Distribution Agreement

In presenting this thesis as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter now, including display on the World Wide Web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis.

Eden Medina April 4, 2022

A Woman's Place is in the Resistance: Understanding the Legacy of Female Combatants on Post-Conflict Gender Equity

by

Eden Medina

Dr. Danielle F. Jung

Adviser

International Studies

Dr. Danielle F. Jung

Committee Member

Dr. Beth Reingold

Committee Member

Dr. Donald Beaudette

Committee Member

2022

A Woman's Place is in the Resistance: Understanding the Legacy of Female Combatants on Post-Conflict Gender Equity

By

Eden Medina

Dr. Danielle F. Jung

Adviser

An abstract of

a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences

of Emory University in partial fulfillment

of the requirements of the degree of

Bachelor of Arts with Honors

International Studies

2021

Abstract

A Woman's Place is in the Resistance: Understanding the Legacy of Female Combatants on Post-Conflict Gender Equity

By Eden Medina

This thesis represents the first effort to leverage quantitative methods to comprehensively understand the long-term political dynamics of female combatants in cases of civil war and insurgency. I examine the relationship between women's participation in rebel groups and their representation in negotiations and post-conflict politics across multiple scenarios. I contend that when women actively participate in rebellion they increase the likelihood of institutionalizing women's presence and activity in the post-conflict political environment in diverse ways. Rebel group experience provides women with the requisite skill set for political activity, while also affording them leverage within their movements and refashioning gender norms within their communities. In a series of three empirical tests, I explore the effects of female combatant presence and prevalence on women's representation on elite negotiating teams, gender provision inclusion in peace agreements, and gender quota adoption by former rebel parties. I test how the gender composition of rebel groups explains variation in women's post-conflict political representation using cross-national data on women's activity in 316 insurgencies active between 1964 and 2014 from the Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset 1.3 (WARD). I also utilize data on women's participation in negotiations from Krause et al. (2018), gender provisions in peace agreements from PA-X 5 (Bell et al. 2021), and gender quotas from the IDEA Gender Quotas Database (GQD), alongside original data on gender quota adoption. I show that peace processes involving rebel groups with female combatants are significantly more likely to include women on conflict termination teams. Additionally, political parties succeeding rebel groups with female combatants are significantly more likely to voluntarily adopt party quotas, and as the share of female combatants in a group increases, the probability of party quota adoption increases. These findings support the existence of a robust relationship between rebel group and political movement as it relates to women's representation.

A Woman's Place is in the Resistance: Understanding the Legacy of Female Combatants on Post-Conflict Gender Equity

By

Eden Medina

Dr. Danielle F. Jung

Adviser

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences

of Emory University in partial fulfillment

of the requirements of the degree of

Bachelor of Arts with Honors

International Studies

2021

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my thesis adviser, Dr. Jung, for the many hours she generously devoted to this project. I am deeply grateful for the contributions of my committee members and mentors Drs. Beaudette and Reingold, who have challenged and empowered me to reach my potential during my time at Emory. Many thanks also to Dr. Ayal Feinberg for his mentorship with earlier stages of the research. To the communities and friends who have lovingly supported and celebrated me through the trials and successes of composing a thesis, I am grateful. Finally, I wish to extend my gratitude to my brothers Daniel and Nadav, my extended family, and especially to my parents Yosef and Michal Medina, whose warmth, strength, brilliance, and unfailing belief in me underlies everything I do. Each conversation with these individuals, among the many others who have contributed in ways big and small to my journey as a student and person, has left me enriched, awed by the productivity and beauty of the university space, and even more curious than I was before.

"All of my work, for certain, has been an attempt at...reconciliation between the different parts of myself."

- Albert Memmi

Table of Contents

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND THEORY

Introduction

In May of 2008, the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) formed in Turkey. It was the successor to another Kurdish nationalist party that shuttered in response to alleged connections with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). The presence of women across roles and levels of authority in the PKK has captivated journalists and academics alike for years (e.g. BBC 2014; Haner, Cullen, and Benson 2019). It is estimated that women comprise as much as 30-40% of Kurdish combatants (Lazarus 2019), and PKK policy requires that all political positions be held jointly by a man and a woman (Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely 2019). In light of this, it is interesting to note that the BDP voluntarily adopted electoral gender quotas, maintains a separate women's assembly, and mandates that all upper positions are split between a man and a woman. In the Turkish local elections of March 2014, the BDP systematically applied its co-chair system so that of 101 representatives elected, 98 had a corresponding co-chair of the other gender (Erel and Acik 2019).

Famously elected in 2007 while incarcerated on terrorism charges, BDP MP Sebahat Tuncel once said of the Islamist, conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), "The AKP wants to put women in their traditional roles. But the struggle of the Kurdish woman and especially the Kurdish parliamentarians dissolves this perception of women." Not only does she refuse to denounce the PKK, she credits them for all of her successes. "Our women's movement started with the female guerilla." (Krajeski 2013) In this thesis, I show that women's participation in rebel groups shapes conflict termination and post-conflict outcomes. In this endeavor, I center the enduring relationships that tether broader political movements to their rebel group origins while highlighting the ways in which traditions of female representation are

maintained. Indeed, the presence and prevalence of female combatants helps to determine women's representation in the negotiating teams, peace agreement terms, and former rebel parties that sometimes succeed the armed groups they fight for.

The case study of Zeynep Sahin-Mencutek (2016) demonstrates that women's high level of representation in the BDP is better understood by examining the interaction between party-related and movement-related factors. Her research falls within the burgeoning literature examining the role of gender in rebellion, the peace process, and post-conflict governance (e.g. e.g. Thomas and Bond 2015; Cohen 2013; Bloom 2011). While some scholars have identified a link between women's involvement in achieving negotiated settlements and women's representation in post-conflict governments, particularly vis-à-vis quotas (Hughes and Tripp 2015; Arendt 2018; Anderson and Swiss 2014), an examination of how female combatants influence these dynamics is missing. Existing works concentrate on either female participation in rebel groups or female political representation in post-conflict governments, with few bridging the two. An independent literature exploring the distinctive characteristics and processes of former rebel parties has also developed, but has not yet broached the subject of gender.

The case of the BDP and PKK is a prime example of an underexplored relationship that exists between women's representation in rebel groups and the political parties they sometimes become. Nevertheless, the Kurdish case is not unique, with recent scholarship uncovering that women are active in a majority of all rebel groups, including as combatants in one-third (Henshaw 2015). Influential actors within rebel groups can affect the outcomes of peace processes, and once conflict ends, many rebel groups continue to exert political influence by disarming and transitioning into former rebel political parties. While historically, civil wars ended in one party's defeat, the nature of civil conflict changed in the post-Cold War era, with

wars now two times more likely to end in negotiated settlement than outright victory (Howard and Stark 2018). Rebel group-to-party transitions are often implemented as parts of negotiated settlements that are increasingly common features of civil wars around the world. I contend that the relationship between rebel group and rebel negotiating team or former rebel party has the potential to explain variation in the initial implementation and long-run effectiveness of post-conflict women's rights initiatives, which scholars have puzzled over (e.g. True and Riveros-Morales 2019; Bell and O'Rourke 2010). Specifically, in this paper, I present a novel argument about the relationship between women's participation in rebel groups and their political representation in the movements and parties that follow them, maintaining that women's mobilization in rebel groups exerts an independent influence on women's rights and opportunities once their groups disarm. Engaging in rebellion may provide women with the requisite skillset for political activity, afford them leverage within the movements they fight for, and refashion gender norms within their communities. During post-conflict transitions, the inclusion of women on elite negotiating teams and adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements are more probable when women have actively participated in rebellion as combatants. After the war, the voluntary adoption of gender quotas is more likely in cases where female combatants have fought for the rebel groups that become the adopting political parties.

Prior scholarship on the long-term political dynamics of female combatants is scarce, and has been dominated by qualitative work. But as data become available that document the contributions of women to armed groups worldwide (Wood and Thomas 2017; Henshaw 2015), scholars have new opportunities to ask and answer questions regarding how gender dynamics within rebel groups translate to women's political representation during negotiations and once conflict ends. My work fits within a broader corpus of international relations scholarship

leveraging positivist approaches and quantitative methods to examine gender in the framework of security studies (e.g. Reiter 2014).

This thesis begins by reviewing previous works pertaining to women's participation in armed rebellion and post-conflict governance. It follows by presenting my theoretical expectations and testing how the gender composition of rebel groups explains variation in women's representation on conflict termination teams, in the texts of peace agreements, and in the ranks of former rebel parties. In three chapters, I present a series of empirical tests to examine women's representation on multiple dimensions—descriptive representation in negotiations, provisions in peace agreements, and quota adoption—in order to develop a comprehensive assessment of the impact of female combatants on political outcomes. I utilize cross-national data on women's activity in 316 armed opposition groups active in over 60 states between 1964 and 2014 from the Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset (WARD) (Wood and Thomas 2017), as well as data on women's participation in negotiations from Krause et al. (2018), gender provisions in peace agreements from PA-X 5 (Bell et al. 2021*),* and gender quotas derived from the International IDEA Gender Quotas Database (GQD), complemented by original quota data. My analysis shows that female combatant prevalence is a key predictor of the presence of female signatories on peace agreements resulting from negotiations involving rebel groups. Analysis on peace agreement terms is mixed, but tentatively points in the direction of higher probability of gendered terms being included as gender equity in the group increases. Finally, I demonstrate that political parties succeeding rebel groups with female combatants are significantly more likely to voluntarily adopt party quotas, and that as the share of female combatants in a group increases, the probability of party quota adoption also increases. These

findings are key in suggesting the existence of a robust relationship linking female participation in rebel groups to women's representation in the political movements that succeed them.

Literature Review

Although the roles of women in conflict have long been overlooked, a plethora of studies have emerged in the last decade documenting the contributions of rebel women to armed organizations worldwide. Challenging the established narrative of female victimhood and passivity in wartime, Henshaw (2015) uncovered that women actively participate in nearly 60 percent of rebel groups, serve as combatants in nearly one-third, and hold leadership positions in over one-quarter. In the same vein, the work of Thomas and Bond (2015) identified that women are willing participants in rebellion more often than is commonly recognized, and organization-based opportunities for women's participation explain whether female members are present in a group. An independent body of scholarly work has simultaneously developed investigating the influence of gender on the construction of post-conflict institutions. In this thesis, I bridge the extant literatures on women's participation in rebellion and women's political representation in post-conflict states, reviewing each through the prism of the movement, both during and after conflict, and focusing on the key aspects that justify my expectation that the gender composition of armed actors explains variation in women's representation following the conclusion of civil wars and insurgencies.

The conventional wisdom on gender and conflict, and particularly militarized nationalism, maintains that nationalism is an impediment to women's empowerment, as its connection to tradition, and relatedly, traditional role patterns, contributes to the entrenchment of a second-class status for women. Nationalism can lend itself to the objectification of women, who can be perceived as the biological incubators and teachers of the next generation of fighters

and patriots, while women's concerns are sometimes sidelined by leaders who claim national liberation as the priority (Sahin-Mencutek 2016; Enloe 1990; Jayawardena 1986; Moghadam 1994; Vickers 2006).

In recent years, conflict scholars have demonstrated that nationalism and war can simultaneously generate new opportunities for women, with numerous scholars adopting a more nuanced view that acknowledges the potential for armed conflict to overturn existing social and political institutions (Webster, Chen, and Beardsley 2019; Hughes 2009). Conflict sometimes creates space for women to step into nontraditional roles, and the destabilization resulting from long periods of armed violence can upend convention. The prospect for gains is relevant after 1985, and especially after 1995 (Hughes and Tripp 2015; Fallon, Swiss, and Viterna 2012; Paxton, Hughes, and Green 2006), following the third and fourth iterations of the United Nations Conference on Women, during which states and international organizations affirmed a commitment to addressing women's issues, including demands for equal political representation. While Wood and Thomas (2017) find little evidence that nationalism independently influences women's combat roles, in patriarchal societies, historical legacies continue to hamper substantive gains in women's rights and standard of living. Variables capturing the enduring institutions of states can be as central as economic development in determining gender equality outcomes (Dilli, Rijpma, and Carmichael 2015). Attempts to achieve gender parity without corresponding institutional reform can be best understood as a refashioning of the age-old imbalance between men and women in a society wherein equitable gender relations have not been realized (Higgins 2015). Hughes (2009) wrote that longer, larger-scale wars that contest the political system have the best prospects for increasing women's representation in post-conflict governments. Hughes and Tripp (2015) found that the ending of armed conflict could explain a 4-5% increase in

women's political representation in post-conflict states in Africa. I argue that as a rebel group enters negotiations, disarms, and transitions to politics, an examination of the gender composition of the group has the potential to explain improvements in women's political status.

Existing scholarship has closely examined how certain qualities of conflict, such as duration and intensity, influence women's representation in post-conflict states. This thesis extends the literature by focusing on how the features of armed groups within those conflicts explain variation in women's participation in post-conflict governance. While prior research attributes changes in women's status to an upheaval of social institutions that is innate to protracted periods of violence, certain classes of actors are deliberately overturning norms, while others are attempting to preserve them. In this respect, scholars have overlooked the possibility that it is not just the presence and character of conflict, but also the characteristics of groups within conflicts, that influence the extent to which women gain.

Discussing post-conflict institution building, Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly (2014, 347) wrote, "With civil war comes a breakdown in status quo traditions, morals, customs, and community. Incorporating women at this critical moment can lead to greater female autonomy, responsibility, and worth." Importantly, it is not just after the civil war when incorporating women enables improvements in women's status. They continued, "Old traditions, morals, customs, and community break down, and new ones must be created" (349). Applying this logic to the conflict itself, I contend that the inclusion of women during rebellion allows women to be active agents in the deconstruction of existing institutions and construction of new norms that favor their group, weaving themselves into the new political structures. Indeed, Wood (2008) explained that conflict can reconfigure patriarchal networks when women and girls take on unprecedented roles as combatants and interlocutors with authority.

As part of a broader corpus of work on gender and civil wars, scholars have also examined how women's participation in conflict termination negotiations influences post-conflict politics. In particular, research has acknowledged the effects of women's participation in the peace process on outcomes for descriptive representation and substantive gains in the status of women (Hughes and Tripp 2015; Arendt 2018; Anderson and Swiss 2014; Bell and O'Rourke 2010). Peace agreements are significantly more likely to have gender provisions when women participate in elite peace processes (True and Riveros-Morales 2019), and more generally, women negotiators tend to push for changes that extend beyond cessation of hostilities and aim to more radically reshape gender relations in the post-conflict state (Swiss and Malet 2017). The literature on gender and the peace process has made important contributions by articulating the benefits of including women in post-conflict institution building and identifying explanatory factors that help to determine women's representation in negotiations. However, existing work is largely agnostic towards the issue of female combatants, focusing instead on pre-conflict measures of gender equality such as female legislative representation and alternative pathways through which women reach the negotiating table such as through influential civil society groups. As newer research indicates, women take on diverse roles in conflict, with some working as prominent peace activists but others fighting as combatants who participate directly in the production of violence. Differences in women's wartime mobilization have implications for their potential pathways to the negotiating table. With female combatants sometimes instigating larger societal changes and positioning women collectively as important spoilers, I test how female combatant presence and prevalence influences women's representation on conflict termination teams and, subsequently, the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements.

More obviously, as armed groups transition to political parties, the question of how a tradition of female participation (or lack thereof) is maintained is one that merits consideration. In addition to the emergent literatures on female combatants and gender and post-conflict institutions, my work is closely related to the former rebel party literature which, thus far, has not engaged deeply with gender issues. Political parties typically form from strong movements of society or as agents of the state (Van Biezen 2005). The party formation literature identifies several mechanisms through which political parties emerge and evolve, noting that differences in regime type (e.g. LaPalombara and Weiner 1966), levels of federal authority (Chhibber and Kollman 2004), and electoral rules (e.g. Van Biezen 2005) affect the character, count, and distribution of parties in a given political context. Previous works on former rebel parties, however, center the importance of the movement-party relationship, or the linkages tying former rebel parties to the armed groups that preceded them. The rebel group roots of political parties affect myriad organizational characteristics, from name changes (Ishiyama and Marshall 2015) to candidate recruitment strategy (Ishiyama and Marshall 2015). Still, just as some former rebel parties play up the programmatic message they espoused during wartime, others adapt their ideological profiles to adjust to a new political context (Sindre 2018). This finding is consistent with qualitative accounts identifying that some rebel groups, when successful, have maintained the pro-woman language they adopted during wartime, while others have sidelined women's issues once they achieved political power. Concentrating on Aceh and East Timor, Sindre (2016, 192) wrote, "An important factor shaping rebel-to-party transformations and post-conflict party governance pertains to how these groups relate to their former rank and file. While drawing on veterans of the war provides for a stable source of support and organizational stability for the former rebel parties, ex-combatants may also pose challenges to such parties as they expect

continued political influence, material rewards, and social recognition for their contribution to the armed group." Sindre (201^) acknowledges the collective of ex-combatants as an interest group that "directly shapes intra-party dynamics as well as policy formulation." (192) An overlooked component of this story is that female ex-combatants comprise their own interest group, lobbying the former rebel party not only on behalf of the larger body of combatants, but on behalf of their gender, with the same expectation of recognition for their contribution to the movement.

My thesis applies the logic of the rebel party literature, which has thus far neglected gender issues, to the robust literatures on gender and political violence and post-conflict gender politics. Again, utilizing Kurdish politics in Turkey, Sahin-Mencutek (2016) writes that the BDP's ideology, compounded with the mobilization strategies and needs of the movement, has facilitated women's self-assertion and elevated them to positions of power within the party. However, the most salient relationship is the one between party and movement; party politics alone cannot explain the BDP's progressiveness, as the Kurdish constituency in Turkey is among the most conservative, alluding to a significant role played by the ethno-nationalist movement more broadly. Indeed, Krajeski (2013) wrote, "The connection between the female PKK guerilla and BDP parliamentarian—a more or less direct line that is both a triumph and a curse—is the complicated foundation of Kurdish feminism." Similarly, Utas (2005) noted that women who were successful in the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) have been appointed to the civil service in Liberia following the First Liberian Civil War, revealing a piece of what may be a larger pattern of movement-party relationships.

When women contribute to armed movements, they often develop the consciousness, capital, networks, and legitimacy necessary to lobby male party elites, take on leadership roles

and ultimately influence agendas (Brechenmacher and Hubbard 2020; Sahin-Mencutek 2016). In the contrastive case of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), Ellerby (2016) noted that a narrow conception of women as victims hampered efforts to secure gains in women's political rights in the negotiating process. The adoption of gender provisions as part of the peace agreement was rejected by male elites who did not perceive women to be legitimate political actors in the Sudanese conflict because they were not soldiers or leaders. Strikingly, Itto (2006) described how the proposal for quotas presented by a female delegate was spurned, and she was explicitly told that the issue of gender provisions was not even on the table because "They had not been fighting women."

The issue of how the characteristics of rebel groups influence women's representation in former rebel parties has significant implications for harnessing the transformative potential of institutional change. Once war ends, men, who are presumed to be the primary agents of conflict, are prioritized in policy making, while women are de-emphasized and de-securitized, even when they have participated directly in the production of violence (Mackenzie 2009). Berry (2017) wrote of the growing literature revealing the potential of armed conflict to facilitate grassroots mobilization and reconfigure political institutions to be more sensitive to gender. Nevertheless, in cases such as Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina, which have been touted as prime examples of this phenomenon, close scrutiny exposes the limited extent to which women have materially benefited from post-war transformations. "While war creates certain opportunities for women, a revitalization of patriarchy in the aftermath can undermine these gains." (Berry 2017, 830) Securing women's political representation in a post-conflict state can reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence (Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017) and, more generally, is related to increases in quantifiable, practical improvements in women's conditions in the long-run.

The act of participating in rebellion affords women tools and opportunities to participate in the political process, even after the groups they fight for disarm. When women take a central role in the production of violence, they embed themselves in national narratives, which they simultaneously transform. They are also integrated into a network of peers, learning the language of their movement and gaining valuable experience organizing. Perhaps most importantly, when a rebel group depends on the continued support of its female combatants, rebel women become powerful coercive agents with leverage within their armed groups. That is, the relationship between movement and participant is not unidirectional; movements are not stagnant—they shape their participants and are shaped by them, in turn (Sahin-Mencutek 2016). Many movements do not relegate women to secondary roles, but instead present avenues in which women can engage in political action centrally and visibly. Often, they do not do so readily, but in response to prolonged struggle by women who challenge communal norms just as they challenge their armed adversaries. Against a backdrop of an otherwise patriarchal society, these movements not only generate empowerment for women, but begin to transform the outlooks of their male counterparts and ultimately, women's post-conflict representation and rights. I argue that it is the experience of participating in rebellion that exerts the key independent influence on women's political opportunities post-conflict.

