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Aleksei Kaminski

April 6, 2020

Defining Voter Preference Amongst Conservative Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians

By

Aleksei Kaminski

Ana Catarina Teixeira

Advisor

Institute of African Studies

Ana Catarina Teixeira

Advisor

Natália Bueno

Committee Member

Devaka Premawardhana

Committee Member

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Abstract

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This honors thesis is a preliminary investigation on conservative voter preference concerning racially and sexually marginalized demographic groups in Brazil following the victory of former military captain and Federal Congressman, Jair Bolsonaro in the 2018 Presidential election. The thesis is a case analysis that includes the oral histories of two socially conservative members from the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian communities in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo and qualitative data analysis of responses from a sample of young adults in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. This thesis intends to describe the relationship between marginalization, social demographics, and political dispositions to voter preference and how conservative Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians cast their vote at polling stations in Brazil. This thesis also highlights the negative perceptions voters of President Bolsonaro from such demographic groups. The unwillingness to understand the political divisions and marginalization of these two communities in Brazil illustrates the current political polarization in both the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Lastly, this thesis also highlights the importance and need for extensive research and polling of Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians regarding their political dispositions and neglected public opinion.

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Introduction

Antônio, A Gay and Pardo Brazilian Journalist

My typical morning began like most others for political researchers in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. I woke up from my bed, made a cup of hot coffee, and browsed my computer and phone reading updated polls and publications regarding the administration of current President Jair Bolsonaro. One morning in July 2019, while visiting my friend Carlos in São Paulo, I scrolled through my Facebook feed and came across a scheduled public demonstration known as a *manifestação*.¹ The public demonstration was scheduled to be held on *Avenida Paulista* in the center of São Paulo, the equivalent of 5th Avenue in New York City in support of Brazil's ongoing criminal investigation, Operation Car Wash.² I messaged my friend who I will mention as Antônio - a news journalist at Grupo Globo who I met in Rio de Janeiro - on WhatsApp about the scheduled demonstration. He replied within several minutes and urged me not to go. According to Antônio, nearly a hundred thousand demonstrators in attendance would have unwavering support for current President Bolsonaro. He told me these public demonstrations or *manifestações* are known for verbally violent and potential physical altercations. However, I ignored Antônio's advice due to my sheer curiosity. I told my friend Carlos that we should attend the demonstration. Minutes later, I rented a public bike with Carlos, and we biked to the demonstration.

I arrived to the demonstration with Carlos minutes after I heard political banter several street blocks from Avenida Paulista. I originally thought this demonstration would be a violent

¹ A public demonstration in Brazilian Portuguese is known as a *manifestação* or plurally known as *manifestações*.

² Operation Car Wash or *Operação Lava Jato* is an ongoing criminal investigation by the Federal Police of Brazil initiated by Federal Judge Sérgio Moro in 2014.

and verbal clash given Antônio's warning. On the other hand, I was surprised to see crowds of families with baby strollers walking amongst political action groups, advocates screaming political propaganda with megaphones on top of double-decker buses, and police with batons and guns on every street corner. I was amazed to see people from all walks of life in support of this demonstration. On one corner of *Avenida Paulista*, parallel to the Art Museum of São Paulo, was a politician screaming "Keep Lula in Prison!"³ and "We don't want privileges!"⁴ This politician was Fernando Holiday, the first openly gay city council member for the municipal government of São Paulo pictured in the left side of Figure 1 below. Black, homosexual, and elected at only 20 years old, Holiday remains a controversial and inspirational figure in Brazilian politics. Holiday affiliates himself with The Free Brazil Movement.⁵ He also identifies as a conservative and advocates against racial equality and LGBTI+ rights. According to Holiday, Afro-Brazilians advocating for racial protection laws "who don't agree with their agendas [Holiday's agendas] are traitors. And, to combat their traitors, they often use racist tools to try to delegitimize them before the black [Afro-Brazilian] community" (Thomaz, 2018).

While protestors in the crowd screamed Holiday's name, I stood in the middle of the crowd shocked by his words. I asked myself how a marginalized person can enthusiastically oppose the interests and rights of their communities. I turned my head to witness black protestors gaze at Holiday with optimism and shout "Kickout Dilma and Lula."⁶ At that moment, I felt

³ The chant Keep Lula in Prison or *Lula Na Prisão* Lula was Brazil's most approved president and served two presidential terms who reduced the national poverty level. He has been recently sentenced to at least 10 years of prison by the prominent Federal Judge and current Minister of Justice Sérgio Moro for charges of corruption. However, Moro has recently been accused of corruption for plotting a crime against President Lula to help Bolsonaro win the presidential election.

⁴ The chant We don't want privileges or *Não Queremos Privilégios* is common amongst protestors who oppose racial quotas and laws protecting social minorities.

⁵ The Free Brazil Movement (O Movimento Brasil Livre-MBL) is a political movement established in 2014 and is widely considered socially conservative and economically liberal.

⁶ The chant Kickout Dilma and Lula or *Fora Dilma e Lula* refers to the former President Dilma Rousseff and Lula da Silva under the Worker's Party (PT) administration between 2003 and 2016.

fearful due to mobs of people screaming such banter. In that moment, I thought that I shouldn't ask any question that was controversial about Holiday with the best interest of not instigating any potential altercation as an outsider.



Figure 1. Fernando Holiday in the Federal Senate with Federal Deputy of São Paulo, Kim Kataguiri, a member of the Free Brazil Movement

As I continued walking down *Avenida Paulista* with my bike, I came across same-sex couples flying rainbow flags and wearing t-shirts with a picture of President Bolsonaro on the front panels. One of these couples was interviewed by a local news broadcaster shown in Figure 2 below. I stood impatiently in front of the couple in the background of the camera frame waiting to speak with them. When the news broadcaster finished their interview, I approached the couple and introduced myself in Portuguese as a university student from Rio de Janeiro. I asked this couple why they like President Bolsonaro and if they believe he dislikes the LGBTI+ community or has any racist sentiments. Their responses were “That’s not the reason why we voted for him.” I asked to exchange our contact information to discuss politics and being LGBTI+ in Brazil. They said yes and we exchanged our phone numbers and saved our contact information in WhatsApp. After several casual conversations with several same-sex couples at the rally, I went back to my friend’s apartment to research articles on conservative LGBTI+ individuals in Brazil. From there, I discovered that polls administered several days before the election showed that not

only did 30% of the LGBTI+ community decide to vote for Jair Bolsonaro (CESOP, 2018), but around 38% of Brazil's black and 51% of the *pardo*⁷ communities intended to vote for him (CESOP, 2018).



Figure 2. A conservative male homosexual couple at the public demonstration on Avenida Paulista.

I returned to Rio de Janeiro the next day and reunited with Antônio at his apartment. He asked if I enjoyed the protest in a condescending manner. I told him I was shocked by Fernando Holiday's words. Antônio then pulled up various articles regarding President Bolsonaro's stance on such communities. With his phone in my hand, I read President Bolsonaro's statement that he would be "incapable of loving a homosexual son" (Folha de São Paulo, 2018) and would prefer them dead. In another article, President Bolsonaro at a Jewish club event in Rio de Janeiro stated that people of African descent are "useless even for procreation" (Kreelon, 2018). Despite his statement, groups of Afro-Brazilians reportedly stood in the street and cheered for him

⁷ *Pardo* is an ethnic/racial category used by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). It is a complex social demographic term that applies to individuals who are of both European, African, and/or Native Brazilian descent.

throughout his presidential campaign.⁸ In terms of President Bolsonaro's legislative behavior, he has vowed to suspend racial quotas that many Afro-Brazilians have been able to attend federal universities and receive equal education.⁹ I asked Antônio "I don't get it. Why would so many gay and black Brazilians vote for Bolsonaro?" He stared at me, lit a cigarette, blew his cigarette smoke in the air, and asked me, "Why does it matter? Who cares? Politics never makes sense. He's our president. He was legitimately elected and respect that Aleksei." While Antônio doesn't support President Bolsonaro, he was not perceptive of the social implications of my question. Antônio's response was yet another inconclusive and reluctant answer that I have heard throughout my fieldwork.

The invisible pile of apathetic answers such as Antônio's left me eager for an answer to my question. Nearly 40% of all global reported murders of transgender people in 2016 occurred in Brazil (Long, 2017) and the lowest tenth income percentile of the Brazilian population is 78.5% Afro-Brazilian (OxFamBrasil, 2018). From these statistics alone, it is evident that racial and sexual marginalization pervades Brazilian society. After listening to conservative marginalized individuals such as Fernando Holiday and visualizing the permanence of injustice in Brazilian society, I knew understanding how certain Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians think about politics and society and identify as conservatives or as supporters of President Bolsonaro was an urgent basis for my research. Therefore, I proposed to investigate why significant percentages of the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities voted for and support President Bolsonaro, a politician who has repeatedly expressed divisive rhetoric. This thesis

⁸ Freelon, Kiaratiana, *The Root. It's Complicated: Why Some Afro-Brazilians Are Willing to Vote for a Racist Presidential Candidate Who's Calling for More Police Violence* (2018, October 25). Retrieved from <https://www.theroot.com/its-complicated-why-some-afro-brazilians-are-willing-t-1829976462>

⁹ Antunes, Leda. 2018 <https://noticias.uol.com.br/confere/ultimas-noticias/eder-content/2018/08/24/bolsonaro-promete-reduzir-cotas-para-universidades-e-concursos.htm>.

therefore provides explanations and synthesizes the implications of how certain Afro-Brazilians (*negro*¹⁰ and *pardo* individuals), and LGBTI+ Brazilians support President Bolsonaro through their individual beliefs, social demographics, and political dispositions. The stories and questionnaire responses amongst conservative Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians serve as a testament for the demand of extensive qualitative research that highlights the personal experiences of marginalized Brazilians.

Methodology

After coordinating meetings with political researchers Dr. Esther Solano, from the Federal University of São Paulo and social anthropologist Dr. Lucas Bulgarelli from the University of São Paulo, I noticed many academics and fieldwork researchers did not express much interest or have extensive knowledge of conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ individuals in Brazil. Dr. Solano and Dr. Bulgarelli explained to me polls by sexual orientation are nearly nonexistent in Brazil and for this, a pattern of voter preference of these demographic groups remains unpredictable. I hypothesized that because the majority of Brazil's racially diverse majority voted for President Bolsonaro then the voter preference for many conservative members of the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities would not have sharp contrasts in public opinion in comparison to the voter preference of the Brazilian general public.

My original research consists of various components: a qualitative analysis of responses from a questionnaire that I distributed online in Portuguese to a snowball sample of approximately 300 individuals between the ages of 18 and 34 in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, the oral histories of two individuals who ardently support President Bolsonaro, news

¹⁰ To describe someone in Brazil as black, Brazilians use the Portuguese word, *negro/negra*. *Preto/Preta* is a common term for the color black in Portuguese but is widely considered offensive in Brazil.

articles and quantitative data on voting behavior, and reflections of observations I made living in Rio de Janeiro after the inauguration of President Bolsonaro.

In my online questionnaire, I gathered demographic information from respondents, which include but is not limited to respondents' gender, race, sexual orientation, monthly income, completed education level, and voting history. Other points of data I collected include and are not limited to questionnaire respondents' approval ratings of political institutions on a scale from 1 to 10, three most important national concerns for Brazil, and information of whether respondents have ever been verbally or physically harassed because of their identity. For questionnaire respondents, I shared an online and secured questionnaire link to fellow graduate students in the Political Science Department at the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio) who shared my questionnaire to online university and church group chats across the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro. Through this channel, I collected qualitative data from approximately 300 individuals of various social classes and who voted for both conservative and liberal presidential candidates.

For my oral history participants, I will name these two individuals Lucas, a 27-year old transgender man from a suburb of São Paulo, and Sandra, a 30-year old Afro-Brazilian woman studying law in Rio de Janeiro. I identified potential participants for my oral histories with the intervention of my local contacts such as friends, professors, university students, and my doorman. With more than 40 identified individuals, Lucas and Sandra were the only individuals who allowed me to personally interview them. Many individuals refused to participate due to possible fear or expected compensation. The reluctance of many potential participants mark a possible inference that I believe many conservative Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians do not wish to discuss politics for specific reasons. While identifying individuals such as Lucas and

Sandra were relatively simple, coordinating potential participants to speak on their behalf was extremely challenging. I met Lucas and Sandra through my local friends who sent me their Facebook information and WhatsApp contact information. Originally, I contacted Lucas and Sandra through social media introducing myself as a researcher and a member of the LGBTI+ community. I asked Lucas and Sandra whether or not they would be willing to speak about their political beliefs and histories as a member of the Afro-Brazilian and/or LGBTI+ communities. Their narratives include their childhood, their experiences as social minorities, their family relations, their profession, and pinpoints in their life of what led them to vote for President Bolsonaro. I met with Lucas on three separate occasions at his house in São Paulo, and twice through a video call platform. I also met with Sandra in person twice at a coffee shop in the West Zone of Rio de Janeiro.

All participants in this study including Lucas and Sandra and questionnaire respondents voluntarily accepted their participation in this study without compensation. Volunteer participation was crucial to avoid conflict of interest. In the online questionnaire, an informed consent protocol was attached at the top of the screen page. The protocol ensured whether participants accepted or did not accept their participation in the study. Before recording Lucas and Sandra's oral histories, I read the informed consent protocol out loud in Portuguese containing information about procedures, benefits, the minimal risk of participation, explanations on accessing results of my research in the future, and my contact information if they had any doubts or questions regarding their participation. I organized all the audio recorded oral histories in a password-protected hard drive and all the questionnaire data in a password-protected Excel spreadsheet. After speaking with Lucas and Sandra and distributing my online questionnaire to respondents, I am certain that the progressive and developed relationships I forged with

participants guaranteed honest opinions and qualitative data to support the integrity of my ethnographic research.

A Summary of the Chapters

The first chapter of my thesis contextualizes marginalization and its relevance to contemporary politics and society in Brazil. I introduce brief histories on racism, homophobia, and transphobia to illustrate the canvas of social inequality and conservatism in Brazil. I then analyze public policies for racial and sexual justice developed by the Brazilian government in the early 21st century. I proceed to introduce the danger, challenges, and implications marginalized Brazilians face with the stories of two former politicians from the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities, Marielle Franco and Jean Wyllys. A synopsis on these policies and the stories Franco and Wyllys bring forth the backfire these policies and politicians received from the Brazilian public and institutions, such as federal government and police. I also provide a brief history on contemporary Brazilian politics from 2013 to the present to give an introductory context on Brazilian voter preference and the political dispositions of Brazilians of various social classes.

I conclude my first chapter with my interpretations of living in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where I lived for seven months in 2019, as an outsider and my interactions with Brazilians who voted for or oppose President Bolsonaro. I detail an important interaction between me and one of my friends on how he inherently internalizes racism and inequality in Brazil. I also detail an Afro-Brazilian man's internalized oppression and Afro-Brazilian woman's opinions on politics. My first chapter aims to clearly depict how Brazilians view marginalization and politics in their country before introducing the analytical comparison of responses from my oral history participants and questionnaire respondents identified in my second chapter.

My second chapter calls attention to the challenges in the recruitment of participants for my oral histories and observations of political tensions I made amongst members of various social classes through my interactions with my friends from PUC-Rio, João and Larissa. I then introduce voting data and previous research on the 2014 and 2018 Brazilian presidential elections to gauge a clear understanding of how existing research doesn't include the discussion of voter preference of Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ voters in Brazil. I proceed with an analytical comparison of a selected group of questionnaire respondents from the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities and discuss the social demographic and ideological differences amongst these respondents. Such analysis reveals how certain demographics and political dispositions reflect visible demographic relationships in the voter preference of these demographic groups of interest.

I also introduce the narratives of Lucas and Sandra that I have collected from July to October of 2019 to supplement the qualitative data analysis of selected questionnaire respondents. I elaborate how Lucas and Sandra's life experiences and certain social demographics such as familial acceptance and religion shape their outlook on politics and voter preference. Thus, my second chapter not only details the results of my qualitative analysis on voter preference amongst conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ individuals, but it also highlights the political desires and hopes that questionnaire respondents and Lucas and Sandra express despite many Brazilians being both socially and politically divided by one central figure, President Bolsonaro.

Ultimately, I elaborate how various members of the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities conceptualize their hopes, understanding of marginalization and define their voter preference. From there, I propose to verbally address discussion to promote mutual

understandings of hope and concerns on national issues between opposing members in the liberal and conservative categories within these two communities. At the same time, I argue it will be hard to address these parallels without taking marginalization and inequality into account, which can be a divisive subject. To conclude, I emphasize that it is crucial to address the mutual political concerns of Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ individuals with opposite political views in the contemporary political climate of Brazil.

Chapter 1: The Significance and Intersection of Racial and Sexual Marginalization in Brazilian Politics and Society

This chapter defines marginalization in the terms of international relations scholars and details the history of racial and sexual marginalization in Brazil. This chapter has five sections, in which the first, titled “What is the definition of marginalization and what is its significance in Brazil?” begins with a general introduction on Brazil. It defines the political and economic history of the nation and elaborates on the historical presence of racial and sexual marginalization in Brazil. The second section, “The Challenges of Racial and Sexual Justice in Brazil,” focuses on addressing the public backlash that public policies and institutions have received while implementing various forms of racial and sexual justice. This section also introduces questions on the efficacy of such legislation in Brazil. The third section, “Backlash Against Social Progression,” brings attention to social violence and political targeting towards active voices in both the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities such as, Jean Wyllys and Marielle Franco. The fourth section, “2013-Present: From *Operação Lava Jato* to President Bolsonaro,” explains the past several years of Brazil’s political and economic precedence and the rise of conservative voting behavior leading to the election to President Bolsonaro. The final section, “My First Impressions on Inequality and Politics in Brazil,” vividly reflects on my personal observations I made living in Rio de Janeiro. This section also introduces specific patterns and negative attitudes on homosexuality and race, as well as general distrust in politics that were prevalent in my fieldwork in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Overall, this chapter lays out the historical and political context needed to understand racial and sexual marginalization in relation to Brazilian politics.

What is the definition of marginalization and what is its significance in Brazil?

Brazil. The Federative Republic of Brazil hosts a population of approximately 209 million people as of 2017, a national language of Portuguese, and is considered one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. The average annual income per capita is approximately \$9,281 USD and the national economic growth rate is 1.0% as of 2017. Brazil has experienced repeated cycles of economic growth and recession affecting income inequality, debt, and inflation over the past several years since 2016.

Election Round	Party and Candidate	Number of Votes	Percentage of the Electorate (%)
1 st	PT - Fernando Haddad	31,341,996	29.28
2 nd	PT - Fernando Haddad	47,040,775	44.87
1 st	PSL - Jair Bolsonaro	49,276,702	46.03
2 nd	PSL - Jair Bolsonaro	57,797,477	55.13

Table 3. Results in the 2018 Presidential Election.

Source: CEPESP Data at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation

The political state in Brazil has varied with a previous regime of a military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985, that followed with presidential administrations marking social progression, and currently waves towards fascism. Brazil, unlike the United States, currently has a vast amount of political parties, with nearly 35 different parties from the ideological left to right. As shown in Table 3 above, Jair Bolsonaro once affiliated with the PSL¹¹ won the 2018 Presidential election with more than 55% of the electoral vote while Fernando Haddad his competitor of the Worker's Party¹² lost with 44.87% of the vote. Given that President

¹¹ The PSL (O Partido Social Livre-PSL) is an economically liberal, nationalist, and anti-communist political party. The party leader is current President Jair Bolsonaro. The PSL is the leading party with 53 seats in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, the Legislative Branch of the Brazilian Federal Government.

¹² The Worker's Party (O Partido dos Trabalhadores-PT) was founded in 1980 on socially liberal values by former President Lula da Silva. The PT held majority power in the Brazilian Federal Government from 2003 to 2016 with

Bolsonaro also received between 64% to 70% of the vote in the cities of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo and received between 30% to 45% of the vote in the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities (CESOP, 2018), his grand win across various electorates illustrates how widely accepted social conservatism is in Brazil.

Defining Marginalization in Brazil. According to the members of the World Fair Trade Organization and the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, marginalization is “both a condition and a process that prevents individuals and groups from full participation in the social, economic, and political life enjoyed by the wider society” (Alakhunova et al, 2015). In further detail, the facets of marginalization include the assessment of an individual’s: economic opportunity, education, food security, language, social security, protection from violence, health & sanitation, infrastructure, and private property. These facets of violence, security, and economic opportunity are of particular focus when discussing marginalization against the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities in Brazil.

While marginalization has resurged to be a widely used term in the fields of anthropology, political science, and sociology, it is important to understand the historical and cultural contexts of Brazil in order to understand how marginalization contextually exists in Brazilian politics and society. Additionally, how does marginalization relate to politics and specifically, voter preference in Brazil? While social demographics such as a person’s gender, race, religion, and social class are likely to never change, they are considered long term factors that directly link to vote choice (Theiss-Morse, 245). Given the outcome of the 2018 Presidential election, it will be important to examine whether Theiss-Morse’s inference on social

President Dilma Rousseff and Lula Da Silva. President Lula has been ranked the most highly approved president in Brazilian history.

demographics can also be applied to voter preference in Brazil. As discussed prior, Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians are statistically shown to be economically and physically marginalized and more so, are denied the experience to live equally. However, we need to build a general understanding of how race and sexual orientation are facets marginalization throughout Brazil's history and what role they hold in the outcome of the 2018 Presidential election and in general, Brazilian politics.

Racial Marginalization in Brazil. Race holds an immense role in Brazil's history from the day the Portuguese arrived in the year 1500, and it continues to be a pressing social and political issue during Jair Bolsonaro's term as president. Between 1600 and 1850, the Portuguese Empire trafficked approximately four and a half million enslaved Africans from the Western and Southwestern coasts of Africa to various regions of Brazil. Millions of captured African people were enslaved on sugar cane plantations in the Northeast and gold mines in the Southeast. In comparison to other American colonies and nations such as the United States of America and nations in the Caribbean, Brazil's role in the Atlantic slave trade accounted for nearly 40% of all captured Africans who were brought to the Americas through the Atlantic Slave Trade. With around four and a half million enslaved Africans brought to Brazil, nearly 53% of Brazilians from the 2010 census (provided by IBGE) classify themselves as Afro-Brazilian or *pardo* and *negro*.

