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Foreign Direct Investment and Human Rights: A Look at Labor and Women's Rights

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An abstract of
a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences
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Abstract

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The influence of international investment on human rights has grown increasingly important with the rise of globalization and the emergence of significant global economic interaction. This paper seeks to explore the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and collective labor rights as well as women's rights, two significant rights that remain underdeveloped in the literature on investment and human rights. Drawing on previous theory and literature, I hypothesize that the influence of FDI on labor rights and women's rights varies across sectors (primary, secondary, or service). To test these hypotheses, I utilize a cross-sectional time series design with updated FDI data broken down by industry as well as multiple measures of labor and women's rights. My findings show that FDI has a significant influence on labor rights, dependent on sector and thus supports previous research in the area of FDI and labor rights. However, my results for the relationship between sectoral FDI and women's rights are less conclusive, and both my analyses would benefit from more extensive data, suggesting future scholars may build upon my findings as data becomes more available.

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II. Introduction

Beginning in 1948 with the creation of the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), the realization of human rights has become increasingly prominent on the global agenda. Furthermore, since the establishment of the UDHR, globalization and technological developments have spurred the growth and expansion of multinational corporations, leading scholars and activists to examine their influence on international development and the global realization of human rights. This paper seeks to contribute to the explorations of the relationship between foreign direct investment (FDI) and human rights. More specifically, this paper examines the influence of FDI inflows into specific sectors on labor rights and women's rights within developing countries.

An assessment of the effect of sectoral FDI contributes to the previous literature pertaining to human rights and FDI, but also seeks to go further by focusing FDI's impact on two specific rights: labor and women's rights. Thus, academics concerned with globalization, human rights, and their intersection may find this article of particular importance. However, given that foreign investment has very real consequences for both host and home countries, often beyond the expected and immediate scope of the investment, investors and policy makers may find this research of interest. Finally, it should be noted that consumers are becoming increasingly aware of how global investors and investment not only drives much of the global economic activity but influences social development as well. As Deborah Spar notes, there is now a "spotlight" effect on major foreign investors that focuses consumer attention on the practices and production of multinational corporations (1999).

To address the concerns posed by academics, policy makers, and consumers alike, I employ a cross-sectional time-series regression, focusing on developing nations during the period 1980 to 2010. I utilize multiple measures of both my independent and dependent variables as a means to achieve more robust findings and account for potential problems associated with missing data or measurement issues. Additionally, in employing multiple measures of my variables, I am able to better integrate the variety of variables used within the literature and offer a means of comparison. I find that the influence of FDI on labor rights and women's rights does indeed vary by sector, with an inverse relationship exhibited between primary sector FDI and labor and women's rights, mixed results between secondary sector FDI on rights, and a positive relationship between tertiary sector FDI and labor and women's rights. The results also supported much of the literature surrounding other factors that may influence government respect for labor and women's rights aside from sectoral FDI, such as internal conflict and judicial independence for labor rights and the existence of religious law in a nation for women's rights. Overall, the labor rights analysis produced more significant results, and both analyses would benefit from more extensive data and continued research.

III. Theory and Literature

Globalization, including, the emergence of new global non-state actors and the development of technologies linking international markets and peoples, economic globalization has especially garnered attention in the field of international development, both for its impact on economic growth and development and also for its implications for human rights in these developing nations. International development incorporates these two—often presented as conflicting—goals of economic growth and human rights and seeks to simultaneously encourage both. The suggestion that inward flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) can spur development and economic growth has encouraged developing nations to seek out foreign investment from multinational corporations (MNCs) in order to accelerate domestic economic growth

(Chowdhury and Mavrotas 2006, Blume and Voigt, 2007). While countries compete to acquire greater amounts of FDI in hopes of aiding the economic growth of their states, scholars have begun to examine its influence on the growth of developing economies, but also to encourage the realization of other important components of development such as human rights and environmental protections.

Determinants of FDI and the Case for Sectors

Human rights as a determinant of FDI will be discussed below, but prior to understanding how human rights factor into the relationship between FDI and economic growth and the emergence of a globalized economic system vying for increased FDI, it is necessary first to understand the traditional determinants of FDI. Notably, the scholarship around this field began by looking at the economic and political factors that motivate investors to locate in a particular country. A foundational piece of scholarship written by John Dunning in 1981 established the Ownership, Location, and Internalization (OLI) model that suggests foreign investors operate under a cost-benefit framework in determining where to invest. This framework is based upon a corporation's desire to have advantages over host country corporations, to not lose these advantages in the future, and to be located in the most advantageous place geographically. He then further adapted this framework to suggest that the form of production influences how corporations understand their locational and economic advantages. Ultimately, he identified three forms of production: resource-seeking, market-seeking, and efficiency-seeking, and each of these forms looks for various advantages (Dunning 1988).

Resource-seeking industries are driven to locate in a host country in which the resource (i.e. oil, a mineral, produce, etc.) is abundant. Market-seeking industries are focused on creating a global market and so will be looking to invest in countries that provide the largest consumer market for their product, thus market size and population (including labor force) are important considerations. Finally, efficiency-seeking industries want to improve their competiveness and reduce their costs either by growing their market or lowering some aspect of production cost, such as labor. This paradigm offers an economic lens through which to understand foreign direct investment decisions. However, certain countries ultimately end up attracting more FDI than others for reasons unanswered by the economic explanation alone. What political and social determinants may also influence investment decisions?

The political and social determinants of FDI are rooted in two competing theories, a neoliberal theory and a theory referenced as the "race to the bottom." Because FDI is increasingly understood as a generator of economic growth, developing nations are often in competition with one another to attract FDI. The competition to attract investment leads states to they create inducements such as tax incentives, reduced environmental protection standards, and diminished labor regulations. Ultimately, this creates what is known as a "race to the bottom," as standards and protections are lowered in order to attract more investment from multinational corporations (Blanton and Blanton 2007; Collingsworth 1994). In this regard, fewer protections of human rights, government corruption, etc. can be viewed as beneficial to investors looking to gain a powerful advantage within the host country. However, this theory has come under greater scrutiny as studies have more recently shown that multinational corporations face criticism as human rights activist organizations have brought to light allegations of child labor or dangerous working conditions in sweatshops. As Deborah Spar suggests, this "spotlight" effect has caused investment to consider human rights and how well states protect them when choosing where to locate (Spar 1998).

Furthermore, because foreign investment has been shown to be sensitive to the political stability of possible host countries, the way in which investment, rights, and political stability interact offers another possible explanation for why respect for human rights may be a determinant of FDI. Traditionally, authoritarian regimes that limited the rights of their citizens in order to prevent the organization of opposition forces, political coup d'états, or mass uprisings were seen as attractive to investors because it meant that the individuals who were not part of the government elite would not have any influence over policies that could ultimately affect the investor. Additionally, authoritarian regimes are arguably viewed as more stable because of the government's ability to repress its people and thereby prevent shifts in power. As a result, the early consensus among political scientists in the development field was that FDI would be attracted to authoritarian regimes and then once invested in the country, MNCs would create alliances with the government in order to further protect their investment from extra regulation or standards (Richards et. al 2001; Egan 2012). However, recent literature has noted that the political stability argument is not effective in explaining FDI trends. Rather than authoritarian regimes being more stable, scholars argue that in the long run, these regimes that fail to respect human rights will likely end up in conflict or in drastic shifts of power that are detrimental to investment (Egan 2012, Blanton and Blanton 2007, 2009, 2012b). Because FDI is a long-term investment in a country, rather than other forms of investment such as foreign portfolio investment, FDI should seek out regimes that are likely to respect human rights, as they tend to be more stable over time (Moran 1998; de Soysa and Vadlamannati 2011).

Thus, the "race to the bottom" theory suggests that FDI is attracted to countries that fail to protect human rights as it facilitates the amount of power they can retain once in the country so long as they are favored by the government. The neoliberal perspective however, argues that investors are too concerned with risk to invest in countries willing to violate human rights on a large scale as those countries tend to be authoritarian or involved in conflict. Thus human rights protections attract FDI and continue to improve once the FDI has entered the country. As suggested however, much of the current research aims to understand the effect respect for rights has on *attracting* FDI, and less of the research is geared towards understanding how FDI influences human rights once it has entered a country, which is what I aim to accomplish, on a more narrow scale, within this paper.

As the body of literature on FDI and human rights has grown, notable challenges have arisen in attempting to discuss the relationship using broad measures of FDI or human rights rather than narrowing the variables to more explicit measures such as the specific sector or a specific right. Thus, the conclusions drawn from much of the extant literature struggles with issues of validity and reliability because of the complexities that come with defining a concept such as human rights or in taking FDI as a whole rather than considering the motivations of various sectors of investment (Hafner-Burton 2002; Landman 2004; Blanton and Blanton 2009). In recognition of these problems, this paper seeks to address how FDI specifically influences labor rights and women's rights in developing countries, disaggregating FDI into sectors of investment so as to better understand how the nature of FDI in primary, secondary, or tertiary sectors may vary in its effect on these particular rights.

The literature surrounding the relationship between FDI and human rights has significantly recognized the need to disaggregate FDI along sector lines (Blanton and Blanton 2012a; 2012b; 2009; Mosley 2008; Busse 2002; Spar 1999). However, the research has not fully explored this relationship. Blanton and Blanton explored the variation caused by sector distinctions initially when looking at human rights and found significant differences between the nature of the FDI sector and how human rights subsequently functions as a determinant of that FDI type (2009). The first question one needs to answer is how should FDI be disaggregated? Traditionally, the literature has distinguished sector type by primary (agriculture and extractive industries), secondary (manufacturing), and tertiary (service) (Blanton and Blanton 2009; 2012b; Busse 2002; Mosley 2007; Egan 2012; Colen et. al. 2008). Within my own analysis, I employ these three overarching sectors, though my measures do allow for some further distinction within sectors as well (i.e. between high and low-skilled manufacturing).

Labor Rights and FDI

Because human rights is a concept that encompasses a variety of distinct rights. While the impact of sectoral FDI has been studied, little research has been done looking at sectoral FDI and labor and women's rights—the focus of this paper. The focus on labor rights in regards to FDI is particularly relevant given the nature of investment and the immediate implications it has on labor. MNCs directly interact with workers, allowing them to have a greater role in either positively or negatively influencing the rights of these workers. Whereas current literature has often addressed how FDI influences human rights in the context of physical integrity rights or civil and political rights, FDI often has less direct implications for affecting these rights (Richards et. al. 2001; Blanton and Blanton 2007; Neumayer and de Soysa 2005; Neumayer and de Soysa 2007). However, in looking at labor rights, it is possible—because of the close relationship between investors and workers—to better understand the role that FDI plays in the advancement or deterioration of labor rights in developing countries.

The literature has generally focused on labor rights as a determinant of FDI. The "race to the bottom" theory suggests developing nations competing for FDI will lower their labor standards and regulation of labor rights in an effort to attract investors seeking out cheap labor or less “aggressive” labor (Egan 2012). Therefore, MNCs will be driven to invest in these areas as a result of the inducements proposed by the host country rather than the country’s level of respect for labor rights (or rights in general). However, as FDI has increased, so has the global community’s ability to monitor FDI and its treatment of labor. As a result, the past decade has seen the proliferation of protests against large multinational corporations who are known to violate the labor rights of their employees by inhibiting their collective bargaining or freedom to associate practices, paying below-living wages, not ensuring the safety of their workers, etc. The case of the “Battle in Seattle” against the World Trade Organization in 1999 as well as campaigns against Nike and other “sweatshop”-utilizing multinationals highlights continued efforts to bring labor rights to the forefront of the discussion on investment. This newfound “spotlight phenomena” and the literature analyzing it, as it pertains to the interaction of labor and investment, implies that FDI is no longer able to turn a blind eye to labor rights violations when investing (Spar 1998; 1999). Rather, out of fear of consumer retaliation—or simply acting out of a “corporate social responsibility”—MNCs and the subsequent investment they bring is thought to be particularly sensitive to respect for labor rights when choosing locales in which to invest.

Additionally, political and economic stability are key to attracting FDI. Debate over whether worker repression aids in creating stable or unstable investment environments is pervasive in the discussion of FDI and labor rights. In a recently published study, Patrick Egan found that worker’s rights violations tended to correlate to a higher risk rating, which MNCs consult when looking to make investments in foreign countries. He notes that violations of worker’s rights tend to promote environments that are liable to erupt in conflict or in large-scale disruptions of the labor force, a major problem for prospective investors. It is important to note however, that Egan finds labor rights to be less significant than other factors in determining risk ratings, notably political institutions, conflict, levels of economic growth, and country indebtedness. Though these other determinants of risk ratings may be more important, labor rights are themselves found to be significant, suggesting the importance of understanding their relationship to FDI.

While the literature emphasizes the role that labor rights play in attracting FDI and ultimately contributing to economic growth, I am concerned with in what way FDI can influence the labor rights within a country once it has already entered the country. The literature has shown that FDI seems to be more attracted to nations protecting core labor rights, but do investors actively contribute to the protection and growth of the rights of labor in host countries by increasing emphasis on corporate social responsibility or understanding the nature of the sector of their investment? This question remains to be addressed in the literature despite the fact that labor rights have been shown to be relevant to the discussion surrounding FDI (Belasco 2006; Busse 2002; Kucera 2002). Therefore, while many other determinants such as democracy or trade openness have been extensively studied from the perspective of the way FDI may ultimately contribute to promoting democracy or increased trade openness, the literature is still lacking on how FDI may influence respect for labor rights (Jensen 2003).

The need to disaggregate FDI as it pertains to assessing its role in the protection of labor rights in developing countries lies in the theory that the skill level of the workers and the degree to which they are involved in production determines to what extent labor rights are respected (Kucera 2002). Those industries that require ample amounts of low-skilled labor are generally thought to be the most likely to ignore labor rights. Those industries requiring high-skilled labor should, according to theory be more conscious of labor rights because of the significance labor plays into the overall success of production. Underlying the significance of labor to production is the concept of human capital as a factor of production. Human capital refers to the skills, education, or knowledge that a labor force has which is transferred into particular value for a corporation or employer (Blanton and Blanton 2007). In this regard, labor is not only important in that it contributes to production, but also in what it contributes to production. Higher-skilled industries require more investment in human capital and find labor more difficult to replace, but low-skilled industries—even if labor is the a significant contributor to the production process—are able to more easily replace labor and are thus less likely to be concerned with protecting its labor force and their employees collective rights.

The primary sector, given that it requires low-skilled labor and is labor intensive should then be the most likely to negatively impact labor rights in developing countries. Furthermore, the primary sector has often been associated with the repression of labor rights as witnessed, for example, in the poor treatment of sugar cane workers in Haiti and the violent repression of labor leaders in countries such as Colombia in which labor was the group pushing for political change. Because these labor intensive industries are likely to desire cheap labor because of the significant amounts of money this can save them in the production process, they will likely be less considerate of labor rights in efforts to maintain cheap labor costs once they have invested (Kucera 2002). Additionally, the primary sector is often subject to labor rights violations such as child labor or forced labor because of the common use of migrant workers whose rights are already vulnerable (Neumayer and de Soysa 2005). Moreover, the primary sector is a significant portion of the FDI going to developing nations and thus its impact on labor rights is of particular concern in the field of development (Colen et. al. 2008).

