Distribution Agreement

In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

Signature:

_____   _____
Grant T. Buckles   Date

Opposition Parties and Authoritarian Control:
The Logic and Limitations of Cooptation

By

Grant T. Buckles
Doctor of Philosophy

Political Science

_____

Jennifer Gandhi, Ph.D.
Advisor

_____

Danielle F. Jung, Ph.D.
Committee Member

_____

Jeffrey K. Staton, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Accepted:

_____

Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D.
Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies

_____

Date

Opposition Parties and Authoritarian Control:
The Logic and Limitations of Cooptation

By

Grant T. Buckles
Master of Arts, Emory University, 2015
Bachelor of Arts, Transylvania University, 2011

Advisor: Jennifer Gandhi, Ph.D.

An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science
2017

Abstract

Opposition Parties and Authoritarian Control:
The Logic and Limitations of Cooptation
By Grant T. Buckles

Cooptation is a central strategy used by dictators to minimize opposition mobilization and remain in power. Yet, only some opposition parties in these regimes are successfully controlled. Which opposition parties do dictators co-opt? Why do some parties resist cooptation? This dissertation answers these questions by examining the internal dynamics of opposition leadership. Specifically, it is argued that successful cooptation depends on how heavily an opposition leader relies on party activists for support. These grassroots members strengthen parties by facilitating collective action. However, activists oppose cooptation and may threaten the survival of leaders who collude with the regime. A formal model is developed to analyze how this dynamic influences an opposition leader's negotiations with the government. It shows that significant grassroots membership is necessary for cooptation to occur, since a party must pose some credible threat in order to warrant an offer from the regime. Yet as reliance on activists increases, leaders are more likely to reject offers to preserve their own survival. A strong activist base also undermines cooptation in divided parties by encouraging opportunistic conflicts over party leadership, which further indicates that authoritarian control is not simply a top-down process.

These arguments are evaluated using original data on opposition parties in 20 African non-democracies from 1990 to 2014. The internal dynamics of opposition parties have an important macro-political influence on key outcomes in multiparty dictatorships, the predominant regime type in this region. Cross-national data on ministerial positions, elite splits, leadership challenges, and party organization show that parties with a strong organizational capacity and secondary leaders are more likely to resist cooptation attempts. Furthermore, using event data to measure party-initiated conflicts with the government, this study finds that anti-government mobilization is driven by these same party-level dynamics. Overall, this dissertation provides novel information on how opposition parties under dictatorship are organized, as well as the first systematic evidence that cooptation through political appointments reduces party-level mobilization.

Opposition Parties and Authoritarian Control:
The Logic and Limitations of Cooptation

By

Grant T. Buckles
Master of Arts, Emory University, 2015
Bachelor of Arts, Transylvania University, 2011

Advisor: Jennifer Gandhi, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science
2017

Acknowledgments

First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife Charlene Ann Buckles for being the best partner and supporter imaginable. From the time we first met, we have shared a passion for the promotion and understanding of democracy and development around the world. Without her support, insight, and quite frankly, her patience, I would not be where I am today. Her dedication to teaching, learning, and helping others grow is something I can only hope to emulate someday.

I would also like to thank my family for their unwavering support of my educational pursuits. My parents, Allan and Marty Buckles, and brother, Daniel, have always encouraged and helped me in every way possible. I am also lucky to have wonderful grandparents, Genirose and Paul Steenbergen and Gladys and the late James Reno Buckles, who have always been true inspirations to me.

This project benefited from the advice and generosity of my dissertation committee: Jennifer Gandhi, Danielle Jung, and Jeff Staton. I also appreciate the fellowship support and learning opportunities provided by the The Carter Center, Institute for Developing Nations, and Emory's Laney Graduate School. Parts of this dissertation were presented at American Political Science Association annual meetings and published in *British Journal of Political Science*. I thank the discussants, editors, and panelists that have provided useful feedback on my work: Leonardo Arriola, Sona Golder, Andrew Little, Ora John Reuter, Nicolas van de Walle, and Michael Wahman.

Lastly, I have been fortunate to have some great teachers during my admittedly long academic career. Thanks to Brian Arganbright, Simonetta Cochis, Don Dugi, Park Gentry, Jeff Freyman, and Thomas Moudry for making this educational journey possible.

For Charlene

Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

Chapter 1

Introduction

Months after the 2010 presidential election in Togo, thousands of members of the country's main opposition party, Union of Forces for Change (UFC), participated in protests against their own leader. Demonstrators carried signs that declared "Down with the Traitors" and labelled long-time leader Gilchrist Olympio a "killer."[1] This vitriol was in response to Olympio's perceived collusion with President Faure Gnassingbé, whose family had controlled the small West African country for nearly a half a century. Gnassingbé won the election, yet faced claims from opposition supporters that the voting process was rigged, a fact corroborated by international observers.[2] Despite criticisms of the election from many members of his own party, Olympio tacitly accepted the results by agreeing to a deal that gifted a number of cabinet positions to his party. With UFC officials successfully incorporated into his government, Gnassingbé secured the cooperation of the country's largest opposition party and solidified his hold on power.

Such deals contribute to the resilience of authoritarianism around the world. Indeed, cooptation is a central strategy used by dictators to control dissent and guaran-

---

[1] "Togo opposition protests leader's move to join government," Agence-France Presse, 29 May 2010.

[2] "Togo's Opposition Leader Protests Election He Says Was Rigged," The Associated Press, 7 March 2010.

tee their own survival (Gandhi 2008, Svolik 2012). Dictators may attempt to appease the opposition with policy concessions or increased influence in policy-making (Conrad 2011, Gandhi 2008, Malesky and Schuler 2010), yet they frequently focus their efforts on co-opting individual opposition party leaders.[3] They provide political positions to leaders, through which they grant access to patronage resources and the spoils of office (Arriola 2009, Blaydes 2010, Greene 2007, Magaloni 2006, van de Walle 2007). In exchange for these incentives, opposition leaders are expected to cooperate with the government and, more importantly, demobilize their supporters (Lust-Okar 2005, 2006, Reuter and Robertson 2015, Wright 2008). Thus, by buying off individual leaders, dictators seek to control entire parties that could threaten the stability of their regime.

Yet, this strategy faces a key barrier: opposition leaders are not always willing to cooperate. For many opposition figures, the benefits of cooptation must be weighed against quite severe consequences. As shown by the backlash against Olympio, these deals can spark internal turmoil and even cause permanent splits.[4] For some leaders, these costs can be prohibitive and they avoid making such deals altogether. For instance, leaders of the other main opposition group in Togo, the Renewal Action Committee, publicly rebuffed the regime's attempts to co-opt their party. Thus, why are some parties more likely than others to be successfully co-opted? When do breakdowns in authoritarian control occur?

This dissertation answers these puzzles by examining the party-level dynamics of opposition leadership. Specifically, it is argued that successful cooptation depends on how heavily an opposition leader relies on party activists for support. These grassroots members serve as the backbone of their party organization and play a key

---

[3]Throughout this dissertation, I will use the terms "regime," "incumbent," and "government" to refer to a dictator or autocrat. By "opposition," I refer to any party that is not the ruling party and not directly created by the dictator. Any references to "party" and "leader" refer to the opposition party and opposition party leader, unless otherwise noted.

[4]"Togo police fire tear gas to break up opposition rally," Agence-France Presse, 10 October 2010.

role in facilitating collective action. Therefore, activists are critical for opposition leaders since they have few other resources for mobilizing support under dictatorship. However, these anti-regime activists oppose cooptation and may threaten the survival of leaders who collude with the regime. This study analyzes how this internal dynamic influences an opposition leader's negotiations with the government. To foreshadow, significant grassroots membership is necessary for cooptation to occur, since a party must pose some credible threat in order to warrant an offer from the regime. Yet as reliance on activists increases, leaders are more likely to reject offers to preserve their own survival. Much like dictators, opposition leaders must address both internal and external threats to their survival, which fundamentally shapes party strategy.

An additional task of this study is to understand how party activists influence patterns of accountability within opposition parties. In many dictatorships, opposition parties lack genuine internal competition, allowing poorly performing leaders to remain in charge. Yet, the activist backlash created by cooptation may be enough to encourage opportunistic party elites to mount challenges for party leadership. The threat of losing their position may make opposition leaders less likely to cooperate with the regime. However, I argue that activists could also discourage internal elites from vying for party leadership, since an emboldened grassroots will limit their rent-seeking opportunities and force them into conflicts with the regime. This study uncovers the surprising result that activists can weaken internal leadership competition in some circumstances and even promote collusion with the regime. Ultimately, these dynamics of internal accountability are shown to have important macro-level consequences for patterns of mobilization and cooptation. Given the impact of these outcomes on authoritarian persistence, it is important to more fully understand the internal politics of opposition parties.

This dissertation assesses these arguments in the context of opposition parties in Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, Africa has been dominated by authoritarian

regimes that allow opposition parties to compete in regularly contested elections. It is widely acknowledged that opposition cooptation plays a central role in the widespread persistence of authoritarianism in Africa (Arriola 2014, van de Walle 2001). While this region is ideal for studying this mechanism of control, few attempts have been made to understand the party-level determinants of cooptation cross-nationally. Opposition parties in Africa are often characterized as weak and unable to turn down rents from the government (Rakner and van de Walle 2009). While this is certainly true of some parties (many countries are rife with "briefcase parties"), there is an under-recognized variation in opposition party structures and strategy. In fact, the novel data collected on opposition parties show that leaders are at times highly constrained by both elites and grassroots members in their party. Therefore, this study provides a more complete picture of how political opposition is organized in a region in need of democratic alternatives.

1.1   The Puzzle of Opposition Cooptation

Opposition political parties are fundamental to democratic rule. Nearly all modern conceptions of democracy require the existence of parties outside of the government to provide citizens with an alternative in elections (Dahl 1971, Downs 1957, Lipset 2000, Przeworski 1991). These parties facilitate accountability, since citizens can sanction unpopular or poorly performing incumbents by voting for the opposition. Competition from opposition parties also forces the government to adopt policies preferred by most citizens, thereby increasing responsiveness. Hence, opposition parties present a crucial restraint on government actions and ultimately serve as the cornerstone of electoral democracy.

Yet, political opposition is not unique to democracies. As shown in Figure 1.1, opposition parties are also a hallmark of contemporary authoritarian regimes.[5] While

---

[5]This figure features data from the Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2017) variable: "Are

Figure 1.1: The prevalence of autonomous, independent opposition parties in dictatorships, 1946–2002.

a majority of non-democratic regimes banned opposition groups during much of the Cold War era, dictators around the world started legalizing these organizations after the fall of the Soviet Union. By the mid-1990s, the vast majority of dictatorships permitted opposition parties to operate and, subsequently, to participate in elections. However, these parties have played a decidedly limited role in promoting democratic rule. Opposition parties are frequently co-opted, lacking the autonomy and independence needed to hold the ruling regime accountable.

opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?" The countries included in the figure are those categorized as authoritarian in Haber and Menaldo (2011), which uses the classification method from Przeworski et al. (2000).

As highlighted in the figure, a substantial majority of contemporary dictatorships—those in the middle three categories—have legalized the opposition, but maintain control over some parties. Segments of the opposition commonly lack autonomy and independence from the regime and, in some cases, opposition parties are almost universally co-opted. For instance, in the long-standing dictatorship of Gabon, 29 of the 35 registered opposition parties were controlled by President Bongo's government in the mid-2000s (Levitsky and Way 2010). Even Bongo's main opponent and leading critic of the regime's human rights record, Paul Mba Abessole, was successfully co-opted. He was appointed Deputy Prime Minister and went as far as endorsing Bongo in the 2005 presidential election (Lansford 2012). When co-opted by the regime in this way, opposition parties fail to promote democratic rule. Instead, they become agents of authoritarianism that reinforce a non-democratic status quo.

Opposition cooptation reinforces authoritarianism through multiple avenues. Opposition parties under regime control fail to present citizens with a genuine alternative in elections, which neutralizes their ability to promote democratic accountability and responsiveness. This lack of alternative is often symbolic, such as when opposition candidates are publicly aligned with the regime. In other cases, cooptation quite literally removes opposition parties from electoral contests. In Cameroon, the second largest opposition party—National Union for Democracy and Progress—has repeatedly skipped presidential elections and supported President Paul Biya's reelection campaigns instead of mounting or even endorsing an opposition challenge.[6] Outside of elections, cooptation sidelines opposition parties from organizing protests or participating in pro-democracy movements that emerge. This occurred during the Arab Spring, where opposition parties were conspicuously absent during the regional unrest, helping numerous dictators remain in power (Khatib and Lust 2014, 7). Such salient examples highlight the vital role often played by opposition parties in author-

---

[6] "Election 2004: CPDM Patiently Awaits Results," *Cameroon Tribune*, 18 October 2004.

itarian persistence and, furthermore, demonstrate why they are commonly viewed as craven and ineffective custodians of democratization.

Yet, cooptation has its limits. Not all opposition parties can be controlled and many are left free to mobilize against the regime. Figure 1.1 highlights that only a small fraction of non-democracies since the early-1990s exhibit complete control over the opposition. Moreover, all opposition parties are currently autonomous and independent from the ruling regime in around 20% of dictatorships. Ultimately, however, most dictatorships feature a divided opposition, in which some parties are co-opted by the regime, while others are free of government control. This can be partially attributed to government strategy, since dictators often extend offers to some parties and not others. Yet, in other cases, opposition parties actually reject cooptation offers. For instance, in the aforementioned case of Cameroon, cooptation has been frequently used by Biya during his decades-long tenure. However, he has failed to co-opt the largest opposition party, Social Democratic Front (SDF), which has repeatedly staged large-scale protests since the early 1990s (Mbaku and Takougang 2004). Despite frequent attempts to co-opt the SDF by offering significant cabinet positions, party leaders have refused these appointments from Biya and kept the party independent from the regime (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2006).

In the remainder of this chapter, I will show how existing work on cooptation is unable to explain this cross-party variation, or even the question of why some leaders refuse to be co-opted. I discuss the implications of these conventional approaches and underline how the cooptation of organizations, particularly opposition parties, through political appointments differ from other forms of cooptation. I then discuss my theoretical solutions to this problem, summarize my main arguments and contributions, and finally describe the remaining chapters.

1.2   Existing Approaches to Cooptation

The recent scholarship on authoritarianism has produced a number of important insights into the strategies used by dictators to remain in power. In particular, its institutional focus has shown how dictators use political parties, legislatures, cabinets, and even elections to co-opt opponents. This emphasis on regime strategy, however, has led to a much less rigorous understanding of the opposition. In fact, some have dismissed the importance of opposition actors on the grounds that popular uprisings are rare (Svolik 2012). Such claims fail to explain why dictators frequently spend valuable resources to control opposition parties.

Typically, the opposition is treated as a unitary actor. At best, when the diversity of opposition strategies are actually recognized, parties are often placed into two general groups: the "loyal," systemic opposition and more radical, non-systemic parties (Lust-Okar 2005, Reuter and Robertson 2015). However this approach has two main shortcomings. First, it overlooks the political process through which parties initially become affiliated with the government, instead treating cooptation as something foundational to particular parties. Second, it is ill-equipped to explain changes in party affiliation. Co-opted parties often rejoin the ranks of the "genuine" opposition and vice versa, either by choice or due to a change in regime strategy. Thus, it is important to more carefully explain how party-level cooptation occurs. While the literature does not explicitly address this topic, existing accounts of other forms of cooptation do have implications for understanding why some parties are more likely than others to be successfully co-opted.

Allocative cooptation.   Dictators often rely on the allocation of resources to co-opt potential opponents. They attempt to create incentives for individuals to back the regime or, at the very least, act in support of the status quo. Incumbents must ensure that citizens are motivated to support the current government by distributing

patronage resources or, in the context of elections, by directly buying votes. In these cases, the calculus of cooptation is fairly simple: individuals receive material benefits in exchange for their support of the incumbent. Extensive work on this topic has shown that incumbents are often adept at solving the informational problems associated with vote-buying (Rueda 2015, Schaffer 2007, Stokes et al. 2013, Wantchekon 2003). This makes it a particularly effective form of control in poorer, rural areas (Birch 2011, Bratton 2008, Hicken 2011). Yet, some have questioned the utility of co-optive strategies given the costs and the presence of potentially cheaper options, such as intimidation (Bratton 2008, Collier and Vicente 2014, Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros, and Estevez 2007, van Ham and Lindberg 2015).

A series of factors influence whether this strategy is a successful mechanism of control. Given the resource-intensive nature of allocative cooptation, this strategy should be more likely when the economy is growing and the incumbent has extensive spoils to distribute. Furthermore, individuals that lack material wealth require fewer resources to be cooperate with the regime, which should make them more likely to be co-opted (McMann 2006). Additionally, it is easier to co-opt individuals that are ideologically-proximate to the regime (Magaloni 2006, Svolik 2012). Since they face fewer ideological costs for supporting a dictator, their cooperation is much easier to obtain.

These arguments help explain the pervasiveness of cooptation in some countries, but, when extended, are ill-equipped to explain why some parties are more likely to be controlled than others. While poorer parties may be cheaper to buy off, parties with more substantial resources may pose a greater mobilization threat to the regime and be more likely to receive cooptation offers. Furthermore, the expected impact of ideology on party cooptation is difficult to discern since the ideology of opposition parties is not exogenous (LeBas 2006), of low salience (van de Walle 2007), and does not predict whether a party mobilizes or cooperates with the regime (Lust-Okar 2005).