With geographic isolation, inhumane treatment, and subordination, captured Africans in Brazil were legally enslaved until the abolition of slavery in 1888. In the following year of 1889, Brazil became a Federalist Republic after being once being an imperialist monarchy. With the abolition of slavery and transformation of Brazil's political regime, social and economic shocks

transformed social factions within its aristocratic society. Oppositions between the working class and the slave class created a multitude of social tensions (Freyre "Order & Progress" 167).

According to the widely acclaimed Brazilian historian Sergio Buarque de Hollanda, rural proprietors became powerless and were removed from the position as stakeholders in the economy since they were heavily dependent on slave labor ("Roots of Brazil" 137). In this sense, it seems that the abolition of slavery and the elimination of the Brazilian monarchy would completely change Brazil's social trajectory. However, rural proprietors and landowners were never stripped from their economic authority. Since emancipated slaves had no income and resources to move away from the plantations, many landowners subjected them to minimal compensation through cheap agricultural labor on these plantations.

While Afro-Brazilians were legally emancipated from slavery, most freed Afro-Brazilians were left in rural areas without any social gains to sustain themselves. From then on, many Afro-Brazilians from the Northeastern states of Alagoas, Bahia, and Pernambuco began to migrate to the Southeast and the former Brazilian capital of Rio de Janeiro to search for employment (Green, "Beyond Carnival" 17). In the beginning of the 20th century, many descendants of African slaves in rural areas of Northeastern and Southeastern Brazil continued to migrate to major cities along the Southeastern coast due to poverty and formed once unconsidered unofficial neighborhoods known as *favelas* or *comunidades*. Today if you visit many of Brazil's major cities such as Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, you can come across many *favelas* in areas that are considered an undesirable place to live such as the slopes of mountains and the greater suburbs with minimal sanitation infrastructure. In fact, certain *favelas* and impoverished areas are adjacent to some of Rio de Janeiro's most expensive neighborhoods such as Ipanema and São Conrado. While the United States has begun to acknowledge its multiracial

diversity, Brazil is still in the process of acknowledging the existence of racial and social inequality both in the past and present (Penha-Lopes, 11). Rather so, social inequality and marginalization is normalized by many Brazilian citizens.

Considering 25% of Rio de Janeiro's population of 6.5 million people lives in *favelas* and nearly 80% of the city's *favela* residents are of Afro-Brazilian descent, we can still see that Afro-Brazilians are currently subject to marginalization. However, racism persists in Brazilian society through violent manifests just like the United States of America, and it continues to pervade daily life. In February of 2019, a 19-year old Afro-Brazilian man, Pedro Oliveira Gonzaga, was suffocated by a security guard outside of a supermarket in a suburb of Rio de Janeiro.¹³ The security guard speculated he stole an item from the store and for this, he held Gonzaga in a brutal chokehold, sat on top of him, and suffocated him to death minutes after. In relation to the murder of Eric Garner in the United States, Gonzaga's brutal murder by security forces is another instance of the racial discrimination and marginalization that pervades in Brazil against young black men.

Unfortunately so, Gonzaga's murder is just one of many daily occurrences of Afro-Brazilians who are discriminated through channels of anti-black racism from both fellow members of their community and society. However, it is difficult to address the channels of anti-black racism in Brazil and to classify who is black given the history of racial miscegenation through the 17th to 20th centuries. In a country where 53% of its population identifies to have a direct ancestral background to African slaves, but only 7% of its population identifies as *preto* or black, it is especially arbitrary for Brazilians self-identity with a definite racial category system.

¹³ <https://extra.globo.com/casos-de-policia/morte-de-jovem-por-seguranca-gera-protestos-acarnemaisbaratadomercado-23456250.html>.

Brazil has self-claimed to be a nation “cured” of racism due to its history of racial miscegenation (Penha-Lopes, 20) despite current social and economic inequalities relating to race.

Miscegenation is seen as race mixing which represents a set belief that Brazilians have long mixed across racial lines and more than any other modern society (“Race in Another America” 2004). While the United States has two main racial groups that are commonly known as black and white due to the Jim Crows Laws in the American South, Brazil never institutionalized a racial categorization scale or rigid racial segregation laws after abolition (Skidmore, 54). This is because Brazilian society and racial categorization are nuanced through the history of Brazil’s “miscegenation.” In the acclaimed novel *A Esfinge*, the author Afrânio Peixoto explains that racial integration in Brazil through miscegenation created “imperfect” racial mixtures and a specific “method of racial interpenetration,” which makes Brazil immune to “racial wars and bloodshed” (Skidmore, 75). In simpler terms, Peixoto emphasizes how miscegenation in Brazil alleviates the tensions brought forth by racial inequalities. However, miscegenation in Brazil wasn’t intended to prevent racial tensions and mobilize social equality. Miscegenation in Brazil involved sexual violence, specifically, rape instigated by Portuguese descended slave masters against enslaved African women. According to Skidmore, miscegenation in Brazil was also institutionalized both through cultural and public policies throughout its history and especially in the early 20th century to “whiten” the Brazilian population.




Figure 4. Map of Brazilian States by Largest Racial Group.

Note: Maioria Branca means the majority of the state population is white. *Maioria Parda* means the majority of the state population is *pardo*.

In the Brazilian context, miscegenation was implemented to decrease the number of people with dark complexions. The racist sentiment that emerges from Brazil’s miscegenation is present in the words of Brazilian abolitionist writer Joaquim Nabuco. In 1883, Nabuco reasoned that abolitionists wanted a country [Brazil] “where European immigration, attracted by the generosity of our institutions and liberality of our [Brazilian] regime, may constantly bring to the tropics, a flow of lively, energetic, and healthy Caucasian blood” (Skidmore, 24). Another major proponent to whiten the Brazilian population was a lobbyist to the 19th century Brazilian government, João Batista de Lacerda. Lacerda is widely considered a racist and pioneer in Brazilian biomedical science. Lacerda influenced government policy and immigration through his consenting letters and opinions. In one letter to the Brazilian government, Lacerda stated that racially mixed children in the third generation will have all physical characters of the white race due to the “atavism” of their black ancestry (Skidmore, 66). With the heightened desire to whiten

the population from abolitionists, the Brazilian government liberalized immigration bringing nearly 3.8 million immigrants from countries such as Germany, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and Ukraine between 1882 and 1929 and once more in the 1930s and 1940s (Lesser, 2013). The legacy of these influx in immigration illustrates the demographic composition of Brazil shown in Figure 4 above. According to the IBGE's 2019 estimates, Brazilian states shaded in green -which include São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro- represent approximately 62% of nation's estimated population of 210,147,125. At the same time, states shaded in orange represent 38% of the nation's estimated population. While Brazil's population composes a non-white majority, we can see the nation's most heavily populated areas are for the majority composed of individuals who identify as white. Therefore, it is evident that race in Brazil has a complicated history rooted in racist sentiments.

Although many Brazilian scholars from the 20th and 21st century have addressed what needs to be done to alleviate inequalities and the marginalized status of Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians, recent legislation has come with public praise, major public disapproval amongst the middle class, and have been questioned for efficacy. These arguments and questions come from both Brazilian academics, government officials, and even Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians. In 2010, former President Lula enacted the Brazilian Statute of Racial Equality. The Statute of Racial Equality legally criminalizes ethnic and racial discrimination, and also requires educational instruction on the history of Africans in both Africa and Brazil (NACLA, 2011). The purpose of this statute, according to President Lula's administration, is a reparation to the disenfranchisement of Afro-descendants in Brazil and to recognize the history behind Brazil's multiracial society. While it is important to recognize the history of Brazil's Afro-descendants, certain scholars believe policies that evoke the history of racial

marginalization are counteractive to Brazil's political trajectory. Alexander Costa, a Brazilian sociologist at the University of Alberta, argues ethno-racial policies such as the Racial Equality Statute are problematic to Brazilian national identity. He formally believes the Racial Equality Statute is a threat to Brazilian society because it enforces Brazilians to rigidly classify themselves, which can produce greater racial divisions and public animosity (2014).

Despite Costa's argument, the Brazilian Congress and Presidential Office of Dilma Rousseff unanimously approved a drafted federal law named the Federal University Quota Bill on August 7th of 2012 (Planalto.gov.br). The Federal University Quota Bill requires all universities that receive federal government funding to reserve 50% of its spots to students who come from public schools, low-income families, and are of African and/or Indigenous descent.¹⁴ The implementation of racial quotas in universities was first introduced to the Federal University of Brasília and by 2003, more than 125 publicly funded institutions were in favor of such quotas systems (Dos Santos, 2014). Despite the increase in accessibility to education for under privileged Brazilians, the battle for tackling racial barriers in education dates to the 1990s under the administration of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. According to Brazilian sociologist Antônio Guimarães, the adoption of racialist measures in federal universities throughout the Cardoso administration received severe resistance despite international pressure ("*Acesso de negros*", 2003). The former Minister of Education, Paulo Renato Souza above all refused to accept the "racial" nature of educational inequalities, preferring to attribute them to the malfunction of public elementary school and to income and social class issues. For Minister

¹⁴A link of the law in Brazilian Portuguese is available through the Office of President of the Brazilian Republic: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2012/lei/112711.htm.

Souza, the problem of black access to universities could only be solved by the universalization of public education and not by addressing racial inequalities in education (2003).

While Minister Souza did not follow President Cardoso's expectations, the increasing level of federal universities individually using Quota System caused political uproar. On May 30th of 2006, white Brazilian anthropologist of Afro-Brazilian culture Yvonne Maggie traveled from Rio de Janeiro to Brasília to deliver an open letter opposing the ongoing implementation of the Quota System (Dos Santos, 2014). Her letter had 114 cosignatories titled "We All Have Equal Rights in a Democratic Republic." Yvonne Maggie states the Racial Equality Statute and Quota System in public universities "pressures" Brazilians to not be themselves because it will deny the racial democracy or nonexistence of racial inequality of Brazil (Costa, 2014). She additionally argues that quotas and the Racial Equality Statute try to mold the Brazilian government into a racist institution. In the words of the Antônio Freitas, a provost at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation,¹⁵ racial quotas are "bad for the future of Brazil, because of the main objective of universities is research, is to achieve quality" and with quotas "you may not have the most qualified people in engineering, in medical school, in the most challenging areas which Brazil needs to develop" (Carneiro, 2013). While many Brazilians who I met at PUC-Rio believed quotas disregard aptitude, Freitas' mutual position minimizes the fact that less qualified Brazilians and mainly Brazilians of color were never given the opportunity and access to a sufficient education because of their foundation in a poorly funded public-school system. However, Freitas' position is also shared by many white students in institutions of higher

¹⁵ The Getúlio Vargas Foundation or *A Fundação Getúlio Vargas* is a private Brazilian institution of higher education and think tank founded on December 20, 1944. It is regarded as one of the most prestigious institutions of higher education in Brazil.

education such as the Federal University of Santa Catarina according to the work of Robert Vidigal. Vidigal marks that extensive political knowledge and racial self-identification in Brazil are among the key actors in the development of opposing attitudes towards racial quotas amongst white students. His results indicate that race and the political position of an individual continue to be key determinants of opposition to affirmative action among white students, but only among white individuals with high political knowledge which is correlated to high levels of education. Therefore, Vidigal shows that neither non-white individuals with various levels of political knowledge oppose affirmative action, suggesting quotas remain controversial to educated white individuals.

In a survey study about on racial quotas at the University of Brasília, researcher Andrew Francis found that increased socioeconomic status had a significant influence on racial classification. The rate of students identifying as *pardo* and *negro* increased on average by 7% between surveys administered before and after racial quotas were enacted (Francis and Tannuri-Pianto, 748). Francis and Tannuri's analysis suggests racial quotas have made Brazilian students of color reevaluate their race when it comes to the implementation of social welfare programs.

From my personal observations in my political science lectures at PUC-Rio, many of my fellow Brazilian classmates believed racial quotas will allow Brazilians of color and people from lower-income families to receive the same opportunity that their wealthier Brazilian counterparts are given. Given my classmates' general support for racial quotas, it is also important to further analyze the reasoning as to why the Quota System in Brazil has succumbed to vast dissent before establishing an inference on the efficacy of racial justice legislation. Fortunately, research on the public opinion of the Quota System is widely available. One researcher who focuses on confronting affirmative action policies in Brazil is a black Brazilian-American sociologist, Vânia

Penha-Lopes. Penha-Lopes argues that the Quota System comes with both a positive and negative impact that affects how Brazilians identify both ethnically and racially. At the State University of Rio de Janeiro (UERJ), Penha-Lopes collected the oral histories of 18 students or *cotistas*¹⁶ who were admitted to the university through the Quota System. Penha-Lopes admits that racial quotas have overtime provoked “a reevaluation of the meaning of race for the personal identity of Brazilians” (“Confronting Affirmative Action in Brazil” 59). In her study, Penha-Lopes stated half of her participants responded they are *negro* and that their racial appearance was in her words “indisputable.”

One of her participants, Teresa is a black social science student who was raised in the Assembly of God church, where African references were regarded as “demonic” (Penha-Lopes, 63). According to Teresa and Luis, one of Penha-Lopes’ other black student participants, racial quotas decrease the marginalized status of black Brazilians through history. According to Teresa, “*Negros* in Brazil are poor because they were slaves, and slaves were those who were *negro*” (Penha-Lopes, 91). At the same time, Luis, uncertain of his racial identification, believes that the modest presence of black people through the Quota System is absurd considering the large presence of Afro-Brazilians in Brazil. On the other hand, Penha-Lopes met another student, Hereovaldo, a 29-year old black student who firmly believes the Quota System is “a mistake that comes to justify another mistake. It comes to minimize another mistake” (“Confronting Affirmative Action in Brazil” 89). Teresa and Luis’ opinions seem to be a similar case that is agreed upon by certain Brazilians who’ve experienced the Quota System as a *cotista*. Teresa and Luis’ justification and opinions of the Quota System provide a unique insight that many of researchers and audiences don’t hear from. Simply said, Teresa and Luis’ and Hereovaldo’s

¹⁶ *Cotista* is an informal term to describe a student that was admitted to a public university through the Quota System.

polar opposite opinions or explicit support and dissent for the Quota System reveal that even beneficiaries of racial justice policies remain divided by their opinions on its efficacy.

Sexual Marginalization in Brazil. Unlike the history of race in Brazil, LGBTI+ Brazilians began to fight for their legislative rights in the late 20th century after the start of the global LGBTI+ movement in the 1970s. Under the Portuguese Imperial Rule, sodomy was illegal. Sodomy was defined by the Portuguese cleric as the anal penetration of either a man or woman. In 1553, the Office of the Holy Inquisition under the Portuguese crown implemented the Portuguese legal codes (Green, “Beyond Carnival”). Between 1587 and 1794, the Holy Inquisition registered 4,419 denunciations of sodomites that were “abominable and of perverted sin” (“Beyond Carnival” 21). Out of the 394 registered sodomites, those on trial were either sentenced to death or sent to temporary exile in Portuguese Angola or Mozambique. After the removal of the Portuguese crown and the formation of the Brazilian Federal Republic in 1889, homosexuality was in itself legal and no existing law criminalized homosexual acts (“Beyond Carnival,” 1999). Brazil was unlike many countries where homosexuality was legislated as an illegal act and behavior.

While the recent implementation of equal protection policies may be deemed as advancements for LGBTI+ rights in Brazil, extensive research on the LGBTI+ community doesn't exist between the formation of the Brazilian Republic in 1889 and the formation of the military dictatorship in 1964. Despite no criminal laws on homosexuality, homosexual behavior was not accepted by the public which came to much attention during the years of the military dictatorship from 1964 to 1985. Repressive measures taken by the military government were implemented to keep homosexuals from being seen in public spaces. In the cities of Rio de

Janeiro and São Paulo, the military police conducted random “sweeps” where they stopped “suspicious” individuals for questioning, potential arrest, and harassment (Green, “Beyond Carnival” 246). Many targeted individuals from these police inspections were typically effeminate men, male prostitutes, and transsexual men on the street who were questioned for their behavior and presence in public spaces such as plazas and sidewalks. To hide from the police and resist public harassment, many LGBTI+ Brazilians in the 20th century gathered in private establishments to freely express themselves without being publicly harassed.

Discotheques and movie theaters became spaces for safe erotic encounters for LGBTI+ Brazilians. Even the staircases of movie theaters and discotheques were spaces in which *travestis*¹⁷ could improvise performances and engage in sexual activity as safe and private spaces (Green, “Beyond Carnival” 250). To curb police infringement and harassment, discotheque owners and movie theater operators sometimes discretely paid the police to incentivize them to not inflict harm (Green, “Beyond Carnival” 248). Under such fear and harassment, LGBTI+ Brazilians had been not recognized and rather mistreated by government institutions known to ensure the health and safety of citizens.

During the second half of the military dictatorship in 1978, the rise of the Brazilian LGBTI+ rights movement had been spiked by prevalent instances of homophobic violence as claimed by the president of Brazil’s leading LGBTI+ rights organization, *O Grupo Gay da Bahia*’s Luiz Roberto Mott. This began when the first Brazilian LGBTI+ activist group was founded, *O Grupo Somos*. Despite *O Grupo Somos* becoming the forefront of the LGBTI+ movement, their socialist values and mission for a mass democracy were of particular focus by

¹⁷ *Travestis* were a distinct social group in Brazil during the 1970s. *Travesti* or *travestis* are people who express the opposite gender that they were assigned at birth.

the military police during the dictatorship (“*História do Movimento LGBT*” 236). Unfortunately, *O Grupo Somos* did not actively proceed with their agendas due to repressive measures of the dictatorship. In a study conducted in 1996 by Roberto Motto and in conjunction with the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, Motto discovered a homosexual person is murdered every four days in Brazil and that 10% of these reported murders lead to justice or more specifically, arrest (Green, “*História do Movimento*” 3). In relation to the number of transgender murders in Brazil in the year of 2016, it is evident that homophobic crimes remain pertinent in Brazilian society.

Even though Brazil illegalized homosexuality at de facto level, Brazil has introduced particular legislation to illegalize discrimination against LGBTI+ individuals. The first legislative bill to illegalize LGBTI+ discrimination began in 2009 when the Supreme Federal Court of Brazil legalized gender reassignment surgery after a lawsuit against the Attorney General’s Office claimed such surgery to violate moral codes (“*História do Movimento LGBT*” 455). In May of 2013, the Supreme Court also legalized same-sex marriage. In June of 2019, the Supreme Court legislated that any act of homophobia shall be legally criminalized. More so, acts of homophobia were inherently legal in Brazil prior to June of 2019. However, such legislation doesn’t guarantee absolute protection for marginalized individuals in their daily lives. This means many LGBTI+ individuals in Brazil continue to conceal their identity to protect themselves against discrimination.

According to Brazilian historian James Green’s most recent publication, many LGBTI+ Brazilians don’t actively disclose their sexual orientation with their families (“*História do Movimento*” 2018). When families find out their daughter or son is gay, their parents and

relatives may tolerate it if their child is not openly effeminate or manly and if people outside their family can't identify their sexuality ("*História do Movimento*" 3). Richard Parker argues two patterns of homosexuality in Brazil exist between different socioeconomic classes. Men from working-class or lower-class backgrounds continue to model their sexual behavior in a traditional masculine form, while men from upper-middle-class or upper-class backgrounds usually embrace their gay identity (2017). Additionally, it is also important to note the diversity of sexualities including bisexuality, as married men who have sex with other men and maintain a heterosexual relationship remains common in Brazil (Green "Beyond Carnival" 8). Outside of the general taboo of homosexuality within families and the late arrival of anti-discrimination policies, Brazil is still a relatively violent and unstable nation for LGBTI+ individuals.

To broadly understand voter preference amongst the LGBTI+ community in Brazil, it is important to analyze the public opinion of LGBTI+ community in relation to violence. In a recent study from 2018, Lucas Bulgarelli and his research team collected questionnaire data on voter engagement and social violence within the LGBTI+ community. 63% of LGBTI+ respondents in Bulgarelli's questionnaire stated that they turn out to vote in the electoral process, while 32% stated they have minimal engagement and 4% have no involvement in the electoral process ("*Violência Contra LGBTs*" 30). However, nearly 93% of respondents considered that violence against LGBTI+ people increased during the second half of elections and 80% of this percentage believe LGBTI+ violence increased significantly since 2014 ("*Violência Contra LGBTs*" 32). Given the high level of violence against LGBTI+ Brazilians on a daily basis, the heightened sense of violence that community members notice may seem unimaginable to many readers. Such research participants stated violence against the community occurred increased

three times through the analyzed period of the election timeline (61). Rather, it is evident that anti-LGBTI+ violence is endemic to Brazil and it is heightened during political elections.

Even from the low participation rate of transgender individuals in Bulgarelli's questionnaire sample, he also discovered the most deeply affected group by violence within the Brazilian LGBTI+ community are transsexuals, transmen, and transwomen. Often, transgender people are still assaulted in the street and in public spaces such as plazas. Considering the high murder rates and publicly visible violence against transgender people, it will be important to hear from individuals who are transgender. Focusing on Lucas' experience as a transgender male and a supporter of President Bolsonaro will be emphasized in the second chapter to decipher whether he believes violence against his community is a political and societal issue.

To monitor anti-LGBTI+ violence in Brazil, research teams and organizations have created systems to document reports for victims of such violence. Victims can contact and dial the number 100 in Brazil, which documents complaints of physical violence. At many times, the Dial 100 channel receives reports of brutal homicide. Two data analysts, Andressa Contarato and Daniella Sanches, from the Getúlio Vargas Foundation have monitored complaints through the Dial 100 channel about crimes against the LGBTI+ community. According to data reports on Dial 100 from 2017, the state of São Paulo reported 260 complaints and the state of Rio de Janeiro reported 181 complaints of homophobic and transphobic violence.

