

Distribution Agreement

In presenting this thesis or dissertation as a partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree from Emory University, I hereby grant to Emory University and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive, make accessible, and display my thesis or dissertation in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known, including display on the world wide web. I understand that I may select some access restrictions as part of the online submission of this thesis or dissertation. I retain all ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis or dissertation. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis or dissertation.

Signature:

Donald M. Beaudette

Date

Beyond Coercion:
The Politics of Punishment Attacks and Policing

By

Donald M. Beaudette
Doctor of Philosophy

Political Science

Clifford J. Carrubba, Ph.D.
Advisor

Dan Reiter, Ph.D.
Committee member

Jennifer Gandhi, Ph.D.
Committee Member

Accepted:

Lisa A. Tedesco, Ph.D.
Dean of the James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies

Date

Beyond Coercion:
The Politics of Punishment Attacks and Policing

By

Donald M. Beaudette
Master of Arts, Emory University, 2010
Master of Arts, The Queen's University of Belfast, 2006
Bachelor of Arts, St. John's University/The College of St. Benedict, 2005

Advisor: Clifford J. Carrubba, Ph.D.

An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science
2013

Abstract

Beyond Coercion: The Politics of Punishment Attacks and Policing By Donald M. Beaudette

The prevailing wisdom in the political science literature holds that insurgent groups serve their own interests most effectively when they use selective violence against suspected collaborators hidden amongst their constituents. By targeting those that are believed to be disloyal, the insurgents demonstrate their own lethal efficiency while simultaneously undermining promises made by the government to protect those that prove willing to provide intelligence on local insurgent activity. As a result, selective violence is assumed to have a deterrent effect, frightening would be informers into toeing the insurgent line and ultimately making the insurgent group itself more secure and increasing the likelihood of insurgent victories on the battlefield. While this is a compelling account of why insurgent groups kill suspected collaborators, anecdotal evidence from places as diverse as Northern Ireland and Afghanistan demonstrates that a wide range of insurgent-against-civilian violence does not conform to this paradigm. In addition to killing suspected informers, insurgent groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Taliban also engage in other types of selective violence against civilians. In particular, these groups have demonstrated a tendency to establish their own systems of law enforcement to deal with common criminals, such as thieves and vandals, in the territories they seek to control. In this capacity, insurgents present the bullet, the stone or the cudgel as alternatives to the prisons, probation boards and parole systems administered by the governments they hope to overthrow. These acts of rough justice serve as part of the insurgent group's overall strategy to build institutions of governance to replace those provided by the state. However, these actions draw on the same pool of relatively scarce resources—manpower, money, vehicles and the like—that insurgents must also rely on in their pursuit of victory of government forces on the battlefield. As a result, the institution building and war-fighting goals of insurgent groups are often in tension with each other. This dissertation seeks to explain how insurgents resolve this tension in the context of their competition with the state to become the dominant providers of law enforcement.

Beyond Coercions:
The Politics of Punishment Attacks and Policing

By

Donald M. Beaudette
Master of Arts, Emory University, 2010
Master of Arts, The Queen's University of Belfast, 2006
Bachelor of Arts, St. John's University/The College of St. Benedict, 2005

Advisor: Clifford J. Carrubba, Ph.D.

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science
2013

Acknowledgements

Much to my surprise, the page you see before you was one of the most difficult to compose in this entire project. Not because there are too few people to thank or because I am not grateful for the support I have received from my friends, family, colleagues and supervisors, but rather because I owe such a great debt of gratitude to so many people that I doubted my ability to adequately express my thanks in the space allotted. That said, I am nevertheless certain that what follows will be both inadequate and incomplete.

First and foremost, I must thank my wife Pascael Beaudette and our son Jack for their unwavering love and support throughout the process of writing this dissertation. Both of you brought light, love and joy to my life, especially when my occasional frustrations and disappointments with this project got the better of me. Pascael has been a patient counselor, a trusted advisor, an insightful critic, a wise editor and countless other things besides over the life of this dissertation. Her constant love and support were vital to my completing this project.

In no small measure, I also owe my continued sanity to the professional and personal support provided by friends in Georgia, Missouri, Minnesota and Northern Ireland. Throughout my time at Emory, Adrienne Smith and Josh Bridwell have been trusted confidants and better friends than any man probably deserves. The mental fog that set in during long days spent in Tarbutton Hall was often only cleared by the conversations and, yes, the suffering experienced while braving the narrow, pot-holed roads of Atlanta with Adrienne on our many *epic* bicycle rides together. From our first day as graduate students, Josh was a kindred spirit and our shared love of history was perhaps only matched by our mutual appreciation for the palliative effects of both strong coffee and fine whiskey enjoyed in the company of good friends. More generally, numerous others, including Andrew Kirkpatrick, Jeff Kucik and Michael Leo Owens, helped to make Emory and Atlanta as enjoyable a place to live and work as it was productive.

Back home in Minnesota my family and friends were a constant source of support. The unwavering enthusiasm expressed by my parents, David and Beverly Beaudette, helped to keep me focused on my goals when the road seemed long. My twin sister Danielle's

determination and intelligence have always been a source of inspiration in my life, and that held true throughout my postgraduate career. I am also indebted to Gary Prevost, Joe Farry and the entire Political Science faculty at the College of St. Benedict and St. John's University (CSB/SJU), as well as Cynthia Curran in the History Department at CSB/SJU, for recognizing my enthusiasm for Ireland and things Irish as an undergraduate and helping to direct me toward my chosen vocation. In Missouri, I would also be remiss if I failed to express my thanks and appreciation to Allie and Andrew Pennington, two dear friends that helped make Jefferson City, where most of this project was written, feel like home with their hospitality, wry humor and ready smiles. I must also express my heartfelt gratitude to my mother-in-law Mary Barclay whose tireless assistance in caring for Jack literally made the completion of this dissertation possible. Becoming a father has been the single greatest joy in my life, but Mary gladly stepped in to help care for our little man when Pascael was at work and I needed to be. In Belfast, I owe special thanks to the desk staff at the Linen Hall Library, the Public Record Office of Northern Ireland and Belfast Central Library's newspaper archive for their tireless assistance in helping to locate and retrieve many of the primary source materials on which the qualitative portions of this dissertation are based. On a personal level I must also thank my good friend and gracious landlord Darren Feely for putting a roof over my head and serving as an invaluable sounding board for the random thoughts and musings of an American Ph.D. candidate.

Last but not least, I owe innumerable thanks to Clifford Carrubba, Jennifer Gandhi and Dan Reiter for their always insightful comments and feedback, which pushed me to think harder about nearly every aspect of this project. The ideas you see presented here are my own, but the quality and the clarity of their presentation, such as it is, belong largely to these three individuals who helped to nurture a germ of a thought about Northern Ireland into what ultimately became this dissertation.

Contents

1	Introduction	1
2	Violence Against Civilians in Wartime	17
2.1	Theoretical Approaches to Insurgent-Against-Civilian Violence	19
2.1.1	Coercion	20
2.1.2	Indiscipline and Exploitation	35
2.2	Conclusion	46
3	Punishment Attacks and Policing: A Game Theoretic Approach	48
3.1	The Formal Model	51
3.2	Model Solution	62
3.2.1	Equilibrium behavior when insurgents move first	63
3.2.2	Equilibrium behavior when the police move first	65
3.2.3	Comparative Statics	67
3.2.4	Hypotheses	70
3.3	Conclusion	74
4	The People's Police?	76
4.1	Hypotheses	81
4.1.1	The Formal Model	81
4.1.2	Alternative Explanations	85
4.2	Data and Methods	90
4.2.1	Republican Punishment Attacks	90
4.2.2	The Benefits of Punishment Attacks	92
4.2.3	The Costs of Punishment Attacks	94
4.2.4	The Value of Counterinsurgency Intelligence	100
4.2.5	The Probability Insurgents Detect a New Informer	103
4.2.6	The Ability of the Police to Coerce Criminals into Becoming Informers	107
4.2.7	The Probability That a Crime is Reported to the Police	109
4.2.8	Control Variables	111
4.2.9	Statistical Estimator	114
4.3	Statistical Results	116
4.3.1	Alternative Hypotheses	117
4.3.2	Main Results: The people's police?	123
4.4	Conclusion	130

5	‘A Very Peaceful Area’	134
5.1	Case Selection	135
5.2	Theoretical Expectations	136
5.3	North Down: ‘A very peaceful area’	143
5.4	The RUC in North Down	148
5.5	The Dog That Didn’t Bark: The PIRA in North Down	156
5.6	Conclusion	163
6	‘The more the better, the sooner the better’	171
6.1	Equilibrium Behavior	173
6.2	PIRA in Dungannon	178
6.3	The South Armagh Brigade	193
6.4	Conclusion	198
7	‘The Land Where All the Bad Things Happened’	201
7.1	Staggering From Day to Day: Policing and Punishment Attacks During the 1975 PIRA Truce	207
7.1.1	The RUC	208
7.1.2	The PIRA	216
7.2	A Permanent Peace: Punishment Attacks and Policing in North Belfast, 1994 - 2000	224
7.3	Conclusion	237
8	The ‘Real’ People’s Police?	238
8.1	Hypotheses and Data Collection	240
8.1.1	Republican Punishment Attacks	241
8.1.2	The Benefits of Punishment Attacks	242
8.1.3	The Costs of Fighting Crime	244
8.1.4	The Value of Military Intelligence	246
8.1.5	The Likelihood of Crime Being Reported to the Police	248
8.1.6	The Ability of the Police to Recruit Informers	249
8.1.7	The Effectiveness of Insurgent Counterintelligence	250
8.1.8	Control Variables	251
8.1.9	Model Estimation	252
8.2	Deprivation, Crime and Punishment	255
8.3	The ‘Real’ People’s Police?	262
8.3.1	The Benefits of Punishment Attacks	264
8.3.2	The Costs of Punishment Attacks	268
8.3.3	The Value of Counterinsurgency Intelligence	272
8.4	Conclusion	275
9	Conclusion	281

List of Tables

4.1	Correlation Between Estimated Prisoner Releases and Firearms Seizures . . .	97
4.2	Estimation Results: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model	118
5.1	Definition of Model Parameters	137
7.1	Republican Punishment Attacks in Ceasefire and Non-Ceasefire Months . .	228
8.1	Estimation Results: Baseline Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model	256
8.2	Estimation Results: ZINB Model Excluding Unemployment*Young Males Interaction	259
9.1	Confirmed Hypotheses	286

List of Figures

1.1	Annual Casualties Attributed to Republican Groups in Northern Ireland 1973 - 1998	14
2.1	Annual Casualties Attributed to FARC and PIRA	37
2.2	Republican Punishment Shootings in West Belfast and Newry and Mourne	39
2.3	Republican Punishment Beatings in West Belfast and Newry and Mourne .	40
3.1	Extensive Form Game	54
4.1	Map Showing Change in RPA 1993-1995	78
4.2	Average Number of Loyalist Punishment Attacks 1994-2000	88
4.3	Estimated Number of Republican Prisoners Released to Each Local Government Area 1993-2000	100
4.4	Estimated Number of Republican Prisoners Released in Belfast 1993-2000 .	101
4.5	Distribution of Catholic Isolation Index (Mean Centered)	106
4.6	Observed Distribution Versus Poisson and Negative Binomial	115
4.7	Probability of Zero Republican Punishment Attacks Conditional on Male Claimant Rate	119
4.8	Predicted Probability of Zero Republican Punishment Attacks Conditional on Loyalist Violence	121
4.9	Annual Number of Republican Punishment Attacks	122
4.10	Marginal Effect of Prisoner Releases (Predicted Number of Events) Conditional on the Number of Criminal Law Offices	125
4.11	Marginal Effect of Prisoner Releases (Predicted Number of Events) Conditional on Catholic Residential Segregation	127
4.12	Marginal Effect of Police Concentration Conditional on Catholic Support for the RUC	128
4.13	Predicted Number of Punishment Attacks Conditional on RUC Arms Seizures	129
5.1	Northern Ireland LGAs Highlighting Selected Cases	166
5.2	Map of Belfast City Highlighting North Belfast	167
5.3	Ward Level Religious Composition of North Down (Percent Catholic) . . .	167
5.4	Ward Level Multiple Deprivation Measure North Down	168
5.5	RUC Fatalities (Three-Year Moving Average) 1970-1999	168
5.6	Shooting Attacks Against Active Duty RUC Personnel 1973-1984	169
5.7	Crime Rate per 1,000 Inhabitants 1998/99 - 2011/12	169
5.8	Police Sanction-Detection Rate 1998/99 - 2011/12	170
5.9	RUC Overtime in Belfast-Area Subdivisions 1994/95 - 1999/00	170

6.1	Map of Ireland Highlighting the Dungannon and Newry and Mourne LGAs	172
6.2	Republican Punishment Attacks in Dungannon and Belfast LGA 1990 - 2002	180
6.3	Percentage of ETB Actions Targeting Locally Recruited Security Forces in Dungannon LGA 1978-1994	182
6.4	Ward Level Religious Composition of Dungannon	185
6.5	ETB and Security Force Fatalities 1980 - 1994	186
6.6	ETB Attacks 1980 - 1994	189
6.7	Ward Level Religious Composition of Newry and Mourne	194
6.8	Security Force Fatalities Attributed to PIRA per 1,000 Inhabitants 1970 - 1997	195
6.9	Republican Punishment Attacks in Dungannon and Newry and Mourne 1990 - 2001	197
7.1	Map of Belfast City Highlighting North Belfast	202
7.2	Ward Level Religious Composition of North Belfast	203
7.3	Ward Level Multiple Deprivation Score, North Belfast	204
7.4	PIRA Killings and Republican Punishment Attacks in North Belfast 1973 - 2005	205
7.5	Kernel Density Map of Republican Punishment Attacks 1990-1999	226
7.6	RUC Weapons and Ammunition Seizures in North Belfast 1990 - 2001 . . .	235
8.1	Observed Distribution of Republican Punishment Attacks Versus Poisson and Negative Binomial	253
8.2	Map of Northern Ireland LGAs Highlighting Zero Outcome Cases	254
8.3	Predicted Probability of Zero Outcome Conditional on Male Claimant Rate	258
8.4	Predicted Probability of Zero Outcome Conditional on Loyalist Strength . .	261
8.5	Republican Punishment Attacks 2005/06 - 2008/09	273
8.6	Marginal Effect of Police Weapons Seizures	274
8.7	Police CHIS Spending vs. Republican Punishment Attacks	275

Chapter 1

Introduction

The prevailing wisdom in the political science literature holds that insurgent groups serve their own interests most effectively when they use selective violence against suspected collaborators hidden amongst their constituents. By targeting those that are believed to be disloyal, the insurgents demonstrate their own lethal efficiency while simultaneously undermining promises made by the government to protect those that prove willing to provide intelligence on local insurgent activity. As a result, selective violence is assumed to have a deterrent effect, frightening would be informers into toeing the insurgent line and ultimately making the insurgent group itself more secure and increasing the likelihood of insurgent victories on the battlefield (Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2009, Hereros and Criado 2009). While this is a compelling account of why insurgent groups kill suspected collaborators, anecdotal evidence from places as diverse as Northern Ireland and Afghanistan demonstrates that a wide range of insurgent-against-civilian violence does not conform to this paradigm. In addition to killing suspected informers, insurgent groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Taliban also engage in other types of selective violence against civilians. In particular, these groups have demonstrated a tendency to establish their own systems of law enforcement to deal with common criminals, such as thieves and vandals, in the territories they seek to control. In this capacity, insurgents present the bullet, the stone or the cudgel as alternatives to the prisons, probation boards and parole systems administered by the governments they

hope to overthrow. These acts of rough justice serve as part of the insurgent group's overall strategy to build institutions of governance to replace those provided by the state. However, these actions draw on the same pool of relatively scarce resources—manpower, money, vehicles and the like—that insurgents must also rely on in their pursuit of victory of government forces on the battlefield. As a result, the institution building and war-fighting goals of insurgent groups are often in tension with each other. This dissertation seeks to explain how insurgents resolve this tension in the context of their competition with the state to become the dominant providers of law enforcement.

To this end, I propose a formal model that captures the fundamental strategic tensions confronted by insurgent groups as they make decisions about how best to allocate their resources. Insurgents face a dilemma when allocating resources, because they are in competition with the state in two arenas. In the first, the insurgents and the state forces they oppose are in competition to become the hegemonic providers of all public goods; in short they are competing to become the state (Lichbach 1995). In the second, the insurgents are engaged in direct competition with the army and the police for victory on the battlefield. While these two contests are clearly related, they also place conflicting demands on insurgent resources. Any resources, whether they be human, financial or material, dedicated to the insurgents' long-term, institution building goal cannot simultaneously be utilized on the battlefield. Money used to print leaflets cannot also be used to buy guns, soldiers used to staff courts cannot, at the same time, be used on the frontlines, etc. As a result, rebel groups are often forced to choose between maximizing their chances of victory on the battlefield, on the one hand, and establishing themselves as a credible government in waiting, on the other.

This dilemma is particularly acute in the area of law enforcement. Insurgents surely want to diminish their constituents' reliance on the state police when it comes to questions of law and order, but they typically lack the well developed set of institutions — courts, prisons, parole boards and probation offices — possessed by status quo governments to deal with these problems. As a result, such diverse groups as the Taliban, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA), the PIRA and the Partiya

Karkerên Kurdistan (PKK) have all been forced to adopt a crude form of vigilante justice as their first, best approximation of the state institutions mentioned above. The methods used by insurgents to punish criminals in their homelands are commonly referred to as punishment attacks, and these attacks typically involve some form of brutal, although often non-lethal, physical injury to the victim. It is crucial to note from the outset that the individuals targeted in punishment attacks are typically not suspected of providing the police with intelligence on insurgent activity. Instead, the victims of this type of selective violence are usually accused of theft, vandalism, or some other type of “ordinary” crime. Since the victims themselves are not suspected informers, it seems unlikely that the purpose of conducting these attacks is to deter future collaboration with the security forces. In fact, there is good reason to believe that punishment attacks in particular might have the unintended consequence of making future defections more likely. Anecdotal evidence from Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine and Afghanistan, presented in chapter three, indicates that, as a result of their extremely brutal nature punishment attacks frequently alienated local people from the insurgents and often led punishment attack victims, as well as their friends and loved ones, to begin collaborating with the security forces as an act of vengeance against the seemingly capricious arbiters of insurgent justice.

Furthermore, while punishment attacks do not serve the battlefield interests of the insurgents they do draw on the same pool of resources that an insurgent group requires for success on the battlefield. By necessity, any manpower or materiel used to investigate crimes, apprehend suspects and implement punishment attacks cannot simultaneously be used to reconnoiter military targets or to attack enemy soldiers in the field. This means that punishment attacks impose both actual, material costs in terms of the resources consumed and additional opportunity costs in terms of absences and material shortages on the battlefield.

If punishment attacks are so costly, then why do groups like the PLO, ETA, the IRA, the PKK and the Taliban all engage in this type of violent behavior against their erstwhile supporters? To answer this question, it is necessary to consider how punishment attacks might serve the long-term interests of the insurgents and determine how gains made in

the battle over institutional control might offset losses on the battlefield. All communities, even those caught in the midst of an ongoing civil war or insurgency, experience “ordinary” crime, such as theft, burglary, vandalism, murder and sexual violence. By responding to, and dealing effectively with, these various offenses the insurgents hope to cultivate a reputation for trustworthiness with the local population. In the long run, the establishment of this type of rapport benefits the insurgents by increasing diffuse support for them amongst the population, and further advances their goal of replacing the state as the dominant provider of public goods to their constituents.

The formal model presented in chapter three incorporates these insights about the tradeoffs faced by insurgent groups and develops specific, empirically testable predictions about the conditions under which insurgents will prioritize their long-term, institution building objectives — as exemplified by punishment attacks — over their short-term goals on the battlefield. In the model nature determines whether a crime is reported to either the insurgent group or the police. The actor receiving the report must then decide either to punish or not to punish the suspected criminal. This decision is conceptualized as being a function of the intrinsic benefits of fighting crime, the associated costs of fighting crime, the value of counterinsurgency information that the police might extract from a suspected criminal and three probability parameters. The probability parameters represent the likelihood that a crime ignored by the insurgents (police) is subsequently reported to the police (insurgents), the likelihood that the police successfully recruit a suspected criminal as a new counterinsurgency (COIN) informant and the likelihood that the insurgents successfully identify any new informants so created by the police.

The theoretical expectations derived from the model are then subjected to a series of quantitative and qualitative empirical tests. Chapter four presents the results of a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) model using data on PIRA punishment attacks in Northern Ireland at the local government level during the 1990s. The results provide support for some of the key predictions derived from the model. The results of the statistical analysis presented in chapter four are used to select a sub-set of regression ‘outliers.’ The selected cases reflect the entire observed range of variation on the dependent variable, and

are used to establish the internal validity of the theoretical predictions that are confirmed by the statistical analysis, while simultaneously probing possible explanations for the null results discovered in chapter four. The final empirical chapter provides the results of a second ZINB model, this time using data on punishment attacks conducted by so-called dissident republican groups at the local government level after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The results once again support several of the main predictions of the model, and are also suggestive of future extensions to the theoretical approach adopted in this project.

While the theoretical model is not analytically complex, it nevertheless captures the dynamics outlined above by placing the police and the insurgents in direct competition with each other for the loyalty of the population, and demonstrates how changes in the strategic environment influence each actor's willingness to dedicate scarce resources to either fighting crime or making war. Hypothesis one indicates that, all else equal, insurgent groups should conduct more punishment attacks when they believe that the benefits of fighting crime are relatively high. These benefits are likely to be greatest in regions where public support for the police has been undermined as a result of the police force's inability or refusal to investigate ordinary criminal activity. In such areas, insurgent groups attempt to capitalize on public disaffection with the state police by offering punishment attacks as a crude, but potentially more effective, means of law enforcement. In this manner, punishment attacks help advance the insurgent group's long term institution building goals by taking advantage of the state's institutional weakness in the area of law and order while simultaneously expanding the population's reliance on the insurgents themselves as the providers of this most fundamental of public goods. This theoretical expectation implies that punishment attacks should be negatively correlated with public satisfaction with police performance.

Hypothesis two indicates that, all else equal, insurgent groups should conduct more punishment attacks when they believe that the material and opportunity costs of fighting crime are relatively low. Punishment attacks are costly in material terms because they consume scarce insurgent resources, particularly weapons and manpower. Punishment at-

tacks also exact opportunity costs on insurgent groups to the extent that the manpower, weapons, vehicles, etc. that are used to hunt down and punish suspected criminals cannot simultaneously be used to reconnoiter or attack military targets, such as enemy outposts or mobile patrols. In other words, punishment attacks have the potential to reduce the war-fighting capacity of insurgent groups. All else equal, the marginal cost of each soldier or weapon removed from the battlefield is multiplied by the level of demand for these resources on the battlefield. As a result, punishment attacks should be negatively correlated with other indicators of insurgent activity, such as the number of offensive operations conducted by the insurgent group and the number of battlefield deaths attributed to the insurgents. Conversely, punishment attacks are expected to be positively correlated with indicators of the size of the insurgent labor pool, such as the number of insurgents released from prison.

The third and final linear hypothesis derived from the model indicates that insurgent groups should conduct more punishment attacks when the value of new counterinsurgency intelligence is relatively high. The type of low-level COIN intelligence typically available to local criminals is likely to be most valuable to the police when they have very little prior information about local insurgent activity. The utility of the information provided by criminal sources is likely to diminish as the police develop more extensive intelligence networks and gain access to higher quality sources of information. This hypothesis is assessed in the statistical models presented in chapters four and eight using data on the number of weapons and rounds of ammunition recovered by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) and, later, the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). These two variables are used to create a weapons index.¹ The theoretical predictions outlined above imply a negative quadratic relationship between the weapons index, which serves as a proxy for the quality of police COIN intelligence, and the number of republican punishment attacks.

The model also reveals a series of non-linear predictions of insurgent behavior. In particular, the perceived costs of punishment attacks, described above, are multiplied

¹The weapons index is equal to the sum of all firearms recovered in a district-year plus the number of round of ammunition divided by 30. See chapter four for a full discussion of the construction of this variable.

when the insurgents are relatively adept at identifying any suspected criminals that begin working for the police as part of their COIN operations. However, this relationship holds only when the costs of fighting crime are equal to or greater than the benefits. Empirically, the ability of insurgents to detect new informants is operationalized using the ethnic isolation index, an indicator of ethnic residential segregation. This measure serves as a proxy for the density and ease of accessibility of intra-ethnic social networks, which insurgents can use to monitor the behavior of their co-ethnics. When ethnic groups are highly segregated, intra-group social networks are likely to be relatively more dense and local ethnic insurgents should have greater access to the information available from these networks. As a result, insurgent counterintelligence operations should be more effective in highly segregated communities. Given this substantive interpretation, Catholic residential segregation is expected to be negatively correlated with the number of punishment attacks in an area. In addition to the negative correlation between Catholic residential segregation and the number of republican punishment attacks, the theoretical relationship described above also indicates that the effect of changes in the insurgent labor pool should have a greater impact on insurgent decision making in highly segregated areas. Increasing segregation should amplify the marginal crime-fighting-costs associated with each soldier lost and each military target attacked. This interactive expectations is confirmed by the statistical analyses presented in chapters four and eight, with results indicating that both the PIRA and, more recently, dissident republican groups in Northern Ireland weighed the costs of punishment attacks more heavily in areas where high levels of Catholic isolation allowed these groups to more easily monitor their constituents for the presence of new counterinsurgency informants.

Insurgents must also consider how police attempts to recruit suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants might influence the course of a conflict. For the police, the arrest of a street criminal from an area that is friendly to the insurgents provides an opportunity to either build trust with the people of that area or use the suspect as a part of their intelligence gathering campaign. The police might offer a suspected immunity from prosecution for what might be considered “ordinary” crime in exchange

for any information that the suspect would be able to provide on local insurgent activity. Analytically, the formal model reveals that such a possibility influences the insurgent approach to vigilantism in two ways. First, the insurgents must consider the possibility that an ignored criminal might be brought to the attention of the police. Second, the insurgents must consider the probability that any criminal that is brought to the attention of the police might subsequently be coerced into becoming a counterinsurgency informant.

Both of these probabilities influence how the insurgents weigh the costs and benefits of conducting punishment attacks. In particular, the first of these two probabilities acts as a benefit multiplier. Similarly, the second of these two probabilities induces insurgents to discount the material and opportunity costs associated with punishment attacks. Both of these relationships hold only when the insurgents believe that the costs of fighting crime outweigh the intrinsic benefits of providing this service. The former theoretical expectation is assessed by interacting data on the concentration of police infrastructure in an area with the two indicators used to operationalize the perceived benefits of punishment attacks.² The latter expectation is operationalized by interacting data on the number of criminal law offices in an area with the indicators of the costs of punishment attacks.

In modern democracies criminal lawyers serve an important role as the primary intermediaries between individual citizens and the often complex system of laws that govern their behavior. Criminal lawyers also serve as protectors and advocates for their clients, offering them protection from exploitation by the police or other state institutions. In their role as advocates for their clients, criminal lawyers can assist individuals under police interrogation and provide them with the legal tools needed to successfully resist police attempts at coercion. As a result, the police should be more successful at coercing criminals into becoming counterinsurgency informants when it is relatively difficult for suspects to avail themselves of the protection provided by criminal lawyers. Access to legal protection should be greater in areas that are populated by a large number of criminal law offices. As a result, the number of criminal law offices in an area is expected

²In chapter four the benefits of punishment attacks are operationalized as the percentage of Catholics who would report a crime to the police. In chapter eight, this concept is operationalized as a multiplicative interaction between the area-level lagged sanction-detection rate and the area-level lagged crime rate.

to be negatively correlated with the observed number of republican punishment attacks when the costs of punishment attacks are particularly high. The results of the statistical model presented in chapter four confirms this expectation. If no detainees affiliated with a republican paramilitary group were released to an area, then the PIRA conducted fewer punishment attacks as the number of locally based criminal lawyers increased.

Chapters five, six and seven flesh out the results of the statistical analysis presented in chapter four, adopting a quantitative approach to the selection of cases for in depth qualitative analysis. Using the regression residuals as a guide, four cases were selected that were both representative of the entire range of variation on the dependent variable and well explained by the statistical model. The cases identified for quantitative analysis were North Down, Dungannon and South Tyrone, Newry and Mourne and North Belfast. Chapter five presents a qualitative analysis of punishment attacks and policing in North Down, one of the most peaceful districts in Northern Ireland throughout the Troubles. The chapter establishes that, given the strategic constraints it faced in such an environment, the PIRA was never likely to use its scarce resources to pursue suspected criminals in North Down and presents a detailed analysis of how the PIRA's absence from the area influenced the RUC's approach to policing along the shores of Belfast Lough. The results indicate that in the absence of a credible threat from the PIRA to usurp its role in the realm of law and order, the RUC in North Down under-provided "ordinary" policing in the area in favor of providing greater resources to its national counterinsurgency campaign, although the resources that were allocated to North Down were primarily used in the pursuit of duties associated with "ordinary" police work.

In keeping with the methodological template established in chapter five, chapter six applies what George and Bennett (2004) refer to as the "congruence method" to the development of the PIRA's approach to vigilantism in the Dungannon local government area (LGA). The results of this analysis are then subject to a further, comparative test which establishes that observed differences in the PIRA's approach to punishment attacks in Dungannon and Newry and Mourne LGAs were primarily the result of the strategic factors highlighted in the analysis of the Dungannon case. This chapter further establishes

how the unique costs and benefits of vigilantism as a form of rebel institution building interact with insurgent and government battlefield objectives on the one hand and the intelligence war on the other. In both South Armagh and Dungannon, the PIRA confronted police forces that were largely disinterested in the investigation of ordinary crimes, in no small part as a result of the highly effective assassination campaigns pursued by the PIRA against the RUC in these areas. However, the PIRA's South Armagh Brigade, which operated largely within the boundaries of the Newry and Mourne LGA, was relatively immune to infiltration throughout the Troubles, while the security forces appear to have had greater success penetrating the Dungannon PIRA's internal security. As a result, PIRA members in Newry and Mourne had a greater incentive to punish suspected criminals as a means of denying the police access to this potential source of information about local insurgent activity. At the same time, the Dungannon PIRA's labor pool was steadily depleted by the assassination and arrest of its members at the hands of the British army and the police. The group did not face the same labor constraints in Newry and Mourne. As a result, the opportunity costs associated with dedicating manpower to apprehend and punish suspected criminals in Dungannon was significantly greater, and local units were forced to largely ignore the problems of criminality and anti-social behavior throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Chapter seven brings a broader historical perspective to the study of punishment attacks in North Belfast, using primary sources to assess the reasons behind the apparent surge in punishment attacks in areas like Ardoyne and New Lodge during the PIRA's three long-term ceasefires in the 20th century. The analysis begins with a process tracing assessment of how the changes on the ground brought about by the PIRA's nearly year-long 'truce' in 1975 influenced the approach the response to crime in North Belfast adopted by both the RUC and the PIRA. Moving forward to the 1990s, the chapter concludes by once again applying the congruence method to explore evidence drawn primarily from open source records and to elaborate on the correlations discovered in the statistical analysis presented in chapter four. The results indicate that, although the PIRA was preparing for peace in the run up to the Good Friday Agreement, the group neverthe-

less remained committed to imposing its own brand of vigilante justice on republican communities throughout Northern Ireland throughout the final decade of the Troubles.

The final empirical chapter, chapter eight, uses a mixture of qualitative and quantitative evidence to demonstrate that, despite the remarkable changes that have taken place in the politics of Northern Ireland since the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, so-called dissident republican groups, including the Real Irish Republican Army and Óglaigh na hÉireann, continue to think about and use punishment attacks in much the same way as their predecessors in the PIRA. Qualitative evidence derived from a variety of sources is leveraged against the results of a second set of statistical tests to both demonstrate the robustness of the results presented in chapter four and to explore potentially fruitful avenues of future research in this area.

Finally, chapter nine concludes with a summary of the empirical findings presented in the previous chapters and a broader discussion of the potential implications of these results for our understanding of punishment attacks in particular and insurgent-against-civilian violence more generally. The concluding chapter draws on anecdotal evidence from other cases to further demonstrate the predictive power of the theoretical model developed in chapter three and discusses potential theoretical and empirical extensions of the present research.

Overall, this project makes a valuable contribution to our understanding of why insurgent groups frequently bite the hands that feed them. Existing theories (Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 2007, Fearon and Laitin 1996) have clearly demonstrated how insurgent groups use violence against their constituents to deter defections, to maintain the ethnic peace or to extract resources from their supporters. However, none of these theories can fully account for why insurgents are willing to sacrifice resources that might contribute to victory on the battlefield in order to punish criminals who typically have not collaborated with the police, usually are not suspected of commit a crime against an ethnic ‘other’ and typically have little to offer in terms of material wealth. This dissertation offers a rigorously specified and empirically well supported explanation for why insurgents often make this perplexing choice.

Furthermore, from a normative perspective, there is good reason to be concerned with developing a theoretical model that can be used to explain and, ultimately, predict and prevent punishment attacks as a distinct form of human suffering during wartime. Although insurgent vigilantism is often under-reported in both popular press and academic accounts of civil wars and insurgencies, anecdotal evidence indicates that this particular form of insurgent-against-civilian violence accounts for a great deal of human suffering during armed conflicts. Lacking formal prisons and other institutional means of punishing criminals, insurgent groups often adopt extremely brutal methods in their vigilante campaigns. In Northern Ireland, suspected drug dealers and “anti-social elements” have been tarred-and-feathered, suffered gun shot wounds to major joints and been impaled with a wide variety of implements, including spiked baseball bats and crowbars. In Somalia Al-Shaabab militants have used stoning and public flogging as punishment for violations of the particular form of Sharia law administered by the group³, while in India and Nepal Maoist insurgents have implemented a system of “people’s courts” that deal with both alleged informers and ordinary criminals like thieves and rapists.⁴ In both Pakistan and Afghanistan, Taliban insurgents have also publicly stoned and lashed rapists and adulterers in addition to suspected drug dealers and other criminals,⁵ while thieves can expect to have their hands or feet amputated.⁶ Drug dealers in Yemen and thieves in Mali have been dealt with in a similar manner by Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Al-Qa’ida affiliated group Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).⁷

³In Hiiraan Al-Shabaab stoned to death a man “accused of rape and sentenced to death by an Islamic court.” On 11/17/2009 Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for an incident in the city of El Bon during which “militants publicly stoned a woman to death and flogged a man 100 times for alleged adultery” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2012). Al-Shabaab militants in Marka province publicly flogged a man accused of being a habitual user of illegal drugs (Al Jazeera English 2008)

⁴For instance, in India’s Jharkhand province the Maoists convicted a man of rape and sentenced him to a public beating beaten at the hands of his accuser (Hindustan Times 2010), while in Bihar province four men suspected of stealing automobiles and motorcycles belonging to local residents were tried by the Maoists and sentenced to a public beating at the hands of local villagers (Hindustan Times 2009).

⁵In November 2010 the Taliban allegedly “flogged 25 men it accused of peddling drugs” in northwestern Pakistan (BBC Monitoring South Asia 2011). In July 2011 Taliban militants in Lowgar publicly flogged four men accused of kidnapping a doctor (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2012).

⁶In one particularly brazen incident in northwestern Pakistan, the Taliban used a public address system to invite residents of Orakzai to watch as they convicted a man of theft and amputated his right hand in the town square (Herald Sun (Australia) 2011)

⁷In November 2011 AQAP “publicly whipped five boys in Haar city, Abyan province Yemen... for

The range of punishments utilized by insurgent groups acting as community vigilantes varies from conflict to conflict, and is often defined by local cultural practices and traditions. Stoning and amputation have been the mainstays of the Taliban and other Islamist groups, while floggings and beatings have been adopted as the predominant form of punishment by a wide variety of leftist organizations. Although the means of punishment may differ from one conflict to another, the end result of these various systems of frontier justice is often the same. Suspected criminals and other individuals considered socially undesirable by the insurgents are left with horrific injuries, many of which lead to lifelong disabilities. The victims of these attacks often struggle to carry on normal, productive lives in the wake of losing a limb or being publicly shamed as a result of a conviction typically obtained without the kind of due process demanded by the standards of international human rights.⁸ In the long run, the social costs of insurgent vigilantism are multiplied by the fact that its victims are subsequently unable to be fully productive members of society, and must instead rely on charitable organizations and/or government welfare programs for their livelihoods.

The consequences of these actions are all the more grave in light of the surprising frequency with which insurgent groups appear to target suspected criminals for maiming or assassination. Figure 1.1 presents a plot of the cumulative number of people killed by republican groups from 1973 to 1998, alongside plots of the cumulative number of individuals who were targeted for punishment shootings and punishment beatings.⁹ Republican paramilitary groups shot over 1,200 individuals accused of drug dealing, vandalism and various other forms of anti-social behavior between 1973, the first year for which systematic data are available, and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. In addition


suspected drug activity” (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2012). In September 2012 MUJAO militants amputated “the hands and feet of four young men they accused of robbery in the main square at Gao” (Nossiter 2012).

⁸For instance, Article 10 of the United Nations’ “Universal Declaration on Human Rights” proclaims that “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.”

⁹Note that republican paramilitary groups were responsible for 387 fatalities between 1969 and 1972 which are not reflected in this figure, as comparable data on punishment attacks are not available for this time period. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) did not begin tracking republican punishment beatings until 1982, although anecdotal evidence indicates that republican groups were using this form of punishment as early as the 1970s.

to these victims, republicans also used a variety of implements, including hurlies, baseball bats, crowbars and hammers, to beat and critically injure another 811 individuals between 1982 and 1998, meaning that at least 2,078 people were victims of republican vigilantism during the Troubles, many of whom were left with lifelong disabilities as a result of these attacks. Over the same time period (1973 - 1998), republican groups were responsible for the deaths of 1,662 individuals. At least in the Irish case, the number of individuals who suffered directly as a result of republican vigilantism was at least equal to the number of civilians, military personnel, police and rival paramilitaries killed by the same groups. Despite the large number of victims, punishment attacks have received relatively little attention in the area studies literature in Northern Ireland.

Figure 1.1: Annual Casualties Attributed to Republican Groups in Northern Ireland 1973 - 1998



Although data limitations make it difficult to determine how prevalent insurgent vigilantism has been in other conflicts, anecdotal evidence indicates that groups like the Taliban have invested significant resources in developing their gruesome systems of alternative justice. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has noted that many communities in western Afghanistan “were relying increasingly on Taliban/anti-government justice mechanisms that provided expedited decisions and implementation”

with punishments ranging from beheading to the amputation of limbs (UNAMA 2011, 19). In a subsequent report which included a small number of additional examples of the Taliban’s “parallel punishment” system at work, UNAMA officials admitted frankly that “many more incidents of Taliban parallel judicial structures issue punishments occur and are underreported [sic]” (UNAMA 2012, 24). In Syria, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has lamented human rights abuses committed by the “judicial councils” established by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Aleppo and other cities which have sentenced rapists, thieves and suspected regime collaborators to death and other forms of extrajudicial punishment, including physical beatings (Human Rights Watch 2012). Despite the prominence of the Syrian conflict in the popular press, the media has provided scant coverage of the development of FSA judicial institutions, and no systematically coded database of the victims of FSA vigilantism exists. In Spain, the Basque separatist group ETA carried out an extensive campaign against drug dealers in San Sebastian and rural Gipuzkoa during the 1980s and early 1990s. The campaign resulted in the deaths of 35 individuals, representing roughly seven percent of the fatalities attributed to ETA between 1980 and 1994 (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). Here again, data limitations prevent a more comprehensive analysis of how ETA’s campaign against drug dealers and criminals in the Basque country may have interacted with the group’s broader war against the Spanish state. Nevertheless, the examples presented here further indicate that “punishment attacks” are not a phenomenon that is unique to the conflict in Northern Ireland. Indeed, this type of violence appears to represent a significant proportion of civilian suffering during wartime, despite the fact that insurgent vigilantism is frequently overlooked by both academic and media accounts of civil wars and insurgencies.

Insurgent vigilantism is a persistent and often terrifying feature of wartime political orders. Existing theoretical and empirical accounts of insurgent-against-civilian violence have tended to either lump vigilante attacks in with violence aimed at punishing regime collaborators or to ignore the former category of attacks completely. This is unfortunate because punishment attacks and anti-collaborator executions serve different purposes and are intended to influence different audiences. Punishment attacks typically target indi-

viduals suspected of some form of “ordinary” crime, such as vandalism, theft or sexual assault. The perpetrators of these crimes are most often not suspected of collaborating with enemy security forces, although resentment caused by losing a limb or being publicly flogged might give them reason to do so in the future. This project develops and tests a theoretical model that aims to explain why some insurgent groups, like the Taliban, the PIRA and the Indian Maoists, allocate a considerable share of their scarce resources toward punishing suspected criminals, while others, like the Basque group ETA, appear to engage in this activity much less frequently. Empirically, the argument presented here is tested using historical data and evidence from the conflict in Northern Ireland. However, given the prevalence of insurgent vigilantism in the conflicts highlighted above, the theoretical findings presented in this dissertation also have implications for our understanding of violence against civilians in a wide variety of other countries currently undergoing armed conflict.

Chapter 2

Violence Against Civilians in Wartime

From both a theoretical and an empirical perspective, recent work by several scholars (Azam 2002, Azam 2006, Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Hechter 1987, Helfstein, Abdullah and Al-Obaidi 2009, Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, Humphreys and Weinstein 2008, Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2009, Sánchez-Cuenca 2007, Weinstein 2005, Weinstein 2007) has contributed greatly to our understanding of how insurgent groups interact with their constituent civilian populations. To paraphrase Mao's famous dictum, the work cited above has shed light on just how the insurgent fish navigate the sea of civilian support. Weinstein (2005, 2007) and Weinstein and Humphreys (2006), for instance, have demonstrated how the structural features and resource endowments of rebel groups influence their relationships with local people, potentially creating a rebel resource curse in which materially well-endowed groups exploit their erstwhile supporters. Alternatively, Hechter (1987), Kalyvas (2006) and Kalyvas and Kocher (2009), amongst others, focus on how the battle for control of territory, and in particular for the loyalty of potential informers, can lead insurgents and counterinsurgents alike to attack civilians as a means of intimidating them into quiescence. These two paradigms emphasize, respectively, either exploitation or coercion as the primary motive for insurgents to attack civilians. Both of these approaches to the study of violence against civilians have produced theoretically

compelling and empirically validated explanations for why some insurgent groups seem particularly prone to abuse their civilian constituents, while other tend to leave civilians unmolested.

Nevertheless, each paradigm has tended to treat every act of insurgent-against-civilian violence as empirically and theoretically identical, although the empirical record indicates that this assumption might not always be appropriate. On the one hand, groups as diverse as the Taliban and the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) can be seen executing and exiling suspected informers from their respective communities. On the other, both groups have conducted brutal acts of vigilante-style violence against men and women suspected of offending Sharia law or engaging in “anti-social” behavior, respectively. These acts of insurgent vigilantism target different types of individuals and are intended to influence different audiences than are the executions of suspected informers typically highlighted in the academic literature on violence against civilians during wartime. As a result, the former and latter types of anti-civilian violence are also associated with different sets of costs and benefits. In order to fully understand the causes and consequences of this particular cause of human suffering during wartime, analysts must move beyond the dominant interpretation of violence as either coercive or exploitative and focus instead on the use of violence as a gruesome tool of rebel institution building.

In the remainder of this chapter, I provide a detailed review of existing work on insurgent-against-civilian violence. The objective here is to demonstrate that, while existing studies have taught us a great deal about why insurgents frequently bite the hands that feed them, a new perspective is necessary to explain the full range of variation in this type of behavior. Building on insights derived from the existing literature, I argue that by disaggregating insurgent-against-civilian violence into categories based on the motivation of the insurgent group, it becomes apparent that not all types of violence against civilians are created equal, nor are they necessarily complementary in terms of how they contribute to the achievement of insurgent objectives. Existing work has tended to focus on how insurgent groups use selective violence to prevent their constituents from collaborating or sharing information with the forces of the state. This is certainly one way in which insur-

gent groups use selective violence. However, insurgents also use violence against civilians for a variety of other purposes, such as the establishment of rudimentary alternative institutions of law and order through the use of vigilante justice. Most importantly, the following literature review demonstrates that the means and methods used to achieve these other objectives create strategic tensions for insurgent groups that, under certain conditions, will cause them to behave differently than existing theories would predict.

2.1 Theoretical Approaches to Insurgent-Against-Civilian Violence

Social scientists have long been concerned with questions about why insurgent groups — and states, for that matter — frequently use their military resources to attack defenseless civilians. In general, the attempts to answer these questions can be divided into two categories. The first group, exemplified by the work of Weinstein (2005, 2007) and Weinstein and Humphreys (2006), treats violence against civilians as a form of exploitation aimed at advancing the personal status of the perpetrators through theft, sexual conquest and the like. These scholars seek to explain why some rebel groups seem to engage in this type of behavior more frequently than others. Theoretical contributions in this vein frequently focus on the material incentives for rebellion and the — often related — issue of rebel institutional strength, in terms of selecting members and disciplining those that have already joined. Contrastingly, the second group, exemplified by the work of Hechter (1987), Kalyvas (2006), Kalyvas and Kocher (2009), Vargas (2009) and Bhavnani et al (2011) treats violence against civilians as an instrumental response to the problem of cultivating collaboration while simultaneously limiting an enemy's ability to accomplish the same objective. For these scholars it is the desire to maintain control over territory that motivates insurgent groups and state forces alike to maim and kill civilians and the strength of the threat from the enemy that determines the extent to which an incumbent actor will attack its constituents, as well as the level of precision with which individuals will be targeted. While much of the research cited above utilizes spatially disaggregated data to determine how different conditions within the same civil war might make violence against

civilians both more or less likely and more or less selective in some areas than in others, researchers have only begun to distinguish between different types of violence within these same categories. This is significant because even within the general category of selective violence different types of attacks are often motivated by different strategic factors, and the factors that are conducive to the production of one type might be unfavorable for the production of another.

The remainder of this chapter summarizes recent theoretical and empirical findings in the literature previewed above, offering theoretically and empirically motivated critiques throughout. The review proceeds in two parts, beginning with a summary and critique of the work of Kalyvas and other scholars who have tended to analyze violence against civilians primarily through the lens of coercion and control. While these scholars have advanced our overall understanding of violence during civil wars, even greater progress can be made in this regard by taking into account the very different purposes that seemingly similar types of violence can serve. The second portion of the review turns to the work of Weinstein and others who have generally explained violence against civilians either as a consequence of indiscipline or as a means of material exploitation.

2.1.1 Coercion

During the course of an official debate on the British Government's policy in Afghanistan a Liberal Democrat Member of Parliament warned the then Labour government that they should not "take comfort from the idea that the Taliban are unpopular because they are nasty people. Nasty insurgents can take power, and they did. They can impose their power through coercion. They do not have to be popular to rule or to take ground" (United Kingdom 2009). In a similar vein, the US Army's updated field manual on counterinsurgency asserts that "Insurgents thrive on terrorizing and intimidating the population to gain control over them" (US Army 2006, vi). These perspectives on the thuggish nature of insurgencies are also shared by popular media accounts which often purport to illustrate how these organizations rule over their constituents with iron fists. Beyond such popular accounts, the idea that insurgents use violence against civilians as an instrumental means

of gaining compliance and preventing the local population from collaborating with status quo governments has also gained serious currency amongst social scientists, particularly since the publication of Kalyvas's (2006) seminal study. Amongst proponents of the logic of coercion, two general streams of thought prevail. The first, represented by the work of scholars such as Azam (2006) and Wood (2010), adopts a primarily economic frame of analysis and describes rebel violence against civilians as a means of inducing support for the rebels by narrowing the distance between the expected utility of supporting the rebels and the expected utility of not supporting them. The second, exemplified by the work of Kalyvas (2006) and others, emphasizes the intimate relationship between collaboration, counterintelligence and the killing of civilians during wartime. Both of these perspectives have produced insightful explanations of why rebel groups often target their civilian constituents. However, neither perspective acknowledges that different types of civilians might actually be exposed to different levels of risk for different types of selective violence.

The economic model of rebel coercion, which is generally reflected in the work of Azam (2006) and Wood (2010), presents violence against civilians as a relatively inexpensive alternative means of gaining public support. In order to induce compliance with and, ultimately, participation in a rebellion the rebel group must provide civilians with some kind of incentive to offset the often considerable costs associated with supporting a rebel movement. One way to create such an incentive structure is for the group to offer a variety of public goods or services, such as education or healthcare, that rival those offered by the status quo government. This approach can be quite costly for rebel groups who must draw the manpower, finances and infrastructure for supporting such services from the same relatively small resource pool that supports the rebellion itself. As a result, rebel groups often pursue an alternative strategy. Rather than building institutions that increase the benefits of supporting the rebellion, rebels may attack civilians to increase the costs of non-participation. In these models, rebel groups with relatively few resources are expected to be most likely to attack civilians, while those with more plentiful resources will be less likely to attack civilians as the marginal cost of providing public goods diminishes.¹

¹Azam (2006), Wood (2010) and Wood, Gent and Kathman (2012) allow for other factors, such as the benevolence of the rebel leader, the level of state violence against civilians and the presence of an

This explanation of rebel violence against civilians is both theoretically elegant and logically compelling. However, there are theoretical reasons to expect that this model might not apply equally well to all types of insurgent-against-civilian violence. This is because some of the violence that insurgent groups direct against their erstwhile constituents is actually an important component of the insurgents' approach to building alternative institutions. Punishment attacks in particular are a form of vigilante justice that targets civilians but does so as a means of usurping the state's role as the hegemonic protector of law and order in the communities that the rebels themselves hope to rule one day. The victims of these attacks are neither completely innocent, nor are they typically suspected of collaborating with the status quo government.² The purpose of attacking these suspected criminals is simultaneously to deter future criminal activity in the community and demonstrate the rebel group's superior ability to respond to everyday problems such as vandalism and robbery.

Given the nature of punishment attacks and their victims, it is unlikely that this type of violence against civilians will generate compliance with the rebels in the manner described by economic models. If, as Azam (2006) predicts, rebel groups use violence primarily as a means of decreasing the "wage difference" between ordinary economic activity and joining the rebellion, then we would logically expect rebel groups to eschew involvement in vigilantism all together. Allowing crime to run rampant would have the likely effect of diminishing the expected utility of any kind of ordinary economic activity, with the added benefit of allowing the rebels to avoid directly taking the blame for the violence leading to this outcome. Since punishment attacks themselves are costly to the rebel group, it seems unlikely that a rational rebel leader would use his/her scarce manpower and resources to perform a task that, within this framework, appears contrary to the interests of the group itself. Furthermore, if all rebel groups use violence against civilians as an inexpensive means of inducing compliance more generally, then we would expect only poorly financed, institutionally weak rebel groups to engage in punishment attacks.

intervening power, to condition these relationships; however, the same basic economic logic provides the basis for their respective arguments.

²Although the danger that the status quo government might use the threat of criminal charges to induce collaboration does influence how insurgents approach the issue of vigilantism. See chapter three.

Nevertheless, examples from Northern Ireland, Afghanistan and Iraq discussed in the following chapter demonstrate that not only do relatively strong rebel groups engage in this activity, but also they do so with surprising frequency.

An alternative explanation of the relationship between coercion and insurgent-against-civilian violence is offered by Kalyvas and others. In *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*, Kalyvas begins his analysis from the assumption that, in civil wars, sovereignty is both segmented and fragmented. As the author explains, sovereignty is segmented “when two political actors (or more) exercise full sovereignty over distinct parts of the territory of the state. It is fragmented with two political actors (or more) exercise limited sovereignty over the same part of the territory of the state” (2006, 89). Civil wars are then depicted as a contest between an incumbent and a challenger for territorial control of the state. Over the course of a civil war, however, the extent to which either actor exerts control varies significantly from one location to the next, as well as from one time to the next. Kalyvas characterizes these variations in control using five “zones” representing the extent to which sovereignty is fragmented at a given place in time, with zone one representing complete incumbent control over an area and zone five representing complete insurgent control over an area. Since belligerents in civil war use violence against civilians as a means of preventing the local population from providing information to their opponents, Kalyvas predicts that there will be little violence of any kind in zones one and five. This is because, in zone one, the insurgents cannot credibly guarantee the safety of civilians who provide information against the government. Since civilians have no incentive to defect, the incumbent has no incentive to use coercion to prevent potential defections.

Zones two and four, however, do present opportunities for civilian defection. In these zones one party enjoys dominant, although not hegemonic, control. As the dominant party in the zone (the incumbent government in zone two and the insurgents in zone four) seeks to consolidate its control over the territory, it will use selective violence against suspected collaborators to deter future defections to the enemy. It is possible for the dominant party to use selective violence because its greater level of control increases its ability to detect and apprehend suspected defectors. Defection is, itself, more likely to occur here than

in zones one or five because detection is less certain and the non-dominant actor will be willing to expend greater resources to induce collaboration.

Ultimately, for the dominant actors in zones two and four, the decision to use selective violence against civilians hinges on a basic cost benefit analysis. When the benefits, which include “the elimination of actual defectors and (especially) the deterrence of potential defectors,” of killing suspected collaborators outweigh the costs, which are conceptualized as the “potential backfire effect of violence,” the dominant actor will use selective violence to keep the local population in check. Thus, the decision by either actor to use selective violence is purely a function of the utility of that violence as a tool for preventing defection.

However, as the examples highlighted in the previous chapter indicate, insurgent groups around the world also use selective violence for other purposes, including for the punishment of suspected criminals within their own communities. In Iraq, militants in Fallujah flogged street vendors for selling alcohol in violation of sharia law in May 2004, while representatives of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army vandalized stores selling alcohol in Basra and temporarily detained the stores’ owners (RAND Corporation 2012). Often times, the form of punishment dispensed by insurgent groups is far more brutal than that demonstrated in the Iraqi examples cited above. In Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali stoning and amputation have been favored as punishment for adultery, rape and robbery. In Yemen, Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has enforced a similarly brutal form of sharia law, while flogging has been reserved for suspected drug dealers (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) 2012). Although some of the forms of punishment described above seem to be more prevalent amongst Islamic insurgent groups, rebels from a wide variety of ideological perspectives have also adopted brutal forms of vigilantism in an effort to replace the status quo institutions of law and order. Indian and Nepalese Maoists have both established “people’s courts” that decide the fates of both suspected regime collaborators and individuals suspected of otherwise ordinary crimes. In the Philippines, the communist New People’s Army organized a system of “people’s courts” which were used to punish “cattle rustler[s], ‘holder-uppers,’ coconut thieves, molesters of women...even wife-beaters” in the countryside and drug dealers in

the urban slums (Chapman 1987, 179). In Northern Ireland ethno-nationalist paramilitary groups from both the Protestant and Catholic communities have implemented a system of punishment attacks aimed at controlling crime and eliminating “anti-social elements” from within their own communities. On the Catholic side of Ulster’s sectarian divide, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) was particularly adept at conducting these attacks, and an elaborate system of reporting, investigation, apprehension and punishment was allegedly operated from within Sinn Féin offices throughout Northern Ireland (Hall 1997). These attacks were often quite brutal, with victims being shot through major joints or impaled with spiked baseball bats, hammers and other implements.

What the examples cited above have in common is that in each case the victims of selective violence were targeted not because they were suspected of collaborating with the security forces, but because they were accused of violating some form of law or moral code being enforced by the insurgent group as a means of usurping one of the primary functions of the state, namely the protection of people and property. Given their different motivations, we would perhaps expect to see little correlation between the type of behavior described in the preceding paragraph on the one hand and anti-collaborator violence against civilians on the other. Fortunately, data from Northern Ireland allows us to assess this expectation directly. By comparing variation in the number of punishment attacks in Northern Ireland with variation in the number of assassinations targeting alleged informers, it is possible to demonstrate that these phenomena are both empirically and theoretically distinct. Looking at the aggregate number of punishment attacks (beatings plus shootings), there is no statistically significant correlation between the number of these attacks and the number of alleged informers assassinated by the PIRA. After disaggregating punishment attacks into beatings and shootings, this relationship looks slightly more complicated. Punishment shootings do appear to be correlated with the assassination of informers, although the correlation is relatively weak at 0.56, and it is possible that this correlation is an artifact of an imperfection in the data, since some attacks classified by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) as punishment shootings might have targeted suspected informers, although this is less likely to be the case for punishment beatings. Punishment

beatings themselves appear to exhibit a negative correlation with the assassination of informers.

Data on violence perpetrated by the Basque separatist groups *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA) against drug dealers and suspected informers in Northern Spain produce similar results. Although no data exists on non-lethal punishment attacks in the Basque Country, the *Victims of ETA Dataset* (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2007) does provide information on the motivation for each fatality attributed to ETA. Between 1975 and 2003 ETA killed 35 drug dealers, 115 suspected informers and 19 individuals who took public stands in opposition to ETA violence.³ ETA appears to have been considerably more concerned with the threat posed by informers than with keeping drugs off the streets of the Basque Country. Furthermore, when these killings are further disaggregated over time, the correlation between drug related killings and assassinations of suspected informers between 1975 and 2003 is statistically insignificant,⁴ while assassinations of public opponents of ETA exhibit a marginally significant negative correlation with drug related killings.⁵

Kalyvas sets out to establish a theory that explains the occurrence of all types of violence against civilians during wartime, and his predictions have withstood a variety of rigorous empirical tests. However, his theory implicitly assumes that all acts of violence against civilians have the same motivation, namely to punish and deter collaboration with the enemy. The lack of a significant statistical relationship between punishment attacks and the type of selective violence that is most likely to be associated with policing such collaboration indicates these two phenomena might be motivated by different causal processes. Given that punishment attacks — which typically target suspected criminals — and the assassination of suspected collaborators appear to be empirically distinct, it is important that we develop a theoretical model that can account for these empirical differences.

How, then, might we draw such a theoretical distinction? I argue that, while the

³An additional 665 individuals, including Spanish politicians and members of the security forces were also killed by ETA.

⁴An analysis using 1980 — the year in which ETA killed a drug dealer for the first time — as the baseline year produced identical results.

⁵Correlations coefficient of -0.34 with $p \leq 0.10$.

description of an insurgent group's decision to attack civilians as a kind of cost-benefit analysis still applies to punishment attacks, the nature of these attacks implies a different conceptualization of both the costs and the benefits of engaging in this form of selective violence. Essentially, Kalyvas argues that selective violence is only costly to the insurgents to the extent that they make mistakes or are perceived to be capricious in their use of assassinations and targeted killings. Thus, insurgents can minimize the costs of using these tactics by doing their homework prior to an attack and ensuring that the population is made aware of each victim's guilt. Punishment attacks, however, impose a much broader range of costs on the groups that conduct them. Furthermore, some of these costs are intrinsic to the act itself and, so long as a group employs this type of violence, cannot be minimized or eliminated.

To begin with, punishment attacks differ from the types of selective violence described by Kalyvas in that they explicitly do not target civilians that are suspected of collaborating with the forces of the state. Rather, these attacks typically target individuals who are suspected of committing some kind of criminal act, such as vandalism, theft, destruction of property, physical assault, sexual assault or some other form of "anti-social" behavior. Given that the individuals targeted by these attacks are not themselves suspected of defecting, these attacks cannot yield the primary benefits of selective violence outlined by Kalyvas, specifically the killing of suspected defectors and the deterrence of future defection. Given that these attacks cannot serve this purpose, they must fulfill some other goal or objective of the insurgent group. But what benefits, if not the elimination of defectors or the extraction of resources (see above), could an insurgent group hope to gain from abusing its constituents?

I argue that punishment attacks are not primarily a coercive tool used by insurgent groups to keep potential informers onside. Rather, these attacks represent an effort — however barbaric — to approximate the system of justice and the institutions of law and order offered by the state through a system of vigilante justice.⁶ In addition to eliminating

⁶The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs adopted a similar interpretation of the vigilante justice being dispensed by Maoist rebels in Bihar noting with some concern that "Jan-Adalats [people's courts] continue to be held by the naxalites [sic] to dispense crude and instant justice, *supplant the State apparatus and assert their hegemony over the rural tracts.*" (Ministry of Home Affairs 2006).

informers from their midst and gaining victories on the battlefield, insurgent groups also pursue a set of long-term, institution building goals through which they hope to replace the state as the dominant provider of certain public goods. Indeed, it could easily be argued that the fundamental purpose of any insurgent group is to become the state. One area in which they hope to do this is in the provision of policing and the protection of public safety in their zones of dominant and hegemonic control (zones four and five, in Kalyvas's terminology).

Thus, it can be seen that punishment attacks are empirically distinct from other forms of insurgent against civilian violence and that this empirical difference has important consequences for our theoretical understanding of why insurgent groups attack their erstwhile constituents. While punishment attacks require the use of many of the same resources as any other form of violence produced by an insurgent group — manpower, weapons, safe houses, vehicles and the like — these uses are far from complementary. Any resources used by an insurgent group to carry out even a single punishment attack by necessity cannot be used to assassinate informers or to engage the forces of the status quo government in battle. This means that there are significant material and opportunity costs involved in conducting punishment attacks, and these costs — and the tension between war-fighting and institution building more generally — are not accounted for in Kalyvas's theory of selective violence.

Furthermore, an insurgent group's decision to carry out punishment attacks is likely to be influenced by the political preferences of the group's constituents and the manner in which the status quo government is expected to respond to "ordinary" crime, such as petty theft and vandalism. When local people have a strong preference for the establishment of a robust system of law and order, insurgent groups are likely to be more willing to pay the material costs of punishing criminals in an effort to reap the political benefits of fulfilling this desire. At the same time, the manner in which the police respond to crime is likely to influence both the public attitude toward punishment attacks and the insurgent group's willingness to carry them out. If the police are expected to ignore normal crime and prioritize their role as counterinsurgents, then there will be more pressure on the

insurgents to step in and fill this institutional void. Exploring the consequences of these additional strategic tensions will help to advance our understanding of insurgent-against-civilian violence, and the formal model proposed in the following chapter attempts to address these problems.

Before exploring these tensions in greater detail, however, it is important to review additional contributions to this literature. Since the publication of Kalyvas's seminal book, numerous scholars have extended the basic logic of defection and control to enrich our understanding of this important phenomenon. Building on Kalyvas's conclusions, scholars such as Bhavnani et al (2011), Boyle (2009), Herreros and Criado (2009), Balcells (2010, 2011) have offered amendments to the theory proposed by Kalyvas in an effort to account for how a range of factors, such as the presence of multiple insurgent groups, the signing of a peace agreement or the establishment of traditional battle lines in a civil war might influence the behavior of insurgent groups. Significantly, Balcells (2010, 2011) and Herreros and Criado (2009) analyze how some of these changes in the strategic environment might influence the production of different types of selective violence, moving beyond the simple selective/indiscriminate dichotomy.

In their analysis of violence against civilians during the Spanish Civil War, Herreros and Criado differentiate between two different types of selective violence, one resulting from a desire to eliminate rival "would-be political entrepreneurs" and the other aimed at re-establishing public order by curtailing the ability of armed, non-state actors to engage in combat operations against the government. Herreros and Criado argue that the first type of violence is motivated by a desire on the part of an incumbent power (or an insurgent group) that exercises hegemonic control over a given territory to prevent enemy ideologues from fomenting opposition. For these scholars, it is the political preferences of the local people, rather than the power of the ruling actor, that determines when selective violence will be used against civilians. In addition to the "pre-emptive" violence used by incumbents against potential opponents, Herreros and Criado also argue that the breakdown of state institutions during a civil war provides local "organizations with a revolutionary agenda" with an opportunity to "put this agenda into practice because

of the absence of state authorities to control public order” (Herrerros and Criado 2009, 425). In this case, the production of violence against civilians follows a kind of Hobbesian logic, in which, absent the constraints imposed by the state, men must live in “continual fear; and danger of violent death.” It is important to note at this point that Herreros and Criado are not arguing that incumbents and insurgents will use violence against civilians in an attempt to impose some form of law and order on an otherwise lawless society. Rather, the occurrence of violence against civilians is purely a consequence of the lack of public order, as the breakdown of the coercive capabilities of the state creates an environment in which actors with “a revolutionary agenda” can use violence to expropriate resources without fear of punishment or retribution from the forces of the status quo government. Furthermore, while the authors make an important contribution by disaggregating violence against civilians into different types, they do not take the necessary next step of assessing how the strategic imperatives that might motivate one type of selective violence might actually be in tension with the incentives that motivate another.

