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Capital Gains
A Bourdieusian Map of the United States

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Abstract

Capital Gains

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By Nicholas Nelson-Goedert

In this dissertation, I explore the political culture of the United States by utilizing Pierre Bourdieu's sociological framework of culture in light of Daniel Elazar's twentieth century state political categorization. While building upon Bourdieu's core social concepts of habitus, capital, and the field, in tandem with his account of national development, I develop a map of the United States that demarcates where categories of such variables are located. I deem these categories *Bourdieusian political cultures*. Finally, I delve into the nascent development for Bourdieusian political cultures and mechanisms of sustainability.

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To my parents for untold assistance in navigating life's challenges.

To politically engaged Americans and their progeny.

To a vibrant and hopeful future.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Political Culture, Pierre Bourdieu, and the American States	5
Overview	6
Political Culture	7-8
Political Culture Theories	9
Elazar	16
Cultural Streams.....	17
Chapter 2: Bourdieu and Political Culture	21
Field	22
Capital	23
Habitus	23-24
Bourdieu and State Development.....	25
State	26
Physical Force and Economic Capital	27-28
Informational Capital	33
Symbolic Capital.....	33-24
State Nobility	35-41
Power	41
Bourdieu and Political Culture.....	43
Chapter 3: Toward the Bourdieusian Political Cultures of the American States	45
Elazar’s Political Cultures.....	47
Measures of Capital	52
Principal Component Analysis.....	54
Incorporating Additional Capital Measures	56
Civil War.....	57
Chapter 4: Mapping Bourdieusian Political Culture in the American States	60
Background for Political Mappings	61
Utility of the Capital Centered Map.....	64
Final Revised Bourdieusian Map	77
Chapter 5: Validating and Contextualizing Bourdieusian Maps of American Political Culture	79
Measuring Ideology	81
Factor Analysis	82

Cluster Factor Scores	86
Clusters and Ideology.....	88
Conservatism	88-91
Democratic Party Membership	92-94
Democratic Congressional Representation	95
Poole’s Congressional Conservatism.....	98
Social Conservatism.....	99
Religiosity.....	102
Chapter 6: Practices: An Integrative and Explanatory Focus.....	106
Habitus	106
Bourdiesian Social Theory	107
Practice.....	107
Political Habitus.....	108
Political Capital.....	109
Political Field	109
Bourdiesian Political Culture	110
Conclusion	113
Appendix A: Elazarian Political Cultures	114
Appendix B: Canonical Correlations	122
Bibliography	129

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Tables

Cultural Streams.....	25
Principal Component Analysis.....	63
Distances Between Final Cluster Centers	81
Distances Between Final Cluster Centers	82
Factor Analysis of Political Ideology.....	90
Regression of Factor Scores on Cluster Categories	92
Regression of Conservatism on Partisan Ideology.....	95
Regression of Conservatism on Capital Centered Clusters	96
Regression of Social Conservatism on Revised Bourdieusian Clusters	105
Regression of Social Conservatism on Capital Centered Clusters	106
Differences in Political Practice.....	117

Maps

Elazarian Political Cultures.....	56
Dimensions and Trust	71
Dimensions, Trust, and Civil War	73
Dimensions, Trust, and Civil War, GSP Per Capita	75
Dimensions, Trust, and Civil War, Unionization.....	77
Dimensions, Trust, and Civil War, Population Density	77
Dimensions, Trust, and Civil War, Population Density	78
Dimensions, Trust, and Civil War, Unionization, GSP Per Capita.....	79
Dimensions, Trust, and Civil War, Unionization, Population Density (Seven).....	82
Dimensions, Trust, and Civil War, Unionization, Population Density (Five)	83
Final Revised Bourdieusian Map.....	85

Preface

Capital Gains is the culmination of an intellectual journey anchored in social curiosity and guided by political reform. It both describes and explains the development of political cultures in the United States, serving as an initial summation of my political research within sociology. From childhood onward, my fascination with such questions has increased in tandem with my education and theoretical engagement. When my family moved to Miami, I frequently peppered my grandfather with questions about the ages of buildings and who lived in them, to his delight of course. This social interest quickly morphed into political inquiry as I became more aware of group dynamics. In 1995, at the age of seven, I gave my first church sermon, focusing on the Israel-Palestine conflict. In middle school and high school, I encouraged teachers to hold mock presidential elections and actively campaigned amongst classmates. At this stage, I realized that my political dalliances were more than fleeting, prompting me to attend Georgetown University in Washington, D.C.

While on campus, I studied under three venerable political scholars, Drs. Eric Langenbacher, Fathali Mogghadam, and Mehrdad Mashayekhi. Dr. Langenbacher was my academic advisor in government. His famed comparative government course underscored the intellectual merit of path dependency with respect to political and economic development, guiding me towards an interest in historical analysis. He also assisted me during the government honors program by suggesting a number of studies for my thesis, including Elazar's *Cities of the Prairie*. It was Elazar's work that introduced me to the concept of political culture, which articulated and explained the political differences that I came across during my travels across the United States.

Fathali Mogghadam served as my psychology advisor, and his work pinpointed psychological processes with respect to politics at the micro level. We discussed his childhood in Iran and differences with British political culture over spots of tea in his classically appointed office. Our discussions dovetailed with lectures in his political psychology course, providing me with an appreciation for political effects outside of the state apparatus itself.

In terms of my specific academic trajectory, Dr. Mashayekhi has had the most impact. As a political exile from Iran, Mashayekhi imparted a deep appreciation for liberty and emphasized the value of using sociological research for political change. It was through his impassioned tales of urging reform in his native country and cogent arguments about power dynamics in Western civilization that I decided to pursue a doctorate in sociology. Mashayekhi enthusiastically supported my doctoral pursuit and suggested suitable programs, including Emory's sociology program. As senior year unfolded, I was the last student to receive a recommendation from Dr. Mashayekhi, as mounting health problems caused him to take a leave of absence early in spring semester. He succumbed to cancer the following year. It is my hope that *Capital Gains* and my subsequent work reflect kindly on his trailblazing legacy. ای آزاد!

At Emory, my approach to political culture was fully expressed as a sociological initiative thanks to the rigor of the program as well as the efforts of my advisor, Dr. Alexander Hicks, and Dr. Timothy Dowd. Dr. Hicks gained global notoriety in the 1990s for comparing the development of the welfare state across national contexts. The spirit of this comparative approach informed the present study, and Hicks' evaluative contributions refined the arguments. Dowd's *Sociology of Culture* course introduced me to Pierre Bourdieu and the habitus concept, which *Capital Gains* utilizes to a great extent in explaining long standing political dynamics.

While this dissertation builds upon the scholarly contributions of Bourdieu, Elazar, and

others, as well as the practical efforts of my academic mentors, I consider it a high point of the social sciences at large because of its explanatory power and its potential for global application. I would encourage future scholars and political analysts to consider a similar theoretical approach in order to limit social strife and maximize government efficiency.

Chapter 1
Political Culture, Pierre Bourdieu, and the American
States

What characterizes American political culture? What are its facets, and where can one observe them? In this dissertation, I address such questions by drawing on the sociological framework of Pierre Bourdieu and the antecedent political typology of Daniel Elazar. Through the process, I develop a novel political analytical method of categorization, while I simultaneously provide an exhaustive account for the manner in which political systems both manifest and are sustained by social interaction. In this chapter, I provide an overview of political culture and explain how Bourdieu's political capital concept is itself a manifestation of culture.

In the subsequent chapter 2, I provide foundational details of Bourdieu's theoretical framework. I commence by describing the *field* and his concept of *capital* in terms of state development. I account for the field as a social milieu in which there is a struggle over attribution of capital, whereas capital refers to elements of relevant value. Following these accounts, I expand upon the meaning and importance of *habitus* to Bourdieu's social analysis. Developed from "the proto-structural anthropology of Durkheim and Mauss, the post-Saussurian structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss and... the psychological genetic structuralism of Jean Piaget," habitus describes "systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures".¹² It produces a set of mental and motivating structures for an individual in a world that appears ordered for the individual. Its development is long term and multigenerational, and it is often related to material conditions. Habitus is theoretically significant in that it is a generative structure that is dynamic and conceptualizes the social agent as an embodied actor, countervailing the disembodied agent of rationalist positional formalism. Moreover, Lizardo (2004) posits that Bourdieu's habitus forges a novel *cognitive*

¹ Bourdieu (1992)

² Lizardo (2004)

sociology by integrating perception, classification, and action that leads to “macrostructural social reproduction and change.”

Defining Political Culture

The concept of political culture has a long history in civic discourse, having been established in the Classical Era. Plato correlates political change with changing characteristics of the population: “that governments vary as the dispositions of men vary and that there must be as many of the one as there are of the other. For, we cannot suppose that States are made of ‘oak and rock’ and not out of the human natures which are in them”.³ He also makes early reference to the importance of political socialization: “Of all animals the boy is the most unmanageable, inasmuch as he has the foundation of reason in him not yet regulated; he is the most insidious, sharp witted, and insubordinate of animals. Wherefore he must be bound with many bridles” (3).

Political culture is conceptually malleable, and a variety of researchers have defined it over the past half century, thus highlighting the need for a systematic method to identify the phenomenon. In *The Civic Culture* (1963), Almond & Verba “stressed political knowledge and skill, and feelings and value orientations toward political objects and processes toward the political system as a whole, toward the self as participant toward political parties and elections, bureaucracy, and the like,” as consequential to the development of democratic governments.

In subsequent years, Almond and Powell (1966) adjust the definition by adding three aspects that constitute political culture. These include: 1) substantive content, 2) varieties of orientation, and 3) the systemic relations among these components. Substantive content refers to the attitudes people have of the nation, fellow citizens and themselves as members of said nation. Orientations are the way one judges “process and policy” objects. They can be cognitive, affective or evaluative. Cognitive orientations refers to the “beliefs, information, and analysis.”

³ Almond and Verba (1963)

Affective refers to “feelings of attachment, aversion, or indifference,” while evaluative consists of “moral judgments” (28).

Systemic relations describe the “internal constraint or consistency” within a state. This means the relatedness of different systems of beliefs. For instance, if an individual is a devout supporter of free and universal public education, they would probably not be inclined to vote for a candidate who is running on a platform of expanding vouchers for parochial schools because vouchers would drain public schools of talented students and harm them during the process.

Sociology and Political Culture

Mainstream sociology has not prioritized culture in political construction in recent decades. However, recent developments in light of the *cultural turn*, have fostered greater appreciation of the impact of culture on politics. Influenced by the cultural turn, particularly in light of Steinmetz, I study the state under the auspices of culture.

One cause of political sociology’s reluctance to incorporate culture is its amorphous definition. The cultural turn did not produce broad consensus for particular conceptual definitions. Instead, theorists of the cultural turn “reject such simplifying assumptions about human subjectivity, the explanatory primacy of utilitarian or material determinants, the directionality of history, and the inexorable differentiation of politics from broader cultural systems in the process of modernization.”⁴ Concurrently, they call for a greater incorporation of culture into studying social phenomena. Raymond Williams provides some general guidelines for examining culture with his broad conceptualizations of the term:

- 1) culture as individual development - 'cultivation' of individual in a sense of spiritual, aesthetic, and intellectual development;
- 2) culture as social development - this meaning derives from Enlightenment which considered culture as a universal process of development towards civilization;
- 3) culture as objects of artistic production;

⁴ Steinmetz (1999), p. 23

4) culture in anthropological and sociological sense - general customs, way of life; view of cultures as plural in contrast to Enlightenment view of universal civilization.

As a result of these general guidelines, the sociologists influenced by the cultural turn view meaning and subjectivity as causally important. These render the historical and cultural settings of states and bureaucracies as consequential, thus necessitating the need to study the political realm in terms of culture. The importance of this development is placed in greater perspective when compared to other theoretical approaches within sociology, namely objectivism and foundational decontextualization. Objectivism does not ignore culture, but views it as largely inconsequential and determined by material availability. As a result, such scholars do not view culture as non-existent, but rather, an inconsequential consideration in an otherwise orderly set of observable phenomena. Foundationalist decontextualization similarly sidesteps the issue of culture through its underlying premise of “some founding assumption about human nature, such as instrumental rationality, a propensity to violence, or territorialism.”⁵ Maintaining this view becomes problematic when different outcomes occur given similar situations, with the only difference being the national context. America’s slow adoption of welfare state policies in contrast with other advanced capitalist democracies is but one example. On the whole, these theories provide value and guide many researchers today. However, it would be useful to incorporate elements of culture as an influential, or explanatory, variable to a greater extent.

Having discussed the impact of cultural turn on studying political effects, I must note that past sociological theorists have addressed the interplay of state and culture. The first is the perspective that culture as an effect of the state. Often espoused by Marxists and Neo-Marxists, this perspective is one-directional and does not encompass the multidimensionality of the culture concept. The second, often attributed to Neo-Weberians such as Skocpol, is that culture impacts

⁵ Steinmetz (1999), p. 20

the state only in its influence of state elites and academics. While these individuals are undoubtedly influenced by culture, this view is far too constrained, as it does not consider additional constitutive elements of the state as influenced by culture. Similarly, it does not consider the converse. The third conceptualization of state and culture relations is that culture only influences the state in foundationalist terms, such as a unifying national character. The primary shortcoming with this perspective is that it does not view state formation as an ongoing process, which it should be considered given its shifting bureaucratic membership, changing population, and uncertain geopolitical conditions.

My approach to politics is informed by the two primary culturalist theories. The first is the *radical culturalist approach*, which “rejects the distinction between cultural and noncultural objects altogether, at least within human sciences. Social objects and practices are inextricably cultural and cannot be understood outside their subjective meaning.”⁶ The second approach is that of *strategic action*, which holds that “culture sets the overall context of constitutive rules, the ideological terrain of taken-for-granted assumptions, within which strategic action occurs.”⁷ This relates to Swidler’s (1986) “tool kit” concept in that it prescribes the strategic action assumed to result in certain outcomes as well as the extent to which certain actions are effective. Steinmetz explains that each of these two positions sit at far ends within the culturalist approach. I draw on the “radical” view of Winant to the extent that I deny a sharp distinction between the cultural and the non-cultural, and I draw on the “tool kit” view insofar as I see culture as permeating politics. My use of Bourdieusian capitals to elucidate and analyze a range of political cultures in the American states reflects these of the pervasiveness of culture in politics.

⁶ Steinmetz (1999), p. 27

⁷ Ibid

A number of political culture studies properly place the study of culture between these end points. That is to say that while culture does encompass every object of study when it comes to the state, it permeates a substantial amount because of the interplay of group dynamics, historical consciousness, and the high stakes of statecraft. It is because of these factors that it is important to study politics in light of culture. Two examples of this second conceptualization of culture within sociology are Omi and Winant (1994) and Thomas (1989).

Omi and Winant's *racial state* theory posits that the state is simultaneously the arbiter of race and the arena for its engagement. They hold that state policies have treated people in differing ways based on race in both the past and the present, meaning that its policies cannot become color-blind. A series of racial projects "reorganize and redistribute resources along racial lines"⁸, meaning the state is produced by racial projects while it simultaneously creates and molds racial stratification. They argue that racial formation is related to politics as a whole through hegemony in the Gramscian understanding. While such an understanding may overstate the impact of race on political function by reifying the concept, the government has incorporated race into its policies, and the voters have remained cognizant of it at the voting booth.

In *Revivalism and Cultural Change*, George M. Thomas attempts to create an overarching theory for the interplay among religion, economics, and political imperatives using the United States as a case study. One of Thomas's core arguments is that the Second Great Awakening, also known as the nineteenth century *Revival*, fused with the inherent individualist predilections of Americans to transform the political system into one of independent capitalists oriented towards progress. This is best encapsulated by the nascent Republican Party. The reason why this occurs, according to Thomas, is because each of the ontological tenets of revivalist capitalism fuse to compel progressive (state-emanated) action and individualist economic

⁸ Omi and Winant (1994), p. 56

competition. These tenets are as follows: free will, rational methods, perfectionism, and postmillennialism.

Adherents believed that each person had a soul, and that their destiny had not been predetermined by God. Instead, each individual had the free will to decide whether they would seek salvation for their souls. This was a radical departure from traditional Calvinism, which taught people that destinies were immutable. Rational methods refer to using intelligence and “the laws of nature” to convince people to join the religion, liberated from carnal desires. Each of these beliefs culminated in a postmillennialist disposition. *Premillennialism* describes the belief of more traditional forms of Christianity that all souls are tarnished, and there is nothing any person can do to establish godly order on earth. As a result, they expect conditions to gradually deteriorate in advance of Christ’s return. Revivalists took the antithetical viewpoint as a result of their belief that they could perfect and purify themselves on earth. They believed that they could bring about the return of Christ by manifesting their beliefs. They co-opted evolutionary dogma and argued that they had to simultaneously bring about spiritual and secular progress to produce an environment conducive to God’s acceptance.

Perhaps the most cited example of sociology grappling with culture is that of Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s theories of social class development and social interaction differentiate his research, notably in terms of behavioral diffusion and collective value orientations, concepts encapsulated in his theories of *habitus* and *capital*. In brief, “habitus is...an acquired scheme of dispositions.”⁹ These dispositions are the mental and emotional schemas people develop for objects and activities. One may consider habitus as a vehicle designed for social interaction in the sense that it takes like a “fish in water” in its source environment.¹⁰ Bourdieu initially uses the development

⁹ Wainwright and Turner (2006), p. 240

¹⁰ Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), p. 127

of habitus to account for divergent behaviors along social class lines in *Distinction* (1984) and with respect to national political development in “Rethinking the State” (1994).

Conversely, capital refers to resources, or more specifically, units of value for a specified trait.¹¹ This emerges from Bourdieu’s early accounts of class development in the sense that individuals who have less financial resources, deemed *economic capital*, have different opportunities because of what they can purchase. Thus, wealthy individuals would have greater economic capital than those that are less so. Over time, groups of people with similar access to economic resources develop similar attitudes and behaviors, linking economic capital to habitus in the construction of culture. Similar effects occur in a myriad of additional circumstances.

Capital and habitus are simultaneously individual and collective phenomena because they affect long term psychological states. They simultaneously produce and are created by societal factors. As a result, Bourdieu’s theory, particularly with respect to habitus and capital, is inherently cultural. Though Bourdieu initially uses habitus to describe class culture, the concept can be expanded to examine broader cultural development in societies. I elaborate on the details in subsequent chapters through describing *political habitus* as long standing orientations toward political behavior and *political capital* in the form of political efficacy.

American Political Culture

Donald Devine (1972) paints a civic landscape of the United States in his *magnum opus*, *The Political Culture of the United States*. Devine highlights the importance of religion with respect to American political culture by describing two of its influences, which include the belief in God and the resulting commitment to helping others. This is strengthened by the words of James Madison in the Federalist Papers:

¹¹ Bourdieu (1994)

“It is impossible for the man of pious reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand which has been so frequently and signally extended our relief in the critical stages of the revolution.” He also recounts the words of Tocqueville: “There is no country in the world where the Christian religion retains a greater influence over the souls of men” (221).

Referring to the United States a *Christian nation* elicits pause in many circles, but according to Devine, it is. Such a persistent religious influence on political dynamics suggests that the practice of religion may be an important origin for a group’s overall habitus. Daniel Elazar’s observation of cultural streams demonstrates this effect in even more pronounced detail.

