Distribution Agreement

In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

Signature:

Ahmed Abdel Meguid

_____ _____

[Student's name typed] Date

The Hermeneutics of Religious Imagination and Human Nature in Kant & Ibn al-'Arabī

By

Ahmed Abdel Meguid
Doctor of Philosophy

Philosophy

David Carr, Ph.D.
Advisor

Rudolf Makkreel, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Vincent J. Cornell, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Devin J. Stewart, Ph.D.
Reader

John Lysaker, Ph.D.
Reader

Accepted:

Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D.
Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies

Date

The Hermeneutics of Religious Imagination and Human Nature in Kant & Ibn al-ʻArabī

By

Ahmed Abdel Meguid
M.A., Emory University, 2007

Advisor: David Carr, Ph.D.

An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Philosophy
2011

Abstract

The Hermeneutics of Religious Imagination and Human Nature in Kant & Ibn al-‘Arabī
By Ahmed Abdel Meguid

The dissertation investigates and synthesizes under-explored dimensions of Immanuel Kant’s and Muhyī ad-Dīn ibn al-‘Arabī’s (d.1240) philosophy of religion. In contrast with mainstream Kantian scholarship that reduces the role of God in his thought to its moral use, this work argues that the idea of God plays a decisive role in his definition of the ‘human-being.’ Building on recent scholarship on the problem of defining the ‘human’ in the *Critique of Judgment*, it argues that only the idea of God allows imagination to define the ‘human-being’ by hermeneutically connecting the realm of rational ideas with that of spatial-temporal experience. The dissertation then shows that Ibn al-‘Arabī, generally viewed as a Muslim mystic *tout court*, held parallel philosophical views of the ‘human-being’ and the faculty of imagination. It then demonstrates that Ibn al-‘Arabī overcame salient problems that Kant faced by outlining the implications of this philosophical view for concrete religious experience and putting forward a more elaborate account of the hermeneutical dimension and uses of the idea of God.

The Hermeneutics of Religious Imagination and Human Nature in Kant & Ibn al-ʻArabī

By

Ahmed Abdel Meguid
M.A.

Advisor: David Carr, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Philosophy
2011

Table of Contents

Introduction

§I. Overview of the Project:

This project is not primarily intended as a comparative study of Kant and the Muslim mystic and philosopher Muhyī ad-Dīn Ibn al-'Arabī (d.1240). It neither attempts to merely point out similarities between the structures of their philosophical systems nor claim that they simply coincide despite the difference in time, cultural background and philosophical jargon of each. It is also not a philological/historical examination of the two thinkers. It is rather a philosophical project; by examining under-explored dimensions in the theory of judgment and consciousness in the thought of Kant and Ibn al-'Arabī (d.1240), this study endeavors to offer an original insight into the relation between philosophy of religion and the theory of human nature. The study demonstrates that both thinkers argue that imagination is the faculty that allows the human being to connect the realm of transcendent ideas, which cannot be empirically verified, with the realm of spatial-temporal experience. In addition, each sees that a sense of the self and form of subjectivity corresponds to each realm—in other words, that every human being can think of her/himself either as a rational essence that is completely transcendent to experience or as an empirical self in the spatial-temporal domain. For both Kant and Ibn al-'Arabī, the faculty of imagination harmonizes these two domains and hence these two senses of the self into one single consciousness of the human being as a whole. Imagination accomplishes this task through a hermeneutical role whereby it represents the super-sensible in the sensible and purposively interprets the sensible in light of the orientation furnished by the super-sensible ideas. Through this role, hermeneutical imagination constitutes human-being as essentially historical and everyday consciousness. The study then shows that imagination can constitute this being through the orientation given to it by the idea of

God as a supreme being; in this respect, it shows that of all the transcendent ideas of reason, the idea of God inasmuch as it represents the sum of all possibilities of being conscious of any 'thing' as such is the main idea that guides imagination in fulfilling this task. While this overall scheme applies to both Kant and Ibn al-'Arabī, there are certainly key differences and more importantly dimensions that are lacking in one system and present in the other. In light of this, the first part of this study is entirely devoted to Kant who articulates the mechanism and structure of imagination in a manner that is definitely lacking in the work of Ibn al-'Arabī. Further, Kant articulates the historical and everyday dimensions of the human-being also in a much more explicit way than Ibn al-'Arabī. The second part presents Ibn al-'Arabī as a possible model for the application of the philosophical system outlined by Kant to religious experience. This presentation demonstrates how Ibn al-'Arabī uses this philosophical framework to construct a complete model for religious experience re-formulating, in this context, of key religious questions including prophecy and revelation. Among these questions is that related to prophecy and the modes of conceiving the Supreme Being in terms of his elaborate theory of the divine names. Based on these findings, the study concludes with an outline of the way in which Kant's and Ibn al-'Arabī's theses complement each other, offering fresh insights into the relation between philosophical anthropology and the philosophy of religion. Based on this suggested relation, it points to the prospect of re-formulating key problems related to religious experience, most importantly the problem of transcendence versus immanence. Below I provide an outline of the arguments of the two parts and the chapters of each.

§II. First Part: The human-divine relationship in light of Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment and imagination

II.1) Summary of the argument:

In the first and second introductions to the *Critique of Judgment,* Kant argues that the main goal of the third *Critique* is to overcome the problem of the dichotomy between the domain of the ideas of reason and the domain of understanding or the construction of experience according to pure categories. In his view, the domain of reason, being the foundation of human freedom, must have an influence over that of the understanding. Nonetheless, such an influence is not warranted, since the realm of ideas is by definition completely transcendent to experience, which, in turn, is the domain to which only the categories of understanding apply. In addition, Kant gives a different perspective on this problem elsewhere in his writings. In the introduction to the 'Doctrine of Virtue' in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, he argues that to the domains of reason and the understanding correspond two senses of the self: the rational transcendent self and the empirical self of spatial-temporal, natural experience. Thus humans are rational natural-beings *(vernünftige Naturwesen)*. Therefore, since the problem of the critical project consists in bridging the gap between the domain of reason and the domain of the understanding, it also consists in reconciling these two senses of the self in a whole that could legitimately be called the 'human-being.' Building on Kant's assertion that the faculty of judgment connects these two realms, the dissertation proposes an alternative reading of judgment's role and its significance in Kant's system. Engaging key commentators on the theory of judgment in Kant including Beatrice Longuenesse, Rudolf Makkreel, and Paul Guyer, the dissertation argues that judgment, inasmuch as Kant asserts that it is not an independent faculty, represents consciousness in different domains of experience. But imagination is the faculty that constitutes the meaning of judgment in every domain of experience; for

instance, it constitutes determinant objective meaning in scientific/theoretical experience by producing schemata of empirical objects. The dissertation then shows that aesthetic judgment expresses consciousness in everyday experience and that aesthetic imagination constitutes its meaning through a hermeneutical role. Imagination is thus the most appropriate realm wherein the consciousness of human subjectivity as a whole could be determined. Drawing on Kant's definitions of aesthetic reflective judgment, its inter-subjective dimension, and the principle of purposiveness *(Zweckmäßigkeit)* that grounds it, the dissertation argues that a transcendent idea must guide this hermeneutical role of the imagination. This view is also supported by Heidegger's often overlooked interpretation of Kant's conception of aesthetic subjectivity and experience in the *Nietzsche Lectures* and its connection with the problem of defining human-being as a whole. Through the analysis of the principle of 'purposivenes without a purpose' *(Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck)* and of the idea of God in both the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Prolegomena*, the dissertation shows that only the 'Ideal' of God and not any other idea can guide imagination in accomplishing this task. In demonstrating this point, the dissertation shows the connection between the constitution of aesthetic judgment, the problem of defining human subjectivity as a whole, and the idea of God. Using this framework, the dissertation re-examines Kant's writings on religion, especially *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* and the *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion*. While many scholars have discussed the implications of Kant's *Religionsschriften* for his theory of history and human nature, all of them took the moral perspective of the *Critique of Practical Reason* as their point of departure. This dissertation proposes a radically new reading of Kant's view of religion and the general significance of religious experience, deducing this claim from the role the

idea of God plays in defining the human as a whole through the orientation it gives to aesthetic imagination. However, Kant does not go beyond defining the fundamentals of this framework; he neither elaborates the significance of this view for concrete religious consciousness, nor does he discuss the different possibilities through which this hermeneutical process may take place in everyday experience.

II.2 Description of the Chapters of Part I:

Chapter 1 starts with a brief account of Kant's characterization of the problem of the critical project in terms of the dichotomy between the domain of reason and that of understanding in the first Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment.* It points out how judgment is introduced as the bridge through which these two domains could be harmonized with each other. The discussion then turns to the second Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* tracing the development of Kant's argument there. Unlike the first introduction wherein Kant conceived of the relation between the domain of reason and that of understanding in terms of the presentation of nature as a system and not as an aggregate, Kant becomes particularly interested in tracing how the super-sensible can have an influence *(Einfluß haben)* over the domain of understanding. Given that the rational domain constitutes the moral essence of humanity, this means that judgment also defines the way the rational-moral sense of subjectivity based on the idea of freedom could influence the empirical sense of the subjectivity that is constructed according to the concepts of nderstanding like any other phenomenon. In order to reinforce this statement the discussion turns to the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' and more importantly to the *Metaphysics of Morality.* In the latter work, Kant argues that each of these domains is associated with a sense of the self; hence the human being can think of himself as a natural phenomenon or as a free rational agent.

The second part of the chapter further underpins this reading of the development of the critical problem from being merely that of the harmonization of the two domains to being the problem of the constitution of human subjectivity as a whole. Chronologically examining the reception of the critical project and the identification of its key problem by Reinhold, Fichte and most importantly Heidegger, the second part of the chapter demonstrates that the reading suggested of the main problem of the critical project is legitimate. Not only this, but it also shows that the development of the recognition of the problem of the critical project from Reinhold through Heidegger reflects the development of Kant's own conception of the same problem from the first through the second introductions of the third *Critique.*

Chapter 2 turns to Kant's theory of Judgment. Its main objective is to demonstrate that aesthetic reflective judgment is the key to resolve the problem of defining the whole of human subjectivity in Kant's system. The first part of the section is devoted to a brief survey of the role of judgment in Kant's system. Building on evidence from the first *Critique* it demonstrates a point that has not been stressed properly by commentators on Kant's system; this point concerns the way in which judgment is associated with consciousness in general or more precisely with the expression of meaning in different subjective attitudes. Hence determinant judgment is associated with consciousness in the theoretical attitude and thus expresses objective meaning. By contrast, reflective judgment is associated with the subjective need for reconciling the domains of reason and the understanding. Such harmonization takes place through either of reflective judgment two species: the aesthetic or the teleological. The third section develops this thesis further by pinpointing the key differences between determinant and reflective judgment based on the two Introductions to the third *Critique.* The last section of the chapter examines

the difference between the two species of reflective judgment: the reflective and the teleological, showing the priority of the aesthetic in connection with the problem of the human based on Kant's argument, particularly in the second Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*. The chapter thus establishes its main thesis, namely, that aesthetic judgment is the medium through which human being as a whole is constituted.

Chapter 3 turns to the constitution of judgment in different subjective attitudes. Investigating the structure of both determinant and reflective judgment shows that imagination is the function mainly responsible for the constitution of judgment. In this sense imagination plays a different role in each subjective attitude and hence in the constitution of consciousness and meaning associated with each attitude. To illustrate the centrality of the imagination to the constitution of meaning, the chapter focuses entirely on the role assigned to it in the first *Critique.* The first section establishes the centrality of the imagination to the interpretation of the A and B Deductions. The second section examines the role of imagination in constituting the three syntheses of the A-Deduction. The Third section addresses the figurative synthesis and the doctrine of schematism in the B-Deduction. In light of the findings of the two sections, the chapter presents an argument for reconciling the A and B deductions based on the different perspectives they present. It argues that the presentation of the role of the imagination due to the different focus of emphasis in the two deductions is what made one seem to be superseding the other. However, since both are describing the constitution of meaning in the subjective attitude, they are both in harmony with each other.

Chapter 4 paves the way for investigating aesthetic reflective judgment and the way it is constituted by aesthetic imagination. It starts with the identification of

the problematic relation between transcendental philosophy and the questions of history. The first part of the chapter addresses the work of key scholars who addressed the claim made by many scholars about the ahistoricity of transcendental philosophy and its structural character. In this connection it addresses the work of David Carr and Karl Ameriks. Building primarily on Karl Ameriks's statement that a 'historical turn' was introduced to transcendental philosophy through Reinhold's interest in philosophical hermeneutics, the chapter investigates the roots of this hermeneutical interest, why it emerged in transcendental philosophy and most importantly its roots in Kant's system. To explore these roots, the investigation suggests a regressive argument from Hegel's concept of history back to Kant, especially that Hegel's system of History as Ameriks claims is the ultimate historical articulation of Reinhold's interest in history as the developmental framework for understanding consciousness. Examining Hegel's introduction to his *Philosophy of History*, the discussion shows that, for Hegel, the relation between the super-sensible and the sensible or freedom and nature or spirit and nature is what defines the domain of history. However, Hegel's totalizing theory of consciousness ultimately necessitates the superseding *(aufhebung)* of the particular by the universal. The third section investigates Kant's most important work on history, *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose*. Investigation demonstrates that history for Kant is also defined in terms of the intersections of freedom and necessity or the super-sensible and the sensible. However, through a series of analyses, it shows that while Kant allowed for a more flexible and indeed more individualistic conception of historical occurrence, still his presupposition about nature having an ultimate end led him to a view that is rather close to that of Hegel. The discussion then poses a question, if aesthetic judgment is mainly concerned with the harmonization of freedom and nature

into a whole of human subjectivity, could not aesthetic judgment be taken as a basis for exploring historicity in Kant? In other words could aesthetic judgment open up the possibility for conceiving of historicity as an integral part of subjectivity instead of history being a representation of the structure already pre-posited in a purely idealistic manner as in the case of Hegel? The last section of this chapter responds to this question, demonstrating how aesthetic judgment indeed opens up a space for conceiving historicity. Based on this analysis, the chapter draws the conclusion that aesthetic judgment and hence consciousness and meaning is essentially historical.

Chapter 5 turns to another dimension of aesthetic judgment which is its everyday-hermeneutical nature. The first part of the chapter focuses on the emphasis Kant lays on universal subjectivity and hence universal communicability as the key determinant of aesthetic reflective judgment. Through a thorough analysis of both the beautiful especially in terms of the 'Ideal of the Beautiful' and the sublime, it argues that reason is the foundation for this universal communicability inasmuch as it furnishes the orientation for the purposeless purposiveness of imagination in constituting aesthetic judgment. It then poses the question about what form of subjective attitude is constituted through the role of the imagination; it is not the empirical ego or the Transcendental Unity of Apperception and not the free subject of the autonomous will. To respond to this question, the second section, turns to Heidegger's often overlooked interpretation of aesthetic subjectivity in the *Nietzsche Lectures*. Examining Heidegger's claims, the section shows that the aesthetic subject is primarily the hermeneutical everyday subject. This hermeneutical everyday nature is the second dimension of aesthetic judgment along with the historical one. But aesthetic judgment is constituted by aesthetic imagination. This means that imagination is the faculty that undertakes this hermeneutical role. To reinforce this

claim about the hermeneutical role of aesthetic imagination, the third section turns to the thesis of Rudolf Makkreel in *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant.* While Makkreel does not refer to Heidegger's work on aesthetic judgment, he fleshes out the structure of the hermeneutical role of the imagination. Examining Makkreel's thesis shows the possibility of the thesis made in the first section about the mode in which imagination creates aesthetic meaning through it capacity to interpret the sensible in terms of the orientation directed by the super-sensible in a purposive yet purposeless manner. The chapter then concludes with a question. Kant allows for three ideas of reason: the world, the self and God; so which of these ideas is best qualified to satisfy the requirements of aesthetic imagination and its purposivenes without a purpose?

Chapter 6 responds to the question posed at the end of chapter 5. It suggests that the idea of God is the idea best fitted to satisfy the requirements of aesthetic judgment. To demonstrate this thesis, the first section examines the idea of God and its origin in reason in the both the *Prolegomena* and the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It starts with Kant's characterization of the idea of God in the *Prolegomena* as the idea of reason is that most transcendent as much as it is not intensification of either the subjective or objective components of experience (as the ideas of the self and the world respectively are). In this respecrt, the first section argues that the idea of God best satisfies the requirements of aesthetic judgment as much as it is the least determinant of the three ideas and hence can provide a general and not a determinant orientation for aesthetic imagination in its free lawful play. Kant's discussion of the idea of God in the *Critique of Pure Reason* introduces another interesting dimension about the idea of God. Kant describes the idea of God as the sum total of the possibilities of anything as such. In other words, the idea of God, noumenally, contains all the predications that could be made of any 'thing' in consciousness.

Accordingly, Kant accepts the conception of God as a necessary existent. This conception of the idea of God can be interpreted in a teleological mode in the sense that it is the ultimate telos and determination of everything. This is the way most commentators have indeed interpreted it. However, another way of interpreting and using this characterization of the idea of God is suggested. As much as the idea of God includes the sum total of all the possibilities of every 'thing' the idea of God gives ultimate freedom to the imagination to interpret the sensible based on the context and the condition of experience. Hence, this conception of God also satisfies the requirement of the imagination. The second part of the chapter turns to the moral use of the idea of God. Investigating the postulate of God in the *Critique of Practical Reason* shows that the idea of God is precisely posited in order to connect the super-sensible and the sensible. In order to constantly pursue the highest good *(summum bonum)* the free moral agent must be assured that the actions he bases on the maxims of the autonomous will must have an effect in the world. This is the basis of happiness. Hence positing the idea of a creator who is responsible for both the noumenal and the phenomenal worlds resolves this problem. For through this the moral agent is assured of the effect of the actions based on the autonomous even if it is in the afterlife. Based on these findings the chapter concludes with the assertion that the idea of God satisfies the requirements of aesthetic judgment more than any of the two other ideas of reason. A questions is then posed, to what extent is this suggested aesthetic use reflected in Kant's religion writings and to what extent it can respond to problems in these writings as well.

Chapter 7 responds to this question. The first part addresses Kant's claims in the often overlooked, posthumously published, *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion.* Examining in particular Kant's description of the use of the idea

of God in both transcendental theology and moral theology as being a subjective necessity, the discussion draws a number of conclusions. First it shows that the characterization of the subjective necessity in both cases (i.e. moral and transcendental theology) is identical with the subjective necessity to which aesthetic judgment responds. Second, and based on the previous claim, it demonstrates that the suggested aesthetic use of the idea of God responds to key claims in the *Lectures* that can not be explained or comprehended merely in line with the moral conception of God. The second part turns to Kant's *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Through a brief account of Kant's argument about the moral faith, its actualization in the symbol of the Son of God and then it application in the idea of a Kingdom of God, this section addresses the following criticism to Kant. First, it argues that the idea of the Son of God is a rational reduction of one aspect of the human, namely the rational moral aspect. The human as such is the state of consciousness created through the constant attempt to harmonize the super-sensible with the sensible. The prototype of the human must be based on this basic nature. Second, this postulate of a purely moral faith led Kant to a reading of the role of the idea of God in history similar to that of Hegel. In other words it led to a totalizing, absolutist view of history wherein the super-sensible ultimately supersedes the sensible. The section then concludes by showing how the aesthetic use of the idea of God could respond to both problems. Finally the chapter concludes by posing two questions regarding the limitations of Kant's system: to what extent can this aesthetic sense of God as much as it is inextricably related to the constitution of the human being furnish a framework for understanding religious experience? Further to what extent can this philosophical basis re-formulate the two central questions of revelation and its trans-historical nature and prophecy, given that these two problems were at the heart all modern

debates about reason from Spinoza and Hobbes onwards? To respond to this question, the dissertation suggests turning to Ibn al-'Arabī's (d. 1240 C.E.) conception of the human-divine relationship. This conception as the four chapters of Part II of this dissertation show, gives a scheme for the religious applications of this aesthetic use of the word of God as an integral part of the constitutions of human subjectivity.

§III. Second Part: Ibn al-'Arabī's conception of imagination and the human-divine relationship: A phenomenological interpretation of his theory of prophecy and divine names.

III.1 Argument of Part II

The second part of the dissertation puts forward a phenomenological interpretation of the writings of Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology, showing, through the analysis of his theory of consciousness, that he developed a stance very similar to Kant's on the role of imagination in defining the human being by hermeneutically connecting the realm of ideas with that of experience. For him as well, imagination *(al-khayāl)* is the principal meaning-determining faculty. The discussion begins by pointing out the roots of Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of subjectivity. While Ibn al-'Arabī's conception of subjectivity has been briefly addressed by scholars such as Henry Corbin and to some extent William Chittick, it has not been studied fully from a philosophical perspective. The investigation of the structure of subjectivity in Ibn al-'Arabī's system starts by carefully examining his conception of being *(wujūd)* and its roots in earlier Islamic philosophy, especially in the work of Avicenna (d. 1037 C.E.) and al-Kindī (d. 873 C.E.). In order to show how classical metaphysics acquired a subjective turn in Islamic philosophy, the discussion briefly considers Avicenna's and al-Kindī's critiques and re-formulations of the question being as the key subject matter of metaphysics. In this respect, it shows that Avicenna's critique of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* transformed the paradigm of metaphysics from naturalism into an

inquiry into the foundations of metaphysics in rational subjectivity, as Dimitri Gutas has demonstrated in *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition*. Similarly, examining al-the *Treatise on First Philosophy*, the analysis demonstrates that al-Kindī's reformulation of the subject matter of metaphysics was based on a distinction between two fundamental subjective attitudes or modes of consciousness in experience. By pointing out this radical turn in the conception of the domain and subject matter of metaphysics, the dissertation argues that Avicenna and al-Kindī discovered the subjective ground of the distinction between the rationally transcendent and empirically immanent modes of consciousness. In turn, this finding opens up the possibility for revisiting Henry Corbin's argument about the noetic structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's metaphysics in the *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn al-'Arabī*. Corbin was the first scholar to point out that only a phenomenological/transcendental inquiry into the structure of subjectivity could explain the metaphysics of Ibn al-'Arabī. Building on Corbin's methodological insights and the highlighted roots of Ibn al-'Arabī's conception of 'being' *(wujūd)* in the work of Avicenna and al-Kindī, the disscusion re-explores his metaphysics. It is first shown that for Ibn al-'Arabī 'being' *(wujūd)* refers not to ontological categories of substances, as is the case in most scholastic philosophy; rather being refers to the set of the domains of consciousness that in turn are associated with different subjective attitudes. Based on the investigation of the relation between being and consciousness in Islamic philosophy and how it explains fundamental premises of Ibn al-'Arabī's system, a preliminary statement is made about his ontology being a fundamental ontology/transcendental philosophy in Heidegger's sense. To investigate this fundamental ontology, the discussion turns to the first chapter of Ibn al-'Arabī's last seminal work *The Bezels of Wisdom*, showing the role the idea of God plays in the constitutions of human-being

and the structure of the human-divine relationship. In this respect, the argument articulates that for Ibn al-'Arabī there are two domains of consciousness which are in turn associated with modes of subjectivity: one represented by the world of fixed essences or rational ideas *('ālm al-ghayb)* and the other by the empirical world *('ālm al-shahāda)*. The harmonization of the two constitutes the whole of the human being. In turn this harmonization is made possible through the idea of God conceived as a divine or as a necessary existent. The divine in turn is conceived in terms of any abstract idea like that of beauty, justice…etc. Human-being is constituted inasmuch as the idea of God is used to interpret the sensible in terms of the different absolute ideas of reason and through this harmonize the rational with the empirical or the sensible with the super-sensible. This reading is further reinforced by Ibn al-'Arabī's conception of the idea of God as a 'thing-in-itself' *(al-shay' fī dhātihi)*. In this vein it is shown that Ibn al-'Arabī, like Kant, argues that God is in essence a noumenal unknowable idea. However, on the level of divinity that is the idea of God as much as it is related to beings in consciousness serve to constitute humanity since it is the idea most capable of harmonizing the super-sensible with the sensible. To Ibn al-'Arabī, the idea of God is the sum total of the possibilities of any 'thing' or object of consciousess *(shay')*. This use of the idea of God helps explain the seeming contradictory claims Ibn al-'Arabī makes about him for he calls him the one and the many, the reality and the creation. Understood on a pure formal level God is a noumenal idea; however, on the level of divinity that is on the level in which the idea of God is used by human consciousness in relation to phenomena the idea of God is many inasmuch as it is manifested in multiple contexts. The question that thus arises is: how is it possible to conceive of God as many? Is this conception possible in any of the two subjective attitudes or modes of consciousness (namely the transcendent

and the immanent) or is this conception possible in a third domain of consciousness? To respond this question, the discussion then shows that imagination is the faculty that constitutes the human-being as a state of consciousness or in Ibn al-'Arabī's language *(barzakh)* wherein the super-sensibe and the sensible are harmonized through the guidance of the idea of God. Tracing the way in which the function of the faculty of the imagination was expanded by the Muslim philosophers, especially by al-Fārābī and Averroës, as the key connector between the super-sensible and the sensible, the role of imagination in Ibn al-'Arabī's system is shown to be essentially hermeneutical. Based on these findings the last chapter of Part II, turns to Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the divine names. By explaining that by the names Ibn al-'Arabī understood all possible predicates that could be made of anything whether on a substantive or a relational level, the discussion sets the stage for examining Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of prophecy. For Ibn al-'Arabī prophets are attempts to perfect humanity through the harmonization of the super-sensible and the sensible. Similarly, he argues that revelation and all of religion is there to help man fulfil this level of perfection. In this sense Ibn al-'Arabī gives a framework for interpreting and approaching religion that is neither dogmatic nor trans-historical. The examination of his theory of prophecy in the *Bezels of Wisdom* reveals that human-being has two dimensions: an everyday dimension and a historical dimension. Ibn al-'Arabī's main advancement ahead of Kant is that he applied this philosophical framework to the interpretation of religious experience and doctrines and thus opened up a possibility for an aesthetic religion on humanistic bases that are much more flexible and inclusive and in a way that can not be matched by the limitations of moral religion.

III.2) Description of the Chapters of Part II

Chapter 8 analyzes of the relation between being and consciousness in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thought in light of its roots in earlier Islamic philosophy. The ultimate aim of this analysis is first to articulate the subjective dimension in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s conception of being which qualifies his system to be a fundamental ontology/transcendental philosophy *par excellence*. The second goal is to give an alternative interpretation to his doctrine that goes beyond the often pantheistic ones put forward by traditionalists like William Chittick or the rationalists like that of Abū al-‘Ilā ‘Afīfī. The chapter starts by tracing the meaning of the word *(wujūd)* Arabic for being to its linguistic root which indicates ‘finding.’ Being is thus the finding of an object by a subject. To support this reading, a brief analysis of the history of the use of the word *(wujūd)* in Islamic theology and philosophy is presented through an examination of the entry on the term in the philosophical lexicon of al-Fārābī. The discussion then turns to the development of the subjective conception of being in terms of a mode of consciousness in the work of al-Kindī and then Avicenna. Investigation the famous Avicennian distinction between essence and existence and the necessary versus the possible being, which were adopted by Ibn al-‘Arabī, provides the stepping stone towards the examination of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s dualistic notion of consciousness as essentially a transcendent rational consciousness and an empirical consciousness. The second section of the chapter is thus demonstrates that this theory better explains away many of the contradictions into which the pantheistic readers of Ibn al-‘Arabī slipped.

Chapter 9 is devoted to a thorough analysis of the subjective/noetic structure of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s ontology. The first part is a detailed commentary on the first chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom*. Based on the findings of this examination it is shown

that human-being is essentially a state of consciousness wherein the super-sensible and the sensible are harmonized with each other. This harmonization is made possible through the idea of God not as an unknowable noumenon but conceived on the level of divinity that is as a necessary existent or the sum total of all possible beings. The second part of the chapter shows the plausibility of the human-divine relationship established in the first part through a thorough examination of the notion of the human and that of God in Ibn al-'Arabī's system. As far as the human is concerned, it is shown that Ibn al-'Arabī completely avoids the language of the Aristotelian substance theory which permeated most of his contemporary Muslim theologians and philosophers. Rather he identifies the human with two main states of consciousness (the transcendent purely rational and the immanent purely sensible) whose harmonization creates the whole of human subjectivity. The transcendent dimension is concerned with morality and freedom and the empirical is concerned with theoretical knowledge of the phenomenal world. As far as the idea of God is concerned, the examination of Ibn al-'Arabī's dualistic approach to God demonstrates the subjective structure argued for in the first part.

Chapter 10 argues that the imagination is the faculty that constitutes the human being by harmonizing the super-sensible and the sensible. The first part traces the development of the theory of imagination beyond the limited role assigned to it by Aristotle, especially in the works of al-Fārābī and Averroës. Both thinkers argued that the imagination is the mediator between the realm of rational ideas and that of sensible phenomena. Al-Fārābī argued that it carries this function by synthetically creating an aesthetic consciousness whereas Averroës was more concerned with the way in which imagination uses the orientation furnished by the rational to re-interpret the sensible world. The second part show how Ibn al-'Arabī synthesized the

approaches of these two thinkers. It starts with the examination of the imagination as a faculty and its distinct place compares to any other faculty for Ibn al-'Arabī. It then turns to different roles of imagination in Ibn al-'Arabī's system arguing that the synthetic is concerned with the constitution of determinant theoretical knowledge whereas the hermeneutical is what is concerned with the harmonization of the super-sensible with the sensible in an aesthetic manner and thus constituting the human-being. Finally the second part turns to the nature of the state of consciousness created by the imagination *(barzakh)* and it main structure.

Chapter 11 turns to the nature of this state consciousness through the examination of Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of prophecy. As a stepping stone towards the theory of prophecy the discussion starts with an examination of Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the divine names. It shows that these names, as has been indicated above, refer to all possible relations and substantives through anything could be aesthetically conceived. This gives the imagination more freedom in its attempt to use the idea of God to harmonize the super-sensible with the sensible. The second part turns to Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of prophecy showing its humanistic origin. For Ibn al-'Arabī the history of prophecy is the history of human endeavours to achieve perfection through the harmonization of the super-sensible with the sensible in different historical context. Through the examination of three main chapters of the *Bezels of Wisdom* it is shown that the *(barzakh)* has two states of dimensions: a historical dimension and an everyday dimension. While these dimensions where articulated in Part I, Ibn al-'Arabī uses them to give a humanistic framework for conceiving of prophecy and revelation in a way that is not dogmatic or trans-historical.

§III) Conclusion

The conclusion briefly indicates how the conceptions of the human-divine relationship developed based on the systems of Ibn al-‘Arabī and Kant may complement each other. Ibn al-‘Arabī offers an elaborate framework for re-intepreting religion and religious experience based on the subjective structure of the human being. Within this framework all religious notions could be approached from a philosophical perspective that goes beyond the limitations of dogmatic faith or even moral faith. Kant’s system furnishes two important additions to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s system. First it articulates the technical aspects of the function of imagination and provides a clearer conception of the historicity and its condition. Second, Kant’s system stresses the moral dimension in a far more elaborate manner that Ibn al-‘Arabī’s. However, both systems offer a possibility for a new conception of transcendence within immanence. This conception can wholly re-define key problems in the philosophy of religion not only on the level of metaphysics and hermeneutics but also on the level of social and political philosophy, particularly with regards to the question of secularism.

Chapter 1

The Crisis of the Critical Project and the Problem of Defining Human Subjectivity as a Whole between the Critique of Judgment, the Metaphysics of Morals and Kant's Later Writings on Religion and their Reception by Reinhold, Fichte and Heidegger

§I. Between the first and second Introductions to the Critique of Judgment: from the harmonization of faculties to the problem of defining the human

I.1 Prelude

In the preface to its first edition, Kant explains that the *Critique of Judgment* is intended to conclude his critical project. Accordingly, it is legitimate to consider the problem Kant sets out to resolve in the *Critique of Judgment* the key problem he identified with his critical project after the publication of the first and second *Critiques.* In both the first and second introductions to the *Critique of Judgment* Kant is most concerned with two problems: the first concerns the correspondence between a proper division of philosophy on one hand and the faculties of the human mind—*Gemüt*[1]—along with the powers associated with each of these faculties on the other.

[1] As is quite common among English translators of Kant, Paul Guyer and Werner S. Pluhar translate *Gemüt* as 'mind' at the beginning of section III of the first introduction (20:205-206). While I think such translation is warranted given the generic way in which Kant deploys this terms as well as *Geist*, I think the connotations the word 'mind' has in contemporary philosophy could lead to rather reductive readings of Kant. From a strict linguistic perspective the word *Gemüt* essentially means soul and has an affective more than an intellectual and dry cognitive implication. It is also used to refer to one's state of mind and general disposition or temperance. This sense is further reflected in the uses of the adjective *gemütlich* and the noun *gemütlichkeit*—when they are used with reference to human beings. As far as Kant's use of the term is concerned, it was primarily used as a general term to refer to all inner acts of consciousness whether affective or cognitive in order to avoid the medieval substantial import of the word soul—*Seele*. This general use of the word *Gemüt* is demonstrated in the works of Kant's immediate students and commentators. In the *Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der Kritischen Philosophie* published by G.S.A. Mellin in Jena in 1799, *Gemüt* is listed under the Latin *animus*. Mellin lists two of the definitions Kant consigns to *Gemüt.* First that it is: "Vermögen zu empfinden und zu denken (A 58)" (Wörterbuch 857)—capacity or faculty of feeling and thinking. Second that it's a term that saves Kant the medieval substantial language of 'soul' with its loaded Aristotelian and scholastic heritage: "In diesem Vermögen stellt man sich alle innere, zum Erkennen und Wollen gehorende Vermögen vereinigt vor, ohne doch dasselbe schon als Substanz (*anima*) zu denken. Man gewinnt dadurch das, dass in solche Untersuchengen, welche die zum Denken, Erkennen, Wollen u.s.w nöthingen Grunde betreffen, sich nicht unnöthigerweise die Fragen und Vorstellungen einmischen, welche bei dem Worte Seele erwachen und sich einschleichen (S. III, 563)" (857-858). The same holds for the terms *Gemüthsart* and *Gemüthszustand.* Both of them generally refer to all acts of consciousness whether affective or cognitive.
This generic use of the of the word *Gemüt* was immediately adopted by Karl Reinhold who uses it extensively in the *Beiträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Mißverständnisee der Philosophen*. After

The second and more important problem concerns the possibility of reconciling what seem to be two irreconcilable faculties and powers that he has so far defined in terms of their domains in the first and second *Critiques.* To resolve the first problem, Kant presents the distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy. He then associates the former with the understanding and its domain and the latter with that of reason and its domain.[2] Kant thereby devotes the entire third *Critique* to the resolution of the second problem. Hence, the conclusion of the critical project amounts to the task of harmonizing understanding and reason on one hand and their respective domains on the other.

In this section I will argue that Kant realized what I choose to call the problem of actualizing the transcendent moral ego or the free will through the investigation of the question: 'how is it possible to reconcile the two faculties of the understanding and reason and thereby the sensible with the supersensible world.'[3] By this problem, I refer to the impossibility of reconciling the maxims of the free will with the mechanical nature of the spatial-temporal world within the Kantian system. In other words, how can a rational being *actually* realize the effect of his free will on his actions, if all his actions are experienced as phenomena and such phenomena must be

---

publishing his famous *Briefe über die Kantische Philosophie*, Reinhold realized the need to give more firm grounds for the connection between universal concepts and empirical intuitions beyond what he saw as Kant's vague and rather weak presentation of such connection in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He attempted to resolve this problem by putting forward a totalizing theory of rational representation *Vorstellung* that in turn served as the basis of the Idealist projects of Fichte and Schelling and later Hegel. In the context of distinguishing between *Vorstellungen*, as the properly rational representations from a strict cognitive and theoretical perspective, from all other inner changes and acts of consciousness whether mental or affective, Reinhold writes in the first part of the *Beiträge*: "…Daß man jede Veränderung des Gemütes Vorstellung nannte, beweist, wie sehr der Begriff einer Vorstellung verkannt wurde..." (Beiträge 121). *Gemüt* refers to all conscious changes *(Veränderung)* but representation or *(Vorstellung)* refers to what Reinhold would like to specifically consider well-grounded rational thoughts. In other words *Gemüt* is the general term that refers to all inner comportments or acts of human consciousness whether such acts can be subsumed, from a Kantian perspective, under either the faculty of understanding, reason or judging.

[2] See first introduction 20:195-201 and the second introduction 5:172 in: Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001). In addition the same argument is more elaborately explicated in the Part II of the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.*

[3] This is the main problem the Idealists identified with Kant's transcendental system. See §III below

presented to him according to the categories of the understanding like any other object in nature? In turn, this realization led him to the question of how it is possible to define human subjectivity and humanity as such as a whole in light of the dual subjectivity at the core of his thought. I will show that Kant's realization of this problem went through two main stages. These stages are reflected in the way Kant identifies and qualifies the problem the *Critique of Judgment* ought to solve in order to conclude the critical project in the second versus the first introduction.

I.2 The presentation of the problem of the critical project in the first introduction

After delineating the division of philosophy in §I of the introduction, Kant proceeds to identify the tripartite division of the faculty for thinking, *Denkungsvermögen,* and the function of its divisions as follows:

> first the faculty for the cognition of the general (of rules), the understanding; second, the faculty for the subsumption of the particular under the general, the power of judgment; and third the faculty for the determination of the particular through the general (for the derivation from principles) i.e. reason… the understanding yields *a priori* laws of nature, reason on the contrary laws of freedom…the power of judgment…mediates the connection between the two faculties[4]

In the above quote the three faculties of thinking[5] are identified; in this context, the power of judgment is assigned the task of connecting the faculties of reason and the understanding. Against the background of this definition, Kant devotes the rest of §II and the first half of §III[6] to a sketch presentation of the role of the power of judgment in fulfilling the subjective need for a system of empirical laws. According to Kant, the spontaneity of the faculty of understanding constitutes the synthetic unity of apperception which in turn makes all empirical laws possible inasmuch as it furnishes the condition of the possibility of experience as such.

---

[4] See Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 20:201-202.
[5] *'Denkung'* or thinking is also among the generic terms that Kant uses in a non-technical sense. In essence, it refers to different acts of consciousness.
[6] *Critique of Judgment*, p. 20:203-207.

However, understanding is incapable of fulfilling the subjective need for synthetically representing these laws as a system. The transcendental unity of apperception constitutes the foundations of the validity of these laws. Thus upon analysis it will transpire as the common synthetic ground that establishes the validity of all empirical laws. However, the transcendental unity of apperception can not demonstrate that all empirical laws constitute a complete system that may be called nature. It thus fails to satisfy a subjective need to synthesize all empirical laws into a systematic unity. This synthetic unity is essential in order for nature to be represented technically—namely of a certain use and *praxis*—and not merely mechanically for every rational subject experiencing it.[7] Nonetheless, Kant does not elaborate much on the faculty from which this need arises; however, it could be inferred to be the tendency of reason to seek the unconditioned condition of the conditioned, as Kant explains in the introduction to the 'Transcendental Dialectic' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*[8] and the *Prolegomena.*[9] Further, Kant does not explicitly connect this subjective need with the task of harmonizing the faculties of reason and the understanding which he assigns to the faculty of judgment.[10]

In the second half of §III Kant continues his elaboration on the relation between the powers of reason, understanding and judgment in terms of the faculties of the mind[11] with which they are associated. In this vein, he restricts cognition to understanding and associates reason and judgment with the faculties of desire and the

[7] Ibid. footnote p. 20:203-204.
[8] See Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), A310/B366-A320/B377, p. 394-399.
[9] See Immanuel Kant. *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics.* Trans. James W. Ellington. (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001. §45, 332-333, p. 68-69.
[10] This connection gets fleshed out more explicitly later in the first introduction and in the second introduction as the ground for the second part of the *Critique of Judgment*.
[11] See footnote 1 above.

feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Kant thereby concludes that the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is intermediary between the cognition and desire.

Subsequently, Kant turns in §IV to an investigation of what he deemed the most important function of the power of judgment, namely, serving as an intermediary between reason and the understanding. He defines this intermediation essentially in terms of the task of representing nature as a system of empirical laws. He thus entitled section §IV 'On experience as a system for the power of judgment.' In this section Kant focuses on the role of judgment in satisfying the subjective need for constituting experience as a synthetic system instead of merely an aggregate based on the common condition—the transcendental unity of apperception—furnished by the categories of the understanding.[12] In order to show how judgment undertakes this task, Kant introduces the distinction between reflective versus determinant judgment. He defines the function of the latter to be the subsumption of the particular under the general.[13] Determinant judgment is thus associated with the faculty of understanding; for understanding constitutes theoretical cognition inasmuch as it subsumes empirical intuitions under pure concepts. Reflection by contrast is defined as 'the capacity to think a representation according to a principle without any determination through a concept.'[14] Kant then proceeds to distinguish the two species of reflective judgment: the aesthetic and the teleological.[15] The principle of both species of reflective

[12] This demonstrates that the origin of the need for this synthetic unity is the desire of reason for completion as indicated above.
[13] This also reflects the development in Kant's thought. In the quote cited above Kant restricts the function of judgment to the subsumption of the particular under the general which is merely the definition of determinant judgment. In turn this indicates another important point. In the first Introduction as will become clear below, Kant was mainly concerned with the use and function of judgment in connection with theoretical knowledge. By contrast, the main focus of his interest in the second introduction will shift to the problem of the actuality of the ego and thereby the question of the meaning of human being.
[14] The distinction between determinant and reflective judgment will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
[15] It will be argues in later chapters the aesthetic judgment is the species of reflective judgment concerned with the actualization of the ego. By contrast, teleological judgment, even though it is also concerned with the connection of reason with the understanding, is primarily concerned with the

judgment is purposiveness. Based on this definition of reflection and the principle of purposiveness, a synthetic unity of empirical laws becomes possible. For there is no concept under which the totality of empirical laws could be subsumed; it is a rational subjective need. Thus, only purposive reflective judgment can constitute a conception of a unity of empirical laws that may satisfy this rational subjective need; but such judgment may never lay claim to objective validity. Later, Kant makes it clear that this task is achieved by the teleological and not the aesthetic species of reflective judgment.

Based on the above brief account of the first four sections of the first introduction we may make two remarks: first, for Kant judgment as a faculty is essentially an intermediary between the two faculties of reason and the understanding.[16] Second and more importantly, Kant saw that this intermediation or connecting task consists only in presenting experience as a system of empirical laws and not merely an aggregate. Kant continues to assert that this is a key function of reflective judgment in the second introduction and sets it as the main task of teleological judgment in the second part of the *Critique of Judgment*. However, it is important to note the transformation that happens in Kant's characterization of the role of the power of judgment in the second introduction. As will be explained, this transformation has considerable influence on his view of the role of the third *Critique* as a whole and the first part of it on aesthetic judgment in particular.[17]

I.3 The presentation of the problem in the second introduction

In §II of the second introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* Kant devotes a considerable part of the discussion not merely to a definition of the two faculties of

---

actualization of the transcendent into the immanent in the theoretical context. Accordingly, most emphasis will be placed on the aesthetic form of judgment.

[16] In Chapter 2 below I will show that this function only applies to reflective judgment and not to judgment as such.

[17] See the previous footnote

the mind that his two previous *Critiques* have so far delineated but also to the influence one of them, namely, reason *ought to* have on the other, namely, understanding. However, he fully acknowledges the difficulty of establishing the possibility of such an influence given the findings of the first two *Critiques* and the way they establish the domains of reason and understanding as two different worlds—*verschiedene Welten*:

> Legislation through concepts of nature takes place through the understanding and is theoretical. Legislation through the concept of freedom takes place through reason and is merely practical… Now although there is an incalculable gulf fixed between the domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom as the supersensible so that from the former to the latter (thus by means of the theoretical use of reason) no transition is possible, just as if there were so many different worlds, the first of which can have no influence on the second: yet the latter should have an influence on the former, namely the concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its laws real in the sensible world; and nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the laws of freedom.[18]

The above quote reflects a radical development in Kant's characterization of the problem the critique of judgment must overcome to conclude the critical project. First Kant stresses that there is a radical, irreconcilable difference between the domain of reason and that of the understanding. Second, Kant explicitly states that despite the gulf between the two domains, one of them, namely, reason must influence—*Einfluß haben*—the domain of the understanding. For free will must make the end imposed by its pure laws actual, *wirklich*, in the sensible world constructed by the categories. Reciprocally, the form of the sensible world must be 'conceived' to be in agreement with the ends to be realized in it according to the laws of freedom. Having delineated the problematic relation between reason and the understanding, Kant proceeds to introduce Judgment as the means of connecting and combining, *Verbindungsmittel,* those two domains and hence the two parts of philosophy—the theoretical and the practical—into one whole. The role of judgment is thus expanded beyond merely

[18] *Critique of Judgment,* p. 5:175-176

making a system instead of an aggregate of the possible set of empirical laws. Judgment's main function is to allow the supersensible world to affect the sensible world. But the supersensible world is in and of itself essentially the totality of the imperatives of the will of the rational, transcendent ego represented by the free will.[19] Further the sensible world is essentially the world of possible experience constituted through the mutual relation between the subject and the object in accordance with the categories of the understanding.[20] Judgment thus allows the free will to *actualize* itself and its ends in the mechanically constructed spatial-temporal world. Judgment's key task could thereby be rephrased in terms of harmonizing the transcendent, purely rational ego, the pure essence of our humanity,[21] with the empirical ego that is constituted in experience according to the categories and their principle of unity, the transcendental unity of apperception. Judgment undertakes this task by making possible the conception that the latter edges towards the end it has set for it. But how is this possible? This is a question that will be addressed later.[22] What matters here is the important implication of Kant's reformulation of the problem his last critique needs to resolve in order to conclude the critical system. Instead of conceiving of the problem as a mere connection between faculties, Kant re-presents the problem in terms of the necessity of one faculty having influence on another even though both are essentially separate. The question of how this necessary relation is possible comes down to the question of how it is possible that a rational will or a pure abstract essence actualizes itself in the spatial-temporal, mechanical world wherein the subject

[19] While Kant does not use the term transcendent ego, I chose to use it in anticipation of the next section. There it will be shown that Kant recognized that the transcendent domain of reason and the sense of positive free will associated with it constitutes a sense of transcendent subjectivity and hence a transcendent ego.
[20] *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. A95-128; B132-165.
[21] The description of the transcendent ego as an 'essence' will be further clarified in §II below in light of Kant's assertions in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. However, it is also implied in Kant's essay 'What is Enlightenment'
[22] See Chapter 2 below

and object are both constituted according to the categories of the understanding. The last and key problem with whose resolution the critical project comes to an end turns out to be: how is it possible that our rational, pure humanity represented by the free will is actualized in the phenomenal world given that this world is mechanically constituted according to the rigid laws of the understanding? But to what extent did Kant conceive of the problem in terms of the question of the actualization of the moral ego and how does the resolution of this problem resolve the question of what it means to be a human being as whole? To answer these two central questions, the discussion turns to a brief examination of a introduction to the 'Doctrine of Virtue' in the *Metaphysics of Morals* and a small commentary on §5 of the 'Analytic of Beauty' in the *Critique of Judgment.*

§II. The relation between the actuality of the transcendent moral ego and the question of human nature or what it means to be a human being: the wholeness of humanity consists in what is peculiarly human

II.1 The two partial dimensions of the human according to the *Metaphysics of Morals*

In §I of the introduction to the 'Doctrine of Virtue', Kant primarily discusses the concept of duty. In this context, he makes an interesting negative remark about his conception of what a human being is:

> such constraint [duty] does not apply to rational beings as such (there could also be holy ones) but rather to *human beings*, rational natural beings who are unholy enough that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law….[23]

Human beings are not exclusively rational. Rationality as indicated above is only the essence or in Platonic language the form of their humanity. But human beings are also not only part of the spatial-temporal phenomenal world that functions mechanically according to the structural categories of the understanding either. Thus humans are rational natural-beings, *vernünftige Naturwesen*. They are a combination

[23] See Immanuel Kant. *Practical Philosophy*. Trans. Allen Wood and Mary Gregor. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 6:379.

or a unity between the rational essence represented by the free will on the one hand and the empirical phenomenal ego that could be studied as any other immanent phenomenon (psychologically, politically, sociologically or according to any ontic-epistemological criterion, to use Heidegger's language). Thus, and in connection with what has been explained above in §I, for each of the two faculties of higher thinking or powers of the soul corresponds a dimension of humanity. However, neither of the two dimensions is what the human being is. The human being is rather a unity of both inasmuch as the human being is a 'rational-natural' being. The question is: how is it possible to combine those two dimensions given that the two faculties that ground them are essentially irreconcilable? Further if judgment is the power that combines those two faculties and so achieves the actualization of the transcendent ego, does this imply that judgment is the faculty that makes possible the human being as a 'rational-natural' being? Finally how is it possible to conceive of the human being qua a 'rational natural' being? Is this an essentialist view of human nature as those who simplistically read Kant would tend to claim? Or is there a hermeneutical-phenomenological dimension to this 'rational-natural' being that goes beyond the essentialism often arbitrarily assigned to Enlightenment thinkers.

The following section will put forward an answer to the second of these questions. As for the fist and third question, answers to them will be put forward in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.

II.2 The human in §5 of the Analytic of the Beautiful

The relation between aesthetic reflective judgment and what it means to be a human being will be investigated extensively in the following chapters. What is of concern here is the way Kant's remarks on the beautiful supplements and supports the

above findings regarding his view of the nature and meaning of humanity. In the course of differentiating the beautiful from the good and the agreeable, Kant writes:

> Agreeableness is also valid for non-rational animals; beauty is only valid for human being i.e. animal but also rational beings but not merely as the latter (e.g. spirits), rather as beings who are at the same time animal; the good however is valid for every rational being in general[24]

In this quote Kant, in a way similar to that encountered above in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, asserts that humans are not purely rational. Here however he does not contrast humans upwardly with transcendent, holy beings, *heilige wesen*, that are purely rational; rather, he contrasts humans downwardly with animals that are purely natural. What is also different in this context is that this notion is presented in the context of the place in which such humanity is actualized, namely, the beautiful, the meaning[25] constituted by the aesthetic reflective judgment. For beauty, as the above quote indicates, is what is peculiarly human inasmuch as humanity is neither purely rational nor purely physical. This sets the ground for responding to the question posed above. Reflective aesthetic judgment that reconciles the faculties of understanding and reason actualizes the ego and thereby, most importantly for our purpose here, resolves the question: what is human being as a whole. The constitution of aesthetic meaning is thus the place proper of the actualization of the ego and in being so it presents the most decisive answer to the question what human being is.[26]

Conclusion of §§I & II

A number of important concluding remarks could be drawn from the brief discussion above. The first concerns Kant's conception of the trajectory of his critical

---

[24] *Critique of Judgment*, p. 5:210

[25] I argue that beauty should be described as a meaning and not a concept. The reasons underlying this contention will become clear in Chapters 2 and 3.

