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Daniel Patrick Moynihan & The American Family

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Abstract

Daniel Patrick Moynihan & The American Family

Gregory B Rudin

Throughout his industrious career, which included cabinet-level service under four presidents and ended in his fourth term as a United States Senator from New York, one of Daniel Patrick Moynihan's central preoccupations was the role of the family in shaping society. This thesis will track Moynihan's changing beliefs regarding the family, spanning his career from the 1960s until his retirement in 2000. His academic writings, personal correspondences, speeches and policy positions will all be examined. It will be contended that Moynihan's views regarding the family were highly *and consistently* conservative throughout his career, and that this conservatism reflected Catholic social thought, as well as a deeply held conviction that culture was unavoidably an organic and inherited process—by necessity coming from the family and not the state.

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Statistics

Chapter 1

"The richest inheritance any child can have is a stable, loving, disciplined family life."[1]

~ Daniel Patrick Moynihan to President Lyndon Johnson, 1965.

1. On Family

Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1927-2003) was one of few twentieth century figures to play an important role in both political and intellectual life. After education at the City of College of New York, followed by a stint in the Navy and then graduate study at Tuft's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, he began his political career working as an aide to New York Governor Averell Harriman in the 1950s. He went on to serve as undersecretary of labor in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations before becoming a professor of government at Harvard University. He later joined the Nixon administration, and then won a seat in the United States senate, as a Democrat for New York, where he remained from 1977 to 2000. Throughout his industrious career, one of Moynihan's central preoccupations was the role of the family in shaping society. This thesis will track Moynihan's changing beliefs regarding the family, spanning his career from the 1960s until his retirement in 2000. His academic writings, personal correspondences, speeches and policy positions will all be examined.

The issue of the family fit squarely within the socially conservative conscience of Moynihan, an otherwise lifelong and self-declared Democrat and fiscal liberal. He became outspoken in favor of the traditional idea that households led by two married parents engendered superior results in raising children. Surely, to Moynihan, this was the noblest end a family could serve. Moreover, he was convinced that strengthened American families stood the best chance of ameliorating poverty. Consequently, he advocated policies that promoted two-parent families,

[1] Moynihan, Daniel P., and Steven R. Weisman. "March 5, 1965: Memorandum For the President.", p. 93.

believing that government should expend its considerable resources in order to strengthen this preeminently important facet of American life.

As someone who espoused traditional social values while promoting government expenditure to help poor families, Moynihan was a rare breed of social conservative and fiscal liberal. By social conservative, I mean someone who believes in 'conserving' certain traditional elements of human experience due to their perceived indispensability to human advancement, as well as their great importance in shaping civilization. For this definition, I am borrowing from Patrick Allitt (fittingly enough my adviser) who explains conservatism much more elegantly as a respect for the "inherited wisdom of the past."[2] Based on this definition, Moynihan was socially conservative with regard to the family, which he believed was and had been for centuries the primary unit of society. He understood the family's unique and historical role as transmitter of virtues and discipline to posterity; he knew the family was central to raising well-mannered children apt to succeed in later life; he appreciated that the powerful bonds of kinship were crucial to avoiding the alienation of life in a capitalist society. Therefore, he believed strongly in conserving the family unit—as essential to preserving a social order full of loving, compassionate, virtuous, and industrious citizens. Fiscal liberalism, on the other hand, simply denotes the belief that society is more just when prosperity (wealth) is broadly shared. Fiscal liberals actively seek the redistribution of wealth between social classes, from the more fortunate to the less, in the interest of achieving a more egalitarian society.

Moynihan's social conservatism and fiscal liberalism, furthermore, were intertwined in that Moynihan regarded living a traditional family lifestyle (consisting of two married, cohabitating parents with children) as essential to the pursuit of economic equality. In other words, Moynihan viewed the primary goal of fiscal liberalism—to achieve a more equal and

[2] Patrick Allitt. *iTunes University Lecture*.

prosperous society—as unattainable unless the recipients of aid lived according to traditional family norms. It was clear to Moynihan that deviant social arrangements—especially single-motherhood—undermined what should be America's primary pursuits of greater financial security and the elimination of poverty—both of which he felt would be achieved *only* through the cultivation of traditional family values in the citizenry.

Specifically, Moynihan framed the surpassing importance of sturdy, two-parent family life in the language of traditional Catholic teachings. As a Catholic, he could identify no more pressing cause than strengthening the family and providing the resources that would make pervasive and stable marriages a reality. Concerned chiefly with Americans' virtuousness and material well-being, Moynihan remained relatively unwilling to consider the validity of non-traditional family behaviors. Detecting his traditional conservatism, many 1960s liberals who spoke in favor of freer divorces and sexual exploration correctly considered Moynihan a cultural traditionalist. Certainly, he was.

This thesis will contend that Moynihan's views regarding the family were highly *and consistently* conservative throughout his career, and that this conservatism reflected Catholic social thought, as well as a deeply held conviction that culture was unavoidably an organic and inherited process—by necessity coming from the family and not the state.

Furthermore, Moynihan's socially conservative family beliefs will be traced and analyzed on an intellectual, as against spiritual or religious, level. This will be a story almost completely about ideas, facts, and statistics, and only infrequently about faith or spirituality. It was the confluence of intellect and empiricism, of Moynihan's reasoned pro-family judgments and the statistics that validated them, which cemented the traditional family in Moynihan's mind as the cornerstone of society.

* * *

Furthermore, Moynihan's views, *consistently conservative*, were unresponsive to changing social norms and expectations, revealing the extent to which his familial conservatism was ingrained, subject to neither debate nor pervasive patterns in American life. To contrast Moynihan's consistent stance with the changing times, a brief historical section summarizing evolving social norms and behaviors will be enclosed at the start of chapters two and four, as well as in the subsequent section of this chapter, one. It should become clear that Moynihan never paid much attention to changing norms. For example, as the sexual revolution—which ignited in the late 1960s—took off early during the next decade, Moynihan continued to espouse conservative family ideas. From the beginning a strong believer in family values, Moynihan remained highly and consistently conservative on the subject of family throughout his career.

This topic is important mainly for two reasons. First and perhaps most fascinating is the unique perspective that studying Moynihan can bring to the present debate over how to stem the continuing rise in broken homes. Family deterioration—measured primarily in rates of divorce and out-of-wedlock births—has persisted into the present on the ominous trajectory that Moynihan first brought to national attention while working as undersecretary of labor in the Johnson White House.[3] For example, "in 2007, a record-high 39.7 percent of all babies in the United States were born out of wedlock."[4] Among blacks, the rate was 72 percent. Today, arguments for how to combat these trends are usually couched in terms either wholly liberal or totally conservative. The former position advocates expanding the welfare state while blaming discrimination and the opportunity structure for failing to distribute awards evenly across racial

[3] From the 1960s on, American family life has unraveled significantly. Illustrating how dramatically family life has changed in America since the 1950s, Appendix A denotes statistical trends speaking to the evolution of family life from the 1950s to the present. Hopefully, this will contextualize the subsequent discussion, demonstrating to readers why the issue of family is today as relevant as ever.

[4] Patterson, p., xvi.

and socioeconomic lines. The latter supports repealing the welfare state, suggesting that a revolution in citizen industry and virtue is required if all Americans are to stand on a prosperous footing.

Moynihan is interesting precisely because he stood between these positions, as a fiscal liberal and a social conservative—a redistributionist who nonetheless believed strongly in virtuous and conforming private life. His viewpoints regarding family life, rarely articulated by fiscally liberal Democrats in today's polarized political climate, should be thought provoking to the modern reader who may question the rigidity of contemporary ideology in public life. Also, Moynihan's insights may prove instructive to how people today think about solving the problem of family deterioration going forward.

The second crucial importance involves the widely held contention that Moynihan underwent an ideological transition from Democrat to 'neo-conservative' in the middle 1960s. (The latter ideology generally is characterized by social conservatism and suspicion about the government's capacity to legislate away social problems, such as poverty and crime). Justin Vaisse, who has undertaken an excelled study[5] of neo-conservatism, suggests that Moynihan's beliefs became more conservative between 1965 and 1968, while James T Patterson suggests that Moynihan became more liberal during the 1980s. With regard specifically to the family, this thesis will demonstrate that neither transition occurred. Moynihan was and remained a social conservative when it came to the family.

* * *

Grasping the consistent conservatism of Moynihan's pro-family insights requires understanding the social liberalization of America, which began in the late 1960s. When Moynihan adopted the family as a political concern during the early 1960s, mainstream family

[5] Vaïsse, Justin. *Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap of Harvard UP, 2010.

norms and values were relatively stable, coalescing around the traditional two-parent ideal. Americans continued to marry young and often; divorce rates remained low. Later in the decade, however, tensions would arise between this traditionalism and newly emerging standards articulated by feminists and sexual revolutionaries. In the aftermath, mainstream social beliefs migrated leftward while Moynihan continued to occupy a conservative wavelength on the ideological spectrum. In order to contextualize Moynihan's beliefs regarding the family, to provide them with a social backdrop, it is necessary to recount 1950s family life. A brief history therefore follows.

During the 1950s, Americans married more frequently and at younger ages than at any other time in history—a legacy of the postwar desire for stability and comfort exhibited by many young Americans returning home from World War II. "Reacting against the poverty of the depression and the upheavals of World War II,"[6] young Americans turned to family life for long-anticipated security and happiness.

Patterns in childbearing and divorce further affirmed that 1950s husbands, wives, fathers, and mothers were particularly enthusiastic family members. As testament to their genuine excitement for family life, Americans "had more children and bore them faster"[7] than at any time since the colonial era. Divorce rates were historically low, rendering American families "particularly stable."[8] Together with the rise in marital rates, lower divorces accounted for 60%[9] of all 18-24 year-old women being married by 1950, while only 42%[10] could claim such

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[6] Mintz, Steven, and Susan Kellogg. *Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life*. New York: Free, 1988., p. 180.
[7] Mintz., p. 178.
[8] May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. New York: Basic, 1988., p. 3.
[9] Chafe, William Henry. *The Unfinished Journey: America since World War II*. New York: Oxford UP, 1986., p. 117.
[10] Chafe., p., 117.

companionship ten years before. By any metric, the decade was aptly considered "the age of marriage."[11]

And yet, despite enthusiasms, fairly rigid cultural expectations developed, prescribing set and often limiting roles for each member of the family. Once ensconced in their home, husband and wife were expected to devote their full energies to the family. For the husband this meant spending his days at work, his mornings and nights commuting to and from the house. In her husband's absence, the wife was solely responsible for upholding the culturally cherished ideal of "family togetherness,"[12] which entailed chauffeuring the kids to school and performing household chores. The typical 1950s mother consequently had no time to complete her education, much less pursue a professional career of her own. Thus, though family life was robust, it clearly came at the price of some parental happiness—especially that of the mother.

Prompting mothers to maintain a singular focus on the household was the "cultural imperative that a woman's place was in the home"[13]—reinforced through the home front ideology of domestic containment. As the corollary to the U.S. "containment" of the Soviet Union abroad, many "postwar experts...prescribed family stability as an antidote" [14] to communist infiltration at home. The dictates of "common wisdom" held that those who deviated from "normal heterosexual behavior culminating in marriage" were, "by definition, irresponsible, immature, and weak."[15] Indeed, "women who failed to marry or who resented their family roles were denigrated [usually by those on the right] as maladjusted or neurotic."[16]

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[11] Mintz., p. 179.
[12] Mintz., p. 180.
[13] Mintz.,p. 181.
[14] May., p. 91.
[15] May., p. 91.
[16] Mintz,. p. 105.

Domestic containment therefore demonstrated how "public policy, personal behavior, and even political values were focused on the home"[17]—specifically by promoting married life.

In sum, when reflecting upon the 1950s as a whole, it is fair to conclude that American society officially coalesced around a narrow and pervasive definition of the family, which consisted of mom dad and the kids. Partially, this was the legacy of having lived through World War II—and consequently seeking peace and security—and partially it was attributable to existential Cold War anxiety, which demanded a noble and righteous American family image against which to pit the "evil" Soviet Union.

* * *

To date, the historiography compiled on Moynihan has touched on his conception of the family, but the analysis remains incomplete, and unsatisfactorily reliant upon psychological speculation. Moynihan's two biographers, Douglas Schoen and Godfrey Hodgson, have acknowledged the centrality of family to Moynihan's political career, suggesting that Moynihan's upbringing in a broken home motivated his later support for pro-family policies. As Hodgson writes, "without a male head," Moynihan's "family automatically lost both income and status."[18] Moynihan's "was the...predicament of a middle-class family whose status and prospects were dramatically affected when the father left home."[19] He continues, "Joining the Navy...opened the way to recouping the opportunities, and the status, he lost when his father walked out seven years earlier."[20] Likewise, Douglas Schoen reaffirms that "Moynihan had always believed that the family was the basic unit of society."[21] Schoen further writes that throughout his career, Moynihan consistently took the position that the "job of government" was

[17] Mintz,. p. 105.
[18] Hodgson., Godfrey. *The Gentleman from New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan : A Biography*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000 p. 30.
[19] Hodgson., p. 26.
[20] Hodgson., p. 36.
[21] Schoen, Douglas E. *Pat: A Biography of Daniel Patrick Moynihan :*. New York: Harper & Row, 1979., p. 104.

"to reinforce...familial institutions."[22] Hodgson describes the family as one of Moynihan's "recurring themes...no doubt rooted in his own painful personal experiences as the child of a broken family himself."[23]

Besides postulating psychological analysis and the observation that family was central to Moynihan's thoughts, neither biographer accounts for what Moynihan meant by "*the family,"* and they both disregard the (traditional-conservative) ideological tenor of Moynihan's pro-family insights. Though Hodgson skims the surface, his explanation is incomplete. When describing Moynihan's 1965 report to President Johnson, *The Negro Family*, Hodgson quotes Moynihan as having said, "Where marriage exists, it is not producing families, and where marriage does not exist, children are produced without families."[24] Clearly, Moynihan possessed a complex definition of family, but how exactly that became manifest remained unexamined.

By tracking Moynihan's conservative family beliefs, this thesis will attempt to fill in this historiographical gap by exploring the family as it concretized in Moynihan's consciousness. It will consider the traditional form of the family along with the almost mystical power Moynihan attributed to it as the nucleus of society. In addition, this paper will add to the existing scholarship by identifying the family as an issue of consistency on Moynihan's ideological compass, whose dial is typically described as having changed orientations over time. Indeed, Moynihan's views regarding the family retained the same, socially conservative tenor throughout his public life.

In this chapter's final section, Moynihan's first thirty-two years of life will be examined, though the bulk of the analysis will investigate the interlude between Moynihan's service as a speechwriter to Governor Averell Harriman, a position which terminated in 1959, and his

[22] Schoen., p. 109.
[23] Hodgson., p. 92.
[24] The Moynihan Papers, Library of Congress.

appointment as the undersecretary of labor to the Kennedy White House in 1961. It was during this time that Moynihan discovered his academic voice, which appeared voluminously in writings on a range of subjects from auto safety to the persistence of ethnic identity in New York City. This period abounds with evidence of Moynihan's political ideology and his early beliefs regarding the family. Specifically, it was during these years that Moynihan realized the power of the family as a cultural transmitter, as the chief determinant of everything from ethnic custom to a child's adulthood endeavors.

The second chapter will discuss Moynihan's career from 1961 through 1965, ending with his infamous report, *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*. It will explore the beginnings of the War on Poverty in the Kennedy Administration, and particularly how partaking in formulating poverty policy cemented Moynihan's vision of the family as essential not only to the preservation of American values, but ultimately to extending access to educational and financial opportunities to poor communities. Crucial during this period was Moynihan's encounter with hard statistical evidence affirming the insights he earlier had gleaned while studying ethnicity. It was here that intellectual thought and empirical proof first merged in Moynihan's mind to become a highly and rigidly potent pro-family force.

The third chapter will address the immediate aftermath of *The Negro Family* (which sparked considerable controversy) and will take the reader through Moynihan's subsequent disassociation from liberal circles, culminating in his service as Secretary of the Urban Affairs Council under President Nixon. Again the consistent conservatism of his family beliefs will be elucidated. Additionally, this chapter will focus on the specific period when Justin Vaisse alleges that Moynihan's ideology shifted rightward toward neo-conservatism. I will try to demonstrate that when considered from the standpoint of family, no such transition occurred.

Moving forward, the fourth chapter will begin during Moynihan's tenure at Harvard University following his resignation from the Nixon White House in 1970, and will culminate in 1985, when Moynihan delivered the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. This time period represents a relative (though temporary) diminution of family concerns from Moynihan's personal and political agendas, corresponding to a deafening national silence on the issue of family largely sparked by the Moynihan Report, which in popular culture was labeled as the work of a bigot. By 1985, many esteemed scholars had vindicated the conclusions put forth in *The Negro Family*, facilitating Moynihan's reentry into the national debate over family. Furthermore, I argue, Moynihan's interests between 1970 and 1985 remained to a significant extent geared toward bolstering family life. Given the sensitivity of the subject during those years, however, Moynihan's actions were often indirect, and so unearthing his discreet pro-family agenda is a large focus of the chapter. In addition, I examine yet another period during which Moynihan is alleged to have shifted ideologically—this time from conservative leftward during the 1980s. Through the lens of the family, it will be proposed that Moynihan's beliefs remained consistently conservative.

Finally, the Epilogue will explore Moynihan's career from 1986-2000 before bringing the discussion into the present. During this period, Moynihan was more consistently outspoken regarding the central importance of family to civic life than at any prior point in time. He was also considerably demoralized due to his perception that America was in a state of terminal cultural decline. The language he used, forecasting the end of American civilization as he knew it, was the sharpest and most direct of his entire half-century in public life.

A brief comment on the relative weight assigned to each year of Moynihan's post-1959 career: I have allotted more space to my expositions of Moynihan's pre-1970 endeavors than to

events thereafter. This is due to my belief that Moynihan engaged the family on a highly profound level leading up to the year 1970, after which time he ceased to challenge—and began to restate—his views regarding the centrality of family to civic life. The greater emphasis given to the earlier periods is therefore the author's bias, preferring to explore the times during which Moynihan was both excited and distraught over the family, and eager to unearth new data further affirming his cause. While his post-1970 career is highly interesting and important, understanding it requires less exposition because his formative family years had already passed.

Finally, throughout all five sections, this thesis will contend that Moynihan's views regarding the family were highly *and consistently* conservative, and that this conservatism reflected Catholic social thought, as well as a deeply held conviction that culture was unavoidably an organic and inherited process, coming from the family and not the state.

2. 1927-1959: Moynihan's Early Life

Moynihan's interest in the family was highly personal. When he was ten years old in 1937, his alcoholic and philandering father left home, and as a result his family plunged into poverty. Moynihan and his siblings were forced to shine shoes in Times Square and perform odd summer jobs to supplement their mother's meager income as a part-time nurse and English teacher.[25] In addition to the difficulty of financial strains, he also understood the psychological burden of single-parenthood, as he witnessed the toll it took on his mother. Margaret Moynihan was prone to bouts of depression and was nearly perpetually unhappy while struggling to support her fledgling family. The insights Moynihan gleaned at a young age would inevitably impact his later political stance on family life.

[25] Patterson, James T. *Freedom Is Not Enough: The Moynihan Report and America's Struggle over Black Family Life : From LBJ to Obama*. New York: Basic, 2010. p., 2.

After parochial school education (where he was instructed in the essentiality of strong family life) for the first fourteen years of his life,[26] Moynihan entered Benjamin Franklin High School in 1943, and graduated a year later at the remarkable age of sixteen.[27] To earn some spending money while in school, Moynihan worked as a stevedore on the Hudson River docks, an occupation he would continue throughout his first few years of college.[28] In the fall of 1944, he enrolled in the City College of New York, where he spent just one year before joining the Navy in July 1944. Initially, he enrolled at Middlebury College in the wartime V-12 training program designed to educate future naval officers. While there, he struggled through his training, earning Cs and Ds in Spanish, French and Trigonometry, but managing As in both English and History. Upon leaving Middlebury when the program closed in 1945, Moynihan enrolled in Tufts to complete his naval education. In June 1946, Tufts awarded Moynihan a Bachelor's degree in Naval Science before the Navy shipped him off to serve as a communications officer aboard the USS *Quirinus,* a repair ship based in Norfolk, Virginia.

Moynihan spent a year in naval service before returning to Tufts in the fall of 1947 in order to complete his Bachelor of Arts degree. With the substantial undergraduate credit he had amassed during his cumulative time at City College, Middlebury, and Tufts, Moynihan achieved this in only one year. But he was far from done with the academy. The next fall, Moynihan returned to Tufts for his Master's Degree, and was named valedictorian of his graduate group. This was a distinctive honor in an otherwise tumultuous year; one night out, after drinking too much, Moynihan was confronted by a neighborhood police officer who brutally "beat him"[29]

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[26] Patterson, p., 2.
[27] All the facts pertaining to Moynihan's life which appear in this section were extracted from both Hodgson and Schoen's biographies of Moynihan. I have picked out what is important to this narrative, and so the selection is intentional and mine. To avoid the exhaustiveness of footnoting every fact, I will state this here with the following caveat: all assertions and analyses are mine unless otherwise footnoted.
[28] Patterson, p., 2.
[29] Hodgson, p., 38.

before sending him to jail overnight. Four years later, Moynihan would describe the incident to a psychoanalyst—a sure sign that it possessed at least some significance. The police officer was, in Moynihan's words, "Irish," and Moynihan recalled the psychoanalyst's interpretation in his diary: "The illusion that I was tough & independent was shattered and once more I was a child vis a vis father?"[30] Though he assessed this theory with a doubtful "Maybe!"[31] it is thought that during that summer of 1948, Moynihan traveled west alone in an unsuccessful attempt to find his father. Indeed, the effects of paternal abandonment are inevitably profound.[32]

Heading back east prior to the fall of 1949, Moynihan was determined to earn a doctoral degree, and achieve the status and job security offered to professors. He thus returned to Tufts to begin researching his dissertation. Later that year, he applied for and received a Fulbright Scholarship to study the International Labor Organization, the subject of his dissertation, at the London School of Economics. He set sail in 1950. Moynihan's time in London marked a period of enormous personal growth. He extended what was intended to be a nine month trip into a three year sojourn. Moynihan was able to capitalize on the government largess, which not only subsidized his Fulbright scholarship but also, via the G.I. Bill, furnished Moynihan with a monthly allowance of $225.[33] Liberal government programs profoundly enhanced Moynihan's life prospects. This is a fact Moynihan surely never forgot.

While in London, Moynihan befriended the Gollogly family, whose patriarch, Jock, was a longshoreman and chairman of the local Labor Party. Moynihan dated Mary Gollogly, Jock's daughter, and grew quite comfortable in the company of these "ordinary"[34] Londoners. By becoming cozy with a working-class family that occupied a decided middle-ground on the

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[30] Hodgson, p., 39.
[31] Hodgson, p., 39.
[32] This argument is also stated in Hodgson and Schoen's books, as recounted in this chapter's introduction.
[33] Hodgson, p., 41.
[34] Hodgson, p., 44.

political spectrum (there were Marxists swarming London at the time), Moynihan foreshadowed his own affinity for the Democratic politics under whose banner he would pursue family policy the following decade.[35] Furthermore, the Golloglys were socially conservative family-values people, something that Godfrey Hodgson suggests endeared them to Moynihan.

Though Moynihan experienced tremendous personal growth while in London, he failed to make a dent in his dissertation. Thus, on his trip home in 1952, he was left searching for something to do—and encountered what Godfrey Hodgson calls "one enormous lucky break."[36] On his boat ride home from Genoa to New York, Moynihan met a well-connected New York lawyer, Paul Reilly, who inquired about his future plans. When Moynihan responded that he had none, Reilly presented him with the opportunity to meet Adrian Burke, New York mayoral candidate Robert Wagner's campaign manager. "Within days of landing in New York" Moynihan found himself working for the campaign, specifically for a man named Jonathan Bingham.[37]

Shortly thereafter, Wagner won the election. Binghman, the son of a Governor destined to remain in a position of political influence, was promptly scooped up to serve as executive secretary to recently-elected New York Governor, Averell Harriman. Bingham brought Moynihan along to serve in a versatile assistant role; in this capacity, Moynihan would, among other things, pen speeches, and issue internal memoranda. Elizabeth Brennan, who within two years became Moynihan's wife, served as Bingham's secretary.

