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Reem Abdalla April 9th, 2019

Toward an Explanation of Attitudes on Dual Citizenship: Perspectives in Africa

by

Reem Abdalla

Dr. Thomas D. Lancaster

Advisor

Political Science

Dr. Thomas D. Lancaster

Advisor

Dr. Kristin Phillips

Committee Member

Dr. Jeffrey Staton

Committee Member

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Abstract

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Despite the rich literature on dual citizenship not much is known on the attitudes toward dual citizenship. In this study, I analyze survey research on African citizens using a logistic regression analysis following the Michigan model heuristically as an initial cut at identifying possible explanations of variation in attitudes toward dual citizenship. The second half of this paper tests two primary hypotheses centered on social identification and economic performance as indicators of support for dual citizenship. The findings of this study suggest that individuals who strongly identify with their national identity are less likely to support dual citizenship. Another finding suggests that when individuals feel more of their ethnic group in comparison to their national identity they are less likely to support dual citizenship. However, when an ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government they are more likely to support dual citizenship. In addition, African citizens are also more likely to favor dual citizenship when the economy is performing poorly.

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Why do some people favor dual citizenship and others do not?

Citizenship was once defined as a legal tie between an individual and a state. Today, there are tens of millions of people around the world who hold citizenship to more than one country (Harpaz and Mateos 2018). Historically, citizenship was bounded by national identity and membership with a state. The League of Nations' 1930 publication "Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Conflict of Nationality Laws" asserts that each individual should have only one national allegiance (Sejersen 2008). Dual citizenship was not only viewed as a challenge to the concept of single nationhood but was also observed by the League of Nations to be a violation of the sociological concept "the nation." Dual citizenship is no longer defined by a historical connection with one political community. Instead, it is defined by full membership with respective rights, privileges, and obligations to two different countries (Alarian et al 2016, Faist, 2012, Hammar 1985, Howard, 2005, Sejersen 2008).

The acceptance of dual citizenship among states has rapidly increased since the 1960s. Before the 1960s, dual citizenship was accepted by states at a 40% rate and significantly increased to a 70% acceptance in 2008 (Faist et al 2008). This dramatic increase in allowance of dual citizenship is seen as directly correlated to the abolishment of military service, recognition of gender equality in citizenship laws, and changing international norms (Harpaz and Mateos 2018, Vink 2019, Whitaker 2011). While dual citizenship policies have increased exponentially in recent years around the world, Western debates about the merits of dual citizenship were recorded as early as the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. (Howard 2005). U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter said that "no man should be in a position where his services are claimed by more than one government" (Howard 2005, 701). Some politicians argue dual citizenship inevitably forces individuals to choose a single country to serve, in the case of

military service and other national duties. This fear was espoused by Theodore Roosevelt, who referred to dual citizenship as "a self-evident absurdity" (Howard 2005, 705). Roosevelt feared that during the event of a war, naturalized dual citizens in the U.S. would be called to serve in the armies of their countries of origin and not the United States (Howard 2005).

Today, dual citizenship remains an increasingly salient and politically controversial topic for both individuals and government leaders. For example, according to The Guardian, four federal politicians in Australia were forced to resign from office under Section 44(I) of Australia's constitution because it prohibits federal political candidates from holding dual citizenship. Following numerous resignations, the Australian government responded by requiring all members of Parliament and Senate to upload any family history and renunciation documents (Karp 2018). The Australian citizenship crisis is only one example of how governments and individuals struggle to navigate the implications of dual citizenship.

American and European academics have carefully explicated the national policies of many states and their decisions to accept or reject dual citizenship. However, very little research has focused on African dual citizenship and the implications of it. I chose to study Africa not only because it has been under-researched but because of the unique dynamics in the African continent. When studying African countries it is important to highlight the role of inequality and how it has shaped the value of citizenship (Harpaz and Mateos 2018). The global hierarchy of nationalities has placed the value of many African countries at the bottom of the hierarchy. "The degree of travel freedom inherent in a passport closely correlates the position of the issuing country in global hierarchies of development, stability and prestige" (Harpaz and Mateos 2018, 851). African countries are known for having some of the most undervalued passports where the "poor are meant to stay at home" and denied the opportunity to prosper while the rich are granted

the opportunity to cross borders freely (Harpaz and Mateos 2018, 9). As a result of fewer citizenship benefits and low levels of development, African citizens are more likely to seek citizenship in Western and North American countries. Thus, Africa is characterized by its huge rates of emigration. From the state perspective, dual citizenship allowance is said to increase remittances and connect with the Afro-diaspora that have emigrated (Whitaker 2011).

Another reason why researching dual citizenship in Africa provides analytical leverage is due to the fact numerous countries are undergoing a democratic transitioning process. In an authoritarian regime, citizenship does not possess the same political weight it would in a democracy because it does not necessarily include the right to participate in choosing a leader (Whitaker 2011). Citizenship in certain African countries can differ than that in Europe and other places around the world because political participation happens through different outlets (Whitaker 2011).

The limited research that has been done on dual citizenship in Africa has exclusively focused on heads of state or government decision-making bodies, rather than looking at the level of individuals. Instead, I propose a shift from looking at states as isolated entities that make a particular citizenship policy and look at individual attitudes towards dual citizenship. This research may also reveal greater attitudes towards globalization and citizenship.

In this thesis, I analyze survey research on African citizens using a logistic regression analysis following the Michigan model heuristically as an initial cut at identifying possible explanations of variation in attitudes toward dual citizenship. The second half of this paper tests two primary hypotheses centered on social identification and economic performance as indicators of support for dual citizenship. My findings, in brief, suggest that individuals who strongly identify with their national identity are less likely to support dual citizenship. Another

finding suggests that when individuals feel more of their ethnic group in comparison to their national identity they are less likely to support dual citizenship. However, when an ethnic group is treated unfairly by the government they are more likely to support dual citizenship. In addition, African citizens are also more likely to favor dual citizenship when the economy is performing poorly.

Background Context

In order to understand dual citizenship, it is important to define citizenship and how it is applied. A citizen is a member of a state who enjoys rights and privileges while also assuming certain duties (Bellamy 2014). [1] Contemporary citizenship is applied in a combination of *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*. *Jus soli*, or birthright citizenship, is based on the territory of one's birth. *Jus sanguinis* is the principle of citizenship based on blood; that is, children of citizens in a state inherit the status of their parents, regardless of their place of birth (Whitaker 2011, Nyamnjoh 2006, Manby 2009). In Africa, *jus soli* and *jus sanguis* are applied differently across the continent.

One of the largest factors that played a role in defining citizenship policies in Africa was colonization. Current nationality laws came into being amidst a lack of preexisting state structures and poorly constructed territorial boundaries left by colonial rule (Manby 2009, 2016).

[1] Citizenship is divided into the active and passive mode of citizenship. The active mode of citizenship is seen in the republican model of citizenship which is defined by self-rule. The republican model believes that an individual is capable of ruling and being ruled. Prominent scholars of the republican model include Aristotle and Machiavelli and their discussions of Athenian democracy and the Roman republic, respectively. Citizenship in Roman and Athenian democracy was a relationship with the state that was exclusive to wealthy males who had strict requirements, including owning slaves. In the republican model, the political community is seen as allowing individuals to be citizens and not subjects of their political community (Bellamy 2014). The liberal model of citizenship is defined as a legal status focusing on extended individual freedoms. Liberal models of citizenship are exemplified by the Roman Empire and Roman law (Bellamy 2014). Citizenship in the Roman empire was a protection by the law and a legal status to everyday life. These freedoms are expressed in private associations and are less frequent in the political sphere. Freedoms including the right to express oneself and to actively participate in a political community.

European empires left a legacy of legal systems consisting of many tiered citizenship structures based on racial discrimination (Manby 2009, Manby 2016). For example, France adopted laws in 1881 in Algeria that divided nationals of its territories into three categories: French citizens who were European, and French subjects who were Black Africans, Muslim Algerians or both (Manby 2016, 39). These rules created an inferior legal status for French subjects. European settlers were full citizens with the same rights as their home countries while African natives were not. Africans were considered subordinate and regarded as essentially mere savage children under European guardianship (Manby 2016). [2]

In response to European racism, some African countries have prohibited dual citizenship as a way to resist colonial rule (Manby 2009, 2016; Whitaker, 2011). Colonialists living in African countries enjoyed the benefits of having both dual citizenship in the country they were exploiting and their European country of origin. This form of dual citizenship angered African leaders who attempted to resist colonial rule from Whites who benefited from two citizenships. For example, Zimbabwe, formally known as Rhodesia, banned dual citizenship as an attempt to denationalize colonial settlers. Under the British Empire, White settlers favored Zimbabwe because of its commercial farms and rich land (Manby 2009). Shortly after their settlement, a war in 1980 led to a liberation movement prohibiting dual citizenship in hopes of expelling White Zimbabweans with foreign passports (Manby 2009).

Contrary to the history of various African countries, many African states have followed the global trend of allowing dual citizenship. As of 2009, 30 out of 53 African countries have legislatively permitted dual citizenship (Manby 2009). What makes African dual citizenship unique is that it has been characterized by huge rates of emigration in comparison to Europe's

[2] Citizenship in African countries was also dependent on who they were colonized by

large rates of immigration. The rationale of dual citizenship allowance in Africa is shaped by its efforts to engage its diaspora through economic and political participation (Whitaker 2011). Engaging the Afro-diaspora abroad increases investments and remittances by incentivizing citizens to own property and vote in their countries of origin (Whitaker 2011). These incentives discussed are later explored in this study.

(Figure 1 about here)

Whitaker (2011) tests the economic benefits African states receive by evaluating citizenship laws in Africa. Whitaker (2011) analyzes dual citizenship from the country level. She tests her dependent variable "whether or not a state has allowed for dual citizenship" and her independent variables, "emigrant pressures, birthright citizenship, remittances as a percent of GDP (Whitaker 2011). She finds that dual citizenship is increasingly permitted in countries that are economically performing poorly. Countries with poor economies are incentivized to allow dual citizenship in hopes of increasing remittances from the diaspora.

