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RELIGIOUS IDENTITY
Conceptualization and measurement of the religious self

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Conceptualization and measurement of the religious self

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An Abstract of

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Abstract

Within the social sciences and humanities, research into the formation and functioning of identity has gained much attention over the last few decades. However, each field has operated in relative isolation of the other. This dissertation draws together many different disciplines in order to better understand religious identity. Psychological research in identity has begun to question the notion of measuring a global identity for each person, and instead, to consider modular domains of identity functioning. First, the dissertation offers a theoretical background for religious identity. By thoroughly investigating the conceptual development of identity in Erik Erikson's work, the project shows numerous insights into and problems with the current measurement paradigm of identity. It then looks at current research into autobiographical memory through cognitive science and considers several aspects of evolutionary psychology and identity. This section argues that religious identity is a core concept for the psychological study of religion, even though the field has largely overlooked this factor. Secondly, the project develops a conceptual foundation for an empirical measure of religious identity by first reviewing the current research in the interaction between religion and identity, and then by carefully laying out a foundation for religious identity salience and a reinterpretation of Marcia's four identity statuses specific to religious identity functioning. Finally, the project offers a empirical project as a preliminary religious identity measurement. The measure is given to 650 participants and the data in described in detail. The dissertation shows that religious identity often implicitly functions in individuals in a subconscious fashion. Social approval bias and "deity approval bias" are suggested as explanations for explicit increases in reported religious identity salience. Finally, the data supports the conceptual validity of four religious identity statuses operating among the participants. Various results show that age and religious backgrounds are very important factors in religious identity formation.

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Introduction

Two developments characterize modern challenges to identity formation in the 21st century. On one side, an emerging global culture has spread to diverse societies all over the world. Presenting numerous challenges to the traditional patterns of identity formation, homogenized cultures place previous traditional identity resources in tension with mass-marketed consumerism. The uniform look of American suburbs and chain stores symbolizes the challenge of finding a "self" when identity resources are dominated by commercials and billboards. At the same time, the rapid advances of technology (communications, media, and travel) have made more people aware of a multiplicity of cultural values, beliefs, and lifestyles. Ironically, the awareness of cultural diversity has come at the same time as its diminution (Harmon, 2002). The rise of consumer identity may actually be a response to multicultural diversity. Consumption and the forces propelling it serve the function of grounding those whose traditional identity resources have been lost (Friedman, 1994).

Why are these developments (globalization and multicultural interaction) *problems* for identity? The evolving human mind and its psychosocial needs have not transitioned as quickly as has our large and technology driven global culture. Both the human mind and the religious institutions of our societies struggle with diversity of

beliefs, values, and meaning. For the first time, the mainstream classes of our societies are aware of and living with conflicting religious claims, sharply distinct sources of meaning, and widely variant claims on ethical norms. In this emerging globalized world, the pooling together of cultures has left in its wake the increasingly enigmatic task of defining one's own identity (Erikson, 1975; Keagan, 1994; Lifton, 1999; Taylor, 1989). The relatively facile process of identity formation has now become a quagmire of challenges as people navigate competing claims and a plethora of identity choices. *"Who am I?"* has become an archetypal quest for Westerners lost in a sea of replicated highway exits and pervasive branding. At the center of this entanglement is the identity resource of religion. People are responding in various and creative ways by adapting, avoiding, adopting, or attacking their own religious identity and/or the religious identity of others.

Erik Erikson's original emphasis on the ego's formation of identity highlighted the importance for each individual to be able to make meaning of one's own self. He located this task in the adolescent years as part of a psychosocial framework in which the sociocultural milieu (*ethos*) is integrated with the biological development of the human being (*soma*) and the psychological processes of the cognitive mind (*psyche*) (1950, 1968, 1997). Erikson's concept of identity first sparked the interest of college students in the 1960's and helped stimulate a "discursive explosion" in identity research through the ensuing decades (Friedman, 1999; Hall, 1996). From this research, academia has explored the ways in which a person's overall identity is formed. It has also looked at how different circumstances in an individual's life may cause the identity to become unraveled and in a state of crisis. Further, certain domains of identity, such as ethnic or gender identity, have been investigated giving scholars insight into identity domain

specificity. However, no careful exploration has yet to be conducted with the domain of religious identity.

Our computers and television screens are full of expressions of religious identity. The cry of *allahu akbar* (Islamic for "God is great") often functions as an expression of religious identity solidarity (opposed to the globalized culture and in harmony with the local cultural needs). American political leaders pragmatically make symbolic gestures of religious identity, trying to balance a seaming connection to mainstream religious identity and trying to offend as few diverse religious identities as possible. Likewise, swaying masses of Christian evangelicals singing *our God is an awesome God* promotes the religious identity cohesion of that group while distinguishing the group from a more secular identity. The work of this dissertation is to describe the intertwining process of how the individual co-constructs religious identity with the cultural structures that have been built to meet those needs.

Academic Context

It is rare to come upon relatively uncharted territory in one's academic journey. And it is even more uncommon to find a new area of subject matter that carries with it powerful explanatory value for several fields of study, as well as the current sociopolitical climate. As will be demonstrated through the following chapters, the psychosocial conceptualization of *religious identity* may very well be described as both uncharted and auspiciously ripe with application. Religious identity is developed theoretically in this dissertation as a core factor in the psychology of religion and in overall psychosocial development. Further, these various processes of establishing

religious identity salience and status may be one of the central factors operating in both cultural cohesion and conflict. To be sure, various studies have looked at how religiosity is affected by identity processes. And sociocultural scholars regularly use the phrase 'religious identity' to refer to self-ascribed labeling. And yet, as a psychological concept, religious identity has not been studied. It has no scale or measure, no integrated body of theory, and no conceptual work in application.

Why have we underestimated the significance of religious identity? In part, because the study of religious identity has proved elusive. Not only does it not fit well in the academic fields of either psychology or sociology (not to mention philosophy, neurology, theology, etc.), but it likewise does not fit in how individuals use common categories to assimilate and interpret data. Since there is nothing immediately tangible in religious identity, individuals use the common categories of epistemological division between internal 'me' information and external 'other' information. One's overall identity is typically experienced as an internal factor, and individuals prefer to think of their identity as independent of external, social influence. We normally perceive of ourselves as autonomous entities when it comes to the construction of the self. But just as the human being is constructed biologically, psychologically, and sociologically, so too is identity. With the notion of overall identity formation and functioning, one must integrate information from a wide array of fields, including cognitive science (neurological modularity and autobiographical memory), psychology (developmental, social psychology, personality psychology), and sociology (cohorts, life course analysis). Erikson H. Erikson's (1950) psychosocial theory was a first step in conceiving a *functional* level of theory and analysis that integrated sharp structural changes in the

developing mind with cultural patterns of development (see comparison of developmental models in Snarey and Bell, 2003).

To add to the difficulty of such an interdisciplinary approach to identity, the specific domain of religion in identity carries notable resistance. People are disinclined to see their own religious identity as influenced by seemingly non-divine external influences. The person's identity attachments and integration with religious content is normally narrated as divinely inspired processes. Yet, this dissertation will extend Erikson's psychosocial method to specifically "explain the way" in which religious identity follows an epigenetic paradigm wherein the needs of the developing body (*soma*), the developing mind (*psyche*), and the shifting cultural constructs of society (*ethos*) all meet together, not by happenstance, but out of necessity (Erikson, 1997, pp. 25-26). This is not to "explain away" the transcendent. One may still find divine agency in this theory, yet it will be behind a broader natural description of religious identity formation and functioning.

Thesis, Organization, and Definitions

Erikson's conceptualization of identity was rooted in his clinical and cultural observations. In this same tradition, James Marcia (1966) went about the process of describing more specific components of identity development.[1] In doing this, he developed one of the most popular research models in identity in which he described four identity statuses in the process of identity formation - *identity diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium, and achieved*; since then, his work has established an empirical foundation

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[1] Marcia developed the notion of measuring identity during his clinical internship under the supervision of David Gutmann, a former teaching assistant of Erikson. Marcia's dissertation was a construct validity study of Erikson's concept of identity formation.

for psychometric measures of identity. Two important developments have characterized identity research in the ensuing decades. First, the recent expansion in identity research has been plagued by a lack of conceptual clarity as scholars in both the humanities and social sciences use the term "identity" in widely varying models (Cote, 2006). Researchers from multitudes of backgrounds and theoretical assumptions have amassed nearly 20,000 research articles dealing with some facet of identity in the last decade (PsychINFO). Secondly, within the research in identity development, there is increasing evidence that a person is composed of identity *domains*, such as ethnic, sexual, or religious – each with their own potentially different identity statuses (Griffith and Griggs, 2001; Pulkkinen and Kokko, 2000; Bartoszuk, 2003; Meeus, 2002; Hunter, 1999; Pastorino, et.al., 1997; Kroger and Green, 1996; Robertson, 1995). Both of these developments are very significant for the conceptualization of *religious identity*.

In several different fields of study, especially through work rooted in the humanities, the term "religious identity" has increasingly appeared, although without theoretical precision or empirical validation. Ethnographic scholars of religion employ religious identity to describe phenomena in small cultural groups, and social statisticians refer to religious identity as social capital. In the social sciences, the growing understanding of identity domains and differing identity statuses has stimulated research per each domain; yet, the scholars have been reticent to work with the domain of religious identity. The first presentation for the possibility of a psychological construct for religious identity (empirically measurable and separable from other identity domains) was recently given to the American Psychological Association's Division 36 Conference (Psychology of Religion) (Bell, 2006). In the field of psychology of religion,

approximately 30 articles have used various measures of religiosity with a measure of

overall global identity to see how religion impacts overall identity development, usually

in adolescence. In doing this, the scholars are generally trapped by the confounding

variable of religiosity which is found in either measure. For example, most of these

studies find that religiosity is a significant variable in relation to identity achievement.

Yet, Marcia's Identity Status Interview (ISI) and Adams' Measure of Ego Identity Status-

II (EOMEIS-II) (the two primary measures of identity) contain significant content that

measures religiosity. In essence, these research articles use a measure of religiosity to see

if it impacts a measure of identity that also includes a measure of religiosity. If religion is

X and identity is Y, then most scholars in the psychology of religion currently find that

increases in religiosity generally increase identity development - if X then Y. In reality,

however, the variable Y should be seen as "xY," and the confounding problem could be

summed up simply as – if X then X. Further, since identity achievement has been

proposed as a positive value to achieve, non-religious people inherently result in fewer

identity achieved statuses. For both the good of clarifying global identity and articulating

a distinct domain of religious identity, this dissertation intends to resolve much of the

confounding issues.

  Thesis. This dissertation proposes that the research be reframed, moving from the

question of how *religiosity* influences overall *identity* to the question of how *religious*

identity itself is an empirically unique, potentially separable component of identity

(qualitatively different per identity statuses/stages) and how *religious identity* should be

included as an important measure when investigating degrees of religiosity

(quantitatively different in salience to an individual). Overall, religious identity is likely

an independent measure that rises or falls in *salience* and *quality* per cultural contexts, individual experiences, and developmental growth. The aim of this dissertation is to conceptually clarify the psychosocial functioning of religious identity, and then construct a scale offering conceptual/face validity for both religious identity status and religious identity salience.

Organization. The dissertation will begin by reviewing Erikson's psychosocial framework, especially as it relates to ego identity development throughout the lifespan. It will be important to look at both Erikson's historical context and his own biography to provide insight into his theory of identity. The second chapter will offer a "multimethod"[2] approach to looking at identity and religion by reviewing the work of cognitive science in autobiographical memory, the cognitive foundations of religion, the narrative construction of the self, and the evolutionary psychology of identity. This chapter will integrate the various findings with the functional psychosocial framework to propose a general demarcation of religious identity that will be clarified in the fourth chapter.

The third chapter will offer a general review of research in the qualitative and quantitative measures of identity, including the EOMEIS-II, and major research related to domain specificity. A second part of the chapter will review the major research findings in measures of religiosity with measures of identity. The fourth chapter integrates the conceptual work on identity (chapters one and two) with the research findings (chapter three) to conceptually clarify the psychosocial functioning of religious identity and to demonstrate the need for a separate measure in religious identity. In essence, this chapter

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[2] Emanating from Erikson's psychosocial theory, it is proposed that research in identity should look at the different forms (modes) of knowledge within psychology and sociology. "Multimethod" is being used instead of "multilevel" since "multilevel" implies a hierarchy of levels in research of the human being.

shows where there is an 'empty space' in our current work in the psychological study of religion. Further, it will present the case for aspects of *salience* and *quality* in a religious identity measure. In reference to quality, the chapter will detail four religious identity statuses.

The final three chapters follow an empirical research paradigm of scale construction (chapter five), methods and results (chapter six), and a discussion of the implications for chapter seven. These chapters will review a survey, completed by over 600 individuals, which offers conceptual validity for a measure of Religious Identity Salience (RISa) and Religious Identity Status (RISt). The discussion will draw upon both the empirical implications of the study and the conceptual implications of a field of religious identity.

Definitions. The study of *religious identity* brings one into a heated debate on both sides of the term. In identity research, there are several theoretical arguments between more concrete notions of the term *identity* versus more subjective notions of the *self*. And in research on religiosity, there is a virulent debate between the conceptual use of *spirituality* versus *religiosity*. Ultimately, I take a Wittgensteinian approach to linguistic meanings. Wittgenstein looked at the language games played by a society and removed the tensions of both epistemology and essence (i.e., How do we *know* what it means to have identity/self, or to be religious/spiritual? and What *is* religion? Spirituality? Identity? Self?). Instead, he reminded his readers that language is simply a temporal phonetic sound used to describe various things/events that could only be mapped rather than sharply defined by essence or singular forms of knowledge (Wittgenstein, 1958). Taking a page from William James' philosophy of pragmatism,

Wittgenstein made a pragmatic deduction of language in saying that what matters is how the word is commonly used currently in society – the practical use of the word (Goodman, 2002). In this framework, the language of self and identity, as well as religion and spirituality, are often indistinguishable. *Identity* can be seen just as subjectively as *self*, and *spirituality* may be just as much a socially influenced and institutionalized expression as is *religiosity*. Thus, this dissertation will approach the terms interchangeably with preference for the terms 'identity' and 'religiosity.'

In lieu of specific demarcations between these terms, what is offered here is a semantic mapping of *religious identity*. As stated above, *identity* and *religiosity* form two conceptual spheres overlapping religious identity. In general, identity is operationally defined by how an individual uniquely understands her or himself in relation to others/the external world. Identity involves long-term and autobiographical memory in its construction, subconscious aspects of patterned behavior and character, and unconscious patterned processes of thoughts and modular neurological connections. Yet, identity is only co-constructed in sociocultural and interpersonal contexts. In this communal context, the specific domain of religious identity may then be psychosocially blended with other identity domains including ethnic/cultural identity, familial identity, and political identity.

In an American context, *religion* and *religiosity* denote the traditional forms of association with a supernatural force and/or transcendental experience and to the sociocultural groups characterized by these phenomena. Some people are averse to using the term 'religious' in preference of the term 'spiritual.' In doing this, however, the notion of spirituality still intimates a supernatural and mystical phenomenon which is

largely validated and co-constructed in sociocultural groups (i.e., literature produced by groups, narratives of spirituality in the media, genres of art expressing spirituality). For the purpose of this study, it is argued that *spirituality* can be a type of religious identity in that it characterizes the way that an individual relates to both the predominant religious traditions and their own sense of transcending the self.

As a psychological construct, "religious identity" is operationally defined by the way a person relates to a transcendent being or force *and/or* to a sociocultural group predominantly characterized by a transcendent object. Certainly, the word 'relates' begs for more clarification; and that is the task of this dissertation.

CHAPTER 1
The Synonyms of Self: Erik Erikson and the quest for identity

In the popular cultural perception in the 1960's and 1970's, Erik Homburger Erikson (1902-1996) represented the traditional and rather enchanting role of a Harvard scholar and professor. He had managed to garner popularity outside of academia through mainstream media, such as on the cover of the *New York Times Magazine*, featured primetime television programs, several features in *Time* magazine, and the front covers of other popular family and daily living journals. Many of his books sold in the tens of thousands. This also carried lucrative gain when he signed a million dollar book contract in the 1950's with Norton Publishers. On Harvard's campus, he was known for dressing stylishly, being able to connect with the younger generation of students, and for the long wait lists to get into his courses.

This attention also drew no small amount of critics. Feminists denounced him for his 1963 essay, "Womanhood and Inner Space" (published in *Identity: Youth and Crisis*, 1968 pp. 261-294). The mainstream of psychological scholars criticized his work for a lack of empirical validation. Erikson's associated field of psychoanalysis was declining in its academic reputation. However, one of Erikson's most painful experiences was a caustic book review by one of his own former graduate students in the *New York Times Book Review*, titled, "Erik Erikson, the Man Who Invented Himself" (1975). Reviewing Erikson's *Life History and the Historical Moment* (1975), Marshall Berman excoriated Erikson and his apparent fraud of having abandoned his Jewish identity. Berman calls

this "bad faith," seizing upon an "all-too-human cover-up" in which Erikson changed his last name from the decidedly Jewish 'Homburger' to the more Danish 'Erikson' when he immigrated to America in 1933 (Berman, p. 2). Jewish himself, Berman saw this as a betrayal to both the Jewish community and the American public who were challenged by Erikson to "accept our past, our parents, our childhood: ego-identity means wholeness and interaction" (Berman, p. 2). Instead, Berman claims, Erikson ended up adopting himself, inventing his own father out of imagination rather than real life history. In fact, however, Erikson inherited many aspects of Christian identity as well (Friedman, 1998). In the end, that is, it would turn out that Erikson's religious and cultural identity constructed from his life history was not so simple.

Three decades after the review and with much more insight into Erikson, Berman's review now reveals more about Berman's own religious identity struggle than it does about Erikson. What Berman did help others to see, however, was the important role of religious and cultural identity, and the social sting that is inveighed against those who are seen to be playful or non-committal to this aspect of identity. Further, what Berman unfairly saw as hypocrisy did highlight Erikson's unique identity complexity. Erikson's life history was one which drew upon several *synonyms of the self*. Each part of his identity drew upon a wealth of overlapping and conflicting identity resources; yet, these were not inventions as Berman claimed, but rather revealed the real psychosocial construction of the self. The resulting identities are *synonymous* to the person's inner achieved self (ego identity), and yet, they are difficult to be consistently expressed and reciprocally exchanged with different social roles and groups.

Biography, 1902-1933[3]

Erikson emerged as an 'intellectual hero' for the American public. Yet he had other identities as well: cultural identities - American, Danish, Jewish, German, Austrian, Californian, New Englander; vocational identities – artist, student, teacher, psychoanalyst, writer, public thinker, researcher, anthropologist; familial identities – fatherless son, step-son, step-brother, husband, lover, father, even *abandoning* father; religious identities – Jewish, Christian, Presbyterian, theologian; and the list could go on. These identities each reflect an authentic synonym of the same person, always temporal, sometimes conflicting, and never all-encompassing. To garner insight into how Erikson conceptualized identity it is important to see the role identity played in his own life, and how it emerged from his psychosocial framework.

Erik's mother, Karla Abrahamsen, came from an important Jewish family in Copenhagen. She was first married in 1898 to a Jewish stockbroker, Valdemar Salomonsen, who actually left on the night of the wedding and was never heard from again. Three years later, it is rumored that Karla had intercourse after drinking too much at a party and did not know or could not recognize the man. Erik was born nine months later and would never know the identity of his biological father. With Erik sporting a tall physique with blond hair and blue eyes in early adolescence, it is safe to say that the birth father was more likely Danish than Jewish. For legal reasons, Erik was born as Erik Salomonsen, and later, after Valdemar Salomonsen was declared deceased, Erik's last name was changed to Abrahamsen. Three years later, Karla was engaged to a prominent Jewish doctor in Germany, Theodore Homburger. Theodore decided with Karla to tell

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[3] Lawrence Friedman's (1999) exemplary biography of Erikson provides much of the biographical content in the following pages. However, the theoretical implications for identity themes and how Erikson's experiences would later shape his central theory of identity formation are original to this dissertation.

Erik that he was his real birth father; Erik's name was changed yet again, Erik

Homburger. He would grow up losing his usage of Danish and becoming more adapted

to the German-Jewish subculture, requiring Erik to use German only in the household

(Friedman, 1999).

His parent's religious interests were quite different. Karla would often read

Kierkegaard (a Danish, Christian, theologian and philosopher) and Emerson (a

transcendental philosopher and poet), among other penetrating writers. Yet, she and

Theodore regularly attended the local synagogue, kept Jewish rituals and customs at

home, and followed all of the Jewish holidays. During all of this, Karla still hung Danish

flags in the home and read Danish newspapers. Looking back as an adult, Erik felt that

his mother had been under the pressure of Theodore to diminish her Danish roots and to

accentuate whatever Jewish religiosity Theodore wished. Furthermore, Erik would also

grow up in a Jewish school in which he physically stood out and was seen as very

different from his peers. He avoided the synagogue as much as possible, and

remembered some of the youth in the synagogue even referred to him as "goy." As he

grew into early adolescence, he confronted Karla and asked if Theodore was his real

father. She conceded that he was adopted, but still did not tell him that Salomonsen was

not his real father. Erik would only learn of a third and anonymous father in the 1960's,

shortly after his mother died. These identity deceptions made Erik feel estranged from

being Jewish, German, and a Homburger. When he graduated from school, his religious,

cultural, and familial identities would all be distressed (Friedman, 1999, 27-42).

Erik's time in his twenties was characterized by searching for vocational identity.

He roamed Europe as a bohemian artist in what in German is called a *Wanderschaft* – a

listless time in which young adults search for their purpose or identity. Erik commonly referred to this time, between the ages of 18 to 25, as a prolonged identity crisis. He would not really end this period until a high school friend, Peter Blos (later, a well recognized psychoanalyst in his own right) connected Erik to teaching art and other subjects at a school in Vienna. A fortuitous position, the Heitzig school was part of Freud's Psychoanalytic Society, and Freud's own daughter, Anna, interviewed Erik for the position. Some of Erikson's initial interests in child psychology came from here as he watched children play and began to analyze their behavior. Others quickly noticed Erikson's witty intellect, and Anna Freud became Erikson's own analyst. Erikson studied psychoanalysis and eventually earned a certificate and full membership in the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society. Surprisingly, this would be Erikson's only degree. With no undergraduate or graduate diploma, Erikson would later drop out of some graduate courses at Harvard – and still he managed to earn a fully tenured professorship at Harvard by 1960. Thus, an added layer to Erikson's identity complexity was that one of America's most well-known public intellectuals would hold no doctorate, no master's degree, not even an undergraduate degree. Erikson would always be in a vocational tension with academia, bristling at the statistical and scientific methods of psychology departments (Friedman, 1999).

Becoming a significant member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society from 1927 to 1933, Erikson interacted with several renowned individuals, such as Heinz Hartmann and Paul Federn. As he studied, he formed a close relationship to Anna Freud and was highly influenced by her work on ego psychology and defense mechanisms. Though his later theories were often at odds with psychoanalysis, Erikson always felt indebted to

Freud. Erikson's earlier writings show much appreciation to the psychoanalytic tradition, and he often pushed some connection to psychoanalysis (rarely traditional to his Freudian education) in his later writings (Friedman, 1999).

It was here in Vienna that Erik met Joan Serson, a person who was possibly even more influential on Erikson's development than either Anna or Sigmund Freud. An often overlooked ingredient to Erikson's intellectual development, Joan's story is also a story of identity. To begin, she did not talk much about her early life and even destroyed diaries of the period.   Born in Ontario in 1903, her birth name was Sarah, and it is unclear when or why she started calling herself Joan. Her father, John, was the local Episcopalian priest. Her mother, Mary MacDonald, was an American from New York City (also Episcopalian). Her parent's marriage was formal and lacked intimacy; her mother would find relief by traveling to Europe with the children. Joan's father favored her older sister, Molly, and her mother was unstable and distant. When Joan was two, her mother was hospitalized for depression for an extended time, and her grandmother took over the childrearing. Rev. Serson died when Joan was eight, and her mother Mary moved to New Jersey to be with friends. Her mother would eventually join an Episcopal nunnery in Boston. Joan earned a bachelor's degree in education at Barnard College, and a Master's in sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. Unusual for a woman in her time, she then began a doctorate in education at Columbia Teachers College. Her dissertation was a creative topic - teaching modern dance. This took her to Europe where she made her rounds of dance studios by bicycle and a backpack. After some time in Germany, she traveled to Vienna to extend her dissertation research. She visited the Heitzig school for an interview to teach physical education and English, and noticed Erik

Homburger passing by the hallway. Interestingly in the subject of identity, Joan first met

Erik at a *masked* ball celebrating Mardi Gras - dancing and talking all night. They began

a close relationship, and Joan moved into rooms that Erik and Peter Blos shared. In the

spring of 1930, Joan temporarily returned to the US to take care of her mother when she

discovered that she was pregnant. Returning to Vienna, Erik was very hesitant to marry a

non-Jew due to his parents likely disapproval, and he had been hesitant himself to make

any major commitments (Friedman, 1999). In a labyrinth of identity entanglements,

Erikson would either repeat the absenteeism of his own birth father or embrace the new

identity as father and husband out of situational pressure rather than developmental

readiness. With Erik's own ambiguity of Jewish identity, a lost Danish past, and Joan's

strong Protestant religious background, Erik and Joan gave their new son the name "Kai,"

a reflection of both a Danish heritage and the Greek word for "and." In a way, Kai was a

conjunction between Judaism and Christianity, between Europe and North America,

between sociology and psychology, and a new life between Joan and Erik.

This first of identity conjunctions was only the beginning of Erikson's habit of

blending cultures, religions, and fields of study. One prominent example of religious

identity and attachment confusion (and playfulness) was in late 1930 when Joan and Erik

held three weddings in Vienna. For Joan's now Anglican mother (though without her

presence), they held a ceremony in the Anglican Chapel of the Holy Family. A second

wedding was a civil ceremony in which Erik called himself a Jew and Joan was

registered as a Protestant. And for the Homburgers, the third wedding was Jewish.

Although an Episcopalian, Joan (legally listed as Sarah) officially converted to Judaism

to satisfy a traditional requirement in both the Conservative and Orthodox Jewish

marriage. Testing the limits of such religious identity professions, Joan went straight

from a marketplace to the synagogue carrying a bag of pork for the evening meal. And

there were other faux pas - other than just the lingering smell of pork. When it came time

to exchange rings, Erik had forgotten to bring the ring for Joan. With a witness loaning

Joan her ring, the wedding continued. Friedman saw this as a "mockery of the middle-

class Jewish propriety practiced by the Homburgers" (Friedman, 1999, p. 84). While this

may be true, I think it also showed two young adults who's own diversity and education

made it difficult for them to just pick one culture, one religion, or just one way of life.

Joan's study of dance and Erik's analysis of children's play would be joined in these

ceremonies – a playful dance with religious and cultural identity.

When Erik disclosed to his family the news of his marriage and the upcoming

birth of his son, his parents were, of course, shocked. He told them of Joan's conversion,

but on their first visit to Erik and Joan's home, they found Joan crocheting in defiance of

the Sabbath prohibition against work. It was quickly apparent that Joan and Erik were

not constructing a Jewish household. Nevertheless, they saw that Erik was better-off,

happy, and settling into a career. In a show of patience and flexibility, Theodore and

Karla approved of the young couple and even helped them out financially. With a

softening of tension in the relationship with Erik's father, Erik and Joan decided to name

their firstborn Kai *Theodore* Homburger. A second son soon came, and by 1933 Joan

had abandoned her dissertation (Friedman, 1999).

The boys were raised as Christians, and Joan's strength of her Episcopalianism

concerned Erik – he liked crossing the lines more. Other tensions arose as well. Joan

didn't like the Vienna Psychoanalytic community. She found it insular. Her own

psychoanalysis had not gone well; it was expensive and one of Freud's disciples charged

her when she couldn't show up due to illness. She also didn't much care for Sigmund –

she thought he was stuffy, snobby, and arrogant. More importantly, she didn't like Anna.

She worried about the effect that Anna was having over Erik, such as in telling him that

religion was illusory and pathological. She thought that Anna was too focused on labels

(like her father) and that her excavation of the inner psyche lacked any real sense of

involvement in the world (Friedman, 1999). It is here that we really begin to see the

influence of Joan and her sociological and pedagogical background. She would harness

Erik's insightful analysis (still rooted in traditional psychoanalysis) and facilitate a

change of focus from pathological to positive, from purely psychological to psychosocial,

and from cultural denigration to cultural integration.

     With the encroaching Nazi army closing on Vienna, Erik and Joan immigrated to

America in 1933, and he became the first child psychoanalyst in Boston. Separating from

Anna Freud and continental Europe, Erik and Joan would later change their last names as

did many new immigrants. Yet, changing from "Homburger" to "Erikson" cannot be

explained away just as a common immigrant activity. Ultimately, Erik felt Danish and

had more of an affinity for Christianity (or at least liberal Protestant theology) than for

his own conservative Jewish upbringing. As a religious identity, Erik moved from a

Jewish surname to a Christian surname, listing his new identity on naturalization papers

in 1938 (Friedman, 1999, p. 144). It should also be suggested that the name change

might have had a practical motivation. America was a new beginning for Erik and a time

for him to make a name for himself, literally; Erik Erikson had a phonetic rhyming to it

that could linger in popular cultural memory. As a synonym of his own self, the once

adopted son would soon become the symbol of good fathering for many Americans.

Erikson's Configurational Approach

Erikson became a research assistant at the Harvard Psychological Clinic where he

specialized in children's research. At the same time, he began pursuing a doctorate in

psychology at Harvard, but eventually dropped out as many of the experimental courses

left little room for the "intuition" so inherent in psychoanalysis (Friedman, 1999, p. 124).

Erikson's need for creativity and intuition showed a much more visual and artistic side of

his perspective, bristling against the practitioners of both experimental psychology and

traditional psychoanalysis. Back in Vienna, he had upset the more orthodox Freudian

psychoanalysts by attending more to "verbal and visual configurations" in children's play

(Erikson, 1970, p. 740). The children were often using defense mechanisms, but Erikson

noticed that the content of their play was also expressive of their inner selves.

Instead of just looking at the inner part of a person's psyche, Erikson was drawn

to how the relationship between the ego and id were expressed by children through

configuring play objects or creating art (external world). This became a parallel method

for some time between a traditional ego-id inward drive theory and the more socially

interactive configuration approach. Ultimately, Erikson's configurational approach laid

the foundation for seeing how it is that adults and societies configure their own objects to

meet the needs of the person. The configurational approach looked at the interactive

dance and play of people in which ego needs were met only in social groups, and the

ways in which different societies have formed structures to meet those needs. Erikson

was drawing a sharp distinction between Anna Freud and himself by blurring the lines between the internal and external world. Instead of a person being primarily composed of drives, and developing defense mechanisms to deal with them, Erikson wanted to look at how the external world was an evolved expression of the person's needs. Anna Freud had described the influences of the social, external world as only accidental forces (Freud, A., 1936). Erikson's notion of a person was one in a real social reality.

With the fallout of Jung and others from Freud's inner circle, there had been a demand of orthodoxy for those in Vienna in the late 1920's and Erikson's configuration theory did not fit the traditional psychoanalytic approach. This tension was rooted in far deeper methodical conflicts than just how to understand society's influence on the ego. Freud was firmly embedded in the Darwinian revolution of thought in the late 19th century as well as what Erikson called a "mechanistic physicalis[m]" (Erikson, 1997, p. 19). Darwin's theory impacted how scholars saw the modern person as well as modern society. The animal-like instincts and the primitive expressions were the primary fodder for Freud interpreting the person through just the *Treib* – the drive or instinct in German. Erikson says this best about Freud:

> "…Freud's conviction of the prime necessity to study vigilantly that unconscious and instinctual core of man which he called the 'id' (and thus something akin to an inner outerworld) and to take no chances with mankind's tenacious resistance to insights into its 'lower' nature, and its tendency to devitalize such insights by remythologizing them as 'higher.'" (Erikson, 1997, p. 17)

Freud and his Vienna colleagues suspected that Erikson's attention to configurational play was really just Erikson being distracted from the rawer, untamed frustrations of the id. When Freud did take up the subject of society through the lens of *tribe* theory, he saw artificial and primitive groups held together by sexual/love instincts diverted into social connections (Freud, 1922; Erikson, 1997, p. 18). Hartmann and Anna Freud would go on

to describe the 'outer world' as accidental to the autonomous ego. Erikson chafed under this mechanical description of the mind which he felt was too reductionistic of the human. Instead of the "single person's inner 'economics' of drive and defense," Erikson began to emphasize "an *ecology* of mutual activation within a communal unit such as the family" (Erikson, 1997, p. 21). Erikson would later describe his method more befitting of the 20th century's postmodern relativity than Freud's naturalist approach of old.

In Erikson's configurational approach, he gave equal attention to what the child's behavior repressed and denied (the animal-like id in Freudian tradition) as well as to the creative expressive forms of play (communal analysis based on co-constructed meaning with others). Calling this the "art-and-science of psychoanalysis" (Erikson, 1997, p. 22), Erikson's essay on his configurational approach was a sharp departure from his writings in Vienna (Erikson, 1937). In 1931, Erikson had originally written on the psychological drives in school aged children and he had noted the "verbal and visual configurations," but later said that he did not explore these at the time because of his own desire to succeed in Freud's Vienna (Erikson, 1931; Erikson, 1970; Friedman, 1988, p. 89). In this and two other early Vienna essays (published in English in 1987, *A Way of Looking a Things*), Erikson explored the interaction between child development and adults outside the language of transference and countertransference. Instead, he saw a mutual interaction between the adult and child in which reciprocity of love and openness were equally beneficial and influential. Foreshadowing his later description of a psychosocial stage of generativity and his larger framework of psychosocial development, Erikson's theory of configurational play would be extended from infancy to college aged young adults (Erikson, 1937). In fact, his 1937 article included the following chart of eight

stages of play that extrapolated three bodily zones (In each circle mode: the top is oral-

facial; bottom is anal-urethral, and the side orifice is genital-urethral) and impulses

(sucking, biting, retaining, expelling, and intruding). The three concentric circles

represent three primitive aspects of human life: the inner surface, the outer surface, and

the sphere of outward behavior. As with his later psychosocial stages, the normal

succession of human growth takes a diagonal direction in which there is a synthesis

between physical zones and epigenetic impulses.

Figure A. Stages of Play, foreshadowing Erikson's psychosocial method
(Erikson, 1937, pp. 178-179)[4]

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[4] Erikson writes, "It is in these stages that impulse and zone find the full training of their function within the framework of growth and maturation. A deviation from the normal diagonal development can be horizontal, i.e., progressing to the impulse of the next stage before the whole organism has integrated the first stage; or, it can be vertical, i.e., insisting on the impulse of the first stage when the organism as a whole would be ready for the training and integration of the dynamic principle of the next stage. Thus, a differentiation of zones and impulses is introduced which gives our chart its two dimensions: in the horizontal we have different impulses connected with one and the same zone—in the vertical we see one and the same impulse connected with different zones" (1937, pp. 180-181).

The symbols in the chart involve a complex breakdown of possible relations between bodily zones and impulses, and the specific meanings are not crucial to this dissertation. The importance of the configurational chart is how Erikson clearly laid a foundation to psychosocial development by seeing the individual composed of an inner self (similar to the psyche), outer self (similar in ways to the soma / biology), and the outward behavior (somewhat similar to social behavior / ethos). These multiple modes of analysis would be a primary component to Erikson's theory of psychosocial identity.

