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Isabella Aguado March 27, 2025

Temporary Status, Uneven Gains: Labor Market Effects of TPS on Central American Immigrants

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An abstract of
a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences
of Emory University in partial fulfillment
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Bachelor of Arts with Honors

Economics

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Abstract

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This paper investigates the labor market effects of Temporary Protected Status (TPS)on eligible immigrants from designated countries. Focusing on immigrants from Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, I assess the impact of TPS on several labor outcomes: pre-tax personal income, annual wages, weekly hours worked, labor force participation, and employment status. Using data from the American Community Survey and a Difference-in-Differences (DiD) framework, I compare TPS-eligible individuals to similarly undocumented likely immigrants from the same country of origin who arrived after the eligibility cutoff, as well as to a control group of Mexican immigrants. My analysis isolates the effect of TPS as a form of temporary legalization and reveals that its labor market benefits are not uniform. In particular, I find that the impact of the policy varies by country, gender, and educational attainment. These findings suggest that liminal legality, while offering some economic stability, interacts with existing social and institutional inequalities, limiting the extent of TPS's labor-enhancing potential across subgroups.

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Temporary Status, Uneven Gains: Labor Market Effects of TPS on Central American Immigrants

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March 2025

1 Introduction

Immigration policies play a pivotal role in shaping labor market outcomes for migrant communities. Temporary Protected Status (TPS), a U.S. immigration policy designed to offer temporary legal relief to previously undocumented individuals from countries affected by crises, has served as a crucial legalization mechanism for hundreds of thousands of immigrants. Despite its widespread implementation, little is known about its effectiveness in improving labor market outcomes in the years immediately following its designation. While previous studies (e.g., Orrenius & Zavodny, 2014; Harris & Jerch, 2024; Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2023) have assessed TPS's long-term effects or focused on a single nationality, this study adopts a comparative approach to evaluate its short-term labor market impacts across multiple recipient groups. Analyzing labor outcomes within ten years after TPS implementation provides a crucial perspective on whether the program achieved its intended humanitarian goal of promoting economic stability and whether its benefits are distributed evenly across different nationalities, genders, and education levels. Further, if TPS helps recipients achieve economic mobility, it strengthens the argument that TPS is not just humanitarian relief but also an economic asset. Policymakers can use this evidence to defend TPS renewals or advocate for a pathway to legal status for long-term beneficiaries like Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador. Conversely, if TPS does not lead to better economic outcomes, it may suggest the program's design limitations, such as barriers to professional advancement and administrative hurdles. Studying the initial labor market effects of TPS is critical for understanding its function as a policy tool—was it effective from the outset, or did its benefits emerge only after long-term extensions, as indicated in existing literature?

Through this analysis, I aim to contribute to the limited research on temporary programs and offer new insights into the ongoing policy debate around temporary immigration protections and their effectiveness in supporting economic advancement and mobility for immigrant communities.

1.1 Background of Temporary Protected Status (TPS)

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a U.S. immigration policy enacted in the 1990s to temporarily relieve deportation for immigrants from countries affected by armed conflict, natural disasters, or other dangerous conditions. The U.S. government grants this status, following international amnesty provisions, when a country is deemed unsuitable for the return of its citizens currently in the USA (Menjívar et al., 2022). The Secretary of Homeland Security decides which countries to designate as TPS beneficiaries, granting them a work permit and relieving them from the threat of removal/deportation for six to eighteen months. These benefits are extended for this defined period, with the possibility of extensions based on ongoing conditions in their home countries. Beneficiaries are eligible for TPS if they originate from a designated country and have continuously resided in the U.S. before a specific time (usually soon after the disaster). Some of these countries' protections have been constantly renewed for twenty years under the condition that applicants register for renewal during the appropriate deadline, pay immigration fees, maintain no criminal record, and meet various other requirements (USCIS, 2024). To acquire TPS, eligible individuals must report to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), submit a processing fee, and ensure they act within the appropriate, subject-to-change registration period. Around 325,000 migrants from 13 TPS-designated countries resided in the United States in 2017. Over 90% of these beneficiaries came from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti (Warren & Kerwin, 2017). TPS has been extended to El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Haiti, Sudan, South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, Venezuela, Afghanistan, Myanmar (Burma), Cameroon, and Nepal.

Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador are particularly interesting TPS recipients due to their large U.S. population benefiting from TPS, their length of time on TPS, and their historical and socioeconomic conditions, creating prolonged instability and increased vulnerability. Central America, in particular, faces persistent challenges stemming from both political violence and frequent natural disasters. Since the 1970s, Central Americans have fled these conflicts and entered the U.S., with their numbers rapidly rising in the two decades prior to TPS designation (Gutiérrez, 2004). These immigrants lived and worked in the U.S., sending large amounts of remittances home during this time (Orrenius & Zavodny, 2014).

In 1998, Hurricane Mitch devastated Honduras and Nicaragua, causing widespread displacement, infrastructure destruction, and economic setbacks. The devastation led the U.S. government to grant TPS designation to those nationals residing in the U.S. before December 30th, 1998 (Ishizawa & Miranda, 2016). Similarly, in 2001, El Salvador experienced a series of significant earthquakes that exacerbated an already fragile post-civil war society, prompting the government to extend protection to Salvadoran nationals as well (Wasem & Ester, 2008). Unlike purely economic migrants, TPS recipients from these countries were driven to immigrate by a conflux of extraordinary circumstances, including war, natural disasters, and chronic poverty.

Since acquiring TPS, these migrants have participated in the U.S. economy for over two decades. Currently, their labor force participation rates are well above the rate for the total U.S. population (80-88%), with many of these recipients working in construction, restaurant/food services, landscaping services, child daycare services, and grocery stores (Wasem & Ester, 2008). These immigrants are key members of our society and have become parents to around 270,000 U.S. citizens (Warren & Kerwin, 2017). Many critics of TPS argue that a path toward permanent legalization should be afforded to long-term recipients. Critics of the program argue that it "traps" beneficiaries in legal limbo, barring them from public benefits and adjusting to legal permanent status (Warren & Kerwin, 2017).

1.2 Amnesty and Legalization Programs: Impacts on Social Assimilation and Economic Advancement

Past literature has sought to answer whether legalization can serve as an effective policy tool to address the challenges associated with undocumented migration and efficiently capitalize on the labor contributions of immigrants. Empirical work has established that immigration policy has far-reaching effects on the labor market. Such studies have analyzed the effect of amnesty on natives, going as far as to examine how the influx of immigrants after Hurricane Mitch affected native labor outcomes (Kugler & Yuksel, 2008). Other studies have investigated the effect of legalization programs on Hispanic legal individuals who might be perceived as undocumented (Bansak, 2005). Recent literature seeks to discover amnesty

programs' effect on previously undocumented immigrants by focusing on their influence on labor market outcomes for those who are eligible. This strain of literature operates with the theoretical framework that illegal status suppresses employment opportunities and returns on human capital, and yields poor skillset-matching outcomes while restricting occupational choices, granting employers monopsonistic power. Past research has primarily established the impact of legalization through amnesty programs and consistently proven that gaining legal status facilitates economic advancement and social assimilation [1]

Lacking legal status limits job opportunities due to discrimination, employer fear of apprehension, and low returns to human capital (Amuedo-Dorantes & Bansak, 2007). Even after accounting for measured differences with legal immigrants, undocumented workers often find themselves in lower-paying jobs, extorted, and with a limited range of upward mobility (Rivera-Batiz, 1999). Research on legalization policies for undocumented immigrants has primarily focused on permanent amnesty programs, each with distinct characteristics that influence labor market outcomes. Studies on programs that affect Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, and Hondurans focus on the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and the 1997 Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA). They find that these policies provide a pathway to regularized employment, harbor significant changes in labor market outcomes, and lead to meaningful socioeconomic gains [2]. These include transitioning from informal employment to formal, higher-paying jobs, changes in labor force participation rates, closing the wage penalty, and changing employment rates. Legalization serves as a mechanism that not only enables economic advancement but also fosters positive change in family planning, civic engagement, and educational hopes (Amuedo-Dorantes & Arenas-Arroy, 2017; Menjívar, 2008; Menjívar et al., 2022).

While such analyses consistently prove that legalization results in higher wages, wage growth, and higher returns to skills and human capital, [3] the effects on employment are theoretically ambiguous and diverging across papers. According to Amuedo-Dorantes et

[1](Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2007; Bahar et al., 2021; Bansak, 2005; Devillanova et al., 2018; Kaushal, 2006; Pan, 2012; Rivera-Batiz, 1999) all study different legalization and amnesty programs and their effects on labor outcomes.

[2](Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2007), (Kaushal, 2006; Pan, 2012), (Bansak, 2005), (Rivera-Batiz, 1999), (Kossoudji & Cobb-Clark, 2002).

[3]See (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes & Bansak, 2007; Bansak, 2005; Devillanova et al., 2018; Kaushal, 2006; Kossoudji & Cobb-Clark, 2002; Pan, 2012; Rivera-Batiz, 1999).

al. (2007) and Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2011), both newly legalized men and women experience declines in employment levels post-legalization, with men facing higher rates of unemployment and women showing reduced labor force participation. In contrast, Kaushal (2006) observes a statistically insignificant effect on employment, while Pan (2012) identifies a positive impact, but only among female immigrants. Kaushal (2006) does not find a significant effect on hours worked per week. Furthermore, the literature highlights that highly educated immigrants can take advantage of these benefits more significantly.

IRCA is the most extensively studied U.S. amnesty program. Studies on IRCA have consistently shown that the stability associated with permanent legalization drives positive labor outcomes (Amuedo-Dorantes & Bansak, 2007; Bansak, 2005; Kossoudji & Cobb-Clark, 2002; Pan, 2012; Rivera-Batiz, 1999). However, IRCA was one of the most extensive immigration reform programs accompanied by other policy changes that affected a broader set of immigrants from various origin countries[4]. We cannot unconditionally extrapolate its effects to Central American recipients of temporary statuses and amnesty programs. NACARA offered specific protections to Central American immigrants, allowing eligible individuals to adjust to permanent resident status. Furthermore, the program applied to a smaller set of immigrants and did not alter the labor supply to the extent of IRCA. Being able to isolate the effect of amnesty better, Kaushal's study (2006) found that this form of legalization improves wages and facilitates economic mobility, but limits his research to men.

1.3 The Unique Nature of TPS: Temporary Legal Status and Liminal Legality

Temporary Protected Status operates differently from IRCA, NACARA, and other legalization programs. TPS does not offer a pathway to permanent residency and is subject to frequent administrative hurdles, cycles of confusing information, and the uncertainty of discretionary renewal without any promise of eventual citizenship or permanent legal status (Wasem & Ester, 2008). This temporary nature introduces a state of "liminal legality," a

[4]IRCA resulted in around 2.8 million immigrants gaining status (Kaushal, 2006). Its stipulations included sanctions for employers who hired undocumented workers, stronger border security, and a continuous presence requirement unrelated to humanitarian grounds.

term coined by Cecilia Menjívar[5] to describe the precarious and uncertain legal position of individuals who are neither fully undocumented nor permanently legal. Menjívar argues that permanent legal status can create a class of immigrants with diverging rights and freedoms from those holding temporary status; these immigrants "have such different experiences that they can be regarded as two different social classes" (2022). The liminal legality of TPS creates a situation where recipients face significant limitations in their ability to plan for the future, invest in long-term goals, or fully integrate into U.S. society. This status is neither a bridge to permanent residency nor a clear path to eventual citizenship. Instead, it is a flimsy arrangement that leaves TPS recipients susceptible to policy changes and volatility that could change their status overnight, rendering them victims to a stagnant social and economic evolution. According to Menjívar**,** TPS's temporary status discourages recipients from long-term commitments, such as pursuing higher education or specialized training that requires them to trust they will be able to remain in the country. This class of immigrants is vulnerable to industries that seek to exploit the chaos of their status and political debates about the value of their presence [6].

The transient nature of TPS also makes it a subject of frequent political debate and more sensitive to shifts in immigration rhetoric based on the federal administration. The executive branch makes decisions about TPS designations and extensions, often influenced by political dynamics and shifting foreign policy objectives (Pierce & Selee, 2017). Over time, different administrations have added or removed countries from TPS eligibility based on varying criteria, sometimes under significant political pressure. For example, the Trump administration attempted to terminate TPS designations for several countries, including El Salvador and Honduras, arguing that conditions in those countries had improved enough for recipients to return (Pierce & Selee, 2017). Conversely, the Biden administration extended TPS protections for specific groups and added new designations (USCIS, 2024).

The lack of continuity, stress, and constant risk of revocation underscores the precarious-

[5](Menjívar et al., 2022) characterizes this as a gray area between legal statuses that affects the individual's social networks and family, the role of the church in immigrants' lives, and the broader domain of artistic expression.

[6]Some unauthorized individuals take advantage of people filing TPS, claiming they can file forms for a fee. A large industry has developed around the seasons when these documents must be filed (*Common Scams — USCIS*, 2023), (Cecilia Menjívar & Menjívar, 2006).

ness of TPS, amplifying the liminal legality that recipients experience and creating unique economic pressures and social barriers. Considering all this, we cannot assume that the mobility facilitated by legalization and amnesty programs is translated to TPS beneficiaries. This state of liminal legality can hinder recipients' ability to adapt their labor market behavior. Recipients might not reap the benefits of legalization if they fear a lack of permanence or security in their decisions.