The foundation of Elazar’s political culture concept lies in his interpretation of cultural streams and their impact within the country. Elazar’s cultural streams consist of fifteen groups of people who came to the United States in immigration waves since the years prior to the founding. The immigration streams accompanied a variety of political and cultural beliefs that were in the archaic historical past of their national origins. Essentially, the cultures they brought were based on thousands of years of formation. This is a clear articulation of Bourdieu’s habitus principle, save direct identification of the concept. In fact, the immigration streams and their resulting political implications lend credence to my *political habitus* theory.

Strongly intertwined with the different cultures are the religious beliefs of the people from the varying countries. Elazar holds that the immigrant groups’ religious affiliations have acted as both a mechanism for people to remain in contact with individuals from their native lands as well as the conduit for maintaining their culture’s inherent values. The religion encompasses the historic ideals of the people who held them through its teachings and actions within the community. Below is a chart detailing the cultural streams Elazar identifies along with the corresponding national origins:

Table 1

Cultural Stream	National Origins Divisions
North Sea	Scotland, Northern Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland
Jewish	Diffused among all national origins divisions, Israel
English Canadian	Canada (English-speaking)
English	England (generally), Wales, Australia
Irish	Ireland
Continental	Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria
French Canadian	Canada (French-speaking)
Eastern European	Poland, Russia (USSR), Latvia,
Mediterranean	Yugoslavia, Turkey, Italy, Greece, Albania
Hispanic	Cuba, Mexico, Puerto Rico, Central and South American countries

Elazar posits that the different cultural streams followed immigration flows and became concentrated in different regions of the country. The specific immigration flows have been important because of their accompanying views on social interaction within society and the resulting conceptions of the appropriate government response to social needs. Elazar's emphasis on the collective attributes of the population, in light of the socialization process, suggests that studying political culture, within a sociological framework, would provide a more comprehensive, systematic explanation for the phenomenon. More specifically, this is accomplished by utilizing Bourdieu's social theory, captured in the following formula: $[(\text{Habitus})(\text{Capital})] + \text{Field} = \text{Practice}$ ¹². Habitus refers to long-standing orientations that

¹² Bourdieu, 1984: 101

provide one's viewpoint and forms the basis from which Bourdieu's other concepts emanate. Though initially discusses the concept in terms of social class dispositions resulting from unequal distribution of financial resources, subsequent scholars extended the concept to other realms, such as athletics (Waquant 1995) and ballet (Wainwright and Turner 2006). The extension of the habitus concept, thus, renders a potential account for cultural diffusion. For instance, different forms of habitus accompanied immigration groups and concentrated in different parts of the country. It is this concept that demonstrates the veracity of understanding political culture in terms of habitus as well as the need to regionally examine the phenomenon. This would all take place within the context of the field, referring to the political environment for our purposes. The interplay between habitus, capital, and the field results in practice, or political activity. I refer to such activity on the collective level as *Bourdieuian political culture*.

In the next chapter, I elaborate on Bourdieu's social theory by accounting for his conceptualizations of habitus, capital, and the field. Following this, I describe each of Bourdieu's forms of capital with respect to politics- encompassing physical force capital, economic capital, informational capital, and state symbolic capital. Finally, I describe the influence of the state apparatus on the individual's life and situate Bourdieu's theory as inherently one of political culture.

In chapter 3, I begin my research agenda of using Bourdieusian political theory to assess political cultures within the United States. I recount Elazar as a previous example of developing a typology of political cultures at the sub-national level using American states. Elazar's example serves as a conceptual underpinning of the present study which aims to produce such a mapping using primarily Bourdieusian measures of political culture. With these in mind, I operationalize the Bourdieusian forms of capital using the theoretical accounts I cover in chapter 2. Next, I

conduct principal component analysis (PCA) in order to create the main variables that I use to produce a map of American political cultures.

Chapter 4 chronicles the actual production of the political culture map using chapter 3's principal component analysis results. I include trust in the state government in the baseline cluster analysis, despite its non-inclusion in chapter 3's components, because of its equation with state symbolic capital and political habitus in terms of allegiance towards the state government bureaucracy. I conduct k-means cluster analysis with the Z-scores for the dimension variables. For dimensions with multiple variables of note, I combine the variables by averaging their Z-scores. In accordance with their conceptual meanings, I weigh the variables with negative loadings by -1.0. I gradually incorporate Civil War allegiance and a few additional measures of capital in terms of state development onto the baseline of solely Bourdieusian measures, as measures of the historical impact on habitus and political capital. Using the strategy produces a comprehensive map of the United States that matches contemporary understandings of political dynamics, thus suggesting that Bourdieusian capital accounts for much of the political regionalization observed today and supporting the previous political culture findings of Elazar. I provide details of this matching in Appendix A and Appendix B, which includes a reiteration using Elazarian political cultures, as well as canonical correlation.

In chapter 5, I relate the political cultures I find in chapter 4 to conventional measures of political orientation, partisanship, and ideology in order to assess the degree to which distinction of each culture. I do this by regressing measures of political culture and ideology on the clusters. Traditional political measures include self-identified conservatism, allegiance to the Democratic Party, the percentage of Democrats who represent the state in the US House of Representatives, and the conservatism of the House Representatives according to roll call votes. Such analysis

provides a great deal of information about the clusters, and particularly distinguishes the South and Alaska.

In the subsequent chapter 6, I describe how political cultures develop and are implemented at the individual level. I largely focus on the Bourdieusian social model, translating it into the political realm by providing contextualizing habitus with capital, the field, and resulting *practice*, which constitutes what I refer to as *Bourdieusian political culture*.

Chapter 2

Bourdieu and Political Culture

In this chapter, I describe Bourdieu's theoretical framework. In particular, I begin by describing his field and capital concepts as central to his sociological theory. Then, I delve into his habitus concept as the central characteristic that renders his theory applicable to historical and cultural analysis. Briefly, Bourdieu's theoretical approach can be summarized using the following formula: [(Habitus) (Capital)] + Field = Practice (Turner and Wainwright 2006). Thus, individuals with dispositions (habitus) use their variant resources (capital) under specific social contexts (fields) to produce behavior. Next, I describe each of his forms of political capital, the influence of the state, and his conceptualization of power. Finally, I bridge Bourdieu and political culture in the United States with the help of political culture theory.

The Field

The *field* is a central concept in Bourdieu's social analysis. It describes a social arena in which there is a struggle over the distribution of *capital*, or elements of relevant value. Examples of fields include the education field, the art world, and the government. According to Bourdieu, fields develop rule systems for obtaining positive evaluation, rendering the field analogous to a competitive marketplace for participants. It is through such competition that individuals forge relationships with each other, simultaneously establishing hierarchies and evolving the rules system. *Habitus*, which I further define in the next section, impacts the extent to which participants are able to use resources to succeed in given fields.

Nomos is the basis of field construction, inspired by the fundamental organizing principle Greek system of division. It encompasses the weight given to different forms of capital as well as their combinations in terms of their relationship to a field. For instance, the international commerce field emphasizes economic capital. Rarely do individuals state the specific rules for obtaining success in a given field. To the contrary, participants learn them through the course of

activity within the field, a process known as *illusio* in which individuals learn behavioral rules associated with participating in the field.

Capital is multifaceted, as it has both vertical and horizontal relations. Vertical relations refer to the amount of capital one possesses (Bennett and Silva 2011). For instance, one may have a great deal of economic capital if they are wealthy. Conversely, horizontal relations refer to the composition of capital. One may examine this concept through observing varying amounts of cultural capital among those with high economic capital. As social analysis demonstrates, increasing societal complexity correlates with a greater number of fields and relationships.

Habitus

The cornerstone of Bourdieu's social analysis is the concept of *habitus*. Bourdieu defines *habitus* as "systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures".¹³ Thus, habitus describes long term thoughts and feelings that are produced by the social structure and simultaneously create the social structure. As a result, *habitus* constitutes "principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an expressed mastery of the operations necessary in order to obtain them" (53). This means that habitus provides the basis for which behaviors come about and are consciously evaluated. It creates a system of "cognitive and motivating structures" for a world with pre-established rules for engagement. Thus, incentives and automatic dispositions for conducting different actions vary with respect to habitus, while it concurrently shapes social rules. Such rules reflexively appear natural and often inherently justified because they are the sources of perception and the means of analysis.

¹³ Bourdieu (1992)

Habitus develops because of experiences, particularly in the positive and negative reactions produced by variant reactions to situations. Specifically, the behaviors that receive negative sanction are enacted more frequently, while those that conversely receive positive reactions are reinforced. “Possibilities and impossibilities, freedoms and necessities, opportunities and prohibitions” shape such actions (54). Bourdieu explains that these realities exist for extended periods, across a myriad of situations, rendering habitus a product of history. In essence, the behaviors of an individual are often in accordance with thoughts produced in previous periods, often in spite of contemporary conditions. This reality is why Bourdieu identifies habitus as “an acquired system of generative schemes,” as individuals simultaneously think freely, while their perceptions of new stimuli are circumscribed into a limited range. Bourdieu summarizes habitus thusly: “a spontaneity without consciousness or will, opposed as much to the mechanical necessity of things without history in mechanistic theories as it is to the reflexive freedom of subjects ‘without inertia’ in rationalist theories.” As a result, Dumais (2002) explains that habitus circumscribes what is possible for a person in terms of future options.

Bourdieu argues that objective socioeconomic conditions produce orientations to phenomena. Such understandings create durable, transferable cognitive functions, and therefore, behavior. These effects are cumulative and span across social situations, leading to Bourdieu’s extensive use of habitus in class analysis. This concept transcends beyond individuals and social class, as it also affects the development of institutions. It is this connection between habitus and institutions that necessitates the present dissertation.

Bourdieu's Capital and the State

Bourdieu bridges culture, power, and the state in an effective manner through his articulation of the *capital* concept. Recall, capital refers to essentialized currency in traits of value. It can take an infinite number of forms, as its production and use require any situation in which the form of capital provides utility. Moreover, as with monetary currency, Bourdieu's capital derives its value from relative scarcity.

In his work with respect to social class, Bourdieu largely focuses on social capital, economic capital, and cultural capital. Individuals with considerable social connections would have a high amount of *social capital*. Such individuals are typically advantaged with respect to the heads of bureaucratic organizations.¹⁴ Similarly, wealthy individuals possess a high amount of *economic capital*, as they have considerable financial resources in comparison to most others. This high amount of economic resources provides individuals with significant time for leisure and the ability to purchase cultural experiences.¹⁵ As a result, one can translate their economic capital into cultural capital. More specifically, cultural capital identifies one's relationship to the legitimate culture, or the culture of the dominant class. With greater cultural capital, an individual stands a greater likelihood of social acceptance with leaders of bureaucratic organizations as well as access to employment and business opportunities that produce wealth. Thus, each form of capital forms the basis for another in that they are continuously exchanged through social interaction.¹⁶ While accounting for state development and the processes of state government bureaucracies, Bourdieu argues that a similar process occurs at the macro level of abstraction in terms of political dynamics.

¹⁴ Bourdieu (1989)

¹⁵ Bourdieu (1984), p. 55

¹⁶ Bourdieu (1989)

The State

Bourdieu uses a neo-Weberian definition of the state, inspired by Weber's acclaimed formulation. He says that "the state is an X which successfully claims the monopoly of legitimate use of physical and *symbolic* violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the corresponding population." (56) He underscores the importance of symbolism by pointing out that the state incarnates itself concurrently in objectivity, through bureaucratic structures and rules, and in subjectivity in the form of cognitive structures and categories or perception. It is through this process of adapting social structures into mental structures that one forgets the total sum of acts that led to institutionalization, leading to the effective appearance of being natural. This is why Bourdieu argues that it is important to review the conflicts and arrangements that were present in the beginnings of the state. Having such knowledge helps in understanding what alternative political paths could have emerged and what may still occur in the future.

Bourdieu offers a systematic account for the emergence of the state vested in historical processes. He positions the state as *the culmination of a process of concentration of different species of capital*. The capital comes in four forms: physical force capital, which includes instruments of coercion (army, police); economic capital; informational capital (or cultural capital); and symbolic capital.

The concentration of these forms of capital leads to the state having a capital granting power over other types of capital and individuals who hold them. The state's concentration of capital leads to the emergence of *statist capital* that allows the state to exert power over different fields and over other specific types of capital, especially over the manner in which capital is converted from one form to another. Thus, state construction occurs simultaneously with the *field of power* construction in which holders of capital struggle for power over the state. Such

power is chiefly manifest in terms of the statist power of granting capital and the ability to reproduce capital, which is most clearly done through the education system.

Most models of state emergence have predominantly paid attention to capital of *physical force*. While incorporating additional forms of capital as ultimately fundamental to state development Bourdieu nonetheless identifies the concentration of physical force capital as an essential element. Such a concentration involves the institutions of the forces of coercion becoming increasingly separated from the typical social world. The idea becomes ingrained in the population that physical violence can only be implemented by a specific, organized group that is mandated to do so in society. In terms of the military, a professional army is established that replaces feudal troops, stripping the nobility of its tools of violence.

The proto-state is compelled to assert its physical force in two respects. First, it must act externally against other states in war to acquire additional territory. Second, it must act internally against rival powers- principally the landed elites and nobility- and also against the dominated underclass. As capital becomes further concentrated, the armed forces increasingly diverge with the police focusing on maintaining internal order, while the military organizes to compete against foreign states.

While discussing the importance of physical force capital, Bourdieu highlights the essential complementarity of *economic capital*. The concentration of coercive capital requires the development of a fiscal system, which occurs concurrently with the establishment of a national market with a common currency and eliminated trade barriers. State taxes grow nearly in unison with increasing war expenses. The state initially makes demands for such funds as a way to provide for common defense of the territory, but they become normalized with time as a self-justified function of the state. In essence, an economic logic was developed in which levying

taxes and redistributing them functioned as the basis for converting economic capital into symbolic capital (or legitimacy) for the head of the government. In fact, symbolic capital is necessary for all levels of government in order to levy taxes. Citizens must believe that government agents involved in tax collection are not allowed to personally profit from their official functions and that their actions in the position will only be used to that end. Physical representations that signify official status, such as emblems and uniforms, gain importance as a result.

On the whole, Bourdieu argues that official state taxation is related to the rise of nationalism.¹⁷ Collecting taxes leads to the unification of a territory, both in reality and in perception, because citizens would be uniformly subject to the same obligations under threat of government sanction. However, national consciousness likely first developed among the employees of the purportedly *representative institutions* that came about during the establishment of taxation that was officially established to provide for the common defense.¹⁸ It is through such means that the state presents itself as a *fount of sovereignty* that is justified in establishing monetary value and is the ultimate basis of transcendent symbolic value.

The establishment of economic capital that is tied with the emergence of a unified taxation system occurs in tandem with the concentration of informational capital, which is closely aligned with the “unification of the cultural market.” Through the process of assessing available resources, the state concentrates and redistributes information in a manner that produces theoretical unification. This means that the state takes responsibility for all the activities that constitute *totalization* and *objectivation* of the territory, encompassing activities

¹⁷ Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. “Rethinking the State.” p. 6

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 7

such as conducting a census and producing maps. In addition, the state implements actions for the *codification* through administrative enforcement of cognitive unification and monopolization.

With respect to *informational capital*, Bourdieu emphasizes that culture is a unifying phenomenon. He states that “the state contributes to the unification of the cultural market by unifying all codes, linguistic and juridical, and by effecting a homogenization of all forms of communication, including bureaucratic communication.” (61) Classification systems that are codified in law, bureaucratic procedures, and education provide the tools for the state to form the *mental structures* for people to view society. This constructs common identity throughout a territory.

Through universal imposition, this dominant culture becomes synonymous with a legitimate national culture. The education system becomes one of the primary agents in this process by teaching a particular variant of history, inculcating a “civic religion” that lays the foundation of a national self-image. Concurrently, cultural and linguistic unification occur apace with the legitimization of a particular language and the relegation of others as inferior. Through this process, the venerated language becomes universalized, while all other languages become particularized. This has ramifications in power dynamics in the sense that the universalization of requirements does not connote the universal ability to fulfill them, meaning that “this fosters both the monopolization of the universal by the few and the dispossession of all others.” Therefore, there would be a group who was considerably more advantaged as a result of universalization, while all others would be held back because of their cultural repertoires. This is related to Omi and Winant’s (1994) *racial state* theory which posits that the state is simultaneously the arbiter of race and the arena for its engagement. Thus, one can consider informational capital as the capital produced by the state’s handling of information.

Bourdieu's key contribution in cultural analysis of the state is his emphasis on the importance of *symbolic capital*. Symbolic capital is "any property (any form of capital whether physical, economic, cultural or social) when it is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to give it value." (62) He elaborates in greater specificity that "symbolic capital is the form taken by any species of capital whenever it is perceived through categories of perception that are the product of the embodiment of divisions or of oppositions inscribed in the structure of the distribution of this species of capital." (63) As a result of its ability to impose its will and essentially teach allegiance through the educational regime, the state represents the greatest concentration of symbolic power and is the collective nexus of exercising symbolic capital, along with all others.

Juridical capital is a particular type of symbolic capital which is objectified and codified, following a logic distinct from physical force and economic capital. During the Middle Ages, many different legal systems coexisted in Europe. These included ecclesiastical jurisdictions, dominated by Christian courts, and secular jurisdictions that included *justices* of the king and lords as well as jurisdictions of municipalities, corporations, and of trade (Berman 1983). The lords' jurisdiction was over their vassals and people who lived on their property. The king had limited royal jurisdiction and initially only controlled trials dealing with direct vassals and his own territories as well; however this expanded as royal justice gradually 'infiltrated' all aspects of society (Bloch 1967). This concentration of juridical capital into royal hands started with the provosts-marshals referenced in terms of the "testament of Philippe Auguste" in 1190 and with the introduction of bailiffs who controlled the provosts. The process continued under King Louis with the creation of a number of bureaucratic entities that concentrated royal juridical power (63).

A number of new practices developed that furthered this process, including the development of *royal cases* that connoted royal court jurisdiction in cases involving specific legal infractions. The concept of the appeal progressed this development as well, as it placed all sections of the country under the king by allowing people to challenge the decisions of lower courts by directly appealing to royal authority. This would occur in hierarchical steps, starting with one lord, to a higher lord, eventually leading to the king himself.

This concentration of juridical capital occurred alongside its differentiation, leading to the development of an autonomous juridical field (Hanley 1989). The field became increasingly mature and hierarchical. *Provosts* became judges, and a *public ministry* became officially tasked with adjudicating cases¹⁹. These trends culminated in the Ordinance of 1670 which replaced all of the Christian and lordly jurisdictions with royal juridical authority. On the whole, these changes portended a shift in courts from precedence or direct authority over individuals toward specific legal competence.

