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Signals Without Borders: The Conditional Impact of INGOs

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Signals Without Borders: The Conditional Impact of INGOs

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An abstract of
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Abstract

Signals Without Borders: The Conditional Impact of INGOs
By Amanda M. Murdie

Do international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) matter? Further, under what conditions are INGOs able to impact policy human rights and development outcomes? According to much of the extant International Relations literature, INGOs are assumed to be purely principled or altruistic actors, existing only to solve the world's problems. This is a strong assumption, as many in International Relations assume that all actors are self-interested and strategic. My dissertation builds a formal theory which relaxes this assumption, and allows INGOs to have varying preferences, including preferences for rent-seeking and international donations. Formal game-theoretic models allow me to investigate how the existence of heterogeneous types of INGOs complicates the interactions of INGOs with sub-state and international actors and, thus, conditions the likelihood of INGO-induced policy and behavior outcomes.

Solutions to the formal models provide a variety of novel and testable hypotheses relating to both when sub-state and international actors are most likely to support INGOs and when INGOs are most likely to affect policy and behavior outcomes. Based on the implications of these formal models, I conduct a series of statistical tests using new data on the activities and permanent locations of human rights and development INGOs.

The findings of this project highlight both the power and the shortcomings of INGOs, implying that a realistic look at the potential and motivations of INGOs is necessary for improvements in human rights and development. I conclude the project with policy recommendations for aid foundations, donor governments, and target or host governments, as well as providing policy recommendations for INGOs themselves.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

> There is an emerging second superpower, but it is not a nation. Instead, it is...a global social movement...made up of millions of people concerned with a broad agenda that includes social development, environmentalism, health, and human rights.
> - John Moore (2003)

1.1 Research Question

Since the 1980s, there has been an explosion in the number and prevalence of international non-governmental organizations.[1] These organizations, such as the well-known Amnesty International or Oxfam organizations, have increased their world presence drastically since the end of the Cold War, often setting up multiple permanent offices and expanding their volunteer bases within countries. In the last twenty years, for example, over 50 countries have seen increases in the number of INGOs active within

[1] An NGO is minimally defined as any non-profit, non-governmental, legal, voluntary organization. This is the definition agreed to in the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, the standard reference on NGOs, and the UN ECOSOC NGO Section. To this minimal definition, however, the focus within this dissertation is on organizations classified as international NGOs (INGOs) by the *Yearbook of International Organization* that have a specific focus on human rights or development (Ahmed and Potter 2006). By this definition, an NGO is an INGO only if it has active members (ie is actively involved) within 3 or more different states in a year.

their borders of over 500%; some countries saw the number of INGOs increase over twenty-fold (Landman 2005; UIA, 2008/2009). This tremendous growth in INGOs has been coupled with drastic increases in the amount of aid and media attention these organizations receive. In fact, some now estimate that "more aid to developing countries is funneled through the NGO sector than the United Nations or the World Bank" (Brown, Brown and Desposato 2008).

Despite this growth in attention, aid, and presence of INGOs throughout the world, as illustrated in Figure 1.1, we know little about the impact of these organizations in world politics. Do INGOs matter? Further, under what conditions are INGOs able to impact policy and behavior? What factors explain why human rights INGOs, for example, have often be credited for improving civil liberties in Latin America but haven't been successful at ending female genital cutting in the Middle East and North Africa?[2] What conditions help development INGOs in their push to end childhood poverty? No existing empirical study examines what factors condition the impact of INGOs in world politics and very few studies systematically examine the general impact of these organizations on political or developmental outcomes.

Figure 1.1: Growth in the Presence of INGOs



Source: Landman (2005)

[2]The impact of human rights INGOs in Latin America is highlighted in the canonical Keck and Sikkink (1998). Conversely, the lack of impact of INGOs on the eradication of female genital cutting is discussed in depth by Boyle (2002).

Extant theories offer limited predictions into the factors that condition the effects of INGOs. More importantly, there exists huge theoretical disagreements about the potential of INGOs, as non-state actors, to affect policy or behavior outcomes. These theoretical disagreements are at the heart of differences between the international relations meta-theories of realism and constructivism (Elman and Elman 2003). State-centric realists, for example, contend that INGOs and other non-state actors really have little potential to impact the behaviors of a state, especially on issues as critical for state survival as how leaders control the citizenry within a state (Waltz 1979). As such, according to state-centric realists, INGOs should have no influence on human rights and little influence on policies or behavior that could be seen as encroaching on the state.

Conversely, constructivists contend that INGOs are actually the "most important actor[s]" for transnational advocacy. Unlike for-profit organizations, according to this dominant transnational advocacy network (TAN) framework, INGOs are assumed to be motivated by "values rather than material concerns" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). In fact, much of the literature assumes that all INGOs are principled or altruistic, motivated solely to help a domestic population with their struggles against an obdurate regime (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Kelly 2005; DeMars 2005). In this way, it is often assumed that INGOs behave as honest agents of a repressed domestic population, without patronizing or self-interested motivations. This is a strong assumption, as many in international relations assume that all actors are self-interested and not wholly altruistic (Fearon 1995; Mercer 1995; Downs, Rocke and Barsoom 1996). Even conflict mediators and the United Nations Security Council are now understood to be self-interested and strategic rather than impartial and altruistic (Kydd 2003; Chapman 2007).

This altruism assumption in the TAN framework is also counter to many practitioner reports, scholarly writings, and journalistic accounts of what INGOs are actu-

ally doing on the ground (Ben Attia 2004; Bob 2005; Clark, Sprenger and VeneKlasen 2006; Sundstrom 2006; Goonatilake 2006; Lee 2007). Instead of behaving altruistically, as is assumed in the TAN literature on INGOs, many practitioner reports highlight the growing number of INGOs that are advocating for policies and behaviors not wanted by the local population the INGO is supposedly trying to help but, instead, in line with the policies and behaviors solely desired by major international donors (Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Goonatilake 2006; Sundstrom 2006). I would contend that actions such as these fall far from the principled or altruistic assumption that the existing literature uses to differentiate INGOs from for-profit organizations. Additionally, these reports highlight frequent rent-seeking behaviors by INGOs, including stealing funds that international actors had donated to help a local population.

This dissertation builds a theory that helps us understand when and where INGOs will have an impact in world politics. In order to better understand the behavior and conditional effects of INGOs, I argue that we must relax the "altruism assumption" dominant in INGO scholarship. In the chapters that follow, I develop a theory of the behavior and impact of INGOs that allows INGOs to have varying preferences, including preferences for completely rent-seeking behavior and preferences for policies that are not desired by the local populations INGOs are professed to be working to help. By relaxing this assumption, we are better able to understand the behavior of INGOs, their interactions with sub-state and international actors and, perhaps most importantly, their conditional impact on policy and behavior outcomes.[3] In short, the theoretical framework developed in this dissertation, in Lakatosian terms, incorporates INGO behavior into a theory of political interactions that provides excess

[3]By sub-state actors, I am referring to domestic NGOs and domestic citizens within the state where the INGO is trying to work. Consistent with extant literature, I define international actors as the international organizations, donor foundations, and third-party states that INGOs interact with while pressuring or working within a targeted state (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Sundstrom 2006). I will discuss these actors in more detail in the following chapters.

empirical content over existing theories of INGOs (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970).

1.2 Approach and Contributions

This dissertation's approach to INGOs is novel in a number of ways. First, unlike much of the previous literature on INGOs within international relations, I extend my theoretical focus to include both advocacy and service INGOs. Advocacy INGOs, such as Amnesty International or Greenpeace, are INGOs whose predominant mission is getting a targeted actor to adopt a policy or behavior in line with the position of the INGO (Ahmed and Potter 2006). Common advocacy INGO missions would involve human rights or environmental outcomes. Conversely, service INGOs, such as CARE or Oxfam, focus mainly on goods provision. Service INGOs would include those organizations that focus on health or development related service provision, such as handing out contraceptives or building wells in developing countries.