Erikson's Description of Ego, Ego Boundaries, and Ego Growth

Erikson inherited in psychoanalysis a tripartite mapping of the mind – the id, the ego, and the superego. If the id was the primal, animalistic drives of each person, then the superego was the mental parent which is internalized by all people in order to restrict the id. Between the two was an operating center of experience, the ego. The word "ego" entered into popular cultural language in the 20th century and, possibly because of this, it has always seemed a less than precise term meaning anything from self-esteem to generic meanings of the self. However, it should be remembered that the three terms were translations of Freud's words "das Es," "das Ich," and "das Uber-Ich" which literally mean "the It," "the I," and "the Over-I." "Ego" was used in English translations and comes from the Latin word for the first person singular pronoun (nominative/subject usage). In Freud's original conception, the ego was the seat of the consciousness; later, Freud revised the ego to include both consciousness, preconsciousness and unconsciousness. Erikson would never really be concerned over where and how these mechanical descriptions of the consciousness were to be precisely located. What concerned him more was the medical approach to psychological analysis in which the

focus was upon pathological problems that surface in the ego. Erikson was more interested in defining the ego apart from just its problems. His attention was turning from pathology to normative and healthy growth. By the time Erikson was in Boston, he was able to articulate this difference.

In 1935, Anna Freud published a small book in child psychoanalysis for teachers and parents (Freud, A., 1935). Erikson was invited to write a review of the book for the American journal *Psychoanalytic Quarterly*. And he did. In a short review (551 words), he writes most of it in complementary language, but ends it sharply with this:

> "Following the traditional route of psychoanalysis the book says much about what may limit and endanger the child's ego; it says little about the ego itself. Correspondingly psychoanalysis has so far been useful to pedagogy primarily as a basis of criticism of cultural progress and the dangers it involves for children. So far as further studies may illuminate the ego, psychoanalytic insight will be able to help education in its most specific problem: the strengthening and enriching of the ego" (Erikson, 1936, pp. 292-293).

Critiquing Anna Freud represented a significant change for Erikson. Instead of defining the inner workings of the mind by a language of pathology and medical solutions, Erikson wished to turn towards what could be considered normative and healthy. He was interested in defining the 'I' by the positive and reciprocal interaction with others. While always influenced by Freud's theory of psychosexual drives that compose the 'I,' Erikson was not satisfied that this was the end of the story.

To describe the ego in terms of growth and health, Erikson would blur the ego boundaries between inner and outer worlds that had so characterized psychoanalysis. Heniz Hartmann was developing his work in ego psychology during this same period in Vienna. Still working with traditional mechanical terminology, Hartmann spoke of how the ego could adapt in normative ways to be able to gain autonomy from libidinal drives. Instead of ego pathology, Hartmann was investigating the ego's potential. The ego had

several specific capacities for attention, memory, motor coordination, perception and language. The role of the therapist was to help the patient work towards normative ego strengths (also called ego capacities and ego functioning) while understanding that it was also normal for these capacities to develop into conflicts with the aggressive and libidinal drives. Hartmann's influence on Erikson is clear. When Erikson scripted the eight psychosocial stages in 1950, he would describe an ego *strength* for each step. At first, identity vs. role confusion was described as achieving the positive ego strength of identity (Erikson, 1950). Erikson would later add the ego capacities of devotion and fidelity to be achieved during this stage (Erikson, 1964). While Hartmann's work opened up more possibility to envision ego strengths instead of just ego defenses, Erikson felt that Hartmann still only described the functioning of the ego without describing its fundamental essence (Friedman, 1998, p. 93). In other words, Hartmann described ego processes without being able to say what the ego was.

Paul Federn was yet another important scholar in the Vienna circle. Working on notions of ego boundaries, he rejected Freud's more structural descriptions of the ego for more fluid notions of ego "feelings" and self-determining ego boundaries. In ego feelings, Federn was intent to explore a phenomenological approach which took seriously one's own mental and physical experience. And in ego boundaries, Federn argued that these ego feelings enable the individual to separate what is part of a more permanent self from the boundary of what is not part of the self (Federn, 1928, 1952). For Erikson, this was a large step in understanding the essence of the ego. He later reflected that Federn may have been the first to use the term, "ego identity" (Erikson, 1975). This movement away from a traditional psychoanalytic approach was extremely important for Erikson's

future direction. Psychoanalysis had thrived on the empowered analyst and the unaware

patient model. The insight and wisdom, held by the analyst, was used to detect mental

problems. Alternately, Federn's phenomenological method gave more power to the

patient and somewhat reduced the role of the therapist. With the goal of recognizing

one's own healthy ego boundaries, patients became the source of knowledge as they

expressed what they felt (ego feelings) about their own experiences of the self. As

Erikson transitioned his psychoanalytic medical model to a well-being model of human

growth, he no longer needed to just see what was wrong with the person, but what was

good. However, this left an epistemological problem. Where does one learn about what

is 'good' and 'healthy'? Combining his configurational approach with Federn's

phenomenological ego boundaries, Erikson would take seriously the expressive play of

healthy children, and later the content and self-explorations of adolescents. In short, what

is good and healthy is what is phenomenologically expressed by people as feeling good

and healthy. This can change per culture, per generation, and certainly per individual. It

follows then that Erikson's model of human growth would need to incorporate both

cognitive and cultural factors as well as generational transitions to know what is for now,

for this person, for this culture - good.

Erikson's Epigenetic Theory

Erikson encountered some difficulty in the field of psychological research while

in Boston. Working for the renowned Henry Murray, director of the Harvard

Psychological Clinic, Erikson tried to operate within the American scientific paradigm

using a "control group," eliciting "results," and collecting "data." However, his chapter

in Murray's *Explorations in Personality* (1938) was not well received in an otherwise very strong book. Erikson was not proficient in experimental testing and would never really be able to work together with other scientifically oriented projects (Friedman, 1999). Yet, Murray and Erikson did both share a creative spark when it came to theory and insight. Erikson was drawn to Murray's blurring of lines between what may be considered "natural" and "ethical" in the description of human development. Starting from his study of chick development within the eggshell, Murray was drawn to embryology and patterns of normal, healthy growth. Moving beyond the traditional boundaries of biology, Murray saw a timed developmental need for relational ethics in the early lifespan of animals. Or said differently, normative biological development required timed development of social capacities in both humans and animals.

Murray may very well have been influenced by Charles Stockard from Cornell University. In 1931, Stockard published *The Physical Basis of Personality*, a work primarily focused upon explaining embryological development and the ways in which problems in development affect the fetus's personality much later. Yet, Stockard would go further. Working in a field of "experimental evolution," Stockard argued that the external environment influenced the developing person, even into the first beginnings as an embryo (White, 1933, p. 357; Stockard, 1931, p. 33). Even though the evidence to support some of Stockard's more sweeping claims would be considered flimsy by today's standards, he made an important move in part of the book that influenced Erikson. Instead of trying to only investigate specific problems that led to specific personality outcomes (more useful for clinical cases), Stockard also used embryology and the framework of epigenesis to understand normative and healthy human development in the

womb. In *Life Cycle Completed*, Erikson refers to Stockard's work as a prime example

of the theory of epigenesis (Erikson, 1997, p. 27). In embryology, biologists have

detailed a cog-wheeling pattern of organ development in which each biological

development in the embryo is designed through evolution to happen in a certain sequence

within a fairly short window of opportunity. Each further development is dependent

upon the successful fruition of previous organic growths. This would become the

grounding principle for psychosocial growth in Erikson's model. When Murray and

Stockard broke the boundaries of embryological epigenesis by considering the inward

effect by the external environment on personality (Stockard) or on moral and social

development (Murray), Erikson saw a powerful explanatory tool for describing ego

development that would be rooted in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic biology. As

human beings had phylogenetically evolved in social groups, evolution had established

ontogenetic frameworks of individual growth that required, after birth, a cog-wheeling

turn of biological growth sequentially ordered and enabled by sociological structures and

processes. The biological-developmental needs for children and adolescents, Erikson

eventually theorized, were dependent upon communal structures being properly timed to

meet these needs (Erikson, 1959, 1980, 1987, 1997).

Erikson's expanding of the epigenetic theory was originally published in his

"Problem's of Infancy and Early Childhood" (1940, 1987). Being Erikson's first

published work on stages of human development, he carefully explained how epigenesis

relates to human development outside the womb. With quotes from Stockard's work,

Erikson says:

> In this [epigenetic] development each organ has its time of origin and this time
> factor is as important as the place of origin. If the eye, for example, does not arise at the
> appointed time "it will never be able to express itself fully, since the moment for the

rapid outgrowth of some other part will have arrived, and this will tend to dominate the less active region, and suppress the belated tendency for eye expression."…

The organ which misses its time of ascendancy not only is doomed as an individual but endangers at the same time the whole hierarchy of organs… The result of normal development is proper relationship of size and function among the body organs. The liver adjusted in size to the stomach and intestine, the heart and lungs properly balanced, and the capacity of the vascular system accurately portioned to the body as a whole (Erikson, 1987, p. 549).

Accepting this normative description of epigenetic development, Erikson pondered why anyone would assume that epigenesis stops in the developing human after it leaves the uterus. The infant continues to develop biologically all the way through adulthood, something he called "extrauterine maturation" (Erikson, 1987, p. 550). The notions of "proper rate" and "normal sequence" are just as important factors for healthy development in a child who naturally seeks interaction with the environment. Drawing upon his observations of play, Erikson points out the need for many animals to use play as a preparatory practice for adult behavior. With humans needing the longest period of adaptation and playful experimentation, Erikson reasoned that this was still an epigenetic period that involved certain behaviors and tasks being developed sequentially. Erikson then explains Freud's psychosexual phases of incorporation, retention-elimination, intrusion, and latency as concatenating displays of normative epigenetic growth. He ends the essay with a brief and not satisfactory treatment of social relativity. Showing his early thoughts on the subject, he begins to lay out how it is that epigenesis is influenced by a seemingly endless number of social factors. At this point, he had not been able to theoretically draw together similarities of social structures as he later does in his psychosocial stages.

Erikson's Conception of Ego Identity

In the 1940's, Erikson was making a dramatic departure from the traditional field of research psychology. As academic departments of psychology sought to establish their scientific credentials, they were grounded in neurological theories of origin and statistical measurements of psychological behaviors. The highly relative and seemingly nonscientific world of culture was entirely outside the realm of interest for experimental psychologists. As with the variety of different religious expressions, the superabundance of cultures seemed capriciously constructed out of happenstance and not from any guiding scientific principle – especially not one as systematic and biological as epigenesis. Yet, the field of psychoanalysis was slowly becoming separated and divided from the academic study of psychology, and Erikson's writings from this period were building interest.

In the late 1930's, Erikson moved to Yale University where he would become a friend and colleague to the anthropologist, Margaret Mead. While there, he traveled to South Dakota to study the Sioux Native-Americans which helped him to see the dramatic impact of cultural forces on child development. In 1939, Erikson moved to Berkeley to begin work with the Institute of Child Welfare. He was excited by this because of the opportunity to interact with a group of normal, healthy children. Here he would interact with Daniel Levinson and Jane Loevinger – two scholars who later crossed discipline boundaries in their work. Berkeley would become one of the most fruitful times in Erikson's life. During this period, he was drawn to how the ego/self developed but was challenged by how to describe cultural influences in any systematic way.

The theoretical key that would connect Hartmann's ego capacities, Federn's ego strengths, his own configurational approach, and the problem of historical relativity was ego identity. By 1946, he published a very important article, "Ego Development and Historical Change" in which he first described the social character of ego identity. In first steering the direction of the article, Erikson says, "Instead of emphasizing what social organization denies a child, we wish to clarify what it may first grant to the infant, as it keeps him alive and as, in administering to his needs in a specific way, it seduces him to a particular life style" (p. 360). Moving from the "…oedipus trinity as an irreducible schema for man's irrational conduct, we are striving for greater specificity within this scheme, by exploring the way in which social organization predetermines the structure of the family" (p. 360). Erikson was clearly shifting the focus from the ways in which social life causes pain and ego conflicts on the self towards the ways in which social life is fundamental in the ego strengths. But what does he make of the problem of social relativity? Erikson draws upon his experiences with the Sioux Native-Americans to illustrate the most difficult example of this problem with two sharply distinct cultures. In the Sioux, there was a historical identity of the buffalo hunter who is nomadic and retains indigenous structures of social life. As the Sioux were forced onto reservations, they were educated by civil servants who tried to teach a new group identity from the perspective of modern people with homes, bank accounts, and jobs. The Sioux reacted with passive resistance since there was no integration of the "powerful psychological reality" of their "identity remnants" (p. 361).

For Erikson, using the comparison between the Sioux and modern society would illustrate social relativity in the extreme: "Comparisons of erstwhile primitive groups

with the remnants of such groups and with subgroups in modern society notoriously

attempt to bridge almost unsurmountable systematic differences" (p. 361). In each

society, a child must achieve a "vitalizing sense of reality from the awareness that his

individual way of mastering experience (ego synthesis) is a successful variant of a group

identity and is in accord with its space-time and life plan" (p. 362). He illustrates this

through the example of a child learning to walk. Becoming one "who can walk" may

mean different things in different cultures. It can mean one "who will go far," or one

"who will be upright," or one "who might go too far" (pp. 362-363). As the child

biologically develops different capacities, there is an integration with the cultural

meaning and support systems of society. The child garners self-affirming reactions from

others and moves towards a "tangible collective future" (p. 363). The subjective

experience of one's own ego within a social reality *is* ego-identity. Although clarity

often eluded Erikson in such grand concepts, he carefully explains a difference between

personal identity and ego identity:

> The conscious feeling of having a personal identity is based on two simultaneous observations: the immediate perception of one's selfsameness and continuity in time; and the simultaneous perception of the fact that others recognize one's sameness and continuity. What I propose to call ego-identity concerns more than the mere fact of existence, as conveyed by personal identity; it is the ego quality of this existence.
> Ego-identity, then, in its subjective aspect, is the awareness of the fact that there is a self-sameness and continuity to the ego's synthesizing methods and that these methods are effective in safeguarding the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others (Erikson, 1946, p. 363).

Erikson would go back and forth for the rest of his career in whether to distinguish

between personal identity and ego identity. Articulating exactly what he meant by ego

synthesis would prove to be a stumbling block and often he would just speak of identity,

and not any specific distinction between personal identity and ego identity. In still the

earlier part of his career, we can also see some motivation for Erikson using a more

Freudian notion of ego synthesis (between the id and the super-ego) and distinguishing it from seemingly simpler notions of personal identity. Maybe he was not yet ready to completely branch out on his own.

Despite Erikson not emphasizing this identity distinction later in his writings, there are good reasons to keep this dual layer of identity on the table. Erikson would go on in this article to show examples of ego synthesis that were quite different from Freudian notions of parleying id and super-ego tensions. Erikson describes a synthesis of different roles a 5-year-old child makes to accommodate his experiences. Each child looks for models "for workable combinations of identification fragments" and the utility of each model is dependent upon the "requirements of the organism's maturational stage and the ego's habits of synthesis" (Erikson, 1946, p. 367). As the boy took on the role model of a bombardier (which functioned as an ego identity), he was able to successfully synthesize several components to his experiences and identification fragments. Erikson frequently shifts between two usages of synthesis in this article. It seems he is at times still referring to Freud's ego synthesis of the tripartite mind. But, he also uses the term "synthesis" to refer (as in the case of the boy above) to how children have to pull together many different possible role identifications; in normative development, the child finds a workable ego synthesis that allows them to express their feelings, memories, and experiences. What Erikson does not explain is how one may have a *continuous* pattern of ego synthesis, and what that would mean. It is important to note that his usage of the term "ego identity" for such young children does not fit his later model of psychosocial growth. He would eventually describe the identity play of children as "identifications"

and reserved the term "ego identity" for adolescence in the psychosocial stage of identity formation (Erikson, 1950).

Erikson's revised use of "synthesis" is important for three reasons. First, the ego identity that is able to synthesize variable and potentially conflicting models of living is able to then achieve healthy, normative growth. For centuries and millennia, cultures operated within a fairly closed system in which resources for identifications and identities were quite limited and straightforward. In the Sioux community, Erikson saw the difficulty of an indigenous community who struggle with their own identity as it came into conflict with modern society identities. And in modern society, the transformation of culture and its integration with technology has expanded the possibilities of identities. Seeing this as an emerging problem most specifically focused in America, Erikson saw the need for the quickly transitioning cultures to find new means and models for the identity needs of their young (Erikson, 1946, p. 388). Taking Freud's original ego synthesis model, Erikson greatly expands it to mean making one's larger synthesis of multifarious ego models. Starting with his observances of children playing different role models (identities), Erikson sees this as a psychobiological need to achieve identity in all cultures. More isolated and traditional cultures usually do not have such a problem with this ego task. Yet, the modern world requires a good deal more work in synthesizing different identity possibilities. This is how Erikson was first able to conceptually deal with the problem of social relativity and the emerging psychobiological person. He saw a epigenetic need (identity achievement) that all cultures strive to enable in their young – and some do it better (or at least *easier*) than others.

Secondly, we could also find some theoretical grounding for the notion of

continuity of synthesis here. Instead of thinking of this as a systematically stable process

over long stages of life, we can see this instead as a functional assessment of one's

current identity attachments. If our identity attachments are functioning well, then we

continue to use them - at least until a new set of circumstances arise in which the current

identity model no longer works. Erikson's later work is often misread to imply that the

identity ego-synthesis is supposed to be a stable and continuous formation that should last

years and decades. However, Erikson's notion of a continuity of identity ego-synthesis is

shown here to be something that is functioning and healthy in terms of weeks and months

(1946).

Thirdly, Erikson's "synthesis" implies different levels of identity consciousness

(1946). His distinction between *personal identity* and *ego identity* could be described as

a distinction between a conscious manner of *expressing* identity and an unconscious

manner of *processing* identity.[5] In the first part of the quoted definition above, Erikson

stresses that in personal identity one feels the same and that others recognize the same

identity. In ego identity, the person has a subjective awareness of ego synthesis and that

the person is able to safeguard their own meaning for others. The subjective notion of

identity-synthesis is internal and less immediate to one's own perception. Erikson's

focus for defining ego identity lies in his distinction between *processing* one's own

identity and not the more straightforward and immediate *expression* of one's identity.

His use of "awareness" in ego-identity is not a fitting word for the examples and

implication he gives throughout the 1946 article. In all of his examples, the individuals

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[5] This distinction is one of the primary components of the Religious Identity Salience measure described in the fourth chapter.

were not aware that they were processing their identities. What they did seem to be aware of was a personal-ego feeling in which they felt satisfied in how they had been expressing themselves. The children were happy and functioning well, and they said as much. The children safeguarded their identities not out of conscious cognitive choices, but more unconsciously as healthy defense mechanisms because their identities felt good. Erikson is careful to say that the ego identity is a subjective thing. It is a phenomenological perspective in which identity is expressed by "senses" of ego identity. It may be better to say that it is expressed by feelings, consciously or unconsciously, that may reveal typically unconscious patterns of synthesis. This twofold distinction between a) one's expressed and perceived identity, and b) the more internal and subconscious identity processing has empirical grounding in current cognitive research in autobiographical memory (see chapter 2). It is important then to consider how Erikson offers a conceptual foundation for looking at the more specific domain of religious identity in which people may explicitly express a certain degree of salience and culturally apropos language that may be distinct from more internal and implicit patterns of religious identity processes. Thus, the ego synthesizing process for religious identity would usually be subconscious to the individual with the real possibility of there being explicit (express) and implicit (synthesis) functioning roles in religious identity.

As Erikson began to focus on ego identity, he started taking clinical cases for adults. Traditionally, the 'ego' was understood to be in place from birth for Freudian psychoanalysts. As Erikson continued to work out ego identity, he began to see that identity is quite different in children than it is in adolescents or in adults. By studying a wave of returning veterans from World War II, he found many men who were struggling

with ego crises. In one of the clinical cases, a Marine was unable to integrate his role and

experiences from war with the person he thought he was prior to the war (Erikson, 1950,

p. 38ff.). With the patient being an otherwise healthy individual, Erikson felt that

psychoanalysis did not have a term to diagnose this condition. It was in these clinical

treatments that Erikson began to use the term, "identity crisis" (Erikson, 1968, p. 16).

Erikson would later say that he identified with the soldier in having a "shattered identity

owing to a sense of discontinuity in his own life history" (Friedman, 1998, p. 162).

Indeed, the synonyms of names that Erikson used for himself were the very things he

strove to make *synthesis* of as he transitioned from a young Freudian psychoanalyst in

Vienna to an established public scholar in America forming his own field of thought.

Erikson's Psychosocial Method

Erikson began to see a timeliness for identity development. Children were not

concerned with who they were as much as were teens. They could play and express

different identity attachments with frequent change. But adolescence brought with it an

epigenetic need to break away from the family, find a mating partner, and successfully

provide for a new family. Evolutionary design would have had this all happen by the

time one reached 18 to 19-years-old. But the process was being delayed in modern

societies and teens had many more choices of vocation, communal values, and cultural

interaction. In most indigenous societies, you would become your own new person by

leaving the home and making a new one. But this was much more complicated in

modern societies. The first step of breaking away from one's communal clan, the family,

was frustrated by extending education into late adolescence and thus the need for teens to

remain at home. As a result, teenagers needed to define themselves away from their

parents – a first step of leaving home. Series of frustrated parents began bringing their

adolescents to see Erikson. In his clinical cases, Erikson started to locate the identity task

in this period and conjectured that it was the primary ego task for the emerging adult.

In 1950, Erikson had been invited to the Midcentury White House Conference on

Infancy and Childhood. Joan and Erik collaborated more than ever before on this paper.

Bringing her sociology background to the forefront, she felt Erik was ready to describe a

life cycle that would incorporate biology, psychology, and the social sciences. Together,

Joan and Erik were quite clear that they were leaving the traditional field of psychology

in order to have a broader picture of human development. They reasoned that each

academic department has unique insights, but the greater reward is in combining the

wisdom of all three fields:

> Our thinking is dominated by this trichotomy [of the three disciplines] because only through the inventive methodologies of these disciplines do we have knowledge at all. Unfortunately, however, this knowledge is tied to the conditions under which it was secured; the organism undergoing dissection or examination; the mind surrendered to experiment or interrogation; social aggregates spread out on statistical tables. In all of these cases, then, a scientific discipline prejudiced the matter under observation by actively dissolving its total living situation in order to be able to make an isolated section of it amenable to a set of instruments and concepts (Erikson, 1950, p. 37).

Joan and Erik had often enjoyed reading Shakespeare's play *As You Like It* and especially

the "All the world's a stage" speech that includes seven ages of man (Erikson, 1997, pp.

2-3; Friedman, 1998, p. 217). The Erikson stages were quite different however,

especially in their insertion of the stages of play, identity, and generativity. The stage of

generativity was the last addition and provided much of the genius of the stage theory. It

connected older age with youthful intimacy in a way that was cyclical for future

generations; further, it connected the long span of adulthood in an epigenetic framework

in which adults have a natural, evolutionary and biological need to nurture a younger generation. Overall, this model was a breakthrough that brought together Erikson's configurational approach, epigenetic framework, ego boundary crossing notions of internal and external worlds, normative healthy development, and the synthesizing ego that influences and is influenced by the surrounding communal life. And most importantly, it made sense to a much wider public. The stage model was included as a chapter in Erikson's bestseller, *Childhood and* Society (1950). In an already strong book, the chapter on the eight stages of life was the strongest. Its publication would increase in sales and popularity through the rest of Erikson's life.

|								
Old Age								Integrity vs. Despair. WISDOM **8**
Adulthood							Generativity vs. Self-Absorption. CARE **7**	
Young Adulthood						Intimacy vs. Isolation. LOVE **6**		
Adolescence					Identity vs. Confusion. FIDELITY **5**			
School Age				Industry vs. Inferiority. COMPETENCE **4**				
Play Age			Initiative vs. Guilt. PURPOSE **3**					
Early Childhood		Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt. WILL **2**						
Infancy	Basic Trust vs. Basic Mistrust. HOPE **1**							

Figure B. Psychosocial Stages

The psychosocial stages emphasized mutuality, complementarity, and overlapping periods. Joan and Erik drew them up in a diagonal chart fashion in order to show how each stage is only built upon the previous stage's achievements. Beginning in infancy,

Joan and Erik described the psychosocial task of achieving a sense of trust versus

mistrust. This was a parallel description to Freud's oral psychosexual stage. The infant

needed to develop a trust that the mother would return to provide nourishment. The ego

strength of trust is necessary over the rest of the lifespan and would provide the basic

foundation for the rest of life. Having said this, no matter how good the parenting, an

infant will also become familiar with mistrust. The goal in each developmental stage is

to achieve a positive balance between the positive and negative outcome. Yet the

negative side is also necessary for growth. For instance, an adult who is overly trusting

and knows nothing of mistrust would not be able to operate in society. In the second

stage of autonomy versus shame and doubt, the toddler experiments with behavior and

learns of personal choice and control. Parallel to Freud's anal stage, the child is learning

how to make choices that can be considered by others as good or bad. If the child makes

a bad choice, then they feel shame and a sense of doubt in their own ability to gain

independence of choice. In the third stage of initiative versus guilt, children begin to

expand their boundaries through walking, running, and play. In line with Freud's phallic

stage, children initiate activities that are meant to test the boundaries of their field of

activity in relation to their family. In the fourth stage, school age children are challenged

with the ego task of industry versus inferiority. Similar to Freud's latency stage, children

learn to make things, produce objects, and garner an entry level ability to work with their

culture's technology. In each of these first four stages, Erikson works hard to

demonstrate that these are not just whimsical social patterns, but are ways in which the

epigenetic needs of a child influence and are influenced by society. The basic biological

needs are the same for all children in all cultures. In turn, the epigenetic argument for the

first four stages was easier to make than the later four stages. In the first part of life, children's bodies are changing dramatically, but how could Erikson show the embryological pattern of epigenesis for teenagers and adults?

Sometimes regarded as Erikson's most crucial stage, the fifth stage of identity versus role confusion becomes a primary task during adolescence. Leaving the Freudian map of psychosexuality, this stage reflected Erikson's ongoing interest in the developing strength of the ego. The teenager is facing dramatic physical change, strongly increased sexual urges, and the adult task of becoming proficient in some worthy skill. Erikson argues that they are much more concerned by how they are seen by others than how they may perceive themselves to be. The task of this stage lies in finding some integration between previous identities and capacities with a viable social role. Notably, Erikson does not talk about personal identity versus ego identity. Instead, he talks about simpler identifications from childhood versus the ego integration of those identifications with facets of biology, individual aptitudes, and social roles. His understanding of synthesis of the ego is now described as a synthesis of the different perspectives of the human – biological needs, psychological aptitude, and social models of living. And, as he has specified the developmental quality of ego identity synthesis, he has moved the notion of any type of synthesis to middle to late adolescence. He continues to use the word "sense" and implies that there is a perceived awareness or feeling of one's own ego assurance: "The sense of ego identity… is the accrued confidence that the inner sameness and continuity prepared in the past are matched by the sameness and continuity of one's meaning for others…" (Erikson, 1950, p. 261). The temptation for youths is to over-identify with a hero or a clique. With a panic of defining one's self, the adolescent may

rush to an all encompassing ideological allegiance. This is satisfactory in the short term, but eventually the youth feels a complete loss of identity in these ideological identities. Erikson notes that this is part of the romantic zeal that ignites teens when they over-identify in another person prior to having achieved any sense of ego identity integration. Important to Marcia's later identity statuses, Erikson first uses the term *moratorium* to describe this psychosocial stage, but he does so in referring to an ethical moratorium between children and adults (Erikson, 1950, p. 262). It is a commitment to ethical/political/religious causes without a more adult-like reflection. As we will see later in discussing Marcia's identity statuses, this ideological commitment, similar to Marcia's status of "identity foreclosure," is similar in description to how Erikson used the term "moratorium" and does not conceptually fit with Marcia's status distinctions, at least in this first description of the psychosocial stages (1950).

For the rest of his career, Erikson would see the danger of ideological attachments as a root cause in racism and other forms of aggression. He would use the term "pseudospeciation" to refer to this isolating tendency in which people seek to eliminate diverging identities – a natural but harmful reaction to insecurity in ego identity. In doing so, Erikson is strongly implying that the search for identity is a lifelong process for some that steers individual, political, and national aggression on many different levels. This will be further discussed in chapters four and seven.

The sixth stage of intimacy versus isolation takes up the task of risking the previous identity achievement by fusing one's identity with another. A natural biological need, the epigenetic adult seeks a stable companion for eventually raising offspring. Yet, some adults fear that they are not yet established enough to risk their identity and avoid

intimate relationships resulting in isolation, which may also lead to self-absorption and narcissism. Sexuality changes from an "identity-searching kind" to a "true genitality" which is characterized by reciprocity and mutuality (Erikson, 1950, p. 264).

The seventh stage of generativity versus stagnation is the longest. Incorporating much of adulthood, Erikson specifically speaks of this as an "evolutionary development" in which the epigenetic adult is naturally the caretaker and teacher of the younger generation (Erikson, 1950, p. 266). Erik and Joan's motivation in this chapter is not to describe how dependent children are upon adults. Instead, they emphasize that adults actually *need* to care for the young. They are dependent upon children in their own developmental needs which crave a sense of generativity during this time in life. If this is not able to be satisfied through raising children, then adults may take up mentoring or creative projects which sustain and nurture environmental factors for the next generation. As with each stage, this stage is dependent upon the successful completion of a positive balance in each of the previous stages. For instance, generativity is much more difficult if an individual is in an identity crisis or has not been able to achieve some level of intimacy.

The last stage of integrity versus despair is a reflective period for older adults to review their life and to either see it as well chosen and satisfactory, or to feel significant regret resulting in a sense of despair. Erik and Joan conjectured that when older adults lose social utility by no longer being generative or productive, then they naturally take a reminiscent step back and access their life's choices. A positive balance in this stage reflects an ego integrity in which the end of life is acceptable and not feared.

Once the Eriksons presented this life cycle, it seemed to take a life of its own.

People started to seize upon its mechanical implications and started estimating exact ages

for each transition. There also seemed to be a hopelessness if one of the earlier tasks was

not achieved on time or at all. Erikson adds a footnote at the end of the chapter

cautioning readers to see the fluidity and interdependence of the stages. Some of the

balances may become unraveled later in life and would need to be reworked again. In

fact the footnote is quite foreboding to Marcia's later work in establishing identity

statuses:

> Among [the misuses of the chart] is the assumption that the sense of trust (and all
> the other "positive" senses postulated) is an *achievement*, secured once and for all at a
> given state. In fact, some writers are so intent on making an *achievement scale* out of
> these stages that they blithely omit all the "negative" senses (basic mistrust, etc.) which
> are and remain the dynamic counterpart of the "positive" ones throughout life. (Erikson,
> 1950, pp. 273-274)

In that Marcia's statuses are quite clearly an "achievement scale" including the explicit

status of identity achievement, it seems this is against Erikson's purpose of the

psychosocial stages. Erikson would certainly not have preferred the term "achievement"

because of its implication of finality, and to be fair to Marcia, he would later emphasize

that it was something that could certainly become unraveled.

If we take seriously Erikson's wish to avoid a rigid mechanical stage model, then

how do we understand the sequencing of the stages? One of the most important

comments in this original chapter that is often forgotten is Erikson's description of how

each previous ego strength of an earlier stage becomes necessarily vulnerable in the next

stage (1950). In discussing intimacy versus isolation, Erikson says, "The strength

acquired at any stage is tested by the necessity to transcend it in such a way that the

individual can take chances in the next stage with what was most vulnerably precious in

the previous one" (Erikson, 1950, p. 263). In an interconnecting way, the psychosocial stage of identity puts the just acquired strength of industry at risk. Instead of acquiring productive skills, the focus on identity seems decidedly nonproductive. Think of the stereotype of youth in modern society: putting so much effort into appearance, seemingly wasting time with nonproductive activities, and often falling away from attention to scholastic skills. While this may not be the case for some adolescents, observers can agree that identity tensions and struggles are likely to stress previously achieved abilities of industry. In some cases, ideological attachments are focused on very narrow skill sets, such as skater groups, gamers, etc. In these examples, industry is so narrowly focused that it indeed jeopardizes the youth's ability to learn a much larger set of skills.

After one forms a sense of ego identity, the young adult then moves on to risk the strength by becoming intimate with another person. With the possibilities of enmeshment and fusion, the identity is certainly at risk. It stands to reason, then, that one has not fully garnered the strength of identity until well into the psychosocial stage of intimacy. In this overlapping sequencing, we begin to see how each part of the stages is closely related to its sequential stage and founded upon all of the previous stages. Joan would eventually make a large weaving of the stages with interlocking threaded colors that dominated certain diagonal boxes and yet are part of the whole cycle of life. For example, the issue of trust vs. mistrust is always with the individual. Further, notions of self as the earliest forms of identity are with the infant who learns object relations by recognizing that the mother is different from their own person. Erik and Joan would often refer to this weaving as a prime example of the inherent fluidity in the stages. The primary points are a) that identity is immediately related to the psychosocial stages of

industry and intimacy, and b) that the mechanical appearance of the chart of psychosocial stages easily leads readers to miss the fluidity of a stage, like identity, throughout the lifespan.

Developing Ego Identity: Erikson after 1950

If Erikson had been a painter, he would have avoided the precision that is necessary of the photographic like style of the genre of art called *realism*. Instead, he was an *impressionist*. His terms were never painted with a sharp line, and any notion of a precise delineation of identity would forever trouble his more anxious readers. As Erikson was clearly breaking away from traditional psychoanalysis, he earned a friend in fellow analyst, David Rapaport. Rapaport encouraged Erikson to sharpen the definition of his terms, and would help interweave Erikson's new ideas with the traditional school of psychoanalysis (Friedman, 1998, p. 287). In 1959, Erikson was invited to republish three earlier articles as one volume of the journal *Psychological Issues*. Titling all three articles, "Identity and the Life Cycle," Erikson reworked the original essays to try to bring them into a clearer definition of how identity was constructed and how it fit into the developing person. Rapaport introduced the work with an essay on the history of psychoanalytic ego psychology. With sharp precision, Rapaport was able to connect the dots - no matter how far apart – between Freud, Hartmann, and Erikson's work on the ego. Rapaport describes the work of Hartmann's adaptation theory with a specific direction towards "reality relations" (Erikson, 1980, p. 11). Hartmann had pointed to the real role of the ego in social relationships but had provided no theory for how this occurs. Rapaport focuses on the epigenetic quality of Erikson's model of the ego and how he provided a framework to understand the role of social reality. Accordingly, when

Erikson describes the "sequence of [stages] of ego epigenesis" he thus "particularizes

Hartmann's concept of autonomous ego development, which generalized Freud's

conception of the development of anxiety" (Erikson, 1980, p. 11). However, this was

quite a leap in deduction. Whereas Hartmann and Freud worked within the traditional

intrapsychic framework of the mind (id, ego superego), Erikson spent his time not in the

inner tension of the psyche between these compartments but in the outer tension and

confluence of the ego with external factors. Rapaport described complimentary and

overlapping components to Hartmann and Erikson in that both attempted to explain the

"genetically social character of the human individual… at each phases…of epigenesis"

(Erikson, 1980, p. 11). The essay was a friendly overture that strained to find a

theoretical bridge between Erikson and the field of psychoanalysis. Importantly,

Rapaport did cite a weakness inherent in Erikson's model:

> Erikson's theory (like much of Freud's) ranges over phenomenological, specifically clinical psychoanalytic and general psychoanalytic-psychological propositions, without systematically differentiating between them. Correspondingly, the conceptual status of this theory's terms is so far unclear. (Erikson, 1980, p. 11)

Erikson agrees and says that this applies most of all to his writings around the term *ego*

identity. But his three essays end up only expanding the notion of identity rather than

narrowing its scope. In the third essay, "The Problem of Ego Identity," Erikson writes in

true Eriksonian fashion:

> I can attempt to make the subject matter of identity more explicit only by approaching it from a variety of angles – biographic, pathographic, and theoretical; and by letting the term "identity" speak for itself in a number of connotations. At one time, then, it will appear to refer to a conscious *sense of individual identity*; at another to an unconscious striving for a *continuity of personal character*; at a third, as a criterion for the silent doings of *ego synthesis*; and, finally, as a maintenance of an inner *solidarity* with a group's ideals and identity. In some respects the term will appear to be colloquial and naïve; in others, vaguely related to existing concepts in psychoanalysis and sociology. If, after an attempt at clarifying this relation, the term itself still retains some ambiguity, it will, so I hope, nevertheless have helped to delineate a significant problem, and a necessary point of view (Erikson, 1980, p. 109-110; originally published 1956).