[26] The grounds of this claim will be demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 3 through the examination of the significance of judgment as consciousness in Kant and the role imagination plays in constituting the meaning of this consciousness in general. In Chapters 4 and 5 I will discuss the specific nature of aesthetic judgment and hence aesthetic consciousness, beauty as meaning and the role aesthetic imagination plays in constituting this meaning.

project. In the first Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant saw the enterprise of a critique of judgment as the completion of his critical project only inasmuch as judgment is the higher power of thinking that corresponds to the last faculty of the mind, namely, that of pleasure and displeasure. Such critique was primarily intended to demonstrate whether or not judgment has a priori principles, as Kant explicitly admits. In addition, while Kant also asserted that Judgment plays a mediating role between reason and understanding, he defined this role primarily in terms of the task of presenting experience as a synthetic unity and not merely an aggregate of laws. In the second introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant re-presents the problem in a different form. First he recognizes and admits, in more explicit way compared to the first introduction, the irreconcilability of the two faculties of the understanding of and that of reason and the domains to which each legislate. Second, and more importantly, Kant realizes that reason has to be *conceived* as having influence on the world of sensible experience structured by the understanding.[27] Not only this, but reason has to be *conceived* as setting the end for nature even thought the latter is necessarily constituted according to the categories of the understanding. The possibility of this conception thus turns out to be the task that reflective judgment is brought forth to accomplish. In addition the recognition of the influence reason must have on understanding, transformed Kant's conception of the problem of the problem even further. The influence of reason is essentially the influence exercised by the free will, the *causa noumena* of the supersensible world. The free will in it turn is the essence of the rational transcendent ego or subject. On the other hand, the sensible world is in itself the world of the transcendental unity of apperception. As Kant's argument in the 'Transcendental Deduction of Pure Categories of the Understanding' decisively

[27] The notion of conception is essential in this context. It foreshadows the hermeneutical dimension of the constitution of aesthetic meaning as will be explained in Chapters 2 & 3.

shows and as Gardner rightly argues the validity of the categories rests on their structural-mutual constitution in the subject-object relation.[28] Accordingly, the transcendental ego inasmuch as it is conceived in terms of the 'Transcendental Unity of Apperception' reflects the constitution or more precisely the possibility of the sensible world. This possibility encompasses the possibility of all phenomena including that of the empirical ego. Therefore the problem of the influence of the transcendence of reason and the supersensible world on the world of sense constituted by the understanding could be re-defined in terms of the influence of the transcendent self over the transcendental world which is nothing other than the world constituted mutually with the transcendental unity of apperception. To further reinforce this argument, the discussion turned to two key instances in the *Metaphysics of Morals* and the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' in the *Critique of Judgment.* In the *Metaphysics of Morals*, as has been shown above, Kant explicitly acknowledges two very important points. First there are two dimensions to our humanity the transcendent and the immanent, which correspond in their turn to the two egos or subjects in whose reconciliation resides the resolution of the problem of the actuality of ego. Second, and more importantly, Kant makes the claim that the human per se is a 'rational natural being'. While he does not elaborate on the full meaning of this characterization and precisely as to how the human combines those two essentially opposite extremes in one single subjectivity. By way of adumbrating of the argument to follow in Chapters 2 and 3, the analysis of §5 of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' in the *Critique of Judgment* showed that the 'beautiful', the aesthetic meaning produced through reflective judgment, is the place proper wherein humanity is to be sought inasmuch as it combines both the natural immanent and rational transcendent

[28] See Sebastian Gardner. *Guidebook to Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*. (London: Kegan & Paul, 1999), p. 75-100.

dimensions of subjectivity. The ego is thus actualized in aesthetic meaning and inasmuch as it is thus actualized it constitutes humanity in its wholeness as 'natural-rational' being. How may we understand this mode of being and whether or not an essentialist versus an existentialist perspective best characterizes this being? Further what does 'aesthetic meaning' signify in this context and what are implications of the idea that human being is actualized in the constitution of this meaning? These and other questions will be addressed extensively in the following chapters. The primary aim of this section was to show how Kant's conception of the key problem whose resolution concludes the critical project developed from a mere characterization of the higher faculties of thinking and the powers of the soul that correspond to them to a more rigorous stage at which he recognized the unbridgeable gulf between the supersensible and sensible realms to another wherein he realized that the former must influence the latter. In this vein it was shown that the final stage was Kant's stepping stone towards transforming the question into that pertaining to the actuality of ego. In turn this question evolved into the question of what human-being as whole is. Evidence in support of this claim was educed from *Metaphysics of Morals* and the 'Analytic of beauty'. In this vein discussions have shown that the solution to the problem of the actuality of the moral ego is precisely the solution to the question concerning humanity or the meaning of human being for Kant.

§IV. Echoes of the problem in Kant's later religious writings and Kant's own confusion

IV.1 Prelude

The aim of this section is twofold. On the one hand it shows that the problem of the actualization of the moral ego and its implication for the question of what human-being as a whole played an important role in Kant's religious writings. On the other hand, it puts forward a prelude to an extensive critique that will be addressed to

the Kant's conception of this problem in his *Religionsschriften*. While the foundation and elements of this critique will be fully explained in later chapters, it is here mentioned in brief to demonstrate an important point. Although Kant was clearly aware of the problems of the actuality of the moral ego and hence the problem of defining the human as a whole, he often committed the mistake of reducing the wholeness of humanity to its rational transcendent essence represented by the free moral subject. He thus failed to systematically deal with humanity in terms of his own notion that the human is a 'rational-natural' being. This failure was mostly manifested, as the argument will preliminarily be made here, in his writings on religion. In turn, such failure was reflected in the reception of Kant's conception of the relation between religion and the questions of history, progress and meaning.[29]

IV.2 God, moral faith and the progress towards the proto-type of humanity in *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*

In part III of *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Kant puts forward what he sees as the principles of founding God's Kingdom on earth. In Kantian language, these would be the principles establishing the possibility of bringing or better relating the idea of God to human experience. From the perspective of the moral argument of the second *Critique*, God is essentially the postulate made by reason to justify the belief in the idea of a *summum bonum* (highest good) which is a necessary requirement for morality in Kant. While the idea of the highest good itself poses complications to Kant's own argument free will and the pure respect for the moral law, what is of concern to the discussion here is the fact that Kant reduced the idea of God to its moral use even though his main concern was how to demonstrate the use of God as a transcendent idea in human experience. This reduction is rather

[29] See Chapter 7 below especially the criticism addressed to the traditional reading of the relation between religion and history in Kant (for instance Webb's and Despland's readings)

problematic for the following reason. Kant saw, that inasmuch as the Christian faith is essentially a faith in a God-man, such faith is a historical stepping stone for the realization of the moral faith in the perfect human, manifested by the transcendent subject and its *noumenal* free will. In this vein, Kant saw that a deeper appreciation of the rational ground of Christian faith should ultimately lead humanity to progress towards an actual realization of the idea of a Kingdom of Ends. This realized Kingdom of ends would then be God's Kingdom on earth. However, in all this Kant completely overlooked the key problem of his critical project, namely that of the actuality of the moral ego. How this kingdom of ends is even possible if the chasm between the supersensible and the sensible is still unbridgeable? Further and more importantly, how can a God that is essentially connected with a formal condition of the transcendent moral subject be actualized in history in order for the Kingdom of ends of to be truly realized? Will this use of God or more precisely the conception of its use suffice to undertake the task of the task of actualizing the idea of God in the world of experience?

The brief answer to this question, as will be fully explained in later chapters, is negative. The conception of God and the use of such idea as a postulate belong only to moral transcendent thought. God is postulated to give force to the moral law which derives its validity purely from the categorical imperative. Further, and more importantly, if there is a prototype of humanity that every human should strive to achieve this prototype must reflect humanity in its wholeness. Now it has been shown that the moral transcendent self is only one dimension of humanity. Humanity, as Kant himself contends is 'rational natural being'. Therefore setting humanity in its transcendent form as a prototype is more or less a violent and indeed unviable model. Rather, if there is a humanity that could be strived for, it should be one that achieves

the full sense of a 'rational-natural' being and so resolves the problem of the actuality of the moral ego in the spatial-temporal world. But such humanity is, as has been briefly indicated above, is actualized in aesthetic judgment. But what role can the idea of God play in such aesthetic actualization of humanity. Further and more importantly what conception of the use of the idea of God befits such a task? It will be argued that the use of the idea of God as a postulate for moral thinking will not suffice. It will be shown that only God conceived of as a transcendental ideal and not merely as a postulate required by the pure faith in a *summum bonum* can resolve the problem of the actualization of humanity through aesthetic judgment. In turn this role will be taken to be the basis for the actualization of God in history.

§V. The recognition of the problem of the actuality of the moral ego as the key problem of Kant's critical project by Reinhold, Fichte and Heidegger

V.1 Prelude

In this section I argue that the above discussed development of Kant's own characterization of the problem inhibiting the conclusion of his critical enterprise was chronologically reflected in the reception of Kant first by the Idealists specifically Reinhold and Fichte and then by Heidegger. In this vein, the first section demonstrates that, in their attempt to fix the Kantian system and arrive at a *philosophia prima* that absolutely establishes the subjective grounds of knowledge, both Reinhold and Fichte identified the relation between the transcendent and the immanent as the main problem to be overcome in Kant's system. They then founded their practical philosophy on the basis of their proposed theoretical systems of idealism. The possibility of the actualization of the transcendent self in the spatial temporal experience was thus never a problem with which they had to wrestle. The problem of the relation between the supersensible and the sensible remained confined to the theoretical question of the grounds of the applicability of pure concepts to the

realm of experience and the possibility of constructing, based on the grounds of such applicability, a totalizing system of science that involves both physics and metaphysics. The second section demonstrates that Heidegger was particularly interested in the problematic relation between the two senses of the self in Kant, due to his interest in showing, as he claimed in his 1927 Marburg lecture series on Kant, that Kant's transcendental project is essentially fundamental ontology. Thus Heidegger identified the paradoxical problem of the actuality transcendent moral self in the phenomenal world and its relation with theoretical self as the key problem in Kant's theory of subjectivity.

Thus the Idealists and Heidegger reflected the development discussed above of Kant's own recognition of the problematic relation between the realm of transcendent ideas and that of experience and its implications for the definition of the human as a whole. The idealists were interested in establishing a totalizing theory of consciousness and representation that could resolve the problem of the applicability of Kant's transcendental categories to empirical content. They thus defined the problem of the critical system in a way very close to Kant in the first introduction of the *Critique of Judgment.* By contrast, Heidegger, owing to his interest in Kant's definition of the human-being or *Dasein* as a whole was mainly concerned with the relation between the transcendent self and the empirical self and how the relation between both could offer such a definition. He thus defined the problem in a way very similar to that of Kant in the second introduction of the *Critique of Judgment.*

V.2 Reinhold's and Fichte's characterization of the problem of Kant's critical project

Reinhold's *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy* were not only commended by Kant himself but set the stage for the Idealists to receive and extend the Kantian project. In the *Letters*, Reinhold places a lot of emphasis on the 'Transcendental

Dialectic' of the *Critique of Pure Reason.* Through this emphasis Reinhold tried to show how Kant's critical project managed to respond to the historical demands of the age of enlightenment inasmuch as it presents a fully fledged rational conception of theoretical and practical philosophy that is based on universal concepts and at the same time in harmony with common sense. In order to demonstrate this achievement, Reinhold devoted most of his letters to the fruits of Kant's project and its implications for the relation between reason and faith and how religion and its role may be conceived of in the age of enlightenment. As Karl Ameriks explains this interest was mainly due to the influence the *Pantheismusstreit* had on Reinhold's thought.[30] Reinhold saw that Kant offered a midway between Jacobi's insistence on a dogmatic faith and Lessing's and Mendelssohn's argument for a Spinozistic, rationalistic model of religion. The characterizing feature of this midway, as is clear from the second and third letters, is that it offers a universal, humanistic view of religion that is at the same time in line with common sense. Reinhold saw that Kant's main contribution was first to explain the rational subjective grounds of transcendent ideas; henceforth, he stressed the paramount importance of the dialectic.

However, Reinhold realized that the critical system failed to furnish absolutely certain grounds for the applicability of universal concepts to experience. If such grounds could not be established, Kant's critical system could not be defended against all the attacks of skeptics and empiricists especially those who alleged that it was a mere replication of Berkeley's Idealism. The question is: how Reinhold defined this problem of 'applicability' and how this definition made him completely blur key conceptual differences in Kant's system. While Reinhold's reading of Kant's system and particularly the 'Transcendental Dialectic' and its implication for his philosophy

[30] See Karl Leonhard Reinhold. *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*. Trans. James Hebbeler. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). pp.ix-xxiii;18-50.

of religion will extensively be discussed and criticized later, it is noteworthy here to give a succinct account of his attempt to fix Kant's critical project by developing a totalizing theory of consciousness and representation—*Vorstellung.*

In the preface to the *Beiträge*, Reinhold asserts, in his main principle *(Überzeugung)*, that the aim of any philosophy that attempts to present itself as a rigorous science *(strenge Wissenschaft)* should be to define the principle *(Grundsatz)* of all philosophy in general.[31] According to Reinhold if philosophy is to be a science, it has to fulfill two key conditions: universality and validity.[32] In light of these two conditions, a philosophical system of universal ideas could be accepted as valid by all rational beings, an aim which he struggled to prove with respect to Kant's critical philosophy. Building on this thesis, Reinhold established the 'Philosophy of Elements' *(Elementarphilosophie)* as a totalizing system of nature and metaphysics. The principles of the 'Philosophy of Elements' is the immediate capacity of consciousness to distinguish between a subject of consciousness and an object of consciousness and to relate both to each other in the totality of conscious experience. This principle in turn serves as the foundation of any properly rational representation *(Vorstellung)* for consciousness. Through this general principle of consciousness, all concepts, whether empirical or rational, could be determined. Hence, the problem of the applicability of pure concepts to experience is obviated inasmuch as all representations of consciousness are traced back to a single principle.

In light of this brief account of Reinhold's system, the following conclusions could be drawn. Reinhold saw that the key problem with Kant's system was the theoretical problem of the applicability of universal concepts to experience. To

---

[31] See Karl Leonhard Reinhold. *Beiträge zur Berichtigung bisheriger Mißverständnisse der Philosopher.* Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2003. p.3-9

[32] Allgemeinheit und Gültigkeit—universality and validity. The first refers to the common rational origin of categories and the second refers to the correct/proper use of these categories.

overcome this problem, Reinhold chose to internalize both concepts and experience by defining the principles of consciousness from which both are derived. The ultimate aim of this was to give a fully unified system of experience. This stance is very much in line with the above explained characterization of the problem of the critical project Kant put forward in the first introduction to the *Critique of Judgment.* However, it commits a fatal mistake. Unlike Kant, Reinhold does not distinguish between the 'transcendent' and 'transcendental.' Both of them may be considered forms of rational representation, to use his language. But each of them is a different category of representation and they can not be dealt with in the same way in consciousness. Thus, he did not properly appreciate the significance and function of the *noumenon* in Kant let alone distinguish between the use of reason in the practical versus the theoretical domains which in turn is of momentous importance to the interpretation of religious experience in Kant, the achievement of the critical project he always admired and defended. This will fully be addressed later. It suffices to conclude the discussion on Reinhold with the assertion that his characterization of the problem of the critical project consists in the theoretical relation between the pure concepts—on a general level—and experience. This characterization led him to argue that the solution to this problem consists in finding a single principle of consciousness that ultimately furnishes the possibility of establishing a system of nature and metaphysics, an intention that Kant definitely had in mind inasmuch as he stressed the importance of presenting nature as a system instead of an aggregate in the first Introduction of the *Critique of Judgment.*

At the outset of the *Wissenschaftslehre* Fichte describes his system to be "Kantian…but is in method quite different from the Kantian presentation".[33] In contrast with Reinhold, Fichte was more explicit in his identification of Kant's system. In §§1 & 6 of the second introduction to the *Wissenschaftslehre*, Fichte identifies the problem of Kant's system with the problem of the *noumenon* or the 'thing in itself.' How could we establish the validity of the transcendental categories if the 'thing-in-itself' or the object outside that causes all the sensible intuitions inside the subject is by definition unknowable? In other words while Kant, in Fichte's language, denies the possibility of intellectual intuition, he allows for it implicitly by assuming that the categories of the understanding must apply to the spatial-temporal intuitions given to us in experience.[34] Following in Reinhold's footsteps, Fichte argued that the solution to this problem is: "to discover…that act which does not and cannot appear among the empirical states of our consciousness, but rather lies at the basis of all consciousness and alone makes it possible."[35] According to Fichte this act *(Tathandlung)* is the identity act of the I am I or A=A; it is the most self-evident act of all consciousness that underlies all others acts and representations whether theoretical or practical. Thus Fichte criticizes Kant as follows:

> Kant…nowhere dealt with the foundation of all philosophy, but treated in the critique in the *Critique of Pure Reason* only of its theoretical aspect…and in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, only of its practical side...[36]

Surprisingly, Fichte does not mention the *Critique of Judgment*—which came out in the same year as the *Science of Knowledge.* More importantly, despite this criticism, Fichte commits the exact same mistake of Reinhold. Although he claims to

---

[33] See J.G. Fichte. *The Science of Knowledge*. Trans. Peter Heath and John Lachs. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). p. 4.
[34] Ibid, p. 43-62
[35] Ibid, p. 93
[36] Ibid, p. 46

be laying the foundation of all consciousness and all its acts, he does not realize that acts of consciousness may have a completely different foundation in a theoretical context or attitude to use Husserl's language than it would have in an everyday sense. Second, Fichte did not properly appreciate the important practical and theoretical implications of Kant's denial of the possibility of intellectual intuition, a matter which will be addressed later. Third, Fichte did not consider the importance of Kant's assertion of the separation between the immanent and transcendent on one hand and then finding a proper connection between them in everyday aesthetic judgments. This insistence on separating and then connecting the transcendent and the immanent, which is either overlooked or ignored in Kantian scholarship, will be addressed extensively as I turn to the discussion of the question of the 'human as a whole' in Kant and particularly in connections with religious experience.

But Fichte does not stop at this point. From the outset of his project he deals with the fundamental principle of identity as an act by the rational self of positing itself. Through the different determinations of this act, the self assumes two senses: a theoretical self and a practical self. Thus Fichte, in his own way, touched upon the two of the senses of the self: the immanent theoretical self and the transcendent practical self. However, given the assumptions of his idealistic system, he found no problem in reconciling them inasmuch as both are essentially different determinations *(Bestimmungen)* of the same principle of identity.

However, although Fichte went beyond Reinhold in identifying two senses of the self corresponding to the supersensible and the sensible realms, his conception of the Kantian problem and hence the solution he proposed to overcome it remained confined to the intricate question concerning the applicability of the categories to experience. Hence his conception of the problem of the critical project coincides

along with that of Reinhold's. This led both of them to look for a theory of consciousness that would establish a coherent system that would harmonize reason's demand for having a systematic view of nature that harmonizes rational ideas with experience. This view coincides with Kant's position in the first Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* regarding the failure of the first and second critique to satisfy the need for having system rather than an aggregate of nature.

Through a systematic criticism of both Fichte and Schelling it will later be shown that their idealistic resolution of the problem not only fails to provide a decisive resolution to the problem with which they started, namely, the reconciliation of the domain of reason and that of nature but is also a pragmatically untenable position. This pragmatic criticism will be further developed in the last two chapters of part one particularly in connection with the problem of religious experience.

Conclusion

Both Fichte and Reinhold saw that the key to perfection of the critical system was to develop a totalizing theory of consciousness that is based on the most fundamental principles of reason. Through this theory of consciousness each of them, in his way, tried not only to harmonize rational categories with experience, but also to establish both as emanating from this fundamental principle of consciousness. In doing so, they attempted to establish a totalizing system of consciousness that would ultimately present nature as a system.

V.2 Heidegger's characterization of the problem of Kantian subjectivity in the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*

In §§12-16 of the *Basic Problems of Phenomenology* Heidegger presents a succinct account and critique of Kantian subjectivity. Heidegger starts his criticism by situating Kant in the medieval tradition and its subjective re-formulation by Descartes. In this vein, he argues that Cartesian solipsism signaled the shift of the orientation

point of ontology from the objective to the subjective sphere. The establishment of *res cogitans* as the sole point of epistemological reference that is uniquely known with absolute certitude heralded the beginning of the demise of the naturalistic orientation of ancient and medieval philosophy. The chief problem of the Cartesian approach is that it remained bound to the same problematic notions of ancient and medieval philosophy. Thus despite its attempt at turning to the subject, the Cartesian undertaking continued to conceive of and address the subject with the whole canon of the object/substance-oriented dogma of ancient and scholastic philosophy hovering in the background.

According to Heidegger, Kant saw the subject as essentially a thing and that it is so in the logic-grammatical sense of that of which a "what" is predicated. But in what way would it be different from any other phenomenally represented thing? Any thingly phenomenon is in this sense a subject of which a potential whatness could be predicated. This is how an empirical intuition comes to be an object as it is given to the knowing subject through the transcendental conditions of the possibility of knowing. To establish the *difference*, Kant propounds the notion of the unity of apperception. According to Heidegger, the self is the condition of all knowing; in Heidegger's language it that which makes possible the

known as such; in the language of ontology it is fundamental ground of letting that which is to be known, possibly known as such:

> …the ego does not itself belong among the root concepts of the understanding, as Kant calls the categories; instead as Kant expresses it, the ego is the "vehicle of all concepts of the understanding." It first of all makes possible the basic a priori ontological concepts…[37]

This is how Kant arrives at the first facet of his threefold notion of subjectivity, viz. *personalitas transcendentalis*. To encapsulate, if knowing, for Kant,

[37] See Martin Heidegger. *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. Albert Hofstader. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 129.

is the primary mode of access to phenomena and if any knowing act as such pre-supposes a knowing subject, *personalitas transcendentalis* establishes the a priori conditions of Kantian ontology of espistemology.

The second facet of the trilogy of Kantian subjectivity is established by the notion of *personalitas psychologica*. Heidegger uses this term to refer to the empirical ego that, to Kant, is ontologically indiscriminant from any other being that exists in the mode of being labeled *res extensa.* Kant's trilogy of subjectivity is then completed by his third characterization of the ego as *personalitas moralis*. This peculiar character of the ego is quite intricately defined by Kant. Whereas Kant designates it to be primarily occurring within the provenance of feeling; but moral feeling *(moralische Gefühl)* to Kant is not like any empirical feeling. The fundamental constitutive of *personalitas moralis* as feeling is respect *(Achtung)*. Respect is not sensibly caused like pleasure or pain; it is rather caused a priori. It does not define action or the ethical maxim but rather makes the maxim and abidance by it possible; it is thereby not a sensible feeling since it is not occasioned by an empirical phenomenal instance. According to Kant it stands analogous to a tension between inclination and fear. On the one hand the rational subject in its full exercise of its freedom abides only by the laws it gives itself; it thus subjugates itself to its reign in fear of loosing such freedom. On the other hand in abiding by this law, the rational subject actually self-elevates itself by exercising its freedom to the maximum. This freedom hinges on the idea of the categorical imperative which in its turn depends of Kant's theory of rational humanity as an in end in itself.

Having investigated the way Kant develops his theory subjectivity, Heidegger advances forward to what he saw as the key problem that plagues it. The rational subject qua *personalitas moralis* is an end in itself; but this end is only reached when

freedom as intellectually given is exercised. Such freedom in its turn pre-supposes a realm of being-with-one-another (kingdom of ends) in order to be achieved; in its turn this being-with-one-another necessitates action in order for freedom to be achieved. But action according to the Kantian system falls within the ontological provenance of *res extensa* since it is always phenomenally given to the knowing subject. It thus belongs to the *personalitas psychological* which is conditioned just like any other phenomenon constituted in the understanding by the *personalitas transcendentalis*. Accordingly, the key problem of the transcendental system of Kant comes down to question: how is it possible to harmonize the transcendent subject with the transcendental immanent subject into a whole that is to be called human-being?

Therefore, Heidegger was fully aware of what may be called the chasm between the moral transcendent subject and the transcendental and empirical subjects that are immanently constituted in the world of experience. What Heidegger failed to see just like Fichte and Reinhold before him is the role of the *Critique of Judgment* in resolving this problem. Further, as will be shown below, Kant's conception of the human being as 'rational-natural being' does not reflect an essentialist view as much as Heidegger would want to argue about Kant. Indeed, Heidegger's reading of Kantian aesthetic in his *Nietzsche Lectures*[38] demonstrates that substantial subjectivity is completely overcome in aesthetic experience. It will thus be shown that a closer reading of the aesthetic reflective judgment and role of the idea of God as a transcendental ideal in its constitution furnishes a conception of a whole of humanity or human-being that fully establishes Kant transcendental project qua fundamental ontology as Heidegger famously claims in the introduction to *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. The problem is that Heidegger

[38] See "Kant's Doctrine of the Beautiful: Its misinterpretation by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche" in: Martin Heidegger. *Nietzsche*. Trans. David Krell. Vol. 1. (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 108-110. This essay will be discussed in later chapters.

sought the solution to the problem of Kant's subjectivity in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and not in the *Critique of Judgment* wherein Kant was fully aware of it and developed his notion of reflective judgment to respond to it.

However, it suffices to conclude that Heidegger's identification of the problem of Kantian subjectivity was in line with both Kant's own characterization of the problem of the critical project in the second introduction of the *Critique of Judgment* and his re-casting of it in the *Metaphysics of Morals* as a problem between two senses of subjectivity that need to be harmonized together in one whole. Heidegger, saw that in order for a full sense of the human-being as whole to be developed from Kant's system, Kant must define a way in which the moral transcendent ego may influence the transcendental ego that is constructed in spatial-temporal experience. Justifiably arguing that Kant's vague formulation of the moral feeling in the form of respect is not enough, Heidegger in a way echoed Kant's confusion and frustration about the gap between the two senses of the self let alone how one, namely the transcendent self, may influence the other, namely, the transcendental self.

V.3 Conclusion

Reinhold's and Fichte's characterizations of the problem of the critical project echoed Kant's own identification of the problem of his own system in the first introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*. The problem of the critical system in this sense was mainly defined in terms of the applicability of the rational categories to experience. It was essentially an epistemological characterization that is inextricably related to what Kant described as reason's demand for systematisation.

Heidegger's characterization of the problem of the critical is in parallelism with Kant's in the second introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* and his re-formulation of it in terms of a relation between two senses of subjectivity and the self

that constitutes the whole of human-being in the *Metaphysics of Morals.* According to this qualification, the problem is more a problem of philosophical anthropology and, as will later unfold, aesthetics. This is the problem this work intends to resolve in light of both the *Critique of Judgment* and the *Religionsschriften.*

Chapter 2

The bridge: Judgment in Kant from the first through the third Critique or from determinant to reflective judgment

§I. Prelude:

In the previous chapter I discussed the development of Kant's characterization of the problem of his critical system in the *Critique of Judgment*. In the first introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* Kant identified this problem in a twofold way. First he characterized it in terms of the irreconcilability of the domains that respectively correspond to the faculties of reason and understanding. Second he identified it in terms of the problem of representing nature as a system and not an aggregate. In the second introduction Kant's characterization of his project's main problem was formulated in terms of establishing the possibility of the influence the domain of reason must have on the domain of the understanding. Building on Kant's assertions in the *Metaphysics of Morals* regarding the two senses of the self or more precisely the two subjects that correspond to each domain the following conclusion was drawn. The problem of the critical project can justifiably be characterized in terms of the problem of defining the human as a whole by harmonizing these two senses of the self.

In §I.2 of the last Chapter 1 I have briefly indicated that Kant argues both in the first and second introductions that the faculty of judgment undertakes the task of bridging this chasm between the transcendent and the immanent. In this chapter and the following one I will briefly analyze how judgment undertakes this task. Through this analysis I will show that aesthetic reflective judgment will be the key to the resolution of the problem of defining the human as a whole in Kant. To demonstrate this assertion, this chapter will be closely devoted to a brief investigation of the role of judgment in Kant. The second section following the prelude will survey the way Kant

defines judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment*. The third section will be devoted to the distinction Kant draws between determinant and reflective judgment in the *Critique of Judgment.* The fourth section will focus on analyzing the two species of reflective judgment: the aesthetic and the teleological, the nature of the function each undertakes and the problem each attempts to resolve. The fifth section will conclude the chapter though a preliminary demonstration of why the aesthetic and not the teleological reflective judgment can fulfill the task of harmonizing the two senses of the self into a sense of the human being as whole.

§II. The faculty of Judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Judgment

II.1 Judgment in the Critique of Pure Reason: overview and interpretation

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant puts forward an initial definition of Judgment in the 'Analytic of Concepts' in the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements.' There he gives a series of three definitions that in themselves reflect the development of the role assigned to the faculty of judgment. Kant puts forward the first definition in the course of his attempt to forge a connection between the faculty of understanding and that of judging: "Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it."[39] Shortly afterward Kant introduces the second definition:

> We can trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging. For according to what has been said above it is a faculty for thinking. Thinking is cognition through concepts. Concepts, however, as predicates of possible judgments are related to some representation of a still undetermined object.[40]

In this same vein Kant adds: "the faculty for judging *(Vermögen zu urteilen)* is the same as the faculty for thinking *(Vermögen zu denken)*".[41]

[39] *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. A68/B93.
[40] Ibid. p.A69/B94
[41] Ibid. p.A81/B107

In these three definitions Kant presents what I would like to characterize as a strictly cognitive and theoretical definition and presentation of the function of the faculty of judgment. In other words, he defines judgment *qua* its cognitive role or as will be shown later judgment in the theoretical, scientific attitude. Kant starts by connecting judgment with the knowledge or cognition of the object *(Erkenntnis)*. In the third definition, Kant elaborates on this claim by identifying thinking,[42] which is generally associated with cognition, with judgment. The second definition forges the connection between the first and the third. Kant argues that judgments, which he mainly conceives in this sense as propositions,[43] essentially define a representation *(Vorstellung)* of an object in terms of an a priori concept of the understanding. Judgment is a formal determination of the empirical content given in terms of the inner and outer sense—space and time. Through judgment, the intuitive content *(inhalt)* is given a formal determination inasmuch as a concept is predicated of it. This formal determination is presented in terms of a proposition *(satz)*. Thus to think an object properly, that is to cognize an object properly is to have a proper judgment about it based on the context in which it was experienced.

To sum up, it appears that judgment is defined as the final product of the understanding *(Verstand)*. But the faculty of the understanding is defined earlier in the §I of the introduction to the second part of 'The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements' as "…the **spontaneity** of cognition…"[44] and as "the faculty for thinking objects of sensible intuition."[45] Thus judgments as the end products of the understandings could essentially be redefined as the spontaneous conscious thoughts produced due to the

[42] Compare the use of thinking here with its use to refer to three faculties of understanding, judgment and reason discussed in the first section of Chapter 1.
[43] See Beatrice Longuenesse. *Kant and the Capacity to Judge.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. p. 90-95
[44] *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. A51/B75.
[45] Ibid. p.A51/B75

spontaneous processes of syntheses of empirical intuitions into objects and relations among objects. The form these theoretical judgment is bound to assume is the propositional form. Therefore, judgments, as far as the understanding is concerned, are the ultimate final propositions that represent spontaneous processes of synthesis described in the transcendental deduction of the categories and the way they apply to intuitions.

Judgments could be understood and formulated on a transcendental level or on an abstract formal level that is devoid of any empirical content. The later is associated with the general rules of human thought and consciousness; the former refers to the concrete use of these rules, that is, in applying them to actual experience. On the general level, judgments would formal apophantic structures completely devoid of any empirical content and hence meaning.

Kant resumes his discussion of the faculty of Judgment immediately after concluding his transcendental deduction of the pure categories of the understanding. In the introduction to the second book of the 'Transcendental Analytic' on the 'Analytic of Principles', Kant discusses judgment in light of the distinction between general abstract logic and transcendental logic. General logic belongs to the domain of reason and must not be used transcendentally:

> …the transcendental use of reason is not objectively valid at all, thus does not belong to the logic of truth i.e. the analytic but rather as a logic of illusion requires a special part of the scholastic edifice, under the name of the transcendental dialectic[46]

The faculty of Judgment and that of the Understanding are essentially transcendental faculties. It is only reason due to its desire for completion that goes into false dialectic:

> Understanding and the power of judgment accordingly have their canon of objectively valid thus true use in transcendental logic and therefore belong in its analytical part. Only reason in its attempts to make out something about objects a

[46] Ibid. p.A131/B170.

> priori and to extend cognition beyond the bounds of possible experience is wholly and entirely dialectical…[47]

Kant then gives an account of the transcendental doctrine of the power of judgment. In this accounts he attempts to show how the pure concepts of the understanding may be applied to intuitions. He thus goes into an elaborate re-cap of the role of schematism in connecting concepts with intuitions. This attempt rightly raised a number of concerns among Kant scholars. As Guyer[48] and others comment, why would Kant require any further demonstration of the applicability of judgments to the intuitions? If understanding is equated with judgment, as he claimed in the introduction to the 'Transcendental Analytic' and if understanding is spontaneous in its application of the categories to empirical intuition once the latter is available, why is there a need to further reinforce the applicability of judgment beyond what has been demonstrated for the understanding? To this question, Kant offers no answer. He rather moves on to a classification of judgments as he did in the *Prolegomena* into analytic and synthetic. He then focuses on synthetic a priori judgments and their role in defining the possibility of experience.

Concluding Remarks

Kant identified judgment with thinking in general. He then identified judgment with the understanding. I propose to interpret these seeming conflicting characterizations as follows. In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant was mainly concerned with theoretical knowledge and objective validity and how they emerge from the application of pure of concepts to empirical spatio-temporal intuitions. Inasmuch as thinking refers to consciousness in general and not only to propositional statements it is legitimate to identify it with judgment which is similarly characterized

[47] Ibid. p.A131-132/B170-B171
[48] See Paul Guyer. *Kant and the Claims of Taste.* Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979. p.33-39

in the *Vienna Logic*. But since the orientation of the thinking subject, as far as understanding is concerned, is toward an object of knowledge, in other words the subject is in the theoretical attitude it made sense for him to identify it with understanding.

Thus judgments, as far as understanding is concerned, are the propositional expressions of the spontaneous subsumption of intuitions under concepts. Hence, as will be discussed in chapter 3, should be considered a re-formulation of the spontaneous action of the understanding. Many of Kant scholars appear to insist on excluding the idea that each of the thinking faculties (thinking, desiring and feeling) Kant identifies may refer to a possible subjective attitude. The use of each of the faculties in each attitude may differ but without contradiction. This assertion about the different subjective attitudes in Kant will be further reinforced and expanded through the following section and chapters 3.

II.2 Judgment in the *Critique of Judgment*: overview of the characterization of judgment in the first and second introductions**.**

As has been indicated in Chapter 1, Kant starts the first introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* with an outline of the tripartite division of the faculty of thinking into: the faculty of the understanding, the faculty of reason and the faculty of judgment. In this vein the faculty of judgment is initially defined as the faculty for the: "subsumption of the particular under the general."[49] This definition is in line with his characterization of the role of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* The faculty of judgment essentially completes the work of the understanding by subsuming particular empirical intuitions under the general concepts of the understanding. In the course of posing the question as to whether judgment can yield

[49] Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 20:201.

an a priori principle as much as understanding and reason does, Kant assigns a new task to the faculty of judgment: judgment "…mediates the connection between the two faculties…"[50] In pursuing this question further, Kant argues that if judgment is to have any a priori principle, this principle should be:

> …a concept of things in nature insofar as nature conforms to our power of judgment, and thus a concept of nature such that one cannot form any concept of it except that is arrangement conform to our faculty for subsuming the given law under more general ones even though these are not given; in other words it would have to be the concept of a purposiveness of nature…[51]

Here Kant makes a very early allusion to the principle of purposivensess *(Zweckmäßigkeit)* which will later unfold to be the principle of reflective judgment. However, two important indications are made indirectly. First Kant's statement about the possibility of transcendental role of judgment based on an a priori principle reflects as Guyer indicates the subjective versus objective nature of such role.[52] This does not mean subjective in the sense of individually relative; rather it means that the origin and need for this role is essentially related to the human rational subject. Also this indicates that the nature of such a role does not have any bearing on the theoretical knowledge of nature as the totality of objects of experience. Hence, the transcendental role of judgment in general is not a scientific, theoretical role. It is not intended to produce objective determinant knowledge. Therefore, it can not be approached in line of the assumptions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which, although it includes the layout of Kant's system of transcendental philosophy, it is mainly devoted to the possibility of objective, determinant knowledge.

However, Kant was still defining the role of the faculty of judgment in terms of subsuming the particular under the general. It is thus still defined in line with its role in connection with the faculty of the understanding. In this vein, the task assigned

---

[50] Ibid. p.202
[51] Ibid. p.202
[52] *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, 1979. p. 40

to judgment was described in terms of presenting nature as a system and not an aggregate. Kant explains in an important footnote,[53] that the a priori concepts of the understanding establish the analytic unity of empirical laws. In others words, pure concepts of the understanding analytically constitutes the unity of all empirical laws. However, such common analytical ground does not guarantee that these laws would constitute a system and not merely an aggregate. Since these laws constitute nature as the totality of the objects of experience, then nature will be in itself an aggregate and not a system. However, Kant argues that judgment can not achieve this task by subsuming the general under the particular. Rather, in order for judgment to achieve this goal, it must argue from the particular empirical laws and argue for the possibility of presenting nature as a system based on the principle of purposiveness. Such purposiveness, in turn, "…does not enrich the knowledge of nature by an particular objective law, but rather only grounds an aim for the power of judgment, by which to observe nature and to hold its forms together."[54] Purposiveness is essentially a principle that is assumed by *us* as rational human subjects: "…purposiveness of nature…we simply **assume** in it [it refers to nature]…"[55] In order to allow judgment to undertake this new role, Kant adjust the definition of judgment. Through this adjustment Kant introduced a new species of judgment which he calls reflective judgment. This species is contrasted with the species of judgment associated with theoretical knowledge in the first *Critique.*

> …for this is not merely a faculty for subsuming the particular under the general, but is also, conversely one for fining the general for particular[56]

---

[53] Kant writes: "…empirical cognitions constitute in accordance to what they have in common (namely the transcendental laws of nature) an **analytic unity of all experience**, but not that synthetic unity of experience as a system in which the empirical laws, even with regard to what is different in them, are bound together under a principle…" see Ibid. p.20:204
[54] Ibid. p.20:204
[55] Ibid. p.20:204
[56] Ibid. p.20:209-210

This adjustment of the definition of the faculty of judgment and the expansion of its role opens up a possibility for radically revisiting Kant's identification of the capacity to think *(Vermögen zu denken)* with the capacity to judge *(Vermögen zu urteilen)*. Thinking, as has been indicated in Chapter 1, is used by Kant in a rather generic manner to refer to consciousness and its acts in general. Inasmuch as judgment is associated with it in his preliminary discussion in the doctrine of elements and then associated with understanding, I have argued that judgment as a faculty could be interpreted as subordinate faculty that performs different roles based on the subjective attitude in experience. Thus in the theoretical attitude, when there is an interest in knowing a specific object and determining it, it is more associated with understanding because it ultimately represents the result of its spontaneous application of concepts to intuitions. This view is reinforced by the aforementioned adjustments that Kant introduces to his definition of judgment. Inasmuch as judgment play a mediating role between reason and the understanding by harmonizing the empirical rules based on the concepts of the latter into a system based on the purposiveness provided by the ideas of the former, judgment open up a now possibility of thinking and hence a new territory to use Kant's terminology or region of consciousness—again to use a Husserlian characterization. This new field of consciousness as I will argue below involves two modalities: the aesthetic and teleological ones. I will now turn to the brief survey of the second introduction.

As far as the definition of the faculty of judgment in the second introduction is concerned, Kant does not considerably change his view. However, the role assigned to this task gets further expanded and emphasized due to the change in Kant's own conception of the crisis of the critical project. The problem Kant brings forth judgment to resolve is no longer to merely connect the faculties and the respective

domains of reason and understanding. Judgment as much as it plays this role ought to allow the domain of reason to have an influence upon *(einfluss haben)* on the domain of the understanding. In other words judgment ought to allow the laws of freedom to have some kind of an influence on nature in order for the rational subject to realize her/his freedom in the phenomenal concrete world. Thus while the task of presenting nature as a system instead of an aggregate for the rational subject is maintained, it assumes new dimensions and depth through the new definition offered of the problem of the critical project. These new dimensions will in turn shape the interpretation I will put forward below of the distinction Kant draws between aesthetic and teleological judgment.

It suffices here to mention that, as it has been argued in Chapter 1, that since judgment and specifically reflective judgment bridges the gap between reason and understanding, it can legitimately be assumed to be the bridge between the transcendent and the transcendental senses of the self. It will do so by creating a new possibility of consciousness or thinking. Such possibility will be identified with the role of aesthetic reflective judgment.

II.3 Conclusion of II.1 and II.2:

The examination of Kant's identification of the role of judgment in both the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Judgment* leads to a number of important results. First judgment in contradistinction from the faculties of reason and the understanding has been shown to be always subordinate to the consciousness field associated with the subjective attitude involved. In the theoretical attitude Kant associated it with the understanding because inasmuch as it represents the expression of the spontaneous synthesis by the understanding of pure concepts and empirical spatio-temporal intuitions. Thus, Guyer and other commentators were justified in

claiming that Kant was in no need of examining the applicability of judgment to sensibility beyond what he did in the 'Transcendental Deduction.' This view is reinforced by the adjustment Kant introduces to his definition of judgment in the *Critique of Judgment.* Second, it has been shown that the role assigned to judgment in the third *Critique* is by no means a theoretical one. This does not only mean that it can not produce theoretical objective knowledge. It also means that reflective judgment is a completely different species whose structure, task and the field of consciousness it opens up for thinking can neither be approached nor understood in terms of the assertions of the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

§III The Distinction between determinant and reflective judgment

The distinction between determinant and reflective judgment has briefly been indicated in the last section. In this section, I will examine it more closely. In light of this examination I will further support the conclusions reached in the last section concerning the relation between judgment and thinking or consciousness as a whole.

III.1 The distinction between determinant and reflective judgment in the first introduction

Having set the task judgment is supposed to undertake and having adjusted the definition of judgment to accommodate this task, Kant realized the need for a classification of the species of judgment based on the additions he introduced. In §V of the first introduction he writes:

> The power of judgment can be regarded as a mere faculty for reflecting on a given representation, in accordance with a certain principle, for the sake of a concept that is thereby made possible or as a faculty for determining an underlying concept through a given empirical representation. In the first case it is the reflecting, in the second case the determining power of judgment. To reflect however is to compare and to hold together given representations either with others or with one's faculty of cognition in relation to a concept thereby made possible. The reflecting power judgment is that is which is also called the faculty of judging[57]

[57] Ibid. p.20:211

The distinction Kant makes here is obviously related to the development in his conception of the judgment that was outlined in the last section. Kant introduces the concept of determinant judgment *(bestimmend Urteil)* to denote the cognitive theoretical judgments that have objective meaning based on the synthesis of concepts and intuitions. The concept of reflective judgment *(reflectirend Urteil)* denotes the role of judgment in mediating between understanding and reason; it thus has a subjective origin and meaning. Reflective judgment does not yield any knowledge about an object of experience. It rather advances from a particular representation and then tries to relate it with a concept in an indeterminate way. Since Kant was still thinking of judgment in terms of its role in connection with cognition to the extent that he associates it again with the understanding, he was mainly concerned with the role of reflective judgment in presenting nature as a system and not merely as an aggregate.[58] He thus argues that reflective judgment essentially harmonizes empirical concepts and laws under an indeterminate principle of purposivness of nature. Such purposiveness emanates from the demand of the faculty of reason for systematicity and completeness which he pointed out in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' of the first *Critique.* Such purposiveness has to be indeterminate; for if it were used in a determinate way it would lead to dialectic of delusions for it will be subjecting the objective knowledge to transcendent ideas. It therefore has to be indeterminate. Kant characterizes such approach to nature as technical and artistic in distinction from the mechanical way in which understanding constructs possible experience of nature. Here Kant adds a number of rather important remarks. First the concept of purposiveness is an a priori concept and has a transcendental use. Hence, it must be

[58] Here Guyer was right in stating that Kant's concern with the question of the presentation of nature as a system did eclipse and led to the misreading of a lot of the important dimensions of Kant's theory of taste.

valid to every subject of experience. Second the use of the power of judgment to reflectively represent nature as a system is essentially a logical use of the power of judgment. This use points to the role of judgment in connecting reason and the understanding. General logic which pertains to the domain of reason, calls for completeness and systematicity that can not be provided by the understanding. Thus judgment uses the principle of purposiveness to harmonize the empirical laws into a system instead of an aggregate of nature.

On the other hand, determinant judgments, as indicated above, are defined as the propositional expressions of the synthesis of the concepts of the understanding with spatial-temporal intuitions. In this vein, Kant rightly refers to the role of schematization in the constitution of determinant judgments. He explains that judgment inasmuch as it is associated with the understanding schematizes a priori—through the power of the imagination—and applies these schemata to "every empirical synthesis."[59]

Thus reflective and not determinant judgment undertakes the task of the connecting reason with the understanding. However, as already indicated above, reflective judgment has two possible modes that will each open up a different possibility of conscious experience.

Before turning to reflective judgment in the second introduction, it is noteworthy to mention that Kant uses the word reflective and reflection to refer to judgment in a general way. This is obvious in the above quote, though he does it elsewhere as well. The reason, as I would like to argue, is that Kant sees reflection as the freer and in a way the basic, everyday form of consciousness and thinking. Determinant Judgments by contrast are just the result or better the propositional

[59] Ibid.p.20:12

expressions of the synthesis of the pure concepts of the understanding with empirical intuitions. Such synthesis as has been explained above occurs spontaneously in the theoretical attitude. Reflection, by contrast, is, as it will become clearer below, freer and is more general.

III.2 The distinction between determinant and reflective judgment in the second introduction

The presentation of the distinction between determinant and reflective judgment does not change significantly in the second introduction. However, some minor differences could be traced. First, determinant judgment is immediately associated with the understanding. Second reflective judgment is more clearly associated with the principle of the purposiveness of nature. Third reflective judgment is also immediately associated with the feeling of pleasure. While this association is present in the first introduction it is more explicitly stressed in the second introduction. The reason is to show, as will be indicated above the relative importance and significance of the affective dimension in the connection judgment established between reason and the understanding. This affective dimension, as it will become clearer later, will play a decisive role in the connection between the transcendent and the empirical notions of the self. Further, it will be one of the key aspects through which reason will manifest its influence on the understanding.

III.3 Conclusion

In light of the additions he introduced to the role of judgment in, Kant put forward the distinction between two species of judgments: the determinant and the reflective. The former denotes the propositional expression of the spontaneous synthesis of the understanding. The latter refers to the role of judgment in arguing from the particular to the general based on an indeterminate use of the principle of the purposiveness of nature or the totality of phenomena. The fact that Kant makes such

distinction between two almost opposite definitions of judgment supports the assertion made in the previous section that judgment is essentially consciousness in general. Different species of judgment refer to different forms of consciousness based on the corresponding attitude of the subject of experience.

§IV The distinction between aesthetic and teleological reflective judgments

IV.1 The distinction between reflective and teleological reflective judgment in the first introduction

In §VIII and §IX of the first introduction Kant gives an account of the two species of reflective judgments: the aesthetic and the teleological. In §XI, Kant gives a summary of the distinction:

> …the aesthetic reflecting judgment has its determining ground in the power of judgment unmixed with any other faculty of cognition, while the teleological judgment although it uses the concept of natural end in the judgment itself only as a principle of reflecting, not of the determining power of judgment, nevertheless cannot be made except through the combination of reason with empirical concepts. Hence the possibility of a teleological judgment about nature can easily be shown, without having to ground it in a special principle of the power of judgment for this merely follows the principle of reason. By contrast, the possibility of an aesthetic judgment which is nevertheless grounded on a principle a priori, i.e. a judgment of taste, if it can be shown that this is really justified in its claim to universal validity, absolutely requires a critique of thje power of judgment as a faculty with its own special transcendental principles...the aesthetic judgment, without presupposing a concept of its object, nevertheless ascribes purposiveness to it, and indeed does so with universal validity, the principle for which must therefore be in the power of judgment itself, while the teleological judgment presupposes a concept of the object which reason brings under the principle of a connection to an end…[60]

In line with this detailed and rather intricate characterization of the distinction between aesthetic and reflective judgments, I will first give a brief basic outline of the function of each. I will then turn to the preference Kant assigns to aesthetic over teleological judgment.

[60] Ibid. p.20:243-244

Kant defines aesthetic reflective judgment in terms of the role of judgment in mediating between the faculties of imagination and that of the understanding. Imagination freely assigns a purpose to a given empirical intuition without encroaching on its conformity to the rules of the understanding. Such a purpose is indeterminate and emanates from the faculty of judgment itself as indicated in the quote above. By contrast teleological reflective judgment is defined in terms of the role of judgment in mediating between the faculties of reason and the understanding. By connecting the principle of an end to the concept of an object of a given intuition, reflective teleological judgment establishes a connection between reason and the understanding. Reason as has been indicated above always strives for completeness and systematicity. In this wake it has the idea of an end of nature. This idea is then associated with the concept of every object so that when an intuition that is to be subsumed under this concept is given, that every concept is used as its end. Thus as Kant says teleological judgment mediates between what a concept is—as has been given in experience—and what it should be. Through this task, teleological judgment establishes nature as a system. By taking every concept of any object of experience and turning it into an end, reflective judgment presents empirical laws as a system bound together with the idea of end given by reason. Thus teleological judgment fulfills the task of mediating between reason and the understanding inasmuch as it fulfills the logical demand of reason to present nature as a system and not a mere aggregate of empirical laws.

But if this is the case, why does Kant seem to assign more importance to aesthetic judgment? In the quote above Kant argues that aesthetic judgment is what could establish judgment as a faculty on its own just like reason and the understanding

inasmuch as its principle emanates from the faculty of judgment itself. Indeed he later writes:

> …the critique of taste…discloses when treated from a transcendental point of view, by the way in which it fills in a gap in the system of our cognitive faculties, a striking and in my view very promising prospect for a complete system of all the powers of the mind, insofar as they are related in their vocation not only to the sensible but also to the supersensible...[61]

If teleological judgment fulfills the task of presenting nature as a system and in doing so connects reason and the understanding, why is the aesthetic judgment assigned such a unique status in terms of its capacity to harmonize the cognitive faculties of the mind and establishing a link between the sensible and the supersensible?

While a full account of aesthetic reflective judgment will be put forward in chapters 4 & 5, a number of clues could be found in the introduction. First, as has been indicated above, the aesthetic judgment seems to have its principle within judgment itself. Thus it is more representative of reflective judgment than the teleological judgment which is more bound and determined by reason and the understanding. Second aesthetic judgment as Kant later reveals, and as will be discussed in detail in chapter 5, makes claims to universal validity and communicability. This establishes it, as Kant argues as a basis of common sense. Hence, aesthetic judgment serves as a better and more solid ground for a harmonized sense of the human being as a whole that could be shared inter-subjectively. There is also another reason that could be traced in the second introduction.

IV.2 The distinction between aesthetic and teleological reflective judgment in the second introduction

Two main differences mark the presentation of the distinction between aesthetic and teleological judgment in the second versus the first introduction. First,

[61] Ibid. p.20:244-245

the section on teleological judgment is entitled by Kant 'The logical representation of the purposiveness of nature.' Here Kant is almost explicitly indicating that teleological judgment fulfills the task of connecting reason and the understanding as far as presenting nature as a system is concerned. Thus the task that seemed most pressing in connecting reason with the understanding is fulfilled by teleological judgment which in turn is given a subordinate position compared to the aesthetic judgment. Second the aesthetic judgment is specifically associated with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. It is thus associated with the faculties or power of the mind that is essentially associated with judgment in the division of faculties presented by Kant. It could thus be inferred that aesthetic judgment is indeed the most fundamental and in a way the most representative form of the faculty of judgment qua a separate faculty.

These two main aspects of differentiating between aesthetic and teleological judgment indicate the third reason why Kant gives priority and assigns more weight to aesthetic reflective judgment. The association of the feeling of pleasure with judgment along with the limiting of the role of teleological judgment to the fulfillment of the logical demand of reason for a systematic representation of nature decisively show that aesthetic judgment will constitute the main link between faculties and will allow the domain of reason to have an influence on the domain of the understanding concretely through its affective dimension.

IV.3 Conclusion

Aesthetic reflective judgment is distinguished from teleological judgment in a number of ways. First the latter's role is limited to the task of fulfilling the logical demand of reason to present nature as a system of laws and not merely an aggregate. Second, aesthetic judgment produces its principle from within judgment itself and

does not borrow it from reason and then apply it to the understanding as in the case of teleological judgment. Based on this it can represent judgment as a faculty on its own just like reason and the understanding. Third aesthetic judgment in the second introduction is explicitly associated with the faulty of the feeling of pleasure which in itself is the faculty corresponding to judgment as such. In light of these three main points it could be concluded that if judgment is thinking or consciousness in general reflective aesthetic judgment gives itself as the key species of judgment that could possibly solve the key problem of the relation between the transcendent and the immanent and more importantly the relation between the transcendent self and the empirical self.

§V. Conclusion.

The above analyses point to a number of important results. First, it has been shown, through the comparison of the characterization of judgment in the *Critique of Pure Reason* with the *Critique of Judgment*, that judgment essentially plays the role of constituting and representing different possibilities of consciousness based on the attitude of the subject of experience and the interplay of the faculties involved. Based on this, the claims of the first *Critique* about judgment should be restricted to the theoretical attitude wherein understanding spontaneously synthesizes concepts with empirical intuitions. Second, through an examination of the distinction between reflective and determinant judgment in the first and second introductions to the third *Critique* it has been shown that Kant clearly realized the need to expand the role of judgment beyond what is allowed by its theoretical definition. He thus introduced the distinction between reflective and determinant judgment to allow the faculty of judgment to play another intrinsically different role than that assigned to it in the theoretical attitude. By further examining the role of reflective judgment and the way

it is presented by Kant, it has preliminarily been shown that reflective judgment is in a way the more fundamental sense of judgment inasmuch as the determinant judgment is only the propositional expression of the results of the synthesis of the understanding. Third by examining the two species of reflective judgment: the aesthetic and the teleological it has been shown that Kant assigns more weight and places more emphasis on aesthetic judgment due to a number of reasons. First its principle emanates from judgment itself, a notion that will be investigated and analyzed later in chapter 5. Second it is more connected to the faculty of the feeling of pleasure which is the main power of the mind Kant associates with the faculty of judgment. Third, as Kant himself claims but does not show except implicitly in his 'Critique of the aesthetic power of Judgment', aesthetic judgment gives a more comprehensive framework for the harmony between faculties and the relation between the sensible and the supersensible.