Much work within the discipline pertains solely to advocacy INGOs, often equating the same patterns of behavior to service INGOs. Despite this focus on advocacy INGOs, there has actually been more growth in the number of service INGOs, such as those providing economic development or health services in developing countries (Cameron 2000). Figure 1.2 illustrates this with respect to human rights INGOs, as a subset of advocacy INGOs, and development INGOs, as a subset of service INGOs. As shown, the growth in development INGOs far exceeds the growth in human rights INGOs. In addressing both advocacy and service INGOs, this dissertation provides an encompassing theoretical framework for understanding INGOs that also accounts for different dynamics across these subtypes.

Figure 1.2: Growth in the Presence of Service and Advocacy INGOs



Sources: Smith and Wiest (2005); UIA (2008/2009)

I use game-theoretic models to assist in rigorous thinking about how the presence of INGOs with altruistic as well as non-altruistic motives impact their interactions with other actors critical for advocacy and service provision and, as such, conditions the impact of INGOs on policy and behavior outcomes. In addition to providing an encompassing framework for understanding many extant empirical regularities, solutions to the formal models provide a variety of novel and testable implications concerning how INGOs try to signal or conceal their underlying motivations. Through drawing attention to this signaling dynamic by INGOs, this dissertation adds to the signaling literature in international relations, which is just beginning to examine signaling by non-state actors (Chapman 2007; Weeks 2008; Chapman 2009). This study also adds to the broader "second image reversed" literature, which has previously focused exclusively on the effects of international governmental organizations on domestic politics (Reiter 2001; Pevehouse 2005; Gleditsch and Ward 2006). By focusing on international *non*-governmental organizations and their impact on domestic politics, I extend the scope of this literature to new actors at the same level of analysis.

Using new data on the activities, presence, and funding of over 1000 human rights and development INGOs, I examine the implications of this theoretical framework

quantitatively. I find that INGOs can have powerful effects on human rights and development outcomes. However, very generally, I find that the characteristics of the issue, the support of both the domestic and international communities, and the underlying characteristics of the state all condition this impact. This study, therefore, provides the first quantitative tests of the impact of large numbers of issue-specific INGOs on a variety of human rights and development outcomes and, more importantly, the first empirical examination of the factors which condition the impact of INGOs. The results of these tests provide many practical and policy related implications for those interested in human rights advocacy or development in poor countries.

1.3 Dissertation Outline

This dissertation proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, I review the extant cross-disciplinary literature on INGOs, paying special attention to practitioner and journalistic accounts that are counter to the dominant theoretical framework. Next, in Chapters 3 and 4, I incorporate these insights into two game-theoretic models of the behavior and impact of INGOs. Chapter 3 focuses on service INGOs while Chapter 4 adopts this logic to understand the dynamics and impact of advocacy INGOs.

After outlining the major empirical implications derived from these theoretical models, the dissertation then focuses on empirically examining these implications. Chapter 5 tests the implications from the service INGO theoretical model on the impact development INGOs have on development outcomes. After this, Chapter 6 examines the impact of human rights INGOs on human rights outcomes, using the hypotheses derived from the advocacy INGO theoretical model.

Finally, the dissertation concludes in Chapter 7. Here, I address the ramifications of these findings on policy and discuss how these results could inform decisions made

by both human rights and development INGOs. I also outline how these results could apply to future research on INGOs and overall scholarship within international relations.

Chapter 2

INGOs in World Politics

> Sadly, NGOs have become miniature personal kingdoms for egotistical and power hungry individuals.
> -Sereke Berhan (2002)

INGOs are nothing new to world politics. In fact, INGOs were active in 18th and 19th century anti-slavery campaigns and in the suffrage movement before the 1900s (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Florini 2004). However, as mentioned, the sheer numbers, attention, and funds directed at INGOs are new (Boli and Thomas 1999; Florini 2004; Ahmed and Potter 2006). Though international relations was silent on the growth and potential influence of INGOs for many years, since the 1990s, INGO research within the discipline has boomed. This boom in the attention INGOs have received from within the discipline has been coupled with increased cross-disciplinary research, including research from the fields of business, sociology, anthropology, and education (Jabine and Claude 1992; Feldman 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Schafer 1999; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Mundy and Murphy 2001; Welch 2001).

The goal of this chapter is to motivate the theoretical innovations made in this dissertation. To do so, I first outline the existing theoretical literature on INGOs, paying special attention to the dominant theoretical framework on INGOs from within international relations. After addressing this literature, I discuss the scholarly and

journalistic critiques to this framework, many which focus on how the underlying motivations of INGOs differ from the altruistic ideal that has dominated the existing theoretical framework. After outlining these critiques, I address how INGOs themselves have responded to concerns about their organization's underlying motivations and then outline the cross-disciplinary literature that examines these actions or signals sent by INGOs.

2.1 The Extant Theoretical Literature on INGOs in International Relations

The dominant theoretical framework of INGOs within international relations, the TAN framework, centers on the role that INGOs play in strengthening advocacy attempts (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 1999; Bob 2005; Ahmed and Potter 2006; Reitan 2007). Within the TAN framework, INGOs are typically viewed as potential allies for domestic groups already interested in change in state policy and conduct (Bob 2005). If state actors are not sensitive to a domestic group's position, the domestic group seeks out INGOs to petition the state from abroad (Keck and Sikkink 1998). In TAN terminology, this is referred to as sending out a "boomerang" (Keck and Sikkink 1998; DeMars 2005). INGOs provide connections, funds, and information to the domestic group in its pressure on the state. They can increase world awareness of the domestic group's plight, encouraging the international community writ large, including foundations, the media, churches, intellectuals, parts of intergovernmental organizations, and governments of third party states, to pressure the state as well. Thus, the state is forced to change its policies as a result of pressure from both below and above, completing what looks like a "boomerang pattern" of advocacy behavior (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 12).

A brief discussion on the theoretical assumptions of the TAN literature is certainly

necessary. First, as Price (2003) contends, most of the TAN literature "downplays the alleged constructivist-rationalist theoretical divide" within international relations (583). However, much of the TAN literature, because of its overwhelming focus on ideas and social factors, has been categorized as constructivist in orientation (Ahmed and Potter 2006; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Kelly 2005; Risse and Ropp 1999). For example, there is often a focus on soft or "discursive power" in addition to material power within the TAN literature; this, according to Hopf (1998), is a key characteristic of the constructivist paradigm within international relations (177).

Within the TAN literature, the discursive power of INGOs is often referred to as "moral authority" (Hall 1999; Sikkink 2002; Price 2003). Moral authority is defined as power derived from the belief that activists are "not only (objectively) right in the sense of providing accurate information but also morally right in the purposes for which such knowledge is harnessed" (Price 2003: 539). This focus on power as moral authority would separate TAN actors, specifically INGOs, from earlier studies of epistemic communities. In that literature, an epistemic community is a community of actors defined by their common knowledge base and ideas (Adler and Haas 1992; Evangelista 1999). Common epistemic communities would include the network of scholars, activists, lobbyists, and politicians attached to think tanks and university research centers. Unlike this literature, the TAN literature commonly assumes that the moral authority of advocacy actors comes from more than just a knowledge base; as Boli and Thomas (1999) contend, the power of INGOs comes also from their claim to represent "humanity," broadly defined (14).