A useful contribution in this regard is offered by Balcells (2010, 2011). Like Herreros and Criado, Balcells uses data on violence against civilians during the Spanish Civil War to test her argument. Also like Herreros and Criado, Balcells disaggregates violence against civilians using a slightly different set of criteria than those employed by Kalyvas. Rather than offering a simple distinction between selective and indiscriminate violence, Balcells contends that the primary factor that differentiates one type of violence from another is the technology of production. Specifically, direct violence is defined as “violence perpetrated with light weaponry. . . in a ‘face-to-face’ type of interaction. . .” (Balcells 2010, 399). This is differentiated from indirect violence, which is defined as an act of violence that “is perpetrated with heavy weaponry. . . [that] does not require face-to-face interaction with the victims” (Balcells 2010, 400).⁷ Having established this distinction, Balcells argues

⁷The significance of the distinction between this taxonomy of violence and the one offered by Kalyvas is greater than it might at first seem. According to Kalyvas, the distinction between selective and indiscriminate violence hinges upon the level at which guilt (and hence targeting) is determined. Violence is selective when there is an intention to ascertain individual guilt (2006, 142). Balcells’ definition, meanwhile, is agnostic about the attribution of guilt. Thus, it would be possible to observe an instance of violence that is both direct and indiscriminate, as well as one that is both indirect and selective. The activities of the Shankill Butchers in Northern Ireland would seem to be an example of the former, while the ongoing predator drone strikes employed by the United States against leaders of the Taliban and al

that it is politics rather than power that determines the likelihood that a belligerent will use one of these two forms of violence. Specifically, she claims that a belligerent exercising dominant control over a section of territory during a conventional civil war will be more likely to use direct violence against the inhabitants of that territory when the distribution of political preferences is close to parity. This is because the ruling party believes that the use of direct violence under these conditions will be likely to tip the balance of local political forces in their favor. Indirect violence, on the other hand, is more likely to be employed against areas under control of the enemy and in particular against those areas in which the enemy's supporters are in the majority. As was the case with direct violence, the hypothesized ultimate goal here is to change the balance of political power in the targeted area in the hope that it will ultimately be more quiescent if and when victory is achieved.

Once again, by employing new criteria for disaggregating violence, Balcells has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of why insurgents and states, for that matter, attack civilians during civil wars. However, because she is primarily concerned with violence against civilians in conventional civil wars, her theory omits some of the key dynamics that influence an insurgent group's decision to engage in punishment attacks. In particular, she does not account for the way resource constraints might influence an actor's decision to target civilians. If the primary objective served by attacking civilians is to achieve a shift in the long-run balance of political preferences in a country, then it is possible that, given scarce resources, an actor might forego this type of violence when either victory or defeat seem imminent, and those same resources are needed for engaging in combat against the enemy. Furthermore, even though her theory speaks to the desire of belligerents to ensure long-term political stability in the contested territory, she does not allow belligerents to condition their strategy on the possibility that using violence against civilians might lead to an endogenous change in their political preferences, for better or for worse. It is assumed that violence changes the distribution of preferences, but only to the extent that an actor kills enough members of a certain group to make a difference.

Qaeda — which frequently result in the deaths of non-combatants — would be an example of the latter.

However, under certain conditions, it is possible that the use of either direct or indirect violence might lead enemies as well as supporters to become either more embittered or more enthusiastic toward an aggressor. Finally, Balcells does not allow for a strategic environment in which two combatants condition their decision about whether or not to attack civilians on their expectation of each other's behavior and the consequences of the expected behavior. In both regular and irregular civil wars, it is likely that insurgents and counterinsurgents alike are concerned not only with their opponent's ability to counter any action they take, potentially by engaging in reprisal attacks, but also by reaping the benefits of any ill-will generated by attacks against a contested area.

The works of de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006), Sanchez-Cuenca (2007) and Bhavnani et al (2011) attempt to overcome these criticisms by offering theories that account for how resource constraints, constituent preferences and strategic interaction with an opponent might influence an actor's willingness to target civilians. Bhavnani et al start with a modification to Kalyvas's theory of selective violence by allowing for the addition of multiple (i.e. more than two) actors with asymmetric capabilities. Bhavanani et al relax assumptions about the nature of civil conflict to include "triadic" conflicts, in which more than two parties are fighting for control of a given territory. They find that in these types of conflict the overwhelming majority of selective violence occurring in zones two and four will be perpetrated by the incumbent, and the total number of civilians killed in zone two will decrease, as the incumbent has less need to deter defections to the opposition. The imbalance in power between a strong, unified incumbent and a relatively weak, divided opposition makes defections to either insurgent group less likely.

By extending Kalyvas's theory in this manner, Bhavanani et al have made an important contribution to our understanding of violence against civilians during civil conflicts. Their findings demonstrate how the internal dynamics of civil wars, and particularly the well-demonstrated tendency of insurgent groups to splinter into rival factions (Boyle 2009, Bueno De Mesquita 2008), can alter the production of violence against civilians. While these results represent an important step in the process of connecting the internal politics of insurgency with the military dynamics emphasized by Kalyvas, there is still more work

to be done in this area. For instance, the theory presented by Bhavanani et al cannot fully account for how different types of violence against civilians might be used to accomplish different goals and how these various goals and the methods used to achieve them might be in tension with one another. Furthermore, in keeping with Kalyvas, Bhavanani et al make no accommodation for how the political preferences of a group's constituents might influence its willingness to attack civilians. Exploring these additional dynamics will be fundamental to further increasing our understanding of the phenomenon of anti-civilian violence during civil conflicts.

Fortunately, de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2007) have already begun the process of exploring the complex political relationship between insurgent groups and the civilians that support them. In their analysis of fatalities attributed to Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) and the PIRA, de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) disaggregate these by the level of selectivity of and the motivation for the attack. The first dimension of this typology — the level of selectivity — follows the convention established by Kalyvas, distinguishing between selective and indiscriminate acts on the basis of the extent to which individual guilt is a motivating factor for a particular killing. The second dimension is a novel and highly useful extension of Kalyvas' typology of violence and differentiates between those attacks that are intended to impose costs on the enemy — referred to as attacks of “influence” by the authors — and those that are intended to impose control on the insurgents' own community. The authors then propose a theoretical model that relies on two key variables to explain variation in the level of selectivity and the relative frequency of attacks of influence. Specifically, they argue that terrorist groups are more likely to engage in indiscriminate violence when their supporters have radical preferences. At the same time, resource rich terrorist groups will be more likely to prioritize attacks of influence over attacks of control.

By using motivation as a criterion for further disaggregating violence against civilians, de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca clearly demonstrate how resource constraints might influence an insurgent group's decision about when, and for what reasons, to target civilians. However, a closer look at the data on selective violence in Northern Ireland reveals a

slightly more complex relationship between violence and resources than the one suggested by the authors. De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca treat the assassination of drug dealers as empirically and theoretically similar to the killing of suspected informers. While they provide a sound theoretical justification for this, there is good reason to believe that these two phenomena are both empirically and theoretically distinct. In fact, PIRA killings of drug dealers are completed uncorrelated with PIRA killings of informers. This would seem to indicate that there is a different causal process driving these two types of violence. As a result, it is possible that resource constraints might influence the production of insurgent violence against suspected criminals differently than they influence the production of violence against alleged informers. The formal model proposed in the following chapter will demonstrate that this is, in fact, the case, showing that an increase in insurgent resources, in the form of manpower, weapons, etc., leads to an increase in attacks against suspected criminals, as these attacks become marginally less costly to the insurgent group.

Furthermore, any explanation of these very different types of violence must account for the very different costs imposed on insurgents by each of them. While de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca are correct in assuming that attacks against drug dealers and against informers are used to increase the level of support for the insurgents in the community and their ability to control local behavior, their focus on lethal levels of violence forces them to ignore the unique costs imposed on insurgent groups by kneecappings and punishment beatings, which are by far the most common means used by groups like the PIRA to deal with common criminals in their communities. While dead men tell no tales, crippled men certainly might. Indeed, punishment attacks impose significant informational costs on insurgent groups in addition to the material costs involved in carrying them out.

Finally, in order to completely understand the dynamics behind insurgent violence against suspected criminals, it is important to place the insurgents' decision about how to deal with crime in strategic tension with the police response to the same problem. As has been explained repeatedly in this review, the competitive dynamic that exists between the police and the insurgents in this regard is likely to influence how both actors respond to the complex problem of ordinary crime during periods of insurgency. By developing

this insight further, the model proposed in the following chapter will build on the insights gleaned from de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca and improve our theoretical understanding of the rationale behind insurgent violence against civilians.

2.1.2 Indiscipline and Exploitation

In many ways, the approach taken by de la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca (2006) and Sanchez-Cuenca (2007) represents a hybrid of theoretical models that focus on how power and control influence the production of violence against civilians—represented by the work of Kalyvas—and other models that emphasize how the distribution of material resources during a civil conflict might influence the same behavior. The work of Kalyvas and others adopting a similar approach has been reviewed in detail above, but how might theoretical models emphasizing material factors be applied to explain the occurrence of punishment attacks? Any attempt to answer this question must begin with a discussion of the work of Jeremy Weinstein (2005, 2007) and his analysis of how access to plentiful resources interacts with the organizational structure of rebel groups to affect the nature of their relationships with civilian populations.


In *Inside Rebellion*, Jeremy Weinstein presents an elegant alternative explanation for why some rebel groups abuse their constituents while others do not. Rather than focusing on battlefield outcomes or the extent of territorial control exercised by a group, Weinstein argues that it is the “initial conditions that leaders confront” that shape how insurgent groups use violence, and in particular how they deal with local civilians (2007, 7). In particular, he contends that when leaders have easy access to material resources — either because of the presence of an easily exploitable natural resource or through the support of an external patron — they will tend to attract large numbers of recruits who are more interested in gaining access to loot than in achieving the rebel group’s political objectives. Since these recruits are primarily interested in personal gain, they will exhibit low levels of discipline and will be more likely to attack civilians whenever such an attack might serve to enrich them. Thus, Weinstein concludes that materially well-endowed rebel groups will suffer a kind of rebel resource curse. Since men can easily be drawn into these

groups, and since the direct support of the community is not vital to the rebel group's survival, these groups will not invest in robust screening or disciplinary mechanisms to keep opportunists out or, at the very least, to rein them in once they have been admitted into the group. Furthermore, the conditions leading to the resource curse are likely to be exacerbated in ethnically heterogeneous communities, where rebel leaders are unable to utilize ethnic kin networks as a source of information on the character and past behavior of potential recruits. In the end, Weinstein concludes that it is groups exhibiting these three pathologies — reliance on material recruiting incentives, lack of robust internal disciplinary mechanisms and ethnic heterogeneity — that will be most likely to attack and abuse their constituents, regardless of how much territory they control.

While data limitations make it difficult to establish comparatively how well Weinstein's theory accounts for insurgent involvement in violence against suspected criminals, it is possible to demonstrate that the overall level of PIRA violence against civilians was typically higher than Weinstein's theory might predict. The PIRA was an ideologically motivated organization with little to offer its members in terms of direct material rewards⁸ and an ethnically homogenous membership. By Weinstein's reasoning, then, the PIRA should be particularly unlikely to engage in violence against its constituents. However, a comparison between the number of civilians killed and injured by the PIRA from 1970 to 1997 and the number of civilians killed and injured over the same time period by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a group with ready access to large amounts of drug money, tells a different story all together. Figure 2.1 demonstrates that, throughout most of its existence, the PIRA was actually more likely to kill or injure civilians than was the FARC. This is certainly a surprising result, given the nature of the two groups. Nevertheless, it is important not to draw overly strong conclusions from this simple comparison. The figures from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) do not include precise information on the identity of the victims of each attack, and while they do indicate the perceived nationality of the victim, this variable captures the geographic, rather

⁸According to Harnden (2000), PIRA volunteers on active service received as little as £20.00 per month. In fact, a number of lower level operatives were left in the awkward position of having to go to the local unemployment office to collect their benefit checks from Her Majesty's Treasury while simultaneously preparing to wage a war against the British state in Ireland.

Figure 2.1: Annual Casualties Attributed to FARC and PIRA



than ethnic or political, identity of the victim.⁹ Furthermore, the data contained in the GTD does not make it possible to clearly establish the motivation for a given attack, and in general it would appear that punishment attacks, at least in the Northern Irish case, are drastically undercounted.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the relatively high overall number of PIRA attacks targeting civilians, combined with the still higher number of PIRA punishment attacks over the same time period, does seem to indicate that the motivation behind these attacks is something other than greed and mismanagement.

This conclusion is further bolstered by within case comparisons from Northern Ireland. The southern portion of County Armagh, bordering on the Republic of Ireland, is known colloquially in Northern Ireland as ‘bandit country,’ and while this moniker is primarily meant to emphasize the military potency of the PIRA in the area, it is also a reflection on the local PIRA’s well-known involvement in a variety of lucrative smuggling schemes that take advantage of the close proximity of the area to the Republic of Ireland. These

⁹For instance, “Northern Ireland” is listed as the nationality for the overwhelming majority of victims of the PIRA, with not distinction being made between Catholics and Protestants, while “Spain” is listed as the nationality of most victims of ETA, with no distinction being made between Basques and other Spaniards.

¹⁰Only one PIRA victim is identified as a “criminal” by the GTD. Seven other incidents coded by the GTD appear to be punishment attacks, based on the incident notes available on the GTD website.

schemes, which include the smuggling of cattle, diesel fuel and cigarettes, have been highly lucrative for local republicans. In a single raid on property owned by an alleged PIRA ringleader in South Armagh, the police seized more than £137,000 in cash, alongside 8,000 liters of vehicle fuel and 30,000 cigarettes. Despite this apparent resource wealth, and the proximity of an international frontier, which might be thought to even further decrease the local IRAs dependence on the people of South Armagh, violence against civilians was relatively rare in this part of Northern Ireland. From 1990 to 2008, statistics provided by the Police Service of Northern Ireland indicated that, in the Newry and Mourne district council area, which includes most of South Armagh, republican paramilitary groups were responsible for a mere 30 punishment shootings and 77 punishment beatings. Furthermore, over the entire three decades of the Troubles, less than 20 percent of all those killed in the area of the Newry and Armagh Westminster constituency are listed by McKeown (2009) as “Other Non Combatant.” On their own, these figures say little about how local resource endowments influenced the PIRA’s relationship with its constituents, but when they are compared with figures from West Belfast, it becomes clear that this relationship did not operate in the manner predicted by Weinstein.

West Belfast is a predominately, although not exclusively, Catholic district of Northern Ireland’s capital city. It was also one of the major flash-points for PIRA activity and is home to some of the most staunchly republican neighborhoods in all of Ireland. In comparison to South Down and South Armagh, West Belfast is quite far from the border. It is also seriously economically deprived and homogeneously Catholic. Republican neighborhoods are often uncomfortably close to equally homogeneously Protestant and Loyalist neighborhoods. There is little opportunity for smuggling here and, if one accepts the PIRA’s claims at face value, local republicans were not involved directly in the drug trade, arguably the most lucrative form of illicit activity in the area, and in fact tried actively to eliminate it. Given these circumstances — a relative lack of easily exploitable economic resources, the presence of a near constant threat of Loyalist violence and the comparatively vast distance from the Irish border — one might expect to observe fewer PIRA attacks against civilians in West Belfast than in South Armagh. Surprisingly, this

is not the case. As figures 2.2 and 2.3 demonstrate, for both the PIRA and its successors, the opposite has been true. Given Weinstein's emphasis on the rebel resource curse this is surprising, particularly since the membership of the PIRA was homogeneously Catholic in both locations.


Figure 2.2: Republican Punishment Shootings in West Belfast and Newry and Mourne



Why then would the PIRA, an ethnically homogenous, relatively well disciplined insurgent group, operating in West Belfast, an economically deprived district in which the support of the local population was vital to the survival of the PIRA as an organization, be more likely to attack its constituents than the same organization operating in a resource rich area, with easy access to an international border and relatively little need for the support of the local people? Weinstein's otherwise compelling theory cannot provide an answer to this question.

The first step to solving this puzzle is to re-evaluate the assumed purpose of violence against civilians in civil war. Unlike Kalyvas, who assumes that insurgents use violence as a means of punishing local people for supporting the state, Weinstein assumes that greedy insurgents use violence against civilians in order to extract loot from them. While this is almost certainly an accurate description of some acts of insurgent-against-civilian

Figure 2.3: Republican Punishment Beatings in West Belfast and Newry and Mourne



violence, it would be wrong to assume that it applies equally to all such acts. Rather than exploiting or controlling the local population, insurgents use punishment attacks as a gruesome substitute for the prisons and parole boards operated by the state. Since these attacks serve a different purpose than those described by Weinstein, it is hardly surprising that their occurrence is best explained by a different set of factors — as enumerated repeatedly throughout this review — than those emphasized in Weinstein’s theory.

Of course, it would be incorrect to assume that this perverse form of institution building is the only reason that a well-disciplined insurgent group might attack its own supporters. Fearon and Laitin (1996) and Nakao (2009) have convincingly argued that ethnic groups will have an incentive to practice “in-group policing” when they fear the consequences of inter-ethnic violence. In order to prevent a single inter-ethnic defection from escalating into an all out ethnic war, the ethnic group of the perpetrator might take responsibility for punishing him/her as a signal of their commitment to maintaining the inter-ethnic peace. While this is a compelling theoretical account of intra-ethnic violence in the context of inter-ethnic conflict, evidence suggests that punishment attacks are motivated by a different set of incentives. If punishment attacks were examples of the type of in-group

policing described by Fearon and Laitin and Nakao, then we would expect that the victims of punishment attacks would themselves typically be thought guilty of some offense that might have the consequence of upsetting the interethnic peace, such as murdering or otherwise exploiting a member of the other ethnic group.

In Northern Ireland the PIRA frequently used the republican movement's propaganda machine to publish claims of responsibility for its various activities — including punishment attacks — as well as warnings to local criminals and informers. These claims of responsibility are often quite detailed, and in the case of punishment attacks they typically provide an account of the charges brought against the victim. For instance, in December 1974 the PIRA's North Armagh Battalion issued a statement through *Republican News* in which it explained that

On the Shore Road, Lurgan, on the evening of Saturday 30th an ASU of North Armagh Battalion, Provisionals [sic] Republican Army shot a man who, along with others, was guilty of the rape of a juvenile from Drumnacree. Crime of a petty and serious nature under the cloak of Republicanism will not be tolerated in Lurgan, so the perpetrators [sic] of such criminal activity be warned (*Republican News* 1974b).

Similarly, in March 1993, the PIRA in south County Down issued a statement in *An Phoblacht/Republican News (AP/RN)*¹¹ in which it claimed responsibility for kneecapping a suspected drug dealer in Newry. The statement provided the details of the shooting as well as an extensive account of the man's suspected offenses (*AP/RN* 1993a). According to the 2001 census, the population of the Drumnacree ward in Lurgan was 99 percent Catholic, and according to the same census the population of Newry was over 89 percent Catholic.

The Basque group ETA also tended to target drug dealers in communities with relatively large ethnic Basque populations. Census data from 1991, 1996, 2001 and 2006 indicates that Euskara was the primary language spoken in the home by an average of more than one quarter of residents in the 19 towns in which ETA killed at least one drug dealer. In contrast, across the whole of the Basque Autonomous Community only

¹¹From 1970 to 1978, *An Phoblacht* (Irish for 'the Republic') was the official news of Provisional Sinn Féin in the Republic of Ireland, while *Republican News* was the official newspaper of the party in Northern Ireland. The two papers were merged, and their titles combined, in January 1979.

about 13 percent of residents reported speaking Basque as the primary language in their homes. The communities in which ETA killed drug dealers also tended to have larger Basque speaking populations in absolute terms, with an average of nearly 4,200 Basque speakers living in these 19 towns, as compared to an average of only 882 in the remaining 232 towns of the Basque country. ETA claimed that these killings were intended to protect Basque communities from illegal drugs because they had “a demobilizing effect on the Basque youth, eroding their political consciousness and revolutionary impetus,” and there is some evidence that Basque voters rewarded ETA’s political wing for the militant group’s campaign against drug dealers in primarily Basque communities. (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca 2013)

These examples indicate that, when acting as vigilantes, insurgent groups have exhibited a tendency to target their co-ethnics for perpetrating crimes against their own communities. This makes punishment attacks, and vigilantism targeting drug dealing and so-called anti-social behavior more generally, a qualitatively different phenomenon from the kind of “in-group policing” described by Fearon and Laitin and others. Indeed, rather than discouraging inter-ethnic conflict, the type of in-group policing practiced by the PIRA and ETA could actually have the opposite effect. Both ETA and the PIRA used their vigilante campaigns to undermine state institutions of criminal justice, while simultaneously attempting to consolidate support for political violence within their own communities. Furthermore, at least in the Irish case, punishment attacks themselves were often used by the PIRA and, more recently, dissident republican groups like the RIRA and ONH, as a signal of their militancy and commitment to the armed struggle in order to attract new recruits (Hamill 2011). Thus, punishment attacks are an example of intra-ethnic violence that might be used to exacerbate inter-ethnic conflict.

Lilja and Hultman (2011) explore the mechanisms through which ethnic insurgents might use intra-ethnic violence as a means of consolidating their own support. In their study of LTTE violence against ethnic Tamils, Lilja and Hultman distinguish between two types of violence against co-ethnics. On the one hand, rebel groups operating in ethnically heterogeneous communities are likely to be compelled to engage in violence against

civilian non-combatants because they are unable to utilize intraethnic social networks — which are likely to be relatively weak in heterogeneous districts — as a mechanism for sanctioning non-compliance. On the other, rebels operating in ethnically homogeneous communities will have an incentive to attack rival ethnic militias. This approach draws on the basic logic of “in-group policing” connecting this concept to the use of coercion and the struggle for ethnic supremacy to explain why ethnically based insurgent groups attack their constituents. However, here again it is difficult to see how punishment attacks fold into this theoretical construct. The victims of these attacks are typically not suspected informers, nor do they tend to be associated with rival militant groups. Furthermore, in the case of Northern Ireland, these attacks tend to be clustered in the most homogeneously Catholic areas of the province, despite the fact that most victims are not associated with rival militias.

The primary purpose of punishment attacks is not to deter co-ethnics from collaborating with the status quo government, nor is the primary audience for punishment attacks the ethnic other. Rather, this particular type of violence is intended to influence two audiences within a militant group’s ethnic constituency. On the one hand, these attacks are intended to intimidate and deter would-be criminals from selling drugs, stealing from local people or engaging in sexual violence. At the same time, the publicity of these attacks is intended to demonstrate the militant group’s commitment to finding and punishing suspected criminals that the status quo government was unable to deal with effectively. Put differently, punishment attacks provide militants with the simple “propaganda of the deed,” drawing a sharp contrast between the militants’ grim but effective justice on the one hand and the status quo government’s inability to resolve the problem of “ordinary” crime on the other. In essence, punishment attacks are an example of insurgent groups acting as vigilantes in an effort not to intimidate or coerce the general population into supporting them, but rather to undermine popular support for the institutions of law and order provided by the status quo government and usurp the functions of these institutions from the state.

This interpretation of the purpose of punishment attacks is also reflected in the general

literature on vigilantism. In general, academic work on this topic has emphasized the theoretical and empirical connections between skepticism toward the official criminal justice system and support for vigilante violence. Rosenbaum and Sederberg(1974) argue that communities will be more likely to turn to “crime control vigilantism”¹² Within the context of this general conceptualization of vigilantism, “crime control vigilantism” is further defined as acts of violence “directed against people believed to be committing acts proscribed by the formal legal system” and is distinguished on the basis of this criterion from “social group control” and “regime control” vigilantism (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1974, 548). when “the government is believed to be ineffectual in protecting persons and property” from criminal exploitation (Rosenbaum and Sederberg 1974, 549). Relatedly, Bateson (2012) finds that, in Latin America, the victims of crime are significantly more likely to support vigilantism, although there is less evidence supporting this relationship in other regions of the world. Meagher (2012, 96 emphasis added) has described the emergence of vigilantism in southeastern Nigeria as a “popular initiative to protect property rights and *fill the gap in state security provision,*” while Adinkrah (2005, 422-423) attributes the surge in vigilante violence in Ghana during the late 1990s to “the lack of sufficient resources for law enforcement agencies to function properly” and “the serious deficit in the administration of justice in the country,” amongst other factors. Finally, Bateson (2012) uses qualitative and quantitative evidence from Guatemala to demonstrate that, within the context of post-conflict society characterized by low levels of confidence in the formal institutions of criminal justice, vigilantism is most likely to emerge in regions with a history of “moderate to intense fighting” during the period of conflict.

Although these scholars are not primarily concerned with addressing the strategic competition between insurgent groups and state police forces described throughout this review, their insights about the correlates of public support for vigilantism more generally nevertheless provide a useful jumping off point for further analysis of how insurgent groups might stand to benefit from their involvement in these activities. Rosenbaum and

¹²Rosenbaum and Sederberg define vigilantism generally as “acts or threats of coercion in violation of the formal boundaries of an established sociopolitical order which, however, are intended by the violators to defend that order from some form of subversion” (1974, 542).

Sederberg, Meagher and others implicitly understand vigilantes as violent entrepreneurs seeking to fill a gap in the market for law enforcement resulting from the inability of the state to deter criminal activity. Thus, insurgents can use vigilantism as a means of contesting the status quo government's monopoly on the use of violence and usurping the state's role as the dominant provider of law and order in a society. The benefits of this activity are, therefore, twofold. When the insurgents provide their constituents with an alternative mechanism for the redress of criminal grievances during wartime, they simultaneously reduce the populations' reliance on the status quo police force and advance their own institution building objectives. Furthermore, in line with Bateson's (2012) findings, communities that have become habituated to violence as a means of conflict resolution are more likely to accept the brutal methods of frontier justice used by groups like the Taliban and PIRA, providing these groups with a greater incentive to conduct punishment attacks in their conflict-ridden heartlands.

Nevertheless, it is important to use caution when extending insights derived from the study of purpose-built vigilante groups in peaceful or post-conflict societies. To begin with, although these groups appear to emerge in response to a lack of confidence in the formal institutions of criminal justice, it is not necessarily clear that their purpose is to undermine the forces of law and order. Indeed, in a 1971 study of citizen organizations involved in vigilantism and community self-defense in the United States, Marx and Archer found that 61 percent of these groups were "pro-police" and actually offered assistance to the police force in many instances. As a result, although the existence of purpose built vigilante groups constitutes a response to police action, these groups are likely to respond differently to strategically anticipated actions of the police than would an insurgent group with a secondary involvement in vigilantism.

This distinction between purpose built vigilantes and insurgent vigilantes is likely to be reinforced by how the police themselves perceive these two types of organizations. Again, according to Marx and Archer (1971, 58), the police actually welcomed the existence of 43 percent of these groups, while off-duty police officers themselves have a long history of involvement in after hours vigilantism in Latin America (Rosenbaum and Sederberg

1974; Huggins 2000; Ungar 2007/08). In contrast, the police tend to regard groups like the PIRA in Northern Ireland or the Taliban in Afghanistan as far more menacing, largely because these groups actively target members of the police force for assassination. As a result of the nature of the relationship between insurgent groups and police forces, the police will have an incentive to exploit criminals as counterinsurgency informants, thereby providing insurgent groups with a different set of incentives for conducting punishment attacks that are not relevant to purpose built vigilante groups. Insurgents must account for the possibility that if they ignore a suspected criminal, the police might either arrest the suspect, thereby increasing their rapport with local people, or attempt to coerce the same suspect into becoming a counterinsurgency informant, thereby advancing their counterinsurgency campaign. Insurgent groups must weigh the costs and benefits of these outcomes against the costs and benefits of vigilantism while purpose built vigilante groups need not conduct a similar calculation.

2.2 Conclusion

The preceding section has reviewed recent contributions to the general political science literature on insurgent-against-civilian violence in an effort to assess how well existing explanations of this type of behavior stand up against the empirical record of punishment attacks. In doing so, this section has highlighted a number of important theoretical distinctions between punishment attacks and other types of insurgent against civilian violence. Punishment attacks themselves are empirically distinct from other forms of insurgent violence, including the killing of suspected informers. This empirical distinction also points to a number of important theoretical distinctions that any theory explaining this behavior must account for. Given that punishment attacks serve a different purpose than other forms of insurgent violence, while drawing on the same pool of insurgent resources as these other forms of violence, a fully specified theoretical model of punishment attacks must account for the trade-offs involved in prioritizing one form of violence over another and should offer predictions of when insurgents will be more or less willing to accept these tradeoffs. Furthermore, since punishment attacks represent a perverse form of institution

building on the part of insurgents, through which they endeavor to replace state institutions of law and order, any fully specified theory must also place the insurgent group's decision about conducting punishment attacks in strategic tension with the group's expectation over how the police will respond to crime. The work reviewed above tells us a great deal about a wide variety of insurgent behavior. However, the theories proposed by the likes of Kalyvas and Weinstein cannot fully explain why insurgent groups engage in this type of violence against their constituents because they do not account for the strategic factors highlighted above. The formal model presented in the next chapter incorporates these insights and offers novel predictions about the conditions under which insurgent groups will conduct punishment attacks. These predictions are then tested empirically using case study and quantitative evidence from Northern Ireland.

Chapter 3

Punishment Attacks and Policing: A Game Theoretic Approach

Existing work has exhibited a tendency to interpret all acts of insurgent-against-civilian violence as tools of intimidation, used by insurgents to ensure compliance and cooperation amongst the general population. This coercive logic is unlikely to provide a sufficient explanation for punishment attacks, which are typically non-lethal and often target ordinary criminals, rather than those suspected of collaborating with the state. Furthermore, the tendency of existing work to ignore the institution-building rationale of punishment attacks has also led previous scholars to ignore the strategic relationship between crime, policing and punishment attacks during an ongoing insurgency. Insurgent groups offer punishment attacks as a form of vigilante justice in order to respond to the problem of crime in their communities. In doing so, the insurgents hope to usurp the status quo government's role as the hegemonic provider of law and order in the society that the insurgents ultimately seek to rule. However, insurgent groups do not take on this additional responsibility lightly. Punishment attacks themselves are costly to the insurgents to the extent that they consume resources that might otherwise be put to work on the battlefield and potentially drive the victims of vigilantism into the hands of the government. At the same time, ignoring crime can be costly to insurgents to the extent that the police are able to either use criminal investigations as a pretext for recruiting counterinsurgency informants or as a means of establishing a reputation for effectiveness in responding to local problems, thereby gaining the tacit support of the people. As a result, insurgents

must carefully weigh the costs and benefits of engaging in vigilantism against the costs of ignoring local crime, conditional on the expected response of the police.

Both the unique costs and benefits of punishment attacks and the strategic competition between status quo governments to become the dominant providers of law and order have largely been overlooked by existing work on violence against civilians during wartime. What is needed, therefore, is a new theory that incorporates these insights about the nature of punishment attacks and specifies the conditions under which insurgent groups will be relatively more or less likely to engage in this particular behavior. In this chapter, I propose a formal model that places the insurgent group's decision regarding whether or not to engage in punishment attacks in the context of the more general competition between the insurgents and the forces of the state for the loyalty of the local population.

The structure of the game reflects the critiques of existing work on insurgent-against-civilian violence developed in the literature review and incorporates anecdotal observations about the rationale behind punishment attacks into a rigorously specified strategic theory, highlighting the tradeoffs between short-term and long-term objectives, faced by both the insurgent group and the police. Rather than interpreting all acts of insurgent-against-civilian violence as the result of coercion or indiscipline on the part of the rebels, the model starts from the explicit assumption that vigilante justice is often part of the insurgent group's effort to replace the state as the provider of certain types of public goods (Lichbach 1995). By placing these long-term institution building goals in tension with short-term military objectives the model highlights the strategic tension faced by both the forces of the state and the insurgents. Each actor has scarce resources and must allocate these resources either toward war-fighting or toward the provision of normal policing and public security. Predictions derived from this model will help to explain when and where the police and the insurgents will be relatively more likely to privilege their 'crime fighting' objectives at the expense of their war fighting goals, and vice-versa.

In addition to providing the first rigorously specified theoretical explanation of punishment attacks, the model described below also makes a significant contribution to the broader literature on insurgent-against-civilian violence. In particular, and in contrast to

much of the existing literature, the model demonstrates the conditions under which even selective violence against civilians can be costly to insurgent groups. Scholars such as Kalyvas (2006) and Kalyvas and Kocher (2009, 339) have argued that targeted killing of suspected collaborators “leads to the consolidation of [insurgent] control, as the population aligns with the new rulers.” This argument rests on the assumption that selective acts of violence are essentially costless, or at the very least that the costs of targeted attacks against collaborators are more than offset by gains in compliance. It is unlikely that these assumptions hold in the case of punishment attacks. In this regard, two features of punishment attacks are particularly significant. First, the victims of these attacks are not suspected defectors. In many cases, individuals selected for punishment have not provided information to the police on local insurgent activity. Instead, they are accused of some other crime such as vandalism, rape, domestic abuse or some other form of ‘anti-social behavior.’ Second, the victims of punishment shootings and beatings almost always survive these brutal attacks. This is significant, because in the aftermath of an attack, a victim might turn to the police and provide information on local insurgent activity, and there is significant anecdotal evidence that the victims of punishment attacks and their loved ones have been fertile sources of information for the police in Northern Ireland in particular. The theoretical model proposed below captures these unique features of punishment attacks and in doing so helps to improve our understanding of the causes and consequences of this uniquely costly form of selective violence.

The remainder of this chapter provides a more detailed description of the formal model and provides greater empirical and theoretical justification for the structure of the game and the payoff functions for the actors involved. To these ends, the chapter proceeds in four sections. Section one provides a verbal description of the structure of the game, identifying the relevant actors and specifying the sequence of moves. Section two describes the model parameters and payoff functions for each actor. Section three presents a series of hypotheses derived from model comparative statics. Section four concludes by highlighting the improvements made by this model over existing work.

3.1 The Formal Model

The model presented here is structured to capture the fundamental strategic tensions faced by both the police and the insurgents in allocating their resources either to fight crime or to fight each other. The structure of the game places two actors — an insurgent group and a police force — in competition with each other over the potential benefits of fighting crime in a given location. To highlight the theoretical intuition behind the structure of the game, the remainder of this section begins with a stylized account of the set of actions that lead to the first equilibrium presented in the formal solution of the model, which is followed by a more technical description of the game. The equilibrium behavior described in the stylized account occurs on the left hand side of the game tree (figure 3.1), with the mutual best replies of $(Punish_{Insurgents} | Punish_{Police})$.

Imagine a community with an ongoing insurgency in which the insurgent group hopes to overthrow the state and institute a new form of government. In addition to the daily threat of insurgency/counterinsurgency related violence, the residents of this community must also deal with many of the mundane challenges of daily life faced by people living in otherwise peaceful settings, and among these mundane challenges are the dangers posed, to person and property, by “ordinary” crime, such as theft, vandalism, assault and, in extreme cases, murder or rape. In a stable, well ordered society (i.e. one that is not experiencing an ongoing insurgency), a victim of one of these crimes would have easy — although not necessarily satisfactory — recourse to the police and the criminal justice system in order to have their property restored to them or their assailants punished. In this community, however, even the seemingly simple matter of phoning the police in response to a burglary is a politically charged one.

In this community, both the police, as the state’s first line of defense against ordinary crime and political insurrection, and the insurgents, as the claimed representatives of the people, offer crime-fighting services. This means that victims must make a decision about which of these ‘service providers’ to contact with their grievance. Either decision is an uncertain one, because the victim cannot know for sure that either the police or the insurgents will respond positively. The police, for instance, might offer the victim’s

assailant immunity in exchange for information on local insurgent movements, leaving the victim without the restoration of his/her property or the satisfaction of a guilty verdict being handed down against an assailant. On the other hand, if the insurgents' resources are stretched thin as a result of their ongoing war with the police, then they too might ignore the victim's pleas.

Knowing all of this, a resident of our hypothetical community becomes the victim of a petty robbery. Assume that, for his or her own reasons, the victim decides in the first instance to report the crime to the insurgents. Using community social networks, the victim contacts a local insurgent commander and describes the robbery and the identity of the robber to the commander. With this knowledge in hand, the insurgent commander faces a critical decision: should she allocate the local insurgent groups scarce resources toward further investigating the robbery and punishing the suspected robber, or should she simply ignore the resident's complaint and do nothing? Before making this decision, the commander carefully weighs the costs and benefits of each choice.

If the criminal is punished, then the victim is satisfied, and the insurgent group can claim a propaganda victory by publicizing their response to a local problem. However, carrying out a 'sentence' against the robber will require the commander to re-assign some of her soldiers, both to investigate the crime and to deliver the punishment. Furthermore, if and when a punishment is delivered, weapons must be provided and other precautions must be taken to ensure the safety of the men delivering the punishment. Finally, since the crime is a relatively minor one, the community would not accept the legitimacy of a death sentence. This means that the robber must be left alive, a dangerous prospect, given the likelihood that the brutally maimed robber will seek revenge against the insurgents by collaborating with the police. Having carefully considered all of these issues, the commander is able to determine the net benefits of punishing the robber.

Before making her decision, however, the commander must also assess the net benefits of ignoring the reported robbery. If the commander suspects that the spurned victim is likely to turn to the police, then she must also assess how the police might deal with the robber. Will they arrest and punish him or will they offer him protection in exchange for


information about the insurgents? In our hypothetical community, the factors influencing the behavior of the police appear to favor the former course of action over the latter, so the commander can safely assume that, given the opportunity, the police will arrest and punish the suspected robber. Given this expectation, the commander must now compare the expected net benefits of punishing the robber in the first instance with the expected net benefits of ignoring the victim's plea and allowing the police to punish the robber. After making this comparison, the commander must decide whether or not punishing the suspect is in the group's best interests. If so, then the commander issues appropriate orders, and punishment occurs. If not, then the insurgents take no action and the game continues to unfold as expected.

The extensive form game, presented in figure 3.1, captures the strategic dynamics outlined above. Assuming that a crime has occurred, the victim - represented here as nature - can either report the crime to the police or to the insurgents. If a victim reports a crime to the insurgents, then the insurgents can either punish the suspect or not punish the suspect. If the insurgents punish the suspect, then they receive a payoff of $B_T - C_T$, reflecting the tension between the costs and benefits of fighting crime, and the police receive a payoff of zero. If the insurgents do not punish the suspect, then the victim can either turn to the police for redress (probability p) or take no additional action (probability $1 - p$). If the victim takes no additional action, then both the police and the insurgents receive payoffs of zero, since the insurgents failed to act and the police did not have the opportunity to do so. If a victim spurned by the insurgents seeks redress from the police, then the police can either punish the suspect or attempt to coerce him into becoming an informer. If the police decide to punish the suspect, then the police receive a payoff of $B_{State} - C_{State}$, again reflecting the tension between the costs and benefits of fighting crime, while the insurgents receive a payoff of zero. If the police attempt to coerce the suspect into becoming an informer, then there is some probability (q) that they succeed and some probability that they fail ($1 - q$). If the police are unsuccessful in their attempt to create a new informer, then both the police and the insurgents receive a payoff of zero. If the police are able to coerce the suspect into becoming an informer, then there is some probability

(r) that the insurgents discover the new informer, and some probability $(1 - r)$ that the insurgents do not discover the new informer. If the insurgents discover the informer, then the police receive a payoff of zero, while the insurgents receive a payoff of $B_T - C_T$. If the insurgents fail to discover the new informer, then the police receive a payoff of I representing the intelligence provided by their new informant, and the insurgents receive a payoff of $-I$ representing the damage done to the insurgents by the new informant.

The sequence of moves progresses somewhat differently if the victim decides to make an initial report to the police. In this instance — on the right hand side of the game tree — the police can either punish the suspect or attempt to coerce him into becoming an informer. If the police punish the suspect then they receive a payoff of $B_{Government} - C_{Government}$ while the insurgents receive a payoff of zero. If the police attempt to turn the suspect into an informer, then there is some probability (p) that the victim seeks redress from the insurgents and some probability $(1 - p)$ that the victim takes no additional action. If the victim does nothing, then the game proceeds in much the same fashion as on the left hand side of the game tree, with payoffs derived in terms of the likelihood that the police successfully turn the suspect, the likelihood that the insurgents detect the informant and other parameters as specified in figure 3.1. If a victim spurned by the police seeks redress from the insurgents, then the insurgents can either punish or not punish the suspect. In either case, the game concludes in much the same way as on the left hand side of the game tree, with payoffs specified in a similar fashion.

Figure 3.1: Extensive Form Game



Payoffs are specified in terms of three main parameters. The first is B_i , the benefits of

actively responding to normal crime. Fighting crime is beneficial to both insurgent groups and status quo governments to the extent that this activity contributes to the long-term institution building goals of each actor. As Lichbach (1995) has argued, during a civil war the insurgents and the existing state are in competition to become the monopoly provider of public goods. The protection of people and property from criminal exploitation is arguably the quintessential public good provided by any government worthy of the name. Before roads can be built or health services can be established, a government must first be able to play the role of the night watchman, keeping citizens safe from murder, assault, robbery and all other manner of offense. As a result, the actor that is able to establish a strong reputation for clearly and effectively responding to crime stands to make significant gains in the contest for the hearts and minds of the people.

This interpretation of the benefits of crime fighting is borne out by the experience of insurgents, policymakers and policemen in conflict torn societies around the world. In an official report on the security situation in Afghanistan for the United Kingdom's Department for International Development, Ladbury (2009, 24) found that "when women respondents in Kandahar mentioned the Taliban and justice it was to endorse the general message: that ordinary people support the Taliban because they provided justice in contrast to the formal justice system and the courts." Taliban 'judges' themselves use similar language to describe the significance of their work. Bayatullah Qasim, a Taliban judge in eastern Afghanistan, told reporters for the *Sunday Times* that "We are popular among the people because in the government everything is about money. If you have money, you get to choose who is right and who is wrong. You are the law." In contrast, Qasim claimed that the Taliban distribute "fast justice" that, by his own estimation, had led to a reduction in the crime rate in Taliban strongholds, and a corresponding increase in support for the Taliban in the same areas (Ammore 2011).

In a similar fashion, the Islamist group al-Shabaab has used the implementation of a strict form of Sharia law to bolster its status in the parts of Somalia controlled by the group. Al-Shabaab's methods of enforcement have been extremely harsh, and the group has attempted to establish control over even the most minute details of daily life

in some communities.¹ Although these extremely harsh practices have led to a degree of public backlash in some communities, other Somalis have expressed appreciation for al-Shabaab's ability to establish a degree of law and order in an often lawless country. For instance, after witnessing the public flogging of a man accused of using drugs in the town of Marka, one individual told the Al Jazeera news-agency that he was "happy with the Islamists" because "we now have peace and the criminals have nowhere to hide" while another claimed that the establishment of Sharia law was "a source of joy for us all" (2008). Similarly, a refugee farmer who was otherwise opposed to al-Shabaab informed investigators from Human Rights Watch that

A human being always strives to get independence and freedom, but the Shabaab administration brought peace and sanity. As a farmer I am saying this—as someone who wishes to work my land with ease and sell the fruits and get back to my family in peace so life can continue. Before al-Shabaab, this was not possible. There were many checkpoints where we needed to pay bribes. Robbery was common and you could come home without anything (Human Rights Watch 2010, 22).

Analogous accounts of the significance of law and order issues come from insurgents and outside observers in Northern Ireland. In the February/March (1976) issue of *Faoi Glas*, the leaders of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in Long Kesh prison highlighted the importance of 'Provo police' in republican communities. They presented the argument that "by accepting the Irish Republican Army as their guardian [i.e. by accepting PIRA policing of republican areas], the people, young and old, would be giving the 'V sign' to Britain, her puppet armies and her mouthpieces, and proclaiming allegiance to the Republican ideals of 1916." Similarly, Human Rights Watch (1992, 7) emphasized how insurgents stood to gain from apparent deficiencies in the government response to crime in Northern Ireland. HRW's report claimed that the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) had "largely abandoned the normal policing role in some troubled areas," a move which had enabled the PIRA to "create alternative criminal justice systems in which perpetrators of ordinary crimes can be tried and informally punished."

¹Al-Shabaab has banned traditional dancing and public gatherings and has also placed restrictions on how local residents spend their leisure time, banning activities such as singing, watching soccer or even playing board games. See Human Rights Watch (2010, 2011, 2012) for detailed descriptions of Al-Shabaab's implementation of Sharia law.

From the perspective of a counterinsurgent government, L. Paul Bremmer III stressed the importance of law and order issues, and the role of the police in particular, in winning the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people. Mr. Bremmer told the *New York Times* (2006) that he had "...put the very first priority on police and law and order" because "we were the government of Iraq, and the most fundamental role of any government is law and order... The fact that we didn't crack down on it from the very beginning had sent a message to the Iraqis and the insurgents that we were not prepared to enforce law and order."

These examples illustrate that, whether by cudgel or court, the provision of law and order is central to gaining the loyalty of the population during an insurgency. In both Northern Ireland and Afghanistan, insurgent groups exploited the apparent inability of existing governments to provide this service and established alternative institutions of frontier justice to compete with the courts and prisons of the state. This situation provided the insurgents with useful propaganda material, but it also allowed them to advance their objective of replacing the existing government as the monopoly provider of public goods. Similarly, in the conflicts highlighted above, the status quo governments and their allies expended significant resources to shut down insurgent institutions and strengthen the position of their own courts, prisons and parole boards as the dominant administrators of justice. Such efforts on the part of both insurgent groups and status quo governments indicate that both types of actor are aware that fighting crime can be beneficial in precisely the manner described at the outset of this section.

In addition to the benefits of fighting crime, the model's payoff functions also incorporate the costs borne by each actor for administering their preferred system of law and order in the form of the parameter C_i . Dedicating resources to finding, apprehending and imprisoning suspected criminals imposes three types of costs on status quo governments. First, there are the explicit material costs for each of these activities, measured in terms of the manpower, money and matériel consumed by the war on crime. Second, there are opportunity costs for allocating resources to fighting crime. Simply put, men, vehicles and weapons used in the pursuit of vandals and burglars cannot simultaneously be used

to man security checkpoints or conduct raids against suspected insurgent positions. Finally, in conflict torn societies both the material and opportunity costs of fighting crime are compounded by the very real danger that any call for help from an alleged victim of an ordinary crime could be the prelude to an ambush. Policemen responding to traffic accidents, burglaries or other crimes present insurgents with tempting targets of opportunity, and insurgent groups might even seek to exploit these circumstances by filing false reports with the police. All of these factors make crime fighting a costly activity for status quo governments to engage in, and policymakers must weigh these costs against any potential benefits to be derived from dedicating government resources to ordinary police work.

Substantively, this conceptualization of the costs of dedicating resources to ordinary police work is corroborated by the statements of policymakers and police officers in conflict zones as diverse as Northern Ireland and Afghanistan. One former chief constable of the RUC explicitly highlighted the tradeoffs created by using RUC assets to investigate ‘normal’ crime, arguing that, “If you try to deflect the manpower away from terrorism and toward common crime, you leave yourself open to terrorist incidents. If you concentrate on terrorism, you sacrifice ordinary policing” (Weitzer 1995, 172). Similarly, in September 2007, a Major General in the Afghan National Police (ANP) informed reporters for the *Christian Science Monitor* that “his men are spread too thin and obliged to both catch criminals and ‘fight against terrorists,’ though with far fewer privileges than the Army” (Peterson 2007). These statements indicate that key decision makers in both the RUC and the ANP embraced the conceptualization of the costs of ordinary policing offered in the preceding paragraph.

Furthermore, there is also significant anecdotal evidence that street-level police and constables are aware of the risks involved in responding to traffic accidents and walking the beat in the midst of an ongoing insurgency. In Iraq, US Army Captain Barry Humphrey, who was charged with training local police, was caught in an ambush in which one Iraqi police officer was seriously wounded while on foot patrol in Samarra (Tyson 2005), and a police officer in Baghdad claimed that “going to the police station now is like going to war. . . You never know if you’ll return home alive or not” (Chandrasekaran 2003). Police

officers from Northern Ireland expressed similar anxieties throughout the provinces recent Troubles. One RUC constable with experience serving near the Irish border explained the inherent risks involved in responding to “ordinary” 999 calls in that part of the world:

If you get a call, everything has to be checked. You just can't go off to it. If it was something like an abandoned vehicle, an army helicopter would be sent out first. Anything at all could be a booby trap for us. A lot of the time we just don't go to it—it's too dangerous (Whitman 1992, 34).

These sentiments undoubtedly spread throughout the RUC as a result of the personal experience of constables like Michael Logue and police reservist Peter Nesbitt, who were killed in separate ambush attacks carried out by the PIRA at alleged crime scenes.

The examples offered above demonstrate that dedicating resources to preventing and investigating ordinary crime is costly to status quo governments. The direct material costs of these activities are obvious. However, policymakers must also account for the significant opportunity costs implied by directing manpower and materiel to fight crime during an insurgency. Awareness of these tradeoffs appears to have influenced how senior decision makers in Northern Ireland and Afghanistan thought about law and order issues during these conflicts. These challenges are exacerbated in places like Iraq and pre-Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland, because constables ‘on the beat’ and at the scene of a crime provide insurgents with tempting targets of opportunity. The potential loss of manpower compounds the other material and opportunity costs of police work. Decision makers must balance these costs against the perceived benefits of fighting crime when deciding how best to allocate their scarce resources.

Insurgent policing is typically less formal than that of the status quo government, but that does not make it any less costly to insurgent groups. Indeed, the costs borne by insurgent groups for fighting crime are conceptually similar to those imposed on governments for the same activity. In particular, punishment attacks impose three types of costs on insurgent groups. First, there are the immediate material costs of each attack, including the men and resources used in each attack, as well as any organizational resources invested in any infrastructure supporting the system of punishment attacks. Second, there are the opportunity costs implied by dedicating scarce resources to fighting crime during

wartime. Any soldiers, money, weapons or vehicles tasked with finding and punishing suspected criminals cannot simultaneously be used to attack the enemy. Finally, punishment attacks are also costly to the extent that they might actually result in the creation of new informers. Unlike other types of selective violence, punishment attacks are typically non-lethal and do not necessarily target individuals that are suspected of working with the security forces. As a result, the victims of punishment attacks and their loved ones, who previously may have been indifferent to or even supportive of the insurgents, might agree to provide information to the security forces as revenge for the insurgents' brutality.

Once again, the statements and actions of insurgent groups in Ireland, Afghanistan and Israel validate the interpretation of the cost of punishment attacks offered above. According to Lia (1999, 158), the danger that members of the Palestinian striking forces would be captured while carrying out a punishment attack was a significant concern for the leaders of the First Intifada. Lia explains, "The omnipresence of the Israeli occupation and the harsh sentences meted out to members of the striking forces by Israeli military courts created an environment in which only extremely speedy legal processes were possible" and these usually involved some type of flogging or beating. In Northern Ireland, a Sinn Féin spokesman told John Conroy (1987, 88) that it had taken "nine volunteers to carry out a kneecapping of a [single] hood in the Beechmount district." The PIRA leadership also expressed fears about the informational costs of punishment attacks. The group's training manual warned new recruits that "The enemy through our own fault or default is the one we create ourselves through . . . our collective conduct of the struggle . . . [such as] the family friends and neighbours [sic] of a criminal or informer who has been punished without being informed why" (Coogan 2000). Finally, in Afghanistan we find evidence that the Taliban's system of "flying courts" consumed a significant amount of the group's manpower. Taliban judge Nasrat Ramani told reporters from National Public Radio that he "frequently goes to Korengal residents' homes to hold court sessions—that is, when he's not fighting American soldiers" (Nelson 2008). Clearly, Ramani could not perform both of these tasks simultaneously, and any time spent holding "court sessions" could not be dedicated to plotting or carrying out attacks against American and NATO troops.

The preceding paragraph demonstrated that insurgents perceive punishment attacks as being costly to their organizations in the three ways described above. The key feature that connects these three types of costs, both conceptually and empirically, is the effect that each of them has on the ability of an insurgent group to carry out its war. All three types of costs associated with punishment attacks make it relatively more difficult for an insurgent group to do battle with the forces of the state that the insurgents oppose. This is a crucial point, because the tension between the long-term institution building goals of the insurgent groups and their short-term battlefield objectives is a key feature of the model described here. Furthermore, this tension differentiates the theory proposed here from existing work on insurgent-against-civilian violence (Kalyvas 2006, Kalyvas and Kocher 2009), which tend to view selective violence against civilians as relatively costless and more or less compatible with insurgent military objectives.

The costs and benefits of crime fighting are placed directly in tension with the informational requirements of war fighting in the form of the parameter I , which represents the value placed on information by the police. For the insurgents themselves, anonymity, secrecy and uncertainty are amongst the very few advantages they have in fighting a war against a state that is almost always better armed, better financed and better organized (Overgaard 1994, Bueno De Mesquita 2005*a*, Bueno De Mesquita 2005*c*, Bueno De Mesquita 2005*b*, Arce and Sandler 2007). As a result, insurgent groups often go to great lengths to conceal even the most basic information about themselves and their members (Bamford 2004, Bamford 2005, Moran 2010). Counterinsurgents then face a particularly acute problem in terms of intelligence when confronted by a guerrilla or terrorist enemy that can easily blend in with the local population. It was this challenge that led Frank Kitson, the chief architect of modern British counterinsurgency policy and one time commander of SAS operations in Northern Ireland, to write that, in the early stages of an insurgency

The problem of destroying enemy armed groups and their supporters therefore consists largely of finding them. Once found they can no longer strike on their own terms but are obliged to dance to the tune of the government's forces. It then becomes a comparatively simple matter to dispose of them (Kitson 1971,

55).

In his assessment of security policy in Northern Ireland, Bamford (2005, 586) extends the logic of Kitson's analysis, emphasizing the extreme disadvantage of the security forces at the onset of an insurgency, arguing that "Although much of the initial information sought on a particular group is very basic it can be very difficult to acquire when the security forces are operating in a hostile environment and when they do not enjoy the support of the population."

In keeping with the description provided above, parameter I is incorporated into the payoff functions of both actors as a zero sum term. When the security forces stand to gain a great deal from the creation of new informers, the insurgent group stands to lose a great deal by the same act. Furthermore, given the premium placed on even rudimentary intelligence when information on the ground is sparse, expressed by Brigadier Kitson, the value of new information is assumed to be decreasing in the quality and quantity of information that the police already possess. In those areas where the security forces know little or nothing about local insurgent activity, any new information is highly valued by the police. This is because even trivial information, such as the names of local notables involved in the insurgency, can be used by the state to begin the process of developing a local network of informants. Contrastingly, in those areas in which the security forces already know a great deal about insurgent activity, new informants will be of little value. This is particularly true of the informants likely to be produced by punishment attacks, since these individuals will typically only have access to location specific information, such as the names of those involved in the insurgency or the location of weapons caches in the area.

3.2 Model Solution

In this section, I present the equilibrium solution to the game theoretic model described above, using the sub-game perfection solution concept. Toward that end, this section proceeds in three parts. Part one derives equilibrium constraints under the assumption that crime is reported to the insurgents in the first instance. Part two presents the formal

solution to the model under the opposite assumption, that crime is reported to the police in the first instance. Finally, part three compares the constraints derived in the first two sections and provides a formal and substantive discussion of the differences in equilibrium behavior under each assumption.

3.2.1 Equilibrium behavior when insurgents move first

Recall from the description of the game provided above that, on the left hand side of the game tree, it was assumed that the victim of a crime would make an initial report of that crime to the insurgent group rather than to the police. Under this assumption, the insurgents have the first opportunity to either punish the criminal or set him free. Recall further that the insurgents' comparison of the costs and benefits of punishment versus non-punishment must also account for how the police are likely to act. In particular the insurgents must determine whether the police will punish a freed suspect or attempt to coerce him into becoming an informant. After establishing which course of police action is more likely, the insurgents can then compare their expected utility for punishing the suspect with their expected utility for not punishing the suspect and arrive at the decision that is in the best interest of the group. As a result, our description of the solution to this side of the game tree begins by establishing the conditions under which the police will punish a suspected criminal.

Recall also that at their final decision node the police must choose between either punishing a suspect or using the threat of punishment to coerce him into providing information on the insurgents. If the police decide to punish the suspect by arresting him and bringing him to trial, then the police receive a payoff of $(B_{Government} - C_{Government})$, where $B_{Government}$ and $C_{Government}$ are defined as described above. If, on the other hand, the police decide not to punish the suspect in an effort to create a new informant, then the payoff received by the police is conditional on the probability that a new informant is created and, if so, the probability that the insurgents discover the new informant. As a result, if the police attempt to coerce a criminal suspect into becoming an informant, then they receive a payoff of $0(1 - q) + q(0(r) + I(1 - r))$, which simplifies to $I(q(1 - r))$.

To determine the conditions under which the police will punish a suspected criminal, it is necessary to compare these two utility functions to determine when the following inequality holds: $(B_G - C_G) \geq I(q(1 - r))$. Solving for I , the value of new informants to the police, this yields the following constraint: $\frac{B_G - C_G}{q - qr} \geq I$ (C1).

Substantively, this constraint indicates that the police will be more likely to punish suspected criminals when the value of information is relatively low. Given this intuitively plausible expectation, it is now possible to determine how the insurgent group will respond to the initial report of a crime, given their expectation that the police will punish the suspect (i.e. their belief that constraint one is true). Recall here that the insurgents face an initial dichotomous choice to either punish a suspected criminal or set him free. If the insurgents decide to punish the criminal, then they derive the benefits of fighting crime, as described above, less their material and opportunity costs for choosing this course of action. Formally, they receive a payoff of $B_{Terrorists} - C_{Terrorists}$. Alternatively, if the insurgents decide to set the criminal free, then the police get the opportunity to punish the same suspect with probability p . Given that police are expected to punish the suspect this yields an expected payoff of $0(1 - p) + 0(p)$, which simplifies to zero. Given these two possible outcomes, the insurgents will prefer to punish a criminal when $B_T - C_T \geq 0$. Solving for the parameter B_T this yields the following constraint: $B_T \geq C_T$ (C2).

It is also necessary to determine what the insurgents will do under the expectation that the police will instead attempt to convert suspected criminals into informants (i.e. when the conditions of (C1) are not met). Here again, the insurgent group's payoff for punishing a criminal can be compared with the expected payoff for not punishing a criminal to determine their best response. The payoff to the insurgents for punishing the criminal is once again $(B_T - C_T)$. However, the payoff to the insurgents for not punishing is considerably different when the police are expected to attempt to turn suspected criminals into new informers. In this case, the payoff to the insurgents is $0[1 - p] + p[0(1 - q) + q(r(B_T - C_T) + I(1 - r))]$, which simplifies to $pq(r(B_T - C_T)I(1 - r))$. Given these expected payoffs, the insurgents will punish criminals when $(B_T - C_T) \geq pq(r(B_T - C_T)I(1 - r))$. Solving again for parameter I , this yields the following constraint: $\frac{(B_T - C_T)(1 - pqr)}{pqr - pq} \leq I$

(C3).

The three constraints derived above from the basis of the equilibrium of the left-hand side of the game. Thus, under the assumption that crime is initially reported to the insurgents, the equilibrium strategies of the two actors can be summarized as follows:

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{Government} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Punish if : } \frac{B_G - C_G}{q - qr} \geq I \\ \text{Not Punish : } \text{Otherwise} \end{array} \right. \\ \\ \mathbf{Insurgents} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Punish if : } B_T \geq C_T \mid \text{Government}_{Punish} \\ \mathbf{or} \\ \frac{(B_T - C_T)(1 - pqr)}{pqr - pq} \leq I \mid \text{Government}_{\sim Punish} \\ \text{Not Punish : } \text{Otherwise} \end{array} \right. \end{array}$$

3.2.2 Equilibrium behavior when the police move first

It is also necessary to assess the equilibrium predictions of the model under the alternative assumption that a crime is initially reported to the police. This section proceeds in a fashion similar to the previous one, applying the sub-game perfection solution concept to the right hand side of the game tree and deriving equilibrium constraints for both actors. Given that the police are granted the initial opportunity to either punish a criminal or coerce him into becoming an informant, it is necessary to begin this phase of the analysis by determining the conditions under which the insurgents will punish a suspected criminal that is set free by the police. Recall here that, at their terminal decision node, the insurgents face the same dichotomous choice as above. They can either administer a punishment attack or let the suspect go free. If the insurgents punish the suspect, then they receive a payoff of $(B_T - C_T)$. If, on the other hand, they decide not to punish the suspect for his initial crime, then there is some probability that the suspect has decided to become an informer (probability q), and, if so, that the insurgents later discover this to be the case (probability r). Given this risk, the payoff for not punishing the suspect is $0(1 - q) + q[r(B_T - C_T) - I(1 - r)]$, which simplifies to $qr(B_T - C_T) - I(q - qr)$. Given

these expected payoffs, the insurgents will punish suspected criminals when $(B_T - C_T) \geq qr(B_T - C_T) - I(q - qr)$. Solving for I , this inequality implies that insurgents will punish suspects released by the government when $\frac{(B_T - C_T)(1 - qr)}{qr - q} \leq I$.

It is now possible to determine how the police will respond to the initial report that a crime has been committed, given the expected behavior of the insurgents. If the police decide to punish the criminal initially, then they receive a payoff of $(B_G - C_G)$. On the other hand, if the insurgents are expected to punish a suspect set free by the police, then the expected utility of the police for not punishing the suspect is $(1 - p)[0(1 - q) + q(0r + I(1 - r))] + 0p$, which simplifies to $I(1 - p)(q(1 - r))$. Thus, the police will punish criminal suspects when $(B_G - C_G) \geq I(1 - p)(q(1 - r))$. Solving for parameter I , this inequality yields the following constraint $\frac{B_G - C_G}{(1 - p)(q - qr)} \geq I$.

To fully characterize the equilibrium, it is necessary to determine how the police will treat a suspect when they believe that the insurgents will not punish a criminal if he is set free. Again, the payoff for punishing the criminal is $(B_G - C_G)$. On the other hand, if the police attempt to coerce the criminal into becoming an informant, then their expected utility for this decision is $(1 - p)[0(1 - q) + q(0r + I(1 - r))] + p[0(1 - q) + q(0r + I(1 - r))]$, which simplifies to $I(q(1 - r))$. As a result, the police will punish a suspected criminal when $(B_G - C_G) \geq I(q(1 - r))$. Solving for parameter I , this yields the following constraint $\frac{B_G - C_G}{q - qr} \geq I$. Constraints four through six form the basis of the model equilibrium under the assumption that a crime is initially reported to the police. Complete strategy profiles for both actors under this assumption are as follows:

$$\text{Insurgents} \begin{cases} \text{Punish if : } & \frac{(B_T - C_T)(1 - qr)}{qr - q} \leq I \\ \text{Not Punish : } & \text{Otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Government} \begin{cases} \text{Punish if : } & \frac{B_G - C_G}{(1 - p)(q - qr)} \geq I \mid \text{Insurgents}_{\text{Punish}} \\ & \text{or} \\ & \frac{B_G - C_G}{q - qr} \geq I \mid \text{Insurgents}_{\sim \text{Punish}} \\ \text{Not Punish : } & \text{Otherwise} \end{cases}$$

3.2.3 Comparative Statics

Having derived the equilibrium constraints described above, it is now possible to assess how changes in the various exogenous model parameters influence the likelihood of the specified behaviors occurring. These relationships can be examined by taking the partial derivative of each constraint with respect to each of its constituent terms. Taking the partial derivative in this manner allows us to determine how changes in each parameter are related to changes in the overall value of the function, all else equal. As a result, the sign of the partial derivative indicates the direction of the expected relationship between the value of each parameter and the likelihood that a constraint holds. For instance, looking at constraint one, we can see the first derivative of this constraint with respect to B_G is $\frac{1}{q-qr}$. Given that q and r are both strictly positive and bounded between zero and one, we can see that the sign of this function is positive. This indicates that the left hand side of constraint one is increasing in the benefits of fighting crime, which in turn indicates that the likelihood that the government will punish a suspected criminal is increasing in the same parameter. Thus, comparative statics demonstrate that the police are more likely to punish criminals as the benefits of punishment increase, all else equal. The remainder of this section proceeds in a similar fashion and presents the full set of comparative statics for each constraint in each equilibrium condition.

Returning again to constraint one, we can see that the critical value for which the government will punish a suspected criminal is also influenced by C_G , the costs of policing, as well as q , the likelihood that a suspect will become an informer, and r , the likelihood that the insurgents will discover any new informers recruited by the police. The partial derivative of the constraint with respect to C_G is strictly negative, indicating that the government will be less likely to punish suspected criminals as the costs of policing increase. Turning to the two probability parameters, q and r , we can see that these parameters influence the Government's willingness to punish—or threaten to punish—suspected criminals regardless of the expected behavior of the Insurgents. The partial derivative of constraint one with respect to q is $\frac{B_G - C_G}{q^2(r-1)}$, which is positive so long as $C_G \geq B_G$ and negative otherwise. This result indicates that when the costs of ordinary policing outweigh

the benefits, governments will be *more* likely to punish individual criminals when they have greater confidence in their ability to recruit informers. On the other hand, when the benefits of ordinary policing outweigh the costs, governments will be less likely to punish suspected criminals as their chances of recruiting new informers increase. Parameter r , the likelihood that new informers are discovered and eliminated by the Insurgents, has the opposite affect on Government decision making. As the Insurgents become more adept at finding Government informants, the Government becomes more likely to punish suspected criminals, rather than attempt to recruit them as informants, when $B_G \geq C_G$. The opposite relationship holds when the costs of ordinary policing outweigh the benefits.