Instead of focusing on the resource limitations of allocative cooptation, other work emphasizes the commitment and monitoring problems associated with authoritarian control (Boix and Svolik 2013, Magaloni 2008). Dictators face a series of challenges when trying to prevent rebellion and insubordination from ruling elites (Brownlee 2007, Geddes 1999, Reuter and Remington 2009, Svolik 2009, Wright and Escribà-Folch 2012) and subordinates (Gehlbach and Simpser 2015, Svolik 2012, Zakharov 2016). This form of cooptation requires dictators to develop institutions that create permanent incentives for regime insiders to remain loyal. When this logic is applied opposition parties, dictators should be more willing to co-opt more established parties. The informational and commitment problems that undermine cooptation may be less severe when an opposition party is more institutionalized, embedded in society, and has more significant experience interacting with the government. While party age and development should be be related to cooptation offers, these factors do not address when opposition partis themselves are more likely to strike deals with the incumbent.

Inclusionary cooptation. Instead of focusing on the challenges of allocation, an additional line of research examines the factors that push dictators to widen their power base to begin with (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). Inclusionary cooptation aims to incorporate key social groups into state institutions and give them greater access to power, thereby increasing their support for the status quo. This is the logic behind allowing opposition parties in the first place, since they help direct dissent into institutional channels instead of onto the streets (Gandhi 2008).

This literature primarily suggests that incumbents are more likely to pursue cooptation when the opposition poses a threat to the regime (Gandhi 2008, Gandhi and Przeworski 2006). When applied specifically to political parties, we should expect dictators to co-opt larger political parties or those that have demonstrated an ability to challenge the regime. Such an equilibrium, however, may be difficult to sustain

since more significant parties may be more difficult and costly to control, given their high probability of winning power on their own. Additionally, small parties frequently participate in dictators' ruling coalition, which is puzzling given the minimal threat that they pose to the regime.

In addition to the size of the threat, dictators may use inclusionary cooptation to address salient social divisions. Power-sharing, in its various forms, is particularly effective at reducing civil conflict and ensuring governmental stability, particularly in divided societies (Gates et al. 2016, Lijphart 1977, 1985). Thus, political parties that represent key social groups are those that should be most likely to receive cooptation offers. In the context of Africa, dictators should be more likely to co-opt ethnic parties in pursuit of political stability (Arriola 2009, van de Walle 2007). Yet, ethnic-based are notably absent in many African party systems (Elischer 2013) and the existence of ethnic politics may be altogether avoided when incumbents have successfully co-opted local intermediaries (Koter 2016). Furthermore, the ethnic affiliation of opposition parties is quite static, suggesting that this variable is unable to account for temporal variations in cooptation outcomes. This approach also assumes that party leaders are perfect agents of their ethnic groups, which ignores the realities of party leadership and the challenges to internal accountability.

Delegative cooptation. Additional research suggests that organizational structures are ultimately decisive in determining which parties are successfully co-opted. This approach suggests that cooptation is not simply about buying off particular individuals or making state institutions more representative, but rather about contracting with opposition leaders to demobilize their organization. Dictators provide incentives for leaders to use their influence to shape the behaviors of their supporters and followers. In this sense, dictators *delegate* authoritarian control to opposition leaders. Delegative cooptation uses allocative approaches to co-opt individual lead-

ers, but allows dictators to control larger groups in society by taking advantage of their opponent's unique influence and leadership skills.

Given this dynamic, the key factor influencing successful cooptation is the party's organizational characteristics. In some cases, leaders are simply unable to enforce cooperative agreements and face steep internal pushback against becoming an agent of the government. This influences not only the government's incentives to make an offer, but also the opposition leader's willingness to cooperate. This issue is particularly important in the recent research on the impact of group structure on civil conflict. This work shows that internal factions undermine negotiations with the state, leading to the initiation or extension of civil conflicts (Cunningham 2006, Cunningham 2013, Heger and Jung 2015, Prorok 2016) and that internally divided separatist groups are more likely to receive concessions (Cunningham 2011). Thus, internal divisions undermine cooperation with the state, which is consistent with findings about other organizations, such as trade unions. For instance, conflicts within state-aligned trade unions have produced waves of anti-government protests and strikes in countries such as South Africa (Williams 2008) and Tunisia (Waltz 1995).

However, there has been relatively little attention paid to these same dynamics within opposition parties under dictatorship. Some have acknowledged the role of party leadership in demobilizing supporters (Reuter and Robertson 2015) and the internal backlash that often occurs following cooptation (LeBas 2014, Levitsky and Way 2010). Yet, there have been no systematic attempts to analyze how opposition parties are internally structured and how party-level factors influence external negotiations. Given that the internal actors within opposition parties have much different incentives and motivations than those in labor unions and rebel groups, the lessons from this literature cannot easily be applied to the party context. Therefore, it remains to be seen what factors actually lead to party cooptation.

To summarize, the literature on cooptation has largely focused on the state-level

factors that enable dictators to successfully control the opposition. Research on allocative and inclusionary cooptation has further implications about which factors make some parties more attractive partners for the regime than others, such as age, ideology, size, and ethnic composition. However, these explanations often ignore the crucial question of when opposition parties are more likely to cooperate. After all, cooptation requires the consent of opposition leaders and we have a limited understanding of both the incentives and consequences that they face from colluding with the regime. Recent work has provided insights into how organizational characteristics influence bargaining between opposition groups and the government. However we need a more rigorous understanding of how opposition political parties under dictatorship, as unique institutions, shape patterns of authoritarian control.

1.3   Argument Summary

The central argument of this dissertation is that cooptation outcomes are driven by the strength of a party's activist base. Activists are central, yet largely overlooked, actors in opposition parties. This is particularly true from the perspective of opposition leaders since activists influence their survival when both cooperating and engaging in conflict with the regime. Opposition leaders in authoritarian regimes face well-documented *external* pressures, such as repression, unfair electoral rules, and poor access to resources, that threaten their party's ability to endure conflicts with the regime. Yet, demobilizing and acquiescing to the regime can also undermine *internal* support for the leader. Party activists are alienated when their leader partners with the incumbent. Thus, "selling out" to the regime may cause activist defections or, in parties with divided leadership, leadership challenges. Therefore, the strength of a party's activist base, in conjunction with its internal leadership structure, influence whether a leader receives and accepts cooptation offers.

This dissertation formally analyzes how these internal party dynamics influence negotiations with the incumbent. Leaders with a strong grassroots are more effective when mobilizing, yet more vulnerable to a collapse in support when aligning with the regime. These leaders require significant concessions in order to compensate for the internal costs of cooptation and forfeited gains from mobilization. In some cases, the internal threat is so severe that the leader will reject any offers to partner with the incumbent. Hence, parties that are less reliant on activists are more likely to be successfully co-opted.

Yet, this relationship is influenced by how activists exert influence within the party, which depends on the party's leadership structure. In parties with unitary leadership, activists have no option but to exit the party when disaffected. Other parties are less personalistic and comprise a coalition of supporting elites (Gunther and Diamond 2003, Kitschelt 2000), which enables activists to instead support a change in party leadership. Internal rivals, however, will only mount a challenge against co-opted leaders when activist support is strong enough to both successfully remove the current leader and endure conflicts with the regime. This leadership structure gives activists a more limited influence, promoting greater collusion with the regime when the base is weak. However, leaders with a strong activist base and a divided leadership structure are those most likely to reject cooptation offers and mobilize against the regime. Additionally, the incumbent is less likely to make offers to these parties given the severe risk that the party will be taken over by an agent of the activist base. This result suggests that internal threats to the opposition leader's survival in turn weaken authoritarian control and may ultimately undermine regime stability.

1.4   Implications

This dissertation has a number of important implications for authoritarian rule and the prospects for regime change. First, it shows that grassroots actors and other party insiders can have an important macro-level impact on authoritarian persistence. These actors can force their leaders to maintain their independence from the regime, which can be key to establishing greater accountability and even democratic change. By mobilizing against the regime in elections or in the streets, opposition parties can unseat dictators (Brancati 2016, Bunce and Wolchik 2010, Howard and Roessler 2006). For instance, independent opposition parties played a key role in the Colored Revolutions that removed dictators in a number of post-Soviet states. Additionally, despite widespread cooptation, the few opposition parties outside of the ruling party's control participated in recent protests that successfully removed long-standing dictatorships in Burkina Faso, Egypt, and Tunisia.

This approach suggests that authoritarian rule is not simply a top-down process and should be studied in a different way. Existing work has focused largely on how the incumbent successfully co-opts members of the ruling coalition and the central role of the ruling party in this process. Yet, since the fate of autocrats is also significantly influenced by the strategies chosen by regime outsiders, I show that it is worthwhile to understand the incentives and strategies adopted by the opposition. Such a focus reveals that incumbents are often constrained not only by regime insiders, but also by the internal actors and features of opposition parties. This argument is consistent with recent work on how intra-organizational politics have an important impact on outcomes ranging from coalition formation in advanced democracies (Bäck 2008, Giannetti and Benoit 2008) to the initiation of violence in conflict settings (Cunningham 2006; Cunningham 2013, Heger and Jung 2015, Prorok 2016).

This approach also has implications for understanding the politics of authoritarian control. Svolik (2012) distinguishes between the problems of authoritarian con-

trol and authoritarian power-sharing, which stem from threats posed by the excluded masses and regime insiders, respectively. However, I show that these two problems are connected, since a dictator's ability to control mass actors is dependent upon being able to incorporate individual parties into the ruling coalition. Thus, breakdowns in authoritarian control can actually be caused power-sharing failures attributed to internal opposition dynamics. This account provides a novel institutional mechanism for cooptation failures, or unsuccessful attempts to control the opposition. While existing theoretical accounts argue that there should always be a peaceful equilibrium in which the opposition is either bought off or the incumbent steps down (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), dictators are not always able to avoid conflicts with the opposition. These cooptation failures are often attributed to ideological divisions, since ideological proximity is crucial for the cooptation of individuals (Magaloni 2006, Svolik 2012). I show that ideologically motivated activists can indeed undermine cooptation at the party level. However, the influence of these individuals is partly dependent on the party's leadership structure, indicating that ideology alone is not sufficient for explaining cooptation outcomes.

Empirically, this paper provides the first cross-national test of party-level cooptation in non-democratic regimes. While empirical work on cooptation has relied on evidence from individual legislatures, such as Russia and Vietnam, (Malesky and Schuler 2010, Malesky, Schuler, and Tran 2012, Reuter and Robertson 2015) or cross-national data on cabinet size (Arriola 2014, van de Walle 2001), my approach allows for greater generalization about why individual parties are co-opted. Using data collected on organizational features, internal competition, and leadership structures, I show that party-level features have an important influence on party cooptation. These findings contribute to recent empirical work on how the strategies and structures of African political parties shape key political outcomes (Arriola 2013a, Elischer 2013, LeBas 2011, Pitcher 2012, Resnick 2013). This paper also provides original data

on portfolio allocation in African non-democracies.[7] I find that party size has little influence on whether a party receives a cabinet post, which suggests that portfolio allocation in dictatorships differs from government formation in democracies.

1.5   Organization of the Dissertation

The following chapter presents a formal theory of opposition cooptation. I develop a model that demonstrates how party activists influence negotiations with an incumbent. Opposition leaders face a fundamental tension between anti-regime mobilization, a party-building strategy that also exposes activists to repression, and cooperative strategies. While acquiescing to the incumbent shields the party from regime pressures, it demobilizes and alienates party activists. Thus, "selling out" to the regime may cause activist defections or, in parties with divided leadership, leadership challenges. I show that a strong grassroots organization undermines cooptation. Activists, however, have a narrower influence on elite negotiations when accounability occurs through elite competition. This generates an unexpected result that internal leadership rivalries can actually promote collusion with the regime in some circumstances.

The remaining chapters explore the cross-sectional time-series patterns of cooptation and protest. Using original data at the party level, these analysis provide new information about which parties get co-opted, the impact of cooptation on mobilization outcomes, and the party-level determinants of anti-regime protest. In Chapter 3, I test my claims using data I collected on ministerial positions, elite splits, leadership challenges, and party organization. This dataset includes all opposition parties in 20 African non-democracies from 1990 to 2014. It provides new evidence of the wide variation in opposition party structures, as well as the prevalence of leadership

---

[7]Other work has focused on the partisan composition of cabinets in African democracies (Ariotti and Golder 2017) and the ethnic identity of ministerial appointments (Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015).

turmoil within these institutions. Ultimately, I find that parties with a strong organizational capacity and secondary leaders are less likely to accept portfolios from the incumbent. I also show that cooptation patterns can be largely attributed to party-level variables rather than regime dynamics.

In Chapter 4, I examine how internal party dynamics influence party mobilization. Parties with a strong organizational base, particularly when coupled with divided party leadership, are those most likely to resist cooptation and mobilize against the regime. Elite competition in the absence of a strong grassroots, however, makes leaders more likely to avoid conflict. Using unique event data to measure party-initiated conflicts with the government, I conduct a cross-national analysis and find that anti-government mobilization is driven by dynamics of accountability within opposition parties. I also provide the first systematic evidence that cooptation through political appointments reduces party-level mobilization.

I conclude in Chapter 5 with a review of the dissertation's major findings and a discussion of their implications for the study of comparative democratization. While opposition parties are often overlooked in this literature or treated simply as the product of regime strategy, I argue that their traits and strategies should be studied with the same rigor as those of autocrats. The dissertation, however, has mixed policy implications, since it suggests that strong accountability within opposition parties may weaken authoritarian control, but may also push opposition leaders into unproductive conflicts with the regime. Furthermore, it suggests that international organizations and foreign governments, which often push for power-sharing agreements as a conflict resolution mechanism, should understand the longitudinal effects of such agreements on both opposition parties and regime stability.

Chapter 2

A Model of Opposition Party Cooptation

2.1 Introduction

The ability of autocrats to remain in power—even when facing widespread discontent—is often attributed to their control over opposition groups. Most recently, co-opted opposition parties are often assigned blame for the failures of anti-regime mobilization during the Arab Spring (Khatib and Lust 2014, 7). While cooptation has important regime-level consequences, control is exerted at the party-level. For instance, countries such as Algeria avoided large-scale demonstrations due in part to the effectiveness of cooptation (Del Panta 2017). Yet, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has guaranteed his survival, not through complete control of the opposition, but through selective cooptation. For instance, the Algerian government has successfully bought off dozens of opposition parties—over 30 parties supported President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's bid for reelection to a fourth term in 2014.[1] Yet, the regime has

---

This chapter is adapted from a manuscript, "Internal Opposition Dynamics and Restraints on Authoritarian Control," accepted for publication by the *British Journal of Political Science*. It appears here with permission from Cambridge University Press.

[1] "Algérie: plus de 30 partis appellent Bouteflika à se présenter pour un 4e mandat," Agence France-Presse, 1 February 2014.

not attempted to co-opt, or even negotiate with, other opposition parties.[2] Moreover, some parties refuse to be co-opted when they actually receive offers from the regime. For example, the Socialist Forces Front and the Workers' Party have both rejected offers of multiple ministerial positions from Bouteflika.[3]

Which parties do autocrats co-opt? Why do some opposition parties resist cooptation? In this chapter, I develop a theory of opposition party cooptation. This requires thinking through the logic of how opposition leaders ensure their own survival in authoritarian settings. The chapter is divided into four sections. I begin by examining how opposition leaders adjudicate between external threats from the regime and internal threats from party members, namely activists and secondary leaders. I then provide a formal framework that demonstrates the impact of these internal party dynamics on negotiations with the regime and identifies the conditions under which a party receives and accepts cooptation offers. The third part of the chapter presents an extended model that relaxes the assumption of unitary party leadership. In this model, an internal rival can mount a leadership challenge to remove a co-opted leader. The rival leader is more likely to succeed when supported by a powerful base, but faces few rent collection opportunities if he becomes party leader given his strong accountability to activists. I then conclude by discussing the significance of this analysis in understanding authoritarian control, regime change, and opposition dynamics in non-democracies.

2.2 The Challenges of Opposition Leadership

Opposition parties in non-democracies are much like their democratic counterparts in that they seek political power. However, achieving power in authoritarian settings poses a distinct challenge for opposition leaders. While opposition parties are able to

---

[2]Roberts 2015.

[3]"Algérie: Bouteflika nomme le 1er gouvernement de son 4e mandat," Agence France-Presse, 5 May 2014.

legally operate and contest elections in nearly all modern non-democracies, they face a host of regime pressures that render the competitive arena unfair and, ultimately, serve to undermine their political viability. Yet, partnering with the regime to gain political access is not without risk, since it may alienate party activists who oppose the government. Thus, opposition leaders face a central dilemma when deciding whether to pursue political power by challenging the government or by cooperating with it.

Challenging the incumbent is often ineffective and invites repression. Limited economic liberalization and biased electoral laws ensure that opposition parties have restricted access to party-building resources (Arriola 2013a, Levitsky and Way 2010). The regime often possesses a vast resource advantage that helps minimize and marginalize support for the opposition through patronage distribution (Greene 2007, Magaloni 2006). Additionally, mobilization—in elections and in the streets—is often met with repression that undermines party survival. Unlike in democracies where civil liberties are generally protected, mobilized opposition parties are frequently targeted by repression. While incumbents face costs to using coercion (Svolik 2013), they often engage in repression against opponents of the regime in order to reduce their capacity and willingness to mobilize against the state (Davenport 2007, Ritter and Conrad 2016). Given these costs, opposition parties may partner with the incumbent. This often entails going into government and accepting political positions within the ruling coalition. The party benefits from the access to state resources, policy-making discretion, and the respite from repression associated with this strategy.