Additionally, as mentioned, underpinning the TAN literature is the assumption that INGOs are different from for-profit organizations in their motivations (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Unlike for-profit actors and states, advocacy network actors, as a whole, are argued to be motivated by "principles" and by "values rather than material concerns" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2). In other words, while for-profit

firms are motivated by material goals, INGOs and other advocacy network actors are motivated predominately by specific advocacy policy or behavior outcomes (Ahmed and Potter 2006; Kelly 2005). In fact, unlike literature on epistemic communities or lobbyist organizations, it is often assumed within the TAN literature that all INGOs have the same shared principles; there is very limited discussion of INGOs that could be advocating for principles or norms that are conflicting or divergent (Austen-Smith 1997; Bearce 2003; Bloodgood 2008). For example, much of the TAN literature would assume that women's rights INGOs in Nigeria, for example, would all be advocating for the same policies or behavior; there is not much theoretical or empirical attention from within the TAN framework that would account for the fact that certain women's rights INGOs in Africa are advocating for abortion rights while others are advocating that women's rights must reflect an ideal that women's rights only come from natural family planning (UIA, 2008/2009).

Further, implicit within Keck and Sikkink (1998) and the larger TAN literature, is often the assumption that TAN actors are advocating for policies and behaviors that are largely consistent with the preferences of the domestic citizenry within the state where the advocacy actor is targeting (Clark 2001; DeMars 2005).[1] As mentioned, within the TAN framework, the INGO is responding to domestic calls for help (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Therefore, it is often assumed that the ideas or norms being advocated by INGOs have some resonance with the domestic citizenry, even if the norms do not resonate widely with state actors (Cortell and Davis Jr 2000; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Risse and Ropp 1999). In fact, as Price (2003)points out, the power of TAN actors "hinges on their legitimacy as agents addressing ..democratic deficits" and, as such, INGOs are assumed to represent the interests of a repressed domestic citizenry (590). Risse (1999) also

[1]To note, however, some of the TAN literature does mention that advocacy actors can not be representative and are often not accountable (Sikkink 2002). The implications of this idea, however, have been under theorized.

points out that the "moral authority" of INGOs and other advocacy actors is based on their predominantly representing "public interests" or the "common good" rather than private interests (186). By assuming that TAN actors are advocating for issues that have resonance with the domestic population, situations where international norms and the norms of a domestic population differ have received scant attention within the TAN framework, despite the focus on these issues in the much broader constructivist literature (Checkel 1997; Cortell and Davis Jr 2000; Risse 2002). In short, as Risse (2002) contends, within the study of transnational advocacy, arguments about "ideational (in)compatibility [are] still underspecified" (267).

The TAN framework does offer some predictions concerning the conditions when advocacy movements are more likely to affect policy and behavior outcomes. The framework predicts that advocacy attempts are more likely to be successful (a) if the advocacy network is dense, (b) if the targeted state is vulnerable or embedded in the international system, and (c) if the issue "involves bodily harm" or "legal equality" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 26-29). There has been scant large-scale systematic empirical attention to any of these potential hypotheses.

Existing case studies have provided some support to the conditional effectiveness predictions from the TAN framework. Human rights INGOs were successful in changing policies in the Philippines in the 1980s and 1990s because of their density (Jetschke 2000). Similarly, the success of the South African apartheid movement has been linked to the density of the advocacy network (Black 1999). Risse (2002) points out, however, that some advocacy network movements have involved a small number of advocacy actors, perhaps in contrast to the density hypothesis.

Case studies have also indicated that the vulnerability of the state does influence the conditional effectiveness of advocacy movements. Increases in state vulnerability explained why TAN actors were able to affect human rights conditions within Mexico in the 1990s but not earlier (Sikkink 1993; Donnelly 1998; Keck and Sikkink

1998). Evangelista (1999) found that state vulnerability increases also explained the conditional efficacy of epistemic communities in Russia at the end of the Cold War. Also, Princen (1995) found that the advocacy movement to end the ivory trade was more successful within Kenya than within Zimbabwe because of state vulnerability to internal and external pressure. However, many have noticed that state vulnerability offers little in explaining why advocacy networks can have divergent outcomes on two issues within the same state (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse 2002; Ahmed and Potter 2006). Finally, the "bodily harm" or "legal equality" contention has received very little attention in case studies; it is typically only mentioned in passing (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Worth noting, however, with respect to some case study empirical research within the TAN framework, as Risse (2002) points out:

> many studies do suffer from methodological problems such as case selection on the dependent variable. There are many single case studies of successful transnational campaigns, while we know much less about failed campaigns (264).

Risse (2002)'s statement could explain the limited attention given to the bodily harm/legal equality contention.[2]

Perhaps more importantly than the problem Risse (2002) outlines with respect to the extant empirical literature, however, these predictions from the TAN framework center not on INGOs themselves but on the total advocacy network, including INGO ties to the domestic and international communities. As such, the framework offers little in the form of predictions concerning when and how INGOs are able to get and maintain these ties or concerning the impact of INGOs themselves.

[2]A notable exception are studies that examine why certain issues are not adopted by advocacy actors (Bob 2005; Carpenter 2007).

Mechanisms Through Which Advocacy INGOs Impact Policy and Behavior

The TAN framework is reflected in the large cross-disciplinary literature that outlines the mechanisms through which advocacy INGOs impact policy and behavior outcomes. As Hahn and Holzscheiter (2005) point out, advocacy INGOs' efforts center on their collective "power of knowledge" (9). Advocacy INGOs use "all forms of modern persuasion" and "multiple political tactics" to influence policy and behavioral outcomes (Yaziji 2004; Schepers 2006: 283). Importantly, INGOs themselves, however, have "no direct ability to change policy" or behavior (Schepers 2006: 283). Instead, INGOs have to work with other actors, such as the international community and domestic citizens to cause actors to change behavior (Yaziji 2004; Teegen, Doh and Vachani 2004; Schepers 2006). As such, advocacy INGOs work to educate individuals and groups, mediate between local and global centers of power, create publicity on issues, and, most importantly, try to gain local and international respect as experts on a specific advocacy issue (Hahn and Holzscheiter 2005).

Very broadly, there are two mechanisms or general theoretical approaches that appear in the interdisciplinary literature on how these tactics invoke policy or behavior outcomes: the spread of economic resources and the spread of norms (Feldman 1997; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Van Tuijl 1999; Richards, Gelleny and Sacko 2001; Welch 2001). Though the mechanisms are often separated in the theoretical literature, in practice, these mechanisms are often used by advocacy INGOs simultaneously (Shigetomi 2002; Okafor 2006). The economic resources approach focuses on how advocacy INGO activities, especially "agenda setting" and "shaming and blaming," can be linked to monetary assistance, investment and aid for a state; the "carrot and stick" incentives of these economic resources can induce targeted-state actors to change their behavior or policies (Hahn and Holzscheiter 2005; Hafner-Burton 2008; Schepers 2006). Under this approach, advocacy INGOs try to gain media attention on

a specific human rights issue and get intergovernmental and powerful governmental actors to support the issue. Through these tactics, termed "leverage politics," advocacy INGOs help pressure a target-state from above (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hestres 2007). By working with international actors, INGOs could impact aid distribution and foreign direct investment, which in turn can cause a target government to adopt a policy or behavior line with the INGO's goal (Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Welch 2001). Under this mechanism, behavior change is based on the rational self-interest of target-state governmental officials; there is usually no discussion of internalization (Johnston 2001; Checkel 2003).[3]

On the other hand, under the normative approach, advocacy INGO activities center on persuading targeted actors to internalize the goals of the INGO (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005). By focusing on normative change, this approach not only focuses on how INGOs work to obtain behavioral or policy outcomes but on how INGOs work to make a specific issue a norm, often defined as a "collective expectation ... of proper behavior" (Katzenstein 1996). At the center of these activities is a process of international and domestic socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Johnston 2008).

