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Conditional Deterrence:
The International Criminal Court and Human Rights

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Abstract

Conditional Deterrence:
The International Criminal Court and Human Rights

By Rachel J. Schoner

The recent movement toward international institutions for law, justice, and peace has culminated in the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) by the Rome Statute in 2002. The Court has become a dividing issue as supporters claim that it will deter massive human rights violations while critics cite the treaty's legal vagueness, invasion of state sovereignty, and African-centered prosecutions as major problems. Little is actually known about the Court's effect on human rights abuses. What influence has the ICC had? Has it worked and improved human rights? As a middle ground between idealists and skeptics, I present a theory of conditional deterrence and propose conditions under which the Court can be effective. I distinguish between state and rebel actors and examine three dependent variables capturing both violence against civilians and physical integrity rights. Using both descriptive statistics and linear regressions to test my hypotheses, I find mixed results for conditional deterrence. The year of ratification marks a decrease in repression, but the entire data analysis suggest a complicated story. Joining the ICC, by signing and ratifying the Rome Statute, is associated with more violence against civilians but fewer physical integrity rights. In general, domestic institutions successfully constrain state actors. Foreign aid and external support allow both rebel and state actors to expand their repressive programs, but aid specifically from States Parties successfully decreases violence. The analysis of military strength produces mixed results and is difficult to generalize. An important policy implication for this study is the prospect that targeted foreign may be able to successfully deter human rights violations. While several puzzles remain unanswered, such as the divergent findings for the different dependent variables, this study is an important step in analyzing the effect of the International Criminal Court on human rights.

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Introduction

The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in hopes of deterring serious human rights violations by holding individuals responsible for their actions. While some praise the Court for promoting human rights, others are quite skeptical of the Court's influence on state behavior, citing the Rome Statute's legal vagueness (for example, Marler 1999), invasion of state sovereignty, or African-centered prosecutions. As a middle ground between idealists and skeptics, conditional deterrence argues that the Court can be effective in certain circumstances. Under what conditions can the International Criminal Court be effective? Little is known about the Court's effect on human rights abuses. What influence has the ICC had thus far; has it worked and improved human rights?

Scholarly work on the ICC thus far has mainly focused on why states join the ICC, while questions about the Court's effectiveness and impact on human rights have not been addressed. I argue that compliance with international law varies for different actors and that the ICC is conditionally effective. Actors, whether associated with the state government or rebel groups, violate human rights as a means to achieve some end. In addition to having incentives to repress their people, leaders can also have strong incentives to avoid punishment by the ICC or its supporters. One strategy leaders may employ to avoid ICC action is suppression of potentially incriminating evidence, if permitted with a lack of institutional restraints.

The presented theory proposes that the Court can be effective when state and rebel leaders are constrained by certain domestic institutions (democracy and judicial independence), when actors are dependent on external support or foreign aid, or when the military is weak and thus the state lacks coercive power. I depart from traditional human rights studies by looking at three different dependent variables measuring two distinct concepts. The first concept is violence

against civilians and draws upon event-level data in Africa, to which this study is restricted. Violence against civilians is operationalized as two dichotomous variables: any violent events and any fatal events. The second concept is physical integrity rights, a traditional measure of states' respect for human rights. The multiple dependent variables allow for a more thorough analysis as they capture different but important aspects of human rights. Further, the event-level data for violence against civilians allow for a distinction between actions by state actors and rebel actors.

I find mixed evidence for the conditional deterrence theory of the International Criminal Court. Joining the ICC is associated with more violence against civilians for both state and rebel actors but fewer physical integrity rights violations. In general, domestic political institutions- democracy and independent judicial systems- successfully constrain actors and reduce levels of repression. The term repression, used frequently throughout this paper, is inclusive of both indicators of human rights repression, violence against civilians and physical integrity rights. Foreign aid or external support enable, respectively, states or rebel groups to increase their violence against civilians. When donors are States Parties, however, foreign aid dependence successfully decreases violence. The influence of military strength of state repression finds mixed evidence. I conclude that the ICC has the potential to be effective given certain domestic institutions and depending from whom African states are dependent on foreign aid. The evidence highlights interesting differences between the two dependent variables, violence against civilians and physical integrity rights, and the diverging influence of the International Criminal Court.

The paper proceeds as follows. I begin with background of the International Criminal Court and a review of the literature surrounding the Court. Next, I present my theoretical argument and hypotheses about conditional deterrence. The third section details the research

design, specifying the variables of interest, operationalization, and methods of analysis. Next, I present the empirical analysis and results, followed by a discussion of the findings. The paper concludes with a summary, discussion of implications, and avenues for future research.

Literature Review

Background of the International Criminal Court

After witnessing the atrocities of the Second World War, states pushed to place human rights on the international agenda. The victorious Allies instituted a series of tribunals to prosecute crimes committed during the war: the Nuremberg Trials in the West and the Tokyo Trials in the East. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948 affirmed the international community's commitment to the "equal and unalienable rights of all members of the human family" (United Nations General Assembly).

After a gap of fifty years with no effort for accountability, tribunals appeared once again after the Cold War to address genocide and other serious violations of international law in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. These courts, established by the United Nations Security Council, were created to prosecute crimes committed in specific time frames and geographic locations. While temporary tribunals were an important step in international justice, activists within the global community realized the need for a permanent, independent criminal court to prosecute past and deter future serious crimes committed throughout the world.

The Rome Statute, establishing the court's structure, jurisdiction and functions, was adopted on July 17, 1998 and went into effect on July 1, 2002. The court investigates four crimes considered to be so heinous that they are a matter of international concern and jurisdiction: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression (Neumayer 2009). The International Criminal Court aims to punish past offenders and deter future crimes by the

genuine threat of punishment. The ICC can investigate and prosecute any of these crimes committed in the territory of a state party, by a national of a state party, or by U.N. Security Council referral. The court functions with a complementarity principle, acting as a complement to existing national judicial systems. It may only act if states are unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute themselves or if the proceedings are deemed not genuine. The prosecutor of the International Criminal Court gathers information regarding possible crimes from states as well as from non-governmental organizations (Çakmak 2006). NGOs and civil activist groups play a large role in human rights and international justice by collecting information and reporting violations.

The International Criminal Court connects rather distinct concepts: international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Humanitarian law, *jus in bellow*, regulates the conduct of armed conflict and protects individuals that are not participating, or no longer participating, in hostilities. Human rights law, however, is not restricted to times of conflict and applies in all circumstances, war or peace. These two laws are complementary, both seeking to protect the lives and dignity of people. The four crimes the ICC prosecutes- genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression- bridge the two types of law. Genocide and crimes against humanity are thought of human rights law, applicable in all circumstances. War crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law, while crimes of aggression concern the acceptable justifications of war, *jus ad bellum*.

Why do states join the International Criminal Court?

The existing literature examines why states ratify the Rome Statute (and thus join the ICC), relinquishing sovereignty to an outside actor. Scholars have analyzed what kinds of states join the ICC and have produced opposing findings (Simmons and Danner 2010; Chapman and

Chaudoin 2013). This section details the literature surrounding the ICC and presents different scholars' expectations of its effect on human rights.

Simmons and Danner (2010) use the credible commitment theory to explain why states surrender sovereignty and join the ICC. They reason that states "rationally use the ICC to tie their own hands as they make tentative steps toward conflict resolution" (230). This aligns with the ICC's ability to pre-commit states to standards of human rights respect. By signing the Rome Statute, states relinquish partial sovereignty to the International Criminal Court, allowing investigations and criminal prosecutions of their citizens. Using quarterly data, Simmons and Danner preform an event history analysis looking for motives for joining the ICC from decisions whether to ratify the Rome Statute. They find two explanatory variables for joining: accountability and civil war. Simmons and Danner argue that, all else equal, unaccountable autocracies are more likely than democracies to join the ICC and pre-commit themselves. They emphasize recent domestic conflict in ratifying the Rome Statute as states wish to improve future respect for human rights and maintain peace.

Chapman and Chaudoin (2013) directly contest these findings and argue that ICC membership is explained by potential costs. Chapman and Chaudoin reanalyze Simmons and Danner's data and show that the evidence suggests that non-democracies with recent conflict are not likely to join the ICC. The disagreement stems from different interpretation of the interaction term (democracy*civil war) and its components in the hazard model. Chapman and Chaudoin propose using the number of battle deaths to capture recent civil conflict rather than Simmon's and Danner's trichotomous variable. This new operationalization questions the previous study and suggests that civil war alone has little effect on ratification.

Chapman and Chaudoin (2013) argue that the ICC raises ex-post costs of committing severe human rights violations, hoping that the threat of indictment deters future crimes. The states that have the most to fear, autocracies with a history of conflict, are least likely to join. Those that see little cost to joining, especially democracies, are more likely to join. While Simmons and Danner (2010) pose that autocracies with a history of conflict are most likely to join under the credible commitment theory, Chapman and Chaudoin argue that these states have the most to lose and therefore are least likely to join.

While Chapman and Chaudoin (2013) argue that autocracies are not likely to join, Hashimoto (2012) argues that some autocracies join not for credible commitments but for domestic political advancement. Hashimoto argues that states join the ICC to deter domestic political opponents from anti-regime violence. By ratifying the ICC, states place all citizens, including their political leaders, at risk of investigation and persecution. At some level, it seems counter-intuitive for leaders to willingly make themselves susceptible to prosecution. Hashimoto argues that leaders weigh this risk against the benefit of deterring rivals from engaging in anti-regime violence, leading to longer and more peaceful terms in office. He adds a unique variable, foreign aid, to explain this complex dynamic. Looking to extend tenure in office, leaders want to keep foreign aid and loans and naturally want to avoid “leader-specific sanctions” (57). Incumbent leaders, therefore, seek to limit self-exposure to the ICC, hoping that the Court will prosecute political opponents, simultaneously marginalizing the opposition and extending tenure in office.

This argument, however, holds true mainly for non-democratic governments focused on marginalizing political competitors. Hashimoto explains that democracies and states with strong rule of law, a European legal tradition and without recent civil wars are more likely to join the

ICC than autocracies, states with weak rule of law, recent civil wars and a "Sharia-influenced" legal system (2012, 22). Hashimoto's dissertation addresses the complexity of ICC membership as non-democracies are inclined to join to deter anti-regime violence but stable democracies are also likely to join.

