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James Zainaldin 04/05/2014

Education and Politics in Plato and Cicero

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Abstract

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In this thesis I examine the relationship between education and political service in Plato's *Republic* and Cicero's *De Re Publica*, *De Legibus*, and *De Oratore*. In the *Republic*, there are a number of indications that the educated individual (φιλόσοφος) and the city (πόλις) stand in a tense, even antagonistic relationship. The first two chapters of this thesis attempt to understand this tension, first by sketching the basic movement of the *Republic*'s educational program, next by considering Socrates's statements on political service and the philosopher's happiness. In the first chapter, I argue that education in the *Republic* can be understood most fundamentally as ascent to and orientation towards the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν) and, in the second, that it is this attention upon the Good that disinclines the individual to political service. Socrates stipulates the need for a compulsion (ἀνάγκη) if the philosopher is to overcome this aversion to politics, but I conclude that it is far from likely that such a compulsion is forthcoming. The second half of the thesis picks up on similar themes in Cicero's writings, asking whether the ideal statesman in Cicero—whom we must also believe to be the perfectly educated individual, as the philosopher is in Plato's *Republic*—is reluctant towards political service. In chapter three, I argue that this individual in Cicero's writings is not only *not* averse to politics, but also that a strong, natural necessity (*necessitas*) compels him to it. The compulsion discussed in the *Republic* is, then, done away with in favor of an internal compulsion that induces the educated individual to participation in the state (*res publica*). The fourth chapter spends some time considering the ways that Cicero's educational plan pay deference to this high, unambiguous valuation of political life and the need to participate therein.

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Introduction

Most would agree that education is a subject of intrinsic interest and enduring importance. Some would even say that there is, perhaps, an especial reason for this study today, when the rallying cry political and social reform so frequently centers on the crucial role education must play in such a project. But perhaps there is not. A good case can be made that we have today no more privileged a claim to the need to think deeply about education than any other generation. An historical survey of those who have thought education worthy of serious thought—from Plato and Isocrates to Cicero, Seneca, Augustine, Rousseau, Kant and on—might tend to confirm this belief. In any case, it does seem remarkable that education has been, and mostly remains, a subject beholden to no one field of inquiry. I think this must be a testament to the fact that education engages most deeply a culture's beliefs and hopes of humans and their nature: implicit in any program of education is an idea of how humans ought to *be* in the world. It is precisely education's embeddedness in its cultural and political context that makes its study so far-reaching.

My own interest in the political stake of education arose from a reading of Plato's *Republic*. In some ways, the *Republic* can be understood as a dialogue about education (παιδεία) in addition to its explicit theme of justice (δικαιοσύνη). Throughout most of the dialogue, Socrates is in search of the kind of educational program that might yield the ultimate guardian of the state, the "philosopher-king"—or several of them in the case of Callipolis's aristocracy of φύλακες (guardians). This search exhibits fully education's rootedness in its political context: in the *Republic*, we are educating a group of individuals for the very specific purpose of participating in rule of the city. We are subordinating their education, in effect, to the values and demands of the πόλις. But what is characteristically Platonic about the educational program of

the *Republic* is how Plato would have us achieve this goal of ideal guardianship: through knowledge of the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν). The Good is a radically universal entity, apolitical, acultural, timeless. It captivates and enlightens its beholder and is ultimately responsible for the virtues and the state of happy flourishing (εὐδαιμονία) that accompanies their possessor. The one who has knowledge of the Good can hardly remain yoked to the realities of his historical context, finding as he does a higher and more enduring ground for contemplation and action. As the city sets its young on the path of education for the Good, then, it also sets them on a path away from the thoroughly political interests of its own preservation and right administration. There is something paradoxical in education both fitting individuals for a political-cultural purposes and predisposing them to find an end higher than these. I was motivated to follow this paradox as far as I could in the dialogue by my interest in seeing how (if) it is resolved and what that might mean for education's relationship to politics.

I looked to Cicero's writings after Plato's on a hunch that I would find an extremely different treatment of this problem—if the problem could be said to exist at all in Cicero's thought. Why the hunch? A reading of *De Re Publica*'s preface I made several years ago suggested to me that Cicero's own political career and convictions might temper his philosophic outlook. Cicero does his best not to let us forget that he is a politician, in fact a very *important* politician, yet he simultaneously managed to make major contributions to Latin poetry, philosophy, rhetoric, and oratory. I was not disappointed in turning to Cicero as a counterbalance to Plato's thought. Cicero has very different convictions regarding the nature of human beings—and a philosophical framework capable of supporting these convictions. These convictions require a different kind of educational program from Plato's to support them, as I will suggest in this thesis.

Even a short twenty years ago, an ostensibly philosophic examination of Cicero's work would have been dubiously received; but as something of a renaissance has taken place in the study of Cicero and Latin-language philosophy in the past few decades, one can now speak of Ciceronian philosophy as valuable in its own right and not merely a source for those interested in the Hellenistic schools of thought. My thesis is a modest contribution to this revaluation.

Some Methodological Remarks

1) Plato and Cicero

The reader may ask why I have chosen to focus upon Plato and Cicero to the exclusion of other ancient thinkers. I will not try to defend the value of choosing these authors above others for study, but there nonetheless remains the legitimate question of the many intermediate thinkers we pass over, notably those of the Peripatetic and Hellenistic traditions; for Cicero was quite familiar with and keen to respond to the philosophers who came after Plato, and in a number of profound ways his understanding of philosophy was inflected through them. I can alleviate, though not finally do away with, this concern in two ways: first, by saying that I have indeed tried to indicate where Cicero is responding to post-Platonic philosophic debates (but it will be remembered that these debates our not our subject); second, by pointing the reader to the many indications that the works of Cicero in question were quite explicitly and self-consciously styled as a response to Plato.[1] In any case, the value of considering Ciceronian thought over and against that of Platonic will, I hope, become clear in the course of this paper.

2) On the Choice of Texts

The reader may further ask why I have chosen the dialogues I have (Plato's *Republic*, Cicero's *De Re Publica, De Legibus*, and *De Oratore*) among the vast offerings of each author. The choice of Plato's *Republic* as a starting point for a discussion of education is a natural one; the choice of Cicero's early works followed from this decision. *De Re Publica* is Cicero's

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[1] See *De Legibus* 1.15, Quintus speaking to Cicero: *Atqui, si quaeris ego quid exspectem, quoniam scriptum est a te de optimo rei publicae statu, consequens esse uidetur ut scribas tu idem de legibus: sic enim fecisse uideo Platonem illum tuum, quem tu admiraris, quem omnibus anteponis, quem maxime diligis*. ("But, if you ask what I am looking for next, since you have already written on the best constitution [*status* ≈ πολιτεία] of the *res publica*, the next thing seems to be that you write similarly of laws: for I observe that's what your dear Plato did, whom you admire, whom you prefer to all, whom you cherish so very much.")

"answer" to the *Republic* and was thus an obvious Ciceronian *comparandum*. But *De Re Publica*, despite its name and many parallels to Plato's *Republic*, is a vastly different dialogue, and Cicero is given to addressing problems quite different from Plato's. This fact, along with *De Re Publica*'s sizable lacunae—we possess a little under one-third of the text—requires that we supplement our perspective from other sources. *De Legibus*, though probably never officially published, was closely linked to *De Re Publica* in composition (cf. *ad Q.F.*3.5.1) and functions as an extended discussion of certain philosophic principles (e.g., natural law) that undergird *De Re Publica*. I therefore make use of it in understanding Cicero's claims regarding political service in *De Re Publica*. On the other hand, *De Oratore* contains Cicero's most extended and explicit discussion of education, even if this discussion dwells more on oratorical particulars than its broader essence and relation with the state. Books I and III contain fruitful parallels that may help us speculate on the educational plan of *De Re Publica* that no longer exists.

3) Why Education and Politics?

I first thought this thesis would examine from a philosophic perspective education's diverse points of contact with society: politics, law, poetry, rhetoric, religion, and so forth. The reader may wonder at the naïveté of that ambition. It will suffice to say that I began the venture with a consideration of education and politics and never got beyond that thought. Because education is thoroughly embedded in its cultural context, there is no avoiding the really difficult questions and assumptions that inform it (e.g., "What is the Good?"); I soon learned that producing anything close to a "definitive" study of education, even in these texts alone, is a problem that demands the focused attention of a lifetime, not a short eight months filled with plenty of other distractions. Politics has proven to be a serviceable window onto the workings and essence of education, but one should note that this thesis has not even been able to address

every aspect even of politics: we have limited our attention to the notion of "political service" and any obligation that education might apply thereto. A very many cruces of Plato's *Republic* and Cicero's *De Re Publica*, *De Legibus*, and *De Oratore* have appeared with a central role in the discussion of education but go unresolved here. That has been the price of thinking only within the dialogues we are considering and attempting to keep this paper at a length appropriate for an undergraduate's writing.

4) What is "Political Service"?

I have now used the term "political service" without explanation, as if it might mean the same thing to everybody. As the term is crucial and recurrent in my thesis, let me here define how I use it: *the devotion of time or energy to upkeep and preservation of a political community*. "Political" implies a community large enough that it requires some explicit principles of structure and wherein citizens are not all related by ties of kinship. For Plato and Cicero, the concept of "political service" appears in a number of ways. In Plato's *Republic*, this service could involve actual monarchical rule, aristocratic participation, military service, and so forth, depending where in the dialogue one looks; in Cicero, we might think of a *pater senatus*, a public advocate, a general, and so on. The exact way I word the idea of political service has been strongly influenced by the vocabulary of the particular context under consideration. For example, at the most vague I will sometimes say "go to the city/state" in reference to politics (following from Cicero's *accedere ad ciuitatem*). Other times, I will simply say "take up rule." I would only remind the reader that for our purposes the exact form political service takes is unimportant, provided it is understood *when* political service is in question, for our main concern is in how education would or would not predispose one to political service *in any form it takes*.

5) An Issue of Structure

The first half of this thesis (chs.1 and 2) deals with Plato. Specifically, I consider how education (παιδεία) renders an individual disinclined to go to political service. This disinclination means that some compulsion (ἀνάγκη) must be present if the educated individual is to participate in politics. When we approach Cicero in the second half of the thesis (chs.3 and 4) we retain a similar focus on the idea of compulsion (*necessitas* is the Latin in the texts under consideration). I have retained this focus on *necessitas* in approaching Cicero so that we might see how his use of the idea implies a philosophical difference in his thoughts on political service. I believe that the goal is more or less accomplished, but also that an opportunity has, perhaps, been lost through this method. Cicero's concerns and philosophical style are quite different from Plato's, so to approach Cicero with "Platonic" interests is *a priori* to take a limited view of his own questions and way of philosophizing. That is to say, interrogating Cicero on the Platonic idea of compulsion has the virtue of answering our fundamental question most quickly, but might also miss distinctly Ciceronian beliefs that fail to stand out when subjected to such a selective treatment. Something in the way of clarity and cohesion may too have been lost, since Plato's thought does not always map easily or neatly onto Cicero's. A future project may rehabilitate these dialogues of Cicero from themselves and not from a comparative standpoint.

6) Interpretative Emphases in Plato's *Republic*

Of central importance in our discussion of education in Plato is the problem of the philosopher's unwillingness to go to political service (cf. ch.3). I side with the small group of scholars who are deeply skeptical of the philosopher's likelihood of participating in politics; I argue that, as the *Republic* presents it, there are very serious, possibly even insurmountable, difficulties to be overcome if the philosopher will engage in political life. I should state here that

I do not really think that Plato would have us believe that philosophers ought not consider politics at all—the entire project of the *Republic* seems to belie such a notion. Nonetheless, there are problems with the philosopher's participation in politics that Plato never resolves in the text. Many solutions to these problems have been proposed, some of them quite ingenious, but I do not think that any of them does away with the basic tension. Too often these problems are glossed over or explained away; yet as will be seen, the underlying tension has serious consequences for how we are to think of education's relationship with politics. Our focus on this problem in the *Republic* might fairly be called an "interpretative emphasis" of this thesis, employed for the sake of exploring how it might change how we think about education. Moreover, thematizing this problem provides for an excellent contrast with Cicero's own philosophic position: reading Cicero against it reveals assumptions and choices of both authors that are difficult to spot when each is read in isolation.

7) Education and Cicero

The reader may note that education does not appear explicitly in the Cicero half of this thesis (chs.3 and 4) with the same frequency as in the Plato half. This fact can be attributed in part to the poor state of *De Re Publica*. A discussion of education equivalent to that in Plato's *Republic* might have existed there, but, as it is, we do not possess it. Rather than propose a complete (or even partial) reconstruction of this educational plan that might have been, I have tried instead to set forth some of Cicero's thought on related matters for which any Ciceronian educational plan would need to account. This conservative approach means that I have left some dots unconnected in the Cicero portion and that it will be incumbent upon the reader to connect them as s/he sees fit. For example, I discuss at length in ch.4 the nature of *eloquentia*, the virtue of the ideal orator, and its relationship to *sapientia* (philosophy). I do not suggest how one might

effectively combine the teaching of these in any educational plan (so far as *eloquentia* goes one might start with *De Oratore*, I suppose), but the significance of the requirement of oratorical training in education (vis-à-vis *eloquentia*) will be understood in its connection to the political thought of Cicero in ch.3.

8) Justice (δικαιοσύνη) in the *Republic*

The *Republic* is a dialogue on justice, so the reader may wonder at the near absence of this idea in the thesis. I believe my discussion of education functions reasonably well without any treatment of justice—but I will readily concede that it is a failing of this thesis that it is unable to the elements under discussion (education, politics, etc.) back to its grand theme. It must stand incomplete until such a task has been accomplished.

Ch.1. Education in Plato's *Republic*

Socrates[2] says to Glaucon in Book I of the Republic, speaking of οἱ βέλτιστοι (the best men):[3] δεῖ δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν ("then a necessity [ἀνάγκην] must be present for them, and a penalty [ζημίαν], if they are to be willing to rule."[4] *R*.347c) At first blush, this claim is somewhat puzzling: we might expect the most powerful offices to attract the best of men. Why must they instead be compelled (ἀναγκάζειν) to that post? The answer to this question follows from Socrates's findings in his dispute with Thrasymachus, that οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδε ἀρχὴ τὸ αὑτῇ ὠφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ᾽, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον ἥττονος ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ᾽οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ("no craft or rule provides for its own benefit, but rather, as I have maintained for a long time now, provides for the one being ruled and commands with an eye to the benefit of that weaker one, not the stronger." *R*.346e). Since, according to this statement, ruling is always for the benefit of the ruled, never the ruler, Socrates insists that the true ruler will require a payment (μισθός) in return for his services rendered. But this payment cannot consist in material goods or cash, nor even in honor—for the best are not money- or honor-loving, and disdain to be called hired men. Failing an acceptable payment, then,

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[2] I will always attribute philosophical ideas in Plato's texts to Socrates or his interlocutors (considered as *dramatis personae*, not historical figures), doing so more from healthy respect for Plato's veiled authorial role and ironic turn of mind than from an attempt to contribute to a "Socratic philosophy" (e.g., as in Vlastos [1971], from which I have nevertheless learned much). Commentators I have found particularly sensitive to the distinction between Plato's thoughts and those of the dialogue's interlocutors include Strauss (1964), Bloom (1991), Benardete (1989), and Ferrari (2005)—more could be named, for whom see Ferrari (2005) 35.

[3] οἱ ἐπεικέστατοι also appears in this passage when speaking of the best men, that is, those *most fit* to rule.

[4] All translations my own, and will follow Greek in parentheses; translation of longer quotes will be placed in quotation marks. If a reference is not given in parentheses, its source is the same as the nearest above quote. Text is that of Adam (1963). Where the sense of the text has been in doubt, I have looked to Adam (1963) or Bloom (1991) for guidance.

there must be proffered a penalty that will compel them to the task. But what is the greatest penalty? τὸ ὑπὸ πονηροτέρου ἄρχεσθαι ("To be ruled by one who is worse." *R*.347c). Faced with this wretched prospect, the best men will be willing to rule οὐχ ὡς ἐπ᾽ἀγαθόν τι ἰόντες οὐδ᾽ὡς εὐπαθήσοντες ἐν αὐτῷ, ἀλλ᾽ὡς ἐπ᾽ἀναγκαῖον ("not as though going to something good, nor that they may live comfortably in that post, but as though going to something necessary [ἀναγκαῖον]." *R*.347cd). Political life for the best is, in short, a burden; it can offer no reward worth the toil it demands, and when the best do rule, they do so in order to avoid the injustice that would be inflicted upon them by a worse man.

When inspected more closely, Socrates's statement to Glaucon—δεῖ δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι καὶ ζημίαν, εἰ μέλλουσιν [οἱ βέλτιστοι] ἐθέλειν ἄρχειν—is remarkable for what it suggests about the relationship between οἱ βέλτιστοι (the best) and the πόλις (the city). It assumes a significant gulf, if not outright antagonism, between these two parties, and tacitly separates the best man's natural state of being from political participation. Socrates states this conclusion briefly and without development in Book I; his discussion of the city's inability to provide an acceptable wage is, while unobjectionable, perhaps not wholly proportional to the force of the claim it supports. And though statement in its immediate context is a logical development of Socrates's refutation of Thrasymachus's argument that justice is τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον[5] ("the advantage of the stronger" *R*.339a), it is not, strictly speaking, a

[5] Put another way: τὸ τῆς καθεστηκυίας ἀρχῆς ξυμφέρον ("justice is the advantage of the established rule"), be that rule δημοκρατία, τυραννίς, or ἀριστοκρατία (*R*.338e). Thrasymachus's argument gets moving in *R*.338d, and culminates in *R*.344c, where he causes injustice to usurp justice: οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰσχυρότερον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ δεσποτικώτερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης ἐστὶν ἱκανῶς γιγνομένη . . . τὸ δ᾽ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον. ("Thus, Socrates, is injustice become full stronger and more fitted for freedom and for rule than justice . . . and injustice is for its own profit and is its own advantage.")

necessary addition to the more pertinent argument that τὸ ἄρχειν (ruling) is always for the benefit of τῷ ἀρχόμενῳ (the one ruled).

This paper's theme is education; why, then, do we focus our attention on Socrates's somewhat cavalier statement about the best men and the city? It is precisely because these βέλτιστοι (best men) are the mature φύλακες (guardians) of the later *Republic*, whom we have *educated* to be best at ruling the city.[6] This connection is not made explicit here, and for this reason we find no full explanation for Socrates's statement in these passages in the first book of the *Republic*.[7] It is only in light of his thoughts on education that we can understand the aversion of the best men to political participation. But let one grant that the βέλτιστοι are the φύλακες: is it still not strange, to say the least, that those we have educated for the sake of the city would wish to reject participation in it? This tension, even paradox, is at the heart of Socrates's thinking about education and politics. It is our intention in the first two chapters of this thesis to ask *why* exactly Socrates thinks that those men who are best at ruling—that is to say, those we have *educated* in such a way that would make them most fit to rule (πράγματα ἔχειν *R*.347d)—would be so loath to the task as to require compulsion (ἀνάγκη) to it. The answer to this

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[6] I think it is uncontroversial to state that those men trained to take up the rule of the city, the guardians (οἱ φύλακες, first appearance *R*.374e), are at times variously identified with οἱ φιλόσοφοι (cf. 502b), οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι (cf. *R*.520c), οἱ βέλτιστοι (cf. usage in Book I above, and αἱ βέλτισται φύσεις *R*.519c), and οἱ ἐπεικεῖς (cf. *R*.489b). Also cf. *R*.502b: νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ κασθιστάναι ("Let us dare to say that, that philosophers must be understood as the most precise guardians"). This is not to say that all of these terms are quite equivalent, but that the same ruling class of best men is regularly referred to by different titles in different contexts and evolves, terminologically and philosophically, throughout the dialogue.

[7] As, I believe, Socrates knows; his statement at the end of this passage, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ εἰσαῦθις σκεψόμεθα (*R*.347d), is, to my mind, an indication that we will resume discussion of this important subject. I cannot agree with Adam (1963), who believes that this statement is "only a convenient way of dropping the subject," even if it does perform that function as well (*ad loc*). On the unity of Book I with the rest of the *Republic*, see Kahn (1993) 138 and generally Kahn (1996)—a position with which I agree.

question has two major parts: first, we will briefly outline Socrates's idea of education for the rulers and its primary movement (ch.1); next, we will look at his statements on the nature of political office and power (ch.2).[8] By following the idea that in educating individuals for political life we at once drive them ever further from participation in the πόλις, we will throw light on the essence of education as Socrates conceives it and, more importantly, lay bare the paradox at its heart. This analysis will, in turn, prepare us for a look at Cicero's fundamentally different perspective on the relationship between education and politics.

The most concise presentation of Socrates's idea of education in the *Republic* is to be found in the famous image (εἰκών) of the cave in Book VII.[9] There is some risk in approaching the cave before considering the metaphors of the sun and divided line, as the image of the cave is the final in the series of three that collectively form the "longer way."[10] Nevertheless, we must

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[8] These are immense topics. Our concern is with education, but even in that sphere we will limit our discussion to the *Republic* and only develop an account to the extent that it elucidates this chapter's theme, namely, education and necessity. We will, regrettably, suppress discussion of some important topics for the sake of brevity, and I will not pretend to give a really adequate bibliography for all of these omissions (for which fuller ones can be found elsewhere). As regards education (politics will be treated later): there have been many attempts to collect Plato's various comments on education in the *Republic* (and other dialogues) into a coherent educational program. Most of these attempts take the form of introductions or surveys of "Plato's idea of education"—perhaps the only way one can present them when synthesizing such an enormous and variegated material. I think that Nettleship (1935), though dated in some respects, is among the best of these. Also cf. Bosanquet (1932) on the education of the young whom we do not much discuss explicitly in this chapter, and elsewise Lodge (1970) and Barrow (1976) & *idem* (2007). On Greek education more generally, including Plato, we cannot fail to mention Jaeger's voluminous *Paideia* (1944).

[9] The educational import is quite explicit: Μετὰ ταῦτα δή, εἶπον, ἀπείκασον τοιούτῳ πάθει τὴν ἡμέτεραν φύσιν παιδείας τε πέρι καὶ ἀπαιδευσίας ("'So then,' I said, 'liken the nature of our education or lack of education to [the following] such sort of state.'" *R*.514a). Sedley (2007) rightly points out that "the cave is to be an allegory, not of our general cognitive state but of our *educational* state" (262). This has, of course, been pointed out before: cf. Voegelin (1957) 115, Heidegger (2004), Jaeger (1944).

[10] Interpretations of the cave and its relationship with the sun and the line are many and varied, as virtually all Platonic commentators have felt obliged to give a philosophic justification for their centrality in the *Republic*. Those I have especially considered in the following sketch of the cave

get a hold of this subject somewhere, and through this analogy (εἰκών) we may understand best and most quickly the broad movements of Socrates's proposed course of education. (In having recourse to an image to untangle a complicated philosophical idea, we will not find ourselves in bad company, either; as Socrates says in a similar context: ἄκουε δ᾽ οὖν τῆς εἰκόνος, ἵν᾽ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἴδῃς, ὡς γλίσχρως εἰκάζω "Listen to this parable [εἰκών], then, that you may better see how greedy I am of parables."[11] *R.*488a) We will make do with supplementing the cave with details from the sun and divided line where appropriate.

In the εἰκών of the cave, we first see men in a state of ἀπαιδευσία (lack of education). They dwell in a cave-like hollow beneath the earth, the entrance of which lies open to the light (ἀναπεπταμένην πρὸς τὸ φῶς τὴν εἴσοδον ἐχουσῇ *R.*514a). This entrance is long and spans the cave.[12] Ranged along the wall opposite this entrance are men who have been bound since childhood by the legs and neck, constrained to look forwards (τὸ πρόσθεν μόνον ὁρᾶν *R.*514b). Their fetters allow no movement (κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν). Between the light (of a fire) and the bound men, along the road, is a wall like that which the puppeteers use (παρ᾽ ἣν ἰδὲ τειχίον παρῳκοδομημένον, ὥσπερ τοῖς θαυματοποιοῖς). Behind it, men shuffle back and forth,[13] bearing along all sorts of contrivances (σκεύη τε παντοδαπὰ *R.*515a) that carry the likenesses of men and beasts. These puppeteers

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(and occasionally directly affirm or deny) are: Nettleship (1935) 116-124; Adam (1963) *ad loc*; Bloom (1991) 402-412 & *idem* (1977); Sedley (2007); Strauss (1964) 50-138, Murphy (1951) Ch.8. Other commentators to whom I have paid some attention include Hall (1977) & *idem* (1980); Scolnicov (1988) 83-111; Planinc (1991) 31-51; Raven (1953); Heidegger (2004), Weiss (2012).

[11] This statement is made in the course of Socrates's and Glaucon's jesting interchange: Ἐρωτᾷς, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐρώτημα δεόμενον ἀποκρίσεως δι᾽εἰκόνος λεγομένης. Σὺ δέ γε, ἔφη, οἶμαι, οὐκ εἴωθας δι᾽εἰκόνων λέγειν. ("'You ask,' I said, 'for an answer requiring a response through an image [εἰκών].' 'But you,' he said, 'as I think, are not accustomed to reply through images.'")

[12] See Adam (1963) *ad loc* on παρ᾽ἄπαν τὸ σπήλαιον.

[13] The puppeteers are the τῶν παριόντων ("the ones going along beside") of *R.*515b.

utter sounds or remain silent in accordance with the figures they bear. By the light of the fire, shadows fall on the wall in front of the bound men, not only of the contrivances borne along behind the wall, but also of themselves and others. These shadows are all they see, for they cannot turn to look at themselves or others.