In recounting the development of judicial capital, Bourdieu (1994) discusses another form of symbolic capital that is unique to the state — the power of nomination. This power allows the sovereign to designate who among the citizens is fit to be distinguished as having higher value than others. This concept is more clearly exemplified in nobility. There were two types of nobility. The first, *ricosombres de natura*, were nobles by birth. Thus, they attained such a status merely through hereditary inheritance, ultimately producing longstanding families enmeshed in noble status. The second type included the nobles identified by the king, or “legal nobility. The two types of nobility operated simultaneously for centuries until ennoblement by the king took precedence. The king’s concentration of more symbolic capital leads to ever-increasing returns because his ability to distribution symbolic capital in honors and titles

¹⁹ Bourdieu (1994)

increases apace. At the same time, the symbolic capital of nobility necessitated more of a bureaucratic justification.

In the greater realm of political developments, statutory honor delivered by the king, which is based on recognition by others and potentially stands up to scrutiny, leads to honors given by the state. In other words, the amorphous symbolic capital of collective recognition became an *objectified symbolic capital* that was more codified by the state, connoting bureaucratization. The evolution of ennoblement from merely the transfer of prestige to selection for positions of responsibility in bureaucracy led to the state constituting a “fountain of honor, of office and privilege. (66)” Thus, the state became the arbiter of symbolic capital and, therefore, the most pervasive, powerful social entity: “By stating with authority what a being (thing or person) is in truth (verdict) according to its socially legitimate definition, that is what he or she is authorized to be, what he has a right (and duty to be, the social being that he may claim, the State wields a genuinely creative, quasi-divine, power. (67)”

One can see this in the state’s ability to impose a *nomos* in the territory in which it controls. *Nomos* refers to “a shared principle of vision and division” (68). Thus, the state becomes the source of logical and moral conformism in the Durkheimian parlance. Bourdieu emphasizes that the state continually formulates lasting dispositions through the constraints it imposes on its citizens, causing them to exert physical and mental discipline.

The state’s development occurs alongside the development of a unitary historical essence among its citizens. As the state articulates common categories and ways of interpreting social frameworks, it creates the basis for implementing particular *habitus*es. Such *habitus*es are the bases “constitutive of national common sense.”

This habitus concept is influenced by a diverse canon, including Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. With regard to Marx, Bourdieu is influenced in terms of focus on class in the development of *habitus*. Importantly, he emphasizes “generalized materialism” rather than the comparatively limited class demarcation characteristic of Marx. With respect to Weber, Bourdieu adopts the conceptualization of actors that try to monopolize markets for different goods and services. In addition, *habitus* largely originates from Durkheim’s proto-structural anthropology. It is this influence, fused with the post-Saussurian structural anthropology of Levi-Strauss and the psychological genetic structuralism of Piaget that Bourdieu developed habitus as “a generative dynamic structure that adapts and accommodates itself to another dynamic meso-level structure composed primarily of other actors, situated practices and durable institutions (fields.)”²⁰

Bourdieu situates himself against the neo-Kantian canon by emphasizing that these dynamic structures are not merely types of consciousness but true *dispositions of the body*. Moreover, one’s acquiescence to the state should not be considered a mechanistic response to the coercive power of the state or a wholly conscious, deliberate acceptance of the state. Instead, “Submission to the established order is the product of the agreement between, on the one hand, the cognitive structures inscribed in bodies by both collective history (phylogenesis) and individual history (ontogenesis) and, on the other, the objective structures of the world to which these cognitive structures are applied. (69)”. Thus, recognizing legitimacy is based on the immediate congruence between objective structures and embodied structures. As a result, the state does not have to utilize coercive means to order the social world if it is able to create embodied cognitive structures that correspond with objective structures.

²⁰ Lizardo (2004)

Political orientation of the population is the result of struggle and imposition. “The ‘natural attitude’ mentioned by phenomenologists, i.e., the primary experience of the world of common sense, is a politically produced relation, as are the categories of perception that sustain it. (70)” In fact, “what appears to us today as self-evident, as beneath consciousness and choice, has quite often been the stake of struggles and instituted only as the result of dogged confrontations between dominant and dominated groups. The major effect of historical evolution is to abolish history by relegating to the past... the lateral possibles that it eliminated.” Through this process, the *doxa*, or point of view held by the dominant social group, is imposed as the universal point of view by those from the dominant group who control the state. Building on Weber’s analysis of symbolic systems produced by structured agents in religious organizations, Bourdieu posits that the way to understand this symbolic effect of the state, particularly universality, “it is necessary to understand the specific functioning of the bureaucratic microcosm and thus to analyze the genesis and structure of this universe of agents of the state who have constituted themselves into a state nobility by instituting the state. (71)”

While studying the state, Bourdieu emphasizes that the emergence of the state’s monopoly over physical and symbolic violence is inseparable from the struggles attached to obtaining its very own monopoly. Bourdieu points out that the monopoly of the universal can only be obtained by submitting to the universal through recognition and acknowledgement as legitimate. This leads to the adoption of values in support of neutrality and the greater public good among bureaucrats. In fact, the bureaucracy is the primary location where monopolization of the universal occurs. Eschewing items for selfish economic gain is seen as legitimate, thus there are material or symbolic rewards for universalization. Fields that demand that individuals submit to the universal, therefore, become more successful in the views of others and in making

profits. This process self-edifies, leading to the growth of universalization. Bourdieu's signature work on political processes, *The State Nobility*, elucidates all of these concepts.

The State Nobility

Bourdieu examines the relationship between material and symbolic power in *The State Nobility*. He builds upon Weber who notes that individuals "privileged through existing political, social, and economic orders wish to see their positions transformed from purely factual power relations into a cosmos of acquired rights, and to know that they are thus sanctified. (Wacquant ix)". He emphasizes that "*habitus* is at the basis of strategies of reproduction that tend to maintain separations, distances, and relations of order(ing), hence concurring in practice... in reproducing the entire system of differences constitutive of the social order. (3)"

In *The State Nobility*, Bourdieu underscores the importance of understanding the structure of education in order to understand power relations and the configuration of legitimacy. It allows one to understand the specific ways in which social structures and mental structures are reproduced despite frequent incongruence with objective conditions. This is because education plays a central role in disseminating cultural capital, which along with economic capital, forms society's social space. As a result, education plays a central role in regulating control over society's dominant positions.

In the university setting, disciplines obscure and perpetuate social differences, particularly when it comes to the possession of capital. Bourdieu states those who study the classics, mathematics, and physics often come from families with considerable amounts of cultural capital. In actuality, the disciplines can be thought of as selecting their students just as much as the converse because of the ways in which they impose categories of perceptions in terms of subjects, careers, and academic skills. This is related to the concept that an individual

was automatically drawn to, or predestined, to pursue a certain discipline. In actuality, the discipline is formulated as essentially a magnet tacitly designed to attract certain types of people. Those who come from families with a greater degree of cultural capital enjoy a privilege in academics because academic culture is their native culture. Therefore, they have an automatic familiarity with it, allowing seamless transition into education. When one thinks of a student as having natural talent for a subject area, it is more accurate to refer to this ease of application of their cultural capital.

Through education, educators make their students' outward display of language and culture, or *la manière*, central to their academic judgments. The educators may employ evaluative phrases that circumvent this reality, but they nonetheless perpetuate it. "Academic taxonomy, through the traditional vocabulary that conveys it, exercises its powers of social discrimination beyond the reach of pedagogical or political vigilance," according to Bourdieu (22). This is the manner in which educators are able to exercise their social prejudices while seeming to act from a neutral standpoint.

Bourdieu interprets his evidence as indicating that the longer a dominated student is subject to dominant control over knowledge, abilities, and ethical positions, more likely they will be to exhibit traits of *perseverance, tenacity, and docility*. However, students who come from dominant backgrounds will have a greater ability to use these traits for advancement on exams and oral assessments. The apparent ease and corresponding speed at which these students work would receive higher valuations because these factors are used in determining overall intellectual capabilities.

As a result, the structure of educational institutions and the teaching methods is what produces the schemata that structure understanding, perception, and actions are instilled and

imposed. “It is thus the objective structures of the educational institutions (such as the hierarchy among disciplines) and, through the homology that binds them, the structures of social space that, at least negatively, orient acts aiming at preserving or transforming these structures” (29).

Bourdieu examines the execution of *symbolic violence* in the production of the nobility through methodical analysis of a philosophy teacher’s documents in 1960s France. The documents contain reports on 154 students that catalog written and oral grades for each student and descriptive comments. Along with this data, each student had information about the secondary schools they attended, their parents’ employment, and their locations of origin. Connecting such material allows one to assess the relationship between the particular terms used in evaluating student work, numerical grades, and the social origins of the students that are being evaluated. Understanding this allows one to pinpoint *academic forms of classification*, channeling the Durkheimian *primitive forms of classification*, that are the product of social structures.

In terms of comments, Bourdieu finds that they become increasingly positive as social origins increase. For instance, students from middle class backgrounds received particularly negative comments, being called *simple-minded*, *slavish*, or *mediocre* (33). Positive traits were transformed into negative character traits, and positive comments were frequently affixed with clever criticisms. The trend remains despite the quality of grades rendered, as comments become increasingly negative as students move down the social scale even when they receive equivalent grades. Thus, “the reasons adduced for a judgment seem more closely linked to social origin than the grade that expresses it” (33).

In total, these actions indicate the existence of a *cognitive machine* that acts as a collective social mechanism that sorts positive and negative attributes for individuals according

to their social origins. The machine develops in terms of cognitive and evaluative actions in a seemingly objective fashion, while actually having a close correlation between the *entry classification* and *exit classification* despite not consciously recognizing or being cognizant of social criteria. For instance, an educator would be surprised and likely dismissive of such an account. Nonetheless, the denial of this classification process is the mechanism that perpetuates it with minimal resistance.

This academic taxonomy is essentially a tacit version of the dominant classification system. Its structure of assessment is homologous with that of overall society, as the traits that are given to one social category are transmuted into an academic version. The academic classification system is based on the assumption that excellence connotes qualities that are encapsulated by the socially dominant group. Therefore, the process of education consecrates the dominant class's existence and their control of the state.

In order to understand how this process works, one must track Bourdieu's understanding of how consecration operates. In the grand sense of the term, consecration is a *rite of institution* that has a central aim of producing a separate, sacred group. Elite schools, in effect, serve as a way to conduct the same function. Their role is to provide rituals of exclusion and give justification for consecrating certain individuals despite a nominally rational society.

Elite schools are tasked with educating and consecrating individuals into the field of power, a location from which the majority of their students arise. Students who are selected into such institutions are placed into a separate group through a legitimated process of *election*. This grants them a form of symbolic capital that further perpetuates the exclusivity of their established group. This exclusivity, according to Bourdieu, is converted into a *nobility* in that they collectively share symbolic capital in their attachment to the educational institution in a manner

constitutive of *magical shareholding*. This means that everyone attached to the specific form of capital becomes “rich by proxy in all the current symbolic capital.” For instance, they would become associated with the prestigious families who went to school their, famous alumni and their accomplishments, and the feats made by other students who are currently there.

The way the group comes together is through the development of a common culture as a result of shared experiences. This comes about not only through the coursework, but also through the effects of their experiences in the institution. They will have common slang for things relevant to the program, inside jokes, mores for behavior. These factors work in tandem to produce a social connectivity among the students that renders them complicit in the institution’s effects. The congruence of their enjoyment of these social relations and the academic rigor fosters nostalgia in later years. This helps explain the concept of *strength of tradition*. Bourdieu summarizes it thusly: “This affective enchantment, born of the ability to love and admire oneself in one’s like-minded neighbors, is one of the foundations, along with *logical conformity* linked to the homogeneity of mental structures, of what is known as *esprit de corps*” (84). It is such a feeling of group solidarity that allows the group to remain unconscious of its true nature.

While discussing preparatory classes, Bourdieu emphasizes that the content of what is taught in classes is not the primary way in which the education takes place. In particular, he emphasizes that the organization of teaching is fundamental to transmitting messages. This largely includes the conditions in which work is done and their conceptual framing. He explains “an entire definition of education and intellectual work is imposed on students through the very organization of their schoolwork, particularly through the subordination of learning to the imperatives of urgency” (85). As a result, the core of institutional instruction is creating the conditions in which students will intensively use their time and are forced to confront rushed

work conditions for survival in the institution. One of the ways that this is accomplished is by encouraging students to compete with each other. Creating the competitive environment, in effect, prepares students for future academic struggles by instituting tendencies toward business and an enjoyment of intellectual strength. Bourdieu likens this to the “will to win” in athletic competition.

Rite of Institution

Through the process of selecting certain students deemed the most gifted, elite institutions select those with the most positive disposition towards it or those who are most recognizable to them because of their attributes. This process makes their selection in actuality a reinforcement of their beliefs in separation and consecration. Bourdieu uses the *concours*, a French standardized test, as an example of the function of academic processes. He explains “academic sanctions fulfill a social function *par excellence*. This social function consists in producing special, separate, sacred beings merely by getting everyone to be aware of and to recognize the boundary separating them from the commonplace.” Making such a distinction widely known leads to widespread adoption of that belief and makes the *elect* see themselves as, in fact, different. Thus, the *concours* become a manifestation of a social boundary between those who have passed and those who have not, despite the degree to which this is the case. It is important to note that this process is exacerbated by the fact that elite institutions select from people who have selected it. This allows the institutions to draw individuals who are more likely to concede to its norms and demands and, therefore, are less likely to change it.

While describing the process by which elite schools convert new students, Bourdieu incorporates Weberian logic of charisma and Durkheim’s concept of hazing for assimilation into a new social environment. He describes it as a charismatic initiation process whose objective is

to “instill the recognition of social competence” by removing people from their habitual environments, breaking family ties, granting them entry into the educational community, and transforming their way of life through repeated testing of “charismatic qualification attained.” Going through this process successfully leads to official acceptance into the group of the chosen and entry into the “consecrated life.”

This process, in effect, removes the individual’s initial sense of value for themselves. The institution champions itself as the way to reinstate such a value by granting them the title that makes them an official member of the *elect*. This act of making an individual dependent on the institution calls for complete obedience to the institution, which leads to a monopoly on granting value.

Power

Taken together, Bourdieu’s articulation of capital, consecration, and the state elucidates his view that the field of power is the product of different forms of capital. Thus, the field of power also represents a field of struggle between individuals who hold dominant positions over organizations that control the different forms of capital. In describing the *dominant principle of domination*, Bourdieu maintains that the different forms of capital “are themselves stakes in the struggles whose objective is no longer the accumulation of or even the monopoly on a particular form of capital (or power)...but rather the determination of the relative value and magnitude of the different forms of power that can be wielded in the different fields or, if you will, power over the different forms of power or the capital granting power over capital” (265). This constant tension leads to a constant state of equilibrium in the division of power. However, *symbolic confrontations* can often take place in which different forms of power may overtake others.

Bourdieu cites the victory of the *oratores* over the *bellatores* in the European Middle Ages as an example.

Bourdieu also accounts for the emergence of conservatism in capital struggle. In systems in which the dominant groups must consistently reinvent themselves to maintain advantaged positions, such dominant groups essentially split into two groups. One group has better access to the new modes of reproduction and is fully able to reconvert, while the other does not do so. Thus, such individuals are “likely to seek to deny or to magically compensate for their economic and social regression through a conservatism born of despair” (Bourdieu 1989). Bourdieu further describes the divergence by explaining that conservative reactions “correspond to two forms of conservative sociodicy, the one that aims above all to legitimate the old mode of reproduction, by saying what formerly went without saying and by transforming *doxa* into *orthodoxy*, and the one that aims to rationalize...reconversion by hastening awareness of the transformations and the elaboration of the adapted strategies and by legitimating these new strategies in the eyes of the ‘integrists.’” Based on Bourdieu’s account for the emergence of conservatism, one can surmise that conservatism develops as a result of an relatively old, established social order becoming threatened, hence the need to *conserve* what remains. In this dissertation, I will analyze how this process occurs in the political realm, primarily within expert historical testimony on different regions.

It is likely that similar effects occur in modern state governments, with different orbs of power reaching different results because of variations in habitus and capital within the fields of government. This effect prompts the present study.

Bridging Bourdieu and Political Culture

Bourdieu situates habitus as a historical production. He emphasizes that as such, it “produces individual and collective practices- more history- in accordance with the schemes generated by history” (54). As a result, habitus “ensures the active presence of past experiences.” In essence, habitus is the very object of analysis of historical inquiry of social behavior. In fact, habitus “accounts equally well for cases in which dispositions function out of phase and practices are objectively adjusted to conditions that no longer obtain.” This is why there is a tendency for groups to persist in certain behaviors that were congruent with past conditions despite their contemporary irrelevance or maladaptivity. Such attributes inform Bourdieu’s social class analysis and extend to larger social groupings.

With respect to institutions, Bourdieu argues that habitus is the cognitive process that enables institutions to formulate and endure. This is because the development and inculcation of particular dispositions corresponds with objectifying history in the abstract. The habitus is the mechanism by which the institution connects with the *magic of the social* to appropriate human subjects. Bourdieu summarizes the relationship between habitus and institutions in the following manner: “Property appropriates its owner, embodying itself in the form of a structure generating practices perfectly conforming with its logic and its demands” (57). Therefore, “an institution...is complete and fully viable only if it is durably objectified not only in things, that is, in the logic, transcending individual agents, of a particular field, but also in bodies, in durable dispositions to recognize and comply with the demands immanent in the field.”

The durability and institutional bases of Bourdieu’s *habitus* necessitate its study in terms of political processes. More specifically, *habitus* and capital explain the concept of political culture such that varying degrees and types of experiences promulgate differences in political

orientation. The following chapter uses Bourdieu's formations of habitus and capital primarily with respect to state governments and historical events to yield a typology of American political cultures. As a result of my focus on American states, I effectively incorporate Elazarian thought into the sociological milieu.

Chapter 3
Toward the Bourdieusian Political Cultures of the
American States

In chapter 3, I situate Elazar as an example of empirical classification of political cultures at the sub-national level. Then, I account for the value of applying the same process using Bourdieusian capitals. Finally, I operationalize Bourdieusian capitals using the theoretical foundations and produce the bases for analyzing the states. This includes using principal component analysis (PCA) in order to create the primary variables that I use to map Bourdieusian political culture in chapter 4. I use PCA as a quantitative alternative to the multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) preferred by Bourdieu. While both are factorial methods, MCA “is a technique for investigating the associations among a set of qualitative or categorical variables”.²¹ It involves observations of such variables in tables, typically involving analytical focus of individuals within groups in the case of Bourdieu. In contrast, my units of analysis are the sub-national entities referred to as *states*, and the majority of my observed variables are continuous. Using such a method assists in grouping American states into political cultures. While Bourdieu prefers the MCA method because of his ability to elucidate distinctive properties and identify conceptual relationships among people, PCA also helps simplify associations between categories of variables by “computing the...dimensions that optimally represent them.”²²

The Elazarian Precedent

Elazar provides an example of empirically classifying state political cultures in terms of subnational units. By analyzing the political conditions in each state, he observed three pervasive political subcultures. These include the Individualist culture, the Moralistic culture, and the Traditionalist culture. Each state has elements of all three, though concentrations vary significantly, likely because of immigration streams, variant experiences, and habitus.

²¹ de Nooy (2003), p. 306

²² *Ibid*

The Individualist culture is one in which people see the government as responding to the demands of active constituents. According to Elazar, the traits of the Individualist political culture emerged as a result of the westward movement of the Middle State cultural stream that formed during the beginning stages of the country. The cultural aspects of the Middle Stream were characterized as an “overriding commitment to commercialism and concomitant acceptance of ethnic, social, and religious pluralism. (261,262)


The Moralist political culture sees government as a commonwealth, meaning that it acts on behalf of the people’s common good through direct action. This view that government has positive ends, as opposed to the neutral outcomes of business exchange, encourages a hopeful view of government that leads to a variety of political behaviors.

