Distribution Agreement

In presenting this thesis as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter now, including display on the World Wide Web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis.

Thomas Czick April 10, 2024

Virtuous *Verecundia*

by

Thomas Czick

Dr. Emily Master
Adviser

Classics

Dr. Emily Master

Adviser

Dr. Niall Slater

Committee Member

Dr. Yun Kim

Committee Member

2024

Virtuous *Verecundia*

By

Thomas Czick

Dr. Emily Master

Adviser

An abstract of
a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences
of Emory University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of
Bachelor of Arts with Honors

Classics

2024

Abstract
Virtuous *Verecundia*
By Thomas Czick

In this thesis, I strive to show how Ancient Romans may have considered *verecundia* a virtue. *Verecundia* is quite a difficult word to translate into the modern English language. In translations, *verecundia* is often referred to as "an attitude of restraint" or "a sense of shame." With this in mind, there is a considerable amount of scholarship that identifies *verecundia* as an emotion. Furthermore, in Henry Wheatland Litchfield's foundational article, "National Exempla Virtvtis in Roman Literature," he does not include *verecundia* on his list of exemplary virtues but includes other forms of modesty and restraint. After meticulously analyzing numerous usages of *verecundia* throughout all Latin literature, I conjecture that *verecundia* should be considered a virtue just as much as an emotion. In Chapter 1, I aim to define *verecundia* by examining *verecundia* in early Latin comedy, contextualizing *verecundia* amongst other virtues, and summarizing recent scholarship. Chapter 2 serves as my effort to prove *verecundia* is a virtue using a variety of Cicero's works. In Chapter 3, I apply my definition of *verecundia* to Livy's moral *exempla* to demonstrate how Livy perceived *verecundia* as a desirable quality in historical figures. Finally, Chapter 4 discusses how *verecundia* fits within Stoic situational ethics and how perhaps Romans considered *verecundia* in the early empire through municipal inscriptions and Valerius Maximus' *Facta et Memorabilia*.

Virtuous *Verecundia*

By

Thomas Czick

Dr. Emily Master

Adviser

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences
of Emory University in partial fulfillment
of the requirements of the degree of
Bachelor of Arts with Honors

Classics

2024

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr. Emily Master for advising this project and being a great help in the research and writing process. You molded this project for the better – I truly learned a lot about academic writing and perceive this as an invaluable learning experience.

I would also like to extend thanks to my high school Latin teacher, Mr. Gabrielson. My love of Latin started in your class and eventually inspired me to pursue Classics in college. Taking four years of Latin and three years of Greek with you provided an indispensable foundation for me to succeed at Emory.

Finally, I wish to thank my family Mom, Dad, Taryn, and Jimmy. Mom and Dad, thank you for always pushing me to be my best and supporting me. Taryn and Jimmy, though you keep me on my toes, you make my life much more interesting and enjoyable.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: *Verecundia*, what is it?

> *Aliquis vir bonus nobis diligendus est ac semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic tamquam illo spectante vivamus et omnia tamquam illo vidente faciamus.*[1]
>
> Cherish some man of high character, and keep him ever before your eyes, living as if he were watching you, and ordering all your actions as if he beheld them.[2]

Seneca the Younger cites this Epicurean principle in solving one of humanity's greatest weaknesses instilled by nature: *verecundia*, or the consideration of others. Though *verecundia* is quite difficult to translate into a modern context, its manifestations are still quite relevant today. For instance, either sweating or trembling while public speaking or perhaps blushing in response to an embarrassing moment. These reactions stem from humanity's innate desire to be accepted by others and to uphold societal propriety. However, according to Seneca, this *verecundia* is purely emotional. There is no way of controlling these sensations. Neither training nor experience can remedy it. In fact, Seneca writes, *Haec, ut dixi, nulla sapientia abigit* (As I remarked, wisdom can never remove this habit).[3] However, I wholeheartedly disagree. *Verecundia* can be improved upon through another facet, not as an emotion but as a virtue.

During periods of political turmoil in the Roman world, several ancient authors have used the word *verecundia* either frequently or infrequently, illustrating their opinions concerning Roman society. However, modern scholars have consistently interpreted *verecundia* as an emotion, not a virtue. Now, rendering *verecundia* as a virtue slightly changes its definition from its emotion counterpart. While emotional *verecundia* is reacting in accordance with societal propriety, virtuous *verecundia* is proacting in accordance with decency in mind. In other words, I

[1] All Latin text taken from the Loeb Classical Library unless otherwise noted.
[2] Epicurus via Sen. *Ep*. 11.8-9 (trans. R. M. Gummere).
[3] Sen. *Ep*. 11.6 (trans. R. M. Gummere).

contend that *verecundia* is a mindful virtue, requiring forethought, integral to all other virtues, aside from a mere emotional disposition or feeling.

To begin, *verecundia* is difficult to define because of its variety of intertwined definitions. According to the Oxford Latin Dictionary (OLD), *verecundia* is etymologically related to the adjective *verecundus* and derived from the deponent verb *vereor*. The OLD defines *vereor* as "to show reverence or respect for, to be in awe of" and "to view (a possible occurrence) with apprehension."[4] From these definitions, *verecundia* procures its foundational senses of restraint and shame. Additionally, the OLD suggests that *verecundia*'s etymological variants also incorporate a sense of morality and decency given *verecundus'* definitions of "restrained by scruples of morality" and "characterized by a regard for propriety."[5] Moving on to *verecundia* itself, the OLD combines the restraint and shame present in *vereor* while also including the morality aspect of *verecundus*. As a result, *verecundia* is a defined as "an attitude of restraint (arising from respect for others or a proper humility on one's own part" or "a sense of shame (consequent on, or inhibiting, dishonorable or disgraceful conduct.)"[6]

As will be discussed at length throughout this project, *verecundia* is quite pertinent to other Roman virtues because of its exemplary nature. Firstly, the practice of *verecundia* hinges on any individual, regardless of background, gauging their relative standing to others so that they appear least offensive to their peers.[7] In other words, *verecundia* involves the process of one's own social calibration.[8] Secondly, the exemplary aspect of *verecundia* resides in the continual identifying of both honorable and dishonorable conduct of one's own actions and recognizing the

[4] *Vereor*. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.
[5] *Verecundus*. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.
[6] *Verecundia*. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.
[7] Kaster (2016)
[8] Belonik (2023) 26.

status of others. As will be discussed later, *verecundia* can surface in a multitude of different social situations, ranging from an intimate friendship to a leader desiring to appease their subjects. From here, one's *verecundia* is measured by how much one's actions are deemed appropriate (or not offensive) by others around oneself. Hence, *verecundia*, like other moral constructs, requires knowing the difference between right or wrong, which could have considerable variability amongst individuals of a society.

Along with its scrupulous sentiment, *verecundia* was a device of social cohesion since its innate restraint and shame established unspoken social boundaries not to be crossed.[9] A straightforward example of *verecundia* arises in Livy's *Ab Urbe Condita* shortly after the establishment of the republic. In this recollection, Jupiter told the plebeian Titus Latinus that the lead dancer of *ludi Romani magni* was not to his liking.[10] For whenever a religious event or ceremony was spoiled, in this case, due to the gods' disliking, it had to be repeated with added observances to appease the gods.[11] In a dream, Jupiter tasked Latinus to inform the high-ranking consul that the games must be held again. However, Latinus struggled mightily to summon up the necessary confidence:

> *Quamquam haud sane liber erat religione animus, verecundia tamen maiestatis magistratuum timorque vicit, ne in ova hominum pro ludibrio abiret. Magno illi ea cunctatio stetit; filium namque intra paucos dies amisit.*
>
> Though the man's conscience was by no means at ease, nevertheless the *verecundia* he felt at the majesty of the magistrates was too great; he was afraid of becoming a laughing-stock. Heavy was the price he paid for his hesitation, for a few days later he lost his son.[12]

---

[9] Kaster (2005) 19.
[10] Ogilvie (1964) 327; Though not overtly expressed by Livy, Ogilvie states that the appearance of Jupiter indicates that these *ludi* were specifically the *ludi Romani magni*, which was during the middle fortnight of September.
[11] Ogilvie (1964) 327.
[12] Liv. *Ab urbe cond*. 2.36.3-4 (trans. B. O. Foster).

Because of Latinus's *verecundia maiestatis* (awe of the majesty [of the consul]), his personal conscious strongly advised against confessing Jupiter's objection because of the great shame he would face as a *ludibrio* (laughing-stock). Latinus' reaction of *cunctatio* (hesitation) is reminiscent of the involuntary behavior that Seneca alluded to in *Epistle* 11: he was so overwhelmed by the circumstances that he shut down out of fear of becoming an embarrassment. This analysis is consistent with *verecundia* as an emotion. However, *verecundia* is more dynamic in this scenario than expected. By weighing the consequences of his actions, Livy suggests that Latinus consciously avoided alerting the consuls to preserve his own reputation since he determined that a plebeian expressing a concern to a high-level magistrate is disgraceful. Furthermore, Latinus did not offend the consuls as his actions would have disrupted the established class divide. Hence, despite the negative consequences, Latinus' mindful *verecundia* should be considered as a virtue as well as an emotion in this scenario.

I mention this anecdote to introduce *verecundia*'s duality as both an emotion and virtue. Along with *Epistle* 11, there are several examples in Latin literature where *verecundia* is purely an emotion. Correspondingly, through my research, I have identified a series of examples where *verecundia* warrants consideration as a virtue. Unlike the ancients, modern scholarship principally interprets *verecundia* as an emotion. For instance, Robert Kaster, the predominant scholar on *verecundia*, not only examines *verecundia* at length but other emotions as well. Kaster describes an emotion as "when the data of life are processed in a particular way… to produce a particular kind of emotionalized consciousness, a particular set of thoughts and feelings."[13] In other words, an emotion represents the disposition one possesses in reacting to unforeseen circumstances. Nonetheless, what caught my attention is that he states later in his work that "the

[13]Kaster (2005) 14.

circumvention of *verecundia* must be constant and pervasive in all one's acts,"[14] which suggests that one who excels in *verecundia* is always socially aware. Therefore, *verecundia* does not have to be pigeonholed into being a reactionary disposition but a conscious mindset in pursuing Roman *virtus*.

Roman *virtus* has a wide range of semantic meanings. *Virtus*, derived from *vir* (man), etymologically is associated with the ideal behavior of a man.[15] However, *virtus* is extremely difficult to translate because it is a comprehensive representation of ideal behavior. As a result, in early Latin, *virtus* had a wide variety of meanings that included courage, military valor, and even a slave's devotion to one's master. In lieu of its diverse meanings, McDonell asserts that the semantic development of *virtus* concluded by the time of Cicero.[16] For he exclusively interprets the word as ethical excellence, reminiscent of Greek word *ἀρετή*, In this facet of the definition, Classical Latin authors render *virtus* as a generic quality that arises with good character.[17] For instance, in *De Officiis*, Cicero breaks down *virtus* into four cardinal virtues, *sapentia*, *iustitia*, *fortitudo*, and *temperantia*, which can all be treated as categories for subsequent virtues. For instance, *verecundia* appears in Cicero's discussion of the fourth cardinal virtue, *temperantia*. By the time of Cicero, conceiving *virtus* as composed of individual qualities was relatively new.[18] Nevertheless, *virtus*, as an aspirational quality, is quite critical to the story-telling method known as *exempla*. A conventional *exemplum* is "presented as a historical episode that has been recast as a morality tale"[19] to establish an ethical framework. Authors use virtues to stress the positive

[14]Kaster (2005) 18.
[15]McDonnell (2006) 2.
[16] McDonnell (2006) 11.
[17] McDonnell (2006) 128-130.
[18] McDonnell (2006) 132.
[19] Langlands (2018) 24.

qualities of a historical figure so that later readers can embody these qualities in their lives. As a result, a resounding usage of the virtues arises not only in philosophical treatises but also in Latin historiography. Amidst the transition between the late republic and early principate, authors, such as Cicero and Livy, either hinted or overtly asserted that Roman virtues had diminished, describing a moral decline in Rome by the 1st century BC at the latest. Since both authors use *verecundia* in this context, it makes the investigation of the virtue ever more intriguing.

The competition of political life in the late Republic would have seemingly been at odds with the display of *verecundia*, which could explain why some authors argued that Rome was driven towards vice. Because of this, I became interested in examining *verecundia* as a virtue in the context of the 1st century BCE and 1st century CE. In the grander scope of this project, I examine *verecundia* within the context of the philosophic works, political speeches, and personal correspondences of Cicero because they are significant to understanding *verecundia* itself and its implications (Chapter 2). Then changing gears, I then analyze Livy's *exempla* concerning *verecundia* and how it manifests in idealized leaders to maintain order of the state (Chapter 3). Moreover, I believe that their growing use of the word was indicative of both authors' thoughts about the decline of societal *verecundia*. Besides being at the forefront of mentioning *verecundia* in their works, I have chosen these two authors, so that my argument has a balanced, wholistic approach. Cicero provides usages from political and philosophical works while Livy provides usages from his exemplary history. Lastly, chapter 4, will conclude my argument that *verecundia* was considered a virtue by explaining its didactic nature and its explicit recognition as a virtue by the early republic.

I. Early Usages, Ennius and Plautus

The first known mentions of *verecundia* (and subsequent forms) are by the 2nd and 3rd century playwrights Ennius and Plautus. They largely used the word in the contexts of shame and self-restraint, not in explicit sexual contexts but referring to them. For example, the grammarian Nonius Marcellus (4th and 5th century AD), comments on Ennius' *Tragoediae*, saying:

> *modicum in consuetudine pausillum volumus significare; modicum veteres moderatum et cum modo dici volunt. . . . Ennius Hecuba:*
>
> *quae tibi in concubio verecunde et modice morem gerit*
>
> modicum ["modest"] we intend to mean "a little" in common usage; modicum the ancients intended to be used as "moderate" and "with moderation." . . . Ennius in Hecuba:
>
> a woman who in bed grants your wish decently and with *verecundia*.[20]

Nonius importantly distinguishes *verecundia* from *modicum*, generally meaning a modest amount.[21] Correspondingly, the adjective *modicus* primarily means "of or use for measuring," with any definition pertaining to moderation coming much later.[22] Although both words have connotations related to restraint, their etymologies prove that they are not quite one-to-one synonyms. As evidenced before, *verecundia* represents a sense of shame reflecting apprehension or awe while *modicum* represents a sense of moderation involving the quantity of something.

Moving on, the next significant early usage of *verecundia* resides in Plautus' *Rudens*. A young man named Trachalio has a conversation with Daemones, alerting him that his lover has

[20] Enn. *Trag*. 79 (trans. S. M. Goldberg, G. Manuwald).
[21] *Modicum*. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.
[22] *Modicus*. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.

been sold to a pimp. Given how the prostitution industry was generally scorned in Roman society, Plautus described the pimp, Labrax, as *inverecundissumus* below:

> *fraudis, sceleris, parricidi, periuri plenissumus,*
> *legerupa impudens, impurus, inuerecundissumus,*
> *uno uerbo apsoluam, leno est:*
>
> A man absolutely full of fraud, crime, parricide, and perjury,
> an impudent, dirty, completely shameless law-breaker;
> I'll finish it in one word, he's a pimp.[23]

Trachalio uses several different adjectives to emphasize the pimp's suspect character, calling him fraudulent, crime-worthy, and even impure. Interestingly, he perceives the pimp as beyond shameless as indicated by the superlative form and "in" prefix. Subsequently, pimps and individuals of other irreputable professions (i.e., prostitutes, gladiators, etc.), were designated as *infames*, or individuals lacking public honor. [24] Consequently, the translation of *inverecundissumus legerupa* as "shameless law-breaker," is perfectly adequate in exemplifying Labrax's lack of legal restraint. Since *infames* for their inappropriate professions, I would like to point out that *verecundia* is most likely used here to reflect their immoral behavior and lack of societal decency. For a pimp either does not understand morally appropriate behavior or willingly disregards it, leading to a lack of *verecundia*. Therefore, Trachalio's description not only reinforces *verecundia*'s intricate definition but also associates its infraction with other condemnatory qualities and unvirtuous behavior. By including *inverecundissmus* in this catalog of derogatory terms, the violation of *verecundia* is inherently associated with the depraved of society. Therefore, we are beginning to see that an individual without *verecundia* lacks virtue.

