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Sarah Corrigan April 17, 2013

Freud and Schenker: Mind, Music, and the Loss of Play

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Abstract

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Sigmund Freud and Heinrich Schenker lived in Vienna during the same time period and achieved considerable success in their respective professions, eventually developing entirely new techniques with which to analyze the mind and music. Both of Jewish origin, they experienced the growth of anti-Semitism and marginalization during the rise of fascism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, survived World War I, and died shortly before World War II. This Honor's thesis compares the works and lives of these two figures, as well as the analytic tools they developed to explore the most crucial issues of their time. Neither Freud nor Schenker witnessed the dawn of a more promising era following World War II, and this arguably contributed to much of what is called a "pessimism" discernable in both of their works in the 1920s and 1930s. In their ideological transitions following the Great War, Freud and Schenker's works arguably lose their lightheartedness or playfulness, even though "play" is an principal part of both psychoanalysis and music respectively, an essential tool for recovery in the mind or enjoyment in music. By 1921, play becomes part of a more sinister group of instincts for Freud – namely, the death drive, and for Schenker, part of an order to the modern music student, "play from the soul!" (*Contribution to Ornamentation*). This insistence on playing from the soul almost entirely overlooks the playful aspect of a musician's work.

In the last three decades, Freud and Schenker tend to be mentioned in similar contexts, particularly in the field of music, but their methods are rarely compared directly. In their respective theories, mind and music emerge as unknown, mysterious, and intangible territories to which we have very few keys, and Freud and Schenker succeed in making these regions more accessible to analysts, by recognizing both the overarching unity and the underlying unconscious progression present in the mental apparatus and the musical work.

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Introduction

The main goal of this thesis is to compare the works of Sigmund Freud and Heinrich Schenker and their approaches to their respective fields – psychoanalysis and music. Both Freud and Schenker lived in the same time period in Vienna, both achieved considerable success in their profession, and both, of Jewish origin, experienced the growth of anti-Semitism and marginalization during the rise of fascism in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, survived World War I and died shortly before World War II. Although Freud and Schenker's life spans and societal predicaments were similar, they reacted to their time period in entirely dissimilar fashions, specifically with regard to their Jewish heritage, which undermined these figures' prominence in their respective fields, at least at the beginning of their careers. Neither Freud nor Schenker witnessed the dawn of a more promising era following World War I, and this arguably contributed to much of what is called a "pessimism" discernable in both men's works in the 1920s and 1930s.[1] In the last three decades, they tend to be mentioned in similar contexts, particularly in the field of music, but their methods are rarely compared directly. The most notable thematic connection between them is their development of respective methodologies that open the mind or musical work to direct analysis and questioning, yet if applied unimaginatively end in a startling lack of flexibility. However, this can be said of every major thinker. Schenkerian music analysis or, more precisely, Schenker's ability to explain music in diagramed structure, makes Schenker a rather confusing figure in the 20th century, and yet also brings him glory. As Anton Alterman observes, "[l]ike the methods of Freud, Marx, or Wittgenstein, [Schenkerian analysis] can be a powerful tool when wielded by someone with an intuitive feel for material under investigation, and an off-putting collection of dogma when applied mechanically" (2002 363). This thesis aims to position Schenkerian and Freudian analyses in

[1] See Peter Gay *Freud: A Life for Our Time*, 356, and Nicholas Cook's *The Schenker Project,* 138.

dialogue beyond such general statements, so as better to understand the ambivalence between the power of their theories that may sometimes lead to "dogma." Even though one cannot overlook several disconcerting contrasts between their theories and works, this thesis will present a more focused comparison between the theories and works of these two men, and through this process identify a movement toward pessimism in their respective views of their contemporary society and fields. Indeed, there was a loss of lightness or "playfulness" in both men's political ideologies and more general theories towards the end of their lives. Certainly by 1920-21, both men's theories underwent a rather bleak transition, in which this notion of pleasure, or even joy, was deemphasized both in the experience of the individual, for Freud, and in the experience of musical performance, for Schenker.

However, before analyzing these transitions, it must be noted that what is of particular interest in the works of both figures is that somehow their analytical approaches to mind and music are incontrovertibly related, and yet their areas of expertise seem to completely miss one another. In Schenker, one cannot detect a dominant theory of mind, and in Freud, there is no theory of music. Nevertheless, both fields deal with the idea of the "soul" or "spirit" in some form or another. Freud's psychoanalysis begins as an analysis of the psyche (the Greek word for soul), and music is traditionally seen as the intangible articulation of the soul or the "*noumenon*," according to Arthur Schopenhauer.[2] Thus, both mind and music emerge as unknown, mysterious, and intangible territories to which we have very few keys, and Freud and Schenker succeed in making these regions more accessible to analysts, by recognizing both the overarching unity and

[2] See *The World as Will and Representation*, Book IV music remains as the only art form that accomplishes this feat "directly," since it is, by its very definition, immaterial, passing invisibly from one ear to another, evaporating after its performance.

the underlying unconscious progression present in the mental apparatus and the musical work.[3] Both Freud and Schenker are engaged, therefore, in translating unknown realms into some kind of comprehensible and more tangible formula.

Their respective relationships to their Jewish ethnic heritage in a world that becomes progressively ever more anti-Semitic introduces another complex dilemma for analysis. As the Austrian and German political struggles of this time period were often directed, whether consciously or unconsciously, toward the restriction of Jewish immigration or social reform through anti-Semitic propaganda,[4] it was common for the whole Viennese gentile world to weigh in on the subject of Jewish identity. This practice may be portrayed in the words of Karl Luger, a politician and ideologue, articulated in 1893 as follows: "Wer Jude ist bestimme ich"/"Who is a Jew is something I determine" (Schorske, 1980 141).[5] This divisive attention to ethnic identity made the end of the 19th-century a rather tumultuous time for Jewish intellectuals, such as Freud, Schenker, Arthur Schnitzler, Theodor Herzl, Gustav Klimt, and their contemporaries. Freud never negated his Jewish roots, however, remarking on several occasions that psychoanalysis had emerged as a Jewish area of study, excepting Carl Jung's influence on the field, but Schenker's relationship to his ethnic heritage and profession was hardly so straightforward. Schenker never directly addressed the question of Gentile-Jewish identity in Vienna in his works, but since Schenker himself became a music analyst, it seems that he believed that music could not remain a subject of division between Jews and gentiles; rather, it was something to be held in common. However, he exalted the German musical genius of the past, approaching it in emphatically

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[3] See *Schenker's Theory, Schenkerian Theory: Pure Unity or Constructive Conflict? By* Richard Cohn for a discussion of overarching unity and a comparison between views of Nicholas Cook and Carl Schachter, 1992 1-19.
[4] See Carl E. Schorske's *Fin-De-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture*, 139, for in depth analysis of anti-Semitic developments during this time.
[5] The political ideologies of Georg von Schönerer (1842-1921) and Karl Luger (1844-1910) eventually formed a cohesive platform upon which Adolf Hitler solidified his claim to power in 1933. While Schönerer supported the depletion of social and economic status of Jews in Austria, Lüger advocated for physical elimination of them.

nationalistic terms and considering it to be an accomplishment beyond compare. It is this ambivalent position that makes Schenker a rather complicated figure to examine from our modern standpoint, for it seems that he positions himself with the gentiles or "German geniuses" of Austrian and German culture, wanting to be the witness, advocate, and eventually restorer of their glory.

The question of Jewish identity is significant in that it raises the question of the two men's identification with the society and culture in which they lived and worked. Carl E. Schorske argues in *Fin-de-Siecle Vienna* that Freud underwent a series of crises at the turn of the century, which led him to abandon his desire for assimilation into the upper medical and academic intelligentsia. He began to entertain instead thoughts of joining the "simpler stratum of ordinary Jewish doctors and businessmen," and he did, in fact, eventually join the Jewish fraternity, B'nai B'rith in 1897 (Schorske, 1980 186). In this community, Freud enjoyed respect as a friend, an insider, and a scientist. Schenker, on the other hand, did not retreat from his goal of assimilation into upper academic musical circles. Rather, in his works, he fights ever more ardently for the restoration of German musical Genius, which he feels to be lost in his time. Thus, Schenker emerges as a man in the wrong time period – he yearns to restore the musical reality of a century earlier, despises his own depraved contemporary time period, and feels unable to contribute to a musical future that is not directed backward toward a past acme of the German tradition, to the times of Johannes Sebastian Bach, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, and Ludwig van Beethoven. Because of his dedication to musical greatness, which he believes resides solely in the German tradition, Schenker emerges not only as a "reluctant modernist" (Cook, 1989 310), but "an anti-modernist, especially, but not exclusively with regard to music"

(Schachter, 2007 7). This undoubtedly places Freud and Schenker in different positions, given their attitudes toward high society in Austrian culture.

Although the social and political views of both men cannot and, in my view, should not dominate an analysis of their thought, Freud's insight into the aggressions and dangers hidden within civilized society in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1927) makes his intellectual corpus ever more formidable, as his vision strikes a somewhat uncanny note in its prophetic power for what would follow in the 20th century. Schenker' political views, often elitist and anti-democratic, are in some ways unforgivable and yet some of his most talented students remained loyal to Schenker-the-theorist, even when they found his politics ugly and dangerous. It is told that Oswald Jonas left Vienna in 1920 "because he could not stand Schenker's politics, yet revered him as a musician" (Schachter, 2001 12). As Schachter argues, "if Schenker's writing had consisted only of his philosophical ideas and his social and political ideology, he would be completely forgotten today" (Schachter, 2001 16). He is remembered not only because he was a talented theoretician, but rather because he was able to produce "single-handedly … a kind of paradigm shift in his field" (Schachter, 2001 9), comparable in its pioneering force to the thought of Freud.

In order to elucidate this pioneering power of thought and vision in the area of these men's passionate expertise, this thesis works with primary sources, examining the writings of Sigmund Freud and Heinrich Schenker and outlining them chronologically from as early as 1895 to 1938, so as to identify a transition in both men's theories before and after World War I. From Freud's opus, selected works that will be examined are as follows: *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900)*, Creative Writing and Day-Dreaming* (1907), *Mourning and Melancholia* (1915), *A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis* (1917), *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1923), *The Ego*

and the Id (1923), and *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1927). From Schenker's oeuvre, this thesis evaluates several of his works, including *The Spirit of Musical Technique* (1895), *A Contribution to Ornamentation* (1904), *Harmony* (1906), *The Art of Performance* (1911), and *The Will of Tones* (1921).

The vast array of secondary literature on Freud and his works begged restriction, and as a result I have chosen to concentrate primarily upon biographical accounts of Freud's intellectual life and development. The most significant scholars whose works are utilized in this thesis' understanding of Freud's theoretical evolutions are as follows: Peter Gay's *Sigmund Freud: A Life for our Time* (1998), Gregory Zilboorg's *Sigmund Freud: His Exploration of the Mind and Man* (1951), Philip Rieff's *Freud: the Mind of the Moralist* (1959), Peter D. Kramer's *Freud: Inventor of the Modern Mind* (2006), and Helen Walker Puner's *Sigmund Freud: His Life and Mind* (1992). The most noteworthy secondary source concerning Schenker's life and intellectual maturation has come from Dr. Nicholas Cook, who has been an invaluable help in the formation of this thesis; through our email-contact, Dr. Cook has been able to identify certain texts from Schenker that are in need of good translation and his book, *The Schenker Project: Culture, Race, and Music Theory in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna* (2007), incisively draws the complex intellectual intensity with which Schenker struggles in his life and time period. Maury Yeston's *Readings in Schenker Analysis and Other Approaches* (1977), Robert Wason's *Viennese Harmonic Theory from Albrechtsberger to Schenker to Schönberg* (1985), Carl Schachter's 'A commentary on Schenker's *Free Composition*' (1981) are other significant secondary research of which this thesis makes use. These works cited above were supplemented by other secondary sources chosen judiciously and noted in the bibliography.

In studying these materials, I came to realize that the lives of both Freud and Schenker are also extraordinary insofar as both men opened areas of inquiry that have still not reached sufficient or conclusive study and analysis. It is for this reason, however, that this thesis will discuss their respective lives only in the context of their work. Rather, in the hope of providing some understanding of the transformations in both figures' works, this thesis examines how their insight was both affected by the historical record of Austro-German politics, and yet had a profound impact upon the development of the 20th and now 21st centuries.

Chapter One: Freud and Mapping the Mind

"One's own self is well hidden from one's own self;
of all mines of treasure one's own is the last to be dug up."
--Nietzsche

From the very beginning of his psychoanalytic career, Freud worked to uncover the "secret" of the mind and lay it open, so that human beings could eventually be healed from mental injuries or invisible wounds. Throughout his opus, one can detect his wish to map out the mind, detailing its natural impulses, fears, resentments, and desires. However, over the course of his work, Freud's intuitive grasp of the mind changes significantly – what was originally considered a mental mystery becomes a form of "deception," and the human being's consciousness moves from a position of authority in the mental apparatus to one of vulnerability, where consciousness is understood as a mere puppet of more powerful, demanding forces. The question arises as follows: to what can we attribute this change in Freud's view of the mind and what were some of the more prominent consequences of this altered vision? This chapter will present several interconnected answers to these questions, including the external political and historical reality of Freud's life and work. In this context, Freud's new model reflects a shift of his understanding of the human psyche after "the terrible war" (World War I), so that the conscious self, who might have been considered an authority, is demoted from "Majesty" to an uncrowned king, no longer in total control of the other systems of the mind, but perhaps, more often than not, controlled by them.[6] In order to elucidate this transformation, one must follow this change chronologically and then outline some other concurrent causes of such a drastic shift. Thus, this chapter will first examine the trajectory of Freud's early career and his departure from determinist medical treatments during the late 1800s; second, it will analyze Freud's initial articulation of the "mental apparatus" in *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900); and finally it will

[6] The term "His Majesty the Ego" is first employed in Freud's 1907 essay, *Creative Writing and Daydreaming*.

examine the more sinister changes in Freud's conception of mental processes in the period following World War I and leading to his death in 1939. A parallel aim undertaken in this chapter is to trace the partial eclipse of a rather understated, yet pivotal element in Freud's opus – the notion of play. Just as topological model evolves, so too does Freud's understanding of the role of play alter in the adult mind – from creative fantasy to a coping mechanism. In *Creative Writers and Daydreaming* (1907)[7], Freud emphasizes the connection between play and fantasy, but with the major difference that the former is performed in childhood externally and the latter takes play internally in the private arena of the mind.