Moynihan distinguished himself through speech-writing, and in 1956 Bingham promoted him to head of reports, a job which entailed keeping track of the on goings of the entire state

[35] At any rate, it is worth noting that Moynihan never sympathized with radical leftism, even during his academy-spent youth. Though many would interpret his later rebuke of the far left as a conversion to conservatism, Moynihan's beliefs were never sympathetic to the radical tenor characteristic of 1960s liberals. James T. Patterson reaffirms this in his book, *Freedom Is Not Enough.*

[36] Hodgson, p., 49.

[37] Hodgson, p., 49.

bureaucracy and reporting them to the media. Moynihan was also made chairman of the Governor's Traffic Safety Policy Coordinating Committee, a body that under Moynihan's direction advocated safer automobile design to decrease the death toll caused by traffic accidents. At the time, policy makers took a different view, wholly blaming driver behavior (such as speeding) for automobile-induced deaths. This latter role, in which Moynihan actually had some discretion, would gain him a measure of fame when he later wrote articles as a journalist upon leaving the administration.

In 1958, Bingham stepped down, and Moynihan took over as acting secretary, a dizzyingly high rise from his seat on the America-bound Genoese ship six years earlier. Still, his tenure would not last long; Harriman lost that year's election to Nelson Rockefeller. By 1959, Moynihan was out of a job, though the outgoing governor soon made him a proposal. Upon leaving office, Harriman contacted Moynihan, asking him write the history of his administration. It was to be based on the Governor's papers, which Harriman had donated to the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. Moynihan consented, and in January of 1959, he and his wife took up residence in isolated Syracuse, where they would stay for two and a half years.[38]

3. 1959-1961: Expressions of Social Conservatism & The Fundamental Family Insights of *Beyond the Melting Pot*

In 1959, just as Moynihan was settling into Syracuse, the Bingham connection paid yet another dividend when Jonathan introduced Moynihan to Robert Bingham, managing editor of *The Reporter*—a high-brow leftist magazine edited chiefly by Irving Kristol. In his first foray into professional journalism, Moynihan contributed regularly to this publication throughout his

[38] Much to his dismay, though Moynihan successfully completed a 500-page typescript of the book, his work on the Harriman administration would never be punished. The reason: it "wasn't flattering enough" for the former governor, according to Moynihan's account in a 1997 letter to Godfrey Hodgson.

stay at Syracuse. During his compositions for the magazine, Moynihan gained significant confidence in his writer's voice, which would serve him immensely well throughout his career.

Moynihan's aptitude for writing became especially useful in his co-authorship, with Nathan Glazer, of *Beyond the Melting Pot.* This book would make explicit (and perhaps uncover) his views on the power of family to shape one's individual and cultural identity. In 1960, Glazer, a college friend of Irving Kristol,[39] was searching for individuals of Irish, African American, Italian, Puerto Rican, and Jewish descent to pen chapters on the present state of their respective ethnic cultures in the city of New York. Kristol, impressed by Moynihan's incisively written articles for *The Reporter*, introduced the two men, and shortly thereafter it was agreed that Moynihan would contribute a chapter on the Irish experience. As the project matured, Glazer failed to find another acceptable co-author, and so he composed the remaining four chapters himself.[40] In 1963, the book was published. Its thesis was that the melting pot, which was fabled to have assimilated all immigrant culture into a common American experience, had not in fact melted. Instead, ethnic identity, forged through centuries of historical circumstance, persisted into the present, reinforcing traditional cultural identities. Succinctly, the authors contended, "ethnicity is more than an influence on events; it is commonly the source of events."[41]

Significantly, while ethnic culture was deemed highly influential, both Moynihan and Glazer recognized that it was not tied to genetics. Their theories on its origins concluded that culture was perpetuated most significantly within the family. Moynihan and Glazer composed a new introduction for the second edition of *Beyond the Melting Pot* (published in 1970), in which

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[39] Hodgson, p., 64.
[40] Glazer, Nathan, and Daniel P. Moynihan. *Beyond the Melting Pot: The Negroes, Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and Irish of New York City*. Cambridge [Mass.: M.I.T., 1970. p., Vii.
[41] Glazer & Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 310.

they summarized the central argument they had put forth in the first edition. They wrote: a group's "basic cultural characteristics" helped "to make each group different, in its own development...and particularly important among these was family structure."[42] In other words, the most highly determinative component of any given ethnic group's culture was its particular form of family life. With hindsight (given Moynihan's near fanatical obsession with family later in the 1960s), this seemed a thesis equally important to both co-authors. And in a most basic sense it was—even though the word "family" was repeated almost *ad naseum* in Glazer's chapters, while it rarely appeared in the one penned by Moynihan.

Family structure was explicitly stated as the locus of Glazer's arguments, especially in his sections on "the Negros" and Italians. In explaining why Italians preferred to live near their families, and undertake local, normally non-*professional* jobs, Glazer wrote, "the contemporary American ethic values self-advancement, whereas the Italian variant still values family advancement."[43] This accounted for why Italians were underrepresented among the nation's professors, doctors, and lawyers: "accomplishment for the Italian son is felt by the parents to be meaningless unless it directly gratifies the family."[44] With regard to "the problems of present-day Negro and Puerto Rican children," they "often stem from the family, in which a single overburdened and resentful parent is unable to maintain an ordered home life for the child."[45] In both cases, family life almost completely determined one's adulthood vocation, level of education, and residential location.

Moynihan's treatment of the family, on the other hand, was less explicit and more implied; indeed, the word "family" almost never appeared in his chapter on New York's Irish.

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[42] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., vii.
[43] Glazer, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 196.
[44] Glazer, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 197.
[45] Glazer, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 206.

This indicated a distinction, however subtle, between Moynihan's and Glazer's treatment of family. While Glazer emphasized family structure and the relationships among family members, Moynihan centered his discussion on the *consequences* of those relationships[46]—in other words, how a given family culture manifested itself in the vocational, marital, and educational decisions made by those within it.

On the surface, Moynihan's narrative on the Irish dealt in cultural patterns of religiosity, personality, and education; invariably, however, the family constituted the vehicle through which these cultural patterns became manifest in individuals. It was, for example, Irish family structure, with its strongly revered patriarch, which instilled the veneration for authority that would become the glue of Tammany Hall—the Irish-controlled Democratic Party power apparatus in New York City. From a young age, Irish parents taught their children to hate the British, which they continued to do throughout the first World War as third generation Americans "who wished to see Germany defeat England."[47] Irish men, moreover, fashioned themselves as "plain as against fancy American."[48] They were "men of the people"[49] who possessed a "contempt for intelligence and learning."[50] Their children, in turn, had placed relatively little emphasis on school, which led to the "particularly galling"[51] scholastic achievements of Irish Americans.

Out of all this grew the culture of the "fighting Irish,"[52] which, as sons and daughters copied their parents' modes of existence, replicated itself across generations of Irish Americans.

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[46] Glazer also obviously discussed the consequences of family life (including in the passage I just cited)--and Moynihan the structures. Still, I am trying to convey that, however subtly, the two authors' focal points were different.
[47] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 244.
[48] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 250.
[49] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 247.
[50] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 247.
[51] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 231.
[52] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 247.

Thus, by living out its unique ethnic experience, the family both embodied and transmitted its culture to the next generation.[53] Children overwhelmingly tended to live by the values of the home.

Further, in *Beyond the Melting Pot* and in an article for *Commentary* in 1961, Moynihan commended and endorsed the familial nature of Tammany even as middle-class Protestant Democrats decried Tammany's leadership as corrupt and undemocratic. Moynihan argued the opposite, that Tammany was a highly democratic "family affair"[54] akin to "the social system of an Irish village writ large."[55] Elaborating, "The Irish village was a place of stable, predictable social relations in which almost everyone had a role to play, under the surveillance of a stern oligarchy of elders, and in which, on the whole, a person's position was likely to improve with time. Transferred to Manhattan, these were the essentials of Tammany Hall."[56] Moynihan's defense of Tammany invoked the legitimacy of ethnic custom, signaling his conservative democratic belief in the importance of family life. Tammany, in his analysis, was the largest Irish family.

Moreover, by equating his favorable perception of Tammany with true democracy, Moynihan demonstrated that his pro-family insights were heavily rooted in a small-government social conservatism that envisaged the family, and not the state, as the proper transmitter of culture. He wrote that New York under Tammany was the "first great city in history to be ruled by men of the people...as a persisting, established pattern."[57] By elevating regular men to positions of high authority, Tammany's Irish were engaged in true democracy, not tyranny. The state, furthermore, had no right to interfere with the community culture.

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[53] What truly made an ethnic culture, therefore, was really an agglomeration of family cultures all shaped by a continuity of experience.
[54] Moynihan, Daniel P. ""Bosses" and "Reformers"" *Commentary* May 1961.
[55] Moynihan, Daniel P. ""Bosses" and "Reformers"" *Commentary* May 1961.
[56] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 226.
[57] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 228.

Finally, in *Beyond the Melting Pot*, Moynihan invoked what would become one of his later concerns: the indispensability of middle-class income to producing career-successful children. As Moynihan recounted, the Irish, in reaction to the English Penal Laws proscribing the Catholic religion, were compelled to spend their money on a massive network of Churches upon arriving in America. Thus, "A good part of the surplus that might have gone into family property has gone into building the Church. This has almost certainly inhibited the development of those solid middle-class dynasties that produce so many of the important people in America."[58] In addition to the centrality of income, Moynihan's analysis of the British statute revealed his belief that state laws could not divert the natural gravity of family culture, which would continue to practice custom—and were justified in doing so—regardless of state intent. The Penal Laws, if anything, strengthened rather than arrested the Irish Catholic desire to worship.

[58] Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot*, p., 230.

Chapter 2

As soon as John F. Kennedy was elected president in November 1960, Moynihan applied for jobs within his assembling administration. Failing to land anything in the Commerce or Transportation Departments where he aspired to work, Moynihan received help from his London School of Economics classmate, Sandy Vancour,[59] who was friendly with Arthur Goldberg, Kennedy's recently appointed secretary of labor. The secretary was hiring, and though he was looking for an economist—and Moynihan was a political scientist—the department offered him a job.[60] By the spring of 1961, Moynihan had packed his bags and was headed for Washington.

Between 1961 and late 1962, Moynihan worked directly for Willard Wirtz, Goldberg's undersecretary. Then in September 1962, President Kennedy appointed Goldberg to the Supreme Court, and Wirtz was promoted to Secretary. Moynihan then stepped into the position of Undersecretary of Labor for Policy Planning and Research, a job that involved identifying areas of concern to the department, and preparing relevant research reports and policy recommendations.[61] He would serve in this capacity until 1965.

Throughout these years, Moynihan demonstrated a passionate and inquisitive drive to unearth truths about the family—namely, he sought to affirm his conviction that living one's childhood in a stable home made the largest positive difference (of any factor including wealth) in later life outcome. In large part, Moynihan was motivated by an intellectual hunch, which was perhaps partially religious and spiritual. Very early in his tenure, Moynihan was already busy devising welfare policies centered on the family, while the rest of the administration endeavored

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[59] Hodgson, p., 69.
[60] Hodgson, p., 70.
[61] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income; the Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan*. New York: Random House, 1973., p., 49.

to discern how creative social policy might diminish feelings of alienation among America's many inner-city dwellers.

Most specifically, Moynihan's belief in the great importance of family life existed where his conservative small-government and *Catholic* social philosophy merged with empirical proof—the latter as conveyed through the numerous scholarly and statistical studies that he undertook during the early 1960s. In fact, his empiricism—which both inspired and reinforced his beliefs—revealed remarkable correlations between metrics of family deterioration (such as divorce rates, out-of-wedlock births) and other social factors such as poverty and crime. Most famous of his works was his 1965 study, *The Negro Family: The Case For National Action*, which convinced him more powerfully than anything else that buttressing family life lay at the core of improving the lots of less fortunate Americans. Thus, armed with the powerful combination of intellectual insight and empirical backing, Moynihan carried forth the mantle of *Beyond the Melting Pot*, continuing to argue that culture could only be transmitted through the nurturing and loving family (and never through the state). When the home broke down, Moynihan therefore would argue, the state must undertake means to stabilize it or else jeopardize the future prospects and ultimately the virtuousness of its citizenry. In sum, Moynihan's beliefs were both deeply intellectual and rigorously backed by empiricism. The strength of this combination sustained his viewpoints not only throughout this period, but during his career as well.

1. Family During the 1960s

Meanwhile, society was changing shape. Feminism and the sexual revolution, however tepidly, entered the American lexicon, prompting national attention toward the issue of personal freedom. While an increasing number of Americans promoted an individual's right to explore

diverse lifestyles, Moynihan remained an advocate for a strong, rigorously defined family life. From a policy standpoint, strengthening the family meant keeping divorces low, fathers employed, and mothers in the domestic sphere. This left little room for divergence. Because the sexual revolution would not command national political attention until Richard Nixon took office, Moynihan rarely addressed the subject during the period of time covered in this chapter. When investigated, however, his views suggest that personal sexual exploration had no place in American society since it jeopardized solid marriages and other pillars of robust family life.

Beginning in the late 1950s, many housewives in their middle thirties[62] ventured outside the household to pursue work—a deeper kind of fulfillment than what was available within their domestic confines. This desire for *more* would constitute the backbone of the controversial feminist movement in half a decade's time. During the late 1950s, however, the much quieter, but numerically significant movement of G.I. Generation women into the workforce was unprecedented in America's peacetime history. What kept it under the radar was the fact that most women who entered the work force during the 1950s had waited for their children to grow up before leaving home. In undertaking employment later in life, they thus avoided violating one "of the most powerful underlying values of American culture,"[63] which demanded that mothers devote themselves wholly to the household during their children's formative years.

Though never challenging American women's sacrosanct role as stay-at-home moms, G.I. Generation mothers gave birth to those who did. The young women entering adolescence during the late 1950s flouted conventional values in a manner that went beyond their mothers' tendency to explore the labor force once their children had grown up. They began reducing the regularity of marriage and the pervasiveness of American family life. Statistics attest to this fact.

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[62] Chafe., p., 11.
[63] Chafe,. p. 11.

Beginning in "1957 the birth rate began to drop."[64] By 1965, forty percent[65] of all women possessed bachelor's degrees (in 1950, the number had been twenty-four percent.[66]) Thus, instead of having children early, an increasing number of women were opting to pursue education and employment first.

Though many women postponed marriage, most eventually wed, reproduced, and eventually abandoned their careers. Mothers' almost universal tendency to sacrifice their personal ambitions to the exigencies of family aroused substantial ire, especially among the women who joined the feminist movement. Feminists, usually educated and middle-class, blamed cultural pressures for the fact that, as late as 1963, 80[67] percent of women with young children stayed at home. They took particular issue with what they called the "double standard": society's tendency to celebrate work-happy men while condemning women who possessed similar inclinations. Cultural values, these women asserted, were anachronistic. There was no reason male ambitions should be exalted in the language of 'bread-winning,' while working wives remained the persistent and unfair targets of castigation.

This feminist sentiment transformed into a socially pervasive movement on the heels of two women: Hellen Gurley Brown and Betty Friedan. The former's *Sex and the Single Girl,* released in 1962*,* articulated the sexual side of feminism, and in doing so "launched"[68] the sexual revolution. In her seminal work, Brown "extolled unmarried sex as a virtue,"[69] and slammed as lunatic those who did not sleep with their husbands prior to marriage. The book became an

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[64] Mintz,. p., 198.
[65] Mintz., p., 198.
[66] Mintz., p., 198.
[67] Murray, Charles A. *Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010*. New York [N.Y.: Crown Forum, 2012., p. 4.
[68] Allyn, David. *Make Love, Not War*. London: Little, Brown, 2001., p. 11.
[69] Allyn, p., 11.

"instant best-seller: 150,000 hardcover copies were sold the first year alone."[70] Brown's "pragmatic attitude about premarital romance" appealed to the average woman coming of age during the early 1960s. Her conviction that women should be unashamed of their bodies and urges resonated with many among the younger generation, who were excited to explore their sexual curiosities and perceived Brown's book as an exoneration of their private desires.

Complementing Brown's emphasis on sexual freedom, Betty Friedan published *The Feminine Mystique* in 1963. Her goal was to articulate the unhappiness experienced by typical American housewives who, she proposed, should explore career opportunities to remedy their chronic dissatisfaction. Friedan argued that American housewives who craved fulfillment outside the home experienced "the problem that has no name."[71] Too "ashamed to admit" their "dissatisfaction" with such habitual tasks as "waxing the kitchen floor," they "never knew how many other women shared"[72] in their misery.

As a result of Friedan's book, housewives once taciturn on matters of discontentment began to openly articulate their unhappiness. In this sense, *The Feminist Mystique*'s influence was pervasive; it became a "national sensation,"[73] and an instant bestseller. On its coattails, feminism entered the popular lexicon, as more women considered Friedan's exhortation to "break away from their domestic confines,"[74] return to work and pursue personal ambitions. Friedan inspired her contemporaries, the unfulfilled mothers and their adolescent offspring coming of age during the early 1960s, to think in terms of personal happiness beyond the security of married life. Her voice initiated a dialogue, which began chipping away at the notion

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[70] Allyn, p., 11.
[71] Friedan, Betty. *The Feminine Mystique*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1963., p. 57.
[72] Friedan., p. 62.
[73] Allyn., p. 11.
[74] May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. New York: Basic, 1988. 199.

that women had to spend their lives in the home. This dialogue persisted throughout the 1960s, reaching and influencing women across the country.

As feminism entered the popular consciousness, the shape of the American family changed accordingly. As Elaine Tyler May writes, "There can be no doubt that the arguments of the women's movement dramatically altered women's attitudes toward family roles, child care, marital relationships, femininity and housework."[75] Not only did women's attitudes change, their behaviors did as well. From 1963 to 1969, divorces among young couples (those married fewer than five years) rose 62 percent.[76] Vocational trends followed a parallel trajectory. By the 1960s, "employment for middle-class white and married women became the norm."[77] This "massive increase of women in the workplace destroyed the reality behind the traditional idea that a woman's place was in the home."[78] Pursuing personal ambitions, women spent a lesser proportion of their lives married, and more time at work.

Though the sexual revolution and feminism would not reach their zenith until the years of Nixon's administration, what occurred during the early 1960s exerted a substantial influence on the shape of American society. Seeking to awaken the latent ambition of their peers, feminists urged women to reorient their priorities in favor of a greater emphasis on individual achievement. Women largely obliged, and as a result, spent less time within the household and more in the workplace. To feminists like Betty Friedan, this was a cause for celebration; surely a decline in reluctant home-making would lead to greater happiness and feelings of fulfillment.

If Friedan's foremost familial concern was for mothers' happiness, however, Moynihan overwhelmingly thought that households should primarily serve to raise children with good

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[75] May., p. 208.
[76] Allyn,. p. 258.
[77] Chafe., p. 316.
[78] Chafe., p. 315.

values, who would one day be productive American citizens. And to this end, he would argue, mothers who stayed at home were the most useful. Importantly, the feminist movement foreshadowed the social trends that would come about during the 1970s (and that Moynihan so deplored)—the mass proliferation of alternative lifestyles.

2. Community Action, The War on Poverty...and Moynihan

In late January 1963, John F. Kennedy came across Dwight Macdonald's review[79] of Michael Harrington's *The Other America*[80]—an impactful encounter that prompted the president to create a task force for the purpose of adding anti-poverty legislation to his domestic platform. Harrington contended that in the wealthy United States between forty and fifty million people, or "about one quarter of the population were living in poverty."[81] The bulk of his focus, however, centered on the issue of 'hard core poverty'—the situation of those whose employment prospects remained consistently bleak (or often nonexistent) even in the face of the unprecedented postwar economic expansion. In 1963, roughly five million Americans[82] could be classified as hard core poor, and their problems could not be dealt with solely via conventional New Deal efforts to raise employment. Proposed remedies would have to address the intangible, perhaps psychological, aspects of obstinate, persistent poverty. Honing this insight, Harrington's book was a call for action; as MacDonald paraphrased (in words read by the President): "The solution is...obvious," America must "provide" significant (tax-funded) "subsidies...so that every citizen could feel he is indeed such."[83] Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the President's Undersecretary of Labor, was appointed to the anti-poverty task force, and from the beginning reasoned that poor peoples' main problem was family breakdown. He proposed aggressive government efforts to

[79] Macdonald, Dwight. "Our Invisible Poor." *The New Yorker* 19 Jan. 1963.
[80] Hodgson., p., 81. (Recall that Harrington was a frequent contributor to *The Reporter*).
[81] Harrington, Michael. *The Other America; Poverty in the United States.* New York: Macmillan, 1962. Xiii.
[82] Nossiter, Bernard D. "Affluent Society's Beset." *The Washington Post* 4 June 1961.
[83] Macdonald, Dwight. "Our Invisible Poor." *The New Yorker* 19 Jan. 1963.

effectuate full employment and income assistance in order to prop up families shown to break under the pressures of financial hardship.

Moynihan's exhortation that jobs constitute the focus of Kennedy's anti-poverty initiative faced competition from many on the task force, especially the members of the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime (PCJD)—a group that had been testing new, what might be termed *avant-garde*, social interventionist theories on the heavily black and Latino population of Manhattan's Lower East Side since 1957. The basis of the PCJD's experiments, which its advocates wanted to use as a blueprint for the federal anti-poverty program, was derived from the research of two Columbia University sociologists, Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin. These men had set out to identify what caused the *anomie*[84] experienced by inner-city youths given over to expressions of juvenile delinquency, specifically, joining a gang. Their conclusion, which they termed the 'Opportunity Theory,' proposed, "There is no such thing as a bad boy."[85] Delinquents, the sociologists insisted, possessed the same goals as those in the middle-class; however, when they realized that society had blockaded the avenues whereby attainment of these goals could be carried out legitimately, they sought new ones. The solution, Ohlin and Cloward argued, was to open the doors of opportunity to lower-class teenagers who, possessing the same goals as everyone else, would walk through them.

This theory sharply deviated from what might be termed the "classical" position, advocated by Moynihan, which centered on a child's early socialization within the family as predominately determinative of delinquent behavior. Essentially, this was a sociological affirmation of conservative family values, of the importance of the stability and virtue of one's

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[84] *Anomie* itself was an old term, coined by the famous French sociologist Emile Durkheim (Durkheim, Émile. *The Division of Labor in Society.* 1893.). The experience of *anomie* was akin to alienation; lacking meaningful social relationships, individuals withdrew from society, as well as its moral code. In Durkheim's analysis, this could lead to suicide. In the 1950s in New York City, it was one of the most powerful propellants of juvenile delinquency.

[85] Cloward, Richard A., and Lloyd E. Ohlin. *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs*. Glencoe, IL: Free, 1960.

home environment to one's later adulthood behaviors and successes. Furthermore, one of *Beyond the Melting Pot's* conclusions—that family stability accounted for the achievements (or lack thereof) of any given ethnic group—expressed a like-minded viewpoint, and so Moynihan the author had his own place in the "classical" tradition during the early 1960s.

The "classical" perspective began with University of Chicago sociologist Frederick M. Thrasher, who theorized that gang behavior arose when the unsupervised children of inner-city communities began to form competing circles of friends, which—having never been taught society's standards of right and wrong—started committing crimes and fighting amongst each other.[86] Another important "classical" work, influential during the formulation of Kennedy's anti-poverty agenda, was Albert K. Cohen's *The Culture of the Gang.* Cohen stated that juvenile delinquency "derives from their [delinquents'] socialization in lower class families and their consequent lack of preparation to function successfully in middle class institutions such as schools."[87] These individuals, unable to compete on middle-class turf, constructed their own in the form of 'counterculture,' the purpose of which was to preserve the self-esteem lost in the realization of inadequacy to society's demands. As David J. Bordua succinctly described it, the norms of gang culture constituted a "compensatory ideology."[88] In his later reflections on the War on Poverty, Moynihan employed "classical" insights to challenge the Opportunity Theory.