This scene—ἄτοπος (ridiculous), thinks Glaucon!—is to describe man's uneducated state. Let us dwell on it for a moment to work out its full implications, both those Socrates mentions and those he does not. Most obviously, the uneducated man is immobile: he cannot move, even should he wish it, for he is bound by fetters (οἱ δέσμοι). He is, therefore, essentially unfree—a δεσμώτης (>δέσμος, bond), as Glaucon calls him. This loss of freedom is complete. He cannot leave the cave, cannot even uncramp his neck or look upon his own undistorted visage. His world is reduced to the shadows projected before him by the endless march of the puppeteers. What is most deplorable, however, is that this diminution of existence goes unnoticed by the prisoner: Παντάπασι δή, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, οἱ τοιοῦτοι οὐκ ἄν ἄλλο τι νομίζοιεν τὸ ἀληθές ἤ τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς ("'In every respect, then,' I said, 'those sorts of men [i.e., οἱ δεσμῶται] would think the true to be nothing other than the shadows of the contrivances [τὰς τῶν σκευαστῶν σκιάς].'"[14] *R*.515c). The shadows are not recognized for what they are by the prisoner, for he has nothing with which to compare them. Thus the colorless march of shadows does not merely fool its spectators into believing that they are seeing the true world, but also entraps them further through this very deception: ignorance of the *really* true habituates the prisoner to his shadow-world and hardens him against other ways of seeing.

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[14] My translation reflects that the "contrivances" here, τὰ σκευαστά, are to be identified with the τὰ σκεύη of *R*.514b, though the τὰ σκευαστά could as well be rendered "artificial things." Adam (1963) 91n is surely right in emphasizing the opposition of τὰ σκευαστά with τὰ φυτευτά. Cf. Bloom (1991) 403-4, and n23-25 below. Strauss (1964) seems to be in favor of calling τὰ σκευαστά "artifacts" (125 & *passim*).

Why portray lack of education as a loss of freedom? What does it mean that the uneducated man is a "prisoner"? It does not suffice for us to suggest vaguely that he is "debarred" from complex or nuanced thoughts, or that he has limited factual knowledge, as his condition alone does not imply either of these: the variety afforded him in the way of the marching shadow-shapes will give him plenty to consider, and there is no reason that he could not thereby accrue some measure of "learning" concerning them. He might even be inclined to shift about these shapes or invent new ones in thought, which he could whisper to the prisoners lined up along with him. Thus, lack of education (ἀπαιδευσία) cannot consist merely in a dearth of facts, untrained mental powers, or creative failure. It must reside, rather, in the prisoner's restricted field of perception, or put another way, the inability to perceive anything other than the shadows before him. He is a prisoner because his *source* or *purview* of "knowledge" is limited to the shadow play on the wall; try as he might, no mental gymnastics will allow him to conceive of anything beyond the shadows, or transmute them into beings of substance. ἀπαιδευσία, we might say provisionally, is an attention trained upon shadows. This definition does not, however, really escape the terms of the allegory. To do that, we must identify what the shadows represent in the continuum of moral and theoretical knowledge. This investigation into the nature of the shadows constitutes a necessary digression, as only when we understand their epistemological status can we see the crucial movement in Socratic education.

The general significance of the shadows (as insubstantial beings) is easily grasped, and we may already be suspicious of them knowing they derive from the contrivances (σκεύη) of the puppeteers; if we are to strengthen these grounds for suspicion into a positive characterization of the shadows, however, we must begin by turning to the φῶς πυρός (firelight) of the cave, their source of existence. Socrates says that we must liken the light of the cave's fire "to the power of

the sun" (τῇ τοῦ ἡλίου δυνάμει *R*.517b). This identification with the sun renders the fire more significant than it might first appear—and complicates the matter. As we will remember from Book VI, the sun is the first of three analogies that culminate in the parable of the cave and is laden with great importance. There, we were told that the sun is an analogue of the Good (τἀγαθόν[15]): as the sun provides light that illumines the realm of seen objects (ὁρατά), so does the Good illumine the realm of things grasped through intellect (what must be νοητά).[16] More significant than this provision of sight, however, are the generative roles of the sun and the Good: all growth in nature is reliant upon the sun, and all existence of knowledge (strictly understood) is reliant upon the Good.[17] The role of the life-giving sun is mirrored by the fire's light in the cave, the fire being that which creates the shadows of the contrivances. It is not a stretch to say that the same relationship governing proximity to the Good governs proximity to the sun: closer is better (forgetting modern science for a moment in the case of the sun). It does not bode well for the prisoners, then, that the shadows constitute a separation from the source of the light, as this distance is consequently to be understood as distance from the principle of perception and growth, the sun.

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[15] "The good" shows up in a variety of contexts: τὸ ἀγαθόν/τἀγαθόν (the good), τὸ ἀγαθόν αὐτό (the good itself), ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα (the idea of the good), and as an εἶδος (Form). There is no little dispute over the exact character of the "the good" and its significance as Idea, Form, etc. As the fine points of this dispute do not bear on our investigation, we will pass over the debate and assume that they are different ways of referring to the same transcendent being, simply "the Good," except where Socrates means to exaggerate a specific contrast.

[16] The full passage for this division is: Τοῦτον τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, φάναι με λέγειν τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τἀγαθὸν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὅ τί περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρός τε νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρός τε ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα ("'Well then,' I said, 'say then that I mean that it [i.e., the sun] is the offspring of the Good, which the Good has borne as an analogue to itself—[the Good] being in the same way related to knowing and knowledge in the νοητόν as [the sun] is to sight and things seen in the ὁρατόν" *R*.508b). Cf. n20 below.

[17] It will be noted that nature is described in terms of Becoming (τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, "generation, growth, and nourishment" *R*.509b) and the realm of knowledge in terms of Being (τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, "being and substance" *R*.509b).

Despite this ominous hint, we have not yet achieved an adequate account of the shadows. Where now do we look? Socrates tells us that if we are to grasp the full significance of the cave, we must connect its image with the preceding discussion (προσαπτέον ἅπασαν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν λεγομένοις *R*.517b). By this, he means the analogies of the sun and the divided line. We have already examined in brief its relationship with the sun, so let us then consider the divided line, where we may endeavor to sketch the shadows more fully.[18] The following paragraph will provide an abbreviated sketch of the divided line, after which we will apply it to the cave.[19]

The divided line contains two overarching divisions: ὁρατά/δοξαστά (*seen/opined* things) and νοητά (*known* things).[20] If vertically oriented, ὁρατά/δοξαστά will constitute the

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[18] The relationship in which the divided line stands to the cave is not certain. E.g., Murphy (1951) says: "It is sometimes debated whether or in what way the two similes 'correspond,' and some deny correspondence . . . [I rather think] 'correspondence' is too weak a term. It is a case rather of absorption and unity. They are in effect one simile . . ." (155). Murphy, relying upon this position, states: "The 'Line' states in abstract or hypothetical, but literal, terms the mental conditions and their objects that we are going to find over again in the 'Cave'" (155). Undoubtedly the images stand in a strong, organic relationship (as Murphy above, Raven [1953] 22, and many others); I am less certain than Murphy and other commentators, however, as to the exact nature of that relationship. I could not agree without some reservation to his latter claim above. See Planinc (1991) 32-35 for some history (and criticism) of prevailing interpretations of the divided line.

[19] For detailed discussion of the line (and other facets of the tripartite simile we pass over rapidly), see section IV.H. *Sun, line and cave* in Ferrari's (2007) bibliography.

[20] The source for this division is: Νόησον τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δύω αὐτὼ εἶναι, καὶ βασιλεύειν τὸ μὲν **νοητοῦ** γένους τε καὶ τόπου, τὸ δ᾽αὖ **ὁρατοῦ** . . . ("'Consider then,' I said, 'that those two things exist as we said [i.e., the Good and the sun], and that the one rules over the class and realm of the **knowledgeable**, and the other over the **visible** . . .'" *R*.509d, emphasis my own). We are authorized to join the δοξαστά with the ὁρατά from the following passage: ῾Η καὶ ἐθέλοις ἄν αὐτὸ φάναι, ἦν δ᾽ἐγὼ, διῃρῆσθαι ἀληθείᾳ τε καὶ μή, ὡς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστόν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωθὲν πρὸς τὸ ᾧ ὡμοιώθη; ("'And would you be willing to say,' I said, 'speaking with respect to what is true and not, that **as opinion** [τὸ δοξαστὸν] **is to knowledge** [τὸ γνωστόν], so what seems is to what it seems like?'" *R*.510a). Unless otherwise stated, ὁρατά (plural) always refers to the visual objects themselves collectively, while ὁρατόν (singular) always refers to that half of the divided line. Similarly for νοητά/νοητόν. It will be remembered that the ὁρατόν also contains δοξαστά, even if they are

lower half of the line. The ὁρατόν can be divided into two further sections. The lower of these subdivisions (thus the lowest of all divisions) contains mere images, that is to say, reproductions of things that possess physical existence: shadows and reflections (e.g., τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι φαντάσματα *R.*510a). The upper subdivision contains the physical things themselves from which those images spring: τά τε περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῷα καὶ πᾶν τὸ φυτευτὸν καὶ τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος ("life around us, every natural thing [τὸ φυτευτὸν], and the whole class of the artificial/contrived [τὰ σκευαστά]" *R.*510a). The νοητόν, the upper half of the divided line, is also split into two portions. For our purposes, it is not necessary that we untangle this complex half completely here. Let us only say that the lower of its two sections contains hypothetical knowledge (mathematics and sciences, for example), and the upper the ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος (*R.*510b). It can hardly be doubted that the ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος here—which perhaps might be translated as the "unconditional first principle"—is to be identified with the highest of the Forms (εἴδη), the Good. Other Forms surely occupy this highest quarter, but they do so in deference to the Good, upon which, as observed in discussion of the sun, all νοητά exist. The uppermost quarter is the home to the truest and most real; what inhabits that realm depends upon nothing (i.e., is ἀνυπόθετος) and is the wellspring of existence (ἀρχή).

Let us now consider the divided line with reference to the cave. In the divided line, shadows make an appearance in the lowest of the four divisions; speaking epistemologically, they correspond there to the furthest possible mode of cognition from true knowledge,[21] εἰκασία ("imagination"). The shadows in the cave are undoubtedly to be understood with an eye to the

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not explicitly mentioned (for the sake of brevity). I favor this terminology after Adam's usage. Also cf. Adam (1963 vol. 2) *ad loc* & 157-8 on the significance of δοξαστόν.

[21] If we acknowledge (uncontroversially, as I think) that the truest inhabits the uppermost quarter. We might say "most real," too, but it would be in a loose sense. Cf. Murphy (1951) 153-55 & Ch. 9.

status of those in the divided line.[22] Before offering an interpretation of the shadows based on the divided line, however, we must note that an important distinction not acknowledged in the divided line is present in the cave, namely, that between φυτευτά (natural things) and σκευαστά (contrived/artificial things). In the divided line Socrates includes τὸ σκευαστὸν ὅλον γένος ("the whole class of artificial things") along with ζῷα and φυτευτά in the upper portion of the ὁρατόν. The shadows in the cave, deriving from the puppeteers' contrivances, are σκευαστά; if we latch onto the divided line entirely in our interpretation, we will miss the obvious importance of their contrived nature. We are surely to understand that the σκευαστά of the cave are not of the same status as the φυτευτά, whatever the divided line suggests.[23] The contrivances are, after all, designed to ape cleverly real things but are not the things themselves, as the puppet metaphor shows. The commonest reasoning directs us towards this conclusion: a duck's shadow is one remove from a duck, while a shadow of a pasteboard image of a duck is two removes.[24]

Despite this difference, the divided line's epistemological structure can help us offer the following interpretation: the cave's shadows, when related to those of the divided line and their firm position in the ὁρατόν, the visible as opposed to knowledgeable realm (νοητόν), must represent a mode of thought wholly concerned with the visible world (i.e., the world of decay and becoming). The attention of the prisoner, trained on the shadows, is entirely absorbed in a

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[22] When Socrates, at *R.*517b, tells Glaucon that he must liken τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω τὴν εἰς τὸν νοητὸν τόπον ("the way up and the sight of the things above to the νοητόν"), we must understand that he wishes to liken the cave to the ὁρατὸν τόπον by force of analogy.

[23] Sedley (2007): "The shadows' ontological superiority [i.e., those outside of the cave] to the statues [σκεύη] is conveyed … also by the fact that they are depicted as natural rather than merely artificial images" (266).

[24] The import of their contrived state will depend upon how one interprets the men carrying them. See n25 below.

world that is insubstantial and fleeting, at least when held in comparison to the eternal and unchanging Good. This account accords with our suggestion earlier that the uneducated man is a prisoner first and foremost because his purview of knowledge is restricted; it is now clear that this restricted purview amounts to an inability to turn one's gaze away from the transience of the surrounding world to focus upon more constant truths—at the very least, mathematical knowledge, if not the Forms themselves achieved through dialectic. The uneducated man's powers of deduction and general mental acuity may be quite admirable, but he does not break into the realm of understanding (διάνοια) and knowledge (νοῆσις), that is, the νοητόν; any "reasoning" can only be imperfect, then, and flawed from the outset.[25] This question on the epistemological status of the shadows should not be dismissed, for it is of central import to the Socratic idea of education: in their gloom does the prisoner begin the journey "out" of ἀπαιδευσία.

Before we change tack to discuss what παιδεία would look like, it would be worthwhile to point out a few elements of the cave on which the divided line cannot shed much light. The inability of the divided line to explain all of the cave's features is significant; it is, I think, a primary clue to the differing import of the similes. First, who are those carrying the contrivances, the ones we have called the "puppeteers"? Socrates calls them in the allegory ἄνθρωποι (men). It is difficult to find a sure counterpart to them outside of the parable: Are they political leaders?

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[25] "Flawed" in that they are epistemologically inferior. Murphy (1951) points out rightly: "Looking at visual images cannot produce more than εἰκασία but may produce worse, since εἰκασία is not necessarily error . . . In itself εἰκασία is a state of ignorance rather than error . . ." (164). This must be similarly true in the case of τὰ αὐτά and their accompanying πίστις (trust). Bloom (1991) puts it rather more strongly, saying that the εἰκασία is "the level of distorted and unclear images, and the faculty related to them [i.e., εἰκασία] is completely unreliable" (403). He describes τὰ αὐτά in better terms, as the "beginning point of knowledge" (403). His interpretation damns even more harshly the prisoners in the cave, who, vis-à-vis the shadows, are confined to εἰκασία.

Sophists? Δαίμονες?[26] They would be men of some sway, as they have a measure of control over the shadows playing across the wall; they are without doubt not philosophers, however, as their gaze is turned away from the light.[27] They are not likely δαίμονες, then, either. If we take them to be politicians, sophists, and poets, the most convincing possibilities, then we must affirm again that the cave has an educational and political significance that the divided line does not. All of these groups of individuals have some control over the education that those in the πόλις receive, a fact which their "power" to move the contrivances in the cave mirrors. Whoever these figures are, we must ultimately believe that the ignorance of the prisoners, the uneducated, is trebled by the fact the shadows they look upon derive for the most part not from real things, but from the contrivances the figures behind the wall carry.[28]

Another observation worth noting about the men in the cave arises from the fact that they are bound by fetters. The fetters suggest not only that they are unfree, but also that they *cannot free themselves*. They are immobile, and it would take an escape artist (or Socrates?) for one to get free of the restraints on one's own. Who then will unbind them? The teacher, speaking

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[26] Bloom (1991) thinks they are "[l]egislators and poets." (404). Under this interpretation, the contrivances [σκευή] carry the force of δόξα: they are "adapted to serve the special interests of the artists. In other words, we do not see things directly, but through the opinions we are taught about them. Those opinions are not accurate reflections of nature [e.g., τὰ φυτευτά] but are adapted to serve the needs of the city" (404). This view seems right to my mind, *pace* Hall (1980) 81-2, who says "they cannot be politicians." Cf. Adam (1963) *ad loc* for a few other interpretations (e.g., Shorey on sophists, Campbell on δαίμονες), of which he prefers Shorey. Sedley (2007) agrees with Campbell that they might be gods or δαίμονες, and adds the possibility of their being "the established laws of the city, which from *Crito* to *Laws* Plato tended to credit with at least semi-authoritative status" (264n). We may also add that they might be related to the malicious intellects of 518d-519a.

[27] τῶν παραφερομένων οὐ ταὐτὸν τοῦτο; *R*.514b ("Is it not the same for those carrying along [the contrivances]?")

[28] Although it will be conceded that in some cases the shadows will be cast by φυτευτά, in the form of the men carrying the contrivances and in the shadows the prisoners themselves cast. Cf. Weiss (2012) 55n19.

educationally: the one ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν[29] ("trying to loose them and lead them up" 517a). We are to understand from this fact, I believe, that true education is seldom, if ever, a solitary process—only the really exceptional individual frees himself for the ascent.[30] On the contrary, education is to be taken as a fundamentally political (i.e., collaborative) process in that it requires the aid of another.[31] And a last note before proceeding: we have emphasized the *distance* between the shadows and the fire (sun), but we would do well to remember that the shadows, as directly dependent upon the fire, are also in a certain positive relationship with it.

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[29] This person is to be identified with the one forcing the prisoners up the road to the light (see quote from 515e in following paragraph). Less flatteringly, he is also the horsefly (μύωψ) in *Apology* 30e (Burnet's [1900] text), "rousing, persuading, and rebuking" (ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων) all of his fellow citizens. Cf. Weiss (2012) 57n20.

[30] One, like Socrates, who benefits from an admonitory δαιμόνιον σημεῖον (daimonic sign R.496c). Or, as Weiss (2012) 57n20, a "divine inspiration" (θείας ἐπιπνοίας). Perhaps also someone whose intellect is "awakened by puzzling features," (Weiss 57), as the examples Plato gives at *R*.523a-524d. Cf. Sedley (2007) 265, too.

[31] Weiss (2012), drawing a distinction between "philosophers by nature" and "philosophers by design" in the *Republic*, believes that only the latter will undergo the sort of philosophic education represented in the cave, because the philosophers by nature are "explicitly not 'like us'" (Weiss 58 and *passim*, citing *R*.474d, *R*.499e-500a), (us) to whom the cave image is likened (cf. *R*.514a). The "natural philosopher" (this term relies on Weiss's analysis in ch.1) will already "thirst for truth and wisdom, for a transcendent reality purer and more ennobling than the one he is born into" and will develop of his own accord (58). He will, in short, not require the compulsory education of the teacher dragging him from the cave to the light (cf. 59). The point is well taken, and could apply to the case of that exceptional individual freeing himself (see n30 above). I think that Weiss is ultimately wrong, however, in arguing that "[n]o one must compel [the philosopher by nature] to stand up, to turn his neck around, to walk and look up toward the light" (59). Learning from Strauss (1964) that "the city can be identified with the Cave" (125 with n47), we come to understand that initial entrapment in the cave and orientation away from the light is an ineluctable result of our being born into πόλεις (on which also cf. Hall 1980, 80-81). No one is free from it, even those naturally philosophic natures—hence the need for education and the teacher. Weiss's error stems from too great a stress on the "explicit" difference between natural philosophers and philosophers by design when it comes to the cave, for which I do not see sufficient evidence.

This fact indicates that we ought not think of education as something wholly present or absent, as something that would have to be "put in" from the outside.[32] More on this in what follows.

Having considered the uneducated state (ἀπαιδευσία) of man, we may now turn to the educated state. The uneducated man remains within the cave, his eyes trained on the shadows; the educated man will, presumably, be found without, gazing upon the sun. But how does he leave? In this movement we will find education.

Our first look at the ascent from the cave shows us an image of compulsion and discomfort. After the prisoner is loosed, he must be compelled (ἀναγκάζοιτο *R*.515c) to stand up, turn his head round, and go up the path towards the light and look at it.[33] This first glance brings pain and blindness (*R*.515c). The sights that greet him upon the surface, bathed in light as they are and so dissimilar to the soft gloom of the shadows, seem cruel and painful illusions.[34] He tries to flee back into the cool darkness of the cave. If he should be bodily dragged back to the surface (ἕλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως *R*.515e), however, his education may continue. The next step is habituation to the light. At first, his vision will be so spotty as for him to be unable to see one true thing (αὐγῆς ἄν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὁρᾶν οὐδ᾽ἄν ἕν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν *R*.516a). Συνηθείας, Socrates says, δέοιτ᾽ἄν ("He would need accustoming." *R*.516a). Only then will he be able to see the things of the upper realm

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[32] As we will see below, Socrates vehemently disagrees with this perspective; but already cf. his articulation of it at *R*.518bc: φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι. ("They say somehow that they put in [ἐντιθέναι] knowledge that is not in [ἐνούσης] the soul.")

[33] Barney (2008) is relevant in the matter of compulsion, esp. 7ff. Barney also introduces the possibility of *eros* functioning in the ascent from the cave. (E.g., 14: "the fact that the Cave passage speaks of epistemic ascent as caused by compulsion does not exclude its motivation by erotic desire.") So too is Wagner (2005).

[34] οὐκ οἴει αὐτὸν ἀπορεῖν τε ἄν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι τὰ τότε ὁρώμενα ἀληθέστερα ἢ τὰ νῦν δεικνύμενα; (*R*.515d) ("Don't you think that he would be at a loss and think that those things seen earlier [i.e., in the cave] to be truer than those which are now [i.e., on the surface] shown?")

(τὰ ἄνω ὄψεσθαι *R*.516a). This accustoming (συνήθεια) is a slow process: his gaze is only slowly drawn upwards from shadows of things, to reflections (e.g., ἐν τοῖς ὕδασι "in water") and other insubstantial forms (εἴδωλα), later to the things reflected themselves (ὕστερον δὲ αὐτά). From things he turns to lights, dim ones at first (e.g., τὸ τῶν ἄστρων τε καὶ σελήνης φῶς "the light of stars and the moon" *R*.516b), then brighter ones (μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν τὸν ἥλιόν τε καὶ τὸ [φῶς] τοῦ ἡλίου "the sun after day and the sun's light"). Only after much practice can he see the sun itself, the goal of his long training.

As we did with ἀπαιδευσία, let us now consider the consequences of this image of παιδεία (education). One will immediately recognize its kinship with the divided line: the slow habituation to the sun's light is similar to the ascent through the divided line's gradations of perception and knowledge. (As we noted before, the parallels, though not exact, are instructive.) If we transpose the cave's ascent onto the divided line, it falls almost entirely in the ὁρατόν: the individual would begin in the lowest quarter, the insubstantial half of the ὁρατόν, looking upon σκιαί, φαντάσματα, and εἴδωλα (shadows, reflections, and phantoms). He then graduates to the things themselves (τὰ αὐτά), the second quarter of the line. His vision is next shifted to light, which governs all perception in the lower half of the line. Finally, he gazes upon the sun itself, the generative force behind light and that power nourishing all visible things. It is not clear whether light and sun are to be understood as strictly "inside" the ὁρατόν, or "outside" of it as structural principles; either way, they enjoy some superiority to the rest of the ὁρατά in the divided line. Insofar as the ὁρατόν is analogically related to the νοητόν (light = truth, sun = Good, etc.), this movement culminating in the sun is analogous to a movement culminating in knowledge of the Good: in both cases, the highest principles of existence are the objects of the educational pull.

This last claim relies on the analogical relationship of the ὁρατόν and νοητόν. There are, however, hints that the ὁρατόν blends quite seamlessly into the νοητόν *within* the allegory itself.[35] After the erstwhile prisoner has beheld the sun, Socrates curiously stipulates one necessary moment of comprehension: . . . συλλογίζοιτο περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τάς τε ὥρας παρέχων καὶ ἐνιαυτοὺς καὶ πάντα ἐπιτροπεύων τὰ ἐν τῷ ὁρωμένῳ τόπῳ καὶ ἐκείνων, ὧν σφεῖς ἑώρων, τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτιος. ("[. . . and after those things,] he would now infer [συλλογίζοιτο] about that thing [i.e., the sun], that it is that which brings forth the seasons and years, and governs all things in the visible realm, and that it is in some way the cause of all of those things which he saw." *R.*516b-c) The key concept here is συλλογίζειν, to "syllogize" or conclude from premises: συλλογίσμος, ratiocination, can be likened to a reagent which, when admixed, alchemically transmutes the ascent through ὁρατά into an ascent through νοητά. Insomuch as the Good is an ideal analogue of the visible sun, successful συλλογίσμος about the sun—when συλλογίσμος is understood loosely as a process of rational abstraction akin to dialectic[36]—yields the formal concept of τἀγαθόν (the Good) as that which is the counterpart to the sun, albeit in considerably more rarefied airs, so to speak. Acquisition of τἀγαθόν in turn substantiates the previous steps in the education, by virtue of its status as the ἀρχὴ ἀνυπόθετος in which knowledge participates. Socrates's comment on συλλογίσμος suggests that education requires this moment of reflective unification, wherein the discrete steps leading to sight of the sun reveal their inner coherence.[37]

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[35] This blending—indicating that gradations of knowledge in the cave are not so sharply drawn as in the divided line—seems to support a notion of organic "absorption and unity" like that Murphy (1951) speaks of (155).

[36] Perhaps a form of dialectic occurring in the ὁρατόν. Cf. *R.*517c & *R.*537b-d.

[37] Although we our primarily concerned with education as it is presented in the *Republic,* a particularly fruitful reference that seems to portray this same ascent, and, importantly, the same smooth transition from the ὁρατόν into the νοήτον can be found in the *Symposium*:

The *Republic* does, of course, contain its own interpretation of the cave's symbols. Socrates identifies training in mathematics and science as key steps in the path of "dialectic," that art which trains the mind upon the eternal.[38] Arithmetic and number theory (λογιστική τε καὶ ἀριθμητική *R*.525a), geometry (*R*.526e), and astronomy (*R*.527d), in that order, play a crucial role in training the mind to the perception of ever finer and finer truths, and are to be related to the cave's movement. These disciplines lead up the soul and direct it towards the Good: πᾶσα αὕτη ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν, ἃς διήλθομεν, ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν, ὥσπερ τότε τοῦ σαφεστάτου ἐν σώματι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φανοτάτου ἐν τῷ σωματοειδεῖ τε καὶ ὁρατῷ τόπῳ. ("that entire activity of the arts (those we just went through) holds that power to lead the best part [τοῦ βελτίστου] of the soul up to the perception of what is best [τοῦ βελτίστου] in what *is* [τοῖς οὖσι], just as earlier what was clearest in the body was led up to the sight of the brightest

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> [Socrates is enumerating the steps in Diotima's ascent to the beautiful:] . . . ὥσπερ ἐπαναβασμοῖς χρώμενον, ἀπὸ [1] ἑνὸς ἐπὶ [2] δύο καὶ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἐπὶ [3] πάντα τὰ καλὰ σώματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων ἐπὶ [4] τὰ καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἐπὶ [5] τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐπ᾽ ἐκεῖνο [6] τὸ μάθημα τελευτῆσαι, ὅ ἐστιν οὐκ ἄλλου ἢ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα, καὶ γνῷ αὐτὸ τελευτῶν [7] ὃ ἔστι καλόν. (Pl.*S*.211c, adding numbers to indicate steps)
>
> [. . . as though making use of steps, from [1] one [beautiful body] to two and [2] from two to [3] all beautiful bodies, and from beautiful bodies to [4] beautiful sciences, and from beautiful sciences to [5] beautiful knowledge, and achieving that [6] knowledge itself, which is a knowledge of nothing other than the beautiful itself, and finally [7] know[ing] that which the beautiful is.]