The secondary or manufacturing sector's impact on labor rights is more ambiguous than that of the primary sector because various types of manufacturing require different levels of skill. For example, Costa Rica has served as an important case study in the positive effects that high-skill manufacturing can have on the development of human rights (Mosley 2008; Blanton and Blanton 2012b; Belasco 2006). However, other manufacturing, especially textiles and apparel has often been the subject of attention because of the poor conditions workers find themselves in in factories or sweatshops. Thus, in understanding the ways in which the manufacturing sector influences labor rights, it is necessary to distinguish between manufacturing that is dependent on skilled labor versus manufacturing that is dependent on non-skilled labor. The literature suggests that manufacturing may negatively impact labor rights because like the primary sector, manufacturing is often best able to reduce costs and increase efficiency by investing in cheap labor where respect for rights is likely to be less of a consideration (Kucera 2002; Egan 2012). However, the literature then subsequently suggests that manufacturing requiring high-skilled laborers for production will positively impact rights by investing in the community and the development of a skilled labor force so as to increase their own efficiency. Additionally, as MNCs work to create a skilled labor force, greater attention is brought to education and workplace training throughout the host country as governments and states begin to take notice of the positive effects of having a skilled labor force (Moran 2002; 2011).

The tertiary or service sector is the third and fastest growing sector of FDI in the developing world (Colen et. al. 2008). Initially, the service sector comprised a relatively small portion of FDI; however, especially in developing countries, the service sector has seen considerable privatization, sparking the growth of service sector FDI (Blanton and Blanton 2012b). Like the manufacturing sector, the service sector presents differing possibilities for its influence on labor rights in the host country. The conventional conception of services is that because they are reliant almost entirely on workers for the success of the industry, the rights of the workers will be respected. Additionally, the service sector often has a market base in the home country and thus alienating or repressing the rights of their workers will have a negative impact on their ability to succeed in the given state. For example, should a bank decide to locate in a given country, if it represses the ability of its workers to associate or organize in some form, it will likely gain a negative reputation within the country and lose a considerable portion of possible clients (Spar 1998; 1999). The service sector is also considered to be relatively high-skilled, suggesting it will likely lead to the improvement of labor rights in a given country. However, service sector FDI may in certain cases lead to the repression of labor rights because in attempting to attract service FDI, host countries will often limit rights to unionize or collectively bargain so as to encourage investment. There is however no literature that has yet determined if these rights continue to be increasingly repressed once the MNC has invested in the country. Additionally, Blanton and Blanton propose that because the service sector is often composed of female workers, labor rights may ultimately be repressed because the labor rights of women are often more susceptible to repression than those of men (2012b).

Women's Rights and FDI

Women's rights represent another right outlined in the UDHR that has gained increasing prominence in the literature surrounding economic globalization, but also in the public media. As appeared in the discussion of labor rights and FDI, FDI may have implications for women and their rates as FDI has, at the basic level, brought more women into the labor force and thus likely influenced at least their economic rights if not their political and social rights as well (Bunch 1990). The literature surrounding women's rights and FDI is somewhat less extensive than the literature surrounding labor rights, but the main theories, like with labor rights, are generated out of the competing neoliberal and "race to the bottom" perspectives of human rights and FDI generally (Braunstein 2002, Blanton and Blanton 2011). The neoliberal approach suggests that as FDI moves into a developing nation, it is likely to engage women in the workforce, extend educational opportunities and infrastructure development, and support democratic regimes which are traditionally considered more likely to promote women's rights. However, the "race to the bottom" theory proposes that nations that attract FDI will cater to their tendencies to promote rights violations in order to save on costs and gain economic advantage and bargaining power. As a result, because women are often at a disadvantage in wage earnings, are viewed as more obedient and less likely to cause workplace disruption, and are considered better employees for many sweatshop or assembly line jobs, they are likely to face the negative effects of a "race to the bottom" more acutely than their male counterparts (Blanton and Blanton 2011).

Underlying this debate between neoliberal and "race to the bottom" theorists as it relates to gender and FDI is a deeper argument about how to view the "benefits" of investment. Undoubtedly, FDI has encouraged large numbers of women to enter the workforce and make a living outside of traditional roles in the home, thus providing them with access to money, means to escape violence, etc. However, scholars have repeatedly posed the theoretical question of whether women are better off working in poor conditions or possibly being in the state of unemployment they were in prior to multinational investment? In essence, because much of the literature has been driven from an anthropological perspective, there is a question as to whether or not to view the results of investment in terms of relative or absolute benefit (Braunstein 2002). This question lies somewhat beyond the scope of my paper, but does inform the literature on the whole and so is necessary to reference and remember throughout the discussion and conclusions of my findings.

Additionally, FDI may influence different components of women's rights in different ways or at different rates. Considering women's economic, political, and social rights, the literature suggests and most often elaborates on how FDI influences women's economic rights (Richards and Gelleny 2007, Blanton and Blanton 2011, Braunstein 2002, Elias 2007) likely because of the more direct relationship of economic rights and foreign investment. Thus, concerns over wage discrimination or the ability of women to gain economic independence are discussed the most extensively in the literature. But of increasing concern to political scientists and policy advocates are how FDI may be influencing the social and political rights of women (Yoo 2011, Braunstein 2002). In regards to social rights, Braunstein argues that FDI may influence a woman's "bargaining and autonomy in the household," giving her more power to alter traditionally repressive social structures beginning in the localized setting of the home (2002, 8). Furthermore, as women enter the workforce, they are then capable of not solely earning wages, but developing assets, which they can ultimately use as a symbol for power that can disrupt repressive social orders that inhibit women's social rights. FDI may influence women's political rights as well when considered alongside the literature debating FDI's preference for democratic or authoritarian regimes. More recently, there has been some consensus that FDI prefers democratic countries, and in this regard, in instances where FDI may promote democracy to its own benefit, it may indirectly encourage the adoption of more political rights for women.

As with labor rights, it is also important to address the relationship between FDI and women's rights from an industry-specific level. FDI in the primary sector and in the low-skilled secondary sector are likely to employ women, though because these industries are often less concerned with labor rights or with developing the country beyond the walls of the firm, these sectors may negatively impact women's rights as their will be little effort made to promote wage equality or infrastructure changes such as building schools that could benefit women's rights. The high-skilled secondary sector may be more likely to positively influence respect for women's rights, especially in terms of economic rights. Because there is less labor turnover when high-skilled laborers are required, women may gain more ability to fight against wage discrimination or other forms of structural discrimination. However, one particular concern is that this sector may not be as female-heavy due to educational disparities between men and women and so its overall benefit for women's rights may be less significant. Again though, high-skilled secondary sector firms have been shown to want to invest in educational and infrastructure initiatives in host countries, which may ultimately result in a benefit for women (Mosely 2008). The literature on the tertiary sector also suggests that it can be both beneficial and harmful to women's rights. Because the tertiary sector incorporates services that range from highly-skilled to domestic work, the level of skill needed is not common throughout the sector, and just as with the secondary sector, investment that requires skilled workers tend to promote rights while low-skilled investment is less conducive to protecting or promoting rights (Blanton and Blanton 2011, 2009).

Hypotheses

Based upon the literature and theory discussed, I have developed multiple hypotheses for both labor and women's rights, dependent on each FDI sector. Concerning labor rights, I hypothesize that primary sector FDI will lead to less respect for labor rights, primarily because of the sector's need to located in specific locations due to resource needs and because of the need for low-skilled labor. Secondary sector FDI could produce both positive and negative relationships due to the inclusion of industries that require high-skilled labor and industries that require low-skilled labor. Because one of my measures of FDI breaks down the secondary sector into even more narrow industries, I propose that secondary industries requiring high-skilled labor will have a positive relationship to labor rights, but secondary industries that need only low-skilled labor (such as textiles or electronics) will be inversely related to respect for labor rights. The tertiary sector could also produced mixed results, though I hypothesize that it will be more likely to result in protection of labor rights due to the need for specialized, high skilled labor within portions of the sector, and because the argument that "pink collar" jobs in the service sector harm labor rights is not extensively discussed within the literature.

In regards to women's rights, I hypothesize that primary sector FDI will not result in respect for women's rights, both as a composite variable, and for each component of economic, social, and political. Regarding the secondary sector, I predict that low-skilled manufacturing FDI will not improve women's rights overall, but may have a positive effect on respect for economic rights (though not social or political) and that high-skilled manufacturing FDI will result in respect for women's rights overall as well as their economic and political rights. Finally, I predict the tertiary sector will have the same result as high-skilled manufacturing (though with more strength) and result in respect for women's rights overall as well as their economic and political rights. I do not hypothesize that any sectoral FDI will result in respect for women's social rights in part because those industries such as high-skilled manufacturing and services that may produce a positive outcome for women's social rights are the newest forms of FDI in many countries and social changes require cultural restructurings in many instances, which take substantial amounts of time. Indeed, I predict that the primary sector will negatively influence women's rights in that because it is often resource-driven, it may be more likely to exist in regimes that are repressive for women in an effort to maintain their own investment advantages and thus perpetuate repressive social structures.

IV. Data and Methods

For the purpose of testing my hypotheses, I utilize cross-sectional time-series regressions for assessing both labor and women's rights, though employing different controls for each of the dependent variables. Furthermore, because the relationship between FDI and human rights, and subsequently between FDI and labor and women's rights, is most relevant within developing countries, I narrow the focus of my test to include countries within the developing world (non-OECD countries with the exception of Mexico and Turkey). My data generally includes between 22 and 26 developing countries over the time period 1980 to 2010. The number of countries is particularly limited by the scarcity of sectoral FDI data as well as my use of controls. However, in recognition of the limits of a study with such a small number of countries, I should point out that the countries that are represented across geographic regions and include a variety of levels of development amongst developing nations.

Dependent Variables

Human Rights

Before exploring the effects of FDI on labor rights and women rights specifically, I first test the relationship between total flows of FDI and human rights given its significance in the previous literature and to offer a base from which to further compare the significance of FDI on labor and women's rights. Based on previous literature (Blanton and Blanton, 2007; 2009) I utilize the measure of physical integrity rights provided by the CIRI Human Rights Data Project to represent human rights (Cingranelli and Richards, 2007). The CIRI Human Rights Data Project offers data from the years 1981 to 2008. Physical integrity rights are an index compiled from other CIRI indicators of torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance. The index ranges from a score of 0, representing no respect for these rights, to 8, representing full government respect for the four rights.

Labor Rights

Concerning labor rights, I utilized multiple measures from previous work to test the relationship between FDI and respect for labor rights. The first measure comes from Mosely and Uno (2007) labeled *labor rights*. The measure is concerned primarily with collective labor rights including the freedom to associate and the right to collective bargaining. Mosely and Uno adapted Kucera's (2002) method of measurement utilizing reports from three sources including the U.S State Department's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices*, reports published by the International Labor Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts on the Applications of conventions and Recommendations and the Committee on Freedom of Associations, and the *Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights* published by the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

From these sources a score is developed based on 37 dimensions of collective labor rights such as the detention or exile of union members, exclusion from the right to strike of industry workers, and the intervention of authorities in collective bargaining by including a measure of 1 if the violation is found in the sources mentioned in a given year. It should be noted that Mosely and Uno have weighted the dimensions depending upon their overall importance as a labor right (i.e. the more significant the labor right, the more it is weighted in the scoring process) and that a lower score represents worse respect for collective labor rights and a higher score indicates more respect for collective labor rights. Finally, these dimensions attempt to measure levels of respect for labor rights both from their inclusion in a country's legal framework and from their actual protections and attempt to reduce bias by utilizing multiple sources of data to create the labor rights score.

As a means of ensuring the robustness of my findings, I also utilize another measure of labor rights, *worker*, which comes from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project (Cingranelli and Richards, 2007). Their measure of labor rights includes respect for collective labor rights, but also measures of the other core ILO labor standards, including freedom from forced labor and minimum age requirements to prevent child labor. The measure is a score from 0 to 2, with 0 representing labor rights that are "severely restricted," a score of 1 suggesting labor rights were "somewhat restricted," and a score of 2 indicating labor rights were "fully protected."

Woman's Rights

To measure women's rights, I again utilize data from the CIRI Human Rights Data Project. The project includes three measures of women's rights: *economic, social,* and *political*. I combine these three measures to create one *women's rights* variable. Each of the three measures of women's rights range from 0 (no respect for the right) to 3 (full respect for the right) and thus *women's rights* is an additive index ranging in scores from 0 (no respect for women's rights) to 9 (full respect for women's rights). While I analyze women's rights collectively, I also retain each of the individual measures to determine if various components of women's rights are affected differently by various sectors of FDI.

Independent Variable

As with the dependent variables, I employ a variety of measures of the independent variable, foreign direct investment, to get the most holistic assessment of the role of FDI in the realization of labor and women's rights. FDI is defined as foreign ownership of at least ten percent of a company or its productive assets (i.e. factories or land) over a given period of time.

The data on FDI that I employ comes from two different sources and I utilize FDI as an aggregate measure and on an industry level. My first measurement of sectoral FDI comes from the United States Bureau of Economic Analysis and consists of outward US FDI in millions of dollars from the years 1980 to 2011 broken down into various sectors according to industry classification, including *petro, total manufacturing, food production, chemical production, metal production, industrial equipment, electricity, transportation production, wholesale trade, finance,* and *services*. *Petro* represents the primary sector, *wholesale trade, finance,* and *services* represent the service sector, and the other measures constitute the secondary or manufacturing sector. My decision to include these measures of sectoral FDI is based off of work by Blanton and Blanton (2009, 2012b) concerning the relationship between sectoral FDI and human rights, therefore allowing me to further explore their findings by replicating their method while narrowing the scope from human rights as a whole to labor and women's rights. Additionally, the data offered by the BEA is one of the few extensive breakdowns of FDI by sector. Finally, this data is given in millions of US dollars and is logged to account for possible skew.

However, because the data from the US BEA is only representative of FDI coming from one country, as compared to the FDI flowing into a country from all foreign investors, I employ another measure of FDI to control for possible bias. The International Trade Center, an organization sponsored by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has compiled data on FDI inflows disaggregated by industry from UNCTAD for the years 2002 through 2011. The sectors are defined as those outlined by the International Standard Industrial Classification of all Economic Activities (ISIC). I primarily use the data for total *primary, secondary,* and *tertiary* sector inflows, with *primary* including industries 1 through 14, *secondary* representing the manufacturing sector, or industries 15 through 37, and *tertiary* representing the service sector or industries 40 through 99. Additionally, the International Trade Center has only compiled FDI data dating back to 2002, but UNCTAD has published individual Country Profiles that include sectoral FDI data for countries dating as far back as 1980. This data is not available for all countries or for all years between 1980 and 2011, but I added the available data from these Country Profiles to the UNCTAD data offered by the International Trade Center in order to strengthen my results. The data is given in millions of US dollars, though it has been logged to account for skew.

Finally, my measure of total FDI comes from the World Bank and is measured as inflows in millions of US dollars, also logged to prevent skew. The purpose of an aggregated measure of FDI is to offer a base by which to distinguish the influence of various sectors of FDI. By offering multiple measures of sectoral FDI, I should have more confidence in my findings. For example, the data provided from the US BEA includes data for a longer period of time, but only presents the effects of FDI coming from one country. The FDI provided by UNCTAD and the International Trade Center measures FDI from all investors, but is available for fewer years and has more missing data. Thus, by including both measures of sectoral FDI, the findings should be more valid.

Control Variables

As briefly outlined in the literature review, a wide variety of factors can influence both FDI and respect for labor and women's rights. As a result, a range of control variables need to be included when exploring the relationship between sectoral FDI and the dependent variables. Economic factors that are tied to respect for human rights include *gross domestic product (GDP)*, *GDP growth, trade openness,* and *external debt.* Data for each of the economic controls are taken from the World Bank Development Indicators initially, and are generally available across countries and years. *GDP,* the size of the economy, is measured in millions of US dollars while *GDP growth* is measured as a percentage difference in GDP from the previous year. I expect that both GDP and GDP growth will be positively correlated to respect for labor rights as well as women rights (Blanton and Blanton 2011, 2012b). To determine *trade openness*, a nation's exports and imports as a percentage of GDP is used. Trade openness according to Mosely and Uno (2007) is negatively tied to labor rights and thus I expect to find negative results as well. Finally, *external debt* is the level of a country's debt as a percentage of total GDP. Larger amounts of external debt are likely to come with more pressure from the international community—namely from the lending countries and multinationals—and thus those countries with more debt I expect to be more likely to repress labor rights due to their obligations to meet the demands of lenders.