Crucially, whereas Cohen and Thrasher—and Moynihan—saw delinquent behavior as reflective of abnormal moral standards deriving from deteriorated family backgrounds, Cloward and Ohlin argued that delinquency was a rational response by *normal* people—lower-class youths—to the closure of the opportunity structure. This disagreement over causes led the two

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[86] Thrasher, Frederick Milton., and James Franklin Short. *The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago*. Chicago [etc.: University of Chicago, 1927.
[87] Cohen, Albert Kircidel. *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*. Glencoe, IL: Free, 1955.
[88] Bordua, David J. "Delinquent Subcultures: Sociological Interpretations of Gang Delinquency." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*338 (1961). p., 133.

groups to different solution—while Cloward and Ohlin tackled opportunity, Moynihan sought to remedy broken family life.

The outgrowth of Cloward and Ohlin's research—adamantly supported by the PCJD and opposed by Moynihan's Labor Department—was "community action," which called for the establishment of non-profit entities within low-income neighborhood to assist local poor people in such efforts as job training, employment searches, and daycare. Significantly, these were to be run largely by reformers *from within local communities* with only minimal assistance from government agents; that is, there was to be 'maximum feasible participation' by lower-class community residents in the implementation of their own initiatives. The sociologists were confident that, under the guise of self-help, the poor would collaborate to improve their own situations out from under the highly condescending shadow of paternalism. It was, moreover, hoped that '*anomic*' community members would begin to feel like regular American citizens with civic responsibilities rather than disenfranchised *others* in need of charity.

The tensions abrading between the PCJD and Moynihan's emphasis on jobs and family persisted. In November 1963, PCJD head David Hackett wrote Attorney General Robert Kennedy to plead his cause. He framed his argument in the language of Ohlin and Cloward's opportunity theory, arguing that community action was essential to "opportunity," which was "the key to eradicating poverty."[89] Undersecretary Moynihan, meanwhile, continued to advocate for a massive employment bill.[90] To make his case that persistent poverty was a condition of

[89] Hodgson, p. 84.
[90] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding.,* p. xv.

jobs and family background (and not the opportunity structure), Moynihan actively sought projects[91] that he hoped would affirm his pro-family insights.

In August 1963, Moynihan encountered a promising opportunity to study the effects of family breakdown when he chanced upon an article in *The Washington Post*, quoting General Lewis B. Hershey, director of the U.S. army's Selective Service (the draft) as saying that "roughly half of the young men called for examination [to determine if they were qualified to serve] had failed the physical or mental tests or both."[92] Moynihan persuaded Secretary Wirtz that he should head a presidential task force to study why so many had failed the mental portion of the test, which measured proficiency equivalent to a seventh-grade education.[93] On New Year's Day, 1964, Moynihan released *One Third of a Nation*, which—as its title suggested—concluded that "One-third of all young men in the nation turning 18 years old would be rendered unqualified if they were to be examined for induction into the armed forces."[94] Significantly, of these about half[95] would be rejected because they had failed "to qualify on the mental test." Data affirmed the centrality of family structure to rates of failure.

Moynihan's conclusions in *One Third of a Nation* were highly significant mainly because they affirmed his beliefs, first articulated explicitly in *Beyond the Melting Pot,* that family was the primary determinant of one's potential to succeed in life—manifested here in educational attainment. The report's subtle, but powerful allusions to family fully bore Moynihan's fingerprints. Affirming a high correlation between poverty and failure—a widely expected relationship—Moynihan demonstrated that there was an *even greater* correlation between failure

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[91] Recall that Moynihan occupied the position of Undersecretary of Labor for Policy Planning and Research. Thus, while he had to obtain Secretary Wirtz's approval for any of his research-intensive undertakings, his job w*as essentially to come up with the topics to be researched*.
[92] Hodgson,. p. 81.
[93] Patterson, p., 12.
[94] Moynihan, Daniel P, "One Third of a Nation: A Report on Young Men Found Unqualified for Military Service," Report of the President's Task Force on Manpower Conservation, January 1, 1964. prospectus.
[95] The precise number was a little over 11% of the entire tested population.

of the exam and having endured the breaking of one's childhood home. The study reported that 21[96] percent of the rejectees came from families that had been on welfare at least once during the previous five years, while about 14 percent were currently on public assistance.[97] 31 percent, however, "almost a third of the rejectees" came "from families broken by divorce or separation." [98] This was groundbreaking, the first of much empirical evidence Moynihan would encounter in support of the surpassing, preeminent importance of family life in determining one's future competency. Furthermore, *Moynihan was looking for* these trends before he found them and not the other way around, suggesting the existence of his preconceived notion that family breakdown during one's childhood was significant to adulthood poverty. Finally, *One Third of a Nation* added an explicitly racial tint to Moynihan's family studies: 56% of African Americans had failed the mental test, a fact that Moynihan undoubtedly would remember.

One Third of a Nation inspired Moynihan to look yet more deeply into the financial, and educational adult outcomes attained by children raised in broken families. Throughout this period, as Moynihan continued to serve on the president's anti-poverty task force, he undertook projects designed to shift the debate away from community action and toward jobs. Moynihan authored a 1963 position paper, "Family Allowances in the United States," in which he advocated a per-child stipend paid to families as a new means of providing assistance to poor Americans by pursuing the essential task of keeping families together. Moynihan encountered the idea of family allowances by studying Northern European systems of welfare[99]—on which he based his proposal. During his preparation of the report, Moynihan became aware of a fact that he would repeat incessantly for the next decade: the United States was the "only industrial

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[96] Moynihan, Daniel P, "One Third of a Nation", p., 21.
[97] Moynihan, Daniel P, "One Third of a Nation", p., 21.
[98] Moynihan, Daniel P, "One Third of a Nation", p., 21.
[99] Moynihan recounted his inspiration to study family allowances in the following article based on a personal interview: Meehan, Thomas. "Moynihan of the Moynihan Report." *The New York Times Magazine* 31 July 1966.

democracy in the world without a system of family allowances."[100] He became so intrigued with replicating the European model that he petitioned Secretary Wirtz for permission to make a trip to Europe for the purposes of studying their anti-poverty measures.[101]

In a memorandum to Wirtz prepared almost a month after his trip, Moynihan attempted to persuade the secretary that the American welfare system—exemplified by Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which paid cash benefits *only* in the event of a broken home—should be refashioned in the European model, which focused on strengthening family life. He wrote, "I have come to think that the most revealing fact about the nature of our problem is that the Europeans seemed to have solved it...The Europeans have been...preoccupied with getting rid of poverty. Our preoccupation has been with opening up equal opportunity for prosperity. The two are not opposite sides of the same coin."[102] In other words, eliminating poverty (attaining equality of result) and allowing people the opportunity to lift themselves out of poverty (providing basic liberties) were different. The latter, plainly, did not work for those who lacked the skills to earn a decent wage. The former, by focusing on the family, provided individuals with the strongest opportunity to obtain the skills necessary for self-sufficiency. Significantly, both systems involved cash transfer payments, and so the entire qualitative difference lay in the perpetuation of robust versus broken homes—with Moynihan strongly calling for the former. Incentivizing people to live apart from their partners, Moynihan continued, the American model of welfare posed the "greatest single danger the Negroes of

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[100]Vadakin, James C. *Children, Poverty, and Family Allowances*. New York: Basic, 1968. This excerpt appears in the introduction, which was penned by Moynihan. The point is that Moynihan knew all about the European pro-family model, and was a serious policy *and* academic advocate for it.

[101] "Memorandum For the Secretary, April 10, 1964." Reprinted in: *Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Portrait in Letters of an American Visionary*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2010., p., 77.

[102] "Memorandum For the Secretary, April 10, 1964." Originally in: *Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Portrait in Letters of an American Visionary*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2010., p., 77.

America"[103] faced. It was akin to "just pension[ing] the Negroes off." A far better course, Moynihan argued, would be "giving the men proper jobs and a respectable place in their community and family"—this is what the Europeans did. They had cured poverty *through family policy*. His advocacy for European-style family welfare provided further reaffirmation of Moynihan's highly-Catholicized, notion of the centrality of family life.

And yet by 1964, despite Moynihan's numerous empirically based efforts to demonstrate the essentiality of jobs and family allowances, community action began to dominate the presidential anti-poverty task force. Competition between the Labor Department and the PCJD escalated on January 8, 1964, when a newly sworn-in Lyndon Johnson used his state of the union address to launch the War on Poverty as his administration's signature legislative development. He promised to present a bill to Congress in the coming months. Thereafter, poverty became the focal point of the entire executive bureaucracy, which became so "sharply divided"[104] that in February 1964, Johnson appointed President Kennedy's brother-in-law, Sargent Shriver, to mediate the situation. Rather than choosing sides, Shriver worked to ensure that the administration's efforts "embodied compromises between [the] two rival social philosophies."[105] The bill that the administration sent to Capitol Hill on March 16, 1964—that the president signed into law on August 20—attempted to give each side of the debate a stake in the fight.

Much to Moynihan's dismay, however, the Economic Opportunity Act (EOA) of 1964 disproportionately funded community action relative to jobs. Of the $500 million in 'new money' authorized by the bill, $340 million—"the lion's share"[106]—went toward this end. When the bill was renewed in 1965, that amount was doubled. Furthermore and of great importance,

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[103] "Memorandum For the Secretary, May 6, 1964." Reprinted in: *Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Portrait in Letters of an American Visionary*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2010., p., 77.
[104] Hodgson., p. 87.
[105] Hodgson., p. 88.
[106] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*,. p. 94.

the provision that the poor would have 'maximum feasible participation' as administrators of the local community action centers was written into the bill. Though Shriver had tried to be even-handed, Johnson ultimately vetoed a final attempt to write an equally emphasized jobs program into the legislation. In March, right before the bill was sent to Congress, Shriver had proposed a five-cent tax on cigarettes. The $1.25 billion this was expected to raise would have gone towards funding employment programs for the poor. Johnson, reluctant to increase taxes, struck this down.

In a later reflection on the period, Moynihan offered his own nuanced reason for why male employment—the crux of the Shriver proposal—should have been adopted: namely, that it would have endowed inner-city youths with 'manliness,' which was essential to Moynihan's conception of fatherhood. To illustrate, Moynihan quoted Paul Goodman, author of *Growing Up Absurd*, "In order to have citizens you must be sure you have men."[107] Moynihan then added in his own words, "In order to have men you must give young people meaningful work."[108] He elaborated, "Had Shriver's employment proposal succeeded...the program leadership would of necessity found itself emphasizing the prudent, frugal, constructive nature of the work being done by deserving men receiving, at most, a modest day's pay for a hard day's work." Moynihan's views on 'manliness' reflected a distinctively traditionalist notion of man as worker, and also as provider and father. He saw work as the best means of instilling the masculine virtues, like industry and frugality, which made men viable fathers.

The outcome of community action and the EOA deeply disappointed and enraged undersecretary Moynihan. In fact, he found Cloward and Ohlin's opportunity theory, and the

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[107] Originally appeared in: Enck, John Jacob., Harry Levin, and John Jacob. Enck. *Paul Goodman, Growing up Absurd* ... Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1960. Reprinted in: Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding.,* p. 1

[108] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding.,* p. 16.

community action agenda it inspired, so appalling that he later wrote a whole book condemning the experience, and reproaching the president's top advisors. Moynihan published *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* in 1969 while he was part of Richard Nixon's cabinet, and long after he had left the Johnson White House in 1965.[109] Thus, he released the book after he had already accepted a Republican President's cabinet appointment, and after most of America had already judged community action to be a complete failure.[110] His claim to have known better from the start, therefore, should be taken with a grain of salt. Still, apart from his declarations of blatant Johnson administration incompetence, Moynihan evinced a level of engaged seriousness with regard to the fundamental weaknesses of community action that, plainly, could not have been feigned. His main argument was that the government was wrong to have utilized Cloward and Ohlin's insights to inform policy because in doing so it had trusted social science, which was inherently "highly uncertain."[111] Crucial for this analysis, furthermore, was Moynihan's related and more complex contention that Cloward and Ohlin's theory was deeply flawed because it espoused explanations for gang culture that wholly absented family and community life. By treating individuals as if they existed in isolation from greater social currents, Moynihan argued, the Opportunity Theory neglected the fundamental driver of life outcomes: the family.

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[109] Moynihan was a prolific writer, and nearly always published books (including many much longer and requiring more research than MFM) during just one summer. The delay in *MFM* was certainly calculated, and not a matter of time constraint.

[110] By 1968, community action programs had been established in over 1,000 American cities. While the results were mixed, as historian Calvin Mackenzie writes, "many of the local community action programs did become hotbeds of community activism." The disturbances of the militant obscured the modest successes achieved by some agencies, dominated media coverage and shaped national opinion. One such famous example occurred in Syracuse involving the establishment the Syracuse Crusade for Opportunity (SCO), which quickly militated against the Syracuse's white power structure, issuing reading manuals that read, "No ends are accomplished without the use of force...Squeamishness about force is the mark not of idealistic, but moonstruck morals." Syracuse was typical of many community action programs in which radicalization occurred fluidly, but "repeated efforts to start job training programs apparently came to little" (p. 102) As historian Mark Gelfand writes about community action: "What had originally been touted as an instrument for more efficient local coordination of extensive federal effort turned into a federally supported device for challenging the local political and welfare structure," (p. 10). See: Mackenzie, G. Calvin., and Robert Weisbrot. *The Liberal Hour: Washington and the Politics of Change in the 1960s*. New York: Penguin, 2008. & Gelfand, Mark. *Elevating or Ignoring the Underclass*. 1986.

[111] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,* p., xiii.

His argument, however, was tricky to pull off. On the one hand, his thesis clearly stated that social science should never inform policy because it required accepting an unacceptably high level of uncertainty; on the other hand, though, he employed sociological insights centered around the family in order to disprove the Opportunity Theory.[112] It should not be doubted that there was blatant hypocrisy in this. That he was willing to make the argument anyway, therefore, attested to the depth of his *conviction* regarding the essentiality of stable family life to well-functioning individuals and a better society. Indeed, Moynihan invoked the work of pro-family sociologists as if their points were a matter of common sense rather than theory—a fact that makes *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding* all the more compelling as a tract on Moynihan's family views.

Moynihan utilized sociological insights to poke holes in the Opportunity Theory[113]—mainly invoking works by two theorists, Walter B. Miller and Robert Nisbet.[114] In a synthesis of these two scholars, Moynihan demonstrated that black inner-city culture was a legitimate product of those who lived it (blacks themselves) *while also being* the outgrowth of unique historical forces that pushed ghetto dwellers away from traditional family life and into gangs and states of withdrawal. In other words, urban blacks had carved their own identities into the narrow landscape provided for them by America's racist and capitalist society. Moynihan wove his own conclusion into his synthesis of the works: society, he argued—having stripped blacks of their historic family ties—should now take every measure to restore circumstances hospitable to a

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[112] Likely, if asked, Moynihan would have said he inserted the section evaluating different theories in order to demonstrate that the theories of Cloward and Ohlin were highly disputed within the social science community, and therefore had no place being treated as 'certain' conclusions worthy of informing mass-scale social policy. Still, in this chapter Moynihan blatantly expressed highly favorable views of all the non-Opportunity Theories he cited—all of which were all presented as a direct attack on those of Cloward and Ohlin.

[113] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,* p., 172.

[114] Robert Nisbet (1913-1996) was a University of California, Berkeley sociologist, and an outspoken communitarian. *A Quest For Community* was his *magnum opus*, and a very general account of his argument held that capitalism, with its individualistic demands and rhetoric, undermined local organizations, most notably families and neighborhoods. The postwar history, therefore, was a 'quest' to restore communities lost.

revival of black family and community life. (It should not, however, assert itself as a viable alternative to families—a course with which Moynihan associated CAPs—because allegiance to an omnipotent state would not foster the intimate community of family life, which was essential to raising children well.) In positing these arguments, Moynihan reaffirmed the family as society's organic nucleus, persuasively and intellectually explaining why it was necessarily the fundamental transmitter of culture.

Furthermore, Moynihan utilized Miller's theory to suggest that gang life did not arise in response to the closure of middle-class avenues to success, as Cloward and Ohlin had suggested. Instead, it was a legitimate culture, "long-established" and "distinctly patterned...with an integrity of its own."[115] Moynihan further deployed Robert Nisbet's theory—that humans fundamentally require and therefore perpetually seek community ties—to explain why gang culture had formed within inner-cities. As Nisbet wrote, "a great deal of the peculiar character of contemporary social action comes from the efforts of men to find in large-scale organizations the values of status and security which were formerly gained in the primary associations of family, neighborhood, and Church."[116] With these latter institutions attenuated (or obliterated), people turned to gangs to satiate their innate needs for community. The state, therefore, should reinforce the family as a viable choice of community identity for inner-city people who were instead turning to gangs.

Moreover, Moynihan offered Miller's work an emphatic endorsement, praising it as "scientifically sound" and based on "meticulous research."[117] Likewise, he called Nisbet's book

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[115] Albert K. Cohen, *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gangs,* New York: The Free Press, 1963.
[116] Nisbet, Robert A. *The Quest for Community; a Study in the Ethics of Order and Freedom.* New York: Oxford UP, 1953., p., 98. (Robert F. Nagel's article in *The Journal of Federalism* was also a helpful resource).
[117] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,* p., 170.

"masterful."[118] Obviously, these were compliments he did not extend to the Columbia sociologists, whose book's largest and "most telling"[119] problem, in Moynihan's view, was that it "contained only two references to the subject of family."[120] In the superior theories of Miller and Nisbet, Moynihan wrote, "the delinquents...seemed to have childhoods; they grew up to be the way they were."[121] Less obliquely, delinquent children grew up in broken homes, which were largely poor and headed by lone mothers. By ignoring this, Cloward and Ohlin missed the primary necessity of establishing stable two-parent family life as the cornerstone of inner-city communities.

In *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*, Moynihan also reaffirmed the Catholic assumptions underlying his belief that socialization was necessarily an organic process, one occurring *by necessity* in the family and not the state. Evidence for this mainly appeared in the first chapter, entitled "A Quest for Community," named for Nisbet's famous book. In choosing to associate the entire history of community almost singularly with Nisbet's views, Moynihan rather directly endorsed Nisbet's theories, which were highly pro-family, and ardently anti-state.[122] As Moynihan recounted, Nisbet's analysis represented a revival of "Catholic social thought."[123] It demonstrated that "the Catholic Church in much of its social teaching, had been right."[124] Protestant capitalism, on the other hand, had "stripped off the historically grown layers of custom and social membership, leaving only leveled masses of individuals."[125] Could this analysis be taken so far, Moynihan asked, as to be extended to the "Protestants Cloward and

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[118] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*,. p. 10.
[119] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,* p., 175.
[120] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,* p., 175.
[121] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding,* p., 175.
[122] What is important when considering Nisbet, moreover, is that his criticism is leveled against states functioning as vehicles for socialization. This is not incompatible with Moynihan's advocacy for a large, fiscally redistributive state.
[123] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*,. p. 12.
[124] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*,. p. 12.
[125] Nisbet, reprinted in Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*,. p. 12.

Ohlin, suffering servants of the Lord"[126] who "had to perceive in the whole miserable business the morally autonomous individual struggling for salvation?" In other words, the *Protestants* Cloward and Ohlin erred by adhering too strictly to their own doctrinally flawed view of human society. Nisbet, inclined toward communal, familial Catholic thought—on the other hand—had it right. Family life was the answer.

The solution to this *Protestant* evisceration of community, therefore, would be to strengthen family life at the expense of the power of the state, which, in Moynihan's words, "deliberately seeks to effect such outcomes as who thinks what, who acts when, who lives where, who feels how..."[127] Reiterating *A Quest for Community*'s call to action, Moynihan concluded that smaller institutions, especially families, would have to proliferate in order to undermine the allure of the capitalist state—to give peoples' lives meaning again. Nisbet felt that "to create conditions within which autonomous groups may prosper must be...the prime object of"[128] postindustrial society. The task was therefore to attenuate reliance on the state by bolstering individual self-sufficiency through fostering community bonds.[129] To do so, Moynihan argued, would mean a government interest in the family

In sum, by tracing the history of community through the eyes of someone who rejected centralized social initiatives in favor of the power of small groups (Nisbet), Moynihan was implicitly rebuking the whole premise of the culturally counterfeit community action. This misguided policy, in his eyes, clearly underestimated the extent to which family and community ties facilitated an organic process—the enrichment of the individual—by believing their functions could be mimicked by the state. He also quite strongly illustrated the Catholicism

[126] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*,. p. 175.
[127] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*,. p. xiii.
[128] Nisbet, Reprinted in Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*,. p. 12.
[129] It is important to remember that this discussion is limited to the eroded American communities of the inner-cities. This is not to say that the state exerted a totalitarian influence over *all* of America, just the communities relevantly addressed by the community action provision of the War on Poverty.

underlying his thoughts. Though he rarely referred to it directly, he chose to couch the desecration of community in a tension between Protestantism and Catholicism; he came out on quite strongly on the side of his inheritance. The family was, plainly, the backbone of society. Without it, the individual was lost.

3. The Report

During December 1964, Moynihan called his two deputies—Paul Barton and Ellen Broderick—into his office and instructed them to begin research into the relationship between unemployment and the deteriorating black family.[130] (In 1965, 17.6% of all black families were headed by a single mother and 28% of all black births occurred out of wedlock, as against 8.5% and 4% respectively for whites.)[131] By March, Moynihan had turned their findings into "urgent prose."[132] The result was the most notorious product of his entire career, the report entitled *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*. This document would catapult Moynihan into celebrity, raising his profile in all circles, his esteem in some, and the ire that his name evoked in many others. Moynihan's line of reasoning centered on the notion that family stability substantially determined essential facets of later life, such as employment and education.[133] Simply, broken families produced people worse off with less (often little) hope for fruitful futures, while robust family life presaged the opposite. People who grew up in broken homes, furthermore, tended to mimic the behavior of their parents—the end result of which was to conceive children who stood the same meager chance at emerging from poverty. What Moynihan identified, therefore, was a self-perpetuating cycle of inner-city poverty. Given this impetus of inner-city families toward rupture, Moynihan further persuaded, the government's

[130] Hodgson., p. 90.
[131] Patterson., p., 91-96.
[132] Hodgson., p. 90.
[133] These insights first appeared (in Moynihan's words) in *Beyond the Melting Pot*; he persisted in reiterating them during his early Labor Department Tenure in such projects as "Family Allowances in the United States" and *One Third of the Nation.*

main priority in remedying the plight of ghetto dwellers should be to strengthen family life because doing so would provide an unparalleled chance to ameliorate inter-generational poverty.

Moynihan argued that black family life was in perilously bad shape as a result of both the black male unemployment rate, and the habituation of destructive family practices on a *cultural* level. He divided his argument into two components. First, he employed statistical analysis to demonstrate that inner-city black families were becoming persistently weaker *partially* as a result of high black male unemployment. He demonstrated that as unemployment rose, metrics of family instability—such as divorce rates and out-of-wedlock births—rose as well. The government, he argued, therefore must provide for full employment so that black family life would no longer suffer the avoidable deterioration caused by job loss.

But this was only step one of his argument, and only *some* of the deterioration he cited could be attributed to employment. Therefore his second, more complex and highly infamous, contention held that black families had become so weak as to be pathological—meaning that their weaknesses were perpetuating themselves independent of unemployment and (by implication) white discrimination. (This was, he maintained, *not* the fault of blacks themselves, but instead a consequence of discrimination and emasculation.) Though complex at the theoretical level, the argument becomes fairly simple when events and people are substituted for abstraction. To illustrate, as divorce became a *normal* occurrence, that is a socially non-judged event within the inner-city community, it lost its stigma; consequently, those arriving at marital age felt less compelled to follow the traditional path culminating in marriage. In this sense, Moynihan was arguing that divorce and out-of-wedlock births had become *cultural.*[134]

[134] This is a slight oversimplification meant to make the case easier to understand. What Moynihan dubbed 'the Tangle of Pathology' was really any set of interrelated behaviors that may contribute to family deterioration (or the perpetuation of the behaviors themselves). For example, growing up in poverty could cause someone to commit a crime, go to jail and as a result become unemployable. If that someone were to impregnate a woman, she may

Having painted a bleak portrait of black inner-city life with the family as the centerpiece of the problem, Moynihan admonished the administration that without a stronger family life inner-city blacks would not be able to emerge from the depths of inter-generational poverty. People would simply continue to suffer, and then perpetuate hardship onto posterity. Succinctly, he wrote, "At the heart of the deterioration of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the Negro family."[135] He implied that if black family deterioration continued, it would enervate the possibility of progress in all other facets of community life; namely—given the subject of his report—employment.