The movement here will be instantly recognized by those acquainted with the εἰκών of the cave. Diotima's ascent is quite similar to the cave's in that both consist primarily in successively complex orientational movement. We might even go so far as to say that Diotima's education of Socrates in τὸ καλόν is a specific application of the cave's general educational principle (which principal is to be discussed below).

[38] Τί οὖν; οὐ διαλεκτικὴν ταύτην τὴν πορείαν καλεῖς; (*R*.532b) "What then? Do you not call that the journey of dialectic?"

thing in the realm of corporeal and visible things." *R*.532c). This passage explicitly identifies the cave's movement through the ὁρατόν with an intellectual movement through the νοητόν. The "best thing" (τοῦ βελτίστου) among "those that *are*" (τοῖς οὖσι) to which the educated individual's soul is led must be understood as Good. The journey of dialectic (πορεία διαλεκτική) comprises the mathematical and scientific training that leads the mind upwards (ἐπαναγωγή) towards the acquisition of ever more ethereal truth.[39] In movement, it is quite similar to the journey from the cave that consists in the study of ever-loftier objects. In both cases, the final scene is one of contemplation of the heavens. Let us note that even when Socrates has stepped "outside" of the image of the cave (τότε, *R*.532c above) in order to refer to it the principles of dialectical abstraction, he retains its language of *movement* and *direction*; dialectic, though a more technical iteration of the sort of education and συλλογίσμος we discussed in the cave, is yet still a primarily *orientational* endeavor.

Seizing upon this term, we may now restate more fully a claim that was only provisional earlier, namely, that education (παιδεία) is, as revealed in the cave and in dialectical training, fundamentally a process of *orientation* (περιαγωγή "turning around" *R*.521c).[40] This fact is

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[39] So far, we have discussed the ascent from the cave as primarily one to theoretical knowledge, but "[i]t would be a great mistake to regard the darkness of the cave as a mere darkness of intellectual ignorance, or the escape from it as a mere intellectual enlightenment. In the mind of Plato, reason is never for long dissociated from emotion, or knowledge from purpose . . ." (Nettleship 1935). Such a mistake would not even be possible if it turns out that higher mathematical knowledge and ethical knowledge are inseparable: Sedley (2007) sums up this position, saying, "in Platonic ethics mathematical thinking is not just a propaedeutic training for philosophical dialectic about values, but stands at the very heart of the discipline's methodology" (271). Burnyeat (2000) and Ferrari (2000) for more on mathematics in education (as Sedley indicates). Needless to say, this emphasis goes hand-in-hand with a focus on the good *qua* mathematical entity.

[40] Wild (1948) says that in the interpretation of the cave "we must never lapse into the language of sight and perception," because "[*s*]*eeing* . . . is always to be interpreted as *knowing* . . ." in the cave (189). To those who would criticize the term "orientation" in this vein I would respond, first, that Socrates's choice of a metaphor of sight is not without significance, and to cleave

made abundantly clear by the cave image's slow movement of συνήθεια (habituation), which is essentially a methodical way of proceeding through various orientational changes that are increasingly dazzling and difficult, the end goal being στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους ("to turn towards the light from the dark" *R*.518c). Want of education (ἀπαιδευσία) in the cave, too, can be interpreted as a matter of orientation: the prisoner, we will recall, is at first directed towards the wall; he must turn (περιάγειν) towards the entrance and ascend before his educational training in συνηθεία may occur. This interpretation also explains Socrates's ridicule of those purporting to "put" knowledge (ἐπιστήμη, sometimes νοῆσις) into another's soul through education. This would be akin, he says, to putting sight into blind eyes (οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες *R*.518c). The point is that education does not imbue one with a quality one does not possess—which would be impossible—but rather redirects the use of an extant faculty (in the case of education, the soul [ἡ ψυχή]) towards the Good. To return to Socrates's ophthalmological metaphor, we might say that παιδεία is not a matter of giving sight to the blind, but rather of *bringing the soul's gaze to the right thing*: [ἡ παιδεία] τούτου τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, αὐτοῦ τέχνη ἄν εἴη τῆς περιαγωγῆς, τίνα τρόπον ὡς ῥᾷστά τε καὶ ἀνυσιμώτατα μεταστραφήσεται, οὐ τοῦ εμποιῆσαι αὐτῷ τὸ ὁρᾶν, ἀλλ᾽ὡς ἔχοντι μὲν αὐτό, οὐκ ορθῶς δὲ τετραμμένῳ οὐδὲ βλέποντι οἷ ἔδει, τοῦτο διαμηχανήσασθαι ("'[Education], then,' I said, 'would be the art of turning about that part [of the soul], in what way it will be turned about as easily and efficaciously as possible, not [the art] of putting sight into it, but, as for one already possessing it but not oriented [τετραμμένῳ] rightly nor looking at what he must, to bring about that thing, [namely that he be oriented correctly and look at what he must.]'" *R*.518d). We ought not constrain all of Socrates's educational theory within this schema of orientational movement,

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wholly the "language of sight and perception" from an interpretation is to impoverish it; second, that "orientation" is not primarily a metaphor of sight and perception.

but it does provide a good rough idea of what education is in the *Republic*: ascent and orientation towards absolute knowledge in the form of the Good.[41] The abbreviated sketch of education we have just concluded will suffice for our purpose of investigating its relationship with politics.

Before we move into an analysis of Socrates's statements on political participation, however, it would be prudent to point out one important *comparandum* in the *Republic* to the εἰκών of the cave: musical training.[42] Socrates, in his exceedingly complex and subtle discussion of musical rhythm and harmony, says: Εὐλογία ἄρα καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὐσχημοσύνη καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐηθείᾳ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἥν ἄνοιαν οὖσαν ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐήθειαν, ἀλλά τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος κατεσκευασμένην διάνοιαν ("So good speech, good harmony, good grace, and good rhythm follow upon good character [εὐηθείᾳ]—and by that term I don't mean that silliness [ἄνοιαν] we sometimes lightly call "good character" [εὐήθειαν], but rather an understanding [διάνοιαν] that furnishes a truly good and beautiful character [τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς τὸ ἦθος]." *R.*400d-e[43]). By this statement, Socrates calls attention to a strong relationship between good and beautiful things *heard* (music being the subject here[44]) and good and beautiful *knowledge*. This symmetry between the *perceived* and *known* beautiful and good allows him to later claim that one cannot be μουσικός (musical) before he can recognize the Forms of virtues (e.g., σωφροσύνη) in all

[41] Again, Socrates on education, *R.*521c: [Education is] . . . ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν . . . ("a turning of the soul from some night-like day to the true day").
[42] To be sure, it is only one of many more that could be suggested but which we must here omit for the sake of brevity.
[43] I have followed Bloom (1991) in the translation of the musical terms, which I do not think can be improved upon for capturing the importance of the repeated εὖ (which thematically appears uncompounded in the Greek at the end of the quote).
[44] This relationship applies to *all* craftsmen, however, not just poets, as *R.*402b (τοῖς ἄλλοις δημιουργοῖς, "the other craftsmen") shows.

things.[45] Socrates has taken musicality, initially only "good taste" in the realm of perceived things (ὁρατά), and extended its purview to include knowledge as well. The symmetry between perceived (ὁρατόν) and known (νοητόν) goodness and beauty means that an individual can be morally and theoretically educated *through* music. Good harmony, good rhythm and the like "tune" the soul, thereby educating it. The metaphorical significations are very different here from those of the cave, but the important point of contact is in the process of shaping the soul. The metaphor of music, as that of sight, reinforces our conclusion that education does not "put" anything into the soul. "Tuning," a metaphor from music, is analogous to "orienting," a rich optic and navigational metaphor. Both imply a *reshaping* or *redirection* of an already present content. When one understands that tuning and orienting are two ways of speaking about education, we can find another instance of essentially educational movement in Socrates's claim that there is a necessity to "harmonize" (ξυναρμόσαντα *R.*443d) the divisions of the tripartite soul. The tripartite soul is a rich subject of discussion for those interested in education, but also an immense one; extended treatment of it here is not practical. We will forego its further exploration and only impress upon the reader the importance of the tuning metaphor, a metaphor that in turn can be related analogically to the orientational movement discussed at length above.

[45] The full passage is: οὕτως οὐδε μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα . . . πρὶν ἄν τὰ τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν . . . ("'So we won't be musical [μουσικοὶ] . . . before we can recognize and perceive in things the Forms of temperance, virtue, liberality, and greatness everywhere, and whatever is akin to those things, and moreover what is opposite, both those things themselves [i.e., the Forms], and their images . . ." *R.*402c).

Ch.2. Politics in Plato's *Republic*

So much for our portrait of Socratic education. Let us now turn to those of Socrates's comments on politics relevant to our inquiry, that we may understand why the educated individual is so loath to go to service of the city. If it were possible, even more has been written on the various topics included under the heading "politics" in the *Republic* than that of education. Of a particularly contentious nature have been debates around Plato's variously political or moral ambitions, the status of Callipolis (i.e., whether it be an "ideal" or "real" city), and the role of the philosophers in governance. I am under no illusions about the difficulties in attempting to knit together an account satisfying these questions; my intention in discussing the *Republic*'s politics is first and foremost to throw light on education, and I will probably be under more pains not to offend the reader with a gross simplification of the text's intricacies than to set forth any convincing answers concerning these issues. We will subdivide the following investigation of Socrates's political comments into three parts: why the truly educated individual—that is to say, the individual educated according to our "curriculum" of ascent and orientation—is the best statesman ("city-man") in the truest signification of the word; why, though he is the best statesman, he is not willing to approach the city; and why a compulsion (ἀνάγκη[46]) must be applied in order to overcome this reluctance.

[46] I render ἀνάγκη either "compulsion" or "necessity," depending upon context. "Compulsion" is to be the typical translation, especially where an agent is understood or there is an explicit contrast with suasion (πειθώ, e.g., *R.*519e). "Necessity" will be used where context (as I believe) suggests a more general notion of necessitation, and where the word is obviously not used in a technical manner.

It is no secret that Socrates believes that the best ruler is the φύλαξ (guardian) we have been educating, who is a philosopher by virtue of his dialectical training.[47] He pronounces this claim somewhat timorously at first,[48] but later grows emboldened and never relinquishes it: Ἐὰν μὴ . . . ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύωσιν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι γνησίως τε καὶ ἱκανῶς . . . οὐδὲ αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία μή ποτε πρότερον φυῇ τε εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ φῶς ἡλίου ἴδῃ ("Unless either the philosophers rule in the cities, or those who are now called rulers and dynasts practice philosophy genuinely and adequately . . . that very constitution [i.e., that of the just city] would at no point sooner grow into something possible and see the light of the sun." *R.*473c-d). Why should this be the case?[49] What is it about "Socratic education" that enables one to oversee the city wisely?

The simplest answer is that knowledge of the Good is essential for the right ordering of the πόλις, and it is only the educated person, the philosopher, who enjoys such knowledge.[50] We are told that the philosopher makes use of the Good as a "paradigm" for ordering the city (παραδείγματι χρωμένους ἐκείνῳ *R.*540a), shaping its institutions and citizenry after this best of Forms (καὶ πόλιν καὶ ἰδιώτας καὶ ἑαυτοὺς κοσμεῖν *R.*540ab). On account of his acquaintance with the Good, the philosopher has a better knowledge of beauty, justice, and

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[47] See n6 above, and esp. cf. *R.*502b, reproduced again here: νῦν δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τετολμήσθω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι ("Let us dare to say that, that philosophers must be understood as the most precise guardians").

[48] εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλωτί τε ἀτεχνῶς ὥσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν καὶ ἀδοξίᾳ κατακλύσειν. (*R.*473c) ("Even if it will practically swamp me with laughter and scorn, just as a wave of guffaws.")

[49] It is not evident: χαλὲπον γὰρ ἰδεῖν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄν ἄλλῃ τις εὐδαιμονήσειεν οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε δημοσίᾳ. (*R.*473c) ("For it is not easy to see, that in no other way would anybody prosper either in private or public life.") Brown (2000) n4 on the reading of this passage. I take ἄλλῃ adverbially, not with a supplied πόλει.

[50] On this latter point cf., e.g., *R.*480a and context (Τοὺς αὐτὸ ἄρα ἕκαστον τὸ ὄν ἀσπαζομένους φιλοσόφους ἀλλ᾽οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέον; "'Must we call call those who delight in each thing that is philosophers (lovers of wisdom), but not lovers of opinion?'") with *R.*507b and context (Καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὕτω περὶ πάντων . . . "And the beautiful itself and the good itself and so for all things . . .").

(particular) goods than those who are confined to the shadow-world of the cave, that is to say, ordinary politicians: μυρίῳ βέλτιον ὄψεσθε . . . καλῶν τε καὶ δικαίων καὶ ἀγαθῶν πέρι ("You will see a thousand times better . . . concerning the things that are beautiful and just and good." *R*.520c). Accordingly, he legislates in such a way that the city becomes a visible analogue of the Good, expressing the virtues explicitly in its disposition.[51]

Beyond the general statements above, it is difficult to ascertain exactly *how* the philosopher-king makes use of the Good in ruling; this difficulty is owed in large part to the extreme obscurity of the doctrine of Forms and the Good in the Platonic corpus. That the Good is central, however, is undisputed, and in Socrates's privileging of the philosopher in the rule of the city we must surely hear the question: Without knowledge of the Good, how could one hope to make the city "Good"? Such knowledge may lend the philosopher moral excellence, but anybody would acknowledge that ministering to a city well requires more than just being a virtuous individual. We can conclude, then, that the philosopher's knowledge of the Forms will have some practical, even technical, significance, aiding him in ordering rightly the city's peoples and structures. Perhaps the Good's knowledge of proportioning the city is mathematical in nature, in support of which idea we may attend to the infamous "nuptial number" of Book VIII, 546a-547a.[52] In any case, framing political administration as knowing imitation of a Form comes naturally to Socrates, as it is this method that he eventually ascribes to *all* craftsmen, carpenters

[51] Recall Socrates's discussion of the symmetry of physical form and virtue (*R*.401b-d). To Socrates's mind there is an easy transition from knowledge of virtue to its rendition.
[52] It cannot be that it is Callipolis, the ideal city in speech, to which the philosopher looks in his imitation, for Callipolis is neither a Form nor the Good (Bloom [1977], 316 is authoritative and Ferrari [2005] calls it, rather pointedly I should think, a "human artefact" 107). On math, see n39 above, and to be discussed further below.

and kings alike.[53] For our purposes, we will take it as granted (at least in the *Republic*) that knowledge of this Form, the Good, is essential for rule and it is the philosopher who possesses such knowledge.

But we can hardly discuss the Good in a political context any further without characterizing the political arena as Socrates conceives it, and where the philosopher stands therein. In so doing, we will also anticipate an obvious objection to Socrates's claim to the philosopher's preeminence in ruling, namely, why, if the philosopher is as extraordinarily fit to rule as Socrates asserts, he does not already rule, or at the very least have a hand in politics. As a matter of fact, Adeimantus astutely asks this of Socrates after the interlocutors have agreed that most of those said to be philosophers appear to be either useless to the city or just depraved (παμπόνηρος).[54] In sketching the political backdrop and responding to this question, let us make use of another image (εἰκών), Socrates's portrait of a ship. The "ship of state" metaphor will also bring us back round to the philosopher's use of the Good as a paradigm for administration.

Socrates asks us to imagine a ship owner (ναύκληρον *R*.488b), superior in strength and size to all the sailors on his ship but half-deaf and myopic. The sailors clamor around him, forming factions (στασιάζοντας) in their quarrel over the right to captain the ship. Each thinks he ought to rule, but none knows the first thing about the art needed (μήτε μαθόντα πώποτε τὴν τέχνην). They can adduce no credentials for the position, and indeed insist that it is a skill that cannot be taught (μηδὲ διδακτὸν εἶναι). They are ready to tear apart anyone who holds a

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[53] In Book X. Despite this similarity, however, the Good cannot be wholly likened to the "Forms" of bridles, beds, or benches: as we shall see shortly, its special sway over those gazing at it will prove problematic for the philosophers, those who would become the best statesmen under its guidance.

[54] Πῶς οὖν, ἔφη, εὖ ἔχει λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πρότερον κακῶν παύσονται αἱ πόλεις, πρὶν ἂν ἐν αὐταῖς οἱ φιλόσοφοι ἄρξωσιν, οὕς ἀχρήστους ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐταῖς εἶναι; (*R*. 487e) ("'Well then,' he said, 'how can you say that the cities won't be free from evils before the philosophers rule among them, those very men we just agreed are useless for them?'")

contrary opinion. They shamelessly (πάντα ποιοῦντας *R*.488c) curry the ship owner's favor[55] and, when they gain the helm, wax wanton at the drugged ship owner's expense. Whoever is best at persuading the ship owner to grant them rule they call "nautical" (ναυτικὸν *R*.488c), "captainly" (κυβερνητικὸν *R*.488d), and "knowledgeable of the things concerning ships" (ἐπιστάμενον τὰ κατὰ ναῦν). The true captain—he who τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι ἐνιαυτοῦ καὶ ὡρῶν καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἄστρων καὶ πνευμάτων καὶ πάντων τῶν τῇ τέχνῃ προσηκόντων ("is concerned with the time of year and the seasons and the sky and the stars and the winds and all things pertaining to that art [of steering]" *R*.488d)—is reproached as useless and called an idle stargazer (μετεωροσκόπον, which in a certain way he actually is), for he does not implore the ship owner and is entirely absorbed in the concerns of his art.

We are to liken the ship owner to the citizenry, the ship to the state, the sailors to the present political leaders, and the maligned ἀλήθινος κυβερνήτης (true helmsman[56]) to the philosopher. For our purposes, this image is important for several reasons. It shows, to Socrates's mind, the normal state of affairs in a democracy: amidst the chaos of those thronging to rule, the ability to wheedle or browbeat the citizenry (the ship owner) into compliance takes precedence. These powers of political manipulation are mistakenly identified with fitness to rule. As the ship

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[55] Cf. Socrates's statements on the proper ruler (at *R*.489b-c), who does not seek out rule but must instead be sought out by those who would be ruled. The section around *R*.489b-c—especially the spirit of Socrates's refutation of Simonides (see Bloom [1993] *ad loc*)—strongly recalls his discussion of τέχνη (art) with Thrasymachus in Book I. In fact, the only justification Socrates gives at *R*.489 for his position that the ruler will not seek to rule is that "it is not natural" (οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν); for a more rigorous explanation, we have to look back to his claims in Book I that ruling is always for the benefit of the ruled, not the ruler, presumably. (But perhaps the helmsman of the ship has a special interest in the safe delivery of the cargo? Socrates might respond that that concern would stem from his practicing the art of profit [ἡ μισθωτική τέχνη], not of sailing.)

[56] As Keyt (2006) points out, 191-192, captain, helmsman, and navigator were all the same figure, ὁ κυβερνήτης—in other words, the person who has knowledge of τὰ κατὰ ναῦν ("the things concerning ships"). I have found Keyt (2006) to be, in general, one of the more serious interpreters of the ship metaphor.

of state metaphor makes clear, the power to gain the helm in no way implies the knowledge required to steer the ship well. Persuasive powers, while necessary to acquire the captaincy, do not grant knowledge of the seasons, the stars, and all the other things a captain must know if he is to steer his ship safely. Conversely, we might say that the true captain's knowledge of the affairs of the ship (τὰ ναυτικά) does not automatically grant him sway over the rest of the crew, even if it would be at first thought to; that task requires eloquence or cunning, neither of which the art of steering affords.

This fundamental disjunction between the skills that allow one to gain political office—πειθώ (suasion) and βία (force)—and those that let one administrate well from that office—ἡ ναυτικὴ τέχνη (for a ship) and φιλοσοφία (for the city)—answers Adeimantus's question as to why philosophers are nowhere seen in the city. It also explains Socrates's statement when discussing the philosopher-king that political power (δύναμις πολιτική) and philosophy must "fall together" (ξυμπέσῃ), a claim that presupposes their having separate roots.[57] The philosopher king is not already to be found in office because there is nothing about philosophy *per se* that would put him in that position.[58] But the philosopher's absence from the political eye cannot be wholly attributed to the fact that philosophy provides no means for acquiring political power, although this is true: as the ship metaphor teaches, the community (the sailors) actively ridicule the philosopher for his perceived pedantry and arrogance. So the philosopher is not merely "distant" from the populace, in that he does not understand it or its reins (as a good orator would), but is also in a certain antagonistic relationship with it, that is to say, shunned and discredited.

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[57] The full statement is: καὶ τοῦτο εἰς ταὐτὸν ξυμπέσῃ, δύναμίς τε πολιτικὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία. (R.473d) ("And that fall together with that, political power and philosophy.")
[58] N.B. Socrates's idea of this separation is important, as it will be a subject of importance in Cicero's thinking.

The true captain's nautical knowledge is analogous to the philosopher's imitation of the Good (perhaps in more ways than one[59]). Ultimately, this analogy brings us once more before the problem of the nature of the Good: that Socrates has no difficulty in rattling off examples of the captain's requisite knowledge (e.g., of the seasons, stars, winds) makes all the more conspicuous his reticence towards the knowledge that the true statesman derives from the Good. We may be frustrated that we are thrown back, once again, on Socrates's vague claim that the philosopher will make use of the Good as a "paradigm" for ordering the city. Some may argue that Socrates *does* adumbrate the political nature of the Good in the course of setting up the city-in-speech: the myth of metals, social communism, and the expulsion of wayward citizens would then constitute concrete examples of political legislation conducted with an eye to the Good. Many arguments have been made in this direction, but I would have us put Socrates's specific policies on the periphery, not in the center: if we could obtain the plan for the right ordering of society from the text of the *Republic* alone, what would be the point of the insistence on the perception of the Good?[60] No, it would seem that Socrates either cannot or will not promulgate whatever essential is obtained in the final ascent to the Good and how this knowledge would aid one in rule. Based

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[59] The stars, being static entities, clearly stand in for the Good; but the philosopher must also consider and make use of the transitory phenomena of wind, current, etc., if he is to maintain a course directed by the stars.

[60] We are not concerned here with the *Republic*'s political philosophy for its own sake, but it seems important to me to call attention to this fact. Plato has been criticized for failing to acknowledge the human need for change, difference, and growth; his guidelines, as set out in the *Republic* or *Laws*, are thought to be excessively rigid and, some have gone so far as to lay charges of totalitarianism against him (most famously Popper [1950], but for another take cf., e.g., Crombie [1962] 101 & *passim*). We will not mount a full-scale defense of Plato (which has been done elsewhere, cf. Rutherford's [1995] survey, 218-227, esp., e.g., 221 with n8—pages good, too, for an abbreviation of Popper's salient points), but I believe that much of this criticism overlooks the radically *unrepresentable* nature of the Good. An individual looking to the Good will not simply force "eternal" laws onto his socio-political reality, as critics imply, since the laws themselves are not eternal; he will rather "interpret" the Good in ways that will instantiate differently based upon the historical currents (which currents are present quite literally in the ship metaphor for careful readers, see n59 above).

on Socrates's later statement to Glaucon—Οὐκετ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ἐγὼ, ὦ φίλε Γλαύκων, οἷός τ᾽ἔσει ἀκολουθεῖν ("'No longer, dear Glaucon,' I said, 'will you be able to accompany me.'" R.533a)[61]—it is probably the former: despite Socrates's willingness to induct Glaucon into the mysteries of the Good, Glaucon must ultimately perceive the Good for himself. The Good, as a pure Form, is surely ineffable and defies description. It is near religious; Socrates can offer no "concrete" lessons from it, for the notion of a "concrete," communicable precept is antithetical to its extreme abstraction. It is for this reason, I believe, that we are left wanting in the case of specific examples of the Good similar to those that can be adumbrated in the case of the true captain. The Good, as beyond description, can never be delimited by a "merely" historical-political set of laws or injunctions in the realm of Becoming.[62]

This discussion of the Good allows us an easy transition to our second question, that is, why the philosopher (i.e., the educated individual) would be averse to politics. Strangely, the answer to this question is closely related to the reason he is fit to rule in the first place: his knowledge of the Good. As we have already discussed, the education (παιδεία) Socrates proposes can be conceived of as a process of orienting oneself towards the Good. The philosopher is suited for rule precisely because his education has led him to contemplation of the highest of Forms, whence he may find the wisdom to helm the state prudently. Perhaps

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[61] Weiss (2012) cannot be right in putting the emphasis in this statement on "[Glaucon's] limitations" (5). The point is, rather, that because perception of the Good is a private experience, Socrates would not be able to communicate it, *even if* Glaucon has the aptitude to make the ascent himself (which we cannot know with certainty from the *Republic*). In any case, many would assess Glaucon's capabilities differently from Weiss, as she acknowledges (5, notes 11-12): Bloom (1991) 411, Dobbs (1994), and we might add Strauss (1964) and Ferrari (2005) esp. ch.1, among others.

[62] This fact could be the reason for the extreme obscurity of the nuptial number; couched in mystery as it is, it is the closest one can come to an expression of political knowledge from the Good.

ironically, it is just this contemplation of the Good that also produces distaste for political life.[63] Why should this be? A return to the cave, so to speak, can provide us with an introduction to answering this question.