After exploring theories of dual citizenship in the African context, this paper turns to analyze the Michigan model, which utilizes social, economic, and political characteristics to explain individual attitudes. The Michigan model will allow this thesis to contribute academic dialogues on dual citizenship by giving a general sense of what variables matter when explaining variation on attitudes towards dual citizenship. One of the most powerful advantages of this model and the reason for its utilization in this study is because it does not treat relationships as one dimensional. Instead, the Michigan Model argued that many factors lead an individual to support a political cause or policy.

Heuristic Model

The Michigan model was developed by political scientists to explain the vote in the United States (Campbell et al 1960). Developing a funnel of causality, the model identified the factors that explain voting behavior in American elections (Campbell et al 1960). The funnel of causality captured certain political and social determinants of political behavior (Wilder 2017, 724). Howlett explains, "[t]hese variables are intertwined in a 'nested' pattern of mutual interaction in which decision-making occurs within institutions, institutions existing within prevailing sets of ideas and ideologies, ideologies within relations of power in society, and relations of power within a larger social and material environment" (Howlett et al 1995, 111). The authors of *The American Voter* (1960) understood that issues are not dichotomous. A set of predispositions and ideologies that are already espoused by individuals lead them to support a policy or cause. The funnel of causality is characterized by five dimensions which include socio-demographics, party identification, issues, candidates and perceptions of the economy. In this paper, I make use of four of the components of the Michigan model.



Explain U.S. Vote

The funnel of causality identifies 'sociological demographics' such as gender, race, religion and education. It suggests that race and gender are social groupings that influence attitudes. Making no adaptations to this dimension, this paper's initial exploration includes gender, age and education. Gender is considered a social grouping because of the increasing gender equality in citizenship laws. States have changed their nationality legislation to ensure that women and men are treated equally (Hammar 1985). Historically, nationality laws have forced women to receive the nationality of her husband. Due to this gender discrimination, women's movements led to increased equality which allowed women to keep their old passports and the new one. This led to the increase of dual citizens and widespread acceptance of dual citizenship among states (Hammar 1985). Age is considered a social group because age groups are known for politically participating differently. "Each group occupies a different social role. Most of these differences will disappear as younger people grow older" (Quintelier 2007, 166). Age should play an important factor because many younger groups are said to think differently

on many different issues. Educated individuals are shown to feel similarly about certain issues because of the strong link between education and political participation. Students are said to acquire skills that better equip them to understand the world and politics (*The American Voter Revisited* 2008, 357). Sociological demographics in this paper should inform whether these groups are important social cleavages when analyzing support for dual citizenship.

A second component of the heuristic model is social psychological in nature. *In the American Voter* (1960) 'party identification' is treated as a psychological tie through which voters interpret political issues (Campbell et al 1960).The model emphasized an individual's social psychology and overall attitudes towards a political party (Campbell et al 1960). Party identification in *The American Voter* (1960) was one of the most important pieces of information that helped understand what an individual's political attitudes and vote choice would be. The Michigan model said that the stronger the person's partisan attachment the greater the individual will be involved with their party's politics (Lewis-Beck 2008). In this paper social psychology is used in replacement of party identification in order to capture an individual's basic value orientation. This research uses two social psychological indicators, nationalism and feelings of ethnicity in order to explain support for dual citizenship. Specifically, national identification in this paper refers to a political identity built around a shared citizenship with the state (Stilz 2009). The main discussion in the nationalism literature on dual citizenship has argued that dual citizenship results in lower levels of political participation and less pride in one's country (Sejersen 2008). Unlike the literature on nationalism and dual citizenship, I introduce ethnic identity as a concept important to dual citizenship because of its importance in the African context.

A third component of this model is ‘issues’, which emphasizes that some members of the general public cast their votes based off of a single given issue. Certain public policies are translated into mass voting decisions. “People support policies they believe are likely to achieve their social goals and oppose policies that are not” (The American Voter Revisited, year, 204). Individuals support and vote on a single given issue because of the benefits they stand to gain. The central issue I analyze are who respondents believe has the right to be a citizen of their country. I analyze inclusive and exclusive citizenship views by observing whether individuals support birthright citizenship, women passing citizenship to their non-citizen husbands and the ability to naturalize in a country a person lives and works in. The ways in which individuals view the obtainment of single citizenship should inform further research on how individuals view dual citizenship.

The last component of this model is ‘economics’ *The American Voter* (1960) discusses how economic background and class consciousness help explain political attitudes. However, the Michigan model was not yet fully developed in its earlier stages. As a result, Michael Lewis-Beck (1988) is one author who created a comparative economic theory building on the Michigan model. Lewis-Beck's (1988) model consisted of four dimensions: self to society, retrospective to prospective, simple to complex and cognitive to affective.

The first dimension of Lewis-Beck’s model “self to society” references “the pocketbook” voter, an individual who views the economy through their own finances. Pocketbook voters tend to think that when their financial situations change it is because of government policies and not their own choices. On the other hand, “sociotropic” individuals do not wonder what the government has done for them personally. Rather, they think in terms of "what has the government done for us?" (Lewis-Beck, 1988, 37). Sociotropic individuals believe their interests

are better served when the collective prospers (Lewis-Beck 1988). The second dimension emphasizes a time component to how individuals view the economy. Retrospective behavior is characterized by comparing the current economy to that of the past, while prospective behavior regards how the economy will perform in the future. The third dimension, simple to complex, is framed in the structure of how survey questions were asked to respondents. Simple questions are those that inquire about a single judgment or familiar economic objects, while complex questions deliberate how the economy is performing in response to government intervention. Fourth, the cognitive versus affective dimension takes into account that individuals are not efficient calculators and are not necessarily logical. Rather, people have feelings, sentiments, and passions that they consider when viewing the economy (Lewis-Beck 1988). In this last component, I utilize all of the four dimensions in this comparative economic theory. For the purpose of this study, these dimensions of the Michigan Model are used as an initial exploratory framework to help identify why someone would support dual citizenship.

Although the Michigan model is very helpful for this study, there are limitations to it and its applicability. One of these limitations includes the Michigan Model's use of party identification which is limited to the study to explain the U.S. vote. Other limitations include its general applicability to the African continent and whether or not it is generalizable to other policies in the non-Western context. As a Western model, it may be difficult to discern important and possibly unique attitudes in African countries. To reiterate, the Michigan model is only used heuristically to better understand, initially, why individual Africans support dual citizenship. The four components of this model include socio- demographics, social psychology, politics and economics.



Data and Method

Between the years 2011 and 2013 the University of Cape Town and Ghana Center for Democratic Development administered the "Afrobarometer Round 5: The Quality of Democracy and Governance" (Mattes et al 2013). The Afrobarometer project was designed to better understand Africans' views on democracy, governance and civil society (Mattes et al 2013). The data collected are concerned with the attitudes of citizens from thirty-four different African countries. The methodology used to conduct this survey is a clustered, stratified, multistage area probability sample. The unit of analysis is an individual respondent who answered the survey. Each individual respondent was required to be a registered citizen of voting age from one of the thirty-four African countries. There were 51, 584 respondents who answered face-to-face interview questions about their personal opinion on a wide range of topics including democracy and their government's overall performance (Mattes et al 2013). Questions asked in this survey range from socio-psychological questions to social characteristics (Mattes et al 2013).

This study's dependent variable focuses on question 86F which asks if respondents support dual citizenship. Few research studies include such survey questions that inquire about individual views on dual citizenship. The only other research that has asked this question was conducted by Vink (2019) who administered his own survey to respondents in the Netherlands. Therefore, the advantage of this dataset is its sample size of 34 African countries which allow this paper to think comparatively, raise questions of the appropriateness of inferences, and to explore the unique aspects of dual citizenship in this part of the world. While there are positive aspects of this large sample size the limitations include potential bias which may overgeneralize the results. Other limitations include potential endogeneity between the inclusive citizenship variables.

This paper pursues a two-part analysis of indicators of attitude formation regarding dual citizenship. First, in an exploratory manner, I analyze correlates with dual citizenship as guided by the Michigan model. The analysis's first part explores variables that indicate what matters when approaching attitudes toward an explanation of dual citizenship. The second part of this analysis tests two specific hypotheses. Hypothesis 1: strong national identification is negatively associated with the acceptance of dual citizenship but not ethnic identification. Hypothesis 2: In non-Western societies, perceptions of a strong economy is negatively associated with dual citizenship. To conduct both tests, I ran a logistic regression analysis on my dependent variable, dual citizenship.

Measuring the Dimensions of the Heuristic Model

The dependent variable "opinion on dual citizenship" is operationalized with the Afrobarometer question "Do you support someone who wishes to be a citizen of the country and

some other country?"[3] Respondents can answer either 'yes' or 'no.' This leaves this indicator as a dichotomous dependent variable.

(Table 4 about here)

The four dimensions of the model are measured with questions that ask respondents their gender, age, educational level, national identification, feelings towards ethnicity, rights to citizenship and questions on the economy. The first dimension of my model measures educational level, gender and age.[4]

The second dimension of my model includes social-psychological variables which ask whether 'it makes you proud to be called a national identity?' and 'do you feel more of your ethnicity or nationality?'[5] This data set does not have a question that asks respondents if they feel how proud of their ethnicity. Instead, the question utilized asks respondents whether a person chooses to identify more with their ethnicity or nationality. This question is used to compare whether respondents who identify with their ethnicity or nationality are more likely to support dual citizenship.

Third, the political dimension is empirically captured through views on who has the right to be a citizen.[6] My first question captures birthright citizenship by asking respondents does 'a person born in the country with two non-national parents have the right to be a citizen?' The second citizenship question asks does "the husband of a national woman, if he was born out of the country have the right to citizenship?' My third question asks respondents does 'a person who came from another country, but has lived and worked in the country for many years, and

[3] See appendix for question Q86F
[4] See appendix for questions Q97, Q101, Q1
[5] See appendix for questions Q85C, Q85B
[6] See appendix for questions Q86D, Q86B, Q86E

wishes to make the country his or her home have the right to be a citizen?' This question captures an immigrant's right to naturalization.