At its core, however well-founded, this assertion nonetheless began as a hypothesis, and therefore attested to the power of Moynihan's intuition that stable families constituted the core of a productive society, and the ticket to individual prosperity. Because Moynihan proved only correlation—but not causation—between unemployment statistics and metrics of family breakdown, his conclusions were also, strictly speaking, not provable in fact. Therefore, the role of intuition in Moynihan's trailblazing, *The Negro Family,* should be understood and recognized as a product of his deeply held, Catholic beliefs regarding the importance of family.

Moreover, Moynihan rooted black-family deterioration in the historic emasculation of black male fathers—rendering it clear that he supported a traditional division of labor within the family, with a strong male patriarch at the head. (Though in 1965 this was likely a majority opinion, it was still a conservative view, especially coming as it did in the wake of *The Feminine Mystique*, published three years earlier). Moynihan made it clear that without the masculine virtues of self-sufficiency and assuredness, men simply could not function as proper fathers. To

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refuse to marry him on the grounds that doing so would be a dead end, as he could not support her. The effect, however, is the same. In both cases the factors of one's upbringing leads him down an unpromising path.

[135] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*. Rep. Office of Policy Planning and Research United States Department of Labor, 1965. Chapter II.

illustrate his point, he drew heavily on Nathan Glazer's diagnosis of black family deterioration, which had originally appeared in *Beyond the Melting Pot*. As Glazer stated, African American family decay centered around "the systematic weakening of the position of the Negro male,"[136] which was a legacy of slavery and Jim Crow. The black slave's "existence as a human being was given no recognition by any religious or secular agency...His children could be sold, his marriage was not recognized, his wife could be violated or sold, and he could also be subject, without redress, to frightful barbarities."[137] As a result of being utterly obedient, black men underwent a "profound personality change," of which "childishness" was symptomatic. Assessing their "completely dependent role," male slaves realized that "the need for achievement" was "severely depressed." Psychological recovery, moreover, remained unattained during the postbellum years because the African-American male psyche was shattered by the humiliation of segregation. "Unquestionably," Moynihan argued, "these events [slavery and Jim Crow] worked against the emergence of a strong father figure." And then, stating his case more bluntly, "The very essence of the male animal, from the bantam rooster to the four star general, is to strut. Indeed, in 19th century America...male boastfulness became almost a national style. Not for the Negro male. The 'sassy nigger [sic]' was lynched."[138] Moynihan's reasoning revealed heavily ingrained traditionalist-conservative presumptions about gender roles, and the masculinity that existed at the root of his conception of fatherhood.

Moynihan's traditional notion of the proper place occupied by mothers and fathers within the family, moreover, played a powerful role in justifying his call for greater employment. Understood in this sense, his report did not merely assert a statistical correlation between

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[136] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*., Chapter II. . Appearing originally in Nathan Glazer, "Introduction," *Slavery*, Stanley M. Elkins, (New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1963).
[137] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*., Chapter III. . Appearing originally in Nathan Glazer, "Introduction," *Slavery*, Stanley M. Elkins, (New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1963).
[138] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*., Chapter III.

unemployment and family breakdown, but instead went further to suggest that the virtues cultivated through work were essential to fatherhood. The black male was so weakened by his past that he *required* work in order to regain his manliness, to reenter fatherhood. To again be able to strut. And furthermore, not only was the black man supposed to work, but the black woman was meant to be home. Indeed, Moynihan wrote negatively of black families dependent on the mother's employment: "dependence on the mother's income undermines the position of the father and deprives the children of the kind of attention, particularly in school matters, which is now a standard feature of middle class upbringing."[139] In his personal correspondence with President Johnson regarding the report, Moynihan revealed even more bluntly the traditionalism underlying his pro-family views: "Men must have jobs. We must not rest until every able-bodied Negro male is working. Even if we have to displace some females."[140] This line of reasoning spoke strongly to Moynihan's highly conservative views regarding how labor was *properly* divided between husband and wife within a household.

Moynihan stated his conservative pro-family beliefs explicitly in the presidential memorandum he penned to accompany *The Negro Family* to Johnson's desk. He wrote, "the role of the family in shaping character and ability is so pervasive as to be easily overlooked. The family is the basic social unit of American life; it is the basic socializing unit."[141] And furthermore, "at the center of" black inner-city problems "is the weakness of family structure. Once or twice removed, it will be found to be the principal source of most of the aberrant, inadequate or antisocial behavior that did not establish but now serves to perpetuate the cycle of

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[139] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*., Chapter IV.
[140] Moynihan, Daniel P., and Steven R. Weisman. "March 5, 1965: Memorandum For the President", p. 93.
[141] Moynihan, Daniel P., and Steven R. Weisman. "March 5, 1965: Memorandum For the President.", p. 93.

poverty and deprivation."[142] In conclusion, "a national effort toward the problems of Negro Americans must be directed toward the question of family structure."[143] Pleading his case to the president, Moynihan continued on a personal note, "You were born poor. You were brought up poor. Yet you came of age full of ambition, energy, and ability. Because your mother and father gave it to you. The richest inheritance any child can have is a stable, loving, disciplined family life."[144]

In sum, *The Negro Family* cemented Moynihan's conservative view that the family was most valuable, both to individuals and society, in its traditionalist and essential role as transmitter of morals, work ethic and every other positive pillar of a fruitful adult existence. That this fit squarely into the tradition of Catholic social thought should not be doubted.

[142]Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*., Chapter IV. Appearing originally in Nathan Glazer, "Introduction," *Slavery*, Stanley M. Elkins, (New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1963).
[143] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*., Chapter V. . Appearing originally in Nathan Glazer, "Introduction," *Slavery*, Stanley M. Elkins, (New York, Grosset and Dunlap, 1963).
[144] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*., Chapter IV.

Chapter 3

1. Moynihan Advances Family Policy

It had required a good deal of hard-nosed, unemotional foresight for Moynihan—the Democrat—to pen *The Negro Family* during 1965, when most (Northern Democratic) Americans were touting the accomplishments of the Civil Rights Movement. Throughout the first half of the 1960s, Americans of all political persuasions had viewed footage of the 1963 Birmingham Spring, and had seen police chief Bull Connor sic dogs, and unleash fire hoses on nonviolently protesting blacks. They had tuned in when national news networks reported on the bomb that, during September 1963, had exploded in Birmingham's Sixteenth Street Baptist Church, killing four young black girls. They had heard Martin Luther King's famously eloquent and inspiring 'I have a dream' speech, which had been delivered during the heroically nonviolent March on the Washington Capitol during August of that same year. By 1964, they had watched in terror as white supremacists murdered several prominent black civil rights leaders, notably Mississippi activist Medgar Evers. Full of hope they had cheered for the ensuing Mississippi Freedom Summer—a campaign to raise voter registration among blacks across the state—and were devastated when eight Freedom organizers were found murdered by Klansmen. So captivated was the nation by civil rights that "several surveys found that the American public considered the race problem the most important issue facing the nation."[145] Increasingly, they came out on the side of the protesters: as a result of the killings and the intolerance, "white supremacy" became "an object of revulsion throughout the entire country."[146]

Thus, during 1965, when it came to African Americans, most whites—especially those in the Johnson administration—were content (often delighted) to celebrate the imminent and

[145] Burner, David. *Making Peace with the 60s*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1996., p., 23.
[146] Burner, David. *Making Peace with the 60s*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1996., p., 29.

glorious formal end to segregation materializing in the South. Moynihan, on the other hand, had turned his attention elsewhere,[147] to a new and far less hopeful cause: that of bringing to national attention the 'pathology' of black ghetto families, and urging a massive political campaign to attack the problem. Understandably, many liberals were highly unprepared to hear that blacks—the heroes of that inspiring moment in American history—were in a state of self-perpetuating decay necessitating urgent intervention. They were not ready to confront Moynihan's suggestion that "it was not enough just to end discrimination," [148] but that "lifting people from poverty required providing confidence and ambition." Needless to say Moynihan had inserted himself between liberals and the "euphoria and sense of achievement of the moment."[149] And all he possessed by way of recommendations—as the man who had spearheaded the discussion—were intuitive insights and statistical correlations making his case that policy *must* begin in the family. (Although family allowances were recommended in *The Negro Family*'s first draft, Moynihan removed the policy suggestion).

One very important liberal, however—the president of the United States—embraced Moynihan's exhortation to pursue black economic advancement through the family, decided that it should be central to his administration's subsequent agenda, and looked for the right opportunity to announce his new initiative to the country. Johnson broadly accepted Moynihan's conclusion, and affirmed Moynihan's call that the civil rights movement must move past the

[147] To the ghetto life of those living in Northern inner-cities. The tension between Moynihan's and mainstream liberals' focus is best understood as that between the formal segregation of the South—in which blacks were barred from white establishments such as restaurants, and hotels, and were infamously required to sit in the rear of buses—and the informal racial divides permeating the large northeastern metropolises, mostly along socio-economic lines. Slum-dwelling northern blacks were socially immobile across generations; it was their plight on which The Moynihan Report focused.

[148] Burner, David. *Making Peace with the 60s*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1996., p., 171.

[149] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The President & the Negro: The Moment Lost." *Commentary* Feb. 1967., p., 35.

point of fighting for basic civil liberties, and toward what Johnson called *equality*.[150] (The difference between liberty and equality was that between parity of opportunity, and final result. It was the difference between the start of the race and the end, between, in Moynihan's analysis, token and genuine commitments to democracy).

To announce his new initiative, Johnson delivered the commencement address at Howard University's 1965 graduation ceremony—the first draft of which was written by Moynihan. The president boomed, "The family is the cornerstone of our society. More than any other force it shapes the attitude, the hopes, the ambitions, and the values of the child."[151] He then continued with the related idea that "Freedom is not enough...It is not just enough to open the gates of opportunity. All our citizens must have the ability to walk through those gates."[152] Johnson explicitly linked equality (that is material prosperity on a par with whites) to strengthened family life—the central contention of the Moynihan report. Thus, for this brief moment, Moynihan had succeeded in placing the family at the center of the administration's mission to provide massive economic advancement to its inner-city citizens. Also in his Howard speech, Johnson called for the establishment of a White House conference to cultivate a more precise understanding of obstacles to black equality. The "theme and title"[153] of the conference was to be "To Fulfill These Rights," and it was planned for November of that year, 1965.

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[150] This had political advantages: by capitalizing on the massive public support for civil rights, Johnson would be able to forestall the end of his historic War on Poverty, which was approaching its natural close. After all, the president recently had overseen the passage of the Civil Rights Act in July 1964 (banning segregation), and had sent the Voting Rights Act (eliminating voter qualifications used to exclude blacks) to Congress by the time he had received Moynihan's report in May, 1965. Johnson understood that these two bills together would eradicate formal discrimination in the South, and in doing so would complete the War on Poverty's legislative bid for liberty. Continuing the War on Poverty would therefore require changing the terrain on which battle was waged.

[151] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*. Volume II, entry 301, pp. 635-640. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. [Accessed online].

[152] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*. Volume II, entry 301, pp. 635-640. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. [Accessed online].

[153] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*. Volume II, entry 301, pp. 635-640. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. [Accessed online].

In the interim, Moynihan began writing prolifically to advance the national cause of a family policy. In an article entitled "The Case for a Family Policy," which he contributed to the Catholic magazine *America*, Moynihan reiterated familiar themes, advocating strongly for a pro-family government agenda. Significantly, this was the first *public* article in which Moynihan explicitly called for a family policy, and that he chose a Catholic magazine (of all publications) should indicate a conscious decision to write for an audience with which he shared strong family values. Moynihan wrote that family decay was "a subject of profound moral significance about which *we* [Catholics—my italics] should be helping to shape national policy."[154] Catholics, he felt, with their strong intrinsic sense of the importance of family, should use their knowledge to help shape and influence American policy.

Furthermore, Moynihan allowed his intuition to creep into the piece, validating his views when data could not. He wrote, even though "it would be wrong to suggest that there is a very great deal of systematic knowledge on the subject...general impressions surely cannot be far wrong: the stability and quality of family life are a prime determinant of individual and group achievement."[155] That Moynihan was willing to concede the incompleteness of his statistics—after *The Negro Family* had relied exclusively on them—revealed his comfort in like-minded company. Writing for those with whom he shared fundamental insights regarding the importance of family, Moynihan allowed himself to become more philosopher than social scientist—a unique occurrence!

Further, Moynihan's comfort writing for a Catholic audience extended beyond his suggestion of emotional—non-empirical—certitude in the importance of family, to his invocation of the cultural family insights he had first articulated in *Beyond the Melting Pot.*

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[154] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Case for a Family Policy." *America* 18 Sept. 1965.
[155] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Case for a Family Policy." *America* 18 Sept. 1965.

Catholics, after all, surely understood how defining one's upbringing could be. Moynihan defended the importance of family by citing the Jews, Chinese and Japanese as the "most prosperous of all peoples."[156] Accounting for this was that all three groups had in common "a singularly stable, cohesive family life." Simple observations of ethnic cultures, Moynihan reiterated, made it plain that the family was "itself a significant and dynamic element in the creation of culture, social character and social structure."[157] Simply put, family life largely determined one's success in life. Therefore, government "must be concerned with family patterns that help or hinder efforts to bring people out of poverty and into the mainstream of American life."[158]

Finally, the *America* article was important because Moynihan was willing to harp on conservative family values to a Catholic audience that was taking a new, more personal approach to religion that was increasingly private and flexible, and therefore less predictably positive in its reaction to public promulgations of traditional Catholic values.[159] When the article was released in September, the Catholic Church was on the brink of concluding The Second Vatican Council (1961-1965), a highly contentious and much-publicized undertaking that promised to decentralize and relax the Church's religious authority—bringing faith nearer to a matter of "the dictates" of "one's conscience."[160] Further, this was an especially sensitive topic given that on the issue of birth control—which for years had been on the Council's agenda—the Pope had "not explicitly condemn[ed] contraception."[161] This represented a dramatic change from the Church's historically intransigent condemnation of the practice, and reflected the widespread tension

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[156] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Case for a Family Policy." *America* 18 Sept. 1965.
[157] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Case for a Family Policy." *America* 18 Sept. 1965.
[158] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Case for a Family Policy." *America* 18 Sept. 1965.
[159] Greeley, Andrew M. *The Catholic Revolution: New Wine, Old Wineskins, and the Second Vatican Council*. Berkeley: University of California, 2004.
[160] "The Fathers in the Modern World." *The Economist* 14 Nov. 1964.
[161] "The Fathers in the Modern World." *The Economist* 14 Nov. 1964.

within the Catholic community concerning modern sexuality. With the state of family values in flux, Catholics increasingly looked inward for guidance on traditionally doctrinal matters such as birth control—many, as it would turn out, rejected the Church's traditional prohibition. In this context, Moynihan was willing to establish himself as a conservative voice—pro-traditional Catholic (family) values—among a liberalizing audience.

Clearly loath to sound too bishop-like, however, Moynihan tread softly and clumsily, even as he confidently espoused the importance of family. Concerning family life he wrote, "This is not to argue for any one pattern...But what evidence we do have argues that social conditions ought to enable the general run of families to succeed in whatever arrangements fit their fancy."[162] Despite this lone nod to pluralism, Moynihan's central argument contradicted diversity of 'arrangements,' remaining instead within the conservative Catholic tradition of two-parent households. He argued, "there is one unmistakable lesson in American history: a community that allows a large number of young men to grow up in broken families, dominated by women, never acquiring any stable relationship to male authority...that community asks for and gets chaos."[163] Importantly, Moynihan's somewhat clumsy homage to diversity gave out under the weight of his enthusiasm that conservative Catholic values might constitute the nexus of future American welfare policy. The awkwardness (and self-contradiction) of his endorsement of diversity revealed that he truly gave the issue little thought, and considered families as proper when in their traditional construct.

In "The Case for a Family Policy," Moynihan further sought to include people of all races, not just blacks, in his discussion of family deterioration. This suggested something that to this point Moynihan had not felt compelled to say—that his discussion was not racially limited,

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[162] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Case for a Family Policy."
[163] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Case for a Family Policy."

but instead that he believed family life was equally necessary to all ethnic groups. Blacks, sadly, exhibited a highly decayed instance that demanded specific and urgent attention. Still, he seemed compelled to apologize for the racial restriction of *The Negro Family*. Explaining why he chose to focus exclusively on blacks while conducting his research, Moynihan wrote: "Because census data distinguish between white and nonwhite families, it is possible to trace the experience of the Negro family...of whom a high proportion live in or near to poverty. It is almost certain that many or most of the same effects would be found to occur among white families in similar circumstances, but the experience of poor whites is concealed in the affluent mass."[164] In other words, even though their disproportionate rates of family breakdown placed them at the focus of the moment, blacks were just one equal part of the great human need for strong family life.

In another article, contributed to the Fall 1965 edition of the journal Daedalus,[165] Moynihan composed a condensed version of *The Negro Family* entitled, "Employment, Income and the Ordeal of the Negro Family." This piece contrasted interestingly with the *America* article because—written for an audience of scholars who were not necessarily Catholic—it completely excluded appeals to the commonsensical importance of family. Its emphasis was instead to exclusively employ *statistical* arguments. Reiterating *The Negro Family*'s proposed correlation between unemployment and family breakdown, Moynihan called for government employment measures to strengthen families. He took his analysis further than he had in his report, however, by explicitly delineating the process by which jobs would strengthen family life. He suggested that fathers 'disciplined' by employment would start to raise children properly, out of poverty and involving the transmission of essential values. These children would not need

[164] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Case for a Family Policy."
[165] The Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. This particular edition was themed "The American Negro." Moynihan's co-contributors included Kenneth Clark, who coined "the tangle of pathology."

government assistance upon entering adulthood; instead, they would be able to fend for themselves. In this sense, an employment bill for poor black fathers would have "work[ed] out arrangements so that" emergence from ghetto life "happen[ed] more or less naturally"[166] among the subsequent generation. At the core of his proposal, family was responsible for creating self-sufficient citizens.

In "The Ordeal," Moynihan also elaborated on his scissors.[167] In his view, these spoke definitively to the pycho-social damage inflicted on blacks who had—for generations— grown up in broken homes. In normal times, he wrote, rates of divorce among blacks rose and fell with the black male unemployment rate. The scissors, however, indicated the point after which "a reversal in the course of economic events...no longer produce[d] the expected response in social areas."[168] This was indicated by the fact that, "After 1962, unemployment dropped sharply, but the increase in employment opportunities for Negro men was not accompanied by a decline in broken marriages."[169] He concluded that family breakdown had therefore crippled many blacks psychologically to such an extent that they had ceased to respond *as expected* to changes in their life prospects. Despite new job opportunities, blacks family life remained obstinately and increasingly unstable. Government intervention directly into the family, therefore, might be

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[166] Moynihan, Daniel P. "Employment, Income, and the Ordeal of the Negro Family,. p. 746.

[167] Of the entire report, which delimited trends with remarkable prescience, Moynihan's scissors proved the most problematic. This, and thus Moynihan's assertion that blacks had ceased to respond *normally* to changes in financial prospects, were potentially uncompelling for the reason that they relied on the unemployment rate without paying attention to labor force participation. Though it is true that the unemployment rate dropped dramatically after 1962, so did the number of black men looking for jobs. The real unemployment rate, therefore, remained high throughout the decade. An examination of census data (by the author) revealed that from 1960 to 1970, among nonwhite males, labor force participation dropped from 78.1 to 71.4 percent. Therefore, though the unemployment rate dropped from 10.7 to 7.3 percent over the same period, the *real* unemployment rate actually ticked up from 33.4 to 33.9 percent.# These data indicate that many blacks dropped out of the work force between 1960 and 1970, and thus ceased searching for jobs altogether. Likely revealing deeper dejection and an even direr economic situation than high unemployment, the decline in labor force participation among black males problematizes Moynihan's conclusion that blacks had ceased to respond rationally to economic factors.

[168] Moynihan, Daniel P. "Employment, Income, and the Ordeal of the Negro Family., p. 766.

[169] Ibid. p.. 767.

necessary, according to Moynihan—who felt that his scissors powerfully affirmed his case for a national pro-family policy.

2. Crisis & Departure: The Aftermath

As Moynihan was writing articles optimistic about the prospects for a U.S. family policy, *The Negro Family* was leaked to the press in August—precipitating a firestorm made more incendiary because it occurred just days after riots broke out in the predominantly African American ghetto of Watts, Los Angeles following the arrest of a young black man by a white police officer.[170] National guardsmen were called to restore peace, which was achieved over the course of three days and after 34 deaths. Watts galvanized national confusion that ramified throughout white America's relationship to the Civil Rights movement. Lost was the powerful association linking the black struggle for civil rights to peaceful nonviolence. As Godfrey Hodgson writes (in his capacity as renowned U.S. historian) "After Watts, attention shifted sharply to racial tension and the potential for violence in the cities of the North and West."[171] These riots would dominate national news every summer from 1965 to 1968.

As moderates and conservatives began to distance themselves from the civil rights movement, many liberals went in another, radicalized direction—expressing outrage over the circumstances that had caused the riots. They seized on Moynihan's complex and sometimes ponderous conclusions, frequently misinterpreting "the tangle of pathology" as the Johnson administration's attempt to blame the riots on perverse black culture. Making things worse, the president was both unwilling and unable to come to his aide's defense. Within a few weeks of his Howard speech, Johnson sent fifty thousand American troops into Vietnam,[172] a move that

[170] Hodgson, Godfrey. *America in Our Time*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976. p., 266.
[171] Hodgson, Godfrey. *America in Our Time*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1976. p., 266.
[172] Burner, David. *Making Peace with the 60s*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1996., p., 196.

profoundly escalated the conflict, and cemented the southeastern war as his administration's primary priority. Thereafter, Civil Rights received little attention.

Just as the consequences of Watts began to sink into America's fragile psyche, on August 18, two *Wall Street Journal* contributors, Rowland Evans and Robert D. Novak, published their nationally syndicated column under the title "The Moynihan Report."[173] Thereafter, *The Negro Family* was to be known by no other name. Though at points fair to the text, the two columnists claimed that Moynihan had identified the roots of black unemployment in the black family—or, to be dangerously simple, that Moynihan had blamed blacks for their own problems. Moynihan had in fact intended to suggest the opposite (that unemployment caused, or at least exacerbated, family breakdown). Thereafter, the report would receive much press, and the popular interpretations to which it was prone slighted Moynihan's full analysis by largely echoing the arguments originally put forth by Evans and Novak.

The Labor Department compounded the problem in mid-August when it assigned *The Negro Family* a Government Printing Office number,[174] and began distributing the report to the general public.[175] Receiving no guidance from the government, the Civil Rights leadership got its hands on the report, and then splintered over its reaction; its enduring, most impactful response, however, was decidedly negative. CORE head James Farmer wrote in his syndicated column, "Moynihan has provided a massive academic cop-out for the white conscience, and implied that Negroes in this nation will never secure a substantial measure of freedom until we

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[173] Evans, Rowland, and Robert Novak. "Inside Report: The Moynihan Report." *The Washington Post, Times Herald* 18 Aug. 1965

[174] Patterson., p., 66.

