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Melanie Mills Dunn March 29, 2021

Beyond the Boycott:

Olympic Security and US Counterterrorism from Munich to Moscow

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Abstract
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This thesis provides an interdisciplinary study that traces the evolution of international terrorism, Olympic security, and US counterterrorism strategies across three presidential administrations. From 1972, when Palestinian nationalists targeted the Israeli Olympic team at the Summer Games in Munich, West Germany and throughout the 1970s, terrorists attacked symbols of imperial power—like the US and USSR—to draw attention to their liberation struggles. These terrorists utilized modern technology to traverse borders, to train with like-minded extremist groups, and to seize the world's attention through what terrorism expert and scholar Bruce Hoffman calls the "internationalization" of terrorism. In light of these global developments, US diplomatic and intelligence personnel reviewed Olympic security protocols and revamped US counterterrorism capabilities.

Though international terrorism in the early 1970s seemed to be a foreign policy problem for the United States, terrorists attacked symbols of American power in the Middle East and slowly made their way across the ocean in the latter half of the decade. Separatist violence on American soil, perpetrated by groups like the Puerto Rican Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia sent shockwaves throughout the American public consciousness. The 1976 Montreal Games brought the threat and fears about a Munich-inspired Olympic attack to North America. Indeed, as the United States Olympic Committee geared up to host the 1979 Pan American Games in San Juan, Puerto Rico, the White House mobilized its newly developed security apparatus to counter the growing threat of separatist violence to the homeland. Yet, as the internationalization of terrorism and a growing jihadist threat converged at the end of the decade, US presidential administrations struggled to balance older, Cold War rhetoric and foreign policy with the new demands of counterterrorism. How these attitudes coalesced—and where they disappeared—during the 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott, ordered by President Jimmy Carter after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, reveals much about Olympic securitization, the evolving terrorist threat, and the struggle to define national security.

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Introduction

In July of 1980, British sports journalist and former Olympian Christopher Brasher was jogging along an overlook in the Lenin Hills neighborhood of Moscow when he was attacked and wrestled to the pavement by a fully-outfitted Soviet policeman. It took Brasher, the *Christian Science Monitor*'s Moscow correspondent David K. Willis informed his readers, some time before the runner "persuaded the man to let him go and convinced police he was not a dangerous terrorist intent on using the overlook to lob bombs down onto Lenin Stadium."[1] The chief of the USSR's Olympic Press services, Vladimir Popov, informed Brasher, when the Briton wondered why he was not allowed to run near the Olympic stadium, that the police "need to stop people from getting up there and shooting a rifle at Lenin Stadium across the river."[2] To the Soviet government, anyone—including an inconspicuous jogger—was a potential terrorist and threat to the safety of 1980 Moscow Games.

The security perimeter established by the Soviet secret police, the *Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti* (KGB), in the months before the 1980 Summer Olympic Games rendered joggers like the British Olympian a rare sight on Moscow's streets. Brasher may have been surprised at the reaction to his running faux-paus and the substantial police presence around the newly constructed Luzhniki Stadium, yet the immediate and overzealous response by the Soviet police was characteristic of new attitudes toward Olympic security held by both governments and sports fans since the deadly hostage standoff at the 1972 Summer Games in Munich, West Germany. This international terrorist incident, as the Soviets' security preparations illustrated, had irrevocably altered how nations prepared to counter potential threats

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[1] David K. Willis, "There he was, just jogging along in Moscow, when…" *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 31, 1980, 1.

[2] Ibid., 10.

at international sporting competitions. Yet while new terrorist threats changed the nature of Olympic security, traditional Cold War politics made the biggest headlines that summer.

In July of 1980, as Christopher Brasher was detained by Soviet police just a few miles away, Misha the Bear smiled placatingly down from the stands of Luzhniki Stadium. Nowhere on the recently-constructed field were fifty stars and thirteen stripes. Instead, only eighty competing nations' flags fluttered in the summer Moscow breeze. Athletes anxiously held their breath; years of training and sacrifice had led to the reckonings they stood to face in the coming weeks. Amidst the colors and cheers, under the watchful eyes of Misha and discreetly placed KGB agents, the Olympic Games were beginning. But where were the Americans?

For most US fans, correspondent David K. Willis' account of Christopher Brasher's run-in with the Soviet police would be the closest they would get to the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) had, at the behest of President Jimmy Carter, withheld American participation in the sporting competition. The committee's decision, much to the dismay of hopeful US athletes, constituted part of the Carter administration's sanctions against the Soviet Union which had invaded Afghanistan a few months prior. Similarly absent from the field were the teams of many US allies, who supported the American president's defiant stand. How did this scene, including its many missing Western teams, fit into nations' evolving understandings of international terrorism?

This thesis traces the evolution of Olympic security protocols and the development of US counterterrorism strategies from the Munich Massacre to the Moscow Boycott. The chapters that follow will explore how presidential administrations from those of Richard Nixon to Jimmy Carter defined and anticipated acts of terrorism, what task forces and procedures each administration established to combat extremism, and how evolving understandings of

international terrorism impacted US participation in Olympic Games and other mega-sporting events.[3] Ultimately, despite the massive Soviet military presence at the Moscow Games, and in spite of an emerging terrorist threat in Central Asia, President Carter made no comments about security before or during the Moscow Olympic Games. Nevertheless, a long history of terrorism and counterterrorism at the Olympics preceded the infamous 1980 boycott.

The first chapter begins in 1972, when the festive atmosphere of the Munich Olympic Games was marred by tragedy. A hostage crisis, which began on the night of September 5 in Munich's Olympic Village and which ended on the tarmac of a West German airport in the early hours of September 6, resulted in the death of eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team and their captors after a failed rescue attempt by the German military.[4] The terrorist attack, perpetrated by Palestinian nationalists aiming to draw attention to their struggle for independence, marked a turning point in terrorism and counterterrorism.[5] In response to the tragedy at Munich, countries ranging from the United States to the USSR created and instituted new, formalized anti-terrorism task forces to study threats and streamline responses to extremist violence. The calculus of Cold War diplomacy, long conceived as a battle between two,

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[3] Works like those of Timothy Naftali, most notably in *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, New York: Basic Books, 2005, similarly trace the counterterrorism strategies of presidential administrations throughout the 1970s. However, works like Naftali's only fleetingly mention the very tangible impact of Cold War politics on officials' definitions of terrorism. They additionally fail to mention the role the Olympic Games played as targets of terrorism and, subsequently, in the development of US counterterrorism strategies.

[4] For further reading on the organization of the 1972 Munich Games, including responses immediately following the September 5 Black September attack, see: David Clay Large, *Munich 1972: Tragedy, Terror, and Triumph at the Olympic Games*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012.

[5] Bruce Hoffman's foundational survey on modern terrorism, *Inside Terrorism*, third edition, New York: Columbia University Press, 2017 traces the origins of Palestinian terrorism and similar movements' interrelationships and strategies. In addition, Hoffman's work contextualizes global counterterrorism efforts.

competing global hegemons, had traditionally warranted the prioritization of domestic political concerns over the study of emerging global terrorism.[6] Yet in the years after Munich, American leaders attempted to balance Cold War, anti-Soviet foreign policy with their nascent counterterrorism strategies. As the US readied itself to send teams to the Montreal Summer Games in 1976, counterterrorism experts increased their efforts to analyze foreign nations' Olympic security protocols and collaborated with global partners. The Montreal Olympics, on North American soil, provided a barometer through which US officials tested the efficiency of their new security strategies and the strength of their international relationships. Working closely with the Canadian government, President Gerald R. Ford's administration provided logistical support to the 1976 Games and no major terrorist attack occurred. In 1977, as President Jimmy Carter took his inaugural oath, it seemed, perhaps, that terrorists were no longer an emerging threat to American national security.[7]

The second chapter marks a transition between both presidential administrations and administrative priorities. Presidential concerns about the development of international terrorist

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[6] Daniel Sargent's *A Superpower Transformed: the Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 is instructive of the calculus of American foreign policy during the final days of the Cold War. Much as Carter had in the late 1970s, however Sargent does not readily address the emergence of international terrorism.

[7] Certainly the Carter administration had other diplomatic priorities. For a survey of President Carter's general foreign policy, see: Scott Kaufman, *Plans Unraveled: the Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration*, DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2008. Other notable works on the Carter administration's diplomatic strategy, and in particular the impact of the Cold War on such, include David Skidmore's *Reversing Course: Carter's Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and the Failure of Reform*, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1996. Douglas Binkley explores the decision-making behind Carter's foreign policy in "Jimmy Carter's Modest Quest for Global Peace," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 6 (1995): 90-100. Yet perhaps the president's most notable diplomatic achievement was the signing of the Camp David Accords. For an in-depth account of the process, see: William Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1986.

networks dwindled as Carter adjusted the trajectory of American foreign policy shortly after assuming office. Despite earlier administrations' attempts to balance anti-terrorism policy with diplomacy, the Carter administration reverted almost entirely to conventional Cold War foreign policy in the late 1970s.[8] This move diminished the influence of American intelligence officials and the Department of State and amplified the voice of the National Security Council (NSC). Carter's closest adviser and the head of the NSC, Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, controlled of the trajectory of US counterterrorism for the duration of the Carter presidency. While the NSC continued to analyze threats, it did not attack the issue of terrorism with the same enthusiasm as had previous administrations.

Still, memories of Munich lurked in the shadows and terrorists were primed to attack close to home, at the 1979 Pan American Games in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Terrorism on American soil increased in the mid to late 1970s as well, as groups like the Armenian Secret

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[8] Scholar John Lewis Gaddis has produced perhaps the most recognized and robust volumes of work on Cold War diplomatic history. Gaddis' retrospective analysis of the Cold War supports the Carter administration's prioritization of US-Soviet relations over the emerging threat of terrorism. Gaddis argues that "[…] disruptions that were more difficult to manage—revolutions, guerilla wars, terrorism, economic rivalries, and the like—posed far less of a threat than a Soviet-American nuclear confrontation would have" during the Cold War (Gaddis 15). John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. Also see: John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, revised and expanded edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Some scholars, such as Michael Morgan, argue that the Cold War ended with the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975. See: Michael Cotey Morgan, *The Final Act: The Helsinki Accords and the Transformation of the Cold War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020. While Cold War tensions perhaps began to fizzle out in the mid-1970s, it is difficult to assign a clear end-date to the conflict. Carter's foreign policy continued to embody the conventional two-camp philosophy into the 1980s. Once again, David Skidmore's *Reversing Course* provides further analysis of the intersection between Cold War politics and the diplomatic efforts of the Carter administration. See also Sargent's *A Superpower Transformed*.

Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) attacked American citizens in the major cities of Los Angeles and New York City.[9] Still influenced by the new expectations of Olympic security post-Munich, and despite its marginalization of counterterrorism programming, the Carter administration committed to securing the 1979 Pan American Games held in San Juan, Puerto Rico and, later, the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympic Games.

To appreciate the full story of Olympic securitization and Cold War politics, the final chapter of this thesis looks beyond the Iron Curtain and into the Soviet Union. Following global trends, terrorists in the Soviet empire likewise threatened the safety of citizens and foreign visitors. A Moscow metro attack by Armenian separatists in 1977 serves as just one example of the increased animosity with which the Kremlin had to contend as it prepared to host the Summer Games. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which prompted the Carter administration to declare its boycott effort in early 1980, likewise marked a moment of heightened tension in the Middle East, and threatened to destabilize the Soviet regime and the security of the 1980 Olympic Games.[10] In response, the Soviet secret police built up its physical capabilities,

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[9] Bruce Hoffman articulates clearly the global anti-colonial movement which influenced separatist violence on US soil in the 1970s in *Inside Terrorism*. For a brief overview of Puerto Rican separatism in the 1970s, see: Sara Awartani, "Puerto Rican Decolonization, Armed Struggle and the Question of Palestine," *Middle East Report* no. 284/285 (2017): 12-17. In addition, scholars David L. Paletz, Peter A. Fozzard, and John Z. Avanian highlight the relationship between separatists terrorists and the press, including the F.A.L.N. See: David L. Paletz, Peter A Fozzard, and John Z. Ayanian. *The I.R.A., the Red Brigades, and the F.A.L.N. in the* New York Times, *Journal of Communication* 32, no. 2 (1982): 162-171.

[10] Gregory Fiefer explores the immediate impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in *The Great Gamble: the Soviet War in Afghanistan*, New York: Harper Collins, 2010. Scholar Christopher Andrew covers the proximate tensions generated in the region and the KGB's response in *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World*, New York: Allen Lane, 2005. For the longer term impact and the role of religious fundamentalism in the post-Soviet empire, see: Galina Yemelianova's "Islamic Radicalisation: A Post-Soviet or

procured new technologies, and cracked down on political dissent. Christopher Brasher's ill-fated jog in July of 1980 marked the culmination of a months-long effort by Soviet law enforcement to secure the Games.

Despite evidence of increased threat levels in the USSR, upon which even American journalists reported, President Jimmy Carter did not remark, publicly or privately, on the security threat to the Moscow Games. In fact, his administration moved away from the codification of the US counterterrorism strategy begun by Richard Nixon and continued by Gerald Ford. As Carter sought to justify his boycott in the press, and in so doing to garner the support of an international audience as well as domestic, political audience, the president did not acknowledge the Soviet security forces' mobilization in Moscow nor the Kremlin's subsequent human rights abuses. Instead, Carter's foreign policy team responded to events like the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with Cold War rhetoric.[11]

To go beyond the boycott and to analyze the changing nature of counterterrorism and Olympic security from Munich to Moscow, this thesis relies heavily on government documents, including memorandums, meeting minutes, telephone conversation transcripts, and handwritten notes. Internal communication between and across Presidential administrations reveals the nature of the evolving terrorist threat and the appreciation for geopolitical tensions maintained by the US government in the wake of foreign developments. Likewise, the public-facing statements of

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a Global Phenomenon?" in *Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union*, ed. Galina Yemelianova (New York and London: Routlege, 2010), 11-13. In addition, Ahmed Rashid traces the long history of radicalization and contextualizes religious fundamentalism in Central Asia in *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2002.

[11] David Farber studies in depth the interrelationship between domestic politics, foreign policy, and the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis in *Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter with Radical Islam*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005.

presidential administrations, including the Carter administration's boycott announcement, reveal much of the goals of their unique counterterrorism strategies. First-hand recordings, in the form of diary entries, in particular reveal much about Jimmy Carter's decision-making process and the president's understanding of terrorism during his time in office. Journalists' reporting on the Olympic Games, security measures, and terrorist events reveal public perception and help trace the impact nationalist terrorism had on both event management and global citizens' daily lives. Translated archival sources made available after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 provide a Soviet perspective on the mounting threat of international terrorism and changes in American foreign policy. Translated newspapers divulge the regime's framing of both terrorist attacks in major cities like Moscow and the US' intervention in the Middle East. Combined, the US and Soviet perspectives help unravel the complicated story of how counterterrorism efforts developed after Munich, changed over time, and ultimately presented themselves at the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games.

While the recorded history of the Olympic Games is vast, it is in no way comprehensive. Only recently, since 9/11, has attention turned to Olympic security and the implications of terrorism on the coordination of sporting competitions. While the expectations for the provision of physical security placed upon hosting nations changed drastically in 1972, the bulk of existing scholarship on sports organization focuses on the years after 2001, when al-Qaeda's attack on the World Trade Center in New York drastically altered global understandings of religious extremism.[12] Nevertheless, all scholars of Olympic security—political scientists, sociologists,

[12] Not all studies of Olympic security fixate on the post-9/11 era. Scholars Cesar R. Torres and Mark Dyrseon unpack the history of the Olympic boycott and its relationship to Cold War politics while Michael Atkinson and Kevin Young take a sociological approach to the influence politics have played on the development of Olympic security since the Cold War. See: Michael Atkinson and Kevin Young, "Political Violence, Terrorism, and

and historians alike—highlight 1972 as a pivotal year in Olympic history. In addition, those works that do explore the securitization of the Olympic Games are primarily based in the political sciences. Scholarship since 2001 has identified "securitization" as a response to terrorist attacks on Olympic Games.[13] Sports historians and researchers have identified and categorized so-called "mega events" as new targets for acts of political violence and recent works hold that the development of a subsequent "risk-society" has fundamentally altered the responsibilities hosting governments must adopt as they facilitate sports competitions in a modern political environment.[14] Other scholars have emphasized increases in government spending on Olympic

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Security at the Olympic Games" in *Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games*, edited by Kevin Young and Kevin B. Wamsley, San Diego: Elseview Ltd., 2005.; Cesar Torres and Mark Dyreson, "The Cold War Games" in *Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games*, edited by Kevin Young and Kevin B. Wamsley, San Diego: Elseview Ltd., 2005. Still, these exceptions are notable outliers and the majority of scholarship on Olympic security focuses heavily on the twenty-first century.

[13] For further reading on Olympic securitization, see Ramón Spaaij, "Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 33, no. 4 (2016): 451-468.; These trends reflect the data compiled by sociologist Pete Fussey and the influence modern media holds on terrorists' strategies. Comprehensive works include: Pete Fussey, "Terrorist threats to the Olympics 1972-2016," in *Terrorism and the Olympics: Major Event Security and Lessons for the Future*, edited by Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey, and Andrew Silke, 239-243, London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010.; Yair Galily, Moran Yarchi, and Ilan Tamir, "From Munich to Boston, and from Theater to Social Media: The Evolutionary Landscape of World Sporting Terror," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 12 (2015): 998-1007. In addition, see *Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games*, edited by Kevin Young and Kevin B. Wamsley, San Diego: Elseview Ltd., 2005.; *Terrorism and the Olympics: Major Event Security and Lessons for the Future*, edited by Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey and Andrew Silke, New York and London: Routledge, 2011.; Guy Sanan, *Olympic Security 1972-1996: Threat, Response and International Co-Operation*, PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 1996.; Austin Duckworth and Thomas M. Hunt, "Protecting the Games: The International Olympic Committee and Security, 1972-1984," *Olympika XXV* (2016): 68-87.

[14] Scholars Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor identify and expand upon this trend. See: Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor, "Mega Events, Fear, and Risk: Terrorism at the Olympic Games," *Journal of Sport Management* 22, no. 4 (2008): 451-469.

security in response to their new roles in counterterrorism.[15] Literature on mega-event terrorism and government response exists, yet scholarship, perhaps because of their famed role in the Cold War, largely ignores the 1980 Moscow Summer Games' continuation of these trends.

The study of terrorism as a modern phenomenon is even more broad. Older scholarship considers the Cold War dynamics at the UN which influenced global definitions of terrorism and limited the development of comprehensive international laws pertaining to the prevention of terrorism.[16] Terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman studies the modernization of terrorism and traces, across time, the development of terrorist strategies and shifts in ideology in response to developing global conditions. Most notably, Hoffman identifies the late 1960s and early 1970s as a watershed in extremism, whose proponents capitalized on technological advances and the decolonization of the Middle East and Africa to traverse borders and sow conflict before a wider global audience. The so-called "internationalization" of terrorism changed both the blueprint for terrorists and counterterrorism experts.[17] Historians have likewise consolidated primary source material similarly traced the evolution of modern terrorism through the eyes of terrorists themselves.[18] Further still, scholars have grappled with the definition and periodization of "new"

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[15] Richard Pringle, "Debunking Olympic sized myths: government investment in Olympism in the context of terror and the risk society," *Educational Review* 64, no. 3 (2021): 303-316.

[16] Bernhard Blumenau places the UN response to terrorism in the 1970s in its Cold War context. See: Blumenau, Bernhard. "The Other Battleground of the Cold War: The UN and the Struggle against International Terrorism in the 1970s." *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014): 61-84. Other scholars, such as Ian Shaprio, have connected American foreign policy after 9/11 to the earlier US strategy of containment during the Cold War. See: Ian Shaprio, *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy Against Global Terror*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. Nevertheless, works like Shaprio's fail to appropriately periodize the transition from the Cold War to the war on terrorism, which began much earlier than 2001. Instead, as this thesis will show, the shift in US intelligence officials' understanding of terrorist threats began after the 1972 Munich Massacre, during the Nixon administration.

[17] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Third ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 2017, 66.