On the other hand, other scholars propose that even the *prospect* of legalization can significantly influence undocumented immigrants' employment behaviors, especially when they perceive a real chance of gaining stable legal status (Devillanova et al., 2018); (Bansak, 2005). Orrenius and Zavodny (2014) argue that even a minimal, temporary legal status can benefit migrants. TPS may increase employment opportunities for beneficiaries, as some employers are reluctant to hire unauthorized workers. Access to legal employment could also increase wages by allowing TPS holders to transition into better-paying jobs or eliminating wage penalties because employers may pass on the risk of fines for hiring them. Additionally, competition for low-skill jobs among undocumented immigrants may depress wages in those sectors.

Moreover, TPS may alter recipients' work incentives. With protection from deportation, beneficiaries might feel less financial pressure, leading some to reduce their working hours or delay returning home. At the same time, those with greater financial obligations to family members abroad might work more to support them. Unlike other immigration programs, TPS does not expand eligibility for most public benefits, meaning that its impact on labor supply is unlikely to stem from access to welfare programs. However, TPS beneficiaries may qualify for unemployment insurance, which could also influence their workforce participation decisions.

1.4 Research Problem and Core Question

Studying the labor market impacts of TPS is crucial because it addresses a significant gap in the literature on legalization policies for undocumented immigrants, especially regarding temporary protections. The results of these studies do not fully capture the unique challenges and outcomes brought by liminal legality and the circumstances of Central American

countries of origin. These varied findings with NACARA and IRCA suggest that the structure of each amnesty program, including its eligibility requirements, target demographics, and permanence, shapes labor market outcomes.

Recent studies have attempted to address this gap in understanding the unique effects of TPS and have found mixed results. Orrenius and Zavodny (2014) provided one of the earliest analyses of TPS's labor market impacts, focusing solely on Salvadoran immigrants. They found less educated men see earnings gains by accessing higher-paying jobs despite slight employment declines; less educated women experienced increased employment and labor participation without earnings growth, more educated men were more likely to be in the labor force and work in higher-paying occupations without changes in employment, weekly hours, or annual weeks worked. More educated women achieved higher earnings through better job opportunities without significant shifts in employment or participation. This study underscored that even a reprieve from deportation and permission to work can improve labor outcomes in the short term. This study only focused on Salvadorans arriving a year before designation (1999-2000) compared to those arriving a year after TPS designation, studying their outcomes in 2005. Bahar et al. (2021)[7] studied a similar temporary amnesty program in Colombia and did not find evidence of short-term benefits for beneficiaries.

Harris and Jerch (2024) extended this line of research by analyzing the long-term effects of TPS on Salvadorans over 20 years. Their findings suggest that TPS enabled substantial improvements in income, wages, workforce participation, and employment for Salvadorans, which were more pronounced among recipients with higher education levels. They found positive and significant effects for men and women for all main outcomes. A survey study by Cecilia Menjívar (2017) confirms these positive effects in the long term.

Amuedo-Dorantes et al. (2023) sought to expand insights beyond El Salvador into the labor outcomes of Haitian and Honduran migrants in the first decade after receiving TPS, finding notable differences between the groups. The study revealed that TPS improved labor outcomes, household earnings, and poverty exposure for Haitian immigrants. In contrast, the program shows little to no effect on Honduran immigrants' outcomes, suggesting het-

[7]No significant changes were observed in wages, hours worked, or labor force participation across the formal and informal sectors, suggesting a limited short-term impact of the program (Bahar et al., 2021).

erogeneity in its impact based on nationality[8]. "Less-educated Haitians gathered the largest gains... among Hondurans, only more-educated women appear to have marginally benefited, pointing to the relevance of human capital for this group" (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2023). Despite some parallels—both groups comprise low-education, low-income populations who have faced significant displacement due to natural disasters and political turmoil—their labor market trajectories under TPS differ starkly. These findings introduce the possibility that TPS benefits do not uniformly translate across nationalities considered to be similar or demographic groups. Actually, they may vary significantly across countries within the same region, despite being treated as homogeneous groups by the U.S.

1.5 The Study's Unique Contribution

This study explores differences in TPS' effects by examining Nicaragua, Honduras, and El Salvador to uncover whether shared regional characteristics lead to similar labor market outcomes or if heterogeneity exists after TPS designation. No study has compared these three countries before. Hammill (2007) highlights that Nicaragua and Honduras have consistently lower GDP per capita and higher economic inequality than El Salvador, possibly influencing how TPS recipients from those countries differ in their labor market advantages [9].

The literature emphasizes the disproportionate effects of natural disasters on Nicaragua and Honduras, leading to long-term economic stagnation and heightened poverty rates (Ishizawa & Miranda, 2016). As TPS-eligible individuals migrated to the U.S. in the decades before TPS in response to war, poverty, and the disasters' devastation, their particular situations at home differentiate them. Individuals from different nationalities may have faced unique challenges that influenced their ability to benefit from TPS, contributing to potential heterogeneity in labor market outcomes among beneficiaries from these countries. Warren and Kerwin (2017) provide a demographic lens of possible differences in the U.S. across TPS recipients. Median household income is $50,000 for Salvadorans but only $40,000 for

[8](Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2023) suggest these disparities can be attributed to differences in linguistic assimilation.

[9]In 2007, El Salvador and Guatemala's incomes were around US$ 2,100 and US$ 1,700 respectively. The countries trailing furthest behind in per capita incomes were Honduras and Nicaragua with around US$ 960 and US$ 810, respectively.

Hondurans, despite both groups having a high labor force participation rate, suggesting that more than TPS eligibility could influence labor market outcomes, pointing to underlying structural factors. According to a study measuring which factors drove U.S. migration, Nicaraguans were more educated on average and could translate their human capital to higher-skilled U.S. occupations (Vurgun, 2022).

TPS might affect Salvadorans, Nicaraguans, and Hondurans differently due to variations in migration history and network effects that create different social contexts to which they arrive. Salvadorans have a larger pre-existing diaspora in the U.S. due to the prolonged civil war (1980–1992) and related economic instability, which created robust migration networks (Gutiérrez, 2004). Nicaragua also benefited from NACARA in earlier years; even those not eligible for it but eligible for TPS may have benefited from immigrant network effects [10]. Language proficiency might play a role in differentiating how nationalities are able to benefit from legalization. Further, as discussed above, immigration policies are consistently proven to have heterogeneous effects across sex and education levels. The study, therefore, seeks to determine whether these differences persist and are heterogeneous across countries.

The policy implications are clear: TPS was intended to provide short-term benefits and protection, demonstrating its potential as a tool for economic mobility. Yet, it has limitations, such as its temporary nature, administrative hurdles, and legal precarity. Given its goal to provide temporary relief for vulnerable populations, policymakers need to understand whether it truly fulfills its objectives to evaluate the efficiency and continued use of such immigration policies. Despite literature suggesting that having legal status allows people from El Salvador to advance in the workforce, TPS covers diverse recipients. U.S. immigration policy often treats beneficiaries from Latin America as a uniform group without accounting for how historical, cultural, and economic differences might influence the policy's outcomes. This "one-size-fits-all" approach can lead to inefficiencies and missed opportunities to tailor support mechanisms. Early evidence of TPS's effectiveness allows for a timely assessment of whether the policy promotes wage growth or other economic outcomes, and whether it achieves these goals equitably across groups. The core assumption behind TPS was that it

[10]Migration network theory posits that established migrants reduce barriers for new arrivals by sharing information on job opportunities, housing, and migration logistics.

would provide short-term relief before recipients returned to their home countries or found alternative legal pathways. If TPS failed to improve labor outcomes early on, this suggests it failed as a temporary economic stabilizer and challenges the notion that minimal, short-term status is enough to help migrants achieve significant economic gains. If, however, TPS significantly boosted labor outcomes in the first five years, it would justify its continued use as an economic mobility tool for displaced populations (Wasem & Ester, 2008). Policy-makers should consider the effectiveness of this temporary program in its current structure and make adjustments to TPS or similar future policies to enhance their ability to foster socioeconomic stability for people who cannot return to their nation of origin. If certain countries and groups benefit significantly while others miss out, is TPS truly achieving its goals?

Unlike previous studies, which focus on the long term, this paper examines the impact of TPS from 2002 to 2007. Other papers limit their analysis to migrants arriving one year before TPS designation for El Salvador; this paper seeks to understand the effectiveness of TPS for migrants arriving three years before its implementation, circumventing eligibility for other policies. No study has examined the effects of TPS on Nicaragua.

2 Method

2.1 Data and Sample

This study uses individual-level data from the 2002-2007 American Community Survey provided by IPUMS to examine labor market outcomes among likely TPS beneficiaries from El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The ACS is a large, cross-sectional, nationally representative sample of U.S. residents collected throughout the year from about 3.5 million addresses. The survey asks questions regarding labor market outcomes, place of birth, naturalization status, year of entry into the United States, personal and household income, education, language spoken at home, access to personal vehicles, and homeownership–among other demographic and occupational questions. Each survey year samples different households. By leveraging the ACS, this study captures detailed outcomes for immigrants during

the relevant post-TPS periods and constructs entry cohorts to compare TPS-eligible and ineligible groups.

It is important to note that my dataset begins in the post-treatment period since no pre-treatment data is available. This means that my study conducts the analysis using only information collected after TPS was implemented (discussed further in the methodology section). The decision to begin the analysis in 2002 reflects the availability and consistency of ACS data. Before 2002, the ACS was not a fully implemented nationwide survey. Furthermore, using ACS data a few years after TPS implementation offers the advantage of capturing the immediate post-adjustment period when TPS was intended to be effective. Since the study focuses on a particular group (Central American immigrants who immigrated in specific years), using data from multiple ACS years helps address sampling inconsistencies and improves the reliability of results by increasing the sample size, reducing random sampling fluctuations, and capturing a broader and more stable sample of immigrants over time.

My analysis focuses on immigrants from El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua between the ages of 18 and 64 who are likely undocumented and, therefore, would have been eligible for TPS at the time. I follow (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2023), (Harris & Jerch, 2024), and (Orrenius & Zavodny, 2014) in determining a respondent's legal status based on their observable characteristics: non-citizens, have a high school diploma or less, and speak Spanish at home [11], since the ACS does not ask people about their particular immigration status. The Migration Policy Institute (2019) estimates that only 7% of unauthorized immigrants speak English at home (72% speak Spanish at home), and around 70% of unauthorized immigrants have a high school diploma or less. Orrenius and Zavodny (2014) use the Department of Homeland Security estimates of unauthorized Salvadorans and the U.S. Census to estimate that more than half of Salvadoran immigrants were unauthorized before TPS designation. Following this method, I find similar results for Nicaragua and Honduras[12]. Therefore, most immigrants in my selected sample would be eligible for TPS, contingent on their year of im-

[11] (Amuedo-Dorantes et al., 2023), (Harris & Jerch, 2024), and (Orrenius & Zavodny, 2014) all use proxies to estimate legal status and likely TPS-eligibility.

[12] Based on 2000 figures from the U.S. Census (217,569 total Hondurans) (Guzman, 2000), and the Department of Homeland Security (160,000 undocumented Hondurans) (Baker, 2007), we can reasonably assume that in 1998, with a slightly smaller total population (estimated 200,000–210,000), at least half—and likely a significant majority—of the Honduran population was undocumented. A similar proportion can be assumed for Nicaragua, given their migration patterns and U.S immigration policy eligibility.

migration. My sample includes migrants who arrived in the United States within a three-year period before and after TPS designation for each respective country. I chose a three-year window to circumvent eligibility for other programs while still maximizing the sample size (avoiding small sample bias) and capturing a more representative sample. Those arriving before TPS cutoff dates are considered TPS-eligible, and those from the same country of origin arriving in the three-year window after are not TPS-eligible. This framework allows us to compare outcomes between TPS-eligible and non-TPS-eligible cohorts from the same country. Below, I provide a summary of the dates associated with TPS eligibility for each designated country in the sample:

- **Nicaraguans**: Entered between 1996–1998 (TPS-eligible), compared to those entering between 1999–2001 (non-TPS-eligible).
- **Hondurans**: Entered between 1996–1998 (TPS-eligible), compared to those entering between 1999–2001 (non-TPS-eligible).
- **Salvadorans**: Entered between 1998–2000 (TPS-eligible), compared to those entering between 2002–2004 (non-TPS-eligible). I exclude immigrants arriving in 2001 since it is unclear if they immigrated early enough to be TPS-eligible.

In addition to comparing entry cohorts within each TPS-designated country, we include likely undocumented Mexican migrants entering during the same periods as an external control group. Mexicans were likely undocumented and entered during the same time frames, but are ineligible for TPS because the program does not apply to Mexico. This external control accounts for broader labor market trends that might affect all low-skilled migrants during these periods, such as economic cycles, immigration enforcement changes, or regional shocks.

2.2 Methodology

2.2.1 Regression Equation

This study employs a modified Difference-in-Differences (DiD) framework to estimate the causal effect of TPS on the labor market outcomes of likely beneficiaries. Unlike traditional DiD approaches, which compare outcomes across pre- and post-treatment periods, this framework uses entry cohorts as proxies for pre- and post-treatment groups. The DiD regression model is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ict} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{TPS\_ELIGIBLE}_{ict} + \beta_2 \text{ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG}_{ict} \\ + \beta_3(\text{TPS\_ELIGIBLE}_{ict} \times \text{ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG}_{ict}) + X_{ict}\Gamma + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ict} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

Y_{ict} is one of several labor market outcomes for individual i, from country c, in year t. $TPS\_ELIGIBLE_{ict}$ is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is from a TPS-eligible country regardless of arrival year (e.g., Nicaragua, Honduras, or El Salvador) and 0 if from Mexico. This variable captures the average difference in outcomes between TPS recipient countries and Mexican migrants. $ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG_{ict}$ is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual entered the U.S. during the relevant pre-treatment window. This variable captures the average difference in outcomes between earlier pre-TPS arrivals and post-TPS arrivals across all groups. The interaction term is the DiD variable that captures the treatment effect of TPS by measuring how the outcomes of TPS-eligible individuals differ from those not TPS-eligible from the same country, compared with the same difference among Mexican migrants. In this setup, the treatment group is migrants from Honduras, Nicaragua, or El Salvador who arrived within the three-year pre-TPS eligibility window. The control groups are Mexican migrants arriving in the same period (never eligible for TPS) and migrants from the same TPS-eligible countries who arrived after the cutoff (not eligible for TPS). X_{ict} represents a vector of individual-level characteristics that could affect labor market outcomes (age at treatment, marital status, sex, education level, gender, and years in the U.S.). λ_t are year-fixed effects to control for macroeconomic shocks, and ϵ_{ict} is the error term.