Elazar holds that the Moralist political culture developed from Puritan tradition in New England, where they worked to develop a holy commonwealth in which “honesty, selflessness, and commitment to the public welfare” (262) were seen as essential to good government. The Yankee Stream carried these values westward, and they combined with the English, Continental, Eastern European, and Mediterranean streams to form the Moralistic political culture that Elazar identifies.

The hallmark of the Traditionalist political culture is allegiance to maintaining the existing political order. The primary functions of the political structure are to stabilize power balances and protect the traditional way of life, often in favor of elite interests. This considerably limited view of government logically discourages activity by the populace and elected officials alike. Elazar surmises that the Traditionalist Political Culture developed from the agrarianism and racially stratified ethos in the South, both of which exemplifying pre-industrial era characteristics and reifying a habitus developed in the context of slavery. As the cultural stream

moved westward and fused with elements of complementary religions, it became the dominant political culture in the southern tier of the United States. Some states combine political cultures (Riley 2014), but Gray (2008) and Elazar (1984) identify regional concentrations. Below is a map that shows the geographic distribution of the dominant political culture in each state (Elazar 1984).

Chart 1: Map of Elazarian Political Cultures



A number of studies lend credence to Elazar's theory. For instance, Fitzpatrick and Hero (1988) confirm much of Elazar's work, particularly in terms of enhanced party competition in the moralist states. Legislatures in moralist states also implement more innovative policies and egalitarian policies. However, Hero and Tolbert (1996) show that the diversity of state

populations is important in determining policy outcomes, particularly in light of increasing immigration and internal migration patterns.

While Elazar's theory provides a great deal of insight into political dynamics, this dissertation will slightly diverge from his conceptualization. For instance, his categories of political culture are too expansive. Kansas and California have vastly different political environments and historical trajectories, rendering their placement under the same label problematic. My dissertation will analyze political cultures within the framework of habitus and capital, using measures that depict social conservatism and partisanship, in order to improve upon such problematic labeling and expand upon previous measures of political culture. I will compare my new map with that of Elazar to observe differences and whether there are consistencies. The political cultures that I discover will be wholly endogenous to the United States, as they are the result of idiosyncratic phenomena, but futures scholars can employ similar strategies in other countries with sufficient sub-national political units.

I must additionally note that political culture theory transcends mere categorization because it can explain many of the variables that scholars traditionally analyze in politics. For instance, one may consider the plane spanning progressivism and conservatism to be a product of political culture. Elazar's three political cultures demonstrate this point in that the major political categories can be ranked according to their degree of conservatism. The Traditionalist political culture would be the most conservative, as it corresponds with limited government action and the maintenance of order. The Moralistic political culture follows in that it encapsulates the view that government functions and participation in the political arena can be positive forces. The pervasive motivation is to create stable, prosperous communities. Since the basis is religious in nature, it is more conservative than the individualist political culture. The Individualist political

culture assumes that individuals are free agents and that the purpose of government is to provide them with things they demand, spanning items and government policy. It is essentially a *quid pro quo* formation. The dearth of religious ties and the near solipsism of political participants suggests that it is the least conservative among Elazar's categories. The understanding of conservatism and progressivism can be applied to political theories other than Elazar's. My dissertation will take this aspect into account while describing the political cultures that I discover using the sociological concepts articulated by Bourdieu.

Bourdieu's State Capitals

As I indicated in chapter 2, physical force capital is the first and most essential form of capital in state development. It involves a concentration of institutions that implement coercion. The coalescence of these institutions instills a sense of legitimacy in the population of the territory that only particular, organized groups are able to act with authority in the society. As the state develops, these groups assert their authority in two primary ways. The first is to thwart external enemies who would like to acquire the territory for their own interests. The second is to act against domestic powers who have the potential to challenge the state. Bourdieu cites landed elites and the nobility, as well as the dominated underclass as such powers. In the modern era, one can extend the concept to include actors who stand to challenge the operational authority of the state, namely criminal elements. The second is most relevant to the present study, as I am addressing subnational units. As a result, I focus on measures of law enforcement as evidence of physical force capital within the state.

In turn, the institutions that manifest state physical force capital require financing to operate. Bourdieu holds that states develop the means to extract funding from their populations in order to self perpetuate. These institutions include those which levy taxes. Over time, such

practices gain legitimacy, and the state can more freely exercise its powers to obtain finance to pay for state objectives. As a result, I will focus primarily on various forms of tax revenue and gross state product as examples of economic capital for state governments.

Informational capital encompasses the ability of the state to “unify the cultural market”. The cultural market includes objectifying its territory, codifying cognitive unification and monopolization, and homogenizing bureaucratic function. These processes collectively form the mental structures by which citizens view society, forging the way to a collective national identity. Sub-national units cannot exhibit all of these functions, but they can primarily do so with respect to their educational systems. Bourdieu emphasizes the power of *l’ecole* in *The State Nobility*. In the work, Bourdieu describes the strong role schools have in perpetuating class differentiation in terms of “transmitting knowledge in codes accessible only to those who, upon entering, already possess the linguistic and cultural capital required to appropriate it” and “consigns the poor to failure and ensures the success of the well to do.”²³ As loci of social violence in terms of imposed identity, schools cement perspectives of social standing, tastes, and the state itself. The process occurs through the interplay of curriculum and bureaucratic structure in terms of manifest functions of education and the hidden curriculum, as well as the functional organization of faculty. For this reason, I will emphasize educational variables while ascertaining information on informational capital in American states.

Symbolic capital refers to the property which “is perceived by social agents endowed with categories of perception which cause them to know it and to recognize it, to give it value.” Thus, state symbolic capital refers to the degree to which citizens recognize state government institutions and assign value to them. It also encompasses the subset, juridical capital, which includes the court system of trained legal professionals who are bureaucratically arranged. Thus,

²³ DiMaggio (1979)

I use measures of approval of the state government and the preponderance of the court system as evidence of state symbolic capital in my subsequent analysis.

Measures of Bourdieu's State Capitals

I analyzed variables corresponding with Bourdieu's formations of state capital in order to produce a typology of American political cultures. The variables included: trust in the state government²⁴, governor's institutional power, judges per capita, appellate cases per capita, total number of executions, incarceration rate, prisons per capita, veterans per capita, total budget amount allocated to the National Guard as approved by the state governments (millions of US dollars)²⁵, revenue as a percentage of state GDP²⁶, state expenditures as a percentage of state GDP²⁷, state revenue per capita (thousands of US dollars)²⁸, state expenditures per capita (thousands of US dollars)²⁹, state economic development expenditures³⁰, state income tax progressivity³¹, state education spending per k-12 student (thousands of US dollars)³², the state tax rate for beer³³, and state university spending per student (thousands of US dollars).³⁴

Trust in the state government consists of the percentage of residents in each state who indicated that they trust the state government to perform its stated functions and to assist the citizens of the state in a manner in which they approve according to a 2013 Gallup Survey of the fifty states. The *governor's institutional power* represents the totality of a governor's powers as

²⁴ *Survey of the Fifty States*, Gallup (2013)

²⁵ I compiled National Guard information from data provided by the state governments in their budgets and from consultations with officials in the state governments where data was not readily available.

²⁶ US Census Bureau, FY 2012

²⁷ *2013 Annual Survey of State Government Finances*, US Department of Commerce- Bureau of Economic Analysis

²⁸ US Census Bureau (2014)

²⁹ *State Government Finances Report*, US Census Bureau (2013)

³⁰ Development expenditures are provided in the form of a scale 1-4 based on economic development expenditures per business establishment in the state. Council for Community and Economic Research (2014)

³¹ Income tax progressivity is scaled 1-5. States with a score of 1 have no income tax, while those with scores of 5 have the highest rates. *State Individual Income Tax Progressivity*, Tax Policy Center (2007)

³² *Public Education Finances Report*, US Census Bureau (2012)

³³ *State Alcohol Excise Tax Rates for 2015*, Tax Policy Center

³⁴ *Examining Fiscal 2012-2014 State Spending*, National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO) (2013)

indicated in state constitutions and statutes. The powers are scaled one through five, with one representing low institutional power. The information was provided by Beyle (2007) and the Council of State Governments. *Judges per capita* constitutes the number of judges per 100,000 citizens, and *appellate cases per capita* constitutes the number of appellate cases per 100,000 citizens, both of which are compiled by Gray and Hanson's (2008) *Politics in the American States*. The total number of *executions* represents the number of executions in the state since 1976.³⁵ The *incarceration rate* is the number of citizens imprisoned per 100,000, as indicated by the US Justice Department in 2008. *Prisons per capita* is the number of prisons per citizen of the state as indicated by the state governments.³⁶ *Veterans per capita* is the number of veterans per 100,000 citizens as provided by the US Census Bureau's 2012 Statistical Abstract. *State revenue per capita* refers to the state revenue in thousands of dollars per citizen.

I selected trust, governor's power, judges, and appellate cases to represent *state symbolic capital* because they each represent state power in the form of the state's capacity to conduct activities aligned with its stated functions. Executions, incarcerations, prisons, veterans, and National Guard represent *physical force capital* in that they address the capacity for violence. Executions, incarcerations, prisons, and National Guard represent such a capacity in the course of implementing policy goals. Veterans address adherence to the same principles among the state's population. Revenue as a percent of GDP, state expenditures as a percentage of GDP, revenue per capita, state expenditures per capita, economic development, and tax progressivity were to constitute *economic capital*, as they address revenue collection by the state government apparatus. Education spending, beer taxes, and university spending constitute *informational*

³⁵ <http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976>

³⁶ This measure includes only the number of state prisons within each state. Federal prisons and work release centers are not included. The information is often included together, requiring me to use discretion to identify the appropriate facilities.

capital. Recall, informational capital refers to the state's control over knowledge and perspectives within its territory. As such, the education system is central to informational capital and reifies the research application of *The State Nobility* in which Bourdieu studies the social impact of France's public education system. In the work and his subsequent (1994) analysis of capital in state development, Bourdieu also notes that there is a moral component to state informational control.³⁷

Principal Component Analysis

I conducted Principal Component Analysis on the aforementioned variables to produce dimensions for further state categorizations. Measures with loading below 0.60 –actually 0.59 to accommodate the reasonable addition to a dimension- were dropped from final use in the measurement of dimensions of Bourdiesian capital in the American states.

³⁷ Bourdieu, Pierre. 1994. "Rethinking the State" p.7-8

Table 2- Principal Component Analysis- All Variables

	Component					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
Trust State Government	.324	.259	-.418	.233	-.238	-.405
Governor's Power	.161	-.516	.236	.530	-.209	.025
Judges	.460	.468	.268	.070	.321	-.201
Appellate Cases	-.051	.367	.765	.242	.056	.052
Executions	-.196	.700	-.182	.053	.374	.100
Incarcerations	-.266	.801	.313	.191	.126	.111
Prisons	.711	.348	-.261	-.129	.257	.193
Veterans	.410	.516	-.331	-.130	-.150	.023
National Guard	.869	.113	-.003	.295	-.049	-.068
Revenue % GDP	.888	-.156	.047	-.037	-.048	.018
State Exp %GDP	.784	.055	.259	-.323	-.042	.038
Revenue Per Cap	.877	-.234	-.079	.206	.043	.134
State Exp Per Cap	.911	-.154	.026	.104	.127	.185
Economic Develop	.416	.203	.431	-.127	-.473	-.258
Tax Progressivity	-.054	-.317	.298	-.711	.100	.021
Education Spend	.297	-.625	.074	.117	.547	.084
Beer Taxes	.252	.250	-.028	-.141	-.408	.703
University Spend	.592	.099	.013	-.347	.100	-.408

The model yields six dimensions from which I selected five as useful in terms of absolute values greater than .59 (see Table 1). The first dimension consists of the Number of Prisons, National Guard Spending, Revenue as a Percentage of GDP, State Expenditures as a Percentage of GDP, Revenue Per Capita, State Expenditures Per Capita, and Number of Universities. Loadings from economic measures are particularly high, with the three highest measures- state expenditures (.911), revenue as a percentage of GDP (.888), and revenue per capita (.877). As a result of these loadings, the first dimension may be characterized as *state investment capacity*.

The second dimension consists of executions, incarcerations, and education spending (for k-12). Education has a negative loading of -.625, suggesting that it commonly has an antagonistic relationship with coercive elements of the justice system. As a result, one may deem

the second dimension *jeopardy potential* in that it captures both educational opportunities and coercive penalties from the state. The third dimension comprises only appellate cases, as it was the only variable with a loading sufficiently high for consideration (.765). The fourth and fifth utilized dimensions follow suit, as tax progressivity and beer taxes stand apart, with loadings of .765 and .703, respectively. (The fifth dimension of Table 1 was dropped for lack of strong, distinctive or meaningful loadings.)

Incorporating Capital Measures of State Development for Political Culture

It is apparent that incorporating variables beyond Bourdieu's capital conceptualization alone would be useful to the study in order to particularize findings to the United States context. More specifically, Bourdieu's capital considerations are most classically linked with sovereign state development within the global political arena. The objective of this study is to study subnational units, which requires studying consequential variables that can effectively differentiate them. To this end, I incorporated variables corresponding with measures of historically produced political habitus and political capital, including unionization, population density, gross state product, and the legacy of the Civil War as additional measures of political culture.

The legacy of the Civil War includes identification of a state in terms of its affiliation with the Confederacy. All states that formally joined the Confederacy received scores of 3; border states that had divided loyalties³⁸, such as Kentucky, received a score of 2, and all other states received a score of 1. Unionization refers to the percentage of the non-farm labor force with

³⁸ The predominant feature of a *border state* is whether the state had two organizations attempting to establish legitimacy as the state government. The exceptions are Delaware, Oklahoma, and Maryland. Delaware did not secede but remained a slave state and rejected the Thirteenth Amendment to end slavery. Many of its citizens also joined Confederate regiments in Virginia (United Daughters of the Confederacy, 1964). Oklahoma was American Indian territory during the conflict, but tribes divided their loyalties to the Union and Confederacy (Walton-Raji, 2008). Maryland had divided loyalties and may have seceded had President Lincoln not suspended *habeas corpus* and occupied Baltimore. Many Marylanders joined Confederate regiments in Virginia as well.

union membership. This data was obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014 *Current Population Survey*. Population density refers to the number of single individuals who live in each square mile of the state, as provided by the US Census Bureau's *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (2012). Gross state product per capita refers to the wealth (in millions of US dollars) produced in the state per citizen, as reported by the US Department of Commerce's Bureau of Economic Analysis in 2013.

This importance of particularizing analysis to the United States context is most apparent with the legacy of the Civil War, as it was perhaps the most important domestic political event in formation of state identity. The essence of the Civil War's impact was not the damage inflicted during the course of the war, but the reflections and ruminations of its effects. This development is best encapsulated by the *Lost Cause* movement in the literature of the former Confederate states starting immediately after the war.

The main tenets of the movement absolve the South of responsibility for the outcome of the war, villainize the North, and imbue the cause with moral justification. The tenets include: the inevitability of defeat due to the North's population and resources, identification of states' rights as the primary cause of secession, the constitutionality of slavery, and the acceptability of slavery in terms of its value to society and acceptance among those enslaved.

Despite originating the immediate aftermath of the war, such writings continued in pure form to the era of the 1930s and beyond. They included *The Clansman* (1905), which was adapted into *Birth of a Nation* (1915), and *Gone with the Wind* (1936) by Margaret Mitchell. Such interpretations of the war extended beyond the fiction realm and had tangible political impacts. For instance, many Southern states incorporated the Confederate battle flag into their

state flags decades after the Civil War. In fact, Mississippi still includes it.³⁹ Use of such a symbol indicates a willingness to accept a political identity defined and unified by a collective Confederate heritage on the part of state citizens and actors in state government bureaucracies.

These effects are further underscored by the acceptance of racially-motivated lynchings in the early twentieth century, opposition to federal Civil Rights legislation based on states' rights, and the subsequent partisan realignment that reached its zenith in the early 2000s. *In toto*, Confederate identity is an indelible part of the political calculus for much of the southern United States. Consideration of economic issues and resources, while important, do not wholly capture this important undercurrent.

Unionization, as a measure of membership in unions, is a commonly used in comparative political discourse as a measure of egalitarian conditions for workers.⁴⁰ Political units with a greater degree of unionization are said to be more egalitarian than those with lesser degrees of it, as union membership confers certain rights to the members. It generally aligns with greater treatment of workers as a result of their political efforts as well. Perhaps more philosophically, union membership re-orientes workers' consciousness by consistently organizing them around common interests. While unionization is commonly used to differentiate national governments, it may also be used to differentiate subnational units within the United States because partisan and ideological differences among the states dramatically diverge rates of unionization.

Population density varies significantly amongst subnational units as well. Consider Rhode Island, which is entirely defined by the greater Providence area, versus Alaska, which has less than one person per square mile. The reason why this is politically consequential is that population density affects the average citizen's adherence to ideological individualism, thus

³⁹ <http://www.mississippi.gov/content/pages/flags.aspx> Accessed June 19th, 2015.

⁴⁰ Martin and Brady (2007), Hicks (1999), Sen and Hameed (1985)

translating into their political behavior.⁴¹ For instance, Alesina and Glaeser (2004) cite low population density, most especially in the once frontier West, as one of the defining elements of American national politics, as the individualist ethos prioritized equality of opportunity over equality of outcome in terms of redistribution. Hirschl and Rank (1993) undergird this argument, as they find higher regard for welfare programs as a function of the population density of one's residence. Preuss (1981) observes lower voter turnout in areas with higher population density. Moreover, one can surmise that such orientations toward government would affect state actors, thus impacting bureaucratic objectives and functions.

Gross state product per capita may be viewed as an indicator of development for a state. While the United States has a highly developed economy, the degrees among the states vary significantly.⁴² Capturing these differences and incorporating them into the model can be helpful in understanding the economic position of the state, and by extension, the maturity of the state government in developing its own economic capital.


Taken collectively, this chapter has propelled my aim of studying American political cultures using a Bourdieusian framework with significant emphasis on historical context, much like his *The State Nobility*. I accomplished this by operationalizing Bourdieu's forms of political capital and then finding the components to create a political culture map in chapter 4. The components that I found form the baseline from which I build the map, ultimately producing a comprehensive, intelligible distribution of Bourdieusian political cultures of the United States.

⁴¹ Alesina and Glaeser (2004), Hirschl and Rank (1993), Preuss (1981)

⁴² Kendrick and Jaycox (1965)

Chapter 4
Mapping Bourdieusian Political Culture
in the American States

In chapter 4, I produce a mapping of political culture that uses the dimensions captured in the principal component analysis of chapter 3. The purpose of the final map is to capture both the presence and geography of political cultures constituted by Bourdieu's capital, habitus, and political fields concepts. Through production of the map, I proceed from a baseline cluster analysis and use a series of different variables that correspond with political habitus and political culture to produce a logically coherent final map. This map is informed by presidential electoral college maps⁴³, Garreau's cultural mapping of the *Nine Nations of North America* (1981), Elazar's (1984) state classification, and Lieske's (1993) more detailed adaptation of Elazar's comprehensive model (below)⁴⁴. While map consideration is subjective, the results from the baseline mapping correspond with Elazar (1984) and Garreau's cultural regions. This finding, in concert with the methodical inclusion of additional variables, provides veracity to the map's overall utility.