The affect of parameters p , q and r on the Insurgents' behavior is contingent upon the expected behavior of the Government. When the Government is expected to punish any criminals ignored by the Insurgents, the three probability parameters do not influence the insurgent group's decision making process. Under this expectation (Punish Government | Punish Insurgents), the Insurgents will always punish suspected criminals so long as they believe that $B_T \geq C_T$. However, under the opposite expectation (\sim Punish Government | Punish Insurgents), all three parameters interact with the costs and benefits of punishment attacks to determine the Insurgents' best response. With respect to parameter r , assuming that the Government will not punish, the Insurgents will be less likely to conduct punishment attacks as they become more confident in their ability to detect and eliminate government collaborators, so long as $C_T \geq B_T$. Parameters p and q have the opposite effect on the Insurgents' willingness to punish suspected criminals. The precise nature of the effect of parameter p , which represents the likelihood that a crime ignored by the Insurgents is subsequently reported to the Government, can be demonstrated by taking the partial derivative of constraint three with respect to parameter p . The result indicates that, assuming the Government will not punish, increases in p will induce the Insurgents to conduct more punishment attacks subject to the condition that the costs of punishment attacks outweigh the associated benefits ($C_T \geq B_T$). Increases in q , representing the likelihood that the Government will successfully recruit suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants, will induce the Insurgents to conduct more punishment

attacks, subject to the same conditions as parameter p . Regardless of the expected behavior of the Government, the Insurgents will conduct more punishment attacks when the benefits of doing so (B_T) increase and fewer punishment attacks as the associated costs (C_T) increase, all else equal.

Turning to the right hand side of figure 3.1, we can see that most of the formal relationships between model parameters and equilibrium behavior discovered on in the preceding analysis hold true regardless of which actor is given the first opportunity to punish a suspected criminal. The likelihood that the Insurgents will punish any criminals initially ignored by the Government is increasing in B_T and I and is decreasing in C_T . Similarly, regardless of their expectation over the Insurgents' behavior, the likelihood that the Government will punish a suspected criminal in the first instance is increasing in B_G and decreasing in both C_G and I . The effect of the probability parameters q and r on the Insurgents' terminal decision is subject to the same conditional relationship described previously. Parameter p has no effect on the Insurgents' decision when the Government is given the first opportunity to punish a suspected criminal. Similarly, if the Government believes that the Insurgents will ignore rather than punish criminals, then its initial decision is constrained in the same manner as if the Insurgents had been given the first opportunity to punish a suspect. Although the specific form of the Government's decision calculus changes slightly under the assumption that the Insurgents will instead punish criminals ignored by the Government, the effects of changes in all model parameters with the exception of parameter p nevertheless correspond to those derived from the preceding analysis.

If the Government believes the Insurgents will punish suspected criminals, then their initial response upon receiving a report of criminal activity is also conditioned by their belief that an ignored crime will subsequently be reported to the Insurgents, represented by model parameter p . When the benefits of ordinary policing outweigh the associated costs ($B_G \geq C_G$), an increase in the likelihood that the victim of a crime initially ignored by the Government will turn to the Insurgents for redress induces a corresponding increase in the likelihood that the Government will punish a suspected criminal in the first instance.

However, when the costs of ordinary policing outweigh the benefits ($C_T \geq B_G$), the opposite relationship holds; under this condition an increase in p will induce a decrease in the likelihood that the Government punishes a suspected criminal in the first instance.

3.2.4 Hypotheses

The comparative statics derived above allow us to produce a set of empirically verifiable hypotheses predicting the relationship between the various model parameters and the behavior of both the insurgents and the police. The remainder of this section briefly summarizes the hypotheses derived from the comparative statics and offers preliminary substantive interpretations of each by connecting the set of relationships predicted by the model to the substantive examples of government and insurgent group behavior described in the previous section.

The comparative statics analysis produced both linear and interactive hypotheses. The model generated linear predictions in terms of the relationship between the benefits of fighting crime, the costs of fighting crime and the value of intelligence on the one hand and the occurrence of punishment attacks and ordinary policing on the other. Both the government and the insurgent group are expected to dedicate more of their resources to fighting crime as the benefits of that activity increase, regardless of the expected response of their respective opponent. Thus:

H1A: *Insurgent groups will conduct more punishment attacks as the benefits of fighting crime increase.*

H1B: *Governments will dedicate more resources to ordinary, rather than counterinsurgency, policing as the benefits of fighting crime increase.*

These predictions are in line with our prior expectations, and they also fit the experience of the coalition provisional authority in Iraq and the Provisional Irish Republican Army described above.

The model also predicted a linear relationship between the costs of fighting crime and the willingness of insurgent groups to conduct punishment attacks on the one hand, and the

willingness of the government to engage in ordinary policing on the other. In particular, both actors were predicted to engage in less crime fighting when their respective costs increased, regardless of which actor was given the first opportunity to respond to a crime and irrespective of the expected behavior of the other actor. Thus:

H2A:*Insurgent groups will conduct fewer punishment attacks as the costs of punishment attacks increase.*

H2B:*Governments will dedicate fewer resources to ordinary policing as the costs of policing increase.*

Once again, these predictions fit with our prior expectations, and they also are in line with the observed behavior of the RUC in Northern Ireland and the Taliban in Afghanistan, as described above.

The model also produced linear predictions in terms of the relationship between the value of intelligence on the one hand and the frequency of punishment attacks and ordinary policing on the other. In this case, however, the model predicted opposite relationships between the parameter of interest and the behavior of each actor. In particular, governments appear less willing to engage in ordinary policing when the value of intelligence is high, while insurgent groups appear to be more willing to conduct punishment attacks under the same conditions. Thus:

H3A:*Insurgent groups will conduct more punishment attacks as the value of intelligence increases.*

H3B:*Governments will engage in less ordinary policing as the value of intelligence increases.*

Recall here that it was previously assumed that counterinsurgency informants can be created in two ways within the logic of the model presented above. First, when the insurgents punish a suspected criminal, they risk alienating both the individual punished and his/her loved ones and potentially driving these individuals to seek revenge by voluntarily providing the police with information on local insurgent activity. Second, if the insurgents

ignore criminal activity in their communities, then the police might use the investigation of “ordinary” crime as a ruse for pressing suspected criminals into service as informants. Recall also that it was assumed that the insurgents account for the former possibility as a component of the costs of punishment attacks ($C_{Insurgents}$). Given these assumptions, all else equal, H3A captures the basic logic of the latter mechanism by which informants can be created. When the police know relatively little about an insurgent group and, therefore, assign a high value to even the most rudimentary information about the group’s activities, the insurgent group will have a greater incentive to punish suspected criminals as a means of denying the status quo government access to an important potential avenue for gathering intelligence, all else equal. Put differently, when insurgent groups suspect that the police are most likely to coerce suspected criminals into becoming informers, they will have a greater incentive to punish those criminals in order to prevent the police from coming into contact with these individuals.

At the same time, for the government, H3B captures the premium that counterinsurgents often place on collecting information about insurgent activity, often at the expense of their ability to uphold law and order. This preference is likely to be most acute when the government knows little or nothing about the insurgent group. When the government has little or no actionable intelligence regarding an insurgent group, the group is likely to pose a significant existential threat to the government that cannot be equaled by the threat posed by discontent resulting from high crime rates. Thus, when new counterinsurgency intelligence is most valuable to the government, the government will have a rational incentive to ignore its responsibilities in the area of ordinary law enforcement in favor of using its resources to combat and eliminate the threat posed by the insurgent group. This finding sheds light on why counterinsurgents in Northern Ireland, Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated a tendency to withdraw civilian police forces in favor of military patrols in times and places when the insurgents appear to be gaining the upper hand in the battle over information.

The linear predictions presented in the preceding paragraphs capture many of the tradeoffs and tensions faced by both governments and insurgent groups as they attempt

to balance the costs and benefits of their simultaneous wars on crime and against one another. For insurgent groups and the governments they seek to depose the decision to either fight or ignore crime is a function of a particular costs versus benefits analysis. Changes in the costs and benefits of fighting crime—as well as the government’s potential utility for ignoring “ordinary” criminal behavior in favor of counterinsurgency operations—influence the willingness of each actor to shoulder the responsibility for finding and punishing thieves, vandals and other criminals in specific ways, regardless of their expectations over the other’s most likely response.

However, the comparative statics analysis presented above also demonstrated the strategic and interactive nature of the decisions faced by both the Government and the Insurgents who are in competition to both win on the battlefield and establish hegemony as providers of law and order to their constituents. Indeed, each actor calculates the relative utility of punishing or not punishing criminals quite differently depending on the anticipated response of their opponent. This feature of the model is demonstrated by the contrast between the Insurgents’ punishment constraint under different assumptions regarding the Government’s expected behavior. Under the assumption that the Government will punish criminals ignored by the Insurgents, the insurgent group’s decision is simplified into a direct costs versus benefits analysis. In these circumstances, the Insurgents will punish all criminals brought to their attention, so long as the benefits of doing so outweigh the associated costs. In contrast, if the Government is expected to recruit suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants, then the Insurgents’ evaluation of the relative utility of fighting or ignoring crime becomes much more complex. In particular, the Insurgents must now account explicitly for the likelihood that a crime ignored by the Insurgents themselves will subsequently be brought to the attention of the Government. Furthermore, the Insurgents must also consider the probability that the Government will succeed in its efforts to turn suspected criminals into counterinsurgency informants, as well as the likelihood that the Insurgents themselves will be able to detect and eliminate any new informants so created by the Government.

Thus, the insurgents will behave differently given the same levels of costs and benefits

for punishment attacks, contingent upon their expectation of the Government's behavior and, ultimately, their assessment of the parameters highlighted above. Given that the Government will attempt to recruit suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants, changes in the value of any one of the three probability parameters (p, q, r) can potentially induce the Insurgents to punish the same criminals even when the direct benefits of doing so are more than offset by the material and opportunity costs resulting from punishment attacks. For instance if $C_T \geq B_T$, then an increase in r - representing the likelihood that the insurgents discover a new informant created by the police - will produce a decrease in the likelihood that the Insurgents will punish a suspected criminal. Thus:

H4A: *All else equal, if the costs of punishment attacks outweigh the benefits, then insurgents will conduct fewer punishment attacks as they become more adept at identifying and eliminating new informers.*

Contrastingly, the comparative statics analysis indicates the opposite relationship between parameters q and p , on the one hand, and the willingness of the Insurgents to conduct punishment attacks on the other, given the conditions outlined above. Thus:

H4B: *All else equal, if the costs of punishment attacks are greater than the benefits, then insurgent groups will conduct more punishment attacks as the ability of the police to coerce suspected criminals into becoming informers increases.*

H4C: *All else equal, if the benefits of punishment attacks are less than the costs, then insurgent groups will conduct more punishment attacks as the likelihood that crimes ignored by the insurgents are reported to the police increases.*

3.3 Conclusion

The formal model presented in this chapter makes a number of significant contributions to the literature on insurgent-against-civilian violence. First, the proposed model explicitly seeks to explain variation in the occurrence of non-lethal insurgent-against civilian violence. Existing literature has largely focused on explaining the dynamics of lethal violence and has tended to ignore non-lethal violence on both an empirical and a theoretical level. This is problematic because it is unlikely that punishment attacks are caused by the same

set of factors thought to motivate lethal violence against civilians. Punishment attacks typically target suspected criminals, rather than suspected informers, and the victims of these attacks typically live to tell their tales. As a result, punishment attacks actually have the potential to create new informers for the state and might actually diminish the insurgents' ability to fight effectively against the security forces. Unlike existing theories of insurgent-against-civilian violence, exemplified by the work of Kalyvas (2006) and Kalyvas and Kocher (2009), the model proposed above incorporates this important insight about the unique costs associated with carrying out intentionally non-lethal violence against civilians, and demonstrates how, under certain conditions, even the use of selective, although non-lethal, violence can be quite costly to the perpetrator. By explicitly placing the decision to carry out punishment attacks in tension with the insurgent group's short-term battlefield objectives, the model makes systematic predictions about the conditions under which insurgents will be willing to forego short-term battlefield successes in favor of advancing their long-term, institution building objectives. Finally, by incorporating both the insurgents and the security forces as strategic actors, the model is able to demonstrate how each actor's expectations over the other's behavior condition decision making.

Chapter 4

The People's Police?

This chapter utilizes a novel data set of republican punishment attacks in Northern Ireland, aggregated at the local government area (LGA) level, in order to test quantitatively the empirical implications of the theoretical model outlined in the previous chapter. By taking advantage of the substantial geographical and temporal variation in the distribution of both punishment shootings and punishment beatings in Ulster, this analysis presents a robust empirical test of the theory proposed above while simultaneously making a valuable contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of violence in Northern Ireland in particular. The results presented here serve to increase our confidence in the explanatory power of the model and serve as a springboard to a series of more detailed qualitative analyses that further demonstrate the robustness of these predictions across an even broader time period.

By analyzing the occurrence of violence in Northern Ireland at the LGA level, this chapter follows a recent trend in the literature on civil war and other forms of intrastate conflict by first theoretically specifying and then empirically testing the set of conditions that lead the same groups, in the same conflicts to use different amounts of violence in different places and at different times. While this type of research design is extremely data intensive, it offers a number of advantages over other types of quantitative studies, and particularly over those that focus on country-level variation in levels of violence. Country-level studies can tell us a great deal about why some conflicts are so much bloodier

than others, and indeed scholars have learned much about the determinants of civil war onset and intensity using this type of research design. However, by their very nature, country-level studies conceal nearly as much as they reveal about the dynamics of violence within a given conflict or set of conflicts. For instance, a comparison of the past five years of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan unsurprisingly reveals that the latter conflict has been much bloodier than the former in recent years. Unfortunately, such a country-level comparisons cannot be used to answer the equally vital question of why Helmand and Kandahar provinces in Afghanistan have been such deadly places for US and coalition forces, while only six coalition soldiers have been killed in Nimruz province, less than one-half of one percent of the total number of troops killed in Helmand and Kandahar.


This weakness of country level research designs is all the more troubling because even the factors identified by these studies as being correlated with the occurrence and intensity of armed conflict are likely to vary, not only from group to group and country to country, but also from province to province and city to city within the same country. For instance, Thompson's (1989) analysis tests the aggregate relationship between the occurrence of terrorism related fatalities and economic deprivation in Northern Ireland. Thompson's results indicate that no such relationship exists. However, subsequent studies using data aggregated at the ward or constituency level have found greater evidence supporting a link between deprivation and violence in Northern Ireland (Fay, Morrissey and Smyth 1999).

Furthermore, different sub-national units within the same country often react differently to changes in the country level strategic environment. For instance, country level studies of Northern Ireland have drawn attention to the increase in republican punishment attacks that historically accompanied the onset of a Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) ceasefire. Indeed, the total number of republican punishment attacks (RPAs) throughout Northern Ireland increased significantly when the PIRA set aside its weapons in 1975 and a similar increase accompanied the arrival of the group's ceasefire in 1994. However, a closer look at the data reveals that the consequences of PIRA ceasefires were felt very differently from one LGA to another.

Figure 4.1 shows the difference in the number of republican punishment attacks per

10,000 inhabitants in each LGA between 1993¹ and 1995. PIRA operatives in Belfast, Derry and South Armagh appear to have led the way in the transition from the war against the British state in Ireland to the war on drugs and anti-social behavior in republican communities. All three LGAs averaged nearly two more attacks per 10,000 inhabitants in the first full year of peace than occurred during the last full year of war. However, the trend was different in other republican strongholds. In Craigavon, the rate of republican violence also increased during the ceasefire period, but the increase was relatively smaller with only 0.39 attacks per 10,000 inhabitants, and in Dungannon republican paramilitaries actually conducted fewer punishment attacks in 1995 than they had two years previously. A research design focused on exploring aggregate relationships between national level strategic conditions and national levels of violence would not be able to detect or explain these varied local outcomes.

Figure 4.1: Change in Frequency of Republican Punishment Attacks per 10,000 Inhabitants Between 1993 and 1995



¹1993 was the last full year of conflict before the PIRA's initial ceasefire was declared in August 1994.

Fortunately, Northern Ireland presents a rich empirical domain in which to conduct a sub-national analysis. By the early 1990s the Provisional Irish Republican Army had become the dominant paramilitary group in Catholic communities throughout Northern Ireland, as evidenced by the ease with which the group dispatched an upstart Belfast rival in 1992. As a result, we can be reasonably confident that the vast majority of republican punishment attacks conducted in Northern Ireland during this period were the result of PIRA activity. Furthermore, the PIRA's longstanding presence, combined with the group's frequent and highly publicized involvement in punishing drug dealers and the like, increases the likelihood that both ordinary people and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) were aware of the possibility that PIRA operatives might be called upon to deal with criminality and anti-social behavior in republican communities. Furthermore, data on both punishment attacks and a variety of factors predicted to be associated with those attacks are available at relatively detailed levels of observation, and the boundaries of sub-national units have not changed over time. The conflict in Northern Ireland occurred in a peripheral region of an industrialized western democracy and, as a result, the amount of both qualitative and quantitative data available on conflict outcomes, such as punishment attacks and fatalities, as well as general developments in society, such as unemployment and police deployment patterns, were reliably collected at a detailed level throughout the conflict.

Northern Ireland is divided into 26 LGAs whose boundaries were established by the Local Government (Boundaries) Act (Northern Ireland) 1971. Despite the relative legislative weakness of their governing bodies, LGAs have been used since their inception as output areas for a wide range of official government statistics. In particular, the Office of National Statistics (ONS) and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) release a number of annual and monthly economic and demographic indicators, as well as the results of the decennial census, at the local government level. Additionally, following the implementation of a series of reforms to policing in Northern Ireland in 2001, local councils have also taken on increasing importance as primary points of contact with the reconstituted Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) by way of so-called District

Policing Partnerships. To facilitate this closer working relationship with local councils, the PSNI itself also reformed its command structure to ensure that the boundaries of police command units correspond to the boundaries of the 26 LGAs, and allowing for a further division of the Belfast City Council area into four geographically separate policing districts.² Since that time, the police have collected data on all types of crime, including punishment attacks and other types of paramilitary related violence, at the LGA level. The police have also collected data on the seizure of weapons and explosives at the district level over the same time period. The statistics and research branch of the PSNI was able to supplement these figures with data derived from the pre-2001 police subdivisions so that the unit of observation corresponds to the boundaries of the post-2001 policing districts, with the exception of a handful of individual police stations that have been transferred to other districts or closed down since that time.

The analysis that follows exploits the availability of this geographically disaggregated data on RPAs. This is a significant advantage because the occurrence of punishment attacks has varied so greatly over both space and time in Northern Ireland. Even if we were to restrict our analysis to districts that are known to contain traditional republican strongholds, such as West Belfast, East Tyrone, South Armagh and Derry City, we would observe significant differences in the number of punishment attacks reported in each of these places. Why is this the case? Why was the PIRA willing to dedicate a great deal of its time and effort to dealing with criminality and anti-social behavior in some areas, while ignoring these same issues in other areas? The remainder of this chapter leverages the theoretical insights derived from the formal model in the previous chapter against the geographically disaggregated data outlined above to answer this vital question. To that end, the chapter proceeds in four parts. Section 4.1 provides a brief review of the hypotheses derived from the formal model, and contrasts these predictions with those derived from alternative theories. Having established these empirical expectations, section 4.2 presents a discussion of issues related to research design and data collection. The primary objective here is to map the variables included in the statistical model to

²Under the terms of this realignment the police have combined the Moyle and Ballymoney LGAs into a single police command unit.

the theoretical parameters discussed previously, while simultaneously demonstrating the validity of each variable as an indicator of the underlying concept being discussed. Section 4.3 presents the results of the statistical analysis. Finally, section 4.4 concludes with a discussion of the implications of these findings.

4.1 Hypotheses

This section proceeds in two parts. Part one reviews the findings of the formal model originally presented in the previous chapter. Rather than reproducing the entire formal proof of the model, the underlying logic of the theory will be reviewed, with an emphasis placed on explicating the hypotheses tested in this chapter. The second part of this section presents a series of rival explanations of why insurgent groups might conduct punishment attacks and derives empirically testable hypotheses from these alternatives.

4.1.1 The Formal Model

As has been highlighted previously, insurgent groups present punishment attacks as an alternative to the formal institutions of law and order maintained by the state. Since these groups typically do not have prisons, parole boards or probation officers available to them, they utilize extreme, although typically non-lethal, forms of physical violence to punish suspected criminals, deter future offenders and provide victims with a sense of satisfaction. In taking on this role, however, insurgent groups confront a series of strategic dilemmas that often place their involvement in fighting crime directly in tension with their broader objective of defeating the forces of the state on the battlefield. Any weapons or manpower utilized in the commission of punishment attacks cannot simultaneously be used to plan or carry out attacks against the army and the police. Furthermore, the victims of punishment attacks, who typically are not suspected of collaborating with the security forces, might seek retribution against their assailants by providing the police with information on local insurgent activity. As a result, insurgent efforts toward fighting crime have the potential to undermine the group's ability to obtain victory on the battlefield, and these two objectives must be carefully balanced against each other.

The model presented in chapter three captured these strategic tensions, placing an insurgent group and a police force in competition with one another to become the dominant provider of law and order. Confronted with a crime, the insurgent leader must decide whether or not it is in the group's best interest to dedicate manpower and matériel to finding and punishing the suspected criminal. This decision was represented as being a function of six factors. These were the benefits of punishment attacks, the costs of punishment attacks, the value of intelligence to the police, the ability of the insurgents to detect new informers, the likelihood that a crime ignored by the insurgents will be reported to the police and the likelihood that the police succeed in any attempt to recruit suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants.

The benefits that insurgent groups derive from punishment attacks are largely a function of the extent to which these activities advance the group's long-term, institution-building goals and increase their support in the local community. Essentially, punishment attacks send a signal to local people that the insurgent group is both aware of and capable of responding to problems like vandalism, theft and sexual assault in their community (Hamill 2011). More generally, by conducting punishment attacks, the insurgent group hopes to exploit public dissatisfaction with the police force and other formal institutions of justice as part of their general campaign to undermine and ultimately replace the existing state. Thus, the benefits of punishment attacks should be greatest in those areas where the insurgents believe public frustration with the official police force to be relatively high. By actively responding to local crime, the insurgents are able to exploit the perceived ineffectiveness of the police and demonstrate that they are more adept at dealing with this important problem than are the forces of the status quo government. Comparative statics derived from the model in chapter three produced a formal proof indicating that, all else equal, as the benefits of punishment attacks increase, insurgent groups will conduct more of these attacks. As a result, we would expect to see evidence of a positive correlation between public disappointment with the police and the number of punishment attacks.

Although insurgent groups can derive meaningful benefits from their involvement in crime fighting, this type of activity also imposes significant costs on the organizations

that participate in it. Punishment attacks impose both material and opportunity costs on insurgent groups. As was highlighted in the previous chapter, punishment attacks are materially costly to the extent that they involve the use of an insurgent group's scarce resources such as manpower, vehicles, weapons and ammunition. In most insurgencies, manpower in particular is at a premium, as battlefield casualties and arrests deplete the insurgent group's already relatively small labor force. The extreme scarcity of these resources means that the costliness of dedicating them to finding and punishing suspected criminals is magnified by the opportunity costs implied by such a decision. Any men, firearms, ammunition or vehicles used in the commission of a punishment attack cannot, simultaneously, be used to plan or carry out an attack on an army patrol or a police station. Additionally, by the brutal means of punishment typically employed by insurgent groups have the potential to alienate the victims of punishment attacks, as well as their friends and loved ones, and to motivate these individuals to seek revenge against the insurgents by actively collaborating with the status quo government. As a result, insurgents must weigh these costs carefully against any perceived benefits of engaging in punishment attacks.

Here again, the comparative statics derived in chapter three provide an insight into how an insurgent leader might balance these scales. The formal model predicts that, as the costs of punishment attacks increase, insurgent groups should conduct fewer punishment attacks. Thus, we would expect to observe more punishment attacks when insurgent resources are relatively plentiful and fewer attacks when insurgent resources are scarce. However, the model also indicates that the costs of punishment attacks are discounted by the insurgent group's assessment of its ability to detect and eliminate new collaborators in its midst. When the insurgents believe their counterintelligence operations to be relatively effective, they will weigh the costs of punishment attacks less heavily than they otherwise would.

In addition to the costs and benefits of punishment attacks themselves, insurgent groups must also be concerned with the potential consequences of ignoring local criminal activity. In particular, they must account for the possibility that a spurned victim of crime might turn to the police and that the police, in turn, might use the threat of jail time

against a suspected criminal to coerce him into providing information on local insurgent activity. The effect of both of these factors on the insurgent group's decision conditions the group's assessment of the costs and benefits of fighting crime. The risk that the police might be given an opportunity to intervene in the case of a crime ignored by the insurgents induces the insurgent group to conduct punishment attacks in circumstances when the immediate benefits of doing so are relatively low. Thus, we would expect to observe more punishment attacks as the benefits of fighting crime decrease and the likelihood that crime is reported to the police increases. Similarly, when the insurgent group believes that the police are likely to succeed in any attempt to recruit suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants, they will discount the costs of punishment attacks. As a result, we should observe an increase in the frequency of punishment attacks as both the costs of fighting crime and the ability of the police to recruit criminals as counterinsurgency informants increase.

Finally, insurgent groups must also consider how valuable *new* intelligence extracted from suspected criminals might be to the police and how damaging the same information might be to the insurgent group itself. In circumstances when the police know relatively little about an insurgent group's members and organizational structure, the type of low-level intelligence provided by common criminals is likely to be highly prized by the police. However, the value of this type of information is likely to diminish as the police expand their intelligence dossiers and gain access to better placed sources within the insurgent movement. As a result, the police will place a higher premium on the counterinsurgency-related information extracted from "ordinary" criminals when they possess relatively little *ex ante* information about an insurgent group, and this type of intelligence is likely to be most damaging to the insurgent group itself under the same conditions. Thus, we would expect the insurgents to conduct more punishment attacks when new intelligence is highly valued by the police so as to limit the ability of the police to use criminal investigations as a ruse for recruiting new counterinsurgency informants.

These hypotheses provide a compelling account not only of why insurgent groups conduct punishment attacks, but also of why they are likely to conduct relatively more of

these attacks at some times and in some places than others. No single factor can be said to completely 'cause' punishment attacks. Rather, the proceeding section has demonstrated that insurgent groups carefully assess their broader strategic environment before deciding how much of their scarce manpower and other resources should be dedicated to fighting crime. Each area in which an insurgent group operates is likely to be characterized by a different arrangement of the factors identified above, and in each case the leadership of the insurgent group must weigh the potential costs and benefits of punishment attacks against an array of other strategic factors including the relationship between criminal and counterinsurgency policing and the expected response of the police to crime in the community.

4.1.2 Alternative Explanations

While the hypotheses presented above provide a vivid explanation of when and where insurgent groups will be most likely to conduct punishment attacks, it is also necessary to consider possible alternative explanations for the behavior under analysis. In particular, it is important to review competing hypotheses derived from the existing literature on punishment attacks and insurgent-against-civilian violence more generally to compare the predictions derived from existing theories to those presented in the previous section. The remainder of this section develops a set of empirically testable alternative hypotheses focusing on socio-economic factors, such as the unemployment rate in and the demographic composition of different towns and districts. Generally, these theories predict a positive correlation between factors such as economic deprivation and crime on the one hand and punishment attacks on the other.

Since the publication of Gurr's (1970) seminal work *Why Men Rebel*, social scientists have been drawn to the hypothesis that economic deprivation — or at least the perception of deprivation — leads to political violence. Regardless of the specific causal mechanism, the empirical hypothesis is generally the same: political violence is more likely in places with higher levels of economic inequality. This claim has been repeatedly tested and challenged in the literature on civil war onset, and these studies have produced decidedly

mixed results. Nevertheless, there is also some evidence of a significant correlation between economic deprivation and political violence (Thompson 1989, White 1993, Honaker 2005, Hayes and McAllister 2001) in the case under analysis here. Similarly, Monaghan and McLaughlin (2006, 184) attribute fluctuations in the number of punishment attacks in Belfast between 1998 and 2005 to “the rising levels of petty crime” in economically deprived areas, amongst other factors.³ Insurgent groups offer punishment attacks as their entry in the marketplace to provide crime fighting services in competition with the formal institutions of law and order administered by status quo governments. Demand for these services is likely to be a function of the crime rate. As the crime rate increases, the demand for crime fighting should also increase. Furthermore, the benefits of successfully punishing suspected criminals should be highest in those areas in which the demand for crime fighting is highest. As a result, socioeconomic deprivation should be positively correlated with both the benefits of punishment attacks and the frequency with which these attacks occur.

Logically, such a competition between insurgent groups and status quo governments can only occur in those areas in which the insurgent group has an established presence on the ground. For instance, the PIRA did not commit a single punishment attack in the staunchly Protestant, middle class North Down LGA during the entire period from 1990 until the group decommissioned its weapons in 2005. Similarly, over the same time period, an average of less than two punishment attacks per year were recorded in loyalist East Belfast, while North and West Belfast experienced an average of more than 16 and more than 35 attacks, respectively. What accounts for the lack of republican activity against crime and anti-social behavior in these two areas, as well as the other four LGAs that experienced no republican punishment attacks of any kind between 1990 and 2000?

A possible explanation for the absence of PIRA punishment attacks in the areas high-

³The other factors cited by Monaghan and McLaughlin are “the absence of a legitimate or adequate policing service . . . and, the perceived failure of the formal criminal justice system” (2006, 184). These conclusions highlight the competition between the police and paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland. The present analysis builds on these insights, as well as similar conclusions offered by Kennedy (1995) and Silke (2000; 2001) developing a theoretically rigorous and empirically testable account of precisely how both police forces and insurgent groups condition their own response to crime on the expected response of their respective opponent.


lighted above can be derived from a logical extension of Fearon and Laitin's (1996) model of ethnic in-group policing. Fearon and Laitin are primarily concerned with how ethnic groups manage defection against the ethnic other committed by their own members. They demonstrate that, if a member of ethnic group A infringes on the rights of a member of group B, then group B will ignore the infringement, so long as there is a reasonable expectation that group A will independently punish the perpetrator. On the other hand, if group A is not expected to punish the perpetrator, then group B might take matters into its own hands, potentially initiating a spiral toward broader interethnic conflict and violence.

Recall here that punishment attacks typically target individuals suspected of some form of petty crime, such as vandalism or robbery. Despite this difference in motivation, the central dynamics of Fearon and Laitin's model can also be applied to punishment attacks. First, their theoretical findings would apply directly to a situation in which a Catholic was the victim of some form of assault, vandalism, robbery or other petty crime at the hands of a Protestant. To the extent that both the PIRA and other members of the Catholic community believed that the Protestant perpetrator would be punished by a loyalist paramilitary organization, there would be little incentive for the PIRA itself to pursue the perpetrator. The PIRA's incentive to punish suspected criminals from the Protestant would be further reduced by the possibility that any such action could potentially initiate the spiral of interethnic retaliation and counter-retaliation described above. Protestant paramilitary groups would have little reason to believe that the PIRA would punish itself for taking this course of action. Given these beliefs, Protestant groups might take matters into their own hands by identifying and punishing the members of any PIRA units caught conducting punishment attacks in Protestant areas.

Given these theoretical expectations, it is hardly surprising to observe that PIRA punishment squads steered clear of areas like North Down and Newtownabbey. The bar graph presented as figure 4.2 demonstrates that loyalist punishment attacks were much more prevalent in the five LGAs in which no republican punishment attacks occurred between 1994 and 2000 than in those areas that experienced at least one republican attack

during the same time period. Indeed, on average LGAs in the former group experienced nearly twice as many loyalist punishment attacks than did LGAs in the latter group.⁴ Thus, loyalist and republican paramilitary groups appear to have settled on a kind of ‘in-group policing’ equilibrium when it comes to crime within their own communities, and it is important to control for this arrangement in the statistical analysis presented below. Furthermore, it is also possible to offer an alternative interpretation of the theoretical

Figure 4.2: Average Number of Loyalist Punishment Attacks
1994-2000



linkage between the crime rate and the particular brand of justice practiced by groups like the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Here it is important to recall that insurgent groups simultaneously seek supremacy on the battlefield and hegemony in the provision of public services. In both of these areas, the insurgents are in direct competition with the armed forces and institutions of the status quo government. The contest on the battlefield is easily observed as each side launches attacks against the other, losing men and gaining or losing territory in the process. In contrast, the competition to become the

⁴The five regions in which no republican attacks occurred between 1994 and 2000 experienced an annual average of 7.31 loyalist punishment attacks during the same time period, while LGAs in which at least one republican attack occurred experienced an annual average of 3.9 loyalist attacks. The difference in means is statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level.

dominant provider of public services can play out in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from the provision of educational or welfare services to the establishment of law and order. Essentially, each of these areas can be thought of as a market in which competitors seek to become the monopoly provider of the good. However, before this competition can take place, the insurgent group must determine when and where it is in the group's best interest to challenge the status quo government's ex ante monopoly status. In each case, the size of the market will influence the willingness of the insurgent group to enter into competition with the state, to the extent that market size reflects the ultimate value to be gained from displacing the state as the dominant provider of the good in question. Insurgents will be more likely to enter larger markets because the value of victory is likely to be greater and the marginal costs of entry are likely to be lower, especially when the good is being under provided by the status quo government.

This is particularly likely to be true in the market for law enforcement, where the size of the market is primarily a function of the crime rate. Demand for law enforcement is likely to be highest in areas with relatively high crime rates. As a result, the insurgent group can make an initial entry into these markets at relatively low cost to itself by picking up the slack left by the unwillingness or inability of the state to adequately respond to local crime. However, once the insurgent group makes a decision to enter this relatively large market, it must also make a decision over how much of its scarce resources to dedicate to the provision of vigilante justice. This latter decision is unlikely to be a direct function of the crime rate. Instead, the insurgent group must weigh marginal costs and benefits of each additional punishment attack in terms of the group's relationship with the local population and its war against the status quo government. As a result, it is necessary to model both stages of this decision, evaluating both when the insurgent group will enter the market for law enforcement and how it will weight the production of this good against its other objectives, both in the community and on the battlefield.

4.2 Data and Methods

The following section describes and discusses the data collected for statistical analysis in light of the empirical expectations established above. The objective here is to connect each concept elaborated in the previous section to a quantitative indicator. To that end, the following section discusses each concept and indicator in tandem, beginning with a brief restatement of the concept. This conceptual review is followed by a description of the variable used to measure the concept. The discussion of each concept-variable pair concludes with a restatement of the expected nature of the statistical relationship between the variable and the number of punishment attacks.

4.2.1 Republican Punishment Attacks

The present analysis is primarily concerned with explaining why insurgent groups engage in punishment attacks as a distinct form of violence against their civilian constituents. As has been highlighted previously, three criteria differentiate punishment attacks from other forms of insurgent violence against civilians. These are selectivity, motivation and methodology. In contrast to bomb attacks on shopping malls, markets or other public spaces, punishment attacks are selective in the sense that the insurgent group makes an effort to identify and attack a specific target for a specific reason. In addition to being selective, punishment attacks typically target individuals suspected of engaging in theft, vandalism or some other form of anti-social or criminal behavior rather than suspected informers. Finally, although punishment attacks are typically quite brutal affairs, they are also most often intentionally non-lethal. Victims may lose limbs or be disfigured for life, but precautions are usually taken to ensure that the individual does not die as a direct result of the attack. These three criteria distinguish punishment attacks from other forms of violence against civilians.⁵

Data on punishment attacks were obtained from the central statistics unit of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). The police in Northern Ireland have kept records on

⁵Punishment attacks can also be intentionally fatal. For instance, the practice of stoning adulterers in Afghanistan and Somalia typically leads to the death of the victim, and the New People's Army in the Philippines often killed suspected drug dealers rather than flogging or otherwise injuring them.

the annual number of punishment shootings occurring in the province since 1973. The data distinguish between loyalist and republican punishment attacks, but they do not provide more precise information on the exact organizations responsible for the attacks. From 1990 to the present, the data have been disaggregated by police district-year. The geographic units of observation correspond to the current boundaries of police District Command Units (DCU), which themselves correspond to the boundaries of Northern Ireland's LGAs and were implemented in 2001.⁶

In a 2010 response to an independent Freedom of Information Act (FOI) request, the police also placed a working definition of what they refer to as paramilitary style assaults in the public record. In that definition, the police provided their criteria for including an incident in the statistics on punishment attacks, and also gave a more general description of punishment attacks, as perceived by the PSNI. According to the FOI response, police statistics on paramilitary style assaults

include all victims of an assault or shooting carried out on an individual or individuals by one or more persons usually from their own community. Typically, the reasoning behind the attack is either to intimidate the victim or to punish them for anti-social activities. Each paramilitary style attack is verified by the Investigating Officer [sic]... [The police] count all paramilitary style attacks where physical injury is inflicted on an individual – both major or minor injury. In the case of a paramilitary style shooting, the injured party is usually shot in the knees, elbows, feet, ankles or thighs.

This official definition also emphasizes the selective and non-lethal nature of punishment attacks, although it is somewhat ambiguous on the question of motivation. Given the relatively close fit between the conceptualization of punishment attacks used in this project and the definition used by the police in collecting their own data, the PSNI data should serve as an appropriate indicator for the dependent variable.

LGAs represent the lowest level of geography for which reliable data are available on punishment attacks in Northern Ireland. It is important to note that each LGA includes

⁶Prior to that year, the RUC used a system of police divisions and sub-divisions, and while the boundaries of the pre-existing divisions did not match those of the current DCUs, the central statistics unit was able to rearrange the subdivisions and stations to match current boundaries, with the exception of a small number of stations that were either closed or transferred to a different sub-district, but in which no punishment attacks were ever recorded.

numerous towns and communities, and it is more common for people in Northern Ireland to identify as members of their neighborhood or village than as residents of their specific LGA.⁷ There is also some evidence that decisions regarding when and where to conduct punishment attacks were made by a mixture of local and regional PIRA personnel. In 1992 Sinn Féin councilor Joe Austin described how punishment attacks were generally administered by the PIRA. Austin told reporters from Human Rights Watch that the victims of crime would report an incident to a local PIRA volunteer who, in turn, would refer the case to a “Civil Administration Board” composed of local members of SF and the PIRA. A three member committee would then decide on the guilt or innocence of the individual, and the local PIRA commander would then be given discretion over how to handle any parties found guilty (Whitman 1992, 39-40).⁸ Although these decisions might appear to be primarily local affairs, authorization from brigade commanders, who would have been in charge of the day to day operations for large swaths of territory such as the city of Belfast, South Armagh and East Tyrone, would have been required in order to procure weapons for punishment shootings. Furthermore, evidence provided by Hamill (2011) indicates that, at least in Belfast, PIRA volunteers were expected to follow strict protocols in terms of gaining authorization from higher authorities within the organization prior to punishing a suspect.⁹ These “higher level” PIRA decision makers would have been keenly aware of both local concerns regarding support for the police as well as more regional issues, such as the amount of manpower or the number of weapons available for carrying out military operations or punishment attacks at any given time.

4.2.2 The Benefits of Punishment Attacks

Recall here that the benefits of punishment attacks were conceptualized as the gains made by the insurgents in terms of their long-term objective of undermining, and ultimately

⁷See Shirlow and Murtagh (2006) for a discussion of the importance of neighborhood identities in Belfast in particular.

⁸Others, particularly (Kennedy 1995) have disputed Austin’s characterization of the supposed level of due process afforded the victims of punishment attacks.

⁹One ex-prisoner informed Hamill that mistakes made in the early 1970s led the PIRA to adopt a system under which punishments must “go to a higher level, it can’t be done at a lower [i.e. the individual volunteer] level. Certainly, they [the individual volunteers] can recommend and they will be listened to, but it isn’t their decision, it’s at a higher level at that stage (2011, 37).

replacing, the institutions of the existing state. By their very nature, then, the benefits of punishment attacks are essentially zero-sum: any gains made by the insurgents in this area translate directly into losses for the state police force. Recall also, however, that the model assumes that for the insurgents to benefit at the expense of the police, they must first choose to engage in the actual practice of fighting crime, regardless of their opponent's course of action. For instance, if a crime is reported to the police and the police decide to do nothing, then the insurgents must punish the criminal in order to capitalize on the inaction of the police. If the insurgents do nothing, then the people's disenchantment with the police is offset by an equal sense of disappointment directed at the insurgents, who would have proven themselves to be equally ineffectual and indifferent in the face of local criminal activity. Given this interpretation, we would expect the potential benefits of punishment attacks to be highest in those areas that exhibit the highest level of disappointment with the police force's response to ordinary crime.

With this conceptualization in mind, the benefits of punishment attacks are operationalized as the percentage of Catholics claiming that they would contact the police if they had knowledge of an ordinary crime. Protestants are excluded in the construction of this variable because Catholics constitute the PIRA's core constituency. The Community Attitude Survey (CAS) asked respondents "If you had information about an ordinary crime, a nuisance, or disturbance, which one of the things on this card would you be most likely to do?" Respondents were then shown a card listing eight options, including six different methods of contacting the police, as well as the option to not report the crime or to express no preference. The CAS was conducted in fiscal years from 1993/4 to 1997/8 and in calendar years from 1999 to 2001. Following the logic of hypothesis 2B, which predicted a positive correlation between the benefits of punishment shootings and the frequency with which they occur, we would expect to observe more punishment shootings in those times and places where there is evidence of significant alienation between the police and the people. Thus, a decrease in the percentage of the population claiming that they would report a crime to the police should be correlated with an increase in the number of punishment attacks.

It is important to note at this point that the measure proposed here does have some drawbacks. The first and most obvious shortcoming of this indicator is that it was derived from a survey conducted over fiscal years for much of its existence. To correct for possible measurement error introduced by using fiscal year data, the analysis was conducted using a two-year moving average of the indicator. The second problem with this variable is the lack of geographic disaggregation. Up to the year 2000, the CAS drew a random sample of the resident adult population of Northern Ireland, stratified into three geographic areas. These areas were defined as Belfast, the area west of the River Bann and the area east of the River Bann. No stratification was made at the LGA level. The boundaries of the three stratification areas can be used to divide the 28 LGAs into three groups, corresponding to the three regions described above, providing each LGA with a group level score on the CAS items. A comparison of sample variance in the dependent variable indicates a high degree of similarity amongst LGAs within each stratification area and a high degree of dissimilarity amongst LGAs in different areas.¹⁰

4.2.3 The Costs of Punishment Attacks

The theoretical discussion, presented above, described three categories of costs associated with punishment attacks. These were direct material costs, opportunity costs and the risk that the victims of punishment attacks might seek revenge against their attackers by actively collaborating with the status quo government's counterinsurgency campaign. Variation in each category of costs is likely to be highly correlated with variation in the others. For instance, both the immediate material costs of punishment attacks, in terms of the weapons used to punish a specific criminal, and the opportunity costs of this activity, in terms of other actions that must be foregone, are likely to be felt most dearly when weapons and manpower are extremely scarce. When an insurgent group has relatively few guns, relatively little ammunition and relatively few men, the marginal costs

¹⁰Several alternative measures, such as the lagged percentage of cases resolved by the police, and the number of formal complaints filed with the Police Authority of Northern Ireland, were considered for the purposes of measuring this concept. However, these variables were either not available at all for the time period covered in this analysis or they were only available at even higher levels of geographic aggregation than the CAS.

of losing a single weapon, bullet or soldier will be greater because such losses will bring the group closer to total resource exhaustion and, ultimately, defeat. At the same time, the spiteful victims of punishment attacks will be more likely to actively seek collaboration with the security forces when they believe that the information in their possession will be most costly to the insurgent group itself and provide them with the greatest leverage in their dealings with the police. As a result, all three categories of costs should be highly correlated with one another, and should be at their greatest when insurgent resources are at their most scarce.

Arguably, manpower is the scarcest material resource for any insurgent group. There is certainly anecdotal evidence indicating that this was the case for the PIRA throughout the Troubles. In the mid-1990s, *Janes Intelligence Review* estimated that the PIRA had no more than 400 “hard-core activists” (Boyne 1996). This number is reduced even further when we account for the estimated one-fifth of these hard-core activists that were assigned to the organization’s quartermaster’s core and did not actively take part in military operations (Moloney 2003). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence indicates that, perhaps surprisingly, punishment attacks are relatively manpower intensive affairs, requiring a number of volunteers to act as lookouts, secure the victim, drive the getaway vehicle and administer the punishment (Horgan and Taylor 2000; Conroy 1995). Given this relatively small labor pool and the relatively labor intensive nature of punishment attacks, it is fair to assume that conducting punishment attacks on a regular basis would be quite costly for a group like the PIRA.

In order to account for the manpower intensive nature of punishment attacks, the estimated number of republican prisoners released from prison to each LGA in a given year is used to measure the material and opportunity costs of conducting punishment attacks. Recall at this point that the formal model predicted that punishment attacks would become more frequent as the costs of conducting them decrease. Following this logic, we would expect to see a positive correlation between this variable and the observed number of punishment attacks, all else equal.

Given that no hard number on district-level PIRA membership exists, the number

of republican prisoners released to a district serves as an excellent proxy for measuring variation in the size of the PIRA's potential labor pool across space and time. Previous studies (Silke 2000; Hamill 2001; Kennedy 2001) have demonstrated that, throughout the Troubles, ex-prisoners exhibited a tendency to return to their former paramilitary groups, and that these members were more likely to be assigned to mundane tasks like conducting punishment attacks, because the authorities were already aware of their identities and their involvement with paramilitarism. In the vernacular of Northern Ireland, ex-prisoners were frequently referred to as "red lights," because their involvement in an operation was likely to attract the attention of the police and therefore had the potential to scupper an attack. As a result, an increase in the number of prisoners released should correspond to an increase in the size of the PIRA's labor pool.

Even if ex-prisoners were only involved in carrying out punishment attacks and took no part in the other activities of the republican movement, the addition of a greater number of ex-prisoners to the PIRA's workforce would have the effect of leaving other core members of the organization free to gather intelligence and carry out attacks against the security forces.

Of course, it is also possible that prisoner releases are themselves the result of strategic decision making on the part of the government and that the relationship between this indicator and the observed number of punishment attacks might be biased as a result. Throughout the 1990s, prisoner remission in Northern Ireland was governed by a series of laws,¹¹ each of which provided for the same basic institutional structure governing the early release of prisoners convicted of terrorist offenses in Northern Ireland. Under the provisions of each act, prisoners convicted of terrorist offenses and sentenced to more than five years in prison were automatically eligible for remission of two-thirds of a fixed term sentence or one-third of a life sentence, provided that the prisoner under review could demonstrate that they were not at the material time and would not become upon release, "a supporter of a specified organisation [sic]" (Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act (1998)). If this system operated as it was intended, then we would expect to observe no significant relationship

¹¹Specifically the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (1991), the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act (1995) and the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act (1998)

between prisoner releases and punishment shootings, since released prisoners would not be reentering the PIRA's labor pool. If, on the other hand, the British Government was using the prisoner review boards to its advantage by only releasing collaborators, we would expect a negative relationship between prisoner releases and punishment attacks, as information passed to the police by these new operatives constrained the ability of the PIRA to operate.

Regardless of potential British manipulation, it is also possible to offer alternative substantive explanations of this metric. In particular, it could be argued that this variable actually proxies the PIRA's ability to detect informants in a given area. As newly released prisoners return to their home communities, the PIRA might try to exploit the apparent growth in its support network by using the ex-prisoners and their families to monitor the behavior of others in the community in an attempt to identify potential collaborators. While this is certainly a compelling interpretation, there are convincing theoretical and empirical reasons to be suspicious of such an explanation.

First, anecdotally we know that the PIRA utilized a dedicated group of volunteers¹² to clamp down on informers throughout the Troubles. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, it is not in the best interest of the PIRA, or any other insurgent group for that matter, to use ex-prisoners for detecting informers, especially when they have been released prior to the expiration of their sentences. This is because there is a greater likelihood that these people have been recruited by the police, and the insurgents will be concerned about their loyalty. As a result, using ex-prisoners to locate and execute suspected informers would leave the insurgent group in the awkward position of using potential informers to identify other potential informers.

Table 4.1: Correlation Between Estimated Prisoner Releases and Firearms Seizures

Variable	Correlation
Firearms	0.20*
Firearms (First Difference)	0.03

* $p \leq 0.01$

¹²The so-called nutting squad, see Collins (1999).

Empirically, if ex-prisoners are being used to root out suspected informers then we would expect there to be a negative correlation between prisoner releases and other variables, like the number of weapons discovered by the police. If ex-prisoners contribute to the PIRA's counterespionage mission, then the PIRA should do a better job of finding informers and preventing the police from finding weapons in those areas with a lot of ex-prisoners. However, this is not the case. Table 4.1 displays the results of pairwise correlations between the estimated number of prisoners released and the number of firearms recovered by the police. While both variables are correlated with prisoner releases, the direction of both bivariate relationships is in the wrong direction. The appearance of more released prisoners seems to be associated with a greater number of intelligence victories by the police. This finding indicates that the PIRA either did not use ex-prisoners as counterespionage operatives, or, at a minimum, did not use them effectively in this capacity.

Data on prisoner releases were obtained from the Northern Ireland Prison Service (NIPS) under the Freedom of Information Act. The Prison service provided data on the annual number of republican prisoners released throughout Northern Ireland from 1990 to 2010. Due to cost constraints, it was not possible for the Prison Service to provide a geographic breakdown of releases for the entire time period covered. In place of this, the Prison Service provided a local government area breakdown of release addresses for a random sample of 295 individuals, representing approximately one half of all prisoners released over the time period covered. The geographic location of each released prisoner in the sample was determined using the last known address of each individual that was on file with the NIPS at the time of that individual's release. Former prisoners were not required to provide the NIPS with any notification of a change of address subsequent to the date of their release from jail.

To estimate the annual number of releases at the local government level, townlands and cities were first sorted into local government districts. An aggregate release rate was then obtained for each LGA by dividing the number of prisoners released to the district by the total number of prisoners in the sample. These rates were then applied to


the annual aggregate release figures to estimate the number of prisoners released to each LGA in each year, with the resulting figures being rounded to the nearest whole number. Confidence in the accuracy of the estimates obtained using this method is increased by a comparison of these figures with the data on hometowns of republican prisoners released by the advocacy group Saoirse in 1997. The list published by Saoirse contains data on the names, hometowns and prison numbers of 375 of the republican prisoners held in jails in Northern Ireland and elsewhere in 1997. Hometown information was not always specific; nevertheless it was generally possible to determine the LGA of each prisoner's hometown. When this was not possible, prisoners listing general locations such as 'Tyrone' were divided equally between the LGAs in that county.¹³ Each LGA's share of the total number of prisoner "hometowns" from the Saoirse database was then compared with each LGA's share of the total number of estimated prisoner releases from the NIPS database. Following this procedure, the average difference in the percentage of prisoners affiliated with each LGA between the two data sources was less than two percent.

Figures 4.3 and 4.4 present maps¹⁴ indicating the geographic distribution of estimated republican prisoner releases between 1994 and 2000. Given the general concentration of violence in Northern Ireland's two largest cities over the course of the Troubles, it is hardly surprising to see that the lion's share of republicans released from prison during this period returned to the streets of Belfast and Derry upon leaving jail. A fraction of the more than 250 republican prisoners estimated to have been released to addresses in Belfast itself appear to have returned to the city's relatively peaceful southern quarter, with an approximately equal number returning to Catholic enclaves like the Short Strand in the predominately Protestant eastern section of the city. However, the overwhelming majority of ex-republican prisoners released during the 1990s returned to addresses in the city's traditional republican strongholds along the Falls Road in West Belfast and in neighborhoods like the Ardoyne in North Belfast.

¹³The Saoirse database does not provide information on when an individual was released from prison. The Saoirse data also provide an inconsistent breakdown of prisoners from Belfast.

¹⁴Basemap shapefiles for the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland were obtained via the open source shapefile database *Natural Earth* and were reprojected into a British National Grid projection using the Quantum GIS software packages. Ward level shapefiles for Northern Ireland were obtained from the Census Geography Data Unit.

Figure 4.3: Estimated Number of Republican Prisoners Released to Each Local Government Area
1993-2000



4.2.4 The Value of Counterinsurgency Intelligence

As was highlighted previously, information about enemy activity is amongst the most valuable commodities sought by participants in an insurgency. Despite its overall importance in determining the outcome of a conflict, the same value is not attached to every scrap of information discovered. In fact, scholars and counterinsurgency practitioners alike have argued that information about local insurgent activity in particular exhibits diminishing marginal returns. When the security forces know relatively little about local insurgents, a single tip from an informant could be extremely valuable. However, once the police have developed extensive dossiers on many of the members of an insurgent group, the same tip could be seen as relatively less valuable, since it is unlikely to sharpen the picture of insurgent activity painted by previously tapped sources. It was in this spirit that British

Figure 4.4: Estimated Number of Republican Prisoners Released in Belfast
1993-2000



Brigadier General Frank Kitson argued that, from the outset, “the problem of defeating the enemy consists largely of finding him” (quoted in Bamford 2005). This argument was extended by Bamford (2005, 586) who claimed that “Although much of the initial information sought on a particular group is very basic it can be very difficult to acquire when the security forces are operating in a hostile environment and when they do not enjoy the support of the population.” Given this understanding of how the security forces evaluate intelligence, we would expect new information from informants and anonymous tips to be more valuable when the police know relatively little about local insurgent activity. We would further expect the value of new information to diminish as the police develop more

extensive intelligence portfolios on insurgent activity in a given area. In short, a plot of the value of new information against the value of already gathered intelligence should be curvilinear and convex.

With this interpretation in mind, the value of new intelligence is operationalized as the squared index of the number of firearms and the number of rounds of ammunition discovered by the police in each district-year. Data on firearms and ammunition finds by the police were obtained from the PSNI at the LGA level for the period from 1990 to 2008. In their raw forms, the two variables are highly correlated with each other, with a strongly statistically ($p < 0.001$) significant pairwise correlation of 0.735, indicating that it is highly probable that they measure a similar underlying dimension of police intelligence. This high correlation between the discovery of weapons on the one hand and ammunition on the other is hardly surprising, since it is quite likely that the two items were frequently stored together.

Nevertheless, in composing the weapons index, it would be inappropriate to treat the discovery of a single bullet as equivalent to the confiscation of a single firearm. The amount of ammunition recovered by the police in each LGA-year was divided by thirty before being added to the number of firearms confiscated in the same area year. A divisor of thirty was selected because this is the capacity of standard magazines for assault rifles such as the AR15 and AK47, favored by the PIRA and other insurgent groups around the world. The logic of this rescaling was twofold. First, it is highly likely that some proportion of the ammunition recovered by the police was recovered in magazine attached to rifles that were ready for use. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that the raw number of rounds recovered should, in part, be a function of the number of magazines recovered. Second, it is also plausible to assume that the loss of an entire magazine of usable ammunition is more damaging to an insurgent groups than is the loss of a single bullet, or even a handful or rounds. Both the raw index and its square are included in the statistical models. Given that hypothesis 3A predicted that the frequency of punishment attacks would increase as the value of counterinsurgency intelligence increased, the raw index should be positively correlated with the number of republican punishment attacks, while the quadratic term

should exhibit a negative coefficient.

While the weapons index clearly measures some aspect of the ability of the police to gather intelligence, it is possible to challenge the substantive interpretation provided above. Specifically, it might be argued that very small intelligence finds are the result of past police successes. If, in the past, the police have uncovered large numbers of arms in a given district, then the supply of arms in that district could be depleted, and wary insurgents might decide against replenishing weapons dumps in an apparently compromised area. If this is the case, then we would expect to observe a strong negative correlation between the occurrence of large weapons finds at time t and the number of weapons confiscated at time $t+1$. However, pairwise correlations between several lags of the weapons index and the present value of the index indicate that there is little evidence of such a relationship. For lags of one and two years, the correlation is not statistically significant at the ten percent level. For lags of three and four years, the correlation is significant, but in the opposite direction. This result bolsters our confidence in the substantive interpretation of the weapons index provided above. Initial weapons cache finds appear to bear greater fruit in subsequent years, demonstrating that early weapons finds are indicative of the initial successes of the police force's efforts to establish a reliable network of local informers and that future counterinsurgency successes are at least partly contingent upon previous successes.

4.2.5 The Probability Insurgents Detect a New Informer

Out of their own self-interest, all insurgent groups engage in counterespionage. These efforts can take different institutional forms, but they are all directed at the same purpose: finding and eliminating individuals who collaborate with the status quo government. The ability of any group to successfully perform this task is a direct function of its access to information. While Kalyvas argues that access to information is purely a function of an actor's ability to intimidate and control the population, there is good reason to believe that intra-group social networks provide ethnic insurgent groups with access to a great deal of information about local people. As Fearon and Laitin (1996) have argued, intraethnic

social networks can help members of a given group detect and sanction group members who behave inappropriately. While Fearon and Laitin are primarily concerned with the ability of an ethnic group to single out and punish members that are likely to defect against an ethnic other, there is no reason why the same mechanism could not be used to establish and assess individual reputations for cooperation with or defection against an in-group guerrilla or terrorist organization.

The density of intra-group social networks is measured using the isolation index. This index is a measure of residential segregation commonly used by demographers (Robinson 1980; Massey and Denton 1989; Callaghan 2001; Doherty 1997) and is computed using the formula:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \left[\left(\frac{x_i}{X} \right) \left(\frac{x_i}{t_i} \right) \right]$$

where x_i is the Catholic population of ward i , X is the sum of all x_i , and t_i is the total population of ward i . From a technical perspective, the isolation index essentially measures the likelihood that “a minority person shares a unit area . . . with another minority person” (Iceland et al 2002, 120). From a substantive point of view, the index measures “the extent to which minority members are exposed only to one another” (quoted in: Iceland et al 2002, 120). The theoretical maximum value of the index is 1.00, indicating that every member of the reference population group (e.g. all Catholics) live in a single ward containing no members of the comparison group (e.g. Protestants). The index would theoretically approach a minimum value near zero in the circumstance in which the reference group was composed of a single individual (e.g. a single Catholic) living in a city composed of geographic areas otherwise populated exclusively by members of the comparison group (e.g. a homogeneously Protestant city). As a result, higher values of the isolation index correspond to a greater level of ethnic segregation. Higher levels of ethnic segregation, in turn, are likely to lead to an increase in the density of intragroup social network as members of each group become increasingly more likely to interact only with their co-ethnics rather than with members of the other group.


Ward-level population data was derived from the 1991 and 2001 decennial censuses. The isolation index was then calculated for each local government district, and for each

of the four geographically defined regions of Belfast,¹⁵ in each census year. The district-level annual rate of change in the isolation index was then calculated by subtracting the 2001 value of the index from the 1991 value and dividing the resulting difference by ten. The annual rate of change was then multiplied by the number of years between the 1991 census and a given year, and that figure was added to the 1991 value of the index to estimate the annual isolation index. While the assumption of linear change in an index such as the one at issue here might seem dubious, it is important to note that the overall effect of this assumption is likely minimal. The average total difference in the isolation index for Northern Ireland's 26 local government districts, plus the four regions of Belfast, between 1991 and 2001 is 0.002, with a maximum value of 0.01 (Castlereagh LGD) and a minimum value of -0.002 (east Belfast), indicating that ethnic settlement patterns remained relatively stable over the course of the intervening decade.

Overall, Catholics and Protestants appear to be relatively evenly distributed across Northern Ireland's 26 local government areas as well as the four regions of Belfast. The average isolation index for all LGAs is approximately 0.53, indicating that, across Northern Ireland as a whole, the Catholic and Protestant communities appear to be very well integrated. In this instance, however, appearances based on aggregate statistics are misleading. Indeed, Figure 4.5 indicates that the observed values of the isolation index approximate a bimodal distribution with clusters around 0.35 and 0.68. Thus, we can see that the appearance of ethnic integration across Northern Ireland as a whole is actually an artifact of a distribution skewed toward relatively extreme values at either end of the isolation index. The comparative statics presented in chapter three revealed that the relationship between an insurgent group's ability to identify and eliminate informers on the one hand and the frequency with which the group punishes suspected criminals on the other was a function of the costs of conducting punishment attacks. In particular, the formal analysis indicated that, given high costs of punishment attacks, insurgent groups will punish fewer criminals as their ability to identify suspected informers increases. Conversely, given low costs for punishment attacks, the insurgent group's decision to punish a

¹⁵For the purposes of the present analysis, these areas are defined as the portions of each of the four Belfast area parliamentary constituencies contained within the statutory limits of Belfast City itself.

Figure 4.5: Distribution of Catholic Isolation Index (Mean Centered)



criminal will be unaffected by its ability to identify informers. In essence, the effectiveness of insurgent counterespionage acts as a cost multiplier. When the insurgents believe they will be able to identify and punish any criminals that the police recruit as counterinsurgency informants, they will be less willing to dedicate their scarce manpower and resources to punishing suspected criminals as a means of denying the police access to this potentially valuable source of information.

Recall here that the relationship between the effectiveness of an insurgent group's counterespionage and the group's willingness to punish suspected criminals was predicted to be conditional on the relative costs of punishment attacks. In particular, when the costs of punishment attacks were high, insurgent groups were expected to conduct fewer punishment attacks as they became more effective at identifying and eliminating counterinsurgent informers. Recall also that, for the purposes of the present analysis, the costs of punishment attacks are operationalized as the estimated number of republican prisoners released from jail in each LGA-year, with a higher number of released prisoners indicating lower costs of punishment attacks. With these operationalizations in mind, it is possible to derive empirical expectations regarding the nature of the interaction between these two

variables on the basis of the hypothesis stated above.

The costs of punishment attacks should be highest in LGA-years with relatively few released republican prisoners. Thus, the main effect of the Catholic isolation should be statistically significant and negative, all else equal. At the same time, the Catholic isolation index should also condition the effect of released prisoners on the frequency of punishment attacks. Recall here that the ability of insurgents to identify counterinsurgency informers essentially acts as a costs multiplier. Given the operationalization of the costs of punishment attacks, described above, we would therefore expect the positive marginal effect of released prisoners to increase directly in proportion to increases in the level of Catholic isolation. This result would imply that a reduction in the number of released prisoners in an LGA-year would have a correspondingly greater reductive effect on the PIRA's willingness to punish suspected criminals in more homogeneously Catholic LGAs, in which the group would be expected to be most effective at identifying counterinsurgency informants.

4.2.6 The Ability of the Police to Coerce Criminals into Becoming Informers

As was noted above, the collection of information about local insurgent activity is central to the counterinsurgency efforts of status quo governments. Governments often rely on local informants to provide them with the intelligence they seek. Suspected criminals are often recruited to serve in this role, because the police can use the threat of imprisonment to coerce these suspects into becoming informers without necessarily resorting to monetary compensation for the intelligence they provide. Suspected criminals, in turn, are most likely to be susceptible to such efforts when they have little or no access to legal aid in the form of representation by a solicitor or lawyer whose facility with the law can be used to shield suspects against the coercive efforts of the police. Solicitors and lawyers perform a vital function in countries governed by the rule of law, and one of their key roles is to serve as intermediaries between the police and other elements of the criminal justice system on the one hand and their clients on the other. In this role, solicitors can provide legal counsel to their clients regarding their own rights as well as the power of the police. Acting in this manner, effective legal counsel can protect criminal suspects from police efforts to obtain

a confession or to coerce the suspect into providing information on insurgent activity in exchange for leniency on criminal charges.

This interpretation of the role played by solicitors in protecting the rights of criminal suspects in Northern Ireland is corroborated by public statements made by senior Sinn Féin (SF) officials throughout the conflict in Northern Ireland advising individuals that were being put under pressure by the RUC to contact a solicitor.¹⁶ Solicitors have also expressed a keen awareness of the possibility that the police might use an arrest or citation for “ordinary” crime as an opportunity to coerce a suspect into providing information on local paramilitary activity. In 1991, the Derry-based solicitor Paddy MacDermott informed Kevin Toolis that he had “a lot of clients who have been questioned about ... the most trivial motoring offence, who have been approached by the RUC and asked to ‘keep an eye’ on certain people. Arrangements have been made to meet them at a later date or telephone them at a certain number” (Toolis 1991).

Given the vital role played by legal professionals in protecting the rights of their clients during police interrogation, the ability of the police to coerce criminal suspects into providing intelligence on insurgent activity is operationalized as the number of legal offices practicing criminal law in each local government area. A higher number of criminal law offices in a district should facilitate easier access to legal defense services by lowering each firm’s opportunity costs for taking on an additional local client. Furthermore, criminal suspects are more likely to have access to and knowledge of specific firms through their own social networks when there are relatively more firms present in a community.

The comparative statics analysis revealed that when the costs of punishment attacks exceed a certain critical value, insurgent groups will discount those costs to the extent that they believe the police are likely to be successful in recruiting suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants. Substantively, this finding indicates that insurgent groups will conduct punishment attacks even when such attacks are extremely costly to the group’s

¹⁶For instance, in August 1994 SF representatives helped a man from Castlederg, County Tyrone contact a solicitor and file a complaint against RUC detectives who had allegedly been pressuring the man to provide information on local PIRA activity (*An Phoblacht/Republican News* 1994e). Party members followed a similar procedure when they were contacted by a 19 year old male from Armagh who claimed that the police had offered to drop charges pending against him in exchange for “low-key intelligence” on the movements of prominent local republicans (*An Phoblacht/Republican News* 1993d).

other interests, so long as the police are likely to use suspected criminals as part of their counterinsurgency campaign. Recall again that the costs of punishment attacks should be highest when no republicans have been released from prison to supplement the PIRA's labor force. With this interpretation in mind, the main effect of the criminal law offices variable should be statistically significant and negative, all else equal. Additionally, the criminal law offices variable should condition the effect of the released prisoners variable. In particular, since insurgent groups were expected to discount the costs of punishment attacks as the coercive ability of the police increased, the marginal effect of each released prisoner should be lowest in areas with relatively few criminal law offices.