It is also necessary to take into consideration certain demographic factors that have been shown to influence respect for labor and women's rights. *Population size* may influence the ability of a state to offer resources and protections of rights and may also influence levels of FDI. Therefore, larger populations should show less respect for both labor and women's rights in part because of the difficulty of protecting the rights of more people and the scale of the challenge. Further, international investors may locate in a country in order to utilize its labor pool and therefore it is necessary to control for population size so as not to mistake either population or FDI alone as the cause for a relationship with human rights. It is also necessary to control for *labor force growth*. This is measured as the growth in the portion of the population that is of a working age, and depending on the skill level of the labor force, could have either a positive or negative relationship with labor rights. Again, labor force growth may be strongly tied to FDI and thus it is necessary to include a measure of labor force growth to prevent witnessing an inaccurate relationship between the dependent and independent variables. In testing the relationship between FDI and women's rights, I add the variable *percent Muslim population* based upon the significance of religion in realizing women's rights, notably in countries with large Muslim populations (Neumayer and de Soysa 2005). My measure comes from the La Porta database and includes the percentage of a country's population that is Muslim, taken during the year 1980 (La Porta et. al. 1999). Alongside the measure of the percentage of the population that is Muslim, I have chosen to include an indicator of whether a country has *religious law*. Traditionally, those countries that operate within a framework of religious law are more likely to repress the rights of women (Neumayer and de Soysa 2005).

There are significant political factors that should be taken into account as well. Of these, *democracy* and *internal conflict* are especially important, with an expected positive relationship between democracy and respect for labor and women's rights and an expected negative relationship between internal conflict and labor and women's rights. I have used the most recent measurement of democratic governments offered by the Polity IV project, which is an index of institutional characteristics which capture a nation's level of democracy. The scores range from -10 (authoritarian) to 10 (full democracy). *Internal Conflict* has been recognized as an important force in garnering respect for human rights given that during times of internal conflict, rights are often purposefully eliminated or compromised. My measure of internal conflict comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. I have also included the control variable of *judicial independence* as a strong, independent judiciary is better able to protect rights and thus I expect a higher score of judicial independence to positively correlate with more respect for labor rights. I utilize a more recent latent variable measure of judicial independence that overcomes common errors caused from missing data, measurement error, and time constraints (Staton and Linzer, 2011). Additionally, I include a variable measuring if the state has signed the *Convention Eliminating All Forms of Discrimination Against Women* (CEDAW) treaty. Signing this treaty suggests a level of dedication to addressing women's rights issues, thus diminishing the possible relationship between FDI and women's rights. *CEDAW signatory* is a dummy variable, with non-signing nations noted with a 0 and signing nations marked by a 1 beginning in the year they sign and every subsequent year.

Finally, there are two other variables that are relevant in regards to understanding the relationship between FDI and labor rights. As Mosely and Uno (2007) suggest, measures of *economic peers practices* and *regional peer practices* are necessary to gauge possible external influence faced by countries from other nations either in geographic or economic proximity. This measure comes from Mosely and Uno (2007) and is the mean labor rights score for either countries in the same geographic area, or in similar economic standing (based on GDP per capita). These measures are included in the labor rights analysis alone and I expect regional and economic peers that have a lower mean labor rights score will be associated with less respect for labor rights.

V. Results and Discussion

My findings indicate that FDI does have a significant relationship to respect for labor and women's rights, although the effect varies across sectors. The following section includes the significant results from my cross-sectional time-series regressions. I first present the findings for my initial test of human rights and FDI, with a brief analysis of the dependent variable and then a discussion of the significant controls as well. Following this, I detail my significant findings for labor rights and FDI, first discussing the results when using the US BEA FDI sector data and then with the UNCTAD FDI sector data. I then synthesize the findings from both the BEA and

UNCTAD FDI measures and offer a brief analysis of the significant control variables. I follow this pattern in discussing my findings from the women's rights regressions as well. I conclude with a summary of the findings.

Human Rights and FDI Results

My initial test involved physical integrity rights as a measure of human rights in order to provide a baseline understanding of what my data says about the relationship and how it may or may not support current theory. In regards to human rights overall; however, FDI failed to be significant when analyzed alongside the range of common controls. The coefficients and standard errors for each of the human rights regressions are presented in Tables 1 and 2, as well as the number of observations.[1] Each of the rows is the particular sector of FDI, with the FDI sectors in Table 1 determined by the US BEA data and the sectors in Table 2 by the UNCTAD data. The columns represent the two models, with model 1 run with a minimum set of control variables and model 2 including a more extensive list of possible confounding variables. The findings from the tests, as presented in the tables, show that FDI, in total flows or disaggregated by sector, fail to be significant overall.

Ultimately, levels of internal conflict, a nation's GDP, and their level of judicial independence were more strongly, and significantly, associated with human rights. Internal conflict and GDP were negatively correlated with human rights, suggesting that the more intense a country's level of internal conflict, or the higher their GDP, the less likely they are to respect human rights. This relationship between GDP and human rights runs counter to the literature, though it may be a result of the countries which make up my sample. Given that all of my cases are developing nations and thus my analysis is not directly comparable to the finding of previous

[1] For complete human rights regression results, see Appendix A, tables A(1-4)

scholars that GDP has a positive impact on human rights. Finally, judicial independence was found to be positively correlated to human rights, supporting the theory that a more independent judiciary can lead to greater respect for human rights.

TABLE 1. Selected Coefficients from Human Rights Regressions (US BEA)

	Model 1: Human Rights	Model 2: Human Rights
Total FDI (WB data)	-.006 (.077) N=500/26	.056 (091) N=400/24
Petro	-.006 (.099) N=265/23	.118 (.120) N=230/23
Total Manufacturing	-.116 (.084) N=489/25	-.028 (.106) N=398/24
Food	**-.159***** **(.052)** N=420/25	**-.165***** **(.061)** N=340/24
Chemicals	.008 (.066) N=451/25	.062 (.033) N=365/24
Fabricated Metals	-.079 (.101) N=299/22	.-.094 (.102) N=245/22
Industrial Equipment	*.094* *(.101)* N=212/21	.140 (.114) N=167/17
Electrical Products	.011 (.061) N=291/23	-.005 (.072) N=230/22
Transportation Products	**-.256**** **(2.36)** N=175/23	**-.329**** **(2.09)** N=140/22
Wholesale Trade	-.116 (.086) N=429/25	-.044 (.109) N=346/24
Finance	-.012 (.051) N=354/25	.015 (.062) N=289/24
Services	-.006 (.073) N=254/24	.057 (.091) N=283/23

Note: Each cell contains the coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations (N=observations/countries)
* p > .1; ** p > .05; *** p > .01

TABLE 2. Selected Coefficients from Human Rights Regressions (UNCTAD)

	Model 1: Human Rights	Model 2: Human Rights
Total FDI (WB data)	-.006 (.077) N=500/26	.056 (091) N=400/24
Primary Sector	**.003** **(.087)** N=137/19	.008 (.110) N=101/18
Secondary Sector	.150 (.111) N=134/20	.216 (.151) N=94/17
Tertiary Sector	-.001 (.099 N=148/22	.013 (.132) N=107/19

* p > .1; ** p > .05; *** p > .01

Labor Rights and FDI Results

While the discussion of how total flows of FDI factors into respect for human rights is interesting and important, this paper explores the more nuanced relationship between sectoral FDI and labor and women's rights. My findings, using both Mosely and Uno's labor rights and the CIRI worker rights measures, show that total FDI and sector-specific FDI can have a variety of different and significant impacts on respect for labor rights. As with Tables 1 and 2, Tables 3 and 4 present the coefficients, standard errors, and number of observations for each of the FDI sectors, with Table 3 presenting the US BEA sectors and Table 4 the UNCTAD sectors. [2] Additionally, because I used multiple measures for the labor rights dependent variable, there are four models rather than the two for human rights. Models 1 and 2 use the Mosely and Uno measure of the dependent variable and models 3 and 4 using the CIRI measure. Models 1 and 3 estimate the influence of FDI on each measure of labor rights while controlling for a minimum set of potential confounding influences and models 2 and 4 present the results for estimates with a broader set of control variables.

The results for these models in Table 3 show that total FDI has a significant and negative relationship with labor rights, using both the Mosely and Uno measure as well as the CIRI measure, suggesting that as a developing nation's FDI increases, their respect for labor rights decreases (though Mosely and Uno's measure only pertains to collective labor rights, while the CIRI worker rights measure is a more encompassing measure of labor rights). In Models 2 and 4 total FDI loses its significance with the addition of these controls. Interestingly, while the results indicate that total FDI has a negative and significant impact on labor rights, sector-specific FDI tends to have a positive relationship with labor rights when the coefficient is significant.

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[2] For full labor rights regression results, see Appendix B, tables B(1-4) and Appendix C, tables C(1-4)

TABLE 3. Selected Coefficients from Labor Rights Regressions: FDI Sectors (US BEA)

	Model 1: *Labor Rights*	Model 2: *Labor Rights*	Model 3: *Worker*	Model 4: *Worker*
Total FDI (WB data)	**-.976***** **(.330)** N=401/24	-.392 (-.294) N=401/24	**-.080**** **(.033)** N=502/26	-.030 (.033) N=401/24
Petro	-.376 (.344) N=231/23	-.154 (.391) N=231/23	.003 (.024 N=267/23	.038 (.030) N=231/23
Total Manufacturing	**1.067**** **(.479)** N=399/24	**1.216***** **(.417)** N=399/24	**.057*** **(.034)** N=491/25	**.081**** **(.036)** N=399/24
Food	-.007 (.269) N=341/24	.388 (.254) N=341/24	.012 (.024) N=422/25	.016 (.026) N=341/24
Chemicals	**1.405***** **(.401)** N=366/24	**1.114***** **(.343)** N=366/24	**.055**** **(.028)** N=453/25	.020 (.032) N=366/24
Fabricated Metals	**1.176***** **(.382)** N=246/22	**.944**** **(.423)** N=246/22	.044 (.031) N=301/22	.032 (.027) N=246/22
Industrial Equipment	.070 (.487) N=168/17	-.336 (.427) N=168/17	.037 (.039) N=214/21	-.002 (.036) N=168/17
Electrical Products	.326 (.282) N=231/22	.174 (.285) N=231/22	**.056**** **(.028)** N=293/23	**.051*** **(.031)** N=231/22
Transportation Products	**1.99*** **(.3.22)** N=175/22	**2.492*** **(3.96)** N=140/22	-.21 (-.051) N=175/23	-.01 (-.20) N=140/22
Wholesale Trade	**1.077 **** **(.453)** N=347/24	**1.525***** **(.398)** N=347/24	.015 (.036) N=431/25	.054 (.040) N=347/24
Finance	.060 (.266) N=290/24	.356 (.247) N=290/24	-.019 (.019) N=356/25	.021 (-.21) N=290/24
Services	**.701**** **(.321)** N=284/23	**.903***** **(.311)** N=284/23	-.027 (.032) N=356/24	-.029 (.037) N=284/23

Note: Each cell contains the coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations (N=observations/countries)
* p > .1; ** p > .05; *** p > .01

Looking first at the data disaggregated based upon the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), the primary sector as represented through petroleum fails to have a significant influence on respect for labor rights. However, my findings indicate that various industries within the secondary sector, or the manufacturing sector, are more significant than others in determining respect for labor rights. Total manufacturing FDI using US BEA data proved to be both significant and positive across models, suggesting that the more manufacturing FDI a developing nation attracts, the more likely they are to respect labor rights. This finding supports the theory that particular sectoral FDI can promote rather than undermine labor rights in host countries.

Among the manufacturing industries that comprise total manufacturing FDI from the US BEA data however, not all were significant, though all of the significant results proved to be positively related to labor rights. The chemical products manufacturing sector proved to be the most significant across the models, losing its significance only in Model 4. Additionally, the chemical products industry had the largest positive coefficient within the manufacturing sector when looking at Models 1 and 2, implying FDI from chemical production produces a greater amount of respect for collective labor rights. Fabricated metal production FDI was, in Models 1 and 2—like chemical production FDI—significant at the .01 level. Fabricated metal production FDI also retained high coefficients in comparison to the other manufacturing industries. In regards to Models 3 and 4, which employ CIRI's more holistic, though less precise measure of labor rights, the electric and transportation production FDI was found to be significant, though only at the .10 level in Model 4 (which includes a greater number of controls), implying that as more factors are introduced into the regression equation, these industries may lose their significance in explaining a developing nation's respect for labor rights.

The tertiary sector also produced mixed results. The data from the US BEA, does not contain a total measure of tertiary sector FDI, though I include the trade, finance, and service industries as representative of the tertiary sector. Within these sectors, only the trade and service sector coefficients are significant, and only for Models 1 and 2. These findings then support the theory that the tertiary sector ultimately promotes respect for labor rights (in this instance, for collective labor rights), possibly because out of the need to protect their investment in educated professionals and high-skilled labor within the sector. It should also be noted that for both trade and service industries, the two became more significant as more controls were included (and their coefficients increased as well), indicating that even in light of other factors, these industries play an important part in explaining a developing nation's respect for collective labor rights.

TABLE 4. Selected Coefficients from Labor Rights Regressions: FDI Sectors (UNCTAD)

	Model 1: *Labor Rights*	Model 2: *Labor Rights*	Model 3: *Worker*	Model 4: *Worker*
Total FDI (WB data)	**-.976***** **(.330)** N=401/24	-.392 (-.294) N=401/24	**-.080**** **(.033)** N=502/26	-.030 (.033) N=401/24
Primary Sector	.480 (.308) N=102/18	**.512*** **(.305)** N=102/18	-.009 (.039) N=138/19	.027 (.034) N=102/18
Secondary Sector	**.855*** **(.440)** N=95/17	**.776*** **(.421)** N=95/17	.007 (.042) N=135/20	.040 (.056) N=95/17
Tertiary Sector	.256 (.406) N=108/19	.280 (.388) N=108/19	**-.053*** **(.030)** N=149/22	-.034 (.035) N=108/19

* p > .1; ** p > .05; *** p > .01

The regressions utilizing the UNCTAD data reveal that the primary sector is only significant as increasing respect for collective labor rights in the second model. The regressions from the UNCTAD data also suggest the secondary sector is a significant factor in explaining respect for labor rights using Mosely and Uno's measure in Models 1 and 2, though the secondary sector failed to be significant for Models 3 and 4. The UNCTAD tertiary sector FDI data is not significant except for in Model 3, for which it is only significant at the .10 level and suggests a negative relationship between the two variables.

Looking at the results from both measures of FDI, patterns concerning the relationship between sectoral FDI and labor rights emerge. Within the primary sector, given that the petroleum sector of the BEA data and the primary sector of the UNCTAD data were primarily insignificant, implying primary sector FDI is not necessarily tied to respect for labor rights, and if any relationship can be said to exist, it is that primary sector FDI is most likely to positively influence collective labor rights. Concerning the secondary sector, both the BEA and UNCTAD measures produced results suggesting the secondary sector is positively related to respect for labor rights, though primarily for Mosely and Uno's measure of collective labor rights. This may mean that secondary sector FDI may lead to respect for the particular components of labor rights such as collective bargaining, but does not have an influence on the broader measure of worker rights which include other components such as freedom from forced or child labor. Finally, the results of the tertiary sector FDI were in contradiction with one another. This may be a function of what tertiary sector FDI measures I utilized. The particular nature of FDI from the US may differ drastically from that of China or Mexico, and so the results of the regressions using BEA tertiary sector FDI do not represent global tertiary sector FDI trends as the UNCTAD measure does, possibly skewing the outcome from BEA data.