[23] Plaut. *Rud.* 651-653 (trans. W. De Melo).
[24] Edwards (2021) 69.

Lastly, I want to examine *verecundia* in Plautus' *Mostellaria*. While his father was away overseas for business, Philolaches prepared to borrow a large sum of money to purchase a slave girl that he loves. Prior to this passage, Philolaches likens his life to a pristine house since his parents properly built him up with education.[25] Despite his parents holding an active, supervisory role in his life, he says, p*ostea quom immigraui ingenium in meum, perdidi operam fabrorum ilico oppido* (Thereafter, when I took up abode in my natural disposition, I immediately ruined the work of the builders utterly.)[26] His negligence of the values instilled by his parents have resulted in his now shambled life. Reflecting upon this, Philolaches exclaims:

> *uenit ignauia, ea mi tempestas fuit,*
> *mi aduentu suo grandinem imbrem[que] attulit;*
> *haec uerecundiam mi et uirtutis modum*
> *deturbauit [texit] detexitque a med ilico;*
>
> Laziness came: she was my storm,
> she brought me hail and rain when she arrived.
> She tore my *verecundia* and my virtuous self-control
> away from me and unroofed me.[27]

The passage above is quite momentous: it is the first known instance where *verecundia* and *virtus* appear in the same sentence. In describing his lack of *verecundia* and *virtutis modum*, Plautus highlights that Philolaches lost his sense of decency. Due to a lack of consideration of parental guidance, Philoches lost his sense of morally appropriate behavior and fell into deplorable condition. Here, I propose that both *virtutis modum* and *verecundia* to be considered in the same way. Like how *virtus* is a tangible quality that someone either has or is devoid of, so is *verecundia*. Furthermore, the interpretation of *modum virtutis* as "virtuous self-control"

---

[25] Plaut. *Mostell.* 85-134.
[26] Plaut. *Mostell.* 135-136 (trans. W. De Melo).
[27] Plaut. *Mostell.* 137-140 (trans. W. De Melo).

indicates that having a sense of boundaries, whether social or in any other matter, may be related to the acquisition of virtue.

Besides his *verecundia*, Philolaches also expresses that his *res, fides, fama, uirtus, decus[que]* (wealth, trustworthiness, reputation, manliness, and respectability)[28] all had deserted him as well. As will be more evident in the Cicero chapter, *verecundia* is very much integral to one's reputation (*fama*) and perceived decency (*decus*) by others. Moreover, I would like to mention that Plautus does not merely associate the removal of *verecundia* with *virtus* but with the other qualities listed above, some of which are considered virtues, namely *fides*. This foreshadows the later Stoic principle that *verecundia* is the guardian of all virtue. I am not stating that *verecundia* should be considered a virtue on this alone, but it is intriguing to examine its proximity to *virtus* in such early text. Though mentions of *verecundia* within Ennius and Plautus are few and far between, their work provides a starting place to interpret *verecundia* as a virtue.

II. Republican Literature

The meaning of *verecundia* reflected in early comedy is largely expanded in republican literature. However, since virtues are an integral aspect of Roman moral works, I will use this section as an opportunity to situate *verecundia* amongst other well-established virtues within the late republican period. First, I will compare *verecundia* to the cardinal virtue *temperantia*, as the two are often featured together in *De Officiis.* Second, I will examine the relationship between *verecundia* and the subsequent virtues, *constantia* and *moderatio*. I chose these two specific virtues not only because of their adjacency in *De Officiis* but also their presence on Henry Wheatland Litchfield's table of exemplary virtues. Back in 1914, Litchfield was original in

[28] Plaut. *Mostell.* 144 (trans. W. De Melo).

cataloguing virtues as they appeared in *exempla* up until Claudian in the 4th century CE.[29] As a result, his work is foundational to the modern study of Roman virtues. For my purposes, Litchfield largely informs several works of Rebecca Langlands, a current scholar focused on Roman exemplarity, whose guidelines I have used to identify *exempla* pertaining to *verecundia*. Nonetheless, it is still important to situate *verecundia* with other virtues to establish its belonging within the conversation of exemplarity.

As outlined by Cicero, *verecundia* falls under the cardinal virtue *temperantia*, often translated as "self-control, moderation, [or] restraint."[30] More specifically, Cicero defines *temperantia* in his *De Inventione* writing, *temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alio non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio* (temperance is a firm and well-considered control exercised by the reason over lust and other improper impulses of the mind).[31] In the realm of virtues, *temperantia* was responsible for holding oneself accountable of any selfish desires and the ability to suppress any sort of immoral temptation or vice.[32] In giving advice to the youth, Cicero states, *caveant intemperantiam, meminerint verecundiae* (beware of excesses and bear in mind the rules of modesty,)[33] overtly displaying *verecundia* and *temperantia* as distinct virtues. Virtuous *verecundia* is the conscious effort to act appropriately while factoring and gauging the feelings of others. Moreover, as Belonick asserts, *temperantia* is the process of resisting any selfish urges after one practices *verecundia*.[34] In other words, *temperantia* plays a role more in defeating one's emotions, whereas *verecundia* is evident in one's acts.

---

[29] Briefly stated, an *exemplum* is a bite-sized, moralized tale, designed to educate the reader of a certain lesson. The key components of *exempla*, according to Langlands' model are 1) The Hero, 2) The Story, and 3), The Moral; Langlands (2018) 24. See Chapter 3 for *verecundia* within the realm of Roman exemplarity and *exempla*.
[30] *Temperantia*. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.
[31] Cic. *Inv.* 2.164 (trans. H. M. Hubbell).
[32] Belonick (2023) 43.
[33] Cic. *Off.* 1.122 (trans. W. Miller).
[34] Belonick (2023) 43.

According to the OLD, the primary definition of *constantia* is "changelessness, invariability; steadiness; regularity resistance to change."[35] Within a literary context, *constantia* is frequently associated with *temperantia* because of its notion of firmness or being resolute in one's beliefs. In *De Officiis*, Cicero interprets *constantia* as a moral virtue relating to the consistency of one taking up all their actions.[36] The example he cites earlier in his work is Cato's decision to take his life in the wake of Caesar's tyranny, which demonstrated his refusal to compromise his republican values.[37] From this example, Schofield argues that *constantia* is not only republican in nature, but also a key stoic virtue.[38] Hence, *constantia* is a rather popular topic in certain passages of Seneca's stoic dialogues. In *De Vita Beata*, Seneca states that disregarding *constantia* leads to a lack of resoluteness: *nam pigritia et haesitatio pugnam et inconstantiam ostendit* (for reluctance and hesitation are an indication of conflict and instability).[39] Seneca argues that wavering beliefs result in dubious, questionable character since *constantia* amasses virtue within the soul, while discord amasses vice. In *De Tranquillitate Animi*, Seneca discusses the relationship between *constantia* and *verecundia*. During this discussion, he provides several examples of how men possess a lack of restraint within the public realm:

> *Quorundam parum idonea est verecundia rebus civilibus, quae firmam frontem desiderant; quorundam contumacia non facit ad aulam; quidam non habent iram in potestate et illos ad temeraria verba quaelibet indignatio effert; quidam urbanitatem nesciunt continere nec periculosis abstinent salibus.*
>
> Some men by reason of their *verecundia* are quite unsuited to civil affairs, which need a strong front; some by reason of their stubborn pride are not fitted for court; some do not have their anger under control, and any sort of provocation hurries them to rash words; some do not know how to restrain their pleasantry and cannot abstain from dangerous wit.[40]

---

[35]*Constantia*. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.
[36] Cic. *Off*. 1.125.
[37] Schofield (2009) 200.
[38] Schofield (2009) 203.
[39]Sen. *Dial.* 7.8.6 (trans. J.W. Basore).
[40]Sen. *Dial.* 9.6.2 (trans. J.W. Basore).

Seneca sees *verecundia* principally as a force to control one's emotions and corresponding irrationality. Accordingly, a lack of *verecundia* could result in *temeraria verba* (reckless words), insinuating a lapse in *constantia*. By controlling one's *verecundia*, one can control their manners (*urbanitatem sciunt continere*) to avoid undesirable situations, damaging to their reputation. Differently from *constantia*, *verecundia* has the inherent functionality of being used in either social contexts or political affairs. *Verecundia* manifests in situations as simple as not grabbing the best pieces of food at the dinner table or acting appropriately in court.[41] Though *verecundia* and *constantia* are connected by their common sense of restraint, *constantia*, as summarized by Cicero and Seneca, often describes the consistency of one's thoughts of beliefs. On the other hand, since *verecundia* is used in more social contexts, it more so describes the diagnosing of social situations so that one may act accordingly. *Verecundia* is restraint in accordance to upholding propriety; Meanwhile, *constantia* is restraint relating to holding certain to one's values.

Moving on to *moderatio*, derived from the root word *modus*, the OLD describes it as "conduct which avoids extremes, moderation in action, restraint."[42] Like *verecundia*, *moderatio* is a form of modesty that entails regulating oneself from violating certain thresholds. However, *verecundia* concerns social thresholds, while *moderatio* concerns political thresholds. As Belonick indicates, *moderatio* describes a high-ranking individual who declines to take an action he is permitted to take.[43] *Moderatio* is more than being merely moderate in daily circumstances as it necessitates the preservation of lawful power.[44] Therefore, *moderatio* is often mentioned in

[41]Kaster (2005) 18.
[42] *Moderatio*. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.
[43] Belonick (2023) 40.
[44] Hellegouarc'h (1972) 264.

both scenarios of governmental overturn and describing the good heartedness of certain historical leaders. For instance, once the kings were vanquished, Livy states that *tranquilla moderatio imperii* established a new age of liberty. The one-year tenure of the consuls, compared to the lasting rule of the monarchs, proposed a new limit of power that no one dared to cross until later.[45] Another example of *moderatio* in the early republic is the dictatorship of Cinncinatus. After saving Rome from impending doom, Cinncinatus willfully gave up the dictatorship to return to his farm, illustrating the ideal leader.[46]

Additionally, in his chapter devoted to *moderatio*, Valerius Maximus associates the virtue with figures who refuse deserved power and glory. Valerius Maximus defines *moderatio* as resistant to *impotentiae <et> temeritatis incursu* (an attack of uncontrolled boldness).[47] Holding this definition in mind, Valerius Maximus analyzes several figures in the early republic, leading to a discussion about Cincinnatus. Despite the senate enticing Cincinnatus to hold office, he refused, which Valerius Maximus finds particularly praiseworthy. In fact, he likens Cincinnatus' abstaining from the dictatorship to saving the republic from impropriety.[48] As a result, Valerius Maximus establishes *moderatio* as a political virtue prevalent among several revered figures in Roman History. Another example is Scipio Africanus' denial of never-ending consulship. Furthermore, Valerius Maximus exclusively features figures that exercised restraint and balanced their desires with reason to avoid negative consequences. Therefore, *moderatio* is a virtue prominently practiced by capable statesmen.[49] Although Cinncinatus and Scipio Africanus are largely defined for their *moderatio*, they both also embody *verecundia* to a certain degree. Both

[45] Liv. *Ab urbe cond*. 2.1.6-11.
[46] Belonick (2023) 40.
[47] V. Max. 4.1.*praef.*
[48] V. Max. 4.1.4.
[49] Hellegouarc'h (1972) 265.

figures exercised *moderatio* in denying unnecessary power, but they exercised *verecundia* when valuing the wellbeing of all individuals under the republic over personal interest. Nonetheless, it would be ignorant to not admit that *moderatio* and *verecundia* have considerable overlap as virtues. However, I would like to emphasize that *moderatio* relates to institutionalized boundaries of power while *verecundia* relates to boundaries related interpersonal respect and morality.

III. Literature Review & Definition

> As the combined testimony of these texts suggests, *verecundia* animates the art of knowing your proper place in every social transaction and basing your behavior on that knowledge; by guiding behavior in this way, *verecundia* establishes or affirms the social bond between you and others, all of whom (ideally) play complementary roles. Most fully, this means that you will each gauge your standing relative to the others;[50]

Verecundia differs from other virtues in that it is almost used exclusively used in social contexts. As it will be explored in future chapters, these examples range from merely two individuals interacting to a leader interacting with its subject citizens. Although I have argued that *verecundia* should be interpreted as a virtue, most previous scholarship interprets it as an emotion. Robert Kaster adamantly refers to *verecundia* as an emotion, and many subsequent scholars have agreed with his assertions. He explains that *verecundia* arises in occurrent and dispositional forms. Occurrent *verecundia* is a "form of fearful self-consciousness" as it arises in experiencing worrying during a social situation. Meanwhile, dispositional *verecundia* refers to one's anticipation of mishandling social situations.[51] Furthermore, Kaster regards dispositional *verecundia* as a social virtue. In a modern context, he uses the example of elevator etiquette, citing that doing anything other than looking forward and avoiding contact would be improper. I

[50] Kaster (2005) 15.
[51] Kaster (2005) 16-17.

agree with Kaster that these dispositions can be translated into virtues. Yet, at least within the context of Classical antiquity, *verecundia* is a desired trait that transcends a mere casual elevator ride. As seen in chapter 3, idealized military generals carry *verecundia*. Additionally, I believe that Kaster overlooks the didactic aspect of *verecundia* in that one's *verecundia* is shaped by the evasion of previous embarrassing experiences or decisions that failed to consider the betterment of others.

Besides Kaster, other scholars have interpreted *verecundia* as well. In the previously mentioned *Epistle* 11, Seneca discusses certain human reflexes that are not able to be corrected by reason. Since not even growing age can promise the control of these reflexes, David Konstan describes *verecundia* as a "full-fledged emotion."[52] Henceforth, like Kaster, Konstan identifies *verecundia* as an emotional disposition, which could result in occurrent behaviors. More so, he defines emotional *verecundia* as "the reaction that ensues upon imagining that someone is observing our behavior."[53] On the contrary, Konstan discussed the appeal of considering *verecundia* a virtue. According to stoic teachings, *verecundia* can mean a "sense of shame" as in the Greek αιδως.[54] Nevertheless, Konstan doesn't entertain the *verecundia* in *Epistle* 11 as virtuous because of its association with *metus* (fear) and *tristia* (sadness). In conclusion, Konstan asserts that *verecundia* consists of the acceptance that social disapproval is bad, and one should not behave in a way to provoke it.[55]

Finally, most recently, Paul Belonick mentions *verecundia* frequently in his book, *Restraint, Conflict, and the Fall of the Roman Republic*. Drawing upon Kaster's definition, Belonick describes *verecundia* as the constant gauging of social standing, so that one could avoid

[52] Konstan (2017) 237.
[53] Konstan (2017) 237.
[54] Konstan (2017) 237.
[55] Konstan (2017) 237.

potential scenarios of offense.[56] Moreover, Belonick situates *verecundia* amongst two other emotions relating to shame: *pudor* and *existimatio*. *Pudor*, a term often mentioned alongside *verecundia* in modern scholarship, refers to the negative emotion when an individual commits an action of shame.[57] *Verecundia* answers the question "How am I doing?" relative to others' approval while *pudor* answers "What if I fail?"[58] *Existimatio*, on the other hand, is one's sense of worth in the eyes of other.[59] Given all these terms connection to one's social worth, Belonick situates the three below:

> In short, if one failed to exhibit *verecundia*—the studied calibration of one's actions with a view to one's standing relative to others—one could lose *existimatio*, which would lead to *pudor*, discredit in the eyes of others; a loss of social capital to be avoided in a republican competition fueled by desire for *dignitas*.[60]

In other words, disregarding *verecundia*, or the awareness of proper behavior as it appears in others' approval, results in one lacking worth and feeling shame. *Verecundia* is integral to one's greater reputation, perceived worth, and wellbeing. As a result, to avoid this chain reaction from occurring, one must master *verecundia*. Yes, simply put experiencing *verecundia* is holding "an attitude of restraint" or feeling "a sense of shame" in already happening circumstances. However, employing *verecundia* in one's own life is "knowing your proper place." The significance of losing one's reputation and being discredited are clear driving factors of exhibiting *verecundia*, and, therefore, the knowledge of avoiding such situations should not be absolved.