INGOs often try to get a critical mass of states to adopt a norm through a process of international socialization (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Johnston 2008). Under this approach, a target-state governmental or non-governmental actor adopts the norm to retain its identity or to be legitimized (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2005).[4] This process is usually argued to involve education, habituation, and repetition, all activities that many advocacy INGOs try to work through (Welch 2001; Checkel 2005; Johnston 2005; Ahmed and Potter 2006). Frequent interactions between the persuader and the persuadee can help expand the identity of

[3]I thank Carrie Wickham for numerous discussions about these mechanisms.

[4]Worth noting, advocacy INGOs can target governments or non-governmental actors, such as multinational corporations or social groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005).

the self, which can also encourage conformity (Checkel 2005; Johnston 2005). Socialization of norms also can be understood as being achieved through peer-pressure: blaming and shaming behavior that goes against the norm while praising the behavior associated with the norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Keck and Sikkink 1998). The key under this approach, in short, is that the advocacy INGO impacts policy and behavior outcomes by changing the identity and expectations of the targeted actor; this actor does not just adopt a policy or behavior because of material concerns.

Worth mentioning, the mechanisms through which advocacy INGOs impact policy and behavior outcomes, as discussed above, are also similar to the mechanisms linking international governmental organizations (IOs or IGOs) to domestic political outcomes in the "second image reversed" literature (Reiter 2001; Pevehouse 2005; Gleditsch and Ward 2006). Though this literature has focused almost exclusively on IOs, as Pevehouse (2005) points out, the international community can encourage domestic political outcomes through direct pressure, socialization and preference change, and "bribery" (170).

Mechanisms Through Which Service INGOs Impact Policy and Behavior

Though largely missing from the TAN framework, the extant cross-disciplinary literature provides a straightforward account of how service INGOs impact policy and behavior outcomes (Masud and Yontcheva 2005; Mohanty 2006; Sparr and Moser 2007). Though it may be commonsensical, these organizations affect outcomes because they often provide the outcome themselves or provide funds for domestic citizens to get a specific good or service themselves (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Masud and Yontcheva 2005). Many service INGOs, especially faith-based INGOs, transfer funds directly to local households (Sparr and Moser 2007). These "social transfers" can be limited to lodging or food monies but also include

larger amounts of funds to support local business initiatives.[5]

More often, service INGOs are involved in providing goods or services themselves within a host state (Mohanty 2006).[6] These organizations provide relief aid, health care and sanitation services, vocational education, and access to business-development training to local populations (Streeten 1997; Clarke 1998; Makoba 2002; Ahmed and Potter 2006). They have also been an important actor in microfinance services in developing countries (Dichter 1996; Amin, Becker and Bayes 1998; Bhatt and Tang 2001). As Makoba (2002) points out, in many developing countries, these organizations "are considered good substitutes for weak states and markets in ... the provision of basic services to most people" (62). Service INGOs typically provide services through funds collected from the international community, including aid from developed countries, individual and private donations, and aid from intergovernmental organizations (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Ahmed and Potter 2006).

Service INGOs also can affect policy and behavior outcomes through partnering with states and intergovernmental organizations in their service provisions. Health and development INGOs often partner with the World Health Organization, for example, in providing vaccinations and micronutrients in developing countries (Buse and Walt 2000). Many domestic governments and service INGOs even partner in pursuit of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (Macan-Markar 2004).

There can also be indirect effects of service INGOs on policy and behavior outcomes. As Murdie and Kakietek (2009) show empirically, development INGOs, as a subset of service INGOs, can affect economic growth through improvements in the health and education of a domestic population. Zinnes and Bell (2002) also point out that service INGOs, through increasing civil society within a state, can lead to

[5]Social transfers usually do not require reciprocity or accountability of the recipient: the funds transferred are non-contingent on results and do not need to be repaid.

[6]I use the term "host" state when referring to the state where the service INGO is providing goods or services. This is in contrast to the "targeted" state, which is the state that an advocacy INGO is trying to get to adopt a policy or behavior in line with the goals of the organization (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Ahmed and Potter 2006).

increases in respect for the rule of law.

In short, though service INGOs are largely missing from the TAN framework, the microprocesses connecting them to policy and behavior outcomes are very straightforward: service INGOs impact policy and behavior through their service provision and civil society activities, which, in turn, has been shown to impact other political and economic outcomes.

2.2 Critiques of the Dominant Framework

The existing TAN framework has been criticized on many fronts (Brown and Moore 2001; Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Kelly 2005; Carpenter 2007). First, as mentioned, the TAN framework, often cited as the "INGO theory of international relations," focuses solely on advocacy INGOs, especially human rights INGOs advocating for the realization of political or civil rights (Keck and Sikkink 1998; DeMars 2005; Kelly 2005). No existing theoretical framework focuses on both service and advocacy INGO or offers predictions concerning the differences between the two.

Additionally, as Kelly (2005) points out, within international relations, "too many scholars in the field overidentify with the NGOs" (62). This "overidentification" could be causing a "wishful academic conjecture" about the behavior and impact of the organizations (Kelly 2005: 62-63). In critiquing the TAN framework, Kelly (2005) goes as far as arguing that "international relations research on [I]NGOs needs less ideological excitement for them and more theoretical and empirical research" (60).

Perhaps this "ideological excitement" is to blame for the TAN framework's idealistic view of INGO motivations and the lack of attention that non-altruistic behaviors by INGOs have received in the international relations literature. As much cross-disciplinary work, practitioner, and journalistic accounts of INGOs point out, the

motivations of many INGOs appear counter to the altruism assumption that has dominated the TAN literature (Petras 1997; Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Khidr 2006; Omara-Otunnu 2007). Below, I highlight these critiques, paying special attention to how non-altruistic motivations differ for service as opposed to advocacy INGOs.

Advocacy INGOs - Non-Altruist Motivations as Internationally-Biased Advocacy

INGOs at work within a state are not always responding to domestic needs or desires (Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Goonatilake 2006; Sundstrom 2006). Instead, INGOs often have their own operational and normative agenda, which can run counter to the goals and objectives of the domestic population. Many times, this agenda can take a very non-altruistic patronizing or paternalistic tone; as Manji and O'Coill (2002) put it, some INGOs have taken the "missionary position."

This problem appears to be especially prevalent in advocacy INGOs, such as environmental or human rights INGOs. Unlike described by TAN, advocacy INGOs are often involved in a state or on an issue not because they have been called there by domestic groups, but because that state or issue fits the existing goals of the INGO (Cooley and Ron 2002; Bob 2005; Goonatilake 2006; Sundstrom 2006). Also counter to the TAN framework, Bob (2005) points out that INGOs may not be interested in all calls for help by domestic populations. Instead, INGOs may only respond to domestic groups if the group's issue fits the strategic needs of the organization. These critiques highlight behavior by advocacy INGOs that is not in line with the altruism assumption that has dominated the literature.

Practitioner and journalistic accounts of INGOs are far more critical of the motivations of some INGOs. These critiques highlight an often "imperial" or "Western" bias in the workings of some advocacy INGOs; often calling these INGOs a modern

day missionary or colonizing force (Roelofs 2006). Let me provide a few of the most striking comments from these writings:

- "The 'work' of NGO's sometimes seems to have more to do with the ideas of donor agencies than of actual local needs. Timetables are likely to be set to please donors rather than to pursue the best quality outcomes. Projects are often determined based on what donors want to fund rather than starting with what local people are asking for" (Wenzel 2006).

- "The NGOs became the 'community face' of neoliberalism, intimately related to those at the top and complementing their destructive work with local projects" (Petras 1997: 12).

- "It is doubtful that Western [INGO] work in Africa can have enduring positive impact unless Euro-Americans discard paternalistic racist attitude towards Africans" (Omara-Otunnu 2007).

- "Every NGO has its own agenda that is not necessarily identical to all domestic interests of the peoples and states that are the target of the organizations' activities. Those organizations are not the angels who we have seen on television" (Khidr 2006).