Before discussing the results for women's rights, a quick reference to the control variables for the labor rights analysis is necessary. For Models 1 and 2, which used the Mosely and Uno measure of labor rights, *trade openness* and *internal conflict* were negatively and significantly correlated with respect for labor rights in nearly every sector and for both UNCTAD and BEA FDI data, suggesting that these two variables are very important to understanding respect for labor rights in developing nations. Their inverse relationships suggest that the more internal conflict a country is facing or the more open a nation is to trade (or the larger the percentage of its exports to GDP is), the less likely a developing nation is to respect labor rights.

Additionally, after the inclusion of additional controls in model two, *judicial independence* and *regional peer practices* were generally significant across the secondary and tertiary sectors for both BEA and UNCTAD FDI data. These two control variables were positively related to respect for labor rights, meaning that the more independent a judiciary is from other political institutions and the more respect for labor rights exhibited by neighboring countries, the more respect a developing nation exhibits for labor rights. While judicial independence and regional peer practices failed to be significant for the primary sector, democracy was significantly and positively related to labor rights in the primary sector equations. Initially, it was surprising that only the primary sector found democracy to be a significant control but for neither the secondary or tertiary sectors. However, given that judicial independence can in many respects be seen as an indicator of democracy, it may be that the rule of law is more important than electoral accountability in protecting labor rights.

In Models 3 and 4, which employed the CIRI measure of labor rights, *trade openness* and *internal conflict* were again generally significant and negatively related to respect for labor rights. *Democracy* also tended to be positively and significantly related to respect for labor rights in Model 3, supporting the theory that democracies are more likely to encourage and protect labor rights. Oddly however, *debt* was also found to be significantly and positively correlated with labor rights in model three, implying the greater a developing nation's level of debt as a percentage of GDP, the more likely it is to respect labor rights. Further research is needed to understand the influence of a country's debt on labor rights. As with Model 2, when more controls were added in model 4, both *judicial independence* and *regional peer practices* were found to be significant and positive. Given that the controls for trade openness, internal conflict, judicial independence, and regional peer practices retained the same relationship across all models in which they appear and two separate measures of labor rights, we can conclude they are especially key in understanding a nation's likelihood to respect labor rights.

Women's Rights and FDI Results

While the regressions testing labor rights produced a variety of significant results, implicating particular sectors and controls as important and relevant to the discussion on labor rights promotion and protection in developing countries, the results for the women's rights analysis produced fewer conclusive and noteworthy results. As with the previous tables, Tables 5 and 6 present the coefficients, standard error, and number of observations for each regression.[3] Table 5 presents the sectors as determined by the US BEA, with the first row representing total FDI flows and each subsequent row a different sector. The columns represent the different measures of the dependent variable used. The first column shows results for women's rights collectively, and the second, third, and fourth columns represent women's economic, political, and social rights respectively. The same structure is utilized for Table 6 that presents the results using UNCTAD sectoral FDI data. Unlike the previous tables, there are not multiple models to compare, as only one set of controls were utilized when testing women's rights. In the upcoming paragraphs, I will first address the results from the regressions utilizing the BEA sectoral FDI measures on each of the women's rights measures and then address the results from the UNCTAD data on women's rights. I will then compare the two findings and briefly detail the results of the control variables.

For the collective women's rights independent variable, only petroleum, food production, and industrial equipment FDI from the BEA data were found to be significant, with petroleum and food production FDI being inversely related to women's rights and industrial equipment FDI displaying a positive relationship to women's rights. It is important that is food production FDI, a low-skilled manufacturing industry had a negative relationship with women's rights, while industrial equipment production FDI, which can require greater skill levels, had a positive relationship, adding some support to the theory that high-skilled manufacturing investment may increase respect for women's rights.

[3] For full women's rights regression details, see Appendix D, tables D(1-4)

TABLE 5. Selected Coefficients from Women's Rights Regressions: FDI Sectors (US BEA)

	Women's Rights	Women's Economic Rights	Women's Political Rights	Women's Social Rights
Total FDI (WB data)	-.030 (.055) N=377/24	.010 (030) N=394/24	.004 (.018) N=400/24	**-.078***** **(.028)** N=383/24
Petro	**-.183***** **(.049)** N=216/23	-.034 (.034) N=229/23	**-.057***** **(.021)** N=231/23	**-.052*** **(.028)** N=217/23
Total Manufacturing	-.007 (.089) N=375/24	-.006 (.042) N=392/24	-.029 (.036) N=398/24	-.020 (.042) N=381/24
Food	**-.096**** **(.049)** N=320/24	**-.044**** **(.021)** N=334/24	**-.036*** **(.021)** N=340/24	-.035 (.027) N=326/24
Chemicals	-.024 (.064) N=342/24	.015 (.033) N=359/24	-.005 (.023) N=365/24	-.038 (.030) N=348/24
Fabricated Metals	-.026 (.067) N=228/22	.000 (.037) N=242/22	-.025 (.033) N=245/22	-.001 (.032) N=231/22
Industrial Equipment	**.118**** **(.053)** N=154/17	.047 (.031) N=163/17	-.010 (.028) N=167/17	**.088***** **(.024)** N=159/17
Electrical Products	.000 (.049) N=218/22	-.017 (.027) N=225/22	.012 (.015) N=230/22	.017 (.022) N=223/22
Transportation Products	**-.199*** **(2.74)** N=128/22	-.035 (-.780) N=137/22	.001 (-.030) N=139/22	**-.105*** **(2.73)** N=130/22
Wholesale Trade	-.071 (.053) N=329/24	-.019 (.030) N=341/24	-.010 (.027) N=346/24	-.040 (.029) N=334/24
Finance	-.034 (.037) N=271/24	-.031 (.018) N=284/24	.006 (.015) N=289/24	-.021 (.019) N=276/24
Services	-.035 (.048) N=265/23	-.025 (.029) N=278/23	.017 (.017) N=283/23	-.023 (.025) N=270/23

Note: Each cell contains the coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, and number of observations (N=observations/countries)
* p > .1; ** p > .05; *** p > .01

Women's economic rights were only significantly related to food production FDI, showing a negative relationship. Women's political rights were also significantly affected by food production FDI, though petroleum FDI was also significant, with each of these displaying an inverse relationship to the dependent variable. The negative relationship between petroleum FDI and women's rights could be linked to which countries are receiving US petroleum FDI, as many of them may be Islamic nations or nations with religious law that have a history of repressing women's political rights on the basis of religion. Of the three forms of women's rights, women's social rights was the only one that displayed a significant relationship to total FDI, with it being significant at the .01 level and inversely related to women's social rights.

However, once disaggregated, women's social rights appeared to only be correlated with petroleum and industrial equipment. As with the previous women's rights variables, petroleum FDI produced a negative relationship while industrial equipment FDI had a positive relationship to women's social rights, likely due to similar reasons as in the other measures of women's rights.

TABLE 6. Selected Coefficients from Women's Rights Regressions: FDI Sectors (UNCTAD)

	Women's Rights	Women's Economic Rights	Women's Political Rights	Women's Social Rights
Total FDI (WB data)	-.030 (.055) N=377/24	.010 (030) N=394/24	.004 (.018) N=400/24	**-.078***** **(.028)** N=383/24
Primary Sector	**-.159**** **(.062)** N=89/18	**-.072**** **(.036)** N=99/18	-.026 (.018) N=102/18	**-.081**** **(.033)** N=92/18
Secondary Sector	.076 (.103) N=81/17	.028 (.051) N=92/17	.022 (.037) N=95/17	.003 (.053) N=84/17
Tertiary Sector	-.036 (.060) N=94/19	-.017 (.029) N=105/19	.027 (.018) N=108/19	-.007 (.040) N=97/19

* p > .1; ** p > .05; *** p > .01

The results from the UNCTAD FDI data showed significant results particularly within the primary sector. The primary sector FDI displayed a significant and negative relationship to respect for women's rights collectively, women's economic rights, and women's social rights. Aside from the significant results produced by primary sector FDI, neither the secondary or tertiary sector FDI were significant for any of the women's rights dependent variables. This may be the result of limited data, those concerns about my findings and availability of data will be further addressed in the conclusion.

The most important findings from the women's rights regressions relate to the significance of the primary sector across most of the measures of women's rights. Petroleum FDI was significant for and inversely related to all but women's economic rights, and UNCTAD primary sector FDI was significant for and inversely related to all but women's political rights. The findings give support to the literature that suggests primary sector FDI and extractive industries are less likely to respect women's rights, whether economic, political, or social because of their reliance on low-skilled, easily replaceable labor, which could prevent women from gaining advances such as equal pay or social benefits such as investment in education or infrastructure by MNCs seeking high-skilled labor. Only the BEA FDI measures produced significant results from secondary sector FDI. This limits the strength of the conclusions that can be drawn from their significance as they failed to be verified with the UNCTAD secondary sector measure. However, the results do suggest the possibility of a relationship and so further study with more data may aid in drawing out the relationship. Neither the BEA or UNCTAD sectoral FDI measures produced significant results from tertiary sector FDI, indicating tertiary sector FDI does not significantly explain a developing nation's respect or lack of respect for women's rights, whether collectively or individually.

However, there were some control variables that were also significant and thus can offer some insight into what influences respect for women's rights in developing nations. *Population* tended to be significant and inversely related to women's rights, women's economic rights, and the portion of the women's social rights regressions run with US BEA data, suggesting more populace developing nations may have less respect for women's rights totally, though especially for their economic and social rights. The religious variables, either *religious law* or the *percent Muslim population*, also appeared to be inversely and significantly related to women's rights, primarily in the models using UNCTAD data. The inconsistency of the religious variables to be significantly correlated suggests that religion may not play as important a role in understanding women's rights as theory. Whether a country was a *CEDAW signatory* was also found to be significant, though inversely related with respect for women's rights, which is somewhat counterintuitive given that if a country signs CEDAW, it supposes they are more dedicated to protecting women's rights. However, it could also be the case that signing CEDAW, as opposed to ratifying it, may not motivate developing nations to protect women's rights and signatory status may merely be a political tactic (Neumayer, 2005). Finally, *judicial independence* appeared relatively frequently as significant, though most notably in regards to women's economic rights. The relationship was positive, indicating that a more independent judiciary leads to greater protection of women's rights, though primarily in regards to women's economic rights.

VI. Conclusion

My findings ultimately suggest that sectoral FDI can offer a more precise and nuanced means of understanding what industries—and eventually, what characteristics of those industries—influence human rights. However, my analysis sought to further understand not simply how sectoral FDI influences human rights, but also how it influences two lesser-studied areas of human rights: labor and women's rights. To do this, I built upon the body of literature by employing multiple measures for both FDI and for labor and women's rights as a means to control for possible false relationships. Unlike the extant literature, I included both sectoral FDI from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis and from the UN Conference on Trade and Development measures of sectoral FDI, allowing me to control for the limited time availability of the UNCTAD data while then controlling for the possible skewed results that could come from looking at US FDI data alone. In regards to labor rights, I employed both Mosely and Uno's more precise measure of respect for collective labor rights and the CIRI worker rights score which is more holistic and available across more years. Finally, rather than looking at women's rights as one whole measure, I also assessed the relationship to sectoral FDI by dividing it into economic, political, and social rights to demonstrate a possible difference between the three very different forms of women's rights.

The results found from running cross-sectional time-series regressions promote the theory that FDI can promote a "race to the bottom" in regards to labor rights, though only significantly within the primary sector. Secondary and tertiary sector FDI, when significant, tended to support the theory that FDI can promote rights, likely through the generation of new income, promotion of education and infrastructure, and the possible empowerment of a new labor force (Neumayer and de Soysa 2005, Blume and Voigt 2007, Blanton and Blanton 2012b). Various findings concerning my control variables also supported various strains of literature surrounding determinants of respect for labor rights. Notably that the more conflict and trade openness a developing nation has, the less likely they are to protect and promote labor rights, and also that higher levels of judicial independence and more respect for labor rights by regional peers are likely to positively influence a developing nation's respect for labor rights (Kucera 2002, Mosely and Uno 2007, Blanton and Blanton 2012b).

Interestingly, in the models in which I employed Mosely and Uno's measure of labor rights, my findings had both consistencies and differences with theirs (2007). Of particular importance is that my models found FDI to be negatively related to respect for rights, while they found a positive relationship. This may be a result of varying time ranges and differences in the countries we measured (though like Mosely and Uno, I focused on the developing world). However, the control variables are likely the cause for the distinction, especially given that the model that found FDI to be both negative and significant employed few control variables than Mosely and Uno's models and once I added in more of their controls, total FDI flows lost their significance in explaining respect for labor rights. Additionally, many of our findings were consistent with one another. Concerning trade openness and conflict, we both found negative relationships with labor rights, suggesting that even in light of differences in models, trade openness and conflict serve as important determinants of respect for labor rights and developing policy or action around these relationships may be important first steps in ensuring collective labor rights in developing nations.

In regards to Blanton and Blanton, who have offered significant research in the field of human rights and FDI, our findings in regards to labor rights were relatively similar (2009, 2012b). While their work tends to focus on the role of human and labor rights as a determinant of FDI, they do also address the reciprocal nature of the relationship, offering findings on how FDI might influence rights. Their method differs from mine, but in spite of this, my findings support their conclusion that total FDI flows tend to have a negative relationship with labor rights (using the CIRI measure). Their attempt to address the reciprocal nature of the relationship between FDI flows and respect for labor rights serves as an important contribution to the literature and while this paper does not address that hypothesis, its data and method could be utilized in the future to build on Blanton and Blanton's conclusion that the relationship is indeed reciprocal in nature and to confirm their findings that respect for labor rights can also serve as a determinant of sectoral FDI.

My analysis for the relationship between sectoral FDI and women's rights (holistically, and then disaggregated into economic, political, and social rights) produced fewer significant results. It did offer some support regarding the literature that suggests FDI in low-skilled or extractive industries (i.e. the primary sector and low-skilled secondary sector FDI) does not aid in the protection of women's rights, particularly their social rights—implying that sectoral FDI may be less effective as a means of promoting women's social rights over their economic or possibly political rights due to the economic nature of FDI. The women's rights analysis also supported literature regarding certain control variables, notably the influence of religious law or predominately Muslim populations on the protection of women's rights. The controls proved to be less consistently significant however, making it difficult to judge if any one control was influential on women's rights, whether taken as a whole or as separate economic, political, and social rights. Overall, my findings pertaining to women's rights and sectoral FDI suggests, like much of the literature, that continued research is needed to understand if FDI does have a significant effect on any form of women's rights, and if it doesn't, how might it?

The conclusions drawn from this paper are not solely for the interest of scholars however, and can have real implications for policy makers and human rights activist organizations. Concerning labor rights, my research suggests that while FDI in certain sectors may not be as significant if their concern is the protection of labor rights, other sectors may call for more action either to promote or protect the rights of workers. Because the manufacturing sector was primarily positively related to respect for labor rights, policy makers and organizations should look closer at these investors to see how exactly they may be contributing to respect for labor rights so as to develop a model for investors in other sectors to aid in the goal of realizing the rights of workers. Additionally, the mixed results from the tertiary sector suggest that policy makers and activists should pay close attention to investment coming from this sector because not only is it the fastest growing sector of investment in the developing world, but it could have both positive and negative impacts of the respect of labor rights in these host countries.