4.2.7 The Probability That a Crime is Reported to the Police

If a crime is reported to a local insurgent commander, and that commander refuses to take action on the victim's behalf, there is some probability that the spurned victim will then seek redress from the police. The likelihood that a victim might take such a course of action must weigh heavily on the insurgent commander's mind, because such a report would provide the police with a pretext to visit and interrogate potential suspects and might ultimately provide the police with an opportunity to coerce the perpetrator into providing information on local insurgent activity. One of the key factors that influences a spurned victim's willingness and ability to contact local police is the level of access that the community has to its police force. In communities with a significant police presence, it will be relatively easier for the victims of crime to contact the police, either by traveling directly to a local police station or through incidental contact with the 'bobby on the beat.' Furthermore, citizens might be more confident in the likelihood that the police will respond to crimes reported via telephone if the police have a significant presence on the ground in their community.

The substantive interpretation of the police concentration variable provided above should be robust regardless of the specific manner in which police patrols are deployed from a given police station. At one extreme, if patrols originating from a police station in one area are confined to operate within the same area, then it is reasonable to assume

that an increase in the number of police stations in that area will be associated with a greater police footprint on the ground. At the other extreme, if patrols originate from a station in one district and are tasked with cruising the streets only in districts other than their point of origin. Even under this assumption, areas hosting more police stations would benefit from a greater police presence ‘on the ground’ as a spillover effect of the concentration of police infrastructure, because patrols — whether on foot or in vehicles — destined for other districts would be required to cover local streets in order to reach their final destination.¹⁷ In either case, the opportunity costs of contacting the police to report a crime are lowered by the proximity of police stations and the frequent presence of police patrols on local streets. The presence of frequent patrols on the streets increases the likelihood of casual contact between the police and ordinary citizens, and these brief interactions can also serve as an opportunity for citizens to report criminal activity directly to a constable. The proximity of a police station can also lower the opportunity costs of reporting a crime and following up on police action related to a complaint, as it lowers the physical barriers to contacting the police.

Of course, it is also possible that the geographic density of police infrastructure in each district actually proxies the police force’s internal assessment of the varying levels of likely criminal and insurgent activity. On the one hand, if the police emphasize the war on crime over the war against the insurgent group, then they might concentrate their physical presence in those areas that are thought to be at greater risk for “ordinary” criminal activity. This preference might be further reinforced by a related desire to keep both individual policemen and women and police stations out of the insurgents’ line of fire. On the other hand, the police might choose to emphasize their counterinsurgency role by concentrating their manpower and resources in districts that are expected to be at greater risk for insurgent violence.¹⁸ Regardless of why the police might be in an area,

¹⁷The reality for the RUC appears to have been somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. Although constables from relatively peaceful/safe areas have occasionally been deployed to assist in patrolling more dangerous regions during times of trouble (see chapter five), RUC divisions generally operated autonomously of one another, as is reflected in the structure of the Chief Constable’s Annual reports throughout the 1970s, which detail police activity and manpower requirements in each division independent of the others.

¹⁸Regressing the number of police stations per square kilometer in each local government area on the level of insurgent activity, the number of male unemployment claimants and the number of young male

the fact remains that a higher concentration of police assets and manpower in a district increases the opportunities for contact between the police and the people and ultimately lowers the opportunity costs for direct communication between these two groups.

This dimension of the relationship between the police and local communities is operationalized as the number of police stations per square kilometer in each district. A higher concentration of police stations in a district indicates a stronger formal police presence in that area. As a result of this increased presence, there are likely to be more police officers out on patrol in these areas, increasing the frequency with which residents experience incidental contact with the police. Thus, an increase in the level of police concentration in an area approximates the likelihood of incidental contact between the police and residents of the district and should therefore be associated with an increase in the likelihood that the police are made aware of crimes occurring in the region. Recall here that hypothesis H4C indicated that the effect of this variable on an insurgent group's willingness to punish suspected criminals is conditioned by the relative benefits of punishment attacks. In particular, when the benefits of punishment attacks were expected to be low, insurgent groups were expected to conduct more punishment attacks as the likelihood that a crime is reported to the police increases. The benefits of punishment attacks are highest in those regions in which Catholic residents are least likely to support the police. Given this substantive interpretation, the marginal effect of police concentration conditional on the level of Catholic support for the police should be positive and statistically significant only when the latter variable is at relatively high levels.

4.2.8 Control Variables

Several control variables are included in the statistical analysis to account for the alternative explanations developed in section 4.1.2. Two variables and an interaction term are

residents indicates that the concentration of police resources is positively correlated with the number of RPAs, the three-year cumulative moving average of RUC fatalities and the number of young male (aged 15-39) residents, but negatively correlated with the male claimant count. The positive correlation between insurgent activity and police concentration in concert with the negative correlation between police concentration and male unemployment indicates that, despite the arrival of peace to Northern Ireland in the late 1990s, the infrastructure of policing in the province nevertheless continued to reflect the force's past experience with and traditional emphasis on counterinsurgency policing, sometimes at the expense of 'normal' or "ordinary" policing.

included as proxies both for the crime rate and for the level of economic deprivation. The first variable, constructed from data provided by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) and the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), is the percentage of the resident, working age male population claiming unemployment benefits. Monthly data on the number of male claimants in each LGA from 1994-2000 were obtained from the ONS's web-based NOMIS database. These data were averaged for each district year to obtain annual claimant counts.¹⁹ The average annual male claimant rate was then constructed by dividing the annual number of claimants by the number of working-age resident males in each LGA-year. The size of the working-age male population was obtained from historic mid-year population estimates, provided by NISRA.²⁰ The second variable is the number of men aged 16 to 39²¹ resident in the district, derived from NISRA's district level mid-year population estimates.²² If variations in the crime rate and the level of economic deprivation influence the willingness of paramilitary groups to enter the market for law enforcement, then both of these variables and their interaction should be positively correlated with an area's risk of experiencing RPAs.²³

The local presence and strength of paramilitary groups drawn from a rival ethnic community were hypothesized to lower an insurgent group's willingness to offer punishment attacks as an alternative form of law enforcement. In the Northern Irish context, predominately Catholic, republican organizations like the PIRA have traditionally faced military opposition from both the state forces and from violent, non-state groups affiliated

¹⁹The claimant count for the four regions of Belfast calculated using ward level figures obtained from ONS from 1996-2000. Belfast claimant counts for 1994 and 1996 were imputed by regressing the monthly claimant count for Northern Ireland as a whole and Belfast City as a whole on the ward level claimant counts in Belfast from 1996 to 2011. The results were used to generate a linear prediction of the expected number of claimants in each ward-month for 1994 and 1995.

²⁰Mid-year population estimates (MYPE) are not available at the ward level prior to the year 2001. As a result, the estimated working-age male population for the four Belfast Assembly Areas were used for North, South, East and West Belfast from 1994-2000. The Assembly Areas draw in a small number of wards from surrounding district councils, but the amount of overlap is relatively small.

²¹The decision of how best to operationalize the 'young male' population was largely dictated by data availability, as the MYPEs for Belfast provide no further breakdown of the population beyond broad age groups, including the 16-39 year old category.

²²The same proviso once again applies to figures for the four regions of Belfast.

²³According to one study (Kennedy 2001) roughly 95 percent of all victims of republican punishment attacks are males, aged 14 to 39. Given that members of this group are far more likely to be targeted for punishment attacks than are older males or females, it is not necessary to control for the overall size of the population of each LGA.

with loyalist political movements. Like their republican counterparts, loyalist groups have drawn a great deal of support from unemployed and socially disadvantaged men in neighborhoods like the Shankill, Tiger's Bay and Sandy Row in Belfast. As a result, loyalist power is likely to be correlated with an area's level of social disadvantage and its risk of experiencing republican punishment attacks. Loyalist power is operationalized as the three-year cumulative moving average (CMA) of the total number of loyalist punishment attacks in an area to capture these relationships in the statistical analysis. Given the theoretical expectations laid out above, this variable should be negatively correlated with an area's risk of experiencing republican punishment attacks.

A challenge in using the average number of loyalist punishment attacks to measure loyalist power is that the relatively high level of geographic aggregation in Belfast is likely to conceal the true nature of this relationship in Northern Ireland's most divided city. North Belfast in particular was a hotbed of both loyalist and republican paramilitary activity throughout the Troubles. In terms of punishment attacks, republican groups assaulted more people in North Belfast than in any other region of Northern Ireland save for the city's western quarter. At the same time, North Belfast was the scene of more punishment attacks committed by loyalist groups like the Ulster Volunteer Force than any other region of the province. However, this aggregate level correlation masks significant neighborhood level differences. Both loyalist and republican paramilitary groups operating in Belfast have tended to respect — and in many ways have been defined by — the city's patchwork ethnic geography. Within North Belfast, loyalist groups dominated Protestant working class communities like Mount Vernon and Tigers Bay throughout the Troubles, while republican groups controlled Catholic neighborhoods like Ardoyne and New Lodge. Given this arrangement and the prior theoretical expectations described previously, the PIRA should be unwilling to pay the high costs of entry into the market for punishment attacks in areas like Mount Vernon, and few, if any, RPAs should occur there. However, even if this expectation is correct, such a relationship would be concealed by the aggregation of Tigers Bay with Ardoyne, for example, into the single area of North Belfast. To control for this potential bias, a dummy variable equal to one for Belfast areas and zero otherwise

is included in the statistical model and interacted with the CMA of loyalist punishment attacks. Prior expectations indicate that the Belfast variable and the interaction term should be correlated with an increased risk of republican punishment attacks.

Finally, a dummy variable equal to one in years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA), and zero otherwise, is included to control for the likelihood that insurgent groups will engage in fewer punishment attacks after signing a peace accord, when it is also likely that more prisoners will be released from jail. This variable is expected to be negatively correlated with the number of republican punishment attacks, as PIRA punishment squads gradually closed up shop in the aftermath of the GFA and throughout the contentious and drawn out implementation phase of the agreement.

4.2.9 Statistical Estimator


Given the nature of the dependent variable under analysis — an annual count of the number of punishment attacks in each local government district — it is appropriate to use an event count model for the purposes of statistical analysis. Looking at some of the basic summary statistics for the dependent variable of interest, it can easily be seen that a standard Poisson count model would be inappropriate in this context. Recall that the Poisson approach assumes that the mean and the variance of the data under analysis are equal. This is clearly not the case for annual LGA-level data on punishment attacks, which are strongly skewed toward small values with a handful of districts producing the majority of the events observed, and a significant proportion of observations clustered at or near zero. The dependent variable has a mean of 3.94 with a variance that is more than twenty times larger²⁴ and fully half of all area-years experiencing zero RPAs. Furthermore, five local government areas in the sample experienced no RPAs in any year between 1994 and 2000 and a further five districts experienced only one such attack over the same time period.

The size of the variance relative to the size of the mean of the dependent variable and the relatively large number of zero outcomes in the sample both point toward the presence

²⁴The variance of the dependent variable is 81.23.

of overdispersion and the possibility of “excess zeros” generated by a process that is both empirically and theoretically distinct from the causal mechanisms that produce variation in the positive outcome units. Figure 4.6 presents a plot of the observed distribution of republican shootings alongside plots of a Poisson distribution with the same mean and a negative binomial distribution with the same mean and variance as the observed data. The figure shows that the observed distribution of the dependent variable is a close match for the hypothetical negative binomial distribution described above. This result provides further confirmation of the presence of overdispersion and potential excess zeros in our data. Given that one of the key statistical assumptions involved in implementing a Poisson count model is that the variance of the dependent variable is equal to its mean, the presence of overdispersion indicates that an alternative approach to modeling RPAs might be preferable to the Poisson. One possibility is to turn to a standard negative binomial

Figure 4.6: Observed Distribution Versus Poisson and Negative Binomial



count model. Negative binomial models relax the Poisson’s assumption of mean and variance equality and can therefore be used to estimate event counts under the presence of overdispersion in the dependent variable (Long 1997; Bagozzi 2011). However, the baseline negative binomial model still does not account for the possibility that at least a

subset of the units in which we observe zero punishment attacks — such as North Down — were at a significantly lower risk of *ever* experiencing an RPA than were others — such as North Belfast — in which we observe at least one attack in each year, and that this difference in risks is attributable to a causal process distinct from the one producing variation in the non-zero group. A zero-inflated version of the negative binomial allows us to model and analyze these different exposures to risk while maintaining the relaxed assumption regarding the equivalence of means and variances.

Given the theoretical and statistical challenges described above, a zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) count model is the most appropriate for the data analyzed here. ZINB models estimate two equations, one predicting the likelihood that a unit experiences zero events, and another predicting variation in the non-zero units. This approach is most appropriate when, as is the case in the present analysis, there is reason to believe that at least a sub-set of the zero observations are caused by a different process than the one producing variation in the non-zero units. Zero inflated models can be estimated using different distributions for the non-zero unit equation, but given the nature of the data described above it is most appropriate to utilize the negative binomial variant of this class of count model.

4.3 Statistical Results

Table 4.2 presents the results of a zero-inflated negative binomial count model with standard errors clustered by LGA.²⁵ The standard logistic regression coefficients for the first equation, predicting the likelihood of a zero outcome, appear in the bottom half of the table. The top half of the table provides the regression coefficients for the negative bino-

²⁵Although the ZINB estimation technique appears to be both theoretically and empirically justified in this context, this category of models can be highly sensitive to model specification. To check the robustness of the results presented here an identical model was estimated excluding the insignificant interaction term between male unemployment and the size of the young male population. This change in model specification did not alter the sign or significance of any other results reported here. A standard negative binomial (NB) model was also run using the same data and again utilizing standard errors clustered by LGA. Although the results of the standard NB model were broadly similar to those obtained using ZINB, there were significant differences between the two. The variables measuring Catholic support for the police and the concentration of police infrastructure were not individually significant, although a post-estimation Wald test indicated that the interaction between the two variables was significant at the ten percent level. The main effect of male unemployment was also statistically insignificant.

mial model predicting variation in the number of RPAs.²⁶ The results and implications of both equations are presented below, beginning with the findings from the zero inflation equation. Since the coefficients of both stages of ZINB models can be difficult to interpret directly, particularly when multiple continuous-on-continuous interaction terms are incorporated into the model, the results of each equation are discussed in terms of the marginal effects of variables on the predicted probability of a zero outcome and the predicted number of republican punishment attacks.

4.3.1 Alternative Hypotheses

Table 4.2 indicates that the equation predicting membership in the zero outcome group produced some interesting results with respect to the control variables included to account for the alternative explanations derived from previous studies. Most surprising amongst these is the finding that increasing the male claimant rate appears to increase the probability that an area will experience zero republican punishment attacks. Furthermore, the number of young males in the area appears to have no direct effect on the likelihood that republican punishment attacks occur there, nor does the presence of a greater number of young men appear to condition the effect of male unemployment overall. Figure 4.7 plots the male claimant rate against the predicted probability that an LGA experiences zero republican punishment attacks. The figure demonstrates that moving from the sample minimum male unemployment rate toward the sample maximum actually increases the probability that an area will be a member of the zero outcome group and experience no republican punishment attacks. If the crime rate is correlated with the male unemployment rate, and punishment attacks are more likely to occur in areas with higher crime rates, then the expectation would be that areas with high male claimant counts would more likely to experience republican punishment attacks. The data do not appear to support this conclusion.

It is possible that this finding is a product of the inclusion of claimants from both

²⁶Data from 1998 were excluded from the analysis as a result of data availability limitations in connection with the Community Attitude Survey. As a robustness check, both models were also run using imputed 1998 values for this variable. The statistical significance, sign and magnitude of all variables remained unchanged.


Table 4.2: Estimation Results: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : Non-Zero Number of Republican Punishment Attacks		
Released Republican Prisoners (Estimate)	0.246**	(0.102)
Isolation Index [†]	0.073***	(0.012)
Number of Criminal Law Offices [†]	0.025***	(0.008)
Isolation Index * Prisoners	-0.006**	(0.002)
Law Offices * Prisoners	-0.007**	(0.003)
Police Concentration [†]	10.066***	(2.676)
Catholics: Would Report Crime to Police [†]	-0.062**	(0.027)
Report Crime*Police Concentration	0.610***	(0.236)
Weapons Index	0.131*	(0.008)
Weapons Index ²	-0.0001**	(0.000)
Good Friday Agreement Dummy	-0.405*	0.232
Intercept	-0.081	(0.312)
Equation 2 : Probability of Zero Outcome		
Resident 16-39 Year Old Male Population	-0.0001	(0.00)
Male Claimant Rate [†]	0.300*	(0.163)
Young Males*Claimant Rate [†]	0.000	(0.000)
Three Year CMA of Loyalist Punishment Attacks	0.304**	(0.148)
Belfast Dummy	-19.857***	(1.538)
Belfast Dummy * Loyalist Attacks	-0.335**	(0.152)
Intercept	-2.890***	(1.012)
Equation 3 : Dispersion Parameter		
Alpha (Natural Log)	-1.011***	(0.341)
N		168
Log-likelihood		-261.661
$\chi^2_{(10)}$		351.8
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%		[†] Mean centered variable

Catholic and Protestant backgrounds in the calculation of the male claimant rate. ONS does not provide a religious breakdown of the claimant count at any geographic level of aggregation. However, there is strong evidence indicating that the Catholic and non-Catholic unemployment rates differed significantly throughout the conflict, with Catholic males being as much as two times more likely to be unemployed than their Protestant neighbors (Rowthorn and Warne 1988; Honaker 2008). Aggregating the relatively lower Protestant unemployment rate with the relatively high Catholic rate could have the consequence of suppressing the statistical relationship between male unemployment and the likelihood that republican groups conduct punishment attacks in an area. Additionally, this finding could also reflect a shortcoming of the data, since the claimant count only includes those individuals who are eligible to receive government unemployment benefits and are actively looking for work. Given the data challenges described above, it is important to be cautious in interpreting the apparently surprising result for this variable, although there is clearly room for additional inquiry into this matter.

In addition to socioeconomic factors like male unemployment,²⁷ the PIRA's willingness

Figure 4.7: Probability of Zero Republican Punishment Attacks Conditional on Male Claimant Rate



²⁷The claimant count includes only those individuals who are receiving unemployment benefits from the government. It does not include those who meet the criteria for being considered unemployed but are


to enter the market for punishment attacks in an area was also hypothesized to be a function of the strength of loyalist paramilitary groups in that area. This hypothesis, which predicted a negative correlation between loyalist strength and an area's risk of experiencing any RPAs, reflected the underlying costs and benefits that lead to the emergence of ethnic 'in-group policing' in deeply divided societies like Northern Ireland. The results of the logistic regression portion of the statistical model largely confirm these theoretical expectations. Figure 4.8 plots the predicted probability that an area experiences zero republican punishment attacks against the three-year cumulative moving average of loyalist punishment attacks in the same area.²⁸ The plot reveals increasing loyalist involvement in punishment attacks dramatically reduces the likelihood that republican groups attempt to conduct punishment attacks of their own in an area. Indeed, moving from an average of four loyalist attacks to an average of twelve such attacks decreases an area's risk of experiencing any RPAs by nearly 60 percent. Furthermore, areas experiencing more than 20 loyalist attacks on average have a less than one in twenty chance of experiencing any republican punishment attacks.

The substantive significance of this result underlines the deeply divided nature of Northern Ireland society and provides empirical support for a logical extension of Fearon and Laitin's discussion of the relationship between intragroup policing and intergroup peace in divided societies. Northern Ireland's two dominant communities have played host to a variety of violent, politically motivated groups throughout the years. Militias from both sides have, from time to time, committed atrocities against members of the other ethnic group. Nevertheless, groups like the UVF and PIRA appear to have been content to adopt a live and let live approach to crime in one another's communities. Given the segregated pattern of ethnic settlement throughout Northern Ireland, this result is hardly

not eligible for unemployment benefit. Additionally, the claimant count includes those individuals that are underemployed and still eligible for government benefits, while the official unemployment rate excludes these individuals. Official unemployment rates are not available at the local government level for the time period covered by the statistical analysis presented in this chapter.

²⁸Figures were created using the Margins package available in Stata 11.0. For the purposes of this figure, all non-dummy variables were held constant at their means. Both the GFA and Belfast dummies were set equal to zero. Changing the value of the GFA dummy does not significantly alter the marginal impact of loyalist strength.


Figure 4.8: Predicted Probability of Zero Republican Punishment Attacks Conditional on Loyalist Violence



surprising. PIRA units from the Falls Road would have to travel a considerable distance across hostile territory to punish a suspected criminal in Bangor. Closer to home, the same units would run the risk of accidentally initiating a spiral of interethnic reprisals, should loyalist paramilitaries catch them in the act of shooting or beating a Protestant from the neighboring Shankill. With little to be gained politically in the heartlands of their ardent opponents, the costs of using PIRA manpower and matériel to capture and punish criminals from loyalist communities — even those suspected of committing crimes across the sectarian divide — were simply too great. Although Fearon and Laitin are not directly concerned with the issue of petty crime in ethnically divided societies, the dynamics that produced the ethnic division of labor nevertheless appear to reflect the causal mechanisms embedded in their model of “in-group policing.” Republican groups have ignore the opportunity to expand their brand of vigilante justice to neighboring Protestant estates out of the fear that any such attack on a Protestant, regardless of their status as a petty criminal, would be perceived as a violation of the inter-ethnic peace, potentially leading to the type of spiral dynamic that occurs in Fearon and Laitin’s model. As a result, both loyalists and republicans have effectively “policed” themselves

by restraining their members from engaging in vigilante activity on the other side of the sectarian divide.

Figure 4.9: Annual Number of Republican Punishment Attacks



Finally, negative coefficients on both the Belfast dummy variable and its interaction with the loyalist power variable confirm the prior expectation that, all else equal, the effect of loyalist power on the PIRA's willingness to conduct punishment attacks would be attenuated by the capital city's patchwork ethnic geography. One possibility is that this negative interaction is the product of simple data aggregation bias, as described above. Alternatively, it is also possible that the norms of in-group policing operate less strongly in Belfast than in other regions of Northern Ireland. Were the latter interpretation correct, then republican groups should have been equally willing to conduct punishment attacks in both North Belfast and the more homogeneously Protestant eastern quarter of the city. Figure 4.9, which plots the number of republican punishment attacks in North and East Belfast for each year from 1990 to 2008, demonstrates that this was not the case. Given the PIRA's resistance to shooting and beating Protestants in east Belfast, it would seem that the negative interaction effect described above results from the clustering together of

loyalist and republican neighborhoods in the other three quadrants of the capital city.²⁹

Overall, the results of the first stage of the statistical analysis provided mixed results when compared against prior expectations. Contrary to the expected relationship, an increase in the male claimant rate appears to reduce an LGA's risk of experiencing RPAs, although this relationship is conditional on the ex ante level of male unemployment in the area. Perhaps most surprisingly, the effect of male unemployment does not appear to be conditional on the size of the resident young male population. While data limitations must be acknowledged, these results nevertheless indicate that scholars should think carefully about the causal linkages connecting socioeconomic factors and political violence. At the same time, the substantive and statistically significant impact of local loyalist power indicates that the presence of a strong rival armed ethnic group can deter an organization like the PIRA from attempting to deliver vigilante justice in certain communities. Each of these factors appears to influence the willingness of groups like the PIRA to offer their services in response to local crime. But what factors determine how large a role an insurgent group will play in the market for law and order once they enter it? The second stage of the statistical analysis demonstrates how a variety of strategic and environmental factors influence the extent to which insurgent groups will dedicate their resources to providing vigilante justice in their communities.

4.3.2 Main Results: The people's police?

Why do insurgent groups like the Provisional IRA enter the market for law enforcement with greater enthusiasm in some areas than in others? Why, for instance, did the PIRA conduct more than 270 punishment attacks in the republican strongholds along Belfast's Falls Road between 1994 and 2000 but only 13 such attacks in the group's rural heartland around Dungannon during the same time period? The results of the negative binomial count model indicate that this variation was largely driven by a number of factors affecting the insurgent group's assessment of both the costs and benefits of fighting crime, as well as the potential consequences of the RUC's response to problems such as robbery, theft

²⁹Recoding the Belfast dummy to equal one only for North, South and West Belfast does not alter the results of the statistical analysis presented in table 4.2.

and anti-social behavior.


In keeping with hypothesis H2A, the PIRA was more likely to shoot and beat criminals as the release of republican prisoners swelled the group's ranks throughout the peace process, all else equal. At the same time, in keeping with hypothesis H1A, republican paramilitaries sought to capitalize on Catholic discomfort and displeasure with the RUC by conducting more punishment attacks in those times and places where Catholics were relatively less willing to report crime to the police. All else equal, a shift from the average level of Catholic support to the lowest observed level in the sample would produce an additional four punishment attacks per year. In the context of the observed variation in punishment attacks such a shift could bring a district like North Down, which experienced no punishment attacks during the period under analysis, to the sample average level of violence for all LGA-years. These findings indicate that punishment attacks are not purely the random acts of sadistic violence and personal revenge described by some popular commentators. Rather, groups like the PIRA respond to the problem of crime strategically, assessing when and where their particular brand of frontier justice is most likely to advance their standing with the local population and least likely to place a strain on their manpower and other resources.

The main effects of these two variables provide an important insight into how insurgent groups assess and respond to the market for crime fighting in their communities. However, the formal model also predicted that insurgents' assessment of the costs and benefits of punishment would be influenced by their beliefs regarding other aspects of their strategic environment. Insurgent groups were expected to discount the costs of punishment attacks when they believed that the police were likely to succeed in any effort to convert suspected criminals into counterinsurgency informants (H4B). The formal model also predicted that insurgent groups would weigh the costs of punishment attacks more heavily when they were confident in their ability to identify and eliminate informers working for the police (H4A).

The statistical results produced mixed support for hypothesis H4B. Recall here that the police were expected to have the greatest chance of recruiting suspected criminals as

counterinsurgency informants in areas with relatively few criminal law offices. Further recall that the costs of punishment attacks were expected to be highest in LGA-years in which few republican prisoners were released from jail. Given these substantive interpretations, the main effect of the criminal law offices variable was expected to be statistically significant and negative. At the same time, increasing the number of criminal law offices in an area was expected to reduce the marginal effect of released prisoners. The results presented in table 4.2 corroborate the first of these two expectations. That is, all else equal, when the costs of punishment attacks are highest the PIRA tended to punish fewer suspected criminals in areas containing a larger number of criminal law offices.

Figure 4.10: Marginal Effect of Prisoner Releases (Predicted Number of Events) Conditional on the Number of Criminal Law Offices




In order to assess the conditional relationship between the costs of punishment attacks and the effectiveness of police coercion, figure 4.10 plots the marginal effect of a one unit increase in the number of republican prisoners released from jail on the predicted number of punishment attacks conditional on the number of criminal law offices in the area. Surprisingly, figure 4.10 indicates that released republican prisoners had the greatest impact in areas containing relatively few criminal law offices. This result is contrary to theoretical expectations, indicating that a change in the number of prisoners released to

an area in which criminals had relatively easy access to legal protection would lead to a smaller change in the number of republican punishment attacks than would a similar change in the number of prisoners released to a district containing relatively few criminal law offices. This result indicates that the marginal costs of punishment attacks weighed most heavily on the PIRA in areas where the police would be more likely to succeed in coercing suspected criminals into becoming counterinsurgency informants. Nevertheless, the substantive significance of this result is worth noting. Releasing eight prisoners — approximately the sample average plus one standard deviation — to an area containing four criminal law offices would yield an average of approximately four more punishment attacks per year than if no prisoners had been released to the area, all else equal. Releasing the same number of prisoners to a district containing approximately 32 criminal law offices would yield 3 additional attacks under the same conditions. These substantive differences demonstrate that changes in the size of the PIRA's labor force had the greatest impact in those places where legal protection was least accessible to suspected criminals and the police were likely to have a relatively free hand in attempting to coerce these suspects into providing information on local insurgent activity.

Hypothesis H4A also receives mixed support from the statistical model. Recall that higher values of the isolation index indicate that Catholics are more likely to live in homogeneously Catholic wards within each LGA and that the PIRA was expected to take advantage of the information available via the relatively dense in-group social networks in these homogeneous areas to identify and eliminate individuals suspected of collaborating with the police. Given this interpretation, the negative marginal effect of a decrease in the PIRA's labor supply — as represented by a reduction in the number of republicans released from jail — should be amplified in increasingly homogeneous districts. Furthermore, the main effect of Catholic isolation was expected to be statistically significant and negative. The first of these expectations is confirmed by the marginal effects plot presented in figure 4.11. All else equal, a reduction in an area's ex-prisoner republican labor supply from eight prisoners to two prisoners would yield approximately one less republican punishment attack per year in an area with a Catholic isolation index score one standard

deviation below the sample mean. Contrastingly, a similar reduction in the number of prisoners released to an area with a Catholic isolation index score one standard deviation above the sample mean would produce five fewer republican punishment attacks in the same year. Ethnic homogeneity appears to have facilitated the PIRA's access to in-group knowledge. This knowledge may have led local PIRA leaders to feel more secure in their position in the community, and less fearful of the consequences of ignoring local crime. As a result, the PIRA weighed the marginal manpower costs of punishment attacks more heavily, preserving the group's most scarce resource for other activities, such as collecting intelligence and attacking militarily valuable targets.


Figure 4.11: Marginal Effect of Prisoner Releases (Predicted Number of Events) Conditional on Catholic Residential Segregation



Insurgent groups were also expected to weigh the benefits of punishment attacks differently depending on the expected likelihood that the police would become aware of crimes ignored by the insurgent group. In particular, when the benefits of punishment attacks were below a critical value, an increase in the probability of police involvement was expected to produce a corresponding increase in the number of punishment attacks. Recall here that punishment attacks were expected to be most beneficial in areas where the local population was alienated from the police force and that the police were expected

to be more likely to become aware of locally committed crimes in areas where they have a relatively strong institutional presence. Thus, given the theoretical expectation stated above, the multiplicative interaction between these two variables should be statistically insignificant when a relatively small proportion of the Catholic population supports the police force. However, the interaction should be statistically significant and positive as the percentage of Catholics supporting the police increases. Figure 4.12 provides tentative support for this hypothesis, with the shaded area of the figure indicating values for which the estimated marginal effect was statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.01$ level. In regions where Catholic support for the police is more than two standard deviations (10.66 percent) below the sample mean, the variable's interaction with police concentration is not statistically significant. However, in regions where more than 83 percent of the Catholic population support the police, the interactive effect of these two variables is both statistically significant and positively signed, as predicted above.


Figure 4.12: Marginal Effect of Police Concentration Conditional on Catholic Support for the RUC



Finally, the formal model also predicted that insurgent groups would alter their approach to crime in their communities as the tides of the intelligence war changed. Recall here that small seizures were hypothesized to indicate that the police had accumulated

relatively little in the way of information on insurgent activity in an area. In these circumstances, any additional information about where the insurgents might be hiding themselves and their weapons should be highly prized by the police. On the other hand, the seizure of a large quantity of weapons and ammunition by the police indicates that they have already penetrated the insurgent group extensively, and additional information will add marginally little to their intelligence portfolio. As a result, the frequency of punishment attacks should increase most dramatically in district-years in which a small number of arms were captured. Figure 4.13, which plots the predicted number of punishment attacks conditional on the value of the weapons index, indicates that this is precisely the pattern observed in the data, all else equal. Small arms seizures appear to have acted as an ‘alarm bell’ of sorts, alerting the PIRA to an emerging intelligence threat and inducing the group to punish more suspected criminals as a means of denying the police access to this potentially valuable source of information.

Figure 4.13: Predicted Number of Punishment Attacks Conditional on RUC Arms Seizures



In general, the results presented here demonstrate that, for any insurgent group, the decision to conduct punishment shootings as a form of crime fighting is a function of a complex set of strategic factors. Importantly, the data presented here also demonstrate

that the factors influencing this decision are both theoretically and empirically distinct from those predicting other types of insurgent violence. Any insurgency is likely to have its hotspots, in which the risk of being a victim of any form of violence is comparatively greater than in other, relatively peaceful parts of the respective country. However, the fact that hotspots exist — and they certainly do in the case being studied here — does not imply that all types of violence occurring in those areas are motivated by the same set of factors. Two secondary analyses conducted using the same data confirm this conclusion. The three-year cumulative moving average of police deaths and the three-year cumulative moving average of all security personnel deaths (including the British Army and Ulster Defense Regiment) were analyzed as dependent variables, using the same independent variables as were used in the models presented in table 4.2. These analyses failed to pass the test of collective fit, indicating that attacks against military targets in Northern Ireland were motivated by different factors, and supporting the conclusion that punishment shootings are a distinct form of insurgent behavior.

4.4 Conclusion

The results presented here have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between “ordinary” crime and insurgent violence. In particular, these results illustrate the importance of providing an adequate response to problems like vandalism, theft and drug dealing in areas that are under threat from insurgent violence. Counterinsurgency theorists and practitioners often treat these types of bread and butter issues as second order problems, to be dealt with only after an insurgent force has been soundly defeated. However, the results presented above serve as a warning that such a narrow view of counterinsurgency might be both inaccurate and dangerous. Throughout the Troubles, the PIRA used ambushes and other attacks against the RUC to increase the level of alienation between the people of Northern Ireland’s Catholic ghettos and the police. Having largely accomplished that goal, republican militants subsequently sought to capitalize on that elevated level of alienation by inserting themselves as providers of a brutal alternative system of law and order. Nevertheless, the PIRA’s willingness and ability to carry

out these kinds of operations was also influenced by factors other than local displeasure with the police. PIRA capabilities and resources also played an important part in affecting the group's willingness to conduct punishment shootings. On average, an increase in the PIRA's labor supply led to a corresponding increase in the number of punishment shootings, but this relationship was conditional on the level of Catholic segregation in a district. RUC intelligence successes also exhibited a strong relationship with punishment shootings. Initial intelligence successes by the RUC served as a fire alarm for the PIRA and led the group to engage in more punishment attacks, although massive arms seizures appear to have reduced the ability of the PIRA to deal with local criminals.

The findings regarding prisoner releases have particularly significant implications for how counterinsurgents approach negotiations with rebel groups. As was the case in Northern Ireland, insurgent negotiators often demand that the status quo government release imprisoned members of the insurgent group as a sign of the government's good faith in negotiating. Although prisoner releases are often controversial, governments have frequently proved willing to grant this concession in order to bring the insurgents to the negotiating table. The results presented here indicate that caution is warranted when pursuing such a policy. In the Irish case, withholding republican prisoners generally had the effect of decreasing the PIRA's ability and willingness to engage in vigilantism aimed at punishing suspected drug dealers and "anti-social elements" within republican communities. The marginal value of each prisoner in offsetting the costs associated with punishment attacks was multiplied by the ethnic homogeneity of a district. In homogeneously Catholic districts the PIRA appears to have weighed the value of each released prisoner more heavily, and withholding even a small number of the prisoners that were released would have likely reduced the frequency of PIRA punishment attacks in these areas. This finding has a variety of implications for how counterinsurgents should approach the issue of prisoner releases during negotiations. First, in light of this result counterinsurgents might alter the schedule of agreed prisoner releases in order to maximize their own bargaining leverage. If prisoners from ethnically homogeneous districts make a more valuable contribution to the insurgent group's labor pool, then the state should be able to extract greater reciprocal

concessions from the insurgents in return for the release of prisoners meeting this description. At the same time, counterinsurgents might feel more secure in releasing prisoners from ethnically mixed districts as a sign of good faith, because these individuals will be less likely to harm the counterinsurgent group upon returning to the insurgent labor pool.

Perhaps more significantly, the influence of released prisoners on insurgent vigilantism must be viewed in the context of the broader challenge of establishing reliable institutions of law and order in conflict torn societies. Released prisoners were but one of several factors that were found to influence an insurgent group's tendency to dedicate its scarce resources to punishing suspected criminals. The level of confidence in the status quo police as defenders of law and order was also found to exert a powerful influence on when and where insurgents would engage in vigilantism. This finding, too, has implications for how status quo powers approach issues of law and order during an insurgency. Previous research (Brewer and Magee 1991, Hall 1997, McGarry and O'Leary 1999, Weitzer 1995) indicates that, in addition to the ethnic composition of the police force itself, public confidence in the police as investigators of crime in deeply divided societies is often undermined when the police are placed on the front-lines of a counterinsurgency campaign. The findings presented here underline the importance of clearly separating the civilian and military roles of a police force. Furthermore, it is equally important that the civil police be provided with sufficient resources to successfully carry out their duties. Status quo governments are often loathe to divert men and resources away from an ongoing counterinsurgency campaign to focus on the apprehension of petty criminals, murders or rapists. However, providing the civil police with sufficient resources is the first step in establishing a working relationship between status quo institutions of justice and the people. If the civil police are successful in establishing rapport with their constituents, then insurgent groups will have less incentive to invest in their own parallel set of law and order institutions, because the perceived return on investment will be relatively low.

These results contrast with the work of Kalyvas and others by demonstrating that different causal processes produce different types of selective violence. Punishment attacks appear to be governed by a wide variety of social and political factors that go beyond

the level of control exercised by the insurgents or the status quo government in a given territory. Indeed, punishment attacks are costly to the groups that conduct them, and these costs appear to have a significant influence on the willingness of groups like the PIRA to dedicate their manpower and resources to this activity. In light of these findings, it is important that we look carefully at the causal processes that support the correlations discovered in the preceding analysis. The following chapters present a series of detailed, qualitative analyses that explore how insurgent groups and governments think about and respond to punishment attacks and demonstrate that these assaults are truly theoretically and empirically distinct from other forms of insurgent-against-civilian violence.

Chapter 5

‘A Very Peaceful Area’

This chapter is the first of three chapters adopting a qualitative approach to PIRA punishment attacks and RUC policing tactics in four regions of Northern Ireland. The results of the primary statistical model were used to select four cases for further analysis using a hybrid of Gerring’s (2007) typical and diverse case selection strategies. This selection strategy produced a set of cases that are relatively well explained by the statistical model and reflective of the broadest possible range of variation on the dependent variable. This chapter, and the two subsequent case studies, demonstrates that the correlations observed in chapter four are not spurious, but are in fact products of the causal mechanisms embedded in the formal model presented in chapter three.

To that end, the remainder of this chapter proceeds in four sections. Section 5.1 provides a brief discussion of the procedure used for case selection. Section 5.2 reviews the theoretical findings from the formal model and restates the hypotheses presented in chapter four in a manner that provides clear expectations for both the RUC and the PIRA in the selected cases. Section 5.3 describes the baseline strategic environment, highlighting features addressed by the model that can effectively be held constant across time within North Down. Section 5.4 applies the insights gleaned from the formal model to North Down, exploring how the RUC’s role as a relatively ‘normal’ civil police force in this area was influenced by the counterinsurgency campaign throughout Northern Ireland. Section 5.5 turns to the PIRA, exploring why the group ignored criminal activity in North Down throughout the troubles, despite the relative proximity of the NDBC to PIRA strongholds in Belfast. Finally, section 5.6 concludes with a summary of the results

presented throughout the chapter and a discussion of the broader, theoretical implication of these findings.

5.1 Case Selection

The quantitative results presented in chapter four indicated that, on average, the PIRA's approach to vigilante justice was influenced by the political and strategic tensions highlighted in the formal model. Across all of Northern Ireland's local government areas and the four regions of Belfast, the group was more likely to punish criminals when manpower was plentiful and local dissatisfaction with the RUC created an exploitable political opportunity, although these relationships were conditioned by factors such as the group's ability to identify informers and the access to legal protection available to suspected criminals. These correlations provide initial evidence in support of the hypotheses developed in chapter three. However, it is possible that these results are at least partly spurious, resulting from unidentified measurement error or other unknown factors. Four cases with small regression residuals were selected for detailed qualitative analysis in order to carefully assess the causal mechanisms linking inputs to outputs and reinforce the results of the statistical analysis.

Cases were selected on the basis of two criteria. Criterion one was the error rate of the statistical model. The error rate was computed by first generating linear predictions for the expected number of events in Stata. Both the predicted and observed number of punishment attacks were then summed for each local government district over the entire time period covered by the statistical analysis. The absolute value of the difference between the total predicted number of attacks and the total observed number of attacks was then divided by the total observed number of attacks. This procedure generated a decimal value indicating the rate at which the model either under predicted or over predicted punishment attacks for each district.

Having generated the error rate for the statistical model, the 28 local government areas¹

¹Recall that, for the purpose of police statistics, the Ballymoney and Moyle LGAs are combined into a single statistical area and Belfast is divided into four regions, yielding 28 areas as opposed to the 26 statutory LGAs.

were then stratified into three groups on the basis of observed values on the dependent variable. Group one contained the five cases that experience zero republican punishment attacks throughout the entire period of analysis. Group two contained the 20 areas that experienced more than one punishment attack, but fewer than 85 republican punishment attacks² during the period considered in the statistical analysis. Group three contained the five cases that experienced more than 85 punishment attacks during the period under analysis. Within each group, cases were then ranked on the basis of the model error rate. The case from each group with the smallest error rate was selected for analysis.³ Because of the relatively large variance within the second group, two local government areas from this group were selected for cross case comparative analysis using a combination of the criteria laid out above and Mill's method of difference. The selection of an additional case from group two ensures that the set of case selected is truly representative of the entire range of variation on the dependent variable and guards against the possibility that inferences gleaned from this section of the qualitative analysis are in some sense peculiar to an individual local government area. The four cases selected using this procedure were North Down (Group One), Dungannon/South Tyrone (Group Two), Newry and Mourne (Group Two) and North Belfast (Group Three). The locations of the four districts are shown in figures 5.1 and 5.2.

5.2 Theoretical Expectations

The formal model defined the conditions under which both insurgent groups and police forces would take action against ordinary criminals, conditional on the relationship between a set of exogenous parameters, defined in table 5.1, and the expected behavior of their respective opponents. In this manner, the equilibrium conditions and comparative statics analysis presented in chapter three can be used to gain analytical leverage on explaining how the interaction between the RUC and the PIRA in their simultaneous

²This cut-point was arrived at using the population mean (27.61 attacks) plus one standard deviation (57.51 attacks).

³It was not possible to generate an 'error rate' for the first group, because division by zero is undefined. As a result, the case with the lowest total model residuals was selected from group one.

contests to gain victory on the battlefield and to become the dominant providers of law enforcement in Northern Ireland influenced the manner in which each actor responded to so-called “ordinary” crime throughout the Troubles. Rather than recapitulate the entire

Table 5.1: Definition of Model Parameters

Parameter	Definition
B_i	Benefits of policing/punishment attacks
C_i	Costs of policing/punishment attacks
I	Value of new counterinsurgency intelligence
p	Probability ignored crime is reported to other actor
q	Probability criminal recruited as new counterinsurgency informant
r	Probability insurgents identify any informers so created

formal solution to the model, presented in full in chapter three, the remainder of this section revisits the formal constraints defining equilibrium behavior in order to provide clear, empirically testable statements of the causal processes connecting changes in the strategic environment with changes in actor behavior. The section begins with a brief restatement of the theoretical constraints on both police and insurgent behavior derived under the ($Punish_{Government} \mid \sim Punish_{Insurgents}$) equilibria discovered in the formal model. The subsequent empirical analysis will demonstrate that the observed behavior of both actors with respect to crime in North Down, and the background conditions producing such behavior, reflect the causal process embedded in the former solution.

Formally, the government’s decision to punish or not punish suspected criminals was represented by a set of three punishment constraints. The first and third constraints were identical, representing the conditions under which the government would punish a suspected criminal under the expectation that the insurgents would not punish the same suspect. Under these conditions, the government was expected to punish suspected criminals so long as $\frac{(B_G - C_G)}{q - qr} \geq I$, where the parameters are defined as in table 5.1, above. Analytically, the comparative statics analysis of this constraint, presented in chapter three, indicated that, all else equal, the RUC should punish more criminals when the value of counterinsurgency intelligence and the costs of ordinary policing are relatively low and

the benefits of ordinary policing are relatively high. Furthermore, the formal model also indicated that, under the same assumption regarding insurgent behavior, the police would be more likely to punish suspected criminals when:

1. The benefits of ordinary policing are greater than the costs of ordinary policing ($B_G \geq C_G$) and:
 - (a) The police are ineffective at recruiting suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants; *or*
 - (b) The insurgents are adept at identifying and eliminating informants created by the police.

These theoretical expectations yield a set of empirically testable predictions that can be assessed against both the observed behavior of the RUC and the decision making process that led the police to a particular allocation of resources. In particular, the RUC should allocate more of its scarce manpower and resources to patrolling the streets of relatively peaceful districts when the PIRA's campaign is at an ebb. This expectation reflects the fungibility of police resources across Northern Ireland. Manpower and vehicles allocated to conduct ordinary foot-patrols or traffic stops in peaceful areas could just as easily be used to investigate terrorist incidents and mount security check-points in Belfast or along the international frontier with the Republic of Ireland. As a result, the *local* allocation of police resources has *national* consequences, and the dedication of manpower, vehicles and the like to North Down creates opportunity costs that must be borne by RUC units operating in less peaceful regions of Northern Ireland. Beyond this expected correlation between the allocation of police resources and the national intensity of the PIRA's bombing and shooting campaign, RUC leaders and senior political figures should make the case for the (non)allocation of resources to peaceful districts in terms that reflect the opportunity costs of ordinary policing.

The RUC's approach to ordinary crime should also be conditioned by its assessment of the potential benefits to be gained by conducting counterinsurgency operations. The comparative statics analysis demonstrated that, when counterinsurgency intelligence is highly valued, police forces will often give priority to intelligence gathering operations at the expense of investigating crime and engaging in other "ordinary" police activities. On

the other hand, when little battlefield advantage is expected to be gained from recruiting suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants, the police will relax their preference for counterinsurgency operations and pursue suspected criminals with greater vigor. Although it is difficult to measure directly the extent to which counterinsurgency intelligence information would have been valued by the RUC in one place or another throughout the Troubles, it is nevertheless possible to establish a set of observable conditions under which the police might place a greater or lesser priority on intelligence gathering operations in a given area.

Recall here that the type of intelligence provided by criminal informants was expected to be of the greatest benefit to the police when they have relatively little knowledge about local insurgent activity. Further recall that the value of this type of information was expected to be of diminishing utility as the police improve their intelligence networks and develop more detailed portfolios on local insurgents. Given this interpretation we would expect the RUC to privilege its role as a civil police force in areas where the value of counterinsurgency intelligence available from local criminals is relatively low. Furthermore, it is possible to logically infer the conditions under which this is likely to be the case.

If the primary objective of counterinsurgency intelligence operations is to identify the insurgents and separate them from the general population, as British Brigadier Frank Kitson has noted, then we would expect military intelligence to be of the greatest value in areas that contain a large number of insurgent activists whose identities are unknown to the police. It goes without saying that the true number of anonymous insurgent activists in an area is impossible to know. However, it is possible to establish the conditions under which an area will be more or less likely to contain a large number of insurgents. In the context of Northern Ireland, empirical and theoretical studies of PIRA recruitment indicate that, throughout the conflict, the organization's membership was almost exclusively Catholic (Bloom, Gill and Horgan 2012), and that Catholics from economically deprived communities who had been the victims of pro-state violence or repression were particularly likely either to support republican violence or to join the PIRA (McAllister and Hayes

2001; White 1989). Additionally, given the highly localized structure of organizations like the PIRA (Boyne 1996; Horgan and Taylor 1997; Leahy 2005) and the importance of anonymity as an element of the guerrilla strategies they pursue (Bamford 2005), areas containing a large number of unidentified insurgents should also produce relatively more anti-state violence than those areas that contain a small number of such insurgents. Finally, in those areas that do experience some degree of insurgent activity, we would expect new intelligence to be the most valuable when the police are least effective at thwarting insurgent attacks to the extent that the successful interdiction of insurgent operations indicates that the police already have an effective network of informers established in an area.

In keeping with these theoretical expectations, we would therefore expect military intelligence to be most valuable in areas with a relatively large, socially disadvantaged Catholic population with a significant historical experience of state repression. As a result, the RUC should be least involved in ordinary policing in these areas, and more involved in areas with the opposite characteristics. Additionally, the RUC should value the collection of counterinsurgency intelligence over the apprehension of suspected criminals in areas where the insurgents, in this case the PIRA, are highly active and the police are unable to successfully counter PIRA activity. Observationally, we can measure the occurrence of PIRA violence using data derived from the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN). The effectiveness of police counterinsurgency can be assessed by the number of insurgents imprisoned by the state, accounting for the expected number of insurgent activists in an area, and by the ratio of police fatalities to insurgent fatalities. Thus, we would expect the RUC to dedicate more of its resources to crime prevention in areas with low levels of insurgent violence and a low ratio of police fatalities to insurgent fatalities.

Having characterized the conditions under which the police will punish suspected criminals, given that the insurgents cannot credibly threaten to do the same, it is now necessary to determine when the insurgents will conform to their assumed behavior. Here again the constraints derived from the formal model can be utilized to derive a set of empirically verifiable expectations regarding when the insurgents will eschew their duties as vigilantes

and how they will arrive at this decision. Recall here that, assuming a crime is reported to the insurgents first and that the police will punish the suspect, the insurgents were expected to punish the criminal so long as $B_{Insurgents} \geq C_{Insurgents}$. Thus, under these conditions, non-punishment is rational so long as the material and opportunity costs of punishment attacks outweigh the benefits of the same activity. Additionally, recall that, assuming that a crime is first reported to the government and that the government does not punish the suspect, the insurgents were expected to punish when $\frac{(B_T - C_T)(1 - qr)}{qr - q} \leq I$, where parameters are once again defined as in table 5.1. The comparative statics analysis indicated that non-punishment would be more likely when the benefits of punishment attacks (B_T) and the value of new counterinsurgency intelligence (I) were low and the costs of punishment attacks (C_T) were high. Finally, the formal analysis also indicated that non-punishment would be more likely when:

1. The costs of punishment attacks are greater than the benefits ($C_T \geq B_T$) and:
 - (a) The police are ineffective at recruiting suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants; *or*
 - (b) The insurgents are adept at identifying and eliminating informants created by the police.

Generally, assuming that the RUC will punish criminals rather than attempt to use them as counterinsurgency informants, we should observe no republican punishment attacks in areas where the costs of this activity would be extremely high or the benefits extremely low, all else equal. Empirically, the benefits of punishment attacks should be lowest in those areas in which the police are well accepted as the providers of law and order and the political preferences of the population strongly favor pro-state parties and organizations. Recall here that insurgent groups derive benefits from punishment attacks to the extent that these attacks send a signal to local people that the insurgents are both aware of and responsive to criminality in their communities while simultaneously highlighting the ineffectiveness of government forces in dealing with the same issue. In this way, punishment attacks help to advance the institution building goals of the insurgents to the extent that they allow the insurgents to capitalize on disaffection with the police and challenge the status quo government's position as the dominant provider of law

enforcement for their constituents.

Punishment attacks will be most likely to have the desired effect in areas in which the public is already frustrated with the police response to crime and open to alternative methods of sanctioning criminals within the community.⁴ However, an insurgent group's utility for offering punishment attacks as an alternative means of law enforcement in any community—even one with high levels of pre-existing frustration with the police—is also a function of the political preferences of local people. In areas where popular opinion is homogeneously and strongly opposed to the insurgents—i.e. areas in which loyalty to the status quo government is highest—it is unlikely that the insurgent group will be welcomed as an enforcer of law and order. Thus, insurgent groups will stand to benefit most from punishment attacks in areas in which the population is disappointed with the performance of the police and in which dominant political opinion is not hostile to the insurgents' objectives. In Northern Ireland, we would therefore expect punishment attacks to be most profitable for the PIRA in LGAs where the police have a relatively poor record of solving crime and in which unionist and loyalist political movements have the least support.⁵

Furthermore, although insurgent groups can use punishment attacks as a means of advancing their long-term institution building goals, this activity can also be costly to the extent that resources that could have been used on the battlefield are consumed in the pursuit of vigilante justice. As a result, punishment attacks should be most costly to an insurgent group when their labor pool is relatively depleted, by arrests, assassinations and

⁴In an experimental study assessing popular support of vigilantism, Haas et al (2012) found that when people expressed higher levels of confidence in the police, they were more likely to express "outrage" in response to acts of vigilantism and more likely to endorse punishment of the vigilante, whereas individuals expressing low levels of confidence in the police were more likely to express the opposite views on both issues.

⁵This is not to say that punishment attacks will be most useful in areas where the insurgents are already strongly supported. Rather it is to assume that insurgents identify some subset of the population as potential supporters/constituents. For instance, in Northern Ireland working class Catholics have been the traditional constituency of groups like the PIRA and SF, and these militant organizations have traditionally faced political competition from more moderate groups like the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) for the loyalty of their co-ethnics. On the nature of Northern Ireland's dual ethnic party systems see Evans and Duffy (1997). SF's commitment to the Catholic community in Northern Ireland is reflected by the placement of the party's official offices throughout the province. As of the 2001 census, the average Catholic share of the population in the 27 Northern Ireland electoral wards containing SF offices was approximately 78 percent, while the Catholic share of the population for all wards was approximately 40 percent.

the like or when the demands placed on its labor pool are relatively great, as a result of an increase in activity on the battlefield. At this point, it is important to note that areas like North Down with little to no republican presence on the ground represent a special case of the opportunity costs associated with punishment attacks or any other military activity. Since these regions do not have indigenous insurgent units or activists, any insurgent activity—whether it be punishment attacks or ambushes against state targets—in these regions requires that insurgent units from other areas be moved into position and taken away from their duties closer to home. As a result, punishment attacks are likely to be at their most costly in these areas, since the insurgents must divert manpower and resources from other operational areas, thereby magnifying the geographic scope of the opportunity costs borne by the group for each punishment attack. Empirically, we would therefore anticipate punishment attacks to be least common in areas with no republican political presence.

The theoretical relationships described above provide empirically testable expectations regarding how both the RUC and the PIRA should respond to crime, given the state of the strategic environment. The remainder of this chapter draws on a variety of government documents in the public domain and other sources to assess the fit between these theoretical expectations and the behavior of both groups in North Down.

5.3 North Down: ‘A very peaceful area’

Not a single republican punishment attack was reported in North Down over the entire period covered by the statistical analysis. In fact, data released by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) indicate that there were no republican punishment attacks of any kind in North Down from 1990 to 2008. Beyond the lack of republican punishment attacks, North Down was relatively free from political violence more generally throughout the Troubles. From 1969 to 2001 only ten people were killed as a result of terrorism in North Down, and only one of these fatalities was attributed to the PIRA, with the remainder

claimed by various loyalist paramilitary groups.⁶ At the same time, the RUC confronted a much different environment in North Down than it did in traditional republican areas in places like Belfast and Derry City. Only one police officer died while on duty in North Down and, despite occasional bombings, the relative tranquility of the district permitted the RUC to generally operate as a normal civil police force in the towns and villages along the southern shore of Belfast Lough. Nevertheless, the battle between the PIRA and the RUC had important consequences for how even a peaceful district like North Down was policed.

Before turning to a more detailed analysis of the RUC and PIRA response/non-response to crime in North Down, it is important to establish the background conditions in which each actor's strategy developed in North Down in terms of model parameters. Essentially, it is necessary to demonstrate that, in keeping with the hypotheses described above, all else is truly equal, turning first to the potential value of new counterinsurgency intelligence within the confines of the North Down Borough Council (NDBC) area. Recall here that the police were expected to value new intelligence most highly when there are a large number of anonymous insurgents operating in their area. Recall further that, although we cannot know the true number of insurgents hidden amongst the general population, the presence of a large or small number of insurgents carried several empirically observable implications. First, recalling previous studies that have shown that PIRA activists and supporters tended to be drawn from predominantly Catholic and socially disadvantaged communities with a historical experience of state repression, we expected intelligence to be more valuable to the police in areas that fit this profile. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 map the ward level Catholic share of the population in North Down and the ward level Multiple Deprivation Measures (MDM) computed by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA), respectively. The two maps indicate that North Down is one of the most homogeneously Protestant, homogeneously prosperous of Northern Ireland's local government areas. Across the entire NDBC area, Catholics comprise roughly 13

⁶Even after adjusting for its relatively small population, the level of Troubles related fatalities in North Down pales in comparison to places like West Belfast and Derry, with 0.13 deaths per 10,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless, the North Down area was the site of a handful of PIRA 'spectaculars' including car-bomb attacks in Bangor city center in 1972, 1992 and 1993, although none resulted in fatalities.

percent of the total population,⁷ and in no ward is the percentage of Catholic residents greater than about one-third of the total. In contrast, Catholics comprise roughly 44 percent of the population of Northern Ireland as a whole and a slightly lower 40 percent of the population in the average ward.⁸ In terms of deprivation, North Down also stands out from other regions of Northern Ireland. NISRA's MDM indicator summarizes seven different elements of social and economic deprivation into a single index, with higher values being assigned to areas experiencing greater levels of deprivation and lower values indicating lower levels of deprivation. At the time of the 2001 census, North Down's 25 wards had an average MDM score of 9.36 as compared to a score of 21.9 for the average ward outside of North Down.⁹ Furthermore, 15 of the 25 wards in the NDBC area ranked in the top 90 percent of all wards in Northern Ireland in terms of the economic, social and physical health of residents. Of the remaining 10 wards, only three fell outside of the 50th percentile. Unemployment statistics paint a similar picture of North Down during the late 1990s. From 1994 to 2000, the NDBC area had an average unemployment claimant rate of just 4.1 percent, nearly a third lower than the Northern Ireland average rate of 6.1 percent for the same time period.

Finally, we also expected areas containing large numbers of anonymous insurgents to experience relatively high levels of insurgent related violence. From 1969 to 1999, only one person died as a result of PIRA violence in North Down. In contrast, the PIRA was responsible for the deaths of an average of 64 individuals in Northern Ireland's other LGAs. Even excluding Belfast and Derry, on average more than 40 people were killed by the PIRA in each of the province's 23 remaining local government areas. The remarkably low number of fatalities in North Down is all the more surprising given the area's relative

⁷Note that the 2001 census represented a high water mark in terms of the Catholic share of North Down's total population since the onset of the Troubles. According to data provided by Compton (1999) Catholics represented about 11 percent of North Down's population in 1971; the Catholic share of the NDBC's population fell to approximately nine percent in 1981 and approximately ten percent in 1991.

⁸The average ward-level Catholic share of the population in North Down's 25 wards is 10.25 percent. The average ward-level Catholic share of the population in the 557 wards outside of North Down is 41.03 percent. A t-test comparing ward-level averages between these two groups indicates that the observed difference in means is statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.001$ level.

⁹A t-test comparing sample means between North Down and the rest of Northern Ireland indicates that this difference is statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.001$ level.

proximity to traditional republican strongholds in North and West Belfast.¹⁰ Given the highly localized nature of PIRA units (Boyne 1996; Horgan and Taylor 1997; Leahy 2005), the relative lack of PIRA violence in North Down also appears to indicate that there were relatively few active PIRA volunteers in the area and that, subsequently, the RUC would have little incentive to prioritize counterinsurgency operations in this area at the expense of “ordinary” civil policing duties.

Publicly available data on RUC intelligence gathering activities as well as biographical data on the hometowns of imprisoned PIRA members also indicate that, especially by the 1990s, the RUC had little reason to be concerned with counterinsurgency operations aimed at thwarting PIRA activity in North Down. Data on explosives finds released by the PSNI Central Statistics Unit (CSU) under the Freedom of Information Act indicate that between 1990 and 2009 the RUC, and later the PSNI, uncovered less than one kilogram of explosives in North Down, as compared to an average of approximately 33 kilograms of explosives in Northern Ireland’s other LGAs over the same time period. Additionally, data on the hometowns of imprisoned PIRA members provided by the SF affiliated political prisoners’ welfare group Saoirse indicate that only one of the nearly 400 PIRA members serving prison sentences in 1997 hailed from North Down. Both the apparent rarity of North Down PIRA volunteers and the sparsity of fruitful weapons finds in the area further indicate that, throughout the Troubles, the RUC had little reason to place a high value on counterinsurgency policing in the area.

Furthermore, the geographic and ethnic separation of the predominately Protestant population of North Down from PIRA havens in Belfast and elsewhere also implied that the RUC would have little success in turning local criminals into potential PIRA infiltrators. In order to provide the police with actionable intelligence, a criminal would require knowledge of PIRA activities. In the absence of indigenous PIRA units, this knowledge could only be acquired through direct infiltration of the PIRA by a newly recruited agent. Although this approach was used fruitfully by the RUC throughout the conflict, a Protestant recruit from North Down would lack the local knowledge and connections that proved vital to

¹⁰For instance, Bangor city center is less than 15 miles from the intersection of the Falls and Andersonstown Roads in West Belfast.

successful infiltration efforts by the likes of Martin McGartland and Raymond Gilmour.¹¹ Furthermore, any informant that was successfully recruited in the first instance would be more likely to be discovered and eliminated by the PIRA, as the organization would rely on Catholic social networks in an attempt to establish the bona fides of the prospective infiltrator, and would quickly determine their status as an outsider. As a result, we would expect parameter q to be relatively low and parameter r to be relatively high in North Down throughout the period under analysis here.

Recall here that, formally, the effects of parameters r and q were felt via their interaction with the costs and benefits of ordinary policing. In particular, when the benefits of ordinary policing outweigh the costs, an increase in r was expected to increase the police force's incentive to punish suspected criminals rather than recruit them as informers. Contrastingly, when the benefits outweigh the costs of policing, an increase in q was expected to have the opposite effect, decreasing the police force's incentive to punish suspected criminals. Analytically, both of these parameters essentially amplify the effect of the benefits parameter (B_G) on the police force's decision making process, with high values of r and low values of q causing the police to weigh the benefits of ordinary, civil police work more heavily than either the costs of this activity or the value of counterinsurgency intelligence in their decision calculus. Given the low value of potential counterinsurgency intelligence to be collected in North Down, combined with a high likelihood that counterinsurgency infiltrators from North Down would be easily identified by the PIRA and the low probability that local criminals would be useful as counterinsurgency informants in the first instance, we would therefore expect the RUC to prioritize civil policing over counterinsurgency operations in North Down, even when the benefits of the former activity only marginally offset the associated costs.

¹¹For detailed accounts of how McGartland went about joining and, subsequently, undermining the PIRA in Belfast see McGartland (1997; 1999).

5.4 The RUC in North Down

Having established the background conditions in which the RUC operated in North Down during the nearly three decades of political violence in Northern Ireland, it is now possible to turn to a more detailed assessment of how the changing costs and benefits of ordinary policing influenced the strategic deployment of RUC resources in the region throughout the Troubles. To this end, the following subsection adopts the methodological approach referred to by George and Bennett (2005) as the “congruence method” to assess the empirical predictions regarding police behavior presented above. As George and Bennett (*ibid*, 182) note this approach has several features that make it an attractive option for addressing the hypotheses presented above in the empirical domain considered here. In adopting this approach, the analyst seeks to establish “congruity,” that is, to discover extent to which “the relative strength and duration of hypothesized causes and observed effects” are similar across space and/or time (*ibid*, 183). This approach is less data intensive than alternative methods of within-case analysis such as process tracing, as it only requires that the analyst have enough information on causes and outcomes within the case to establish ‘congruity’ between causes and effects. This approach is particularly well suited to the present research context, since the quantitative analysis presented in the previous chapter already provides us with good reason to believe that police and insurgent behavior are relatively well explained by the theory presented in chapter three.

Furthermore, perhaps as a result of its status as one of the most peaceful regions of Northern Ireland, North Down has received comparatively little attention both in the secondary literature on the conflict in Northern Ireland and in the archives most widely used for researching the conflict.¹² Given these limitations, it is unlikely that the considerable data requirements of a process tracing approach could be met in the present case. As a result, the remainder of this subsection adopts the congruence approach, assessing the relationship between changes in the costs and benefits of ordinary police in North Down with changes in observed police behavior in the area between 1974 and the first act of

¹²For instance, a search of the catalog of the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland for the keywords Bangor, Holywood and North Down in records created after 1969 produced only two hits. A similar search for the keyword South Armagh returned nearly 200 results.

PIRA decommissioning in October 2001.

To that end, this section begins by establishing the strategic conditions confronted by the RUC throughout Northern Ireland between 1970 and 1975. The objective here is to assess the likely opportunity costs of policing operations in North Down. When the RUC is heavily committed to counterinsurgency policing in Northern Ireland as a whole, we would expect fewer resources to be allocated to peaceful areas like North Down, demonstrating the effect of the opportunity costs of ordinary policing on police decision making at the national level. Subsequently, the conditions on the streets of North Down are examined in greater detail in order to demonstrate that the local costs of ordinary policing were quite low, allowing those constables that were allocated to North Down to focus on civil police duties even when the conflict between the PIRA and the security forces was at its height.

By the mid-1970s, the conflict between the PIRA and British and local security forces had been in full swing for roughly half a decade and nearly half of the roughly 3600 people that would lose their lives as a result of political violence in Northern Ireland had already been killed. By the end of calendar year 1976, the PIRA had killed 739 people in its war against the British state in Ireland, approximately 45 percent of the total number of individuals that would lose their lives as a result of PIRA action over the entire course of the conflict. Furthermore, it was also during this period that the threat posed by the PIRA and other paramilitary groups to the RUC reached its zenith. Figure 5.5 plots the three-year moving average of RUC fatalities between 1970 and 1999. The figure indicates that the early to mid-1970s were amongst the bloodiest time-periods for the police in Northern Ireland, with the moving average of RUC fatalities reaching a peak of 17.33 in 1975. Figure 5.6, which plots the number of assaults against active duty RUC personnel classified as 'shooting' incidents, indicates that this trend was not isolated to lethal attacks against the RUC. Aside from a dip in the number of such attacks in 1975—which corresponds to the PIRA's 'truce' discussed in the following chapter—and a spike during 1981—which corresponds to the public outrage at the death of PIRA and INLA hunger strikers in Long Kesh Prison—more RUC constables appear to have been at generally greater risk

of falling victim to gun violence while on patrol in the early years of the conflict.¹³ Given the apparent intensity of the PIRA's campaign during this period, and the considerable threat to RUC officers in particular, it would seem reasonable to conclude that the costs of policing Northern Ireland as a whole during the early 1970s were probably higher than at any other point during the Troubles.