[18] Historian Walter Laqueur's *Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda,*

terrorism in recent years.[19] The study of terrorism, while extensive, is largely retrospective and as such, often fails to address violent extremism during the waning days of the Cold War. Events like the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games, for example, do not fit neatly into traditional periodization; instead, as this thesis explores, Cold War politics informed the terrorism which arose during the 1970s and likewise informed government response.

Within the US, historians have identified trends in both terrorism and in government agencies' responses to terrorist acts. Recent histories of anti-terrorism strategies across presidential administrations highlight individual policies and programs.[20] This scholarship, however, rarely focuses on Olympic security despite the international sporting competition's role in the development of international counterterrorism efforts (the West Germans, for example, created their first dedicated anti-terrorism military unit after the Munich Massacre). Yet the changing nature of US foreign policy cannot be understood independently from contemporaneous domestic political pressures. As this thesis will show, the Carter administration's silence on potential terrorist threats to and security built up before the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics was part of a larger trend in American foreign policy, whereby presidents struggled to balance evolving national security concerns with traditional, anti-Soviet policies. Social historians have long built upon comprehensive histories of American foreign policy and strategies which trace US diplomacy across the twentieth century.[21] While numerous

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Hamas, and Other Terrorists from Around the World and Throughout the Ages, edited by Walter Laqueur, Naperville: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2004 is a notable example.

[19] See: Isabelle Duveystyen, "How New Is the New Terrorism?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, no. 5 (2004): 439-454.

[20] Timothy Naftali's *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*. New York: Basic Books, 2005 is perhaps the most comprehensive.

[21] For comprehensive and foundational scholarship on American foreign policy, see: Walter LaFeber, *The American Age: United States Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad Since 1750*, New York: Norton, 1989. For specifics on US Middle East policy beyond Douglas

scholars have characterized Jimmy Carter's approach to diplomacy and domestic politics in light of these works, few have addressed the intersection between Carter's political anxieties and the White House's counterterrorism strategy.[22] Yet domestic politics and traditional Cold War apprehension of Soviet aggression informed and shaped the 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott.[23] Though terrorism and Soviet aggression were not mutually exclusive, President Carter utilized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to draw a diplomatic line in the sand, calling upon rhetoric reminiscent of that during the height of the Cold War to establish moral and political authority in lieu of addressing global terrorism. Carter's boycott should be understood in light of the mounting domestic political tensions, to which the Iranian hostage crisis and geopolitical instability in the Middle East only added, with which his administration grappled in the 1970s.[24]

Little's *American Orientalism*, see: George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, Durham: Duke University Press, 1990.

[22] In addition to the notable works on Carter's foreign policy previously mentioned, accessible works on the Carter presidency include Stuart Eizenstat's *President Carter: The White House Years*, New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2018.

[23] Nicholas Evan Sarantakes provides perhaps the most comprehensive study of the 1980 Moscow Olympic boycott to date. See: Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. In addition, Scholar Ray Morrison attempts to trace the Carter administration's boycott efforts through a contents analysis and bibliography of government documents. See: Ray L. Morrison, "Government Documents Relating to the 1980 Olympic Games Boycott. A Contents Analysis and Bibliography," Bibliography, Graduate School of Library and Information Science, University of Illinois, 1982. Yet, Morrison and Sarantakes' works both fail to mention the securitization of the Olympic Games and the role the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan held on the fomentation of terrorism in the Soviet Union.

[24] See: David Farber, *Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter with Radical Islam*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005. In addition to Farber's social and political history, which focuses on the Carter administration's response to the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, notable studies on the US-Iranian relationship and the Carter administration's attitude toward Iran include Barry Rubin's *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. See also: Javier Gil Guerrero, *The Carter Administration & the Fall of Iran's Pahlavi Dynasty: US-Iran Relations on the Brink of the 1979 Revolution*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. For a broader survey of American foreign policy in the

Facing a so-called "crisis of confidence" at home, Carter's decisive stand against the Soviet Union was meant to revive the image of America as a global power.[25] The 1980 Olympics, however, went on despite the missing American athletes.

Within the Soviet Union, historians have described the organization, including the build-up of police presence, of the 1980 Moscow Games.[26] Soviet scholarship prioritizes archival evidence only made available following the breakup of the USSR. Those with access explore the Soviets' security concerns surrounding the 1984 LA Summer Olympic Games and the government's rhetoric pertaining to both boycotts.[27] Others utilize extensive primary source documentation and reveal, with the help of former KGB agents, the organization, strategy, and goals of the Soviet secret police during the 1970s.[28] Following the collapse of the Soviet empire

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Middle East, see: Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, Third ed., Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2008.

[25] See Sarantakes for more on the domestic impetus behind the Carter administration's boycott decision and strategy. Natasha Zaretsky also provides in *No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-1980*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007 historical context for the crisis of confidence that gripped the American public in the 1970s. While cultural histories like *No Direction Home* masterfully trace the responses of American citizens to global events like the Vietnam War, they fail to mention terrorism outside the context of the Iranian hostage crisis. Instead, international terrorism, Zaretsky contends, "anticipated the end of the emergence of a post-Cold War order" (Zaretsky 20). The threats of nationalism and religious fundamentalism, this thesis shows, began long before the official end of the Cold War or the establishment of a so-called "post-Cold War order."

[26] See: Jenifer Parks, "Red Sport, Red Tape: The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, 1952-1980," PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009.; Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," *Russian History* 43, no. 3-4 (2016): 394-423.

[27] Evelyn Mertin, "The Soviet Union and the Olympic Games of 1980 and 1984: Explaining the Boycotts to Their Own People," in *East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War*, edited by Stephen Wagg and David L. Andrews, 235-252, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007.

[28] Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II: the KGB and the World*, New York: Allen Lane, 2005.

in 1991, political scientists have highlighted the role the Soviet Union's ethnic policies played in the development of religious fundamentalism in Central Asia and the Middle East.[29] Further still, scholars attempt to untangle the complex interrelationship between Soviet psychology and the utilization of the 1980 Olympic Games to bolster the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.[30] The Soviet perspective remains instructive in the ways Olympic securitization developed to meet evolving threats and highlights the relationship between Cold War politics, ethnic nationalism, and a rapidly developing notion of religious fundamentalism. However, American historical scholarship neglects to engage with the perspectives of those behind the Iron Curtain, instead understanding developments at the end of the Cold War, like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, through the public and often imprecise narratives of events like the 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott.

The study of terrorism and counterterrorism, as this thesis will show, warrants an interdisciplinary approach that traces the changes in security expectations over time. More importantly, existing scholarship fails to consider how concerns about terrorism, if they existed, shaped the Carter administration's decision to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. Blinded by the traditional Cold War narrative, the scholarly community has failed to appreciate changing definitions of terrorism throughout the late 1970s. Existing literature neglects to

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[29] See: Galina Yemelianova, "Islamic Radicalisation: A Post-Soviet, or a Global Phenomenon?," in *Radical Islam in the Former Soviet Union*, ed. Galina Yemelianova (New York and London: Routledge, 2010), 11-30. For further reading on the rise of religious fundamentalism in the post-Soviet empire, see: Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2002.; Matthew Crosston, *Fostering Fundamentalism: Terrorism, Democracy and American Engagement in Central Asia*, Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2006.

[30] Nina Kramareva and Jonathan Grix, "'War and Peace' at the 1980 Moscow and 2014 Sochi Olympics: The Role of Hard and Soft Power in Russian Identity," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 35, no. 14 (2018): 1407-1427.

highlight the complex interrelationship between Cold War rhetoric and anti-terrorism policy with which US presidential administrations from Nixon to Carter struggled to balance. The threat of violence, even if acts of terrorism did not actually occur, held national security implications that spanned presidential administrations. The chapters that follow will explore the emergence of modern terrorism and counterterrorism, will address administrations' competing security priorities, and, most importantly, go beyond the boycott to understand the essence of modern Olympic security.

Chapter One

"We Shall Have to Live With Terrorism"

Munich and the Making of a Counterterrorism Strategy

Short, staccato messages flooded US diplomatic and intelligence communication channels on September 5, 1972. "Terrorist attack on Israelis at Olympic Games has stunned Israeli public, which is being informed of events by continuous special radio bulletins," cabled the American embassy in Tel Aviv to the Secretary of State in Washington, D.C. "Comment. Expect that if more Israeli lives lost, reaction in Israel will be extremely bitter. Olympics and performance of Israeli team have been matter of high publicinterest [sic] here."[31] American officials in Germany, likewise stunned, quickly tried to piece together the events of the evening. "From news reports and initial talks with local officials," the embassy in Munich informed D.C., US Foreign Service Officers had "pieced together the following details on Arab terrorist raid on Israeli Olympic team living quarters."[32] The details that followed, however, failed to provide any clarification.

By that evening, the situation in Munich remained unclear. The world watched in horror, as, much like the Israeli citizens to whom the Tel Aviv embassy referred, Olympic viewers witnessed in real time a terrorist attack that would change the international political landscape. The "Munich Massacre" began in the early hours of the morning when, as the American embassy

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[31] Joseph O. Zurhellen, "Terrorist Attack at Munich Games – Israeli Reactions," September 5, 1972, Central Foreign Policy File (Subject-Numeric File), Germ. W 1/1/70, CUL 15-1, Box 372, Department of State Central Files, 1906-1979, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 1-2.

[32] Edward W. Doherty, "Arab Nationalists Raid on Israeli Olympic Headquarters," September 5, 1972, Central Foreign Policy File (Subject-Numeric File), Germ. W 1/1/70, CUL 15-1, Box 372, Department of State Central Files, 1906-1979, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 1.

in Munich telegraphed to D.C., "five Arab nationalists armed with submachine guns forced their way into the Israeli Olympic team living quarters in Olympic Village under unknown circumstances."[33] Immediately, the responsible Palestinian terrorists killed two of the athletes. A group with ties to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Black September Organization (BSO), held a remainder of nine Israeli athletes hostage until a failed rescue attempt by the German police ended in bloodshed. The hostage crisis was unprecedented and the confusion was palpable. In its frantic message to Foggy Bottom, the Munich embassy mistakenly referred to the terrorists as members of "Black November."[34]

Much to the chagrin of the West German police but to the merriment of BSO, the whole spectacle was transmitted in real time into the living rooms of millions around the world who had gathered around their television sets to watch the Olympic Games. An estimated six thousand print, radio, and television reporters combined with an audience of nearly one billion people around the world witnessed Black September's assault on the Israeli Olympic team on the night of September 5, 1972.[35] The presence of journalists and news cameras at the major sporting event had been just what the terrorists had in mind when they designed their plan of attack. While the terrorists made concessional demands—including the release of Palestinian prisoners and safe passage to the Middle East—the primary goal of BSO's Munich attack was to "make the world pay attention to us."[36] The group intended, as they explained after the fact, to arouse international interest in the Palestinian struggle for self-determination. "A bomb in the White

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[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, Third ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 2017, 71.
[36] Yair Galily, Moran Yarchi, and Ilan Tamir, "From Munich to Boston, and from Theater to Social Media: The Evolutionary Landscape of World Sporting Terror," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 12 (2015): 1000.

House," BSO infamously communicated following its "successful" Munich operation, "a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao Tse-tung, an earthquake in Paris could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in the world like the Operation at Munich."[37]

In 1972, the Soviet Union remained the biggest threat to American global hegemony, yet US officials, following the Munich Massacre, recognized the threat now posed by revolutionary terrorist groups. Likewise, policymakers felt compelled to respond to this seemingly new foreign policy problem. The Cold War was in no way over, yet a new war—the war on terrorism—was in its early stages. To craft its strategy, the US government balanced its traditional priorities with anti-terrorism efforts as decolonization in the Middle East and parts of Asia fostered separatist and ethno-nationalist violence. Many of these anti-terrorism endeavors required external cooperation with foreign powers, and Nixon tasked the Department of State with adapting US foreign policy to respond to the root of terrorists' grievances. Less than a year after the Munich attacks, American officials in Lebanon lamented that, "We shall have to live with terrorism so long as [the] present situation in the Middle East continues."[38] The challenge after 1972, then, was in generating a counterterrorism strategy that addressed both the practical security risks associated with terrorism after Munich, including at the Olympics and other international athletic competitions, and the ideological roots of extremism. In addition, the Nixon administration still needed to balance these newfound concerns with established Cold War anxieties.

The Cold War and the emerging terrorist threat were intertwined. The most active and visible terrorist groups in the late 1960s and early 1970s drafted their manifestos in the spirit of

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[37] Ibid.

[38] William B. Buffman, "Analysis of Black September Operational Planning and Preparation," April 3, 1973, Central Foreign Policy File (Subject-Numeric File), POL 13-10 (Arab), Department of State Central Files, 1906-1979, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 3.

revolutionary socialism and the new threat, despite its unpredictably violent nature, espoused the familiar Marxist language the USSR maintained throughout the Cold War. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a predecessor of Black September, captured global attention as its militants hijacked airplanes and bombed embassies from 1968 through 1977, articulating socialist rhetoric in their manifestos and press releases. They argued that many ethnic Muslims in the Middle East were part of the "bourgeoisie" and were "not prepared to sacrifice their own interests or to risk their privileges" on behalf of a Palestinian cause.[39] Instead, the PFLP argued that Arab states were complicit in the oppression of Palestinian interests, having come "to power through military coups and without any activity on the part of the masses," and that "guerillas must take steps to transform their actions into a people's war with clear goals."[40] The ultimate goal of many of these ethno-nationalist organizations, Iranian socialist Bizham Jazani argued, was to utilize violent strategies to ensure "the total mobilization of the masses in an armed movement."[41] Much as the Russian revolutionaries had fashioned themselves at the start of the twentieth century, revolutionary terrorist groups saw their efforts as those of a vanguard class, bringing liberation to comrades oppressed by imperialist forces. The United States, the greatest symbol of Western domination since the collapse of the British empire in the mid-century, would become the primary target of their grievances. To counter these new threats, the US government developed the nation's first official counterterrorism program.

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[39] "Platform of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine," in *Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists From Around the World and Throughout the Ages*, ed. Walter Laqueur (Naperville: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2004), 149.

[40] Ibid., 149-150.

[41] Bizham Jazani, "Armed Struggle in Iran," in *Voices of Terror: Manifestos, Writings and Manuals of Al Qaeda, Hamas, and Other Terrorists From Around the World and Throughout the Ages*, ed. Walter Laqueur (Naperville: Sourcebooks, Inc., 2004), 161.

A few weeks after the Munich attack, President Richard Nixon drafted a memorandum titled "Action to Combat Terrorism," for distribution to the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, the Directors of Central Intelligence and the FBI, the Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and Domestic Affairs, and the Attorney General. "I consider it to be of the utmost importance," the president wrote, "that we move urgently and efficiently to attack this worldwide problem."[42] Nixon's looping signature marked, at the bottom of the memorandum, the White House's commitment to the development of a new foreign policy. This policy included the newly christened "Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism" (CCCT) which Nixon commissioned in a sequential memorandum that day.[43] With a final stroke of his pen, the president changed the trajectory of US counterterrorism strategy which from 1972 onward was marked by interagency coordination, transnational partnerships, and a growing emphasis on intelligence gathering and dissemination.

The White House and its new task force, including the CCCT's subgroup, the Working Group, prioritized diplomacy as they postured the United States to confront the surge of international terrorism cascading through Europe which was inching its way across the Atlantic and closer to home as the decade progressed. These strategies, which began under Nixon and continued to direct foreign policy as the Oval Office changed tenants and President Gerald Ford exercised control over US anti-terrorism priorities beginning in 1974, stemmed directly from the Munich Massacre of 1972 and reflected a broader trend both around the globe and in US policy. Most notably, they marked a unique period during the Cold War where the United States, still at

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[42] Richard Nixon, "Action to Combat Terrorism [Attached to Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies Entitled "Action to Combat Terrorism"]," September 25, 1972, Country Files – Middle East, Israel Vol. 10, Box 609, National Security Council Files, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, 1.

[43] Ibid., 2.

odds with the Soviet Union, nevertheless began to shift and balance its priorities and even, at times, cooperate with the USSR on matters of international security.

Despite Nixon's formation of the CCCT and its Working Group, international cooperation remained the primary stratagem of the US government in the weeks and months after the 1972 Munich attack. On the phone with the Israeli ambassador to the United States on the 6th of September, 1972, US statesman Henry Kissinger remarked that the US intended to address the United Nation's Security Council "about countries harboring terrorist groups" and to "focus the problem on an issue on which we can talk jointly […]"[44] This directive came straight from Nixon, Kissinger informed Ambassador—and future Israeli prime minister—Yitzhak Rabin.[45] Still, despite the president's desire to spearhead international talks, the United States was not entirely ready to abandon the opportunity to exploit the Munich attack to further its Cold War agenda. "Now we would take the initiative and in fact we wouldn't focus it exclusively on you," Kissinger told Rabin. "We would say this is an example of a general world problem and this way we can put the Chinese and the Russians on the spot."[46] Yet, in the days following Munich and despite Kissinger's desire to manipulate the situation, the US government worked with the Soviets to address the evolution of terrorism. "[W]e are also in diplomatic contact with a number of governments that we believe have influence with Arabs and I will be talking to Dobrynin [the Soviet ambassador to the United States] in a little while," Kissinger informed a US senator via telephone on September 5, 1972.[47] This was in the midst of the ongoing hostage

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[44] "Transcript of telephone conversation between Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin, [Attack on Israeli Athletes at Munich Olympics]," September 6, 1972, September 2-7, 1972, Box 15, Chronological File, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, 1.

[45] Ibid., 2.

[46] Ibid.

[47] "Transcript of telephone conversation between Henry Kissinger and Jacob Jatvis, [Attack on

crisis, and later US strategy, which included hostage negotiation tips, would reflect this dynamic approach and strategy with which Kissinger engaged.[48]

In the week after the 1972 attack, those who would go on to head major US anti-terrorism committees met in the Oval Office to discuss the attack and consider the possibility of Israeli retaliation. Cold War politics continued to complicate the diplomatic situation in Munich. While the National Security Council debated calling upon the United Nations to convene a conference on terrorism, Nixon was uncertain. "The President," meeting minutes report, "stated that this kind of action would butt us up against China and the Soviet Union," yet the administration faced mounting pressure from Israel to act. "[I]f the US were to go to the Security Council condemning countries which harbor guerillas," the NSC determined, "this would in effect support Israel while at the same time not encouraging retaliatory action."[49] Secretary of State William Rogers highlighted the Israelis' frustration with the Germans' underdeveloped and poor response to the hostage crisis.[50] In the week after the President and US officials met in the Oval Office to discuss the Munich attack, Kissinger met with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow to discuss economic relations between the US and USSR. During an interlude, conversation turned toward the Olympics and the Middle East. Kissinger expressed the very

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Israeli Athletes]," September 5, 1972, September 2-7, 1972, Box 15, Chronological File, Henry A. Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, 1.

[48] Robert Ingersoll, "Guidelines for Dealing with Terrorism with International Ramifications [Includes Attachment]," November 6, 1974, Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism File, 1974-77, Box 17, Kilberg Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Ann Arbor, MI.

[49] Alexander M. Haig, Jr., "President's Meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, Dr. Kissinger and M/Gen. Haig [September 6, 1972 Meeting on Munich Terrorist Attacks]," September 6, 1972, September 1-13, 1972, Haig Chron, Box 995, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, National Security Council Files, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, 3.

[50] Ibid., 2.

sentiment held by the Israelis which would characterize the securitization of the Olympic Games in the following years. "I don't know how they let the terrorists slip through," he told Brezhnev. "The Germans are given to extremes. They are now so concerned not to show too many in uniform."[51] The failure of the West German government to provide capable police protection in Munich lead to a shift in Olympic policy. Over the course of the decade, government officials increasingly prioritized shows of strength and military presence in the months leading up to Games and during international sporting competitions. Governments' abilities to respond appropriately to potential attacks emerged after Munich as a prominent concern within the international community.

