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Susannah Gloor April 11, 2011

In Pursuit of Representation: The Effect of Gender Quotas on Legislative Committee Assignments

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Abstract

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Many previous studies on women's substantive representation in legislatures have focused on the effect of gender proportions in Western legislatures. Specifically, many researchers have tested critical mass theory, which states that women must achieve a "critical mass" of descriptive representation before they can work as a force to promote women's interests. However, at least within a Western context, many political scientists have not found evidence to support critical mass theory (Bratton 2005; Carroll 2008; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Reingold 2000). This study aims to test the influence of a gender quota on women's substantive representation, in order to determine whether critical mass theory is true in a quota legislature outside of the Western world. The legislative committee membership of female and male legislators was compared across two legislative assemblies for each of two countries—one with a reserved seats quota (Pakistan) and one without a quota (India). The study concludes that female legislators who benefited from the gender quota in Pakistan were more likely to substantively represent their gender (serve on women's issues committees) than the elected women in both Pakistan and India. However, the quota women were also more likely to serve on power committees and men's issues committees, providing support for the mandate effect as described by Franceschet and Piscopo (2008). Still, the study does not provide evidence to truly support critical mass theory due to a lack of support for the theory across both legislative assemblies.

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INTRODUCTION

Women in legislatures, by the nature of their gender, descriptively represent other women, but do they actually act on behalf of this group? Are they more supportive of women's issues than men? Do they promote legislation that furthers the rights of women? Often, the line between descriptive representation and substantive representation is blurred when women who "stand for" women are automatically assumed to "act for" women as well (Reingold 2000). The need for distinction between the two types of representation has led to research that aims to discern if the number of women in a legislature has any effect on the degree to which they substantively act for their gender (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Bratton 2005; Crowley 2004; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

I decided to add to the discourse by analyzing whether a factor that affects descriptive representation—gender quotas—affects substantive representation as well. Looking at the committee assignments of legislators in a country that operates with a national gender quota (Pakistan) as opposed to a country that has no such provision (India), I was able to find differences among legislative groups on this one measure of substantive representation. Most of these differences confirmed previous conclusions that women are more likely to serve on women's issues committees than men, but the quota element provided an interesting spin on the descriptive representation versus substantive representation discussion. Within my study, quota women more than directly elected women had generally higher percentages of membership on every type of committee I categorized. However, I found that quota women's membership on women's issues committees could have distinctly marginalizing repercussions for these women that are not true for other women in legislatures.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Critical Mass Theory

Thus far, much of the existing research tends to focus on institutional factors that may mediate the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation in the developed world. The main institutional factor analyzed has been the proportion of female representatives within the legislature, and the main theory in Western gender politics studies surrounding this subject is that of critical mass. Critical mass theory is "the popular and compelling notion that increasing the numbers of women in politics will start a chain reaction, leading to a new dynamic favorable to women" (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007, 553). This idea stems from Kanter's 1977 study on group interaction among corporate saleswomen and men. Kanter hypothesized that the proportion of women in a group setting drastically changes the dynamic, thus affecting how those women will behave and how much influence they will have.

For example, "skewed" groups with less than 15% of women will be controlled entirely by the male dominants. Under this condition, the "token" women "are often treated as representatives of their category, as symbols rather than individuals" (Kanter 1977, 966). The ensuing increased visibility, polarization, and feelings of forced assimilation lead to performance pressures, role entrapment, and boundary heightening for women (Kanter 1977, 972), limiting their ability to interact effectively with the dominant members of the group. Women may downplay their differences within the group, trying to "blend unnoticeably into the predominant male culture" (Kanter 1977, 973). Obviously, this behavior would negatively influence the likelihood of female legislators to promote women's interests, which is why many political

scientists have come to associate tokenism with an undermining of women's legitimacy in government. "Token" is often considered a derisive label for female representatives who are only superficially involved in politics because of their gender, not because of their capabilities as politicians. Throughout the course of my research, however, I refer to token women in Kanter's neutral sense—as women who are considered symbolic due to their small numbers but are not necessarily marginalized or lacking authenticity. Instead, these women are labeled tokens to indicate their small numbers and the likelihood that they are associated with their entire gender by others.

In "tilted" group structures, on the other hand, the minority constitutes more than 15% but less than 35% of the population (Kanter 1977, 966). In these settings, the minority members (in this case, women) are seen by dominant members as potential allies and have increased influence. Kanter believes that in gender "balanced" groups—where each subgroup represents 40-60%—"culture and interaction" are more balanced and women can operate as a driving force for their interests, if indeed they have interests in common (Kanter 1977, 966). Kanter's categories suggest that the proportion of women within a group has significant implications for women's behavior and influence. Some political scientists are skeptical, however, having found evidence that "sheer numbers" of women alone do not necessarily make them more active on women's issues (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007).

Contradictory Thoughts on Critical Mass Theory

Bratton (2005), for instance, studied the increasing proportions of women in three state legislatures over 30 years, and concluded that though women were overall more likely than men to sponsor women's interests bills, there is "no evidence that women become more likely to

behave distinctively as the legislature becomes more gender balanced" (111). In fact, women were sometimes more advantaged and likely to pass their sponsored legislation when they existed in smaller proportions within the legislature (Bratton 2005). Crowley (2004) similarly found evidence that women in a smaller minority are more influential in passing women-friendly legislation than female legislators who are on the "cusp of becoming nontokens" (130).

In their analysis of manifestos published by the Conservative Party in the UK, Childs, Webb, and Marthaler (2010) agree with the rejection of critical mass theory by Childs and Krook (2009) on the grounds that "higher numbers of women representatives do not deliver, in any straightforward fashion, women's substantive representation" (201). They propose that variables such as party affiliation, newness to the position, institutional norms, and the external political environment of a country have a stronger influence on female representatives' behavior (Childs, Webb, and Marthaler 2010).

Carroll (2008) similarly states that both institutional and individual-level factors influence women's substantive representation. She found that variables such as the level of professionalization of the legislature, whether a female legislator is a veteran or newcomer, and even the woman's ethnicity all affect the extent to which they serve on "soft issues" committees dealing with education, health and human services, or women's issues, for example (Carroll 2008). Carroll found in her study of gender differences in U.S. state legislative committee assignments in 1988 and 2001 that women are not necessarily stereotyped into certain committee roles at this level (154). While she observed that women were almost twice as likely as men to serve on education and health and human services committees, there was no significant gender difference in 2001 in who served on "prestige," or power, committees (143). Additionally, she stated that in her data, "the proportion of women serving in a legislative chamber is not related in

any consistent way to gender differences in committee assignments," (Carroll 2008, 149). In general, minority women were more likely than both white women and men of all races to serve on the soft issues committees (143), but Carroll concluded that women in general seemed to serve on the committees by choice rather than by marginalization (155). Thus, the personal and political preferences of female legislators also impact the degree of women's substantive representation.

This rejection of critical mass theory is only one side of the discussion, however. Abou-Zeid (2006) found evidence that public attention on token women in Arab countries' parliaments can be hostile and inhibitive of their vocal support for other women, so greater proportions are needed in government before women act on women's or social issues committees. Women might be wary of stepping out and challenging existing practices when "society is staring, waiting for them to falter, and ready to judge" (Abou-Zeid 2006, 186). He claims that instead of asserting themselves as legitimate assets to the legislature, token women may be bullied, harassed, or "puppeted" into acting in accordance with the traditionally male institution (Abou-Zeid 2006, 188).

But even gender diversity and the resulting female activity in legislatures has been interpreted in different ways. For example, Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson (2005) studied the gender composition of Latin American legislatures and how it may spark male legislators' defense of political positions of power. They theorized that "traditionally dominant groups [men] will try to defend their access to limited political resources" (421), and used committee assignments as indicators of these resources. The authors concluded that when the governing party dominates the seats in legislature and has control over committee assignments, women of that party are most likely to be isolated to women's issues committees (Heath,

Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005). They also found that the higher the percentage of women, the more likely that female representatives will be on social issues committees and the less likely they will be assigned to power committees. Unlike Carroll, they interpreted women's presence on women's and social issues committees not as a result of their own preferences or self-propelled representation for their gender, but rather as a sign of marginalization by men in power. The authors' descriptions of the female behavior they observed seems similar to the "role entrapment" of tokens described by Kanter. Interestingly, however, Kanter would not have considered the Latin American women tokens since they held a relatively high proportion of legislative seats.

When these observations are interpreted in a different way, the critical mass of Latin American female legislators could be perceived as facilitating the substantive representation of women (their activity on social issues committees) rather than marginalizing them. This seems to support critical mass theory. Thus, there is more than one line of reasoning that could be used to interpret the phenomenon of women acting on women's issues committees, should this be observed in politics. It is possible that women are relegated to these committees because of their gender in lieu of acting on more prestigious or "power" committees. It is just as likely theoretically that women feel strongly about promoting women's issues or social issues like education and health because of their gender, and are thus not dissatisfied with their committee assignments (Carroll 2008). Perhaps as Bratton (2005) asserts, even when their numbers are small, "women do not have an incentive to avoid focusing on women's issues" (98).

But there is also acknowledgment among researchers of this topic that women are not easily categorized; they are a heterogeneous group, composed of many different female actors whose behavior is influenced by a variety of variables. Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007)

point out that party identification likely has an effect, and "expect that leftwing parties offer sheer numbers of women a better context for promoting women-friendly policies" (557). Moreover, they explain that the intersectionality of other identities with gender can overshadow shared female experiences, so "sheer numbers" of women in legislatures alone may not advance their interests. Reingold (2008) similarly states that the presence and degree of the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation "can and does vary across individuals of all sorts, across institutional and cultural contexts, and over time" (146). Thus, there is acknowledgement that women, like all humans, have individual party affiliations and ideologies, religious views and morals, life experiences and historical backgrounds that may or may not compel them to act for women. For this reason, there are some political scientists who discount the value of attempting to categorize women at all, arguing that "women's concerns are a priori undefined, context related, and subject to evolution" (Childs, Webb, and Marthaler 2010, 202), and that the effect of individual factors far outweighs any collective gender identity among women in political office.

Others point to the importance of the gendered nature of institutions in affecting how legislators act. While acknowledging that individual-level influences such as party identification, ideology, and ethnicity have an effect on the policy preferences of women, Reingold (2008) calls for more study on how institutional factors like party composition, gender proportions, and procedural norms can affect women's behavior as well. If female politicians are in fact predisposed to act for the benefit of women, institutional factors could lead to their isolation or marginalization within a dominant group. Conversely, if women in legislatures are not initially inclined to acting for women, then these institutions may prompt them to reconsider.

These ideas pose problems for discerning a generalizeable theory: how can we predict when women legislators will identify strongly as women and act to promote women's interests, and when they will feel the need to prove their credibility among men and thus align with male-dominated political norms (as critical mass theory suggests is the case for women in "skewed" groups)? Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007) explain that sheer numbers of women may have a proportional impact, a curvilinear impact, an absolute impact, or no impact on the likelihood of legislative women acting for women's interests, and no research yet has isolated the nature of the linkage. Electing more women could help achieve a critical mass that will then band together to act for women, or it might just lead to "electing fewer women motivated by the absence of women in politics to 'act for' other women" (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007, 554). Electing more women would also increase the diversity among female representatives, possibly reducing their ability to cross party, racial, and economic lines to agree on promoting certain women-friendly policies (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007). This debate surrounding positive versus negative implications of pursuing a critical mass of women in legislatures has persisted throughout gender politics research.

Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) present their own reasoning for why political scientists have had such varied conclusions about the importance of the proportion of women in politics for encouraging women's substantive representation. They explain that much of the research to date has conflated two very different aspects of women's substantive representation: substantive representation as process and substantive representation as outcome (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008). Substantive representation as process is when legislators contribute to activities on behalf of women and "feminize" the legislative agenda, such as introducing or sponsoring women's issues bills or putting women's issues on committee agendas (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008,

400). Substantive representation as outcome, however, occurs when women directly change policy outcomes and succeed in adopting women's rights laws (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 421). The problem, the authors argue, is when researchers only study representation as process or representation as outcome, which results in variation among their conclusions about critical mass theory. Studies of legislators' attitudes and behavior often find gender differences in legislatures, while studies focusing on outcomes often find that women's presence has "neither empowered women as political actors nor dramatically transformed public policy" (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 398). So, a focus on process often yields conclusions that are more supportive of critical mass theory than does a focus on legislative outcomes.

Gender Quotas and Substantive Representation

One institutional factor explored by Franceschet and Piscopo as a possible influence on both types of female legislators' substantive representation is that of legislated gender quotas. Quotas have not received much attention in gender politics research, at least partly because of the scarcity of formalized quotas until recently. Between 1930 and 1980, only ten countries had established gender quota provisions, with 12 more being implemented during the 1980s (Krook 2009, 4). In 1995, at the United Nations' Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, the 189 UN member states signed a declaration calling for governments to "take measures to ensure women's equal access and full participation in power structures and decision-making" (Krook 2009, 3). This led to the establishment of gender quotas in 50 more countries over the course of the 1990s (Krook 2009, 4). As of 2006, 40 additional nations have introduced quotas in national parliamentary elections either through constitutional amendment or change in electoral law, and even more have major political parties that have set their own quotas ("Global Database of

Quotas for Women"). As some countries have subsequently taken away their quotas, the total number of nations that currently operate with a quota policy stands at 104 ("Global Database of Quotas for Women").

A main purpose of quotas is to guard against tokenism by ensuring a "critical minority," or critical mass, of women in legislature, usually of about 20-30% (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, 38). In line with this idea, the UN's Economic and Social Council endorsed a global 30% target for women in legislative positions in 1990 (Dahlerup 2006, 6), but the world's current proportion of 19% illustrates that this goal has been unfulfilled ("Global Database of Quotas for Women"). As of this year, only 25 countries have a proportion of female representatives in their legislatures at or above 30% ("Women in National Parliaments").

How then, if at all, can these types of provisions affect how women participate in the legislative body? Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) have ideas about this as well. They state that quotas can have either a "mandate effect" or a "label effect" on women who benefit from them. In a positive sense, gender quotas contribute to women's own perceptions that they are needed because of their "distinctly feminine perspectives," and thus obligated to act in the interests of other women (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 402). In addition, they say that it is possible for women's increased descriptive representation over time to lead to a greater acceptance of women's changing social roles (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 401). A representative who benefits from a quota system may recognize that her identity as a woman was a factor in her election and feel empowered to act in the stereotypical interests of her gender, setting the stage for further political inclusion and positive legislative outcomes for women in the future.

On the other hand, if a quota mandated by the national constitution aids a woman's election to parliament, she may feel less bound to her female constituents and be less likely to

speak out against her male peers for women's rights. These "quota women" may "lack a power base of their own and thus have difficulties using their elected position as they want" (Dahlerup 2006, 14). These female representatives suffer from what Franceschet and Piscopo define as the "label effect," where quotas "create a demeaning belief that 'quota women' are undeserving or underqualified" (402). So, not only will men potentially view these women as less capable, but the quota women as well may attempt to distance themselves from the stigma and be less willing to act for women or ally with their female colleagues (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 404).

Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) point out that some quotas "turn [women] into tokens and leave them relatively powerless, unless the initiative is followed up by massive capacity-building, critique, and support of the many newcomers by women's organizations" (42). With proper implementation, though, quotas may help women overcome some of the barriers to equal political participation by forcing the traditionally male-dominated institutions to seriously recruit women (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). Kanter (1977) summarizes these dichotomous responses by describing a token woman as having two options: she can either minimize her differences with the dominant group, or she can promote herself and her achievements (974). The question, then, is under what circumstances are quotas more or less likely to encourage legislative women to act in the interests of women?

This is why quotas should be explored; they dictate the proportion of women in government, which may have implications for how women will behave and how others in power will react to them. If a country's law requires only 15% of a legislature to be female, will those women operate as lone legislative representatives of their gender and therefore be constrained by the males who control the institution? Is there a possibility that female beneficiaries of quotas will be "clients of the State patron that installed them into office" (About-Zeid 2006, 186)? On

the other hand, if a quota helps build a government with a larger 20-30% female proportion, will those women act as a force to promote women's interests? If some scholars have found through their studies of Western countries that a "shift from being a small to being a large minority (critical mass) is required before women can bring about a change in political culture" (Sawyer 2005, 369), do these findings extend to other areas of the world with less historical female representation?

All of these questions aim to support my claim that while much research has been done to observe the link between women's descriptive and substantive representation (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007; Bratton 2005; Carroll 2008; Crowley 2004; Reingold 2000), the connection between substantive representation and the means by which a woman was elected to office (specifically, whether or not she benefited from a quota system) has been explored less. Krook (2005) calls for future research to address how quota regulations instigate change in political culture, the alliance structure of political assemblies, and the ability for "elected women to perform their job" (42). Furthermore, critical mass theory and other ideas about women's substantive representation should be applied to areas outside of the West. An analysis of quotas as a variable that mediates or alters the legislative institutional context of under-explored regions would then be beneficial to understanding if and when women in these areas act for other women.

HYPOTHESES

Forms of Quota Provisions

Before hypothesizing how I expect quotas to affect women's substantive representation in national legislatures, it is necessary to outline the different types of quotas that exist. Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires summarize the three main formats quotas can take in "Gender Quotas and Models of Political Citizenship" (2009). They explain that party quotas are voluntary pledges by individual parties to nominate a specific percentage of women. Party quotas for aspirants indicate the percentage of women who must be considered as nominees for a political position, while candidate party quotas mandate that parties select a certain percentage of women based on the final list of candidates. Party quotas, whether they are targeted towards aspirants or candidates, are the most common type of formal quota among Western developed countries. By contrast, legislative quotas encompass a requirement dictated by the legislature that all participating parties nominate a certain proportion of women representatives for election (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009). Thirty-two countries currently employ a legislative quota in the single or lower house of their legislature, sometimes (but not always) in addition to voluntary party quotas ("Global Database of Quotas for Women"). Lastly, reserved seats gender quotas are spaces in political assemblies that men are barred from contesting, making only women eligible for the seats. Sixteen nations—all located in areas of Africa, the Arab region, or South Asia—operate under a reserved seats system (Dahlerup 2006, 294), and only three also have major parties that use voluntary quotas ("Global Database of Quotas for Women"). Legislative quotas and reserved seats are stipulated through a constitutional amendment, the electoral law of the country, or both ("Global Database of Quotas for Women").

Apart from these three formal quota measures, Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires also acknowledge the influence of a fourth, informal quota. "Soft" quotas, articulated by individual parties themselves or by legislatures as a whole, encourage but do not mandate that parties promote the selection of more female candidates to create a "gender balance" among political representatives. This is the most common quota practice of all in the West, since it is a way of promoting informal target proportions in legislatures but does not provoke accusations of unequal treatment that accompanies other affirmative action-type measures. While I recognize the influence of soft quotas in many countries on benefiting women throughout the electoral process, for the purposes of my study I am going to focus on the effect of a more institutionalized quota on women's substantive representation. I limit my research in this way for a number of reasons.

First, soft quotas are hard to identify and rarely occur outside of developed nations (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009). They also cannot be compared easily to hard quotas. Soft quotas cannot be measured concretely since they rely on undocumented "recommendations" and "suggestions," whereas hard quotas are easily identifiable and articulated through party doctrine, national legislation, or the constitution. And even where soft quotas are recognized, their strength in some countries cannot be estimated relative to their strength in others. A certain number of recommendations of preferred candidates might lead to the successful nomination of those candidates in one nation, when in a different country much more coercion or suggestion would be needed for the same outcome. In these types of cases, how can the strength and effectiveness of an informal, ungrounded quota be analyzed? To accurately measure the impact of quota usage in my study as did Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires, I chose one country that has a quota stipulated in its constitution and electoral law, and one country that does not have any

quota provisions. The presence or absence of any soft quota practices is subjective, and therefore not taken into account here. Instead, I focus only on the influence of a reserved seats quota.

Implications of a Reserved Seats Quota

Limiting my study to one of the three types of formal quotas helps to control for other possible influences on substantive representation. Specifically, reserved seats quotas are an interesting area of inquiry because of the radical nature of their imposition; these are quotas that enable the president or top executives to set aside seats for only women to fill, either through an election among specifically chosen female candidates or by appointment of women to the seats directly. In such a top-down system, the quota mechanism may be less likely to empower women in the interests of their gender (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 403). As suggested in a explanation of the reserved seats quota in Pakistan, "Those who are directly elected will most likely treat women in reserved seats in the provincial and national assemblies as second class members. With their own constituencies as mass base, will [directly elected women] be able to respond more effectively to their [constituencies'] needs?" (Reyes 2002, 5). This is an important consideration.

Legislative and voluntary quotas are often articulated in a gender-neutral way, stating that neither gender can have more than 60% or less than 40% of the legislative candidates (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). When this is the case, "the question of stigmatization of the elected woman ('elected just because you are a woman') is not relevant, since both men and women are there as a result of the quota" (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005, 38). But reserved seats quotas are inherently biased due to their specific provision of seats to women, so I also consider the fact that

the more biased the wording of the quota, the greater the possibility of an extreme influence, either positive or negative, on female legislators' behavior. For example, reserved seats are sometimes filled after an election (Krook 2009), which could increase a female representative's perception that she is a symbol of gender equality rather than a politician with a broad electoral base—increasing the obligation she feels toward acting in the interests of her gender. As a result, quota women without a solid connection to an electorate may also feel pressured disproportionately into acting as token women.

On the other hand, the increased association of reserved seats women with their gender as a whole could also pave the way for the label effect described by Franceschet and Piscopo (2008). Especially in the case of a reserved seats quota country, legislative seats are actually "labeled" as belonging to someone of the feminine gender. This may lead to a stronger reactionary response among female legislators to curtail their activity for stereotypical women's issues in order to negate the label. Both the mandate effect and this label effect are equally plausible—another reason why reserved seats quotas are an interesting subject for exposition.

Reserved seats are most commonly employed in the Middle East, South Asia, and parts of Africa ("Global Database of Quotas for Women"), which are all counted as developing regions. The pattern suggests that "there may in fact be region-specific 'repertoires' of female representation" (Krook 2009, 28). A focus on reserved seats quotas, then, automatically controls for the possibly influential variable of the regions' repertoires of shared routines, isolating the study of critical mass theory to a less developed and culturally distinct area rather than the oft-researched, industrialized West. While variation still exists in the East, eliminating Western nations from the study at least guards against comparing countries at the most opposite ends of the political and cultural spectrum.