⁴³ "Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives"


⁴⁴ Lieske, "Regional Subcultures of the United States", 1993

In the baseline cluster analysis, I also include trust in the state government because it represents Bourdieu's fourth capital conceptualization, state symbolic capital, and is an indicator of habitus with respect to citizens' allegiance towards the state. I conducted the k-means cluster analysis by using Z-scores for the variables within the dimensions. For dimensions that yielded more than one variable of note for cluster analyses to follow, I combined variables by averaging their Z-scores. In such averages variables with negative loadings (like "education spending" on the "jeopardy potential" dimension were weighted by -1.0). I gradually incorporated the Civil War and the additional capital variables onto a baseline that uses only Bourdieu's contributions. Adding such variables is in accordance with Bourdieu's historical account of habitus as well as his class analysis. My approach in this respect is informed by his historical approach in *The State Nobility*, as well as Durkheim's categorization of groups sharing mutual experiences and Weber's emphasis on markets, actors, and bureaucracies⁴⁵. Each of the measures is typically found in political sociology literature in comparing political units, as well. I first attempted adding GSP per capita, then unionization and population density. Based on these results, I determined that the map should include both unionization and population density. This led to a map that included the original dimensions, trust in the state government, Civil War loyalty, unionization, and population density. The states were split into eight clusters, and the results are below.

⁴⁵ Through incorporating Weberian social conceptualization, I take a slight departure from Bourdieu's conceptual bifurcation of structure and interaction (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 113-114). I cover reasons for this in chapters 5 and 6.

Map 2- Dimensions and Trust

Using solely the dimensions obtained from principal component analysis yields state clusters that are somewhat balkanized, yet split in a manner that would not be surprising to a reader versed in American politics. This finding in itself provides solid evidence that Bourdieu's capital variables capture relevant political dynamics and accounts for much of the political variation across states that analysts currently use.



For example, California and Connecticut are within the same cluster, which would be conceptually feasible, as they are both progressive coastal states with similar ethnic foundations, particularly in the population flows from New England to California mentioned by Elazar.⁴⁶ The southern states of Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Texas, Virginia, and Georgia are similarly grouped. One would expect his effect given their common agricultural histories, Protestant

⁴⁶ Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives"; Elazar, *Cities of the Prairie* (1972)

religious heritage, and racial demographics.⁴⁷ The light blue states of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming share common frontier and ethnic histories. Including Indiana within light blue category underscores the strength of the Republican Party in the included states. The yellow states include a number of traditionally moderate states that are often *swing states* during presidential elections, including Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Missouri, Nevada, and Colorado. As such, one could attribute these groupings to largely split partisan dynamics among the voting population.

However, there are a number of states that potentially stand out as misplaced within the clustering model. These include the light purple states in which one finds such highly progressive states as Massachusetts, New York, and New Jersey, alongside their rural, conservative counterbalances of Utah and Montana. As such, it is difficult to conceptually group such politically and socially disparate states. In addition, Hawaii is grouped with the Carolinas and Tennessee. Hawaii, as a progressive, tourist-driven state has little in common with its fellow group members that are heavily agricultural and extractive. Concurrently, Louisiana and Alaska each have their own separate cluster categories, meaning that each state is itself a cluster.

Utility of The Capital Centered Map


The capital centered map demonstrates the significant and substantive differences between the states in terms of political culture. For instance, states that are similarly grouped in terms of the Electoral College and general cultural attributes (e.g. way of life, accent, religious impact). As such, the capital centered map shows that many of the political differences that analysts observe among the states are not solely the result of partisan differences and voter demographics. In effect, the capital centered map reifies using the Bourdieu-derived capital dimensions as a baseline for understanding political dynamics with respect to habitus and the

⁴⁷ *Ibid*

political field. While comprehensive, the map can be further refined by adding a series of variables that indicate habitus with respect to political questions as well as *political capital* in the form of political efficacy among individual citizens and state governments. In addition to the providing practical benefits, such variables follow Bourdieu's theoretical trajectory and are often used in political literature to differentiate political units.

Moreover, Bourdieu emphasizes approaching social questions in a dynamic, historical manner. For instance, Bourdieu underscores the importance of following historical trajectories in *The State Nobility*. Additionally, Bourdieu's class definition is "both a Durkheimian category of groups sharing experiences and collective representations and a Weberian notion of sets of actors attempting to monopolize markets for different goods and services." Thus, adding variables with respect to the state populations buttresses analysis in the Durkheimian style, while adding variables related to state bureaucracies is a Weberian exercise. I begin by adding the legacy of the Civil War, which was itself a severe juncture in political habitus in the form of national allegiance.

Map 3- Dimensions, Trust, Civil War



Adding the legacy of the Civil War regionalizes the clusters to a slight degree. On the whole, the clustering model yields expectable results. California and Oregon are paired with the Northeastern states. One would expect this given their progressive characters. Utah, Montana, The Dakotas, Nebraska, Colorado and Wyoming form a Rocky Mountain and Plains block. Their contiguity underscores their common histories as being part of the *American Frontier* which includes high rates of farming and ranching.

Nonetheless, there are states that potentially stand out as problematic. These include are Kansas, Idaho, and Kentucky in light purple and Hawaii in orange alongside Tennessee and the Carolinas. While Kentucky is a heavily Democratic state, its politics have leaned much more conservative in recent years.⁴⁸ The Democratic presidential nominee has not won Kentucky since 1996, and Mitch McConnell, the current Senate Majority Leader, hails from the state. Its contiguity with West Virginia and Ohio somewhat ameliorates the placement, at the very least in comparison to Idaho and Kansas, which are two of the most conservative states in the United States. Moreover, Louisiana and Alaska retain their own category designations in the current model.


Given these results, I surmised that it would be useful to add additional measures of *political habitus* and *political capital* that corresponded with economic and social conditions within states.⁴⁹ These included gross state product per capita, unionization, and population density. First, I turn to three analyses of the inputs of *Map 4*, each marked by the addition of one of the three additional measures of capital.

⁴⁸ Clinger et. al, *Kentucky Government, Politics, and Public Policy* (2013)

⁴⁹ I expand upon Bourdieu's creation of multiple capitals to theorize political capital, which refers to a resource that allows individuals are able to affect political dynamics and allows states to successfully meet their policy objectives. Similarly, I theorize political habitus as deeply ingrained dispositions to political behavior, encompassing such actions as voting, contributing to campaigns, allegiance to governments, and meeting with politicians.

Map 4- Dimensions, Trust, Civil War, GSP Per Capita

Adding gross state product rearranges the map, but does little to improve the interpretability of the clusters.



Many of the states of the Deep South form a contiguous block as a result of their Confederate heritage and current political dynamics. New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Minnesota are together in the orange category as well. This is a positive change, as the states share robust economies, common population flows, as indicated by Elazar, and progressive politics. The light purple states, which include Illinois, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Maine are all within the Northeastern quadrant of the country. They are all center-left states and are industry-driven, with the possible exception of Maine, which has an economy based largely on wood product extraction and agriculture.⁵⁰

Nonetheless, potentially problematic states include Washington in the light blue category, and California, Oregon, and Michigan in the red category. Washington is fairly progressive state


⁵⁰ <http://www.maine.gov/labor/cwri/publications/pdf/SizingUpMaine%27sEconomy.pdf> Accessed July 3rd, 2015.

that has a highly regarded technological infrastructure.⁵¹ While the eastern part of the state does resemble Idaho in topography, economics, and politics, the heavily populated Greater Seattle Metropolitan area is much more similar to California. The red category is too encompassing. California and Oregon are among the most progressive states in the country. While Michigan has periodic conservative jaunts, it is generally progressive as well. As a result, is impractical to categorize them with Utah, Idaho and Montana, the most conservative states of the Rocky Mountain region. Adding gross state product per capita also retains Louisiana and Alaska in their own distinct cluster designations.

Map 5- Dimensions, Trust, Civil War, Unionization


Using unionization in lieu of gross state product produces a strong set of clusters. The conservative plains and Rocky Mountain states form a contiguous block. This harkens back to their shared social, economic, and political histories. The red category pairs California, Oregon, and Minnesota with New York, New Jersey, and Massachusetts. This is a helpful development, as it groups most of the progressive states in the country together. The only potentially problematic state is Delaware in the blue category. The Carolinas and Tennessee remain a separate category from the rest of the South. Additionally, Louisiana, Alaska, and Hawaii each have their own categories.

⁵¹ Clayton and Novrich, *Governing Washington: Politics and Government in the Evergreen State* (2011)



Map 6- Dimensions, Trust, Civil War, Population Density


Replacing unionization with population density considerably adjusts the cluster distribution, predominately by limiting the explanatory power of the model. While, the conservative inner West remains in a single block and most of the South remains connected, the emergence of the cluster that is in the light blue category is problematic.



For instance, California, New York, and Minnesota are clustered with Kansas, Nebraska, and Utah. These states have markedly different political environments.⁵² Moreover, Alaska and Louisiana each remain individual cluster categories. In total, replacing unionization by population density does not improve the clustering process. Thus, it would not be prudent to select *Map 6* as the final map.

Based on the strength of the unionization clustering of *Map 5*, I decided to use that as a baseline and to probe the effects of adding an additional measure of political culture. First, I used gross state product per capita to effectively combine the unionization map with its forerunner. Then, I used population density in lieu of gross state product.

Map 7- Dimensions, Trust, Civil War, Unionization, GSP Per Capita




Combining the maps yields fascinating and intelligible clusters. The red category encompasses California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Minnesota along with Massachusetts, New York,

⁵² "Federal Elections 2004: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives", "Federal Elections 2008: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives", Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives"

New Jersey, and southern New England. This is an intuitive grouping in that it includes both the most urban and the most progressive states in the country. The light purple cluster is an effective corollary to the red cluster, as it includes the bulk of the center-left states such as Washington, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Maryland. Also, there are two ‘Heartland’ clusters with politically similar states.⁵³ The orange cluster includes the northern extractive states of North Dakota, South Dakota, and Wyoming. The blue states, while quite numerous, include a number of the contiguous, non-Southern conservative states. The only potentially problematic states are Vermont and Delaware in this category. Alaska and Louisiana maintain separate cluster designations. The South remains split into two versions, with Tennessee and the Carolinas retain their distinct cluster. Given these issues, I replaced gross state product per capita with population density.

Map 8- Dimensions, Trust, Civil War, Unionization, Population Density (Eight)



Replacing gross state product per capita with population density yielded the strongest map through this point of the process, as no states appear categorized in conceptually

⁵³ "Federal Elections 2012: Election Results for the U.S. President, the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives"

inappropriate clusters. *The South* is a unified block of former Confederate states and border states, with the sole exception of Louisiana. Minnesota, Vermont, New York, California, and Oregon form a *Great Progressive* cluster as they include the most progressive states in the country. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Jersey constitute smaller, urban Northeastern states. The Great Plains and Rocky Mountain states form a contiguous block of conservative, non-Southern states that are largely agricultural and extractive. Indiana and New Hampshire are within the same cluster, but they have similar political characteristics. The South is split into two categories- orange, which includes the Carolinas and Tennessee, and yellow, which includes all of the other states with Confederate influence, save Louisiana. Louisiana and Alaska maintain their own categorizations, likely because of their unique historical trajectories.

Analysis of cluster distances shows that the Carolinas and Tennessee, in orange, are very close to placement with the bulk of the other Southern states. The cluster distance between the two is only 2.783. The blue and red clusters are also very close, with a distance of 2.326. Yellow and light purple states are similarly close, with a distance of only 2.211, likely the result of their shared political conservatism. The clusters that are furthest apart are also the states that were separated from the others, Alaska and Louisiana. On the whole, the cluster model is successful in delineating political regions.

Table 2

Distances between Final Cluster Centers

Cluster	Blue	Alaska	Yellow	Louisiana	Red	Light Purple	Green	Orange
Blue		6.194	2.964	6.216	2.326	3.011	3.598	4.589
Alaska	6.194		6.386	8.730	5.853	5.886	7.212	6.599
Yellow	2.964	6.386		5.329	2.981	2.211	4.576	2.783
Louisiana	6.216	8.730	5.329		6.295	6.544	7.768	6.504
Red	2.326	5.853	2.981	6.295		2.443	3.185	4.129
Light Purple	3.011	5.886	2.211	6.544	2.443		4.278	3.912
Green	3.598	7.212	4.576	7.768	3.185	4.278		5.352
Orange	4.589	6.599	2.783	6.504	4.129	3.912	5.352	

Based on its success in forming state clusters, I decided to use the model of the Bourdieusian dimensions, trust, Civil War, unionization, and population density to produce the final Bourdieusian map. However, the balkanization of the South and the separation of Alaska still represented glaring challenges. Thus, I repeated this analysis using only seven categories.

Map 9- Dimensions, Trust, Civil War, Unionization, Population Density (Seven Clusters)

Reducing the number of clusters in the model to seven improves the results by enveloping the Carolinas and Tennessee under Southern states, yielding the strongest map of the process in that it corresponds with Elazar's previous map of American political culture, national election maps, and Garreau's cultural landscape. The majority of the states with Confederate influence, including both those that seceded and those with divided legacies, form a contiguous *Southern Tier* cluster. Southern New England and New Jersey form *The Foundry* of smaller, urban northeastern states. California, Oregon, Minnesota, New York, and Hawaii constitute a *Progressive USA*, as it is composed of the most progressive states in the country. The Rocky Mountain and Great Plains states with the *amber waves of grain* form the *American Heartland*. The green states in the map constitute politically moderate states heavily known for labor and extraction. As such, one may deem these states as the *Middle* states. Alaska and Louisiana retain

distinct cluster designations because of their unique historical backgrounds- Louisiana likely as a result of its French social and legal heritage⁵⁴ and Alaska in terms of its isolation from the contiguous forty-eight states.




Table 3

<i>Distances between Final Cluster Centers</i>							
Cluster	Blue	Alaska	Yellow	Louisiana	Red	Light Purple	Green
Blue		6.375	3.560	5.427	4.862	2.528	2.929
Alaska	6.375		5.894	8.730	7.212	5.877	6.091
Yellow	3.560	5.894		6.612	3.210	2.717	2.211
Louisiana	5.427	8.730	6.612		7.768	6.503	5.905
Red	4.862	7.212	3.210	7.768		4.154	3.488
Light Purple	2.528	5.877	2.717	6.503	4.154		2.255
Green	2.929	6.091	2.211	5.905	3.488	2.255	


Further analysis of cluster distances reiterates the proximity of the southern states with the Plains states, sharing conservative trends. The green states of the *Middle* are relatively close

⁵⁴ As of 2016, much of Louisiana state law retains influence from Napoleonic legal code, which stands in contrast with the British Common Law tradition that characterizes the US Constitution and the vast majority of state constitutions. Nonetheless, the French Napoleonic legacy is quickly dissipating at the hands of political convergence.

to the blue states (2.929), the yellow states (2.211), and the light purple states (2.255). On the whole, the cluster of seven categories is an improvement upon the model. In the interest of observing the effects, I repeated the analysis using five categories.

Map 10 - Dimensions, Trust, Civil War, Unionization, Population Density (Five Clusters)

I also explored Further reduction of the chart to include only five clusters, which produces contiguous, regional blocks; however, the intelligibility of the blocks is weak as the chart makes clear..



This effect is most evident in the red category, which loses most of its utility in the model, as it conjoins Minnesota and Vermont with Utah, Wyoming, and Idaho. Such a grouping is problematic given the gaps in progressivity and political behavior among the states. The combination of progressive and conservative states renders the red category an essential middle ground between the progressive yellow states and the conservative light blue states in the South. This effect is most clearly expressed in the cluster distances of 2.456 and 2.482 from the yellow and light blue states, respectively.


Table 4

Distances between Final Cluster Centers

Cluster	Louisiana	Alaska	Yellow	Light Blue	Red
Louisiana		8.730	6.566	5.427	6.280
Alaska	8.730		6.285	6.375	5.799
Yellow	6.566	6.285		3.607	2.456
Light Blue	5.427	6.375	3.607		2.482
Red	6.280	5.799	2.456	2.482	

Final Revised Bourdieusian Map

I ultimately selected a straightforward simplification of *Map 9* as the final map of Bourdieusian political cultures. I made the slight modification of including as a blue Southern state for two reasons. One is that Louisiana has a relatively low cluster distance of 5.427 from the Southern region. The second reason is that Louisiana has good face validity as a Southern state grouped together with the states, and territories of the Confederacy. I retained Alaska's lone designation because its cluster distances were slightly higher, and it would not be clear where it would socially match given its isolated historical and social environment. The final map is below.



The contiguity of states in most of the clusters leads credence to the premise that states may be grouped as political regions based on common historical trajectories and current conditions. All of the states of the Southern tier, including Arizona and New Mexico, as former border states, are together. The Great Plains and inner mountain West form a solid block, as their frontier and agricultural legacies bind them. Southern New England and New Jersey, all small states that function more as municipal forms of government when compared to larger states constitute a cluster. New York and California, which are often referred to as *The Coasts* in colloquial parlance are together as one would anticipate. Alaska, in nearly poetic homage to its individualist ethos, stands alone.

Considered in unison, one may consider Bourdieu's conceptualizations of capital as the bedrock by which one can categorize subnational political units, largely as a result of the map's broad similarity to political and culture maps found in social commentary. Moreover, this suggests that Bourdieusian capital in terms of state development captures the same underlying dynamics as those identified in other contexts. Refining the process in the Weberian and Durkheimian parlance produces more context specific results through incorporating additional variables that correspond with historically produced political habitus and capital, thereby usefully differentiating units. In the case of the United States, adding the Civil War, which was the most consequential political development after the Revolution, unionization, a principal political economic manifestation of industrialization, and population density, a key differentiation of states in Alesina and Glaser's (2004) important work on U.S. politics and political culture, creates a useful map by which one can identify American states in the twenty-first century.

The final map largely reflects contemporary political dynamics with respect to partisanship and cultural differentiation by region. On balance, this similarity is a strength of the map as an analytical tool for understanding American politics in that it builds upon a conceptually useful base map of capital to create an even more intelligible map with political indicators that correspond with habitus and political capital in the Bourdieusian parlance.

Paths for Future Inquiry

While the final revised Bourdieusian map is a useful categorization of states and regions within the United States, time and research constraints have limited a number of conceptually fruitful paths of inquiry. More specifically, I was compelled to focus on broader dynamics while curtailing focus on state outliers and potentially disjointed clusters in creating the map. One instance of such a hidden dynamic was seen from the original capital-centered map. The map linked Florida with Ohio, Pennsylvania, Nevada, and Colorado. Subsequent maps separated these states, but doing so may discount elements that draw them together such as some common thread that makes them swing states in general elections. Cultural dynamics may also be present with Florida's initial grouping with non-Southern states, potentially resulting from recent settlement patterns from the northern part of the country. The grouping of Hawaii with the Carolinas and Tennessee may speak to similarities in government function irrespective of population flows or common histories.