These scholars present different theories about why states join the International Criminal Court and thus hypothesize that the ICC will have different effects on leaders' behavior. The credible commitment theory posits that human rights violations will decrease following the enactment of the ICC (Simmons and Danner 2010). The self-selection theory (potential costs) hypothesizes that the Court will not affect human rights because states only commit to joining when they expect to comply (Chapman and Chaudoin 2013). The political opponent theory makes a distinction between the state and domestic political opponents as the state is able to credibly threaten punishment to rebel groups while maintaining its repressive programs (Hashimoto 2012). This theory expects that the Court will decrease violence by domestic opposition groups but will not affect violence by the state.

Impact of the ICC on human rights

While the existing theories have not examined the Court's impact on respect for human rights empirically, they do imply what effect it may have. The credible commitment theory suggests that the ICC may increase the prospects of peace in civil war resettlement and transitions (Simmons and Danner 2010). States with a history of civil conflict ratify the Rome Statute in order to tie their own hands and credibly commit themselves and future leaders to peace. Simmons and Danner explicitly claim that "ratification is associated with tentative steps toward peacemaking" (253). A criticism of this theory, which they openly acknowledge, is that it

is only applicable to a small subset of states: non-democracies and low rule of law countries with recent civil war.

Chapman and Chaudoin's (2013) self-selection theory, on the other hand, suggests that the ICC will not have any significant effect on human rights. States with little to fear of the Court, i.e. those that are unlikely to violate human rights in the court's jurisdiction, will join while those that are likely to violate human rights will avoid joining the ICC. An important critique of both the credible commitments and self-selection theories is that they apply only to state behavior. They predict only state actions (ratification and subsequent behavior) and exclude rebels, who have been a frequent target of the Court's prosecution. Hashimoto (2012) addresses this difference, separating states from rebels in his theory. His political opponent deterrence theory predicts that rebel violence would decrease after the state joins the ICC while the state is free to continue its repression programs.

The previous theories are centrally about why states join the International Criminal Court, and the predictions for behavior are secondary implications. Prorok (nd) explicitly address the possible impact of the ICC on civil conflict. She finds that involvement by the ICC (investigation or indictment) in a civil conflict counter-intuitively "decreases the prospects for peace, as leaders will fear that joining negotiations, relinquishing political power, or demobilizing forces will lead to capture, transfer to The Hague, and prosecution" (40). Prorok argues that active ICC involvement makes punishment "more certain and more immediate." Leaders are desperate to avoid punishment and thus extend the conflict. With this increased expectation of punishment, leaders are desperate to avoid punishment and thus extend the conflict.

Jo and Simmons (2014) present one of the first studies testing the deterrent effects of the ICC, for both state and non-state actors. They argue that the ICC can potentially deter atrocities through two distinct processes: prosecutorial deterrence and social deterrence. Prosecutorial deterrence concerns the potential threat of prosecution and punishment while social deterrence concerns the "informal consequences of law-breaking" including norms (3). They find that the deterrent effect of the International Criminal Court is conditional upon whether actors, either governments or rebel groups, seek legitimacy. Their analysis is limited to countries where widespread violence is possible, including only states that have experienced civil war since 1945 (20). Their dependent variable differs slightly from the traditional human rights yearly score of state, opting rather for "the number of civilians killed intentionally by government forces…or rebel group…in a direct military confrontation based on media reports" (Jo and Simmons 2014, 22). Their findings support the deterrent capacity of the ICC, albeit conditionally.

Jo and Simmons' (2014) study is an important contribution in understanding the effects of the International Criminal Court. In this paper, I ask a similar question but seek to adapt and expand their research design. While they use one-sided violence against civilians as their dependent variable, I include a similar measure (from a different data set) in addition to a traditional human rights annual state score. This allows for a more nuanced analysis, examining differences between types of repression. Further, my analysis is more inclusive and is not limited to states with recent civil conflict because the Court may have impacts on different types of states. Cognizant of the impact of domestic conflict on repression, however, I include civil war as a control variable in my analysis.

The literature presents conflicting theoretical expectations and divergent evidence. There is no consensus as to the effect international criminal law will have on actors' behavior regarding

human rights. Does the International Criminal Court constrain actors, successfully deterring human rights violations? Under what conditions may deterrence succeed? The following theory presents the conditions under which deterrence is likely to succeed.

Theory and Hypotheses

I propose a novel theory for examining the effect of the International Criminal Court on compliance levels of different actors, distinguishing between state actors and rebels. Unlike many previous studies, I am interested in the effect the ICC has on respect for human rights rather than explaining why states join. I argue that the ICC is conditionally effective as it may constrain human rights violations under some conditions. The theory rests on three assumptions: rationality of actors, significant domestic competition for power, and the ICC poses a real threat of punishment. These assumptions, which are readily found in the literature, lead easily into my theory and hypotheses.

First, I assume that actors are rational and that they weight costs and benefits of possible actions. Leaders use violence strategically, to achieve an end. States repress their people and violate human rights to maintain power. Extensive literature argues that state leaders are rational in their decision to repress, weighing several consequences- both positive and negative- of repression (Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999; Moore 2000; Davenport and Armstrong 2004). When leaders perceive a threat, whether from dissent or war, repressions is employed in an attempt to suppress their opposition and/or deter challenges (Davenport 1995; Gartner and Regan 1996; Shellman 2006; Franklin 2009). Leaders, however, weigh these benefits with the threat of punishment by domestic democratic and legal institutions (Davenport 1995; Powell and Staton 2009). Ultimately, leaders utilize repression to achieve an end.

As rational actors, leaders consider the risk of punishment in decision-making. Punishment is well-researched in the fields of psychology, sociology, and criminology. While some scholars argue that punishment institutions (i.e. the penal system) have a deterrent effect, others support the "risk-reward trade-off" (Luckenbill 1982; Viscusi 1986). In "Compliance under Threat of Severe Punishment," Luckenbill discusses the decision process of a potential criminal, weighing the "relative merits" of either compliance or opposition before selecting the "one judged most useful in preserving well-being" (1982, 820). Individual biases and perceptions are important in criminal deterrence and help determine how much a person estimates the risk and value of the punishment (Viscusi 1986). People, including leaders who make decisions about repression, consider the perceived risk when deciding whether (and how much) to repress. Facing unacceptable risk, they may – as proponents of deterrence expect – choose not to repress.

To avoid punishment, leaders who violate international law want to suppress incriminating evidence. Certain factors, however, may restrain leaders' behavior. Domestic institutions such as judicial independence and democracy constrain behavior by holding leaders accountable. An independent judiciary poses a real threat of punishment to domestic leaders if they overstep their authority and commit crimes in violation of international law. Similarly, democratic institutions are designed to hold leaders accountable through free and fair elections.

Second, I assume that there is significant domestic competition for power. Leaders have an interest in maintaining and gaining power, oftentimes resulting in power struggles among actors. The theory is most applicable where there is a significant domestic opposition that threatens the central government's hold on power. This is often a rebel group or insurgency. The state, therefore, is concerned with weakening the opposing group's power. The means of domestic competition differ in democracies and non-democracies. Democracies contain

institutions designed to peacefully handle disputes, so grievances are able to be resolved peacefully. Without such institutions, however, people do not have a proper, peaceful pathway to settle their grievances. Therefore, in non-democracies, disagreement and competition is more likely to result in rebel groups and violence.

Third, I assume the ICC poses a real threat of punishment. This adds an additional cost which is included in the rational cost-benefit analysis.

This theoretical foundation is supported by the existing literature. The three main theories presented by Simmons and Danner (2010), Chapman and Chaudoin (2013), and Hashimoto (2012) rest upon similar assumptions. All three theories contain a cost and benefit analysis performed by actors. Hashimoto explicitly states, "Leaders trade off the ICC's potential to destroy their own political careers in unwanted prosecutions against the similar threat that the court poses to contenders for office and the foreign patrons of domestic enemies of the state" (6). Chapman and Chaudoin's argument centers around the costly nature of joining the International Criminal Court for states that tend to violate human rights.

My second assumption, significant competition for power, is unique as it narrows the scope of the theory slightly. Many of the presented studies focus on countries with civil war (Simmons and Danner 2010; Prorok nd; Jo and Simmons 2014). The geographical scope of this study, Africa, attempts to address this assumption. Numerous African states, nearly half included in this study (25 out of 51), have experienced armed civil conflict during the specified temporal domain (1997-2013). Other states that have not experienced civil war, such as Tunisia, have experienced domestic turmoil and challenges to the regime.

The third assumption concerning the functionality of the ICC is also supported by the literature. All three major works assume that the International Criminal Court poses a real threat

of punishment. The credible commitment theory argues that it acts to tie states' hands while the self-selection theory argues that it deters potential violators from joining. The previously mentioned quotation by Hashimoto (2012) similarly supports the assumption that the Court functions and may prosecute any offenders. Hashimoto also argues that attention by the Court has international consequences, such as removal of foreign patron support.

This theory analyzes under what conditions the International Court may have a positive or negative impact on human rights. First, I argue that the anticipation of being under the ICC's jurisdiction temporarily increase violence. States increase their levels of repression one year before ratifying, and then levels decline the year of ratification. Although the Rome Statute went into force into 2002, after ratification by 60 states, ratification is the key mechanism. By ratifying the Rome Statute, states acknowledge and accept the Court's current or impending future jurisdiction. Leaders are aware that their action will be under specific scrutiny from that point forward, even if it is before the Court is in force. Therefore, the anticipation of joining the ICC incentivizes states with a significant domestic political threat (such as a rebel group) to increase their violence one last time to solidify their dominant political position. The state is aware that their future actions will be susceptible to punishment at the ICC, so they take advantage now by weakening potential threats.

Hypothesis 1: Before ratification, states temporarily increase their levels of repression.