When it comes to illustrating violence against the LGBTI+ community by region in Brazil, the Midwest had an overall rate of .94 complaints per 100,000 habitants, the Northeast had .70 complaints per 100,000 habitants, followed by the Southeast region (which contains the states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo) with .68 complaints per 100,000 habitants (Contarato &

Sanches, 2019). With respect to the population of each region, approximately 544 complaints of anti-LGBTI+ violence were reported in the Southeast region, and approximately 371 complaints were reported in the Northeast in 2017. Given the higher instances of violence in the Southeast region, my oral histories are focused on the experiences of Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ individuals in the Southeastern states of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. The experiences of these individuals will also potentially represent a significant percentage of the national demographic of these communities given that the Southeast region hosts around 42% of the Brazil's national estimated population of 210,147,125 people.¹⁸

Given the staggering prevalence of anti-LGBTI+ violence in 2017 alone, Sanches and Contarato argue these numbers must be placed on a public agenda that not only stress accountability on public institutions but also on citizens to individually take a stance against prejudice and discrimination (“About Homophobia in Brazil” 2019). In other words, the Brazilian Congress must continue to tackle the endless violence and marginalized status of the LGBTI+ community. However, the transition of Brazilian protective legislation being written to publicly enforced remains a great challenge.

¹⁸ According to the IBGE's 2019 estimates, the Southeast region of Brazil is estimated to have 88,371,433 residents.

The Challenges of Racial and Sexual Justice in Brazil

One case that has ensued the inefficiency and the issue of battling racial marginalization through the Quota System is the story of Lucas Siqueira, a 27-year old male who applied for a position at Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Siqueira identifies as a *pardo* Brazilian, but the controversy of his case stems from him being described as physically white by the public (Garcia-Navarro, 2016). The Quota System requires 20% of government job positions to be composed of African and/or Indigenous descendants. Siqueira's paternal grandfather is black, his maternal grandmother is both white and indigenous, and his mother's side is entirely of Portuguese descent. After applying to his desired position and listing himself as *pardo*, Siqueira was appointed to his long-desired position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Weeks later, his position was put on hold after people reported him as a fraud and identified him as white or in Brazilian Portuguese, *branco*. Siqueira was called to defend himself in front of a Race Court to investigate his application and justify his racial self-identification as *pardo*. The committee denied that he was not *pardo* or broadly Afro-Brazilian. Siqueira then decided to file a lawsuit as he believes the government should not determine a person's race. As Garcia-Navarro reports, Siqueira says "I think we are going down a very dangerous path if we want to institutionalize these kinds of racial tribunals" (NPR, 2016).

After the scandal of Lucas Siqueira, the Ministry of Planning announced on August 2nd of 2016 that anyone who takes an entrance exam for public service positions must substantiate their skin color by their physical characteristics and not their racial ancestry labeled on their application (Penha-Lopes, 145). The creation of the race court from Siqueira's trial and the Ministry's policy are seen as controversial to some because it echoes racist ideologies (Garcia-

Navarro, 2016). Similar to the legacy of miscegenation in Brazil, the adoption of the Ministry's policies have recently challenged many Brazilians to reevaluate their racial self-identification with different measurements. It is that race courts are emphasizing that physical characteristics such as skin color and hair texture are key determinants to give social welfare to individuals who have been marginalized because of such characteristics. Additionally, Siqueira's case illustrates another instance of how difficult it can be to legitimize the marginalized status of Brazilians by race without outside judgement and lawsuits.

While the Brazilian government has created new measures to seek racial justice, the legacy of miscegenation challenges the Quota System with Siqueira's story. Simultaneously, Siqueira's opinion also minimizes the marginalized status of Brazilians of color given that he possesses a fair skin tone and has semi-curly dark hair. As Penha-Lopes argues, "Brazilians are finally confronting their history of racial and economic inequality; on the other, most of them are not yet ready to definitely support measures that would lead, if not the elimination of inequalities, to more social inclusion" ("Confronting Affirmative Action in Brazil" 102). These institutions have provoked Brazilians to not only reevaluate their racial identification through their physical attributes but also evaluate how such attributes linked with race shapes their life experience. At the same time, these institutions for racial justice make individuals such as Siqueira feel exonerated for identifying with their direct ancestry. In the case of these institutions, the issues brought upon by Siqueira and discussed by Penha-Lopes illustrate the challenges further to come in order to seek racial justice in Brazil.

In the discussion on the efficacy of LGBTI+ protective legislation in Brazil, there exists an issue of effectively developing and implementing penal civil code to protect LGBTI+ Brazilians. Although the Supreme Court of Brazil criminalized homophobia in June of 2019,

many Brazilians are not hopeful that the criminalization of homophobia will decrease the level of violence that the community faces. Such hopelessness from the community and the Brazilian public is due to the high level of aggressive violence addressed by Bulgarelli. According to Brooke Long, it is paradoxical that parts of Brazil utterly celebrate queer Brazilians while having the world's largest count of homophobic murders ("Rather Dead Than Gay" 5). To bring further awareness, the 445 murders of LGBTI+ people during 2017 in Brazil only includes reported murders. More than 445, if not hundreds or thousands murders and assaults against LGBTI+ Brazilians remain unreported. Therefore, it seems that legislation and public institutions such as the police are rather ineffective in the fight against anti-LGBTI+ violence.

According to the Human Rights Campaign and Watch, Brazil's ongoing legislative efforts to protect LGBTI+ rights and criminalize homophobia have not fulfilled their goals because of inefficiency. The ineffectiveness of Brazilian protective legislation stems from the theory that the government never places responsibility on the police and citizens to adopt norms that combat such violence. While homophobic acts have been introduced to the Brazilian Penal Code, defendants of anti-LGBTI+ violence are now subject to federal criminal charges. However, certain legal scholars in Brazil believe that Brazil has an ineffective formulation of penal code. When social problems are reported across Brazilian news outlets, the general public focuses on criminalizing perpetrators due to the nature of Brazilian criminal law. While the public may feel protected from a future instance of injustice, the Brazilian government does not formulate any discussion of sustainable and systematic policy solutions that combat instances of hate at their root (Foley & Casara, 129-130).

For recommendations, researcher Julia Melasipo argues that the Brazilian government must develop diversity training programs to public and social workers, specialized police

stations, and education diversity programs to lower rates of anti-LGBTI+ violence (“The Brazilian Paradox” 60-61). Ensuring collective action and training programs against anti-LGBTI+ violence is the only way to implement effective strategies in a democracy such as Brazil. This is because democracy is most successful when the decisions of a government are held accountable by the majority of its population and respect human rights (Green & Vecchiatti, 450). Unfortunately, obstacles are in the way to implement sustainable protections for LGBTI+ individuals in Brazil. These obstacles include resistance from the members of National Congress and Executive officials in the state governments who are of the religious and far-right movement and the lack of capabilities within the Brazilian government (Melasipo, 63). Between 1998 and 2007, three Evangelical politicians held the top positions in the state administration of Rio de Janeiro and a significant proportion of members of the National Congress were Evangelicals (Machado, “Evangelicals and Politics in Brazil,” 2012). The recent growth of Evangelicals in the Federal Congress and the historical precedence of Catholicism creates a potential concern for the implementation of LGBTI+ protection policies.

In most hypothetical situations, implementing such programs through policy could add greater gridlock that is currently in the National Congress. Creating more gridlock could potentially prevent the Brazilian government from tackling other national issues as well. All recommendations considered, the future of tackling anti-LGBTI+ violence is not a priority for the Brazilian government given that it is currently recovering from an economic recession. Nonetheless, there is a nuance for marginalized LGBTI+ individuals. Unlike people of darker complexions, people in the LGBTI+ community who are not of color have the privilege to conceal a part of their oppressed identity as a means to avoid being a victim of violence. However, no one should ever conceal their identity from the public to live safely.

While social activists and local politicians have taken several measures to fight for justice, the challenges battling such issues of marginalization include both cultural and historical precedents and public outcry against such policies. For this reasoning, the definition of marginalization according to scholars from the World Fair Trade Organization and Elliot School of International Affairs doesn't attend to the cultural and historical context of current challenges that combat racial and sexual justice in Brazil. In the following section, I introduce two individuals who are social activists within the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities to address the danger and active political targeting directed towards these individuals who have fought for the rights of marginalized groups in Brazil.

Backlash Against Social Progression

Social Activism and The Danger Faced. In a world where social division seems more visible than ever before, people continue to be silenced, fired from their jobs, and when they go into the streets to protest, they can be arrested or harassed with excessive force. Additionally, people are even murdered for speaking their truth and acting upon their heroism. Consider two heroines of the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities, Marielle Franco and Jean Wyllys. Marielle Franco was a city councilor for the city of Rio de Janeiro and a human rights activist for individuals in Rio de Janeiro's *favelas* where she lived for most of her life (Gonçalves, 2019). Jean Wyllys is a former winner of the Brazilian TV series *Big Brother Brasil* and a former Federal Deputy who served in National Congress from 2010 to 2019 (Cerioni, 2019). Franco and Wyllys were active voices for underrepresented individuals within Rio de Janeiro and all of Brazil. Unfortunately, Franco and Wyllys were confronted with violent backlash after being

deemed as threats to the political establishment in both Rio de Janeiro and politicians in the Federal Government.

In the specific context of Rio de Janeiro, security forces have leverage in political elections and act as instigators of political violence. The military police are the main police division who monitor both civil and violent crime in Brazil. However, informal security forces such as militias or *milícias* and *bancadas*¹⁹ have existed since the late 1980s provoking violence and fear amongst low-income communities in urban areas of Brazil (Macaulay, 2019). These *milícias* of former military police officers, communicate through groups within social media applications such as WhatsApp where they strategically select politicians, especially far-right candidates who served in the military such as President Bolsonaro and current governor of Rio de Janeiro, Wilson Witzel (Macaulay, 63). The city of Rio de Janeiro alone has 250,000 active and retired police officers who are seen as a direct political force. In fact, President Bolsonaro's affiliated political party, the PSL elected eight military police officers to the State Assembly in Rio de Janeiro and the Federal Congress.

The Tragedies of Marielle Franco and Jean Wyllys. On March 15th of 2018, Franco attended a round-table discussion about black female empowerment and the day before the discussion, she posted a public comment against the violent behavior of Rio de Janeiro's military police through Twitter. Two hours after her round-table discussion, Franco and her driver, Anderson Pedro Gomes, were assassinated by a former police officer or *milícia* in Rio de Janeiro who was in another moving car (Gonçalves, 2018). Franco was shot once in the neck, and three times in the head. In the following days after her murder, protests to pay tribute to Franco's

¹⁹ *Bancadas* function both as informal identity and affinity groups and as advocacy coalitions of police officers, business owners, and policy entrepreneurs mainly in the city of Rio de Janeiro.

courage and mourn her death ensued across Brazil, with signs and chants literally and verbally shouting “Who ordered and sent to kill Marielle Franco?”²⁰ To this day, peaceful protests continue to unfold across Brazil to remember Franco as a hero. Franco’s voice has been never been silenced but rather her story and activism have only catalyzed the discourse to continue seeking justice in Brazil.

After a year and a half of “formal” investigation, the Federal Police of Brazil identified a former Rio de Janeiro military police officer who shot both Franco and her driver. In an anonymous testimony, Rodrigo Jorge Ferreira an ex-militia leader stated Orlando Oliveira de Araujo was ordered by Rio de Janeiro city councilor, Marcello Siciliano to murder Franco (Martins, 2019). After further investigation, a notorious sniper from Rio de Janeiro military police force named Adriano da Nóbrega became the latest suspect of Franco’s murder (Jucá, 2020). On February 9th of 2020 however, Nóbrega was murdered by the police in the Northeastern state of Bahia. Additionally, Araujo and Nóbrega happened to be a former friends of President Bolsonaro and associates of his son Flávio, a Federal Senator at his Rio de Janeiro office (Abbud, 2019). Questions remain to be answered on who ordered and murdered Marielle Franco and whether President Bolsonaro and his son Flávio had any involvement in the coordination to murder Franco.

A year and a half following Franco’s assassination, Jean Wyllys self-exiled from Brazil days after President Bolsonaro’s inauguration in January of 2019. Outside of the influence of clandestine security forces, Wyllys stated that President Bolsonaro’s victory wasn’t the mere reason he fled Brazil. It was because anti-LGBTI+ violence increased ensuing President

²⁰ In Brazilian Portuguese, “Quem Mandou Matar a Marielle Franco?” This chant is a question that many social activists and Brazilians chant at demonstrations to pressure public institutions such as the Federal Police for an answer.

Bolsonaro's victory. Therefore, Franco's murder and Wyllys' exile is a direct association to the increased violence and hate that politicians like President Bolsonaro foster. Wyllys received public death threats and verbal harassment over his nine years in the National Congress. During President Rousseff's impeachment trial in April of 2016, Wyllys, the only openly gay congressman at that time, spat towards former Federal Deputy Jair Bolsonaro after he praised the torture President Rouseff endured during the military dictatorship.²¹ The instance of Wyllys spitting at Bolsonaro was captured on live television and sparked public outrage across Brazil (Maranhão, 2016).

Wyllys renounced his position as a Federal Deputy and fled to Germany because he could no longer handle facing life and death situations on a daily basis. Traveling in a bulletproof car made Wyllys see himself living in internal exile. He could no longer live in a state where he had to sacrifice his life to the public. Living in constant security after Francos's murder made him see the reality in which he lived was mentally unsustainable. Being in the constant public eye and the only openly gay congressman in Brazil, Wyllys testified that people continuously shoved him in the street despite having several personal bodyguards with him at all times. Now a research fellow at Harvard University, Wyllys remains somewhat hopeful about Brazil in the future.²² He states that political violence in Brazil shall pass in the time to come (BBC, 2019). However, Wyllys story as an exiled politician is not a typical case of the marginalization that LGBTI+ Brazilians brave. The publicity of Wyllys' political platform and global presence gave him the privilege to be speak his words and story across continents. Unfortunately, Franco and Wyllys'

²¹ Rachel Holman, "Jean Wyllys, a Gay Congressman Flees Bolsonaro's 'Dangerous' Brazil," France 24 (France 24, March 20, 2019), <https://www.france24.com/en/20190320-brazil-jean-wyllys-openly-gay-congressman-rights-activist-exile>

²² <https://alari.fas.harvard.edu/people/jean-wyllys-de-matos-santos>

stories are just two of the thousands of silenced voices of Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians who seek justice and representation.

The Implications of Franco and Wyllys' Tragedies. Although questions about who ordered to murder Franco remain unanswered and Wyllys continues to live outside Brazil, Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians are under direct persecution in the volatile political state of Brazil. Given the immense circulation and media presence of Franco and Wyllys' tragedies, it's even more intriguing to understand why certain members of their communities would support politicians like President Bolsonaro who continues to instigate division and hate. While Franco and Wyllys' are no longer activists in Brazil, the city of Rio de Janeiro named a street in Franco's commemoration. Wyllys continues to speak against the excessive security force, gender norms, and nationalism in Brazil. David Miranda, who is both Afro-Brazilian and gay as well, has replaced Wyllys' seat in the Federal Congress under Wyllys' political party, the PSOL.²³ More so, Franco and Wyllys' stories will never be silenced. Their stories have publicized the external exile that Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians live on a daily basis. Franco and Wyllys' political presence sparked many Brazilians to refrain from being silent and actively vocalize their concerns for the well-being of their communities.

However, Franco and Wyllys' tragedies spark broader questions on voter preference amongst conservative Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians. Prior to and after the inauguration of President Bolsonaro, it was reported that suspects of Franco's murder had relationships with President Bolsonaro and that Wyllys was repeatedly verbally harassed by President Bolsonaro. Simply said, President Bolsonaro's lack of concern and utter harassment of

²³ The PSOL (O Partido Socialismo e Liberdade-PSOL), was formed in 2004 that divided from the Worker's Party. The PSOL is a left-wing party and is generally self-describes itself as socialist and democratic.

these individuals raise broader questions to ask conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters why they support a politician who displays complete indifference and contempt towards these communities and even refuses to acknowledge the issues these communities confront on a daily basis.

2013-Present: From *Operação Lava Jato* to President Bolsonaro

The Blackblocs, *Operação Lava Jato*, and Dilma's Impeachment. To understand the timeline of Brazil's history of political progression to rising social conservatism, it is important to illustrate the country's political timeline over the past seven years. In 2013, prices for necessities such as public transportation in the city of São Paulo began to rise. Along with decreasing approval rates of politicians such as former President Dilma Rousseff and the Governor of Rio de Janeiro Sergio Cabral, Brazilians across various social classes began to express their dissatisfaction with politicians through public demonstrations that were rampant across an assortment of metropolitan areas from 2013 into 2014. These demonstrations, known as the Blackblocs, were masses of people who went to the street dressed mainly in black and were known for many violent police altercations (Igarapé, 2015).

The middle and lower-middle classes, who were most hit by rising prices for necessities, were in fact, the largest group of people who participated in the Blackblocs (Igarapé, 2015). Many individuals in these social classes felt both socially and economically alienated by federal politicians in Brasília (Paulo Martins, 2016). In the eyes of the elite politicians in Brasília, the middle and lower-middle classes held much social capital to dispute and revolt in criticism of

political parties. However, public demonstrations in Brazil were just the first instance of what was next to come.

In 2014, the Federal Police Division in the State of Paraná initiated an investigation of political corruption involving the racketeering and laundering of money between the state-owned oil company Petrobras, hundreds of private contractors, and politicians from Brazil's most widely respected political parties like the PT, the PMDB²⁴, and the PSDB.²⁵ This investigation is known as Operation Car Wash or *Operação Lava-Jato*. The sum of reported recovered and misappropriated funds from the investigation has totaled to approximately \$3.5 billion US dollars. However, Operation Car Wash was conducted with a considerable amount of procedural violations especially the neglect for the rights of those under investigation. The prosecutor of Operation Car Wash issued over 1,000 search and seizure warrants, charged over three hundred politicians and business magnates for criminal offenses, and ordered many of those convicted to preventive detention in prison. Not only does the identity of these convicted individuals reveal the historical significance of the investigation, the principle of preventive detention or simply being sentenced to jail while innocent exhibits a flaw of human rights within the Brazilian criminal justice system. The leader of Operation Car Wash is Sérgio Moro a former federal judge at the Federal Police Division in Paraná. Moro was also recently appointed by President Bolsonaro as the current Minister of Justice. Moro has been accused of violating human rights throughout his execution of Operation Car Wash using preventive detention and plea bargains to

²⁴ The PDMB (O Movimento Democrático Brasileiro-PDMB) was formed in 1985. The PDMB is a centrist political party and its most infamous members include former Vice President Michel Temer and former President of the Chamber of Deputies, Eduardo Cunha. Both Temer and Cunha were involved in the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and were charged with multiple accounts of financial and political corruption in Operation Car Wash.

²⁵ The PSDB (O Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira-PSDB) was formed in 1988. It is was once the third largest political party in Brazil and has continuously been an opponent to the PT.

coerce individuals and for them to also induce testimonies of other potential criminals involved in the embezzled funds discovered in the investigation (Aragão, 152).

Amid the second year of Operation Car Wash, rising commodity prices began to plummet in Brazil resulting from President Dilma Rousseff decreasing the national interest rates to international creditors. Decreasing these national interest rates produced both devaluation of the national currency and increased unemployment rates drastically. Protests and the Blackblocs continued to ensue across Brazil that centered on President Rousseff's decreasing approval rate from her economic policies and especially since certain members of her party within the PT were accused of corruption and embezzlement in Operation Car Wash. While President Rousseff refused to coordinate in Operation Car Wash, her colleague Vice President Michel Temer and his colleagues including Eduardo Cunha from the PMDB, publicly organized an institutional coup with a petition for the impeachment of President Rousseff in December of 2015. President Rousseff had been accused by Vice President Temer and Cunha for violating budget law and opening finance credits without Congressional approval (Amorim, 2015). These accusations in which only one was true are worthy of impeachment under the Brazilian Constitution. With a bandwagon of support from Cunha and Temer's political party, Temer and Cunha convinced much of the Brazilian legislature that President Rousseff was worthy of impeachment. In April of 2016, President Rousseff was voted out of office under impeachment votes and removed from presidential office in August of 2016.

With alleged corruption scandals, rising unemployment rates, and violent crime becoming the forefront of many Brazilian's socioeconomic concerns, much of Brazil's middle class began to hope for a new politician that would be a fresh face for the country; a clean slate

for the country and someone without corruption. These admirable terms and the removal of President Lula’s candidacy made voters see no other option besides Jair Bolsonaro (“*O bolsonarismo arrependido já começou,*” 2019). Following these public hopes and general voter dissatisfaction, President Bolsonaro won the 2018 presidential election with a campaign that vaguely promised to end corruption, tackle violent crime, and appealed to voters who were once loyalists to Brazil’s largest political parties who were under prosecution in Operation Car Wash.

Candidate	White (%)	Black (%)	Pardo (%)	Other (%)
Jair Bolsonaro	58.30	38.20	51.10	39.12
Fernando Haddad	28.98	45.93	33.81	41.96

Table 5. Percentage of Brazilian Electorate for Bolsonaro and Haddad by Race

Source: Archived by CESOP. Data collected by DataFolha.

Candidate	Heterosexual (%)	Homosexual/Bisexual/Other (%)
Jair Bolsonaro	53.731	29.663
Fernando Haddad	32.30	57.186

Table 6. Percentage of Brazilian Electorate for Bolsonaro and Haddad by Sexual Orientation

Source: Archived by CESOP. Data collected by DataFolha.