At the beginning of his career, Sigmund Freud questioned the determined view of medicine in the last decades of the 19th century. In this challenge to the medicinal practices of his time, Freud posed questions that still remain unanswered in modern-day medical arenas – namely, how one understands the complex pathways between mental and physical processes in the mind. In the beginning of his career, Freud faced a medical world, in which most psychiatrists agreed that mental ailments were results of physical lesions in the brain, but it was uncommon, if not even unheard of, to investigate the etiology of those causes: "until Freud challenged the prevailing materialist consensus, there was relatively little dispute over the basically physical nature of the mental machine" (Gay, 1998 123). Distrusting the "materialist consensus" of the physicality of the "mental machine," Freud began his career-long aim of revising the traditional approach to mental illness. Moreover, prior to Freud's work, the predominant medical explanation of "heredity" eclipsed any other understanding of neurological illness: "Case histories provided massive – it seemed to many, conclusive – evidence that the

[7] It is significant to note that the English translation of the title "misses the main psychoanalytic point of the paper, which connects the play of children with the *fantasies* of "creative writers: (Freud uses the economical, untranslatable German word "Dichter," which embraces story-tellers, novelists, poets, and playwrights" (Gay, *Freud Reader,* 436).

mental patient is bound to be burdened with an abnormal family history" (Gay *ibid*.). Thus, "family history" became responsible for mental illness – a factor, which lay entirely outside of the invalid's control and reinforced the patient's state of powerlessness by arguing that his/her genetic predisposition stands against the individual's ability to heal. Freud's work eventually confronted this perspective insofar as he hoped to empower the individual to free him/herself from repressed truths within the mind. He both advocated and fervently believed that if one were to unlock that which has been shut away in the mind, recovery would certainly follow. Thus, for Freud, the goal of healing the mentally-ill patient was of primary importance in his approach to the psychological state of the individual.

In the early parts of Freud's research, hypnosis emerged as an essential element in the movement away from this vision of the physical "mental machine," inherited from the family's past. In his *Autobiographical Study* (1925), Freud states that he was "firmly convinced of the genuineness of the phenomena of hypnosis" (*Freud Reader* 9). For him, there was "something positively seductive in working with hypnotism. For the first time there was a sense of having overcome one's helplessness; and it was highly flattering to enjoy the reputation of being a miracle-worker" (*Freud Reader* 10). However, it was not merely a sense of power that attracted Freud's attention to hypnotism. Rather, hypnosis was significant for Freud's career insofar as it gave him a chance to shift the emphasis from the treatment of symptoms to the search for a cause in the area of the mind that evades the patient's conscious control, and, for Freud, sexuality and sexual impulses were at the heart of this unconscious arena.[8] Although he agreed with the largely popular psychological view that urban, bourgeois, and industrial civilization unquestionably contributed to nervousness and mental illness via "its haste, its bustle, [and] its rapid communications and overburdening of the mental machinery," Freud argued that the cause of the

[8] See W. W. Meissner's *Freud and Psychoanalysis* for the complex "ambiguity" of libido in Freud's opus, 76.

rise of nervousness, hysteria, and neurosis was society's "excessive restricting of sexual behavior" – a theory which eventually led to much controversy (Gay, 1998 123). Although Freud's emphasis upon sexuality was and still is seen as his main deviation from the position of the medical majority, one must not overlook his passionate intent to empower the patient to free himself from his/her past or heredity, in order to begin the process of recovery. This visionary goal should be considered as equally (if not more) revolutionary in the medical field.

This emphasis upon self-empowerment can be seen in Freud's earliest articulations of the mental mechanism. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), published at the turn of the twentieth century, Freud outlines the layers of the "mental apparatus" as comprising three essential "agencies": the Conscious (*Cs.*), the Unconscious (*Ucs.*), and the Preconscious (*Psc.*) (Freud, *Interpretation* 174). Moreover, in *The Interpretation*, Freud draws a distinction between the conscious and unconscious agencies in the mind. The conscious faculty of the mental apparatus includes that which is in our current awareness, such as sensations, perceptions, feelings, memories, etc.: "consciousness [is] a sense organ which perceives data that arise elsewhere (either in the mental apparatus or the external world)" (Freud, *Interpretation* 178). However, these perceptions are rarely one-dimensional; we hardly ever understand the depth of their complexity and confusion, so that we must accept that much of what is found in the conscious mind often has an underlying meaning or drive that resides in another system. Thus, thoughts, feelings, and memories emerge as two-fold beings, like two faces of the same coin, so to speak; the "heads" of this coin faces consciousness, while the "tails" faces darkness and the unknown, namely, the unconscious.[9]

[9] This notion of reversals and opposites is not only articulated in *The Interpretation of Dreams,* 1900, but also constitutes the argumentation of one of Freud's most celebrated essays, *The Uncanny,* 1919.

Furthermore, in 1900, the Unconscious (*Ucs.*) seems to be characterized as an unruly, but demanding and powerful child, who is entirely possessed by his needs, urges, and wishes. This child wails bitterly within the walls of his confined room, yearning for freedom and fulfillment: "[the] *Ucs.*[…] knows no other aim than the fulfillment of wishes and […] has at its command no other forces than wishful impulses" (Freud, *Interpretation* 607). These "wishful impulses" drive the unconscious, and it is the relentless desire for "fulfillment" that empowers the unconscious wish, occasionally strengthening it to such an extent that it overflows into consciousness itself and demands satisfaction. Freud particularly emphasizes the power of the unconscious when consciousness's control is weakened, when it is asleep. Thus, he argues that we can find the strongest confirmation of the unconscious at work in the mental apparatus in a dream.[10]

However, it is not only the conscious state that keeps the Unconscious in its place –nor is the Unconscious wholly alone in its confinement. This child has a babysitter of sorts – a "watchman," who secures the child's enclosure, only relaxing his defensive "activities during the night, [thus] allow[ing] the suppressed impulses in the *Ucs.* to find expression" through dreams (Freud, *Interpretation* 606-607). According to Freud, the "watchman" is also "unconscious in the sense used by psychology," and yet this custodian's inner world, unlike that of the child's, is not altogether "*inadmissible to consciousness*" (Freud, *Interpretation* 653). The watchman – the preconscious system – "bars access to consciousness, stand[ing] like a screen between the system[s] *Ucs.* and [*Cs.*]," but the information that this system stores is not concealed from the

[10] See a counter to Freud's argument in "The Interpretation of Dreams" by Alessandro Pagnini, where Pagnini argues that Freud's dream analysis does not correspond to modern scientific knowledge, but nevertheless remains a powerful analytical tool: "It is my impression that if one remains tied to Freud and the spirit of his *Interpretation of Dreams* - even at the distance and with the caveats noticed in many of his followers – one will be prevented from working out a dream theory which fits the data better and is more in agreement with current scientific knowledge" (350).

conscious mind. Rather, aspects of this information are temporarily dormant, like memories, which lie momentarily undetected and may be summoned by consciousness when and if ever necessary.

It is important to emphasize that in the dialectic between the systems – or characters in the mind in 1900, consciousness arguably occupies the central stage, and yet it is also evident that Freud's original theory of both this mental apparatus and the instincts that drive it presents the relationship between the Conscious (*Cs*.), the Unconscious (*Ucs.*), and the Preconscious (*Psc.*) as something of an imprisonment of the wayward child (Freud, *Interpretation 174*). The implicit and, indeed, explicit imagery of a child restricted in its wishes colors the depictions of the pathways toward healing which eventually evolve into a more comprehensive view of the mind that still maintains a tripartite model, but introduces a key instinctual drive that revolutionizes the relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. Later branded "His Majesty" in Freud's essay *Creative Writing and Daydreaming* (1907), consciousness beckons, dismisses, and imprisons the child and watchman at his will – or perhaps more significantly, at his *pleasure* or *displeasure*, for it is from the notion of pleasure that Freud's first sketch of the mental apparatus develops. In fact, in *Creative Writing*, Freud explores the significance of playing for a child and argues that "playing" becomes "phantasizing" in adult life – an internalized realm in which desires and wishes may be released, either through fantasizing or dreaming (*Freud Reader* 437*)*. Thus, if every fantasy or dream is in some way a representation of an unfulfilled wish, then, for early Freud, the notion of play and the desire for pleasure are intrinsically linked. Even though Freud foregrounded the important of pleasure, his descriptions of this instinct presuppose a released desire for play: "nothing but a wish can set our mental apparatus at work" (Freud, *Interpretation* 606). Thus, as the dream follows a trajectory from the

Unconscious to Preconscious and finally to Consciousness, it is not located as such in any one of these areas of the mind; rather, the pleasure principle – the desire for play or pleasure - transfixes and drives all parts alike.[11] In 1907, this interaction is clearly set forth when Freud speaks of the pleasures of released creative fantasy at work in unlocking the Unconscious or abandoning strong "motives for concealment": "for many things which, if they were real, could give no enjoyment, can do so in the play of fantasy, and many excitements which, in themselves, are actually distressing, can become a source of pleasure for the hearers and spectators at the performance of a writer's work" (*Freud Reader* 439)

However, Freud's understanding of this dialectic began to shift very decisively following the atrocities and horrors of World War I. The experience of the war and its aftermath incapacitates the earlier structure of the mind and, as may be seen in his letters during that time, perhaps incapacitates Freud as well. During the Great War, Freud suffered in a manner similar to the patients he had been treating. As the Austro-Hungarian Empire's plan grew more desperate, Freud experienced strong internal division. He had no overwhelming reason to support the German cause, as the Viennese upper class hardly supported his own scientific or medical work, values, or writing, but in spite of many anxious reservations, Freud identified "the cause of the Central Powers as his own" (Gay, 1998 353). In a letter to his friend, Karl Abraham, in July of 1914, he articulated a newly-renewed nationalist bond with Austria: "Perhaps for the first time in thirty years, I feel myself an Austrian, and would like just once more to give this rather unpromising empire a chance" (Gay, 1998 346, *as quoted*). With three sons enlisted in the Austro-Hungarian army by 1915, Freud thus willfully aligned himself in support of his nation's position although he openly acknowledged that these were "miserable times" (Gay, 1998 353).

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[11] Cf. *Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming:* "As people grow up, then, they cease to play, and they seem to give up the yield of pleasure which they gained from playing" (*Freud Reader,* 437).

In fact, the "unfailing confidence in the eventual victory of the Allies" shared by his associates often irritated Freud, and it was clear that his sons were often on his mind, since almost every letter during that time contained an account of his children: "References to [his sons'] military adventures provide a touching paternal counterpoint to the business matters that fill his letters" (Gay, 1998 353). Therefore, while, on the one hand, Freud "remained the father of sons who were fighting Germany's cause" (Gay, *ibid*.), on the other, the war left him in a temporary paralysis between hope and despair, making him rely on the policies of the government and the country with which he scarcely identified in so many other respects.

One could argue that at this juncture Freud positioned himself to fight a losing battle that even the most reasonable part of himself could not justify. Albeit aligned with the German cause for the sake of his sons, Freud could not help but witness, identify, and analyze a developing instinct he now believed to exist in human nature. Helen W. Puner identifies this period as Freud's disillusion with human nature in *Sigmund Freud: His Life and Mind*; moreover, she questions Freud's own semi-willing participation in the fight of Austria when she observes Freud's "resign[ing] himself to the recognition of a truth he had been fighting all his life – that man, despite his intelligence which differentiates him from the ape, is still a hopeless victim of his animal nature?" (Puner, 1992 159). Thus, in a certain sense, in order for Freud to continue his investigation of human nature, he had not only to accept one of the ugliest parts of man's nature, but also to accept the reality of his own semi-willing delusion in supporting the war, which almost all his instincts had urged him to counteract. And from this perspective, from the abyss of his "own disillusion with man's humanity and himself," Freud tried to understand the underlying, unconscious factors of war. And he believed that putting them in the context of psychoanalytic thought might help his readers to "survive the war years less depressed, less

despairing" (Gay, 1998 356). For Freud, at least the rational deductions of psychoanalysis could help lessen the burden of disillusionment placed upon mankind: "Man's civilized behaviour, his altruism, his social adaptability, are at best illusions. 'In reality,' Freud consoled himself, 'our fellow citizens have not sunk so low as we feared, because they had never risen so high as we believed" (Puner, 1992 163).[12]

This "reality," although a form of consolation for Freud, according to Puner, is perhaps closer to despair than one might imagine. Simply because we recognize a horrible truth, it does not follow that we are relinquished from the pain it may provoke. During this time, Freud himself was perhaps in need of consolation. His defeatism rings out most clearly in a letter to Lou-Andreas Salomé:

> "'I have no doubt that humanity will get over this war, too, but I know for certain that I and my contemporaries will see the world cheerful no more. It is too vile.' …mankind is 'organically not fit for this culture. We have to leave the stage, and the great Unknown, he or it, will some day repeat such a cultural experiment with another race.'" (Freud, 1998 353)[13]

Peter Gay argues that Freud's discomfort with mankind's place in culture emerges as a sign of his "mounting misgivings about his commonplace loyalty to the German-Austrian cause" (Gay, 1998 353). Not to mention that this "great Unknown" was of rising concern to Freud, as he believed that whatever was emerging in human nature during the war would be repeated by "h[im] or it" in the future. For Freud, this Unknown – this mysterious power – becomes a sadistic force in civilization that aims to repeatedly seal unbreakable destructive patterns into human history.

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[12] This citation is taken from Freud's 1915 essay, *The Disillusionment of the War.*
[13] Original letter may be found in *Letters of Sigmund Freud*, ed. Ernst L. Freud.