Opposition leaders choose between these two strategies, but not without considering key actors within the party. Specifically, opposition leaders are often reliant on party activists. These actors oppose the existing regime for ideological reasons and are hence willing to volunteer their labor for opposition leaders that challenge the government. They serve as important intermediaries for the party in particular localities, conveying local information and voter demands to the party leadership. They

also implement party strategies on the ground, such as mobilizing ordinary citizens for protests and elections. Given their exclusion from the spoils and policy-making discretion of executive power, opposition leaders are often heavily dependent on these human resources to mobilize support.

Activists, however, bear the brunt of state repression. Opposition activists are often targeted for participating in electoral campaigns and protests. Following elections in Ethiopia (2005) and Iran (2009), thousands of opposition party activists were arrested and imprisoned (Arriola 2013b, Rieffer-Flanagan 2013). Even when they do not face violence or imprisonment, opposition activists—particularly the many who lack economic autonomy—are vulnerable to material punishment (Hsieh et al. 2011, Magaloni 2006, McMann 2006). Thus, opposition leaders must consider the strength of their activist base before mobilizing against the regime. A strong activist base makes parties more effective at confronting the government and enduring state repression (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), which makes leaders better equipped to gain political power.

A strong activist base, however, places limitations on the opposition leader's ability to partner with the regime. While ideological objectives make activists willing to pay the costs of dissent, these same motives make activists intolerant of cooptation. Activists have no incentive to be part of an organization that "sells out" to the regime and are often alienated when party leaders join government coalitions (LeBas 2014, Levitsky and Way 2010, 31). Cooperation with the regime has caused activists to abandon their party in long-standing non-democracies, such as Gabon (Ndombet 2009). Alienated activists have important consequences for a leader's political survival. Consider, for instance, the government of national unity following the 2008 stolen elections in Zimbabwe. The main opposition party, Movement for Democratic Change, received key political positions in a power-sharing deal, including the premiership and nearly a majority of ministerial portfolios. Yet, cooperation with the

regime eroded the party's activist base and produced significant electoral losses in the next election (LeBas 2014). In some cases, the consequences are more immediate. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (2014) and Togo (2010), opposition leaders were expelled by party members for accepting political appointments.[4]

Ultimately, opposition leaders must consider party activists when devising party strategy. Even when mass mobilization is not a viable alternative, party leaders are fundamentally concerned with their base's reaction to deals with the ruling party. Even in a more democratic dominant party regime such as South Africa, the small opposition party Freedom Front Plus extensively consulted with its grassroots organizations to ensure that supporters would not be alienated if it accepted a government post.[5] Without activist support, opposition leaders have few resources with which to insure their political survival. The following model shows how these concerns drive opposition leaders' decision-making.

2.3 A Baseline Model

2.3.1 Elements of the Model

Consider an infinite-horizon game game with an incumbent (I; pronoun "he") and an opposition leader (L; pronoun "she"). Additionally, assume a nonstrategic activist base of size $\phi \in [0, 1]$. The strength of the leader's activist base is observed by both players and in each period t, the leader maintains activist support. I assume a political regime where the incumbent maintains a monopoly on the spoils of office, normalized to 1.[6] He retains these spoils unless he offers concessions that are accepted by the opposition leader, denoted by $x_t \in [0, 1]$. The incumbent is also characterized by some

---

[4]Aaron Ross, "Congo opposition party expels leader for joining unity government," *Reuters*, 9 December 2014; "Togo opposition shuns leader over power-sharing plan," *Reuters*, 29 May 2010.

[5]Interview, Freedom Front Plus Member of Parliament, 15 May 2014, Pretoria, South Africa.

[6]This setup assumes that the incumbent controls all rents from office and has not committed spoils to members of the ruling party. Relaxing this assumption would make opposition cooptation even more difficult given the reduction in total rents available for distribution.

vulnerability to opposition mobilization, $z \in [0, 1]$. The opposition leader's decision to mobilize at time t is denoted by $m_t = 1$, while $m_t = 0$ represents cooperation with the regime. In each period, the sequence of events is as follows:

1. The incumbent chooses some level of concessions, x_t, to offer to the opposition leader.

2. The opposition leader can choose to reject the offer and mobilize against the government ($m_t = 1$) or accept the concessions and agree to be co-opted by joining the government ($m_t = 0$).

3. If the party mobilizes, the opposition forces some concessions from the incumbent, equal to z. The party leader survives into the next period with probability ϕ and the party succumbs to repression with probability $1 - \phi$. If the party collapses, the leader leaves the game permanently.

   If the opposition leader accepts x_t and is co-opted, the party leader survives into the next period with probability $1 - \phi$ and activists leave the party, leading to a collapse in support with probability ϕ. If party support collapses, the leader leaves the game permanently.

If the two sides engage in conflict, the incumbent must expend resources to address opposition protests, $c_I \in [0, 1]$. This corresponds to the costs of transferring power to the security apparatus and expending resources on coercion. Thus, the incumbent's payoff from conflict in the current period is $1 - z - c_I$, compared to $1 - x_t$ following cooptation. The opposition leader has no access to executive power, unless she accepts x from the incumbent or forces z from mobilizing. Mobilization, however, is also costly for the opposition leader, who must spend resources to organize anti-regime protests at some cost $c_L \in [0, 1]$. Therefore, the opposition leader's payoffs in any period where she does not mobilize depends on the offer from the incumbent, x. When engaging in conflict, the leader receives $z - c_L$.

Ultimately, the payoffs for the actors from both conflict and cooperation are determined by the strength of the activist base. A strong activist base helps the leader survive following mobilization, yet increase the probability of a collapse in support following cooptation. If the opposition leader exits the game following either mobilization or cooptation, the incumbent receives 1 in all future periods. The neutralized opposition leader receives 0. When calculating the actors' continuation values, the common discount factor for both actors is denoted by δ.

This payoff structure makes several key assumptions about the motivations of the actors in the model. First, it suggests that concessions received from cooptation can act as a substitute for the increased political openness achieved through mobilization. In the model, the opposition leader is simply concerned about access to state resources, regardless of how it is achieved. Second, I assume that activists are disaffected by all outcomes that keep the incumbent in power and that activist loyalty cannot be increased through cooptation.

In analyzing the game, attention is restricted to stationary strategies. Using these strategies, in any period the incumbent makes the same offer and the opposition leader applies the same decision rule when deciding whether to accept a cooptation offer, regardless of the previous history of play. Thus, the two actors play the strategy that is in their best interest for the future, regardless of past offers or actions. First, the incumbent's strategy simply consists of a level of concessions $x \in [0, 1]$ to offer to the opposition. Additionally, the actions of the opposition leader consist of a decision to mobilize, $m(x)$. This decision is conditioned on the offer made by the incumbent at the start of each period, so m is a function, $m : [0, 1] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Hence, a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy combination $\{x, m\}$, such that these strategies are best responses to each other conditional on the strength of the activist base.

2.3.2   Analysis

First, consider the level of concessions that are required to co-opt the opposition leader, $\hat{x}$. The incumbent is able to secure the cooperation of the opposition leader as long as he makes an offer that meets or exceeds this threshold of concessions. Intuitively, the amount demanded depends largely on the value of ϕ, which influences the expected utility of mobilizing and the likelihood that the party will collapse when activists abandon the party following cooptation.

Lemma 2.3.1. *For any concession offer x, the opposition leader accepts if $x \geq \hat{x}$, where $\hat{x} = \frac{(z - c_L)(1 - \delta + \delta\phi)}{1 - \delta\phi}$.*

Hence, the concessions required to co-opt the opposition are largely driven by the regime's vulnerability to mobilization and the costs of conflict, in addition to ϕ. In some cases, these factors can create conditions where the opposition leader does not require political positions in order to cooperate. Specifically, $\hat{x} < 0$ when $c_L > z$. When the costs of conflict exceed the benefits of mobilizing against the incumbent, such as when the regime is invulnerable to opposition protests, the opposition leader is willing to cooperate even when she does not receive concessions from the incumbent. Under these conditions, the incumbent's choice of x is equal to 0 and the opposition leader *unilaterally cooperates.* However, in other cases, the opposition leader's optimal demand can exceed the maximum level of rents that the incumbent can offer. For instance, for very high levels of ϕ, the opposition leader prefers to engage in conflict with the regime rather than accepting the regime's maximum offer and risk the high probability of a collapse in support. Specifically, the opposition leader rejects all offers when $\phi > \bar{\phi}$, where

$$\bar{\phi} = \frac{1 - (z - c_L)(1 - \delta)}{\delta(1 + z - c_L)}. \tag{2.1}$$

Therefore, given the presence of a strong activist base above some threshold $\bar{\phi}$, the opposition leader *rejects* all possible offers from the incumbent and mobilizes

against the regime. For the incumbent, any offer $x \in [0,1]$ is optimal since it is inconsequential. In this case, the political gains from mobilizing exceed even large-scale rent distribution from the incumbent. This equilibrium is more easily sustained when the regime is highly vulnerable to opposition mobilization and the leader faces low costs to entering a conflict. Under these circumstances, a strong activist base pushes leaders to reject negotiated settlements and pursue regime change through confrontation with the existing regime.

Assuming that the value of ϕ is sufficiently small so that $\hat{x} \in [0,1]$, the opposition leader will accept concessions from the incumbent. Yet, for the incumbent to meet these demands and offer $\hat{x}$, the value of a cooperative opposition must exceed the value of engaging in a conflict. This depends on the concessions demanded by the opposition leader. The incumbent prefers to make an unacceptable offer, leading to conflict, only when

$$\hat{x} \geq \frac{(z + c_I)(1 - \delta + \delta\phi)}{1 - \delta\phi}. \tag{2.2}$$

When substituting the result from Lemma 2.3.1 for $\hat{x}$, this inequality is never true. Therefore, the incumbent always prefers to offer $\hat{x}$ over making an unacceptable offer, as long as $\hat{x} \in [0,1]$. Given this result, I can characterize the game's cooptation equilibrium.

Proposition 2.3.1. *When the activist base is sufficiently weak, where $\phi \leq \bar{\phi}$, then an equilibrium of the game exists in which the incumbent offers $x = \hat{x}$ and the opposition leader is co-opted, choosing $m = 0$.*

This strategy combination is an equilibrium since it survives a one-shot deviation (see all proofs in Appendix A). This equilibrium ultimately relies on the activist base to be sufficiently weak so that the demands made by the opposition leader can be met by the incumbent. In some instances, when $c_L > z$, $\hat{x}$ is less than zero and the opposition leader will cooperate without receiving concessions. Yet, this equilibrium

breaks down when the activist base is very strong ($\phi > \bar{\phi}$) since the opposition leader's demands cannot be met by the incumbent. Therefore, all offers are rejected by the opposition leader, leading to conflict.

2.3.3 Discussion

Comparative statics. Proposition 2.3.1 generates a number of observable implications about the role of activism on cooptation and protest. First, opposition leaders with a weak activist base are those that can be most easily co-opted. Since parties without a strong activist base pose a smaller threat to the regime and are not undermined when activists withdraw, they require fewer concessions in order to cooperate with the regime. In fact, the very weakest parties cooperate without any concessions at all. However, the incumbent even has incentives to target parties that are only weakly reliant on activists since they can be cheaply brought into the ruling coalition. Thus, the model suggests that parties with poor or modest potential for successful activism may be the ones most frequently co-opted by the regime. This provides an alternative prediction about cooptation compared to conventional explanations, which suggest that cooptation is largely driven by threats to the regime. This explains why cooptation often occurs not with the regime's most significant rivals, but with minor parties. For instance, the regimes in Cameroon and Gabon have repeatedly used ministerial appointments to co-opt small parties, with some parties receiving cabinet positions with less than one percent support in legislative elections.[7]

This influence of activists on elite negotiations is highlighted in the left panel of Figure 2.1. The figure compares the results from Lemma 2.3.1, for two different values of ϕ, against a model without activists (formal statement and proofs of this model

---

[7]President Bongo of Gabon named the leader of the Democratic and Republican Alliance (ADERE) as vice president in 1997, a position he kept until 2009 (Lansford 2012). At the time of the initial appointment, ADERE held 0.8% of seats in the legislature (Fleischhacker 1999). At various points in Cameroon, the National Union for Democracy and Progress and the Cameroon People's Union both received cabinet portfolios while holding a sole legislative seat (0.6% of total) (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2006, Ngoh 2004, 445).

Figure 2.1: The effect of activist base strength on patterns of cooptation.
The left panel displays the optimal concessions demanded by the opposition leader in the baseline model for various levels of regime vulnerability and activist base strength. The presence of activists in the model drives different demands when compared to a model without activists. The right panel displays the equilibrium concessions accepted by the opposition leader. For very high values of ϕ and high regime vulnerability (z), the opposition leader rejects concessions from the incumbent and mobilizes.

are in Appendix A). The primary result shows that all parties require little or no concessions to cooperate when the regime is invulnerable to mobilization. However, as z increases the demands made by the party vary widely depending on the strength of the activist base. First, parties with a strong activist base require much more significant concessions to cooperate than their counterparts with a weak base. Second, the model without activists inflates the equilibrium demands of parties with a weak activist base. Even when the regime is highly vulnerable to mobilization, opposition leaders with a weak base only demand (and receive) smaller levels of concessions from the incumbent. Thus, ignoring activists serves to over-emphasize the role of regime vulnerability, when instead concessions are significantly driven by party-level variables. Third, the parties with a strong activist base are better able to capitalize on regime vulnerabilities. The party with high accountability to activists commands

more significant concessions and, for high levels of z, is ultimately unable to be co-opted. Thus, by ignoring activists, a model fails to predict cooptation failures, which do occur in some cases.

Assuming that cooptation can be successful, this result has the important implication that parties with activists are better able to secure rents from the regime. Elites often create or maintain parties largely to secure patronage resources and political positions from the regime (Arriola 2014, van de Walle 2007). These "briefcase" parties are often weakly institutionalized and vehicles for elite rent-seeking. Thus, the model uncovers an irony in this political strategy. Those parties formed to seek state resources for elites or local notables are those least capable of commanding these rents in equilibrium. Those that have actually invested in party-building or inherit organizational structures that have historically attracted activists are those most likely to extract significant concessions from the regime. Not all parties are capable of building a strong activist base, but those that are find themselves in a better position to secure concessions via both cooptation and mobilization.

While parties with a strong base are able to command more significant concessions from the incumbent, at times the activist base can be strong enough to undermine cooptation altogether. As shown in the right panel of Figure 2.1, cooptation can always be sustained when the regime is only weakly vulnerable to opposition mobilization, such as when $z = 0.25$. However, when the regime is vulnerable, then $\hat{x} > 1$ for large values of activist base strength. This causes a cooptation failure since the incumbent cannot offer enough concessions for the opposition to accept the offer. This shows that political opportunity alone does not undermine cooptation. Instead external opportunities must be combined with the right internal dynamics for an opposition leader to reject cooptation offers. Under this scenario, conflict is more efficient than negotiated concessions to an opposition leader, even high-profile political posts or large-scale rents. A strong activist base proves too effective at de-

feating the incumbent and too volatile when cooperating with the incumbent, which could ultimately undermine the leader's position within her own party. Thus, given the central importance of leadership survival, conflict may be preferable to negotiated agreements for leaders with strong grassroots.

Lastly, the calculus of the two actors is not solely driven by opposition-level factors. State features can facilitate cooptation even when party-level variables are not conducive to cooperation. Both sides are more likely to strike a deal as the costs associated with conflict increase, c_I and c_L. The incumbent faces economic costs during conflict and must use resources to address threats from the opposition. Additionally, repression transfers power to the security apparatus and may promote military intervention (Svolik 2013). Increases in these costs make the incumbent more likely to rely on co-optive solutions to mass threats. The opposition leader, who faces logistical costs of mobilizing supporters in less-than-democratic regimes, will also be more willing to cooperate as mobilization costs increase. This generates collusion between the opposition leader and the incumbent, who prefers to deal with civilian rivals rather than allies in the military and security sector.

Endogenous regime vulnerability. The results from the model partially rely on the assumption that the incumbent's vulnerability to opposition mobilization remains unchanged following cooptation. However, cooptation provides opposition leaders with a respite from repression and may serve to transfer significant resources to the opposition. This not only provides the opposition with valuable resources, but it weakens the incumbent, who must expend these resources on the opposition instead of shoring up support from ruling elites, leaders of the military, or members of the ruling party. Indeed, opposition leaders in countries such as Kenya, Senegal, and Ukraine have been able to parlay temporary cooptation into eventual victories over the incumbent (Levitsky and Way 2010, 31).