We recall that we identified the cave's fire with the sun, which was, in turn, analogous to the Good. In the ascent to perception of the sun—in education, that is—one left behind his fetters and the glooming cave. In leaving the cave, he also left behind the association of crouched prisoners, the fictitious objects (σκεύη) carried along like so many puppeteer's props, and the δοξαστά ("opinions") whispered among those habituated to the shadow-pictures on the wall. But politics, understood as the day-to-day transactions and management of the πόλις, must surely occur in the cave:[64] political activity is nothing other than the tending and administration of institutions bound to change and decay;[65] it is squabbling and quarreling and tedium;[66] it is personal hazard for the sake of the madding crowd's comfort[67]—or so it must seem to him who

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[63] I do not take most commentators to disagree on the *distaste*, merely on whether or not the *compulsion* proffered to the philosopher will overcome this distaste. But Annas (1981) outlines an even stronger position held by some that repudiates even the general fact of their aversion: "[As some scholars think,] . . . they [the philosophers] do not see the sacrifice of going down into the Cave as a real sacrifice, really against their interests" (268). Mahoney (1992) compiles a somewhat more restricted list of thinkers who he says believe that the philosopher sacrifices happiness (261n).

[64] I cannot see how one could object to Strauss (1964) saying that "the city can be identified with the Cave" (125 with n47). Cf. Hall (1980) on what he calls "orthodox" interpretations of the cave—those that "deny it any political content" (74). On the cave and politics, *ibid* 80-81.

[65] Decay they must: χαλεπὸν μὲν κινηθῆναι πόλιν οὕτω ξυστᾶσαν· ἀλλ᾽ἐπει γενομένῳ παντὶ φθορά ἐστιν, οὐδ᾽ἡ τοιαύτη ξύστασις τὸν ἅπαντα μενεῖ χρόνον, ἀλλὰ λύθησεται ("A city thus composed is hard to move. But since there is decay for all things that become, it will not last forever, but will be undone." *R*.546a).

[66] That is, πόνων τε καὶ τιμῶν (*R*.519d), which are εἴτε φαυλότεραι εἴτε σπουδαιότεραι (*ibid*). For another explicit disavowal, consider the τιμαὶ, ἔπαινοι, and γέρα destined for the astute shadow-watchers (τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα) at *R*.516c.

[67] The sailors on the ship are "ready to tear apart" (ἑτοίμους κατατέμνειν *R*.488bc) anybody claiming that the art of ruling can be taught (τὸν λέγοντα ὡς διδακτὸν). They are also in the habit of slaying or exiling their potential rivals (τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους ἢ ἀποκτεινύντας ἢ ἐκβάλλοντας ἐκ τῆς νέως *R*.489c). Cf. also *R*.496de; and Socrates's words at *Apology*, 31d-e:

has gazed with naked eye upon the sun and turned back to the shadowy mouth of the cave with all its crude unknowing. This must be the reason that Glaucon objects to the philosophers' return to the cave: ἀδικήσομεν αὐτούς, καὶ ποιήσομεν χεῖρον ζῆν, δυνατὸν αὐτοῖς ὂν ἄμεινον; ("Shall we do them an injustice, and make them live a worse way of life, when there is a better one possible?" *R*.519d).[68]

So in a fairly obvious way, the philosopher's distaste for political activity is really not so hard to understand, if still to us a bit unexpected. (Unexpected because, in his education, we trained the philosopher towards the Good so that he might rule but now find that this education disenchants him with the task.) Socrates spends no little time emphasizing the contrast between the philosopher's displeasure in political participation and delight in contemplation of the Good. He says that those having perceived the Good realize how exceedingly sweet and beautiful a possession it is (ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα *R*.496c), and in its light see the madness (μανίαν *R*.496c) and unhealthful bustle (οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς) practically ubiquitous among the cities. They would enjoy nothing more than to remain in contemplation of it and share in none of the toils and offices of the prisoners (μηδὲ μετέχειν τῶν παρ᾽ἐκείνοις πόνων τε καὶ τιμῶν *R*.519d). So did the "best men" of Book I disdain (under Socrates's guidance, so to speak) to approach the city, because it could hold nothing that might attract them, money- and honor-

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εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἄν ἀπολώλη . . . ("If I had set my hand to politics, I would have been killed long ago.") To a certain extent, we may also recall the Epicurean proverb μὴ πολιτευέσθαι ("stay away from politics"; or, perhaps, with a slight perversion, "stay away from the πόλις"—cf. Johnson [1976] 150),

[68] One might think that my use of Glaucon's claim in this context is an abuse of the text, since Socrates immediately answers negatively to Glaucon's question, asserting that they do *not* in fact do unjustly, because their (Socrates's and Glaucon's) job as founders (οἰκισταί) requires that they consider the interests of the "whole city" (ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει *R*.519e), not "one class" (ἔν τι γένος). But it seems clear to me that Socrates's response—while perhaps successful in defending himself from the charge of injustice—does not imply that the philosopher will be better off for his political activities, merely that his sacrifice in going to them will be "justified" in some sense.

despising as they were. Why did they scorn bullion and fame? Precisely because knowledge of the Good reveals these things to be pale and insubstantial shadows, bandied about as currency only by the luckless prisoners. Socrates sums it all up quite nicely: Ἔχεις οὖν, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, βίον ἄλλον τινὰ πολιτικῶν ἀρχῶν καταφρονοῦντα ἢ τὸν τῆς ἀληθινῆς φιλοσοφίας; ("'Well then,' I said, 'mustn't we agree that it is no other way of life than that of true philosophy that despises political rule?'" *R*.521a-b). It seems apparent from these statements that for the philosopher meditation upon the Good is a far and away happier existence than political toil;[69] it is for this reason that the philosopher would require some compulsion (either forcible or persuasive) if he is to approach the city. Is this compulsion (ἀνάγκη, broadly) forthcoming?

Here is another famous crux in the *Republic*, and the third part of our investigation into politics, upon which much depends in our discussion of education: how one answers this question will, in the last analysis, determine how deep the quarrel between the philosopher and the city—thus, the quarrel between philosophic education and the city, in a sense—runs. Plato's interpreters have variously responded "yes" or "no," attributing to different sources the origin (or lack thereof) of the philosopher's ἀνάγκη. It is beyond the scope of this essay to wade into the thick of these arguments; rather than attempt to add an entirely novel solution, I will trace what I believe is the most convincing answer to this difficult "problem of compulsion": the negative one in support of the idea that the philosopher will likely *not* go to politics.[70] I should state that I have found much that is persuasive in alternative interpretations arguing that the philosopher *will* have a good reason to go to politics, however, and will accordingly supplement the following

[69] Bloom (1977) is important, esp. 317-318.
[70] Strauss (1964), Bloom (1991) are the most visible interpreters in this camp and claim the most for it. Some sympathetic views that are not necessarily as strong: Shorey (1933) 235, Aronson (1972), esp. 393-394, Heinaman (2004). Mahoney's (1992) list (226n) is also of some use here.

discussion with observations from that viewpoint.[71] Let me also add, as a qualification, that I do not take it to be an absolute impossibility that the philosopher will go to politics—only that it is extremely unlikely beyond the city-in-speech, as we will see.[72]

The argument that there will be no compulsion bringing the philosopher to politics and, therefore, that he is unlikely to undertake political service, relies upon our taking seriously two

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[71] Scholars arguing that the philosopher *will* return to the cave often claim that knowledge of the Good will compel not only contemplation but also action (though they differ on how exactly the Good effects this action in the philosopher): so Kraut (1973) (". . . [the philosopher] wants to help *create* virtue in those he loves. And if he receives no political assignment, this desire to create must remain unsatisfied."); Cooper (1977) ("his reason for acting [in any sphere public or private] is that the good-itself demands it."); Mahoney (1992) ("reason also desires the actualization of the entire range of good things . . . the 'desire for the unrestricted good'" 280); Annas (1981) ch.10, esp. discussion on 268-271; Irwin (1995) sec. 213 ("The philosopher's concern for the community in which she propagates what she values most about herself gives her reasons to follow the principles that at aim the good of the community rather than her own good" 315). Reeve (1988) has a different compromise, one often implicit in other scholars' accounts too: "[the philosopher] must, as it were, exchange some ruling for the food and protection he needs in order to spend much of his time doing philosophy" (203). Brickhouse (1981) provides a pretty good summary of the problem (1-3), but ultimately offers a solution similar to some others above ("the discharging of moral requirements is a necessary condition for the achievement of *eudaimonia*" 1). So too does Hall (1978) diagnose a similar issue (169), before arguing that "[t]o believe that *eudaimonia* consists exclusively contemplation of the forms is to read Plato through Aristotle" (170). Brown (2000) does a pretty good job of citing (up to the time of that article's publication) the scholars who concur that the philosopher will go to rule (2-9), whose strategies for explaining this fact he attempts to defuse on the way to presenting his own thesis, "that the philosophers' ultimate willingness to rule depends on two factors: the founders' compulsion, in the form of a law that those who have been educated by the city as philosophers will rule the city, and a conception of justice which makes obedience to just laws obligatory" (9). For another excellent and subtle approach (originating from an exegesis of the city-soul analogy), see Ferrari (2005) 100-119, esp. 115 with 118; find a characteristically ingenious claim on 115: "the necessity of caring for the needs of the general citizenry . . . corresponds to the force exerted on reason by the necessary bodily desires. In the individual this force is imposed 'by nature' . . . In the city the corresponding necessity is imposed 'by law.'"

[72] In this respect, I differ from Strauss's interpretation (also Bloom and others), whose reading I agree with in a very many other respects. Also cf. Socrates at *R*.500d, where he admits of the difficulty of his project but insists on its possibility. Strauss and his followers (so-called "Straussians") have generated no little controversy in their distinctive style of interpretation and writing. See, e.g., Klosko (1986) for a critical perspective purporting to reveal "the overall weakness of their [i.e., the "Straussians's"] case" (275), mostly charging the writers with the so-called *secundum quid* fallacy and general obscurantism. But better, I think, and subtler, is Ferrari's (1997) consideration of this "Straussian" interpretation; also Ferrari (2005) 117-119.

of Socrates's claims: first, that contemplation of the Good provides for the happiest life; second, that the philosopher's absorption in this contemplation renders him averse to politics. It is only on the basis of these two related points that we could take seriously Socrates's claim that some compulsion must be brought to bear on the philosopher if he will rule and, subsequently, reject the likelihood of this compulsion. As we saw in the second section of our discussion on politics above, Socrates makes several statements implying these two points; but as it is with one or the other of these points that most critics take issue when they claim that the philosopher *will* indeed go to politics, it would be of use to set forth a few more of Socrates's comments supporting them by way of a simple defense. Once it has been established that it is reasonable to give credence to these points, it is only a matter of considering whether the required compulsion presents itself (inside or outside of the city-in-speech).

Those who would doubt that the philosopher is quite contented with contemplation of the Good must account not only for the strong statements to this effect that we considered in the preceding section, but also for Socrates and Glaucon's agreement that the philosopher would "rather suffer anything than live that way" (πᾶν μᾶλλον πεπονθέναι ἄν δέξασθαι ἤ ζῆν ἐκείνως *R*.516d-e), that is, the way of life of the cave. It is also significant that Socrates makes use of a quotation from Homer in introducing this claim (from *Od*.XI), comparing the philosopher in the cave to Achilles in the underworld. As we will remember from earlier in the *Republic*,[73] Socrates is a critical reader of Homer and is quite willing to bowdlerize the poet when he believes him to be in the wrong; that he frames the philosopher's aversion to the cave in terms of Achilles's lamentation in the underworld, then, should indicate that he has thoroughly vetted the sentiment and does not utter it carelessly. Achilles's cry of woe also has a special

[73] Book II, 376eff.

appropriateness for the philosopher. Achilles renounces kingship of the shades in favor of the humblest station of living men (ἐπάρουρον ἐόντα θητευέμεν ἄλλῳ, ἀνδρὶ παρ᾽ἀκλήρῳ . . . ἤ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν *Od*.XI.489-91 ≈ *R*.516d); so, too, we can imagine, would the philosopher renounce kingship in the city for the most meager opportunity to gaze upon the Good.

Socrates finds further "mythic" support in his characterization of the philosopher, saying that those who have "spent their time in education through to the end" (τοὺς ἐν παιδείᾳ ἐωμένους διατρίβειν διὰ τέλους *R*.519c) are unwilling to rule (ἑκόντες εἶναι οὐ πράξουσιν) because they believe that they have "settled in the isles of the blessed" (ἡγούμενοι ἐν μακάρων νήσοις ζῶντες ἔτι ἀπῳκίσθαι). Here is as clear a statement as any that one who has seen his education "through to the end" (διὰ τέλους)—which phrase I take to refer, at least in part, to the τέλος of education, knowledge of the Good—will not rule of his own volition. It is for this reason that Socrates states immediately afterwards that it is the job of the founders μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν αὐτοῖς ὅ νῦν ἐπιτρέπεται . . . μὴ ἐθέλειν πάλιν καταβαίνειν παρ᾽ἐκείνους τοὺς δεσμώτας ("not to permit them what is now permitted . . . [that they] not be willing to go down again to those prisoners" *R*.519d). It is fairly clear, then, that were it up to the philosopher he would not return to the city.

In response to the notion that the philosopher would not willingly return to the city, it is sometimes thought that the philosopher does not really know what is best for him: he must be guided onto the path of justice, that is, of service to city.[74] It is only through this "compulsory" political service that he can obtain a complete and harmonious life bringing happiness (i.e., εὐδαιμονία); in other words, he must be made whole by an influence that curbs his desire of the

[74] Representative is Kraut (1973) 342-3.

Good and yokes his own interests to the community's wellbeing. This sentiment is a fine and noble one, but, as it seems to me, there is little in the way of evidence supporting it. In fact, Socrates seems to disavow expressly such a notion with his argument that the philosopher is the one most able to recognize true happiness: it is by "experience, wisdom, and speech" (ἐμπειρίᾳ τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ *R*.582a) that one can judge what is most true (ταῦτα ἀληθέστατα *R*.582e), and as the perfection of such traits is the stamp of the philosopher, it is he who would best be able to recognize happiness in its purest form when perceived.[75] It is, therefore, unlikely that the philosopher would be ignorant of what is best for him or where the purest happiness lies. In its strongest form, our thesis concerning the philosopher's relationship with the Good is that the philosopher's happiness as afforded by contemplation of the Forms is total and complete; he does not need the city to realize the best life, except so far as it mostly leaves him be.[76] Therefore, he must be compelled to politics if he is to take up the task of ruling, as it can only diminish his happiness. It is for us now to determine whether such a compulsion (ἀνάγκη) presents itself and, if so, how.

Now ἀνάγκη thought most broadly as "necessity" takes three different forms in the *Republic*: πειθώ (suasion), ἀνάγκη (force, as opposed to πειθώ), and ζημία (penalty).[77] It is not

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[75] So Bloom (1977) on this section of the *Republic,* specifically referring to Socrates's claim that the philosopher is 729 times happier than the tyrant (*R*.587e and context): "Philosophy is presented as choiceworthy on the ground that it provides permanently accessible pleasures for the individual, and the philosopher here is not presented as ruling or in any way concerned with the city" (318).

[76] Even if the city makes life hard for the philosopher, it is not clear whether he should think that his best course is to join the political life in the hopes of rectifying it; at least, so implies Socrates at *R*.496de when he states that, without sufficient hope of success, the philosopher must act like one caught in a storm and "stand off behind some shelter" (ὑπὸ τειχίον ἀποστάς).

[77] Cf. *R*.519, where it is the founders' task to harmonize the citizens' ranks (ξυναρμόττων *R*.519e), bringing them to their places by "persuasion and force" (πειθοῖ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ). ζημία occurs in Book I (but not after). Strauss (1964) rejects (rather convincingly) the possibility of a

entirely clear what πειθώ and ἀνάγκη (as force) would look like, though in the former's case we might think of the myth of the metals[78] and in the latter the threat of violence that first brings Socrates to Cephalus's house.[79] As for ζημία, we can recall that a potential penalty for the philosopher was characterized in Book I as the rule of the worse man over the better. Some thinking about the precise nature of the philosopher's compulsion is necessary, but not our primary concern so long as that compulsion is effective. We rather ask: Who will persuade the philosopher? Or, Whence comes the threat of violence that shall make him rule? Or, Whence comes the penalty if he chooses not?

The answer is, at best, obscure.[80] As far as the penalty (ζημία) end of things goes, we have already noted that one such penalty is to be ruled over by one who is worse (and perhaps we could think of more). The compulsion to politics here arises from the philosopher's cognizance of a bare possibility—the possibility of the worse man (πονηρότερος) delegating to the philosopher worthless (πονηρός) tasks. Because he wishes to avoid the event of one who is not fit to give him orders giving him orders, he rolls up his sleeves and governs (himself along with the πόλις, to his own great relief). But there is, perhaps, a dubious calculus at work here:

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persuasive compulsion in the case of the philosopher; on this matter we cannot do better than point to Ferrari's (1997) reading of Strauss (39-40).

[78] Cf. Socrates on the Φοινικικόν τι (Phoenician tale) that will require συχνῆς πειθοῦς (much persuasion, *R*.414c); also, *R*.414d: ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας πείθειν καὶ τοὺς στρατίωτας . . . [κτλ.] ("I will first attempt to persuade the ones themselves ruling and the generals . . . [etc.]").

[79] *Pace* Brown (2000) 13: "But we should be clear that this is compulsion is not physical force, nor is it even the threat of physical force." A few others agreeing with Brown (more could be named) include Andrew (1983), arguing *contra* Strauss, that, "the return to the cave should be interpreted as an internal necessity of philosophy rather than external compulsion" (513), and, Barney (2008) 14, "Compulsion is not necessarily, or even standardly, a matter of external force or violence." Bloom (1991) differs (310-311).

[80] Brown (2000) 8-9 concludes that the source is the "legislators," in the case of Callipolis the interlocutors, we must assume. I find this probable on the whole (with Sedley [2007] 280), but think that it is perhaps simplifying the matter as the following will make clear.

just how bad does the ruler have to be for the philosopher to approach ruling, given that ruling itself is a πόνος? Under a regime that pretty much leaves the philosopher be, will the perceived indignity of the rule of the worse be sufficient to coax him to politics? Other uncertainties have also been observed:[81] can not the philosopher avoid the penalty of shirking his duty to rule by leaving it to the rest of the guardians, who are not worse than he? Most criticism, from any side, boils down to the fact that it is easy for one to imagine how the philosopher could make himself absent from the political sphere with few personal repercussions. This is not to say that there are not *any* occasions when prospects of this penalty would compel the philosopher to politics—merely that at least as many instances can be found in which the philosopher could avoid the penalty, and thus the compulsion to politics, with relatively little effort. (We should note that, despite the diminished efficacy of this penalty, care should be taken in saying that there exists *no penalty at all* that could compel the philosopher to politics, as Socrates's single suggestion cannot be taken to exhaust all of the possibilities.)

At other times, the compulsion (persuasive or forcible) is uncertain in origin. For example, in Book VI, Socrates says merely that the philosophers will not rule [πρὶν ἄν] ἀνάγκη τις ἐκ τύχης παραβάλῃ ("before some [τις] compulsion by chance approaches them." *R.*499b). The verb παραβάλλω, used intransitively, gives us no source for the compulsion, and the τις could be taken to further obscure this force.[82] Immediately afterwards Socrates gives an almost

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[81] The following objection is from Kraut (1973) 332. He provides other arguments there, too, against the notion that the philosopher will have a "self-regarding motive for ruling" arising from the penalty inflicted by rule of the worse (Kraut *ibid*). Kraut (332n) cites Cross and Woozley (1964), 101, as a source that *does* hold that position.

[82] Adam (1963) is not thrilled with παραβάλῃ intransitively here, and once tried to take τις as the subject and emend ἀνάγκη to ἀνάγκην, before recanting and favoring παραβάλῃ "provisionally and *pro tempore*" (Adam *ad loc*). The meaning, as he points out, is "*accedere* (not, as has been asserted, *accidere*)." Cf. *R.*556c. Any difficulty here is not serious; Bloom (1991) and Griffith (2000) render it differently but agree in sense.

identical formulation of this "indefinite ἀνάγκη" (i.e., ἀνάγκη without an agent), only changing the verb and the word order (ἄν οὖν τις . . . ἀνάγκη γένηται *R.*500d). In Book V we find another instance of an indefinite ἀνάγκη in a position of importance, where Socrates says that the city will suffer many evils "until the many natures pursuing [philosophy or political power] to the exclusion of the other have been forcibly [ἐξ ἀνάγκης] debarred" (τῶν δὲ νῦν πορευομένων χωρὶς ἐφ᾽ἑκάτερον αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀποκλεισθῶσιν *R.*473d).[83] This sentiment is not quite analogous to the previous in substance, being a broader statement about harmonizing the ranks within the city. Neither is it identical in form: ἐξ ἀνάγκης is adverbial and I have rendered it as such. Nevertheless, the expression causes us to wonder *who* will do the "forcible debarring" of those exclusively practicing philosophy or politics. It cannot be the guardians, as in this context the philosopher-king has not yet come to power; the debarment itself of these opposing camps is a precondition for the advent of the ideal city.[84] Attempting to infer the source of the compulsion does not give us much more to work with than in the examples cited from Book VI.[85]

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[83] Following closely Adam (1963) in translating this sentence.

[84] Cf. 474d-e, quoted already in this paper. On a more general note concerning this quotation, Adam (1963) points out that Socrates's formulation αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις ("the many natures") suggests that there are others who *do* successfully combine politics and philosophy (and Adam gives Pythagoras, Solon, etc. as examples). If so, we do not hear about them in the *Republic*, unless they are, as politically-minded philosophers, the οἰκισταί whose job it is to set Callipolis into motion (Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus for our city-in-speech). So far as the idea that Socrates here as quickly disavows those who are wholly devoted to philosophy as those who are to politics, that is all well and good—he must do so if he is to commit to the ideal of the philosopher-king, who blends the two; but that he puts them in opposition is more telling, to my mind, and naturally makes us wonder *who* exactly will bring the two together into one.

[85] More *comparanda* for the impersonal ἀνάγκη can be found. Cf. *R.*539e (ἀναγκαστέοι ἄρχειν); cf. τις ἀνάγκη yet again at *R.*500c. The conditionals and general conditions coupled to ἀνάγκη (e.g., παραβαλῃ, γένηται, κτλ.) abundant in the quoted passages further push it into the realm of the "possible" as opposed to the "actual."

In yet other cases, Socrates calls the matter of compulsion "our task" (῾Ημέτερον δὴ ἔργον *R*.519c), referring to himself, Glaucon, and Adeimantus as the "founders" (τῶν οἰκιστῶν) of the city(-in-speech). It is their work to compel (ἀναγκάσαι) the most promising students to "see the good" (ἰδεῖν τε τὸ ἀγαθὸν *R*.519d) and to return to govern the city, for they have taken it upon themselves to "harmonize" (ξυναρμόττων *R*.519e) the citizens with one another by "suasion and force" (πειθοῖ τε καὶ ἀνάγκῃ). But who serves the role of οἰκιστής in "real life" (i.e., outside of the city-in-speech)? Surely that is for the philosopher, to whom some ἀνάγκη has fallen such that he is brought to political life (cf. 500c-d). But is it not a circular claim that the philosopher, who requires a compulsion if he is to govern the city, will provide that very compulsion to other philosophers? At first blush it may seem so, but we will remember that there are other compulsions that can be brought to the philosopher (like the ζημία of Book I discussed above) that could set him on the path of philosopher-king without another philosopher's prompting.[86] Nevertheless, the seeming circularity points up the difficulties of such events coming to pass (they are χαλεπά, as Socrates concedes at *R*.500d), even if they are not illogical or impossible (οὐ γὰρ ἀδύνατος γενέσθαι).[87]

In the *Republic*, the compulsion that is said to bring the philosopher to politics, forcible or persuasive, is almost always presented in one of the three contexts analyzed above.[88] But as we saw, in none of these cases can we view the proffered compulsion without a fair measure of uncertainty concerning its origin and efficacy. Socrates explicitly states that the difficulties

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[86] Should we accept the *Seventh Letter*, we might be inclined to think Plato acted in the capacity of a would-be philosopher-cum-οἰκιστής in his dalliance with Dionysius at Syracuse.
[87] Barney (2008) has observed some of these issues of "circularity" (9).
[88] We might add, lastly, that the people themselves could potentially persuade the philosopher; in this case, they would first need to be talked down and generally mollified (cf. 499d-500a). Considering the philosopher is, presumably, the one who would do this mollification, and that he would already have to have been motivated to this task by some other persuasion or compulsion, that eventuality is unlikely.

contained in the set-up of the philosopher-king's regime are great but not impossible (*R*.500d); I do not go so far as to disbelieve this claim,[89] but I should think that, based on the glaring uncertainties around the all-important ἀνάγκη for the philosopher, we must consider it highly improbable that the philosopher will be found on the throne even if such a thing *is* possible in some way.[90] That said, *were* a philosopher to become king, it would be emphatically more likely that others would succeed him, as he would almost certainly set to ordering the society in such a way that future philosophers would also be guardians of the city.

It is high time that we come back around to education, for the sake of which we entertained this discussion of the philosopher's necessity. At the beginning of this chapter, we asserted that a certain tension lies at the heart of Socrates's educational doctrine, a tension between education and its political goals. We spelled it out roughly thus: the would-be-philosopher is educated so that he might be the city's chief citizen, but in the course of this education he grows estranged from the city. Socrates leaves us with no doubts that the philosopher is averse to the city's political life, as we saw above; and that his education was for its benefit is a thematic premise of the *Republic*. We examined closely the so-called philosopher's ἀνάγκη to determine whether it might afford us a way of overcoming the apparent antagonism between politics and philosophy (and thus education). As I hope can be agreed on, Socrates does not make us unduly confident that such a resolution can be found. We could not say, as some do, that the politics-philosophy ("city-philosophy") conflict is insoluble, but it must be accepted that there is scanty evidence in the *Republic* that they will go whistling arm-in-arm, whatever the dialogue seems to suggest in its broadest strokes. Cicero's famous comment in *De*

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[89] *Pace* Strauss & Bloom. See n72 above.

[90] And with the dangers of political life and, maybe, the improbability of the philosopher pulling off his "set-up" of the ideal regime, we find Socrates providing escape routes for the philosopher or counseling against political involvement. See n67 above.