Theory

When women contribute to armed rebellion, they engage in a double-deviance in which they resist both the state and intra-communal gender norms. Whereas states are chiefly concerned with maintaining political power, and rebel groups are principally concerned with achieving it, rebel women have their own agendas within the movements they participate in; in addition to fighting for the recognition, sovereignty, and representation of their rebel group, they

advocate the same for themselves. Indeed, in *Insurgent Women*, Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely (2019) noted that one broader theme in interviews with Kurdish women was their "double struggle" against the Turkish state and Kurdish men. When rebel groups ultimately lay down their arms and pursue non-violent political solutions to their grievances, unlike male participants whose roles are assumed in the status quo, women combatants must continue their fight from within.

Women's participation in rebellion influences the representation of women's agendas in the political arena through three central mechanisms: experience, leverage, and integration. Each contributes to women seeking a role in post-conflict politics by empowering them to mobilize, entrenching their power within the movement, and catalyzing the reimagination of intra-communal gender relations. Additionally, it is not just a question of whether or not women are active in a rebel group, but the extent to which they are, that influences the leverage women have within their movements, their ability to deconstruct and reform gender norms, and, consequently, their propensity to produce more gender-equal outcomes.

Rebel women gain experience with political organization and learn the language of their movement. Participating in rebellion is an exercise in political mass mobilization. Some women who are already politically interested, such as those urban Kurdish women who had been radicalized as university students (Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely 2019), may be more likely to join rebel groups to begin with. For many other women, rebel group experience is the entry point to political action and expression. Several scholars have noted that participation in the PKK represented an alternative to early marriage for large numbers of rural Kurdish women, facilitating their politicization (Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely 2019; Sahin-Mencutek 2016). In any case, through some combination of the two, women's association with rebellion

offers them visibility, inclusion, and representation by "facilitating the articulation of group consciousness, building female solidarity, and by organizing and mobilizing the very groups that were to be represented." In the Kurdish example, "Women accumulated social and political capital, and were then able to raise gender issues more assertively and negotiate their space in the Kurdish nationalist movement." (Sahin-Mencutek 2016, 481) Considering the factors that impact the level of gender inclusion in party development, Brechenmacher and Hubbard (2020, 2) identified that parties' origins, including women's mobilization in preparty organizations, "influenced whether there were pools of female members or supporters who were ready to step forward as political candidates and whether nascent parties included female leaders who had the networks, legitimacy, and influence necessary to take on leadership roles and lobby male party leaders."

When women fight, or make up a valuable body of supporters, they gain leverage that can be actively exercised. The greater proportion of the overall rebel population women comprise, the more influence women, as a collective, possess within the movement. The critical mass literature on women in the legislature suggests that once descriptive representation reaches a threshold, substantive representation follows, with women more likely to influence policy decisions (Kanter 1977a; Kanter 1977b; Dahlerup 1988). Similarly, I argue that the descriptive representation of women in rebel groups, if sufficiently high, should be followed by the substantive representation of women in the movement, even after the armed conflict ceases. When women's continued backing is an essential condition for success in a rebel group's pursuit of its interests, women can leverage their contributions for concessions in the movement on women's issues. Even absent active protest, women have power that is passively leveraged so long as they are not compelled by force to stay in the group, and therefore have a credible exit

threat. For example, in Syrian Kurdistan, “Even if the Syrian Kurdish leadership had sought to distance itself from the PKK’s egalitarian recruitment practices for domestic political reasons, it would have been militarily foolhardy to do so, as it would have meant turning away fighters who represented a critically important resource” (Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely 2019, 48). Much like political parties during election years, it is in the best interests of rebel groups to appease their winning coalition. In line with the state feminism literature maintaining that the efficacy of NGO advocacy is contingent on partnership with women inside the state, Arendt (2018) found that the inclusion of women’s voices in internal negotiations over quotas enables them to push for disruptive measures to ameliorate status quo power dynamics. As a result, the mainstream political activity of women during quota adoption is key. More broadly, the extent of women’s participation reflects on the armed group and the prospects for women’s mobilization in the politics that follow conflict termination, as Henshaw (2015) writes, “There is a tension in many rebellions between a rebel group’s need or desire to mobilize women and its interest in fully recognizing and valuing their work.” This dynamic is specifically valuable because differences in mobilization and recognition of women’s work among armed groups likely have consequences for women’s continued mobilization in their movements when rebel groups are eventually incorporated in a state’s political order. Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely (2019, 47) wrote that “As women joined in greater numbers, they sharpened the PKK’s focus on women’s liberation from within the organization.” As such, I predict that women’s post-conflict political representation, measured in various ways, increases with the prevalence of female combatants.

Women’s integration within rebel groups holds the potential to integrate them within broader movements, changing communal norms. Webster, Chen, and Beardsley (2019) found

that “periods of warfare can upend existing gender hierarchical orders… At least in the short and medium term, warfare can disrupt social institutions and lead to an increase in women's empowerment via mechanisms related to role shifts across society and political shifts catalyzed by war.” Anecdotally, Sahin-Mencutek (2016, 482) wrote of the Kurds that “women are not treated merely as symbols or tokens, but have also become influential actors, with women’s roles changing substantially over time,” with one interviewee relating, “While we were identified only as mothers and daughters of Kurdish men, we turned into independent female politicians, in the process, we strongly stated, ‘we are not your mothers and daughters anymore.’” Rebel women become part of social and political networks and have the opportunity to contribute to the mythology of their movement. As more women participate, and as women participate with greater intensity, the evolution of gender roles is more likely to occur. Over time, Kurdish politicians grew to appreciate female guerrillas, who proved that women’s capabilities were equal to men’s and gave the movement a legacy to build upon (Sahin-Mencutek 2016). Similarly, in the case of uMkhonto I Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, the group was dominated by men in its early years, but saw women increasingly joining the armed struggle following the 1976 Soweto uprising (Brechenmacher and Hubbard 2020). Female recruits trained together with men, and though few were deployed in combat, according to female MK combatant Thenjiwe Mtintso, “Women members of MK had to be taken seriously. They had to explode the myth of women as inferior on a day to day basis. They did not articulate feminism but had to prove themselves in the field and gain respect.” Women’s participation in MK, “the arena in which the most committed members were located,” was thus symbolically significant, highlighting their equal status within the movement. Indeed, female MK members including Thandi Modise, Dipuo Mvelase, and Mtintso would become prominent

political leaders in the party (Brechenmacher and Hubbard 2020). Whether seeking secession, autonomy, or to overhaul the state entirely, rebel groups fight for institutional change. Institutional change in favor of women is more likely to happen when women are involved in the processes that drive it.

Endogeneity

An outstanding consideration is the role of rebel group ideology in the construction of gender-sensitive post-conflict institutions once rebel groups disarm. Wood and Thomas (2017) demonstrated that the political ideology of a given rebel group is a primary determinant of whether and to what extent the group will recruit female combatants. To that end, Marxist groups are significantly more likely to recruit women to their armed wings. This finding introduces potential confounding because ideology may independently drive women's inclusion just as it drives the recruitment of female combatants. Separately, the presence and prevalence of female combatants within a given group, determined by the ideologically-driven opportunity to join, may drive women's inclusion through the mechanisms I have outlined. I expect that leftist groups will be more amenable to women's inclusion in negotiations and once they become political parties. For left-wing groups, ideological incentives to configure post-conflict institutions to be sensitive to gender can combine with the mobilization of female members.

However, though ideology may affect women's initial opportunities to join rebel groups, once they have joined, I argue that female combatant presence and prevalence independently influences the likelihood of women's inclusion in negotiations and former rebel parties. A deep qualitative literature describes how women's participation has reoriented leftist rebel groups towards a sharper focus on women's rights. Brechenmacher and Hubbard (2020) pointed to a confluence of characteristics of the ANC that facilitated gender inclusion in the post-apartheid

party formation period. These factors included ideology, the engagement of women in the anti-apartheid movement, and the participation of women in the armed struggle, which challenged traditional gender norms just as it gave rise to female leaders with strong struggle credentials. “In its early years, the ANC focused primarily on national and racial liberation, often at the expense of gender issues… Beginning in the 1980s, however, women began denouncing chauvinism in the movement more explicitly and speaking openly about the intersection of gender, class, and racial oppression” (12). While ideology and related organization-based opportunities for recruitment matter, once women are in the rebel group, female combatant prevalence may drive women’s post-conflict political opportunities. The work of Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely (2019) about Kurdish rebel groups is especially useful in this regard. Discussing the case of the PKK, they explained that its ideological program evolved from traditional Marxism to democratic confederalism over time, but the explicit focus on women’s empowerment remained. “It has arguably become more central over time as the number of women in the group has increased.” (46) More generally, they wrote that “One consequence of recruiting women can be that, once present, they increase the organization’s ideological focus on women’s rights.” (49) Addressing the chicken-and-egg dynamic between ideology and women’s rights, they emphasize that the focus on women’s rights was not a given, but that Kurdish women had to struggle within the nationalist movement to see women’s issues prioritized. “Perhaps these organizations were more predisposed to recruit women in the first place because they were ideologically committed to gender equality. But in the case of the PKK… the shift towards greater inclusion of women has taken place over time and has increased as more women have joined.” (51) The authors conclude that the PKK’s focus on women’s rights and empowerment was increased by the presence of female combatants, with one interviewee relating, “In the

beginning, it was different…As more women joined the PKK, there was more and more discussion of gender issues. From the beginning there were women recruits, but the PKK was a military and male-dominated organization. It was women's participation that changed it into a feminist organization." (49)

In other cases, internal pressure combined with the external incentives to include women in post-conflict politics can succeed even without ideological alignment. Evidence from France indicates that even parties on the right that are more resistant on ideological grounds to gender quota adoption have been coerced into supporting quotas through internal and external pressure (Murray, Krook, and Opello 2012). Fundamentally, there is evidence to suggest that in diverse cases "women's participation changes armed movements from within," (Trisko Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely 2019, 52) a proposition I turn to now for testing. For obvious reasons, the "gold standard" for causal inference is unavailable to answer the research questions of interest. It would be impossible and unethical to take an experimental approach (i.e. randomly assigning female combatants to rebel groups) and it is unclear that a compelling instrumental variable approach exists to examining the effects of female combatants on post-conflict gender equity. Instead, by controlling for the characteristics that might lead certain classes of rebel groups to recruit female combatants, I can mitigate some of the concerns that female combatants may not be randomly assigned by making within-group comparisons. For example, I include ideology as a control variable in the regression models of each of the empirical tests, demonstrating that among leftist groups, for example, those with female combatants are more likely than those without female combatants to promote women's political rights and participation at the various post-conflict stages. I find strong evidence of an association, and importantly, my results show that there is heterogeneity when it comes to the effects of female combatants, with women's

participation having a bigger impact in some post-conflict stages compared to others. The major contribution of this thesis, ultimately, rests upon the articulation of a new theory and presentation of a large body of evidence indicating that the theory has major potential as an explanation for diverse post-conflict dynamics.

In the coming three chapters, I produce three empirical tests to elucidate how women's participation as combatants in rebel groups influences women's representation in different post-conflict stages. At a high level, the empirical strategies regress various measures of women's post-conflict political representation on female combatant presence and prevalence. I hypothesize that the presence of female combatants in a rebel group increases the likelihood that women are descriptively represented on conflict termination teams involving the rebel group, that gender provisions are adopted in peace agreements signed by the rebel group, and that gender quotas are adopted by political parties succeeding the rebel group. Furthermore, I contend that the prevalence of female combatants is an important predictor of post-conflict gender equality outcomes, such that it is not only the presence of women in a rebel group but the achievement of a "critical mass" that matters for the prospects of women's post-conflict representation. In particular, I hypothesize that the likelihood of women's representation in negotiations, gender provision adoption in peace agreements, and gender quota adoption increase with the prevalence of female combatants. In Chapter 2, I find evidence indicating that a strong positive relationship exists between female combatant presence and prevalence and women's participation on conflict termination teams. Additionally, in Chapter 3, I find weak evidence to suggest a potential relationship between the presence of female combatants and the adoption of gendered terms in peace agreements. Finally, I present results in Chapter 4 suggesting that a strong positive relationship exists between female combatant presence and gender quota

adoption, and that as the prevalence of female combatants increases, as does the likelihood of quota adoption. My final chapter concludes and suggests new questions raised by my findings.

CHAPTER 2: WHEN WILL MY WIFE COME HOME FROM WAR? FEMALE COMBATANTS AND THE GENDER COMPOSITION OF ELITE NEGOTIATING TEAMS

Introduction and Literature Review

In July of 2016, half of a century of conflict between the Colombian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), a Marxist guerilla group, concluded with the signing of a peace agreement developed over several years of negotiations. It is generally considered to be the most inclusive peace agreement in history, including a women's sub-commission during negotiations, provisions enshrining the rights of women and LGBT people, a focus on sexual violence, and explicit language addressing issues of poverty and inequality through the lens of gender (Nylander 2017). Notably, women comprised 20% of the government delegation and 43% of the FARC negotiating team (Bigio, Vogelstein, and Connell 2017). Indeed, a rich literature exists confirming the myriad benefits of women's descriptive representation in the peace process for the substantive representation of women's agendas and the production of durable and inclusive peace (Anderson and Swiss 2014; Anderson and David 2017; Arendt 2018; Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017). Although, research into the determinants of women's participation on conflict termination teams is more limited.

In the Colombian case, an underexplored element of the peace process is the impetus for women's inclusion in the talks. Interestingly, the gender composition of the FARC delegation mirrored the gender composition of the rebel group itself (Bigio, Vogelstein, and Connell 2017). Existing work relating to the movement-party relationship has established that bodies of rebel ex-combatants function as interest groups that effectively lobby for concessions in the movement that prioritize their interests (Sindre 2016), offering evidence to suggest that armed groups are not unitary actors, with influential players and collectives within the rebel groups continuing to affect political outcomes in diverse post-conflict contexts. In this chapter, I posit that women's

participation in armed rebellion may be the critical factor driving women's representation in peace processes involving the rebel groups they fight for.

Previous research on women's participation in the peace process has typically fixated on the influence of autonomous women's movements within the state (Htun and Weldon 2012, Htun and Weldon 2010), and at times their linkages to international advocacy groups. A common thread throughout this literature is an acknowledgement of the challenges involved in ensuring women have a seat at the table in elite negotiations despite strong civil society participation. What explains variation in the gender composition of negotiating teams? I present the argument that women's activity in rebel groups during civil conflicts advances their descriptive and substantive representation during peace processes, in this chapter concentrating on women's involvement on conflict termination teams. The case of the FARC suggests that the presence and prevalence of female combatants could be the key factor influencing the orientation of armed groups towards gender issues during peace processes. My contribution elucidates an overlooked possibility: that it is not just civil society organizations dedicated to women's empowerment, but militant groups in which women are key stakeholders, which can influence the representation of women in the peace process, and ultimately secure women's agendas. Specifically within the context of civil war and insurgency, rebel women, in sufficient numbers, have power within their movements and can mobilize to leverage their contributions for formal representation.

As Mary Moran and Anne Pitcher (2004, 504) expressed, "Women can be the perpetrators of violence as much as they can be the midwives of peace." In this chapter, I will review and bridge the literatures on rebel women and female engagement in peace processes to advance my argument that women's participation in the production of violence during wartime affects their ability to position themselves as peacemakers, and to be influential in those roles. I

utilize data on women's direct participation in 467 peace processes between 1975 and 2011 in order to assess how the prevalence of female combatants in rebel groups affects women's representation once those groups reach the negotiating table (Krause et al. 2018). Ultimately, I identify a significant positive relationship between female combatant prevalence and female participation on conflict termination teams proxied by the presence of female signatories, providing evidence in support of my argument that women's engagement in rebel groups influences their representation in post-conflict politics.

In recent years, scholars have begun eschewing the conventional wisdom that militarism entrenches traditional gender relations in favor of a view that accounts for the nuanced realities of social upheaval during civil war across diverse socio-political landscapes (Berry 2017; Beardsley, Chen, and Webster 2019; Hughes 2009). Demeritt, Nichols, and Kelly (2014) wrote of the breakdown of institutions and communities during civil conflict, finding that incorporating women in the process can advance the development of female autonomy and worth and the creation of new norms. Conflict can suspend social and cultural convention and, relatedly, generate opportunities for women to enter traditionally masculine roles. Examining the case of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in Turkey, Sahin-Mencutek (2016) underscored the crucial role played by the ethno-nationalist movement in elevating Kurdish women to positions of political power, finding that the mobilization of women in influential combatant and leadership positions in the rebel group explains the pro-woman orientation of its successor party, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP). Sindre (2016,192) discussed the power of rebel ex-combatants in influencing the movements they fought for, describing how their lobbying "directly shapes intra-party dynamics as well as policy formulation," because they pose challenges to former rebel parties with the expectation of rewards and recognition for their contributions. For rebel

women, the intersection of gendered interests with ex-combatant status results in lobbying on behalf of both identities. In his work on the Liberian Civil War, Press (2010) detailed the lobbying efforts of Liberian women to participate in peace talks as agents, not victims. Women organized and led mass demonstrations with the backing of major religious institutions and the goal of ending the protracted conflict, voicing that as survivors, peacemakers, and the majority population, their voices must be included in the peace process. As Nylander (2017) articulated, "It is important to note at the outset that women and men have different roles both between and among themselves and are part of a broader conflict picture. Women are not only victims: they are also peacebuilders and peacemakers. Women are also combatants and perpetrators of violent crimes, spoilers, engaged actors, and indifferent citizens." The work of Wood and Thomas (2017) has exposed the extent of women's participation in rebellion, challenging the perception of women as solely victims of war and men as the sole agents of violence. Indeed, women are active participants in close to 60 percent of all rebel groups, combatants in nearly one-third, and leaders in over one-quarter (Henshaw 2015). Burgeoning documentation of the scope of women's participation in civil war and insurgency and, more broadly, the production of violence worldwide demands research that responds to this phenomenon and addresses not only its causes but also its consequences.

Between 1992 and 2011, women comprised only 4% of signatories to peace agreements, and only 9% of negotiators (Njoku 2018). However, the growing number of United Nations resolutions prioritizing the rights of women and girls over the past two decades have driven an evolution of international standards. In 1995, 189 governments endorsed the Beijing Platform for Action, which affirmed the importance of women in an array of policy areas and identified ways to address gendered violence (Htun and Weldon 2012).

In her book about the involvement of women's groups in peace negotiations to advance favorable political change, Anderson (2016) wrote of significant barriers for women to access peace talks and subsequently leave a mark on final agreements, determining that, especially in the midst of conflict, women struggle to have their voices heard and their concerns addressed. Drawing upon three case studies, she identified that women's groups linked to transnational feminist networks, and in the two successful cases outside allies helped women access the talks in varying degrees. However, women's roles in negotiations are not limited to representatives of civil society organizations or mediation teams, with women partaking in government and rebel conflict termination teams. Taylor, Htum, Goetz, and Hattam (2015) acknowledged the path by which women joined their negotiation teams to be a factor in their active participation in the formation of peace agreements. Even if women are included as non-combatant representatives, the status of women in the peace process as victims has implications for their influence in negotiations. In the case of the Sudanese peace process for Darfur, Ellerby (2016, 9) described the failure of female representatives of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to achieve gender quota adoption, explaining that "Women were understood only as victims in the Sudanese conflict, not soldiers, leaders or negotiators. This narrow conception of women as victims is both a cause and effect of a competing peace process for women: only those actors who shape and implement these provisions are considered the rightful parties to negotiate. In this sense, women-as-victims and other marginalized groups were excluded from negotiations because they were not considered legitimate actors to the conflict." Her contribution is particularly valuable because it highlights not only how participation in rebellion can validate women as legitimate political actors, specifically as emissaries in the peace process, but also how the route through

which women get to the negotiating table matters for the ultimate prospects for gender provision adoption, a subject I explore in a later chapter.

Strolovitch (2006), writing of interest groups in the United States, found empirically that activist organizations not focused specifically on women have inadequate responses to violence against women because they see the issue as unimportant to the group's larger objectives. However, there is evidence to suggest that, within rebel groups, the presence and prevalence of female combatants can influence the direction of the movement, precisely because the continued support of women is a necessary condition for success. Women's advocacy groups attempt to capitalize on intrastate peace processes to transform the roles and opportunities of women in the state (Anderson 2016). Problematically, Goetz and Jenkins (2016, 211) argued, "The fact that the privileged category for post-conflict decisions are those groups capable of acting as 'spoilers' has tended to exclude women's groups from the categories considered most important to involve in decision making." Similarly, Anderlini (2003) attributed the marginalization of women in the peace process to the infrequency of women having enough power to implement peace agreements. Arguably, the existing literature on women's descriptive representation in negotiations has overlooked the role of the most important spoiler in these peace processes – the armed group itself – and the reality that these groups are not unitary actors, but are instead influenced by a range of powerful actors within them. It follows that women can move from the periphery in peace processes when they are positioned as combatants and spoilers within the rebel groups that comprise the primary actors in negotiations. Consequently, it is possible that women's participation in rebel groups influences their representation in the peace process.