This sentiment appears to have been shared by the RUC's Chief Constables during the early years of the Troubles. At the very outset of the conflict in 1970, Chief Constable Graham Shillington lamented in his official report that "The heavy commitment of police on security duties unfortunately but inevitably reduces the amount of attention which can be given to the prevention and detection of ordinary crime" (RUC 1971, 33). Similar sentiments were expressed by the Chief Constable in subsequent reports, which emphasized how "continuing violence and utter disregard for the law" had "made the investigation of [ordinary] crimes extremely difficult and in many cases well-nigh impossible" (RUC 1973, 27) and admitting that, in the border regions of County Fermanagh, for instance, "terrorist activity continues to be of first priority and the combating of it by every legitimate means is the primary aim of the police" (RUC 1974, 87).¹⁴ Thus, we can see here that, at the national level, RUC decision makers were preoccupied with the control of republican violence during the early years of the conflict, and that the general preference of Chief Constables was to allocate manpower and resources to counterinsurgency policing.¹⁵

The environment confronted by the RUC in North Down during this period could not have been more different from the national picture described above. In contrast to the 77 RUC men that lost their lives throughout Northern Ireland by the end of calendar year 1975, not a single constable was killed on the streets of Bangor or Holywood in the first half-decade of the Troubles. Furthermore, as was established in the previous section,

¹³The data, obtained from statistical appendices in the Chief Constable's Annual Reports (1973-1984) include shooting attacks against both foot and mobile patrols.

¹⁴This description of the tension between ordinary policing and counterterrorism in Fermanagh is not atypical of reports from throughout Northern Ireland. For instance, in the same report the conditions in Omagh were described thusly: "Crime detection last year was not unsatisfactory when allowance is made for the abnormal conditions resulting from subversive activity" (RUC 1974, 91). For similar descriptions of Belfast, Newry and Derry see (ibid, 56, 76 and 95).

¹⁵Further evidence of this preference for counterinsurgency over civil policing can be seen in the dramatic fall in the RUC's detection rate for reported crimes between 1969 and 1972 from 58.2 percent in the former year to 21 percent in the latter, see (United Kingdom 1973).

the NDBC area was generally free from PIRA activity as a whole, and was incredibly unlikely to be a source of useful counterinsurgency intelligence for the RUC. Given North Down's status as an incredibly peaceful area during a time when the RUC's role as a counterinsurgent force throughout Northern Ireland placed a significant strain on the organization's resources, we would expect the police to under provide manpower and resources in support of ordinary policing in North Down. However, due to the relatively low local costs of ordinary policing, we would further expect that such resources as are allocated to North Down would be utilized primarily to carry out the functions of a civil police force.

Although no hard numbers of RUC force deployment could be obtained for this time period, it is possible to review the assessments of RUC Chief Constables and others to assess how the police force approached the deployment of resources to North Down in the early 1970s. In particular, the Chief Constable's Annual Reports (CCAR) for 1974 and 1973 reflect the tension between the RUC's national counterinsurgency campaign and its local duties as a civil police force in North Down.¹⁶

In his report for calendar year 1974, the Chief Constable indicated that there was "no lack of public confidence" in the RUC amongst the people of North Down and that, as a result, "Full and impartial enforcement of the law" was possible throughout the year (RUC 1975, 83). However, this assessment was also conditioned by a degree of disappointment that "the continuing difficult security situation" had created a "shortage of manpower" which had necessitated the "deployment of a small number of [unarmed] Royal Military Police" in support of civil policing operations in some parts of the district (RUC 1975, 78). Similarly, the following year, the Chief Constable reported that "A full police service has [sic] been maintained" in North Down and that "normal policing was carried out" throughout the region (RUC 1976, 16;11). Here again, however, the CCAR reflects the tension between local policing in North Down and the demands of a nationwide counterinsurgency campaign, as the Chief Constable explained that "foot

¹⁶Prior to an internal reorganization conducting in the early 1980s, North Down was divided between the RUC's E and G divisions. The quotations from Chief Constable's reports presented below are drawn from assessments provided for both of these divisions.

patrols were operated when sufficient men were available" (ibid, 11).

The tension between providing adequate resources to conduct ordinary policing in North Down and supporting a counterinsurgency campaign against the PIRA was put into sharp relief at Westminster in 1977 when John Carson, at that time the Ulster Unionist MP for North Belfast, told the secretary of state for Northern Ireland that

... The RUC Reserve is a grand force, but it has been deployed in the wrong way. We have an example in Bangor ... It is a very peaceful area and there is not the sectarian violence which I and some of my honorable Friends experience in our constituencies.

I should like the Minister to consider whether the Chief Constable should ... take reserve policemen from the Bangor area and put them into North Queen's Street police station [in North Belfast] ... and assist the RUC and the reserve police, who are very much under strength in those troubled areas.

These assessments by RUC decision makers and senior politicians generally appear to indicate that, during the first half decade of the Troubles, resources were diverted away from North Down in support of the RUC's efforts to combat terrorism in other, less peaceful parts of Northern Ireland. This pattern of decision making reflects our theoretical expectation that, all else equal, the local allocation of police resources would produce national opportunity costs, and that these opportunity costs would be at their greatest when insurgent activity was at its highest. Nevertheless, it also appears that RUC officers serving in North Down utilized the scarce resources provided to them primarily in the pursuit of "ordinary" civil policing duties. This to some extent reflects our theoretical expectations. Although the RUC stood to gain little by policing North Down—the force was already well supported in the region and did not face credible competition to provide law enforcement services from the PIRA—the local costs of conducting foot patrols and investigating robberies were practically zero. The PIRA was not active in the region, and it was unlikely that the police would be able to uncover actionable counterinsurgency intelligence through the use of criminal informers in, or from, North Down. As a result, the RUC was able to function as a relatively normal, although somewhat resource deprived, police force in North Down even during the most prodigious years of PIRA violence in other parts of Northern Ireland.

We have seen that, at the height of the Troubles, RUC decision making regarding the allocation of resources in North Down at both the national and the local level was influenced by the perceived costs of ordinary police work. At the national level, successive RUC Chief Constables were quite frank in admitting the strains placed on RUC manpower by the competing demands of the civil and counterinsurgency roles carried out by the force. For North Down, this meant that police resources were, to a considerable extent, under provided. Nevertheless, local commanders reported to the Chief Constable that police activities in Bangor and Holywood focused almost exclusively on criminal investigation and other “ordinary” civil police duties.

The question of how the RUC, and later the PSNI, might respond to changes in the costs of ordinary police work remains unanswered. To that end, the remainder of this section moves the analysis forward in time, to assess how the RUC responded to crime in North Down during the waning days of the conflict and the years immediately following its resolution. In this instance, our expectations are slightly different. Given the general decrease in insurgent activity during the 1990s, we would expect the police to dedicate more of their resources to the investigation of crime and criminal activity in places like North Down. At the same time, since the conditions in North Down itself remained largely unchanged, we would also expect constables in this area to continue to emphasize the civil aspects of their duties, conducting foot patrols, responding readily to reported crimes and the like.

In general, by the time the PIRA completed its first act of decommissioning in October 2001, the police had managed to maintain their relatively amiable—and relatively safe—relationship with the people of North Down. Throughout the whole of the conflict, only one police officer was killed within the boundaries of the NDBC, a female constable killed by a loyalist booby trap bomb. Four police officers were wounded during a 1993 IRA car bombing, but even this incident reveals the extent to which police operations in North Down differed from those in more dangerous regions of Northern Ireland, as the officers were returning to their station at the end of an extended foot patrol of Bangor city center. More generally, support for the police in North Down has also been underlined by the

relative infrequency with which residents of the NDBC area have filed complaints claiming abuse or mistreatment at the hands of a police officer. Between fiscal years 2000/01 and 2008/09, the Police Service of Northern Ireland's North Down District Command Unit (DCU) averaged 1.41 complaints against the police per 1,000 inhabitants, as compared to an average of approximately 1.44 complaints per inhabitants across the whole of Northern Ireland. Furthermore, official crime statistics indicate that the police in North Down have provided a highly efficient service, especially since the arrival of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA). Figure 5.7 plots the number of crimes per 1,000 inhabitants in North Down between fiscal years 1998/99 and 2011/12 alongside the average crime rate in the rest of Northern Ireland over the same time period and figure 5.8 plots the sanction detection rate for crimes reported to the police in North Down and the whole of Northern Ireland over the same time period. The two figures indicate that, in general, North Down has tended to have a lower crime rate than other LGAs and that the police have been relatively more effective at solving those crimes that are reported in the NDBC area than in greater Northern Ireland. Although the RUC managed to conduct itself as a relatively ordinary police force in North Down throughout the waning days of the Troubles, the fight against the PIRA and, later, dissident republican terrorism continued to place a strain on police resources. In 1996, the year the PIRA returned to violence at the end of its 1994 ceasefire, Chief Constable Hugh Annesley reported that while the detection and prevention of normal crimes would be "pursued with vigor, the principal task [of the RUC] must be to prevent terrorist activity" (Annesley 1996, 58). Data on the allocation of RUC manpower during this period seems to corroborate the Chief Constable's assessment.

Figure 5.9 plots the average amount of overtime pay per full-time RUC officer in ten Belfast area police subdivisions between fiscal years 1994/95 and 1999/00. While each officer in the North Down subdivision received over £520 in overtime on average, their colleagues in North Belfast received an average £386 in overtime payments per year during the same time period. Furthermore, the average overtime expenditure per officer in North Down during this period was higher than similar expenditures in all Belfast-area subdivisions, with the exceptions of South Belfast, West Belfast and Lisburn. Police officers

serving in these latter three districts were likely forced to work significant overtime hours as a result of the relatively high crime rates¹⁷ in these areas and, perhaps more significantly, the significant number of public disturbances that occurred in each of these areas during the mid-1990s.¹⁸ On the other hand, North Down experiences little in the way of both ordinary crime and paramilitary activity, and is spared the sectarian confrontations that often accompany public gatherings—and Orange Order marches in particular—elsewhere in Northern Ireland.

The temporary shifting of police resources from North Down to trouble spots in Belfast during the summer marching season has also been the subject of much comment during meetings of the North Down Borough Council itself. In 2002, Councillor Marion Smith expressed her “grave concern” upon hearing that police officers “from the Borough were to be moved over the summer to trouble spots in North and West Belfast.” The Council, who has generally been amongst the most supportive of the police throughout the Troubles, then went on to pass a motion to “write to the Assistant Chief Constable stating our refusal to allow the officer number in Bangor Station to be reduced [during the summer marching season]... and [request that] Officer level in Bangor Police Station be raised to the appropriate level” (NDBC 2002).

Despite the continued use of RUC manpower and resources as part of the counterterrorism effort in Northern Ireland, there is, nevertheless, some evidence that the RUC’s—and later the PSNI’s—approach to policing in North Down continued to evolve in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement. In the fiscal year following the signing of the GFA, the RUC dedicated one of its eight Headquarters Mobile Support Units (HMSU) to a pilot project aimed at reducing burglaries and other petty crimes in Bangor city center (Flanagan 1999). This decision is remarkable in the context of the original purpose of police Mobile Support Units. According to Roy Mason, at that time the Secretary of State

¹⁷In fiscal years 1998/99 and 1999/00, the only years for which local level data on both reported crime and overtime expenditure were available, South and West Belfast had the highest and second highest average reported crime rates in Northern Ireland, respectively. Lisburn had the sixth highest average crime rate during the same period (PSNI 2012).

¹⁸The burden of policing Northern Ireland’s contentious “marching season” tends to fall heavily on the police in South Belfast, as they are charged with keeping order during controversial Orange Order marches in the mixed Ormeau Road region of the city.

for Northern Ireland, mobile support units were established in the late 1970s to “provide divisional commanders with a mobile squad of experienced officers to combat terrorist activity” (United Kingdom 1977), and this is precisely how they were used throughout the 1980s and 1990s. According to Weitzer (1985, 48) “The training, equipment, and operations of these elite Units dovetail strikingly with those of the Army.”

Throughout the Troubles policing in North Down took place within the broader context of the RUC’s role in the counterinsurgency campaign against the PIRA and other violent groups in Northern Ireland. RUC officers on patrol in the borough rarely felt the effects of the PIRA’s campaign directly, although there were exceptions. Furthermore, the force’s position as the dominant provider of law and order was not credibly threatened by the PIRA, who did not conduct a single punishment attack in the area. As a result of their relative safety, police in North Down were able, for the most part, to conduct ordinary, community policing, and there is little evidence of ordinary constables expressing the same concerns about responding to traffic accidents or robberies that were frequently voiced by their colleagues in the more dangerous rural areas along the border with the Republic of Ireland. At the same time, the ability of the RUC to adequately perform the duties of an ordinary police force in North Down was constrained by a relative lack of resources resulting from the force’s preference for allocating manpower to counterterrorism duties in Belfast, Derry and along the border. These constraints appear to have diminished as the threat of republican and loyalist terrorism has subsided, indicating that changes in the material and opportunity costs of ordinary policing exert a powerful influence on the willingness and ability of a force like the RUC to deploy its resources effectively in relatively peaceful areas like North Down.

5.5 The Dog That Didn’t Bark: The PIRA in North Down

Despite the fact that Bangor, the largest town in the NDBC area, lies a mere 15 miles from the traditional republican strongholds in North and West Belfast, all evidence indicates that the PIRA did not punish a single criminal in North Down during the 1990s, and most likely did not conduct any punishment attacks in the area throughout the nearly

three decades of political violence in Northern Ireland. This outcome is perhaps more surprising in light of the fact that, although police resources allocated to North Down appear to have been primarily used to conduct civil policing duties, RUC decision makers and Protestant politicians alike openly admitted that the manpower available in North Down was inadequate to police the district, despite its relatively small size. In short, although there were few PIRA activists living within the boundaries of the NDBC, the district was geographically proximate, and potential frustration with the police force could have provided republican militants with an opportunity to build support in a traditionally hostile area. In actual fact, this did not happen. The remainder of this section draws on the insights derived from the formal model to explain why this was the case.

From the outset, it is important to recall here that, despite their shortage of resources, the evidence presented above indicated that the police in North Down were consistently expected to focus their energies on civil police duties rather than counterinsurgency operations. The RUC's preference for civil policing in the NDBC area was further demonstrated to have been partly a function of the relative lack of actionable counterinsurgency intelligence in the area and the likely ineffectiveness of criminals recruited from North Down as anti-PIRA informants. These circumstances, combined with a lopsided cost-benefit analysis, created an environment that was not conducive to the PIRA's provision of vigilante justice on the streets of Bangor in Holywood.

Recall here that, all else equal, the PIRA was expected to conduct more punishment attacks in areas where vigilantism was most beneficial to the group's long-term institution building objectives. Recall further that vigilantism was expected to be most beneficial toward this end in areas where alienation between the police and the public was relatively high. Despite the shortage of available manpower and resources, the people of North Down have generally thrown their support behind the state's police force. Indeed, one constable working in the force's community relations (CR) branch contrasted the ease with which the RUC was able to establish positive relations with the residents of North Down with the characteristic tension between the police and people in predominately Catholic areas claiming that

It [CR work in nationalist areas] is not frustrating work at all. We have to struggle for everything we get and this makes it more satisfying than Community Relations work in Bangor. . . where they turn people away. In Bangor, Community Relations officers don't have to work hard to cultivate relations with the community. Here [in a nationalist area], job satisfaction is *higher*; it's more challenging here (quoted in: Weitzer 1995, 254).

Furthermore, both North Down's positive relations with the RUC and the area's staunch support for the union between Great Britain and Northern Ireland have historically been matched by its antipathy toward militant Irish nationalism. No candidate representing a republican political party has ever held a seat on the North Down Borough Council. Indeed, since it first began contesting local elections in 1985, Sinn Féin has never placed a candidate on the ballot in North Down and even the more moderately nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) has never exceeded two percent of the poll in a local election in North Down.¹⁹ The political fortunes of Irish nationalism have been equally dismal in the slightly larger North Down Parliamentary Constituency. Both SF and the SDLP have typically not contested the North Down seat, although that pattern has changed slightly in recent years. In any case, neither party has ever won more than five percent of the total poll in a Parliamentary election in North Down, nor do the SDLP or SF maintain party offices in the area.²⁰

It would be difficult to imagine how the PIRA would have expected to benefit from conducting punishment attacks in such an environment. The purpose and audience for punishment attacks are different from the purpose and audience for other forms of political violence. Bomb and gun attacks against mobile army patrols, police barracks or even so-called 'economic' targets, like shopping centers, banks and the like, are intended to demonstrate an insurgent group's strength vis-a-vis a status quo government, and ul-

¹⁹SDLP candidates stood for election to the North Down Borough Council in the Bangor West constituency in 2005 and 2011. In 2005 the party's candidate won four percent of the poll in Bangor West, which amounted to 1.9 percent of the total poll in the NDBC area. In 2011 the SDLP improved their standing in Bangor West but lost ground in North Down as a whole, polling six percent of the constituency vote, but only 1.2 percent of the NDBC vote.

²⁰The roots of antipathy toward militant Irish nationalism in North Down stretch back to the very foundation of Ireland's dual political units. In the 1918 general election North Down was one of only 22 constituencies in Ireland to elect a unionist MP. It was also one of only two constituencies in which Sinn Féin did not field a candidate. A year later County Down registered a lower rate of membership in the republican party than any other county in Ireland (Fitzpatrick 1979). The Mourne county was also remarkably inactive during the Irish revolution and the Irish Civil War (1919-1923), producing the third lowest fatality rate of any county in Ireland (Hart 1997).

timately to coerce the status quo government into some form of negotiation or surrender. Given this interpretation, we can see how occasional car bombings in otherwise peaceful locations might benefit a group like the PIRA. These attacks demonstrate the group's ability to operate over a wide range of territory and, at a minimum, could force the police and the army to re-deploy their scarce resources to protect a much wider range of targets. Punishment attacks, on the other hand, are intended to demonstrate the insurgent group's commitment to 'protecting' their constituents and establishing law and order in their territory. The high level of hostility toward the PIRA, and indeed toward republican politics more generally, in North Down, combined with the high level of support for the police in the borough made it difficult, if not impossible, for the PIRA to derive these kinds of benefits from providing vigilante justice in the area.

It would be difficult to imagine how the PIRA would have expected to benefit from conducting punishment attacks in such an environment. The purpose and audience for punishment attacks are different from the purpose and audience for other forms of political violence. Bomb and gun attacks against mobile army patrols, police barracks or even so-called 'economic' targets, like shopping centers, banks and the like, are intended to demonstrate an insurgent group's strength vis-a-vis a status quo government, and ultimately to coerce the status quo government into some form of negotiation or surrender. Given this interpretation, we can see how occasional car bombings in otherwise peaceful locations might benefit a group like the PIRA. These attacks demonstrate the group's ability to operate over a wide range of territory and, at a minimum, could force the police and the army to re-deploy their scarce resources to protect a much wider range of targets. Punishment attacks, on the other hand, are intended to demonstrate the insurgent group's commitment to 'protecting' their constituents and establishing law and order in their territory. The high level of hostility toward the PIRA, and indeed toward republican politics more generally, in North Down, combined with the high level of support for the police in the borough made it difficult, if not impossible, for the PIRA to derive these kinds of benefits from providing vigilante justice in the area.

In addition to the relatively low potential benefits for conducting punishment attacks in

North Down, the potential costs were also considerable. As was stated at the outset of this section, the PIRA had practically no physical presence on the ground in the NDBC area. The group's weakness on the ground in Bangor and Holywood is reflected in statistics on the republican prison population in Northern Ireland during the 1990s. According to data made public by the prisoners' welfare group Saoirse, quoted above, only one of the nearly 400 republicans held in British and Irish jails in the mid-1990s hailed from the villages and towns of the NDBC. Given the group's lack of manpower in and around North Down, volunteers would have to be diverted from other areas, such as North or West Belfast, to carry out punishment attacks in the area. As a result the PIRA faced a potential tradeoff between sending men and resources to punish criminals in a Protestant heartland or keeping the same men closer to home to deal with anti-social behavior and conduct ambushes against the RUC and the British Army in Belfast. Such opportunity costs were likely exacerbated by the relatively high risk that PIRA members in transit to Bangor or Holywood would have been stopped and searched at one of the ever present police and army checkpoints that dotted the major routes in and out of Belfast.²¹

It is difficult to gauge the PIRA's feelings on this subject directly, given the apparent reluctance of republican activists or politicians to speak openly about the movement's weakness in Protestant communities. However, the group's assessment of the opportunity costs of conducting any operations in North Down is revealed by the rarity with which they attacked relatively soft targets in district's largest settlement of Bangor. In contrast to the fortified police stations of the Falls Road and the western boarder regions of Northern Ireland, Bangor's RUC station was relatively unprotected throughout the Troubles, while ordinary police officers were free to conduct foot patrols throughout the district without the protection of the armored Land Rovers favored by constables in more dangerous areas like West Belfast.²² It would be reasonable to expect the PIRA to attempt to take advantage of the relatively light protection provided to police officers in North Down as part of the

²¹Security around the city was often described by journalists as a "ring of steel." In December 1992 David McKittrick recorded that "All major roads [in and out of Belfast] are covered. Some minor roads have been sealed off which means vehicles have no option but to take their place in the queues to be checked."

²²See below for a more detailed discussion of the contrasts in manner of policing conducted by the RUC in North Down and republican areas like South Armagh.

group's general campaign aimed at stretching the resources of the security forces. However, aside from a pair of bombings in the autumn of 1992 and the winter of 1993,²³ republicans took no action against the police presence in the district after 1975, apparently preferring to keep volunteers closer to home to launch attacks against the RUC and British Army in Belfast. If the Belfast PIRA was unwilling to send its volunteers into North Down to attack relatively soft police targets, then it is extremely unlikely that the group would have been willing to divert its resources away from Belfast to conduct punishment attacks in Bangor or Holywood.

Furthermore, in addition to the generally high potential costs and low potential benefits of conducting punishment attacks in North Down, the PIRA was also confronted by the very real possibility that any republican action in the Protestant heartlands along the shore of Belfast Lough would result in immediate retaliation from loyalist paramilitary groups, who had established a strong presence in the areas surrounding East Belfast. Throughout the history of Northern Ireland's Troubles, Protestant paramilitary groups, known as loyalists, have engaged in retaliatory violence against Catholic communities in response to PIRA attacks (White 1993; Sullivan 1998). By the mid-1990s, the groups like the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), Protestant Action Force (PAF) and Red Hand Commandos (RHC) had become more prolific killers in Northern Ireland than their republican counterparts, and retaliation was often particularly brutal when a republican group was perceived to have engaged in a sectarian attack against a Protestant target. After the PIRA detonated a car bomb in Bangor city center in 1992, the UFF warned that they would "redirect our campaign against the republican community as a whole ... in a manner similar to Teebane" (*Irish Times* 1992). The group made good on the threat two weeks later, killing three Catholics at a betting shop in the republican Oldpark district of North Belfast. After the attack, the group claimed that

The direct responsibility for this action lies with Sinn Féin and the IRA. If the IRA continue to sanction bombing campaigns, the theater of war will be full

²³The January 1993 bomb targeted a four member RUC foot patrol just outside Bangor police station. All four members of the patrol were injured, but none were killed.

of casualties from the republican community in the coming weeks (Bowcott 1992c)

In the wake of the killing in Oldpark, and a similar UFF attack on another Belfast betting shop nine months earlier, the UFF's 'blame game' politics were also reflected by internal thinking in the republican movement and in nationalist/Catholic circles more generally. Allasdair McDonnell, a leading figure in the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP), placed the blame for the first attack squarely with the PIRA claiming that "The Provos have been looking for loyalist reaction. They have got it" (Bowcott 1992b). Meanwhile, anxiety was growing within republican ranks over the PIRA's apparent inability to protect its own strongholds from loyalist retaliation. One republican activists lamented that "People were afraid because it seemed the loyalists had a free hand . . . Meanwhile the IRA [sic] was doing nothing to protect the people" (Moloney 2010, 417).

The sentiments of the Belfast republican quoted above indicate that the republican movement was aware of the risks involved with engaging in sectarian attacks. Given the risks involved and the PIRA's lack of political and material support—or the hope achieving such support—in predominately Protestant districts like North Down, the group was unlikely to divert its manpower away from its urban heartland to punish suspected criminals in North Down. Finally, it is important to recall here that the general strategic environment in North Down throughout the troubles was such that the RUC were never likely to use criminal investigations as a ruse for cultivating counterinsurgency intelligence on PIRA activity and, even if they did, the PIRA could be confident that any information gained from these sources would be of comparatively little value to the police. As a result, republicans had little incentive to challenge the RUC's role as the dominant provider of law and order in North Down. In fact, the PIRA may have benefited strategically by ignoring crime in North Down and leaving the RUC to use a portion of its own scarce manpower and resources to conduct civil policing in Bangor when these same resources could have been used to some effect in the counterinsurgency campaign against the PIRA itself.

5.6 Conclusion

Conventional accounts of violence against civilians during civil wars often treat such attacks as the result either of rebel indiscipline or as a means by which the both insurgents and status quo governments ensure the compliance of potentially disloyal constituents. Typically the dependent variable in these studies is variation in the amount of violence perpetrated against civilians by either status quo governments or insurgent armies across both space and time. While previous studies have undoubtedly advanced our understanding of why both insurgents and governments often bite the hands that feed them, they have tended to ignore the connection between insurgent vigilante violence—punishment attacks in the parlance of Northern Ireland—and the competing institution building projects pursued by both types of actors during a civil war. Insurgent groups seek to become the dominant providers of public goods in a territory and status quo government's seek to protect their positions as dominant providers. One of the most fundamental public goods provided by any government is the security from theft and personal injury provided by law enforcement.

However, for both insurgent groups and the governments they seek to topple, the desire to become the hegemonic provider of law and order in a contested territory is often placed in tension with the more immediate objective of gaining an advantage on the battlefield. For states, this incentive is likely to be greatest when the war on the battlefield is at its most intense. Furthermore, when government intelligence gathering efforts are either in their infancy or bearing little fruit, states will have an additional incentive to ignore their duties in the realm of civil policing as they seek to use suspected criminals as informants to build intelligence dossiers on local insurgent activity. Significantly, each of these factors can vary independently across both space and time.

The preceding analysis has demonstrated how RUC responded to crime in a particular strategic environment, given a particular set of expectations about how the PIRA act in the same area. Although the RUC's prospective benefits of engaging in civil policing in North Down were consistently marginal—the force was well supported by the area's Protestant, unionist population—other factors, including the lack of a credible threat from

the PIRA to challenge the state's role as the dominant provider of law and order, created an environment that allowed the police to focus on 'ordinary,' rather than counterinsurgency, duties in this area. Locally, the RUC's costs for conducting foot patrols and the like in North Down were small when compared to equally rural, but significantly more violent, regions of Northern Ireland like Country Fermanagh and South Armagh. Police officers typically did not have to fear that they would be ambushed by the PIRA when responding to emergency calls in Bangor and Holywood, as indicated by the fact that no police officers were killed by republican paramilitaries in the area throughout the nearly three decades of political violence in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, the *local* opportunity costs of tasking constables in North Down with investigating burglaries and the like were also quite small, on account of the relative lack of republican terrorism more generally in the region. Nevertheless, the ability of the police to operate in North Down was constrained by the *national* opportunity costs associated with allocating manpower, vehicles and other resources to such a peaceful district, when the same resources could have been used in the war against the PIRA in more violent areas.

Insurgent groups operating in such an environment, such as the PIRA in North Down, have little reason to use their scarce manpower and resources to support a system of vigilante justice. Knowing that the police are unlikely to use suspected criminals from areas like North Down as counterinsurgency informants, the incentive to punish criminal as a means of denying the police access to this potentially fruitful source of intelligence is minimized. Furthermore, given that the police will not pursue their counterinsurgency aims in such an area, the possibility that victims of vigilantism will turn on their assailants and report the attack to the police is likely to weigh even more heavily on insurgent groups. Additionally, despite shortages of manpower in the area, the police continued to be generally well supported by the loyal inhabitants of North Down. Given the generally high levels of public satisfaction with the police, it is unlikely that militant republicans would have derived significant political benefits from engaging in vigilantism in this area. The lack of potential political benefits to insurgent vigilantism was reinforced by the relatively high costs likely to be associated with sending men and resources into a staunchly unionist

area of Northern Ireland to punish suspected criminals there.

Generally, these results demonstrate that both punishment attacks and policing are motivated by political processes that distinguish these activities from other forms of violence perpetrated by both insurgent groups and status quo governments during wartime. In calculating their respective response to crime both types of actor certainly account for the state of the informational environment. Indeed, in exceptional cases, the desire for actionable counterinsurgency intelligence can lead a government to ignore ordinary criminal activity within its borders and provide insurgents with a greater incentive to engage in vigilantism. However, the prospect of recruiting, or preventing the recruitment of, new informants is only one amongst several determinants of how governments and insurgent groups will respond to criminal activity. Each actor must also weigh the benefits of providing law enforcement services against the potential costs of the same activity in terms of opportunity costs paid on the battlefield.

Figure 5.1: Northern Ireland LGAs Highlighting Selected Cases




Figure 5.2: Map of Belfast City Highlighting North Belfast



Figure 5.3: Ward Level Religious Composition of North Down (Percent Catholic)




Figure 5.4: Ward Level Multiple Deprivation Measure North Down




Figure 5.5: RUC Fatalities (Three-Year Moving Average) 1970-1999




Figure 5.6: Shooting Attacks Against Active Duty RUC Personnel
1973-1984



Figure 5.7: Crime Rate per 1,000 Inhabitants
1998/99 - 2011/12




Figure 5.8: Police Sanction-Detection Rate
1998/99 - 2011/12





Figure 5.9: RUC Overtime in Belfast-Area Subdivisions
1994/95 - 1999/00




Chapter 6

‘The more the better, the sooner the better’

This chapter draws on case study evidence to assess the theoretical predictions derived from the formal model against the observed behavior of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) in the rural border regions of Northern Ireland. The analysis presented in this chapter focuses on exploring a different set of equilibrium conditions than those assessed in the context of North Down. In particular, this chapter turns to two of the PIRA’s traditional strongholds along the border with the Republic of Ireland, namely the Dungannon and Newry and Mourne LGAs, highlighted in figure 6.1, below. Both of these areas were incredibly hostile environments for the police Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), however the present chapter seeks to explore how changes in the general strategic environment in these two regions influenced the insurgent response to crime, conditional on the assumption that the police, in this case the RUC, would not punish suspected criminals but would, instead, attempt to coerce these suspects into providing information on local insurgent activity with the promise of leniency or absolution for whatever crimes they may have committed. To that end, this chapter combines the congruence method utilized in the analysis of evidence from the North Down case with a structured, cross-case comparison to assess how differences in 1. The value of counterinsurgency intelligence and 2. The costs of punishment attacks impact the willingness of insurgent groups to engage in vigilantism as a means of denying the police access to potential informers.

The remainder of the chapter proceeds in four parts. Section 6.1 revisits the rele-

Figure 6.1: Map of Ireland Highlighting the Dungannon and Newry and Mourne LGAs



vant equilibrium constraints derived from the formal model and presents a set of clearly stated, qualitatively verifiable empirical implications of these constraints. The empirical implications of the formal model provide the theoretical structure for the subsequent analyses. Section 6.2 presents a detailed pattern matching analysis of the PIRA’s response to crime in Dungannon, demonstrating that, in general, the group’s attempts at vigilantism in the area were constrained by the mounting opportunity costs of such an activity in an area where the PIRA’s manpower was steadily depleted by British counterinsurgency operations. Section 6.3 briefly compares the results of the Dungannon case study against evidence from the Newry and Mourne LGA, an area that is in many respects similar to Dungannon, but experienced considerably more punishment attacks during the period under analysis. Section 6.4 concludes, offering a summary of the findings presented in the chapter and a discussion of the theoretical implications of these results.

6.1 Equilibrium Behavior

This section revisits the results of the formal model, presented in detail in chapter three, with a view toward establishing empirical expectations for the existence of two sets of model equilibria relevant to the cases under consideration here. To that end, the section proceeds in a similar fashion to the previous chapter, first restating the formal constraints on each actor's behavior supporting the relevant equilibrium and then returning to the results of the comparative statics analysis to establish testable hypotheses. The empirical implications of each formal hypothesis are then described in greater detail, with a special emphasis on the types of evidence available regarding both the motivation and the behavior of both the PIRA and the RUC in Dungannon and Newry and Mourne.

Recall here that under the expectation that the government would not punish suspected criminals, preferring instead to recruit these individuals as counterinsurgency informants, the insurgent group was expected to punish the same suspects when $\frac{(B_T - C_T)(1 - qr)}{qr - q} \leq I$ (IC1) or $\frac{(B_T - C_T)(1 - pqr)}{pqr - q} \leq I$ (IC2). Insurgent constraint one (IC1) applied under the assumption that the suspected crime was reported to the insurgents in the first instance, while IC2 applied under the assumption that the suspected crime was reported to the government in the first instance. Analytically, these two constraints are nearly identical, with the exception that when the insurgents move first they weigh their cost-benefit analysis by the likelihood that a crime they ignore is subsequently reported to the police.

From the comparative statics analysis, presented in chapter three, we can further see that there are a number of theoretical expectations that hold regardless of who is the first mover. First without resorting to calculus we can see that, assuming the government will attempt to use suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants, the insurgents themselves will be more likely to engage in vigilante justice when the police assign greater value to counterinsurgency intelligence. This relationship might appear somewhat counterintuitive, given the possibility that punishment attacks themselves have the potential to create new informants.

However, it is important to recall at this point that informants could be created in two ways within the context of the model. First, as described above, the government can

use the investigation of “ordinary” criminal activity as a ruse for recruiting new informants. In this manner, the police hope to use the threat of punishment for some criminal offenses—drug dealing, burglary, theft, vandalism and the like—to coerce an individual into becoming an informant for the government, often by monitoring the comings and goings of known insurgents in the suspect’s home neighborhood. This type of approach can only be adopted when the police become aware that a crime has been committed, as it is the threat of sanction, or rather the promise of leniency, for a suspected offense that provides the police with leverage over the potential informer. This mechanism for the creation of informers was embedded in the structure of the formal model, and is represented in the payoff functions for all outcomes in which the police do not punish suspected criminals. Second, the victims of punishment attacks and their friends and loved ones can turn to the police in an attempt to seek revenge against their assailants. Although they may not be able to identify their attackers, these individuals may nevertheless seek to punish local insurgents for the brutality of their vigilantism by seeking out the police and voluntarily providing information on local insurgent activity more broadly. This mechanism for the creation of informers was embedded in the insurgent group’s payoff function as a component of the costs parameter (C_T), as it was expected that the conditions favoring the creation of this type of informer would be highly correlated with the material and opportunity costs associated with punishment attacks.¹ With these mechanisms in mind, it is equally important to recall that, as with all of the hypotheses derived from the formal model, the relationship described above is subject to the condition that all else, including the costs of punishment attacks, is equal. Thus, accepting that there is some likelihood that a victim of insurgent vigilantism will turn to the police to seek revenge, the insurgents will be more willing to engage in vigilantism as a means of denying the police the opportunity to use the threat of imprisonment to coerce suspected criminals into becoming counterinsurgency informants when they believe that new counterinsurgency intelligence is highly valued by the police.

Empirically, it can be difficult to measure directly how valuable new counterinsurgency

¹For a more detailed discussion of this point see chapter three.

intelligence is to the police, as governments are understandably reluctant to disclose how much they know about the insurgent groups they confront. Nevertheless, as was the case in the previous chapter, it is possible to establish logically the conditions under which intelligence is most likely to be of greater or lesser value to the police and, further, to rely on empirical indicators of these conditions to assess the value of counterinsurgency intelligence indirectly. Recall the dictum from British Brigadier Frank Kitson that “The problem of destroying enemy armed groups and their supporters therefore consists largely of finding them.” Given the relative importance of anonymity as an element of the guerrilla strategies pursued by groups like the PIRA, it is easy to understand the logic of this statement. In keeping with Kitson’s insight, we would therefore expect counterinsurgency intelligence to be most valuable in areas containing a large number of unidentified insurgents. Here again, this is a quantity that is difficult, if not impossible, to measure directly.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to establish the empirical implications of the presence of a large number of anonymous insurgent activists in an area. These factors can then be used as proxies to measure the degree of anonymity enjoyed by the insurgent group in a given area, which in turn serves as an indication of the value of new counterinsurgency information in a given area, which is one of the key parameters of the formal model. In particular, previous studies have indicated that PIRA operatives were recruited almost exclusively from predominately Catholic, socio-economically deprived areas of Northern Ireland with considerable past experience of state repression (Bloom et al 2012; Breen and Hayes 2001; White 1989). Additionally, given the highly localized structure of organizations like the PIRA (Boyne 1996; Horgan and Taylor 1997; Leahy 2005) and the importance of anonymity as an element of the guerrilla strategies they pursue (Bamford 2005), the ratio of insurgent to state fatalities on the battlefield should be smallest in areas where the police have little information on insurgent activity, to the extent that higher numbers of insurgent fatalities result from improved intelligence collection on the part of the police.

In addition to the value of counterinsurgency intelligence, the willingness of insurgents to engage in vigilantism is also conditioned by the costs and benefits of punishment attacks.

All else equal, insurgents will punish more criminals when the benefits of punishment attacks are high and the associated costs are low. Generally, we would expect both the material and opportunity costs of punishment attacks are to be greatest in areas where the insurgent labor pool has been significantly depleted, either through the imprisonment and assassination of insurgent activists or as a result of greater commitments on the battlefield. Thus, we would expect to observe fewer punishment attacks in areas in which the PIRA has suffered major losses in terms of manpower and weapons, as well as in areas in which the PIRA is engaged in more frequent attacks against military targets.

Punishment attacks will be most likely to have the desired benefits in areas in which the public is already frustrated with the police response to crime and open to alternative methods of sanctioning criminals within the community. The general public is most likely to be frustrated with the police in areas where the police provide an insufficient or inefficient response to crime and where contact with the police most often occurs in settings likely to elicit negative reactions from citizens, such as random car searches and at other security checkpoints. Although it is difficult to directly assess these concepts at the local level throughout the time period analyzed here, it is nevertheless possible to establish a set of empirical expectations under which the public will be more likely to become frustrated with the police. In particular, we would imagine that ordinary citizens would be most frustrated with the RUC as a civil police force in times and places where the police either ignore reports of robberies, car accidents and the like, or only respond to these types of incidents after a considerable delay. As a result, we would expect punishment attacks to be most beneficial in these areas and should, therefore, observe relatively more punishment attacks in these areas than in those regions in which the police exercise their duties more freely.

Finally, from the insurgents' perspective, the comparative statics analysis indicated that the costs and benefits of punishment attacks would, under certain conditions, interact with the three probability parameters incorporated into the model, representing the likelihood that crime ignored by the insurgents is reported to the police (p), the probability that the police are able to coerce a suspected criminal into becoming a counterinsurgency

informant (q) and the probability that the insurgents are able to identify and punish any informers thusly recruited by the police (r). Specifically, the model predicted that non-punishment would be more likely when:

1. The costs of punishment attacks are greater than the benefits ($C_T \geq B_T$) and:
 - (a) The police are ineffective at recruiting suspected criminals as counterinsurgency informants; *or*
 - (b) The insurgents are adept at identifying and eliminating informants recruited by the police; *or*
 - (c) Crimes ignored by the insurgents are unlikely to be reported to the police.

Here again it is possible to establish a set of empirical implications on the basis of the hypothetical relationships described above. Turning first to the ability of insurgents to identify and eliminate new informants recruited by the police, this parameter was operationalized in the quantitative analysis using the Catholic isolation index to approximate the relative density of Catholic social networks on the assumption that PIRA counterintelligence efforts would be more effective when the group had access to the information available via these networks. It is also possible to establish behavioral expectations regarding the broader consequences of relatively ineffective PIRA counterintelligence. In particular, we would expect that informers operating in a region in which PIRA counterintelligence is ineffective would have a greater long-term impact on the group's operations than informers operating in the presence of relatively effective PIRA counterintelligence operations. As a result, we would expect the PIRA to experience temporary operational setbacks in areas where counterintelligence is effective, but for PIRA activity to return to a consistent mean-level after the informer has been identified and eliminated. On the other hand, if the PIRA is ineffective at identifying informers, informers should have a greater long-term impact on the group's operational capacity.

The theoretical and empirical expectations established above provide the basis for the analysis of punishment attacks in Dungannon and Newry and Mourne. The remainder of this chapter uses qualitative evidence derived from publicly available sources to compare the behavior of the PIRA in these two regions against the hypotheses presented above.

6.2 PIRA in Dungannon

Republicans in East Tyrone played an important part in the PIRA's campaign against the British state in Ireland from 1969 onward. According to one source, PIRA units in County Tyrone were responsible for approximately 1500 operations against police, military and civilian targets between 1970 and 1994, with nearly half of these attacks taking place in the DST area alone (Magee 2011). Beyond the sheer volume of its operations, the East Tyrone Brigade of the PIRA (ETB) was also highly selective in terms of the individuals it targeted for assassination in DST. Members of the security forces² were significantly more likely to be targeted by the PIRA in the Dungannon area than were civilians, and the East Tyrone Brigade accounted for more than 10 percent of all RUC and UDR fatalities attributed to the PIRA during the Troubles (Sutton 2001).

However, the region does not appear to have been equally vital to the republican movement's campaign against ordinary criminals in Northern Ireland during the same time period. Official police statistics indicate that in the months immediately before and after the Loughgall Ambush, the ETB had little time for kneecapping local criminals. Not a single one of the over 90 republican punishment attacks occurring between January of 1986 until June 1987 took place in the Dungannon area. This figure is particularly significant when contrasted with the ETB's 21 percent share of all PIRA operations reported in *An Phoblacht* during the same time period (Moloney 2003). Furthermore, despite accounting for nearly one in ten security force fatalities attributed to the PIRA between 1970 and 1998, the ETB's theater of operations was the site of less than two percent of all republican punishment attacks from 1990 to 2005.

The difference in the ETB's approach to vigilantism and its approach to political violence more generally is all the more striking in light of expectations derived from existing theories for a case such as this one. Straddling the international border with the Republic of Ireland, volunteers from East Tyrone had easy access to a safe haven that could be used to avoid British security forces in the immediate aftermath of an operation. At the same time, tax differentials as well as other legal and political differences between

²Including those killed both on and off duty.


the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland created incentives and opportunities for smuggling, offering PIRA volunteers in border areas the opportunity for significant personal enrichment. Indeed, both of these consequences of the international border were recognized explicitly by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) in its official assessment of the British Army’s involvement in Northern Ireland. At the conclusion of “Operation Banner” Army officials noted that

The Border [sic] with the Irish Republic was a problem at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. From August 1969 to the later stages of the campaign republican terrorists used the Republic as a safe haven. . . In the late 1970s it was considered that PIRA [sic] simply could not survive without refuge in the Republic and the Border also offered opportunities for fundraising and smuggling activities (MOD 2006, 4-4).

The Republic of Ireland’s status as a potential safe haven and a source for ‘fundraising and smuggling’ created an environment in which local PIRA activists were potentially less dependent on the residents of the Northern Ireland country side for both material and operational support than were their colleagues in Belfast, surrounded, as they were, by the Queen’s territory on all sides. As a result, Weinstein (2007) might anticipate that PIRA units operating in border areas would be more likely than their Belfast compatriots to engage in significant violence against the civilian population. The statistics on punishment attacks, quoted above, indicate that this was not the case in regard to vigilantism. Figure 6.2 plots the average annual number of republican punishment attacks per 1,000 inhabitants in the Dungannon and Belfast LGAs between 1990 and 2002. The figure demonstrates that residents of Dungannon were typically less than half as likely to be victims of republican punishment attacks during the 1990s than were their compatriots living in Belfast.

Furthermore, despite their relative potency in the area, and despite a strategy designed by men like Jim Lynagh explicitly to do so, the ETB never manage to fully wrest control of the Dungannon countryside away from the British Government. Indeed, the conditions on the ground in Northern Ireland’s rural border regions throughout much of the Troubles appear to correspond to what Kalyvas (2006) would consider hegemonic zones of control, with local dominance see-sawing between the British Army and the PIRA. In these cir-

Figure 6.2: Republican Punishment Attacks in Dungannon and Belfast LGA
1990 - 2002



cumstance we would therefore also expect to observe a considerable amount of violence against civilians aimed at eliminating and deterring civilian collaboration with the British Army and the police. However, as the statistics quoted above indicate, the PIRA actually killed relatively few civilians in East Tyrone, and alleged informers account for an even smaller proportion of these civilian fatalities.

What accounts for the apparent underperformance of the East Tyrone Brigade—a unit that was historically regarded as being amongst the most skilled and most effective in all of the PIRA—in terms of dealing with local criminals, especially during the early years of the peace process.³ The remainder of this section draws on insights derived from the formal model to answer this question. In particular, the chapter demonstrates that two

³Although no official statistics are available on PIRA punishment attacks in Dungannon LGA—or in any other LGA—prior to 1990, there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence that the ETB was consistently involved in punishment shootings throughout the Troubles. A manual search of the *Belfast Telegraph* indicated probable ETB involvement in punishment shootings in the Dungannon area in 1973, 1974 and 1975, while *Fortnight's* “Diary” section indicated that the group was involved in a handful of punishment shootings and expulsions of suspected criminals throughout the early to mid 1980s. It is important to note that these sources tend to significantly underreport punishment attacks outside of Northern Ireland’s two largest cities. As a result, these reports are likely indicative of a more general trend.

features of the strategic environment in the area around Dungannon combined to create circumstances in which even a well armed and relatively effective insurgent group like the ETB would be highly unlikely to divert its resources toward the production of vigilante justice. First, successive losses of ETB activists to British bullets and prisons depleted the Brigade’s manpower to the extent that tasking even a single volunteer with locating or punishing a suspected criminal in the Dungannon area became prohibitively costly. At the same time repeated RUC and Army intelligence successes against the ETB signaled the presence of a high level informer amongst the ranks of the ETB and reduced the Brigade’s incentive to use vigilantism as a means of denying the police access to suspected criminals as potential counterinsurgency informants. All of the above occurred in an environment in which the ETB nevertheless stood to benefit substantially from the establishment of its own system of alternative justice, thereby nullifying the potential interactive effect of other model parameters.


Under the influence of Jim Lynagh, Patrick Kelly and Padraig McKearney in the 1980s, the ETB committed itself to a “strategic defensive approach” to the conflict in which “the RUC, UDR and army would be denied all support in selected areas following repeated attacks on their bases” (P. McKearney quoted in: Taylor 1989). Inspired by the Maoist approach to rebellion, the objective of Lynagh and his cohorts was not merely to kill and wound as many soldiers and policemen as possible, but also to destroy the infrastructure that the security forces relied on to perform their duties in rural areas of Northern Ireland. According to one source “Lynagh believed that the IRA’s aims could be achieved through the creation of a series of liberated zones which would be secured by attacking remote security force bases in mainly-nationalist areas” (Harnden 2000, 247). This strategic shift was reflected in the target selection of the PIRA in the Dungannon area.

Figure 6.3 presents a plot of the percentage of all ETB attacks occurring in the Dungannon LGA that targeted locally recruited security forces between 1978 and 1994, as reported in the “Diary” section of the periodical *Fortnight*.⁴ The Brigade’s “strategic

⁴*Fortnight’s* “Diary” section has been printed under various headings until the Belfast-published monthly’s recent closure. It presented the most comprehensive summary of political and military events in Northern Ireland. The Diary section of all issues of the publication from 1978 to 1994 were manually read and coded by the author to identify events occurring in the Dungannon area.

defensive approach" to the conflict is reflected in the ETB's steadily increasing focus on RUC and UDR targets throughout the 1980s. Prior to the unit's decimation at Loughgall, the East Tyrone Brigade used a combination of car bombs, rocket propelled grenades and homemade mortars to destroy or significantly damage RUC and UDR outposts in Clogher, Carrickmore, Ballygawley, Coalisland, Killymeal and the Birches, in nearby County Armagh. Over the same period, the ETB also killed over a dozen members of the security forces in targeted assassinations and bombings.

Figure 6.3: Percentage of ETB Actions Targeting Locally Recruited Security Forces in Dungannon LGA 1978-1994



While the ETB's success on the battlefield during this period is noteworthy on its own, the nature of the strategy pursued by the PIRA in Dungannon under the leadership of Jim Lynagh and others is vital to our understanding of the Brigade's approach to punishment attacks both prior to and following the ambush at Loughgall. Heavily influenced by Maoist theories of social revolution, Lynagh stressed the importance of creating liberated zones along the Irish border which were to be controlled exclusively by the PIRA. However, eliminating the presence of the British Army and the RUC represented only the first step

toward creating such zones. Following the exclusion of British security forces from the predominately Catholic villages around Dungannon, the PIRA would be under pressure to provide some form of governance, including the establishment of law and order, for the area. As a result, it would be reasonable to assume that the perceived benefits of punishment attacks, both as a means of excluding British forces from Catholic areas and as an institution building tool, would have been significant in the Dungannon area. Furthermore, the relationship between the Catholics of Dungannon and the RUC has often been a fraught one. In his official report for 1973 the RUC’s Chief Constable described the people of Coalisland as “generally unfriendly and depressing” (RUC 1974, 84), and there is little reason to believe that the area became any more friendly to the police over the 20 subsequent years of conflict in the area. Even in 2003, fully five years after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, 25 percent of the Catholic respondents to a survey on policing in the Dungannon LGA claimed they were either “dissatisfied” or “very dissatisfied” with the PSNI (NISRA 2003, 16).⁵

In these circumstances one might reasonably have expected the PIRA to conduct a comparatively large number of punishment attacks in the Dungannon area. Both local frustration with the police and the political leanings of senior PIRA leaders created circumstances in which republican militants potentially stood to benefit significantly from usurping the police force’s role as the dominant provider of law and order in villages like Moy and Coalisland. And yet, the statistics quoted above indicate that this was not the case, even though local PIRA units had good reason to expect the RUC to ignore its ordinary policing duties in favor of conducting counterinsurgency operations.

For a full explanation we must also look to other strategic factors identified as impor-

⁵The survey asked respondents “Overall, how satisfied are you with policing in your District Council?” Possible responses were as follows: Very Satisfied, Satisfied, Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied, Dissatisfied, Very Dissatisfied, Don’t Know. Amongst Catholics, the most popular response was “Neither Satisfied nor Dissatisfied” (41 percent). 32 percent of Catholic respondents selected one of the two “satisfied” responses. The total sample for the survey consisted of 434 randomly selected residents from the Dungannon LGA. 195 of the 434 respondents were Catholic. The sample was stratified to ensure representativeness at the LGA level, although the response rate amongst Catholics was slightly lower than that amongst Protestants, and they are, therefore slightly underrepresented in the survey. The underrepresentation of Catholics in the survey must be borne in mind when considering the near tie between the satisfied and dissatisfied responses in Dungannon, as Irish republicans, who are most likely to be frustrated with the police, have also historically been less likely to respond to government sponsored polls, including the census of population.


tant in the model, beginning with the potential value of new counterinsurgency intelligence to the police. Recall here that, within the parameters of the model, counterinsurgency intelligence was expected to be more valuable to the police in areas in which a large number of anonymous insurgents are able to operate outside the supervision government spies and informers (i.e. when the government knows little about the local insurgents). Recall also that the likelihood of insurgent vigilantism was expected to be increasing in the value of counterinsurgency intelligence.

Although it is impossible to know the true number of anonymous insurgents operating in any area at any particular point in time, the previous section established a set of conditions that would be more likely to produce recruits for the PIRA. In particular, PIRA membership was expected to be highest in areas with a large, economically deprived Catholic population. In contrast to North Down, Dungannon certainly appears to meet these criteria. Figure 6.4 maps the ward level Catholic share of the population of Dungannon as of the 2001 census. Overall, Catholics comprise approximately 60 percent of Dungannon's roughly 48,000 inhabitants. However, the majority of these inhabitants live in wards that are homogeneously Catholic. 65 percent of Dungannon's Catholic population live in wards in which Catholics represent at least two-thirds of the population and an additional 18 percent live in wards that are majority Catholic. Dungannon also suffers from greater socio-economic deprivation than does North Down, with 12 of the 22 wards in the Dungannon LGA earning lower Multiple Deprivation Measure (MDM) scores than the average ward in Northern Ireland. Furthermore, wards in Dungannon with larger Catholic populations are more likely to score poorly on the MDM indicator.⁶ The social and economic characteristics of Dungannon, as well as the region's long historical association with militant republicanism, indicate that the area was likely to produce a large number of recruits for the PIRA.

In such an area, we might expect that, generally, the police would attach a relatively high value to intelligence that might be used to identify and arrest or eliminate PIRA operatives in East Tyrone. However, the economic, demographic and historical charac-

⁶Correlation coefficient -0.32.

Figure 6.4: Ward Level Religious Composition of Dungannon



teristics of Dungannon serve as indicators of the area’s mean tendency to produce PIRA volunteers. These figures do not account for the varying fortunes of the RUC and the British army in developing both human and technical sources of intelligence in East Tyrone during the conflict. To assess more directly how the value of new counterinsurgency intelligence in East Tyrone fluctuated throughout the 1980s and 1990s, we can turn to data on the number of security force and PIRA fatalities in the area during that period. Recall that, empirically, we expected to observe a relatively high ratio of insurgent-to-government fatalities when the police already have access to high quality intelligence on local insurgents and a low ratio of insurgent-to-government fatalities under the opposite assumption.

Figure 6.5 plots the three-year moving average of the number of ETB volunteers killed by the security forces from 1980 to 1994, represented by the dashed line, and the three-year moving average of the number of security forces killed in the ETB’s primary theater of operations⁷ over the same time period, represented by the solid line. The figure demonstrates the lethal efficiency of the ETB prior to the Loughgall ambush. Before 1987, the ETB operated with relative impunity, and it would appear that the security forces had relatively little foreknowledge of PIRA activity in the area in the early 1980s.⁸ The picture

⁷Defined here as including the Dungannon and Cookstown LGAs.

⁸At the time, the head of the RUC’s intelligence unit recorded in his personal diary that the security forces in East Tyrone “were under pressure from the government to get results” (Holland and Phoenix 1997, 141). Years later, this sentiment was echoed by a “security source” who told the *Andersonstown*

Figure 6.5: ETB and Security Force Fatalities
1980 - 1994

changes drastically from 1987 onwards, with the ETB suffering losses equal to or greater than those inflicted on the security forces in East Tyrone for the remainder of the conflict.

In part, the increase in ETB mortality must be attributed to the deployment of Special Air Service (SAS) units to the area (Toolis 1995). However, subsequent accounts of the buildup to Loughgall indicate that the effectiveness of the SAS and other covert armed forces in East Tyrone from 1987 onward was the result of significant improvements in the intelligence being collected by both the British army and the RUC at the time. Writing in 1992, Urban quoted "senior security forces" to speculate that the army's lethal success at Loughgall was, most likely, the result of information derived from a high level local informer. More recently, Liam Clarke, the security correspondent for the *Belfast Telegraph* has quoted Ian Hurst⁹ as claiming that the "operation [the PIRA attack on Loughgall RUC

News that the Loughgall ambush had been necessary, from their perspective, because "the number of murders they [the ETB] had carried out had got out of control, the area had gone to the dogs" (2001). Both comments reflect the frustration of decision makers in both Belfast and London with the apparent ineffectiveness of counterinsurgency measures in place in East Tyrone at the time.

⁹Hurst, a former member of the British Army's "Force Research Unit" in Northern Ireland, had published a controversial account of security force penetration of paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland

barracks] was not betrayed by an informer but was instead compromised by a listening device planted in the home of Gerard Harte, the IRA’s mid-Tyrone commander” which had led to “a surveillance operation” being “mounted against Jim Lynagh” (Clarke 2011). Regardless of which account is correct, it is clear that by the late 1980s British security forces had made significant strides in terms of their ability to follow the activities of the PIRA in East Tyrone.

Perhaps more importantly, PIRA commanders in East Tyrone appear to have believed that Loughgall and similar SAS ambushes in later years indicated that the RUC and the army had succeeded in penetrating the highest levels of the Brigade’s command staff. According to Coogan (2000, 576) the Loughgall massacre exacerbated the brigade’s “deep rooted fear and detestation of informers” causing them to react on the basis of “the principle that just because you are paranoid does not mean they are not out to get you.” Moloney (2003, 315) also emphasizes the paranoia that gripped the PIRA in the wake of Loughgall, arguing that “The obsession [about finding the suspected informer] caused near-paranoia” and led to the temporary suspension of all ETB activity to allow for a full investigation. In such an environment, it is unlikely that either the leadership or the foot soldiers of the ETB would be deeply concerned with the threat posed by the low-level intelligence available to the police via suspected criminals from the Catholic towns and villages in the Dungannon LGA. This interpretation is in line with the theoretical expectation that the number of punishment attacks would decrease in line with the falling value of counterinsurgency intelligence.

Aside from indicating a substantial increase in the quality of counterinsurgency intelligence available to the RUC and British army in East Tyrone, the ETB’s increasingly dire fortunes on the battlefield in the late 1980s and early 1990s also had consequences for the resource constraints faced by PIRA commanders in the area. In the nine years between 1983 and 1992, the ETB lost nearly 30 men as a result of accidents and enemy action, more than any other unit in the PIRA during the same time period.¹⁰ At the same time, under the pseudonym Martin Ingram.

¹⁰By way of comparison, Sutton (2001) reports that only three members of republican paramilitary organizations died in North Belfast during the same time period, with a similar number dying in Derry City, for instance.


the ranks of the Tyrone PIRA were also being decimated by the arrest and imprisonment of volunteers. According to data made available by the republican prisoners’ welfare group Saoirse, 40 East Tyrone PIRA men were imprisoned in jails in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland by 1997. These losses are all the more significant when placed in the context of contemporary estimates of the total number of volunteers available to the IRA. Boyne (1996) estimates that by the early 1990s the PIRA had no more than 400 activists in the field across Northern Ireland, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland. In Tyrone, Urban (1992, 220) estimates the PIRA never had more than fifty active volunteers in the entire County at any one time.

The consequences of the decimation of ETB ranks in the aftermath of Loughgall were put into sharp relief by a senior local republican who later claimed that “after McNally and Pete Ryan that was it; we had nobody left” (Moloney 2002, 318) while another Tyrone republican complained that by 1992 the ETB was suffering from major “war weariness” and on the verge of collapse (Taylor 1993, 236).¹¹ Despite their depleted manpower and apparent ‘weariness’ the ETB nevertheless managed to remain active until the PIRA declared its first indefinite ceasefire in nearly two decades in 1994. Figure 6.6 plots the number of PIRA attacks occurring in the Dungannon LGA alone between 1980 and 1997, as recorded in the “Diary” or “Chronology” section of the Belfast-published magazine *Fortnight*.¹² The figure indicates that, although the ETB generally became less lethal after Loughgall, the Brigade’s annual level of activity remained relatively unchanged until the end of the Troubles, with the number of ETB attacks reported in *Fortnight* dipping below their 1980 - 1997 average of approximately five attacks per year in 1991 only.

Despite their waning lethality, the ETB appears to have used their reduced manpower to continue their war against the British state in Ireland throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. Given the extent of the Brigade’s losses to battlefield deaths and imprisonment, maintaining a relatively consistent level of military activity in East Tyrone would have exerted increasingly significant costs on the group’s labor pool. In these circum-

¹¹The SAS killed Pete Ryan, Lawrence McNally and Tony Doris in the village of Coagh while the three volunteers were en route to assassinate a UDR member.

¹²Data coded by the author from machine readable editions of *Fortnight* available via *JSTOR*’s Irish Studies collection.

Figure 6.6: ETB Attacks
1980 - 1994

stances punishment attacks would have been particularly costly to the group, as the loss of even a single active volunteer became marginally more costly with the death or imprisonment of one ETB member after another.

The material and opportunity costs of punishment attacks in Dungannon were further compounded by the ETB's bungled attempts at punishing Michael 'Mickey' Sherlock and Christopher Donnelly in 1992 and 1993, respectively, for alleged involvement in anti-social behavior. Both men lost limbs as a direct result of their respective shootings, and a negative turn in public opinion forced the PIRA to subsequently lift expulsion orders against each of them.

Sherlock's shooting generated a great deal of publicity in both the local and national press, and it is worth considering the circumstances of his case in detail to assess the long term consequences of this episode. On 18 August 1992, a PIRA active service unit entered the Dungannon home of Michael Sherlock and shot him in the thigh for alleged anti-social behavior. Sherlock originally hailed from Belfast, where he had a history of run-ins with

the local PIRA that ultimately had led to his being expelled from Northern Ireland in 1989. Two years after returning to Dungannon in 1990 to live with his girlfriend and their child, the ETB came knocking. Sherlock was shot once in the thigh and left bleeding on the floor of his home under threat to leave Northern Ireland within 24 hours. By the time Sherlock received medical attention, doctors were forced to amputate his foot.

Were this the end of the story, then Sherlock’s shooting might be recorded as a particularly tragic, although not particularly significant, example of how the PIRA dealt with criminal activity during the Troubles. However, the severity of Sherlock’s injuries, combined his pleas for mercy published in the local and national press¹³ caused revulsion in the nationalist community and the attack quickly became a propaganda nightmare for the East Tyrone Brigade. In the *Belfast Telegraph*, Father Denis Faul, a respected Dungannon priest and human rights activist, advised Sherlock’s family to “bring him home to Dungannon and look after him, and disregard the threat by the Provos, which should be lifted immediately anyway” (1992).

Under mounting pressure from the media and the local community, the ETB heeded Father Faul’s request and lifted the expulsion against Sherlock. In a statement carried by *An Phoblacht*, the leadership of the ETB explained that “Michael Sherlock is free to return to his home when released from hospital and we will further review his case in the future. We stress this is a one-off concession” (1992). The public nature of this reversal was significant, as it indicated that the East Tyrone leadership of the PIRA was sensitive to public opinion and concerned about the potential damage negative press generated by punishment shootings gone awry.

After Donnelly’s shooting also ended in the amputation of one of his legs and the lifting of the expulsion order against him, there were no punishment attacks of any kind in the Dungannon area for over three years and no punishment shootings for a further two years. The particularly gruesome outcomes of the Sherlock and Donnelly shootings combined with the fact that the two incidents occurred in close succession to elevate the negative

¹³Sherlock was quoted in the *Guardian* saying “I deserved to get shot. I didn’t deserve to lose my foot” (Bowcott 1992b). The *Times* (London) printed a similar quote: “I know I deserved getting shot . . . but I didn’t deserve to lose the leg. I couldn’t cope if I were put out of the country. I need to be with the family (Gorman 1992).

publicity generated by these events. With their manpower stretched to the breaking point and confronted with the fear that a dangerous informer still lurked in their midst, the ETB was already in a relatively weak position in terms of its ability to deal with anti-social behavior in the Dungannon area. The fear of another headline grabbing mistake exacerbated this situation further and deterred the Dungannon PIRA from taking extreme action against suspected criminals in DST for over three years.

These fears were underlined by statements by the commanders of the ETB carried in *An Phoblacht* in 1993. In a statement published less than a week after the Sherlock shooting, the ETB simultaneously emphasized its commitment to eliminating “criminal elements” in the Dungannon area and the oppression brought by the RUC and British Army. The statement went on to describe suspected criminals as “an enemy within the nationalist community, a community which suffers more than enough from the full effects of British occupation” that “We [the East Tyrone Brigade] will not tolerate.” (1993a). In a similar statement, issued just three months after the disastrous shooting of Christopher Donnelly, the brigade took credit for forcing “a criminal named Bell to leave the area because of his criminal activities” and warned “Bell’s former associates not to become involved in any similar activity” (1993c) These claims clearly demonstrate that the ETB was determined to promote the idea that they were committed to punishing local criminals, especially if it were possible to do so without incurring the significant costs associated with punishment shootings.

In addition to the substantial costs confronting ETB commanders concerned with crime and anti-social behavior, there is also some evidence that the ETB’s quest to rid itself of informers in the wake of Loughgall had met with only limited success by the early 1990s. In October 1993 the two East Tyrone Brigade volunteers entered a number of pubs in the Dungannon area and read the following statement:

We in the East Tyrone Brigade warn all those engaged in such [acting as informers] activity to stop immediately and to come forward within 72 hours, otherwise they will face the consequences” (quoted in *Belfast Telegraph* 1993).

The promise of an amnesty for police informers reportedly followed “a succession of

arms finds” resulting from “what RUC sources described as planned searches” (ibid). These public declarations, combined with the ETB’s brief suspension of operations—cited above—indicate that by 1993 the Brigade was dedicating a significant proportion of its resources to finding the elusive Loughgall informer.