Re Publica is perhaps relevant: he says that Socrates's city (≈ *ciuitas*) is *optandam magis quam sperandam, quam minimam potuit, non quae posset esse, sed in qua ratio rerum ciuilium perspici posset* ("one more to be wished for than hoped after, small though it was; not one which could be, but in which the *ratio* of political things could be clearly seen" II.52).[91]

Whatever one's stance on the possibility of the philosopher coming to politics, it will be admitted that at least *some* tension as we have characterized it lurks in the folds of Socratic education. The *raison d'être* of *any* educational program is, ostensibly, drawn from the community (e.g., family, church, or government) that institutes it and brings up youth within it; it is an interesting—and perhaps compelling—facet of "true" education as presented in the *Republic* that it also drives its pupils *away* from the very community which set them on the path of education and endows them with a criterion for judgment absolute in a way the community's purpose cannot be. A future project may approach the relationship between education and politics and ask whether some limited harmony might be achieved, a harmony requiring reasonable sacrifice on the part of the πόλις and the philosopher for the sake of justice. Nothing we have stated above would be recanted, but it would be suggested that there is the possibility of a space for a "symbiotic relationship" of sorts between the philosopher and the city. So much for education's relationship to politics in the *Republic*. The following analysis of Cicero will, I think, throw into even sharper relief Socrates's philosophical contentions on this matter and perhaps reveal some assumptions hitherto veiled.

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[91] The importance of Cicero's observation, and its authority, cannot be downplayed. Not surprisingly, Strauss and those sympathetic to his position are quite fond of it (e.g., Strauss [1963]138, Benardete [1989] 9). Latin translations are my own and follow, in format, Greek translations (n4 above). Text of *De Re Publica* is Ziegler (1969) with Zetzel's (1995) emendations of the contiguous manuscript portion; occasionally reading Powell (2006) where I have noted. Text of *De Legibus* is Powell (2006), and, finally, *De Oratore* is Wilkins (1892). On matters of sense, I have referred to Zetzel (1999) for *De Legibus*, Rudd (1998) and Zetzel (1999) for *De Re Publica*, and May & Wisse (2001) for *De Oratore*.

And here I will append a final comment for those still unsettled by the perceived "egoism" or "hedonism" of Socrates's philosopher, though it will probably not provide much reassurance—and perhaps it should not, as it is in this vein that a Ciceronian criticism will be made. It will suffice to say, however, that the charge of a lack of common feeling (*sensus communis*) leveled against the philosopher is quite possibly not one Socrates would understand. Such a reproach supposes that pleasure is essentially cleft from moral feeling—but no such separation necessarily exists in Socrates's mind, I think. The beautiful and the good are unified in the highest good (τἀγαθόν); however strange it may seem to our minds, there can be no "purely" aesthetic or pleasurable contemplation of it that lacks a moral content. Contemplating the good is *both* pleasurable ("aesthetically good") *and* morally good. More fundamentally, this whole charge seems to rest upon the idea that human beings have a duty to other human beings, and that they ought not indulge their own interests at the expense of their fellowmen. This notion culminates in the belief that the truly good life can *only* be lived vis-à-vis political and social service. Once again, I am not sure that Socrates wholly endorses such a belief. The Good is a thing basically and only attainable privately (even if someone else provides an impetus); the good man may have moral scruples, but there would be nothing about the Good that would compel him to provide service to others in order to live happily and ethically. Socrates's emphasis on the private nature of the Good is subtle but meaningful; we will return to it in our discussion of Cicero, who *does* find such a position untenable.

First Interlude

ego uero eodem, quo ille Homerum, redimitum coronis et delibutum unguentis emittit ex ea urbe, quam sibi ipse fingit

"I shall treat [Plato] in the same way he treats Homer, sending him decked with garlands and anointed with perfumes from that city which he fashioned for himself . . ."

Cicero (Nonius 308.38 = *DRP*.3.5 Z)

magis eum delectabat Neoptolemus Ennii, qui se ait philosophari uelle, sed paucis; nam omnino haud placere. quodsi studia Graecorum uos tanto opere delectant, sunt alia liberiora et transfusa latius, quae uel ad usum uitae uel etiam ad ipsam rem publicam conferre possumus.

"Ennius's Neoptolemus was more to his taste: he said that he wished to philosophize, but only a little, for it didn't suit fully suit him. But if zeal for the Greeks so captivates you all, there are other studies freer and spread more widely which we can to bring to bear for living or to the *res publica* itself."

Cicero (*DRP*.1.30)[92]

[92] A favored quotation: cf. *Tusculanae Disputationes* 2.1, *De Oratore* 2.156.

Ch.3. Politics in Cicero's *De Re Publica* and *De Legibus*

In his preface to the first book of *De Re Publica*, Cicero is concerned with asserting the superiority of the active life—that is to say, the political—over the contemplative: *uirtus in usu sui tota posita est*, as he says ("virtue's whole worth is found in its use" *DRP*.1.2). It is clear that Cicero has the Epicurean philosophers in mind with this statement,[93] who advocated a withdrawal from the dangers of political life in favor of peaceable contemplation (*in illa tranquillitate atque otio iucundissime vivere*, "to live most pleasurably in peace and leisure" *DRP*.1.1). He must prove, against the Epicureans' claims to the contrary, that the sane man (*homo sanus*, as opposed to *homo demens* of *DRP*.1.1) would have some reason to approach the dealings of the state (*res publica*/πόλις) voluntarily.[94] If Cicero's quarrel with the Epicureans here sounds at all familiar, it should: a central focus of our study of Plato's *Republic* was the philosopher's attitude toward the dealings of the πόλις. As will be remembered, we found that the philosopher in the *Republic* had a strong aversion to politics. We located the key to understanding this aversion in what might be called the "Socratic" concept of education, understood essentially (as the cave allegory teaches) in terms of ascent and orientation towards the Good. From these facts, we concluded that a certain tension must be said to exist between Socratic education and politics, politics consisting in rule of the πόλις in the philosopher's case. We cannot wholly assimilate Socrates's position on the philosopher's political wariness to the

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[93] As the *isti*, contemptuous in context, makes clear (*bis*: *DRP*.1.1 *ut putant isti* & *DRP*.1.2 *isti in angulis*). (There is no hint of *iste* used merely as the second-person pronoun here.) The *in angulis* is a familiar taunt; cf. *De Oratore* 1.57 (= *Or*.1.57 henceforth) and context. Also consider Callicles in Plato's *Gorgias* (485d, cf. Zetzel [1995] *ad loc*).

[94] "Voluntarily" here draws upon *DRP*.1.1: *cum cogeret eum necessitas nulla* ("though no necessity compelled him")—a phrase of some importance to which we shall return.

Epicureans' retreat from the state,[95] but I think it is clear *prima facie* that Cicero's convictions on political involvement have some definite relevance for the philosopher's reticence as Socrates conceives it, too. The following inquiry will show that this relevance is really the indication of a more fundamental disagreement between Cicero's and Socrates's conception of the perfectly educated individual—that person typified as the best statesman in Plato's *Republic* and, as we shall see, in Cicero's *De Re Publica*, *De Legibus*, and *De Oratore*.[96]

In examining Socratic education's relationship with politics, we began by sketching the movement of Socratic education and then considered that movement as it comes to bear on the philosopher's disposition toward politics. The pitiful state of *De Re Publica* renders a similar approach to Cicero difficult:[97] books IV and V, where ancient sources indicate we might have expected to find the fullest discussion of education, exist almost entirely in the slight testimony of later authors (primarily Augustine, Lactantius, Nonius, and Donatus). On the other hand, we

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[95] Cicero's taunts make clear that the dangers and rigors of political life were the prime consideration in the Epicureans' avoidance (cf. *DRP*.1.4). Some Socratic sentiments (see n67 above) have a kinship with this turn of mind, but it is overreaching to say that Socrates and the Epicureans would have discouraged political life for the exact same reasons.

[96] Plato and Cicero do not agree on what to call this educated individual, a suggestive fact. For Plato, as we have seen, this person would be the philosopher. For Cicero, well, the title *De Oratore* should give us a clue—or more explicitly, cf. Crassus speaking at *Or*.1.34: *sic enim statuo, perfecti oratoris moderatione et sapientia non solum ipsius dignitatem, sed et privatorum plurimorum et universae rei publicae salutem maxime contineri* ("Thus do I maintain that by the prudence [*moderatio et sapientia*] of the complete [*perfecti*] orator is not his own dignity alone preserved, but especially the safety of the greatest number of private citizens and the entire *res publica*."). Scaevola's response (*Or*.1.35ff) is important but does not finally gainsay Crassus's thesis. Reinhardt (2000) also speaks of the "ideal of the philosopher-orator" in Cicero, which is more to the point, as we shall see (531).

[97] Preliminary lamentations concerning the fragmentary state of *De Re Publica* have become a hallmark for any study of Cicero's political philosophy. They are amplified by the fact that *De Re Publica* is reputed to have been one of Cicero's most masterly and polished philosophic works.

do possess the whole of *De Oratore*,[98] another philosophic dialogue of the 50s where much on education can be found. It will prove a useful resource for us later, but as the great bulk of it is technical in orientation there is little in it thematically that could afford an immediate transition from the political focus of the second chapter on the *Republic*.[99] For these reasons, we will go about our examination of Cicero in inverse order to that of Plato: we will consider first Cicero's comments in *De Re Publica* (with some help from *De Legibus*[100]) on the necessity (*necessitas*/ἀνάγκη) of political service; then, relying heavily on *De Oratore*, we will attempt to sketch a plausible understanding of a Ciceronian course of education that might suit his thoughts on politics.[101]

It will already be guessed from our opening statements that Cicero is in broad disagreement with any philosophic position that encourages retreat from the state (exemplified for him by the Epicureans). Let us not impute to Socrates this position, for we did not conclude beyond a shadow of a doubt that Socrates would indeed recommend such a path. In discussing

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[98] Indeed, Wolfe (1995) rightly points out that *De Oratore* is the "*locus classicus* for the Ciceronian educational philosophy" (469).

[99] Some scholarship that I have found useful on Cicero's relationship to Plato and Aristotle includes: Nicgorski (1991), who highlights the "fundamental agreement" between Cicero's and Plato's political ideas (235), but only to throw into relief Cicero's dissatisfaction with the focus on the best state (Plato) and his accordant shift to discussion of the best statesman (238ff), Long (1994) 37-52, Powell (2012), and, more generally, Rawson (1985). Cicero's intellectual relationship with his more immediate Greek teachers and the Greek-language Hellenistic philosophic writings has been thoroughly examined and needs no mention here (cf. Smith's excellent bibliography in Barnes & Griffin [1989]).

[100] The relationship between *De Re Publica* and *De Legibus* is a difficult matter. For the compositional relationship between the two, see Schmidt (1969) or his condensed and revised thoughts in *idem* (2001). For some surmises on the philosophic relationship, see, e.g., Powell (2001), esp. 18-20. We do know that the dialogues were closely linked when they were conceived in the late 50s BC, but it is likely that *De Legibus* was never completed for publication.

[101] It goes without saying that far less has been written on education in *De Re Publica* than in Plato's *Republic*. *De Oratore*, on the other hand, is a favored source for discussion of the "liberal arts" education. See, e.g., Wolfe [1995]. More on education in *De Re Publica* can be found at n165 below, first heading.

the *Republic*, we had the rather less ambitious goal of showing only that Socrates indicates a need for some sort of compulsion (ἀνάγκη) if the philosopher is to overcome his reluctance to rule. This need for compulsion would be unproblematic if its presence were guaranteed, but we concluded that, as it stands, its provenance is extremely obscure and set forth in largely conditional terms, that is, in the language of possibility rather than probability or actuality. The difficulties this problem poses led us to believe that the relationship between politics and the philosophic education that inculcates such a reluctance is an uncertain or even antagonistic one. The best way to understand whether this same unhappy relationship exists in Cicero's thought is to examine how Cicero treats these questions of political service (that he treats them will become apparent, I believe). We may begin by asking how Cicero has appropriated and changed Socratic concerns: will Cicero's best statesman also require some necessity if he is to helm the state? Are the source and actuality of this necessity expressed, as in the *Republic*, in uncertain terms?[102]

The notion of necessity (*necessitas*) is one that recurs frequently in different contexts in *De Re Publica*. To begin, we might consider more fully the argument against the Epicureans partially quoted above. What survives of *De Re Publica* begins with Cicero speaking in his own voice in a sort of preface to the dialogue proper.[103] In this preface, Cicero spends a great deal of time attempting to clear the air of criticisms of political participation so that he can begin a

[102] It is somewhat surprising that there is little scholarship self-consciously approaching the problem of political necessity in *De Re Publica* as Cicero sees it. I have found a notable exception in Prof. Asmis's writings, esp. (2001) and (2008).

[103] Hand-in-hand with the revised attention to Cicero has come a greater respect for his introduction into the Latin language and employment of the dialogic genre. For a few remarks on the dialogue form and Cicero, and an illustrative methodology: Zoll (1962), Barlow (1987) 356, Nicgorski (1991) 232, Powell (1996) 24, Asmis (2004) 570, Schofield (2008), Inwood (2012) 235ff. I do not live up to these standards, but I do hope that I have made no egregious errors in interpreting the context and value of quotations for our study.

discussion of politics without having to guard against doubts as to the validity of the theme.[104] As a part of this effort, he provides a list of great Romans who devoted themselves to service of the state. Among these figures (the Metelli, Marcelli, and so on) Cicero is particularly interested in the figure of Marcus Porcius Cato, an intellectual and political luminary of the second century whom the Romans sometimes thought of as a Stoic sage.[105] Of Cato, Cicero says: . . . *certe licuit Tusculi se in otio delectare, salubri et propinquo loco. Sed homo demens ut isti putant, cum cogeret eum necessitas nulla, in his undis et tempestatibus ad summam senectutem maluit iactari* . . . (". . . he certainly could have passed the time in leisure at Tusculum, a healthful place not too far from Rome. But he must be a mad man, as they [i.e., the Epicureans] would have it, since he rather chose to be tossed about in the tempestuous swells [sc. of politics] at the height of old age, though no *necessitas* compelled him . . ." *DRP*.1.1). No *necessitas* compelled Cato and he went to political service anyway. This statement suggests that *necessitas* is a superfluous motivation to political service. Considering the statement's tone, we might even be inclined to call it petty and contemptible. What, then, does Cicero mean by *necessitas*? Let us plunge ahead for further clues.

Only a few lines later, *necessitas* reappears with a radically different sense. In bringing an end to the list of great Roman politicians, Cicero recapitulates his position: *unum hoc definio, tantam esse necessitatem uirtutis generi hominum a natura tantumque amorem ad communem salutem defendendam datum, ut ea uis omnia blandimenta uoluptatis otique uicerit* ("I make this one assertion, that so great a *necessitas* of/for virtue has been given by nature to the human race,

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[104] *DRP*.1.12: . . . *quae* [*disputatio de re publica*] *ne frustra haberetur, dubitationem ad rem publicam adeundi in primis debui tollere* (". . . and lest this discussion concerning the *res publica* issues fruitlessly, the first point of business was to remove any doubts about participating in the *res publica* [*ad rem publicam adeundi*]). The importance of this declaration for our purposes is obvious.

[105] Zetzel (1995) *ad loc* for more on Cato, who, as Zetzel points out, was a figure of great importance for Cicero, a "precedent for his own [Cicero's] career" (*ad loc*).

and so great a love of defending the common wellbeing, that that power has overcome all the attractions of leisure base and fair" *DRP*.1.1). Has Cicero mixed things up by suggesting both that no *necessitas* compels the greatest of politicians to service and that *necessitas* compels the whole human race to (what might be called) political service? I think not. A closer reading would show that he has carefully distinguished between two sorts of compulsion that might come to bear upon the would-be politician. In context, the first *necessitas* is surely to be understood as an *external* compulsion.[106] The implication of the Epicureans (vis-à-vis *isti*) brings to mind Cicero's presentation of their position later in the preface as maintaining that a wise man ought only go to political service when faced with a grave crisis that might threaten him.[107] The first instance of *necessitas* is compatible with this Epicurean position, primarily connoting conditions (forcible or not[108]) threatening one's personal and philosophic equanimity. The whole phrase in the first formulation (*cum cogeret eum necessitas nulla*) nearly means *voluntarily*, that is, of one's own accord, or lacking external pressures conducing the action. The second *necessitas* is indubitably more abstract, with psychical or metaphysical overtones; it is not imposed by circumstances but is rather given by nature (*a natura*). This second *necessitas* could, then, more properly be said to be *internal*. We may provisionally understand it as *instinct*, a natural tendency that only necessitates or compels action insofar as it predisposes one to service of the common good. Let us spend some time considering this second instance of *necessitas* and what it implies about

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[106] On this external sense, cf. *Lewis & Short* (*LS*) s.v. *necessitas* I ("compulsion, force") and *Oxford Latin Dictionary* s.v. *necessitas* 3. Cf. n108 below and, on the internal sort of *necessitas*, n142.

[107] See *DRP*.1.4.

[108] One could, for example, imagine the strictures of duty that would compel a *pater* to political service (consider *LS* s.v. *necessitas*, I, "by the compulsion of circumstances," and *OLD* s.v. *necessitas*, 3a, "constraint imposed by external circumstances"). On a related note, that this goad cannot convincingly explain Cato's action Cicero makes clear by calling attention to his status as a *homo ignotus et nouus*.

Cicero's philosophical position. As the first instance of *necessitas* we considered more properly seems to describe what Socrates suggests when he uses a form of ἀνάγκη,[109] distinguishing the second instance that is unique to Cicero will help us get a better grasp on his disagreement with the Socratic position.

Hard on the heels of his statement that we are all bound by a *necessitas uirtutis*, Cicero specifies not only that *uirtus*'s whole worth is found in its use (*usus, DRP*.1.2 quoted above), but also that *usus . . . eius est maximus ciuitatis gubernatio* ("its greatest use is the governance of the state" *DRP*.1.3). It follows closely from these statements that *necessitas uirtutis* is virtually *necessitas gubernandae ciuitatis*. Our provisional identification of this kind of *necessitas* with "instinct" is corroborated only slightly later when Cicero restates the sentiment it expresses thus: *. . . maxime rapimur ad opes augendas generis humani, studemusque nostris consiliis et laboribus tutiorem et opulentiorem uitam hominum reddere, et ad hanc uoluptatem ipsius naturae stimulis incitamur* ("we are most strongly pulled along [*maxime rapimur*] to increase the prosperity of the human race, and we are eager to make the lives of men safer and better off with our plans and efforts, and we are whipped up to this pleasure by the goads of nature itself" *DRP*.1.3). The unidentified impulse by which we are "dragged"[110] (*maxime rapimur*) towards the service of the *genus humanum* is undoubtedly to be understood as the *necessitas* of *necessitas uirtutis*. It should also be pointed out that *natura* recurs in the same role as earlier (*esse . . . a natura DRP*.1.2), responsible for implanting such a tendency and greasing its wheels (*ad hanc*

[109] That is to say, we deemed it likely (although not certain) that the ἀνάγκη in the *Republic* was external. E.g., consider the problems we found with the internal compulsion at ch.2, pp47-48.
[110] I wish to translate *maxime rapimur* a bit more strongly than do either Rudd (1998) "we are led by a powerful urge" or Zetzel (1999), "we are strongly drawn." Asmis (2001) more satisfactorily renders: "'we are seized' (*rapimur*) 'above all' (*maxime*) . . ."

uoluptatem[111]). *Necessitas* here can hardly be said to operate in the sense of the first instance of *necessitas* or of Socrates's ἀνάγκη: the psychical or internal element of compulsion commentators have tried to find with little success in the Socratic ἀνάγκη is quite explicit in this passage.[112] There is not a whiff in *maxime rapimur* of an external application of compulsion:[113] the impulse or instinct (cf. *stimulis* above) is firmly rooted *in* human beings and directs its pull from that source. There are many more statements in *De Re Publica*, often those characteristic of what is sometimes referred to as Ciceronian "humanism,"[114] that seem to rely precisely upon this philosophic sense of *necessitas*.[115] I do not think we would go wrong in believing that Cicero means to refer these statements back to a common philosophical framework undergirding them; but it is a little strange, then, that he does not go to the trouble of explicitly developing this framework in the dialogue (at least the surviving portion). How are we to characterize this "instinct" (*necessitas*) as to its nature and source? One possible strategy might include going straight to the Stoic sources suggested by Cicero's use of *natura* (an admittedly helpful source). As we should rather let Cicero speak for himself,[116] however, another fruitful source from the

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[111] See Zetzel's (1999) note *ad loc* on Cicero's use of *ad hanc uoluptatem* in mocking the Epicureans.

[112] When I say "with little success," I refer to the lack of scholarly consensus on the nature of the philosopher's ἀνάγκη (cf. n70-71 above).

[113] I must apologize for the rather subtle distinction between "internal" and "external" compulsion for which I am arguing. But however difficult it might be to draw a hard and fast line between the two senses of the term, the distinction is a crucial one for understanding the fine differences in how an individual might be brought to confront politics. I happily find Asmis (2001) also adopts such terminology, going so far as to distinguish between "external political necessity" and "internal necessity." Asmis calls the latter a "naturally implanted impulse for virtue," for more on which see Asmis (2008), esp. 10-11.

[114] Rand (1932) and Hayes (1939) sketch an abbreviated Ciceronian notion of humanism well enough for our purposes; we must guard, however, against falling into an anachronistic Christian brand thereof.

[115] Several of these instances will be examined below.

[116] Powell (2012) puts the sentiment well: " . . . I am not by and large attempting to unravel the sources of Cicero's ideas but rather—in tune with the overall direction of Ciceronian scholarship

"early" philosophic period[117] might include the dialogue *De Legibus*, which we know was written in close conjunction with *De Re Publica*.[118] There are also fairly obvious clues in *De Re Publica* that Cicero assumes a knowledge of his philosophic stance in *De Legibus*. We will consider one of these clues before turning to *De Legibus*.

In Book II of *De Re Publica* Scipio forcibly asks: *quis enim hunc hominem rite dixerit, qui sibi cum suis ciuibus, qui denique cum omni hominum genere nullam iuris communionem, nullam humanitatis societatem uelit?* ("For who would rightly call that person 'human,' who should wish for himself no common defense of justice, no partnership in humanity with his fellow citizens, nay, not with the whole human race?" *DRP*.2.48). This rhetorical question is not, strictly speaking, a philosophic argument for anything (nor need it be in context), but it does hint at a few necessary conditions for a definition of the human being (*homo*/ἄνθρωπος): *communio iuris* and *societas humanitatis*. These two ideas include the old formulation ζῷον πολίτικον

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in the last twenty years—to interpret Cicero on his own terms (15). There has, fortunately, been a great exodus away from the dismissive, and as I think most would agree now, reductive and uncritical assessments of Ciceronian philosophy (as evinced, e.g., by Mommsen's or Syme's famous comments). On this general movement, cf. Douglas (1968), Wiseman (1990), Nicgorski's (2012) introduction, esp. 6-7, Schmidt (1978-9) 117-118, and Nicgorski's (1978) essay updated and reprinted in that same volume (but also, see Smith's (1989) III, (i) bibliography). The commitment to approaching Cicero on his own terms is well represented in Powell's (1995) collection, but one can see that at least some contributors in that volume still felt the need to defend the value of studying Ciceronian philosophy. Papers today seem to me to have a more celebratory attitude, but there remains a (healthy) consciousness that old prejudices die hard and profound and basic misconceptions remain abundant in a number of fields (cf., e.g., Powell & North's [2001] list of "[m]ajor misunderstandings [that] have remained current," 1).

[117] Glucker (1988) and Steinmetz (1989) have argued (as Görler [1995] quotes, 85-6) that the philosophic dialogues of the 50s (*De Re Publica, De Legibus, De Oratore*) came in an "Antiochan" period, during which Cicero (allegedly) shifted away from Academic skepticism towards the Antiochan "Old Academy." In his essay, Görler (1995) convincingly argues against this position and in favor of the traditional interpretation that Cicero remained an Academic skeptic throughout his life, despite having some "dogmatic" beliefs.

[118] See n100 above.

(political animal) but extend well beyond that definition:[119] human beings are not only "political," i.e., "tending to congregate in communities (πολεῖς)," but are also given by nature to the preservation of justice and mutual cultivation of humane tendencies in these communities. *Humanitas*, as we shall momentarily see, is to be identified with all of those unique features that human animals hold in common, so a *societas humanitatis* would consist in an explicit partnership among men recognizing and promoting these characteristics. These off-the-cuff rhetorical questions could be mistaken for the commonplace observation that human beings tend to congregate together. If we remain attentive to the rhetorical force of the questions (*qui . . . qui denique*), however, then we might already suspect that Cicero is as concerned with redefining the category of *homo* as he is with transmitting it; that is to say, his tone suggests that he cares to assert what humans *should* do and be in communities, not merely what they *are*. The expressions *communio iuris* and *societas humanitatis* are not further elaborated after this question, but for us, it has done its job, for in *De Legibus* Cicero will pick up on and develop in no uncertain terms the sentiment it expresses.

A variety of philosophic assertions,[120] partly Stoic, partly Platonic in origin, can be collected from where they lie scattered in the first book of *De Legibus*; when patched together

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[119] On the Chrysippean appropriation and modification of Aristotle's definition (*Politics* 1253a2-3), see Asmis (2008) 10-11: "In a groundbreaking correction of Aristotle's famous dictum, Chrysippus gathers all humans into a single community of 'naturally political animals,' governed by the commands prohibitions of natural law." Cicero seems to presuppose a similar such expansion of the Aristotelian definition.

[120] Pangle (2008) finds Cicero's "legislative preamble" to *De Legibus* "admittedly subphilosophic or rhetorical," and seems to give *DL*.1.23 and *DL*.1.32 in support of these claims (244 with n21). I am not sure "subphilosophic" is the best way of putting it; "dogmatic" might more comfortably be said. Graver (2012) captures the idea well: "Though presenting himself as a skeptic in some matters, Cicero does not wish to give up on the concept of a divinely conferred human nature" (113). This conviction, which Cicero does not always feel the need to justify could possibly be categorized as dogmatic. In any case, Cicero need not explain himself fully in this passage, as he makes it clear that he is jumping off from an assumed body of Stoic doctrine

into a coherent whole, they will begin to clarify not only the definition of the human being presented above but also, with some hope, the elusive *necessitas* we are considering. A constellation of terms interrelated and laden with technical meaning emerges, of which the most important for our purposes are *ratio*, *lex*, *societas* and *ius*. First, let us get the facts out and see how they stand together (all emphases my own):

> *solum est enim ex tot animantium generibus atque naturis* ***particeps rationis*** *et cogitationis, cum cetera sint omnia expertia*.
>
> [The human] is the only living being from so many types and natures participating in ***ratio*** and thought, which all other creatures lack (*DL*.1.22).[121]

Before drawing any conclusions, read on about *ratio*:

> *lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quae iubet ea quae facienda sunt, prohibetque contraria. Eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et perfecta, lex est*.