From Munich onward, hosting nations assumed partial responsibility for Olympic security and supplemented the needs of their individual nations' Olympic organizing committees, the latter of which took primary responsibility for coordinating the international competitions. Host governments had to strike a careful balance between security and sport. As Guy Sanan notes in his study of Olympic counterterrorism measures after Munich, "Olympic security operations not only occur in a democratic context where civil liberties and rights have to be strictly respected, but they also cannot spoil the joyous festival atmosphere, which is so special to the Olympic Games."[52] Organizing committees after Munich thus relied on partnerships with national governments to ensure the security side of the Games ran smoothly. "This alternative

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[51] "[Discussion with Leonid Brezhnev of U.S.-Soviet Economic Relations; Includes Washington Post Editorial Entitled 'The Wheat Sales to Russia']," September 11, 1972, September 1972 Memcons (Originals), HAK Trip to Moscow, Box 74, HAK Trip Files, Henry A. Kissinger (HAK) Office Files, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, 22.

[52] Sanan quoted in Ramón Spaaij, "Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 33, no. 4 (2016): 460.

approach," explain scholars Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor, ensured that security measures evolved beyond "a 'rings of steel' mentality, characterized by regulatory management, fortification, and surveillance, as was instituted at the 1976 Olympic Games in response to the 1972 terrorist attack."[53] While sports organizers adjusted to a developing "risk society," in which "more and more aspects of our lives are framed by an awareness of the dangers confronting humankind at the individual, local and global level," post-Munich, spectators and athletes relied on governments to provide insurance for their physical safety.[54]

Nixon's Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism illustrates one such way sovereign nations responded to the needs of their Olympic organizing committees. The first summer Olympics after Munich, which occurred just an hour's drive north of the US border in Montreal, materialized the new distribution of authority that emphasized governments' ability to protect athletes and sports fans. In light of security experts' developing appreciation for the threat ethno-nationalism now held outside the Middle East, planners immediately adjusted their expectations for the Games. Terrorism remained fresh in the minds of the 1972 Games' global audience and American journalists highlighted separatist militants who might threaten the security of the competition in 1976. "Montreal has been the scene in recent years of numerous terrorist incidents carried out by militant French Canadians demanding separation of the Province of Quebec from the rest of Canada," reported *The New York Times* in 1972, concerned about another ethno-nationalist threat to the Games. Four years before the 1976 Summer Games, a Canadian Olympic official echoed these concerns, noting that "the security situation is obviously going to take a lot of thinking about." Canadian organizers, the *New York Times* reported, "at first thought in terms

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[53] Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor, "Mega Events, Fear, and Risk: Terrorism at the Olympic Games," *Journal of Sport Management* 22, no. 4 (2008): 453.
[54] Ibid., 455.

of a 'highly informal' form of security such as existed at the games in Munich until Tuesday."[55] As journalists reported on Olympic organizers' immediate responses to Munich, the Nixon administration simultaneously developed through the CCCT, which emphasized intelligence, an appreciation for the types of threats posed by groups like BSO. Coupled with complex political tensions in the Middle East, which led the American embassy to regretfully inform D.C. meant that the US "shall have to live with terrorism," the media landscape further encouraged terrorists to copy Munich-style violence.

The Munich attackers, as well as other militants in the Middle East and beyond, made use of technological developments like television media to broadcast their grievances instantaneously around the globe. Beginning in the 1970s and following decades of anti-imperial violence in North Africa and the Middle East, ethno-nationalist violence emerged as a dominant and formidable trend in international terrorism. Favoring big events like the Olympics or UN General Assembly gatherings, ethno-nationalist terrorists modeled their attacks after the earlier successes of the Algerian liberation movement.[56] Calling upon a legacy of anti-colonial violence, mid-century ethno-nationalists fashioned themselves as "freedom fighters" and clashed with global hegemons and their political allies in decolonizing regions of the world. Scholar and terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman refers to these developments in modern terrorism as the "internationalization" of terrorism, through which successful attacks can serve "as a model for similarly aggrieved ethnic and nationalist minority groups everywhere" and which ensure "hitherto ignored or forgotten causes can be resurrected and dramatically thrust onto the world's

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[55] "Montreal Weighs Its '76 Olympics: Security Will Be Tight at the Games, Mayor Asserts," *The New York Times*, September 8, 1972, 13.

[56] Bernhard Blumenau, "The Other Battleground of the Cold War: The UN and the Struggle against International Terrorism in the 1970s," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014): 61-84.; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*.

agenda through a series of well-orchestrated, attention-grabbing acts."[57] To create these well-orchestrated and attention-grabbing acts, extremists utilized strategic bombings in heavily populated areas, hostage-taking, and hijackings. Yet increasingly important became the vast international networks radicals developed across borders and movements. Not only did terrorists attempt to attract the attention of international audiences in the 1970s, as they had during the 1972 Munich Massacre, but extremists likewise traversed state boundaries to commit acts of violence.[58] It was this new and global threat that Nixon's administration hoped to confront with its CCCT and which Olympic organizers hoped police presence at events might counter. The US government's response to Munich, comprised of the creation of the anti-terrorism task force and its subgroups, including the much more active "Working Group," showcase the seriousness with which the government viewed the newly prominent ethno-nationalist threat. The CCCT, as well as the State Department and other agencies independent of the group, recognized the need to *understand* as well as *explain* the grievances and tactics of terrorists, and attempted to do so through intelligence gathering.

Despite the growing emphasis on intelligence, the US struggled to capture a full picture of the evolving threat in the immediate aftermath of Munich. Officials imbedded in local communities, in embassies throughout the Middle East, attempted to pin down the networks of Palestinian terrorists—namely BSO— throughout the end of 1972 and into the spring of 1973. When captured, US intelligence officials interrogated Palestinian terrorists like Munich organizer Abu Daud with rigor. Given the media strategies of ethno-nationalist terrorists at this time, which prioritized recognition over tactical success, proponents and facilitators were quick to

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[57] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 66.
[58] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*.

acknowledge their involvement in acts of violence and often did not hesitate to convey their methodology. For example, Abu Daud informed US interrogators of his involvement in the planning of the Munich attacks and shed light on the expansive network upon which his organization relied to act throughout Europe. "Abu Daud's confession," the Department of State summarized in January of 1973, "clearly bears out" the "difficulty of trying [to] 'identify any single center were BSO planning and training take place […]'"[59] The terrorism with which the US government and Olympic organizers had to contend in the wake of Munich was global in scope and officials attempted to tailor their approaches to the perceived threat's expansive nature.

Immediately following the attack in Munich, the American government did not know how to classify the terrorists. Extremists, like Abu Daud, maintained tactical alliances across state lines and dispersed their ideologies around the globe via attacks on diplomatic targets, international travel routes, and, as the Munich Massacre had shown just that past September, even on pop-culture events like the Olympics.[60] Militants began to see themselves, in the 70s, as revolutionaries liberating their brethren from the grip of imperialist colonialism. The US government, however, was only just beginning to appreciate the aspirational motivations of ethno-nationalist terrorists. The Department of State, in its analysis of Palestinian terrorism in the early 1970s, concluded that the "only effective long-term solution is [a] viable plan satisfying reasonable Palestinian aspirations."[61] That State maintained the lead on Nixon's CCCT and its Working Group confirms the Oval Office's agreement.

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[59] William B. Buffman, "Analysis of Black September Operational Planning and Preparation," April 3, 1973, 2.
[60] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*.
[61] William B. Buffman, "Analysis of Black September Operational Planning and Preparation," 1.

Following the trail of intelligence and recognizing the globalization of extremist networks, early United States counterterrorism strategy prioritized diplomatic efforts to placate ethno-nationalist terrorists' territorial ambitions. As analyst and terrorism scholar Bruce Hoffman articulates, the US government "elected to concentrate on diplomatic initiatives in the UN and elsewhere" in the wake of Munich—despite European nations' focus on tactical efficiency and military readiness.[62] Indeed, Nixon's chartering memorandum reflected the president's decision to prioritize diplomacy. As he created the group to fight terrorism in 1972, Nixon tasked the Secretary of State with facilitating international partnerships to "ensure our government can take appropriate action in response to acts of terrorism swiftly and effectively."[63] No one, least of all the United States, wanted a repeat of the West Germans' public failure to secure their Games. The redistribution of Olympic security responsibilities also required the United States to increase its capacity for tactical efficiency. Still, the US did not perceive a need to bolster its military capabilities and instead generated guidelines for responding to attacks which favored peaceful resolution and negotiation over military intervention. The emphasis Nixon's CCCT placed on negotiation followed a surge in hostage crises, like that of the Munich Olympic attack.[64]

While concerns about Olympic security grew after Munich, the security of diplomatic installations was of paramount concern to the Department of State and to the President. The

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[62] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 70.

[63] Richard Nixon, "Action to Combat Terrorism [Attached to Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies Entitled "Action to Combat Terrorism"], 1.

[64] The CCCT's strategies also reflect the prevalence of domestic and international airline hijackings, a favored tactic of Cuban dissidents in North America and Palestinian terrorists in Europe and the Middle East. The frequency of these attacks slowed in 1973 and resulted in shifts in counterterrorism strategies within the DOJ and FBI, notes scholar Thomas Naftali. For more, see: Chapters 2-5 in Timothy Naftali, *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, New York: Basic Books, 2005.

CCCT coordinated "the collection of intelligence worldwide and the physical protection of U.S. personnel and installations abroad" as part of its mission.[65] In the immediate years that followed the Munich Massacre, American diplomats serving in hotbeds of terrorist activity in Sudan, Cyprus, and Lebanon died as civil unrest swelled in the local populations.[66] Terrorists hoped to disfigure symbols of America's global power and presence, whether diplomatic and military installations on foreign soil or international gatherings like the Olympics. "We have to kill their most important and most famous people," Palestinian terrorist Faud al-Shamali said following Munich. "Since we cannot come close to their statesmen, we have to kill their artists and sportsmen."[67] Munich emphasized the role media played in terrorist attacks. It became increasingly important to counterterrorism strategists that propaganda was the primary strategy of terrorists and that target differentiation had shifted. The procedures outlined by the CCCT are instructive in the influence Munich had on the trajectory of US counterterrorism.

By November of 1972, the CCCT organized its initial research and findings into a report, sent to the president and stamped "CONFIDENTIAL." As the interagency task force sought to establish clear protocols in the event of an attack on US soil or abroad, department heads likewise increased border security, monitored the postal service for letter bombs, and created a

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[65] Richard Nixon, "Action to Combat Terrorism [Attached to Memorandum for Heads of Departments and Agencies Entitled "Action to Combat Terrorism"], 3.

[66] In March of 1973, a US Ambassador, alongside other diplomatic allies, was killed in Khartoum, Sudan. In 1974 another ambassador died during the course of a protest in Nicosia, Cyprus. Finally, in 1976 US officials were kidnapped and killed in Beirut, Lebanon. These diplomatic murders in the Middle East preceded the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis, perhaps the most infamous attack on a diplomatic installation until Benghazi in 2012. For a more complete list of terrorist attacks on State Department installations and officials, see: "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology," Office of the Historian, Department of State, March, 2004, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm.

[67] Al-Shamali quoted in: Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 68.

subsidiary, "Emergency Watch Group" to correspond with foreign governments.[68] Powers never before delegated to the national government were solidified in ink and congressional support for the expansion of federal power signaled a growing appreciation for the developing threat of international terrorism across the branches of government.

Diplomatic symbols had long been targets of political violence, but following Munich terrorists' increased emphasis on media spectacle foregrounded the vulnerability of symbolic buildings. As the winter months turned into spring, the CCCT and its Working Group sought to generate trans-Atlantic partnerships and to strengthen response capabilities should terrorists target US diplomatic installations around the globe. Immediately following the Munich attack in September of 1972, US strategy reflected its diplomatic intentions. "Our approaches were designed to elicit ideas and responses from other governments," explained the Near Eastern Affairs department's Rodger Davies to the Secretary of State on September 8th.[69] A draft for a Convention for the Prevention and Punishment for Certain Acts of International Terrorism circulated the State Department in late September of 1972, articulating proposed articles that defined international terrorism, state-sponsorship and responsibilities pertaining to the prevention of terrorism, and the responsibilities of states in which attacks occurred. Included on the agenda were acts designed specifically with reference to the "Munich Tragedy."[70]

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[68] Armin Meyer, "Actions to Combat International Terrorism [Attached to Cover Memorandum Entitled 'Report of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism' Dated November 2, 1972]," November 7, 1972, Central Foreign Policy File (Subject-Numeric File), POL 23-8, 1-1-73, Box 1987, Department of State Central Files, 1906-1979, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 2-4.

[69] Rodger Davies, "Measures to Combat Terrorism [Includes Attachments 1 and 2; Attachments 3-5 Not Included]," c. September 14, 1972, Country Files – Middle East, Israel Vol. 10, Box 609, National Security Council Files, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, CA, 8.

[70] John R. Stevenson, "Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of

Keeping with Nixon's focus on diplomatic efforts to combat terrorism, the United States spearheaded international cooperation. In March of 1973, NATO allies met to discuss continued efforts to combat terrorism. CCCT sent three delegates, including Ambassador Armin Meyer, the then-chairman of the Working Group of CCCT, to Belgium. Still focused primarily on Middle Eastern terrorist organizations, the Brussels meeting nevertheless included discussions of "physical security" and possible threats to the next major international event—the UN General Assembly.[71] The events in Munich the previous fall had altered the realm of possibilities; symbols of power, not just government officials, were at risk. More critically, the US Department of State recognized the support from Middle Eastern regimes terrorist organizations like BSO maintained. Part of combating terrorism, the State Department believed, required combating state-sponsorship. "Over long term, only means of combating it is to create counter pole of attraction for Palestinians," the Beirut embassy cabled to the Secretary of State in the spring of 1973.[72] The US government, at this point, understood the motivational aims of ethno-nationalist terrorists, even if it did not fully grasp the operational capabilities of extremists.

A secondary concern of those in charge of the US' new task force, which would directly influence the relationship between the US government and Olympic security planning after 1972, was the modernization of the response mechanisms of the government in the increasingly likely event of an attack—at home or abroad. These steps were critical to the securitization of the

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International Terrorism [Includes Attachment]," September 22, 1972, Central Foreign Policy File (Subject-Numeric File), POL 23-F, 9-21-72, Box 1985, Department of State Central Files, 1906-1979, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 2.

[71] "NATO Consultations on Terrorism," March 24, 1973, Central Foreign Policy File (Subject-Numeric File), 3-24-73, Box 1987, Department of State Central Files, 1906-1979, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 2.

[72] William B. Buffman, "Analysis of Black September Operational Planning and Preparation," 3.

Olympic Games, which required hosting nations to provide physical security at international sporting competitions. Part of this process included crystalizing the hierarchical structure of the still relatively amorphous and disparate anti-terrorism groups across agencies. In their delineation of responsibilities, the CCCT took the lead. The Working Group of the CCCT was the first to be contacted in the event of an international terrorist attack, before even the White House Situation Room.[73] US officials were directed to "[o]btain as many facts as possible," including the "physical set-up at scene of terrorist act, floor plan, city maps," the "[t]errorists' specific demands," "[n]umber of terrorists," "[n]umber of hostages," and more.[74]

The assumption, by mid-1973, was that a terrorist act would include hostages like it had in Munich. In addition, the government recognized the international scope of terrorist cells. Those responding to acts of terrorism were instructed to "[c]onsider concomitant trouble elsewhere" and to "[a]lert other posts in the area, perhaps globally […]"[75] Further reflective of Munich's influence on US counterterrorism strategy, the suggested procedures assumed hostage crises would constitute the hypothetical threat. "Although there are no easy nor perfect answers for coping with acts of international terrorism," the Department of State acknowledged in July of 1973, the agency nevertheless sought to outline "some thoughts which may prove useful during the tense hours when the fate of the compatriots pre-occupies attention."[76] Included in the comprehensive procedural outline were "[i]maginative delaying tactics," lessons on "[a]voiding confrontations," and "[s]avehaven solutions," among other contingency plans and guidelines for

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[73] Kenneth Rush, "Procedures for Dealing with Acts of Terrorism against American Officials Abroad [Includes Procedures]," July 13, 1973, Central Foreign Policy File (Subject-Numeric File), 5-1-73, Box 1987, Department of State Central Files, 1906-1979, Record Group 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD, 1-2.
[74] Ibid., 6.
[75] Ibid., 7.
[76] Ibid., 9.

dealing with the press during an attack.[77] Each presented strategy reflected the post-Munich world in which ethno-nationalist terrorists utilized the media to spread their message, desired material concessions like safe passage to a foreign country (as BSO had in September of 1972), and were willing to kill. Negotiation strategies made up the bulk of State's outline, a willingness from which the Ford administration would later depart, but nevertheless the US began taking important steps toward streamlining responses to attacks.

The Munich Olympics marked a turning point in not only the Nixon administration's awareness of international terrorism and in its dedication to the development of hostage-taking response capabilities, but in the global community's conceptualization of Olympic security.[78] Event preparedness took on a new guise and governments, whose interests were intimately linked to the politics of the Olympic Games, strategized in the years leading up to the events. As the responsibility for protecting athletes fell to the hosting nation, governments devised clear steps in the event of an attack. While those strategies varied per nation and across time, in the early 1970s in the US, negotiation took precedence, as evidenced above. What threats each competition might bring and how best to protect their athletes grew to be of paramount concern to the International Olympic Committee (IOC), hosting governments, and attending countries

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[77] Ibid., 9-11.

[78] The Munich Massacre's role a watershed moment is well documented. The terrorist attack's impact on the scope and nature of security protocols for the Olympic Games is covered by both historians and political scientists. For further reading, see: Yair Galily, Moran Yarchi, and Ilan Tamir, "From Munich to Boston, and from Theater to Social Media: The Evolutionary Landscape of World Sporting Terror," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 12 (2015): 998-1007.; Kristine Toohey and Tracy Taylor, "Mega Events, Fear, and Risk: Terrorism at the Olympic Games," *Journal of Sport Management* 22, no. 4 (2008): 451-469.; Ramón Spaaij, "Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 33, no. 4 (2016): 451-468.; Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," *Russian History* 43, no. 3-4 (2016): 394-423.

after 1972. In a process sociologist Ramón Spaaij calls "securitization," foreign governments as well as event planners increased their physical capabilities leading up to mega sports events in the years after 1972. "Post-event security legacies are now a strategic issue in Olympic security planning," Spaaij explains.[79]

During the years of turmoil marked by Watergate, Nixon's resignation, and Gerald Ford's inauguration, the CCCT's Working Group stayed its course. The terrorist threat, the US government understood, had not diminished in the years following Munich, though some officials did argue the decline in domestic airline hijackings from 1972-1973 indicated an end to a direct threat to American lives.[80] Nevertheless, the Ford administration determined to follow Nixon's trajectory. When, in the first few months of Ford's tenure in the Oval Office, a memo was sent from White House Counsel Philip Buchen to National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft asking about the need for the CCCT, Scowcroft adamantly affirmed the need for the group. "Apparently," Buchen wrote, "the Cabinet Committee itself has not met in at least two years, but has a Working Group which consists mainly of State Department employees."[81] The US' diplomatic focus, it seems, was part of Buchen's concern. He went on to ask about the "structure" of the group and incorrectly rooted the CCCT's establishment in the 1973 Khartoum murders of three Western diplomats.[82] The White House Counsel's misattribution of the anti-terrorism group's origin was never corrected, but nevertheless Ford's National Security Adviser

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[79] Ramón Spaaij, "Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas," 461.

[80] Timothy Naftali, *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, New York: Basic Books, 2005.

[81] Philip W. Buchen, "Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism [Attached to Two Handwritten Notes and Draft Memorandum Dated January 6, 1975]," January 7, 1975, Terrorism, General Subject File, Box 62, Philip W. Buchen Files, 1974-77, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI, 4.

[82] Ibid.

replied that "Although the CCCT has met only once since its formation, it continues to serve, in my view, two useful functions."[83] The most important of these functions included the coordination of the group's subcommittees, which performed intelligence gathering and dissemination.