This approach is an adjustment to lacking pre-treatment data. Rather than comparing outcomes before and after TPS designation, this approach leverages differences between migrants who arrived just before TPS eligibility and those who arrived just after. This setup allows us to examine whether TPS eligibility affected labor market outcomes by comparing groups similar in origin and characteristics but that did not both benefit from TPS. However, comparing only earlier and later arrivals from TPS-designated countries could introduce bias if labor outcomes naturally differed across cohorts for reasons unrelated to TPS (i.e., changing labor market conditions or changing migration trends). Including Mexican migrants lets us control for general labor market conditions that affected all migrants during those years as a stable comparison group. The key interaction term in the regression measures whether the difference between early and late arrivals is larger for TPS-eligible individuals than for Mexican migrants. If TPS had a positive impact, we would expect TPS-eligible early arrivals to experience greater improvements in employment, wages, and hours worked compared to their late-arrival counterparts, and this difference should be larger than the comparable difference among Mexican migrants. Like in typical DID models with pre-treatment data, we still have two levels of differences capturing a relative effect: how much more an outcome changes for the treated group.

$$\begin{aligned}&\left(\text{Early Arrivals}_{\text{TPS Eligible}} - \text{Late Arrivals}_{\text{TPS Eligible}}\right)\\&\quad - \left(\text{Early Arrivals}_{\text{Mexicans}} - \text{Late Arrivals}_{\text{Mexicans}}\right)\end{aligned}$$

The basic regression controls for sex (male or female), marriage status (married/ not married), education (high school diploma vs. not completed), and years in the U.S. as a key predictor of labor market integration. Since TPS is a treatment with a fixed implementation time, I control how old individuals are when TPS becomes available. Age at treatment is used instead of age because it anchors individuals to their age when TPS was granted. This approach prevents bias time-varying age effects and allows for a more stable interpretation of how TPS impacts labor outcomes. This mitigates age's multicollinearity with survey year and immigration year. Further, the regression uses normalized person weights to ensure that observations contribute proportionally without distorting coefficient magnitudes, main-

taining representativeness while improving estimation stability. Year-fixed effects control for macroeconomic shocks and policy changes that affect all migrants. State-fixed effects are omitted because the sample is highly concentrated in a few states, leading to multicollinearity issues and unstable estimates. Instead of clustering standard errors, I use HC3 robust standard errors, which provide valid inference even with smaller sample sizes. Given that the sample is concentrated in a few states, clustering at the state-year level would not add much correction. I also avoid the downward bias that arises when the number of clusters is too small for reliable variance estimation. Therefore, using HC3 and normalized weights controls for heteroskedasticity and maintains representativeness.

I run the basic regression (1) for all individuals from each country and then run separate regressions in data subsets of only men or only women by education level[13]. I then run an extended model that includes interaction terms with DID (the interaction between $TPS\_ELIGIBLE_{ict}$ and $ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG_{ict}$) capturing gender differences and differential TPS effects by education level. The model also controls for the interaction between TPS treatment and age at treatment to account for potential age-based heterogeneity. The extended model allows for heterogeneous treatment effects by interacting the DiD variable with these key variables.

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{ict} = \beta_0 &+ \beta_1 \text{TPS\_ELIGIBLE}_{ict} + \beta_2 \text{ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG}_{ict} \\ &+ \beta_3 \text{DID}_{ict} + \beta_4 \text{DID\_SEX}_{ict} + \beta_5 \text{DID\_EDUC}_{ict} \\ &+ \beta_6 \text{DID\_SEX\_EDUC}_{ict} + \beta_7 \text{DID\_AAT}_{ict} \\ &+ X_{ict}\Gamma + \delta_t + \epsilon_{ict} \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

The extended model (2) is used in separate regressions for all individuals from El Salvador, Honduras, or Nicaragua.

[13] An alternative specification, which estimated the extended model separately for men and women but excluded the sex interaction term (DID_SEX), produced largely insignificant results. These regressions are presented in the appendix for reference, but due to their structural differences from the main models, they should not be directly compared to the DID_SEX coefficient in the full extended model.

2.2.2 Key Assumptions

Several assumptions must hold to ensure valid identification of TPS's effect on labor outcomes. First, cohorts within groups must be comparable. The model assumes that absent TPS, the difference in outcomes between earlier and more recent migrants from TPS-eligible countries would be the same as the corresponding difference among Mexican migrants. In the absence of TPS, labor outcomes for non-TPS-eligible migrants would have followed similar trends to TPS-eligible migrants because they are subject to the same external labor market conditions and treatment in the U.S. Since I am comparing earlier and later cohorts within TPS-eligible countries (and within Mexicans), the two cohorts must be similar enough for valid inference. Earlier and later cohorts within TPS-eligible countries must differ primarily in their eligibility for TPS, not in their inherent characteristics. Cohorts of late-arriving and early arriving Mexican migrants must also be similar to each other. We conduct normalized differences balancing tests (3) among these groups and find that the cohorts are not significantly different in key demographic and labor market characteristics, such as age, education, gender distribution, marriage status distribution, income, and home ownership.

$$\Delta = \frac{\bar{X}_T - \bar{X}_C}{\sqrt{\frac{s_T^2 + s_C^2}{2}}} \tag{3}$$

Although post-TPS migrants may differ in characteristics due to the circumstances that triggered TPS (such as natural disasters), this distinction is unlikely to bias the treatment effect because, once in the U.S., all migrants face the same labor market conditions. The model assumes that differences in labor outcomes are driven by TPS eligibility itself rather than differences in migration motives, as all individuals must navigate the same structural barriers to employment. The natural disasters did not affect the trend of outcomes in the labor market in the U.S. Another key assumption is that valid counterfactuals must exist. The model assumes that early-arriving Mexicans' labor market outcomes represent what TPS-eligible individuals would have experienced without TPS. TPS-eligible individuals and Mexicans must face the same external labor market forces (e.g., economic shocks, immigration policy, discrimination) that could influence outcomes. While pre-TPS equivalence cannot be confirmed directly, I validate this assumption indirectly by conducting normal-

ized differences balancing tests comparing the characteristics of TPS-eligible migrants from TPS-designated countries to similarly defined Mexican migrants. These tests, repeated for late-arriving migrants, reveal no significant differences and support the comparability of these groups. Additionally, I conduct an event study analysis to examine if labor market outcomes evolved similarly for post-TPS arrivals from TPS-eligible countries and Mexico, estimating year-by-year deviations relative to a 2002 reference year. The studies show that both groups follow similar trends in the survey for most (but not all) outcomes across TPS countries. The reliability of these findings is limited by compositional changes of the ACS, which did not include individuals from every TPS-eligible and non-eligible immigration year in every survey year. Since the composition of observed cohorts varies from year-to-year, the event studies face biases in accurately displaying trends over time. Finally, Mexicans are largely concentrated in the same industries and states as TPS beneficiaries, strengthening the assumption that they operate in comparable labor markets and reinforcing their suitability as a control group.

The model structure requires that the effect of time in the U.S. be controlled since people immigrating in TPS-eligible years have lived in the country longer, potentially biasing their comparability with newer migrants. The no anticipation assumption holds because TPS was granted in response to exogenous shocks and migrants could not have strategically altered their arrival timing to gain eligibility. Last, the model assumes that spillover effects are of second-order importance and that the basic and extended models inherently capture shared economic shocks that affect both TPS-eligible and non-eligible individuals.

2.3 Robustness Checks

To ensure the validity of the basic model estimates and confirm that unobserved labor market trends do not drive the observed effects of TPS eligibility, I conduct two robustness checks: a placebo test and a Guatemala-Mexico comparison.

The placebo test assigns random TPS eligibility to a cohort that should not have received it: 1996 for Salvadorans and 1994 for Hondurans and Nicaraguans. Then, it re-estimates the basic model to assess if the difference in labor market trends between treated and control groups (Salvadoran/Honduran/Nicaraguan migrants vs. Mexican migrants) is due to TPS

and not some unrelated factor. If TPS is not affecting labor outcomes, then the placebo DiD coefficient (the interaction term between being from an eligible country and immigrating in eligible years) should still show a significant effect because some other unobserved factor must be driving the results. The placebo DID coefficients are statistically insignificant across all labor market outcomes for all designated countries. This strengthens the parallel trends assumption and supports the validity of the control group selection.

To further assess the validity of the Mexican migrant comparison group and the reliability of our main results, I conducted an additional DiD analysis using Guatemalan migrants as the treatment group and Mexican migrants as the control. Due to shared economic and migration patterns, Guatemalan immigrants are similar to Salvadorans, Nicaraguans and Hondurans, but were never granted TPS. I further verify the comparability of the treatment countries and Guatemala by running normalized differences balance tests. Outcomes that contrast Mexicans with Guatemalans can reveal if any atypical trends among Mexican migrants or in the labor market might explain our findings. The Guatemalan DiD coefficients are statistically insignificant across all outcomes.

Together, these robustness checks provide strong support for the reliability of the main findings, confirming that TPS eligibility had a significant impact on labor market outcomes and that external labor market forces or selection bias do not drive these effects.

3 Results

3.1 General Sample Results

The analysis examines several labor market outcomes to assess the impact of TPS eligibility. Employment is a binary indicator of whether an individual was employed. Labor force participation is a binary variable indicating whether an individual was active in the labor force. Weekly hours worked captures the number of hours a respondent usually worked per week if they reported working in the previous year. Income represents a respondent's total pre-tax personal income in a year, while wages represent pre-tax wage and salary income (money received as an employee). Both are shown in logarithmic form and adjusted for

inflation. All outcomes, except labor force participation, are conditional on being in the labor force.

To properly interpret these results, it's important to understand that all effects are measured as relative differences that isolate the causal impact of TPS eligibility. The results focus on three main coefficients: DID, DID_SEX, and DID_EDUC. The DID coefficient comes from the basic model (1). It represents the average treatment effect of TPS eligibility across all eligible individuals from a given country without distinguishing between gender or education groups. DID is constructed as the interaction between a dummy variable for being from a treatment country and a dummy for immigrating in the TPS-eligible period. A positive DID coefficient indicates that TPS-eligible individuals benefited more from TPS relative to non-eligible individuals, beyond general labor market trends observed among Mexican migrants. Conversely, a negative DID coefficient suggests that TPS-eligible individuals benefited less (or were more negatively impacted) compared to their non-eligible counterparts. In contrast, the extended model (2) introduces interaction terms to capture heterogeneity in TPS effects across gender (DID_SEX) and education (DID_EDUC), capturing if TPS benefits were distributed unevenly across subpopulations. The DID_SEX coefficient measures how much more (or less) TPS affected women relative to men rather than an absolute effect of TPS on women. Similarly, the DID_EDUC coefficient captures how TPS effects differ between high school graduates and non-graduates. Since the extended model introduces additional interaction terms, the DiD coefficient in the basic model cannot be directly compared to the DiD coefficient in the extended model.

The DID coefficient, which measures the overall effect of TPS eligibility, is statistically significant only in El Salvador. TPS eligibility is associated with a 9.3% increase in wages and a 10% increase in total income for Salvadorans relative to their ineligible counterparts, beyond the changes observed among Mexican migrants. For Honduras and Nicaragua, the DID coefficients are statistically insignificant, providing evidence that TPS eligibility did not have a clear overall effect on these groups.

In the extended model, the DID_SEX coefficient indicates that TPS had a differential effect on hours worked between men and women. In El Salvador, the TPS effect on hours worked for women differed from that for men by 1.3 hours, and in Nicaragua, by 4.58 hours.

However, this does not imply that women necessarily increased their hours worked. It only tells us that the TPS effect on hours worked was more positive (or less negative) for women compared to men. For example, this difference could arise if TPS led to a decrease in men's hours worked while women's hours remained unchanged or if men's hours declined more than women's. Similarly, a positive DID_SEX coefficient could reflect cases where both men and women increased their hours, but women's increase was larger. The coefficient only captures the relative difference in the TPS effect between genders, not the absolute impact on women's hours worked. In Honduras, a positive DID_SEX coefficient of 5.2 for labor force participation means that TPS had a 5.2 percentage point different effect on women's participation relative to men's. However, this does not indicate whether women's participation increased in absolute terms—it only tells us that women were affected differently than men. This relative difference could result from women's labor force participation increasing more than men's or from women's participation declining less than men's after TPS. Additionally, TPS had a weaker employment effect for high school graduates in El Salvador, who experienced a 5.1 percentage point difference in employment compared to non-graduates.

3.2 Gender Subsets Results

To further examine gender differences in the effect of TPS, the study estimates separate regressions for men and women by education level using the basic model (1), reporting only the DiD coefficient for each country. These coefficients capture the overall effect of TPS on each group without interaction terms. Unlike DID_SEX, the coefficient reflects the within-group impact of TPS eligibility for each gender by each education level. The subset regressions demonstrate that TPS effects varied significantly across countries, gender, and education levels. I also ran the basic model for subsets of men and women (not delineated by education), but these results are only included in the appendix.