(Table 1 about here)

The economic dimension of this model is captured by questions which are closely aligned to Lewis Beck's economic theory.[7] Self to society is captured with questions on employment status and a person's present living conditions. I capture retrospective to prospective with questions that ask respondents how the economy was performing 12 months ago and how it will perform in 12 months' time. Simple to complex is captured by a simple question that asks respondents how the economy is performing and complex is measured by a question that asks how the government is handling the economy. Lastly, cognitive to affective is measured with how the government will solve a problem within the next five years. This question is meant to capture how respondents view the future and if they are hopeful about the future.

(table 2 about here)

Analysis

In an attempt to uncover what matters when viewing what drives support for dual citizenship this study ran a correlation matrix to view bi-variate correlations between all of the variables. The advantages of conducting this correlation matrix help clarify the directionality of the variables and how they interact with one another. As expected, none of the different indicators of dual citizenship are greater than .75 ($p<.01$) which indicates that none of these variables are highly correlated.

(insert table 3)

[7] See appendix for questions Q96, Q3B, Q5A, Q6A, Q3A, Q65A, Q64

The negative relationship between dual citizenship and gender (-0.0112) and age (-0.0071) shows that males and younger people are more likely to support dual citizenship. Education (0.0655) is positively correlated with dual citizenship, meaning that the more educated a respondent is the more likely they are to support dual citizenship.

The first social psychology variable, nationalism (-0.0348) is a negative correlation meaning that the more nationalistic respondents are the less likely they will support dual citizenship. This supports the literature which has argued that nationalists are threatened by dual citizenship because it may lead to the decline of the nation-state (Sejersen 2008). Results show that more nationalistic respondents are less likely to support dual citizenship. The second social psychology question asks respondents whether they feel their ethnicity or nationality (0.0165). This variable is positively correlated with dual citizenship which reveals that respondents who feel their state nationality more than their ethnicity are more likely to support dual citizenship.

Questions regarding inclusive and exclusive citizenship are among the highest correlated variables. Interestingly, the highest correlation among my variables on dual citizenship is the variable 'lived and worked in a country.' This reveals that respondents who support naturalization (0.1797) are more likely to support dual citizenship than those who support other forms of inclusive citizenship such as birthright citizenship and marrying a citizen woman (0.2214). Due to the high correlations observed it is important to note that potential biases include reverse causality.

Lastly, within this column, views on the economy were not as strongly correlated as expected. The results show that respondents who are financially performing well are more likely to support dual citizenship (0.0176). This reveals that the better a person perceives their economic conditions are the more likely they are to support dual citizenship. Contrary to this

finding, the country's economic performance (-0.0188) is negatively associated with dual citizenship meaning that the worse the country is performing the more likely a respondent will support dual citizenship. The variable 'the government will solve problem within 5 years' (-0.226) is also negatively associated with dual citizenship. Therefore, when the economy and government are performing poorly a respondent is more inclined to support dual citizenship, however, when a person's financial conditions are not doing well they are less inclined to support dual citizenship.

Another robust finding in Table 3 reveals that education and employment status are correlated at .3026, which suggests that the more educated a respondent is, the more likely they are to be employed. Employment status (0.032) may not be related to support for dual citizenship, but rather reveals that educated respondents are more likely to be more employed and support dual citizenship. Similar to this finding, the more educated the respondent is the more likely they are to have a good present economic condition (0.1256).

Given this initial exploration, interesting findings suggest that ethnic and national identity matter when analyzing support for dual citizenship. Therefore, I further develop this finding and examine the role of how ethnic groups are treated by the government. Another interesting finding shows that negative perceptions of the economy lead to greater support for dual citizenship. I build on an earlier finding by using the highly correlated economic variables as controls for future models. Moving forward, this paper aims to better identify how social identification and the economy effect support for dual citizenship.

A Second Explanation of Dual Citizenship

Symbolic Threat to the Nation?

Nationalism as a social psychological concept has sparked many debates around dual citizenship. Renowned scholar Benedict Anderson has defined the nation as “an imagined political community" (Anderson 1991, 6). The nation in much of the dual citizenship literature is viewed as under threat because of globalization and large trends of migration (Alarian and Goodman 2016). The United Nations (2013) reports that migration flow has soared to include 230 million people globally. Dual citizenship as a policy is directly related to global migration and globalization (Alarian and Goodman 2016). Nationalists hold that "the inflows of newcomers with different cultural values as well as the outflows of mobile groups who abandon the nation are conceived to threaten national survival" (Vink 2019, 89). Nationalists are said to believe that citizenship has no meaning if someone can leave the country, naturalize somewhere else and still maintain certain rights (Vink 2019).

Most of the migration and ethnic studies literature on nationalism and dual citizenship has neglected to discuss the role of strong ethnic identity and how it impacts support for dual citizenship. Strong ethnic identification is defined in terms of how proud one is of their ethnicity. This paper expands on the literature on nationalism and dual citizenship, exploring the role of ethnic identification in explaining attitudes.

Ethnic identification-- "the belonging to a social group" -- is different from state nationalism because it does not claim territorial boundaries or links to the state (Eriksen 1994). "A nationalist holds that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural boundaries, whereas most ethnic groups, even if they ask for recognition and cultural rights, do not demand command over a state" (Eriksen 1994, 10). In Africa, for example, countries faced the challenge of creating "imagined communities" among groups of people who were coerced into living with one another regardless of ethnolinguistic similarities (Manby 2009). Many ethnic groups in

Africa were reshaped or relocated as a consequence of state policies and economic changes, which led to many groups still identifying with their pre-colonial identity.

For example, the Zaghawa people in Western Sudan and Eastern Chad share more similarities with each other than with the state-sponsored identity (Shoup III 2011). Zaghawa people may have stronger claims to their ethnicity than the national sentiments created during the post-colonial era in the 1950s (Shoup III 2011). The Zaghawa people are one example of an ethnic group that was split by state borders. One theoretical explanation for why an individual from an ethnic group would identify more with their ethnicity is explained by Li (2000) who says that someone chooses to identify with the symbols and meanings an identity can better provide someone. "The ways they connect to the nation, the government and their own, unique tribal place, are the contingent products of agency and cultural and political work of articulation" (Li 2000, 151). The Zaghawa people are one example of an ethnic group that articulates their agency by choosing to resist the national identity that has excluded them. Dual citizenship may be a threat to the nation-state because it means people are no longer connected to one political community. However, some ethnic groups such as the Zaghawa people and other minority groups may have never felt a sense of national identity.

Some ethnic groups choose to strongly identify with their ethnicity as a form of resistance to state violence and coercion. States have had a long history of forcing ethnic groups to assimilate and take on the state national identity. Ethnic groups, in turn, argue that they have their own culture and may span beyond the territorial boundaries of the state (Erikson 1994).

H1: Strong national identification is negatively associated with the acceptance of dual citizenship but not ethnic identification.

Dual Citizenship as an Insurance Policy

An alternative explanation of attitudes toward dual citizenship is economic in nature. Much of the theory on why people oppose dual citizenship emphasizes immigrant dual citizenship and working rights in two countries (Howard 2005). In many European countries and Western societies, dual citizenship is conflated with immigrant dual citizenship, which greater reveals attitudes towards immigration and the economy. For example, in the 1970s several million foreigners migrated to Western Europe for economic reasons (Hammar 1985). The majority of these immigrants were Turkish citizens who did not want to lose status in their home countries. As a result of not allowing for dual citizenship, millions were being unheard and labor parties were suffering (Hammar 1985). This is only one example of how dual citizenship in Western countries is characterized by allowing immigrants the right to keep their old citizenship while also remaining connected to their country of origin.

The dominant discussion in the literature has been characterized by immigrants seeking to naturalize while keeping the citizenships of their country of origin. In the non-Western perspective dual citizenship is characterized by emigrant dual citizenship where individuals from poor countries are more likely to emigrate and later seek a relationship with their countries of origin. In the non-Western context dual citizenship and the economy has explained why states in the least developed world would support dual citizenship. This paper argues that individuals in non-Western societies may view dual citizenship as an insurance policy in a poorly performing economy.

This insurance policy is rooted in the fact that Western Europe and North America can offer their citizens higher levels of stability in comparison to the rest of the world. Dual citizenship has created a pathway for people from outside of the West to have Western citizenship without immigrating. In Latin America for example, descendants of European

immigrants were permitted to reacquire citizenship from their ancestors' countries of origin (Harpaz and Mateos 2018).

Therefore, the literature on non-Western societies explains that dual citizenship is really 'compensatory citizenship' where the second citizenship provides global advantages that the original citizenship lacks in terms of security and economic opportunities (Harpaz and Mateos 2018). In line with this theory, African citizens, if given the opportunity, should strategically choose a passport that will give them a set of transnational privileges rooted in global inequality. African citizens who have dual citizenship to a Western society have an insurance policy which guarantees that if anything were to happen in their country of origin they have the opportunity to travel to a more 'prosperous' country.

In non-Western societies, dual citizenship usually centers around emigrant dual citizenship and strategic citizenship (Harpaz and Mateos 2018 Whitaker 2011). Strategic citizenship is defined as a strategy for citizenship. "Strategic citizenship is a set of 'bottom-up' practices and conceptions that have arisen at the intersection of two trends: the persistent centrality of national membership within global inequality, combined with the growth of new modes of access to multiple citizenship" (Harpaz and Mateos, 6).

The second citizenship acquired by an individual in a non-Western society is viewed as a premium passport in which citizenship is a commodity and status symbol (Harpaz and Mateos 2018). Strategic citizenship highlights the role of inequality in shaping the meaning of citizenship drawing upon the global hierarchy of nationalities and the reason an individual would pursue a second citizenship. The theory suggests that individuals seek to "maximize utility, … to provide them with economic advantages, global mobility, a sense of security or even higher social status" (Harpaz and Mateos 2018, 2). For example, research has shown that immigrants

from low-income countries are far more likely to naturalize than those from high-income countries (Harpaz and Mateos 2018). Given this literature, I hypothesize that the economy's performance plays a critical role in shaping attitudes towards dual citizenship.

H2: In non-Western societies, perceptions of a poor economy is positively associated with dual citizenship.

Logistic Regression Analysis

To test these hypotheses and to observe a casual effect of weak national identification and the economy's poor performance leading to greater support of dual citizenship, I make use of a logistic regression analysis. To minimize the effects of confounding variables, education, living conditions and employment status were controlled.