- "They are heirs of the missionaries, who did many good deeds, bringing sewing machines to Bulgaria, ideas of women's liberation to Chinese footbinders, and life-saving medicines to the less industrialized world. Yet the missionaries also served as scouts for corporations and colonizers" (Roelofs 2006).

- "The NGOs are financed and directed by the various imperialist agencies, the imperialist governments and the comprador regimes. They act as the liaison

> between the people and the governments. They are the vehicles through which the exploiters seek to influence the opinions of 'civil society"' (Mudingu 2006).

As these reports highlight, critiques of advocacy INGOs' motivations are often coupled with concerns for the issue of "donor dominance" within the INGO community (Clark, Sprenger and VeneKlasen 2006). In other words, because INGOs get most of their funding and support from international actors, particularly from the Western community, some INGOs might have little or no incentive to do what domestic groups would like them to and more incentive to advocate for what their international donors desire. The presence of INGOs that advocate for issues that run counter to the desires of local communities can make domestic populations leery of supporting any INGO, even an INGO that has preferences similar to the domestic community (Boyle 2002; Goonatilake 2006; Sundstrom 2006). The TAN framework offers little insight into how this phenomenon could impact overall advocacy INGO effectiveness in world politics.

Let me briefly illustrate these dynamics with a discussion of the anti-female genital cutting (FGC) movement in North Africa. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, most advocacy INGOs in North Africa framed FGC issues in medical terms (Boulware-Miller 1985). As such, most advocacy groups, such as Doctors without Borders, were only pressing for policy changes requiring the practice to be performed in hospitals or doctor's offices by trained medical staff and age-specific restrictions on the practice (Boulware-Miller 1985). By many accounts, these early efforts for medicalization and age-restrictions of the practice were successful and in line with the preferences of the domestic population (Parker 1995; Gruenbaum 2001).

At the end of the Cold War, however, preferences of the international community changed; now the international community wanted all-out FGC eradication. In 1995, four major donor foundations issued a joint statement that the previous advocacy

attempts for medicalization policies concerning FGC were "mistake[s]" (Boyle 2002). Many INGOs thus joined larger IGO groups or policy statements concerning their goals for total FGC eradication (Boyle 2002).

In the 1990s, there was an increase in both the number of INGOs active on anti-FGC projects and funds directed at these INGOs. In fact, as Clark, Sprenger and VeneKlasen (2006) point out, all other funding to human rights or women's INGOs already active within the region dried up; INGOs with long standing commitments to the region could join the bandwagon of anti-FGC and gain international community funds or they were forced to look elsewhere for funds and support.

Given the vast amount of funding and attention to FGC eradication advocacy, the extant TAN framework would predict the advocacy attempt by INGOs to be wildly successful (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). In addition, the issue concerned states vulnerable to international pressure and involved bodily harm, all factors that, according to the TAN framework, would increase the likelihood of the advocacy effort influencing policy and behavior outcomes in line with the preferences of the INGO. In reality, however, though INGO efforts led to some policy changes and treaty adoption by targeted governments, the project was largely considered unsuccessful in eradicating FGC practices (Boyle, Songora and Foss 2001; Grande 2004). Many scholars writing on the subject conclude that human rights INGO efforts might have actually increased FGC prevalence, especially among middle and upper class highly-educated women in North Africa (Gruenbaum 2001; Boyle 2002).

As the case of FGC eradication advocacy highlights, INGOs are often not motivated to help a domestic population reach their own goals. Instead, INGOs can have self-interested motivations to be involved on an issue or in a state. Many of these motivations reflect an international bias on the part of the advocacy INGO. These motivations can be in stark contrast to the goals and desires of the domestic

population that the INGO, by its very mission statement, is supposedly trying to help.

The FGC case would imply that this type of behavior by INGOs could condition when and where INGOs have an impact in world politics. However, this phenomenon has not been empirically examined and falls outside of the dominant TAN framework. No theoretical framework examines how the presence of advocacy INGOs that are internationally-biased could impact the behavior of other advocacy INGOs, how advocacy INGOs are responded to by other international and domestic actors, or, perhaps most importantly, the effectiveness of overall advocacy INGO efforts.

Service INGOs - Non-Altruism as Rent-Seeking

There are very few channels of accountability for INGOs (Hillhorst 2002; Cooley and Ron 2002; Grant and Keohane 2005). Unlike governments or private companies, there are very rarely boards or constituents who oversee the decisions of INGOs. Many donation channels have little formal reporting requirements; INGOs do not often have to prove their projects were successful, just that donations were actually spent (Petras 1997). Issues of INGO accountability are not addressed within the TAN framework and bring up many debatable issues for both international relations scholars and practitioners (Hillhorst 2002; Cooley and Ron 2002; Grant and Keohane 2005). For example, are INGOs accountable to their host government or to the government where they were founded? How accountable should INGOs be to donors? Or, as the above section might suggest, could accountability to donors limit accountability to local populations? Additionally, will accountability from above (ie accountability from governments and international organizations) limit the creativity and low-overhead that is supposed to be a strength of INGOs? These issues have been similarly raised in recent American politics and public policy research on non-profits (Najam 1996;

Frumkin 2002; Darnall and Carmin 2005; Gugerty N.d.; Gugerty and Prakash 2009)

Regardless of where INGO accountability should lie, a lack of overall accountability, coupled with a growing amount of funds directed at INGOs, has been argued to have led to an increase in the number of INGOs solely motivated by private rents (Cooley and Ron 2002; Ben Attia 2004; Petras 1997). Like before, this type of non-altruistic motivation is contrary to the TAN's assumption that INGOs are motivated by "values rather than material concerns" (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2).

The issue of rent-seeking by INGOs seems especially prevalent in service INGOs.[7] Service INGOs, which typically take large donations for development or health projects, often have much larger operating budgets than advocacy INGOs (Ahmed and Potter; UIA, 2008/2009). These organizations also typically have far more overhead than advocacy INGOs, perhaps making the siphoning of funds from large donations easier.

The practitioner and journalistic literature on service INGOs highlights the growing number of organizations that are rent-seeking, typically taking international donations and not investing the funds in service provision domestically but, instead, using the funds to fill private coffers. Below, I provide some comments from these reports:

- "Many people may believe that honestly concerned individuals and groups establish NGOs. But in most cases the situation clearly shows that selfish and greedy individuals use the system to create and benefit from NGOs" (Berhan 2002).

- "There are NGOs doing valuable work; there are also fake NGOs set up either to siphon off grant money or as tax dodges" (Roy 2004).

[7] This could also explain the lack of attention to rent-seeking INGOs from within the TAN framework, which, as mentioned, focuses solely on advocacy INGOs.

- "It is common for me to see them benefit from disaster recovery projects: another project, another new flashy car for each of them" (quote of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Puji Pujiono, in a *Jakarta Post* August 24, 2006 article by Adisti Sawitri) .

- "I think NGOs are doing well but the majority of them are in it to make money. There are instances where some will just go to the villages, take photographs, and present them to the donors" (quote of Fadda Dickson, Ghana in *BBC News* February 20, 2004 article "NGOs: Achievers or Deceivers?")

- "The potential for fly-by-night organizations is very high. Sometimes it is a man and wife. Sometimes it's a few cronies who had a beer in a pub and decided that having an AIDS organization would be a good thing" (quote of Frances Angila, "head of Kenya's oversight group for nongovernmental organizations, in a *New York Times* July 9, 2003 article by Marc Lacey).

- "The problem of bogus NGOs is a worryingly under-researched area. Not only do they tarnish the image of genuine NGOs but may also lead to an over-estimation of the developmental capacity of certain regions. It is not improbable that bogus NGOs fraudulently appropriate tens of millions of dollars of donor funding and charitable contributions every year. On a more normative level, it is indeed time they were rounded up!" (quote of William Greene, United Kingdom in *BBC News* February 20, 2004 article "NGOs: Achievers or Deceivers?")