2017-Present: The Rise and Support of President Bolsonaro. Given President Bolsonaro’s repeated homophobic and racist commentary and meager record of effectively proposing bills working on legislative committees, questions remain as to what definitively led to his electoral victory. Although Fernando Haddad received the majority of support across various racial groups and the LGBTI+ community, President Bolsonaro also received a large proportion of support from these communities shown above in tables 5 and 6. The data provided by CESOP in tables 5 and 6 visually reemphasizes the demand for extensive research on conservative voter

preference in the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities in Brazil. To investigate this inquiry more broadly, there exists a multitude of social, political, religious, and economic facets that may answer why more than 55% of the Brazilian electorate voted number 17, the voting number of President Bolsonaro. During the midst of Operation Car Wash, one of President Bolsonaro's opponents, former President Lula was summoned by Sérgio Moro to the Federal Police for charges of bribery. In a closed-court testimony at the Federal Police in Paraná, President Lula was found guilty to the lower court in Curitiba for accepting nearly a million US dollars in bribes to improve his beachfront vacation home. These accusations were seen to be worthy as criminal charges and viewed as a President formally stealing public funds to launder embezzled money from private contractors. A year after his trial, President Lula was sentenced to nine and a half years in prison which led to public outcry from former PT loyalists. As of November 8th of 2019, President Lula has been released from prison after the Supreme Court of Brazil voted to end mandatory imprisonment for those convicted after their first appeal has failed.

Even though President Lula himself and his party of the PT held a high approval rating during the election, President Bolsonaro never saw Lula as a single threat (DeCastro, 2019). While President Bolsonaro received major support from middle class and upper class voters, his socially conservative rhetoric held a deep sentiment amongst low-income and religious voters such as Evangelicals, and those who previously were in the business elite and security forces (“O bolsonarismo arrependido já começou,” 2019). In a series of interviews conducted in 2019, Maria de Castro discovered that the majority of sampled supporters of President Bolsonaro she interviewed held a deep appreciation for his moral and religious values and especially his opposition to corruption (“Why Did Bolsonaro's Supporters Vote for Him?” 73).

In 2017, 4,974 murders were recorded in the state of Rio de Janeiro alone with an 11% increase in murders between 2016 and 2017 (ISP, 2020). These statistics not only illustrate the increasing level of crime in Rio de Janeiro and across the nation, they also show proof as to why Brazilians have become more concerned about public safety. As a popular concern amongst most voters, President Bolsonaro promised he would decrease violence through loosened gun control and extensive police intervention. This rhetoric was deeply crucial for the support of many middle and upper-middle-class voters who live in urban areas where some fear walking the street of being robbed or assaulted at gunpoint, especially in Rio de Janeiro. Many supporters of President Bolsonaro that de Castro interviewed also stated high levels of violent crime must come with a punishable or “tough” response. The rhetoric and reasoning directly echo a central theme throughout President Bolsonaro’s campaign (“Why Did Bolsonaro’s Supporters Vote for Him?” 82). The popular discourse on law and order in Brazil has always been centered on giving human rights to those who are only innocent. De Castro inferred that many of her interviewees implied black people, who are most often victims of violent crime, are to blame themselves for the instance of such crimes. From her observation, it’s also evident that many supporters of President Bolsonaro continue to deny racial inequalities and exhibit racist attitudes. In a broader aspect, President Bolsonaro’s campaign and discourse allowed his supporters to mobilize in his defense, by giving them leverage to freely speak on racially and politically insensitive material without further accountability of their actions.

Outside of such factors, the majority of voters for President Bolsonaro seem to have also been unconvinced by the electoral process and chose to vote for who they considered the lesser of the two evils. While journalist Brazilian journalist Rosana Pinheiro-Machado states that President Bolsonaro wasn’t an ideal option for many voters, the majority of Bolsonaro voters

were “seduced by a wave of fear and hope of radical change.” However, Fiona Macauley claims a major role of Bolsonaro’s victory is the loyal support he received from Evangelical voters who use social networks such as WhatsApp to discuss politics and spread news updates in his favor (74). In fact, the population of Evangelical Christians has continuously grown since the year 2000. According to the 2010 census, 22.2% of the nation’s population of approximately 209,000,000 people religiously identify as Evangelical. In the 2020 census, 32% of the nation’s population is expected to religiously identify as Evangelical (IBGE). As Evangelicalism expects to become ever more influential in Brazil by numbers, it will also be important to see if the majority of non-white Evangelical voters also admire President Bolsonaro. Given the brief synopsis of why President Bolsonaro won the 2018 election by a popular landslide, I will introduce my personal observations living in Rio de Janeiro to illustrate marginalization, the current political climate of Brazil, and proceed to discuss voter preference for President Bolsonaro through the ethnographic and qualitative analysis discussed in the second chapter.

My First Impressions of Inequality and Politics in Brazil

One Night with Fábio. My mornings began outside my apartment two blocks from the General Osório Square in the wealthy neighborhood of Ipanema in Rio de Janeiro. Despite being one of the wealthiest cities in Brazil, nearly 25% of Rio de Janeiro’s residents live in *favelas*. Three blocks away from my apartment in Ipanema lied a complex of *comunidades* called, *Cantagalo e Pavão-Pavãozinho*. This complex lies on a steep mountain between the neighborhoods of Copacabana and Ipanema. Around 10 am, I walked to the metro entrance at the General Osório Square located a block from a stair entrance to the complex. In General Osório Square, residents of the complex pass through carrying carrels of beach chairs and multiple

freezers stacked eight feet in the air to work as vendors along the beach. At sundown, these vendors carry heavy carrels up nearly 300 feet of steep sidewalks and stairs back to their homes. While passing residents of this complex whom are of a darker complexion, women with light complexions pass these vendors carrying designer bags and wearing luxurious clothes and accessories from boutiques, such as H.Stern and Hermès. The juxtaposition of social inequality and failed recognition of such wealth disparities by race can surprise anyone who has never visited or lived in Rio de Janeiro. It is the fact that wealthy residents of Ipanema prevail to be accustomed and neglect the inequality visible on their manicured sidewalks. The fact is the extreme of the poor and rich occupy the same public space of the sidewalk but with different social boundaries and roles. Observing these daily norms in Rio de Janeiro helped me develop a framework on how to pose questions of whether my questionnaire respondents and Lucas and Sandra were also negligent to or view racial inequalities as a pressing issue. More so, walking through General Osório square made me realize how Brazilians generally remain silent about visible racial inequality.

From General Osório Square, I grabbed a public bike and shortly after I arrived at the entrance of PUC-Rio for class. During these daily commutes, I met one person whom I will call Fábio through a friend of mine at PUC-Rio. He is a 23-year old *pardo* and LGBTI+ Brazilian who works at a marketing agency in the affluent neighborhood of Gávea, located a 10-minute walk from my university. With curly black hair and a brown skin tone, Fábio's father is *negro* and a member of the Brazilian Navy and his mother is of Portuguese descent and a stay-at-home mother. He refuses to tell his parents he is gay and only defines himself as bisexual to his friends. One night after class, Fábio asked me to grab dinner and go to a barber shop with him in a trendy neighborhood called Botafogo. While in the Uber to the barbershop, Fábio told me he wanted to

cut his hair because he said he looked uncivilized and like an animal. Half an hour later, both him and I were sitting on the barber chairs getting groomed. However, little did I know Fábio wanted to get his hair chemically treated and relaxed. He wanted to remove his curls to look more “natural.” At that moment, I was shocked to hear his own words. He thought that the natural state of hair which resembled African hair characteristics was uncivilized. His words revealed to me how he internally oppresses his racial identity through his physical appearance.

After our trip to the barber, we went to a local bar and pop up store with expensive clothing. At the store, Fábio insisted we shop for certain clothes for Carnival parties. Through the curated racks of recycle plastic bag shirts and polished shelves of leather sneakers, Fábio paid particular attention to any piece of clothing with a high-end brand name such as *Alhma* or *Osklen* – brands popular amongst wealthy residents in Rio de Janeiro. Moments before he purchased nearly 500 Brazilian *Reais* or \$125 US dollars - worth of clothes, he complained to me about being short on money and that he supports himself while living at home with his parents in a suburb called *Ilha do Governador*. That night I went home confused trying to reflect on Fábio’s words and attitudes. After two months, my friendship with Fábio dissolved while I was at university and while he worked.

Even though a year has passed since that night with Fábio, I continue to think about how Fábio and in general, Brazilians internally self-identify both racially and by social class. Reflecting on Fábio’s behavior shines a light of work by Rosana Pinheiro-Machado. In 2015, Pinheiro-Machado conducted an ethnographic study that analyzes consumer behavior amongst individuals in the southern Brazilian city of Porto Alegre. While Fábio does not come from a family with consistent financial struggles, Machado brings light to understand how Brazilian youth from lower-income backgrounds use branded clothing and shoes as a form of identity.

Machado argues that brands are not just a source of pride and personal gratification but rather branded clothes are “a clear strategy to exercise the right of being able to move and feel like other young people” who come from wealthier backgrounds (“Brand Clans: Consumption and Rituals” 122). In other words, certain youth in Brazil incorporate clothing brands as a sense of belonging. This reminds me of how Fábio battles his internal oppression considering that he typically surrounds himself with wealthy private university students at PUC-Rio. He uses superficial practices as a means to self-integrate himself around his wealthier and white counterparts that he considers the status quo. More so, Machado’s work on consumer behavior in lower-income communities provides context on how certain Brazilians develop their sense of belonging through specific social behaviors.

Negative Political Dispositions: Adriana. During my time in Rio de Janeiro, I lived in my apartment with two roommates who were also exchange students. The moment we had all moved in, my Brazilian landlord Fabiana put me in contact with a woman who would be a housekeeper for my apartment. I will call her Adriana. Adriana is from a lower-middle-class suburb of Rio de Janeiro called Campo Grande and she is of Afro-Brazilian descent. Her entire family lives in the northeastern state of Sergipe and she hasn’t visited them in six years.

On Tuesdays at 10 am, my roommates had left the apartment to go to lecture, leaving Adriana and I together in the apartment. Every Tuesday morning, Adriana and I asked each other questions about our lives’, joked on and off, and had a morning cup of cashew juice. At first, she asked me what I was studying and what brought me to Brazil. Her question led me to directly discuss my research. Within the first two minutes, Adriana told me to remember two widely known phrases in Brazilian Portuguese that I had prior familiarity with. The first being “he robs

but does the work”²⁶ and the second phrase being called a “politician”²⁷ which is regarded as an insult for cunning behavior. Hearing these phrases overtime made me discover how political distrust in Brazil remains a commonality amongst both liberal and conservative voters. Adriana told me that while she remains loyal to the PT, she is distrustful of any politician in Brazil. At one moment, Adriana told me that the PT’s majority in the Federal Government helped her gain more money and support both herself and her family in Sergipe. According to Adriana, the years after the PT or since 2016 have created financial anxiety for anyone dependent on the Brazilian government. To broadly infer, public opinion forecasting in Brazil remains unpredictable, especially hearing from Adriana’s political attitudes and hardships. The uncertainty of election outcomes in Brazil such as President Bolsonaro’s victory seems to include a multitude of factors that may influence the voter preference of a marginalized individual in Brazil. That is to say, distrust in politics seems to be a major component on Adriana’s outlook on politics and voter preference.

Adriana and Fábio’s stories are just of two of many experiences I continue to elaborate on in the following chapter with Lucas and Sandra and with the qualitative data collected from questionnaire respondents. I detail the lives of Lucas and Sandra through their behavior, their social demographics, their association of coming from a marginalized status, their life experiences, and what made them decide to support President Bolsonaro. In this first chapter, I contextualize the histories and challenges that marginalized Brazilians within the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities endure. The information analyzed in the first chapter, such as the history of marginalization of race and sexual orientation, the issues of fostering racial and sexual

²⁶ Original version in Brazilian Portuguese, “Rouba mas faz.”

²⁷ Original version in Brazilian Portuguese, “Político.” It is generally directed to someone who is considered to be a thief or a liar. It is generally used to insult someone.

justice broadly, and the political precedence explain how Brazilians within the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities develop their voter preference discussed in the second chapter.

Chapter 2: Marginalization and Voter Preference for Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian Voters

My research in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo made me realize that understanding the relationship between marginalization and voter preference in Brazil is much more complex in reality than in theory. As I continued to speak with Brazilians across various social classes, I realized many Brazilians have different perceptions about marginalization and reasoning in their voter preference for President Bolsonaro. Due to familial support, education, religion, personal instances of harassment, and varying political attitudes, citizens conceptualize marginalization and develop their voter preference in individual ways. The prescribed definitions of marginalization and patterns of voter preference I obtained from officials of the Elliot School of International Affairs and Theiss-Morse et. al fell short of considering the various answers given by questionnaire respondents and expressed in Lucas and Sandra's personal narratives. Therefore, this chapter unveils how questionnaire respondents and oral history participants, who participated in my research, conceptualize marginalization in Brazil and develop their voter preference through their social demographics, personal hardships, and narratives.

The second chapter has six sections that detail the discourse of marginalization, politics, and voter preference which utilizes oral histories and qualitative data from questionnaire respondents to describe the relationship of voting patterns concerning these demographic groups in the 2018 Presidential election. The first section, "Interviewing Brazilians: Acknowledging Unwillingness and Stigma" discusses insights I made on the attitudes towards conservative Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians during the recruitment of participants for my oral histories. I continue with the second section, "Introducing Questionnaire Respondents and Lucas and Sandra." This section introduces the selection process of analyzing data from 10 respondents in

the questionnaire. It also includes introductory information of the backgrounds of my oral history participants, Lucas and Sandra. The third section, “Political Dispositions and Voting History: Are there visible Differences between Voters for Bolsonaro and Haddad?” focuses attention on the relationship of voter preference to trust and distrust in politicians and political institutions, partisanship, and voting history with data from previous presidential elections and the data from selected questionnaire respondents.

The fourth section is titled, “Why Bolsonaro or Haddad? Are there visible Demographic and Ideological Relationships between Conservative and Liberal Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian Voters?” This section provides tables and qualitative analyses of the data from 10 selected questionnaire respondents and the narratives of Lucas and Sandra by their social demographics and reasoning in their vote for President Bolsonaro. This section synthesizes the visual relationship between certain social demographics and similar ideological reasoning in voter preference amongst the selected questionnaire respondents and my oral history participants. The following section, “Conceptualizations of Marginalization: Experiences and Opinions from Respondents and Lucas and Sandra” analyzes how personal experiences of marginalization or simply, harassment influence the voter preference of both Lucas and Sandra and the selected respondents. The information and reflections presented throughout this chapter aim to address the implications of the negative attitudes towards conservative percentages of the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities in Brazil. The chapter then concludes with sixth section, titled “National Concerns: Addressing Mutualism between Conservative and Liberal Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian Voters.” This section concludes the chapter to highlight national concerns that selected questionnaire respondents and Lucas and Sandra expressed on what needs to be addressed in Brazilian politics. Therefore, a qualitative analysis of questionnaire data and oral

histories amongst Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians inherently address mutual political concerns and ideologies to ease the contentious political scene in contemporary Brazil under the Presidency of Jair Bolsonaro.

Interviewing Brazilians: Acknowledging Unwillingness and Stigma

Challenges in the Recruitment for Oral Histories. Given that Lucas and Sandra were the only two of the 46 participants who agreed to meet with me, the remaining 44 participants I recruited for oral histories refused to discuss their identity and political dispositions. While a 4% response rate is not considered inadequate for many survey projects, it is important to note that the individual observations I made in the recruitment of individuals of my oral histories by myself and with my friends João and Larissa bring forth the existence of negative and condescending attitudes towards conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ voters in Brazil.

In the case of the public demonstration on *Avenida Paulista* in São Paulo discussed in the introduction, this couple was simultaneously being interviewed by a local TV news channel. Protesters surrounded the couple in support with applause, while I anxiously waited behind the camera for minutes during the broadcast. After the new reporters finished their broadcast, I spoke with the couple and we exchanged each other's WhatsApp contact information. The couple also agreed to schedule a conversation in the following weeks and suggested that I should text them in the following days. During the first two weeks of our conversations through WhatsApp, the couple said they couldn't meet because of on-going construction in their apartment. I found the construction to be reasonable. In weeks of back and forth communication, we still had not scheduled a personal meet and greet. After several attempts, I inferred the couple made every excuse possible to not meet. In one instance, the couple responded to me with a WhatsApp voice

message telling me that they couldn't meet because they were diagnosed with laryngitis. To this extent, I was inherently certain that the couple did not want to meet. I received no further response from the couple and felt slightly hopeless of speaking with conservative LGBTI+ voters in Brazil.

A similar case also occurred with a fellow student at my university in Rio de Janeiro in June of 2019. João, one of my friends at PUC-Rio, shared the contact information of an LGBTI+ design student who I will name Pedro. Pedro on his Facebook page proudly supports President Bolsonaro. He is also openly homosexual and according to some of his friends, flamboyant. I sent a message to contacted Pedro over Facebook telling him that one of his classmates suggested we meet due to our mutual interests in Brazilian politics and as LGBTI+ individuals. Pedro responded to my Facebook friend request three weeks after I messaged him. He told me that he would like to meet after class at the *Bandejão* (the cafeteria at PUC-Rio) to discuss politics and why he supports President Bolsonaro. On the day of our scheduled meeting, I contacted Pedro to tell him I was waiting at the *Bandejão*. I received no response and I asked him a day later if we could meet another time. Once again, I received no response from Pedro and two weeks later, at a *Festa Junina*,²⁸ I saw Pedro in the mere distance. We exchanged eye contact, and he proceeded to walk away to the other side of the room and left the facility. An hour later, I received a Facebook voice message from Pedro in which he gave me his phone number apologizing to me for the lack of coordination. From then on, I never heard from Pedro again.

²⁸ A *Festa Junina* is Brazilian celebration that features costumes, traditional Brazilian music and dance, foods and drinks, and private and public parties during the month of June.

The display of paradoxical behavior from Pedro and the couple being vocally open of in public while being disinterested to speak with me n made an important observation for me to mark in my ethnographic research. More so, the disinterest and hesitation expressed by them in my conversations and recruitment made me realize the importance to forge sincere relationships with participants, in order to analyze and collect data on their honest political dispositions and life experiences. While this may be seen as a limitation of my research, the hesitance and stories I've discussed amongst other identified participants created a foundation of questions that I ask Lucas and Sandra in their narratives as voters of President Bolsonaro. Based on these observations, I proposed to ask questions why Lucas and Sandra believe people do not wish to discuss politics and more simply, what is the underlying issue of discussing politics with voters of President Bolsonaro.

João and Larissa. Two people who I consider my confidants in Rio de Janeiro were my former classmates at PUC-Rio, whom I will call João and Larissa. Larissa is a recent graduate from PUC-Rio with a degree in Civil Engineering. Her mother is a lawyer and her father is a civil engineer for the Water and Sewer Authority of Rio de Janeiro. Well-traveled and from the South Zone of Rio de Janeiro, Larissa comes from an upper-middle-class background. João, on the other hand, studies Design at PUC-Rio on a private scholarship and his mother and father own a restaurant in a middle-class neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro called São Cristóvão. Unlike Larissa, João is a member of the LGBTI+ community and fearlessly expresses his sexuality. In João's case, he is not fearful to conceal his sexuality from the public in Brazil. He regularly attends gay parties in the city and is a member and frequent blogger on various gay Facebook group pages. Despite their different social backgrounds, the condescending attitudes João and

Larissa expressed towards political parties and especially voters of President Bolsonaro addressed possible reasons as to why I faced challenges in the recruitment of my oral histories.

After class on Tuesday and Thursday nights, Larissa typically came to my apartment to study or prepare dinner with my roommates. One evening during the middle of June 2019, I came home to Larissa with my roommates preparing dinner in the kitchen. I closed the hallway door and took a deep sigh after having class from 10 am to 9 pm that day. My main frustration was that I still found no one willing to participate in my research. I told Larissa and my roommates about my frustrations and anxiety. Both Larissa and my friends responded to my frustrations, asking me why I would ever want to discuss President Bolsonaro and converse with people who voted for him. They viewed such voters who are black or LGBTI+ as a mystery and by verbatim *malucas* or *doidos*.²⁹ Larissa and my friends continued to laugh after calling these voters *malucas* and *doidos*. The attitude and haughty laughter from Larissa and my friends were important for me to potentially reason as to why many identified participants didn't wish with me.

One afternoon while studying for a Brazilian literature exam at my apartment, I told João about the status of my research project and the lack of people willing to speak with me. Given that João gave me the contact information of several potential participants, he had known about my project prior. I told João that all of the individuals he referred to me refused to speak or never responded. João nudged his head at the table and aimed his head downward, also apathetically stating he wasn't surprised that a *Bolsominion*³⁰ wouldn't accept to privately speak. I found the

²⁹ *Maluca(s)* and *Doido(s)* are adjectives and nouns to describe people as crazy, or as people who have lost their sanity.

³⁰ The term *Bolsominion* is a pejorative expression for people who are politically aligned with the ideals of President Bolsonaro. A *Bolsominion* is considered to be dumb, mean, ignorant, biased, homophobic, misogynist, and racist with values lined to authoritarianism and conservative extremism.

term *Bolsominion* to directly relate with the negative connotation that Larissa cackled about such voters as *malucas* and *doidos*. During many of my conversations with João, he repeatedly expressed concern that my identified participants would abruptly diverge to racist and homophobic commentary. Definitively so, João like Larissa held similar opinions on such voters and more formally, placed them in categories discrediting the underlying reasons as to why they voted for President Bolsonaro.

Many of the attitudes that I observed from João and Larissa's behavior and my interactions with them made me realize the similarities amongst many Brazilians in terms of their current political opinions. Although João and Larissa come from different social backgrounds, it is evident that both João and Larissa's attitudes are not just personalized stigmas, but rather a collective negative attitude directed to conservative voters that may leave certain demographic groups fearful from openly expressing their opinions. The negative attitudes or loose stigma expressed by João and Larissa potentially explain the contradictory behavior of Pedro and the gay couple at the public demonstration. These voters are generally viewed as a mystery and mentally ill which completely disregards the logic and legitimacy of their voter preference. In other words, the observations I made from the attitudes expressed by João and Larissa were crucial standpoints for me to draft questions for my conversations with Lucas and Sandra and the structure of my online questionnaire.

Introducing Questionnaire Respondents and Lucas and Sandra.

Questionnaire Respondents. Before finding conclusive patterns of voter preference from previous elections, this research aims to understand the reasoning of particular conservative voters in the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities who voted for Jair Bolsonaro in the 2018 Presidential election. For this reason, a qualitative analysis of social demographics and dispositions on voters within these demographic groups of interest must be taken into consideration. To measure differences in voter preference, a comparison must be made between both liberal and conservative voters within these demographic groups, or those who voted for Fernando Haddad of the PT and Jair Bolsonaro of the PSL.