Model 1: $Y = \beta_1 + \beta_{\text{Nationalism}} X + \beta_{\text{Ethnicity vs Nationality}} X + \beta_{\text{Ethnic Group Treated Unfairly}} X + \beta_{\text{Education}} X + \beta_{\text{East Africa}} X + \beta_{\text{Southern Africa}} X$

In Model 1, I test nationalism and ethnic nationalism's effect on dual citizenship. In order to discern causality, I control for education because of findings in the literature that show that education has a negative association on nationalism (Coenders and Scheepers 2003). I also introduced a variable that was not included in the correlation matrix 'ethnic group treated unfairly' in order to observe if the treatment of ethnic group impacts support for dual citizenship. Finally, I introduce dummy variables, East and Southern Africa in order to analyze regional differences in Africa. This paper introduces region-specific variables because of the different levels of nationalism and xenophobia across Africa. The literature on xenophobia and nationalism in Southern Africa is said to be higher than in West and East Africa. In particular, two Southern African countries characterize this region as more intolerant than the rest of the continent. Examples include Botswana and South Africa which have relatively prosperous

economies and growing xenophobia against migrants (Nymanjoh 2006). One explanation for xenophobia in South Africa is explained by the end of apartheid and the adoption of liberal democracy (Nymanjoh 2006, 14). The adoption of liberal democracy emphasized individual rights which were not extended to Black immigrants who migrated to Southern Africa in hopes of better economic opportunities. Similar to South Africa, Botswana's liberal democracy allowed Botswana nationals to scapegoat foreigners as an expression of individual rights that only certain groups could exercise (Nymanjoh 2006). The growing xenophobia in these countries is related to rejecting immigrant dual citizenship which is a phenomenon characterizing dual citizenship in Europe. Therefore, the effects of nationalism are examined by each region.

Model 2: $Y = \beta_1 + \beta_{\text{Country's Economic Condition}} X + \beta_{\text{Education}} + \beta_{\text{Your Living Condition}} X + \beta_{\text{Employment Status}} X$

In Model 2, I test the perception of a country's poor economic performance and if it leads to greater support for dual citizenship. In order to discern causality, I control for education, a respondents living conditions and employment status because of an earlier finding that revealed respondents view the economy largely by how they view their own finances. Lewis- Beck's "self to society" theory explains that an individual views the economy relative to how they are performing. An earlier finding from the correlation matrix found that the highest correlation .5872 was between how a respondent views their country's economic condition and their own personal financial condition.

Results

Hypothesis 1

In Table 5, I test the effects of strong national identity and ethnic identification on dual citizenship.[8] I include how 'proud one is of their nationality', whether or not they feel more of their 'ethnicity or nationality' and "if their ethnic group is treated unfairly.' In Model 1, I test for how proud one is of their nationality while controlling for education. Results show that the more nationalistic a respondent is the less likely they are to support dual citizenship (-0.063***). As expected, this relationship is negatively associated with dual citizenship and is statistically significant.

(Table 5 about here)

In Model 2, I test for whether a respondent feels more of their ethnic or national identification. This is important in the African studies literature because ethnic identity has shown to be more important because of poorly constructed colonial boundaries (Manby 2009). Unexpected, model 2 reveals that the more a respondent identifies with their ethnicity the less likely they are to support dual citizenship (0.049***). Respondents who identify with their state-nationality, are in turn, more likely to support dual citizenship. This reveals that ethnic identity is more exclusionary, one explanation of this finding concludes that ethnic group identity is not as fluid as state-national identity. State nationalism promotes heterogeneously and may convince people to think beyond their regional identity and instead indoctrinates people to build a sense of political identity around the state.

In Model 3, I introduce a new variable that was not included in the Michigan Model. I differentiate from not only strong ethnic identification but also if the ethnic group is treated

[8] See Appendix for standard error reporting

unfairly by the government. Model 3 shows that when respondents view their ethnic group as treated unfairly by the government they are more likely to support dual citizenship (0.104***). Many ethnic groups in African countries can be minority groups that are coerced into adopting national identities. Therefore, dual citizenship may be in their best interest, especially if they expand territorial boundaries.

In Model 4, I introduced East and Southern Africa to observe region variation in Africa while using West Africa as a baseline. Every other region is recorded as a 0 while East Africa (-0.018***) is recorded as a 1. Similar to this Southern Africa (-0.697***) is also recorded as a 1 when respondents are from Southern Africa. Results show that Southern Africa in comparison to West Africa as a baseline is much less likely to support dual citizenship and is a statistically significant negative relationship.[9] This finding supports the literature that characterizes Southern Africa as more nationalistic and xenophobic.

Hypothesis 2

In Table 6, I test perceptions of the economy in order to observe views on dual citizenship and how they interact. Table 6 controls for a respondents educational level, living condition and employment status.[10] In Model 1, I test a country's present economic condition and include education as a control (-0.017**). Controlling for education while measuring perceptions of the economy is especially important because of the variation in perceptions of the economy. Educated respondents may be more aware of how the economy is performing in comparison to less educated individuals. Model 1 reveals that the poorer the economy is

[9] Countries within each region are classified as West Africa= Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo. East Africa= Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. Southern Africa=Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe. North Africa= Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia (Dual Citizenship not asked in North Africa).

[10] See Appendix for standard error reporting

performing the more likely an individual will support dual citizenship (Pseudo R^2 0.007). The negatively associated relationship supports hypothesis 2, however, it is not as statistically significant as expected (-0.017**)

(Table 6 about here)

In model 2, I test for country's economic condition while adding an individual's living condition as a control. Results in Model 2 reveals that when controlling for an individual's living standard, 'Country's Economic Condition'(-0.050***) becomes stronger and more statistically significant. This shows the impact that the control has on how respondents view the country's economic condition.

In model 3, I test for similar findings included in model 2 while introducing an additional control, employment status. The economic literature has found that personal unemployment effects perceptions of the economy. When respondents are unemployed they may be more likely to blame the larger economy rather than themselves (Lewis-Beck 1988). Country's economic condition is still statistically significant (-0.049***) and as a result of controlling for employment status, education remains relatively constant (0.064***) as a control variable which supports that education is not impacted by other variables. The worse an individual's living conditions are the less likely they will support dual citizenship (0.057***). The more employed (part time/full time) an individual is the more likely they will support dual citizenship (0.030***). When the economy is performing poorly respondents are more likely to support dual citizenship. Similar to this finding, when the government is poorly handling the economy respondents are more likely to support dual citizenship. What is interesting about the economic models is that when respondents are thinking about the economy as a whole and the economy is not performing well they are more likely to support dual citizenship. In comparison to when a

respondent is discussing their own personal finances and they are not financially doing well they are less likely to support dual citizenship. Harpaz and Mateoz (2018) have argued that when the economy is performing poorly individuals are more likely to support dual citizenship, however, this research finds that when individuals are financially not doing well they are less likely to support dual citizenship.

After finding that dual citizenship is impacted by national, ethnic and economic factors this paper analyzes the impacts of these variables controlling for each other. In order to test this, I conducted a logistic regression analysis on all of the variables followed by the Michigan model. The purpose of conducting this analysis is to more generally explore the indicators of dual citizenship and which ones are statistically significant. To restate, this paper looks more generally at how the variables interact with one another only as an initial exploration to find what indicators matter.

(Table 7 about here)

Table 7 reports the findings for a logistic regression analysis that measures all of the variables of the heuristic model and dependent variable, dual citizenship. Model 1 of Table 7 measures gender, age the effects of education. The results of model 1 show gender (0.002) is not statistically significant. However, age (0.001^{*}) is statistically significant with a p-value of less than .1 (Table 7). Age is not as statistically as significant as expected which reveals that gender and age are not significant explanations for support of dual citizenship. The variable education (0.074^{***}) is a statistically significant variable which reveals that the more educated respondents are, the more likely they are to support dual citizenship (Pseudo R^2 0.007).

In Model 2, I test for how nationalism effects support for dual citizenship. The variables in Model 2 include how proud a respondent is of their country (-0.077^{***}) and whether or not

they identify with their ethnicity or state-nationality (0.066***). Compared to earlier results the coefficients of nationalism do not greatly change which shows that nationalism is a relatively stable coefficient.

In Model 3, I test inclusive views of citizenship by including variables that ask respondents about the requirements for citizenship. As expected, respondents who believe that citizenship should be granted to individuals born in a country (0.427***), currently residing or working within a country (0.0698***), or those married to a citizen woman (1.117***), are also more likely to support dual citizenship (Pseudo R^2 0.155). In Model 3 the strongest relationship observed is among respondents who believe someone has the right to naturalize if they live and work in a country. This relationship is statistically significant and has a larger coefficient than variables 'born with two noncitizen parents' and 'husband of a citizen wife.'

In Model 4, I test the variables that capture the four dimensions of Lewis-Beck's economic theory. Results show that 'employment status' (0.057***), a respondent's 'living condition'(0.084***), the 'country's economic condition'(-0.058***) and how the 'government is handling the economy'(-0.058***) have statistically significant effects on respondents' views of dual citizenship. Employment status reveals that the more educated respondents are the more likely they are to support dual citizenship. Similar to this finding, when a respondent's present living conditions are fairly good, they are more likely to support dual citizenship. Unexpected, questions that capture Lewis Beck's economic time dimension 'how the economy is doing compared to 12 months ago' and 'how the economy will perform in 12 months' time' are not statistically significant variables.

Country Policies on Dual Citizenship

Given this initial exploration, I explore country-level policies in order to view variation among individual attitudes and dual citizenship policies. Many researchers have argued that public policy shapes public opinion. Other scholars have argued that public opinion shapes government policies. Thus, providing a link between public opinion and dual citizenship policies this paper turns to shift the unit of analysis to the country level in order to test what drives country-level policies in Africa.[11] To further investigate whether country policies drive support, I turn to analyze whether or not there is strong support for dual citizenship in countries that legislatively permit it. In the following table, I show whether countries support dual citizenship, reject, or sometimes allow for it.