In addition, analyzing reserved seats rather than voluntary party quotas, for example, may help reduce the possibility that a legislator's felt obligation to the political party that nominated her will eclipse possible gender loyalty. When full responsibility for the selection of candidates is given to a few party leaders, "legislators' need for future resources ensures party discipline, thereby undermining legislator autonomy" (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 401). Krook (2009) echoes the concern about strong party loyalty, explaining that "political elites adopt quotas for strategic reasons, generally related to competition with other parties" (9). If a female legislator's party has ulterior motives for either implementing a quota voluntarily or putting certain women on the ballot, these could overshadow women's ability to be outspoken for their interests. I recognize that in some situations a high-ranking official such as the president often nominates or appoints quota women in reserved seats legislatures, leading legislators to still feel an obligation to the majority party of the legislature or the party of the president. Regardless, in a reserved seats system the legislature determines the distribution of reserved seats across all parties, providing consistency. By contrast, in a voluntary party quota system each party decides its own level of female representation.

Statement of Hypotheses

Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) warn against using only one indicator to "capture" women's substantive representation. They argue that substantive representation has two parts—process and outcome—so using the measure of just one variable to determine the extent of women acting for women is simplistic. They cite this oversimplification as one reason for the difference in conclusions about critical mass (Franceschet and Piscopo 2008, 398). Due to constraints on time and data availability, I had to rely on just one measure of process to indicate

women's substantive representation in this study. Still, as previously discussed, a measure of process is more likely than a measure of outcome to result in findings that support critical mass theory. Therefore, the one measure that I chose to study is nevertheless the better choice for studying possible mediating effects of gender quotas on critical mass.

Though I consider women's membership and leadership in women's issues committees a sign of them substantively representing other women, I acknowledge that this is far from the only indicator of legislators' attitudes and behavior. I also look at membership on men's issues committees and power committees, in the hope that an analysis of all three categories will help provide some insight into the influence of quotas on women's legislative behavior and status. My hypotheses thus address the possibility of differences in categorical committee membership between women who benefit from reserved seats quotas and directly elected legislators of both sexes.

H1: Female representatives chosen through a reserved seats system will be more likely to be members on or chair "women's issues" legislative committees than similarly situated male representatives within the same legislature.

H2: Female representatives chosen through a reserved seats system will be less likely to be members on or chair "power" legislative committees than similarly situated male representatives within the same legislature.

H3: Female representatives chosen through a reserved seats system will be less likely to be members on or chair "men's issues" legislative committees than similarly situated male representatives within the same legislature.

H4: Female representatives chosen through a reserved seats system will be more likely to be members on or chair "women's issues" legislative committees than directly elected female representatives within the same legislature.

H5: Female representatives chosen through a reserved seats system will be less likely to be members on or chair "power" legislative committees than directly elected female representatives within the same legislature.

H6: Female representatives chosen through a reserved seats system will be less likely to be members on or chair "men's issues" legislative committees than directly elected female representatives within the same legislature.

H7: Female representatives chosen through a reserved seats system will be more likely to be members on or chair "women's issues" legislative committees than female representatives in a legislature without a quota.

H8: Female representatives chosen through a reserved seats system will be less likely to be members on or chair "power" legislative committees than female representatives in a legislature without a quota.

H9: Female representatives chosen through a reserved seats system will be less likely to be members on or chair "men's issues" legislative committees than female representatives in a legislature without a quota.

Finding results that confirm H1, H4, and H7 could indicate either a mandate effect or a label effect at work. According to the mandate effect, I would expect to observe a greater likelihood of membership on women's issues committees if a legislator were chosen through a gender quota system because quotas emphasize the importance of including "distinctly feminine perspectives" within the legislature. Women chosen through this system would have a stronger identity as women, and thus would act on women's issues committees more than women elected without specific attention to their gender. With quota women filling the trademark female role, elected women might feel less of a mandate to address women's issues. A label effect also results in increased women's substantive representation for quota women, but for different reasons. In the presence of this effect, quota women would be labeled as unqualified and marginalized to women's issues committees at greater rates than the supposedly more legitimate, elected women. This is because male legislators would perceive women who had been through a non-quota election as more politically competent than those who had been appointed.

Therefore, I will only be able to determine which effect is at work in my sample based on the results of testing the hypotheses addressing power and men's issues committees (H2, H3, H5, H6, H8, and H9). Under the mandate effect, quota women feel obligated or empowered to act on behalf of women's interests, but they do not necessarily do this at the expense of other political activity. If the mandate effect is the explanation for quota women's substantive representation, I

would not necessarily observe many differences between quota women's and other legislators' membership on power or men's issues committees. But under a label effect, male legislators "may respond to women's [political] presence by establishing a gendered division of labor," (Franceschet and Piscopo, 2008, 413), relegating women to women's issues committees and keeping them off of prestigious ones. Quota women would thereby serve on fewer power or men's issues committees than men (H2, H3) and women elected without the benefit of a quota (H5, H6, H8, H9).

I might also observe all categories of women excluded from power or men's issues committees if the theory of Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson (2005) holds true; the general presence of women in legislatures may threaten male dominance and lead to the marginalization of all women to women's issues committees at the expense of prestigious committees, regardless of their quota status. This line of reasoning contradicts H5, H6, H8, and H9. Examining the implications of these effects helps me understand the theory behind the observations I make from my own data.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Independent Variable—Presence or Absence of a Quota

Using the Global Database of Quotas for Women, I identified the specific countries that currently employ reserved seats quotas only. A search on this variable yields 14 countries: the population from which I chose my case study. Of these, Pakistan is the only country with any accessible, comprehensive information about its parliamentary members, found mainly through

its website for the National Assembly (lower house of Parliament) and the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. The other 13 countries either did not have information on legislative officials—possibly due to national political instability and a lack of record keeping—or did not provide information in English.

Pakistan adopted a reserved seats quota recently in 2002, through an amendment to Article 51 of its Constitution ("Global Database of Quotas for Women"). The quota mandates 60 seats for women in the National Assembly, which amounts to 17%—far from the 30% that has been repeatedly called for by women's advocacy groups such as the Pakistan Commission on the Status of Women (Krook 2009, 74). Information from the Inter-Parliamentary Union shows that women's descriptive representation in Pakistan's Parliament greatly increased in the first election after the establishment of the reserved seats quota, from 2.3% in 1997 to 21.6% in 2002 ("Parline Database"). Besides allotting a certain number of seats for women in Parliament, the Pakistani amendment substantiates a reserved seats system that operates through nomination rather than by direct election.

This characteristic is another reason why Pakistan is an ideal case for my study. In this country, women are nominated for the reserved seats based on the proportion of the popular vote each party received in the general election. Under such a system, "the nominated women lack both a mandate and a power base because they are not elected from a constituency," but instead are dependent on nominations from men (Suri 2007, 113). Limited connection to an electorate—and the resulting lack of popular consensus to support these women—may lead to marginalization within the legislature and very few committee assignments overall, despite the increase in proportion of women achieved with the quota. Reserved seats women will likely be found mainly on women's issues committees, in which case quota-induced critical mass could be

increasing the process of women's substantive representation in the Pakistan National Assembly through the label effect.

In order to more extensively analyze the quota's implications on women's substantive representation and the application of critical mass theory in a reserved seats country, I needed to analyze it alongside a similar country that does not currently have a quota. India has a history of debating the use of reserved seats, although the government never ended up implementing this type of provision nationally. Britain attempted to use this method during colonization to increase the proportion of Indian women in national government, but it was rejected repeatedly by the men in political power. Today, both Pakistan and India have similar 30% quotas for women in local government; India has no such national policy, so its legislative proportion of women stands at less than 9%. Even though both countries now have very different levels of female representation in their national legislatures, they have similarities that make their comparison interesting. In fact, I am not the first to specifically research them side by side. Krook (2009) cites their shared colonial past and histories of reserved seats proposals as justification for her analysis of why Pakistan ultimately accepted a national quota but India did not (57).

Besides cultural similarities that are the result of once being the same country under the same colonizer, India and Pakistan are comparable on other factors of gender equality and economic development. According to the UN Development Programme's Human Development Index—a summary measure of average achievements in a country based on its population's capacity for a long and healthy life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living ("Human Development Reports")—both Pakistan and India are categorized as "medium human development" countries ("Human Development Indices and Its Components"). Under this worldwide ranking, Pakistan is listed at 141 and India is ranked 134. Evaluating women's

disadvantage in terms of reproductive health, empowerment, and the labor market in both nations results in ranked scores on UNDP's Gender Inequality Index of 125 for Pakistan and 119 for India ("Human Development Indices and Its Components"). In addition, the Gross National Income, Purchasing Power Parity estimates per capita for both countries are alike at $2,960 in Pakistan and $2,700 in India as of 2008, and these amounts increased at similar rates over the course of the past ten years ("World Development Indicators 2009").

However, Pakistan and India do have notable differences in the strength of their democracies. According to the Polity IV Project, a 21-point scale from -10 to 10 for comparing government regimes throughout the world, Pakistan had a polity score of 5 and India had a score of 9 in 2008 (Polity IV Project). This places Pakistan on the democratic end of the category of "anocracies" (-5 to 5) and labels India as a "fully institutionalized democracy" (6 to 10). It is important to note also that Pakistan's score increased by three units from 2007 to 2008, so it was improving democratically over the course of the time period I studied. India's score stayed the same. Even though these two countries have different polity scores, they are not so different on the corresponding 2009 State Fragility Index (Polity IV Project). This index rates countries' security, political, economic, and social fragility. On a scale from 0 (no fragility) to 25 (extreme fragility), Pakistan is 16 and India is 13. The two countries are obviously not identical in terms of democratic strength, but these measures indicate to me that they are similar enough for a comparison of women's legislative representation to be worthwhile.

Furthermore, Pakistan's lower Polity score and a lower ranking on the Human Development Index list is actually a prime condition for my study. These measures indicate lower levels of progressiveness and democracy, which often coincide with greater levels of discrimination and gender disparity in a country. Because Pakistan is less developed and

democratic than India according to these measures, it is already at a disadvantage for female representation in legislature. If I observe greater levels of women's substantive representation in Pakistan, any conclusions I then draw about critical mass theory and gender quotas are strong because they occurred under unfavorable conditions.

I examined the proportion of female representatives both before and after the quota in Pakistan began (with the 2002 elections), observing India over a similar period. A time-series analysis is valuable because legislative representation exists within ever-changing institutional contexts and political climates, which then influence the degree and extent to which legislators' behavior varies over time (Reingold 2008). I initially set out to analyze the men and women elected to the lower house of Parliament of each country at four points throughout a relatively similar time period. For Pakistan, this time period encompassed two elections before the reserved seats quota began and two elections post-quota, when the representation of women had substantially increased ("Parline Database"). This resulted in a 15-year span, from 1993 to 2008. For India, the four elections fell between 1998 and 2009, an 11-year period. In both cases, I aimed to scrutinize the elected and appointed members for all four elections to help evaluate women's substantive representation in each legislative situation.