Munich continued to influence the US government's counterterrorism strategy. The group "serves as a tangible expression of the President's concern with the still very acute problem of worldwide terrorism," Scowcroft explained, "and, it serves as an umbrella for the extremely useful work which has been conducted by its Working Group […]"[84] Not only did the US government's counterterrorism strategy recognize the importance of symbolism and the *appearance* of security, but the White House continued to prioritize intelligence gathering and sharing as well as the standardization of response procedures.[85] "The emphasis remains," Lewis Hoffacker, then-chairman of the Working Group, drafted in a memorandum for President Ford, "on prevention and diplomacy, but the Cabinet Committee/Working Group is also prepared to cope with emergencies."[86]

If under President Nixon the international terrorist threat was in its infancy, by the time President Gerald Ford assumed office the threat had metastasized. Years of hijackings and relatively small-scale incidents—primarily between the US mainland and Cuba—in the years that followed legitimated the need for a review of domestic airport security procedures and DOJ

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[83] Brent Scowcroft, "Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism," January 27, 1975, Terrorism, General Subject File, Box 62, Philip W. Buchen Files, 1974-77, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI, 1.

[84] Ibid.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Lewis Hoffacker, "Report to the President [Federal Antiterrorism Activities; Includes Draft Memorandum Entitled 'Combatting Terrorism']," January 20, 1975, Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism File, 1974-77, Box 17, Kilberg Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Ann Arbor, MI, 3.

capabilities.[87] Yet, by November of 1974, the CCCT warned its members that "We have now had sufficient warnings to cause us to be increasingly concerned about possible acts of terrorism in the United States with international ramifications."[88] Citing a 1974 attack at a Berkley, California bank by Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) terrorists, members of the CCCT worried that homegrown terrorism had "international ramifications."[89] Increasingly, the US government and its agencies began to appreciate the role geopolitics and localized climates played on the development of terrorist networks (particularly in the Middle East). Still, despite the understanding amongst the committee members, the Ford White House maintained the diplomatic focus advocated by the Nixon administration. "We are hopeful that new factors such as progress toward a Middle East settlement will ease tensions and will render the climate for international terrorists less favorable," Acting Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll wrote to his counterterrorism partners of the CCCT.[90] Diplomatic attempts to address the issue of terrorism extended to the United Nations (UN) during the 1970s, which saw the actions of terrorists and responses (or lack thereof) by states critical enough to the stability of world order to organize discussions throughout the decade.[91]

Still reeling from Munich, and leading into Montreal Games, the Ford administration's focus on cooperation, yet recognition of the types of threats to US symbols, was particularly

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[87] Timothy Naftali, *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*.

[88] Robert Ingersoll, "Guidelines for Dealing with Terrorism with International Ramifications [Includes Attachment]," November 6, 1974, Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism File, 1974-77, Box 17, Kilberg Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Ann Arbor, MI, 1.

[89] Ibid.; "Patty Hearst," Federal Bureau of Investigation, Accessed 7 March 2021. https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/patty-hearst.

[90] Robert Ingersoll, "Guidelines for Dealing with Terrorism with International Ramifications [Includes Attachment]," 1.

[91] Bernhard Blumenau, "The Other Battleground of the Cold War: The UN and the Struggle against International Terrorism in the 1970s."

critical. The administration was quickly coming to terms with the growing phenomenon of ethno-nationalist terrorism, which continued to plague Western countries and Soviet satellite states alike, and during Ford's presidency US counterterrorism strategies began to take a slightly more militarized turn.[92] While they maintained the original hierarchy of the CCCT and its working group (with State at the helm), Ford and his National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, oversaw the rigorization of US protocols in the event of international and domestic terrorist attacks. In a 1974 memo, the CCCT expressed concerns about hostage situations in particular, a direct call-back to Munich and the crisis that spawned the group's formation two years prior. The memorandum's authors went on to outline US "assumptions" and guidelines for dealing with events, complete with contingencies for "pre-attack," "attack," and "post-attack" conditions.[93] Included under "attack" options was a firm official stance against acquiescence to terrorists' demands. Yet, the group provided loopholes to what would later be known as the "'no concessions' policy."[94] For example, provided the US was operating in foreign territory and could distance itself from the policy, "[a]s a last resort and if the life of the hostage is clearly at stake, acquiesce in 'the Bangkok solution'," the Working Group advised, "whereby terrorists are given their freedom and publicity for their cause in return for freedom of the hostages."[95] The public and violent murder of Israeli athletes during the Munich Olympic Games encouraged strategies that prioritized minimizing the global public's exposure to terrorist ideology. While a

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[92] Ibid.
[93] Robert Ingersoll, "Guidelines for Dealing with Terrorism with International Ramifications [Includes Attachment]," 5-11.
[94] Timothy Naftali, *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, 70.
[95] Robert Ingersoll, "Guidelines for Dealing with Terrorism with International Ramifications [Includes Attachment]," 8-9.

"bomb in the White House" was not desired, neither did US officials crave an international audience of roughly one billion Olympic fans.[96]

In addition to hopes at minimization of a potential attack's audience, Ford's agencies displayed early desires to improve US tactical capabilities. The goal following any attack was to "[i]mprove technical, physical, and legal deterrents in light of the experience gained in the attack. Exploit the momentum which sometimes is generated by an attack to induce other governments to improve counter-measures."[97] At this point, the Ford administration's counterterrorism strategy was decidedly reactionary, rather than proactive, despite diplomatic attempts to mitigate terrorists' initial concerns. Diplomacy remained the cornerstone of administration anti-terrorism efforts. "While political motivations such as the achievement of self-determination or independence are cited by some individuals or groups to justify terrorism," the Acting Secretary of the Department of State explained, "such issues should be addressed in appropriate fora rather than by resort to violence against innocent bystanders."[98] Despite the US' desire for peaceful solution to the anti-imperial sentiments espoused by groups like the BSO and the PLO, terrorists continued to attack innocent civilians to make their desires known. In the face of this globalizing threat, the US government, along with other sovereign nations, would need to bolster their physical capabilities. Indeed, in the lead-up to the Montreal Games, not only did the Canadian government increase its police presence and military readiness in the event of an attack, but the US government similarly analyzed and tracked the threat level as it prepared to send athletes across its northern border.

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[96] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 71.
[97] Robert Ingersoll, "Guidelines for Dealing with Terrorism with International Ramifications [Includes Attachment]," 9.
[98] Ibid., 5.

The coordination of security for the Montreal Olympic Games showcased many of the lessons learned at Munich. Consultant Paul Howell, who helped organize the '76 Montreal Games reflected that, despite the Montreal Organizing Committee's careful planning and preparation, which began in 1971, the events at Munich required the alteration of earlier organization. The security clearance process leading up to the games would be overseen by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who assumed responsibility for the Games' physical security. Organizers "recognized they could leave no stone unturned to avoid anything like Black September in Munich," and the Canadians refused to have a repeat of 1972.[99] "What has attracted considerable attention," reported Robert Fachet of the *Washington Post* from Montreal in the summer of 1976, "is the presence of the Canadian armed forces." In a seeming attempt to eliminate not just the possibility of an attack, but media coverage of a terrorist incident should one occur, the Canadians kept reporters "away from the athletes" and the Olympic Village under strict control.[100] The Palestinian threat loomed large. Shortly after the Games began, the *Austin American Statesman* reported that the government "reinforced security details Friday after a report that a Palestinian terrorist leader was in Montreal […]"[101] The cost of the Games, according to newspapers, "ballooned to $1.4 billion" as a result of increased security measures.[102] The price, however, felt small to governments who hoped to avoid another Munich.

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[99] Paul Howell, *The Montreal Olympics: An Insider's View of Organizing a Self-financing Games*, Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009, 54.

[100] Fachet, Robert. "Olympics: Security, Sirens; Presence of Soldiers Unnerves Canadians," *The Washington Post*, July 14, 1976, A1.

[101] "Terrorist report hikes security for Olympics," *The Austin American Statesman*, July 24, 1976, A1.

[102] Fachet, Robert. "Olympics: Security, Sirens; Presence of Soldiers Unnerves Canadians," *The Washington Post*, July 14, 1976, A9.

While the responsibility to protect the games fell to the hosting government, US counterterrorism experts recognized the mutual interest they held in a safe contest. While the Canadians carefully analyzed Munich and adjusted their planning to reflect concern for ethno-nationalist terrorist attacks, the Americans likewise expressed concern for the safety of American citizens given the proximity of the Games to US soil. In the months leading up to the Games, the Ford administration geared up to help the Canadians address possible terrorist threats. CCCT reports acknowledged the Canadians' preoccupation with "internal and external threats" and their willingness to seek foreign aid in intelligence gathering. Technological advancement, like a "Computerized Olympic Immigration Lookout System (COILS)" were put into place. The CCCT's FBI delegate "said that, if desired, arrangements could be made for a Canadian representative to speak to the Working Group."[103] In the month before the Games, Henry Kissinger wrote in a memo to the rest of the CCCT that "There is a heightened risk of terrorist activity this year," attributed, in part, to the Montreal Games. In the following pages Kissinger, who was now the Chairman of the Working Group, outlined what the committee referred to as "intermediate" terrorism and procedures to address the "level of terrorist violence lying between mass destruction terrorism and the types of assassinations with which US terrorism policy has been primarily concerned."[104] These strategies, rooted in lessons learned in Munich, reflect what Spaaij identifies as "progressive securitization and expanding notions of risk." Black

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[103] Robert A. Fearey, "Ninety-Fifth Meeting of the Working Group/Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, Wednesday, October 29th, 1975, 2:30 p.m., Department of State, Room 7516 [Includes Attachment]," November 3, 1975, Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism File, 1974-77, Box 17, Kilberg Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Ann Arbor, MI, 2-3.

[104] Robert A. Fearey, "'Intermediate' Terrorism [Includes Attachment]," June 1, 1976, Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism File, 1974-77, Box 17, Kilberg Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum, Ann Arbor, MI, 3.

September's attack on Israeli athletes in 1972 was a watershed moment in the organization of international sporting competitions, but it was the next summer Olympiad, in Canada, which crystalized the reprioritization of security. "The 1976 Montreal Summer Games," Spaaij contends, "constituted a turning point in Olympic history as the Games' first highly visible security operation."[105]

The Montreal Games marked both a turning point in event coordination, as Spaaij explains, and a continuation in US counterterrorism policy. Nixon's Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, though primarily through the meetings and efforts of its Working Group, continued to spearhead US anti-terrorism efforts. The Americans continued to prioritize diplomatic efforts over tactical support, as evidenced by intelligence sharing and coordination with Canadian officials. Despite its proximity to and close diplomatic relationship with its neighbor to the north, the United States did not send security personnel to Canada for the 1976 Summer Games. Yet, under the lead of the Department of State, the Ford administration did oversee the streamlining of various domestic agencies' response capabilities and continued to evaluate the rapidly expanding threat of global terrorism through intelligence gathering and dissemination. Much like Nixon, Ford maintained focus on the Middle East as a source of ethno-nationalist terrorism. However, according to historian Timothy Naftali, the "Ford administration was the first in history to consider the likelihood of a major terrorist attack on U.S. soil."[106] The enemy, indeed, was moving closer to home. The Montreal Olympics brought concerns about ethno-nationalist terrorism to North American soil. No longer could counterterrorism strategists, the Oval Office, nor the American public ignore the possibility that US citizens might be targets.

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[105] Ramón Spaaij, "Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas," 460.
[106] Timothy Naftali, *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, 97.

Despite the continued Cold War, the Soviet Union was no longer the biggest threat to American democracy.

The early 1970s highlighted, at Munich, the influence the media and symbols of power had on terrorists' strategies. Throughout the decade, US officials, as well as Olympic organizers, responded in kind. Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford identified the need for a coherent counterterrorism strategy and, while cognizant of the Cold War, began to shift the US' foreign focus. As the American embassy in Lebanon understood in 1973, and cabled to the Department of State in Washington, D.C., the US would have to live with terrorism and adjust its foreign policy strategies to cope with individual acts of violence. Yet, as the terrorist threat crossed the Atlantic and following his inauguration, the next president, Jimmy Carter, reinvigorated older, Cold War animosities and disregarded the new, practical concerns of US counterterrorism strategists. The end of the decade was looming and so, too, were the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games. Despite a long history of Olympic securitization and concern for the safety of the Games, Carter and his administration neglected to address the very real anxieties of US intelligence and diplomatic officials.

Chapter Two

"The Future Security of the Civilized World"

The Cold War and Terrorism Compete for Attention

After the 1976 Montreal Summer Games concluded without any notable disturbances, the international community breathed a sigh of relief. Yet as preparations for the 1980 Moscow Summer Games ramped up, tensions ran high, albeit for an entirely different reason. Instead of focusing on threats to homeland security, which the Montreal Olympics and attacks by separatist groups in the early 1970s had shown were increasingly prevalent, US officials revived Cold War tensions. "History holds its breath," Vice President Walter Mondale informed the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) in the early months of 1980, "for what is at stake here is no less than the future security of the civilized world."[107] American presidents, since the end of the Second World War, had long defined the so-called "future security of the civilized world" through Cold War diplomat George Kennan's theory of containment.[108] In 1980, decades after Kennan shaped US foreign policy in opposition to the USSR's expansion, Mondale called upon this long history of anti-Soviet sentiment. His assertion would come to characterize not just the Olympic Games' legacy, but the nature of US-Soviet relations until the Reagan administration's easing of tensions in the mid-1980s.

On January 20, 1980, Jimmy Carter sat before NBC's cameras with news anchor Bill Monroe and declared, following the Soviet Union's invasion of neighboring Afghanistan, that

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[107] Allen Guttmann, "The Cold War and the Olympics," *International Journal* 43, no. 4 (1988): 560.

[108] For more on Cold War diplomacy, including George Kennan, see: John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War*, Revised and expanded edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

should the Soviets refuse to "withdraw their troops immediately from Afghanistan," the president "would not support the sending of an American team to the Olympics."[109] The declaration came as a surprise to many Americans, most of whom had lived under the illusion of détente since the Nixon administration's softening of rhetoric and, at times, cooperation with the Soviet Union on matters of international terrorism. Mondale's speech before the USOC, following Carter's threat and designed to convince the committee, which had ultimate jurisdiction over the US Olympic Team, to refuse to send athletes to Moscow that summer, highlighted the precarious position in which Carter's announcement had placed the United States' diplomatic authority. After all, as Bill Monroe had astutely pointed out on national television, "Mr. President, if a substantial number of nations does not support the U.S. position, would not that just put the U.S. in an isolated position, without doing much damage to the Soviet Union?"[110] Yet the president was facing, by January of 1980, mounting domestic political pressure from the ongoing crisis in Iran, where Iranian radicals continued to hold more than fifty Americans hostage in Teheran following a 1979 storming of the American embassy.[111] In a last-ditch attempt to strengthen US hegemony, and to boost his reelection chances, Carter turned to a boycott.[112]

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[109] "'Meet the Press' Interview with Bill Monroe, Carl T. Rowan, David Broder, and Judy Woodruff,'" The American Presidency Project, UC Santa Barbara, accessed March 1, 2021, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/249569.

[110] Ibid.

[111] "The Iranian Hostage Crisis," Office of the Historian, Department of State, Accessed March 1, 2021, https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises.

[112] Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.; Zaretsky's *No Direction Home* provides additional social and political context and underscores the national sentiments with which Carter contended.

How the Carter administration chose to define the "future security of the civilized world" differed from the previous two administrations' prioritization of anti-terrorism strategy. Through the Moscow Olympic Boycott, Jimmy Carter utilized conventional Cold War diplomatic strategies. Yet the threat of terrorism remained, and indeed the Soviet Union increased its own counterterrorism efforts in the years before their hosting of the 1980 Games.[113] Although the Carter administration defined the Iranian hostage crisis as "terrorism," it neglected to prioritize or to expand the Nixon and Ford administrations' deliberate efforts to counter international terrorism. The ethno-nationalist terrorist threat, which still lurked in the shadows, had failed to materialize during the Montreal Games, save two security breaches which resulted in little press coverage.[114] Still, sports organizers, from the USOC to the Moscow Olympic Committee, continued to prioritize police readiness and other physical security measures as they coordinated international athletic competitions. While Munich remained clear in the minds of athletic coordinators, the US administration struggled to define "national security," and the Carter administration oscillated between the traditional understanding of US symbolic hegemony rooted in Kennan's Cold War containment strategy and the newer, immediate concerns pertaining to terrorism in North America and the Middle East. While the Carter administration did acknowledge terrorism, the President and his advisors ultimately returned to a mid-century foreign policy and crafted diplomatic strategies that sought to reassert US power—most notably in the Middle East. Despite his prioritization of diplomatic shows of strength, Carter emphasized

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[113] Chapter three of this work will cover the Soviet Union's security perimeter at the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. For further reading on the Soviet Union's pre-Olympic securitization see: Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," *Russian History* 43, no. 3-4 (2016): 394-423.

[114] Pete Fussey, "Terrorist threats to the Olympics 1972-2016," in *Terrorism and the Olympics: Major Event Security and Lessons for the Future*, edited by Anthony Richards, Pete Fussey, and Andrew Silke, 239-243, London: Taylor & Francis Group, 2010, 240.

the National Security Council's (NSC) lead in the development of his administration's foreign strategy, stripping the Department of State of the authority it had been granted previously under President Nixon.

The National Security Council (NSC) took control of Carter's counterterrorism policies and, under the guidance of Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, created and facilitated an anti-terrorism task force similar to the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism (CCCT), though with a decidedly less diplomatic focus. The "Special Coordinating Committee" (SCC) as Brzezinski termed the group, and its subsidiary "Executive Committee to Combat Terrorism" (ECT), formed the crux of the Carter administration's antiterrorism efforts. Carter tasked the coalition of intelligence and department heads to, much as Nixon had desired in 1972, serve as liaisons between their departments' analysts and the president.[115] At this point, US counterterrorism strategy resembled earlier attempts to streamline intelligence sharing, coordinate response capabilities, and assemble a dynamic strategy. Yet, the Department of State, unlike under Nixon and Ford, was pushed to a largely conciliatory role and Brzezinski controlled policy creation and intelligence dissemination.[116] Carter felt that so-called "future security of the civilized world," as it pertained to both Soviet aggression and the administration's nascent understanding of terrorism, was best placed in the care of his National Security Adviser. Nevertheless, the president ensured his presence remained in the room. Throughout his time in office, Carter coordinated strategy, approved recommendations, and ensured his department heads followed his personal desires.[117]

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[115] Jimmy Carter, "The National Security Council System," January 20, 1977, AN: IP00661, Document NSC 2, The U.S. Intelligence Community: Organization, Operations and Management, 1947-1989, Digital National Security Archive.

[116] National Security Council, Executive Committee on Terrorism, *The United States Government Antiterrorism Program: An Unclassified Summary Report*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 7-8.

[117] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Afghanistan," February 29, 1980, Zbigniew Brzezinski Material –

Carter's active role in the development of a US foreign policy was reflected in his 1980 call for a boycott of the Moscow Olympics and would shape the NSC's priorities throughout his administration.

Under Nixon and Ford, the US attempted to coordinate international efforts to define and counter terrorism, most notably in coordination with the United Nations. While the SCC oversaw the sharing of intelligence, the group was far less proactive than its forerunner, the CCCT. Carter's SCC, instead, limited the scope of the federal government's involvement in international legislation. While "the threat of international terrorism is a matter of continuing concern to the U.S. Government," as a later review of the US' "Antiterrorism Program" acknowledged, it was only after 1977 that the US military created "Delta Force," an elite special forces unit trained in the battle against terrorism.[118] Following yet another international hostage crisis in Somalia, during which West German commandos specializing in tactical efficiency "stormed a hijacked Lufthansa airliner on an airport runway in Mogadishu, Somalia, and ended a five-day, 6,000-mile hijacking episode by slaying the four terrorists and freeing all 86 hostages unharmed," US strategists recognized the need for military readiness.[119] The hijackers in Somalia claimed allegiance to the "Society Against World Imperialism," a relatively unknown organization, and harbored Palestinian sympathies according to the *New York Times*. Much like in Munich, the terrorists in Somalia made demands for the release of their peers from prison in Turkey.[120] Carter acknowledged, after witnessing the Germans' stunning professionalism in Somalia, the

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Office Country and Subject Chron Files, Box 75, Records of the Office of National Security Advisor, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, [n.p.]..

[118] National Security Council, Executive Committee on Terrorism, *The United States Government Antiterrorism Program: An Unclassified Summary Report*, 6.