[175] Denzin, Norman K. *The Values of Social Science.* [Chicago]: Aldine Pub., 1970., p., 226. This work is a compendium of social science history and research. The particular chapter cited was written by Lee Rainwater and William L. Yancey, author of *The Moynihan Report and the Politics of Controversy*.

learn to behave ourselves and stop buying Cadillac's instead of bread."[176] The most influential polemic composed in response to the report appeared in the progressive magazine *The Nation* during November 1965 when it printed "Savage Discovery"—written by Harvard psychologist and CORE activist William Ryan. Ryan oversimplified and distorted Moynihan's argument as: "Negro family instability is a basic cause of the Negro inequality and pathology that are reflected in unemployment statistics, census data and the results of sociological research."[177] In place of what he interpreted to be Moynihan's thesis, Ryan offered his own assessement: "It would be far more reasonable to conclude...that poor Negro families—that is, half of all Negro families—are bitterly discriminated against and exploited with the result that the individual, the family and the community are all deeply injured."[178]

Though widely cited as an authority on the report, Ryan's focus on discrimination problematically overlooked one of the most important elements of *The Negro Family*: its reference to a burgeoning black middle class. According to Moynihan, this group was "stable" and "steadily growing stronger and more successful," while placing a "premium on family stability" even "higher" than that of the "white middle class family."[179] Moynihan's central point—which Ryan missed—was that the existence of stable and pervasive two-parent, middle-class black family life was proof that family stability (and not discrimination) was the central, fundamentally important variable in determining the quality of life for black (and all other) Americans! Though discrimination was obviously relevant, if the black middle-class had been able to overcome it then clearly other, more important factors were at work.

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[176] Farmer, James L. "The Core of It: The Controversial Moynihan Report." *New York Amsterdam News* 18 Dec. 1965.
[177] Ryan, William. "Savage Discovery: The Moynihan Report." *The Nation* 22 Nov. 1965: 380-84.
[178] Ryan, "Savage Discovery: The Moynihan Report."
[179] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Negro Family: The Case for National Action*., Chapter II.

Despite its rather significant flaws, "Savage Discovery" was reprinted in the NAACP's journal The Crisis—a big blow to Moynihan. His mistaken critics legitimized, things became even worse when the Johnson administration—wary of controversy—allowed for the Moynihan Report's exclusion from the conference 'To Fulfill These Rights.' At the conference's November pre-planning session, executive director Berl Bernhard began by saying, "I want you to know that I have been reliably informed that no such person as Daniel Patrick Moynihan exists."[180] By June of the following year when the actual conference would finally meet, the issue of the family had been completely scrapped from the agenda. After all the excitement, nothing came of Johnson's great speech (and thus Moynihan's report).

3. Beyond Johnson

Moynihan stayed on as Undersecretary of Labor for just one month after Johnson's Howard speech, before leaving the administration to run for City Council President of New York in July 1965. After losing later that summer, he received and accepted an offer to head the Center for Advanced Studies at Wesleyan University. From his new academic perch in Middletown, Connecticut, Moynihan persisted in writing prolifically on the subject of the family. Initially, he was excited to harness the momentum of Johnson's Howard address to advocate family policy—an enthusiasm expressed in his articles for Daedalus and *America*. Come August and the controversy, however, Moynihan became angry, his pieces vitriolic and highly critical of the Johnson administration—which he felt had hung him out to dry. By February of the next year, he would write famous Harvard historian and investigator of ethnicity, Oscar Handlin, describing his "present mood"[181] as "defiance."

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[180] Denzin,., p., 235.
[181] Moynihan, Daniel P., and Steven R. Weisman. Letter to Oscar Handlin. February 1, 1966. p., 118.

During his tenure at Wesleyan, Moynihan became involved with a group of liberal intellectuals similarly "skeptical of the efficacy of government intervention."[182] By the 1970s, America would know them as the neoconservatives. Until then, they were the men who ran a special journal—co-founded by *The Reporter*'s former editor Irving Kristol—*The Public Interest*. A Moynihan-authored article, "The Professionalization of Reform," kicked off the inaugural edition—arguing somewhat excitedly that social science was on the verge of becoming *analytical.* That is, it would soon be the new economics—able to discern the impact of policy inputs (on human behavior) ahead of time.

The Public Interest crowd became an important platform for affirming and discussing Moynihan's conservative social beliefs regarding the family. Among the magazine's contributors was Johns Hopkins sociologist James S. Coleman, who spearheaded a study that would become particularly impactful on Moynihan's views—by adding yet more empirical ammunition to his argument that family, more than anything else, was fundamentally determinative of the quality of one's life. Under a provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Coleman had been contracted to study the qualitative difference in black versus white schools. People generally expected that his findings would demonstrate a dramatic discrepancy. However, they did not. In Moynihan's own words, "it turned out the quality of the schools couldn't explain the enormous differences in pupil achievement...the differences come from *family background* (my italics) and peer group influence."[183] The Coleman Report, as it was dubbed, became a national sensation, akin to Harrington's *The Other America*. The neoconservatives—whose mantra was "to know a little better what we are talking about"[184]—

[182] Hodgson., p. 125.
[183] Moynihan, Daniel P., and Steven R. Weisman. Letter to Irving Kristol, editor of *The Public Interest*. August 22, 1966. p., 125.
[184] Kristol, Irving, and Daniel Bell. "What Is the Public Interest?" *The Public Interest* 1.1 (1965): p. 3.

gained a large following in the wake of the report. Even Moynihan himself re-gathered much credibility lost in the wake of *The Negro Family Report*.

Emboldened following publication of the Coleman Report, Moynihan wrote his most indignant indictment of the Johnson administration to date. Appearing in *Commentary* during 1967, "The President & The Moment Lost" asserted that it was the great failure of the 1960s that the President's agenda to provide blacks with equality (as outlined at Howard) had not been carried out. He placed the blame squarely on the civil rights leadership, which had allowed the "preposterous" controversy over *The Negro Family* to preempt addressing what was undeniably the most serious issue of the time. As Moynihan wrote succinctly, "the opposition emanated from the supposed proponents of such a commitment."[185]

In addition, Moynihan included the ultimate affirmation of his own family views: "The family is the cornerstone of our society. More than any other force it shapes the attitude, the hopes, the ambitions, and the values of the child. When the family collapses. It is the children that are usually damaged. When it happens on a massive scale the community itself is crippled. So, unless we work to strengthen the family, to create conditions under which most parents will stay together--all the rest: schools and playgrounds, public assistance and private concern, will never be enough to cut completely the circle of despair and deprivation."[186] The fingerprint of the Coleman Report appeared stamped onto his prose.

Later in 1966, Moynihan would carry these views to Harvard, when his friend the political scientist James Q. Wilson stepped down from the directorship of the Harvard-MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies, and recommended that Moynihan take his place. Harvard appointed Moynihan to the post, and gave him a professorship in the education department to formalize his

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[185] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The President & the Negro: The Moment Lost." *Commentary* Feb. 1967., p., 32.
[186] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The President & the Negro: The Moment Lost." *Commentary* Feb. 1967., p., 34.

place on Harvard's faculty. That he was confirmed to such a high-profile position at the crossroads of two immensely prestigious academic institutions should suggest the extent to which his views had been validated in the aftermath of the Coleman Report. For Moynihan, it was rebirth.

4. From Harvard to Nixon

Once at Harvard, Moynihan organized a seminar for the 1966-1967 academic year to discuss the results of Coleman's Report, which was officially titled *Equality of Educational Opportunity*. The conference was "eagerly attended"[187] and "nationally discussed." Professors came from various university departments, and experts flew in to share their insights. Its proceedings, furthermore—like the Coleman report itself—only served to reaffirm Moynihan's conservative certitude that pervasive and stable family life was essential to bringing entire groups out of poverty and into a prosperous civic life.

Following the conference, Moynihan received a lot of press, much of it quite laudatory. In a profile piece appearing in the November 3, 1967 edition of *Life*, an interview with Moynihan demonstrated that his conservative pro-family insights were impervious to the effects of black militancy—the escalation of which was profoundly reshaping views about the civil rights movement held by liberals throughout society. While many began to see black culture as irreconcilable with white America, Moynihan continued to espouse the conservative notion that blacks were capable of achieving the strong family life that had so helped other ethnic groups to attain success in America. Further, he reiterated that stronger families would inculcate faltering inner-city youths with the industriousness necessary to success.

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[187] Patterson, James T. *Freedom Is Not Enough: The Moynihan Report and America's Struggle over Black Family Life : From LBJ to Obama*. New York: Basic, 2010.

The *Life* interview made it abundantly clear that Moynihan's conservative family values had not changed. Neither did his core policy recommendations. He continued to regard a family allowance, government-provided full employment, and job training programs as essential to stabilizing family life. And yet he began to see these as insufficient following the summer of 1967—when riots even more virulent than Watts had broken out in the black ghettos of Newark and Detroit. As Moynihan admitted, "I used to think my proposals would solve the welfare problem. I realize now that they're just the beginning steps."[188] Jobs and family allowances remained central but insufficient to his desired end of family stability.

While Moynihan remained confident that something *could* stabilize inner-city black families, his interview betrayed and foreshadowed a certain fear that social science would not soon produce the insights required to devise effective policy. This was a far cry from the hopefulness he had expressed in "The Professionalization of Reform." which had envisioned social science as the next economics—an "analytical science"[189] capable of measuring repeatable social responses to changes in financial, educational, or even psycho-therapeutic circumstances. While he had never concluded that an adequate system of social science was in existence, in 1965 he thought academia was "on the verge" of producing one.

By 1968, Moynihan held a far less sanguine view of the future of public policy as it might strengthen American family life. His frustration could turn into radical, and unpalatable policy recommendations. For example, in "The Crisis in Welfare," which he contributed to *The Public Interest* in 1968, he proposed—after reciting (typical) pleas for employment policy and family allowances—new remedies in the form of "a greater willingness on the part of the state to remove children from homes deemed improper, and on the part of the community to

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[188] Powledge, Fred. "Idea Broker in the Race Crisis." *Life* 3 Nov. 1967.
[189] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Professionalization of Reform." *The Public Interest* Fall (1965).

encourage interracial adoption of children."[190] This proposition clearly envisioned white parents adopting black children in order to bring them up *properly*, in the conservative tradition of a two-parent, nurturing ideal. That Moynihan favored such a recommendation suggested the extent to which he continued to trust stable family life as the best means of breaking the cycle of poverty. That he was willing to propose something so disagreeable (and against American notions of freedom) as depriving parents of their own children revealed his newfound disillusionment with the prospects that black family life would get better anytime soon. If anything he believed even more ardently, in the aftermath of the Coleman Report, that stable family life was the linchpin of a child's capacity for later accomplishment; nonetheless, it became clear that sturdy family life could not be coerced into inner-city proliferation.

Frustration began to pervade other of Moynihan's works, causing him to make yet more desperate recommendations that seemed ever more unlikely to produce successful results. To use Moynihan's own critique, "a measure of fantasy"[191] seemed to creep into his work—apparently in a desperate attempt to justify a federal pro-family agenda. In the five years following the Harvard seminar, all of Moynihan's published pieces addressing family issues expressed substantial dismay that social science was no closer to solving the plight of the black urban poor than it had been in 1965. Instead of retreating, however, Moynihan proposed to double down and try to force answers out of the recalcitrant science. An excellent example appeared in a collection of sociological studies, deriving from the Harvard seminar, edited by Moynihan and Harvard statistician Frederick Mosteller. In the introduction, sounding an almost eccentric (and certainly desperate) note, Moynihan proposed that "new kinds of schools" should

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[190] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Crisis in Welfare." *The Public Interest* Winter (1968).

[191] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*, p., 55.

employ "revolutionary ideas" that, he wrote, could be "valuable."[192] Still, that Moynihan made somewhat haphazard policy recommendations geared to strengthen family life revealed—if anything—the strength of his convictions.

Furthermore, while at Harvard between 1966 and 1968, Moynihan became somewhat of a celebrity, and was courted by the press not only for his insights into the family, but also for such perspectives as his take on the 1968 presidential election. Moynihan remained loyal to his party's ticket, publicly endorsing Hubert Humphrey (after his first choice, Robert Kennedy, was assassinated) against Richard Nixon. Despite this, Nixon wanted Moynihan in his White House. The Republican president had become enticed by Moynihan's pronouncements lamenting the state of political polarization, and urging the Democratic Party to sever its radical wing, and return to the center. During his campaign, Nixon became familiar with the text of a speech Moynihan had delivered before the Americans for Democratic Action in 1967.[193] Moynihan had called for "the politics of stability," lecturing his party that the preservation of order was of a greater priority than social change. He said that liberals should recognize that they "share" with "conservatives" an "interest" in the overarching harmony of American society, which had been poisoned by the radicalism of the 1960s. Also in this speech, Moynihan explicitly reiterated his wariness of ambitious Great Society social programs, arguing again, "The Federal government is good at collecting revenues, and rather bad at disbursing services. Therefore, we should use the Federal fisc as an instrument for redistributing income between different levels of government, different regions and different classes."[194] Of course, Moynihan had family allowances on his mind, but sticking to the theme of stability, he abstained from saying so.

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[192] Mosteller, Frederick, and Daniel P. Moynihan. *On Equality of Educational Opportunity.*New York: Vintage, 1972., p., 56.
[193] Patterson., p., 110.
[194] Patterson., p., 113.

While Nixon was probably ambivalent regarding Moynihan's call for redistributionism, he no doubt found alluring the prospect of having in his cabinet a highly regarded Democrat-intellectual, who was no less a social conservative! Moynihan, on the other hand, had grown wary of his party and its sanctimonious refusal to deal in the reality of urban slums. In his 1967 *Commentary* article, he had written that "the liberal left" refused "to accept the unpleasant facts of life for the poor," especially their broken families. Instead, it "acknowledges the relevance of these facts only to the extent that they serve as an indictment of American society."[195] On other hand, he argued, "conservatives" may "have more stomach for dealing with the problems of poverty and disorganization in the necessary terms."[196] By this latter judgment, Moynihan meant that while liberals blamed ghetto life wholly on discrimination and opportunity, conservatives were more apt to perceive degenerative social and family behavior in urban chaos. (That Moynihan was on the side of the conservatives should be clear enough). Moynihan understood that reversing the tendency for inner-city blacks to disadvantage themselves would require acknowledging its existence—specifically, as manifest in family life. In particular, Moynihan hoped conservatives would be optimistic "first of all [for] a family allowance."[197]

Inspired by the possibility that Nixon would be receptive to passing such a policy, Moynihan accepted the prestigious cabinet post of Executive Secretary to the Urban Affairs Council (UAC)—a new position, which Nixon had created upon taking office. UAC was founded to keep abreast of the country's considerable urban problems—namely, the dramatic rises in welfare, and the outbreak of riots, such as occurred in Watts, Newark, and Detroit. In the context of this role, Moynihan's purview was to investigate urban developments, and ultimately to help craft presidential initiatives aimed at improving the quality of urban life. From the start,

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[195] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The President & the Negro: The Moment Lost." *Commentary* Feb. 1967., p., 43.
[196] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The President & the Negro: The Moment Lost." *Commentary* Feb. 1967., p., 44
[197] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The President & the Negro: The Moment Lost." *Commentary* Feb. 1967., p., 36.

Moynihan narrowed his agenda, focusing almost exclusively on the plight of families living in urban slums.

In the first of his many memoranda[198] prepared for Nixon, Moynihan argued that the erosion of urban family life threatened the viability of America's democracy—powerfully reiterating his belief that values cultivated in the family were responsible for the virtue of a society. Whereas at earlier points in history, he argued, states were able to trust individuals with considerable freedoms, today that ceased to be true for large swaths of the population. To make his point, he employed historical analysis, contrasting the "moral and political crisis" of the late 1960s with "the social system of American and British democracy that grew up in the 18th and 19th century."[199] Government in these earlier periods was "able to be exceedingly permissive with regard to public matters precisely because it could depend" upon "family, church and local community" to mold "its citizens to be quite disciplined." These latter institutions, especially family—that had "regulated behavior" and "instilled motivation in such a way as to make it unnecessary for the State to intervene"—were non-existent in the contemporary inner-city. As a result, an increasing proportion of Americans lacked "self-reliance, self-discipline and industry," which only the family could provide. Moynihan's point was no less than that family deterioration threatened the productive exercise of personal autonomy; it left people unable to productively exercise their own freedoms because they had never learned how to do so.

These long-held, culturally conservative, Catholic, and democratic pro-family instincts undergirded Moynihan's support for the Family Assistance Plan (FAP)—the endeavor in which he became most invested, cared most deeply about, and sought the passage of with the vast

[198] Here, Moynihan is summarizing the conclusions of a conference sponsored by The Public Interest in December, 1968. Though he clearly agreed with its arguments and insights, they were significantly prepared by Harvard Professor of government Paul Weaver. Moynihan wrote that Weavers arguments were "persuasive" and that he "states the case much more effectively than I might." At any rate, that this appeared in Moynihan's *first* letter to Nixon suggests a strong, if not provocative, endorsement.

[199] Moynihan & Weisman, "Letter to the President," Jan. 9, 1969., p., 170.

majority his energy while in the Nixon White House. Moynihan began pressing the President to support the plan's fundamentals (at first, family allowances) in February, and it took Nixon until August to agree. In the interim, Moynihan undertook to spearhead the project himself, performing a variety of roles from devising the actual policy to amassing congressional support—all the while actively seeking the recalcitrant Nixon's approval. Committed to persuasion, Moynihan could employ flattery to make his case; in one letter, he suggested that the decision to undertake FAP was Nixon's alone, but then proceeded to paint the hypothetical program as "the center piece" of Nixon's "domestic program—truly an historic proposal."[200] And in a later memo: "The 1970's will almost certainly see such a change [in welfare policy] instituted...It is up to you to dominate and direct this social transformation."[201] Moynihan's determination to persuade Nixon (even if it meant deploying sycophantic, oftentimes warlike imagery) reaffirmed this period as one of high prospects for family legislation. While a measure of Moynihan's persistence undoubtedly reflected his personal ambitiousness—along with the allure of winning the president's ear—his positions were genuine, and long-cultivated; they mirrored analyses he had employed for over half a decade's time. They were, in short, based on Moynihan's deeply held conservative notion that the family constituted the essential pillar of society.

When Nixon finally called for Congress to adopt FAP in August 1969, the program he outlined bore Moynihan's fingerprints. First, it was based on a system of family allowances and work incentives, a platform Moynihan had been promoting since 1963[202]—most notably in *The Negro Family* (implicitly), his highly influential 1967 article in *Commentary*, and later in letters

[200] Moynihan & Weisman, "Letter for the President", April 11, 1969., p., 184.
[201] Moynihan & Weisman, "Memorandum for the President", June 6, 1969., p., 193.
[202] When he prepared "Family Allowances in the United States" as Undersecretary of Labor in President Johnson's White House.

to president Nixon. Furthermore, a system of family allowances, because it reflected an "income strategy," was superior (in Moynihan's opinion) to "services strategies"—such as the community action programs. The former was better because it sought to uphold, rather than make dependent, the cultural autonomy of the home; by assuming "that what the poor and near poor lack most is money"[203] and not manners, it respected individual dignity—justifying Moynihan's consistent preference for redistribution over paternalism. Moreover, an income strategy would provide wage supports for all workers, thus having the additional benefit of fostering cohesion, and *maybe* community, among lower-income whites and urban blacks. Current welfare programs, which catered disproportionately to blacks, achieved the contrary effect of white resentment and alienation. Finally and most importantly, FAP would provide a cash incentive[204] for fathers to stay at home, thus negating the perversity of AFDC payment prerequisites, which required the absence of the male parent. All of these reasons—which on many occasions Moynihan had promoted to and even spelled out for the president—reflected Moynihan's consistent and deeply seated belief that family life had to be strengthened, and that the process by which this should be accomplished had to be organic—that is starting in the home.

In April 1970, FAP passed the house only to be overturned by the Senate Finance Committee in November, in a vote that included three Democratic nays.[205] Following the defeat, Moynihan returned to Harvard in the spring of 1970, and began working on a comprehensive 600-page social and political history of the Family Assistance Plan, called *Politics of A Guaranteed Income*. Though almost the entire book was exhaustive narrative, the central thrust of Moynihan's argument—when he made one—expressed disappointment in what he saw as

[203] Moynihan & Weisman, "Letter for the President", May 17, 1969., p., 190.
[204] At $500 *per parent* and $300 per child. See Patterson, p., 117.
[205] Patterson., p., 120.

FAP's avoidable failure.[206] His most enduring message, moreover, pertained to the family; filled with cautious "optimism,"[207] he saw the possibility materializing for government to devise lasting and effective family policies. As justification, he argued that though FAP failed, it did so only narrowly, and could be brought back. Moreover, that Nixon had created such a specific body as the UAC—which had held its own and wrestled the agenda onto his desk (and away from disapproving and competing cabinet members)—revealed a novel, sophisticated, and effective policy making apparatus, which held promises for the future.

As Moynihan concluded, the pieces were in place if Americans wanted to take seriously the prospect of restoring family life in America. And yet, the country ignored Moynihan's call to action. From the 1970s until 2000, family life continued to deteriorate, and government failed to secure any critical mass of support to engage the issue. Moynihan remained outspoken in his insistence that stable family life was essential to eliminating poverty and producing moral and productive citizens. However, the country did not echo his call.

5. Looking Back on the 1960s

An examination of Moynihan's 1960s career reveals a clearly defined conception of the family. *Essentially*, the family served as a bastion for stability, for the transmission of values conducive to the long-term welfare of its members, most emphatically children. Moynihan's ideal family primarily embodied this purpose and essence, which often bordered on Platonic form. Indeed, a family succeeded, it lived up to its purpose, when father and mother stayed together and raised children equipped to succeed on their own in the world.

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[206] He placed the blame squarely on liberals, as they had (yet again) undermined a sensible program for moderate income by calling for the mass proliferation of wealth across social classes.

[207] Moynihan, Daniel P. *The Politics of a Guaranteed Income; the Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan*. New York: Random House, 1973. p., 543.

Moreover, Moynihan insinuated that the *essential* family embodied the traditionalist form of mom, dad and the kids. In his view, the father was meant to work, and the mother should stay at home to raise the children. Moynihan invoked this fairly rigid formation in light of his strongly traditional views regarding the division of labor within the household. In *The Negro* Family, weak fathers—emasculated by working mothers and unable to hold down jobs or properly raise their children—dwelt at the core of family deterioration.

Furthermore, Moynihan possessed a very clear vision of what role the family played in the larger social order—it was the cornerstone of community and of society, the place where children were civilized, and where the comforts of kinship and security could be enjoyed. The largest threat to the community, Moynihan argued (with help from Robert Nisbet), was an omnipotent state that attracted peoples' primary allegiances away from the home. Moynihan was wary that such a situation was threatening the American social order, and so proposed efforts to reverse this course via government intervention aimed at strengthening family life.

Finally, Moynihan's stance regarding the family should be considered in its historical context. When thought of in relation to the burgeoning sexual revolution, which was gaining momentum throughout the 1960s, Moynihan's views remained traditional. He expressed no interest in individual happiness outside the family, and was explicitly opposed to mothers undertaking careers—Betty Friedan's central recommendation. As during the rest of his career, Moynihan throughout the 1960s kept at a distance from left-moving social forces, preferring to hone his attention to stabilizing the family.

Chapter 4

1. The Sexual Revolution & The New Right

If the 1950s deployed sturdy family life as a bulwark against domestic and foreign dangers, those coming of age in the 1970s saw marriage, and life experiences generally, in light of their potential to produce pleasure. A substantial plurality of Americans began to place a premium on personal freedom and new forms of experimental fun. America lurched toward a complete liberalization of traditionally held beliefs during the early 1970s. "Intercourse outside marriage became the rule"[208] among the general population. The percentage of people who disapproved of premarital sex, just between the years of 1969 and 1973, dropped from 68 to 48 percent.[209]

The case of Alex Comfort's *The Joy of Sex,* released in 1972 as a "marriage manual,"[210] evidenced the shift in popular belief. This widely read book, whose title encapsulated its appeal, attested to newfound life expectations that deviated sharply from the traditionalist family norms of the 1950s. In its first two years, 3.8 million copies were sold.[211] (Compared to the 150,000 annually sold copies of *Sex and the Single Girl* a decade earlier, this suggests the extent to which the sexual revolution had pervaded the mainstream). Owning *The Joy of Sex* was fashionable, "a not-so-subtle symbol of urbane style."[212] It appealed to those "status conscious" people who "wanted to keep up with their sexually liberated neighbors."