If Freud's main goal was originally to empower the individual to break circular patterns within the self, then how could he continue to promote the power of his therapeutic work if history itself was not free from obsessive neurotic systems, if even the "great Unknown […] would repeat such a cultural experiment" yet again (Gay, 1998 353)?[14] Not only were mental patients defenseless vis-à-vis their heredity, but society as a whole now seemed powerless when confronted with the drives inherited from history: "what Freud found saddest was that people were behaving precisely the way that psychoanalysis would have predicted" (Gay, 1998 353). Thus, as early as 1915, one can witness a transition in Freud's thought, leading towards a new understanding of the self, the mental apparatus, and the mapping of the individual. The war had revealed a previously unrecognized human drive to such an extent that Freud was obligated to integrate it into his understanding of the mental apparatus:

> The Great War was a turning point. It led Freud to abandon a range of optimistic views, about insight for the individual and sublimation for the species. After the war, Freud folded his idiosyncratic ideas into a workable everyday psychology that was, however, considerably less distinctive than any of the bold theories that made his name. (Kramer, 2006 175)

This "workable everyday psychology" relied heavily, however, on unswerving understandings of the power and range of the unconscious. And eventually, this new evolved model of the mental apparatus – free of its "optimistic views" – echoes Freud's transformed understanding of human nature, now characterized by unsettled, deceptive characters and drives—the ego, the id, and the

[14] Freud will later explore in depth the return of the repressed in history in *Moses and Monotheism* (1838). See Robert Paul's *Moses and Civilization* for an articulation of the oedipal complex expanded through history: "If the myth of the primal horde, and its biblical representation in the Torah narrative, is analogous, as Freud claims, to the pattern of the individual development of an obsessional or conscientious character, then the climax of the oedipal phase corresponds with the killing of the primal father" (1996 181).

super-ego that came to replace the Conscious (*Cs*.), the Unconscious *(Ucs.),* and the Preconscious (*Psc.*) (Freud, *Interpretation* 174).

However, before we explore the transformation of the mental apparatus, we must first turn to Freud's pivotal book *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), which is typically thought to mark a major development in his thought. In this work, Freud identifies yet another force alongside the pleasure principle – a complex operation of "death instincts" within the "mental apparatus" (Freud, *Beyond* 43). For him, this force is "more primitive, more elementary, and more instinctual" than his original pleasure theory and is characterized by "a compulsion to repeat" or "*an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things*" (Freud, *ibid.*). While the operation of the pleasure principle implies that the individual strives to fulfill his wishes in his future, the death instincts theory maintains that although the pleasure principle still functions,[15] the human being nevertheless wishes to return to an "*old* state of things" and, thus, "recalls from past experiences" in order to inform future ones (Freud, *Beyond* 45).[16] In other words, as Freud encounters the inadequacies of the first model of the mental apparatus fueled by the pleasure principle, he also discovers its insufficiency as an explanation for the post-war illnesses he observes in his patients: "[n]o complete explanation has yet been reached of the great number of 'traumatic neuros[e]s [following] the terrible war" (Freud, *Beyond* 10). In response to these neuroses, therefore, Freud unearths an additional unconscious drive within the mind that "overrides the pleasure principle" (Freud, *Beyond* 17) and by means of which human beings unconsciously use the past as a template from which we construct the future. Moreover, according to Freud, we strive, ever "looking backwards" to return to the "inanimate" existence

[15] Freud renames the pleasure principle as the "life instincts" or "Eros" (*Beyond*, 45).
[16] According to Frank J. Sulloway in *Freud, Biologist of the Mind*, Freud "now elevated the regression side of the" dichotomy between "progression [and] regression" and included in this "a whole group of previously enigmatic phenomena," such as "the compulsion to repeat; the mechanisms of fixation to traumas[…]; the painful psychotherapeutic manifestations of transference; and certain repetitive aspects of children's play" (1979: 401).

that came before the "living" one, namely, death: "the aim of all life is death" (Freud, *Beyond* 46).

This additional drive – the "death drive" – transforms Freud's understanding of human instinctual life, and could not, therefore, be ignored in the structure of the mental apparatus (Freud, *Beyond* 48). Thus, the earlier system of the Conscious, Unconscious, and Preconscious is augmented and reworked, in order to comprise a more informed understanding of the cohesion between the processes of the mind. In his own pursuit of "turn[ing our] eyes inward, looking this other self firmly in the face, and being truly self-aware," therefore, Freud articulates a new tripartite division of the mind in his book, *The Ego and the Id* (1923), which is published soon after *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.*[17] In this new structure, the boundaries between the states of the mind are no longer rigid, since "the distinguishing mark of being conscious or unconscious" is described as decidedly "ambiguous," and, therefore, perhaps not so useful in distinguishing one system of the mind from another (*Freud Reader* 631). In fact, none of these systems can be described as fully conscious, not even the "ego," which contains unknown psychic material that would have earlier characterized the *Ucs.* system alone.[18] In 1923, Freud sees the "ego" as resting upon the "system *Pcpt.*" – a system fueled by perception. This *Pcpt.* develops by "embracing" the original "watchman," who acted as barrier between the conscious and unconscious systems – the preconscious, as it was originally described in *The Interpretation of Dreams* in 1900 (*Freud Reader* 634). Moreover, by 1923, Freud argues that the preconscious "has no meaning where feelings are concerned," and so, the *Pcs.* "drops out" of the tripartite apparatus, "and feelings [become] either conscious or unconscious" (*Freud Reader* 634).

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[17] Although he had already used some terms of his reformed division of the mental apparatus in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* and other works, Freud did not explicitly formulate the tripartite structure until *The Ego and the Id* in 1923.
[18] According to W.W. Meissner in *Freud & Psychoanalysis*, "forms of internalization-incorporation, interjection, and identification—are variously connected with development of the ego," so that the "internal world is built up and […] consolidated within the self" (2003 167).

At the same time, the "other" wholly "unconscious" part of the mind comes to be represented by the term "id" – literally, "the it," which was first coined and developed by a physician and writer, Georg Groddeck, when describing the ego's "passive … behavior in life" (*Freud Reader* 635). In some sense, our most unexpressed wishes seem to be somehow removed from our conscious ego, so that we do not feel responsible for their manifestation because we are rarely even aware that they belong to us and compose our most undisclosed self. Thus, since the "otherness" of our selves – the id – is not accessible to our consciousness, Freud, following Groddeck in this regard, proposes that consciousness is in some sense powerless, "'lived' by unknown and uncontrollable forces" that make our ego behave "passively in life" as our unconscious wishes unveil themselves in our actions (*Freud Reader* 635). This is not to say that Groddeck and Freud's interpretations of the id were identical; rather, Freud developed Groddeck's notion of a passive "other" self into Freud's new understanding of the mental apparatus (*Freud Reader*, 635) within which this unconscious "passivity" of the ego is arguably evocative of the death drive, as articulated above. The ego "in its relation to the id," however, is no longer passive – it must attempt to be in charge, remaining a step ahead of the id's unruly tricks and taming its wild impulses: while the "ego represents what may be called reason and common sense," the id "contains the passions" (*Freud Reader* 636). Within this new pattern of relations, the unfortunate reality emerges as follows: "His Majesty the ego" does not seem to be aware that his actions are actually maneuvered and directed by the id's will, and the ego "transforms the id's will into action as if it were [the ego's] own" (*Freud Reader* 636).[19]

Thus, Freud's transition from the original structure of the mind to another, more flexible tripartite apparatus emerges more and more clearly: the *Cs.* system evolves into the ego, the *Pcs.*

[19] See *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 21-23 for Freud's understanding of the death drive as the unconscious "compulsion to repeat" that "recalls from past experiences," so that individuals perpetually pass "through the same phases and reach the same conclusions," recreating some new version of "an old event."

system becomes the platform upon which the ego rests, and the *Ucs.* develops into the id. But this id is no longer like the *Ucs.* that was originally confined to one part of the mind; now, the id pervades not only the ego, but also another character, both overbearing and sadistic, who is "set up inside the ego" (or, rather above it) and can, if empowered by melancholia, proclaim untiring "dissatisfaction with the ego on moral grounds" (*Mourning and Melancholia*, 585).[20] Moreover, this new authoritarian figure – the "super-ego" – does not emerge entirely unannounced. Characterized also "as the last enemy of reason," the super-ego possesses a formidable controlling force similar to that of the "watchman" or the *Preconscious* (Rieff, 1959 71), only its power of operation is considerably widened and enlarged. Perhaps the very image of the "watchman" that characterized the Pcs. in the earlier structure of the mental apparatus in 1900 does not actually "drop out"[21] – this "watchman" is very much still there, only arguably more powerful than before and no longer silent, now bearing the name of "super-ego" (*Freud Reader* 642).

In Freud's work by 1923, therefore, consciousness – "His Majesty the Ego" – no longer rules as king. Even the notion of play has undergone a significant, if barely detectable revision: from that of pleasurable fantasy to coping with trauma. As Freud describes his grandson playing in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* in 1920, the boy's playful activity denotes no longer only a pleasurable fantasy, but rather, a coping mechanism for the absence of the parental figure. As Freud's grandson attaches the wooden reel to a string and throws it back and forth ("fort" and "da"), Freud encounters a more sinister constituent of child's play through which the boy may gain agency over his own experience, repeating it over and over again: "This, then, was the

[20] See *Freud Reader* 1988.
[21] Cf. "In other words: the distinction between Cs. and Pcs. here drops out— the Pcs. here drops out—and feelings are either conscious or unconscious" (*Freud Reader, The Ego* 634).

complete game—disappearance and return" (Freud, *Beyond* 17). In other words, play becomes a means by which one may cope with trauma.

Accompanying all these shifts in Freud's view of mental dynamics, therefore, the earlier version of consciousness as the master, who locked up the unruly child (the *Ucs*.) and employed the silent watchman (the *Pcs.*) as a babysitter, evaporates into thin air. This former dynamic of control is reversed in the new structure. Although the ego tries to tame the child (and is thus somehow considered to be in control of it), the ego's own movements and undertakings are actually guided by the "animal" – or the id (*Freud Reader* 636). And while the id's power over the ego is arguably camouflaged and largely undetectable, His "Majesty" the Ego must also answer to yet another demanding and controlling system that has no scruples in loudly and "critically judging" him and treating him "as its [own personalized] object" (*Mourning and Melancholia* 585).[22] The super-ego comes to represent the conscience, constructed by societal conventions, which Freud sees as an antagonist to self-knowledge: "true self-awareness is impossible until the moralizing voice is restrained, or at least controlled" (Rieff, 1959 71). The super-ego retains the "character of the father" as its conscience and could be considered a good representative of Freud's death instincts theory in the mental apparatus. Thus, although one may find traces of the death drive in the id, the most significant effects of this "compulsion to repeat" and "return to an old event" may be seen in this third and finally identified character of the apparatus, for this force acts as the internalized voice of the parent from the individual's childhood.

Indeed, this super-ego may be seen as a sinister counterpart to Freud's earlier understanding of healthy fantasy in play in *Creative Writing and Day-Dreaming* (1907). In 1907, the individual, in leaving childhood and growing older, continues the games of his/her youth,

[22] See *Freud Reader* 1988.

"building castles" in his/her own mind – in fantasies.[23] However, by 1923, the notion of playful fantasy and pleasure is deemphasized, insofar as Freud argues that the individual also internalizes the most threatening parts of his childhood within his own identity; by "giving permanent expression to the influence of the parents," the super-ego "perpetuates the existence of the factors to which it owes its origin" and keeps the ego in a belated and belittled state (*The Ego* 643). Thus, by internalizing the voice of the child's "external conscience" – his/her parents, the super-ego in some sense preserves the wish of the individual to remember "its origin" and "*to restore an earlier state of things*" (*Beyond*, 43). If in 1907 the human being could return to its earliest childhood patterns by "withdraw[ing]" this external conscience "into the mind," and either playing games in his mind (*Creative Writing and Day-Dreaming*), in later Freud, the return to childhood is presented as eternalizing the chastising voice of his father (*Mourning* 585). By carrying the parent's voice forever in the mind, a human being remains caught in circular patterns of behavior, where misconduct is met with punishment, imposed no longer from an external force (which arguably might have more restraint); rather, this retribution is performed via one's own memory and imagination, which is far less forgiving and keeps the individual in subjugation.

This transition from fantasy as playing to that of retreating into self-fulfilling prophecy arguably occupies much of Freud's theory by the later 1920s, so that in this new map of the mental apparatus, the mind is in irreconcilable conflict, intrinsically divided—it strives to adhere

[23] Some scholars argue that the "beginnings of identity" may be found developed in the original activity of a child's play – see "Toys and Reason" by Erik H. Erikson in *An Outline of Psychoanalysis,* ed. by Mary Thompson, 1955.

to reason and yet other undetected processes in the mind are driven by desire, in order to fulfill their own respective wishes[24]:

> In every case […] the news that reaches your consciousness is incomplete and often not to be relied on. Often enough, too, it happens that you get news of events only when they are over and when you can no longer do anything to change them. Even if you are not ill, who can tell all that is stirring in your mind of which you know nothing or are falsely informed? You behave like an absolute ruler who is content with the information supplied him by his highest officials and never goes among the people to hear their voice. Turn your eyes inward, look into your depths, learn first to know yourself!" (*A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis* (1917), XVII 143).

The experience of the war was indeed decisive for Freud's understanding of the individual, for the human being emerges as a deceived ruler, who has never heard the "voice" of his "people". Thus, even by 1917, consciousness is seen as effectively powerless in the psychic apparatus. The conscious individuals "can no longer do anything to change" events because they become aware of the real state of things too late. Even the distinction between healthy and ill becomes irrelevant, and man's mind emerges as a deceptive, untrustworthy device; as Freud points out, "even if you are not ill, who can tell all […of which you] are falsely informed?". Thus, man is ultimately mistaken in believing himself to be the "absolute ruler" in his own mind. Rather, this illusion of control disguises the power of hidden, unconscious drives that overrule those of consciousness, and the ego is usually last to recognize this concealed mental hierarchy. In order to accept, on the one hand, one's own powerlessness, and, on the other, to strive to hold reason as king in the mind, Freud urges us to look inward and "learn to know" ourselves through close

[24] See Helen Puner for articulation of how reason operates in Freud's structure of the mind: "reason is the god of Sigmund Freud's conscious mind, … under that conscious layer, there fermented and brewed in him all the needs, drives, and instincts that have driven men to other than rational gods" (1991 172).

watchfulness and wary patience. Self-knowledge no longer emerges through analysis of the individual's pleasures or repressed wishes, but instead through careful observation of how one is being guided by the will of other, unrecognizable forces.