Based on this conclusion it has preliminary been concluded that the aesthetic judgment will be taken as the key bridge between the transcendent and the empirical sense of the self. Indeed as Heidegger indicated, feeling is the key for understanding the human as a whole in Kant inasmuch as it represents that connection between the transcendent and empirical senses of the self.[62] In addition Kant's own assertion that the role of teleological judgment essentially consists in fulfilling the task of presenting nature as a system and not a mere aggregate of laws reinforces that decision to take aesthetic judgment as the main access for solving the problem of the human in Kant. However, before delving into the structure, problems and different aspects of the aesthetic judgments, I will first turn to the constitution of the different species of

[62] See Martin Heidegger. *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. Albert Hofstader. (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 133-6. Although Heidegger focuses mainly on moral feeling completely disregarding the affective dimension of reflective judgment let alone Kant's discussion of judgement of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure in the Introductions to the *Critique of Judgment*.

judgments through the different functions of the imagination. Once this constitutive role is fleshed out for all judgments and specifically the aesthetic judgment, I will turn to an extensive discussion of the aesthetic judgment, its structure, role, essential aspect and above all the field of consciousness it opens up for the human being to have a sense of her/himself in everyday, concrete experience.

Chapter 3

Imagination and the constitution of meaning in Judgment: Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason as model

§I. Prelude:

In the previous chapter I have preliminarily drawn the conclusion that different species of judgment constitute different territories of consciousness based on the subjective attitude in each instance. In the theoretical or scientific attitude wherein a subject is interested in knowing a given object, determinant judgment defines the region of cognitive and theoretical consciousness. Reflective teleological judgment may be associated with a second order theoretical attitude that has an essentially inter-subjective rather than an objective orientation. In this mode the subject is interested, as claimed above, in reconciling what the object is with what the object should be. Through the principle of purposiveness, reflective judgment satisfies this demand by presenting nature as a system rather than an aggregate. Reflective aesthetic judgment, as will be argued in Chapter 5, defines the region of everyday, *(alltäglich)* in Heidegger's language, consciousness.

All judgments that add meaning are synthetic, ampliative and not merely explicative as analytical judgments.[63] They are also a priori inasmuch as they claim validity to all subjects. But different modes of synthesis lead to different species of meaning. Further, while synthetic *(synthetisch)* processes assume different modes and structures in Kant's system, the most important faculty that takes part in making synthesis possible is the imagination. However, imagination plays different roles based on the subjective attitude in which it functions, the kind of judgment it

---

[63] See Immanuel Kant. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (trans. James W. Ellington). Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001. p. 266

constitutes, the species of meaning it ultimately generates and hence the territory of consciousness that it makes possible.

This chapter will focus on the different species of synthesis in the A and B Deductions. More attention will then be given to the role of imagination in the A and B deductions. I will then turn to Kant's important chapter on 'Schematism' in the 'Analytic of Principles.' In the context of this analysis I will address the interpretations put forward by Henry Allison, Rudolf Makkreel, Beatrice Longuenesse and most importantly Martin Heidegger. Through this analysis, I will demonstrate that imagination is essentially the meaning-producing faculty for Kant. In this respect, I will argue that imagination determines the meaning expressed by judgment in the various subjective attitudes in experience. This will set the framework for the discussion in the following chapters of how imagination undertakes role in the case of reflective judgment.

§II. Imagination in the Critique of Pure Reason:

II.1 Preamble: Imagination and Judgment and the problem of interpreting the relation between the A-Deduction and the B-Deduction

The inextricable relation between imagination and judgment in the first *Critique* poses a number of challenges. Is it that imagination makes judgment as consciousness possible or is it that imagination and judgment are different ways in which the relation between representations and the twelve categories of the understanding could be defined? The latter position is endorsed by Longuenesse in *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*. First, she defines the key problem of the first *Critique* in terms of the possible relation between categories and given representations. In Chapter 1'Synthesis and Judgment'[64] and Chapter 2 'The

[64] Beatrice Longuenesse. *Kant and the Capacity to Judge* (trans. Charles T. Wolf). Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998. p. 17

Threefold Synthesis and the Mathematical Model'[65] she argues that Kant offers two arguments for demonstrating the possibility of this relation. The first is a logical argument based on the concept of judgment while the second is an argument based on synthesis; the former is associated with the A-Deduction whereas the latter is associated with the B-Deduction. She then claims that due to the limitations of the mathematical model on which the synthetic argument is based Kant was forced to reformulate the deduction in the second edition. He thus realizes that the logical argument is necessary and has to take precedence. Hence, he starts with the transcendental unity of apperception and then moves on to principles of judgment in the second part of the 'Transcendental Analytic.'

A similar stance is adopted by Henry Allison. Insisting that Judgment in Kant is essentially discursive,[66] Allison initiates his analysis of the transcendental deduction by giving the reasons for assigning priority to the B-Deduction over the A-Deduction:

> The B-Deduction argument is structured in such a way as to make it evident that the central problem [of the deduction] is the demonstration of a connection between the intellectual and sensible conditions of human cognition. Although this is likewise true of the A-Deduction, it is obscured there by the way in which Kant presents his argument. Thus by concentrating on the later version we can consider Kant's solution to the problem in its most perspicuous form.[67]

The role of judgment is thus completely reduced to its discursive function in the production of knowledge. In turn this function plays a key role in defining the relation between the sensible and intellectual conditions of human cognition. In light of his claim that this relation is better explained in the B-Deduction, Allison, following Deiter Henrich, asserts that the argument of the B-deduction involves two steps. The first establishes the rule for thinking an object of a sensible intuition in

---

[65] Ibid. p.36
[66] Henry Allison. *Kant's Transcendental Idealism.* New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. p.77-89
[67] Ibid. p.159

general: "It shows that any representation that is brought to the 'objective unity of apperception' is also thereby related to an object in a judgment and as such necessarily stands under the categories."[68] The second part of the Deduction demonstrates the "the applicability of the categories to whatever is given under the conditions of human sensibility….In short it attempts to link the categories to the perception rather than merely to the thought of objects."[69] The essence of Allison's argument is that inasmuch as Kant establishes the 'Transcendental Unity of Apperception' as the condition of all cognition, he uses it as the link between the categories of judgment and the sensible objects. In the second part Kant shows how this is concretely possible for the case of human sensibility namely, perception. He thus connects his analysis of the first and second parts of the deduction with a discussion of the difference between judgments of perception and judgments of experience in the *Prolegomena.* This step is similarly adopted by Longuenesse to show the primacy of the discursive orientation of the B-Deduction to the A-Deduction. In this wake, Allison insists on Kant's association of imagination with understanding.

Turning to the Analytic of principles, Allison structures his argument in response to the criticism discussed in the previous chapter regarding the need for an argument proving the applicability of judgments to experience beyond the 'The Transcendental Deduction.' Describing these criticisms as 'dismissive views' of Kant, Allison argues:

> The question the Schematism addresses is not whether the categories apply to appearances (that question is dealt with in the Deduction) but under what sensible conditions they can do so. Moreover the question is both perfectly coherent and largely unaddressed by the Deduction. To know that the concept of quantity is applicable to appearances is not yet to know that the objects to which it applies are extensive magnitudes and that all appearances are such magnitudes. The latter

[68] Ibid, p. 160
[69] Ibid, p.161

> conclusion requires that addition knowledge of how this concept is expressed in sensible terms, that is, how it is schematized. The same holds, mutatis mutandis, for other categories.[70]

The gist of Allison's position in this paragraph could be summarized in terms of the example he puts forward to illustrate his view. Someone may know the rules of chess; however, he/she may still not know how to apply such rules properly in a game of chess. By analogy, the Deduction merely shows the applicability of the categories to sensible intuitions but they do not tell us when and how to apply the categories. The question that immediately comes up in response to Allison is whether or not such an analogy applies to the case of Kant.

In making this argument Allison overlooked an important point and by passed an alternative interpretation. The point he overlooked has to do with the 'spontaneity' of the understanding. As indicated in the previous chapter, understanding acts spontaneously once a an object is *given* to it through representation in terms of the forms of sensibility (space and time). Kant bases the entire A-Deduction on this primary principle that he makes at the beginning of the Transcendental Analytic. The fact that he gives priority to the Transcendental Unity of Apperception over imagination and its syntheses in the B-Deduction does not mean he gives up this position. Thus the analogy to a chess player does not hold. Determinant judgments are, as asserted in the previous chapter, the predicative expression of the spontaneous act of understanding; they are the propositional expression of theoretical cognition. The alternative interpretation that I argue Allison overlooked supports this claim. Such alternative interpretation is that of Heidegger's in the 1927 Marburg lectures. The section on schematism in the 'Analytic of Principles' can not be read independently of the relation between the three syntheses of the A-Deduction. I will discuss this point below. It suffices here to assert that while I disagree with

[70] Ibid p. 203

Heidegger's generic claim that imagination is primordial time, I agree with the importance of acknowledging that time or the form of inner sense is ground for the relation between the syntheses and between them and the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. The fact that the latter is given priority in the B-Deduction should, as I would like to argue, be essentially explained in terms of Kant's interest in showing the key role played by the Transcendental Unity of Apperception as the condition of all theoretical cognition, a point that he did not properly flesh out in the A-Deduction. In this vein the role of figurative synthesis should also be read in line with schematism as a different presentation of the role of the three syntheses in the A-Deduction. Thus, while Heidegger may have been wrong in his claims about Kant's motive to shift his argument in the B-Deduction, I believe he was completely justified in his claims about schematism and the necessity of reading it in line with the three syntheses of the A-Deduction and their temporal orientation. However, contrary to Heidegger, Allison and Longuenesse, I would like to argue that there is an essential harmony between the A-Deduction and the B-deduction and that each is a different formulation of the constitution of determinant judgment and meaning in the theoretical attitude.

Having delineated the context in which imagination emerges in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the problematic relation between it and judgment, the main stances in scholarship toward this relation specifically in connection with the debate on the relation between A-Deduction and B-Deduction, I will turn to a close examination of the three syntheses of the A-Deduction, the figurative synthesis of the B-Deduction and the doctrine of schematism. Through this examination I will demonstrate that the A-Deduction and B-Deduction qua two expressions of the constitutions of consciousness and meaning in the theoretical attitude converge rather than diverge.

II.2 Imagination and the three synthesis of the A-Deduction:

Preliminary Remark:

In *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, Rudolf Makkreel, in agreement with Dieter Henrich, criticizes Heidegger's claim that the imagination in the A-Deduction is "If the transcendental imagination as the pure formative faculty in itself forms time…then the thesis…that transcendental imagination is primordial time, can no longer be avoided"[71] and that it thus solves the problem of combining the intellectual with the sensible.[72] The kernel of Makkreel's criticism is twofold; first he criticizes Heidegger for only focusing on the temporal dimension of the three syntheses and for his claim that the synthesis of recognition in concepts as future primordial time. According to Makkreel, Heidegger overlooks the transformation that happens in Kant's characterization of transcendental role of imagination as he moves from the subjective to the objective deduction. This transformation led to Kant to identify all acts of synthesis with the understanding including the figurative synthesis of imagination. To demonstrate his point, Makkreel adds that Kant identifies imagination with only one synthesis in the A-Deduction, namely, the synthesis of reproduction. More importantly, he points to the spatial dimensions of the figurative synthesis assumes in the B-Deduction and the higher emphasis Kant lays there on the outer sense versus the inner sense in the formation of cognition. Drawing on these two arguments, Makkreel shows that Heidegger was rather misled in his identification of transcendental imagination with primordial time. While I agree with Henrich and

[71] See Martin Heidegger. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (trans. Richard Tufts) (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997) p. 185

[72] See Rudolf Makkreel. *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990) p.20-25.

Makkreel that Heidegger's characterization of imagination is more in line with his own assumptions about the temporal constitutions of Da-sein in *Being and Time* than they are with Kant, I will show that Heidegger's interpretation of the three syntheses was correct. My analysis of the three syntheses along with my analysis of figurative synthesis and schematism in the following section will demonstrate that Heidegger was absolutely justified in associating imagination with time. However, contrary to Heidegger's thesis, I will claim that the temporal orientation of imagination demonstrates the harmony of the A-Deduction and B-Deduction inasmuch as each of them gives two obverse but not contradictory readings of the constitution of cognition in the theoretical attitude. In light of this claim I will demonstrate my above proposed thesis that imagination is the spontaneous faculty of meaning production in consciousness.

Time & the three syntheses

As indicated above, I would like to argue that the difference between the A-Deduction and the B-Deduction is essentially a difference between two presentations of the relation between categories and sensible intuitions. My key to the demonstration of this claim will be the role of time or the inner sense in both versions of the deduction. In this respect and as far as the A-Deduction is concerned, I will show that Heidegger's analysis of the three syntheses and their temporal orientation supports this claim. I will start with an examination of Kant's own account of the three syntheses and their role in constituting objective meaning in the A-Deduction.

At the beginning of the A-Deduction Kant introduces three synthetic acts which "contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind—*Gemüt*"[73] The first is associated with

[73] *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. A94/B127.

sense, the second with imagination and the third with apperception. He then defines them respectively as the syntheses of apprehension, production and recognition.

As far the synthesis of apprehension is concerned, Kant makes two important remarks. He immediately connects with time but in very general senses:

> Whenever our representations may arise, whether through the influence of external things or as the effect of inner causes, whether they have originated a priori or empirically as appearances—as modification of the mind they nevertheless belong to inner sense and as such all of our cognitions are in the end subjected to the formal conditions of inner sense, namely time…[74]

Kant argues that every intuition includes a manifold. This manifold is originally understood as a unity which in turn is based on a primordial synthesis. In other words a manifold is discretely discernible only based on the original act of synthesis—any analysis presupposes a synthesis, a point that was asserted continuously by Fichte about Kant. This original act of synthesis is the synthesis of apprehension and since every intuition is related to the inner sense or time, it is safe to conclude, as Heidegger did, that apprehension is in the a priori presentation of time as such. Kant then turns to the synthesis of reproduction in imagination. The mind can not unite to representation in a manifold if does have the capacity to retain and re-produce this every past representation whenever a new representation is given. This capacity must be a priori as well. It can not be merely empirical; otherwise it would haphazard and relative. In this respect, He writes:

> There must therefore be something that itself makes possible this reproduction of the appearances by being the a priori ground of a necessary unity of them.

Such reproduction is indeed possible for the representation of the intuition as a manifold in the inner sense. Thus Kant concludes that:

> The synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably combined with the synthesis of reproduction. And since the former constitutes the transcendental ground of the possibility of all cognition in general…the reproductive synthesis of imagination

[74] Ibid, p. A98-99

> belongs among the transcendental synthesis action of the mind and with respect to this we will also call this faculty the transcendental faculty of imagination[75]

Here Kant puts forward two important insights. First he asserts that the two syntheses are inseparable; so it appears that the synthesis of apprehension a priori pre-supposes the synthesis of reproduction. Second, Kant asserts that since the synthesis of apprehension constitutes the transcendental ground of all cognition in general then it also grounds imagination. Below I will show that the second insight will be reversed toward the end of the deduction and in the B-Deduction in particular.

Kant then introduces the synthesis of recognition in the concept: "Without consciousness that that which we think in the very same as what we thought a moment before, all reproduction would be vain."[76] This sameness in defined in terms of an object X which in turn is made possible through the transcendental unity of apperception. This transcendental sense of the self is what makes possible the unity of the representation in a single intuition. It thus makes both the synthesis of reproduction and thus the synthesis of apprehension possible. More importantly the transcendental unity of apperception makes possible the derivation of the categories or the pure concepts of the understanding. Before, I turn to this I would like to further examine the relation between the three syntheses.

According to Kant's own line of argument so far, the relation between the three syntheses is rather regressive. The synthesis of apprehension presupposes the synthesis of reproduction and the latter presupposes the synthesis of recognition. The synthesis of apprehension is still the a priori condition of all cognition. But the synthesis of recognition is essentially connected with the inner sense or time. Thus the transcendental unity of apperception and the reproductive synthesis of the imagination are also temporally oriented. Hence, Heidegger's general thesis about the temporality

[75] Ibid, p. A102
[76] Ibid. A103

of imagination and of all syntheses is correct even if his interpretation of it as primordial time is incorrect.

However, as Kant turn to the third section 'On the relation of the understanding to objects in general and the possibility of cognizing a priori', Kant adheres to the assertion to that the transcendental unity of apperception takes priority over all synthesis. This is mainly due to his interest in the demonstrating the applicability of the categories to sensible intuitions. However, his demonstration of such applicability is primarily undertaken in terms of the relation to the inner sense or time. This in a way set the stage to the transformation the argument of the transcendental deduction undergoes in the second edition of the critique. It is noteworthy here, that Heidegger was also right that ultimately the synthesis of recognition takes priority. However, such priority is not due to the fact that it is a projection of the future.

Kant makes this turn primarily because of the way the early part of the deduction was structured. The first presentation of the three syntheses in the first part of the deduction was mainly empirical. In the second part, Kant tries to show that the three syntheses primarily play a transcendental role. For instance, the synthesis of imagination is described as productive instead of reproductive given that there is no empirical intuition to be re-produced. This empirical presentation of the syntheses led Kant to start with the initial and presentation and then investigate its grounds in the two other syntheses namely that of re-production and that of recognition. Thus it is the starting point of the A-Deduction that sets it apart from the B-deduction. In the following section, I will show that the B-Deduction also has the same temporal orientation and that it is in line with the B-Deduction. This step will lead to two key conclusions. First it will show that, unlike the claim of Longueness, it is not that there

are two ways of demonstrating the applicability of the categories to the sensible intuitions. Rather judgment is an expression of a field consciousness and meaning that is constituted through the role of imagination. Second, I will show that this constitutive/semantic role of imagination is better spelled out in the B-Deduction. In this vein, I will also show that the temporal dimension of this role demonstrates the verity of the thesis posed about judgment and the fields of consciousness in Kant.

II.3 Figurative synthesis and the doctrine of schematism in the B-Deduction:

In the B-Deduction Kant continues his analysis of cognition along the same lines he started in the second part of the A-Deduction. He asserts that the transcendental unity of apperception is the condition of all cognition because:

> The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called objective on that account and must be distinguished from the subjective unity of consciousness which is a determination of inner sense, through which that manifold of intuition is empirically given for such combination.[77]

Here Kant puts the reason why he gives primacy to the transcendental unity of apperception over the other syntheses. It is mainly due to conceptual and intellectual orientation. Kant realized that the best way to respond to the main question of the transcendental analytic viz. the applicability of the categories to sensible intuitions is to anchor both component elements of cognition in an cognitive intellectual 'I' that must be predicated of propositions. This point was indicated by Allison who though gives an extensive argument for the discursive and cognitive nature of the transcendental unity of apperception in B-Deduction. However, he does not compare it to Kant's presentation of it in the A-Deduction and more importantly the implications of the section on schematism for the possible harmony between the presentation of the transcendental unity of apperception in the A-Deduction and the B-Deduction. The core of my argument in this section will be to show how Kant finds

[77] Ibid. B 139

himself forced to go back to the temporal orientation of the A-Deduction in the section in his argument on schematism. This was mainly due to the insufficiency of the objective argument for the demonstration of the constitutions of cognition in the theoretical attitude. This will in turn indicate the greater and indeed more constitutive role played by imagination in the B-Deduction. In order to fully demonstrate this thesis I will give a brief account of Kant's argument in the B-Deduction with special emphasis on the role assigned to transcendental imagination.

After making this central statement, Kant puts forward the justifications for it. In §§19-21 Kant shows that by establishing the transcendental unity of apperception as the a priori ground of all cognition, he apodictically demonstrates the application of the categories to sensible intuitions. In this context he gives a rather illustrative example:

> …Bodies are heavy. By that, to be sure, I do not mean to say that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but rather that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthesis of intuitions, i.e. in accordance with principles of the objective determination of all representations insofar as cognition can come from them, which principles are all derived from the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception. Only in this way does there arise from this relation a judgment, i.e. a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently distinguished from the relation of these same representations in which there would be only subjective validity, e.g. in accordance with the laws of association[78]

This quote fully illustrates the orientational shift of Kant's argument in the B-Deduction. It also fully explains the positions of Allison and Longuenesse in giving primacy to the B-Deduction and overcoming the problems associated with the A-Deduction. The main reason why the transcendental unity of apperception has to be given primacy is because it is the origin of judgment. Such originary relation is represented by the *copula* in the judgment as Kant himself asserts.[79] To put it more clearly the transcendental unity of apperception points to the deductive and hence

[78] Ibid. B 142
[79] Ibid. B 141

necessary nature of all judgments. However, this notion of judgment, as Allison himself admits is rather formalistic; it is judgment on a purely formal and discursive level. This also gives the impression that judgment or the logical path of the demonstration of the applicability of the categories to sensible intuitions is to be contrasted with the demonstration based on synthesis in the A deduction. This interpretation is further supported by Kant's claim that the A-Deduction had a subjective orientation.

However, Kant realizes that there must be a link that mediates transcendentally between the categories and the sensible intuitions in order to establish the apodictic validity of judgments. This link, as Makkreel asserts, is the imagination. Imagination undertakes this role through a productive synthesis—which is already indicated toward the end of the A-Deduction. Kant calls this synthesis: figurative or *synthesis speciosa* and distinguishes it from the *synthesis intellectualis* which is carried out by the understanding alone.[80] In this context imagination is defined as the faculty of "representing an object even without its presence in intuition."[81] This characterization fits the description of its role as productive rather than reproductive. Such productive role is more connected to the outer sense than it was in the A-Deduction. While Kant still insists on the temporal orientation imagination, Kant asserts and expounds on the spatial dimensions of the figurative synthesis. Makkreel explains this shift towards the outer sense as follows:

> Inner sense may be more inclusive than outer sense because it can incorporate all the contents of the latter, but it derives its determination from its relation to objects of outers. Even the concept of succession which in the A edition seemed a primitive temporal concept, turns out in the B edition to be inseparable from space.[82]

---

[80] Ibid. B 151
[81] Ibid. B 151
[82] See Rudolf Makkreel. *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990. p.32

The reason underlying this new orientation is that Kant at this point was interested in showing how imagination could formally and transcendentally mediate between sensible intuitions and understanding. It was an *externalization* rather than an *internalization* as in the case of the A-Deduction. In other words, the A-Deduction was more concerned about the intuitions are internalized through a threefold synthetic process and then forged into concepts that are related to each other in temporally. The B-Deduction by contrast, is proceeding from the logical conditions defined deductively in connection with the transcendental unity of apperception to the derivation of the possibility of objects. Thus the second part of the B-Deduction as Allison rightly remarks is concerned with the applicability of the categories to human sensibility and not to sensibility in general. This second part is mainly devoted to the role of imagination in undertaking this task. In this context, the temporal dimension of imagination re-surfaces anew and Kant gives a thorough analysis, as Allison shows, of how the figurative synthesis constitutes the synthesis of apprehension in intuition again.

In the first chapter of the Transcendental Doctrine of Judgment on schmatism, Kant writes:

> The schema of a pure concept of the understanding, on the contrary, is something that can never be brought to an image at all, but is rather only the pure synthesis, in accord with a rule of unity according to concepts in general, which the category expresses, and is a transcendental product of the imagination which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general in accordance with conditions of its form (time) in regard to all representations, insofar as these are to be connected together a priori in one concept in accord with the unity of apperception[83]

According to this statement, schematism which defines the use of judgments, if we accept Allison's thesis, is made possible through the temporal role of the imagination. Temporality again surfaces as the key for understanding the constitution

[83] Ibid. A142/B181

of cognition in the theoretical attitude. Thus Kant gives an extensive temporal analysis of the applicability of the categories to sensible intuitions.[84]

This leads to the point I indicated earlier in the section. The doctrine of schematism shows that Kant realized that the logical/judgment thread, to use Longuenesse language, of demonstrating the applicability of the categories to sensible intuition must also be understood in terms of the temporal constitution of cognition. This temporal constitution, in turn, is mainly associated with imagination. This finding supports Heidegger thesis about the temporal orientation of the deductions and the general understanding of the meaning of the 'transcendental' in Kant, which will be extensively discussed later. However, this does not mean that Kant repudiated his original thesis in the B-Deduction. To the contrary, I would like to argue that the two deductions are in harmony with each other. The A edition of the deduction presents the constitution of cognition in the theoretical attitude as it occurs immediately in experience. This is why the transcendental unity of apperception emerges at the end both as a condition of cognition necessary for both the synthesis of imagination and that of sense and at the same time as a product of the mutual relation between the intellectual and sensible in the theoretical attitude. The B edition of the deduction tries to respond in a decisive manner to the question of the applicability of the categories to sensible intuition by demonstrating their logical unity in the transcendental unity of apperception. However, such logical unity was never sufficient to exclude the temporal dimension that constitutes the kernel of synthesis that makes cognition possible in the theoretical attitude. Hence it is not that there are two alternative ways of showing the applicability of the categories to the sensibility in general and human sensibility in particular as Longuenesse argues. Rather, there are

[84] Ibid. A142-145/B182-184

two ways of presenting the possibility of this relation in the constitution of cognition in the theoretical attitude. The description of the A presentation as subjective, I would like to argue, focuses on the fact that it demonstrates the way the subject is constituted in cognition in the theoretical attitude. By contrast, the B presentation was described as objective because it focuses on the constitution of objects in cognition in the theoretical attitude.

But in what way does this inform our discussion of imagination and its role constituting judgment and hence consciousness in the different attitudes? This is what I will briefly discuss in the following section that concludes this chapter.

§III. Conclusion: Imagination and the constitution of meaning in consciousness

In more than one place in the A and B editions of the deduction, Kant associates imagination with the understanding. Many commentators, specifically those who insist that the B deduction supersedes rather than give an alternative presentation of the A deduction like Allison and Longuenesse, insist that this shows the primacy Kant ultimately concedes to the logical component of cognition over the sensible experiential component or the Analytic over the Aesthetic. However, based on the reading I advanced above, I believe that there is an alternative interpretation of such identification. The key to this alternative interpretation is the complementary rather than contrasting relation between judgment and imagination that is, I believe, absolutely incorrectly and unjustifiably proposed by Longuenesse. In Chapter 2, I have shown that the identification of thinking with consciousness with judgment in the 'Transcendental Analytic' could justifiably be interpreted in terms of a unifying theory of consciousness. I have demonstrated that the three rather loaded terms are simply identified by Kant because they express different dimensions and facets of theoretical consciousness. Building on this thesis and my analysis of judgment in the

Critique of Judgment, I have argued that judgment is essentially the expression of the consciousness based on the attitude of the subject of experience. In the first *Critique*, which is primarily concerned with the theoretical attitude and the constitution of cognition and knowledge theoretically, judgment is just the expression of the spontaneity of the understanding. The meaning of such expression is determined through the role of imagination. Imagination as Makkreel and other commentators have argued is the faculty responsible for the determination of objective meaning. Such determination in the theoretical attitude achieved against the temporal horizon. The temporal horizon is essential in this attitude because, as Kant has shows in the 'Transcendental Aesthetic', is the primary form of intuition that could relate representation to the subject and thus to the categories. Hence, inasmuch as Kant assigns all synthesis to imagination in the B-deduction Kant also identifies imagination with the understanding as such simply because only through imagination and its temporal synthesis such cognition and consciousness is made possible. This is further supported by Kant claims with regard to schematism. Imagination constitutes determinant meaning through a temporal synthesis. The end product or expression of this synthesis is determinant judgment which defines consciousness in the theoretical attitude. But how does imagination constitute meaning in the reflective attitude? This will be the subject matter of the two following chapters. It suffices here to have demonstrated that for Kant imagination is the meaning-producing faculty in consciousness.

Chapter 4

Aesthetic Judgment and everyday historical consciousness

§I. Prelude:

In the two previous chapters I demonstrated the relation between judgment and the constitution of meaning in different subjective attitudes. Chapter 2 demonstrated the connection between judgment, consciousness, and meaning in Kant's transcdental system in general. It also showed the primacy of aesthetic reflective judgment in light of its role in harmonizing the two main domains of reason and the understanding and the two modes of subjectivity associated with each versus teleological reflective judgment which is only concerned with this harmony as far as representing nature as a system and not a mere aggregate of laws is concerned. Chapter 3 demonstrated the role of imagination in constituting judgment and hence meaning and consciousness in every subjective attitude; it was shown that the imagination is essentially the meaning-constituting faculty in Kant's system. The role of imagination in constituting determinant versus reflective meaning was thus fleshed out in brief.

In this chapter I will discuss the relation between historicity and the meaning of the historical in Kant's system on one hand and aesthetic judgment on the other hand. The investigations of this chapter will be further reinforced through the analysis of the structure of aesthetic judgment discussed in the next chapter. The first section of this chapter will address the origins of the question of history in Kant. It will undertake this investigation regressively through a deconstruction of Hegel's argument showing how Hegel's conception of history, being the key philosopher of history in the Idealistic tradition relies on Kant fundamental distinction between realm of nature and that of freedom. The analysis put forward will demonstrate the key

differences between Kant and Hegel on the question of history and the relation between aesthetic judgment and the question of history and the historical in Kant's system. The second section will then point out the discrepancy that emerges between the origin of the question of history and the significance of the historical turn in Kant and Kant's writings about the trajectory of human history. Through the dissection of Kant's famous essay *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose*, this section will show Kant's conception of history and historicity is inextricably related to the problem of harmonizing the domain of reason with that of the understanding. Based on this assertion, the connection between historicity and the meaning of historical occurrence on one hand and aesthetic judgment on the other hand will be demonstrated.

§II. From Hegel back to Kant: a regressive argument about the origin of the problem of history and the question of human subjectivity as a whole

II.1: Preliminary sketch of the problem of history:

It is customary to deem the emergence of the historical perspective in 18th century German thought in particular and modern philosophy in general coeval with the philosophy of Johann Gottfried Herder. By the historical the perspective, I mean the view that holds, contrary to classical and medieval scholastic essentialism, that all epistemological, ontological, aesthetic and axiological claims of philosophy are a function of the historical period in which they emerge. This view found a more profound articulation in Dilthey's philosophy of the human sciences and then Heidegger's hermeneutical phenomenology. In other words, the historical perspective or turn in philosophy strongly challenges claims like that of Leibniz for instance about a *mathesis universalis* that defines the essence of reality and knowledge irrespective of the historical dimension in which it is discovered and formulated. According to this view, as Ameriks explains, two radically opposed positions are often identified in

modern German philosophy: "the classical and largely ahistorical tradition, which culminates in Kant's system of 'pure reason' and the post-Kantian tradition, which is defined by an insistence (for example in Schelling, Hegel, and Friedrich Schlegel) on paying very close attention to history and the limitations of so-called pure reason."[85] This historical perspective poses, as Carr argues a serious challenge to the transcendental condition as much as it searches for "…the concepts or rules which render experience and knowledge possible and condition the way in which the world is given to us"[86] and assumes that "such structures are…unchanging or ahistorical."[87] Further, the attempt to define the conditions of the possibility of historical knowledge would, as Carr continues to argue an "…attempt to draw the fangs of history, to render it harmless, and precisely not to take it seriously…"[88] For all this would only prove that transcendental philosophy is "…unable to admit the importance of history or historicity into its account…"[89]

In this section I would like to strongly contest this ahistorical categorization of Kant. I will start with a destruction of the origin of the idea of history in Hegel who is often duly credited for synthesizing Reinhold's historical insights in his developmental interpretation of the history of philosophy along with Fichte's insights into the idealistic structure of consciousness into a systematic philosophy of history. In this respect I will show that this origin has its roots in Kant transcendental system. More importantly, I will show that this origin is inextricably related to the problem of defining the human subjectivity as a whole in Kant's system. Based on these, findings, I will show that it is plausible to claim that Kant like Dilthey and Heidegger

[85] See Karl Ameriks. *Kant and the Historical Turn* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 3.
[86] See David Carr. *Phenomenology and the Problem of History* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. xix.
[87] Ibid, p. xix.
[88] Ibid, p. xxx.
[89] Ibid, p. xxx.

saw human subjectivity as a whole as essentially historical. In turn this view of history is neither based on defining some conditions of the possibility for historical knowledge nor is it lending itself to pure historical relativism. It rather tries to strike a midway between pure structural essentialism and historical relativism; it does not deny the effects of historical change but asserts that such change is always interacting with the fundamental ideas of reason. As such it could be argued that Kant defined 'historicity' as an essential fundamental of human subjectivity as a whole rather than trying to construct a transcendental philosophy of history based on the ahistorical structures of subjectivity. The latter, the ahistorical, pertains, as will be shown to the two dimensions of subjectivity defined by the first and second *Critiques*. However, the only possibility of their harmonization *must* be historical. In doing so I align myself with the position of Ameriks in *Kant and the Historical Turn* that Kant maintains a stance that allows for the importance of historical facts but 'holds back' from historical relativism.

II.2: History and the problem of freedom and necessity in Hegel's *Reason and History*:

II.2.1: Reinhold and the 'historical turn': engaging Ameriks's thesis

In §3 of the introduction to *Kant and the Historical Turn*, Ameriks argues that Reinhold, being influenced by both Kant's critical project and Herder's insights into the philosophy of history, became interested in reconciling both. This interest was manifested in his attempt to defend Kant's highly complex critical system by showing its relevance to common sense and above all its relevance to the historical period. Indeed, as Ameriks mentions, Reinhold was the first to express interest in studying the history of philosophy inasmuch as he believed that "…philosophers must pay very close attention to the specific 'spirit of the age' at each step, for this is the crucial

precondition for the creation and reception of significant philosophical work…"[90] However, unlike Herder he still believed in the validity of universal structural systems of philosophy. This is also clear in his philosophy of consciousness as he presented it in the *Beiträge*. There he put a forward a developmental analysis of consciousness and its acts that he thought was the required improvement on Kant's system (especially as far as defending it against the charge of Berkeleyan Idealism). This analysis of consciousness and conscious representation ultimately served as the main inspiration for the Fichte's and then Schelling's and Hegel's systems of Idealism. The Reinholdian view, as Ameriks contends, was the first attempt to grope a way between relativistic historicism and ahistorical transcendental systems with and their claims to universality. According to this Reinholdian option, Ameriks concludes that:

> …what distinguished most of philosophy and its history is a structure that manifests neither timeless clarity nor sheer chaos but rather a complex kind of *hermeneutical* progress, one wherein each generation has a chance of genuinely advancing from previous philosophical discussions by enriching them with concrete improvements that are introduced through an explicit reconsideration of their precise relation to a sequence of actual past alternatives…[91]

Ameriks's conclusion about philosophy and its history is definitely supported by the way the Reinholdian view was received by and developed by the idealists especially Hegel. However, the fundamental motivation that derives that hermeneutical process still remains unexplained.

Below I will show that the fundamental motivation underlying the hermeneutical process that drives philosophy and its reception is grounded in Kant's reformulation of the relation between theoretical and practical philosophy in terms of his critical investigation of the constitution of subjectivity in these two domains in the first and second *Critiques* respectively. I will demonstrate that Reinhold's attempt to find a midway between historicism and essentialism is fundamentally grounded in

[90] See Karl Ameriks. *Kant and the Historical Turn.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 8.
[91] Ibid, p.11.

Kant's fundamental distinction of the sensible from the supersensible and the two senses of subjectivity that correspond to each. Based on this I will argue that such interest in the history of philosophy and the historical reception of philosophy is ingrained in Kant's implicit definition of the historical. As has been discussed in chapter 1 the division of philosophy itself into theoretical and practical is founded on the division of the faculties of the experiencing subject. The harmonizing of the two through reflective judgment and specifically through aesthetic reflective judgment will thus emerge as the essence of historicity and historical being as such. Thus what was represented in Reinhold's and then later Hegel as the foundation for a philosophy of history and a history of philosophy is in itself rooted in the Kant's delineation of the structure of subjectivity. Consequently, and against Ameriks claims, it is not that the 'historical turn' emerged as a result of the attempts to explain Kant's philosophy. Rather, it was Kant himself who defined in an indirect way a vision of history that inspired the discovery of what Ameriks designates as the Reinholdian view of the hermeneutical process of doing and receiving philosophy. More importantly, the findings of this section open up a new way of defending transcendental philosophy against the charge of being completely ahistorical. If the claims made so far are valid, and if the thread of argument in this section is also valid, then the conclusion of the transcendental system in the *Critique of Judgment* defines historicity and historical existence as much as it shows the way the supersensible and the sensible could be harmonized. If this is true and if as Ameriks claims philosophy after Reinhold took a historical turn based on the discovery of its *hermeneutical* nature, then it could be argued that not only is the foundation of this hermeneutical nature was furnished for Reinhold in Kant's system but that Kant system offer a view of the fundamental

historical nature of man and knowledge that preceded and perhaps could overcome many problems in the thought of thinkers like Dilthey and Heidegger.

In order to demonstrate this thesis, the analysis in this subsection will proceed backwardly starting with an analysis of Hegel's foundation of the philosophy of history and going back to Kant.

III.2.2: Hegel's spirit and nature and Kant's division of philosophy

In the introduction to the *Philosophy of History,* Hegel defines history as "…the progress of the consciousness of freedom…"[92] According to Hegel, the consciousness of freedom is essentially the work/action of the Spirit *(Geist)*; Spirit in turn is the realm of the human per se. Hegel writes:

> After the creation of nature, appears Man. He constitutes the antithesis to the natural world; he is the being that lifts itself up to the second world. We have in our universal consciousness two realms, the realms of nature and the realm of man. One may have all sorts of ideas about the Kingdom of God; but it is always a realm of Spirit to be realized and brought about in man…the realm of Spirit of is all comprehensive; it includes everything that ever has interest or ever will interest man. Man is active in it; whatever he does, he is the creature within which Spirit works. Hence it is of interest in the course of history to learn to know spiritual nature in its existence, that is the point where Spirit and Nature unite, namely human nature.[93]

The idea of freedom is introduced and defined in the context of the contrast Hegel draws between Spirit and Nature; Hegel writes:

> The nature of Spirit may be understood by a glance at its direct opposite—Matter. The essence of matter is gravity, the essence of Spirit—its substance—is Freedom…philosophy teaches us that all the properties exist only through Freedom. All are but means of attaining Freedom; all seek and produce this and alone. It is an insight of speculative philosophy that Freedom is the sole truth of Spirit… Spirit is Being-within-itself (self contained) But this is precisely Freedom…[94]

Freedom is then further qualified in connection with God and providence:

> Freedom alone is the purpose which realizes and fulfills itself, the only enduring pole in the change of events and conditions, the only truly efficient principle that pervades the whole. This final aim is God's purpose with the world. But God is the absolutely perfect Being and can, therefore, will nothing but Himself, His own will. The nature

[92] See George Wilhelm Hegel. *Reason in History* (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1953) , p. 24.
[93] Ibid. p. 20
[94] Ibid. p. 22

> of his own will, His own nature is what we here call the Idea of freedom. Thus we translated the language of religion into that of philosophy.[95]

In addition to being the efficient cause of history, Hegel also deems freedom the final cause of history. Being so, it is also the realization of God and divine providence in history. The motive for man to realize this ultimate purpose in history is passion. Hegel defines passion as follows:

> Passion is the absolute unity of the individual unity of the individual character and the universal…[96]

Great men, subjects of history, are motivated by this pure sense of passion to realize the universal and overcome the particular (the particular manifested in the particular interests of individuals). Passion is the desire to fulfill the reason or the divine in man inasmuch as it seeks to supersede the particular and contain it by the universal idea or freedom. The ultimate statement and expression of the universal idea, is the state:

> The universal idea manifest itself in the state… The manifestation of Spirit is its actual determination and this is the element of its concrete nature…[97]

Thus the State is the ultimate expression of freedom which, as has been indicated above, is the essence of Spirit. Since Freedom is in and of itself the essence of God and His providence, Hegel concludes that: "The state is the divine Idea as it exists on earth." He then goes further to conclude that the citizen who obeys the law achieves his ultimate freedom:

> Only the will that obeys the law is free, for it obeys itself and being in itself, is free. In so far as the state our country constitute the community of existence, and as the subjective will of man subjects itself to the laws, the antithesis of freedom and necessity disappears[98]

Piecing these statements together we can construct a portrait of Hegel's vision of history. History is essentially defined in terms of the strife of the Spirit to actualize

---

[95] Ibid, p. 23
[96] Ibid, p. 42
[97] Ibid, p. 51
[98] Ibid, p. 53

itself against or more precisely *in* its antithesis, namely, nature. This struggle is also manifested in the strife of the universal idea of freedom that stems from the divine in man viz. reason to overcome the particular actions of man that result from his natural physical inclinations. As such history and the 'historical' is the attempt to realize what is rationally transcendent and universal in the realm of nature. This is what Hegel means when he claims that the 'spiritual' in existence is "…the point where Spirit and Nature unite…" But Hegel Further qualifies this claim as we have seen in the quote above. He argues that the point where spirit and nature unite is "…human nature…" History and the historical occurrence are thus equated with human nature; they are equated inasmuch as they represent the intersection and unity of Spirit and Nature. Accordingly, human nature consists in the strife to unite Spirit and Nature and as such is historical. This strife progressively proceeds towards the ultimate purpose of the realization of freedom, the essence of Spirit (or God or Reason as the in and for itself). This realization means actualizing freedom and turning it from pure abstract reflection into a concrete existence in the spatial-temporal world. Such realization, as we have seen, is nothing other than the State. The state, and more precisely the nation state, is the ultimate superseding *(Aufhebung)* of the particular by the universal. Through its laws, it defines the contours of culture, morality and religion of a certain people and as such demonstrates how the Idea of Freedom as a self-contained essence can be actualized in concretely. Upon this interpretation, the trilogy 'culture, religion and morality' constitute the unity of Spirit and Nature as much as they are manifested in a nation State. This trilogy also represents the capacity of the universal to supersede the particular. The individual achieves his ultimate freedom through his abidance by the laws of the State. For these laws essentially embody the ultimate essence of

invidicual freedom in the purest form, i.e. in the freest way possible from the particular inclinations of the individual (which are part of natural necessity).

The only problem that Hegel seems to assume without actually tackling is the problem of the relation between the antitheses of Spirit and Nature or freedom and necessity on the individual level. All what he does is to simply assume that given that Freedom defines the ultimate essence of the divine in man, then it must be the case that freedom will be the guiding telos of the progress of events. Hegel completely overlooked that the antithesis of Spirit and Nature, according to his own assertion, will continue to be play a role in the life of every human being. Hence, the pursuit of achieving their unity will constantly be a purpose that governs every human life. Further, even though he admits at the end of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that the duality of the in-itself and the for-itself will always be the at the core of human consciousness, his analysis of history seems to quite ignore this assertion. Even if the trajectory of the historical progress toward freedom is granted, the question as to how the historical consciousness of freedom will be actualized for every individual subject is not at all answered. In other words the question as to how the every subject is going to have a consciousness that reconciles freedom with necessity and unites them is completely left unanswered. Therefore, Hegel does not give an answer to the question as to how the in and for itself could be retained or more precisely harmonized in historical consciousness, especially that such consciousness as we have seen constitutes the essence of human nature.

The assertion that the unity of the freedom and necessity constitutes the essence of the human is as also fundamental to Schelling's analysis in the *Inquiry into Human Nature*, Fichte's *Science of Knowledge* and above all Reinhold's *Beiträge*. But this understanding of the fundamental nature of human subjectivity as a whole is

evidently grounded in Kant's transcendental system. As explained in chapter 1, Kant associates the domain of the understanding and that of reason with two senses of subjectivity. The former domain involves the necessary construction of the world according to the categories of the understanding. The latter is the domain of absolute positive freedom afforded to the rational subject through the complete transcendence of reason. The harmony of both constitutes the whole of human subjectivity. The duality of freedom and necessity was thus defined in terms of the structure of subjectivity for the first time in Kant. Where Hegel goes ahead of Kant is to give a more elaborate account of history in light of this duality.[99] However, in light of the claims made in Chapters 2 and 3, if reflective judgment constitutes the consciousness and space of meaning that harmonizes the realm of natural experience with that of freedom then Kant opens up a different possibility for conceiving the history. Instead of assuming a dialectical view of the development of consciousness and then superimposing this assumption on the trajectory of history as Hegel does, Kant's system of judgment and meaning that is essentially a function of the subjective attitude in experience makes it possible to conceive of the fundamental constitution of historical consciousness or more precisely the condition of historical existence. Hegel's system of history as much as his idealistic system of consciousness had to be a closed system. The assumption Hegel makes in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that every moment of consciousness is superseded by another until the absolute subject realizes that truth is in its positing of the antithesis of the in-itself and the for-itself when projected on history necessarily leads to the suppression of the individual under the universal. By contrast, Kant's system makes two assertions that save it from this determinism: first, it establishes the ground of the distinction between nature and

[99] As will be shown below, Kant does define history in terms of this duality.

freedom in the structure of subjectivity itself; second, it associates each of the two domains with a different field of consciousness and meaning that are then harmonized into a new one through the work of aesthetic reflective judgment. Through these two assertions Kant's system achieves three main advantages over Hegel's. First it establishes the philosophical ground for historicity rather than assuming a structure of consciousness and then re-constructing history based on it. Second, it furnishes solid basis for the constitution of individual historical consciousness. Third, it does not force a necessary trajectory of historical development. For Kant purposiveness, as will be discussed in detail later, is just a principle that guides the constitution of aesthetic everyday meaning and not an a priori condition of the development of history. In other words purposiveness is part and parcel of the historical structure of subjectivity rather than being a structuralist assumption about history.

Even if a Hegelian argues that Hegel admits that historical consciousness inasmuch as it is manifested in culture encompasses the interactive relation between spirit and nature or freedom and necessity, still the above criticism would still hold. Hegel's assertion—which is in turn based on his idealistic system of consciousness—that the individual must be subsumed under the universal let alone his complete failure to identify the conditions of historicity rather assuming a structural assumption, gives Kant system a significant advantage over him as far as defining the problem of history in terms of the duality of freedom and necessity.

To sum up then, the analysis of Hegel's philosophical definition of the historical and its relation to human nature led us back to the problem of defining human subjectivity as a whole in Kant's system. According to this view, history is essentially the attempt to fulfil the divine idea of freedom which is the essence of God and Spirit in the realm of nature. The critique of Hegel's monolithic system of

philosophy and consciousness in comparison with the view presented above of the threefold relation between judgment, consciousness and subjective attitude in Kant's dualistic system demonstrated the advantage the latter has the over the former.

Thus the above analysis of Hegel's conception of history especially in view of its connection with the question of human nature led back to the problem of harmonizing determinant necessary judgments about nature with the positive idea of freedom and God which for Kant defines, as has explained above, the holy essence of man. Inasmuch as this problem is connected with the problem of harmonizing the domains of reason and understanding then it is safe to conclude that history is connected with reldective judgment. But reflective judgment has two species: the aesthetic and the teleological. In the course of the discussion above most of the references were made only to the aesthetic and not the teleological species of judgment? In harmonizing the super-sensible with the sensible, teleological judgment tends to be based on a determinant purpose that is projected as an end of nature. In this sense, it would lead to pre-determined conception of history that does not incorporate the constantly shifting horizon of historical occurrence. In essence, it would lead back to the problem for which Hegel's and similar conceptions of history have been criticized. By contrast, as will be argued in chapter 5, aesthetic judgment is concerned with the human as such and is thus more related to the problem of defining the human as a whole. In addition the free lawful play of the imagination through aesthetic judgment and meaning is determined gives more flexibility in defining historicity as constituent of human subjectivity rather than defining history based on an idealistically determined purpose. Therefore, it could be safely concluded that for the purpose of defining historicity as a component of human subjectivity in Kant's system, the aesthetic rather the teleological judgment should be considered. These

findings led to preliminary conclusions about the advantage Kant system has over its Hegelian counterpart in furnishing the ground for the historicity and, through this, leaving more room for the role and significance of individual historical consciousness. But to what extent did Kant define history and the 'historical' in this sense? The next section will respond to this question through a brief examination of Kant's main writings on history.

§III. Kant and History:

Unlike Hegel, Kant does not explicitly define history from a philosophical stance let alone connect it fully with the problem of harmonizing reason and understanding and the two senses of subjectivity associated with each. Hence, the conclusion made above about the relation between aesthetic judgment and historical consciousness and meaning can not be explicitly found in any of Kant's writings on history. Nonetheless, this does not mean that there is no trace in Kant's though of the conception of history in terms of the intersection between the transcendence of reason and freedom on one hand and nature and its necessary structure on the other. The opening sentences of Kant's famous essay *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* give us an interesting clue:

> Whatever conception of the freedom of the will one may form in terms of metaphysics, the will's manifestation in the world of phenomena i.e. human actions are determined in accordance with natural laws, as is every other natural event. History is concerned with giving an account of these phenomena no matter how deeply concealed their causes may be and it allows us to hope that, if it examines the free exercise of the human will on a large scale, it will be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions.[100]

In the first sentence Kant acknowledges the problem of the dichotomy between freewill as the *causa noumenon* of human actions and phenomenal manifestations of these actions as much as he does in the first *Critique*. However, this

[100] See Immanuel Kant. *Political Writings* (trans. H. B. Nisbet). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 41.

essay, like most of the historical writings of Kant, was written the period that preceded the publication of the *Critique of Judgment.*[101] Hence, Kant did not either incorporate the role of reflective judgment in addressing this problem and the way it could be related to history and historicity as a fundamental structure of subjectivity. Despite this position, Kant clearly defines the core of history in terms of the same duality that Hegel uses.

In the second sentence Kant defines history as an account the phenomenal manifestation of human actions. But these phenomena are determined according to natural laws. Thus history is essentially an account of human actions as far as they are represented in accordance with natural laws. In the second sentence, Kant hopes that since all of these actions are caused by human free will, history should be progressing towards the realization of the ultimate purpose of such will. But history is nothing but the account of human actions as they are manifested in accordance with natural laws. Thus if there is a purposive progression in history it seems that it has to be attributed to nature. Indeed Kant almost immediately makes this claim:

> Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by *nature*…The only way for the philosopher, since he cannot assume that mankind follows any rational purpose of its own in its collective actions is for him to attempt to discover a purpose in *nature* behind this senseless course of human events and decide whether it is after all possible to formulate in terms of a definite plan of *nature* a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own.[102]

In this paragraph Kant seems to come very close to Hegel's view. As a matter of fact the rest of this essay tries to give a teleological reading of history based on the

---

[101] This essay along with Kant's other famous essays '*Was ist das Aufklärung?*' were published in 1784. They put forward almost the same thesis. The *'Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan purpose'* was chosen because it is the clearest and most comprehensive in its scope. Other essays that address the question of history were published after the *Critique of Judgment* in 1790 like *Zum ewigen Frieden: Ein Philosophischer Entwurf* (1795), *Streit der Fakultäten* (1798) and *Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Rechtslehre* (1798). However, Kant continued to maintain the same approach to history in these essays without any attempt to incorporate the findings of the third *Critique* in his investigations

[102] Ibid, p. 41.

purposiveness of nature. In the third proposition Kant argues that nature gave the human being free will and reason and in the course of the remaining eight propositions of the essay he tries to prove that nature has a plan to actualize such freedom in the form of a cosmopolitan kingdom of ends through a series of antitheses.[103] This argument holds if and only if the assumption that nature and reason are in harmony with each other. For this reason, Kant asserts toward the end of the essay that trajectory he projected about the plan nature intends for history is not intended as:

> …a universal history, which to some extent follows an *a priori* rule, to supersede the task of history proper, that of empirical composition. My idea is only a notion of what a philosophical mind, well acquainted with history, might be abler to attempt from a different angle.[104]

The radical difference between Hegel's system of history and that of Kant's becomes quite evident in this last proposition. The narrative Kant presents of the plan nature intends for history as the aggregate of the phenomenal manifestations of human actions is not intended in the sense of an ultimate necessary universal history.[105] It's rather an attempt to put forward a philosophical reading of history. Therefore, unlike Hegel, Kant does not attempt to give a view of the necessary development of history based on an idealistic structure, as Hegel does based on his monolithic theory of consciousness. Yet, Kant accepts the possibility of having a philosophical reflection of history that can bear some validity. But what does this philosophical reflection on history mean for Kant? Further and even more importantly to the core thesis of this

---

[103] Ibid, p. 43-4.
[104] Ibid, p. 53.
[105] In contrast with Hegel, Kant even asserts that his statements regarding the progressive trajectory of human history toward the realization of freedom are merely conjectural. In the course of his examination of the claim regarding the continuous progress of the human race in the *Conflict of Faculties*, Kant writes: "Even if it were found that the human race as a whole had been moving forward and progressing for an indefinitely long time, no one could guarantee that its era of decline was not beginning at that very moment, by virtue of the physical character of our race…For we are dealing with freely acting beings to whom one can dictate in advance what they ought to do, but of whom one can not predict what they actually do…". See Ibid, p. 180.

essay, how can nature be as such purposive for Kant? The guiding thread to respond to these two key questions is found in the introduction to the third *Critique.*

As has been discussed in chapter 1, Kant maps the division of philosophy against the division of the faculties of human mind (thinking, desiring and feeling). It was also explained that the word *Gemüt* that is often translated as mind is rather generic and that its use particularly in 18th century German thought was mainly in reference to all acts of consciousness (whether cognitive or affective).[106] Kant then shows the harmony between the classical division of philosophy into theoretical and practical with the task accomplished by the first and second *Critiques.* The third *Critique* is then introduced as the transcendental approach to the third, often overlooked, faculty of feeling/affectivity inasmuch as it harmonizes the two other faculties. Thus a critique of judgment completes a philosophical program as much as reflective judgment harmonizes theoretical knowledge concerned essentially with experience and through moral transcendent maxims that govern desire into an affective whole of human subjectivity. Therefore, philosophy for Kant is essentially the inquiry into the different domains of subjectivity and the fields of consciousness and meaning associated with each. Philosophy is thus inextricably related to the structure of human subjectivity as is the case in Hegel's system. The major difference between Kant's and Hegel's systems consists in the insistence of Kant on separating different species of subjectivity that constitutes the human whole and the relation among them versus the insistence of Hegel following Reinhold and Fichte on defining all subjective attitudes in terms of the fundamental rule of identity.