(cf. *DL*.1.18 *ut idem definiunt*)—even if he is perfectly content to tinker with this doctrine however he sees fit. Pangle surely recognizes this fact, as he refers us to *De Finibus* and *De Natura Deorum* for fuller discussion of the matter (244 and n21). More Stoic sources might be given.

[121] Reading *quarum* for *cum* with Bake. The fuller definition *ibidem* goes, *Huc enim pertinet: animal hoc prouidum, sagax, multiplex, acutum, memor, plenum rationis et consilii, quem uocamus hominem, praeclara quadam condicione generatum esse a supremo deo* ("This also pertains: this is an animal with foresight, wisdom, versatility, memory, full of reason and council, whom we call 'human,' created with outstanding rank by a supreme god"). More fully on this formulation's pedigree, see Dyck (2004) *ad loc*. On the unity of the human race that any "definition" implies, cf. Cicero at *DL*.1.29 (*Nihil est enim unum uni tam simile, tam par, quam omnes inter nosmet ipsos sums . . . itaque quaecumque est hominis definitio, una in omnis ualet* "Truly, there is no one thing so similar to another, so like, as we all are among ourselves . . . and so, whatever the definition of 'human' is, that one definition is sufficient for all") and so forth.

> ***lex***[122] is the highest ***ratio*** that permeates ***natura***, [*natura*] which orders what ought to be done and forbids things opposite to that. That same ***ratio***, when it is strengthened and perfected in the mind of man, is ***lex*** (*DL*.1.18).[123]

And then comes *societas*:

> *Est enim unum* ***ius****, quo deuincta est* ***hominum societas****, et quod* ***lex*** *constituit una, quae* ***lex est recta ratio*** *imperandi atque prohibendi.*
>
> There is one ***ius*** by which the ***societas*** **of men** is bound, and which consists in one ***lex***, which ***lex*** is **right** ***ratio*** of ordering and forbidding (*DL*.1.42).

Finally our *societas* and *communio legis* with both gods and men:

> *Est igitur, quoniam nihil est* ***ratione*** *melius, eaque <est> et in homine et in deo,* ***prima homini cum deo rationis societas****; inter quos autem* ***ratio****, inter eosdem etiam* ***recta ratio*** *{et}* ***communis*** *est: quae cum sit* ***lex****, lege quoque* ***consociati*** *homines cum dis putandi sumus; inter quos porro est* ***communio legis****, inter eos* ***communio iuris*** *est.*
>
> Since, therefore, nothing is better than ***ratio***, and that is common to both gods and men, the first ***societas*** **for men with gods is one of** ***ratio***. Moreover, among whom there is ***ratio***, there is also **right and common** ***ratio****;* and since that is ***lex***, we also ought to think of ourselves as partnered [***consociati***] with the gods by ***lex***.

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[122] See Cicero's note at *DL*.1.19 on his "special" usage of *lex* as it pertains to the "primal" law, rather than *leges* (< *lex* in the sense of statutory law). For natural law theory in general, Girardet (1989) and, more comprehensively in *De Legibus*, *idem* (1983). Asmis (2008) is a serviceable primer for the purpose, too.

[123] It will be observed that this passage begins with Cicero attributing this definition to *doctissimis uiris* ("most learned men," *DL*.1.17). It is significant that these *doctissimi uiri* are not named: I think it is Cicero's intention to leverage the currency of the idea's Stoic underpinnings while deemphasizing its particular proponents. This should, in turn, cause us to attend more to *how* it is used than by *whom*.

> What's more, among whom there is ***communio legis***, there is ***communio iuris*** (*DL*.1.23).

These statements are quite complex, but at the heart of them all is *ratio*. *Ratio* is the unique possession of men and gods; *ratio* is the immanent principle of *natura*; *lex* in both men and nature is *ratio* articulated rightly (*recta ratio*); *lex* stands as the explicit framework of *ratio* for the *societas* of men (and men with gods); *ius* emerges from this more archaic *lex*; from *lex* come too the political forms of law and justice (*communio legis* / *communio iuris*). *Ratio* is, in short, the common principle shared by men, gods, and nature that seems to give rise to the elaboration called *lex*, a thing at once subjective (*cum est in hominis mente confirmata et perfecta*) and universal,[124] deriving as it does from a *ratio* that is inborn (*insita*) in nature, men, and gods. Because men possess *ratio* (*plenum rationis*, *DL*.1.22), they are already "in" *societas* (i.e., *consociati*) with other *ratio*-instinct entities and "in" a certain relationship to the rational warp of nature. There is no "escaping" *ratio*, only strengthening and perfecting it as *lex* that will, in turn, harmonize men in their *societas* (*societas humanitatis*) and fashion this *societas* after *ratio* and *natura*.

For the sake of brevity we will pass over more exhaustive treatment of these terms here;[125] it will suffice for us to acknowledge that through *ratio* a fine but tough thread runs among all human beings. This bond is expressed in the idea of a *societas* in *ratio*[126]—

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[124] *Lex* in humans and *lex* in nature are distinguished as "two fields of operation" by Asmis (2008) 7: "nature as a whole, or what the Stoics called 'common nature,' and the mind of a wise person." But she is also quick to point out that "law is the same in nature as a whole and in the wise person" (7). Cicero's shifting talk between the two can, at times, be a source of confusion.
[125] Dyck (2004) follows them through quite fully, if one attends to the location of their appearance.
[126] *Societas humanitatis* is also given, as we saw, at *DRP*.2.48. This is tantamount to *societas rationis* insofar as *humanitas* is a word emphasizing those distinctly "human" characteristics,

"partnership in reason" is the best we can do—and affords Cicero a philosophical basis for his advocacy of political service.[127] Political activity, on the basis of what we have considered, must in its highest form be construed essentially as recognition of and contribution to the *societas* that is an essential feature of (human) existence.[128] The unifying principle inherent in the *societas rationis* and quite explicitly formulated in *De Legibus* informs many of Cicero's important declarations in *De Re Publica* that cannot otherwise be completely understood, including the definition of the human (*homo*) we considered above. For example, Cicero has Scipio define a *res publica*[129] as a *coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus* ("a coming-together of a multitude united [*socitatus*] by consensus in justice and the mutual support of utility" *DRP*.1.39). Scipio then goes on to say: *prima causa coeundi est non tam imbecillitas quam naturalis quaedam hominum quasi congregatio; non est singulare nec soliuagum genus*

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among which *ratio* has pride of place. (To be sure, the gods also possess *ratio*, but maybe not *humanitas*.) For more on *humanitas*, see n114 above.

[127] And also for the great importance he lays upon freedom (*libertas*) and equitability (*aequitas*/*aequabilitas*). Discussion here will of these topics will necessarily be limited. For a limited conversation of their significance here, cf. n137 below.

[128] The points of contact between my entire analysis in ch.3 (on the *necessitas* of political service) and Asmis (2001) are too many to adumbrate here. I had, in fact, come to my own conclusions on *necessitas* before discovering that article, but was greatly cheered by the clarity and sophistication with which Asmis approaches the same issue. Suffice to say, I am in broad agreement with Asmis's argument and, should my own discussion befuddle the reader, I could recommend that as an appropriate substitute. Asmis (2008) is similarly useful for our purposes in a more restricted sense, linking the individual's recognition of the "commands and prohibition of [natural] law in such a way as to heed them fully" with the conclusion that "the wise person will take an active part in the political community" (17). *Eadem* (2008) is more valuable, however, by way of a discussion of the natural law theory of *De Legibus* and as furnishing (possible) sources for Cicero's thought on the matter.

[129] The distinction may come rather late, but it is worth noting the difference between a *res publica* and *ciuitas*. In brief, the latter can be understood as a more general term (= state), whereas the former recognizes the importance of the role of the *populus* in a state's legitimacy (*res publica* = *res populi*, the people's concern). See Schofield's (1995) excellent article on this point, and for more on the *res publica* as a special political entity. Also cf. Asmis [2004]. We might say that all *res publicae* are *ciuitates*, but that not all *ciuitates* are *res publicae*. At *DRP*.1.48 and *DRP*.3.43, Cicero specifically stipulates that a *res publica* can only properly so called if it precisely is the *res populi*, the "concern of the people"; otherwise, it loses that title.

hoc . . . ("the first cause of coming together [*sc*. into a *res publica*] is not so much weakness as a certain natural gregarious impulse [*congregatio*[130]] of men; for his race is not solitary or given to wandering alone . . ." DRP.1.39). Both of these statements of Scipio work together with the *societas rationis* we considered to give a complete account of the *res publica*'s nature and origin. The *iuris consensus* of the first quotation must be conceived in terms of an elaboration of the *ratio* and *lex* we analyzed in *De Legibus*: the *unum ius* by which the *societas* of humans is bound is *lex*, which in turn is *recta ratio* (*DL*.1.42, quoted above). The *iuris consensus*,[131] then, is an explicit recognition of the common foundation afforded by *ratio* and *lex*. Interestingly, this common foundation is already attested in man's natural (*naturalis*) tendency to form society (*congregatio*), something that is surely a symptom of his joint-stock existence with other human beings.[132] We should compare this position on the origin of the *res publica*—rooted in natural law and the human being's instinct to express that law—with Socrates's on the origin of the πόλις: Γίγνεται τοίνυν, ἦν δ᾽ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής ("'Well then, the city comes to be as I say,' I said, 'as a result of each us of not being self-sufficient, but rather *in need of many things"* emphasis my own, *R*.369c). Cicero's Scipio would allow that we are not self-sufficient (*communio utilitatis* is also a spur to society) but he explicitly stipulates that a *res publica* is founded not as much upon a

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[130] Zetzel (1995) finds the use metaphorical, "as it more properly refers to animals rather than men" (*ad loc*). Dyck (1998) would caution us that "[i]t seems doubtful . . . that in general the *–grego* compounds were at this date felt as vividly metaphorical" (564), citing *segrego* in Plautus and Terence.

[131] For some thoughts on *consensus iuris* and the difficulties of interpretation it poses: Powell (2001) Asmis (2004) 578-582, Asmis (2005) 401, and Márquez (2012), who argues that it is "an essentially *legal* concept" (196). I find How's (1930) discussion of the *consensus Italiae* and *bonorum* (33-34), while not strictly linked, suggestive. Also, consider a formulation of a similar idea at DRP.1.49: *quid est enim ciuitas nisi iuris societas civium?* ("For what is a state if not a *societas* of *ius* among citizens?").

[132] This tendency (*congregatio*) could be construed as guiding individuals towards an explicit recognition and perfection of natural law (*lex naturalis*); so Asmis (2008) 9-11.

weakness (*non tam imbecillitas*)[133] as upon an innate gregarious tendency (*congregatio*) that calls attention to the common link among humans[134] and conduces social behavior.[135] So Scipio's definition of the *res publica* must not be thought of as a sort of "contract theory" in the same sense as Socrates's (cf. πολλῶν ἐνδεής),[136] even though the *iuris consensus* might suggest this, for the *iuris consensus* is an outgrowth of the underlying natural law to which men are subject. Cicero pays deference to this idea with his insistence that the governance (*consilium*) of the state *semper ad eam causam referendum est quae causa genuit ciuitatem* ("must always be referred back to that cause which first gave rise to the state" *DRP*.1.42). He adds that a state is only "tolerable" (*tolerabile*) *si teneat illud uinclum quod primum homines inter se rei publicae societate deuinxit* ("if it preserves that bond which first tied men together amongst themselves in

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[133] In dissenting from the opinion that *imbecillitas* is the origin of the state, Cicero rejects his Polybian "source" (see How [1930] 29n1 and Asmis [2005] 401). For more on Cicero's rethinking of the Roman constitution and his disagreement with Polybius (though borrowing much), see Asmis (2005) generally.

[134] This notion of the "common link" strikes me as an important one in Ciceronian thought. Cf., e.g., *Pro Archia* 2: *Etenim omnes artes, quad ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune vinculum, et quasi cognatione quadam inter se continentur* ("For truly, all the arts which pertain to humanity possess a certain common thread, and are held together among themselves by a certain kinship.")

[135] Cf. a fragment generously preserved by Nonius (321.16 = *DRP*.1.39b Z), vague in specific philosophic import (the *idque* is quite uncertain in its referent) but useful in affording some futher characterization of this impulse (text is Lindsay's [1903]): *idque ipsa natura non invitaret solum, sed etiam cogeret* ("and nature itself not only encourages it, but also compels it"). (Nonius adds: *Invitare significat replere*.) Also, cf. Lactantius *Inst*. 6.10.18 (= *DRP*.1.40 Z). On the position of the Lactantius and Nonius fragments here, see Zetzel (1999) 18n, who agrees with Ziegler (1969) in general position if not the exact order.

[136] I think of contract in the Hobbesian sense, when he posits (*Leviathan*, ch.17) that "the final cause, end, or design of men (who naturally love liberty, and dominion over others) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, in which we see them live in Commonwealths, is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby." Cicero would, in the final analysis, agree with these last points, but, I think, reject Hobbes's placement of them at the root of the state.

the *societas* of a *res publica*" *DRP*.1.43).[137] The *causa* and *primum uinclum* will, I think, be recognized as pointing to the original fact of men's partnership in reason.[138]

This partnership in reason[139] (*societas rationis*) also explains the sense of *necessitas* in the phrase *necessitas uirtutis* we examined. *Necessitas* there cannot signify any really ineluctable compulsion.[140] That is to say, when Cicero uses *necessitas* in such a context, I do not think that

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[137] There is the additional caveat that it may only endure (*diuturnum*) if it is *aequabilis*: *in hoc statu rei publicae, quem dixi iam saepe non posse esse diuturnum, quod non esset in omnis ordines ciuitatis aequabilis . . .* ("in this state of the *res publica*, which, as I have often said, cannot endure long, because it was not equitable towards all orders of the state [*ciuitas*]. . . DRP.2.62). I take *aequitas*/*aequibilitas* to refer back, in the final analysis, to the fact of men's common nature, and so too *libertas* as having its foundation in that fact. For more cf., e.g., *DRP*.1.49, *DRP*.2.57 (this latter a puzzling passage with its own difficulties: see Zetzel [1999] *ad loc* and more fully Nicgorksi [1991] 236, among others). (For a few illuminating notes on the terms *aequitas*/*aequibilitas*, thought not coming to bear strongly on our discussion here, see Zetzel [1995] *ad* 1.53 and Fantham [1973]; and *contra*, Dyck [1998] 564-5.) So far as the point of *non diuturnum* goes, Powell's (2001) essay has an enlightening discussion of mutability and the causes of change in the state (23-30); citing Scipio's comments at *DRP*.1.69, he emphasizes that it is by "some great fault in the ruling politicians" that a state is induced to decline (25). Following from this, it is of the utmost importance "to ensure a good supply of conscientious statesmen," for it is they who are capable of guiding the state within the existing constitution (26). Whether or not Cicero's stance implicitly criticizes the stratification of Plato's Callipolis is another matter, but I think that Powell's comments do highlight the integral role of our theme, education.

[138] This partnership is also a constitutive element of the *res publica*. On the requirement of legitimacy, see n129 above.

[139] This *societas* gains its crucial staying power by its link to the gods: *Et ille: 'an tu ad domos nostras non censes pertinere scire quid agatur et quid fiat domi? quae non est quam parietes nostri cingunt, sed mundus hic totus, quod domicilium quamque patriam di nobis commune secum dederunt, cum praesertim si haec ignoramus, multa nobis et magna ignoranda sint . . .'* ("And he asked: 'Don't you think it pertains to our homes to know what is goes on and is done at home? Our home is not that which our walls encircle, but this entire universe, *which the gods have given to us a dwelling place and homeland to be held in common with them . . .*' *DRP*.1.19). The link to the gods is to be found, of course, in the common possession of reason (*ratio*). This idea has a rich and enduring pedigree in Stoic philosophy. A good exegesis of this relationship is to be found in the *Somnium Scipionis*.

[140] Cf. Lactantius *Inst*.6.8.6-9 (= *DRP*.3.33 Z). There, Lactantius reports a very strong, Stoic understanding of natural law. Of *lex*, *recta ratio*, he says: *quae tamen neque probos frustra iubet aut uetat, nec improbos iubendo aut uetando movet* ("which [law] nevertheless does not command or forbid the good in vain, though it cannot move the wicked by this ordering or forbidding").

he means that all men are really subjected to a palpable goad to service of the *res publica* (*qua* political manifestation of *societas*).[141] Rather, I think Cicero loosely employs the phrase, perhaps after a rhetorical fashion, to call attention obliquely to the underlying philosophical framework structured by *ratio* that we have discussed.[142] Any conceivable sense of *necessitas* as it appears here would have to begin from the foundational partnership in reason that *a priori* ties our interests to those of our fellowmen. While it is true that claims asserting the necessity of political service would have been par for the course among Roman nobles, it is equally true, as I think is obvious, that Cicero does not take this expected agreement as sufficient grounds for his contentions: he is supremely interested in finding a philosophical justification for what was, for him, the noblest course of life one could undertake.[143] Indeed, political service is shown to share a common foundation with the virtues: Cicero explains the origins of *caritas, liberalitas*, and even *pietas* by saying that *natura propensi sumus ad diligendos homines* ("we are inclined by nature to a fondness for human beings"), a tendency *quod fundamentum iuris est* ("which is [also] the foundation of justice" *DL*.1.43). Reluctance towards political service can only be

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[141] On the significance of *res publica* as legitimate political manifestation of *societas*, see n129 above.

[142] This is not to say that it is rhetorical in any fundamental sense; I am only seeking to explain why Cicero uses *necessitas* rather than a weaker substantive meaning something like "instinct," "impulse," etc. Asmis (2001 & 2008) does not specifically attempt to explain Cicero's choice of *necessitas*, but generally agrees that (when used internally) it must refer to some kind of "impulse" (2001) or "psychical force" (2008, 11) guiding human beings. The discussion of Stoic moral progress (*ibid*., 11ff) with its emphasis on reason and law "commanding" human beings suggests a possible root for *necessitas*. It is rather strange, but I can find no reference to any meaning of *necessitas* in *LS* or *OLD* that would fit the context; nor do any of the usages in question (e.g., *DRP*.1.1) appear in either lexicon. *LS* is closest, s.v. *necessitas* II.a, "fate, destiny, a law of nature," although this meaning does not quite fit either.

[143] Cf. *DRP*.1.2: *Neque enim est ulla res in qua propius ad deorum numen uirtus accedat humana, quam ciuitates aut condere nouas aut conseruare iam conditas (*"For there is no matter in which human virtue approaches the divinity of the gods than in founding new states or preserving those already founded" *DRP*.1.12).

explained as an inadequate grasp of the human's true nature as revealed by philosophical inquiry.[144]

Let us pause for a moment to consider what we have just learned. We were led to consider Cicero's idea of a partnership in reason in order to understand in what sense Cicero says we are endowed with a "necessity" for virtue (*necessitas uirtutis DRP*.1.1) and are thus "dragged along" (*rapimur maxime DRP*.1.3) to political service. It seems clear that these claims must be referred back to the *societas* arising from humans' mutual possession of *ratio*: the explanation for Cicero's belief that we are "compelled" to political service can be found in his analysis of the human race and his conclusion that humans are inextricably bound together by common participation in *ratio*, including its presence in *natura* and its elaborations as *lex* and *ius*. Cicero's assertion of a compulsion to political service must be interpreted in this vein, as positing an internal compulsion (whether we want to term it psychical or metaphysical). On the other hand, we will recall that in our examination of the *Republic* we found insufficient evidence to support the idea that the philosopher's ἀνάγκη was to be understood as an internal force[145]—indeed, we found that its source was often attributed to the οἰκισταί of the city or the philosopher-king himself.[146] This distinction between *external* and *internal* compulsion to politics is more important than it might first seem. An internal compulsion, the likes of which we have found in Cicero, has the potential to remain in perpetual force, continuously reminding men of their political duties. External compulsion would almost certainly be of a more accidental character,

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[144] So "natural-philosophical" inquiry, that is, inquiry into the nature of human beings and the universe, directly motivates and justifies political life; yet the revelation of natural philosophy also places political service *above* philosophy, because one sees one's nature precisely as a social creature linked to others. See Barlow (1987): "[s]tatesmanship . . . appears to be a more comprehensive kind of knowledge than natural philosophy" (364; and cf. 369).
[145] Consider the diversity of opinion observed in n70-71 above.
[146] See ch.2 above, esp. p50.

not deriving from the essential constitution of men but rather coming from without as an arbitrary imposition. If one reads Cicero's use of *necessitas* carelessly, this distinction is lost. It is also lost if one arrogates too much to Plato's use of ἀνάγκη.[147] But allow me to make a less bold claim: if the compulsion needed for the philosophers in the *Republic* is at all uncertain as to its form, source, and possibility of existence, the same cannot be said of the internal *necessitas* Cicero emphasizes, which is grounded in nothing less than the (psychical or metaphysical) constitution of man. Of course, this is not to say Cicero never employs *necessitas* as meaning an external compulsion akin to the philosopher's ἀνάγκη in the *Republic*. To be sure, we noted earlier that Cicero employs this sense of external *necessitas* (albeit depreciatively) in his claim that Cato went to political service "though no *necessitas* compelled him" (*cum cogeret eum necessitas nulla DRP*.1.1). Having learned what we can of *necessitas* in *De Legibus*, it may be of use to return to *De Re Publica* and consider a few occasions where the external and internal senses of *necessitas* are present, that we may more fully characterize their role in Cicero's thought. As may already be suspected, we will see that Cicero has a low estimation of the efficacy of external rather than internal goads to action. We will first consider two instances of internal *necessitas*, then two of external *necessitas*. After so doing, we will briefly reflect on the politician's potential for happiness as Cicero sees it and then follow a thread in *necessitas* that may bring us back to a discussion of education proper.

In characterizing the person who has right understanding of the world (*DRP*.1.26), Cicero says that such a person is authorized (*liceat*) to regard all things as matters of his own interest (*pro suis vindicare*) *non Quiritium sed sapientium iure . . . nec ciuili nexo sed communi lege*

[147] I make a philosophical rather than linguistic point: it goes without saying that Plato uses ἀνάγκη however he sees fit. But this does not mean that we cannot exclude certain senses of a word in particular contexts, or at the least deem them very unlikely.

naturae ("not by the law [*ius*] of the Romans, but of the philosophers . . . and not by the bonds of civil law, but by the common law [*lex*] of nature" *DRP*.1.27).[148] The *lex naturae* serves as a gloss on the "law of the philosophers" (*ius sapientium*),[149] and both of these formulations recall our discussion of *De Legibus* and the philosophic structure adumbrated there in support of political community: this cosmopolitan individual is one who possesses the sort of philosophic knowledge of himself and the rational order of the universe described in *De Legibus*. The link to *necessitas* becomes explicit in Scipio's statements immediately following. He adds that this person *qui, imperia, consulatusque nostros in necessariis, non in expetendis rebus, muneris fungendi gratia subeundos, non praemiorum aut gloriae causa appetendos putet* ("considers ruling and the Roman consulship as necessary things [*in necessariis*], not desirable ones, to be approached for the sake of discharging a duty, not coveted for the sake of reward or glory" *DRP*.1.27). So those acting with reference to the *lex naturae* approach the state as a "necessary" matter (*in necessariis*), that is, approach it under a sort of *necessitas*. This locution will, perhaps, recall the philosopher's treatment of political office in Plato's *Republic* as a "necessary thing" (ἀναγκαῖον). Indeed, it would not be unreasonable to compare Cicero's statement here with Socrates's that the ideal ruler would scorn the wages of service (μισθός) and must know a better way of life than ruling.[150] The crucial difference between Cicero's *in necessariis* and Socrates's

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[148] On the "legal" language of this section in general, Zetzel (1995) *ad loc*, who also rightly observes the allusion to *R*.347 (to be touched upon below).

[149] I cannot help recalling, from *ius sapientium*, the mention of the Academic philosopher Xenocrates in the preface of Book 1: *cum quaereretur ex eo quid assequerentur eius discipuli, respondisse ut id sua sponte facerent quod cogerentur facere legibus* ("when it was asked of him what his students sought to obtain, he answered, to do of their own accord what they are compelled to do by laws" *DRP*.1.3). I am inclined to believe that this sentiment is one which Cicero, in another context, would endorse; he is unfavorably disposed to it here, perhaps because it comes in the midst of his virulent attack on Epicurean philosophy (and this attack spreads into a sort of smear campaign on philosophy that he does not maintain throughout the dialogue).

[150] See *R*.521a.

ἀναγκαῖον, however, consists in the nature of compulsion to these necessary things: Cicero leaves us with no doubts that the ideal statesman will go to his task as a result of his understanding of the *lex naturae*, whereas Socrates does not provides assurances that the philosopher will have a reason to approach the "necessary" task of ruling.[151]

The second reference to an internal form of *necessitas*, and a very clear one, is found in Book II of *De Re Publica*. There, Cicero describes the celebrated L. Brutus[152] of the early Roman Republic and his role in deposing the younger Tarquin (*depulit a ciuibus suis iniustum illud durae seruitutis iugum*). In so doing, Cicero makes Brutus over into a sort of patron saint of political service: *qui cum priuatus esset, totam rem publica sustinuit, primusque in hac ciuitate docuit in conseruanda ciuium libertate esse priuatum neminen*. ("and he, though he was only a private citizen [*priuatus esset*], [nevertheless] preserved the entire *res publica*; and he was the first in our country to think that, when it comes to the preservation of the citizens' liberty, nobody can be said to be a private citizen" *DRP*.2.46). This is as clear an instance as any that can be offered of a citizen acting *nec civili nexo sed communi lege naturae* (*DRP*.1.27, quoted above). By emphasizing Brutus's action exactly *in spite* of his private status, Cicero seems to reject the notion that one can be entirely a private citizen (*priuatus*) at all—that is, an individual without political interest. I submit that Cicero sets forth the example of Brutus as historical

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[151] The form of compulsion presented in Book I of the *Republic*, that is, the ἀνάγκη or ζημία arising from the rule of the worse man (to which *DRP*.1.9 is an allusion), could be an exception and bears more similarity to this Ciceronian "internal" compulsion, as we have noted. But on some of the problems with compulsion in Book I, see our discussion above, ch.2, esp. the summary remarks on pp50-51.