In El Salvador, TPS eligibility caused more educated men to benefit 5 percentage points less in employment compared to both non-eligible Salvadorans and the baseline Mexican immigrant trend. Less educated Salvadorans experienced a 6.5 percentage point positive effect on employment beyond any changes observed in the control groups. Meanwhile, more educated Salvadoran women worked 4.77 fewer hours per week due to eligibility for TPS,

beyond any shifts seen in the control groups. In Honduras, there was evidence that TPS eligibility produced economic benefits for less educated men, causing a 14.9% positive relative effect in wages, a 15.5% in income, and a 3.4 percentage point higher labor force participation rate compared to both non-eligible Hondurans and the Mexican immigrant baseline. For Nicaragua, the only statistically significant impact was among more educated men: TPS eligibility caused a 6.5 percentage point greater labor force participation relative to both non-eligible Nicaraguans and Mexican immigrants.

Due to the different model specifications, the gender-specific regression results cannot be directly compared with the DID_SEX coefficient from the full model. However, both analytical approaches consistently demonstrate heterogeneous TPS effects across education and gender groups.

Table 1: Difference-in-Differences (DID) Estimates by Country

	Employment	Wages	Income	Hours Worked	Labor Force Participation
Panel (A) El Salvador					
DID	0.005	0.100*	0.093*	-0.313	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.54)	(0.052)	(0.496)	(0.010)
DID_SEX	0.024	0.084	0.054	1.300*	0.025
	(0.015)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.680)	(0.020)
DID_EDUC	-0.051**	-0.042	-0.053	-0.022	0.005
	(0.022)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.584)	(0.011)
Panel (B) Honduras					
	Employment	Wages	Income	Hours Worked	Labor Force Participation
DID	0.004	-0.016	0.027	0.136	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.593)	(0.015)
DID_SEX	0.004	-0.301	-0.103	-1.104	0.052*
	(0.039)	(0.222)	(0.118)	(1.251)	(0.027)
DID_EDUC	0.011	-0.036	-0.038	-0.657	-0.046
	(0.019)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(1.354)	(0.031)
Panel (C) Nicaragua					
	Employment	Wages	Income	Hours Worked	Labor Force Participation
DID	-0.015	0.173	0.161	0.486	0.01
	(0.039)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(1.548)	(0.034)
DID_SEX	0.087	0.240	0.240	4.583**	-0.025
	(0.054)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(1.861)	(0.190)
DID_EDUC	-0.089	0.098	0.119	4.036	0.094
	(0.111)	(0.177)	(0.174)	(2.951)	(0.075)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
The table displays the DID coefficient of the basic Difference-in-Differences (DiD) specification model on the labor market effects of TPS eligibility for all individuals from each designated country. The `DID` coefficient is the interaction of being from a TPS-eligible country and immigrating to the U.S in an eligible year. It comes from a baseline Difference-in-Differences (DiD) regression that controls for age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the U.S. In contrast, the `DID_SEX` and `DID_EDUC` coefficients come from an extended model and are the interactions terms between `DID` and a dummy for gender or a dummy for having a highschool diploma. The capture differential effects by gender (`DID_SEX`) and education level (`DID_EDUC`). The model also controls for the interaction between `DID` and age at treatment (`DID_AAT`) to account for potential age-based heterogeneity, but these results are not reported. The sample is restricted to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

Table 2: Difference-in-Differences (DID) Estimates by Country, Gender, and Education Level

	High School Diploma		No High School Diploma	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Panel A: El Salvador				
Employed	-0.050**	-0.017	0.015	0.065**
	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.033)
Wages	0.111	-0.227	0.121	0.158
	(0.099)	(0.140)	(0.077)	(0.157)
Income	0.103	-0.218	0.107	0.166
	(0.099)	(0.140)	(0.072)	(0.158)
Hours Worked	0.814	-4.777**	-0.367	0.198
	(0.665)	(1.909)	(0.718)	(1.385)
Labor Force Participation	0.008	0.039	0.002	0.023
	(0.015)	(0.049)	(0.011)	(0.035)
Panel B: Honduras				
Employed	0.001	0.010	-0.018	0.053
	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.054)
Wages	-0.087	-0.011	0.149**	-0.244
	(0.087)	(0.169)	(0.069)	(0.232)
Income	-0.078	-0.026	0.155**	-0.040
	(0.089)	(0.166)	(0.069)	(0.141)
Hours Worked	0.305	0.919	0.448	-1.514
	(1.355)	(1.855)	(0.824)	(1.409)
Labor Force Participation	-0.013	-0.052	0.034*	0.037
	(0.035)	(0.051)	(0.019)	(0.042)
Panel C: Nicaragua				
Employed	-0.078	0.030	0.009	0.001
	(0.089)	(0.036)	(0.067)	(0.014)
Wages	0.005	-0.012	0.266	0.429
	(0.186)	(0.299)	(0.207)	(0.269)
Income	0.033	-0.020	0.235	0.367
	(0.182)	(0.300)	(0.205)	(0.250)
Hours Worked	2.658	-1.093	-1.875	1.137
	(2.049)	(3.856)	(2.831)	(2.395)
Labor Force Participation	0.065*	-0.015	-0.053	-0.039
	(0.036)	(0.057)	(0.069)	(0.190)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

The tables display the DID coefficient of the basic Difference-in-Differences (DiD) specification model on the labor market effects of TPS eligibility by gender and education level. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the U.S. The sample is restricted to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

3.3 Results Discussion

Two general ideas emerge from the results: the study did not find evidence that TPS had broad and sweeping effects (effects were often small and/or insignificant or inconsistent across countries), which are characterized by heterogeneity. Across and within the three countries, impacts were not broad-based or consistent across groups. There are fundamental differences in how each country's nationals benefit. Although El Salvador shows a general wage effect in the DID model, the lack of consistent or strong effects at the subgroup level suggests the wage effects observed in the general DID model may be driven by a broad but small increase spread across the population, rather than coming from noticeable effects in various subgroups. If TPS had broad economic benefits, we would expect consistent wage or labor market improvements across subgroups or across countries based on the literature.

The study reveals that TPS does not deliver uniform benefits across all Central American immigrants. Instead, TPS creates narrow windows of opportunity that specific demographic groups are positioned to leverage, while others see little or no change. Consistently, the most meaningful effects emerge at the subgroup level, and who and how they benefit depends on the national context. Specifically, different subgroups benefit across different countries, and the same demographic (e.g., less-educated men) may be affected in one country but not another (or see a different outcome if from another country). Several factors can explain this limited impact.

First, eligible people may not take advantage of TPS. The results indicate that administrative hurdles and confusing information might have inhibited access. Immigrants unfamiliar with the confusing process might not apply or lose status, allowing only a few people to fully acquire status. Further, TPS-eligible and non-eligible individuals exhibit high labor

force participation rates; since we assume non-eligible migrants represent what TPS recipients might have faced before TPS, we can deduce that most TPS-eligible migrants were already working, so the policy didn't enact widespread effects by changing their ability to work. Many TPS holders work in the same low-skilled, low-wage industries as non-eligible workers. Industry distributions show that Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans primarily worked in construction, food service, manufacturing, and other sectors with limited upward mobility. TPS's temporary status likely discouraged long-term human capital investments. Migrants may have been reluctant to pursue higher education, specialized training, or change jobs if they were uncertain about their long-term ability to stay in the U.S. Further, the political-economic context of TPS recipients' arrival–one of adverse immigration laws and public reception–might have discouraged them from taking the risk of exposing themselves to USCIS by applying for status and investing in human capital (Menjívar, 2006). These mechanisms suggest that people as a whole did not change their behavior after TPS. Therefore, it could not facilitate sweeping benefits. Only specific groups were directly affected by the policy.

Further, who chooses to apply for TPS might vary systematically across countries and demographics. Salcido and Menjívar (2012) demonstrate how immigration policies, including pathways to legal status, are inherently gendered, reinforcing structural barriers that could have limited women's ability to leverage TPS fully and led to heterogeneous labor market responses, as men and women face distinct challenges in applying for and utilizing temporary legal protections. Women often depend on men during the legalization process and are frequently not the primary petitioners. Laws may appear neutral, but in practice, they reinforce patriarchal norms by privileging male breadwinners and marginalizing women as dependents. Gender dynamics and inequalities may manifest differently across countries, determining which groups benefit or are suppressed in each country. Central American countries have diverging racial compositions and language assimilation to further differentiate them. Therefore, they might be differentially affected by discrimination. Last, the evidence of heterogeneity supports the idea that education and gender are still insufficient to overcome structural barriers. For example, more educated immigrants might face credential recognition issues that TPS doesn't solve.

For groups where we see significance, those effects align with previous literature where various explanations arise. In El Salvador, more educated men experienced a decline in employment, consistent with Kaushal's (2006) findings, which suggest that higher-skilled immigrants may temporarily leave employment after legalization to search for better jobs. More educated Salvadoran men may have struggled to find jobs that matched their credentials post-TPS if they were limited in translating legal status into improved economic outcomes by employers' willingness to hire. More-educated Salvadoran women saw declining hours worked, potentially due to household dynamics. Pan (2012) notes that newly legalized women may reduce their labor supply if household income increases or a partner works more. Alternatively, some women may have transitioned into part-time or informal work while looking for better opportunities, as Kaushal (2006) observed for men. In contrast, less-educated Salvadoran women saw increased employment, suggesting that TPS helped them transition from informal or unstable jobs into more stable employment. Pan (2012) finds that employers were more willing to hire newly legalized women, which may explain this increase. Additionally, Orrenius and Zavodny (2014) suggest that increases in employment for less-educated women could be linked to declining employment among their male counterparts.

The only significant TPS effects in Honduras were for less-educated men, who saw wage increases, income, and labor force participation. This finding is consistent with Kaushal (2006), who suggests that lower-skilled workers may experience immediate wage gains post-legalization as their limited skill sets previously prevented them from accessing and searching for better jobs. Pan (2012) argues that legalization gives workers bargaining power, allowing them to hold out for better jobs rather than accepting unstable, low-paying work. Additionally, Amuedo-Dorantes & Bansak (2011) found that legalization improves wages for those who remain in their jobs, suggesting that some less-educated Honduran men may have stayed in their existing jobs but saw wage increases as employers formalized their employment or reduced the wage penalty. However, these significant effects on Hondurans do not appear in the general DID model, likely due to heterogeneous effects across other groups. While the policy may have positively impacted less-educated Honduran men, its effects were not strong or widespread enough across Honduran subgroups to appear at the aggregate level,

reinforcing that only certain groups are prepared to leverage TPS. The only significant effect in Nicaragua was an increase in labor force participation for more educated men. TPS may have encouraged these individuals to re-enter the workforce or search for jobs that better match their skills. Pan (2012) finds that TPS-like programs can increase job-search incentives by providing legal stability, which could explain why more educated Nicaraguans showed increased labor force participation. However, we do not see corresponding gains in employment or wages, suggesting that some of these individuals may have been actively searching for work but were not necessarily securing higher-paying jobs immediately. It is important to interpret the Nicaraguan results cautiously, as the sample sizes for many subgroups are small, often around 50 individuals or fewer. This limited sample size increases standard errors, reduces statistical power (making it more challenging to detect effects), and increases instability in measured effects.

Overall, El Salvador reaped the effects of TPS more broadly. The general model and multiple subgroup regressions show more consistent TPS effects, suggesting broader uptake or stronger network support. In contrast, Honduras and Nicaragua each show gains for only one subgroup. Salvadorans were less educated and had lower income levels. Perhaps they see more benefits because they had more to gain from minimal legalization, or because their networks allowed them to take advantage of TPS. Regardless, their outcomes reinforce that TPS's impact is shaped by national context and demographic composition. Which groups are prepared to take advantage of the policy depends on the unique context of their nationalities.

3.4 Empirical Concerns

This section outlines key empirical challenges that may affect the interpretation of results, including estimation accuracy, model specification, and the limitations of the dataset.

Using HC3 robust standard errors accounts for heteroskedasticity but can inflate standard errors, especially in smaller samples, possibly leading to type two errors (false negatives). For Nicaragua, multicollinearity is particularly severe due to its small sample size and because many Nicaraguans immigrated in the same year, interacting with controls for years in the U.S., year-fixed effects, and age at treatment. While these controls are necessary to account for differences in age at migration and time in the U.S., they make it difficult to separate

their independent effects, and the resulting inflated standard error makes it harder to detect them. Normalized person weights ensure that underrepresented subgroups, like TPS holders, receive the appropriate influence in estimates. However, WLS reduces precision compared to OLS because it has a disproportionate influence on heavily weighted observations, which can increase variance in the estimates, especially when those observations are few or noisy, as is often the case in small subgroup samples. Another empirical concern comes from the structure of the Nicaraguan sample. The ACS sampled a small number of Nicaraguan people concentrated in fewer states than other TPS-eligible groups (California and Florida). The lack of significance in DID, DID_SEX, and DID_EDUC for Nicaragua may be due to sample size limitations rather than the absence of an actual TPS effect. The composition of observed TPS-eligible and ineligible cohorts varies across ACS years, distorting estimates if certain TPS-eligible groups are underrepresented in specific ACS years. The DID model assumes that the composition of TPS-eligible and ineligible groups remains stable over time, but fluctuations in sample composition could bias the results. Given our total sample size, ACS sample sizes for TPS countries are small year-to-year. Fluctuations in the structure of year-to-year samples introduce noise that may either exaggerate or obscure treatment effects, undermining the model's ability to cleanly isolate the causal impact of TPS. While sample size presents challenges for statistical power in some models, the consistent pattern of heterogeneity across specifications strengthens confidence in this central finding.