	Pakistan	India
2009		59/10.8%
2008	76/22.2%	
2004		45/8.26%
2002	74/21.6%	
1999		49/8.99%
1998		44/8.1%
1997	5/2.3%	
1993	4/1.8%	

However, the information I sought on Pakistani members' legislative activity—their committee assignments and chairs—was unavailable for the 10th and 11th legislative assemblies (elected in years 1993 and 1997, respectively). Each of these pre-quota assemblies contained 217 directly elected legislators, including four women in 1993 and five women in 1997 ("Parline Database"). In order to find the relevant information, I pursued sources such as the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, National Assembly Secretary Mr. Karamat Hussain Niazi, the Women's Parliamentary Caucus of the National Assembly, and other prominent researchers of comparative legislatures and gender politics. Unfortunately, I was unsuccessful (see Appendix). Still, because of the small proportions of female representation in these two assemblies, the data on committee assignments would have been scant even if I had obtained it.

The comparison of Pakistan and India incorporates an institutional level of control in the study, which is important for several reasons. Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires (2009) find in their analysis of "Gender Quotas and Models of Political Citizenship" that "differences across these four models of political citizenship suggest that quota debates are likely to take distinct forms and experience varying rates of success, depending on how particular proposals mesh with reigning or emerging political norms" (791). The models of citizenship of which they speak are the varying degrees of liberalism or conservatism that are present within the country's political bodies. So, the importance of the prevailing political system in a country is influential for the type of quota the country adopts (if one is actually adopted) and perhaps for how well it is received and operates. The Pakistani and Indian legislatures both have many political parties and utilize the same direct, majority, single-member districts electoral procedure. The similarity in operation makes this comparison ideal.

I also control for party ideology at the individual level. In order to understand the committee membership of reserved seats women in Pakistan, these legislators need to be analyzed alongside directly elected women and men within the same legislature as well as those in India, a country without any national reserved seats provisions. This is an attempt to isolate the effect of the reserved seats quota on the women who benefit from it and how it may change their parliamentary roles. In addition, all women in the sample need to be compared against a sample of their male counterparts in order to determine if the female representatives' behavior actually diverges any from the "standard" behavior in their own legislative context. Since in both the Pakistani and Indian legislatures the men overwhelmingly outnumber the women, I chose a matched sample of men to include in my dataset. I gathered information about the female representatives of both countries and used it to choose a sample of men that mirrored the women in the same legislature (during the same legislative session) on a number of characteristics: number, party identification, and state.

I felt it was important to keep the number of representatives consistent because it makes comparing proportions and numbers of assignments to specific committees simpler. I therefore chose one man with the same party and state for each female representative. In both Pakistan and India, states are sub-national units that are each allotted a certain number of representatives to elect to the lower house of legislature. In the case of Pakistan, the 60 reserved seats for women in the National Assembly are divided among the states (also called provinces) according to population proportions.

I only diverged from the process of matching each female representative with a similarly situated male representative when no man existed to match a woman in the equivalent party/state configuration—a situation that occurred only eight times, in the data for India. In these cases,

two men were chosen to "match" the woman—one of the same party as her and one from the same state. As previously stated, Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007) articulate that a representative's party has an effect on his or her beliefs and opinion, causing the legislator to do more work for issues that are seen as priorities by the party. Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson (2005) also concluded that individual-level factors like party are important in determining which women are likely to be marginalized onto women's and social issues committees, but these are far from the only effects (433). Other variables such as legislators' educational backgrounds and past political experience can also influence committee assignments, but this information was unavailable for every legislator in the National Assembly.

Therefore, I selected the male samples for Pakistan and India with regard to the party identification of the individual female members of parliament, so that the resulting samples would have similar proportions of liberal- and conservative-leaning legislators. And since geography can affect the culture and belief systems of the people who live there, I considered it beneficial to have the same breakdown of representatives from each state in the female and male samples. Combining all of my samples of legislators across two assemblies for each of the two countries, I ended up with a dataset of 525 legislators and their committee assignments.

Dependent Variable—Committee Assignments

Analysis of gender differences in legislatures is not new, especially with regard to political systems in the developed democracies of the West. Many researchers have studied the preferences of male and female legislators for certain issue areas to determine if and where men and women differ (Carroll 2008; Dolan and Ford 1997; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Reingold 2000; Swers 2008; Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991). Even

though a similar depth of study has not been applied to the Pakistani or Indian legislatures specifically, I use the accepted definitions for women's and men's issues developed throughout Western-based research to analyze women's activities for my study. When combined with an examination of the workings of committee systems in Pakistan and India, I used already established criteria to categorize their legislative committees in four ways.

I followed the research design of Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson (2005), believing that women's service on different types of committees speaks to their role and status within the legislature. These authors organized the committees of Latin American legislatures into the four categories of "women's issues," "social issues," "economics and foreign affairs issues," and "power." I coded committees in Pakistan and India slightly differently. I aimed to distinguish women's issues from men's issues, but I also wanted to take into account the relative prestige of each committee to try to uncover if quota women or directly elected women (or both) were being included or excluded from powerful committees at different rates than their male counterparts.

Because I studied committee assignments over time, I attempted to keep my analysis as consistent as possible despite the natural changes that occur within the committee systems of both legislatures. Ad hoc committees are transitory, so I suspected that legislators would have different perceptions of them than of permanent standing committees. Furthermore, the changing and inconsistent nature of ad hoc committees gave me reservations about comparing their influence with that of standing committees—whose work is continuous—and about comparing ad hoc committees cross-nationally. Both India's Lok Sabha and Pakistan's National Assembly operate with a large number of small, permanent committees with a few members each (Masood 2004, 19), so there are opportunities for committee membership in a number of

specific issue areas. Therefore, I recorded membership and leadership in only permanent committees in Pakistan and India.

There are three types of committees in the National Assembly. Ministry related standing committees, of which there are currently 34, are associated with a division of the government. These are also sometimes called Committees of the Assembly, and are generally considered important due to their permanence and ties to a ministry (Masood 2004). They are each allotted 17 members (including the chairperson), though the actual number often ranges due to popularity ("National Assembly of Pakistan"). The ministry related standing committees have changed over the years to respond to shifts in the different ministries' scopes. Some committees have incorporated others of a similar issue area, while some have broken into multiple committees. For example, in the 12th assembly (elected in 2002), there were separate committees on Finance and Revenue and on Planning and Development. By 2008, however, the two combined into one ministry related standing committee on Finance, Revenue, and Planning and Development. By contrast, the committee in existence in 2002 on Law, Justice, and Human Rights split into the committee on Law and Justice and the committee on Human Rights in order to address these distinct issues separately from 2008 onward.

On the other hand, the two non-departmental standing committees in Pakistan's National Assembly have not changed. The committee on Public Accounts has 19 members, and deals with the appropriation of sums granted for the government's expenditure (Masood 2004, 11). The committee on Government Assurances holds 16 members, and scrutinizes the promises and assurances of the government given by those in the ministries (Masood 2004, 11). The final category for House (or Domestic) committees includes the committees on Rules of Procedure and Privileges, House and Library, and Business Advisory (Masood 2004, 13). The Business

Advisory committee is also called the Finance Committee of the National Assembly and is chaired by the Speaker of the House; it addresses "the time that should be allocated for the stage-wise discussion of Government Bills and other business" (Masood 2004, 13) rather than hard financial issues, which are covered in the other finance committees.

The Lok Sabha is organized in a fairly similar way, also with three categories of permanent committees, most of them associated with a ministry. The three financial committees "are by common consent the most important and influential of all the parliamentary committees. In general, they are expected to keep a vigil over government spending and performance" (Kashyap 1979, 308). These include the committees on Public Accounts, Public Undertakings, and Estimates. The Estimates committee holds the most members (30) of any in the lower house of Parliament ("Committees of Lok Sabha").

The second category encompasses the departmentally related standing committees, whose members are elected by the Speaker of Lok Sabha and have the responsibility of overseeing the activity of their corresponding government ministry ("Committees of Lok Sabha"). As in Pakistan, the Indian legislature underwent an increase in the number of departmentally related standing committees over the course of the early 2000s. By the most recent assembly in 2009, 24 of these existed. As in Pakistan, these newer committees were usually created to mirror the splitting of a ministry into two ministries that had previously addressed a multifaceted subject matter. For example, the Urban Development committee and the Rural Development committee were created out of the Urban and Rural Development committee. Initially, I had assigned the later committees the same code as the original committee due to their focus on similar issues, but created a separate variable for each committee. This was to take into account the changing specification of committees' purview and to remain consistent with how I approached the

differing committees over time in Pakistan's legislature. However, after narrowing my sample to just the two most recent legislative assemblies for each country, many of these older committees were no longer included in my data on Indian legislators' committee assignments.

Currently, the leader of the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of India's legislature) appoints members to eight of the departmentally related standing committees, and the remaining 16 are within the jurisdiction of the Lok Sabha Speaker ("Committees of Lok Sabha"). Still, each departmentally related standing committee has members from each house—21 from the Lok Sabha and ten from the Rajya Sabha. Since I confine my study to the lower houses of legislature in Pakistan and India, I looked at the committee membership of Lok Sabha legislators only, regardless of whether the committee was listed under the jurisdiction of the upper or lower house.

The remaining committees in India's Lok Sabha are classified under the third category, as "other parliamentary standing committees" ("Committees of Lok Sabha"). Depending on the committee, these address a variety of subject matters ranging from administrative parliamentary tasks to behavior and conduct within the legislature (Chavan 2003). Upon gaining this understanding of the legislative setup and responsibilities of different committees in the National Assembly and the Lok Sabha, I used existing research about committee classifications to code each committee dichotomously on each of the four categories of women's issues, men's issues, power, and weakness.

Identifying Women's Issues

"Women's issues" is a category that encompasses the policies that are generally considered to arise from women's traditional roles as caregivers. How and if women represent

their gender through political activity can be manifested in a number of ways, and defining what constitutes "women's interests" requires a certain degree of subjectivity. The definition constructed by Childs, Webb, and Marthaler (2010) for the concept is "those [interests] traditionally associated with women (such as child care and the family), or those with a 'feminist accent' (such as abortion or domestic violence)" (202). Bratton (2005) combined the approaches of many political scientists to come up with the broad classification that "women's interest legislation includes bills that directly address and seek to improve women's economic, political, and social status" (107). Similarly, Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007) defined their variable of "women-friendly public policy" as a specific type of policy "advanced by women's organizations that both addresses issues that affect women exclusively and directly and that simultaneously advances their status in society" (556). Even though they recognized that "what it means to be successful on behalf of women's interests is governed by dynamics of culture and history" (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007, 554), they pointed out that political scientists have come to accept a general definition for the issue despite the influence of women's differing intersectional identities across nations. Thus, Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007) operationalized the "women's issues" variable in their study by evaluating any legislation that liberalized divorce and reproductive rights, equalized civil rights for men and women, and specifically addressed women's health care, for example (556).

Taking all of these into account, my category of "women's issues" includes any issues that are associated with education, social welfare (especially that of families and children), and health care (Carroll 2008; Thomas and Welch 1991; Dolan and Ford 1998). Carroll (2008) also addresses women's rights in her definition, and others specifically consider home maintenance and other "private sphere" issues unique to women (Thomas 1994; Thomas and Welch 1991).

Taking cues from these definitions, I classified 13 current committees within Pakistan's National Assembly and eight committees within India's Lok Sabha as dealing with women's issues.