Though the results from my women's rights analysis were less conclusive, FDI and investors can still have a positive role in protecting and promoting women's rights. Investors do, in many ways, have the ability to decide to encourage protecting human rights, and with women's rights, this remains true as well. Policy makers and activists can push investors to pay equal wages to men and women, promote the development of women's education options, etc. My findings suggest that interested parties should not solely concern themselves with how investors may be inhibiting the protection of certain rights, but also how there are encouraging them so as to better understand and implement positive action plans, laws, and policies. Recent movements like that of the UN to develop guiding principles for businesses and nations to work together to promote rights offer a positive framework from which to continue to develop policy. While these are relatively recent endeavors and their success yet unknown, the need for investors and nations to collaborate in order to realize human rights for individuals across the globe is undeniable given the increasing evidence of the significance of foreign investors on human rights, as shown in this paper as well as others.

While my paper does offer significant contributions to the current literature and the debate by policy makers and human rights activist organizations on what the role of FDI should be in developing nations, it also offers a foundation on which to continue research in the field of human rights and FDI. In regard to all my findings, it should be noted that they were weakened by the limited amount of available sectoral FDI data, dropping the number of observations and countries to a relatively low number. In this sense, while my findings are in line with the literature and theory, it is necessary to qualify their strength given the small number of observations my paper was able to address. Much of the data was limited by time constraints because the UNCTAD data was especially limited, often unavailable prior to the year 2002 and generally not ever before the early 1990s. Furthermore, because I was concerned primarily with developing nations, they often lack detailed and extensive FDI data, further limiting the number of observations. In time, as more data is collected about the various FDI sectors and their flows, I believe the current findings in the literature, including my own findings, can be confirmed and strengthened.

Additionally, as UNCTAD data becomes more available, I believe it will serve as a more representative measure of sectoral FDI. While the sectoral FDI data provided by the US BEA is useful as a means of verifying the influence of sectoral FDI witnessed using other measures such as the UNCTAD data, it is still only representative of the influence of data coming from one country. As more non-Western nations have begun to engage in FDI and economic globalization, an emerging field of literature suggests the influence of FDI may in part depend on the country of origin of the FDI, and in line with this literature, I think that using the US BEA measure can only offer a slim picture of how sectoral FDI behaves on the whole. Because the UNCTAD data is representative of FDI from countries around the world, it offers a more accurate understanding of how sectoral FDI may be influencing respect for human, labor, and women's rights given investment now comes from countries across development classifications. In line with this, I believe an additional important contribution to the literature would involve exploring if FDI from nations such as China or India influences respect for rights differently than FDI from the US or other Western nations. While theory offers ample support for the hypothesis that it does, little statistical analysis has emerged (due to insufficient data). However, I believe that my paper, in using US FDI data, opens the door to continue such an analysis as similar data from developing countries' economic agencies begin to emerge.

Additionally, the literature regarding FDI and human rights—especially concerning labor rights, tends to be especially quantitative in nature, with few case studies utilized in the scholarship as a means to understand the relationship between the two variables. Given this, I believe a future endeavor that would advance my findings would be to have one or several case studies. A qualitative analysis could serve to fill the gaps in the quantitative analysis, notably, what the specific mechanisms are in various countries that influence and interpret FDI and labor or women's rights given that the quantitative approach fails to address *how* specifically countries or investors are promoting or repressing rights. Furthermore, a case study could serve to better address the reciprocal relationship question by better understanding the causal mechanisms at work within different nations.

In conclusion, this paper has sought to address an important question in international development: Does FDI influence labor and women's rights in developing countries, and if so, does this influence vary by FDI sector? My findings suggest that the answer to this question is indeed "yes." As more FDI and rights data becomes available, these findings can be strengthened and ultimately allow for individuals in the area of international development to better advocate for structural and political changes to encourage the realization of both economic growth and the protection and promotion of human rights in our globalized world.

VII. References

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VIII. Appendices

Appendix A: Human Rights and FDI Regression Results

Table 1(A): Human rights regression results, Model 1 (BEA Data)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Trans-portation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	-0.006	-0.006	-0.116	-0.159	0.008	-0.079	0.094	0.011	-0.256	-0.116	-0.012	-0.006
	-0.08	-0.06	-1.38	(3.04)**	-0.12	-0.78	-0.93	-0.17	(2.36)*	-1.34	-0.23	-0.09
GDP	-0.229	-0.699	-0.084	-0.17	-0.343	-0.368	-0.899	-0.852	0.07	-0.049	-0.527	-0.668
	-1.11	(2.35)*	-0.43	-0.91	-1.9	-1.04	(2.38)*	(3.34)**	-0.14	-0.21	(2.67)**	(2.94)**
GDP growth	-0.006	-0.004	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003	-0.026	-0.042	-0.005	-0.016	-0.002	0	-0.007
	-0.4	-0.21	-0.11	-0.05	-0.21	-1.37	-1.66	-0.25	-0.82	-0.14	-0.01	-0.42
Debt	-0.067	-0.338	-0.152	-0.31	-0.12	-0.644	-0.496	-0.323	0.134	0.099	-0.088	-0.186
	-0.18	-0.68	-0.39	-0.79	-0.33	-1.44	-0.9	-0.68	-0.21	-0.25	-0.23	-0.48
Trade openness	0.02	-0.041	0.028	-0.01	0.026	0.064	-0.028	-0.063	-0.555	0.037	0.054	-0.11
	-0.1	-0.16	-0.15	-0.06	-0.15	-0.3	-0.13	-0.34	-1.7	-0.21	-0.31	-0.58
Population size	-0.327	0.042	-0.447	-0.362	-0.235	-0.208	0.043	-0.002	-0.547	-0.457	-0.08	0.04
	(2.03)*	-0.18	(2.97)**	(2.24)*	-1.56	-0.81	-0.2	-0.02	(1.99)*	(2.09)*	-0.5	-0.21
Labor force growth	-22.334	-1.673	-20.377	-11.85	-17.713	-4.695	-39.41	-47.74	-80.446	-23.396	-7.866	-19.091
	-1.46	-0.06	-1.22	-0.65	-1.09	-0.16	-1.43	-1.92	(2.61)**	-1.43	-0.49	-1.1
Internal conflict	-0.917	-1.185	-0.979	-1.047	-0.972	-1.115	-0.944	-1.088	-0.922	-1.033	-1.134	-1.076
	(9.64)**	(9.63)**	(10.52)**	(11.70)**	(10.29)**	(8.88)**	(6.36)**	(14.55)**	(7.11)**	(11.01)**	(11.13)**	(9.74)**
Democracy	0.032	0.048	0.03	0.048	0.04	0.048	0.019	0.056	0.051	0.043	0.045	0.043
	-1.74	-1.78	-1.54	(2.73)**	(2.02)*	(2.47)*	-0.64	(3.54)**	-1.87	(2.46)*	(2.37)*	(2.33)*
R^2	0.37	0.4	0.39	0.47	0.43	0.49	0.45	0.52	0.47	0.42	0.48	0.42
n	500	265	489	420	451	299	212	291	175	429	354	354
N (countries)	26	23	25	25	25	22	21	23	23	25	25	24

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 2(A): Human rights regression results, Model 2 (BEA Data)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Trans-portation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	0.056	0.177	-0.028	-0.165	0.062	-0.094	0.14	-0.005	-0.329	-0.044	0.015	0.057
	-0.62	-1.53	-0.26	(2.69)**	-0.73	-0.93	-1.23	-0.06	(2.09)*	-0.4	-0.24	-0.63
GDP	-0.626	-1.13	-0.541	-0.408	-0.801	-0.546	-1.491	-0.881	0.425	-0.533	-0.806	-0.956
	(2.62)**	(4.05)**	(2.02)*	-1.65	(3.25)**	-1.55	(3.01)**	(2.63)**	-0.64	-1.8	(3.17)**	(3.09)**
GDP growth	0.002	0.005	0.01	0.014	0.008	-0.01	-0.027	0.009	0.005	0.01	0.015	0.003
	-0.09	-0.22	-0.62	-0.82	-0.48	-0.46	-0.76	-0.44	-0.23	-0.58	-0.94	-0.21
Debt	-0.088	-0.636	-0.08	-0.205	-0.102	-0.13	-0.368	0.058	0.737	0.103	-0.002	-0.231
	-0.21	-1.24	-0.19	-0.47	-0.25	-0.24	-0.64	-0.1	-1.04	-0.23	-0.01	-0.57
Trade openness	0.014	-0.257	0.025	-0.02	0.032	0.128	0.104	-0.276	-0.703	-0.003	0.063	-0.172
	-0.06	-1.03	-0.13	-0.09	-0.16	-0.5	-0.39	-1.21	-1.74	-0.02	-0.28	-0.77
Population size	-0.072	0.211	-0.107	-0.208	0.114	-0.056	0.513	-0.101	-0.918	-0.084	0.093	0.239
	-0.38	-0.97	-0.55	-1.01	-0.6	-0.2	-1.6	-0.49	(2.33)*	-0.32	-0.44	-0.97
Labor force growth	-7.549	-1.019	-10.853	-18.636	-10.716	-39.412	-27.684	-56.984	-129.849	-8.704	-18.545	-5.402
	-0.39	-0.04	-0.61	-1.09	-0.54	-1.28	-0.88	(2.05)*	(3.70)**	-0.44	-0.95	-0.26
Internal conflict	-0.95	-1.175	-0.988	-1.039	-1.001	-1.019	-1.029	-1.052	-0.875	-1.06	-1.119	-1.121
	(9.53)**	(9.99)**	(9.96)**	(11.43)**	(9.66)**	(8.20)**	(5.30)**	(11.16)**	(5.97)**	(9.65)**	(10.31)**	(9.75)**
Democracy	-0.056	-0.052	-0.055	-0.028	-0.039	-0.038	-0.009	-0.046	0.03	-0.031	-0.014	-0.029
	(2.21)*	-1.79	(1.97)*	-0.94	-1.31	-1.3	-0.21	-1.73	-0.61	-1.2	-0.44	-0.94
Economic Peer Practices	0.033	0.076	0.017	0.012	0.048	0.067	0.097	-0.035	-0.082	0.012	0.043	0.049
	-0.98	(2.09)*	-0.5	-0.36	-1.28	-1.5	-1.81	-0.86	-1.39	-0.28	-1.05	-1.1
Regional Peer Practices	-0.023	-0.015	-0.03	-0.037	-0.044	-0.022	-0.07	0.03	0.093	-0.033	-0.045	-0.015
	-0.69	-0.36	-0.92	-1.15	-1.32	-0.48	-1.16	-0.72	-1.41	-0.96	-1.29	-0.38
Judicial Independence	3.742	4.781	3.629	3.364	3.487	4.395	1.282	3.332	0.961	3.618	2.405	3.038
	(6.04)**	(4.72)**	(5.74)**	(4.81)**	(4.69)**	(4.49)**	-0.92	(3.50)**	-0.62	(5.00)**	(3.08)**	(4.03)**
R2	0.42	0.48	0.44	0.51	0.47	0.54	0.47	0.55	0.51	0.45	0.5	0.47
n	400	230	398	340	365	245	167	230	140	346	289	283
N (Countries)	24	23	24	24	24	22	17	22	22	24	24	23

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 3(A): Human rights regression results, Model 1 (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	-0.006	0.004	0.15	-0.001
	-0.08	-0.04	-1.34	-0.01
GDP	-0.229	-0.366	-0.643	-0.203
	-1.11	-0.91	-1.35	-0.74
GDP growth	-0.006	0.015	0.033	0.006
	-0.4	-0.56	-1.17	-0.22
Debt	-0.067	-0.813	-0.405	-0.299
	-0.18	-1.29	-0.59	-0.48
Trade openness	0.02	0.237	0.128	0.271
	-0.1	-0.57	-0.37	-0.74
Population size	-0.327	-0.546	-0.442	-0.649
	(2.03)*	(2.02)*	-1.54	(2.73)**
Labor force growth	-22.334	-97.337	-95.992	-76.368
	-1.46	(2.80)**	(2.65)**	(2.94)**
Internal conflict	-0.917	-0.756	-0.748	-0.722
	(9.64)**	(5.92)**	(6.22)**	(6.64)**
Democracy	0.032	0.063	0.08	0.067
	-1.74	-1.5	-1.94	-1.87
R^2	0.37	0.5	0.54	0.5
n	500	137	134	148
N (countries)	26	19	20	22

* *p*<0.05; ** *p*<0.01

Table 4(A): Human rights regression results, Model 2 (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	0.056	0.008	0.216	0.013
	-0.62	-0.07	-1.43	-0.1
GDP	-0.626	-0.962	-1.197	-0.83
	(2.62)**	-1.94	-1.76	(2.06)*
GDP growth	0.002	0.006	0.025	0.011
	-0.09	-0.2	-0.71	-0.36
Debt	-0.088	-0.569	-0.024	-0.389
	-0.21	-0.6	-0.02	-0.42
Trade openness	0.014	-0.317	-0.512	-0.2
	-0.06	-0.5	-0.9	-0.31
Population size	-0.072	-0.026	-0.05	-0.132
	-0.38	-0.06	-0.1	-0.33
Labor force growth	-7.549	-98.487	-96.356	-70.02
	-0.39	-1.92	(2.06)*	-1.63
Internal conflict	-0.95	-0.925	-0.878	-0.899
	(9.53)**	(4.38)**	(4.84)**	(5.10)**
Democracy	-0.056	-0.082	-0.044	-0.065
	(2.21)*	-1.17	-0.89	-1.03
Economic Peer Practices	0.033	-0.06	-0.092	-0.05
	-0.98	-0.86	-1.42	-0.78
Regional Peer Practices	-0.023	-0.017	0.032	-0.086
	-0.69	-0.45	-0.93	(2.23)*
Judicial Independence	3.742	4.276	3.52	3.445
	(6.04)**	(3.73)**	(5.22)**	(3.70)**
R2	0.42	0.58	0.64	0.58
n	400	101	94	107
N (Countries)	24	18	17	19

* *p*<0.05; ** *p*<0.01

Appendix B: Labor Rights and FDI Regression Results

Table 1(B): Labor rights regression results, Model 1 (BEA)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Transportation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	-0.976	-0.376	1.067	-0.007	1.405	1.176	0.07	0.326	1.99	1.077	0.06	0.701
	(2.96)**	-1.09	(2.23)*	-0.03	(3.50)**	(3.08)**	-0.14	-1.16	(3.22)**	(2.37)*	-0.23	(2.18)*
GDP	0.069	-1.376	-3.17	-1.476	-4.236	-2.044	-3.062	-2.349	-8.117	-2.916	-1.198	-4.524
	-0.07	-1.13	(2.22)*	-1.24	(3.87)**	-1.41	-1.25	(2.15)*	(2.38)*	-1.91	-0.88	(3.69)**
GDP growth	0.094	0.006	0.082	0.027	0.054	0.005	0.039	0.026	-0.023	0.015	0.01	0.027
	-1.38	-0.07	-1.27	-0.39	-0.79	-0.07	-0.32	-0.28	-0.23	-0.22	-0.13	-0.33
Debt	0.42	1.599	2.104	1.608	0.291	1.346	0.273	-0.93	-1.804	0.166	-0.611	1.859
	-0.26	-0.85	-1.23	-0.9	-0.18	-0.87	-0.09	-0.42	-0.42	-0.09	-0.29	-1.1
Trade openness	-4.38	-5.029	-5.722	-4.895	-4.953	-3.97	-5.819	-5.896	-5.509	-5.895	-5.001	-5.412
	(3.65)**	(3.52)**	(4.60)**	(4.41)**	(3.71)**	(3.94)**	(4.75)**	(4.51)**	(4.49)**	(4.44)**	(3.57)**	(4.94)**
Population size	-0.164	0.698	1.047	1.083	1.893	1.42	1.706	1.507	5.526	1.042	0.16	2.622
	-0.19	-0.66	-0.95	-1.14	(1.99)*	-1.27	-1.2	-1.39	(2.84)**	-0.79	-0.14	(2.57)*
Labor force growth	55.178	224.948	84.756	280.607	120.034	498.967	282.446	415.728	553.022	192.764	165.443	139.199
	-0.63	(2.85)**	-0.89	(2.78)**	-1.31	(3.99)**	-1.66	(3.49)**	(3.08)**	(2.16)*	-1.59	-1.41
Internal conflict	-2.085	-2.308	-1.725	-2.114	-1.91	-1.473	-2.846	-2.582	-1.952	-1.783	-2.276	-2.763
	(4.97)**	(5.24)**	(4.33)**	(4.85)**	(4.48)**	(4.02)**	(3.44)**	(4.64)**	(3.07)**	(4.12)**	(5.40)**	(5.91)**
Democracy	0.219	0.245	0.135	0.277	0.188	0.152	0.515	0.267	0.253	0.238	0.2	0.311
	(2.21)*	(2.59)**	-1.27	(3.36)**	-1.9	-1.36	(3.39)**	(2.03)*	-1.57	(2.52)*	-1.93	(2.99)**
R^2	0.29	0.36	0.28	0.32	0.32	0.48	0.41	0.43	0.4	0.33	0.33	0.35
n	401	231	399	341	366	246	168	231	140	347	290	284
N (countries)	24	23	24	24	24	22	17	22	22	24	24	23