Recall here that the formal model predicted that, assuming the costs of punishment attacks outweigh the benefits ($C_T \geq B_T$), insurgent groups would be more likely to conduct punishment attacks as their counterintelligence capabilities diminish (i.e. as they become less effective at identifying informers). The fact that the ETB was forced to resort to such desperate means of counterintelligence in the early 1990s indicates that the Brigade’s counterintelligence capabilities had continued to degrade in the aftermath of the Loughgall incident. Given the apparently high costs of vigilantism for the ETB, we would therefore expect to observe a gradual increase in the number of punishment attacks carried out in Dungannon during this period. In this instance, the ETB’s behavior does not appear to conform to our theoretical expectations, as the costs of vigilantism appear to have deterred the group from punishing a significant number of criminals, despite the relative ineffectiveness of their counterintelligence operations.

Despite the longstanding tension between the people of Dungannon and the RUC and the police force’s preference for counterinsurgency policing at the expense of its civil police duties in the area, the PIRA did not attempt to reap the institution building benefits of insurgent vigilantism by picking up the slack left the by RUC. The infrequency with which the ETB punished criminals was all the more surprising because of the Brigade leadership’s social-revolutionary ideological leanings. The preceding section relied on insights derived from the formal model to explain the apparent disparity between the expected and observed behavior of the ETB. In this regard, the analysis presented here emphasized the importance of both the material and opportunity costs of punishment attacks on the one hand and the value of counterinsurgency intelligence on the other.

The ETB’s labor pool was steadily drained over the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s, to the point where nearly 70 of the Brigade’s activists had been imprisoned or killed by the security forces by the time peace arrived on the streets of Northern Ireland with

the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. Despite these losses, press accounts of ETB activity in the Dungannon area nevertheless appears to indicate that, although the Brigade's attacks on military and economic targets proved to be less lethal as time went on, they were no less frequent. In these circumstances, the opportunity costs of punishment attacks were likely too great for the ETB leadership to consider detailing any of their ever-shrinking labor force with the investigation and punishment of suspected criminals.

During this period the increasing costs of punishment attacks were matched by the decreasing value of new information on the identities and activities of PIRA members in East Tyrone. When the police assign a high value to the type of intelligence available from local criminals, insurgent groups have a greater incentive to punish these criminals (all else equal), especially when the insurgents anticipate that the police will attempt to use criminal suspects as part of their counterinsurgency campaign. The increasingly lethal efficiency of the SAS and the British army in East Tyrone throughout the 1980s and 1990s reflected the increasingly high level penetration of the ETB by the security forces, whether through paid informants or electronic surveillance. Having amassed sufficient intelligence to ambush and otherwise stymie the ETB practically at will, it is unlikely that the police would have regarded information from criminal informants as being particularly useful.


In these circumstances, a haggard and security-compromised ETB had little incentive to punish local criminals, and little means to do so in any case. The following section draws on these observations and uses a structured comparison with PIRA operations against security forces and local criminals in the Newry and Mourne to further assess the validity of these conclusions.

6.3 The South Armagh Brigade

The ETB's extended period of inactivity against anti-social behavior is all the more surprising when compared with the activity of their brethren in the South Armagh Brigade (SAB) of the PIRA. In many respects, South Armagh and East Tyrone are quite similar. Both regions have a long history of republican activism and straddle the border with the

Republic of Ireland. Both LGAs are also predominately Catholic, with Catholics representing over three-fourth of the population of Newry and Mourne, and the overwhelming majoring of those Catholics living in wards in which Catholics constitute the local majority (see figure 6.7). Both regions have also suffered from significant social and economic deprivation, with 26 of the 30 wards in Newry and Mourne ranking below the Northern Ireland average on NISRA's MDM indicator.


Figure 6.7: Ward Level Religious Composition of Newry and Mourne



Given these similarities, it is perhaps unsurprising to find that both East Tyrone and South Armagh were also hotbeds of PIRA activity throughout the Troubles. Figure 6.8 plots the number of security forces killed per 1,000 inhabitants in the Newry and Mourne and Dungannon LGAs between 1970 and 1997. The figure indicates that, although the Newry and Mourne area was significantly more deadly for the British army, the Ulster Defense Regiment and the RUC, the ETB had rapidly closed the gap with their comrades to the east in terms of offensive military action.

Despite these similarities, the PIRA's two most active rural brigades nevertheless took different approaches to the problems of crime and anti-social behavior in their respective communities. Between 1990 and 2001 the SAB punished 79 individuals in Newry and Mourne, while the ETB conducted seventeen such vigilante attacks over the same time period. Adjusting these figures for differences in the average population of the two areas during the 1990s does not eliminate the difference. Accounting for total population,

Figure 6.8: Security Force Fatalities Attributed to PIRA per 1,000 Inhabitants 1970 - 1997



the SAB conducted 0.95 punishment attacks per 1,000 inhabitants of Newry and Mourne during the 1990s while the ETB conducted 0.37 such attacks per 1,000 inhabitants of Dungannon. The remainder of this section expands on the analysis of Dungannon, presented above, and draws on the theoretical insights derived from the formal model to explain differences in the PIRA's approach to crime in these two areas.

Nevertheless, the war between the PIRA and the British state unfolded very differently in the two republican heartlands. In particular, although the PIRA was equally active and equally lethal in both districts, the South Armagh unit appears to have been far more successful at countering British intelligence gathering efforts. Eight members of the South Armagh Brigade were killed as a result of enemy action between 1969 and 1998, only one of whom died after 1980. Additionally, by 1997 only eleven members of the SAB were imprisoned in Ireland and the United Kingdom. These figures contrast sharply with the more than fifty volunteers killed and 40 imprisoned from the ETB over the same time period, and give some indication of how much more effective the SAB's counterintelligence

efforts were throughout the conflict. This assessment is confirmed Harnden (2000, 320) who claims that, by the late 1980s, "South Armagh was the one safe base they [the IRA] had" because "the RUC was getting on top of it everywhere else."

As a result of their greater resiliency in the face of British counterinsurgency, the SAB was left with a much greater pool of manpower and resources to draw on in the waning days of the conflict. The unit's apparent effectiveness in the area of counterintelligence also made them largely immune to the type of paranoia that gripped the ETB in the wake of Loughgall. As a result, we would expect the SAB to have a greater willingness and capacity to conduct punishment attacks in their brigade area than did their neighbors in Tyrone, especially after the implementation of the first PIRA ceasefire.

Figure 6.9 demonstrates that this is precisely the pattern that emerged after the PIRA called its cessation of military operations in August 1994. No longer tasked with attacking the British Army or the RUC, the South Armagh Brigade was free to turn its considerable resources inward and 'deal with' local 'hoods.' At the same time, the PIRA in East Tyrone was left reeling from the military setbacks of the past decade and the political fallout from botched attacks in 1992 and 1993. As a result, the number of attacks in South Armagh increased significantly in 1994 and 1995, while no punishment attacks of any kind occurred in East Tyrone during Northern Ireland's first year of peace in nearly two decades.

When the PIRA returned to war from February 1996 to June 1997, the pattern described above reverses itself. As O Ruairc (2008) has illustrated, it was during this period that the PIRA relied most heavily on its members in South Armagh to make and deliver the massive bombs detonated at Canary Wharf, Manchester and elsewhere. It is, therefore, unsurprising that the number of punishment attacks in South Armagh fell significantly during this period when the costs to the SAB in terms of manpower would have increased dramatically.

At the same time, British intelligence and the RUC had responded to the end of the IRA's ceasefire by focusing their efforts on preventing further bombings in London and attempting to uncover the source of the IRA's explosives in South Armagh (Harnden 2000). This factor, combined with the increased media attention that was being paid to the IRA's

Figure 6.9: Republican Punishment Attacks in Dungannon and Newry and Mourne 1990 - 2001



campaign in Great Britain, provided the East Tyrone Brigade with additional breathing room on the security and publicity fronts. Given their relative lack of involvement in the IRA's new offensive - not a single policeman or soldier was killed or injured in the Dungannon area from 1996-1997 - the unit was free to use its own men and matériel against local hoods. Furthermore, as Hamill (2011) has argued with reference to the PIRA in West Belfast, it is likely that the punishment attacks conducted by the ETB in 1996 and 1997 had an additional benefit of signaling to both the local population and the British government that the PIRA remained active and potentially dangerous in East Tyrone. As a result, the ETB had good reason to engage in this type of violence during the lull in the PIRA ceasefire to demonstrate that they "hadn't gone away."¹⁴

Nevertheless, in the long run the volunteers of the ETB never truly matched their compatriots in South Armagh at doling out kneecappings and beatings to young men in their respective communities. In large part, this difference can be explained by the

¹⁴This phrase was infamously used by Gerry Adams to describe the status of the PIRA during a speech delivered to a crowd in front of Belfast city hall in August 1995.

powerful interaction between the resources available to each brigade on the one hand, and their relative effectiveness in terms of counterintelligence on the other. By the 1990s, the ETB's manpower had been significantly depleted by the murder and imprisonment of large numbers of the brigade's volunteers at the hands of both the British Army and the RUC. At the same time, the unit was seized by a pervasive fear regarding the presence of a thus far unidentified informer in their midst. These factors did not prevent the ETB from attacking the security forces in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nevertheless, the strain they imposed on the brigade's resources, combined with the political pressure resulting from botched attacks in 1992 and 1993, deterred the unit from becoming heavily involved in punishment attacks both during and after the peace process. In contrast, the SAB had maintained tight control over its own internal security throughout the entirety of the Troubles. As a result, when the IRA's ceasefire arrived in 1994, the brigade was in a strong position to punish local criminals. The SAB's ability to conduct punishment attacks was once again briefly constrained when the PIRA returned to war in 1996 and 1997. Nevertheless, as the IRA's campaign came to a close in the summer of 1997, this relatively secure unit had both the means and the inclination to engage in punishment attacks far more regularly than did the depleted and insecure unit in East Tyrone, despite the political and socioeconomic similarities between the two regions.

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that local decisions about where and how often the PIRA would engage in punishment attacks were influenced by local commanders' evaluation of the perceived costs and benefits of these attacks. When resources were plentiful and the demands of war were low, as they were in South Armagh at the time of the IRA's first ceasefire, local volunteers were free to deal with drug dealing and anti-social behavior in their communities. On the other hand, when resources were scarce and the demands of war comparatively high, as they were in East Tyrone in the years following the Loughgall massacre, local PIRA units were unable to spare the men needed to locate and punish suspected criminals.

Most significantly, this chapter has demonstrated that different types of insurgent violence are the result of different causal processes. One size fits all approaches to explaining insurgent violence run the risk of overlooking these differences. In contrast to attacks against police and army targets, punishment attacks are primarily intended to influence the opinions and behavior of ordinary people in the districts where these attacks occur. In particular, punishment attacks are used as a perverse form of insurgent institution building, by which the insurgent group aims to capitalize on local disenchantment with the police and other criminal justice institutions of the state. Nevertheless, even in areas like South Armagh and East Tyrone, where the insurgents are relatively well supported and the people are relatively hostile to the government's forces, there are a variety of other factors that influence the willingness of local insurgent commanders to invest the time and resources necessary to fight simultaneous wars against crime and against the status quo government. In particular, the opportunity costs involved in assigning insurgent soldiers to find and punish suspected criminals evidently limit both the willingness and ability of local commanders to prioritize punishment attacks. These costs are likely to be particularly great when insurgent manpower is at a premium and the group is still engaged in offensive action against status quo sources, as was the case in East Tyrone in the early 1990s. Additionally, if punishments are too severe or victims are perceived as innocent, the consequences of particular attacks can negatively impact the insurgent group's standing in the community. The fact that insurgent groups appear to be more likely to refrain from conducting punishment attacks when the likelihood of negative fallout is high further demonstrates how these attacks in particular are intended to benefit the group's long term interests.

/

Chapter 7

‘The Land Where All the Bad Things Happened’

North Belfast¹ is perhaps the most deeply divided region of a deeply divided city in a deeply divided province. In the aggregate, this might not appear to be the case. At the time of the 2001 census, Catholics represented approximately 45 percent of the overall population of North Belfast, close to the Northern Ireland average of about 40 percent. However, figure 7.2, which maps the ward level Catholic share of the population throughout North Belfast, reveals that this superficial appearance of integration is misleading. Despite their minority status in the area overall, three quarters of North Belfast’s Catholic population live in wards in which Catholics constitute the majority of the population, and nearly 60 percent of North Belfast Catholics reside in wards in which the Catholic share of the population is greater than two thirds. A similar pattern of segregated settlement applies to Protestants in the area. In addition to being one of the most deeply divided regions of Northern Ireland, North Belfast has also historically been one of the province’s most socially and economically disadvantaged. Figure 7.3 maps the ward level Multiple Deprivation Score throughout North Belfast. According to their Multiple Deprivation Measure scores¹, half of the area’s wards are amongst the bottom ten percent of all wards in Northern Ireland in terms of social and economic deprivation; only one ward ranks outside the bottom 40 percent.

Given the high levels of ethnic segregation and socio-economic deprivation in North Belfast, it is hardly surprising to find that the levels of violence experienced by both

¹See figure 7.1 for a map of the Belfast LGA, highlighting the wards of North Belfast.


Figure 7.1: Map of Belfast City Highlighting North Belfast



civilians and the security forces in the area during the Troubles were an order of magnitude greater than those observed in North Down and, in terms of frequency, greatly outstripped levels in East Tyrone and South Armagh as well. More people died in North Belfast as a result of political violence between 1969 and 2001 than in any other region of Northern Ireland, with the exception of the provincial capital's western quarter (Sutton 2001).² Perhaps more tellingly, seven of North Belfast's 15 wards were amongst the 25 deadliest wards throughout the entire conflict (Kelleher 2010). In keeping with this general pattern, North Belfast also recorded the second most punishment attacks of any police command area during the period covered by the statistical analysis presented in chapter four. 179 republican punishment attacks were recorded in North Belfast between 1994 and 1999, with an additional 80 attacks occurring during the remaining years from 1990 to 2005, for

²576 of the 3529 Troubles related fatalities recorded by Sutton occurred in North Belfast. 623 such fatalities occurred in West Belfast.

Figure 7.2: Ward Level Religious Composition of North Belfast




a total of 259 attacks throughout that period.

Judging by the figures quoted above, novelist Robert McLiam Wilson's description of North Belfast as "the land where all the bad things happened" certainly seems apt. However, closer examination once again reveals a much more complex local pattern of both lethal and non-lethal political violence. For instance, while there were fewer total Troubles related fatalities in North Belfast than in West Belfast, policemen were actually more likely to be killed by the PIRA in the former district than in the latter.³ This difference is all the more striking when placed in the broader context of the overall level of PIRA activity in these two areas. In North Belfast, RUC fatalities represented more than 15 percent of all PIRA kills over the course of the conflict, while in West Belfast the same category accounted for less than 8 percent of all PIRA victims. A similar pattern emerges with regard to punishment attacks. The 3rd Battalion of the PIRA's Belfast Brigade killed less than 10 percent of all PIRA victims, but perpetrated more than 17 percent of all republican punishment attacks in the 1990s and early 2000s. In contrast

³From 1969 to 1997, 20 RUC men were killed by the PIRA in West Belfast while 26 constables were killed by the PIRA in North Belfast.

Figure 7.3: Ward Level Multiple Deprivation Score, North Belfast



with the East Tyrone Brigade, North Belfast PIRA units appear to have over performed in the category of punishment attacks.

Furthermore, in the years for which we have reliable data,⁴ the annual number of republican punishment attacks in North Belfast actually exhibits a *negative* correlation with the annual number of fatalities in the district attributed to the PIRA.⁵ This trend is further confirmed by figure 7.4, which compares the annual number of PIRA kills in North Belfast from 1973-2005 with the estimated number of republican punishment shootings in the district during the same time period.⁶ Each figure demonstrates that, in keeping with


⁴Geographically disaggregated data on punishment attacks were provided by the Central Statistics Unit of the PSNI in an Excel spreadsheet for the years from 1990-2008. Data on the location of punishment attacks in 1986 and 1987 was obtained from an RUC briefing paper entitled "Paramilitary Thuggery." The paper is available from Belfast's Linen Hall Library's Northern Ireland Political Collection, reference number P2546.

⁵Pairwise correlation coefficient of -0.25.

⁶The PSNI maintains aggregate records of the total number of punishment shootings in Northern Ireland from 1973 to 2012. North Belfast's share of the total number of republican shootings in each year prior to 1990 - excluding 1986 and 1987 - was estimated by multiplying the total number of attacks in each year by the average percentage of republican punishment attacks occurring in North Belfast from 1990-2005 expressed as a decimal value and rounding to the nearest whole number. Using the same procedure to replicate the annual number of shootings from 1990-2005 produced an average error rate of 2.19 attacks per year.

our baseline expectations derived from the formal model,⁷ the North Belfast PIRA conducted fewer punishment attacks during years in which they were more active against other potential targets, including the military, the police and loyalist paramilitaries. Overall, punishment attacks took a back seat to offensive operations in the Ardoyne and surrounding PIRA strongholds. Local PIRA operatives put to work reconnoitering and attacking other targets were unavailable to investigate crimes or locate and punish suspected criminals. As a result the number of punishment attacks in the area often fell sharply when the number of lethal operations increased sharply.

Figure 7.4: PIRA Killings and Republican Punishment Attacks in North Belfast 1973 - 2005



This general interpretation is in keeping with the findings presented in previous chapters. However, a closer inspection of the available evidence reveals that the aggregate pattern once again conceals a much more complicated picture. Punishment attacks must also be understood within the broader context of the contest between the PIRA and the RUC to become the dominant providers of law and order in republican communities

⁷Recall here that hypothesis 2B predicted a negative correlation between the costs of punishment attacks and their occurrence.

throughout Northern Ireland. The formal model indicated that the insurgent approach to vigilantism is conditioned by general features of the strategic environment *and* the anticipated police response to crime. Dealing with criminality and anti-social behavior in communities like North Belfast places a strain on both insurgent groups and status quo governments, to the extent that either actor decides to allocate scarce resources to policing these communities. As a result, the response to criminality pursued by both actors also has consequences for their respective campaigns against one another. If the police are expected to use suspected criminals as part of their counterinsurgency campaign, then the insurgents will have a greater incentive to dedicate their own scarce resources to punishing these suspects to the extent that the type of information available from criminal informers is valued by the police. On the other hand, if the police are expected to instead arrest and attempt to convict suspected criminals, the insurgents need not worry about how valuable this information is to the police, although they must still account for the possibility that the brutality of vigilante justice might alienate members of their own community.

The remainder of this chapter draws on insights derived from the formal model to address these tensions. To that end, the chapter proceeds in three parts. Section 7.1 analyzes the changing patterns of police and insurgent behavior with regard to their respective wars against crime and against one-another in the period during and immediately prior to the PIRA's ill-fated truce in 1975. This section adopts a process tracing approach to the behavior of the PIRA and the RUC, drawing on republican propaganda materials and previously classified government documents to assess how decision makers in both groups responded to the changes on the ground brought by this brief period of peace in the midst of the bloodiest decade of the Troubles. Section 7.2 moves forward in time, assessing how the conditions on the ground had changed in North Belfast by the time period covered by the statistical analysis. Section 7.3 summarizes the findings presented in the chapter and discusses the broader implications of the results. The picture that emerges from these three sections demonstrates that the 'war on crime' in North Belfast was crucial to the efforts of both actors to establish legitimacy and build rapport with the residents of neighborhoods like Ardoyne, Oldpark, New Lodge and the Bone throughout

the Troubles.

7.1 Staggering From Day to Day: Policing and Punishment Attacks During the 1975 PIRA Truce

The early 1970s were by far the most violent period of Northern Ireland's Troubles. Approximately 42 percent of all those to lose their lives as a result of political violence in Ulster died in the six years from 1969 to 1975. In North Belfast itself, the figure was over 50 percent. At the same time, the PIRA's 1975 ceasefire marked an important turning point in the conflict. The levels of death and destruction on the streets of Ulster prior to 1975 were never again equalled at the conclusion of the group's nearly year-long truce with the British government. Beyond its practical and political significance in the history of Northern Ireland, this period in North Belfast's history also provides a useful setting in which to evaluate the validity of hypotheses regarding the effect of both the costs and benefits of fighting crime on the decision making of both insurgent groups and status quo governments.

The conditions affecting the willingness and the ability of both the PIRA and the RUC to respond to criminal activity in North Belfast varied significantly during the early 1970s. For the PIRA, the period from 1969-1974 was one of intense activity against the security forces. 1975, on the other hand, was entirely different. The PIRA's offensive campaign laid dormant and the group's energies turned toward implementing long talked about plans for building a formal counterstate, especially in terms of providing law and order. At the same time, police operations in North Belfast were made incredibly difficult by local hostility toward the RUC and the PIRA's active campaign against the police. The ceasefire also provided the police with an opportunity to overcome both of these obstacles as they attempted to reassert their position as the dominant providers of law and order in the area. These competing attempts at establishing—or re-establishing—a basic system of criminal justice in North Belfast were shaped by the long term, institution building goals of both the status quo government and the insurgent group. However, the vigor with which each actor pursued its respective long term goals was also constrained by more

immediate demands for success—or at least survival—on the battlefield.

The remainder of this section presents evidence from primary sources to evaluate hypotheses 1A through 2B as explanations for insurgent and state behavior in the environment described above. In particular, the first sub-section demonstrates that, from 1970-1974, the RUC's willingness to investigate ordinary crime was constrained both by the force's emphasis on counterinsurgency and the very real danger posed by potential PIRA ambushes. After the PIRA implemented its open-ended ceasefire, these conditions changed dramatically. The danger of PIRA ambushes was reduced significantly during this period. At the same time, the PIRA itself was no longer constrained by the demands of its campaign against the forces of the British state in Ireland and, as a result, was able to begin presenting a serious challenge to the police force's position as the dominant provider of law enforcement in a substantial portion of Northern Ireland's capital city. As a result of these changes, the police were able to begin conducting ordinary duties in republican communities around North Belfast in an attempt to stake the government's claim to being the sole provider of public goods in the city while simultaneously building rapport with the residents of republican North Belfast. In short, as the costs of ordinary policing decreased and the threat of institutional competition posed by the PIRA increased, the RUC used more of its resources to perform civil policing duties in North Belfast. The second sub-section focuses on the PIRA's campaign against criminals in North Belfast during the same period. Unsurprisingly, this campaign reached its zenith during the 1975 ceasefire, as the group sought to assert and defend its role as the dominant provider of law and order in the area. Here we can see evidence supporting both hypothesis 1A and hypothesis 2A, conditional on the increasing encroachment of the RUC as a civil police force in republican areas like New Lodge and Ardoyne.

7.1.1 The RUC

In a written reply to a question put forward by Ulster Unionist MP for Derry William Ross, then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland Merlyn Rees informed the House of Commons that, since the outbreak of serious political violence in the early 1970s, it had

been necessary for the RUC “to adapt its operations in areas of possible terrorist attack” including the North Belfast districts of “Ardoyne and the Bone . . . New Lodge and Unity Flats” and that “[c]onsequently the RUC did not provide “normal” policing in those areas, as it is recognised [sic] in the remainder of the United Kingdom” United Kingdom 1976).⁸ In many ways, this statement set the tone for the RUC’s approach to policing in North Belfast throughout the early 1970s. Ordinary policing had the potential to be extremely dangerous, as emergency calls from the districts mentioned by the Secretary of State often served as a prelude to ambush.

Contemporary assessments of the RUC’s operations in North Belfast and throughout Northern Ireland confirm that the fear of being lured into ambushes influenced the willingness and ability of the police to deal with mundane matters like traffic accidents. In a confidential memo describing police activity in the New Lodge area of North Belfast, the local RUC commander described the area as “the most potentially dangerous in Belfast.” The memo went on to detail the attempted killing of “2 policemen investigating an accident,” and conceded that “The New Lodge Rd. . . . is not patrolled at night and only visited by the police when a specific task requires it and when Army cover is provided.” The memo concluded that “The clear need is to re-establish proper police coverage in this whole area and this will require time, judgement and adequate manpower” (PRONI CAB 9/G/93/1). In a subsequent assessment of the amount of manpower available to police North Belfast, the local RUC Superintendent went on to assert that, in the existing circumstances, it would be all but impossible for North Belfast to “have proper policing re-introduced” (*ibid*, emphasis in original). Similar concerns were expressed in the RUC’s public performance reviews. These sentiments were echoed by reports in subsequent years. The Chief Constable’s report for 1974 explained rather bluntly that PIRA activity throughout Belfast “has the effect of inhibiting normal police function” (1975, 67) in many parts of the city.

By the end of 1970, nine people had died as a result of sectarian killings in North

⁸The significance of this statement is magnified both by its timing and the identity of the author. Rees was one of the primary architects of the British Government’s policy of ‘Ulsterization’ which emphasized the importance of professionalizing local security forces and placing the RUC back on the front lines against both ordinary crime and terrorism. See Rees (1985), Dixon (2001) and Cunningham (2001).

Belfast, none of them policemen. However, four of the nine people killed in North Belfast during this period were Catholic civilians killed by the RUC in a variety of circumstances. As a result, public hostility toward the police was particularly high in areas around New Lodge and Oldpark in particular, as many residents felt that the police had aided loyalist mobs involved in rioting in 1969 rather than trying to disperse them. The PIRA both reflected, and attempted to take advantage of, this existing tension by using ambushes, such as the one described in the superintendent's report quoted above, in an effort to increase the costs associated with ordinary police work and deter the RUC from performing its duties as a civil police force in North Belfast. Despite the fact that PIRA operatives did not succeed in killing a policeman in North Belfast until 1971, attempted ambushes - and the numerous successful ones in subsequent years - contributed to the relatively high level of hostility toward the police in the area. The end result was that, by 1970, the RUC felt unable to perform the duties of a normal police force in the nationalist enclaves of North Belfast.

The RUC's reluctance to respond to calls in these areas was compounded by a more general tendency for the force to allocate a significant share of its human resources to static guard duty and counterinsurgency operations. In his 1970 annual report, the Chief Constable lamented that "The heavy commitment of police on security duties unfortunately . . . reduces the amount of attention which can be given to the prevention and detection of ordinary crime" (1971, 33). Internal police documents from the period reflect a similar perspective on the relative importance of 'ordinary crime' and 'security duties.' A confidential report on RUC manpower indicated that "A large proportion of RUC manpower (about 1,500 men) is diverted from normal policing to guard duties" (PRONI NIO/25/3/5), and the RUC Superintendent in North Belfast complained that "the politically peaceful areas . . . are being neglected because of the concentration of manpower in the sensitive sector" for counterinsurgency activity (PRONI CAB/9/G/93/1). Taken together, these statements indicate that the RUC's focus on counterinsurgency and security duties further hindered the force's ability to deal adequately with "criminals and hooligans" during the darkest early years of the Troubles (*ibid.*).

Despite the RUC's apprehension regarding the costs associated with re-introducing "ordinary" policing to the "hard areas" of North Belfast, local commanders nevertheless remained cognizant of the potential long-term benefits of doing so. In his letter on challenges of policing North Belfast, quoted previously, the RUC Superintendent for the region went on to highlight the prospect that "The longer the New Lodge Rd. area is without disorder the more the influence and control of the self-appointed defence [sic] committee is under-mined [sic]" noting that "When the influence of the extremists has been challenged by the local people there will be a demand for normal policing" (PRONI CAB 9/G/93/1). We can see here that local commanders believed that effective "ordinary" policing of North Belfast would benefit the RUC in terms of their rapport with local people. At the same time, however, the RUC also took account of the other side of the cost-benefit analysis indicated by the formal model. Concluding his remarks on the future of policing in North Belfast, the local Superintendent lamented that

There is no easily applied instant solution to this difficult and delicate problem. It is a protracted operation which will require diligent, well-planned work backed by intelligence and experience together with the necessary manpower and resources even then there is no certainty of success. What is certain is that without sufficient numbers of police being available to make the effort there will be no hope of success (ibid).

Thus, the police weighed the costs and benefits of dedicating more local resources to civil police duties in North Belfast in 1970 and concluded that, at the time, the costs of doing so outweighed the benefits in terms of increased political support amongst the people of the region.

Up to this point, we have painted a picture of a police force in North Belfast that was overstretched in terms of manpower and maintained a relationship that was tenuous at best with the local population. The PIRA sought to profit from the tension between the Catholic residents of North Belfast and the RUC, and they used ambushes to apply pressure on the police and reduce their willingness to operate in Ardoyne, Oldpark, New Lodge and other traditional republican strongholds in the area. From 1970 onwards, it would appear that these efforts bore considerable fruit. Both confidential and public evaluations of the RUC in North Belfast reflect a police force that felt both threatened by

and isolated from the people of these neighborhoods. This general sense of apprehension was reinforced by a preference at management level to dedicate the lion's share of police resources to security. At the same time, the danger posed by potential PIRA ambushes targeting ordinary police patrols was so high that it was unclear whether or not the RUC would be able to derive any net benefits from conducting ordinary patrols in the "hard areas" of Belfast. The end result was that investigating "ordinary" crime was perceived to be too costly in North Belfast, and these duties were sidelined in favor of performing the counterterrorism tasks highlighted above.

The arrival of the PIRA's indefinite ceasefire, starting in December 1974, utterly changed the conditions on the ground and created an environment where the RUC was compelled to reconsider its previous reluctance to conduct ordinary policing in North Belfast. The nature of this change can be seen most clearly in the statistics on local RUC fatalities. From 1971 to 1974 16 RUC officers were killed by the PIRA in North Belfast. In 1975 not a single constable died in the area as a result of PIRA action. With the PIRA on ceasefire, the police were far less likely to be attacked during a routine patrol or investigation. Perhaps more importantly, the relative lack of PIRA activity throughout much of the year freed RUC resources that would typically have been directed at security duties to be used in conducting 'proper' policing of traditionally republican districts.

The impact of the PIRA's ceasefire on RUC deployment decisions is evident in contemporary assessments of the police force's performance during 1975. Republican sources, quoted in detail below, highlighted the increasing appearance of RUC patrols on the streets of North and West Belfast throughout the ceasefire, and encouraged local people to avoid contact with the police and report the presence of these patrols to their local Sinn Féin office. These reports are corroborated by the RUC's own evaluations of the period. The Chief Constable's report for 1975 records that, throughout the year, the police were able "to operate in all parts" of North Belfast and that "the opposition to police patrols in certain areas has declined" (1976, 8). A similarly cheery assessment of RUC-Catholic relations during 1975 was provided by representatives of the Police Federation during a private meeting with Secretary of State Rees in November 1975. During this meeting, the

chairman of the Federation informed Rees that “it was remarkable how much liaison there in fact was between the communities there [in “green areas” of Northern Ireland] and the Police force at the moment” (PRONI NIO/25/1/6).⁹ These reviews contrast sharply with those expressed by senior RUC figures in previous years.

While past reports and internal reviews had highlighted the dangers and risks associated with policing North Belfast, reports from 1975 emphasized progress in this area and a general improvement of the RUC’s ability to operate in “green” areas. This shift in tone was partly a result of the relative freedom of movement enjoyed by the police during the year, which was itself the result of the PIRA’s suspension of offensive operations. However, the push to increase the RUC’s involvement in policing nationalist communities was given an added impetus by the RUC’s apparent fear that Sinn Féin and the PIRA would use the incident centers¹⁰ to establish a formal institutional alternative to the state police. In short, the RUC attempted to increase its “ordinary” presence in North Belfast during 1975 both because the relative costs of doing so were relatively low and because the potential lost benefits for not doing so were equally great.

Senior RUC decision makers repeatedly expressed their misgivings about the establishment of the incident centers in private meetings with British officials. In February 1976 RUC Chief Superintendent Rogers, at that time the chairman of the Police Association, expressed to Minister of State Moyle the “apprehension felt in the RUC over the role of the incident centres [sic] in the ceasefire.” In particular, the Superintendent felt that “no go areas [i.e. places where the police were unable to perform their regular duties] might return and indeed were returning” as a result of the incident centers being established. The consequences of this shift could be seen in the presence of “PIRA patrols” which “were out in the streets once more” (PRONI NIO/25/1/6). These statement clearly indicate that the RUC was anxious about being replaced in, rather than merely excluded

⁹The benefits of peace were also reflected in the Police Federation’s anxieties about a return to war. In August, Inspector McIlwrath had told Roland Moyle, at that time junior minister of state for Northern Ireland affairs, that the police were concerned about the continued release of republican prisoners from Long Kesh and the increasingly tenuous nature of the PIRA’s ceasefire. If the PIRA returned to full scale violence, then the RUC would be forced to “keep a low profile” and “would not immediately answer calls...until daylight or until military assistance was available” (PRONI NIO/25/1/6).

¹⁰See below.

from, "Green areas" in Belfast and throughout Northern Ireland.

To the police, the incident centers, which were manned by local Sinn Féin volunteers, provided the PIRA's alternative system of law and order an unprecedented level of formality and, most worryingly, legitimacy. If the PIRA were able to operate "patrols" and receive formal complaints about criminal activity through their newly established offices, then the status of the RUC as the hegemonic providers of law enforcement would be called greatly into question. Given the commitment of both the Labour government in London and local police commanders to increasing the front-line policing role of the RUC, this development was undoubtedly deeply troubling, adding to the force's motivation to reestablish its presence in Catholic areas and prevent the PIRA from advancing its own institution building objectives during this period of peace on the battlefield.

In the end, the 1975 ceasefire allowed the police to find both the time and the manpower necessary to begin accomplishing this task. The ceasefire reduced both the opportunity costs and the operational risks associated with conducting ordinary police work in North Belfast. With fewer terrorist incidents to investigate, and fewer vehicle checkpoints to man, more constables were available to carry out these duties. At the same time, the relative lack of PIRA activity drastically reduced the likelihood that a reported crime might be an invitation to an ambush. As a result, the danger associated with investigating such crimes diminished, and the RUC felt free to operate more openly in an area where they had long lacked a significant foothold. In other words, as the costs of policing North Belfast shrank, the police were poised to reap the benefits of providing an "ordinary" criminal investigation service for the area.

The relationship between the police and the people of predominately Catholic areas of North Belfast was defined by two key characteristics throughout the conflict. As a result of historical experience, Catholic residents of North Belfast often perceived the RUC as a political and quasi-colonial police force with little intention of either protecting or serving nationalist communities. These historical memories were reinforced by more immediate experiences of RUC brutality in 1969 and 1970. Prior to its ceasefire in 1975, the PIRA sought to exploit existing tensions between the police and the Catholics of North Belfast

by laying ambushes for the RUC, thereby increasing the police force's apprehension about responding to "ordinary" crime in the area. At the same time, throughout the early 1970s, senior RUC decision makers exhibited a marked preference for dedicating manpower and resources to security and counterinsurgency duties. The net outcome of these strategic conditions was that, until the PIRA temporarily laid down its arms and set to work formalizing its counterstate institutions, the costs of "ordinary" policing far outweighed the benefits. During this period the RUC, by its own admission, had little interest in providing or ability to provide "proper policing" in republican strongholds.

However, the arrival of the PIRA's ceasefire in the middle of the decade provided a marked, albeit temporary, change in conditions on the ground that facilitated a shift in the RUC's posture in North Belfast and other "no go" areas throughout Ulster. During this period, the police had much less reason to fear PIRA ambushes - indeed, the PIRA did not kill a single RUC officer in North Belfast during the ceasefire period. At the same time, the lower overall rate of insurgent violence and the introduction of civilian search wardens to perform static guard duties freed up RUC resources that would previously have been dedicated to security and counterinsurgency operations. These men and resources could now be used to provide some semblance of "ordinary" policing in North Belfast. This objective was given greater priority during the ceasefire, because the police perceived the establishment of incident centers in republican neighborhoods as a threat to the long term legitimacy of the RUC in those areas. Faced with the threat or replacement in North Belfast and elsewhere, and less constrained by the direct threat of PIRA activity, the RUC gradually began to reintroduce ordinary patrols into "Green areas" throughout the year. These changes ultimately proved fleeting. Twenty subsequent years of conflict saw the RUC largely return to its pre-1975 posture and priorities. Nevertheless, the evolution of the police approach to crime and counterinsurgency in North Belfast demonstrates how both the costs and benefits of ordinary policing can alter the relative vigor with which a status quo government pursues each of these objectives.

7.1.2 The PIRA

Much like their enemies in the police, the PIRA's attitude toward "ordinary" criminals in the early years of the conflict was characterized by a kind of disdain and annoyance. PIRA commanders throughout Northern Ireland saw punishment attacks as a distraction - albeit a necessary one - and a drain on their scarce resources, all of which were needed to get the 'Brits out.' In particular, PIRA sources from Belfast and further afield indicate that insurgent decision makers and foot soldiers alike were apprehensive about the apparently significant manpower required to investigate crimes and locate and punish offenders. The manpower intensive nature of punishment attacks was clearly evident in PIRA statements published in the *Ardoyne Freedom Fighter* throughout the mid-1970s. In one such statement (n.d.) the commander of the 3rd Battalion explains how

The Republican movement in North [sic] Belfast have found it necessary to launch a concerted campaign against the gangster element operating in the area . . . and will continue to swoop on houses and premises where stolen goods are being stored for re-sale on a black market.

Already this week . . . 3rd Batt. volunteers raided houses and in one meted out physical punishment to operatives in this 'fagan-style business' [sic].

The challenge posed by using men and weapons that could otherwise have been employed in planning, reconnoitering or executing operations against the security forces to instead find and punish criminals was underlined by other PIRA leaders, both in Belfast and further afield. In 1974 *Republican News* asked a senior Belfast PIRA commander if it were "really possible for a guerrilla army to fight a war and, at the same time, perform the duties of a local police service?" The commander responded frankly "No. This is a very big problem and one which has given us a lot of trouble." These sentiments were echoed by the west Tyrone PIRA, who claimed to "dislike" conducting punishment attacks "mainly because this diverts our attention from the fight for freedom."

Despite these misgivings on the part of the PIRA leadership throughout Northern Ireland, official statistics appear to provide support for the PIRA's description of a "concerted campaign" against criminals in the mid 1970s. More republican punishment shootings took place over the course of the PIRA's 1975 ceasefire than in any other single year. Indeed,

there were more *punishment shootings* in 1975 than there were *total punishment attacks* attacks in any year between 1982 and 2005 with the exception of 1995 and 1996. A similar pattern holds true for North Belfast, with an estimated 27 punishment shootings occurring there in 1975 alone. More significantly, in both 1975 and 1977 significant increases in the projected number of punishment attacks in North Belfast correspond with equally steep decreases in the number of PIRA kills in the same region, and the opposite is true in 1976.

We can see in these local level fluctuations further evidence that the potential opportunity costs of punishment attacks exerted a powerful influence on the willingness of local PIRA units to engage in this particular form of political violence. However, other significant factors were also at play during this period that pushed the PIRA toward using a greater share of its manpower and resources to conduct punishment attacks, in Northern Ireland generally and in North Belfast in particular. For the PIRA, the conditions created by the ceasefire throughout Northern Ireland in 1975 presented both an opportunity and a challenge. The opportunity was to exploit the ceasefire by taking advantage of new and existing resources to begin formalizing the counterstate institutions then being discussed by the group’s leadership. The challenge was to conduct this institution building project in the midst of an ever increasing police presence in republican strongholds, facilitated by the relative safety with which the RUC was able to operate in such areas during this period. It is in this contest that we see the clearest example of the PIRA and the forces of the status quo government competing to reap the potential benefits of delivering effective law and order.

The republican movement’s desire to supplant the coercive institutions of the state was formalized in a briefing paper entitled “People’s Courts.” The paper was composed by Sinn Féin just months before the beginning of the PIRA’s ceasefire in December 1974, and it drew heavily on the experience of the Dáil Courts of the 1920s, arguing that these institutions served as “a manifestation of republican control and an illustration of a practical and realistic undermining of the British State.” The paper concluded by recommending a multi-tiered system of republican courts to be administered by local PIRA units, with punishments enforced by a “republican police force.” The launch of

this system was announced by the Belfast Brigade in a statement published in *Republican News* indicating that

'People's Courts' are to be set up in various parts of Belfast to deal with crimes of vandalism and the exploitation by selfish individuals by the working class people . . . because of the concentrated activities by criminal elements in the Belfast area (Sinn Féin 1974).

The suspension of offensive PIRA operations that began three months later provided PIRA operatives on the ground with a window of opportunity to begin putting these plans into action.

The republican movement's desire to use the ceasefire period to reaffirm its position in nationalist communities and advance its long term, institution building objectives vis-a-vis the police was evident in their negotiations with NIO representatives throughout 1975.¹¹ In their initial "Terms for Bi-Lateral Truce" the republican movement requested, amongst other things, that there be "No reintroduction of R.U.C. and U.D.R. into designated areas" and that "an effective liaison system" be established "Between British and Republican forces" to ensure that these conditions were met throughout the truce. Despite the NIO's somewhat ambiguous response, the republican movement immediately set to work establishing a network of nascent 'republican police' in communities throughout Belfast.

A vital element of this network was the 'truce incident centers' established in Belfast (north and west), Derry, Enniskillen, Armagh, Newry and Dungannon to operate the "liaison system" requested by Ó Brádaigh and his fellow republican negotiators. Statements in *Republican News* reminded readers that there should be "No R.U.C." in republican areas during the ceasefire and informed residents of these areas that

The function of these centres [sic], however, is not restricted to the ceasefire. Other incidents, such as Break-ins [sic], vandalism, thefts etc. can be reported to our centres.

The information given to our members in these centres will not be made available to persons other than the local Republican who can best use such infor-

¹¹Much of the following account is based on Sinn Féin President Ruairi Ó Brádaigh's original minutes from his meetings with NIO officials during the year. The documents are available at the special collections room, James Hardiman Library, NUI Galway, reference number POL29.

mation, to alleviate distress caused by theft, etc. and *to seek out and stop criminal elements from further acts of crime* (emphasis added).¹²

A March 1975 article in *An Phoblacht* explicitly emphasized both the illegitimacy of the RUC and the perceived effectiveness of the PIRA's response to criminal activity. The editors of the republican news weekly asked readers "who will look after all the we ordinary things that keep your neighbourhood a good and safe place to live"? The answer to this query was provided in the subsequent paragraph:

One thing is clear: In Republican area it *won't* be the R.U.C ... Sinn Féin have set up Advice and Complaint Centres which are working very smoothly at handling these complaints and necessities at the moment. They are not a "police force" - as we have stressed, it is too early to talk about an acceptable police until we talk about an acceptable State.¹³ Sinn Féin is simply providing a service for the community which rejects totally the R.U.C and British Army (emphasis in original).

While the PIRA were making public solicitations that crimes be reported to local incident centers, SF negotiators were making private pleas to the effect that the NIO reign in the RUC. During a meeting with NIO representatives on 3 March 1975, Ruairi Ó Brádaigh criticized recent RUC incursions into nationalist areas of Belfast and warned that "If this action continues Oglaiġ na hEireann [the PIRA] will adopt suitable measures to bring to an end all forms of harrassment [sic] and provocation by the R.U.C." The warning was reiterated at a similar meeting the next day in which Ó Brádaigh informed British officials that "If the R.U.C. is not abiding by the Truce [sic] agreement then the necessary measures will be taken by R.M. [the republican movement] to control the R.U.C."

Despite republican protestations to the contrary, the RUC took advantage of the cease-fire to gradually reintroduce ordinary patrols to parts of Belfast that had previously been off limits to the police force. As was shown above, the police force's change in posture was temporary, but it was largely motivated by the decreased threat of PIRA ambushes

¹²The Belfast republican newsheet *An Troid* used similar language in a June 1975 advertisement for the incident centers in the city claiming that "The centre deals with breaches of the truce, robberys [sic], vandalism, stolen cars, break-ins, etc. . . Everything possible is done on every complaint."

¹³This comment should be interpreted in light of the republican leadership's desire not to be seen as collaborating with, but rather as supplanting the RUC. Cf the comments of a republican spokesman who told the *Irish News* that republicans manning the incident centres "are acting as a community service. We have no co-operation with the security forces, no co-operation with the Royal Ulster Constabulary."

and the increased challenge to the RUC posed by the PIRA's expanded role in dealing with local criminals via the incident centers. This was certainly not the arrangement imagined by republican leaders as they entered the truce. The increasing incursion of RUC patrols into New Lodge, the Ardoyne, Old Park and Unity Flats likely added extra impetus to the 3rd Battalion's efforts to supplant the police. *Unity News*, a North Belfast PIRA newsheet, expressed this anxiety in an article pointedly entitled "RUC-OUT!!" The article explained that "Since the announcement of the TRUCE [sic] the bully-boy RUC have wasted no time in trying to sneak back into . . . areas such as Unit Flats where the RUC have been, and remain, totally unacceptable because of their record" and urged Unity Flats residents to contact Sinn Féin upon witnessing any RUC "incursions" into the area. Intriguingly, the same issue of *Unity News*, which consisted of little more than a handful of mimeographed pages of text, carried an article entitled "Stolen Goods" in which the local PIRA unit took credit for the recovery and return of "SIX [sic] bicycles stolen earlier from the premises of Frederick Thomas's in Royal Avenue." Articles like these appeared repeatedly throughout the newsheet's - admittedly limited - production run. These stories indicate that the North Belfast PIRA hoped to both protect and build upon gains in support resulting from the group's response to local crime, while at the same time emphasizing the illegitimacy and ineffectiveness of the RUC.

It is within the context of these public and private statements about the role of the incident centers and the actions of the RUC that we can best understand the dramatic spike in republican punishment attacks that occurred in the mid-1970s. For the PIRA, the 1975 truce offered a window of opportunity that was both real and imagined. Michael Oatley, Sir Frank Cooper and other British civil servants repeatedly held out the possibility of eventual British withdrawal from Northern Ireland as a carrot to be chased by the republican leadership. The pledges and promises of these men proved to be non-starters. Nevertheless, the respite provided by nearly an entire year of relative peace allowed republican activists to revitalize their plans for counterstate institutions and continue their struggle against the British state in Ireland by different means. The realization of some of these plans, such as the formal 'people's courts' envisioned by SF in 1974, proved fleeting. Others,

like the North Belfast PIRA's attempt to impose a 15 mile per hour speed limit in the Ardoyne, contained an element of farce.¹⁴ The rise of punishment attacks as a means of dealing with local crime and highlighting the illegitimacy of the state police became an enduring feature of the PIRA's campaign until the group decommissioned its last weapons in 2005.

Punishment attacks had certainly taken place in Northern Ireland before the PIRA's 1975 ceasefire. However, it was during this period of relative quiet on the offensive front that senior republicans began to fully realize - and exploit - the potential benefits of using PIRA volunteers to hunt down and punish suspected local criminals. The attacks themselves were popular with the residents of nationalist communities, and this 'community service' provided the group with a propaganda opportunity to demonstrate that it was capable of delivering a rough form of law and order where the RUC could provide none at all.

This newfound understanding was reflected in the writings of PIRA prisoners in Long Kesh, published in the February/March 1976 issue of the prisoner's journal *Faoí Glas*. In an article entitled "Law and Order" imprisoned PIRA members reflected on the 'policing' role of PIRA volunteers from 1975 onward highlighting the "understandable fear" of British and Irish politicians that

If they [the Provisionals] could be seen publicly to be not only the popular vanguard against Britain and her imperialist dogs, but also the guardians of their rights as citizens, at present denied, then they would have scored yet another victory against oppression
 ... In accepting the Irish Republican Army as their guardians, the people, young and old, would be giving the 'V sign' to Britain, her puppet armies and her mouthpieces, and proclaiming allegiance to the Republican ideal of 1916 (brackets in original).

The authors then went on to assert that the PIRA had

Never asked if we could police, we went ahead and did it, and perhaps soon when they waken from their dream world, the politicians and the rest who

¹⁴In an article appearing in the *Ardoyne Freedom Fighter* (1975) entitled "Speed Kills," the Ardoyne PIRA insisted that the practice of "driving around the area at break-neck speeds ... MUST STOP IMMEDIATELY." The article went on to highlight the lack of social amenities in the neighborhood, the result of which was to compel local children to "make the streets their playground."

concerned themselves with little writing and rallies on policing, will realise [sic] that they are not needed.

These passages indicate that the leadership of the PIRA within Long Kesh¹⁵ saw policing and criminality as issues that could be exploited to the PIRA's advantage. By using punishment attacks and other methods to deal with local criminals in North Belfast and elsewhere, the PIRA hoped both to demonstrate their own fidelity to their communities and to prove that the RUC were "not needed."

Concern that the Provisionals might in fact succeed in their quest to exclude and replace the RUC in nationalist communities was voiced repeatedly by politicians in Dublin and Belfast. In his memoirs, Garret Fitzgerald, at that time minister of foreign affairs in the Republic of Ireland, recounts how one of the primary concerns of the southern coalition government during 1975 was with "the 'incident centres', [sic] which, we feared, could develop a policing role" (1992, 262).¹⁶ At the same time, the leadership of the moderate and non-sectarian Alliance Party (APNI) was making similar representations to Secretary of State Rees. In a private meeting with Mr Rees, Oliver Napier, at that time leader of APNI, asserted that the party was "Disturbed about the Incident Centres [sic] because . . . they were likely to lead to the establishment of Provisional vigilantes in catholic [sic] areas." Mr. Napier went on to emphasize the gravity with which this potential development was regarded, because it might help the republican movement to "become a more acceptable organisation [sic] in the eyes of ordinary Catholics." The APNI delegation concluded this meeting noting that "If vigilante groups did begin to police Catholic areas, the Government should take any steps (whatever the cost) to stop them" (PRONI CENT/1/3/40).

These comments, both public and private, closely parallel the concerns expressed by senior RUC officers in the course of their own private meetings with Northern Ireland

¹⁵Many of those serving jail terms in early 1976 would have been newly imprisoned and were probably active in the PIRA during the ceasefire period. Furthermore, republican prisoners have historically served an important role as opinion setters within their community, and the remarks quoted here should be interpreted in that context.

¹⁶State papers made available under the 30 year rule in 2006 indicate that the Irish Fine Gale/Labour government's primary concern during this period was to ensure that negotiations between the republican movement and the British government did not lead to a rapid British withdrawal from Northern Ireland, because it was feared that the Republic of Ireland would be ill-equipped to deal with the consequences of such a decision.

Office officials. The level of concern demonstrated by government officials, politicians and the police indicate that decision makers of many different stripes in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were troubled by the possibility that the PIRA might use the ceasefire and the incident centers to establish a formal alternative system of law and order in Belfast, Derry, Dungannon and elsewhere. Furthermore, the writings and statements of republicans appear to validate these fears. Freed from the day-to-day demands of planning and conducting operations against the police and the army, the republican movement turned its attention toward developing its role as a community police force, and the incident centers appear to have been of central importance to these efforts.

Much like their enemies in the RUC, the PIRA saw criminal activity in their communities as a nuisance that, with some reluctance, the group had to do something about. As the PIRA's offensive campaign against the British Army and the RUC took shape in the early 1970s, the group appears to have dedicated relatively little of its time and manpower to addressing this issue. Upon establishing their indefinite ceasefire in the mid-1970s this strategic calculus changed dramatically. During the ceasefire, senior republicans engaged in frequent contact with officials from the Northern Ireland Office were led to believe that British withdrawal from Northern Ireland was potentially imminent. Faced with this potential opportunity, and freed from their costly campaign of violence against the British state in Ireland, the PIRA was able to set to work in adding substance to its long debated plans for establishing alternative institutions in the Catholic enclaves of Belfast. The establishment of the ceasefire incident centers was a crucial element of this campaign, and evidence from republican sources shows that, at least in the early days of their operation, these centers did effectively function as "Provo police stations" (Monaghan 2002). The urgency with which these efforts were pursued was increased by daily encroachments by the RUC into republican dominated territory. During the ceasefire, the republican movement focused its propaganda efforts in North Belfast on highlighting the continued illegitimacy of the RUC while simultaneously publicizing the PIRA's own response to criminal activity in the community.

Here again, the evolution of the PIRA's dual wars on crime and on British forces in Ireland reflects the complex interaction between an insurgent group's short term interest in maximizing its effectiveness on the battlefield and its long term interest in building and maintaining alternative state institutions. While the PIRA was on the offensive during the early 1970s, local commanders throughout Northern Ireland saw punishment attacks as a distraction from the group's central mission, namely attacking the British Army and the police. The arrival of the PIRA ceasefire in December 1974 and its continuation in early 1975 radically changed republican perceptions. With the time and energy of volunteers no longer being directed toward attacks on the forces of the crown, they were free to engage more directly and more readily in hunting down and punishing suspected criminals. At the same time, British indications - which we now know to have been dubious - that a military withdrawal from Northern Ireland was in the offing increased the immediacy and relative importance of establishing robust, republican controlled institutions to take the place of fading British ones. In this context, the dramatic spike in republican punishment attacks during the mid-1970s is best understood as resulting from a complex set of changes in the strategic environment, the net result of which was to simultaneously increase the perceived benefits and decrease the perceived costs of punishment attacks.

7.2 A Permanent Peace: Punishment Attacks and Policing in North Belfast, 1994 - 2000

By the time the PIRA declared its next ceasefire in 1994, North Belfast had well and truly earned its reputation as the 'land where all the bad things happened.' More people died as a result of political violence in North Belfast during the 1990s than in any other area of Northern Ireland except Counties Armagh and Tyrone. Nevertheless, after more than two decades of continued fighting the nature of the war between Irish republicans and British security forces in the areas around Ardoyne and New Lodge had changed dramatically. Although the PIRA was still actively seeking and attacking police and Army targets throughout Belfast during the final decade of the Troubles, the group was no longer anywhere near as lethal as it had been in the early days of the conflict, as

imprisonment and assassination at the hands of the police and the army began to take their toll on republican manpower. No more than two members of the security forces were killed in North Belfast in any single year after 1987, with a total of nine such fatalities occurring between 1988 and 1994.¹⁷

At the same time, the late 1980s and early 1990s saw a general increase in the number of republican punishment shootings, although once again this pattern was far from uniform. The number of republican attacks in North Belfast peaked several times during this period, with an estimated 23 incidents in 1989 and more than 25 attacks in each year from 1994 to 1996. Between those peaks, there were also several valleys, with only seven republican punishment attacks recorded by the police in North Belfast in 1993. Beyond this apparent temporal variation, there was also significant geographic variation in terms of where punishment attacks occurred within North Belfast.

Using data obtained from the PSNI, which indicated the specific date on which a punishment attack was reported to the police, the *Irish News* was searched for stories reporting the details of each incident. For all dates included in the present analysis (1990 to 2000) it was necessary to conduct a manual search of the *Irish News* as no electronic archive of the paper is available prior to 2001.¹⁸ In order to ensure maximum coverage all editions of the *Irish News* published within five days of a reported attack were reviewed in microfilm¹⁹ form the Belfast Central Newspaper Library. Any editions that were not available in microfilm were reviewed in hard copy. When an attack was reported in the paper, information was recorded on the geographic location of the attack, the type of weapons used in the attack, the extent of the victim's injuries and the gender of the victim. Each event was then georeferenced by postcode using the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency's electronic postcode and street search facility.²⁰ These data

¹⁷There were no police or army fatalities in North Belfast between 1995 and 2000.

¹⁸The news aggregation service LexisNexis has the most extensive electronically searchable holdings for the paper, although its coverage does not begin until July 2nd 2001.

¹⁹The microfilm versions of the *Irish News* include copies of every page appearing in every edition of the paper release for each day. The bound copies held by the Central Library contain pages from only one edition, creating the potential for attacks that were reported in one edition but not others being missed.

²⁰This service is available at <http://www.ninis.nisra.gov.uk/mapxtreme/CPD.asp>. The search engine accepts both street names and postcodes as inputs. When a street name is provided as an input, the search result provides a list of possible post codes and town locations for the input.

were then read into ArcGIS which was used to produce a kernel density map indicating the geographic distribution of republican attacks in North Belfast. The resulting density map, presented as figure 7.5, below, indicates the concentration of punishment attacks at the ward level in North Belfast during this period. When read in combination with

Figure 7.5: Kernel Density Map of Republican Punishment Attacks
1990-1999




figure 7.2 and 7.3—indicating the ward level Catholic share of the population and Multiple Deprivation Measure scores throughout North Belfast, respectively—the density map indicates that throughout the 1990s republican punishment attacks were mostly confined to a small number of predominately Catholic, traditionally republican wards within North Belfast. Major clusters appear in the Ardoyne and New Lodge area.²¹ Both wards are over two-thirds Catholic and both have consistently ranked amongst the most socially and economically deprived areas in Northern Ireland.²² Both areas also featured prominently in the Belfast PIRA's campaign of punishment shootings during the 1975 ceasefire (see above). Given Monaghan and McLaughlin's (2009) finding that punishment attacks were highly correlated with social deprivation from 2001 onward, the geographic concentration

²¹The New Lodge ward boundary also includes the Unity Flats area.

²²According to the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency's (NISRA) Multiple Deprivation Indicators, New Lodge and Ardoyne were both amongst the ten most deprived wards in Northern Ireland in 2001, 2005 and 2010. See NISRA (2001; 2005; 2010).

of violence in North Belfast during the 1990s appears unsurprising at first blush.

However, both the religious and socioeconomic composition of Ardoyne and New Lodge was relatively constant from year to year during the 1990s. Contrastingly, the number of punishment attacks in North Belfast varied significantly throughout this period. As a result, it is unlikely that demographic and socioeconomic factors alone can adequately explain the observed pattern of variation. Here again, we return to the observation from the statistical analysis presented in chapter four that high levels of social deprivation are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the occurrence of this type of political violence. The key question thus remains: what other factors influenced the willingness of the PIRA to punish suspected criminals during Northern Ireland's decade of peace? The remainder of this section provides a provisional answer to that question.

As Silke (2001) and Hamill (2011) have argued, a crucial factor in explaining the sudden spike in republican punishment attacks in North Belfast during the mid-1990s is the emergence of another PIRA ceasefire in August 1994 and its continuation in 1997. At the same time, these scholars and others also contend that a desire on the part of the PIRA to avoid being seen to violate their ceasefire led the group to drastically reduce its use of punishment shootings and increase its reliance on punishment beatings during the ceasefire period. A series of two sample t-test comparing the mean number of republican punishment attacks in North Belfast during ceasefire and non-ceasefire months between January 1990 and March 1998 appears to confirm this assessment.²³ The results of these tests, presented along with summary statistics for cease-fire and non-ceasefire months in table 7.1, indicate that North Belfast experienced significantly more republican punishment attacks in months prior to the GFA during which the PIRA was observing a ceasefire. At the same time, the North Belfast units of the PIRA appear to have substituted punishment beatings for punishment shootings during the pre-GFA ceasefire period. North Belfast experienced significantly more punishment beatings during ceasefire months than in non-ceasefire months between January 1990 and April 1998. The opposite relationship held true for punishment shootings.

²³The terms of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) were formalized by the parties involved on April 10th 1998.

Table 7.1: Republican Punishment Attacks in Ceasefire and Non-Ceasefire Months

Variable	Mean (CF)	Mean (Non-CF)	t-statistic
Attacks	2.22	1.53	-1.74**
Shootings	0.33	0.68	1.34*
Beatings	1.89	0.85	-2.90***

Indeed, a closer examination of the data indicates that other factors may have been at play during both the ceasefire and non-ceasefire periods. Substantively, the observed difference in means in monthly attacks is actually remarkably small, with an average of 2.22 attacks occurring during each ceasefire month and an average of 1.53 attacks occurring during each non-ceasefire month, producing an annualized difference of approximately eight attacks between a ceasefire year and a non-ceasefire year. Furthermore, nearly a quarter of all punishment attacks in Belfast during 1994 occurred during the month of April alone, with the onset of the PIRA’s first ceasefire since 1975 still months away.²⁴ Approximately 73 percent of the punishment attacks mounted by the PIRA in North Belfast during 1994 occurred before the implementation of the group’s ceasefire on August 31, indicating that the arrival of the ceasefire did not immediately alter the PIRA’s willingness or ability to conduct punishment attacks. Additionally, an explanation that focuses on the PIRA’s ceasefire status does not address the crucial question of why there were more punishment attacks in North Belfast during 1996, a year in which the PIRA’s ceasefire was suspended, than in any other year during the peace process.²⁵ Furthermore, the presence or absence of a nationwide ceasefire does not adequately account for why North Belfast’s share of the total number of republican punishment attacks surged to nearly 25 percent of the total in 1996 and subsequently fell to less than 15 percent of the total for the remainder of the decade.

Both the formal model and our prior exploration of the strategic competition between the PIRA and the police in North Belfast provide guidance in terms of how best to solve these puzzles. As was the case in 1975, the arrival of a ceasefire in the mid-1990s appears to

²⁴The overwhelming majority of these attacks took place on a single night of “operations against drug pushers throughout Belfast” (*An Phoblacht/Republican News* 1994c). See below.

²⁵None of the republican punishment attacks recorded in North Belfast during calendar year 1996 were punishment shootings.

have created the conditions under which it was possible for the PIRA to dedicate additional manpower and resources to conducting punishment attacks. Given that the opportunity costs of punishment attacks are lower during times of peace than in times of war, this is precisely the type of relationship that the comparative statics analysis presented in chapter three would predict, and the lack of PIRA offensive operations appears to explain a great deal of the difference in the mean number of attacks during ceasefire and non-ceasefire months. However this factor was relatively constant across time and space. As a result we must turn to changes in other model parameters, such as the perceived benefits of punishment attacks and the value of intelligence to the security forces to explain the within-ceasefire variation in the number of republican punishment attacks in North Belfast.

The first question that must, therefore, be answered, is whether or not the PIRA in North Belfast believed that punishment attacks remained a useful alternative solution to the problem of anti-social behavior in Belfast by the early 1990s. Statements from both the republican press and the mainstream media indicate that, even at the outset of the 1994 ceasefire, the PIRA and its constituents continued to believe in the potential utility of punishment attacks as a means of demonstrating the ineffectiveness of the RUC while simultaneously generating additional support for the republican movement in the area. On the night of April 25th 1994, for the second time in two years, the Belfast Brigade of the PIRA launched a series of coordinated attacks against alleged drug dealers in north and West Belfast. The operation left 16 people wounded and one, Francis ‘Rico’ Rice, dead.²⁶ At least five of these individuals were shot in the New Lodge and Ardoyne areas of North Belfast.

In the aftermath of these attacks, the command staff of the Belfast Brigade issued statements claiming credit for “operations against drug pushers” in both the mainstream press and in the republican news weekly, *An Phoblacht/Republican News* ((AP/RN)). In both statements, the PIRA drew sharp contrasts between its own response to the problem of drug dealing in nationalist communities and the response of the RUC. In the *Irish*

²⁶Rice himself was a former member of the Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO), a short lived republican splinter group. A statement published following his second punishment in 1994 indicated that he had previously been targeted in the PIRA’s night of action against the IPLO for alleged involvement in the drugs trade in October 1992 (*An Phoblacht/Republican News* 1994c).

News, the local PIRA commander claimed that the group’s action against drug dealers was in response to “popular demand” arguing that “We [the PIRA] are not waging war on the community. We are supporting the community in the war against drugs” (1994*d*). The statement carried in *AP/RN* went on to highlight the indifference of the RUC to the drugs²⁷ problem facing nationalist north and West Belfast. In the statement, the PIRA explained that

It is also important that we place on record the fact that major figures within the drugs trade are operating with the full knowledge of the RUC (1994).

Here we see another example of the PIRA using punishment attacks as a means of highlighting the ineffectiveness of the RUC while simultaneously cultivating its own reputation for being, quite literally, tough on crime.

That the Belfast PIRA remained dedicated to using punishment attacks as a means of dealing with local crime, asserting their continued relevance to nationalist communities and further undermining the RUC in those same areas is further demonstrated by the actions of the group’s units in the western quarter of the city during the mid-1990s. In March 1994 the PIRA and the RUC were “locked in a race against time to catch the brutal murderer of a West [sic] Belfast pensioner” (*Andersonstown News* 1994). A year later - in the midst of the PIRA’s first ceasefire in two decades - the *Irish News* described an ongoing “race” between the PIRA and the RUC to capture a gang that had “been stealing plants from gardens in West Belfast.” RUC sources indicated that “While the police are anxious to catch the thieves, the Provos are understood to be hunting them too” and expressed concern that the thieves might “be nabbed first by the IRA [sic] - sentenced in a kangaroo court and subjected to a severe so-called punishment beating” (1995a). These examples demonstrate that, both before and after the PIRA declared its ceasefire in August 1994, the group believed that law and order issues - no matter how minor - pitted them in a zero-sum contest for the hearts and minds of the people of Belfast.

²⁷The residents of North Belfast openly expressed frustration with the RUC’s response to the drugs problem throughout the 1990s. In one incident, residents gathered near a notorious drug dealing hotspot in the area with placards “calling for ‘Drug dealers to get off our backs” (*Irish News* 1997b). One protestor explained the group’s frustration arguing that “We want our streets cleaned up. We do not want this [the selling of drugs] going on . . . It’s making the point. It’s getting to stage [sic] where residents have to do this because the police have not done anything” (ibid).