In light of this definition of philosophy we can try to re-construct what Kant would essentially mean by a philosophical reading of history. To philosophically

[106] See the extensive discussion of the use of the word *Gemüt* in Kant and the main German authors around him in footnote no.1 in chapter 1.

interpret history is essentially to explore the relation between the domains of reason and the understanding and how they are harmonized in history. But history as we have seen above is defined as the phenomenal manifestation of human actions caused by the free will. Philosophical interpretation of history is thus the exploration of the way freedom may be harmonized with the necessary structure nature. But this task is in itself the task of reflective judgment. Of the two species of reflective judgment, aesthetic judgment is the one that can best manifest the influence of the super-sensible on the sensible. This point was demonstrated in Chapter 2; in addition, it has been shown that aesthetic is more concerned with inherently human. If this is the case and if our interest is to define the condition of historicity for the human subject, then such historicity should aptly be thought in aesthetic judgment. However, as indicated above, this does not exclude the possibility of a teleological reading of history. The only problem with the teleological interpretation of history is that it will give a determinate and in a way ahistorical structuralist reading of history. Aesthetic meaning being based on the free lawful play of the imagination allows for the incorporation of historical difference and relativity. Thereofore a philosophical interpretation of history that reflects the condition of historicity rather than superimposing a determinate telos on history should be the task of aesthetic and not teleological reflective judgment. To philosophically reflect on history can thereby mean to explore how aesthetic judgment manifest the influence of the super-sensenbile on the sensible or freedom on nature. This philosophical task, according to the argument of Chapter 1, in coincides with the way human subjectivity as a whole is constituted in Kant. Accordingly history and historicity is not only a fundamental constituent of human subjectivity but also philosophy, as far as the transcendental project is concerned, is in and of itself essentially historical.

However, two objections may be raised to the above conclusions. First, why did not Kant explicitly formulate the relation between philosophy and history in this way? Secondly, why did Kant give such a trajectory of history as a whole instead of focusing on historicity as a fundamental structure of subjectivity? As for the first objection, the most immediate answer is that most of Kant's major writings on history were composed and published before writing the third *Critique* and presenting it as the conclusion of his critical project. These historical writings were thus preliminary attempts to approach history in light of his transcendental system and at the same time respond to the rising interest in the relation between history and philosophy under the influence of the writings of Herder's historicism. With regards to the second objection, the argument made in the first chapter should suffice to respond to it. As mentioned there, the problem of harmonizing the two senses of subjectivity that are associated with the domain of reason and that of the understanding was touched upon rather briefly by Kant in the *Metaphysics of Morals.* The third *Critique* was mainly concerned with harmonizing the domain of reason and that of the understanding inasmuch as the former must have an influence on the second. The problem of defining human subjectivity as a whole was explicitly articulated in transcendental philosophy by the Idealists and then by Heidegger as explained above. Accordingly in the Kant's writings on history were mainly concerned with demonstrating the possible application of his critical project (at this stage defined in terms of the first and second critiques only) to the definition and trajectory of history in general.

The last objection that may be raised to the above interpretation of Kant's argument about history is the claim made about history and aesthetic reflective judgment. Kant argues about the plan nature has for human actions. So why not think of the purposiveness of nature in terms of the teleological judgment and not aesthetic

judgment? Both of them are species of reflective judgment which accomplish the task of harmonizing freedom and nature. Teleological judgment as described above is concerned with the problem of presenting empirical laws according to which nature is constructed as systematic whole and not as a mere aggregate. Aesthetic judgment by contrast is concerned with the general harmony between the sensible and the supersensible. Given that history is concerned with the harmony of freedom with the nature and not with the problem of the presentation of nature as a system rather than an aggregate, then it is perfectly plausible to associate reflective judgment with the constitution of historical consciousness.

Therefore Rudolf Makkreel, Michael Despland and other scholars rightly try to use the import of the *Critique of Judgment* to revisit Kant's view of history. Unfortunately, most of them, following Kant's claims about the teleological plan nature has for human history especially in his essay on universal history, tend to re-interpret history in light of the structure of teleological reflective judgment. Based on the above analysis I would argue that this overlooks the foundation of historicity and historical existence and their deeper roots in his outline of the structure of subjectivity and its relation to the problem of the connection between the supersensible and the sensible that lies at the core of the critical project. Thus teleological judgment may allow for an overall delineation of the trajectory of human history (that is similar though not as absolutist as that of Hegel's) that corresponds with its attempt to present history as a system and not an aggregate. However, the origins of history and historicity as an integral fundamental of human subjectivity can only be found and investigated in terms of aesthetic reflective judgment. Only the investigation of the roots of historicity in terms of the problem of harmonizing the supersensible and the sensible and the senses of subjectivity associated with each can uncover the roots of

historicity and historical existence as a fundamental structure of human subjectivity. Given that only aesthetic judgment and consciousness is capable of achieving such harmony, it must be the place proper for investigating the relation between history and transcendental philosophy in Kant's thought. This often overlooked origin of history is what, as I would like to argue, furnished the ground, for Reinhold's hermeneutical-historical conception of philosophy that was later taken over by the idealists especially Hegel.

The way aesthetic consciousness grounds historical being will be further discussed and substantiated in the second section of the next chapter especially in the course of analyzing Heidegger's interpretation of aesthetic subjectivity in Kant. The connection between aesthetic consciousness, religion and history that is put forward in chapter 7 will respond to Makkreel's and Despland's arguments with regard to the teleological and purposive dimensions of history in Kant's system.

Chapter 5

Aesthetic judgment and the Hermeneutical Constitution of Everyday Historical Meaning

§I. Prelude:

In Chapter 2 I briefly discussed why the aesthetic rather than the teleological reflective judgment can satisfy the purpose of harmonizing the senses of subjectivity associated with reason and the understanding respectively into a whole of human subjectivity. In the previous chapter I have also shown the relation between aesthetic judgment and the problem of history and the meaning of the historical in Kant. In this chapter I will consider aesthetic judgment in more detail, focusing on the way it harmonizes reason and the understanding. I will start with a brief examination on the two species of aesthetic judgments Kant chooses to analyze in the critique of aesthetic judgment, demonstrating the importance of the moral transcendent dimension in each of them. The following section will turn to a brief examination of Heidegger's often overlooked interpretation of the disinterested subject in Kant's third *Critique* in the *Nietzsche* lectures. The investigation of Heidegger's interpretation of aesthetic subjectivity and experience in Kant will further reinforce the findings of the last chapter about the relation between aesthetic judgment and historicity as a fundamental constituent of human subjectivity. In addition, the analysis of Heidegger claims will point to the everyday nature of aesthetic consciousness. Finally, investigating Heidegger's interpretation will point to the hermeneutical constitution of aesthetic consciousness and its everyday-historical dimensions. Following this thread of argument the last section will be devoted to the way imagination hermeneutically constitutes aesthetic consciousness. In this respect, Rudolf Makkreel's thesis on the subject will be both accepted and explained. To further reinforce the claims put forward about the hermeneutical nature constitution of aesthetic judgment and

consciousness, a brief discussion of Kant's famous section on 'Beauty as a Symbol of Morality' will follow.

§II. The common moral ground of the sublime and the beautiful and the key function of aesthetic judgment

II.1: Preliminary remarks:

In this section I will argue that the kernel of aesthetic reflective judgment and aesthetic consciousness is its claim to universal validity *(allgemeingülitgkeit)* and that the essence of this claim is the capacity of the aesthetic reflection to relate rational transcendent ideas with their moral use to everyday experience and its natural manifestation. Through this capacity, as will be shown in the next section the, the aesthetic judgment and the consciousness associated with it, constitutes a holistic subjective attitude that harmonizes the two dimensions of subjectivity associated with the two modes of consciousness (the moral and the theoretical) into one human whole. I will demonstrate this point by analyzing one of Kant's key statements in his important "General remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgments" that concludes his discussion of the structures of the 'beautiful' *(das Schöne)* and the 'sublime' *(das Erhabene)*. In addition special attention will be given to Kant's opening remarks in the course of his deduction of pure *(reinen)* aesthetic judgments in addition to his claims about the ideal of the beautiful *(Ideal der Shönheit)* in §17 of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful.' The investigation of all these sections will demonstrate the main thesis indicated above.

II.2 The moral and the subjective universal validity of aesthetic judgment

By way of concluding his discussion of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' and the 'Analytic of Sublime' Kant gives a summary of the two species of aesthetic judgments in 'General remark on the exposition of aesthetic reflective judgments':

> If one draws the result from the exposition thus far of the two kinds of aesthetic judgment, the outcome would be the following brief explanations: That is beautiful which pleases in the mere judging (thus not by means of the sensation of sense in accordance with a concept of the understanding). From this it follows of itself that it must please without any interest. That is sublime which pleases immediately through its resistance to the interest of sense. Both as explanations of aesthetically universally judging, are related to subjective grounds, namely on the one hand to those of sensibility, as it is purpose in behalf of the contemplative understanding, on the other, in opposition to those, as purposive for the ends of practical reason; *and yet both, united in the same subject are purposive in relation to the moral feeling.* The beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest; the sublime to esteem it even contrary to our sensible interest[107]

In this quote Kant gives a rather adequate summary of the two species of the aesthetic judgment he presented. More importantly, it establishes a common ground for the 'beautiful' and the 'sublime' in terms of their purposive relation towards morality and the moral feeling. Before delving into this relation, which is the main objective of this section, it is necessary to give summary of the 'beautiful' and the 'sublime' as two examples of the aesthetic judgment.

The beautiful is the consciousness or state of mind *(Stimmung/Gemüthstimmug)* produced through the purposive presentation of an object without a purpose. This purposeless purposiveness *(Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck)* is essentially the consciousness produced through the playful attempt of the faculty of imagination to show the conformity of the sensible intuitions to the concepts of the understanding without actually subsuming these intuitions under a concept. Such lawful play gives a pure feeling of pleasure that arises as a result of the harmony of the faculties of imagination and that of the understanding:

> …The powers of cognition that are set into play by this representation are hereby in a free play, since no determinate concept restricts them to a particular cognition. Thus the state of mind in this representation must be that of a feeling of the free play of the powers of representation in a given representation for a cognition in general. Now there belongs to a representation by an object is given in order for there to be cognition of it in general, the imagination for the composition of the manifold of intuition and understanding for the concept that unifies the representations…[108]

---

[107] See Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 5:267.
[108] Ibid. p. 5:217

Since this feeling *(Gefühl)* or better affective state of mind and consciousness is not objective inasmuch as it is neither associated with a determinant judgment about an object nor about a transcendent rational ideas, it is subjective. However, it is not subjective in the same way as an interest in an agreeable *(angenehm)* object is based on relative individual inclinations and pleasures. For such interest has a clear purpose, namely physical pleasure. Further and more importantly, the fact that such state of mind/consciousness arises due to the harmony existing between the subject's faculties, the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful is universally communicable. As a matter of fact Kan insists in §9 of the 'Analytic of the Beautiful' that such universal communicability is the essence of such joy. Thus while the free play of the faculties constitutes the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful, the essence of the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful which in turn is the expression of such state of mine is the capacity for communicating it *(Mittheilungsfähigkeit)*. Kant thus writes:

> Thus it is the universal capacity for the communication of the state of mind in the given representation which, as the subjective condition of the judgment of taste, must serve as its ground and have the pleasure in the object as a consequence…. The subjective universal communicability *(subjektive allgemeine Mitteilbarkeit)* of the kind of representation in a judgment of taste, since it is supposed to occur without presupposing a determinate concept, can be nothing other than the state of mind in the free play of the imagination and the understanding (so far as they agree with each other as is requisite for a cognition in general): for we are conscious that this subjective relation suited to cognition in general must be valid for everyone and consequently universally communicable, just as any determinate cognition is which still always rests on that relation as its subjective condition.[109]

This statement clearly demonstrates the centrality of the 'subjective universal communicability' to Kant's conception of the essence of aesthetic conscious. It is due to this universal communicability that the feeling of pleasure and contentment associated with the aesthetic consciousness and state of mind. But is the claim about the lawful play of imagination sufficient for establishing this subjective universal

[109] Ibid p. 5:217-8

communicability and validity? Further is it enough for giving a lucid enough picture of the significance of purposiveness without a purpose? Realizing the diversity of empirical concepts and the need for furnishing a more solid ground for universal communicability, Kant tries to give the purest form of the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful in §17 'On the Ideal of beauty.' There Kant writes:

> The universal communicability of the sensation (of satisfaction or dissatisfaction), and indeed one that occurs without concepts, the unanimity, so far as possible, of all times and peoples about this feeling in the representation of certain objects: although weak and hardly sufficient for conjecture, this is the empirical criterion of the derivation of a taste…Hence some products of taste are regarded as exemplary….[110]

Kant defines this exemplary as the Ideal of beauty. Kant defines the Ideal as "…the representation of an individual being as adequate to an idea";[111] an idea is defined following the scheme of the 'Transcendental Dialectic' in the first *Critique* as "….strictly speaking a concept of reason…"[112] The Ideal of beauty must have a ground in reason. The Ideal of beauty can not be of an empirical object like a beautiful residence or a beautiful flower. All these concepts when presented at ends or more precisely purposes will differ based the cultural, spatio-temporal context. They thus can not serve as a purse basis for the universal communicability of aesthetic consciousness and meaning. Thus Kant concludes that:

> Only that which has the end of its existence in itself, the human being, who determines his ends himself through reason, or where he must derive them from external perception can nevertheless compare them to essential and universal ends and in that case also aesthetically judge their agreement with them: this human being alone is capable of an ideal of beauty, just as the humanity in his person, as intelligence is alone among all the objects in the world capable of the ideal of perfection[113]

Here Kant makes two very important assertions. First the human being inasmuch as the he is a rational being, is the only being capable of an ideal of beautiful. For inasmuch as he is a transcendent, moral essence constituted by the ideas

[110] Ibid p. 5:231-2
[111] Ibid p. 5:232
[112] Ibid p. 5:232
[113] Ibid p. 5:233

of his reason, he is an end in himself. Further, he is also capable of relating external perceptions to his universal moral ends. Second beauty and aesthetic judgment in general is a specifically human mode of consciousness. In other words aesthetic judgment and the state of mind/consciousness it constitutes are specifically human; in other wards they define what human as a whole is. This point will be further reinforced in the coming section. The main point of concern here is the claim that the moral and hence, in Kant terms, rational essence of the human being is the basis of the 'subjective universal communicability' that in turn defines the essence and key characterizing feature of aesthetic judgment. The rational moral essence of the human being is the ultimate purpose to that the sensation could aspire, through the lawful play of the imagination, to abide by and fulfill. Since this essence is shared with all rational beings, it can thus serve as the basis for the 'universal communicability' of aesthetic consciousness.

Therefore, even though the aesthetic judgment of beauty was claimed to be a result of the lawful play of imagination and the understanding, the fact that the universal communicability of such judgment is what defines its essence made it necessary to refer the sensations to reason and not only to the understanding. Further, ideas of reason define the moral essence that constitutes man as an end in himself and is thus not conditioned by contextual relativity as empirical concepts are.

But it is not only that the aesthetic judgment needs to be oriented by the ideas of reason, the maxims of practical reason are also in need of the aesthetic consciousness. As Kant explains in Chapter III of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, the main incentive for the will to follow the categorical imperative is the moral feeling. The moral feeling arises from the satisfaction the will achieves inasmuch as it realizes its own freedom by abiding the law given to it by reason and not being

conditioned by any empirical cause. Such moral feeling of respect is described by Kant as completely pure and having nothing to do with physical feelings. However, the nature of this feeling and how it can bridge the gap between the transcendence of pure will and the fact that actions are manifested phenomenally according to the mechanical laws of nature are left unexplained in the second *Critique.* Aesthetic experience provides a way out of this problem. Aesthetic consciousness and the feeling of pleasure associated with it provides a way in which the transcendent ideas of reason which ground morality can be seen to have influence on the sensations and thus show the harmony of the two domains that seemed completely dichotomous and rather irreconcilable. This point will be discussed in further detail in the coming subsection.

The moral dimension of the sublime is even clearer. Kant explains that the feeling of the sublime is:

> …a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of the imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude for the estimation by means of reason, and a pleasure that is thereby aroused from the correspondence of this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest sensible faculty in comparison with ideas of reason insofar as striving for them is nevertheless a law for us.[114]

In the experience or better the state of mind and consciousness where the judgment and feeling of the sublime emerges, as for instance when one contemplates nature, the imagination feels powerless inasmuch as it fails to estimate the scale of the object experienced and represent in the inner sense. However, reason finds pleasure in such experience inasmuch as it is the faculty of seeking the unconditioned condition of all conditioned and is thus constantly striving for completion and perfection. The way the sublime manifests the absoluteness and more importantly the perfection of the ideas of reason, induces respect for these ideas. Since these ideas constitute the

[114] Ibid. p. 5:258

essence and basis of morality, the feeling of the sublime thus gives a concrete exemplification of the moral feeling. For instance, since freedom is the *causa noumenon* of all moral laws and since the experience of the sublime shows the way in which ideas of reason are free from the limited representation afforded by the imagination, the experience of the sublime supports the respect for the moral law. Thus if the state of mind associated with the beautiful harmonizes the ideas of reason and their moral import with the phenomenal world by showing how the former can give purpose to the latter, the sublime achieves the same result by showing how the former can be represented purposively in the latter. The common ground of the sublime and the beautiful is therefore their purposiveness with regard to the moral feeling; in other words it is their capacity to harmonize the transcendent moral maxims of reason with the sensible, phenomenal world of experience.

But Kant summarizes the distinction between the sublime and the beautiful as follows:

> the aesthetic power of judgment in judging the beautiful relates the imagination in its free play to the understanding, in order to agree with its concepts in general (without the determination of them), so in judging a thing to be sublime the same faculty is related to reason in order to correspond subjectively with its ideas (though which is undetermined) i.e. in order to produce a disposition of the mind which is in conformity with them and compatible with that which the influence of determinate (practical) ideas on feeling would produce[115]

However, as we have shown above through the investigation of the 'Ideal of the Beautiful,' Kant argues that both judgments have to be connected with reason and thus moral feeling. The emphasis that hitherto been placed on the moral dimension of the ideas of reason does not mean that all aesthetic dimensions have a moral ground. They all have an orientation provided by the ideas of reason. However, some are oriented by theoretical reason as in the case of the mathematical sublime. The emphasis on the moral dimension is primarily due to regulative practical use Kant

[115] Ibid. p. 5:256

assigns to the ideas of reason. It could thus be concluded that the main function of aesthetic judgment is essentially the harmonization of the moral laws with their ground in the transcendent ideas of reason with the phenomenal realm. Through this harmony, aesthetic judgment makes it possible to reconcile the sensible and the supersensible and the two senses of subjectivity associated with each. But what form of subjectivity is made possible through this harmony? Among the few who tackled this question was Heidegger in his *Nietzsche Lectures.* This sets the stage to turn to the next section.

§III. The Disinterested Aesthetic subject and the everyday human

Toward the end of his short essay: 'Kant's doctrine of the beautiful and its misinterpretation by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche', Heidegger writes:

> Kant's interpretation of aesthetic behaviour as pleasure of reflection propels us toward a basic state of human being in which man for the first time arrives at the well-grounded fullness of his essence. It is the…condition of the possibility of man's existence as historical as grounding history.[116]

Man realizes his humanity as a whole in the aesthetic pleasure of reflection. But if man's realization of his humanity as a whole occurs in aesthetic experience, how does such realization take place? Heidegger puts forward the answer in the course of explaining the meaning of beauty as an object of *pleasure* for both Kant and Nietzsche. He writes:

> What pleases we take to be what corresponds to us, what speaks to us. What pleases someone, what speaks to him, depends on who that someone is to whom it speaks and corresponds. Who such person is, is defined by what he demands of himself. Hence we call 'beautiful' whatever corresponds to what we demand of ourselves. Furthermore, such demanding is measured by what we take ourselves to be, what we trust we are capable of, and what we dare as perhaps the extreme challenge…[117]

While Heidegger elaborates on how this definition of the beautiful fits the Nietzschean framework, he does not show how it may fit or even translate into the

---

[116] See "Kant's Doctrine of the Beautiful: Its misinterpretation by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche" in: Martin Heidegger. *Nietzsche* (trans. David Krell), 2 vols. (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), p. 113.
[117] *Ibid*, p. 111-112.

scheme of Kantian aesthetics and its claim about beauty as disinterested pleasure. In order to show how Heidegger's reading of the 'beautiful' could perfectly be translated into the language of Kantian aesthetics and indeed illuminate and extend it, I would like to initially refer to what Heidegger earlier says about the meaning of beauty as disinterested pleasure for Kant. Heidegger writes:

> …in order to find something beautiful, we must *let* what encounters us, purely as it is in itself, come before us in its own stature and worth. We may not take it into account in advance with a view to something else, our goals and intentions, our possible enjoyment and advantage. Comportment toward the beautiful encounters us as such to its way to be; we must allow and grant it what belongs to it and what it brings to us…Precisely by means of the 'devoid of interest' the essential relation to the object itself comes into play…The word beautiful means appearing in the radiance of such coming to the fore[118]

But what does Heidegger mean by 'letting something come before us as it is in it self'? Heidegger's own definition of 'phenomenology' in the introduction to *Being and Time* gives us the clue. According to Heidegger 'phenomenology' consists in letting that which appears appear as such. This means letting phenomena give themselves as they are in an everyday sense.[119] Being 'devoid of interest' in this sense means not to determinately frame what is given and perceived according to concepts. But letting phenomena give themselves as they are, is essentially related to the subject of experience and more precisely to what he demands of himself, as Heidegger explains. Aesthetic experience thus consists in letting phenomena give themselves in a primordial everyday sense. This mode of consciousness and comportment towards the world takes the form of relating phenomena to what the subject demands of himself not in conceptual way but in a way that is devoid of interest. What the subject of aesthetic experience demands of himself thus gives a purpose and orientation for the

---

[118] *Ibid*, p. 109-110.

[119] See Martin Heidegger. *Being and Time* (Trans. Joan Stambugh), (New York: Suny Press, 1996), p. 23-34. See especially Heidegger's etymological discussion of the concept of phenomenology as 'letting-be-seen that which-shows-itself' and how is that essentially the fundamental method of investigating fundamental ontology or transcendental conditions of experience as he later translates it in Kantian terms in the *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason.*

givenness of phenomena. But how does this subjective mode of giveness take place according to Heidegger? The answer as he also argues in the Introduction to *Being and Time* is achieved through a hermeneutical process. The aim of this hermeneutical process is to present the given objects/sensations in terms of the purposes of the subject what he demands of himself. Since the aesthetic consciousness defines the essence of the human being, this means that human-being is essentially hermeneutical and it so as much as it constitutes an everyday a consciousness wherein all representations are interpreted in terms of the purposes delineated by what the subject demands of himself. This everyday humanity as constituted by aesthetic judgment is, in turn, the condition of human existence as historical and as grounding history. Aesthetic consciousness is thus essence of historicity in Kant according to Heidegger's interpretation.[120]

Translating the above argument back into Kantian language, it would mean the following. Aesthetic consciousness constitutes the whole of human subjectivity. This whole is established through a hermeneutical interpretation of all representations in terms of the ends of the subject of experience. The highest and indeed what Kant calls the holy essence of the human being is reason. Therefore, reason through its transcendent ideas gives the orientation in terms of which all representations may be

[120] It is noteworthy that Heidegger adopts the same thesis about the aesthetic essence of the human in his famous commentary on Hölderlin in his famous essay *'poetically man dwells'*. In his commentary on Hölderlin's verse "In lovely blueness blooms the steeple with metal roof… poetically man dwells", Heidegger makes two radical assertions. First he argues that if the human being exists at all by way of dwelling on earth, such dwelling is only possible in a poetic mode. This poetic mode is then explained in terms of an act of '*measuring* man against Godhead', as he quotes Hölderlin in another instance. The two questions that immediately arise are: what is the meaning of *measuring* in this context? And what sense of the divine or Godhead is intended so that such *measuring* could be possible? In response to the first question Heidegger gives the following answer: poetic measuring is "*imagining* in a distinctive sense: not mere fancies and illusions but imaginings that are visible inclusions of the alien in the sight of the familiar." Measuring is thus possible through the act of imagination which is capable of bringing the 'alien in the sight of the familiar.' If the 'alien' here is taken to be what fully transcendent to experience as God by definition is and the 'familiar' is taken to refer to phenomenal spatio-temporal experience then Heidegger is essentially adopting the same conception of the human condition that he applies to Kant. The function of poetic imagination that constitutes aesthetic consciousness is thus to relate these two dimensions to each other.

interpreted. But these ideas in turn constitute the moral essence of the human being. Thus, the essence of everyday human subjectivity consists in interpreting representations in terms of the moral orientation furnished by the ideas of reason. In turn, such interpretative process constitutes the basis of everyday being as much as it provides, according to Kant, the basis of common sense. But to what extent is this interpretation of Kant reconcilable with Heidegger's claim about the aesthetic consciousness being the condition of historicity and the historical existence of the human? The findings of the last chapter fully establish support this reconciliation. It has been shown in the last chapter that the condition of historicity in Kant is the realization and manifestations of the moral ends in the realm of nature. It has also been shown that aesthetic judgment can best fulfil this task. Given the above interpretation of aesthetic judgment and consciousness, it could cogently be concluded that aesthetic judgment constitutes the core of historicity and the human being as the condition of history. Aesthetic judgment and consciousness is therefore the essence of everyday historical humanity through its purposive interpretation of given representation in terms of the moral orientation furnished by the ideas of reason. In conclusion, Heidegger's analysis of the meaning and structure of aesthetic experience in Kant's system reinforced the findings of the first section and the last chapter about the aesthetic constitution of historicity. In addition, Heidegger's interpretation of aesthetic experience and consciousness expanded Kant's claim about the aesthetic foundation of common sense to establish it as the essence of everyday human-being in the world.

A question remains though. How does aesthetic judgment achieve such interpretation? As has been shown in chapter 3 imagination is the meaning-constituting function in Kant's system. So what role does imagination play in

constituting aesthetic judgment and consciousness? This leads to the discussion in the next section of the role of imagination in the third *Critique*.

§III. The hermeneutical nature of aesthetic imagination: Makkreel's thesis and Heidegger's interpretation.

The previous section investigated Heidegger's often overlooked interpretation of aesthetic judgment in his *Nietzsche Lectures*. Based on this interpretation it has been argued that the aesthetic judgment constitutes the historical-everyday essence of the human being through a hermeneutical process that harmonizes the transcendent ideas of reason with the phenomenal realm. Given that the imagination, as has been discussed in Chapter 2, is the faculty that constitutes judgment and hence meaning and consciousness in Kant's system, it was preliminarily inferred that imagination must undertake this hermeneutical role. Of all the commentators on the third *Critique,* Rudolf Makkreel was the only one who pointed such interpretative role of reflective judgment in general and the aesthetic judgment in particular. Below I will give a brief explanation of his thesis and show its compatibility with the results reached so far.

In *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, the hermeneutical import of the Critique of Judgment*, Makkreel demonstrates that the function the imagination undertakes in constituting reflective judgment is not synthetic as is the case in determinant theoretical judgments. Rather he argues that it plays a role in specifying the categories rather than schematizing them (as in the case of the judgment of the beautiful) or the purposiveness of the subject in terms of his faculties (in case of the mathematical sublime). For instance in the case of the mathematically sublime Makkreel argues:

> The imagination does not…produce any positive image of either the integration of the our faculties or our moral ideas. In fulfilling its task of making itself adequate to the idea of reason, the imagination does not rely on its sensuous capacity to produce and reproduce empirical image. The imagination in the service of reason can only provide what Kant calls an "abstract…mode of

presentation" of the infinite…[121]

Therefore the imagination does not carryout a schematic function as is it does in constituting determinant judgments. It rather harmonizes the sensible and the super-sensible through a negative presentation of its capacity. Such negative presentation constitutes an affective state of mind that demonstrates the infinite nature of the ideas of reason through the corresponding experience of the dynamically sublime.

According to Makkreel, the imagination fulfils this hermeneutic reflective task through the production of reflective ideas:

> The potential for a theory of reflective interpretation can be explored by developing a set of ideas that are introduced in the *Critique of Judgment.* These are the normal, aesthetic and teleological ideas which are not rigidly prescribed by reason but are adaptive to the content of their subject matter. They provide no a priori determinant rules for interpretation but indeterminate guidelines…These ideas are used to discern order and meaning in aspects of experience left contingent by the laws of the understanding. What distinguishes a reflective interpretation of the particulars of experience from purely theoretical explanations using concepts and from dialectical reconstructions on the basis of rations ideas is that such an interpretation will never analyze the structure of its object to the point of eliminating all contingency[122]

Normal aesthetic ideas are introduced by Kant in the course of his discussion of the 'Ideal of the Beautiful.' As has been explained above, Kant asserts in this section that the in order for the aesthetic judgment of the beautiful to have proper foundations for the claim of universal communicability it must be based on the rational moral essence of the human being. The orientation given to this imagination inasmuch as it is pure and unconditioned by any empirical context secures the universal validity of the judgment. As an approximation of the Ideal, Kant introduces the normal aesthetic idea. As Makkreel rightly argues the normal aesthetic idea is based on empirical experience inasmuch as tries to approximate the ideal of perfection of a certain species, for instance. However, it still involves an a priori element granted

---

[121] See Rudolf Makkreel. *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant.* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990) p. 85.
[122] Ibid. p. 112

to it through the purposiveness afforded to it by the moral orientation given by the rational ideas. It thus differs from the ideas of reason in that it does not aspire to full perfection and completion. But rather allow for reflective freedom based on the context of experience. Makkreel writes:

> Whereas the ideal of reason is a completely determinate archetype, the ideal of the imagination contains a model image that makes possible reflection about an archetype. The model image of the aesthetical normal idea represents a norm for judging what is typical and can give only a provisional estimate of nature's archetype[123]

The hermeneutical role of the imagination in constituting the aesthetic reflective meaning of the beautiful takes the form of producing an idea that is neither an empirical intuition nor a pure one but rather a semantic reference that allows for thinking about a species. However, Makkreel did not stress the importance of the guiding moral role of the ideas of reason in constituting aesthetic consciousness. As has been explained above even though Kant differentiates between the judgment of the beautiful and that of the sublime by explaining the former in terms of the harmony of the imagination with the understanding ad the latter in terms of the harmony of the imagination with reason, he ultimately acknowledges that both of them share the key function of concretely representing the moral and in doing so harmonizing the domains of reason and the understanding. In light of this, it is important to keep in mind that the normal ideas are essentially approximations of the 'Ideal of Beauty.'

According to Makkreel imagination plays an analogous function in constituting aesthetic ideas in artistic experience. The main difference is that while imagination in constituting the normal idea is guided by the rational idea and its moral orientation, the imagination of the artist tries to emulate reason. In doing so, the imagination thus constructs an intuition to which no concept applies. Thus Makkreel describes the difference between rational ideas and aesthetic ideas as follows:

---

[123] Ibid. p. 117

> Both rational and aesthetic ideas go beyond the limits of experience and they fail to produce determinate knowledge of empirical objects. However they differ in the way they preclude the normal syntheses of sensible intuitions and concepts of the understanding that Kant requires for experience. A rational idea involves a transcendent concept (of the supersensible) corresponding to which an intuition can never be given…An aesthetic idea is an intuition of the imagination for an adequate concept can never be found. Here there is an excess on the side of what Kant calls the full inner intuition of the imagination for which the understanding cannot find a determinate concept[124]

The aesthetic idea, guided by the rational desire for perfection and the interest in seeking the unconditioned condition of all condition tries to produce intuitions of perfection to which no concept of the understanding. This interpretative process does not produce a determinate meaning that results from a synthesis of a concept and intuition and can be expressed in a predicative form. It rather produces an indeterminate meaning and more importantly a state of mind that involves a satisfaction for the subject inasmuch as he feels that his humanity is fulfilled through the harmonization of his faculties and the senses of subjectivity associated with each of them.

Kant's famous section on 'Beauty as a Symbol of morality' further supports the assertion that the imagination in the third *Critique* and particularly as far as aesthetic judgment is concerned undertakes a hermeneutical role. In this section which decisively concludes the first part of the *Critique of Judgment*, Kant writes a paragraph that sums up all his claims about the role and constitution of the aesthetic judgment. Kant writes:

> Now I say that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and also that only in this respect (that of a relation that is natural to everyone, and that is also expected of everyone else as a duty) does it please with a claim to the assent of every one else, in which the mind is at the same time aware of a certain ennoblement and elevation above the mere receptivity for a pleasure from sensible impressions, and also esteems the value of others in accordance with a similar maxim of their power of judgment. That is the intelligible, toward which, as the preceding paragraph indicated, taste looks, with which, namely, even our higher faculties of cognition agree, and without which glaring contradictions would between their nature and the claims taste makes. In this faculty the power of judgment does not see itself, as is otherwise the case in

[124] Ibid. p. 119

> empirical judging, as subjected to a heteronomy of the laws of experience; in regard to objects of such pure satisfaction it gives the law to itself, both on account of this inner possibility of the subject as well as on account of the outer possibility of a nature that corresponds to it, as related to something in the subject itself and outside of it, which is neither nature nor freedom, but which is connected with the ground of the latter namely the supersensible, in which the theoretical faculty is combined with the practical in a mutual and unknown way to form a unity[125]

Before discussing the hermeneutical mode in which the beautiful symbolizes the good, a careful examination of the above quote can indicate the cogency of the claims made so far. Kant starts his concluding remarks about aesthetic judgment by re-asserting it fundamental characteristic: its claim to universal validity despite the fact that it does not involve any determinant objective knowledge. This claim to universal validity, which as has been shown above is the essence of everyday human-being, is associated with an affective state of mind of pure satisfaction *(Wohlgefallen)*. Such satisfaction being pure is not conditioned by any physical factor; it must thus be rooted in the rational essence of the human being as rational subject. This essence is found in the realm of reason and not the understanding since the former and not the latter is that which is completely unconcerned with experience and whose ideas, through their regulative use, constitute the moral essence of the human being. The connection to this transcendent moral essence is the ground of the aesthetic judgment's claim to universal validity. But what is the origin of this pure pleasure and satisfaction? It is the harmony such mode of consciousness establishes between the faculties of the soul which in turn are associated with two main domains of nature and freedom and which also constitute the subject matter of theoretical and practical philosophy respectively. But the intersection of the nature and freedom is what essentially constitutes the essence of historical existence and the condition of history; this was demonstrated both in chapter 4 and asserted in the last section through the

[125] See Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Judgment*. Trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 5:353.

examination of Heidegger's interpretation of aesthetic subjectivity in Kant. Thus aesthetic consciousness is what defines the human subjectivity as a whole in its everyday, historical sense. But how is aesthetic judgment constituted? It is constituted through the hermeneutical role of imagination. Such role can assume different forms. One of them is symbolic representation. Makkreel argues that symbolic representation is "…the presentation of a supersensible concept of reason, so that the intuition can be given only indirectly…."[126] This indirect presentation is, as Makkreel continues to explain essentially an interpretation *(Auslegung)* of the moral in the phenomenal context. Such interpretation results in an affective state of mind that in and of itself represents the pure moral feeling. However it gives the moral feeling a concrete significance inasmuch as it relates to the phenomenal sensible realm and thus show how the moral can be relevant to experience instead of being completely transcendent to and separate from it. Thus the reflective use of the ideas of reason produces an "…an interpretation of reality that encompasses the various levels of our awareness…"[127] Thus aesthetic judgment inasmuch as they are the products of the reflective interpretation of the ideas of reason in the phenomenal realm, represent depending on the context different forms and levels of consciousness through which the human being can be aware of his humanity as a whole.

IV. Conclusion

The examination of aesthetic judgment has led to a number of important results. First it has been shown that aesthetic judgment is essentially the place where the 'human' as a mode being is actualized. In other words, the human-being as whole is essentially aesthetic. This being has been shown to have two essential dimensions: everydayness and historicity. The 'everyday' dimension of the human-being refers to

[126] *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*, p. 123.
[127] Ibid. p. 129

the way meaning is constituted immediately in ordinary consciousness. Both Kant and Heidegger in his interpretation of Kant stress this point. Further, this everydayness is manifested in the universal communicability of judgment of taste which in turn roots on its capacity to harmonize the moral essence of the human with the phenomenal manifestation of his actions. Now, the domain of freedom, the noumenal foundation of the moral, and that of nature in which human actions, just like any other phenomena are manifested correspond to two senses or domains of consciousness and subjectivity. This has been discussed extensively in chapters 1 and 2. Thus aesthetic consciousness constitutes everyday human-being inasmuch as it harmonizes these two senses of subjectivity into one whole. As far as historicity is concerned, it has been demonstrated above that the foundation of historicity in Kant is the intersection or better the manifestation of the freedom in the realm of nature. Hence aesthetic judgment also constitutes the historical dimension of the human-being.

It has also been shown the historical-everyday human-being manifested in aesthetic consciousness is constituted as such through a hermeneutical process undertaken by the imagination. Imagination, in a variety of way, tries to relate the sensible to the supersensible or nature to freedom by trying to purposively interpret the former in terms of the latter or find a correspondence between the latter and the former. Such interpretative modes takes assumes various forms and produces different levels of consciousness (as in the case of normal ideas, aesthetic ideas and symbolic presentation).

But so far I have spoken of rational ideas and the moral orientation they furnish in a rather loose manner. What is the ‘rational’ or more precisely reason in Kant? Further which or the three ideas of reason (the self, the world or God) is most capable of guiding imagination in its constitution of the aesthetic everyday-historical

being of the human-being? More importantly how can the intricate relation among these ideas as presented in the 'Transcendental Dialectic' of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and more importantly in the *Critique of Practical Reason* guide our investigation of their role in the constituting aesthetic judgment. I will turn to these questions in the following chapter.

Chapter 6

God and the orientation of Aesthetic Consciousness

§I. Prelude:

The last chapter demonstrated that aesthetic judgment constitutes human-being as a whole; this being had two essential characteristics: its everydayness and its historicity. In turn, aesthetic judgment is constituted through a hermeneutical role undertaken by the imagination whereby it tries to reflectivity relate the supersensible and the sensible. The imagination accomplishes this task in a variety of ways; it may either represent a sensible intuition in line with the moral orientation furnished by the ideas of reason. Or it may try to represent a moral idea through an aesthetic idea or merely through it frustration and incapacity to comprehend the might of nature create a state of mind of satisfaction as much as it shows that something in nature corresponds in its infinity to the ideas of reason.

But so far, very little has been said about the ideas of reason and the moral orientation they provide. In the 'Transcendental Dialectic' of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant defines reason as the faculty of principles. The principles of reason are transcendent in distinction from the concepts of the understanding which are immanent to experience. Accordingly, the principles of reason do not produce knowledge; they are concerned with comprehension in an absolute way. Kant re-defines this comprehension as seeking the unconditioned condition of all conditions. Such comprehension could be undertaken through three Ideas: The Psychological Idea (the self), The Cosmological Ideas (the world) and the Theological Ideas (God). These ideas, to which no sensible intuition corresponds, fulfill the desire of reason for complete knowledge. Accordingly the theoretical use of these ideas leads to

paralogistic assumptions about the world. However, these Ideas have a regulative use that is not only essential but constitutive of our morality.

In this chapter, I will argue that the idea of God along with its nature as such makes it best befit the purpose of orienting imagination in constituting aesthetic judgment and consciousness. The core of my argument will focus on the principle of 'purposvieness without a purpose' that is inextricably related with both the everyday character of aesthetic judgment and its universal subjective grounds and central to its capacity to produce historical indeterminate meaning versus the determinant meaning produced and expressed by determinant judgment. I will start with an investigation of the idea of God as presented in both the *Critique of Pure Reason* and more importantly in the *Prolegomena*. I will then discuss the moral role of the Idea of God in the *Critique of Practical Reason.* Through my analysis of the role assigned to reason in each of the two critiques and the domain of experience, namely the theoretical and the moral, which each define, I will demonstrate that the idea of God can best satisfy the requirements of aesthetic judgments. I will then conclude by briefly showing the harmony between the characterizations of the idea of God in the first and second *Critiques* especially in connections with aesthetic judgment.

§II. The idea of God in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena:

II.1: The idea of God in the *Prolegomena*

While it might seem more proper to start with Kant's discussion of the idea of God in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, I have chosen to start with the *Prolegomena* for an important reason. Kant's characterization of the idea of God in the *Prolegomena* not only summarizes but more explicitly articulates the key aspect that demonstrates its suitability to satisfy the constitution of aesthetic judgment more than the psychological idea or the cosmological idea.

In §55 of the *Prolegomena* Kant articulates the difference between the ideas of God—the theological idea—and the two others ideas of reason as follows:

> The third transcendental idea, which affords material for the *most important* but, if pursued only speculatively, transcendent and thereby dialectical use of reason, is the ideal of pure reason. *Reason in this case does not, as with the psychological and cosmological ideas, start from experience and err by exaggerating its grounds in striving to attain, if possible, the absolute completeness of their series. Rather, it totally breaks with experience and from mere concepts of what constitutes absolute completeness of a thing in general (hence by means of the idea of a most perfect primal being) proceeds to determine the possibility and therefore actuality of all other things.*[128] And so the mere presupposition of a being which although not in the series of experiences is thought for the purposes of experience and for the sake of conceiving its connection, order and unity, i.e. the idea, is more easily distinguished from the concept of understanding here than in the former cases.[129]

This succinct account of the idea of God summarizes Kant's discussion of the notion of the idea of Goa as the perfect necessary being in §§1-3 of chapter III of the 'Second Book of the Transcendental Dialectic.'[130] This discussion will be considered in more detail in the following section. However, Kant makes an important elaboration in the *Prolegomena* that sums up many of the scattered threads in his analysis in the first *Critique.* This elaboration concerns, as has been indicated above, the comparison between the transcendental ideal (or the theological idea) versus the psychological and cosmological ideas. In contrast with his approach in the first *Critique*, Kant starts his characterization of the 'most important' idea of reason by indicating the aspect that sets it apart from the psychological idea (the self) and the cosmological idea (the world). The idea of God, unlike the idea of the world or the

---

[128] "Da die Vernunft hier nicht, wie bei der psychologicshen und kosmologischen Idee, von der Erfahrung anhebt, und durch Steigerung der Gründe, wo möglich, zur absoluten Vollständigkeit ihrer Reihe zu trachten verleitett wird, sondern gänzlich abbricht, unde aus bloßen Begriffen von dem, was die absolute Vollständigkeit eines Dinges überhaupt asmachen würde, mithin vermittelst der Idee eines höchst vollkommen Urwesens zur Bestimmung der Möglichkeit, auch der Wirklichkeit aller andern Dinge herabgeht..." I have deliberately included the original wording of the part I italicized to capture the full force of Kant's claims. It is noteworthy that Ellington translates 'Steigerung' as exaggerating. It should rather be extension or better extrapolation of the grounds of experience since the verb 'steigern' implies both increasing and improving or extending. Further 'Urwesen' should be the original being rather than primal being.

[129] See Immanuel Kant. *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics* (trans. James Ellington). (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Companay, 2001), p. 348.

[130] See *Critique of Pure Reason* p. A567/B595-A590/B618

self, is not the result of reason's extrapolation of the ground of experience in its attempt to seek completeness. As Kant explained in the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason,' the idea of the self is the dialectical result of the attempt at locating the ground of all concepts and representations in the thinking subject. The idea of the world, as Kant explains in 'Antinomies of Pure Reason' is the dialectical result of the attempt to locate the ground of all concepts and representation in 'manifold of the object in appearance.' The psychological and cosmological ideas are thereby the extrapolations of the two component elements of experience: the subjective element and the objective element. Being so, both ideas bear, at least vaguely, a certain level of determination as much as they are related to experience. This sets the theological idea (the idea of God) apart from both of them inasmuch as the latter is 'indeterminate.'[131] While Kant does intimate that such indeterminacy is connected with the purely transcendent nature of the idea of God; it is only in the *Prolegomena* that Kant explicitly states that the reason underlying this indeterminacy is that the idea of God results from reason's attempt to completely break away from the subjective and objective components of experience. For determinacy is, as has been shown in chapter two, the result of the synthesis of concepts and intuitions; the idea of God can not be alleged to be the extrapolation of either. Due to this peculiar nature, the idea of God can be "…more easily distinguished from the concept of the understanding…" Kant then vaguely argues that the idea of God encompasses the possibility of every thing. In this respect, he identifies possibility *(Möglichkeit)* with actuality *(Wirklichkeit)*. Since this possibility/actuality of all things in general *(überhaupt)* is purely rational and hence completely transcendent to experience, Kant further qualifies it as subjective and not objective. By subjective here, Kant refers to the structure of

[131] Ibid, p. A573/B601.

subjectivity as such and not what is relatively subjective. In order to understand the significance of this possibility/actuality I will turn to Kant's discussion of the transcendental ideal in the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the next subsection. The rest of this subsection will carefully examine the implications of Kant's characterization of the Idea of God in connection with aesthetic judgment and consciousness.

The constitutive principle of reflective judgment in general and aesthetic reflective judgment in particular is purposiveness without purpose. As has been argued in chapter 4, aesthetic imagination constitutes historical-everyday meaning inasmuch as it hermeneutically connects the rational ideas with their moral import to the spatio-temporal world. This hermeneutical connection does not result in a determinate judgment and meaning. Rather aesthetic imagination either constructs intermediate approximations or states of consciousness through the orientation or purposeless purposiveness furnished to it by the transcendent ideas of reason. This sets aesthetic judgment apart from the moral judgment of the good which are determinately constituted on pure transcendent level based on the universalizability principle which is in turn grounded in freedom. It also distinguished aesthetic judgment from the judgment of the agreeable which is associated with the physical pleasure and state of mind arising from the determinate subsumption of intuitions under specific empirical concepts. Accordingly, the less determinate and the more universal the idea of reason is, the more aptly it will fulfill the requirements of aesthetic judgment. The more determinate the idea is the more likely it will impinge on the free lawful play of aesthetic imagination and thus hinder its capacity to mediate between the sensible and supersensible as much as it will make the judgment more determinate. In conclusion to fulfill the principle of purposiveness with a purpose, the transcendent idea of reason has to be neither experientially determinant, especially in

the case of the aesthetic judgment of beauty, nor morally determinant, especially in the case of the aesthetic judgment of the sublime.

In the quote above, Kant argues that since the idea of God can not be traced to any of the components of which determinate judgments are synthesized and thus completely breaks with experience, it is "…more easily distinguished from the concept of the understanding here than in the former cases…"[132] By the former cases Kant refers to the psychological idea of the self and the cosmological idea of the world. Thus the Ideal of God is least comparable to the understandings and its concepts and is thus least likely to lead to any form of determinacy the latter could involve.

It could thereby be concluded that the idea of God best fulfills the requirement of the principle of purposiveness without a purpose. Inasmuch as it completely dissociated from experience and can not be traced back to any of the components of which determinate judgments are synthesized, the idea of God can furnish imagination with a universal enough orientation required for the hermeneutical constitution of the historical-everyday aesthetic meaning. Through this universal orientation, the purely transcendent nature of the idea of God furnishes purposiveness without a determinate purpose that is required for the constitution of aesthetic judgment in a manner that can not be fulfilled by the psychological idea and the cosmological idea.

Having established the priority and uniqueness of the idea of God in connection with the structure and requirements of the aesthetic judgment, I will not turn to Kant's discussion in the *Critique of Pure Reason.*

[132] See. *Prolegomena*, p. 348.

II. 2: The idea of God in the *Critique of Pure Reason*:

Given my concern with the nature of idea of God especially its peculiarity in comparison with the cosmological and psychological ideas I will focus my examination of Kant's presentation of it in the first *Critique* on the first three sections of chapter three of the 'Transcendental Dialectic.' Therefore, I will not address Kant's refutation of the dialectical proofs of God.

However, Kant's approach to the idea of God in the first *Critique* poses a number of difficulties to its suggested aesthetic use. Instead of referring to God as an idea, Kant refers to it as an Ideal. Kant's characterization of God as an ideal and not an idea bears a level of determinacy that will challenge the way it could satisfy the requirement of purposivess without a purpose. Towards the end of the discussion a way to avoid overcome these challenges will be suggested.

In §1, Kant initiates his discussion of what he means by an ideal in general as follows:

> But something that seems to be even further removed from objective reality than the idea is what I call the ideal, by which I understand the idea not merely *in concreto* but *in individuo,* i.e. as an individual thing which is determinable, or even determined, through the idea alone[133]

The first part of this description was essentially the subject matter of the previous subsection. The purely transcendent nature of the ideal of God and its complete dissociation from experience was by far better articulated and explained in the *Prolegomena.* This nature, as we have seen, shows its compatibility with the structure of aesthetic judgment and consciousness. The second part offers a new thread leading to another dimension of what a transcendent ideal of reason is in general and what the ideal of God is in particular. The ideal is an individual thing that is determined in a purely transcendent manner. But what does this mean? Will this

[133] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, p. A568/B596.

determinacy contradict with what was claimed above about the objective indeterminacy of the idea of God?

Kant elaborates this rather ambiguous formulation in the course of his explanation of the Stoic sage as an example of an ideal:

> …just as the idea gives the rule, so the ideal in such a case serves as the original image for the thoroughgoing determination of the copy…these ideals even though one may never concede them objective reality (existence), are nevertheless not to be regarded as mere figments of the brain; rather they provide an indispensable standard for reason, which needs the concept of that which is entirely complete in its kind, in order to assess and realize the ideal in an example…[134]

Thus the ideal is a transcendent scheme that is purely determined in reason without any reference of experience. In this capacity it serves as the model for determining whether an instance in experience is an exemplification of or an attempt to emulate this model. Thus the Stoic sage is an ideal based on which we can judge if a certain man can be called a sage in this sense even though no one can actually fulfill such level of perfection as defined by the ideal.

In §2, Kant proceeds to qualify the transcendental ideal in terms of the principle of thoroughgoing determination of a thing in general. According to Kant the determinability of a concept with regards to what is not contained in it is defined by the law of contradiction. By contrast, Kant argues, in a way similar to Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*, that a 'thing' is determined in terms of the totality of possibilities of which it could predicated. Here Kant is making a distinction between a 'concept' on the level of formal logic and a 'thing' on the level of transcendental logic and thinking. To have a full cognition of a thing is to be aware of the all the possibilities of meanings that the thing could have. Since meaning is, as has been demonstrated above, connected with judgment and since different species of judgment define, each in its own turn, a different field of consciousness, this means that to have a full

[134] Ibid, p. A569/B597.

cognition of a thing is to comprehend all the cognitive and affective significances this thing may have. Thus the ideal of the 'thing' is essentially the idea of the sum total of all possibilities which in turn is a purely transcendent idea given that cognition in so far as it is determinate must also be finite. Hence Kant writes:

> Now although this idea of the sum total of all possibility, insofar as it grounds every thing as the condition of its thoroughgoing determination in regard to the predicates which may constitute the thing itself is still indeterminate, and through it we think nothing beyond a sum total of all possible predicates in general, we nevertheless find on closer investigation that this idea, as an original concept, excludes a multiplicity of predicates, which as derived through others, are already given or cannot exist with one another; and that it refines itself to a concept thoroughly determined *a priori* and thereby becomes the concept of an individual object that is thoroughly determined merely through the idea, and them must be called an ideal of pure reason.[135]

The ideal of a sum total of all possibility grounds every thing as much as it encompasses all the possible meanings a thing may assume. However, since it can not include contradictions and derivative possibilities, this idea of the sum of all possibility could be thought of a pure individual thing that can in turn serve as the ideal of the 'thing' as such. Any thing when determined in experience would thus involve the negation or the limiting of the totality of possibilities based on the spatio-temporal context of experience. This ideal represents the concept of the 'thing-in-itself' which constitutes the essence of the noumenal realm for Kant. He thus writes:

> Through this possession of all reality, however, there is also represented the concept of a thing in itself…Thus it is a transcendental ideal which is the ground of the thoroughgoing determination that is necessarily encountered in everything existing and which constitutes the supreme and complete material condition of its possibility, to which all thinking of objects in general must, as regards the content of that thinking, be traced back. It is however, also the one single genuine ideal of which human reason is capable, because only in this one single case is an-in itself universal-concept of one thing thoroughly determined through itself, and cognized as the representation of an individual[136]

The transcendental ideal inasmuch as it is an individual representation of the sum of all possibilities of meaning and consciousness of anything as such establishes the material condition of the possibility of a thing being fully determined by thought.