Furthermore, after investigating *verecundia* in both ancient works and modern scholarship, I will now craft my own definition for the purposes of my later chapters. In my

---

[56] Belonick (2022) 26.
[57] Kaster (2016).
[58] Kaster (2016).
[59] Belonick (2023) 26.
[60] Belonick (2023) 26.

discourse surrounding Plautus' *Mostellaria* (Section I), I established that recognition of boundaries is essential to the definition of virtuous *verecundia*. Individuals, exceling in *verecundia*, are characterized by their proficiency in considering others and their ability to foresee consequences if they fail to do so. In Section II, I maintained that *verecundia* is indeed a unique virtue that should not be considered synonymous with any other. *Verecundia* significantly differs from *temperantia*, *constantia*, and *moderatio* because it manifests within the thought process of deeming appropriate responses to certain social situations. As a result, *verecundia* is exclusively a social virtue tasked with upholding either individual or societal propriety. Lastly, in this section, I have settled the difference between emotional *verecundia* and virtuous *verecundia*. As declared by Kaster, Konstan, and Belonik, emotional *verecundia* takes form in occurrent involuntary behaviors individuals stemming from one's worry. As a result, virtuous *verecundia* is the mindful consideration of others for either 1) the betterment of a third party greater than oneself or 2) the avoidance of repercussions onto oneself or others. For the individual, the primary result of virtuous *verecundia* is the constant prevailing of one's interpersonal cordiality and attention to social acceptability and public decency. For the greater republic, virtuous *verecundia* undeniably results in social cohesion, which is in the general interest of most citizens. Therefore, *verecundia* extends beyond a mere emotional disposition to include a deliberate, thoughtful, and, perhaps, even moral approach to social interactions. Furthermore, a strong sense of societal *verecundia* incentivizes citizens to sustain their own propriety to avoid at all being discredited or proven unlawful. As will discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, *exempla* have demonstrated *verecundia* to be a desirable virtue as its own place on Litchfield's list. *Verecundia* is exemplified by actions that demonstrate restraint, modesty, and a keen sense of moral responsibility, making it an integral aspect of Roman virtue.

Chapter 2: Cicero

> *saepe, ut fit, cum ipse te confirmasses, cum statuisses mentionem de pecunia facere, cum paratus meditatusque venisses, homo timidus virginali verecundia subito ipse te retinebas; excidebat repente oratio; cum cuperes appellare, non audebas, ne invitus audiret. Id erat profecto.*
>
> More than once (as is often the case) after you had plucked up courage and determined to mention the money, when you approached him, having carefully prepared and considered what you intended to say, on a sudden you, the nervous man of virgin *verecundia*, drew back; at once words failed you; when you wanted to call upon him for the money, you did not dare to do so, for fear he might feel hurt to hear you. No doubt that was the explanation.[61]
>
> *Cum septem cohortibus esse Apolloniae scribit Antonium, qui iam aut captus est—quod di duint!—aut certe homo verecundus in Macedoniam non accedit ne contra senatus consultum fecisse videatur.*
>
> Brutus writes that Gaius Antonius is in Apollonia with seven cohorts; by now either he has been taken prisoner—may the gods grant this!—or at least the fellow with *verecundia* is keeping away from Macedonia so as not to seem to act contrary to the senate's decree.[62]

Given that *Pro Quinctio* dates to 81 BC and the *Philippics* 44-43 BC, Cicero writes about *verecundia* throughout his entire catalogue of works. However, as reflected in the above passages, his understanding and various usages of *verecundia* evolved throughout his career. In *Pro Quinctio*, his very first political speech, Cicero defends Publius Quinctius, brother of Gaius Quinctius from the ensuing Gaius' former business partner, Sextus Naevius.[63] Considering Naevius' case as wrongful, Cicero calls Sextus Naevius, a *homo timidus virginali verecundia* (the nervous man of virgin modesty), citing his physical drawing back (*retinebas*) and his inability to speak (*excidebat repente oratio*). Recalling Kaster, *verecundia* is obviously

---

[61] Cic. *Quinct*. 39.12 (trans. D.R. Shackleton Bailey).
[62] Cic. *Phil*. 10.13 (trans. J.H. Freese).
[63] The dispute then follows that after Gaius's death, Quinctius, the heir of his estate, inherited all of Gaius' debts. Sextus Naevius agreed to pay off the debts of his now deceased business partner, selling off some of the jointly owned property. However, once Publius set out for Gaul, Naevius called for Publius to return to court. Since Publius never attended, the judge gave permission for Naevius to seize Publius' property.

emotional in this context since it manifested into occurrent reactions of the body associated with shame. As demonstrated by his nervousness, Sextus Naevius realized that it was indecent to ask Publius for money, resorting to his dubious activity. Rhetorically, Cicero's labeling of Naevius as someone characterized by *verecundia* undermines his integrity, suggesting that his accusations against Publius Quinctius stem from his own insecurities and moral shortcomings.

By the time of the *Philippics*, the series of political orations denouncing Marc Antony, Cicero uses *verecundia* in a rather different manner. In this appearance of the word, Cicero calls Gaius Antonius, Marc Antony's brother, *verecundus*, for aligning with the senate's decree of not entering Macedonia. In this scenario, there has been a boundary established that Gaius seemingly has the foresight not to cross. Since there are no occurrent bodily reactions associated with this usage, this instance more closely resembles *verecundia* as a virtue. Gaius does not feel embarrassed but exercises caution. That being said, I am willing to admit the fact that this instance of virtuous *verecundia* does not fit my initial definition in Chapter 1, Section III. Gaius does not explicitly consider others and, hence, should not be an example for others. However, he assuredly recognizes the potential consequences if he fails to adhere to that decree. Instead of feeling an emotion, Gaius Attonius' *verecundia* is portrayed as a sense of propriety.

After careful analysis of both passages, the second example concerning Gaius Attonius is much more useful to my argument. Hence, most of the passages mentioned throughout this chapter are from Cicero's later years. from ~50 BC to the time of his death in 43 BC. Moreover, in his early political speeches, Cicero only uses *verecundia* very selectively, often using the word only once in any particular work or speech.[64] Interestingly, in his early career, Cicero rarely ever

[64]According to PHI Latin Texts word search tool, *verecundia* is mentioned in 5 works prior to 51: *Quinct*. 39.12, *Pro Tullio* 5.9, *Caecin.* 72.2, *Clu*. 198.15, *Cael*. 69.9. Cicero also uses *verecundia* in the *Philippics*, never using it more than once in any particular one.

used *verecundia* in public oratory challenging opposing political figures, such as *Catiline* or *Verres*. Instead, *verecundia* appears a profuse number of times in Cicero's later dialogues and treatises. Even further, a large proportion of the word's usage are concentrated in either personal correspondences or Stoic works. Though several different factors could explain this trend, I do not think it is pure coincidence. I hope to offer somewhat of an answer to this quite intriguing phenomenon across my three sections concerning Cicero's *Epistulae ad Familiares*, *De Officiis*, and *Pro Marcello*, respectively. The *Epistulae* will provide valuable insight into how Cicero managed friendships. Meanwhile, in *De Officiis*, Cicero explains *verecundia*'s place within the stoic system of virtues, and the *Pro Marcello* offers how Cicero used *verecundia* in political life. By the end of this chapter, my aim is to demonstrate that Cicero considered *verecundia* a virtue not only evident within the contextual nuances of the word's usage but also his own practice of it.

I. Epistulae Ad Familiares

Out of the large catalog of letters, *verecundia* appears in thirteen distinct letters with varying levels of formality. By examining both intimate and more formal letters, we can observe how Cicero navigated different relationships and situations while remaining polite and respectful. Before analyzing specific instances of *verecundia* within his letters, it is important to summarize certain principles Cicero thought were necessary to hold true friendship. Acknowledging that complex friendships may contain several offensive instances, there is one instance that Cicero labels as useful in *de Amicitia*, his treatise on friendship.[65] Laelius, the treatise's interlocuter, explained that friendship allows the entertaining of good-minded criticism: *nam et monendi amici saepe sunt et obiurgandi, haec accipienda amice, cum benevole fiunt* (for

[65] Cic. *Amic*. 88.

friends frequently must be not only advised, but also rebuked, and both advice and rebuke should be kindly received when given in a spirit of goodwill).[66] When criticism is given with good intention, it involves the consideration of the well-being of that individual, a mindful use of *verecundia*. Moreover, it is expected that this criticism is a two-way avenue since it affirms the usefulness and reliability of the friendship.[67] As demonstrated by these letters, Cicero particularly values how his friends perceive him and often imagines himself in his friends' point of view.[68] Even further, in a letter addressed to Lucius Papirus Paetus, a businessman located in Naples, Cicero ironically praises, *amo verecundiam!* (I love your consideration of me!),[69] in response to Paetus calling him a *mentula* (prick). However, Cicero seizes the chance to give a stoic lecture concerning the importance of truthful speech (i.e., calling/naming things exactly what they are).[70] Even in lieu of vulgar language, Cicero actually endorses this behavior writing, *te adversus me omnia audere gratum est* (I like you to have no inhibitions when you are addressing me.)[71] In this way, Cicero wants clear communication between himself and his friends so that he knows that his *verecundia* is upright and is in good standing. As a result, in intimate letters, Cicero's *verecundia* reflected in surveying and checking in on his friend's feelings.

An intimate letter defined by Cicero's *verecundia* is his correspondence with Lucius Papirus Paetus, a businessman located in Naples. The two characters have a total of twelve surviving letters dating sometime between 50-43 BC. Though there is some context missing, the general circumstances are that Paetus read a seemingly overelaborate work of Cicero that

---

[66] Cic. *Amic*. 89 (trans. W.A. Falconer).
[67] Cic. *Amic*. 88.
[68] Damon (2010) 376.
[69] Cic. *Fam*. 9.22.1; Shackleton Baily translates *verecundia* as "modesty" here, implying sarcasm.
[70] Damon (2010) 381.
[71] Cic. *Fam*. 9.22.4 (trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey).

probably falls short.[72] In response, it is assumed that Paetus sends a joking attempt to reformulate Cicero's elaborate rhetoric in a returning letter.[73] After acknowledging Paetus' antics, Cicero writes, *potius ἀπότευγμα meum* (The 'miss' was rather mine,)[74] clearly demonstrating Cicero's awareness of his own mistake. Moreover, by using the word, *ἀπότευγμα*, meaning failure, Cicero takes accountability for the miscalculation he had committed. *Verecundia* is especially relevant to Cicero's maintaining of friendships since he finds fault with himself and, as will be shown later, wishes to not further offend his fellow man.

Cicero then asks, *verum tamen quid tibi ego videor in epistulis?* (How do I seem in my letters?)[75] In questioning this, Cicero tries to sense Paetus' feelings and desires reassurance of his own authenticity. More effectively, he is establishing a dialogue for good intentions to ensure a healthy friendship. Later, Cicero's expresses his concern for using the appropriate rhetoric in his letters asking, *Nonne plebeio sermone agere tecum?* (Surely, I deal with you in a colloquial style?),[76] illustrating his willingness to alter his rhetoric so that he adheres to the stylistic *decorum* and is further appropriately received by Paetus.[77] Furthermore, this question serves as an opportunity to solicit Paetus' insights, fostering an environment of mutual respect and trust in their exchange. Continuing on, Cicero proclaims that formal sorts of writing and speaking are meant purely for the public sphere, for writing overly formally would be arrogant. Overall, the statesmen's willingness to open a dialogue showcases humility and a commitment to fostering mutual respect, indicative to virtuous *verecundia*. By mindfully perceiving himself through the

[72] Damon (2010) 379.
[73] Baily poses that Paetus may have been sent a copy of a Ciceronian speech and tried to reproduce it.
[74] Cic. *Fam*. 9.21.1 (trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey).
[75] Cic. *Fam*. 9.21.1 (trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey).
[76] Cic. *Fam*. 9.21.1 (trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey).
[77] Damon (2010) 379.

eyes of others, Cicero is dedicated to changing his behavior and demeanor for the greater good of his relationship with Paetus.

Transitioning into his more formal letters, such as those addressed to prominent politicians or allies, Cicero often employs *verecundia* as a formal acknowledgement of respect to build stronger connections.[78] According to Hall, many of these letters include "requesting favors, writing recommendations, offering thanks and congratulations, [and] cultivating alliances."[79] A prime example of this is when Cicero attempts to revitalize his friendship with Marcus Lucinius Crassus, a member of the first triumvirate, in 54 BC. The two had never been close friends but their relationship had deteriorated to such an extent that Pompey maintained that Cicero send a letter to renew their relationship.[80] With this goal in mind, Cicero authored a letter extending friendship and even offering any assistance he may provide.[81] In prefacing his letter to Crassus, Cicero wrote:

> *de me sic existimes ac tibi persuadeas vehementer velim, non me repentina aliqua voluntate aut fortuito ad tuam amplitudinem meis officiis amplectendam incidisse sed, ut primum forum attigerim, spectasse semper ut tibi possem quam maxime esse coniunctus. quo quidem ex tempore memoria teneo neque meam tibi observantiam neque mihi tuam summam benevolentiam ac liberalitatem defuisse. si quae inciderunt3 non tam re quam suspicione violata, ea, cum fuerint et falsa et inania, sint evulsa ex omni memoria vitaque nostra.*
>
> As for me personally, I very much hope you will thoroughly persuade yourself that I have not happened to embrace your cause and work for your greatness through any accident or sudden whim, but have always made it my aim ever since my entry into public life to be on the closest terms with you. Since those days I recall no failure of attention on my part or of good will and generosity in the highest measure on yours. If certain infringements, surmised rather than real, have occurred so as to affect our relations, these are mere figments of the imagination; let them be utterly eradicated from our memories and our lives. [82]

---

[78] Hall (2009) 32.
[79] Hall (2009) 29-30.
[80] Hall (2009) 72.
[81] Cic. *Fam.* 5.8.4.
[82] Cic. *Fam.* 5.8.3 (trans. D. R. Shackleton Bailey).

Differing from his correspondence with Paetus, Cicero demonstrates his *verecundia* by asserting how he should be regarded rather than attempting to gauge how he is viewed. More rhetorically, the phrase *tibi persuadeas…velim*, and in particular the subjunctive *velim*, is a common phrase/word in Cicero's more formal letters that results in a courteous and civil tone.[83] With this tone, Cicero's next aim is to silence any grievances the two may have had in the past, which shows true consideration of Crassus' feelings by putting his mind at ease for this new era of their friendship. By doing this, Cicero affirms that he should regarded as a trustworthy individual and bestows upon himself the responsibility to prove his worth through visible action. [84] By declaring his goodwill and pledge of support to Crassus in the record, Cicero once again showcases his upstanding *verecundia*.[85]

As revealed from both examples above, *verecundia* manifests in both intimate and formal letters of Cicero. In intimate letters, Cicero explicitly considers Paetus' feelings and demonstrates a willingness to change his behavior to his liking. Whilst in formal letters, Cicero is rather considerate towards Crassus by offering friendship and assistance, and eases any potential worry about their disagreements from the best. Despite these two different mechanisms, I hope to show that Cicero's respect for others was clearly overt despite varying levels of friendship. In both cases, Cicero was eager to provide himself for the betterment for another individual, aligning with my aforementioned definition of virtuous *verecundia*. Ultimately, by examining these letters, we gain valuable insights into his character and values as they pertain to his *verecundia*. However, no other work besides *De Officiis* is more helpful in defining *verecundia* as a virtue.

---

[83] Hall (2009) 74.
[84] Damon (2010) 383.
[85] Hall (2009) 76.