Determining how women get to the negotiating table has important implications for maximizing the capacity for peace agreements to facilitate the transformation of institutions in

favor of marginalized populations. More substantively, scholars have established that women's involvement in the peace process increases peace duration and durability (Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017). In modern peace negotiations, female participants tend to prioritize not just the cessation of hostilities, but long-term goals that carve out more equitable roles for women in the post-conflict political environment (Swiss and Malet 2017). Indeed, Ellerby (2016, 437) articulated that the avoidance of studying the variation in women's inclusion in the peace process has consequences for security practices, "including: what is considered security; who are deemed legitimate and relevant actors in peace negotiations; and who gets access to limited resources in peacebuilding endeavors." Riveros-Morales and True (2019) concluded that the participation and representation of women in formal peace processes is the most important factor influencing gender-sensitivity in peace agreements, underscoring the significance of an analysis ascertaining the political conditions that enable women to engage in negotiations. Finally, some scholars have argued that women's participation in the peace process also drives quota adoption, which institutionalizes a mechanism for women's access to political power following the conclusion of conflict, because women accrue political capabilities through experience in negotiation and opportunities to take a role in formal politics in the formative period immediately following peace talks (Anderson and Swiss 2014). Though this may be the case, it may also be that women's activity during rebellion is the key causal mechanism explaining both the gender composition of negotiating teams and the subsequent adoption of gender provisions in the peace agreement and the post-conflict political arena, a possibility that I explore in this thesis.

When women, in sufficient numbers, join rebel groups and become combatants, they develop leverage within their organizations alongside a complementary skillset that enables them to engage in political activity. Rebel women join groups representative of larger movements that

may continue to be politically persuasive long after the groups promoting them disarm. Women are integrated into networks of politically active peers, and, as a result, gain access to a world they can tangibly influence. When elevated to positions of leadership, female combatants possess the power to reorient the rebel groups they fight for. Rebel group experience advances women's agendas by "facilitating the articulation of group consciousness, building female solidarity, and by organizing and mobilizing the very groups that were to be represented." The female combatants of the PKK "accumulated social and political capital, and were then able to raise gender issues more assertively and negotiate their space in the Kurdish nationalist movement." (Sahin-Mencutek 2016, 481) Rebel women shed the label of "victim" typically ascribed to women during wartime and instead become active agents who can make meaningful decisions and affect outcomes.

In cases of civil war and insurgency, female combatants share the agendas of their male counterparts vis-à-vis conflict outcomes, but also retain distinct interests on behalf of their gender. That is, insurgent women fight both the state and intra-communal gender norms. Conflict, which destabilizes the existing political order and frequently demands that women fill social, economic, and political roles once reserved only for men, holds the potential to reshape gender relations. As both rebels and women, female combatants participate not only in the degradation of prevailing institutions, but in the active formation of new and more favorable norms. Accessing peace negotiations is a primary objective for mobilized women, because peace agreements represent a highly public and enforceable opportunity to institutionalize the gains accrued to women during conflict, including higher status in post-conflict governance, consequences for gender-based violence, and newly-won rights for women and girls. Earlier works have established how the descriptive representation of women in the peace process is

followed by the substantive representation of women's objectives (Anderson and David 2017; Arendt 2018). Indeed, the inclusion of women in negotiations is linked the pursuit of a broad, long-term feminist agenda that reduces the likelihood of conflict recurrence (e.g. Shair-Rosenfield and Wood 2017).

I draw upon the antipodal cases of Darfur and Colombia, where the effects of the mechanisms of experience, leverage, and integration were prominently featured, to highlight how differences in women's roles during civil conflicts influence gender inclusivity in subsequent peace negotiations. The high prevalence of women in the FARC illustrates how female combatants can leverage their contributions for concessions in the movement. Sanin and Franco (2017) wrote that female combatants shaped the FARC and identity construction within the movement. The feminization of the FARC transformed the organization. "As a consequence, the FARC, while including women in order to grow in military capacity and implement its organizational blueprint, also created spaces in which gender inequalities were renegotiated, rethought, and rehashed." (776) One outcome of this is that FARC women have been active participants in debates about women since the peace process was initiated between the FARC and the Colombian government. Consequently, Kazman (2019) noted that the landmark peace agreement included the Spanish word for woman, "mujer," 197 times.

In stark contrast, Ellerby (2016) noted that female combatants were nearly entirely absent in the SPLA, which entrenched an enduring perception of women as victims rather than agents in the Darfur conflict. As a result, women were delegitimized as political actors, and demands for gender provisions during the peace process lacked credibility or backing from any of the powerful actors in the negotiations. Itto (2006) recounted how the proposal for quotas presented by a female delegate was shut down because women were not combatants in the conflict.

Juxtaposed with the FARC women, who Herrera and Porch (2008, 612) wrote, "revel in their service, not because they lived it as did men, but because it allowed them to prove their worth as women," the cases of Darfur and Colombia suggest an interesting theoretical basis that could form a pattern of relationships connecting female combatants with women's representation in peace processes around the world.

H_1: The prior presence of female combatants in a rebel group increases the likelihood of women's participation in negotiations involving the rebel group.

H_2: The likelihood of women's participation in negotiations increases as female combatant prevalence in the associated rebel group increases.

Data and Variables

Independent Variables:

This thesis draws upon the measures of female combatant presence and prevalence found in various iterations of the Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset (WARD) as explanatory variables for each of the three empirical tests. The WARD includes both binary and categorical indicators that reflect the presence and prevalence of women in hundreds of armed groups over a timespan of several decades. This chapter utilizes independent variable data from the original WARD (Wood and Thomas 2017), which was merged by Krause, Krause, and Bränfors (2018) with data on peace agreements included in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) dataset.

The WARD draws upon the list of groups included in the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2007 v.1-2015) to generate the base sample of armed groups. International conflicts, civil conflicts involving only military factions, and coups are excluded, resulting in a sample representative of 80% of the UCDP Dyadic Dataset for the years included. The indicators of female combatant participation reflected in the WARD were constructed from an array of open-source media, including news reports, academic scholarship,

biographies, publicly-available government sources, and international and non-governmental organization reports (Wood and Thomas 2017).

In line with the consensus conceptualization and operationalization of female fighters commonly applied for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) initiatives sponsored by the United Nations and other international organizations, female combatants are defined as "Women and girls who participated in armed conflicts as active combatants using arms." (UN Women 2012, 22-23; Wood and Thomas 2017). Like the sponsors of DDR programs, the WARD distinguishes between female combatants and female supporters or females associated with armed forces and groups. Examples of the latter may include cooks, nurses, spies, translators, and women and girls used for sexual exploitation, among other roles. Female supporters, whether coerced or voluntary, are women and girls who participate in armed conflict in supportive roles and are economically and socially dependent on the armed group for income and social support. Female combatants, in contrast, receive military training and combat arms and directly participate in organized violence on behalf of the armed group in any capacity over the course of the conflict (Wood and Thomas 2017).

As Thomas and Wood (2017) have previously noted, the WARD has some limitations due the challenges associated with locating accurate materials on female rebel participation, which may result in imprecise estimates. Low media density, a paucity of English language sources, or underreporting may have potentially contributed to the underestimation of female combatant participation in some cases, while exaggerated reports may have resulted in overestimation in others. Mitigating these concerns, the WARD v1.3 includes several measures of female combatant presence and prevalence, including more conservative and reliable estimates and estimates that maximize estimated female combatant participation. Furthermore, there is no

reason to expect that information would be systematically missing in ways that would confound my analysis. An additional coding challenge is that the boundary between combatant and supporter are often blurred for guerilla groups. To address this issue, the operational criteria for "female combatant" in the WARD include diverse activities ranging from the use of arms in combat to service in auxiliary and militia forces forces and execuction of suicide bombings and assassinations (Wood and Thomas 2017).

In order to test my second hypothesis about the effects of female combatant prevalence on women's participation on conflict termination teams, I used the *fem_com* variable from the Krause et al. (2018) replication data, which is derived from the WARD. The original WARD examines women's participation in 211 rebel organizations active between 1979 and 2009. The *fem_com* variable is a categorical indicator with values ranging from 0 to 3, where estimated female combatant prevalence increases with the value of the variable. A value of 0 indicates an estimated percentage of 0 for female combatants in a given rebel group, or no evidence of female combatants. A value of 1 reflects low prevalence, or an estimated female combatant prevalence of <5%, while a value of 2 indicates moderate female combatant prevalence estimated between 5-20% of the rebel combatants. Finally, groups taking a value of 3 for *fem_com* have the highest female combatant prevalence, with an estimated percentage of female combatants of greater than 20%. In the original sample, 60.66% of rebel groups had no female combatants while 20.38% of rebel groups had more than 0 but less than 5% female combatant participation. Female combatants comprised between 5 and 20% of combatants in 11.37% of groups sampled. Finally, female combatants made up more than 20% of the body of combatants in 7.58% of groups sampled (Wood and Thomas 2017).

Of 467 observations of *fem_com,* the plurality of cases took a value of 0, with 128 cases associated with a female combatant prevalence of 0% or no evidence of female rebel participation. Additionally, 94 observations each took values of 1 and 2 for *fem_com*, associated with female combatant prevalence of <5% and 5-20%, respectively. Finally, 87 observations were associated with the highest female combatant prevalence of >20% in *fem_com*.

I also utilized a binary indicator of female rebel participation in order to test my first hypothesis regarding the effects of female combatant presence on women's participation on conflict termination teams. Drawing upon data from *fem_com*, I produced a binary iteration of the variable named *fem_bin* where groups with evidence of >0% female participation took on a value of 1 and all other groups took 0. For *fem_bin,* 275 observations took a value of 1, reflecting evidence of female rebel participation, with the remaining 128 observations taking 0.

Dependent Variable:

The empirical test conducted in this chapter aims to uncover a relationship between female combatant presence and prevalence and women's participation on conflict termination teams. The direct participation of women in negotiations to end armed conflict is proxied by female signatories to peace agreements, which includes female government or rebel group representatives and civil society representatives but excludes third-party representatives (Krause et al. 2018). Utilizing the proxy allows researchers to circumvent challenges associated with collecting data about the gender of negotiation participants. While demographic data about participants on conflict termination teams are not consistently and publicly available, Krause et al. (2018) verified and coded female delegates' signatures to peace agreements by cross-checking signatories' names recorded in the UCDP peace agreement database with information from the UN Peacemaker database.

The Krause et al. data (2018) are sourced from the UCDP dataset of 216 peace agreements signed between 1975 to 2011 (Gleditsch et al. 2002; Harbom, Högbladh, and Wallensteen 2006; Högbladh 2011; Pettersson and Eck 2018). The dataset includes only full and partial agreements, excluding the process agreements found in the UCDP which deal with regulating negotiations without affecting the final agreements.

Control Variables:

A number of variables could potentially mediate the relationship between female combatant presence and prevalence and female participation on elite negotiating teams as proxied by female signatories. First, the level of women's mainstream political participation before and during the conflict may influence both women's recruitment into rebel groups and women's participation in negotiations, creating confounding. High levels of legislative participation may normalize women as agents in a given political environment, driving both the recruitment of female combatants and inclusion of women on negotiating teams. Additionally, Thomas and Wood (2017) noted that in cases where women have higher levels of political awareness and efficacy, they are more likely to seek out opportunities for collective action, which has clear implications for both the explanatory and response variables as women may be more likely to join rebel groups and mobilize for descriptive representation in negotiations. I utilize the *fem_leg* variable from Krause et al. (2018) in order to control for women's legislative participation and, more generally, capture gender equality and women's political influence at the country level.

In addition to women's political participation, I also control for conflict duration using *con_dur* (Krause et al. 2018). Conflict duration may influence women's recruitment opportunities in rebel groups as rebel group elites may be reluctant to allow women's participation early on but may permit their inclusion once the group becomes more

well-established (Wood and Thomas 2017). Additionally, conflict duration may affect women's inclusion on conflict termination teams in line with the existing body of literature suggesting that longer wars more deeply contest existing institutions, opening space for women to participate in post-conflict politics (e.g. Hughes 200).

Finally, I control for leftist ideology using the *lef_ide* variable from Krause et al. (2018). In their seminal work on women's mobilization in rebel groups, Thomas and Wood (2017) found that the political ideology of a group is a primary determinant of women's deployment in combat roles in armed groups. Specifically, leftist rebel groups often draw upon Marxist philosophies of class struggle and promote revolution as a mechanism to fundamentally remake social hierarchies, contributing to greater access for women. For ideological reasons, it is also possible that these groups are more likely to include women on their conflict termination teams. I utilize a dummy variable for leftist ideology in order to account for the potential confounding.

Model Selection and Estimation

I utilize linear probability models to assess the effects of female combatant participation on female participation on conflict termination teams. A variety of robustness checks were conducted to confirm model fit and to validate my analysis. All models were also run as probit regressions and logistic regressions and the results are robust to the different specifications. The results show no substantive differences in the findings of the linear models. I test two hypotheses (H_1 and H_2) in a total of 24 models. Each hypothesis has three sets (linear probability, logistic regression, and probit regression) of four models. In the coming section, I discuss only the results of the linear probability models, which I selected due to interpretability. The probit and logistic regression models are presented as tables in the Appendix.

Analysis and Results

In Table 2.1, I present the results of the linear probability models for H_1, estimating the effects of female combatant presence on female participation on conflict termination teams proxied by female signatories. The results for Model 1 indicate a positive, statistically significant relationship when controlling for female legislators and conflict duration. Dropping conflict duration and adding leftist ideology as a control, Model 2 also shows a significant, positive relationship between female combatant presence and female signatories. Model 3, which controls for conflict duration and leftist ideology as controls but not female legislators, yields statistically insignificant results. Finally, Model 4 includes all three controls and again shows positive, statistically significant results providing evidence to suggest that female combatant presence influences female signatories at a p-value of less than 0.01. Model 4 has the highest R-squared and Adjusted R-Squared values of all models, suggesting the best model fit and indicating that 33.7% of the variability in the presence of female signatories is explained by the presence of female combatants. The regression estimates that the probability of negotiations including female signatories increases by 12.6%, on average, when a group switches from having no female combatants to having female combatants.

Table 2.1: Linear Models for Female Combatant Presence and Female Signatories

	Dependent variable:			
	fem_sig			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
fem_bin	0.214***	0.146***	-0.007	0.126***
	(0.045)	(0.049)	(0.040)	(0.046)
fem_leg	-0.165***	-0.124***		-0.146***
	(0.024)	(0.024)		(0.023)
con_dur	0.012***		0.008***	0.009***
	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
lef_ide		0.436***	0.399***	0.342***
		(0.052)	(0.051)	(0.051)
Constant	0.103***	0.207***	0.010	0.122***
	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.036)	(0.040)
Observations	374	358	386	358
R^2	0.258	0.249	0.266	0.337
Adjusted R^2	0.252	0.243	0.260	0.329
Residual Std. Error	0.343 (df = 370)	0.351 (df = 354)	0.339 (df = 382)	0.330 (df = 353)
F Statistic	42.867*** (df = 3; 370)	39.227*** (df = 3; 354)	46.127*** (df = 3; 382)	44.837*** (df = 4; 353)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Consistent with the results from the first set of linear probability models, in Table 2.2 I present results for the linear models for H_2, estimating the effects of female combatant prevalence on female signatories. Model 1 shows a positive, statistically significant relationship between female combatant prevalence and female signatories when controlling for female legislators and conflict duration. Similarly, controlling for female legislators and leftist ideology in Model 2 shows a positive, statistically significant relationship between female combatant prevalence and female signatories. Model 3, which drops the female legislators control, shows statistically insignificant results. As with the results of the H_1 models, Model 4 again showed positive, statistically significant results indicating that with a p-value of less than 0.01 there is strong evidence to suggest that female combatant prevalence affects the presence of female signatories. Female combatant prevalence explains 33.1% of the variability in female signatories

and as female combatant prevalence goes up a level, the probability of female signatories increases by 5.5%, on average.

Table 2.2: Linear Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Female Signatories

	Dependent variable:			
	fem_sig			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
fem_com	0.105***	0.068***	0.011	0.055***
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.018)	(0.019)
fem_leg	-0.160***	-0.120***		-0.140***
	(0.022)	(0.023)		(0.022)
con_dur	0.011***		0.008***	0.009***
	(0.001)		(0.001)	(0.001)
lef_ide		0.387***	0.381***	0.307***
		(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.055)
Constant	0.110***	0.216***	-0.005	0.133***
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.032)	(0.038)
Observations	374	358	386	358
R^2	0.286	0.254	0.267	0.338
Adjusted R^2	0.280	0.248	0.261	0.331
Residual Std. Error	0.337 (df = 370)	0.350 (df = 354)	0.339 (df = 382)	0.330 (df = 353)
F Statistic	49.333*** (df = 3; 370)	40.273*** (df = 3; 354)	46.306*** (df = 3; 382)	45.127*** (df = 4; 353)
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The results of the linear models provide strong evidence in support of my first two hypotheses, suggesting that women's participation in rebel groups influences their subsequent representation in the negotiations involving the rebel groups they fight for. The results for both hypotheses consistently achieve statistical significance and are robust to different specifications. My models show that negotiations involving groups with female combatants are significantly more likely to have female signatories than negotiations involving groups without female combatants. Furthermore, as female combatant prevalence in the rebel group increases, the likelihood of female signatories being active in associated negotiations also increases. Taken together, my findings confirm that the presence and prevalence of female combatants are

valuable and overlooked explanatory factors for women's post-conflict political rights and opportunities. The presence of female signatories in negotiations is independently important in light of extensive evidence demonstrating that women's descriptive representation has direct benefits for building trust and legitimacy and increasing women's senses of political efficacy, especially meaningful in post-conflict contexts. Additionally, women's descriptive representation often translates to improved substantive representation, with women in politics pursuing distinct policy priorities in an array of settings. Given the implications of women's participation on conflict termination teams for the prioritization of women's agendas in negotiations, my results also motivate further questions about the consequences of female combatant presence and prevalence for the adoption of gendered terms in peace agreements, a question I address in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER 3: PEACE OUT, GIRL SCOUT: FEMALE COMBATANTS AND GENDER PROVISIONS IN PEACE AGREEMENTS

Introduction and Literature Review

Peace agreements are foundational documents that formalize an attempt to end armed conflict between warring parties and establish politics as an alternative (Bell and O'Rourke 2011). Contemporary peace agreements are increasingly expanding in focus beyond achieving the cessation of hostilities and towards the reimagination of the state as a liberal democracy with an emancipated role for women (Anderson 2016). References to the rights of women and girls in peace agreements are crucial because they exploit a window wherein political and social institutions are malleable to establish gains in the post-conflict political order. Peace agreements generate the legal frameworks in which post-conflict states will operate, and thus can change norms and bind political actors to commitments (Reid 2021). Because the peace agreement represents not only the conclusion of war but also the beginning of new rules for governance, inclusion in the texts of peace agreements can form a bedrock for subsequent political, legal, and social reform (Bell and O'Rourke 2011).

The share of peace agreements referencing women has more than doubled since 2000 (Bell 2015), when UNSC resolution 1325 first stipulated that peace agreements ought to adopt a "gender perspective." Anderson and Swiss (2014) found that gender provisions are increasingly common features of peace agreements, as the agreements succeeding approximately 40 percent of conflicts that generated peace settlements between 1975 and 2011 contained at least one reference to women, with most of those referencing women signed after 1989. A gender perspective may feature in peace accords through specific terminology (e.g. use of the words "women" as opposed to gender-neutral terms such as "people" or "minority groups"), provisions to encourage or require gender parity and other forms of gender mainstreaming in political

organs and the post-conflict economy, consequences for war-related sexual and gender-based violence, rejection of blanket amnesty for war crimes, and establishment of resources for women. Furthermore, peace agreements adopting a gender perspective may recognize the diverse roles of women, identifying both women and men (when relevant) as ex-combatants, survivors of violence, heads of households, and internally displaced people. Specific provisions may specify women's entitlements within these categories, designing equitable benefits, policies, and security arrangements (Buchanan et al. 2012).