---

[135] Ibid, p. A573/B601
[136] Ibid, p. A575/B605

In other words, the ideal encompasses a priori all the possible judgments that could be made about any form of consciousness of a 'thing' as such. Therefore every determination of a thing is essentially a 'derivative' of the ideal by way of limiting it through the negation of some possibilities and affirming others.

But how is this individual ideal to be conceived? Kant rgues that it is to be conceived as the original being *(ens originarium)*, the highest being *(ens summum)* and the being of all beings *(ens entium)*. The sum total of all these descriptions could be subsumed under the idea of God. The idea of God as much as it represents an individual, all-perfect being that includes all reality represent the concept of a 'thin' as such.

In §3, Kant puts forward another important result. The ideal of reason encompasses the possibility of being conscious of any thing as such. But a thing is essentially that which exists at least for consciousness given that Kant's argument about the existence as a predicate and how it does not add much to what it is being predicated of. But all things that are encountered in consciousness seem to be contingent, thus the ideal of a thing that encompasses all the possibilities of any thing as such must be necessary: "…this is the natural course taken by every human reason, even the most common, although not everyone perseveres in it. It begins not with concepts, but with common experience, and thus grounds itself on something existing. But this footing gives way unless it rests on the immovable rock of the absolute necessary."[137]

[137] Ibid. p. A584/B612.

The ideal of God inasmuch as it *noumenally* encompasses the possibility of any 'thing' as such must be essentially conceived as a necessary being[138] and not contingent being. [139]Kant then concludes:

> This, therefore, is how the natural course of human reason is constituted. First it convinces itself of the existence of some necessary being. In this it recognizes the unconditioned existence. Now it seeks for the concept of something independent of all conditions, and finds it in that which is the sufficient condition for everything else, i.e., in that which contains all reality. The All without limits however, is absolute unity and carries with it the concept of one single being, namely the highest being; and thus reason infers that the highest being, as the original ground of all things exists in an absolutely necessary way.[140]

The Ideal of God does not have any objective validity. In other words no determinant judgment could be made about it in theoretical experience. However, Kant claims that is essential for moral purposes.

What about its reflective use? According to Kant, the origin of the Ideal of God is reason's desire to seek an prototype of a what a 'thing' as such is. A 'thing' for Kant is a general term for that which exists. In turn that which exists is that what exists in consciousness. In line with this claim, Heidegger writes: "Kant talks about things…and means by this term something that is. But for Kant that is what becomes the object of a representing that runs its course in the self-consciousness of the human ego"[141] The prototype of a thing or thing-in-itself encompasses all the possibilities of being consciousness of any thing as such. This prototype, as we have seen, can not have any objective reality for if its does it will finitely be determined in experience and that would be a limiting of its possibilities. More importantly, this prototype must be thought as necessary and not conditioned by any other factor, for it were, it would

---

[138] This claim is not an ontological one. It's purely on the noumenal level. Hence it does not contradict at all with the transcendental conditions of experience concerned with the phenomenal level.
[139] The conception of God as a necessary being versus a world of contingent beings was first introduced in the history of philosophy by Avicenna. It should be kept in mind for the second part of this work. For the Avicennian distinction will be adopted and thoroughly used by Ibn al-'Arabi in his characterization of the idea of God.
[140] Ibid. p. A586/B614
[141] See Martin Heidegger. *Poetry, Language and Thought* (trans. Albert Hofstader). (New York: Harper and Collins, p. 177)

not include, as Kant argues, all reality as such. This characterization of God can definitely serve as an ultimately telos of everything. Hence it God can better serve as the idea that guides the teleological interpretation of history. This is indeed the plausible and most immediate sense of the reflective use of the idea of God. This use, must lead to a teleological view of history that is trying to achieve this state of completion. This would make the use of God in connection with the question of history in Kant's though very similar to it use in Hegel's idealism.

However, I would like to suggest an alternative use. The ideal of God as much as it noumenally represents the necessary condition of all reality (of every thing and every act of consciousness) can definitely better guide aesthetic imagination in constituting everyday-historical meaning. Unlike the psychological idea of the self or the cosmological idea of the world, the all-inclusive nature of the ideal of God gives imagination more latitude for hermeneutically connecting the supersensible with the sensible. This ideal is represents the concept of thing-in-itsefl as such; this noumenal determination has two special qualities. It is completely 'removed from all objective reality more than any idea.' However, this ideal encomopasses the sum total of all the possibilities of any thing. It thereby satisfies the requirement of aesthetic judgment to connect the super-sensible and the sensible. Despite being completely removed from objective reality it also includes possibility of thinking of anything. In this sense it can bring the sensible with the super-sensible. More importantly, it will not reduce aesthetic judgment to the subjective side of experience as the idea of the self would or the objective side of experience as the idea of the world would.

Yet another question arises. Kant argues that the Ideal of God is individual determination of the prototype of the idea of sum of all possibilities as a necessary all-perfect being. Would not such determination contradict what was argued above with

regards to Kant's characterization of the Ideal of God in the *Prolegomena*? It was argued that the Ideal of God best fulfills the principle of purposiveness with out a purpose given that it is the idea least determinate inasmuch as it not the extrapolation of any of the components of experience. In this connection, would not the claims of the first *Critique* be at odds with this analysis? A careful examination of the notion of determinacy involved in each case would show that that such contradiction is not necessary at all. The idea of God is mainly determined through ideas; it is completely disconnected from experience. The determinacy that would impinge on the 'purposiveness without purpose' of aesthetic imagination is objective determinacy which in turn is the result of the synthesis of concepts and intuitions. Therefore, the pure determinacy of the ideal of God does not necessarily contradict with the principle of purposiveness without a purpose. The ideal of God being a pure, universal idea can not be synthesized with any finite intuition.

§II. Idea of God in the Critique of Practical Reason:

In the preface to the second *Critique* gives an overview of the role of the ideas of God and immortality in the practical use of reason:

> The ideas of God and immortality, however are not conditions of the moral law but only conditions of the necessary object of a will determined by this law, that is, of the mere practical use of our pure reason; hence with respect to those ideas we cannot affirm that we cognize and have insight into… But they are nevertheless conditions of applying the morally determined will to its object given to it a priori[142]

The moral law is the sole determinant of the pure will and its autonomy; if any other object takes part in the determinacy of the will, this would lead to its heteronomy. Through this determination, which constitutes the autonomy of the will, the rational subject realizes it freedom positively rather than negatively vis-a-vis the phenomenal realm. But reason inasmuch as it seeks completion or the unconditioned condition, it

[142] Immanuel Kant. *Practical Philosophy* (tans. Mary J. Gregor and Allen Wood). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 5:4.

tries to aim at the highest good *(summum bonum)* as its ultimate target. In order to apply the moral law to the highest good, the rational subject makes two important postulates that are definitely not the determining ground of the moral law but are *necessary* conditions for its application.

In order to understand the role and significance of the idea of God in the practical use of reason, we will have to take a closer look at the origin of the idea of the highest good. Given that the moral law is determined exclusively with regards to its form and not its content, the rational subject, who, in following the moral law, thinks of himself noumenally as a free agent, still can not be satisfied that following such a law would lead to happiness. For the action of this subject are manifested in the phenomenal world according to the rules of the understanding. Only through the a priori assumption of the possibility of the highest good as the object of pure practical reason, is it possible to overcome the dichotomy between the supersensible constitution of the moral law and its natural application. Thus Kant writes toward the end of his resolution of the antinomy of practical reason:

> …it follows that in practical principles a natural and necessary connections between the consciousness of morality and the expectation of a happiness proportionate to it as its result can thought as possible…that, accordingly, the supreme good is morality, whereas happiness constitutes its second element but in such a way that it is only the morally conditioned yet necessary result of the former. Only with this subordination is the highest good the whole object of pure practical reason, which must necessarily represent it as possible since it commands us to contribute everything possible to its production. But since the possibility of such a connection of the conditioned with its belongs wholly to the supersensible relation of things and can not be given in accordance with the laws of the sensible world although the practical results of this idea—namely actions that aim at realizing the highest good—belong to the sensible world, we shall try to set forth the grounds of that possibility….[143]

The highest good being aims at overcoming the dichotomy between the pure intelligibility of the moral law and the manifestation of its application in the phenomenal world. But the moral law itself is not determined by the pursuit of

[143] Ibid, p. 5:119

happiness. For this would lead back to the problem of the heteronomy of the will. Rather happiness is subordinated to the highest good. But still, the highest good is a rational idea produced by the desire of practical reason. Hence it requires further conditions for the possibility of considering the highest good the ultimate object of the moral law. These conditions are essentially what Kant mentioned in the preface, viz. the postulates of the immortality of the soul and of God.

The postulate of the immortality of the soul is primarily required as a condition of the possibility of the highest good in order to ensure the complete conformity of the disposition and actions produced by the will according to the moral law. Since no rational being is capable of such holiness or complete conformity of his will to the moral law at every moment of his existence, endless progress toward reaching this aim must be postulated. This endless progress is possible upon the assumption of the immortality of the soul. Thus Kant argues that the postulate of the immortality of the soul essentially establishes the consciousness of complete morality of the rational agent which he needs to always will the highest good as his main object. It is thereby a postulate that is mainly required by moral thought or more precisely by the subject inasmuch as he is making a moral decision.

The postulate of God is more related to the problem of happiness which in turn is connected, as we have seen above with the problem of the dichotomy between the supersensible and the sensible and how such dichotomous relation constitute a problem in explaining the possibility of the former having an influence on the latter. Kant explains this dichotomy as follows:

> Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence everything goes according to his wish and will, and rest, therefore on the harmony of nature with his whole end as well as with the essential determining ground of his will. Now the moral law as a law of freedom commands through determining grounds that are to be quite independent of nature and of its harmony with our faculty of desire; the acting rational being in the world is however not also the cause of the world and of nature itself. Consequently, there is not the least ground in the moral law for a

> necessary connection between the morality and the proportionate happiness of a being belonging to the world as part of it and hence dependent upon it, who for that reason cannot by his will be a cause of this nature and as far as happiness is concerned, cannot by his own powers make it harmonize thoroughly with his practical principles[144]

The moral law is determined on pure intelligible according to the universalizability principle. Still the rational subject in order to see that his actions fulfill the moral law must be assured that the manifestations of these actions in the phenomenal world are caused by the moral laws. However, these actions being phenomena like any other phenomena are given to him according to the necessary laws of nature based on the synthesis of intuitions and concepts. The rational subject can thus never be assured his actions are actually in conformity with and in the spirit of the moral law and hence can not attain happiness; for happiness, as the quote above illustrates in finding harmony between the will and the actions and existence in the world. Hence happiness consists in finding a way in which the supersensible could be harmonized and shown to have an influence on the sensible. This dichotomy which preoccupies most of Kant's discussion in the second *Critique* especially after the 'Analytic of pure practical reason' is essentially the same problem with which he wrestles in the Introduction to the third *Critique*, as has been explained in chapter 1. In turn this problem is essentially the core issue at stake as far as the questions of defining human subjectivity as a whole is concerned.

In order to overcome this problem, Kant argues that the *existence* of a supreme being must be postulated:

> Accordingly the existence of a cause of all nature, distinct from nature, which contains the ground of this connection, namely the exact correspondence of happiness with morality, is also postulated. However, this supreme cause is to contain the ground of the correspondence of nature not merely with a law of the will of rational beings but with the representation of this law, so as they make it the supreme determining ground of the will, and consequently not merely with morals in their form but also with their morality as their determining ground that with their moral

[144] Ibid. p. 5:124.

> disposition…Now a being capable of actions in accordance with the representation of laws is an intelligence (a rational being) , and the causality of such a being in accordance with this representation of laws as his will. Therefore, the supreme cause of nature, insofar as it must be presupposed for the highest good, is a being that is the cause of nature by understanding and will (hence its author), that is, God.[145]

The postulation of the existence of a supreme being that is the cause of nature by understanding and will can assure the rational subject of the harmony between the moral law, the ground of the determination of the will, and the phenomenal manifestations of the will in the realm of nature according to the rules of the understanding. If the ultimate author of the world according the structure of its manifestation in accordance with the laws of the understandings is also an intelligent rational being then the moral laws determined in pure intelligible manner must be in conformity with the structure of the phenomenal world. Thus the postulation of the existence of God justifies making the pursuit of the highest good the object of the pure will and that such pursuit will lead to the attainment of happiness. For, even if this happiness is not attained in this world it can still be hoped for in the hereafter.[146] The relevance of the moral use of the idea of God to the structure of aesthetic judgment becomes clear. Of all the ideas of reason involved in the constitution of moral thought through the practical application of reason, the idea of God is the one that plays the essential role in harmonizing the intelligible nature of moral law that determined solely in the supersensible world with the necessary structure of the phenomenal world wherein the actions of the subject of experience are manifested.

As has been shown in the previous chapter aesthetic judgment constitutes everyday-historical meaning through its hermeneutical harmonization of the transcendent ideas of reason with the sensible realm of spatial-temporal experience. Through this human being is constituted as a whole. Now, as Kant admits, there are

---

[145] Ibid. p. 5:125.
[146] Ibid. p. 5:129.

three main ideas and postulates involved in moral thought: the postulate of freedom, the postulate of immortality and the postulate of God. The postulate of freedom is realized in through the autonomy of the will which in turn is based on its pure intelligible determination. It can not therefore serve as the guiding principle for imagination in its hermeneutical harmonization of the supersensible with the sensible. As for the postulate of immortality, it is essentially connected with the rational subject consciousness of his capacity for being *endlessly* in conformity with the moral law. Thus while it has a religious dimensions just like the idea of God it related essentially to the subject's attitude while making a moral decision. In contrast with both ideas, the idea of God is postulated essentially to reconcile the pure intelligibility of the moral law with the nature and hence to show not only that they are in harmony with each other but also that the former can influence the latter. Further, being the ground for happiness which is an integral part of taking the highest good as the object of the will, the idea of God gives a possibility for manifesting the moral feeling of respect which lies at the core of the choice to make the will in conformity with the moral law. Hence, the idea of God satisfies the requirement of aesthetic judgment in constituting a state of consciousness that represents the pure moral feeling which, as we and other commentators including Heidegger, is a rather ambiguous notion.

Therefore, the idea of God turns out to be the most suitable idea for guiding imagination in its hermeneutical connection of the supersensible with the sensible. For, the idea of God is the idea that essentially constitutes the possibility of the harmony between the two realms. It can therefore give the orientation required by the aesthetic imagination to interpret nature purposively according to moral ends furnished by reason.

It is noteworthy to mention that this peculiar role of the idea of God could possibly respond to the criticism often addressed to Kant's postulates. Many critics claim that Kant seem to retract what he asserts about the autonomy of the will in its choice to conform to the moral law out of its own essential worth through his discussion of the highest good and the postulates that constitute the conditions of its pursuit as the object of the moral law. However, if the use of the highest good as the key to bridge the dichotomy between the supersensible and the sensible is taken into consideration the harmony of Kant's claims could be better appreciated. The postulate of the existence of God is not required for determination of the will. This is completely done through the moral law. Rather, the function of the postulate is to constitute a state of mind and a new species of meaning that reconciles the pure intelligibility of the moral law with the natural manifestation of the actions that allegedly fulfill such a law. However, the full appreciation of this role can not be attained without reference to aesthetic judgment and its role in constituting this consciousness. Only through this reference can the importance of this consciousness and new species of meaning could be appreciated. For this consciousness as has been shown in chapters 4 and 5 is what constitutes the whole of human subjectivity with its historical and everyday dimensions.

§Conclusion: the harmony of the characterizations of the idea of God in the first & second Critiques with the structure of aesthetic judgment

It has been demonstrated that according to Kant's characterization of the origin of the ideal of God in the first *Critique* it can best fulfill the requirement of guiding the hermeneutical role of imagination in reconciling the supersensible with sensible for two reason. So first it is the idea that is least experientially determinant; second, it is the most universal idea and can accommodate all variations of contexts in everyday experience given that it is the idea the encompasses all reality as much as it

encompasses all the possibilities of any consciousness of anything as such. This characterization is in perfect harmony with the moral characterization of the idea of God in the second *Critique*. As has been shown in the previous section, the existence of God is postulated by practical reason essentially for the purpose of reconciling the intelligible with the sensible. Thus the fact that it encompasses the possibility of every thing is in perfect harmony with the fact that it's the cause of nature both according to will and the understanding.

It could thereby be concluded that the idea of God can best fulfill the need of aesthetic judgment. The idea of God can furnish imagination with the freedom it requires for its hermeneutical harmonization of the supersensible and the sensible. It also gives it the moral orientation it requires in addition to infinite possibilities for interpretation inasmuch as it encompasses the possibilities of the consciousness of any thing as such.

But how does the idea of God fulfill this task? Is there any clue in Kant's writings in support of this suggested role? Further what are the limitations of Kant's views and how can they be developed further especially with regards to the aesthetic essence of religious experience and the significance of the latter to the meaning of the human as such? To respond to these questions, the following chapter will turn to Kant's religious writings focusing primarily on *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* and *Lecture on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion.*

Chapter 7

God, the Aesthetic Everyday-Historical Human and the Limitations of Kant's System

§I. Prelude:

In the last chapter I have demonstrated the aspects of the idea of God that sets it apart from the two other ideas of reason: the cosmological and the psychological ideas especially as far as fulfilling the structure of aesthetic judgment and consciousness is concerned. Kant's asserted in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Prolegomena* that the idea of God is completely disconnected from experience inasmuch as it is not the extrapolation of any of the components of experience like the cosmological and the psychological ideas. It has been shown that this characteristic qualifies the idea of God to better comply with the principle of 'purposiveness without a purpose' according to which aesthetic imagination hermeneutically constitutes aesthetic judgment and meaning. Second, Kant's assertion that the ideal of God is the complete idea of any 'thing,' that is any object of consciousness as such, and thereby contains all reality qualifies the idea of God even further to fit the structure of aesthetic judgment. Inasmuch as the subjective universality of aesthetic judgment is one of its key characterizing features and is what primarily allows it to serve as the basis of common sense and thus everyday meaning, the fact that the idea of God contains all possibilities of consciousness of any object gives more freedom for the imagination in its interpretative function compared to the limited subjective orientation (in the case of the psychological idea) or the objective orientation (in the case of the cosmological idea). The last chapter also showed that the function of the postulate of the idea of God as a necessary condition of the application of the moral laws and the pursuit of the highest good qualifies it even further for furnishing the moral purposiveness required by aesthetic judgment. The main function of the idea of God in the practical

use of reason is to bridge the gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal or the supersensible and the sensible. Through the postulation of the idea of an intelligent supreme being that designed the world according to its pure, free will and its understanding, the actions caused by the autonomous will of the free rational subject could be harmonized with natural causality. For, if both realms originate from the same being, such harmony must follow. Further, the pure feeling of respect for the moral law can at last find a parallel in the feeling of happiness that is associated with the hope for the attainment of the *sumum bonum* in the hereafter. This moral role of the ideal of God also best fits the requirement of aesthetic judgment. First, the main function of the idea of God is to bridge the gap between the super-sensible and the sensible in the practical use of reason; I can thus provide orientation for aesthetic imagination to harmonize the super-sensible with the sensible especially when the aesthetic experience involves a moral dimension as in the case of 'beauty'. Second, as much as the aesthetic pleasure, as has been shown in chapter 5, provides a parallel for the moral feeling, the idea of God inasmuch as it allows the subject the satisfaction and happiness it affords through the harmony it affords between the supersensible and the sensible best befits this function of the imagination. The questions that concluded the discussion of the previous chapter were: to what extent was this central role of the idea of God reflected in his writings on religion? More importantly, how can we piece together into a vision of the human-divine relation in Kant's thought the threads developed so far with regards to the role of aesthetic judgment in constituting the whole of human subjectivity and the claimed role the idea of God plays in such constitution? To what extent can this view give a ground for religious experience in general and what are the limitations of Kant's system? This chapter will try to succinctly respond to these questions. It will start with a brief examination of Kant's

Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion. In this examination I will focus on Kant's assertion that the use of the idea of God is 'subjectively necessary'; I will demonstrate the connection between this assertion and aesthetic judgment. The following section will turn to a brief examination of the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.* This section will specifically focus on Kant's argument for rational faith and the 'Kingdom of God' especially in connection with the Christian notion of the Son of God. A comparison will be drawn between the role the Ideal of God, according to the findings of the previous sections, could play in form everyday-historical consciousness on one hand and the picture Kant depicts of the relation between morality, religion and history in this work. Based on this comparison a critique will be addressed to Kant's view and how it overlooked dimensions that were discussed both in the second and third *Critiques.* The final section of this chapter will conclude with an overview of the elements of the human-divine relation in Kant's system that could be deduced based on the findings of the previous chapters. Based on this view the limitations of Kant's system especially as far as religious experience is concerned will be pointed out. The discussion of these limitations will establish the transition to Part II where the system of the human-divine relationship in Ibn al-'Arabī will be suggested to overcome these limitations.

§II. The subjective necessity of God in the Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion:

The *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* published after Kant's death in 1817, probably gives the most extensive statement of Kant on the variety of ways in which the idea of God evolves and is used by human reason. It thus delineates the limits and nature of the human-divine relation and its significance in Kant's system could be discerned.

Kant starts the lectures with a division of the different species of theologies, based on the different ways in which the idea of God could be approached.[147] Kant defines theology as "…the system of our cognition of the highest being"[148]; He then qualifies this definition further arguing that "the system of cognition of God signifies the sume total not of all possible cognitions of God but of what human reason encounters pertaining to God."[149] Accordingly, theology defines all possible modes of coneiving of the idea of the perfect being. Given his criticism of natural theology and its false proofs of the idea of God, Kant, then, devotes the two parts of the lectures to the two legitimate species of theology he identifies: transcendental theology and moral theology. The first concerns the origin of the idea God in reason and the understanding.[150] Here, it is important to bear in mind what Kant means by reason. Reason as he defines it in the first *Critique* is the faculty of principles *(das Vermögen der Prinzipien)*[151] and seeking the unconditioned condition *(unbedingte Bedingung)* of all conditioned/possible.[152] As such this faculty defines the realm of what is completely transcendent to experience. The second, viz. moral theology, concerns the moral use of the idea of God.[153]

As much as I have shown the harmony between the nature of the idea of God in the first *Critique* and the regulative use of the idea of God by practical reason in the second *Critique* especially as far as the nature of aesthetic judgment is concerned, I will show the same here. Further, I will demonstrate that the common ground that

---

[147] See Immanuel Kant. *Religion and Rational Theology* (trans. Allen Wood & George di Giovani). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 28:1000.
[148] Ibid, p. 28:995
[149] Ibid, p. 28:995
[150] Ibid, p. 28:999
[151] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A299-301/B356-8
[152] Ibid, A322/B378-9
[153] See *Religion and Rational Theology*, 28:1000

could be identified between transcendental theology and moral theology is in harmony with the structure of aesthetic judgment.

In the course of his demonstration of the transcendental necessity of the idea of God as the sum of all possibilities, Kant writes:

> The first thing here is the possibility of God, which no one either can deny or prove, because the cognition of it surpasses all human reason…Here it was shown that of all possible proofs, the one which affords us the most satisfaction is the argument that if we remove an original being, we at the same time remove the substratum of the possibility of all things.—But ever this proof is not apodictically certain; for it cannot establish the objective necessity of an original being, but establishes the subjective necessity of assuming such being. But this proof can in no way be refuted because it has its ground in the nature of human reason. For my reason makes it absolutely necessary for me to assume a being which is the ground of everything possible, because otherwise I would be unable to know what in general the possibility of something consists in.[154]

Kant clearly reiterates his assertion that it is impossible to prove or deny the possibility of determining the idea of God objectively, that is in a predicative determinant judgment. However, the subjective necessity of postulating such being can not be denied. For denying the possibility of a necessary being that encompasses the possibility of all reality means denying the possibility of all possible 'things' or objects of consciousness. Assuming a necessary being as the origin and the cause of all contingent beings is necessary in the context of ontological scholastic argument[155] as much as it was also necessary for Aristotle to assume an unmoved mover to establish that potentialities would turn into actualities. But why would it be necessary for Kant? The transcendental idea of God does not have any objective use since objective meaning is determined through the spontaneous synthesis of intuitions with concepts; yet, it does have what Kant calls a subjective necessity. But is this 'subjective necessity' which, as Kant says above is due to the nature human reason merely a logical abstract one or does it have a transcendental use in the sense of being

[154] See *Religion and Rational Theology*, 28:1034.
[155] Especially under the influence Avicenna's metaphysics.

condition of a possibility of certain domain of consciousness and meaning? This transcendental use, as I would like to argue is intimately related to the aesthetic/everyday consciousness. Aesthetic everyday consciousness as it has been argued above establishes a state of mind/consciousness that allows the whole of human subjectivity to emerge through the harmony it establishes between supersensible and the sensible. While the theoretical use of the idea of God would definitely lead to dialectical illusions, it is subjectively necessary because, of all the ideas of reason, it is the one universal enough to provide a basis for such a state of consciousness as much as it encompasses the possibility of all reality. The origin of the Ideal of God is essentially purely transcendent and is defined in terms of the desire of reason to pursue the unconditioned condition of every 'thing.' But this desire, as the examination of the Introduction to the third *Critique* has shown, calls for the construction of new plan and level of meaning in the everyday attitude. A scientist who wants to restrict himself to what could legitimately be said about experience would necessarily limit himself to the spontaneity of the synthesis of the understanding. However, in everyday consciousness when reason desires to find a ground for its influence in the phenomenal world and seek a new plan of meaning that could be used as the basis for a common sense, it must have an anchoring point that goes beyond all the determinant judgments of possible things and harmonizes them together in a whole. Through this 'anchoring point', the rational desire for completion could be reconciled with natural necessity. This anchoring point is, as I would like to argue, the idea of God whose aesthetic transcendental use allows for the constitution of this new plane of everyday historical meaning. In light of this we can extend the implication of Kant's conclusion:

> Hence every possibility presupposes something actually given since if everything were merely possible, then the possible itself would have no ground; so this ground of

> possibility must itself be given not merely as possible but also as actual. But it must be noted that only the subjective necessity of such a being is thereby established, i.e. that our speculative reason sees itself necessitated to presuppose this being if it wants to have insight into why something is possible, but the objective necessity of such a thing can by no means be demonstrated in this matter[156]

The desire of reason not only necessitates the constitutions of the Ideal of God but to postulate it as actually there. Actuality in this context means that it exists in itself not as encountered in the phenomenal world.[157] Since all objectivity is based on the synthesis of intuitions with concepts which in turn result in the construction of the phenomenal world, this means that such an Ideal can not have any objective reality. The idea of God originates as a result of the desire of reason. However, this desire, as we learn from the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, requires a degree of fulfillment. This fulfillment is established through the aesthetic level of consciousness that makes it possible to harmonize the supersensible with the sensible. Given that the Ideal of God is the sum total of all possibilities, the idea of God can offer a multitude of orientations for imagination to hermeneutically constitute aesthetic consciousness.

In other words, the 'subjective necessity' of the idea of God is precisely what qualifies it to fulfill the 'universal subjective' nature that underlies the transcendental nature and function of aesthetic judgment. This is how I attempt to explain this 'subjective necessity' that is not simply rendered as a dialectical delusion as in the case of the psychological and cosmological ideas

Turning to Kant's discussion of moral theology we find a similar characterization of the moral use of the idea of God in terms of it subjective necessity. Kant writes:

> …the concept of God is a moral concept that is practically necessary…for morality contains the conditions as regards the conduct of rational being under which alone they can be worth of happiness…experience and reason show us that in the present course of things, precise observation of all morally necessary dues is not always

[156] Ibid, p. 28:1036
[157] Ibid, p. 28:1021-32

> connected with well being, but rather the noblest honesty and righteousness is often misunderstood, despised, persecuted and trodden under foot by vice. But there must exist a being who rules the world according to reason and moral laws, and who has established in the course of things to come, a state where the creature who has remained true to his nature and who has made himself worthy of happiness through morality will actually participate in this happiness; for otherwise all subjectively necessary duties which I as a rational being am responsible for performing will lose their objective validity[158]

In this quote, Kant re-explains his argument for the moral use of the Ideal of God in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Pure will is determined exclusively by the moral law that is intelligibly. In order for the rational subject to see that his pure will does affect his actions which are manifested phenomenally, the rational subject must postulate that both nature and the will have the same origin. This postulation is the sole ground for happiness or satisfaction in abiding by the moral law. Happiness is thus the result of the harmonization of the supersensible and the sensible through the postulation of the idea of God. This postulation is what gives 'objective validity' for 'duties' because it allows for a phenomenal representation of the moral feeling through the feeling of happiness which in turn is grounded in the harmony it affords between the supersensible and the sensible.

The idea of God both morally and transcendentally plays a necessary subjective role. This role consists in creating a state of consciousness that results from the harmony it establishes between the sensible and the supersensible. This subjective necessity shares the same ground with the subjective need to which reflective judgment in general and particularly aesthetic reflective judgment was introduced to respond.

[158] Ibid. p. 28:1072

§III. Religion, morality and history: implications and problems in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason.

In the preface to *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, Kant repeats the relation between morality and religion. The need for practical reason to postulate the existence of a supreme being from whom both the supersensible and the sensible originated provides the condition of the application of the moral law and the pursuit of the highest good. Thus Kant argues:

> Morality thus inevitably leads to religion, and through religion it extends itself to the idea of a mighty moral lawgiver outside the human being, in whose will the final end (of the creation of the world) is what can and at the same time ought to be the final human end.[159]

Here, Kant explicitly argues for the moral origin of religion and the need for having a rational faith. This origin consists in the moral need for postulating the idea of a supreme being that justifies the highest good based primarily on its capacity to harmonize the supersensible and the sensible, as has been argued in the previous section and in chapter 6. Based on this argument Kant sets out to define human nature[160], the origin of evil in human nature[161] and then use the example of the 'Son of God' as the prototype human to defend his thesis on the 'Kingdom of God'[162] which is manifested in a divinely governed state as the ultimate realization of the highest good in the world.[163] Below I will present a brief account of Kant's argument. However, I will criticize him for the following. In his argument here as much he has done in the history writings, Kant seems to overlook the important thesis that resulted from the discussions of the last few chapters. 'Human' subjectivity or the human-being is essentially the historical-everyday hermeneutical state of consciousness

[159] Ibid, p. 6:6.
[160] Ibid, p. 6:20-5
[161] Ibid, p. 6:29-53
[162] Ibid, p. 6:60-78
[163] Ibid, p. 6:93-100, 6:115-6:123

constituted by aesthetic imagination. In other words, the human-being is essentially a hermeneutical being that is constituted through the work of imagination in its harmonization of the supersensible and the sensible. This is the result reached in chapter 5. In chapter 6 and the first section of this chapter, it was shown that the ideal of God as far as it is origin in speculative reason and as far as its moral use is concerned is idea of reason best fitted to guide aesthetic imagination in undertaking this task. The problem with the above picture that Kant depicts of the relation between morality, religion and history is that it sets the divine or more precisely the transcendent-moral essence of the rational subject as the prototype of the human being. Human-being as such is the constant hermeneutical endeavor to harmonize the supersensible with the sensible. Setting a supersensible prototype of the divine-human in the form of the son of God, even as Kant will argue, based on rational faith and not on any religious dogma is a reduction of the human to the holy, rational side of him *(heilige)*. The human in Kant, as Heidegger rightly puts it in his commentary on Kant's aesthetics, is the hermeneutical attempt to relate the intelligible to the sensible.[164] The intelligible side defines a mode of consciousness and thought that is needed for deciding on the moral maxim as much as theoretical consciousness defined by determinant judgment is also a mode of consciousness required for knowledge. Bringing these two modes consciousness together through the role of imagination defines human consciousness as such. Reducing the human to either of them or more precisely to the either of the senses of subjectivity associated with then and, then, using it as a prototype does violence to the nature of the human as such. Not only this, but as has been shown in chapter 4, this leads to the superimposition of a specific view on history instead of defining the historical constitution the human. In other

[164] See §III of chapter 5 above.

words, this view is bound, like that of Hegel to assume that there is a continuous progress towards the realization of a specific ideal in history. Indeed Kant's notion of the realization of the 'Kingdom of God' in the form of a divinely governed state almost coincides in its idealistic tendencies with Hegel's thesis about the National State in which the universal spirit will supersede the particular. To better appreciate this critique, I will give a brief account of Kant's argument; I will then show in what way it deviates from the findings of the last chapter and indeed suppresses important ways through which the findings of the Kantian system with respect to the use of the Ideal of God could be developed.

Kant starts Part I of the work with a brief definition of human nature:

> …by the nature of a human being we only understand here the subjective ground wherever it may lie—of the exercise of the human being's freedom in general (under objective moral laws) antecedent to every deed that falls within the scope of the senses[165]

This definition is in line with the claims put forward above. Human nature is identified with the subjective consciousness of the influence of the acts caused originally by freedom on the sensible world. Kant then introduces the problem the propensity to evil and defines it in terms of the weakness of adopting the moral maxims determined purely by the moral laws. According to Kant evil arises from the heteronomous determination of the maxim. This arises from the effects of sensibility. In other words it arises from the lack of an autonomous free will; succumbing to 'affects of sensibility'[166] leads to the heteronomy of the will. But sensible inclinations are not themselves the problem. The cause of this heteronomy of the will as Kant explains in §III is the propensity of the human to subordinate the moral law to the natural inclinations. Therefore Kant concludes:

---

[165] Ibid, 6:21
[166] Ibid, 6:32

> …if a propensity to this inversion does lie in human nature, then there is in the human being a natural propensity to evil; and this propensity itself is morally evil, since it must ultimately be sought in a free power of choice…This evil is radical, since it corrupts the ground of all maxims…[167]

However this claim regarding the propensity to evil is based on experience. Its origin can not be determined.

> The rational origin, however, of this disharmony in our power of choice with respect to the way it incorporates lower incentives in its maxims and makes them supreme, i.e. this propensity to evil, remains inexplicable to us…Evil can have originated only from moral evil (not just from the limitations of our nature); yet the original predisposition (which none other than the human himself could have corrupted, if this corruption is to be imputed to him) is a predisposition to the good; there is no conceivable ground for us, therefore, from which moral evil could fist have come in us[168]

In this context the practical use of the Ideal of God comes forth again. The way to overcome this propensity to evil is to constantly will the highest good. God is consequently postulated to justify the highest good. Although the human being realizes his weakness, the postulation of the existence of a supreme God, can assure him of a continuous progress towards the achievement of a Kingdom of God where all humans will the highest good. Here Kant brings the Christian notion of the Son of God and argues that this idea, from a purely rational basis, not based on any Christian dogma, should give hope for the achievement of a Kingdom of God where all humans would be pleasing to God inasmuch as they autonomously will the highest good:

> In the practical faith in this Son of God (so far as he is represented as having taken up human nature) the human being can thus hope to become pleasing to God (and thereby blessed); that is only a human being conscious of such a moral disposition in himself as enables him to believe and self-assuredly trust that he, under temptations and afflictions…would steadfastly cling to the prototype of humanity and follow this prototype's example in loyal emulation, only such a human being and he alone, is entitled to consider himself not an unworthy object of divine pleasure[169]

The belief in this prototype of a divine human and the constant attempt to emulate it should hopefully lead to the establishment of Kingdom of God. This

---

[167] Ibid, 6:37
[168] Ibid, 6:43
[169] Ibid, p. 6:62.

Kingdom of God would be essentially constituted of a civil community and would take the form of an *ethico-civil* state.[170] This state is the historical realization of the kingdom of God. While this state may need religious institution, all its members must ultimately realize the pure, rational foundation of all faiths and religions.[171]

This view of the threefold relation between morality, religion and history, brings Kant very close to Hegel and indeed situates his discourse perfectly within the context of the modern theory of state and how it represents a progress from the natural state to a civil state—with the exception that Kant gives it a religious tone more than Hobbes, Spinoza or Rousseau. However there are a number of problems that should be noted. First of all Kant bases the relation between morality, religion and history solely in light of his discussion of the problem of evil. In doing so the main reason why practical reason essentially postulates the existence of God is completely overlooked. God's existence is postulated in order to make it possible to conceive a harmony between the supersensible and the sensible or more precisely, as Kant puts it in the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, to allow for a the former to influence the latter. This does not contradict with what Kant says about the possible role the idea of God could play in overcoming the propensity to evil. But it is definitely not the essential reason why the idea of God is postulated.

Second, and more importantly the idea of the divine-human or the Son of God as a prototype of the human does reductive violence to the meaning of the human being as a whole. It is definitely unquestionable that aspiring to an idealistic prototype of a divine human, whose will is fully and consistently in line with the divine will inasmuch as it pursues the highest good, could establish hope and foster progress for a better future. Nonetheless this prototype does not resolve the key problem of how a

[170] Ibid, p. 6:95-100
[171] Ibid, p. 6:115-136

being that is conscious of itself in terms a dichotomous duality defined in terms of two worlds that seem like separate isles (the world of natural necessity and the world of moral freedom) can harmonize these two modes of consciousness into one whole that could be called a human. As has been shown in chapter 1 this was the main problem in the transcendental system that motivated the Idealist project starting from Reinhold and Fichte through Hegel. It was also the key problem Heidegger identified with the transcendental system of Kant, especially if the transcendental as he justifiably claims is essentially a fundamental ontology. In this view, a prototype of the human would essentially be a prototype for how an everyday human being can harmonize the supersensible with the sensible and not a prototype or an incarnation of the supersensible.

Thirdly, and this point is inextricably related to the second point, concerns the view of history Kant presents. Kant's setting of an idealistic prototype led him as it did in his history writings earlier to project a progressive, totalizing view of history similar to that of Hegel. Instead of looking at the condition of historicity and man as essentially a historical being and role the idea of God could play in the constitution of such historicity, Kant projected a idealistic trajectory on the movement of history based on his idealistic, purely rational assumptions. It is true that Kant acknowledged that the relation to the sensible should always be acknowledged and that the sensible is not the origin of evil but rather the choice to subordinate the moral law to the sensible is the source of evil. Nonetheless, the harmonization of the supersensible and the sensible and the role God could play in this as a condition of historicity was not properly articulated by Kant in any of his writings on either history or religion.

§IV. Conclusion: the human-divine relationship in Kant, its limitations and the transition to part II

Based on the findings of the previous chapters a number of conclusions could be drawn about the human-divine relationship in Kant particularly in connection with the problem of defining human subjectivity as a whole in his system. The role played by the divine is essential to the constitution of the human as a whole. It has been shown that the nature of the Ideal of God as the sum total of all possibilities and the idea that has least objective reality specifically qualifies it for guiding imagination in constituting historical-everyday meaning and consciousness which in its turn the hermeneutical essence of what the human is. This qualification is further reinforced by the role played by the idea of God in the practical use of reason that is constitutive of morality. The *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* further supports these claims, even if partially.

In light of this argument two main results were achieved by the first part. First, it put forward a new thesis about human subjectivity as a whole in Kant's sysytem as essentially a hermeneutical being that has two dimensions: a historical and an everyday dimension. In this vein it has been asserted that this hermeneutical being is constituted through aesthetic imagination. Second, it argued that the idea of God has better capacity to guide and orient aesthetic imagination more than any of the ideas of reason. This in turn opens up a new possibility for re-defining the relation between the human and the divine in Kant's thought.

Unfortunately, the implications of this thesis to a philosophical model of religious experience are yet to be discovered and investigated. For instance how can Kant's claim with regards to the Ideal of God being the sum total of all possibilities of consciousness of any 'thing' as such be translated into the structure of aesthetic judgment and how can this structure be in turn translated into a framework for religious experience? Further how can this aesthetic structure of the human-divine

relationship define a philosophical framework for re-conceiving the question of prophecy? The question of prophecy has been a key question in the philosophy of religion since the medieval period and it has definitely taken a new path since the emergence of modernity especially through the writings of Hobbes and Spinoza. Nonetheless very few have approached this question from a Kantian perspective especially from this aesthetic perspective. Thirdly how can this aesthetic framework offer a possibility for re-defining religion and historicity from a transcendental perspective? In other words how can the suggested aesthetic framework for understanding human subjectivity as a whole and the role, the idea of God is suggested to play in the constitutions of such aesthetic structure of humanity re-define the condition of historicity from a transcendental perspective especially in connection with religion and the idea of God? It has been shown above the connection between morality, religion and history is fundamental to Kant's work. However, it was also demonstrated that Kant delineated this relation in a rather limited and idealistic manner, subsiding if not overlooking the main problem which the Idea of God mainly helps to resolve, namely, the harmonization of the supersensible with the sensible and the senses of subjectivity and consciousness associated with each?

To respond to these questions, the second part of this work will turn to famous Andalusian mystic and philosopher Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī (d. 1240). The similarity between his conception of the human being and that of Kant will first be established. Subsequently, it will be shown how the human-divine relationship in both thinkers corresponds with each other. Further, it will be shown how Kant's articulation of the role of imagination and how it constitutes meaning and judgment help explain and develop Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of imagination. However, the examination of Ibn al-'Arabī's perspective on the human-divine relationship will

demonstrate the way it can overcome the limitations of the Kantian system with regards to the three questions raised above. First the examination of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s complex system of the divine names will provide a concrete way in which the Idea of God as the sum of all possibilities could guide imagination in harmonizing the supersensible and the sensible. Second through the examination of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s theory of prophecy and its roots in his theory of the human a new philosophical approach to role of prophecy from the perspective of the philosophy of religion will be made possible. Third, the examination of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s theory of the history of prophecy will demonstrate a framework for conceiving the relation between the human-divine relationship on one hand and the historicity as a fundamental condition of the human being on the other.

Chapter 8

Being and Consciousness in Ibn al-'Arabī: from ontology to 'fundamental ontology'

§I. Prelude:

I.1 The crisis of Ibn al-'Arabī scholarship:

The scholarship on Ibn al-'Arabī is as problematic as his own writings. In the Muslim tradition there have been quite ambivalent stances towards him. For instance, the famous 15th-century theologian, Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 1505) argued that no scholar should attempt to read the works of Ibn al-'Arabī before the age of forty. By contrast, the literalist traditionalist Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328) argued that his arguments constitute a system of *(shirk)* or ascribing divinity to aught beside God. Among Sufis there have also been mixed attitudes toward Ibn al-'Arabī's works, ranging from those who warned against the philosophical nature of his writings, like Aḥmad Zarrūq (d. 1493), to those who considered him the ultimate and most genuine expression of Islamic spirituality, like Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī (d. 1883).

In contemporary scholarship, the main background against which most of the arguments in the following chapters will be set, two main problems dominate the debates on interpreting the work of the master of Seville. The first, which most of Ibn al-'Arabī scholars would admit, is related to the classification of his thought or more precisely: how to read Ibn al-'Arabī. On the one hand, the wave of intellectual disenchantment with European metaphysics and particularly with the philosophical project of the Enlightenment that started at the beginning of the 20th century and swept the western hemisphere in the aftermath of World War II opened the appetite of many thinkers to re-discover the orient as the absolute spiritual 'other' of western rationality. Islam was suddenly categorized by some of these scholars as part of this

oriental spiritual tradition. Sufism, the mystical tradition of Islam, became a very appealing field of study for many of these figures. Furthermore, Ibn al-'Arabī, who was deemed as one of the greatest figures of this tradition was, immediately classified a purely spiritual figure. There has been a thorough resistance among this category of traditionalist scholars to any philosophical reading of Ibn al-'Arabī's corpus despite not only his philosophical terminology and style but also his explicit acknowledgement of the role of philosophy, as I will show below. Among this group of traditionalist scholars are: René Guénon, Martin Lings, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Michel Chodkiewicz. While William Chittick would also fall in this category, he stands somewhat apart for contributing significantly to the explication and philosophical tabulation of the work of Ibn al-'Arabī. On the other hand, and in opposition to this group, there have been continuous scholarly attempts to unravel the philosophical depth of Ibn al-'Arabī's thought. The most important of these are the groundbreaking work of Henry Corbin, *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn al-'Arabī*, and the recent work of Salman H. Bashier on the concept of the limit *(barzakh)* in Ibn al-'Arabī and its roots in Avicenna and Averroës,[172] and Ian Almond's work on the deconstructionist approach in Ibn al-'Arabī's hermeneutics.[173]

The second problem has to do with the western centrism in Ibn al-'Arabī scholarship. There has been a complete neglect of the modern scholarship in the Arab world, particularly as far as the philosophical interpretation of Ibn al-'Arabī is concerned. While the work of Abū al-'Ila 'Afīfī is quite well known, given that he was the first to publish and compose a long commentary on Ibn al-'Arabī's last

[172] See Salman H. Bashier. *Ibn al-'Arabī's Barzakh*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004)
[173] See Iad Almod. *Sufism and Deconstruction*. (New York: Routledge, 2004)

seminal work, *The Bezels of Wisdom*, in 1939, it is often ignored or belittled.[174] Moreover, the insightful work of Maḥmūd Qāsim[175] and Sulaymān al-'Aṭṭār[176] and the more recent contributions of scholars like Sa'īd Shiblī[177] have been completely ignored.

Most of these Arab commentators maintain, as Muḥāmmad Ghallāb argued, more than half a century ago,[178] that Ibn al-'Arabī had a profound stance on the role and significance of philosophy. Ghallab also argues that Ibn al-'Arabī defined metaphysics, the domain to which the idea of God belongs, as the key object of the faculty of reason. He thus adopted and developed the Neo-Platonic oriented reading of Aristotelian espistemology that was maintained by most of the Muslim philosophers before him, most notably Avicenna.[179] In this vein, Ibn al-'Arabī acknowledges the importance of philosophy and defends philosophical rational inquiry against its critics especially from among the Sufis:

> A philosopher means a lover of wisdom and wisdom is the ultimate purpose of every rational being…so do not ever deny a thesis made by a philosopher upon the pretext this is the wrong path of philosophers; for only those who do not have knowledge would say so…[180]

---

[174] There has been thorough resistance to the work of 'Afīfī because of its philosophical orientation and his attempt to draw comparisons between Ibn al-'Arabī and modern thinkers, especially Leibniz, Spinoza and German Idealism. See for instance, the introduction to: Michel Chodkiewicz. *The Seal of the Saints: Prophethood and Sainthood in the Doctrine of Ibn 'Arabi*. (Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society, 1993).

[175] See Maḥmūd Qāsim. *Muhiyy al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī*. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhir al-Ḥadītha, 1972)
[176] See Sulaymān al-'Aṭṭār. *Naẓrayat al-Khayāl 'ind Ibn 'Arabī*. (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqāfa, 1997)
[177] See Sa'īd Shiblī. *Naẓrayat al-Insān wa al-Ḥuriyya fi 'Irfān Muhiyy al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī*. (Beirut: Maktabat Ḥasan al-')
[178] See Ibrāhīm Madkūr. *Muhiyy al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī: al-Kitāb al-Tidhkārī*. (Cairo: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 1969), p.183-208.
[179] Ibid, p. 192-4.
[180] Ibn al-'Arabī. *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*. (Cairo: Al-Maṭb'a al-Maymaniyya, 1911), V. II, p. 271. There are also so many other clues not only in support of his embracement of philosophy but of considering it a condition for the full spiritual experience. For instance see, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makiyya*, V. II, p. 266-267.

Further he acknowledges the influence Greek philosophy has on his thought in several places in the *Meccan Revelations*.[181]

The following chapters will articulate an important philosophical dimension of Ibn al-'Arabī's thought, focusing in particular on the central role he assigns to subjectivity. It will be shown that Ibn al-'Arabī uses philosophical reflection to delimit the fields of consciousness associated with the different attitudes of the subject of experience. In other words the main task of philosophy and philosophical reflection, for Ibn al-'Arabī, as has been argued in chapter 4 with reference to Kant, is to define the boundaries of the domains of consciousness associated with the different subjective attitudes. This conception of philosophy and more importantly the subjective foundation of Ibn al-'Arabī's system will demonstrate that contrary to the way Ibn al-'Arabī's system has been received by most scholars his metaphysics does not constitute a pantheistic ontology but rather a fundamental ontology in Heidegger's sense of the term. In other words, Ibn al-'Arabī was mainly concerned with the articulation of the fundamentals of human subjectivity and the way they are constituted. Our key to this investigation will be the first chapter of Ibn al-'Arabī's *The Bezels of Wisdom*. Close examination of this work will further show that many of the seeming contradictions and rather vague formulations in Ibn al-'Arabī's system may be explained and elucidated in terms of the centrality of the subjective dimension that emerges in this work.[182]

But is there a guiding thread that can lead this philosophical investigation of Ibn al-'Arabī's thought? In the course of showing how the fields of consciousness

[181] Ibid, V.I , p. 138. There Ibn al-'Arabī talks about the contributions of philosophers to the physical sciences mentioning in specific the work of the pre-Socratics.
[182] The examination of chapter 1 of the *Bezels of Wisdom* which we take as the basis of the structure of subjectivity in Ibn al-'Arabī's will be the subject matter of chapter 9 below.

afforded by the imagination in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought ought to be approached, Henry Corbin writes:

> …with the help of phenomenology, we are able to examine the way in which man experiences his relationship to the world without reducing the objective data of this experience to data of sense perception or limiting the field of true and meaningful knowledge to the mere operations of the rational understanding…[183]

Phenomenology, from Corbin's perspective, inasmuch as it allows for the investigation of the subjective structure of experience can open up a possibility to investigate the field of consciousness defined by the imagination in Ibn al-'Arabī's system. This field of consciousness will only be understood, as he immediately and in an obviously Husserlian language, asserts, when the "…full *noetic* value of the imagination is admitted…" In other words, only a philosophical approach that takes as its main task the discovery of the structure of subjectivity and the different fields of consciousness associated with every subjective attitude can reveal the significance of the use of imagination in the work of Ibn al-'Arabī.

Corbin argues that the faculty of imagination underlies the constitution of religious experience, through the role it plays in constituting the structure of consciousness in the everyday subjective attitude. But how does imagination achieve this role? Corbin answers that it undertakes this role through a process of interpretation *(ta'wīl)*. But what does the imagination interpret? We respond to this question by investing the place and function of imagination. Corbin describes this place as follows:

> The intermediary between the world of Mystery *('ālam al-ghayb)* and the world of visibility *('ālam al-shahādat)* can only be imagination since the plane of being and which it designates is that in which the Incorporeal Beings of the world of Mystery take the body (which does not yet signify a material, physical body) and in which, reciprocally, natural sensuous things are spiritualized or immaterialized.[184]

---

[183] See Henry Corbin. *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn al-'Arabi* (trans. Ralph Manheim). (Princeton: Princeton University Press), p.3.
[184] Ibid., p. 189.

Imagination interpretatively or hermeneutically connects the two worlds between which it stands as an intermediary. However, *('ālam al-ghayb)* is not the world of Mystery as Corbin wrongly translates. It is the world of rational, transcendent ideas, essentially the noumenal world that transcends all knowledge based on sensible experience. Also, the *('ālam al-shahādat)* should not be reductively translated as the world of visibility. It is essentially the sensible world and encompasses all spatial-temporal phenomena accessible through sense percetion. This will be discussed extensively in the following chapter.

Further, Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of interpretation *(ta'wīl)* and its roots will be discussed in detail in chapter 10 below. Here, it suffices to make a few comments in connection with Corbin's analysis of the concept of imagination in his 'Introduction.' While Corbin was right to refer to Averroës and Avicenna as the possible source for the relation between imagination and interpretation in Ibn al-'Arabī, he limited his examination of the interpretative role of the imagination to the determination of the relation between exoteric *(al-ẓāhir)* meaning and esoteric meaning *(al-bāṭin)*. It is true that Averroës discusses interpretation in terms of this function in *The Decisive Treatise*[185] and other writings; however, the interpretative role of the imagination was not limited to this role. As will be shown in chapter 10, among the hitherto unexamined contributions of Islamic philosophy to the development of the Greek legacy, was the expansion and development of the role of the faculty of imagination, specifically in the works of al-Fārābī, Avicenna and Averroës. Despite the difference among the works of these writers, they assigned a central role to the faculty of imagination in mediating and connecting the realm of universal ideas with the realm

[185] See Averroes. *Decisive Treastise* (trans. Charles E. Butterworth). (Provo: Brigham Youn University Press, 2008), p.9-12

of sensible or substantial forms in a way that transcends the limited role assigned by Aristotle to φαντασία in the *De Anima* and *Sense and Sensibilia*.

In conclusion, then Corbin's guiding thread for philosophically approaching Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the imagination leads to two results. First, the primary object of philosophical analysis should be to investigate the noetic or subjective structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of consciousness which underlie his conception of religious experience and human-divine relationship. Second, imagination is the faculty that constitutes consciousness and meaning for Ibn al-'Arabī, and it accomplishes this task by interpretatively relating the realm of universal ideas with the realm of sensible phenomena.