The PIRA and Sinn Féin also used both the mainstream and republican press to draw attention to the RUC's focus on counterinsurgency at the expense of ordinary policing. In February and March 1994 *AP/RN* carried stories describing RUC attempts to pressure North Belfast residents into providing the police with information on local PIRA activity. The first article described how "RUC attempts to recruit a young New Lodge Road man as an informer" had "once again revealed the extent of the terror that force uses against nationalists" (1994a). The article concluded by stressing "the need for people ... to come forward and publicise [sic]" any attempt by the RUC to coerce them into becoming informers. A month later Paddy McManus, at that time an SF member of Belfast city council, brought attention to the case of another New Lodge Road area youth whom the RUC had attempted to recruit "as a British agent." The anonymous youth advised others in his situation to contact a solicitor and their local councilor reminding "anyone else they [the RUC] are trying to pressurise [sic] ... that they are passing personal details about your friends and neighbours [sic]" to loyalist paramilitaries (1994b). Finally, in November 1994, another New Lodge resident, Alexander Patterson, informed councilor McManus that the RUC had attempted to bribe him into becoming an informer concluding that the attempt demonstrated that the RUC were "beyond reform" (*Irish News* 1995b).

Statements such as those quoted above served two purposes for the PIRA. First, these articles can be read as practical advice to any members of the nationalist community that might have been put under pressure by the RUC to work as police informers. This had the practical consequence of helping the PIRA's cause to the extent that the offer of protection and assistance from SF representatives might have provided potential informers with an added incentive to resist the RUC recruitment efforts.²⁸ At the same time, these articles served as propaganda highlighting what republicans saw as the untrustworthy and unscrupulous nature of the RUC, as well as the force's alleged indifference toward ordinary crime in North Belfast. These efforts further demonstrate the republican movement's desire to undermine the status of the RUC in nationalist communities and capitalize on

²⁸Indeed, this point was made explicitly by a 17 year old man from the New Lodge area, who told *AP/RN* he "wanted them [the RUC] off my back and from when I saw Paddy [McManus of SF] they haven't said anything more" (1994a).

existing levels of public disaffection with the force in North Belfast in order to build support and sympathy for SF and the PIRA. In short, they provide yet another example of republicans in both the militant and political wings of the movement working to reap the benefits of policing at the expense of the RUC.

Of course, Sinn Féin politicians did not have a monopoly on criticism of the RUC and demands for alternative policing arrangements during the 1990s. Moderate nationalist politicians from the Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP), independent community groups and other members of Northern Ireland’s intelligentsia were equally vocal in their condemnation of the RUC’s approach to policing in regions like Ardoyne. In 1996, one such group, the Ardoyne Association,²⁹ published an extensive review of RUC activity in North Belfast throughout the Troubles. In the report the Association argued that “The consistent abuse of power exercised by the RUC has evidenced a contempt for the law and the people they have been charged to protect” (Ardoyne Association 1996, 33). The AA concluded that “For the people of Ardoyne . . . the rejection of the RUC’s policing methods created a vacuum which was never filled by an organised [sic] and accepted community service” (ibid, 34). This assessment was shared by the editorial board of the moderate, although generally nationalist leaning, *Irish News*. An April 1990 lead editorial column in the paper claimed that punishment attacks were evidence the PIRA was “exploiting a law-and-order vacuum in some Nationalist [sic] areas - the result of a lack of confidence in the RUC” (1990a).³⁰

Although both the Ardoyne Association and the *Irish News* condemned the brutality of punishment attacks, their description of a “policing vacuum” and the PIRA’s attempt to fill that vacuum nevertheless provide evidence that punishment attacks were a means through which the PIRA sought to capitalize on local rejection of the RUC. Furthermore,

²⁹The association was established in the 1970s and has been funded by British government grants, such as the Action for Community Employment program, in subsequent decades. The Association is non-sectarian and is not affiliated with any political party. It “is involved in numerous community initiatives including, environmental improvements, housing, play facilities for children, creation of employment and leisure opportunities as well as an advice service” in the Ardoyne area (North Belfast Advice Consortium 1999).

³⁰The *Irish News* used similar language in another lead editorial published in September 1990 claiming that “There has traditionally been a general lack of confidence in the police in these areas. The result is a ‘law and order vacuum’ which has been filled by the paramilitaries” (1990b).

the fact that these two organizations, both of which were generally hostile toward the PIRA and SF, shared the republican movement's general assessment of the RUC as a largely political and unacceptable police force in areas like North Belfast lends greater credence to the PIRA's critiques of the RUC and indicates the true breadth of nationalist disenchantment with the status quo forces of law and order.

The evidence presented above indicates that the PIRA stood to derive significant benefits from its campaign against drug dealers and criminals in North Belfast throughout the 1990s. Nevertheless, the group's statements explaining the rationale for its "night of action" against drug dealers also indicate a concern for the potential long term costs of inaction against drug dealers in the city. In particular, the group appears to have been troubled by two potential developments in this area. First, there was some concern that drug dealers were arming themselves. In a follow-up interview published in *AP/RN*, an "IRA spokesperson" expressed concern that "drug dealers here [in Belfast] have acquired weapons ranging from shotguns to weapons stolen from members of the crown forces by car thieves" (1994d). This statement can be interpreted as indicating that the PIRA was motivated to launch a preemptive strike against the drug dealers of Belfast out of fear that the costs of doing so would be raised by the possibility of drug dealer retaliation in the future.³¹ In the same interview, the spokesperson also described how "RUC use the dealers to get information on the movement of republican activists" concluding that "While our main activity is against the crown forces we will always listen to our people and give them full support in dealing with the drug problem" (*ibid*).

These statements highlight the PIRA's understanding of the costs of both action and inaction against crime in north and West Belfast. A failure on the part of local units to crack down on drug dealing could provide the police with a valuable opportunity to enter republican communities and, even if the RUC did not address the drugs problem, they could use accused drug dealers as potential sources of information on "the movements of republican activists." On the other hand, just four months before the PIRA was

³¹A subsequent report in the generally pro-republican *Andersonstown News* indicated that these fears may have been well founded. The article claimed that "The IRAs authority in North and West Belfast" had been "dramatically challenged" by drug dealers who had "hit back [at the PIRA] by burning 10 black taxis in a half hour period" (1994).

to declare a ceasefire in August 1994, punishment attacks were still seen as a potential distraction from the group's "main activity . . . against the crown forces." Thus, we can see that, even at this late juncture in the conflict, the leadership of the PIRA in Belfast was concerned with both how punishment attacks affected the organization's own ability to carry out offensive actions and how inaction against drug dealers might influence the strategy pursued by the RUC in the city.

Throughout the ceasefire period leading up to the Good Friday Agreement, the PIRA in Belfast continued to view punishment attacks as a form of political violence that could simultaneously impose significant costs and deliver substantial benefits for the organization. Given the group's understanding of how either action or inaction against criminals in north and West Belfast might affect their own influence in these communities, as well as that of the police, we must now turn to the question of how changes on the ground affected the willingness of local PIRA units to hunt down and punish suspected drug dealers, car thieves and the like.

The summary statistics and t-tests quoted above demonstrated that one factor that exerted a powerful influence on the PIRA's willingness to use punishment attacks in general, and punishment shootings in particular, was the presence or absence of a PIRA ceasefire. In months when the PIRA was observing a ceasefire, the group was more likely to engage in punishment attacks on the whole, but less likely to conduct punishment shootings. Ceasefires primarily influence the likelihood of punishment attacks by reducing the insurgent group's opportunity costs for engaging in this activity.

From the perspective of the intelligence war between the PIRA and the RUC, the 1990s appear to have been a decade of relative police supremacy in the communities surrounding Ardoyne and New Lodge. From 1991 to 2000, the RUC's counterinsurgency campaign generally produced better results in North Belfast than in other parts of the city. Nevertheless, the police force's level of success in the region was mixed throughout times of war and peace during the decade. Figure 7.6 presents a plot of the weapons index, representing the total number of firearms and the amount of ammunition recovered by the

police,³² and its three year moving average from 1990 to 2001.³³

Figure 7.6: RUC Weapons and Ammunition Seizures in North Belfast
1990 - 2001



The figure indicates that the police were most successful in finding weapons in the years immediately prior to the first PIRA ceasefire in 1994 and in the period following the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The fact that the RUC recovered substantially fewer weapons in North Belfast during calendar year 1996 might appear to indicate that the police force had simply diverted its resources away from counterinsurgency in favor of fighting ordinary crime. However, the RUC's official review of its performance during this period does not support such an assessment. In August 1993 an RUC spokesperson told the *Irish News* that "Intelligence provided by informants is crucial to combating republican and loyalist violence" (1993). The Chief Constable's Annual Report for 1995 also indicates that the RUC continued to prioritize its counterinsurgency activities at the expense of routine police work throughout the mid-1990s. The report for 1995 explained that

³²For the purposes of the construction of the index, the total number of rounds recovered by the police was divided by thirty and the resulting figure was added to the total number of firearms recovered. See chapter four for a detailed discussion of this metric.

³³Due to data availability limitations, the three year moving average is plotted from 1991 to 2001.

“While the detection of those who have committed [normal] crimes and the accumulation of evidence required to bring them to the Courts will of course be pursued with vigor, the principal task must be to prevent terrorist activity” (Annesley 1996, 58). Unfortunately for the police, the continued zeal with which the RUC pursued its counterinsurgency duties did not produce many tangible results in North Belfast during calendar year 1996. In fact only 308 rounds of ammunition were uncovered in the areas around Ardoyne and New Lodge during the year, a mere drop in the bucket compared to the nearly 2500 rounds of ammunition confiscated in 1997. The apparent ineffectiveness of the RUC intelligence gathering efforts combined with the force’s desire to clamp down on the PIRA’s renewed campaign of violence to create an environment in which intelligence on local insurgent activity was, at least for a time, highly valued and difficult to gather.

At this point, it is useful to recall the predicted nature of the relationship between insurgent punishment attacks and the value of information to the police. As was highlighted previously,³⁴ for the police the value of new information on insurgent activity in any area is inversely proportional to the amount of information that the police already have in their possession regarding local insurgent activity. Thus, in a situation such as the one that existed in North Belfast in 1996 we would expect the police to place a premium on cultivating new sources of information on PIRA activity. In January 1997 Bill Stewart, a senior RUC officer in Belfast, informed Unionist members of the city council that this is precisely what the police had done, explaining that “More patrols, roadblocks and undercover operations” had been instated to counter the renewed threat posed by the PIRA (*Irish News* 1997a). In keeping with hypothesis 3A,³⁵ we would expect the PIRA to conduct relatively more punishment attacks in a year like 1996 when the RUC was desperate for information on the group’s activities than in the following year when the police appear to have enjoyed greater success in their counterinsurgency campaign.

³⁴See chapters three and four.

³⁵Hypothesis 3A predicted that: Insurgents will conduct more punishment attacks as the value of military intelligence increases.

7.3 Conclusion

The present chapter has again demonstrated that punishment attacks and policing follow their own rhythms and have their own causes and consequences, distinct from those of other forms of political violence. For insurgents and counterinsurgents alike, the war against crime and the war against one-another are intimately linked. Both campaigns draw on the same pool of resources - manpower, weapons and infrastructure. Both campaigns also have the potential to help advance each actor's progress toward attaining ultimate victory in a conflict. Finally, both campaigns have dramatic and immediate consequences for the lives and well being of a far larger group of people than those that are directly responsible for carrying out orders on the battlefield.

Despite these similarities, insurgents and counterinsurgents face a dilemma in terms of how best to allocate their scarce resources. By dedicating a large share of their men and matériel to finding and punishing ordinary criminals either actor can increase its general standing in the community and advance its long term goal of becoming the hegemonic provider of this most fundamental of all public services. At the same time, any resources allocated toward fighting crime cannot simultaneously be used to plan or conduct attacks on the enemy. As a result, crime fighting can act as a significant drain on each actor's resources and reduce its ability to achieve victory on the battlefield. On the other hand, dedicating resources exclusively to offensive operations has the potential to alienate each actor's constituency and create a political opportunity for its opponents. As a result, both categories of combatants in this type of irregular war must carefully account for the potential trade-offs involved in using scarce resources for either task. The evidence presented above has demonstrated not only that these factors influence the decision making of both insurgents and counterinsurgents alike, but also that they exert that influence in precisely the manner predicted by the formal model.

Chapter 8

The ‘Real’ People’s Police?

This chapter explores the use of punishment attacks by republican paramilitary groups after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998. The objective is to test the predictions derived from the formal model against the observed behavior of paramilitary groups that have been active since the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) formally ended its armed campaign in 1998 and put all of its weapons permanently beyond use some seven years later.

Previous chapters have tested the theory developed in chapter three against the behavior of a single group, namely the PIRA. Those chapters have presented both qualitative and quantitative evidence indicating that the behavior of this group largely conformed to the predictions of the model across a broad range of both space and time. However, the possibility still exists that the observed behavior was peculiar to the PIRA itself or to the period of conflict in Northern Ireland between 1973 and 2000 more generally. Several scholars (Bishop and Mallie 1987, Sluka 1989, O’Doherty 1998, English 2004) have noted that the PIRA viewed its role as the armed protector of Catholic ghettos in Northern Ireland—from both Protestant paramilitaries and the Royal Ulster Constabulary—as one of the principle reasons for the group’s existence, especially in the city of Belfast. It is possible that the PIRA’s roots as a—admittedly self-proclaimed—protector of Catholics from the abuses of the unionist regime in Northern Ireland provided the group with a unique set of incentives to punish suspected criminals as a relatively low risk means of maintaining this reputation. Shooting or beating suspected thieves carries less risk than actually attacking the police or establishing barricades to prevent the security forces from

entering a community because the criminals themselves are unlikely to return fire. Thus, it is possible that the PIRA used punishment attacks not as a means of building alternative political institutions, but instead as a relatively low-risk tactic aimed at maintaining a central element of the group’s foundation myth.

In order to address this possible alternative explanation for the PIRA’s campaign against criminals in Belfast, Derry and throughout Northern Ireland, the present chapter turns toward so-called dissident republican paramilitary groups like the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH) that have emerged to fill the military void left by the PIRA’s departure from the political scene in Northern Ireland. While the leadership figures of many of these groups are drawn from the ranks of disgruntled former PIRA activists, the majority of their members are relatively young, relatively recent recruits to militant republicanism who have come of age during an era in which the threat of violence against Catholic communities perpetrated by either loyalist paramilitary groups or the police force itself, since reformed and renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), has been minimal (Tonge 2012). Furthermore, the PSNI has begun to make headway in terms of developing support amongst Catholics in even traditionally hardcore republican communities like North Belfast’s New Lodge area (Ellison, Shirlow and Mulcahy 2012), while dissident republican groups have continued to emphasize the political implications of current policing arrangements vis-a-vis the constitutional question (see below). Although the signing of the GFA and the implementation of police reform have diminished the political space in which dissident republican groups seek to operate, their stated objectives have been nonetheless grand, despite the fact that the overwhelming majority of Catholics in Northern Ireland support the current institutional arrangements. As a result, these groups are likely to see the building of parallel institutions as vital to their long term interests, although objective observers might expect that the probability for their success will be quite low.

The remainder of this chapter builds on previous results and presents further quantitative tests of the theoretical expectations established previously. In particular, the quantitative analysis presented in chapter four is revisited and a roughly comparable statistical

analysis is presented covering the period from April 1998 to March 2009. This analysis utilizes some different data sources and different variable operationalizations than those presented in the earlier chapter. The statistical tests produces mixed results in terms of theoretical expectations. However, the results of this quantitative analysis are supplemented with qualitative evidence indicating that the theoretical model proposed here nevertheless provides a robust characterization of how insurgent groups understand the relationship between punishment attacks, their broader campaigns of violence and the issue of policing. This qualitative evidence, presented in tandem with the results of the statistical model, also points in the direction of fruitful areas of future research on this subject.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds in four sections. Section 8.1 introduces the quantitative analysis, restates the hypotheses derived in chapter three and describes the quantitative indicators used to measure each concept. Section 8.2 presents the results of the statistical analysis that pertain to hypotheses derived from the existing literature describing the relationship between deprivation, crime, ethnic in-group policing and punishment attacks. Section 8.3 presents the main results of the statistical analysis, in tandem with qualitative evidence pertaining to each of the conceptual components of the theoretical model. Section 8.4 concludes with a discussion of the broader implications of the findings presented in the chapter and suggests possible extensions of both the theoretical and empirical models that might help to explain some of the more surprising results presented in this chapter.

8.1 Hypotheses and Data Collection

Before presenting the results of the qualitative and quantitative analyses described above, it is necessary to review the hypotheses to be tested. As was the case with the analysis presented in chapter four, the present chapter focuses primarily on the behavior of republican insurgents in Northern Ireland. As a result, the presentation of hypotheses will focus primarily on the expectations over insurgent behavior derived from the formal model. To that end, it is important to recall that the key decision addressed by the in-

insurgent group in the formal model is about how best to expend the group’s resources. Recall here that, prior to deciding how much of the insurgent group’s resources should be allocated to vigilante justice, the group must first decide whether or not it is in the group’s best interest to enter the market for law enforcement in competition with the local police. This decision is a function of the ease with which the insurgents believe they will be able to enter the market, which, in turn, is a function of the size of the market itself — the real crime rate — and the presence and strength of competing armed groups from a rival ethnic group. The insurgent group will be most likely to enter this market when the crime rate is high and no rival ethnic militia is present. Upon entering the market, an insurgent commander must decide how much of the group’s scarce manpower and matériel to dedicate to locating and punishing criminals. This decision is conditioned by the insurgent commander’s anticipation of the police response to local crime. It is also motivated by the insurgent commander’s assessment of the relative costs and benefits of conducting punishment attacks, as well as the value the police place on new information regarding insurgent activity, which suspected criminals can potentially provide. These calculations are in turn weighted by the insurgent commander’s beliefs about the likelihood that a criminal victim spurned by the insurgents will turn to the police for redress, the perception of the ability of the police to coerce suspected criminals into becoming informers and the capacity of the insurgent group to identify and eliminate any new informers working for the police.

With these parameters in mind, it is now possible to briefly highlight the strategic tensions captured by the model and present the hypotheses evaluated in the remainder of this chapter. The remainder of this section presents the hypotheses derived from the formal model and describes that data collected to measure the various theoretical parameters highlighted above.

8.1.1 Republican Punishment Attacks

Data on republican punishment attacks were obtained from Central Statistics Unit of the Police Service of Northern Ireland. Monthly data on punishment attacks occurring at the local government district (LGD) level from 1990 to the end of calendar year 2008 were

obtained from the PSNI under the terms of the Freedom of Information Act (2001). These data were reformatted so that the unit of observation is the LGD-UK fiscal year in order to be directly comparable to other data used in the analysis¹ and the time series was completed using data published in PSNI’s annual digest of security situation statistics. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain comparable figures for fiscal years subsequent to 2008/09.

The criteria used by the PSNI for coding recorded events as punishment attacks are consistent with those described in chapter four. Non-lethal assaults and shootings were recorded as punishment attacks when the investigating officer believes that “the reasoning behind the attack is either to intimidate the victim or to punish them for anti-social activities” (PSNI 2010). For the time period covered in the present chapter, the PSNI also disaggregated events recorded as punishment attacks by the type of paramilitary organization responsible, although the specific identity of the group was not identified.²

8.1.2 The Benefits of Punishment Attacks

For insurgent groups, punishment attacks are but one element of a broader campaign to discredit and ultimately replace the institutions of the status quo government with insurgent controlled alternatives. As a result, punishment attacks are most beneficial in those times and places where they are most likely to be effective in advancing the insurgents’ long-term institution building objectives. Vigilante justice of this kind is most likely to be helpful to the insurgents when and where the efforts of the status quo police to curtail crime appear to be faltering. Failure by the police to apprehend and punish suspected criminals, either through negligence or incompetence, presents the insurgents with a potentially valuable opportunity. If the insurgents are able to succeed where the police have failed, then they will have gained a significant propaganda victory. Such an accomplishment advances the insurgents’ objective of displacing the police by demonstrating their greater effectiveness in dealing with law and order issues in their own communities and

¹See below.

²See chapter four for a more detailed discussion of the methodological issues raised by this feature of the data.

potentially increasing the willingness of local people to rely on and, ultimately, offer their support to the insurgents in their other military and political endeavors.

In order to capture this competitive dynamic, the potential benefits of punishment attacks are incorporated into the statistical models presented below by way of a multiplicative interaction between the lagged district level sanction detection rate³ and the lagged reported crime rate per 1000 inhabitants. Data for both variables were obtained from the PSNI’s Crime Statistics Archive via the documentation accompanying the report entitled “Crime in Northern Ireland 1998/99 Onwards” published in 2011. Taken together, these two variables can be used to determine which LGAs offer dissident republican groups the greatest potential reward for providing an alternative means of crime and punishment. On the one hand, a high reported crime rate indicates that a district is experiencing a great deal of criminal activity and that the people of the district held an *ex ante* belief that the police would be capable of responding to this activity. On the other, a low sanction detection rate indicates that the police have failed to live up to the people’s expectations, possibly through negligence or incompetence. This failure creates a new opportunity for the insurgent group to advance its objective of replacing the state by implementing the kind of rough justice represented by punishment attacks.

The formal model predicted a positive correlation between changes in the benefits of fighting crime and the frequency with which insurgent groups will conduct punishment attacks. Specifically, the comparative statics presented in chapter three produced hypothesis H1A, which predicted that:

H1A: *Insurgent groups will conduct more punishment attacks as the benefits of punishment attacks increase.*

Intuitively, this hypothesis makes sense. Insurgent groups like the PIRA and the various dissident republican organizations in Northern Ireland should conduct more punishment attacks when they perceive this activity to be more beneficial to their own interests. Empirically, this expectation should translate into a negative coefficient on the lagged sanction rate variable. Furthermore, the negative marginal effect of the sanction rate

³The sanction detection rate is defined as “the percentage of crimes for which someone is charged, summonsed, receives a caution or other formal sanction” (United Kingdom 2005).

should increase in proportion to the lagged crime rate in an area, indicating that areas with a recent history of high levels of crime and low levels of police efficiency are most likely to experience republican punishment attacks.

8.1.3 The Costs of Fighting Crime

Punishment attacks are costly to insurgent groups to the extent that they consume scarce resources like weapons and vehicles and divert insurgent foot soldiers from planning and conducting attacks against military and economic targets, the destruction of which might have a more direct impact on the group’s success on the battlefield. In the statistical analysis presented in chapter four, both types of costs were primarily operationalized as the estimated number of republican prisoners released to each district in each year of the analysis. Unfortunately, comparable data are not available for years beyond 2001.⁴ As a result, an alternative indicator of the material and opportunity costs of fighting crime is utilized in the analysis presented below.

Specifically, both types of costs are operationalized as the number of dissident republican operations occurring in each district-year, excluding punishment attacks. Data on republican punishment attacks were obtained from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and were geocoded by local government area using the Northern Ireland Neighbourhood Information Service’s postcode directory. Only those events which were attributed to a specific republican group were selected for inclusion in the analysis. Punishment attacks were not coded as a distinct category of events and had to be removed from the database manually following a careful review of the included coding notes and, where possible, the source material for each event.

The logic of this metric is relatively straight forward. If punishment attacks are costly to insurgent groups to the extent that they are a potential drain on resources that could otherwise be used to attack targets of greater military significance, then we would expect

⁴There are other reasons that post-2001 prisoner releases would not be the most valid measure of the costs of republican punishment attacks. The majority of the paramilitary prisoners released in 2001 and 2002 were set free under the terms Good Friday Agreement. Only prisoners affiliated with groups officially recognized as no longer being involved in violence were allowed to take advantage of the release scheme. As a result, the impact of these releases on dissident behavior was likely minimal, although they may have enhanced the ability of the PIRA in particular to monitor potential dissident activity.

these costs to be greatest during the high points of a group's military campaign. When a group's manpower and matériel are fully engaged in the planning and execution of offensive operations, any diversion of those same assets toward crime fighting will be particularly great. Conversely, when insurgent leaders believe that offensive actions are unlikely to be profitable for the group or when there is a general lull in the fighting, more men, weapons and vehicles will be free to locate and punish criminals, and the relative costs of doing so will be significantly diminished.

Here again, we can return to the predictions generated by the formal model to explore the expected empirical relationship between the costs of fighting crime and the frequency with which insurgents conduct punishment attacks. All else equal, the results of the comparative statics analysis indicated that:

H2A: *Insurgent groups will conduct fewer punishment attacks as the associated costs of fighting crime increase.*

Given this theoretical expectation and the substantive interpretation of the relationship between punishment attacks and other forms of political violence provided above, the number of incidents of republican violence should be negatively correlated with the number of republican punishment attacks. In the statistical models, this relationship is expected to produce a negative coefficient on the republican violence variable, all else equal.

Alternatively, it might be argued that the overall amount of republican violence in an area is better interpreted as measuring the overall strength of republican paramilitary groups in the vicinity. Launching gun attacks or building and planting bombs requires both the necessary manpower to perform these tasks as well as the tacit support of the local population to create a conducive environment. Given these requirements, one might expect to observe more republican violence in areas in which republican groups are both better equipped and better supported by the general population. If this interpretation is correct, then the overall level of republican violence would not proxy the costs of conducting punishment attacks, but rather the capacity of militant republican groups to engage in violent activity in general, with higher levels of overall violence indicating higher levels of militant capacity. Under these conditions, the expected direction of the correlation

between punishment attacks and other forms of republican violence would be the opposite of the one outlined above. A positive correlation would indicate that both high levels of violence in general and high levels of punishment attacks in particular are actually a product of increasing military capacity on the part of the rebels.

8.1.4 The Value of Military Intelligence

Information about enemy activity is one of the mostly highly valued assets in any military conflict. This is particularly true for the forces of status quo governments confronted by insurgencies, as anonymity and secrecy are amongst the few advantages that insurgent groups are likely to have over typically much better financed and better equipped government forces. Despite the overall importance of accurate military intelligence in determining the outcomes on the battlefield, new information about enemy activity is not equally prized at all times and places during a conflict. Rather, governments are likely to place the greatest value on new information about insurgent activity at times and places where little is already known about who the insurgents are and what their intentions might be. At one extreme, if a government knows absolutely nothing about a new insurgent group, a single anonymous tip might be extremely valuable as it provides a starting point for further counterinsurgency activities. At the other extreme, if a government has nearly perfect knowledge about a particular group, then additional tips from the public, or even from trusted informants, will provide the government with only a marginal gain over its already substantial leverage over the insurgents. When information is scarce, a single scrap might make a significant contribution to the government’s efforts to defeat the insurgents. When information is already plentiful, the same scrap will do little to improve the government’s fortunes in combat.

The constantly shifting value of information also has important consequences beyond the battlefield. When information about insurgent activity is scarce, and therefore most valuable, governments will be more likely to divert resources away from the provision of other services, such as ordinary policing, in order to maximize their intelligence gathering capabilities. Furthermore, the police themselves are likely to have similar priorities with

regard to the collection of counterinsurgency related intelligence. As a result, the police will be likely to prioritize counterinsurgency tasks at the expense of ordinary police work. This preference for counterinsurgency is likely to be reflected in both police resource allocation, and in the vigor with which ordinary criminals are pursued. The kind of low level intelligence that these individuals might be able to provide is most valuable when other sources are unavailable.

Thus, the value of military intelligence affects the government’s success on the battlefield and the vigor with which the police will pursue ordinary criminals, and insurgent groups must account for these factors in determining their own approach to crime in their communities. In particular, insurgents must account for the possibility that, by ignoring crime, they create an opportunity not only for the government to provide a valuable service, but also for the police to exploit suspected criminals by coercing them into becoming informers. When the police know relatively little about the insurgent group, this is a very real possibility. Fearing this outcome, insurgents should be more likely to conduct punishment attacks when they believe the police prize military intelligence over arresting and prosecuting ordinary criminals. This preference was reflected in hypothesis H3A, which predicted that:

H3A: *Insurgents will conduct more punishment attacks as the value of military intelligence increases.*

Empirically, the value of intelligence is operationalized using the weapons index described in detail in chapter four. The index is constructed from data on firearms and ammunition seizures by local government area provided by the PSNI. The number of firearms recovered by the PSNI in each district was added to the number of rounds of ammunition recovered divided by 30. The square of the weapons index is also included in the statistical models presented below to account for the diminishing returns of each new piece of information. Two-year moving averages were used in the construction of both terms because the data were originally provided in calendar year format. Given the nature of military intelligence, described above, and the theoretical prediction over the relationship between the value of intelligence and insurgent behavior, expressed in hypothesis H3A, the raw weapons index

should exhibit a positive correlation with the number of punishment attacks while the coefficient on the squared term is expected to be negative.

A potential weakness of the weapons index, as described above, is that the data do not account for the number of weapons hidden in a district *ex ante*. Although the actual number of weapons hidden by dissident republicans in each Northern Ireland’s LGAs is unknowable, it is nevertheless possible that the value of the weapons index is at least partly a function of this unknown quantity. For instance, weapons seizures occurring in time period t potentially reduce the size of the stockpile of weapons that could potentially be captured in time period $t + 1$ and beyond. Furthermore, the dissidents themselves might alter the distribution of their weapons caches in response to seizures occurring at time t by either removing weapons from the affected region or diverting future deposits away from the region. In either case, the expectation would be that weapons seizures in time period t would be negatively correlated with weapons seizures in the same district during previous time periods. Empirically, this does not appear to be the case. A time series cross-sectional regression of the current value of the weapons index on up to four lags of the same variable fails to pass the minimum test of collective fit.

8.1.5 The Likelihood of Crime Being Reported to the Police

In addition to assessing the costs and benefits of punishment attacks, insurgent groups must also consider the consequences of ignoring criminal activity in their communities. These consequences, in turn, are a product of two factors. One, the expected response of the police, has already been discussed in detail above. The other, the anticipated behavior of a victim ignored by the insurgents, conditions many of the strategic calculations described above. If these spurned victims are expected to turn their backs on the insurgents and seek redress from the police, then the insurgents might give greater weight to the perceived benefits of punishment attacks. Just such a relationship is reflected in hypothesis H4C, which predicted that

H4C: *All else equal, if the benefits of punishment attacks are less than the costs, then insurgent groups will conduct more punishment attacks as the likelihood that crime ignored by the insurgents are reported to the police increases.*

The likelihood that a victim spurned by the insurgents reports a crime to the police is once again operationalized as the number of PSNI stations per square kilometer in each district.⁵ The interpretation of this variable's expected statistical relationship with the dependent variable is made slightly more complicated by the operationalization of the benefits of punishment attacks. Recall here that this latter concept was operationalized as the statistical interaction between the lagged reported crime rate and the lagged sanction detection rate, with RPAs expected to be most beneficial in areas with high crime rates and low sanction detection rates. H4C indicates that the marginal effect of police concentration should be greatest in areas with low crime rates and high sanction detection rates.

8.1.6 The Ability of the Police to Recruit Informers

The ease with which the police will be able to recruit informers is once again operationalized as the number of criminal law offices in each area. Solicitors perform a vital function as advocates for the rights of those accused of criminal activity in societies governed by the rule of law. Criminal suspects are likely to have greater access to legal services if they are arrested and detained in areas with a high concentration of attorneys. As a result of this greater access to the legal protection provided by solicitors, accused criminals might be better able to resist police efforts to coerce them into providing information on local insurgent activity. Thus, the ability of the police to recruit informers should be greatest in districts with a low concentration of solicitors and weakest in districts with a high concentration of solicitors.

How does the relative ease with which accused criminals can access legal protection influence an insurgent group's approach to punishment attacks? The answer is once again provided by the formal model. As was the case with the local geographic concentration of the police, access to legal aid conditions the effect of other factors thought to influence insurgent policy toward local crime. In particular, hypothesis H4B predicted that:

H4B: *All else equal, if the costs of punishment attacks are greater than the benefits, then insurgent groups will conduct more punishment attacks as the ability of the police to coerce suspected criminals increases.*

⁵See chapter four for a detailed discussion of this metric and its attendant strengths and weaknesses.

Thus, the statistical interaction between the number of criminal law offices—representing the ability of the police to coerce criminals into becoming counterinsurgency informants—and the amount of non-RPA republican violence should be negative and statistically significant only for relatively high values of the latter variable.

8.1.7 The Effectiveness of Insurgent Counterintelligence

The final substantive parameter of interest is the effectiveness of insurgent counterintelligence operations. The primary objective of counterintelligence is to find and eliminate individuals who collaborate with the status quo government. The ability of any group to successfully perform this task is a direct function of its access to information. While Kalyvas argues that access to information is purely a function of an actor’s ability to intimidate and control the population, there is good reason to believe that intra-group social networks provide ethnic insurgent groups with access to a great deal of information about local people (Fearon and Laitin 1996). This attribute of insurgent counterintelligence is once again operationalized using the district-level Catholic isolation index.⁶ The isolation index ranges from zero to one with higher values indicating a greater level of residential segregation amongst Catholics living in a district.⁷

An insurgent group’s ability to detect and eliminate informers influences how the costs of punishment attacks affect the group’s willingness to use its scarce resources to fight crime. If the insurgents believe that they are relatively adept at finding new informers in their midst, then the costs of punishment attacks will be given relatively less weight in the group’s decision calculus. Thus, hypothesis H4A:

H4A: *All else equal, if the costs of punishment attacks outweigh the benefits, then insurgents will conduct fewer punishment attacks as they become more adept at identifying and eliminating new informers.*

Given this theoretical expectation and the substantive interpretation of the Catholic isolation index provided above, the Catholic isolation index should reduce the negative marginal

⁶See chapter four for a detailed discussion of the construction of the index.

⁷For example, in the hypothetical district with an isolation index of one, the entire Catholic population of the district would reside in a single, 100% Catholic ward.

effect of the republican violence variable. This result would indicate that the costs of punishment attacks weigh less heavily on republican paramilitary groups in those areas where they would be expected to have the most success pinpointing police collaborators.

8.1.8 Control Variables

In order to assess the empirical relationships outlined above, it is also necessary to control for other potentially confounding factors that, if ignored, could bias the results of the statistical analysis. To that end, control variables are included for the actual - as opposed to reported - crime rate, the level of loyalist violence in each district year and the total decommissioning of Provisional IRA (PIRA) weapons in autumn of 2005. The reported crime rate reflects both the amount of crime in a district and public confidence in the police to deal with crime. As a result, the reported crime rate might underestimate the actual amount of crime in districts where public confidence in the police is at its lowest. This is problematic for our purposes because such districts are also likely to experience more punishment attacks than districts where public confidence in the police is high. To control for this possibility, the actual crime rate is operationalized as the statistical interaction between the number of men aged 16-39 in a district and the male unemployment rate in the same district. If punishment attacks are more likely to occur in areas with high crime rates and low confidence in the police, then we would expect to see a positive result on the interaction term.

It is also important that we control for the influence of loyalist paramilitary groups. Communities with strong ties to loyalist paramilitaries are likely to have equally weak ties to republican groups. Furthermore, republican groups are unlikely to see any benefit in conducting punishment attacks in these areas, because of the high level of hostility toward both republican paramilitaries and their political objectives in these regions. As a result we would expect to see few, if any, republican punishment attacks in areas of loyalist strength. In keeping with the modeling approach presented in chapter four, loyalist strength is operationalized as the three-year cumulative moving average of loyalist punishment attacks, and we would expect a negative correlation between this variable and

the number of republican punishment attacks in a district-year.

Finally, a dummy variable equal to one for all district years after 2004/05 and zero otherwise is included to control for the effect of the total decommissioning of PIRA weapons, which occurred in November 2005. Substantively, we are agnostic about the direction of this effect. On the one hand, up until it disarmed in late 2005, the PIRA was by far the most well-organized and well-equipped of all republican paramilitary organizations. As a result, we might expect a general decrease in republican punishment attacks after the group handed in its weapons. On the other hand, reports from the International Monitoring Commission indicate that, by the early 2000s, the group had relatively little involvement in punishment attacks. At the same time, the elimination of the PIRA’s arsenal might have made it easier for other republican groups to begin conducting punishment attacks, as they no longer had to fear sanction from their predecessors in the PIRA.

8.1.9 Model Estimation


Given the nature of the dependent variable under analysis - an annual count of the number of punishment attacks in each local government district - it is appropriate to use an event count model for the purposes of statistical analysis. Looking at some of the basic summary statistics for the dependent variable of interest, it can easily be seen that a standard Poisson count model would be inappropriate in this context. Recall that the Poisson approach assumes that the mean and the variance of the data under analysis are equal. This is clearly not the case for annual district-level data on punishment attacks, which is strongly skewed toward small values with a handful of districts producing the majority of the events observed. The variable republican attacks has a mean of 2.35 with a variance of 29.89.

These statistics strongly indicate that a distribution other than the Poisson should be selected for the analysis. A typical response in situations like this is to utilize the negative binomial distribution. Figure 8.1, below, presents a plot of the observed distribution of republican shootings alongside plots of a Poisson distribution with the same mean and a negative binomial distribution with the same mean and variance as the observed data. In

combination with the summary statistics presented above, figure 8.1 clearly indicates that the data exhibit over dispersion, with the distribution strongly skewed toward zero.

In addition to the over dispersion in the dependent variable, demonstrated by the statistical evidence presented above, the possibility of excess zeros in the data on punishment attacks is also a concern. Empirically, this concern seems warranted because four areas, highlighted in figure 8.2, experienced no republican punishment attacks during the entire period under analysis, while an additional 19 LGAs experienced no such attacks during at least one fiscal year between 2000/01 and 2008/09. Furthermore, from a theoretical perspective, there is good reason to believe that at least a subset of the observations in the zero republican punishment attack category result from a different causal process than the one underlying variation in the non-zero group. As has been argued previously, insurgent groups essentially face two separate decisions with regard to punishment attacks. Before


Figure 8.1: Observed Distribution of Republican Punishment Attacks Versus Poisson and Negative Binomial



deciding what percentage of their scarce resources to dedicate to meting out vigilante justice, the insurgents must first determine whether or not it is in their best interest to enter the competitive market for the provision of law enforcement in a given area. This decision, in turn, is a function of the insurgents' assessment of the ease with which they will be

able to establish themselves as alternative providers of law and order. Insurgents make this determination by evaluating the relative size of the market and the likelihood that their entry into the market will meet with violent resistance from a rival ethnic militia and potentially spark or escalate an interethnic armed conflict. Having made this assessment, the insurgents will tend to be more likely to enter the markets that are relatively large — i.e. areas that have high crime rates — and pose little danger of sparking interethnic retaliation. Only after making this initial assessment can the insurgents directly assess the costs and benefits of dedicating a given share of their resources to fighting crime on the streets rather than fighting their enemies on the battlefield.

Figure 8.2: Map of Northern Ireland LGAs Highlighting Zero Outcome Cases



Given the theoretical and statistical challenges described above, a zero-inflated neg-

ative binomial (ZINB) count model is the most appropriate for the data analyzed here. ZINB models estimate two equations, one predicting the likelihood that a unit experiences zero events, and another predicting variation in the non-zero units. This approach is most appropriate when, as is the case in the present analysis, there is reason to believe that at least a subset of the zero observations are caused by a different process than the one producing variation in the non-zero units. Zero inflated models can be estimated using different distributions for the non-zero unit equation, but given the evidence of over dispersion in our data, presented above, it is most appropriate to utilize the negative binomial variant of this class of count model.

8.2 Deprivation, Crime and Punishment

Tables 8.1 and 8.2 present the results of two zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) count models. In both tables, the standard logistic regression coefficients are presented in column two and clustered standard errors are presented in column three. The top portion of each table presents the results of the equation predicting variation in the number of republican punishment attacks. The bottom portion of the table presents the results of the equation predicting the likelihood that a district-year experienced no punishment attacks. In the excess zero equation, positive regression coefficients indicate an increased likelihood of experiencing zero punishment attacks, while negative regression coefficients indicate a greater likelihood of at least one punishment attack occurring. Results from both models are identical, with the exception of the exclusion of the claimant rate interaction term from the excess zero equation in model two (table 8.2). Since the coefficients of both stages of the statistical model can be difficult to interpret directly, the results of the quantitative analysis will be discussed primarily in terms of the estimated marginal effects of each variable. Marginal effects for the excess zero equation are presented in terms of the predicted probability that an area experiences zero republican punishment attacks. Marginal effects for the negative binomial equation are presented in terms of the predicted number of RPAs.

The equation predicting excess zero outcomes produced some surprising results in

Table 8.1: Estimation Results: Baseline Zero Inflated Negative Binomial Model

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : Non-Zero Number of Republican Punishment Attacks		
Catholic Isolation Index	0.057***	(0.011)
Criminal Law Offices	-0.009	(0.010)
Republican Attacks (GTD)	-0.432*	(0.236)
Republican Attacks * Isolation	0.004	(0.010)
Republican Attacks * Law Offices	0.025*	(0.015)
Lagged Sanction Rate	-0.079	(0.049)
Lagged Reported Crime	0.019	(0.016)
Police Concentration	0.226	(3.167)
Sanction * Crime * Concentration	0.015	(0.014)
Weapons Index	0.024**	(0.009)
Weapons Index ²	0.000**	(0.000)
Intercept	0.083	(0.309)
Equation 1 : Probability of Zero Outcome		
Male Claimant Rate	-1.074*	(0.645)
16-39 Year Old Males	0.000**	(0.000)
Young Males * Claimant Rate	0.000	(0.000)
Three Year CMA Loyalist PAs	0.092*	(0.052)
Decommissioning Dummy	1.649	(1.082)
Belfast Dummy	6.935**	(3.432)
Belfast * CMA Loyalist	-0.231**	(0.116)
Intercept	-3.535***	(1.025)
Dispersion Parameter		
Alpha (Natural Log)	-0.658**	(0.259)
N	252	
Log-likelihood	-338.513	
$\chi^2_{(14)}$	5204.622	
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%		

light of prior theoretical expectations. In particular, the null interaction between the male claimant count and the size of the young male population in model one appears to confound the expectation that areas containing both a relatively large number of young men and a high rate of male unemployment would provide the ripest markets for dissident republican vigilantism. However, despite the statistical insignificance of both the male claimant rate and the relevant interaction term in model one, it is worth noting that the male unemployment rate itself is nearly statistically significant with a p-value of 0.111. Furthermore, the results of model two, which omits the statistically insignificant interaction term ($p = 0.481$), indicate that areas with either high male unemployment rates or large populations of young males are at greater risk of experiencing republican punishment attacks, even if the effect of the former is not conditioned by the latter.


For instance, an increase in the size of the resident young male population from the sample minimum of approximately 4,700 to the sample mean of approximately 12,200 would increase an area’s risk of experiencing at least one republican punishment attacks by nearly 70 percent.⁸ As the size of the young male population increases above its sample mean, the likelihood of a zero outcome rapidly diminishes, approaching zero for values more than one standard deviation above the mean. This result confirms the findings of previous studies indicating that young males are more likely to be involved in petty crime throughout the United Kingdom (Carmichael and Ward 2001) and most at risk of being targeted by republican groups for punishment attacks in Northern Ireland (Kennedy 2001).

The male unemployment rate has a similar effect on the likelihood that dissident republicans will enter an area’s market for law enforcement. Moving from the observed minimum male claimant rate of 1.22 percent to a rate of approximately five percent reduces the probability that an area falls into the excess zero category from 0.94 to 0.17. The magnitude of this relationship is best illustrated by figure 8.3, which plots the predicted probability of a zero outcome against the male claimant rate. As the claimant rate

⁸The marginal effects presented here were derived using the Margins package available in Stata 11.2. For all marginal effect calculations, the continuous variables in the model were held at their sample means, the decommissioning dummy variable was set equal to one and the Belfast dummy variable was set equal to zero, unless otherwise noted.

approaches, and ultimately exceeds, its average value, the likelihood of a zero outcome rapidly approaches zero. Again, this finding is generally in keeping with the results of previous studies, as well as the theoretical expectation established above predicting that dissident republican groups would be most likely to become involved in vigilantism in areas where the market for crime is largest.

Figure 8.3: Predicted Probability of Zero Outcome Conditional on Male Claimant Rate



These substantive effects demonstrate that socioeconomic conditions have a statistically and substantively significant effect on the willingness of the dissident republican groups to enter the market for crime fighting services in different regions across Northern Ireland. On the one hand, these findings are surprising, given the statistical null results for similar variables in the analysis presented in chapter four. On the other, there were strong theoretical reasons to suspect that this would be the case. An insurgent group’s willingness to dedicate men and resources to finding and punishing suspected criminals was hypothesized to be a function of the size of the market for law enforcement, which in turn was hypothesized to be a function of the size of the actual, as opposed to reported, crime rate. The finding that dissident republican groups are more likely to conduct punishment attacks in areas with large young male populations and high male unemployment rates —

two factors that are often correlated with the crime rate — provides partial confirmation of this hypothesis.

Table 8.2: Estimation Results: ZINB Model Excluding Unemployment*Young Males Interaction

Variable	Coefficient	(Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : Non-Zero Number of Republican Punishment Attacks		
Catholic Isolation Index	0.057***	(0.011)
Criminal Law Offices	-0.008	(0.010)
Republican Attacks (GTD)	-0.434*	(0.238)
Republican Attacks * Isolation	0.004	(0.010)
Republican Attacks * Law Offices	0.026*	(0.015)
Lagged Sanction Rate	-0.080*	(0.047)
Lagged Reported Crime	0.019	(0.016)
Police Concentration	0.061	(3.026)
Sanction * Concentration * Crime	0.017	(0.014)
Weapons Index	0.024***	(0.009)
Weapons Index ²	0.000**	(0.000)
Intercept	0.056	(0.307)
Equation 1 : Probability of Zero Outcome		
Male Claimant Rate	-0.743***	(0.227)
16-39 Year Old Males	0.000***	(0.000)
Three Year CMA Loyalist PAs	0.089**	(0.041)
Decommissioning Dummy	1.901**	(0.951)
Belfast Dummy	4.971***	(1.392)
Belfast * CMA Loyalist	-0.190***	(0.070)
Intercept	-3.271***	(0.870)
Dispersion Parameter		
Alpha (Natural Log)	-0.657**	(0.259)
N	252	
Log-likelihood	-339.15	
$\chi^2_{(14)}$	4412.694	
Significance levels : * : 10% ** : 5% *** : 1%		

However, the theoretical predictions laid out above also indicated that, even in otherwise ripe markets, insurgent groups could be discouraged from conducting punishment attacks if an area also hosted a relatively strong militia affiliated with a rival ethnic group. This hypothesis drew on the logic of the in-group policing model developed by Fearon and Laitin (1996), arguing that an insurgent group from ethnic community A would be unwilling to punish a criminal from ethnic community B out of fear of initiating a spiral of

interethnic reprisals. This expectation appears to be borne out by the statistical analysis. The results of both model one and model two indicate that republican groups are significantly less likely to conduct punishment attacks in areas outside of Belfast in which loyalist paramilitary groups tend to be more active.⁹ Within Northern Ireland’s capital city, loyalist strength appears to have the opposite effect on the behavior of republican militant groups.

Figure 8.4, which plots the predicted probability of zero republican punishment attacks conditional on the value of the loyalist variable in Belfast and the rest of Northern Ireland, demonstrates the substantive significance of this relationship.¹⁰ In the city of Belfast itself, an area experiencing a three-year average of zero loyalist punishment attacks would also experience zero republican punishment attacks with a probability of 0.97, while an area experiencing a three-year average of 22 loyalist attacks¹¹ would be 20 percent more likely to experience at least one republican attack. Contrastingly, in greater Northern Ireland, a similar increase in the level of loyalist violence would produce a 64 percent swing in the opposite direction, making republican groups less likely to conduct punishment attacks.

Across most of Northern Ireland, it appears that the local presence and strength of loyalist paramilitary groups like the Ulster Volunteer Force acts as a significant deterrent to dissident republican activity against ‘anti-social elements.’ This result provides preliminary evidence in support of an extension to the ‘in-group policing’ model to the present context, although additional research is needed to further assess the causal mechanisms linking these phenomena. However, the discovery of a positive correlation between loyalist and republican punishment attacks in Belfast warrants additional exploration. As was the case in the previous quantitative analysis,¹² this finding is not entirely unexpected. It was hypothesized above that the aggregation of strongly loyalist neighborhoods with strongly republican neighborhoods into each of the four regions of Belfast might produce


⁹Although the main effects of the loyalist variable are not significant in model one, the interaction term including the loyalist variable is significant at the five percent level. The loyalist variable itself is marginally insignificant at the ten percent level with $p = 0.106$.

¹⁰Estimation results from model two were used in constructing the marginal effects presented here. The results from model one produced similar marginal effects.

¹¹The sample mean plus two standard deviations.

¹²See chapter four.

Figure 8.4: Predicted Probability of Zero Outcome Conditional on Loyalist Strength



precisely this result. Although it seems quite likely that this finding is a result of data limitations, future research should nevertheless attempt to address these challenges and explore alternative explanations.

Overall, the results of the first stage of the statistical analysis have provided good reason to reconsider how scholars conceptualize the relationship between deprivation and political violence in general and the relationship between socioeconomic strain, crime and punishment attacks more particularly. The overall results of this analysis demonstrate that these factors do influence the frequency with which insurgent groups use violence against their erstwhile constituents. However, the relationship between input and outcome appears to be slightly different than the one anticipated by scholars of the grievance school. The presence of a relatively large, relatively young unemployed male population may indeed place an area a great risk of experiencing criminal activity. However, this enhanced level of risk does not appear to translate directly into an increased frequency of vigilante justice. Instead, increasing socioeconomic deprivation and the associated increase in the risk of crime create a market for paramilitary punishment attacks and establish the necessary — although not sufficient — conditions for the occurrence of this particular type of insurgent-

against-civilian violence. But what factors determine how large a role an insurgent group will play in the market for law and order once they enter it? The second stage of the statistical analysis demonstrates how a variety of strategic and environmental factors influence the extent to which insurgent groups will dedicate their resources to providing vigilante justice in their communities.

8.3 The ‘Real’ People’s Police?

The results of the ZINB equations in model one and model two provide mixed support for the hypotheses derived from the formal model. The following section begins by presenting a general overview of the main results obtained from the statistical model. With this presentation as a backdrop, the remainder of the section provides a more detailed discussion of each result, drawing on qualitative evidence to either demonstrate the substantive significance of the relationship discovered in the statistical models or to explore possible explanations for anomalous findings.

Several of the hypotheses derived in chapter three found empirical support in the two ZINB models presented above. In particular, hypothesis H2A, which predicted a negative correlation between the costs of punishment attacks and their occurrence was confirmed by the statistically significant and negative main effect of the republican violence variable in both models. Similarly, in keeping with H3A, the willingness of dissident groups to engage in vigilante violence also appears to be partly a function of the successfulness of the PSNI’s counterinsurgency campaign. The statistically significant and negative coefficient on the quadratic weapons index term indicates that, as expected, this relationship is curvilinear, with small and moderate weapons seizures signaling to the dissidents the renewed urgency of countering the intelligence gathering activities of the police. Hypothesis H1A, predicting a positive correlation between the benefits of fighting crime and the frequency of punishment attacks, found mixed support in models one and two. The lagged sanction detection rate variable narrowly failed to achieve statistical significance in model one ($p = 0.107$), although it is both significant at the ninety percent level and correctly

signed in model two. None of the components¹³ of the three-way interaction between the lagged reported crime rate, the lagged sanction rate and the police concentration variable are independently significant. However, a post-estimation Wald test of the collective significance of all four interactive components indicates that their joint inclusion in the model is justified ($p \leq 0.05$).

The results relevant to the other interactive hypotheses derived from the formal model are also mixed. H4A predicted that increasing Catholic isolation would produce fewer republican punishment attacks as the level of other republican violence increased. However, the interaction between these two variables is not statistically significant at conventional levels. On the other hand, H4B indicated that dissident republican groups would be more likely to conduct punishment attacks when suspected criminals had limited access to the legal protection provided by criminal lawyers, particularly when the costs associated with punishment attacks were high. On average, this appears to be the case, as punishment attacks appear to be negatively correlated with the number of criminal law offices in areas experiencing no other republican violence. However, as the positive coefficient on the interaction term indicates, an increase in the opportunity costs of punishment attacks actually appears to mediate this relationship, contrary to theoretical expectations.

The remainder of section 8.4 explores each of these results in greater detail. Turning to each of the three main parameters of interests — the costs of punishment attacks, the benefits of punishment attacks and the value of new counterinsurgency intelligence to the police — the discussion begins with an assessment of the marginal effects of the associated variables in the statistical model. Where these findings conform to prior expectations, the analysis then qualitatively explores the relationship between each concept and the dependent variable in the context of the military campaigns of the RIRA and ONH. Where the findings of the statistical analysis are in tension with prior theoretical expectations, similar qualitative evidence is used to explore these anomalous findings and, where possible, to provide evidence that the null statistical results may not be entirely reflective of how groups such as the two mentioned above have approached their dual campaigns against

¹³For clarity of presentation the constituent bivariate interactions of this three-way interaction term are excluded from the table of results, although they were included in both statistical models

crime on the streets and the British state in Ireland.

8.3.1 The Benefits of Punishment Attacks

The results of the comparative statics analysis presented at the conclusion of chapter three indicated that, all else equal, insurgent groups should conduct more punishment attacks when the benefits associated with fighting crime increase. Empirically, this relationship was operationalized using an interaction between the lagged sanction detection rate and the lagged reported crime rate, with the expectation that the benefits of fighting crime in the present would be greatest in areas with high reported crime rates and low sanction detection rates in the recent past. The quantitative analysis provided mixed support for this expectation. All else equal, a shift from the sample average sanction detection rate (approximately 17 percent) to the sample minimum rate would nearly triple the expected number of republican punishment attacks in an area. However, this relationship does not appear to be conditioned by the lagged reported crime rate. Nevertheless, this result does provide tentative evidence that dissident republican groups have responded strategically to the perceived failures of the PSNI to deal with petty crime throughout Northern Ireland.

Furthermore, the RIRA and ONH, along with their associated political groups, have consistently highlighted the political importance of undermining public support for the PSNI and exploiting existing public disenchantment with the police. A *Sovereign Nation* editorial commenting on a recent spate of RIRA punishment attacks lamented:

The British security services and their supporters among our former comrades in Stormont are fully aware of the potential support from the community in a tough line against these criminals. They will no doubt make a concerted effort to shut our movement down and suppress any of the community work Republican activists are currently engaged in (especially now that the deadline for policing and justice draws nearer) (2008).

The same dynamic was highlighted by the 32 County Sovereignty Movement’s (32CSM)¹⁴ national spokesman in an interview with the author. The spokesman explained that ‘[P]unishment shootings are seen by people now as ‘well listen the police aren’t gonna

¹⁴The 32CSM is generally considered to be the political wing of the RIRA, although the 32CSM maintains that there is no connection between the two organizations.

do anything so ... let’s go back to what we know, and what we know is republicans solve the situation”’ concluding that, in border areas, there was a “dynamic emerging where the PSNI fail to address the situation initially, and when they turn to republicans, the PSNI respond by oppressing the community further” (National Spokesperson of the 32CSM Interview with the Author 2011).¹⁵ In a similar vein, representatives of the North Belfast based dissident group ONH have attempted to highlight the political benefits of using punishment attacks as a means of exploiting disaffection between the police and the people of Catholic communities like New Lodge and Ardoyne for the group’s own political benefit. Indeed, the RIRA splinter group announced its existence to the world by publicly taking credit for 15 punishment attacks in its Belfast strongholds in January 2009 (Morris 2009a). The group’s leadership made a definitive connection between its use of punishment attacks and its quest for greater support amongst Catholics. During a subsequent interview, an ONH spokesman told the *Irish News* :

... [W]e know that punishment shootings aren’t going to solve the anti-social problem long term. I admit it’s crude but it’s effective and regardless of what the security forces, Sinn Féin or the media might say it’s a policy that has public support. The problem most other groups faced was they didn’t have the support framework needed to be effective. Because we are taking action [against anti-social behavior] we are going to people now and asking can we use their house and it’s opening doors to us, literally (Morris 2009b).

These statements by senior dissident republicans indicate that these groups think about the potential benefits of punishment attacks in much the same way as their predecessors. Both the spokesman from the 32CSM and the representative of ONH described the tension between republican punishment attacks and PSNI policing as mutually exclusive alternatives, thus highlighting the zero sum nature of the potential benefits associated with fighting crime. However, the theoretical model also indicated that an insurgent group’s assessment of the benefits of engaging in vigilantism would be conditional upon their expectation of how the police would respond to crime occurring in the same area, at

¹⁵The 32CSM’s official policy statements have also consistently emphasized the connection between political legitimacy and policing. In a document entitled “Necessity of policing” the group claims that “the issue of policing is actually the issue of the legitimacy of law and its prosecution which in turn derives legitimacy from governmental authority.” The document then concludes that “strategic rebuttal of one [policing/constitutional legitimacy] requires a strategic rebuttal of all facets” of British rule in Ireland (32 County Sovereignty Movement N.d.).

the same time. In particular, hypothesis H4C indicated that insurgent groups will weigh the benefits of fighting crime more heavily when the police are likely to become involved in solving crimes first ignored by the insurgents themselves. The statistical evidence in support of this hypothesis was limited. The interaction between police concentration and the crime rate was not statistically significant on its own, although the constituent terms were collectively significant in both models.

Given the relative lack of quantitative support for this hypothesis, it is important to examine how dissident republicans themselves have understood the relationship between the potential benefits associated with punishment attacks and the dangers associated with police intervention resulting from dissident inaction. In this regard, statements issued by the RIRA’s South Down Brigade provide an example of the general dissident republican mindset. In 2004, the RIRA in South Down warned “anti-social elements in the area” that it would not “stand by and allow you to give the police an excuse to infiltrate our community.” This warning was paired with a statement claiming that two “car thieves” had been ordered to “leave the Castlewella district” after being “physically punished” by the RIRA (*Sovereign Nation* 2004).¹⁶

Each of these statements illustrates separately how dissident republicans have conditioned their approach to punishment attacks on the expected behavior of the police. Certainly, as was demonstrated above, groups like the RIRA desire the political benefits derived from picking up the slack left by any PSNI shortcomings in responding to crime and anti-social behavior. However, both the warning issued by the South Down Brigade and the outside assessment of the 32CSM spokesman imply that this desire is framed in terms of strategic anticipation of how the police themselves might take advantage of criminal and anti-social elements ignored by the RIRA. Fear of police ‘infiltration’ into

¹⁶The RIRA’s move against alleged car thieves in South Down followed several months of complaints from Castlewella residents about increasing problems with crime and anti-social behavior in the area. In May 2004, a local man had told the Belfast newspaper, *Sunday Life*, “Local people in the area are sick to the teeth of these thugs intimidating people every weekend . . . Some people were just so fed-up with everything that was going on and the failure of the police to do anything that they decided to hit back” (Breen 2004). PSF’s Caitríona Ruane complained that the people of South Down had “no trust in a police force who they see as unwilling to address issues like drug dealing” and should be “supported in acting collectively to confront the problem” (*Irish News* 2004). However, it is interesting to note that the RIRA itself did not take action until after the PSNI had pledged to divert additional “resources in a bid to deal with young people who cause annoyance” in Castlewella (*Belfast Telegraph* 2004).

republican communities is compounded by the RIRA's expectation that the police will use local car thieves and drug dealers as part of their counterinsurgency campaign, although there is no direct evidence to support dissident claims that the PSNI willfully ignored certain types of crime in exchange for information on local republican activities. This compound relationship is illustrated by the RIRA's action against 'car thieves' in Castlewellan, highlighted above. Although these individuals were apparently persistent offenders, no action was taken against them until there was an immediate threat of increased PSNI intervention to deal with problems associated with anti-social behavior in the community.

The evidence presented above suggests that dissident republicans use punishment attacks as a means of simultaneously highlighting the shortcomings of the PSNI and demonstrating the brutal effectiveness of vigilante justice as a response to crime. Although dissident groups seek to maximize these potential benefits at all times, in all places, their willingness to allocate scarce resources to maiming car thieves and drug dealers is also a product of their strategic anticipation of the police force's likely response to crime. While the statistical analysis did not indicate any significant interaction between the concentration of police resources in an area and the potential benefits of fighting crime, the qualitative evidence indicates that the RIRA and ONH account for the likely actions of the PSNI and weigh the potential benefits of punishment attacks accordingly. For the RIRA and ONH, such assessments are occasionally colored by the fear that any police response to drug dealing and anti-social behavior is a ruse to collect intelligence on republican activity. These concerns, whether real or imagined, are often piqued by changes in police activity. Imminent police action, such as the redeployment of police personnel to aggressively respond to anti-social behavior in Castlewellan, can trigger an immediate response from republican terrorists who were previously content to either do nothing or merely to issue statements highlighting such concerns.

This preliminary finding suggests that future research might usefully explore other mechanisms through which police forces increase their interaction with local populations and assess the potential unintended consequences of these methods vis-à-vis punishment

attacks. Although the concentration of police infrastructure — the variable used in the statistical analysis to measure this concept — is a useful measure of the relative size of the police footprint in an area, it fails to capture the full range of activities that police forces like the PSNI can engage in to enhance communication with the general public. In particular, since the establishment of the District Policing Partnerships in 2003, the PSNI has aggressively pursued the development of state sponsored neighborhood watch initiatives as well as other projects intended to encourage the exchange of information between the police and the general public. Data on the number and location of these projects are not readily available at present. Nevertheless, preliminary, small-n studies on this issue would further enrich our understanding of the dynamic relationship between “ordinary” crime, police activity and insurgent violence.

8.3.2 The Costs of Punishment Attacks

Insurgent groups become involved in vigilante justice because they hope to reap some of the political benefits described above. However, punishment attacks can also impose significant costs on the groups that are responsible for them. First and foremost, the hypotheses presented above indicated that punishment attacks involve both direct material costs and opportunity costs. These attacks are materially costly to the extent that they involve the use of ammunition, the consumption of fuel and the exertion of insurgent manpower. The opportunity costs arise as a direct result of the scarcity of these resources. Men, vehicles and weapons used to capture and maim suspected criminals cannot simultaneously be used to conduct reconnaissance or to attack strategically important targets.

Given the nature of these costs, it is unsurprising that the comparative statics analysis indicated that insurgent groups would conduct fewer punishment attacks as the associated costs increased, all else equal. This hypothesis was supported by the results of the statistical analysis, which indicated a negative correlation between republican punishment attacks and other types of republican violence. Results of the statistical model indicate that an area experiencing five acts of republican terrorism in a given year, as coded by

the GTD, would experience three fewer republican punishment attacks than an identical area experiencing no republican terrorism. Substantively, this difference may seem small at first blush, but it is important to recall that the sample average number of punishment attacks rounded to just two incidents per LGA-year during the period under analysis.¹⁷

Although this result should be interpreted cautiously, given the data limitations highlighted previously, it corresponds to the general pattern observed in the PIRA’s campaign against criminals during the mid-1970s. In the early years of the Troubles, the PIRA took a limited role in vigilantism, as it focused its efforts on attacking strategically significant British Army, RUC and civilian targets. However, with the arrival of the group’s nearly year-long ceasefire in early 1975, PIRA volunteers became much more directly involved in punishing suspected joyriders and thieves in republican strongholds.¹⁸ The negative correlation between dissident republican punishment attacks and other acts of political violence perpetrated by these groups provides a preliminary indication that the dissidents have adopted a similar perspective on the relationship between their war on crime, on the one hand, and their war against the British state in Ireland, on the other.

Additionally, the national spokesperson for the 32CSM acknowledged that the availability of manpower was likely to be a major concern for any militant group interested in punishment attacks. According to the spokesman:

[I]f you look at it from their [the RIRA’s] perspective that takes up huge amounts of time, resources, it puts people’s lives at risk who have to carry out that type of action. It allows police time to perhaps arrest people, so the issue of a punishment shooting needs to be looked at in all its complexity, and it’s not something that republicans would take on lightly, I’d imagine (32CSM Spokesperson 2011).

The spokesman went on to explain that he believed “the so-called Real IRA is getting stronger.” Although he denied having any direct knowledge of RIRA operational decisions, he believed that there had been “a lot more recruits ... and following an increase in strength is an increase in activity ... [such as] facilitating community policing [by the

¹⁷Restricting the sample to only non-zero observations increases the average to approximately five attacks per LGA-year.

¹⁸See chapter six for a full assessment of the evolution of the PIRA’s war on crime in North Belfast during this crucial period.

republican movement]” (ibid).¹⁹

Regardless of their validity as indicators of RIRA strength, the 32CSM spokesman’s statement about the relationship between the availability of manpower and the frequency of punishment attacks indicates that, like their predecessors in the PIRA, dissident groups feel constrained in their ability to act against anti-social behavior in their own communities and the availability of volunteers appears to be one of the most important such constraints. Furthermore, these statements once again highlight the strategic nature of punishment attacks. Given their preference for planning and carrying out attacks against British Army and police targets, these manpower constraints are likely to be felt most acutely during periods when dissident groups are relatively more active in conducting offensive operations.

Beyond the opportunity and manpower costs of RPAs, punishment attacks—and political violence more generally—also became less costly for all dissident republican groups after the PIRA completed its final act of decommissioning in the autumn of 2005. In the immediate aftermath of the signing of the GFA, the military and political effectiveness of dissident groups was severely constrained by public revulsion at the RIRA’s mass killing of civilians at Omagh in August 1998 and the readiness of the PIRA itself to take direct action against the dissidents. Michael McKeivitt, at that time the leader of the RIRA, reflected on the dire strategic position of his own group as they contemplated a return to political violence two years after the Omagh bomb. At a meeting in February 2000, McKeivitt informed David Rupert, an informant working for the FBI and MI5, that he might be forced to wait “for Gerry Adams to declare decommissioning before he started to wage a campaign” (Mooney and O’Toole 2003, 330).