18 to 24 years old	25 to 34 years old	35 years or older
44%	41%	15%

Table 7. Percentage of Respondents in the Questionnaire by Age Group

	White (%)	Pardo (%)	Negro (%)	Other (%)
Jair Bolsonaro	0	2	0	0
Fernando Haddad	23	13	5	2
Voted blank	0	0	0	0
Didn't vote	0	0	0	0

Table 8. Percentage of LGBTI+ Respondents in the Questionnaire by Race and 2018 Vote

	White (%)	Pardo (%)	Negro (%)	Other (%)
Jair Bolsonaro	4	2	1	1
Fernando Haddad	19	10	4	1
Voted blank	0	3	1	0
Didn't vote	6	2	0	1

Table 9. Percentage of Non-LGBTI+/Heterosexual Respondents in the Questionnaire by Race and 2018 Vote

Approximately 30 respondents or 10% of the total amount of questionnaire respondents indicated they voted for President Bolsonaro. This sample unfortunately doesn't represent the Brazilian population given that more than 55% of the electorate voted for President Bolsonaro. Since my sample doesn't represent the Brazilian electorate, statistical tests of significance will not be made during this analysis. Due to the qualitative framework of this research, demographic points of data collected from respondents will include respondents' evaluations on political institutions, religion, monthly income, education, voting history, instances of harassment, and etc. These topics and points of data will be considered to draw comparisons and relationships between conservative and liberal voter preference amongst these demographic groups. The questionnaire responses were collected in June and July of 2019 with the original version of the survey instrument, *Questionário (Portuguese Version)*, located in Appendix B.

In the questionnaire, table 7 above shows that the 85% of the respondents or approximately 255 individuals reported to be between the ages of 18 and 34. As shown in table 8, the only LGBTI+ individuals who indicated they voted for President Bolsonaro were *pardo* and represented 2% of the sample size. The sample did not report any conjointly white and LGBTI+ voters for President Bolsonaro. While there were no jointly white and homosexual respondents who voted for President Bolsonaro in this questionnaire, an unreported percentage of individuals who are both homosexual and white who voted for President Bolsonaro does exist. However, with such limitations, a certain number of *pardo* LGBTI+ individuals indicated to have voted for President Bolsonaro. A selected amount of these respondents will be selected in the category as conservative voters in the qualitative analysis of these demographic groups of interest. tables 8 and 9 show there exists a percentage of respondents in my questionnaire who are either Afro-Brazilian (*pardo* or *negro*) and LGBTI+ men and women who voted for President

Bolsonaro. The selected group of participants that I will analyze include 10 individuals between the ages of 18 and 34 and are for the majority Afro-Brazilian and also from the LGBTI+ community. In order to undergo a qualitative analysis with precise measurements and conclusions, I evenly selected five individuals from these demographic groups who voted for Bolsonaro of the PSL and five individuals from these groups who voted for Fernando Haddad of the PT. The qualitative points of data from these 10 selected participants will also supplement the analysis Lucas and Sandra's narratives regarding their such qualitative points of interest. More broadly, the qualitative analysis from the questionnaire data may allow us to determine how Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians develop a conservative or liberal voter preference.

Lucas and Sandra. I met Lucas through a friend who is an anthropology graduate student in São Paulo. My friend sent me Lucas' contact information and from there, I wrote to him through Facebook Messenger. I introduced myself to Lucas as an LGBTI+ student who wants to meet LGBTI+ Brazilians to discuss politics and being LGBTI+ in Brazil. My first time speaking with Lucas was through a video call in June of 2019, the following time at his house in July of 2019, and last through another video call in October of 2019. Lucas is a transgender man who transitioned from a woman to a man at 19 years old. Lucas is 26 years old and is from a suburb of São Paulo called Guarulhos. His family is from the Southeastern state of Minas Gerais but Lucas was born and raised in São Paulo. He has a younger brother and an older sister. As for his occupation, Lucas was previously an Uber driver when I contacted him. Lucas now operates a local storefront that sells grocery items from the front of his home. He lives with both his mother and siblings and throughout his narrative he highlights the role of his family in every facet of his life. Before analyzing Lucas' narrative, it is important to note that Lucas felt extremely comfortable with me in his house during our conversations. In most cases, Lucas

responded to my questions immediately and with much enthusiasm. During our conversations, Lucas referred to me as *Cara*.³¹

One month after I contacted Lucas, I also met Sandra through a classmate of mine in my sociology class at PUC-Rio. My friend knows Sandra as an acquaintance since both he and her attend similar church groups with a Christian organization in the Rio de Janeiro suburb of Barra da Tijuca. My classmate sent me Sandra's contact information and I wrote to her through WhatsApp. I introduced myself to Sandra as an undergraduate student at PUC-Rio to establish a mutual connection. She told me that she had known of me before I contacted her through our friend. Sandra is a 33-year old Afro-Brazilian woman and who is originally from Santarém, a small city within the interior of the northern state of Pará. She is an undergraduate student studying law at PUC-Rio and outside of her studies, Sandra works as a street vendor selling a variety of things such as barbeque known in Brazil as *churrasco*. Outside of her studies and busy days as a street vendor, Sandra also is devoutly religious and attends a Neo-Pentecostal church in Barra da Tijuca.

Before I met in Sandra, she continuously referenced the name Jesus in our conversations through WhatsApp, telling me which days she can't meet because she was preoccupied working on volunteer projects with her church, studying for class, or selling *churrasco*. Sandra regularly changed her profile photo on her WhatsApp account with a different verse from the Bible each week. I spoke with Sandra on two occasions at a coffee shop in a shopping mall in Barra da Tijuca. Before I analyze Sandra's narrative, it is important to note that Sandra seemed somewhat uncomfortable and anxious through WhatsApp. Sandra initially was concerned that I was "another person wishing to interview me [Sandra] and have myself [Sandra] repeatedly defend as

³¹ *Cara* is common term in Brazilian colloquial Portuguese to refer someone a friend or translatable to colloquial American English as "bro."

to why I voted for Bolsonaro.” Sandra revealed through her words that she was extremely nervous of being judged by both her friends and by according to her “unsympathetic reporters” who view her both as a mysterious and enigmatic conservative minority voter. In the list of drafted questions for my oral histories in Appendix A, I will introduce how Lucas and Sandra interpret their beliefs of being a marginalized individual, express their views on Brazilian politics, and develop their voter preference in relationship to their social demographics.

Political Dispositions and Voting History: Are there visible Differences between Voters for Bolsonaro and Haddad?

To gauge a broader perspective on the voter preference of the 10 selected respondents from the online questionnaire and Lucas and Sandra, it is crucial to analyze at research on voting behavior in Brazil. Due to recent corruption scandals and economic recession, many Brazilian voters hold neutral and relatively low approval ratings for the diverse amount of political parties (Samuels & Zucco, 2018). Brazilian voters are slightly reluctant to feel any connection with political parties because many politicians display a lack of interest in differentiating themselves from other political parties. In simpler terms, low approval ratings, lack of confidence, and partisanship characterize voter preference in the Brazilian electorate and especially election outcomes within marginalized communities for both Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians. After these analyses, I found that the selected Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian questionnaire respondents were visibly different in their voter preference by their general trust in political institutions and levels of political anti-partisanship.

Respondent	2018 Vote	Is Bolsonaro corrupt?	Is Lula corrupt?
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1	Bolsonaro	Not sure	Yes
2	Bolsonaro	Yes	Not sure
3	Bolsonaro	Yes	Yes
4	Bolsonaro	Yes	Yes
5	Bolsonaro	Yes	Yes
6	Haddad	Not sure	Not sure
7	Haddad	No	Not sure
8	Haddad	No	Not sure
9	Haddad	No	No
10	Haddad	No	Yes

Table 10. Selected Respondents Opinions' on Politicians

Trust and Distrust. During the commencement of Operation Car Wash, President Lula's detention, and President Rousseff's impeachment, many former loyalists of the PT have changed their views on their once highly respected party and its politicians. To view the opinions on politicians from the selected questionnaire respondents, table 10 above shows whether respondents believe current President Jair Bolsonaro and former President Lula are corrupt. Table 10 shows that respondents 1 through 5, who voted for President Bolsonaro, for the majority believe that both President Bolsonaro and former President Lula are corrupt. At the same time, respondents 6 through 10, who voted for Fernando Haddad of the PT, for the majority believe that President Bolsonaro isn't corrupt and the majority remain unsure as to whether they believe former President Lula is corrupt. The observation made from the respondents 1 through 5 provides an insight to decipher whether voters of President Bolsonaro, or the majority of the Brazilian electorate lack trust in candidates and political institutions. However, what does the Brazilian electorate reveal about political distrust when it comes to voter turnout in elections?

To investigate whether or not Brazilians for the majority remain unconvinced by politicians in election, table 11 below represents the percentage change in the number of *votos*

nulos and *votos brancos*³² between the 2014 and 2018 Presidential elections, in both the primary and final election cycles. It is evident from table 11 that the number of *votos nulos* between the final round of the presidential election terms in 2014 and 2018 increased by approximately 64.9%. More importantly, the number of *votos brancos* between the 2014 and 2018 Presidential elections decreased by approximately 29%. Therefore, it can be inferred that voter disengagement in Brazil is visible through the rising numbers in *votos nulos* and decreasing numbers in *votos brancos*. The significant increase in residual votes (*votos nulos* and *votos brancos*) are composed of various factors in presidential elections. According to Brazilian political scientist Thomas Fujiwara, the advancement of electronic voting booths have allowed less educated Brazilians to be enfranchised to vote in elections.³³ At the same time, the percentage increase in *votos nulos* and decrease in *votos brancos* between the final round of the 2014 and 2018 Presidential elections suggest higher voter disengagement even with recent technological advancements that empowered socioeconomically disadvantaged individuals. Rather, the percentage increase in *votos nulos* and decrease in *votos brancos* may suggest an unprecedented growth of political distrust and partisanship towards both political candidates and general politics. Therefore, what do the selected respondents suggest when it comes to their trust in political institutions against corruption?

³² *Voto Branco* means the vote is blank and does not have any indication for a candidate. *Voto Nulo* means the voter selected a candidate not indicated on the ballot. A *voto nulo* is typically made as a form of protest and it is considered inadequate. Votes can only be classified as valid if the vote indicates the selection of candidate that has been explicitly listed on the ballot. *Votos brancos* and *Votos nulos* are defined as residual votes and do not constitute the electorate.

³³ Accessible link to Fujiwara's insight on pg. 432. http://www.princeton.edu/~fujiwara/papers/elevote_site.pdf

Type of Vote	Election Round (between 2014 and 2018)	Percentage Change (%)
<i>Voto Branco</i>	1 st	-29.712
<i>Voto Branco</i>	2 nd	29.387
<i>Voto Nulo</i>	1 st	7.900
<i>Voto Nulo</i>	2 nd	64.913

Table 11. Growth Rates in Votos Brancos and Votos Nulos between the 2014 and 2018 Presidential Elections

Source: CEPESP Data at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation. Percentages calculated in Microsoft Excel.

In the words of Brazilian sociologist Maria Tavares de Almeida, the political dispositions of Brazilians have drastically shifted over time. In her recent survey from 2017, Almeida asked subjects to select which institution they had the most trust in. 74% of her randomized participants agreed that their trust remains mainly in the church, 60% in the armed forces, 48% in the police, and unfortunately, 6% in political parties (de Almeida, 2019). With the significant lack of trust and confidence in political parties amongst the Brazilian population at large, table 12 below reemphasizes Almeida's findings that Brazilians remain generally hopeless of political institutions. Table 12 presents information on how much the selected respondents believe that Operation Car Wash will end political corruption in Brazil. Despite respondents 1, 4, and 5, table 12 for the majority reveals that the selected respondents regardless of their vote for President Bolsonaro or Fernando Haddad remain unsure or completely unconvinced that political corruption can be ended through further police investigation and punitive punishment on the hundreds of politicians convicted of political crimes. While respondents who voted for President Bolsonaro remain somewhat unsure or convinced that political corruption can end through Operation Car Wash, this observation reveals a potentially visible relationship of hope in voting history and partisanship.

Respondent	2018 Vote	Belief that Operation Car Wash will successfully end corruption in Brazil. 0 being absolutely No and 10 being absolutely Yes
1	Bolsonaro	9
2	Bolsonaro	4
3	Bolsonaro	6
4	Bolsonaro	8
5	Bolsonaro	7
6	Haddad	0
7	Haddad	2
8	Haddad	3
9	Haddad	0
10	Haddad	2

Table 12. Selected Respondents Opinions' on Operation Car Wash

Voting History. Table 13 below illustrates the voting history of the 10 selected respondents in the online questionnaire. In the 2014 Presidential election, respondents 5 through 10 voted Dilma Rousseff from the PT and also voted for Fernando Haddad in the 2018 Presidential election. Both Haddad and Rousseff were candidates for the PT which broadly illustrates that these voters are loyal to socially liberal or left-wing candidates. More so, there is a possibility that voters can be categorized as *petistas*.³⁴ Respondents 1 through 5, who voted for President Bolsonaro in the 2018 Presidential election, made a variety of choices at the voting booths in the 2014 Presidential election. Respondents 1 and 5 voted for Aécio Neves of the PSDB who represents a centrist-democratic political ideology. Respondent 2 voted blank in the 2014 Presidential election which means they indicate no one on their ballot. However, respondents 3 and 4 voted for Dilma Rouseff of the PT. In various surveys, Samuels and Zucco also revealed an increasing effect of nonpartisans to recall their preferred candidates from the 2014 Presidential election onward and change their party affiliation in the 2018 Presidential election. In this case, respondents 3 and 4 changed their voter preference from liberal to

³⁴ *Petistas* are considered individual that support or have continuously voted for the PT in elections.

conservative candidates like President Bolsonaro. Accordingly, a substantial number of former PT loyalists voted for President Bolsonaro in the 2018 election.

The voter preference of respondents 3 and 4 in the 2014 Presidential election is an insightful observation considering these respondents voted for a liberal candidate and four years later in 2018, they chose to vote for both a politically and socially conservative candidate like President Jair Bolsonaro. Given that respondents 3 and 4 are both heterosexual, there is a possibility that their sexual orientation does not influence the shift in their voter preference. Rather, a multitude of factors may exist for respondents 3 and 4 to change their recent voting history from a liberal to conservative presidential candidate. To uncover more factors and relationships on voter preference, it is important to visually compare the party preferences of the online questionnaire respondents.

Respondent	2018 Vote	2014 Vote
1	Bolsonaro	Aécio Neves
2	Bolsonaro	Voted blank
3	Bolsonaro	Dilma Rousseff
4	Bolsonaro	Dilma Rousseff
5	Bolsonaro	Aécio Neves
6	Haddad	Dilma Rousseff
7	Haddad	Dilma Rousseff
8	Haddad	Dilma Rousseff
9	Haddad	Dilma Rousseff
10	Haddad	Dilma Rousseff

Table 13. Voting History of Selected Respondents

Partisanship. From the Thursday night I spent with Larissa at my apartment, I guessed that Larissa didn't like President Bolsonaro and I proceeded to ask her if she liked President Bolsonaro's opposer from the PT, Fernando Haddad the former Secretary of Education. She proceeded to casually tell me, "Absolutely not. I hate the PT." I then asked her if she likes any political party. She repeated "No" as she rolled her eyes and scrolled through her Instagram feed. I then proceeded to ask Larissa does she like Bolsonaro. She proceeded to answer but with more

agitation, “Absolutely not. I hate him more than any other politician. But if you ask a Brazilian if they like a political party, you won’t be surprised to meet anyone who likes any political party or politician.” I asked also my friend João if he felt the same way about politics like Larissa. He stated he doesn’t like most parties due to their history of corruption, especially Brazil’s largest and most established political parties. These parties include the PT, the PDMB, and the PSDB discussed on page 40. However, João gave exception for the PSOL, the party that both Jean Wyllys and Marielle Franco were members of.

Larissa and João’s attitudes and apathetic responses interested me to research whether their anti-partisan attitudes actually reflect the political dispositions of the majority of Brazilians and especially conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters selected in this qualitative analysis. According to previous research, antipathy towards politicians does shape voting behavior in Brazil (Samuels & Zucco, 139, 2018). Table 14 below indicates the political party preferences of the selected questionnaire respondents. More than half of respondents indicate they don’t have a preferred political party which supports the existence of political antipathy discussed by Samuels and Zucco. Simultaneously however, the vast majority of the selected respondents indicate their least preferred political party. The majority of respondents who voted for President Bolsonaro indicate they least prefer the PT and its’ derivative, the PSOL. The majority of respondents who voted for Fernando Haddad also indicate their least preferred political party is the party of President Bolsonaro, the PSL. This observation seen from the micro-sized sample of conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters reemphasizes the visibility of anti-partisanship in Brazil and contextually, *anti-petismo*.³⁵ *Anti-Petismo* is widely considered one of the main factors for the rise of social conservatism and

³⁵ *Anti-Petismo* can be broadly defined as the opposing social movement against the PT which grew exponentially after the reelection of President Dilma Rousseff in 2014.

President Bolsonaro’s victory in 2018. The main first reason why many *anti-petistas* dislike the PT is for its history of corruption and lack of trust growing from 6.12% in 1997 to 46.49% in 2006 (“Partisans, Nonpartisans, and Anti-Partisans,” 65).

Respondent	2018 Vote	Most Preferred Party	Least Preferred Political Party
1	Bolsonaro	Don't have	PT
2	Bolsonaro	Don't have	PT
3	Bolsonaro	Don't have	PT
4	Bolsonaro	NOVO	PSOL
5	Bolsonaro	NOVO	Don't have
6	Haddad	Don't have	PSL
7	Haddad	Don't have	PSL
8	Haddad	PSOL	PMDB
9	Haddad	PSOL	PSL
10	Haddad	Don't have	PSL

Table 14. Political Party Preferences of Selected Respondents

In most cases, partisanship can be seen as a wide lens on the evaluation of everything when it comes to politics in Brazil following the reign of the PT. At the same time, partisans whether loyal to the PT or not do not remain divided by social demographics (Samuels & Zucco, 160). For this reasoning, partisans whether *petistas* or *anti-petistas* don’t seem to be divided by social demographic indicators such as race. When it comes to representation and voter preference in Brazilian politics, the underrepresentation of non-whites in political power remains visibly present. As for the Brazilian electorate, many voters seem to not defer to powerful and prestigious political candidates along racial lines (Bueno, 2017). In a racially diverse society such as Brazil, many voters do not take race into consideration when defining their voter preference or casting their vote at the polls. Simply said, *petistas* are not less likely to self-identify as white than *anti-petistas* (Samuels & Zucco, 38). Rather so, *petistas* and *anti-petistas* in Brazil represent socioeconomic and educational differences in visible divide between Brazil’s lower and upper classes. Likewise, Brazilian political scientist Natália Bueno states that the gaps

in racial representation within the Brazilian government also discount challenges in the voter participation of disadvantaged communities (“Race, Resources, and Representation,” 2017). These disadvantaged communities include Afro-Brazilians but also sexual minorities such as LGBTI+ Brazilians. These findings seem to underscore other lurking variables as to why significant percentages of marginalized groups stand in support of President Bolsonaro.

As previous findings of voting patterns in Brazil are not subject to be statistically different by social demographics, many data sources and analyses continue to disregard race and sexual orientation as potential catalysts of patterns in voter preference. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that voter preference and previous analyses don’t provide sufficient evidence of how significant percentages of sexual minorities vote for conservative politicians such as current President Bolsonaro. Given that anti-partisanship and the lack of racial boundaries have now become an endogenous facet of Brazilian politics with the rise of *anti-petismo*, a voters’ social demographics, and reasoning in their vote must be considered to further investigate a cohesive understanding of conservative and liberal voter preference amongst Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians.

Why Bolsonaro or Haddad? Are there visible Demographic and Ideological Relationships between Conservative and Liberal Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian Voters?

This section focuses whether there are visible relationships in the social demographics between selected questionnaire respondents and Lucas and Sandra on their conservative and liberal voter preference and with respect to their gender and sexual orientation. The goal of these analyses are to identify any demographic factors that differentiated Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters who voted or did not vote for President Bolsonaro. Most categories were not visibly different from each other in all but three categories, religion, education type, and political reasoning. From a qualitative standpoint and my sampling methods, the social demographic points of data for the majority showed no visible social demographic differences between the selected Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian respondents.

Religion. Table 15 below presents the religious affiliations of the selected respondents in the online questionnaire. This table shows there is no visible difference in the religious affiliations between the respondents 1 through 5, and 6 through 10 given the religious diversity of this selected group of respondents. However, there is a noticeable relationship amongst the selected group of respondents who are Afro-Brazilian and/or LGBTI+ Brazilian voters. Two of three respondents who are all *negro* religiously affiliate themselves as Evangelical.

Evangelicalism or Evangelical Protestantism has recently grown in Brazil since the 1970s. As discussed prior, not only has a large proportion of Brazil's population become Evangelical many researchers have addressed that the growing demographic of Evangelicals has influenced conservative politics in Brazil. To investigate whether Evangelism holds an influential role in politics and voter preference at an individual level, I decided to ask questions to my oral history participants, Lucas and Sandra about their religious affiliations.

Respondent	Gender	Race	Sexual Orientation	2018 Vote	Religion
1	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Bisexual	Bolsonaro	Don't have
2	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	Evangelical
3	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	Agnostic
4	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	Evangelical
5	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Bolsonaro	Judaism
6	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	<i>Candomblé</i>
7	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Haddad	Evangelical
8	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Agnostic
9	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Spiritualist
10	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Bisexual	Haddad	Don't have

Table 15. Religion of Selected Respondents

When I asked Lucas questions of any religious affiliation, his response was rather limited on his spirituality. I simply asked Lucas whether or not he was religious, and he stated he doesn't have a religion but rather only believes in God or *só acredito em deus*. Given that Lucas stated he doesn't have a particular religion. I wanted to verify if Lucas had a religious affiliation by asking if he ever attended religious services or reads religious scriptures routinely. He proceeded to add he hasn't attended any religious service since he was teenager and doesn't view religion as an important role in his life. Therefore, religion doesn't play an important role in Lucas' moral beliefs and political dispositions. However, Lucas' belief in God does reflect the legacy of religion or specifically, Catholicism being a component of popular Brazilian culture with common phrases such as *If God Will Want To* or *Se Deus Quiser*.