These quotes all point out a very non-altruistic motivation of many service INGOs: funds for private purposes. These funds can be fully embezzled or some of the money can be used to buy "$40,000 four wheel drive sports vehicle" and "maids" for private purposes (Petras 1999). This self-interested use of funds donated to help a domestic

population is in stark contrast to the altruism assumption dominant in the TAN framework.

To note, there have been some governmental efforts designed to curb this private rent-seeking. For example, in India, over 3000 NGOs and INGOs were blacklisted by major Indian donor groups for suspicion of embezzlement in 1997 (Mohan 1998). In post-Taliban Afghanistan, where the joke goes: "first there was Communism, then there was Talibanism, and now there is NGOism" a recent Afghan political campaign centered on the idea that the vast majority of Afghanistan's 2500 registered INGOs were corrupt and need to be expelled (Huggler 2005; Mojumdar 2006). These actions by governments, however, have also been criticized as attempts to get INGOs critical of the ruling party out of the country (Lowe 2006; Volk 2006). This was definitely the case in Russia in 2006 when President Putin signed a bill that gave the Justice Ministry sweeping powers over INGOs and local NGOs. Although Putin justified the law as a way to control corruption and outside funding of political fringe groups, many see the law as as way to limit outside critiques of Putin's leadership (Lowe 2006; Volk 2006).

To conclude this section, let me be clear that, in all reports, no one is claiming that all INGOs have self interested motivations. In fact, as Vaknin (2005) points out:

> Some NGOs...genuinely contribute to enhancing welfare, to the mitigation of hunger, the furtherance of human and civil rights, or the curbing of disease. Others ...are sometimes ideologically biased, or religiously-committed and, often, at the service of special interests...Conflicts of interest and unethical behavior abound (1).

As Vaknin (2005)'s quote shows, there are both INGOs with altruistic and non-

altruistic motivations active in world politics today. Unfortunately, however, the underlying motivations of INGOs are not public knowledge. No one besides the INGO really knows whether the organization is motivated mainly to help a domestic population reach their goals or whether the organization is self-interested (Berhan 2002; Roy 2004; Vaknin 2005). Berhan (2002) points out that the true motivations of INGOs are often "hidden...and vehemently denied." INGOs have incentives to disclose and disguise their true type. In other words, they may want to appear as legitimate and altruistic as possible, even if they are not. This was also the case historically with many religious based advocacy INGOs; they wanted to disguise their proselytizing and not appear internationally-biased (Paine and Gratzer 2001; Ahmed and Potter 2006).

In short, the heterogeneity in the motivations of INGOs is missing in the dominant TAN framework and, thus, the behavior and impact of INGOs discussed in the TAN literature fails to reflect reality. Not only does this TAN framework, then, fail to account for INGOs with non-altruistic motivations, it fails to address how these heterogeneous motivations could complicate the interactions INGOs have with other actors in the world system and condition, by extension, any impact INGOs have on policy and behavior outcomes.

2.3 Signals Sent by INGOs

Many INGOs are concerned that a rise in the number of INGOs with non-altruistic motivations could undermine their ability to gain international and domestic support (Steinberg 2001; Ben Attia 2004). As Lee (2007)put it, could a few "bad apples" cause the international and domestic community to throw out the whole barrel? Given that INGOs do differ in their underlying motivations, what can those with altruistic motivations do to separate themselves from the pack? In this section, I address

how INGOs themselves have sought to deal with issues concerning their underlying motivations and outline the cross-disciplinary literature concerning the actions and procedures INGOs have tried to use as an indication of their motivations. In short, these actions by INGOs can be thought of as *signals* and can, when credible, help the INGO indicate its underlying motivations to both the international and domestic communities. Thus, I situate these actions within the larger signaling literature within international relations.

Like discussed above, INGOs need and desire the support of international and domestic actors. However, these actors are uninformed of the actual motivations of the INGOs they are interacting with. In the domain of advocacy, INGOs could be altruistic, working to aid a domestic community reach their own goals, or non-altruistic, working for policy or behavior outcomes that are internationally-biased and not consist with the domestic population that they are supposedly trying to help. Conversely, service INGOs could be either altruistic, working to provide goods and services to a domestic population, or non-altruistic, taking money from international donors and using it to fill their own private coffers. Uncertainty about the actual motivations of the INGO complicates the decision of these international and domestic actors to support these organizations (Bekkers 2007).

For both service and advocacy organizations, issues of heterogeneous motivations have been an important discussion topic at INGO conferences and networking meetings. As these conferences have concluded, it is often up to the INGOs themselves to try to indicate their underlying motivations to the domestic and international actors that are crucial to their work (Ben Attia 2004). These actions taken to indicate underlying motivations could be relatively costless, such as setting up a website or writing a mission statement concerning their altruistic motivations, or could be very costly, such as releasing their financial documents or signing larger issue and policy statements on an advocacy issue.

In many cases, these actions differ for advocacy as opposed to service INGOs. Below, I will discuss the different ways in which advocacy and service INGOs have sought to indicate their underlying motivations to the domestic and international actors that can offer them support. Before doing so, however, let me stress that that these actions by the INGOs themselves fit squarely within the larger signaling literature within international relations. As such, I'm arguing that these actions of INGOs are *signals,* made to reduce the uncertainty domestic and international actors have concerning the underlying preferences and motivations of the INGO.

Within both international relations and economics, a large literature has formed concerning signals (Jervis 1970; Kreps 1990; Morrow 1994; Sartori 2003; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007; Chapman 2009). Much of this literature is formal, using game-theoretic models to examine signaling dynamics (Kreps 1990; Morrow 1994; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). This signaling literature all reflects one basic dynamic: there exists some private information, typically concerning an actor's underlying motivations, and other actors would like to be informed of this private information. The uniformed actor(s) do have a belief about the private information; however, they are uncertain. The fully-informed actor can send a signal to others of its private information (Kreps 1990; Morrow 1994; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). By sending this signal, the informed actor is trying to change beliefs the uninformed actor has and, thus, get the uninformed actor to behave in the way it would like.[8]

This is clearly the case with respect to INGOs: the domestic and international communities want to know the underlying motivations of the INGO they could support. These communities could receive some benefit from the work of INGOs. However, if the service INGO is a rent-seeker, for example, the INGO could provide no benefit for the international and domestic communities and just use the support it

[8]Game-theoretic discussions of these dynamics also refer to signaling as an adverse selection principal-agent situation. The fully-informed player is the agent and the uninformed player is the principal. The principal must rely upon signals sent by the agent when selecting which type of agent to support (Kreps 1990; Morrow 1994; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007).

receives privately. If the advocacy INGO is internationally-biased, likewise, the domestic community may also receive no benefit from the policy and behavior outcome INGO is advocating for. The INGOs would like to indicate their underlying motivations to these communities, either signaling that they are non-rent seekers, in the case of service INGOs, or signal whether they are predominantly motivated to help the domestic population or internationally-biased, as is the case with advocacy INGOs.

Drawing on this signaling literature allows the study of INGOs to connect to the larger signaling literature in international relations, which is just beginning to examine signals made by non-state actors (Chapman 2007; Weeks 2008; Fang 2008; Chapman 2009). It also provides a theoretically-satisfying framework to examine these actions by INGOs. Previous research on similar actions by domestic non-profits has not focused on how these signals could affect policy or behavior outcomes by the overall INGO/non-profit community (Reinhardt 2006; Gugerty N.d.; Gugerty and Prakash 2009; Reinhardt 2009).