Thus, it is possible that the regime's vulnerability (z) following periods of cooptation is actually greater than the value of z at time t. Depending on how much z increases at time $t + 1$, relaxing the assumption of constant regime vulnerability can undermine the equilibrium where the opposition leader refuses to cooperate with the incumbent. Formally, the strategy profile $m = 1$ is less likely to survive a one-shot deviation strategy when the regime becomes more vulnerable following cooptation. Thus, some opposition parties have an incentive to temporarily cooperate, which weakens the incumbent, and then mobilize in following periods. Thus, the equilibrium where the opposition leader rejects all offers and mobilizes is less easily sustained. Overall, this change tempers the negative effect of activist base strength on the likelihood of cooptation and makes parties demand less in order to cooperate. This result seems consistent with the previously mentioned cases where parties that rely on long-term mobilization strategies may choose to be temporarily co-opted. This enables parties to save resources and momentarily shield their base from repression in order to "fight another day" when the incumbent is more vulnerable.

2.4   Extended Model: Divided Leadership

2.4.1   Elements of the Model

The previous model assumes that activists leave the party when their leader is co-opted. However, in some cases, activists may instead have the option of replacing the current leader, as discussed earlier in the cases of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Togo. For activists to remove a co-opted leader, the party must first have divided leadership, where rivals exist within the party who can actually serve as a viable leadership candidate. Second, the rival leader must cooperate with activists in order to become leader. This requires the alternative leader to not only mount a challenge against the current leader, but he or she must also keep the party

mobilized if the leadership challenge is successful. Thus, a leadership rival becomes fully accountable to the activist base after receiving their support in a leadership contest.

To capture this dynamic, I adapt the baseline model to include a rival for party leadership as a strategic actor. The rival leader (R; pronoun "he") can mount a leadership challenge when the party leader is co-opted by the incumbent, with $h_t = 1$ denoting a leadership challenge at time t. Activists can only push back against cooptation when the rival leader actually chooses to challenge the current leader. His attempts are more likely to be successful when supported by a strong activist base. This assumption should hold regardless of whether a party is weakly institutionalized or has formal means, such as a party convention or congress, for electing leadership positions. The main assumption of the model is that if the rival leader collaborates with and employs activists to remove the leader, he must avoid cooptation in all future periods. Thus, in each period, the following sequence occurs:

1. The incumbent chooses some level of concessions, x_t, to offer to the opposition leader.

2. The opposition leader can choose to reject the offer and mobilize against the government ($m_t = 1$) or accept the concessions and agree to be co-opted by joining the government ($m_t = 0$).

3. If the party mobilizes, the opposition forces some concessions from the incumbent, equal to z. The party leader survives into the next period with probability ϕ and the party succumbs to repression with probability $1 - \phi$. If the party collapses, the leader leaves the game permanently.

4. If the opposition leader accepts x_t and is co-opted, the rival leader can choose to mount a leadership challenge ($h_t = 1$) or support the current leader ($h_t = 0$).

5. If $h_t = 1$, then the party leader survives into the next period with probability $1 - \phi$ and the activist base successfully removes the leader with probability ϕ. If the leader is removed, she leaves the game permanently and the rival leader mobilizes in all future periods. If $h_t = 0$, the party leader survives into the next period.

The payoffs for the incumbent and opposition leader remain the same. The rival leader does not receive a payoff for any period in which he is not party leader. However, when he mounts a challenge, he must pay a cost for inciting conflict within the party, $q \in [0, 1]$, regardless of whether the challenge is successful. In some parties for instance, factional conflicts boil over into intra-party violence, which increases the rival's costs of mounting a challenge. Therefore, the rival prefers to remain a loyal member of the party rather than mounting a costly, unsuccessful bid for party leadership. Yet, if successful, he receives the expected benefit of mobilizing against the regime in all future periods given some cost, $c_R \in [0, 1]$. This payoff is largely dependent on the strength of the activist base since the rival leader may receive few long-term benefits if the base is likely to erode from repression.

Attention is again restricted to stationary strategies. The incumbent and opposition leader's strategies remain the same as in the baseline model. The actions of the rival leader consist of a decision to challenge the current leader, h. This decision is conditioned on the strength of the activist base (ϕ), which determines whether a leadership challenge is likely to be successful and whether the activist base can endure conflicts with the regime in subsequent periods. Thus, h is a function, $h : [0, 1] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Hence, a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy combination $\{x, m, h\}$.

2.4.2 Analysis

First, consider the rival leader's decision to cooperate with the leader or mount a leadership challenge. The rival prefers to remain loyal if his leadership challenge is unlikely to be successful. Therefore, a leadership challenge is the rival's best response only when the activist base is sufficiently strong. Thus, for any level of activist base strength ϕ, the rival leader mounts a challenge if $\phi \geq \phi^*$, where

$$\phi^* = \frac{q}{\delta(q + z - c_R)}. \tag{2.3}$$

In some cases, however, the value of ϕ required to sustain a leadership challenge exceeds 1. Internal competition will not occur, even for parties with a very strong activist base, when the costs of mounting a leadership challenge (q) are high. Specifically, when $q > \frac{\delta(z - c_R)}{1 - \delta}$, then $\phi^* > 1$ and the opposition leader will cooperate with the current leader.

Next, consider the opposition leader's decision to accept offers from the incumbent in the case where there is no leadership challenge. When a weak activist base eliminates the threat of competition over leadership, cooptation is less costly for the current leader. Since the activist base poses no threat to the leader without cooperation from the rival, there are no internal costs to cooperating with the regime. If co-opted, the opposition leader simply forgoes the potential gains from conflict, which are still dependent on the probability with which the activist base can endure repression. Hence, the opposition leader will accept the incumbent's offer of x and agree to be co-opted if $x \geq \tilde{x}$, where

$$\tilde{x} = \frac{(z - c_L)(1 - \delta)}{1 - \delta\phi}. \tag{2.4}$$

Assuming that $z > c_L$, then the level of concessions demanded by the opposition leader is greater than zero and, as long as ϕ is sufficiently small, the opposition leader

will accept any offer greater than or equal to $\tilde{x}$.[8] Importantly, this value of $\tilde{x}$ is smaller than the amount of concessions required to cooperate in the baseline model defined in Lemma 2.3.1. Hence, as long as its leader is not highly reliant on activists, a party with divided leadership is actually easier to co-opt since it requires fewer concessions from the incumbent.

In this case, the incumbent's best response is to always offer $\tilde{x}$ as long as $\tilde{x} \in [0, 1]$. Given the lower costs of cooptation, the incumbent faces even stronger incentives to make acceptable offers to control the opposition. Therefore, I can characterize one equilibrium of the extended model where cooptation occurs without a leadership challenge:

Proposition 2.4.1. *Suppose that $\phi < \phi^*$. Then there is an equilibrium of the game, where $\tilde{x}$ is given by (2.4): the incumbent offers $x = \tilde{x}$ as long as $\tilde{x} \in [0, 1]$; the opposition leader is co-opted, choosing $m = 0$; and the rival leader does not mount a leadership challenge, $h = 0$.*

Now consider the case where the leadership rival has an incentive to mount a challenge, such as when $\phi \geq \phi^*$. An additional cooptation equilibrium exists where the leader is co-opted and a leadership challenge occurs. When a party's activist base is strong, a leadership challenge is more likely to be successful and the party is better able to endure conflict with the regime. Thus, in this case, the opposition leader faces much steeper costs for cooperating with the incumbent. Any benefits from a deal with the incumbent may be spoiled by the rival leader, in addition to undermining the leader's long-term survival. Therefore, the leader will require a higher offer of x from the regime in order to be co-opted:

$$\tilde{x} = \frac{(z - c_L)(1 - \delta + \delta\phi)}{(1 - \delta\phi)(1 - \phi)}. \tag{2.5}$$

---

[8]In some cases the concessions required to co-opt the leader exceed the maximum possible level of concessions. Specifically, $\tilde{x} > 1$ when $\phi > \frac{1 - (z - c_L)(1 - \delta)}{\delta}$.

Additionally, unlike the previously discussed equilibrium, the incumbent does not always prefer to make a successful offer of $\tilde{x}$ to the opposition leader. For very high values of ϕ, the costs of cooptation are so prohibitive that the incumbent allows the opposition to mobilize. When the offer required to co-opt the opposition leader, $\tilde{x}$, exceeds the incumbent's threshold, then the incumbent chooses some $x < \tilde{x}$, which is rejected by the opposition leader and leads to conflict. Thus, the incumbent will only make a successful offer when $\tilde{x}$ is sufficiently small:

$$\tilde{x} \leq \frac{(z + c_I)(1 - \delta)}{(1 - \delta\phi)(1 - \phi)}. \tag{2.6}$$

This result suggests that the incumbent will allow conflict to occur when facing an opposition party with a base that is capable of successfully enduring conflicts with the regime. This seems counterintuitive, but the incumbent can prefer conflict in the current period under the existing leadership instead of giving wide-ranging concessions to an opposition leader whose party is extremely likely to be highjacked by a rival leader who will mobilize in all future periods. Conflict can ultimately be less costly for the incumbent than trying to buy off an opposition leader facing an internal coup from an agent of the activist base.

Thus, it is more difficult to sustain cooptation when the activist base is very strong. However, an equilibrium still exists where cooptation occurs with a subsequent leadership challenge.

Proposition 2.4.2. *Suppose that $\phi \geq \phi^*$. Then there is an equilibrium of the game, where $\tilde{x}$ is given by (2.5): the incumbent offers $x = \tilde{x}$ as long as $\tilde{x} \in [0, 1]$ and inequality 2.6 holds; the opposition leader is co-opted, choosing $m = 0$; and the rival leader mounts a leadership challenge, $h = 1$.*

2.4.3   Discussion

This extended model shows that the influence of the activist base on elite negotiations depends, in part, on the party's leadership structure. In the baseline model, cooptation always led to the exit of activists since the party had unitary leadership with no internal rivals to support. However, when activists have an alternative option for party leader that represents their interests, they should instead remain loyal to the party and focus on internal channels to remove a leader who collaborates with the regime. The only obstacle is that these agents of the activist base do not always have an incentive to mount a campaign to replace the current leader. Thus, as shown in Figure 2.2, leaders of parties with a divided leadership structure are responsive to activists under a narrower set of conditions than those of parties with unified leadership, as represented in the baseline model.

When a party has a weak or even moderately strong activist base, the rival leader faces too many risks to actually mount a leadership challenge. A limited activist base, even if able to successfully replace the leader, is less able to endure repression during a conflict with the regime. Therefore, the internal rival remains loyal to the party leader and does not mount a challenge. Under these conditions, as shown in Figure 2.2, an opposition leader actually requires less concessions to cooperate than a leader of a party with unitary leadership. Also, increases in the strength of the activist base have very little influence on the concessions demanded by the opposition leader below the threshold ϕ^*. Importantly, the incumbent is always willing to meet the opposition leader's demands since the costs of cooptation are minimal when the rival does not pose a threat to the leader.

However, when the activist base is extremely strong and the rival will mount a challenge if the leader is co-opted for values of $\phi \geq \phi^*$, the concessions required by the leader are much higher. While not shown in the scenario graphed in the figure, these increased demands are so large in some cases that the incumbent refuses to

Figure 2.2: The intervening role of leadership structure on the relationship between activist base strength and cooptation.
The black curve shows the level of concessions, $\tilde{x}$, required to co-opt a leader with an internal rival (extended model) for different values of activist base strength. The gray curve shows the same threshold from the baseline model ($\hat{x}$), in which the party has unitary leadership.

make an offer. Thus, the interaction between activist base strength and the party's leadership structure plays a key role in whether a deal can be struck between the opposition leader and incumbent. For high levels of activism, the rival leader serves as a "spoiler" to negotiations with the incumbent. This is consistent with findings from the civil conflict literature, where divided groups are more likely to engage in conflict the state (Cunningham 2006, Cunningham 2013, Heger and Jung 2015, Prorok 2016). However, I show that this relationship does not always hold since internal divisions may actually facilitate collusion with the state when the activist base is less strong. Thus, divided parties are more likely to strike deals, receive fewer

concessions, and remain cooperative, as long as the activist base is weak. Therefore, I show that the role of the activist base not only depends on its own strength, but also on the nature of the party's leadership.

In addition to these implications for authoritarian control, this model shows that parties with divided leadership and a weak activist base are the least effective at forcing concessions from the regime when co-opted. These leaders cannot credibly demand significant concessions from the incumbent since they face fewer repercussions for acquiescing to the regime. Thus, for many levels of activist base strength, parties with a unitary leadership structure are more capable of commanding significant returns from a deal with the incumbent. However, parties with elite competition, coupled with a strong activist base, are those with the greatest potential for securing extensive rents. Since rival elites can exact severe political costs in response to cooptation, the opposition leader is able to demand large-scale returns in order to compensate for the risks posed by internal challengers.

2.5   Implications

This chapter examines the key question of why some opposition parties are co-opted while others are not, which has implications for the study of authoritarian persistence. The model shows that internal opposition dynamics play an important factor in influencing the level of concessions a party demands and whether an opposition leader can be successfully co-opted by the regime. A strong activist base may ultimately undermine cooptation and, subsequently, weaken authoritarian control by increasing the party's ability to endure repression and by promoting internal pushback to cooperative strategies. Yet, the role of activists is influenced by the leadership structure of the party. Activists in parties with divided leadership exert a narrower influence, since leadership rivals can only challenge the party leader for colluding with

the regime when the activist base is extremely strong.

This analysis shows that internal party dynamics provide an important constraint on the ability of incumbents to control opposition parties. While parties are frequently co-opted, accountability to activists leads to greater concessions from the regime and, if sufficiently strong, a breakdown in cooptation that may produce democratic change. More generally, it shows that opposition leaders actually benefit from responsiveness to activists. While many opposition parties are personalist vehicles without a significant grassroots structure, parties with a strong activist base are actually those most likely to command offers of state resources. Activists thus play an important role in increasing their party's effectiveness when mobilizing, as well as increasing their leader's ability to extract concessions from the incumbent. The only caveat is that a strong activist base can make leaders pursue political change through conflict rather than agreeing to large-scale concessions from the incumbent. Thus, activists can push parties into costly confrontations with the regime when negotiations would produce similarly beneficial outcomes for the leader.

This analysis also provides new insight into the role of ideology in determining why incumbents successfully co-opt some opposition parties and not others. Formal work suggests that ideological proximity facilitates the cooptation of individuals (Magaloni 2006, 69; Svolik 2012, 183). However, these individual-level predictions contrast with evidence that the ideology of opposition parties vis-à-vis the ruling party is not exogenous (LeBas 2006) and does not predict whether a party mobilizes or acquiesces to the regime (Lust-Okar 2005). My argument suggests that these contradictions can be attributed to the variation in a party's underlying reliance on activists. Ideologically motivated activists will not necessarily support the most radical political parties, since moderate or catch-all opposition parties may be more effective at achieving reforms or regime change. Therefore, activist accountability can occur in parties regardless of ideology, suggesting that individual ideology plays an important but indirect role

in cross-party patterns of cooptation.

I note that, while this model provides predictions about which parties are most likely to be co-opted, it assumes that the actions of both the incumbent and opposition leader are not influenced by the actions taken by other opposition parties. In some cases, the incumbent must prioritize which parties to co-opt, given limited resources. Additionally, opposition leaders may attract cooptation offers when they are likely to coordinate with other opposition parties (Gandhi and Buckles 2016). Thus, patterns of cooptation may be a product not only of intra-party dynamics, but also of inter-party dynamics.

Looking beyond the issue of cooptation, opposition parties have an influence on a variety of outcomes in non-democratic regimes. Thus, the idea that opposition parties vary in their organizational and leadership structures should influence how we understand authoritarian rule. The literature on authoritarian institutions needs a greater understanding of opposition parties as political institutions, which have often been neglected in both theoretical and empirical studies despite their role in authoritarian persistence and governance. The next chapter explores how differences in the internal characteristics of opposition parties have an important impact on authoritarian control in African countries from 1990 to 2014.

Chapter 3

A Cross-National Analysis of Cooptation in Africa

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I showed that the internal politics of opposition parties should have a discernible impact on negotiations with the regime. In conventional theories of cooptation, the strategies and structures of opposition parties are frequently overlooked. By adding intra-party dynamics into a formal model of cooptation, novel theoretical insights emphasize the importance of activists and secondary party elites in driving cooptation outcomes. However, in order to justify this approach to cooptation, novel information about opposition parties is required, particularly on party-level cooptation, which has been heretofore lacking in the research on authoritarianism.

To study the effects of internal party actors on cooptation, I look specifically at opposition parties in Africa. The continent has been dominated by non-democracies since the initial wave of independence in the region, a trend that has persisted well into the post-Cold War era despite the global expansion of democracy. Currently, Africa has seven of the ten longest ruling leaders in the world; five of which have been in office for over three decades. Even though they maintain authoritarian rule

in their countries, these dictators allow opposition parties to operate and compete in elections. In fact, nearly all dictatorships in Africa feature regularly held elections contested by—frequently numerous—opposition parties. Consequently, this region provides the ideal setting for understanding how opposition parties function internally and, ultimately, how they interact with non-democratic regimes.