Table 8 categorizes Africa regionally, this table utilizes data provided by Manby (2009) in her book *Citizenship Law in Africa*. Manby's data set includes information on each African country's policies toward dual citizenship and what year they made their decisions. I also added information reflecting individuals' support for dual citizenship from the Afrobarometer in order to compare country policy to support for dual citizenship in each African country.

(Table 8 about here)

A finding earlier in this study (see page 25) revealed that Southern Africa was less likely to support dual citizenship. What is interesting about this finding is that when analyzing support for dual citizenship by region the individual level also aligns with the country level. As seen in Table 8, some of the lowest rates of dual citizenship approval include Botswana, Malawi and Swaziland which are all Southern African countries that approve of dual citizenship at 11%, 14% and 19%. What is intriguing about this is that Malawi does not allow dual citizenship and Botswana and Swaziland only allow dual citizenship under certain conditions.

[11] Each country excluding North Africa which did not ask respondents questions on dual citizenship

Another explanation of why states allow for dual citizenship is argued by Whitaker (2011) who reveals that support for dual citizenship is more common in countries with large numbers of emigrants leaving to secure citizenship in Western countries. This is similar to the literature on the economy which has argued that in non-Western societies dual citizenship is strategic. If dual citizenship is an insurance policy then it is expected that countries with large rates of emigration also have more individual support for dual citizenship and governments should legislatively permit it. In order to test this, I analyzed the number of emigrants in each African country in this survey and tested whether the number of emigrants leaving each country may be driving governments to support dual citizenship in hopes of receiving remittances and connecting with the Afro-diaspora.

Emigration Statistics

In Table 9, I turned to analyze country variation among policies on dual citizenship and how emigration statistics impact support for dual citizenship. I measured emigration statistics from a dataset provided by PEW research in the year of 2017. In order to observe the percent of emigrants, I divided the emigrant population by the total population. The importance of this is to proportionality compare countries to one another.

(Table 9 about here)

Table 9 does not show any direct relationship between emigration rates and dual citizenship policies. For example, Cape Verde which has a 29.6% emigration rate allows for dual citizenship while Lesotho, the second highest emigration rate at 12.9% does not allow for dual citizenship. This table descriptively shows that all of the countries that support dual citizenship do not necessarily have the highest rates of emigrants leaving their countries. Some of these countries have really high emigration populations, however, when analyzing it to the total

population they are not as high as expected. Alternatively, if individuals emigrate out of their countries more they should also be more likely to support dual citizenship because it is an opportunity to leave the country and gain benefits elsewhere. In order to observe this relationship, I conducted a scatter plot to analyze if emigration rates have an effect on dual citizenship attitudes.

(Figure 2 about here)

In Figure 2, I diagram emigration statistics and its effect on support for dual citizenship. The y-axis 'emigrated population' is measured by the emigrated population proportionate to the total population. Support for dual citizenship is measured from earlier data provided by the Afrobarometer. In figure 2, each data point on the chart is an African country in this survey. The results of this chart show that there is a relationship between emigration and support for dual citizenship. However, this relationship is not as strong as expected.

(insert chart 1)

Discussion

The two most important findings in this paper include ethnic identification's effect on dual citizenship and how the economy's performance greatly impacts support for dual citizenship. The empirical results showed that individuals who feel their ethnicity more than their nationality are less likely to support dual citizenship. However, when an ethnic group is treated unfairly by the national government they are more likely to support dual citizenship. The interesting implications of this finding suggest that ethnic identity is more exclusionary than state-nationalism. Explanations of why state-nationalism leads to greater support of dual citizenship include the fact that state political identity is more inclusionary. Individuals can choose to naturalize into a country and join the national identity, whereas, this is not possible

with ethnic group identities. Therefore, identifying with an ethnic group is not enough to posit support for dual citizenship. Rather, an ethnic group needs to feel excluded from the national identity and treated unfairly by the government to lead to more support for dual citizenship.

The economic findings show that when the economy is performing poorly respondents are more likely to support dual citizenship. The indications of this finding suggest that dual citizenship may be an insurance policy for people in poorer countries. The ability to have dual citizenship is strategically chosen among citizens in non-Western societies. What is interesting about this finding is that even when individuals are in poorer countries they are still cognizant of their own economic conditions. When individuals view their finances as not doing well they are less likely to support dual citizenship.

Conclusion

Dual citizenship is a result of how we have negotiated the boundaries of exclusion and inclusion over time (Nyamnjoh, 2006).

> "We are all born into borders, and struggle for or against them our entire lives. These boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are political, social, cultural and, above all, material. How well we succeed in claiming and realizing citizenship-global, regional national or otherwise-- and in what form depends very much on how we are able to negotiate away the boundaries of exclusion" (Nyamnjoh 2006, 25).

Today more people are identifying as global citizens and are no longer connected to one political community (Howard 2005, Sejersen 2008). With this controversial phenomenon happening the literature has widely reported on why states reject or support dual citizenship. This study provides initial explanations on what leads to support for dual citizenship in the African context. This analyses drew on data from the Afrobarometer which asked respondents whether they

supported dual citizenship. Based on the exploratory framework drawing on literature from the Michigan model, I suggest that individuals who strongly identify with their ethnic or national identity are less likely to support dual citizenship. However, when ethnic groups are treated unfairly they are more likely to support dual citizenship. In addition, when individuals view the economy is performing poorly they are more likely to favor dual citizenship.

Based on the exploratory analysis noted in this paper and the testing of two primary hypotheses, I invite further research to analyze support for dual citizenship among different social identifications. In particular, identifying the relevance of how an individual view's themselves, whether it be on a national or subnational level may explain support for dual citizenship. I also invite future research to explore the role of immigration in African countries. Today, Africa has many Asian and European immigrants who have moved because of economic investments that have created a new form of neo-colonialism. Further research should explore the ways in which this has changed the dynamics of immigration and support for dual citizenship in many African countries.

Figure 1: Support for Dual Citizenship among 34 Different African Countries



Table 1

Socio Demographics	Socio-Psychology	Citizenship Views
• Gender (Q101) • Age (Q1) • Education (Q97)	• Proud of Nationality? (Q85C) • Do you feel more your ethnicity or nationality? (Q85B)	• Does a person born in a country with two non-national parents have the right to be a citizen? (Q86B) • Does the husband of a national woman, if he was born out of the country have the right to citizenship? (Q86D) • Does a person who came from another country and has lived and worked for many years have the right to citizenship? (Q86E)

Table 2

Self to Society	Retrospective to Prospective	Simple to Complex	Cognitive to Affective
• Employment Status (Q96) • Personal Finances (Your present living conditions Q3B)	• Country's economic condition compared to 12 months ago (Q5A) • Country's economic condition in 12 months' time (Q6A)	• Simple: How is the Country's economy doing (Q3A) • Complex: How is the government handling the country's economy (Q65A)	• How likely will the government solve this problem within the next 5 years (Q64)

Table 3. Correlates with Dual citizenship

	Dual Citienship	Gender	Age	Education	Nationalism	Ethnicity vs Nationalism	Born in a Country with two non-citizen Parents	Husband of a Citizen Wife	Lived and Worked in a Country	Employment Status	Your Present Living Condition	Econ Condition Compared to 12 months ago	Country's Economic Condition in 12 months time	Country's Econ Condition	Government Handling the Economy	Government will solve Problem in 5 Years
Dual Citizenship																
Gender	-0.0112 n= 42,739															
Age	-0.0071 n= 42,397	-0.1194 n= 51,143														
Education	0.0665 n=42,666	-0.1146 n= 51,461	-0.2262 n= 51,023													
Nationalism	-0.0348 n=42,554	-0.0102 n= 51,220	0.023 n= 50,791	0.0011 n= 51,105												
Ethnicity vs Nationalism	0.0165 n= 41,354	-0.0251 n= 44,023	0.0219 n= 43,618	-0.0006 n= 43,938	0.1352 n= 43,813											
Born in a Country with two non-citizen Parents	0.1797 n= 42,243	-0.0181 n= 44,204	0.0092 n= 43,835	0.0363 n= 44,125	0.0038 n= 44,006	0.0161 n= 42,711										
Husband of a Citizen Wife	0.2214 n= 42,057	-0.0094 n= 43,717	0.028 n= 43,361	0.0615 n= 43,638	-0.0011 n= 43,525	0.005 n= 42,243	0.3008 n= 43,228									
Lived and Worked in a Country	0.2728 n= 42,231	-0.0356 n= 43,549	-0.0017 n= 43,194	0.1012 n= 43,473	0.0181 n= 43,356	-0.0076 n= 42,078	0.2267 n= 43,006	0.2805 n= 42,818								
Employment Status	0.032 n= 42,627	-0.1134 n= 51,378	-0.0497 n= 50,938	0.3026 n= 51,279	0.0026 n= 51,033	-0.0352 n= 43,883	0.031 n= 44,071	0.0415 n= 43,579	0.0305 n= 43,432							
Your Present Living Condition	0.0176 n= 42,597	-0.0014 n= 51,387	-0.065 n= 50,951	0.1256 n= 51,265	0.0248 n= 51,105	-0.0072 n= 43,938	0.0295 n= 44,060	0.0068 n= 43,576	0.0355 n= 43,408	0.0349 n= 43,432						
Country's Econ Condition Compared to 12 months ago	-0.0056 n= 41,986	-0.0087 n= 51,172	-0.0164 n= 50,148	0.0102 n= 50,445	0.0332 n= 50,445	0.0074 n= 50,445	0.0309 n= 43,410	0.0083 n= 42,942	0.0078 n= 42,771	0.001 n= 43,223	0.2268 n= 50,619					
Country's Economic Condition in 12 months time	-0.0079 n= 38,560	0.0111 n= 46,303	-0.0435 n= 45,960	-0.0409 n= 46,197	0.0695 n= 46,197	-0.0392 n= 46,197	0.0227 n= 39,764	-0.0058 n= 39,377	0.0109 n= 39,238	-0.0308 n= 39,238	0.2632 n= 46,163	0.311 n= 45,774				
Country's Econ Condition	-0.0188 n= 42,153	-0.0162 n= 50,727	-0.0219 n= 50,316	0.0101 n= 50,608	0.0338 n= 50,608	0.0095 n= 50,608	0.036 n= 43,558	0.0178 n= 43,092	0.0225 n= 42,936	-0.021 n= 42,936	0.5872 n= 50,619	0.2903 n= 50,613	0.3206 n= 45,844			
Government Handling the Economy	-0.0328 n= 40,435	-0.0243 n= 48,364	0.0109 n= 48,006	0.002 n= 48,258	0.0496 n= 48,528	0.0173 n= 48,358	0.0162 n= 41732	0.0058 n= 41,330	0.0176 n= 41,172	-0.0064 n= 41,172	0.2494 n= 48,209	0.1928 n= 47,685	0.248 n= 43,890	0.3645 n= 47,845		
Government will solve Problem in 5 Years	-0.0226 n= 40, 578	0.0215 n= 48,698	0.0076 n= 48,324	-0.142 n= 48,587	0.0782 n= 48,587	0.0476 n= 48,587	-0.0074 n= 41,862	-0.0083 n= 41,468	-0.0283 n= 41,309	-0.0496 n= 41,309	0.0697 n= 48,526	0.0767 n= 47,877	0.1742 n= 44,306	0.1006 n= 48,009	0.2019 n= 46,035	