[119] Henry Tanner, "German Troops Free Hostages on Hijacked Plane in Somalia; Four Terrorists Killed in Raid," *The New York Times*, 18 October 1977, 77.

[120] Ibid.

inadequacy of US tactical capabilities. Juxtaposed with the German military's ability to safely rescue hostages in Somalia, the US military seemed "not as highly trained as they should be," Carter lamented. Encouraged by the antiterrorism efforts of European nations, Carter asked Brzezinski to rely on the advice of the Germans, as well as the Israelis and the Dutch.[121] The US, Brzezinski agreed, lagged behind its European partners. He directed the NSC to probe US military capabilities. [122]

Adhering to its promise to further streamline counterterrorism capabilities, the NSC created a pyramid of responsibility (a so-called "tri-level" authority structure) which placed, at its top, the National Security Council. While the Department of State, which had previously coordinated the CCCT, was placed in charge of the "Executive Committee on Terrorism" (ECT) and "Working Group on Terrorism" (WGT), it held little of the decision-making power. A visual representation of the Carter administration's redistribution of American foreign policy priorities, the pyramid ensured the NSC/SCC coordinated all "significant policy decisions."[123] In a 1979 comprehensive report on the US Antiterrorism Program, the US government acknowledged that incidents of terrorism, particularly against American citizens and targets, had increased over the decade. Since 1972, the group counted 48 hijackings, 54 barricade-hostage crises, and 1,090 explosive bombings internationally. In the decade since 1968, 293 of the world's 3,043 terrorists incidents occurred on North American soil.[124] Yet, in the years following his presidency, Carter held the belief that his administration successfully reduced terrorism, despite its lack of any tangible response mechanisms or protocols. The Camp David Accords and other attempts to

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[121] Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010, 121.
[122] Timothy Naftali, *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, 108.
[123] National Security Council, Executive Committee on Terrorism, *The United States Government Antiterrorism Program: An Unclassified Summary Report*, 7, 11.
[124] Ibid., 9.

generate peace in the Middle East discouraged terrorist attacks, the president maintained.[125] Though he argued that, in general, his administration limited terrorists' opportunities for violence, Carter would at times, like during the Iranian hostage crisis and during the preparations for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, publicly acknowledge that violent extremism continued to plague America. Ironically, in a continuation of previous policy, the US government still "look[ed] to the host government when Americans [were] abducted overseas to exercise its responsibility under international law to protect all persons within its territories, and to ensure the safe release of hostages," as the NSC's review of its counterterrorism procedures proclaimed.[126] While this understanding would continue to hold profound effects on Olympic organization, it surprisingly played little role in the Carter administration's justification for the 1980 Moscow Olympic boycott.

Despite the NSC's insistence that terrorism was not a major concern and despite clear numbers to the contrary, Munich proved difficult to forget and sporting competitions remained at high risk for terrorism. While the Olympics remained the preeminent sporting event, with the foreign press, athletes, and fans anxiously awaiting the Games' arrival every four years, the USOC coordinated and facilitated other transnational competitions as well. The additional competitions, the Carter administration acknowledged, held potential to serve as the site of another Munich. Despite the relative calm during the 1976 Montreal Games—related to, no doubt, the billions spent on security preparations and massive police presence—terrorism still threatened sovereign nations' peace of mind and terrorism continued to plague North America. In the late seventies, for example, a series of assassinations rocked Southern California,

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[125] Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary*, 121.
[126] National Security Council, Executive Committee on Terrorism, *The United States Government Antiterrorism Program: An Unclassified Summary Report*, 18.

perpetrated by the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA). Like many ethno-nationalist terrorist groups inspired by the Munich attacks, terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman notes that ASALA "unhesitatingly cited the Palestinian example."[127] Much like the Munich attackers, ASALA utilized news coverage to strike at the hearts of international viewers. Furthermore and indicative of the terrorist threat's continued international network, ASALA militants received training and arms from the PFLP, learning tactical and ideological lessons from the very ideological movement that capitalized upon the Munich massacre to broadcast its struggles.[128] "ASALA's brutal tactics and desperate bids for attention," Hoffman contends, "drew comparisons with the ruthlessness of the Palestinian Black September Organization in general and the Olympics massacre in particular."[129]

As copycat terrorism appeared US soil, the USOC had not only to begin planning the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Games, which required years of forethought and coordination, but begin organizing the Pan American Games which were to take place in San Juan, Puerto Rico in the summer of 1979. While the Carter administration emphasized Cold War "national security" throughout its push for the 1980 Moscow Olympic boycott and neglected homeland security, the White House nevertheless recognized and affirmed the continued threat of terrorism to US citizens. Since the 1950s, some Puerto Rican nationalists had "fervently indicted the United States as an imperial power" and aligned themselves with the Palestinian struggle.[130] In the 1970s, radical separatists attempted to force the American government's hand in the designation of statehood to the territory. Extremists increased their efforts to draw attention to their cause in

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[127] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 73.
[128] Ibid., 74.
[129] Ibid.
[130] Sara Awartani, "Puerto Rican Decolonization, Armed Struggle and the Question of Palestine," *Middle East Report* 284/285 (2017): 13.

the 1970s, and the separatist group Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional (FALN) claimed responsibility for more than one hundred bombings between the years of 1974 and 1983.[131] Many of these attacks were on American soil; newspapers like the *New York Times* relayed the bombings to a frightened public, who felt increasingly unsafe as the FALN targeted office buildings and bars in New York city.[132] In light of these attacks, the Carter administration needed to ensure the sporting competition in Puerto Rico came and went without any violent outbursts.

The organization of the Pan American Games served as an intermediate step before the USOC's organization of the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Games. Carter's team took considerable efforts to remove the president from the planning process, concerned that the leader's involvement may haunt the administration should a Munich-style attack occur in San Juan. The geographic location of the Games concerned organizers, particularly given the long history of Puerto Rican nationalist violence in the US territory. Scrawled at the bottom of a drafted memorandum about security concerns, presidential adviser Jack Watson wrote "I recommend that the President not get directly involved."[133] The president's staff had "several concerns," the first of which was that Carter's involvement "will inevitably be leaked and draw public attention to the potential security problems at the Games." US officials, after Munich, understood how important the *appearance* of security was. "This could encourage some individuals or groups to

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[131] Ibid., 15.

[132] Charles Kaiser, "Bomb Threat Closes La Guardia An Hour: Thousands Evacuated and Flights Halted After Phone Calls—No Explosive Device is Found," *The New York Times*, 15 August 1977, 30.; Shawn G. Kennedy, "Public is Responding on Tavern Blast," *The New York Times*, 28 January 1975, 20.

[133] Jack Watson, "Attorney General's Memorandum regarding Security for Pan American Games in Puerto Rico," February 7, 1979, Presidential Files, [2/9/79-Not Submitted] [CF, O/A 548], Container 106, Office of Staff Secretary, Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, [n.p.].

undertake disruptive activities," James McIntyre Jr. informed the president.[134] Even further, Carter's team prohibited the president from contacting the Puerto Rican government in the weeks before the Games. "I am concerned," Watson wrote to White House staffer Rick Hutcheson, "that a direct call from the President to the Governor will raise anxiety levels in Puerto Rico and contribute to a self-fulfilling prophecy; i.e., too much advance publicity to preparations to prevent terrorist acts may be a stimulus to the acts themselves."[135] In efforts to dissociate Carter from any potential blowback, the NSC put the Department of Justice's Attorney General in charge of the Games' security preparations.

Though smaller than the Olympics, the Pan American Games promised a sizable crowd—and thus posed a legitimate target. "Authorities expect 9,000 athletes and trainers, 1,000 foreign officials and VIP's [sic] and more than 20,000 sports fans, representing 34 nations in the Western Hemisphere, including the United States," the Attorney General, Griffin Bell, informed President Carter.[136] While the responsibility for securing the Pan American Games ultimately belonged to the Puerto Rican police, "We continue to work closely with Commonwealth officials," Bell explained. "We plan to assemble security experts to review the PORP [Police of Puerto Rico] plans and suggest improvements and to ask GSA [General Services Administration] to lend vehicles." The threat of an FALN attack put the US' existing counterterrorism machine into action and the government promised tactical contributions, like vehicles, to the US territory.

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[134] James T. McIntyre, Jr. "Attorney General's Bell's Memo Regarding Security Preparation for Pan American Games," February 9, 1979, Presidential Files, [2/9/79-Not Submitted] [CF, O/A 548], Container 106, Office of Staff Secretary, Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, [n.p.].

[135] Jack Watson, "Attorney General's Memorandum regarding Security for Pan American Games in Puerto Rico," [n.p.].

[136] Griffin B. Bell, "Security Preparations for Pan American Games and Pending Problems," February 1, 1979, Presidential Files, [2/9/79-Not Submitted] [CF, O/A 548], Container 106, Office of Staff Secretary, Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, [n.p.].

The hierarchy developed under Nixon and Ford, including the delegation of homeland threats to the DOJ, remained, yet in 1979 Brzezinski's NSC had final say in counterterrorism planning. The SCC "solicited reports" and followed the coordination of the games, though intelligence officials were "reluctant to become highly aggressive in collection on the Pan Am Games for fear of creating a 'threat' by calling attention to the opportunities for terrorism," Christine Dodson, the Staff Secretary of the NSC wrote to the West Wing in the months before the competition.[137]

The logistical support the US provided to Puerto Rico during the Pan American Games nevertheless stemmed from concerns about potential FALN activity at the Games. "On the basis of initial 'threat assessments' by FBI, Police of Puerto Rico, and the State Department, the terrorist threat appears substantial," the Attorney General explained to Carter.[138] Citing a rise in separatist terrorist attacks out of Central and South America, US strategists ensured the president that "we cannot exclude such a possibility" of an attack on athletes or spectators.[139] The security perimeter, though substantially smaller than the Olympic Games, was extensive. "Approximately 80 sites are involved – 27 competition sites, three residential villages and more than 40 practice sites" needed protection.[140] Despite the distance from Munich, the Pan American Games' organizers recognized the possibility of similarly orchestrated attacks and sought to counteract

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[137] Christine Dodson, "Judge Bell's Memorandum on Security for the Pan Am Games," February 9, 1979, Presidential Files, [2/9/79-Not Submitted] [CF, O/A 548], Container 106, Office of Staff Secretary, Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 1.

[138] Griffin B. Bell, "Security Preparations for Pan American Games and Pending Problems," February 1, 1979, [n.p.].

[139] Ibid.

[140] Ibid.

them. “Further, DOJ and FBI will become involved directly in crisis management if terrorist incidents comparable to those at the Munich Olympics should occur.”[141]

Yet the NSC’s efforts to combat international terrorism were otherwise limited. General William Odom, assistant to Brzezinski and later Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) under President Ronald Reagan, argued in the early years of Carter’s presidency that the “United States did not need a general counterterrorism organization or strategy.” Carter’s team did not consider terrorism a primary threat. “‘Brzezinski did not believe that terrorism was a strategic issue,’ recalls William Odom.” Instead, the cold warrior materialized his lived experience as a Polish emigre into hardline, anti-Soviet rhetoric and posturing.[142] Whether Carter’s de-prioritization of anti-terrorism at the federal level stemmed from Brzezinski’s influence or his own, personal feelings toward the threat is debatable. What, however, is clear is that under the Carter administration, the United States adopted a new understanding of national security, which its leaders defined through symbolic strength and anti-Soviet posturing. While Brzezinski and Carter did make a few futile attempts to generate a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, including the facilitation of the new, NSC-centered task force, the Cold War once again took center stage and informed US diplomatic policies from 1977 through 1980. The codification of these trends is exemplified in the Carter administration’s boycott of the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, yet the boycott, as historian Nicholas Sarantakes explains, cannot be understood independently of the domestic political pressure Carter faced in 1979 and 1980.[143]

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[141] Ibid.

[142] Timothy Naftali, *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, 101.

[143] Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. For more on Carter’s domestic political pressures, see: Natasha Zaretsky, *No Direction Home: The American Family and the Fear of National Decline, 1968-1980*, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007.

While the Carter administration, behind the scenes, supported anti-terrorism efforts in the summer of 1979 in Puerto Rico, it failed to appropriately respond to an incident of terrorism in the fall of 1979 when, across the Atlantic and in Iran, extremists held US citizens captive in the America's Iranian embassy. President Carter's inability to return the hostages soured US public opinion and encouraged his embrace of his politically motivated boycott in 1980.

Carter took a stance on terrorism during the Iranian hostage crisis, much as he did on Soviet aggression during the Olympic boycott, in part because it became increasingly clear that the voting public viewed the administration negatively. The hostage crisis, which dragged on for 444 days, drew attention to the president's ignorance of foreign affairs and was "an easily understood example of the nation's inability to control its fate, maintain its dignity, and pursue its independent course in the world," explains scholar David Farber.[144] The US, beginning in the early 1970s, faced energy insecurity and economic downturn, largely the result of a Middle Eastern oil embargo which inflated the cost of oil to $12 a barrel by 1973.[145] Though Carter inherited this legacy, he nevertheless had to contend with the implications rising gas prices had on the American public's pocketbooks. Understanding the gravity, "Carter called the energy crisis 'the moral equivalent of war'" in a policy speech in 1977.[146] American economic interests in the Middle East complicated the diplomatic catastrophe in Iran. Not only did Carter understand he had to address the hostage crisis amidst a souring relationship Middle Eastern nations, but he likewise had to contend with dropping approval ratings, and, later that year, Soviet aggression in the region. In this context, Carter's decision to deploy a boycott strategy—a

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[144] David Farber, *Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's First Encounter with Radical Islam*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005, 2.
[145] Ibid.,23.
[146] Ibid., 25.

seemingly low-risk soft power response—was the logical extension of domestic political pressure. In addition, "[t]he notion that Iran, like China and Cuba, was America's to lose revealed a good deal about the cold war ethos that still permeated much of America's foreign policy elite, even after the disaster of Vietnam."[147]

The Carter administration recognized terrorism only when it was politically expedient for them to do so. In 1979, "a large majority of Americans, at least according to poll data," explains historian David Farber, "believed that Jimmy Carter did not know where he was leading the United States, globally or at home."[148] The Iranian hostage crisis, which further illustrated the need for American intelligence experts to address terrorism, marked a turning point in the president's public rhetoric describing terrorism. In a draft of a speech given before the AFL-CIO in November of 1979, a little over a week following the storming of the American embassy in Tehran, Carter's team called out the Iranian government's tacit support of violence. "This is an act of terrorism –" the Carter team surmised, underlining not once, but twice, the term which for the last few years had been ascribed by presidents and world leaders to independent attacks. "This crisis calls for both restraint-and-firmness," the speech continued, "restraint" and "firmness" affirmed in ink with yet another underline. To prevent potential escalation in Tehran, the Carter administration prohibited the gathering and picketing of US citizens at home.[149] "I am determined to make clear," the speech continued, "that we will never allow any foreign country to dictate our nation's policies," with notation underscoring "never," "any," and "our."[150]

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[147] Ibid., 111.
[148] Ibid., 115.
[149] Jimmy Carter, "AFL-CIO Convention Original Speech Text," November 15, 1979, Presidential Files, 11/15/79, Container 139, Office of Staff Secretary, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 4.
[150] Ibid., 6.

Harkening back to a sentiment expressed clearly in the policies of Nixon and Ford's CCCT, Carter affirmed that "It is a clear tenet of international law and diplomatic tradition that the host government is fully responsible for the safety and well-being of the property and lawful representatives of another country."[151] Non-committal language was crossed out and excluded from an earlier draft of the speech. In its place, a handwritten note affirmed the US' condemnation of the Iranian government which, instead of having "acquiesced in and even encouraged such action," had "condoned" "this illegal action […]"[152] Carter was at the center of the decisions made by his administration in the coming months. Down to the very speeches he would give, in which he marked up phrases and crossed out suggestions of those on his policymaking team like Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, the president controlled his foreign policy machine.[153] While Carter contended with state-sanctioned terrorism in Iran, the Soviet Union added fuel to the political fire.

As the terrorist threat invaded, via television media, the living rooms of the American public and facilitated some concern in the Carter White House, around the world another—this time military—invasion captured the attention of the president. Tensions in Afghanistan between anti-communist rebels and the Soviet-backed government escalated throughout 1979. Earlier that year, and almost a year before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter referred to the "turbulence" in Afghanistan, a friction generated by anti-Soviet sentiments.[154] The administration continued to track the rapidly deteriorating local political climate throughout

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[151] Ibid., 7.
[152] "AFL-CIO Convention Speech Draft B-4," November 14, 1979, Presidential Files, 11/15/79, Container 139, Office of Staff Secretary, Jimmy Carter Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 3.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary*, 297.

1979. Yet by September, "The Afghan problem ha[d] not become a cold war, superpower issue and it is in our interest that it not become one," NSC staffer Thomas Thornton informed Zbigniew Brzezinski.[155] Nevertheless, as the Soviets grew increasingly aggressive in Central Asia, the president and his team took a hardline stance on the superpower's presence in the area. The president held geopolitical concerns. The oil crisis which contributed to the difficult situation in Iran likewise contributed to the notion that Afghanistan must remain independent of Soviet influence. [156] In part, these fears seem to have stemmed from President Carter's own biases and, as he admitted during a White House meeting with his intelligence officials, he felt that "he and Brezhnev do not understand one another." Because, as Carter fully admitted, he did "not know what Brezhnev's next step is and what he is aiming to accomplish," the US president informed his NSC that both he and the Soviet leader "must assume the worst of each other."[157]

As it became increasingly clear that the Soviets would invade the Central Asian country in the later months of 1979, the NSC considered the international ramifications. "The problem falls into two phases," the NSC's South Asian expert, Thomas Thornton wrote to Brzezinski. "What do we do now to deflect Soviet intervention (if that is what we want to do) and how do we exploit the fact politically once it occurs?"[158] Carter's men considered the possibility that they may "benefit more by getting the Soviets enmired" in Afghanistan.[159] "Later," Carter reminisced

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[155] Thomas Thornton, "V-B-B Lunch: Afghanistan-USSR [Attachments Not Included]," September 19, 1979, Brzezinski Material - Subject Files, Luncheon Meetings (BBV), September-October 1979, Container 32, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 2.

[156] Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

[157] "National Security Council Meeting Minutes," March 18, 1980, Staff Material – Office Files, Container 2, Records of the Office of the National Security Advisor, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 1.

[158] Thomas Thornton, "V-B-B Lunch: Afghanistan-USSR [Attachments Not Included]," 1.

[159] Ibid., 2.

following his presidency, "when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan and threatened, if successful, to move farther into the oil-rich Gulf region, I felt that this was a direct threat to the security of our country."[160] As early as March of 1979, ten months before he stood on national television and announced the boycott of the Moscow Olympics, President Carter attempted to coerce the USSR to withdraw their troops. "We got a lot of publicity about cautioning the Soviets not to become directly involved in trying to control Afghanistan's political affairs," Carter confided in his diary.[161] By December of 1979, just weeks before the Soviets invaded Kabul, Carter recorded that he felt the US-Soviet relationship was "deteriorating unnecessarily."[162] If the president had any qualms about placing further strain on the relationship, however, he ignored them. In the coming weeks Carter announced the boycott and began the months-long process of galvanizing international support for a relocation, postponement, and later boycott of the Moscow Summer Games. Just days after the Soviet invasion, during an SCC meeting, Brzezinski confirmed "that we must make this costly for the Soviets very quickly."[163] Carter echoed Brzezinski's strategy, promising that "we're determined to make this action as politically costly as possible."[164] By the end of December, the Soviets had indeed invaded Afghanistan, overthrown the Afghani president, and placed into power Babrak Karmal, who held communist sympathies. In the weeks following the Soviet's capture of the Afghani capital, Kabul, Jimmy Carter and his team moved toward a decidedly aggressive stance.

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[160] Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary*, 273.
[161] Ibid., 306.
[162] Ibid., 379.
[163] "Special Coordination Committee [Iran/Afghanistan]," December 28, 1979, Staff Material, Office—Meeting Files, Box 98, Records of the National Security Adviser, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, [n.p.].
[164] Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary*, 382.