Although Rupert appears to have regarded McKeivitt’s claim as bluster, it was nevertheless an accurate assessment of political and military realities in Northern Ireland at the time. The emergence of the RIRA was greeted by the PIRA with both threats and acts of violence. In the immediate aftermath of the Omagh bomb, a PIRA spokesman told the *Belfast Telegraph* that the RIRA “should disband and they should do so sooner

¹⁹While these claims of increased strength should be regarded with appropriate skepticism, there is some outside evidence indicating that such statements might not be wholly misleading.

rather than later” (*Belfast Telegraph* 1999). The PIRA delivered on this thinly veiled threat in October 2000, just as the RIRA began its return to military action, when Joseph O’Connor, a member of the 32CSM and, allegedly, the commander of the Belfast Brigade of the RIRA, was assassinated in the PIRA stronghold of Ballymurphy. This incident, along with the 2004 kidnapping of a prominent dissident named Bobby Tohill, led the security editor for the *Sunday Tribune* to conclude that “the Provisional IRA has genuinely tried to crush” the RIRA (Breen 2009).

Given the British Government’s apparent ambivalence toward PIRA ‘housekeeping,’ it was obvious that dissident groups, including the RIRA, would have a difficult time operating so long as the PIRA maintained both its arsenal and its position of dominance within republican communities (Frampton 2010, Frampton 2011, Sawyer 2012). However, the political and military landscape confronted by the RIRA and other dissidents changed dramatically on July 28th, 2005, when the leadership of the PIRA issued a statement explaining that it had “formally ordered an end to the armed campaign” and that, subsequently, “All IRA [sic] units have been order to dump arms . . . [and] to assist the development of purely political and democratic programmes [sic] through exclusively peaceful means.” Less than six months later, the PIRA had delivered on its pledge, surrendering and putting beyond use its entire arsenal under the supervision of the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning.

With the elimination of the military threat posed by the PIRA, dissident groups were free to gradually emerge from the shadows of the republican communities that had sheltered them since 1998. This was precisely the point made by a “senior republican” who told the Belfast newspaper, *Sunday Life*, that, since 2005, dissidents “don’t care about stepping on the toes of the Provos because there’s nothing they [the PIRA] can do” (Breen 2007). In short, the potential *costs* for engaging in any form of political violence were dramatically reduced by the disarming of the PIRA.²⁰

As expected, dissident groups responded to this strategic change with an almost im-


²⁰Sawyer (2012) makes a similar point with reference to the emergence of republican splinter groups during earlier periods of the Irish conflict, but does not make the explicit link between decommissioning and dissident punishment attacks presented here.

mediate increase in activity. The number of republican punishment attacks in Northern Ireland increased significantly from November 2005 onward, reaching a peak of seven attacks in October 2006 alone. Perhaps unexpectedly, however, the elimination of the threat posed by the PIRA did not have the same effect on dissident activity in all of Northern Ireland's traditional republican heartlands. While the general trend in North Belfast and Derry City after 2005 was in the direction of an increase in the frequency of republican punishment attacks, the opposite was true in areas like West Belfast, Strabane and Dungannon. Indeed, as figure 8.5 demonstrates, a significant proportion of Northern Ireland's LGAs remained free from republican punishment attacks fully four years after the PIRA dumped its arms, while others suffered severely at the hands of the RIRA and other dissident groups. The different local effects of PIRA decommissioning partly explain the surprising results of the decommissioning dummy variable included in the statistical analysis.

8.3.3 The Value of Counterinsurgency Intelligence

Finally, the frequency of republican punishment attacks in post-Good Friday Agreement Northern Ireland has continued to be influenced by the response of dissident republicans to the intelligence gathering and counterinsurgency efforts led by the PSNI. As predicted, police seizures of firearms and ammunition exhibited a negative quadratic relationship with republican punishment attacks. As can be seen in figure 8.6, this relationship differs slightly from the one observed during the waning days of the PIRA's campaign in the 1990s, with the peak number of expected RPAs occurring approximately one standard deviation above the sample mean for the weapons index, all else equal. Nevertheless, it appears that low and moderate levels of weapons seizures continued to act as alarm bells for republican paramilitary groups after the signing of the GFA. The sounding of these alarms alerted republican militants to new counterinsurgency threats, encouraging the militants to take a more active role in policing their communities in order to deny the PSNI access to these areas and to prevent the police from exploiting suspected criminals as part of their counterinsurgency campaign against the militants.

Figure 8.6: Marginal Effect of Police Weapons Seizures



money being spent indicates that the PSNI have attached greater value to the information provided by human intelligence sources since the PIRA’s disbandment in late 2005.


Furthermore, as figure 8.7 indicates, police spending on informers over the past seven fiscal years has exhibited a relatively close relationship with the total number of republican punishment attacks across Northern Ireland. The two variables demonstrate a relatively high, and statistically significant, pairwise correlation of 0.85.²² This correlation fits with the general expectation established above the republican paramilitary groups would conduct more punishment attacks as the value attached to new counterinsurgency intelligence increased.

Dissident republican groups have spoken frankly about their beliefs regarding the connection between ordinary crime and counterinsurgency intelligence. The national spokesperson for the 32CSM explained that groups like the RIRA might have a particularly keen interest in punishing drug dealers and driving them off of the streets because

... they’re also part of the British policing effort, in that traditionally they’ve [the RUC and PSNI] used informers, through the drugs trade, they protect

²²The correlation is significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level. In the interest of protecting their sources, the PSNI will not release a geographic breakdown of their spending on informers.

Figure 8.7: Police CHIS Spending vs. Republican Punishment Attacks



drug dealers in republican areas ... They're [drug dealers] the primary source of information for British policing (32CSM Spokesperson 2011).

Although this assessment probably overstates the importance of drug dealers as counterinsurgency informants, it nevertheless reveals the seriousness with which dissident republicans regard this threat. More significantly, the 32CSM spokesman's statement once again highlights the strategic nature of punishment attacks. The RIRA's motivation for maiming suspected drug dealers is greater when they believe the police will use suspected criminals as counterinsurgent informants.

8.4 Conclusion

Taken as a whole, these results provide tentative evidence in support of the theory proposed in chapter three. In keeping with previous studies, the statistical models confirmed that punishment attacks were more likely to occur in local government areas that had large young male populations. An increase in the male claimant rate was also found to increase the likelihood that an area would experience republican punishment attacks, indicating that across Northern Ireland paramilitary vigilantism tends to be more prevalent in regions

with high levels of socio-economic deprivation. Although the size of the young male population and the proportion of unemployed males living in a district do not appear to have an interactive effect, it is nevertheless possible that both of these variables serve as proxies for the real, as opposed to reported, crime rate in an area, indicating that increases in the crime rate account for some of the observed variation in republican punishment attacks. The ethnic segregation of Northern Ireland was found to impact the frequency with which dissident groups punish suspected drug dealers and anti-social elements in two ways. First, their analysis presented above confirmed the finding presented in chapter four that paramilitary vigilantism in Northern Ireland is characterized by an ethnic division of labor. Fearing a potential loyalist backlash, dissident republican groups have been hesitant to extend their operations into Protestant districts, despite persistent frustration with the PSNI in these areas. To a certain extent, loyalist paramilitary groups have taken on the vigilante role in traditional loyalist strongholds, although there is evidence that loyalist punishment attacks are more often used as a means of settling territorial disputes between rival loyalist paramilitary gangs. More generally, increasing levels of Catholic residential segregation tended to be associated with increasing levels of republican punishment attacks. Additionally, dissident republican groups appear to use punishment attacks to capitalize on the perceived institutional failures of the status quo government. By doing so, they likely hope to advance their own long-term institution building objectives by establishing themselves as the most effective and most trustworthy protectors of law and order in Northern Ireland's republican communities. However, these groups are also constrained in terms of their ability to deliver rough justice in their own communities, particularly when they are also busy planning and conducting operations against the army and police themselves. Vigilantism appears to be downplayed by dissident groups during periods when they are conducting more frequent military operations. The threat posed by informers also appears to influence the willingness of republican groups to conduct punishment attacks, although this is only one of the many factors that influence the insurgent response to crime and anti-social behavior.

Several of these results have implications for how both policy makers and scholars

respond to and understand punishment attacks as a distinct form of insurgent-against-civilian violence during wartime. The finding that insurgent vigilantism wanes as other forms of insurgent military activity proliferate demonstrates the resource constraints often confronted by insurgent groups. Because governments typically have access to vastly greater resources than do insurgent groups governments might seek to capitalize on this weakness. In particular, governments might take the surprising step of dedicating more of their own resources to problems associated with ordinary crime, drug dealing and anti-social behavior when insurgent groups are frequently attacking military targets. Such action would allow the government to capitalize on the insurgent group’s inability to simultaneously wage wars on both crime and the status quo government. This is exactly the kind of interplay between rebel and police decision making that was predicted by the formal model. As a result, we also know that any police attempt to capitalize on the breakdown of nascent insurgent institutions will also be constrained by the cost-benefit analysis conducted by the police. If insurgent groups have used calls to an emergency hotline — e.g. 911 calls in the United States or 999 calls in the United Kingdom — to set the police up for an ambush, then police officers might be hesitant to respond to ordinary crimes in communities that are considered friendly to the insurgents. However, the police must carefully weigh these potential costs against the benefits to be gained by exposing the ineffectiveness and/or unreliability of insurgent vigilantism as a means of responding to criminal activity.

Equally, both the statistical and anecdotal evidence presented above indicated that insurgent groups use punishment attacks as a means to undermine the state’s institutional monopoly on law and order, and that they do so precisely in the strategic fashion indicated by the formal model. Dissident republican groups were more likely to punish suspected criminals at time t in areas where the police had performed poorly in the recent past, as indicated by a lower proportion of crimes being solved by the police at time $t - 1$. This result compliments the findings presented in chapter four, which indicated that the PIRA was historically more likely to conduct punishment attacks in an area as public frustration with police increased. However, given the emerging nature of the dissident

republican threat in the years since the GFA, the policy implications of this result are slightly different than those presented in the conclusion of chapter four. The benefits of undermining the police and usurping their role as the dominant providers of law and order are likely to be greatest in the early days of an insurgency when the rebels have only weak support in their own communities. As the ONH representative quoted previously indicated, in this setting punishment attacks can “open doors...literally.” Thus, it is particularly important that governments maintain a high level of service in terms of civil policing even when they are confronted with an emerging threat from an insurgent group. Ensuring that public satisfaction with the police remains high might seem costly in this context. Nevertheless, investing in civil policing during the early days of an insurgency can deny the rebels an opportunity to exploit a perceived weakness of the government and prevent them from using vigilantism as a means of cultivating support from their constituents.

The discovery of an ethnic division of labor in terms of insurgent vigilantism also has potential implications for how police forces might be structured to accommodate communal differences in a deeply divided society. Historically, the homogeneously Protestant composition of the RUC was one of the leading complaints leveled against the force by Northern Ireland’s Catholic population. However, the fact that both Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland appear to prefer that vigilantism in their communities be carried out by coethnics might imply a more general preference for cooperation with coethnics as protectors of law and order. Although this expectation is not tested directly in the present analysis, it implies that police forces in deeply divided societies might be better received, and potentially more effective, if they match the ethnicity of their officers to the ethnic composition of the beats that they patrol. Such a result would dovetail with Lyall’s (2010) finding a “coethnicity advantage” in counterinsurgency. In addition to being better at combating an insurgency once it has begun, coethnic police and security forces might also have an advantage in maintaining the support of their constituents and preventing an insurgency from developing in the first place.

In addition to the results described above, the statistical analysis also produced findings

that were contrary to our prior theoretical expectations. For instance, ethnic residential segregation and the concentration of criminal law offices were expected to modify the relationship between dissident republican military action and dissident republican punishment attacks. This expectation was not borne out by either statistical model presented in this chapter. It is possible that these anomalous results are a product of the altered strategic environment confronted by dissident republican groups in Northern Ireland since the late 1990s. By the onset of the peace process in 1994, the PIRA had clearly established itself as a hegemonic power in republican communities. As a result, the group was also able to act as the hegemonic provider of vigilante justice in these same communities. In the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement, the competitive environment faced by aspiring republican militant organizations changed significantly. A veritable alphabet soup of dissident groups emerged both during and after the peace process to become king of the republican hill vacated by the disarming of the PIRA in 2005. The competition between these groups could alter the relationships predicted by the formal model, which assumes only one challenger and one incumbent force are at work. Future research should explore in greater detail how intra-ethnic competition between insurgent groups influences each organization's willingness to take on the responsibilities of enforcing law and order within their own communities.

The findings presented in this chapter offered mixed support for the hypotheses derived from the formal model. Nevertheless, the qualitative and quantitative evidence discussed above once again highlights the importance of disaggregating insurgent-against-civilian violence. In keeping with much of the extant literature, this analysis indicated that punishment attacks, like many other forms of violence against civilians during wartime, are partly a product of the informational environment in which insurgents and counterinsurgents operate. However, vigilantism can also be costly to the insurgent groups that practice it in ways that other forms of insurgent-against-civilian violence are not. Manpower and resources must be marshaled to round-up and, ultimately, to punish suspected criminals. For many insurgent groups, these assets are scarce commodities, and the results presented here indicate that, all else equal, insurgents will freely trade-off the institution building

benefits of punishment attacks when military operations place ever greater demands on insurgent manpower and matériel. At the same time, punishment attacks produce benefits that are qualitatively different from those obtained by insurgent groups that kill suspected informers or use violence to extort “revolutionary taxes” from their constituents. Insurgents use these attacks to build a reputation for trustworthiness as providers of law and order, arguably the most fundamental public good provided by modern states. In doing so, they seek to replace the institutions of the status quo power with their own gruesome system of frontier justice, thereby undermining public confidence in the government while simultaneously advancing their own objectives as a government in waiting. These contrasts between punishment attacks and other forms of violence against civilians lead to different policy prescriptions in order to keep civilians, even those suspected of criminal behavior, safe from political violence.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

Insurgents groups, as well as the governments they are trying to overthrow, frequently engage in both selective and indiscriminate violence against civilians during civil wars. In recent years, social scientists have made considerable contributions to our understanding of why, when and where both the insurgents themselves (Azam 2006, Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Balcells 2011, Humphreys and Weinstein 2006, Kalyvas 2006, Weinstein 2007, Wood 2010) and status quo governments attack their erstwhile constituents. However, previous studies have exhibited a tendency to treat all acts of insurgent-against-civilian violence as functionally equivalent. In the two perspectives that currently dominate the literature, insurgent groups are assumed to target civilians either as a means of coercing them into supporting the insurgent group or as a means of extracting rents from their otherwise unwilling hosts. Both empirically and theoretically, these two paradigms appear to account for a great deal of the violence that targets civilians during civil wars and insurgencies. Nevertheless, the evidence presented throughout this dissertation has indicated that, although explanations based on the dynamics of coercion and exploitation are useful, they are also incomplete.

In regard to their relationship with their civilian constituents, insurgent groups have objectives that go beyond deterring civilian collaboration with the status quo government or extracting rents needed for the maintenance of the insurgent group itself. In the long term insurgent groups seek to build shadow institutions that will ultimately be used to

replace the machinery of governance operated by status quo powers. These institution building efforts take on diverse forms, ranging from the provision of basic health care and education services to the establishment rudimentary forms of public transportation and the operating of drinking and social clubs in areas with few social amenities. In addition to these seemingly benign forms of social welfare provision, insurgent groups also seek to replace the institutions of law and order provided by incumbent powers, as represented by the police forces, courts, prisons and parole boards operated by most governments. Lacking the resources and infrastructure to build formal prisons or staff permanent police forces, insurgent groups often rely on crude forms of vigilante justice to punish suspected criminals amongst their constituent populations.

These vigilante attacks take on diverse forms, ranging from the stoning of adulterers and rapists in Afghanistan, Somalia and Mali to the public beating and shaming of suspected thieves in India and the mutilation with baseball bats, metal spikes and firearms of suspected drug dealers in Northern Ireland. The common thread uniting these diverse examples is that the victims of these attacks were not targeted because they were suspected of collaborating with the security forces. Instead, each victim was targeted specifically on the suspicion that he or she had violated a legal or moral code that the insurgent group sought to enforce in its community. The exact nature of the laws enforced by each group is relatively unimportant. What is more significant is that insurgent groups from the Islamists in Afghanistan to the Maoists in India and nationalists in Ireland chose to utilize their scarce manpower and resources to apprehend and to physically punish suspected criminals, often in a very public manner.

Indeed, available evidence indicates that the victims of insurgent vigilantism represent a large, if often underrepresented, proportion of the victims of insurgent-against-civilian violence more generally. In Northern Ireland, republican paramilitary groups intentionally maimed or wounded nearly 2,100 people accused of drug dealing and other forms of anti-social behavior between 1973 and 1998, almost all of them Catholic civilians. Over the same time period, republican groups killed nearly 1,700 people of whom fewer than 400 were Catholic. In Spain, the 35 alleged drug dealers targeted by ETA between 1980

and 1994 represented roughly one in every fourteen of the more than 500 people killed by Basque separatists during that time period (De la Calle and Sanchez-Cuenca 2007). Comparable figures are not readily available for other conflicts, however recent statements issued by the United Nations Assistance Mission (UNAMA) in Afghanistan indicate that the brutal punishments imposed by so-called “Taliban courts” are a common feature of Taliban activity, particularly in western Afghanistan.¹ Human Rights Watch has expressed similar concerns in regard to the “people’s courts” administered by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) in Aleppo and other rebel held territories (Human Rights Watch 2012). Despite the evident frequency with which insurgent groups engage in vigilante violence, previous studies of insurgent-against-civilian violence have paid little attention to this phenomenon.

This omission is all the more significant because acts of insurgent vigilantism impose unique costs on and produce unique benefits for insurgents groups that are not paralleled by, or even necessarily correlated with, the factors expected to produce the types of coercive or exploitative violence described by Kalyvas (2006), Weinstein (2007) and others. The victims of vigilantism typically are not selected because they are believed to be collaborating with the state, so the role of these punishments in deterring future such defections is likely to be minimal at best. Even if one were to assume that insurgent groups turn to vigilante justice as a costly signal of their ability to use selective violence as a means of punishment, it is not clear that sending such a signal would serve as an effective deterrent against collaboration with the incumbent power. On the one hand, attacking criminals might not provide potential collaborators with any information about the ability or willingness of an insurgent group to punish those that support the incumbent. On the other, if the insurgents punish a large number of criminals, but relatively few suspected collaborators, the vigilante attacks might serve as a signal that the insurgent group is skilled at investigating crimes, but inept at identifying and punishing suspected collaborators. In this context punishment attacks would likely diminish the deterrent effect of anti-collaborator killings.

¹In a 2012 report on the protection of civilians in Afghanistan, UNAMA officials admitted frankly that “many more incidents of Taliban parallel judicial structures issue punishments occur and are underreported [sic]” (UNAMA 2012, 24).

Additionally, punishment attacks are often, although not always,² intentionally non-lethal affairs in which the victim is wounded or maimed, but not killed. The non-lethal punishment of suspected criminals is particularly risky for insurgent groups, given the assumption that the victims of insurgent vigilantism are not suspected of previous defections against the insurgents. These alleged criminals may have been indifferent to the activity of local insurgents prior to being punished. However, it is also possible that they will seek retribution against their attackers by collaborating with the COIN forces of the status quo government. Dead men tell no tales, but flogged men might not be so tight lipped.

Finally, the mere act of diverting manpower, vehicles, weapons and the like to aid in the apprehension and punishment of suspected rapists, thieves or vandals can be a potentially costly distraction for insurgent groups, particularly given the disadvantages under which these groups typically operate on the battlefield. Insurgent groups typically face shortages of both manpower and weapons, particularly in comparison to the better financed and often better organized governments that they seek to overthrow. The often public nature of vigilante punishments exposes the vigilantes themselves to possible apprehension or assassination. If insurgent soldiers are arrested while carrying out a punishment attack, then the weapons and any information on insurgent operations that they carry with them will also fall into the hands of the incumbent power. Even if men and matériel are not captured by the enemy, any of these resources that are tasked with conducting vigilante attacks cannot simultaneously be used to reconnoiter or attack military targets. As a result, punishment attacks have the potential to impose significant material and opportunity costs on the insurgents. Coercive attacks do not impose the same kind of costs, as such attacks make a direct contribution to the insurgent group's effectiveness on the battlefield.

Why then do insurgent groups engage in this behavior so frequently, despite the dubious value of punishment attacks as a means of deterring collaboration with the enemy, as well as the significant informational, material and opportunity costs associated with

²For instance, stoning is a form of punishment frequently used by Islamist groups which frequently leads to the death of the victim, while the Basque separatist group ETA assassinated alleged drug dealers in the Basque Autonomous Community.

insurgent vigilantism? The answer lies in linking the benefits of punishment attacks in particular to the long term institution building goals of the insurgent group. In this perspective, punishment attacks serve a dual purpose by increasing the public's reliance on the shadow institutions being constructed by the insurgent group while simultaneously undermining the public's reliance on the status quo government for the provision of public security, arguably the most fundamental of public goods provided by modern states.

This dissertation developed a game theoretical model that incorporated these insights about the costs and benefits of insurgent vigilantism and provided theoretical insights into when and where insurgent groups might privilege their institution building goals, through the provision of vigilante justice, even at the expense of decreasing their effectiveness on the battlefield. The model placed an insurgent group and a status quo government in direct competition to become the providers of law enforcement in a community, and indicated how the insurgent group's allocation of resources to vigilantism is often conditioned by the group's expectation regarding how the state police force will respond to "ordinary" crime. The results of the comparative statics analysis, presented in chapter three, indicated that, all else equal, insurgent groups will conduct more punishment attacks when the benefits of vigilantism are high, the costs of vigilantism are low or when the police assign a high value to new counterinsurgency intelligence that might be provided by ordinary street criminals.

However, all else is frequently not equal, and the first two of these expectations were found to be conditioned by other factors. When the costs of vigilantism outweigh the benefits, insurgent groups were predicted to conduct fewer punishment attacks as their ability to identify new informants recruited by the police increased. In other words, the effectiveness of insurgent counterespionage operations was expected to act as a cost multiplier. Under the same conditions ($C_T \geq B_T$) insurgents were expected to punish more criminals as the likelihood that the police would succeed in recruiting suspected criminals as COIN informants increased. Finally, insurgent groups were expected to engage in more vigilantism as the likelihood that the police would investigate any crimes ignored by the insurgents increased. This expectation also held if and only if the costs of vigilantism more than offset the associated benefits. These latter two predictions demonstrate the

Table 9.1: Confirmed Hypotheses

Hypothesis	Evidence	Chapter
H1A: More punishment attacks as the benefits of punishment attacks increase.	Negative correlation between punishment attacks and Catholic willingness to phone police	Four
	Negative correlation between PA and lagged sanction-detection rate	Eight
	More PA as PIRA focused on institution building, anticipated British withdrawal from NI in 1975	Seven
H2A: Fewer punishment attacks as the costs of punishment attacks increase	Fewer PA in Dungannon as PIRA manpower depleted by arrest and assassination during 1990s	Six
	Positive correlation between PA number of republicans released from prison	Four
	More PA in North Belfast during 1975 ceasefire	Seven
	Negative correlation between PA and other known republican paramilitary activity; Dissident republican concerns about manpower/opportunity costs of PA	Eight
H3A: More punishment attacks as the value of counterinsurgency intelligence increases	Negative quadratic relationship between PA and weapons index.	Four and Eight
	Few PA in Dungannon (low value of COIN), many PA in Newry and Mourne (high value of COIN)	Six
H4A: More punishment attacks if insurgents more likely to identify new informers, if and only if costs are greater than benefits	Positive interactive effect between released prisoners and Catholic isolation index.	Four
H4B: More punishment attacks when police more likely to recruit criminals as COIN informants, if and only if costs are greater than benefits.	Negative main effect of criminal law offices.	Four
H4C: More punishment attacks when the police are more likely to investigate crime ignored by insurgents, if and only if the cost of punishment attacks outweigh the benefits	Positive interactive effect between police concentration and Catholic willingness to phone police; interaction significant only for high levels of latter variable	Four

conditions under which the insurgent group will either discount the costs of vigilantism or give greater weight to the associated benefits.

The theoretical expectations laid out above were explored empirically using both qualitative and quantitative evidence derived from the recent, and indeed ongoing, conflict in Northern Ireland. The results provided robust support for many of the predictions derived from the formal model, although other findings offered only mixed support for these expectations. Table 9.1 provides a brief summary of the hypotheses highlighted above, as well as a description of how each hypothesis was operationalized in the relevant empirical chapter and an indication of whether or not the expected relationship was confirmed by the results of the analysis.

The results of the two quantitative chapters provided robust support for the expectation that insurgent vigilantism is the product of a unique costs versus benefits calculation. Chapter four, which presented a statistical analysis of Provisional Irish Republican Army

(PIRA) punishment attacks at the local government level in Northern Ireland between 1994 and 2000, indicated that insurgent vigilantism becomes more common as the size of the insurgent group's labor pool increases. Substantively, the people of Belfast could anticipate an additional punishment attack for roughly every two republican paramilitaries released from prison each year, while the people of Northern Ireland's other local government areas could expect an additional attack for roughly every three such prisoners released each year. Qualitative evidence presented in chapters six and seven indicated that PIRA decision makers in North Belfast, Dungannon and South Armagh were acutely aware of the demands that punishment attacks placed on the group's relatively small labor pool. Similarly, chapter eight, which presented a mixture of both qualitative and quantitative evidence of punishment attacks conducted by dissident republican groups in Northern Ireland after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, demonstrated that these groups have been less willing to promote their brand of vigilante justice when they have been relatively more active in attacking military and economic targets. On average, dissident groups carried out one fewer punishment attack for every two additional attacks against military or economic targets in an LGA-year.³

Qualitative evidence presented in chapters six through eight fleshed out these correlations, demonstrating that variations in the material and opportunity costs of punishment attacks influenced the republican approach to vigilantism across a variety of times and places throughout Northern Ireland's troubled history. In North Belfast, the arrival of the PIRA's prolonged "truce" with the British government in 1974 freed up the group's activists to pay closer attention to crime and anti-social behavior in Ardoyne, Unity Flats and other local republican strongholds. The result was a dramatic spike in republican punishment attacks in the area for the duration of the truce, followed by a rapid decline in PIRA vigilantism once the group returned to war in late 1975. In contrast, by the early 1990s PIRA units operating under the banner of the group's notorious East Tyrone

³The marginal effect of a one unit change in the republican terrorism variable was calculated with all other variables, except the Belfast and PIRA decommissioning dummies, set at their means. Marginal effects were calculated for each of the four combinations of the two dummy variables (i.e. Belfast=1 and Decommissioning=1; Belfast=0 and Decommissioning=0; Belfast=1 and Decommissioning=0; Belfast=0 and Decommissioning=1) and the results of the four calculations were averaged. All calculations were computed using the Margins package in Stata 11.2.

Brigade (ETB) were faced with mounting losses resulting from the arrest and assassination of Brigade volunteers throughout the 1980s. Public outrage expressed in the aftermath of a pair of particularly brutal punishments conducted by the ETB in the early 1990s further reduced the ETB's willingness to task its few remaining volunteers with carrying out similar attacks in subsequent years. With only a handful of operatives available in the Dungannon area and facing the possibility of further negative publicity, the ETB focused its remaining energies on launching attacks against the British army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, right up until the arrival of the PIRA's final ceasefire in 1997. In contrast, the PIRA's South Armagh Brigade, which operated in an equally rural border region of Northern Ireland that had a long history of republican activism, was not hampered by similar manpower shortages in the waning years of the Troubles. As a result, SAB volunteers were amongst the most prolific of the PIRA's vigilantes outside of Belfast throughout the 1990s. More recently, a national spokesman for the 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM), a group widely believed to be the political wing of the RIRA, admitted that republicans in Derry, Down and Fermanagh felt punishing criminals was a distraction which placed a significant strain on the RIRA's rather limited manpower and occasionally reduced the group's ability to engage in military activity against the "crown forces."

These results illustrate the relationship between an insurgent group's labor supply and its willingness to engage in vigilantism. When the size of an insurgent group's labor pool is reduced, through the assassination or capture of insurgent soldiers, the opportunity costs of allocating manpower to the apprehension and punishment of suspected criminals are magnified. As a result, insurgent groups tend to reduce their involvement in vigilantism as their labor pool dwindles, apparently preferring to assign their remaining operatives to engage in other military activities. On the other hand, when insurgent ranks swell, either because of increased a lull in military activity on the part of the insurgent group or as a result of captured insurgents being freed from prison, insurgent commanders will have greater freedom to assign some activists to law enforcement duties. These findings have implications for how policymakers approach a wide variety of issues in the context of insurgency and civil war.

In the waning days of an insurgency, insurgent groups often request that status quo governments release imprisoned insurgents as confidence building measure prior to undertaking negotiations toward a settlement to the conflict. The evidence presented above indicates that, although such prisoner releases often bear fruit in the long run, they also have the potential to lead to a short-term increase in human rights abuses on the behalf of the insurgent group. Furthermore, prisoner releases have the potential to undermine the bargaining position of the status quo government, to the extent that these releases lower the insurgent group's opportunity costs for vigilantism and that punishment attacks help to bolster support for the insurgents amongst their constituents.

Although punishment attacks appear to be costly to the insurgent groups that conduct them, these groups also stand to derive significant political benefits from this type of activity. Vigilantism benefits the insurgent group in two ways. First, punishment attacks themselves provide a kind of "propaganda of the deed" by highlighting the inability of the state to respond effectively to ordinary crime in the midst of an ongoing insurgency. Second, the attacks benefit the insurgent group directly to the extent that local people come to rely on the insurgents rather than the status quo government for law enforcement services. In this way punishment attacks help to advance the institution building objectives of the insurgent group. Furthermore, in certain circumstances these perceived benefits appear to trump the associated costs of insurgent vigilantism.

Empirically, the quantitative analyses presented in chapter four and chapter eight highlighted the strategic relationship between public dissatisfaction with the police and the occurrence of insurgent vigilantism. Chapter four showed that, all else equal, the PIRA was more likely to punish suspected criminals in areas where the level of Catholic trust in the police was relatively low. Similarly, the results presented in chapter eight indicated that, all else equal, dissident republican groups have been more likely to punish suspected criminals in areas where the police have recently performed poorly, as measured by the lagged proportion of reported crimes in the area resolved by the police. These results indicate that insurgent groups seek to take advantage of perceived weaknesses of the state as they attempt to construct their own shadow institutions. When the public believes

the police are ineffective, or when they in fact appear to be ineffective, at dealing with ordinary crime, insurgent groups are likely to have an easier time establishing themselves as effective providers of law and order through the use of punishment attacks. Given the public's level of disaffection toward the status quo police force insurgent groups hope to use the issues of law and order to consolidate support amongst their potential constituents while simultaneously continuing to undermine the relationships that bind the public to its erstwhile government.

Qualitative evidence presented in chapters seven and eight indicated that both the PIRA in North Belfast and, more recently, dissident republican groups throughout Northern Ireland have thought about the strategic benefits of punishment attacks in similar terms. The PIRA's nearly year-long ceasefire in the mid-1970s provided the group with an opportunity to focus its energies on what a young Gerry Adams referred to as social republicanism by providing "a peoples alternative to the British system. . . at every opportunity on as many fronts as possible" (Adams 1975). One of the areas in which republicans were most active in constructing a "people's alternative" was that of law and order. The North Belfast Battalion of the PIRA's Belfast Brigade dedicated a significant share of its resources to investigating crimes and punishing criminals in the area throughout the ceasefire. Local volunteers saw an opportunity in the form of persistent local alienation from the RUC. Their belief in the institution building benefits of punishment attacks was likely reinforced by a sense that, throughout the truce period, some form of negotiated British withdrawal was in the offing. As a result, the construction of a government-in-waiting took on added urgency for PIRA members during this period.

In more recent years, and despite their relative weakness when compared to both the British state in Ireland and the republican militias that have preceded them, dissident republican groups have also sought to use punishment attacks as a means of undermining the public relationship with the recently reformed Police Service of Northern Ireland, while simultaneously laying a foundation for their own long term objectives. An anonymous representative of the dissident group Óglaih na hÉireann summarized that organization's understanding of the potential benefits of punishment attacks, telling reporters from the

Irish News that punishment shootings were “literally” opening doors for the group and improving ONH’s support within republican communities.

These results highlight the complex relationship between bread and butter issues like law enforcement on the one hand, and more conventional battlefield concerns during a counterinsurgency. Although governments might be tempted to dedicate an overwhelming share of their resources to confronting and defeating insurgents on the battlefield, they must be careful to strike a balance between battlefield operations and the provision of basic services, especially in the area of law and order. An exclusive focus on counterinsurgency operations has the potential to provide the insurgent group with an opportunity to further integrate itself with its constituents by building nascent alternative institutions that could undermine the long term political position of the status quo government, thereby potentially increasing the durability of the insurgency.

The potential tradeoff between providing resources to civil or counterinsurgency police operations is not the only way in which these two activities are intertwined with insurgent vigilantism. The formal model predicted that insurgents would conduct more punishment attacks when the police possessed relatively low quality intelligence on local insurgent activity. Substantively, this expectation rested on the assumption that the police often attempt to coerce suspected criminals into providing counterinsurgency intelligence in exchange for leniency on whatever criminal charges might be brought against them. This tactic is likely to be more valuable to the police when they know relatively little about the insurgents, because the type of information available from ordinary criminals is likely to be fairly rudimentary. Empirically, this expectation was born out by the quantitative results presented in chapters four and eight. In both cases, punishment attacks demonstrated a negative-quadratic relationship with the number of weapons seized by the police. Small weapons seizures appear to have acted as trip wires, warning the militants that local criminals might be keeping tabs on the comings and goings of local republicans, and increasing the incentive to punish suspected anti-social elements as a means of denying the police access to this potential source of counterinsurgency intelligence. On the other hand, large weapons seizures appeared to have almost no effect on the frequency of republican vigilan-

tism, possibly because these discoveries indicated that the insurgents were compromised by a potentially high-level informant.

One implication of this result is that counterinsurgents should be cautious in terms of how they utilize counterinsurgency intelligence gleaned from non-traditional sources such as suspected criminals. Moving against individual insurgents or small arms caches identified by these means risks exposing the counterinsurgent's source, as well as other local criminals, to punishment by the insurgents. More importantly, although these low level intelligence successes are likely to reduce the military capability of the insurgents only at the margins, they can also serve as motivation for the insurgents to make a greater investment in constructing their own shadow institutions of law and order in the form of vigilante justice. Thus, small intelligence gains have the potential to contribute to the undermining of the status quo government to the extent that insurgent groups are likely to derive political benefits, as described above, from an increase in vigilante activity.

Theoretically, the effect of the costs and benefits of punishment attacks on insurgent decision making was also expected to be conditioned by other features of the strategic environment. In particular, insurgent groups were expected to discount the costs of vigilantism when they believed that the police were relatively more likely to be successful in coercing suspected criminals into becoming informants. At the same time, insurgents were expected to weigh the costs of punishment more heavily when they believed that their own counterespionage measures were relatively more effective or when they believed that that the police were unlikely to become aware of criminal activity ignored by the insurgents. Empirically, these expectations received mixed support from the qualitative and quantitative evidence presented in this project.

On average, republican insurgent groups were significantly more likely to punish criminals in areas where a relative lack of criminal lawyers implied that any suspects apprehended by the police would lack the resources required to enable these individuals to resist police attempts to coerce them into providing information on local insurgent activity. However, these relationships only held under the assumption that an average number of republican prisoners were released to the area (in chapter four) or that dissident groups

were not engaged in *any* other military activity in the region.

Changes in the size of the PIRA's labor pool, as represented by the number of republican prisoners released from jails in Northern Ireland, appear to have had different effects of the group's approach to vigilantism, conditional on local levels of ethnic residential segregation. The marginal value of each additional prisoner released, or conversely of each additional activist imprisoned, was greatest in areas that were homogeneously Catholic, although this result was not confirmed by the analysis of dissident republican activity presented in chapter eight. Thus, ethnic homogeneity appears to have multiplied the perceived costs of punishment attacks. Insurgent groups can take advantage of the relatively dense intraethnic social networks that are likely to prevail in ethnically homogeneous areas to improve their counterintelligence and counterespionage capabilities. As a result, insurgents operating in relatively homogeneous areas will likely be more confident in their ability to identify and eliminate suspected informers recruited by the police, and will therefore be less willing to take action against local criminals to deny the police access to this potential source of information in the first place.

Overall, the results of this project highlight the importance of disaggregating selective violence against civilians. Punishment attacks do not fit the dominant paradigms of insurgent-against-civilian violence in the literature today. These attacks generate unique costs and benefits for the insurgents that conduct them, and it is within the context of insurgent institution building that they are best understood. Nevertheless, it is important that scholars continue to explore the dynamics of these and other forms of violence against civilians during wartime. For instance, from a theoretical perspective this project made the simplifying assumption that a single insurgent group confronted a single incumbent government. While the latter assumption is probably a fair representation of reality, the former does not reflect the full complexity of most insurgencies, which are often characterized by multiple groups fighting for dominance within the same population. A future extension of the model presented here could usefully analyze how the addition of multiple insurgent groups, competing for the loyalty of the same constituents, might influence each group's willingness to provide vigilante justice.

Intra-community competition between insurgent groups could alter the cost versus benefit analysis that each group conducts. For instance, the emergence of a new group might increase an existing insurgent organization's costs for vigilantism, as the older group must now dedicate resources to eliminating its new competition, while simultaneously trying to maintain its other activities on the battlefield. On the other hand, if the upstart group is unprepared to undertake significant action on the battlefield, it might use punishment attacks as a relatively low cost means of building its reputation with local people. These competitive dynamics might also induce changes in the anticipated police response to crime.

Future research should also further explore the connection between punishment attacks and other forms of violence against civilians. For instance, it is possible that, although punishment attacks and anti-informer killings are the result of different causal processes, both types of killing provide information about insurgent intentions and capabilities to local people and to the counterinsurgent. In this scenario the ratio of punishment attacks to anti-informer violence might indicate the capacity of the insurgent group to engage in selective punishment. A high ratio of punishment attacks as compared to anti-informer killings might indicate that the insurgent group is effective at targeting specific individuals for punishment, but ineffective at identifying informers. These signaling dynamics might in turn have implications for how counterinsurgents respond to an insurgent group. If they believe the groups are ineffective at identifying informers, then they should seek to exploit this weakness by dedicating greater resources to developing a network of covert information sources.

By exploring these and other dynamics in the context of disaggregating selective violence-against-civilians, scholars will continue to refine our theoretical and empirical understanding of these diverse phenomena. From a normative perspective, improved theoretical models of insurgent-against-civilian violence are desirable to the extent that they facilitate the production of policy recommendations that can be implemented to avert further human suffering during civil wars and insurgencies. The present project has taken one step in that direction by developing a distinct theory explaining the conditions under

which insurgents will most likely turn to vigilantism during wartime.

Bibliography

32 County Sovereignty Movement. N.d. "The Necessity of Policing."

URL: <http://tinyurl.com/ao4fjpa>

Adams, Gerry. 1975. "Active Abstentionism." *Republican News* (11 October).

Al Jazeera English. 2008. "Somali Fighters Destroying Shrines." (21 December).

Ammore, Miles. 2011. "Afghans Flock to Judge Dread and his Butcher Boys." *Sunday Times (London)* First Edition(23 January):30.

An Phoblacht. 1975. "R.U.C. Out!" (21 March).

An Phoblacht/Republican News (AP/RN). 1993a. "Criminal Elements Warned." (11 March).

An Phoblacht/Republican News (AP/RN). 1993b. "Drug Dealer Targeted." (11 March).

AP/RN. 1994c. "Criminal Warned." (29 April).

AP/RN. 1993d. "RUC Trawl for Informers in Armagh." (14 October).

An Phoblacht/Republican News (AP/RN).1994a. "RUC Pressure New Lodge Man." (3 February).

An Phoblacht/Republican News (AP/RN).1994b. "Recruitment Attempt." (10 March).

An Phoblacht/Republican News (AP/RN).1994c. "IRA Moves Against Drug Barons in Belfast." (28 April).

AP/RN. 1994d. "Armed Drug Dealers and Loyalist Killers Linked." (28 April).

AP/RN. 1994e. "RUC Attempt to Recruit Castlederg Man." (18 August).

Andersonstown News. 1994. "IRA's Authority in North and West Belfast Challenged." (5 July).

Andersonstown News. 2001. "SAS Shooting 'Destroyed Deadly IRA Unit.'" (5 May).

Annesley, Hugh. 1996. *The Chief Constable's Annual Report 1995*. Belfast: Royal Ulster Constabulary.

Ardoyne Association. 1996. "Ardoyne: A Neighbourhood [sic] Police Service." Belfast: Ardoyne Association.

- Anon. N.d. "Thieves Beware." *Ardoyne Freedom Fighter*.
- Anon. N.d. "Speed Kills." *Ardoyne Freedom Fighter*.
- Anon. 1976 "Law and Order." *Faoí Glas: The Journal of Sentenced Republican Prisoners of War*. 1(4).
- Adinkrah, Mensah. 2005. "Vigilante Homicides in Contemporary Ghana." *Journal of Criminal Justice*. 33(5): 413–427.
- Arce, Daniel G. and Todd Sandler. 2007. "Terrorist Signaling and the Value of Intelligence." *British Journal of Political Science* 37(4): 573–586.
- Azam, Jean-Paul. 2002. "Looting and Conflict between Ethnoregional Groups: Lessons for State Formation in Africa." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1):1 31–153.
- Azam, Jean-Paul. 2006. "On Thugs and Heroes: Why Warlords Victimize Their Own Civilians." *Economics of Governance* 7(1): 53–73.
- Azam, Jean-Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. "Violence Against Civilians in Civil Wars: Looting or Terror?" *Journal of Peace Research* 39(4): 461–485.
- Balcells, Laia. 2010. "Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians in Conventional Civil Wars." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(2): 291–313.
- Balcells, Laia. 2011. "Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence in Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(3): 397–422.
- Bamford, Bradley. 2004. "The United Kingdom's "War Against Terrorism"." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 16(4): 737–756.
- Bamford, Bradley. 2005. "The Role and Effectiveness of Intelligence in Northern Ireland." *Intelligence and National Security* 20(4): 581–607.
- Bateson, Rachel 2012. "Crime Victimization and Political Participation." *American Political Science Review* 106(3): 570–587.
- BBC Monitoring South Asia. 2011. "Daily says Taleban [sic] Running Parallel Justice System in Tribal Areas." (5 January).
- Belfast Telegraph*. 1992. "IRA Victim Urged to Ignore Threat." (5 September).
- Belfast Telegraph*. 1993. "RUC Silent on Provo Informer Speculation." (12 October).
- Belfast Telegraph*. 1999. "IRA Tells Omagh Bombers 'You Must Disband Now'." (31 August).
- Belfast Telegraph*. 2004. "News in Brief." (17 August).
- Bhavnani, Ravi, Dan Miodownik and Hyun Jin Choi. 2011. "Three Two Tango: Territorial Control and Selective Violence in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(1): 133–158.
- Bishop, Patrick Josph and Eamonn Mallie. 1987. *The Provisional IRA*. London: Corgi.

- Bloom, Mia, Paul Gill and John Horgan. 2012. "Tiocraidh ár Mná: Women in the Provisional Irish Republican Army." *Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*. 4(1): 2012.
- Boyle, Michael J. 2009. "Bargaining, Fear, and Denial: Explaining Violence Against Civilians in Iraq 2004–2007." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(2): 261–287.
- Boyne, Sean. 1996. "Uncovering the Irish Republican Army." *Jane's Intelligence Review*.
- Bowcott, Owen, 1992a. "Loyalist Gunmen Extract Their Indiscriminate Revenge." *The Guardian*. (6 February).
- Bowcott, Owen. 1992b. "I Did Deserve to Get Shot but I didn't Deserve to Lose My Foot." *The Guardian*. (12 September).
- Bowcott, Owen. 1992c. "Three Killed in UFF Reprisal for Bombs." *The Guardian*. (16 November).
- Breen, Stephen. 2004. "Village Group Targets Thugs." *Sunday Life* (9 May).
- Breen, Stephen. 2007. "A Law Unto Themselves: Dissidents Still Being Asked to Dish out Justice in some Nationalist Areas Despite Sinn Féin's Backing for Cops." *Sunday Life* (4 February).
- Breen, Suzanne. 2009. "Unshakeable Believers in the Power of the Bullet: Three Dissident Republican Groups have Pledged to Continue to Wage War." *Sunday Tribune* (March 15).
- Brewer, John D. and Kathleen Magee. 1991. *Inside the RUC: Routing Policing in a Divided Society*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan. 2005a. "Conciliation, Counterterrorism and Patterns of Terrorist Violence." *International Organization* 59(1): 145–176.
- Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan. 2005b. "The Quality of Terror." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3): 515–530.
- Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan. 2005c. "The Terrorist Endgame: A Model with Moral Hazard and Learning." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2): 237–258.
- Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan. 2008. "Terrorist Factions." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3: 399–418.
- Chandrasekaran, Rajiv. 2003. "Iraqi Police Now Targets of Choice." *Washington Post* (2 November).
- Chapman, William. 1987. *Inside the Philippine Revolution: The New People's Army and Its Struggle for Power*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton.
- Clarke, Liam. 2011. "Provos Suspected an Informer, but Terrorist's Home had been Bugged." *Belfast Telegraph*. (2 December).
- Collins, Eamon. 1997. *Killing Rage*. London: Granata Books.

- Conroy, John. 1987. *Belfast Diary: War as a Way of Life*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Coogan, Tim Pat. 2000. *The IRA*. New York, NY: Palgrave.
- Cunningham, Michael J. 2001. *British Government Policy in Northern Ireland: 1969-2000*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- De la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca. 2006. "The Production of Terrorist Violence: Analyzing Target Selection with the IRA and ETA." *Juan March Institute: Working paper* 230.
- De la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca. 2007. "The Victims of ETA Dataset."
- De la Calle, Luis and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca. 2013. "Killing and Voting in the Basque Country: An Exploration of the Electoral Link Between ETA and its Political Branch." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 25(1): 94–112.
- Dixon, Paul. 2001. *Northern Ireland: The Politics of War and Peace*. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- Ellison, Graham, Peter Shirlow and Aogán Mulcahy. 2012. "Responsible Participation, Community Engagement and Policing in Transitional Societies: Lessons from a Local Crime Survey in Northern Ireland." *Howard Journal of Criminal Justice* 51(5): 488–502.
- English, Richard. 2004. *Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Evans, Geoffrey and Mary Duffy. 1997. "Beyond the Sectarian Divide: The Social Bases and Political Consequences of Nationalist and Unionist Party Competition in Northern Ireland." *British Journal of Political Science*. 27(1): 47-81.
- Fay, Marie-Therese, Mike Morrissey and Marie Smyth. 1999. *Northern Ireland's Troubles: The Human Cost*. London: Pluto Press.
- Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin. 1996. "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation." *The American Political Science Review* 90(4): 715–735.
- Fitzgerald, Garret. 1992. *All in a Life: An Autobiography*. Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.
- Frampton, Martyn. 2010. *The Return of the Militants: Violent Dissident Republicanism*. London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence.
- Frampton, Martyn. 2011. *Legion of the Rearguard: Dissident Irish Republicanism*. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.
- George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
- Gorman, Edward. 1992. "The Day an IRA Punishment Misfired." *The Times (London)*. (10 September).
- Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

- Hall, Julia A. 1997. *To Serve Without Favor: Policing, Human Rights and Accountability in Northern Ireland*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.
- Hamill, Heather. 2011. *The Hoods: Crime and Punishment in Belfast*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Harnden, Toby. 2000. *Bandit Country: The IRA and South Armagh*. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
- Hart, Peter. 1997. "The Geography of Revolution in Ireland: 1917-1923." *Past & Present* 155: 142-176.
- Hayes, Bernadette C. and Ian McAllister. 2001. "Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland." *Political Studies* 49: 901-922.
- Hechter, Michael. 1987. *Principles of Group Solidarity*. Vol. 11 Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Helfstein, Scott, Nassir Abdullah and Muhammad Al-Obaidi. 2009. "Deadly Vanguard: A Study of al-Qa'ida's Violence Against Muslims." Technical Report DTIC Document.
- Helsinki/Human Rights Watch. 1992. *Northern Ireland: Human Rights Abuses by All Sides*. New York, NY: Helsinki/Human Rights Watch.
- Herald Sun (Australia). 2011. "Man Loses Hand as Punishment." (6 January).
- Herreros, Francisco and Henar Criado. 2009. "Pre-emptive or Arbitrary: Two Forms of Lethal Violence in Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3): 419-455.
- Hindustan Times. 2009. "Maoists Punish Thieves in Public Court in Bihar." (23 March).
- Hindustan Times. 2010. "Maoists Punish Rapist in Jharkhand Court." (5 September).
- Holland, Jack and Susan Phoenix. 1997. *Phoenix: Policing the Shadows*. London: Coronet Books.
- Honaker, James. 2005. Unemployment and Violence in Northern Ireland: A Missing Data Model for Ecological Inference. Society for Political Methodology.
- Horgan, John and Max Taylor. 1997. "The Provisional Irish Republican Army: Command and Functional Structure." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 9(3): 1-32.
- Huggins, Martha K. 2000. "Urban Violence and Police Privatization in Brazil." *Social Justice*. 27(2): 113-134.
- Human Rights Watch. 2012. "Syria: Extrajudicial Executions."
URL: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/09/syria-extrajudicial-executions>
- Human Rights Watch. 2010. *Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM in Somalia*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.

- Human Rights Watch. 2011. *You Don't Know Who to Blame: War Crimes in Somalia*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.
- Human Rights Watch. 2012. *No Place for Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage and Attacks on Schools in Somalia*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2006. "Handling and Manhandling Civilians in Civil War." *The American Political Science Review* 100(3): 429–447.
- Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2008. "Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 436–455.
- Iceland, John, Daniel H. Weinberg and Erika Steinmetz. 2002. *Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980 - 2000*. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Irish News*. 1990a. "Policing—Not Vigilantes." (24 April).
- Irish News*. 1990b. "IRA Justice in its Most Brutal Form." (18 September).
- Irish News*. 1993. "Informants Play Vital Role in RUC Work Says Officer." (18 August).
- Irish News*. 1995a. "Police and IRA Try to Weed Out Garden Gang." *Irish News*. (26 June).
- Irish News*. 1995b. "Man Claims Blackmail Photo Ploy by Police." (15 November).
- Irish News*. 1997a. (11 January).
- Irish News*. 1997b. "Get Out Residents Tell Drug Dealers." (7 June).
- Irish News*. 2004. "Only People Power can put an end to the Drug Dealers' Reign of Misery." (17 February).
- Irish Times*. 1992. "UFF Threat to Extend Range of Attacks." (7 November).
- Kalyvas, Stathis. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Kalyvas, Stathis and Matthew Adam Kocher. 2009. "The Dynamics of Violence in Vietnam: An Analysis of the Hamlet Evaluation System." *Journal of Peace Research* 46(3): 335–355.
- Kelleher, Luke. 2010. *Death Rate (and Deaths) from the Conflict in Northern Ireland*. Derry: CAIN [distributor].
- Kennedy, Liam. 1995. "Crime and Punishment in West Belfast." Nightmares within Nightmares: Paramilitary Repression within Working Class Communities.
- Kitson, Frank. 1971. *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peace-Keeping*. Boston: Faber and Faber.
- Ladbury, Sarah. 2009. *Testing Hypotheses on Radicalization in Afghanistan: Why do Men Join the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami? How much do Local People Support Them?* London: Department of International Development.

- Leah, Kevin C. 2005. *The Impact of Technology on the Command, Control and Organizational Structure of Insurgent Groups*. MA Thesis. Fort Leavenworth: US Army General Staff College.
- Lia, Brynjar. 1999. "The Establishment of a Palestinian Police Force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." *International Peacekeeping* 6(4): 157–170.
- Lichbach, Mark Irving. 1995. *The Rebel's Dilemma*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Lilja, Jannie and Lisa Hultman. 2011. "Intra-Ethnic Dominance and Control: Violence Against Co-Ethnics in the Early Sri Lankan Civil War." *Security Studies* 20(2): 171–197.
- Lyall, Jason. 2010. "Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War." *American Political Science Review* 104(1): 1–20.
- Magee, Gerard. 2011. *Tyrone's Struggle for Irish Freedom*. Strabane: West Tyrone Sinn Féin.
- Marx, Gary T. and Dane Archer. 1971. "Citizen Involvement in the Law Enforcement Process." *American Behavioral Scientist* 15(1): 52–72.
- McAllister, Ian and Bernadette Hayes. 2001. "Sowing Dragon's Teeth: Public Support for Political Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland." *Political Studies*. 49(5): 901–922.
- McGarry, John and Brendan O'Leary. 1999. *Policing Northern Ireland: Proposals for a New Start*. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.
- McGartland, Martin. 1997. *Fifty Dead Men Walking*. Norwalk, CT: Hastings House.
- McKeown, Michael. 2009. "Post-Mortem: An Examination of the Patterns of Politically Associated Violence in Northern Ireland During the Years 1969-2001 as Reflected in the Fatality Figures for Those Years."
- McKittrick, David. 1992. "Belfast Security Measures Accepted as Normal." *The Independent (London)*. (7 December).
- Ministry of Defense. 2006. *Operation Banner: An Analysis of Military Operations in Northern Ireland*. London: Ministry of Defense.
- Ministry of Home Affairs. 2006. *Annual Report: 2005-2006*. New Delhi: Government of India.
- Moloney, Ed. 2001. *A Secret History of the IRA*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company.
- Moloney, Ed. 2010. *Voices From the Grave: Two Men's War in Ireland*. New York, NY: Faber and Faber.
- Monaghan, Rachel. 2002. "The Return of 'Captain Moonlight': Informal Justice in Northern Ireland." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. 25(1): 41–56.

- Monaghan, Rachel. 2004. "An Imperfect Peace: Paramilitary 'Punishments' in Northern Ireland." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 16(3): 439–461.
- Monaghan, Rachel. 2008. "Community-Based Justice in Northern Ireland and South Africa." *International Criminal Justice Review*. 18(1): 83–105
- Monaghan, Rachel and Suzanne McLaughlin. 2006. "Informal Justice in the City." *Space and Polity* 10(2): 171–186.
- Mooney, John and Michael O'Toole. 2003. *Black Operations: The Secret War Against the Real IRA*. Maverick House.
- Moran, Jon. 2010. "Evaluating Special Branch and the Use of Informant Intelligence in Northern Ireland." *Intelligence and National Security* 25(1): 1–23.
- Morris, Allison. 2009a. "Alarm at Rise in Dissident Paramilitary-Style Attacks." *Irish News* (4 February).
- Morris, Allison. 2009b. "Dissident Republican Threat - Exclusive - 'Explosives Experts Recruited into Ranks'." *Irish News* (16 February).
- Moss, Michale and David Rohde. 2006. "Misjudgments Marred U.S. Plans for Iraqi Peace." *New York Times* Late Edition (21 May).
- Nakao, Keisuke. 2009. "Creation of Social Order in Ethnic Conflict." *Journal of theoretical politics* 21(3): 365–394.
- National Consortum for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). 2012. "Global Terrorism Database." Data file.
- National Spokesperson of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement. 2011. Telephone Interview by the Author. Dublin, Ireland, 18 August 2011.
- Nelson, Sorary Sarhaddi. 2008. "Taliban Courts Filling Justice Vacuum in Afghanistan." *National Public Radio* (16 December).
- North Down Borough Council. 2002. "Minutes of the Leisure, Tourism and Community Development Committee." (14 May 2002). Document Number 020514.
- Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA). 1993. *Community Attitudes Survey: 1992-93*. ESDS version. Belfast: NISRA [producer] Manchester: Economic and Social Data Service [distributor].
- NISRA. 1994. *Community Attitudes Survey: 1993-94*. ESDS version. Belfast: NISRA [producer] Manchester: Economic and Social Data Service [distributor].
- NISRA. 1995. *Community Attitudes Survey: 1994-95*. ESDS version. Belfast: NISRA [producer] Manchester: Economic and Social Data Service [distributor].
- NISRA. 1996. *Community Attitudes Survey: 1995-96*. ESDS version. Belfast: NISRA [producer] Manchester: Economic and Social Data Service [distributor].
- NISRA. 1997. *Community Attitudes Survey: 1996-97*. ESDS version. Belfast: NISRA [producer] Manchester: Economic and Social Data Service [distributor].

- NISRA. 1998. *Community Attitudes Survey: 1997-98*. ESDS version. Belfast: NISRA [producer] Manchester: Economic and Social Data Service [distributor].
- NISRA. 1999. *Community Attitudes Survey: 1999*. ESDS version. Belfast: NISRA [producer] Manchester: Economic and Social Data Service [distributor].
- NISRA. 2000. *Community Attitudes Survey: 2000*. ESDS version. Belfast: NISRA [producer] Manchester: Economic and Social Data Service [distributor].
- NISRA. 2001. *2001 Census: Digitized boundary Data (Northern Ireland)*. Belfast: NISRA [producer]. Edinburgh: EDINA (University of Edinburgh)/Census Dissemination Unit [distributor].
- NISRA. 2003. *District Policing Partnership Survey, 2003: Dungannon and South Tyrone Borough Council*. Belfast: NISRA.
- Nossiter, Adam. 2012. "Amputations and Killings Shake an Embattled Mali." *New York Times* (11 September).
- O Ruairc, Liam. 2008. "A History of the Provisional Irish Republican Army and Sinn Féin." *The Blanket: A Journal of Protest and Dissent*. (March 2008).
- O'Doherty, Malachi. 1998. *The Trouble with Guns: Republican Strategy and the Provisional IRA*. London: Blackstaff Press.
- O'Duffy, Brendan. 1995. "Violence in Northern Ireland 1969–1994: Sectarian or Ethnonational?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies*. 18(4)
- Overgaard, Per Baltzer. 1994. "The Scale of Terrorist Attacks as a Signal of Resources." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 38(3): 452–478.
- Patterson, Henry. 2006. "In the Land of King Canute: The Influence of Border Unionism on Ulster Unionist Politics, 1945-63." *Contemporary British History*. 20(4): 511–532.
- Patterson, Henry. 2010. "Sectarianism Revisited: The Provisional IRA Campaign in a Border Region of Northern Ireland." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 22(3): 337–356.
- Peterson, Scott. 2007. "Uphill Battle to Bolster Afghan Police." *Christian Science Monitor* (20 September).
- Public Record Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI). 1970/71. *Police: Policing Statistics for Belfast and Londonderry [sic]*. Reference Number CAB/9/G/93/1. Belfast: PRONI.
- PRONI. 1973/76. *Minutes of Meetings Between Secretary of State, Ministers, Deputations and Political Parties*. Reference Number CENT/1/3/40. Belfast: PRONI.
- PRONI. 1974/76. *Police Meetings: Minutes of Meetings - Police*. Reference Number NIO/25/1/6. Belfast: PRONI.
- PRONI. 1974/78. *Police Staffing/Administration*. Reference Number: NIO/25/3/5. Belfast: PRONI.

- RAND Corporation. 2012. *Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Rees, Merlyn. 1985. *Northern Ireland: A Personal Perspective*. London: Methuen.
- Republican News*. 1974a. "Vandalism." (23 February).
- Republican News*. 1974b. "Statement for Lurgan." 7 December.
- Republican News*. 1975. "The Incident Centres [sic]" (22 February)
- Rosenbaum, H. Jon and Peter C. Sederberg. 1974. "Vigilantism: An Analysis of Establishment Violence." *Comparative Politics* 6(4): 541–570.
- Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). *Chief Constable's Annual Report, 1970*. Belfast: Royal Ulster Constabulary.
- RUC. *Chief Constable's Annual Report, 1971*. Belfast: Royal Ulster Constabulary.
- RUC. *Chief Constable's Annual Report, 1972*. Belfast: Royal Ulster Constabulary.
- RUC. *Chief Constable's Annual Report, 1973*. Belfast: Royal Ulster Constabulary.
- RUC. *Chief Constable's Annual Report, 1974*. Belfast: Royal Ulster Constabulary.
- RUC. *Chief Constable's Annual Report, 1975*. Belfast: Royal Ulster Constabulary.
- Sánchez-Cuenca, Ignacio. 2007. "The Dynamics of Nationalist Terrorism: ETA and the IRA." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 19(3): 289–306.
- Sawyer, John Paul 2012. Competition in the Market for Political Violence: Northern Irish Republicanism, 1969-1998 PhD thesis Georgetown University.
- Schellenberg, James A. 1977. "Area Variations in Violence in Northern Ireland." *Sociological Focus*. 10(1): 69–78.
- Shirlow, Peter and Brendan Murtagh. 2006. *Belfast: Segregation, Violence and the City*. Ann Arbor: Pluto Press.
- Silke, Andrew. 1999. "Rebel's Dilemma: The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Féin and Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 11(1): 55–93.
- Silke, Andrew. 2000a. "Beating the Water: The Terrorist Search for Power, Control and Authority." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 12(2): 76–96.
- Silke, Andrew. 2000b. "The Impact of Paramilitary Vigilantism on Victims and Communities in Northern Ireland." *International Journal of Human Rights*. 4(1): 1–24.
- Silke, Andrew. 2000c. "Bitter Harvests: The Royal Ulster Constabulary's Response to Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland." *Low Intensity Conflict & Law Enforcement*. 9(2): 27–46.
- Silke, Andrew. 2003. "Deindividuation, Anonymity and Violence: Findings from Northern Ireland." *Journal of Social Psychology*. 143(4). 493–499.

- Silke, Andrwe. 2005. "Success and Failure in Terrorist Investigations: Research and Lessons from Northern Ireland." 13(3): 250–261.
- Sinn Féin. 1974. "People's Courts." Reference Number: P2876, Northern Ireland Political Collection, Belfast Linen Hall Library.
- Sluka, Jeffrey A. 1989. *Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish: Support for the IRA and INLA in a Northern Irish Ghetto*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- Sovereign Nation*. 2004. "Óglaigh na hÉireann Banish Car Criminals." (October/December).
- Sovereign Nation*. 2008. "Republicans and the Drug Problem - An Analysis." (May/June).
- Sullivan, Scott. 1998. "From Theory to Practice: The Patterns of Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969-1994." *Irish Political Studies*. 13(1): 76–99.
- Sutton, Malcolm. 2001. *An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland*. Belfast: Malcolm Sutton [creator]. Derry: Conflict Archive on the Internet [distributor].
- Taylor, Peter. 1989. *Families at War*. London: BBC Books.
- Thompson, J.L.P. 1989. "Deprivation and Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1922-1985. A Time Series Analysis." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33(4): 676–699.
- Tonge, Jonathan. 2012. "No-one Likes Us; We don't Care': Dissident Irish Republicans and Mandates." *Political Quarterly* 83(2): 219–226.
- Toolis, Kevin. 1991. "Inside the IRA." *The Guardian*. (16 February).
- Toolis, Kevin. 1995. *Rebel Hearts: Journeys Within the IRA's Soul* New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
- Tyson, Ann Scott. 2005. "U.S. Seeks to Escape Brutal Cycle in Iraqi City." *Washington Post* (26 December).
- UNAMA. 2011. *Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Annual Report 2011*. Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations.
- UNAMA. 2012. *Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Mid-Year Report 2012*. Kabul, Afghanistan: United Nations.
- Ungar, Mark. 2007/08. "The Privatization of Citizen Security in Latin America: From Elite Guards to Neighborhood Vigilantes." *Social Justice*. 34(3/4): 20–37.
- United Kingdom. 1973. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 859 col. 931.
- United Kingdom. 1976. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 913, cols. 419-420W.
- United Kingdom. 1977. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 934, col. 637.
- United Kingdom. 2005. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 432, col. 1399W.
- United Kingdom. 2009. *Hansard Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 502, col. 16WH.

- Unity News*. 1975. "RUC-OUT" (22 February).
- Unity News*. 1975. "Stolen Goods" (22 February).
- Urban, Mark. 1992. *Big Boys Rules*. London: Faber and Faber.
- Vargas, Gonzalo. 2009. "Urban Irregular Warfare and Violence Against Civilians: Evidence From a Colombian City." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(1): 110–132.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2005. "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(4): 598–624.
- Weinstein, Jeremy M. 2007. *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Weitzer, John. 1995. *Policing Under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police-Community Relations in Northern Ireland*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- White, Robert W. 1989. "From Peaceful Protest to Guerrilla War: Micromobilization of the Provisional Irish Republican Army." *American Journal of Sociology*. 94(6): 1277–1302.
- White, Robert W. 1993. "On Measuring Political Violence: Northern Ireland, 1969 to 1980." *American Sociological Review* 58: 575–585.
- White, Robert W. 2011. "Provisional IRA Attacks on the UDR in Fermanagh and South Tyrone: Implications for the Study of Political Violence and Terrorism." *Terrorism and Political Violence*. 23(3): 329–349.
- Whitman, Lois. 1992. *Children in Northern Ireland: Abused by Security Forces and Paramilitaries*. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch.
- Wood, Reed M. 2010. "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence Against Civilians." *Journal of Peace Research* 47(5): 601–614.
- Wood, Reed M., Jacob D. Kathman and Stephen E. Gent. 2012. "Armed Intervention and Civilian Victimization in Intrastate Conflicts." *Journal of Peace Research* 49(5): 647–660.