II. *De Officiis*

De Officiis is a series of three books addressed to Cicero's son Marcus, purposed to provide guidance on proper, ethical conduct in various aspects of life. Though *De Officiis* is written in the form of a letter to his son, it more so serves as a philosophical treatise, heavily inspired by the Rhodian Stoic Panatius. Despite being three books, only Book 1 has piqued my interest since it is tasked with defining *honestum* deriving its subsequent parts, the four cardinal virtues. As for *verecundia*'s presence throughout the work, however, Cicero does not mention *verecundia* until his discussion on *decorum* (decency) and subsequent discourses regarding individuals and their relationship to society.[86] Diverging from Panaetius' original work, Cicero's intentions for this section were not only to review traditional virtue σωφροσύνη (moderation), but also to describe appropriate behavior.[87] Beginning his discussion on *decorum*, or one's propriety, Cicero explains that moderation of all spheres are significant components.[88] Specifically, Cicero mentions *temperantia*, *modestia*, and, of course, *verecundia*, which Dyck asserts were all qualities well known to Cicero's readers.[89] In defining *decorum*, Cicero wrote:

> *nobis autem cum a natura constantiae, moderationis, temperantiae, verecundiae partes datae sint, cumque eadem natura doceat non neglegere, quem ad modum nos adversus homines geramus, efficitur, ut et illud, quod ad omnem honestatem pertinet, decorum quam late fusum sit, appareat et hoc, quod spectatur in uno quoque genere virtutis.*
>
> But to us Nature has assigned the roles of steadfastness, temperance, self-control, and *verecundia*; Nature also teaches us not to be careless in our behaviour towards our fellow-men. Hence we may clearly see how wide is the application not only of that propriety which is essential to moral rectitude in general, but also of the special propriety which is displayed in each particular subdivision of virtue.[90]

---

[86] Cicero's discussion of the fourth virtue is contained within 1.93-151. *Verecundia* only appears in these sections in Book 1. In *De Officiis* Book 1, modern scholars have outlined the book according to five main subdivisions: the derivation of the *honestum*, and the discussion of the four cardinal virtues.
[87] Dyck (1996) 17.
[88] Cic. *Off.* 1.93-94.
[89] Dyck (1996) 249. In his commentary, Dyck lists few Latin references for *verecundia*, instead referring to the Greek αιδως. Importantly, however, Aristotelian αιδως is only considering those opinions in society who appear "good," while Ciceronian *verecundia* considers the opinions of others. Cf. Arist. *EE*. 1234a30-32; Cic. *Off.* 1.99.
[90] Cic. *Off.* 1.98 (trans. W. Miller).

Consistent with Stoic ideology, virtues such as *verecundia* were bestowed onto humans by nature. The stoics identified virtue as the knowledge to perform deeds that are good and steer clear of deeds that are bad. As a result, one's propensity for virtue carried over into the key ethical deliberation that relies on one's understanding of societal roles and corresponding principles.[91] Furthermore, Schofield assert moderation is required for "achieving the order in our behavior for which nature has given us the impulse" and, further, for exhibiting virtue within the public sphere.[92] Considering how Cicero deliberately expresses how nature teaches not being careless towards others, *verecundia* fits into the realm of a stoic virtue. Given *verecundia*'s regard for one's fellow man, it represents the avenue by which *decorum* subscribes to the general virtue of *honestum*, or being morally right.[93] Contrarily, Dyck contends that only *moderatio* and *temperantia* are integral in understanding *decorum*, for which, I disagree: *verecundia* captures the unique aspect of orientating oneself given a social situation, not present in those qualities.[94]

Besides stoic ideology, the above passage highlights how the interconnectivity of *decorum* and *verecundia* contributes to moral rectitude. Since one's actions are either defined by societal approval or dismay, being morally reputable requires a strong sense of *verecundia*. Hence, *verecundia* is integral to societal reverence, entailing moral aptitude, an aspect not emphasized by Kaster. Cicero later states, *Nam neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti* (For indifference to public opinion implies not merely self-sufficiency, but even total lack of principle.)[95] This statement provides "negative

[91] Klein (2020) 106-107.
[92] Schofield (2012) 54.
[93] Marchese (2019) 64.
[94] Dyck (1996) 247; Schofield (2012) 55.
[95] Cic. *Off.* 1.99 (trans. W. Miller).

confirmation," as Dyck puts it, that reinforces Cicero's valuing of others' approval.[96] From this, we could postulate that Cicero thought that *verecundia* was critical to the ethical framework of Rome.

Before getting any further, another Stoic principle is crucial to Cicero's conception of *verecundia*: the interconnectivity of virtue.[97] A common trend in §93-151 of *De Officiis* and other Ciceronian works is the contextualizing of *verecundia* amongst other virtues. In other words, as far as I know, there is no long-form passage in the Ciceronian canon with the sole purpose of defining *verecundia* for definition's sake. Instead, Cicero more often connects *verecundia* to other virtues. For instance, he compares *verecundia* to *iustitia* since both determine citizens' behavior:

> *Est autem, quod differat in hominum ratione habenda inter iustitiam et verecundiam. Iustitiae partes sunt non violare homines, verecundiae non offendere; in quo maxime vis perspicitur decori.*
>
> There is, too, a difference between justice and *verecundia* in one's relations to one's fellow-men. It is the function of justice not to do wrong to one's fellow-men; of considerateness, not to wound their feelings; and in this the essence of *verecundia* is best seen.[98]

Cicero outlines how *verecundia* manifests itself in the outward expression of *decorum*. Though both virtues relate to others, Cicero establishes that *iustitia*'s purpose as *non violare* and *verecundia*'s purpose as *non offendere*, a very large distinction. While the purpose of justice is to not inflict physical harm on another man, *offendere*, as in to make offense, reaffirms *verecundia* as a social virtue. The primary reason why *verecundia* informs *decorum* rather than *iustitia*, is because it gauges one's feelings and emotions.[99]

---

[96] Dyck (1996) 258.
[97] Referring to the idea that virtue was unitary in that either one possessed all the virtues or none of them.
[98] Cic. *Off.* 1.99 (trans. W. Miller).
[99] Dyck (1996) 258.

Cicero also emphasizes the interconnectivity of *verecundia* outside of *De Officiis*. In his other philosophical works, Cicero elaborates on the role of *verecundia* within the whole scope of virtue. A striking example of this is in *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum*. In explaining the stoic doctrine, he explains again *verecundia* was bestowed onto humans by nature:

> *quodque hoc solum animal natum est pudoris ac verecundiae particeps appetensque convictum hominum ac societatem animadvertensque in omnibus rebus quas ageret aut diceret ut ne quid ab eo fieret nisi honeste ac decore, his initiis et ut ante dixi seminibus a natura datis, temperantia, modestia, iustitia et omnis honestas perfecte absoluta est.*
>
> and also, since man is the only animal endowed with a sense of *verecundia* and shame, with a desire for intercourse and society with his fellows, and with a scrupulous care in all his words and actions to avoid any conduct that is not honourable and seemly, from these beginnings or germs, as I called them before, of nature's bestowal, were developed Temperance, Self-control, Justice and moral virtue generally in full flower and perfection.[100]

Several features of this passage are reminiscent of *Off*. 98. However, a key difference between the two passages is that *verecundia* is credited as being integral to all four cardinal virtues rather than just *decorum*. Even further, Cicero not only credits *verecundia* with not neglecting one's fellow man but also one's scrupulous care in words and actions, reflecting that *verecundia* transcends mere instilled human emotion. Given that *verecundia* guides individuals towards honorable conduct and is necessary for the cultivation of other virtues, it possesses the complexity and significance of a virtue in its own right. As discussed in the previous section, Cicero's *verecundia* in the *Epistulae ad Familiares* demonstrates Cicero's meticulous effort to be perceived favorably and be of service to his friends. Cicero's rhetoric in the letters is not indicative of any old friend but one characterized by *verecundia*. Therefore, virtuous *verecundia* goes beyond the almost autonomous maintaining of societal standards, such as greeting one's friends, to more complicated social situations, requiring intense forethought and the

[100] Cic. *Fin*. 4.18 (trans. H. Rackham).

consequential consideration of others. From here, I assert that there are two main components that inform one's *verecundia*: the unconscious and conscious.

In *Off.* 1.126-127, Cicero attributes *verecundia* to concerning public affairs. In other words, *verecundia* is responsible for one's natural inclination to not show their genitals in public or discuss sexual intercourse in everyday conversation.[101] These same norms have transcended into modern society, suggesting that they are indeed produced by nature. Nonetheless, upholding these specific standards of society does not require a constant and pervasive mindset. Again, the same concept appears in 1.134 regarding conversation. Though *verecundia* is not explicitly stated, Cicero argues that one should match the tone of conversation and more importantly, not deliberately show any character flaws.[102] These are examples are for the unconscious since they are more in tune with daily life.

Conscious *verecundia* is employed when making more momentous, consequential decisions, particularly within a political context. Cicero wrote this moral treatise not just for his son but as a specific political program for the youth of Rome and a measure of his political legacy.[103] At some points within *De Officiis*, Cicero references certain vices pervasive of the late republican political climate, such as *nimia cupiditas principatus* (excessive lust for power,)[104] stressing that it would lead to complete disregard to any public or lawful authority. A pertinent example of this is Julius Caesar. In usurping of the republican political structure, Caesar had a complete disregard for the lawful institutions in place for centuries and placed his own personal interests over the liberty of the people. Perhaps, Cicero believed that Caesar and some of his colleagues had an absence of *verecundia*. Considering that he only generously supported his

[101] Cic. *Off.* 1.127.
[102] Cic. *Off.* 1.134.
[103] Dyck (1996) 29-30.
[104] Cic. *Off.* 1.64 (trans. W. Miller).

veterans, his boisterous lack of restraint towards the common people and the rest of the republic is an outstanding example of vice in lieu of virtuous *verecundia*. Furthermore, Cicero suggests that figures like Caesar were not virtuous in any respect, stating, *custos vero virtutum omnium dedecus fugiens laudemque maxime consequens verecundia est* (But the guardian of all the virtues, which shuns disgrace and attains praise in the greatest degree, is *verecundia*).[105] Since *verecundia* is the *custos* (guardian) of all virtue, its presence is the difference between an individual who acts virtuously and one who succumbs to arrogance like Caesar.

For Cicero, Julius Caesar was only first in a line of individuals who jeopardized the integrity of the republic. During the late republic, Cicero, along with other historical authors, judged that there was a moral decline within the political sphere due to individuals' great unchecked ambition. In their pursuit of glory, these individuals were caught up in the pursuit of their own personal interests rather than the common good. They had no tie to any morals or justice, which Mitchell attributes as *audacia* (boldness), which Cicero regarded as the most alarming form of moral decline.[106] Moreover, these qualities generally surfaced in skilled and determined individuals such as Julius Caesar, whom Cicero critiques throughout *De Officiis*. Cicero states the more ambitious an individual the more likely he is to become a sole ruler, and, correspondingly, a disregard for any public or lawful authority.[107] Caesar's reduction of the republic into a dictatorship is a disregarding of *verecundia,* recalling that the virtue entails the

---

[105]Cic. *Part. Or.* 79.7; *Atque haec quidem virtutum; vitiorum autem sunt genera contraria. Cernenda autem sunt diligenter, ne fallant ea nos vitia, quae virtutem videntur imitari. Nam et prudentiam malitia et temperantiam immanitas in voluptatibus aspernandis et magnitudinem animi superbia in nimis1 extollendis et despicientia in contemnendis honoribus et liberalitatem effusio et fortitudinem audacia imitatur et patientiam duritia immanis et iustitiam acerbitas et religionem superstitio et lenitatem mollitia animi et* ***verecundiam*** *timiditas et illam disputandi prudentiam concertatio captatioque verborum, et hanc oratoriam vim inanis quaedam profluentia loquendi* (Cic. *Part. Or.* 81.11). An instance where Cicero explicitly lists *verecundia* as a virtue. Its corresponding vice is *timiditas*, which suggests that showing too much restraint could also be vice in relation to *verecundia*.

[106] Mitchell (1984) 31.

[107] Cic. *Off.* 1.64 (trans. W. Miller); Though Caesar is not mentioned by name in this passage, Dyck asserts that Cicero is indeed alluding to Caesar. Caesar is explicitly mentioned by name in other passages in *De Officiis* Book 1.

consideration everyone's opinion. Since *verecundia* is the "first line of defense" towards all virtue, Caesar clearly lacked it. As a result, like the virtues commonly mentioned alongside *verecundia*, such as *temperantia*, *moderatio*, and *constantia*, *verecundia* has the tangible quality of not being present within detestable individuals.

I think that *De Officiis* and Cicero's other later works, serve as evidence that—in Cicero's mind—certain spheres of Roman society were lacking a degree of *verecundia*. Perhaps, he viewed the waning integrity of the republic as the most ultimate overstepping of boundaries, such that overt discussions of *verecundia* were necessary.

III. *Pro Marcello*

Of all the political speeches, the most intriguing use of *verecundia* resides in the *Pro Marcello*. In breaking his six-year silence of public oratory, Cicero advocated for the reinstating of the exile Marcellus, a significant adversary of Julius Caesar. In the very opening of his speech, Cicero addresses his long period of silence:

> *Diuturni silentii, patres conscripti, quo eram his temporibus usus, non timore aliquo, sed partim dolore, partim verecundia, finem hodiernus dies attulit, idemque initium quae vellem quaeque sentirem meo pristino more dicendi: tantam enim mansuetudinem, tam inusitatam inauditamque clementiam, tantum in summa potestate rerum omnium modum, tam denique incredibilem sapientiam ac paene divinam tacitus praeterire nullo modo possum.*
>
> To-day, Conscript Fathers, has brought to a close the long silence, a due not to a feeling of fear, but to mingled feelings of grief and of *verecundia*, which I had observed during the recent troubles; to-day, too, marks the resumption of my old habit of expressing freely my desires and my opinions. For such humanity, such exceptional, nay, unheard-of clemency, such invariable moderation exhibited by one who has attained supreme power, such incredible and almost superhuman loftiness of mind I find it impossible to pass by in silence. [108]

[108]Cic. *Marcell.* 1.3.

Cicero ascribes *dolor* (grief) and *verecundia* as reasons for his *diuturni silentii* (long silience) from public affairs. Cicero's acknowledgment of his *verecundia*-induced silence not only shows his respect for Caesar's power and authority but also demonstrates his aptitude for statesmanship. Since Marcellus was an adversary of Caesar with similar beliefs to that of Cicero, Marcellus' recalling provided an avenue for the statesman to "rediscover his public voice."[109] Prior to this moment, it is often speculated that Cicero had a reluctance to speak publicly because of the distressing nature of the political climate as affected by the civil war.[110] In fact, Cicero stated in a letter, *magna gladiorum est licentia, sed in externis locis minor etiam ad facinus verecundia* (Swords are loose in their scabbards nowadays; but abroad there is less *verecundia* to check a deed of violence), suggesting that Rome was more hostile than in his earlier years.[111] Therefore, Cicero exercised "conscious" *verecundia* in this scenario as silence was the appropriate behavior to avoid any potential consequences onto himself in navigating these peculiar times. Aside from his period of public silence, Cicero's *verecundia* extends into the rhetoric of the *Pro Marcello*. As Marchese identifies, a large portion of the speech is elaborate praise of Caesar as she calls it an *actio gratiarum* (act of grace.)[112] By praising Caesar for his *clementia* (mercy) and *mansuetudo* (gentleness), he is trying to explicate a persona of someone who is grateful for Marcellus' restating. In verbally appeasing the dictator, Cicero reduces any possibility of violent action.[113]

Moreover, Cicero provides an account of these events in a letter to Servius Rufus. After alerting Rufus of Caesar's intention to permit the reinstating of Marcellus, Cicero mentioned that

[109] Marchese (2014) 80.
[110]Marchese (2014) 79.
[111] Cic. *Fam*. 4.9.4 (trans. D.R. Shackleton Bailey)
[112]Marchese (2014) 79.
[113] Marchese (2014) 79.

he was called upon to speak, which, of course, was his oration of the *Pro Marcello*. Interestingly, he speaks upon his decision to break his silence writing, *ego rogatus mutavi meum consilium… fregit hoc meum consilium et Caesaris magnitudo animi et senatus officium* (my name was called; and I changed my resolution…this resolution of mine was overborne by Caesar's magnanimity and the Senate's solicitude).[114] Besides Caesar's *magnitudo animi*, I would like to highlight that Cicero cited *senatus officium* as a reason for his seemingly abrupt, newfound feeling for public discourse. Seeing that numerous other senators were praising Caesar, Cicero thought it necessary to join in the reign of laudations. Therefore, Cicero joining in on the praise is an example of his *verecundia* because he avoided appearing out of place. Correspondingly, Cicero continues, qui *fortasse arbitraretur me hanc rem publicam non putare si perpetuo tacerem* (he might have thought I did not regard the present regime as constitutional if I never broke silence).[115] Hence, Cicero was influenced by the desire to avoid giving offense to Caesar in case he interpreted silence as a political statement.[116]

After examining *verecundia* in Cicero's *Epistulae Ad Familiares*, *De Officiis*, and *Pro Marcello*, Cicero's virtuous *verecundia* is a function of his mindful consideration of others' feelings. As discussed in *De Officiis* and other stoic works, *verecundia* is the virtue that allows humans to deem what is appropriate, and correspondingly, is the *custos* (guardian) of all virtue. As a result, Cicero's *verecundia* allowed him to build stronger connections with his friends and successfully navigate the political sphere with minimal repercussions.