While adding the Civil War to the capital-centered map, I the placement of states change, though not to a large degree. One case that stands out most strongly is Missouri, which becomes clustered with many of the Southern states. Missouri may be considered a transitional state in the sense that it had slavery through 1865 and divided loyalty during the Civil War, while it is often identified as a Midwestern state. Movement of the state may exemplify some of the practical

limitations of placing states within individual clusters. In-depth analysis of such transitional states is in order for subsequent studies.

As I refined the map, I came across states linked because of considerable influence from variables that I added with each step. For instance, adding GSP per capita brings California, Montana, Idaho, Vermont, and Utah together. The states are not politically or socially similar enough to be grouped together in the final model, but their common clustering indicates that they have a degree of economic similarity that transcends traditional political limitations. A similar event occurs when I replace GSP with unionization, as West Virginia is placed with Minnesota, Ohio, and Michigan. This grouping underscores the fact that specific indicators of political dynamics within states vary considerably because of the idiosyncratic dynamics within the states. It is this fact that, at once, necessitates including multiple political measures for classification and serves as an additional overlooked political process.

The final revised Bourdieusian map may lose the dynamic that links New Hampshire with the Plains states. Perhaps of the strongest notes are Louisiana and Alaska, which were naturally within their own cluster categories. I placed Louisiana with its surrounding states because in-depth analysis shows that it exemplifies traits that typify the states in the Southern culture, though to a greater degree. The specific reasons for Louisiana's southern fortification must be studied in more detail in future studies, likely incorporating historical analysis, qualitative analysis, and general process tracing.

Chapter 5
Validating and Contextualizing Revised Bourdieusian
Maps of American Political Culture

In this chapter, I analyze ideology in an attempt to assess the extent to which the map's clusters correspond with measures such as conventional measures of political polity orientations, partisanship and ideology as well as to assess the extent to which the clusters capture distinction in political culture in the American states. To do this, I regress measures of political culture and ideology on the clusters. To obtain a summary measure of political culture, conventionally regarded, I conduct factor analysis of the separate measures and use factor scores for the principal extracted factor – in fact, a “principal component”—as the summary measure.

I conducted all linear regressions with dependent variables expressed as deviations from their means and with intercepts suppressed. This provides an elegant interpretation for slope estimates for particular cluster categories. Each slope for a category may be interpreted to tell us how much greater (if positive) or less (if negative) a category's mean value on the dependent political-cultural variables is, given the mean value for the average state. (This is true for regressions predicting the summary, factor-score measure of political culture/ideology as this is already expressed in Z-score form and, as z-scores, is inherently in deviation-from-mean form.) The regressions are regressions of political cultural measures on both (a) the revised Bourdieusian clusters derived from Bourdieusian measures of political culture and such additional state development characteristics as Civil War legacies and (b) capital centered Bourdieusian clusters. Regression informs us of two things: how well a categorization of states predicts political culture ideology conventionally regarded and how well clusters look in terms of such cultural-ideological characteristics. They also help us assess the relative merits of a conception of political culture based purely on Bourdieusian capital conceptions and measures as well as a conception elaborated in terms of some key historically and institutionally specific aspects of the American States.

Measures of Ideology

I used a series of measures that traditionally quantify ideology, encompassing the percentage self-identified conservatives, ideological scores for state congressional delegations, the percentage of citizens who self-identify as democrats or leaning democratic, the percentage of citizens in the state who support gay marriage, the percentage of democrats in the state congressional delegation, and the percentage of the state population who self-identifies as “very religious.”⁵⁵ The measures cover a diverse range of phenomena, from ideological self-identification, party identification and representative behavior through interpretation of interpersonal morality to and metaphysical belief systems. As such, they provide a robust toolkit for assessing the intricacies of political orientation.

I obtained data on self-identified conservatism, party identification, and religiosity from the Gallup’s *State of the States* (2014) survey. The instrument engages a random sample of 176,702 adults, aged 18 and older, with fifty percent of the responses coming from mobile devices. Ideological scores for the congressional delegations come from Poole and Rosenthal’s legislator estimates from the 112th Congress, which ran from January 3, 2011 until January 3, 2013.⁵⁶ The ideological score assigns a point value to each legislator based on the conservatism of their voting record. A neutral score is 0, while a negative score is progressive, and a positive score is more conservative. For the purposes of the current analysis, I utilized only their first dimension, which focuses primarily on economic and social welfare issues such as taxes and Social Security.⁵⁷ To obtain the scores, I averaged the ideological scores for the legislators within

⁵⁵ Almond and Verba (1963), Green and Guth (1988), Poole and Rosenthal (2007), Campbell and Monson (2008)

⁵⁶ I analyzed the House of Representatives alone because two senators per state are not numerous enough to be analytically valuable, which is exacerbated by the lack of turnover in the body. Adding the senators to the congressional delegation would also be unrepresentative because of the technical and symbolic differences between statewide and local elected positions. <http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm>

⁵⁷ Poole and Rosenthal’s second dimension focuses on Civil Rights issues. The authors have noted that the second dimension has largely disappeared as a consequential element of national politics, but it is quite valuable in

each state. Information on the percentage of democrats in the congressional delegation comes from the same data set. The percentage in favor of gay marriage comes from a 2013 report by the Williams Institute on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Law and Public Policy at UCLA that combines multiple state-level surveys for comprehensive measures.⁵⁸

Factor Analysis

I conducted Principal Component Analysis to observe whether measures such as percent in support of gay marriage and percent religious would produce an ideological component reflective of cultural or *collective* conservatism, while the other measures would conceivably produce a measure of economic, *individualistic* conservatism. The model does not produce such measures, as indicated in Table A.

Table 5: Factor Analysis of Political Ideology

	Component 1
Percent Conservative	.945
Poole Ideology Score	.908
Delegation Percent Democratic	-.892
Percent Support Gay Marriage	-.886
Percent Democrat or Lean Democrat	-.834
Percent “Very Religious”	.765

Principal component analysis yields only one component, with convincingly high loadings for each measure of ideology. Percent conservative has the highest correlation, at .945, followed by the Poole ideology loading at .908. Measures with negative loadings with relation to the aforementioned variables include the delegation’s democratic percentage, support for gay marriage, and democratic self-identification. It is conceivable that such measures would load

explaining the cleavage between *Dixiecrats* and Democrats from other regions in Congress through most of the twentieth century, up until the Reagan administration (2007).

⁵⁸ *Public Support for Marriage for Same-sex Couples by State* <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/5640q32g>

negatively, as the partisan realignment of the 1970s and 1980s brought conservative Southern Democrats into the Republican Party, and religious evangelicals began Republican activism during the same period. Thus, those who are conservative are less likely to self-identify as Democrats and less likely to vote for Democratic or progressive candidates, while they would be more likely to oppose gay marriage. In tandem, the single component extracted from the data reflects one form of ideology- an all encompassing conservatism. The schism between cultural conservatives and economic conservatives has melded in the current era, as the two appear synonymous. Analysis of the clusters' factor scores helps contextualize the data

Factor Scores of Clusters

I conducted regressions on clusters and their factor scores to compare the degree to which each set of clusters can predict the component scores and to gain information on how much given cluster categories deviate from component-score means for clusters. (For example we would expect South-centered clusters to be above “conservatism” means and Pacific-centered (or Northeast-centered) clusters to be well below “conservatism” means.) For the reader's convenience and ease in interpreting regression results, I included the following summaries of state cluster:

Revised Bourdieusian Cluster States

Progressive 1- CA, HI, ME, MN, NY, OR, VT

Progressive 2- CT, MA, NJ, RI

Heartland- CO, DE, IA, ID, IN, KS, MT, ND, NE, NH, SD, UT, WY

Middle- IL, KY, MD, MI, MO, NV, OH, PA, WA, WI, WV

South- AL, AR, AZ, FL GA, LA, MS, NC, NM, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA

Alaska

Capital Centered Cluster States

Northeastern- CT, IL, MD, ME, PA, RI

Plains- DE, IN, MT, ND, NE, NH, SD, UT, WY

General American- AR, CA, IA, ID, KS, KY, MI, MA, MN, NJ, NM, NY, OH, OR, WI, WV, VT

Southern- AL, AZ, CO, GA, FL, (LA), MO, MS, NV, OK, TX, VA, WA

Carolinas and Tennessee- HI, NC, SC, TN
Alaska

Table 6: Regression of Factor Scores on Cluster Categories

Panel A: Revised Bourdieusian Cluster Factor Scores

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		
		B	t	Sig.
1	Alaska	.377	.601	.551
	Progressive 1	-1.293	-5.454	.000
	Progressive 2	-1.541	-4.913	.000
	Heartland	.512	2.941	.005
	Middle	-.137	-.724	.473
	South	.692	4.129	.000
Adjusted R-square		.598		

Panel B: Capital Centered Cluster Factor Scores

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		
		B	t	sig
1	Alaska	.377	.425	.673
	Louisiana	1.195	1.346	.185
	Southern	.368	1.436	.158
	Carolinas and Tennessee	.178	.402	.690
	Plains	.576	1.946	.058
	General American	-.314	-1.457	.152
	Northeastern	-1.092	-3.013	.004
Adjusted-R-square		.196		

Factor score regressions produce anticipated measures in both the new cluster conceptualizations as well as those created by using Bourdieusian capital variables alone. With respect to the new clusters, average factor scores are the highest for the states within the South cluster, as the average factor score is .692. (Technically, the South's 0.692 slope estimate denotes how much greater the new cluster factor score is for the South than for the average state; but as the score sets that all-state average at zero the South's 0.692 score is the South's average

factor score.) Concurrently, the lowest factor score means are found in the Progressive 1 and Progressive 2 clusters. Within the capital centered clusters, the Northeastern cluster has the lowest mean factor score of -1.092, and the highest is held by Louisiana (1.195), while the other Southern-tier states simultaneously obtain a high mean factor score. As a result of the high factor score means, one can anticipate that clusters in the Southern part of the country- South in the new clusters and Southern, Carolinas and Tennessee, and Louisiana in the capital centered clusters- will have higher means for the ideological variables in the component, connoting greater conservatism. Factor score mean significance levels buttress this interpretation in the new clusters, as the significance stands at less than .001 for the South cluster. Significance levels are much more modest in the capital centered model, at .158 (Southern), .185 (Louisiana), and .690 (Carolinas and Tennessee). While none of the measures fall below the .05 alpha level, they nonetheless reinforce the findings of the unified South category that I created.

Conversely, the factor score regression indicates that states in the Northeast and Pacific regions, which include Progressive 1 and Progressive 2 in the new clusters and Northeastern in the capital centered model, will have means lower than the average for the variables within the component. Progressive 1 and Progressive 2 in the new cluster model means both obtain significance levels below .001, and the capital centered Northeastern cluster mean of -1.092 obtains a significance level of .004, which is below the requisite alpha level. As a result, there is strong evidence in favor of clusters in the Northeast and Pacific coast obtaining means below the national averages for component measures of ideology. In order to further delve into the matter, I observed cluster patterns for each ideological variable by conducting a series of regressions.

Cluster Ideological Variable Regressions

I compared political orientation across regions in greater detail by analyzing deviations from the mean for each measure of ideology. I conducted linear regressions and suppressed the intercepts to obtain cluster averages of deviations from the mean. I begin with conservative self-identification and conclude with the percentage that is very religious. For each measure, I commence with the novel clusters that I created using Bourdieusian measures of political culture along with the additional measures. Then, I contrast them with the seven clusters brought about from solely using Bourdieusian measures. It is through this process that one contrasts different clusters in terms of ideology, while simultaneously observing the effects of adding additional measures of capital. Because the inputs differ, states included in each region are not a precise match, though they may largely cover the same regions. Names for many of the clusters are similar as a result.

Conservatism and Partisan Ideology

I begin with the variables that connote deviations in self-ascribed conservatism and partisan ideology. These include measures of the percentage of individuals who call themselves conservative, the percentage of House members who are democrats from the states comprising the clusters, the percentage of the population that are Democrats or Lean Democratic, and the degree of conservatism in the House members representing the state.

Table 7: Regressions of Conservatism and Partisan Ideology on Revised Bourdieusian Clusters

Cluster	Conservatism		% House Democratic		% Democratic		House Conservatism	
	B	Sig	B	Sig	B	Sig	B	Sig
Alaska	-1.380 (-.355)	.724	-41.124 (-1.882)	.066	-6.706 (-1.490)	.143	.273 (1.236)	.223
Progressive 1	-6.023 (-4.097)	.000	40.505 (4.905)	.000	5.594 (3.289)	.002	-.456 (-5.457)	.000
Progressive 2	-8.055 (-4.142)	.000	48.151 (4.408)	.000	7.444 (3.308)	.002	-.547 (-4.953)	.000
Heartland	2.135 (1.980)	.054	-20.393 (-3.366)	.002	-5.552 (-4.448)	.000	.245 (4.004)	.000
Middle	-.898 (-.766)	.448	-.688 (-.104)	.917	2.894 (2.133)	.039	-.012 (-.187)	.853
South	4.134 (3.977)	.000	-11.595 (-1.986)	.053	-1.563 (-1.300)	.200	.147 (2.483)	.017
Adj. R-square	.492		.530		.468		.590	

Table 8: Regressions of Conservatism and Partisan Ideology on Capital Centered Clusters

Cluster	Conservatism		% House Democratic		% Democratic		House Conservatism	
	B	Sig	B	Sig	B	Sig	B	Sig
Alaska	-1.380 (-.272)	.787	-41.124 (-1.466)	.150	-6.706 (-1.275)	.209	.273 (.890)	.379
Louisiana	8.720 (1.720)	.093	-26.824 (-.956)	.344	1.494 (.284)	.778	.293 (.955)	.345
Southern	2.095 (1.432)	.159	-9.799 (-1.210)	.233	-1.206 (-.794)	.431	.110 (1.238)	.222
Carolinas and Tennessee	1.045 (.412)	.682	7.051 (.503)	.618	.794 (.302)	.764	-.012 (-.078)	.938
Plains	2.409 (1.426)	.161	-22.613 (-2.418)	.020	-5.984 (-3.414)	.001	.252 (2.463)	.018
General American	-1.674 (-1.362)	.180	9.041 (1.329)	.191	1.759 (1.379)	.175	-.111 (-1.485)	.145
Northeastern	-4.980 (-2.407)	.020	34.526 (3.015)	.004	6.744 (3.142)	.003	-.370 (-2.956)	.005
Adj. R-square	.137		.225		.274		.210	

Percent who self-identify as conservative

The measures of self-identification of conservatism in the new clusters generally split in a conceivable fashion, with an adjusted R Square value of .492. Progressive 1 and Progressive 2 both convincingly deviate below the mean, with negative deviations of 6.023 and 8.055. They also obtain significance levels below .001. Heartland, which includes states such as Kansas and Montana is above the national average, as would be anticipated given the political behavior of the residents. Its significance level stands at .054, which is marginally above the .05 alpha. The South, encompassing all of the former Confederate states in the Southern tier of the country exhibits the most positive deviation in self-identification of conservatism, standing at 4.134 percent above the mean with a significance level below .001. Alaska is surprisingly below the national mean. The Republican Party has performed exceptionally well in the state for the past five decades, as the last Democratic presidential nominee to carry the state was President Lyndon Johnson in 1964.⁵⁹ This intimates that there could be a substantive gap between ideology and partisanship within certain parts of the country. I discuss partisanship in more detail in a subsequent section for the our.

Analyzing the revised Bourdieusian clusters is an imperfect match, as the cluster memberships vary. Specifically, the adjusted R-square for this cluster is only 0.137 as compared with the 0.492 R-square for the revised Bourdieusian cluster. Nonetheless, it is instructive to observe the different regions of the revised Bourdieusian clusters and their effectiveness in analyzing differences cross-region differences for ideological measures. For instance, the states in the Southern cluster of the revised Bourdieusian model are still higher than the national average for percent who identify as conservative. The Carolinas and Tennessee, which are part of the South in the new model are higher than average as well. Additionally, the Northeastern

⁵⁹ <http://ballotpedia.org/Alaska>

states, encompassing a series of states in the northeastern quadrant of the country, deviate below the mean to the greatest extent among the clusters. It is also worth noting that the Plains are nearly the same group of states as the Heartland cluster in the new model. As a result, the 2.409 percent deviation in the Plains cluster of the revised Bourdieusian model eclipses the Heartland deviation (2.135) by only 0.274 percent. One must note, however, that the explanatory power of the Bourdieusian model is weakened a great deal, from .492 to .137. Moreover, the significance levels for the clusters are all above .05, with the exception of the Northeastern cluster. I added Louisiana to the bulk of the Southern states in an attempt to replicate my addition of the state to the South cluster in the new model. Louisiana has an extreme deviation of conservatism, so its addition alone increases the Southern deviation from the mean by .51 percent, from 2.095 to 2.605.

Differences from the mean in self-identified conservatism varied in anticipated ways. The revised Bourdieusian clusters are similar enough to the new clusters to produce near synonymy in the Plains and, to a lesser extent the South and Northeast. This match produced similar slope estimates (i.e., differences in deviations from all-state means) for self-identified conservatism, although these differences tend to be statistically insignificant for revised Bourdieusian clusters. Areas of particular note are Louisiana and Alaska. Louisiana is remarkable because of its high deviation from the national mean, while Alaska is illuminated because of the converse, pushing the question of partisanship to the foray.

Percentage who self-identify as Democrat or Lean Democratic

The new clusters demonstrate that Democratic identification varies as a function of cluster residence. In a testament to their monikers, Progressive 1 and Progressive 2 have the highest rate of democratic identification, followed by the Middle cluster of the Great Lakes and

Southern Midwest states. The Heartland has a low amount of Democratic identification, deviating from the national mean by 5.552 percent. The significance levels for each measure are all below .04 as well, fortifying the veracity of the findings.

Clusters that stand out are the South and Alaska. Although the South is by far the most conservative region of the country, as indicated by the previous regression on conservative self-identification, it is only the third most Republican, trailing the Heartland (-5.552) and Alaska (-6.706). Alaska is noteworthy in that it has the strongest Republican identification in the country, yet its conservative identification is below the mean. The combination of these effects indicates that partisanship and political ideology- in terms of progressivism and conservatism- may be decoupled in these areas.

In the South, the dynamic of the *Dixiecrat* may still survive in that people identify as a Democrats despite socially and economically conservative views. Poole and Rosenthal's (2007) analysis of Congressional vote patterns shows that the Civil Rights dimension of roll call votes which distinguished Southern Democrats from the national party has lost its significance, as basic questions of minority rights largely have been settled among legislators. Perhaps state party apparatuses have retained their strength while forging identities distinct from the National Democratic Party. Further inquiry is necessary. In the case of Alaska, the opposite effect may be at hand, as a population that does not overwhelmingly identify as conservative is the most Republican-identified cluster. Significance levels for the clusters are quite high, .143 (Alaska) and .200 (South) potentially mitigating the results. Nonetheless, analysis of Bourdieusian clusters further elucidates this phenomenon.