The conceptual boundaries of "identity" certainly do retain ambiguity after studying this essay; yet, it is one of Erikson's most important writings in identity.

He divides the chapter into three perspectives on identity: biographical, pathological, and social. The biographic description of ego identity is related to the epigenetic need of an adolescent to transition from a child to an adult. Related to Freud's latency period, Erikson prefers to use the term *psychosocial moratoria* to describe the institutionalized period in which a society leaves open to a youth to achieve a "lasting pattern of 'inner identity'" to reach completion (Erikson, 1980, p. 119). In psychoanalytic terms, a child practices *identifications* through *introjection* and *projection*. Achieving some early satisfactory mutuality with the parent, the child both takes on and projects outward particular body images, vocational roles, and family roles, which all have limited usefulness in that they are disassociated identifications and are easily uncoupled from the child with a new experience. Yet, as the child grows and needs to become a productive member of society, these identifications no longer work. "*Identity formation* begins where the usefulness of multiple identifications ends" (Erikson, 1980, p. 122). Adolescents selectively reject some identifications while incorporating others, eventually being absorbed into a "new configuration" of identity (Erikson, 1980, p. 122).

Erikson is careful to point out that while the identity crisis does occur during adolescence, identity formation is a much larger process that began before and continues after adolescence. He speaks to the notion of an identity process beginning before adolescence with the earliest example of the baby who exchanges a smile with his or her mother – a first step in knowing that one is separate from others. However, Erikson does

not speak to the identity formation that continues throughout adulthood other than in adult pathological cases which reactivate earlier crises.

Importantly, Erikson asks himself and the reader, "Is the sense of identity conscious?" (Erikson, 1980, p. 127). He argues that the adolescent who is anxiously concerned with their presentation to their peers is certainly conscious of their struggle on its face value. At the same time, there is a preconscious sense of increasing identity that is coupled with an increasing sense of psychological well-being. This can come into and out of consciousness at times. This preconscious process of identity formation is able to be perceived through observable behavior, but there is also an unconscious process (the epigenetic process) that can only be studied through psychological tests and probing psychoanalysis. Erikson is referring here to his psychosocial stages and the unconscious workings of the ego in a social environment. He lays out a new chart (see figure C below) that contains the diagonal stages but also includes prior forms of identity (vertical axis – column 5), as well as the arising conflicts and reoccurring tensions of each stage (horizontal axis – row 5). What is especially interesting in this chart is the usage of developmental language in identity. The third and fourth psychosocial stages include the language of "identification" as a positive and functional aspect of the ego's emergent identity. The dystonic (or negative) aspect countered to the school age child is an "identity foreclosure." This is Erikson's first usage of the term "foreclosure" and he does not pick up on it again in this essay. Marcia's developmental status language (identity diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium, and achievement) are all terms from Erikson's writings and conceptual style, yet Erikson never describes any individual developmental statuses. As we later consider Marcia's identity statuses, the presumption that identity

diffusion is a beginning point for identity seems questionable. In the chart below, Erikson implies that identity foreclosure is a dystonic precursor to either identity formation or identity diffusion (noting that Erikson is sharply critical of using the term "identity achievement"). The actual starting point for identity in adolescence, according to Erikson, is a resource of multiple *identifications* that does not include a notion of apathy and lack of interest as Marcia develops in his status of identity *diffusion*.

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.
I. INFANCY	Trust vs. Mistrust				Unipolarity vs. Premature Self-Differentation			
II. EARLY CHILDHOOD		Autonomy vs. Shame, Doubt			Bipolarity vs. Autism			
III. PLAY AGE			Initiative vs. Guilt		Play Identification vs. (oedipal) Fantasy Identities			
IV. SCHOOL AGE				Industry vs. Inferiority	Work Identification vs. Identity Foreclosure			
V. ADOLESCENCE	Time Perspective vs. Time Diffusion	Self-Certainty vs. Identity Consciousness	Role Experimentation vs. Negative Identity	Anticipation of Achievement vs. Work Paralysis	Identity vs. Identity Diffusion	Sexual Identity vs. Bisexual Diffusion	Leadership Polarization vs. Authority Diffusion	Ideological Polarization vs. Diffusion of Ideals
VI. YOUNG ADULT					Solidarity vs. Social Isolation	Intimacy vs. Isolation		
VII. ADULTHOOD							Generativity vs. Self-Absorption	
VIII. MATURE AGE								Integrity vs. Disgust, Despair

Figure C. Psychosocial stage model with focus on identity
From *Identity and the Life Cycle* (Erikson, 1980, p. 129)

Erikson takes up pathological aspects of identity in the next section. Most of his descriptions follow the horizontal axis in the above chart. Again, he seems to broaden the understanding of a term – this time 'identity diffusion' - to incorporate many different

aspects of the psychosocial stages. Most importantly for the purpose of this dissertation,

Erikson describes a phenomenon he calls "identity resistance" (Erikson, 1980, p. 145).

This is an unconscious process in which patients protect their own possibly weak identity

from those who they fear may carelessly probe into their psyche. What is interesting in

this description is how Erikson implies that a patient may try to express/defend one

identity while actually trying to protect and keep out others from a truer inner identity. In

chapter four, I will discuss the impact of social approval identities, especially religious

identity, and how people may work with an implicit inner identity while promoting

outwardly and explicitly a slightly or significantly varied identity. Identity resistance

seems that it may fluctuate per identity domain. In chapter four, religious identity

salience is measured implicitly and explicitly through a scale that also allows other

domains of identity to be expressed in the same fashion. Thus, the results may be able to

point to this fluctuating level of resistance in which people are more open about some

identity domains than others. To illustrate a few examples, one may consider that there

are differing levels of sensitivity in different identity domains. For instance, a sexual

identity may likely be expressed socially and explicitly in significantly different ways

than how the person may "secretly" know themselves. Likewise, a person may socially

express a religious identity that garners more social approval than what actually may be

their own working religious ego synthesis. This identity resistance may be conscious or

subconscious depending (Erikson uses the term "preconscious") on the level of

resistance.

Erikson concludes his essay with a discussion of social identity. Beginning with a

consideration of the term "self," Erikson offers yet another definition of identity: "In the

paper, we are concerned with the *genetic continuity* of such a self-representation – a continuity which much lastly be ascribed by the work of the ego" (Erikson, 1980, p. 159). Erikson says that formation and maintenance of a self-representation (and not just an object-representation) can only be done in the ego. Erikson works hard with his terms in this section. He tries to distinguish between ego identity and Freud's notion of an ego ideal. The ego identity is the "actually attained but forever-to-be-revised sense of the reality of the self within social reality," and the ego ideal is the "to-be-strived-for but forever-not-quite-attainable ideal goals for the self" (Erikson, 1980, p. 160). Between the "self" and the "ego," Erikson prefers to keep the "ego" as subject and the self as "object." Here, the ego is the organizing core of an individual in which it must deal with the ever changing self. Operating on two levels, "identity formation" is both an aspect of gaining a continuity of the "self" as well as the "ego" (Erikson, 1980, p. 161). This again implies a more conscious part to identity and a less conscious part; yet, Erikson does not offer a clear description of how identity formation operates in the inner ego versus the notion of self.

How does cognitive science fit into his model of ego identity? Neuroscience had a significant beginning by the time Erikson wrote this essay (1956), and psychologists had even then begun mapping out the modular cognitive regions of the brain. Erikson auspiciously argues in this section of the essay that the field of psychoanalysis was practicing "pseudo biology" especially in its allegiance to seeing the tripartite psyche operating outside of any social environment. He says that this is "senseless" and "threatens to isolate psychoanalytic theory from the rich ethological and ecological findings of modern biology" (Erikson, 1980, pp. 161-162). Erikson could not have been

aware of what would occur in the massive findings of neurology and cognitive psychology in the last two decades, yet he correctly predicted that psychoanalysis was driving itself out of academia by not incorporating the findings of other scientific fields. Erikson never was able to reap the benefits of modern scientific knowledge of the modularity of the brain, and specifically in the field of autobiographical memory. Yet, he laid a foundation that understood that the brain/mind could only be understood in the interactive social ethos of the human being. Chapter 2 will describe multidisciplinary models emerging in the study of identity and autobiographical memory.

Erikson would later write several psychobiographical works that examined the identity struggles of Luther, Gandhi, and Jefferson to name a few. But he never moved much further in clarifying his conceptual field of ego identity in these later works. His 1968 publication of *Identity: Youth and Crisis* was a rambling collection of previous essays that Erikson pushed through quickly so he could move on to his psychobiography of Gandhi (Friedman, 1999, p. 350). Yet, there are three developments in it worth noting. First, Erikson emphasizes the "sense" of inner identity in which a person "must *feel* a progressive continuity" between what a person has "come to be" from childhood and what the person "promises to become in the anticipated future" (Erikson, 1968, p. 87; noted in Friedman, 1999, p. 351). In focusing on a feeling of identity, Erikson more clearly emphasizes the phenomenologically subjective experience of identity formation. Secondly, Erikson links identity development with historical change in America. In that the 1960's were a time of turbulent change, the nation as a whole was more characterized by ideological commitments. Such turbulent changes in an individual parallel what may happen on a macro level for society.

Finally, Erikson begins to use the "I" as the developmental goal of identity formation (Loevinger). In a new essay titled "Theoretical Interlude," Erikson takes up a discussion of the "I" saying that the "I" is the integrated conscious person in the subjective experience which is able to have a reasonably coherent self, despite the many different socially (work, home, friends, etc.) and biologically (drowsy, sick, sexual, etc.) influenced states in which our many selves operate (Erikson, 1968, p. 217). Erikson actually rejects the term "ego identity" in preference of "self-identity" since the "I" is only conscious and aware of its "selves" (always ambiguous, he reuses the term "ego identity" just a few pages later). In the debate over consciousness, Erikson firmly says that the "I" is explicitly conscious, and the selves are preconscious with the ego being completely unconscious. This is interesting, but also very confusing in relation to his earlier and later writings on identity. The implication is that the completion of identity formation is the "I" – a feeling of a coherent subjective personhood in which consciousness of this feeling is essential to attaining it. The outcome of such an "I" is a mutuality between other people that allows one to remain centered while truly experiencing another person.

For the last three decades of his career, Erikson's language was decidedly more spiritual and philosophical than in earlier writings. In his "Theoretical Interlude" essay, Erikson takes yet another step into the frontier by saying that the "I" is a meaning-*full* statement of "I *am* life" which can only have a counter player in a deity who is the giver of life. In other words, the "I" allows for a mutual and spiritual relationship with a deity that is not possible if the coherent and conscious "I" is not yet formed (Erikson, 1968, p. 220-221). Erikson draws upon examples in Hinduism and Judaism in which the image of

the God is seen on or through another person and through ourselves. He later expands this in his essay, "The Galilean Sayings and the Sense of 'I'" in which he almost entirely leaves the discussion of identity in favor of the "I" in relationship to a divine Other (Erikson, 1981). There is a lot to make of this spiritualized "I" in a dissertation on religious identity development. However, Erikson's spiritualized "I" also has limiting parameters. He is essentially making a theological claim that requires a religious belief in which someone cannot deeply know a supernatural deity unless they know themselves. However, surely there are theologians that may counter argue that a person cannot know themselves without first knowing the deity, or that knowledge of the self is entirely beyond the interest of the religious doctrines. The methodological approach of this dissertation is to step outside of religious beliefs and not advocate any particular style of religiosity. For those who are non-religious, can they not experience the highest level of "I" and the benefit of mutuality without a supernatural belief system? Erikson's essay implies that spirituality is a necessary ingredient in identity formation.

Despite the particularized nature of this theological/psychological framework, it offers some powerful insight to those who do integrate religion and identity. Many people may experience religious identity integration/formation as a spiritual experience that opens them up to a highly transcendent aspect of experience. Further, it may be that mystical and transcendent experiences actually help to engage the process of identity formation, of becoming the "I." Religion may not be a necessary ingredient in identity integration, but it seems to be a powerful resource common in many cultures that is often related to becoming the "I."

In the later part of his life, Erikson's primary focus was in ethics and spirituality. During his time at Harvard, he seems to have read most of the writings of William James, another scholar who had moved from being a biologist, to a psychologist, and finally to a philosopher. Erikson befriended the theologian Paul Tillich with whom he shared existential and ethical interests. He wrote on the religious figures of Luther, Gandhi, and on the religiosity of Jefferson. In his 1964 book, *Insight and Responsibility*, Erikson detailed specific ego virtues for each psychosocial stage. Presenting a rather utopian version of each stage, Erikson describes "fidelity" as the ego-quality of the psychosocial stage of identity. In fidelity, Erikson argues that one is able to remain loyal despite the "inevitable contradiction of value systems" (Erikson, 1964, p. 125). Of course, fidelity is similar to some usages of "faithfulness" – a connection that Erikson relishes. Remaining faithful (having fidelity) is important in the next stage of intimacy, as well as in realizing some stable commitment to an identity. In the introduction to the dissertation, I stated that the specific area of religious identity may be one of the most important processes in Erikson's psychosocial model, as well as drawing even larger implications in current cultural conflicts. Erikson locates fidelity in the center of his model of psychosocial development, rooted in the central concept of identity formation. He surrounds it with descriptions of ethical goals that are consistently connected with spirituality. To realize one's "I" and the faithful quality of fidelity needed for intimacy and generativity, one must find a resource that gives a feeling of life (1968). And that is often found by individuals in religion.

Why such a prominent place for religion? We could psychoanalyze Erikson and suggest that he elevated religion because Freud did not. In his effort to separate himself

from Freud's pathological model of development, one might claim that Erikson wanted to look at religion positively because Freud has taken such a negative view of religion. But his prominent role for religion may have been more than just wanting to demarcate his own model's uniqueness. Religion has much to offer in our everyday psychosocial world. Religious institutions are very artistic and imaginative. They are full of rituals. And at their best, they promote ethical mutuality among all people. If we move from the micro scale of an individual to the macro scale of a cultural institution, one could see that once religion helps form identity, it then allows the religious person to have a much deeper intimacy (stage six) with others in their culture. These may be some of the components that drew Erikson towards religion.

In their last decade, Erik and Joan focused their attention upon the last stage of the model, integrity versus despair. Both had achieved the "I," yet they had struggled with intimacy and generativity at times as is normal in aging adults. In Erik's reading of Martin Luther he saw a prolonged identity crisis that was existentially rooted (Erikson, 1958). And, it is easy for most readers of Erikson's biography to see the same struggle with the "I" throughout his life. If Erikson's own lifespan can be considered to be some normative model, one may see that the focus of identity changes in a systematic way through the lifespan. Erikson suffered from an identity crisis of family of origin in his teens to 30's, a vocational crisis in his 30's to 50's as he splintered from psychoanalysis, and an existential/spiritual crisis in his last decades of life. His writings on identity struggles shifted from vocational and familial towards existential in the same period. "Crisis" may overstate the immediacy of these identity processes. A better term may be "focus," in that the continually re-working of identity changes its focus in somewhat

systematic ways through the lifespan. In the fourth chapter, I will explore the notion that

identity crises are not all the same, and that they themselves may have a developmental

pattern.

In older age, Erik and Joan saw that the process of aging itself unraveled many of

the earlier tasks by losing levels of productivity and autonomy. Yet, Joan would write

that in the last stages of life, the "I" truly is transcendent from the self, and she implies

that the "I" is not so bothered with needing to keep all the different selves together

(Erikson, 1997). This transcendence takes up implications of ego/identity boundaries and

defense of these boundaries. It means that one is willing to now be vulnerable to others.

In psychosocial terms with intimacy, generativity, and integrity, there comes a willing

vulnerability to the "I."[6] We could say that vulnerability (rooted in the coherent and

competent "I") is in ethical tension to defensiveness (from an insecure sense of identity).

This highlights the fundamental difference between Freud's and Erikson's developmental

models. Freud's model was based on defense mechanisms trying to cover up raw

aggression and Erikson's model was founded on the strength of the person to move

beyond defensiveness and aggression towards compassion, trust and vulnerability. From

Joan's insights, we may reason that religious identity at the end of life may be coupled

with this vulnerability and transcendence of the "I." The uniqueness of the domain of

religion in identity may lie in its ability to aid and facilitate capacities for vulnerability

(transcendence) as early as young adulthood. Healthy identity formation allows one to

feel secure and stable. Beyond the simpler religious commitments of adolescence,

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[6] Interpreted in this fashion, the vulnerability of a coherent identity/self is necessary for the second half of life. As a foundation to adult morality and the ability to treat others in selfless ways, one can more clearly see how identity formation is a gateway (or ethical "moratorium" as Erikson called it) in moral development.

religion provides this resource of identity transcendence for the emerging adults who

must make themselves vulnerable to life mates (intimacy), self-sacrificing care

(generativity), and the potential loss of the self (integrity in older age). Erikson may have

used many synonyms of identity as he continually re-worked his relationship with his

parents, Joan, his children, and his work. But both he and Joan would likely have agreed

that the final synonym should be the simple pronoun, *ich*, "I," in which the self

transcends the many other categories.

CHAPTER TWO
A Multidimensional Approach to Identity

If we take Erikson's multimethod model of incorporating the findings of several applicable fields of knowledge (which is now dated by almost 60 years), then we need an updating on identity for the early 21st century that would include the fields of cognitive psychology (and the closely associated field of neuropsychology), narrative theory (which really doesn't have one academic department), and evolutionary psychology (spanning philosophy and psychology departments). The updating would also need to include complexified theories of self (including domains of identity) and the qualitative critique of scientific presumptions. It is not the purpose or intention in this chapter to provide an exhaustive coverage of these different areas, but it will be the goal to glean the primary findings and insights from each.

A Biology of Identity

The terms "identity" and "self" are favored by qualitative researchers in the fields of ethnography, anthropology, literature and film studies, religious studies, and many others mostly located in the humanities. In general, the scholars in these areas strongly resist any mechanical dissection, biological reduction, or measurement of the self. Such efforts are seen as regressions to 19th century naturalist attempts to reduce everything to what can be seen on a laboratory table – a reductionist attempt to find the "essence" of

any thing. These attempts also completely ignore the postmodern critique in which "scientists" bring in their own various agendas to form new artificial constructions between researchers and subjects that then purport to be truth or reality. This is a valid critique and empirically oriented researchers should try to make every attempt possible to see how their own power and methodology may include presumptions and agendas. But to completely lop off the scientific method from certain fields of study may reveal just as much of an agenda by those in the humanities. Biology has a lot to say about the "I." Even the cherished terms "identity" and "self" can be studied from neuropsychological bases.

A starting point for the biological basis of identity is in describing it as an expression of memories storied in the brain. If I state who I am, I must recall my previous experiences and impressions to do so.[7] There are two primary ways of studying memory in cognitive science. Neuropsychologists speak of memory "systems" with an emphasis on the specific modular locations and regional functions of different forms of memory. Cognitive psychologists, generally, look at memory "processing" and the similar functional characteristics that may span across the boundaries of different neural systems (Foster and Jelicic, 1999). I will begin by looking at the neural modularity of the brain.

Scientists began to discover modular neurological functions for regions of the brain through studying traumatic brain injuries in patients. In memory studies, the famous case of patient HM provided researchers with valuable insight into neurological

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[7] This is not to imply that identity is simply the construction of memory. There are other parts to identities than just our remembered pasts. These include beliefs about our anticipated selves in the future, patterned subconscious methods of interpreting and constructing identity, social contexts that influence types of identity presented, and individual circumstances that affect identity retrieval such as recency effects or mood states.

roles in memory processing. Suffering from seizures, doctors removed his medial

temporal lobes and rendered useless his hippocampus and amygdala (Scoville and

Milner, 1957). He then suffered from anterograde amnesia in which he could not convert

short term memories into long term episodic memories. However, he was still able to

learn new skills through converting short term working memory into long term

procedural memory (Hilts, 1995). Other unfortunate patients added to this knowledge

including those who suffered from retrograde amnesia and could form new memories (the

more popular form in Hollywood), but were not able to recall anything prior to a trauma

or surgery. HM and others showed an important role in the hippocampus in that is was

necessary to memory processes in which explicit and conscious recall were required.

Positron emission tomography (PET) beginning in the 1970's and functional

magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in the 1990's dramatically opened up the depth of

research and knowledge in memory. In general, it is posited that the cerebellum

(phylogenetically oldest part of the brain, directly attached to brain stem) is responsible

for implicit and procedural memory. The amygdala and hippocampus are responsible for

encoding and processing declarative (explicit, conscious) memories of emotional and

factual events. When an experience happens, neurochemical firing enters the

hippocampus where it is encoded and then sent out to other parts of the brain. And, in

general, it is believed that long term memories are stored in the various portions of the

cortex, with the temporal cortex considered to be the most likely storage location. Yet,

there are also exceptions to these broad claims, and the more that memory is researched,

the more neurological complexity is revealed. We now know specifically that the small

basolateral complex of the amygdala (BLA) plays an important role in consolidating

different forms or aspects of memory that have been processed in other regions of the

brain (McGaugh, 2007). Further, the *types* of memories affect the neural functioning.

For instance, only explicit conscious memories, and not memory feelings of familiarity

(even if correct), are selectively retrieved though the hippocampus (Eldridge, Knowlton,

Furmanski, et.al., 2000). The amygdala is crucial in the encoding and consolidation

processes of explicit emotional memories (Hamann, 2001). Most fMRI studies of

episodic memory show retrieval activation in the prefrontal cortex and often in the

parietal regions. Some evidence points to the prefrontal cortex as significant in encoding

for episodic memories as well (Ranganath and Knight, 2002). And the complexity

continues: for example, the left inferior prefrontal cortex plays an important role in

encoding "deep" or "elaborative" processing (Schacter, 1996, p. 55).

Where is identity in all of this? Tulving (1985) studied a patient who suffered a

traumatic brain injury and lost the ability to remember any (and only) personally

experienced events. With anterograde amnesia, he could not remember any new

autobiographical events, and yet he could learn new factual information and encode that

short term memory into long term memory (unlike HM). In other words, the patient

could be told of an episode that happened to the patient and encode that memory for long

term, but he could not do so from his own experience of the episode. Although Tulving

was not able to draw out specific neurobiological bases from this, he did see that

autobiographical memory as personal episodic memory can be specifically affected by an

injury while leaving intact all other forms of memory. Yet, this may only be an encoding

injury for personal experiences and not a retrieval/storage injury. The complexity of the

process in which individuals filter and associate various personal experiences, encode and

selectively consolidate them into long term memories, and then selectively retrieve them in certain contexts for various motivations to express notions of the narrated self likely means that neuropsychologists will find it quite challenging to map out one specific neurochemical processing vehicle in the brain that is responsible for identity construction (Squire, 1995). This does not mean that identity does not have neurological foundations; it means that autobiographical retrieval (and the construction of identity) is extremely complex and involves multiple memory systems responsible for the different components (encoding, modifying, and retrieving) of autobiographical memory.

Autobiographical memory and the role of implicit memory

In general, researchers refer to autobiographical memories as a form of declarative memory (vs. procedural memory) which are episodic (vs. semantic) and explicit (vs. implicit). Further, autobiographical memory is understood as part of a long term memory system (vs. short term working memory and sensory memory systems). Within this understanding, autobiographical memory is part of identity but not its entirety. In fact, implicit memory is gaining more attention as researchers investigate memories of experiences that are not consciously remembered but are influential on autobiographical memories. Implicit memory (sometimes called automatic memory) is formed when experiences are encoded, stored, but not consciously retrieved. They are retrieved unconsciously when they are associated with a current experience. They act in foundational ways by forming types of beliefs that are then consequential to the consolidation and connections of retrieved autobiographic memory. Research studies have examined how an experience is not consciously remembered and yet it is still stored

in the brain and influences recall. Banaji and Bhaskar (2000) demonstrated that previous experiences are implicitly remembered and can become beliefs, such as in the social beliefs expressed through stereotyping, racism, and sexism.

Knowing and *awareness* of experiences through long term memories contrast with the unconscious *beliefs* that are formed through implicit memories (Eichenbaum and Bodkin, 2000). Interestingly, William James made some similar distinctions over a century ago. In his chapter on memory, he distinguished between *primary memory* (what we would today call short term working memory) and *memory proper* which is "the knowledge of a former state of mind after it has already once dropped from consciousness; or rather it is the knowledge of an event, or fact, of which meantime we have not been thinking, with the additional consciousness that we have thought or experienced it before" (James, 1890, p. 648). James's long term "memory proper" stood in contrast to his chapter on habits, which emanate, he reasoned, out of striated connections in the brain that eventually form automatic processing, thereby shaping and expressing beliefs. Noting that James called long term explicit memory "knowledge," it is not a substantial leap to see that the "habits" are similar to what we might call implicit memory today.

These beliefs from implicit memories may become so influential in memory retrieval that the consolidation and construction of a memory becomes an entirely new episodic memory which may misrepresent the actual experience. Researchers have studied the variables in implicit memory formation through suggestibility experiments and have explained that an entirely false memory (episodic) may be produced from a series of associations of other implicit memories (i.e., Loftus and Pickrell, 1995). Such

memories illustrate the versatility of autobiographical memory. There is widespread

agreement among researchers that an individual's consciously expressed autobiographical

memory has a very fluid nature. People recall experiences and their own personality

characteristics differently in different circumstances. Eakin writes about this as a positive

thing in which the self is always necessarily changing; the irony is that accurate episodic

memories may actually encumber the "project" of autobiography which is to "square with

the needs and requirements of the self we have become in any present" (2000, p. 293).

James described the underworking of identity as a "stream of thought" that gives:

> a sense of continuity, the sense of the parts being inwardly connected and belonging
> together because they are parts of the common whole, the consciousness remains sensibly
> continuous and one. What now is the common whole? The natural name for it is *myself,*
> *I,* or *me*" (James, 1890, p. 238; Eakin, 2000, p. 294).

One's identity needs to have a fluid nature in order to take in and respond to new

situations. Indeed, the role of implicit memories/beliefs affecting autobiographical recall

seems to have an adaptive function in social and personal well-being. Further, this

encoding of implicit memories that then influence recall of autobiographical memory

does seem to fit with Erikson's theory of a subconscious process for the ego as it

synthesizes various experiences. Yet, there are many more components to this

synthesizing. The plasticity of autobiographical memory is shaped by overlapping

conceptual areas of implicit memory, social construction and influence, personal

schemata (anticipated selves, implicit theories), and the role of narrative.

The social construction of autobiographical memory

Autobiographical memory is fundamentally characterized as a constructive

process that belies the more static and factual nature of the term "retrieval." One

component to this adaptable memory is the social role in its construction. In an article

titled "The social construction of self-knowledge," Kenneth Gergen (1977) outlined the

fundamental dialectical role of society and social discourse in constructing how each

person understands their own self. Gergen well represents the postmodern critique of

science as he later calls the mind a "social myth" and the "'truth' about mental life is

rendered curious" as constructionist theory deconstructs psychology (1985, p. 271). He

would later say about autobiographical memory: "To report on one's memories is not so

much a matter of consulting mental images as it is engaging in a sanctioned form of

telling" (Gergen, 1994, p. 90; Eakin, 2000, p. 295). While sometimes overstating his

theory, Gergen helped bring the importance of society into the study of autobiographical

memory. Gergen's conceptualization of autobiographical memory was explicitly a

conscious one, full of narrative that is necessarily expressed in relationship with others;

thus, he gives little credence to implicit and unconscious neurological processes that are

equally important. Gergen's emphasis was not on the conscious and unconscious divide,

but on the critique that most people (including cognitive neuroscientists) tend to believe

that their identity is constructed autonomously outside of the influence of others. One

could argue that we are generally unaware of this significant role that our cultural and

social environments have on how we understand ourselves. The social construction of

our identity and the role of implicit memories/beliefs are both "under the radar" as we go

about constructing memories of the self.

Ontogenetic construction of autobiographical memory

One of the ways in which social construction overlaps implicit patterns of

autobiographical memory is in the social construction of autobiographical memory by

children. In the 1980s, Katherine Nelson shifted the study of memory in children away

from structural and content oriented approaches towards a functional approach in which

she theorized that children used their memories in important ways to achieve different

goals (1986; Nelson and Gruendel, 1981; reviewed in Fivush and Vasudeva, 2002). In

this shift, scholars began to see the functional importance of social interaction in forming

autobiographical memories. Robyn Fivush has extensively described the ontogenetic

development of autobiographical memory by examining the social construction of

narratives in childhood. Her model of development does not see autobiographical

identity as an autonomous entity inside the mind but, instead, as fundamentally social in

its construction (Nelson and Fivush, 2004). In an earlier article, Fivush (1991) studied

six pairs of mothers and children to see if the ways in which mothers structured narratives

about experiences with their children later influenced the way the child would express

their autobiographical memory. She found that the children of mothers who narrated

temporally complex and informationally dense stories with 2 ½-year-olds would be able

to recount more temporally dense narratives a year later. This was not related to the

quantitative amount of information, but instead it related to the descriptive quality of the

information. The results point to a process in which children learn how to construct and

narrate their own autobiographical memory through the quality and patterns of social

interaction. In another study, Fivush describes the process of autobiographical memory

construction in which a child "internalizes…the culturally available narrative forms for

recounting and for representing past experiences," a process that helps children begin the

journey of narrating and organizing their own life story (Fivush, 1994, p. 115; Eakin,

2000).

Despite the presumption that children have poor memory, Fivush and others have found that children are quite skilled in recalling specific episodic memories after long periods. She opens one review with this example:

> A mother once reported to me that as she and her 34-month-old daughter were driving past an empty field, her daughter called out, "pumpkins, pumpkins!" Indeed, this was the field where they had gotten their Halloween pumpkin 8 months previously, and they had not driven past there since. The mother was startled that her daughter was able to recall the event after such a long delay (Fivush, 1997, p. 139).

Children are able to recognize themselves in a mirror between the ages of 18 to 20 months, an event that some researchers theorize is a beginning to the 'I' in which a sense of self begins to emerge (Howe and Courage, 1993; Fivush and Schwarzmueller, 1998). Beginning usually around 20 months, children begin to refer to their own past and start the lifelong process of constructing autobiographical memory. In a study on childhood experiences of trauma and nontraumatic events, Fivush found that recall (interestingly similar ability for both types of events) paralleled verbal development in which memories between 18 months and 2.5-3 years are recalled in a fragmentary fashion and those experienced after 3 years may be retained for long term and are generally coherent (Fivush, 1998). The acquisition of language allows children to construct and compare their experiences in social settings.   This social sharing provides the context in which children are able to perceive of themselves as continuous across time (Fivush, Haden, and Reese, 1996).

Fivush's research and conceptualization of autobiographical memory necessarily forming within a social context parallels and validates Erikson's fundamental principle of psychosocial theory. Through the careful modeling of their parents and interactive play with their siblings or play partners, children rapidly accumulate a number of narratives that function to demonstrate both uniqueness and similarity, as well as using the

narratives to gain attention. A notion of one's self begins to gain traction as children

selectively retrieve or co-construct certain remembered experiences. Why are certain

experiences encoded into autobiographical memory as valuable memories and others are

not? There are two primary factors. First, the level of distinctiveness certainly plays a

role in which an event is remembered because it is unique and unusual, and/or because it

is emotionally salient. Secondly, verbal rehearsal of the story is extremely important. In

a longitudinal study, Fivush and Schwarzmueller (1998) asked 8-year-olds to recall

experiences that they had recalled at four earlier intervals between the ages of 3 and 5 ½

(meaning the memories were from events that occurred approximately five years

previously). A remarkable 84% of the stories were recalled showing that there was little

sign of childhood amnesia (typically experienced in memories prior to 3-4 years old), and

demonstrating that verbal rehearsal coupled with distinctiveness of the event enabled the

emergence of autobiographical memory.

Crucial to Fivush's approach to "autobiographical memory" is the expansion of

the term from just a story telling of an event personally experienced, to a much deeper

sense of a psychological phenomenon in which a self emerges and is organized around

these events.

> Event memory not only organizes our knowledge of the world, but also helps us
> organize our knowledge about ourselves. Our sense of self and event memories are
> interwoven systems… Autobiographical memory is not simply memories of previously
> experienced events; it is memory of the self engaging in these activities. (Fivush, 1988,
> p. 277).

In ontogenetic terms, a child slowly becomes an author (autobiographer) of their stories –

one who has a self extended over time. Neither of these (development of memory or

development of self) necessarily develops prior to the other. Instead, "memories of the

past and sense of self develop *dialectically*" in which preschool children construct a sense

of an autobiographical self over time wherein new experiences are able to be organized

into coherent frameworks and potentially retained for a lifetime (Fivush and

Schwarzmueller, 1998, p. 457, italics added).

This points to a much larger picture of why humans tell stories and put so much

energy into forming identity. The dialectical relationship between memories and the

developing self in children has a functional goal in that the parent-child reminiscing

serves to maintain and nurture social and emotional bonds. Fivush and Vasudeva (2002)

theorized that the quality of expressiveness and the more elaborative means of mothers

verbally interacting with children would predict levels of mother-child attachment. The

authors found that highly elaborative mothers predicted stronger mother-child emotional

relationships, and that the quality of attachment (not necessarily defined by emotional

content) was indeed related to the quality of reminiscing. In Erikson's framework of

psychosocial epigenesis and ontogeny combined with these new findings, the child uses

memories to form a notion of self in order to become "one" who can be known by others

– one who can give and receive love. In Freudian terms, the toddler (anal stage) learns to

control and *hold onto* experiences that thereby establish a sense of autonomy.

Epigenetically, this is the time for the child to start mapping boundaries, garnering some

initial notion of self-rule, and then to project her or his will (initiative) into the world. It

is also possible to see a synthesizing quality in current research in autobiographical

memory. Going back to Erikson's term of "synthesis," the dialectical interaction

between the 1) neurological skills to both learn language and encode, consolidate, and

retrieve memories (in both implicitly influenced memories/beliefs and constructed

episodic memories) and 2) the necessarily interactive and co-constructed emerging sense

of storied self (socially constructed) demonstrates a nexus, or synthesis, in which a person cannot emerge successfully into adulthood without this fundamental integration between the mind and others.

Possible Selves

Overlapping the discussion of the developing self in children is the temporal quality that early autobiographical memory provides. Not only does autobiographical memory function by strengthening parent-child relationships, it also gives a temporal schema with which to interpret and integrate various experiences. It is difficult for adults to consider this, but children have initial experiences that are pre-temporal. Early language skills and initial rehearsal of memories allow children to distinguish between the past and present (Nelson and Fivush, 2004). It could be that the first components of identity are seeded when children discover that they have a continuous self with experiences in both the past and present. Damasio (1999) has referred to this as an "extended consciousness" versus a "core consciousness" in which children first form autobiographical memories and are able to extend themselves into the past and into the future. The emerging ability to rehearse memories enables children to establish some architectural framework of time in which they begin to organize experiences.