[152] L. Brutus fits in more broadly with the "good old" (≈ καλὸς κἀγαθος) Roman statesman who in the hands of Cicero becomes an exemplar of political virtue: . . . *sapientissimis et fortissimis et armis et consilio ciuitatem tuentibus, quorum auctoritas maxime florebat, quod cum honore longe antecellerent ceteris, uoluptatibus erant inferiores nec pecuniis ferme superiores*. (. . . "[those] most wise and courageous men in arms and council guarding the state, whose supremacy [*auctoritas*] especially waxed because, though they exceeded by far others in honor, they were less given to pleasure and barely even better off in wealth" *DRP*.2.59).

evidence for the kind of *necessitas* that would bring an individual to political service. (The substitution of appeal to legendary Roman figures for direct philosophic argument is a hallmark of Cicero's method in these works.[153]) It is up to us, in other words, to gather from the example that acting with respect to the *societas* that binds humans together entails acting in a way that will preserve and construct an equitable (*aequabilis*) political structure.[154] In a roundabout way, Brutus's example also provides another rebuttal of the kind of contract theory that forms the basis of the city-in-speech in Plato's *Republic*: there can be no choice after Brutus to refuse participation in a political entity as there can be in a contract, because any such notional contract is nonexistent.

As we have already observed in Cato's case, Cicero also uses *necessitas* to mean an external sort of compulsion, as opposed to internal. A sure sign of this external *necessitas* is the requirement of an external agent or set of circumstances in its application.[155] Although Cicero acknowledges the possibility of such compulsion, he rejects its ability to have a meaningful influence on the statesman. In Book I Cicero (again in the context of his argument against the Epicureans) anticipates and mocks the belief that *tempus et necessitas* ("a time of need") could ever meaningfully compel (*cogeret*) someone to take an active part in the *res publica* (*suscepturum ullam rei publicae partem DRP*.1.10). The "time of need" indicates a circumstance of impending physical danger or calamity for both the state and its citizens, and we are to think

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[153] This seems to be a feature of some importance in Cicero's writings. Commonly, when Cicero has reservations against following a specific line of philosophic thought, he will subvert it through an appeal to a distinctly "Roman" figure (Ennius is common, e.g., *DRP*.1.30, as are any number of political figures) as a sort of rebuttal from tradition. Even when Cicero *does* assent to a particular demonstration of logic, he seems to find it a more convincing proof if he can formulate it in historical terms (cf. *DRP*.1.62) rather than apply syllogistic reasoning or spin a metaphor (not that he does not do those things as well). We should also refer the reader to to *DRP*.2.2ff.

[154] See n129 and n137.

[155] Thus did we characterize most of the compulsion in Plato's *Republic* (ch.2, pp47-52).

of the Catilinarian conspiracy here: *quasi uero maior cuiquam necessitas accidere potest quam accidit nobis* ("as if any greater necessity could fall to anyone than fell to me" *DRP*.1.10). But Cicero pointedly asks, *in qua quid facere potuissem, nisi tum consul fuissem*? ("How could I have helped in that time of need if I had not been consul then?" *DRP*.1.10). If the statesman is not already embedded in the fabric of the political *societas* he can offer no help to the state even should a suitable *necessitas* present itself. Cicero's skepticism towards an external *necessitas* resides in his belief that political participation is fundamentally based in a political art (or science) tempered by experience—a *scientia rerum ciuilium*.

Cicero elaborates this argument shortly afterwards. Again, he focuses on the inability of an external *necessitas* alone to bring the ideal statesman to the helm of the state. He asks, How can we expect the statesman to control the state in a time of need (*uti necesse est DRP*.1.11), when he has not guided it in a time of peace (i.e., *nulla necessitate premente*)? One might doubt Cicero's implied claim in these questions. To be sure, it is by no means *impossible* to imagine a circumstance where an individual utterly unfamiliar with politics might happen upon a position of political power by pure chance and discover he has a knack for swaying the citizens towards sound judgments. For Cicero, however—an individual acquainted with the strictures of the Roman political system, and especially with the political turbulence of the first century BC—this likelihood would have seemed ridiculous.[156] We might even more solidly dismiss the possibility again on the basis of Cicero's belief in a *scientia rerum ciuilium*, a belief that precludes faith in a "knack" for political matters. The necessity of the moment could not possibly yield up a

[156] To many, the idea will still seem preposterous. On the other hand (suspending our cynicism for a moment), a platform that has enjoyed some success among American political candidates is to run as a "Washington outsider." See n157 below.

competent politician, because the politician's skill derives at least as much from this art as from any innate qualities he possesses.[157]

We might finally move away from *necessitas* for a moment to consider the statesman's possibility for happiness. We will remember that a key reason for the philosopher's requirement of compulsion to rule in Plato's *Republic* was the happiness he derived in contemplating the Good. Political life, portrayed as a return to the cave, promised to diminish the philosopher's happiness by removing him from this contemplation. Could a similar problem exist for Cicero? In fact, Cicero abandons the idea of a privately attainable Good, radically fusing the possibility of an individual's happiness with his involvement in *societas*.[158] The motivation for this shift can be partly attributed to his rejection of the Epicurean doctrine of withdrawal from public life, partly to his appropriation of Aristotelian moral philosophy. Whatever its causes, however, this shift seriously changes the individual's relationship to his political environment. Not only does his nature *a priori* compel him into *societas* with other humans, but also locates the possibility for the good life in this very *societas,*[159] thereby providing a further incentive for participation.[160]

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[157] See Barlow (1987): "Against his critics, ancient and modern, Cicero holds that a science of politics is not only possible but necessary, and this science is the basis of civic education" (356); and Powell (1994), esp. 27, "It is not possible, according to Cicero, for just anyone to decide to plunge into politics and make a success of it by the light of nature; politics is a profession requiring both innate qualities and appropriate training . . ." For the source of these claims in *DRP*, see the reference at n163 below. Powell's latter point resonates strongly with Cicero's contention in *De Oratore* (argued against his brother Quintus) that the orator's skill must also derive in part from education *Or*.1.5.

[158] Consider a snippet near the end of the *De Re Publica*'s Vatican manuscript (Book V), where we are told that *nec bene uiui sine bona re publica esset, nec esse quicquam ciuitate bene constituta beatius* ("there could be no living well without a good *res publica*, nor could anything be more blessed than a well-constituted state [*civitas*] *DRP*.5.7).

[159] In his zeal to play up the possibilities of virtue and happiness afforded by a rightly ordered state, Cicero even seems to recant momentarily on his earlier attribution of the "first cause of society" (*prima causa coeundi*) to a gregarious principle inherent in men (*quasi congregatio*) and instead says that men came together so that they might live "honestly and well" (*beate et honeste DRP*.4.3). But it should be said that man's *congregatio* and his desire to live *beate et honeste* are

A famous locus for this sentiment is Scipio's dream,[161] but references to Cicero's belief that the good life can only be obtained through participation in society (i.e., political participation) are found scattered throughout *De Re Publica* and *De Legibus*[162] as well as most of his other philosophical texts; in fact, Cicero's devotion to politics in his own life can probably be taken as *prima facie* evidence of his dedication to this ideal.

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not mutually exclusive first causes of society; the *congregatio* may very well derive partly or wholly from this impulse to virtuous living (*necessitas uirtutis*).

[160] It goes without saying that an explicit concern with understanding the "good life" was a central feature of ancient philosophy (not so much in contemporary philosophy it could seem). Thus Boethius, sometimes called the "last classical philosopher," could survey the Greco-Roman philosophic tradition and say (O'Donnell's [1994] text): *omnis mortalium cura quam multiplicium studiorum labor exercet diverso quidem calle procedit, sed ad unum tamen beatitudinis finem nititur peruenire* ("every concern of mortal men, which the effort of divers pursuits labors after, proceeds indeed by divers paths; yet they all strive to reach that single end, namely, happiness [*beatitudo*]" *Cons*.3.2).

[161] Famous, but sometimes misconstrued as recommending *against* political service; on the incoherence of this view, see Powell (1998). In that paper, Powell reexamines the foreshadowing of Scipio's dream (Book VI) in the preface to Book I of *De Re Publica* (see18ff, and n8), and observes that "all the essential points made in the *Somnium* about the insignificance of worldly glory, and the obligation to engage in politics from a disinterested sense of duty, are already established at the very beginning of the dialogue" (23). Powell believes that the "rewards in the afterlife" that the dream of Scipio promises to the politician encourage political action for noble reasons and discourage fame- and wealth-seekers (18). See also Pangle (1998) 244-247, who says that the dream teaches the superiority of the contemplative life, but only in a "roundabout way" (247) causes politics to become "worthy of devotion."

[162] Cf. n158 and n159 above for a few examples. We have also already seen him describe participation in the community as *haec voluptas* (*DRP*.1.3) when he inverted the Epicurean principle of peaceable and pleasurable retirement from the public eye.

Ch.4. Education in Cicero's *De Oratore*

By now it should be clear that Cicero dissents strongly from any philosophical position that would call into question the value of and obligation to political service. But after so extended a discussion of topics political, the reader may justifiably ask, What do they have to do with education? As mentioned earlier, the major lacunae in Cicero's *De Re Publica* where we could have expected to find an explicit discussion of education make it difficult for us to go straightway to the heart of the matter. Therefore, we proposed that we begin with Cicero's abundant comments on political service before backtracking to an understanding of an educational system that could support the weight of these ideas. Even though we will rely on *De Oratore* in considering Cicero's thought on education, we will be hard pressed to present as discrete and succinct a program as we were able with Plato's *Republic*. We will, instead, consider a number of central features that would necessarily hold places of importance in any Ciceronian educational program. To this end, our discussion of education will address three major points: why we may reasonably think that Cicero's conception of the ideal statesman—the individual responding to the *necessitas* of political service—is to be understood as the ideal orator; how we may identify and characterize the orator's specific virtue; and how the orator's specific virtue (*eloquentia*) demands a rethinking of the relationship between oratory and philosophy.

In passing from our discussion of the ideal statesman[163] and the *necessitas* for political service to the orator, we might do no better than consider a passage at the end of the first book of *De Legibus*:

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[163] If we were to seek to characterize the ideal statesman as he appears to us from the fragments of *De Re Publica*, we would need to consider *DRP*.1.33, 2.45, 2.67, 3.4-6, 5.5 among other passages. The common thread in all of these is Cicero's stipulation that the statesman be

[61] *Idemque cum caelum terras maria rerumque omnium naturam perspexerit, eaque unde generate, quo recursura, {quando} quomodo obitura, quid in iis mortale et caducum, quid diuinum aeternumque sit uiderit, ipsumque ea moderantem et regentem <deum> paene prenderit, seseque non {omnis} circumdatum moenibus alicuius loci, sed ciuem totius mundi quasi unius urbis agnouerit: in hac ille magnificentia rerum atque in hoc conspectu et cognitione naturae, dii inmortales, quam se ipse noscet* (*quod Apollo praecepit Pythius*) *quam contemnet, quam despiciet, quam pro nihilo putabit ea quae uolgo dicuntur amplissima!* [62] *Atque haec omnia, quasi saepimento aliquo, uallabit disserendi ratione, ueri et falsi iudicandi scientia, et arte quadam intellegendi quid quamque rem sequatur et quid sit cuique contrarium. Cumque se ad ciuilem societatem natum senserit, non solum illa subtili disputatione sibi utendum putabit, sed etiam fusa latius perpetua oratione, qua regat populos, qua stabiliat leges, qua castiget improbos, qua tueatur bonos, qua laudet claros uiros, qua praecepta salutis et laudis apte ad persuadendum edat suis ciuibus, qua hortari ad decus, reuocare a flagitio, consolari possit adflictos, factaque et consulta fortium et sapientium cum improborum ignominia sempiternis monumentis prodere. Quae cum tot res tantaeque sint, quae inesse in homine perspiciantur ab iis qui se ipsi uelint nosse, earum parens est educatrixque sapientia.*

[61] And when that same person has perceived the sky, the earth, seas, and the nature of all things, whence they arise and where they return and how they will

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prudens, that is, possessing wisdom and foresight (see Zetzel [1999] *ad DRP*.2.67). It is surely this individual (as *DRP*.3.4-6 shows) who is discussed in this passage from *De Legibus*.

> pass away; and seen what, in those things, is mortal and fleeting, and what is divine and eternal; when he has thoroughly understood that some god moderates and guides those things; and has recognized that he himself is not circumscribed by the walls of any place, but is rather a citizen of the whole world, the one true city, as it were; then, in the splendor of those things, and in the sight and knowledge of nature—immortal gods!—how that man would know himself (as Pythian Apollo has taught)! How he would scorn, how he would despise, how he would count for nothing those things the crowd most dwells on! [62] And he will fortify his understanding with a method of argumentation, a defensive barrier, so to speak, and with the knowledge of judging true and false, and with a certain art of discerning what follows on each thing, and what is contrary to each thing. And when he has understood that he was born for civil *societas*, he will think that he ought not only employ that fine sort of discourse [*subtili disputatione*], but also a more widely spread *oratio*, whereby he may direct the people, shore up the laws, chastise the wicked, defend the good, laud the excellent, exhort his fellow citizens to things praiseworthy and salutary, encourage them to virtue, recall them from vice, and, finally, commit to everlasting record the deeds and judgments of wise men and the ignominies of the base. And although those things, which would be evident in man to those who should wish to know themselves, are so many and so great, yet the parent and educator of them all is philosophy.

In short, says Cicero, the person who has realized he is *ad ciuilem societatem natum* ("born for civil society")—a fact closely related to the *necessitas* to political service—shall direct all his

attention to the effectuation of this knowledge.[164] And how? By shoring up his philosophical knowledge not only with *subtili disputatione*, but also *oratione*—that is to say, through an explicitly *oratorical* education affording him the skills to sway the state towards virtuous community. Yet Cicero adds, *earum parens est educatrixque sapientia*, as if to remind us that it is only on the basis of the proper philosophic understanding of our nature that we might benefit from this oratorical education: training rhetoricians (*si dicendi copiam tradiderimus* Or.3.55) without instilling wisdom is, according to Cicero, akin to giving arms to madmen (*furentibus quaedam arma dederimus*). Cicero's subtle introduction of oratorical education into what is a predominantly natural-philosophical discussion also prefigures what will be laid out in greater detail in *De Oratore* and provides us with a clue as to what Cicero might think of the ideal statesman's education.[165] Let us look now at *De Oratore*.[166]

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[164] Rand (1932) sings the praises of this passage (214-216) and, on its strength, suggests (quite sensibly to my mind) that we all "declare a truce of a year, to be spent in reading the works of Cicero" (216).

[165] I will use this note to address three points about what we can learn of the best statesman and his education from *De Re Publica* before we move to *De Oratore*. **1)** In a celebrated and oft-quoted letter to Quintus (*ad Q.F.*3.5.1), Cicero says that the theme of the dialogue we now know as *De Re Publica* is *de optimo statu ciuitatis et de optimo ciue* ("on the best constitution of the state and on the best citizen"). We are at first cheered by this prospect; as soon after, we are disappointed by the tattered state of the text, which ensures that a great deal of the explicit treatment of the *optimus ciuis* (in the later books) is lost and that much of our surmising remains mostly just that—surmising. Nevertheless, there have been many fruitful and subtle treatments of the *optimus ciuis*, whom I think we must identify with the *moderator rei publicae*, *rector rei publicae*, etc., and even the *perfectus orator* of *De Oratore* (see below in this note). For a few of the treatments I have consulted, see How (1930), Barlow (1987, and the best explicit discussion of education in *De Re Publica*), Nicgorski (1991), Zetzel (1995) *passim*, esp. 25-29, Zetzel (2001) 86-7, Powell (1994), Powell (2001) *passim*, and Powell (2012). **2)** We have as of yet implicitly treated Cicero's ideal statesman as an answer to Plato's philosopher-king. I think this is right, but only if we keep in mind that Cicero's statesman is much less king than exemplary politician. This confusion is one Powell & North (2001) list as of the "major misunderstandings" swirling around *De Re Publica* (1). Cf. on this matter Powell & North (2001) 4-5, and more comprehensively Heinze (1924), How (1930) 36-41, and most fully and recently Powell (1991). **3)** Finally, the reader may wonder: why do we not follow the excellent aforementioned studies in using *De Re Publica* as the primary source for considering the *optimus ciuis* and his education,

In *De Oratore*, it does indeed become clear that Cicero's answer to the philosopher as ideal statesman is the orator, who has been "rebuffed from governance of the state" ever since Plato first thrust him from that spot (*a quibus omnibus una paene uoce repelli oratorem a gubernaculis ciuitatem Or*.1.46; *harum disputationium inuentori et principi . . . Platoni Or*.1.47). Although in this dialogue Cicero is concerned first and foremost with the qualities and education of the orator *qua* orator, he is also careful to remind us throughout the dialogue of the orator's preeminent political fitness—and followed far enough, this fitness is revealed to be the ground of the entire inquiry. If we attend to the development of the dialogue carefully, we see that Crassus and Antonius do not ultimately disagree on this latter point in spite of their vigorous debate over the orator's exact character.[167] We have already made reference once to Crassus's claim that the

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especially as that is where our discussion of Cicero began? I can only reply that I hope the answer to this question, and the value of approaching the *perfectus orator* of *De Oratore* as a sort of analogue for the *optimus ciuis*, will become obvious in the course of this chapter. Moreover, switching our focus to *De Oratore* here is, I think, justified by Cicero's fairly explicit identification of the ideal (*perfectus*) *orator* with the type of the *rector rei publicae* (as to be shown below). Cf. Nicgorski (1991): "That this orator is the public leader or statesman becomes indubitably evident to the reader of DO [*De Oratore*] and *Orator*" (238). Powell (2012) suggests that the *rector* and *orator* are "complements" (17). Further, consider Davies (1971), Nicgorski's (1991) 249n28, Schofield (2008) 68-70, and Gildenhard (2007).

[166] My survey of scholarship on *De Oratore* has been less comprehensive than on the other dialogues we consider. This fact is owed to the radically different thematic content of *De Oratore*, which has consequently attracted scholars of a different ilk than *DRP* and *DL* have (and of course, Plato's *Republic*). Integrating the many enlightening discussions of *De Oratore* oratorical particulars with the more politically-minded discussions of the *DRP*/*DL* pair is challenging, and not something I have attempted here. For most interpretative questions on *De Oratore*, I have considered the "essential" commentaries (venturing further where necessary): Wilkins (1892), Leeman & Pinkster's magisterial commentary (especially the volumes on Book III, the last of which was completed by Wisse, Winterbottom, and Fantham), and May & Wisse (2001).

[167] The quarrel between Antonius and Crassus complicates attempts to interpret *De Oratore*. Antonius initially argues for a more restricted understanding of the orator than Crassus and assaults the value of philosophic and other knowledge for oratorical purposes (Book I). It is revealed later (Book II) that Antonius values such pursuits more highly than he first let on; before long, he is largely reconciled to a "Crassian" style orator, though never so fully that we could not distinguish his opinions from Crassus's. The respectful exchange of oratorical precepts

orator is the chief guardian of the state,[168] a statement that precedes his account of the ideal orator. Antonius, in his initial quarrel with Crassus about some aspects of the orator's education, grounds his rebuttal of Crassus in what is intended to be a more precise definition of the orator: *. . . eum puto esse, qui et uerbis ad audiendum iucundis et sententiis ad probandum adcommodatis uti possit in causis forensibus atque communibus* ("I think that he [is the *orator*], who may employ words pleasing to hear and opinions fit for approval in cases, forensic and otherwise" Or.1.213). Some recognition of the political here, but no noble claims of guiding the state—of more interest is Antonius's nearby definition of the ideal *politician*: *qui quibus rebus utilitas rei publicae pareretur augereturque, teneret eisque uteretur, hunc rei publicae rectorem et consili publici auctorem esse habendum* ("the one possessing and making use of those things, by which the good of the *res publica* is secured and increased, and who ought to be considered the guide [*rector*] of the *res publica* and the author of its public policy" *Or*.1.211). It is striking that when Crassus later reformulates the definition of the orator, he appropriates much of Antonius's language in this definition of the ideal politician and states agreeably that the orator is *quem quaerimus et quem auctorem publici consilii et regendae ciuitatis ducem et sententiae atque eloquentiae principem in senatu, in populo, in causis publicis esse uolumus* ("the one whom we seek, and who we wish to be the author of public policy, the leader in ruling the state, and chief in opinion and eloquence in the senate, among the people, and in all public occasions"

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in Books II & III are to be understood as contributing to the education of the ideal orator. Crassus's account of philosophy in Book III is never challenged by Antonius and acquires a kind of finality in its statement. It is typically thought that Crassus most closely represents Cicero's own views throughout; this may indeed be true, but we would be gravely mistaken to dismiss Antonius's comments on that ground. Hall (1994) provides a sophisticated discussion of this movement.

[168] See n96 above, and we might add for further consideration *Or*.1.30ff.

Or.3.63). This appropriation is symbolic of the reconciliation between Antonius and Crassus and thus the marriage in the orator of the rhetorical and political.

If knowledge of the Good was the aim of Socratic education, and also that which endowed the philosopher with the ability to guide the state, then the orator's equivalent aid is *eloquentia* (eloquence). *Eloquentia* is not a rhetorical skill or property, as Cicero makes quite clear.[169] We would come closer to it if we said that it is a virtue in the same sense as courage or justice (*est enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis uirtutibus Or*.3.55)—Cicero even arrogates to *eloquentia* the title of superior beauty among virtues (*est specie alia magis alia formosa et inlustris*),[170] though he does not go so far as to call it greater in other respects. It would not be unfair to say that *De Oratore* examines *eloquentia* in the way that Plato's *Republic* examines δικαιοσύνη (justice). One will understand, then, why we cannot attempt a full exegesis of the idea here. (In any case, *eloquentia*, despite Cicero's best efforts to characterize it, remains quite elusive, and its vagueness could recall the Socratic ἀπορία in which we so often conclude discussions of the virtues.) If we consider just a few of its key characteristics, however, we may be afforded a window into Cicero's most explicit statements on the nature of education.[171]

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[169] Consider, e.g., *Or*.3.54: *qua re omnes istos me auctore deridete atque contemnite, qui se horum, qui nunc ita appellantur, rhetorum praeceptis omnem oratoriam uim complexos esse arbitrantur neque adhuc quam personam teneant aut quid profiteantur intellegere potuerunt* ("therefore, with me leading off, scorn and contemn all those fools who believe that they have grasped the whole power of oratory through the teachings of those now called "rhetoricians" [*rhetores*], and who still cannot understand what role they try to play [*personam teneant*] or what they are professing themselves to be."

[170] Cicero suggests this because it is *eloquentia* that is responsible for the beautiful presentation of other virtues. Insofar as others participate in it, it must possess superior beauty in some sense.

[171] At this point, it might be worthwhile to remind the reader that *De Oratore* is, more or less, *entirely* and *specifically* educational in orientation, a fact which my statements might obscure. This specific educational content is of a technical and curricular nature, however, and therefore difficult to relate in its fine points to our broad discussion on the essence of education. I think that Cicero's balancing of technical oratorical precepts with more overtly philosophical forays into the nature of education is characteristic of his program in *De Oratore* and to his great credit.

One of the earliest, still indirect attempts at a characterization of *eloquentia* can be found in the first book of *De Oratore*. There, in discussing the qualities of the skilled orator, Crassus states that *unum erit profecto, quod ei, qui bene dicunt, adferunt proprium, compositam orationem et ornatam et artificio quodam et expolitione distinctam* ("surely those who speak well possess one distinctive quality [*unum proprium*]: speech [*oratio*] that is composed, well-styled, and distinguished with a certain artistic polish"[172] Or.1.50). This *unum proprium* is to be understood as *eloquentia*, the distinctive characteristic of which is the ability to *componere* speech, render it *ornata*, and artfully polish it. Crassus again refers to the eloquent person (*eloquens*) shortly after as *qui mirabilius et magnificentius augere posset atque ornare quae uellet* ("he who is able to increase wondrously and magnificently and style well whatever he wishes" *Or*.1.94). This is to be contrasted with the merely "well-spoken" individual (*disertus*), who relies upon common opinion (*ex communi quadam opinione hominum*) in speaking *satis acute et dilucide* (*Or*.1.94). *Eloquentia*, as gleaned from these two quotes, expands (*augere*), orders and articulates (*componere*), and styles (*ornare*) speech; the well-spoken individual may present his material skillfully (*acute*) and in such a way that he is quite clear (*dilucide*), but *eloquentia* actually transforms the constituent parts of the speech by producing something greater.

Only later does it become clear how *eloquentia* has consequences that reach beyond the composition and enrichment of speech—things which rhetoric would suffice to accomplish.[173]

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[172] "A certain artistic polish" is Wilkins's (1892) *ad loc* suggestion for *artificio quodam et expolitione distinctam*.

[173] Or not. It might be that Cicero is willing to give rhetoric not even this much power, insofar as he resists divorcing a well-fashioned speech from a power of *eloquentia* that allows one to treat the underlying matter. So it may be that only by *eloquentia* and never by mere *praecepta rhetorum* could one hope to achieve "eloquence" even in its everyday meaning. Cf. n169 above, and also *Or*.3.24.

Cicero comes to characterize *eloquentia* in Book III as a virtue retaining the ability to weld together into a coherent whole any number of domains of thought, not merely speech. For example, Crassus says: *una est enim . . . eloquentia, quascumque in oras disputationis regionesue delata est, . . . riuis est diducta oratio, non fontibus, et, quocumque ingreditur, eodem est instructu ornatuque comitata* ("for *eloquentia* is one, into whatever shores or regions of disputation it might come . . . *oratio* flows in different rivers, but not from different sources, and wherever it approaches, it is accompanied by that same fashioning and stylizing power" *Or*.3.23-4). One only realizes that *eloquentia* deals with more than speech when one considers that the "anywhere" (*quocumque*) to which it flows includes topics *siue de caeli natura . . . siue de terrae, siue de diuina ui siue de humana . . .* ("of the nature of heaven and earth, of powers human and divine . . ." *Or*.3.23). We are clearly not dealing with a merely rhetorical power, that is to say, a power involved only with the cunning arrangement of words. *Eloquentia* encompasses the content of the speech itself, negotiating matters human and divine in its synthetic and expressive power. Now *eloquentia* is beginning to sound more like a virtue.