Variables in this dataset are coded as followed. **Dual Citizenship** (0=no, 1=yes), **Proud of Nationality** (0=strongly disagree, 1=disagree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree), **Ethnic or National Identity** (0=I feel more ethnic group, 1=I feel more ethnic group than national identity, 2=I feel equally national identity and ethnic group, 3=I feel more national identity than ethnic group , 4= I feel only national identity), **Gender** (0=Male, 1=Female), **Age** (18-66), **Education** (0=No formal education, 1=Primary, 2=Secondary, 3=Post-secondary), **Citizenship Variables** (0=no, 1=yes), **Employment Status** (0=no, not looking, 1= no, looking, 2=yes, part time, 3=yes, full time), **Country's Present Economic Condition** (0= very bad, 1=fairly bad, 2=neither good nor bad, 3=fairly good, 4=very good)

Table 4: Dual Citizenship among 34 African Countries

Country	No	Yes	Support for Dual Citizenship
Benin	662	524	44.20%
Botswana	984	158	13.80%
Burkina Faso	765	369	32.50%
Burundi	620	552	47.10%
Cameroon	731	373	33.80%
Cape Verde	388	710	64.70%
Cote d'Ivoire	869	297	25.50%
Ghana	1545	734	32.20%
Guinea	648	512	44.10%
Kenya	1082	1104	50.50%
Lesotho	717	398	35.70%
Liberia	796	321	28.70%
Madagascar	659	297	31.10%
Malawi	2101	260	11.00%
Mali	823	333	28.80%
Mauritius	525	595	53.10%
Mozambique	1496	479	24.30%
Namibia	884	247	21.80%
Niger	812	343	29.70%
Nigeria	960	1366	58.70%
Senegal	727	414	36.30%
Sierra Leone	578	536	48.10%
South Africa	1700	562	24.80%
Swaziland	878	211	19.40%
Tanzania	1732	531	23.50%
Togo	756	370	32.90%
Uganda	1393	910	39.50%
Zambia	905	244	21.20%
Zimbabwe	1716	537	23.80%

Source Based upon Afrobarometer Round 5 Democracy and Governance (2011-2013)

TABLE 5. Nationalism's Effect on Dual Citizenship Attitudes

	Dual Citizenship (0=No, 1=Yes)			
	Model 1 DV	Model 2 DV	Model 3DV	Model 4 DV
Nationalism	-0.063***			-0.061***
	(0.009)			(0.010)
Ethnicity vs Nationalism		0.049***		0.068***
		(0.016)		(0.017)
Ethnic Group Treated Unfairly			0.104***	0.046***
			(0.009)	(0.012)
Education	0.072***	0.071***	0.067***	0.090***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
East Africa Dummy Variable				-0.018
				(0.029)
Southern Africa Dummy Variable				-0.697***
				(0.026)
Constant	-0.475***	-0.991***	-1.076***	-0.703***
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.026)	(0.050)
Pseudo R^2	0.008	0.007	0.011	0.041
N	42,554	40,009	40,056	38,439

Note: Variables in this dataset are coded as followed. Proud of Nationality (0=strongly agree, 1=disagree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree), Ethnic or National Identity (0=I feel more ethnic group, 1=I feel more ethnic group than national identity, 2=I feel equally national identity and ethnic group, 3=I feel more national identity than ethnic group , 4= I feel only national identity), Ethnicity Group Treated Unfairly (0=never, 1=sometimes, 2=often, 3=always), Education (0=No formal education, 1=Primary, 2=Secondary, 3=Post-secondary), East and Southern Africa Dummy Variable with West Africa as baseline

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE 6. Perceptions of the Economy

	Dual Citizenship (0=No, 1=Yes)		
	Model 1 DV	Model 2 DV	Model 3 DV
Country's Economic Condition	-0.017**	-0.050***	-0.049***
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	0.073***	0.069***	0.064***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Your Living Condition		0.057***	0.057***
		(0.011)	(0.011)
Employment Status			0.030***
			(0.009)
Constant	-0.661***	-0.935***	-0.985***
	(0.016)	(0.024)	(0.029)
Pseudo R^2	0.007	0.008	0.008
N	42,554	42,083	41,905

Note: Variables in this dataset are coded as followed. Country's present economic condition (0= very bad, 1=fairly bad, 2=neither good nor bad, 3=fairly good, 4=very good), Education (0=No formal education, 1=Primary, 2=Secondary, 3=Post-secondary), Your Living Condition (0= very bad, 1=fairly bad, 2=neither good nor bad, 3=fairly good, 4=very good), Employment status (0=no, not looking, 1= no, looking, 2=yes, part time, 3=yes, full time)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

TABLE 7. Individual Attitudes and Characteristics as Predictors of support for Dual Citizenship

	Dual Citizenship (0=No, 1=Yes)				
	Model 1 DV	Model 2 DV	Model 3 DV	Model 4 DV	Model 5 DV
Socio-demographics					
Gender	0.002				0.008
	(0.021)				(0.026)
Age	0.001*				-0.0004
	(0.001)				(0.001)
Education	0.074***				0.032***
	(0.053)				(0.007)
Social Psychology					
Nationalism		-0.077***			-0.085***
		(0.009)			(0.011)
Ethnicity vs Nationalism		0.066***			0.082***
		(0.016)			(0.019)
Politics					
Born with two Non-citizen Parents			0.427***		0.435***
			(0.024)		(0.027)
Husband of Citizen Wife			0.0698***		0.615***
			(0.024)		(0.027)
Lived and Worked in Country			1.117***		1.110***
			(0.027)		(0.030)
Economics					
Employment Status				0.057***	0.016
				(0.010)	(0.011)
Your Present Living Conditions				0.084***	0.063***
				(0.012)	(0.013)
Country's Economic Condition Compared to 12 months ago				-.0001	-0.004
				(0.011)	(0.013)
Country's Economic Condition in 12 Months' Time				-.002	0.012
				(0.010)	(0.011)

Country's Economic Condition				-0.058***	-0.068***
				(0.013)	(0.013)
Government Handing the Economy				-0.058***	-0.083***
				(0.013)	(0.015)
Government Will Solve Problem in 5 Years				-0.022*	-0.003
				(0.012)	(0.013)
Constant	-0.988***	-0.525***	-2.140***	-0.727***	-1.949***
	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.092)
Pseudo R^2	0.007	0.003	0.155	0.005	0.154
N	42,328	39,931	41,366	34,917	31,608

Note: Variables in this dataset are coded as followed. Gender (0=Male, 1=Female), Age (18-66), Education (0=No formal education, 1=Primary, 2=Secondary, 3=Post-secondary), Proud of Nationality (0=strongly disagree, 1=disagree, 2=neither agree nor disagree, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree), Ethnic or National Identity (0=I feel more ethnic group, 1=I feel more ethnic group than national identity, 2=I feel equally national identity and ethnic group, 3=I feel more national identity than ethnic group , 4= I feel only national identity), Citizenship Variables (0=no, 1=yes), Employment status (0=no, not looking, 1= no, looking, 2=yes, part time, 3=yes, full time), Your Present Living Conditions (0= very bad, 1=fairly bad, 2=neither good nor bad, 3=fairly good, 4=very good), Country's Economic Condition Compared to 12 Months Ago (0=much worse, 1=worse, 2=same, 3=better, 4=much better), Country's Economic Condition in 12 Months' Time (0=much worse, 1=worse, 2=same, 3=better, 4=much better), Country's Economic Condition (0= very bad, 1=fairly bad, 2=neither good nor bad, 3=fairly good, 4=very good), Government Handling the Economy (0=Very Badly, 1=Fairly Badly, 2=Fairly Well, 3=Very Well), Government will Solve Problem in 5 Years (0=not at all likely, 1=not very likely, 2=somewhat likely, 3=very likely)

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 8: Country Level Analysis on Dual Citizenship (2014)

Region	Country	Dual Citizenship Allowed?	Year	Individual Support for Dual Citizenship (2011-2013)
West Africa	Benin	Yes	1965	44%
	Burkina Faso	Yes	1975	33%
	Cameroon	No	1968	34%
	Cape Verde	Yes	1992	65%
	Cote d'Ivoire	No	1961	25%
	Ghana	Yes	1996	32%
	Guinea	No	1960	44%
	Liberia	No	1958	29%
	Mali	Yes	1995	29%
	Niger	Yes	2014	30%
	Nigeria	Yes	1999	59%
	Senegal	Sometimes[12]	1961	36%
	Sierra Leone	Yes	2006	48%
	Togo	Sometimes [13]	1978	33%
East Africa	Burundi	Yes	2000	47%
	Kenya	Yes	2010	51%
	Tanzania	No	1961	23%
	Uganda	Sometimes [14]	2005	40%
Southern Africa	Botswana	Sometimes[15]	1982	14%
	Lesotho	No	1971	36%
	Madagascar	Sometimes[16]	1960	31%
	Malawi	No	1966	11%
	South Africa	Sometimes [17]	2010	25%
	Swaziland	Sometimes	1967	19%
	Mauritius			