Contrary to Lucas, Sandra quickly responded to my question if she was religious while we sat in a mall café. She affirmed: "I am Christian and only Christian with the love of God." After this short affirming statement, I then asked Sandra which sector or faith of Christianity she belongs to or what type of church she attends. She reaffirmed, "I am just Christian. My church is neither Catholic, Evangelical, or Agnostic. It is a Church of Jesus." In her experience and affirmation of her Christianity, Sandra seems to be a member of a new branch of Evangelical

movements in Brazil. That movement is the modern Neo-Pentecostalist movement in Brazil. Neo-Pentecostalism emerged in Brazil during the late 1970s and it has a centralized theology with autonomous churches built through community loyalty that establishes a central focus on “the return of Jesus Christ as a moral mindset and source of knowledge” (Harvard Divinity School, 2020). With social demographics that mirror Sandra, most members of the Neo-Pentecostalist movement in Brazil are poor, black, and female with limited education similar to respondent 2 who also voted for President Bolsonaro. The niche demographic of many Neo-Pentecostalists directly reflects the history of Pentecostalism in Brazil, which sought out impoverished Brazilians in rural areas when urbanization increased, and economic modernization led to higher socioeconomic disparities between Afro-Brazilians and the general Brazilian population (Harvard Divinity School, 2020).

I proceeded to ask Sandra about her relationship with Christianity. She said she doesn't remember when she became religious exactly. However, she begins the story her relationship with religion in her hometown of Santarém in 2013 when she was 27, where she went to church with her father. She also emphasizes that no one ever pressured her to become religious, claiming it as her own choice. As I began to further comment on her church and religion, Sandra redirected our conversation to discuss Jesus is not a thing and how Jesus is a thing that does not judge and asks us to do everything with love. From then on, she said she felt compelled and wanted to follow the path of Jesus and follow the words of the Bible. I proceeded to ask if she found the Bible to be a guiding book throughout her life. She answered, “it is exactly a book of life” or *é um livro da vida mesmo*. At one point, Sandra stated that Jesus spoke with her and said Jesus will always follow her. She believes that she has never been assaulted in Rio de Janeiro, notoriously known for high rates of violence, because of her moment with Jesus, who taught her

“to love everyone.” From this standpoint, she also wanted to advertise that her church follows the Bible’s mission through the lawyers on staff and humanitarian projects that are a part of the service at her church in Barra da Tijuca. From Sandra’s involvement and journey with religion, it’s clear that religion plays a fundamental role in her outlook on life and how she interprets what is morally right and wrong within politics, a path directly correlated to the theology of Neo-Pentecostalism in Brazil.

When I proceeded to ask whether or Sandra didn’t vote for other candidates such as Fernando Haddad from the Worker’s Party, she wanted to first assure that she isn't partisan and nor she is against Haddad or the Worker’s Party. I found her clarification to be especially important to understand her logic. She then proceeded to explain, “I always study the proposals of each party. Haddad, for example, wants to legalize everything too early. I see people on the street waking up early when I work with my church. They’re on drugs and suffering, but at my church, we want to help people. Why do you want to elect a man who wants to legalize marijuana and possibly other drugs such as cocaine? It’s not a good interest for the people.” For this, Sandra equates the liberalization of drugs that she associates with Fernando Haddad as an immoral public interest. In her experience working as a volunteer at her church, Sandra has equated her involvement with the church as an encompassing vision of reality and to decipher what are the best public interests. Sandra’s words also mirror the theology of Neo-Pentecostals who believe that health, wealth, and salvation depend on the fight against the natural struggles brought upon the world (Gustafson, 2013).

Followers of this movement like Sandra and of a similar demographic like respondent 2 place their religious principle and personalized interpretation of evil and injustice in the world through their religious freedom in politics. More so, Neo-Pentecostals use their religious

principles as a measure of understanding political and social issues. In the case of Sandra as an Afro-Brazilian woman in Rio de Janeiro, Sandra's religious morals manifests in her individual voter preference by equating such morals to social and political issues. Therefore, religion holds a significant role in the voter preference of Sandra and individuals of a similar social demographic, who voted for President Bolsonaro.

Sandra's response to her support for President Bolsonaro, disapproval of Haddad supposed policies mirrors the "Pentecost culture" described by Brazilian sociologist Maria Machado. The individualism in "Pentecost culture" according to Machado allows its followers to develop their outlook on public institutions. In interviews archived by Machado, one Pentecostal follower stated a politician has to be afraid of hell, because if the politician is not afraid of hell, politics becomes corrupted (*"Religião e Política no Brasil Contemporâneo"* 2015). In respect to Sandra's own affirmations, she believes that there is need for a politician who is charismatic to her affiliations and in this case her religious morals that directly influence her political beliefs. In this sense, a politician that is charismatic to such waves of Evangelism and Pentecostalism in Brazil, who directly caters to Sandra's religious and social demographic, seems to be President Bolsonaro, a self-proclaimed Catholic who frequents Evangelical churches.

Income. From the 10 selected respondents, half of the selected respondents reported to have a monthly income between 0 and 3,000 Brazilian Reais. Interestingly enough, the selected respondents when grouped by their vote reported in table 16 below have similar income ranges. This is a limited sample to draw convincing conclusions from, but it does illustrate that the majority of Brazilians have generally low incomes and that these individuals don't seem to be politically divided by income. According to the IBGE, *pardo* and *negro* Brazilians on average earn 1,530 Reais a month; 1,200 Reais less in comparison to white Brazilians. More than 250 of

the approximate 300 questionnaire respondents and including all of the selected respondents answered yes on whether they had faced financial instability in the past five years. American scholars and the general public would expect individuals with higher incomes to lean more conservative especially on racial lines as well. The lack of a visible difference in income between Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ voters of different complexions in the sample represents a gap between an idealized theory on how income inequality and race influence voter preference in a superficial matter. This contradicts findings in studies with representative samples.

Respondent	Gender	Race	Sexual Orientation	2018 Vote	Monthly Income Level (Reais)
1	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Bisexual	Bolsonaro	R\$3,000 to 6,000
2	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	R\$0,000 to 1,000
3	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	R\$3,000 to 6,000
4	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	R\$1,000 to 3,000
5	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Bolsonaro	R\$0,000 to 1,000
6	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	R\$1,000 to 3,000
7	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Haddad	R\$3,000 to 6,000
8	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	R\$0,000 to 1,000
9	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	R\$3,000 to 6,000
10	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Bisexual	Haddad	R\$6,000 to 9,000

Table 16. Monthly Income Level of Selected Respondents

In my oral histories, Lucas and Sandra never discussed income as an influential factor in their voter preference. This surprised me given the fact that many Brazilians political scientists and sociologists have stated that income tends to be a defining factor on party affiliation and voter preference. Throughout my Emory career, I have learned about Brazil as a country that struggles with income inequality especially along racial lines. Thus, when first arriving to Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, I expected my conversations with Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ voters to include perceived differences between voter preference when discussing their income and financial stability. However, not only was income never mentioned a single time during my discussion with Lucas and Sandra, it was never mentioned in my discussions with professors, Dr.

Solano and Dr. Bulgarelli. Ultimately, the lack of discourse on income inequality concerning politics demonstrated to me that the relationship between voter preference and income by race needs to be further investigated in 21st century Brazil. This means that income operates through different paths such as socialization and upbringing which may be found in representative sampling.

Respondent	Gender	Race	Sexual Orientation	2018 Vote	Highest Education Level
1	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Bisexual	Bolsonaro	Undergraduate
2	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	High School
3	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	Graduate
4	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	Undergraduate
5	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Bolsonaro	Undergraduate
6	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Undergraduate
7	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Haddad	Undergraduate
8	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	High School
9	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Undergraduate
10	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Bisexual	Haddad	Doctorate

Table 17. Highest Education Level obtained by Selected Respondents

Education. Only 16.5% percent of the Brazilian adult population has completed an undergraduate education (“Educação 2018-Biblioteca Do IBGE”, 2019) and while eight of the ten selected respondents have received an undergraduate education, it can be seen above from table 17 that the selected Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters are highly educated in comparison to the national average. In fact, the median years of education for *negro* and *pardo* Brazilians is 8.4 years, equivalent to the completion of a middle school education. Thus, the selected Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian respondents are also completing a high-level education at much higher rates than most members of their social demographic groups (2019). Given that the vast majority of the selected respondents are highly educated, there is no plausible and distinguishable relationship between level of education and liberal and conservative voter preference. However, when the respondents’ education is stratified by type of education such a

private or public education, a visible relationship does exist. Consider table 18 below which indicates the type of education the 10 selected respondents received. It is undeniable to observe that regardless of race and sexual orientation, the majority of voters for President Bolsonaro respondents 1 through 5 for the majority received a private education. At the same time, the majority of respondents 6 through 10, who voted for Fernando Haddad of the PT, regardless of their gender, race, and sexual orientation received a public education. Thus, one can infer that a visible relationship exists between conservative and liberal voter preference and a private or public education. The confidential respondents from this sample therefore show that Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters who've received a private education may tend to vote for more conservative candidates or specifically, have a conservative voter preference.

In my oral histories, Lucas and Sandra also did not discuss education as a distinguishing factor when discussing their reasoning in their vote for President Bolsonaro and even when discussing their life experiences. Given that I recently discovered private and public education may affect conservative and liberal voter preference amongst sampled Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters, it will be important to further investigate how the type of education and level of education received by Lucas, Sandra, and future participants influence their voter preference.

Respondent	Gender	Race	Sexual Orientation	2018 Vote	Type of Education
1	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Bisexual	Bolsonaro	Private
2	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	Private
3	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	Private
4	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	Both private and public
5	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Bolsonaro	Public
6	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Private
7	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Haddad	Public
8	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Public
9	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Public
10	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Bisexual	Haddad	Both private and public

Table 18. Type of Education obtained by Selected Respondents

Respondent	2018 Vote	Main Reasons for 2018 Vote
1	Bolsonaro	Reduction of state intervention, Economic Growth, Combat Corruption
2	Bolsonaro	Public Safety, Economic Growth
3	Bolsonaro	Economic Growth
4	Bolsonaro	Pension Reform, Economic Growth, Public Safety
5	Bolsonaro	Public Safety, Education Reform, Economic Growth
6	Haddad	Human Rights, Education, Employment
7	Haddad	Social Inequality
8	Haddad	Education, Social Inequality, Environmental Protections
9	Haddad	Unemployment, Budget Deficit, Social Inequality
10	Haddad	Human Rights, Environmental Protections, Social Inequality

Table 19. Selected Respondents Reasons' for Vote in the 2018 Presidential Election

Political Priorities. To investigate a difference in political priorities amongst conservative and liberal voters in my questionnaire, I drafted a question for online questionnaire respondents to list their most important reasons or national issues (a maximum of three) which made them vote for Fernando Haddad or President Bolsonaro. Table 19 above provides the responses as to why the selected respondents voted for either Fernando Haddad or President Bolsonaro or Fernando Haddad. As shown from respondents 1 and 5, who reported to have voted for President Bolsonaro, two common reasons from the majority of these respondents include economic growth and public safety or simply, combating violence. The reasoning of combating violence echoes de Castro's discussed findings that various Bolsonaro voters she interviewed stated high levels of violent crime must come with a punishable and immediate response. In comparison to respondents 6 through 10, who reported to have voted for Fernando Haddad, the majority of these respondents share common reasons and issues in their vote which include social inequality and human rights. More broadly, it seems that the selected Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ respondents who voted for President Bolsonaro express that they are more concerned or

prioritize economic and authoritarian concerns for Brazil's national agenda. At the same time, the selected Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ respondents who voted for Haddad express they are most concerned with liberal ideologies concerning human rights and justice. In way or another, voters of these demographic groups differentiate themselves politically between ethical issues and economic self-interests. However, it's difficult to validate such a claim without further supplemental data. In this case, what do Lucas and Sandra discuss in their reasoning for their vote for President Bolsonaro? Does their reasoning in their vote for President Bolsonaro support a potential inference that conservative and liberal voters seem divided on ethical and economic concerns?

To further investigate this question with Lucas' opinions and reasoning during our interactions, I asked myself whether or not I should pose such a question of this nature to Lucas. However, when I posed this question during my second meeting with Lucas, he began to smile and gave me a thumbs-up as I began to ask for his opinion on politics. He verbally told me that he was excited to share his opinion of Brazilian politics. Lucas stated, "While I'm not a fan or knowledgeable about politics, Brazilian politics is nothing more nowadays. Security and safety are the worst problems for the country at the moment. As a citizen, I saw safety become worse during the PT and especially during President Dilma's administration." In his opinion, Lucas displays a similar sentiment of *anti-petismo* and concern on public safety that many voters of President Bolsonaro display in the reports of Rosana Pinheiro-Machado and Mariana de Castro. I then asked him for whom did he vote for in the 2018 election. He smiled and graciously responded, "Bolsonaro."

I then proceeded to ask him why he choose to vote for and preferred President Bolsonaro in comparison to other candidates. Lucas answered with: "My biggest hope is that Bolsonaro will

fix safety. Before being an LGBTI+ person, I am first a citizen of Brazil. For this, I want equality and the safety for every citizen to be guaranteed. I don't search or want privileges. Unlike the power of the PT, President Bolsonaro wishes the best and understands the hopes of the Brazilian people. This will be especially important for Brazil in the next several years." Lucas' reasons for his vote directly echoes the reasoning of respondents 1 through 5 vividly. More importantly, it seems that Lucas also equates that human rights are only guaranteed through the implementation of public safety or specifically, punishable measures must be implemented to ensure the safety of everyone and not the political agendas of the PT.

Unlike Lucas, Sandra reiterated the importance of where she comes from to envision her opinion on what has recently happened in Brazilian politics and why she voted for President Bolsonaro. She stated, "Where I come from, there's no electricity and the government has finally responded to providing safe drinking water. The government of Brazil is a chaotic state. I am 33 years old and where my mother lives, she is finally able to receive certain things that people in big cities like Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo take for granted. As for living in Brazil in general, everything has become better for religious, racial, and sexual minorities. I think right now, the majority of people want order in the government for things to be done correctly." In the reasoning in her vote for President Bolsonaro, she stated "Bolsonaro is not the best person, but his wife and his family are a perfect example of order in Brazil, especially when it comes to his religion. Bolsonaro is robbing in his crazy words, right, but I've never seen him assault or hurt a woman physically. He speaks crazy words. Yes, he verbally assaults people. I've seen this yes, but he's never done anything physically even though my black and homosexual friends tell me seriously look at the things he has said, Sandra."

While Sandra does acknowledge that President Bolsonaro has repeatedly made various violent and derogatory, she believes that President Bolsonaro mirrors the principle of the Brazilian state written on the national flag “Order and Progress” or *Ordem e Progresso*. At that same time, the paradox for her to reconsider President Bolsonaro’s faults also raises concerns on how certain people are willing to forgive and prioritize certain facets of a candidate’s character for their charisma and morality in their voter preference. Once again, it is evident that religion plays a significant role for Sandra to not only defend and overlook President Bolsonaro’s statements, but also make her decide who she prefers as president in reflection with her individualized religious morals. The fact that President Bolsonaro was stabbed and spent most of the election campaign hospitalized or bedridden at home gave him a sense of “martyrdom” to his public image and an appeal to Neo-Pentecostal voters like Sandra (“*O bolsonarismo arrendido já começou*” 2019). In this case, Sandra finds the Brazilian national theoretical foundation of order and progress as a basis when understanding her voter reference which directly mirrors her religious morals.

To supplement the inference made from the analysis on selected respondents, Lucas and Sandra’s reasoning in their vote for President Bolsonaro presents multiple findings for political scientists and sociologists who research voter preference. In the case of Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters, not only do concerns on national issues vary based on moral beliefs and values across conservative and liberal voters, many voters are willing to sacrifice certain mutually political priorities over others regardless of a candidate’s controversial affirmations. Therefore, the political priorities and reasons displayed by the selected respondents and Lucas and Sandra illustrate are not exogenous to race and sexual orientation but rather endogenous to education, religion, and interpretations on morality.

Conceptualizations of Marginalization: Experiences and Opinions from Respondents and Lucas and Sandra

To expand on the social demographics and the political dispositions on the voter preference of the 10 selected respondents and Lucas and Sandra, I finally address whether marginalization is an influential factor for Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians in their voter preference. In these analyses, I found that the selected Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian questionnaire respondents were visibly different in their voter preference by their personal experience of physical and/or verbal harassment. As for my oral history participants, Lucas and Sandra disclosed that their unperceived experiences of marginalization by their race and sexual orientation leave them to believe marginalization is not just an insignificant factor in Brazilian politics but surprisingly, a divisive issue not only in voter preference but for Brazilian society as a whole due to their reoccurrence and belief in a racial democracy.

Respondent	Gender	Race	Sexual Orientation	2018 Vote	Have you been harassed because of your identity?
1	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Bisexual	Bolsonaro	No
2	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	Yes, only verbally
3	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	No
4	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Heterosexual	Bolsonaro	No
5	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Bolsonaro	Yes, only verbally
6	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Yes, both physically and verbally
7	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Heterosexual	Haddad	Yes, only verbally
8	Male	<i>Pardo</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Yes, only verbally
9	Female	<i>Negro</i>	Homosexual	Haddad	Yes, only verbally
10	Male	<i>Negro</i>	Bisexual	Haddad	Yes, only verbally

Table 20. Marginalized Experience of Selected Respondents

Table 20 above indicates whether or not the selected respondents have been to subject to experiences of marginalization through physical and/or verbal harassment with regards to gender, race, and sexual orientation. In comparison to respondents 6 through 10, 3 of the 5 respondents who reported to have voted for President Bolsonaro report they have never been

harassed because of their identity or in particular, because of their race, sexual orientation, religion, and etc. However, respondents 6 through 10, who reported to vote for Haddad of the PT, all indicate they have been that they have been verbally harassed because of their identity. Additionally, it is that visible that regardless of their vote in the 2018 Presidential election, all of the selected respondents who identify as black or *negro* have reported to have been harassed because of their identity unlike the selected respondents who are *pardo*. This observation indicates that black or *negro* Brazilians in comparison to *pardo* Brazilians are subject to harassment of because their reported darker complexion. More so, these observations made from analyzing Table 20 above allow us to potentially inference that voters who've never experienced harassment because of their identity – a form of marginalization – may tend to prefer a conservative politician and vice versa. Therefore, it can be potentially inferred that within these demographic groups, individuals who've experienced harassment may vote for liberal candidates with agendas for equal rights and protection due to their concern and possible trauma brought upon by their past experiences of harassment. However, do these claims of racial and sexual marginalization seem to suffice in Lucas and Sandra's narratives as conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters?

Sandra's Perspective on Race and Conceptualization of Racial Marginalization in Brazil. As an Afro-Brazilian woman and supporter of President Bolsonaro, I decided to ask Sandra a variety of questions regarding her racial self-identification and perspective of racial marginalization in Brazil. When I first asked Sandra how she self-identifies in terms of her race, she responded that she is both black and indigenous or *negra e indígena*. With a response of two racial categories, I then asked her if she ever places herself into one racial category. Sandra stated she personally identifies as indigenous when asked about her physical appearance, but

when it comes to self-identification through government entities such as the Brazilian census and social welfare programs, she prefers to self-identify as black. Sandra's racial self-identification highlights the interpretation of race that most Brazilians racially identify themselves through their phenotypic traits rather than directly through their skin color. American sociologist, Edward Telles makes a similar point about racial categorization in Brazil, suggesting that Brazilians tend to identify themselves by their phenotypic traits. This is due to the fact that Telles discovered that Brazilians personally experience discrimination more often if they self-identify as dark-skinned or another non-white feature.³⁶ That being said, Sandra highlighting that she is more than an Afro-Brazilian or black woman raises questions if Sandra wishes to not categorize herself to just a specific demographic in order for her not internalize the racism existent in Brazilian society.

I proceeded to ask Sandra if she believes people are treated differently for their skin color in Brazil. She stated, "Racism does not exist at a societal level in Brazil. Racism exists everywhere. In Brazil, racism exists. Of course, it does." Her brief response directly mirrored Lucas' issue of equal rights in Brazil in his vote for President Bolsonaro. Although racism exists in Brazilian society, Sandra undermines the issue of racial marginalization by simply equating to such injustice as a universal phenomenon. More broadly, her brief response suggests that Sandra is greatly aware of racial marginalization but in her perspective, does not find it to be a pressing issue in society and politics even as a self-identified Afro-Brazilian woman.

Outside of her views on racism in Brazil, Sandra disclosed her experience as a *cotista* and scholarship recipient. These experiences have directly shaped her outlook on contemporary

³⁶ Edward Telles. "Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, Race, and Color in Latin America." Choice Reviews Online, 2015, 52(08). https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.5149/9781469617848_telles

politics and racial marginalization in Brazil. According to Sandra, “With scholarships, there are so many, I have one. But now I am against them for the most part. In my city, it doesn’t have technological advances and there are major disparities.” She continued to explain, “It is honorable to have *Bolsa Família*³⁷ or be a *cotista* from where I come from. If you’re a mother and receive *Bolsa Família*, you’re going to want more children in my hometown.” Her statement on *Bolsa Família*, a conditional welfare program in Brazil that President Lula developed raised questions on how she inferably stated people have abused the program in her hometown. However, President Lula’s *Bolsa Família* alleviated nearly 30 million Brazilians from poverty.³⁸ This paradox made me question her on whether or not people in her town have escaped poverty through *Bolsa Família*. She responded with, “No, they’re using the money to buy clothes and not items for an education. Lula, I love and respect him. But the things he did have not helped the nation. Government programs don’t take into account people who desire an education and wish to escape poverty. They only take into account people for their skin color like the Racial Quota System. But, indeed, people don’t have accessibility when it comes to race in Brazil.”