Further, a fully interacted model for gender was not used due to sample size limitations. Running separate regressions for men and women preserves statistical power but prevents the estimation of fully interacted gender effects across all covariates. Instead of estimating separate coefficients for every variable by gender, we allow the TPS treatment effect to vary by gender while keeping other covariates pooled. Moreover, a fully interacted Difference-in-Differences model pooling all three TPS-eligible countries into a single dataset would allow for a direct comparison of TPS effects across nationalities. However, implementing this model poses significant challenges due to differences in TPS implementation timing and the need for a flexible staggered DiD framework beyond the traditional DiD structure. The most significant empirical concern is the possible misidentification of TPS-eligible individuals. Legal status is not directly reported in the dataset, and using proxies introduces the risk of

misclassification bias where some individuals may incorrectly be categorized as TPS-eligible while overlooking individuals who were eligible for TPS.

4 Conclusion

The results challenge TPS's effectiveness as a short-term economic stabilizer. Rather than producing broad labor market improvements for all possible beneficiaries, the effects of TPS were small, often insignificant, and highly heterogeneous across groups. This suggests that legal work authorization–or its prospect– does not guarantee economic gains and that the temporary nature of TPS may limit its effectiveness in fostering labor improvements in the short term. Moreover, the variation in TPS's impact across Salvadorans, Hondurans, and Nicaraguans underscores the limitations of a one-size-fits-all immigration policy. Fragmentation is evidence that TPS did not function as a broadly effective economic stabilizer or mobility tool. Historically, U.S. immigration policy has affected Central American groups differently and unevenly, and applied within the same group at different times. The legacies of these effects change how groups benefit from broad-stroke policies, possibly inhibiting them from working as designed. These findings indicate that the effectiveness of TPS depends on structural factors that vary by country and demographic group. If TPS intends to provide humanitarian protection and economic stability, policymakers must consider whether its current design is sufficient. TPS might need to include more substantial employment support, pathways to more permanent legal status, or tailored labor market programs for different recipient groups. If the policy's goal is economic mobility, future immigration policy may need to shift away from temporary protections toward more stable, long-term solutions that provide displaced individuals with greater security and opportunities for advancement.

Further research should focus on a fully interacted DiD model pooling all TPS-eligible countries, allowing for a direct comparison of TPS effects and a more comprehensive understanding of heterogeneous effects; this could involve using the Callaway and Sant'Anna (2021) Difference-in-Differences approach, which allows for staggered treatment timing across multiple time periods. Expansions on TPS research should also uncover the causes of heterogeneity among nationalities to tailor policy improvement recommendations better. If

countries are not benefiting homogeneously in the short term, future studies should investigate if this discrepancy persists twenty years later. More effective immigration policies could alleviate immediate vulnerabilities and empower recipients to contribute more fully to the economy and society. Future expansions should formally test the role of immigrant networks in shaping labor market responses to TPS. A potential extension could incorporate local network density measures, using regional settlement patterns of TPS recipients to examine whether labor market benefits are more potent in areas with larger pre-existing co-national communities.

Another key area of inquiry is gender-specific labor market behavior. The DID_SEX coefficient identifies differential effects by gender but does not explain what drives these differences. Future research could move beyond broad gender classifications by investigating specific labor market conditions affecting men and women differently across origin countries. Theoretical models on intra-household labor allocation could be used to explore how TPS interacts with household dynamics and examine whether marital status mediates TPS effects. Additionally, future research could move beyond labor market indicators to examine broader measures of integration and stability (homeowner ownership, access to credit, intergenerational mobility). Finally, expansions should also investigate whether long-term reliance on temporary status allows for eventual investment in human capital and alters the industry concentrations of TPS recipients compared to non-eligible people from the same country over time. Overall, future research should uncover the causes of heterogeneity among nationalities to better tailor policy improvement recommendations.

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A Appendix

A.1 Variable Descriptions

Table 3: Variable Descriptions

Variable	Description
SEX	Binary variable indicating respondent's sex (0 = male, 1 = female).
AGE	Respondent's current age in years.
AGE_AT_-TREATMENT	Age of the respondent at the time TPS was granted, used instead of current age to control for time-varying age effects.
YEARS_IN_US	Number of years the respondent has lived in the U.S., calculated as the survey year minus the immigration year.
INCOME	Total pre-tax personal income in a year, shown in logarithmic form and adjusted for inflation.
WAGES	Pre-tax wage and salary income—money received as an employee, also shown in logarithmic form and adjusted for inflation.
MARST	Marital status dummy (1 = married, 0 = not married).
TPS_ELIGIBLE	Binary variable indicating whether an individual is from a TPS-eligible country (1 = eligible, 0 = not eligible).
ELIGIBLEYR-IMMIG	Binary variable indicating whether an individual immigrated within the TPS-eligible period.
DID	Difference-in-Differences interaction term capturing the overall TPS treatment effect (TPS_ELIGIBLE × ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG).
DID_SEX	Interaction term measuring how TPS effects differ by gender (DID × SEX).
DID_EDUC	Interaction term measuring how TPS effects differ by education level (DID × EDUC_9TH).
DID_SEX_EDUC	Triple interaction term capturing TPS effects by both gender and education level (DID × SEX × EDUC_9TH).
DID_AAT	Interaction term capturing variation in TPS effects based on age at treatment (DID × AGE_AT_TREATMENT).
EDUC_9TH	Binary variable indicating whether the respondent has a high school diploma (1 = at least high school, 0 = less than high school).
C(YEAR)	Set of year fixed effects controlling for macroeconomic trends affecting all migrants.
YEAR	Survey year indicating the year in which the data was collected.
OWNERSHP	Binary variable indicating whether the respondent owns their dwelling (1 = owning, 0 = not owning).

A.2 Summary Statistics

A.2.1 Summary Statistics by TPS Eligibility

Table 4: Demographic and Economic Statistics by TPS Eligibility

	TPS Eligible		**Not TPS Eligible**	
Outcome	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)
Panel A: Honduras				
Age	31.52	(7.55)	30.46	(7.94)
Years of Education	9.46	(2.52)	9.22	(3.01)
Employment Rate (%)	94.53		94.66	
Labor Force Participation (%)	95.45		94.47	
Hours Worked	40.07	(9.08)	39.41	(8.19)
Log Income	9.67	(0.83)	9.54	(0.81)
Log Wage Income	9.62	(1.00)	9.53	(0.82)
Homeownership (%)	29.50		20.66	
Panel B: Nicaragua				
Age	35.36	(11.58)	29.44	(9.79)
Years of Education	10.74	(2.32)	10.51	(2.20)
Employment Rate (%)	93.61		95.34	
Labor Force Participation (%)	94.96		94.64	
Hours Worked	39.37	(10.11)	38.76	(9.32)
Log Income	9.68	(0.87)	9.47	(0.98)
Log Wage Income	9.66	(0.87)	9.45	(1.01)
Homeownership (%)	32.94		26.61	
Panel C: El Salvador				
Age	29.73	(7.81)	28.65	(8.39)
Years of Education	9.03	(3.17)	8.94	(3.24)
Employment Rate (%)	95.11		94.59	
Labor Force Participation (%)	95.16		95.02	
Hours Worked	39.48	(8.45)	39.75	(8.58)
Log Income	9.65	(0.85)	9.37	(0.96)
Log Wage Income	9.64	(0.86)	9.36	(0.97)
Homeownership (%)	28.75		23.14	

A.2.2 Summary Statistics for Women

Table 5: Demographic and Economic Statistics for Females by TPS Eligibility

	Female TPS Eligible		**Female Not TPS Eligible**	
Outcome	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)
Panel A: Honduras				
Age	32.28	(6.93)	31.42	(8.43)
Years of Education	9.73	(2.47)	9.12	(2.94)
Employment Rate (%)	93.43		90.65	
Labor Force Participation (%)	92.62		93.33	
Hours Worked	37.19	(9.50)	36.81	(7.87)
Log Income	9.50	(0.29)	9.21	(0.90)
Log Wage Income	9.16	(1.28)	9.19	(0.91)
Homeownership (%)	26.33		23.22	
Panel B: Nicaragua				
Age	35.41	(11.60)	31.29	(11.11)
Years of Education	10.86	(2.25)	11.01	(1.54)
Employment Rate (%)	99.17		97.39	
Labor Force Participation (%)	91.47		91.81	
Hours Worked	36.36	(10.04)	35.47	(9.70)
Log Income	9.35	(0.93)	9.13	(1.17)
Log Wage Income	9.35	(0.93)	9.09	(1.19)
Homeownership (%)	42.81		30.51	
Panel C: El Salvador				
Age	30.42	(8.42)	29.13	(8.91)
Years of Education	9.10	(3.18)	8.95	(3.27)
Employment Rate (%)	95.26		90.86	
Labor Force Participation (%)	90.53		88.93	
Hours Worked	37.02	(9.27)	37.79	(9.70)
Log Income	9.28	(0.94)	9.11	(1.01)
Log Wage Income	9.26	(0.95)	8.99	(1.11)
Homeownership (%)	31.77		24.15	

A.2.3 Summary Statistics for Men

Table 6: Demographic and Economic Statistics for Males by TPS Eligibility

	Male TPS Eligible		**Male Not TPS Eligible**	
Outcome	Mean	(SD)	Mean	(SD)
Panel A: Honduras				
Age	31.13	(7.82)	29.97	(7.64)
Years of Education	9.32	(2.53)	9.27	(3.04)
Employment Rate (%)	95.08		96.66	
Labor Force Participation (%)	96.92		95.05	
Hours Worked	41.57	(8.48)	40.73	(8.04)
Log Income	9.87	(0.71)	9.71	(0.71)
Log Wage Income	9.85	(0.72)	9.71	(0.71)
Homeownership (%)	31.15		19.35	
Panel B: Nicaragua				
Age	35.31	(11.57)	28.36	(8.74)
Years of Education	10.64	(2.37)	10.21	(2.46)
Employment Rate (%)	89.21		94.18	
Labor Force Participation (%)	97.91		96.30	
Hours Worked	41.91	(9.44)	40.70	(8.52)
Log Income	9.95	(0.71)	9.67	(0.78)
Log Wage Income	9.93	(0.71)	9.66	(0.81)
Homeownership (%)	24.58		24.32	
Panel C: El Salvador				
Age	29.40	(7.47)	28.46	(8.17)
Years of Education	9.00	(3.17)	8.94	(3.23)
Employment Rate (%)	95.05		95.95	
Labor Force Participation (%)	97.36		97.47	
Hours Worked	40.65	(7.76)	40.54	(7.96)
Log Income	9.83	(0.74)	9.52	(0.85)
Log Wage Income	9.82	(0.75)	9.50	(0.87)
Homeownership (%)	27.32		22.73	

A.3 Sample Sizes

Table 7: Overall Sample Sizes by Country and Eligibility

	Country		
	El Salvador	Honduras	Nicaragua
Eligible	1,861	700	110
Not Eligible	824	702	160
Total	2,685	1,402	270

Table 8: Mexico Control Sample Size by Country and Eligibility

	Mexico Control Sample Size		
	El Salvador	Honduras	Nicaragua
Eligible	19,093	14,460	14,460
Not Eligible	18,060	18,738	18,738
Total	37,153	33,198	33,198

Table 9: Sample Sizes by Gender, Country, and Eligibility

	Country		
	El Salvador	Honduras	Nicaragua
Panel A: Women			
Eligible	634	243	46
Not Eligible	247	232	58
Total	881	475	104
Panel B: Men			
Eligible	1,227	457	64
Not Eligible	577	470	102
Total	1,804	927	166

Table 10: TPS Eligible by Education Level and Country

	TPS Eligible		
	El Salvador	Honduras	Nicaragua
Panel A: Counts			
Graduated	657	260	71
Did Not Graduate	1,204	440	39
Total	1,861	700	110
Panel B: Proportions			
Graduated	35%	37%	65%
Did Not Graduate	65%	63%	35%
Total	100%	100%	100%

A.4 Regression Results

Here we present full regression results for the models discussed in the paper and for other models ran as part of the study.