Furthermore, cooptation is a common strategy used by autocrats in Africa. For instance, one in three African executives appointment an opposition party member to their post-election cabinet (Arriola 2013a, 12). I focus on cabinets since this is a predominant form of cooptation in this region, particularly in the context of minimizing ethnic conflicts (Arriola 2009, 2014, Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015, van de Walle 2007). The strategy of using ministerial appointments as political currency is far from unique to dictatorships. In established democracies, parties commonly trade ministerial positions for legislative votes in both parliamentary and presidential regimes (Carrubba and Volden 2000, Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004, Martin and Vanberg 2011). In dictatorships, incumbents use ministerial appointments, not to buy legislative support, but to control opposition parties and keep them off of the streets. Cabinets appointments are public signals of alignment, meaning that opposition supporters are aware of their party's decision to demobilize and cooperate with the regime. Furthermore, government positions are efficient mechanisms for channeling spoils to individual politicians as a reward for their cooperation (Blaydes 2010, Lust-Okar 2006, Reuter and Robertson 2015). Therefore, cabinet positions are the primary indicator of cooptation used in this dissertation. This chapter provides novel data on the true extent of opposition party participation in dictators' cabinets in Africa.

In addition to substantive reasons, there are methodological reasons for studying cabinet positions as a form of cooptation. First, cabinet positions are one of the few publicly observable forms of cooptation common in all countries. Information on

cabinet composition is widely available, which makes it possible to measure whether an opposition leader has been incorporated into the ruling coalition. Since cabinet posts are the top political appointments in the country, this measure may miss some lower-level control and thus represents a "high bar" of party-level cooptation in each country. However, it provides a crucial systematic measurement of cooptation across all countries in the sample. Second, since cabinet information is published annually in multiple sources, this measure provides important longitudinal data on cooptation. Cabinet shuffles frequently occur between elections, thus this measure provides a more complete picture of cooptation when compared to measures that mainly focus on post-election cabinets (Arriola 2013a). It is also crucial for explaining yearly trends in protest behavior, which will be explored in Chapter 4.

The chapter is organized as follows. First, I present descriptive information about the original data collected on cabinets in Africa. This dataset provides the first cross-sectional time-series information on party-level cooptation in this region. I then show how the magnitude of cooptation cannot be fully explained by factors such as legislative seat share, ethnic polarization, or economic growth. The following section describes the data collection process for the primary explanatory variables: party organization and leadership competition. I then present the empirical analysis, which uses a bivariate probit model with partial observability to estimate the likelihood of cooptation. I conclude by discussing the empirical patterns uncovered by the analysis and their implications for understanding authoritarian rule.

3.2 Cabinets and Cooptation in Africa

To evaluate my arguments, I collect data on opposition parties in African dictatorships from 1990-2014.[1] For the purposes of this analysis, an opposition party is simply

---

[1]Opposition party-years are the unit of analysis. I chose this unit of analysis instead of parties per election since a significant amount of cooptation and leadership challenges occur outside of election

any party that does not control the executive and the sample includes all opposition parties that hold at least one seat in the lower house of the national legislature in that year.[2] Overall, the sample includes unique data on over 1,800 party-year observations in 18 countries.

Dictatorships take a variety of forms in Africa, yet this analysis focuses specifically on those in which independent opposition parties are able to win seats in a multi-party legislature.[3] This reflects the structure of the model in which opposition parties are institutionalized, but can also mobilize and undermine the regime, if not explicitly controlled. Additionally, since I use cabinet appointments as the indicator of cooptation, only those parties that participate in government institutions, such as elections and the national legislature, can feasibly participate in the cabinet. A country is excluded from the sample if an incumbent is removed during the sample period, through either a transition to a democracy or a military coup. Figure 3.1 shows a map of the country-years in the sample.[4]

The dependent variable in this analysis, *Cabinet*, is a dichotomous variable that is coded as a 1 if an opposition party received at least one cabinet-level position from the incumbent, 0 if not. As noted, political appointments are an important way through which incumbents co-opt opposition parties. Ministerial positions in particular are conventionally offered as incentives for opposition leaders to cooperate (Arriola 2014, Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015, van de Walle 2001). The incorporation of the party into the ruling coalition and its control of policy portfolios is a form of party cooptation, which is distinct from personal cooptation where rents are allocated to

---

years. Additionally, parties that are given cabinet positions immediately after an election do not always retain the position for the entirety of the period between elections.

[2]For parties that form a coalition that competes as a single entity on the ballot, all parties in the coalition that have previously won a legislative seat remain in the sample. For minor alliances of new parties or small parties that have never won a legislative seat, the coalition is considered a single unit.

[3]These variables are all coded using the Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) dataset.

[4]See Appendix B for a full description of the country-years included in the sample, as well as explanations for why other countries were excluded.

Figure 3.1: Map of the sample (in country-years).

individual elites (Reuter and Robertson 2015). The measure excludes lower-level members within the party who join the cabinet, often without the party's permission and who may be expelled from their party for taking a portfolio. For instance, in Cameroon, secondary leaders in the UNDP accepted positions from the regime and were subsequently expelled for undermining party strategy (Banks, Muller, and Overstreet 2006). Thus, these cases are not coded as observations of cooptation.

Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of opposition party-years for the countries in the sample. Opposition parties hold cabinet positions in 296 of the 1,741 observed party-years (17%). Cooptation, while not as pervasive as some accounts may suggest, is still widespread in many parts of Africa. There is significant cross-national variation in the prevalence of cooptation. Opposition parties are frequently included in cabinets across Francophone Africa, such as Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, and Gabon. Yet cooptation is far from unique to these countries, since the dominant

Figure 3.2: Distribution of opposition party-year observations by country.
The red portions of the bars represent the total number of opposition-party years in cabinet for each country. All other observations are in black.

party regimes in Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda, and South Africa also rely on co-optive strategies. However, opposition parties are never included in some country's cabinet, notably in East and Southern African. The regimes in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania, and Uganda have rarely, if ever, extended offers to opposition parties since the early 1990s.

Such patterns of cooptation ultimately differ from the expectations created by accounts of inclusionary and allocative cooptation. For instance, the cooptation of opposition parties is not any more likely when a country's economy is growing. As shown in Figure 3.3, the highest density of co-opted parties are located at essentially 0% GDP per capita growth. While very few countries have significant economic growth to begin with, a substantial number engage in cooptation while their economy is actually contracting. Only a few instances of cooptation occur at very high levels of economic growth, such as in Equatorial Guinea, which relies on its significant oil wealth. Therefore, the argument that authoritarian control can only be sustained

Figure 3.3: Distribution of co-opted party-years for observed levels of GDP per capita growth.

during robust economic growth (Magaloni 2006) seems inaccurate, particularly in the African context.

An additional argument from the literature on patronage politics in Africa argues that increasing cabinet sizes may actually be retarding economic growth (van de Walle 2001). Cabinet size, a proxy for the magnitude of opposition cooptation, is instead driven by ethnic conflicts, according to this literature. Thus, we should expect more party-level cooptation at high levels of ethnic polarization. As Figure 3.4 shows, this is nominally the case in Africa. The highest density of co-opted parties are located

Figure 3.4: Distribution of party-years for observed levels of ethnic polarization. The distribution of co-opted parties is graphed in black, while the grey line represents the distribution of independent parties.

in countries with high levels of ethnic polarization. There may be some support for the claim from the inclusionary cooptation literature since dictators do not co-opt any opposition parties for levels of ethnic polarization below 0.3. Yet, the sample as a whole features significant ethnic divisions. As plotted by the grey line, the highest density of parties that are not co-opted is also located at high levels of ethnic polarization.

Lastly, cooptation patterns may not be driven by social divisions, but by the regime's vulnerability to opposition mobilization. Highly popular incumbents may

Figure 3.5: Distribution of co-opted party-years for observed ruling party seat shares.

not need to co-opt opposition parties. Those with waning popularity, operationalized as their seat share in their country's legislature, may be more vulnerable to opposition mobilization in the streets. Therefore, we should expect higher levels of cooptation when the ruling party is less popular. Figure 3.5 shows that this is not necessarily the case. Even when the incumbent needs legislative support (i.e. a seat share below the 50% mark), cooptation is not widespread. Instead, the highest density of co-opted opposition parties is located around 70% seat share. Furthermore, a non-trivial number of parties are co-opted when the incumbent is far from vulnerable to opposition mobilization. Thus, in order to untangle these patterns of cooptation, we

need to examine the party-level dynamics that may drive authoritarian control.

3.3   Empirical Analysis

The model from the previous chapter generates a series of predictions with respect to opposition demands, incumbent offers, and whether a party is successfully co-opted. This section tests the core argument that the party's internal structure influences whether the leaders accepts an offer from the incumbent. I evaluate three primary predictions. First, opposition parties with unitary leadership are more likely to reject offers from the incumbent when they have a strong grassroots (Proposition 2.3.1). Second, parties with secondary leaders or elite splits are more likely to accept cooptation offers (Proposition 2.4.1), unless the party has a strong activist base (Proposition 2.4.2). The empirical analysis tests whether party-level cooptation outcomes are driven by this interaction between features of the activist base and the party's leadership structure.

3.3.1   Data and methods

Independent variables.   The primary independent variable is the strength of the party's activist base. A party's organizational features are used to capture the strength of the activist base since developed party structures are typically associated with a strong grassroots (LeBas 2011). I use two organizational features to measure the presence of a mobilizing structure within the party: the existence of a party headquarters and the maintenance of a communications infrastructure. A party headquarters houses the party organization, which coordinates party activists and helps direct mobilization efforts. Therefore, I measure whether each party has a full mailing address or physical headquarters listed each year in *Africa South of the Sahara.*

Additionally, parties must invest in a communications infrastructure in order to communicate with activists and to allow activists to report information from their individual localities. Therefore, I measure whether the party maintains a phone number, email address, or website.[5] Lastly, I combine this information on the party headquarters and communications channels to construct the variable *Party Organization*. This dichotomous variable is coded as a 1 if the party has a permanent party headquarters at a specific street address (separate from any legislative offices). Additionally, the variable is coded 1 if the party only has a post office box or a city-level address and also lists a phone number, email address, and/or website. It is coded as a 0 otherwise.

The second main independent variable is the presence of leadership competition. I measure this variable in two ways. The first is a measure of divided leadership. This indicator captures whether a party has formal leadership roles below the party leader that could, potentially, pose a leadership challenge. *Secondary Leaders* is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if there is a secondary leadership position listed in the two party directories used for this project: *Africa South of the Sahara* and *Political Handbook of the World*. It takes 0 otherwise. Examples of such positions are the party's secretary-general, deputy or vice president, chairperson, or presidential candidates that are not the party's leader.

The second measure of elite competition is *Elite Split*, which captures existing elite divisions within the party. Using yearly party-level reports from the *Political Handbook of the World* and party entries in the country-level *Historical Dictionaries*, this variable is coded as a 1 if notable party elites defected to another party or formed their own party in the previous year, 0 otherwise.[6] This measure captures whether

---

[5]Given changes in technology, I assume that these three channels of communications are substitutes.

[6]I exclude cases where it appears that the incumbent has interfered to exploit internal conflicts or party splits. In some cases, the incumbent provides incentives for secondary leaders to break away from their current party or for these leaders to defect to the ruling party. Since these splits are not exogenous, they are not coded as a 1 for this variable.

Figure 3.6: Distribution of party-years, given different levels of internal competition, for observed levels of opposition party size.
The distribution of party-years without leadership challenges are plotted in black. Party-years with some form of internal turmoil, competition over party leadership and party splits, are graphed in red and blue, respectively.

there are existing "exit" options for party activists. If their leader is co-opted, they should be more willing to throw their support behind these elite rivals who have criticized and split with the leader in the past. Lastly, there may be a concern that *Elite Split* is endogenous to party size, since internal elites may be more likely to vie for leadership when the party has a greater likelihood of winning office. However, as shown in Figure 3.6, internal competition and even splits are most common in parties holding less than 10% of legislative seats.

Control variables. In addition to the main independent variables, I include control variables that capture alternative explanations of party cooptation. These conventional accounts focus on autocrats' incentives to use co-optive strategies. First, incumbents should try to co-opt parties that pose a significant threat to the regime (Gandhi 2008). To capture party threat, I use an opposition party's total legislative seat share. This measures the general size of the party's support and its ability to mobilize citizens. Additionally, incumbents should want to control those parties that have shown an ability to persist over time. Therefore, I control for the age of each opposition party. Finally, to capture the regime's vulnerability to opposition mobilization, I control for the regime's duration in years (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). Political hegemony is difficult to maintain over time, so regimes should be more likely to make co-optive offers as the regime's age increases.

Autocrats are also motivated by declining economic fortunes, which can undermine support for the regime, increase regime defections, and make opposition mobilization more effective (Lust-Okar 2005, Magaloni 2006, Pepinsky 2009, Reuter and Gandhi 2011). Therefore, incumbents should be more likely to make cooptation offers during economic crises. I add a variable for lagged gross domestic product per capita growth (as an annual percentage) (The World Bank 2016). Autocrats may also use cooptation to address social conflicts. Dictators, particularly in Africa, rely on political appointments to minimize ethnic conflicts (Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015, van de Walle 2001). I control for ethnic polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005), which should increase the likelihood that an incumbent offers cabinet positions to opposition parties.

In addition to these controls, I include a count variable of the opposition leader's tenure as party leader. This variable captures whether the incumbent and opposition's respective strategies are driven by temporal dynamics of party leadership. For instance, a leader may be more likely to strike deals near the end of her tenure

Table 3.1: Identifying conditions for the bivariate probit model with partial observability.

Incumbent decision to offer cabinet position	Opposition decision to accept position
Opposition Party Seat Share	Party Organization
Opposition Party Age	Leadership Competition
Opposition Leadership Tenure	Party Organization × Competition
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	Incumbent Seat Share
Ethnic Polarization	Opposition Leadership Tenure
Regime Duration	

when there are fewer repercussions for her political career. I also include an additional party-level variable that captures the opposition's political opportunity from mobilizing, which is measured using the incumbent's own share of total seats in the legislature. The opposition leader should be more likely to reject offers and mobilize when the party has more to gain from mobilizing. See Appendix B for descriptive statistics of all of the variables included in the analysis.

Model. The primary issue in testing the paper's main hypotheses is the problem of observability of the process of interest. Bargaining between the incumbent and opposition occurs behind closed doors. We observe only the final outcome of the bargaining process. When the opposition party is successfully co-opted, we can infer with confidence that the incumbent made an offer that was accepted by the opposition leader. However, when we observe a lack of cooptation, there are two distinct causal pathways that could lead to this outcome: either the incumbent chose not to make an offer or the incumbent made an offer but the opposition leader rejected it. Since the goal is to test the influence of factors on both actors' actions, we need a model that can aid in distinguishing between these distinct pathways.

To address these issues, I use a bivariate probit model with partial observability

(Poirier 1980).[7] This model has been applied to similar scenarios of bilateral coopera-
tion in which only successful agreements are observed (Przeworski and Vreeland 2002,
Stone 2008, Vreeland 2003). In addition to addressing the problem of observability,
the dependent variable—cooptation—is modeled as the product of two dichotomous
decisions made by the incumbent and opposition leader. This model estimates the
marginal predicted probability of an incumbent offer and an opposition acceptance
given a set of predictors for each actor. The predictors for each actor are listed in
Table 3.1. To assess model fit, I also estimate a simple probit model that includes all
of the independent variables in order to provide a comparison to the bivariate probit
model with partial observability.

3.3.2 Results

Table 3.2 displays the results from two models that use *Secondary Leaders* as the
indicator of leadership competition. I estimate two models: a probit model (Model
3.1) and a bivariate probit model with partial observability (Model 3.2). The results
from from Model 3.2 are separated into the effects of the variables on (1) the incum-
bent's decision to make a cooptation offer and (2) the opposition leader's decision to
accept an offer. Both models provide support for the main prediction that leaders
with a strong party organization and leadership competition are less likely to accept
offers from the incumbent. This effect remains consistent across the models, however
the Model 3.2 generates an effect of greater statistical and substantive significance.[8]
Additionally when comparing the AIC of the two models, which rewards goodness of
fit and penalizes complexity, the bivariate probit model with partial observability is
the preferable model since it has a lower value.

---

[7]This model is a special case of the more general Boolean probit model (Braumoeller 2003,
Braumoeller and Carson 2011, Gordon and Smith 2004). To fit this model in R, I use the **boolean3**
package (Morgan 2015).

[8]*Ethnic Polarization* and *Regime Duration* are excluded from these models since they significantly
reduce the number of observations. Models including these variables are included in Appendix B

Table 3.2: The determinants of party-level cooptation with *Secondary Leaders* as indicator of divided leadership

	Model 3.1	Model 3.2	
		Incumbent (Offer)	Opposition (Accept)
Constant	0.05	-0.2	1.2**
	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Party Organization	−0.4***		−0.5**
	(0.2)		(0.2)
Secondary Opposition Leaders	0.2		0.4**
	(0.1)		(0.2)
Secondary Leaders × Party Organization	0.04		−0.4*
	(0.2)		(2.9)
Incumbent Seat Share	−1.5***	0.9	−3.5***
	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.7)
Opposition Party Seat Share	0.5	1.0*	
	(0.4)	(0.7)	
Opposition Party Age	0.3	5.5***	
	(0.3)	(1.8)	
Opposition Leadership Tenure	0.6	−11.5***	11.8***
	(0.5)	(2.7)	(2.0)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	0.4	0.2	
	(0.4)	(0.7)	
Number of Observations	1,626	1,626	
AIC	1490	1444	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. AIC = Akaike information criterion.