Moving beyond early childhood, individuals take this temporal self and try to integrate stories and experiences through beliefs about the future self (the beliefs may be conscious or unconscious). William James described the various temporal identities as the "Me of the past," the "immediate present Me," and the "potential social Me" (1910). Hazel Markus coined the term *possible selves* to refer to the motivational quality of

becoming a future self. Possible selves "represent individuals' ideas of what they might become, what they would like to become, and what they are afraid of becoming, and thus provide a conceptual link between cognition and motivation" (Markus and Nurius, 1986, p. 954). There are a wide array of possible selves that any person may hold relatively at the same time, and they are constructed from both previous notions of self and from the cultural context: "the pool of possible selves derives from the categories made salient by the individual's particular sociocultural and historical context and from models, images, and symbols provided by the media and by the individual's immediate social experiences" (Markus and Nurius, 1986, p. 954). These act as a kind of self-schemata in which prior experiences are organized, sifted through, and consolidated in a system of affective-cognitive structures (Markus, 1977). Markus and others have done considerable work researching the influence of these possible selves and demonstrated in several studies how they are active in shaping decisions, feelings, and interpretations of the self (Fong and Markus, 1982; Fryberg and Markus, 2004; Markus, 1977, 1980, 1983; Stein, Roeser, and Markus, 1998). These envisioned identities act as a hermeneutic through which individuals perceive autobiographical experiences and are determined by a variety of factors. For instance, the possible self is affected by personality, such as an optimist who uses positive current experiences to construct a hopeful optimistic self versus a pessimist who focuses on negative current experiences and both predicts and fears the negative self.

What do these possible selves have to do with religious identity? It helps us see both the motivation in constructing an inner identity, and the motivation in projecting a social self to garner approval. First, as individuals imagine different identities for

themselves in the future, they may adapt and change their memories quite significantly.

A person's perceived reality of an autobiographical memory may be quite fluid

depending on which possible self is most immediately salient. For instance, a person in a

religious setting may be more apt to interpret experiences and organize them onto the

salient future religious self than if they had the same experiences while golfing, or at

work. Further, some facets of religion build into their theologies a normative growth in

religiosity, meaning there is an implicit schema in which religiosity is expected to

increase over time. Anecdotally, I have experienced a significant population of people

who see themselves as becoming more "religious" in the future even if they are currently

quite religious. Few people narrate a declining schema in which they anticipate that they

will become less religious. A second point of application of the possible self is included

in the survey as part of the conceptual basis for a measure of implicit and explicit

religious identity. Religion tends to be a sensitive subject in which most people never

want to stray too far from the perceived dominant religious identity of a culture. When

subject to approval in the area of religiosity, a person's possible self may be quite

different and divided as the presented possible religious self in a social context is

potentially separated from an implicit possible religious self. Psychologists of religion

have shown that people's belief systems are socially demonstrated through more

orthodox and traditional forms, and yet inwardly a person is full of supernatural beliefs

(or doubts) that lie well outside of their traditional faith (see discussion in Boyer, 2000).[8]

For instance, a person who has doubts about a religious tenant may be hesitant to express

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[8] A similar example can be seen within popular responses among politicians after September 11, in which few were willing to present a possible political self that would not be seen as patriotic. Thus, many voted for a war that their own inner political self would not agree with fully. This is partly related to the social psychological concept of group think.

such doubts explicitly to another person. In fact, given enough rehearsals of a more

traditionally religious self, the person may be able to push aside doubts. The narrative

process of religious story telling, such as in public testimony in religious worship, may

help to consolidate any divisions in the religious self. Of course, in certain given social

contexts, one may also minimize the religiosity of a possible self. In a work environment

that is decidedly scientific or critical of religion, an individual might express a lesser

degree of religious identity explicitly than what may be expressed in a more confidential

and implicit format. For example, a graduate student in experimental psychology who

tends to be drawn to a new religious movement (i.e., Scientology) may be quite hesitant

to present this religious self in any way to the student's colleagues. The social influence

of academia may actually affect the student by minimizing or completely ending the

possible religious self. The point of this is to emphasize that people have different

possible selves that are not necessarily integrated, and that the identity domain of religion

seems especially sensitive to conflicts in one's identity. More of how this is factored into

the dissertation's research study will be discussed conceptually in chapter four and

methodologically in chapter five.

Narrative Theory and the Construction of the Self

Overlapping these previous discussions of possible selves and the social

construction of autobiographical memory is the narrative quality of identity. Narrative

theory has been a widely approached subject from different fields of study, including

human development, cognitive psychology, theology, clinical psychology, pastoral care,

philosophy, and anthropology. In its more extreme form, scholars in narrative theory

encourage a fairly extreme shift from seeing people expressing identity through stories to one of understanding that people *are* stories. Taking a page from postmodern philosophy, White and Epston (1990) wrote a seminal book in clinical theory in which narratives are used to achieve clinical goals. Building on Foucault's philosophy of power, White and Epston encourage mental health practioners to co-construct new stories of health for the patient, in which previously ignored healthier parts of experiences are merged with new stories of change and transformation. The process empowers the client to see how they have constructed stories in the past and to transform their experiences, externalize negative outcomes, and become their own more conscious architect of their narratives. Markus's conceptualization of possible selves intertwines nicely in narrative theory as a description of the motivation behind individuals' choices of identity interpretation.

What narrative theory adds in general is a study of the functional content of the narratives through the categorical types they tend to fall in, and an emphasis on how individuals fit information into their narratives. Fivush and Haden (2003) succinctly describe narratives as "culturally prescribed forms for organizing events through canonicalized linguistic frameworks. Although events in the world may be organized by space and time, it is through narrative that events take on human shape and human meaning" (p. viii). As described earlier, children learn *types* of stories by verbal interaction with their parents. Some of the characteristics of different stories that Fivush and colleagues have parceled out in parent-child interaction are temporal organization types (temporal or causal), narrative organization (propositions or information), and narrative function (orienting or referential or evaluative) (Fivush, 1991). Others have

characterized developmental patterns of narratives in childhood development. Nelson

(2003) proposes six levels of early self-understanding in children in which they transition

from having no object relations to being able to contrast and integrate cultural

experiences: Physical (postnatal), social (6-12 months), cognitive (18-24 months),

representational (2-4 years), narrative (3-6 years), cultural (5-7 years). The narrative self

understanding (3-6 years) has a temporal awareness (past, present and future) and is able

to juxtapose the narrative with the narratives of others. In the cultural self (5-7 years),

children are in larger social settings and can distinguish between an ideal cultural self and

the actual self. This is where the broader culture begins to integrate and co-narrate the

narrative of the child. Cultural myths and ideals take on a rapidly increasing importance

(already part of the parent as well) to the school aged child. Children are quick to pick up

on different forms of stories and roles (i.e., hero, soldier, doctor) and practice stories and

identities of rescue, repairing, saving, etc. Nelson illustrates how America tends to utilize

autobiographical memory to a greater degree than other cultures such as Asian societies

that do not value individualism as much. In America, there is an emphasis on telling *your*

story, such as in the elementary school practice of show-and-tell. Thus, narratives in

America aim to demonstrate uniqueness in contrast to more communal societies.

This raises an important critique. One of the primary criticisms of identity

research is that it comes out of a Western infused individualism in which society's

members strive to achieve uniqueness. The most common analysis is that Asian cultures

do not seem as concerned with identity formation as do individuals in American culture.

Drawing upon Erikson's observations with the Sioux Native Americans, he reasoned that

youth in homogenous cultures rarely come to any identity crisis; it seemed that for these

more communal and homogenous cultures, identity is more easily formed and fashioned

by a well defined set of values and roles. Despite some influences of Western

consumerism, many Asian cultures still teach their children group unity and solidarity

values that tend to define an identity crisis in terms of those who are *unable* to achieve

the cultural identity. This does not undermine the theory of identity formation - it is still

a key task in the developing adult in both types of cultures. Children in both of these

societies are striving to achieve an *ideal cultural self* that will be productive to the values

of that culture. Certainly, the cultural values do change among different societies but the

need to have an integrated coherent sense of self is important in all of them. Children in

America may tell "my story" but it is just as socially constructed a process as is the child

in China who tells "our story in which I fit."   My experiences with youth groups in

China and America have shown that both form niches and cliques in which youth strive

to identify with a preferred subgroup. The difference lies in the extremes of expression in

which American youth are allowed to show more explicit forms of rebellion through

fashion and language.

One of the most influential theorists in narrative theory is Dan McAdams.

Working mostly from Erikson's paradigm, McAdams describes three levels of

personality with a sharp distinction between "I" and "Me." Although McAdams likens

his distinction between the I and Me to the similar distinction Erikson made when he

talked about the subjective feeling of "I," he actually reverses the terms in saying that the

I is the process of constructing the Me, which is the self. (McAdams, 2003). Saying that

the I is really a verb in which you are "I-ing" or "self-ing" the object Me, which is the

core center – the self. This is a misreading of Erikson who considered the nominative "I"

to be the synthesizing core of identity who then acts as the narrator of the self. The differences boil down to semantic interpretations of English pronouns and sentence structure. More importantly, McAdams is conceptually similar to Erikson in that the ego identity (the I for Erikson, the Me for McAdams) is a stable source of inner self that synthesizes experiences in a consistent pattern. As with Erikson's understanding of identifications that may continue to change, McAdams says that the I is constantly in motion (processing) by emerging and always evolving, but the Me is essentially produced and stable (McAdams, 1996, 2003). For McAdams, the selfing I is the narrating story-telling component that brings together experiences for the Me.

McAdams's primary framework of understanding a person is divided into three levels. Level 1 consists of general, decontextualized and nonconditional traits of a person, such as those in the Big Five paradigm of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism (Goldberg, 1981). According to McAdams, most researchers in personality psychology study the person from this trait assessment level. The second level to knowing a person is to look at motivations, defenses, values, attachment styles, and developmental issues. At this level, one can begin to know a little more about a person through this information as these descriptions are contextualized in time and space. What, according to McAdams, is missing from these two levels? The component still missing is identity. Level 3 is the *story*, a narrative that integrates the "person with a purposeful self-history that explains how the Me of yesterday became the Me of today will become the anticipated Me of tomorrow" (McAdams, 1996, p. 306). For McAdams, this is the core of the self – the best way to know a person is to know how they tell a story of purpose in their lives. And this is what defines identity.

McAdams intentionally emphasizes the "story" component in its original literary characteristics. In qualitative interviews, he saw patterns that included all the necessary ingredients of literature: plot, settings, characters, consequences, etc. He analyzed the stories for narrative tone, imagery, theme, ideological setting, nuclear episodes (meaning they are very salient), imagoes (idealized personifications of the Me), and script endings (to achieve generativity) (McAdams, 1993, 1996). He divides life into a prenarrative era (infants through early adolescence), narrative era (adulthood), and postnarrative (older age, similar to Erikson's stage of integrity). During the primary narrative stage, people are constantly working on their life stories, often in implicit ways that are not consciously expressed during routine life. Thus the life story is often verbally rehearsed and co-constructed in social contexts, but this is not typically done for the conscious reason of building the story.

This dissertation is not conceptually organized around McAdams's theories of life story, but it is important to look at some of the challenges that McAdams presents. The key distinctions between McAdams's concept of identity and some of the earlier theories presented in the paper is: 1) his emphasis on existential quest in adults and the search for purpose; 2) flipping the framework in which the "depth" of a person is what is explicitly expressed, whereas implicit and relatively unconscious traits or even contextualized characteristics are less important concepts for identity; and 3) he clearly supports the notion that people work with *one* unifying story.

Dealing with the existential contention first, McAdams is most centrally concerned with adult identity and theorizes that adults in modernity are seeking deep levels of purpose and meaning. He is clear that this is a fairly recent trickling down

product of the West: "It is with the rise of modernity in the West that an increasing number of people, beginning with elites and spreading to the expanding professional working classes, have come to find challenging and problematic the experience of individual selfhood" (McAdams, 1996, p. 297). According to him, identity is an individual's overarching life story which functions primarily to find meaning and purpose. One may have attachments and identifications on a shallower level, but a person's identity is at a deeper level which functions exclusively to make meaning and purpose. But there are some problems with this narrowing of the concept of identity. Does McAdams's assertion mean that people who are less existential and less concerned with purpose do not have identity, or maybe their identity is less important or developed? Evolutionary psychologists will tell us that all people look for causal patterns between episodes of experiences (or streams of experiences), but this is different from McAdams's claim that all people are driven to find a deep sense of purpose. Ultimately, this component to McAdams's theory suffers from two problems. First, some *personality* types are more existentially anxious than others, and so it can be argued that McAdams is subsuming his understanding of all people under the presumption that they all share this personality trait. Such existential concern seems hardly universal, and even McAdams admits it to be an outcome of modern society. But still, his theory speaks as if all people in modernity have this need, and that does not seem to be the case. Secondly, arguing that identity is oriented primarily out of existential seeking suffers from an elitism of *vocation*. Scholars - especially ones drawn to academic pursuits of philosophy, existential psychology, and religion – are more likely to be existentially concerned. The danger is in projecting one's concern by assuming that others in different vocations are

equally distressed by questions of self. While I agree that people are meaning makers

and tell stories of experiences in casual narrative ways, I take issue with the level of

existential worry that McAdams consistently perceives.

A second major distinction between McAdams and other theories, including the

one presented in chapter 4 of this dissertation, is that he argues that the personality traits

(level 1) and motivations (level 2) are not fundamental components to identity. Since

McAdams agrees that these two levels are real and are part of a person, this becomes

mostly a semantic argument over whether an academic understanding of "identity"

should incorporate additional facets other than the story. To be sure, McAdams admits

that the traits and motivations are part of the "DNA" out of which a story emerges in the

psychosocial world. But according to McAdams, identity itself is and only is the story. I

take issue with this narrow location of identity to just the explicitly told narrative of his

third level. As a conceptual field for researchers, it seems best to include all the

components that construct one's identity when referring to the term. A wider perspective

of identity would include the neuropsychology of the brain, the interactive working of the

brain with other people to form autobiographical memory, the typically unconscious

psychological traits and developmental needs/experiences of a person that influence the

self, the typically unconscious influences of the sociocultural world, and finally, the

organized life story that is shared with and formed by others.

The final distinction between McAdams and other theories presented in this paper

lies in his understanding that identity is one unified story. Scholars in the field of

identity/self research have found this to be a contentious topic in which those like Marcia

and McAdams understand identity to be unified and global, while others speak of

multiple selves and distinct identity domains (see discussion in Raggatt, 2006).

McAdams argues that people have one overall story because 1) this is the story's inherent

functional purpose, and 2) because people speak about themselves as one story.

McAdams criticizes the postmodern privileging of multiplicity over unity in identity,

such as in theorists like Gergen (McAdams and Logan, 2006; Gergen, 1992). The whole

purpose of the story is to tell one's self, not one's selves. He argues that scholars have

erred by mistaking the evolving story for many stories. By its nature, according to

McAdams, the story functions only when it blends different experiences into the one

story and not by splitting experiences into different stories. Secondly, he takes seriously

what people say about their stories. In his research performing qualitative interviews,

McAdams uses a phenomenological method to give truth bearing importance to how

people perceive of themselves as one unified self and how they resist any notion that they

have different and multiple selves (McAdams, 1996; McAdams and Logan, 2006).

     I agree that it is important to consider that people perceive of themselves as telling

one story, but experience shows that different social contexts precipitate different stories

of the self. These may not actually be evolving but could be wavering back and forth in

different contexts. In general, people are not aware of how their stories of self are co-

opted from others in social situations, but researchers have long found that identity is

certainly influenced by context. William James originally proposed that an individual

"has as many social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion

he[she] cares... From this there results what practically is a division of the [person] into

several selves" (James, 1890, p. 294). This notion of many selves is referred to as self-

concept differentiation (SCD) in personality and social psychology. Generally, less

division in SCD predicts overall psychological health (Donahue, Robins, Roberts, and John, 1993). Integration of the self between various social contexts is important for well-being. James called the person who is divided in their own core self a "sick soul." This notion of divided identities could be taken on two different levels. On one level, there may be an individual who has a fairly coherent sense of inner self but consciously expresses different role identities with ease in different social settings. On another level, there may be a person who knowingly or unknowingly is not able to integrate different role identities into a coherent self and suffers from a fragmented self. I agree with the preponderance of research which shows that identity and self are more various than of what people are aware. Even well formed and integrated identities are expressed variously in different contexts. I agree with McAdams that a person should be able to form and work from one identity, but I add that this identity is often an inner identity that is subconscious to the person, strongly influenced by social approval factors when expressed, and often expressed in different forms to different people with or without personal awareness of these differences.

The strength of McAdams's work lies in his demonstration that the life story best functions when it is perceived to be one story. Individuals who are aware of different social selves (different life stories) may become distressed and enter an identity crisis. Further, McAdams shows how the person constructs the psychosocial story. What McAdams underestimates is the fluidity of that construction. He assumes that the constructed story is actually consistent and would not be changed because of the less natural interaction between a researcher and a subject. When a researcher and a subject conduct an interview, the story told in that interview serves the perceived needs of both

persons and could be considered unique to that one time and place. Yet, McAdams assumes that this story is a story of essence (of unified identity) that would be similar to one told in a non-research context. In doing this, he assumes that the identity of the person is only the story being told in any social context, and that the story would not be significantly different if told in another context. This underestimates the artificial nature of researcher-participant interviews in which the interviewee has been prompted to the nature of the interview (subject reflects on identity prior to interview) and may wish to project a story that is "smart" (since an academic is perceived as smart) and "unified" (so that they seem like one healthy person). Said more simply, it overestimates the singularity of autobiographical narrative.

There is an important balancing of theory that should take place in order to understand identity which is all at once functioning in neurological, psychological, and sociological domains. If we agree that identity is fundamentally constructed in a dialectical relationship between the person's own mind and the culture, then we should be cautious to not ignore or privilege just one side of the equation. Instead, identity can be perceived on a continuum in which some expressions of a self are more socially influenced than others. In some close relationships, you might have heard someone say, "I can be myself around you." Even though this is still a socially interactive and constructed identity statement, it communicates that the person genuinely feels like they are being more authentic to who they are in that particular situation. In relationships as varied as work roles, romantic partners, or religious communities, there are varying levels of real and perceived cultural influence. How do we get towards the lesser socially influenced identity? In conducting identity research, how do we reduce social approval

factors? Does a diary entry that is locked away for no one else to read communicate a higher degree of authenticity of the self? I think such insight, while not available to researchers, would more likely disclose a unified self that Erikson and McAdams believe to exist. I agree with Erikson's notion that there is a "sense" of identity that may be less accessible to the conscious than the socially presented identity. And it stands to reason that removing social approval factors would improve the ability of knowing that identity. This will be further discussed in the measure construction section of chapter five.

Evolutionary Psychology

In harvesting many different areas of research in or related to identity, one final note should be added in the area of evolutionary psychology. A combination of evolutionary biology and cognitive psychology, evolutionary psychology has quickly expanded in the last decade to present broad theories of human behavior with far-reaching implications for many different areas of study. Like the evolved complexity of other parts of the human body, the complexity of the human mind is an outcome of natural selection. Instead of the mind being understood as a general processing unit, evolutionary psychology asserts that there are specific cognitive systems that have evolved. The task of evolutionary psychology is to deduce why these specific subsystems (sometimes considered to be in a massive modular brain and numbered into the thousands) have evolved (Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992). To investigate the most distinctly human modules of the mind, researchers have turned to primates to consider some of the adaptive problems early humans may have had, such as mate selection, avoiding predators, forming alliances, and reading other people's minds. For

instance, predator avoidance genes have helped to build modules that must quickly detect danger, distinguish who can be trusted from whom, and trigger defensive behavior or a false alarm. This involves a group of biological modules linked together to complete the task. To start, the detection device favors a false alarm over a slow detector, thus the brain may kick in a quick feeling of fright in more harmless situations and then trigger a false alarm afterwards. In alliance modules, the evolving human has long lived in groups in which forming alliances is very important and there are modules that look for free-riders and perceptive estimations of trustfulness. Hamilton (1964) demonstrated in kin selection preferences how non-reciprocal altruism decreases by a module that estimates degree of relatedness and thereby predicts naturally occurring nepotism in social groups. The theory of mind module develops in children around the age of 4 ½ in which they understand that two people can believe a different truth about one thing. Autistic children are unable to develop this specific capacity. Other theorists have shown that humans are gossip hungry and constantly trying to find out strategic information about others in order to estimate levels of trustworthiness. Additionally, the mind is wired for sexual preferences that predict healthy childbirth (curved and wide pelvises in females), symmetry, and the desire to raise offspring in long standing pair-bonds.

To the best of my knowledge, it seems that no major research has been conducted in evolutionary psychology and identity. The evolutionary psychological question would be: what task was solved by the mind's well evolved ability to construct autobiographical memory? Or, why do adolescents spend so much valuable energy and time being concerned about their identity? Why do some adults tend to be existentially concerned about not having purpose or meaning? Why do we have names and feel the need to

distinguish ourselves? Here are some first thoughts on these questions that involve identity for mating, learning, social approval factors, and generativity. To begin, autobiographical memory is a learning tool in children in which the child begins to organize experiences and learn how to interact with others. For the evolving human to be able to function in a primitive group, the individual would have needed to learn the forms of communication and the valued signs of trust. Early processing of long term episodic memory may benefit the child in language acquisition (language learning module in which telling stories not only develops notions of self, but also increases linguistic ability) and character perception (cheater detection module functions by estimating the motivation and beliefs of someone else). As the child grows, they themselves must be trusted so they tell coherent and fairly consistent stories of the self that are meant to build up approval in the listeners.

When the child enters puberty, mating becomes a primary goal and so the adolescent tries to gain ways in which he or she can be noticed and appear more sexually desirable. In one way, the American teenager who suddenly focuses on fashion, or muscles, or music, is in a mating game in which the goal is to say to the desired audience, "Look at me!" Of course, each culture offers a certain set of possible roles and forms of identity markers, and so the psychosocial human interacts with the resources of the society. Another identity act of adolescence is the biological task of leaving the house in order to mate with someone outside of immediate kin. Just as the chick leaves the mother bird's nest, the adolescent is wired to leave the family and form at first a peer group and eventually a new family. When moving out of the family is not possible, as in the case for teenagers in America, adolescents turn to identity markers that can clearly distinguish

themselves form their parents. And there are different levels of a need for the teenager to be able to say to the parent, "I am not you." Erikson spoke of this period as an identity crisis, and we can see why if we understand how the adolescent is wired by evolution to try on new forms of identity for both breaking from the family and mating needs.

When a sexual relationship does form in the emerging adult, there can be an evolutionary functional attachment between the two individuals (feelings of intense romantic love) which typically lasts one to two years. In evolutionary terms, these feelings secure a relationship commitment from both parents before the child is born. In identity terms, there is a sharing of stories and a self commitment to the other that Erikson says produces a *fidelity* of the ego identity. In adulthood, individuals are genetically wired to nurture their children in an altruistic form. Erikson would agree, saying that this satisfies an evolved genetic need for generativity. As children grow older, the feelings of generativity towards offspring are less satisfied and one outcome may be that a person may feel that they are without purpose. Thus, the deeper desire for existential purpose in one's self could actually be a fairly normal developmental phenomenon in adulthood. In these first thoughts on an evolutionary psychology of identity, one can quickly see points of application that could provide insight into why people work so hard to integrate their experiences as they narrate them to others.

In contrast to identity, quite a large amount of material has been written in the area of evolutionary psychology and religion. The basic question is: Why is religion found in all cultures? And, why are people attracted to supernatural beliefs and the institutions that support them? This is an interesting question because many cultural theorists have been arguing that religion is dying out in the modern world (Berger and

Luckmann, 1967). However, evolutionary psychologists have argued that science is more likely to die before religion dies. Religious ways of thinking have a natural fit to the currently evolved human brain (McCauley, 2000). Boyer (2001) has theorized that religion supports many different modules in the evolved brain. He is not saying that religion is innate in the brain; instead, he is saying that "all humans can easily acquire a certain *range* of religious notions and communicate them to others" (Boyer, 2001, p. 3). Individuals are primed to over predict causality in their experiences. We are pattern seekers who try to figure out why a tree fell in front of us, or what happened to me that made me sick. Religious stories of causal agency are salient to this cognitive function. On top of this, the child's mind is geared for imaginative role play in order to learn the patterns of social interaction in a society. Our highly imaginative minds practice stories that may bring in elements of danger and protection. One byproduct of the imaginative mind is the potentially supernatural narrative full of unseen predators, causal patterns explained, and information knowing agents behind the scenes (Boyer, 2001). This does not mean that one is wired to be religious. A person can function well without religion. However, people are wired to be imaginative, to look for predators, to find agency and cause, and to gain access to social information about others. The result is that religious beliefs are fairly easy to acquire, but only particular kinds.

Much of Boyer's work is in describing why some religious beliefs are more salient and fitting to the modules of the mind than others. Religious beliefs tend to stimulate the mind in specific ways, such as in counterintuitive biology (i.e., a mountain that bleeds) or counterintuitive mentation (i.e., a tree that listens, an animal that talks or never dies). These ideas interact with mental templates in the mind in which they violate

an ontological label and a particular tag, or element, of the system. The limitation of religion is that they violate only one category. The tree that listens should not also be able to move around. The ghost that can go through walls should be like a person otherwise. Slone (2004) has conducted several studies in the last few years testing which type of beliefs are more salient and memorable to a person than others. He has also shown that people can hold divergent and conflicting beliefs simultaneously.

The perspective of evolutionary psychology of religion is naturalistic with most of the scholars not being religious themselves. And this separation of scholar from believer seems essential to the questions asked. From the naturalist point of view, why would anyone believe some of the absurd claims that religions make? Why would people build huge pyramids for the gods, or blow themselves up for a deity that has never been seen? Some of the explanations are compelling, such as religious self-sacrifice is often the kin selection module gone badly wrong. Personal sacrifice in solitude for religious reasons is very rare. But as has been in the current news, sacrifice intended to destroy an enemy under religious pretense is more common. In the example of a religious martyr trying to kill others, the cheater detection module, group protection module, and kin selection module all come into play in which an individual has detected cheaters who are perceived to threaten the well-being of their group (i.e., individuals from another religion and culture are perceived as trying to steel resources). Remembering that a youth seeks new commitments outside of the family which is often displayed in an intense ideological identity, the kin selection module is transferred from the actual kin to a new "family" which is the new ideological group. In evolutionary terms, the martyr is acting just as a parent would by sacrificing their own life to save their child's life. The young religious

martyr is trying to radically protect his or her idealized family. This theory correctly predicts that adolescents, who are more prone to ideological commitments, would be the most likely martyrs.

A Multidimensional Approach

From these many different fields, a picture begins to emerge of how identity is constructed and functions. Understanding that the modular brain encodes, consolidates, and retrieves particular kinds of memories that may be influenced by implicit memories/beliefs, the picture of emerging identity begins as children learn to dialectically rehearse and organize their own experiences out of the patterned narratives of their parents. This socially constructed self selects particularly salient stories to express in different social situations for varying degrees of approval. Particular synthesizing patterns of identity emerge in the adolescent, who out of evolutionary biological development, needs to take on identifying markers to attract mates and break with family. Ideological commitments of identity are common during this time. Entering adulthood, the individual learns to narrate trustworthy and consistent stories of the self, though varying in different social environments to garner context specific goals. For many, the stories of self are shared with an intimate partner in order to form a stable pair-bond to raise children. As the children grow, the parents further consolidate identities to provide a stable home for the child and have their needs for generativity met by sharing their stories and co-constructing new stories for their children. During this time, generative feelings may wane (or never become fulfilled) which could parallel an increased need to making existential meaning and purpose in one's identity. Towards the end of life, or

due to neurological disease at any time, modular damage to the hippocampus or decreased activity in the cortex (and a number of other regions of the brain) can begin to jeopardize an integrated sense of self. This presents description of identity that is phylogenetic, ontogenetic, neurological, psychological, and sociological. Chapter four will integrate this work with the particular domain of religious identity.

CHAPTER THREE
Review of Identity and Religion Measures

This chapter will begin by reviewing the current findings in the field of Identity Studies and will follow with a specific overview of recent research that considers identity domain specificity. Then, in the field of Psychology of Religion, the chapter will review studies which have used identity models and measures in relationship to religion measures. The two fields, Identity Studies and Psychology of Religion, are both characterized by a lack of an overall multilevel approach to research. Both fields have been plagued by a surplus of conceptual models and psychometric measures. Most of these are quite helpful but there has been little work to integrate the various theories and findings into a coherent body of knowledge. Within Identity Studies, one of the primary figures, James Cote, has called together the community of researchers to address the urgent need to develop a "common taxonomy that attends to the *multidimensionality* represented in various approaches sharing the term *identity*" (Cote, 2006). Within Psychology of Religion, the overabundance of psychometric measures prompted two prominent researchers to call for a move from a *measurement paradigm* towards a *multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm* (Emmons and Paloutzian, 2003). At first, this does not seem to bode well for a dissertation that is trying to establish a new conceptual model and measure that integrates the two fields. However, this dissertation's interdisciplinary approach is precisely what is being called for from each of the fields.

Erikson's psychosocial model may be one of the best foundations for either of these disciplines to map out its own research while finding connecting points to other fields of study. By studying the body, mind, and society, Erikson was truly a harbinger of this interdisciplinary method which he felt was urgently needed over fifty years ago. In regards to human development, Snarey and Bell (2003) mapped out Erikson's framework as a *functional developmental model*, as opposed to structural models (focused exclusively on cognitive structure) on one side and sociocultural models (focused on the cultural construct of developmental age periods) on the other side. The theoretical balance between the biological/structural development of identity with the sociocultural influence on identity roles and expectations has also been similarly described as *developmental contextualism* (Lerner, 1993). In essence, the psychological study of religious identity must always keep in mind the essential functional nature of people as biological needs for self-definition can only be met in historically relative cultural contexts.

Marcia's Paradigm

James Marcia developed one of the most popular research models in identity in which he described four identity statuses in the process of identity formation - *identity diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium, and achieved* (1966); since then, his work has established an empirical foundation for psychometric measures of identity with over 500 published studies using his identity statuses. Stemming from Erikson's psychosocial conceptualization of identity, Marcia sought to demonstrate construct validation of Erikson's theory of identity formation through a semi-structured interview – the Identity

Status Interview (ISI). In Marcia's early clinical work, he had come across cases of

individuals who were suffering identity problems but could only be clinically diagnosed

with severe disorders, such as schizophrenia. He agreed with Erikson's theory, but

sought to validate it empirically so it could be used as a clinical tool for adolescents. As

his dissertation project in clinical psychology, Marcia had several false starts but

eventually found a way to conduct and measure an interview that empirically established

the four identity statuses (Marcia, 2004).

Marcia's original ISI covers two domains: occupation and ideology (politics and

religion). According to Marcia, Erikson (1968) originally said adolescents need to

develop identity in these two domains. Several supplemental domains were added that

looked at friendships, sexual roles, and relationships with family. The interviews

generally last 30-45 minutes and have an interrater reliability of around 80 percent

(Kroger, 2004). Marcia designed the ISI to include those who were not religious by also

asking about a particular philosophy of life, including ethics and social responsibility

(Waterman, 1993). The religious identity related issues include:

> 1. Should one believe in God or not?
> 2. What form or frequency of religious observances should be maintained?
> 3. Should involvement with an organized religion be maintained, or does one need to develop a highly personal religious orientation?
> 4. What positions should be taken on any of various doctrinal issues?
> 5. Under what circumstances should one change one's religion?
> 6. If one is not religious, on what basis can ethical judgments be made?
> 7. How should one feel about interfaith marriage?
> 8. What type of religious training should be offered to one's children?
> (Waterman, 1993, p. 158).

The qualitative format allows the semi-structured interview to adapt to the findings of

each participant. The inter-rater reliability is usually around 80-85%, and this is after

dropping an average of 5% of the interviews because they are unclassifiable using the scoring manual.

Marcia's first encounter with Erikson's writings was during his clinical psychology internship (when David Guttmann encouraged him to read *Identity and the Life Cycle*), and it seems that he may not have read Erikson extensively before developing the measure (Marcia, 2007). Never having met Erikson, he acknowledges that Erikson was "not fond of attempts to operationalize and measure his constructs" (p. 13).[9] In developing the measure, Marcia first looked for just levels of identity *commitments*, but in several interviews he came to see that people make commitments in different ways. He then added *exploration* as a second process variable to be scored. The process variable of commitment was either present or not. When present, an individual has made a firm decision about identity elements and is going about activity that confirms this choice. There are no thoughts being directed towards considering any other decision. When commitment is present, the individual should show resistance to being swayed. Exploration (crisis) may be one of three options: 1) past crisis, 2) present crisis, and 3) absence of crisis. A person with a past crisis may have emerged with a commitment to some identity feature, or may have abandoned the exploration without any longstanding decision (Waterman, 1993). Marcia took these two process variables and saw four identity status outcomes. In *identity achievement,* a person has had a crisis in the past and is currently committed. In *identity moratorium,* a person is currently in a period of exploration and any commitments are only vague. In *identity foreclosure*, a person has never explored identity options, but there is a commitment to an identity. In

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[9] It is somewhat surprising that Marcia never met Erikson. Although his PhD was from Ohio State, he did his internship at Massachusetts Mental Health Center – Harvard Medical School in 1963-64. This was the same time that Erikson was a professor at Harvard.

identity diffusion, there is no commitment and no significant period of exploration (Marcia, 2007).

How are these statuses expressed in religion? Marcia's semi-structured interview allows for a good deal more variability in religion than what we will see in Adams's more objective questionnaire. Marcia detailed three different levels of statuses 1) early and middle adolescence, 2) late adolescence, and 3) adulthood. Marcia is careful to point out that having or not having a religion is not as important as having some reflection on ideological issues, whether they be philosophical, ethical, political, or religious. Marcia includes atheists and agnostics as a religious commitment, as long as the commitment included some ethical approach to life. Early and middle adolescents find it difficult to integrate religion into an ideological perspective. By late adolescence, however, these young people commonly seek ideological perspectives. Marcia found that teens who had commitments to religion had typically held them from an early age, and teens without religious identity commitments were often pressured to attend services by their parents. This shows some identity domain uniqueness in that some adolescents may begin in the area of religious identity foreclosure, never having been in any religious identity diffusion.

In identity diffusion, early and middle adolescents show little interest in religion, even though they often will say that they believe in God. They may also identify with a religion, which Marcia sees as motivated in order to gain social approval. Tellingly, Archer (writing with Marcia) says that weekly attendance at religious services does not signal an identity commitment unless it is done for devotional reasons (Archer, 1993, p. 194). The implication is that extrinsic religiosity (socially motivated) alone is superficial

and cannot reflect an identity commitment. This shows a bias against more communally oriented religions and is a conceptual flaw. By saying that intrinsic religiosity (more devotional) is necessary for any identity commitment in religion, the identity status researchers are likely privileging devotional forms of religion (i.e., Protestant-styled Christianity) at the cost of misunderstanding the power of socially oriented religious rituals and traditions. This will be further discussed in chapter four. In later adolescence, Marcia describes identity diffusion in religion to be a general lack of concern with any ideological issues. In interviews, Marcia and others found individuals who could articulate a belief system, but further probing revealed it to be shallow. Among adults, identity diffusion was seen in some individuals who had previously scored as foreclosed (or more rarely, achieved) in adolescence and had drifted away from religion. Marcia scores this as diffusion if the individual does not seem to be concerned with this change (Marcia, et.al., 1993).