In the above passage, one may recognize perhaps the most significant and poignant transition in Freud's thinking throughout his career. In his earlier years, Freud's primary goal was to heal and help the patient recover from mental illness, but during and after World War I, Freud's analyses extend to the whole human race, since every man may "be falsely informed" of whatever is in his mind (*A Difficulty* 143). Freud's theoretical concentration is no longer directed toward bringing recovery to his patients, but rather to expose the secrets of man's mind in general, regardless of health or illness. Along the course of his career, Freud's understanding of mental work not only loses some of its original playfulness (in the loss of the sole emphasis of pleasure), but it also arguably comes to agree with much of the determinism of the original model Freud had opposed and overturned, that of the essential powerlessness of a human being against the disease that is to take over control of the mind. Peter Kramer articulates the transition as follows:

> Early Freudian therapy was magical. Seriously ill patients would recover once they had confronted repressed thoughts and desires. Later Freudian therapy is more diffuse and more pedestrian. It embraces not only unconscious sexual impulses, but also (through attention to the genetic model) developmental history, (through economics) attachments in adult life, and (through structure) conflicts between values. Repeated self-undermining behavior has its own explanation, through the death drive. (Kramer, 2006 173)

Kramer sees the development of psychoanalysis as moving further away from the "magical" mystery and recovery that characterized "early Freudian therapy." However, Kramer misunderstands in his analysis the powerful discovery of Freud, namely, that of the super-ego who may become a sadistic god that the ego cannot escape, while the id pervades every part of the mind with its hunger and need. In the end, both the super-ego and the id deceive the ego into thinking that consciousness controls the unconscious, while actually clandestinely bending the ego to their will. In embracing these stock characters in the mind, Freudian analysis arguably becomes "more diffuse" and deterministic, closing its once open arms to the playful power of fantasy or pleasure to heal injuries, whether internal or external.

However, although it may be tempting to interpret Freud's transition as a departure from youthful optimism to despairing pessimism, such an understanding is not only untrustworthy, but it also does a disservice to Freud. It is true, of course, that although he could never view the mind as merely "physical" or consider illness as a "manifestation of a lesion in the brain," Freud nevertheless brought about a new form of "mental machine" by 1923 (Gay, 1998 123).[25] Freud's discoveries, however, do not entirely subvert his original understanding of illness or the mind. What Freud introduces into his apparatus is a drive that both disables and strengthens his original understanding of human nature. Indeed, the power of aggression was no surprise to him before 1914: "Freud was the one, after all, who had revealed its workings in himself, privately in his letters to Fliess and publicly in *The Interpretation of Dreams*" (Gay, 1998 395-6). It was the extent and effects of aggression, demonstrated during the war, that necessitated new analytical tools. In a letter to the Dutch poet and psychopathologist Frederik van Eeden in December 1914, Freud emphasized that the war had confirmed what analysts had already proposed "from a study

[25] See Clara Thompson's *Psychoanlaysis: Evolution and Development*, in which she critiques Freud for falling "back upon organic constitution in order to find an explanatory principle for organizing and interpreting observed facts" (1951 27).

of the dreams and mental slips of normal people, as well as from the symptoms of neurotics" (as quoted in Gay, 1998 396). Thus, the event of the war consolidated the understanding of the fuller reality of processes operating in civilized society that immobilized the mental apparatus, so that the "principle [that] dominates the operation ... from the start" – pleasure and the avoidance of displeasure – no longer remained the most powerful drive or group of instincts in the apparatus (Freud, *Beyond* 23). Although the human being undeniably seeks to minimize tension by resolving or neutralizing it to a state of ease (pleasure) and thereby temporarily gratifies his wishes, Freud recognizes that many post-WWI neuroses and traumas in both dream and waking life could not be explained solely by this instinctual drive of pleasure. The mental apparatus was clearly fueled by yet another drive, awaiting identification – namely, the death instincts. And while play, day-dreaming, and fantasy help the adult individual restore a childhood delight, these activities also become tools of the death instincts, a mechanism by which an individual deals with trauma, but these forces may no longer be strong enough to arrest and heal the discontents of the inhabitants of the civilized world. Thus, in Freud's view, perhaps mirroring Freud's own life, the conscious individual seems to have become an uncrowned king, struggling to meet the strict demands imposed upon him by two internal unconscious selves and the often harsh reality that characterizes the external world and unrelenting human history.

Chapter Two: Schenker and Freud in their Time

"Know thyself? If I knew myself, I'd run away."
--Johann Wolfgang von Goethe

When one explores the fin-de-siècle period in our modern-day frame of reference, it is almost impossible not to associate Viennese culture with a love of high intellectual aesthetics - theatre, art, and specifically music. However, Sigmund Freud did not fall so easily in love with the works of traditional German musical genius, e.g., Johannes Sebastian Bach, Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, and Ludwig van Beethoven. With a "rather distant and quizzical relationship to music," Freud never hid his "ignorance in musical matters" and rarely attended or derived pleasure from musical performances (Gay, 1998 168). Opera was a rare exception to this rule, but only because of the melodramatic way in which "opera grappled with the psychological issues that preoccupied Freud in his adult life: love, hatred, greed, betrayal," etc. (Gay, 1998 169). In fact, in one of his most significant works, *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud "virtually boast[s] about his tone deafness: humming the challenge of Figaro to Count Almaviva in the first act of *The Marriage of Figaro*, he thought that 'someone else would perhaps not have recognized the melody'" (Gay, 1998 168).[26]

Why, then, would the figure and works of the music theorist Heinrich Schenker be significant when compared to the person and theories of tone-deaf Freud? In some respects, their superficial similarities connect them not so much to each other as to a great number of other talented inhabitants of Vienna. Indeed, both men lived in the same city and time period,

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[26] Cf. *Interpretation of Dreams* 242 – full quotation:
Meantime I had been humming a tune to myself which I recognized as Figaro's aria from *Le Nozze di Figaro*:

Se vuol ballare, signor contino	If my lord is inclined to go dancing,
Se vuol ballare, signor contino,	If my lord is inclined to go dancing,
Il chitarino le suonerò	I'll be ready to play him a tune

(It is doubtful whether anyone else would have recognized the tune).

struggled in Vienna in their professions because of their Jewish heritage, and introduced new approaches to their respective fields.[27] Interestingly enough, however, it is their dissimilarities rather than likenesses that indicate a curious kind of tension or connection between them, even though their conceptions of both mind and music seem to miss each other completely and have, in fact, hardly ever been compared or contrasted. Indeed, Schenker never attempts to provide any theory of mind, just as Freud does not of music, and yet it is also true that while the material of their work may at first glance seem entirely unconnected, both men act as cartographers of unknown territories in their respective fields. In this context, one finds their similarity, for the territories they chart are of immense importance for future centuries. While Freud's exertions were directed to mapping out dreams and bringing reason to internal, unconscious emotions and imagery, Schenker mapped out another arena of the unknown – the act of musical composition. As a result of these discoveries, Freud is remembered as the founder of the psychoanalytic tradition, and Schenker is best known for his entirely innovative approach to music theory, now called Schenkerian analysis. In both of their works, the rigors of technical analysis meet the spontaneous elements of human existence, creativity, and art.

Moreover, one of the most striking ways in which Freud and Schenker are closely interlinked is the manner in which they view the unlimited territories of their analytical work. Both define these respective spaces as complex, yet unified systems that are never entirely imitative. Although Freud understands the acme of aesthetic sensibility as linked to anything but music, Schenker, along with many in the Western tradition, upholds music as the most unique of art forms in one of his earliest works *Die Harmonie* (1906). Schenker argues that other forms,

[27] For more on Schenker's academic life, see Cook's *Schenker Project*, 2007 23: "Schenker's account in his diary of the 'difficult interview' in February that year arguably raises questions as to how capable he would have been of holding down [a] job, or even whether he really wanted [one] (Schenker told his interviewers that the truth of 'higher laws…is easier to grasp than the untruth of the nonsensical and faulty rules that are given out today', which is probably not what they wanted to hear from a prospective harmony teacher)."

such as painting, prose, or sculpture, emerge from the direct image of nature, but music cannot so easily fit into these artistic rules. Rather, it is set apart from the traditional mimetic paradigm of nature and art:

> All art, with the exception of music, rests on associations of ideas, of great and universal ideas, reflected from Nature and reality. In all cases, Nature provides the pattern; art is imitation – imitation by word or color of form. We immediately know which aspect of nature is indicated by word, which by color, and which by sculptured form. Only music is different. (Schenker, *Harmony* 3) [28]

By highlighting the untraceable quality of the art of music as invisible, incapable of direct imitation of any earthly thing, Schenker glorifies music above all other art forms.[29] Although the notation of music is mimetic, music itself, as an art, is not—it stands for nothing else than what it is. In this sense, music becomes an art form through which we may "hope to stumble upon the true meaning of life," invisible, transient, and yet passing undetected before us (Schenker, *Free Composition* 41).[30] Similarly, Freud uncovers mechanisms in the mind that are only initially imitative, drawing upon the remarkable power of the "talking cure" to break unconscious cyclical patterns. In his work before World War I, Freud highlights the patient's psychic work as emerging from pre-formed structures, in order to see reality as it truly is. Just as Freud hoped that the psychoanalytical work on the part of the patient can break the mechanical imitative patterns

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[28] Full quotation continued: "Intrinsically, there is no unambivalent association of ideas between music and nature"; since the process of music is intangible, the listener can hardly relate it to a direct imitation of nature; it does not function via imagistic imitation.

[29] See Richard Littlefield and David Neumeyer's *Rewriting Schenker: Narrative – History – Ideology* for the extraction of "timeless essence of a masterwork, to explain the aesthetic experience" of music in Schenkerian analysis.

[30] See Nicholas Cook's *The Schenker Project*, 2007 30 for more on intangible music in Schenker's thought.

inherited from his or her immediate environment, so too did Schenker believe that his theories would open vistas that could confront the decay brought into music and culture by modernity.[31]

It is curious, nonetheless, that in his understanding of the importance of creativity and its interconnection to play in *Creative Writers and Daydreaming* (1907), Freud excludes the whole notion of "playing" music or *Musik spielen* imbedded in language, even though he centrally emphasizes the fact that language "has preserved this relationship between children's play and poetic creation" (*Freud Reader 437*).[32] It is equally significant that Schenker's writings on music never address the playful aspect of a musician's work; he argues that one should "play from the soul" in an intellectual or spiritual context, but not in a light-hearted one.[33] Thus, Schenker's understanding of the exceptional, even sublime experience involved in writing, performing and listening to music does not correlate with what Freud identifies as "a source of pleasure for the hearers and spectators at the performance of a writer's work" in the context of creative work (*Freud Reader* 438). Rather, Schenker's approach to training the ear for music is expressed first and foremost in theoretical language, which permits the highest pleasure, but little light-heartedness or cheerfulness. In his conflicts with other theoreticians, he even dismisses their arguments as those of "children playing with dolls" (*Counterpoint*, vol. 1. xxx). There seems to exist, therefore, a curious omission in both the works of Freud and Schenker on the issue of "playing music," and the pun of language in the German and English verbs, *spielen* or to play. As we will see in this chapter, Schenker's avoidance of the notion of light-hearted,

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[31] For a brief explanation of the interconnection between Freud and Schenker's theories, see Alan Walker *Music and the Unconscious*, 1979 1641.

[32] Cf. full quotation: It gives [in German] the name of 'Spiel' ['play'] to those forms of imaginative writing which require to be linked to tangible objects and which are capable of representation. It speaks of a 'Lustspiel' or a 'Trauerspiel' ['comedy' or 'tragedy': literally, 'pleasure play' or 'mourning play'] and describes those who carry out the representation as Schauspieler ['players': literally 'show-players'] (*Freud Reader* 437).

[33] See Yeston *Readings in Schenker Analysis* 18: "The concept of structural levels, which […] is central to Schenker's theory, was first set forth in the analyses published in *Der Tonwille* (1921-24). However, the idea of the background and its essential content, the fundamental structure, did not emerge clearly until many years later; not until the publication of *Der Freie Satz* (1935) was it definitively stated."

playful pleasure in understanding music would, in time, turn him into the bitterest accuser of modernity, who all but despairs in its shortcomings. These dark ruminations, however, do not minimize the importance of Schenker's theoretical discoveries presented as formulaic structures.[34]

Indeed, Schenker's goal emerges as the effort to train the ear to follow the key structure in this invisible, non-mimetic art form that stretches in two directions – horizontally and vertically. Upon theses axes, Schenkerian analysis merges an apparent dichotomy of opposite approaches: first, intense structural theory, and second, the "extremely abstract, metaphysical" experience of the "pure idea" that Schenker associated with musical art specifically (Cook, 2007 30). Generally, two opposing approaches to music theory would no doubt ensure tension between one another, but Schenker's primary aim was to ensure stability and balance between both approaches so that they would, in their interaction, form parts of a single, more-cohesive theoretical technique. Schenker's approach to a creativity that leaves little room for playfulness entirely differs from that of Freud, therefore, and yet it is startling how similarly both men searched for permanent structures in the non-mimetic territories of the human mind at work.

One of the first full articulations of underlying structure in the musical piece may be seen through the introduction of Schenker's work, *Die Urlinie* (1921), a term originally coined by William Hogarth as the "line of beauty."[35] In music theory, the "line of beauty" becomes the "fundamental line" or the "archetypal succession of tones" that "bears in itself the seeds of all the forces that shape tonal life" (Schenker, *Tonwille* 21).[36] One may understand this as the basic melody of the work that any person, whether professionally trained or otherwise, recognizes and

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[34] See Schenker's *Counterpoint* (1910) 1st volume. Translated by John Rothgeb and Jürgen Thym. New York: Schirmer, 1987.
[35] Theory of Aesthetics *Analysis of Beauty,* 1753.
[36] For more on the "Urlinie," see Alan Walker's *Music and the Unconscious*, 1979 1641-1643.

remembers. What is particularly significant about this fundamental line is that it carries musical weight along with it, so that, in its horizontal movement, it also suggests a vertical dimension of chordal progression surrounding it: "The Urlinie indicates the paths to all elaboration and so also to the composition of the outer voices, in whose intervals the marriage of strict and free composition is so wonderfully and mysteriously consummated" (Schenker, *Tonwille* 21). Thus, no melody can stand alone as a solitary, musical phrase; rather, the *Urlinie* intimates the synthesis – the "consummation" – of the whole musical piece. This "marriage" thus leads to the development of the axis of Schenkerian thought: the horizontal and vertical dimensions of music that "create the necessary balance" through which one should approach the text. The horizontal is the fundamental line of *Urlinie*, and the vertical is the structural analysis of the musical progression. Thus, Schenker recognizes how the individual musical line and the unity of the work reciprocally inform one another. Interlaced in each part rests the presence of its other-directional progression and, thus, the key to musical analysis emerges as the recognition of the "tension of musical coherence" (Schachter, 1981 71-2) and an ability to distinguish both the unique line and the unified multi-dimensional structure.