Symbolically, 1973 proved the pivotal moment of the sexual revolution; by the end of the year, the new sexual norms had cemented their influence on the mainstream, appearing even in landmark legislation and judicial decisions. In January, the Supreme Court decriminalized

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[208] May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*. New York: Basic, 1988. p., 211.
[209] May, Elaine Tyler., p., 211.
[210] Allyn, David. *Make Love, Not War: The Sexual Revolution, an Unfettered History*. Boston, Mass: Little, Brown, 2000. p., 229.
[211] About 1 copy sold for every 50 Americans.
[212] Allyn, p., 229.

abortion in *Roe v. Wade*. Popular television shows—notably *An American Family,* which featured the breakup of Pat and Bill Loud—challenged conventional family values by chronicling divorces meant to appear liberating rather than immoral. Gays even gained. The American Psychological Association revoked its designation of homosexuality as a mental disorder in the same year, solidifying 1973 as the "watershed of the sexual revolution."[213] It was the year that opened the floodgates to "new possibilities in personal autonomy."

And yet, changing attitudes and behaviors foretold troubling consequences. As "expectations of personal happiness" were rising, they collided with "more traditional concern (and sacrifice) for the family."[214] Divorce rates were "spiraling."[215] This confluence of increasing divorces and liberalizing views regarding premarital sex facilitated the annual birth of hundreds of thousands of babies out of wedlock, leading to a rise in single-parent families. In 1977, eighteen million children were growing up in single-parent homes.[216] This was a 100% increase over 1960. Almost always, it was the mother who found herself at the helm. Deprived of a male earner, single mothers were forced to juggle child-rearing with careers that paid comparatively little. As a result, "welfare roles mushroomed."[217]

In this environment of freer sex and less commitment, single-mothers emerged as visible underclass, a phenomenon often referred to as the "feminization of poverty."[218] By 1980, eleven million Americans—eight million children and three million mothers—received assistance under

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[213] Allyn, p., 256.
[214] Mintz, Steven, and Susan Kellogg. *Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life*. New York: Free, 1988. p., 225.
[215] Mintz *et al*. p., 225.
[216] Bianchi, Suzanne M., John P. Robinson, and Melissa A. Milkie. *Changing Rhythms of American Family Life*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006. *Foreward* (page not indicated).
[217] Chafe, William Henry. *The Unfinished Journey: America since World War II*. New York: Oxford UP, 1986. p., 413.
[218] Chafe, p., 413.

Aid to Families with Dependent Children, a welfare program for the needy.[219] (In 1950, only three million total Americans had.) It became all too clear that the "new morality of tolerance toward divorce and family breakup...spelled disaster." The 1950s trade-off between stability and individuality had returned, but this time it was destabilizing.

Undoubtedly, the 1970s was a transformative decade; mainstream beliefs, apprehensively traditionalist at the beginning of the decade, dramatically liberalized by the end. The extent of this change was exemplified in the contrast between President Lyndon Johnson's 1964 Howard University address, and the wording of Jimmy Carter's announcement, calling for the White House Conference on Families, in 1978. Affirming the narrowly defined but culturally ubiquitous notion of family life, Johnson orated, "So, unless we work to strengthen the family, to create conditions under which most parents will stay together—all the rest...will never be enough to cut completely the circle of despair and deprivation."[220] In contrast, Carter's statement accepted, and even encouraged, multiple forms of the family. Unlike Johnson's speech, it invoked no cultural ideal. Carter said, "The widely differing regional, religious, cultural, and ethnic heritages of our country affect family life and contribute to its diversity and strength. Families also differ in..composition. There are families...with two parents or one...The Conference will respect this diversity."[221] While Johnson spoke of strengthening the family by taking steps to uphold the two-parent ideal, Carter discussed respecting single-mother headed homes.

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[219] Chafe, p., 422.
[220] *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*. Volume II, entry 301, pp. 635-640. Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. [Accessed online].
[221] Jimmy Carter:"White House Conference on Families Statement Announcing the Conference. ," January 30, 1978.Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woo

When it assembled, the White House Conference on families further evidenced the shift in public opinion that had occurred during the 1970s. Elected by the people, the delegates sent to the conference presumably represented popular opinion, and a majority of them "were moderate or liberal, with their philosophies predominant."[222] These delegates drafted progressive bills, calling for the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, the right to abortion, and sex education in schools.[223]

And yet, the conference also presaged another development with a very different tenor: the rise of the New Right. Devoutly religious, and armed with "evangelical fervor," this group blamed society's ails on secular humanism—"the view that religious considerations should be excluded from civil affairs."[224] As the self-declared antithesis of secular politics, the New Right largely attempted to fuse and achieve "an effective working relationship between national piety and national patriotism."[225] It promised that a moral renaissance would save America. This required decimating feminism, overturning *Roe v Wade,* and washing away "new attitudes of permissiveness toward pornography and sexual freedom."[226]

Moreover, the New Right, taking its familial ideology from the Bible, asserted a "bold and unequivocal defense of homogeneity."[227] At its centerpiece stood a singular definition of the family because "the family is the first institution that God created."[228] Monogamous mom and dad alongside the kids returned to the political scene. This time though, the ideological

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[222]Alexander, Sharon J. "Implications of the White House Conference on Families for Family Life Education." *Family Relations* 30.4 (1981). p., 643.
[223] Mintz *et al.,* p., 235.
[224] Allyn, p., 275.
[225] Capps, Walter H. *The New Religious Right: Piety, Patriotism, and Politics*. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1990. p., 3.
[226] Chafe, p., 442.
[227] Capps, p., 219.
[228] Capps, p., 34.

justification was largely religious rather than nationalistic (as it was during the Cold War) or rooted in social science (as expressed in the Moynihan Report).

Armed with these views, the New Right made one of its first national appearances at the family conference. At that point, the group was a "strong, organized minority"[229] though it worked hard and with partial success to thwart the implementation of the conference's recommendations.[230] Mobilizing previously aloof "conservative voters...around volatile social issues"[231]—namely the family—the New Right gathered more and more appeal, until its rise culminated in the election of Ronald Reagan, the "family man *par excellence,"*[232] in 1980.

And yet religiosity alone cannot explain the rise of the New Right. Large numbers of Americans sensed in America's mushrooming welfare roles a profound moral malaise; consequently, many gravitated toward the security represented by traditionalist values. The New Right thus "drew its primary strength from *anger against* policies" that had been introduced during the contentious 1960s and 1970s. People began to blame *Roe v Wade*, and the liberalization of divorce laws for society's ailments. Other factors that had "nothing to do with"[233] backlash against the sexual revolution, or any sort of moralism, caused many in the public to support the New Right, even if they did not agree with much of what the group preached. Most notably, the 1973 economic crisis constituted a dramatic reality check for most Americans, who had assumed that postwar economic growth would continue in perpetuity.

The election of Ronald Reagan to the presidency hardened the tensions between liberals and the American right in their modern form. Today, the legacy of the sexual revolution permanently has undermined traditionalist family norms among a substantial (liberal) sect of the

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[229] Alexander, p., 649.
[230] Alexander, p., 649.
[231] Chafe, p., 441.
[232] May, p., 208.
[233] Allyn, p., 275.

population. Indeed, a growing number of Americans have continued to "believe that both husband and wife should have jobs, both do housework, and both take care of the children."[234] And yet, "a large majority" of Americans agree that the "family is an institution in great trouble."[235] In other words, the sexual revolution rendered more flexible Americans' viewpoint as to *what* constituted proper family values, without endowing the populace with any confidence in the institution on whose behalf those values are pursued.

2. Family Detente: Moynihan from 1970-1980

During the 1970s, substantial scholarship emerged in reaction to *The Negro Family*—most of it highly critical, voicing a tone decidedly hostile to Moynihan's conclusions. Usually, these works emphasized the vitality and resilience—as against the breakdown cited by Moynihan—of black family life. Exemplifying this new interpretive movement was Herbert Gutman's *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom*, which argued that despite brutal white attempts to strip blacks of their African culture, black families had succeeded in retaining and transmitting their historic African traditions and customs. Such scholarly glorification of black family life inevitably led to "widespread rejection"[236] of *The Negro Family,* a trend that cloaked the issue of black family breakdown in a "great silence" for over a decade. Even Moynihan, as James Patterson writes, "made no serious effort in these years [1971-1984] to refute the sociologists and historians who criticized him."[237] Though rarely done explicitly, however, Moynihan often pursued the pro-family cause indirectly—through means ostensibly with some other primary purpose. In doing so, he revealed that his views remained unchanged. He

[234] Mintz *et al*, p., 208.
[235] Mintz *et al*, p., 236.
[236] Patterson., p., 136
[237] Patterson., p., 136.

continued to believe, perhaps even more strongly than ever, that autonomous, robust, and virtuous family constituted the core of society.

Yet, the first half of the 1970s was highly uneventful for Moynihan. Save one article published in *The Public Interest*, Moynihan did not address the issue much until 1977, when he began his first term in the Senate—and even then he did so only indirectly. Almost definitely, this trepidation resulted from the increasingly virulent accusations of racism directed against Moynihan, which arose following what became known as the 'benign neglect' memo. In 1970, Moynihan had sent a memo to President Nixon, urging him to abandon racial rhetoric for a while in order to cool off the nation's black-white tensions, which were simmering in the aftermath of the tumultuous 1960s. Unfortunately for Moynihan, the memo was leaked to the press, and the phrase "benign neglect"[238] was smattered all over newspapers, inspiring fresh charges that Moynihan wanted the country to forget about African Americans.

During the next couple of years, Moynihan took his own advice, throwing himself into teaching and remaining relatively quiet on the issue of family. Briefly, his reticence ended in 1972, upon his publication of "The Schism in Black America" in *The Public Interest.* Apparently, this was an attempt to reinvigorate debate, though Moynihan's prose quickly devolved into a self-conscious and repetitious *apologia* of his 1965 report; indeed, even the title—a reminder that *The Negro Family had also* mentioned a black *middle-class*—smacked of insecurity. Moynihan concluded that "*poverty is now inextricably associated with family structure.*"[239] Attempting to prove his case through citing (in italics) purportedly irrefutable statistical relationships, he explained, "during the 1960s, the number of children living in poverty declined sharply—*except for those in female-headed families; and this was true for white*

[238] Moynihan, Daniel P., and Steven R. Weisman. "January 16, 1970: Memorandum For the President.", p. 211.
[239] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Schism in Black America." *The Public Interest* Spring (1972). p., 8.

families as well as black."[240] Furthermore, "In young families outside the South, *where both husband and wife worked,* black incomes are *higher* than white." This piece, expressing nothing new, explicitly conveyed that Moynihan continued to espouse stable family life as the cornerstone of good society and effective social order.

Later in 1972, Moynihan received a phone call from the recently reelected President Nixon, asking him to serve as the new United States Ambassador to India. Moynihan accepted the post in Delhi, where he would remain for two years. The start of his tenure, in 1973, marked a decided (but temporary) shift in his dominant political preoccupation, away from the family and toward foreign affairs—specifically toward the United States' hostile relationship with the Soviet Union. During his ambassadorship, Moynihan's central task was to negotiate repayment of a massive debt that India owed to America. Once he had done this successfully, Moynihan returned to Harvard in 1975, where he stayed—very briefly—before President Ford selected him to serve as Ambassador to the United Nations. It was in this latter role that Moynihan became disgusted with international attitudes towards America, which he saw as highly delusional, and dangerously prone to sympathize with the Soviet Union. An outgrowth of his disgust, Moynihan's most infamous act as ambassador would also hasten his departure from the administration. During an October 1975 meeting of the General Assembly, Field Marshal Idi Amin of Uganda—serving as temporary head of the Organization of African Unity (OAU)—called for "the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations and the extinction of Israel as a state."[241] Moynihan responded famously by excoriating the Marxist Amin as a "racist murderer," saying—in a comment that landed him in trouble—that it was "no accident that Amin was "head of the OAU." Many, including Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, blamed this latter

[240] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Schism in Black America." *The Public Interest* Spring (1972). p., 10.
[241] Hodgson., p., 240.

remark for the high number of African votes in favor of the resolution, which passed in November. His relationship with his superior strained, Moynihan resigned in January 1976, and returned to Harvard.

Even before leaving for Cambridge, however, Moynihan was courted by Benjamin Wattenberg to help Henry "Skip" Jackson, the conservative Democratic Senator from Washington, in his campaign for president. Wattenberg, primarily a journalist slash author, and Moynihan were fellow members of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM). The CDM was formed in 1972 by a group of conservative Democrats in response to "George McGovern's disastrous presidential campaign"[242]—which had appealed mainly to the party's far left at the expense of the centrists needed to win elections. Moynihan began jetting around the country (when not teaching) to support Jackson. When it became clear that Jimmy Carter, a mainstream Democrat, was going to win, Jackson resigned and Wattenberg turned his focus to persuading Moynihan that he should contest incumbent Republican James L. Buckley in the upcoming New York Senate race. Moynihan agreed, announcing his decision on June 10.

In the Democratic primary, Moynihan ran to the right, as a family values candidate, of his main opponent, three-term Congresswoman Bella Abzug—"an outspoken leftist and feminist."[243] Two weeks before the primary, Moynihan took out a full-page advertisement in the *New York Times* in which he explicitly delimited practically his entire belief system regarding the family—a rarity for a man prone to publicly concealing his views in academic prose. Written in the first-person, he called for a return to sensible conservative family life. Although the candor of any campaign advertisement should be viewed warily, the message was highly

[242] "Moynihan's Men." *The Economist* 29 July 1978.
[243] Hodgson., p., 265.

consistent with his personal views, and so can be judged as sincere.[244] The advertisement declared, "families are the key to the success or failure of society as a whole."[245] Lashing out at his far-left opponent, Moynihan wrote, "In our most fashionable centers of thought and culture, family life is represented as repressive...No wonder the divorce rate soars." (Though a direct attack against Abzug, it is easy to imagine Moynihan choosing similar words for David Hackett, community action's chief advocate during the Johnson years). Furthermore, Moynihan decried the "new imperative that an individual's first, and perhaps only, duty is to his or her own self-fulfillment." These were the pointed, indeed deep-felt words of a man who had distanced himself mightily from the ultra-liberal social agenda of his party. Sticking to his conservative, pro-family platform, Moynihan narrowly beat Abzug in the primary, and won by a healthy margin against Buckley in the general election.

As Godfrey Hodgson rightly points out, Moynihan's main priority upon entering the Senate was to was to advocate for the concerns of his constituents, not his own personal beliefs. With New York City in financial straits largely due to swollen welfare rolls, Moynihan initially shied away from promoting family policy—though he continued to engage this passion indirectly, through related endeavors. Welfare was highly divisive in New York during the 1970s; with AFDC payments mushrooming, the conservatives who had helped Moynihan prevail over Abzug wanted cuts, while the more liberal party base would tolerate nothing less than expansion. The country, moreover, was still reeling from the oil shocks of the earlier 1970s, and so there was simply insufficient political support to fund the kind of family policy Moynihan had

[244] Also, his personal views aligned nicely with political advantage during this time in New York when welfare rolls were increasing so rapidly. Because Moynihan was probably not going to win the black vote in the wake of two separate memoranda scandals, it was safe for him to appeal chiefly to the party's conservative Irish constituency.
[245] "Here's Where Pat Moynihan Stands on the Family, the City, the State and the Nation. What Do the Other Candidates Have to Say?" *The New York Times* 1 Sept. 1976, Display Ad 48 ed.

spearheaded during the Nixon regime. Nevertheless, Moynihan did not abandon his passion for enhancing American family life; he just engaged it more subtly.

As Senator, Moynihan's first such subtle act of family engagement was to co-sponsor a bill—the Tuition Tax Credit Act of 1977—allowing up to $500 of private school tuition to be tax deductible. Undoubtedly, the conservative Moynihan viewed this as a strongly *democratic* pro-family gesture, specifically intended to facilitate increased enrollments in Catholic parochial schools—where family values and local traditions were taught and nurtured. Liberals of the Bella Abzug variety, on the other hand, opposed the bill on the grounds that it represented a first amendment violation of the separation of church and state. As *The New York Times* reported, it rankled the liberal Democratic base[246] so thoroughly that even President Carter—a devoutly religious, and socially conservative man himself—refused to support it. At the heart of this act lay Moynihan's hope that the behemoth American state would retreat from its "monopoly"[247] over the "private sector," and allow for different groups to exercise their cultural autonomy by educating their children in the traditions of their beliefs. Undoubtedly, Moynihan had his hopes set on increasing Catholic parochial school enrollments; given that 3.5 of the five million children[248] enrolled in private schools attended Catholic school, there can be no doubt that Catholics would have been the primary beneficiaries.

Furthermore, this bill was important because it was the first Moynihan-devised family initiative *not intended* primarily to address inner-city urban African Americans. This revealed the universality of his pro-family beliefs: that though they often emphasized, they were not restricted to blacks. It furthermore rooted them in Moynihan's Catholic conservatism—in his

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[246] "Tax Credit For Tuition For All Schools Urged." *The New York Times* 27 Sept. 1977.
[247] Moynihan, Daniel P. "Why Private Schools Merit Public Aid: The Constitutional Case For Tuition Tax Credits." *The Washington Post* 5 Mar. 1978.
[248] "Private Schools: Another Promissory Note." *The Economist* 24 Apr. 1982.

conviction that independent, culturally autonomous family groups must generate their own traditions and loyalties unencumbered by state interference. In contrast, historian James Patterson sees the tuition act through the lens of the struggling black family, leading him to argue that the bill "revealed his [Moynihan's] beliefs that students ought to have viable alternatives to failing public schools."[249] This, however, is too narrow. Simply, the 1977 bill could not have been intended to help children stuck in the worst schools, which were located in the poorest areas. Taking the form of a tax credit (rather than a subsidy), the financial benefit required parental employment, and likely a middle-class income. Automatically, therefore, the substantial portion of black New Yorkers on welfare was automatically disqualified. Also, since the release of the Coleman Report eleven years earlier, Moynihan had ceased to believe that school quality was a meaningful determinant of academic outcomes. In that regard, he posited, in the family lay the answer. Furthermore, Moynihan was concerned with federal aid to parochial schools before adopting inner-city family breakdown as a political passion—suggesting that he had a stake in the issue unrelated to poverty.[250] In an article written in 1961 for *The Reporter*,[251] Moynihan had urged President Kennedy to extend federal education funding to Catholic schools, invoking a similar rationale then as in 1977—focusing on the impropriety of state control over these diverse and small community institutions of civic life. An apt reading of Moynihan's support, therefore, must shy away from justifications of poverty, and focus on his strong endorsement of Catholic teachings—specifically, the assertion that the cultural backbone of a virtuous society consisted in individual families and communities. America, Moynihan felt, must resist the impulse toward state hegemony; it must reverse the "conquest of the private

[249] Patterson., p., 143.
[250] Michael Harrington's *The Other America* was not released until 1963, and only thereafter did Moynihan express any concern with failing schools and poverty.
[251] Moynihan, Daniel P. "How Catholics Feel About Federal School Aid." *The Reporter* 25 May 1961.

sector by the public sector."[252] In an essay explaining his stance, Moynihan wrote that the bill arose to address the "pervasive sense that government has got to stop choking the life out of other American institutions that compete with it."[253] Forever seeing the government as 'Protestant' and its competition as 'Catholic,' Moynihan concluded by quoting an article suggesting that opposition to the bill represented a "subtle form of anti-Catholicism."[254] Plainly, Moynihan was motivated to assert and protect the vitality of Catholic family culture from state usurpation.

Unfortunately for Moynihan, the Tuition Tax Credit Act failed to pass Congress. Thereafter, however, the issue of the family returned in the form of President Carter's proposed welfare reform. During his 1976 campaign, Carter had promised to shift a substantial portion of the welfare burden away from the states and onto the federal ledger. Upon taking office, however, many in congress (including Democratic Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd), expressed a desire to table welfare reform in favor of focusing exclusively on energy policy. During April, Moynihan denounced the expected delay in welfare on the Senate floor. He said, "if welfare reform has to wait its turn, which indeed it must...then its turn is next."[255] Turning his attention to the absent Carter, Moynihan firmly admonished the president, "We expect a message from the President proposing a sweeping change in our welfare program, a proposal as large in its consequences as the energy proposal itself." And finally, Moynihan let it be known that Carter's welfare reform should draw on the legacy of the "family assistance plan," which he had drafted during the Nixon years. Importantly, though Moynihan couched his support in terms of

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[252] Moynihan, Daniel P. "Why Private Schools Merit Public Aid: The Constitutional Case For Tuition Tax Credits." *The Washington Post* 5 Mar. 1978.
[253] Moynihan, Daniel P. "Government and The Ruin of Private Education." *Counting Our Blessings: Reflections on the Future of America*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1980., p., 236.
[254] Miller, Normal S. "A New Anti-Catholic Bigotry." *The Wall Street Journal* 14 Dec. 1978.
[255] Senator Moynihan (NY). "Welfare Reform." Congressional Record 95:1 (April 25, 1977) p. 11965. Available from: LexisNexis® Congressional.

shoring up New York's state finances—he announced that New York City alone paid more in welfare benefits than "twelve other states"—the grandiosity of his words suggested that he still had his pro-family social agenda in mind. After all, a simple shift of welfare from the states' to the federal balance sheet would be neither "sweeping" nor truly "large in its consequences."

Indeed, when Carter promptly introduced his welfare reform bill to Congress in August, it reiterated (and largely extended) the provisions of the Family Assistance Plan. Moynihan, normally reticent regarding Carter's accomplishments, described the reform as "a magnificent proposal."[256] In addition to ameliorating the financial burden on states, the bill repealed the AFDC provision rendering benefits contingent on paternal absence. The whole bill would double the annual cost of welfare to $40 billion by providing 1.4 million federal jobs and expanding benefits to needy but whole families.[257] Moynihan had been an advocate of these policies for a while, and was delighted that Carter had returned them to the congressional chambers. When congress promptly rejected the bill, Moynihan grew upset. By the time that Carter returned with a new, much scaled-down version of welfare reform, Moynihan was disillusioned and frustrated. As the *Economist* reported, Moynihan was a "grudging supporter"[258] of this latter initiative, which the magazine quoted him as calling "tireless tinkering." Clearly, the disgruntled Moynihan had continued to hope for mass-scale welfare reform aimed to support and stabilize America's faltering families.

Otherwise during the Carter years, Moynihan helped to spearhead the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, which—passing both chambers of Congress with overwhelming support—placed the responsibility on the federal government to locate adoptive parents for over half a million foster children. This was yet another instance of his desire to

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[256] Oliphant, Thomas. "Welfare Reform -- the Second Time around." *Boston Globe* 7 Aug. 1977.
[257] "Welfare Reform: Good If Not Perfect." *The Economist* 9 June 1979.
[258] "Welfare Reform: Good If Not Perfect." *The Economist* 9 June 1979.

pursue pro-family policy, though in ways less direct than comprehensive welfare reform. He also, somewhat surprisingly, played almost no role in the 1980 White House Conference on Families, assembled by President Carter. There is no record of him having attended any of the proceedings, nor did he mention the conference in any articles written during the period. Six years later he referred once to the incident in his book *Family and Nation*, but even then—in an over two-hundred page disquisition on family—Moynihan referred to the conference in only one paragraph. Still, in that short excerpt he managed to express general disapproval, accusing the "liberal" Carter administration of having "*asserted* (his italics) that no one set of arrangements—parents raising children—was to have social priority over alternative life-styles."[259] As he made clear throughout the book, he disagreed profoundly with this suggestion—favoring two parent arrangements as essential to virtue and social advancement. Likely, Moynihan's absence had something to do with his general reluctance to engage the issue publicly during that overheated period. Also, however, the conference was expected to be wholly unproductive—attended by enthusiasts from either side of the aisle known to shut out any moderate voices. As a first-term senator, Moynihan likely wished to avoid the controversy caused by inserting himself—the infamous author of the Moynihan report—between the far-left liberals who wanted not to define family at all, and the New Right's "pro-family"[260] faction, insisting that family meant mom, dad and kids.