In identity foreclosure, early and middle adolescents have most commonly just continued to participate in their parents' religion. They may be aware of other faiths and denominations, but they have never considered changing. When individuals make a change due to coercion, they are scored as foreclosure. Interestingly, teens who become religious for a first time during adolescence are scored as foreclosure. Marcia and others see these conversions as often unreflective and unquestioning. Most older adolescents will say that their faith is different from their parents, but foreclosed teens will not be able to articulate any major difference. In general, adults in foreclosure remain committed to the faith in which they were brought up. Religion is important to these

individuals and is often characterized by rigidity in one's commitment (Marcia, et.al., 1993).

Identity moratorium is rare for early adolescents in the area of religion. Among early and late adolescents, religious identity moratorium may be very distressing. It does not necessarily mean that a person is considering leaving her or his faith, but may instead significantly renegotiate what it means to be a practioner of that religion. Most of the crises of religion during this time have to do with peers, education and parents. In adulthood, moratorium in religion is more often precipitated by real-life ethical conflicts, such as divorce, abortion, and work ethics (Marcia, et.al., 1993).

The commitment among those in identity achievement is variously described as firm and unwavering. However, when speaking of religion, Marcia and Archer (1993) say that it is "flexibly held" (223). Very rare in early adolescents, late adolescents and adults tell of some past crisis with religion that is now resolved. Commonly, identity status researchers will say that those in achieved status will resist being swayed from their religious orientation. Religious involvement should be evident. However, Marcia is careful to point out that this may also be a deconversion from one's childhood faith. Marcia further describes the religious commitment as a "self-assuredness and comfortableness about their current position, but is not the inflexibility or self-righteousness of the Foreclosure" (Marcia and Archer, p. 229). Identity achievement in adults in the area of religion shows a pattern of ideological coherence that influences daily life. These individuals are not likely to make absolutist claims. If a crisis happened in adolescence in a way that reaffirmed the religious background, individuals may at first

seem to be in foreclosure. But probing during the interview will reveal a time of religious exploration.

Marcia argues that the semi-structured interview is a better tool for most studies but admits the difficulty of administering the interview in any studies with over a hundred participants. The development of questionnaires that may more easily test identity statuses is useful but has shown a much larger number of unusable results (including those whose results are dropped because they do not score clearly in any of the statuses) (Marcia, 2007). Nevertheless, Marcia says that the questionnaires are very helpful and Adams's Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status (EOMEIS-II) has been the most validated study (Adams, 1999; Adams, et.al., 1993). Adams designed the 64-item scale with Likert-responses around two domains – ideological and interpersonal. The ideological domain includes vocation, religion, politics, and philosophy of life. The interpersonal domain includes dating, sex role, friendships, and recreation. Measures of internal consistency have helped establish reliability, and Cronbach alphas have averaged .66. Test-retest reliability has averaged .76 (Kroger, 2004). The eight content areas (four per domain) each have eight questions, with two per status per area.

Dozens of research articles using both Marcia's ISI and Adams's EOMEIS-II have revealed numerous insights. Gender and intelligence are evenly distributed across the four domains. Identity achieved individuals have higher measures of autonomy, function well under stress, function at post-conventional moral reasoning, have more successful intimate relationships, and approach gender roles with a greater degree of neutrality (Blustein and Philips, 1990; Boyes and Chandler, 1992; Kroger, 2004; Marcia, 1966, 1967, Rowe and Marcia, 1980; Skoe and Marcia, 1991). Together with foreclosed

individuals, they have a feeling of satisfaction with who they are (Makros and McCabe, 2001). Identity moratorium individuals have a higher degree of anxiety than any other status, generally avoid romantic commitments, are more skeptical in general, and are more open to new experiences (Boyes and Chandler, 1992; Dyk and Adams, 1990; Josselson, 1987; Marcia, 1967; Orlofsky, et al., 1973; Podd, et al., 1970; Stephen, et al., 1992; Sterling and Van Horn, 1989; Tesch and Cameron, 1987). Identity foreclosed individuals have the highest degree of authoritarianism, have higher needs for social approval, employ pre-conventional or conventional moral reasoning, and are the least open to new experiences (Cote and Levine, 1983; Marcia, 1966, 1967; Rowe and Marcia, 1980; Schenkel and Marcia, 1972; Skoe and Marcia, 1991; Stephen, et al., 1992; Tesch and Cameron, 1987). Also, identity foreclosed teens are often very close to their parents and are raised with values of conformity (Frank, et al., 1990; Grotevant and Cooper, 1985; Willemsen and Waterman, 1991). Identity diffused individuals come from the greatest variety of backgrounds. Some may be carefree and others stressed. Some may come from cultural environments that provide few identity options. They have the highest level of hopelessness, are often isolated from others, and often came from parents who were distant and rejecting (Josselson, 1987; Kroger, 2004; Orlofsky, et al., 1973; Selles, et al., 1994).

The eight specific questions from Adams's EOMEIS-II used for religion are discussed in chapter five. Overall, the questions overemphasize the firmness of religious commitment for identity achieved individuals. The two questions in achieved identity with religious content give the reader a sense of rigidity. Further, the questions seem to locate the importance of religion in the person and not in the deity. Most people with

religious beliefs are not trying to make their religion fit "who they are;" instead, they are trying to figure out which religious tradition is most true. Finally, the questions value intrinsically oriented religion over extrinsically oriented religion. Without a background in religious studies, Adams and others seem to have constructed the questions without an awareness of the rich, communally oriented religious practices and traditions that exist outside Protestant Christianity. Judaism, forms of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, Shintoism, and Hinduism all include elements of personal piety and devotion. However, it can be argued that the central focus of these communities lies in coming together to share stories with each other, enjoy fellowship, and build relationships. Some extrinsically oriented individuals may not be practicing a shallow faith, as presumed by Adams and others, but may actually be working with a fully formed religious identity that is extrinsically oriented. This is further developed in chapter four.

Domain Specificity

Over the last decade, an increasing number of scholars have come to see identity as a collection of different identities which may not coalesce within the same status for one person. From their findings, there is now good evidence that a person is composed of identity *domains*, such as ethnic, sexual, or religious – each with their own potentially differing identity statuses (ie., Alberts, 2000; Archer, 1989; Bartoszuk, 2003; Berzonsky, et al., 2003; Goosens, 2001; Hunter, 1999; Jensen, 2003; Kroger and Green, 1996; Meeus, 2002; Pastorino, et.al., 1997; Waterman, 1985). For instance, an individual may have an achieved sense of vocational identity, and yet a diffused sense of the ethnic or cultural self. Most commonly, these domain specific studies have used the semi-

structured ISI, or devised new questions that presumably aim at domain specific identity statuses. There have been extensive reviews of gender, ethnic, and vocational domain development.

Six studies have looked at domains of identity which included the religious domain. In a study of gender differences in South Africans using the ISI, Alberts (2000) found that males used less sophisticated decision-making skills in the domain of religious identity (foreclosure and diffusion). In a similar study, Pastorino et al. (1997) used the semi-structured *Ego-Identity Interview* (Grotevant and Cooper, 1981) and found that females were more likely to make commitments (foreclosure and achieved) in the domain of religious identity. Archer (1989) used the ISI and found no gender differences in the domains of vocation, religion, and sex-role orientation. Primarily interested in vocational identity, Skorikov and Vondracek (1998) found that other domains (including religion) lag behind vocational identity formation. They conclude then that vocational identity formation is potentially the most important domain in adolescent identity formation. De Hann and Schulenberg (1997) used the EOMEIS (1st edition). The scale consists of 4 domains (religion, sex-roles, politics, and philosophy on life) with two questions per status per domain. Breaking down the results per domain is statistically difficult since only 2 questions per status are given. Most statisticians will agree that three items is generally considered a minimum. The authors found that political and religious domains were only related in the foreclosure status. Religious diffusion status was the most significant predictor of having a low level of religious beliefs, and religious identity achievement was associated with higher levels of intrinsic religiosity. Of course, this would make sense as pointed out above in the discussion of Marcia's and Adams's

conceptualization of religiosity which minimizes the identity value of extrinsic religiosity. In fact, when used together, the scales (EOMEIS and Extrinsic/Intrinsic measure) are basically measuring the same thing.

Finally, a recent study included religious identity as a separate domain within the study of Marcia's four statuses (Fadjukoff, Pulkkinen and Kokko, 2005). Working with Finnish adults and using their own adaptation of the ISI, the authors found religious identity to commonly be diffused for men and foreclosed for women even when the individuals were rated as identity achieved overall. Because of the way in which religious identity lagged behind overall identity statuses, the authors concluded that religious identity was not important in the overall achievement of identity. Of course, this also suggests that religious identity may be understood separately from other domains of identity. Two caveats to this study should be noted: 1) Lutheran religion in Finland is not perceived as an important entity in that cultural context. How would North American adults differ in their perception of the importance of religious identity? and, 2) the research in religious identity was collected by this question, "Do you have a personal relationship to religion?" Their method lacks a theoretical sharpness that a carefully constructed religious identity scale may be able to provide. Altogether, these studies show that religious identity does function in a unique and separate way from other domains of identity.

Two projects have specifically aimed at establishing conceptual content for separate religious identity statuses. Robertson (1995) used the EOMEIS-II and the Religious Life Inventory (RLI) to speak about religious identity development. Despite a focus on religious content, she basically shows a correlation between global statuses of

identity and the religiosity measure (RLI). The strength of her work is in revealing how little is known about religious identity development. Griffith and Griggs (2001) explicitly spell out religious identity statuses and appropriate applications for counseling (there is no empirical research component to this article). However, their work does not develop the content already included in the primary manual for the ISI (Marcia, et al., 1993). Basically, they discuss religious identity without considering how it may function uniquely from other domains of identity.

Religiosity Measures

In regard to identity, scholars in Psychology of Religion have most often been interested in how variables of religiosity (i.e., extrinsic religious orientation, intrinsic religious orientation, and quest) interact with an individual's overall identity development status (Allport and Ross, 1966; Gorsuch and McPherson, 1989). Most of these articles find that certain forms of religion are significantly related to identity formation.

Fulton (1997) used the EOMEIS-II, Age Universal I-E measure (measures extrinsic and intrinsic), and a prejudice measure, to see how all three were related. He found that intrinsic religiosity was positively associated with identity achievement and extrinsic religiosity with identity diffusion (Fulton, 1997). Prejudice was positively related to foreclosed identity but not to the religion measure. As stated earlier, this may actually reveal a conceptual problem with the EOMEIS-II in which intrinsic religiosity is considered necessary for any identity commitment. The religious part of the EOMEIS-II and the I-E measures are, thus, basically measuring the same thing. In a similar study, Markstrom-Adams and Smith (1996) likewise found that identity diffusion was positively associated with extrinsic orientation (Measures: EOMEIS-II and Religious Orientation

Scale). Indiscriminate pro-religious individuals (high on I and E) were more likely to be foreclosed than other orientations, and extrinsics scored higher than other orientations on moratorium.

Hunsberger, et al. (2001) used the EOMEIS (1st edition) and several measures of religiosity (adjustment, overall religiousness, and the religious doubts scale). They found that Identity achievement was related to both belief-confirming consultation (BCC) and belief-threatening consultation (BTC). Moratorium was related to avoiding BCC, and foreclosure was related to BCC. Diffusion individuals avoid both BCC and BCT. Overall religious commitment was stronger for achieved and foreclosed, and religious crisis was positively associated with moratorium. One problem with the results is fairly clear. The different measures are not necessarily finding positive relationships, but are in fact, measuring the same thing. Marcia constructed the statuses explicitly around crisis and commitment. With religion included among three other content domains in the EOMEIS, Hunsberger et al. really were not able to develop new insight into the relationship between religion and identity, other than to confirm that religious identity crisis and commitment are indeed related to notions of overall religious identity.

Other researchers have found that religion influences identity achievement and prosocial behavior (Furrow, et al., 2004; Youniss, J., et al., 1999), religion influences ethnic identity development (Sciarra and Gushue, 2003), and religious beliefs influence identity development (Fisherman, 2004). Sanders (1998) studied religious identity status and its relationship to faith maturity. The results were mixed, but diffusion was related to a lower overall faith maturity. The measurement instruments Sanders used were more interesting than the results. Benson's Faith Maturity Scale (Benson, et al., 1993) was one

of the instruments, but the other was a basically unknown measure called the Dellas Identity Status Inventory-Religious Beliefs (DISI-R). Developed by Dellas and Jernigan (1987), it is an unpublished 35-item forced-choice scale. It was presented at an educational conference and seems to have never been further developed. It appears to be the most similar project to the one this dissertation sets forth. But to date, I have been unable to find Dellas or Jernigan, and have received no response from Sanders.

Three studies have presented a case for the uniqueness of religious processes. Although the authors do not address identity, Pargament, et al. (2005) present a strong case for religion being unique in psychological functioning. With an attachment to a notion of holy or sacred, religious motivation seems to operate separately from other sources of motivation. It uniquely effects personality, coping strategies, and may be a powerfully unique source for distress. King (2003) demonstrates that religion uniquely provides a rich nexus of ideological, spiritual, and social resources which prove quite helpful in reaching identity achievement. No other social resource is able to provide such powerful motivation, rich social interaction, resources for ideological purpose, and the ability to facilitate experiences of the holy or sacred. Finally, Furrow and Wagener (2003) suggest that transcendence is a unique variable in identity. Given Erikson's psychosocial model, we may be able to see how religion typically provides rich social resources for identity (potentially distinct from other resources because of the unique role of the holy or sacred), and we can suggest that transcendence may be a unique element in the psychological construction of identity.

Overall, the correlational research is problematic due to the confounding of religious content in identity scales. Given this, Spilka et al. (2003) suggest that

researchers should construct an independent measure for religious identity: "Perhaps researchers should focus on *religious* identity development, with purer (religious identity) measures that are not complicated by content from other domains (i.e., politics, career)" (p. 146). One possible advancement would be to encourage researchers in the Psychology of Religion to use the EOMEIS-II with the eight religious items removed (56 remaining items). However, this still leaves the conceptual problem of global identity versus domain specificity. With a 56 item scale, researchers would still be basically measuring varying statuses of identity over seven other content areas instead of a global identity. Thus, the goal of this dissertation is to offer researchers a purer measure that looks at just religious content (20 items) and domain-free direct questions of overall identity (8 items).

CHAPTER FOUR
A Conceptual Foundation for Religious Identity

> *A man's character is discernible in the mental or moral attitude in which, when it came upon him, he felt himself most deeply and intensely active and alive. At such moments there is a voice inside which speaks and says: "This is the real me!"* (James, 1920, p. 199)

Erikson was very fond of this passage from a letter William James wrote to his wife (Erikson, 1968, p. 19). When religious identity is important to a person, it is a source of deep and intense feelings in which a person feels "active" and "alive." Why is religion a particularly important aspect of identity? And could religious identity be a core cognitive mechanism influential in many other psychological aspects of religion? Addressing these questions, this chapter will offer a conceptual foundation for religious identity grounded in Erikson (chapter 1), informed by conceptual work in autobiographical memory (chapter 2), and linked to findings in current identity research (chapter 3).

As a psychosocial process, religious identity has quantitative and qualitative properties. By quantitative, what is meant is that religious identity rises and falls in levels of importance. This present salience level and measure of how those levels are changing may be known and expressed (explicitly), or relatively unknown or unaware in its importance or lack of (implicitly). By qualitative, what is meant is that religious identity development is not just part of a simple quantitative increase in religiosity as a child emerges into an adult. Instead, there are qualitative statuses of religious identity in

which one's relationship with the outside-religious-world/religious-other is fundamentally different in each of the religious identity statuses.

In some presentations of the following concepts of religious identity, questions have been raised about delineating different identity domains. Specifically, some have questioned whether a religious identity is actually religious; for example, a Catholic individual who may not have many religious beliefs does not have a religious identity that is of any importance. The argument is that some people have a cultural/communal identity (i.e. Jewish) instead of a religious identity. I will add that many domains overlap. For example, someone's vocational identity may also function as a religious identity if they are a priest or rabbi. The overlapping of the domain does not negate the religious quality of it. Many religions serve a primary ethnic group, but the religious quality of the identity still exists and grounds the identity.

Multidimensional Approach to Religious Identity

Erikson's attention to childhood play helped him develop a configurational approach to analysis. His early charting of this process revealed an interaction between the external social world and the internal psychological needs of an individual. He was interested in the healthy epigenetic/ontogenetic growth of the person and eventually saw identity as a biologically rooted need that is realized only in social interaction. Fivush's more recent work in autobiographical memory has demonstrated how children begin to construct identity through the styles and content types of their parents. Thus, the study of the cognitive construction of identity is necessarily a psychosocial study in which the brain is significantly influenced by social interaction. Emmon's and Paloutzian's (2003)

call for a multilevel interdisciplinary paradigm and Cote's (2006) call for a

multidimensional approach to identity are both considered with Fivush's work and

Erikson's psychosocial model in the conceptualization of religious identity. Religious

identity is at once a neurologically rooted and socially constructed feature of individuals

that have epigenetic needs to articulate a coherent story of the self. Often, religion is an

important ingredient in narrative, and may bring unique cognitive capacities for identity

in which transcendence is integrated in the self. This multidimensional approach to

conceptualizing and measuring religious identity serves as a foundation for exploring the

following characteristics of religious identity.

Implicit and Explicit Aspects of Religious Identity

In chapter one, I described the many name changes and roles in Erikson's life as

"synonyms of the self." Discovering that Erikson had chosen his own last name, Berman

(1975) had argued that this showed a superficiality to Erikson's identity. However, the

conflicting and overlapping identity resources in Erikson's life made the many names and

roles symbolic of Erikson's configuration play and Joan's and Erik's lifelong dance

together. Berman understood identity to be constantly explicit and simple, but Erikson's

life is a great example of how identity processes rise and fall both in importance and in

awareness. Erikson renegotiated the meaning of ego synthesis (from Freud's original

meaning) and spoke of it as a continuous component to identity, but not in terms of

extensive time periods - years, but more in terms of weeks and months. The ego

synthesis was the operating process in the less conscious ego identity, which was

different from the expressed identity in personal identity (Erikson, 1946). Thus, Erikson

offers a description of identity that looks for stability rather than long term rigidity, and operates on two levels between what is consciously expressed and how the inner, subconscious self processes such identity. Erikson sometimes referred to this inner identity as a preconscious identity that one sometimes has a "sense" of. Grounded in Erikson's conceptual work, religious identity may be explicitly expressed with a certain degree of salience and culturally apropos language that may be distinct from more internal and implicit patterns of religious identity processes.

As described in chapter two, autobiographical memory often takes on schemas and motifs that may operate subconsciously and largely unaware to the individual. One component to implicit identity is the cognitive processing of implicit memory. Also called automatic memory (and similar to James's concept of "habits"), the mind forms beliefs about objects, events, and experiences that are not consciously retrieved. The implicit memories can be so influential in retrieval that experiences may seem misrepresented to objective reality. This partly explains the fluidity of autobiographical memory. Additionally, there may be conscious or subconscious motivations in which memory is influenced by motifs of one's possible self, which lies in the past, present, and future (Strahan and Wilson, 2006). Bringing these two concepts together, we see a clearer role for implicit religious identity which is full of beliefs (implicit memories) and motivations. In explicit religious identity, the motivation for social approval and cultural expectations of faith (with exceptions in which religious identity is to be avoided), social approval bias and the narrative quality of autobiographical memory function together to construct interpretive frameworks of identity. New experiences are filtered or later recreated to flow together into the expressed self. Finally, it should be noted that identity

should not be limited, as McAdams does, to what is only consciously expressed. Identity is the self that involves multiple levels of processing and construction.

The conscious expression of the identity, and to whom it is expressed, can be seen to lie on a continuum from lower levels of social approval bias and higher levels of social approval needs. Domain specificity is demonstrated as people feel much more comfortable talking about certain domains of self (leisure/hobbies, physical appearance, regional/cultural background) than other identity domains (religion, sexuality/gender). Thus, not only does religion operate in potentially unique ways as an implicit and subconscious part of the synthesizing core self, it also varies on the explicit side in which social approval strongly effects the salience of religious identity as it is expressed differently (often higher in salience) in different social contexts. High differences between implicit and explicit religiosity should also demonstrate elements of extrinsic religiosity in which social approval is factored in to increase the appearance of religiosity.

In practice, a scale for implicit and explicit religious identity salience may show how religious identities tend to sustain individuals through periods of dissonance. For instance, an implicit religious identity may be the primary factor sustaining overall religiosity when an individual is confronted with conflicting belief systems or perceived facts, or when an individual's religious community encounters a crisis (the individual relies on religious identity until a new community is found, or returns to the previous one). The person may not practice their faith, nor even hold many of the beliefs associated with the religion, but the implicit religious identity (relatively subconscious to the person) still acts as an influential force that keeps the person attached to religion until an explicit religious identity is able to be reconstructed. In short, individuals may not

practice religion nor even hold salient religious beliefs, and yet their implicit religious identity may continue to push and pull upon them throughout adulthood.

Religious Identity Formation

Erikson did not want his psychosocial model turned into mechanical instruments that would measure the achievement of each task. In fact, he did not like the term achievement and would instead refer to identity formation, identity integration, or just identity (1950, 1959, 1987). Marcia was likely not aware of this opinion at first, and I will agree with Marcia that the measurement model has helped many researchers in discovering aspects of Erikson's original concept of identity formation. Although it has conceptual problems, Marcia's semi-structured interview (ISI) is still supple enough to allow for some sensitivity to the participant, but Adams's EOMEIS-II is really a blunt instrument that does miss important pieces of Erikson's theory.

I will adapt the four statuses in ways that will better fit the unique domain of religion and the theoretical work of Erikson. To begin, Erikson said that each stage is a balance between the two variables. Identity was to be positively balanced over role confusion, but it was not meant that there would be no role confusion. An identity commitment in Erikson's paradigm is stable but not rigid. The child takes on several *identifications* prior to adolescence and then goes through psychosocial *moratoria* in which society provides teenagers with a time to make such decisions. The healthy result is an identity in which the self has an integrated sense of identity. For this reason, I am referring to the fourth and final status of religious identity as religious identity integration (instead of using the word achievement). If the identity is not reflected upon and

integrated, then the youth might make an ideological commitment to some cause (often religious or political). This is similar to Marcia's "foreclosure," but Erikson used that word differently. In the school age child, Erikson says that children should make work identifications; however, an early commitment, or lack of choice, forces them to make an identity *foreclosure* (such as a child forced into a early job) (1980, p. 129). Instead of Marcia's paradigm in which diffusion precedes foreclosure, Erikson's model has foreclosure as a possibility prior to identity *diffusion*. In fact, Erikson described identity diffusion as the crisis in which a person is not able to make a commitment. He did not characterize it with notions of apathy as did Marcia. Thus, on a developmental model more oriented to Erikson, we could speak of identifications and identity foreclosure as precedents to the searching process of identity in which an individual experiences the crisis and exploration of identity diffusion and manages to integrate the identifications into a more formed identity.

Given Erikson's model and the needed practicality of using much of the same language as Marcia, I will use the other three status terms but conceptually understand that one may be expected to enter adolescence in identity foreclosure or identity diffusion (apathy). The term I most struggle with is diffusion, and a better term may be religious identity indifference. Given Fivush's work in early childhood identity and the fact that religion often is integrated in many of these stories, it makes sense that several of the youngest respondents (age 11-13) in this study are in religious identity foreclosure instead of diffusion. For highly religious families, children's only period of religious identity diffusion may have been when there was simply no central concept of the self. At the other end of the statuses, religious identity integration should be able to

incorporate notions of religious quest and openness that characterizes mature faith. Adams's questions were much too rigid to include this component. Further, Erikson often spoke of a reflection that was not necessarily a crisis of identity. Conceptually, the statuses should be understood on the two axes of reflection and attachment. The attachment style may be rigid and firm in foreclosure, and stable and fluid is integration.

Finally, this model of religious identity formation understands that religious identity may be integrated by varying levels of both extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity. Some individuals may practice primarily extrinsic religiosity and still be able to find deep meaningful resources for religious identity. However, it is also likely that extrinsic religiosity will usually predict religious identity foreclosure or diffusion. In foreclosure, a person has made a commitment rather unreflectively and should be more susceptible to differences in implicit and explicit levels of religious identity salience.

Religious identity diffusion, RID

It has been assumed that children inherently begin in identity diffusion. Prior to adolescence, they have little psychological need for constructing identity. They are not interested in defining themselves. RID would not only describe children, but also adults who are disinterested in religion, and possibly those who are extrinsically oriented towards their religion (self-serving motivation for religious involvement[10]) (Griffith and Griggs, 2001). They have made no commitment to a religious community or set of beliefs, nor have they felt any crisis in regards to this lack of commitment.

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[10] Although overall identity diffusion is related to extrinsic religiosity, Allport and Ross's measures of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation are problematic in that the measure applies negative value to extrinsic religious motivation. Thus, those more motivated by the liturgical practices and fellowship in a religious community are deemed less religiously mature than those who are more intrinsically motivated by personal belief systems.

Religious identity foreclosure, RIF

This status reflects individuals who have made a commitment to a religious tradition and its set of beliefs and practices. RIF's are distinguished from RII individuals by their lack of flexibility and their strong desire for conformity. Foreclosure is the absence of any role confusion/diffusion. Remembering that Erikson said both components are important to a healthy psychosocial balance, RIFs completed rid themselves of the important balancing feature of diffusion. Overall foreclosed individuals tend to be authoritarian and need the approval of their peers. They can quickly become defensive about their faith and are correlated with conventional moral reasoning (Kroger, 2004). They are marked by a pattern of accommodation and inherit their religious identity with little critical reflection. De Hann and Schulenberg (1997) reviewed findings that showed early adolescents in the RIF status, and then moving into a RID status – opposite of more typical patterns of other identity domains. In highly religious societies, it may be that teenagers have ample opportunities to unquestionably adopt a religious identity for sake of ease and comfort. If we had data for pre-adolescents, we may find that they move from diffusion earlier than other identity domains, as many adopt a concrete-operational styled religious identity (RIF) by the age of 11. That this is out of sync with other identity domains establishes further evidence that religious identity functions in cognitively unique ways for many individuals. Are religious symbols and belief systems more salient resources for identity commitments at an earlier age than other identity resources? If so, why has some research pointed to a move from RIF to RID as the teenager gets older? Further, in that some churches encourage critical reflection on their beliefs and others renounce such efforts, we could

imagine that denominational backgrounds would be strongly influential in moving

masses of people into RIF, or towards RII. Finally, Kroger (2004) points out that

foreclosed individuals are the most approval seeking individuals. If so, I predict that

RIFs will be associated with higher explicit ranking of religious identity salience.

Religious identity moratorium, RIM

Individuals characterized by RIM status do not demonstrate a commitment to a

religious tradition, and they may either feel some anxiety about their religious identity, or

they may simply be reflective and attentive to this identity domain. They have a strong

sense of willfulness and self-esteem while resisting demands for conformity. These are

the religious seekers, those who are open to different religious identities and score high

on the Quest measure of religiosity. Their religious identity is in flux and may stay in

this status for weeks or for a lifetime. From clinical experience, these are the individuals

who feel greater stress and seek out pastoral counselors and clinical psychologists. In

regards to those in overall identity moratorium, individuals report that Marcia's identity

status interview gives them insight into their situation (Kroger, 2004). Such clinical

application could be sharpened with a clearer perspective on the individual domain of

religious identity, especially for spiritual caregivers and pastoral counselors.

Religious identity integration, RII

Another reason to use the word *integration* instead of Marcia's word *achievement*

is in order to remove the implicit valuing of different theologies and traditions of

religious identity formation. Those who are foreclosed can be quite satisfied with their

religious identity; it may serve them and their tradition well. Erikson used the

terminology "identity vs. role confusion" to describe this stage in which an individual

takes previous identifications (labels) and integrates them into a coherent sense of self.

Building on Erikson's original conceptualization, *integration* better describes this process

in religious identity formation in which a person critically reflects upon his/her culture's

religious belief systems and traditions. They then choose for their own sake, and not just

for others, to integrate a particular faith system into who they are and how they define

themselves. Having made a commitment to a religious identity, RII individuals have a

strong sense of self-esteem and autonomy. However, they also remain flexible, even

playful, with religious practices and beliefs.

In dialogue with Fowler's Faith Stages

Fowler's (1981) six stages of faith (intuitive-projective, mythic-literal, synthetic-

conventional, individuative-reflective, conjunctive, universalizing) seem to have a nice

parallel with the religious identity statuses. Religious identity diffusion reflects the

confused and peripheral role of religion that we would likely find in mythic-literal faith.

Religious identity foreclosure would likely be located in synthetic-conventional faith in

which religion is regarded in fairly absolutist terms. The Individuative-reflective stage of

faith could be seen alongside the religious identity moratorium in which a person is

actively engaging in reflection. Finally, the conjunctive faith stage may show similarities

with religious identity integration in which some openness is grounded in recommitments

to a religious system. So are they measuring the same thing? Fowler's primary course at

Emory University was titled "Faith and identity." He saw identity intertwined with faith

and expressly used Erikson's concept of ego as the meaning making (faithing) process of the person. One of the primary differences lies in describing religious identity moratorium as a temporary and unstable time that may end early in foreclosure or with some resolving of the concerns in integration. Fowler's individuative-reflective stage was not seen to be a temporary point, but could be a life long stage of faith. If the two measures were used together, the study may find that religious identity integration might be dispersed with some in synthetic-conventional faith, many more in individuative-reflective, and some in conjunctive (Fowler's hard to reach stage of conjunctive faith may have more RIIs than any other status, but more RIIs may be found the previous stage). The dialogue between the two religious formation paradigms would bring about important implications between cognitive understandings of meaning-making and identity constructing processes.

Transcendence

Identity may be psychosocially unique in that it is the only domain which is so closely related to transcending the self. In this domain, identity is drawn from individual and social/institutional allegiance to an unseen, outside-of-me god/s, cosmic force – it is the most imaginative identity domain. Since identity is an integration and balance between self and other, a religious identity is peculiar in that its trajectory, in some religions, is towards transcending the self in some manner. This could be understood as an internalized/integrated sense of sacred Other, or even a third 'other' as identity is potentially triangulated. This is not to say that religious identity must be centered on transcendental experiences. The mere fact that a religious community is grounded on

narratives of transcendence make such experiences part of a communal identity, even if the experience is not immediate to the individual.

Religious Identity Focus

In Erikson's later writings, his description of the "I" was one that was often seeking a spiritual identity resource and was hungry for existential purpose. I am proposing that identity has a developmental focus that follows Erikson's psychosocial stages. The young adult is concerned with intimacy and the necessary risk of one's identity in such a relationship, and/or with vocation and the requirement of finding satisfaction in work. The stage of generativity is characterized by risking both intimacy and identity by sharing one's identity resources with the next generation. Commonly, adults who have achieved this, or possibly in spite of reaching this, begin to focus their identity on an existential concern looking for deep meaning and elements of transcending the self. Erikson's own writings turned to philosophical and spiritual focuses during this stage of his life. If so, this would mean that religious identity may find its function as a resource for presenting a stable and nurturing self to attract a mate in intimacy. It may be a pedagogical resource for identity development in intergenerational story telling. And it may function primarily as an existential identity resource after generative needs are formed or thwarted.

Religious Identity in the Sociopolitical Realm

Erikson early on described the adolescent's attraction to ideological commitments, similar to Marcia's notion of foreclosure. As youths seek to break out

from family groups, they often form pseudo-kin groups that are characterized by radical

commitments. One common outcome is the pseudospeciation of others. Without an

integrated identity, the fragile and tenaciously held grip on the identity commitment is

insecure and easily threatened. Any group of individuals who have made an alternative

identity attachment can be seen as threats. In combining evolutionary psychological

concepts of kin selection and adolescent mating and grouping behaviors with Erikson's

epigenetic model of identity, we have a powerful explanatory tool for occurrences of

religious violence rooted in identity needs and kin-selection modules gone awry. This

dissertation does not directly deal with such possibilities in the construction of the

measure, but it is hoped that the measure's sensitivity to status formation and

implicit/explicit aspects of identity will be a tool that we can use to learn more of

violence and religious identity, and potentially seek out alternative directions for our

youth and young adults.

Measuring Religious Identity

Can it be measured? In 2006, I presented the possibility of measuring religious

identity to scholars in sociological, psychology, and religious studies conferences in

America and in Europe. Although well received, just a few scholars came to hear it at the

American Psychological Association, Division 36 section of psychology of religion. In

all three of the other conferences it was a rare standing room only presentation that was

received with much more excitement and disagreement by scholars of sociology (British

Sociology of Religion Conference), religion (American Academy of Religion

Conference), and an international group of psychologists of religion (International

Association for the Psychology of Religion). Douglass Davies, a prominent sociology of religion scholar at the University of Durham, UK, responded to my presentation, "You have just presented the exact thing that I have worked my whole career against!" International scholars at a conference in Belgium greeted it with praise and heavy criticism: "How can you measure something as subjective as the expressed self?" "How can mystical experiences be subsumed under a notion of religious identity?" "This is just scientific reductionism!" The paper was published as a chapter in *Religion and the Individual: Belief, Practice, Identity*, just down the table of contents from a chapter by Professor Davies (Bell, 2008). Although there is a bluntness to such objective measures, I do think that the measure for religious identity will be able to help in large number studies that are looking for statistical significance between demographics and other measures.

CHAPTER FIVE
Measuring Religious Identity – Scale Construction

Overview

Although identity and narrative processes are fundamental to how people construct beliefs, experience feelings, and choose actions, until now there has been no development in psychology of religion for a measure of religious identity. Out of the conceptual framework presented in this paper and building on the recent findings of cognitive psychology, there are strong reasons to suspect that the formation and integration of religious identity may be a core cognitive process that determines many of the already measured psychological outcomes and typologies associated with religion. Building on the understanding that religious identity holds powerful explanatory value in describing the psychology of religion, the first step in empirically demonstrating this relationship lies in constructing a measure for religious identity. The goal of this research is to establish a measure for religious identity 1) functioning, and 2) formation - by looking at implicit and explicit psychological aspects of religious identity as well as psychological formation of religious identity measured by religious identity statuses. The complete measure can be found in Appendix A.

Preliminary Considerations in Construct Validity

This pilot study addresses the face validity of concepts around religious identity. As a preliminary project, it does not establish internal reliability or other components of construct validity. As with existing identity measures, future research will be needed to

address construct validity broadly defined, including convergent and discriminant aspects, as well as thorough reliability analysis.

To understand these concepts, this section will briefly describe construct validity as set forth by Campbell and Fiske (1959). Out of their multitrait-multimethod matrix (MTMM), construct validity for a measure is established by both convergent and discriminant validity. For convergent validity in the next research project, the measures which are theoretically supposed to be highly interrelated would be, in practice, highly interrelated (convergent validity). Likewise for discriminant validity, the measures that are theoretically not supposed to be related to each other in fact are not (also known as divergent validity). For the Religious Identity Status measure (RISt), the results should theoretically lie predominantly within one of the four identity statuses (see Chapter four for descriptions of statuses). Some results may show transition between two related statuses, although two relationships should not be blended: 1) *religious identity diffusion* should be inversely related to *religious identity integration*, 2) *religious identity foreclosure* should be inversely related to *religious identity integration*. Each of the items scored per status should be highly correlated per status, and 3 status sets of data should diverge from the results of one primary status set of items. Finally, there should be a positive association between age and status acquisition. Since identity statuses have long been conceived as a developmental phenomenon, there should be a significant association with age in the cross-sectional data although, of course, future longitudinal research is needed to more adequately address the transition from foreclosure to integration. The results of this projects preliminary research do reflect the above associations and offer support to the face validity of the work.