Extant research on gender and peace agreements has revealed that references to women are oftentimes not just "pieces of paper" but instead that gender provisions substantially improve women's rights and opportunities in post-conflict states (Bell and O'Rourke 2010). Agreements produce incentive structures and behavioral constraints for political actors, empower groups to advocate for reform, and can produce notable social and political shifts, especially for women following conflict (Reid 2021). There are some limitations to gender provisions in peace agreements, including that references are still largely limited to once-off provisions or female victimhood. Furthermore, the inclusion of gender provisions in peace agreement texts is concentrated in the more comprehensive stages of agreement, with gender issues frequently overlooked in pre-negotiation and implementation stages (Bell and McNicholl 2019). Nevertheless, recent quantitative scholarship suggests that, across diverse contexts, gender inclusive agreements result in improved government respect for women's political rights, including adoption and enforcement of national laws designed to protect women's rights to vote, run for public office, hold elected and appointed government positions, join political parties, and petition government officials (Reid 2021). Reid (2021) wrote that peace agreements can affect women's rights through direct and indirect mechanisms, increasing actors' commitments and

government respect for women's rights, empowering women's groups in civil society, and spurring broader norm shifts.

Despite notable gains, peace agreements that include meaningful provisions for women and girls, remain the exception, not the rule (Wise 2021). Women face enduring challenges in having their demands prioritized during peace processes and incorporated into the foundational political texts that follow negotiated settlement. Over the past decade, scholars have opened an investigation of gender in peace agreements in an attempt to discern the explanatory factors underlying the significant variation observed in gender provision adoption. Consensus exists that among the two key drivers of gender provisions are women's inclusion in elite negotiations (True and Riveros-Morales 2018; Aduda and Liesch 2022) and women's activity in civil society (True and Riveros-Morales 2018; Aduda and Liesch 2022). Women's national parliamentary representation has also been presented as a primary determinant of gender-inclusive peace agreements (True and Riveros-Morales 2018), although this finding has been recently contested by scholars leveraging bias-corrected approaches (Arciniegas Murillo 2021). Underlying the salience of women's inclusion in peace talks and women's civil society groups is the argument that collectives of women advocate on behalf of a different set of interests than men, and when possible leverage positions of power to actualize demands on behalf of those interests. Indeed, Weldon (2002) wrote that, absent pressure from feminists, gender-based violence is seldom raised as an issue, much less as a priority.

However, even where robust women's advocacy movements exist, women's demands are often ignored during peace processes. In cases such as Northern Ireland, for example, despite remarkable efforts by local women's groups and the cross-community Northern Ireland Women's Coalition, "paramilitary ceasefires and subsequent talks ushered in a peace process that was

rooted in a male dominated and ethnically polarized polity." (Racioppi and Sullivan 2006, 197) Why are autonomous women's movements successful in achieving the representation of women's agendas in some situations, but unsuccessful in others? Though autonomous movements that are explicitly feminist have clear implications for the articulation of group consciousness, mobilization efforts, and the development of international solidarity networks with gender at one focus, the participation of women within rebel groups may also be key for advancing women's rights in the post-conflict arena. Women in rebel groups accrue leverage within movements and attain significant coercive power. Anderson and Swiss (2014) concluded that "More research is needed to determine how and under what conditions women's participation in peace negotiations translates into gains for women." In this chapter, I test whether the variables exerting the key independent influence on the adoption of gender provisions are the presence and prevalence of female combatants within those groups.

Htun and Weldon (2010) discussed how feminist networks weaponize moral leverage from inter-state agreements with the aim of producing favorable reform, but noted that the pressure resonates differently in various contexts. "Poor countries seek financial capital and legitimacy; autocracies and emerging democracies want to demonstrate their democratic and human rights credentials. These countries are therefore more vulnerable to external pressure than wealthier nations or established democracies." (212) The other side of this coin is that similarly situated states are vulnerable to internal pressure, particularly in the form of an insurgency that mobilizes numerous cross-sections of the population, a logic that also applies to the internal dynamics of rebel groups seeking legitimacy and relying on combatants for power and influence. In light of the sometimes superficial roles of women at the negotiating table, Aduda and Liesch (2022) recently raised the question of how female participants influence the scope and specificity

of gender provisions in peace agreements. They contended that delegates need both the willingness and opportunity to push for gender provisions in order to influence final agreements. Drawing upon the theory articulated in the previous chapters, I suggest that the skills and status female ex-combatants gain through rebellion enables them to position themselves as influential actors who ultimately affect the texts of the peace agreements involving the rebel groups they fought for. Women develop political agendas through conflict experience while the leverage accrued to women through their contributions to rebel groups creates opportunities to influence peace processes, among other avenues for post-conflict politics.

H_3: The prior presence of female combatants in a rebel group increases the likelihood of gender provision inclusion in the peace agreement signed by the rebel group.

H_4: The likelihood of gender provision inclusion increases as female combatant prevalence in the associated rebel group increases.

Data and Variables

To test the relationship between female combatant presence and prevalence and the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements, I merged the WARD 1.3 with data on peace agreements from the PA-X Peace Agreements Database and Dataset Version 5 (Bell et al. 2021). Bell et. all (2021, 2) define a peace agreement as a "formal, publicly available document, produced after discussion with conflict protagonists and mutually agreed to by some or all of them, addressing conflict with a view to ending it." The PA-X 5 contains data on 1915 peace agreements from more than 150 peace processes taking place between 1990 and 2021.

Independent Variables:

As described in Chapter 2, I use the WARD indicators of female combatants in rebel groups in order to estimate the relationship between female combatant presence and prevalence

and the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements. For this empirical test and the one outlined in Chapter 3, I utilize the WARD v1.3 for the explanatory variables. The WARD v1.3 includes information on over 300 groups active between 1964 and 2014 (Wood and Thomas 2017). For the binary indicator, I primarily utilize *female_combatants_best*. The *cat4_prevalence_best* variable is used for the categorical indicator. The "best" estimates rely on a relatively strict coding procedure vis-à-vis who constitutes a fighter and report the levels of female combatant participation most commonly reflected in the source material.

All models are also estimated using the more liberal indicators in the WARD for robustness checks (i.e. *female_combatants_high* and *cat4_prevalence_high).* These variables include women who were formally included in the military wing of an organization in cases where clear evidence of combat participation is lacking. In addition, the high estimates reflect an upper bound of the prevalence of female combatants reported in source documents (Wood and Thomas 2017). Additional robustness checks use the *female_combatants_exs* and *cat4_prevalence_exs* variables, which exclude female suicide bombers from estimates of female participation in the armed group in light of scholarship suggesting that their modes of recruitment, levels of integration, and training may differ notably from those of other troops (Wood and Thomas 2017).

Dependent Variables:

In this chapter, I assess the relationship between female combatant presence and prevalence and the inclusion of gender provisions in the peace agreements signed by rebel groups. Specifically, I utilize the *EqGen* variable from PA-X 5. The *EqGen* variable is a categorical indicator with values ranging from 0 to 3 reflecting the depth of the commitment to gender provisions made in the peace agreement. If no provisions referring to general

commitments to equality, non-discrimination, or similar appear in a peace agreement, the observation takes a value of 0 for *EqGen.* If such provisions appear, a value of 1 for *EqGen* denotes rhetorical provision or mention of equality in the agreement. Values of 2 and 3 respectively represent substantive provisions on equality and detailed substantive provisions on equality suggesting commitment (Bell et al. 2021)

In addition to the ordinal variable, I recoded *EqGen* as a dummy variable to reflect the presence of any gender provisions in the peace agreement. This variable captures whether any commitments to equality are made in the peace agreement, regardless of how detailed the provisions are in the texts of the agreements. Observations with values of 0 for *EqGen* receive a score of 0, with all other values receiving a score of 1.

Control Variables:

The relationship between female combatants and gendered provisions in peace agreements may be mediated by several variables. First, I control for women's civil society participation *civ_soc* from PA-X 5 (Bell et al. 2021) in light of how prominently the civil society explanation features in the existing literature on gender provisions in peace agreements (e.g. True and Riveros-Morales 2018; Aduda and Liesch 2022). While civil society participation might not create confounding, it is an important alternative pathway that may explain a large amount of the variability observed in the response variable. It is also possible that, in addition to clearly influencing the likelihood of gender provision adoption, women's civil society participation represents a form of women's mainstream political representation at the time of conflict, which may influence women's recruitment into rebel groups through the mechanisms outlined in Chapter 2.

In addition to civil society participation, I also account for the forced recruitment of female combatants using *forced_recruit* from the WARD v1.3. The diverse recruitment strategies of armed groups may play a role in the potential relationship between female group rebel participation and rebel group willingness to adopt substantive measures to improve women's rights in the post-conflict arena. Though scholars have documented extensive female participation in armed groups on a voluntary basis (e.g. Henshaw 2015), forced recruitment, particularly of women, is likely to occur when rebel groups experience deficits and when accountability is low (Richards 2014). Recruitment strategy has implications both for the outcome of a conflict (Braithwaite and Ruiz 2018) and for assessing the empowerment of women in the context of a rebel group, warranting a complex view of agency. Whether or not female participation in the armed group is voluntary reflects on the prospects for female combatants to leverage their contributions to the movement for concessions.

Reflecting the aforementioned data collection challenges, I include *low_information* from WARD v1.3, a dummy variable denoting cases for which no or very limited information about female combatant participation is available despite the substantial availability of material about other aspects of the armed group. Those cases receiving a score of 1 for *low_information* are assumed to have no female combatants, although the presence or absence of female combatants could not be reliably verified given the data constraints. Observations taking a value of 0 are associated with evidence explicitly confirming or denying women's participation in the armed group (Wood and Thomas 2017).

Finally, in line with the discussion of ideology in Chapter 2, I control for *no_ideol* from WARD v1.3, a dummy variable indicating whether or not a group has a coherent, clearly stated political ideology. Ideology can create confounding as it can drive both the recruitment of female

combatants and the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements. Concurrent with Wood and Thomas (2017), I also control for the the Muslim population of a state using *islmgenpct* from WARD v.1.3 in order to account for the broad cultural values found in many Muslim-majority states which may depress both female participation in rebel groups and the likelihood of gender provision adoption.

Model Selection and Estimation

In the coming section, I present the results of the second empirical test. Adoption of gendered terms in the peace agreement was modeled as an ordered logistic regression model with *EqGen* as the dependent variable, absorbing the country. Results are sensitive to model specification and estimation choices. Tables presenting the probit regression models are included in the Appendix. Turn now to the results of the logit models.

Analysis and Results

Recall, H_3 posits that the presence of female combatants should be associated with gendered terms. In Model 1 of Table 3.1 I show the unconditional relationship. I find a statistically insignificant relationship for the naïve model. When controlling for no ideology, civil society, and low information in Model 2 of Table 3.1, I find positive, statistically significant results at an alpha level of 0.1, offering weak evidence of a relationship. Model 3 regresses *EqGen* on *female_combatants_best* including *forced_recruit* as a control and shows positive, statistically significant results at an alpha level of 0.1. Finally, Model 4 includes the full suite of control variables and shows null results. In sum, I find weak evidence in support of my hypothesis H_3 that female combatant presence significantly increases the likelihood of gender provision adoption.

Table 3.1: Logit Models for Female Combatant Presence and Gender Provisions

VARIABLES	(1) Gendered Provisions	(2) Gendered Provisions	(3) Gendered Provisions	(4) Gendered Provisions
female_combatants_best	0.0934	0.492*	0.589*	0.418
	(0.317)	(0.276)	(0.343)	(0.288)
noideol		0.0187		-0.0250
		(0.410)		(0.424)
civso		1.241***		1.315***
		(0.213)		(0.214)
low_information		-0.409		-0.181
		(0.322)		(0.454)
forced_recruit			0.375	0.313
			(0.409)	(0.585)
islmgenpct				0.0683
				(0.582)
Constant	-1.803***	-2.655***	-2.409***	-2.939***
	(0.211)	(0.223)	(0.325)	(0.621)
Observations	1,777	1,125	1,099	1,096

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.2 displays the results of the ordered logistic regression models testing H_4 or the potential relationship between female combatant prevalence and gender provision adoption. Regressing *EqGen* on *cat4_prevalence_best,* Model 1 shows a positive, statistically insignificant relationship. Controlling for no ideology, civil society, and low information in Model 2 again yields null results. Model 3 regresses *EqGen* on *cat4_prevalence_best* while controlling for forced recruitment and shows negative, statistically insignificant results. Results for Model 4 were also negative and insignificant, including only the no ideology and civil society controls. Model 5, which includes all of the control variables, shows positive and insignificant results, with the sign of the partial regression coefficient conforming to expectations. Overall, I do not find evidence in support of H_4 that the prevalence of female combatants positively influences the likelihood of gender provision adoption in peace agreements signed by the groups for which rebel women fought as combatants.

Table 3.2: Logit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Gender Provisions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions
cat4_prevalence_best	0.0867	0.126	-0.292	-0.239	0.0855
	(0.165)	(0.136)	(0.223)	(0.192)	(0.157)
noideol		-0.0455		-1.896**	-0.0971
		(0.412)		(0.810)	(0.415)
civso		1.259***		0.247	1.328***
		(0.226)		(0.389)	(0.223)
low_information		-0.566*			-0.256
		(0.303)			(0.439)
forced_recruit			1.006*		0.450
			(0.546)		(0.522)
islmgenpct					0.0523
					(0.567)
Constant	-1.821***	-2.490***	-1.450***	-0.626	-2.884***
	(0.193)	(0.191)	(0.413)	(0.381)	(0.614)
Observations	1,777	1,125	147	153	1,096
Sample		hrdem =1	hrdem =1	hrdem =1	hrdem =1

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

In addition to testing the potential relationship between female combatant presence and prevalence and *EqGen,* a categorical indicator measuring the depth of the commitment to gender inclusion made in a given peace agreement, I also tested H_3 and H_4 using a recoded binary indicator. The new response variable indicates whether or not a peace agreement includes any gender provisions, regardless of the depth or level of detail of the commitment. I produced ordered logistic regression models with any gender provisions as the response variable, absorbing the country. In the coming section, I discuss the results of the ordered logistic regression models. However, alternative estimation techniques were also leveraged. Tables displaying the probit models are included in the Appendix.

In Table 3.3 I display the results of the models testing H_3 using the second dependent variable. Model 1 shows a positive, statistically insignificant relationship. Controlling for no ideology, civil society, and low information, Model 2 shows positive results that are statistically significant at an alpha level of 0.1. The results Model 3 indicate a positive, statistically significant relationship between female combatant presence and any gender provisions when controlling for forced recruitment at an alpha level of 0.05. The results of Model 4, which

includes all controls, are also positive and statistically insignificant. Ultimately, I again find weak evidence in support of my hypothesis H_3 that the presence of female combatants drives the adoption of gender provisions in peace agreements.

Table 3.3: Logit Models for Female Combatant Presence and Any Gender Provisions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions
female_combatants_best	0.154	0.492*	0.732**	0.418
	(0.296)	(0.276)	(0.344)	(0.288)
noideol		0.0187		-0.0250
		(0.410)		(0.424)
civso		1.241***		1.315***
		(0.213)		(0.214)
low_information		-0.409		-0.181
		(0.322)		(0.454)
forced_recruit			0.113	0.313
			(0.403)	(0.585)
islmgenpct				0.0683
				(0.582)
Constant	-1.738***	-2.655***	-2.225***	-2.939***
	(0.202)	(0.223)	(0.300)	(0.621)
Observations	1,802	1,125	1,108	1,096

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Lasly**,** in Table 3.4, I present the results of the logistic regression models for H_4 examining the effects of female combatant prevalence on the adoption of any gender provisions in peace agreements. The results of the naive model are positive and insignificant. The results of Model 2, which includes no ideology, civil society, and low information as controls are also positive and insignificant. Model 3 regresses *cat4_prevalence_best* on any gender provisions while controlling for forced recruitment and yields negative and statistically insignificant results. Model 4, which adds no ideology and civil society as controls indicates negative, statistically insignificant results. The results for Model 5 are insignificant, but the partial regression coefficient is positive, in the expected direction. These results do not offer evidence to suggest that going up a level in female combatant prevalence may make a difference for the probability of gender provision adoption.

Table 3.4: Logit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Any Gender Provisions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions	Gendered Provisions
cat4_prevalence_best	0.121	0.126	-0.292	-0.239	0.0855
	(0.148)	(0.136)	(0.223)	(0.192)	(0.157)
noideol		-0.0455		-1.896**	-0.0971
		(0.412)		(0.810)	(0.415)
civso		1.259***		0.247	1.328***
		(0.226)		(0.389)	(0.223)
low_information		-0.566*			-0.256
		(0.303)			(0.439)
forced_recruit			1.006*		0.450
			(0.546)		(0.522)
islmgenpct					0.0523
					(0.567)
Constant	-1.753***	-2.490***	-1.450***	-0.626	-2.884***
	(0.185)	(0.191)	(0.413)	(0.381)	(0.614)
Observations	1,802	1,125	147	153	1,096
Sample		hrdem =1	hrdem =1	hrdem =1	hrdem =1

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The findings for the second empirical test are puzzling, especially in light of the strong evidence presented in Chapter 2 of an association between female combatants and female signatories. However, there are several potential explanations consistent with existing work and my theoretical expectations for why, generally, I did not observe a strong relationship between female combatant participation and the adoption of gender provisions. The direct link may be weaker than the ties between combatants and negotiators, diminishing the influence of female rebels. Difficult negotiations over provisions of the peace agreements could also mean that gender provisions are one of the concessions that is cut first. Additionally, it could also be that more gender equal societies already have extensive protections for women's political rights and opportunities, making gender provisions seem lower-priority relative to other, group specific goals. This explanation is potentially valuable because more gender equal societies with higher female political participation may also be more likely to see women join rebel groups.

Another compelling explanation for the disparity between the results observed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 relates to critical mass, this time vis-a-vis signatories. A broad literature on gender and legislative politics suggests that a critical mass of 10 to 35% of women is needed to

precipitate major changes in institutions, behavior, policy priorities, and voting (Studlar and McAllister 2003). Revisiting the coding for the response variable in the previous test, Krause et al. (2018) code the female signatories indicator as 1 in cases where at least one female signatory is present. However, it is unclear how many female signatories were present for each observation, or what proportion of the conflict termination team women comprised. Considering the coding of the response variable in Chapter 2 may help to contextualize the second set of results. The distinction between the presence of female signatories and the prevalence of female signatories is crucial, because we would expect that a single female signatory may not be able to have a policy impact in negotiations. When women do not comprise a critical mass of negotiators, they are not able to function as spoilers in negotiations, undermining their ability to impose their policy priorities in the ultimate agreements.

While women in politics, generally speaking, have distinct agendas and policy priorities from men, there is evidence to suggest that women who are significant minorities in a given political setting (e.g. in legislative politics) may eschew identity-related policy priorities or even display more "masculine" preferences because of pressure to show that they are effective leaders who represent communities outside of their gender. In skewed legislatures where women and minorities comprise fewer than 15% of legislators, they are often perceived as tokens, afforded less status and respect and attracting more scrutiny for policy activism on behalf of their affinity groups (Thomas 1991; Barrett 1997; Childs and Mona 2008). However, while the critical mass literature may help to explain the differences between the results for H_1 and H_2 on one hand and H_3 and H_4 on the other, they underscore the puzzling disparity in results for H_3 compared with H_4. We would expect that going up a level in female combatant prevalence could make a difference for the likelihood of gender provision inclusion in peace agreements. The expectations

outlined in the critical mass literature are that the mere presence of women may not be sufficient to instigate changes in favor of women's rights, but passing a threshold at which point women comprise a meaningful body of supporters of a group allows them to function as spoilers and influence outcomes.

Given that women might be invited to negotiations as window dressing rather than as part of an effort to elevate women's voices in the peace process, it is possible that the kinds of women selected to represent these rebel groups are distinct in their policy preferences. Possibly, they are co-opted and socialized by group elites and unlikely to engage in significant activism on behalf of a smaller interest group. Including female negotiators also then allows rebel group elites to shift the blame for failure to adopt gender provisions onto women.

Finally, while an array of actors may have incentives to promote the descriptive representation of women in negotiations, this is especially true for cases of rebel groups with female combatants. Including women is an important signaling mechanism to the outside world, but also to the rebel group's own constituency when it includes female combatants. Ultimately, including a female negotiator is a relatively low-cost and low-commitment way to signal solidarity with a body of female supporters compared with agreement to concrete, binding measures that improve their status, rights, and material conditions. The heterogeneity observed in the results across the chapters is interesting, because it suggests that female combatants might matter more for some post-conflict stages than others. Especially puzzling are the null results for the female combatant prevalence independent variable juxtaposed with the weak evidence for the binary measure of female combatants. Future archival or field work might help bring into sharper relief the dynamics at play.