Moreover, in Schenker's analysis of Robert Schumann's *Dichterliebe* in his work *Der freie Satz*, for instance, one may witness the true innovation of Schenker's theoretical approach and its relation to Freud's theoretical approach to the mind. Schenker relates his theoretical understanding through visual form, dividing the staff into three composite levels, aligned vertically (see example on p. 36).[37] The lowest level – the foreground – contains "major surface events, …elements that are usually most immediately perceptible," including musical

[37] See Kofi Agawu's *Schenkerian Notation in Theory and Practice* and Carl Schachter's *Unfoldings: Essays in Schenkerian Theory and Analysis* for a hierarchic interpretation of Schenkerian analysis, in which Schenker aims to demonstrate "hierarchic distinctions embodied in actual pieces of music" (Agawu, 1989 282) with "the higher levels [as] a kind of Platonic realm of certainty" (Schachter, 1981 363).

elaborations and flourishes (Yeston, 1977 8). The sketch of this level most resembles the original score, only omitting "repeated tones," so as to highlight the voice-leading or interaction of voices in Schumann's work. Directly above the foreground is the middle staff or "the middleground," which Schenker has made to represent "the structural events which lie immediately beyond the foreground level," omitting the distracting instrumental elaborations present in the former. Thus, we see the beginning of one of Schenker's most prominent and useful theoretical techniques: reduction, an analytic procedure that details what is subordinate (or irrelevant) to the theoretical understanding of "larger patterns" (Yeston, 1977 10). At the same time, on the upper staff, we may see the "background" whose structural movement and progression "controls the entire work" and invisibly directs the movement of all the other levels (Yeston, *ibid.*).

In this way, one begins to witness both the reductive process of the Schenkerian method and its simultaneous expansion into an ever more complex awareness of the linear progression. Almost like a detective, the musical practitioner travels deeper into the score until the sublayers are revealed and the musician is engaged in an activity that Wilhelm Furtwängler named as one of Schenker's greatest accomplishments – *Fernhören* (literally "distance-hearing"). If one reads the levels from bottom to top, one can see that "each subsequent level expands, or *prolongs,* the content of the previous level," a technique known as prolongation (Cook, 2007 12). Thus, the more deeply one engages with the structure of the score, the more detailed and concise becomes the underlying progression of the text to the investigator. Eventually, even the rhythm is effectively erased on the background level, so that no collection of 32^{nd} or 64^{th} notes will be dismissed if those notes are essential to the underlying musical progression.

Example 1.1



Figure 22a from the "Anhang" to *Der freie Satz.* Reprinted with permission of Universal Edition, Vienna.

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[38] Excerpt from Allen Forte's "Introduction" to *Readings in Schenker Analysis*, ed. Maury Yeston p. 10.

Thus, the structural movement, which we eventually recognize as I-V-I (Tonic-Dominant-Tonic) becomes the key that unlocks the mysteries of expansion within the piece. Consequently, by training oneself to "hear" the "distances" of the musical work rather than the succession of notes in an "academic kind of performance at high speed" (Schenker, *Contribution* 98), Schenker engages in a kind of metaphysical process of discarding distracting embellishments and recognizing the unified truth of the musical movement, which is always undeniably simple: "in each case, what is being demonstrated is not some abstract quality of musical unity, but rather the conflict and contradiction that animates the musical experience" (Schachter, 2001 71-72). This is "the tension of musical coherence," as Schenker himself expressed it.

In light of these analytical techniques, one may see that Schenker's notion of musical unity is not entirely dissimilar to Freud's articulation of the mental apparatus – both full of contradictions, "tension, conflict, disunity," but nevertheless consisting in one entity, one movement, one apparatic system. The key element in understanding these apparatuses lies in the recognition that the unified sample does not exist as a solidified, one-dimensional structure – what we hear is not necessarily what is truly there. In Freud's theory of mind and Schenker's theory of music, one must always be in the process of decoding whatever is presented in order to access the hidden or unconscious truth, whether it be the repressed truth or the structured musical progression. In Freud's topographical model and understanding of dream-work, for instance, one may recognize a deeply imbedded, present structure – a "background" (id or super-ego) – that when articulated in the language of the day eventually emerges through some kind of deception, embellishment, or even reversal, as a kind of "foreground" (or consciousness/ego). The underlying progression of thought becomes, therefore, the essential movement for which the analyst must continuously search. Similarly, in the case of Schenkerian analysis, a musical

analyst must employ a unified double-axis approach through which one may access the fundamental musical progression that the embellished ornamentation overrides or conceals.

While Freud recognizes that ornamentation and disguise are central to the dream-work and that in many cases they cloud the truth through the use of "reversal" or "opposites," Schenker begins to see music as a kind of language, in which duality or duplicity may similarly play a prominent role: "music's language-like properties, he says, represent a kind of deception: composers concealed artifice, they 'dressed it up, in order to keep the sensibilities entirely in that instinctive state which would be most likely to hear and accept the artificial whole as something generated naturally' (Cook, 2007 36). By "dressing up" the truth and employing a kind of "artifice" through either regular or "music-language," both the dream-world and the musical work hide the simplicity, always a fluid and changing, rather than solidified principle, that lies at their core.

Both forms of analysis emerge as techniques through which one finds a path to deep hidden structures and achieves an understanding of the diverse patterns of unknown, mysterious processes for which we have very few keys. Schenker's conclusions about music-creation mirror the psychoanalytic arguments of Freud:

> Just as Freud opened the way for a deep understanding of human personality with his discovery that the diverse patterns of over behavior are controlled by certain underlying factors, so Schenker opened the way for a deeper understanding of musical structure with his discovery that the manifold surface events in a given composition is related in specific ways to fundamental organization.[39]

[39] See Allen Forte *Readings in Schenker Analysis* 7 for more on the likening of Schenkerian analysis to science or Freudian interpretation.

Thus, the works of Freud and Schenker open avenues in their fields that access the invisible and ever elusive structures in the mind's work. Just as the "manifold surface events in a given composition" are related specifically "to a fundamental organization" of a musical piece, so too are the "surface events" of the dream specifically associated with one repressed thought or movement of thoughts. The analyses of both fields require an active, attentive engagement with apparent lack of cohesion between the overt presentation and the more hidden interior, a kind of "distance-hearing." Schenker and Freud must pierce through or discern either the language of the patient in psychoanalysis or the presentation of the musical work in music theory, in order to hear the distances between ornamentation and kernel, embellishment and substance, or deception and insight. As Schenker says, "Simplicity does not lie on the surface" (Schenker, *Free Composition* I xxiii), and neither does understanding of an unhealthy mind. In short, musical analysis and psychoanalysis both operate on suspicion of what is manifest.[40]

This dedication to the underlying unity of either musical or mental processes of apprehension does not easily translate to the works and lives of either Schenker or Freud, unfortunately. At the very same time in history that both men destabilized and transformed traditional approaches employed by the professionals in their fields, they also witnessed some of the most disturbing historical developments in Western civilization, interpreting and reacting to these frightening times in very different ways. Freud questioned the deterministic view of medicine in fin-de-siècle Vienna and revised established theories of the mind; Schenker challenged the institutional study and practice of music and music theory, eventually pioneering a theoretical system of analysis that transformed musical practice. As indicated in the previous chapter, Freud's approach to analysis underwent a significant transformation before and after World War I, and a similar transition, less abrupt, but nevertheless tangible, may be observed in

[40] See Cook's *The Schenker Project* 213 for shared imagery between Freud and Schenker.

Schenker's theories, even though the development of Schenker's understanding of music does not diverge from its original course. His theories nonetheless may be plausibly divided into two phases: one which runs up to the First World War and another which follows this catastrophic event. Something of a clear-sighted pessimism affects at that time the mind-sets of both figures.

In Freud, this change is immediately discernable in his works from 1914 onwards, but in Schenker, the real trauma does not surface until 1922. Thus Schenker's initial period is defined by his first and perhaps most celebrated essay, *Der Geist der musikalischen Technik* (1896), which emphasizes the complexities of harmony, counterpoint, and the Hegelian notion of evolving "spirit" in musical history. In Schenker's view, the historical progression is not directed towards greater glory, but rather the reverse—from "the first humans in paradise" to "whole families [that] came along,…a dense population that, unfortunately, is not subject to the Law of Malthus!" (Schenker, *Der Geist* 332). For Schenker, therefore, this progression – from paradise to a dense population – was always accompanied by pollution, but in the second phase of his oeuvre after the war, Schenker appears obsessed with the extent and depth of this pollution, which obscures the brilliance of German culture, music, and philosophy, a cultural inheritance assaulted by a world that cannot stand up to "the mission of German genius," but undermines it nonetheless.

From our modern standpoint, it is both unsettling and unnerving that Schenker's discernment of the corruption of "German genius" was also interconnected to his perception of his own heritage. Indeed, in order to understand Schenker's character and position in Vienna, one must understand the different between being self-aware and being self-conscious. No Jewish immigrant in Vienna at the turn of the twentieth century could be completely unaware of his/her position as outsider in the community and culture. As Freud explains in *Moses and Monotheism*

(1938), "Jews mostly live as a minority among other peoples, since the feeling of solidarity of the masses in order to be complete has need of an animosity against an outside minority and the numerical weakness of the minority invites suppression" (Freud 115). Although the marginalization of the Jews cannot, therefore, be much disputed, both Schenker and Freud deal with this marginalization in strikingly different fashions. Freud commits to the pursuit of self-knowledge and knowledge of others, in which he explores and uncovers what is repressed, whether in the individual, in an act, or in society. While Freud exposes issues of repression and marginalization, Schenker devotes himself to overlooking them; instead of recognizing the cultural problem with categorizing the Jew as "mechanical," he over-compensates for his ethnic heritage with the fierce desire to restore the soul to Germany. Thus, from his self-consciousness as a Jew in Vienna, intermixed with his profound admiration for "German musical genius," Schenker attempts to rectify his own position and role in history via intense loyalty to the masters of the West. From his hands, the hands of the "other," he will restore the purity of German cultural purity.

In almost all of Schenker's works, the whole generation of youth in Vienna is assigned the unsettling task of redeeming the musical world, extending from analysis and composition to instruction and technique. Before and after the Great War, Schenker upholds the notion that contemporary musical practices pollute and misrepresent the glorified past of Western music. Although this view is barely detectable in *Der Geist*, Schenker's 1904 publication, *Ein Beitrag zur Ornamentik* (*A Contribution to Ornamentation*) assails the act of performance in the modern day musical world, claiming that virtuosos "are merely slaves of engraver and hand position."[41] For him, musical performance, the product of modern Viennese musical culture, has "deteriorated into an artificial, systematized, narrow-minded, academic kind of performance at

[41] From the editor's summary of the final section ('On the degeneracy of the virtuoso').

high speed" (Schenker, *Contribution* 98). Moreover, oppressed by the popularity of performing techniques that deeply insult his (and, as he argues, Bach's) ear, Schenker becomes ever more belligerent in his diatribes which interlink several unrelenting complaints against his times.

First and foremost, Schenker calls for the end of mechanical performance—"away with mechanical, finished finger facility!" (*A Contribution* 99)— and longs for the restoration of performance from the soul, charging modern musicality with an "academic" soullessness:

> Every piece has its own special fingering, its own special dynamics. All practicing of studies misses the point, as fingering, dynamics, and position of hand in any particular piece are not applicable to any other. That is why the art of performance is unattainable for the many who, from incompetence, attempt to get by with an absolute model for fingering, dynamics, and hand position (Schenker, *The Art of Performance* 77).[42]

The "special dynamics" that Schenker associates with his late contemporary Hans von Bülow are criticized for not only "miss[ing] the point," but also making the "art of performance" forever unattainable, for all these mechanical practices, he argues, "are not applicable to any other" work. For Schenker, Bülow's "disfigurement" of Bach's music not only unsettles the great master in his grave, but also actively harms "every pianist."[43] Thus, by imposing mechanical fingering systems on music, but never looking to its inner content, the contemporary musical world in Vienna offends Schenker who concludes that institutional musical practice undermines the performance instead of enhancing it. Thus, Schenker observes in the world of his profession, brilliantly it seems, the proliferation of unemotional professionalism replacing soulful

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[42] *Die Kunst des Vortrags*, 1911
[43] Quotation taken from *Ein Beitrag,* 1904 102.

understanding, a process which is to play a major role in the course of German history throughout the twentieth century.

Second, it is equally important to note that in Schenker's battle against mechanical views of and practices in music, he mirrors Freud's struggle to overturn deterministic medicine. For both figures at the beginning of their careers, structure-oriented approaches are far too restrictive for fields as unchartable as the psyche for Freud and music for Schenker. However, Freud, as argued in the last chapter, eventually departs from this stage of his career; he returns to a more structuralized view of mind and healing, insofar as he establishes a strict tripartite psychic apparatus and two overarching set of instincts – those of life and of death, and this movement may be seen as Freud's own personal return to medical determinism. Yet Schenker never makes any movement toward an approach that could be characterized as one-dimensional musical structuralism. Rather, with all his passion and indignation, he works to restore an earlier era of musical genius that leads him the opposite direction – namely, to return the "soul-stirring impressions [that] we expect of art," as Wagner put it long ago (Wagner, "Das Judentum in der Musik" 34).[44]

This leads us to the third and most problematic aspect of Schenker's dislike of modernity, interconnected so profoundly, and yet unfortunately, to his genuine insight into the mental state of Germany. In his disdain for mechanical practices in music, Schenker joins the German composer and theorist Richard Wagner (1813-1883), who also associates his time period with the degeneracy of music and dry technical methodologies in musical composition. In this renunciation of mechanical music, Schenker co-inhabits the world of Wagnerian anti-Semitism that makes Wagner reject Mendelssohn:

[44] Wagner's "Judaism in Music" was published under a pseudonym in the *Neue Zeitschrift für Musik* of Leipsig in September 1850 and was later reissued and expanded under Wagner's name in 1869.