The committees on Women Development; Social Welfare and Special Education; Education; Health; Population Welfare; Minorities; and Human Rights were all coded under the women's issues category, as they all specifically speak to welfare, health, and a desire for social improvement. The committee on Inter-Provincial Coordination addresses social or administrative issues in each Pakistani province that have implications for the country overall ("Official Gateway to the Government of Pakistan"), so it was included as well. The Religious Affairs committee aids the related ministry in ensuring the welfare and safety of those making religious pilgrimages outside of Pakistan and in organizing activities for the promotion of Islam ("Official Gateway to the Government of Pakistan"). The committee on Zakat and Ushr similarly aims to "provide for the implementation of Islamic precepts" ("Zakat and Ushr Ordinance" 1980, 1) by working for the fulfillment of Zakat and Ushr, two principles in Islam that focus on assisting the "needy, indigent, and poor" through traditional almsgiving ("Official Gateway to the Government of Pakistan"). These two committees were originally one, named the committee on Religious Affairs, Zakat, and Ushr, but were separated and each given their own legislative purview during the most recent legislative assembly. Since my dataset spans this committee alteration, I gave each of the three committees their own variable but coded them the same, under women's issues. A similar split occurred with the Culture, Sports, and Youth Affairs committee that was present in the 12th Assembly. In this case, I coded the original committee under women's issues—since it addresses social issues and children (Carroll 2008; Dolan and Ford 1998)—but coded the resulting three committees created in 2008 in different ways based on their focus. The Culture committee and Youth Affairs committee were both

categorized as dealing with women's issues. The House and Library committee is a domestic committee that advises on the availability of references within the House Library and also addresses personal amenities for members, so it was coded under women's issues because of its association with education and caretaking.

For obvious reasons, the Lok Sabha committees on Social Justice and Empowerment, Health and Family Welfare, Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, and Empowerment of Women fit the criteria due to their focus on the social welfare and protection of families, minorities, and women. The committee on Human Resource Development considers policies addressing youth affairs and sports as well as women and child development ("Committees of Lok Sabha"). The House and Library committees exist to help with administrative, maintenance, and education tasks that are considered within the women's realm (Carroll 2008; Thomas and Welch 1991), such as supervising residential accommodations, food, and other amenities for Lok Sabha members and advising on the selection of books and reference services for the legislative Library ("Committees of Lok Sabha"). The last committee under this category is Food, Consumer Affairs, and Public Distribution, which includes advising India's Public Distribution System to increase food security for the poor ("Committees of Lok Sabha")—very much a program of welfare.

Identifying Men's Issues

By contrast, "men's issues" are mainly those that concern money—including business, commerce, finance, budgeting, and economic affairs (Carroll 2008; Reingold 2000; Thomas and Welch 1991). Economic development goes along with this, so I labeled committees dealing with industry as men's issues committees. I also consider issues of foreign policy to be in this

category. Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson (2005) specifically distinguish between women's issues on the one hand and economics and foreign affairs issues committees on the other (434), which leads to the natural association of foreign affairs with men's issues. In addition, Swers (2007) points out that it has been proven that male politicians are more likely than their female counterparts to support military action and increased defense spending even when political ideology is taken into account (561). To contrast the private sphere issues that are associated with women, other issues considered within the domain of men are those that are stereotypically public in nature, such as community protection, security, and regulation (Kathlene, Clarke, and Fox 1991, 35). Additionally, tourism, agriculture, and rural concerns are associated with men (Reingold 2000, 290).

Following the relationship between men and money issues that has been established through previous research, I coded Pakistan's ministry related standing committees of Commerce; Economic Affairs and Statistics; Finance, Revenue, and Planning and Development; Industries and Production; Textile Industry; Petroleum and Natural Resources; Privatization and Investment; and Public Accounts as addressing men's issues. The Planning and Development committee and the Finance and Revenue committee that existed in the 12th assembly before combining into one committee in 2008 were each similarly categorized as men's issues. The same held true for the Industries committee and the Production committee. The Railways committee deals with appropriations of funds for the functioning of the railway transportation system, so I included it in this category as well. Based on other criteria for men's issues previously stated, I included the committees on Defense; Defense Production; Foreign Affairs; Food and Agriculture; Livestock and Dairy Development; Labor and Manpower; Law and Justice; Narcotics Control; and Tourism. The Housing and Works committee coordinates city

works and budgeting, while helping with the "acquisition and development of sites as well as construction and maintenance of Federal Government buildings" ("Official Gateway to the Government of Pakistan"), so it was coded as addressing men's issues. The Sports committee that arose from the Culture, Sports and Youth Affairs committee was categorized as a men's issues committee contrary to its counterparts. Finally, I included committees dealing with public security and control in specific areas of Pakistan, such as those on Interior; Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan; and State and Frontier Regions.

In India, the committees addressing money and government finances were most clearly categorized as men's issues. This included the three financial committees of the Lok Sabha—Estimates, Public Accounts, and Public Undertakings—as well as the committees on Finance and Commerce. Like in Pakistan, the Indian committee on Railways also has a large stake in the appropriation of sums used specifically for the railways (an important and valued form of transportation in the country) so this committee was listed under men's issues. Based on classifications from others' research, I coded the Indian committees on Agriculture; Chemicals and Fertilizers; Coal and Steel; Defense; Industry; Labor; and Petroleum and Natural Gas as men's issues. While I generally associate culture with women's issues (and did in fact code the applicable Pakistani committee as such), the inclusion of culture on the committee for Transport, Tourism, and Culture did not sway me from listing it as a men's issues committee. Reingold (2000) listed tourism as a men's issue when analyzing the policy preferences of California and Arizona state legislators, and both tourism and transportation have large economic impacts that would presumably be important to men. The Lok Sabha has no committee on foreign policy, but it does have committees on External Affairs and Home Affairs. External Affairs deal with India's role in the United Nations and relations with Pakistan, for example, while the Home

Affairs committee has a similar purview as the Interior committee does in Pakistan. Categorizing these committees as men's issues committees brings the total number classified in this group to 16.

Classifying Power Committees

Many political scientists agree that committees dealing with issues of finance, appropriations, revenue, commerce, and budgeting—generally, the "money issues"—are prestigious or hold more power in the legislature (Carroll 2008; Dolan and Ford 1997; Gertzog 1976; Swers 2008; Thomas and Welch 1991). This could be one reason why men are attracted to them. In addition, foreign affairs, particularly when in conjunction with defense or armed services, is considered a power issue area (Bullock 1976; Carroll 2008; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005; Swers 2008). When coding power committees in Latin American legislatures, Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson (2005) enlisted the help of experts within each country rather than relying solely on an analysis of existing research. Through this approach, they found that in some countries, committees with a high number of members indicated prestige. For example, if a committee held more than 20 members in Venezuela it was considered by the expert source to be powerful (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005, 434). The authors also acknowledged in their classifications that committees where the leader of the legislature acted as chairperson were often more powerful (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

The National Assembly has ten current committees that I classified as particularly prestigious or powerful. The committees on Public Accounts; Commerce; Economic Affairs and Statistics; and Finance, Revenue, and Planning and Development were all categorized this way

based on their heavy focus on money, appropriations, and overseeing government expenditures. The Business Advisory committee decides which government business should be discussed in the legislature and is responsible for allocating time accordingly (Masood 2004, 13). It is one of the few National Assembly committees that is allotted more than 17 members (it is given 19). It even exceeds this legislated number in the current assembly ("National Assembly of Pakistan")—a possible indication that the committee is popular and thus prestigious in the eyes of members of parliament. Additionally, the Speaker of the House acts as its chairperson. Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson (2005) cited both of these characteristics as potential indicators of a power committee. The committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges has 22 members, more than any other committee, and, like the Business Advisory committee, is responsible for examining questions of privilege and conduct referred to it (Masood 2004, 13). It determines "whether a breach of privilege is involved for every question of privilege referred…by the Assembly," (Masood 2004, 33). Its broad authority and large membership led me to classify it as powerful. The committees on Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior were also given this classification. Defense Production, however, was not; it helps coordinate a "base for self-reliance in the production of defense stores and materials" ("Official Gateway to the Government of Pakistan") but does not deal with policy pertaining to forces engaged in the defense of Pakistan, as does the Defense committee. Based on the wide acceptance of the judiciary and law as power issues (Carroll 2008; Dolan and Ford 1997; Kathlene, Clarke, and Fox 1991), I categorized the Law and Justice committee from the current assembly as a power committee. This committee was created from the Law, Justice, and Human Rights committee of earlier legislatures, which I coded similarly as a power committee and include in my data even though it only existed in the legislature elected in 2002.

In the Lok Sabha, the three financial committees are widely regarded the most powerful committees (Chavan 2003; Kashyap 1979; Longley and Davidson 1998). Whereas not all of the committees in the Indian lower house of legislature have the ability to closely inspect government activity, "Such scrutiny is provided in the Lok Sabha by three financial committees—the Public Accounts Committee, the Estimates Committee, and the Committee on Public Undertakings. These are the most important standing committees in the Lok Sabha…" (Longley and Davidson 1998, 245). I thus classified these three, plus the money-oriented committees of Finance; Commerce; and the Joint Committee on Salaries and Allowances of Parliament, as power committees. Though this latter committee is a smaller committee of only ten members and is listed under the administrative issue area (Chavan 2003, 25), which is often associated more with women, it makes rules for appropriating allowances to members of parliament for traveling, their constituencies, and pensions, for example ("Committees of Lok Sabha"). Following the evidence found that foreign affairs and military related issues are powerful, I coded the External Affairs committee and the Defense committee the same way. The Business Advisory committee dictates which parliamentary business will be addressed in the Lok Sabha and how much time will be allotted to different issues ("Committees of Lok Sabha"). The chairperson is always the Speaker of the House, indicating that it is an important committee for control of legislative discussion and separate in terms of authority from other committees that address the functioning of the Parliament. For these reasons, I included this committee in the power committee category as well. Finally, the General Purposes committee advises on ad hoc measures that are not encompassed in the purview of the other committees, and is made up of the chairs of every other legislative committee ("Committees of Lok Sabha"). It also is not required to lay its papers on the table of the House, indicating that its activity is not up for scrutiny by

other committees. Given these characteristics and its distinctly authoritative makeup of committee leaders, I categorized the General Purposes committee as a power committee.

Classifying Weak or Undesirable Committees

There is little research that involves the categorization of weak or undesirable legislative committees, which may be attributed to political scientists' acknowledgment of the differences in internal dynamics of individual legislatures. For example, education and social services were listed by Kathlene, Clarke, and Fox (1991) as issues considered less important, but I avoided classifying the coincidental committees in both Pakistan and India as such because of their legitimacy in those countries. In both cases, the Education committee is a permanent standing committee associated with a ministry, a category of committee generally considered important and authoritative due to its stability ("Committees of Lok Sabha"; Masood 2004). Still, I agree with research that lists administrative tasks or basic procedural operations as indicators of weakness or undesirability (Bullock 1976). Additionally, I was observant of the numbers of members in committees, given that committees that are legislated to have fewer members or committees that do not reach their member limit might be less popular. This is a kind of reverse application of the assumption that more members indicate a more prestigious committee (Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005).

In Pakistan, the House and Library committee was created "to deal with matters relating to the issue of admission cards for galleries, residential accommodation for members, and matters pertaining to Library" (Masood 2004, 13). Its administrative focus, along with its less generous member limit of 13, led me to include it in this category. Although the committee on Overseas Pakistanis is a ministry related one, I also classify it as weak due to its ambiguous

scope as a committee created to "analytically study the core problems of the citizens abroad and find a solution to them" ("Official Gateway to the Government of Pakistan") and its inability to reach the 17 member threshold—it had only 14 members in 2008 ("National Assembly of Pakistan"). In the same vein, the relevant committee that existed only in the data for the 12th legislative assembly, named Labor, Manpower, and Overseas Pakistanis at the time (which then split into two committees) was categorized as weak here. In 2002, it only had seven members out of a possible 17.