CHAPTER 4: FROM CONFLICT TO CONGRESS: FEMALE COMBATANTS AND GENDER QUOTA ADOPTION

Introduction and Literature Review

Incorporating women into positions of power signals openness and lends legitimacy to new political actors. Nevertheless, Stockemer and Kchouk (2017) conclude that most regime changes do not improve the representation of women. Relatedly, Fallon, Swiss and Viterna (2012) show empirically that it is the process of democratization, rather than the level of democratic freedoms, that counts for women's representation in the legislature. In recent decades, the adoption of gender quotas has become a common feature of democratization processes. Quotas are measures that require political parties to promote the selection of more female candidates, typically taking one of three forms outlined by Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires (2009). First, some national parliaments have instituted reserved seats that only women are eligible to contest. In a second arrangement, legislative quotas are mandated by national parliaments and set out new criteria for candidate selection, sometimes entailing sanctions for non-compliance. Finally, party quotas are gender quotas adopted by individual political parties, setting out criteria for candidate selection and sometimes involving internal party sanctions for non-compliance. For PR electoral systems, party quotas affect the composition of party lists, while in majoritarian systems they affect candidate eligibility for particular seats.

However, quotas are neither uniformly adopted nor uniformly implemented. Arendt (2018, 295) articulated, "That the outcomes of gender quotas are highly contingent on adoption context suggests the need for academics and policy makers to analyze the politics behind these measures to develop country-specific approaches for empowering women in politics." The recent publication of datasets such as the Quota Adoption and Reform Over Time (QAROT) dataset (Hughes, Paxton, Clayton, and Zetterberg 2017) have substantially advanced scholarly efforts to

uncover the determinants of legislative gender quota adoption, but a paucity of publicly available, quantitative, and cross-national data on party quotas, or those gender quotas voluntarily adopted by individual political parties, has until now precluded the study of quota adoption through the prism of the movement-party relationship.

As of 2006, 130 political parties in 61 states had adopted party quotas, or those gender quotas voluntarily enacted by parties to improve the gender balance of their legislators (Davidson-Schmich 2006). The adoption of gender quotas by political parties is particularly meaningful because parties gatekeep women's access to political office (Kittilson 2006; Lovenduski and Norris 1993). Usually, party quotas mandate that women constitute a given percentage of a party's electoral slate, which tends to be between 25 and 50 percent. While some policies specifically identify women as the group to be promoted, others opt for a gender-neutral formulation that outlines a minimum level of representation for "each sex" or limitations on "either sex" comprising above a given percentage of the party's candidates (Krook, Lovenduski, and Squires 2009).

Some have criticized quotas, which may leave unaddressed the authority deficits that undermine women in formal positions of political power. At worst, in specific instances, quotas have even strengthened nepotism while allowing oppressive political actors to deflect criticism. The implementation of gender quotas may not be effective in all contexts, and must take into account cultural and historical realities, especially interlocking oppressions in societies reckoning with post-conflict legacies. (Ali 2019). Nevertheless, the overall consensus is that gender quotas have a measurable effect on the advancement of women's rights. Xydias (2007) found that greater descriptive representation of women in political parties that have adopted party quotas translates to substantive representation. Women legislators are more likely than men

to call attention to the interests of their women constituents, and the presence of a gender quota independently increases attention to women's issues in the feminist and traditional senses.

The gender quota guarantees women's representation within the party, on electoral lists and in other central party structures. It is instrumental in supporting the construction of equitable institutions, linking women's desire for access to political power with a mechanism for access. Self-imposed and often tied to enforcement provisions, the voluntary party quota signifies a group's accountability to its female membership and serves as an avenue for the substantive representation of women's agendas, ensuring that women comprise a critical mass within the organization. Quotas have become an increasingly common feature of peace agreements attempting to resolve civil conflicts in addition to voluntary adoption in other post-conflict contexts. In her book about women in post-war Africa, Tripp (2015) discussed the pressure women face to return to traditional roles following the conclusion of armed conflict. The implementation of gender quotas enshrines in law the gains in women's political mobilization produced by conflict, preventing a backslide towards patriarchy.

The success of party quotas at increasing women's descriptive and substantive representation has raised questions about the factors influencing their adoption. The existing scholarship on the adoption and implementation of party quotas is focused on established European democracies. However, the process by which a political party in an established Western democracy comes to adopt a gender quota may differ from the process by which a former rebel party in a post-conflict state does so; specifically, former rebel parties must reckon with the legacy of conflict and the movement-party relationship. Nevertheless, there are several relevant insights that can be derived from the existing party quotas literature. Murray, Krook, and Opello (2012) explore the puzzling support of male party elites for quota adoption, arguing that

quota adoption is self-interested and comes down to party pragmatism influenced by a range of competing incentives. Because parties are not unitary actors, decisions regarding parity reform are the result of pragmatic compromises in the face of various pressures. Kittilson (1999), analyzing established democracies, concluded that the presence of women within the rank-and-file and leadership of a given political party is among the most salient and direct factors enhancing the likelihood that quotas will be adopted. Indeed, Lovenduski and Norris (1993, 14) wrote that in the political parties of Western Europe, "There [was] no party in which efforts to nominate more women have occurred without an intervention by women making claims." Concurrently, studying Belgium, Meier (2000) identified that the decision to adopt quotas can be attributed to a broader tradition of group representation. In short, much of what is known so far about the adoption of party quotas is that women's representation in the adopting group matters. For former rebel parties, the tradition of representation is rooted in the gender composition of the rebel group, a subject I investigate.

H_5: The prior presence of female combatants in a rebel group increases the likelihood of voluntary party quota adoption in the consequent former rebel party.

H_6: The likelihood of voluntary party quota adoption increases as female combatant prevalence in the associated rebel group increases.

Data and Variables

Independent Variables:

As in Chapter 3, I utilize indicators of female combatant presence and prevalence from the WARD v1.3 (Wood and Thomas 2017), with a primary interest in *female_combatants_best* and *cat4_prevalence_best* for testing the fifth and sixth hypotheses, respectively.

Dependent Variables:

In order to test the relationship between female combatant presence and prevalence and gender quota adoption, I constructed a dataset merging the WARD 1.3 and data on rebel group to political party transitions from Ishiyama and Marshall (2017). I then constructed several variables capturing gender quota adoption. The first, *idea_quota*, reflects political parties found in the International IDEA Gender Quotas Database (GQD) that have adopted gender quotas. This estimate is highly reliable but undercounts instances of gender quota adoption in a number of ways. The database does not include those groups that have adopted gender quotas outside of party statutes. For example, while the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) in Mexico does not contest elections at the level of the national legislature, the EZLN has adopted gender quotas in the Zapatista autonomous government structures it has established in the state of Chiapas (Moncayo 2006). Perhaps more importantly, the IDEA GQD only lists voluntary party quotas when they are set at a threshold that is higher than a legislated gender quota, if one exists. Consequently, the database does not list cases where political parties have adopted a gender quota if there is a national quota set at a higher threshold. For instance, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN) in Nicaragua has adopted a 30% quota for female candidates on party lists (Roza et al. 2011), but this quota is not reflected in the GQD because the Nicaraguan constitution and electoral law mandate a quota of 50% (GQD 2022). The adoption of voluntary party quotas is significant even against the backdrop of a higher legislated quota because it signals party-level agreement with quotas, which are often hotly contested during national adoption processes, demonstrating support for women's political participation more broadly. Additionally, party quotas are meaningful commitments even against the backdrop of higher national thresholds because parties frequently do not comply with legislated quotas.

In order to rectify the undercounting of cases from the GQD, I constructed a set of additional variables in order to capture cases of gender quota adoption. The *quota_high* variable is a binary variable coded as 1 if evidence was found that quotas were adopted 1, with all other cases coded as 0. Sources collected include academic journal articles and NGO and IGO reports, and data were reviewed through terms such as the name of the rebel group and any acronyms or aliases, country name, party name and acronym (if applicable), and "gender quota."

In addition to the *quota_high* variable, I also included *alt_quota,* which broadly captures measures similar to quotas aimed at increasing women's political participation within the group. I did not look systematically for *alt_quota*, but noted cases that arose in the process of coding the *quota_high* variable. An example of a group that was coded as 0 for *idea_quota* and *quota_high* but 1 for *alt_quota* is the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), an Angolan former rebel party that has not adopted voluntary party quotas but which requires that women should have 30% of all posts in all leadership organs (Amundsen and Weimer 2008).

Despite efforts to reduce bias, the suite of variables measuring gender quota adoption are still susceptible to undercounting. Only English language sources were consulted when coding the original variables.

In order to match cases of quota adoption with rebel groups in the WARD, I manually merged the WARD with the Ishiyama and Marshall (2017) dataset on former rebel political parties. The presence of a rebel group to political party match is indicated by the *partymatch* dummy variable. The *partymatch* variable does not encompass all rebel groups that eventually became political parties, but instead represents only those rebel groups that became former rebel parties included in the rebel-to-party transitions dataset.

I took a conservative approach to coding matches when dealing with exceptional cases. Because both the WARD and rebel-to-party dataset contain observations that are splinter groups or coalitions, I did not match an original rebel group with a splinter group party, or an individual rebel group with a coalition party. Splinter group-splinter party matches and coalition rebel group-coalition party matches were made, when applicable. Because splinter groups and coalitions can have different levels of female combatants from the original groups, combining them without regard to differences in female participation would undermine the internal validity of the study. When a rebel group splintered into multiple rebel groups, and a party succeeding one of the splinter groups was present in the rebel-to-party dataset, I did not code a match for the original rebel group and the splinter party. In the same vein, I did not code a splinter group as a match for a unified former rebel party. However, splinter rebel groups were merged with matching former rebel parties that succeeded the splinter group. Similarly, when a coalition of rebel groups formed, and a party succeeding one of the rebel groups in the coalition was present in the rebel-to-party dataset, I did not code a match for the coalition rebel group and the former rebel party succeeding one coalition member. Additionally, I did not code an individual rebel group as a match for a coalition party of which the rebel group became a member. However, coalition rebel groups were merged with matching coalition former rebel parties.

Take as an illustrative example the Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad (CMA), a coalition of Tuareg and Arab rebel groups in Mali, which is included in the WARD but not in the rebel-to-party dataset. Parties such as the Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), which succeeded rebel groups that were a part of the CMA, but not the entirety of the CMA, are included in the rebel-to-party dataset. These two observations were not matched. As a party directly succeeding the entire CMA was not found, the observation representing the CMA

in the merged dataset is coded as 0 for *partymatch.* For a contrastive case, the Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP), found in the WARD, was one of five rebel groups that comprised the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN) in El Salvador. The ERP does not have a direct successor in the rebel-to-party dataset and so is coded as 0 for *partymatch.* However, the FMLN is present in both the WARD and rebel-to-party dataset and these observations are merged.

Control Variables:

Consistent with the justifications presented for the previous empirical tests, I include a number of controls in my models to account for variables that may mediate the relationship between female participation in rebel groups and gender quota adoption. First, I control for conflict duration using *warduration* from the WARD v1.3 in light of evidence suggesting that longer-scale wars might both positively influence women's recruitment opportunities in rebel groups and exert an upward pressure on the likelihood of gender quota adoption, with longer wars more deeply challenging existing political institutions. I also control for *inequality* and *democracy* from the WARD v1.3 as low inequality and robust democratic political institutions could increase women's political efficacy and participation, driving both rebel group involvement and women's engagement in post-conflict politics.

In another set of models presented in the coming section, I merge the quota data with the original WARD (Wood and Thomas 2017) in order to examine the relationships between female combatant presence and prevalence and quota adoption while controlling for additional variables. These variables include conflict duration, forced recruitment, leftist ideology, nationalist ideology, islamist ideology, female-to-male secondary education ratio, natural log of GDP per-capita, very weak rebel groups, and percent Muslim.

Model Selection and Estimation

As in the previous two empirical tests, I utilize linear probability models in order to estimate the relationship between female combatant presence and prevalence and the adoption of gender quotas. All models are also run as logistic regressions and probit regressions and results are highly robust to the different specifications. Tables displaying the results of the logit and probit models are included in the Appendix[1]. In the coming section, I present and discuss the results of the linear models.

Analysis and Results

In Table 4.1, I display the results of the linear probability models for H_5 testing the relationship between female combatant presence and gender quota adoption utilizing the IDEA quotas indicator as the dependent variable. Across models and specifications, the results are consistently positive and significant with a p-value of less than 0.01, providing strong evidence in support of my hypothesis that the presence of female combatants is positively related to the probability of gender quota adoption. Model 1 is the naive model and shows strong positive results. Adding conflict duration as a control in Model 2, the results are also positive and significant. Model 3 shows the results including inequality as a control, and shows positive and statistically significant results. In Model 4, I show that there is a positive, significant relationship between female combatant presence and quota adoption when controlling for democracy. In Models 5 and 6, I utilize different combinations of the aforementioned controls, and again find a positive and statistically significant relationship. Finally, Model 7 offers the best fit for the data with the highest R-Squared of the models presented and shows strong evidence of a positive

[1] Logistic and probit regression models for H5 are excluded. Estimation was not possible as the independent variables perfectly predict the dependent variables.

relationship between female combatant presence and quota adoption at a p-value of less than 0.01. The partial regression coefficient for Model 7 indicates that, holding conflict duration, inequality, and democracy constant, the probability of gender quota adoption increases by 25.7%, on average, when a group switches from no female combatants to having female combatants. These results are important for suggesting that female combatants maintain political influence once conflict ends.

Table 4.1: Linear Models for Female Combatant Presence and Quota Adoption

	(1) Quota Adoption Idea	(2) Quota Adoption Idea	(3) Quota Adoption Idea	(4) Quota Adoption Idea	(5) Quota Adoption Idea	(6) Quota Adoption Idea	(7) Quota Adoption Idea
female_combatants_best	0.270***	0.262***	0.269***	0.270***	0.259***	0.270***	0.257***
	(0.0414)	(0.0425)	(0.0414)	(0.0409)	(0.0420)	(0.0409)	(0.0422)
warduration		0.0145			0.0196		0.0231
		(0.0185)			(0.0183)		(0.0192)
inequality			0.0155			0.00743	0.0176
			(0.0272)			(0.0270)	(0.0283)
democracy				0.117***	0.121***	0.115***	0.119***
				(0.0433)	(0.0436)	(0.0437)	(0.0438)
Constant	-0	-0.0594	-0.0629	-0.0383	-0.120	-0.0680	-0.205
	(0.0306)	(0.0817)	(0.115)	(0.0334)	(0.0835)	(0.113)	(0.161)
Observations	257	257	257	257	257	257	257
R-squared	0.143	0.145	0.144	0.167	0.170	0.167	0.172

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

I also test the relationship between female combatant presence and the higher measure of quota adoption in order to evaluate H_5. The results of the linear probability models regressing female combatant presence on the original quota adoption variable are presented below in Table 4.2. My findings confirm that a strong, positive relationship exists between female combatant presence and gender quota adoption. Model 1 is the naive model and shows a positive relationship between the explanatory and response variables. In Model 2, I include the war duration control and again find a positive, statistically significant relationship between female combatant presence and quota adoption. I control for inequality in Model 3 and similarly find positive and significant results. Adding the democracy control for Model 4, the results are also positive and significant. I find positive and significant results for Models 5 and 6, which utilize a combination of the controls. Model 7 again indicates the best fit for the data with the most variability in the response variable explained relative to the other models, and shows a positive,

statistically significant relationship between female combatant presence and quota adoption with a p-value of less than 0.01. The Beta coefficient for Model 7 estimates that, on average and holding constant conflict duration, inequality, and democracy, the probability of gender quota adoption increases by 32.3% as a group changes from having no female combatants to having female combatants. Overall, this set of findings offers strong evidence in support of my fifth hypothesis. Interestingly, the partial regression coefficients are noticeably higher when comparing the second set of linear models with the first set for H_5. Generally speaking, the difference in the partial regression coefficients suggests that the increase in the probability of gender quota adoption is higher for the more liberal operationalization of quota adoption compared with the stricter operationalization.

Table 4.2: Linear Models for Female Combatant Presence and Quota Adoption (High)

	(1) Quota Adoption High	(2) Quota Adoption High	(3) Quota Adoption High	(4) Quota Adoption High	(5) Quota Adoption High	(6) Quota Adoption High	(7) Quota Adoption High
female_combatants_best	0.235***	0.328***	0.348***	0.348***	0.326***	0.348***	0.323***
	(0.0268)	(0.0454)	(0.0445)	(0.0443)	(0.0452)	(0.0444)	(0.0454)
warduration		0.0374*			0.0408**		0.0467**
		(0.0197)			(0.0197)		(0.0207)
inequality			0.0136			0.00878	0.0293
			(0.0292)			(0.0293)	(0.0305)
democracy				0.0710	0.0806*	0.0694	0.0766
				(0.0470)	(0.0469)	(0.0474)	(0.0471)
Constant	0.0108	-0.153*	-0.0553	-0.0233	-0.193**	-0.0584	-0.335*
	(0.0179)	(0.0871)	(0.123)	(0.0362)	(0.0899)	(0.123)	(0.173)
Observations	502	257	257	257	257	257	257
R-squared	0.133	0.205	0.195	0.201	0.214	0.201	0.217

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Next, I present the results of the first set of linear probability models for H_6. In Table 4.3, I model the relationship between female combatant prevalence and gender quota adoption with the IDEA gender quotas indicator as the response variable. The linear models show a consistently strong, positive, and statistically significant relationship between female combatant prevalence and quota adoption. In Model 1, I show the simple regression and find positive, significant results. Adding the war duration control in Model 2, the results remain positive and significant. Model 3 includes the inequality control and Model 4 adds the democracy control, both showing positive and significant results with a p-value of less than 0.01. In Model 5, I show

a positive and significant relationship between female combatant prevalence and quota adoption when controlling for both conflict duration and democracy. Model 6 similarly shows positive and significant results when including the inequality and democracy controls. As with the previous sets of linear models for H_5, model fit is best when including the full suite of controls in Model 7. The results for Model 7 show that female combatant prevalence and gender quota adoption are strongly and positively related. As with all of the other models, Model 7 yields statistically significant results with a p-value of less than 0.01. The partial regression coefficient indicates that, holding conflict duration, inequality, and democracy constant, as the level of female combatants in a rebel group goes up one factor level, the probability of quota adoption increases by 13.6%, on average. My findings are robust to logit and probit specifications and provide strong evidence in support of my sixth hypothesis that higher female combatant prevalence should be associated with higher probability of gender quota adoption.

Table 4.3: Linear Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption

	(1) Quota Adoption Idea	(2) Quota Adoption Idea	(3) Quota Adoption Idea	(4) Quota Adoption Idea	(5) Quota Adoption Idea	(6) Quota Adoption Idea	(7) Quota Adoption Idea
cat4_prevalence_best	0.142***	0.139***	0.145***	0.139***	0.135***	0.141***	0.136***
	(0.0193)	(0.0197)	(0.0193)	(0.0192)	(0.0197)	(0.0193)	(0.0196)
warduration		0.0148			0.0195		0.0265
		(0.0180)			(0.0180)		(0.0187)
inequality			0.0334			0.0268	0.0377
			(0.0267)			(0.0267)	(0.0277)
democracy				0.0928**	0.0981**	0.0875**	0.0927**
				(0.0428)	(0.0431)	(0.0431)	(0.0432)
Constant	0.0131	-0.0485	-0.124	-0.0142	-0.0971	-0.123	-0.280*
	(0.0272)	(0.0799)	(0.113)	(0.0298)	(0.0821)	(0.113)	(0.158)
Observations	257	257	257	257	257	257	257
R-squared	0.176	0.178	0.181	0.191	0.195	0.194	0.201

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Turn now to Table 4.4, which presents the final set of linear models for H_6 showing the relationship between female combatant prevalence and gender quotas using the higher indicator for quota adoption. As with the previous linear models for the third empirical test, all models show a positive relationship between the explanatory and response variables that is statistically significant at a p-value of less than 0.01, with results robust to alternative specifications. In

Model 1, I show the simple linear relationship, which is positive and significant. I add the war duration control in Model 2, which shows positive and significant results with an improved model fit. For Model 3, I add the inequality control and find positive and significant results. I control for democracy in Model 4 and also find a positive and significant relationship. In Model 5, I control for war duration and democracy and find a positive and significant relationship. For Model 6, I again find a positive and significant relationship when controlling for inequality and democracy. Model 7 explains the most variability suggesting the best model fit, and shows a positive, statistically significant relationship between female combatant prevalence and the high measure of gender quota adoption at a p-value of less than 0.01. The partial regression coefficient for Model 7 can be interpreted as the change in the probability of gender quota adoption when female combatant prevalence increases by one factor level. That is, as female combatant prevalence moves up a level, the probability of gender quota adoption increases by 20.1%. Again, the slopes for the second set of linear models for H_6 are steeper when compared with those for the first set of models, and the second set of models explains more variability. Cumulatively, my findings from both sets of models offer strong evidence in support of H_6 that female combatant prevalence is positively related to the probability of gender quota adoption. Overall, the results of the third empirical test highlight an enduring relationship between female combatants and the political movements that are associated with the rebel groups they fought for, suggesting that women's activity as combatants in cases of civil war and insurgency matters for women's representation in the post-conflict state.