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 2(B): Labor rights regression results, Model 2 (BEA)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Trans-portation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	-0.392	-0.015	1.216	0.388	1.114	0.944	-0.336	0.174	2.492	1.525	0.356	0.903
	-1.34	-0.04	(2.92)**	-1.52	(3.24)**	(2.23)*	-0.79	-0.61	(3.96)**	(3.84)**	-1.44	(2.90)**
GDP	0.574	-0.419	-2.08	-0.962	-1.722	-0.496	1.557	-1.092	-8.027	-2.336	-0.174	-2.234
	-0.61	-0.37	-1.65	-0.94	-1.6	-0.33	-0.86	-1.01	(2.51)*	-1.78	-0.13	-1.67
GDP growth	0.045	-0.006	0.072	0.006	0.026	0.016	0.003	0.01	-0.024	0.004	0	0.001
	-0.69	-0.06	-1.15	-0.09	-0.41	-0.19	-0.02	-0.1	-0.25	-0.07	0	-0.01
Debt	0.842	0.452	2.656	1.559	0.905	2.719	1.197	-0.283	-1.046	0.591	0.037	1.288
	-0.58	-0.24	(2.01)*	-1.16	-0.7	-1.6	-0.45	-0.12	-0.27	-0.47	-0.02	-0.86
Trade openness	-4.829	-5.361	-6.114	-4.644	-5.683	-4.764	-5.597	-5.579	-5.292	-6.424	-5.731	-5.741
	(4.98)**	(4.00)**	(6.72)**	(5.24)**	(5.96)**	(5.50)**	(5.54)**	(4.61)**	(3.93)**	(7.39)**	(4.90)**	(5.67)**
Population size	-0.945	-0.441	0.153	0.482	0.157	-0.317	-1.483	0.501	4.755	0.631	-0.843	0.776
	-1.28	-0.49	-0.18	-0.62	-0.2	-0.28	-1.41	-0.45	(2.52)*	-0.62	-0.86	-0.78
Labor force growth	118.781	254.188	133.133	228.705	198.782	363.54	192.74	330.934	385.282	262.437	214.412	169.606
	-1.72	(3.19)**	-1.94	(2.94)**	(3.06)**	(3.35)**	-1.48	(2.69)**	(2.17)*	(4.04)**	(3.05)**	(2.10)*
Internal conflict	-1.887	-1.997	-1.686	-1.939	-1.914	-1.392	-1.766	-2.435	-1.939	-1.911	-2.111	-2.233
	(4.99)**	(4.41)**	(4.79)**	(5.02)**	(5.17)**	(4.49)**	(2.41)*	(4.37)**	(2.98)**	(5.04)**	(5.63)**	(4.89)**
Democracy	0.024	0.123	-0.134	0.058	-0.053	-0.026	0.051	0.15	0.015	0.005	0.042	0.06
	-0.2	-0.76	-1.17	-0.52	-0.5	-0.19	-0.33	-1.04	-0.07	-0.05	-0.37	-0.42
Economic Peer Practices	0.151	0.076	0.06	0.219	0.055	-0.157	0.154	0.141	0.034	0.044	-0.026	0.16
	-1.27	-0.45	-0.49	-1.77	-0.46	-1.07	-0.81	-0.94	-0.13	-0.38	-0.19	-1.2
Regional Peer Practices	0.621	0.643	0.663	0.559	0.775	0.735	0.733	0.419	0.923	0.727	0.766	0.688
	(5.43)**	(3.82)**	(6.26)**	(5.22)**	(7.03)**	(4.72)**	(4.17)**	(2.47)*	(3.65)**	(6.32)**	(6.17)**	(4.91)**
Judicial Independence	10.981	6.29	13.949	11.063	12.993	9.747	18.325	6.285	10.317	13.738	10.185	10.78
	(2.93)**	-1.08	(4.21)**	(2.88)**	(4.05)**	(2.11)*	(4.72)**	-1.58	-1.5	(4.84)**	(2.90)**	(2.67)**
R^2	0.37	0.4	0.38	0.39	0.43	0.5	0.48	0.45	0.48	0.44	0.41	0.43
n	401	231	399	341	366	246	168	231	140	347	290	284
N (Countries)	24	23	24	24	24	22	17	22	22	24	24	23

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 3(B): Labor rights regression results, Model 1 (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	-0.976	0.48	0.855	0.256
	(2.96)**	-1.56	-1.94	-0.63
GDP	0.069	1.994	0.634	0.815
	-0.07	-0.67	-0.2	-0.36
GDP growth	0.094	-0.052	0.039	-0.069
	-1.38	-0.39	-0.26	-0.48
External debt	0.42	-1.63	0.453	-2.011
	-0.26	-0.74	-0.16	-0.76
Trade openness	-4.38	-3.428	-4.156	-3.718
	(3.65)**	(3.42)**	(4.64)**	(3.24)**
Population size	-0.164	-1.492	-1.487	-0.879
	-0.19	-0.51	-0.51	-0.38
Labor force growth	55.178	635.35	424.585	527.559
	-0.63	(3.23)**	-1.65	(2.25)*
Internal conflict	-2.085	-3.146	-2.931	-3.448
	(4.97)**	(7.99)**	(6.12)**	(7.64)**
Democracy	0.219	0.157	0.109	0.134
	(2.21)*	-0.95	-0.67	-0.86
R^2	0.29	0.37	0.36	0.31
n	401	102	95	108
N (Countries)	24	18	17	10

* *p*<0.05; ** *p*<0.01

Table 4(B): Labor rights regression results, Model 2 (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	-0.392	0.512	0.776	0.28
	-1.34	-1.68	-1.84	-0.72
GDP	0.574	2.011	0.321	2.155
	-0.61	-0.51	-0.08	-0.58
GDP growth	0.045	-0.137	0.002	-0.081
	-0.69	-1	-0.01	-0.6
Debt	0.842	1.817	4.681	2.261
	-0.58	-0.61	-1.33	-0.66
Trade openness	-4.829	-4.37	-5.059	-4.181
	(4.98)**	(3.46)**	(4.36)**	(3.81)**
Population size	-0.945	-1.288	-0.905	-1.927
	-1.28	-0.35	-0.25	-0.54
Labor force growth	118.781	505.032	189.452	414.51
	-1.72	(3.00)**	-0.84	(2.10)*
Internal conflict	-1.887	-3.176	-2.824	-3.308
	(4.99)**	(5.44)**	(4.76)**	(5.92)**
Democracy	0.024	-0.097	-0.198	-0.046
	-0.2	-0.5	-1.11	-0.25
Economic Peer Practices	0.151	0.146	0.219	0.21
	-1.27	-0.48	-0.61	-0.7
Regional Peer Practices	0.621	0.611	0.648	0.585
	(5.43)**	(3.03)**	(2.82)**	(2.65)**
Judicial Independence	10.981	11.651	15.001	8.885
	(2.93)**	(3.18)**	(3.65)**	(2.47)*
R^2	0.37	0.44	0.45	0.4
n	401	102	95	108
N (Countries)	24	18	17	19

* *p*<0.05; ** *p*<0.01

Appendix C: Worker Rights and FDI Regression Results

Table 1(C): Worker's rights regression results, Model 1 (BEA)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Trans-portation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	-0.08	0.003	0.057	0.012	0.055	0.044	0.037	0.056	-0.021	0.015	-0.019	-0.027
	(2.41)*	-0.14	-1.69	-0.51	(1.97)*	-1.43	-0.96	(1.98)*	-0.51	-0.41	-1.03	-0.84
GDP	0.134	0.07	-0.089	0.012	-0.11	-0.029	-0.206	-0.121	0.006	0.021	0.017	-0.021
	-1.95	-0.75	-1.04	-0.16	-1.37	-0.28	-1.26	-1.47	-0.03	-0.24	-0.2	-0.21
GDP growth	-0.009	-0.014	-0.007	-0.009	-0.006	-0.004	-0.02	-0.016	-0.011	-0.007	-0.01	-0.007
	-1.35	-1.31	-0.96	-1.24	-0.79	-0.43	-1.83	-1.88	-1.14	-0.96	-1.23	-0.87
Debt	0.515	0.368	0.554	0.558	0.541	0.457	0.319	0.528	0.401	0.537	0.579	0.548
	(3.33)**	-1.96	(3.70)**	(3.66)**	(3.50)**	(2.33)*	-1.53	(2.60)**	-1.29	(3.23)**	(3.43)**	(3.16)**
Trade openness	-0.257	-0.216	-0.37	-0.26	-0.339	-0.33	-0.325	-0.305	-0.491	-0.339	-0.287	-0.292
	(2.67)**	-1.76	(3.95)**	(3.00)**	(3.44)**	(3.40)**	(2.95)**	(2.96)**	(4.84)**	(3.30)**	(3.13)**	(2.87)**
Population size	-0.114	-0.055	-0.021	0.016	0.016	0.006	0.072	0.111	-0.078	-0.068	-0.01	0.003
	(1.97)*	-0.72	-0.31	-0.23	-0.24	-0.08	-0.83	-1.77	-0.67	-0.83	-0.14	-0.04
Labor force growth	10.485	19.427	13.889	31.586	17.642	39.313	24.042	31.852	24.839	21.334	24.101	15.558
	-1.34	-1.9	-1.73	(4.41)**	(2.25)*	(3.32)**	(2.28)*	(3.61)**	(2.11)*	(2.77)**	(2.70)**	-1.69
Internal conflict	-0.08	-0.093	-0.068	-0.092	-0.077	-0.058	-0.048	-0.077	-0.052	-0.084	-0.12	-0.097
	(2.12)*	-1.9	-1.76	(2.22)*	(2.02)*	-1.48	-0.79	(2.04)*	-0.85	(2.01)*	(2.78)**	(2.21)*
Democracy	0.037	0.054	0.036	0.049	0.043	0.035	0.049	0.052	0.038	0.042	0.044	0.047
	(4.35)**	(5.64)**	(3.96)**	(4.96)**	(4.78)**	(3.42)**	(4.37)**	(5.40)**	(2.91)**	(4.36)**	(5.36)**	(5.08)**
R^2	0.21	0.25	0.19	0.22	0.21	0.23	0.29	0.3	0.28	0.2	0.22	0.23
n	502	267	491	422	453	301	214	293	175	431	356	356
N (countries)	26	23	25	25	25	22	21	23	23	25	25	24

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table 2(C): Worker's rights regression results, Model 2 (BEA)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Trans-portation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	-0.029	0.038	0.081	0.016	0.02	0.032	-0.002	0.051	-0.01	0.054	-0.004	-0.029
	-0.86	-1.36	(2.28)*	-0.61	-0.62	-1.2	-0.06	-1.65	-0.2	-1.35	-0.21	-0.78
GDP	0.167	0.161	-0.024	0.139	0.099	0.091	0.214	0	0.042	0.052	0.119	0.268
	(2.08)*	-1.53	-0.24	-1.64	-1	-0.86	-1.12	0	-0.18	-0.49	-1.22	(2.02)*
GDP growth	-0.006	-0.006	0.001	-0.004	-0.001	0	-0.019	-0.006	-0.005	-0.002	-0.004	-0.003
	-0.75	-0.55	-0.09	-0.51	-0.07	-0.01	-1.42	-0.65	-0.44	-0.19	-0.42	-0.36
Debt	0.659	0.311	0.687	0.663	0.655	0.567	0.44	0.709	0.483	0.635	0.734	0.662
	(3.96)**	-1.61	(4.37)**	(4.10)**	(4.06)**	(2.51)*	-1.86	(2.95)**	-1.25	(3.87)**	(3.79)**	(3.74)**
Trade openness	-0.42	-0.427	-0.513	-0.376	-0.481	-0.472	-0.38	-0.497	-0.518	-0.499	-0.466	-0.448
	(3.86)**	(3.46)**	(4.66)**	(3.93)**	(4.19)**	(4.51)**	(3.33)**	(4.25)**	(3.49)**	(4.52)**	(4.65)**	(4.05)**
Population size	-0.182	-0.214	-0.102	-0.131	-0.154	-0.17	-0.254	-0.084	-0.195	-0.126	-0.138	-0.246
	(2.58)**	(2.47)*	-1.35	-1.75	(2.00)*	(2.04)*	-1.9	-1	-1.25	-1.51	-1.67	(2.52)*
Labor force growth	20.676	29.121	22.98	30.609	25.953	29.578	16.463	27.782	20.337	31.266	25.067	24.458
	(2.52)*	(2.92)**	(2.84)**	(3.62)**	(3.04)**	(2.90)**	-1.71	(2.95)**	-1.46	(3.74)**	(3.11)**	(2.42)*
Internal conflict	-0.09	-0.096	-0.075	-0.088	-0.087	-0.054	0.031	-0.075	-0.065	-0.096	-0.106	-0.074
	(2.30)*	(2.02)*	(2.06)*	(2.18)*	(2.36)*	-1.41	-0.45	-1.71	-0.92	(2.64)**	(2.45)*	-1.69
Democracy	0.022	0.024	0.015	0.033	0.022	0.023	0.026	0.032	0.01	0.019	0.026	0.028
	-1.79	-1.35	-1.25	(2.56)*	-1.74	-1.74	-1.84	(2.14)*	-0.49	-1.63	(2.36)*	(2.23)*
Economic Peer Practices	-0.031	-0.036	-0.04	-0.032	-0.037	-0.034	-0.022	-0.038	-0.014	-0.038	-0.031	-0.045
	-1.95	-1.94	(2.55)*	-1.92	(2.30)*	-1.71	-1.19	(2.06)*	-0.5	(2.40)*	(2.00)*	(2.71)**
Regional Peer Practices	0.049	0.074	0.049	0.045	0.051	0.066	0.064	0.048	0.028	0.051	0.057	0.069
	(3.32)**	(3.68)**	(3.55)**	(3.22)**	(3.11)**	(2.51)*	(2.75)**	(2.25)*	-0.95	(3.95)**	(3.30)**	(3.92)**
Judicial Independence	0.87	1.226	0.945	0.597	0.896	0.508	0.907	0.425	1.099	1.041	0.882	0.746
	(3.28)**	(2.12)*	(3.72)**	(2.27)*	(3.07)**	-1.4	(2.42)*	-1.25	(2.15)*	(3.07)**	(3.45)**	(2.60)**
R2	0.29	0.35	0.29	0.29	0.3	0.31	0.37	0.35	0.31	0.3	0.32	0.32
n	401	231	399	341	366	246	168	231	140	347	290	284
N (Countries)	24	23	24	24	24	22	17	22	22	24	24	23