[12] Senegal: dual citizenship for any citizen except the president
[13] Togo: allows dual citizenship for nationals from birth, prohibited for those who naturalize, allowed for married woman (in some circumstances), not the president
[14] Uganda: cannot be dual citizen if someone is the president, vice-president, prime minister, cabinet ministers, heads of security services, complex citizenship laws and significant conditions to hold dual citizenship
[15] Botswana: dual citizenship allowed for naturalized citizens/prohibited for those who voluntarily acquire another citizenship, allowed for married woman (in some circumstances)
[16] Madagascar: dual citizenship allowed for naturalized citizens/prohibited for those who voluntarily acquire another citizenship, allowed for married woman (in some circumstances)
[17] South Africa: permission of government required and if other country does not support dual citizenship not allowed

Mozambique	24%
Namibia	21%
Zambia	21%
Zimbabwe	24%

Source: Based upon Bronwen Manby (2016) and Afrobarometer Round 5 Democracy and Governance (2011-2013)

Table 9: Emigration Statistics Analysis on Dual Citizenship Policy (2014)

Country	Dual Citizenship Allowed?	Emigration (2017)	Total Country Population (2017)	Percentage of Emigrants/ Total Country Population
Liberia	No	260,000	4,732,000	5.2%
Zambia	No	280,000	17,090,000	1.6%
Tanzania	No	320,000	57,310,000	0.6%
Cameroon	No	330,000	24,050,000	1.4%
Lesotho	No	330,000	2,233,000	12.9%
Malawi	No	340,000	18,620,000	1.8%
Guinea	No	430,000	12,720,000	3.3%
Cote d'Ivoire	No	830,000	24,290,000	3.3%
Botswana	Sometimes	80,000	2,292,000	3.4%
Swaziland	Sometimes	90,000	1,367,000	6.2%
Madagascar	Sometimes	170,000	25,570,000	0.7%
Namibia	Sometimes	190,000	2,534,000	7.0%
Zimbabwe	Sometimes	730,000	16,530,000	4.2%
South Africa	Sometimes	900,000	56,720,000	1.6%
Mauritius	Sometimes	n/a	n/a	n/a
Uganda	Sometimes	740,000	42,860,000	1.7%
Togo	Sometimes	450,000	7,798,000	5.5%
Senegal	Sometimes	560,000	15,850,000	3.4%
Sierra Leone	Yes	160,000	7,557,000	2.1%
Cape Verde	Yes	230,000	546,388	29.6%
Niger	Yes	360,000	21,480,000	1.6%
Burundi	Yes	440,000	10,860,000	3.9%
Kenya	Yes	500,000	49,700,000	1.0%
Benin	Yes	630,000	11,180,000	5.3%
Ghana	Yes	860,000	28,830,000	2.9%
Mozambique	Yes	950,000	29,670,000	3.1%
Mali	Yes	1,070,000	18,540,000	5.5%
Nigeria	Yes	1,260,000	190,900,000	0.7%
Burkina Faso	Yes	1,470,000	19,190,000	7.1%

Source: Source: Based upon Bronwen Manby (2016) and Pew Research Center [18]

[18] http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/02/28/global-migrant-stocks/?country=ZW&date=2017

Figure 2


Emigration's Effect on Dual Citizenship Support (2017)
Emigrated Population
35.00%
30.00%
25.00%
20.00%
15.00%
10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
Support for Dual Citizenship

Appendix

Q 86F: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years old: A person who wishes to hold dual citizenship, that is, to be a citizen both of the country and some other country?

0. No
1. Yes

Q101: Gender of Respondent

0. Male
1. Female

Q1: How old are you?

(18-66)

Q97: Education

0. No formal education
1. Primary
2. Secondary
3. Post-secondary

85C: Proud of Nationality

1. Strongly Disagree
2. Disagree
3. Neither Agree Nor Disagree
4. Agree
5. Strongly Agree

85B: Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a national ID and being a _____ [R's Ethnic Group]. Which of the following best expresses your feelings?

1. I feel more (ethnic group)
2. I feem more (ethnic group) than national identity
3. I feel equally (national identity) and ethnic group
4. I feel more (national identity) than ethnic group
5. I feel only (national identity)

Q85A: How often is [respondent's ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?

0. Never
1. Sometimes
2. Often
3. Always

86B: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years old: A person born in the country with two non-national parents?

0. No

1. Yes

86D: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years old: The husband of a national woman, even if he was born outside of the country?

0. No
1. Yes

86E: In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country? A citizen would have the right to get a passport and to vote in national elections if they are at least 18 years old: A person who came from another country, but who has lived and worked in the country for many years, and wishes to make the country his or her home?

0. No
1. Yes

Q 96:Do you have a job that pays a cash income? If yes, is it full-time or part-time? If no, are you presently looking for a job?

0. No (not looking)
1. No (looking)
2. Yes, part time
3. Yes, full time

Q3B: In general, how would you describe: Your own present living conditions?

0. Very bad
1. Fairly Bad
2. Neither good nor bad
3. Fairly good
4. Very good

Q5A: Looking back, how do you rate the following compared to twelve months ago: Economic conditions in this country?

0. Much worse
1. Worse
2. Worse
3. Same
4. Better
5. Much Better

Q6A: Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Economic conditions in this country in twelve months' time?

0. Much worse
1. Worse
2. Worse
3. Same

4. Better
5. Much Better

Q3A: In general, how would you describe: The present economic condition of this country?

2. Very bad
3. Fairly bad
4. Neither good nor bad
5. Fairly good
6. Very good

Q65A: Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Managing the economy? [NOTE]: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

0. Very badly
1. Fairly badly
2. Fairly well
3. Very well

Q64: Taking the problem that you mentioned first, how likely do you think it is that government will solve this problem within the next five years?

0. Not at all likely
1. Not very likely
2. Somewhat likely
3. Very likely

Testing Nationalism's Effect On Dual Citizenship

	Estimate	Std.Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
Intercept	-0.703431	0.050232	-14.004	< 2e-16 ***
Nationalism	-0.061442	0.009749	-6.302	2.94e-10 ***
Ethnicity vs National	0.067873	0.016833	4.032	5.53e-05 ***
Treated Unfairly	0.045691	0.011875	3.848	0.000119 ***
Educ	0.08964	0.005364	16.712	< 2e-16 ***
East Africa	-0.018062	0.028953	0.624	0.53273
Southern Africa	-0.697437	0.025572	-27.273	< 2e-16 ***

Testing Perceptions of the Economy

	Estimate	Std.Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
Intercept	-0.984575	0.028949	-34.01	< 2e-16 ***
Country's Econ Cond	-0.048844	0.010366	-4.712	2.45e-06 ***
Education	0.063631	0.005333	11.931	< 2e-16 ***
Your Present Cond	0.05709	0.010913	5.231	1.68e-07 ***
Employment Status	0.029632	0.009477	3.127	0.00177 **

Sociological Demographics

	Estimate	Std.Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
Intercept	-0.9875186	0.0528999	-18.668	<2e-16 ***
Gender	0.0017084	0.0210096	0.081	0.9352
Age	0.0013918	0.0007421	1.875	0.0607
Educ	0.0742682	0.0052277	14.207	<2e-16 ***

Social Psychology

	Estimate	Std.Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
Intercept	-0.525352	0.037681	-13.942	< 2e-16 ***
Nation	-0.077418	0.009394	-8.241	< 2e-16 ***
Ethnicity	0.066255	0.016034	4.132	3.6e-05 ***

Politics

	Estimate	Std.Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
Intercept	-2.13987	0.02712	-78.9	<2e-16 ***
Born In Territory	0.42677	0.02427	17.58	<2e-16 ***
Husband of Citizen Wife	0.69822	0.02396	29.14	<2e-16 ***
Lived and Worked in Country	1.11733	0.02683	41.64	<2e-16 ***

Economy

	Estimate	Std.Error	z value	Pr(>|z|)
Intercept	-7.27E-01	4.25E-02	-17.091	< 2e-16 ***
Employment Status	5.73E-02	9.82E-03	5.831	5.51e-09 ***
Your Econ Cond	8.42E-02	1.19E-02	7.102	1.23e-12 ***
Country Econ Cond in 12 months' time	-5.67E-05	1.15E-02	-0.005	0.9961
Country Econ Comp 12 months ago	-1.52E-03	1.02E-02	-0.149	0.8819
Country Econ Cond	-5.76E-02	1.20E-02	-4.817	1.46e-06 ***
Gov Handling Econ	-5.81E-02	1.33E-02	-4.368	1.25e-05 ***
Gov Solve Problem in 5 years	-2.18E-02	1.18E-02	-1.854	0.0637

Sample Demographics

Country Demographics

(11) Benin	(12) Burkina Faso	(13) Cameroon	(14) Cape Verde
1200	1200	1200	1208
(15) Cote d'Ivoire	(16) Ghana	(17) Guinea	(18) Liberia
1200	2400	1200	1199
(19) Mali	(20) Niger	(21) Nigeria	(22) Senegal
1200	1199	2400	1200
(23) Sierra Leone	(24) Togo	(31) Burundi	(32) Ethiopia
1190	1200	1200	0
(33) Kenya	(34) Tanzania	(35) Uganda	(41) Botswana
2399	2400	2400	1200
(42) Lesotho	(43) Madagascar	(44) Malawi	(45) Mauritius
1197	1200	2407	1200
(46) Mozambique	(47) Namibia	(48) South Africa	(49) Swaziland
2400	1200	2399	1200
(50) Zambia	(51) Zimbabwe	(61) Algeria	(62) Egypt
1200	2400	1204	1190
(63) Morocco	(64) Sudan	(65) Tunisia	
1196	1199	1200	

Gender

Male
25770

Female
25817

Age

(1) 18-35	(2) 36-50	(3) 51 and above
27889	13868	9816

Education

No Formal Education
10356
Primary
16468
Secondary
18077
Post-Secondary
6560

Urban vs Rural

Urban	Rural	Semi-Urban

19907 30993 687

Racial Demographics
Black /African
43230
White /European
534
Coloured /Mixed Race
1871
Arab /Lebanese /North African
4889
South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, etc_)
945
East Asian (Chinese, Korean, Indonesian, etc_)
11