A.4.1 Basic Model Regression Results

Table 11: Regression Results by Country: Basic Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.008	0.017	0.022	0.062	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.422)	(0.008)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.008	-0.030	-0.025	-0.449*	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.235)	(0.005)
DID	0.005	0.100*	0.093*	-0.313	0.011
	(0.012)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.496)	(0.010)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.009***	0.009***	0.006	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.031***	-0.598***	-0.579***	-4.722***	-0.089***

Table 11 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.146)	(0.004)
MARST	-0.002	0.036***	0.033***	0.147	-0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.125)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.001	0.074***	0.072***	0.191***	-0.003**
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.062)	(0.001)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.007	0.062*	0.057*	-0.104	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.343)	(0.011)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.010	0.032	0.025	0.420*	-0.005
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.254)	(0.006)
DID	0.004	-0.016	0.027	0.136	0.013
	(0.015)	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.593)	(0.015)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.009***	0.009***	0.011	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.033***	-0.603***	-0.584***	-4.752***	-0.089***
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.150)	(0.004)
MARST	-0.001	0.050***	0.044***	0.125	-0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.128)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.002	0.025***	0.028***	-0.018	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.078)	(0.002)
Panel C: Nicaragua					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.001	-0.001	0.006	-0.365	0.002
	(0.018)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.872)	(0.018)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.008	0.035	0.029	0.462*	-0.005
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.257)	(0.006)
DID	-0.015	0.173	0.161	0.486	0.010
	(0.039)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(1.548)	(0.034)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.008***	0.009***	0.008	0.001***

Table 11 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.032***	-0.602***	-0.586***	-4.766***	-0.092***
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.153)	(0.004)
MARST	-0.001	0.045***	0.041***	0.139	-0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.131)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.001	0.025***	0.027***	-0.032	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.079)	(0.002)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.
The tables display the results of the basic Difference-in-Differences (DiD) specification model on the labor market effects of TPS eligibility. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the U.S. The sample is restricted to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

A.4.2 Extended Model Regression Results

Table 12: Regression Results by Country: Extended Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.007	0.017	0.022	0.065	-0.007
	(0.009)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.422)	(0.008)
ELIGIBLEYEIMMIG	0.008	-0.030	-0.025	-0.448*	0.007
	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.235)	(0.005)
DID	-0.001	0.028	0.017	-1.049	-0.001
	(0.022)	(0.106)	(0.105)	(1.031)	(0.021)
DID_SEX	0.024	0.084	0.054	1.300*	0.025
	(0.015)	(0.087)	(0.087)	(0.680)	(0.020)

Table 12 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DID_EDUC	-0.051**	-0.042	-0.053	-0.022	0.005
	(0.022)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.584)	(0.011)
DID_SEX_EDUC	0.029	0.005	0.035	-0.306	-0.005
	(0.032)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(1.295)	(0.036)
DID_AAT	0.001	0.002	0.003	0.015	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.034)	(0.001)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.009***	0.009***	0.006	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.033***	-0.603***	-0.582***	-4.789***	-0.091***
	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.150)	(0.004)
MARST	-0.002	0.036**	0.033***	0.147	-0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.125)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.001	0.074***	0.072***	0.192***	-0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.062)	(0.001)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.007	0.062*	0.057*	-0.103	-0.003
	(0.011)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.343)	(0.011)
ELIGIBLEYEIMMIG	-0.010	0.032	0.025	0.422*	-0.005
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.254)	(0.006)
DID	-0.046	-0.207	-0.190	-1.694	0.028
	(0.033)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(1.791)	(0.032)
DID_SEX	0.004	-0.301	-0.103	-1.104	0.052*
	(0.039)	(0.222)	(0.118)	(1.251)	(0.027)
DID_EDUC	0.011	-0.036	-0.038	-0.657	-0.046
	(0.019)	(0.083)	(0.084)	(1.354)	(0.031)
DID_SEX_EDUC	0.017	0.392	0.184	2.894	0.001
	(0.045)	(0.246)	(0.160)	(2.363)	(0.055)
DID_AAT	0.002*	0.010*	0.010*	0.081	-0.001

Table 12 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.060)	(0.001)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.008***	0.009***	0.009	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.033***	-0.600***	-0.584***	-4.753***	-0.090***
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.151)	(0.004)
MARST	-0.001	0.050*	0.044***	0.126	-0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.128)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.002	0.026***	0.028***	-0.018	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.078)	(0.002)
Panel C: Nicaragua					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.001	-0.001	0.006	-0.365	0.002
	(0.018)	(0.089)	(0.087)	(0.872)	(0.018)
ELIGIBLEYEIMMIG	-0.008	0.035	0.029	0.464*	-0.005
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.257)	(0.006)
DID	0.010	0.032	0.023	-2.627	-0.181
	(0.113)	(0.271)	(0.272)	(6.291)	(0.139)
DID_SEX	0.087	0.240	0.240	4.583**	-0.025
	(0.054)	(0.149)	(0.151)	(1.861)	(0.190)
DID_EDUC	-0.089	0.098	0.119	4.036	0.094
	(0.111)	(0.177)	(0.174)	(2.951)	(0.075)
DID_SEX_EDUC	0.065	-0.121	-0.163	-7.004	0.070
	(0.098)	(0.292)	(0.291)	(4.675)	(0.193)
DID_AAT	-0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.016	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.165)	(0.003)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.008***	0.009***	0.008	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.032***	-0.602***	-0.586***	-4.765***	-0.092***
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.153)	(0.004)

Table 12 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
MARST	-0.001	0.045***	0.041***	0.139	-0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.131)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.001	0.025***	0.027***	-0.032	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.079)	(0.002)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

(1) Employed, (2) Log Wages, (3) Log Income, (4) Hours Worked, (5) In Labor Force

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Standard errors are robust in heteroskedasticity (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

This table presents results from the extended Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model, which allows TPS effects to vary by gender, education, and age at treatment. The DID coefficient represents the TPS effect for the reference group, which consists of men without a high school diploma who immigrated in the base year at the baseline age. The (`DID_SEX`) coefficient measures how much more (or less) TPS affected women relative to men, rather than the absolute effect of TPS on women. Similarly, the (`DID_EDUC`) coefficient captures how the TPS effect differed for high school graduates relative to non-graduates, rather than the direct effect of TPS on high school graduates. The (`DID_AAT`) coefficient accounts for whether TPS eligibility's effect varies based on the age at which an individual became eligible for TPS. The sample is restricted to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the US. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

A.4.3 Men and Women By Education Results

The tables below display the results of the basic Difference-in-Differences (DiD) specification model on the labor market effects of TPS eligibility by gender and education level. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the U.S. The sample is restricted to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

Table 13: Basic Regression Results for Men with High School Diploma

	Men with High School Education				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.006	-0.008	-0.011	-1.335***	-0.004
	(0.013)	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.456)	(0.012)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.021**	-0.061	-0.042	-0.106	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.403)	(0.008)
DID	-0.050**	0.111	0.103	0.814	0.008
	(0.024)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(0.665)	(0.015)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001*	0.009***	0.009***	0.005	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.015)	(0.000)
MARST	0.010*	0.141***	0.139***	0.871***	0.005
	(0.005)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.231)	(0.004)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.005**	0.061***	0.058***	0.041	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.107)	(0.002)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.002	0.141***	0.134**	-0.624	-0.020
	(0.012)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.581)	(0.016)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.024*	0.026	0.020	-0.327	-0.009
	(0.012)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.475)	(0.008)
DID	0.001	-0.087	-0.078	0.305	-0.013
	(0.018)	(0.087)	(0.089)	(1.355)	(0.035)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.011***	0.011***	0.012	-0.001

Continued on next page

Table 13 – continued from previous page

	Men with High School Education				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.000)
MARST	0.005	0.148***	0.145***	0.798***	0.001
	(0.005)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.234)	(0.005)
YEARS_IN_US	0.006*	0.028**	0.029**	0.068	0.004
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.142)	(0.003)
Panel C: Nicaragua					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.016	0.123	0.112	-0.914	-0.034
	(0.033)	(0.086)	(0.086)	(0.806)	(0.036)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.023*	0.029	0.023	-0.288	-0.007
	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.477)	(0.008)
DID	-0.078	0.005	0.033	2.658	0.066*
	(0.089)	(0.186)	(0.182)	(2.049)	(0.036)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.011***	0.011***	0.011	-0.001
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.000)
MARST	0.005	0.144***	0.142***	0.764***	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.239)	(0.005)
YEARS_IN_US	0.006	0.027**	0.028**	0.055	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.142)	(0.003)
Observations	9330	9330	9330	9330	9693

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 14: Full Regression Results for Men without High School Education

	Men without High School Education				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.008	-0.029	-0.007	-0.222	-0.006
	(0.014)	(0.065)	(0.059)	(0.630)	(0.009)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.003	0.035	0.035	-0.494	0.002
	(0.010)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.338)	(0.008)
DID	0.015	0.121	0.107	-0.367	0.002
	(0.016)	(0.077)	(0.072)	(0.718)	(0.011)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.000	0.004***	0.004***	-0.008	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.000)
MARST	0.000	0.082***	0.084***	0.363**	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.172)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.002	0.066***	0.067***	0.219**	-0.001
	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.089)	(0.001)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.003	-0.043	-0.047	-0.151	-0.026
	(0.011)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.558)	(0.018)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.008	0.003	0.000	0.506	0.001
	(0.011)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.353)	(0.006)
DID	-0.018	0.149**	0.155**	0.448	0.034*
	(0.019)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.824)	(0.019)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.000	0.003***	0.004***	-0.012	-0.000

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Table 14 – continued from previous page

	Men without High School Education				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)	(0.000)
MARST	-0.003	0.096***	0.098***	0.650***	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.176)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.003	0.038***	0.040***	-0.028	-0.000
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.109)	(0.002)
Panel C: Nicaragua					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.026	-0.172	-0.147	-0.280	0.073
	(0.040)	(0.189)	(0.186)	(2.225)	(0.010)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.008	0.006	0.003	0.594*	-0.002
	(0.011)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.359)	(0.006)
DID	0.009	0.266	0.235	-1.875	-0.053
	(0.067)	(0.207)	(0.205)	(2.831)	(0.069)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.000	0.003***	0.003***	-0.014	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.011)	(0.000)
MARST	-0.003	0.094***	0.096***	0.511***	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.180)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.003	0.038***	0.039***	-0.057	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.111)	(0.002)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Full Regression Results for Women with High School Education

	Women with High School Education				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.017	0.374***	0.363***	4.970***	-0.021
	(0.026)	(0.113)	(0.113)	(1.567)	(0.040)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.026	-0.143*	-0.138	-0.020	0.024
	(0.019)	(0.086)	(0.085)	(0.830)	(0.025)
DID	-0.017	-0.227	-0.218	-4.779**	0.039
	(0.033)	(0.140)	(0.140)	(1.909)	(0.049)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.003**	0.025***	0.026***	0.095***	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.025)	(0.001)
MARST	-0.014	-0.091**	-0.110**	-1.210***	-0.048***
	(0.010)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.410)	(0.013)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.003	0.103***	0.105***	0.121	-0.007
	(0.005)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.217)	(0.006)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.007	0.119	0.121	0.409	0.049
	(0.023)	(0.139)	(0.135)	(0.877)	(0.034)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.005	0.171*	0.156*	0.984	0.002
	(0.020)	(0.094)	(0.092)	(0.851)	(0.028)
DID	0.010	-0.011	-0.026	0.919	-0.052
	(0.030)	(0.169)	(0.166)	(1.855)	(0.051)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001	0.021***	0.021***	0.072***	0.003***

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Table 15 – continued from previous page

	Women with High School Education				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.001)
MARST	-0.007	-0.114**	-0.141***	-1.527***	-0.050***
	(0.010)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.408)	(0.013)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.001	-0.022	-0.017	-0.294	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.266)	(0.008)
Panel C: Nicaragua					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.016	0.167	0.150	-0.233	0.049
	(0.034)	(0.220)	(0.219)	(1.762)	(0.042)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.002	0.162*	0.148	1.064	0.005
	(0.021)	(0.096)	(0.094)	(0.864)	(0.029)
DID	0.030	-0.012	-0.020	-1.093	-0.015
	(0.036)	(0.299)	(0.300)	(3.856)	(0.057)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001	0.021***	0.021***	0.065**	0.003***
	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.027)	(0.001)
MARST	-0.009	-0.124***	-0.150***	-1.203***	-0.046***
	(0.010)	(0.046)	(0.045)	(0.421)	(0.013)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.002	-0.020	-0.015	-0.326	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.272)	(0.008)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: Full Regression Results for Women without High School Diploma

	Women without High School Education				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.038	0.009	-0.019	0.362	-0.007
	(0.030)	(0.136)	(0.137)	(1.231)	(0.029)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.004	-0.107	-0.113	-1.223*	0.029
	(0.017)	(0.074)	(0.072)	(0.698)	(0.020)
DID	0.065**	0.158	0.166	0.198	0.023
	(0.033)	(0.157)	(0.158)	(1.385)	(0.035)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.011***	0.011***	-0.011	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.019)	(0.001)
MARST	-0.021**	-0.179***	-0.184***	-0.884**	-0.066***
	(0.008)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.361)	(0.010)
YEARS_IN_US	0.001	0.100***	0.098***	0.428**	-0.011**
	(0.004)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.174)	(0.005)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.048	0.098	0.090	0.213	0.034
	(0.040)	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.863)	(0.030)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.006	0.029	0.015	1.146	-0.019
	(0.019)	(0.072)	(0.072)	(0.722)	(0.024)
DID	0.053	-0.244	-0.040	-1.514	0.037
	(0.054)	(0.232)	(0.141)	(1.409)	(0.042)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001	0.011***	0.012***	0.017	0.002***

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Table 16 – continued from previous page

	Women without High School Education				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.020)	(0.001)
MARST	-0.002	-0.131***	-0.153***	-1.101***	-0.056***
	(0.010)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.377)	(0.011)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.008	0.012	0.017	0.036	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.222)	(0.007)
Panel C: Nicaragua					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.073***	-0.204	-0.153	0.165	-0.027
	(0.008)	(0.246)	(0.225)	(2.200)	(0.086)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.013	0.035	0.026	1.033	-0.015
	(0.019)	(0.074)	(0.073)	(0.734)	(0.025)
DID	0.001	0.429	0.367	1.137	-0.039
	(0.014)	(0.269)	(0.250)	(2.395)	(0.190)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001	0.011***	0.012***	0.016	0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.020)	(0.001)
MARST	-0.004	-0.153***	-0.165***	-1.110***	-0.061***
	(0.010)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.389)	(0.011)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.010	0.010	0.014	0.078	0.000
	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.227)	(0.007)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.4.4 Basic Model Women Only Regression Results