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 3(C): Worker's rights regression results, Model 1 (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	-0.08	-0.009	0.007	-0.053
	(2.41)*	-0.22	-0.17	-1.75
GDP	0.134	0.048	0	0.073
	-1.95	-0.41	0	-0.79
GDP growth	-0.009	-0.009	-0.011	-0.022
	-1.35	-0.85	-0.99	(1.97)*
External debt	0.515	0.525	0.454	0.273
	(3.33)**	(2.49)*	-1.87	-1.13
Trade openness	-0.257	-0.529	-0.497	-0.475
	(2.67)**	(5.95)**	(6.53)**	(6.70)**
Population size	-0.114	-0.074	-0.038	-0.103
	(1.97)*	-0.6	-0.32	-1.06
Labor force growth	10.485	4.888	7.061	-3.656
	-1.34	-0.45	-0.62	-0.32
Internal conflict	-0.08	-0.17	-0.171	-0.186
	(2.12)*	(3.52)**	(3.65)**	(4.11)**
Democracy	0.037	0.052	0.053	0.039
	(4.35)**	(3.41)**	(3.78)**	(2.71)**
R^2	0.21	0.28	0.28	0.28
n	502	138	135	149
N (Countries)	26	19	20	22

*p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 4(C): Worker's rights regression results, Model 2 (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	-0.029	0.027	0.04	-0.034
	-0.86	-0.79	-0.72	-0.96
GDP	0.167	0.218	0.129	0.313
	(2.08)*	-1.11	-0.52	-1.47
GDP growth	-0.006	-0.011	-0.007	-0.02
	-0.75	-1	-0.49	-1.52
Debt	0.659	0.632	0.639	0.4
	(3.96)**	(2.80)**	(2.00)*	-1.36
Trade openness	-0.42	-0.536	-0.541	-0.504
	(3.86)**	(4.58)**	(4.74)**	(5.73)**
Population size	-0.182	-0.316	-0.274	-0.403
	(2.58)**	-1.34	-0.99	-1.57
Labor force growth	20.676	-13.867	-9.35	-11.751
	(2.52)*	-0.79	-0.5	-0.64
Internal conflict	-0.09	-0.117	-0.13	-0.158
	(2.30)*	-1.88	(2.21)*	(2.57)*
Democracy	0.022	0.069	0.069	0.065
	-1.79	(2.61)**	(2.74)**	(2.75)**
Economic Peer Practices	-0.031	-0.005	-0.015	-0.013
	-1.95	-0.24	-0.61	-0.61
Regional Peer Practices	0.049	0.044	0.024	0.04
	(3.32)**	(2.42)*	-1.06	(2.63)**
Judicial Independence	0.87	-0.008	-0.192	-0.169
	(3.28)**	-0.01	-0.3	-0.33
R2	0.29	0.34	0.34	0.35
n	401	102	95	108
N (Countries)	24	18	17	19

*p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Appendix D: Women's Rights and FDI Regression Results

Table 1(D): Women's rights regression results (BEA)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Trans-portation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	-0.03	-0.183	-0.007	-0.096	-0.024	-0.026	0.118	0	-0.199	-0.071	-0.034	-0.035
	-0.54	(3.75)**	-0.08	-1.96	-0.37	-0.38	(2.21)*	0	(2.74)**	-1.32	-0.93	-0.72
GDP	0.199	0.258	0.213	0.332	0.23	0.142	-0.186	0.05	1.071	0.488	0.223	0.15
	-1.02	-1.59	-0.75	-1.59	-1.01	-0.69	-0.88	-0.35	(3.32)**	(2.63)**	-1.24	-0.7
GDP growth	-0.021	-0.033	-0.016	-0.019	-0.013	-0.022	-0.024	-0.033	-0.037	-0.014	-0.026	-0.015
	-1.89	(2.09)*	-1.47	-1.82	-1.25	-1.63	-1.61	(2.39)*	(2.23)*	-1.4	(2.13)*	-1.67
Debt	-0.591	-0.641	-0.322	-0.412	-0.198	-0.964	-1.346	-1.426	-0.94	-0.004	-0.721	-0.336
	(2.12)*	(2.46)*	-1.11	-1.55	-0.7	(2.38)*	(4.09)**	(3.79)**	(2.05)*	-0.01	(2.16)*	-1.25
Trade openness	0.142	0.075	0.121	0.211	0.054	0.193	0.293	0.345	-0.003	0.165	0.245	0.12
	-0.89	-0.44	-0.75	-1.41	-0.33	-1.31	(2.20)*	-1.92	-0.01	-1.04	-1.2	-0.63
Population size	-0.387	-0.451	-0.383	-0.395	-0.371	-0.291	-0.335	-0.364	-1.046	-0.569	-0.355	-0.29
	(2.65)**	(3.74)**	-1.95	(2.50)*	(2.34)*	-1.81	-1.93	(3.35)**	(4.67)**	(3.79)**	(2.86)**	-1.84
Labor force growth	-7.529	-46.505	-7.182	19.323	-10.593	19.59	33.04	-2.059	-10.679	-4.531	-1.745	-24.453
	-0.5	(2.60)**	-0.45	-0.96	-0.66	-0.76	-1.74	-0.09	-0.44	-0.26	-0.1	-1.36
Internal conflict	0.053	0.099	0.062	-0.01	0.075	0.097	0.114	-0.039	0.148	0.023	-0.012	0.053
	-0.85	-1.32	-0.98	-0.17	-1.19	-1.45	-1.04	-0.55	-1.22	-0.33	-0.18	-0.67
Democracy	-0.062	-0.038	-0.041	-0.042	-0.054	-0.046	-0.063	-0.046	-0.083	-0.028	-0.026	-0.039
	(3.25)**	-1.63	(2.26)*	(2.43)*	(2.93)**	(2.03)*	(2.06)*	(1.98)*	(3.23)**	-1.69	-1.17	(2.14)*
Economic Peer Practices	-0.023	0.003	-0.031	-0.036	-0.024	0.01	-0.019	-0.038	-0.075	-0.037	-0.02	-0.013
	-1.07	-0.1	-1.41	-1.66	-1.19	-0.37	-0.64	-1.46	(2.04)*	-1.86	-1.05	-0.64
Regional Peer Practices	-0.014	0.019	-0.003	-0.004	-0.006	-0.063	0	0.045	-0.016	-0.005	0.001	-0.016
	-0.72	-0.69	-0.15	-0.21	-0.26	(2.10)*	0	-1.72	-0.39	-0.22	-0.07	-0.79
Judicial Independence	2.072	1.08	1.829	1.577	2.266	1.785	0.418	1.726	2.698	1.553	0.917	1.92
	(3.91)**	-1.15	(3.52)**	(2.37)*	(4.16)**	(2.91)**	-0.63	(3.22)**	(2.90)**	(3.11)**	-1.4	(3.11)**
Percent pop. Muslim	-0.008	-0.002	-0.007	-0.006	-0.01	-0.005	0.014	-0.002	-0.017	-0.008	-0.003	-0.008
	-1.74	-0.37	-1.53	-1.6	(2.53)*	-0.93	-1.44	-0.52	(3.31)**	-1.9	-0.58	-1.47
Religious law	-0.266	0.006	-0.246	-0.707	-0.006	-0.593	-2.477	-0.558	0.009	-0.234	-0.479	0.118
	-0.78	-0.01	-0.64	-1.58	-0.02	-1.54	(3.00)**	-1.56	-0.02	-0.71	-1.16	-0.21
CEDAW signatory	-0.098	0.147	-0.055	0.165	-0.056	-0.06	-0.337	0.515	-0.43	-0.114	0.088	0.176
	-0.41	-0.56	-0.23	-0.71	-0.2	-0.2	-1.03	-1.84	-1.38	-0.43	-0.24	-0.46
R^2	0.43	0.49	0.4	0.49	0.48	0.61	0.73	0.57	0.53	0.51	0.6	0.59
n	377	216	375	320	342	228	154	218	128	329	271	265
N (Countries)	24	23	24	24	24	22	17	22	22	24	24	23

*$p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table 2(D): Women's rights regression results (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	-0.03	-0.159	0.076	-0.036
	-0.54	(2.57)*	-0.74	-0.6
GDP	0.199	0.366	0.18	0.281
	-1.02	-1.84	-0.64	-1.25
GDP growth	-0.021	0.007	-0.018	-0.016
	-1.89	-0.37	-0.75	-0.85
Debt	-0.591	-0.474	-0.85	-1.208
	(2.12)*	-0.91	-1.08	-1.76
Trade openness	0.142	-0.123	-0.116	0.06
	-0.89	-0.75	-0.43	-0.35
Population size	-0.387	-0.426	-0.386	-0.375
	(2.65)**	(2.12)*	-1.63	-1.82
Labor force growth	-7.529	117.725	139.426	130.606
	-0.5	(3.48)**	(3.51)**	(3.27)**
Internal conflict	0.053	-0.216	-0.134	-0.154
	-0.85	(3.17)**	-1.83	(2.72)**
Democracy	-0.062	-0.082	-0.061	-0.053
	(3.25)**	(2.53)*	-1.54	-1.39
Economic Peer Practices	-0.023	-0.082	-0.105	-0.098
	-1.07	(2.16)*	(2.37)*	(2.20)*
Regional Peer Practices	-0.014	-0.062	-0.047	-0.06
	-0.72	-1.59	-1.32	(1.99)*
Judicial Independence	2.072	0.289	0.13	-0.11
	(3.91)**	-0.42	-0.1	-0.14
Percent pop. Muslim	-0.008	-0.003	0.002	0.006
	-1.74	-1.04	-0.41	(2.59)**
Religious law	-0.266	-0.721	-1.604	-1.577
	-0.78	-1.3	(2.36)*	(3.41)**
CEDAW signatory	-0.098	-0.899	-1.215	-0.884
	-0.41	(3.67)**	(3.49)**	(2.66)**
R^2	0.43	0.55	0.52	0.57
n	377	89	81	94
N (Countries)	24	18	17	19

*p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 3(D): Women's economic rights regression results (BEA)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Trans-portation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	0.01	-0.034	-0.006	-0.044	0.015	0	0.047	-0.017	-0.035	-0.019	-0.031	-0.025
	-0.33	-1	-0.14	(2.10)*	-0.44	-0.01	-1.51	-0.64	-0.78	-0.62	-1.67	-0.86
GDP	0.065	0.037	0.08	0.17	0.005	0.047	-0.033	0.029	0.214	0.16	0.19	0.113
	-0.67	-0.39	-0.56	-1.59	-0.04	-0.34	-0.25	-0.22	-1.08	-1.46	-1.74	-1.02
GDP growth	-0.011	-0.012	-0.009	-0.012	-0.007	-0.01	-0.02	-0.018	-0.018	-0.008	-0.014	-0.009
	-1.87	-1.34	-1.52	(2.26)*	-1.26	-1.25	(2.49)*	(2.52)*	(2.19)*	-1.45	(2.47)*	-1.52
Debt	0.01	0.023	-0.029	-0.026	0.079	-0.124	-0.262	-0.316	-0.348	0.143	-0.132	0.117
	-0.09	-0.19	-0.22	-0.16	-0.62	-0.7	-1.39	-1.96	-1.61	-1.13	-0.83	-0.82
Trade openness	-0.029	-0.119	-0.004	0.021	-0.077	0.035	0.055	0.062	0.139	-0.016	0.022	-0.055
	-0.37	-1.27	-0.05	-0.29	-0.92	-0.45	-0.68	-0.6	-1.04	-0.18	-0.23	-0.55
Population size	-0.167	-0.147	-0.155	-0.191	-0.101	-0.079	-0.203	-0.151	-0.279	-0.206	-0.227	-0.172
	(2.29)*	(1.98)*	-1.52	(2.29)*	-1.02	-0.77	(2.14)*	(2.01)*	(2.32)*	(2.33)*	(2.77)**	(2.02)*
Labor force growth	3.142	-4.086	5.321	16.223	3.568	27.963	20.66	10.32	7.471	6.351	5.825	8.947
	-0.38	-0.36	-0.6	-1.35	-0.36	(2.09)*	(2.12)*	-0.8	-0.55	-0.59	-0.66	-0.79
Internal conflict	-0.02	-0.005	-0.028	-0.03	-0.021	-0.018	-0.003	-0.08	-0.019	-0.031	-0.053	-0.031
	-0.64	-0.12	-0.84	-0.87	-0.59	-0.57	-0.07	(2.68)**	-0.35	-0.84	-1.34	-0.76
Democracy	-0.03	-0.03	-0.019	-0.023	-0.027	-0.031	-0.027	-0.026	-0.011	-0.017	-0.014	-0.023
	(2.95)**	(2.43)*	-1.86	(2.41)*	(2.68)**	(2.72)**	(2.00)*	(2.22)*	-0.85	-1.81	-1.26	(2.38)*
Economic Peer Practices	-0.02	-0.009	-0.021	-0.019	-0.02	0.003	-0.038	-0.019	-0.042	-0.027	-0.017	-0.032
	-1.67	-0.64	-1.65	-1.63	-1.75	-0.18	(2.31)*	-1.18	(2.09)*	(2.42)*	-1.46	(3.11)**
Regional Peer Practices	0.005	-0.002	0.002	-0.005	-0.002	-0.045	0.024	0.011	-0.002	-0.002	0.011	0.004
	-0.47	-0.15	-0.16	-0.42	-0.19	(2.44)*	-1.85	-0.7	-0.1	-0.2	-0.91	-0.34
Judicial Independence	1.063	1.113	0.867	0.702	1.029	0.856	0.088	0.81	0.44	0.849	0.44	0.919
	(4.41)**	(2.16)*	(3.55)**	(1.98)*	(3.98)**	(3.12)**	-0.31	(3.04)**	-1.13	(3.16)**	-1.36	(3.61)**
Percent pop. Muslim	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.004	-0.001	0.006	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003	0	-0.003
	-1.1	-0.38	-0.71	-0.5	-1.9	-0.23	-1.14	-0.65	-1.26	-1.61	-0.11	-1.24
Religious law	-0.158	-0.171	-0.155	-0.452	-0.005	-0.565	-1.035	-0.343	-0.112	-0.015	-0.31	-0.106
	-1.07	-0.79	-0.93	-1.75	-0.03	(2.65)**	(2.33)*	(2.33)*	-0.62	-0.08	-1.13	-0.36
CEDAW signatory	-0.332	-0.333	-0.309	-0.273	-0.414	-0.477	-0.326	-0.186	-0.405	-0.347	-0.287	-0.407
	(3.20)**	(2.22)*	(2.74)**	-1.74	(3.49)**	(3.04)**	-1.54	-1.08	-1.78	(2.45)*	-1.88	(2.32)*
R2	0.25	0.31	0.24	0.29	0.26	0.34	0.51	0.38	0.38	0.3	0.36	0.32
n	394	229	392	334	359	242	163	225	137	341	284	278
N (Countries)	24	23	24	24	24	22	17	22	22	24	24	23