[114] Cic. *Fam*. 4.4.4 (trans. D.R. Shackleton Bailey).
[115] Cic. *Fam*. 4.4.4 (trans. D.R. Shackleton Bailey).
[116] Dugan (2013) 212.

Chapter 3: Livy

Next, my investigation of *verecundia* now reaches the historian Livy and his great history, *Ab Urbe Condita*. As prefaced in Chapter 1, I hope this chapter proves to augment my assertions by diverging from the literary mediums previously discussed. Interestingly, Livy was a proponent of Cicero as his work "shows at all points a profound and pious study of the great orator."[117] Therefore, Livy aligns with Cicero his desire for peace and unity within the state.[118] Chronicling the tumultuous events from the inception of the republic to his present day, Livy wrote approximately two generations after Cicero. Hence, by living under Augustus, the inaugural emperor of the Roman empire, it is plausible that Livy's sentiment of moral decay from the days of the republic is more pronounced. Given Livy's affinity for Cicero, I decided to investigate Livy's work to see if he regarded *verecundia* as a virtue. For this reason, my study has continued here. Before examining the prevalence of *verecundia* in *Ab urbe condita*, it is important to discuss Livy's motivations, inspirations, and techniques. In the preface of his work, Livy writes:

> *ad illa mihi pro se quisque acriter intendat animum, quae vita, qui mores fuerint, per quos viros quibusque artibus domi militiaeque et partum et auctum imperium sit; labente deinde paulatim disciplina velut desidentis primo mores sequatur animo, deinde ut magis magisque lapsi sint, tum ire coeperint praecipites, donec ad haec tempora quibus nec vitia nostra nec remedia pati possumus perventum est.*
>
> Here are the questions to which I would have every reader give his close attention—what life and morals were like; through what men and by what policies, in peace and in war, empire was established and enlarged; then let him note how, with the gradual relaxation of discipline, morals first gave way, as it were, then sank lower and lower, and finally began the downward plunge which has brought us to the present time, when we can endure neither our vices nor their cure.[119]

---

[117] Ogilvie (1964) 4.
[118] Ogilvie (1964) 3-4.
[119] Liv. *praef.*9 (trans. B. O. Foster).

Aside from summarizing historical events, a primary function of his work to instruct readers on the customs of the past due to the decline of the present.[120] Although this conception of a history deviates largely from modern historical methodology, Livy's work followed the general conventions of ancient historiography. However, what makes Livy's work unique is the uniting of two complementary traditions: the didacticism of historiography and exploiting the role of *exempla* in Roman culture. Consequently, in constructing his work, Livy's largest influences were the annalists, Polybius, and Sallust.[121]

The most obvious manifestation of the annalistic tradition resides in Livy's organization of his work. Like the annalists, Livy arranged his material by year and magistrates elected.[122] As for Polybius, *exempla* were significant to pushing his narrative. Polybius' work sought to illustrate Rome's rise to power through a complex rendering of causes and effects, resulting in *exempla* being expressed as explicit commentaries on good and bad behavior. This is rather different than Livy because he pushes his narrative through speeches or focalizing his characters.[123] By doing this, Livy's characters display exemplary virtues, which he wishes his readers to interpret as the moral.

The final author that informs Livy's work is Sallust, who believed that looking to the past offers models of conduct. This is quite evident above when Livy identifies past *vitae*, *mores*, *viri*, and *artes* as informants on ethical behavior. Moreover, Livy's very rhetoric is very reminiscent of Sallust, as evidenced below:

---

[120] *labente* and *dissidentis* imply a metaphor of a large object rolling down a hill with increasing momentum. Another possibility is that this metaphor represents the gradual destruction of a house, emphasizing the total disunity of Rome's *mores*; Oglvie (1964) 27.
[121] Chaplin (2000) 4.
[122] Chaplin (2000) 16. Chaplin also suggests that *exempla* were included in the annals to a certain degree. However, these remaining annals only exist in a highly fragmentary form, and Chaplin concedes that it is difficult to make any further generalizations.
[123] Chaplin (2000) 25.

> *Ex quo tempore maiorum mores non paulatim, ut antea, sed torrentis modo praecipitati; adeo iuventus luxu atque avaritia conrupta, ut merito dicatur genitos esse, qui neque ipsi habere possent res familiaris neque alios pati.*
>
> And from that time, the manners of our ancestors were discarded not gradually, as previously, but after the fashion of a torrent; to such an extent was our youth corrupted by luxury and greed that it may rightly be stated that men were born who could neither maintain possession of their own property nor permit others to do so.[124]

In addition to their shared perspective on moral decline, Livy uses similar word choice in the passage above in his preface, which includes *paulatim*, *praecipitaiti*, *pati*, and *possent.*[125] Despite similar intentions, *exempla* did not frequent Sallust's monographs. According to some, Sallust would often distort historical facts to fit the scheme of his work.[126] Instead, Livy recasts events as accounts of moral truths. As a result, Livy's style is characteristic of "wanting to be read," and he used contemporary syntax and diction. To make his writing more engaging, Livy often simplifies stories by omitting certain characters and offering some sort of climax.[127]

The primary literary technique Livy employs is the repeatedly aforementioned "*exempla*." In a purely rhetorical sense, *exempla* are *alicuius facti aut dicti praeteriti cum certi auctoris nomine propositio* (the citing of something done or said in the past, along with the definite naming of the doer or author).[128] However, within later works, *exempla* are more so understood to be concise ethical tales, pertaining to behavioral norms and morally upright behavior. Like the modern word "example," Romans used *exempla* as evidence or means of effective persuasion.[129] However, unlike modern examples, *exempla* exclusively had moral

---

[124] Sallust *Hist*. 13 (trans. J. T. Ramsey).
[125] Ogilvie (1964) 27.
[126] Ogilvie (1964) 24.
[127] Ogilvie (1964) 18, 20.
[128] *Rhet. Her.* 4.62 (trans. H. Caplan).
[129] *Exemplum…ante oculos ponit, cum exprimit omnia perspicue ut res prope dicam manu temptari possit.*(*Rhet. Her.* 4.62). In fact, as Chaplin poses, *exempla* support an argument by putting it before the audience's eyes, meaning that it has a tangible quality.

implications, especially in relation to the past.[130] More specifically, effective *exempla* simply do not explicitly outline their moral. Rather, the narrative should "facilitate a journey towards understanding in which readers feel they are playing an active and intelligent role," somehow relating the story back to themselves.[131]

The study of exemplarity in the Roman world has been a recent area of scholarly focus.[132] Moreover, scholars have determined that one of the many functions of these stories was to teach. *Imitatio*, or imitation, was recognized as an important educational method significant to the moral development of ancient Rome.[133] Furthermore, these stories were often defined by the virtues of the protagonist, which later surface as aspirational qualities to the reader. Therefore, to fully understand *verecundia* as a virtue, it must be examined in *exempla* where it is the moral of the story. To identify the *exempla* later discussed in this chapter, I followed Langland's parameters as shown below:

1. A hero that is "morally charged" and serves as a template for virtue.
2. A story that dramatizes moral decisions
3. A resulting ethical moral which reflects that more was at stake than the individual involved.[134]

Despite these somewhat rigorous requirements, *exempla* range from extremely well-known stories to smaller episodes. For example, Roller dedicates a whole chapter to Horatius Cocles, who singlehandedly defended Rome from invading Etruscans in the 6th century BC. On the other

[130] Roller (2018) 1.
[131] Langlands (2018) 80.
[132] Cf. Langlands (2018), Roller (2018), Chaplin (2000).
[133] Langlands (2018) 95.
[134] Langlands (2018) 29-30; 31; 32-33. Roller offers an alternative model consisting of "action, evaluation, commemoration, and norm setting," which he regards as a sequential and cyclical process. "Roman exemplarity's four operations are thus both sequential and cyclical: actions are observed, evaluated, and commemorated, creating standards and models that inspire and shape new actions; these are observed and evaluated in their turn, and so on, in an endless loop of social reproduction." Roller (2018) 11.

hand, the stories explored in Livy during this chapter are lesser known. Nevertheless, Livy does not deem any story more important than another, declaring, *hoc illud est praecipue in cognitione rerum salubre ac frugiferum, omnis te exempli documenta in inlustri posita monumento intueri* (What chiefly makes the study of history wholesome and profitable is this, that you behold the lessons of every kind of experience set forth as on a conspicuous monument.)[135] Regardless of their notoriety, *exempla* were clearly teaching tools. Chaplin, Langlands, and Roller all suggest that *exempla* were significant to the moral development of Rome. Firstly, Chaplin poses that Livy's use of *exempla* does indeed work within the moralizing tradition of Roman history.[136] Secondly, Langlands asserts that *exempla* provided the Romans with a source of imitation.[137] Thirdly, Roller adds that *exempla* establish a key moral discourse, which creates and could lead to the evolving of social values.[138]

Now that Livy's intentions and corresponding *exempla* have been defined, it is time to steer the conversation back to *verecundia*. In Livy's work, I have found some *exempla* in which certain characters possess *verecundia*. By examining *verecundia* within these exemplary stories, we can gain further insight into how *verecundia* was exercised specifically as a virtue. Livy's use of *exempla* allows for a deeper exploration of *verecundia* not able to be done with the Ciceronian canon. By providing concrete historical examples of *verecundia*, we can examine *verecundia* within the realm of society rather than the individual.

[135] Liv. *praef.*10 (trans. B. O. Foster).
[136] Chaplin (2000) 29.
[137] Langlands (2018) 95.
[138] Roller (2018) 11.

Ia. Titus Quinctius Capitolinus

Appearing in Books 2-4, Quinctius Capitolinus, believed to be the son or cousin of the famous Cincinnatus, held the consulship six times, ranging from 471 to 439 BC. Throughout his several appearances in Livy, Capitolinus often has the task of defending Rome from outside attacks from the foreign Aequi and Volsci tribes while navigating domestic strife. During his consulship in Book 2, Capitolinus functions as a foil character to the discourteous and uninspiring Appius Claudius.[139] While portraying a battle between the Romans and Volsci, Livy juxtaposes the temperaments of Appius and Capitolinus' armies, respectively. Appius' army was so uninspired by their leader that Livy states *vinci voluit* (they wished to be conquered).[140] In comparison, Livy describes Capitolinus as *lenior* (gentler) as compared to his colleague.[141] His army regarded him as a *parens* (parent) rather than a *dominus* (master), which is quite the compliment.[142] Hence, Livy categorizes Capitolinus as a leader that prioritizes respecting his men and receiving that same respect. This level of care regarding social relations is indicative of his later role as a peacemaker, specializing in fostering *concordia* (harmony) amongst the plebeians and patricians. Along with this, Capitolinus' recognition of his own place as a military leader hints at the same proficiency he embodies as consul.

Capitolinus' next notable episode is during his fourth consulship at the end of Book 3 amidst another impending threat from the Aequi and Volsci. During this period of *discordia* (civil dissention), according to Ogilvie, the plebeians and patricians are depicted as "waiting for a chance to jump at each other's throats."[143] The point of contention lies in the power of the

[139] Vasaly (1999) 515; This is the same Appius Claudius responsible for the institution of the decemvirate, who is portrayed as wildly corrupt in some episodes in Book 3. However, in this instance, Appius Claudius is Capitolinus' co-consul.
[140] Liv. 2.59.3.
[141] Liv. 2.60.1.
[142] Liv. 2.60.3.
[143] Ogilvie (1964) 514.

tribunate. If the patricians could hinder that office, they could have all the power for themselves. Conversely, the plebeians believed that the power of the tribune could serve as a gateway to other magistracies, greatly reducing the patrician's power. This schism along class lines resulted in *dissolvi licentia militandi morem, nec pro communi iam patria Romam esse* (Lawlessness was breaking down their martial traditions, nor was Rome any longer a united nation.)[144] In response to this, Capitolinus gives an elaborate speech summarizing the issues ruining Rome and offers a call to action. *Moderatio* exercised by the governing classes is simply not enough for social unity. In addition, the governed must exercise another form of moderation, *modestia* (restraint), to limit their personal ambitions.[145] Reflecting this sentiment, Capitolinus begins by listing all the compromises the patricians followed in accordance with the plebeians *concordiae causa* (for the sake of harmony).[146] Despite these efforts, there is a sense of restlessness and endless turbulence in the civic body. Given the Patricians significant efforts to secure *concordia*, Capitolinus argues that the Patricians have already conformed to the Plebeians' needs to no such end. In other words, if *concordia* is to be reestablished, the plebeians need to compromise like the patricians have done since the inception of the republic.

In making this argument, Capitloinus says, *his ego gratiora dictu alia esse scio; sed me vera pro gratis loqui, etsi meum ingenium non moneret, necessitas cogit* (I know that there are other things more pleasant to hear; but even if my character did not prompt me to say what is true in preference to what is agreeable, necessity compels me).[147] By virtue of necessity, Capitolinus' intentions are not in the interest of the patricians but rather for the overall welfare of

[144] Liv. 3.66.4 (trans. B. O. Foster).
[145] Ogilvie (1964) 520.
[146] Liv. 3.67.9; These examples include the establishing of tribunes, the establishing of the decimvirs, their eventual removal, etc.
[147] Liv. 3.68.9 (trans. B. O. Foster).

the state. For if the Roman people do not come together, all Romans risk the Aequi and Volsci harming Rome. As consul, it is Captitolius' duty to consider Rome's prosperous future as pertains to everyone. Hence, in pleading with the citizens to disregard their ambitions, Capitolinus exercises *verecundia* since he prioritizes the wellbeing of the whole state over anyone's personal desires. In leaning into the Ciceronian definition of the virtue, the rhetoric is also mindful of *verecundia* in not directly attacking their feelings.[148] He does npt blame the plebeians themselves but appeals to them by indicating that they have been taken advantage of by *adsentatores publici* (public flatterers). At the end, Capitolinus calls upon the plebeians to revert to the *antiquos mores* (old morals) to hopefully restore *concordia*.[149] Capitolinus' speech was met with so much praise that Livy wrote *Raro alias tribuni popularis oratio acceptior plebi quam tunc severissimi consulis fuit* (Rarely has the speech of a popular tribune been more agreeable to the plebs than was at that time this speech by the sternest of consuls.)[150] By acknowledging the concerns and grievances of the plebeians with humility and respect, Capitolinus demonstrated an exceptional understanding of their perspective. Therefore, Capitolinus, granted the title *severissimi consulis* (the sternest of consul), employed *verecundia* in his rhetoric by having the best interest of the plebians in mind.

This episode displays all three criteria for an *exemplum*. In this episode, Capiolinus is a moral hero defined by his *lenior* (gentler) leadership style. Once Rome faced impending doom, Capitolinus' demeanor did not waver as the moral of the story resides in his *verecundia* that resonates in his social responsibility to arise above civil discord to preserve Rome for another day. Furthermore, this is the first long-form speech in *Ab Urbe Condita*, which not only

[148] *verecundiae non offendere;* Cic. *Off.* 1.99.
[149] Liv. 3.68.12.
[150] Liv. 3.69.1 (trans. B. O. Foster).

emphasizes his rhetorical excellence but the dramatic implications of the situation.[151] Therefore, Capitolinus' speech is an *exemplum* for his own *verecundia*. On a final note, supporting this sentiment, Capitolinus scorns the citizens for their new *mores* and proceeds call for citizens to revert to their old *mores* is reminiscent of Livy's preface as outlined before. Perhaps, Livy is arguing that the values exemplified by Capitolinus' speech are timeless and should be upheld even in times of societal change. By portraying Capitolinus as a morally responsible leader who values *concordia* and upholds traditional *mores*, Livy may be advocating for a return to these principles as a means of addressing the social and political challenges facing Rome during his current day.