What happens after accession, i.e. after countries are officially States Parties to the Rome Statute and the ICC has authority to prosecute crimes? Here, the term accession includes both signing and ratifying the Rome Statute, but the two actions will be separated in the analysis. The signature serves as a preliminary endorsement of the Statute and does not create a binding legal

obligation. Instead, signing is a signal. Ratification denotes an agreement to be legally bound by the Statute.

Under what conditions may the ICC have a positive impact on human rights, successfully decreasing violence? Respect for human rights may increase if leaders are constrained and unable to control the flow of information. Domestic institutions such as democracy and independent judiciaries constrain actors, holding leaders accountable by checks on power and/or free and fair elections.

Hypothesis 2a: After accession, repression decreases by state actors in democratic states.

Hypothesis 2b: After accession, repression decreases by state actors in states with independent judiciaries.

Next, I apply Hashimoto's (2012) foreign aid variable to examine when the ICC may have positive consequences. Leaders that are dependent on foreign aid or international donors, are susceptible to "leader-specific sanctions by wealthy donor states that prefer to keep politicians who commit atrocities out of office" (57). Therefore, leaders want to avoid any possible repercussions from possible investigations and indictments that might lessen their cash inflows. This mechanism, however, may be limited for donors that buy into the International Criminal Court and human rights norms because some actors are not concerned with their allies' respect for human rights.

Hypothesis 3a: After accession, repression decreases more for actors that are dependent on foreign aid or external support.

Hypothesis 3b: After accession, repression decreases more for actors that are dependent on foreign aid or external support from states who are States Parties to the International Criminal Court.

The military plays an important role as they are the primary means by which state represses the population. A strong military provides a state with coercive ability to successfully suppress evidence. A state with a weak military, on the other hand, lacks the coercive power to cover up evidence and silence anyone who may call attention to their crimes. A weak military, therefore, constrains behavior and decreases the likelihood of actors committing these crimes.

Hypothesis 4: After accession, repression decreases by state actors with a weak military. The hypothesized relationship between military and repression is likely to be more complicated than this somewhat superficial level. On one hand, a strong military allows the government to carry out attacks on civilians and repressive programs. On the other hand, a weak military might be disorganized and have issues of command and control. Soldiers may not carry out leaders' missions as directed, resulting in more violence possibly harming civilians along the way. There may be an important distinction between professional and non-professional (disorganized and/or heavily reliant on paramilitary forces) militaries. This paper focuses on the first cut of this analysis, the superficial relationship between these two variables and the International Criminal Court while acknowledging its limitations.

Research Design

To test the hypotheses, I use both descriptive statistics and linear regressions. The temporal domain covers the period from 1997 to 2013. This is in part determined by the datasets for the dependent variables. The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court went into effect in 2002, but many states signed and/or ratified before then. One of the datasets used for the dependent variable, ACLED (see below) begins in 1997, so this provides data for five years prior. Spatially, this analysis is restricted to Africa. All ICC indictments have occurred in Africa, so this is an important area for study. Furthermore, this allows for the use of one,

constant event dataset to control for any disparities between coding. The unit of analysis is state-year.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variable is respect for human rights. Scholars often use measures aggregated at the state-year level such as the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset and Political Terror Scale. While useful, these measures sometimes fail to capture real events and practices concerning human rights. Therefore, I take a unique approach to measuring human rights and utilize both a traditional country-year measure (CIRI physical integrity rights) and event-level data measuring violence against civilians. Violence against civilians captures a different, important aspect of human rights: whether civilians are attacked and therefore genuinely feel threatened. The event-level data also allows for differentiation between state actors and rebel actors. Further, the event-level data provides two extra years for analysis: the CIRI physical integrity rights are updated through 2011, and the ACLED event data are updated through 2014. The analysis, however, excludes 2014 because of data unavailability for the other explanatory variables.

The Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Personal Integrity Rights Index creates a composite score for each state-year from four aspects of personal integrity abuse: extrajudicial killing, torture, disappearance, and political imprisonment (Cingranelli, Richards and Clay 2014). Government respect for each personal integrity right is measured on a three-point scale from 0 to 2, with higher values capturing better respect for the right. The four measures are then combined to produce an index that ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values capturing better government respect for personal integrity rights overall. The CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index adds the four components and ranges from 0 to 8, with increasing values representing increasing

government respect for human rights. To make the results more intuitive and easily comparable to the other dependent variables, I reverse the coding so that higher values represent increasing personal integrity abuse. The CIRI measure captures solely state behavior, excluding rebels.

I utilize the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) for the event-level data (Raleigh et al. 2010). Considering the egregious human rights violations the International Criminal Court pursues, I include the events coded as "violence against civilians." The dataset contains information on the specific actors involved in each event, so I include actors specifically identified with the state (military or police forces) and identified rebel groups. Here, civilians are always the target, so battle events are excluded. Differentiating for state and rebel groups, I create two different dependent variables at the country-year level. All rebel groups are collapsed into a single measure for rebel group activity in each state-year. I record the number of events (violence against civilians) included in the ACLED Data and the sum of fatalities for each actor set. Not all events are deadly, and there is substantial range in fatalities per event, so it is useful to include both event count and death measures.

The two dependent variables, in some regard, capture the two different laws contained in the Rome Statute: humanitarian law and human rights law. Humanitarian law regulates armed conflict while human rights law protects individuals at all times. Violence against civilians, according to humanitarian law, is illegal if they are intentional targets or if their harm is disproportionate to the military objective. Physical integrity rights, on the other hand, captures human rights law because disappearance, extrajudicial killings, political imprisonment and torture are often outside an arena of armed conflict. Torture, however, crosses both laws as torture is used in times of peace and war.

The descriptive statistical analysis utilizes the event counts and sums of civilian deaths, but the latter regression analysis creates dichotomous variables: whether there was an event in the state-year and whether there were any fatalities in the state-year (still maintaining the distinction between state and rebel actors). This simplifies the analysis and interpretation while still capturing the variation of interest.

Independent Variables

The key explanatory variable involves the International Criminal Court: whether states are under the Court's jurisdiction. I capture this in four different ways: signing, time since signing, ratification, and time since ratification. Signing and ratification are simple dichotomous variables indicating whether the state signed/ratified the Rome Statute, accepting the Court's jurisdiction. If the state signed or ratified between January and June, the previous year the jurisdiction of the Court is coded as beginning in the previous year. If the date is between July and December, the same year is recorded. This action is justified because the domestic processes signal to actors that they are accepting the Court's jurisdiction before the actual signing or ratifying date.

While signing and ratification are binary, the other two variables (time since signing and time since ratifying) capture the length of time the country has been under the Court's jurisdiction in either regard. Here, the year of signing or ratifying is coded as "1," and every additional following year increases by one. This is included because the Court's influence over actors may change over time.

The hypotheses include other explanatory variables other than accession into the ICC. All of the following variables except for external support are concerned solely with the state. The second hypothesis concerns domestic political institutions, specifically democracy and judicial

independence. Democracy is measured through its Polity score (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). The variables range from -10 to 10, with lower values indicating increasing levels of autocracy and higher values indicating increasing levels of democracy. Judicial independence is taken from the CIRI database (Cingranelli, Richards, and Clay 2014). The estimates are trichotomous: a score of 0 indicates not independent, a score of 1 indicates partially independent, and a score of 2 indicates generally independent. The Polity measure is available through 2013, and the judicial independence data (as with physical integrity rights) is available through 2011.

The third hypothesis introduces foreign aid and external support. Foreign aid data are taken from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2014). Foreign aid, operationalized as official development assistance: disbursements, is compiled based on recipient country and disaggregated by donor country. All sectors are included. Total aid received is calculated as well as the percentage of aid from States Parties to the ICC.

Relatedly, external support is used as another measure for economic, financial or material dependence. External support is the only variable that is used in both state and rebel analyses (democracy is always included as a control) because the data includes both state and rebel supporters. These data are taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UDCP) External Support Data (Högbladh, Pettersson, and Themnér 2011). The data are available through 2011. External support is used in the analysis as a dichotomous variable. It is easy to determine whether the state had an external support. This is important to distinguish between foreign aid (as discussed above) because the assistance included here is more likely to be from closer, African states rather than the developed, Western world. It is important to clarify the process used for the rebel external support analysis: The analysis began with the specific actor (rebel group) as the unit of analysis, where it was added whether or not the group had external support. This was the

condensed into state-year form through the location of the events (violence against civilians). There, I tallied both the number of rebel groups active in events and how many had external support. I then created a dichotomous variable of whether any of the rebel groups in each state-year had external support.

The fourth hypothesis concerns state military strength. This is operationalized with two different measures: military expenditures (as % of GDP) and military personnel (% of total labor force). These measures are taken from the World Bank Database (World Bank 2014).

In addition to the key variables of interest, it is necessary to control for other factors that may contribute to levels of repression. First, the Polity database includes a measure for regime durability: the number of years since the most recent regime change of the end of a transition period defined by the lack of stable political institutions (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). As discussed earlier, repression is often utilized in response to dissent (Davenport 1995; Gartner and Regan 1996; Shellman 2006; Franklin 2009), and I operationalize dissent using the Banks Cross-Sectional Time-Series Data Archive (Banks and Wilson 2014). I create a single measure of dissent summing domestic acts against the state- assassinations, general strikes, riots, revolutions, and anti-government demonstrations- for each country-year in the data.

It is clear in the literature that war also effects repression because it presents challenges to regimes (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, and Keith 1999). I create a civil war dummy variable to control for this relationship (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Population is also included as a control variable. Population size often negatively effects repression because large populations create strain on the society and stress on natural resources, resulting in repression (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). The population data are taken from the World Bank Database (World Bank 2014).

Methodology

To test the first hypothesis, I utilize descriptive statistics and nonparametric tests of means of the dependent variable, repression, taken from the two years preceding and the year of ratification. I employ a sign test for the paired samples because it makes few assumptions of the data. Unlike a simple t-test or a Wilcoxon signed rank test, the sign test does not assume anything regarding the distribution of the sample, either normality or symmetry. The sign tests determine any significant differences between years before ratification. Graphs help display the different repression trends for states that have signed and ratified the Rome Statute.