*$p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table 4(D): Women's economic rights regression results (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	0.01	-0.072	0.028	-0.017
	-0.33	(1.98)*	-0.56	-0.59
GDP	0.065	0.368	0.263	0.363
	-0.67	(2.41)*	-1.44	(2.43)*
GDP growth	-0.011	-0.012	-0.012	-0.014
	-1.87	-1.27	-0.87	-1.22
Debt	0.01	-0.317	-0.407	-0.499
	-0.09	-1.34	-1.14	(1.96)*
Trade openness	-0.029	0.086	0.094	0.165
	-0.37	-0.69	-0.62	-1.48
Population size	-0.167	-0.36	-0.314	-0.356
	(2.29)*	(2.58)**	(2.05)*	(2.66)**
Labor force growth	3.142	54.927	62.312	62.394
	-0.38	(3.23)**	(3.33)**	(3.10)**
Internal conflict	-0.02	-0.104	-0.063	-0.075
	-0.64	(2.14)*	-1.21	-1.72
Democracy	-0.03	-0.027	-0.022	-0.018
	(2.95)**	-1.32	-0.97	-0.81
Economic Peer Practices	-0.02	-0.038	-0.049	-0.046
	-1.67	-1.8	(2.13)*	(2.11)*
Regional Peer Practices	0.005	-0.029	-0.026	-0.029
	-0.47	-1.33	-1.38	-1.71
Judicial Independence	1.063	-0.389	-0.344	-0.515
	(4.41)**	-0.8	-0.51	-1.14
Percent pop. Muslim	-0.002	-0.001	0.002	0.003
	-1.1	-0.43	-0.61	(1.97)*
Religious law	-0.158	-0.597	-0.94	-0.991
	-1.07	-1.82	(2.39)*	(3.43)**
CEDAW signatory	-0.332	-0.825	-0.925	-0.821
	(3.20)**	(5.17)**	(5.26)**	(4.57)**
R^2	0.25	0.42	0.34	0.4
n	394	99	92	105
N (Countries)	24	18	17	19

**p*<0.05; ** *p*<0.01

Table 5(D): Women's political rights regression results (BEA)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Trans-portation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	0.004	-0.057	-0.029	-0.036	-0.005	-0.025	-0.01	0.012	0.001	-0.01	0.006	0.017
	-0.22	(2.65)**	-0.81	-1.68	-0.21	-0.75	-0.37	-0.79	-0.03	-0.37	-0.4	-0.95
GDP	0.158	0.135	0.217	0.209	0.161	0.176	0.146	0.07	0.099	0.188	0.117	0.025
	(2.15)*	-1.59	(2.23)*	(2.60)**	(2.11)*	-1.59	-1.42	-1.01	-0.6	(2.29)*	-1.49	-0.31
GDP growth	-0.005	-0.007	-0.004	-0.003	-0.004	-0.009	-0.009	-0.007	-0.007	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005
	-1.27	-1.51	-1.27	-0.73	-1.04	-1.87	-1.46	-1.73	-1.28	-1.07	-1.01	-1.21
Debt	-0.177	-0.341	-0.103	-0.049	-0.125	-0.328	-0.227	-0.482	-0.589	-0.074	-0.173	-0.204
	-1.44	(2.63)**	-0.84	-0.53	-1.14	(2.23)*	-1.04	(3.20)**	(2.92)**	-0.58	-1.59	-1.68
Trade openness	0.259	0.235	0.208	0.235	0.207	0.211	0.269	0.313	0.228	0.195	0.189	0.198
	(3.27)**	(2.83)**	(2.34)*	(3.15)**	(2.52)*	(2.87)**	(3.29)**	(4.10)**	(3.34)**	(2.21)*	(2.14)*	(2.51)*
Population size	-0.098	-0.101	-0.136	-0.114	-0.108	-0.141	-0.063	-0.02	-0.081	-0.135	-0.064	-0.001
	-1.68	-1.6	-1.88	-1.65	-1.86	-1.71	-0.79	-0.4	-0.76	(2.01)*	-1.05	-0.01
Labor force growth	-5.439	-19.359	-13.028	-3.339	-13.097	-10.626	-4.818	-9.016	-6.796	-9.61	-0.174	-20.928
	-0.62	(2.40)*	-1.41	-0.45	-1.56	-1.04	-0.58	-0.95	-0.64	-0.97	-0.02	(2.45)*
Internal conflict	0.021	0.078	0.017	-0.002	0.017	0.046	0.033	0.023	0.03	0.011	0.018	0.034
	-0.85	(2.58)**	-0.67	-0.08	-0.85	(2.21)*	-0.83	-0.74	-0.65	-0.38	-0.8	-1.16
Democracy	-0.005	-0.001	0.004	0.003	-0.003	0.006	-0.017	-0.006	-0.034	0.004	0.003	-0.002
	-0.68	-0.16	-0.6	-0.39	-0.47	-1	-1.44	-0.72	(2.56)*	-0.64	-0.4	-0.24
Economic Peer Practices	-0.006	-0.007	-0.007	-0.012	-0.007	-0.011	0.004	-0.003	-0.014	-0.011	-0.015	-0.006
	-0.98	-0.76	-1.06	-1.87	-1.21	-1.09	-0.4	-0.32	-1.05	-1.53	(2.28)*	-0.79
Regional Peer Practices	0.007	0.014	0.012	0.012	0.009	0.02	-0.005	0.014	0.003	0.012	0	-0.001
	-0.92	-1.34	-1.59	-1.5	-1.13	-1.43	-0.3	-1.57	-0.2	-1.54	0	-0.17
Judicial Independence	0.389	-0.072	0.206	0.259	0.459	0.401	0.897	0.746	1.5	0.234	0.246	0.458
	-1.41	-0.22	-0.79	-0.9	-1.69	-1.42	(2.04)*	(3.40)**	(3.26)**	-0.98	-0.75	-1.77
Percent pop. Muslim	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.004	-0.001	-0.002	0	0	-0.004	0	0	-0.001
	-0.62	-0.85	-0.69	-1.92	-0.27	-0.83	-0.01	-0.17	-1.52	-0.14	-0.07	-0.76
Religious law	0.047	0.369	0.108	0.01	0.127	0.214	-0.076	-0.007	-0.081	-0.039	0.077	0.32
	-0.22	-1.65	-0.5	-0.05	-0.62	-1.39	-0.37	-0.03	-0.42	-0.18	-0.35	-1.42
CEDAW signatory	0.445	0.449	0.422	0.388	0.516	0.543	0.324	0.495	0.246	0.327	0.491	0.558
	(3.66)**	(3.01)**	(3.13)**	(2.48)*	(3.66)**	(5.93)**	(2.35)*	(3.38)**	-1.88	(2.49)*	(3.20)**	(3.40)**
R2	0.45	0.52	0.39	0.59	0.51	0.63	0.7	0.69	0.57	0.53	0.66	0.63
n	400	231	398	340	365	245	167	230	139	346	289	283
N (Countries)	24	23	24	24	24	22	17	22	22	24	24	23

**p*<0.05; ** *p*<0.01

Table 6(D): Women's political rights regression results (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	0.004	-0.026	0.022	0.027
	-0.22	-1.46	-0.6	-1.52
GDP	0.158	0.135	0.107	0.106
	(2.15)*	-1.39	-0.73	-1.36
GDP growth	-0.005	0.004	0.002	0.001
	-1.27	-0.82	-0.26	-0.09
Debt	-0.177	0.353	0.29	0.263
	-1.44	-1.6	-1.55	-1.43
Trade openness	0.259	-0.079	-0.034	-0.016
	(3.27)**	-0.8	-0.43	-0.22
Population size	-0.098	-0.111	-0.127	-0.128
	-1.68	-1.5	-1.31	(2.02)*
Labor force growth	-5.439	-17.226	-16.027	-11.788
	-0.62	-1.49	-1.71	-1.3
Internal conflict	0.021	-0.004	0.034	0.015
	-0.85	-0.12	-1.44	-0.64
Democracy	-0.005	0.028	0.017	0.019
	-0.68	-1.61	-1.24	-1.32
Economic Peer Practices	-0.006	-0.027	-0.03	-0.028
	-0.98	(2.08)*	(2.28)*	(2.51)*
Regional Peer Practices	0.007	0.006	0.003	0.01
	-0.92	-0.87	-0.45	-1.66
Judicial Independence	0.389	0.027	0.321	0.215
	-1.41	-0.14	-1.6	-0.91
Percent pop. Muslim	-0.002	-0.001	0.001	0
	-0.62	-0.86	-0.43	-0.35
Religious law	0.047	0.399	0.249	0.166
	-0.22	(2.47)*	(2.33)*	-1.45
CEDAW signatory	0.445	0.152	0.195	0.177
	(3.66)**	-1.94	(2.21)*	(2.72)**
R^2	0.45	0.78	0.57	0.65
n	400	102	95	108
N (Countries)	24	18	17	19

*p<0.05; ** p<0.01

Table 7(D): Women's social rights regression results (BEA)

	Total FDI	Petro FDI	Total Man. FDI	Food Products FDI	Chemical Products FDI	Fabricated Metals FDI	Industrial Equipment FDI	Electrical Products FDI	Trans-portation FDI	Trade FDI	Finance FDI	Services FDI
FDI Flows	-0.078	-0.052	-0.02	-0.035	-0.038	-0.001	0.088	0.017	-0.105	-0.04	-0.021	-0.023
	(2.82)**	-1.87	-0.47	-1.3	-1.28	-0.04	(3.60)**	-0.77	(2.73)**	-1.39	-1.11	-0.91
GDP	0.071	0.056	0.056	0.027	0.128	-0.036	-0.352	-0.105	0.56	0.136	-0.034	0.017
	-0.79	-0.65	-0.42	-0.24	-1.32	-0.32	(4.41)**	-1.23	(4.00)**	-1.44	-0.38	-0.14
GDP growth	-0.005	-0.011	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	-0.004	-0.012	-0.002	-0.007	-0.002
	-0.89	-1.4	-0.6	-0.63	-0.4	-0.26	-0.09	-0.59	-1.3	-0.43	-1.04	-0.36
Debt	-0.349	-0.281	-0.122	-0.185	-0.066	-0.324	-0.612	-0.397	0.073	0.004	-0.265	-0.132
	(2.63)**	(2.17)*	-0.84	-1.68	-0.48	-1.75	(4.48)**	(2.04)*	-0.27	-0.03	-1.63	-0.89
Trade openness	-0.005	-0.062	-0.072	-0.065	-0.074	-0.076	-0.081	-0.102	-0.258	-0.073	0.017	-0.073
	-0.07	-0.75	-0.85	-0.82	-0.9	-0.8	-1.07	-1.27	(2.41)*	-0.89	-0.17	-0.88
Population size	-0.153	-0.182	-0.173	-0.135	-0.202	-0.115	-0.02	-0.151	-0.493	-0.226	-0.085	-0.117
	(2.27)*	(2.57)*	-1.96	-1.48	(3.24)**	-1.25	-0.27	(2.04)*	(4.76)**	(2.98)**	-1.34	-1.24
Labor force growth	-5.31	-18.941	-2.153	5.216	-1.615	-5.69	10.61	-6.903	-2.541	-5.406	-6.891	-5.08
	-0.61	(2.48)*	-0.24	-0.6	-0.18	-0.54	-1.46	-0.74	-0.2	-0.65	-0.69	-0.6
Internal conflict	0.012	0.024	0.043	0.006	0.058	0.063	0.081	0.026	0.088	0.036	0.014	0.043
	-0.38	-0.58	-1.31	-0.21	-1.76	-1.66	-1.55	-0.63	-1.43	-0.92	-0.37	-0.95
Democracy	-0.024	-0.015	-0.021	-0.017	-0.023	-0.019	-0.017	-0.021	-0.024	-0.011	-0.009	-0.017
	(3.10)**	-1.29	(2.44)*	-1.86	(2.77)**	-1.67	-1.32	-1.89	-1.62	-1.4	-0.98	-1.93
Economic Peer Practices	-0.004	0.017	-0.006	-0.006	-0.002	0.012	0.011	-0.022	-0.018	-0.005	0.007	0.008
	-0.32	-1.23	-0.56	-0.55	-0.19	-0.89	-1.05	-1.8	-1.08	-0.48	-0.73	-0.64
Regional Peer Practices	-0.014	0.014	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.026	-0.024	0.015	0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.007
	-1.3	-0.85	-0.41	-0.56	-0.28	-1.56	-1.67	-1.04	-0.13	-0.35	-0.35	-0.59
Judicial Independence	0.562	0.605	0.638	0.459	0.795	0.678	-0.594	0.416	0.305	0.35	0.178	0.569
	(2.50)*	-1.26	(2.76)**	-1.62	(3.43)**	(2.24)*	-1.68	-1.28	-0.85	-1.4	-0.69	(2.31)*
Percent pop. Muslim	-0.004	0	-0.004	-0.002	-0.005	-0.003	0.006	-0.001	-0.006	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003
	(2.03)*	-0.2	(2.04)*	-1.42	(2.73)**	-1.11	-1.74	-0.51	(2.46)*	(1.97)*	-1.3	-1.32
Religious law	-0.222	-0.164	-0.228	-0.296	-0.202	-0.131	-1.07	-0.267	-0.085	-0.181	-0.265	-0.136
	-1.56	-0.9	-1.4	-1.75	-1.29	-0.86	(3.42)**	(2.37)*	-0.38	-1.21	-1.7	-0.76
CEDAW signatory	-0.096	0.045	-0.113	-0.007	-0.074	-0.081	-0.287	0.054	-0.213	-0.146	-0.053	-0.047
	-0.86	-0.37	-0.98	-0.06	-0.56	-0.66	-1.7	-0.57	-1.48	-1.09	-0.3	-0.31
R2	0.22	0.28	0.18	0.19	0.23	0.36	0.45	0.33	0.27	0.23	0.32	0.25
n	383	217	381	326	348	231	159	223	130	334	276	270
N (Countries)	24	23	24	24	24	22	17	22	22	24	24	23

*$p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table 8(D): Women's social rights regression results (UNCTAD)

	Total FDI	Primary Sector FDI	Secondary Sector FDI	Tertiary Sector FDI
FDI Flows	-0.078	-0.081	0.003	-0.007
	(2.82)**	(2.43)*	-0.06	-0.19
GDP	0.071	-0.107	-0.098	-0.147
	-0.79	-0.84	-0.53	-0.96
GDP growth	-0.005	0.009	-0.011	-0.008
	-0.89	-0.9	-0.97	-0.78
Debt	-0.349	0.16	-0.089	-0.172
	(2.63)**	-0.6	-0.25	-0.48
Trade openness	-0.005	-0.228	-0.194	-0.114
	-0.07	(2.94)**	-1.4	-1.52
Population size	-0.153	0.036	0.017	0.056
	(2.27)*	-0.33	-0.12	-0.42
Labor force growth	-5.31	56.238	75.426	65.782
	-0.61	(3.62)**	(3.49)**	(3.08)**
Internal conflict	0.012	-0.101	-0.089	-0.082
	-0.38	(3.14)**	(1.98)*	(2.42)*
Democracy	-0.024	-0.071	-0.058	-0.052
	(3.10)**	(3.59)**	(2.48)*	(2.40)*
Economic Peer Practices	-0.004	-0.021	-0.022	-0.019
	-0.32	-1.15	-1.05	-0.97
Regional Peer Practices	-0.014	-0.028	-0.016	-0.027
	-1.3	-1.5	-0.89	-1.74
Judicial Independence	0.562	0.972	0.676	0.496
	(2.50)*	(3.10)**	-1.3	-1.32
Percent pop. Muslim	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002	0.001
	(2.03)*	(2.22)*	-0.94	-0.55
Religious law	-0.222	-0.04	-0.605	-0.57
	-1.56	-0.14	-1.86	(2.30)*
CEDAW signatory	-0.096	-0.133	-0.364	-0.158
	-0.86	-1.31	(2.26)*	-1.02
R^2	0.22	0.53	0.5	0.49
n	383	92	84	97
N (Countries)	24	18	17	19

*p<0.05; ** p<0.01