3. Under Reagan

As the 1980s wore on, Moynihan remained at a distance from the family, preoccupied with criticizing Carter's foreign policy and advocating for greater federal aid to New York State. In 1982, he ran for reelection against Florence Sullivan, although as the *Economist* pointed out,

[259] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Family and Nation: The Godkin Lectures, Harvard University*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986., p., 16.
[260] Brozan, Nadine. "Conference on Family Turns into Feud." *The Chicago Tribune* 13 Jan. 1980.

"Few New Yorkers know his opponent's name."[261] Moynihan won by record margins. The commencement of his second term coincided with the inauguration of newly elected President Ronald Reagan—for whom Moynihan quickly developed considerable antipathy. Specifically, Moynihan came to regard Reagan's anti-Soviet rhetoric as excessive and counterproductive. Convinced that the "evil empire" was headed for extinction, Moynihan thought it behooved the nation for the president to turn his attention elsewhere. Moynihan's dislike for Reagan developed early in the administration when it was discovered that the president was illegally funding the Nicaraguan contras in their plea to overthrow the Communist Sandinista regime.

Although Moynihan hardly explicitly mentioned the family during this period, on two notable occasions he was outspoken. The first involved what Moynihan felt was Ronald Reagan—and his budget director David Stockman's—intentional plan to run up budget deficits so that domestic expenditure *on welfare* would have to be cut. Reagan, a famous opponent of government programs, reserved especially virulent language for 'welfare queens'—the African American women he incorrectly portrayed as living comfortably off government largesse. Moynihan honed in on the president's plan early on in the administration, suspecting Reagan of disingenuousness as early as 1981, when the President called for massive tax cuts without seeking commensurate decreases in spending. Only a few weeks before these passed, Moynihan accused Stockman of lacking "morality"[262] in a speech delivered before the thousands of high-profile attendees of Washington's annual Gridiron Club dinner. Only two days after the dinner, an assassination attempt was made on the President, whose popularity thereafter rose to astronomical levels, rendering it easy to push his tax cuts through Congress. Moynihan grew nervous regarding the fate of welfare policy.

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[261] "Good Luck Favors the Gadfly." *The Economist* 16 Oct. 1982.
[262] Moynihan, Daniel P. "Gridiron Address 1981" Republished in: *Came the Revolution: Argument in the Reagan Era*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1988.

As deficits began to climb in the aftermath of the tax cuts, Reagan started sending proposals to Congress requesting cuts to AFDC. On the first such occasion, in May 1981, Moynihan joined Senator Bill Bradley as the only two members of the nineteen-person, Democratically controlled Finance Committee to vote against the $10.3 billion in cuts to welfare requested by the Reagan administration.[263] Moynihan's reason, of course, was that the poor were suffering enough, and that less income—as he had proven in The Moynihan Report—made an already bad situation appreciably worse. That year alone, Reagan secured $25 billion in welfare cuts, in addition to cutting the welfare rolls by 10% and slashing benefits to 300,000 American families. He accomplished all this while decreasing taxes by $750 billion, and obtaining approval for $1.2 trillion in deficit spending on defense.[264] To Moynihan and many other Democrats, the spending cuts seemed pointless in comparison to the government's loss of revenue, which catapulted the deficit from $1 to $2.6 trillion [265] during Reagan's tenure.

Throughout this fiscal debacle, Moynihan continuously called foul, accusing the President of malpractice. He took to the press in an article entitled "Reagan's Bankrupt Budget," excoriating Reagan for "intentionally"[266] creating a "fiscal crisis" in order to "reduce the size of" AFDC payments, which were, as Moynihan pointed out, a paltry one-percent of GDP. Though wholly dissatisfied with AFDC himself, Moynihan continued to believe that it was the only thing keeping single mothers and their children relatively well fed and alive. Despite the rightward movement of the country, Moynihan remained a consistent advocate for the family; during the Reagan years this took the form of defending the strained social safety net from evisceration.

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[263] "$10 Billion in Welfare Cuts Voted." *The Los Angeles Times* 6 May 1981.
[264] Chafe., p., 453.
[265] Hodgson., p., 314.
[266] Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Biggest Spender of Them All: Reagan's Bankrupt Budget."*The New Republic* 31 Dec. 1983.

As Moynihan became further disgusted by Ronald Reagan's budgetary policy, he increasingly spoke out against what he perceived as the president's extremist conservative stances—especially regarding welfare reform. In consequence, the Reagan years began a process whereby Moynihan distanced himself from many of his former neoconservative friends, such as Ben Wattenberg and Norman Podhoretz. These latter men began associating with Reagan when just a few years earlier they had encouraged Moynihan to challenge Carter in his bid for presidential reelection. They became disappointed in their old friend, feeling that Moynihan's incessant critique of Reagan signaled the New York Senator's return to the political left. Godfrey Hodgson corroborates this interpretation, as does James Patterson who writes that Moynihan became so "frustrated" with Reagan that he "moved to the left politically—so much so that he gradually alienated his neoconservative friends."[267]

When perceived from the standpoint of the family, however, Moynihan's views remained constant. Each president under whom Moynihan served from 1961 until 1980 (including Carter) sought to expand welfare payments and social expenditure to help poor families escape poverty. (President Ford, a fiscal conservative presiding over an economic crisis, proved the one exception—though he made no substantial effort to deprive the poor of benefits). In fact, Moynihan not only supported the ambitious welfare proposals of Reagan's predecessors, but in the cases of President Johnson's Howard University bid for equality and Nixon's Family Assistance Plan, he inspired them. Throughout his career, Moynihan supported increased government expenditure on public welfare specifically for the purposes of stabilizing and enriching family life, and so it was unsurprising that he did not support Reagan's draconian social policies.

[267] Patterson., p., 143.

4. Emerging From Silence

Beginning in 1984, scholars—some of them black—began to revisit the conclusions Moynihan had first put forth in *The Negro Family*, affirming and rescuing them from their fifteen years of marginalized non-discussion. Central to this revival were two conservative African American men, comedian Bill Cosby and Harvard economist Glenn Loury. The former's show, launched in 1984, was a conscious attempt to challenge "the notion that virtually all black families were wrapped in a tangle of pathology."[268] Cosby's character, an obstetrician, became the most recognizable face on television—attracting 63 million viewers each week (most of whom were white).[269] Loury, the first black professor of economics to receive tenure at Harvard, began writing articles for journals and magazines including *The New Republic* and *The Public Interest.* Mainly, he advanced the argument that blacks had to take responsibility for themselves. In one article he wrote, "The bottom stratum of the black community has compelling problems which can no longer be blamed solely on white racism, and which force us to confront fundamental failures in black society."[270]

The times had changed sufficiently for Moynihan to step back into the public fray, and he did so in 1985 when the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard asked him to deliver that year's series of the Godkin Lectures—on the traditional topic of "The Essentials of Free Government and the Duties of the Citizen."[271] Moynihan used the occasion to reinsert himself into the newly shifting debate over the state of America's families. Over a quarter of the speech, however, was devoted to the past, to recounting *The Negro Family*, and asserting that he had been right all along. In saying this, Moynihan made it clear that his views had not changed, that

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[268] Patterson., p., 147.
[269] Patterson., p., 147.
[270] Loury, Glenn C. "A New American Dilemma." *The New Republic* 31 Dec. 1984.
[271] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Family and Nation: The Godkin Lectures, Harvard University*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986., p., xi.

he remained equally sure of the family's essentiality to good society, and utterly troubled by its continued deterioration. The two *Newsweek* journalists who covered the lectures aptly entitled their article: "Moynihan: I Told you So." They quoted the ex-Harvard Professor as saying, "I do not know more than I knew then...What would I prescribe? Nothing different now from then."[272] Moynihan was speaking candidly in saying his views had not changed. They had remained throughout conservatively wed to the family as the greatest vehicle for fulfillment.

The text of the lectures, published in 1986 in book form, was equally riveting—repeating almost verbatim the pro-family insights Moynihan had articulated consistently up to this point in his career. The difference, perhaps, is that by 1985 Moynihan's convictions evolved to embody ever more certain and impassioned language. He wrote, "There can be, there is, no equality of social conditions between groups, or generations, without some equivalence of social structure."[273] Plainly, without stable family structure, groups could not advance to the top of society. And, he continued, in an unusually explicit show of his deeply held Catholic beliefs: "Family not only educates in general but its quality ultimately determines an individual's capacity for love" and "whether he is capable of loving his fellow man...The whole society rests on this foundation for stability, understanding and social peace." Abstracting to the religious and philosophical, Moynihan asserted his insights in emotional, rather than empirical language. Toward the end of his speech, he quoted James Coleman who said, "The process of making human beings is breaking down in American society."[274]

Furthermore, perhaps the most fascinating part of the speech as it elucidated his family 'ideology' was Moynihan's summation of liberal versus conservative approaches to the subject.

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[272] Starr, Mark, and Jerry Buckley. "Moynihan: I Told You So." *Newsweek* 22 Apr. 1985.
[273] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Family and Nation: The Godkin Lectures*., p., 13.
[274] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Family and Nation: The Godkin Lectures, Harvard University*. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986., p., 192.

His reasoning spoke strongly and quite trenchantly, revealing where he saw himself in the fray, and so a block quote is here justified:

"The prospect that the needs of families might be the means for bringing liberals and conservatives together on matters of policy is intriguing and real... "Liberals" emphasize social policy but are criticized for ignoring values. "Conservatives" emphasize values in the outcomes for children but seem threatened by the idea of social policy. Surely each group is seeing part of the truth."[275]

Moynihan spoke of the right approach (and by implication his approach) as the combination of social conservatism—the belief in the essentiality of family values—and fiscal liberalism—the willingness to use government to buttress broken families. He did, indeed, embody these two truths.

5. Looking Back: 1970-1985

Between 1970-1985, Moynihan's perspective on family life remained consistently conservative; though concealed, family remained a central political priority. From supporting the Tuition Tax Credit Act to endorsing and rebuking, respectively, Presidents Carter and Reagan's calls for welfare reform, Moynihan evinced the same values he had held throughout his career: namely, a belief in the centrality of family life to a good society, and the rightness of government fiscal intervention to help faltering families regain their footing. Furthermore, his Catholic viewpoints came out quite strongly as well—both in the tax credit debate and the Godkin Lectures, which explicitly returned him to the fray as an expert on family deterioration.

During the period from 1970 through 1985, moreover, the prism of the family served as an apt means for understanding the consistency of Moynihan's beliefs, which otherwise could seem desultory and paradoxical. For example, the Senator caucused with the left of his party on welfare reform, consistently seeking its expansion, and remaining devoutly opposed to reductions in benefits. In this sense, Moynihan was correctly understood to be an advocate for

[275] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Family and Nation: The Godkin Lectures, Harvard University.,* p. 189.

helping the poor. And yet, Moynihan also supported a seemingly contradictory position: the Tuition Tax Credit Act, which would move public money out of the state's education coffers and into the tuition funds of middle-class private schools. Certainly, reallocating money from the needy to the better off, especially in the sphere of education, represented the *antithesis* of equality. Many liberal Democrats perceived this, and considered Moynihan a heartless Democrat-in-name-only. Nevertheless, invoking the family reconciles these two seemingly contradictory positions. Moynihan's support for welfare was always intended to enhance the family primarily because of the special place it held in his conception of a good society. Similarly, tuition tax credits, by restoring the power of decision-making to the autonomous family, allowed all Americans the freedom to educate their children in whatever cultural tradition they saw fit. Fostering community and family, this policy would return culture to the home—while also enhancing Catholic parochial school enrollments. It was no coincidence that these institutions, moreover, were tremendous champions of family values and virtuous and disciplined private behavior.

Epilogue

1. 1987-2012: Gestures Repeated & Closing Thoughts

Following the Godkin Lectures at Harvard, Moynihan reentered the national discussion of family, but this time as a sought-after expert, a founding father of the subject, but a leading proponent of neither policy nor answers. True, he pushed his own welfare reform bill through both chambers of Congress and onto the president's desk in 1988. But the measures contained therein were ancient concerns—glaring problems with the old system but nothing revolutionary— such as modifying AFDC to allow funding for two-parent homes, a commonsensical position he had promoted for decades. And while few policy makers professed to have cogent solutions to the crisis of family, most had not been in the game for as long as Moynihan, who became pessimistic and sad. A career of family advocacy had passed, and the country was worse off in 1995 than in 1965. And not only in rates of divorce and out-of-wedlock births, but also in policy. President Clinton's draconian welfare measure ensured that. This sinking reality conspired to create the near depression that hovered above Moynihan's rhetoric and writings during the late 1980s and 1990s. Usually flowery and littered with all sorts of random allusions to poets and scholars, Moynihan's ruminations on family were now blunt, direct, and incisive, while at the same time melancholic. Moreover, the most important features of this period were Moynihan's somber mood, and his refusal to consider cutting welfare provisions to America's broken families (even though many fellow Democrats were willing to do so). The interplay of these forces strongly revealed the depth of Moynihan's personal passion for the family, which remained unchanged since 1965, going well beyond politics.

Though the Godkin Lectures had represented popular vindication of Moynihan's report, solutions remained elusive, and a crisis of interpretation emerged in the society at large. Some

(conservatives) blamed welfare, while others (liberals) continued to implicate opportunity and discrimination in the sad state of America's persistently dire inner-city family life. Moynihan, however, remained admittedly without answers, and so he became preoccupied with achieving incremental improvements to welfare policy—mostly, with the goal of wresting from Congress as much funding as was politically tenable. His goal was less to espouse something revolutionary—he had given up on that—and more to save the family from the forces that threatened to cut welfare funding, which he felt would tear apart its already strained safety net.

In the 1986 elections, the Democrats retook the Senate, and Moynihan was named chairman of both the Finance Committee and its subsidiary, the Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy. The former role recognized his tenure; the latter, his expertise. Immediately upon assuming his new position, Moynihan took the lead on welfare reform, appearing in front of various House and Senate panels to make his case. Given that the conservative Reagan continued to occupy the White House, however, Moynihan's ambitions were modest. As James T Patterson correctly writes, the bill that was eventually passed into law—the Family Support Act—was "a compromise measure meant to please Regan and was not...much of a reform."[276] Still, the bill reflected many of the beliefs of its champion, Moynihan.

Appearing before the House Subcommittee on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation in 1987, Moynihan appealed to his audience's sense of urgency. Moynihan advocated a "universal"[277] system of welfare, to be received by whoever met given qualifications. (Reagan, on the other hand, made it known that he wanted a program where fixed block grants were given to states to disburse as they saw fit). To make his case, Moynihan appealed to the children growing up in failing families. He testified that Reagan's cuts "really

[276] Patterson., p., 160.
[277] Senator Moynihan (NY). Testified before House Subcommittee on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation. (100-14) *Congressional Record* (February 19, 1987). p., 72.

hurt...children," going so far as to suggest, "If you set out to hurt a group of the population, you couldn't have done so more deliberately than what we have just done inadvertently."[278] Though there was a measure of political hyperbole in his testimony, Moynihan was courageous enough to veer left of what most Congressmen found politically acceptable. He must have hoped to communicate how grave the situation was, how badly America's families needed support.

When Moynihan's Family Support Act passed both chambers of Congress and was signed into law by the President in October 1988, welfare enthusiasts denounced the New York Senator for compromising on what they saw as a tepid bill. Even the nominally centrist *Economist* accused "Congress"[279] of being "more concerned with the moral worth of parents than the welfare of their children." Still, Moynihan had created consensus around the bill—no small feat during those hyper-partisan years—and had won his central bread-and-butter provision: the end of AFDC's discrimination against two-parent homes. Now, married as well as single parents would be eligible for welfare, and so mothers would no longer face a financial incentive to split with the fathers of their babies. Enacting this reform was a longtime goal of Moynihan, who was undoubtedly excited for this particular provision to become law. With regard to the *Economist*'s accusation, more directly, the Act required that all single mothers receiving benefits register for either work training or education programs, which after two years would translate into jobs. The bill also strengthened laws requiring that absent fathers pay child support—which would be deducted from their wages if necessary. The combination of these two provisions, though undoubtedly Republican in nature, were intended to provide a disincentive to child bearing: now the parents would be financially responsible, and might take better care.

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[278] Senator Moynihan (NY). Testified before House Subcommittee on Public Assistance and Unemployment Compensation. (100-14) *Congressional Record* (February 19, 1987). p., 72.
[279] "Welfare: Mother, Leave Home." *The Economist* 25 June 1988.

Though inserted to placate Republicans, this 'workfare' provision was likely attractive to Moynihan for the reason that it seemed likely to reduce rates of out-of-wedlock births. This probably reflected Moynihan's newly disillusioned approach to pursuing family policy: to follow the path of least harm because he could see no good in the offing. During a subcommittee hearing convened to discuss the Family Support Act's effectiveness in collecting child support payments, Moynihan sounded a particularly angry and also hopeless tone. He lectured Assistant Secretary of Health and Human Resources Jo Anne Barnhard, apparently one of the few in attendance, "Those of you who are not aware that this is hearing that has to do with the welfare of children can confirm the fact by the absence of any lobbyists and even of anybody else. If you can shoot a deer in the hallway we are talking about children."[280] Angry, Moynihan continued, "This is catastrophic and that is why no one is here."[281] Clearly unable to fathom how disinterested national leaders could ignore a crisis in welfare, Moynihan demonstrated his continued passion for family.

Appearing before a House subcommittee the following year, Moynihan evinced further frustration and incredulity over the neglect shown to America's deteriorating families. Suggesting that *The Negro Family* (1965) had been the last government-sponsored empirical examination of family breakdown, Moynihan complained, "It is a scandal that the enormous research facilities and resources of the federal government have not gone into the subject."[282] He seemed to be suggesting that if only government had taken the issue more seriously and

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[280]Senator Moynihan (NY). "Child Support Enforcement Hearing." Delivered before Senate Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy. *Congressional Record* (September 16, 1991)., p., 2.
[281] Senator Moynihan (NY). "Child Support Enforcement Hearing." Delivered before Senate Subcommittee on Social Security and Family Policy. *Congressional Record* (September 16, 1991)., p., 3.
[282]Senator Moynihan (NY). "Hearing on Investing in Families: A Historical Perspective." Delivered before House of Representatives Select Committee on Children, Youth & Families. *Congressional Record* (July 23, 1992)., p., 17-20.

furnished it with more funding, he would have answers. As it was, he did not. Describing his outlook as "pessimistic," he griped, "there are no answers that I know of."

Also during this hearing, he lamented the moral decay of his party, which he saw as wrongly alienating itself from the traditional moral values of family life. Deviating from the hearing's topic, he recited a story of how President H.W. Bush, while campaigning for reelection, had characterized the liberal agenda as "for public schools to hand out birth control pills and devices to teenage kids and they [liberals] believe it's no business of the parent." Seemingly agreeing with the president, Moynihan said, "That's not what being liberal meant in 1930. Liberal meant you should have a minimum wage, and a Wagner act. It's entirely different now." Bush's reproach to liberal public school enthusiasm likely struck a sensitive chord, for Moynihan had always emphasized the preeminent importance of parents over schools, while asserting the rights of traditional, family values parochial schools to receive their fair share of federal funding.

Moynihan further brought his frustration to the press, contributing articles to *The Public Interest*, which lamented the sluggishness of government in addressing the family crisis, while simultaneously expressing no hope that it would be solved. In "How the Great Society Destroyed the American Family," Moynihan claimed credit for having "forecast"[283] the "crisis" in American family life "27 years earlier." His message to the government was: get on with addressing it already! In a later article, "Toward a New Intolerance," Moynihan pleaded for the return of heightened civic virtue, and for a newfound willingness on the part of citizens to censure morally aberrant behavior such as bearing children out of wedlock. Succinctly, he wrote, "The decline in our social institutions is really without equivalent. Most importantly and

[283]Moynihan, Daniel P. "How the Great Society Destroyed the American Family." *The Public Interest* Summer (1992).

absolutely essential is the decline of family."[284] Moynihan called families the "small platoons without which a society this large cannot function." Catholic and conservative as ever, Moynihan's belief that family life should embody an autonomous bastion for kinship and culture was tinged with sadness and a sense of urgency.

Furthermore, Moynihan carried the same anxiety—occasionally manifesting itself as rage—into the arena of welfare reform during the Clinton era. Initially, however, Moynihan was enthusiastic to join the newly elected Democratic president in "ending welfare as we know it" (Clinton's campaign promise). When he saw Clinton's 1994 proposal to provide $300[285] million for the establishment of birth control and abortion clinics, Moynihan offered to sponsor the initiative. Undoubtedly, the Senator was enthusiastic that the measure aimed to curb the birth rate among single mothers. Regardless, Moynihan was excited to reengage what he saw as his political calling: attempting to restore the broken American family. Quoted in *The New York Times,* Moynihan reasoned, "You have to do something about how children are raised in our society. The specifics of a bill…or whatever. We've got to work out."[286] Specifics would be dealt with later; Moynihan was excited to jump in.

As the welfare debates raged in Congress, however, Moynihan became decidedly less enthusiastic about Clinton's reform. For one, the Republicans—who had captured both chambers in 1994—began to demand the repeal of AFDC's status as a federal entitlement program, to be replaced by large block grants to states. Moynihan feared this proposal, which he called "a mode of immiseration,"[287] because it kept payments fixed (at the size of the grant) regardless of economic conditions. If recession hit, Moynihan warned, many people would flood

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[284]Moynihan, Daniel P. "Toward a New Intolerance." *The Public Interest* Summer (1993).
[285] Broder, David S. "Illegitimacy: An Unprecedented Catastrophe." *The New York Times* 22 June 1994.
[286] Interview recorded in: Purdum, Todd S. "The Newest Moynihan." *New York Times Magazine* 7 Aug. 1994.
[287] Pear, Robert. "Moynihan Joins Fray with Welfare Bill of His Own." *The New York Times* 14 May 1994.

the rolls, decreasing the already dangerously low per-capita outlay. Asserting himself into the fray, Moynihan introduced his own bill retaining AFDC as an entitlement, but it won almost no supporters, and was quickly tabled.

In 1996, to Moynihan's utter horror, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act. Implementing the provision whereby funding would be channeled through state grants, it ended welfare as it had existed since the Social Security Act had passed during the New Deal era over sixty years prior. Moynihan had strongly opposed the bill. *The New York Times* quoted him as saying, "we don't know enough"[288] to justify such a thorough cut to welfare. Moynihan felt that the family was far too fragile and important an institution to be deprived of resources, which have already proven to be insufficient. It was clear that yet again even as the national mood shifted rightward, Moynihan stayed put in his traditional stance as a vital advocate for the family.

In a later reflection on the proceedings, Moynihan recounted a day when Democratic and Republican Senators were quibbling over some trivial amount of funding for childcare in the new bill. In light of the elimination of AFDC, Moynihan wrote, to make such a trifling "fuss"[289] was "literally arranging flowers on the coffin of the provision for children in the Social Security Act." Though never at a loss for grandiose phrases, Moynihan was nonetheless clearly devastated.

In 1996, Moynihan published his last substantive book, *Miles To Go: A Personal History of Social Policy*, whose title directly alluded to the decay of family and morality in America. Moynihan used the occasion of this work to reaffirm long-held beliefs regarding family life. After thoroughly rebuking Clinton's 1996 welfare reform act, Moynihan explained the

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[288] Pear, Robert. "Moynihan Joins Fray with Welfare Bill of His Own." *The New York Times* 14 May 1994.
[289] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Miles to Go: A Personal History of Social Policy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1996., p., 46.

fundamental "defect"[290] of the welfare system generally: "it creates two classes of working mothers: one which gets government-provided care, and another which does not." Recalling the purpose of merging welfare and negative income taxes under the umbrella of Family Assistance during the Nixon years, it was clear that Moynihan continued to see family as integral to community—which itself thrived on civic cohesion, on everyone feeling part of the same experience.