The clusters that used Bourdieusian variables alone add further detail to the Southern partisanship dynamic, as they show that Louisiana and the Carolinas and Tennessee clusters

positively deviate from the mean of Democratic identification. Louisiana deviates from the mean by 1.494, while the Carolinas and Tennessee cluster deviates by .794. One must note that the latter includes the state of Hawaii, which is both a regional and cultural mismatch; however, it is unlikely that the cluster's deviation would change dramatically in the opposite direction were one to remove the state, as it is only one of three.

While Louisiana and the Carolinas and Tennessee demonstrate a decoupling of partisanship and conservatism, the same effect does not hold true for the entire Southern region, as it actually negatively deviates from the mean with the third lowest value of -1.206. However, the significance level for the Southern cluster is .431, and Louisiana and the Carolinas and Tennessee obtain substantially high significance levels of .778 and .764, respectively. Thus, further analysis must take place. Additionally, the adjusted R square for the new clusters is .468, while it is only .274 for the Bourdieusian clusters alone, continuing the trend of the new clusters having greater explanatory power.

Having discussed the ideological self-identification of the clusters' citizens, along with their partisan identities, the question of their voting patterns comes into play. Most notable is the question of what parties receive the citizens' votes. Given the decoupling in previous regressions, it is not extremely compelling intuitively that individuals would vote for representatives that share their ideologies or political parties, as other factors might be at play. The results of such an analysis follow.

Percentage of Democrats in Congressional Delegation

Deviations from the mean of Democratic representatives in the congressional delegations vary dramatically, as five out of the six new clusters have double digit deviations. In a nod to its name, the *Middle* cluster of the southern Midwest has the lowest deviation, a mere .688 below the mean, significant only at the 0.917 level level. The Progressive clusters positively deviate by over 40 percent, showing a consistency in their partisanship, conservatism, and their voting patterns. Their significance levels further buttress this consistency, as they stand below .001. The Heartland regions also displays this effect. The Heartland region negatively deviates from the mean by 20.393 percentage points, which the second lowest deviation, but perhaps the most conceptually meaningful, as Alaska has a larger difference but its low population grants it only one representative in the US House of Representatives. The South negatively deviates by only 11.595 percentage point. Although this is a non-trivial difference that is significant at the 0.053 level it belies the strong conservatism indicated by survey respondents. This provides evidence that the relationship between conservatism and party affiliation is weak, perhaps weakest, in the Southern region. The overall statistical model is fairly strong, as the adjusted R square is .530, which is much higher than the .225 adjusted R square for the Bourdieusian model. Nonetheless, supplementary analysis using the Bourdieusian model strengthens its key insights. The Bourdieusian model's particular value with respect to state Congressional delegations highlights the Southern political dissonance with respect to the Democratic Party. More specifically, it reinforces the stark differences in partisan affiliation of representatives from different areas, and it shows a weaker deviation from the national average than one would anticipate given the conservatism of the region.

Louisiana has the second lowest percentage of Democratic representatives, as indicated by the deviations below, with a value of 26.824 percent. This stands in dramatic contrast with the percentage of Louisiana residents who identify as Democrats, which is higher than the national mean. This schism means that although Louisiana is more Democratic than the average cluster, its citizens vote overwhelmingly for Republican candidates at the national level. This stands in slight contrast with the Carolinas and Tennessee cluster which has Democratic Party affiliation that is near the mean but has a greater than average percentage of Democrats in Congress and, concurrently, has a higher than average percentage of conservative-identified individuals. Much like the previous variable, findings with respect to House representation are tempered by the significance levels for each cluster, which obtain values above .05 for all except the Plains (.02) and Northeastern (.004).

I have grappled with political orientations of individuals who live within clusters and the effects of their voting behaviors in the form of the partisanship of their representatives. The behaviors of their Congressional representatives are likely most politically consequential, as they would affect policy matters. As a result, voters may decide whether to retain an officeholder or replace them based on the merits of their votes. Thus far, I have shown schisms between partisanship and ideology among individuals. It is important to ascertain whether this dynamic follows in the manner in which clusters are represented in Washington. For instance, are citizens in the Southern region voting for Republicans who happen to be moderates, effectively obviating the impetus to vote based on party identification? I address such a question in the following section.

Poole Congressional Delegation Conservatism

Poole and Rosenthal's legislative scores analyze the economic conservatism of US House members' roll call votes. The higher a legislator's score, the more conservative they are, while conversely, the lower the score, the more progressive they are. Within the new clusters, Progressive 2, encompassing southern New England and New Jersey has the most progressive legislators in Congress, as their representatives' ideology scores fall .547 below the mean. Progressive 2 is followed by Progressive one with a deviation of .456 below. The highest score came from the representative from Alaska, whose score was .273 for the 112th Congress. This indicates that there is considerable gap between the conservatism of Alaskan citizens and the policy aims espoused by their Washington representation. In accord with its Congressional partisanship and, to a lesser extent its citizens' conservatism, the South positively deviates from the mean. The model is convincingly strong as well, posting an adjusted R square value of .59 and significance levels below .05 for all clusters except Alaska (.223) and Middle (.853). Analysis of the revised Bourdieusian clusters underscores these findings, although House measure's R-square is much lower than that for the revised Bourdieusian clusters (0.21 versus 0.59).

The revised Bourdieusian clusters indicate that Louisiana's Congressional delegation is the most conservative in that the state has the highest positive deviation in Poole and Rosenthal's ideology scores. This follows the party dissonance trend, as Louisiana citizens are also more Democratic than average. The Southern states in the Bourdieusian model positively deviate much like in the new model, but the Carolinas and Tennessee cluster shows greater progressivism among its representatives than one would expect. However, one must keep in mind that Hawaii is also a member of the cluster, and were it not for the state, the conservatism

ideology score would positively deviate from the norm. The capital center model, while of value in contextualizing the data, is particularly weak in its explanatory value. The adjusted R square is only .210 and the significance level is above .05 for all clusters except Northeastern (.005) and Plains (.018).

Having covered measures that constitute direct political variables, I have observed most clusters falling along expected patterns, with the most notable exceptions occurring in the South and Alaska. These exceptions involve apparent contradictions between their partisan identifications, conservatism, and those who represent them in Washington. Such schisms, in tandem with the need to expand ideology beyond the circumscribed political realm, require me to analyze sociocultural measures of ideology. These include religiosity and support for legalizing gay marriage.

Social Conservatism

In this section, I provide regressions of measures of social conservatism on the clusters. The measures of social conservatism include the percentage of the population that describes themselves as being 'very religious' as well as the percentage of the population that supports the legalization of gay marriage.

Table 9: Regression of Social Conservatism on Revised Bourdieusian

Cluster	% Very Religious		% Support Gay Marriage	
	B	Sig	B	Sig
Alaska	-5.666 (-.866)	.391	2.620 (.502)	.618
Progressive 1	-10.280 (-4.159)	.000	8.191 (4.150)	.000
Progressive 2	-8.266 (-2.528)	.015	10.370 (3.971)	.000
Heartland	-.166 (-.092)	.927	-.380 (-.262)	.794
Middle	-1.275 (-.647)	.521	-.289 (-.184)	.855
South	9.063 (5.185)	.000	-6.666 (-4.775)	.000
Adj. R-square	.478		.501	

Table 10: Regression of Social Conservatism on Capital Centered Clusters

Cluster	% Very Religious		% Support Gay Marriage	
	B	Sig	B	Sig
Alaska	-5.666 (-.649)	.520	2.620 (.377)	.708
Louisiana	14.334 (1.643)	.108	-12.380 (-1.779)	.082
Southern	3.284 (1.304)	.199	-2.797 (-1.393)	.171
Carolinas and Tennessee	6.084 (1.395)	.170	-3.880 (-1.115)	.271
Plains	.356 (.122)	.903	-.936 (-.403)	.689
General American	-2.354 (-1.113)	.272	1.502 (.890)	.378
Northeastern	-5.933 (-1.666)	.103	6.953 (2.448)	.019
Adj. R-square	.071		.114	

Percent who identify as “very religious”

I analyzed religiosity by comparing clusters by the degree to which Gallup survey respondents indicated that they are “very religious.” While such a phrase is ambiguous in terms of orthodoxy, the overwhelming Christianity of the United States⁶⁰ indicates that one may consider “very religious” as an effective proxy for *very Christian*. In terms of the new clusters, the Progressive 1 cluster, which includes New York, California, and Oregon is the least “very religious” cluster. Progressive 2 follows, as it is 8.266 percent below the mean. Both progressive clusters have strong significance levels, standing at less than .001 for Progressive 1 and .015 for Progressive 2. Alaska and the Heartland are noteworthy in their collective lack of religiosity. The two clusters heavily non-Democratic and vote for conservative representatives, yet their religiosity is lower than the mean, particularly in the case of Alaska, which is the third least religious cluster. These differences are nonetheless slightly mitigated by the high significance levels, .391 in for Alaska and .927 for the Heartland.

The religiosity of the South is stark, as its deviation is 9.063 percent above the average, representing the only cluster with a value above the average. (Significance here is high attaining the 0.001 test level). It is difficult to understate the degree to which this difference stands in contrast with the other clusters. Given the effects of religious orthodoxy on social and cultural discourse, it is highly conceivable that religiosity accounts for much of the divergent political dynamics in the region. The Bourdieusian model further contextualizes this difference.

With respect to the Bourdieusian clusters, all in what constitutes the southern part of the country positively deviate from the mean. The Carolinas and Tennessee deviate by 6.084, while the Southern cluster positively deviates by 3.284. Louisiana is the strongest exemplar of high religiosity, as it has a positive deviation of 14.334 percent from the mean. It is noteworthy that

⁶⁰ <http://religions.pewforum.org/reports>

Louisiana shows this effect, as the state also has the most dramatic gap between conservatism and partisanship. This suggests that religiosity may disproportionately influence political orientation with respect to national issues. National issues such as abortion and gay marriage may elicit negative voting responses as a result of religious scripture, while local issues would allow a more progressive policy desire. I cover the issue of gay marriage in the next section. The adjusted R square is exceptionally low for the Bourdieusian model (.071) and the significance levels for all of the variables fail to attain the .05 level, while the new cluster model obtains an adjusted R square of .478. This provides especially strong support for the conclusion that we should stress the revised Bourdieusian clusters far more than the capital centered one.

Percent who support gay marriage

At initial glance, support for gay marriage appears to be a solely religious matter. However, opposition to the practice more broadly indicates the extent to which an individual would allow the government to formulate moral standards and enforce them onto the population. It essentially bespeaks the chasm between a superordinate government that creates culture and one that aims to enforce laws that ensure the basic welfare of individuals. Analysis of the new clusters for their support for gay marriage generally supports this assumption. While Progressive 1 and 2 show the highest support for gay marriage legalization, Alaska has the third highest; it positively deviates from the mean by 2.62 percent. This suggests a potential libertarian dynamic in Alaskan politics in the fashion described by Alesina's (2004) depiction of conservatism in the American Frontier that is based on individualism. Findings for the state are only tempered by a .618 significance level. The South has the lowest percent in favor of gay marriage legalization, falling short of the mean by 6.666 percent. It is noteworthy that the South is the only cluster to negatively deviate by a substantial degree, an effect in large part due to its religiosity. It also has

a significance level below .001. The overall model has a moderately strong adjusted R square of .501.

The capital centered model reiterates the findings of the new model, as the Northeastern cluster shows the highest degree of support for legalizing gay marriage, reiterating the findings in the new model for Progressive 1 and Progressive 2. The Carolinas and Tennessee show a great deal of opposition, as the mean for the cluster is 3.88 percent below the mean. However, the significance level is .689. Louisiana has the lowest support for gay marriage. The state deviates from the mean by 12.38 percent, likely a testament to the strong religiosity in the state. Despite the similarities with the new model, the Bourdieusian model has weak explanatory power, as the adjusted R square is only .114, which is a decline of .387. Moreover, the only cluster with a significance level below .05 is Northeastern.

In this chapter, I provided additional information on the clusters with respect to ideology. Through the process, I uncovered not only the ideological differences underpinning cluster designation. I also observed patterns of political behavior and identity that are not apparent in data that describes actions of state or federal bureaucracies. For instance, the apparent contradictions in conservatism and party identification indicate a larger question of what to make of deviations of ideological identity from partisan identity, most especially for the case of the South where this divergence is most pronounced. Again, R-square for the capital centered clusters is very low (.114), compared to .501 for the new cluster model.

Interestingly, results for both religious variables highlight the libertarian ethos of Alaskan political culture and its inveterate incongruence with mainstream Republicanism, contrasted by the religiously-guided political milieu of the South. More importantly, completing scrutiny of the social conservative, religious measures reveals this striking pattern: To focus on the revised

Bourdieuian clusters for which the pattern is sharpest, the South and Heartland vie for the status of most conservative or – to use a more distinctive term – most Right Wing regions,. Specifically, the South and Heartland rank differently as predictors of ideology/partisanship measures across cluster types. The South is more Right Wing on religion-centered social conservatism variables, the conservative-ID variables and the factor-analytical summary conservatism index while the Heartland is more Right Wing on the party-related variables.

Given the fact that Chapters 3 and 4 are inspired by Elazar's typology, I have included additional analysis of political culture using Elazar's identified political culture categories. In Appendix A, I repeat analysis of ideology that I conducted in Chapter 4 using Elazar's cultures, and in Appendix B, I use canonical correlation to juxtapose my new clusters with those of Elazar. In summary, the Elazar clusters don't map onto the New clusters very well, although Traditional states and Southern states show some match as do individualist states and Progressive ones. In addition, Elazar clusters can somewhat predict the religion-centered social conservatism variables, the conservative-ID variables and the factor-analytical summary conservatism index but have little predictive power for the party-related variables.

Chapter 6

Practices: An Integrative and Explanatory Focus

From chapters one through five, I used Bourdieusian capital theory to explain how political dynamics in the United States systematically vary by region. In this chapter, I build upon this theory and explain precisely how such political cultures are constructed, namely the process in which private citizens and government office holders ‘on the ground’ enact the political cultures that I identify with Bourdieu’s theory. I do so by simultaneously explicating and expanding upon his (1984) formula which builds around the *habitus* construct. Then, I provide brief descriptions of how this takes place within the realm of government. Finally, I provide a grand synthesis of the aforementioned topics in order to elucidate the significance of my study, particularly the efficacy of using Bourdieu in political analysis of the United States.

Bourdieu (1999; 2000) underscores that his social theory should be considered as habitus, rather than simply including a theory of habitus. As such, each aspect that Bourdieu studies emanates from this core concept. Recall, habitus describes “an acquired scheme of dispositions.”⁶¹ As such, habitus itself is akin to a “fish in water” in which a individual is enveloped in a mode of behavior, taking their social world for granted. Robbins (1991) encapsulates this concept when he explains that habitus involves the mastery that people have over their situations. Wainwright and Turner’s (2006) study of ballet dancers cautions that habitus as “not simply a state of mind, it is also a bodily state of being” in which the body itself becomes ingrained with behavioral dispositions and is the locus of experienced history. As a result, of the experiences individuals have and the actions that they conduct in society, habitus may be considered the medium and the resulting product of social interaction. Thus, considerations of habitus, and greater social phenomena at large under the Bourdieusian theoretical schema, must be considered as both end inputs and outputs. With respect to political

⁶¹ Wainwright and Turner (2006)

culture, this means that the concepts that I previously examined must be considered as both outcomes and underpinnings of political milieus. The route is largely reflexive and cannot be considered in one direction alone.

While habitus is largely constitutive of Bourdieu's social theory, it is but one part of an overarching approach to behavior, which he identifies as *practice*. Bourdieu's social theory is captured largely in the formula [(Habitus) (Capital)] + Field = Practice. Crossley (2001) summarizes the manner in which *practice* results from habitus, capital, and the field in the following manner: "Practice is the result of various habitual schemas and dispositions (habitus), combined with resources (capital), being activated by certain structured social conditions (field) which they, in term, belong to and variously reproduce and modify."

Wainwright and Turner (2006) utilize Bourdieu's formula to study ballet dancers and their environment. In accordance with Bourdieu's theoretical inclinations, they place particular emphasis on habitus and its products. With the understanding that habitus involves mastery over situations, they theorized that the training to become a ballerina and maintain one's position produces a 'ballet habitus,' demonstrating that habitus can form in a myriad of different formations, including political.

Capital affects ballet dancers in terms of exchange of one for the other. For instance, ballet dancers will exchange their physical capital for economic capital. A similar process occurs in other sports, such as boxing where divergent behavior results from varying capital inputs. "Physical capital, in the form of body shape, tends to mould boxers into one... [type of boxer]." Wainwright and Turner (2006) expand upon Bourdieu by suggesting that the individual habitus of a particular boxer is affected by the boxing gym's institutional habitus, captured in the concept of the *field* of structured social conditions, reifying the reflexive nature of social dynamics. In

fact, Wacquant (1995) describes this process thusly: “objective structures of the social world of boxing are embodied in the boxers habitus.” He further explains that “the boxer willfully perseveres into this potentially self-destructive trade because, in a very real sense, he is inhabited by the game that he inhabits.” As a result, one may say that the engrained habitus that results from training as a boxer is the same process that tethers the individual to the social context of boxing (field) and its capital interchanges.

One may similarly extend this Bourdieusian social conceptualization to government, and I posit that researchers should utilize this understanding in analytic political inquiry. Given that habitus is quite malleable and runs the spectrum from ballet and boxing to social class, I contend that a *political habitus* develops throughout the life course. Political habitus entails ingrained dispositions toward government as well as the inclinations toward behavior with respect to political questions. Elazar (1972) tangentially alludes to this phenomenon in his cultural streams concept in which long standing traditions follow groups as they move across geographic territories. I expand upon this concept by identifying the specific mechanism in which this takes place and fastening it within a broader social framework. For instance, habitus does not develop from nominal group membership or awareness of past events, but through close social interaction with others. Bourdieu (1985) explains that “actors who are close in social space...have more similar habitus...and their similarity in habitus draws them together to form concrete relations: ‘the proximity of conditions, and therefore of dispositions, tends to be translated into durable linkages and groupings.’”⁶² Thus, differential association is the means by which habitus varies from one group to another, meaning that individuals in adjacent social spaces develop similar habitus because they interact with each other, influencing and creating the habitus of others. Bottero and Crossley (2011) sums the concept as such” “concrete relations and interactions both

⁶² Bottero and Crossley (2011)

shape and are shaped by habitus.” I use this interpretation to make the argument that political habitus develops over time through interactions among people. Such interactions, while dynamic, remain for long time periods precisely because of this dexterity, in tandem with the fact that they constitute the inherent vantage points of individuals.

Expanding beyond habitus, capital refers to resources, particularly exchangeable resources, thus entailing social interaction. I posit that in terms of government, there exists a broad resource entailing *political capital*⁶³. One may find political capital at the micro and macro level, as it refers to an individual’s efficacy in government as well as the state’s overall ability to accomplish its aims. For instance, one may say that a former state governor has more political capital than the typical citizen because they are well connected with current officeholders and retain arcane knowledge of how to enact policy despite not holding a position within government. Similarly, a state government in the United States may have more political capital than a state government in a developing country in the sense that it would likely be more effective in enacting policy.