The overall paradigm of identity statuses has undergone several construct validity studies. One scholar, van Hoof (1999), has raised serious questions about the validity of the statuses. Her argument is that each of the four statuses, in regards to the variable in question, must be statistically different from every other identity status. Kroger responds that:

> one would not expect statistically significant differences between each identity position and every other one…rather, one would expect a distinctive pattern of responses for the identity statuses on dependent variables, and such patterns of responses have generally been found. Indeed, few developmental paradigms in psychology would meet van Hoof's stringent criteria for the establishment of construct validity. (Kroger, 2004, p. 47)

Indeed, the results from this dissertation's study do show strong relationships between the statuses and dependent variables.

For the Religious Identity Salience measure (RISa), the basic scoring of high and low is a combination of the first page of the scale (coded narrative content) and the second page (ranking of identity domains). Theoretically, the results from these two pages could conflict for an individual (high on one, low on the other). Since each page has one basic measure and they do not theoretically need to be related (see implicit/explicit discussion below), construct validity is not extensively supported and may only be achieved through the logic and face validity of the research design. For instance, in trying to understand how important the domain of religious identity is for an individual, if I ask an individual to rank several domains of identity, then I should be getting data that shows the importance of the religious identity domain. Likewise, if I ask an individual to describe her/himself, then it is reasonable to expect that the content and the order in which the content is written, reveals some facets of importance (scoring will be done on both whether any religious/spiritual content is included, and in which order

the religious content lies compared to the overall list of descriptors). Of course, there are more complexities to construct validity and many of these issues are dealt with per each measure below. The RISa is not constructed along developmental principles. Any child may report a high degree of religious identity (salience), as may an older adult. The salience scale is similar to a trait *taxonomy* in conjunction with other religiosity measures.

Scale Construction

Overall Design - Bell Measure for Religious Identity

As argued in the previous chapters, social approval bias is a significant factor in the expression of religious identity. In the fairly religious culture of America, many individuals may seek social approval by increasing their religious identity. Participants in this study may have doubts about components of their faith or even in the existence of God/gods that they do not wish to share with others. Or, they may feel like they are not religious enough overall. Further, there may be a "deity approval bias" in which subjects express their identities in ways that they believe would earn the approval of their God/gods. It may not be possible to reduce a deity approval bias, but one can possibly reduce the effects of social approval bias.

The Bell Measure for Religious Identity (both the RISa and RISt) is designed to maximize anonymity and minimize social approval bias. The measure is constructed as a questionnaire to be taken on the internet in whatever setting the participant chooses. When results are received, the computer program housing the measure scrambles computer IP addresses from the respondents and does not trace email or any other personal information. There is never any social interaction between the researchers and

the respondent. The only contact is through the sending of mass emails that make a

potential participant aware of the study. It is not possible to remove all social approval

bias. In line with Emory's Institutional Review Board's protocol, the participants are

aware that the study is on identity, that the principle investigator is "David Bell," and that

it is part of a dissertation project from Emory University. However, the high degree of

anonymity and lack of face-to-face contact should significantly reduce social approval

bias.

The measure consists of four primary sections. The first two pages request the

participant to rank domains of identity. Both of these are part of the subscale of

Religious Identity Salience (RISa). The third page is a 28-item scale designed to measure

the subscale of Religious Identity Status (RISt). The final page requests demographic

information including religious background.

Religious Identity Salience (RISa) – Quantitative Measure

As described in chapter four, this dissertation contends that one's religious

identity is not just the current social expression of it in whatever context that may be.

Instead, individuals operate with implicit identities and explicit identities. Ranging on a

continuum, the implicit identity is more of an inner self, sometimes not shared with

others, and less socially constructed in regards to social approval bias. The explicit

identity is readily conscious, potentially changes in different social contexts, and is

willingly shared with others to garner social approval. With a high degree of sensitivity

to the subject of religion, the measure intentionally does not say that it is about religion.

The title of the measure read by the respondents is the "Bell Identity Measure" which

makes no reference to religion. In the consent page, the participant is told that the questions may ask about identity, gender, vocation, religion, politics, and personal beliefs.

Thus, the research design is set up to first ask, in a non-religious context, for the individual to simply describe who they are:

> *For this first section, imagine that you need to describe or identify yourself to someone that you have NEVER met, who CANNOT see you, and does not know you from any other person in the world. This person can only know who you are through the following words or short phrases that you use. [Please do not use any contact information (i.e., no addresses, emails, phone numbers, or social security numbers).] Now, as quickly as the answers come to your mind, write out the top ten words or short phrases that best identify who you are.*

Conceptually, this is designed to look for implicit salience in the particular domain of religious identity. The participants have not been given any prompting of what would make an "identity domain" and so the answers are freely formed. The goal of this measure is to code it for religious content and to compare the ranking of that content with the second page's more explicit measure of religious identity. Another benefit is that all of the responses can be coded for 10 categories of identity and compared with the ranking of identity when prompted explicitly on the next page. The theory is that there could be a wide degree of divergence between religious identity implicitly expressed versus explicitly expressed. The result will be referred to as *implicit religious identity salience*, or iRISa. The iRISa could then be used to see if there is any relationship between divergence or similarity per demographic variables (including religious affiliation) and religious identity statuses. Is this actually getting at an *implicit* religious identity? 'Implicit' comes from the Latin past participle *implicare*, meaning 'to entangle.' If a religious identity is given on the first page, even though it is not prompted as an identity

domain, it likely (though not always) points to an important 'entangling' of the domain

with other areas of identity and represents domain salience for the person. The other

implicit factor of this page is that it represents a ranking of importance even though the

respondents are not told that they are ranking. After the task request, the participants are

give ten boxes (50 letter character limit) that are vertically placed with a sequential

numbering of each box. The free-form listing of identity words or phrases can be

understood to be estimating degrees of importance in which the first phrase in the first

box should be more important than the last phrase in the last box. This results in the

participant implicitly ranking identity domains without being made aware of this task.

As a measure for explicit religious identity, the next page asks the individuals to

rank importance of identity domains with religion/spirituality included as a category

option. The ten categories offered are: vocation, gender/sexuality, personality/personal

characteristics, religion, hobby/sports/leisure, education, ethnicity/cultural group,

political/ethical, relationship status – family/friends, and age. The outcome will be

referred to as *explicit religious identity* salience, or eRISa. The thesis contended here is

that religious identity will move up the explicit scale in importance versus the previous

implicit scale. If so, this may demonstrate a social approval bias with people wanting to

say that religion is more important to their identity that it may actually be. The overall

ranking of eRISa can also be correlated with demographic variables (including religious

affiliation) and religious identity statuses to see if there are any significant relationships.

Other important outcomes are possible by combining the implicit and explicit

components for an overall measure of *religious identity salience*, or RISa . The overall

summation of religious identity salience for both scales per individual could be correlated

with demographic variables and religious identity statuses looking for significance, and then contrasted with iRISa correlations and eRISa correlations. As simple as it sounds, this could be valuable information in the psychological study of religion. For instance, we could ask: How important is religious identity (RISa) to individuals who are religiously extrinsic or intrinsic? Is there a positive relation with other measures in religiosity? We do not know how religious identity salience interacts with any other established measures of religious, and there could be very important relationships with powerful explanatory value. One final result from this measure would lie in comparing the domains of identity beyond religion to see how they relate in implicit/explicit styles and to then contrast this with the domain of religious identity. For instance, many participants use personality characteristics on the implicit scale (funny, optimistic, etc.) and then likewise rank personality characteristics high on the second scale. Implicit and explicit personality characteristics seem to not be very different. This measure would be able to detail implicit/explicit patterns of difference per each identity domain.

Religious Identity Statuses (RISt) – Qualitative measure

The third page of the measure is a 28 item inventory with 5 items per religious identity status and 2 items per global identity status. The respondents are asked to check a box that most appropriately describes their level of agreement: strongly disagree, moderately disagree, slightly disagree, slightly agree, moderately agree, and strongly agree. This is similar to Adams's EOMEIS-II scale differing only in that the middle two responses do not include the word "slightly" (1998).

The first goal of the RISt is to establish an independent measure of religious identity statuses that has convergent validity with already established items in the

EOMEIS-II (Adams, 1998).   Secondly, the RISt will test for differences between

established items of global identity with items of religious identity. The thesis is that

religious identity statuses may act independently to global identity statuses. Thirdly, the

RISt will give researchers a measure to be used longitudinally to see if religious identity

status formation follows the general sequencing of Marcia's theory, beginning in

diffusion, going to foreclosure or moratorium, and ending up at achievement/integration

for some. Preliminary data in this study will be able to show if there is significance

between age and religious identity statuses.

The EOMEIS-II is a 64 item scale designed to test overall identity formation in

relationship to Marcia's identity statuses. It has been used extensively in published

research and has been show to have construct validity in relationship to Marcia's SIS

qualitative interview. The scale measures 8 domains of identity including occupation,

religion, politics, philosophical life-style, friendship, dating, sex roles, and recreation and

leisure. With 8 items each, there were then 2 items each per status per category. The

design of the scale to measure overall global identity makes it difficult to break down per

each identity status per 8 identity domains. One of the design flaws, mentioned in the

literature review in chapter three of this dissertation, is the contractual nature of the items.

Building on the two axis grid of Marcia's test for identity commitment and crisis

(Diffusion --, Foreclosure +-, Moratorium -+, Achievement ++), Adams's writes many of

the questions in a way that includes both components of crisis and commitment. The

question basically asks two different things joined with a conjunction. If the person

agrees with one side and not the other, they do not know whether to agree overall or

disagree overall. I received back 24 emails in regards to this specific problem. The

presumption is that the person would either mark such an item in which both parts do not agree with them as some level of disagreement up to the level of "slightly agree." But this allows for quite a bit of variance and does not offer a sharp design.

It is not presumed that all people have a religious identity. People may be non-religious, and those that are non-religious might struggle with this 28 item section. One statistical measure will see if status validity is stronger when non-religious individuals are not included in this measure. "Non-religious" is measured by the religious background question (demographic page) in which non-religious is an option.

The RISt includes 8 items in religious identity and 4 items in life style identity previously used from the EOMESI-II. Adams's conceptualization of the life style identity domain is quite similar to how someone would speak of a global, overall identity. To these items were added 4 new life style/global identity questions and 12 new religious identity questions to form an overall 28 item inventory with 20 items for religious identity and 8 items for global identity. These items were given to college students and informally discussed with others to gather feedback on the project's face validity. Several were adapted to a degree in which the most recent group of students readily agreed that the items were clear and understandable by themselves and later, per the identity status's concept. The items with conjunctions make for a difficult statistical analysis. I am trying to consider options of how to revise the scale to not include dual level statuses. For this first presentation of RISt, I have gone ahead with items that include both crisis and commitment elements in the same statement. The break down of the questions per status follows:

I. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY DIFFUSION

1. When it comes to religion I just haven't found anything that appeals to me and I don't really feel the need to look. (From Adams, Q2)

The first part could indicate diffusion or moratorium, and the second part is diffusion.   It implies that there is some degree of effort and struggle which is closer to moratorium and maybe a confounding problem for this item.

5. I don't give religion much thought and it doesn't bother me one way or the other. (From Adams, Q10)

15. I have a few religious beliefs, but I am not committed to any religious tradition and am not concerned about finding one.

This new item was added with the notion that diffusion oriented individuals may still have religious beliefs (in tension with Q5) but are not concerned with them. It is still a conjunction statement and may be a confounding factor for non-religious individuals (who would disagree with the first part and agree with the second part).

22. *I don't see religion as important to who I am, and I'm not concerned with religion.*

This new item was added to explicitly ask about a diffused relationship between religion and identity. It presents the possibility (unlike in the EOMEIS-II) that one may have a diffused religious identity but still some at least nominal sense of self.

26. *I've never thought about whether religion is important to me or not.*

This new item aims to find a participant who has done no reflection upon a religious identity. Ultimately, this is the conceptual group that Marcia and Adams were describing.

One of the problems with the original measure is that the original questions (Q1 and 5 in this measure) could include those who *have* reflected upon religion in the past

and decided to not be religious. One statistical run of this data will be to consider a group of *committed* non-religious individuals. This would mean that Q15 and 26 would be removed, and Q1, 5, and 22 will be used to estimate and sort the non-religious individuals. Also, since Q15 implies some religiosity, this status should be run with and without it to see if Q15 is an outlier to the convergent similarity of the other items.

Two items are included for global identity diffusion:

3. I have never really thought about "who I am."

This is a new item that explicitly asks about the "self" as a reflected upon quality of a person.

18. There's no single "life style" which appeals to me more than another. (From Adams, Q4)

This question aims at Adams's broad notion of lifestyle reflection. It should be strongly correlated with Q3.

II. Religious Identity Foreclosure

4. I've never really questioned my religion. If it's right for my family it must be right for me. (From Adams, Q58).

The term "family" is used instead of the original "parents" from the EOMEIS-II. Adams designed this question for foreclosure, but one could imagine a diffused individual who would find some agreement with it. It does not really get at Marcia's notion of commitment and may only imply a reflection of status that is first prompted by the actual taking of the questionnaire. It is likely that Q4 is somewhat correlated with diffusion items. It is also problematic because it assumes that the participant has a religious family. One can certainly imagine individuals from non-religious families who

accept a religious identity fairly quickly with little reflection. One example would be a person who has never reflected upon religion and then unexpectedly experiences a conversion experience at a religious service.

14. I am committed to my religious beliefs and never really had any period of questioning my faith.

This new item was included to explicitly ask about commitment and crisis and is different from the previous item by removing references to family of origin. It is clearly a conjunction statement in the nature of Adams's original items. Of course, this presents a problem of those who may agree with the first part and not the second part. In general, when people do not agree with both sections, they tend to mark that they disagree with the overall statement. However, from the emails I received, the question was a point of stress in which individuals wanted to make sure that they expressed that they were indeed committed to their religious beliefs even if they had questioned it. Emails from concerned participants implied that they had marked that they agreed with statements such as this one since they considered a part of it very important to communicate. This shows both the sensitivity to the subject of religion and the confounding problem of including statements that desire to measure both crisis and commitment.

16. My faith is very important to me, and I have never really doubted it.

This new item seeks to link salience and commitment. Implied in Marcia's original status paradigm, commitment means that one has formed a degree of attachment to this identity. Attachments are important by their nature. Thus a foreclosed religious identity should be at least somewhat important to the person holding it. Again, this is a conjunction statement and may have respondents who agree with one part and not the other.

21. I like my church/religious community, and I have never considered changing denominations or faiths.

This item brings into the notion that religion is more than the belief system and may be largely defined by some as an attachment to the people who are religiously similar. Considering Allport and Ross's measures of extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity, one could imagine a foreclosed identity here that is based in extrinsic religiosity (1966). This illustrates a conceptual blind spot for Marcia and Adams who envisioned religious identity being only inward and ideological instead of social and interpersonal.

28. I attend the same church/faith community (or same kind of church) that my family has always attended, and I've never really questioned why. (From Adams, Q50).

The original question just used the term "church" and did not include "faith community (or some kind of church)." This reflected a conceptual blind spot in religious diversity and confuses notions of a local church body with a denomination of like churches. Church is exclusively a Christian term and excludes those who would use the language of "temple" (Mormon, Jewish), "synagogue" (Jewish), and "mosque" (Islamic). I also added "same kind of church" since the purpose of the question is not to ask if the participant is attending the same church building as his/her family of origin, but the same type of religious community.

There are two items to measure global identity foreclosure:

12. My parents' views on life were good enough for me, I don't need anything else. (From Adams, Q44).

Adams felt the need to include references to parents, however Erikson certainly did not understand a foreclosed identity (an "ideological" commitment) to be related to the family. Here, Adams is confusing elements of diffusion with foreclosure. There is no real notion of commitment in this question – a fundamental part of Marcia's

understanding of foreclosure. Further, the very nature of the question makes it very unpopular. Almost all teens and adults wish to define themselves apart from their parents of origin, even if they share a strong and healthy relationship. Thus, Q4 and Q12 are predicted to be scored very low (strongly disagree) and lower than any other items on the scale. These could then provide a problem in convergent validity for the overall measure of both religious diffusion and global diffusion.

24. I know "who I am" and I never had to worry about it much.

This new item explicitly asks about a knowledge of a committed self and whether there is a history of any searching for overall identity. Again, it is a conjunction statement and a participant may agree with one part and not the other part. Each of the seven items in foreclosure status are dependent on there not being a prior time of reflection or doubt.

III. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY MORATORIUM

7. I'm not sure what religion means to me. I'd like to make up my mind but I'm not done looking yet. (From Adams, Q26).

This is a good question, but it still combines both crisis and commitment in one item. Diffused and Moratorium would agree with the first part on commitment). The second part on crisis would be true for moratorium, but only true historically for achieved/integrated. Thus the questions in moratorium status ask if there is a present crisis versus historical crisis.

9. Religion is confusing to me right now. I keep changing my views on what is right and wrong for me. (From Adams, Q34).

This question is problematic because the "right now" makes it sound like one would need to be in an acute crisis, possibly at the very moment of taking the questionnaire – which is very unlikely. The "right and wrong" for me does not connect well enough with the topic of religion in the first part and may be perceived as more general and meaning "right or wrong" in terms of moral ambiguity. The third problem is much larger. Another blind spot from the EOMEIS-II, people do not often go about consciously looking for what religion "fits" them. Usually, they are looking to see if they can believe in a religion and find truth in it. The addition of "for me" implies that religious claims are relative. Those who are open to religious belief do not see usually themselves on an identity journey when they consider religious beliefs and attachment; instead, they see the God (religious truth) guiding them to which one is true. Adams and Marcia both considered religion just like other domains of identity (such as vocation and hobbies). Deciding which sport to play is quite a bit different experience for people than deciding which religion is true. Even if researchers observe that the identity processes are similar, one should ask the question in a way that reflects the general the phenomenological experience of the participants.

I predict that these problems will make this item very low rated with very few people agreeing with it. I included it because I needed to keep each of the religion identity statuses structurally similar with two questions each from the previous EOMEIS-II. A better question would have been: "*Religion is confusing to me, and I am trying to see which denomination or faith, if any, is best or true*" and Q17 basically asks this. The present tense verbs imply that one is currently in moratorium and the notion of fittedness

("right or wrong" in original question) is given more credibility with the description of "true."

13. I am still exploring my faith and I'm not sure where I will end up.

This new item uses Quest scale terminology. In retrospect, "still" was not a necessary adverb. The verb "exploring" and the possessive "my" are intended to fit those who are religious, but significantly unsettled in their religious affiliation. "Faith" is used as a more colloquial and personal term than "religion." In general, people who are in religious identity moratorium use words that carry more intimacy than the word "religion", such as "spiritual," "faith," and "soul."

17. I have a lot of questions about different denominations and faiths, like "Which one is true or best?"

This new item seeks to get at what was meant to be measured in Q9. It demonstrates some concern about religion, but it implies a lesser degree of crisis than being measured in Q13's reference to "exploring."

23. My religious beliefs are different from others', and I am still forming them.

This new item includes those who do have religious beliefs but are aware that significant parts of their beliefs are still being chosen. I included the reflection of difference to replicate the common narrative in which people enter religious identity moratorium because they are unable to believe all of what their family, church, or peers believe. Of course, most people would technically agree with the first part of the item, especially those aware of the massive variety of religions. In preliminary research with different youth in Atlanta, this phrase was repeated in different forms commonly for youth in religious identity moratorium: "I just couldn't believe all the stuff that _____ (parents, friends, church members) say. I'm still trying to figure out what's true." For

youth entering a moratorium religious identity status, they tend to work with a notion of "others" that generally believe all the same way. Despite the ambiguity of "others," this item should fit well into moratorium status. There could be some minor overlapping with Quest oriented religious identity integrated individuals who could agree with this item.

There are two items that measure global identity moratorium.

8. I feel like I am still trying to find out "who I am."

This new item is an explicit measure of overall identity status that implies concern about the crisis and a general lack of stable knowledge of the self (commitment to an identity).

10. In finding an acceptable viewpoint to life itself, I find myself engaging in a lot of discussions with others and some self exploration. (From Adams, Q34).

This item nicely adds a dimension of dialectical identity in which people ask questions of others during the moratorium status. However, "viewpoint" is different from Adams's other questions in the same category about "life style." "Viewpoint" seems to add a more existential element instead of global identity and could overlap more significantly with religious identity. It will be interesting to see if these two items correlate well.

IV. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY INTEGRATION

2. A person's faith is unique to each individual. I've considered and reconsidered it myself and know what I can believe. (From Adams, Q18)

At first, this seems like a very good item for religious identity achievement/integration. The second part is very strong. While the first part may be true, it may not reflect the beliefs or phenomenological experience of many religious

believers who have considered and reconsidered their beliefs. It implies a relativity of truth in regards to faith. To a conservative Christian, it could be seen to be promoting a liberal understanding of faith and not one's own "true" faith. It would be better written, "*In regards to faith, I've considered and reconsidered it and know what I can believe.*"

11. I've gone through a period of serious questions about faith and can now say I understand what I believe in as an individual. (From Adams , Q42).

As with each of the integration questions, the participant is being asked a temporal question to see if an exploration/reflection of religious identity has occurred in the past. Interestingly, a non-religious person who would score overall on religious diffusion could also agree with this question. It shows how the original scale was not constructed to consider non-religious people who have consciously decided not to believe. Also, a deconverted person who does not have an identity attachment to religion could agree with this item. Although an extreme example, this illustrates how religious identity salience may be independent to religious identity status.

In 11 emails from participants, this item (as well as Q19) was highlighted as a problem. The individuals felt like they wanted to agree and did score that they agreed on this item even though they had not gone through a period of serious questioning. It was important to them not to disagree with a statement that included: "I understand what I believe in as an individual." Again, this shows the confounding problem of two statements in one item.

19. It took some time and effort, but after wrestling with my faith, I now know what I believe.

This new item was added to reflect the language often observed in my early research by those who tell narratives of religious identity integration. The term

"wrestling" is possibly too unusual to those who have never used it. It is a more common narrative description in many Christian groups. In small trial runs of this item, Jewish (n=12) and Islamic (n=3) students said that the term was not problematic and made sense to them. This item did suffer from participants wanting to agree with "I know what I believe" even if there was no struggle to determine those beliefs.

20. I know what I believe, and even though I don't believe everything my religious tradition believes, it's still a part of who I am.

This new item describes those who feel an attachment to a faith community and a strong degree of religious identity without the actual religious beliefs. In preliminary research, I have heard numerous people ranging from Baptist to Jewish to Catholic tell a religious identity story similar to this item. It differs conceptually from the commitment aspect of Marcia's statuses paradigm since these people express a religious identity that is fully integrated and yet it does not rank high on commitment. When I asked a Catholic individual who strongly agreed to this item whether they would describe themselves as having a firm and unchangeable commitment to the Roman Catholic Church, the Catholic individual decidedly said no. The language of "commitment" does not fit the phenomenological experience of this group of people. It is not part of their narrative script. This item was added to measure religious identity integration that is more oriented around the social community (extrinsic) that the creed of that tradition (intrinsic).

25. I've questioned a lot of things about religion, and I now feel at peace with my faith.

Again, this new item was added to reflect the language that I heard commonly used by people. The terminology of a feeling of "peace" made sense to early reviewers of the scale in that it contrasts well to Erikson's notion of crisis. It does not include a reference to a fully formed belief system found in the other four items. Certainty about

one's beliefs does not necessarily characterize those who have religious identity integration, and it will interesting to see if this question is a statistical outlier to the other four.

There are two items that seek to measure a notion of overall global identity achievement/integration.

6. After considerable thought I've developed my own individual viewpoint of what is for me an ideal "life style" and don't believe anyone will be likely to change my perspective. (From Adams, Q20).

This item seems to make a defensive posture towards being open to others. I am not sure that having an achieved formation of identity means that no one could ever change my mind. The defensiveness of it may draw some foreclosed people to it who wish to defend their identity rather than reflect upon it, and may miss some achieved people who have a stable understanding of themselves that still may be open to new experiences with others.

27. I did a lot of searching and exploring and I now have a good sense of "who I am."

This new item seems to better get at global identity integration. It may not have a good statistical correlation with Q6. Overall it will be interesting to see the relationship with global identity achievement and religious identity statuses. The thesis is that although they may be related, one does not significantly predict the other.

The final part of the measure is a demographic page that requests age, education, race, gender, income, regional location, and religious background. The religious background question takes those who check one of four categories (no religious background, Christian, Jewish, Islam) to a following page specific to each category with a breakdown of affiliations. The option of "other" is offered for race and religion.

CHAPTER SIX
Measuring Religious Identity – Methods and Results

METHODS

Sample

The sample was composed of 653 participants who completed the full measure. The anonymous participants ranged in age from a group of 11-13-year-olds (n=10) to one adult above the age 90. The survey counted all starts which totaled 1121. False starts were included (n=260) which meant that the consent page was accepted, but no information was given on the first part of the iRISa measure. Incomplete measures (n=208) were often caused by the second eRISa measure. The wording was not clear enough and many participants tried to rate each category on a 1-10 scale instead of ranking all of the categories from 1-10.

Females (63.4% female) and people in their thirties (n=188) were oversampled (58% larger than second largest decade sample). Age range categories were divided closely between 11-23 due to the theoretical constructs in which Erikson placed identity formation during this time and the common presupposition that it now extends into college age years. Compared to the general population, the sample was very educated (35.4% hold a master's degree or higher), ethnically homogenous (80.4% Caucasian), wealthy (37.7% have household income over $90,000), and from the Southeast (55.4%). The request for state of residence was collapsed into Midwest, Mountain, Northeast,

Pacific, Southeast, and not reported. The large not reported group was due to Alabama being a default setting and not being able to distinguish between non responders and Alabama, thus all Alabama results were grouped together as Non-reported. Urban, suburban, and rural variables did fit with general population censuses. The undersampling of non-Caucasian racial backgrounds, lower education levels, and lower income levels are significant and prevent the data from being considered a general representation of the US population. However, as independent variables, the sampling is still large enough to measure for factor significance in education and income. Race was not diversified enough to be able to test for significance.

Table 1 *Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents (N = 653)*

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Gender		
Female	414	63.4
Male	236	36.1
Not reported	3	0.5
Age		
11-13	10	1.5
14-16	17	2.6
17-19	27	4.1
20-23	47	7.2
24-29	72	11.0
30-35	111	17.0
36-40	77	11.8
41-45	55	8.4
46-50	34	5.2
51-55	43	6.6
56-60	52	8.0
61-65	49	7.5
66-70	39	6.0
71-75	11	1.7
76-80	6	0.9
81-85	1	0.2
86-90	1	0.2
91 and over	1	0.2

Table 1 *Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents (*N = *653)* **(continued)**

Category	Frequency	Percentage

Education completed

Middle school	13	2.0
High school	67	10.3
Some college	116	17.8
College degree	226	34.6
Master's degree	169	25.9
Doctorate	62	9.5

Female, 414
Male, 236
None, 3

Racial background

African descent	13	2.0
American Indian	12	1.8
Caucasian/European descent	525	80.4
Eastern Asian	16	2.5
East Indian	1	0.2
Latino/a	8	1.2
Multi-racial	13	2.0
Pacific Islander	2	0.3
Other	60	9.2
Not reported	3	0.5

Race not able to be used for independent variable analysis

Other
Multi
Latino
East Asian
Caucasian
Amer Indian
African

Household income

Less than $40k	93	14.2
Between $40k and $65k	149	22.8
Between $60k and $90k	148	22.7
Above $90k	246	37.7

>90k
65-90k
40-65k
<40k

Geographic region in the United States

Midwest	46	7.0
Mountain	14	2.1
Northeast	65	10.0
Pacific	40	6.1
Southeast	362	55.4
Not reported	126	19.3

Midwest
Mountain
Northeast
Pacific
Southeast
Not reported

Description of living area

Rural	104	15.9
Suburban	356	54.5
Urban	189	28.9
Not reported	4	0.6

Rural
Suburban
Urban
Not reported

East

Note. Respondents from the following states were included in each of the following geographic regions in the United States. Midwest: IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, ND, NE, OH, SD, and WI. Mountain: AZ, CO, ID, MT, NM, NV, UT, and WY. Northeast: CT, DC, DE, MA, MD, ME, NH, NJ, NY, PA, and VT. Pacific: AK, CA, HI, OR, and WA. Southeast: AR, AL, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, OK, SC, TX, TN, VA, and WV.

The categorical independent variable of religious background (see Table 2) was oversampled for Christians (n=530, 81.2%) and undersampled for Buddhists, Hindus and Muslims (n=10, 1.6%). Baptist were oversampled among subcategories of Christians. Protestant denominations were collapsed into the following two categories: Mainline Protestant (Episcopal, United Church of Christ, Methodist, Presbyterian, Lutheran), Evangelical (Pentecostal, Baptist, Church of Christ, Independent, Non-denominational). Sampling was high enough in religious backgrounds to form the following overall categories: Mainline Protestant, Evangelical, Catholic, Non-Practicing Christian, Jewish, and Non-religious. See Table 3 for percentage breakdown.

Table 2 *Religious Backgrounds of Survey Respondents (*N *= 653)*

Background	Frequency	Percentage
Atheist	5	0.8
Buddhist	4	0.6
Christian	530	81.2
Baptist	(123)	(24.5)
Catholic	(60)	(11.9)
Conservative	(1)	(0.2)
Church of Christ	(8)	(1.6)
Episcopal	(16)	(3.2)
Evangelical	(5)	(1.0)
Independent Churches	(5)	(1.0)
Liberal	(2)	(0.4)
Lutheran	(15)	(3.0)
Methodist	(60)	(11.9)
Moderate	(2)	(0.4)
Mormon	(1)	(0.2)
Non-denominational	(15)	(3.0)
Non-practicing	28	(5.6)
Pentecostal	(11)	(2.2)
Presbyterian	(36)	(7.2)
United Church of Christ	(6)	(1.2)
Endorsed multiple options	(101)	(20.0)

| | Other | (8) | (1.6) |
| | Hindu | 3 | 0.5 |

Table 2 *Religious Backgrounds of Survey Respondents* (N = *653)* **(continued)**

Background		Frequency	Percentage
Jewish		43	6.6
	Conservative	(7)	(16.3)
	Orthodox	(8)	(18.6)
	Non-practicing	(8)	(18.6)
	Reform	(9)	(20.9)
	Other	(11)	(25.6)
Muslim	3		0.5
	Shi'a	(1)	(33.3)
	Sunni	(1)	(33.3)
	Other	(1)	(33.3)
No religious background		41	6.3
	De-converted from family's religion	(3)	(7.0)
	Never accepted family's religion	(9)	(20.9)
	Family not religious	(28)	(65.1)
	Other	(3)	(7.0)
Other		24	3.7

Note. Atheism was not an option in the original survey; however, it was the most frequently specified category of "Other" religious background. Non-denominational also was not an option in the original survey; however, it was the most frequently specified category of "Other" Christian background.

Table 3 – *Six Religious Affiliation Categories (*N=467)*

Religious Affiliation

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Mainline Protestant Christian	133	20.4	28.5	28.5
	Evangelical Christian	162	24.8	34.7	63.2
	Catholic Christian	60	9.2	12.8	76.0
	Non-Practicing Christian	28	4.3	6.0	82.0
	Jewish	43	6.6	9.2	91.2
	No Affiliation	41	6.3	8.8	100.0
	Total	467	71.5	100.0	
Missing	System	186	28.5		
Total		653	100.0		

Procedures

Emory University's Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the Bell Measure

for Religious Identity on July 23, 2008, as a study working with human subjects in the

field of social/behavioral research with minimal risk (IRB#00011370). David Bell is the

principle investigator and John Snarey is a co-investigator. Consent forms can be found

in Appendix B. The measure allows minors to participate between the ages of 11-17, but

does not allow children younger than 11. A parental information sheet and a minor

consent form are included in the survey for individuals aged 11-17. The consent forms

are meant for information purposes only since consent verification is not possible for

anonymous internet questionnaires. A waiver for consent documentation was approved

by the IRB.

For recruitment, an email was sent out to groups of acquaintances and a request

was included to continue to spread the measure to as many people as possible.

Approximately 250 contacts were initially contacted by the principle investigator, which

was then forwarded to an estimated 2500-3000 possible participants. Approximately 975

different internet users pulled up the measure on the internet with total starts of 1121

(some pulled it up more than once). The IRB approved the email format as the

following:

Subject heading: *Request for you to participate in an identity survey*
    Content: *Hello! I am conducting research through Emory University in identity
development and need your help! The link below is spam free and not traceable to your
email. It will tell you about the scope of the survey and about informed consent. You
must be 11 years old or older to take the survey. It is free to take the survey and will only
require around 20 minutes. If you have any questions, you may contact me, David Bell,
at dmbell@emory.edu, or at 404-388-7767. Thank you!*

An understanding by IRB that adaptations in the email was permissible, and it is acknowledged that the copied and forwarded email would contain additional information from the new person spreading the request. An internet group was formed on the Facebook web site under "Bell Identity Research Group" (http://www.facebook.com/group.php?gid=30371420015), and the website www.surveymonkey.com hosted the measure which can be found at: https://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=hqyfvqtJihFXFPO_2b9SO9sg_3d_3d.

The oversampling of Baptists, the Southeast, and higher levels of education and income was directly related to my immediate contacts. The participants were not aware that the measure was specifically designed for religious identity. Instead, it was presented more simply as an identity questionnaire. The measure took most participants approximately 25 minutes to complete. Some participants reported frustration with the 28-item RISt measure in which an item would include two different components. The largest problem from participants was in the eRISa measure in which many participants initially thought each of the 10 identity domains should be individually rated from 1-10 instead of ranking the domains altogether. The eRISa measure included a summation requirement in which the ten items together would always equal a total of 55. If this was not achieved, the participant was not allowed to go to the next part of the measure. This thwarted the completion of the measure for at least 78 individuals (78 responses were found to have completed the first iRISa, but were not able to enter results for the eRISa). It should be written so that someone as young as 11, or without a high school degree, should be able to readily understand the nature of what is being asked. A revision of the format or clarification of the instructions is needed.

Results

Religious Identity Salience – RISa

Implicit measure for religious identity salience – iRISa

The first page of the measure requires subjective coding of the responses for what could generally be considered "religious" in nature. A broad definition of "religious" was used to include what might be considered religious aspects of identity. Some of the examples include: *God fearing, Christian, love God, Godly woman!, pastor and preacher, religious, child of God, Jewish, raised Catholic but with agnostic parents, believer, interfaith marriage, Protestant, saved by Christ, sporadic church goer, faithful believer of God, spiritual, Godly, Catholic, Bible school teacher, church member,* etc. Some responses overlap other identity domains such as "minister" being both vocational identity and religious identity, and "Jewish" being both cultural identity and religious identity. A discussion of these overlapping domains (especially in reference to predominantly cultural identifications such as "Jewish") is found in chapter 4. Some words were not included but could have signified a religious identity depending on the intent of the participant include, for example, *blessed, charismatic, wasp,* etc.

A total of 225 out of 653 respondents (34.5%) ranked a religious description in their implicit measure for religion (see Table 4). That leaves 428 (65.5%) who did not use any religious description to express 10 words or phrases that would best define who they were. The data are run in two different ways: 1) as a categorical variable to compare non-rankers with implicit rankers, and 2) as an ordinal variable to compare the ranking of

the implicit rankers with other variables and to compare the implicit ranking with their

explicit ranking. Non-rankers were also compared with explicit ranking.