The results from Model 3.2 provide support for the three primary predictions. As shown in Figure 3.7, parties with a strong activist base are around 10% less likely to accept an offer from the regime. However, secondary leadership positions have nearly the opposite effect. Leaders without an activist base are actually 10% more likely to accept offers when facing secondary leaders. This confirms that elite competition may actually facilitate collusion with the regime in some circumstances. However, as the far right pane shows, this effect is reversed when a secondary leaders are coupled with a strong activist base. *Leadership Tenure* and *Party Age* also have a significant

without significantly influecning the results.

Figure 3.7: Predicted probabilities from Model 3.2 that an opposition leader with a strong activist base, secondary leadership positions, and both a strong activist base and secondary leaders accepts a cabinet position (with 95% confidence intervals).

impact on cooptation offers in both models. Incumbents place a significant emphasis on making offers to parties able to persist over time. However, they are much less likely to make offers to leaders that have controlled their parties for a significant number of years. For instance, the incumbent has almost zero likelihood of making offers to leaders with a tenure over 20 years. Additionally, the size of the opposition party has a modest influence on the incumbent's co-optive strategies. The incumbent is just as likely to make an offer to a party with less than 1% of the total seats than one nearing a majority. This is evidence against the common claims in the literature that incumbents have a greater interest in co-opting large opposition parties. This is likely due to the increased demands made by larger parties. Additionally, contrary to the literature on portfolio allocation in democracies, cabinet appointments are not tied to party size. Instead, very minor parties are nearly as likely to receive cabinet offers as parties with substantial electoral support in both empirical models. Lastly, I find little support for the conventional claim that incumbents expand the use of cooptation during periods of economic growth.

These substantive results largely hold when *Elite Split* is used as the indicator of

Table 3.3: The determinants of party-level cooptation with *Elite Split* as indicator of divided leadership

	Model 3.3	Model 3.4	
		Incumbent (Offer)	Opposition (Accept)
Constant	0.1	-0.4	1.8***
	(0.3)	(0.5)	(0.7)
Party Organization	−0.4***		−0.8***
	(0.1)		(0.2)
Opposition Elite Split	0.03		0.3
	(0.3)		(0.5)
Elite Split × Party Organization	-0.2		-0.3
	(0.3)		(0.5)
Incumbent Seat Share	−1.4***	1.0	−3.8***
	(0.4)	(0.8)	(0.8)
Opposition Party Seat Share	0.5	0.9*	
	(0.4)	(0.6)	
Opposition Party Age	0.4	5.8***	
	(0.3)	(1.8)	
Opposition Leadership Tenure	0.4	−11.0***	12.0***
	(0.5)	(2.6)	(2.1)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	0.4	0.3	
	(0.4)	(0.7)	
Number of Observations	1,431	1,431	
AIC	1326	1282	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

leadership competition (Table 3.3). In this model, I find a stronger negative effect for *Party Organization*. However, the results are slightly more modest, both substantively and statistically, for parties with a strong activist base and leadership competition. As shown in Figure 3.8, leaders of these parties are only around 8% more likely to reject offers from the incumbent. However, given fewer observations of party splits, the confidence intervals are much wider on this marginal predicted probability.

Similar to the previous models, leadership competition on its own has little effect on the leader's decision to cooperate with the incumbent and may actually promote collusion. This is consistent with the prediction from the formal model (Proposition

Figure 3.8: Predicted probabilities from Model 3.4 that an opposition leader with a strong activist base, past elite splits, and both a strong activist base and past splits accepts a cabinet position (with 95% confidence intervals).

2.4.1) that leadership competition actually facilitates cooptation in the absence of a strong activist base. Furthermore, *Party Age* and *Leadership Tenure* have a significant impact on outcomes across the models, suggesting that party and leadership institutionalization strongly influences the incentives of the regime. Incumbents are more likely to extend offers as the opposition party's age increases, but less likely to co-opt leaders with a long tenure. It is also worth noting that the bivariate probit model with partial observability (Model 3.4) again produces a better model fit, based on AIC, than the regular probit model.

In all model specifications, I find little evidence that the opposition leader's decision-making is driven by external opportunities. Opposition parties are actually more likely to accept offers from the incumbent when the incumbent is electorally weak. However, there is a significant positive impact of leadership tenure on the probability of accepting an offer across that is consistent across models. Established opposition leaders are much more likely than less established leaders to cooperate. Specifically, for new leaders, there is nearly a zero percent chance of accepting an

offer. This provides additional support for my claim that concerns over leadership survival drive patterns of cooptation.

3.4   Conclusion

Why are some opposition parties co-opted while others are not? The main empirical finding is that leaders with a strong activist base coupled with competition over party leadership are those most likely to reject cabinet positions. Furthermore, I find that cooptation is driven by internal party features rather than the threat posed by the party. Instead, dictators partner with parties large and small. Thus, authoritarian regimes, which rely on cooptation to limit mass mobilization, are limited by factors beyond their control. The ability to co-opt specific parties is dependent on the internal rivalries and grassroots structures of opposition parties. Crucially, I find a significant variation in cooptation outcomes between parties and evidence that opposition leaders actually reject offers from the regime. This runs counter to the conventional narrative that opposition leaders are craven and ineffective at resisting cooptation from the regime.

Overall, studying opposition parties and their internal dynamics is critical for developing a more complete understanding of how authoritarian regimes survive. While autocrats co-opt, repress, and pursue a number of strategies to survive, they do so in conjunction with the actions of opposition parties. This chapter provides novel data to justify this approach and to show how internal features of parties contribute to cooptation. This outcome ultimately has important implications for patterns of protest and authoritarian survival. As shown in the recent case of Burkina Faso, opposition parties' unwillingness to strike a deal during negotiations with the government ultimately contributed to the demise of the Compaoré regime. However, these dynamics between opposition leaders and activists may undermine authoritarianism even when cooptation is successful. Prior to the Arab Spring, anti-regime activists in

some countries became disillusioned with the established opposition parties (Khatib and Lust 2014, 7). These activists, who were not controlled by the co-opted opposition, ultimately played a key role in the removal of autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia (Chomiak 2014, Clarke 2014). Consequently, if we want to understand how autocracies operate and why they survive, we need to further investigate which features and behaviors of diverse opposition actors contribute to authoritarian persistence. The next chapter begins this task by studying the party-level predictors of anti-regime protest.

Chapter 4

The Internal Politics of Party Mobilization

4.1 Introduction

The previous chapter showed how internal party actors influence patterns of opposition cooptation. Such outcomes are important for understanding authoritarian rule since regime survival depends on the successful control of opponents. However, these same party-level factors should also influence other key outcomes, namely anti-regime mobilization. Dictators often go to great lengths to stifle dissent, particularly when it takes the form of collective action. However, opposition actors do frequently take to the streets. Regular anti-regime mobilization, such as demonstrations, strikes, and occupations, can have important economic costs for the incumbent and may empower the security apparatus, which may increase the likelihood of military coups (Svolik 2013). In more extreme circumstances, these protests can ultimately lead to regime change.

This chapter examines how the party-level factors explored in this dissertation, particularly activism and leadership competition, influence party-led protest in Africa. In the 21st century, opposition protests have removed incumbents in a number of African countries, most recently in Burkina Faso, Egypt, and Tunisia. These protests

are the most notable of a recent proliferation of protests in Africa, which is the second major wave of mass mobilization in the region since the end of the Cold War (Branch and Mampilly 2015, Bratton and van de Walle 1992). Despite the widespread presence of protest in Africa's non-democracies, there have been few attempts to study party mobilization patterns cross-nationally in the region. Recent research on democracy protests around the world focus on countries as the unit of analysis (Beaulieu 2014, Brancati 2016). Additionally, explanations of protests organized specifically by opposition parties have looked at system-wide dynamics, such as a country's "organizational ecology," or elite electoral competition (LeBas 2011, Robertson 2011). However, few attempts have examined how internal party dynamics influence party leaders' decision to mobilize against their regime.

This chapter is organized as follows. First, I present descriptive information about the data I collected on party-initiated protests in Africa. This event data provides novel insights into the geography and party characteristics of opposition protest. The empirical analysis then shows that cooptation does not necessarily guarantee that opposition parties will not engage in anti-regime protests. Further results show that a strong activist base has a positive effect on anti-regime mobilization, as expected, as does secondary leadership positions. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for understanding patterns of protest and regime survival in Africa.

4.2 Opposition Mobilization in Africa

Event data on anti-regime activity was collected using a two-step process. First, using the Social Conflict Analysis Database (Salehyan et al. 2012), I identify all instances of organized and spontaneous demonstrations, violent riots, and strikes in the sample country-years.[1] Specifically, I focus on such events led by an opposition actor with

---

[1]Note that three countries from the sample in the previous chapter—Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, and Seychelles—are not included in SCACD and are therefore excluded from this chapter's analysis.

Figure 4.1: Map of anti-government protest in the sample country-years.

the central government as its primary target. Next, I establish the primary actor responsible for the event. In most cases, the dataset uses the generic "opposition" label to identify the primary actor. Therefore, I searched the primary news stories to determine which opposition party, if one is identified at all, participated in the protests.

Figure 4.1 shows the geographical distribution of the full set of protests against the central government. Protests organized by non-opposition party actors are plotted

Figure 4.2: Distribution of anti-government protest in the sample country-years.
Party protest-years experiencing a lethal response and a non-lethal response from the regime are represented by the red and black portions of the bars, respectively. All other party protest-years are in grey.

in blue. These protests represent 79% of all anti-regime protests. This suggests that opposition parties are not the only actors responsible for anti-regime mobilization. In fact, protests led by opposition parties, represented by the red dots, are only a part of a much larger fabric of resistance against dictators. While a primary task of dictators is to minimize protest, the map shows that they are often unsuccessful at neutralizing protest in the African context. Furthermore, there is a notable geographic dispersion in many countries. Protests do not just occur in the capital or largest city, but frequently happen in more remote reaches of countries. This poses an additional challenges for dictators, who may be hard-pressed to exert control in all regions.

Furthermore, the response of dictators to opposition party protest varies significantly across countries, as shown in Figure 4.2. Similar to the puzzle raised by Robertson (2011), dictators often vary their responses sub-nationally to opposition mobilization. At times, dictators may not respond at all, which is the case in Chad

Figure 4.3: Distribution of opposition party size and protest activity.

The rug (in red) represents the distribution of opposition-led protests for the observed levels of party size.

and the more liberal South Africa. However, some governments never fail to respond to opposition protests, such as Cameroon and Uganda. In these cases, the government always engages in some form of repression and, at times, this repression turns deadly. Some countries, such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe, utilize a mixture of all three strategies: non-response, non-lethal repression, and deadly force. These trends highlight the potential costs faced by opposition leaders when deciding whether to protest.

Lastly, it is important to note the unimportance of party size in influencing protest. As displayed in Figure 4.3, most opposition protests are staged by parties holding less

	No protest	Protest
Outside of cabinet	1294	76
In cabinet	266	11

Table 4.1: Contingency table: Protest and cabinet inclusion.

than 10% of the seats in their national legislature. While most opposition parties are small in size, this does not seem to limit their engagement in anti-regime mobilization. This may reflect the notion that protest is a party-building strategy and that small parties rely on mobilizing dissent in order to grow their organization (LeBas 2011). Ultimately, some large opposition parties (nearing 50% seat share) do engage in anti-regime mobilization. However, given the rarity of such opposition parties with such high popularity, it is difficult to assess whether party size is an important influence on protest strategy.

4.3   Empirical Analysis

4.3.1   The Effectiveness of Cooptation

Existing accounts of cooptation suggest that it is an effective way to prevent opposition mobilization. Yet, there is little micro-level evidence to confirm whether parties that are co-opted actually refrain from organizing protests. The data collected for this dissertation are unable to confirm that cabinet appointments are a guaranteed way of reducing a party's protest activity. As shown in Table 4.1, 11 party protest-years occurred while the party was in cabinet. Examples of this arrangement included high-profile power-sharing agreements in South Africa and Zimbabwe, which attempted to reduce violent conflicts between the ruling party and their primary rival. Yet, what is most noticeable is the sheer number of parties that do not protest despite being excluded from the cabinet. This either suggests that the threat of repression is enough to dissuade most parties from protesting without further incentives or that they are

Coefficient

Figure 4.4: Coefficient from the univariate linear probability model of opposition party protest.

co-opted with incentives less visible than cabinet positions.

In order to briefly assess the impact of cabinet positions on the decision to stage anti-regime protests, I run a simple linear probability model. The coefficient and 95% confidence interval from this model are plotted in Figure 4.4. The plot shows that the effect is in the expected direction, but it is not substantively distinguishable from zero. Therefore, the dataset collected on this set of mainstream opposition parties in Africa suggests that granting cabinet positions may not have a noticeable impact on opposition party mobilization.

4.3.2   Determinants of Protest

Next, I assess whether the party-level factors that capture activism and internal competition influence party-level protest activity. The independent variables used in this section are the same ones collected for the analysis in the previous chapter.[2] Given the arguments from the theoretical model, we should expect the same internal variables to have an impact on party mobilization. Specifically, opposition parties should be more likely to protest when they have a strong activist base. This effect should be larger when the party has divided leadership. However, parties with divided leadership, but no activist base, are those least likely to confront the regime.

To assess these arguments, I use a probit model with country-level fixed effects. The dependent variable, *Protest*, is dichotomous and I again run two models using the different indicators of leadership competition: *Secondary Leaders* and *Elite Split*.[3] The results from these models are plotted in Figure 4.5.

The results generally support the primary argument that a strong grassroots pushes opposition leaders into protest-based strategies. While the coefficient from the first model is not distinguishable from zero, both models indicate that *Party Organization* has a positive effect on the likelihood of protest in parties with unitary leadership. However, this variable has no discernible effect in parties with secondary leaders or past elite splits. Furthermore, elite splits on their own have a negative, yet insignificant effect on protest. Secondary leaders, in contrast, actually has a significant positive impact on the likelihood of protest. This suggests that past splits may push leaders into more cooperative strategies, while other forms of elite competition incentivize leaders to adopt mobilization strategies.

The remaining control variables have negligible effects on protest. However, incumbent seat share and opposition party seat share both have a substantive positive

---

[2]See Appendix B for all descriptive statistics

[3]The first model has 1,536 observations and $AIC = 536$. The second model has 1,354 observations and $AIC = 485$.

Figure 4.5: Coefficients from the probit model of opposition party protest.
The model that uses *Secondary Leaders* as the indicator for Leadership Competition is plotted in black. The model using *Elite Splits* is plotted in red.

impact on mobilization outcomes. This finding suggests that opposition leaders, un-surprisingly, are more willing to engage in protests as their party increases in size and support. However, they are also more willing to take to the streets when the incumbent has a higher total seat share. Together, these results indicate that leaders are more willing to take to the streets when their party has higher popularity, but the incumbent is more secure, and perhaps less likely to use repression.

4.4   Conclusions

When do citizens protest against dictatorship? This simple question has sparked mountains of research, yet few attempts have been made to empirically assess the role of political parties in organizing anti-regime protests. While I find that opposition parties account for only a fraction of the protests in African non-democracies, they still organize a significant number of demonstrations despite the frequent threat of repression. Opposition protests have been staged in every country in the sample, with the exception of Rwanda, and they feature significant sub-national variation in their locations.

Ultimately, the findings from this chapter suggest that party-level factors, specifically a strong activist base and secondary leaders, serve to promote opposition protest. However, these initial findings are far from conclusive given the relatively few number of observations of opposition party protest. While the data collected for this chapter provide the first cross-national evidence of party-level mobilization in Africa, the approach used may overlook some minor forms of protest that do not generate stories on the major newswires. Ultimately, it is possible to make one major conclusion. Opposition party protests are driven by party-level factors rather than by external opportunity. Party-level variables, such as size and organizational structure, have a more significant impact than economic decline or other forms of regime vulnerability. These factors, however, have shown to have limited impact on facilitating large-scale change and often promote unilateral demobilization.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

In this dissertation, I examine how often-overlooked actors within opposition parties can ultimately influence patterns of cooptation and protest in dictatorships. These outcomes ultimately have important repercussions for authoritarian rule and regime survival. I briefly discuss the implications from this dissertation for both academic research and policy work. I conclude with some brief remarks on the future trajectory of this research.

5.1   Implications

This dissertation has two main contributions. First, it applies the theoretical rigor to the opposition that is frequently reserved solely for research on dictators. This approach not only produces novel theoretical arguments, but should provide for a more dynamic understanding of how dictatorships function. It also helps us understand how political parties, particularly those in opposition under dictatorship, differ from their democratic counterparts. Second, this dissertation provides innovative data on party-level cooptation, protest, and organizational characteristics. These data collection efforts should provide a more complete and nuanced understanding of authoritarian rule and opposition party strategy.

Implications for democratization. Sun Tzu originally stated, "It is best to win without fighting." Modern dictators take this to heart and often win without fighting the opposition. Frequently, the also win without co-opting. Opposition parties are often cooperative without being incorporated into ministerial institutions. The evidence provided for this conclusion is new, yet this argument is not. Indeed, most conventional accounts of African politics paint the opposition in this craven light. However, I caution against painting the opposition with an overly broad brush. Instead, it is important to recognize the agency of opposition parties and more fully understand their internal incentive structures. For democratization to occur, this dissertation suggests that opposition parties should build internal accountability to the grassroots and facilitate internal competition. However, it is also important that opposition leaders have some job security to ensure that they do not engage in conflicts too quickly with the regime.