Political habitus and political capital provide for behaviors within the context of the field, which I describe as the political environment. The environment specifically refers to the objective social structure that allows behavior. Thus, the collective ability for groups to vote, access to the polls, physical accessibility of officeholders, and stipulations for holding office, and political transparency, among others, produce the political field. One can see how the field, while itself a product of habitus and capital exchange, can affect the political behavior, habitus, and possession capital in its own right through adjustment of the aforementioned measures. For instance, denying the population of the right to vote would stifle an individual’s political efficacy and change their orientation to government.

Habitus, capital, and the field synergistically create *practice* in the Bourdieusian model. While Bourdieu's practice theory focuses on action on the micro level, he also maintains that interaction at more abstract levels results from the sum of such events.⁶⁴ Consequently, I theorize that in terms of government, practice entails political engagement⁶⁵ at the micro level and the resulting enactment of government policy at the macro level. Such enactment of policy results from selection of particular candidates for office, as well as long-standing systems of classification of roles and administrative functions for those within the bureaucracy. de Nooy (2003) describes such a system of institutional logic and memory, which harkens back to the *new institutionalism* canonized by Friedland and Alford (1991). Thus, I argue that overarching political practice is what constitutes *Bourdiesian political culture*, which may be subdivided based on systematic differences.

This subdivision is what I capture in chapter 4 and articulate in more detail in chapter 5. Each political culture has a series of different formulations of habitus, divisions in the possession of capital, and field constraints. These inputs result in different forms of political practice, which along with its components, produces overarching political patterns. One can observe instances of this by comparing two of the more extreme political cultures from chapter 4, the "blue" Southern cluster and the "yellow" northern and western cluster, which included such states as New York, Hawaii, and California. The table below compares the "yellow" cluster and the "blue cluster": the percentage of the vote Obama obtained in 2012, the percentage received by the republican senate candidate in the most recent election⁶⁶, and the percentage of states that have expanded Medicaid since passage of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The percentage of the vote for

⁶⁴ de Nooy (2003: 322)

⁶⁵ Political engagement at the micro level includes activities such as voting, canvassing for candidates, attending political meetings, and donating to political causes, amongst others.

⁶⁶ The most recent elections encompass results from 2012 and 2014, along with a special election from 2015.

President Obama indicates individuals' actions with respect to national political questions. While the Republican senate percentage largely covers national action, there is evidence that such races cover local issues as well. Finally, Medicaid expansion entails a state policy action, describing action to those within the state government and taking Bourdieusian political culture beyond mere partisan voter behavior.

Table 11: Differences in Political Practice

Cluster	Obama %	Republican Senate %	Medicaid Expansion %
Yellow	60.429	38.029	85.71
Blue	43.429	57.55	18.75

The “yellow” cluster has a high percentage of the vote for President Obama, at 60.429, along with a very low percentage of the vote for Republican US Senate candidates. The “blue” cluster represents the converse, as Obama received only 43.429% of the vote, while the Republican Senate candidates received an average of 57.55%. Beyond the realm of voting, the effects remain, and are in fact expanded. Eighty-five percent of the yellow states approved Medicaid expansion, while only 18.75 percent of blue states did so. Such differences likely represent the proverbial *tip of the iceberg*, as they are the result of decades of social interactions and institutional formation events.

For instance, Mississippi's 1830s cotton boom equated agrarian life to the American dream. The boom increased the presence of African American slaves and rendered the group a disempowered population for much of the state's history. Minority presence and the elite's tenuous rule led to discrimination in the enforcement of black codes and “stagnation with an inferior school system, continued dedication to cotton agriculture, and sharecropping, which eventually sucked in many white farmers who fared no better than black farmers”.⁶⁷ Thus,

⁶⁷ Mitchell, Dennis J., *A New History of Mississippi* (2014)

opposition to centralized government and social programs may be considered a legacy of past political conditions.

California's political culture, in contrast, did not have the influence of European American slavery. Despite an early influx of Southern farmers, initial (American) habitation by New England merchants and Midwestern farmers prevented the institution from gaining a foothold. The state had a sparse population until the Transcontinental Railroad and other lines connected it with the rest of the country in the late nineteenth century. Subsequently, population flows brought additional yeoman farmers, merchants, and those engaged in maritime industries to California. With respect to non-Europeans, indigenous Mexican Californians and Asian populations politically influenced the state in terms of anti-minority sentiment, as California spearheaded the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and witnessed a series of anti-Mexican lynchings. Nonetheless, such influence was muted because of demographics. The overall political character of the state became similar to those of northern states such as New York and Minnesota as a result of the political habitus brought by the newcomers from those areas and nascent institutional behaviors implanted in the early years of the state's history.

Conclusion


In *Capital Gains*, I used Bourdieusian social theory to both elucidate and explicate political cultures within the United States, thereby providing a new method of political analysis. I began by detailing seminal works of political culture and juxtaposed them with Bourdieu's interpretation of state development. Inspired by this account of development, I used the capitals within his theory- physical force capital, economic capital, informational capital, and state symbolic capital- for each state, along with measures of habitus and political capital to politically categorize the states. Subsequently, I delved into each political culture and compared each one to those found in past works such as Elazar (1972). Finally, I placed my findings within the context of Bourdieu's broader social theory, which emanates from his central concept of habitus. This provided more detail of precisely how the political cultures form and how they are implemented by individuals at each level of abstraction.

Perhaps the greatest significance of *Capital Gains* is in bridging the sociological account of interaction with the political scientific approach and more individual, cultural accounts. It is this conceptual integration that encourages future analysts to expand upon the work and reunite the social sciences in vigorous pursuit of the national character.

Appendix A
Elazarian Political Cultures

Thorough analysis of the political clusters that I created requires comparing them to those conceptualized by Elazar. To this end, I have included regressions of Elazar's political culture designations- Individualist, Traditionalist, and Moralistic- on measures of ideology within this section. For the sake of convenience, I have included a map of Elazar's typology below.

Map 12



Ideology Comparison

I compared the Elazarian political cultures ideologically by conducting regressions on the ideology component I obtained earlier in Chapter 4. I repressed the intercepts to include all of the cultures simultaneously. Given that the factor effectively represented a greater conservatism, the results are those which one would anticipate.

Table A: Factor Scores on Ideology for Elazarian Clusters

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		
		B	t	sig
1	Traditionalist	.678	3.066	.004
	Individualist	-.523	-2.438	.019
	Moralist	-.115	-.537	.594
Adjusted-R-square		.202		

For instance, the Traditionalist political culture obtains the highest mean factor score of .678. The Individualist culture, conversely, obtains the lowest mean factor score of -.523. The Moralistic culture stands between the Individualist and Traditionalist cultures with respect to the factor scores, as it obtains a mean of -.115. As a result of these means, one may predict that the Traditionalist culture will obtain positive deviations for the variables contributing to the component, and the Individualist culture will obtain negative deviations. The Traditionalist and Individualist cluster means also obtain significance levels of .004 and .019, respectively. The Moralistic culture obtains a significance level of .594, which suggests that the mean factor scores will have little predictive power for measures of ideology.

Having examined Elazar's political cultures with respect to factor analysis, I provide more specified information by analyzing the political cultures with respect to each ideology variable. This helps to elicit more nuances with respect to ideological variation among Elazar's political cultures.

Conservatism and Partisan Ideology in Elazarian Clusters

Table B: Regressions of Conservatism and Partisan Ideology on Elazarian Clusters

Cluster	Conservatism		% House Democratic		% Democratic		House Conservatism	
	B	Sig	B	Sig	B	Sig	B	Sig
Traditionalist	4.095 (3.529)	.001	-11.418 (-1.458)	.152	-1.325 (-.874)	.387	.133 (1.575)	.122
Individualist	-3.474 (-3.086)	.003	12.129 (1.596)	.117	2.612 (1.776)	.082	-.135 (-1.644)	.107
Moralist	-.380 (-.338)	.737	-1.383 (-.182)	.856	-1.365 (-.928)	.358	.009 (.116)	.908
Adj. R-square	.276		.033		.034		.042	

Percent who self-identify as conservative

The percent who identify as conservative falls along the lines expounded by Elazar. The Individualist states are those in which the political culture is characterized by patronage and immediate gratification at the hands of the political system within Elazar's theory. This means that such locations would place emphasis on material items and upcoming economic concerns rather than other factors. Analysis of conservatism supports this notion in that the Individualist states have the lowest number of individuals who identify as conservative, deviating 3.474 percent below the mean. The Moralist states are those in which government is viewed as a positive good, essentially a means to fix problems and contribute to society. Elazar identifies such states as effectively a middle category. Conservatism complements this understanding, as the Moralist states have very little deviation from the mean.

In accordance with its category name, the Traditionalist states have the highest percentage of conservatives, positively deviating from the national mean by over four percent. The Traditionalist states in Elazar's model almost perfectly match the South category in the new map of political cultures that I created, leading credence to the effectiveness of Bourdieu's capital theory, as well as my novel conceptualization.

Percentage Who Self-Identify As Democrat or Lean Democratic

Analysis of partisan self-identification among Elazar's clusters underscores the pattern previously observed, namely the discrepancy between the conservatism in the Southern states and the partisan demographics. The Traditionalist states are more democratic than the Moralistic states, as they have an average 1.325 percent below the national mean, while the Moralistic states are .04 below the measure. The Individualist states have the highest percentage of self-identified Democrats, surpassing the national average by 2.612 percentage points. Substantive interpretation of these differences are tempered by the significance levels of .387 for the Traditionalist culture and .358 for the Moralistic culture.

Percentage of House Democrats

Individualist states have the highest percentage of Democrats in their Congressional delegations, exceeding the national average by 12.129 percent. The Moralistic states are near the average, only 1.383 percent below. The Traditionalist states have the lowest Democratic representation in congress, obtaining an average 11.418 percent below the national average. This difference further highlights the partisan identities in the previous section. For instance, the Moralistic states have the lowest number of self-identified Democrats, but have a fairly average congressional partisanship representation. Conversely, the Traditionalist states have the second lowest percentage of self-identified Democrats but have the lowest number of Democrats in their

Congressional delegations, by a wide margin. Noteworthy is that each of the significance levels are above .116, limiting the veracity to a certain extent.

Poole Congressional Delegation Conservatism

Using Elazar's model for the conservatism of the Congressional delegation underscores the partisan identities of the political cultures. The Individualistic political culture has the lowest scores according to Poole and Rosenthal's conservatism scale, meaning that its Members of Congress are the most progressive. The Individualist cluster negatively deviates by .135. The Traditionalist states have the most conservative Members of Congress, as they surpass the national average score by .133. The Moralist cluster, in accord with its name and moderate ideological trend, positively deviates from the national average by an infinitesimal .009. However, it also obtains a significance of .908.

Cultural Conservatism and Elazarian Clusters

Table C: Regressions of Social Conservatism on Elazarian Clusters

Cluster	% Very Religious		% Support Gay Marriage	
	B	Sig	B	Sig
Traditionalist	8.471 (4.740)	.000	-7.192 (-5.081)	.000
Individualist	-3.654 (-2.107)	.040	3.855 (2.807)	.007
Moralist	-4.319 (-2.491)	.016	2.914 (2.122)	.039
Adj. R-square	.376		.413	

Percent who identify as 'very religious'

Elazar's political cultures underscore the previous findings. The Traditionalist states are the most religious, as they surpass the national average by 8.471 percent for individuals who call themselves "very religious". Somewhat surprisingly, the Individualist states are only the second least religious. The Moralistic states have the lowest number of "very religious" people, as they have an average of 4.319 percent below that of the nation. This highlights the cultural distinctiveness of the southern region, while it concurrently undercuts the religious basis of political action that Elazar identifies in the Moralistic states. The significance levels for each culture run below .05 as well. On the whole, analysis of "very religious" people demonstrates the need for a renewed analysis of American political cultures, in the form of the present study.

Percent who support gay marriage

Support for legalizing gay marriage largely mimics the "very religious" identification within Elazar's political cultures. The Traditionalist states have the lowest percentage in favor of legalization, deviating from the national average by 7.192 percent. The Individualist states have the highest percentage in favor, positively deviating by 3.855 percent. The Moralistic states, which are less religious, nonetheless had a slightly lower percentage in favor of legalizing gay marriage, 2.914 percent above the national average. Findings here have interesting relations to those of the new, post-Elazar clusters. The Elazar clusters better predict the religion-centered social conservatism variables, the conservative-ID variables and the factor-analytical summary conservatism index but have little power with regard to the party-related variables.

Reiterating ideological regressions makes it apparent that Elazar's Traditionalist political culture is still observed in the current day, as it trends nearly exactly the same as the South cluster in Chapter 4. In addition, the Individualist states relate to the ideological variables much

like the Progressive 1 and Progressive 2 clusters within Chapter 4. All of the significance levels fall below .04. Additional comparison between the two models is required in order to provide additional credence to these observations. To this end, I conducted canonical correlations between Elazar's political cultures and my new clusters in Appendix B. What we find in summary is that the Elazarian model and revised Bourdieusian model both capture underlying differences in political culture, as the Traditionalist and Individualist cultures are well captured in the new model.

Appendix B

Canonical Correlations

Canonical correlation is a mathematical procedure that compares the relationships between two sets of data. In this case, I compare each of Elazar's political cultures with each of my new political clusters. The procedure works by creating canonical variates equal in number to those of the dependent variable. Then, the model correlates these canonical variates with the independent variable. Below, I have included canonical correlations that include Traditionalist culture and Individualist culture, Traditionalist culture and Moralistic culture, and Moralistic culture and Individualist culture. I cannot include them in a simultaneous model because the data structure produces a linearity error. Instead, this iterative process covers each combination and allows comprehensive comparison.

Traditionalist and Individualist

The first canonical variate obtains a canonical correlation of .922, while the second obtains a correlation of .51393. The significance level of the first is less than .001, and the significance of the second is .008, which are well below the .05 alpha level. Thus, there is consistency between the two models.

Table A

Eigenvalues and Canonical Correlations

Root No.	Eigenvalue	Pct.	Cum. Pct.	Canon Cor.	Sq. Cor
1	5.71018	94.08599	94.08599	.92248	.85097
2	.35893	5.91401	100.00000	.51393	.26413

Dimension Reduction Analysis

Roots	Wilks L.	F	Hypoth. DF	Error DF	Sig. of F
1 TO 2	.10967	17.36950	10.00	86.00	.000
2 TO 2	.73587	3.94820	4.00	44.00	.008

Below, one finds that the first canonical variate is a near perfect encapsulation of the Traditionalist culture, and the second is a very strong representation of his Individualist culture. The first variate correlates with Elazar's Traditionalist culture at .99883, and the second variate correlates with the Individualist culture at .89319.

Table B

Correlations between DEPENDENT and canonical variables
Function No.

Variable	1	2
Traditionalist	.99883	-.04838
Individualist	-.44968	.89319

Analysis of the relationship between the clusters I created and those of Elazar shows that the South cluster is nearly perfectly synonymous with Elazar's Traditionalist culture. This confirms my observation in Appendix A. The Progressive 1 and Middle regions are strongly correlated with the second variate, and thus Elazar's Individualist culture. The Heartland and Progressive 2 states have low correlations with both, possibly because of their correlations with the Moralistic political culture, which was left out of the analysis.

Table C

Correlations between COVARIATES and canonical variables
CAN. VAR.

Covariate	1	2
Progressive 2	-.31069	-.38148
Progressive 1	-.20028	.71404
Heartland	-.45478	-.49903
Middle	-.16113	.35618
South	.98430	-.08558

The additional canonical correlations below further define the relationship between Elazar's political cultures and those that I created within the present study.

Traditionalist and Moralist

Canonical correlation of Elazar's Traditionalist and Moralist political cultures yields two roots of respectable strength. The first root obtains a canonical correlation of .92248, while the second root has a correlation of .51393. Both have significance levels below the .05 alpha level.

Table D

Eigenvalues and Canonical Correlations

Root No.	Eigenvalue	Pct.	Cum. Pct.	Canon Cor.	Sq. Cor
1	5.71018	94.08599	94.08599	.92248	.85097
2	.35893	5.91401	100.00000	.51393	.26413

Dimension Reduction Analysis

Roots	Wilks L.	F	Hypoth. DF	Error DF	Sig. of F
1 TO 2	.10967	17.36950	10.00	86.00	.000
2 TO 2	.73587	3.94820	4.00	44.00	.008

Examining the roots in further detail shows that the first root is nearly synonymous with Elazar's Traditionalist culture, as the correlation between the two is .99883, while the second root performs nearly the same role for the Moralist culture. The correlation between the Moralist culture and the second root is .84555.

Table E

Correlations between DEPENDENT and canonical variables Function No.

Variable	1	2
Traditional	.99883	.04838
Moralist	-.53390	.84555

Most illustrative are the correlations between the political clusters that I derived and Elazar's political cultures. The South cluster correlates very strongly with the first cluster, as it obtains a correlation of .98430. The second root is less clear in its connections, however the Plains cluster and Progressive 2 have the strongest, as their correlations are .38148 and .49903, respectively.

Table F

Correlations between COVARIATES and canonical variables
CAN. VAR.

Covariate	1	2
Progressive 2	-.31069	.38148
Progressive 1	-.20028	-.71404
Plains	-.45478	.49903
Core	-.16113	-.35618
South	.98430	.08558

Moralist and Individualist

Analysis of the Moralist and Individualist political cultures yields two roots with canonical correlations of .92248 and .51393. The significance levels for both are below the .05 alpha level.

Table G

Eigenvalues and Canonical Correlations

Root No.	Eigenvalue	Pct.	Cum. Pct.	Canon Cor.	Sq. Cor
1	5.71018	94.08599	94.08599	.92248	.85097
2	.35893	5.91401	100.00000	.51393	.26413

Dimension Reduction Analysis

Roots	Wilks L.	F	Hypoth. DF	Error DF	Sig. of F
1 TO 2	.10967	17.36950	10.00	86.00	.000
2 TO 2	.73587	3.94820	4.00	44.00	.008

The first root is poorly defined, as the correlations for both the Moralist culture and the Individualist culture are both moderately strong. However, the second canonical variate is

strongly correlated with the Moralistic culture, at .84555. This weakens the explanatory power of the model and highlights the political consolidation of the Southern block.

Table H

Correlations between DEPENDENT and canonical variables
Function No.

Variable	1	2
Moralist	.53390	.84555
Individualist	.44968	-.89319

Comparing the clusters that I created to Elazar's, by way of canonical correlation of Individualist culture and Moralistic culture, is somewhat strained by the explanatory power of Traditionalist political culture in the Southern region in terms of national politics. For instance, none of the clusters obtain a positive correlation above 0.5. The closest are the Plains states for both the first canonical variate (.45478) and the second variate (.49903).

Correlations between COVARIATES and canonical variables
CAN. VAR.

Covariate	1	2
Progressive 2	.31069	.38148
Progressive 1	.20028	-.71404
Plains	.45478	.49903
Core	.16113	-.35618
South	-.98430	.08558

In sum, canonical correlation reveals that the most politically defined region, in the present era, is the South. This effect is captured both by my political clustering of the United States, as well as that of Elazar. The Individualist culture has a weak correlation to the first root when one removes Traditionalist culture from consideration, however it obtains a stronger correlation to a canonical variate than the Moralistic culture when placed in the model with the Traditionalist culture alone- .89319 compared to .84555. This ambiguity suggests that Elazar's

model remains accurate for the Southern tier, but his Moralistic and Individualist political cultures may have merged or vanished at the hands of social evolution.

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