Table 4
Ranks Implicitly Assigned to Religion by Survey Respondents (N = 653)

Rank	Frequency	Valid Percentage	Percentage
1	49	21.8	7.5
2	17	7.6	2.6
3	26	11.6	4.0
4	20	8.9	3.1
5	21	9.3	3.2
6	17	7.6	2.6
7	24	10.7	3.7
8	19	8.4	2.9
9	20	8.9	3.1
10	12	5.3	1.8
Total who ranked religion implicitly	225	100.0	34.5
Total who did not rank religion implicitly	428		65.5
Total	653		100.0

The data shows that when religion was ranked implicitly, it was most common for

it to be in first place (21.8%) and that the rest of the rankings were spread out fairly

evenly, with 10th being the smallest at 5.3% (see figure A for graph). Of those who

ranked religion implicitly, the mean rank was 4.75 with a sizable standard deviation of

2.95. Male and female respondents were equally likely to rank or not rank religion

implicitly, $\chi^2(1, N = 650) = 0.21$, $p = .64$ (females 35.3% likely; males 33.5% likely).

Individuals living in rural, suburban, and urban environments were equally likely to rank

or not rank religion implicitly, $\chi^2(2, N = 649) = 4.04$, $p = .13$ (rural 35.6% likely;

suburban 37.1% likely, urban 28.6% likely). Finally, individuals living in the various

geographic regions in the United States were equally likely to rank or not rank religion

implicitly, $\chi^2(4, N = 527) = 1.18$, $p = .88$ (Pacific 27.5% likely, Mountain 35.7% likely,

Midwest 37.0% likely, Northeast 32.3% likely, Southeast 30.7% likely).

Implicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)

Figure A. *Graph of frequency of ranking among implicit rankers.*

Explicit measure for religious identity salience – eRISa

The second section of the measure asks the participants to rank ten domains of identity: vocation, gender/sexuality, personality/personal characteristics, religion, hobby/sports/leisure, education, ethnicity/cultural group, political/ethical, relationship status – family/friends, and age. The ranking of all domains, including religion, was required to go to the next page. The mean rank was 4.79 (very similar to implicit 4.75) with a significant standard deviation of 3.44 (see Table 4 for selts; Figure B for graph). eRISa and education are significantly related in which the higher the level of education, the lower the ranking of explicit religious identity (Spearman r(653) = .14, p = <.01). eRISa and age are significantly related in which older individuals rank explicit religious identity higher (Spearman r(653) = -.26, p = <.01). And, eRISa and household income

are significantly related in which higher income predicts less importance of explicit

religious identity (Spearman r(636) = .16, *p* = <.01).

Table 5 - *Ranks Explicitly Assigned to Religion by Survey Respondents (*N = 653)

Rank	Frequency	Percentage
1	186	28.5
2	64	9.8
3	54	8.3
4	39	6.0
5	42	6.4
6	38	5.8
7	36	5.5
8	44	6.7
9	44	6.7
10	106	16.2

Rank assigned to religion (1-10)

Figure B. *Graph of frequency of ranking for explicit religious identity salience.*

There is a significant relationship between iRISa and eRISa (Spearman r(225) =

.21, *p* = <.01) meaning that a high ranking of implicit religious identity predicts a high

ranking of explicit religious identity. This also means that those who implicitly chose to

include religious descriptors of themselves but ranked them lowly on the implicit

measure were more likely to also rank religion lowly on the explicit measure. Table 5

shows the statistical relationship between implicit and explicit measures

Table 6 – *Statistics of implicit and explicit measures for* RISa

Rank	Implicit rank 1-10	Explicit rank 1-10
N Valid	225	653
Missing	428	0
Mean	4.75	4.79
Std. Error of Mean	.197	.135
Median	5.00	4.00
Mode	1	1
Std. Deviation	2.951	3.439
Variance	8.708	11.827
Skewness	.204	.313
Std. Error of Skewness	.162	.096
Kurtosis	-1.266	-1.462
Std. Error of Kurtosis	.323	.191

Several other questions can be asked from this data. First, does entering any

ranking on the implicit measure influence the level of ranking on the explicit measure?

To answer this, I established a categorical variable of implicit rankers versus explicit

rankers and compared them to their mean explicit ranking (see Figure C). The results

show that not ranking religion implicitly does predict a much lower level of explicit

ranking of religion. The group statistics in Levene's test for equality suggests that the

variances between the two groupings were not equal (See Table 6). However, the second

line, "equal variances not assumed" corrects this issue (t=10.285).

**Explicit Rank Assigned to Religion by Presence or Absence of Implicit Ranking**

Figure C. *Mean explicit ranking among implicit rankers vs. no implicit rankers*

Group Statistics

	Mentioned Implicitly	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
Explicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)	.00	428	5.69	3.350	.162
	1.00	225	3.08	2.926	.195

Independent Samples Test

		Levene's Test for Equality of Variances		t-test for Equality of Means					95% Confidence Interval of the Difference	
		F	Sig.	t	df	Sig. (2-tailed)	Mean Difference	Std. Error Difference	Lower	Upper
Explicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Equal variances assumed	26.707	.000	9.863	651	.000	2.607	.264	2.088	3.126
	Equal variances not assumed			10.285	511.642	.000	2.607	.253	2.109	3.105

Table 7 – *Group statistics for explicit ranking of implicit rankers vs. no implicit rankers*

Finally, it is important to see how the six categories of religious background predict implicit and explicit ranking of religious identity salience. Figure D shows the average implicit and explicit ranking among the 225 participants who did rank a religious component to their identity on the implicit measure. Remembering that 1 is most important and 10 is least important, the chart shows that explicit rankings are typically higher than implicit rankings. Jewish ranking of religious identity showed a fairly equal level between implicit and explicit rankings. When non-practicing Christians gave an implicit religious identity, they often ranked it high, and then explicitly ranked it very low. This demonstrated a fairly high level of inner iRISa, but a purported very low level of eRISa. Figure E shows the average per religious background of those who mentioned an implicit religious identity. It is important to note that Jewish participants are most likely to express an implicit religious identity with Evangelicals just behind.

Figure D. *Among implicit rankers, a comparison of explicit and implicit rankings*

Figure E. *Percentage of participants that ranked an implicit religious identity per religious background*

Religious Identity Statuses – RISt

Establishing the four statuses

This section has two parts. First, the results will be examined to see if each of the four statuses demonstrates validity and coherence. Chapter 5 described the construction of the statuses and how the new items relate to previously established items. The following charts break down the reliability of the items for each of the statuses, by first examining the 5 items per religious identity status, performing a split-half reliability measure, and then adding the 2 items for global identity to see for comparison, and finishing with a factor analysis for variance. Secondly, the statuses will be examined to see how they relate and potentially overlap each other as well as how they may relate to significant demographic variables.

I. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY DIFFUSION (RID)

In considering the five religious identity diffusion items, the measure displayed

good internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.86$) and acceptable split-half reliability

(Guttman = 0.82) (see Table 7). Factor analysis suggests that a one factor solution for

this scale is the best description, explaining 64% of the variance. When combined with

the two global identity items, the measure still displayed good internal consistency

(Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.80$). This measure of all seven items did not display acceptable split-

half reliability (Guttman = 0.46). This reflects a difference in the direction of the

questions in which some may not consider religion as important to their identity (RID),

but may not score high on overall global identity diffusion. Factor analysis of all seven

items suggests that a one factor solution is best explaining 48% of the variance.

Overall, the findings provide preliminary support for the validity of religious

identity diffusion as a religious identity status (with 3 new items fitting well with original

2 items), including its significant correlation with global identity diffusion.

Table 8. *Religious Identity Diffusion*

5 RID Items

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.859	.855	5

Table 8. *Religious Identity Diffusion* (continued)

Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	.822
		N of Items	3(a)
	Part 2	Value	.538
		N of Items	2(b)
	Total N of Items		5
Correlation Between Forms			.775
Spearman-Brown Coefficient	Equal Length		.873
	Unequal Length		.877
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient			.819

a The items are: item1, item5, item15.   b The items are: item22, item26.

5 RID Items + 2 Global Items

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.797	.791	7

Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	.886
		N of Items	4(a)
	Part 2	Value	.467
		N of Items	3(b)
	Total N of Items		7
Correlation Between Forms			.364
Spearman-Brown Coefficient	Equal Length		.534
	Unequal Length		.538
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient			.461

a The items are: item1, item5, item15, item22.
b The items are: item26, D global, D global.

Factor analysis 5 RID Items

Total Variance Explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.214	64.285	64.285
2	.806	16.116	80.402
3	.439	8.774	89.176
4	.301	6.011	95.186
5	.241	4.814	100.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Table 8. *Religious Identity Diffusion* (continued)

Factor analysis 5 RID Items + 2 Global Items
Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.372	48.174	48.174
2	1.199	17.135	65.309
3	.829	11.839	77.148
4	.640	9.141	86.289
5	.426	6.085	92.374
6	.294	4.203	96.577
7	.240	3.423	100.000

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

II. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY FORECLOSURE (RIF)

In considering the five religious identity foreclosure items, the measure displayed acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.79$) and adequate split-half reliability (Guttman = 0.73) (see Table 8). Factor analysis suggests that a one factor solution for this scale is the best description, explaining 55% of the variance. With the addition of two global items, the measure displayed good internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.79$) and adequate split-half reliability (Guttman = 0.70). Factor analysis suggests that a two factor solution for this scale is the best description, explaining 61% of the variance. However, the global items and items from the scale load on separate factors.

Overall, the findings provide preliminary support for the validity of religious identity foreclosure as a religious identity status (with 3 new items fitting well with original 2 items), including an expected strong correlation between global identity diffusion and religious identity diffusion.

Table 9. *Religious Identity Foreclosure*

5 RIF Items

Reliability Statistics

	Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
	.793	.793	5

Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	.717
		N of Items	3(a)
	Part 2	Value	.660
		N of Items	2(b)
	Total N of Items		5
Correlation Between Forms			.600
Spearman-Brown Coefficient	Equal Length		.750
	Unequal Length		.756
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient			.733

a The items are: item4, item14, item16,   b The items are: item21, item28.

5 RIF Items with 2 Global

Reliability Statistics

	Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
	.797	.796	7

Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	.767
		N of Items	4(a)
	Part 2	Value	.503
		N of Items	3(b)
	Total N of Items		7
Correlation Between Forms			.612
Spearman-Brown Coefficient	Equal Length		.760
	Unequal Length		.763
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient			.704

a The items are: item4, item14, item16, item21.
b The items are: item28, F global, F global.

Table 9. *Religious Identity Foreclosure* (continued)

Factor analysis RIF 5 Items

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.744	54.871	54.871
2	.821	16.413	71.284
3	.655	13.091	84.375
4	.421	8.424	92.799
5	.360	7.201	100.000

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Communalities

	Initial
item4	.267
item14	.460
item16	.457
item21	.407
item28	.342

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Factor analysis RIF + Global 7 items

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigen values		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.190	45.567	45.567
2	1.071	15.296	60.863
3	.798	11.399	72.262
4	.639	9.126	81.388
5	.533	7.608	88.995
6	.412	5.883	94.878
7	.359	5.122	100.000

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Rotated Factor Matrix(a)

	Factor	
	1	2
item4	.272	.615
item14	.703	.318
item16	.816	.166
item21	.547	.366
item28	.290	.623
F global	.135	.611
F global	.420	.156

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
a Rotation converged in 3 iterations.

Communalities

	Initial
item4	.332
item14	.488
item16	.466
item21	.403
item28	.372
F global	.262
F global	.177

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

III. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY MORATORIUM (RIF)

In considering the five religious identity moratorium items, the measure displayed good internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.82) and adequate split-half reliability (Guttman = 0.75). Factor analysis suggests that a one factor solution for this scale is the best description, explaining 60% of the variance. With the addition of two global identity items, the measure displayed good internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.84) and adequate split-half reliability (Guttman = 0.78). Factor analysis suggests that a one factor solution is best with 52% of variance explained.

Overall the findings provide preliminary support for the validity of religious identity moratorium is as a religious identity status (with 3 new items fitting well with original 2 items), including a strong correlation between global identity moratorium and religious identity moratorium.

Table 10. *Religious Identity Moratorium*

5 RIM Items

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.823	.827	5

Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	.816
		N of Items	3(a)
	Part 2	Value	.524
		N of Items	2(b)
	Total N of Items		5
Correlation Between Forms			.642
Spearman-Brown Coefficient	Equal Length		.782
	Unequal Length		.787
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient			.747

a The items are: item7, item9, item13.   b The items are: item17, item23.

Table 10. *Religious Identity Moratorium* (continued)

RIM Scale 7 Items

Reliability Statistics

	Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
	.839	.843	7

Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	.793
		N of Items	4(a)
	Part 2	Value	.690
		N of Items	3(b)
	Total N of Items		7
Correlation Between Forms			.649
Spearman-Brown Coefficient	Equal Length		.787
	Unequal Length		.790
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient			.777

a The items are: item7, item9, item13, item17.   b The items are: item23, M global, M global.

RIM Scale Factor analysis 5 items

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.984	59.681	59.681	1.815	36.306	36.306
2	.708	14.170	73.851	1.254	25.082	61.389
3	.604	12.084	85.935			
4	.381	7.623	93.557			
5	.322	6.443	100.000			

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Communalities(a)

	Initial
item7	.515
item9	.441
item13	.571
item17	.221
item23	.400

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Table 10. *Religious Identity Moratorium* (continued)

With Global items (total 7):

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	3.651	52.161	52.161	2.593	37.044	37.044
2	.870	12.428	64.588	1.120	16.000	53.044
3	.731	10.446	75.034			
4	.592	8.457	83.491			
5	.457	6.527	90.018			
6	.377	5.384	95.402			
7	.322	4.598	100.000			

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Communalities(a)

	Initial
item7	.519
item9	.462
item13	.584
item17	.230
item23	.440
M global	.400
M global	.252

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

IV. RELIGIOUS IDENTITY INTEGRATION (RII)

In considering the five religious identity moratorium items, adequate internal consistency approaches but is not achieved at the minimum .70 level. (Cronbach's α = 0.68). A revised analysis of 3 RII items (11, 19, 25) did achieve adequate internal consistency (Cronbach's α = 0.78) but fell short of adequate split-half reliability (Guttman = 0.69). Factor analysis suggested that a one factor solution is best and explains 69% of the variance. Of the two items removed, one item was from Adams original measure, and one item was new.

Overall, the findings provide preliminary support for the face validity of religious identity integration as a religious identity status (with 2 new items fitting well with 1

original item). The status does show minor conceptual problems in which the original

items from Adams's measure seek a more rigid notion of religious identity commitment

than is conceptually argued for in chapter four. Given the reliability of the new items to

the original items in the other three statuses, it shows that scale construction may take

liberty in the integration status to establish entirely new items that aim more at a

commitment rooted in stability rather than rigidity. This is also discussed in chapter four.

Table 11. *Religious Identity Integration*

5 RII Items

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.678	.678	5

Revised (11, 19, 25 – 3 items on the scale)

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.776	.777	3

Cronbach's Alpha	Part 1	Value	.681
		N of Items	2(a)
	Part 2	Value	.(b)
		N of Items	1(c)
	Total N of Items		3
Correlation Between Forms			.630
Spearman-Brown Coefficient	Equal Length		.773
	Unequal Length		.789
Guttman Split-Half Coefficient			.688

a The items are: item11, item19.
b The value is negative due to a negative average covariance among items. This violates reliability model assumptions.
c The item is: item25

Table 11. *Religious Identity Integration* (continued)

RII Factor Analysis (3 items)

Communalities(a)

	Initial
item11	.334
item19	.406
item25	.401

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Total Variance Explained

Factor	Initial Eigenvalues		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.076	69.189	69.189
2	.509	16.957	86.146
3	.416	13.854	100.000

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.

Correlational analysis of each status

The relationship of each status to demographic factors was run in a full

correlational analysis to look for areas of significance.

Religious Identity Diffusion Correlations

In this scale, "DGlobal" refers to the two items designed to measure a sense of overall identity diffusion. "DIS_Scale" refers to the 5 religious identity diffusion items. A status of religious identity diffusion was significantly related to age (-.289, p<.01) meaning that older individuals were less likely to have this status. Males are significantly more likely to have this religious identity status (.199, p<.01). Both lower implicit ranking of religion and lower explicit ranking of religion predicted that a person would be more likely to be in religious identity diffusion (implicit .169, p < .05; explicit .640, p<.01). For overall identity diffusion (DGlobal), age was interestingly not significant. Education was related with less educated individuals being more likely to be in identity diffusion (-.216, p<.01). Higher implicit and explicit ranking of religious identity predicted less likelihood of being in identity diffusion (implicit .169, p < .05; explicit .143, p<.01). As predicted, global identity diffusion was related to religious identity diffusion (.282, p<.01).

Table 12. *Diffusion Correlations*

Correlations

		DGlobal	DIS_Scale	Implicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Age	Gender	Education	Rank assigned to religion (1-10)
DGlobal	Pearson Correlation	1	.282**	.169*	-.066	.013	-.216**	.143**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.012	.094	.749	.000	.000
	N	640	620	221	640	637	640	640
DIS_Scale	Pearson Correlation	.282**	1	.169*	-.289**	.199**	-.033	.640**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.014	.000	.000	.406	.000
	N	620	625	214	625	623	625	625
Implicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Pearson Correlation	.169*	.169*	1	-.062	.006	-.111	.129
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.012	.014		.354	.924	.095	.054
	N	221	214	225	225	225	225	225
Age	Pearson Correlation	-.066	-.289**	-.062	1	-.044	.092*	-.252**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.094	.000	.354		.262	.019	.000
	N	640	625	225	653	650	653	653
Gender	Pearson Correlation	.013	.199**	.006	-.044	1	.087*	.159**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.749	.000	.924	.262		.027	.000
	N	637	623	225	650	650	650	650
Education	Pearson Correlation	-.216**	-.033	-.111	.092*	.087*	1	.124**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.406	.095	.019	.027		.002
	N	640	625	225	653	650	653	653
Rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Pearson Correlation	.143**	.640**	.129	-.252**	.159**	.124**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.054	.000	.000	.002	
	N	640	625	225	653	650	653	653

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Religious Identity Foreclosure Correlations

In this scale, "FGlobal" refers to the two items designed to measure a sense of overall identity foreclosure. "FIS_Scale" refers to the 5 religious identity foreclosure items. A status of religious identity foreclosure was negatively related to education levels (-.241, p<.01). Women were more likely than men to have this religious identity status (-.148, p<.01), and interestingly, age was significant with older individuals being more likely to have a foreclosed religious identity (.248, p<.01). Higher explicit ranking of religion predicts much greater likelihood of religious foreclosure (-.443, p<.01), but implicit ranking was not related. Less education (-.160, p<.01), older (.171, p<.01), and higher levels of explicitly ranking religion (-.124, p<.01) predicts an overall global identity diffusion. Religious identity foreclosure was significantly related to overall identity foreclosure (.515, p<.01).

Table 13. *Foreclosure Correlations*

Correlations

		FIS_Scale	FGlobal	Rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Education	Age	Gender	Implicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)
FIS_Scale	Pearson Correlation	1	.515**	-.443**	-.241**	.248**	-.148**	-.096
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.156
	N	630	625	630	630	630	627	218
FGlobal	Pearson Correlation	.515**	1	-.124**	-.160**	.171**	.039	-.019
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.002	.000	.000	.325	.781
	N	625	640	640	640	640	637	222
Rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Pearson Correlation	-.443**	-.124**	1	.124**	-.252**	.159**	.129
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.002		.002	.000	.000	.054
	N	630	640	653	653	653	650	225
Education	Pearson Correlation	-.241**	-.160**	.124**	1	.092*	.087*	-.111
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.002		.019	.027	.095
	N	630	640	653	653	653	650	225
Age	Pearson Correlation	.248**	.171**	-.252**	.092*	1	-.044	-.062
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.019		.262	.354
	N	630	640	653	653	653	650	225
Gender	Pearson Correlation	-.148**	.039	.159**	.087*	-.044	1	.006
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.325	.000	.027	.262		.924
	N	627	637	650	650	650	650	225
Implicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Pearson Correlation	-.096	-.019	.129	-.111	-.062	.006	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.156	.781	.054	.095	.354	.924	
	N	218	222	225	225	225	225	225

**.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*.Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Religious Identity Moratorium Correlations

In this scale, "MGlobal" refers to the two items designed to measure a sense of overall identity moratorium. "MIS_Scale" refers to the 5 religious identity moratorium items. A status of religious identity moratorium was significantly related to lower rankings of explicit religious identity (.370, p<.01), younger age (-.370, p<.01), and to males (.90, p < .05). Overall identity moratorium was related to lower explicit ranking of religion (.187, p<.01) and younger age (-.367, p<.01). Implicit ranking of religion did not predict levels of religious identity moratorium or global identity moratorium. Global identity moratorium and religious identity moratorium were significantly related (.586, p<.01).

Table 14. *Moratorium Correlations*

Correlations

		MIS_Scale	MGlobal	Rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Education	Age	Gender	Implicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)
MIS_Scale	Pearson Correlation	1	.586**	.370**	.015	-.370**	.090*	.095
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.712	.000	.024	.166
	N	627	620	627	627	627	625	215
MGlobal	Pearson Correlation	.586**	1	.187**	.046	-.367**	-.022	.073
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.000	.242	.000	.571	.276
	N	620	644	644	644	644	641	223
Rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Pearson Correlation	.370**	.187**	1	.124**	-.252**	.159**	.129
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000		.002	.000	.000	.054
	N	627	644	653	653	653	650	225
Education	Pearson Correlation	.015	.046	.124**	1	.092*	.087*	-.111
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.712	.242	.002		.019	.027	.095
	N	627	644	653	653	653	650	225
Age	Pearson Correlation	-.370**	-.367**	-.252**	.092*	1	-.044	-.062
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.019		.262	.354
	N	627	644	653	653	653	650	225
Gender	Pearson Correlation	.090*	-.022	.159**	.087*	-.044	1	.006
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.024	.571	.000	.027	.262		.924
	N	625	641	650	650	650	650	225
Implicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Pearson Correlation	.095	.073	.129	-.111	-.062	.006	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.166	.276	.054	.095	.354	.924	
	N	215	223	225	225	225	225	225

**· Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*· Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

Religious Identity Integration Correlations

In this scale, "AGlobal" refers to the two items designed to measure a sense of overall identity achievement. "AIS_Scale" refers to the 3 religious identity integration items. A status of religious identity integration was significantly related to older age (.275, p<.01). Overall global identity achievement was positively related to education (.087, p < .05) and older age (.167, p<.01). Higher explicit rankings of religious identity positively predicted religious identity integration (-.272, p<.01),[11] and implicit rankings were not significant for religious identity integration or overall identity achievement. Global identity achievement and religious identity integration were significantly related to each other (.480, p<.01).

Table 15. *Integration Correlations*

Correlations

		AIS_Scale	AGlobal	Rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Education	Age	Gender	Implicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)
AIS_Scale	Pearson Correlation	1	.480**	-.272**	.024	.275**	-.021	.005
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.000	.548	.000	.604	.943
	N	629	618	629	629	629	627	218
AGlobal	Pearson Correlation	.480**	1	.045	.087*	.167**	.024	.001
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.256	.028	.000	.542	.987
	N	618	636	636	636	636	633	218
Rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Pearson Correlation	-.272**	.045	1	.124**	-.252**	.159**	.129
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.256		.002	.000	.000	.054
	N	629	636	653	653	653	650	225
Education	Pearson Correlation	.024	.087*	.124**	1	.092*	.087*	-.111
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.548	.028	.002		.019	.027	.095
	N	629	636	653	653	653	650	225
Age	Pearson Correlation	.275**	.167**	-.252**	.092*	1	-.044	-.062
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.000	.000	.019		.262	.354
	N	629	636	653	653	653	650	225
Gender	Pearson Correlation	-.021	.024	.159**	.087*	-.044	1	.006
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.604	.542	.000	.027	.262		.924
	N	627	633	650	650	650	650	225
Implicit rank assigned to religion (1-10)	Pearson Correlation	.005	.001	.129	-.111	-.062	.006	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.943	.987	.054	.095	.354	.924	
	N	218	218	225	225	225	225	225

**·* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

· Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

[11] The "positive" relationship understands that higher ranking of religious identity (both implicit and explicit) was measured by the lower number (1 was the highest with 10 the lowest). Thus -.272 means that a higher level of explicit ranking (lower ranking #) is positively associated with scoring higher on religious identity integration.

Statistical Analysis for Age

Because age was significantly related to each of the identity statuses, it is important to get a fuller picture. Figure F shows cross-sectional age differences but the analysis of variance somewhat weakens this connection by showing that each of the statuses had large variance across age (Table 14). A full table of descriptives is provided below.

Figure F. *Age of respondent average for religious identity statuses*

Until a color chart is provided, lines on left side begin at bottom: achieved, diffused, foreclosure, and moratorium (on right side from bottom: diffused, moratorium, achieved, foreclosure). As would be predicted, achieved is the least likely religious identity status in school and college aged individuals. Showing commitments, foreclosure and integrated/achieved are highest in older adults. Interestingly, foreclosure is high in school aged teens.

Figure G. *Confidence Intervals of religious identity statuses*

Mean Religious Identity Scale Scores by Age of Respondent

Error bars: 95% CI

Confidence intervals in Figure G show that among older adults, there is still a

signficiant prediction of lower levels of diffusion and moratorium.

Table 16. *Analysis of Variance for age among religious identity statuses*

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Diffusion Identity Scale	Between Groups	1895.169	7	270.738	7.929	.000
	Within Groups	21068.920	617	34.147		
	Total	22964.090	624			
Foreclosure Identity Scale	Between Groups	2267.732	7	323.962	9.102	.000
	Within Groups	22138.833	622	35.593		
	Total	24406.565	629			
Moratorium Identity Scale	Between Groups	2892.314	7	413.188	14.325	.000
	Within Groups	17853.737	619	28.843		
	Total	20746.051	626			
Achieved Integration Identity Scale	Between Groups	829.543	7	118.506	8.453	.000
	Within Groups	8705.697	621	14.019		
	Total	9535.240	628			

The analysis of variance shows wide divisions of age among each status meaning that a

status may be more liekly at an older or younger age, but age cannot be predicted within

that status.

The test of homogeneity of variance shows that the foreclosed and achieved scales had a homogenous degree of variance meaning that these variances across ages can be considered predictable. As conceptually expected, the diffusion scale was widely divergent, meaning variance ranged unpredictably across ages. Unexpectedly, moratorium also did not demonstrate homogenous variance. Appendix C has a break down of age related scores.

Table 17. *Homogeneity of Variances for ages and statuses*

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Diffusion Identity Scale	5.388	7	617	.000
Foreclosure Identity Scale	1.344	7	622	.227
Moratorium Identity Scale	2.607	7	619	.012
Achieved Integration Identity Scale	1.816	7	621	.082

Statistical analysis for religious background

Figure H shows the scale of religious identity status scores across different religious backgrounds. Foreclosure is least likely among non-practicing Christians and the religiously unaffiliated. Diffusion is least likely among mainline Protestants, Evangelicals, Catholics and Jewish individuals. Moratorium is most likely for non-practicing Christians and those with no affiliation. Levels of religious identity integration/achievement are fairly steady across all religious groups. The analysis of variance in Table 16 shows that that there were wide differences in likelihood of religious identity statuses per different groups meaning that your religious background has a

significant affect on your religious identity status. Appendix D includes a table with the full results for identity statuses among religious backgrounds.

Table 18. *Analysis of variance for religious backgrounds and statuses*

ANOVA		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Diffusion Identity Scale	Between Groups	7081.058	5	1416.212	64.713	.000
	Within Groups	9629.140	440	21.884		
	Total	16710.197	445			
Foreclosure Identity Scale	Between Groups	3720.777	5	744.155	23.007	.000
	Within Groups	14425.583	446	32.344		
	Total	18146.361	451			
Moratorium Identity Scale	Between Groups	1030.203	5	206.041	6.779	.000
	Within Groups	13403.358	441	30.393		
	Total	14433.562	446			
Achieved Integration Identity Scale	Between Groups	360.009	5	72.002	4.880	.000
	Within Groups	6580.522	446	14.755		
	Total	6940.531	451			

Figure H. *Religious Identity Status scale in religious backgrounds and confidence intervals*

**Religious Identity Scale Scores by Religious Affiliation**

Figure I. *Religious Identity Status scale in religious backgrounds and confidence intervals*

Religious Identity Scale Score by Religious Affiliation

Error bars: 95% CI

The following tables (Figures J and K) show a narrower breakdown of religious identity status among Christian backgrounds. Until a color chart is provided, the lines on the left side starting from the bottom and moving up are: diffusion, moratorium, integrated, foreclosure. Foreclosure and moratorium is most likely in evangelical backgrounds and diffusion is least likely. Mainline Protestants and Catholics have similar identity statuses, and religious identity integration is steady across all three groups.

Figure J. *Religious identity scale scores by Christian affiliation*

Figure K. *Religious identity confidence intervals by Christian affiliation*

A test for homogeneity of variances (Table 17) were equal across all three groups meaning that the data is readily interpretable. The analysis of variance (Table 18) shows that the three groups differed significantly on all statuses except the religious identity integration status.

Table 19. *Homogeneity of variances among Christian backgrounds*

Test of Homogeneity of Variances

	Levene Statistic	df1	df2	Sig.
Diffusion Identity Scale	2.190	2	334	.114
Foreclosure Identity Scale	.177	2	341	.838
Moratorium Identity Scale	.046	2	335	.955
Achieved Integration Identity Scale	.893	2	340	.410

Table 20. *Analysis of variance among Christian backgrounds*

ANOVA

		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Diffusion Identity Scale	Between Groups	265.308	2	132.654	6.521	.002
	Within Groups	6794.478	334	20.343		
	Total	7059.786	336			
Foreclosure Identity Scale	Between Groups	692.433	2	346.217	9.929	.000
	Within Groups	11890.404	341	34.869		
	Total	12582.837	343			
Moratorium Identity Scale	Between Groups	299.222	2	149.611	4.869	.008
	Within Groups	10294.057	335	30.729		
	Total	10593.278	337			
Achieved Integration Identity Scale	Between Groups	3.345	2	1.672	.108	.898
	Within Groups	5271.746	340	15.505		
	Total	5275.090	342			

The following Levene's Test investigates whether there are differences across practicing Christians in terms of religious identity status/scale scores controlling for other variables associated with identity status scores such as age, income, and education. It shows that the dependent variables are equal across groups for all statuses except for the religious identity diffusion status. This means that dependent variables were potentially

responsible for differences in average religious identity diffusion status levels among the

three different groups of practicing Christians.

Table 21. *Levene's test for dependent variables*

Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variances [a]

	F	df1	df2	Sig.
Diffusion Identity Scale	3.395	2	301	.035
Foreclosure Identity Scale	.036	2	301	.964
Moratorium Identity Scale	.007	2	301	.993
Achieved Integration Identity Scale	1.363	2	301	.257

Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is
equal across groups.

[a]. Design: Intercept+age+income+education+ChristianAffiliation

Finally, Appendix E includes a table of tests between subject effects. The

"Christian Affiliation" row shows that the three Christian groups differed on scores on all

four status scales after controlling for the confounding variables.

CHAPTER SEVEN
Measuring Religious Identity – Discussion and Review

Discussion

This study proposes that *religious identity* is a separately measurable domain of the self which may be elucidated through a psychometric measure specifically designed for religious identity. Such empirical data could offer new insight into understanding the psychology of religion, and it may have a predictive and explanatory role to other variables already measured in the field of psychology of religion. In this first attempt to establish a measure of religious identity, it is proposed that religious identity functions as implicit and explicit aspects of the self, and appears to develop in qualitatively unique religious identity statuses.

Limitations

Although the sample for this study was large (*n*=653 completed questionnaires), generalizing the overall data from this study is problematic due to the oversampling of women, individual in their thirties, college graduates, higher household incomes, Caucasians, and people from the southeastern region of the US. Undersampled groups include men, adolescents, older adults, lower educational levels, lower household incomes, non-Caucasians, and people from the mountain states region of the US. Racial background was not able to be factored. Religious backgrounds were oversampled for Christians (especially Baptist – evangelical), and religious backgrounds of Hindu, Buddhist, and Islam were not able to be studied.

RISa - *Religious Identity Salience – implicit and explicit measures*

One goal of this measure is to see if people are more or less likely to speak of religious parts of their identity when they are not prompted to the subject of religion than when they are prompted. In measuring this, it is conceptually argued that implicit religious identity operates differently (for some, more important; for others, less important) from explicit religious identity. One of the primary factors likely influencing this is social approval bias in which people may try to express a higher degree of their religious identity when there is a perceived audience in order to garner perceived social approval. If used in the future with measures of extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientation, this new measure for RISa should provide a richer description of religiosity than previously understood (see discussion in chapter four).

The survey shows that a large number of participants did not include any religious identifiers when describing themselves (no implicit religious identity *n*=428, 65.5% of participants). Only 43 of the 653 participants reported having no religious background. Of the 529 Christians, 28 reported that they were not practicing Christians. When religion was included on the implicit measure, it was most commonly ranked first (21.8%, *n*=49). These "high implicit rankers" also were very likely to rank religion first on the explicit scale. Their iRISa and eRISa operate very similarly and together the measure offers a portrait of very high overall religious identity salience (RISa). For this group of individuals, the consistently high RISa may imply that there is less social approval need.   However, it could also mean that the answers are well rehearsed.

When religion was ranked last on the explicit scale (16.2%, *n*=106), it significantly predicted that the participant did not rank religion at all on the implicit

scale. These self-same (low on both measures) "low explicit rankers" do not consider religion to be important to how they think of themselves, whether in implicit subconscious disclosure or in explicit prompted disclosure. It is reasonable to conclude that their iRISa and eRISa operate very similarly and demonstrate together a very low level of RISa.

If we stop and look at these first two groups of people and how religious identity functions for them, we already have new insight into the psychology of religious identity functioning. These two smaller groups describe a particular set of people who operate implicitly and explicitly in a consistent manner in regards to their religious identity. Why is this important? We could reason that they are less likely to experience worry or distress regarding religious beliefs because of these self-same religious identities. What could it explain? Imagine if a study that measures Hood's M-scale for mystical experiences found a pattern that was similar for both high RISa groups and low RISa groups (Hood, 1975). The RISa scale would be able to offer the self-same expression of religious identity (whether high or low) as a possible cognitive foundation for these experiences. This may or may not be the case, but the point is to illustrate the potential usefulness and role of this new measure.

The vast majority of people lie between the high implicit rankers and low explicit rankers. Many of the participants did not mention religion at all when not prompted for the subject on the implicit measure, but would then rank it fairly importantly on the explicit scale. A comparison between the two is not possible since "no implicit rankers" is a categorical variable and not an ordinal variable (unless the scale is numerically inverted and 0 is given to "no implicit rankers"). However, among the "no implicit

rankers," the average explicit ranking was 6th. This shows a medium level of importance of religious identity even though these participants did not list religion at all on the implicit measure. Among the "implicit rankers," the average ranking was 3rd, demonstrating a very high level of importance. This confirmed that the two levels are statistically related, meaning that in general the higher one ranked religion (if at all) on the implicit scale, then the greater likelihood the individual would rank it high on the explicit scale.

The differences between the two levels of rankings are interesting when correlated with religious backgrounds. Among implicit rankers (Figure D in Ch. 6), Jewish participants averaged 4th on implicit and 4.5th on explicit showing a similar pattern of overall RISa. We could refer to them as more having a "self-same" RISa. However, evangelicals averaged 5th on implicit and 2.5th on explicit showing a disparity between the two rankings, as did mainline Protestants to a lesser degree (4th vs. 2.5th). Among implicit rankers, Catholics implicitly ranked religion lower than any other religious group (6th), but raised that ranking on the explicit measure to an average of 4th.