> Mendelssohn has shown us that a Jew can have the highest specific talent, possess the most refined and varied culture, the most exalted and delicate sense of humor, and yet be unable, with all those qualities to make in us even once such soul-stirring impressions as we expect of art, knowing that it is capable of them, because we have often experienced such impressions, whenever a true hero of our art merely opened his mouth, as it were, to address us. (Wagner, "Judaism in Music" 34).[45]

Thus, both Wagner and Schenker's immovable conservatism and resistance to contemporary musical developments become framed by a large-scale anti-Semitic mythology, espoused by Wagner, for whom there exists a specific and sinister root of depravity—namely, the Jewish sensibility or "Hebrew taste in art" that unworthily governs Western music (Finck, 1968 325).[46] Indeed, Wagner's primary critique of Jewish musical skill consists in its inability to produce "even once such soul-stirring impressions" that one expects of art.

Although Schenker never addresses the Jewish question in his works in a specific fashion, it may be argued that his adoption of the terms "mechanical" and "soulful" is an embracing of the cultural code words for Jew and gentile, a code evident in Wagner's diatribes, and prominent in the German cultural scene prior to the twentieth century.[47] This dichotomy between "mechanics" and the "soul," therefore, must necessarily inform the examination of the works of both Freud and Schenker, who deal with mechanical and psychical theories simultaneously. Freud eventually returns to a more deterministic approach to mental health,

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[45] For full quotation, see *Richard Wagner: Stories and Essays* 34-35.
[46] Cf. Henry T. Finck's *Judaism in Music* analysis: "[In this essay] a reference was made to a "Hebrew taste in art," and this leads to a discussion of the reasons why there exists among the people an inner aversion to the Jews. [As Wagner argues,] the Jew can no longer complain of persecution (in Germany): he has had his emancipation, religious and political, and now "it is *we*, rather, who have to fight the Jews for our emancipation" (1893 323).
[47] See *Richard Wagner: Stories and Essays* 34-36 for an understanding of Jewish music as "soulless, unfeeling inertia."

while Schenker does not and, moreover, works primarily to bring about what he perceives as a restoration of an earlier era, the power of which he feels is diminishing in the degenerate contemporary world. Cook notes that as Schenker's articulation of the "obvious decline of '[the] age' becomes more virulent," so too does the music of the "(real) classics increasingly take on a utopian quality" (Cook, 2007 95). As a "reluctant modernist," therefore, Schenker leads a professional life ripe with nostalgia, and he adopts an overall approach toward cultural heritage in relation to which he must remain irreconcilably divided between his advocacy for German greatness and himself—his own ethnicity (although he may not identify with it) which is considered by the "greats" as chiefly to blame for this loss of "soul."

While Freud's aim is to undo unhealthy patterns of the past, Schenker idealizes them and works to restore them, lacking an ability to see their foreboding shadows. Following World War I, at the same time that Freud discloses his idea of the death drive in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920), Schenker publishes a series of articles in *Der Tonwille,* the aim of which echoes Freud's understanding of a "desire to return" (Freud, *Beyond* 43). Through analytical substantiation of the illustrious quality of German intellectual and cultural accomplishment, Schenker's *Tonwille* is centered upon the need to restore an earlier, greater era of musical genius. Although Schenker always underscored the greatness of German cultural achievement in his earlier works, the first article of *Der Tonwille*, *Von der Sendung des deutschen Genies* (*The Mission of German Genius*), betrays the development of Schenker's rather tragic ambivalence with regard to the culture in which he now finds himself. His loyalty seems to be paralyzed between an allegiance to the past classical tradition of Germany and an over-emphasized contempt for modern German culture. In the following extensive passage, we can observe the

power of this allegiance to the classical tradition that places German culture, its current pollution notwithstanding, at the highest peak among all other nations:

> Only one thing can be of service: recognition of the truth! It is time that Germans freed themselves from the illusion that all men and all nations are equal. This is no truer than to say that all ants, mushrooms, rocks, etc. are equal. Were they all equal, then the state would surely need to revoke equality and assign unequal tasks and duties to individuals. … Let Germans be alive to the superior quality of their human propagating soil; let them appreciate that even if they were all to become self-betrayers, traitors, Dortens[48], even if South Germans and north Germans were to secede from one another, and all political parties and organizations fragment […]; on the day that these things came to pass, Germany as the nation of Luther, Leibniz, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, of Bach, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Brahms, would set like the sun, would sink like a spiritual Himalayan mountain range into eternity, irretrievable and unattainable by the other nations!" (*Mission of German Genius* 17)

Without a doubt, Schenker's undying nationalism in the service of the German Empire places him in an altogether unfavorable light in the historical record to which our modern progressive culture is privy. It is peculiar for a Ukrainian Jew, who suffered professional loss because of his foreign heritage, to reinforce and strengthen the developing triumph of German genius in the 20th century, particularly when it has already at this time situated itself in forceful condemnation of Jewish influence. The Germans are characterized in the above passage as intrinsically invincible; the "superior quality of their human propagating soil" and the cultural acme in past generations

[48] Here, Schenker references Dr. Hans Abraham Dorten, a minor German official, who carried out a political coup d'état in the Rhineland and appealed to the French for their protection from Germany in 1919.

will always redeem them, in some respect, from any possible fall. It should be noted that in this intensified promotion of the immortality of German mastery, the essay barely mentions music, but rather provides long lists of German geniuses, and yet it is also unquestionable that Schenker's attachment to German music and his extraordinary ability for "distance-hearing" play a considerable role in this unquestionable political madness. His capacity to discern the "pure line" in the ever-widening context of the structural events which lie immediately beyond the surface make him believe that the German genius is ultimately dominant and unassailable. His insight into music which makes him a pioneering figure also undermines him when his quest for purity becomes a metaphor for social reality.

Unlike Freud, then, who never considered himself truly Austrian until the war temporarily renewed his nationalism,[49] Schenker may be thus viewed – in the worst possible light – as a kind of servant to the German genius that he worships in the musical and intellectual tradition of the West. The repeated use of the phrase "even if" supports this notion – "even if they were all to become self-betrayers," even if the people were to go astray (a point that Schenker has argued for the last 15 years), the fault would lie in the nation's inability to recognize the truth, the true underlying structure of history and the time period – namely, the abandonment of the premise that Austro-Germanic history and culture will remain polluted. Not only will Germany remain unblemished, irrefutable because of its vast mastery and richness, but this and future generations must also accept the equality between men as an "illusion" that leads to cultural corruption.

Although Schenker and Freud do not, thus, agree on the infallible nature of German genius, one may nevertheless argue that both figures underwent something of a similar transition following the war, which they articulated in very different, even contrasting ways.

[49] Cf. See Freud's letter to Karl Abraham, in July of 1914 in Peter Gay's *Freud: A Life for our Time*, 346.

While Freud would never advocate the necessity for Germans to "free themselves from the illusion that all men and all nations are equal" (Schenker, *Mission* 17), Schenker's philosophical evolution also led him to abandon an optimistic range of views on the restoration of an older, greater era. In Cook's view, the "Schenker project" hardly remained a project at all following the second decade of the 20th century; instead, Schenker's "forward-looking" tone evolves into a tune of pessimistic reconstruction after it seems that Schenker recognizes that Germany, like himself, has lost its struggle to revive German genius.[50] Schenker's perpetual fight to restore an earlier state of things, a struggle to revive the origin that Freud presented at this same time of the early 1920s as the death drive,[51] seems to paralyze his earlier hope to contribute his work to a current, inventive era capable of redemption. Although Freud also struggled with a loss of faith in the integrity of the human race after the war, his work was unquestionably progressive for its time, insofar as his discoveries of the mind lay the groundwork for much developing scientific theory in the 20th century. Schenker's concentration upon the contemporary musical institutions of Vienna, however, is paralyzed between first, a sense of distaste, even perhaps a disdain for modernity and, second, a developing nostalgia for the past German tradition that he believes can only be restored through the strengthening of Austrian and German political resolve, even leading to his supporting of Hitler in 1933.

What is significant in the transitions of both figures towards less optimistic understandings of their respective fields and time periods lies in a loss of lightness that may be detected in both figures' works after World War I. As argued in Chapter 1, the idea of "play"

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[50] See Cook *The Schenker Project* 138 on Schenker's writings and pessimism.

[51] Cf. *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 43: "At this point we cannot escape a suspicion that we may have come upon the track of a universal attribute of instincts and perhaps of organic life in general which has not hitherto been clearly recognized or at least not explicitly stressed. *It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things* which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life."

outlined in *Creative Writing and Daydreaming* as well as the pleasure principle are eventually deemphasized in Freud's theory, and the mental apparatus must make room for the more sinister counterparts of internalized childhood experience – namely, the super-ego and the death instincts. Similarly, Schenker's more optimistic view of restoring the Viennese cultural acme evolves into pessimistic reconstruction by 1921. The notion of "play," which is what one does with music, is not approached with lightness of spirit, but rather with strict soulful directions. Perhaps, therefore, what brings the most healing really is almost nonexistent in both Freud and Schenker's later works. The methods that both figures develop so brilliantly lose the sense of "play" and "pleasure," which originally took precedence in their respective fields.

Conclusion

Schenker and Freud: Thoughts as Identity

"One must conceal the depths. Where? On the surface.
No part of the surface of a figure can be formed
except from the innermost core outward"
(Hugo von Hofmannsthal)

Sigmund Freud and Heinrich Schenker may be compared through several facets of their work in their time. The work of each man was not merely pioneering; in their respective disciplines, they were able to set up an altogether new space of discourse and discovery. Freudian analysis has given rise a great variety of psychotherapeutic approaches that continue to create further discussion, discoveries, arguments, and counter-arguments. Schenker's influence on musicology is equally multi-layered and multi-directional; as Kofu Agawu writes, "[…] one finds orthodox and non-orthodox Schenkerians, neo-Schenkerians, strict constructionists, post-Schenkerians and a host of others" (1989 276). However, these multiple pathways and areas of inquiry were not merely posthumous, but perhaps even characterized the thought of both men. For Freud and Schenker, contradictions, tensions, and deceptions inhabit the fields of mind and music to such an extent that apparent inconsistencies sometimes succeed in making the analyst forget the overarching unity of either the mental apparatus or the musical piece. By the 1920s, however, the notion of unity either in mind for Freud or in music for Schenker is accompanied by a transition in both men's works and lives, in which their viewpoints on culture and human nature become much less optimistic. As articulated in the previous two chapters, both characters seem to lose a notion of playfulness or light-heartedness, which was perhaps impossible to preserve after the horrors of the Great War. Although these analysts' work are linked in these ways and many others, one cannot overlook their intensely conflicting relationships to their Jewish identities and their view and experience of European and particularly German culture.

As emphasized above, Freud embraces his Jewish heritage and Schenker emerges as a self-hating Jew, but such a conclusion does not accurately address the complexity from which identity surfaces; there is almost too much evidence to let such a conclusion stand without further analysis, for any simple conclusion in the case of identity is most probably untrustworthy. The final movement of this thesis, therefore, is to address Freud and Schenker's respective relationships to their Jewish identities and ultimately to reevaluate Schenker's position as a Jewish Wagnerian. It is my view that the complexity of both men's relationship to dominant culture reflected, to a considerable extent, the complexity of their own thought. The real issue for such an evaluation lies in a mindset that was characteristic of their time, a mindset according to which the individual was viewed merely as a product of his cultural heritage, a deterministic construction, in fact, in which nothing is left of the internal mystery of the human being that had been so essential to the Enlightenment and the Romantic period. Freud and Schenker lived through a time, in which every part of a person was considered to be shaped by biology and society, so that even one's own thoughts became defined by ethnic or national identity, and this advent of social construction extends to society today, even as we examine these figures from our position of progressive retrospect.

Perhaps one of the most striking similarities between Freud and Schenker lies in the ways that they view their respective fields. For them, mind and music are complex, unified systems, to whose mysteries both devote themselves entirely throughout their careers: mind and music are "predicated on the concept of unity, but *about* tension, conflict, disunity" (Schachter, 2006 71-72). Unity does not, therefore, suggest the elimination of opposition or contradiction as intrinsic to both the mental apparatus and the musical piece; rather, it emphasizes the integrated process through which this contradiction or tension is played out, unfolded, or, in the case of music,

composed. From their approaches emerges an emphasis upon the process through which one recognizes how an organism functions as a whole. Only through this kind of awareness of the tension of the mind or music can one recognize the greater harmony (or disharmony) in which the individual or the musical piece operates—to "play from the soul" in both mind and music, as Bach once urged his students to do. The aims of Freud and Schenker, therefore, uncannily parallel each other—both attempt to bring individuals into a deeper, more integral experience of understanding either their internal conflicts or the complexities of the musical piece.

Furthermore, as Cook notes in *The Schenker Project*, Freud and Schenker make use of similar images through which they express the distinction between surfaces and depths in both mind and music. For both figures, the image of archaeological excavation is significant to their understandings of accessing hidden root progressions within either a patient's mind or a composer's piece.[52] As an archaeologist, Schenker enters into the infrastructure of music and makes delving into the past his primary goal, in order to restore the tradition of the Classical period. Following the usual lament concerning the decline of the age, he writes in *Der Kontapunkt 1* that "in view of these circumstances, our first task must be real excavation before we can even begin work that will allow us to proceed" (xxiv). Thus, the most meaningful work of Schenker's life is characterized by this painstaking process of archaeological inquiry, for by means of excavation, he hopes to unearth and restore an essential truth in music and then to share it with the musical world.

Similarly, in one of the most memorable passages in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), Freud explores the connection between excavation and mental life, eventually choosing Rome, the "Eternal City," to represent the imperishable quality of the human mind:

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[52] For more on imagery in Schenker and Freud, see Cook *The Schenker Project* 212-214.

> Since we overcame the error of supposing that the forgetting we are familiar with signified a destruction of the memory-trace—that is, its annihilation—we have been inclined to take the opposite view, that in mental life nothing which has once been formed can perish—that everything is somehow preserved and that in suitable circumstance (when, for example, repression goes back far enough), [repressed material] can once more be brought to light. (*Freud Reader* 725)

For Freud, the mind functions as a landscape that not only has the capacity for memory, but also remembers all it has witnessed. It is the work of the psychoanalyst to access the roads and tunnels, all the while remembering that, in mental life, "nothing…can perish." The trick is to learn how to search and access the material, in order to bring the mystery "once more…to light." Thus, the mind is akin to the city of Rome—a historical city of ruins: if one knows enough, one will find the wall of Aurelian, sections of the Servian wall, the outline of the *Roma Quadrata*, and much more. Thus, there is no end to the treasures of memory or imagination that the analyst may uncover, if he or she knows how to approach the mental landscape.