Section Ib: The Refusal of Triumph

Our discussion now turns to Capitolinus' role in defending Rome from the impending attacks of the Aequi and Volsci in 3.70. After his utmost display of leadership to prevent *discordia*, the other consul, Agrippa, relinquished his power so that Capitolinus could have complete *imperium* in battle. Once the battle had subsided, the Romans retreated in victory with tons of spoils to show for it. Following such a battle, usually a triumph followed, a widespread civil ceremony that celebrated a Roman commander's military conquest or achievement. However, Livy states that he could not find any records indicating that Capitolinus requested or was even offered a triumph by the senate.[152] Despite the lack of historical evidence, Livy conjectures that this was the result of the precedent established by the consuls Valerius and Horatius, who held their consular term in 449 BC.[153] That being said, Livy continues:

---

[151] Ogilvie (1964) 516.
[152] Liv. 3.70.14.
[153] In 3.63.5-11, after beating the Sabines, the senate unanimously refused to offer Valerius and Horatius triumph. The reason being *de patribus, non de hostibus consules triumphare velle* (It was a triumph, he said, over the

> *verecundiae fuit pro parte dimidia rerum consulibus petere triumphum, ne etiamsi impetrassent magis hominum ratio quam meritorum habita videretur.*
>
> It was a source of *verecundia* for the consuls to seek a triumph for an achievement only half as great, so that even if they had gained their request, it might not seem more a judgment of the men themselves rather than a consideration of the merits.[154]

Hence, Capitolinus did not ask for a triumph because he believed it to be shameful to ask for a triumph when his predecessors had not received one for a more militarily successful achievement. Capitolinus exercised forethought in predicting that if he was granted triumph, it would be viewed as undeserved by the Roman people. For, as Livy suggests, the triumph would be a reflection of the men's reputation (*hominum*), rather than of *meritorum* (their merit). This refusal of glory once again demonstrates Capitolinus' *verecundia*. As a proponent of *concordia*, Capitolinus prefers stability and harmony over the proper recognition for his deeds and possible public scrutiny. Thinking of his own achievements in the context of others exhibits conscious and deliberate thought. Given that this is Livy's final remark in the chapter, Capitolinus' *verecundia* is clearly the moral of the story. Overall, this episode cements Capitolinus as an individual excelling in both domestic and military leadership thanks to his moral integrity and ability to foster *concordia*. With this in mind, Capitolinus is a virtuous individual who is successful in curbing personal ambition and using his platform to hinder the jealously and tension between the classes, therefore, exemplifying *verecundia*. In conclusion, *verecundia* emerges as the central virtue of this exemplum, epitomized by Capitolinus' conscious decision not to seek a triumph despite his significant military achievement. Capitolinus's foresight in considering the precedent and his reluctance to seek personal glory demonstrate a deep sense of modesty and consideration for the perceptions of others. By prioritizing *concordia* and stability

---

patricians, not Rome's enemies, which the consuls desired); 3.63.9. Valerius and Horatius were the inaugural consuls after the collapse of the decemvirate, restoring the integrity of the republic.

[154] Liv. 3.70.15.

over individual recognition, Capitolinus exemplifies *verecundia* as a guiding principle of moral integrity and leadership.

II. Marcus Valerius Maximus Corvus

Marcus Valerius Maximus Corvus was an individual most known for living to 100 years old and holding the consulship six times over his 46-year political career.[155] Before demonstrating his *verecundia* in more elaborate episodes, Livy anecdotally introduces Valerius amidst the Roman-Gallic wars where he gained notoriety for facing a Gallic soldier in a duel. After taking up arms, a *corvus* (raven) flew down onto his head, and terrified, the Gallic soldier suffered defeat. In recounting these events, Livy designated the *corvus* as a *praepetes* or "a bird of favourable omen," a distinct sign of divine intervention.[156] Henceforth, Valerius was a well-respected individual of the republic and was elected to his first consulship shortly thereafter in 348 BC at the astonishingly young age of twenty-three.

The first episode regarding Valerius I would like to discuss occurs during the First Samnite War in 343 BC. Shortly before battle, Valerius and his men traveled to Samnite region where he would give words of encouragement to his men. In opening his speech, Corvus declares *Facta mea, non dicta vos, milites sequi volo* (It is my deeds not my words are what I want you to follow, my soldiers).[157] In saying this, Corvus classifies himself as a leader that values setting an example before others and the way in which his subordinates perceive him. Furthermore, Livy's emphasis of the significance of his actions suggests that Corvus is socially aware in his acts.[158] Then later, in the second half of the speech, Valerius argues that he has

[155] Cf. Cic. *Sen*. 60; Val. Max. 8.13.1; Plin *HN* 7.157.4.
[156] Oakley (1998) 242.
[157] Liv. 7.32.12.
[158] Cf. Kaster (2005) 14.

always admired the plebeians and respected their rights, which alludes to the Conflict of the Orders as described by previous books.[159] Alluding to a more harmonious state of the past, Corvus states that he has the utmost respect towards his plebeian men despite his own Patrician heritage, even lavishly praising, *colo atque colui* (I respect and have respected [the plebeians]).[160] In all, Oakley reports that the rhetoric used is mindful of the political ideology of the *novi homines* of Livy's time: most importantly, the significance of personal merit over birth.[161] Therefore, in recognizing the plebeians' value, Valerius is an ideal *nobilis* because he embraces the ever-evolving social structure and corresponding social dynamics. Moreover, his personability and support for the plebeian cause exemplify his humility and modesty. In this way, Valerius' respect for his men manifests as *verecundia* since he is more than willing to adhere to the new social standards.

Livy recounts that the soldiers were extremely receptive to the speech, claiming that *Non alias militi familiarior dux fuit omnia inter infimos militum haud gravate munia obeundo* (There was never a commander who more endeared himself to his men by cheerfully sharing all their duties with the meanest of the soldiers.)[162] Interestingly, such absolute statements are a rarity in Livy. The only other figures referred to in such terms are Scipio Africanus, Cato the Censor, and Cicero, all quite notable figures in Roman History.[163] Holding Valerius to this standard indicates his preponderance of virtues, such as Cato's *constantia*, or more interestingly, Cicero's *verecundia* as previously entertained. In fact, Livy later writes, *factis benignus pro re, dictis haud minus libertatis alienae quam suae dignitatis memor* (in his acts his kindness was suited to

---

[159] Oakley (1998) 315. *nec generis, ut ante, sed virtutis est praemium*; 7.32.14.
[160] Liv. 7.32.16; Though *colo* has primary meanings of to live or to dwell, a minor definition is "to cherish in one's mind, remember with respect;" *Colo*. Oxford Latin Dictionary, 1968.
[161] Oakley (1998) 317, 320.
[162] Liv. 7.33.1
[163] Yardley (2013) 319-320.

the circumstances, in his speech he had regard to the liberty of others no less than to his own dignity).[164] The ensuring of *libertas* in Rome required two things: equality of all before the law and the *dignitas* of the *princeps*. *Dignitas* not only requires that citizens respect their leader but also the leader's recognition of his own worth.[165] Hence, a leader jeopardizing the freedom of his state and disregarding his *dignitas* is a miscalculation of behavior that exceeds his own self-worth. I would call a breaking of such boundaries a violation of *verecundia*. Therefore, I argue that the phrase *factis benignus pro re* and allotment of *dignitas* directly acknowledge Valerius' *verecundia*. Adapting kindness to the circumstance, *pro re*, undoubtfully demonstrates a consideration for others as outlined by both ancient and modern scholars alike. His *verecundia* comes from a desire not only to serve but also be respected by his fellow countrymen. Therefore, by regarding public opinion, Valerius has moral principles aligns with those associated with *verecundia*.[166] As a result, Livy portrays Valerius as an ideal citizen and commander, highlighted by his respect for others.[167]

The next relevant episode involving Valerius Corvus is his dictatorship a year after his third consulship in lieu of a revolt within the Roman ranks. Ravaged by debt while guarding the Capuan territory, the soldiers believed it best to seize the territory for themselves. Once the current consul caught wind of this, Valerius was appointed dictator to put down the uprising. Upon his entrance, *Cognito ei extemplo haud minore ab adversariis verecundia quam ab suis silentium datum* (he instantly accorded a silent attention, in which his opponents showed as great *verecundia* for him as did his followers.)[168] Interestingly, the same type of respect, exuded

---

[164] Liv. 7.33.3.
[165] Oakley (1998) 324.
[166] As Cicero states, *Nam neglegere, quid de se quisque sentiat, non solum arrogantis est, sed etiam omnino dissoluti* is negative confirmation of valuing others. Hence, following this model, Valerius is a moral individual by having a regard for public opinion.
[167] Yardley (2013) 319-320.
[168] Liv. 7.40.4 (trans. B. O. Foster).

during his consulship, is being reciprocated here in this episode. Therefore, it becomes evident that *verecundia* is not a one-sided interaction but an attestation and reinforcing of Corvus' own character. His prior consideration of his subordinates immediately captivates the audience since they understand that Valerius will be appealing and reasonable in his speech.

In opening his speech, Valerius establishes himself as someone the mutineers can trust. In fact, Valerius' mission is not to secure *victoria* (victory, conquering) but *concordia* (harmony). In doing so, Valerius uses morally charged rhetoric to convince the soldiers of their best interests. Once again, Valerius places significance in his actions over words. He declares that he has not oppressed the plebeians in any office he has held, later stating, *in omnibus meis imperiis in me severior quam in vos* (in every position of authority I have been sterner to myself than to you).[169] In his position of power, Valerius understands his potential influence on the body politic. Moreover, his desire for *concordia* and categorization of himself as *severior* (sterner) is reminiscent of Titus Quinctius Capitolinus.[170] Both figures persuade plebeians that their best interest was in the stability of the state. To explain Valerius' case further, despite being ordered to suppress the revolt, Valerius was determined not to fight, for he allotted the decision to wage battle solely onto rebel soldiers themselves. By not wanting to fight, Valerius values these men's wellbeing. He wishes to see everyone survive so that the men can see their mothers and wives as did Coriolanus.[171] Valerius' consideration of an alternative course exemplifies his *verecundia*, as it reflects his respect for the perspectives and grievances of even enemies.

The final moments of this episode take somewhat of a dramatic turn as Valerius allows the leader of the rebels, Titus Quinctus, to speak, who is fighting through tears. Most notably, he

[169] Liv. 7.40.7 (trans. B. O. Foster).
[170] Cf. Liv. 3.69.2; Capitolinus was described *severissimi consulis* (sternest of the consuls).
[171] Liv. 7.40.10-12.

states *Qui pugnarent vobiscum infestius*, *alios duces senatus habuit* (The senate had other leaders who would have made more ruthless war on you),[172] which I propose is one of the morals of this story. At the very end of his response, Titus Quinctus said that Valerius was a man of *fides* (good faith). This confirms Valerius's status as a figure who would not be tempted by his new power, for he has strong morals. On the other hand, however, if a harsher dictator was appointed, it is plausible that the mutiny would have resolved in a very different way as numerous revolts in Roman history have resulted in violence. In choosing the peaceful route, perhaps, Valerius desires to avoid another pronounced period of *discordia*. As touched upon in the Capitolinus section, resolving *discordia* takes a certain degree of *verecundia*. In other words, not just appealing to the audience's emotions but prioritizing their own individual wellbeing as well as the state's. To conclude the story, once Valerius returned to Rome, he proposed legislation that none of the conspirators were to be held liable for their misjudgment. Hence, the soldiers faced no consequences, and the social balance of state was maintained for yet another year. Truly, Valerius' endearing qualities are one of a kind in Livy's narrative.

As for Valerius' presence within the wider exemplary tradition, I could not find any other accounts of these stories. Despite this, there are undoubtedly exemplary qualities in this portion of the narrative that emphasize that ideal leadership and statesmanship require the consideration of others. Though Valerius was not designated to make any pivotal moral decision, as per the definition of an *exempla*, the integral decision of this story resides in his appointment as dictator. For many other leaders would have lacked his forethought and endearing qualities.

[172] Liv. 7.40.17 (trans. B. O. Foster).

III. Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus and Papirus Cursor

Lastly, the final *exemplum* I would like to discuss takes us to the Second Samnite War (326-304 BC). The episode begins with Papirus Cursor, the dictator at the time had to leave his military camp to seek favorable auspices back at Rome. In doing so, the dictator explicitly forbade Fabius, the *magister equitum*, from taking any sort of military action in his absence. Despite these orders, Fabius noticed that the Samnite troops were unorganized and erratic. For whatever reason, whether to take advantage of the opportunity or to defy the dictator's absolute power, Fabius and his men attacked, violating the chain of command. The results of the battle proved that the dictator's presence was unnecessary since Fabius led his men to an unquestionable victory.

Unfortunately for Fabius, his breach of command would result in a public dispute, lasting the next couple chapters. Upon returning to the camp, Papirus summoned Fabius, not caring about his victory whatsoever. Instead, Papirus conjectured that his title, *magister equitum*, possessed under the same *auctoritas* as a dictator and other magistracies and high-up positions. Therefore, he has no grounds to not follow orders. Further, Papirus asserts that Fabius' actions have other societal concerns:

> *Sed quid ego haec interrogo, cum, si ego tacitus abissem, tamen tibi ad voluntatis interpretationem meae dirigenda tua sententia fuerit? Quin tu respondes, vetuerimne te quicquam rei me absente agere, vetuerimne signa cum hostibus conferre? Quo tu imperio meo spreto, incertis auspiciis, turbatis religionibus adversus morem militarem disciplinamque maiorum et numen deorum ausus es cum hoste confligere.*
>
> But why do I put these questions, since, had I gone off without a word, nevertheless your thoughts should have been directed to the interpretation of my will? Come, answer me: Did I forbid you to take any measures in my absence? Did I forbid you to engage the enemy? But you spurned this order; and notwithstanding the uncertainty of the auspices and our uneasy scruples, you had the hardihood, against all military precedent, and the discipline of our fathers, and the divine will of the gods, to encounter with the enemy.[173]

[173] Liv. 8.32.5-8 (trans. B. O. Foster).

In lieu of violating military orders, Papirus stresses that Fabius' actions are not in accordance with the *militarem morem* (military precedent) and *disciplinam maiorum* (discipline of the ancestors). Therefore, he poses that assuming military control so recklessly goes against established customs and acceptable behaviors. Additionally, not waiting for auspices adds a disregarding of not only military customs but also of religious customs. In acknowledging his victory, Papirus emphasizes that Fabius' rashness and its consequences are the subject of this episode.

Back in Rome, Papirus was determined that Fabius was to receive punishment. Though the citizens of Rome favored Fabius' acquittal, Livy states that technically Papirus' grievances were warranted due to *disiplina militaris* and *edictum dictatoris*, undoubtedly showing that Papirus was right in this scenario.[174] Nevertheless, Livy portrays Papirus in a negative light. For instance, after Fabius' victory while everyone was happy Papirus was indeed overcome with *tristia*, suggesting a sense of envy.[175] Furthermore, Livy writes, *Papirium tamquam ex hostium ducibus, sic ex Romano imperatore victoriam et triumphum petere* (but Papirius was seeking a victory and triumph over a Roman general, as if over commanders of the enemy); He desired all the glory for himself, which Livy attributes as a lack of *moderatio*.[176] Nonetheless, Papirus was also harsh to maintain the *auctoritas* of the dictatorship and chain of command:

> *cum polluta semel militari disciplina non miles centurionis, non centurio tribuni, non tribunus legati, non legatus consulis, non magister equitum dictatoris pareat imperio, nemo hominum, nemo deorum verecundiam habeat, non edicta imperatorum, non auspicia observentur…*
>
> For let military discipline be once broken, and soldier would not obey centurion, nor centurion tribune, nor tribune lieutenant, nor lieutenant consul, nor master of the horse

[174] Liv. 8.34.1-2; Oakley (1998) 706.
[175] Liv. 8.30.11.
[176] Liv. 8.30.11 (trans. B. O. Foster).