India's Lok Sabha had more committees categorized as weak, and all of them are "other parliamentary standing committees." They mostly consist of the committees that focus on administrative measures for the legislature, such as those on Privileges, Petitions, Papers Laid on the Table, and Absence of Members from the Sitting of the House. The House committee, joint committee on Office of Profit, and Library committee are all allotted fewer members—12, ten, and six, respectively—and address tasks to ensure administrative efficiency and maintenance. I classified them as weak committees as well.

RESULTS

Data Analysis

I operationalized my independent variable by first making it into a five-category variable that incorporates each legislator, their gender, country, and quota status (1=appointed through reserved seats, 0=directly elected). A legislator was given a value of "1" on this independent variable if she was a quota woman from Pakistan, and a "2" if she was an elected woman from

Pakistan. Legislators categorized with a value of "3" were women (all elected) from India. The last two categories were for the male legislators; a value of "4" indicated that he was from Pakistan and "5" indicated that he was from India. When necessary, I disaggregated the data by year using conditional "if" statements.

legiscat value	Country	Gender	Quota
1	Pakistan	F	1
2	Pakistan	F	0
3	India	F	0
4	Pakistan	M	0
5	India	M	0

My dependent variables were much more complex. I first made each committee on which I had data into a separate categorical variable (keeping in mind that each country has different committees in its legislature, and some committees were only applicable to legislatures of a certain year). In total, I had 60 committees for Pakistan and 43 for India. I coded each of the 525 legislators in my dataset on each variable, indicating their membership on a given committee with a "1" and their chairmanship with a "2." If a legislator was not a member of a committee, that observation was coded as "0." For each country, I then created four dichotomous variables—one each for women's issues, men's issues, power, and weak—that count how many of these types of committees a legislator was present on in that assembly. For example, "powercom" is one of my dependent variables that gives a legislator a "1" if he or she is a chair or member of one of the 12 committees coded under "power" for Pakistan, or one of the nine coded in the same category for India. In order to construct more cohesive analyses, and because chairmanship of any committees was infrequent for all five legislative groups, I treated either a "1" or "2" committee coding as activity on that committee without distinguishing between the level of activity.

Pakistan in Isolation: H1-H6

First, I attempted to obtain a grasp of legislative differences that already exist within Pakistan's National Assembly before analyzing how the different groups of female legislators potentially differentiate on committee membership. Hypotheses 1-6 address differences between reserved seats quota women and elected women within the same legislature, and quota women and men (all of whom are elected) within the same legislature. To begin, I ran a cross tabulation of women's issues committees and the independent variable for the three groups of legislators in Pakistan. This created a table to show how frequently each category of legislators was on women's issues committees.

womenscom	**legiscat**			
# women's issues committee assignments	Quota women (P)	Elected women (P)	Elected Men (P)	Total
0	27.50%	40.00%	77.33%	53.67%
1	41.67%	30.00%	18.67%	29.00%
2	20.83%	26.67%	4.00%	13.00%
3	9.17%	3.33%	0.00%	4.00%
4	0.83%	0.00%	0.00%	0.33%
Mean # committees	1.14	0.93	0.27	
Total # observations	120	30	150	300

On its face, this test exhibits a clear gender difference in committee assignments of members of Pakistan's lower house of parliament. A higher percentage of quota women (72.50%) have served on at least one women's issues committee in the most recent two legislative assemblies than either directly elected women (60%) or men (22.67%) within the same legislature. To analyze the significance of these frequencies, I did the same chi-squared test on a tabulation of just quota women and men in Pakistan and found a sufficiently low p value (0.000). When I ran the chi-squared test again on a tabulation of elected women versus

elected men in Pakistan, the results were still statistically significant. However, when I compared the frequencies of membership for quota women versus elected women, the resulting p value of 0.445 indicates that there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis for H4, which states that women appointed through a reserved seats system will be more likely to serve on women's issues committees than women elected within the same legislature.

I also separated the data by year to observe any changes in frequencies of membership on women's issues committees in Pakistan as the years progressed.

For 2002:

womenscom	**legiscat**			
# women's issues committee assignments	Quota women (P)	Elected women (P)	Elected Men (P)	Total
0	35.00%	50.00%	79.73%	58.78%
1	43.33%	28.57%	17.57%	29.05%
2	16.67%	21.43%	2.70%	10.14%
3	5.00%	0.00%	0.00%	2.03%
Mean # committees	0.92	0.71	0.23	
Total # observations	60	14	74	148

For 2008:

womenscom	**legiscat**			
# women's issues committee assignments	Quota women (P)	Elected women (P)	Elected Men (P)	Total
0	20.00%	31.25%	75.00%	48.68%
1	40.00%	31.25%	19.74%	28.95%
2	25.00%	31.25%	5.26%	15.79%
3	13.33%	6.25%	0.00%	5.92%
4	1.67%	0.00%	0.00%	0.66%
Mean # committees	1.37	1.13	0.30	
Total # observations	60	16	76	152

One difference that becomes apparent when comparing the two assemblies is the overall increase in representation (mostly female) on women's issues committees that occurred. During the 12th National Assembly (elected in 2002), 65% of the quota women were on at least one of these committees—a small lead over the percentage of elected women (50%). During the 13th National Assembly, the percentage of membership on a women's issues committee for quota women increased to 80%, with elected women still serving at a lower percentage by comparison (68.75%). The pattern of quota women versus directly elected women thus appears consistent since a higher percentage of quota women than directly elected women had representation on women's issues committees throughout the entire time period. From 2002 to 2008, male representation only increased from 20.27% to 25%, and in both assemblies no men served on more than two women's issues committees at any one time.

In order to attach a more substantive value to the variance observed here, two different analytical actions can be taken. The most common approach would be to use a linear regression model to determine the strength of relationship between committee membership and different categories of legislators, but this type of test requires both variables to be continuous. While I could easily separate my independent categorical variable into five dichotomous variables, I would also have to condense each dependent committee variable into a dichotomous variable. This simple regression is therefore not fully applicable to count variables (such as mine) whose distribution is small; it would result in a dependent variable that would only indicate if a legislator was on any of the committees ("1") or not ("0"). Since I wanted to retain the nuances of my dependent variable and take into account the numbers of committee assignments of each legislator, I used another method instead.

A Poisson regression is used to analyze count data, unlike a linear regression. I used this model because each of my dependent variables contains a small count of the number of applicable committee assignments for each legislator. To run a Poisson regression, I still had to separate my independent variable into five dichotomous variables for each of the five legislator categories. Regression models can only include four independent dummy variables at a time, so I excluded the variable for quota women from Pakistan since this group is the primary legislative category against which I compare the other groups. I ran the Poisson regression using the dependent variable for women's issues committees and the four independent variables indicating the non-quota categories. The basic results show that, as compared to quota women from Pakistan, all other legislative groups in my sample are less likely to have membership on women's issues committees. The results become insignificant only when comparing against elected Pakistani women, possibly due to the much smaller number of observations that exist for this group.

womenscom	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > |z|
Pakistani elected women	-0.2015	0.2074	-0.97	0.331
Indian elected women	-0.6025	0.1469	-4.10	0.000
Pakistani men	-1.4542	0.1797	-8.09	0.000
Indian men	-1.4926	0.2044	-7.30	0.000
_cons	0.1325	0.0854	1.55	0.121

I then used the adjust command to set all four independent variables equal to 0. This allowed me to estimate the average number of women's issues committee assignments for the excluded category, Pakistani quota women. I could then go on to adjust the regression further, setting each independent variable equal to 1 in turn in order to find the estimated average of women's issues committee assignments for each legislative group. I found that quota women in

these two assemblies of the National Assembly were on an average of 1.14 women's issues committees. Elected women were on an average of 0.93 committees, an insignificant difference. These results confirm what I concluded from the frequency table—that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of H4. By contrast, men within the same legislature were on an average of 0.27 committees. Since greater percentages of reserved seats quota women than elected men in Pakistan have served on National Assembly committees classified as dealing with "women's issues" in the two most recent assemblies, I can reject the null hypothesis of H1.

The same statistical actions were taken to compare the representation of legislators in Pakistan on power committees, addressing H2 and H5. First, I created a general frequency table using my independent variable and the dependent variable for powerful committees.

powercom	**legiscat**			
# power committee assignments	Quota women (P)	Elected women (P)	Elected Men (P)	Total
0	60.83%	63.33%	52.67%	57.00%
1	27.50%	33.33%	33.33%	31.00%
2	10.00%	3.33%	12.00%	10.33%
3	1.67%	0.00%	2.00%	1.67%
Mean # committees	0.53	0.40	0.63	
Total # observations	120	30	150	300

The resulting frequencies are not statistically significant, and this remains true when analyzing the data from the 12th and 13th National Assemblies separately. Therefore, in my sample there were no statistically significant findings when comparing the frequency of membership on power committees for any of the Pakistani legislators. Not only did quota women and men not have any significant differences in membership, but comparisons of quota women and elected women and of elected women and men did not result in any significant differences, either. A Poisson

regression shows similar results; quota women in Pakistan are on an average of 0.53 power committees, while elected women are on an average of 0.40 committees and men are on an average of 0.63 committees. While the average for quota women is closer in value to the men's average than the elected women's average, quota women and elected women have an almost identical frequency of membership on power committees—39.17% and 36.67%, respectively. Based on these findings and lack of statistical significance, I cannot reject the null hypotheses of either H2 or H5.

The last analysis of variation between Pakistani legislators addresses H3 and H6, concerning men's issues committees.

menscom	**legiscat**			
# men's issues committee assignments	Quota women (P)	Elected women (P)	Elected Men (P)	Total
0	34.17%	60.00%	28.00%	33.67%
1	40.83%	16.67%	37.33%	36.67%
2	21.67%	23.33%	24.67%	23.33%
3	3.33%	0.00%	8.00%	5.33%
4	0.00%	0.00%	1.33%	0.67%
5	0.00%	0.00%	0.67%	0.33%
Mean # committees	0.94	0.63	1.19	
Total # observations	120	30	150	300

The pattern observable here is different from the one for membership on women's issues committees. Overall, a higher proportion of quota women (65.83%) than elected women (40%) have representation on men's issues committees, and this was true for each individual assembly as well. Still, a larger proportion of the men in general are members of these committees, and higher percentages of men serve on greater numbers at one time. Attributing the variance in these frequencies to different legislative categories is statistically significant when comparing

elected women and men during both assemblies. It is also statistically significant when comparing quota women and men in the current assembly only. This indicates that quota women are less likely than men to serve on men's issues committees, but only in the National Assembly elected in 2008. So, I can reject the null hypothesis for H3 if considering this assembly only. On the other hand, since quota women and elected women in Pakistan's National Assembly do not vary significantly in their membership on men's issues committees, I do not reject the null hypothesis of H6.

Pakistan and India: H7-H9

My last three hypotheses address the differences between the committee assignments of women from a legislature with a quota and women from a legislature without a quota. Since this involves comparing two different legislatures, I first needed to understand the "norm" committee membership that occurs in each individual parliament, which includes that of the male legislators as well. This was to ensure that, before going forward with comparisons of women across countries, I had a grasp of the normal levels of committee membership in both institutions as background information for my analysis.