The other hypotheses necessitate linear regressions. To fit the panel data, the models are generalized estimating equations and control for autocorrelation, the relationships between last year's value and this year's value. Robust standard errors are used. I use a Gaussian distribution for the CIRI scores. While this dependent variable is ordered, ranging from 0 to 8, its distribution is approximately normal. The other two dependent variables are binary, so I use a probit regression.

Results and Analysis

The hypotheses posit that accession to the International Criminal Court will be associated with decreased levels of repression contingent upon certain variables, namely democracy, judicial independence, foreign aid, external support, and a weak military. First, however, the theory suggests that repression will spike directly before ratification. Graphs displays the levels of repression (separated for each dependent variable) for each state that has accepted the Court's jurisdiction. The state's years of signing and ratifying are marked with vertical lines. Figures 1-3 depict the number of violent events, Figures 4-6 civilian fatalities, and Figures 7-9 physical integrity rights violations.

The graphs display the actual counts of violent and deadly events against civilians rather than a dichotomous measure used in the regressions. Therefore, there is significant variation in the dependent variables. In order to see the details of the graphs, countries are grouped with others with similar values. It is important to note that the y axis ranges vary significantly among these groups.

At first glance, there does not appear to be any overarching general trend, comparing before and after joining the International Criminal Court. Some states, such as Liberia and Namibia, preform as deterrent theorists expect with a decrease in human rights abuses in relation to the ICC. Other states, such as Zambia and Gambia, display the opposite result with an increase in violations. Several others, such as Cape Verde and Comoros, seem to function independently of the Court with no apparent impact. Closer examination of the values surrounding ratification year suggests that several countries experience a decrease from the previous year. The following assessment of the first hypothesis examines the years leading up to ratification and includes descriptive statistics and significance tests.

Hypothesis 1 predicts an increase in state repression immediately before ratifying. Table 1 displays the summaries of the years leading up to and including ratification for the count of violent events, the number of civilian deaths, and the physical integrity rights score. The number of violent events and the number of civilian deaths seem to peak the year before ratification while the physical integrity rights scores do not. It is necessary, however, to statistically test these data. Table 2 displays the results of the sign tests comparing both t-2 and t-1, and t-1 and the year of ratification (t).

The tests suggest that there is no difference between t-2 and t-1. None of the three tests were significant at any acceptable level. This suggests that states do not increase their levels of

repression before ratification but instead continue their routine repression of civilians. The tests for t-1 and the year of ratification, however, are more interesting. The evidence suggests that there is a decrease in repression between these two years. The difference in the count of violent events against civilians is significant at the .05 level, and the difference for physical integrity rights scores is significant at the 0.10 level. The difference for civilian deaths, however, is not significant.

The sign tests do not support Hypothesis 1, which predicts an increase in repression immediately before ratifying. The results, however, do point toward a positive effect of the International Criminal Court: the year of ratification marks a decrease in repression. This does not take in account future levels or repression, so further analysis is needed. Therefore, I continue the analysis with regressions to determine the conditions under which deterrence (a decrease in repression) is possible.

The analysis for the regressions is separated into two parts: state analysis and rebel analysis. The analysis for state actors includes all three dependent variables: violent events against civilians, deadly events against civilians, and CIRI physical integrity rights. The analysis for rebels includes only the event-level data: violent events against civilians and deadly events against civilians. The state analysis tests all hypotheses while the rebel analysis only tests the third hypothesis concerning external support since rebels are unlikely to be constrained by domestic institutions.

State Analysis

The theory predicts that the ICC will decrease human rights violations when states are democratic, have independent judiciaries, are dependent on foreign aid or external support, and when they have a weak military. This section tests the hypotheses with three different dependent

variables and four different key independent variables capturing the International Criminal Court: signing, duration of signing, ratification, and duration of ratification. I walk through the various hypotheses with different independent variables, integrating the different dependent variables throughout the analysis.

First, I briefly analyze the different dependent variables. As mentioned above, they capture two fundamentally different (but still related to human rights) concepts: violence against civilians and physical integrity rights. Table 3 shows the correlation between the three variables. All three are positively correlated (the CIRI scores were inversed), and intuitively the two variables resulting from the violence against civilians are the most highly correlated.

A series of control variables are included in all state analysis regressions: democracy (also an important independent variable), regime durability, population, civil war, and domestic dissent. Table 4 shows the first regressions. Most of the control variables perform as expected and are statistically significant. Rather than discuss the influence of the controls for each set of results, I will discuss all at once and then address any variation later with the detailed analysis of the key variables.

Democracy is inversely related to repression and is statistically significant. In other words, democratic states are less likely to repress their populations than non-democratic states. Democracies are less likely to experience attacks on civilians and violations of physical integrity rights. Because citizens have institutional mechanisms to hold leaders accountable, the interests of leaders and citizens are aligned.

While regime type is important, regime durability generally is not. State leaders do not alter their levels of repression depending on the length of their tenure. Newer and older regimes act in similar ways in regard to violence targeting civilians and physical integrity rights. This

suggests that neither new leaders crack down harder on their populations because of perceived tenure insecurity nor older leaders consistently repress more.

Population, civil war, and domestic dissent are all positively associated with repression and statistically significant. The results support the theoretical expectations. Large populations place a strain on society because of competition for limited natural resources (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). There are simply more people to control, often leading to government repression.

Civil war is associated with higher levels of repression, both violence against civilians and physical integrity rights. Violence against civilians may be a side effect of war if the state does not discriminate between targets. Physical integrity rights abuses generally increase in times of civil armed conflict because the government is threatened by challengers and trying to maintain a monopoly on power.

Domestic dissent is also positively associated with repression. As the literature explains, repression is often used in response to dissent (Davenport 1995; Gartner and Regan 1996; Shellman 2006; Franklin 2009). Challenges to the state, such as riots and anti-government demonstrations, cause the regime to feel threatened, so leaders turn to repression to tighten their control.

Here, I present the regressions testing hypotheses 2, 3, and 4. Tables 4 and 5 display the first results testing the ICC variables and polity. Table 4 displays the results for violence against civilians, and Table 5 displays the results for physical integrity rights. The variables representing the International Criminal Court produce interesting results here and throughout the regressions. For civilian deaths, the duration since signing and the duration since ratifying are statistically significant. Both have a positive effect on civilian deaths, suggesting that countries that are

associated with the International Criminal Court are more likely to kill their civilians. Further, this strengthens over time. On the other hand, the dichotomous measure of ratification of the Rome Statute has a negative impact on physical integrity rights. That is, States Parties generally tend to have more respect for physical integrity rights than non-States Parties. The two opposing directions suggest that there are dynamics at play that are beyond the surface, pointing to the difference between the two different measures of human rights.

Hypothesis 2 posits that both democracy and judicial independence will be associated with decreased levels of repression. Throughout the analysis, democracy is strongly and negatively associated with repression. Judicial independence, on the other hand, has mixed results. Judicial independence is not significant for any violence against civilians regressions (displayed in Table 6) but is negative and significant for physical integrity rights (displayed in Table 7). Again, this highlights the differences between the two sets of dependent variables. The results do support the constraining effects of domestic political institutions on state repression, supporting the second hypothesis.

Next, I test the third hypothesis concerning external support and foreign aid. Tables 8 and 9 present the results for the regressions with external support dummy, and Tables 10 and 11 present the results for the regressions with a count of external supporters. None of the external support variables are significant. When a measure of external support is included, civil war is no longer significant for fatal events.

Foreign aid arguably captures a similar mechanism, and the results are displayed in Tables 12, 13, 14 and 15. The first two tables include the natural log of total foreign aid while the latter two include the proportion of foreign aid from ICC member states. Unlike external support, some of foreign aid variables are statistically significant but results are quite nuanced. Total

foreign aid is positively related to civilian deaths, but the proportion of aid from ICC member states is negatively related to violence against civilians (both violent events and fatal events). The positive relationship between foreign aid and civilian deaths suggests that the inflow of outside financial resources allows governments to repress (and kill) their citizens. There are likely more complex dynamics involved, possibly concerning natural resources and strategic political aid.

The negative relationship between the proportion of foreign aid from ICC members and violence against civilians suggests a mechanism through which the ICC may have a positive impact on human rights. States that receive a larger percentage of their foreign aid from States Parties to the International Criminal Court generally have fewer incidents of violence against civilians. The foreign aid variables, however, are not significant in regard to physical integrity rights. The evidence supports Hypothesis 3b with the ICC donor condition but does not support the more general Hypothesis 3a.

Hypothesis 4 posits that states with weak militaries will have lower levels of repression. I operationalize military with two different variables: military expenditure (as % of GDP) and military personnel (% of total labor force). Tables 16 and 17 display the results for military expenditure, and Tables 18 and 19 display military personnel. Military expenditure is positively related to violence against civilians but is negatively related to physical integrity rights. Stronger militaries, therefore, tend to be associated with violent and deadly events against civilians but also with increased respect for physical integrity rights. This divergence again highlights the differences between the two dependent variables. Military personnel produces no significant results. Therefore, I find mixed evidence for the fourth hypothesis.

Rebel Analysis

I shift away from the state as the primary actor and focus now on rebel groups. The two key theoretical variables of interest are the International Criminal Court (signing and ratification) and external support. This analysis mimics the state analysis with a few differences. First, there are fewer tested explanatory variables, because rebel actors are not constrained by the same factors as states are. Second, violence against civilians (both violent events and fatal events) is the only dependent variable. Physical integrity rights reflect the practices of the state, so it is omitted in this analysis. Third, domestic dissent is not included as a control variable because the number of anti-government acts is not theoretically linked to rebel violence.

Democracy, regime durability, population, and civil war are all still included as control variables. As shown in Table 20, democracy is not significant for rebel violence, but regime durability is. This is the opposite from the state analysis. Regime type does not affect rebel violence, but regime durability seems to deter rebel violence. Population and civil war remain statistically significant and positive for rebel violence against civilians. Larger populations and civil war both create an atmosphere of competition, which appears to be related to an increase in violent and deadly rebel activity.

Signing the Rome Statute appears to greatly influence rebel activity: signing membership and duration are significant and positively related to rebel violence. Ratification does not seem to influence violence. This relationship will be discussed in detail in the following section.