I.2 Note on the theme and layout of part II:

The following three chapters investigate the way imagination constitutes the noetic structure of consciousness in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought. It will argue that Ibn al-'Arabī's system of metaphysics is essentially a fundamental ontology or transcendental philosophy—if the two terms may be used interchangeably, at least from Heidegger's perspective. While different parts of Ibn al-'Arabī's corpus will be addressed, the main focus of these chapters will be chapter 1 of the *Bezels of Wisdom.* As has been indicated above, it articulates the noetic structure of consciousness in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought in the most explicit way.

The overall aim of this part of the study is to demonstrate how Ibn al-'Arabī's system presents a suggestion for the development of Kant's notion of aesthetic imagination and its role in constituting human-being with regards to religious experience. Hence, the arguments it puts forward will stress the themes and issues that achieves this aim.

In light of these objectives, part II will be structured as follows. The chapter will start with the paradox of the question of 'being' in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought. It will show the connection between being *(wujūd)* and consciousness in his thought. This connection will be taken as the first step toward investigation the subjective structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology. The next chapter will investigate the foundation of this subjective structure in chapter 1 of the *Bezels of Wisdom*. It will also address the human-divine relationship in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought through a careful analysis of his conception of the human-being in general and the idea of God in general and its significance to the conception of the human being in particular. Chapter 10 turns to the role of imagination in Ibn al-'Arabī's epistemology and its hermeneutical function. Chapter 11 then addresses the three questions posed at the end of chapter 7. The first part will address Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the divine names in light of the findings of the chapters 8-10.[186] In doing so, it will respond to the first question as to how the idea of God as the 'sum of all possibilities' of the consciousness of any 'thing' as such may be articulated in a framework for religious experience. The second part will address two of the key chapters of the *Bezels of Wisdom* to demonstrate that the aesthetic everyday-historical consciousness may serve as the basis for a humanistic conception of prophecy and thus re-define the relation between historicity and religious experience. In investigating these two themes, the second part of chapter 11 will respond to the two remaining questions raised in the conclusion of chapter 7.

[186] Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the divine names is initially introduced in chapter 9. But its implications will be further investigation in chapter 11.

§II. The Paradox of being (wujūd) in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought:

II.1 The concept of being 'wujūd' in Islamic philosophy and theology: an overview from al-Fārābī's *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf:*

In *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf*, al-Fārābī gives a comprehensive account of the use of the word 'wujūd', or 'being,' in Islamic theology and philosophy. He starts with the linguistic root of the word:

> The existent/being *(al-mawjūd)* for the majority of Arabs is the first word derived from being *(wujūd)* and finding *(wijdān)*. They used it in an absolute and qualified sense. They use it absolutely when they say 'I have found what I was looking for' and 'I sought so and so until I found.' They use it in a qualified way when they say 'I have found Zayd to be generous' or 'cunning'. The absolute use thus refers to the cases when what is already known actually happens or when it is found in the way it was intended…the qualified use refers to the specific state in which I found the thing under consideration[187]

The general sense of the word *(wujūd)* is 'finding' whether this finding is of an object in an unqualified way or the finding of such an object in specific state. But this sense also has a noetic/subjective dimension. The existent is not an existent as such but the existent as *found* by the subject of experience. The etymological root of the word indicates that there is a fundamental subjective dimension inherent to its semantics.

Subsequently, al-Fārābī turns to the philosophical and theological use of the word *(mawjūd)*. He initially explains that this word was used to translate verb 'to be' in Greek and Persian given that the Arabic language does not have an equivalent verb. There was a controversy as to whether to translate 'being' as 'huwiyya' or 'wujūd'. Because the latter was an original Arabic root it was preferred to the inverted form 'huwiyya' which is derived from the noun *(huwa)*—third person masculine singular pronoun. Al-Fārābī then turns of the significance of the word 'wujūd' in general.

> "The existent is a word common to all statements—it said about what is indicated…in general it is assumed and imagined about everything…"[188]

---

[187] See Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī. *Kitāb al-Ḥurūf* (ed. Muhsin Mahdi). (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1990), p. 110.
[188] Ibid, p. 115

In this quote the Aristotelian influence on al-Fārābī is obvious. Being or existence is assumed about anything that could be indicated. In other words, as Aristotle puts it in the *Metaphysics* existence is connected with the 'thisness' or *(inniyya)* as Avicennas would label it in his *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. However, al-Fārābī qualifies it further. The best articulation of this qualification is found in terms of its negation.

> "the non-existent *(ghayr mawjud)* is the opposite of that which exists; it is the thing that does not have an essence outside the self"[189]

The non-existent is the thing that does not have an essence outside the rational self. Conversely, the existent is the thing that has an essence outside the rational self. This is a classical argument of scholastic ontology. However, the aspect in which it differs from Aristotle's view is the association with the self. Existence must be in a full ontological sense; it can not be a being that only exists in consciousness. According to al-Fārābī the more general term for referring to anything as such whether or not it has an essence outside the self or not is the term 'thing' *(shay')*.

> "the word thing *(shay')* is used to refer to anything that has an essence whether such an essence is outside the self or not"[190]

The word 'thing' refers to anything, whether this thing exists only in consciousness or has an essence outside of consciousness. Thus the word being *(wujūd)* as much as it was used to translate the technical term 'being' in classical philosophy refers only to what has an essence outside the self. While it could be argued that this characterization is due to the empirical orientation of Aristotelian philosophy, which had much more influence on Arabic philosophy, no one can deny that nothing in the Aristotelian system expressly connects 'being' with 'consciousness.'

---

[189] Ibid, p. 121
[190] Ibid, p. 128.

Taking this as our guideline, I will investigate the interrelatedness of being and consciousness in the work of two key Muslim philosophers: al-Kindī and Avicenna. The latter in particular is most relevant to the study of Ibn al-'Arabī given the vast influence he had on his thought, as will be shown below.

II.2 al-Kindī's association of being with consciousness in the *Treatise on First Philosophy*:

Any good reader of Aristotelian philosophy will immediately be struck by the first few lines of the chapter II of al-Kindī's *Treatise on First Philosophy* wherein he characterizes what he sees as two types of human existence/consciousness.[191] What is striking about this part, and which has not so far been noticed by any of the few commentators on al-Kindī's philosophy, is that while this is a treatise on *First Philosophy* and so on *Metaphysics* and while it follows the structure of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, as Ahmed Fu'ad al-Ahwāni pointed in his introduction to it, al-Kindī starts the treatise with a distinction which he draws from Aristotle's *Physics.* In the second paragraph of the *Physics* Aristotle distinguishes between two types of things: one that is more known to us and less knowable by nature and the other is less knowable to us but more in line with nature. The former as he later explains are the sense perceptual phenomena and the latter are principles (αρχε) known through abstraction and the employment of thinking or (*nous*):

> The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearers and more knowable by nature; for the same things are not knowable relatively to us and knowable without qualification. So we must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, toward what is more clear and more knowable by nature.
> Now what is to us plain and clear at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from universals to particulars; for it is a whole that is more knowable to sense-

[191] See Al-Kindī, Ahmad Fu'ad al-Ahwānī . *Kitab al-Kindī īla al-Mu'taṣim bi Allah fī al-Falsafa al-'ūla .* Cairo: Dar Ihya' al-Kutub al-'Arabiyya 1948. p. 84

> perception, and a universal is a kind of whole, comprehending many within it, like parts.[192]

The distinction made here is an essentially ontological one between two domains of things/beings. The difference between the ontological structure of each realm of beings (the realm of the sense-perceptible objects and that of universal ideas) leads to the difference in the access we have to them.

Now, al-Kindī takes the exact same distinction, but, instead of distinguishing between two ontological categories of natural objects and our epistemic accesses to them, he turns them into types of human existence. Al-Kindī writes:

> Human existence *(wujūd)* is of two types: one is closer to us and remoter from nature which is the perceptual being with which we are familiarized since our early evolution….the other is closer to nature but more distant away from us which is our rational existence[193]

This means that al-Kindī has, if it is plausible to say so, *subjectivized* the Aristotelian distinction. In other words, he converted the distinction between the two ontological categories in Aristotle into a distinction between two possible modes of human existence. What is more interesting is that al-Kindī, through a serious of systematic analyses based on this distinction, moves on to wage a radical attack on Aristotle's doctrine of the eternity of the world. This anticipates similar critique that will be raised by Avicenna.

II.3 Avicenna's metaphysics as a metaphysics of the rational soul:

II.3.1: The problematic implication of the necessary-contingent distinction: the essence/existence distinction or the in-itself versus the for-itself

Avicenna consistently insists on distinguishing between the essence and existence of a particular substance. While Aristotle does distinguish between what something is versus whether or not it may actually exist, the fundamental distinction

---

[192] See Aristotle. *Complete Works* (ed. Jonathan Barnes). (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 184a17-24.
[193] Ibid. p. 84-85

of Avicennian metaphysics between the necessary and contingent existences makes this distinction assume a new form. The place of existence in Avicenna's philosophy is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, existence for Avicenna is, as several scholars argue, something added to the essence of a particular substance. It thus does not define what it is. On the other hand, Avicenna asserts that there is nothing prior to existence; an essence is only instantiated into being through combination with matter.[194] Below I propose an explanation. There are three modes of being: the necessary, possible and impossible modes. For Avicenna, as for Aristotle, any possible being necessarily exists only if its necessity is driven on a rational level from the relation of its essence to the essence of the necessary existent. However, considered in itself, the existence of that very substance as it is empirically given is not necessary from a purely rational perspective.[195] Thus, while the start of all observations may be existence as Aristotle, would argue in his empiricist tendency, still, from a rational, subjective standpoint all existence is contingent. But existence for Avicenna is not merely empirical presence that could be verified using sense perception; otherwise universals would not exist—indeed this is one of the criticisms al-Ghazālī addresses to Avicenna in the *Incoherence of the Philosophers.*[196] Existence is thus a category of understanding beings that in and of itself hinges on a purely logical proof; this needs elaboration. In identifying the three modes of being (the necessary, the possible and the impossible) in his *Metaphysics*, Avicenna asserts that they are logically intuitable by any rational being; in other words reason tells that any being *is* so in either of those three modes. From the standpoint of this purely logical analysis, Avicenna proceeds to an application of this purely transcendent and logical

[194] See the discussion of the problematic relation between essence and existence in Soheil Afnan. *Avicenna, his life and works* (London: , 1958), p. 115-121

[195] Ibn Sīna. *Kitāb al-Shifā': al-Ilāhiyāt,* (ed. G. Qanawati and S. Zayid)) (Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Maṣriyya al-'Amma lil-Kitāb, 1960), p. 22-34.

[196] al-Ghazālī. *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* (ed. Sulaymān Duniyā) (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1966), p.121-2

interpretation to the way in which they can define the constitution of beings to any rational subject. There is thus a move from a purely formal/apophantic logical analysis to what may be called a transcendentally logical analysis, a logic defining the possible application of categories and constitution of different beings in experience for a rational subject. The priority of existence may therefore be interpreted as a transcendental priority. Thus existing things may be thought of as necessary upon pure rational inquiry into the necessary existent and the implication of its necessity to the essences of others possible existents. However, for us, as subjects interested in studying being, the existence of all objects of experience is contingent. This is why Avicenna can simultaneously claim that existence is something added to the essence and argue that there is nothing prior to existence.

There are thus two modes of comportment that the rational self can have; one in the purely transcendent domain that is governed by pure logic and the other in the domain of possible experience which stem from the first as far as possible objects and beings in experience are concerned. This latter mode is what I choose to call, following Kant's and Husserl's terminology, the transcendental comportment and the logic that it follows the transcendental logic.

These two subjective attitudes can be further illustrated by considering Avicenna's critique of Aristotelian metaphysics.

II.3.3: Avicenna's transcendental critique of Aristotle's methodology in the

A) The critique

Unlike al-Kindī, Avicenna had access to most of the Aristotelian corpus translated into Arabic in addition to the anonymous *Theology of Aristotle* which was a paraphrase of Enneads IV, V and VI of Plotinus. He was thus, in contrast to al-Kindī, more influenced by the Peripatetic interest in scientific and logical rigor than he was

by the dialectical style of the theologians of his day. One of the key scientific criticisms that he addressed to Aristotle concerned his methodology in the *Metaphysics*:

> It is nonsensical to arrive at the First Truth by way of motion and by way of the that it is a principle of motion and then to undertake from this position to make it into a principle for the essences, because these people offered nothing more than establishing it as mover not that it is a principle of what exists. How utterly incompetent that motion should be the means of establishing the One, the Truth which itself is the principle of every being[197]

In addition an anonymous student of Avicenna from Rayy reports in an extant treatise:

> We also heard him—Avicenna—saying: 'it distresses me that the belief in the permanence of the first principle and in the permanence of its unity should be arrived at by means of motion and the oneness of the moved world, as if the metaphysics could yield its riches concerning God almighty only in this way… Had they—the Peripatetics—comprehended the innermost ideas of the Metaphysics they would have been ashamed o this sort of thing and not felt compelled to maintain that the course to be adopted includes both the physical approach and the theological approach[198]

The key quibble Avicenna had with the methodology of Aristotelian metaphysics was its reliance on motion for approaching the fundamental question of metaphysics namely, the principle of all beings or God. Thus, while mostly agreeing with the subject of metaphysics as defined by Aristotle, Avicenna, inasmuch as Plotinus criticized Aristotle for associating God or the One with the Intellect, rejects his approach to metaphysics in light of the findings of the *Physics*. Like al-Fārābī, particularly in his book on *Religion*, Avicenna saw that metaphysics should be the scientific ground and foundation of *Religion*. However, Avicenna criticized Aristotle for his physicalistic approach to metaphysics. This critique was not intended to establish it as a theology but rather to show the proper place and approach to the investigation of metaphysics as a science.

---

[197] See the translation of the extant fragmentos of *Kitāb al-Inṣāf (Fair Judgment)*, Avicenna's main lost commentary on *The Theology of Aristotle* and his discussion of Avicenna's critique of the Aristotelian conception of God or the Necessary Existent in terms of motion in: Dimitri Gutas. *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradtion* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), p. 130-140 & 260-2.

[198] See the translation of the manuscript form of the letter in: *Aicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition,* Ibid. p. 261

B) The implications of the critique

In his preliminary discussion of being in Book I of the *Metaphysics of the Book of Healing*, Avicenna argues that the term being/existent *(mawjūd)* refers to whatever is found by the self. In other words it is the term that refers to constitution of any object in the self/consciousness *(irtisām fī al-nafs)*. Based on this he argues that the distinction between the three kinds of existences, the necessary, the possible, and the impossible is distinction that anyone with sound reason can intuit as Aristotle says about the first principles in the *Posterior Analytics*. It is only through thought that I can conceive of a necessary existent versus the contingency of all what is known to me through my senses. Here Avicenna is trying to show that pure thought is capable of recognizing the contingency of any sense-perceptible being and that it can at the same time recognize the idea of a necessary being a priori. Because of this distinction, the inquiry into each realm of beings has to be completely separate from each other. For each being refers to a particular mode of consciousness.

In this respect, the inquiry into the subject matter proper of metaphysics should be based exclusively on the rational, transcendent ideas and should not, to put it in modern language, resort to any argument from physical experience. According to Avicenna, following the Platonic model of the *Timaeus*, which was among the earliest pieces of Greek philosophy to be translated into Arabic along with Galen's compendium on it, all that belongs to the physical world may be thought not to exist. However, rationally, we can think of a necessary being that has to exist.[199] This is in direct contrast with the method of Aristotle. For Aristotle, the world could not have not existed; accordingly, physics, as a system of motion explained in terms of causal relations required the existence of an unmoved mover. Thus, Book XII of his

[199] See Plato. *Complete Works* (ed. John Cooper) (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 27d-29d6

Metaphysics was only an elaboration of the results already reached in Book VIII of the *Physics*. For Avicenna the question is radically different. There is a rational domain that is restricted to purely transcendent ideas and there is an empirical domain that is restricted to the reception and synthesis of empirical intuitions. Dimitri Gutas, thereby correctly remarks that for Avicenna 'epistemology defines the possible regions of ontology' and not the other way around. To Avicenna, the biggest problem of the Aristotelian approach was its failure to adhere to the very principles and goals it set for the science of metaphysics under the spell of physics. Metaphysics proper should be restricted to the purely rational domain. This can only be achieved if the subject of experience differentiates between the two domains of consciousness, that of purely rational ideas and that of empirical intuitions. Only through this subjective basis of distinguishing between two epistemic attitudes may the two realms of the purely transcendent and that of possible experience be distinguished. The nature of God as the being whose being encompasses the sum of the possibility of all other beings could only be investigated on a purely rational transcendent level without resorting to arguments from physics. However, once reason ascertains the nature of God as a necessary Being, the necessity of the being of the contingent existence could also be asserted *transcendentaly* based on his very nature and the fact that it was through the use of logic that the physical world was initially understood. To put it more clearly, rational inquiry into the nature of God can assure me of the necessity of the existence of the world when thought of in terms of essences, but not through the argument from physics and the necessity of positing an unmoved mover. Accordingly, the methodological disagreement Avicenna had with Aristotle also reflects the distinction between two epistemologically identified regions of beings and hence the respective attitudes of having access to and approaching them. The analysis of the

subjective orientation of Avicenna's work reinforces Gutas's conclusion that Avicenna turned metaphysics into essentially a metaphysics of the rational soul:

> The study of the rational soul thus involves both the theoretical sciences, Metaphysics (the knowledge of God and the intelligibles) and Physics (De Anima), and the practical sciences, Ethics and religious law. The rational soul is the meeting point of philosophical theory and praxis because it becomes "like a polished mirror," there ensues an automatic practicing of the philosophical sciences. The science that engages in this study, the Metaphysics of the Rational Soul, is the thus the highest stage of the philosophical sciences.[200]

In other words, Avicenna, as much as al-Kindī did, *subjectivized* classical ontology through the association of being with consciousness. Existence as consciousness is connected with the subjective attitude involved; thus there is a purely rational transcendent mode versus a purely empirical mode. The examination of Avicenna sets the stage to turn to the investigation of Ibn al-'Arabī.

II.4 The Paradox of 'being' in Ibn al-'Arabī

The definition of 'being' in Ibn al-'Arabī has lent him to different interpretations. Most commentators whether those who approached him from a traditionalist perspective like Chittick and Nasr or those who approached him from a philosophical perspective like 'Afīfī and Qāsim tended to read Ibn al-'Arabī's system as a pantheistic metaphysics. 'Afīfī[201] tried to compare his system to Spinoza's rational pantheism and Qāsim compared his system of Leibniz revival of Aristotelian rationalism.[202] Similarly, Sufi interpreters of Ibn al-'Arabī often compare his metaphysics to oriental pantheistic doctrines. I will argue that Ibn al-'Arabī takes the same subjective-epistemic attitude that Avicenna and al-Kindī took and follows them in identifying two essential modes of subjectivity and consciousness with which he

---

[200] Ibid., p. 250.
[201] In both the *the Mystical Philosophy of Ibn al-'Arabī* and his Arabic edition and commentary on *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, 'Afīfī constantly compares Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology to the one-substance pantheistic theory of Spinoza.
[202] See Maḥmūd Qāsim. *Muhiyy al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī*. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qāhir al-Ḥadītha, 1972). The whole book is an attempt to compare Ibn al-'Arabī's system to Leibniz system of Pre-established harmony.

identifies two possible domains of being. However, he goes beyond Avicenna in showing how they may be harmonized with each other, as will be shown in chapters 9 and 10. This argument overcomes a key problem with which most commentators on Ibn al-'Arabī grapples. Ibn al-'Arabī insists through out his writings that the essence of God is completely transcendent to the world and that it is essentially unknowable. This point has been argued extensively by Su'ād al-Ḥakīm. However, it is also true that Ibn al-'Arabī argues that the essence of God encompasses and underlies the essence of everything as such. So how is it possible to harmonize both positions? Many attempted to do so by claiming, like Chittick, that God is 'Being' and hence assert that Ibn al-'Arabī is a fundamentally pantheistic thinker.

These two seemingly contradictory positions may be fully harmonized once the duality of Ibn al-'Arabī's thought is understood as a duality of two subjective attitudes and that each attitude defines a specific region of consciousness. To briefly demonstrate my point, I will focus on two main issues. The first is the distinction between essence and existence in which he completely follows the Avicennian position, as he does in adopting the distinction between necessary and possible existence. The second is the duality of *al-ḥaqq* or truth/reality and *al-khalq* or creation and the way this duality re-defines the nature of the problem of transcendence *(tanzīh)* and immanence *(tashbīh)*.

Ibn al-'Arabī argues that the essence of God is absolutely transcendent and unknowable. Simultaneously, he argues that: "were it not for the permeation of God, by means of his form *(ṣūra)*, in all existents, the world would have no existence, just as, were it not for the intelligible universal realities, no predications of external object would be possible"[203] How can these two statements be harmonized with each other?

[203] Ibn al-'Arabī. *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* (ed. Abu al-'Ila Afifi). (Cairo: Jami'at Fu'ad al-Awal, 1939), 101

The positions of Al-Kindī and Avicenna with regards to the distinction between the domain of reason and that of experience could furnish a way for reconciling these seemingly contradicting positions with regards to God. From a purely rational perspective, God, as a pure rational essence is absolutely unknowable; the fixed essence of God *(‘aynahu al-thābita)* or God as an idea is purely noumenal. However, given that the idea of God is the sum of all possibilities since it contains all perfections, then it is also represented as the idea of the necessary being that makes every ‘thing’ possible. The necessary being makes other beings possible as far as their it contains the sume total of the possibilities that could be predicated of them and thus qualify them in every possible way and context. This is why Ibn al-‘Arabī completely avoids the language of causality which permeated Peripatetic Islamic philosophy and theology.[204] Realizing, like Avicenna, that it is impossible to apply the category of causality that is essentially connected with the phenomenal realm to the noumenal realm, he restricted his language to purely rational distinctions.

‘Afīfī argued, that the argument of most theologians who claimed that Ibn al-‘Arabī was a pantheistic could be summarized as follows:

> The abstract existence (existence as a concept) is itself not an external reality and cannot possibly be the source of external realities. On the contrary ‘existence’ if we regard it as a universal, is, itself, based on and derived from existing objects in which it is manifested. From combining our mind, the idea of existence and the quiddity of Man—as a rational being—we can never hope, neither can God, to produce Man in the external world. This leads to a second. That existence as a concept is mentally posterior to particular existents in the external world[205]

This view is obviously adopting the Aristotelian conception of being presented above by al-Fārābī. Anything that exists in cosciounsess, i.e. on a conceptual levbel, must have an external quiddity; in other words, existence is attributed of things that are actually there in the Aristotelian ontological sense. As a concept, then, it is

---

[204] *Mystical Philosophy of Ibn al-‘Arabī*, p. 41-46.
[205] Abu al-‘Ila Afifi. *The Mystical Philosophy of Ibn al-‘Arabī.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 4-5.

derived from actual existents and not the other way around. However, as we have seen above, Avicenna completely transposes this view. Existence and essence are two modalities that apply to any object of consciousness as such. The same holds for Ibn al-'Arabī. The relation between God and other beings or the world does not have anything to do with external existence ontologically—it will have aesthetically as will be shown in chaper 10. On the pure, rational level though, the idea of God encompasses the possibilities of all things as such. This interpretation is supported decisively by Ibn al-'Arabī's differentiation between absolute existence *(al-wujūd al-muṭlaq)* and and qualified existence *(al-wujūd al-muqayyad)*.[206] Each of these two species of existence is in turn associated with a different faculty of the human-being. The first is defined in terms of reason and rational ideas whereas the other is defined in terms of phenomenal being. If Ibn al-'Arabī's theory adopted the classical Aristotelian perspective he would not distinguished between different species of being. He would rather differentiate between beings or substances as Aristotle does. Ibn al-'Arabī's apparent adoption of the Avicenna's position allowed him the flexibility to distinguish between the domain of the supra-sensory and the sensory as two domains of consciousness. Based on this view he could make dualistic views that would seem from the perspective of classical ontology contradictory.

This Avicennian position could also explain the oneness of the duality of *al-ḥaqq* (God) or truth and *al-khalq* or creation in Ibn al-'Arabī's system. Ibn al-'Arabī argues that there is only one reality; but such reality may be seen as a divine entity or in terms of its immanent manifestation in creation. Apparently this position could be deemed as purely pantheistic, but when the complexity of Ibn al-'Arabī's system is taken into consideration, a completely different interpretation would be possible. To

[206] Ibn al-'Arabī. *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya.* (Cairo: Al-Maṭb'a al-Maymanyya, 1911), V. II, p. 484. See also V. IV, p. 81.

properly achieve this interpretation, the relation between transcendence and immanence in Ibn al-'Arabī's should be examined. Throughout the history of Islamic theology the debate between transcendence and immanence was focused mainly on the question of anthropomorphism. Some theological schools like that of the Mu'tazilites argued for the complete transcendence of God. On the other hand, other schools such as the *mushshabiha* called for interpreting the verses that attribute human characteristics to God literally. Ibn al-'Arabī takes an intermediate position on this issue similar to that of the Ash'arite school. For instance, with regards to the incarnation of Christ he argues that is true to say that Christ is God, but it is wrong to say that God is Christ.[207] On what basis can he make this claim? Ibn al-'Arabī would argue, as will be explained below, that the idea of God is essential for the fulfillment of the humanity of every human being. Nonetheless, given that God by definition is completely transcendent to space and time, it is impossible to think of God as incarnated.

Similarly, the duality of *al-ḥaqq* or truth and *al-khalq* or creation may be interpreted anew. In its attempt to find the unconditioned condition of all 'things', reason must posit one truth, called God or the perfect being. This truth encompasses the sum of all possibilities of everything. Reciprocally, things, seen from the perspective of the whole of human subjectivity must be conceived of as creation, that is, as will be shown below, the idea of God should hermeneutically guide the conception of every 'thing' in everyday consciousness.

In conclusion, the connection between being and consciousness that developed in the history of Islamic philosophy especially at the hands of al-Kindī and Avicenna furnishes a possible ground for harmonizing the seemingly contradictory views of Ibn

[207] Ibn al-'Arabī. *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* (ed. Abu al-'Ila Afifi). (Cairo: Jami'at Fu'ad al-Awal, 1939), 138-150.

al-‘Arabī. Further it also explains key positions he has with regards to the question of being. However, the foundation of this phenomenological/transcendental conception of being in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s own thought has not yet been furnished. The next chapter will articulate these foundations through a careful examination of the first chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom*.

Chapter 9

The Human-Divine in the chapter one of the *Bezels of Wisdom*

§I. Prelude:

In the previous chapter, I have argued, following Henry Corbin, that the noetic structure of consciousness is the key to the philosophical approach of Ibn al-'Arabī. This noetic structure was briefly defined in terms of the role of the imagination as mediator between the realm of universal, purely transcendent ideas and the realm of sensible experience. Imagination undertakes this mediating role through interpretation (*ta'wīl*). Through this hermeneutical role, the imagination constitutes a field a consciousness and meaning that is different from that which is based on experience (*'ālam al-shuhūd*) or that which is based on pure rational consideration *(naẓar 'aqlī)*. The following chapter attempts to demonstrate that, for Ibn al-'Arabī, imagination is the meaning-constituting faculty; it constitutes all the different genres of consciousness and meaning. Indeed, Ibn al-'Arabī argues that the entire world as perceived by the human is essentially 'imaginal' (*khayālī*), but by 'imaginal,' he does not mean that the world is imaginary or fictional. Rather, he intends that imagination is the faculty that constitutes meaning and thus consciousness of the world.

As a preliminary demonstration of the subjective structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology, the second part of the preceding chapter tried to show the connection between being and consciousness in his thought. A brief analysis of the semantics of the term *(wujūd)* or being in Arabic and its development in the history of Islamic philosophy suggested that there was a tendency to associate being with consciousness. The etymological meaning of the word—the transitive verb 'to find' *(yajid)*—influenced the way it was interpreted, especially by al-Kindī and more importantly by Avicenna. Finally, a brief examination of the distinction Ibn al-'Arabī makes between

essence and existence on the one hand and the dualistic vision of reality he presents in terms of creation and truth/reality on the other, two preliminary results have been established. First, the subjective foundation of the Avicennian distinction between essence and existence explains key paradoxical claims of Ibn al-'Arabī's metaphysics. This thesis will be further reinforced in this chapter. Second, Ibn al-ʿArabī's configuration of the relation between consciousness and being, and hence the subjective foundation of his metaphysics, sets his views apart from the ontological arguments of scholastic philosophy.

This chapter provides additional evidence to support the claims of the previous one. It begins with a brief examination of the first chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom,* pointing out the structure of the human-divine relationship in Ibn al-'Arabī's system and focusing in particular on its subjective orientation. Investigation of the idea of 'God' in Ibn al-'Arabī's system, its rational-transcendent grounds, its moral dimension, and the relation between it and Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of (*al-aʿyān al-thābita*), fixed essences, makes it possible to determine the often overlooked boundaries between the phenomenal and the noumenal. The third and last section of the chapter is devoted to the conception of the human in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought and will include a discussion of Ibn al-ʿArabī's theory of the perfect human (*al-Insān al-Kāmil)* and its relation to both the idea of God and the question of freedom.

§II. The human and the divine in chapter one of the Bezels of Wisdom:

At the beginning of chapter 1 of the *Bezels of Wisdom*, Ibn al-'Arabī articulates a very distinct vision of the human-divine relationship:

> The Reality (*al-Ḥaqq*)[208] wanted to see the essences of His most Beautiful Names or to put it another way, to see His own Essence in an all-inclusive object encompassing the whole divine Command, which, qualified by existence would reveal to Him His own mystery. For the seeing of a thing, itself by itself, is not the same as its seeing

[208]Austin translates *(al-Ḥaqq)* as 'Reality'; I prefer 'truth', given the logical, abstract nature of the term in Ibn al-'Arabī's language, as discussed above.

> itself in another, as it were in a mirror; for it appears to itself in a form that is invested by the location of the vision by that which would only appear to it given the existence of the location and its self disclosure to it. The Reality gave existence to the whole of Cosmos [at first] as an undifferentiated thing without anything of the spirit in it, so that it was like an unpolished mirror…Thus the divine Command required [by its very nature] the reflective characteristic of the mirror of the Cosmos, and Adam was the very principle of reflection for that mirror and the spirit of that form…[209]

As claimed above, truth/reality refers to God. God, logically approached, is essentially an unknowable essence; it is a noumenal idea. However, this idea, while no determinate theoretical knowledge (*'ilm naẓarī*) can be based on or predicated of it, defines the sum total of the possibilities of anything. The reality is mediated through the essences of God's names; as Chittick explains, God's names in Ibn al-'Arabī's system define "relations and attributions"[210] among all beings. Beings *(mawjūdāt)*, in turn, are objects of consciousness. Given that God's essence is completely unknowable, it manifests itself through the intepretation of His names, which in turn define the relations among beings;[211] in other words, it defines the relationship among different objects in consciousness. God manifests Himself in terms of the different possibilities and relations in terms of which objects of consciousness and the relations among them are represented.

According to Ibn al-'Arabī, this manifestation could equally be phrased as follows: "God wanted to see His own essence in an all-inclusive being." This means that the manifestation of the essence of God in terms of His names takes place through a certain being that, through its being, makes the divine command possible. As Titus Burckhardt[212] and 'Afīfī[213] both explain, the divine command here refers to the imperative verb (*kun*) through the utterance of which God brought beings into

---

[209] Muhyī al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī. *The Bezels of Wisdom* (trans. R. W. J. Austin), (New Jersey: Paulist Press), p. 50-1.
[210] William Chittick. *The Sufi Path of Knowledge.* (Albany: Sate University of New York Press), p. 52.
[211] The theory of the divine names/epithets will be discussed in Chapter 11
[212] Ibn al-'Arabī. *The Wisdom of the Prophets* (trans. Angela Culme-Seymour), (Aldsworth: Beshara Publications, 1975), p.8
[213] Abū al-'Ilā 'Afīfī. *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*. (Beirut: Dar al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 2002), p. 7

being. Therefore, as the essence of God mediates itself through its names, it lets beings manifest themselves; this mediated manifestation is possible through the being of this all-inclusive. Without this being, the manifestation of God through the essences of His names will continue to be like an image reflected in an unpolished mirror. That is, the role of this being is to let beings manifest in their being the essence of God through His names.

Ibn al-'Arabī then tells us that this being is Adam. But does he mean the historical Adam? In his Arabic commentary on *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, 'Afīfī interprets Ibn al-'Arabī's use of Adam in this context as follows:

> What is intended here is not the historical Adam, the first human being. Rather, what is intended is the human race as a whole. More precisely, Ibn al-'Arabī refers to the human qua human or human nature as such. This is indicated by what he later says about the beginning of human history and that the human being is the only being in which divine perfections may be best manifested…[214]

The human-being is the being through which God's transcendent essence manifests itself through the interpretations of its names. In turn, these names define all possible predications of all beings/things as objects of consciousness. This means that there is an essential connection between the human-being as such and beings or more precisely objects of consciousness on the one hand and the essence of God on the other. In other words, human nature stands a mediator between the transcendent essence of God and material existents in the world. It then allows the essence of God to be manifested in these existents through the names of God. How this manifestation (*tajallī*) takes place will be discussed in full in the following chapter. What is most relevant here is the threefold relation between the human-being, the world, and God. However, this does not fully establish the noetic/subjective structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's metaphysics; it only points to the centrality of human subjectivity in Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology.

---

[214] *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, p. 7

Most commentators on the first chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom* have overlooked the fact that the title of the chapter is the 'Wisdom of Divinity in the Word of Adam.' Investigation of the significance of the 'divine' in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought demonstrates the subjective structure of the threefold relation established above. In explaining the meaning of divinity, William Chittick writes:

> …to speak of Divinity is to envisage relationships with creatures, while to speak of the Essence is to envisage the Reality Itself, without any relationships. About God as Divinity we can say that certain relationships are established with Him. Then we can talk about these relationships, which are known as the divine names, but we cannot talk about God in Himself, the Essence in terms of any relationships.[215]

To Ibn al-'Arabī the category of divinity and the meaning of the divine refer God inasmuch as He is related to the world and the phenomena in it. But the human being is the *only* being through which this relationship is possible. The field of consciousness wherein the divine is made possible is necessarily associated with the human standpoint. In other words, 'divinity' and the 'divine' define God as ground for the human consciousness of phenomena in the world. They do not refer to the essence of God; rather, they refer to the mediated manifestation of this essence through the names that encompass all possibilities of being consciousness of any 'thing' as such. In this context, Ibn al-'Arabī writes, "It is not correct for the Real and creation to come together (*'ijtimā'*) in any mode whatsoever in respect of the Essence, but only in respect of the fact that the Essence is described by Divinity."[216] God as an essence is completely unknowable through theoretical knowledge (*'ilm naẓarī*). It defines the sum total of the possibilities of the consciousness of any 'thing.' Ibn al-'Arabī thus writes: "God in respect of being a god is that by which the possible thing is supported in its possibility."[217]

---

[215] Ibid., p.59.
[216] See. Ibn al-'Arabī. *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya.* (Cairo: Al-Maṭb'a al-Maymanyya, 1911), V. I, p. 41
[217] Ibid., V. II, p. 579.

Highlighting the significance of the divine in the context of the human-divine relation delineated in the frist chapter of *The Bezels of Wisdom* establishes the noetic structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's metaphysics. It demonstrates that it is essentially a fundamental ontology in Heidegger's transcendental sense of the term[218] and not an ontology or cosmology in the classical sense of the term. While the language of Ibn al-'Arabī could encourage the interpretation of his system as a classical medieval ontology, a careful examination reveals that it is essentially a fundamental ontology. In other words, the structure of human subjectivity is the center for understanding Ibn al-'Arabī's metaphysics and not the other way around. The first chapter of *The Bezels of Wisdom* demonstrates this subjective structure in terms of the threefold relationship it establishes between phenomena, the human being and God. The use of the word divinity gives us the guiding thread to the intention of Ibn al-'Arabī. Since the essence of God is absolutely unknowable, as he repeatedly asserts, his concern will be the manifestation of this essence through the manner in which it defines the totality of the possibilities of the consciousness of any 'thing' as such, and this manifestation is only possible through the human being. The fulfilment of human nature as a whole consists in the constitution of this consciousness.

Ibn al-'Arabī turns to the structure of human subjectivity immediately after presenting the centrality of the human being to the manifestation of the divine essence. In a manner very similar to that of Kant, he talks about the transcendent (divine) dimension of this subjectivity and the sensible (animalistic) dimension of it. He associates the former with universal ideas (*al-ma'qūlāt al-kulliyya*) that are recognized by reason (*'aql/dhihn*) and the latter with spatial-temporal phenomena

[218] See Heidegger's discussion of transcendental philosophy as essentially fundamental ontology in his 1927 Marburg lectures on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in: Martin Heidegger. *The Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (trans. Kenneth Maly and Emad Parvis). (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997), §3 especially subsections b.α and b.β

accessible through the five senses**.** In this context, Ibn al-‘Arabī argues that these universals, even though they do not have any phenomenal, actual existence (*wujūd ‘aynī*), must exert an influence (*athar*) on the phenomenal world. In order for this influence to take place, there must be some form of connection (*irtibāṭ*). Here Ibn al-‘Arabī argues that all phenomena/things are possible; therefore, a necessary being must be posited. This necessary being/God makes possible the influence of the rational universal ideas on phenomena. Recalling the argument for the origin of the necessary/possible existent distinction in Avicenna, we can discern that these claims support the thesis about the noetic/subjective structure of the Ibn al-‘Arabī’s arguments. Human-being is fulfilled or better achieved as a state of consciousness inasmuch as it manifests the idea of God through His names which define every possible determination of any ‘thing’ as such. This manifestation is made possible through the connection it establishes between the universal ideas recognized by reason and the phenomena encountered in the sensible world. In turn this manifestation is achieved through a transcendental-reflective process, as seen in the analysis above of the distinction between essence and existence in Avicenna. Upon considering phenomena that are given through the senses, the subject of experience realizes that all phenomena or things are essentially possible. The subject must posit a necessary existent that, as the quotation above states, contains the sum total of all possibilities of being conscious of any ‘thing’, that is of any object of consciousness as such**.** Through this positing of a necessary existent, the connection between the realm of universal ideas and that of the sensible phenomena is made possible. In this respect, Ibn al-‘Arabī speaks of the distinction between the holy superabundance (*al-fayḍ al-aqdas*) and the sanctified superabundance (*al-fayḍ al-muqaddas*). In his commentary, ‘Afīfī explains:

> …the holy superabundance is the manifestation of one essence inasmuch as it encompasses the possibility of every possible thing. It is the first determination of God in an absolute sense. However, this is a transcendent rational determination to which no sensible determination corresponds. These possibilities are what Ibn al-'Arabī calls the fixed essences…. As for the sanctified superabundance it is the existential manifestation or the manifestation of this one essence in the multiplicity of beings…[219]

This passage could be read as an ontological argument based on the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation. The One, since it is pure goodness, overflows 'being', and through this emanation, makes the existence of the soul and the intellect possible. In light of the centrality of human subjectivity that has just been indicated, though, a completely different reading is possible. Since the idea of God encompasses the possibility of the consciousness of any thing, it is a holy superabundance. It is the necessary existent that grounds the existence of every thing else. However, it is a sanctified overabundance, since the human subject manifests this essence through the divine names.

Ibn al-'Arabī concludes that: "…the cosmos is preserved so long as the Perfect Man remains in it."[220] This statement decisively supports the interpretation put forward above. If Ibn al-'Arabī's argument were a medieval ontological argument, there would be no way, even from the perspective of the centrality of the human in hermetic philosophy, to say that the world's existence depends on the human and that its perfection depends on the perfection of humanity. The 'world' here must be understood as the world perceived and interpreted by the perfect human. In other words, the world must be understood as the consciousness of the world as constant aesthetic manifestation of the idea of God through his names in different phenomena and the relations among them. The 'world' Ibn al-'Arabī refers to is the

---

[219] Abū al-'Ilā 'Afīfī. *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*. (Beirut: Dar al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 2002), p. 8-9.
[220] Muhyī al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī, *The Bezels of Wisdom* (trans. R. W. J. Austin). (New Jersey: Paulist Press), p. 51.

consciousness/state of mind of interpreting the world through the names of the idea of God, as the sum total of all possibilities of any 'thing' as such. If such a form of consciousness disappears, then the world should vanish; the world for Ibn al-'Arabī is inextricably connected with the consciousness of the subject experiencing it.

Conclusion: Ibn al-'Arabī's Fundamental Ontology and the Human-Divine Relationship:

Examination of the first chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom* has reinforced Corbin's thesis about the noetic/subjective structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's metaphysics. While the language of Ibn al-'Arabī in the *Meccan Revelations* lends itself to ontological interpretations and led scholars like Chittick to conclude that God for Ibn al-'Arabī is being, the centrality of human subjectivity and consciousness to the relation between God and the world completely subverts these readings. By explicitly articulating the role the human being plays in the relation between the unknowable, noumenal essence/idea of God and the beings in the world, the *Bezels of Wisdom* puts forward a possibility for overcoming many of the terminological inconsistencies and clandestine language of the *Meccan Revelations.* Human consciousness and meaning can be based either on the level of sense data or on a pure rational and logical one. However, the perfection of humanity consists in the state of mind/consciousness that emerges through the reconciliation of the two domains. Ibn al-'Arabī provides the clue to understanding the emergence of these two domains in human experience and the role the idea of God plays in this process. Thinking not from the perspective of theoretical knowledge based on causality and physical experience, but rather from a logical perspective, all phenomenal occurrences are possibilities. In order for these possibilities to have grounds, as has been shown in the discussion of Kant and Avicenna, the idea of a necessary existent must be posited. This idea contains within itself the sum total of all possibilities and predications/logical correlatives

(*muqtaḍayāt*) in terms of which we can become conscious of any 'thing' and hence make it sensible and meaningful to us. The following chapter will discuss the structure of this level of consciousness and its constitution through the faculty of the imagination. In conclusion, there is third level/mode of consciousness different from pure rational consciousness/intuition of universal ideas and equally distinct from theoretical knowledge based on causality, which Ibn al-'Arabī perfectly accepts as long as it is only limited to spatial-temporal physical objects.

The human-divine relationship is the fundamental core of Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of consciousness, which centers on the role the idea of God plays in the constitutions of human subjectivity as a whole. Therefore, Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology may be re-defined as primarily fundamental ontology or a transcendental analysis of the structure of human subjectivity. Within this structure, the idea of God plays a decisive role in constituting human subjectivity as a whole. This holistic sense of human subjectivity and its structure will be discussed in chapter 11. In the following two sections, I reinforce this thesis about the human-divine relationship by examining more closely different dimensions of the idea of God and the nature of the human-being in Ibn al-'Arabī's system.

§III. The 'God' of Ibn al-'Arabī

Both Chittick and 'Afīfī fully acknowledge that Ibn al-'Arabī presents two different modes of conceiving God. While 'Afīfī stresses the subjective nature of these two modes, he and Chittick both argue that Ibn al-'Arabī is a pantheist. 'Afīfī argues that Ibn al-'Arabī presents a rational pantheistic metaphysics similar to that of Spinoza's one-substance ontology. Chittick, in contrast, argues that 'God is being' in the sense of pure universal consciousness that manifests itself in different modes. While the former touches on the subjective dimension in Ibn al-'Arabī and the latter

acknowledges the centrality of consciousness to his system, neither connects the two or attempts to investigate this relation in connection with the significance of being in Ibn al-'Arabī's philosophy. This connection is only possible through the subjective structure that Ibn al-'Arabī articulates in the first chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom*. In light of the arguments made in the previous section, this section attempts to give an account of 'God' in Ibn al-'Arabī's system. It introduces fresh perspectives on some of the key problems scholars have faced in grappling with the inconsistencies and terminological contradictions of Ibn al-'Arabī's discourse.

III.1: God: the transcendent and the immanent, the one and the many:

As Chittick explains, Ibn al-'Arabī consistently refers to 'God' in a dualistic way. In one sense God is the reality/essence which is completely noumenal and completely unknowable, and in another sense God is immanent since it constitutes the manifestation (*tajallī*) of every phenomena through his names. These names, as explained above, comprise all the possibilities of being conscious of a thing as such. God is also described as an absolute one, but at the same time God can also be comprised as multiplicity since He manifests Himself in many ways in phenomena. The oneness of God cannot be understood in the Neoplatonic sense. The One of Plotinus is a hypostasis from which the universal soul and intellect emanate; it is a combination of the form of the good of Plato and the unmoved mover of Aristotle. Ibn al-'Arabī completely avoids any ontological argument about emanation. As a matter of fact, as will be shown below, he avoids any discussion of creation. The physical world, for him, is perfectly accessible through the senses and can be interpreted in terms of causal laws. In this vein, he is following al-Ghazālī in accepting causality in judgments related to the physical/phenomenal world and rejecting the application of the category of causality particularly in terms of motion to arguments about

metaphysics and metaphysical concepts.[221] The manifestations of the essence of God, mediated through his names, form a field of consciousness and meaning completely different from that which is based on theoretical (*naẓarī/fikrī*) approach to the world. But what are origins of this twofold approach to the conception of 'God'?

Ibn al-'Arabī calls the divine essence *ankar al-nakirāt* or "the most indeterminate of all indeterminates."[222] Interestingly, he also calls it "the Thing" (*al-shay'*). Here, he uses the definite article *al-* to indicate that God is essentially 'the Thing in itself.'[223] In this sense the essence is something that is posited by reason (*'aql*). However, reason tries to qualify it further. These qualifications cannot be positive ones like those that occur in judgments about the physical world. They must be purely logical. However, they must still be in relation to something, since the essence itself cannot be determined in any positive way. This is the stage of conceiving of God in terms of his divinity (*ulūhiyya*). The first meaning associated with God on this level is, as we have seen above, God as a necessary being. This makes perfect sense, for if the idea of God is another way of describing the core of the noumenal, the thing in itself, then it must be the ground for the possibility of all other beings. This is the first attempt of reason at determining the indeterminate emptiness of God as the condition of the possibility of any 'thing' as such. Ibn al-'Arabī writes, "The Divine Essence cannot be understood by the rational faculty…But the Divinity and Lordship (*al-rubūbiyya*) can be understood by this faculty."[224] 'Afīfī explains the connections between divinity and lordship as follows:

---

[221] See the Second and Third 'Introductions' of Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī. *The Incoherence of the Philosophers.* (Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, 1966)
[222] See Ibn al-'Arabī. *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya.* (Cairo: Al-Maṭb'a al-Maymanyya, 1911), V. I, p. 41
[222] Ibid., V. I, p. 375.
[223] See Abū al-'Ilā 'Afīfī. *The Mystical Philosophy of Ibn 'Arabi*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.35.
[224] See Ibn al-'Arabī. *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya.* (Cairo: Al-Maṭb'a al-Maymanyya, 1911), V. II, p. 257.

> When we regard it [God] in relation to the potential existence of the phenomenal world, we say that God has revealed Himself in the state of divinity. This is also the state of what Ibn al-'Arabī call the fixed essences, and the state of the divine Names. And when we regard it in relation to the actual manifestation of the phenomenal world, we say that God has revealed Himself in the state of Lordship.[225]

Consciousness of God as divine and consciousness of God as a Lord are both related to the phenomenal world. In other words, they are related to beings in the world. But this relation, as we have seen, is possible only through the human being. The human being is the only being through which divinity and lordship are manifested as much as they define the possibility of being conscious of any 'thing' as such. This is the connection that is completely overlooked by both 'Afīfī and Chittick. The manifestation (*tajallī*) of God on these different levels of consciousness takes place through human consciousness, and the perfection of such consciousness constitutes the perfection of the human being. Failing to take this connection into consideration immediately makes Ibn al-'Arabī's thought susceptible to ontological, pantheistic interpretation. The state of divinity consists in the conception of God as the necessary existent or as the sum total of the possibilities of any object of consciousness. The state of lordship is made possible through the fixed essences.

Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the fixed essences (*al-a'yān al-thābita*) is central to the understanding his delineation of the subjective structure of the human-divine relationship. The fixed essences are the second level of the rational determination of the Essence of God as a necessary existent. As 'Afīfī argues, they are the modes in which the necessary existent may possibly be conceived. In this sense Ibn al-'Arabī describes the fixed essences as the *muqtaḍayāt* or logical correlatives of the divine names. By this he means that they are the logical forms of the divine names.

---

[225] See Abū al-'Ilā 'Afīfī. *The Mystical Philosophy of Ibn 'Arabi*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p.63.

Additionally, the fixed essences, like the Mu'tazilīs' nonentities (*ma'dūmāt*),[226] define the possibilities of every existent as such. But Ibn al-'Arabī also talks about the existence or coming into being (*ilbās al-wujūd*) and hence their actual manifestation in the phenomenal world. Here a dilemma emerges. 'Afīfī describes it as follows: "Is that Ibn al-'Arabī asks that which we call the existent and perceive by our senses the fixed essence transferred from a state of non-existence to a state of existence? Or is it only its subjective determination *(ḥukm)*…"[227] The noetic structure suggested above may harmonize these two seemingly contradictory positions. If existence is being in consciousness, then both claims may be reconciled in Ibn al-'Arabī's system without contradiction. As has been shown above, existence as consciousness is only possible through the human subject. From a strictly logical point of view, the essence is merely an intelligible essence. However, it is also a subjective determination of every being since this being is the act of manifesting one of the essences of the divine names in human consciousness. They are given phenomenal existence not in an ontological sense but rather because they play a role in the interpretation of phenomena as expressions of the divine names. They are intelligible existents merely on the formal level of logic. However, they have a transcendental use, to use Kantian terminology, because they serve the function of the expression of phenomena in terms of the divine names. This interpretation better explains Ibn al-'Arabī's claim that the fixed essences are the keys of the noumenal realm (*'ālam al-ghayb*). The fixed essences are the keys of this realm because they make it possible to conceive of the divine logically in terms of all possible absolutes—in terms of absolute justice, absolute power, absolute dominion, for instance. This flexibility of conceiving of the necessary existent can

[226] See 'Afīfī's comparison between Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the fixed essences and the Mu'tazilites concept of nonentities in Ibrahīm Madkūr (ed.). *Ibn al-'Arabī: al-Kitāb al-Tidhkārī*, (Cairo: Al-Hay'a al-Miṣriyya al-'Amma li-Kitāb, 1966), p. 209-220

[227] *The Mystical Philosophy of Ibn al-'Arabī*, p. 49.

accommodate all forms and contexts of the human experience in the phenomenal world. It thus allows for the connections between the super-sensible realm and sensible realm in a more comprehensive way than the idea of the necessary existent as such.

This interpretation also explains why Ibn al-‘Arabī, as ‘Afīfī has shown, tries to avoid any causal claims about creation. For Ibn al-‘Arabī, creation is the manifestation of phenomena in terms of the divine names, which are the phenomenal interpretation of the fixed essences that encompass all possible rational absolutes and ideas that define all the possibilities of being conscious of any thing as such. Describing creation, in this sense, as an effect of a cause is completely irrelevant to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s doctrine. Causality is a category that is limited to the conception of relations among phenomenal appearances. The relation between God and creation is expressed in a completely different domain of consciousness in terms of the manifestation that is allowed, as we will see in the following chapter, through the role of the interpretative role of the imagination. Failing to appreciate the noetic kernel of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s metaphysics, leads to pantheistic interpretations of his arguments. These interpretation, in turn, lead to contradictions.

§IV. The human in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s system

This section briefly discusses three main points. First, it gives an outline of Ibn al-ʿArabī’s theory of the self. This sub-section demonstrates that Ibn al-ʿArabī’s conception of the self differs from the Peripatetic substantial theory of the self which dominated the arguments of most Muslim theologians and philosophers. It then discusses Ibn al-‘Arabī’s conception of human morality in connection with his characterization of both the notion of ‘will’ and that ‘desire.’ Finally, it provides an

overview of Ibn al-'Arabī's notion of the perfect human (*al-Insān al-Kāmil*) particularly in connection with the concept of freedom.

IV.1: Beyond Aristotle's *De Anima*: al-'Arabī's Theory of the Self

Unlike most of the Muslim theologians and Peripatetic philosophers who adopted Aristotle's psychology with its roots in his theory of substance in a rather strict manner, Ibn al-'Arabī gave himself significant freedom in dealing with this theory. Following Aristotle's division of the powers of the soul into nutritive, sensitive, and rational, most Muslim theologians and philosophers argued that the soul is a substance. In this connection, they wrestled with almost the same problems that the Aristotelian commentators of late antiquity grappled, especially those who were translated into Arabic from the mid 9th century through the early 11th century such as Themistius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Philoponus. In light of the interest in Islamic philosophy in the human-divine relation and hence subjectivity, Muslim philosophers were particularly interested in the status of the material intellect and how it moves into a state of actuality through contact with the active intellect. In their discussions of this topic, they tried to provide fresh philosophical insight into key questions in Islamic theology, most importantly those concerning the problematic relation between transcendence and immanence.[228]

In contrast with this stance, Ibn al-'Arabī does not restrict himself to the scholastic theory of substance and the relation between matter or potentiality and form or actuality. He radically breaks from this tradition by claiming that imagination is the highest faculty with which the human-being is endowed. While the radical expansion of imagination's epistemic and aesthetic role beyond the limitations

[228] See the discussion of the centrality of the question of 'human nature' to Islamic theology in the Introduction to. Hary Wolfson. *The Philosophy of the Kalam*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974). Also see a similar discussion in 'Abd al-Raḥmān Badawī. *Al-Insāniyya wa al-Wujūdiyya fī al-Fikr al-'Arabī*. (Kuwait: Wikālit al-Maṭbū'āt, 1973), p.

assigned to Aristotelian *phantasia* is one of the key contributions of Islamic philosophy, no one went as far as Ibn al-'Arabī did to claim that human-being is actualized through imagination. The role of imagination and its interpretative role will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Here, the main focus will be on Ibn al-'Arabī's conception of the self, which will set the stage for the discussion of the next chapter.