First, to test H7, I ran a cross tabulation of the women's issues committees dependent variable and my independent variable (including all five groups of legislators).

womenscom	**legiscat**					
# women's issues committee assignments	Quota women (P)	Elected women (P)	Elected women (I)	Elected men (P)	Elected men (I)	Total
0	27.50%	40.00%	47.32%	77.33%	77.88%	57.52%
1	41.67%	30.00%	44.64%	18.67%	18.58%	30.10%
2	20.83%	26.67%	6.25%	4.00%	3.54%	9.52%
3	9.17%	3.33%	1.79%	0.00%	0.00%	2.67%
4	0.83%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.19%

Mean # committees	1.14	0.93	0.63	0.27	0.26	
Total # observations	120	30	112	150	113	525

The resulting table of frequencies shows that 72.5% of quota women in Pakistan are on at least one women's issues committee in the National Assembly. By contrast, 60% of elected women in Pakistan and 52.68% of elected women in India have been on any women's issues committees in the past two legislative assemblies. The lower levels of membership among Indian women could be attributed to different general standards of membership on women's issues committees that exist in Pakistan versus India, except for the fact that men in both countries have nearly identical percentages of service on these types of committees. The proportion of representation on women's issues committees for men in Pakistan was 22.67%, compared to 22.12% of the men in India. Because the men from two different legislatures had the same levels of participation, I can assume that the differences between the groups of women are not due to their country.

In the group of women who were appointed through the reserved seats system in Pakistan, there was also a higher percentage of membership on multiple women's issues committees as compared to either group of directly elected women. This could indicate that quota women in this case were more likely to serve on multiple women's issues committees, while directly elected women usually served on just one or none at all. And elected women in Pakistan had higher percentages of membership on these committees than elected women in India—a difference that proves to be statistically significant. This introduces the possibility that the mere presence of a quota policy in a legislature has a mandate effect on all women's behavior, regardless of their quota status. When women interpret a gender quota as fulfilling the need for a female perspective within their legislature, perhaps it encourages all of them within that legislature to pay more attention to women's issues, even if they did not benefit from the

quota. In a parliament where such a policy is not on the radar, however, female legislators may be less aware and less likely to act on behalf of women.

An adjusted Poisson regression helps me determine that while quota women and elected women from Pakistan have a similar average number of women's issues committee assignments (1.14 and 0.93, respectively), elected women from India are only on an average of 0.63 of these committees. Overall, these results show that reserved seats women from a legislature with a quota are on more women's issues committees than women in a legislature without a quota, so I reject the null hypothesis of H7.

Doing the same statistical analysis with power committee assignments as the dependent variable, I found a small but statistically significant association. The frequency table for these variables provides more insight into the relationship.

powercom	**legiscat**					
# power committee assignments	Quota women (P)	Elected women (P)	Elected women (I)	Elected men (P)	Elected men (I)	Total
0	60.83%	63.33%	80.36%	52.67%	70.80%	64.95%
1	27.50%	33.33%	17.86%	33.33%	17.70%	25.33%
2	10.00%	3.33%	1.79%	12.00%	8.85%	8.19%
3	1.67%	0.00%	0.00%	2.00%	2.65%	1.52%
Mean # committees	0.53	0.40	0.21	0.63	0.43	
Total # observations	120	30	112	150	113	525

Higher proportions of reserved seats quota women in Pakistan have membership on power committees than female legislators in India. The same pattern is observed when I separated the data for the current and previous assemblies, though it was not statistically significant when comparing each country's current legislature [Pakistan's 13th National Assembly (2008) and India's 15th Lok Sabha (2009)].

Again, I looked at power committee membership levels in each parliament individually to determine whether I could draw any conclusions from the differences between Pakistani women and Indian women. In Pakistan, elected men are on an average of 0.23 more power committees than the elected women; in India, the difference is 0.22. Though these gender differences appear to be of a similar magnitude in each country, the ratio of elected women's membership to men's membership is not the same in Pakistan as in India. The ratio of power committee membership in Pakistan condenses down to approximately 2:3, while it is closer to 1:2 in India. This shows that even though in each country male legislators have a 10% higher percentage of membership on power committees than the elected female legislators, women in Pakistan are slightly more likely than women in India to be on these committees relative to their male counterparts.

Because each country's parliament has significant gender differences in power committee membership, it is likely that these committee assignments are just more common or easy to secure in Pakistan than similar committee assignments in India. More quota women in Pakistan have membership on power committees than women in India—an average of 0.53 committees, as opposed to an average of 0.21 committees, but more men in Pakistan have membership on these committees than men in India as well. Thus, even though reserved seats quota women in a quota legislature are more likely to be on power committees than women in a non-quota legislature, this is more likely an effect of differing norms of committee membership than the influence of the quota. And since quota women in this sample are definitely not less likely to be on power committees than female representatives in the non-quota legislature, I do not reject the null hypothesis of H8.

Changing the dependent variable once more, I found more variation between these two groups of legislative women with regard to membership on men's issues committees.

menscom	legiscat					
# men's issues committee assignments	Quota women (P)	Elected women (P)	Elected women (I)	Elected men (P)	Elected men (I)	Total
0	34.17%	60.00%	58.93%	28.00%	44.25%	41.33%
1	40.83%	16.67%	33.93%	37.33%	41.59%	37.14%
2	21.67%	23.33%	7.14%	24.67%	13.27%	17.71%
3	3.33%	0.00%	0.00%	8.00%	0.88%	3.24%
4	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	1.33%	0.00%	0.38%
5	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.67%	0.00%	0.19%
Mean # committees	0.94	0.63	0.48	1.19	0.71	
Total # observations	120	30	112	150	113	525

Again, women elected through a quota have the highest overall percentage of membership on men's issues committees (65.83%) of the three female groups. Interestingly, both groups of elected women had similar percentages of participation—40% for elected Pakistani women and 41.07% for elected Indian women. However, since 72% of Pakistani men are members of men's issues committees as opposed to 55.75% of Indian men, there is actually a larger gender difference in representation on these types of committees in Pakistan. The gender gap decreases, however, when comparing Pakistani men and reserved seats women. In addition, the quota women in Pakistan have a higher frequency of membership on multiple men's issues committees than elected women in either country. For example, the largest number of committees on which any of the female legislators served was three; 3.33% of reserved seats quota women served on three men's issues committees, compared to 0% of the elected women in either legislature. Thus, as with power committees, I cannot reject the null hypothesis for H9 about membership on men's issues committees.

Given these findings, it seems that the quota in Pakistan mitigates gender differences a bit. It allows reserved seats women higher percentages of membership on the power and men's issues committees I studied but still places them disproportionately on women's issues

committees. By contrast, elected women in Pakistan are less likely than quota women to be on the types of committees I studied, but their membership across committees has a more equal distribution.

Going Further: Repercussions of Assignments

This study could not go so in depth as to determine whether the committee assignments of the legislators analyzed actually mirrored their committee and issue preferences. That would require extensive qualitative data including interviews with individual legislators about their attitudes and behaviors, more background research on which legislators are more active on committees, and details on who sponsors which legislation—information that was not available for any of the Pakistani legislators. Even though I could not obtain information to link the women's substantive representation I observed among quota women with their true legislative preferences, I wanted to examine whether this substantive representation had any negative repercussions for quota women's legislative activity. My hypotheses illustrate that I expected to observe some negative effects of gender quotas (fewer power and men's issues committee assignments among quota women); even though these were not confirmed, I studied the potential costs of women's issues committee membership.

I ran a Poisson regression using women's issues committees as the independent variable and power committees as the dependent variable. This tested whether women's issues committee assignments had any effect on the number of power committee assignments for the legislators in my sample. The results of this test showed that in general, membership on a women's issue committee has a negative effect on membership on a power committee, and this relationship is statistically significant.

- poisson powercom womenscom

power committee assignments	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > |z|
women's issues committee assignments	-0.2832	0.0949	-2.98	0.003
_cons	-0.6288	0.0759	-8.28	0.000

The coefficient value shows a negative relationship between membership on a women's issues committee and membership on a power committee for all 525 Pakistani and Indian legislators. The statistically significant relationship remains when this test is restricted to just the female legislators elected through the reserved seats quota.

- poisson powercom womenscom if Quota==1

power committee assignments	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > |z|
women's issues committee assignments	-0.3939	0.1505	-2.62	0.009
_cons	-0.2596	0.1769	-1.47	0.142

Most interestingly, such an association does not exist for any other group in this study. When the sample tested is either just elected women from Pakistan, just elected women from India, or just men (from either country), the relationship becomes either non-existent or not statistically significant. From this, I conclude that quota women who serve on women's issues committees are doing so at the expense of serving on more powerful committees, and vice versa. In my sample, it appears that quota women alone must choose between substantively representing their gender and acting on stereotypically prestigious committees, while no other legislators have to choose between acting for women and wielding more legislative power. Only women who gained office through the reserved seats quota suffer from this apparent tradeoff.

I found a similar pattern of effect on men's issues committee membership as well. Service on a women's issues committee negatively affects membership on a men's issues committee, but only when the legislator is a quota woman.

- poisson menscom womenscom

men's issues committee assignments	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > |z|
women's issues committee assignments	-0.2854	0.0702	-4.06	0.000
_cons	-0.0229	0.0561	-0.41	0.684

- poisson menscom womenscom if Quota==1

men's issues committee assignments	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P > |z|
women's issues committee assignments	-0.3476	0.1105	-3.14	0.002
_cons	-0.2857	0.1336	2.14	0.032

Even when taking the standard error values into account, there is a slightly stronger negative relationship between power committees and women's issues committees. This makes sense, as more committees were classified in the men's issues category than the power category (resulting in more opportunities for membership on a men's issues committee). In addition, quota women were on more of the men's issues committees (an average of 0.94, as opposed to an average of 0.53 power committees).

The negative association between women's issues committee assignments and power or men's issues committee assignments does not support the label effect, however, because quota women in Pakistan are still more likely than the elected female legislators to serve on power or men's issues committees. This shows that reserved seats women in Pakistan are not necessarily

labeled as unqualified to serve on prestigious committees due to their quota status, but they must make the important decision to either empower their gender or have a more influential legislative role.

CONCLUSIONS

Comparing the quota women in Pakistan to the elected women of both countries shows that female legislators elected through a reserved seats system generally had higher percentages of membership on all categories of committees studied—those concerning women's issues, men's issues, and power. This contradicted my hypotheses that stated that quota women would be less likely than directly elected women to serve on men's issues committees and power committees. Universally, the differences between quota women and elected women in Pakistan were not statistically significant. However, statistical significance measures how representative a sample is of an entire population, and the sample of female legislators I studied was the actual female population. I gathered information on every female legislator in both Pakistan and India across two parliamentary assemblies, so the results obtained are the real percentages of committee membership and not estimates based on a sample. For this reason, I think it is important to analyze the patterns I found even though they were not always statistically significant. For instance, quota women did have lower percentages of membership on power and men's issues committees than elected men within the same parliament, confirming the ideas behind H2 and H3 even though I could not formally reject the nulls of those hypotheses.