Table 21 displays the models including a measure of whether a rebel group in the state-year received any external support. This variable is highly significant across the models, as the ICC variables remain significant. External support is positively related to rebel violence, both violent events and fatal events. The theory proposes a decrease in violence if actors are

dependent on external support because of the international community's influence. Rebels, however, may be supported by actors that are not concerned with the ICC and human rights norms. Rather, the material funds allow actors to continue or increase their violence. Analysis of rebel activity does not support the presented hypothesis of conditional deterrence.

Potential Methodological Concerns

I realize that no statistical methodology is perfect and that the research design presents potential methodological concerns. I discuss three areas of potential concern: the nature of the dependent variables, sample size, and endogeneity. The dependent variables are classified into two different concepts: violence against civilians and physical integrity rights. Physical integrity rights are ordinal, on a scale from 0 to 8, are not a concern here. Violence against civilians is measured as two dichotomous variables: any violent events and any fatal events. There are many more non-events than events in either case, as displayed in Table 22. Not all violent events are deadly, so there are many more zeros for deadly events than violent events. There are also more non-events for rebel actors than state actors. The amount of zeros, however, is not a major concern because they do not reach a threshold that would demand a zero-inflated model.

Second, sample size varies between the multiple regressions, depending on the data availability. CIRI has two less years (through 2011) than the event-level data (through 2013), so the physical integrity rights models have a smaller n than those of violence against civilians. Judicial independence and external support data are only available through 2011. The military data presents a problem because of it somewhat sporadic availability. In the regressions, I force missing values. This is reasonable because the military is unlikely to undergo large shifts in a year or two. Further, I deleted the missing values and re-ran the regression to investigate whether

there is a selection problem. The results are the same as with the forced data, which is also similar to the plain models.

Third, causal inference is an important concern here as with most statistical analyses. Some of the presented theoretical arguments argue that signing and ratifying the Rome Statute are the result of certain levels of repression rather pointing toward the impact of the Statute on repression. As a robustness check, I lead the dependent variables so that the independent variables, including those of the International Criminal Court, explain the next year's repression. This, however, barely altered the results. The values' signs stayed the same, and significance decreased only slightly, as to be expected with one year of data excluded. In order to maximize the utilized data, I present the original actor-year data without the leads.

Discussion

The previous analysis produces several interesting results. In particular, I discuss the differences in the explanatory variables between the two dependent variables, violence against civilians and physical integrity rights; the different results for the ICC variables depending on the actors and dependent variable; the regime type and regime duration for state versus rebel actors; and the conditional effects of foreign aid and external support.

The analysis shows that there are stark differences between the two dependent variables, violence against civilians and physical integrity rights. While they are both related to human rights and seek to measure the level of safety and secure of citizens, the two measures are noticeably different for three explanatory variables: International Criminal Court signing and ratifying, judicial independence, and foreign aid. Judicial independence is associated with decreased physical integrity rights but has no effect on violence against civilians. On the other hand, total foreign aid (positive) and proportion of foreign aid from ICC members (negative) is

significant for violence against civilians but not for physical integrity rights. This strongly suggests a difference between the two dependent variables.

The most interesting finding regarding the two dependent variables concerns the signing and ratifying of the Rome Statute. The ICC has different effects depending on actor (state or rebel) and measure of repression. Signing is significant for both state and rebel actors and is associated with increases violence and lethalness. Ratification, conversely, is associated with decreased violations of physical integrity rights. What explains the conditional difference between ratification and signing? Signing is the first step of the ascending to the International Criminal Court and acts as a signal of possible jurisdiction. Ratification, on the other hand, is a concrete acceptance of the Rome Statute and is the final step. What explains the increase in violence against civilians but decrease in physical integrity rights? Perhaps state actors are getting smarter at covering their repression, aware they are under scrutiny. If the international community is concerned with CIRI scores (torture, extrajudicial killings, disappearance, and political imprisonment), then actors may decrease these violations and are still free to continue their small-scale repression. The dichotomous variable for violence against civilians does not capture the extent of this violence. Perhaps there are many small-scale and/or isolated events and not many large-scale events?

Signing the Rome Statute is associated with more violence against civilians. Some may explain this observation by arguing that states sign to either tie hands (Simmons and Danner 2010) or deter domestic opposition (Hashimoto 2012). Signing would then be a product of previous levels of violence. By leading the dependent variable, I addressed this endogeneity concern. It would be useful to go further back (the event level used here begins in 1997), several

years before states signed the Rome Statute. Because several African states joined early (the majority in 1998), additional previous years would be helpful.

The results suggest a difference between two components of the International Criminal Court: humanitarian law and human rights law. Operationalized loosely by violence against civilians, violations of humanitarian law increase when states are part of the ICC. Violations of human rights law, captured by physical integrity rights, decrease in relation to the Court. This suggests that the Court successfully deters abuses of human rights but not violations of humanitarian law.

The analysis also finds opposing influences of regime type and regime durability for state and rebel actors. States are constrained (decreased repression) by democracy, and durability is not important. Conversely, rebels are constrained by regime durability, and regime type is of no importance. Democracy includes institutions demanding accountability and checks on power. Democratic institutions, often including extensive bureaucracies, can limit leaders' ability to employ repressive programs. Rebel groups are not constrained the same way state actors are. Because they function outside the political arena, rebels are not very concerned with the domestic institutions and processes. The durability of the regime, however, influences rebel group strength and prevalence. They are more likely to exist amid weak and unstable regimes, so a long-lasting regime (whether democratic or not) is unlikely to have a large rebel presence.

Finally, the results regarding aid and external support demand discussion. For the state analysis, total aid is positive and the proportion of aid from donor ICC countries is negative. External support for rebels is also significant and has a positive impact on violence. This suggests that the donor country is extremely important. General aid and financial support enables actors to increase their levels of repression, but aid from ICC member states constrains actors.

Through targeted aid, countries are able to spread international norms of human rights. Countries that are not States Parties to the International Criminal Court are likely to not place as high a value on the diffusion and acceptance of such norms and practices. Rebel external support is not disaggregated by donor country, but it is likely that rebel groups are funded by actors not concerned with the ICC and human rights norms. Rather, they help support their violence.

Conclusion

This analysis seeks to contribute to the debate in the literature surrounding the International Criminal Court by conducting a study on its impact on human rights and testing conditional deterrence. I distinguish between rebel and state actors for a more fine-grained analysis and include different variables that may conditionally deter human rights violations. I find that the year of ratification marks a decrease in levels of state repression, suggesting a positive impact on human rights. The following regressions were more insightful, allowing for a more complex analysis including the relevant variables.

I find mixed evidence for conditional deterrence. Joining the International Criminal Court is associated with more violence against civilians for both state and rebel actors but less physical integrity rights violations. In general, domestic political institutions- democracy and independent judiciary- successfully constrain actors and decrease repression. Foreign aid empowers state leaders, and external support rebel leaders, to increase violence. When donors are States Parties to the ICC, however, aid has a positive, deterrent effect. The influence of military strength on state levels of repression finds mixed evidence, and considering the limited data, it is difficult to generalize.

An important policy implication for this study concerns foreign aid donors. If a state receives a larger proportion of its foreign aid from States Parties to the ICC, it tends to have

lower levels of violence. This suggests that States Parties to the ICC can help deter human rights violations and aid the Court's mission by providing aid to countries with poor human rights performance. This demands further analysis, examining aid stipulations and types of aid.

This study is an important step in analyzing the effect of the International Criminal Court on human rights, but it leaves several questions unanswered and presents new puzzles. Future research should focus on examining and refining the dependent variables. The two different concepts for human rights practices can produce opposing results, so future research should carefully analyze the differences between the two measures. Relatedly, an improvement to the current analysis would be refining the violence against civilians variables to include different levels of violence rather than a dichotomous variable. This would allow for investigation into changes in small-scale violence or wide-spread violence.

Adding a geographical element would also advance this study. One could determine if violent events are geographically clustered or tend to be isolated incidents, speaking again to the nature of the violence. Further, one could introduce territorial control as an explanatory variable, examining actors' varying levels of violence in their own territory versus in opposing territory (see Strandow et al. 2013 for relevant, upcoming data).

This analysis has excluded International Criminal Court activity, an important avenue for future research. Twenty two cases in nine situations have been brought before the Court. All indictments thus far have occurred in Africa, but the Office of the Prosecutor is "currently preliminary examinations analyzing alleged crimes committed on the territories of Honduras, Ukraine, Iraq, and Palestine and assessing if there are genuine national proceedings being carried out in Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, and Nigeria" (Office of the Prosecutor). Research into the process of ICC activity from preliminary investigations, official investigations,

warrants, and indictments will provide insight into the real world consequences of the Court. NGOs may also play an important role in this process by monitoring and drawing attention to possible human rights violations.

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Figure 1: Violent Events Against Civilians



Figure 2: Violent Events Against Civilians, cont.



Figure 3: Violent Events Against Civilians, cont.



Figure 4: Civilian Fatalities



Figure 5: Civilian Fatalities, cont.



Figure 6: Civilian Fatalities, cont.



Figure 7: Physical Integrity Rights



Figure 8: Physical Integrity Rights, cont.



Figure 9: Physical Integrity Rights, cont.