While she is an opponent of the Quota System in Brazil, Sandra believes that racism has been perpetuated through such a system. In her words, “Many people believe quotas increase accessibility to a fair education, but in reality, many people use quotas and scholarships as an economic dependency on the state. In this sense, quotas are not a permanent solution. We [Brazilians] as a country need to address racial inequalities in our country through the investment

³⁷ *Bolsa Família* is a social welfare program developed in 2003 by former President Lula da Silva. The program provides financial aid to poor Brazilian families; and if they have children, families must ensure that the children attend school and are vaccinated. Under these conditions, the mother of the family is given a direct cash transfer to assist in necessity costs. *Bolsa Família* has been known to have significantly decreased the poverty rate in Brazil.

³⁸ Katy Watson. "Brazil's Lula: Saint or Sinner?" *BBC News*. 2018, accessed June 27, 2019.

in public education and not systems that only take into account a person's race. You shouldn't be considered for a degree in engineering because you're black, even if you didn't learn math well in middle or high school." For that reason, Sandra believes President Bolsonaro will inhibit equality in Brazil by disregarding racial inequalities. While Sandra's opinion that race must be disregarded in the implementation of social welfare programs in Brazil, she also inherently also supports the ideal of a racial democracy by firmly believing that policies on wealth distribution and social disparities should disregard race as a central component of marginalization and social disparities in 21st century Brazil.

The fact that Sandra views people abusing social welfare programs in her hometown speaks volumes on how she envisions what needs to change in Brazil with President Bolsonaro and the impact of her Neo-Pentecostal morals on her voter preference for President Bolsonaro. In her case, she believes programs can be directly resolved in Brazil through President Bolsonaro because he aims to challenge social welfare programs for racial justice and challenge the moral corruption created through public institutions such as *Bolsa Família* and the Quota System. In other words, Sandra not only believes that racial marginalization isn't an issue in Brazilian society and politics. She more robustly believes that the programs against racial marginalization encourage division or redundantly, inequality in Brazil. Therefore, racial marginalization according to Sandra is not of much importance in Brazilian society and politics and rather a destructive concept in an institutional form.

Lucas' Perspective on being LGBTI+ and Conceptualization of Sexual Marginalization in Brazil. As a member of the LGBTI+ community and particularly a transgender male, I decided to ask Lucas various questions about his sexual orientation and his perspective on marginalization within the LGBTI+ community. In our first meeting, Lucas said

that he has never been treated differently because of his gender identity as an LGBTI+ individual. In our second meeting, I repeated the same question again to gauge whether or not his statement changed from the first time I spoke with him through our video call. Lucas responded with a similar answer that his experience has been peaceful or *tranquilo* and that he has never suffered for being an LGBTI+ person in Brazil. Given Lucas' short and prompt answers, I proceeded to ask him questions about his LGBTI+ identity.

Before I began to discuss politics or sensitive topics with Lucas, I first asked him open-ended questions about his childhood and when he realized he was LGBTI+. He began to discuss his childhood through the lens of his transgender identity. At 11 months old as a biological woman, Lucas cried at his baptism because as his mother told him, he wore feminine clothing. After his baptism, Lucas and his mother left the church to change his clothes in a small diner or *lanchonete*. Lucas states after his mother changed him into masculine clothing, he stopped crying. As a biological woman at six years old, Lucas states he realized he liked girls both sexually and romantically and viewed himself as a lesbian. His mother and father said they had already known he was a lesbian and were both indifferent about it. Considering Lucas never felt the need to conceal his sexual identity to his parents, Lucas' experience first coming-out challenges the concept that Brazilian parents only tolerate their child's queer sexuality if they conceal from the public ("*História do Movimento LGBT no Brasil*").

Lucas never discussed his teenage years but rather disclosed when he realized he was a transgender man. After marrying his first partner at 19 years old, Lucas realized he wasn't a lesbian female but rather a transgender man. During his first year of marriage with his wife, Lucas confessed to his wife that he was a transgender man and asked her for her opinion of changing his biological gender. Unfortunately, his wife didn't accept him being a transgender

male. Lucas described this period as a waste of time or *tempo perdido*. Considering his first marriage a waste of time made Lucas lead himself to begin his gender transition. The first phase of his transition from a biological female to male began when he was 20 years old during a six-month period. After he left his first wife, he went to his mother and father telling them he was a transgender man and wished to biologically change his sex.

Unlike most Brazilian families, Lucas' father accompanied him to multiple medical consultations at a clinic specializing in gender hormonal therapy. For this, Lucas says his family is wonderful and fortunately supportive. Describing his family as fortunately supportive is an indirect answer of Lucas' knowledge that many Brazilian families are not acceptive of their children's queer identity. From then on, Lucas took the initiative to participate in local transgender support groups on Facebook and WhatsApp. One transgender woman in these group chats recommended Lucas to a hormone therapy clinic in the São Paulo suburb of Guarulhos. Lucas vaguely described his process at the clinic as, "I went quickly and met with various doctors." Although his father attended his consultations, he also emphasized that his mother has always been his greatest support system. Despite the familial acceptance and support Lucas received, he stated, "If I was still a woman, my family would be happier." Given this statement, it is obvious that LGBTI+ identity and dynamics are still not completely accepted in Lucas' household. I proceeded to ask Lucas how he felt about anti-LGBTI+ violence in Brazil. When I asked this question, he first scratched his head and began to state that he has never been fearful during his gender transition. The behavior that Lucas exhibited before giving a verbal answer has made me question whether Lucas attempted to conceal personal experiences of mistreatment that he wishes to not disclose.

Throughout the narrative of Lucas' childhood and gender transition, I had trouble gaining direct information on whether Lucas has suffered any harassment and lack of acceptance outside of his family. However, when asked about his public life, Lucas repeatedly stated he has never experienced any sort of verbal slurs by people outside of his family. Given the familial support and confidence Lucas displays in his narrative, it is visible that Lucas' experience in Brazil has been relatively positive and can be treated as an atypical case given the prevalence of LGBTI+ phobia in Brazilian family dynamics and anti-LGBTI+ violence in Brazil.

When I asked Lucas if he believed marginalization exists in Brazil, he responded with: "Brazil has more important issues to handle than issues of violence against minorities. What is happening is that the majority of the LGBTI+ community, the majority of the black community as well, many of them don't want Brazil to change into a nation that helps everyone, right? They only want rights and privileges for themselves. When many of these people ask for equality, they're asking and looking for superiority over the entire population, you understand? It's not fair. It's not fair." In Lucas' eyes, he believes the idea of equality shouldn't be guaranteed to specific groups because it would undermine the equality of everyone. Stating that he doesn't want privileges highlights a common phrase discussed prior and heard at many conservative public demonstrations in Brazil, we don't want privileges or *não queremos privilégios*. In simpler terms, Lucas equates addressing inequalities as a form of superiority given to marginalized individuals or simply, another manifestation of injustice.

Since Lucas stated violence against minorities such as Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians is not a national issue in Brazilian politics, I was curious to ask Lucas whether or not he believed Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians are treated differently than the rest of the population. In his response, "As a country, Brazil isn't racist or generally homophobic. They

both exist in certain parts of the country. As a nation, we can't be racist. Certain people can be homophobic but we can't be racist. Nowadays, a Brazilian has every race in their blood. For this, we can't be racist and neither Bolsonaro can be." Lucas' perspective exhibits ideas that directly mirror the ideology of the infamous racial democracy. More so, Lucas' indirect support of a racial democracy develops his beliefs that rights for marginalized individuals are rather fundamental inequalities. inequality emphasizes his belief that equal rights for minorities is divisive. His beliefs also reveal the controversy of racial democracy according to many sociologists who study inequality in Brazil. According to Telles, Brazilian politicians and citizens who've displayed an expressive purpose of integration through racial democracy have failed to use such an instrument of attenuating to and "ending" racism in Brazil ("Race in Another America" 2004). Therefore, like Sandra, racial and sexual marginalization according to Lucas is also an insignificant issue in Brazilian society and politics and a destructive discussion. In these narrative analyses, it can be concluded that not only do Lucas and Sandra share similar conceptualizations of marginalization but rather, they are opponents to socially liberal agendas that propose equal rights protections for marginalized individuals.

National Concerns: Addressing Mutualism Between Conservative and Liberal Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian Voters

To conclude my conversations with Lucas and Sandra, I asked each of them to highlight any national concerns they have in relation to Brazilian politics and their respective demographic groups. Instead of addressing general national concerns that Lucas discussed before in the reasoning of his vote for President Bolsonaro, Lucas concluded with: "The LGBTI+ community is divided. In this sense, the majority believe if you support Bolsonaro then you can't be a part of

the LGBTI+ family in Brazil. In order to be a part of the LGBTI+ family, you need to be on their side of the government that does shit like the PT. In this case, they want to manipulate the community to continue winning elections.” As Lucas continued to comment, he became naturally defensive which was uncommon after the hours we spent talking and texting each other. Lucas’ grievance revealed that some people, including himself, feel excluded from being members of such a community due to political polarization. In this sense, not only does an exclusionary dichotomy seem to exist between conservative and liberal LGBTI+ voters, Lucas’ experience and political opinions introduce a new personal sentiment of exclusion. That is to say, Lucas is one of many Brazilians who believe that Brazil has a racial democracy and because of his belief in it, inequality or marginalization cannot exist in Brazil. For this reasoning, he infers that his beliefs are not just contradictory to the majority of the LGBTI+ community, but rather don’t allow him to feel included. While Lucas expressed this grievance to a certain extent, he wanted to reemphasize that he hopes President Bolsonaro will battle social violence and ensure public safety for all citizens. In this sense, Lucas like many voters of President Bolsonaro defend their voter preference by prioritizing that violence is not just one of the main reasons they voted for him, it is to what they believe is the most important issue that Brazil currently faces.

As for Sandra, she expressed her visions that President Bolsonaro will hopefully resolve urban and rural disparities, changing educational policy, and suspending social welfare programs that she believes people use with “immoral” intentions. For this, Sandra believes education and internal corruption within Brazilian society are the greatest national struggles. Additionally, Sandra also stated the majority of other voters for President Bolsonaro she knows voted for him because of policy specifics that she addresses for her same national concerns and hopes. Not only does violence seem to be a common theme in the vote for supporters of President Bolsonaro, the

battle against corruption and reform of social welfare programs seem to be recurring issues in the concerns of his voters regardless of their race and sexual orientation.

Respondent	2018 Vote	What are the three most important national issues / concerns for Brazil?
1	Bolsonaro	Economic crisis, Violence, Bad public education
2	Bolsonaro	Corruption, Bad public education, Life troubles
3	Bolsonaro	Public tax abuse, Corruption, Bad public education
4	Bolsonaro	Unemployment, Corruption, Violence
5	Bolsonaro	High workers costs, Inefficient fiscal legislation, Corruption
6	Haddad	Absent government plan, Violence, Militias
7	Haddad	Unemployment, Minimal opportunities because of educational standing
8	Haddad	Unemployment tax, Social Inequality, Wealth Inequality
9	Haddad	Unemployment, Bad salaries, Class inequality
10	Haddad	Public Health, Education, Infrastructure

Table 21. National Concerns voiced by Selected Respondents

Lucas and Sandra's national concerns directly mirror those shared by the selected respondents indicated in table 21 above. As seen from respondents 1 through 5 who voted for President Bolsonaro, commonly expressed national concerns include public safety voiced by Lucas, and corruption and bad public education voiced by Sandra. These concerns and issues directly affect the financial wellbeing of Brazilian citizens. Even for respondents 6 through 10 who voted for Haddad, the most common national concerns include issues directly relating to education and unemployment which directly are related to financial wellbeing as well. Violence, unemployment, and economic growth according to Brazilian sociologist Elisa Reis seem to be recurring concerns in Brazilian politics. In a 2004 public opinion survey, Reis discovered that every educational class agreed that these three issues were the most important national problems ("Elite Perceptions of Inequality and Poverty" 2005). Therefore, it is evident that such concerns are not particularly exogenous from the rise of President Bolsonaro and the impeachment of President Rousseff. According to Reis, one of the factors that has caused social demographic

groups in Brazil to vote for presidential candidates and particularly President Bolsonaro is mutual political concerns that have remained the same for the past decade.

Overall, my interviews with Lucas and Sandra and the qualitative analysis on the selected respondents highlighted the need for further conversations amongst both conservative and liberal Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians on their political dispositions and voter preference. In Lucas and Sandra's stories, their preference for President Bolsonaro, their political dispositions, and the stigma of their illegitimate voter preference by being supporters of President Bolsonaro acknowledge the need to seek further understanding on the current political polarization that exists in Brazil. The fact that trust and extensive conversations were established in order to meet and speak with Lucas and Sandra are a vivid illustration of the negative attitudes associated with voters of President Bolsonaro and the need to understand what social demographic and personal factors influence a citizen's vote in elections.

Despite underlying political polarization and negative attitudes, Brazilians regardless of their social demographics and political standing share mutual national concerns. Many Brazilians must consider the implications of such polarization to sympathize the personal experiences that voters face throughout their lives in such a socioeconomically divided country with a contentious political climate. Citizens, politicians, and academics in Brazil need to encourage an environment where citizens living in the margins of society can address their political concerns and life stories to address similarities between voters amongst polar opposite political spectrums. The political climate and stigma on such voters intensify political polarization given that individuals are not willing to engage in discussions that can reveal how they are concerned on similar issues and only divided by a controversial political figure, President Bolsonaro. Without these conversations, citizens in Brazil in and outside of such demographic groups may continue

to increase the political tension into the 2022 Presidential election and increase voter disengagement that is already visibly present between the 2014 and 2018 Presidential elections.

Conclusion

Throughout my thesis, I demonstrate that 1) there is an existing tension of unwillingness to bring mutual understanding between conservative and liberal Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters, 2) this results in stigma and negative political dispositions between liberal and conservative voters within these communities and 3) the dichotomy of religion, social acceptance, and experiences of social marginalization provide insight on the relationship between the realities and voter preference of marginalized voters. In my two months of research after spending seven months in Brazil, I spoke repeatedly with a conservative transgender man and a religious and conservative Afro-Brazilian woman in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro and collected a qualitative data sample of questionnaire respondents on their voter preference and political dispositions.

In the analysis of my oral histories, I realized Lucas and Sandra had their own unique stories about their conceptualizations of marginalization by race and sexual orientation, their political dispositions, and their voter preference through their life narratives. Lucas' story of familial acceptance throughout his gender transition, and values of being a citizen before an LGBTI+ individual elaborates how Lucas identifies as an LGBTI+ person in Brazil and to why he voted and supports President Bolsonaro. Additionally, Sandra's relationship with the Neo-Pentecostal church, and her experience as a *cotista* from a rural town in the interior of Brazil allowed her to develop her perspective on how she views herself in Brazilian society and how she developed her political dispositions and voter preference through the individual struggle of injustice fostered by her religious community.

In the qualitative analysis of selected questionnaire respondents, I also discovered that variations in religion, type of education, partisanship, trust and distrust in political institutions,

and experiences of harassment help distinguish relationships that may elaborate how Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilian vote for either a conservative or liberal politician. In my qualitative analyses, I realized that individuals who receive a private education, have a relatively positive outlook on political institutions, observe to be anti-partisan towards to the PT, and have no personal experiences of marginalization are more likely to vote for conservative politicians or in this particular case, President Bolsonaro. Thus, familial support, religion, education, and general political dispositions play an inherent role in the voter preference amongst a percentage of conservative voters in the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities in Brazil. These factors, for instance, seem to answer as to why Lucas and Sandra and online questionnaire respondents voted for President Bolsonaro, instead of voting blank, not voting, voting in protest, or voting for Fernando Haddad.

The visible differences between voters and nonvoters for President Bolsonaro inhibits the exchange of varying opinions on public institutions and also relates to the differences between *anti-petistas* and *petistas*. For example, Lucas voted for President Bolsonaro under the aspect of equality for all and that rights should not be granted to specific demographic groups. At the same time, many voters in the online questionnaire regardless of their education level who voted for candidates in the PT in the 2014 and 2018 Presidential elections generally believed human rights and social inequality are major issues for Brazil to address in its political agenda. This directly mirrors Vidigal's analysis on the social attitudes towards the Quota System amongst white students at the Federal University of Santa Catarina. Vidigal's results indicate the political position of an individual continue to be key determinants of opposition to affirmative action among white students, but only among individuals with high levels of education or knowledge of the political system. The results for those who believe they are socially superior display that

neither individuals with high nor low political knowledge oppose affirmative action. This suggests certain Brazilians believe racism isn't acceptable but rather inevitably accepted and engrained into the veins of Brazilian society ("Affirmative Action Attitudes of Whites" 2018).

Additionally, the role of religion in politics amongst particular Brazilians such as Sandra in the Neo-Pentecostal movement fosters the need for further research on how religion affects voter preference in 21st century Brazil. With low-income individuals being subject to be a part of modern Evangelical movements in Brazil, it is evident that voters and individuals such as Sandra turn to religion as a means to seek guidance throughout their own personal struggles (Harvard Divinity School, 2020). Sandra's experience as an Afro-Brazilian and Indigenous woman doesn't make her seem as though her social demographics play an important role in her voter preference. Therefore, Sandra's preference for President Bolsonaro is a sheer reflection of her religious journey which formed her way of reasoning and developing her own beliefs of what is morally and politically correct. Outside of Sandra's relationship with her religious faith, both Lucas and Sandra's narratives encourage further discussions with future participants to potentially address other confounding variables in the personal experiences of Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians that can influence their voter preference. These variables made include other social demographic factors such as the level of violence in their residential areas, the individuals' experiences of violence, their marital status, and their family's voting history. Due to the fact that quantitative points of data in statistical models do not include all confounding variables in voter preference and voting behavior, extensive ethnographic research on this inquiry can supplement underlying questions and limitations regarding quantitative research on voter preference in Brazil.

In regards to negative attitudes towards conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters, it is difficult to eradicate every potential research participants notions and concerns. However, my intentions and efforts as a researcher are to tackle and challenge the perceptions of these voters as counterintuitive through their personal narratives. The negative attitudes displayed by João and Larissa may potentially explain my previous observations I experienced and observed in the recruitment of my oral history participants. Brazilians regardless and citizens of democratic nations need to recognize the power of their words in political discourses and make conscious efforts to address the attitudes placed on such voters given the sensitive nature of individuals' narratives. Ultimately, these conversations will not only ease particular conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters to actively disclose their political dispositions with different audiences, but they will also educate many Brazilian citizens with such negative attitudes to understand that individual life experiences vividly define many people's voter preference while having mutual national concerns.

Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions

As an English and Portuguese-speaking researcher in Brazil, I had strengths that provided unique insights, but also had limitations in the scope of my studies. I did not arrive in Brazil to develop a project that was so deeply connected to the stereotypes against voters of President Bolsonaro, the contentious discussion of race in politics and social welfare, and the role of religion in the daily life of many Brazilians. However, the fact that I am a young, LGBTI+ man allowed me to connect with Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ individuals to hear their stories and discuss their views on politics. Ultimately, I faced the challenge of attempting to connect with Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilians while being a non-native Portuguese speaker in which I'm not completely fluent in the local jargon of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo.

This made it challenging to formulate questions that would prompt Lucas and Sandra to address my main research questions. However, this was a challenge I overcame by continuously engaging with family friends in Brazil and with my university classmates and friends, and I was still able to engage both Lucas and Sandra, and Brazilian undergraduate students through my online questionnaire.

My conversations and my qualitative analyses covered various demographic data points of young voters in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, including respondents' racial and sexual identity, experiences of personal harassment and violence, religion, income, and education. However, there are still points that my research alone cannot answer. Time was a limitation to my research, and a second, longer period in Brazil would strengthen my results and sample. With a longer time frame, I would be able to contact and speak with a wider range of conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ voters across different regions of Brazil. I took advantage of my seven weeks of granted research time and collected information on two individuals from the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities who voted for President Bolsonaro and were willing to speak on their behalf. Additionally, I was only able to collect information on Lucas and Sandra and survey respondents' political dispositions and social demographics during the first several months of President Bolsonaro's administration. A greater amount of time in Brazil, preferably more than a year, would allow me to collect various survey responses on the same sampled individuals and statistically test whether time was more likely to change their understanding of marginalization in Brazil and their opinions of President Bolsonaro. I would also conduct research at LGBTI+ community organizations and *comunidade* organizations across other regions of Brazil, including the Northeast and South to compare Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo to the remainder of the country and understand how Brazilian's

collectively perceive marginalization, express their political dispositions, and individually define their voter preference.

Some of the questions that my research cannot adequately answer include questions of conservative voting behavior amongst percentages of the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities who voted for President Bolsonaro are to respect to age and occupation. The individuals I spoke to and surveyed mostly were of the same age range and mainly university students between 18 and 34 years old. Thus, my exposure to Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians from various age ranges was rather limited. Additionally, I did not speak to individuals of these demographics that could afford private schools and chose to not attend public schools or afford an opulent lifestyle. Thus, future research should consider individuals of various social backgrounds by race, education level, and age to assess whether Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians in higher socioeconomic classes also have an ideological and reasoning gap between themselves and the people they vote into office. In most cases, individuals of these two demographic groups in higher socioeconomic classes may be able to never face as many social challenges discussed in Chapter 1. However, I argue that white LGBTI+ Brazilians also undergo unique experiences that alter their perceptions of marginalization, their political dispositions, and the development of their voter preference in Brazil.

In my time in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, my exposure to the political and social tensions present had also limited my sample to individuals who were willing to speak on their behalf. For the rest of the 44 identified participants, their absent stories and narratives conceal a deeper and thorough understanding of conservative voter preference within significant percentages of these communities. Future research should explore extensive of effectively recruiting individuals on sensitive topics in times of political tension. Based on my limited

exposure in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, supplemental methods of recruitment would allow a greater sample of participants across various social backgrounds and also more narratives on conservative voter preference in marginalized communities. For now, my research shows that fear and negative attitudes on polarized voters contributes to the current political polarization in Brazil.