This rather uncanny connection between their instinctive approaches to their respective areas of study, however, does not mean that their contrasting thought and approaches can be overlooked or minimized, for in their views of the surrounding world, Freud and Schenker could not have been more unlike one another. Self-knowledge is an honored principle in Freud's life and oeuvre: "Turn your eyes inward, look into your depths, learn first to know yourself!"[53] However, the importance of self-knowledge does not resonate so strongly with Schenker, and this leads him eventually to be on the wrong side of the principal struggle of their time, supporting Hitler in 1933 and never even mentioning Viennese anti-Semitism in any of his works. Both Freud and Schenker grapple with their Jewish heritage in complex, but nevertheless

[53] See *A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis* (1917), XVII 143

very dissimilar ways. Freud embraces his social identity as a Jew in Vienna, while Schenker seems to choose the standpoint of Wagner, in calling for the end of mechanical performance, but identifying the "soul" of real performance in a chillingly narrow, discriminatory way.

Thus, in order to understand the internal states of both figures, one cannot overlook the "Jewish question" at this time. One particularly telling example of Freud's consciousness of being Jewish may be recognized in one of his childhood memories when his father, Jacob Freud, relates his experience in Vienna before the 1867 Constitution: "When I was a young fellow, one Saturday I went for a walk in the streets in your birthplace, beautifully decked out, with a new fur cap on my head. Along comes a Christian, knocks off my cap into the muck with one blow, and shouts, 'Jew, off the sidewalk!'" (Gay, 1998 11). Having asked for his father's response to this antagonism, young Freud was singularly unimpressed—Jacob Freud moved out of the road, picked up his cap, and moved on. Freud "recalled soberly" that this act "did not seem heroic" to him. His father was a "big strong man" – surely he could have defended himself (Gay, 1998 11-12). In this, one may recognize a rather familiar appreciation for rebellion in Freud that eventually plays an important role in his work. His father, big and strong, should have challenged such anti-Semitic behavior. Thus, from a young age, Freud's understanding of the relationship between Jews and gentiles involved a deep awareness of the historical injustice towards the Jewish people, and this led him to identify even more strongly with his ancestry: "I have always held faithfully to our people, and never pretended to be anything but what I am: a Jew from Moravia whose parents come from Austrian Galicia" (Gay, 1998 597).

Unlike Schenker, Freud does not unequivocally champion the so-called "German genius" that plays such a significant role in Schenker's opus. In 1926, four years after the publication of Schenker's *Mission to German Genius*, Freud proclaims in an interview with George Sylvester

Viereck: “My language is German. My culture, my attainments are German. I considered myself German intellectually, until I noticed the growth of anti-Semitic prejudice in Germany and German Austria. Since that time, I prefer to call myself a Jew” (Gay, 1998 448). Freud thus casts off German identity, in response to the growth of anti-Semitic feeling in the post-war Weimar Republic, but he does not cling to the religious institution or practice; his Jewish identification is undoubtedly secular, an “infidel Jew,” as he describes himself in later years (Gay, 1998 599). Freud’s son Martin recalled that family celebrations were limited to “Christmas, with presents under a candle-lit tree, and Easter, with gaily painted Easter eggs. [He] had never been in a synagogue, nor to [his] knowledge had [his] brothers or sisters” (Gay, 1998 600). Thus, although Freud’s personal Jewish identity was not bound up in tradition, he exhibited no ambivalence in affirming his Jewish roots in society. In working with repressed psychic material, Freud perhaps knew only too well the price one might pay for repressing one’s own tradition in the face of an increasingly triumphant and frightening Austro-Germanic nationalism.

Schenker, on the other hand, addresses the implications of being a Jew in Viennese society in an altogether incompatible fashion—he does not address them at all. According to musicologists, there is, indeed, only one gesture in Schenker’s opus towards his Jewish roots – namely, when in a fury against popular culture, he chooses to speak of pogroms as one of its most sickening manifestations: “Art can bring together as many as two or three thousand people. But to assemble and entertain 50,000 people – this can be accomplished by bullfights, cock fights, massacres, pogroms: a brutal ranting and raving, a demented and chaotic outcry” (*Free Composition* 159). Even in this one instance, Schenker places pogroms in the midst of a series of detestable cultural phenomena, and the topic of his own position in Vienna is not addressed directly. Nevertheless, the tone of this passage is indicative of Schenker’s experience during his

time, and we may at least gather that not only musical degeneracy, but also more sinister forms of entertainment in German culture have been recognized by the great German supporter, Schenker himself. Rather than reclaiming his own Jewish roots, however, Schenker frames the problems of growing anti-Semitism within the context of the disappearing great German spirit and its high art of the past.

While Freud argues that the individual should actively seek self-knowledge, Schenker promotes the knowledge of the Other, whether it be German culture and politics or the German musical text. The conclusion seems scarcely avoidable here, in this over-preoccupation with the other, that Schenker falls into the category of "self-hating Jew" that Sander Gilman examines in *Jewish Self-Hatred: Anti-Semitism and the Hidden Language of the Jews*. Schenker's homage to the original purity of a people who do not accept him as one of their own places him at the margins of society: "the more one attempts to identify with those who have labeled one as different, the more one accepts the values, social structures, and attitudes of this determining group, the farther away from true acceptability one seems to be. […]. For the ideal state is never to have been the Other, a state that cannot be achieved" (Gilman, 1986 3). In wishing the restoration of Germany's greatest cultural achievements to be brought about by his own hands, by the hands of the Other, Schenker emerges as a figure who possesses minimal self-knowledge, in that he cannot accept his own societal position as Other and wishes to have never been the Other in the first place. And yet it must also be recognized that Schenker positions himself in opposition to the surrounding reigning culture, not as a Jew in anti-Semitic Austria, but as an elitist spokesman for a past Germany that stands against the developments of popular culture in the Empire in which he now finds himself.

In this reaction to German culture and the relation between Jews and gentiles, therefore, Freud and Schenker not only diverge, but present an intense contrast to each other. Freud's focus is upon understandings of the self, and Schenker's – understandings of the other. While Freud writes *Moses and Monotheism* in the 1930s (a book that he longed to open to the public, but never did until his exile in 1938), Schenker's work completely neglects any consideration of how "Viennese Jewry" might adapt to post-Hapsburg Austria. However, although Schenker does not "prefer" to "call [him]self a Jew" as Freud does, he does not convert to Christianity, as was customary for many Jews at that time, who sought to reach higher career levels in law or academia.[54] He may have flirted with such an idea, when in December of 1933, only two years before his death, he compares his works and the reaction of the German people to Jesus Christ's teachings and the influence of Christ's message on the Jewish people: "after 2,000 years the successors to the Germanic people may disavow Schenker as they disavow Rabbi Jesus, but all along the teaching has made its effect and achieved propagation in the world" (Letter to Oswald Jones, *Schenker Correspondence Project website*). Since Schenker compares himself not to traditional images of Jewish prophets, but to Jesus, one may continue to discern the view of Schenker as a self-hating Jew, and yet there is a point in his words that extends beyond this perhaps confused construction of his own racial identity. Schenker draws the conclusion that people often do not respond in the way the individual hopes they would; in this picture of his alienation, Schenker compares himself not to traditional Jewish prophets, but to Jesus. By terms of the comparison, the people represent both Germans and Jews and the individual represents both Schenker and Jesus. Thus, Germans and Jews, so divided in this time period, come to experience the same position for Schenker – namely, they act as unwilling recipients to an alienated prophet and, in this, Schenker perhaps aims to console himself, as an emergent martyr,

[54] Unlike Schoenberg, for instance, who converts in 1898 (Bujic, *Arnold Schoenberg* 31).

that the reception of his work is not what he wanted it to be. Nevertheless, in both his works and persona, Schenker's Semitic roots function as a kind of unspoken reality that must be recognized, although he never directly addressed them.

If one views Schenker in this light, one cannot help but wonder whether his intellectual works are truly representative of his real mental state. Perhaps his eccentric writing and ceaseless diatribes are not always entirely sincere, but rather part of a persona that he hopes will stimulate his career in Viennese society. The earlier characterization of Schenker as a kind of servant to German brilliance and one who has entirely broken faith with his own people does not fully represent the complex reality of his life. Rather, he aims to blend apparently-polarized traditions together, whether they be Christianity and Judaism, or German and Jewish. With this in mind, I suggest that Schenker's work can be viewed from two perspectives. The first outlines him as a follower of Wagner and the tradition of *Was ist deutsch?* (Wagner's 1878 essay in *Deutsches Volksblatt*). From this perspective, Schenker's Jewish roots are central to a modern-day critique of him, so that he may be viewed as a self-conscious Jew fighting to integrate himself into the majority, both a "self-hating Jew" and an individual with almost no self-awareness at all. Yet the result of his work in music is not, in fact, the restoration of German genius (although that was undoubtedly Schenker's desire). Rather, his methods may be understood as an act of reappropriation of cultural treasures that exceed national boundaries. The goal of his work lies in the introduction of an analytical method of music that combines "mechanics" and "soul," thereby making room for the theories of both Jew and gentile to coexist and inform one another. If one reorients one's historical retrospection in order to view his work from this more generative light, Schenker becomes a somewhat more progressive figure. He "redefines the German in music," prying it away from pure Wagnerism and returning it to the Viennese classics (Cook, 2007 88).

Thus, while Schenker struggled to bring the seemingly irreconcilable musical approaches of mechanics and soul into dialogue in his work, early Freud confronted another facet of this social absolutism in society, in which the human being is viewed as fundamentally determined by his social history and genetic makeup. At this time in European medicine, "heredity" was named the ultimate cause for mental and nervous illness. To identify heredity as the etiology of every mental disease excuses the individual from any role he/she may play in his illness (Gay, 1998 120). In Freud's new approach to mental illness and healing – "the talking cure", the patient plays an active role, seeking to know himself via internal reflection and examination of repressed material. One of the most significant and latent issues that both Freud and Schenker confront in their own time, therefore, emerges as the notion that ethnic identity permeates and defines every part of the human being, from physique to mind to soul. There is no longer a divine mystery at work within the individual, a notion to which the Romantic Period greatly subscribed (as Hofmannsthal put it, "No part of the surface of a figure can be formed except from the innermost core outward"). At this time, not even mental or private identity is free from the divide between gentile and Jew: either one's thoughts are "one hundred per cent Hebraic" (Wittgenstein in 1949) or purely and soulfully German.

Moreover, this social absolutism leaves little room for true marginalization, for marginalization implies that there, indeed, exists an assigned place for the marginalized. Freud embraces his position as marginalized because he both recognizes his Jewish ethnicity and feels the need to counter anti-Semitism; he has "always held faithfully to [his] people, and never pretended to be anything but what [he is]" (Gay, 1998 597). Schenker, however, seemingly pretends to be many things other than what he is, if one accepts him as how many have tried to categorize him: namely, as both a German-wannabe and a self-hating Jew. Indeed, it is nearly

impossible to deny that he is both, but Schenker nevertheless emerges as a figure whose thoughts cannot be either one hundred per cent Hebraic or exclusively and soulfully German; his discoveries are a complex mixture of technique and spirit, as Schenker makes clear in his very first article, *Der Geist der musikalischen Technik* (1895). In his intellectual approach and theoretical work, Schenker unites both parts of his identity in fluid discourse, so that they cannot be divided and categorized according to social constructive arguments of the self; rather, Schenker's "mechanical Jewry" and soulful German identity come together with the goal of finding hidden truth in the musical artwork.

Freud might analyze such a character as an obsessive neurotic, reducing this unification of both parts of identity to a crippling fear of defining oneself, and this psychoanalytic reading of Schenker is undoubtedly sound. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, we will leave the question open, for if one looks at Schenker purely in light of his offensive lack of self-knowledge or self-control, he becomes an almost irredeemable figure. Time has already made a mockery of his primary goal of playing from the soul or spirit. For all his fight to be the restorer of soulful instruction, Schenker's work can only too easily become the subject of many a child's groans during their music lessons; to them, Schenkerian analysis is extremely technical, tedious math. At Emory, for instance, Schenker's approach is taught as purely structural analysis of music, through which the student pays strict attention to the musical progression without adverting much to the larger unified apparatus; one-dimensional technique was not the aim of Schenkerian analysis: "from as early as the *Geist* essay, Schenker locates the core of music in spirit rather than technique, and so […] understands it not as a titillation of the ears and nerves but as an object of thought, a system of ideally moving forces, a community of tones" (Cook, 1998 316).

Freud, on the other hand, is also not associated now with what he hoped to represent during his time. As argued in Chapter 1, Freud cracked open the deterministic structures of medicine in his time, only to close them eventually again with his own specific seal, a seal which would produce much speculation, disagreement, and wonder in the following century. In Freud's approach to psychoanalytic practice, one identifies three figures in the psychic apparatus (ego, id, and super-ego) along with two drive theories (one of life and another of death). These keys to the mind exhibit the intense, structural approach that Freud outlines for the psychoanalytic community following World War I in works such as *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920) and *The Ego and the Id* (1923). Thus, Freud's own understanding of psychic space became one of emerging structuralism, a product of "mechanical" Jewry as the Viennese might have labeled it.

Yet, psychoanalysis does not seem to merge well with structuralized or post-structuralist thinking for that matter, in our modern day. There is a significant shift in theory to discredit the power of unconscious life (as it is expressed in early Freud), highlighting instead socio-economic processes as defining the individual's position in the world. According to contemporary sociological and psychological understandings of the human being, the individual draws his/her internal life and identity from outside events, from his/her social environment, rather than from an intrinsic area in the psyche. Thus, Freud, in believing in the unconscious life, may come to represent an essentialist position that cannot be applied to the fluid influences and experiences that mold the individual as he/she moves through life. Thinking of people purely as social constructs allows for the individual to be analyzed as developing from outside inwards, as opposed to Freud's original understanding of a budding, inner psychic world. For this reason, Freud is now viewed by many scholars as the guardian of the outmoded mystery of the unconscious.