Implications for regional politics. This dissertation also brings nuance to our understanding of African political parties. Too frequently, studies of African political parties have focused solely on ethnicity. However, other features of these parties have important implications that must be recognized. Furthermore, the arguments presented here could and should be applied to other regions of the world. Multiparty dictatorships are common in post-Soviet states, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. Many of these dictatorships exhibit a puzzling cross-party variation in cooptation outcomes. From Ukraine to Cambodia, dictators and opposition leaders frequently make important strategic choices concerning cooperation. Therefore, it will be important to study these dynamics in a diversity of regions despite the African roots of this literature on cabinets and cooptation.

Policy implications. The dissertation has mixed policy implications, since it suggests that strong accountability within opposition parties may weaken authoritarian

control, but may also push opposition leaders into unproductive conflicts with the regime. Furthermore, it suggests that international organizations and foreign governments, which often push for power-sharing agreements as a conflict resolution mechanism, should understand the longitudinal effects of such agreements on both opposition parties and regime stability. This issue is evident in Zimbabwe, where the opposition Movement for Democratic Change was severely crippled by its participation in the Government of National Unity following the country's 2008 election. It was forced to abandon its mobilization strategies and thereby lost significant organizational momentum, resulting in its worst electoral performance to date (LeBas 2014). Ironically, by pushing for the opposition to enter the government, international actors may have delayed a genuine alternation in power.

5.2   Future Work

This research contributes to the burgeoning field of authoritarian institutions, while specifically providing insights into our understanding of opposition parties under dictatorship. In addition to expanding data collection efforts in Africa and other regions of the world, I suggest two lines of future research. First, there needs to be a greater understanding of activists' incentives and motivations. Specifically, it is important to verify anecdotal evidence that activists oppose collusion with the regime. This would provide an important justification for the major assumption of this dissertation. Second, there is an additional need to study the effects of cooptation on regime survival. My findings here raise questions about the utility of cooptation strategies in reducing anti-regime mobilization. However, it is important to assess how these strategies influence regime survival more broadly.

Appendix A

Proofs of Formal Results

This appendix contains proofs of the formal results presented in Chapter 2, as well as the technical details of Figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.

Proof of Lemma 2.3.1 For the opposition leader, L, to accept an offer from the incumbent, I, and demobilize, then $V_L(m = 0, x = \hat{x}) \geq V_L(m = 1)$. L's continuation payoff from mobilizing is the payoff from the current period plus the discounted payoff in the following period, given that the player adheres to the mobilization strategy and survives into the next period. Therefore, $V_L(m = 1) = z - c_L + \delta[\phi V_L(m = 1)]$, which simplifies to $\frac{z - c_L}{1 - \delta\phi}$. The continuation value from cooptation is calculated the same way, where $V_L(m = 0, x = \hat{x}) = \hat{x} + \delta[(1 - \phi)V_L(m = 0)]$. This simplifies to $\frac{\hat{x}}{1 - \delta + \delta\phi}$. Therefore, the opposition's optimal concession demand is the value of $\hat{x}$, in which $\frac{\hat{x}}{1 - \delta + \delta\phi} = \frac{z - c_L}{1 - \delta\phi}$. This results in

$$\hat{x} = \frac{(z - c_L)(1 - \delta + \delta\phi)}{1 - \delta\phi}. \blacksquare \tag{1.1}$$

Proof of Proposition 2.3.1 In some cases $\hat{x} \notin [0, 1]$. First, when $\hat{x} < 0$, then L accepts any offer, including $x = 0$. This occurs when $0 > \frac{(z - c_L)(1 - \delta + \delta\phi)}{1 - \delta\phi}$, which simplifies to $c_L > z$. Thus, L unilaterally demobilizes when the costs of conflict exceed

the potential benefits, regardless of the strength of the activist base. Additionally, when $\hat{x} > 1$, then L rejects all possible offers from the incumbent. This occurs when $\frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}{1-\delta\phi} > 1$, which occurs at large values of ϕ, such that $\phi > \frac{1-(z-c_L)(1-\delta)}{\delta(1+z-c_l)}$.

As established in the Proof of Lemma 2.3.1, the optimal opposition demand is $\hat{x} = \frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}{1-\delta\phi}$. I is willing to offer $\hat{x}$ as long as $V_I(m = 0, x = \hat{x}) \geq V_I(m = 1)$. His continuation value from permitting opposition mobilization is $V_I(m = 1) = 1 - z - c_L + \delta[\phi V_I(m = 1) + (1 - \phi)\frac{1}{1-\delta}]$. Since I monopolizes rents if L's base collapses, his continuation value from her collapse is $\frac{1}{1-\delta}$. Thus, $V_I(m = 1)$ simplifies to $\frac{(1-\delta)(1-z-c_I)+\delta(1-\phi)}{(1-\delta\phi)(1-\delta)}$.

In comparison, the continuation value from striking a deal is $V_I(m = 0, x = \hat{x}) = 1 - \hat{x} + \delta[\phi(\frac{1}{1-\delta}) + (1 - \phi)V_I(m = 0)]$, which simplifies to $\frac{(1-\delta)(1-\hat{x})+\delta\phi}{(1-\delta)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}$. Therefore, the incumbent prefers to meet L's demand of $\hat{x}$ when $\frac{(1-\delta)(1-x)+\delta\phi}{(1-\delta)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)} \geq \frac{(1-\delta)(1-z-c_I)+\delta(1-\delta)}{(1-\delta\phi)(1-\delta)}$. This results in $\hat{x} \geq \frac{(z+c_I)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}{1-\delta\phi}$. When substituting (1.1) for $\hat{x}$, then $\frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}{1-\delta\phi} \geq \frac{(z+c_I)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}{1-\delta\phi}$, which is always true since $-c_L$ cannot be larger than c_I. Hence, I always offers $\hat{x}$ as long as $\hat{x} \in [0, 1]$.

Lastly, to show that $x = \hat{x}$ and $m = 0$ iff $x \geq \hat{x}$ is an equilibrium, this strategy profile must survive one-shot deviation:

$$V_L(m = 0, x = \hat{x}) = \frac{x}{1 - \delta + \delta\phi} \geq z - c_L + \delta[\phi V_L(m = 0, x = \hat{x})]. \qquad (1.2)$$

This results in $\hat{x} \geq \frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}{1-\delta\phi}$, which always holds since this is equal to the optimal demand made by L. Therefore, this stationary strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium. ∎

Proof of Proposition 2.4.1 The continuation value of the rival leader (R) from mounting a challenge, $V_R(h = 1)$, must exceed 0 for R to compete for party leadership. $R's$ continuation value comprises the costs in the current period of mounting a challenge and the discounted payoffs of mobilizing in all future peri-

ods, which he receives with probability ϕ: $V_R(h = 1) = -q + \delta\phi V_R(m = 1)$, where $V_R(m = 1) = z - c_R + \delta\phi V_R(m = 1)$, which simplifies to $\frac{z-c_R}{1-\delta\phi}$. Therefore, $V_R(h = 1) = -q + \frac{\delta\phi(z-c_R)}{1-\delta\phi}$ and R mounts a challenge when $-q + \frac{\delta\phi(z-c_R)}{1-\delta\phi} \geq 0$. Thus, for values of $\phi \geq \phi^*$, where $\phi^* = \frac{q}{\delta(q+z-c_R)}$, R chooses $h = 1$, and $h = 0$ otherwise. Lastly, when $\phi^* > 1$, then R never mounts a challenge since ϕ cannot be sufficiently large to sustain internal competition. This occurs when $q > \frac{\delta(z-c_R)}{1-\delta}$.

Consider the case in which $\phi < \phi^*$ and R does not mount a challenge. L accepts an offer from I and demobilizes when $V_L(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) \geq V_L(m = 1)$, where $\tilde{x}$ is L's threshold of concessions above which she cooperates and demobilizes. In this case, $V_L(m = 1) = \frac{z-c_L}{1-\delta\phi}$, as in the baseline model. However, the continuation value from cooptation differs, where $V_L(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) = x + \delta V_L(m = 0)$. Since there is no threat of activist defections following cooptation, L is guaranteed to survive to the next period. Thus, $V_L(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) = \frac{x}{1-\delta}$. Therefore, the opposition cooperates for any value of x such that $\frac{x}{1-\delta} \geq \frac{z-c_L}{1-\delta\phi}$. This results in the threshold of $\tilde{x} = \frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta)}{1-\delta\phi}$. As in the baseline model, $\tilde{x} < 0$ when $c_L > z$, leading to unilateral cooperation. $\tilde{x} > 1$ when $\phi > \frac{1-(z-c_L)(1-\delta)}{\delta}$, which leads L to reject all offers.

I is willing to offer $\tilde{x}$ as long as $V_I(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) \geq V_I(m = 1)$. The continuation value from permitting opposition mobilization is the same as in the baseline model: $V_I(m = 1) = \frac{(1-\delta)(1-z-c_I)+\delta(1-\delta)}{(1-\delta\phi)(1-\delta)}$. Yet, $V_I(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) = 1 - \tilde{x} + \delta V_I(m = 0)$, which simplifies to $\frac{1-\tilde{x}}{1-\delta}$. Therefore, I offers $\tilde{x}$ when $\frac{1-\tilde{x}}{(1-\delta)} \geq \frac{(1-\delta)(1-z-c_I)+\delta(1-\delta)}{(1-\delta\phi)(1-\delta)}$. This results in $\tilde{x} \leq \frac{(z+c_I)(1-\delta)}{1-\delta\phi}$. When substituting $\frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta)}{1-\delta\phi}$ for $\tilde{x}$, then $\frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta)}{1-\delta\phi} \leq \frac{(z+c_I)(1-\delta)}{1-\delta\phi}$, which is always true since $-c_L$ cannot be larger than c_I. Hence, I always offers $\tilde{x}$ as long as $\tilde{x} \in [0, 1]$.

Lastly, to show that $x = \tilde{x}$ and $m = 0$ iff $x \geq \tilde{x}$ is an equilibrium when $\phi < \phi^*$, this strategy profile must survive one-shot deviation:

$$V_L(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) = \frac{x}{1 - \delta} \geq z - c_L + \delta[\phi V_L(m = 0, x = \tilde{x})]. \qquad (1.3)$$

This results in $\tilde{x} \geq \frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta)}{1-\delta\phi}$, which always holds since this is equal to the optimal demand made by L. Therefore, this stationary strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium. ∎

Proof of Proposition 2.4.2 As shown in the Proof of Proposition 2.4.1, the rival leader mounts a challenge when $\phi \geq \phi^*$. In this case, the leader's continuation value from cooptation is $V_L(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) = (1 - \phi)(x + \delta V_L(m = 0))$. Since there is a chance that L is removed in the current period, then she only receives the current *and* future payoffs of cooptation with probability $1 - \phi$. Thus, $V_L(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) = \frac{x(1-\phi)}{1-\delta+\delta\phi}$. Additionally, $V_L(m = 1) = \frac{z-c_L}{1-\delta\phi}$, as in the baseline model. Therefore, the opposition cooperates when $\frac{x(1-\phi)}{1-\delta+\delta\phi} \geq \frac{z-c_L}{1-\delta\phi}$. This inequality is true for any value of $x \geq \tilde{x}$, where $\tilde{x} = \frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}{(1-\delta\phi)(1-\phi)}$. As in the baseline model, $\tilde{x} < 0$ when $c_L > z$, leading to unilateral cooperation. $\tilde{x} > 1$ when $z > \frac{(1-\delta\phi)(1-\phi)}{1-\delta+\delta\phi} + c_L$, which leads L to reject all offers.

I is willing to offer $\tilde{x}$ as long as $V_I(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) \geq V_I(m = 1)$. The continuation value from permitting opposition mobilization is the same as in the baseline model: $V_I(m = 1) = \frac{(1-\delta)(1-z-c_I)+\delta(1-\delta)}{(1-\delta\phi)(1-\delta)}$. Yet, $V_I(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) = \phi[1 + \delta V_I(m = 1)] + (1 - \phi)[1 - \tilde{x} + \delta V_I(m = 0)]$. When the leader faces a challenge, the deal is temporarily undermined, leading to one period of disorganization (a payoff of 1 for I) followed by permanent mobilization, with probability ϕ. The deal remains intact and cooptation occurs with probability $1 - \phi$. This payoff simplifies to $\frac{\delta\phi V_I(m=1)+1-\tilde{x}(1-\phi)}{1-\delta+\delta\phi}$. Thus, $V_I(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) \geq V_I(m = 1)$ results in $\tilde{x} \leq \frac{(z+c_I)(1-\delta)}{(1-\phi)(1-\delta\phi)}$.

When substituting $\frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}{(1-\delta\phi)(1-\phi)}$ for $\tilde{x}$, then $\frac{(z-c_L)(1-\delta+\delta\phi)}{(1-\delta\phi)(1-\phi)} \leq \frac{(z+c_I)(1-\delta)}{(1-\phi)(1-\delta\phi)}$, which is only true when $\phi \leq \frac{(c_I-c_L)(1-\delta)}{\delta(z-c_L)}$. Therefore, there are some values for which I chooses to permit mobilization, unlike in the baseline model.

Lastly, to show that $x = \tilde{x}$ and $m = 0$ iff $x \geq \tilde{x}$ is an equilibrium when $\phi \geq \phi^*$,

this strategy profile must survive one-shot deviation:

$$V_L(m = 0, x = \tilde{x}) = \frac{(1 - \phi)x}{1 - \delta + \delta\phi} \geq z - c_L + \delta[\phi V_L(m = 0, x = \tilde{x})]. \qquad (1.4)$$

This results in $\tilde{x} \geq \frac{(z - c_L)(1 - \delta + \delta\phi)}{(1 - \phi)(1 - \delta\phi)}$, which always holds since this is equal to the optimal demand made by L. Therefore, this stationary strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium. ∎

Comparative Statics for Figures 2.2.1 and 2.2.2

The left panel of Figure 2.2.1 graphs the optimal demand of concessions—the concessions threshold $\hat{x}$—for the opposition leader, as defined in Lemma 2.3.1, for various levels of regime vulnerability z. Each line is plotted with the following values held constant: $c_L = 0.1$ and $\delta = 1$ (i.e. there is no discounting), while the top line is set at $\phi = 0.75$ and the bottom line is set at $\phi = 0.25$ as labeled. However, the dashed line represents the demanded concessions when there is no activist base that influences the opposition leader's political survival. In this case $V_L(m = 0, x = \hat{x}) = \frac{x}{1-\delta}$ and $V_L(m = 1) = \frac{z-c_L}{1-\delta}$. Thus, $\hat{x} = z - c_L$ and this line is plotted with c_L also held at 0.1.

The right panel of Figure 2.2.1 graphs the equilibrium concessions accepted by L as a function of ϕ. Both curves are graphed with $c_L = 0.1$ and $\delta = 0.5$. At high levels of ϕ for the curve where $z = 0.75$, $\hat{x} > 1$. Therefore L rejects all offers and $x = 0$.

Figure 2.2.2 graphs the threshold of concessions above which the opposition leader cooperates under unified leadership, as defined in Lemma 2.3.1, and divided leadership, as defined in (1.2) and (1.3). Both curves are graphed with the values $z = .35$, $c_L = 0.1$ and $\delta = 0.5$.

Appendix B

Data Appendix

Sample Details

This dissertation addresses which institutionalized opposition parties actually receive and accept cooptation offers from autocrats. Parties that are not institutionalized (i.e. do not participate in legislative or electoral institutions) are unable to receive institutionalized concessions, such as political appointments. Therefore, the sample is limited to dictatorships where opposition parties outside of the regime front are legal and capable of winning legislative seats. Furthermore, only those opposition parties capable of mobilizing dissent (those capable of mobilizing enough support to win a legislative seat) are included in the sample.

A country is excluded from the sample if the incumbent or ruling party is removed, following either an initial transition to democracy or after a military coup. Additionally, countries may not enter the sample if they remained a closed autocracy, transitioned from a closed autocracy directly to a democracy, or were a democracy in 1990.

The formal conditions for inclusion in the sample are defined below, using the Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited data.

Country included in sample when

- the country is a dictatorship (democracy = 0) AND

- opposition parties exist outside of the regime front (defacto2 = 2) AND have won seats in the legislature (closed = 2 and lparty = 2).

Country-years in sample

- Angola (1992-2014)

- Botswana (1990-2014)

- Burkina Faso (1992-2014)

- Cameroon (1992-2014)

- Chad (1997-2014)

- Djibouti (2013-2014)

- Equatorial Guinea (1993-2014)

- Gabon (1990-2014)

- Mozambique (1994-2014)

- Namibia (1990-2014)

- Rwanda (2003-2014)

- Seychelles (1993-2014)

- South Africa (1994-2014)

- Sudan (2010-2014)

- Tanzania (1995-2014)

- Togo (1994-2014)

- Uganda (2006-2014)

- Zimbabwe (1990-2014)

Countries excluded due to party alternation (date in parentheses)

- Kenya (1997)

- Lesotho (2011)

- Liberia (2000: period of political closure before transition in 2006)

- Senegal (1999)

- Tunisia (2010)

- Zambia (2011)

Countries excluded due to coup (date in parentheses)

- Algeria (1992)

- Côte d'Ivoire (1998)

- Egypt (2010)

- Gambia (1993)

- Guinea-Bissau (1998)

- Mauritania (2004)

Countries that started as a democracy

- Comoros

- Mauritius

Countries that transitioned from closed autocracy to democracy

- Benin

- Burundi

- Cabo Verde

- Central African Republic

- Congo, Republic of the

- Ghana

- Guinea

- Madagascar

- Malawi

- Mali

- Niger

- Nigeria

- São Tomé and Príncipe

- Sierra Leone

Other countries excluded from sample

- Democratic Republic of the Congo: Data availability issues (i.e. there are over 60 opposition parties with the majority only holding one seat).