Table 17: Women Only Basic Model: Regression Results by Country

	EMPLOYED	LOGINCWAGE	LOGINCTOT	UHRSWORK	IN_LABFORCE
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.018	0.131	0.110	1.957*	-0.011
	(0.021)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(1.004)	(0.023)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMMIG	0.013	-0.123**	-0.125**	-0.760	0.028*
	(0.012)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.533)	(0.016)
DID	0.035	0.036	0.043	-1.484	0.027
	(0.024)	(0.114)	(0.114)	(1.150)	(0.028)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.016***	0.016***	0.024	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.015)	(0.000)
MARST	-0.018***	-0.140***	-0.151***	-0.995***	-0.058***
	(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.273)	(0.008)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.001	0.102***	0.099***	0.310**	-0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.136)	(0.004)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.028	0.122	0.115	0.363	0.041*
	(0.027)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.639)	(0.023)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMMIG	0.001	0.093	0.078	1.121**	-0.010
	(0.014)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.555)	(0.018)
DID	0.039	-0.163	-0.045	-0.601	-0.000
	(0.036)	(0.154)	(0.106)	(1.122)	(0.032)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.015***	0.015***	0.037**	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.000)
MARST	-0.004	-0.124***	-0.148***	-1.269***	-0.054***
	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.280)	(0.008)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.005	-0.004	0.002	-0.108	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.171)	(0.005)
Panel C: Nicaragua					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.035	0.037	0.044	0.100	0.018
	(0.023)	(0.169)	(0.164)	(1.348)	(0.039)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMMIG	0.006	0.094	0.082	1.088*	-0.007
	(0.014)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.564)	(0.019)
DID	0.023	0.166	0.136	-0.724	-0.007
	(0.025)	(0.223)	(0.219)	(2.810)	(0.068)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.014***	0.015***	0.033**	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)
MARST	-0.006	-0.139***	-0.157***	-1.139***	-0.055***
	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.288)	(0.008)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.007	-0.004	0.001	-0.095	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.175)	(0.006)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

The tables display the results of the basic Difference-in-Differences (DiD) specification model on the labor market effects of TPS eligibility for women only. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the U.S. The sample is restricted to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish

at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

A.4.5 Basic Model Men Only Regression Results

Table 18: Men Only Basic Model: Regression Results by Country

	EMPLOYED	LOGINCWAGE	LOGINCTOT	UHRSWORK	IN_LABFORCE
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.003	-0.019	-0.006	-0.606	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.435)	(0.007)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMMIG	0.006	-0.001	0.006	-0.347	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.260)	(0.005)
DID	-0.008	0.119**	0.107*	0.049	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.060)	(0.058)	(0.518)	(0.009)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.000	0.005***	0.005***	-0.005	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)
MARST	0.004	0.106***	0.106***	0.561***	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.138)	(0.002)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.001	0.064***	0.064***	0.151**	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.069)	(0.001)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.003	0.032	0.027	-0.327	-0.024*
	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.408)	(0.013)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMMIG	-0.014*	0.011	0.007	0.196	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.284)	(0.005)
DID	-0.012	0.060	0.068	0.457	0.019
	(0.014)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.690)	(0.017)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.006***	0.006***	-0.005	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.000)
MARST	0.000	0.118***	0.119***	0.653***	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.140)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.004*	0.035***	0.036***	0.008	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.086)	(0.002)
Panel C: Nicaragua					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.022	-0.029	-0.021	-0.584	-0.011
	(0.026)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(1.155)	(0.019)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMMIG	-0.013	0.014	0.010	0.264	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.287)	(0.005)
DID	-0.050	0.157	0.159	1.046	0.018
	(0.065)	(0.153)	(0.151)	(1.834)	(0.028)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.005***	0.005***	-0.007	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.000)
MARST	0.000	0.116***	0.117***	0.619***	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.143)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.004	0.034***	0.035***	-0.014	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.088)	(0.002)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.1$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{***}p < 0.01$.

The tables display the results of the basic Difference-in-Differences (DiD) specification model on the labor

market effects of TPS eligibility for men only. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, marital status, and years in the U.S. The sample is restricted to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

A.4.6 Extended Model Men Only Regression Results

Table 19: Men Only Extended Model: Regression Results by Country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.003	-0.019	-0.005	-0.606	-0.005
	(0.010)	(0.052)	(0.049)	(0.435)	(0.007)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.006	-0.001	0.006	-0.347	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.260)	(0.005)
DID	0.003	0.086	0.060	0.072	-0.022
	(0.030)	(0.122)	(0.121)	(1.173)	(0.020)
DID_EDUC	-0.051**	-0.043	-0.057	-0.074	0.006
	(0.022)	(0.061)	(0.061)	(0.591)	(0.011)
DID_AAT	0.000	0.002	0.003	0.000	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.040)	(0.001)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.000	0.005***	0.005***	-0.005	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)
MARST	0.004	0.106***	0.106***	0.561***	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.138)	(0.002)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.001	0.064***	0.064***	0.151**	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.069)	(0.001)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.003	0.032	0.027	-0.327	-0.024*
	(0.008)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.408)	(0.013)

Table 19 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.014*	0.011	0.007	0.198	-0.003
	(0.008)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.284)	(0.005)
DID	-0.069*	-0.198	-0.175	-0.598	0.065*
	(0.036)	(0.157)	(0.155)	(2.185)	(0.035)
DID_EDUC	0.015	-0.027	-0.030	-0.747	-0.044
	(0.020)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(1.363)	(0.032)
DID_AAT	0.002**	0.011*	0.010*	0.052	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.076)	(0.001)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.005***	0.005***	-0.006	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.000)
MARST	0.000	0.118***	0.118***	0.652***	-0.000
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.140)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.004*	0.035***	0.036***	0.008	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.086)	(0.002)
	Panel C: Nicaragua				
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.022	-0.029	-0.021	-0.585	-0.011
	(0.026)	(0.102)	(0.101)	(1.155)	(0.019)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.013	0.014	0.010	0.269	-0.004
	(0.008)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.287)	(0.005)
DID	0.057	-0.026	-0.047	-8.356	-0.123
	(0.179)	(0.298)	(0.299)	(5.326)	(0.159)
DID_EDUC	-0.091	0.107	0.128	5.115*	0.084
	(0.121)	(0.172)	(0.168)	(2.924)	(0.082)
DID_AAT	-0.002	0.004	0.004	0.202*	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.121)	(0.003)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.005***	0.005***	-0.008	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.000)
MARST	0.000	0.116***	0.117***	0.618***	-0.000

Table 19 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.143)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.004	0.034***	0.035***	-0.016	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.088)	(0.002)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

(1) Employed, (2) Log Wages, (3) Log Income, (4) Hours Worked, (5) In Labor Force

Standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.

This table presents results from the extended Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model for a sample of men only, which allows TPS effects to vary by education and age at treatment. The DID coefficient represents the TPS effect for the reference group, which consists of men without a high school diploma who immigrated in the base year at the baseline age. The the (`DID_EDUC`) coefficient captures how the TPS effect differed for high school graduates relative to non-graduates, rather than the direct effect of TPS on high school graduates. The (`DID_AAT`) coefficient accounts for whether TPS eligibility's effect varies based on the age at which an individual became eligible for TPS. The sample is restricted to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the US. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3)and weighted using normalized person weights.

A.4.7 Extended Model Women Only Regression Results

Table 20: Women Only Extended Model: Regression Results by Country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.018	0.131	0.110	1.955*	-0.011
	(0.021)	(0.099)	(0.099)	(1.003)	(0.023)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.013	-0.123**	-0.124**	-0.755	0.028*
	(0.012)	(0.056)	(0.055)	(0.533)	(0.016)
DID	0.023	0.036	0.029	-2.378	0.077
	(0.037)	(0.223)	(0.222)	(2.048)	(0.051)

Table 20 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
DID_EDUC	-0.022	-0.043	-0.012	-0.159	-0.005
	(0.024)	(0.112)	(0.111)	(1.176)	(0.035)
DID_AAT	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.036	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.063)	(0.001)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.016***	0.016***	0.022	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.016)	(0.000)
MARST	-0.018***	-0.140***	-0.151***	-0.993***	-0.058***
	(0.006)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.274)	(0.008)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.001	0.102***	0.099***	0.310**	-0.009**
	(0.003)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.136)	(0.004)
Panel B: Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.028	0.122	0.115	0.364	0.041*
	(0.027)	(0.074)	(0.075)	(0.639)	(0.023)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.001	0.094	0.078	1.130**	-0.010
	(0.014)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.555)	(0.018)
DID	0.013	-0.422	-0.213	-5.118*	0.015
	(0.064)	(0.363)	(0.308)	(3.065)	(0.075)
DID_EDUC	0.017	0.301	0.092	2.231	-0.056
	(0.041)	(0.237)	(0.144)	(1.943)	(0.047)
DID_AAT	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.138	0.000
	(0.002)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.090)	(0.002)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.014***	0.015***	0.034**	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)
MARST	-0.004	-0.123***	-0.148***	-1.258***	-0.054***
	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.280)	(0.008)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.005	-0.004	0.002	-0.110	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.171)	(0.005)
Panel C: Nicaragua					

Table 20 – continued from previous page

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.035	0.037	0.044	0.094	0.018
	(0.023)	(0.169)	(0.164)	(1.348)	(0.039)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.006	0.094	0.082	1.091*	-0.007
	(0.014)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.564)	(0.019)
DID	0.029	0.486	0.497	10.142	-0.219
	(0.045)	(0.577)	(0.577)	(12.416)	(0.337)
DID_EDUC	-0.018*	-0.066	-0.086	-4.920	0.143
	(0.011)	(0.273)	(0.273)	(6.124)	(0.200)
DID_AAT	0.000	-0.009	-0.010	-0.246	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.346)	(0.006)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.015***	0.015***	0.035**	0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.016)	(0.001)
MARST	-0.006	-0.140***	-0.158***	-1.144***	-0.054***
	(0.007)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.288)	(0.008)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.007	-0.004	0.001	-0.096	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.175)	(0.006)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.

(1) Employed, (2) Log Wages, (3) Log Income, (4) Hours Worked, (5) In Labor Force

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.

This table presents results from the extended Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model for a sample of men only, which allows TPS effects to vary by education and age at treatment. The DID coefficient represents the TPS effect for the reference group, which consists of men without a high school diploma who immigrated in the base year at the baseline age. The the (`DID_EDUC`) coefficient captures how the TPS effect differed for high school graduates relative to non-graduates, rather than the direct effect of TPS on high school graduates. The (`DID_AAT`) coefficient accounts for whether TPS eligibility's effect varies based on the age at which an individual became eligible for TPS. The sample is restricted

to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the US. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3)and weighted using normalized person weights.

A.5 Balance Tests

Table 21: Balance Test: Treatment Country Cohorts

Country	Variable	Treatment Mean	Control Mean	Normalized Difference
Honduras	AGE	31.52	30.46	0.14
	YEARS_EDUC	9.46	9.22	0.09
	LOGINCTOT	9.59	9.47	0.14
	LOGINCWAGE	9.54	9.46	0.08
	SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00
	OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.30	0.21	0.21
	IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.94	0.05
	SEX	0.34	0.34	0.01
	MARST	0.47	0.40	0.14
Nicaragua	AGE	35.36	29.44	0.55
	YEARS_EDUC	10.74	10.51	0.10
	LOGINCTOT	9.60	9.40	0.21
	LOGINCWAGE	9.58	9.38	0.22
	SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00
	OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.33	0.27	0.14
	IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.95	0.01
	SEX	0.46	0.37	0.18
	MARST	0.43	0.36	0.15
El Salvador	AGE	29.73	28.65	0.13
	YEARS_EDUC	9.03	8.94	0.03
x	LOGINCTOT	9.58	9.32	0.28
	LOGINCWAGE	9.56	9.31	0.28
	SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00
	OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.29	0.23	0.13
	IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.95	0.01
	SEX	0.32	0.29	0.08
	MARST	0.38	0.32	0.13

Notes: Balance tests comparing baseline characteristics of TPS Eligible migrants and Non-TPS eligible migrants across each treatment country. Following common practice, any value below 0.2 is considered acceptable, indicating that the treatment and control groups are sufficiently similar in observed characteristics.

Table 22: Balance Test: Mexico Cohorts

Comparison	Variable	Treatment Mean (Pre)	Control Mean (Post)	Normalized Difference
1996-1998 vs 1999-2001	AGE	30.64	29.60	0.12
	YEARS_EDUC	9.46	9.36	0.04
	LOGINCTOT	9.63	9.52	0.14
	LOGINCWAGE	9.62	9.50	0.13
	SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00
	OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.29	0.20	0.21
	IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.95	-0.00
	SEX	0.27	0.27	-0.01
	MARST	0.55	0.50	0.11
1998-2000 vs 2002-2004	AGE	29.81	28.88	0.11
	YEARS_EDUC	9.37	9.27	0.04
	LOGINCTOT	9.56	9.36	0.22
	LOGINCWAGE	9.55	9.35	0.21
	SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00
	OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.22	0.15	0.19
	IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.96	-0.05
	SEX	0.27	0.22	0.11
	MARST	0.51	0.45	0.12

Notes: Balance tests comparing baseline characteristics of Mexican migrants immigrating in TPS-Eligible years and those immigrating Non-TPS years eligible years. Following common practice, any value below 0.2 is considered acceptable, indicating that the treatment and control groups are sufficiently similar in observed characteristics.

Table 23: Balance Tests: TPS Eligible (El Salvador vs. Mexico)

Variable	El Salvador Mean	Mexico Mean	Normalized Difference
AGE	29.73	29.81	-0.01
YEARS_EDUC	9.03	9.37	-0.12
LOGINCTOT	9.65	9.56	0.11
LOGINCWAGE	9.64	9.55	0.11
SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00
OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.29	0.22	0.15
IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.95	0.01
SEX	0.32	0.27	0.12
MARST	0.38	0.51	-0.27

Notes: Balance tests comparing baseline characteristics of TPS-eligible migrants from El Salvador and control group migrants from Mexico. Any value below 0.2 is considered acceptable, indicating that the treatment and control groups are sufficiently similar in observed characteristics.