Cicero follows up on this idea of the more-than-rhetorical nature of *eloquentia* with an even more explicit statement as to its efficacy later in Book III, where Crassus states that

> *illa uis autem eloquentiae tanta est ut omnium rerum, uirtutum, officiorum omnisque naturae, quae mores hominum, quae animos, quae uitam continet, originem, uim mutationesque teneat, eadem mores, leges, iura describat, rem publicam regat, omniaque, ad quamcumque rem pertineant, ornate copioseque dicat.*
>
> the power of *eloquentia* is so great that it holds the origin, power, and principles of change [*mutationes*] of all things, all virtues, all duties, and of the nature of

> men's customs, spirit, and life; that same *eloquentia* defines customs, laws, and rights, guides [*regat*] the *res publica*, and speaks all things, to whatever matter they pertain, ornately [*ornate*] and copiously (*Or*.3.76).

Tanta uis indeed. There is very little about mere "speech" here. *Eloquentia* does indeed penetrate all spheres, and, if we take seriously Cicero's admittedly lofty language here, is responsible for their constitution. It may also begin to dawn on us now how Cicero can afford to substitute *eloquentia* in lieu of the Good (τἀγαθόν) as the goal of the statesman's training; we would say that the *eloquens* person quite knows how things are properly composed, as it were, and thus knows everything he needs to know about men to govern the *res publica* effectively.

But how can Cicero thus effect this substitution of *eloquentia* for the Good? In so doing, he might seem to us to confuse the powers of oratorical and philosophical knowledge. Allying ourselves with the Antonius of Book I, we could charge Cicero with confusing the orator—*qui et uerbis ad audiendum iucundis et sententiis ad probandum adcommodatis uti possit* ("he who is able to use words pleasant to the ear and sentiments suited to persuade" *Or*.1.213) as Antonius characterizes him at one point[174]—with the philosopher, whose proper charge it is to possess *omnem omnium rerum atque artium scientiam* ("all knowledge of every thing and every art").[175] Cicero arrogates to the perfect orator a vast authority. In what sense could we say he is justified in doing so? Are his claims to the orator's supremacy to be understood as rhetorical praise? I think not. It emerges as Cicero's project in *De Oratore* to efface the border between the orator and philosopher. It is Cic=ero's great insight that oratorical knowledge—in effect, *how we*

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[174] On the context of this formulation and its ultimate resolution, see p85-87 above, and also n167.

[175] The *Tusculanae Disputationes* are the *locus classicus* for this kind of definition. See *ibid*. 5.7ff, where philosophy (*sapientia*) is defined as [*cognitio*] *diuinarum humanarumque rerum, tum initiorum causarumque cuiusque rei* ("thinking on human and divine things, and on the origin and causes of everything").

articulate what we articulate—is not rightly cleft from philosophical knowledge, the "what" of what we articulate. Whether one is convinced by Cicero's attempt to argue this thesis is another matter, but he does devote some time to its explicit demonstration. Let us consider his line of reasoning here, as it constitutes what is distinctive in essence about Cicero's thought on education.

Cicero's attempt to reconcile philosophy with oratory (generally *Or*.3.56ff) begins with an historical argument, urged by the figure of Crassus. Cicero first has Crassus say: *hanc . . . cogitandi pronuntiandique rationem uimque dicendi veteres Graeci sapientiam nominabant* ("this *ratio* of thought and expression and power of speaking, the Greeks of old called *sapientia* *Or*.1.55). This proclamation is at once subtle in the particulars and bold in its general thrust. The *ratio cogitandi pronuntiandique* and *uis dicendi* must be loosely understood as a sort of philosophical hendiadys for *eloquentia* (or just oratory more generally, whose virtue is *eloquentia*), knowing what we do of it. But we ought to notice, too, that in addition to explicitly equating *eloquentia* with *sapientia*, Cicero has already slyly joined thought (*cogito*) with speech (*pronuntio*) in the phrase *ratio cogitandi pronuntiandique*. He has begun to erase the distinction in his locution even as he embarks upon an attempt to show philosophically and historically that it does not hold. The force of Cicero's argument is all the more pronounced in that we might construe his reference to *sapientia* as either "wisdom" generally or, perhaps, "philosophy."

Cicero adduces a number of figures whom he believes are *prima facie* evidence for the consonance of the two branches, beginning with the "types" (as shown by the plural *Lycurgi, Pittaci,* etc.) of Solon, Lycurgus, and Pittacus among the Greeks; Cato, Scipio and others among the Romans. These men were all considered towering political figures, combining eloquence and prudence in their deeds (and thus oratory and philosophy). Cicero refuses to claim these

ambivalent cases for one side or the other of the debate, but rather uses them as exempla against the unnatural tendency to separate the two branches.[176] Crassus then cites Pythagoras, Democritus, and Anaxagoras as the "new" wave (relatively speaking) of thinkers who broke from the state and devoted themselves wholly to natural philosophy (*a regendis ciuitatibus totos se ad cognitionem rerum transtulerunt Or*.3.56). *Multo plura* [did they do so], *quam erat necesse*, Crassus says, *nam vetus quidem illa doctrina eadem videtur et recte faciendi et bene dicendi magistra* ("much more did they do so than was necessary . . . for indeed that ancient teaching seems at once to be the teacher of right action and speaking well" *Or*.3.57). To this point Crassus attaches the Homeric teacher of Achilles Phoenix, who he says accompanied Achilles at Peleus's request *ut efficeret oratorem verborum actoremque rerum* ("that he might make him a speaker of words and a doer of deeds" *Or*.3.57 ≈ μύθων τε ῥητῆρ᾽ ἔμεναι πρηκτῆρά τε ἔργων *Il*.IX.443).

After scornfully dismissing other gifted men of old who devoted themselves too completely *ad geometras, ad musicos, ad poetas*, and so on, Cicero returns us again to those who "flourished in the wisdom of both deed and speech" (*faciendi dicendique sapientiam florerent Or*.3.59), Themistocles, Pericles, and Theramenes. To these he adds another class of men who he believes were *eiusdem sapientiae doctores* ("teachers of that same wisdom") but who were not especially involved in politics: Gorgias, Thrasymachus, and Isocrates. We might think that in enlisting these figures Cicero begins to fall in with those who are sometimes called "sophists" in opposition to the "philosophy" of the Platonic Socrates and subsequent tradition. Cicero quickly makes it understood that he will have no truck with these sorts of rigid and pedantic distinctions. Against the so-called "sophists"—whom he pointedly does not call such—he cites a class of wise

[176] Cf. May and Wisse (2001) 240n65.

men who shrank from political life on principle (*a re autem ciuili . . . animi quodam iudicio abhorrerent Or*.3.59) and openly drove out and contemned attention to speech (*hanc dicendi exercitationem exagitarent atque contemneret*). Chief among these, he says, was Socrates. Let us consider what Crassus has to say about this enigmatic man:

> [*Socrates,*] *qui omnium eruditorum testimonio totiusque iudicio Graeciae cum prudentia et acumine et uenustate et subtilitate tum uero eloquentia, uarietate, copia, quam se cumque in partem dedisset omnium fuit facile princeps, eisque, qui haec, quae nunc nos quaerimus, tractarent, agerent, docerent, cum nomine appellarentur uno, quod omnis rerum optimarum cognition atque in eis exercitatio philosophia nominaretur hoc commune nomen eripuit sapienterque sentiendi et ornate dicendi scientiam re cohaerentis disputationibus suis separavit; cuius ingenium variosque sermones immortalitati scriptis suis Plato tradidit, cum ipse litteram Socrates nullam reliquisset. Hinc discidium illud exstitit quasi linguae atque cordis, absurdum sane et inutile et reprehendendum, ut alii nos sapere, alii dicere docerent.*
>
> Socrates, according to the testimony of all learned men and in the judgment of all Greece, was easily foremost not only in wisdom, acumen, charm and subtlety, but also in *eloquentia*, variety, and abundance of speech, in whatever quarter he directed his efforts; and although for all of those men, who dealt with and taught these things which we now take as our subject, [these things] were called by one name, which [name] signified all studies into the best things and the practice[177] thereof, that is, "philosophy," yet Socrates tore away this common name and cleft

[177] Wilkins (1892) *ad loc* renders *atque in eis exercitatione* as "combined with practice in dealing with them," adding "i.e., with declamations such as those of the sophists."

> in his arguments the knowledge of wise thought from that of speaking eloquently [*ornate*], [branches of knowledge] that in fact are bound together [*re cohaerentis*]. Plato handed down his genius and varied conversations to immortality through his writings, since Socrates himself had not left a word. From this source is come to be that rent between tongue and breast, as it were, clearly one absurd, injurious, and to be repudiated, as though some teach us to think and others to speak (*Or*.3.60-1).

Here is Cicero's thesis baldly stated, and again we find him employing a certain *subtilitas* of his own in the treatment of the issue: the descriptors he applies to Socrates implicitly jar with the fact that Socrates is said to have strictly cut off *scientia sentiendi sapienter* from that *dicendi ornate*. Cicero pointedly adds to the more conventional epithets of Socrates (cf. *prudentia, acumen, uenustas, subtilitas*) those with a distinctly oratorical connotation (cf. *uarietas, copia*), most significantly, *eloquentia*. In this way, Socrates's own recognized oratorical prowess is meant to give the lie to his repudiation of it.[178] This is what I meant by saying that Cicero has little time for pedantic distinctions between oratory and philosophy. He is more than willing to call a spade a spade and point out that Socrates was so transparently a master of both domains[179]—a quality of his that most will admit contributes to the delight of all his reader up to the present day. It is also interesting to note that Cicero appears to attribute the scorn for

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[178] Partly as an effort to assimilate Socrates to the Academic tradition, Crassus states that it was first Socrates (*primum instituisse Or*.3.67) who *non quid ipse sentiret ostendere, sed contra id, quod quisque se sentire dixisset, disputare* ("[took it as his method] not to show what he himself thought, but to argue against that, which another person said he himself thought"). Beyond claiming Socrates as the progenitor of the Academic Skeptical tradition to which Cicero himself belonged (for the general tendency of which *Or*.3.61-2), Cicero would also have us understand from this fact, I believe, that any possible "Socratic dogma" on the oratory/philosophy divide is already suspect.

[179] Or Plato, as some might now be keen to point out, though it hardly matters for our purposes.

oratorical practice more to a conscious avoidance of politics among Socrates and his companions [*a re autem ciuili et a negotiis animi quodam iudicio Or*.3.59] than to any real qualms about the value of eloquent speech in its own right.

So Cicero's attempt to understand the historical source for the split "between tongue and breast" revolves around the crucial figure of Socrates. *Usque ad Socratem* ("up to Socrates's time" *Or*.3.72), Crassus says, the ancients *omnem omnium rerum, quae ad mores hominum, quae ad uitam, quae ad uirtutem, quae ad rem publicam pertinebant, cognitionem et scientiam cum dicendi ratione iungebant* ("joined the inquiry into and knowledge of all things which pertain to human customs, life, virtue, and the *res publica* with the principles of oratory [*dicendi ratio*]"). Only after Socrates did philosophers and orators come to despise (*despexerunt*) one another and parcel out the their respective disciplines. Looking again to the "ancients" (*veteres Or*.3.73), Crassus says that *dicendi et intellegendi mirificam societatem esse uoluissent* ("they had wished that there be a wondrous society between thought and speech"). Cicero's argument relies largely upon the conviction that once we have seen that the division between oratory and philosophy is artificial and idiosyncratic, we will return to a more primordial understanding of their fundamental proclivity to communion (*re cohaerentis*, above).

Although Cicero's historical argument for the unity of oratory and philosophy (*eloquentia* and *sapientia*) is a discrete movement in the third book of *De Oratore*, he conditions us to favorable reception of this demonstration through a recurrent focus on metaphors of "source" (typically *fons*) throughout *De Oratore*. By recalling us again and again to the *fontes* whence oratory flows, he accomplishes the twofold goal of both deemphasizing the *riui*/*riuuli* (streams) of mere rhetorical precept (the "rhetorical particulars" we could say) and turning our attention to the ancient and common wellspring that encompasses more than rhetoric and affords

the basis for true *eloquentia*. These metaphors of source are numerous and build in frequency and intensity as we approach the historical argument of Book III. In Book II, we already see: *tamen et ingenii est riuulos consectari, fontis rerum non uidere, et iam aetatis est ususque nostri a capite quod uelimus arcessere et unde omnia manent uidere* ("it is the mark of a dull man to follow the rivulets of ingenuity, but not to perceive the sources of things; it's more appropriate for those of our age and cultivation [*usus*] to fetch what we wish from the origin and to see whence all things flow" *Or*.2.117). And later in the same book, Crassus similarly recalls the importance of the *fons*, saying that he will bear away the oratorical disciple (*illuc eum rapiam*), *ubi non seclusa aliqua teneatur, sed unde uniuersum flumen erumpat* ("not to some secluded brook, but to where the whole river issues forth" *Or*.2.162). The source metaphor shows up repeatedly in Book III of the dialogue,[180] and finds its fullest expression in Cicero's metaphorical recapitulation of his historical argument: *haec autem, ut ex Apennino fluminum, sic ex communi sapientiae iugo sunt doctrinarum facta diuortia, ut philosophi tamquam in superum mare [Ionium] defluerent Graecum quoddam et portuosum, oratores autem in inferum hoc Tuscum et barbarum scopulosum atque infestum laberentur, in quo etiam ipse Ulixes errasset* ("this is how the parting occurred from the common watershed of wisdom, just as [the parting] of rivers flowing from the Apennines, so that the philosophers, as it were, have washed into the upper sea, that is Greek and rich in harbors, and the orators have slipped into this lower Tuscan sea, barbarous, rocky, and dangerous, in which even Ulysses himself went awry" *Or*.3.62). This metaphor avoids becoming obscure by employing an image that has by this time already become commonplace in the dialogue.

[180] Cf., e.g., *Or*.3.23 (quoted above), *Or*.3.72, *Or*.3.82, *Or*.3.123, etc.

There are certain hints that Cicero finds the division between oratory and philosophy untenable from a philosophical position as well as historical. This argumentative drift is most typically seen in Crassus's repeated assertions (with Antonius at first dissenting, later joining) that the orator can be called *eloquens* only if he possesses full and penetrating knowledge of every possible topic of speech: *statuebam . . . eloquentem . . . qui mirabilius et magnificentius augere posset atque ornare quae uellet, omnisque omnium rerum, quae ad dicendum pertineret, fontis animo ac memoria contineret* ("I said that . . . he was eloquent, . . . who could increase and adorn [*ornare*] marvelously and magnificently whatever he wished, and who possessed in the intellect and memory the sources of everything that pertains to speaking" *Or*.1.94). Broad inquiry into the nature of things (i.e., *cognitio rerum*) is usually understood to be the domain of philosophy, not oratory, and Antonius argues this point directly in response to Crassus's ambitious claims for *eloquentia*, as we have seen (1.213ff, quoted above). Yet, following Antonius's attempt to rebut Crassus, we find Cicero in his own voice (in the preface to Book II) insisting again and again upon *eloquentia*'s ubiquity and enormous rights. He states that anyone who has achieved success in *eloquentia* could never have done so *sine omni sapientia* ("without the whole of wisdom" *Or*.2.5), and again, that *eloquentia* can only be said to exist in one who can expound upon *omnia, quaecumque in hominum disceptationem cadere possunt* ("all things, whatever could possibly fall into the realm of human"). In an only slightly less ambitious tone, Cicero might later have Antonius say—once he has been reconciled to a more charitable understanding of the orator[181]—that the orator need only understand all things pertaining to humans, not all things in themselves (cf. *Or*.2.67-68, all of which is important). These various

[181] For the shifting attitude of Antonius and the dialogue's general development, topics of great importance we cannot cover here, cf., e.g., *Or*.2.5 and context, *Or*.2.40, *Or*.2.153 and *Or*.2.156, etc. On a relevant mention of Antonius's method in *Pro Cluentio*, see May & Wisse's (2001) note *ad loc*.

claims to the orator's vast knowledge can only be understood by having recourse to the political dimension: the orator is intimately connected to the political organization of the state and must, therefore, know as well *what* he ought to do as *how* he ought do it. In other words, the lofty requirement of understanding the nature of humans is stipulated with an eye not only to the orator's ability to persuade others (i.e., to his rhetorical prowess), but also to his knowledge of *what* ought to be persuaded in the first place—hence he must have insight *de re publica, de imperio, de re militari*, among many other things (*Or*.2.67).

There are two types of complaints most typically brought against Cicero's aggrandizing account of *eloquentia* and oratory. Considering them will allow us to clarify Cicero's philosophical position concerning oratory further. The dissenting voices might be said to originate from two general attacks in the text: in the first place, some might accept (implicitly or explicitly) the authority of Antonius's claim that *oratoris autem omnis actio opinionibus, non scientia continetur* ("the whole sphere of the orator's action rests in opinion, not knowledge" *Or*.2.30, and see context);[182] secondly, others might scoff (again, with Antonius) at the requirements for knowledge placed upon the orator on the grounds of their being unnecessarily and implausibly high.[183] Both of these arguments support Antonius's contention that persuasive form is all that is required of *eloquentia*—and both suffer the same basic weakness: they are occupied with the notion of the orator as mere speaker. As we have seen, however, Cicero's vision of the ideal orator is intertwined with his vision of the *rector rei publicae*. The orator is a

[182] The authority of this argument is derived from its strong support we find in a number of Platonic dialogues, wherein philosophy is said to deal with what *is* over and against what merely *seems* to be (the latter articulated as "opinion," δόξα).
[183] Cf., e.g., the sentiment at *Or*.1.250-1, basically stating that it is an absurd requirement on the orator that he have such a deep knowledge. This line of argument depends on the premise that the orator does not *need* knowledge of anything, only a reasonable command of popular opinion. It is flawed for reasons noted below. The attack on the "implausibly high" requirements is not a very good one: cf. Crassus's decisive statements on this matter at *Or*.3.84.

political figure through and through, and therefore requires all the knowledge that will indicate *where* he ought to steer the state in addition to how he might so do. If we recall Plato's ship of state metaphor, then we will recognize that Cicero's orator combines both the helmsman's (= philosopher's) knowledge of the winds, stars, and seasons and the wily sailors' (= sophists'/current politicians') ability to persuade the ship-owner to give them power. So when Cicero vigorously asserts that all possible topics are within the orator's reach, but especially human nature and political things, he has in mind the orator's responsibility to steer the state and guide its development, not only his ability to speak beautifully. Taking knowledge of all things (*cognitio rerum*) as a discipline's goal was far from an absurd practice in antiquity, as this was philosophy's especial claim as the queen of sciences. Cicero's only audacious move is making the philosopher into an orator, that is, into one who has the ability to express *ornate copioseque* (eloquently and copiously) what he *does* know so that he might translate theoretical knowledge into practical guidance of the state.

In sum, Cicero's fundamental shift in educational doctrine might be said to consist in his introduction of oratorical training into the ideal statesman's education. This emphasis on oratory leads us to label Cicero's ideal statesman an orator, not, as in the *Republic*, a philosopher. If we were to phrase Cicero's intentions in these terms, however, we might end up obscuring his broader argument. As revealed in *De Oratore*, Cicero would have us collapse the artificial distinction between true oratory and philosophy in service of a more fundamental participation in the two branches of thought. This move yields a statesman who *both* possesses the knowledge necessary to lead the state *and* the skills whereby he might effectuate this leadership. The oratorical shift can be read in light of Cicero's resounding emphasis upon the value and

necessitas of political service: the statesman's oratorical training is a nod to the fact that his education is worked out with respect to the end of political leadership.

We will recall that Socratic education, as portrayed by the cave, is orientational in nature; that is to say, its movement is found in ascent to and orientation toward the Good. On the basis of what we have discussed in Cicero's case, we would need to abandon the cave as a model of education. Not because Cicero's educational system contains far more technical oratorical instruction, for if we were to expand upon the mathematical and scientific requirements of the Socratic education implied in the orientational movement, there would be just as much technical instruction, if not more. Nor because Ciceronian education does not require transcendent knowledge, for the ideal orator must also have sweeping knowledge of the virtues (starting with *eloquentia*) and the ways the universe is structured. Rather, we would say that it is incoherent to speak of Ciceronian education in terms of orientation because there is no turning "away" or "toward" anything: the would-be statesman does not turn from the city and back towards it, anymore than he is initially lost and must have his gaze trained onto the affairs of the city. If we learned only one thing from our discussion of *societas humanitatis*, it is that we are bound to others—there is no position one could occupy that would not already be *inside* the "state" (*qua* cosmic affiliation of men), and, therefore, no way that one could not already be inextricably involved in his political context. Cicero's comments on education—especially his emphasis on the union of philosophy and oratory implied *eloquentia*—support this conclusion: the individual must be educated in such a way that he may navigate the political waters (vis-à-vis his oratorical skills) as easily as he can navigate the theoretical.

I think there is little need for us to draw out here every explicit difference between what we have discussed of Cicero and Plato. Education is always already caught up in the socio-

political realities and ambitions of the community in which it occurs. Squeezing out these concrete and spiritual facts into a curriculum would not, ultimately, satisfy the philosophic aim of this thesis—and I believe that the reader will come to his or her own conclusions on what the youth brought up in the best states of Cicero and Plato will be told and taught and, *in fine*, of what sort of stamp we will find them when they has come of age and gone on to greater things.

Second Interlude

Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick; or, the Whale* (ch.32, "Cetology"):

> Finally: It was stated at the outset, that this system would not be here, and at once, perfected. You cannot but plainly see that I have kept my word. But I now leave my cetological System standing thus unfinished, even as the great Cathedral of Cologne was left, with the cranes still standing upon the top of the uncompleted tower. For small erections may be finished by their first architects; grand ones, true ones, ever leave the copestone to posterity. God keep me from ever completing anything. This whole book is but a draught—nay, but the draught of a draught. Oh, Time, Strength, Cash, and Patience!

Concluding Remarks

Some conclusion has already been offered in the body of this thesis, but it will be of use to restate in the most general terms the major differences between Plato and Cicero. The educational program for the state's guardian-rulers (φύλακες) presented in the *Republic* was an education of orientation toward the Good (τὸ ἀγαθόν). On the one hand, knowledge of the Good afforded the philosopher the ability needed to helm the state prudently; on the other hand, its contemplation also disinclined him to return to the realm of darkness, the cave (= the πόλις). In the course of our study, we were not unduly reassured that the philosopher would have *any* reason to return to the city, given the happiness he acquired from the Good and the wretched and dangerous conditions of the city. It would seem to reinforce this belief that the philosopher received little training that would allow him to navigate the vagaries of political life: his political naïveté was actually thematized in the simile of the ship of state, where his utter lack of any persuasive (= oratorical) ability is set front and center. Cicero, in contrast to Plato, displays few or no reservations about the value of political life. In fact, he posits a philosophical framework of *societas* that justifies the value of political participation by anchoring it in human nature and the common possession of *ratio* with humans and gods. The external compulsion (ἀνάγκη) required of the philosopher in the *Republic* is then replaced by a perpetual impulse or instinct (as *necessitas*) inclining one to politics. The priority of political life is also reflected in Cicero's thought on education. Through *eloquentia*, Cicero introduces an oratorical emphasis to education, an emphasis that recognizes the educated individual's obligation to participate in political life. Oratorical training will allow the educated individual to acquire power and sway the state. But Cicero would still have the orator retain broad philosophic knowledge. He argues that *eloquentia* (eloquence) and *philosophia* (philosophy, also *sapientia*) are to be understood as

two halves of a more comprehensive kind of wisdom (*sapientia*): a person cannot be called *eloquens* before he also possesses *sapientia* (philosophy). This union of philosophy and oratory makes sense in terms of Cicero's high valuation of political life. The *perfectus orator* is also to be understood as the *rector rei publicae*, and must thus have knowledge of both *how* to guide the state (= oratory) and *where* to guide it (= philosophy).

It might also be valuable to consider here how this thesis could (or almost did) further develop. We have already suggested in the introduction that a fresh reading of Cicero—without reference to Platonic considerations—might yield very different results from those we have obtained. On the other hand, if we were to continue with the current comparative project we would return to the *Republic* and continue to mine the dialogue for thoughts on education and its relationship to the state. This thesis was originally to contain three chapters and pursue just such a course; what has been presented here is only the first of the three intended chapters, subdivided into four units. The planned second chapter was to explore further education's relationship with politics and extend its consideration to law and justice, and the planned third chapter would have examined the role of poetry and rhetoric in education. This third chapter was swiftly dropped as I began to realize the sheer scale of the task. Later, I also dropped the second when I realized that to include it would require an unacceptable loss of time in revising the first chapter. I cannot state with certainty how the third chapter would have looked, but the second would have begun by re-approaching some issues discussed in the first chapter (e.g., political service) in order to suggest certain philosophic revisions. These revisions would attempt to find space in Plato's *Republic* for contexts in which the educated philosopher-ruler could justly be compelled to preserve and perpetuate his society.

How a study of Cicero might look in response to this discussion of Plato is less clear. Undoubtedly I would have begun with a discussion of deception and "propaganda" in Cicero's *De Oratore* before backtracking to the development of law and justice in *De Re Publica* and *De Legibus*. The particulars of such a movement remain quite fuzzy to me, however, even now. The uncertainty around the Ciceronian *comparanda* for this theme may only go to show that the intended second chapter would have pushed the ability to hold Cicero to a specific Platonic philosophic agenda to its very limits, and perhaps even on to Procrustean absurdity. While I am confident that the development of ideas in Plato's *Republic* once destined for the second chapter and laid out above finds strong evidence in that text, I am less sure that such interrelationships would have the same importance in Cicero's writings under consideration. This ill fit must be attributed to what has been the predominant tendency of this project to read Plato first, and Cicero second. Reading the authors in the inverse order would afford different results but, I think, ultimately encounter similar difficulties. (There would, of course, be much of value in discovering what distinctly Ciceronian concerns we would then prioritize.) In any case, it may be timely to set down our thinking of education in Cicero and Plato here—or at least its formal exercise. Mayhap we will return when the fullness of patient study renews the possibility for successful issue.

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