> dictator—none would have respect for men, none *verecundia* for the gods; neither edicts of generals nor auspices would be regarded;[177]

Though Papirus is portrayed as a harsh, unforgiving character, at least some portion of his prosecution of Fabius is reasonable. Papirus feared that if Fabius went unpunished, the dictator's power would be perceived as a punitive position, leading to disastrous precedent. The chain of command would be absolved such that one would not feel *verecundia* for one's fellow man or even the gods. Hence, like the previous two *exempla*, Papirus exercises forethought to ensure the harmony of the state. Therefore, as Oakley argues, the moral of this episode is that military discipline can be upheld to brutal lengths.[178] Once Fabius threw himself at Papirus' mercy, he relented on any sort of punishment. As explained in a later chapter, this was as much of a learning experience for Papirus as it was for Fabius. While Fabius learned perhaps to be more mindful of the customs that come along with the *disiplina militaris*, Papirus acknowledged this unrelenting support of Fabius by his men and further realized that his abilities as a general are hindered because of his overblown *severitas*.[179] Shockingly, Papirus has a stark change of character. So much so that he visited each wounded soldier's tent and checked in on how they were doing.[180] Livy notes that this new cheerful attitude allowed all the soldiers to heal more quickly and return to battle. In a concise manner, Livy states that the Samnites suffered a crushing defeat, emphasizing Livy's moral point.[181] As a result, both characters had distinct lessons relating to *verecundia*.

After the dispute with Papirus, Livy demonstrates Fabius' changed character in later episodes. In 298 BC, the public determined that Fabius Rullianus would be an excellent consul

---

[177] Liv. 8.34.7-8 (trans. B. O. Foster).
[178] Oakley (1998) 707.
[179] Liv. 8.36.6; Oakley (1998) 707.
[180] Liv. 8.36.6.
[181] Oakley (1998) 707.

amid the continuing Samnite Wars. However, he initially declined the candidacy, citing that he already had a career full of glory.[182] Additionally, he cites a law stating that the reelection of a consul within a ten-year period is forbidden. As a result, Livy attributes the virtues of *moderatio* and *verecundia legum*, deference or awareness of the laws, to Fabius. In attacking the Samnites without Papirus' permission, Fabius' did not possess either of these virtues, suggesting that previous story was not only an *exemplum* for the reader but also a learning experience for himself. This is most evident when he poses: *Et ille quidem in recusando perstabat: quid ergo attineret leges ferri, quibus per eosdem qui tulissent fraus fieret. Iam regi leges, non regere.* (What, in that case, he demanded, was the good of making laws, when their very makers broke them? The laws were no longer in control but were themselves controlled.)[183] Nevertheless, his public support was so immense that the law was waived, and he was elected to office.

The main aspect of this episode I would like to highlight is Fabius' character development concerning *verecundia*. By acknowledging the authority and importance of the law, the now older Fabius recognizes the consequences of breaking certain social rules. Relative to the previous episode, he employs a degree of forethought that simply was not present. Interestingly, in both episodes, Papirus Cursor and the Fabius in this episode use quite similar reasoning: if laws are to be willfully broken without consequence, then they would lose all effectiveness. Hence, when the nobility pushed Fabius to run for reelection, Fabius refused once again, but this time honoring his own decision. Livy states that he referenced the same reasons as the previous election cycle.[184] However, he did include an additional reason: his actions would establish *pessimum exemplum*, the worst or most evil precedent.[185] In the time spanning these

[182] Liv. 10.13.7.
[183] Liv. 10.13.11 (trans. B. O. Foster).
[184] Liv. 10.13.9.
[185] Liv. 10.15.12.

two events, Fabius gained a sense of *verecundia*. This older and wiser version of Fabius realizes that upholding the law along with moral principles not only preserves societal order but also fosters a sense of integrity and respect within the community, ensuring the continuity of these values for future generations. Since Fabius lacked this disposition in the first episode, his acquisition *verecundia* indicates that it is a virtue in this context. As demonstrated by the previous episode, an individual's *verecundia* is not inherent, and it can be learned or acquired by experiencing certain social situations. His embrace of *verecundia* serves as a testament to Livy's purpose of presenting righteous, ethical conduct and the profound impact it can have on both individuals and society.

IV. *Verecundia* in Livy's Day

After meticulous examination of these stories, Livy considers *verecundia* a central virtue to the maintenance of Concordia within the state. All four figures, Capitolinus, Valerius, Papirus, and Fabius make decisions that exemplify their consideration and courtesy for the republic and the people that reside in it. Furthermore, it is evident that Livy considered *verecundia* to be hand in hand with *concordia*. If a historical figure overreached beyond their social dignity or worthiness, they risked the possibility of upsetting the public and disrupting the social harmony of the state. Therefore, at the end of this chapter, I would like to argue that maintaining *concordia* requires careful political navigation in the realm of *verecundia*.

Going back to Livy's preface,[186] I would like to remind that one of Livy's purposes in writing his history was to set out proper ethical behavior of the ancestors before the moral degradation of Rome. By emphasizing *verecundia* in several separate *exempla*, Livy is not only describing the qualities of an ideal leader but perhaps Livy is arguing something more: perhaps

[186] See Page 35-38.

he speculated that there was a reduced presence or absence of *verecundia* in his present day. In describing Papirus, Livy wrote, *Quantum interesse inter moderationem antiquorum et novam superbiam crudelitatemque!* (How great was the difference betwixt the moderation of the ancients and this new-fangled arrogance and ruthlessness!)[187] Though this statement only explicitly mentions *moderatio*, remember that *moderatio* and *verecundia* are indeed related. *Moderatio* is the resistance to an attack of uncontrolled boldness or ambition within an individual, whereas *verecundia* is restraint as it arises in the consideration of others.[188] In referencing the *nova superbia et crudelitas* (new arrogance and ruthlessness), Livy states that modern leaders or individuals of high standing lack *verecundia*. This lack of *verecundia* manifests in the degradation of social harmony and societal propriety. Effective, virtuous leaders successfully balance sternness with the prioritizing of societal cohesion. In this way, the lessons drawn from Livy's accounts transcend mere historical analysis, offering timeless insights into the principles of virtuous governance and ethical conduct.

[187] Liv. 8.33.13.
[188] V. Max. 4.1.*praef.*

Chapter 4: *Verecundia*'s Greater Inclusion as a Virtue

As insinuated by Cicero and Livy, a strong sense of *verecundia* is an important characteristic for an ideal, virtuous leader. Cicero believed that *verecundia* was the *custos* (guardian) of all other virtues. For if a man succumbed to his ambitions, he would lose all regard for others and proceed to not have virtue.[189] Meanwhile, prefacing that the *mores* were in decline by his time, Livy demonstrated how *verecundia* manifested in idealized historical figures, expressing its importance to the harmony of the state. I hope these last two chapters were convincing that *verecundia* is a virtue in certain instances. By having conscious and unconscious aspects, *verecundia* breaches the simple scope of Kaster's definition of an emotion. Instead, *verecundia* is a complex abstraction that it is utilized on both sides of the spectrum between an emotion and a virtue. Scholars have failed to consider *verecundia* as a virtue. In this final chapter, I will illustrate that (1) virtuous *verecundia* is didactic in nature, such that it arises as a guiding principle in unfamiliar circumstances and that (2) by the early empire, it was not out of the ordinary to consider *verecundia* a virtuous quality, describing one's prioritization of others over themselves.

I. *Verecundia* in Seneca and Situational Versatility

As alluded to in Chapter 1, Seneca regards *verecundia* as an emotion, conceiving it as an uncontrollable form of modesty that results in impulses, such as blushing or trembling.[190] However, it is important to note that Seneca considered reason and emotion as separate entities, writing that they are different states of the human mind.[191] Once emotion contaminates one's

[189] Cf. Cic. *Part. Or.* 79.7. See Chapter 2 Section II.
[190] Sen. *Ep*. 11.1-3.
[191] Sen. *Dial*. 3.8.3

rational thought process, emotions tend to prevail.[192] As Konstan argues, according to Seneca, reason and emotion exist in the mind together. The only way to mitigate an emotion is the arousal of another one.[193] Nevertheless, aligning with Cicero, Seneca agrees that *verecundia* is inherited by nature, and considers it a *custos* (guardian).[194] Despite stating that wisdom cannot control the body's involuntary reaction to shameful circumstances, Seneca does offer a remedy: He writes, *Magna pars peccatorum tollitur, si peccaturis testis adsistit* (We can get rid of most sins, if we have a witness who stands near us when we are likely to go wrong.)[195] In other words, the solution to eluding embarrassment is to avoid shameful situations in the first place. Though Seneca explicitly perceives *verecundia* solely as being an emotional response, I argue that this is the practice of conscious, virtuous *verecundia*, since Seneca instructs Lucilius, the recipient of his philosophical letters, to select a figure worthy of respect to serve as a model in *vita* (life) and *oratio* (speech).[196] Put more concisely, Seneca wishes his pupil to choose an *exemplum* of whom he will be mindful.[197] This model of adhering to ethical conduct is an active process that indicates an individual's flaws.[198] By identifying these flaws, an individual is inclined to fix their behavior in an forthcoming manner. As a result, *verecundia* is both a virtue and an emotion because it is crucial for this process of selection.[199]

Moreover, Seneca reaffirms the importance of conscious *verecundia* throughout other letters, stating, *hoc quidem longe magnificentius est, sic vivere tamquam sub alicuius boni viri ac*

---

[192] Sen. *Dial*. 3.8.3.
[193] Konstan (2017) 233.
[194] Sen. *Ep*. 11.9; Recall that Cicero regarded *verecundia* the *custos* of all other virtues.
[195] Sen. *Ep*. 11.9 (trans. R. M. Gummere).
[196] Sen. *Ep*. 11.10.
[197] Sen. *Ep*. 11.10; Seneca cites Cato the Censor and Laelius as examples.
[198] Langlands (2020) 26.
[199] Cf. Konstan (2017) 237-238. This also touches upon my theory regarding conscious and unconscious *verecundia* in *De Officiis*. Within a Senecan context, any inherent uncontrollable reaction, such as blushing or trembling is unconscious *verecundia*. Conscious *verecundia* consists of avoiding shameful situations all together and the offense of others.

semper praesentis oculis (It is, indeed, nobler by far to live as you would live under the eyes of some good man.)[200] This practice was not novel for Seneca's time as the incentive to master all the virtues resided in the belief that all the virtues could exist within a single person.[201] Therefore, if *verecundia* is truly the guardian of all virtues, living according to a role model utilizes reason, not emotion. Though Seneca's conception of *exempla* is different than Livy's, both view *exempla* as a vehicle to encourage moral behaviors.[202] Living according to a virtuous *exemplum* reflects conscious *verecundia*'s ability to guide moral behavior. By internalizing a virtuous individual, members of society are prompted to align their actions with virtuous principles, transcending mere emotional responses to deliberate action.

However, living according to an *exemplum* without any deviations in modest behavior is rather unlikely: everybody makes mistakes, which is indicative of *verecundia*'s didactic nature. Since man is the only animal that is gifted with a sense of shame,[203] the negative emotions associated with shame provoke the circumventing of future similar situations.[204] As hinted by Kaster's work, a cohesive society requires constant self-reflection from social interactions. The sheer number of unknown possibilities that arise with daily life outweigh any library of *exempla*. In other words, even the most proficient student of *exempla* will not have the answer on the way to act, and subsequently will have to make a rational decision.

From this reasoning, I would like to propose a new dimension of *verecundia* as it appears within the concept of situational versatility. Within the realm of stoicism, the mere conception of situational versatility is challenging. As evidenced by *De Officiis* and Seneca's broad library of

---

[200] Sen. *Ep*. 25.5 (trans. R. M. Gummere).
[201] Cf. *Rhet. Ad Her.* 4.5.7; Langlands (2018) 98.
[202] Roller (2018) 266.
[203] Cic. *Off.* 1.99; Sen. Ep. 74.15.
[204] Fraño (2023) 17.

work, the teaching of Stoicism often manifested itself in rigid *praecepta* (moral instructions) and *decreta* (moral principles) that could not be directly applied to every situation in a one-to-one manner. As a result, the stoics valued consistency in practicing virtue amidst diverse circumstances.[205] For instance, factors, such as social class and economic status of all parties are potential nuances that modify what constitutes appropriate behavior among individuals. Correspondingly, Seneca writes in a letter to Lucilus: *Consilia enim rebus aptantur. Res nostrae feruntur, immo volvuntur*. (For advice conforms to circumstances; and our circumstances are carried along, or rather whirled along.)[206] While morality promotes the recognition of virtues, the implementation of these virtues differs based on circumstance.[207] Hence, Seneca's work imposes a model for basic moral principles to be modified with sensitivity to the situation at hand.[208] This principle is what scholars have deemed "situational ethics."[209] In unprecedented circumstances, I believe that *verecundia* is a key tool in determining the consequences of condemnable behavior to ensure right response. To demonstrate situational ethics in action, Seneca discusses the dilemma of returning a deposit in *De Beneficiis*:

> *Depositum reddere per se res expetenda est; non tamen semper reddam nec quolibet loco nec quolibet tempore. Aliquando nihil interest, utrum infitier an palam reddam. Intuebor utilitatem eius, cui redditurus sum, et nociturum illi depositum negabo. Idem in beneficio faciam. Videbo, quando dem, cui dem, quemadmodum, quare. Nihil enim sine ratione faciendum est; non est autem beneficium, nisi quod ratione datur, quoniam ratio omnis honesti comes est.*
>
> To restore a deposit is something that is desirable in itself; yet I shall not always restore it, nor at every time or in every place. Sometimes it is a matter of indifference whether I deny a deposit or restore it openly. I shall always regard the interest of the one to whom I am intending to restore a deposit, and shall refuse to do so if it will do him harm. I shall proceed in the same way in the matter of a benefit. I shall consider when to give it, to whom to give it, and how and why. For reason should be applied to everything we do;

[205] Roller (2018) 288.
[206] Sen. Ep. 71.1 (trans. R. M. Gummere).
[207] Morgan (2007) 22.
[208] Langlands (2011) 101; Inwood (2005) 96.
[209] Langlands (2011) 101.

> and no gift can be a benefit unless it is given with reason, since every virtuous act is accompanied by reason.[210]

Here, Seneca is alluding that even the simple action of returning a deposit has several variables that could provoke a multitude of different responses. In considering *quando dem, cui dem, quemadmodum* (whom to give it, and how and why), Seneca is considering every aspect of this possible lender to formulate the appropriate response, obviously an overt manifestation of *verecundia*. Nevertheless, Seneca proposes two noteworthy pieces of advice: regard the interest of the individual and use *ratio* (rational reflection). These two principles are reminiscent of Cicero's conception of *verecundia* as a virtue integral to *decorum* and avoiding offense of one's fellow man, meaning that the upholding of these principles require conscious, conscientious thought. Hence, *verecundia* manifests itself in situational ethics in the diagnosing of circumstances and the corresponding cognitive process leading to real-world action.

As for how the situational versatility of *verecundia* materializes in the greater morality of Rome, Morgan writes that popular morality relies strongly on the "conflict between certain moral aspirations (justice, for instance) and the social institutions (like the law) which attempt to enshrine them,"[211] which necessitates the adaption of behavior to the specific situation. Therefore, citizens must use the moral teachings in *exempla* along with the didactic reflectance of previous experiences to navigate daily unfamiliar circumstances to achieve the situational versatility resonant in *verecundia*. Furthermore, this notion aligns with the principle that a "good" life is defined not by consistency or coherence of societal rules or norms but the sum of appropriate behavior.[212] An example of this within my own work is Paprirus Cursor from Chapter 2. Though Papirus acted harshly in trying to punish Fabius for not following orders, he

---

[210] Sen. *Ben*. 4.10.1-2 (trans. J. W. Basore).
[211] Morgan (2007) 22.
[212] Morgan (2007) 22.

exercised mercy when Fabius begged for it. This is quite notable since the precedent for not following military orders is death.[213] However, the magnitude of Fabius' success as a result of his own disobedience was rather unprecedented. Since Paprius sensed the unrelenting support of Fabius and his victory over the Samnites, he realized that death was much too harsh as evidenced by his change in behavior. Thus, by considering all factors as outlined by Seneca above, Papirus deemed Fabius' success and the public's outcry to any punishment as extenuating circumstances to the established *exemplum*, and Papirus realized that sparing Fabius was the appropriate decision. By prioritizing societal propriety, Papirus' navigation of unfamiliar circumstances resulted in the creation of a new *exemplum*.[214] Through the adapting of situational *verecundia* to already present moral teachings, individuals practice appropriate behavior necessary for virtue, continually shaping and redefining the standards of societal propriety.