***Table 1**: Summary Statistics for Repression before Ratification*

	Violent Events				**Civilians Deaths**			
	t-3	t-2	t-1	Ratification	t-3	t-2	t-1	Ratification
Mean	2.741935	2.84375	4.69697	3.060606	11.25806	10.71875	25.27273	9.030303
Standard Deviation	4.885132	4.86667	10.30014	6.707922	43.30202	33.89855	74.44137	29.43158
(Min, Max)	(0, 16)	(0,22)	(0,57)	(0, 30)	(0, 234)	(0. 184)	(0, 337)	(0, 159)

	Physical Integrity Rights			
	t-3	t-2	t-1	Ratification
Mean	4.62963	4.37037	4.354839	3.166667
Standard Deviation	1.983551	2.040892	2.345896	2.166888
(Min, Max)	(1,7)	(0, 8)	(0, 8)	(0, 8)

***Table 2**: Sign Tests for Repression before Ratification*

	Violent Deaths		Civilian Deaths		Physical Integrity Rights	
	t-2 and t-1 Increase	t-1 and Year of Ratification Decrease	t-2 and t-1 Increase	t-1 and Year of Ratification Decrease	t-2 and t-1 Increase	t-1 and Year of Ratification Decrease
One sided test: p-value	0.2272	**0.0392**	0.3036	0.1662	0.4018	**0.0925**
N	32	33	32	33	32	33

***Table 3**: Correlation of Dependent Variables*

	Any Violence	Any Deaths	Physical Integrity Rights
Any Violence	1		
Any Deaths	0.67510485	1	
CIRI	0.46699416	0.452560803	1
N	705	705	705

***Table 4**: Violence Against Civilians and the International Criminal Court*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.024				0.042**			
	(-0.017)				(-0.016)			
Ratify Duration		0.02				0.039*		
		(-0.018)				(-0.017)		
Sign			0.128				0.310+	
			(-0.181)				(-0.184)	
Ratify				-0.024				0.176
				(-0.155)				(-0.15)
Polity	-0.060**	-0.056**	-0.054**	-0.047**	-0.063***	-0.057***	-0.056***	-0.049**
	(-0.019)	(-0.018)	(-0.018)	(-0.018)	(-0.018)	(-0.017)	(-0.017)	(-0.016)
Regime Durability	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.009+	-0.010+	-0.007	-0.009+
	(-0.006)	(-0.007)	(-0.006)	(-0.006)	(-0.005)	(-0.005)	(-0.005)	(-0.005)
Population	0.356***	0.352***	0.357***	0.354***	0.415***	0.403***	0.416***	0.406***
	(-0.067)	(-0.068)	(-0.065)	(-0.067)	(-0.069)	(-0.069)	(-0.067)	(-0.067)
Civil War	0.446*	0.429*	0.414*	0.403*	0.314	0.287	0.265	0.27
	(-0.177)	(-0.177)	(-0.175)	(-0.175)	(-0.214)	(-0.214)	(-0.211)	(-0.213)
Dissent	0.148**	0.149**	0.150**	0.149**	0.185***	0.187***	0.190***	0.189***
	(-0.05)	(-0.049)	(-0.05)	(-0.049)	(-0.043)	(-0.042)	(-0.044)	(-0.042)
Constant	-5.673***	-5.546***	-5.659***	-5.526***	-7.219***	-6.941***	-7.242***	-6.963***
	(-1.054)	(-1.089)	(-1.032)	(-1.06)	(-1.101)	(-1.107)	(-1.062)	(-1.082)
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	833	833	833	833	833	833	833	833

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

Table 5: *Physical Integrity Rights and the International Criminal Court*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sign Duration	0.026			
	-(0.021)			
Ratify Duration		0.008		
		-(0.026)		
Sign			0.011	
			-(0.203)	
Ratify				-0.438*
				-(0.21)
Democracy	-0.129***	-0.121***	-0.119***	-0.101***
	-(0.024)	-(0.024)	-(0.023)	-(0.024)
Regime Durability	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.013
	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)
Population	0.627***	0.623***	0.624***	0.625***
	-(0.118)	-(0.117)	-(0.117)	-(0.117)
Civil War	1.026***	1.011***	1.008***	0.970***
	-(0.219)	-(0.222)	-(0.221)	-(0.213)
Dissent	0.123**	0.123**	0.123**	0.123**
	-(0.042)	-(0.042)	-(0.042)	-(0.041)
Constant	-6.093**	-5.942**	-5.958**	-5.814**
	-(1.948)	-(1.927)	-(1.901)	-(1.925)
p	0	0	0	0
N	625	625	625	625

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 6**: Violence Against Civilians and Judicial Independence*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.013				0.033+			
	-(0.019)				-(0.019)			
Ratify Duration		-0.004				0.018		
		-(0.021)				-(0.022)		
Sign			0.211				0.433*	
			-(0.19)				-(0.204)	
Ratify				-0.07				0.121
				-(0.161)				-(0.167)
Judicial Independence	-0.184	-0.196	-0.199	-0.197	-0.182	-0.198	-0.214	-0.204
	-(0.126)	-(0.127)	-(0.126)	-(0.126)	-(0.133)	-(0.136)	-(0.132)	-(0.133)
Democracy	-0.047*	-0.040*	-0.051**	-0.038*	-0.050**	-0.041*	-0.055**	-0.040*
	-(0.019)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)	-(0.019)	-(0.019)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)
Regime Durability	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.002	-0.007	-0.008	-0.005	-0.007
	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)
Population	0.336***	0.332***	0.343***	0.331***	0.369***	0.356***	0.381***	0.357***
	-(0.075)	-(0.076)	-(0.074)	-(0.076)	-(0.075)	-(0.075)	-(0.075)	-(0.075)
Civil War	0.468**	0.449**	0.469**	0.443**	0.462*	0.436*	0.460*	0.437*
	-(0.168)	-(0.169)	-(0.165)	-(0.168)	-(0.213)	-(0.215)	-(0.21)	-(0.214)
Dissent	0.104**	0.106**	0.106**	0.105**	0.150***	0.154***	0.154***	0.156***
	-(0.038)	-(0.039)	-(0.038)	-(0.04)	-(0.039)	-(0.04)	-(0.04)	-(0.041)
Constant	-5.309***	-5.171***	-5.478***	-5.135***	-6.439***	-6.116***	-6.742***	-6.147***
	-(1.21)	-(1.24)	-(1.188)	-(1.231)	-(1.216)	-(1.211)	-(1.213)	-(1.21)
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	696	696	696	696	696	696	696	696

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

Table 7: *Physical Integrity Rights and Judicial Independence*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sign Duration	0.017			
	-(0.021)			
Ratify Duration		0		
		-(0.026)		
Sign			0.014	
			-(0.19)	
Ratify				-0.444*
				-(0.209)
Judicial Independence	-0.523***	-0.533***	-0.533***	-0.541***
	-(0.14)	-(0.142)	-(0.141)	-(0.141)
Democracy	-0.099***	-0.092***	-0.092***	-0.074**
	-(0.027)	-(0.027)	-(0.025)	-(0.027)
Regime Durability	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.008
	-(0.009)	-(0.009)	-(0.009)	-(0.009)
Population	0.549***	0.545***	0.546***	0.545***
	-(0.115)	-(0.114)	-(0.113)	-(0.113)
Civil War	1.065***	1.054***	1.054***	1.016***
	-(0.211)	-(0.214)	-(0.213)	-(0.205)
Domestic Dissent	0.130**	0.130**	0.130**	0.130**
	-(0.041)	-(0.041)	-(0.041)	-(0.04)
Constant	-4.557*	-4.426*	-4.441*	-4.256*
	-(1.907)	-(1.885)	-(1.848)	-(1.861)
p	0	0	0	0
N	625	625	625	625

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 8**: Violence Against Civilians and External Support Dummy*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.011				0.037*			
	-(0.018)				-(0.018)			
Ratify Duration		-0.005				0.023		
		-(0.02)				-(0.02)		
Sign			0.129				0.381*	
			-(0.178)				-(0.183)	
Ratify				-0.086				0.143
				-(0.153)				-(0.155)
External Support	0.196	0.201	0.19	0.205	0.038	0.04	0.008	0.038
Dummy	-(0.191)	-(0.188)	-(0.188)	-(0.188)	-(0.17)	-(0.171)	-(0.171)	-(0.174)
Democracy	-0.059**	-0.053**	-0.060***	-0.051**	-0.064***	-0.055**	-0.066***	-0.054**
	-(0.018)	-(0.017)	-(0.018)	-(0.017)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)	-(0.017)
Regime	0	0	0	0	-0.007	-0.008	-0.006	-0.007
Durability	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.005)
Population	0.341***	0.340***	0.343***	0.340***	0.399***	0.390***	0.406***	0.391***
	-(0.072)	-(0.072)	-(0.071)	-(0.072)	-(0.073)	-(0.073)	-(0.073)	-(0.073)
Civil War	0.370+	0.349+	0.367+	0.340+	0.312	0.28	0.313	0.282
	-(0.197)	-(0.199)	-(0.199)	-(0.197)	-(0.216)	-(0.218)	-(0.217)	-(0.218)
Dissent	0.130**	0.132**	0.132**	0.131**	0.158***	0.160***	0.164***	0.162***
	-(0.046)	-(0.046)	-(0.046)	-(0.046)	-(0.042)	-(0.042)	-(0.044)	-(0.042)
Constant	-5.448***	-5.392***	-5.519***	-5.364***	-7.024***	-6.781***	-7.216***	-6.820***
	-1.132	-1.153	-1.117	-1.141	-1.18	-1.175	-1.167	-1.171
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	748	748	748	748	748	748	748	748

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 9**: Physical Integrity Rights and External Support Dummy*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sign Duration	0.026			
	-(0.021)			
Ratify Duration		0.008		
		-(0.026)		
Sign			0.012	
			-(0.205)	
Ratify				-0.438*
				-(0.21)
External Support Dummy	-0.009	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	-(0.055)	-(0.056)	-(0.057)	-(0.056)
Democracy	-0.129***	-0.121***	-0.119***	-0.101***
	-(0.024)	-(0.024)	-(0.023)	-(0.024)
Regime Durability	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.014
	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)
Population	0.627***	0.623***	0.625***	0.626***
	-(0.118)	-(0.116)	-(0.116)	-(0.116)
Civil War	1.034***	1.020***	1.017***	0.979***
	-(0.243)	-(0.246)	-(0.246)	-(0.237)
Dissent	0.123**	0.123**	0.123**	0.123**
	-(0.042)	-(0.042)	-(0.042)	-(0.041)
Constant	-6.097**	-5.946**	-5.964**	-5.819**
	-(1.942)	-(1.921)	-(1.893)	-(1.918)
p	0	0	0	0
N	625	625	625	625