Early in his tenure in office, Carter's national security team determined to posture the president as "a man who is strong and sure of himself in dealing with the Soviets." In a memo from Carter's Chief of Staff to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's team debated his posturing in the so-called "East-West Speech," of which officials felt "the tone" of earlier drafts was "slightly apologetic in places" and resolved should be "stronger in the statement of our policy and beliefs."[165] Certainly by 1980, Carter's national security team had moved away from apology. Brzezinski advised the president to take a page out of the Cold War playbook, encouraging the president that "You have the opportunity to do what President Truman did on Greece and Turkey […]"[166] Carter's announcement on *Meet the Press* that the United States government would not support its athletes' attendance of the Moscow Games should the Politburo fail to withdraw from Afghanistan was decidedly uncompromising. In the spring of 1980, months after his publicized line in the sand, Carter encouraged his national security team "to develop a definition, for ourselves and for our Allies, of a neutralist Afghanistan and try to build world support for it along with a concomitant condemnation of the Soviet military occupation."[167] Still, the president felt the United States, despite his Olympic strategy, was in a precarious diplomatic position. In the cabinet room, Carter "said that Soviet withdrawal is not likely within a year." Understanding that the boycott was inevitable, the issue became "how to hold the Allies together during this period." Carter feared that "the Allies would desert us."[168]

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[165] Hamilton Jordan, "Re: Your Request for my Comments on the East-West Speech," n.d., Hamilton Jordan's Confidential Files, Container 36, Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 4.

[166] Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*, 76.

[167] "National Security Council Meeting Minutes," 2.

[168] Ibid., 10.

Yet the Soviets, as military historian Nicholas Sarantakes explains, were, within two months of the invasion, struggling to maintain control of the region. The Carter administration, Sarantakes contends, did not fully appreciate the precarious position in which the Soviet Union had placed itself through its invasion. The country, which featured mountainous terrain and ethnic-diversity which encouraged religious fundamentalism, would prove difficult for the Soviets to effectively control. Within two months of the invasion, the Karmal government was entirely dependent on Soviet forces.[169] Were the Soviets to withdraw, their influence throughout the Middle East and Central Asia would crumble. Still, their continued presence fostered resentment amidst the Afghani people and weakened the Soviet military's authority. The Soviets were now facing their own Vietnam, and like the US' previous military entanglement in South East Asia, the invasion would serve to generate hostility among the Soviet population that destabilized, rather than bolstered, Brezhnev's regime. Brzezinski and his team understood the implications of the Soviet misstep. In January of 1980, six days after Carter announced the boycott, they determined to strengthen the president's case by drawing comparisons to the Soviet Union's previous eleven year occupation of Czechoslovakia. A task force promised to present "material documenting that the Soviet Union is in Afghanistan for a long haul."[170] The "future security of the civilized world," of which Vice President Mondale would beg the USOC to uphold, was at risk.

In general, when it came to US-Soviet policy, the NSC respected the State Department's position that "we want to avoid conjuring up a red menace,"—yet in 1979, Brzezinski was

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[169] Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*.

[170] Jerry Schroter, "SCC Working Group on Iran and Afghanistan: Sixth Meeting," January 26, 1980, AN: CO00744, Document 0658, CIA Covert Operations: From Carter to Obama, 1977-2010, Digital National Security Archives, [n.p.].

adamant that the US needed to oppose Soviet aggression.[171] The CIA warned that the US' geopolitical interests—namely its access to Middle Eastern oil—were at stake.[172] Given the existing energy crisis, which drained not only oil reserves but voters' patience with the administration, Carter needed to act definitively. While the Carter administration debated the best course of action, ultimately the White House decided to, as Brzezinski had suggested, return to older methods and launch a propaganda campaign against the Soviets. Carter reflected that "the Olympics issue would cause me the most trouble and be the most severe blow to the Soviets."[173] To deal the blow, President Jimmy Carter sat before the cameras on *Meet the Press* and announced the Olympic boycott. Still, not all those on Carter's national security team agreed with the president's decision to boycott the 1980 Games. Director of the CIA, Admiral Stansfield Turner, for example, felt that the boycott would do little to change Soviet policy.[174] Nevertheless, the hierarchy of Carter's foreign policy team ensured Brzezinski and the NSC's voices were louder than all others'.

Carter's Cold War strategy came at the cost of his counterterrorism program. New York Senator Jacob Javits introduced, alongside Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, the "Omnibus Antiterrorism Act" before Congress during the early days of Carter's presidency. "I am becoming increasingly apprehensive," Senator Javits explained, "that the Carter administration

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[171] Thomas Thornton "SCC Working Group Meeting on Afghanistan [Includes Attachment]," May 3, 1978, Country Files, Afghanistan, 1978, Container 1, Records of the Office of the National Security Adviser, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 3.

[172] Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*, 76.

[173] Jimmy Carter, *White House Diary*, 387.

[174] Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*, 85.

has been relinquishing the lead expected of the United States in this struggle."[175] The president's national security team, still ambivalent toward terrorism, attempted to constrain the bill to encompass only international terrorism, though the NSC acknowledged it did not want to appear entirely complacent. "The basic problem for the Administration," officials bemoaned, "is how to appear non-negative on anti-terrorism without endorsing a bad bill."[176] Despite evidence to the contrary and an increase in attacks on American soil by groups like the FALN, the NSC felt terrorism was unlikely to affect the majority of Americans.[177] While the Carter administration pledged to assist Puerto Rico with security for the Pan American Games and would pledge to assist the USOC with security for the Los Angeles Olympic Games, much of the Carter administration's counterterrorism efforts, when they existed, were hidden from public view. Aside from the preparations for the 1984 Games, antiterrorism efforts seemingly disappeared, and coupled with the Iranian hostage crisis, ASALA, and FALN attacks, public officials felt the Carter administration was dropping the ball.

If Congress expressed dismay at the president's inattention to anti-terrorism efforts, the announcement of the Olympic boycott succeeded in, for the moment, fixing Carter's domestic political problems. The American public initially reacted positively to Carter's appearance on national television. An ABC-Louis Harris poll tracked 55 percent in favor of the boycott, with only 39 percent of participants opposed. Gallup shortly thereafter recorded 56 percent of American citizens supportive of Carter's stance and only 34 percent against the US withdrawal

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[175]Jatvis quoted in: Timothy Naftali, *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, 106.

[176] Annie M. Guitierrez "Ribicoff's Bill on Terrorism [Includes Attachments]," January 12, 1978, Annie Guitierrez – Subject Files, Container 33, Records of the Domestic Policy Staff, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 3.

[177] Timothy Naftali, *Blindspot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism*, 107.

from the Olympics. NBC placed 49 percent of viewers in favor of and 41 percent opposed to the boycott, but nevertheless the American public generally supported the president's symbolic stance in the face of Soviet aggression.[178] Carter's team likewise followed the foreign media's reaction to the boycott, compiling and distributing reporting from international press outlets around the West Wing.[179] The White House even, in the months after the announcement, considered lobbying for a new, permanent location for the competitions, floating the possibility of coordination with the Greek government to establish a spot for the Olympics in the Games' ancestral home.[180] Officials went so far as to hire outside counsel to look into the legality of hosting an alternative games, which attorneys advised the West Wing would likely result in sanction by the International Olympic Committee.[181] Perhaps understanding that a permanent ban from the Olympic Games would hurt US morale more than an alternative sporting competition would help, the White House did not proceed.

The USOC, despite its desire to attend the Olympic Games, nevertheless backed the White House. Robert Kane wrote to the president that "since the President of the United States has advised the United States Olympic Committee that in light of international events the

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[178] Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*, 86.

[179] "Foreign Media Reaction to Olympic Participation Issue – III Summary," February 7, 1980, Robert Berenson's Subject Files, "Olympics – Boycott, 1/80 – 2/80," Container 14, Records of the Domestic Policy Staff, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 3-9.

[180] Anne Wexler, "Greek Olympic Committee Proposal for a Permanent Site," February 7, 1980, Lloyd Cutler's Files, "Olympics – Alternative Games, 1-7/80," Container 101, Records of the White House Counsel to the President, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 1.

[181] Michael Scott, "Letter to Joseph Onek, Dated February 13, 1980," February 13, 1980, Lloyd Cutler's Files, "Olympics – Alternative Games, 1-7/80," Container 101, Records of the White House Counsel to the President, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 1-5.

national security of the country is threatened, the USOC has decided not to send a team to the 1980 Summer Games in Moscow […]"[182] Much as during the earlier years of the Cold War, Americans recognized "national security" hinged on symbolic power. Nevertheless, despite their support, USOC officials like Kane felt Carter unfairly exercised his authority and placed political concerns over the spirit of the Olympic Games. Kane, in a show of rebellion, informed the media, "if 'there's a problem with the site, it ought to be focused on that. A boycott is just not the right way to do it.'"[183] Even US officials acknowledged that, despite the White House's rhetoric, the "Soviet Union was actually in full accord with the letter of the Olympic charter."[184] What Carter's contemporaries failed to point out, however, was the continued need for securitization at the Olympic Games. The Carter administration engaged in counterterrorism planning during the 1979 Pan American Games, and promised to contribute to the 1984 Los Angeles' security perimeter. The administration, however, was noticeably silent on the threat to the 1980 Moscow Games.

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[182] Robert Kane, "Letter to President Carter, Dated April 19, 1980," April 19, 1980, Lloyd Cutler's Files, "Olympics – Letters 3-4/80," Container 102, Records of the White House Counsel to the President, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 1.

[183] Nicholas Evans Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*, 88.

[184] Ibid., 93.

Chapter Three

Pressing the Wrong Button

Soviet Security and the 1980 Olympic Boycott

In the spring of 1980, as he encouraged President Carter to continue the American-led Moscow Olympic boycott effort, White House staffer Nelson Ledsky asserted that "We have already substantially damaged the Moscow games, and we clearly can inflict still greater harm."[185] While Ledsky believed the president's Cold War-inspired, diplomatic blow against the USSR was successful, members of intelligence agencies and the Department of State recognized the Carter administration was focusing on the wrong war. Though the "war on terrorism" would not officially begin until after September 11, 2001, career officials as early as the 1970s understood international developments warranted a more comprehensive definition of national security. As the Pan American Games had shown, and as the preparations for the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Games would show in the coming years when President Carter would commit to assisting the southern California city with security procedures and costs, the terrorist threat Nixon and Ford had carefully sought to counter after Munich only grew in size and danger.

The theatrics of the boycott certainly overshadowed and likely undermined the ongoing global effort to understand and prevent terrorist threats to international sporting competitions, including the Olympic Games. The Carter administration, in the months following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, successfully mobilized dozens of allies to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics in solidarity with the United States. Sixty-five countries refused to send any athletes to

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[185] Nelson Ledsky, "Olympic Boycott: Our next move?," May 21, 1980, Lloyd Cutler's Files, "Olympics – Memos, 5-10/8," Container 103, Records of the White House Counsel to the President, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, [n.p.].

the Soviet Union, and only eighty sent teams.[186] The White House conscientiously tracked the number of countries which planned to abstain from the competition in the months before the Games, carefully monitoring trends within the international sporting movement.[187] "We have had our major victories from direct Presidential involvement," Al McDonald wrote to Lloyd Cutler in February of 1980. However, Carter's administration recognized the precarious nature of its moral authority. "For the moment," he continued, "we are riding the crest of a gigantic and successful wave on the Olympic issue. Perhaps I am dead wrong, but I am concerned we are pressing our luck too hard."[188] The issue, though the majority of Carter's administration neglected to understand such, was not so much that the boycott pressed too *hard* but rather that it pressed the *wrong* button.

While they addressed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration failed to identify, both in the press and internally, any security concerns tied to the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games—despite the administration's own memories of Munich and counterterrorism efforts during the 1979 Pan American Games in Puerto Rico. Additionally, the USOC had already begun planning for the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles, and President Carter, mindful of the Puerto Rican separatist violence in New York, committed to providing security for the Summer Games on American soil. The administration's commitment of personnel and intelligence gathering for both the 1979 Pan American Games and 1984 Olympic Games indicate

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[186] "The Olympic Boycott, 1980," Department of State, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/qfp/104481.htm.

[187] "Olympic Committee Decisions," June 18, 1980, Lloyd Cutler's Files, "Olympics – Memos, 5-10/8," Container 103, Records of the White House Counsel to the President, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, [n.p.].

[188] Al McDonald, "Our Olympic Posture," February 15, 1980, Lloyd Cutler's Files, "Olympics – Memos 1-2/80", Container 102, Records of the White House Counsel to the President, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 3.

the White House's genuine appreciation for the rise in a political extremist threat to the homeland. The Ford administration's earlier monitoring of the 1976 Montreal Games had established a clear precedent for American surveillance of Games held on foreign soil. Yet despite this history of Olympic security concerns, the White House was silent when it came to Moscow.

As the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games drew near, public support for Carter's boycott waned. Within the Soviet Union, regime-friendly press drew attention to the deteriorating strength of the American-led sanctions on Western participation in the Games. Papers in the USSR, including *Izvestiya*, emphasized the antipathy the Carter administration faced from the international sporting movement in its organization of the boycott. The US government was "now floundering in muddy water beneath a wave which they themselves created," the paper informed Soviet citizens.[189] By highlighting the Soviet Union's embodiment of the "noble Olympic ideal" and the US' failure to uphold any such commitment to peace, Soviet papers attempted to undermine not just the strength of Carter's boycott, but the US' return to a conventional Cold War foreign policy. By July of 1980, Soviet journalists reported on the Carter administration's Republican challenger Ronald Reagan, who, "speculating on the feelings of disillusionment which U.S. voters are experiencing in connection with J. Carter's policy," grew increasingly popular among American voters in the months before the 1980 presidential election. The Carter administration indicated that, through its boycott, it continued to "worship

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[189] "Attempts to Organize Olympic Boycott 'Floundering'," *Daily Report, Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-80-010*, January 15, 1980, CC12, CC13; Originally published by V. Popov, "The Olympic Games Draw Nearer," *Izvestiya*, 11 January, 1980, 6.; For further reading on the logistics of the 1980 Olympic Boycott and the Carter administration's efforts to coordinate the international movement, including its struggle to obtain support, see: Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

the god of cold war," *Pravda* gravely told its readers.[190] The Soviet press had a clear bias, but nevertheless, in the months following, the Carter administration would indeed face many hurdles in its execution of a successful international, US-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games. In part, these difficulties stemmed from a global trend away from fears of mutually assured destruction. Concerns in the coming decade would come from independent and state-sponsored terrorists, not the rapidly weakening USSR.

The Soviet Union, while still the ideological enemy, was not, some at Carter's Department of State hypothesized, the greatest threat to American security by the late 1970s. Rather, the already present ethnic and religious fractures in formerly colonized states served as cannon fodder that might blow up global peace, and the USSR's meddling in the region contributed to rising tensions. Transnational terrorism continued to plague the Middle East and Europe throughout the latter half of the decade, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis marked a transitional period in the history of modern terrorism. Though still largely amorphous, religious terrorism began to take root in the Middle East, where the Iranian Revolution, which occurred in 1979 shortly before the hostage crisis, was used by terrorists to encourage "Muslims throughout the world […] to reassert the fundamental teachings of the Qur'an and to resist the intrusion of Western—particularly U.S.—influence in the Middle East," Bruce Hoffman writes.[191] Recognizing the shifting nature of international geopolitical concerns, the Department of State—though not under the guise of the SCC or any counterterrorism unit—requested just under eighty thousand dollars to facilitate an investigative

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[190] "Pravda Review Discusses Olympics, Disarmament, Bolivia Coup," *Daily Report, Soviet Union, FBIS-SOV-80-148*, July 30, 1980, CC1-CC4; Originally published by Yuliy Yakhontov, "International Review," *Pravda*, 27 July 80, 4.

[191] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 92.

committee which would evaluate not only the potential for a repeat of Iran, but Soviet influence in the Middle East as well.[192] While the sum requested was small, the Department of State proposed a unique mission. Despite the rapidly evolving terrorist threat, which was beginning to take on a new shape as it maintained its transnational nature from the early 1970s, the Carter administration continued to style concerns about terrorism, when it chose to address them, in a Cold War fashion.

The battle between the US and the USSR still raged, but increasingly career foreign policy officials turned their attention toward the rising fundamentalist threat, and groups at the State Department understood this threat to be inextricably linked to the geopolitical realities of the Cold War. The Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), run out of the Department of State with the backing of the Department of Defense, sought to counter the possibility that the Soviet Union "will support not only left-wing radical revolutionary movements, but also rightist ultra-conservatives and fundamentalist religious groups" in the Middle East.[193] State proposed the establishment of a coalition of academics, with special knowledge of Soviet and Middle Eastern history, who might help dissect the stark ethnic divisions within the region and analyze the degree to which Soviet intervention in the area fostered religious extremism and conflict. The threat of *jihadism*, which proponents like al-Qaeda's Osama bin Laden would argue in the late 1990s was an "individual responsibility incumbent upon Muslims everywhere" to ensure "the restoration of a pan-Islamic caliphate"

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[192] David Newsom, "Department of State Clearance of Research Project: 'Projecting the Soviet Threat in the Middle East,'" June 14, 1979, U.S. Espionage Den. V. 49:30-40, Document: A-1938, AN: IR02669, Iran: the Making of U.S. Policy, 1977-1980, Digital National Security Archives.

[193] Ibid., 1-2.

through violence, had not yet crystalized.[194] Still US intelligence officials recognized in 1979 that fundamentalism could pose a threat to US hegemony. Specifically, HERO hoped to study "the possibility of terrorist use, or threat of us, of nuclear weapons," which, coupled with Soviet influence in the region, posed a new, more pressing threat.[195] Further, HERO hoped to understand how the Kremlin approached ethnic identities and religious movements in the Middle East.[196] In addition to ascertaining the political climate of the region, the Department of State sought to counter anti-American sentiment through its program. State's efforts in early 1979, however, served as the Carter administration's only explicit attempt to understand and counter terrorism in the Middle East. The White House likewise remained silent on the influence these rising tensions held on the 1980 Summer Games, despite the Soviet Union's internal and, at times, even public, acknowledgement of dangers posed to the 1980 Games by disgruntled comrades both within the Soviet Union's immediate borders and at the outer edges of its political empire.

As the Carter administration gathered in the Oval Office, strategizing ways to convince its fellow Western nations to avoid sending athletes to the Moscow Summer Games, the USSR's leadership focused its energy on securing both its socialist ideology and the Olympic venues themselves. The Soviets, ever concerned about protecting the regime's control over its citizens' social and political intentions and hoping to mitigate the unrest which plagued nations across the Eastern bloc throughout the late 1970s, focused on the task which, since Munich, had tormented Olympic organizers. Much as the Canadians had leading up to 1976 and like the Americans

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[194] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 97-98.
[195] David Newsom, "Department of State Clearance of Research Project: 'Projecting the Soviet Threat in the Middle East,'" 3.
[196] Ibid.

would in the years before 1984, Soviet sports organizers worried about the prevention of acts of terrorism at the 1980 Games. Communist leaders created an "external relations commission," which coordinated with various international organizations like the International Olympic Committee, and tasked the group early in the 1970s to begin the planning process and to study, among other sporting events, the Olympic preparations in Montreal.[197]

Cold War attitudes shaded both the US and the USSR's understanding of and strategies for countering terrorism abroad, yet the Soviet Union's Olympic preparations reveal the additional domestic complications the oppressive regime's politics generated as the USSR readied its population for an influx of Western visitors. While the Carter administration remained committed to its antiquated definition of national security, and only slowly began to appreciate the dynamic nature of terrorism, the Soviet Union took a hardline approach; albeit, the Soviet definition of terrorism, too, was amorphous and used primarily to target anti-Soviet sentiment within the Eastern bloc. The Soviets blamed "the influence of the most aggressive forces of imperialism," through which the United States "clearly exhibits a tendency toward returning to a policy 'from the position of strength' and to the 'Cold War.'"[198] Mounting political dissent within the Soviet Union, in republics like Armenia, threatened to trigger acts of terrorism at the 1980 Games. As Munich had shown eight years earlier, international sporting events provided the perfect opportunity for separatists to make their voices heard. The Soviets understood these threats and the implications political protest might have on the security of the Olympic Games. A

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[197] Jenifer Parks, "Red Sport, Red Tape: The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, 1952-1980" (PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009), 344-345.