With both the mandate and the label effect, I expected to see larger proportions of quota women serving on women's issues committees than any other category of legislator. As previously stated, I looked to my results concerning power and men's issues committee assignments to then determine which effect was stronger. Under a label effect, quota women would be less likely to serve on prestigious committees because they would be labeled "underqualified" based on their quota status. They would therefore serve on women's issues committees and not on power or men's issues committees. But I found that quota women in Pakistan actually served on higher percentages of power and men's issues committees than the other women, indicating that their committee assignments were not affected by any negative labeling.

Instead, a type of mandate effect led quota women to feel the need to act strongly on behalf of other women by serving on women's issues committees. Quota women still had decent levels of membership on power and men's issues committees relative to the other women. While they (unsurprisingly) had lower levels of power and men's issues committee assignments than the men, I was interested that my findings totally rejected H5, H6, H8, and H9. I expected that a gender quota would reduce the likelihood that quota women would serve on more prestigious committees, but they actually served on more than the standard groups of elected women. As a result, the patterns I observed in my data show that there is a mandate effect at work within Pakistan's reserved seats system.

Because quota women had high levels of participation on women's issues committees, the reserved seats gender quota in Pakistan is fulfilling its purpose of increasing women's descriptive and substantive representation. At first glance, my results seem to reinforce the idea of gender differences between women and men and provide evidence to support critical mass

theory. Pakistan's quota legislature has a higher proportion of female representation than India's elected legislature, and it has a higher percentage of women on women's issues committees as well. However, when I separated the data by legislative assembly, the relationship becomes less distinct. For both of the past two legislatures there have been higher percentages of quota women on Pakistan's National Assembly (21.6%, 22.2%) than women on India's Lok Sabha (8.26%, 10.8%), but these groups only differ significantly in their percentages of membership on women's issues committees for the current assembly. If critical mass theory were truly at work, I would observe a higher percentage of quota women on these committees for both individual assemblies. This result is confined to only the most recent assembly, so I cannot conclude that an increase in women's descriptive representation in Pakistan's legislature necessarily created an increase in women's substantive representation.

Even though I studied women's substantive representation as process—the approach that Franceschet and Piscopo (2008) considered more likely to confirm critical mass theory—I did not find strong support for it in my results. Perhaps this is because women simply needed time to identify as a critical mass before acting cohesively for their gender. The relationship between the length of time a critical mass of female legislators has existed in a legislature and women's substantive representation might be another interesting area of study. However, the mass of female legislators achieved through the reserved seats quota did have a mandate effect on the quota women's legislative behavior. It may be that the nature of implementing a quota (and its mandate effect) rather than the specific change in gender proportion facilitated women's substantive representation.

So, why is this analysis of reserved seats quotas and women's substantive representation important if my findings only serve to reinforce the subject's ambiguity? First, the finding that

overall, both quota women and directly elected women are more likely than men to be on women's issues committees in the lower house of legislature is not necessarily surprising. Nor does this finding say much positively or negatively about women's substantive representation. Female legislators could be satisfied with serving on these committees because that is where their true interests lie; or, these women could feel marginalized and dissatisfied with this type of political activity. Whichever the case, this evidence reinforced previous findings (Bratton 2005; Carroll 2008; Heath, Schwindt-Bayer, and Taylor-Robinson 2005) that women are likely to serve on women's issues committees.



But quota women in Pakistan were also much more likely than elected women in Pakistan to serve on men's issues committees, indicating that a higher percentage of women in legislature actually resulted in more membership on issues not usually associated with women.

Thus, a larger percentage of female representation seemed to give women the availability and opportunity to act on all types of committees at greater rates. These results may seem on their face to be a sign of reserved seats legislators' disinterest in expected feminine roles, but quota women still had the largest levels of participation on women's issues committee than on any other type of committee. Therefore, though quota women obviously recognized the importance of acting on a wide range of committees, their priority was women's issues.

Lastly, it was interesting to find that being on a women's issues committee makes a legislator less likely to serve on a power or men's issues committee, but only if that legislator is a woman who benefited from a gender quota. This result is important for the study of gender quotas in legislatures because it points to a potentially negative impact of using certain methods to increase the proportion of women in government. An increase in descriptive representation of women is necessary and can lead to more substantive representation of women for women's issues through a type of mandate effect, as occurred in Pakistan after its quota implementation. However, this study provides evidence that the influence of gender quotas does not end there. Yes, quota women in the National Assembly had higher percentages of representation on women's issues committees, but for them alone, this was at the expense of being on more prestigious committees.

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APPENDIX

Data Constraints

A note on data collection and the absence of a time series analysis pre- and post- quota:

I originally aimed to analyze the committee assignments of female representatives in Pakistan before and after the implementation of the reserved seats gender quota in 2002. Since it has been theorized that the presence of gender quotas may also alter the general dynamic of a legislature (and thus could impact the behavior of even those legislators who do not directly benefit), I thought an examination of committee assignments both before and after 2002 would provide valuable context for my study. Unfortunately, what I considered to be general information—lists of committees and their members at the time—is not available for the 10th and 11th assemblies (whose members were elected in 1993 and 1997, respectively).

The website for the Pakistan National Assembly is fairly thorough, with lists of current committees, their members and chairs, and lists of members of parliament that are separated according to gender and quota status. I used this website for nearly all of my primary data for the current (13th) assembly, and utilized the website www.archive.org to look at the website as it was in the early 2000s, during the 12th assembly. This method enabled me to obtain the information for the two post-quota assemblies. However, after meeting with the Political Science Librarian Dr. Chris Palazzolo on the struggle to locate committee assignments for earlier years, he explained that www.archive.org did not begin archiving "screenshot" information from websites until after 2000. Per his suggestion, I reached out to organizations and private parties who I thought might have access to or know of the location of such information.

I first emailed the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, whose website pildat.org was extremely helpful in other areas during my research. I also emailed the Women's Parliamentary Caucus, a caucus associated with the National Assembly, the Election Commission of Pakistan, and Dr. Saira Bano, professor at Fatima Jinnah Women University in Pakistan and author of "Women in Parliament in Pakistan: Problems and Potential Solutions," published in *Women's Studies Journal* in 2009.

Dear Dr. Bano,

This was the only contact email I could find for you, so I hope this reaches you. My name is Sue Gloor and I am in the process of writing an honors thesis at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, USA. The topic of my thesis is women in parliament and gender quotas, and I am studying the case of Pakistan's National Assembly. My thesis advisor is Dr. Beth Reingold, an expert and published author on female representation in government. However, even with extensive research I have been unable to find lists of the National Assembly committees and their members, or a list of National Assembly members and their committee assignments, for the 10th (1993-1996) and 11th (1997-1999) assemblies. Since the focus of my study is which committees and legislative issues Pakistan's female MPs have been drawn to over time, it is vital for my research to have the data on members' committee assignments for these years.

As an expert on women's representation in Pakistan yourself, I would so appreciate if you send me any applicable data you have, or direct me to a source if you know of one. I would be happy

to share my research with you once completed. Thank you and I hope to hear from you.

Sincerely,
Sue Gloor, Emory University

I received two responses from this first round of requests. From the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency:

Dear Susannah D. Gloor,

Thank you very much for your email but we are afraid we have the data for only 12th and 13th National Assembly as PILDAT has been established in 2002. We don't have the data for previous Assemblies.

Please let me know if you require data related to the 12th or 13th National Assembly, we'll try our best to cooperate with you for your research.

Kind regards

Hmmal

From the Election Commission of Pakistan:

Dear Sue Gloor,

The requisite information is not available with us. Please visit or contact National Assembly Secretariat, Islamabad for the purpose.

http://www.na.gov.pk/intro_offscry.html

With regards,

(Adnan Bashir)
Research Officer

The National Assembly Secretary was contacted but I received no response.

Upon the suggestion of Dr. Beth Reingold, I contacted Dr. Mona Lena Krook, a professor at Washington University in St. Louis. She is also the author of *Quotas for Women in Politics*, which contains a comparison of the quota systems in Pakistan and India, and which I consulted in my literature review. She directed me to a friend of hers in Political Science at Purdue, Dr. Meg Rincker, who has studied decentralization and women's organizations in Pakistan. Dr. Rincker responded that she also was unsure of where to find the information I sought, but suggested that I look into Master's theses in Emory's Library to see if anyone had ever used such information. However, when I searched for Master's theses that included legislative committee assignments for the 10th and 11th assemblies in Pakistan I was still unsuccessful. I concluded that

such information on the committee makeup in older incarnations of the National Assembly is unobtainable, at least for a study with my time and resource constraints, since not even major organizations in Pakistan, such as PILDAT and the Election Commission, are aware of its existence.

Thus, my resulting research and analysis was restricted to the most recent two assemblies of Pakistan's National Assembly, which have operated with a quota system. To remain consistent in the amount of data I am analyzing for each country, I used only the two most recent legislatures of India's Lok Sabha as well, even though I initially gathered the committee assignments for the legislators in four elections there.

Committee Coding

	Women's Issues Committees	Men's Issues Committees	Power Committees	Weak Committees
National Assembly, Pakistan	Culture, Sports, and Youth Affairs (2002); Culture (2008); Youth Affairs (2008); Education; Health; House and Library; Inter-Provincial Coordination (2008); Human Rights (2008); Minorities; Population Welfare; Religious Affairs, Zakat, and Ushr (2002); Religious Affairs (2008); Zakat and Ushr (2008); Social Welfare and Special Education; Women Development	Commerce; Sports (2008); Defense; Defense Production; Economic Affairs and Statistics; Planning and Development (2002); Finance and Revenue (2002); Finance, Revenue, and Planning and Development (2008); Food and Agriculture; Livestock and Dairy Development (2008); Foreign Afairs; Housing and Works; Industries (2002); Production (2002); Industries and Production (2008); Interior; Kashmir Affairs, Northern Affairs, and SAFRON (2002); Kashmir Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan (2008); State and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) (2008); Labor, Manpower, and Overseas Pakistanis (2002); Labor and Manpower (2008); Law and Justice (2008); Narcotics Control; Petroleum and Natural Resources; Privatization and Investment; Public Accounts; Railways; Textile Industry (2008); Tourism	Commerce; Defense; Economic Affairs and Statistics; Finance and Revenue (2002); Finance, Revenue, and Planning and Development (2008); Business Advisory; Foreign Affairs; Interior; Law, Justice, and Human Rights (2002); Law and Justice (2008); Public Accounts; Rules of Procedure and Privileges	House and Library; Labor, Manpower, and Overseas Pakistanis (2002); Overseas Pakistanis (2008)

	Women's Issues Committees	Men's Issues Committees	Power Committees	Weak Committees
Lok Sabha, India	Food, Consumer Affairs, and Public Distribution; Social Justice and Empowerment; Health and Family Welfare; Human Resource Development; Empowerment of Women; House; Library; Welfare of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes	Estimates; Public Accounts; Public Undertakings; Agriculture; Chemicals and Fertilizers; Coal and Steel; Defense; External Affairs; Finance; Labor; Petroleum and Natural Gas; Railways; Commerce; Home Affairs; Industry; Transport, Tourism, and Culture	Estimates; Public Accounts; Public Undertakings; Defense; External Affairs; Finance; Commerce; Business Advisory; General Purposes; Joint Committee on Salaries and Allowances of Members of Parliament	Absence of Members from the Sitting of the House; House; Joint Committee on Office of Profit; Library; Papers Laid on the Table; Petitions; Privileges