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 10**: Violence Against Civilians and External Support Count*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.011				0.037*			
	-(0.018)				-(0.018)			
Ratify Duration		-0.004				0.023		
		-(0.021)				-(0.021)		
Sign			0.134				0.382*	
			-(0.176)				-(0.182)	
Ratify				-0.081				0.144
				-(0.155)				-(0.156)
External Support	-0.015	-0.014	-0.018	-0.014	-0.002	-0.002	-0.009	-0.001
Count	-(0.042)	-(0.04)	-(0.041)	-(0.04)	-(0.03)	-(0.029)	-(0.031)	-(0.03)
Democracy	-0.059**	-0.053**	-0.061***	-0.051**	-0.064***	-0.055**	-0.066***	-0.054**
	-(0.018)	-(0.017)	-(0.018)	-(0.017)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)	-(0.017)
Regime	0	0	0	0	-0.007	-0.008	-0.006	-0.007
Durability	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.005)
Population	0.342***	0.342***	0.345***	0.341***	0.399***	0.390***	0.406***	0.392***
	-(0.072)	-(0.073)	-(0.072)	-(0.072)	-(0.074)	-(0.074)	-(0.073)	-(0.073)
Civil War	0.508**	0.489**	0.505**	0.482**	0.337	0.307	0.328	0.306
	-(0.175)	-(0.177)	-(0.174)	-(0.177)	-(0.225)	-(0.227)	-(0.223)	-(0.226)
Dissent	0.128**	0.129**	0.130**	0.128**	0.158***	0.160***	0.164***	0.162***
	-(0.046)	-(0.047)	-(0.047)	-(0.047)	-(0.042)	-(0.042)	-(0.044)	-(0.042)
Constant	-5.463***	-5.408***	-5.538***	-5.382***	-7.024***	-6.782***	-7.224***	-6.821***
	-(1.138)	-(1.158)	-(1.128)	-(1.146)	-(1.186)	-(1.182)	-(1.176)	-(1.177)
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	748	748	748	748	748	748	748	748

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 11**: Physical Integrity Rights and External Support Count*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sign Duration	0.026			
	-(0.021)			
Ratify Duration		0.008		
		-(0.026)		
Sign			0.012	
			-(0.205)	
Ratify				-0.438*
				-(0.21)
External Support Count	-0.009	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
	-(0.055)	-(0.056)	-(0.057)	-(0.056)
Democracy	-0.129***	-0.121***	-0.119***	-0.101***
	-(0.024)	-(0.024)	-(0.023)	-(0.024)
Regime Durability	-0.015	-0.015	-0.015	-0.014
	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)
Population	0.627***	0.623***	0.625***	0.626***
	-(0.118)	-(0.116)	-(0.116)	-(0.116)
Civil War	1.034***	1.020***	1.017***	0.979***
	-(0.243)	-(0.246)	-(0.246)	-(0.237)
Dissent	0.123**	0.123**	0.123**	0.123**
	-(0.042)	-(0.042)	-(0.042)	-(0.041)
Constant	-6.097**	-5.946**	-5.964**	-5.819**
	-(1.942)	-(1.921)	-(1.893)	-(1.918)
p	0	0	0	0
N	625	625	625	625

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 12**: Violence Against Civilians and Foreign Aid*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.023				0.037*			
	-(0.018)				-(0.016)			
Ratify Duration		0.018				0.033+		
		-(0.019)				-(0.017)		
Sign			0.128				0.302	
			-(0.188)				-(0.189)	
Ratify				-0.066				0.116
				-(0.156)				-(0.155)
Foreign Aid	0.027	0.042	0.057	0.069	0.169+	0.186*	0.210*	0.206*
	-(0.076)	-(0.076)	-(0.079)	-(0.076)	-(0.092)	-(0.094)	-(0.091)	-(0.093)
Democracy	-0.055*	-0.051*	-0.051*	-0.042*	-0.066***	-0.061**	-0.063**	-0.054**
	-(0.021)	-(0.02)	-(0.021)	-(0.021)	-(0.02)	-(0.019)	-(0.02)	-(0.018)
Regime Durability	-0.002	-0.003	-0.001	-0.001	-0.011	-0.012+	-0.009	-0.01
	-(0.008)	-(0.008)	-(0.008)	-(0.008)	-(0.007)	-(0.007)	-(0.007)	-(0.007)
Population	0.319**	0.304**	0.299**	0.289**	0.269*	0.246*	0.241*	0.234*
	-(0.098)	-(0.101)	-(0.1)	-(0.1)	-(0.111)	-(0.111)	-(0.108)	-(0.111)
Civil War	0.463**	0.448**	0.441**	0.429*	0.344+	0.323	0.318	0.313
	-(0.167)	-(0.167)	-(0.164)	-(0.167)	-(0.205)	-(0.204)	-(0.201)	-(0.204)
Dissent	0.140**	0.142**	0.144**	0.144**	0.195***	0.199***	0.203***	0.201***
	-(0.049)	-(0.048)	-(0.049)	-(0.049)	-(0.046)	-(0.045)	-(0.048)	-(0.045)
Constant	-5.226***	-5.006***	-5.036***	-4.849***	-5.732***	-5.357***	-5.515***	-5.268***
	-(1.314)	-(1.366)	-(1.314)	-(1.336)	-(1.419)	-(1.425)	-(1.371)	-(1.41)
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	782	782	782	782	782	782	782	782

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 13**: Physical Integrity Rights and Foreign Aid*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sign Duration	0.036			
	-(0.024)			
Ratify Duration		0.024		
		-(0.027)		
Sign			0.1	
			-(0.209)	
Ratify				-0.386+
				-(0.216)
Foreign Aid	0.064	0.076	0.088	0.108
	-(0.11)	-(0.106)	-(0.104)	-(0.102)
Democracy	-0.142***	-0.136***	-0.133***	-0.113***
	-(0.025)	-(0.026)	-(0.024)	-(0.026)
Regime Durability	-0.028**	-0.029**	-0.027**	-0.026*
	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)
Population	0.555***	0.537***	0.537***	0.524***
	-(0.137)	-(0.136)	-(0.137)	-(0.144)
Civil War	1.033***	1.019***	1.011***	0.975***
	-(0.215)	-(0.219)	-(0.217)	-(0.21)
Dissent	0.108*	0.109*	0.110*	0.112*
	-(0.047)	-(0.047)	-(0.047)	-(0.047)
Constant	-5.186*	-4.867*	-4.942*	-4.663*
	-(2.081)	-(2.059)	-(2.087)	-(2.188)
p	0	0	0	0
N	580	580	580	580

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 14**: Violence Against Civilians and ICC Foreign Aid*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.018				0.032*			
	-(0.018)				-(0.016)			
Ratify Duration		0.011				0.025		
		-(0.019)				-(0.017)		
Sign			0.09				0.256	
			-(0.178)				-(0.176)	
Ratify				-0.077				0.101
				-(0.157)				-(0.147)
ICC Foreign Aid	-0.915**	-0.948**	-0.975**	-1.014**	-1.226***	-1.268***	-1.334***	-1.335***
	-(0.322)	-(0.321)	-(0.309)	-(0.319)	-(0.325)	-(0.325)	-(0.323)	-(0.325)
Democracy	-0.060**	-0.056**	-0.056**	-0.048**	-0.063***	-0.057***	-0.060***	-0.052***
	-(0.018)	-(0.017)	-(0.017)	-(0.017)	-(0.017)	-(0.016)	-(0.016)	-(0.015)
Regime Durability	-0.006	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.012+	-0.013+	-0.011	-0.012+
	-(0.008)	-(0.008)	-(0.008)	-(0.008)	-(0.007)	-(0.007)	-(0.007)	-(0.007)
Population	0.342***	0.339***	0.342***	0.340***	0.404***	0.394***	0.405***	0.395***
	-(0.069)	-(0.07)	-(0.068)	-(0.069)	-(0.071)	-(0.071)	-(0.07)	-(0.07)
Civil War	0.437*	0.421*	0.414*	0.399*	0.281	0.254	0.243	0.241
	-(0.179)	-(0.18)	-(0.177)	-(0.178)	-(0.229)	-(0.228)	-(0.224)	-(0.227)
Dissent	0.140**	0.141**	0.141**	0.140**	0.181***	0.184***	0.184***	0.184***
	-(0.051)	-(0.05)	-(0.051)	-(0.05)	-(0.046)	-(0.045)	-(0.047)	-(0.045)
Constant	-4.641***	-4.517***	-4.570***	-4.419***	-5.991***	-5.722***	-5.930***	-5.670***
	-(1.099)	-(1.12)	-(1.095)	-(1.103)	-(1.141)	-(1.143)	-(1.124)	-(1.14)
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	816	816	816	816	816	816	816	816

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 15**: Physical Integrity Rights and ICC Foreign Aid*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sign Duration	0.028			
	-(0.021)			
Ratify Duration		0.011		
		-(0.025)		
Sign			0.039	
			-(0.2)	
Ratify				-0.423*
				-(0.206)
ICC Foreign Aid	-0.406	-0.439	-0.457	-0.542
	-(0.322)	-(0.326)	-(0.327)	-(0.34)
Democracy	-0.126***	-0.119***	-0.117***	-0.099***
	-(0.024)	-(0.024)	-(0.023)	-(0.024)
Regime Durability	-0.022*	-0.023*	-0.022*	-0.021*
	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)
Population	0.623***	0.616***	0.619***	0.617***
	-(0.12)	-(0.118)	-(0.118)	-(0.117)
Civil War	1.048***	1.033***	1.029***	0.992***
	-(0.22)	-(0.224)	-(0.221)	-(0.215)
Dissent	0.106*	0.107*	0.108*	0.109*
	-(0.047)	-(0.047)	-(0.047)	-(0.047)
Constant	-5.660**	-5.444**	-5.479**	-5.200**
	-(1.954)	-(1.929)	-(1.897)	-(1.917)
p	0	0	0	0
N	610	610	610	610