II. *Verecundia* in the Early Empire

Philosophical and historical treatises are relatively abstract, but we also have evidence that Romans, in their day-to-day activities thought of *verecundia* as a virtue and praised individuals for it. For example, *verecundia* appeared in 1st to 3rd century municipal inscriptions, praising either equestrians or municipal magistrates.[215] Below is an individual praised for their *maxima verecundia*:

> *Huius propter morum gravem patientiam maximamque verecundiam/ splendidissimus ordo, consentiente populo, tabulas patrocinales aheneas/ liberisque eius offerri censuerunt.*

[213] Titus Manlius Imperiosus Torquatus was an early Roman hero in the 4th century BC. Known for his strong morals, especially his *severitas*, Manlius decided to execute his own son for not following military orders. Cf. Sall. *Cat*. 52.30.34.
[214] Langlands (2018) 99.
[215] Forbis (1996) 84.

> On account of the weighty forbearance and greatest *verecundia* of his customs, the most splendid order, with the consent of the people, decreed that the bronze patronage tablets also be offered to his children.

For more context, this individual was extremely generous in his patronal duties "providing for a public banquet, establishing a birthday celebration fund in the community worth 50,000 sesterces, and distributing multiple cash *sportulae*."[216] These municipal inscriptions not only contain laudations of *verecundia* within local governance but also reflect its influence as a guiding principle for those dedicated to public service. This inscription uses *verecundia* to describe a leader (or merely a high-standing individual) that values the welfare of his community over his own. And, as discussed by Cicero and Livy, *verecundia* is a desirable quality to maintain *decorum* and *concordia*. Therefore, in describing the magistrate's temperament, *verecundia*'s use as a stand-alone, virtuous quality holds quite a different meaning from the *verecundia* I initially analyzed in the Latinus anecdote in chapter 1.

While *verecundia* displays an inherent duality between emotion and virtue as indicated in the Latinus story back in Chapter 1, as determined by my detailed examination of Cicero and Livy, in some instances, *verecundia* is also a virtue, desired in admirable leaders. Despite the gods alerting Latinus about their dismay regarding the games, Latinus' awe of his superiors and fear of humiliation led to serious consequences. Although the manifestation of *verecundia* as either an emotion or virtue was rather unclear in Latinus' story, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, several ancient sources have interpreted it as a conscious quality integral to moral aptitude and ideal leadership. However, Cicero and Livy's conceptions of *verecundia* as a virtue was just the beginning of this trend, considering their works in question are dated right at the inception of the empire. Furthermore, although Seneca did not directly acknowledge *verecundia* as a virtue, his

[216] Forbis (1996) 84.

advice of conducting oneself in the presence of an imaginary role model and his admiration for situational versatility indicates that *verecundia* was evolving into a much more recognized virtuous quality compared to the days of Plautus and Ennius. Following this trend, unlike any of the previously mentioned authors, Valerius Maximus[217] dedicated one of his chapters to *verecundia*, presenting it as an enduring virtue. In *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*, *verecundia* principally alludes to the "ignoring [of] one's own advantage in the interests of the state."[218] In this chapter, Valerius assigns *verecundia* to certain historical figures, who have demonstrated modesty as it relates to the consideration of others, including even the likes of Pompey the Great and Julius Caesar.[219] Despite the citing of these unexpected *exempla*, Valerius Maximus' definition of *verecundia* involves aspects of Livy and Cicero's interpretations of the virtue:

> *A qua tempestivus ad verecundiam transitus videtur: haec enim iustissimis viris praecepit ut privatas facultates neglegerent, publicas quam amplissimas esse cuperent, digna cui perinde atque caelesti numini templa exstruantur araeque consecrentur, quia parens est omnis honesti consilii, tutela sollemnium officiorum, magistra innocentiae, cara proximis, accepta alienis, omni loco, omni tempore favorabilem prae se ferens vultum.*
>
> From Poverty, the passage to *verecundia* seems timely. For she told the most just of men to neglect their private means while desiring the amplest for the public. She deserves that temples be erected and altars consecrated to her as to a celestial deity because she is the mother of every virtuous counsel, the guardian of regular duties, the teacher of innocence, dear to our nearest, acceptable to strangers, in every place and at every time bearing a welcome face.[220]

Avoiding self-interest in favor of the state aligns with Livy's belief that *verecundia* was a key component in upholding *concordia*. The latter portion of the definition along with the labeling of *verecundia* as *tutela* (guardianship) is reminiscent of Cicero's philosophy that *verecundia* is the

---

[217] Most notable for writing *Facta et Dicta Memorabilia*, which contains several chapters listing *exempla* on a certain topic or quality.
[218] Morgan (2007) 307.
[219] Val. Max. 4.5.5-6.
[220] Val. Max. 4.5.*praef.*

custos of all virtuous behavior and integral to acting appropriately. Therefore, by the early empire, *verecundia* was a quality ascribed to individuals not to indicate their fear or shame but their ability to embrace the welfare of others over themselves.

Conclusion

As demonstrated in Chapters 2, 3, and above, *verecundia* is an exemplary virtue associated with ideal moral behavior and resultingly warrants placement on Litchfield's foundational list of *exemplary* virtues. Litchfield lists *constantia* and *moderatio* and omits *verecundia* despite the fact that they are closely related qualities. Perhaps, an explanation for this is Litchfield's methodology: Instead of using the stoic system of virtues, Litchfield reviewed passages in which ethical models were created with corresponding mentioned virtues.[221] As later explained by Litchfield, a large portion of *exempla* were motivated by patriotism and military valor.[222] Given Livy's fascination with *verecundia* as it relates to *concordia* of the state, all the *exempla* in Chapter 3 express patriotism at least to some degree. All the figures mentioned desired the stability of the state over their self-interests, putting Rome before themselves and inspiring morally correct behavior. Of the figures discussed in chapter 3, Litchfield only lists Marcus Valerius Maximus Corvus and Quintus Fabius Maximus Rullianus. To Valerius, Litchfield assigns several virtues, such as *virtus*, *aequitas*, and *fides*, and to Fabius, Litchfield only assigns *virtus*. Therefore, Litchfield agreed with my assessment that Valerius and Fabius acted virtuously for their stories to be considered *exempla*. However, all four individuals acted morally correctly amidst adverse circumstances with Livy explicitly acknowledging their *verecundia* in the text. Capitolinus refused a triumph because of *verecundia*, Valerius earned

[221] Litchfield (1914) 8.
[222] Litchfield (1914) 10.

verecundia from his military deeds, and Papirus Cursor decided that Fabius must be punished because he lacked *verecundia*. Moreover, Cicero's interpretation of *verecundia* as the consideration of others, Seneca's philosophy of situational versality, the existence of inscriptions that recognize the virtue, and Valerius Maximus' chapter reinforce the fact that casting *verecundia* as an emotion is not sufficient: virtuous *verecundia* reflects rational reflection and forethought. Therefore, like any other virtue on Litchfield's table, *verecundia* is not solely a reactionary disposition but a quality that arises in those who display appropriate behavior.

The evolution of *verecundia* from its origins as an emotional response to its conceptualization as a virtuous quality reflects its missing place in the broader modern scholarly discussion of exemplary virtues. Yes, *verecundia* is two-sided in that it can be considered either an emotion or a virtue, but that should not hinder further discussion since it serves as a guiding principle in several sorts of situations. Cicero indicated that conscious *verecundia* is significant in establishing friendships, successfully maneuvering within the political landscape, and, as a result maintaining virtuously appropriate behavior. Likewise, Livy emphasized *verecundia*'s crucial role in being an ideal leader and fostering *concordia* and stability within the state. Writing a generation later, Seneca hinted at *verecundia*'s manifestation in traversing unfamiliar circumstances in order to create new *exempla*. Lastly, Valerius Maximus' chapter and late inscriptions indicate the conception of *verecundia* as a virtuous quality. In conclusion, *verecundia* emerges as not only a desirable trait in leaders but also as a fundamental principle that underscores moral behavior and civic duty. Its recognition as a virtue highlights the complexity of Roman ethical thought as it pertains to the prioritization of selflessness and dedication to the common good.

Bibliography

Belonick, Paul. "Moderatio, Modestia, and Temperantia." *Restraint, Conflict, and the Fall of the Roman Republic*, edited by Paul Belonick, Oxford University Press, 2023, p. 0, https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197662663.003.0003.

Chaplin, Jane D. *Livy's Exemplary History*. OUP Oxford, 2000. eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost), *EBSCOhost*, https://login.proxy.library.emory.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xna&AN=155695&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Cicero. *Letters to Friends, Volume I: Letters 1-113*. Edited and translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Loeb Classical Library 205. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001.

Cicero. *On Duties*. Translated by Walter Miller. Loeb Classical Library 30. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1913.

Cicero. *On Ends*. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 40. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914.

Cicero. *On Invention. The Best Kind of Orator. Topics*. Translated by H. M. Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library 386. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949.

Cicero. *On Old Age. On Friendship. On Divination*. Translated by W. A. Falconer. Loeb Classical Library 154. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1923.

Cicero. *On the Orator: Book 3. On Fate. Stoic Paradoxes. Divisions of Oratory*. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 349. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1942.

Cicero. *Philippics 7-14*. Edited and translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Revised by John T. Ramsey, Gesine Manuwald. Loeb Classical Library 507. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010.

Cicero. *Pro Milone. In Pisonem. Pro Scauro. Pro Fonteio. Pro Rabirio Postumo. Pro Marcello. Pro Ligario. Pro Rege Deiotaro*. Translated by N. H. Watts. Loeb Classical Library 252. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931.

Cicero. *Pro Quinctio. Pro Roscio Amerino. Pro Roscio Comoedo. On the Agrarian Law.* Translated by J. H. Freese. Loeb Classical Library 240. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1930.

Cicero. *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Translated by Harry Caplan. Loeb Classical Library 403. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Damon, Cynthia. *Quid Tibi Ego Videor in Epistulis? Cicero's Verecundia*. Brill, 2010, pp. 375–90, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004192331_017.

Dyck, Andrew R. (Andrew Roy). *A Commentary on Cicero, De Officiis*. University of Michigan Press, 1996.

Edwards, Catharine. *THREE. Unspeakable Professions: Public Performance and Prostitution in Ancient Rome*. Princeton University Press, 2021, pp. 66–96, https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691219547-005.

Ennius. *Fragmentary Republican Latin, Volume II: Ennius, Dramatic Fragments. Minor Works.* Edited and translated by Sander M. Goldberg, Gesine Manuwald. Loeb Classical Library 537. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018.

Forbis, Elizabeth. *Municipal Virtues in the Roman Empire : The Evidence of Italian Honorary Inscriptions*. De Gruyter, Inc., 1996, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/emory/detail.action?docID=3043807.

Fraño, Peter, and Dominik Novosád. "The Social, Therapeutic and Didactic Dimension of Shame in Seneca's Thinking." *Pro-Fil – An Internet Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 24, no. 1, 1, June 2023. *journals.phil.muni.cz*, https://doi.org/10.5817/pf23-1-33840.

Glare, P. G. W., editor. *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. [Clarendon P.], 1968.

Hall, Jon. "29Doing Aristocratic Business: Affiliative Politeness and the Politeness of Respect." *Politeness and Politics in Cicero's Letters*, edited by Jon Hall, Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 0, https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195329063.003.0002.

Inwood, Brad. *Reading Seneca : Stoic Philosophy at Rome*. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/emory/detail.action?docID=422900.

Kaster, Robert. *Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome*. Oxford University Press, Incorporated, 2005, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/emory/detail.action?docID=3052074.

_____, and David Konstan. "The Thought-World of Ancient Rome." *The Adventure of the Human Intellect*, 2016, pp. 149–66, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119162629.ch7.

Klein, Jacob. "Aristotelian and Stoic Virtue." *The Routledge Handbook of Hellenistic Philosophy*, 1st ed., Routledge, 2020, pp. 99–111, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351168120-8.

Konstan, David, et al., editors. "Reason vs. Emotion in Seneca." *Emotions in the Classical World : Methods, Approaches, and Directions*, [Franz Steiner Verlag], 2017, pp. 231–43.

Langlands, Rebecca. *Exemplary Ethics in Ancient Rome*. Cambridge University Press, 2018. Cambridge Core, *Cambridge University Press*, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781139629164.

_____. "Roman Exempla and Situation Ethics: Valerius Maximus and Cicero de Officiis." *The Journal of Roman Studies*, vol. 101, 2011, pp. 100–22. JSTOR.

Litchfield, Henry Wheatland. “National Exempla Virtvtis in Roman Literature.” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, vol. 25, 1914, pp. 1–71, https://doi.org/10.2307/310381. JSTOR.

Livy. *History of Rome, Volume I: Books 1-2*. Translated by B. O. Foster. Loeb Classical Library 114. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1919.

Livy. *History of Rome, Volume II: Books 3-4*. Translated by B. O. Foster. Loeb Classical Library 133. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1922.

Livy. *History of Rome, Volume III: Books 5-7*. Translated by B. O. Foster. Loeb Classical Library 172. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1924.

Livy. *History of Rome, Volume IV: Books 8-10*. Translated by B. O. Foster. Loeb Classical Library 191. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1926.

Livy. *Rome’s Italian Wars : Books Six to Ten*. Edited by John Yardley 1942- and B. D. (B. Dexter) Hoyos 1944-, 2013.

Marchese, Rosa R. “Speech and Silience in Cicero’s Final Days.” *The Classical Journal*, vol. 110, no. 1, 2014, pp. 77–98, https://doi.org/10.5184/classicalj.110.1.0077. JSTOR.

McDonnell, Myles Anthony. *Roman Manliness : Virtus and the Roman Republic*. 2006.

Mitchell, T. N. “Cicero on the Moral Crisis of the Late Republic.” *Hermathena*, no. 136, 1984, pp. 21–41. JSTOR.

Oakley, S. P. (Stephen P.). *A Commentary on Livy, Books VI-X*. [Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press], 1997.

Ogilvie, R. M. (Robert Maxwell). *A Commentary on Livy : Books 1-5*. [Clarendon Press], 1965.

Plautus. *The Little Carthaginian. Pseudolus. The Rope.* Edited and translated by Wolfgang de Melo. Loeb Classical Library 260. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012.

Plautus. *The Merchant. The Braggart Soldier. The Ghost. The Persian*. Edited and translated by Wolfgang de Melo. Loeb Classical Library 163. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011.

Roller, Matthew B., editor. “Introduction: The Work of Examples.” *Models from the Past in Roman Culture: A World of Exempla*, Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 1–31. Cambridge Core, *Cambridge University Press*, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316677353.001.

Rosen, Ralph, and Ineke Sluiter. *Valuing Others in Classical Antiquity*. Brill, 2010, https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004189218.i-476.

Schofield, Malcolm. "Republican Virtues." *A Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought*, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, 2009, pp. 199–213. *Wiley Online Library*, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781444310344.ch13.

_____. "The Fourth Virtue." *Cicero's Practical Philosophy*, University of Notre Dame Press, 2012.

Seneca. *Epistles, Volume I: Epistles 1-65*. Translated by Richard M. Gummere. Loeb Classical Library 75. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1917.

Seneca. *Moral Essays, Volume I: De Providentia. De Constantia. De Ira. De Clementia*. Translated by John W. Basore. Loeb Classical Library 214. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928.

Seneca. *Moral Essays, Volume II: De Consolatione ad Marciam. De Vita Beata. De Otio. De Tranquillitate Animi. De Brevitate Vitae. De Consolatione ad Polybium. De Consolatione ad Helviam*. Translated by John W. Basore. Loeb Classical Library 254. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932.

Seneca. *Moral Essays, Volume III: De Beneficiis*. Translated by John W. Basore. Loeb Classical Library 310. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935.

Teresa Morgan. *Popular Morality in the Early Roman Empire*. Cambridge University Press, 2007. eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost), *EBSCOhost*, https://login.proxy.library.emory.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xna&AN=529360&site=ehost-live&scope=site.

Valerius Maximus. Memorable Doings and Sayings, Volume I: Books 1-5. Edited and translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey. Loeb Classical Library 492. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000.