Table 24: Balance Tests: Non TPS-Eligible (El Salvador vs. Mexico)

Variable	**El Salvador Mean**	**Mexico Mean**	**Normalized Difference**
AGE	28.70	28.88	-0.02
YEARS_EDUC	8.87	9.24	-0.12
LOGINCTOT	9.32	9.33	-0.01
LOGINCWAGE	9.30	9.32	-0.02
SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00
OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.22	0.14	0.21
IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.96	-0.05
SEX	0.27	0.21	0.12
MARST	0.31	0.45	-0.28

Notes: Balance tests comparing baseline characteristics of Non-TPS-eligible migrants from El Salvador and control group migrants from Mexico. Any value below 0.2 is considered acceptable, indicating that the treatment and control groups are sufficiently similar in observed characteristics.

Table 25: Balance Tests: TPS Eligible (Honduras/Nicaragua vs. Mexico)

Variable	**Country 1 Mean (Nicaragua/Honduras)**	**Country 2 Mean (Mexico)**	**Normalized Difference**	**Comparison**
AGE	35.36	30.64	0.47	Nicaragua vs Mexico
YEARS_EDUC	10.74	9.46	0.51	Nicaragua vs Mexico
LOGINCTOT	9.68	9.63	0.05	Nicaragua vs Mexico
LOGINCWAGE	9.66	9.62	0.05	Nicaragua vs Mexico
SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00	Nicaragua vs Mexico
OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.33	0.29	0.08	Nicaragua vs Mexico
IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.95	-0.00	Nicaragua vs Mexico
SEX	0.46	0.27	0.41	Nicaragua vs Mexico
MARST	0.43	0.55	-0.25	Nicaragua vs Mexico
AGE	31.52	30.64	0.11	Honduras vs Mexico
YEARS_EDUC	9.46	9.46	0.00	Honduras vs Mexico
LOGINCTOT	9.67	9.63	0.04	Honduras vs Mexico
LOGINCWAGE	9.62	9.62	-0.00	Honduras vs Mexico
SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00	Honduras vs Mexico
OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.30	0.29	0.01	Honduras vs Mexico
IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.95	0.02	Honduras vs Mexico
SEX	0.34	0.27	0.16	Honduras vs Mexico
MARST	0.47	0.55	-0.16	Honduras vs Mexico

Notes: Balance tests comparing baseline characteristics of TPS-eligible migrants from Honduras and Nicaragua with control group migrants from Mexico. Any value below 0.2 is considered acceptable, indicating that the treatment and control groups are sufficiently similar in observed characteristics.

Table 26: Balance Tests: Non-TPS Eligible (Honduras/Nicaragua vs. Mexico)

Variable	Country 1 Mean (Nicaragua/Honduras)	Country 2 Mean (Mexico)	Normalized Difference	Comparison
AGE	29.44	29.60	-0.02	Nicaragua vs Mexico
YEARS_EDUC	10.51	9.36	0.45	Nicaragua vs Mexico
LOGINCTOT	9.47	9.52	-0.05	Nicaragua vs Mexico
LOGINCWAGE	9.45	9.50	-0.06	Nicaragua vs Mexico
SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00	Nicaragua vs Mexico
OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.27	0.20	0.15	Nicaragua vs Mexico
IN_LABFORCE	0.95	0.95	-0.02	Nicaragua vs Mexico
SEX	0.37	0.27	0.22	Nicaragua vs Mexico
MARST	0.36	0.50	-0.29	Nicaragua vs Mexico
AGE	30.46	29.60	0.10	Honduras vs Mexico
YEARS_EDUC	9.22	9.36	-0.05	Honduras vs Mexico
LOGINCTOT	9.54	9.52	0.03	Honduras vs Mexico
LOGINCWAGE	9.53	9.50	0.03	Honduras vs Mexico
SPANISH_DUMMY	1.00	1.00	0.00	Honduras vs Mexico
OWNERSHP_DUMMY	0.21	0.20	0.01	Honduras vs Mexico
IN_LABFORCE	0.94	0.95	-0.03	Honduras vs Mexico
SEX	0.34	0.27	0.15	Honduras vs Mexico
MARST	0.40	0.50	-0.19	Honduras vs Mexico

Notes: Balance tests comparing baseline characteristics of Non-TPS eligible migrants from Honduras and Nicaragua with control group migrants from Mexico. Any value below 0.2 is considered acceptable, indicating that the treatment and control groups are sufficiently similar in observed characteristics.

A.6 Event Studies

The graphs show the results of an event study analysis to examine if labor market outcomes evolved for similarly post-TPS arrivals from designated countries and Mexico, estimating year-by-year deviations relative to a 2002 reference year.



(a) El Salvador - Graph 1



(b) El Salvador - Graph 2



(c) El Salvador - Graph 3



(d) El Salvador - Graph 4

Figure 1: Event Study Graphs for El Salvador



(a) Honduras - Graph 1



(b) Honduras - Graph 2



(c) Honduras - Graph 3



(d) Honduras - Graph 4

Figure 2: Event Study Graphs for Honduras



(a) Nicaragua - Graph 1

(b) Nicaragua - Graph 2



(c) Nicaragua - Graph 3



(d) Nicaragua - Graph 4

Figure 3: Event Study Graphs for Nicaragua

A.7 Geographic Distribution

The graphs show the results of a geographic concentration analysis to examine which states respondents in the sample lived in. Distribution is shown by eligibility and country, compared to the corresponding Mexican sample.

Geographic Distribution - TPS Eligible



Figure 4: Geographic Distribution-TPS Eligible - Graph 1



Figure 5: Geographic Distribution-TPS Eligible - Graph 2



Figure 6: Geographic Distribution-TPS Eligible - Graph 3

Geographic Distribution - TPS Not Eligible



Figure 7: Geographic Distribution-TPS Not Eligible - Graph 1



Figure 8: Geographic Distribution-TPS Not Eligible - Graph 2



Figure 9: Geographic Distribution-TPS Not Eligible - Graph 3

A.8 Robustness Checks

A.8.1 Guatemala Regression

Table 27: Regression Results: Guatemala Robustness Check

Panel (A): Guatemala - El Salvador Years

	EMPLOYED	LOGINCWAGE	LOGINCTOT	UHRSWORK	LABFORCE PARTICIPATION
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.002	0.089***	0.083***	-0.709**	-0.005
	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.288)	(0.007)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.010	-0.029	-0.024	-0.482**	0.006
	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.233)	(0.005)
DID	-0.000	-0.035	-0.034	0.212	0.001
	(0.012)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.417)	(0.011)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.000***	0.009***	0.009***	0.006	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.033***	-0.595***	-0.574***	-4.785***	-0.091***
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.147)	(0.004)
MARST	-0.003	0.040***	0.037***	0.123	-0.016***
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.125)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.002	0.073***	0.072***	0.204***	-0.003*
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.061)	(0.001)

Panel (B): Guatemala - Honduras/Nicaragua Years

	EMPLOYED	LOGINCWAGE	LOGINCTOT	UHRSWORK	LABFORCE PARTICIPATION
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.008	0.061**	0.056**	-0.646**	-0.008
	(0.008)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.311)	(0.009)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.008	0.039	0.032	0.471*	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.251)	(0.006)
DID	-0.011	0.003	-0.003	0.458	0.014
	(0.014)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.485)	(0.013)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.008***	0.009***	0.007	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.033***	-0.593***	-0.577***	-4.748***	-0.092***
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.150)	(0.004)
MARST	-0.001	0.047***	0.043***	0.080	-0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.128)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	0.001	0.023***	0.026***	-0.033*	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.076)	(0.002)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *$p < 0.1$; **$p < 0.05$; ***$p < 0.01$.
The basic Difference-in-Differences (DiD) specification estimates the labor market effects of TPS eligibility using Guatemalan migrants as the treatment group and Mexican migrants as the control group. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the U.S. The sample is restricted to individuals with a high school diploma or less and those classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

A.8.2 Placebo Test

Table 28: Placebo Regression Results by Country

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel (A): El Salvador					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.004	0.129***	0.126***	-0.407*	0.003
	(0.007)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.243)	(0.006)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	-0.002	-0.045**	-0.048**	-0.171	-0.007
	(0.006)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.240)	(0.006)
DID	0.010	0.007	-0.000	0.225	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.447)	(0.011)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001***	0.008***	0.009***	0.018**	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.008)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.031***	-0.605***	-0.583***	-4.682***	-0.090***
	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.141)	(0.004)
MARST	0.005	0.068***	0.063***	0.380***	-0.014***
	(0.003)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.127)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.002	0.023***	0.025***	0.085	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.059)	(0.001)
Panel (B): Honduras					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	0.009	0.101*	0.136***	0.193	0.015

	(0.010)	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.476)	(0.010)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.006	-0.005	0.014	-0.121	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.026)	(0.289)	(0.007)
DID	-0.018	0.086	0.038	1.064	0.013
	(0.020)	(0.080)	(0.071)	(0.874)	(0.017)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.009***	0.009***	0.031***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.000)
SEX	-0.032***	-0.645***	-0.617***	-5.149***	-0.091***
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.155)	(0.005)
MARST	0.008**	0.093***	0.084***	0.624***	-0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.143)	(0.003)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.002	0.008	0.006	0.025	-0.005**
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.068)	(0.002)
Panel (C): Nicaragua					
TPS_ELIGIBLE	-0.021	0.048	0.037	-0.324	-0.010
	(0.034)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(1.004)	(0.032)
ELIGIBLEYRIMMIG	0.004	-0.000	0.014	-0.110	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.292)	(0.007)
DID	0.013	0.127	0.105	1.719	-0.029
	(0.040)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(1.446)	(0.059)
AGE_AT_TREATMENT	0.001**	0.009***	0.009***	0.030***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.000)

SEX	-0.032***	-0.644***	-0.619***	-5.120***	-0.093***
	(0.004)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.157)	(0.005)
MARST	0.008**	0.092***	0.086***	0.625***	-0.012***
	(0.004)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.144)	(0.004)
YEARS_IN_US	-0.001	0.006	0.006	0.021	-0.004**
	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.069)	(0.002)

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
(1) Employed, (2) Log Wages, (3) Log Income, (4) Hours Worked, (5) In Labor Force
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
These regressions estimate a basic model placebo Difference-in-Differences (DiD) model, where TPS eligibility is randomly assigned to a cohort that should not have received it (1996 for El Salvador, 1994 for Honduras and Nicaragua). The purpose of this test is to assess whether the estimated DID effects in the main analysis are capturing the true impact of TPS or are driven by unrelated labor market trends. The model controls for TPS eligibility, year of migration, treatment status, age at treatment, sex, marital status, education level, year fixed effects, and years in the US. The sample is restricted to individuals classified as likely undocumented, meaning they speak Spanish at home, are noncitizens, or have a high school diploma or less. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust (HC3) and weighted using normalized person weights.

A.9 Industry Distribution

Honduras: Top Industries by TPS Eligibility and Gender

Men_TPS_Eligible	Women_TPS_Eligible	Men_TPS_Not_Eligible	Women_TPS_Not_Eligible
Construction	Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommo	Construction	Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommod
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommo	Manufacturing	Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommo	Waste Management
Waste Management	Waste Management	Manufacturing	Manufacturing
Other Services (Except Public Admin)	Other Services (Except Public Admin)	Other Services (Except Public Admin)	Other Services (Except Public Admin)
Manufacturing	Educational, Health and Social Services	Waste Management	Educational, Health and Social Services
Retail Trade	Utilities	Retail Trade	Utilities
Educational, Health and Social Services	Construction	Crop Production	Retail Trade
Furniture and related products manufactur	Retail Trade	Grocery stores	Construction

Figure 10: Top Industries for Honduras by TPS Eligibility and Gender

Nicaragua: Top Industries by TPS Eligibility and Gender

Men_TPS_Eligible	Women_TPS_Eligible	Men_TPS_Not_Eligible	Women_TPS_Not_Eligible
Construction	Manufacturing	Construction	Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommod
Other Services (Except Public Admin)	Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommo	Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommo	Other Services (Except Public Admin)
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommo	Educational, Health and Social Services	Waste Management	Educational, Health and Social Services
Manufacturing	Retail Trade	Manufacturing	Manufacturing
Structural metals and tank and ship	Other Services (Except Public Admin)	Retail Trade	Waste Management
Utilities	Grocery stores	Services to Buildings and Dwellings	Retail Trade
Groceries and related products	Services to Buildings and Dwellings	Groceries and related products	Department stores
Grocery stores	Waste Management	Wholesale Trade	Miscellaneous nondurable goods

Figure 11: Top Industries for Nicaragua by TPS Eligibility and Gender

El Salvador: Top Industries by TPS Eligibility and Gender

Men_TPS_Eligible	Women_TPS_Eligible	Men_TPS_Not_Eligible	Women_TPS_Not_Eligible
Construction	Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommo	Construction	Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommod
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommo	Educational, Health and Social Services	Arts, Entertainment, Recreation, Accommo	Waste Management
Manufacturing	Other Services (Except Public Administrati	Other Services (Except Public Administrati	Other Services (Except Public Administration
Other Services (Except Public Administrati	Waste Management	Waste Management	Manufacturing
Waste Management	Manufacturing	Manufacturing	Educational, Health and Social Services
Retail Trade	Utilities	Crop Production	Utilities
Truck transportation	Grocery stores	Retail Trade	Retail Trade
Wholesale Trade	Construction	Furniture and related products manufactur	Not specified manufacturing industries

Figure 12: Top Industries for El Salvador by TPS Eligibility and Gender