Among all participants, Jewish participants were the most likely to mention a religious identity on the implicit scale (nearly 50%). As discussed in Chapter 4, it is tempting to conclude that this is exclusively a cultural identity instead of a religious identity. However, I previously explained how this goal to diminish the importance of the religious nature of such identities is done so by outsiders to Judaism, and not insiders. It could be that the strength of the cultural influence of Jewish identity rests in its religious grounding, even when Jewish identifiers do not hold the standard beliefs. A religious identity and the measure of its importance is not the same as measuring the

amount of supernatural beliefs a person may have. Religious traditions may serve in the background for some as grounding for their identities even when those individuals are not consciously aware of such motivations.

Evangelicals were the next most likely group to rank an implicit religious identity (44%). Another point of contention lies in saying that some religious traditions promote more vocalization of religious faith than others. Evangelicals are presumably more practiced in sharing their religious identity with others, such as in the practice of witnessing. Thus, is religious identity truly more important for evangelicals than mainline Protestants and Catholics? In general, yes. Erikson and current autobiographical memory research both contend that identity is a socially interactive process in which autobiographical memory is constructed through narrative. As Evangelicals hear a weekly challenge to go and tell others about their faith, part of their religious identity is shaped by the hoped for possible self that shares religious beliefs with others (Markus, 1986).

A final point that could be raised is the contention that religious identity is under-ranked because people do not like to share religious values with people they do not know. It is true that people are sometimes reticent to speak of their religious beliefs. In American society in general, one would not normally expect to meet a new acquaintance and have them use religious content to describe who they are. As with sexual identity, there is often an identity filter in social interaction with more controversial domains of the self being held in from public view. The anonymity of the design of this study and the means of looking for religious identity prior to the person knowing that the measure is asking about religious identity counteracts some of the theory that people are hesitant to

share their "true" selves. The measure takes on a "diary" role in which the research goal is unknown to most of the participants, and the participant's identity is never disclosed. No design is perfect, but this one seems well suited for both honest disclosure of the self and minimizing social approval bias.

Overall, the RISa measure was successful by demonstrating good reliability among the participants across different religious groups and demographic factors. For instance, the percentage of implicit rankers was extremely consistent across different areas of the country. In general, one could now reasonably expect around 35% of sampled populations from different regions of America to implicitly use religious language to describe how they know themselves. Further, the concept of implicit and explicit functional differences was supported by religious backgrounds predicting patterns of differences between implicit and explicit religious identities. And, social approval bias was supported by the consistent upranking of religion on the explicit measure. Altogether, this demonstrates that people fall into patterns of identity construction in which religion may take on a self-same role or may be separated in salience for various motivations. It also provides a new map in the psychology of religion in which a religious identity typology can be constructed in four boxes of low vs. high in implicit and explicit religious identities, with the smallest group (n=28 in this survey) being those who rank religion high implicitly and low explicitly.

RISt – *Religious Identity Statuses*

Erikson's notion of identity formation was operationalized into Marcia's four identity statuses (Marcia, 1966). Adams's psychometric measure (EOMEIS-II) offers an easier scale with which to measure these statuses (Adams, Bennion, and Huh, 1989). However, its design inherits from Marcia a homogenizing presumption that different domains of identity function in similar ways. Further, it supposes that overall identity achievement is partially dependent upon religiosity. More recently, scholars have shown domain specificity, but no one has tried to show this in religion. After reviewing the 8 religious identity items on the EOMEIS-II, I saw that the quality of the items could be improved and the number of the items needed to be increased to demonstrate domain specificity. The goal of this research is to establish a measure that is specific to religious identity formation through the model of identity status. By reusing 12 of Marcia's items, the new 28-item measure can establish a preliminary face validity by having good internal consistency between the new and old items. There is, nevertheless, a large caveat to this goal. The original scale for Marcia uses dual-loaded items that often ask about both aspects of commitment and crisis. In the domain of religion, respondents find it difficult to contradict an important statement of personal faith just because one side of the statement is not correct. Further, Marcia's original notion of identity achievement and Adams's two original items on religious identity achievement showed a lack of understanding religious behavior and perception. In future research, to establish construct validity by reusing these dual-loaded items does jeopardize the quality of the new measure because of the original shortcomings.

Religious identity (RID) diffusion (see chapter 4 for conceptual descriptions of the statuses) was supported by 3 new items which showed good internal consistency. The new items included those who had some beliefs (Q15), have a good sense of self (Q22), or have been totally unexposed to religion. Despite the conceptual broadening of this status, it still demonstrated consistency between the new items and old items. The 2 global identity items showed similar internal consistency with the religious identity items, but older age predicted a disparity between non-religious individuals (diffused) who have a formed identity. Although the overall identity diffusion was significantly related to religious identity diffusion, it demonstrated that individuals can form perfectly healthy notions of self without considering religion.

Religious identity foreclosure (RIF) had acceptable internal consistency. The original items from Adams's measure were problematic since they assumed foreclosure was directly related to being different from one's parents (Q4, Q28) and assumes that the family of origin is religious. The new items correct this (Q14, 16, 21) by removing references to one's family of origin in 3 new items, adding a description of religion that is communal oriented instead of creed focused, and highlighting aspects of salience related to commitment. It seems that removing or rewriting the original measures and removing specific references to parents would improve the internal consistency to above .80. The two global identity items were significantly related to religious identity and showed acceptable internal consistency for all 7 items.

Religious identity moratorium (RIM) was problematized by the original item (Q9) from Adams's inventory which described religion as something meant to "fit me." In observing religious narratives, you do not often find people who are looking for what

"fits" them but are actually looking for what is true, or will guide them to truth. The new items better reflect the language of people who are in spiritual/religious crises by using more intimate words, notions of "truth," and awareness of conflicting belief systems (Q13, 17, 23). Adams's original global identity question (Q10) uses the word "viewpoint" which connotes more of a value system than an overall identity. Internal consistency moved from good for the 5 religious identity items to acceptable for the 7 items altogether. This could be partially improved by improving both Q9 and Q10 to better fit Erikson's concept of identity crisis experiences.

Religious identity integration is where the new scale construction reaches conceptual boundaries with the previous scales assumptions. The five items only reached an internal consistency of .678, not enough for validity. Analysis showed that getting rid of Q2 and 20 brought up the consistency to .78 for 3 items on religious identity integration. Q2 is original to Adams's measure and shows a blind spot in perception of religion. It states that "faith is unique to each individual." While this may be true, many people use the religious language of faith not in relative terms but in absolute terms, even those who have reflected upon their religious identity and considered other options. The new item Q20 (*I know what I believe, and even though I don't believe everything my religious tradition believes, it's still a part of who I am*) reflects a notion of commitment in spite of divergent beliefs. Both of these could be revised which would likely bring up the internal consistency to a good level. The 2 items on global identity achievement were more strongly related that what was originally proposed (divergence between global identity and religious domain diversity). Even still, there is a significant subgroup that demonstrated achieved global identity and not integrated religious identity.

One conceptual difficulty of Marcia's original paradigm is in his confounding overall identity development with religious identity development (also see discussion in chapter 5). By including items in religion, Marcia (and later Adams) assumes that religion is a normally necessary part of reaching overall identity formation. Although it may be a valuable resource, religious identity formation (and the typical beliefs associated with them) is not necessary to overall identity formation. All of the domains are psychosocial and involve particular and relative constructions of resources. And the resource of religion can be powerfully influential in defining identity. Although this Religious Identity Measure is expressly designed to measure *religious* identity, it could be broadened to consider those who are non-religious and yet have an overall sense of identity formation. This would reflect an individual who has considered the claims of religions and has consciously decided to form identity apart from these religious institutions. A conceptual axis of "reflection" would better describe this individual rather than "crisis." A subgroup of individuals who were low on the RISa and high on global identity status reflected a scattering of answers across the religious identity items with most being classified as RID. This could be corrected by separating the dual loaded items and likely improving internal consistency of items related to a "non-religious identity formation."

One challenge to an argument for domain specificity is the strong correlation between religious identity versus global identity for each status. This was to be expected conceptually since it is being argued that religion is an extremely important aspect for identity and that identity is an extremely important aspect of religion for many people. As noted above, there are examples of groups that form identity apart from religion.

Further support of domain specificity would need to include the full EOMEIS-II and compare it with the RISt. Conceptual validity on the axis of commitment was supported by the relationship between RISa and RISt in which high RISa (ranked religion high) demonstrated a commitment status to religion in both foreclosure and integration. Conceptual validity on the developmental model is partly supported by achieved status being lowly ranked among teens and increasing across the lifespan. Likewise diffusion went down across the lifespan, as did moratorium. Foreclosure showed up very high among teens, the went down during middle adulthood and back up in older age. This may reflect a cohort effect and/or a sampling bias. Since education was inversely related to religious identity foreclosure, the oversampling of high levels of education would be most pronounced in the rising cohort and not reflected as much in older adults. In comparison with religious backgrounds, religious identity statuses were dependent upon religious category, offering researchers for the first time a measure of religious identity formation apart from other domains. This could prove to be an important factor in the psychology of religion, and the results would be immediately applicable to religious educators.

A revision of this scale is needed, but this first attempt shows good promise for the future measure's usefulness. A preliminary aspect of validity was achieved, but only by removing 2 items form the design which leaves the measure unbalanced. As a developmental model, the RISt will be best used to examine longitudinal differences in individuals in order to see if religious identity statuses fluctuate much during the lifespan or if they are fairly stable. In particular, it would be helpful to see how change happens in adolescents in this domain.

The term "foreclosure" still brings with it a value judgment. Since many religious traditions discourage questioning and dissent, it is out of place to make an evaluative claim on a religious identity that seems to be functioning well for a person. Can a foreclosed religious identity be considered an "identity formation" in Eriksonian terms? I suspect that an individual can make his or her religion "mine" in which it is truly important to one's identity (formed and integrated) without a history of religious identity crisis. That person's religion may not necessarily be rigid and defensively held as suggested by Marcia's description of foreclosure. Erikson never spoke of domain specificity and would likely not have agreed that a crisis is necessary in every domain. Thus, we can see one of the conceptual conflicts between status theory and domain specificity. Potentially, a person's crisis of identity may be primarily located in another domain and religion could operate as an important part of identity and yet never have been reflected upon.

What is most promising is the combined use of RISa and RISt to gain new insight into how the mind processes religious information and integrates religious experiences and implicit beliefs into one's narrative. With a consideration of identity statuses based more on reflection and formation rather than crisis and commitment, the RISt will provide better knowledge of how people use the religious scaffolding of our cultures to tell their own stories.

APPENDIX A
BELL MEASURE FOR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY – RELIGIOUS IDENTITY SALIENCE AND STATUS

PART 1 OF 4

For this first section, imagine that you need to describe or identify yourself to someone that you have *never* met, who *cannot* see you, and does not know you from any other person in the world. This person can only know who you are through the following words or short phrases that you use. [Please do not use any contact information (i.e., no addresses, emails, phone numbers, or social security numbers).] Now, as quickly as the answers come to your mind, write out the top ten words or short phrases that best identify who you are:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

APPENDIX A *(continued)*
BELL MEASURE FOR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY – RELIGIOUS IDENTITY SALIENCE AND STATUS

PART 2 OF 4

For this second section, please look at each of the following areas of identity. Consider how important each subject area is to how you identify yourself. After you have looked at each one, please rank them with the numbers 1 through 10, with 1 being the most important to who you are and 10 being the least important. Enter the ranking number in the box beside the subject (1 is most important, 10 is least important). (*Do not 'rate' each one. Instead 'rank' them altogether, meaning only one of the following categories is a '1', only one category is a '2', etc.*)

• VOCATION (How important is your current job or primary work role to who you are?)

• GENDER/SEXUALITY (For example, the importance to you that you are male or female, or your sexual orientation)

•PERSONALITY/PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS (For example, if you are "extroverted," "optimistic," "aggressive," "hopeful," or have any part of your personality that is important to who you are)

• RELIGION (How important is your faith or religious affiliation to who you are?)

• HOBBY/SPORTS/LEISURE (For example, if it is important to how you identify yourself that you are a sports fan, or a runner, or a quilter, or anything else like this.)

• EDUCATION (For example, if you are in school or the level of education you have achieved)

• ETHNICITY/CULTURAL GROUP (For example, African-American, Southern, Caribbean, Texan, etc.)

• POLITICAL/ETHICAL (For example, how important are your political beliefs/opinions to how you identify yourself?)

• RELATIONSHIP STATUS, FAMILY/FRIENDS (For example, the importance to you that you are married (or have a long term partner), or a child, or a father/mother, divorced, grandparent, etc.)

• AGE (How important is your age to how you identify yourself?)

APPENDIX A *(continued)*
BELL MEASURE FOR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY – RELIGIOUS IDENTITY SALIENCE AND STATUS

PART 3 OF 4

This third section consists of 28 questions. For each of the questions, select only one response from the choices provided. If the statement has two parts (connected with "and"), take it as a whole and ask yourself if you agree with both parts of the statement (not just one part).

1. When it comes to religion I just haven't found anything that appeals to me and I don't really feel the need to look.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

2. A person's faith is unique to each individual. I've considered and reconsidered it myself and know what I can believe.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

3. I have never really thought about "who I am."

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

4. I've never really questioned my religion. If it's right for my family it must be right for me.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

5. I don't give religion much thought and it doesn't bother me one way or the other.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

APPENDIX A *(continued)*
BELL MEASURE FOR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY – RELIGIOUS IDENTITY SALIENCE AND STATUS

6. After considerable thought I've developed my own individual viewpoint of what is for me an ideal "life style" and don't believe anyone will be likely to change my perspective.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

7. I'm not sure what religion means to me. I'd like to make up my mind but I'm not done yet.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

8. I feel like I am still trying to find out "who I am."

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

9. Religion is confusing to me right now. I keep changing my views on what is right and wrong for me.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

10. In finding an acceptable viewpoint to life itself, I find myself engaging in a lot of discussions with others and some self exploration.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

11. I've gone through a period of serious questions about faith and can now say I understand what I believe in as an individual.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

12. My parents' views on life were good enough for me, I don't need anything else.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

13. I am still exploring my faith and I'm not sure where I will end up.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

14. I am committed to my religious beliefs and never really had any period of questioning my faith.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

15. I have a few religious beliefs, but I am not committed to any religious tradition and am not concerned about finding one.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

16. My faith is very important to me, and I have never really doubted it.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

17. I have a lot of questions about different denominations and faiths, like "Which one is true or best?"

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

18. There's no single "life style" which appeals to me more than another.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

APPENDIX A *(continued)*
BELL MEASURE FOR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY – RELIGIOUS IDENTITY SALIENCE AND STATUS

19. It took some time and effort, but after wrestling with my faith, I now know what I believe.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

20. I know what I believe, and even though I don't believe everything my religious tradition believes, it's still a part of who I am.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

21. I like my church/religious community, and I have never considered changing denominations or faiths.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

22. I don't see religion as important to who I am, and I'm not concerned with religion.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

23. My religious beliefs are different from others, and I am still forming them.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

24. I know "who I am" and I never had to worry about it much.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏	❏

APPENDIX A *(continued)*
BELL MEASURE FOR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY – RELIGIOUS IDENTITY SALIENCE AND STATUS

25. I've questioned a lot of things about religions, and I now feel at peace with my faith.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

26. I've never thought about whether religion is important to me or not.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

27. I did a lot of searching and exploring and I now have a good sense of "who I am."

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

28. I attend the same church/faith community (or same kind of church) that my family has always attended, and I've never really questioned why.

Please choose your response:	Strongly disagree	Moderately disagree	Slightly disagree	Slightly agree	Moderately agree	Strongly agree
	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑	❑

APPENDIX A *(continued)*
BELL MEASURE FOR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY – RELIGIOUS IDENTITY SALIENCE AND STATUS

PART 4 OF 4
For this last section, you just need to fill out background questions.

What is you highest level of education?
❍ Middle school
❍ High School
❍ Some College
❍ College Degree
❍ Master's Degree
❍ Doctorate

What is your age?

❍ 11-13	❍ 36-40	❍ 66-70
❍ 14-16	❍ 41-45	❍ 71-75
❍ 17-19	❍ 46-50	❍ 76-80
❍ 20-23	❍ 51-55	❍81-85
❍ 24-29	❍ 56-60	❍ 86-90
❍ 30-35	❍ 61-65	❍ 90+

What is your primary racial background?

❑ African Descendent	❑ Caucasian / European Descendent
❑ Arab	❑ Latino
❑ East Indian	❑ Multi-Racial
❑ American Indian	❑ Other
❑ Eastern Asian	❑ Pacific Islander

What is your gender?
❍ Female
❍ Male

What is your household income?

❍ Less than $40,000	❍ Between $65,000 and $90,000
❍ Between $40,000 and $65,000	❍ Above $90,000

How would you describe where you live?
❍ Rural
❍ Suburban
❍ Urban

What is your state of residence? *Box with list of states provided*

APPENDIX A *(continued)*
BELL MEASURE FOR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY – RELIGIOUS IDENTITY SALIENCE AND STATUS

What is your religious background?
○ No religious background

○ Jewish

○ Muslim

○ Christian

○ Buddhist

○ Hindu

○ Other

Other: (please specify) _____

No religious Background link:
○ I de-converted from my family's religion
○ I never really accepted my family's religion
○ My family of origin was not religious.
○ Other _____

Islam Link
○ Sunni
○ Shi'a
○ Sufi
○ Black Muslim
○ Non-Practicing

○ Other_____

Jewish link:
No religious Background link:
○ Reform
○ Conservative
○ Orthodox
○ Non-practicing
○ Other_____

Christian link:
○ African Methdoist Epsicopal (AME)
○ Baptist
○ Catholic
○ Church of Christ
○ Conservative
○ Eastern Orthodox
○ Episcopal
○ Evangelical
○ Greek Orthodox
○ Independent Churches
○ Liberal
○ Lutheran
○ Methodist
○ Moderate
○ Mormon
○ Non-Practicing
○ Other_____
○ Pentecostal
○ Presbyterian
○ United Church of Christ

APPENDIX B – CONSENT FORMS

ONLINE SURVEY CONSENT

Please check only one of the following options:

I am 18 or older ☐   **I am 11-17 years old** ☐   **I am less than 11 years old**
                                   (linked to second consent page)   *(linked to **stop** page)*

EMORY UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

TITLE
Bell Identity Measure for Salience and Status: *Understanding the quality and quantity of identity domains in psychosocial development*

Investigators
David Bell, Principle Investigator, John Snarey, Co-Investigator

Introduction
You are being asked to volunteer for a research study in identity. The goal of the study is to understand how a particular area of identity works, and it is hoped that we will achieve 500 completed surveys. You may be asked questions about how you identify yourself, and particular questions that may include subjects of gender, vocation, religion, politics, and personal beliefs. If you take part in the study, we will ask you to fill out the following survey consisting of four parts with a total of 56 questions. The survey will take between 20-25 minutes to finish.

Risks
There is minimal risk with this study. You have the right to stop taking the survey at any time and may skip questions if you choose.

Benefits
Taking part in this research study may not benefit you personally. It is hoped that the results will add to the general body of knowledge in the area of identity research.

Confidentiality
You will ***not*** be asked for any information that would identity you specifically, such as your name, email address, or any other specific data. Thus your answers are completely confidential and not traceable to you in any way. People other than those doing the study may look at study records. Agencies and Emory departments and committees that make rules and policy about how research is done have the right to review these records. The government agencies and units within Emory responsible for making sure that studies are conducted and handled correctly that may look at your study records in order to do this job include the Office for Human Research Protections, the Emory University Institutional Review Board, and the Emory Office of Research Compliance. In addition, records can be opened by court order or produced in response to a subpoena or a request for production of documents. We will keep any records that we produce private to the extent we are required to do so by law. The data will not include any personal identifiers and will be kept indefinitely.

APPENDIX B – CONSENT FORMS *(CONTINUED)*

Compensation
You will not be paid for your participation in this study. There will be no costs to you for participating in this study.

Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you have the right to refuse to be in this study. You can stop at any time after giving consent. If you have any questions about this study you may email David Bell at dmbell@emory.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a participant in this study, you may call the Emory University Institutional Review Board at the toll free number, 1-877-503-9797. You may print a copy of this consent by selecting "File" and then "Print" in your internet browser.

If you are willing to volunteer for this research, please check the appropriate box. Checking the box is considered consent to participate.

☐ Yes, I am willing to be a volunteer in this study.

APPENDIX B – CONSENT FORMS *(CONTINUED)*

Assent Form for Minors 11-17 years old

Emory University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences
Title: Bell Identity Measure for Salience and Status: *Understanding the quality and quantity of identity domains in psychosocial development*

Hi! Now this page is for you, a child or teenager who is 11 years old to 17 years old. Please read through it before checking any box and moving ahead!

My name is David Bell and I am a graduate student at Emory University. I am doing a research study and I need some help to do it.

You are invited to be in my research study through the following internet survey. I am studying the subject of *identity*, and if you want to complete it, you will be asked some questions about how you understand yourself. Some of the questions may ask about how you see yourself in comparison to your friends or your family. It may also ask about politics, or religion, or things you believe in.

The internet survey will not ask for your name or email address, or anything like that. It will take about 20 minutes to finish.

You do not have to help me with this study. You can quit whenever you want to and nothing bad will happen. You do not have to answer a question if you do not want to. You can refuse to do the study even if your parents have said yes.

If you have any questions about the survey, please call me at 404-388-7767. If you want to talk with someone other than me about how you feel being asked to take the survey, or after taking the survey, you can call 1-877-503-9797. It's a free call and people will answer whose job it is to look out for kids like you helping researchers. You can write these numbers down, or print this page under the File tab in your web browser.

If you understand what is in this form and want to help in the project, please check the Yes box below. If not, that's OK – don't check the Yes box.

☐ Yes, I want to help in this project.

APPENDIX B – CONSENT FORMS *(CONTINUED)*

Information Sheet for Parents

EMORY UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

<u>Title</u>
Bell Identity Measure for Salience and Status: *Understanding the quality and quantity of identity domains in psychosocial development*

<u>Investigators</u>
David Bell, Principle Investigator, John Snarey, Co-Investigator

<u>To the Parent:</u>
Your child is being asked to volunteer for a research study in identity. The goal of the study is to understand how a particular area of identity works, and it is hoped that we will achieve 500 completed surveys. Your child may be asked questions about how he/she identifies himself/herself, and particular questions that may include subjects of gender, vocation, religion, politics, and personal beliefs. If your child takes part in the study, we will ask him/her to fill out the following survey consisting of four parts with a total of 56 questions. The survey will take between 20-25 minutes to finish.

<u>Risks</u>
There is minimal risk with this study. Your child has the right to stop taking the survey at any time and may skip questions if she/he chooses.

<u>Benefits</u>
Taking part in this research study may not benefit your child personally. It is hoped that the results will add to the general body of knowledge in the area of identity research.

<u>Confidentiality</u>
Your child will ***not*** be asked for any information that would identity her/him specifically, such as her/his name, email address, or any other specific data. Thus your child's answers are completely confidential and not traceable to her/him in any way. People other than those doing the study may look at study records. Agencies and Emory departments and committees that make rules and policy about how research is done have the right to review these records. The government agencies and units within Emory responsible for making sure that studies are conducted and handled correctly that may look at your study records in order to do this job include the Office for Human Research Protections, the Emory University Institutional Review Board, and the Emory Office of Research Compliance. In addition, records can be opened by court order or produced in response to a subpoena or a request for production of documents. We will keep any records that we produce private to the extent we are required to do so by law. The data will not include any personal identifiers and will be kept indefinitely.

<u>Compensation</u>
Your child will not be paid for participation in this study. There will be no costs to your child for participating in this study.

APPENDIX B – CONSENT FORMS *(CONTINUED)*

<u>Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal</u>
Your child's participation in this study is completely voluntary and your child has the right to refuse to be in this study. Your child can stop at any time during the survey. If you or your child has any questions about this study you may email David Bell at <u>dmbell@emory.edu</u>. If you or your child has any questions about your child's rights as a participant in this study, you may call the Emory University Institutional Review Board at the toll free number, 1-877-503-9797. You may print a copy of this information sheet by selecting "File" and then "Print" in your internet browser.

APPENDIX C, AGE BREAKDOWNS PER RELIGIOUS IDENTITY STATUSES

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean – Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum	Between-Component Variance
Diffusion Identity Scale	School-aged	27	14.0370	6.57783	1.26590	11.4349	16.6391	5.00	26.00	
	College-aged	70	12.2000	6.45070	.77101	10.6619	13.7381	5.00	27.00	
	Late-20s	70	12.0429	6.43909	.76962	10.5075	13.5782	5.00	30.00	
	30s	179	10.9832	6.25441	.46748	10.0607	11.9058	5.00	29.00	
	40s	89	9.6517	5.17665	.54872	8.5612	10.7422	5.00	25.00	
	50s	89	9.0112	5.78693	.61341	7.7922	10.2303	5.00	29.00	
	60s	82	7.5732	4.55428	.50294	6.5725	8.5739	5.00	25.00	
	70+	19	7.2632	3.82742	.87807	5.4184	9.1079	5.00	16.00	
	Total	625	10.3392	6.06642	.24266	9.8627	10.8157	5.00	30.00	
	Model Fixed Effects			5.84357	.23374	9.8802	10.7982			
	Random Effects				.76710	8.5253	12.1531			3.18363
Foreclosure Identity	School-aged	27	15.5185	7.38694	1.42162	12.5963	18.4407	5.00	28.00	
	College-aged	71	13.0423	5.63772	.66907	11.7078	14.3767	5.00	28.00	
	Late-20s	69	12.8261	6.02191	.72495	11.3795	14.2727	5.00	28.00	
	30s	183	12.9126	5.67460	.41948	12.0849	13.7402	5.00	27.00	
	40s	86	14.3605	5.61073	.60502	13.1575	15.5634	5.00	26.00	
	50s	93	15.4086	6.10637	.63320	14.1510	16.6662	5.00	30.00	
	60s	83	17.8795	6.36951	.69914	16.4887	19.2703	6.00	30.00	
	70+	18	19.2778	6.57809	1.55047	16.0066	22.5490	7.00	30.00	
	Total	630	14.4317	6.22914	.24817	13.9444	14.9191	5.00	30.00	
	Model Fixed Effects			5.96599	.23769	13.9650	14.8985			
	Random Effects				.84290	12.4386	16.4249			3.85807
Moratorium Identity	School-aged	27	15.9630	6.38798	1.22937	13.4360	18.4900	6.00	29.00	
	College-aged	71	15.5070	4.97673	.59063	14.3291	16.6850	5.00	25.00	
	Late-20s	68	13.7353	6.21413	.75357	12.2312	15.2394	5.00	27.00	
	30s	180	12.6556	5.51009	.41070	11.8451	13.4660	5.00	29.00	
	40s	87	11.3218	5.38407	.57723	10.1743	12.4693	5.00	23.00	
	50s	92	9.9348	5.18833	.54092	8.8603	11.0093	5.00	27.00	
	60s	83	9.1084	4.68524	.51427	8.0854	10.1315	5.00	24.00	
	70+	19	8.8421	4.04507	.92800	6.8924	10.7918	5.00	17.00	
	Total	627	12.0686	5.75679	.22990	11.6171	12.5201	5.00	29.00	
	Model Fixed Effects			5.37056	.21448	11.6474	12.4898			
	Random Effects				.95548	9.8092	14.3279			5.15786
Achieved Integration Identity Scale	School-aged	25	10.3200	4.53431	.90686	8.4483	12.1917	3.00	17.00	
	College-aged	70	10.8571	3.33747	.39890	10.0614	11.6529	4.00	18.00	
	Late-20s	69	11.5797	3.47853	.41877	10.7441	12.4153	3.00	18.00	
	30s	184	12.1250	3.86106	.28464	11.5634	12.6866	3.00	18.00	
	40s	86	13.6163	3.17034	.34187	12.9366	14.2960	5.00	18.00	
	50s	92	12.7391	4.05693	.42296	11.8990	13.5793	3.00	18.00	
	60s	84	14.1548	3.95607	.43164	13.2962	15.0133	3.00	18.00	
	70+	19	14.7368	3.66427	.84064	12.9707	16.5030	6.00	18.00	
	Total	629	12.4960	3.89660	.15537	12.1909	12.8011	3.00	18.00	
	Model Fixed Effects			3.74417	.14929	12.2029	12.7892			
	Random Effects				.51102	11.2877	13.7044			1.40167

APPENDIX D, RELIGIOUS BACKGROUNDS BREAKDOWN PER RELIGIOUS IDENTITY STATUSES

Descriptives

		N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error	95% Confidence Interval for Mean — Lower Bound	Upper Bound	Minimum	Maximum	Between-Component Variance
Diffusion Identity Scale	Mainline Protestant Christian	126	9.0000	4.69894	.41861	8.1715	9.8285	5.00	25.00	
	Evangelical Christian	154	7.6364	4.05810	.32701	6.9903	8.2824	5.00	24.00	
	Catholic Christian	57	9.9474	5.20103	.68889	8.5673	11.3274	5.00	26.00	
	Non-Practicing Christian	28	18.0000	5.65030	1.06781	15.8090	20.1910	6.00	29.00	
	Jewish	42	10.2143	5.01479	.77380	8.6516	11.7770	5.00	22.00	
	No Affiliation	39	20.5641	4.97782	.79709	18.9505	22.1777	11.00	30.00	
	Total	446	10.3408	6.12789	.29016	9.7705	10.9111	5.00	30.00	
	Model Fixed Effects			4.67808	.22151	9.9055	10.7762			
	Random Effects				2.20750	4.6663	16.0154			20.45544
Foreclosure Identity	Mainline Protestant Christian	128	14.7031	5.97021	.52770	13.6589	15.7473	5.00	30.00	
	Evangelical Christian	157	17.6051	5.93853	.47395	16.6689	18.5413	5.00	30.00	
	Catholic Christian	59	14.8814	5.66625	.73768	13.4047	16.3580	5.00	28.00	
	Non-Practicing Christian	28	8.1786	3.44323	.65071	6.8434	9.5137	5.00	18.00	
	Jewish	41	16.5610	6.54618	1.02234	14.4947	18.6272	5.00	29.00	
	No Affiliation	39	9.3590	3.63091	.58141	8.1820	10.5360	5.00	19.00	
	Total	452	15.0376	6.34317	.29836	14.4513	15.6240	5.00	30.00	
	Model Fixed Effects			5.68721	.26750	14.5119	15.5633			
	Random Effects				1.58829	10.9548	19.1204			10.32511
Moratorium Identity Scale	Mainline Protestant Christian	127	12.3465	5.52825	.49055	11.3757	13.3172	5.00	27.00	
	Evangelical Christian	152	10.3684	5.54892	.45008	9.4792	11.2577	5.00	27.00	
	Catholic Christian	59	12.0339	5.56146	.72404	10.5846	13.4832	5.00	26.00	
	Non-Practicing Christian	28	15.3214	5.39584	1.01972	13.2291	17.4137	5.00	23.00	
	Jewish	41	11.6585	5.18946	.81046	10.0205	13.2965	5.00	24.00	
	No Affiliation	40	14.7250	5.65226	.89370	12.9173	16.5327	5.00	27.00	
	Total	447	11.9687	5.68878	.26907	11.4399	12.4975	5.00	27.00	
	Model Fixed Effects			5.51299	.26076	11.4562	12.4812			
	Random Effects				.81767	9.8668	14.0706			2.56533
Achieved Integration Identity Scale	Mainline Protestant Christian	129	12.5969	3.74274	.32953	11.9449	13.2489	3.00	18.00	
	Evangelical Christian	156	12.7628	4.17073	.33393	12.1032	13.4225	3.00	18.00	
	Catholic Christian	58	12.5172	3.70510	.48650	11.5430	13.4914	3.00	18.00	
	Non-Practicing Christian	28	10.5357	3.74643	.70801	9.0830	11.9884	3.00	18.00	
	Jewish	42	10.7381	3.59579	.55484	9.6176	11.8586	4.00	18.00	
	No Affiliation	39	10.4615	3.24318	.51932	9.4102	11.5129	3.00	16.00	
	Total	452	12.1593	3.92291	.18452	11.7967	12.5219	3.00	18.00	
	Model Fixed Effects			3.84116	.18067	11.8042	12.5144			
	Random Effects				.47884	10.9284	13.3902			.82992

APPENDIX E, TESTS OF BETWEEN SUBJECT EFFECTS FOR RELIGIOUS IDENTITY STATUSES

Tests of Between-Subjects Effects

Source	Dependent Variable	Type III Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.	Partial Eta Squared
Corrected Model	Diffusion Identity Scale	883.791[a]	5	176.758	9.094	.000	.132
	Foreclosure Identity Scale	1576.263[b]	5	315.253	10.095	.000	.145
	Moratorium Identity Scale	1923.286[c]	5	384.657	14.944	.000	.200
	Achieved Integration Identity Scale	350.217[d]	5	70.043	4.729	.000	.074
Intercept	Diffusion Identity Scale	2695.792	1	2695.792	138.696	.000	.318
	Foreclosure Identity Scale	5567.902	1	5567.902	178.292	.000	.374
	Moratorium Identity Scale	3817.523	1	3817.523	148.309	.000	.332
	Achieved Integration Identity Scale	1608.385	1	1608.385	108.597	.000	.267
age	Diffusion Identity Scale	599.007	1	599.007	30.818	.000	.094
	Foreclosure Identity Scale	368.901	1	368.901	11.813	.001	.038
	Moratorium Identity Scale	1572.243	1	1572.243	61.081	.000	.170
	Achieved Integration Identity Scale	306.918	1	306.918	20.723	.000	.065
income	Diffusion Identity Scale	6.856	1	6.856	.353	.553	.001
	Foreclosure Identity Scale	1.879	1	1.879	.060	.806	.000
	Moratorium Identity Scale	33.361	1	33.361	1.296	.256	.004
	Achieved Integration Identity Scale	15.088	1	15.088	1.019	.314	.003
education	Diffusion Identity Scale	38.160	1	38.160	1.963	.162	.007
	Foreclosure Identity Scale	742.222	1	742.222	23.767	.000	.074
	Moratorium Identity Scale	9.375	1	9.375	.364	.547	.001
	Achieved Integration Identity Scale	16.649	1	16.649	1.124	.290	.004
ChristianAffiliation	Diffusion Identity Scale	240.024	2	120.012	6.175	.002	.040
	Foreclosure Identity Scale	321.636	2	160.818	5.150	.006	.033
	Moratorium Identity Scale	332.566	2	166.283	6.460	.002	.042
	Achieved Integration Identity Scale	.479	2	.239	.016	.984	.000
Error	Diffusion Identity Scale	5792.126	298	19.437			
	Foreclosure Identity Scale	9306.263	298	31.229			
	Moratorium Identity Scale	7670.595	298	25.740			
	Achieved Integration Identity Scale	4413.560	298	14.811			
Total	Diffusion Identity Scale	29377.000	304				
	Foreclosure Identity Scale	86672.000	304				
	Moratorium Identity Scale	49660.000	304				
	Achieved Integration Identity Scale	52916.000	304				
Corrected Total	Diffusion Identity Scale	6675.918	303				
	Foreclosure Identity Scale	10882.526	303				
	Moratorium Identity Scale	9593.882	303				
	Achieved Integration Identity Scale	4763.776	303				

a. R Squared = .132 (Adjusted R Squared = .118)

b. R Squared = .145 (Adjusted R Squared = .130)

c. R Squared = .200 (Adjusted R Squared = .187)

d. R Squared = .074 (Adjusted R Squared = .058)

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