Moynihan ended the work by admonishing his reader to seize a moral and fruitful future rooted in family life. He lamented what earlier that year he had dubbed "defining deviancy down," the recent sociological phenomenon whereby Americans had increased their tolerance for deviant behavior—in Moynihan's words, the "redefining" of "deviancy so as to exempt much conduct previously stigmatized."[291] He encouraged Americans to lower their tolerance for aberrant behavior, to begin marrying more frequently, divorcing less often, and bearing children only within the confines of two-parent households.

His final warning was profound: "Expect little of government, especially national government." This is not the state's fault, Moynihan wrote, but instead, "it is the nature of the problems we confront. They are about values."[292] Which could, as Moynihan concluded, only derive from the family: "It is time for small platoons; a time possibly to be welcomed for such can move quickly, and there are miles to go."[293]

[290] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Miles to Go: A Personal History of Social Policy*., p., 47.
[291] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Miles to Go: A Personal History of Social Policy*., p., 144.
[292] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Miles to Go: A Personal History of Social Policy*., p., 229.
[293] Moynihan, Daniel P. *Miles to Go: A Personal History of Social Policy*., p., 230.

2. Reflecting

None who knew Moynihan well would have disputed the claim that the four-time presidential aide and four-term Senator viewed family as essential to a productive and virtuous civic community. Indeed, Godfrey Hodgson and Douglas Schoen state the obvious, as does James T. Patterson, who writes, that Moynihan "strongly held"[294] the view "that the quality of family life was the key to good society." Moynihan's neoconservative friends—such as Irving Kristol, Ben Wattenberg, and Nathan Glazer—would have said the same, as would have anyone who served with him in the United States Senate. Not in the least, Moynihan made this point explicitly on multiple occasions. The purpose of this thesis, however, is not merely to state this fact, but to analyze *why* and *how* it came to be—to trace the thoughts of a man who borrowed his ideology from numerous time periods. With an acute sense of history, Daniel Patrick Moynihan was able to merge pre-Benthamite Catholic social thought, namely its emphasis on the community and family, with strands of 20th century liberalism—invoking the essentiality of government intervention to stabilize the invaluable but often attenuated American family. Millennia from now, when scholars look back on this time in history, the past three hundred years of human social thought will seem short. I argue that they will see Moynihan as a man who borrowed the few best facets from each ideological genre.

This long-range focus illustrates precisely *why* conservatism is so apt a label for Moynihan's underlying social beliefs—because he felt an undying respect for those institutions of human civic life that that had, over time, been proven to enhance peoples' lives. Mainly, this meant the historical family, though an acute reverence for history appeared throughout his works. As a scholar, for example, he typically began his writings on modern issues by invoking their continuity with seemingly ancient times. In *Beyond the Melting Pot*, he rooted his

[294] Patterson., p., 103.

discussion of New York's Irish population in events that had occurred in 16th century Ireland—and it was nothing less than bold to assert that the former had in some sense inspired the on goings of Hell's Kitchen in 1960. As a personality, he felt an idiosyncratic kinship to the manners of Britain's Victorian aristocracy. Moynihan's conservatism, therefore, was an outgrowth of his ingrained respect for the past, for the legacy of its indelible influences, and with all, and as Dr. Patrick Allitt puts it, "its inherited wisdom."[295] Humans, Moynihan knew, had been nurtured and civilized in families for thousands of years, and so he understood that this trend must continue. In fact, Moynihan saw family life as so thoroughly fundamental to human existence that in 1994, he decried alarming rises in single-mother births as human "speciation"[296]—that is a creation of an entirely new species of humans: those raised outside the traditional two-parent family. Family life, in other words, was not just essential to a good society; it was not just a way of rescuing people from poverty. It was, more profoundly, at the core of what it meant to be human.

And yet, if Moynihan borrowed his core social beliefs from the distant past, he tempered his nostalgia with a shrewd eye for the present. Escaping easy ideological compartmentalization, Moynihan's beliefs regarding the necessity and direction of government social expenditure were remarkably and modernly liberal. Their rationale was familiarly historical and rooted in the family. During the 20th century, Moynihan argued, in the industrial capitalist world of "secular liberalism,"[297] community ties had been eviscerated. Having left the farm, the masses had evolved from agrarian to working class, and so daily labor had ceased to be communal; individualism and the factory had set in. By the 1970s, moreover, as titanium and steel receded beneath newer postindustrial technology, the even more nefarious trend of mass structural

[295] iTunes University Lecture Delivered by Patrick Allitt.
[296] Purdum, Todd S. "The Newest Moynihan." *New York Times Magazine* 7 Aug. 1994.
[297] Moynihan, *Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding*, p., 10.

unemployment emerged. The result was a great and troubling deterioration of family life—especially among blacks for whom unemployment compounded other, more deeply seated problems. Taking his characteristically long view of the human past, Moynihan knew that people fundamentally required family life, and so he charged the state with devising means to provide it.

Furthermore, an identifiable (but tacit) endorsement of Catholic social thought pervaded his thoughts and writings. Consistently, he favored scholars such as Robert Nisbet who were inclined to vindicate Catholic family teachings; and often, he betrayed hostility toward Protestant theory, which he blamed for the exaltation of the individual and the decline of family life. (His utter distaste for the works of Richard Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin, which he explicitly identified with the authors' supposedly unconscious Protestantism—made this clear enough). Again, his vantage point—historical and analytical—was neither intransigently ideological nor biblical. Indeed, I have little doubt that had Catholics counseled individualism, and Protestants community, Moynihan would intellectually have endorsed the latter, against his heritage. That he *was* Catholic was not irrelevant, and religion clearly did play a role in his life, but this should not obscure his constant attempts to exalt the family through historical analysis, and not belief. For this reason, Moynihan never sympathized with the religious evangelism of the New Right. In fact, among his biggest problems with Reagan was the president's overly simplistic worldview, much of which was obviously rooted in religiosity. Moynihan was thus *not* conservative in any important doctrinal sense. He was instead an intellectual professor of history, teaching The Essentiality of Family 101.

Moynihan's allegiance to Catholic social thought was highly *intellectual* (as against spiritual)—meaning that his policy positions were rooted primarily in experience, reason, and

study, rather than faith. In fact, Catholic doctrine itself played almost no role in Moynihan's public life. Statistics, instead, did. Therefore, it must be concluded that Moynihan's faith in the family was substantially a secular one, meaning it was based largely on reason over dogma. For example, though Catholic intuition may have motivated his study of black family breakdown, he became impassioned only after conducting exhaustive statistical research—in *One Third of a Nation*, and *The Negro Family*. Also, Moynihan's clairvoyance was aided by the *experience* of having spent a chunk of his 20s in Europe—where welfare policy explicitly focused on the family. In addition, there was Nathan Glazer, who opened the doors for Moynihan to study the effects of family culture on different ethnic groups.

Furthermore, Moynihan's belief in the importance and legitimacy of autonomous group culture—a legacy of his *scholarship* on the Irish—likely contributed to his intellectual support for explicitly Catholic causes, such as the unpopular (among Democrats) position of providing federal aid to parochial schools. In this latter case, though he framed his agenda in terms of constitutional legitimacy, his true passion must have lain in increasing the number of parochial school pupils, taught the traditional importance of robust family life. This was a conclusion espoused not only by bishops, but also in *Beyond the Melting Pot.* Relatedly, he consistently rejected state intrusions into well-functioning private, communal life. He felt that the expanses of American government could never constitute a healthy community, and so monopolization of potentially communal endeavors (such as education) was completely unjustifiable. The point is that Moynihan was an intellectual Catholic, and that while his faith may have played a role in his thinking, it was not decisive.

Moreover, when it came to his personal beliefs—especially those regarding the family—Moynihan was certainly not strictly devout. Indeed, one popular story tells of his visit to the

Vatican in June 1965. When the Pope greeted him, Moynihan—to the shock of all present—asked the then-still infallible holy father, "What about our friends the Jews?" (It was not until December of that year that the Church would abandon its official stance blaming the Jews for the death of Christ). Furthermore, Moynihan supported the legality of abortion in the aftermath of *Roe v Wade*—and as his career wore on, he became enthusiastic about policies that made abortion services more accessible. For example, in 1994 Moynihan became particularly excited to support President Clinton's first proposal for welfare reform because it provided $300 million in funding specifically to be spent on birth control and abortion clinics. Though clearly these enthusiasms violated Church teachings, they were also espoused in the interest of family. Since *One Third of a Nation* (1964), Moynihan had been considerably frustrated with the tendency for poor, single-mothers to bear more children than their married, middle-class counterparts. Throughout his career, Moynihan felt that true families had two married parents, and abortion preempted arrangements not conforming to this formation.

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All this demonstrates that Moynihan's political ideology with regard to the family should be understood as consistent. Scholars routinely speak of Moynihan's ideology in terms of fluctuation, but from the standpoint of the family this is untrue. It is often alleged that when Moynihan began his service as Undersecretary of Labor in 1961 he was a standard Democrat-liberal, and later became conservative in the aftermath of the War on Poverty— specifically over community action, which is said to have led him to the realization that ambitious social policies were likely to be ineffectual. In reality, Moynihan never evinced much enthusiasm for policy of the community action variety; mainly, he felt that it improperly encouraged government to play the nurturing and civilizing role proper only to the family. In fact, as early as 1963, when David

Hackett proposed community action, Moynihan began spearheading studies meant to sway the debate in an opposite direction: toward family allowances. One such study, *One Third of a Nation*, emphasized that family breakdown—even more than poverty—was correlated with extremely poor educational outcomes. In his study "Family Policy in the United States," Moynihan encouraged the government to adopt a family allowance as the centerpiece of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. From the beginning of the War on Poverty, Moynihan advocated pro-family policies—a position he held throughout his entire career.

Problematizing this conclusion, historians such as Justin Vaisse point to an article that Moynihan contributed to the inaugural issue of *The Public Interest* in 1965, called "The Professionalization of Reform." They suggest that here Moynihan expressed enthusiasm for social policy, a stance he moved away from later in the decade. While this is technically true, the argument is nonetheless irrelevant to Moynihan's family views. Though Moynihan did express confidence in the *future* of social policy, he found the present variety inadequate. He imagined that down the road social science would become analytical. He expected that soon social scientists would be able to quantify their insights in such a way that social behaviors would respond predictably to policy inputs, much as economic metrics (such as inflation and employment) could be anticipated and manipulated via fiscal and monetary policy. In other words, Moynihan was *never* enthusiastic for social initiatives justified by non-empirical theory, such as Cloward and Ohlin's community action. Furthermore, by the fall of 1965 when the article was released, Moynihan had already authored *The Negro Family*—in the initial draft of which he had proposed family allowances—as well as Johnson's Howard University address. This signified that family, and not community action, was already on his mind, and in a major way. While it is true that later he would become less sanguine regarding the analytical potential

of social science to enhance family life, his ideology remained exactly the same—focused on strengthening the family as the primary unit of society.

The same consistency defined Moynihan's service during the presidencies of Nixon and Reagan and Clinton. When working for the former, Moynihan spearheaded a massive welfare reform initiative aimed directly at stabilizing fissuring families; while under the latter two, Moynihan was among the most outspoken opponents of stripping away AFDC. Though some (such as James T Patterson) suggest that in the former instance he worked with a Republican President only to later oppose one, this rests on the faulty assumption that Moynihan's ideology can be surmised from whichever party he chose to ally himself at a given time. A far better analysis, however, involves seeing the continuity of his pro-family agenda in each instance.

* * *

Nine years after Moynihan's passing, the issue of American family life remains wholly unresolved, and is today largely neglected. With the economic recession of 2008 shifting national focus to the diminishing middle class, poverty is receiving scant attention just as welfare rolls are skyrocketing. As financially overburdened states cut welfare, the poor—especially single mothers—are receiving troublingly meager financial assistance as less cash is spread out over more qualifying people. Jobs, a central provision of the Clinton legislation, remain underfunded, and many poor are consequently suffering. With over half the births in the country occurring to (mostly poor) women outside of wedlock, a new underclass is developing. Many might say it has already developed.

Indeed, almost fifty years after the Moynihan Report, almost no progress has been made on the issues of either family or bringing the urban poor into middle-class society. People across the political spectrum are certain they understand the root of the family problem, but there is no

national consensus. The country is divided between two polarized positions—although this is true regarding many issues, the President's citizenship and whether NASCAR is a true sport among them. Too bad Moynihan is no longer here to bridge the divide.

On one side of the contemporary debate are the 'conservatives' and for the sake of simplicity (though without sacrificing too much accuracy), I will say they are represented academically by libertarians like Charles Murray, author of the recent book, *Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010*. (Murray wrote *Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980* in 1984—a widely read indictment of the Great Society, which provided powerful intellectual justification for Reagan's welfare cuts during the 1980s. This earlier book, though nearly identical in nature to *Coming Apart*, primarily addressed African Americans). In *Coming Apart*, Dr. Murray contends that American society is dividing along lines of class, with the upper group enjoying unprecedented success and the lower group enduring tragic moral and spiritual deterioration—manifested in broken family life. Murray sees welfare as the culprit; he argues that only by repealing public assistance to the able-bodied will lower-income Americans face the incentive to work, and ultimately rejoin American society as virtuous and industrious citizens—the citizens on whom the viability of a free country necessarily depends. Page after page, Murray recounts shocking statistics: among working class whites aged 30-49, marriage rates dropped from 84% in 1960 to 48% in 2010.[298] Among the same working class group, 22% of children live with single-parents (mostly mothers), while among the upper-class the figure is 3%.[299] The solution: return people to the state of nature, where they will need to work in order to survive.

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[298] Murray, Charles A. *Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010*. New York [N.Y.: Crown Forum, 2012. p., 154.

[299] Murray, Charles A. *Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010*., p., 159.

Standing in indignant opposition are many on the left, the various followers of such highly esteemed liberals as Paul Krugman—the economist—Lawrence O'Donnell—Moynihan's former Legislative Aide who now has his own show on MSNBC—and various other columnists and TV hosts who are all linked by a sense of moral outrage. These individuals reject the notion that society is individualistic and should be profit-maximizing. They, for example, generally embrace President Obama's health care law on moral grounds (if not, they probably think it did not go far enough in providing coverage). Many tend to think of conservatives as heartless and greedy, while many conservatives look at liberals as naive (or elitist) people who lack appreciation for the virtues on which the American experiment was founded.

Generally speaking, as Moynihan identified in the 1985 Godkin Lectures *Family and Nation*, liberals remain unwilling to discuss the reality that it might behoove the poor to change their behavior—to, for example, postpone having children while marrying more frequently. (I would word this slightly differently than Moynihan, and say that liberals do not acknowledge that given the constraints of modern society the poor *can* change their behaviors). Conservatives, on the other hand, tend to see the problem as wholly cultural; espousing the idea that every person is improved by being held responsible for his or her own self, they view handouts as immoral and unnecessary. In addition, the former group (liberals) are generally happy to spend government funds, while the latter conservatives are usually only enthusiastic about government expenditure on "public goods" (the military, police, judicial system) but decidedly hostile to social policy.

If everyone in Congress were to think like Moynihan, it is likely America would be a better country. Each side in the debate (liberal and conservative) stands to learn something from the other, and both should listen to the ghost of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who if alive, would

continue to espouse the necessity of family life (culminating in marriage) to a good and stable society, while also encouraging Americans to tackle the problem head on, with a commitment to government expenditure.

Appendix A

Statistics on American Family Breakdown

The sexual revolution, which unfolded during the 1960s and 1970s, gripped the American mainstream and led to a decline in traditional American family life. More Americans chose not to marry, while those who did divorced much more frequently. This led to a greater number of American heads of household fending for themselves and their children without the aid of a partner. Predictably, the poverty rate has soared among people in such a situation, particularly single-mothers. This poverty had proven to be remarkably persistent across generations. Children of the poor, who disproportionately have experienced the break-up of at least one home, are comparatively likely to achieve poor educational and social outcomes, and ultimately, to remain poor in adulthood. Many consider the transmission of poverty across generations to be indicative of a new permanent American underclass. The starkness of the situation has demanded, and received, considerable political attention.

Statistics provide a good demonstration of what has occurred in American family life since 1960. They confirm that Americans after 1960 have felt less compelled to assume the traditional roles of husband, wife, father and mother. To illustrate, I have compiled and analyzed aggregate data from the Decennial United States Census Bureau marriage report,[300] alongside the online agglomeration of American statistics, *Historical Statistics of the United States.*[301] The following table represents decennial snapshots of the family life of all Americans of all races 25 years old and older.

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[300] United States of America. US Census Bureau. *Marital Status: 2000.* By Rose M. Kreider.
[301] "Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial Edition Online." *Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial EditionOnline*.

Table 1. Marital Trends Among All Americans 25 Years and Older.

	% Married	% Divorced	% Never Married
1950	68.03%	2.30%	10.24%
1960	70.73%	2.70%	8.62%
1970	67.29%	3.62%	8.11%
1980	62.45%	6.57%	9.90%
1990	59.73%	9.08%	13.80%
2000	63.15%	11.64%	14.79%

I chose to examine only Americans 25 years and older to normalize the data with regard to changing patterns in the age at which most Americans have married over the past sixty years. During the 1950s, a majority of Americans wed between the ages of 19 and 25 and so, had I used statistics encompassing Americans in their late teens and early twenties, my data may have borne testament to changing marital ages rather than the deteriorating American family. The marital status of Americans 25 years of age and older demonstrates what thus far has been argued: the 1950s (most aptly represented by the 1960 data) were a time of unusually high marriage rates. After 1960, the divorce rate rose while the married proportion of the population fell. Similarly, the number of Americans who never had married also rose.

Still, these data tell only part of the story. Though the proportion of the population that is divorced at any given time has quintupled since 1960, this does not nearly account for the total rise in divorces. Because three in four divorcees remarry, the number of people who *have been* divorced at one point in their lives is far greater than the number of people divorced at any given time. In fact, in 2002 the Census Bureau estimated that about half of all first marriages end in divorce.[302] Thus, while 63 percent of the population was married in 2000, 27.5 percent of all

[302] Rose M. Kreider and Jason M. Fields, "Number, Timing, and Duration of Marriages and Divorces: 1996", U.S. Census Bureau Current Population Reports, February 2002, p. 18

marriages contained at least one partner who was previously divorced.[303] Many contained two. Importantly, remarriage was much less common in 1960 than today, and so the number of ever-divorced people was significantly lower then versus now.

The effects of divorce on children are an important part of the discussion. When a child's parents split, social science unanimously tells us, irreparable harm is done. This harm is barely, if at all, compensated for when either parent remarries. By any measure, whether it is health, education or income, parents and children from ever-broken homes fare *much* more poorly than those hailing from traditional married backgrounds.

The effects of household fracturing are evident when examining statistics on homes headed by single mothers. Single-mother headed households are important to this story because Moynihan grew up in such a situation and focused politically on them throughout his career. Since 1960, as Americans continued to 'never marry' and divorce more frequently than ever before, the number of such households has been on the rise. In order to demonstrate how families headed by single mothers fare relative to the median American, I compiled data from the *Historical Statistics of the United States*. My findings appear below in Table 2.

Table 2. Single-Mother Headed Families in Relation to the American Median

	% SM/Total	%SM INC/Med	%SM Inc/WNILF Med
1950	10.12%	57.91%	57.98%
1960	10.12%	52.81%	53.77%
1970	11.45%	51.62%	54.74%
1980	15.06%	49.51%	54.86%
1990	16.99%	47.89%	55.95%
1998	17.88%	47.42%	59.64%

[303] United States of America. U.S. Census Bureau. *Remarriage in the United States*. By Rose M. Kreider. 2006.

The first column represents the total percent of all American families that are headed by a single mother; (single-father and remarried-divorcee headed households do not count). Beginning in 1960 the proportion began to rise dramatically before almost doubling by 1998. The second column accounts for the ratio of the median income earned by such a household relative to the median American household income. While single-mother families took home more than half of the national median income before 1970--hardly an encouraging sum--they now receive even less than that.

Furthermore, because the median household is still led by a married couple, and may still benefit from a dual income, I included the third category: the ratio of median income taken home by a single-mother headed family relative to that won by a family of which a married couple was head though in which the wife was not part of the labor force. Both households have one breadwinner, and yet, the numbers present a staggering inequality.

One foreseeable objection to this analysis is that, due to wage discrimination, men earn more than women, all else equal. To this, there are a few counterclaims. One is that women *have* gained relative to men on the income scale since 1950, and yet the data do not reflect any bridging of wage inequality over that same time period. In fact, the differential remains relatively constant over almost a half-century.

Another important point is that income is far more correlated to education than gender, which means that a highly educated woman is likely to make more than a less educated man. A far more plausible interpretation, therefore, is that single mothers are holding jobs that pay far less than the median income, gender discrimination notwithstanding. Likely, many are having children during their school years, and dropping out of high school or failing to complete college. Regardless of causality, however, the reality remains that single-mother headed

households earn *far* less money than the median American family. As testament to this, the government classifies 31.6%[304] of all single-mother headed households as poor. Only 6.2%[305] of married family households are similarly categorized.

These trends lead to one important fact: A rise in single-parent headed households correlates with a rise in youth poverty and youth poverty leads to worse academic, social, health and, ultimately, occupational outcomes for the duration of a child's life. Child Trends, a nonpartisan research organization, reports, "Poverty has large and consistent associations with negative academic outcomes." Additionally, "Children in poverty have a greater risk of displaying behavior and emotional problems, such as disobedience, impulsiveness, and difficulty getting along with peers."[306]

Furthermore, single mothers have more children than married mothers, which accounts for the fact that 41%[307] of all births in America occur outside of marriage. Because single mothers are poorer, and produce more offspring than married women, children are overrepresented among the nation's poor. In fact, 22% of children are poor even though the national poverty rate hovers around 11%.[308]

Still, this discussion cannot be fully understood without accounting for class and race. Today, the vast majority of high-income highly educated Americans reproduce in the context of a married household. The same is not true of their poorer, less educated counterparts. For example, among whites aged 30-49 who possess at least a bachelor's degree and who work as doctors, lawyers, engineers, professors and managers, or who are married to such a person, 83%

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[304] "Poverty Facts." *National Poverty Center, the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy.*
[305] Ibid.
[306] Moore, Kristen A. *Children in Poverty: Trends, Consequences and Policy Options*. Rep. no. 2009-11. Washington D.C.: Child Trends, 2009.
[307] Paul, Taylor. *The New Demography of American Motherhood*. The Pew Research Center, 19 Aug. 2010.
[308] "Poverty Facts." *National Poverty Center, the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy.*

are married.[309] 20% of all American whites fit into this category. Among white Americans with less than a bachelor's degree, and who work in traditional blue collar or low-level white collar jobs, or who are married to such a person, only 48% are married. 30% of whites fit into this category today. In contrast, the marriage rate of highly educated whites working in highly esteemed professions versus that of their less educated, lower-income counterparts was 94% to 84%[310] in 1960.

While evidence suggests that class is a much better predictor of family deterioration than race, data segregated by race provided the first glimpse into the American family's decay. It is for this reason that Moynihan focused extensively on the black family, as reported in the first chapter. Though the white family has deteriorated across class lines over the past half-century, it remained stable in 1960. The 1960 Census did not reveal radical change in family behavior among the white population. Nevertheless, it demonstrated a marked deterioration within the African American family. These data informed Moynihan's early policy memos advocating for a strengthened family policy. Indeed, to this day blacks remain ahead of whites in certain fundamental metrics of family deterioration. For example, 72% of black babies are born to unmarried women, while the number for whites is 29%[311]. Whites, however, are catching up.

I have taken a long historical view in order to delimit the trends ongoing throughout Moynihan's public career. I brought them into the present in order to demonstrate contemporary resonance, and to suggest that the deterioration of the family has become yet greater since the end of Moynihan's career in 2000. The numbers I have recounted reveal the realities that motivated discussion of the American family during the past half-century. They are what

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[309] Murray, Charles A. *Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960-2010*. New York [N.Y.: Crown Forum, 2012. Murray,. p 154.
[310] Murray., p. 154.
[311] Paul, Taylor. *The New Demography of American Motherhood*. The Pew Research Center, 19 Aug. 2010

Moynihan drew on throughout his career. It hope the reader now will be familiar with general trends in American family life, which can only contextualize Moynihan's career advocacy for the American family.