- Eritrea: No political parties are legal.

- Ethiopia: No opposition parties exist outside of the regime front.

- Libya: No opposition parties were legal under Gaddafi and constant turnover after his removal in 2011.

- Morocco: The country is a royal dictatorship and the head of government is separate from the head of state. Thus, the person appointing the cabinet (the head of government) is not the individual concerned with regime survival and therefore puts Morocco beyond the scope of this project.

- Somalia: It has not had a parliamentary election since 1984.

- South Sudan: No elections have been held since its independence in 2011.

- Swaziland: The country is a royal dictatorship and opposition parties are formally banned.

Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Levels	n	%
Cabinet	0	1445	83.0
	1	296	17.0
	all	1741	100.0
Secondary Leaders	0	564	33.2
	1	1132	66.8
	all	1696	100.0
Leadership Competition	0	1446	89.3
	1	173	10.7
	all	1619	100.0
Party Split	0	1506	93.0
	1	113	7.0
	all	1619	100.0
Phone Number/Website	0	856	50.7
	1	831	49.3

	all	1687	100.0
Party Headquarters	0	529	31.4
	1	747	44.3
	2	411	24.4
	all	1687	100.0

Table B.1: Descriptive statistics of categorical party-level variables

Variable	**n**	**Min**	**$\widetilde{x}$**	**$\bar{x}$**	**Max**	**#NA**
Total Seat Share	1793	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.5	9
Share of Opposition Seats	1793	0.7	5.9	17.8	100.0	9
Incumbent Seat Share	1802	0.4	0.7	0.7	1.0	0
Leader Tenure tenure	1646	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.5	156
Party Age age	1656	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.9	146
Ethnic Polarization	1442	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.7	360
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	1802	-0.3	0.0	0.0	1.4	0
Regime Duration	1280	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.8	522

Table B.2: Descriptive statistics of continuous party-level variables

Model Results

Table B.3: The determinants of party-level cooptation with *Secondary Leaders* as indicator of divided leadership, including ethnic polarization and regime duration measures

	Model 4.1	Model 4.2	
		Incumbent (Offer)	Opposition (Accept)
Constant	-0.3	-0.4^*	0.5
	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.7)
Party Organization	-0.1		0.01
	(0.2)		(0.4)
Secondary Opposition Leaders	0.3**		0.6***
	(0.1)		(0.2)
Secondary Leaders × Party Organization	-0.2		-1.1^{***}
	(0.2)		(0.4)
Incumbent Seat Share	-1.3^{**}	-0.01	-2.8^{***}
	(0.5)	(0.9)	(1.1)
Opposition Party Seat Share	-0.3	-0.3	
	(0.5)	(0.8)	
Opposition Party Age	0.4	4.8***	
	(0.4)	(1.5)	
Opposition Leadership Tenure	-0.4	-11.1^{***}	16.8***
	(0.7)	(2.3)	(2.9)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	-1.0	-2.1^{**}	
	(0.7)	(1.1)	
Ethnic Polarization	0.07	1.3*	
	(0.4)	(0.9)	
Regime Duration	0.1	0.2	
	(0.4)	(0.6)	
Number of Observations	980	980	
AIC	980	925	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. AIC = Akaike information criterion.

Table B.4: The determinants of party-level cooptation with *Elite Split* as indicator of divided leadership, including ethnic polarization and regime duration measures

	Model 4.3	Model 4.4	
		Incumbent (Offer)	Opposition (Accept)
Constant	0.2	-0.4	1.8**
	(0.5)	(0.8)	(0.8)
Party Organization	-0.3^{**}		-0.8^{***}
	(0.1)		(0.3)
Opposition Elite Split	0.1		0.6
	(0.3)		(0.6)
Elite Split $\times$ Party Organization	-0.5		-0.9
	(0.4)		(0.8)
Incumbent Seat Share	-1.4^{**}	0.4	-4.4^{***}
	(0.5)	(1.0)	(1.2)
Opposition Party Seat Share	-0.4	-0.5	
	(0.6)	(0.8)	
Opposition Party Age	0.5	5.4***	
	(0.4)	(1.6)	
Opposition Leadership Tenure	-0.1	-10.4^{***}	19.2***
	(0.7)	(2.3)	(3.9)
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	-0.9	-1.8^{**}	
	(0.7)	(1.1)	
Ethnic Polarization	0.1	0.5	
	(0.5)	(0.9)	
Regime Duration	-0.3	-0.2	
	(0.5)	(0.7)	
Number of Observations	856	856	
AIC	868	815	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Bibliography

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Albrecht, Holger, and Oliver Schlumberger. 2004. ""Waiting for Godot": Regime Change without Democratization in the Middle East." *International Political Science Review* 25 (4): 371–392.

Ariotti, Margaret, and Sona Golder. 2017. "Partisan Portfolio Allocation in African Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* (Forthcoming).

Arriola, Leonardo R. 2009. "Patronage and Political Stability in Africa." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (10): 1339–62.

Arriola, Leonardo R. 2013a. *Multiethnic Coalitions in Africa : Business Financing of Opposition Election Campaigns.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Arriola, Leonardo R. 2013b. "Protesting and Policing in a Multiethnic Authoritarian State: Evidence from Ethiopia." *Comparative Politics* 45 (2): 147–68.

Arriola, Leonardo R. 2014. "Cooptation and Fragmentation in African Party Systems." Paper Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Washington, D.C., 28-31 August.

Banks, Arthur S., Thomas C. Muller, and William R. Overstreet. 2006. "Cameroon." In *Political Handbook of the World 2005-2006.* Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

Beaulieu, Emily. 2014. *Electoral Protest and Democracy in the Developing World.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Birch, Sarah. 2011. *Electoral Malpractice.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Blaydes, Lisa. 2010. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Boix, Carles, and Milan W. Svolik. 2013. "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships." *The Journal of Politics* 75 (2): 300–16.

Brancati, Dawn. 2016. *Democracy Protests: Origins, Features, and Significance.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Branch, Adam, and Zachariah Mampilly. 2015. *Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change.* London: Zed Books.

Bratton, Michael. 2008. "Vote Buying and Violence in Nigerian Election Campaigns." *Electoral Studies* 27: 621–632.

Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas van de Walle. 1992. "Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa." *Comparative Politics* 24 (4): 419–442.

Braumoeller, Bear F. 2003. "Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics." *Political Analysis* 11 (3): 209–233.

Braumoeller, Bear F., and Austin Carson. 2011. "Political Irrelevance, Democracy, and the Limits of Militarized Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55 (2): 292–320.

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in the Age of Democratization.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon J. Wolchik. 2010. "Deafeating Dictators: Electoral Change and Stability in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." *World Politics* 62 (1): 43–86.

Bäck, Hanna. 2008. "Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Formation Evidence from Swedish Local Government." *Party Politics* 14 (1): 71–89.

Carrubba, Clifford J., and Craig Volden. 2000. "Coalitional Politics and Logrolling in Legislative Institutions." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2): 261–277.

Cheibub, José A., Adam Przeworski, and Sebastian M. Saiegh. 2004. "Government Coalitions and Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and Parliamentarism." *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (4): 565–587.

Cheibub, José A., Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland. 2010. "Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited." *Public Choice* 143 (1): 67–101.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Maria J. Stephan. 2011. *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Chomiak, Laryssa. 2014. "Architecture of Resistance in Tunisia." In *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism*, ed. Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Clarke, Killian. 2014. "Unexpected Brokers of Mobilization: Contingency and Networks in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising." *Comparative Politics* 46 (4): 379–397.

Collier, Paul, and Pedro C. Vicente. 2014. "Votes and Violence: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Nigera." *The Economic Journal* 124 (574): F327–F355.

Conrad, Courtenay R. 2011. "Constrained Concessions: Beneficent Dictatorial Responses to the Domestic Political Opposition." *International Studies Quarterly* 55: 1167–87.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Joshua Krusell, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Valeriya Mechkova, Moa Olin, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Josefine Pernes, Constanza Sanhueza Petrarca, Johannes von Römer, Laura Saxer, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Jeffrey Staton, Natalia Stepanova, and Steven Wilson. 2017. "V-Dem Dataset v7." Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Cunningham, David E. 2006. "Veto Players and Civil War Duration." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (4): 875–92.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2011. "Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States Respond to Internally Divided Separatists?" *American Political Science Review* 105 (2): 275–97.

Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher. 2013. "Actor Fragmentation and Civil War Bargaining: How Internal Divisions Generate Civil Conflict." *American Journal of Political Science* 57 (3): 659–72.

Dahl, Robert A. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davenport, Christian. 2007. *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Del Panta, Gianni. 2017. "Weathering the storm: why was there no Arab uprising in Algeria?" *Democratization*: 1–18.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy.* New York: Harper.

Elischer, Sebastian. 2013. *Political Parties in Africa: Ethnicity and Party Formation.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fleischhacker, Helga. 1999. "Gabon." In *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*, ed. Dieter Nohlen, Michael Krennerich, and Bernard Thibaut. New York: Oxford University Press.

Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer, and Francesco Trebbi. 2015. "How Is Power Shared in Africa?" *Econometrica* 83 (2): 465–503.

Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships." *Economics & Politics* 18 (1): 1–26.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Grant Buckles. 2016. "Opposition Unity and Cooptation in Hybrid Regimes." Paper Presented at the Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference, Chicago, IL, 7-10 April.

Gates, Scott, Benjamin A.T. Graham, Yonatan Lupu, Håvard Strand, and Kaare W. Strøm. 2016. "Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace." *The Journal of Politics* 78 (2): 512–526.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 115–44.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Regimes and Transitions." *Perspectives on Politics* 12 (2): 313–331.

Gehlbach, Scott, and Alberto Simpser. 2015. "Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control." *American Journal of Political Science* 59 (1): 212–24.

Giannetti, Daniela and Kenneth Benoit, eds. 2008. *Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments*. New York: Routledge.

Gordon, Sanford C., and Alastair Smith. 2004. "Quantitative Leverage Through Qualitative Knowledge: Augmenting the Statistical Analysis of Complex Cases." *Political Analysis* 12: 233–255.

Greene, Kenneth. 2007. *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond. 2003. "Species of Political Parties: A New Typology." *Party Politics* 9 (2): 167–99.

Haber, Stephen, and Victor Menaldo. 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse." *American Political Science Review* 105 (1): 1–26.

Heger, Lindsay L., and Danielle F. Jung. 2015. "Negotiating with Rebels: The Effect of Rebel Service Provision on Conflict Negotiations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*: 1–27.

Hicken, Allen. 2011. "Clientelism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14: 289–310.

Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler. 2006. "Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2): 365–81.

Hsieh, Chang-Tai, Edward Miguel, Daniel Ortega, and Francisco Rodriguez. 2011. "The Price of Political Opposition: Evidence from Venezuela's 'Maisanta'." *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics* 3 (2): 196–214.

Khatib, Lina, and Ellen Lust. 2014. "Reconsidering Activism in the Arab World." In *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism.* Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2000. "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities." *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (6/7): 845–79.

Koter, Dominkia. 2016. *Beyond Ethnic Politics in Africa.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lansford, Thomas. 2012. "Gabon." In *Political Handbook of the World 2012.* Washington, D.C.: CQ Press.

LeBas, Adrienne. 2006. "Polarization as Craft: Party Formation and State Violence in Zimbabwe." *Comparative Politics* 38 (4): 419–38.

LeBas, Adrienne. 2011. *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa.* New York: Oxford University Press.

LeBas, Adrienne. 2014. "The Perils of Power Sharing: A New Twilight in Zimbabwe?" *Journal of Democracy* 25 (2): 52–66.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1977. *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1985. *Power-Sharing in South Africa.* Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California.

Lipset, Seymour M. 2000. "The Indispensability of Political Parties." *Journal of Democracy* 11 (1): 48–55.

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2005. *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2006. "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan." *Democratization* 13 (3): 456–71.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (4/5): 715–41.

Magaloni, Beatriz, Alberto Diaz-Cayeros, and Federico Estevez. 2007. "Clientelism and Portfolio Diversification: A Model of Electoral Investment with Applications to Mexico." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Malesky, Edmund, and Paul Schuler. 2010. "Nodding vs Needling: Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 104 (3): 482–502.

Malesky, Edmund, Paul Schuler, and Anh Tran. 2012. "The Adverse Effects of Sunshine: A Field Experiment on Legislative Transparency in an Authoritarian Assembly." *American Political Science Review* 106 (4): 762–786.

Martin, Lanny W., and Georg Vanberg. 2011. *Parliaments and Coalitions: The Role of Legislative Institutions in Multiparty Governance*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Mbaku, John Mukum, and Joseph Takougang. 2004. *The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon Under Paul Biya*. Africa World Press.

McMann, Kelly M. 2006. *Economic Autonomy and Democracy: Hybrid Regimes in Russia and Kyrgyzstan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Montalvo, José G., and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2005. "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars." *American Economic Review* 95 (3): 796–816.

Morgan, Jason W. 2015. "boolean3: Boolean Binary Response Models." R package version 3.1.6.

Ndombet, Wilson-André. 2009. *Renouveau démocratique et pouvoir au Gabon (1990-1993)*. Paris: Karthala.

Ngoh, Victor Julius. 2004. "Biya and the Transition to Democracy." In *The Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon Under Paul Biya*, ed. John Mukum Mbaku and Joseph Takougang. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.

Pepinsky, Thomas B. 2009. *Economic Crises and The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pitcher, M. Anne. 2012. *Party Politics and Economic Reform in Africa's Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Poirier, Dale J. 1980. "Partial Observability in Bivariate Probit Models." *Journal of Econometrics* 12: 209–217.

Prorok, Alyssa K. 2016. "Leader Incentives and Civil War Outcomes." *American Journal of Political Science* 60 (1): 70–84.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, and James Raymond Vreeland. 2002. "A Statistical Model of Bilateral Cooperation." *Political Analysis* 10 (2): 101–112.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, José A. Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rakner, Lise, and Nicolas van de Walle. 2009. "Democratization by Elections? Opposition Weakness in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 20 (3): 108–121.

Resnick, Danielle. 2013. *Urban Poverty and Party Populism in African Democracies.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Reuter, Ora John, and Graeme B. Robertson. 2015. "Legislatures, Cooptation, and Social Protest in Contemporary Authoritarian Regimes." *The Journal of Politics* 77 (1): 235–48.

Reuter, Ora John, and Jennifer Gandhi. 2011. "Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties." *British Journal of Political Science* 41 (1): 83–110.

Reuter, Ora John, and Thomas F. Remington. 2009. "Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (4): 501–26.

Rieffer-Flanagan, Barbara Ann. 2013. *Evolving Iran: An Introduction to Politics and Problems in the Islamic Republic.* Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Ritter, Emily Hencken, and Courtenay R. Conrad. 2016. "Preventing and Responding to Dissent: The Observational Challenges of Explaining State Repression." *American Political Science Review* 110 (1): 85–99.

Roberts, Hugh. 2015. "Algeria: The Negotiations That Aren't." In *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat,* ed. I. William Zartman. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.

Robertson, Graeme B. 2011. *The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rueda, Miguel R. 2015. "Buying Votes with Imperfect Local Knowledge and a Secret Ballot." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 27 (3): 428–456.

Salehyan, Idean, Cullen S. Hendrix, Jesse Hamner, Christina Case, Christopher Linebarger, Emily Stull, and Jennifer Williams. 2012. "Social conflict in Africa: A new database." *International Interactions* 38 (4): 503–511.

Schaffer, Frederic Charles, ed. 2007. *Elections for Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying.* London: Lynne Rienner.

Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stone, Randall W. 2008. "The Scope of IMF Conditionality." *International Organization* 62 (4): 589–620.

Svolik, Milan W. 2009. "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2): 477–94.

Svolik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Svolik, Milan W. 2013. "Contracting on Violence: The Moral Hazard in Authoritarian Repression and Military Intervention in Politics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57 (5): 765–94.

van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

van de Walle, Nicolas. 2007. "Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss? The Evolution of Political Clientelism in Africa." In *Patrons, Clients, and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, ed. Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. New York: Cambridge University Press.

van Ham, Carolien, and Staffan I. Lindberg. 2015. "From Sticks to Carrots: Electoral Manipulation in Africa, 1986–2012." *Government and Opposition* 50 (3): 521–548.

Vreeland, James Raymond. 2003. *The IMF and Economic Development.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Waltz, Susan E. 1995. *Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Wantchekon, Leonard. 2003. "Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Benin." *World Politics* 55 (3): 399–422.

Williams, Michelle. 2008. *The Roots of Participatory Democracy: Democratic Communists in South Africa and Kerala, India.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment." *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2): 322–43.

Wright, Joseph, and Abel Escribà-Folch. 2012. "Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 42 (2): 283–309.

Zakharov, Alexei V. 2016. "The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Dictatorships and Outside Options for Subordinates." *The Journal of Politics* 78 (2): 457–66.