Table 4.4: Linear Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption (High)

	Dependent variable:							
	quota_high							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
cat4_prevalence_best	0.094***	0.156***	0.162***	0.160***	0.155***	0.155***	0.161***	0.154***
	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.038)
warduration		0.026			0.035	0.026		0.034
		(0.032)			(0.033)	(0.032)		(0.034)
inequality			0.025		0.041		0.023	0.040
			(0.047)		(0.050)		(0.048)	(0.051)
Democracy				0.030		0.028	0.024	0.016
				(0.085)		(0.085)	(0.087)	(0.087)
Constant	0.004	-0.109	-0.102	-0.005	-0.316	-0.113	-0.099	-0.310
	(0.015)	(0.142)	(0.201)	(0.050)	(0.288)	(0.144)	(0.203)	(0.292)
Observations	311	69	69	69	69	69	69	69
R^2	0.125	0.231	0.226	0.225	0.239	0.232	0.227	0.239
Adjusted R^2	0.122	0.208	0.203	0.201	0.204	0.197	0.192	0.192
Residual Std. Error	0.219 (df = 309)	0.302 (df = 66)	0.303 (df = 66)	0.303 (df = 66)	0.303 (df = 65)	0.304 (df = 65)	0.305 (df = 65)	0.305 (df = 64)
F Statistic	44.107*** (df = 1; 309)	9.905*** (df = 2; 66)	9.654*** (df = 2; 66)	9.553*** (df = 2; 66)	6.802*** (df = 3; 65)	6.550*** (df = 3; 65)	6.372*** (df = 3; 65)	5.035*** (df = 4; 64)
Note:								*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

In addition to the models produced using the WARD v.1.3, I also merged the quotas data with the original iteration of the WARD (Wood and Thomas 2017) in order to estimate the relationship between female combatant presence and prevalence using additional controls. Though the sample in the original WARD is smaller, the dataset includes a number of variables omitted in the newer iteration that may be useful for understanding the association between female participation in rebel groups and quota adoption, including conflict duration, forced recruitment of women into the rebel group, female-to-male secondary education ratio, natural log of per-capita GDP, rebel group capacity, and percent Muslim. Further, I include several variables in the next set of models that capture rebel group ideology, including dummy variables representing leftist, nationalist, and islamist ideology. In the remainder of this Chapter, I present and discuss the results of the linear models regressing the high estimate of quota adoption on female combatant presence and prevalence. In sum, I show a consistently strong and positive relationship between female combatant participation and quota adoption, aligning with the earlier results. Results of linear models for the more conservative quotas estimate are presented as tables in the Appendix and also show a statistically significant relationship for all models and both

independent variables. Logistic and probit regression results are also included in the Appendix.[2] Results are robust to the different specifications.

In Table 4.5, I display the results of the linear probability models for female combatant presence and quota adoption using the original WARD. All models achieve statistical significance at an alpha level of 0.05. In Model 1, I regress quota adoption on female combatant presence controlling for conflict duration and rebel group capacity and find positive, statistically significant results with a p-value of less than 0.01. In Model 2, I add forced recruitment as an additional control and again show positive and statistically significant results. For Model 3, I drop the forced recruitment control and add leftist ideology, showing positive and significant results with a p-value of less than 0.01. Model 4 shows the best model fit with the highest Adjusted R-Squared value. The estimated Beta coefficient indicates that controlling for conflict duration, leftist ideology, nationalist ideology, and group capacity, as a group switches from no female combatants to having female combatants, the likelihood of quota adoption increases by 9.3%, on average. Models 5 through 9 drop in and out additional controls including islamist ideology female-to-male secondary education ratio, natural log of per-capita GDP, and percent Muslim, all showing positive and statistically significant results. Model 10 also shows a strong model fit, including conflict duration, leftist ideology, nationalist ideology, group capacity, and percent Muslim as controls. The results of Model 10 indicate that, holding constant the aforementioned variables, the probability of quota adoption increases by 9.2%, on average, as female combatant presence moves from 0 to 1.

[2] Logit and probit models for the female_combat_binary independent variable and idea_quota dependent variable for the original WARD are omitted as the sample size was too small for these estimation techniques

Table 4.5: Linear Models for Subset of Female Combatant Presence and Quota Adoption (High)

	Dependent variable:									
	quota_high									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
female_combat_binary	0.128***	0.101***	0.101***	0.093**	0.100***	0.122***	0.093**	0.088**	0.093**	0.092**
	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)	(0.037)
duration	-0.001	0.0004	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
forced_recruit		-0.032								
		(0.032)								
leftist			0.100**	0.123**	0.094*		0.122**	0.119**	0.124**	0.125**
			(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)		(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.049)
nationalist				0.072**		0.048	0.072**	0.069*	0.073**	0.069**
				(0.034)		(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
islamist					-0.024	-0.031	-0.002			
					(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)			
mean_femseced_ratio								0.036		
								(0.071)		
lngdppc									-0.002	
									(0.019)	
veryweak	-0.090***	-0.082**	-0.094***	-0.099***	-0.092***	-0.091***	-0.099***	-0.101***	-0.098***	-0.101***
	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.036)	(0.034)
islmgenpct										-0.013
										(0.045)
Constant	0.045*	0.053*	0.049*	0.026	0.053*	0.037	0.026	0.007	0.039	0.034
	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.047)	(0.131)	(0.037)
Observations	199	185	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	195
R^2	0.103	0.085	0.123	0.143	0.124	0.116	0.143	0.144	0.143	0.146
Adjusted R^2	0.089	0.065	0.105	0.121	0.101	0.093	0.116	0.117	0.116	0.119
Residual Std. Error	0.228 (df = 195)	0.209 (df = 180)	0.227 (df = 191)	0.225 (df = 190)	0.228 (df = 190)	0.229 (df = 190)	0.226 (df = 189)	0.226 (df = 189)	0.226 (df = 189)	0.226 (df = 188)
F Statistic	7.463*** (df = 3; 195)	4.202*** (df = 4; 180)	6.705*** (df = 4; 191)	6.346*** (df = 5; 190)	5.403*** (df = 5; 190)	4.990*** (df = 5; 190)	5.261*** (df = 6; 189)	5.311*** (df = 6; 189)	5.262*** (df = 6; 189)	5.376*** (df = 6; 188)
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Finally, in Table 4.6, I present the results of the linear probability models for female combatant prevalence and quota adoption utilizing the original WARD and additional controls. All of the models show a positive relationship between female combatant prevalence and quota adoption and achieve statistical significance at an alpha level of 0.01. As before, in Model 1, I show a positive and significant relationship between female combatant prevalence and quota adoption when controlling for conflict duration and group capacity. In Model 2, I add the forced recruitment control and find positive and significant results. In Model 3, I drop the forced recruitment control and add the leftist ideology control, again showing positive and significant results. In Model 4, I add the nationalist ideology control and show the best model fit for the set, with an R-Squared of 0.200 and an Adjusted R-Squared of 0.179. Controlling for conflict duration, leftist group ideology, nationalist ideology, and group capacity, I find a strong positive relationship that is significant with a p-value of less than 0.01, with the probability of quota adoption increasing by 9%, on average, as rebel groups move up a level in female combatant

prevalence. In Model 6, I control for duration, nationalist and islamist ideology, and group capacity and find a positive and significant relationship. Model 7 adds the leftist ideology control back in and also shows positive, significant results. In Models 8 and 9, respectively, I add the female-to-male secondary education ratio and log per-capita GDP controls, finding a positive and significant association. Lastly, Model 10 also shows a relatively strong model fit with an R-Squared of .203 and an Adjusted R-Squared of 0.177. The results of Model 10 suggest that controlling for conflict duration, leftist ideology, nationalist ideology, group capacity, and percent Muslim, the probability of quota adoption increases by 9%, on average, as the prevalence of female combatants in the associated rebel group moves up a factor level.

Table 4.6: Linear Models for Subset of Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption (High)

	Dependent variable:									
	quota_high									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
cat4_prevalence	0.096***	0.075***	0.092***	0.090***	0.091***	0.099***	0.090***	0.089***	0.090***	0.090***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
duration	-0.001	-0.0001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
forced_recruit		-0.038								
		(0.031)								
leftist			0.020	0.043	0.018		0.045	0.042	0.042	0.046
			(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.052)		(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.052)
nationalist				0.075**		0.070**	0.077**	0.073**	0.075**	0.073**
				(0.033)		(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.033)
islamist					-0.013	0.002	0.010			
					(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.044)			
mean_femseced_ratio								0.016		
								(0.068)		
lngdppc									0.001	
									(0.018)	
veryweak	-0.074**	-0.072**	-0.076**	-0.081**	-0.075**	-0.078**	-0.082**	-0.082**	-0.082**	-0.083**
	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.034)
islmgenpct										-0.004
										(0.044)
Constant	0.033	0.048*	0.035	0.010	0.038	0.009	0.007	0.002	0.0004	0.013
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.045)	(0.126)	(0.036)
Observations	199	185	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	195
R^2	0.178	0.134	0.179	0.200	0.179	0.197	0.200	0.200	0.200	0.203
Adjusted R^2	0.166	0.114	0.161	0.179	0.157	0.176	0.175	0.175	0.175	0.177
Residual Std. Error	0.218 (df = 195)	0.203 (df = 180)	0.220 (df = 191)	0.218 (df = 190)	0.221 (df = 190)	0.218 (df = 190)	0.218 (df = 189)	0.218 (df = 189)	0.218 (df = 189)	0.219 (df = 188)
F Statistic	14.109*** (df = 3; 195)	6.935*** (df = 4; 180)	10.376*** (df = 4; 191)	9.515*** (df = 5; 190)	8.280*** (df = 5; 190)	9.342*** (df = 5; 190)	7.899*** (df = 6; 189)	7.899*** (df = 6; 189)	7.889*** (df = 6; 189)	7.972*** (df = 6; 188)
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

As before, the results of the additional set of models corroborate that there is a strong association between the presence and prevalence of female combatants in a rebel group and the adoption of gender quotas by political movements that succeed those groups. This set of results, considered in light of the earlier findings, provides strong evidence in support of my argument

that women's participation as combatants in rebel groups matters for gender equity in various post-conflict stages. My thesis elucidates political arenas wherein female rebel group participation can make a difference for women's rights and opportunities, highlighting a class of rebel groups and conflicts that are more likely to see headway while underscoring the importance of bridging gender and conflict and gender and post-conflict institution building in future research.

CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

This thesis represents the first effort to leverage quantitative methods to comprehensively understand the long-term political dynamics of female combatants in cases of civil war and insurgency. Testing how female participation in rebellion influences women's representation and rights in different post-conflict stages through three empirical tests, I uncover evidence to suggest that women's participation as combatants in rebel groups indeed improves women's representation in post-conflict politics. In addition to the presence of female combatants, the extent of female participation in the rebel group is also an important predictor of post-conflict gender equality outcomes. More specifically, in Chapter 2, I demonstrate that the presence of female combatants in a rebel group is a significant predictor of female participation on conflict termination teams for negotiations involving the rebel group, proxied by female signatories. I also show that the probability of female participation on elite negotiating teams increases as the prevalence of female combatants in the associated rebel group increases. Then, in Chapter 3, I offer mixed evidence on peace agreement terms, tentatively indicating that inclusion of gendered terms in peace agreements is more probable when a rebel group has female combatants. In the last empirical test performed in Chapter 4, I provide strong evidence showing that the presence of female combatants is a key explanatory factor behind the adoption of gender quotas by associated parties. Also, as female combatant prevalence increases, as does the likelihood of gender quota adoption. Taken together, my analyses show that the presence and prevalence of female combatants increase the probability that women's post-conflict political rights and opportunities are promoted. The results of Chapter 3 juxtaposed with the strong evidence of an association offered in the previous and subsequent tests also suggest, interestingly, the potential for heterogeneity, with female combatants mattering more in some cases than others.

My findings are especially valuable in light of the consensus in existing work that women's participation in politics is positive for post-conflict states on numerous dimensions. In addition to the general benefits of descriptive representation for improving the senses of political efficacy and trust of members of the represented group, especially in contexts of historical marginalization, descriptive representation often translates to the substantive representation of women's agendas. When women are represented in politics, they are more likely to govern in ways that include and benefit their female constituency. Beyond benefits to women alone, women's descriptive representation is doubly important for post-conflict states as it is linked to regime stability, legitimacy, and lowered risk of conflict recurrence.

Furthermore, I make a valuable theoretical contribution by articulating a novel argument relating gender to ties between rebel groups and broader political movements. In the process, I outline how women's experiences in conflict enable and orient their participation in the various stages of post-conflict politics, underscoring the enduring relationship between rebel groups and political movements vis-à-vis gender. My work thus fits within the growing literature on former rebel parties while showing how the movement-party logic also applies to new dimensions of rebel group politics, such as conflict termination negotiations. Future research on former rebel parties might consider how female combatant presence and prevalence is related to references to women in the manifestos of former rebel parties. It could also examine how policy advocacy and voting behavior might reflect different preferences for legislators from former rebel parties associated with rebel groups with female combatants when compared with former rebel parties without traditions of female participation and traditional political parties. Scholars could also explore how the descriptive representation of women within rebel groups is related to their descriptive representation within former rebel parties, going a step further to investigate the

implications of different women's roles in a rebel group for women's leadership in the former rebel party. Beyond gender-related explanatory variables, one implication of my contribution is that future research might consider the consequences of other group-level characteristics, from ethnic makeup to recruitment strategy of the rebel group, for earlier stages of the post-conflict political process before former rebel party formation, for example on the demographic makeup of conflict termination teams or the adoption of provisions in peace agreements related to democracy, pluralism, and human rights.

The revelation that the presence and prevalence of female combatants influences female post-conflict political participation in diverse ways opens a litany of new avenues for research while also underscoring the need for more and better data on women in rebellion, peace processes, and post-conflict governance. I confronted numerous challenges related to the paucity of publicly available, reliably coded, large-n quantitative data on gender and rebellion and women in post-conflict governance at each stage of the collection and analysis process in this thesis. For example, while clearly making an immense contribution to the study of female combatants, the WARD v1.3 omits the suite of political ideology variables and other controls included in the earlier iteration. Research on female participation in negotiations is limited by the lack of data on the participants in those negotiations that do not result in a peace agreement with signatories. Additionally, the dataset built by Krause et al. (2018) does not identify which side the female signatories represent (i.e. the government team, rebel group team, or otherwise), or indicate the number of female signatories. Finally, there is no publicly available dataset on gender quota adoption at the party level that does not exclude cases with party quota adoption below the national threshold, an issue my original variables attempted to rectify. In Chapter 4, I undertake a replicable data collection process that may be of use to other scholars. New data

collection might seek to address the issues I have outlined, expand upon and refine existing datasets, or offer insight into new aspects of female participation and representation that have thus far been neglected entirely. For instance, Henshaw's (2015) dataset on women's roles in armed groups has many interesting implications for the findings of this thesis, including how differences in women's mobilization in rebel groups, from supporters to combatants to leaders, might drive differences in the post-conflict stages I examine, among others. However the small sample size limits the analysis that can be performed. Navigating these constraints while, at points, presenting new data to overcome them, the findings of my thesis highlight a fruitful and understudied intersection of issues teeming with opportunities for new data collection efforts and analysis.

Putting in conversation the literatures on gender and rebellion, gender and post-conflict institution building, and former rebel parties, I make a general case for female combatant presence and prevalence as important explanatory factors driving diverse post-conflict gender equality outcomes. Thus far unexplored, my thesis offers evidence that variables capturing the participation of women in conflict are valuable for understanding women's rights and roles in post-conflict societies, building a foundation for future research. In sum, against the backdrop of existing work explaining how and why women rebel, my thesis opens the question of how and why women's participation in rebellion matters. As Reiter (2014, 1302) recounted, a burst of positivist scholarship in recent years "has demonstrated that accounting for gender helps better explain phenomena long recognized by the positivist community as important. It has also highlighted new and underappreciated gender-related theoretical puzzles…[These phenomena include] the spread of gender equality and norms." Indeed, my thesis shows how accounting for gender among the conflict-related variables that may shape post-conflict political institutions

holds the potential to explain how women achieve improved rights and representation once war ends. This contribution illuminates the value in merging literatures and theories that were previously evaluated independently, outlining a rich agenda for future work.

REFERENCES

Acik, Necla and Umut Erel. 2019. "Enacting Intersectional Multilayered Citizenship: Kurdish Women's Politics." *Gender, Place, & Culture*: 1-23.

Aduda, Levke and Johanna Liesch. 2022. "Women at the Table: Identifying Factors through Which Women Have the Opportunity to Influence Peace Agreement Design." *Journal of Global Security Studies* 7(1).

Ali, Darya Abdulkarim. 2019. *The Struggles of the Kurdish Women's Movement in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq*. https://lup.lub.lu.se/student-papers/search/publication/8998986.

Anderson, Miriam J. 2016. *Windows of Opportunity: How Women Seize Peace Negotiations for Political Change.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, Miriam J and Liam Swiss. 2014. "Peace Accords and the Adoption of Electoral Quotas for Women in the Developing World, 1990–2006." *Politics & Gender* 10(1): 33-61.

Arciniegas Murillo, Andrea. 2021. "The Relationship Between Female Parliamentary Representation and the Inclusion of Gender Provisions in Peace Agreements." *Georgetown University Graduate Theses and Dissertations - Public Policy.*

Arendt, Christie M. 2018. "From Critical Mass to Critical Leaders: Unpacking the Political Conditions behind Gender Quotas in Africa." *Politics & Gender* 14(3): 295-322.

Barrett, Edith J. 1997. "Gender and Race in the State House: The Legislative Experience." *The Social Science Journal* 34(2): 131-144.

BBC. 2014. "Who are the Female Fighters of the PKK?" 5 January.

Bell, Christine and Kevin McNicholl. 2019. "Principled Pragmatism and the 'Inclusion Project': Implementing a Gender Perspective in Peace Agreements." *Feminists @ Law* 9(1).

Bell, Christine and Catherine O'Rourke. 2010. "Peace Agreements or Pieces of Paper? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and their Agreements." *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 59(4): 941-980.

Berry, Marie E. 2017. "Barriers to Women's Progress After Atrocity: Evidence from Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina." *Gender & Society* 31(6): 830-853.

Bigio, Jamille and Rachel B. Vogelstein. 2017. "Women's Participation in Peace Processes: Colombia." *Council on Foreign Relations.* https://www.cfr.org/blog/womens-participation-peace-processes-colombia. (December 15, 2017).

Bloom, Mia. 2011. *Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists*. London: Hurst Publishers. http://www.hurstpublishers.com/book/bombshell/.

Braithwaite, Alex and Luna B. Ruiz. 2018. "Female Combatants, Forced Recruitment, and Civil Conflict Outcomes." *Research & Politics* 5 (2).

Brechenmacher, Saskia, and Caroline Hubbard. 2020. "Breaking the Cycle of Gender Exclusion in Political Party Development." https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/24/breaking-cycle-of-gender-exclusion-in-political-party-development-pub-81345.

Buchanan, Cate et al. 2012. "From Clause to Effect: Including Women's Rights and Gender in Peace Agreements." *Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue*. https://www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/24ClausereportwebFINAL-December-2012.pdf (March 10, 2022)

Chhibber, Pradeep and Ken Kollman. 2009. *The Formation of National Party Systems: Federalism and Party Competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Childs, Sarah and Mona Lena Krook. 2008. "Critical Mass Theory and Women's Political Representation." *Political Studies* 56(3): 725-736.

Cohen, Dara Kay. 2013. "Female Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War." *World Politics* 65(3): 383-415.

Cunningham, David, Kristian S. Gleditsch, and Idean Salehyan. 2013. "Non-State Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30(5): 516–531.

Dahlerup, Drude. 1988. "From a Small to a Large Minority: Women in Scandinavian Politics." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 11 (4): 275–97.

Davidson-Schmich, Louise K. 2006. "Implementation of Political Party Gender Quotas." *Party Politics* 12 (2): 211–232.

Demeritt, Jacqueline H. R, Angela D. Nichols, and Eliza G. Kelly. "Female Participation and Civil War Relapse." *Civil Wars* 16 (3): 346-368.