I verify in both chapters that despite the violence and marginalization of the Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians, race and sexuality for many voters of President Bolsonaro are not significant factors when making election decisions at voting booths or developing their political dispositions. The vice-versa also exists amongst liberal voters in Brazil. This ideological difference leads to the following questions: 1) does race, sexual orientation, and religion jointly influence voter preference and if so 2) why do further analyses on voter preference in elections amongst other social demographics than race not exist such as by sexual orientation? The vast majority of analyses amongst researchers do not ask voters about their sexual orientation, and particularly their experiences of harassment. Just like the dichotomy between conservative and liberal voters in the Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ communities, asking voters to identify their race, religion, and sexual orientation are complex questions that researchers need to analyze an individual level through ethnography.

In the presence of the large population of African and racially mixed descendants, the social demographic similarities between Brazilians were much more emphasized than their differences. This surprised me given the prominence of race in discussions I partnered in throughout my academic career in Brazilian studies. Future research should address whether discourses across Brazil in racially homogenous communities have different political dispositions than racially mixed Brazilians. Given my academic background in Brazilian studies,

it would also be interesting to note whether white and non-white LGBTI+ people have visible differences in their voter preference for political candidates in the upcoming 2022 Presidential elections.

Lastly, I propose community leaders such as local politicians to foster mutual understanding between polarized voters and vulnerable Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians. However, future research should study a representative sample of the Brazilian population to compare opinions across social demographic indicators and qualitative frameworks. This information can be collected via interviews with individuals at their homes, community organizations, and public institutions. Additionally, future research should explore how certain conservative Afro-Brazilian and LGBTI+ Brazilian voters develop their political dispositions and support politicians that verbally express disinterest to their communities. This research on the dynamics between Afro-Brazilians and LGBTI+ Brazilians and the Brazilian population at large will aid in the development of effective strategies to understand mutual political concerns and ease the current heated political scene in 21st century Brazil.

Appendix A

Common Questions for Lucas and Sandra

One of the most valuable experiences during my research in Brazil was the opportunity to discuss the experiences of being a social minority with Lucas and Sandra. Most of my recorded conversations occurred at Lucas and Sandra's homes and public spaces such as a coffee shop at the mall or through online video calls. I also spoke with Lucas and Sandra through online video calls. I knew Lucas and Sandra would feel hesitant at first to share personal information, i.e. Lucas' gender transition and Sandra's experiences of racism. To ensure Lucas and Sandra felt comfortable, I conducted my interviews with a semi-structured set of questions to ensure their comfort and for us to have informal conversations. A fellow ethnographer and political scientist in São Paulo and a member of an Evangelical church in Rio de Janeiro introduced me to Lucas and Sandra. Despite time constraints and geographical distance, I scheduled my meetings with Lucas and Sandra a week or two prior to the time we met. We continue to talk to each other, once in a while, through social media, to update each other on what we are doing with our lives and to also update each other on politics in Brazil and the United States.

As a nearly fluent Portuguese speaker, I verbally asked all of my questions in Portuguese to Lucas and Sandra. I found my proficiency in Portuguese to be immensely helpful when I talked with Lucas and Sandra. In fact, speaking in Portuguese with Lucas and Sandra over the phone and in person added a stronger sense on Brazilian politics and society. It made the conversations more personable and prevented cultural mistranslation. Through these conversations, I gained first-hand accounts of the experiences of an Afro-Brazilian woman and a LGBTI+ man in Brazil.

Questions I asked to Lucas:

1. What is your name?
2. Where are you from?
3. What is your age?
4. What is your gender?
5. What is your race?
6. What is your sexuality?
7. What is your religion?
8. What is your highest level of education?
9. What is your occupation?
10. What was your childhood like?
11. When did you realize you were transgender?
12. How did your parents react when you told them you were transgender?
13. What was your gender transition process like?
14. What challenges have you faced in your gender transition?
15. Can we discuss politics?
(If Lucas answered yes, I asked the next question)
16. In your opinion, what are politics like in Brazil?
17. What is your opinion of politics in Brazil over the past several years?
18. Who did you vote for in the 2018 Presidential election?
19. Why did you vote for this candidate?
20. What did you like about this candidate?
(After Lucas answered that he liked and voted for President Bolsonaro, I proceeded to ask him the following questions)
21. What do you think about the phenomenon of Fake News?
22. Do you pay attention to politics?
23. How do you stay up to date on politics?
24. At what frequency do you stay up to date on politics?
25. In your opinion, what are your main concerns on politics in Brazil?
26. Do you believe violence against people of color or LGBTI+ people exists in Brazil?
27. In your opinion, what does it mean to be a part of the LGBTI+ community?
28. Do you have LGBTI+ friends?
29. Do you believe the LGBTI+ community is politically divided?

Questions I asked to Sandra:

1. What is your name?
2. Where are you from?
3. What is your age?
4. What is your gender?
5. What is your race?
6. What is your sexuality?
7. What is your religion?
8. What is your highest level of education?
9. What is your occupation?
10. What was your childhood and adolescence like?
11. Are you religious?
12. How did you become religious?
13. What is your experience with religion?
14. Can we discuss politics?
(If Sandra answered yes, I asked the next question)
15. In your opinion, what are politics like in Brazil?
16. What is your opinion of politics in Brazil over the past several years?
17. Who did you vote for in the 2018 Presidential election?
18. Why did you vote for this candidate?
19. What did you like about this candidate?
(After Sandra answered that she liked and voted for President Bolsonaro, I proceeded to ask her the following questions)
20. Do you believe President Bolsonaro has stated racist or homophobic statements as reported by the media?
21. What do you think about the phenomenon of Fake News?
22. Do you pay attention to politics?
23. How do you stay up to date on politics?
24. At what frequency do you stay up to date on politics?
25. In your opinion, what are your main concerns on politics in Brazil?

Appendix B

Survey Instrument for Questionnaire Respondents

I selected sample a sample of university students from the metropolitan areas of Rio de Janeiro to 1) gauge a broader picture on Brazilian public opinion with respect to social demographics and 2) learn whether respondents of different social demographics had opposing or mutual political dispositions and voter preferences. To administer this survey, I converted the survey instrument below into an online Google Form. I dispersed the Google Form link to online university group chats and graduate students at PUC-Rio. I wanted my anonymous questionnaire respondents to have as many options as possible when answering every question. To do this, I created the option to write their own identification when it came to their social demographics and also rate statements or questions asked on a scale from 0 to 10. The questionnaire instrument is attached below with the translated English version first and the original version, both administered and written in Portuguese, second.

QUESTIONNAIRE (English Version)

Our confidentiality of your identity is very important to us. Your name and documentation will not be required. Please take care of the integrity and validity of your answers. Make sure all of your answers are correct. Your time commitment will be almost 15 minutes to complete this questionnaire. If you have any questions about this study, your part of it, your rights as a research participant, or if you have questions, concerns, or complaints about the

study, you can contact the following:

- Aleksei Kaminski, + 55 (XX) 98170-3644 or by email at aleksei.kaminski@emory.edu

1. In which city or urban area do you live in?

Rio de Janeiro	São Paulo
----------------	-----------

*If your city is not designated, please write it below:

2. What is your age? Please indicate below.

18 to 24 years	25 to 34 years	35 to 45 years	45 to 59 years	60 and above years
----------------	----------------	----------------	----------------	-----------------------

3. What is your gender? Please indicate below.

Male	Female	Transgender (Male to Female)	Transgender (Female to Male)
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*If your gender is not indicated, please write your gender below:

4. What is your race/ skin color? Please circle one.

Yellow	White	Indigenous	Black	Mixed
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*If your race is not indicated, please write your race below:

5. What is your sexual orientation? Please indicate below.

Straight	Bisexual	Gay	Pansexual	Asexual
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*If your sexual orientation is not indicated, please write your sexuality below:

6. What is your religion?

Roman Catholic	Evangelist	Jewish	Islam
Candomblé	Orthodox Christian	Agnostic	Pentecostal

*If your religion is not indicated in the boxes above, please write your religion below, if you have one:

7. How many people live in your household? Indicate below.

Number: _____

8. What is your monthly income in Brazilian *Reais* before taxes? Please circle one.

R\$0 to 1,000	R\$1,000 to 3,000	R\$3,000 to 6,000	R\$6,000 to 9,000
R\$9,000 to 11,000	R\$11,000 to 18,000	R\$18,000 or more	

9. Is your monthly income your household income or your personal income? Please circle one.

Household Income	Personal Income
------------------	-----------------

10. What is your highest level of education?

Elementary School	Middle School	I didn't finish Secondary School	Secondary School
College	Graduate School	Doctorate	I don't have any level of education

11. Did you attend public or private school?

Public School	Private School
I study/studied at both private and public schools	I didn't study at any school

12. What is occupation currently? Please circle one.

Student	Self-Employed	Unemployed and searching
Unemployed and not searching	Homemaker	Employed by wage
Military	Retired	I cannot work

13. If you are employed, do you currently have more than one job?

Yes	No
-----	----

14. Which is your most preferred political party? Please circle one.

PT	PSL	PSOL
PMDB	PP	PTB
DEM	PR	I don't have a preferred political party

*If your most preferred political party is not indicated in the boxes above, please write it below:

15. Which is your least preferred political party? Please circle one.

PT	PSL	PSOL
PMDB	PP	PTB
DEM	PR	I don't have a least preferred political party

*If your least preferred political party is not indicated in the boxes above, please write it below:

16. Have you ever been physically mugged or assaulted, i.e. with a weapon?

Yes	No
-----	----

17. Have you ever been robbed or pickpocketed?

Yes	No
-----	----

18. Which candidate did you vote for in the 2018 Presidential election? Please circle one.

Jair Bolsonaro	Fernando Haddad	I didn't vote	I voted blank
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19. Please number and rank your top three reasons that indicate why you voted for the candidate indicated above.

Security/Safety	LGBTI+ Rights	Income Inequality	Incarceration
Anti-corruption	Education reform	Economic growth	Infrastructure
Economic instability	Budget deficit	Reproductive rights	Environmental Protections

*If none of such priorities listed below are not any reason why you voted for one of the candidates, please indicate three reasons why in the lines below.

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

20. On a scale from one to ten, please give your personal grade of President Jair Bolsonaro's performance in office by circling one of the numbers below. 0 being the worst and 10 being the best.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

21. Do you believe loosened gun control policies will lower crime in Brazil? Please circle one.

Yes	No	I'm not sure
-----	----	--------------

22. Have you ever been assaulted or harassed because your identity?

Yes, but only verbally	Yes, but only physically
Yes, both physically and verbally	No

23. How much time do you spend reading or watching the news every week in hours?

0 to 1 hour	2 to 4 hours	5 to 7 hours	8 to 10 hours	10 or more hours
-------------	--------------	--------------	---------------	------------------

24. What are is your main resource for news? Please circle one.

Internet/Website/Application	Television	Radio	Newspaper/Magazine
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25. Please circle two news outlets that you read/listen/watch most frequently.

Estadão	Folha de S. Paulo	Jornal O Globo	Notícias do Jornal Extra
Meia Hora Online	Super Notícia	Rede Globo	TV Band
Rede Record	SBT	Gaúcha	CBN

*If none of the news outlets you read/listen/watch are listed in the boxes above, please write your top two below:

26. What type of neighborhood do you live in?

Commercial Neighborhood	Residential Neighborhood	Favela/Comunidade	Suburb
-------------------------	--------------------------	-------------------	--------

27. Please give your opinion on the following statement: "Do you believe Operation Car Wash will successfully end corruption in Brazil?" 0 being completely disagree and 10 being completely agree.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

28. Do you believe President Bolsonaro is less corrupt than other Brazilian politicians?

Yes	No	I'm not sure
-----	----	--------------

29. Do you believe President Bolsonaro is racist?

Yes	No	I'm not sure
-----	----	--------------

30. Do you believe President Bolsonaro is sexist?

Yes	No	I'm not sure
-----	----	--------------

31. Do you believe President Bolsonaro has authoritarian tendencies?

Yes	No	I'm not sure
-----	----	--------------

32. If you believe President Bolsonaro has authoritarian tendencies, do you believe these tendencies are acceptable?

Yes	No	I'm not sure
-----	----	--------------

33. Do you believe the political era between 1964 and 1985 in Brazil was a military dictatorship?

Yes	No	I'm not sure
-----	----	--------------

34. If you believe the political era between 1964 and 1985 was a military dictatorship, do you believe the military dictatorship was good for Brazil?

Yes	No	I'm not sure	It never existed
-----	----	--------------	------------------

35. If you remember, which candidate did you vote for in the second term of the 2014 Presidential election?

Aécio Neves	Dilma Rousseff	I didn't vote	I voted blank	I don't remember
-------------	----------------	---------------	---------------	------------------

36. Do you believe that former President Lula is guilty of corruption and deserves to be in prison?

Yes	No	I'm not sure
-----	----	--------------

37. Did you support or were in favor of the impeachment of former President Dilma Rousseff?

Yes	No	I don't have an opinion
-----	----	-------------------------

38. Have you or do you know someone that has been affected by violence?

Yes	No
-----	----

39. Have you or your family been affected economically in the last several years?

Yes	No
-----	----

40. On the lines below, write three problems or concerns that you think are the largest economic and social problems in Brazil today.

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

QUESTIONÁRIO (Portuguese Version)

Nossa confidencialidade da sua identidade é muito importante para nós. O seu nome e sua documentação não serão necessários. Por favor, cuide da integridade e da validade das suas respostas. Assegure-se de que todas as suas repostas estejam certas. Seu compromisso de tempo será de quase 15 minutos para preencher esse questionário. Se você tem algumas questões sobre este estudo, a sua parte nele, os seus direitos como uma participante de pesquisa, ou se você tem questões, preocupações, ou reclamações sobre o estudo, você pode contatar o seguinte:

- Aleksei Kaminski, +55 (XX) 98170-3644 ou pelo email em aleksei.kaminski@emory.edu

1. Em qual cidade ou metrópole que você mora?

Rio de Janeiro	São Paulo
----------------	-----------

*Se a sua cidade não está indicada, escreva a sua cidade abaixo:

2. Qual é a sua idade? Por favor, indique abaixo.

18 a 24 anos	25 a 34 anos	35 a 45 anos	45 a 59 anos	60 ou mais anos
--------------	--------------	--------------	--------------	-----------------

3. Qual é seu gênero? Por favor, indique abaixo.

Feminino	Masculino	Transgênero (Homem a Mulher)	Transgênero (Mulher a Homem)
----------	-----------	------------------------------	------------------------------

*Se o seu gênero não está indicado, por favor escreva-o abaixo:

4. Qual é sua raça? Por favor indique somente uma.

Amarelo	Branco	Indígena	Negro	Pardo
---------	--------	----------	-------	-------

*Se a sua raça não está indicada, por favor escreva-a abaixo:

5. Qual é a sua sexualidade? Por favor, indique abaixo.

Hétero	Bissexual	Gay	Panssexual	Assexual
--------	-----------	-----	------------	----------

*Se a sua sexualidade não está indicada, por favor escreva-a abaixo:

6. Qual é a sua religião?

Católico	Evangélico	Judeu
Muçulmano	Candomble	Cristão Ortodoxo
Pentecostal	Agnóstico	Ateu

*Se a sua religião não está indicada nas caixas acima, por favor escreva a sua religião abaixo, se você tem uma:

7. Contando com você, quantas pessoas moram na sua casa? Por favor, indique o número das pessoas abaixo.

O Número aqui: _____

8. Qual é a sua renda mensal bruta? Por favor indique somente uma.

R\$0 a 1,000	R\$1,000 a 3,000	R\$3,000 a 6,000	R\$6,000 a 9,000
R\$9,000 a 11,000	R\$11,000 a 18,000	R\$18,000 ou mais	

9. A sua renda mensal é individual ou a renda da casa? A renda individual significa que você não compartilha sua renda com outros e a renda compartilhada significa que a sua renda inclui a renda de outros, como a sua família, seu/sua marido/marida ou outros na sua casa. Por favor, indique abaixo.

A Renda Individual	A Renda da Casa
--------------------	-----------------

10. Qual é o seu nível mais alto de escolarização?

Ensino Fundamental Um	Ensino Fundamental Dois	Não terminei Ensino Médio	Ensino Médio
Graduação	Pós-Graduação	Doutorado	Tenho nenhum nível de escolarização

11. Você frequenta/frequentou em uma escola pública ou privada?

Escola Pública	Escola Privada
As duas	Não frequento/freqüentei nenhuma escola

12. Qual é a sua ocupação principal? Por favor, indique somente uma.

Estudante	Empregado Autônomo	Desempregado e procurando por emprego
Desempregado e não procurando por emprego	Dona/o da Casa	Empregado por Salário
Militar	Aposentado	Não posso trabalhar

13. Se você está empregado, você tem mais de um trabalho?

Sim	Não
-----	-----

14. Qual é o seu partido mais preferido? Por favor, indique somente um.

PT	PSL	PSOL
PMDB	PP	PTB
DEM	PR	Não tenho partido preferido

*Se o seu partido mais preferido não está indicado nas caixas acima, por favor escreva-o abaixo:

15. Qual é o seu partido menos preferido? Por favor, indique somente um.

PT	PSL	PSOL
PMDB	PP	PTB
DEM	PR	Não tenho partido menos preferido

*Se o seu partido menos preferido não está indicado nas caixas acima, por favor escreva-o abaixo:

16. Você já foi assaltado?

Sim	Não
-----	-----

17. Você já foi roubado?

Sim	Não
-----	-----

18. Para quem você votou no segundo turno na última eleição presidencial? Por favor, indique somente um.

Jair Bolsonaro	Fernando Haddad	Não votei	Votei nulo
----------------	-----------------	-----------	------------

19. Por favor, indique suas três principais razões que indicam por que você votou no candidato que você escolheu.

Segurança/ Violência	Direitos da Comunidade LGBTI+	Desigualdade social	Reclusão nas prisões
Anticorrupção	Reforma de Educação	Crescimento Econômico	Infraestrutura
Instabilidade Econômica	Deficit orçamentário	Direitos das Mulheres	Proteções Ambientais

*Se nenhuma das suas razões estão indicadas abaixo nas caixas acima, por favor escreva e indique três razões para o seu voto nas linhas abaixo.

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____

20. Em uma escala de 0 a 10, por favor dê a sua nota pessoal do desempenho do Presidente Bolsonaro no gabinete até ao presente, indicando um dos números abaixo. Considere 0 péssimo e 10 excelente.

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

21. Você acredita que políticas de liberação do porte de armas no Brasil irão diminuir o crime?

Sim	Não	Não tenho certeza
-----	-----	-------------------

22. Você já foi agredido ou maltratado por conta da sua identidade?

Sim, mas somente verbalmente	Sim, fisicamente e verbalmente
Sim, mas somente fisicamente	Não

23. Em horas por semana, quanto tempo você gasta lendo ou assistindo as notícias?

0 a 1 hora	2 a 4 horas	5 a 7 horas	8 a 10 horas	10 ou mais horas
------------	-------------	-------------	--------------	------------------

24. Qual é sua principal fonte para notícias? Por favor indique somente uma.

Internet/Site/Aplicativo	Televisão	Rádio
Jornal/Revista	WhatsApp	Do amigo/ Da família

25. Por favor, indique dois principais veículos de comunicação que você costuma consumir com maior frequência.

Estadão	Folha de S. Paulo	Jornal O Globo	Notícias do Jornal Extra
Meia Hora Online	Super Notícia	Rede Globo	TV Band
Rede Record	SBT	Gaúcha	CBN

*Se nenhum dos veículos de notícias você costuma consumir com maior frequência estão indicados nas caixas acima, por favor escreva seus dois principais abaixo:

26. Em que tipo de lugar você mora?

Bairro Commercial	Bairro Residencial	Favela/Comunidade	Subúrbio/Periferia
-------------------	--------------------	-------------------	--------------------

27. Dê a sua opinião para a seguinte afirmação: "Você acredita que a Operação Lava-Jato será bem sucedida em acabar com a corrupção no Brasil?" 0 como "discordo totalmente" e 10 como "concordo totalmente."

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

28. Você acredita que o Presidente Bolsonaro é menos corrupto do que outros políticos brasileiros?

Sim	Não	Não tenho certeza
-----	-----	-------------------

29. Você acredita que o Presidente Bolsonaro é racista?

Sim	Não	Não tenho certeza
-----	-----	-------------------

30. Você acredita que o Presidente Bolsonaro tem opiniões machistas?

Sim	Não	Não tenho certeza
-----	-----	-------------------

31. Você acredita que o Presidente Bolsonaro tem tendências autoritárias?

Sim	Não	Não tenho certeza
-----	-----	-------------------

32. Se você acredita que o Presidente Bolsonaro tem tendências autoritárias, você acredita que essas tendências são aceitáveis?

Sim	Não	Não tenho certeza
-----	-----	-------------------

33. Você acredita que a época política no Brasil entre 1964 e 1985 foi uma ditadura militar?

Sim	Não	Não tenho certeza
-----	-----	-------------------

34. Se você acredita que a época política entre 1965 e 1985 foi uma ditadura militar, você acredita que a ditadura foi boa ao Estado do Brasil?

Sim	Não	Não tenho certeza	Nunca existiu
-----	-----	-------------------	---------------

35. Caso lembre, qual candidato que você votou para presidente no segundo turno das eleições em 2014?

Aécio Neves	Dilma Rousseff	Não votei	Votei nulo	Não lembro
-------------	----------------	-----------	------------	------------

36. Você acredita que o ex-Presidente Lula é culpado de corrupção e merece ficar na prisão?

Sim	Não	Não tenho certeza
-----	-----	-------------------

37. Você apoiou o impeachment da ex-Presidente Dilma Rousseff?

Sim	Não	Não tenho uma opinião
-----	-----	-----------------------

38. Você ou alguém que você conhece foi afetado pela violência?

Sim	Não
-----	-----

39. Você ou a sua família foi afetado economicamente nos últimos anos?

Sim	Não
-----	-----

40. Nas linhas abaixo, escreva três problemas que você acredita serem os maiores problemas econômicos ou sociais no Brasil hoje.

1. _____

2. _____

3. _____

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