Ibn al-'Arabī asserts, "…the vegetative and the animal souls are the body itself"[229] He then argues that the rational soul "is neither a body nor an accident…It is the reality signified by the word 'I' *(anā)*"[230] While Ibn al-'Arabī uses the word substance (*jawhar*), he does not use it in the ontological sense of scholastic philosophy. Rather, he argues that "there are two aspects of Man's nature, animality or as he would say human and divine."[231] On the one hand, the animal dimension is defined by the sensitive and nutritive dimensions that our bodies manifest. All sensual phenomena may be causally interpreted. However, in a fascinatingly similar but not identical way to Kant, Ibn al-'Arabī argues that 'cause' and 'effect' constitute two categories (*'ibāratān*)[232] that we use to explain the phenomenal world. In other words, causality is a subjective epistemic category[233] and not an ontological one. On the other hand, the divine dimension is defined and accessed by reason. The rational faculty is what allows us to realize the unknowability of God as noumenal idea. It then, on the level of divinity, presents it to us as the necessary existent that encompasses the sum total of the possibilities of being conscious of any thing as such. The divine in the human is thus the domain of the rational and pure rational consciousness. Hence the

[229] See Abū al-'Ilā 'Afīfī. *The Mystical Philosophy of Ibn 'Arabi*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 121.
[230] Ibid., p. 123.
[231] Ibid., p. 122.
[232] For Kant causality is a single category.
[233] Ibid, p. 25.

rational dimension is the truth/reality (*ḥaqīqa*) of the 'I' (*anā*). This conception of the self in terms of a dualistic sense of subjectivity is definitely exceptional given the metaphysical foundation of scholastic philosophy. The only antecedent to it is found in Plotinus' *Enneads.* In *Ennead* I.1, Plotinus argues that it is always a challenge as to whether 'we' humans identify ourselves with the 'we' that is here, that is in the sensible world, or the 'we' that is there, that it is in the supersensible realm made possible through our reason.

This unique conception of human nature is fully in line with our presentation of the noetic structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's metaphysics. Through our divine faculty or reason, we realize the noumenal, absolutely unknowable essence of God or the 'Thing in itself' (*al-shay' dhātuhu*). Our reason also allows us to think of God, qua his relation to the phenomenal world, as divinity or the necessary being. This necessary being may be conceived logically in terms of all possible absolutes. These absolutes may be actually expressed in terms of the divine names, which provide the aesthetic hermeneutical frameworks for interpreting phenomena in light of the essence of God. This fulfils humanity because it harmonizes its two dimensions.

IV.2 Human morality and the purity of the will

Ibn al-'Arabī distinguishes between desire *(shahwa)* and will *(irāda)* in the *Meccan Revelation*. 'Afīfī gives an excellent summary of this distinction.

> Ibn al-'Arabī draws a distinction between desire and will by defining the former as the mere striving towards the gratification of some natural appetite or other. This striving is usually determined by the nature of its object. Will, on the other hand, for him, means a divine and spiritual power whose object is an existing one (i.e. a concrete object in the external world)… He intellectualizes "will" to such an extent that a truly volitional state must be absolutely free from all pleasurable and displeasing feelings or ideas…Will does not concern itself with concrete objects, neither does desire with abstract ideas.[234]

[234] Ibid, p. 128-9.

Ibn al-‘Arabī associates the will with the divine or the rational in us. It has to be purely intellectual and not determined by the effect of any sensible object. In this sense, his notion of the will is similar to the pure will of Kant. In contrast, desire is conditioned by seeking the pleasure engendered by the effect of sensible objects. Desire is thus like a heterogeneous will in Kant that is conditioned by the feeling of pleasure or pain and not purely determined by the rational power. This suggested interpretation of the distinction between desire and will may shed further light on Ibn al-‘Arabī’s conception of good versus evil.

Chittick argues that “In the final analysis Good is being, to which all positive beautiful attributes belong. Evil *(sharr)* is the lack of good…”[235] Existence as such is being an object in consciousness. This being in consciousness reaches is achieved in fullness when it manifests the divine essence. It is the consciousness of the human being, the being that combines both a divine, rational dimension and a phenomenal, physical dimension. This consciousness and space of meaning manifests the divine essence through the essences of the divine names which provide hermeneutical schemata, as will be shown in the following chapter, for conceiving of all possible phenomena. Thus, while Chittick is correct in identifying ethics with the fulfilment of the essence of humanity, he does not give a full explanation of how this fulfilment is possible**,** since he overlooked the noetic structure of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s ontology.

However, the view that the ‘good’ consists in an intellectual will that is based on the rational faculty and that evil is the result of following the animalistic desires of the body has roots in Islamic mysticism and Sufism before Ibn al-‘Arabī. The moral dimension of reason may be easily discerned in the Mu‘tazilī concepts of will *(irāda)* and intention (*mashī’a*). This view was further developed in by al-Ḥārith al-Muḥasibī

[235] William Chittick. *The Sufi Path of Knowledge.* (Albany: Sate University of New York Press), p. 290

(d. 857) in *Reason and the Understanding of the Qur'an* (*al-'Aql wa Fahm al-Qur'ān*). His thesis was then picked up by Abū al-Qasim al-Junayd (d. 910), whose writings exerted considerable influence on Ibn al-'Arabī's thought, something detectable both in his definition of monotheism and in the distinction he draws between honesty (*ṣidq*) and purity of intention *(ikhlāṣ)*. The former is an ethical character that may be attributed of an action that phenomenally represents the inception of the will in the physical world. The latter is the basis of the moral decision; it is pure will determined solely by rational abstraction (*tajrīd 'aqlī*).

IV.3 The perfect human: a general outline

The human-being is a *barzakh* or intermediary state between the *noumenal* realm and the phenomenal world.[236] The human being has a dual nature or two subjective modes. On the one hand, the human being has a transcendent or divine mode inasmuch as he is a rational being capable of thinking the divine essence as a necessary being and the universal fixed essences as modalities expressing this fundamental 'thing in itself.' On the other hand, the human being is a being like any other being in the phenomenal world, and all his physical characteristics may be analyzed and understood naturally, like those of any other being. As a consequence of this dual nature, Adam or the human-being became the polishing of the mirror of existence, for only through his consciousness can the divine nature be manifested in the world. Otherwise, the world will be merely the sheer totality of beings. In other words, only a being whose being consists in recognizing and knowing the way beings and the relations among them reflect the divine attributes and names can manifest divine nature. Hence, 'Afīfī writes:

> The human-being is the most perfect manifestation of divinity…he is the embracing whole (*al-Kawn al-Jāmi'*) that comprehends all the characteristics and levels of

[236] See the discussion of *(barzakh)* in connection with imagination in the following chapter

> being. Man is the microcosm wherein all the perfections of the macrocosm are reflected. This is why he merited to be the vicegerent of God…For God created man so that his divinity could be manifested through his attributes…[237]

The perfection of humanity consists in showing how beings in the world manifest the attributes, absolute ideas, that express the different way in which the necessary being can manifest himself. Therefore only the perfect human (*al-Insān al-Kāmil*) can serve as the mirror image of God because, "Through the cosmos, Being displays the infinite possibilities latent within Itself. But it only manifests Itself in Its fullness through perfect man, since he alone actualizes every divine character trait, or every quality of being."[238] Since the perfect human represents the ultimate meaning of the totality of worldly phenomena, Ibn al-'Arabī describes him as the all-embracing microcosm (*al-kawn al-jāmi'*).

The perfect human is also the ultimate representation of freedom inasmuch as the perfect human aligns his will with the divine in him or his rationality and then represent this rationality in the phenomenal world, his consciousness is the freest consciousness. For only such consciousness shows the capacity of the divine to influence the materiality of the phenomenal world. Hence, Sa'īd Shiblī correctly argues that Ibn al-'Arabī completely redefined al-Qushayrī's famous statement, "The truth of freedom consists in the perfection of servitude to God."[239] Servitude as understood in terms of the noetic structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's metaphysics means striving to fulfil humanity. Such fulfilment consists in the state of consciousness and state of mind wherein the divine/rational is manifested in the phenomenal world. Such manifestation is the ultimate expression of freedom since it shows the positive capacity of the human being to transcend the physical world and its causal structure.

---

[237] See Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī, *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, ed. With commentary by A. E. 'Afīfī, (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-'Arabī, 2002), 36-37

[238] See William Chittick, *The Sufi Path of Knowledge*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 30

[239] Sa'īd Shiblī. *Naẓrayat al-Insān wa al-Ḥuriyya fi 'Irfān Muhiyy al-Dīn ibn al-'Arabī*. (Beirut: Maktabat Ḥasan al-'Aṣriyya, 2010), p. 310

More importantly, it shows that the phenomenal world should be expressed in terms of the divine or the rational and thus demonstrate the capacity of the latter to influence the former.[240]

[240] For a full discussion of Ibn al-ʻArabī's conception of freedom see Ibn al-ʻArabī. *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya.* (Cairo: Al-Maṭbʻa al-Maymanyya, 1911), V. II, p. 227 & 502, V. I, p. 167 & 173.

Chapter 10

Imagination and the Hermeneutical Constitution of the Limits between the Supersensible and the Sensible

§I. Prelude:

The last chapter established the noetic structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology. By examining the first chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom*, it has been shown that human-being mediates between the realm of rational, transcendent ideas and that of physical experience. The human-being, because he has access to the realm of the supersensible through rational ideas and the sensible realm through sensible intuitions, is the only being that may reconcile both. God, conceived as the necessary being and the thing-in-itself, contains the sum total of the possibilities of any 'thing' as such. Through this idea human consciousness can establish a connection between the supersensible and the sensible. This consciousness/state of mind is what allows the noumenal essence of God to be manifested through the essences of the divine names, for the latter define all the relations and attributions that may be predicated of objects of consciousness and relations among them. The viability of this thesis on the human-divine relationship was further substantiated by demonstrating that it may be reconciled with Ibn al-ʿArabī's conception of God and the epistemic and moral dimensions of the human being.

This chapter examines the way this consciousness is constituted. As mentioned above, Ibn al-'Arabī allows for different plans of consciousness and meaning. On the one hand, there is the pure rational consciousness which is based entirely, as is the case in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, on the rational intuition of the first principles (*πρώτο αξιωματα*). On the other hand, there is the physical world (*'ālam al-shuhūd*), which is represented through empirical intuitions. The consciousness of this world and any meaning associated with it is described by Ibn al-

‘Arabī as imaginal. As Henry Corbin has argued, ‘imaginal’ does not mean imaginary or unreal. It rather means that imagination is the faculty responsible for the constitution of the consciousness of the world. Imagination constitutes different levels of meaning. The highest of these levels, the level that establishes the fulfillment of human nature, is that which represents beings as expressions of the divine names.

In chapter 8, it has already been indicated that Corbin argues that the faculty of imagination undertakes its mediating role through a hermeneutical function. This chapter will reinforce and expand Corbin’s thesis. The first section provides a brief account of Muslim philosophers’ expansion of the role of imagination compared to the limited role assigned to it by Aristotle. Two main thinkers will be addressed: al-Fārābī and Averroës.[241] In the philosophy of these two major figures, imagination serves to reconcile rational universals with the domain of sense perception. The second section examines the role of imagination in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thought. The first part of the section describes the faculty of imagination and its hermeneutical role in light of Henry Corbin’s and Sulaymān Al-‘Aṭṭār’s analyses. The second part of the section engages the field of consciousness constituted by imagination or *al-barzakh*, as Ibn al-‘Arabī calls it.

§II. Imagination in Islamic Philosophy

II.1 The place of the imagination in al-Fārābī’s psychology and theory of prophecy

Following the peripatetic tradition, al-Fārābī starts his landmark work on Plato’s *Republic (Arā’ Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila)* with a physical-cosmological account of the world and a theory of matter and form. He then turns to an account of human psychology. However, unlike Aristotle, al-Fārābī does not immediately define

[241] Of course there are other key theories of imagination which are definitely forerunners of aspects of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s concept of the imagination, most notably, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī in *Ma‘ārij al-Quds fī Madārij Ma‘rifat al-Nafs*. However, I will restrict my discussion to al-Fārābī and Averroës; it will be shown in §II that the synthesis of their contribution constitute the two main characterizing features of imagination in the thought of Ibn al-‘Arabī.

the soul in terms of its three powers, as the former does in Book II of the *De Anima*. Rather, in chapter XX, on the parts of the human soul and its powers, he begins with the nutritive power, and then identifies the sensitive power, then the imaginative power, and finally the rational power of the soul.[242] In doing so, he parted from the Aristotelian tendency to suppress or subsume the imaginative part of the soul or merely associate it with the sensitive part. This becomes clear in al-Fārābī's claim that there are three kinds of knowledge: knowledge by the sensitive power of the soul, knowledge by the imaginative power of the soul, and knowledge by the rational power of the soul. Such classification is not strictly found in Aristotle's *De Anima*, or in *Sense and Sensibilia* or even in his classification of the hierarchy of human knowledge in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In the subsequent chapters, chapters XXI through XXIV, al-Fārābī gives a more elaborate characterization of the imaginative power and its place relative to the other powers of the soul. In chapter XXIV he characterizes it as the intermediate faculty between the sensitive and appetitive soul, on the one hand, and the rational soul, on the other. He defines the function of the imaginative soul in synthetic (*tarkībiyya*) terms.[243] The imaginative soul pieces together images furnished to it by the senses, whether following the same order in which they were given in the senses or a different one. Al-Farabi's understanding of the role of imagination does not differ much from that of Aristotle, but he goes further to argue that the imagination, since it mediates between the rational and the sensitive souls, tends to be influenced by both. Since it is influenced by the sensitive power, the imaginative soul is affected by all physical factors that affect sense perception, including weather and the state of the receptive sensory organs. All these factors affect the way it pieces together sense intuitions according

[242] See al-Fārābī . *Arā'Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila* (ed. Albir Naṣrī Nādir). (Beirut: Dār al-Mashriq, 1986), p. 87-91
[243] Ibid, p. 108

to the order in which they were furnished by the senses or freely associates them in dreams when the sensitive faculty is in a potential rather than active state. This is a more or less empirical-psychological description of the function of the imaginative power, as Ibrahīm Madkūr[244] noted in his analysis of the al-Fārābī's theory of imagination.

However, al-Fārābī does not stop there. He argues that the imagination may also mimic and be guided by the rational power of the soul. The imagination tries:

> Imagination mimics the intelligible objects through the things that can best mimic them. Thus it mimics the perfect intelligibles like the first cause and the things transcendent to matters and the heavens by the best and most perfect sensible objects like the aesthetically beautiful objects[245]

The question that immediately arises is whether the imaginative power can undertake this task through a merely synthetic function. The intelligible objects are by definition free of matter, whereas the sensible are by definition material objects; otherwise, they would not be sensible from the strict view of Aristotelian physics. If the imagination is to use the sensible objects to mimic or represent an intelligible object, it cannot do so merely by piecing together sense intuitions. Rather, it needs an interpretative or hermeneutical act that allows it to relate the pure transcendence and immateriality of the rational form to the materiality of sense intuitions. Otherwise, the way in which the sense intuitions will be pieced together will either follow the order in which they impressed themselves upon the sense organs or will result from free association created by the imagination, as happens when one is asleep. Imagination may therefore be said to have two different functions: synthetic, since it is related to sense perceptions, and hermeneutical or interpretative, since it is related to the rational

---

[244] Ibrahīm Madkūr. *Fī al-Falsafa al-Islāmiyya Manhaj wa Taṭbīquh* (Cairo: Dār al-Maʻārif, 1976), p.76-81.
[245] Ibid, p. 110

soul and tries to put it in contact with the immanent world of sense perception. The following section will show that Ibn al-'Arabī also did take this step**.**

Al-Fārābī then moves to the social political implications of his psychology. He argues, again following Aristotle in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, that inasmuch as the rational power is the most exalted power of the human being, any rational agent that actualizes this power in the act of thinking itself should be the ruler of the city-state and the one most capable of leading its inhabitants to happiness. Thus, the philosopher ought to be the ruler of the perfect state. However, since the rational soul directs the imagination, the prophet can also be a leader, because the purity of his imagination, which is directed by the rational soul, allows him to receive revelation through the light inspired by the active intellect and so mimic the intelligible forms. This theory of prophecy is fully developed by Ibn al-'Arabī as will be shown below.

II.2 Imagination in Averroës's *Middle Commentary on the De Anima*:

II.2.1 Prelude: The material intellect and the place of man in Averroës' Middle Commentary on the De Anima

As Davidson explained, Averroës, unlike his three key Arab and Muslim philosophical predecessors—al-Kindī (d. 873 A.D.), al-Fārābī (d. 950 A.D.), and Avicenna (d. 1037 A.D.), was particularly interested in qualifying the status of Aristotle's controversial material intellect (ὑλικός νους) as Alexander described it or passive παθητικός νους—as Aristotle described it in *De Anima* 3.4-5.[246] In this section I will discuss Averroës' conception of the material intellect in the *Middle Commentary on the De Anima*, focusing on the function it assumes based on the role Averroës assigns to the imagiantion. I will start with a brief sketch of Averroës' characterization of the middle intellect in the *Middle Commentary* and the way it

[246] Herbert Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 258-259. See also: Aristotle. *De Anima,* ed. Sir David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961) 429b30-430a10.

contrasts with his view in the *Long Commentary*. Subsequently, I will turn to a brief analysis of the implications this conception has for Averroës' understanding of human nature and man's ontological status.

II.2.2 Themistius and Alexander of Aphrodisias: Averroës' combined theory of the Middle Commentary

Averroës devoted the third section of Book III of the *Middle Commentary on the De Anima* to put forward his interpretation of Aristotle's conception of the intellect. He starts the section by reiterating two of Aristotle's key arguments about the nature of the intellect. First, the intellect, unlike the senses, cannot have any specific nature, because it must be capable of receiving all forms and not only a specific form, as is the case in sense perception.[247] Second, the intellect is not affected like perception. It might be considered affected inasmuch as it receives material forms, but it is not affected as senses are when they receive perceptible forms, for the latter change upon receiving these forms, whereas the intellect does not change when it thinks.[248] The reason is that change in the case of the senses assumes a change from one state to the other, while the intellect is one with its thought and does not have any particular nature, since particularity comes from the unity of form and matter, and the intellect, unlike the senses, is purely a form. It is thus active while being affected and vice versa.

After delineating the nature of the material intellect in a negative way by demonstrating logically what it cannot be, Averroës turns to the complicated question of positively defining its ontological status. In this respect, he explains that there are generally two theories of interpreting Aristotle's material intellect. The first one, that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, claims that the material intellect is a mere disposition in

[247] Ibn Rushd ed. Alfred Ivry, *Talkhīs Kitāb al-Nafs,* 121. See also: Aristotle. *De Anima,* ed. Sir David Ross, 3.4, 429a15-b15
[248] Ibid, 121-122

the human soul like the disposition of a tablet to receive writing.[249] The second is that of Themistius, but which Averroës attributes to all other key interpreters as well, argues that the material intellect is an incorporeal substance.[250] Both are problematic. Alexander's theory problematically posits an incorporeal disposition in the human substance. This means that it posits an incorporeal being which must be separate from all matter in a physical substratum. Similarly, the theory of Themistius and the other commentators posits a disposition or potentiality in an incorporeal substance, while potentiality is associated with material passivity. To avoid the paradoxical positions of both stances, Averroës suggests combining them in a new interpretation of the human material intellect: it is the combination of an incorporeal intellect that conjoins with man and a disposition in man. In this manner, Averroës tries to avoid the problem of Alexander's theory, which posits an incorporeal disposition in the human substance, and the problem of Themistius' theory, which posits a disposition or potentiality in an actualized incorporeal substance. He writes:

> We may thus conclude that the material intellect is a combination of a disposition in us and an intellect that conjoins with this disposition. Inasmuch as this intellect conjoins with such disposition, it is a potential intellect (*'aql musta'idd*), and inasmuch as it is not, it is an active intellect. This intellect is indeed the active intellect whose existence will be demonstrated below. For inasmuch as it is in contact with this disposition, it has to be only potential, since it can not think itself but is capable of thinking material forms. But inasmuch as it is not in contact with this disposition, it has to be an active intellect thinking itself and not thinking what is here. I mean to say that it does not think material forms … The forgoing discussion has thus shown to you that there are two theories about the active intellect: the theory of Alexander and the theory of others. It has also been shown that the truth, namely Aristotle's theory, consists in combining both of them in the way we have said. Through this combination we avoid positing an incorporeal being (*jawhar*) that contains a disposition in its substance. Instead, we posit that this incorporeal being has such disposition not on account of its nature but on account of its conjoining with the substance that has such disposition, viz. the human being…[251]

---

[249] Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*, 259-260. Also See: Badawī 'Abd al-Rahmān, *Shurūh 'ala ARistū mafquda fi al-Yūnānya,* 31-42.

[250] Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*, 259-260. Also see: M.C.Lyons ed., *An Arabic Translation of Themistius Commentary on Aristoteles De Anima* (London: Bruno Cassirer, 1973) 169-213

[251] Ibn Rushd ed. Alfred Ivry, *Talkhīs Kitāb al-Nafs,* 124-125

Through this theory, as Davidson rightly explains, Averroës avoids the defects in both Themistius and Alexander's theses:

> The untoward implications of locating the human disposition for thought in an incorporeal being are thus removed by locating the disposition, *essentially*, within the human organism and the untoward implications of the locating the human disposition for thought in the human organism are removed by locating the disposition for thought, in an *accidental* fashion in the incorporeal active intellect.[252]

The human material intellect is a disposition inasmuch as it belongs to the physical human substratum, but it is incorporeal and separable inasmuch as an incorporeal being conjoins with the human substance that has this disposition and engages in the activity of thinking. This argument closely resembles Aristotle's argument in the *Physics* about a man qua man and a man qua doctor or in his vocational capacity as a doctor.

However, Averroës does not limit his qualification of the material intellect to this characterization. Throughout his discussion of the nature of the material intellect, Averroës asserts and reemphasizes, as he did in the *Epitome* of the *De Anima*, the dependency of the material intellect on imagination. As a matter of fact, he goes so far as to claim, as Alfred Ivry notes in his introduction to the Arabic edition of the *Middle Commentary*, that the material intellect is "the disposition of the imaginative faculty to think."[253] The reason is that all the faculties of the soul are purposively connected with each other in a harmonious hierarchy with the intellect at its top. Imagination is disposed to think rationally, and thinking wants to abstract rational forms from the material forms handed to it by the imagination and the senses.

Therefore, as Davidson correctly notes, the material intellect has both a transcendent dimension and an immanent dimension. The transcendent dimensions is represented by the view of the active intellect as an incorporeal substance that

---

[252] Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*, 281
[253] Ibn Rushd ed. Alfred Ivry, *Talkhīs Kitāb al-Nafs,* 9

activates the disposition for thinking through the thinking process that ultimately allows man to break from the immanence of spatial-temporal experience. In contrast, the immanent dimension is represented by the intellect as an accidental disposition inhering in the incorporeal intellect because it conjoins with the human substance.

If the activity of the intellect, the highest faculty of the human soul, represents the highest form of the actualization of the human being, as Aristotle claims in the *De Anima*,[254] the *Nicomachean Ethics*,[255] and elsewhere, then the conception of the human material intellect is essential for understanding Averroës' conception of human nature. The second part of this section will propose a possible interpretation of the implications the above view of the material intellect may have for Averroës' understanding of human nature in general and its ethical and political dimensions in particular.

II.2.3 The Middle Commentary Theory of the Material Intellect and Human Nature in Averroës

Unlike the *Long Commentary on the De Anima*, where Averroës defines the material intellect as a transcendent incorporeal substance, a view that resembles that of Themistius, the conception of the material intellect presented in the *Middle Commentary* reflects a more individualistic perspective. As indicated above, the status of the intellect for the Aristotelian system reflects the essence of human nature in general. In the *Middle Commentary*, the human intellect connects the transcendent rational forms and the immanent empirical forms furnished by the imagination. This happens in two different modes. The human material intellect may abstract the rational forms from the material forms provided by the imagination, which in turn depends on the senses. Or, the human intellect may be completely transcendent to all

[254] See Aristotle. *De Anima,* ed. Sir David Ross, 3.5
[255] See Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics,* ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 10.6-9 (1176a30-1181b23)

the immanent elements adduced from experience, because it thinks the first principles, which are the basis of absolute demonstration (*burhān* or αποδείξει) and so the ground of ontology proper. The principle according to which this connection is made possible is, as Alfred Ivry explains, the teleological relation between the different powers of the soul.[256] Since the soul seeks a state of pure actuality, and since this state is fully achieved through the actualization of the intellect, the highest power of the soul, each power of the soul desires to be as rational as it possibly can. Since imagination, according to Averroës, furnishes the intellect with the material forms from which it educes the rational forms, imagination is the power of the soul that is most disposed towards rationality.

Because the intellect thinks the first principles, it desires to interpret and organize the intelligible forms that it abstracted from the imagination according to these principles. The teleological structure of the relation between the different powers of the soul functions in two similar yet opposite manners, for it allows the material intellect to connect the transcendent with the immanent. On the one hand, it sets the orientation of the imagination towards being rational and initiates its desire to make abstract the intelligible forms from the material forms it handles. On the other hand, it allows the intellect to interpret the first principles or apply them to the intelligible forms abstracted from the material forms to construct rationally coherent thought. The connection between the transcendentally rational with the empirically immanent is therefore at the core of Averroës' theory of the material intellect in the *Middle Commentary*.

What implications does this theory have for Averroës' conception of human nature in general? If the thesis proposed above, that the status of the human material

[256] Ibid, 9-10

intellect reflects Averroës' characterization of human nature in general, is correct, then the following conclusions may be drawn. First, this conception of the human intellect is more in line with Averroës' view in *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics* and *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (*The Incoherence of the Incoherence*). As Davidson has explained, Averroës moved from his early emanationist account of the relation between the First Cause and the celestial spheres, especially the sublunar realm, in which he was more in line with al-Fārābī and Avicenna, to a more naturalistic account.[257] The key reason underlying this transformation consists in his argument against the claim that from one cause only one effect can follow. Davidson correctly demonstrated that Averroës argued that this principle applies only to efficient causes and not to final causes. The intellect or the unmoved mover associated with every sphere thinks itself and thinks the First cause; however, each does so in a different modality. These different modalities produce variations in the ontological statues of beings in each and every sphere. If this interpretation is correct, this supports both Alfred Ivry's[258] and 'Ābid al-Jābirī's[259] theses that he composed the *Middle Commentary on the De Anima* later in his life, when he composed his *Long Commentary on the Metaphysics*. The reason is that this view of the final cause can analogously justify Averroës' theory of the material intellect in the *Middle Commentary* and indicate the individualistic dimension in it. Since each unmoved mover or intellect associated with each celestial sphere can think the First Cause in a different mode, every individual human material intellect is actualized in a different modality when it is actualized. This modality is precisely the modality in which the transcendent rational forms are connected, related, and used to interpret the

[257] Davidson, *Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect*, 245-254
[258] Ibn Rushd ed. Alfred Ivry, *Talkhīs Kitāb al-Nafs,* p.7-16
[259] Ahmad Sha'lān, ed. Muhammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī, *Al-Ḍarūrī fī Al-Siyāsa: Mukhtaṣar Kitāb Al-Siyāsa li-Aflātūn* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wiḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1998), 29-36.

intelligible forms abstracted from the immanent material forms furnished to it by the imagination. Each and every human material intellect, because it is actualized through thinking, actualizes a unique human being or substance, since it is essentially connected with the imaginative faculty, which in turn depends on sense-perceptual experience that varies in scale and scope. Every human substance is actualized through the actualization of the human material intellect inasmuch as the latter connects the transcendent and the immanent dimension that is a function of experience.

Drawing on the experience of each and every individual soul, the active intellect strives to actualize itself inasmuch as it can fully connect what is rational and transcendent to what is immanent and empirical. Furthermore, the fact that each soul is in a constant strife to actualize itself by brining together the immanent and the transcendent dimensions leaves more latitude for the role human will may play in achieving human perfection. In conclusion, Averroës' theory of the material intellect in the *Middle Commentary* is more in line with his later naturalistic view of metaphysics in general. Because of this distinction, Averroës' conception of human nature reflects a better appreciation of individualism and so variation among humans.

§III. Imagination, it place, structure and hermeneutical nature in Ibn al-'Arabī's system

III.1: Imagination as a faculty:

In his characterization of imagination as a faculty, Ibn al-'Arabī follows the Peripatetic outline adopted by most Muslim philosophers. He expands the function of imagination and assigns to it, as do al-Fārābī and Averroës, as I will show in the following section, the task of harmonizing transcendent rational ideas with empirically based data. However, Ibn al-'Arabī almost identically follows the language of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī in *Ma'ārij al-Quds fī Madārij Ma'rifat al-Nafs* in

his description of the nature of the imaginative faculty, especially in comparison to the remaining faculties of the soul. I will indicate this parallelism as I briefly describe Ibn al-'Arabī's definition of imagination.

As indicated above, Ibn al-'Arabī argues that Aristotle was wrong in his assumption that the differentia of the human species is reason.[260] According to Ibn al-'Arabī, imagination is the faculty that defines the specificity of the human-being. Imagination is the faculty that constitutes human-being as the harmonization of the noumenal and the empirical realm.[261] He describes the faculty of the imagination as follows:

> God created human being/consciousness on three levels *(marātib)*: reason and sensation, which are two extremes, and imagination which is the limit/connector *(barzakh)* between sensation and abstract meaning *(al-ma'na)*"[262]

Ibn al-'Arabī then portrays the relation among the faculties that interact to constitute these three levels of consciousness. Interestingly, while he follows the Peripatetic structure, he completely avoids using the terms substance, soul, or even powers of the soul. According to Ibn al-'Arabī, all knowable objects (*ma'lūmāt*) are arrived at through the five senses. Knowledge is thus restricted to the realm of experience, but as I demonstrate below, Ibn al-'Arabī argues that there is a higher level of meaning that is constituted through the mediating role of the imagination.[263] Intimately related to the senses is what Ibn al-'Arabī calls the figurative power (*al-quwwa al-muṣawwira*). This power or cognitive function is the product of the relation between reason and the imagination. Because of reason's interest in knowledge, the figurative power uses imagination to synthesize sense data producing different conceptual forms. In fulfilling the purpose of the figurative power, imagination plays

---

[260] See *al-Futuḥāt*, V.III, p. 290.
[261] Ibid, V. II, p. 391 & 691.
[262] Ibid, VII, p. 391 & 691; see also V.III, p.38; V.I, 532
[263] Ibid, V.I p. 94; see also V.III, p. 38; V.II, p.44.

a synthetic role.[264] Following Aristotle, Ibn al-'Arabī also associates the power of memory with the senses.

Ibn al-'Arabī divides the intellectual domain into two main powers or functions: thought (*fikr*) and reason (*'aql*). Thought is governed by reason; it uses rational ideas to guide imagination in the synthesis of knowledge. Ibn al-'Arabī writes:

> Thought is subservient to reason…Despite this reason [as much as it is connected to thought] is dependent on imagination; for thought's main object is imagination … Imagination, in turn, is based on what is given through the senses… Therefore, through thought, imagination associates sensible date with rational ideas…[265]

Reason has one of two objects: what is handed to it through thought or the universal ideas of reason. Since reason mainly deals with universal ideas, it always requires the help of other faculties to represent these ideas.[266]

Ibn al-'Arabī turns to the domain of the imagination, which stands in between the domain of sensory and the supra-sensory. He identifies it as follows: "The domain of imagination (*ḥaḍrat al-khayāl*) is an intermediary domain between the extremes of the sensory and abstract meaning/essences."[267] Imagination connects these two domains. Its main object is the sensory domain, which it re-presents according to reason. This takes place in two ways: through the synthetic process that takes place under the guidance of thought (*fikr*) or through interpretation (*ta'wīl*). Ibn al-'Arabī describes this intermediary role of the imagination in a variety of ways. He writes:

> Truth is conceived on three levels: transcendent (*'ulwiyya*), which is universal ideas; this is the level of abstract meanings that are conceived by reason. The second level is the immanent (*sufliyya*); this is the level of objects that are perceived by the senses. The third level is a combination of both; this is the level of imagination. Imaginal meanings represent abstract universals in sensible forms.[268]

---

[264] Ibid, V.III, p. 364; see also V.I, p.125
[265] Ibid, V.I, p.125: see also V.IV, p.185
[266] Ibid, V.I, p.94
[267] Ibid, V.I, p. 120
[268] Ibid, V.I, p.33; see also V.II, p.66

In another passage, Ibn al-'Arabī expresses this same position in a different way. He writes:

> There are two worlds and two domains…the first is that of the noumenon/unknowable *(ghayb)*. This is the world of abstract universals. It is the world of reason. … The second is the domain of sense and experience. … It is the phenomenal, sensible world. … The result of their coming together *(jam'ahumā)* is the world of imagination…[269]

III.2 The Imagination and the human; the interpretative function of the imagination:

In the previous section, I have discussed Ibn al-'Arabī's characterization of the imagination as a faculty. I have also explained the way in which he defines the domain of the imagination in general. The domain of imagination is that wherein universal ideas may be brought together with the sensible world. One basic form of this bringing together of the domain of reason with the sensible world is synthesis. Thought, as rational faculty, directs the figurative power which functions through the imagination to synthesize rational ideas with sensible intuitions. This leads to the production of knowledge. Such knowledge may be described as a theoretical knowledge of objects in the world. However, this is not the only role imagination plays as a connector between two these domains. Imagination constitutes another form of consciousness and meaning by connecting these two domains. This other form of consciousness is constituted through the interpretative function of the imagination (*ta'wīl*); this role was Corbin's main interest in Ibn al-ʿArabī's thought, and it is the main foundation for the human-being as such. In the course of describing the role the imagination plays in constituting the human-being, Ibn al-'Arabī writes:

> Imagination brings the divine into existence in its domain…this is only expressed through the perfect human…For though the imagination is connected with sensible realm, it has a divine function inasmuch it is the only faculty capable of representing the truth in the sensible objects…[270]

[269] Ibid, V.I, p.311; see also V.III, p.42 & V.II, 129
[270] Ibid, V.III, p.290

This convoluted formulation of the relation between imagination and humanity may be explained as falling fully in line with the subjective structure discussed in the previous chapter. The human-being consists in connecting the supersensible with the sensory. The basis of the supra-sensory or the noumenal, the thing-in-itself (*al-shay' fī dhātihi*), is the idea of God. The idea of God, as the necessary existent, contains the sum total of the possibility of all things; this sum total is defined as all the predications and relations in terms of which any 'thing' may be determined. These determinations are the fixed essences, which are expressed in the divine names. If the imagination is the faculty that undertakes this task, as the quotation above suggests, then the faculty of the imagination is the most important human faculty. An interesting clue that supports this suggested connection with the first chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom* is Ibn al-'Arabī's use of the word 'divine.' As explained in the previous chapter, Ibn al-'Arabī uses the word 'divine' exclusively to refer to the relation or manifestation of the noumenal essence of God in the phenomenal world. The characterization of the imagination's function as divine in this context should be understood in light of this conceptual framework. Ibn al-'Arabī is referring to the function of imagination as it fulfills humanity by allowing the human being to harmonize the supra-sensory and the sensory. Through this harmonization ,the essence of God can be represented in the phenomenal world; such representation establishes the divine level of consciousness and meaning.

How does imagination constitute this representation? It has been suggested above that this representation is hermeneutical. What are the bases of this claim? Ibn al-'Arabī's further qualifications of the imagination provide a number of clues. Ibn al-'Arabī refers to human imagination as the connected imagination (*al-khayāl a-muṭṭaṣil*). He describes it as follows: "Connected imagination allows the human being to

represent (*yumaththil*) transcendent meanings in the sensible world."[271] The Arabic root (*tamthīl*) that Ibn al-ʿArabī uses here means to symbolize or set an example. This form of imagination is therefore not synthetic, for synthetic figurative imagination involves determination of a sensible intuition by a rational concept through the faculty of thought. This symbolism hinges on the capacity to interpret (*ta'wīl/ta'bīr*). Such capacity, as he explains, is the main function of any religious activity. Through this function, the human being may have a more authentic religious experience, which is a higher level of the actualization of his humanity.

The difference between a common (*'āmm*) religious experience and a special (*khāṣṣ*) one is the use of the imagination. This use of the imagination consists in the capacity to interpret sensible experience in line with rational ideas. According to this interpretation, the imagination can find a symbolic presentation of every possible rational idea. This hermeneutical presentation is of an aesthetic nature.[272] As 'Afīfī has argued, Ibn al-'Arabī takes beauty as the ultimate expression of the noumenal essence on the divine level. Beauty, as 'Afīfī also argues, is the basis of divine love. According to Ibn al-'Arabī, divine love, as 'Afīfī briefly summarizes it, is: "the love of rediscovering the one essence in the universal."[273] This rediscovering, which 'Afīfī does explain, is undertaken through the role of the imagination. Imagination is the faculty that allows the human being to constantly to rediscover the essence of God in every possible human experience and, through this rediscovering, harmonize the transcendent and immanent dimension in him. This harmonization leads to a harmonious feeling or state of mind associated with beauty.

---

[271] Ibid, V.III, p. 442

[272] See Sulaymān al-'Aṭṭār. *Naẓariyyat al-Khayāl 'ind Ibn 'Arabī* (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqāfa, 1997), p.32-46.

[273] See Abu al-'Ila Afifi. *The Mystical Philosophy of Ibn al-'Arabī* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1939), p. 173.

The following section gives a brief account this state of mind or consciousness that is created by the imagination or the *barzakh*. A major question that remains to be addressed is how this hermeneutical symbolization takes place. To this question Ibn al-‘Arabī does not offer a specific answer. However, examination of the imagination in the thought of in al-Fārābī and Averroës may provide a clue. Ibn al-‘Arabī’s theory of the imagination presents, I argue, a synthesis of both theses. On the one hand, al-Fārābī provides a model for the aesthetic role of the imagination. However, his argument that imagination is synthetic would lead to a level of theoretical determinacy that would limit the flexibility afforded by Ibn al-‘Arabī’s theory of the divine names. On the other hand, Averroës provided Ibn al-‘Arabī with a perfect model for framing his hermeneutical theory. Imagination constitutes a plane of consciousness and meaning that is in between the rationally supra-sensory and the immanently sensory. The two domains are not conflated or synthesized with each other. However, the ideas of reason give an orientation or horizon for interpreting phenomenal experience. The key advancement Ibn al-‘Arabī achieves over both thinkers is his presentation of imagination as a faculty constitutive of a third domain of consciousness. Neither al-Fārābī nor Averroës could have done this, because both were bound to the Aristotelian theory of the soul and the problem of the material intellect. Ibn al-‘Arabī’s identification of being with consciousness and, through the subjective foundation of his system, his definition of three possible modes of consciousness and meaning—the noumenal, the phenomenal, and the imaginal—allowed him to synthesize previous contributions of Islamic philosophy in an innovative way.

II.3 The imaginal consciousness or the *(barzakh)*:

Ibn al-'Arabī uses the term *barzakh* to mean limit, connector, isthmus, and also the perfect human-being. When Ibn al-'Arabī uses *barzakh* in the sense of a limit, he refers to the limit of the realm of the supra-sensory and the sensory.[274] He uses the same term to refer to the intermediary or connector between these two domains.[275] He also uses it to refer to the imagination. Most importantly, Ibn al-'Arabī uses the term *barzakh* to refer to the perfect human. He writes: "…the perfect human is the *barzakh* between the truth [essence] and the world [phenomena]"[276] Discussing the *barzakh* in general, Ibn al-'Arabī writes, "The *barzakh* (combines) the two extremes which it separates. It is the place of the manifestation of the divine names …"[277] This quotation determines the end of the *barzakh*; it is the manifestation of the divine names. The divine level or plane of consciousness, as has been explained in the previous chapter, defines the relation between the noumenal essence of God and the world. This relation, when analyzed epistemologically, turns out to be the relation through which the human being is actualized and fulfilled. Human being is itself a state of consciousness that results from the imagination's hermeneutical harmonization of the supersensible and the sensible. This harmonization takes the form of an aesthetic consciousness. The *barzakh* is a state of consciousness actualized in the form of an aesthetic consciousness, and the faculty that fulfills this actualization is the imagination. Ibn al-'Arabī finds it appropriate to label imagination also as a *barzakh*.

Failure to understand the subjective structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology and its connections with the problem of the *barzakh* in his thought has led many

[274] See *al-Futuḥāt*, V.I, p. 304.
[275] Ibid, V.IV, p.328
[276] Ibid, V.I, p. 304
[277] Ibid, V.II p.609, 203

commentators, most notably Chittick and ‘Afīfī, to describe Ibn al-‘Arabī’s system as pantheistic. In *Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Barzakh: The Concept of the Limit and the Relationship between God and the World*, Salman Bashier gives a succinct account of the problematic consequences that ramify from the dualistic perspective of Ibn al-‘Arabī. In the previous chapters it has been explained that for Ibn al-‘Arabī the subjective attitude determines the consciousness and meaning constituted in experience. From this perspective, God is can be phenomenologically experienced as both truth and creation; reciprocally; the world can be conceived of as a concept or as the totality of phenomena. In order for these contradictory dualities to be reconciled, Ibn al-‘Arabī grappled with the same problem that many of the Muslim philosophers faced in the course of their attempt to reconcile the Aristotelian notion of the eternity of the world with the theistic claim that God created the world. According to Bashier, he made the following advancement beyond the thought of Avicenna and Averroës:

> In my opinion, Ibn al-‘Arabī’s greatest achievement toward a solution of the problem of the relation between God and the world lies in his qualified identification of God with being, but he did not render this identification in terms of finality…By saying that Ibn al-‘Arabī does not render the identification of God with Being in terms of finality, I mean that he incorporated the element of *finding* in his understanding of the concept of being. The concept of being understood as finding designates a dynamic process, rather than a static reality….God’s essence must not be limited by any limitation…This implies that in order to truly become infinite, God must transcend his one infinitude and become finite. This conclusion must be absurd when considered from the level at which god is unqualifiedly identified with Being. Hence, a higher level of existence must be posited, which renders the synthesis between infinite and finite existence possible. At this level, the unlimited God can be characterized by extreme opposites, being, at the same time, also transcendent to the world also immanent in it. This is the level of existence of the Third Thing, which synthesizes the unlimited and the limited aspects of Reality while preserving the unlimitation of the unlimited and the limitation of the limited [This is Third Thing] is the level of the..Barzakh[278]

Bashier reached the same conclusion suggested in chapter 8 with regard to the relation between being and finding in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s thought. However, he did not consider finding in connection with consciousness and hence the subjective attitude in

[278] See Salman H. Bashier. *Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Barzakh*. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. 107-8

experience. He thus framed the problem of reconciling the contradictory duals of Ibn al-'Arabī's entirely in terms of the logical problem of 'Tetrium Quid.' While he is correct in stating that a 'third thing' must be posited, he did not conceive of this third thing as a plane of consciousness; rather it was only a third party needed to resolve the *tetrium quid* problem he got himself into. The phenomenological approach suggested by Corbin and developed in chapters 8 and 9 offers a better insight, for it explains clearly how the Barzakh is constituted and presents the Barzakh as a third level of consciousness and meaning compared to the those of the supersensible and the sensible. In other words, it shows that the *Barzakh* defines a subjective attitude that is associated with a field of consciousness and meaning, just like the purely logical, transcendent attitude and the empirical attitude concerned with theoretical knowledge. This phenomenological analysis is indeed more in line with the conception of being in terms of 'finding,' for the finding is always the finding by a subject of consciousness of an object of consciousness. Accordingly, the description of the *Barzakh* as a third level of consciousness is much more plausible than a third logical postulate needed to reconcile two logically contradictory propositions.

§III. Conclusion

This chapter establishes three mains results. First, it situates Ibn al-'Arabī's discussion of the imagination as a faculty within the broader discussion of imagination in Islamic philosophy. The developments introduced by the Muslim philosophers before Ibn al-'Arabī regarding the function and scope of the imagination were clearly adopted and expanded further by him. Secondly, an examination Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the imagination showed that for him, imagination plays the role of connecting thought to intuition. This role takes two forms: a synthetic form and a hermeneutical, symbolic form. The former is concerned primarily with theoretical

knowledge. The second is the site of the actualization of the human-being and hence the fulfillment of the divine plan of consciousness—the plan wherein the noumenal essence of God is manifested in terms of the divine names that encompasses the sum total of the possibilities of the predications that may be made of any 'thing.' Thirdly, the harmonization of the supersensible and the sensible, which is one and the same thing with the actualization of the human being and the constitution of the divine plan of consciousness, is a third plane of consciousness. This plane of consciousness is what Ibn al-'Arabī calls the *barzakh*. Understanding the *barzakh* in this manner is only possible against the background of the subjective structure explained in the previous chapter.

What are the specifics of Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the divine names? How can it present a model for a philosophical approach to the question of prophecy and revelation? Furter, what are the dimensions of the human-being constituted by the imagination? Finally, how can this view complement the Kantian framework, as suggested at the end of chapter 7? In order to respond to these questions, the next chapter, which will conclude both the second part of this work and the whole project, begins with an examination of the *Bezels of Wisdom* demonstrating that the human-being for Ibn al-'Arabī has a historical and an everyday dimension. The second part addresses his theory of prophecy as perfect humanity and suggests that his view can provide a religious scheme for the philosophical analysis of Kant's writings. The last section indicates the aspects in which the system of each thinker may complement that of the other and suggests that examination of the two systems simultaneously may respond to the problem of the transcendence and ahistoricity of religion and its ramifications for the role of religion in culture.

Chapter 11

Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Theory of Prophecy and the Historical-Everyday Human-Being

§I. Prelude

In the previous chapter I have demonstrated that imagination plays a central role in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s fundamental ontology. The main function of the faculty of imagination is to connect the realm of transcendent rational ideas with that of sense intuitions. This connection takes place in two modes: either through synthesis, as in the case of theoretical knowledge, or through interpretation *(ta’wīl)*. The latter mode is what constitutes human-being; through this interpretative process human-being is fulfilled inasmuch as the realm of supersensible, rational ideas is harmonized with sense intuitions through symbolic representation. In light of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s claims about ‘beauty’, this symbolic representation was characterized as being of an aesthetic nature. The field of consciousness and meaning created through this aesthetic consciousness constitutes what Ibn al-‘Arabī calls the *barzakh*. The *barzakh* has a threefold reference in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s system. First it denotes the constitution of human-being as a state of mind/consciousness. Second, it refers to the semantic space wherein the domain of supersensible rational ideas is harmonized with that of sensible intuitions in a non-theoretical sense. It is also the field of the expression of the noumenal essence of God in terms of the divine names. For Ibn al-‘Arabī, these three results refer to one and the same field consciousness. This field is what Ibn al-‘Arabī chooses to call the *barzakh*.

This chapter argues that this state of mind/consciousness has two dimensions: a historical and a hermeneutical one. To demonstrate these dimensions, it begins with a brief examination of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s theory of names. It then turns to Ibn al-‘Arabī’s theory of prophecy. In light of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s theory about prophecy as perfect

humanity, I will show how Ibn al-'Arabī articulates the everyday and historical dimensions of human-being. In order to demonstrate the everyday dimension, I will focus on Ibn al-'Arabī's conception of the Muhammadan reality, which, according to him, equally represents the archetype of human being as much as Adam does. Examination of the second and third chapters of the *Bezels of Wisdom* will demonstrate the historical dimension. The word historical is used here to refer to the expression of the transcendent ideas in the phenomenal world. More precisely, it is the intersection of the supersensible and the sensible. Hence, it is perfectly in line with the Kantian/Hegelian notion of history discussed in chapter 4.

Drawing on these findings, this chapter argues that Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of prophecy articulates a framework for re-conceiving revelation on bases that are not trans-historical. In other words, it shows that Ibn al-'Arabī's theory offers a new possibility for re-conceiving religion as an integral part of the subjective structure of the human being.

II) The historical-everyday nature of the human-being in Ibn al-'Arabī's fundamental ontology

II.1: Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the divine names

In the course of describing the theory of the divine names in Ibn al-'Arabī's system, Chittick writes:

> …names establish a bridge between the phenomenal world and the non-phenomenal [noumenal]…the attributes or names are the *barzakh* or isthmus between the essence and the cosmos…[279]

Although Chittick maintains a pantheistic reading of Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology, his characterization of the names fits perfectly with the interpretation suggested in the previous chapters of the function of the name. The noumenal, the realm of the thing in itself, is absolutely unknowable. The aesthetic consciousness requires positing the

[279] *The Sufi Path of Knowledge,* p. 33-4.

idea of a necessary being. Through this idea of the necessary being the noumenal may be made sense of in relation to the phenomenal. This necessary being, however, can be thought of in different ways. It can be thought of as the highest being *(ens originarium)*, the most rational being (*summa intelligentia*) or the highest good *(summum bonum)*. However, Ibn al-'Arabī does not restrict himself to these limited qualifications. God, the sum total of the possibility of every thing, can be conceived as any abstract essence *(muṭlaq)*. Ibn al-'Arabī calls these abstract essences the fixed essences. In turn, fixed essences define the possibility of divinity. They are, to use Chittick's formulation, the 'bridges' that allow for the connection of the phenomenal with the noumenal. But the connection between the phenomenal and the noumenal is established by the hermeneutical role of the imagination. Through its hermeneutical function, the imagination interprets the phenomenal world in terms of the orientation and scope furnished by the fixed essences of reason. The expression of these fixed essences in the phenomenal world is precisely what Ibn al-'Arabī calls the divine names. These names and essences include absolute justice, beauty, goodness, love, knowledge.[280] Ibn al-'Arabī explains this point as follows:

> The divine names allow us to understand many realities of obvious diversity (*ikhtilāf*). The names are attributed only to God, for He is the object named by them, but He does not become multiple *(takaththur)* through them.[281]

However they are not only substantives; they also and more importantly encompass relationships (*nisab*). Chittick explains this point as follows:

> …they [names] are relationships, attributions, ascriptions or correlations *(nisab, iḍafāt)* that are envisaged between God [as an essence] and the cosmos. As soon as we juxtapose God and the cosmos, we perceive a relationship between the two. The relationship may be expressed by *saying* that God created the cosmos, so He is its Creator *(al-khāliq)* and Author *(al-bāri')*. He also made and originated the cosmos, so is its Maker *(al-ṣāni')* and Originator *(al-mubdi')*. By bringing the creatures into existence He shows mercy to all of them, so He is the All-merciful. By guiding some

[280] Ibid, p.10

[281] *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, V.III, p. 398. In this quote, Ibn al-'Arabī hedges against the charge of ascribing divinity to aught beside God *(shirk)*. God's essence is one but such essence can have multiple manifestations on divine level, that is, as much as it is interpreted by the human agent in the spatio-temporal context of experience.

> on the straight path of religion, He is the Guide *(al-hādī)* and the Benefactor *(al-mun'im)*. By the fact the He stands infinitely beyond the grasp of the creatures, He is the Transcendent *(al-muta'ālī)*, the Glorified *(al-subbūḥ)* and the All-holy *(al-quddūs)*.[282]

Therefore, depending on the context, the subject can posit an abstaract idea in light of which he may use his imagination to interpret the experience he is undergoing in a way that harmonizes the supersensible with the sensible. The rules and the way in which the choice of this abstract idea is to be made is the function of religion and religious rules. In others words, the main purpose of any religion is to provide guidelines for the fulfillment of humanity through the harmonization of the sensible and the supersensible.