Dilli, Selin, Auke Rijpma, and Sarah G. Carmichael. 2015. "Achieving Gender Equality: Development versus Historical Legacies." *CESifo Economic Studies* 61(1): 301-334.

Enloe, Cynthia. 1990. *Bananas, Beaces and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Fallon, Kathleen M, Liam Swiss and Jocelyn Viterna. 2012. "Resolving the Democracy Paradox: Democratization and Women's Legislative Representation in Developing Nations, 1975 to 2009." *American Sociological Review* 77 (3): 380-408.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Wallensteen, Peter, Eriksson, Mikael, Sollenberg, Margareta and Strand, Håvard. 2002. "Armed Conflict 1946-2001: A New Dataset." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5): 615-637.

"Global Database of Gender Quotas." *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Inter-Parliamentary Union, and Stockholm University* https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/gender-quotas

Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander, and Peter Wallensteen. 2007. "Dyadic Dimensions of Armed Conflict, 1946—2007", *Journal of Peace Research* 45 (5): 697-710.

Högbladh, S. (2011) Peace Agreements 1975-2011. Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset. States in Armed Conflict 2011, edited by T. Pettersson and L. Themnér. Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report 99.

Haner, Murat, Francis T. Cullen, and Michael L. Benson. 2019. "Women and the PKK: Ideology, Genderm and Terrorism." *International Criminal Justice Review* 1 (23).

Henshaw, Alexis. 2015. "Where Women Rebel." *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 18(1): 1-22.

Higgins, Rylan. 2015. "Is It My Job to Make Him Care? Middle-Class Women and Gender Inequality in Ho Chi Minh City." *Anthropology of Work Review* 36(2): 74-86.

Howard, Lise Morjé and Alexandra Stark. 2018. "How Civil Wars End: The International System, Norms, and the Role of External Actors." *International Security* 42 (3): 127–171.

Hughes, Melanie M. 2009. "Armed Conflict, International Linkages, and Women's Parliamentary Representation in Developing Nations." *Social Problems* 56(1): 174-204.

Hughes, Melanie M., Pamela Paxton, Amanda Clayton, and Pär Zetterberg. 2017. Quota Adoption and Reform over Time (QAROT), 1947-2015. [Computer file]. http://www.pitt.edu/~hughesm/data.html

Hughes, Melanie M., Pamela Paxton, Amanda Clayton, and Pär Zetterberg. Forthcoming. "Global Gender Quota Adoption, Implementation, and Reform." Comparative Politics.

Hughes, Melanie M and Aili M Tripp. 2015. "Civil War and Trajectories of Change in Women's Political Representation in Africa, 1985–2010." *Social Forces* 93(4): 1513-1540.

Ishiyama, John and Michael Marshall. 2015. "Candidate Recruitment and Former Rebel Parties." *Party Politics* 21(4): 591-602.

Ishiyama, John and Michael Marshall. 2017. "What explains former rebel party name changes after a civil conflict ends? External and internal factors and the transition to political competition." *Party Politics* 23(4): 364-375.

Jayawardena, Kumari. 1986. *Feminism and Nationalism in the Third World*. London: Zed Books.

Kanter, Rosabeth M. 1977a. "Some Effects of Proportions on Group Life." *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (5): 965–90.

Kanter, Rosabeth M. 1977b. "Men and Women of the Corporation." New York: Basic Books.

Kittilson, Miki Caul. 1999. "Women's Representation in Parliament: The Role of Political Parties." *Party Politics* 5 (1): 79–88.

Krajeski, Jenna. 2013. "Kurdistan's Female Fighters." *The Atlantic*, 30 January.

Krook, Mona Lena, Joni Lovenduski, and Judith Squires. 2009. "Gender Quotas and Models of Political Citizenship." *British Journal of Political Science, 39*(4): 781-803.

LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner. 1966. The origin and development of political parties. In J. LaPalombara & M. Weiner (Eds), *Political parties and political development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 3–42.

Lazarus, Sarah. 2019. "Women. Life. Freedom. Female Fighters of Kurdistan." *CNN*, 27 January.

Lovenduski, Joni and Pippa Norris (1993) Gender and Party Politics. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Lyons, Terrence. 2016. "Victorious Rebels and Postwar Politics." *Civil Wars* 18(2): 160-174.

Mackenzie, Megan. 2009. "Securitization and Desecuritization: Female Soldiers and the Reconstruction of Women in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone." *Security Studies* 18(2): 241-261.

Meier, Petra. 2000. "The Evidence of Being Present: Guarantees of Representation and the Belgian Example." *Acta Politica* 35: 64-85.

Moghadam, Valentine M. 1994. *Identity Politics and Women: Cultural Reassertions and Feminisms in International Perspective*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Murray, Rainbow, Mona Lena Krook, and Katherine A. R. Opello. 2012. "Why Are Gender Quotas Adopted? Party Pragmatism and Parity in France." *Political Research Quarterly* 65 (3): 529–543.

Paxton, Pamela, Melanie M. Hughes, and Jennifer L. Green. 2006. "The International Women's Movement and Women's Political Representation, 1893–2003." *American Sociological Review* 71 (6): 898-920.

Pettersson, Therése and Kristine Eck. 2018. "Organized Violence, 1989-2017." *Journal of Peace Research* 55(4): 535–547.

Reid, Lindsay. 2021. "Peace agreements and women's political rights following civil war." *Journal of Peace Research* 58(6): 1224-1238.

Reiter, Dan. 2014. "The Positivist Study of Gender and International Relations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59(7): 1301-1326.

Sahin-Mencutek, Zeynep. 2016. "Strong in the Movement, Strong in the Party: Women's Representation in the Kurdish Party of Turkey." *Political Studies* 64 (2): 470-487.

Shair-Rosenfeld, Sarah and Reed M. Wood. 2017. "Governing Well after War: How Improving Female Representation Prolongs Post-conflict Peace." *Journal of Politics* 79 (3): 995-1009.

Sindre, Gyda M. 2019. "Adapting to Peacetime Politics? Rebranding and Ideological Change in Former Rebel Parties." *Government and Opposition* 54 (3): 485–512.

Sindre, Gyda M. 2016. "In Whose Interests? Former Rebel Parties and Ex-combatant Interest Group Mobilisation in Aceh and East Timor." *Civil Wars* 18 (2): 192-213.

Stockemer, Daniel and Bilel Kchouk. 2017. "(Democratic) Regime Change and the Representation of Women in Parliament." *International Review of Sociology* 27(3): 491-509.

Studlar, Donley T. And Ian McAllister. 2002. "Does a Critical Mass Exist? A Comparative Analysis of Women's Legislative Representation since 1950." *European Journal of Political Research* 41(2): 233-253.

Thomas, Jakana L. and Kanisha D. Bond. 2015. "Women's Participation in Violent Political Organizations." *American Political Science Review* 109 (3): 488-506.

Tripp, Aili M. 2015. *Women and Power in Postconflict Africa.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Trisko Darden, Jessica, Alexis Henshaw, and Ora Szekely. 2019. *Insurgent Women: Female Combatants in Civil Wars*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

True, Jacqui and Yolanda Riveros-Morales. 2019. "Towards Inclusive Peace: Analysing Gender-Sensitive Peace Agreements 2000–2016*." International Political Science Review* 40 (1): 23–40.

UN Women. 2012. "Identifying Women's Peace and Security Priorities." *UN Women* http://www.unwomen.org/~/media/Headquarters/Media/Publications/en/03BIdentifyingWomens.pdf (March 12, 2022)

Utas, Mats. 2005. “Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman's Social Navigation of the Liberian War Zone.” *Anthropological Quarterly* 78(2): 403-430.

Van Biezen, Ingrid. 2005. “On the theory and practice of party formation and adaptation in new democracies.” *European Journal of Political Research* 44(1): 147-174.

Vickers, Jill. 2006. “Bringing Nations In: Some Methodological and Conceptual Issues in Connecting Feminisms with Nationhood and Nationalisms.” *International Feminist Journal of* Politics 8 (1): 84–109.

Webster, Kaitlyn, Chong Chen, and Kyle Beardsley. 2019. “Conflict, Peace, and the Evolution of Women's Empowerment.” *International Organization* 73(2): 255-289.

Wise, Laura (2021) *Peace agreements with a gender perspective are still an exception, not the rule. Women, Peace and Security* (18 Jun 2021). Blog Entry.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2008. “The Social Processes of Civil War: The Wartime Transformation of Social Networks.” *Annual Review of Political Science* 11 (1): 539–561.

Wood, Reed M. and Jakana L. Thomas. 2017. “Women on the Frontline: Rebel Group Ideology and Women’s Participation in Violent Rebellion. *Journal of Peace Research 54*(1): 31-46.

Xydias, Christina V. 2007. “Inviting More Women to the Party: Gender Quotas and Substantive Representation in Germany.” *International Journal of Sociology* 37 (4): 52–66.

APPENDIX

Table 2.3: Logit Models for Female Combatant Presence and Female Signatories

	Dependent variable:			
	fem_sig			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
fem_bin	1.669***	1.236***	-0.040	1.065**
	(0.433)	(0.439)	(0.395)	(0.459)
fem_leg	-1.297***	-1.123***		-1.378***
	(0.227)	(0.237)		(0.256)
con_dur	0.078***		0.054***	0.070***
	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.013)
lef_ide		2.332***	2.111***	2.102***
		(0.361)	(0.360)	(0.409)
Constant	-2.433***	-1.410***	-2.949***	-2.155***
	(0.375)	(0.344)	(0.367)	(0.388)
Observations	374	358	386	358
Log Likelihood	-136.164	-138.546	-143.700	-121.071
Akaike Inf. Crit.	280.328	285.093	295.400	252.142
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2.4: Logit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Female Signatories

	Dependent variable:			
	fem_sig			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
fem_com	0.863***	0.543***	0.217	0.576***
	(0.155)	(0.160)	(0.162)	(0.171)
fem_leg	-1.435***	-1.131***		-1.467***
	(0.243)	(0.237)		(0.263)
con_dur	0.081***		0.053***	0.074***
	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.013)
lef_ide		2.011***	1.810***	1.690***
		(0.385)	(0.392)	(0.434)
Constant	-2.551***	-1.293***	-3.267***	-2.224***
	(0.378)	(0.308)	(0.373)	(0.384)
Observations	374	358	386	358
Log Likelihood	-127.127	-137.139	-142.798	-118.159
Akaike Inf. Crit.	262.255	282.279	293.597	246.319
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2.5: Probit Models for Female Combatant Presence and Female Signatories

	Dependent variable:			
	fem_sig			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
fem_bin	0.946***	0.771***	-0.108	0.605**
	(0.235)	(0.240)	(0.205)	(0.250)
fem_leg	-0.776***	-0.634***		-0.800***
	(0.126)	(0.127)		(0.139)
con_dur	0.047***		0.032***	0.042***
	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.007)
lef_ide		1.348***	1.240***	1.202***
		(0.207)	(0.209)	(0.232)
Constant	-1.413***	-0.875***	-1.670***	-1.275***
	(0.199)	(0.189)	(0.185)	(0.210)
Observations	374	358	386	358
Log Likelihood	-134.331	-138.330	-143.244	-119.519
Akaike Inf. Crit.	276.662	284.661	294.489	249.038
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 2.6: Probit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Female Signatories

	Dependent variable:			
	fem_sig			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
fem_com	0.495***	0.331***	0.075	0.320***
	(0.087)	(0.090)	(0.086)	(0.096)
fem_leg	-0.859***	-0.617***		-0.838***
	(0.135)	(0.124)		(0.142)
con_dur	0.048***		0.030***	0.044***
	(0.007)		(0.006)	(0.007)
lef_ide		1.137***	1.108***	0.961***
		(0.224)	(0.228)	(0.247)
Constant	-1.460***	-0.813***	-1.809***	-1.297***
	(0.198)	(0.173)	(0.182)	(0.205)
Observations	374	358	386	358
Log Likelihood	-125.472	-137.003	-142.998	-117.060
Akaike Inf. Crit.	258.943	282.005	293.995	244.121
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Table 3.5: Probit Models for Female Combatant Presence and Gender Provisions

VARIABLES	(1) Gendered Provisions	(2) Gendered Provisions	(3) Gendered Provisions	(4) Gendered Provisions
female_combatants_best	0.0509	0.276*	0.321*	0.231
	(0.173)	(0.145)	(0.185)	(0.148)
noideol		0.00485		-0.0124
		(0.221)		(0.223)
civso		0.674***		0.712***
		(0.118)		(0.117)
low_information		-0.203		-0.0953
		(0.162)		(0.224)
forced_recruit			0.195	0.157
			(0.211)	(0.291)
islmgenpct				0.0189
				(0.292)
Constant	-1.074***	-1.524***	-1.390***	-1.657***
	(0.114)	(0.114)	(0.164)	(0.306)
Observations	1,777	1,125	1,099	1,096

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.6: Probit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Gender Provisions

VARIABLES	(1) Gendered Provisions	(2) Gendered Provisions	(3) Gendered Provisions	(4) Gendered Provisions	(5) Gendered Provisions
cat4_prevalence_best	0.0480	0.0733	-0.180	-0.149	0.0442
	(0.0919)	(0.0772)	(0.139)	(0.115)	(0.0892)
noideol		-0.0308		-1.049***	-0.0495
		(0.221)		(0.401)	(0.218)
civso		0.681***		0.155	0.719***
		(0.125)		(0.231)	(0.123)
low_information		-0.287*			-0.142
		(0.153)			(0.219)
forced_recruit			0.593*		0.227
			(0.317)		(0.263)
islmgenpct					0.000601
					(0.288)
Constant	-1.084***	-1.433***	-0.868***	-0.387*	-1.616***
	(0.105)	(0.0998)	(0.233)	(0.231)	(0.305)
Observations	1,777	1,125	147	153	1,096
Sample		hrdem =1	hrdem =1	hrdem =1	hrdem =1

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.7: Probit Models for Female Combatant Presence and Any Gender Provisions

VARIABLES	(1) Gendered Provisions	(2) Gendered Provisions	(3) Gendered Provisions	(4) Gendered Provisions
female_combatants_best	0.0848	0.276*	0.396**	0.231
	(0.164)	(0.145)	(0.183)	(0.148)
noideol		0.00485		-0.0124
		(0.221)		(0.223)
civso		0.674***		0.712***
		(0.118)		(0.117)
low_information		-0.203		-0.0953
		(0.162)		(0.224)
forced_recruit			0.0667	0.157
			(0.208)	(0.291)
islmgenpct				0.0189
				(0.292)
Constant	-1.038***	-1.524***	-1.301***	-1.657***
	(0.110)	(0.114)	(0.156)	(0.306)
Observations	1,802	1,125	1,108	1,096

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 3.8: Probit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Any Gender Provisions

VARIABLES	(1) Gendered Provisions	(2) Gendered Provisions	(3) Gendered Provisions	(4) Gendered Provisions	(5) Gendered Provisions
cat4_prevalence_best	0.0680	0.0733	-0.180	-0.149	0.0442
	(0.0838)	(0.0772)	(0.139)	(0.115)	(0.0892)
noideol		-0.0308		-1.049***	-0.0495
		(0.221)		(0.401)	(0.218)
civso		0.681***		0.155	0.719***
		(0.125)		(0.231)	(0.123)
low_information		-0.287*			-0.142
		(0.153)			(0.219)
forced_recruit			0.593*		0.227
			(0.317)		(0.263)
islmgenpct					0.000601
					(0.288)
Constant	-1.047***	-1.433***	-0.868***	-0.387*	-1.616***
	(0.102)	(0.0998)	(0.233)	(0.231)	(0.305)
Observations	1,802	1,125	147	153	1,096
Sample		hrdem =1	hrdem =1	hrdem =1	hrdem =1

Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.7: Logit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption

VARIABLES	(1) Quota Adoption Idea	(2) Quota Adoption Idea	(3) Quota Adoption Idea	(4) Quota Adoption Idea	(5) Quota Adoption Idea	(6) Quota Adoption Idea	(7) Quota Adoption Idea
cat4_prevalence_best	1.098***	1.068***	1.235***	1.070***	1.029***	1.208***	1.176***
	(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.214)	(0.185)	(0.187)	(0.216)	(0.217)
warduration		0.264			0.287		0.394*
		(0.223)			(0.222)		(0.237)
inequality			0.653*			0.630*	0.720**
			(0.352)			(0.360)	(0.354)
democracy				0.743*	0.779*	0.687*	0.681*
				(0.400)	(0.404)	(0.400)	(0.404)
Constant	-3.246***	-4.415***	-6.155***	-3.487***	-4.754***	-6.291***	-8.418***
	(0.376)	(1.096)	(1.676)	(0.408)	(1.104)	(1.722)	(2.157)
Observations	257	257	257	257	257	257	257

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.8: Logit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption High

VARIABLES	(1) Quota Adoption Idea	(2) Quota Adoption Idea	(3) Quota Adoption Idea	(4) Quota Adoption Idea	(5) Quota Adoption Idea	(6) Quota Adoption Idea	(7) Quota Adoption Idea
cat4_prevalence_best	1.398***	1.470***	1.654***	1.454***	1.454***	1.648***	1.717***
	(0.157)	(0.209)	(0.238)	(0.201)	(0.210)	(0.239)	(0.256)
warduration		0.617**			0.615**		0.880***
		(0.246)			(0.245)		(0.289)
inequality			0.816**			0.811**	1.048***
			(0.365)			(0.366)	(0.362)
democracy				0.180	0.203	0.114	0.00746
				(0.410)	(0.424)	(0.408)	(0.429)
Constant	-3.799***	-6.357***	-7.162***	-3.509***	-6.387***	-7.175***	-12.35***
	(0.315)	(1.309)	(1.786)	(0.408)	(1.301)	(1.790)	(2.556)
Observations	502	257	257	257	257	257	257

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.9: Probit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption

VARIABLES	(1) Quota Adoption Idea	(2) Quota Adoption Idea	(3) Quota Adoption Idea	(4) Quota Adoption Idea	(5) Quota Adoption Idea	(6) Quota Adoption Idea	(7) Quota Adoption Idea
cat4_prevalence_best	0.658***	0.645***	0.741***	0.647***	0.630***	0.727***	0.712***
	(0.105)	(0.107)	(0.123)	(0.106)	(0.108)	(0.124)	(0.125)
warduration		0.159			0.162		0.215*
		(0.122)			(0.121)		(0.130)
inequality			0.387*			0.369*	0.412**
			(0.200)			(0.205)	(0.203)
democracy				0.413*	0.425*	0.377*	0.366
				(0.224)	(0.227)	(0.227)	(0.231)
Constant	-1.928***	-2.641***	-3.662***	-2.067***	-2.789***	-3.710***	-4.843***
	(0.201)	(0.605)	(0.950)	(0.219)	(0.602)	(0.974)	(1.206)
Observations	257	257	257	257	257	257	257

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.10: Probit Models for Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption High

VARIABLES	(1) Quota Adoption Idea	(2) Quota Adoption Idea	(3) Quota Adoption Idea	(4) Quota Adoption Idea	(5) Quota Adoption Idea	(6) Quota Adoption Idea	(7) Quota Adoption Idea
cat4_prevalence_best	0.777***	0.882***	0.980***	0.857***	0.874***	0.978***	1.024***
	(0.0833)	(0.120)	(0.134)	(0.110)	(0.120)	(0.134)	(0.147)
warduration		0.359**			0.357***		0.480***
		(0.140)			(0.138)		(0.157)
inequality			0.491**			0.488**	0.598***
			(0.208)			(0.209)	(0.209)
democracy				0.125	0.133	0.0754	0.0195
				(0.230)	(0.241)	(0.236)	(0.250)
Constant	-2.123***	-3.747***	-4.276***	-2.066***	-3.763***	-4.283***	-7.040***
	(0.151)	(0.747)	(1.018)	(0.217)	(0.739)	(1.021)	(1.415)
Observations	502	257	257	257	257	257	257

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4.11: Linear Models for Subset of Female Combatant Presence and Quota Adoption