By seeing these actions as signals to uninformed actors, many theoretical and empirical factors can be examined. First, by drawing on the signaling literature, the costs of these actions are highlighted (Jervis 1970; Sartori 2003). In other words, for a signal to inform the uninformed actor, the signal has to be discriminating and can't be copied or mimicked by the undesired type (Kreps 1990; Morrow 1994; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). To insure that the signal isn't mimicked, the signal typically must be costly, too costly in fact for the undesired type to copy.[9] However, the signal typically can't be too costly or the desired type won't be willing to send the signal (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). Attention to this idea from the signaling literature allows the study of these actions by INGOs to focus on their costs and how their costs

[9]Worth noting, however, as Sartori (2003) points out, some signals, even if non-costly "cheap talk" can inform if there are repeated interactions, uninformed actors know the history of the signal-sender, and there is the possibility of punishment. I would contend that a cheap talk approach to signaling would not as aptly apply to INGOs because the international and domestic communities rarely know the full history of the INGO they are interacting with.

are borne by both altruistic and non-altruistic types of INGOs.

Second, the signaling literature addresses when and where signals are more likely to be observed. In certain situations, such as when the uninformed player faces predominantly one type of actor or when the uninformed player's benefits from the two types are similar, we are less likely to see signals at all (Kreps 1990; Morrow 1994; McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). Attention to these dynamics are important for understanding when heterogeneous types of INGOs will try to indicate their underlying motivations in the first place.

Third, the signaling literature in international relations has separated costly signals into categories based on when the costs are paid in relation to when the uniformed player updates its beliefs (Fearon 1997). If costs are paid ex post, these signals are typically thought of as "tying hands" signals (Fearon 1997). These signals inform the uninformed player by showing resolve and involve an audience that can punish the signal-sender for not following through (Fearon 1997; Weeks 2008). Public statements of resolve by a state's leadership, for example, have been thought of as tying hands signals.

Conversely, if costs are paid ex ante, these signals are typically referred to as "sunk costs" signals (Fearon 1997). In other words, these signals inform because of the financial costs that are taken up front, showing the uniformed player the commitment, for example, of the signal-sender. I contend that the signals by INGOs are typically sunk costs signals. Because of issues of overall accountability of INGOs, as discussed above, there rarely exists an audience that can coordinate and punish the INGO ex post. As Weeks (2008) points out, this coordination is necessary for tying hands signals to inform and be credible.

Finally, the previous signaling literature in international relations has focused on how signals sent by actors condition the behavior of others and, thus, impact many different political outcomes, including war, foreign direct investment, and diplomacy

(Jervis 1970; Mansfield, Milner and Rosendorff 2003; Sartori 2003; Chapman 2009). Similarly, through examining how signals by INGOs impact the behavior of other actors, a more theoretically satisfying account of the conditional impact of INGOs can be constructed. In short, there are many theoretical reasons for drawing on the signaling literature to understand the actions of INGOs. I return to these ideas further in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 when I draw upon the signaling literature to construct game-theoretic models of INGO behavior.

Signals by Advocacy INGOs

Signals sent by advocacy INGOs differ somewhat from the classic signaling literature and draw attention to the fact that these signals are, at the very basic level, to *two* uninformed actors, the domestic community and the international community, and these actors can have divergent preferences concerning which type of advocacy INGO they would prefer to support. Distinct from the situation with respect to service INGOs, therefore, signals by advocacy INGOs can be responded to differently by the domestic as opposed to the international community. For advocacy INGOs, the international community may actually want a non-altruistic INGO, one whose motivations are not to help a domestic population reach its own goals but whose motivations are internationally-biased and, thus, more in line with the preferences of the international community. Therefore, signaling by advocacy INGOs really reflects a *signaling dilemma*, in which the signals sent are not effective at influencing the behavior of both potential audiences. I will return to this dynamic in Chapter 4.[10]

To indicate their underlying motivations, advocacy INGOs typically have relied upon signing on to larger policy position statements on an advocacy issue or joining intergovernmental policy positions and organizations (WRC 2001; CSD 2005; CAN

[10]This type of signaling to multiple uninformed actors has been referred to as a common agency situation within the larger literature (Stole 1991; Martimort 1996; Dixit, Grossman and Helpman 1997).

2007; *NGO Statement on US IDP Policy* 2008). Much of the time, these policy statements are used to signal that an INGO is internationally-biased (WRC 2001; CSD 2005; CAN 2007). This was definitely the case with the above example of female genital cutting advocacy by INGOs; many internationally-biased INGOs signed on to large Western statements concerning the need for the full eradication of FGC, indicating that there would be no efforts for the medicalization or age-restriction of the practice (Boyle, Songora and Foss 2001; Boyle 2002). These policy statements, as Boyle (2002) points out, indicated to the domestic populations in North Africa and the Middle East that their preferences were not paramount for the advocacy INGO.

However, as mentioned, signals by advocacy INGOs can also indicate their interest in supporting the preferences of domestic communities. As an example, in December of 2008, twenty-one human rights and refugee INGOs signed a policy statement entitled "NGO Statement on US IDP Policy." This statement laid out a policy position that was contrary to the United States' position on internally displaced people (IDP). In addition to advocating for a change in this policy, this statement can be viewed as a signal that these groups are not internationally-biased but, instead, have advocacy preferences that are more in line with the domestic communities they are trying to help.

Signals through policy statements occur in many different advocacy situations. For example, in 2007, many INGOs joined the European Union in a joint policy statement on climate and energy (CAN 2007). This policy statement was very internationally-biased, offering little discussion of the desires of domestic groups, specifically domestic groups in developing countries, with respect to environmental concerns (Steinberg 2002, 2005). Therefore, by signing this statement, these advocacy INGOs were indicating that their underlying motivations were in line with the international community and not in line with the domestic communities of many developing states.

A similar signal of underlying motivations for advocacy INGOs has occurred

through their involvement with large intergovernmental organizations (Chiang 1981; Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Otto 1996; Willetts 2000; Alger 2002). Many intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, have consultative status or working relationship status that INGOs can apply for (Willetts 2002; Kelly 2005). These consultative status arrangements provide the INGO with some additional access to the workings of the intergovernmental organization but can, especially with the case of advocacy INGOs, be seen as a signal of the INGO's international bias (Chiang 1981; Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Otto 1996; Willetts 2000; Alger 2002).[11] In fact, to gain status with the UN or the World Bank, an INGO has to state how its motivations and policy positions reflect the overall goals of the intergovernmental organization (Willetts 2002; Kelly 2005; UN 2008).[12] Organizations with preferences for advocacy issues that are not in line with international preferences are typically not given consultative status (Willetts 2002; UN 2008). In short, consultative status, though perhaps desired for a variety of networking reasons, also serves as a signal of international preferences for advocacy INGOs.

Signals by Service INGOs

Similar to the "Better Business Bureau" for American for-profit firms, INGOs and domestic non-profits have sought ways to create voluntary accountability mechanisms or programs to signal that their underlying motivations are not for rent-seeking activities and that they will, instead, use donated funds to help domestic populations (Gugerty N.d.; Tschirhart 2009; Gugerty and Prakash 2009). These voluntary accountability

[11] In a recent working paper, Brewington, Davis and Murdie (2009) find that human rights INGOs with consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) are more likely to be central to the overall advocacy network.

[12] As such, the vast majority of INGOs with consultative status are based in the global North, recent reports from the UN show that 66% of organizations with consultative status are based in either Europe or North America (UN 2008).

groups are very prevalent for service INGOs, where concerns of rent-seeking behaviors are paramount.