An important point should be always kept in mind, though. For Ibn al-'Arabī all these relations are subjective. In other words, they are related to the subject of experience, and they are constituted to fulfill a subjective *(dhātiyya)* need of human consciousness, that is, the need to reconcile the rational with the empirical. No objective claims about the structure of the sensible world may be based on them. As has been indicated above, Ibn al-'Arabī, like al-Ghazālī, fully accepts the category of causality as an explanatory mechanism for understanding the physical world. Following both al-Ghazālī and Avicenna, he for the most part does not accept its application to arguments related to metaphysical concepts and the relationships among them. In addition, Ibn al-'Arabī, in addressing the relation between God and the world, completely avoids engaging in the debate over the creation of the world *ex nihilo* versus its eternity, a debate that was at the center of Islamic theology and philosophy from the time Aristotle's *Metaphysics* was translated into Arabic around the mid 9th century C.E. Rather, he completely re-defined the relation between God and the world in terms of his theory of consciousness which, in turn, centers around

[282] *The Sufi Path of Knowledge,* p. 35.

the subjective/noetic structure of his ontology or better fundamental ontology. According to this theory, the divine names of God are the 'bridge' through which the supersensible and the sensible, each a separate plan of consciousness that has it own semantics, are harmonized with each other. Thus, Ibn al-'Arabī finds it necessary to assert that names as relations do not define any ontological relationships among beings on the objective level: "Relationships are not ontological entities, nor do they become qualified by absolute nonexistence. ..."[283] These relationships are subjectively constructed to assist the subject in fulfilling his humanity. Given that the context of each experience differs, the manifestation of every name, whether it is substantive or relational, will be different. Though all names are attributed to one object and describe the same entity, viz. God, each of them can be manifested in different ways based on the context of experience and cultural background of the subject. Ibn al-'Arabī explains this point repeatedly. For instance he says:

> Every human being has an imagination…through which he interprets *(yu'abbir)* what is around him based on the context….For context *(ḥaḍra)* determines what is perceived in it…the context always determines meaning…indeed the final judgment of interpretation is dependent on the context and environment…For abstract meanings are always manifested based on the one to whom it is manifested.[284]

Imagination contextualizes interpretation. But how does it achieve this task? The main function of the imagination is to harmonize the supersensible with the sensible and overcome the dichotomy that is always already there in the context of every human experience. But the domain of the sensible or the spatio-temporal context of experience is constantly shifting. Thus different names are invoked by the subject based on this context of experience to harmonize and the supersensible and the sensible in this particular context. Through this harmonization a whole of human subjectivity is constituted.

---

[283] *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, V.II, p. 684.
[284] Ibid, V.I, p.591; see also V.II p. 66

From this analysis, the following conclusion may be drawn. Imagination interprets the sensible in light of the orientation furnished to it by the fixed essences, which are the sum total of all possibilities and hence predications that may be made of any object as such. The expression of these essences or their actual, empirical manifestation is delineated by the divine names. In this sense, the domain of the divine names encompasses any possible rational absolute. The capacity not only to do so constantly is the hallmark of the perfect human *(al-insān al-kāmil)*.

How does Ibn al-'Arabī use this theory to develop a humanistic framework for religious experience? It has already been shown that for Ibn al-'Arabī the main function of religion is to develop the capacity of its followers to fulfill their humanity. In other words, religions with all their aspects, whether ritual or doctrinal, are there to help the imagination fulfill its task by constantly creating an aesthetic consciousness wherein the supersensible and the sensible in any context may be harmonized. Still, this does not respond to the core question related to any religious dogma: to what extent can the 'religious' be incorporated in the epistemological/hermeneutical horizon of culture if it is based on the trans-historical notion of 'revelation'? To show how Ibn al-'Arabī responds to this question I turn to his theory of prophecy.

II.2 The 'Muḥammadan Reality' or the everyday structure of human-being:

II.2.1: Prophecy and human perfection in Islamic Philosophy: a brief overview

Among the first Muslim philosophers to use the psychological, ethical, and political theories of Plato and Aristotle and their combination in Neo-Platonism to address the question of prophecy (*nubuwwa*) was Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī. Following in his footsteps was Avicenna, who gave a brilliant psychological interpretation of the meaning of prophecy in his *Risāla fī Ithbāt al-Nubuwwāt*. In many of his books, including *Arā' Ahl al-Madīna al-Fāḍila (Opinions of the Citizens of the Perfect City-State)* and *Kitāb*

al-Milla (The Book of Religion), al-Fārābī harmonizes elements of Plato's theory of the philosopher king in the *Republic* with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* to recast the theory of prophecy. According to al-Fārābī, the prophet, like the philosopher, seeks to actualize his humanity by acquiring both practical and theoretical wisdom. Since the prophet, like the philosopher king of Plato's *Republic*, is concerned mainly with highest and most exalted human activities, namely thinking the forms or in Aristotle's language universal ideas, which are in turn the divine thoughts, the prophet is capable of leading his community to perfection. In order to practise this leadership, the prophet must have a unique imaginative faculty. This faculty allows him to represent the universal rational ideas in a practical way to his people. Strong imagination is thus an essential dimension of prophecy.

This naturalistic view of prophecy and prophetic psychology led to a similar perspective on religion and its role in society. In *Kitāb al-Milla (The Book of Religion)*, al-Fārābī refers to religion by the term *(ri'āsa)* or leadership; similarly, the prophet is referred as the first ruler of the community. Practical and theoretical wisdom, the two main components of philosophy are required for the preservation of the virtuous religion that was revealed to the first ruler, the prophet. However, philosophy is higher than religion, for what was merely revealed to the prophet and represented to his people through his imagination can be demonstrated rationally through philosophy. Thus, for al-Fārābī, the true heir of the prophet and the best extrapolation of prophecy is philosophy and the rational inquiry on both the theoretical and practical levels.

Following the same Aristotelian, naturalistic framework, al-Ghazālī in *Ma'ārij al-Quds fī Madārij Ma'rifat al-Nafs* puts forward a thorough analysis of the psychology of the prophet. He argues that what sets the prophet apart from any other

human being is not only his possession of theoretical and practical wisdom but also his possession of a strong imagination that enables him to represent the rational universal ideas in tangible sensible terms to his people. The prophet is thus a perfect human who can use all his faculties, especially the rational and imaginative faculties, in the best way possible to attain happiness and lead his community to its attainment as well.

II.2.2: Muḥammadan Reality and the everydayness of the human-being in Ibn al-'Arabī's Bezels of Widom

Ibn al-'Arabī develops the connection between prophecy and perfect humanity further. In *The Bezels of Wisdom*, he puts forward a rather unique vision of prophecy. Every prophet is associated with a certain idea/absolute; this idea or absolute is interpreted in the life of this prophet as a perfect human being. In this sense, prophets for him are essentially perfect humans. The only difference between prophets and other humans who have actualized their humanity in full *(awliyā')* is that they have special prophecy *nubuwwat ikhtiṣās*, whereas any other human beings have *nubuwwa 'āmmah* or general prophecy. Prophets are essentially humans who perfect their humanity. Ibn al-'Arabī illustrates this point as follows:

> Messengers represent the domain *(ḥaḍra)* of imagination…for they combine the two extremes of rational thoughts on one hand and the sensible world on the other…[285]

With this view as a basis, Ibn al-'Arabī presents an interpretation of biblical/Qur'ānic prophetic figures as humanistic aesthetic expressions of the attempt to use imagination to harmonize the supersensible and the sensible. Each prophet is associated with a certain idea that was expressed through his imaginative faculty in the context of his life. Ibn al-'Arabī's analysis of the prophets is in and of itself an

[285] Ibid, V.III, p.365

analysis of the human-being or more precisely the *barzakh* or state of consciousness constituted by the imagination.

Examination of the first chapter on Adam has shown that Ibn al-‘Arabī uses Adam to refer not to the historical Adam but to the human condition as such. Similarly, Ibn al-‘Arabī uses the term Muḥammadan Reality *(al-ḥaqīqa al-Muḥammadiyya)* to refer to the fulfillment of this condition or its actual perfection in history.

> [Muhammad]…is the most perfect existent belonging to the human species. For this reason he represents the beginning and the end of the command [of creration]. This is also why he was prophet while Adam was between water and clay. His biological/elemental coming into being later manifested the seal of all prophets.

The Muḥammadan Reality does not refer to the historical Muḥammad. Rather, it represents the fulfillment of the human condition or more precisely the full actualization of human-being as a whole. In this respect, we may understand the statement: “For this reason he represents the beginning and the end of the command [of creation].” As has been explained in chapter 9, Adam stands for the human condition inasmuch as he manifests the divine comman of creation by harmozing the sensory and the supra-sensony. Muḥammad represents the fulfillment of this condition. Accordingly his reality or ontological signficance furnishes the model for the way creation could be manifested from the beginng of historical dialectic to its conclusion and end. For this historical dialectic is nothting but the endeavor of humanity to fulfill itself by reconciling the transcendent and the immanent within itself.

Hence ‘Afīfī explains the relation between the Muḥammadan Reality as the fulfillment of the human condition and Adam as the representation of the human condition as follows:

> As for the relation between the Muḥammadan Reality with human-being as such, Ibn al-'Arabī considers it a full picture of the perfect human who gathers within him all the realities of being. For this reason Ibn al-'Arabī call it the actual Adam or the actual humanity. [286]

The Muḥammadan Reality is thereby the ultimate actualization of the human being. Based on the interpretation advanced above of the subjective structure of this being, it could be concluded that the Muḥammadan Reality is the actualization of the human-being through the harmonization of the supersensible with the sensible.

What is the peculiarity of Muḥammad according to Ibn al-'Arabī? Examination of the last chapter of the *Bezels of Wisdom* provides a response to this question. Ibn al-'Arabī entitles the last chapter on Muḥammad: *(Faṣṣ Ḥikma Fardiyya Fī Kalima Muḥammadiyya)*. Austin translates this as the 'Wisdom of Singularity in the Word of Muḥammad.' Unfortunately, the translation of the word *(fardiyya)* as singularity is inaccurate if not completely misleading. In the entry on the word *(al-fardiyya)* in her lexicon of Ibn al-'Arabī's terminology, Su'ād al-Ḥakīm explains that Ibn al-'Arabī uses the term *fard* in two senses. The first sense is that of oneness; but such oneness is qualified in a rather special way.[287] The one for Ibn al-'Arabī is gathering together of three levels of consciousness discussed in the previous chapter: the rational, sensible and the imaginative.[288] More precisely, and this what al-Ḥakīm does not address at all, it is the *barzakh*. Thus, Ibn al-'Arabī uses the word *fard* to qualify the perfect human: "the perfect human is 'al-fard'."[289] The other sense in which the word *fard* is used is to designate the common/everyday human being or *al-*

---

[286] See *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, p. 320
[287] See *Mu'jam Muṣṭalḥāt al-Ṣūfiyya,* p. 873-5
[288] In their explanation of Ibn al-'Arabī's conception of oneness both al-Ḥakīm and 'Afīfī rightly refer to his adoption of the Platonic/Neo-Platonic theory of numbers. The first number is one which is completely transcendent nor the indefinite dyad (two); it rather number 3. However, for Ibn al-'Arabī '3' did not refer to the three hypostases as the Neo-Platonists would argue. It reather refers, according to what has been shown above, the three levels of consciousness (rational, sensible and the imaginal) which in turn define the subjective structure of his ontology.
[289] See *Al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyya*, V.II, p. 641

ʻāmma.[290] While Austin's translation may have captured the first sense, it fails to capture the second entirely.

In the opening paragraph of the chapter, Ibn al-ʻArabī describes the way in which the Muḥammadan Reality expresses the bringing together of the three levels of consciousness discussed above. He explains that this is the case because it reflects the oneness of all the names or essences of the divine. In this context he writes that Muḥammad "…himself is clue to himself…"[291] ʻAfīfī argues that this qualification could mean one of two things: either that "…the clue to Muḥammadan Reality is clue to itself…for it is one with the truth, … or that it serves as a clue for itself."[292] Immediately following this sentence, Ibn al-ʻArabī writes: "Now, man's knowledge of himself come before his knowledge of his Lord, the latter being the result of the former, according to his word, "Whoso knows himself knows his Lord""[293] Here Ibn al-ʻArabī refers to the famous tradition attributed to Muḥammad "Whoso knows himself knows his Lord." This tradition was frequently quoted and analyzed by philosophers and theologians who were particularly interested in the human-divine relationship in Islam. As ʻAfīfī notes, Ibn al-ʻArabī has an unusual interpretation of this tradition:

> Ibn al-ʻArabī understands this tradition in a special way…The human knowledge of God in this context is not in the sense that man knows the greatness and power of God through self examination and the realization of the secrets of creation God invested in him. Rather, Ibn al-ʻArabī means that one knows God as much as he knows himself and is ignorant of Him as much as he is ignorant of himself for man is…the mirror in which God is manifest…God in this context is meant in the sense of divinity which is manifested through the names[294]

Drawing on this argument ʻAfīfī re-asserts that Ibn al-ʻArabī is a pantheistic thinker. According to this argument, the human is one with God and vice versa.

---

[290] See *Muʻja, Muṣṭalḥāt al-Ṣūfiyya,* p. 877
[291] *The Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 272
[292] See *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, p. 324
[293] *The Bezels of Wisdom*, p. 272
[294] *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, p. 324-5

Below I will present an alternative interpretation of the above argument that is based on the subjective structure of Ibn al-‘Arabī’s system and the double meaning of the term *fard* in Ibn al-‘Arabī’s system.

As far as the Muḥammadan Reality being a clue to itself, I would like to argue that both interpretations suggested by ‘Afīfī are equally plausible and reconcilable. As for the first interpretation of it being guide to the divine as much as it is a guide to itself, it is absolutely acceptable from the perspective of the subjective structure suggested above. The divine is manifested only through the human being. Ibn al-‘Arabī avoids any ontological claims about the essence of God or God Himself. Such claims should be restricted to the level of divinity, which is the level of the manifestation of the essence phenomenally through the names. Since this manifestation takes place through the hermeneutical role of the imagination and since this role constitutes the human-being as an aesthetic state of consciousness or *barzakh*, then the divine is inextricably related to the human being. Not only this, but as has been indicated above, Ibn al-‘Arabī is concerned with the idea of divinity in connection to the human being more than with claims about dogmatic faith. In light of this, the second interpretation may be also accepted. The human being is itself a clue to himself because, if being is defined by consciousness as has been shown above, then the human-being is himself the guide to himself. For ultimately, all reality is determined in fields of consciousness or as parts of the structure of the egology, to use a Husserlian term.

Such a realization enables one to understand Ibn al-‘Arabī’s phenomenological conception of the famous tradition, ‘Whoso knows himself knows his Lord.” Through the discovery of the structure of subjectivity in terms of the duality of the supersensible and the sensible, the human-being realizes that his being

as a consciousness is fulfilled through the harmonization of these two domains. This harmonization in itself leads to the manifestation of God. 'God' in this context is understood as the 'thing-in-itself', the necessary being that contains the sum total of all possibilities of every 'thing.' In other words, 'God' as an idea of reason that is necessary for the harmonization of the transcendently rational and the immanently empirical which in turns constitutes human-being. This view is almost the antithesis of 'Afīfī's view explained above. It is not that God permeates everything in an ontological pantheistic sense that the knowledge of human being of himself will lead to the knowledge of Him. It is rather that 'God' is known on the level of divinity through the human being, because the latter's own being consists in the harmonization of the supersensible with the sensible.

What are the implications of this view for Ibn al-'Arabī's fundamental ontology? The Muḥammadan Reality is primarily the actualization of the humanity or, the model for the constitution of the perfect human. If this is the case, if this model is described as a *fard*, and if *fard* implies both uniqueness and everydayness, then this points to a new dimension in Ibn al-'Arabī's conceptions of subjectivity and humanity and prophecy. The unique/perfect human being is the one who realizes the noetic structure of being. The perfection of humanity, which is one and the same as the manifestation of the divine, consists in the harmonization of the two dimensions of this structure. But this harmonization is always connected to the context of experience. In other words, it is always already embedded in the everyday encounter with the world. This way uniqueness and everydayness may be connected with each other.

Applied to prophecy, this theory has a number of implications. Muḥammad was seen as the seal of the prophets, who in turn are models for attempting to achieve

perfect humanity, because he manifested the meaning *fardiyya* in the sense just explained. For Ibn al-'Arabī, Muḥammad is the seal of all prophets because he is the prophet who achieves the everyday dimension of the human-being in full. Hence the Muḥammadan Reality is described by him as the actualization of perfect humanity. The divine name/rational idea that was represented in this Muḥammadan Reality is thus oneness *(fardiyya)*; this oneness refers to the capacity of the everyday human to find the truth within himself. Hence, it is used as the model for the perfection of humanity. The next section will argue that every other prophetic moment showed one mode in which this perfection could be achieved.

II.2.3 The historical dimension of the human-being in Ibn al-'Arabī's Bezels of Widom

If Hegel's classification of the methods of writing history into original, reflective, and philosophical history is to be accepted, then Islamic civilization knew only the first kind, viz. original history. Hegel subsumes under this category the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides. According to Hegel,

> Original historians primarily described the actions, events and conditions which they had before their own eyes and whose spirit they shared. They transferred what was externally present into the realm of mental representation and thus translated the external appearances into inner conception….The original historians then transform the events, actions, and situations present to them into a work of representative thought.[295]

Most histories written from the seventh century up till the 12th century, the time of Ibn al-'Arabī, can be subsumed under this category, including the famous histories of al-Ṭabarī, al-Ya'qūbī , Ibn al-Athīr, and the different bibliographies of Muḥammad. It was only when Ibn Khaldūn (d. 1406) wrote his *Muqaddima* and *Kitāb al-'Ibar* almost a century and a half after the death of Ibn al-'Arabī that the Muslim world was introduced to a reflective and to great extent philosophical history. Ibn Khaldūn's work later had great influence on modern European philosophers of

[295] *Reason in History,* p. 3-4

history, especially Giambattista Vico (d. 1744). However, like Vico and Hegel, Ibn Khaldūn presents a totalizing view of the development of history; a view, as has been shown in chapter 4, that is itself the main subject of criticism by the modern theory of historicity.

In chapter 4 I argued the harmonization of the supersensible and the sensible establishes the condition of historicity or historical occurrence in Kant. This condition is part of the overall structure of subjectivity he presents. While Ibn al-'Arabī does not use the term 'history' or 'the historical', the fact that he identifies the constitution of the human being with the harmonization of the sensible and the supersensible makes it plausible to argue that the human-being is also historical, from the strict Kantian perspective suggested above. In other words, if historicity is defined in terms of this relation, then Ibn al-'Arabī's conception of the human being definitely has a historical dimension. Below, I will show the significance of this historical dimension through a brief examination of the second and third chapters of the *Bezels of Wisdom*.

Ibn al-'Arabī associates every prophet with a specific name/idea which is manifested in his humanity. The choice of this name/idea is based on Ibn al-'Arabī's reliance on biblical/Qur'anic stories and of course the Sufi tradition. This background, however, is irrelevant to our discussion here. What is most important to us is the way in which Ibn al-'Arabī's examination reflects the noetic structure argued for in the previous chapter and how this noetic structure, strictly from the Kantian perspective, recognizes historicity as constituent of the human being.

Chapter 2 is entitled the 'Wisdom of Expiration in the Word of Seth.' The word 'expiration' renders the Arabic 'nafathiyya' which is symbolic of creation. The first level of the conception of the divine is to think of God as a creator or the originator of every thing *(ens originarium)*. Thus, the use of the word *(nafthiyya)* or

breath is metaphor for creation as much as the world was created through the breath of God. Ibn al-'Arabī devotes the first part of the chapter to a re-iteration of his theory of the human-divine relationship. The consciousness of the divine is only manifested through the human being, the being that has both a supersensible and a sensible dimension. This manifestation takes place through the interpretation of phenomenal experience in light of the divine names. The fulfillment of divinity, which is itself the fulfillment of the human-being, is thus carried through the relation between the noumenal and the phenomenal through the divine names. 'Afīfī summarizes Ibn al-'Arabī's argument in the first part of the chapter as follows:

> In this chapter Ibn al-'Arabī uses Seth to symbolizes one of the manifestations of the truth; it is his manifestation in the form of the creating principles that bestow existence on every existent or, to use the author's terms, the manifestation in the existents…Creation in this context means manifestation in phenomena; it is not intended in the sense of creation ex nihilo…[296]

One way in which creation as manifestation may be conceived is to re-frame the relation of creation in terms of the relation between a necessary existent and possible existents. Based on this relation, God would serve as the sum total of all possibilities. This relation of the necessary to the possible existence offers a way in which the divine may manifest himself as a creator or originator. Hence, Ibn al-'Arabī devotes most of the remainder of this chapter to a discussion of the relation between necessary and possible existents, siding, as expected, with the Avicennian position explained in chapter 8.

Chapter 3 is entitled 'The Wisdom of Exaltation in the Word of Noah.' Here I disagree entirely with Austin's translation. The word *tasbīḥ*, here rendered as 'exaltation,' should be transcendence. The entire chapter revolves around the problem of the transcendence versus the immanence of God and attempts to explain how it could be manifested through the human everyday consciousness. The model he uses

[296] *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, p. 20

for this is Noah and his people. The first part of the chapter is devoted to a radical critique of Muslim theologians, especially the rationalist Mu'tazilīs, who argued that God is absolutely transcendent and that there is no way in which he can be manifested in this world. Ibn al-'Arabī argues that God may be conceived of as both a purely transcendent being and also in terms of immanent spatial-temporal experience. He thus calls anyone who argues for pure transcendence a fool or a rogue.[297] He then describes what he sees as the right attitude:

> He, however, who unites in his knowledge of God both transcendence and immanence in a comprehensive way…know Him in a general way…as he may know himself…[298]

Here Ibn al-'Arabī repeats his dualistic view. The transcendent and the immanent fields of consciousness should be harmonized. Through this harmonization one allows the divine to be manifested as much as it allows one to know oneself. For this harmonization constitutes the human being as such. The human being only knows himself when he realizes the noetic structure of being and how his humanity as a whole is constituted through the harmonization of the supersensible with the sensible. Ibn al-'Arabī then turns to the story of Noah, giving an unusual interpretation of the way it was related in Qur'ān 71:1-25. He explains that Noah started by conceiving of the divine exclusively in immanent terms. He then conceived of God in purely transcendent terms. Both approaches kept his message from spreading despite the long span of his life. For God must be presented in both a transcendent and an immanent way. Human nature calls for this kind presentation. The reduction of the divine to either one of these domains will always lead to an incomplete view. Ibn al-'Arabī writes:

> Had Noah combined the two aspects in summoning his people, they would have responded to his call…Then he said [I summoned them by night *(inwardly)* and by

[297] *The Bezels of Wisdom,* p.73
[298] Ibid, p. 74

> day *(outwardly)* by my summons only made them more averse.] He states that his people turned a deaf ear to his summons only because they knew [innately] the proper way for them [maintaining God's immanence in many forms] to respond to his summons [made from the standpoint of unity and transcendence].[299]

In commenting on this part 'Afīfī writes:

> Ibn al-'Arabī presents Noah in the form of a man who preaches absolute transcendence to his people who, in turn, turn their back upon him because his call is for something that is impossible. He preaches something completely abstract and to which they can not relate or know anything about. He invited them to follow *(al-furqān)*—that is a completely transcendent God that is separate from all phenomena. Therefore, they could not understand his call. If he had preached them in a way that combines transcendence and immanence and thus articulated to them the aspects of reality they would have followed him…[300]

Accordingly, the main problem that hampered Noah's preaching was his attempt to represent the divine in absolutely transcendent or immanent ways. That was against human nature, wherein the divine has to be the connection between these two domains. Hence, his people could not accept the form of revelation he presented.

The brief analysis of chapters 2 and 3 of *The Bezels of Wisdom* shows the way Ibn al-'Arabī re-interpreted prophetic stories according to his fundamental ontology. It was argued that this re-interpretation points to historical dimension of his view of the human-being. The 'historical' in this context refers to the conditions of historicity. This condition is the harmonization of the supersensible and the sensible. The main value of Ibn al-'Arabī's presentation of the history of prophecy as attempts to achieve perfect humanity is the presentation of religion in humanistic way. Prophets, as the main representatives of the human divine relationship, are models for the constant human attempt to reconcile the supersensible with the sensible. These attempts are not always successful in reaching perfections. As we have just seen in the case of Noah his attempt to interpret the divine merely in a transcendent sense or merely in an immanent sense led to the rejection of his call. The reason for this is that it overlooked

---

[299] *The Bezels of Wisdom*, p.75
[300] *Fūṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, p. 37

that both dimensions must be combined in order for the divinity to make sense with the subjective structure of the human being. However, through these human attempts, which are conditioned by the context in which they occur, history and culture are constituted and with them the vision or the representation of the divine. Following this representation, religious experience could be constantly re-defined as integral dimensions of human subjectivity.

III) Conclusion:

Examination of Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of the divine names and theory of prophecy produced a number of important results. First and foremost, Ibn al-'Arabī offers a re-construction of the notion of prophecy, which is central to religious experience in terms of his fundamental ontology. Second human-being/prophecy has two main dimensions: the everyday dimension and the historical dimension. The third conclusion concerns revelation. If prophecy represents the actual intersection of the divine with the human, and if it is the basis for the acceptance of revelation, then a radically new view of revelation may be developed. The condition of acceptance of revelation must not be assumed to be trans-historical. The view Ibn al-'Arabī presents offers a humanisitic basis for accepting revelation. Revelation is accepted neither on the basis of miracles nor merely on a moral basis. Rather, it must be accepted based on its capacity through its prescriptions and doctrines to help fulfill the humanity of every one of its followers. Furthermore, every revelation must be subjected to renewal or historical re-construction in light of the shifting horizon of human reason on the one hand and cultural and scientific context on the other.

This sets the stage for the conclusion of the whole project, wherein the dimensions and importance of putting Kant's and Ibn al-'Arabī's systems together will be articulated.

Conclusion

Kant and Ibn al-'Arabī: where they complement each other and the value of harmonizing their thought for the philosophy of religion

§I. Ibn al-'Arabī and Kant's inner revelation: where Ibn al-'Arabī complements Kant

In the last section of the *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion*, entitled 'Of Revelation,' Kant makes a very important distinction that is not discussed in most of the scholarship to date on Kant's doctrine of religion. Kant distinguishes between inner and outer revelation *(Offenbarung)*:

> Revelation is divided into the outer *(ausere)* and inner *(innere)*. An outer revelation can be of two kinds: either through works or through words. Inner divine revelation is God's revelation to us through our own reason; this latter must precede all other revelation and serve for the estimation of outer revelation. It has to be the touchstone by which I recognize whether outer revelation is really from God, and it must furnish me with proper concepts of him…Here the religion of reason always has to remain the substratum and foundation of every investigation; it is according to this religion that the value of that verbal revelation must be determined. So it must precede every other revelation and serve as a gauge.[301]

As has been argued in chapter 7, 'theology' as Kant presents it in the *Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion* refers to the different modes of conceiving and of using the idea of a Supreme Being, whether on a transcendental level or on a moral level. The inner revelation on which any outer revelation, that is any doctrine that claims to be revealed from God, may be accepted or not, should furnish the foundations for the importance and significance of the use of the idea of God for the human being. In other words, inner revelation should furnish the basis for thee acceptance or rejection of any revelation as being of divine origin in light of the significance of the divine to human nature as such. Inner revelation must be based on the structure of subjectivity. But what is the essence of this inner revelation? Kant argues that is the moral religion.[302]

---

[301] *Religion and Rational Theology*, p. 28:1118-1119
[302] Ibid, p. 28:1119

But is Kant's conception of the moral religion sufficient in and of itself to provide a proper basis for judging revelation? It has been argued in chapter 7 that moral religion does not fully flesh out the relations between the human and the divine. Human being as a whole is the historical-everyday aesthetic consciousness created through imagination's hermeneutical harmonization of the supersensible and the sensible. The moral is constituted on a purely intellectual level; this is guarantees the autonomy of the will. If 'inner revelation' is to determine the significance and use of the idea of God and to identify the conditions necessary for the acceptance of revelation by characterizing the subjective roots of the human-divine relationship, then moral religion does not suffice. There is no question that the idea of God does have a moral use based on which it defines a dimension of religion and of religious experience. However, this dimension is limited compared to the aesthetic use of the idea of God suggested above. The moral dimension cannot comprehend the hermeneutical, everyday and aesthetic aspects involved in religious experience which are an integral part of the horizon of human interaction in the world. Reducing the use of the idea of God to the moral domain is not only a reduction of religious experience, since the moral is supposed to define the framework for the acceptance religion, but also a reduction of the human to the moral. Human-being as a consciousness/state of mind is a constantly shifting horizon of meaning reflecting the constant attempts to reconcile the sensible with the super-sensible. Both of these dimensions change dependent on the context of experience historically and culturally. Ibn al-'Arabī's religious application of this structure of subjectivity effectively complements Kant's stance in this particular respect. Through the theory of the divine names, which allows the conception of God in connection with the phenomenal world in terms of any absolute idea, Ibn al-'Arabī established a comprehensive scheme that can

accommodate all varieties of religious experience. He also allowed for this without making any dogmatic assumptions. More importantly, Ibn al-'Arabī's system advances beyond that of Kant. In discussing revelation, Kant completely overlooks that, at least in the Abrahamic tradition, revelation is always communicated through prophecy. By interpreting prophecy as every-day historical attempts to harmonize the super-sensible with the sensible in different contexts, Ibn al-'Arabī allows for a more tolerant and more comprehensive view of religious experience than Kant does. Kant's limitation of the religious to the moral and his attempt to connect this with the idea of the 'Son of God' led him a view of history that is rather self-contained, like that of Hegelian Idealism, and that is definitely rather Christian-centric. If the idea of the inner revelation is to be accepted as a condition for outer revelation, this idea must be based on the whole of human subjectivity and not a mere dimension of this subjectivity, namely the rational, transcendent side.

§II. The aspects in which Kant complements Ibn al-'Arabī

In chapter 10 I discussed the theory of imagination in Ibn al-'Arabī's thought. While Ibn al-'Arabī delineates a general outline of how imagination hermeneutically constitutes human being as a historical-everyday consciousness, he does not flesh out the technical aspects of this constitution. The theory of aesthetic and normal ideas in Kant helps explain the mode in which the hermeneutical imagination functions in constituting aesthetic consciousness.

But this is not the only aspect in which Kant's views may complement Ibn al-'Arabī's theory. While Ibn al-'Arabī does suggest that the transcendent rational dimension furnish the grounds of morality, he does not give a full-fledged theory of the 'will' and 'human freedom' in the same way that Kant does. Kant's system of practical reason can serve to complement and develop Ibn al-'Arabī's claim in a much

more elaborate manner. Furthermore, Kant's claim about freedom as the *causa noumenon* of the autonomous will is in line with Ibn al-'Arabī's notion of freedom presented in chapter 9. However, the connection Kant better articulates between freedom and morality is not explicitly articulated by Ibn al-'Arabī. This development can indeed explain and further develop many clandestine aspects in Ibn al-'Arabī's theory of morality in a way that radically contrasts with the ontological interpretations of scholars like Chittick. This development can better situate Ibn al-'Arabī's moral thought in the general interest in discovering the rational roots of morality in Islamic theology among the Mu'tazilites and other key schools of thought.

Finally, Kant demarcates the dividing line between the phenomenal and the noumenal much more explicitly than Ibn al-'Arabī. While Ibn al-'Arabī makes this same distinction through his theory of consciousness, it is not fully articulated. There are certainly antecedents to this interest in separating purely transcendent rational ideas from the world of physical phenomena. The work of al-Ghazālī is of notable importance, particularly his critique of Aristotle's argument for the eternity of the world in the *Incoherence of the Philosophers.* Ibn al-'Arabī touches on this distinction in connection with the two different roles of imagination and his assignment of the task of producing theoretical objective knowledge to synthetic imagination and of the task of harmonizing the supersensible with the sensible in everyday-historical context to hermeneutical imagination. Also, following Avicenna, he rejects the application of the category of causality to questions related to purely transcendent ideas. Employing the Kantian framework to develop and re-construct the noetic structure of Ibn al-'Arabī's ontology may open up new opportunities for analysis of the connections between physics and metaphysics in Ibn al-'Arabī's system.

§III. The value of bringing of Kant and Ibn al-'Arabī together for the philosophy of religion

The problem of 'transcendence' remains one of the key problems of the philosophy of religion. First, it is connected with a whole set of problems related to religion and religious experience, including the problem of the ineffability of God, the problem of pantheism, and, most notably, the relation between science and religion. How could the notion of God's transcendence, which permeates most religious discourse, especially in the Abrahamic/biblical tradition, be conceived? Further, how can this notion be harmonized or reconciled with science? What does transcendence mean? Does it mean ontological transcendence?

To all these questions, Kant's and Ibn al-'Arabī's conceptions of the meaning of the human-being as a whole and the role the human-divine relationship plays in constituting it provides unique answers. Both thinkers furnish the grounds for what may be called a theory of transcendence within immanence. First, the two thinkers locate the origin of transcendence in pure rational thought. They thus avoid all the complications that ensue from the assumptions of ontological transcendence. For them, transcendence is part of the structure of subjectivity. Second, both of them hold that the noumenal is essentially unknowable and that violating the boundaries between the noumenal and the phenomenal would lead to confusions. However, the two realized that the noumenal must have an influence on the phenomenal; otherwise, the two would remain two separate islands. The logos of the connection between these domains, and hence the condition for the noumenal to have an influence on the phenomenal, is the human being. For, the human being is the being which combines these two domains. Each of them constitutes a domain of his consciousness and meaning. Thus, the whole of human subjectivity, or the human-being, is constituted through the harmonization of these two domains. According to this theory, the

problem of transcendence can be interpreted from a radically fresh perspective. Transcendence as such corresponds to one of the domains of consciousness. The structure of human subjectivity requires that this domain should be constantly connected with the immanent empirical domain. The domain of transcendence is therefore not only explained but it relation to the opposite immanent domain is shown to be a necessary in order for humanity to be actualized in full.

Similarly, the key problems related to the problems associated with the concept of transcendence can also be radically reformulated. Let's consider the problem of the ineffability of God. According to the framework developed based on Kant's and Ibn al-'Arabī's theories, God is considered to be absolutely unknowable or a noumena. However, this noumenal idea can give guidance to the imagination in interpreting the sensible world. Such guidance is made possible through the conception of God on the level of divinity or on the level of the relation between God and the possible things, to use Ibn al-'Arabī's terminology. In this framework, while the assumption of ineffability and pure transcendence is maintained, problems like the relation of the ineffable to the world and the possibility or relating to something that is by definition ineffable are completely overcome.

The same holds for the problem of pantheism, which is in a way also related to that of ineffability. If the relation between God and the world is re-defined in terms of the relation of the purely rational transcendent level of thinking to that of empirical consciousness of the world, the problem of pantheism could be entirely avoided. For in this case, all of the absolute ideas, including those of omnipotence and omniscience, would be by definition attributed to God as the sum of all perfections. However, they will not bear any ontological significance. They will just be the characterizations in terms of which the idea of God may be conceived. They serve as

different experiential concepts along with other ideas of reason to interpret the sensible phenomenal world.

Finally, the human-divine relationship, understood as transcendence within immanence, offers an interesting approach to the problematic relation of science and religion. Instead of subjecting religious experience to the categories of scientific explanation, as many analytical philosophers tend to do, the subjective structure underlying this view of the human-divine relationship argues for the complete separation of the two domains on the level of the constitution of meaning and consciousness. In other words, the transcendent domain does not have any claims to knowledge, however it determines morality on a pure level. In contrast, the phenomenal world is constructed through the synthesis of categories and empirical intuitions. However, these two levels of consciousness and subjective attitudes are not left entirely separate. Rather, they are harmonized hermeneutically through the role of imagination in an everyday sense. Such harmonization does not create knowledge. It only constitutes an aesthetic consciousness that does not have an objective reference in the strict scientific sense.

Each of these suggested extrapolations or uses of the framework of the human-divine relationship developed in this dissertation is a project on its own. Though presented here only briefly, they all point to the philosophical value of combining the thought of Kant and Ibn al-‘Arabī. The latter’s approach articulates a religious scheme for applying this idea and re-constructing religious experience. The former’s approach articulates the technical and moral aspects of this experience. Moreover, bringing these two thinkers together allows the investigator to re-formulate the relation between modernity and the enlightenment and many streams of Islamic thought. As has been shown, Ibn al-‘Arabī did not just emerge in an intellectual vacuum. Most of

his claims have origins in the pioneering work of key Muslim philosophers and theologians whose thoughts and reflections Ibn al-‘Arabī managed to synthesize in his brilliantly innovative fundamental ontology. This system, which was shown to be parallel to and complementary with that of Kant, who likewise represented the development of many modern ideas of his time and before and served as an origin for key enterprises in modern and contemporary philosophy, opens up new possibilities for the investigation of the relation between modernity and pre-modern Islamic philosophy.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

1. Adorno, Theodore. *Jargon of Authenticity*, Trans. Knut Tarnowski and Fredrick Will. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
2. Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. *Ihya' Ulum al-Din*. Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Tygariiya, 1913.
3. Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. *Tahafut al-Falasifah*, ed. S. Dunya. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1960.
4. Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. *Maqasid al-Falasifah*, ed. S. Dunya. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1963.
5. Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. *Me'yar al-Elm*, ed. S. Dunya. Cario: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1965.
6. Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. *Mizan al-'Amal*, ed. S. Dunya. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1967.
7. Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. *Faysal al-Tafriqah bay al-Islam wa al-Zandaqa ed. Rafiq al-Ajem*. Beirut: Dar al-Fikr al-lubnany, 1991.
8. Al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din Muhammad Ibn Umar. *"al-Matalib al-'Alya fi al-Ulum al-illahya"*. Cairo: Manuscript in Dar al-Kutub wa al-was'iq al-Qawmya.
9. Al-Razi, Fakhr al-Din Muhammad Ibn Ummar. *Al-Mabahith al-Mashreqia*. Heydar Abad: Da'rat al-Ma'aref al-Uthmanya, 1922.
10. Aristotle. *Complete Works* (volumes I-II) ed. Jonathan Barnes. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995.
11. Davidson, Donald. *Truth, language and History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
12. Davidson, Donald. *Problems of Rationality*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.
13. Dilthey, Wilhelm. *The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences*. Trans. Rudolf Makkreel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
14. Dilthey, Wilhelm. *Introduction to the Human Sciences*. Trans. Rudolf Makkreel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.
15. Dilthey, Wilhelm. *Poetry and Experience*. Trans. Rudolf Makkreel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
16. Dilthey, Wilhelm. *Hermeneutics and the Study of History*. Trans. Rudolf Makkreel. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.
17. Dilthey, Wilhelm. *Die Philosophie des Leben*. Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1961.
18. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. Trans. Garrett Barden and William Galen-Doepel. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.
19. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzuge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*. Tubingen: Mohr, 1975.

20. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Hermeneutisch Entwurfe: Vortrage und Aufsatze*. Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000.
21. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Hermeneutick, Asthetik, praktische Philosophie,* hrsg. Carsten Dutt. Heidelberg: Universitatsverlag C. Winter, 1993.
22. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Reason in the Age of Science*. Trans. Frederick G. Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982.
23. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Philosophical Hermeneutics*. Trans. David E. Linge. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
24. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Heidegger's Way.* Trans. by John Stanley. Albany: State University of New York, 1994.
25. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays*. Trans. Nicholas Walker. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
26. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Historicity*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1972.
27. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing & Friedrich Jacobi. The Spinoza Conversations between Lessing and Jacobi. Trans. G. Vallee, J. B. Lawson and C. G. Chapple. New York: University Press of America, 1988.
28. Habermas, Jurgen. *The Future of Human Nature*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003.
29. Habermas, Jurgen. *Knowledge and Human Interests.* Trans. Jeremy Shapiro. Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
30. Habermas, Jurgen. *Post Metaphysical Thinking*. Trans. William Hohengarten. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992.
31. Habermas, Jurgen. *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*. Trans. Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987.
32. Habermas, Jurgen. *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Trans. Thomas McCarthy. 2 vols. Boston: Beacon Press, 1987.
33. Habermas, Jurgen. *Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God and Modernity*. Oxford: Polity Press, 2002.
34. Habermas, Jurgen. *Moral Consciousness and Theory of Communicative Action*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990.
35. Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991
36. Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
37. Heidegger, Martin. *History of the Concept of Time*. Trans. Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985
38. Heidegger, Martin. *Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Trans. John Van Buren. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999

39. Heidegger, Martin. *Contributions to Philosophy*. Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.
40. Heidegger, Martin. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
41. Heidegger, Martin. *The Phenomenological Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
42. Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Trans. Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
43. Heidegger, Martin. *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.
44. Heidegger, Martin. *Basic Writings* ed. David Frell Krell. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.
45. Heidegger, Martin. *The Question Concerning Technology.* Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
46. Heidegger, Martin. *On the Way to Language*. Trans. Peter R. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
47. Heidegger, Martin. *Poetry, Language and Thought*. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
48. Heidegger, Martin. *What is Called Thinking?* Trans. J, Glenn Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
49. Heidegger, Martin. *What is Philosophy?* Trans. William Kluback. London: Vision Press, 1958.
50. Heidegger, Martin. *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*. Trans. William Mckneill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
51. Heidegger, Martin. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Trans. Michael Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
52. Heidegger, Martin. *On Time and Being.* Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
53. Heidegger, Martin. *Plato's Sophists*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
54. Heidegger, Martin. *The Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle.* Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
55. Heidegger, Martin. *Early Greek Thinking*. Trans. David Frell Krell. New York: Harper Collins, 1985
56. Heidegger, Martin. *Aristotle's Metaphysics*. Trans. Walter Brogan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

57. Heidegger, Martin. *Parmenides*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
58. Heidegger, Martin. *Heraclitus Seminar.* Trans. Charles E. Seibert. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993.
59. Heidegger, Martin. *Introduction to Phenomenological Research.* Trans. Daniel Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.
60. Heidegger, Martin. *Phenomenology of Religious Life*. Trans. Matthias Fritsch. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.
61. Heidegger, Martin. *On the Essence of Language*. Trans. Wanda Gregory. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004.
62. Heidegger, Martin. *Identity and Difference*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.
63. Heidegger, Martin. *The Principle of Reason*. Trans. Reginal Lilly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
64. Heidegger, Martin. *The Essence of Reasons*. Trans. Terrence Malick. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969.
65. Heidegger, Martin. *Gesamtausgabe.* 90 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976-present.
66. Husserl, Edmund. *Logical Investigations.* 2 vols. Trans. J.N. Findlay. London: Routledge Publishing Company, 2000.
67. Husserl, Edmund. *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*. Trans. Fred Kersten. Netherlands: Kluwer Publishing Company, 1998.
68. Husserl, Edmund. *The Idea of Phenomenology*. Trans. L. Hardy. Netherlands: Kluwer Publishing Company, 2006.
69. Husserl, Edmund. Ideas: *General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*. Trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson. Collier, 1996.
70. Husserl, Edmund. *Cartesian Meditations*. Trans. Dorion Cairns. Springer, 1977.
71. Husserl, Edmund. *Crisis of European Sciences*. Trans. David Carr. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
72. Husserl, Edmund. *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
73. Husserl, Edmund. *Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.
74. Husserl, Edmund. *Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 2001.
75. Husserl, Edmund. *Things and Space*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997.

76. Husserl, Edmund. *Formal and Transcendental Logic.* Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
77. Husserl, Edmund. *Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic.* Trans. Karl Ameriks. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1997.
78. Husserl, Edmund. *The Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness* ed. Martin Heidegger. Trans. James Churchill. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964.
79. Ibn al-'Arabi, Muhyy al-Din. *Fusus al-Hikam* edited by Abu Ela Afifi 9 (1-14). Cairo: University of Fouad al-Awal Press, 1949.
80. Ibn al-'Arabi, Muhyy al-Din. *Al-Futuhat al-Makyya* ed. Uthman Yehia (volumes 1-14). Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Masrya al-Amma lil-Kitab, 1963-1997.
81. Ibn Sina. *Kitab ash-shifa'/Tabi'iyyat (1): as-Sama' at-tabi'i* ed. S. Zayid. Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Masrya al-Amma lil-Kitab, 1983.
82. Ibn Sina. *Kitab ash-shifa'/Tabi'iyyat (4): al-Af'al wa-l-infi'alat* ed. M. Qasim. Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Masrya al-Amma lil-Kitab, 1965.
83. Ibn Sina. *Kitab ash-shifa'/Tabi'iyyat (6): an-Nafs*, ed. F. Rahman, (Aviceena's De Anima—Arabic Text). Oxford: Oxford 1970.
84. Ibn Sina. *Kitab ash-shifa'/Tabi'iyyat (8): al-Hayawan,* ed. 'A. Mustansir, S. Za'id and A. Isma'il. Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Masrya al-Amma lil-Kitab, 1970.
85. Ibn Sina. *Kitab ash-shifa'/Illahyat (1),* edd. G. Qanawati and S. Zayid. Cairo: al-Hay'a al-Masrya al-Amma lil-Kitab, 1960.
86. Ibn Sina. *Kitab ash-shifa'/Illahyat (2),* M.Y. Musa, S. Dunya and S. Zayid. al-Hay'a al-Masrya al-Amma lil-Kitab, 1960.
87. Ibn Sina. *Kitab an-najat,* ed. Majid Fakhry. Beirut: Dar al-Afaq al-Jadeedah, 1969.
88. Jacobi, Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. The Main Philosophical Writings and the Novel Allwill. Trans. George di Giovanni. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994.
89. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason.* Tans. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. New York: Cambridge University Press: 2000.
90. Kant, Immanuel. *Kant's Practical Philosophy.* Trasn. Mary J. George. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
91. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment.* Trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Mathews. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
92. Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Judgment.* Trans. Werner S. Plushar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987.
93. Kant, Immanuel. *Theoretical Philosophy.* Trans. David Walford. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

94. Kant, Immanuel. *Opus Postumum* ed. Eckart Forster. Trans. Eckart Forster and Michael Rosen. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
95. Kant, Immanuel. *Religion and Rational Theology.* Trans. Allen Wood and George Di Giovanni. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
96. Kant, Immanuel. *Lectures on Logic.* Trans. Michael J. Young. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
97. Kant, Immanuel. *Lectures on Ethics.* Trans. Louis Infield. New York: Harper and Row, 1963.
98. Kant, Immanuel. *Kant's Political Writings.* Trans. H. B. Nisbet. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
99. Kant, Immanuel. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. Trans. Mary J. Gregor. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974.
100. Kant, Immanuel. *Lectures on Metaphysics*. Trans. Karl Ameriks. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
101. Kant, Immanuel. *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*. Trans. Gary Hatfield. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
102. Kant, Immanuel. *Ground Works of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Trans. Mary Gregor. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
103. Kant, Immanuel. *Werke*, hrsg. Ernst Cassirer. Berlin: 1922.
104. Plato. Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997.
105. Plotinus. *Enneads.* 6 vols. Trans. A. H. Armstrong. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969.
106. Proclus. *Elements of Theology*. Trans. E. R. Dodds. London: Oxford University Press, 2004.
107. Quine, W. V. Ontological Relativity and other Essays. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969.
108. Reinhold, Karl. *Letters on Kantian Philosophy*, Trans. James Hebbeler. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
109. Ricoeur, Paul. *From Text to Action,* Trans. *Kathleen Blamey*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991.
110. Ricoeur, Paul. *The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays on Hermeneutics*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.
111. Ricoeur, Paul. *Philosophical Hermeneutics and Theological Hermeneutics*. Berkeley: The Center for Hermeneutical Studies, 1976.
112. Ricoeur, Paul. *Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning*. Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976.

113. Ricoeur, Paul. *The Rule of Metaphor: Multi-Disciplinary Studies of the Creation of Meaning in Language*. Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1977.

114. Ricoeur, Paul. *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

115. Ricoeur, Paul. *Time and Narrative*, Trans. Kathleen Mclaughlin. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988.

116. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. *Vorlesungen uber die Aesthetik*. Berlin: G. Reimer, 1842.

117. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. *Hermeneutik*. Heidelberg: C. Winter: 1959.

118. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. *Hermeneutics and criticisms and other writings*, Trans. Andrew Bowie. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

119. Schleiermacher, Friedrich. *Hemeneutik und Kritik*. Berlin: Reimer, 1838.

120. Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer. *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Trans. John Cumming. New York: Continuum, 1973.

121. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Trans. D. F Pears and B. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Paul, 1961.

122. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Philosophical Investigations*, Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe & Elizabeth Anscombe. London: Blackwell Publishing Company: 2001.

Secondary Sources

123. Al-Ajem, Rafiq. *Al-Mantiq ind al-Ghazali*. Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1995.

124. Adamson, Peter. The Arabic Plotinus: a study of the 'Theology of Aristotle'. London: Duckworth Publishing Company, 2003.

125. Afifi, Abul Ela. The Mystical Philosophy of Ibn al-'Arabi. New Yorik: AMS Press, 1974.

126. Allison, Henry. *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983.

127. Allison, Henry. *Kant's Theory of Taste: a Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

128. Allison, Henry. *Lessing and the Enlightenment; his philosophy and his relation to eighteenth century thought*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966.

129. Almond, Ian. *Sufism and Deconstruction: A comparative study of Derrida and Ibn al-'Arabi*. London: Routledge Publishing Company, 2004.

130. Arberry, A. J. Revelation and Reason in Islam. London: Allen & Unwin, 1957.

131. Arberry, A. J. Sufism: an Account of the Mystics of Islam. London: Allen & Unwin, 1950.

132. Badawi, Abdel Rahman. *Aristu end al-Arab*. Kuwait: Wekalat al-Matbu'at, 1971.

133. Badawi, Abdel Rahman. *Al-Aflatuni al-Muhdatha end al-Arab*. Kuwait: Wekalat al-Matbu'at, 1971.

134. Badawi, Abdel Rahman. *Aflutin end al-Arab*. Kuwait: Wekalat al-Matbu'at, 1973.

135. Badawi, Abdel Rahman. *An-Nafs end Aristu*. Kuwait: Wekalat al-Matbu'at, 1972.

136. Badawi, Abdel Rahman. *Aflatun end al-Arab*. Beirut: Dar al-Andalus, 1977.

137. Brittan, Gordon. *Kant's Theory of Science*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

138. Booth, William James. *Interpreting the World: Kant's Philosophy of History and Politics*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986.

139. Carnois, Bernard. *The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*. Trans. David Booth. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987.

140. Carr, David. *The Paradox of Subjectivity*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

141. Carr, David. *Time, Narrative and History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.

142. Carr, David. *Phenomenology and the Problem of History*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974.

143. Casey, Edward S. *Imagining: A Phenomenological Study*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.

144. Cassirer, Ernst. *Kant's Life and Thought.* Trans. James Haden. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981.

145. Chittick, William. *The Self-Disclosure of God: Principles of Ibn al-'Arabi's Cosmology*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998.

146. Chittich, William. *The Sufi Path of Knowledge: Ibn al-'Arabi's Metaphysics of Imagination*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.

147. Cohen, Ted. *Essays in Kantian Aesthetics*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982.

148. Coleman, Francis. *The Harmony of Reason: A Study of Kant's Aesthetics*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974.

149. Corbin, Henry. *Creative Imagination in the Sufism of Ibn al-'Arabi.* Trans. Ralph Manheim. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969.

150. Corbin, Henry. *Avicenna and the Visionary Recitals*. Trans. Willard Trask. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960.

151. Corbin, Henry. History of Islamic Philosophy. Trans. Liadain Sherrard. London: Kegan Paul, 2001.

152. Cornell, Vincent. *The Realm of the Saint*. Texas: University of Texas Press, 1998.

153. Crawford, Donald. *Kant's Aesthetic Theory*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1974.

154. Crowell, Steven. *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001.

155. Despland, Michel. *Kant on History and Religion*. Montreal and London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1973.

156. Dunya, Sulyman. *Al-Haqiqa ind al-Ghazali*. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'aref, 1963.

157. Dusing, Klaus. *Die Theologie in Kants Weltbegriff*. Kantstudien Erganzungshefte, 96. Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag, 1968.

158. Engell, James. *The Creative Imagination: Enlightenment to Romanticism*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

159. Frank, Richard. *Al-Ghazali and the Ash'arite School.* Durham: Duke University Press, 1994.

160. Guyer, Paul. *Kant and the Claims of Taste*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

161. Gutas, Dimitri. *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988.

162. Heintel, Peter. *Die Bedeutung der Kritik der asthetischen Urteilskraft fur die transzendentale Systematik*. Kantstudien Erganzungshefte, 99. Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag, 1970.

163. Kaulbach, Friedrich. *Aesthetische Welterkenntnis bei Kant*. Wurzburg: Konigshausen und Neumann, 1984.

164. Kroner, Richard. *Kant's Weltanschauung*. Trans. John E. Smith. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1956.

165. Makkreel. Dilthey: *Philosopher of Human Studies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.

166. Makkreel, Rudolf. *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: the Hermeneutical Import of Critique of Judgment*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1994.

167. Nasr, Seyyed Houssein. *Religion and the Order of Nature.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

168. Nasr, Seyyed Houssein. *Knowledge and the Sacred.* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.

169. Nasr, Seyyed Houssein. *History of Islamic Philosophy*. London: Routledge Publishing Company, 2001.

170. Nasr, Seyyed Houssein. *An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993.

171. Peter, Heath. *Allegory and Philosophy in Avicenna*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992.

172. Pitte, Frederick van de. *Kant as a Philosophical Anthropologist*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

173. Sallis, John. *The Gathering of Reason*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1980/

174. Sallis, John. *Spacings—of Reason and Imagination in Tests of Kant, Fichte, Hegel*.

175. Schweizer, Hans Rudolf. *Asthetick als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis*. Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co., 1973.

176. Wisnovsky, Robert. *Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context*. London: Duckworth Publishing Company, 2003.

177. Wolfson, Harry. The Philosophy of the Kalam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976.