R Code

```
#dual citizenship
da36351.0001$DC<-(da36351.0001$Q86F)
da36351.0001$DC<- as.numeric(da36351.0001$DC)
da36351.0001$DC[da36351.0001$DC==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$DC[da36351.0001$DC==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$DC[da36351.0001$DC==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$DC[da36351.0001$DC==9]<-NA
da36351.0001$DCF[da36351.0001$DC==997]<-NA
da36351.0001$DC[da36351.0001$DC==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$DC)

##political

#twononcitizenparents
da36351.0001$twoncp<-(da36351.0001$Q86B)
da36351.0001$twoncp<- as.numeric(da36351.0001$twoncp)
da36351.0001$twoncp[da36351.0001$twoncp==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$twoncp[da36351.0001$twoncp==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$twoncp[da36351.0001$twoncp==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$twoncp[da36351.0001$twoncp==9]<-NA
da36351.0001$twoncp[da36351.0001$twoncp==997]<-NA
da36351.0001$twoncp[da36351.0001$twoncp==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$twoncp)


#right to be citizen husband of citizen wife
da36351.0001$HCW<-(da36351.0001$Q86D)
da36351.0001$HCW<- as.numeric(da36351.0001$HCW)
da36351.0001$HCW[da36351.0001$HCW==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$HCW[da36351.0001$HCW==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$HCW[da36351.0001$HCW==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$HCW[da36351.0001$HCW==9]<-NA
da36351.0001$HCW[da36351.0001$HCW==997]<-NA
da36351.0001$HCW[da36351.0001$HCW==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$HCW)

#right to be citizen- lived and worked in a country
da36351.0001$LW<-(da36351.0001$Q86E)
da36351.0001$LW<- as.numeric(da36351.0001$LW)
da36351.0001$LW[da36351.0001$LW==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$LW[da36351.0001$LW==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$LW[da36351.0001$LW==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$LW[da36351.0001$LW==9]<-NA
da36351.0001$LW[da36351.0001$LW==997]<-NA
```

```
da36351.0001$LW[da36351.0001$LW==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$LW)


#ideology
#Proud of nationality
da36351.0001$Nation <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q85C)
da36351.0001$Nation[da36351.0001$Nation==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$Nation[da36351.0001$Nation==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$Nation[da36351.0001$Nation==3] <- 2
da36351.0001$Nation[da36351.0001$Nation==4] <- 3
da36351.0001$Nation[da36351.0001$Nation==5] <- 4
da36351.0001$Nation[da36351.0001$Nation==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$Nation[da36351.0001$Nation==9]<-NA
da36351.0001$Nation[da36351.0001$Nation==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$Nation)

#ethnicity over nationality
da36351.0001$Ethnicity <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q85B)
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==2] <- 0
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==3] <- 1
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==4] <- 2
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==5] <- 2
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==7]<-NA
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==6]<-NA
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==9]<-NA
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==997]<-NA
da36351.0001$Ethnicity[da36351.0001$Ethnicity==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$Ethnicity)

table(da36351.0001$Q85B)

#####sociology#####
#Education
da36351.0001$Educ<- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q97)
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==3] <- 2
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==4] <- 3
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==5] <- 4
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==6] <- 5
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==7] <- 6
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==8] <- 7
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==9] <- 8
```

```
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==10] <- 9
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==99]<-NA
da36351.0001$Educ[da36351.0001$Educ==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$Educ)

#gender
da36351.0001$Gender<- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q101)
da36351.0001$Gender[da36351.0001$Gender==0] <- 0
da36351.0001$Gender[da36351.0001$Gender==1] <- 1
da36351.0001$Gender[da36351.0001$Gender==-1]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$Gender)

#economy
#employment status
da36351.0001$Employstat <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q96)
da36351.0001$Employstat[da36351.0001$Employstat==0] <- 0
da36351.0001$Employstat[da36351.0001$Employstat==1] <- 1
da36351.0001$Employstat[da36351.0001$Employstat==2] <- 2
da36351.0001$Employstat[da36351.0001$Employstat==3] <- 3
da36351.0001$Employstat[da36351.0001$Employstat==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$Employstat[da36351.0001$Employstat==99]<-NA
da36351.0001$Employstat[da36351.0001$Employstat==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$Employstat)


#country's economic condition
da36351.0001$countrycond <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q3A)
da36351.0001$countrycond[da36351.0001$countrycond==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$countrycond[da36351.0001$countrycond==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$countrycond[da36351.0001$countrycond==3] <- 2
da36351.0001$countrycond[da36351.0001$countrycond==4] <- 3
da36351.0001$countrycond[da36351.0001$countrycond==5] <- 4
da36351.0001$countrycond[da36351.0001$countrycond==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$countrycond[da36351.0001$countrycond==99]<-NA
da36351.0001$countrycond[da36351.0001$countrycond==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$countrycond)

#yourpresentconditions
da36351.0001$presentcond <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q3B)
da36351.0001$presentcond[da36351.0001$presentcond==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$presentcond[da36351.0001$presentcond==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$presentcond[da36351.0001$presentcond==3] <- 2
da36351.0001$presentcond[da36351.0001$presentcond==4] <- 3
da36351.0001$presentcond[da36351.0001$presentcond==5] <- 4
da36351.0001$presentcond[da36351.0001$presentcond==-1]<-NA
```

```
da36351.0001$presentcond[da36351.0001$presentcond==99]<-NA
da36351.0001$presentcond[da36351.0001$presentcond==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$presentcond)

#country economic condition in 12 months time
da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12 <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q6A)
da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12[da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12[da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12[da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12==3] <- 2
da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12[da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12==4] <- 3
da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12[da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12==5] <- 4
da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12[da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12[da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12==99]<-NA
da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12[da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$countryeconomicin12)

#countryeconcompared to 12 months ago
da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12 <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q5A)
da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12[da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12[da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12[da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12==3] <- 2
da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12[da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12==4] <- 3
da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12[da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12==5] <- 4
da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12[da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12[da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12==99]<-NA
da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12[da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$countryeconcomp12)

#how is the country's economy doing
da36351.0001$countrydoing <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q3A)
da36351.0001$countrydoing[da36351.0001$countrydoing==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$countrydoing[da36351.0001$countrydoing==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$countrydoing[da36351.0001$countrydoing==3] <- 2
da36351.0001$countrydoing[da36351.0001$countrydoing==4] <- 3
da36351.0001$countrydoing[da36351.0001$countrydoing==5] <- 4
da36351.0001$countrydoing[da36351.0001$countrydoing==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$countrydoing[da36351.0001$countrydoing==99]<-NA
da36351.0001$countrydoing[da36351.0001$countrydoing==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$countrydoing)

#handling maintaining the economy
da36351.0001$govhandling <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q65A)
da36351.0001$govhandling[da36351.0001$govhandling==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$govhandling[da36351.0001$govhandling==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$govhandling[da36351.0001$govhandling==3] <- 2
da36351.0001$govhandling[da36351.0001$govhandling==4] <- 3
```

```
da36351.0001$govhandling[da36351.0001$govhandling==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$govhandling[da36351.0001$govhandling==99]<-NA
da36351.0001$govhandling[da36351.0001$govhandling==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$govhandling)

#how likely the gov will handle the problem in 5 years
da36351.0001$govin5 <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q64)
da36351.0001$govin5[da36351.0001$govin5==1] <- 0
da36351.0001$govin5[da36351.0001$govin5==2] <- 1
da36351.0001$govin5[da36351.0001$govin5==3] <- 2
da36351.0001$govin5[da36351.0001$govin5==4] <- 3
da36351.0001$govin5[da36351.0001$govin5==7]<-NA
da36351.0001$govin5[da36351.0001$govin5==-1]<-NA
da36351.0001$govin5[da36351.0001$govin5==99]<-NA
da36351.0001$govin5[da36351.0001$govin5==998]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$govin5)

da36351.0001$Age <- as.numeric(da36351.0001$Q1)
da36351.0001$Age[da36351.0001$Age==-1]<-NA
table(da36351.0001$Age)

#Logit 1
logit1<-
glm(DC~Gender+Age+Educ+Nation+Ethnicity+twoncp+HCW+LW+Employstat+presentcond+
countryeconcomp12+countryeconomicin12+countrycond+govhandling+govin5,
data=da36351.0001, family=binomial (link="logit"))
summary(logit1)
stargazer(logit1, type = "html", dep.var.caption = "Dual Citizenship", covariate.labels
=c("Gender","Age"), out = "reemlogit1.htm" )

logit2<-glm(DC~Gender+Age+Educ, data=da36351.0001, family=binomial (link="logit"))
summary(logit2)
stargazer(logit2, type = "html", dep.var.caption = "Dual Citizenship", covariate.labels
=c("Gender","Age"), out = "reemlogit2.htm" )

logit3<-glm(DC~Nation+Ethnicity, data=da36351.0001, family=binomial (link="logit"))
summary(logit3)
stargazer(logit3, type = "html", dep.var.caption = "Dual Citizenship", covariate.labels
=c("Nation","Ethnicity"), out = "reemlogit3.htm" )

lrm(formula = DC~Nation+Ethnicity, data = da36351.0001)


logit4<-glm(DC~twoncp+HCW+LW, data=da36351.0001, family=binomial (link="logit"))
summary(logit4)
```

```
stargazer(logit4, type = "html", dep.var.caption = "Dual Citizenship", covariate.labels
=c("noncitizen","hcw", "lW"), out = "reemlogit4.htm" )

lrm(formula = DC~twoncp+HCW+LW, data = da36351.0001)

logit5<-
glm(DC~Employstat+presentcond+countryeconcomp12+countryeconomicin12+countrycond+go
vhandling+govin5, data=da36351.0001, family=binomial (link="logit"))
summary(logit5)
stargazer(logit5, type = "html", dep.var.caption = "Dual Citizenship", covariate.labels
=c("emplo","prese", "country econom com 12"), out = "reemlogit5.htm" )

lrm(formula =
DC~Employstat+presentcond+countryeconcomp12+countryeconomicin12+countrycond+govhan
dling+govin5, data = da36351.0001)
```

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