Thus, the educated individuals of our own time arguably do not remember Freud or Schenker as these men wanted to be known and recognized. Our own age, however, is not the final destination of these two men's thoughts which are to develop in new significance through other periods in history. In fact, both analysts hold new, yet untapped resources for the future of contemporary scholarship. Interdisciplinarity has come to the forefront of academic excellence, so that the synthesis between the sciences and humanities has become a project for the twenty-first century. Although Freud and Schenker did not exactly bring the sciences and humanities together as we understand them today, they nevertheless do apply tangible structures to the seemingly-incomprehensible and abstract rules of mind, music, and nature. As education aims at integration, to be more and more inclusive of the diversity of approaches, the bridges built by these thinkers between the technical and the intangible promise to provide further horizons for more synthesized advances into the mystery of life.

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Listening in Music

by Heinrich Schenker

"Happy is he who is able to create; but happy too is he who has found another's creation and can recognize and appreciate it. Will that which was found be less yours?" – Goethe

The most accomplished understanding/view of musical artwork is and remains that which introduces both unified tonal material and also the prevailing (foreign or inherent) laws of composers – one should be able to feel and envision the destiny of the piece. Except for the difference of the psychic background, such an understanding of the musical piece is not unlike that of the composer himself, counting from the time when the composer finally emanated through his work and is now in a position to introduce it as separate from himself, as a place where his inner feelings have now been revoked for the rest of the future.

It is at present generally believed that the recording of unified tonal material will give a monotype case of experience for all who listen to a musical work. And most believe in the excellence of their views, but these people are actually expressing their own degenerate views. The practice of complete listening is granted only to the best music experts, while most others just hear the general piece – with intermittent consciousness – from case to case, from instrument to instrument, only understanding certain excerpts of the work of art. There is a small number of simple organized art pieces, which are justified at a level of un-development and immature auditory states; less important artworks are fully understandable to most people. However, for a long time, the art of music in the western world was compelled to search for the intertwined graceful manifolds of complexity, while preserving the character of simplicity, which is well-nigh harmless and self-evident. Therefore, the number of such works of art that makes intensive demands on the ear and even more on all the senses is much larger than one might imagine. Only rarely is a truly good work trapped in complexity, wholly inaccessible to the listener, but all

other complexities are good and beautiful and always well-explained in a kind of simplicity, and this element of simplicity has always been, is, and perhaps should remain a bit peculiar in all great works of art. Therefore, it is correct to say that even in the vast macrocosm of Beethoven's 9th symphony, all the varied interweaving [together of notes] cannot provide what only the service of simplicity finally accomplishes. But who is listening for the divine simplicity of the work? Only those who have heard and understood the complexity from which bright simplicity is born!

It is not clear, neither physiologically nor psychologically, whether, first, the whole tonal material illuminates consciousness in an informative way, leading the listener securely through the work; second, whether the experience of what was heard is immediately and entirely understood; or third whether this material just glides by the whole wide spectrum of consciousness, much like a passerby on the street - we see it and yet do not see it. From our point of view, one cannot really say that one *heard* the tones before they penetrate consciousness, or rather, the center of consciousness. Even if the sound waves are intrusive, the tones themselves are nevertheless welcomed by and accepted into consciousness; if consciousness does not, however, take the initiative and invite them in directly, this means that the extensive, broad effect of the piece is lacking, and this is because the tones lack the power to provoke consciousness, to penetrate it to the degree that understanding of the musical work requires.

The experience of full, rich, completely congruent hearing is, however, also sometimes so heavy a thing that even the most experienced musical consciousness on this subject may fall short of the task. There are very many important works of art, whose construction is so natured, that even despite preceding diligent study, the same consciousness, due to a lack of large, natural elasticity, so to speak, can never fully comprehend them and at a given point is only able to pay

particular attention to this or that. The problem with such musical scores – futile scores one could call them – is in many respects very interesting, most interesting when [one understands] that it relates to the composer himself. Why is it appealing for the composer to think up some musical work, which transcends both his own capacity and that of others? Why did he write something that one cannot hear or comprehend, and what did he initially want to suggest to the listener? After all, it should be clear that in a first hearing of an artwork, so many areas must remain simple tunnels[55] because even if consciousness is clear, deep and comprehensive enough as is necessary, it is still not completely possible to illuminate these areas. And that is why we hold that in the majority of cases, the result of the first hearing of a piece is far too insufficient, but [most people] will not admit that there actually exists an honest, accurate view of the work that they could not access.

"But this is obvious!" many will cry out. Well, yes, but this insight will be violated daily and hourly in often pretentious ways, and the audience of musical art resists this view and essentially takes part in talent that is egregious. How often is the initial hearing also the last, so that the audience disregards the implicitness of the aforementioned situation and immediately judges the piece, even though there are many reasons to push these judgments aside?

In order to save a too-hasty, poorly constructed judgment, one was accustomed to readily remember the position of judgment in relation to painting, architecture and poetry, and then say that for all these arts one only needs to look and then judge, and so it is thought to be the case in relation to music. This is a mistake, for man's relationship to music is entirely different. Even if the viewing of an illustration, a palace, a work of poetry is immature – and immature is always the view of a person who does not know the techniques of art, what is valuable even in this first

[55] Schenker is referring to the simplicity that is found in "the manifolds" of complexity on page 72-3 (paragraph 2). Simple tunnels are necessary, in order to gain some kind of access to the work; otherwise, with such a complex barrier, the listener would be entirely separated from the inner progression of it.

experience of a musical piece is the perpetual repetition of one's own fixed idea of this work in front of all one's senses. Consider the following: not only once does the layman understand the fable depicted in a painting, not only once does the layman see the smooth and fluid lines of a palace before his eyes; involuntarily, the laymen surveys the art object, immersing himself completely in it many times. And how does this compare to poetry? Does not man hang his own experience, every fiber of his life on a work built from words? Is there not in every word of drama, in a verse of poetry, a thread between one's own soul and that of the poet? Is it then possible to see the connection through this unspeakable, microscopic instrument of words from one being to another, the reader to the poet, the poet to the reader? The "association of ideas," which is born in reality and in language, leads each individual smoothly and securely through the work; furthermore, many secrets of the effect of the poetic work are based precisely on the fact that the viewer dares not only to go with the poet step by step, but also at the same time to anticipate what is to come in the all-constructing poetic architecture of the piece. The association of ideas in reality, ideology, and one's own soulful mood trembles and weaves into the enjoyment of a lyric poem.

As one can now see, the position in relation to these arts is always qualified differently than in relation to music. However, music also brings, in a first hearing, a few elements that make the detection of a work's inner substance possible, but they are not sufficient to uncover the sophisticated musical art form, which is at the height of modern historical development, but this height only grazes the discovery of that which one can hear with merely passive ears. So as to judge simply and immediately based on one's first impression of a musical work, man has constructed the foreboding term of "full impression" [of the work]. Man is bound thus to this misunderstood term, which would elsewhere possess the truest sense in the world, but is in this

context dishonest. “Full impression” does not mean excerpts from the work of art simply squeezed out and then extrapolated together to form an impression: from where does the man, who did not hear the work well, find the guarantee that the understandable excerpts are the main issues of the art work? Is music not an art that has learned to carry simultaneously several things forward? How often must consciousness become divided, when it searches for that beautiful simplicity, discussed above? And finally, we must not forget that there is as much, often even more revealed in the proposed "side issues" of the peculiar spirit of the composer himself than in the “main issues.” Never would one anticipate, for example, Schubert's spirit if one had not eavesdropped upon the effervescent polyphony, peculiarly quiet, suddenly arising out of secret depths, which disappears just as suddenly and silently – a polyphony, so different from that of Schumann, and which in turn is again quite unlike that of Bach or Beethoven or Brahms. No! The "full impression" builds its honest existence only on the emergence of the whole, complete artwork material. And the first impression is rarely, and only for those chosen few, a "full impression".

This much is true, that the first impression is undeniably an impression, and an equally independent fact is that a second or third impression may or may not be more detailed and richer than its predecessor. But it is wrong to think that a true work of art must also give in its first impression decisive enjoyment. But the history of music too often proves the opposite of this opinion, which has grown out of a need for convenience, and this is the reason that such an opinion should not be taken seriously. And if one refutes this view [that the first impression should give decisive enjoyment], the person’s second, richer impression could possibly still bring about a worse turnabout in the understanding of the art work; we say this: *fiat justitia, pereat*

opus[56], because the first impression, which goes against the innermost nature of music, is an immoral, unjust, unfulfilled view, which is unfortunately too often used and misused. In this, some element is lacking, which can be replaced by nothing else and possesses the sole power to bring this an understanding of music into fullness and maturity.

This most important of all elements, unknown, underestimated, but bristling with the active force of all the various theories, is the *"*habit,"[57] the "habituation," [terms whose true meanings] spurn the views of those who are too proud and absolutely incorrect. If one sometimes, bowing before the power of simple truth, uses these words and expressions, one owes conscious reverence to both the words and the "principles" underlying them, as is usually the case [when one employs a term].

It takes time to apportion out the corporeal existence of music, but it is true that it takes even more time to become habituated [to a musical work]– it takes a while for the listener to feel the tones and make sense of the experience. The habit has helped music on its path; the habit alone raised music in this lovely modern age, and today the habit still raises it and strengthens its power. And it cannot be any other way, as music is arguably the most algebraic art, in which we ascribe changing sentiment values to the number of tones. Are folk songs and Gregorian chants thus thought to be the same on the first day of their creation […][58] or rather, did not both have to enter into the community and church for a long, long time?

The "habit" particularly helped the first inexperience of the creative imagination at the beginning of art to conquer the first swoon of the receiving ear; only the habit could bestow upon the cells of melody, which seem to be in a vast realm of randomness, the soul of the artwork;

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[56] Schenker puns on the tradition "*fiat justitia, pereat mundus*" (Let there be justice, though the world should perish), in replacing the "world" with "work."
[57] By habit – "Gewohnheit," Schenker means the habit of practicing listening.
[58] Here, Schenker adds that folk songs and Gregorian chants develop "in their indestructible, flush glory."

only the habit trained and made the ear receptive to the progression of the cells of melody towards greatness up until today, and now, we finally have such a wonderfully broad topic to consider, such as the adagio theme from Beethoven's B-flat major Rudolf Sonata; the longing for "habit" finally pushed on to the creation of structure, which is a peculiar characteristic of music more than any other arts—[one may see this structure], for instance, in the use of "repetitions" whose task is to habituate the ear to the themes of the piece and tap into the bright psyche of sensation. The latter alone proves that the "habit" is not an external principle which prevails only where it is necessary to listen to an already created work and learn to listen in the right way; at the same, the habit can also be a strength, which prevails in the depths of the art and governs the work.

It is also not to be underestimated that the "habit," in positive circumstances, is able to elevate a layman's naïve, aesthetic enjoyment of a work of art to a conscious, active enjoyment. And, as mentioned above, this active enjoyment of music is a postulate, a necessity because the naïve, aesthetic experience of the layman is simply not fully sufficient, not even sufficient enough to comprehend the work of art on the lowest level of materiality. It is not justifiable in nature that the naiveté, the non-consciousness, which is usually [nature's] favorite principle, has been left stranded; it used to be that as music becomes historic, this "artificial art," as Wagner says, requires full, already-oriented consciousness as the principle of listening and enjoyment. Why should someone ask which is better—passive or active enjoyment—if something besides active enjoyment cannot survive in a world of equality or justice?

Moreover, the "habit" must come closer to action in enjoyment; or rather, beyond active, conscious listening, "habituation" is required in the artwork and in its own new or old laws and makes the principle perhaps especially hard to understand. Must the laws of musical listening be

so many and so demanding? Well, first, the work must be heard all the way through, so that one necessarily listens to the action of consciousness; second, the 'habit' must help the work to obtain its own peculiar atmosphere. What Goethe says is true: "All life builds an atmosphere around itself," and who can deny that a work of art is "alive"? Incidentally, the composer beholds the psyche of self-created [musical] motives only partially through inspiration, and partially through habit. How long and deep did Beethoven search, for example, into the foundations of any of his glorious variation themes, before he proceeded to reveal the soul, which lies inside such mechanical processes of the variations, as always renewing itself? Now, if the creative musician has to go through the course of habit, how much more responsibility does the person have, who merely glances at an artwork, to look at and internalize the work through the lens of habit? The process of the composer's creation must find its likeness in the process of the listener.

Since a single, specific musicology does not exist today, it follows that there is no other musicology with which to compare it. It is left to the art of the future to describe the relationships and subdivisions of more or less remote, but known types of music. The types of music are strictly divided up, strange and incomprehensible to each other, and what is law in one is prohibited in another, and what is prohibited in one is law in another. Yet there is something sacred and simple in some of these laws, which prevails with eternal majesty over all types of music, so that what music is can remain music in every place. It is difficult to attain this knowledge; people love only such music that is born close to their senses, to their milieu, and with which they have lived. Music, however, which is brought up by foreign laws, by a strange world of views and feelings, by a mysterious nature, meets with resistance and intolerance, as if in each form of music there is not that same beautiful blood. And yet whoever allows himself to be guided by the principle of "habituation" will be able to enjoy Slavic, Czech, Russian,

Swedish, Danish, or French music and experience the same inner fragrance just as a person who grew up with such music would.[59] How many Germans believe today, having heard the music of Smetana and referring to that fact, that they have opened their ears to this and any other time? And yet how little justification there is for them to believe it!

The highest triumph, the proudest delight in listening to a work of art is the raising of the power of the ear to that of the eye. Man can imagine a landscape, wide and beautiful, surrounded by mountains and hills, full of fields and meadows and forests and streams, full of whatever nature creates in beauty and variety. Then, he climbs to a place with a view that gives him access to the whole landscape; how joyous and remote are the tiny roads and rivers and forests and villages, and all that lives and does not live intertwined—such a sweeping view readily comprehensible! So there is also a point where the spirit looks over the work of art and can clearly see or hear all the roads, the goals, the rest stops and storms, all the varieties and limitations, all the measurements and their proportions. One may safely say that he who finds this climax/zenith/peak—indeed, the composer must also reach such a point to be able to unfold his work—has indeed "heard" the musical piece. But such listeners are truly few.

[59] Here, Schenker adds the sense of smell, in order to point out the union of the senses in engaging with art.