	Dependent variable:									
	idea_quota									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
female_combat_binary	0.057**	0.050**	0.054**	0.050**	0.053**	0.055**	0.050**	0.046*	0.051**	0.047*
	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.024)
duration	0.0004	0.0004	0.0003	-0.0002	0.0003	0.00004	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0001	-0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
forced_recruit		0.00001								
		(0.021)								
leftist			0.011	0.021	0.007		0.019	0.018	0.023	0.014
			(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.032)		(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
nationalist				0.034		0.030	0.033	0.031	0.035	0.030
				(0.022)		(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
islamist					-0.015	-0.009	-0.004			
					(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)			
mean_femseced_ratio								0.038		
								(0.047)		
lngdppc									-0.005	
									(0.012)	
veryweak	-0.038*	-0.034	-0.038*	-0.041*	-0.037	-0.039*	-0.040*	-0.043*	-0.038	-0.040*
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
islmgenpct										-0.043
										(0.029)
Constant	0.012	0.011	0.012	0.001	0.015	0.004	0.002	-0.019	0.033	0.024
	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.087)	(0.024)
Observations	209	193	206	206	206	206	206	206	206	205
R^2	0.051	0.046	0.051	0.062	0.052	0.061	0.062	0.065	0.063	0.073
Adjusted R^2	0.037	0.026	0.032	0.039	0.029	0.037	0.034	0.037	0.034	0.045
Residual Std. Error	0.150 (df = 205)	0.141 (df = 188)	0.152 (df = 201)	0.151 (df = 200)	0.152 (df = 200)	0.151 (df = 200)	0.152 (df = 199)	0.151 (df = 199)	0.152 (df = 199)	0.151 (df = 198)
F Statistic	3.648** (df = 3; 205)	2.288* (df = 4; 188)	2.703** (df = 4; 201)	2.647** (df = 5; 200)	2.210* (df = 5; 200)	2.576** (df = 5; 200)	2.198** (df = 6; 199)	2.316** (df = 6; 199)	2.220** (df = 6; 199)	2.602** (df = 6; 198)
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.12: Linear Models for Subset of Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption

	Dependent variable:									
	idea_quota									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
cat4_prevalence	0.033***	0.030***	0.035**	0.034**	0.035**	0.034***	0.034**	0.032**	0.034**	0.032**
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
duration	0.0003	0.0003	0.0003	-0.0001	0.0004	-0.0002	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0001	-0.0002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
forced_recruit		-0.0002								
		(0.021)								
leftist			-0.012	-0.003	-0.015		-0.003	-0.005	-0.001	-0.008
			(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)		(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
nationalist				0.037*		0.037*	0.037	0.033	0.037*	0.033
				(0.022)		(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)
islamist					-0.012	0.001	0.0003			
					(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.029)			
mean_femseced_ratio								0.037		
								(0.046)		
lngdppc									-0.003	
									(0.012)	
veryweak	-0.034	-0.030	-0.033	-0.035	-0.032	-0.035	-0.035	-0.037	-0.034	-0.034
	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
islmgenpct										-0.042
										(0.029)
Constant	0.012	0.011	0.012	-0.001	0.014	-0.001	-0.001	-0.021	0.018	0.021
	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.031)	(0.086)	(0.024)
Observations	209	193	206	206	206	206	206	206	206	205
R^2	0.059	0.055	0.059	0.072	0.060	0.072	0.072	0.075	0.072	0.082
Adjusted R^2	0.045	0.035	0.040	0.049	0.036	0.049	0.044	0.047	0.044	0.054
Residual Std. Error	0.150 (df = 205)	0.140 (df = 188)	0.151 (df = 201)	0.150 (df = 200)	0.151 (df = 200)	0.150 (df = 200)	0.151 (df = 199)	0.151 (df = 199)	0.151 (df = 199)	0.150 (df = 198)
F Statistic	4.250*** (df = 3; 205)	2.753** (df = 4; 188)	3.145** (df = 4; 201)	3.094** (df = 5; 200)	2.539** (df = 5; 200)	3.093** (df = 5; 200)	2.566** (df = 6; 199)	2.680** (df = 6; 199)	2.574** (df = 6; 199)	2.948*** (df = 6; 198)
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.13: Logit Models for Subset of Female Combatant Presence and Quota Adoption (High)

	Dependent variable:									
	quota_high									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
female_combat_binary	2.969***	3.264***	2.583**	2.482**	2.568**	2.889***	2.474**	2.336**	2.472**	2.392**
	(1.075)	(1.199)	(1.099)	(1.118)	(1.106)	(1.091)	(1.124)	(1.132)	(1.119)	(1.130)
duration	-0.003	0.012	-0.017	-0.025	-0.017	-0.011	-0.024	-0.026	-0.028	-0.023
	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)
forced_recruit		-1.519*								
		(0.835)								
leftist			1.266*	1.645**	1.086		1.483*	1.642**	1.576**	1.671**
			(0.714)	(0.778)	(0.718)		(0.783)	(0.785)	(0.795)	(0.778)
nationalist				1.439*		0.939	1.327*	1.483*	1.453*	1.421*
				(0.747)		(0.692)	(0.755)	(0.767)	(0.752)	(0.762)
islamist					-16.832	-16.906	-17.350			
					(2,505.650)	(2,454.566)	(4,087.553)			
mean_femseced_ratio								1.055		
								(1.440)		
lngdppc									0.139	
									(0.336)	
veryweak	-18.189	-18.594	-18.324	-18.498	-18.207	-18.107	-19.373	-18.576	-18.631	-18.498
	(1,907.528)	(1,828.640)	(1,868.042)	(1,828.663)	(1,821.232)	(1,824.944)	(2,954.745)	(1,817.841)	(1,814.898)	(1,827.431)
islmgenpct										-0.507
										(1.188)
Constant	-4.272***	-3.859***	-4.229***	-4.956***	-4.036***	-4.494***	-4.752***	-5.666***	-5.937**	-4.741***
	(1.020)	(1.034)	(1.026)	(1.144)	(1.023)	(1.106)	(1.150)	(1.560)	(2.646)	(1.221)
Observations	199	185	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	195
Log Likelihood	-32.358	-24.962	-30.735	-28.675	-29.722	-29.904	-28.021	-28.408	-28.590	-28.354
Akaike Inf. Crit.	72.715	59.924	71.471	69.351	71.445	71.807	70.041	70.816	71.180	70.709

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.14: Logit Models for Subset of Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption

	Dependent variable:									
	idea_quota									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
cat4_prevalence	0.997**	1.088**	1.243**	1.401**	1.137*	1.092**	1.322*	1.351*	1.400**	1.978*
	(0.437)	(0.528)	(0.615)	(0.705)	(0.602)	(0.490)	(0.704)	(0.745)	(0.705)	(1.071)
duration	0.023	0.024	0.029	0.012	0.030	0.014	0.015	0.003	0.011	0.005
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.044)	(0.048)	(0.047)
forced_recruit		-0.480								
		(1.353)								
leftist			-0.856	-0.726	-0.845		-0.694	-0.186	-0.727	0.792
			(1.344)	(1.462)	(1.313)		(1.443)	(1.534)	(1.458)	(2.208)
nationalist				2.036*		1.983	1.961	2.564*	2.036*	4.775**
				(1.218)		(1.212)	(1.225)	(1.432)	(1.219)	(2.384)
islamist					-16.774	-16.059	-16.020			
					(4,224.098)	(4,026.210)	(4,022.698)			
mean_femseced_ratio								3.004		
								(2.301)		
lngdppc									0.051	
									(0.486)	
veryweak	-18.132	-18.186	-18.066	-18.071	-18.004	-18.096	-18.002	-18.231	-18.100	-19.231
	(3,083.300)	(3,077.934)	(3,051.006)	(2,940.261)	(2,971.513)	(2,908.473)	(2,876.182)	(2,851.738)	(2,938.586)	(3,870.940)
islmgenpct										-17.662*
										(9.122)
Constant	-4.800***	-4.721***	-4.989***	-6.355***	-4.726***	-5.991***	-6.145***	-9.184***	-6.711*	-8.421***
	(1.026)	(1.238)	(1.154)	(1.615)	(1.135)	(1.540)	(1.630)	(3.198)	(3.762)	(3.213)
Observations	209	193	206	206	206	206	206	206	206	205
Log Likelihood	-17.729	-14.412	-17.499	-15.724	-17.149	-15.652	-15.536	-14.756	-15.718	-10.697
Akaike Inf. Crit.	43.458	38.824	44.999	43.448	46.298	43.304	45.072	43.513	45.437	35.394

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.15: Logit Models for Subset of Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption High

	Dependent variable:									
	quota_high									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
cat4_prevalence	1.355***	1.620***	1.372***	1.621***	1.286***	1.572***	1.555***	1.597***	1.640***	1.576***
	(0.337)	(0.476)	(0.442)	(0.515)	(0.433)	(0.419)	(0.514)	(0.526)	(0.516)	(0.524)
duration	-0.006	0.014	-0.006	-0.026	-0.005	-0.024	-0.024	-0.030	-0.033	-0.025
	(0.031)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.036)
forced_recruit		-2.227**								
		(1.103)								
leftist			-0.092	0.057	-0.096		0.055	0.059	-0.093	0.110
			(0.960)	(1.018)	(0.939)		(1.006)	(1.013)	(1.033)	(1.025)
nationalist				1.966**		1.890**	1.893**	2.042**	1.944**	1.976**
				(0.863)		(0.865)	(0.867)	(0.883)	(0.857)	(0.884)
islamist					-16.348	-16.594	-16.598			
					(2,654.018)	(4,189.414)	(4,199.006)			
mean_femseced_ratio								1.281		
								(1.476)		
lngdppc									0.249	
									(0.365)	
veryweak	-18.006	-19.043	-17.995	-18.204	-17.920	-19.100	-19.117	-18.295	-18.439	-18.100
	(1,874.564)	(1,722.400)	(1,878.438)	(1,797.190)	(1,840.747)	(2,919.379)	(2,922.130)	(1,777.394)	(1,773.021)	(1,814.673)
islmgenpct										-0.414
										(1.299)
Constant	-4.041***	-3.412***	-4.034***	-5.345***	-3.807***	-5.167***	-5.157***	-6.329***	-7.100**	-5.193***
	(0.756)	(0.770)	(0.801)	(1.142)	(0.794)	(1.141)	(1.155)	(1.723)	(2.871)	(1.200)
Observations	199	185	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	195
Log Likelihood	-28.710	-22.361	-28.652	-25.516	-28.068	-25.209	-25.208	-25.142	-25.283	-25.395
Akaike Inf. Crit.	65.419	54.721	67.304	63.031	68.136	62.419	64.416	64.284	64.567	64.791

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.16: Probit Models for Subset of Female Combatant Presence and Quota Adoption (High)

	Dependent variable:									
	quota_high									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
female_combat_binary	1.396***	1.648***	1.189***	1.193**	1.209***	1.440***	1.209**	1.160**	1.210**	1.158**
	(0.443)	(0.576)	(0.454)	(0.489)	(0.469)	(0.482)	(0.500)	(0.505)	(0.496)	(0.492)
duration	0.00001	0.010	-0.007	-0.014	-0.007	-0.006	-0.013	-0.015	-0.016	-0.013
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
forced_recruit		-0.877*								
		(0.484)								
leftist			0.689*	0.940**	0.592		0.853*	0.907**	0.885*	0.959**
			(0.405)	(0.441)	(0.412)		(0.449)	(0.443)	(0.452)	(0.442)
nationalist				0.842**		0.556	0.786*	0.836**	0.834**	0.821**
				(0.403)		(0.378)	(0.412)	(0.412)	(0.405)	(0.405)
islamist					-4.702	-4.869	-4.584			
					(533.979)	(513.368)	(514.026)			
mean_femseced_ratio								0.596		
								(0.766)		
lngdppc									0.102	
									(0.187)	
veryweak	-4.895	-5.554	-5.309	-5.629	-5.301	-5.202	-5.590	-5.713	-5.778	-5.624
	(260.580)	(386.093)	(404.206)	(382.187)	(393.005)	(392.991)	(375.536)	(376.737)	(374.916)	(382.771)
islmgenpct										-0.125
										(0.603)
Constant	-2.211***	-2.049***	-2.186***	-2.654***	-2.109***	-2.417***	-2.569***	-3.060***	-3.379**	-2.586***
	(0.399)	(0.433)	(0.402)	(0.514)	(0.409)	(0.490)	(0.523)	(0.756)	(1.422)	(0.569)
Observations	199	185	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	195
Log Likelihood	-32.364	-24.803	-30.872	-28.524	-29.848	-29.786	-27.916	-28.214	-28.364	-28.271
Akaike Inf. Crit.	72.728	59.605	71.745	69.048	71.697	71.572	69.832	70.429	70.728	70.542
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.17: Probit Models for Subset of Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption

	Dependent variable:									
	idea_quota									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
cat4_prevalence	0.505**	0.526**	0.605**	0.718**	0.561**	0.610**	0.685*	0.694*	0.721**	0.999*
	(0.207)	(0.248)	(0.285)	(0.351)	(0.280)	(0.260)	(0.352)	(0.363)	(0.352)	(0.524)
duration	0.014	0.014	0.016	0.007	0.017	0.008	0.008	0.003	0.008	0.003
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.025)
forced_recruit		-0.160								
		(0.636)								
leftist			-0.369	-0.243	-0.379		-0.238	-0.156	-0.240	0.211
			(0.666)	(0.749)	(0.654)		(0.741)	(0.765)	(0.756)	(1.140)
nationalist				1.087*		1.075*	1.058*	1.254*	1.094*	2.352**
				(0.613)		(0.619)	(0.621)	(0.700)	(0.616)	(1.185)
islamist					-4.170	-4.018	-4.033			
					(898.505)	(811.182)	(809.287)			
mean_femseced_ratio								1.147		
								(1.098)		
lngdppc									-0.033	
									(0.247)	
veryweak	-4.779	-4.817	-4.793	-5.083	-4.999	-5.093	-5.084	-5.272	-5.059	-5.861
	(393.807)	(392.890)	(387.659)	(589.308)	(608.529)	(585.568)	(579.073)	(568.528)	(588.385)	(717.654)
islmgenpct										-8.211*
										(4.448)
Constant	-2.574***	-2.539***	-2.642***	-3.439***	-2.535***	-3.322***	-3.360***	-4.433***	-3.225*	-4.242***
	(0.458)	(0.560)	(0.507)	(0.809)	(0.502)	(0.794)	(0.819)	(1.442)	(1.885)	(1.492)
Observations	209	193	206	206	206	206	206	206	206	205
Log Likelihood	-17.374	-14.164	-17.191	-15.269	-16.871	-15.183	-15.129	-14.677	-15.259	-11.008
Akaike Inf. Crit.	42.747	38.329	44.382	42.538	45.741	42.366	44.258	43.354	44.519	36.016
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4.18: Probit Models for Subset of Female Combatant Prevalence and Quota Adoption High

	Dependent variable:									
	quota_high									
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
cat4_prevalence	0.704***	0.825***	0.711***	0.853***	0.678***	0.847***	0.828***	0.851***	0.874***	0.843***
	(0.170)	(0.242)	(0.215)	(0.266)	(0.213)	(0.219)	(0.266)	(0.274)	(0.269)	(0.272)
duration	-0.002	0.010	-0.002	-0.014	-0.001	-0.013	-0.013	-0.016	-0.018	-0.013
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.019)
forced_recruit		-1.115**								
		(0.564)								
leftist			-0.043	0.076	-0.062		0.067	0.044	-0.020	0.102
			(0.521)	(0.568)	(0.516)		(0.564)	(0.569)	(0.582)	(0.574)
nationalist				1.108**		1.075**	1.077**	1.128**	1.101**	1.083**
				(0.466)		(0.474)	(0.474)	(0.479)	(0.466)	(0.469)
islamist					-4.278	-4.398	-4.391			
					(576.201)	(836.992)	(839.700)			
mean_femseced_ratio								0.624		
								(0.794)		
lngdppc									0.138	
									(0.198)	
veryweak	-5.405	-6.151	-5.390	-5.946	-5.373	-6.071	-6.095	-6.057	-6.178	-5.952
	(391.552)	(348.049)	(392.896)	(351.984)	(386.128)	(560.228)	(560.572)	(345.366)	(342.714)	(351.760)
islmgenpct										0.015
										(0.659)
Constant	-2.181***	-1.891***	-2.175***	-2.926***	-2.078***	-2.861***	-2.850***	-3.388***	-3.905**	-2.910***
	(0.341)	(0.362)	(0.356)	(0.573)	(0.359)	(0.582)	(0.586)	(0.861)	(1.525)	(0.621)
Observations	199	185	196	196	196	196	196	196	196	195
Log Likelihood	-28.738	-22.300	-28.690	-25.395	-28.094	-25.129	-25.122	-25.084	-25.140	-25.319
Akaike Inf. Crit.	65.476	54.600	67.380	62.791	68.188	62.258	64.244	64.169	64.279	64.638
Note:										*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

CODEBOOK

I took the WARD version 1.3 (Wood and Thomas 2017) and dropped cases with missing data on the independent variables. Then, I manually merged it with data from Ishiyama and Marshall (2017) to identify former rebel party matches. Matches are captured by *partymatch.* The *partymatch* variable does not encompass all rebel groups that eventually became political parties, but instead represents only those rebel groups that became former rebel parties included in the Ishiyama and Marshall dataset. A verified merge is indicated by the *verified* variable.

I took a conservative approach to coding matches when dealing with exceptional cases. Because both the WARD and Marshall contain observations that are splinter groups or coalitions, I did not match an original rebel group with a splinter group party, or an individual rebel group with a coalition party, etc. when there are splinter group-splinter party matches and coalition rebel-coalition party matches. Ultimately these splinter groups and coalitions can have different levels of female combatants, and combining them without regard to these differences would undermine the internal validity of the study.

Splinter groups: When a rebel group splintered into multiple rebel groups, and a party succeeding one of the splinter groups was present in the Marshall dataset, I did not code a match for the original (unified) rebel group and the splinter party. Additionally, I did not code a splinter group as a match for a unified former rebel party. However, splinter rebel groups were merged with matching former rebel parties that succeeded the splinter group.

Coalition groups: When a coalition of rebel groups formed, and a party succeeding one of the rebel groups in the coalition was present in the Marshall dataset, I did not code a match for the coalition rebel group and the former rebel party succeeding one coalition member. Additionally, I did not code an individual rebel group as a match for a coalition party of which the rebel group became a member. However, coalition rebel groups were merged with matching coalition former rebel parties.

- Example: the CMA, a coalition of Tuareg and Arab rebel groups in Mali, is included in the WARD, but not in the Marshall dataset. However, parties such as the MNLA, which succeeded rebel groups that were a part of the CMA, are included in the Marshall dataset. These two observations were not matched. As a party directly succeeding the CMA was not found in the Marshall dataset, the observation representing the CMA in the merged dataset is coded as 0 for *partymatch*
- Example: The ERP, found in the WARD, was one of five rebel groups that comprised the FMLN in El Salvador. The ERP does not have a direct successor in the Marshall dataset and so is coded as 0 for *partymatch.* However, the FMLN is present in both the WARD and Marshall dataset and these observations are merged.
- Example: the INPFL, a splinter group of the NPFL in Liberia, is a rebel group in the WARD. The NPFL, but not the INPFL, is included in the Marshall dataset. The INPFL (WARD) and NPFL (Marshall) were not matched.

Political and military wings: In the case of the Frolinat in Chad, the group had matches for both the Frolinat and Frolinat (Political Wing). In this case and all others where one rebel group in the WARD had multiple matches for different wings of the group in Marshall, the match

was made on the military wing, unless a political wing was explicitly specified in both the WARD and the Ishiyama and Marshall dataset.

Variable *quota_high* coding procedure:

- If evidence that quotas were adopted 1, all other cases 0
- Sources collected include academic journal articles, NGO and IGO reports, news media articles
- Search terms:

If no *partymatch*:

  - "sideb" AND "sidea [state]" AND "gender quota"

If the observation has *partymatch*:

  - ("rebel_name" OR "partyname") AND "gov" AND "gender quota"

Rebel to party matches with different countries or group acronyms include:

- AIS rebels (Algeria), FIS party (Algeria)
- FNLA rebels (Portugal), FNLA party (Angola)
- Frelimo rebels (Portugal), Frelimo party (Mozambique)
- Hezbollah rebels (Israel), Hezbollah party (Lebanon)
- KR rebels (Cambodia), KDKP party (Cambodia)
- M-19 rebels (Colombia), M19 party (Colombia)
- MPLA rebels (Portugal), MPLA party (Angola)
- NPFL rebels (Liberia), NPLF party (Liberia)
- SSA rebels (Myanmar), SSNA-S party (Burma)
- UWSA rebels (Myanmar), UWSA party (Burma)
- SWAPO rebels (South Africa), SWAPO party (Namibia)
- Ansar Dine rebels (Mali), Ansar al-Dine party (Mali)
- Frolinat rebels (Chad), FROLINAT party (Chad)
- MPA rebels (Mali), MPAL party (Mali)
- SPLM/A rebels (Sudan), SPLM party (Sudan)
- SSLM rebels (Sudan), SSLA party (South Sudan)
- Seleka rebels (Central African Republic), UFDR-SELEKA party (Central African Republic)