[198] M.A. Yuzbashyan, "Report by the Chairman of the Committee for State Security of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic M. A. Yuzbashyan," March 14, 1979, translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, Armenian National Archives, Record ID: 117341, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Cold War International History Project, [n.p.].

report presented by the Bureau of the CCCP of Armenia in March of 1979 asserted that, "Therefore there clearly exists an attempt by our enemies to create a united anti-Communist front."[199] The attempts by "enemies" of the USSR, namely ethno-nationalists in union republics like Armenia or, later, religious fundamentalists in Afghanistan, to oppose the regime were styled by the Soviet press to resemble Western aggression.[200] If old, Cold War attitudes did not fall by the wayside as new, terrorist threats emerged, they at least—in the minds of HERO's proponents and various Soviet leaders—changed shape somewhat.

While the rhetoric of Soviet leaders may have fallen in line with traditional Cold War attitudes, the threats with which the USSR contended were very much based on real tensions and were rooted in successful attacks by terrorists in the 1970s throughout the deteriorating Soviet empire. These attacks, including a bombing by Armenian nationalists in a central Moscow metro station in early 1977, rocked Soviet leadership to its core. Terrorism, the metro attack showed, inched closer to Red Square, but it most glaringly existed in the outskirts of the Soviet empire, in places like Afghanistan, where the US supplied ethnic Afghanis with weaponry to destabilize Soviet influence. In March of 1980, only a few months before the start of the Games, Army General S. Tsvigun, first deputy chairman of the USSR Committee for State Security outlined, in an article he titled "Subversion as a Tool of Imperialism," the efforts made by US intelligence to undermine Soviet authority. He alleged that the US, among other "imperialist states," waged "secret warfare" and spent billions of dollars to "move gangs of terrorists into Democratic Afghanistan […]"[201] At this point, the Soviets, though they misattributed the cause, did

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[199] Ibid.

[200] "Tsvigun Discusses Western Special Services and State Security," *Daily Report, Soviet Union, Annex, FBIS-SOV-80-085-A*, April 30, 1980, 2-16; Originally published S. Tsvigun, "Subversion as a Tool of Imperialism," *Kommunist*, March 1, 1980, 108-119.

[201] Ibid.

acknowledge the presence of terrorism within Afghanistan. Furthermore, justifying the security perimeter they had established around the Olympic Games, the Soviets argued that the "main directions of the subversive activities of the special services and propaganda centers in the capitalist countries aimed against our country are espionage, provocations directed at Soviet citizens and establishments abroad, and ideological divisions."[202] Those ideological divisions, whether generated by US intelligence agencies or by the Soviets' own oppressive regime, in turn, fomented terrorism which threatened to undermine the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. Andropov and the Politburo used the friction to justify crackdowns on Soviet citizens in the months before the Games. Pointing to alleged US interference and attempts at espionage, Tsvigun claimed that "the greatest reliance is placed on the 'dissidents,'" further elaborating that, "imperialist propaganda finds it more convenient to describe with this term the few renegades, people who have alienated themselves from our society and have taken the path of anti-Soviet activities." The Soviet general made use of the definition the Soviet security agencies would likewise utilize to remove potential "anti-social" threats from the center of Soviet society in the build-up to the Games.[203] The Soviets, fearful of ideological subversion as their empire continued to weaken, left their definition of terrorism intentionally vague, so as to encompass political dissidents as well as violent actors.

Moscow's secret police carefully watched citizens who had a history of insubordination as they prepared to welcome foreign nations into the capital of the USSR. One of the goals of "ideological diversions," Tsvigun wrote, was to "create disorder in the political and economic life of the socialist countries."[204] Those political divisions included, the USSR acknowledged,

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[202] Ibid.
[203] Ibid.
[204] Ibid.

though dutifully prescribing their presence to US meddling rather than Soviet policy, nationalist divisions within the Soviet Union—particularly in the Baltic and "transcaucasian" union republics.[205] Deep, ethnic divisions existed within the Soviet Union, though those in the Kremlin struggled to understand the diverse cultures throughout Eurasia which made up their constituencies. Whether fomented by "hostile Western propaganda," or otherwise, ethnic groups of "negatively inclined individuals inside the country, including those in the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]," the CCCP of Armenia reported, "still commit anti-state, and anti-Soviet crimes."[206] Those "negatively inclined" included citizens of Soviet republics who identified with their ethnic backgrounds in lieu of Soviet ideology. Falling under even western analysts' (like Bruce Hoffman's) definition of terrorist, groups of "marginalized individuals" in the USSR sought to address their political concerns with violence.[207]

Much as Black September had at the 1972 Munich Olympics, groups of ethno-nationalists hoped to draw attention to the callousness of an imperialist regime through shocking displays of brutality. In 1977, a few years before the Armenian Bureau of the CCCP issued its 1979 report, Armenian terrorists had, "in various public places in the city of Moscow […] carried out explosions of hand-made bombs, resulting in human causalities, destruction and damage to state property."[208] Seven people were killed and more injured in the blasts. The KGB, in response, strengthened its anti-terrorism procedures. "Over the last 12 years, the Armenian KGB," the CCCP explained, "has uncovered and liquidated more than 20 illegal anti-Soviet

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[205] Ibid.
[206] M.A. Yuzbashyan "Report by the Chairman of the Committee for State Security of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic M. A. Yuzbashyan," [n.p].
[207] Ibid.; Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*.
[208] M.A. Yuzbashyan, "Report by the Chairman of the Committee for State Security of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic M. A. Yuzbashyan," [n.p.].

nationalist groups […]"[209] Though the Soviet Union continued to maintain that these nationalist divisions were exacerbated by western influence, the reality was that ethnic divisions within the Soviet republics generated violence in the years before 1980. Those terrorists behind the 1977 Moscow bombings cited "territorial ambitions" and harbored a manifesto, entitled "Terror and Terrorists," in which one of the extremists "made an effort to justify the methods of extremism and means of struggle against the Soviet state."[210] The perpetrators' act encouraged other Armenian separatists to call for the purification of Armenian culture and independence from the Soviet Union.[211] The bombing was designed, in the style typical of ethno-nationalist terrorism of the 1970s, to maximize psychological impact. At the time of attack, the station was "packed with parents and children making the most of the last days before Soviet schools reopened after the new year break."[212]

Word of the terrorist attack in Moscow hit the American presses when information leaked by Soviet officials indicated that a "bomb, apparently the work of terrorists," had gone off in the Moscow subway station. "There were indications," Philip Caputo of the *Chicago Tribune* reported, "that Soviet authorities may try to blame the incident on dissidents."[213] Caputo noted that "it is unusual for Soviet newsmen to report so readily on a bombing," highlighting past terrorists attacks within the USSR which the Soviet press attempted to hide from Western media.[214] The logical explanation for the Soviets' deviation from their traditional secrecy,

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[209] Ibid.
[210] Ibid.
[211] Ibid.
[212] David K. Willis, "Blast puts Soviets on alert: Leaders concerned West-style violence could spur dissidents," *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 12, 1977, 1.
[213] Philip Caputo, "Report is leaked: 'Terrorist' blast kills 4 in Moscow subway car," *Chicago Tribune*, January 11, 1977, 2.
[214] Ibid.

American journalists worried, was that the government had purposely amplified the threat to justify increased repression of Soviet citizens. The *Los Angeles Times* likewise acknowledged the release of information pertaining to the bombing, noting that western journalists' source "has often been used in the past to disclose sensational information that the Kremlin for some reason is anxious to reveal in the West," and that as such, "his graphic explanation of the episode carries some weight."[215] The "graphic" nature of the attack aside, the *LA Times* hypothesized that a "possibility is that the incident could be used as the excuse for taking some stringent new measures against dissident elements."[216] Some American journalists recognized the complex politics behind such an attack. "Coming at a time," explained Paul Whol, the *Christian Science Monitor*'s Soviet affairs commentator, "when Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany have resorted to repressive measures reminiscent of the Stalin era, the question arises with some observers whether the KGB (secret police) will not use the latest incident as part of a carefully orchestrated campaign to intimidate critics of the regime."[217] Indeed, this appears to be the same logic upon which the infamous Fifth Directorate capitalized leading up to the Olympic Games.

Tsvigun, as he painted American wiles as the greatest threat to Soviet security, acknowledged the threat terrorism—whether generated by US interference or otherwise—might pose at the 1980 Games. "We must also mention the fact that with the approaching Moscow Olympic Games," he wrote, "the ideological diversion centers have considerably energized their efforts, trying to discredit this world sport ceremony and the Soviet state as organizer of Olympiad-80."[218] Calling upon not just the recent history of Armenian separatist bombings, the

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[215] "Moscow Subway Blast Laid to Terrorist Bomb," *Los Angeles Times*, January 11, 1977, 1.
[216] Ibid., 10.
[217] David K. Willis, "Blast puts Soviets on alert: Leaders concerned West-style violence could spur dissidents," 7.
[218] "Tsvigun Discusses Western Special Services and State Security," [n.p.]; Originally published

chairman of the USSR Committee for State Security reminded Soviet readers of the Zionist threat as well. Rooted in anti-imperialism, Zionism developed out of Jewish desires for an independent, sovereign Jewish nation (the state of Israel) in post-war Palestine.[219] Militant Zionism had a long history in the Soviet Union, which not only allied itself with Arab nations hostile to Israel, but likewise oppressed Jewish cultural practices and thought, even preventing Jewish hopefuls from emigrating to Israel.[220] Soviet authorities worried about potential Zionist-inspired violence as they continued to battle anti-imperial terrorism throughout their republics. "The imperialist special services actively use and generously finance various Zionist and exile national organizations," wrote Tsvigun, who went on to admit that "Zionism is ascribed a special role in subversive ideological activities against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries."[221] This was particularly true following the 1970 Dymshits-Kuznetsov hijacking, during which sixteen Soviet Jews attempted to overtake a Soviet aircraft, to "forcibly remove the Russian pilots," and to divert the plane's course of travel to Israel.[222] These so-called "refuseniks" concerned Soviet leaders who recognized, particularly in the context an international sporting event, the possibility that Zionists might utilize public attention to draw attention to the plight of Jews in the Soviet Union.

In addition to the separatist terrorism with which the KGB and Muscovites were familiar, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan heightened religious tensions in the outskirts of the Soviet

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S. Tsvigun, "Subversion as a Tool of Imperialism."

[219] Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 48.

[220] For further reading on the history of Zionist activity in the USSR, see: "The Middle East: Introduction" and "Israel and Zionism" in Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World*, New York: Allen Lane, 2005.

[221] "Tsvigun Discusses Western Special Services and State Security," [n.p.]; Originally published S. Tsvigun, "Subversion as a Tool of Imperialism."

[222] Adam Reinherz, "Refusenik jailed in attempted hijacking in 1970 offers inspiring message," *Pittsburgh Jewish Chronicle*, April 27, 2018.

empire. Though Islamic fundamentalism would not crystalize until the 1990s, religious extremists in the Middle East still threatened peace in Soviet puppet states. The invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 only served to increase tensions and meant that, in addition to political dissent in Moscow's capital, Olympic organizers had to counter a developing *jihadist* movement while they secured their Games. The KGB explicitly expressed concern about the rising threat of religious fundamentalism in the late 1970s. "Moscow's concern about the loyalty of its Muslim subjects in both the Caucasus and central Asia," scholar Christopher Andrew writes, "was heightened at the end of the 1970s by the 'Islamic revolution' in Iran and the beginning of the war in Afghanistan."[223] Scholars Nina Kramareva and Jonathan Grix argue that "for non-Russians the war turned into a unifying symbol of their opposition to Moscow's rule" and that the invasion "received a cold response domestically."[224] KGB leaders "publicly denounced the 'infiltration of foreign agents across our borders' (an indirect reference to Iranian attempts to export the Khomeini brand of fundamentalism into Azerbaijan) and the 'anti-social activity' of 'sectarians' and 'reactionary Muslim clergy' (the traditional Soviet codewords for the Sufi brotherhoods and unauthorized mullahs)" in the turbulent 1970s.[225] Soviet security officials admitted in the months before the Games that "[o]f late the number of anti-Soviet provocations has increased: bombing, shooting at and burning Soviet institutions, hooliganistic actions and hostile demonstrations at the buildings of our missions, illegal arrests and detentions of Soviet

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[223] Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World*, New York: Allen Lane, 2005, 378.

[224] Nina Kramareva and Jonathan Grix, "'War and Peace' at the 1980 Moscow and 2014 Sochi Olympics: The Role of Hard and Soft Power in Russian Identity," *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 35, no. 14 (2018): 1411, 1414.

[225] Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The Mitrokhin Archive II: The KGB and the World*, 378.

citizens, and attempts to recruit them."[226] The US' public boycott campaign did not help matters; "the controversy around the Olympics produced by Afghanistan, and the consequent greater likelihood of protest during the proceedings" encouraged "a larger crackdown on domestic opponents" in 1980.[227] To combat this ideological and physical threat, particularly as they prepared for the 1980 Games, the Kremlin heightened security protocols in the capital city.

As part of the propaganda campaign they launched during the organization of the Moscow Olympics, the USSR attempted to highlight the need for political unity. "The most important conditions for the effectiveness of Chekist activities," Tsvigun wrote, invoking the old name for the Soviet secret police, "are dedicated service to the interests of the people, party guidance and the broadest possible support of the working people."[228] The KGB capitalized on those interests, using the Games as pretext to round up four thousand individuals with "terrorist inclinations," a reference to perhaps political dissidents or genuine nationalists, and those who were "criminal recidivists and psychologically ill."[229] According to declassified reports uncovered by Soviet historian Simon Young, KGB leader Yuri Andropov, "in what was likely a reverence to Soviet dissidents, recorded that the KGB had 'strengthened control over individuals suspected of committing especially dangerous crimes against the state' as a direct consequence

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[226] "Tsvigun Discusses Western Special Services and State Security," [n.p.]; Originally published S. Tsvigun, "Subversion as a Tool of Imperialism."; For more on the USSR's propagandistic aims during the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games and the organizational process see: Jenifer Parks, "Red Sport, Red Tape: The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, 1952-1980" (PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009) and Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," *Russian History* 43, no. 3-4 (2016): 394-423.

[227] Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," *Russian History* 43, no. 3-4 (2016): 411.

[228] "Tsvigun Discusses Western Special Services and State Security," [n.p.]; Originally published S. Tsvigun, "Subversion as a Tool of Imperialism."

[229] Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," 407.

of the security preparations for the Games."[230] The CPSU CC Politburo additionally committed to "strengthening international security."[231] They identified the Carter administration's reversion to Cold War rhetoric and attempted to justify, internally, the invasion of Afghanistan, which Soviet leaders saw as within the bounds of UN law.[232] Furthermore, the Soviets understood the precarious control they exercised in their fringe states, arguing that "we were unable to stand by idly, in view of the fact that the USA is attempting (with the assistance of China) to create a new and dangerous military-strategic standing ground on our southern border."[233] Left unsaid was the impact this might have on ethnic tensions in the region. "We shall henceforth exhibit a maximum degree of cool-headedness and reasonable judgement," the CCCP committed.[234]

As the Games drew closer, the KGB continued to monitor dissidents. In April of 1980, months before the Moscow Games, Chairman of the Delegation of the Committee for State Security of the USSR, General Colonel V. M. Chebrikov informed Soviet leaders that the KGB continued its "measures of coordination and collaboration in the work of organizing the Olympic Games in Moscow."[235] Soviet Olympic planning followed the trend of securitization established

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[230] Ibid.

[231] "CPSU CC Politburo Decision," February 01, 1980, obtained by David Wolff and translated by M. Doctoroff, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 4, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Record ID: 111260, Cold War International History Project, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, [n.p.].

[232] "Soviet Communication to the Hungarian Leadership on Events in Afghanistan," December 28, 1979, Translated by Attila Kolontari and Zsofia Zelnik, National Archives of Hungary (MOL) M-KS 288, f. 5./790.o.e., Record ID: 113162, Cold War International History Project, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, [n.p.].

[233] "CPSU CC Politburo Decision," [n.p.].

[234] Ibid.

[235] Viktor M. Chebrikov, "Report by the Chairman of the Delegation of the Committee for State Security (KGB) of the USSR, General-Colonel V. M. Chebrikov during Soviet Bloc Meeting on Western Radio," April 23, 1980, obtained by Jordan Baev and translated by Sveta Milusheva, Bulgarian Interior Ministry Archive, Fond 22, Record 1, Document 124, Record ID: 121522, Cold War International History Project, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, [n.p.].

after Munich, through which "the Olympics are one site where authorities seek to construct and manage the risk of terrorism through highly dramatized security displays."[236] Not only did Politburo documents reflect these concerns, but the Soviet government created a new arm of the KGB, the 11th "Olympic" department, to handle securing the Games. The Olympic department was "formally charged with 'thwarting the ideological actions of the enemy and hostile elements during the preparations and orchestration of the Moscow summer Olympics'" and fell under the jurisdiction of the KGB's infamous Fifth Directorate, which handled vaguely-defined "internal opposition" to the communist cause.[237] The hierarchy of Moscow's Olympic security apparatus indicated the Soviets' concerns of homegrown terrorism (like that which rocked the Moscow subway system in 1977) and political dissenters, which were heightened in the build-up to the 1980 Olympiad.

Much as global powers watched the Montreal Olympics, the first Summer Games after the 1972 Munich Massacre, for signs of terrorist activity, the Soviets likewise paid attention to the costs and security perimeter of the 1976 Canadian effort to host the Games. Terrorist incidents in the Soviet Union, including the earlier Zionist attacks, prompted the Soviet security agencies to initiate "an analysis of the security arrangements at the Munich and Montréal Olympics" through which a dedicated counterterrorism program developed.[238] In addition to intelligence gathering, the KGB created a special forces unit which was "assigned the task of 'neutralizing acts of terrorism, sabotage, and/or the seizure [of hostages by] armed groups and combat support for real-time [security] operations'" and which countered threats of political

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[236] Ramón Spaaij, "Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas," 459.
[237] Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," 400.
[238] Ibid.

dissident violence in the USSR.[239] The Soviets remembered Munich as they geared up to host their games. General Filipp Bobkov, head of the KGB's Fifth Directorate during the preparations for the Summer Games, reminisced in 2008 that the "notorious terrorist attack [the Munich Massacre] led Soviet officials to suspect that 'much was being done to bring disorder to the [Moscow] Olympics.'"[240] The events of 1972 continued to shape host nations' security strategies and the readiness for *potential* violence was as important as any response to *actual* acts of terrorism.