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 16**: Violence Against Civilians and Military Expenditures*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.031+				0.062***			
	-(0.016)				-(0.019)			
Ratify Duration		0.029+				0.061**		
		-(0.017)				-(0.02)		
Sign			0.132				0.533*	
			-(0.179)				-(0.216)	
Ratify				0.016				0.311+
				-(0.159)				-(0.181)
Military	0.042+	0.040+	0.040+	0.038+	0.080*	0.075*	0.081**	0.074**
Expenditure	-(0.023)	-(0.022)	-(0.021)	-(0.02)	-(0.033)	-(0.031)	-(0.031)	-(0.027)
Democracy	-0.059**	-0.056**	-0.050**	-0.045*	-0.060**	-0.053**	-0.053**	-0.042*
	-(0.019)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)	-(0.019)	-(0.019)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)
Regime	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002	-0.002	-0.007	-0.010+	-0.004	-0.007
Durability	-(0.007)	-(0.007)	-(0.007)	-(0.007)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.005)
Population	0.352***	0.341***	0.352***	0.346***	0.419***	0.397***	0.433***	0.408***
	-(0.069)	-(0.07)	-(0.067)	-(0.067)	-(0.085)	-(0.083)	-(0.083)	-(0.082)
Civil War	0.429*	0.414*	0.398+	0.393+	0.368	0.332	0.326	0.321
	-(0.206)	-(0.206)	-(0.203)	-(0.203)	-(0.258)	-(0.257)	-(0.256)	-(0.257)
Dissent	0.159*	0.163**	0.162*	0.162**	0.182**	0.187***	0.190***	0.189***
	-(0.065)	-(0.062)	-(0.063)	-(0.062)	-(0.056)	-(0.051)	-(0.055)	-(0.051)
Constant	-5.751***	-5.516***	-5.712***	-5.529***	-7.642***	-7.132***	-7.925***	-7.310***
	-(1.126)	-(1.136)	-(1.089)	-(1.082)	-(1.406)	-(1.363)	-(1.393)	-(1.355)
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	667	667	667	667	667	667	667	667

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

Table 17: *Physical Integrity Rights and Military Expenditures*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sign Duration	0.041			
	-(0.029)			
Ratify Duration		0.033		
		-(0.032)		
Sign			0.203	
			-(0.267)	
Ratify				-0.194
				-(0.278)
Military Expenditure	-0.030*	-0.032*	-0.030*	-0.033*
	-(0.014)	-(0.014)	-(0.014)	-(0.014)
Democracy	-0.138***	-0.132***	-0.130***	-0.112***
	-(0.031)	-(0.031)	-(0.03)	-(0.031)
Regime Durability	-0.001	-0.002	0	0
	-(0.013)	-(0.014)	-(0.013)	-(0.013)
Population	0.632***	0.623***	0.641***	0.637***
	-(0.154)	-(0.154)	-(0.156)	-(0.156)
Civil War	1.260***	1.253***	1.242***	1.231***
	-(0.274)	-(0.274)	-(0.276)	-(0.269)
Dissent	0.073	0.075	0.076	0.077
	-(0.058)	-(0.059)	-(0.059)	-(0.06)
Constant	-6.383*	-6.161*	-6.486*	-6.255*
	-(2.603)	-(2.597)	-(2.632)	-(2.637)
p	0	0	0	0
N	408	408	408	408

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 18**: Violence Against Civilians and Military Personnel*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.013				0.033+			
	-(0.018)				-(0.018)			
Ratify Duration		0.01				0.025		
		-(0.019)				-(0.021)		
Sign			0.095				0.357+	
			-(0.17)				-(0.184)	
Ratify				-0.092				0.137
				-(0.153)				-(0.159)
Military	0.017	0.014	0.017	0.01	0.042	0.034	0.051	0.035
Personnel	-(0.04)	-(0.04)	-(0.038)	-(0.041)	-(0.061)	-(0.063)	-(0.059)	-(0.063)
Democracy	-0.052*	-0.049*	-0.050*	-0.042*	-0.055**	-0.050**	-0.056**	-0.047**
	-(0.02)	-(0.019)	-(0.02)	-(0.019)	-(0.018)	-(0.018)	-(0.017)	-(0.017)
Regime	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-0.008	-0.008	-0.006	-0.008
Durability	-(0.006)	-(0.007)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)	-(0.006)
Population	0.309***	0.305***	0.310***	0.305***	0.377***	0.365***	0.386***	0.366***
	-(0.076)	-(0.076)	-(0.075)	-(0.075)	-(0.085)	-(0.085)	-(0.085)	-(0.084)
Civil War	0.453*	0.445*	0.438*	0.423*	0.349	0.33	0.32	0.324
	-(0.178)	-(0.178)	-(0.178)	-(0.177)	-(0.221)	-(0.22)	-(0.222)	-(0.222)
Dissent	0.191**	0.190**	0.193**	0.192**	0.213***	0.212***	0.222***	0.215***
	-(0.065)	-(0.065)	-(0.065)	-(0.065)	-(0.056)	-(0.055)	-(0.057)	-(0.055)
Constant	-4.966***	-4.864***	-4.984***	-4.800***	-6.711***	-6.434***	-6.942***	-6.460***
	-1.232	-1.246	-1.205	-1.214	-1.399	-1.392	-1.393	-1.377
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	724	724	724	724	724	724	724	724

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 19**: Physical Integrity Rights and Military Personnel*

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Sign Duration	0.03			
	-(0.03)			
Ratify Duration		0.050+		
		-(0.03)		
Sign			-0.049	
			-(0.373)	
Ratify				0.087
				-(0.259)
Military Personnel	0.23	0.239	0.2	0.211
	-(0.212)	-(0.216)	-(0.21)	-(0.208)
Democracy	-0.127***	-0.131***	-0.110**	-0.117**
	-(0.037)	-(0.035)	-(0.041)	-(0.038)
Regime Durability	-0.019	-0.021	-0.016	-0.017
	-(0.014)	-(0.014)	-(0.015)	-(0.015)
Population	0.662***	0.654***	0.674***	0.671***
	-(0.173)	-(0.169)	-(0.182)	-(0.178)
Civil War	0.596***	0.589***	0.586***	0.589***
	-(0.153)	-(0.152)	-(0.16)	-(0.154)
Dissent	0.093+	0.092+	0.093+	0.093+
	-(0.052)	-(0.053)	-(0.051)	-(0.053)
Constant	-6.919*	-6.791*	-7.025*	-7.014*
	-(2.899)	-(2.828)	-(3.039)	-(2.973)
p	0	0	0	0
N	270	270	270	270

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 20**: Rebel Violence Against Civilians*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.042*				0.038+			
	-(0.02)				-(0.021)			
Ratify Duration		0.026				0.022		
		-(0.024)				-(0.025)		
Sign			0.468*				0.287	
			-(0.189)				-(0.196)	
Ratify				0.21				0.132
				-(0.172)				-(0.169)
Democracy	-0.031	-0.021	-0.032	-0.021	-0.029	-0.019	-0.024	-0.016
	-(0.022)	-(0.019)	-(0.021)	-(0.019)	-(0.025)	-(0.021)	-(0.022)	-(0.021)
Regime Durability	-0.028**	-0.029***	-0.025**	-0.027***	-0.026*	-0.027**	-0.024*	-0.026**
	-(0.009)	-(0.008)	-(0.008)	-(0.008)	-(0.011)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)
Population	0.339***	0.336***	0.354***	0.342***	0.348***	0.344***	0.360***	0.350***
	-(0.071)	-(0.072)	-(0.07)	-(0.071)	-(0.081)	-(0.081)	-(0.079)	-(0.081)
Civil War	1.067***	0.959***	1.010***	0.942***	1.040***	0.944***	0.954***	0.919***
	-(0.152)	-(0.15)	-(0.143)	-(0.15)	-(0.221)	-(0.232)	-(0.223)	-(0.229)
Constant	-6.205***	-6.008***	-6.519***	-6.131***	-6.577***	-6.373***	-6.764***	-6.473***
	-(1.149)	-(1.176)	-(1.108)	-(1.164)	-(1.314)	-(1.329)	-(1.274)	-(1.318)
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	833	833	833	833	833	833	833	833

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 21**: Rebel Violence Against Civilians and External Support*

	Any Violent Events				Any Fatal Events			
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Sign Duration	0.062**				0.054*			
	-(0.023)				-(0.023)			
Ratify Duration		0.050+				0.038		
		-(0.027)				-(0.029)		
Sign			0.425+				0.293	
			-(0.222)				-(0.209)	
Ratify				0.27				0.186
				-(0.174)				-(0.17)
External Support	1.847**	1.762**	1.696**	1.696**	1.047***	0.990***	0.943***	0.945***
	-(0.64)	-(0.585)	-(0.572)	-(0.558)	-(0.314)	-(0.29)	-(0.282)	-(0.273)
Democracy	-0.03	-0.02	-0.023	-0.016	-0.025	-0.015	-0.015	-0.01
	-(0.02)	-(0.018)	-(0.02)	-(0.018)	-(0.023)	-(0.019)	-(0.022)	-(0.02)
Regime Durability	-0.027*	-0.028**	-0.024*	-0.026**	-0.021+	-0.023*	-0.019+	-0.021*
	-(0.011)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.01)	-(0.011)	-(0.01)	-(0.011)	-(0.01)
Population	0.253***	0.242***	0.264***	0.252***	0.279***	0.270***	0.291***	0.279***
	-(0.066)	-(0.068)	-(0.065)	-(0.067)	-(0.075)	-(0.076)	-(0.072)	-(0.075)
Civil War	1.031***	0.940***	0.939***	0.910***	0.849**	0.763**	0.768**	0.738**
	-(0.175)	-(0.173)	-(0.161)	-(0.17)	-(0.262)	-(0.265)	-(0.256)	-(0.26)
Constant	-5.022***	-4.671***	-5.176***	-4.826***	-5.688***	-5.369***	-5.807***	-5.501***
	-(1.087)	-(1.121)	-(1.064)	-(1.093)	-(1.197)	-(1.233)	-(1.149)	-(1.209)
p	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N	748	748	748	748	748	748	748	748

Significance levels: + 0.10, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001

***Table 22**: Violence Against Civilians Summaries*

	State Activity		Rebel Activity	
	Any Violent Event	Any Fatal Event	Any Violent Event	Any Fatal Event
No Event	43.85%	63.54%	71.98%	78.66%
Yes Event	56.15%	36.46%	28.02%	21.34%