Yet, in Moscow, the threat of violence was real. Though it had been three years since their 1977 Moscow subway attack, Armenian nationalists allegedly planned to target the Olympics. According to Soviet filmmakers with access to classified archival documents and first-hand accounts, the KGB uncovered the threat to the 1980 Games after the 1977 Moscow subway bombing. It appears the conspirators were inspired by the earlier separatist attack.[241] "From at least mid-1978 until the final months before the XXII Games," writes Young, "Andropov regularly provided evidence to the Central Committee of plots against the Soviet Olympiad."[242] While it is possible some of this evidence was simply justification for crackdowns on political dissent, the Soviet state nevertheless used the language of Munich and the 1972 terrorist attack continued to influence organizers' decisions. The Moscow committee's chairman, Ignatii Novikov, "made it clear to his colleagues at a meeting in January 1976 that even the smallest chance of a Munich-style attack in Moscow from any quarter had to be eliminated."[243] The Soviets continued to utilize the Games as an excuse to crack down on all political dissidents,

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[239] Ibid., 401.
[240] Ibid., 396.
[241] Ibid., 397.
[242] Ibid., 398.
[243] Ibid., 397.

lumping those who disagreed with the party line into the broad category of "anti-social elements" which ranged from those who were thought to be "participants in international terrorist organizations" to individuals "who were liable to 'commit hostile acts' on Soviet territory."[244] Just under 10,000 names were placed on lists and under the watchful eye of the Soviet police.[245] "Spectator numbers and flows make it difficult to physically identify terrorists; the proximity of events to transportation hubs allow quick escape routes" at major sporting events, explain scholars Yair Galily, Moran Yarchi, and Ilan Tamir.[246] Consequently, much like in Montreal, Soviet organizers greatly increased military and police presence around the Games. US journalists placed the number of militia present in Moscow as high as 200,000 personnel at the start of the Games, which had quadrupled from 50,000 just ten days earlier.[247] "According to veteran sportswriters," explained the *Atlanta Constitution*, "such security is unprecedented – even since Munich – at Olympic sites."[248] Russian archival sources place the number significantly lower—though still impressive—at 97,901 total personnel.[249]

Despite the long history of terrorism in the Soviet empire, and the human rights abuses the Soviet government undertook to secure its competition, the Carter administration made no public statements about the security threats to the 1980 Olympic Games or about the round-up of dissidents by Soviet authorities. Instead, only horrified American journalists published stories in

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[244] Ibid., 403.
[245] Ibid.
[246] Yair Galily, Moran Yarchi, and Ilan Tamir, "From Munich to Boston, and from Theater to Social Media: The Evolutionary Landscape of World Sporting Terror," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 38, no. 12 (2015): 1001.
[247] Kevin Klose, "Moscow Readies Massive Security For the Olympics," *The Washington Post*, July 8, 1980, pg. A1.
[248] "It's No Game to Moscow's Police: Soviets beef up security to near-Olympian proportions," *The Atlanta Constitution*, July 13, 1980, 12A.
[249] Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," *Russian History* 43, no. 3-4 (2016): 408-409.

the months before the Olympics. "Moscow Prepares Purge Before Summer Olympics," proclaimed the *Washington Post* in December of 1979.[250] In addition to preparing its citizens for interactions with Westerners who might aim to subvert communist ideology, the Politburo ordered local officials to organize lists of names of Soviet citizens with histories of public disorder, as well as Jews who showed sympathy to Israel. Those listed were to be removed from Moscow for the duration of the Olympic Games the *Post*'s Kevin Klose reported.[251] The "Draconian measures" according to sources, were the result of the Soviets' efforts to round up "undesirables" who ranged from those with previous court appearances and mental illness to those the KGB simply delineated as "suspicious." Western journalists suspected up to tens of thousands of citizens would be sent on state-ordered vacations outside the capital city in the weeks before the 1980 Games.[252] As the Soviet Union shipped large numbers of its population out of Moscow and into the countryside, security forces increased the tactical capabilities of its response teams. The heavy police presence, like during the 1976 Montreal Games, was noted by Westerners who "say they have never seen anything like it in peacetime in Moscow or other Soviet cities."[253] The KGB's massive security perimeter and military readiness indicated their "determination to avoid any Munich-style terrorism or incidents as Moscow becomes the first communist city ever to host an Olympics Games," reported David Willis.[254] Presenting a first-hand account to his readers, Willis outlined the intense procedures he and other journalists were

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[250] Kevin Klose, "Moscow Prepares Purge Before Summer Olympics: 'Undesirables' to Be Sent From Capital, Access to Foreign Tourists Curtailed," *The Washington Post*, December 17, 1979, pg. A23.
[251] Ibid.
[252] Ibid., A23, A26.
[253] David K. Willis, "En garde for Olympics: Moscow brings in troops to man tight security system," *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 1, 1980, pg. 1.
[254] Ibid.

required to undergo before entering any sporting complex. Surrounding the Games was equipment ranging from airport security detection devices to AK-47 rifles, barbed wire, and night-activated security beams. "Correspondents who were in Munich in 1972 and Montreal in 1976 say no such security surrounded press centers there," the *Christian Science Monitor* reporter claimed.[255] Perhaps a reflection of the USSR's clear and tight propagandistic controls, the security measures nevertheless reflected the continued securitization of all Olympic Games in the years following Munich.

Some of the issues with which Moscow police had to contend were the influx of visitors, press, and athletes, all of whom threatened not only Soviet physical security, but ideological security as well. As Russian scholar Simon Young explains, "in the view of the fundamental propagandistic goals of the Olympics project, both the creation of counter-terrorism units and the arrangements for the Olympic Village should also be seen as part of the USSR's overarching attempt to promote all aspects of Soviet socialism in 1980."[256] Most critically, "the organisers likely hoped that," in addition to a well-run sporting competition, "an absence of home-grown terrorism […] would prove the stable and harmonious nature of the USSR's political system and society" and that "the lack of any violence perpetrated by foreign extremists" might "demonstrate the competence of the socialist state in protecting the country from outside hostility and maintaining public order."[257] Yet, as some nations "warned others venturing to Moscow" in

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[255] Ibid., 9.

[256] Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," 402; For more see Jenifer Parks, "Red Sport, Red Tape: The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, 1952-1980" (PhD diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2009), Allen Guttmann, "The Cold War and the Olympics," *International Journal* 43, no. 4 (1988): 554-568.

[257] Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," 402.

1980, "in the absence of established military superpowers like the United States at the Games, hostile attacks against Westerners could occur."[258]

Despite this opportunity to strike at the USSR's image, the US government neglected to make mention of the Soviets' ability to protect their Games. Carter never addressed, publicly nor privately, the link between Afghanistan and the Soviet's rapidly deteriorating hold on political power in the region. Furthermore, the NSC and the White House failed to highlight for the international public the Armenian, Zionist, or religious extremist activity that preoccupied the KGB. The threat did however, in spite of the unprecedented security build up, exist. While the 1980 Games themselves were ultimately untouched by terrorists, save an allegedly thwarted Armenian nationalist attempt to attack the competition, what Spaaij calls "Olympic related" violence occurred in the months leading up to the Games.[259] "1980 is not going to escape the bloodshed," opined the *Los Angeles Times*' famed sportswriter Jim Murray, citing the attack of Afghanistan's field hockey team by "armed rebels" in April of 1980, three months before the Summer Games, during which three of the team members were immediately murdered and the remaining nineteen kidnapped. Soviet authorities never recovered the bodies of the rest of the field hockey team.[260] Still, in the wake of attacks, "not even this dark and bloody backdrop prepares you for the Soviet security measures in this Olympics," Murray opined.[261] The security protocols surrounding the 1980 Moscow Games were so intense that "Hitler's bunker was easier

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[258] Michael Atkinson and Kevin Young, "Political Violence, Terrorism, and Security at the Olympic Games," in *Global Olympics: Historical and Sociological Studies of the Modern Games*, Edited by Kevin Young and Kevin B. Wamsley, San Diego: Elseview Ltd., 2005, 274.

[259] Simon Young, "An Honourable Task for Chekists," 397; Ramón Spaaij, "Terrorism and Security at the Olympics: Empirical Trends and Evolving Research Agendas," 455.

[260] Jim Murray, "Toughest Event in the Olympics: the Security Check," *The Los Angeles Times*, July 17, 1980, 1.

[261] Ibid.

to get in and out of than Moscow's Olympic infrastructure."[262] While some, like Murray, felt the Soviet measures to be overblown, the USSR wanted to prevent, in every possible manner, a repeat of Munich.

There existed, by 1980, precedent for the boycott of sporting events on the basis of security concerns. In 1976, for example, the Soviet Union boycotted the "Chess Olympics," held in Haifa, Israel, because of "the unstable security situation, in which the safety of the participants could not be insured [sic]"[263] Yet President Carter and his NSC lagged in their transition from "national security" to "homeland security" and, while they protected US interests in San Juan and geared up to do so again in LA, the White House made no mention of Soviet security preparations. While his Department of State initiated some studies of developing violent threats in the Middle East, beginning in 1979 with its HERO program, Carter's political myopia meant that his administration did not spotlight practical concerns about the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games. Most critically, however, the administration's failure to publicly mention the Soviet's security build-up before the 1980 Olympic Games undermined its position that the Soviet state still posed a threat to global security; its new role, however, was not as hegemon but instigator of global terrorism. Instead, Carter continued to maintain that only the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan warranted withdrawal from the competition.

Both in the USSR and in the US, terrorism continued to threaten the Games. Despite Carter's failure to mention terrorism and the 1980 Games, he did concern himself with terrorism at the 1984 Games. Building upon the legacies of Nixon and Ford and reminiscent of past

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[262] Ibid., 1, 14.

[263] John Hirsch, "'Chess Olympics,'" February 8, 1980, Lloyd Cutler's Files, "Olympics – Memos 1-2/80", Container 102, Records of the White House Office Counsel to the President, Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum, Atlanta, GA, 1.

administrations' concerns about Montreal, the federal government committed to aiding the USOC in 1984. "It is clear that with terrorism spreading," the *Los Angeles Times* published at the conclusion of the Moscow Games, "there is deadly fear in the Olympic community of what might occur." In anticipation, the "Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee has hired as a security consultant a man who took a dire view of what terrorists might do last year at the Pan American Games in San Juan, Puerto Rico."[264] As early as 1978, as the city of Los Angeles vied for the right to host the 1984 Games, Californians appealed to the president for logistical support. "Sen. Alan Cranston's office disclosed," reported the *Los Angeles Times*, "that at the committee's request he had written to President Carter, asking him to commit the federal government to assume responsibility for security at a Los Angeles Olympics."[265] The *LA Times* drew attention to the vast cost of such an endeavor. "The latest reported security cost estimate from the Los Angeles Police Department for a 1984 games here is roughly $22 million." Still, despite the clear concerns for Olympic security, "this figure is less than a fourth of the cost of security at the 1976 Montreal games."[266] Nevertheless, a few months later, Carter committed to providing federal counterterrorism support for the host city. The president "advised [LA mayor Tom] Bradley that a special interagency committee has been created in Washington to coordinate such preparations."[267] Consistent with the attitude adopted by previous administrations, Carter's White House understood the role the hosting nation played in countering security threats at international sporting events and appreciated the vulnerability of symbolic gatherings like the

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[264] Kenneth Reich, "Moscow's Un-Spartan Olympics May Foil L.A.'s Plan for 1984 Games," *The Los Angeles Times*, August 3, 1980, pg. D1.
[265] Kenneth Reich, "Carter's Aid Asked for Security at Olympics," *The Los Angeles Times*, June 14, 1978, pg. SD_A4.
[266] Ibid.
[267] Kenneth Reich, "Carter Promises U.S. Aid for '84 Olympics Security," *Los Angeles Times*, September 21, 1978, SD_A1.

Olympics. Unlike the Carter administration only four years prior, Soviet leaders would pounce on the opportunity to rhetorically attack US counterterrorism capabilities.

The Soviets did not, in 1980, make an immediate decision to boycott the 1984 Los Angeles Games.[268] In the coming years, however, the USSR withheld its athletes' participation in the international sporting competition. Deviating from Carter's boycott strategy, Soviet politicians did not, in 1984, explicitly mention the Cold War. Instead, leaders cited security concerns, including for the physical safety of Soviet athletes should they travel to Los Angeles, in their justification of their retaliatory boycott. "Extremist organizations and groups of all sorts, openly aiming to create 'unbearable conditions' for the stay of the Soviet delegation and performance by Soviet athletes," explained Soviet leaders.[269] The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia's recent attacks in southern California and threats directed at Turkish athletes, as well as continued Puerto Rican separatist violence perpetrated by the FALN, contributed threats to the 1984 LA Games.[270] Directing a blow at the Carter administration and the US counterterrorism program, the Soviet government announced that the "practical deeds by the American side, however, show that it does not intend to ensure the security of all athletes, respect their rights and human dignity and create normal conditions for holding the games…"[271] The Soviets identified the US' inability to maintain the spirit of the Games (as they perceived they had done in 1980), citing everything from "smog and ecological problems to facts as that

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[268] Evelyn Mertin, "The Soviet Union and the Olympic Games of 1980 and 1984: Explaining the boycotts to their own people," in *East plays West: Sport and the Cold War*, edited by Stephen Wagg and David L. Andrews, 235-252, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2007.

[269] Guttmann, Allen. "The Cold War and the Olympics." *International Journal* 43, no. 4 (1988): 564.

[270] Pete Fussey, "Terrorist threats to the Olympics 1972-2016," 240.

[271] Guttmann, Allen. "The Cold War and the Olympics," 564-565.

Los Angeles boasted the world record holder in 'competitive smoking' or that a murder was committed there every 24 minutes."[272] The main factor remained "missing guarantees for Soviet security."[273] While real threats to the 1984 Games did exist, much as in Moscow in 1980, the Olympic Games went off without a hitch.

[272] Evelyn Mertin, "The Soviet Union and the Olympic Games of 1980 and 1984: Explaining the boycotts to their own people," 245.
[273] Ibid., 246.

Conclusion

As the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympic Games approached, the threat of terrorism at the Olympics had subsided. Far removed from the violent strategies utilized by their forerunners at Munich in 1972, Palestinian separatists competed in the 1996 Summer Games as a recognized team. "In Atlanta," Palestinian sports official Rassem Yunis declared, "we will be there, you know, as a symbol." The Palestinians' symbolic presence in Atlanta was small—only a handful of athletes attended—yet critical to an aspiring Arab population's dreams of statehood. Earlier that year, in January of 1996, elections for a Palestinian president and national council boasted eighty percent turnout in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. The path toward peace in Israel, while a long ways away, had begun to materialize.[274]

Despite the notable absence of a specific ethno-nationalist or radical Islamist threat prior to the Games in 1996, the possibility of terrorism remained of concern to Olympic and US officials. In the weeks leading up to the Atlanta Games, the FBI and other law enforcement agencies began "secretive training exercises" throughout the city. Special Agent in Charge (SAC) David W. Johnson told local media outlets that his agents were "practicing for situations we hope will never occur."[275] Personnel simulated hijackings, kidnappings, and biological weapon attacks. Federal officials organized command centers that prepared teams to respond to a potential attack on the sporting competition. "We have no reason to believe these Games will be anything but safe and secure," the SAC told reporters. Since the West German military's failure

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[274] Mark Sherman, "The World Comes to Atlanta: Winning recognition Palestinians hope to shine in sports, lighting way to nationhood," *The Atlanta Journal Constitution*, March 31, 1996.

[275] Ron Martz, "Your Daily Update on Olympic News Atlanta Games 93 days: Games Security FBI, others conduct secret training exercises. Federal, state and local law enforcement agencies are 'practicing for situations we hope will never occur.'," *The Atlanta Journal Constitution*, April 17, 1996.

to rescue the Israeli hostages in 1972, governments and Olympic organizers had prioritized these types of training exercises. Indeed, US counterterrorism officials felt ready to counter any Munich-inspired event. Yet what the government had not prepared for was a lone-wolf attack, designed to sow chaos among fans gathered to watch the historic competition.

A group of Palestinian terrorists did not storm Atlanta's Olympic Village in 1996. Instead, domestic extremist Eric Rudolph killed one and injured more than one hundred other spectators with a backpack bomb he had built to call attention to his anti-government and anti-abortion agenda. The 1996 Olympic Park bombing drew immediate comparisons to Munich. "To us," Israeli activist Ankie Rechess remarked, "this proves the point that unless you take note of these terrorists' attacks and bring these terrorists to justice, these things will continue to happen."[276] Rechess' late husband, Andre Spitzer, was a member of the Israeli Olympic team killed by Black September on that fateful September night in 1972. More than twenty years later, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) had yet to recognize the Munich Massacre formally. While Rechess sought official acknowledgement from Olympic organizers, governments and the IOC were turning their attention elsewhere. By 1996, as the Olympic bombing in Atlanta had shown, official and popular understandings of terrorism had shifted.

The Munich Massacre demonstrated that while pivotal international events might not usher in replica attacks (no hostage crisis has occurred again at an Olympic Games), they nevertheless inspire other terrorism and alter the expectations the global population holds of governments during mega-events. Olympic securitization was reactive and developed out of the glaringly obvious need for heightened police and military readiness in the event of a hostage

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[276] Mark Sherman, "Munich Remembrance Takes on New Meaning," *The Atlanta Journal Constitution*, July 27, 1996.

crisis after the Munich Massacre. As such, in 1996 the FBI prepared for potential attacks like those the world had already seen at international sporting events; Eric Rudolph's lone-wolf attack took the Atlanta and global community by surprise, despite a developing pattern of domestic terrorist attacks on symbols of American power in the 1990s. The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, perpetrated by a group of political extremists just a year earlier, had likewise sent US law enforcement scrambling. Obsolete definitions of terrorism would haunt well-meaning counterterrorism efforts into the twenty-first century. Through September 11, counterterrorism experts continued to play catch-up and often only addressed the root causes of terrorism *after* an attack. In 2001, when al-Qaeda militants hijacked commercial airline jets and directed their skyborne weapons into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, killing almost three thousand Americans, the world sat stunned. Retroactively, governments and scholars struggled to understand the *jihadist* threat, which, as scholars like Bruce Hoffman have shown, existed long before 2001 and grew out of existing religious and ethnic tensions in the Middle East. While terrorists have not yet managed to fly planes into skyscrapers or US government buildings again, 9/11 nevertheless altered notions of what was possible and alerted intelligence analysts to what strategies terrorists might adopt in the coming years. Much as Munich had almost thirty years prior, notions of terrorism shifted in 2001 in response to unprecedented acts of violence.

Yet Rudolph's attack at the 1996 Olympic Games five years before 9/11, following closely behind the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, revealed the ugly underbelly of domestic terrorism in America. The US government continues to balance, well into the twenty-first century, domestic and international terrorism concerns. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security after 2001 helped aid in the distribution of this authority to federal agencies,

but nevertheless analytical minds struggle to predict the next great threat.[277] If memories of Munich prove to be instructive, they will remind policymakers and pundits that terrorism is ever changing and, most critically, that it must be understood concurrently with counterterrorism strategies. Terrorists plan their attacks based not only upon what their forebearers show possible, but where they might find an opportunity to make their manifestos heard. Effective counterterrorism breeds new and innovative terrorism, but the efforts to protect global citizens must remain at the forefront of national security.

As this thesis has shown, definitions of national security are dynamic and contingent. After 1972, the US government struggled to balance notions of Cold War security and global terrorism. Presidential administrations from Nixon to Carter responded to international developments, including acts of terrorism, with varied and nuanced approaches. While Nixon created and Ford sustained the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, Carter dismantled the organization in favor of a National Security Council-led working group. For Jimmy Carter, concerns about terrorism took a backseat to domestic political concerns. The latter encouraged the president's adoption of hardline, diplomatic rhetoric reminiscent of that of presidents during the height of the Cold War. The future security of the civilized world, the Carter administration reminded Americans, lay in countering Soviet aggression, not in addressing root causes of

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[277] Historians like Kathleen Belew have identified the longer history of these changing threats. In particular, Belew's *Bring the War Home: The White Power Movement and Paramilitary America*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018 contextualizes the radicalization of Rudolph and likeminded domestic terrorists in the twentieth century in America. For further reading on the post-Cold War foreign extremist threat, one can do no better than to consult Bruce Hoffman. See: *The Evolution of the Global Terrorist Threat: From 9/11 to Osama bin Laden's Death*, edited by Bruce Hoffman and Fernando Reinares, New York: Columbia University Press, 2014. In addition, *Inside Terrorism* remains a pivotal survey of the progression of terrorism and counterterrorism throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century.

terrorism. As Jimmy Carter pressed Western allies to boycott the Moscow Games in 1980, he pressed the wrong button. Though of an era critical to the history of modern terrorism, Carter's boycott did not address very real threats to the Moscow Games or emerging security concerns in the region. Still, despite the Carter administration's silence on terrorism, the Soviets continued the trend of Olympic securitization. The US would likewise adopt measures to combat terrorism as it prepared for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games. The 1980 Moscow Olympic Boycott, through the policies of both US and Soviet officials, showcased just how difficult it was to balance the long history of the Cold War with new and emerging threats.

Interests in the Cold War waned after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and US foreign policy concerns continued to fluctuate as *jihadism* crystalized in the Middle East in the late 1990s. Presidential administrations since the end of the Cold War have struggled to understand the inner workings of domestic terrorist networks and to address foreign extremist threats. When the Department of State woefully informed President Richard Nixon in 1972 that "we shall have to live with terrorism" should the US fail to address the root causes of extremism, officials were unaware of just how prescient they were. Almost fifty years later, Americans continue to live in fear of rapidly evolving terrorist threats. Now, amidst a surge in domestic and international attacks on innocent civilians, scholars and policymakers must come together, armed with knowledge of the history of modern terrorism, and create a balanced strategy to finish what the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism began in the weeks after Munich.

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