As Gugerty and Prakash (2009) contend, voluntary accountability mechanisms, often termed voluntary accountability "groups" or "clubs," are a way for NGOs to signal their motivations to donors and other actors concerned about the organization's underlying motivations.[13] As a recent practitioner article concluded, "it has come full circle, with NGOs forming their own NGO government in order to establish some kind of order" (SP 2008). In effect, this is exactly what service INGOs have tried to do through these mechanisms: they have tried to form a voluntary "government" or program though which their underlying motivations can become clear to both the international and domestic communities.

There are many voluntary accountability programs; in fact, Bowman (2008) found over 200 such programs in the United States for domestic non-profits. For service INGOs, who are often involved in multiple states and regions in a single year, the UN ECOSOC consultative status program represents a similar type of accountability mechanism.[14] To gain consultative status, organizations must fill out a lengthy application and participate in a review process (UN 2008). INGOs are asked about their governing structures, their relationships to any governments, and list all monies received in the last five years with detailed explanations of how the funds were used. These applications are then reviewed by both governmental and non-governmental representatives to ECOSOC and, if documentation is sufficient, the INGO is granted consultative status (UN 2008). This process, which is very arduous and time-consuming, thus can serve as a signal to both the international and domestic communities of a service INGO's underlying motivations not to rent-seek. Once accredited, many INGOs proudly list their UN Consultative Status on their organization's stationary and

[13]The focus of Gugerty and Prakash (2009) is on domestic non-profits. However, many of the clubs or groups they outline are also utilized by INGOs.

[14]To my knowledge, the nonprofit literature has not addressed the ECOSOC consultative status in this way.

website. Organizations with consultative status are subjected to quadrennial reporting requirements (UN 2008). In short, the ECOSOC consultative status program perhaps could be argued to be the longest and most well-known of any voluntary accountability program and one that would be observable to both the domestic and international communities (Dieng 2001).

The impact of these accountability programs on the behavior of INGOs and the responses to these programs by the international and domestic communities has not been theoretically or empirically established. More importantly, the impact of a growing number of rent-seeking service INGOs on levels of overall INGO-induced policy and behavior outcomes has been under theorized and never empirically examined. In Chapter 5, I provide the first empirical tests concerning this phenomenon.

Conclusion

In reviewing the extant practitioner and cross-disciplinary literature on INGOs, this chapter has made three interrelated points. First, INGOs interact with actors from both the international and domestic communities in trying to impact policy or behavior outcomes. Second, unlike the dominant TAN framework, INGOs differ in their underlying motivations; some are altruistic and some display behavior that would be consistent with very non-altruistic or self-interested motivations. For service INGOs, non-altruistic motivations are typically observed as rent-seeking behaviors. For advocacy INGO, non-altruistic motivations are typically seen as an international bias as opposed to advocating for policies or behavior outcomes that are desired by the domestic population of the state that the INGO is targeting. Third, INGOs can make signals to the domestic and international communities concerning their underlying motivations.

In the next two chapters, I use these basic points to develop a theoretical frame-

work of the behavior and conditional impact of INGOs in world politics. This framework, by relaxing the assumption that all INGOs are altruistic, provides excess empirical implications over the dominant TAN theory and offers rich empirical implications for when and where we can expect INGOs to impact policy and behavior outcomes.

Chapter 3

Modeling Service INGOs

> After more than four decades of existence, the varied NGO world is caught in deep contradictions. If ...NGOs are genuinely seeking ways to help overcome the poverty in the South, they have yet to find many answers.
> Oliver Berthoud (2001)

Not much is known about the political and developmental impact of service INGOs. As Chapter 2 pointed out, the dominant theoretical framework of INGOs in international relations seems to skip any discussion of service INGOs altogether. Instead, the literature has focused predominantly on advocacy INGOs, such as human rights or environmental organizations. This is unfortunate considering how much of the growth in the INGO sector is due to increases in the number of service INGOs. Are service INGOs, as many contend, critical actors for ending poverty and aiding development and health in poor countries? If these organizations do have a potential role, what factors condition their effects? When and where are service INGOs most likely to improve human well-being? What, if anything, could be done to aid their efforts at service provision? Extant theory offers little insights into these questions.

In this chapter, I develop a game-theoretic model of the behavior and conditional impact of service INGOs. Within the model, I relax the assumption that all service

INGOs are altruistic and, instead, allow there to be both service INGOs motivated to help a domestic population and service INGOs who are only motivated by collecting private rents from international donations. The model also accounts for the existence of signals, as discussed in the last chapter, through which service INGOs can try to indicate their underlying motivations to both international and domestic actors. By focusing on how these factors influence when and where service INGOs are likely to get the support of others, the first theoretical framework of the conditional impact of service INGOs is developed. The empirical implications of this theoretical framework are then tested in Chapter 5.

This chapter proceeds in four parts. In the first section, I outline the structure of the game-theoretic model. Here, I highlight the actors and behavior critical to understanding the impact of service INGOs and discuss the motivations of these actors in greater detail. Second, I walk through the model equilibria, or, in other words, the likely behavior for each actor in the theoretical model. Third, I discuss the model results and general empirical implications derived from the model. Finally, I address how these general implications are adapted into testable hypotheses. Whenever possible, I try to leave mathematical proof of the results to the appendix and focus only on the logical intuition in the body of the chapter.

3.1 Model Structure

Service INGOs do not act in a vacuum. While service INGOs can be critical in getting goods and services to local populations, they do not have many formal powers or unlimited funds. Instead, the effect of service INGOs depends on the cooperation of additional actors. This is consistent with both the extant TAN framework and the cross-disciplinary literature on service INGOs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 1999; Cooley and Ron 2002; Ahmed and Potter 2006).

According to this literature, as discussed in Chapter 2, there appears to be two large groups of actors who are critical to the success of service INGOs: the domestic population of the state where the INGO wants to work and the international community. By the domestic or sub-state population, I am referring to domestic NGOs and domestic citizens in the host state. The support of the domestic population is essential for service INGO activities to have any lasting impact on political or developmental outcomes (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Petras 1997, 1999). By the international community, I am referring to international organizations, donor foundations, and third-party states that often interact with service INGOs. The support of these actors aids in the funding and operations of the service INGO (Cooley and Ron 2002).[1]

Domestic and international support for an INGO is not automatic; each actor has a choice of whether or not to support the INGO.[2] If these populations support a service INGO with ideal or altruistic motivations, the service INGO provides goods or services which are of some value to both the international and domestic communities.

However, like discussed in Chapter 2, there exist both service INGOs with altruistic motivations *and* those with non-altruistic motivations. Consistent with the practitioner literature, service INGOs with non-altruistic motivations typically use funds donated by the international community as private rents (Ben Attia 2004; Petras 1997, 1999). In other words, these organizations use international donations privately, not investing the money in the provision of goods or services to a domestic

[1]The existence of both an international and a domestic community is distinct from the extant nonprofit voluntary accountability program or signaling literature (Reinhardt 2006; Gugerty N.d.; Gugerty and Prakash 2009; Reinhardt 2009). This literature has assumed, even when referring to INGOs, that only one set of actors has a choice of whether or not to support the non-profit organization. As discussed above, this would be inconsistent with the larger literature on INGOs and even non-profits, which acknowledges that there exists both local service recipients and a distinct group of donors and supports, who are in many instances, international (Hulme and Edwards 1997; Petras 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Petras 1999; Grant and Keohane 2005; Ahmed and Potter 2006).

[2]This assumption, though very straightforward, is largely distinct from the TAN framework, which often assumes that the domestic community calls out to and would welcome any INGO with open arms (as outlined by Bob 2005; Kelly 2005).

population. The domestic and international communities do not receive any benefit from these non-altruistic service INGOs.

Whether the INGO is altruistic or not is private knowledge; other actors do not know whether they are interacting with an INGO that prefers to actually provide goods or services or an INGO that is simply rent-seeking. Like American for-profit firms and the "Better Business Bureau," service INGOs can register with voluntary accountability groups to try to signal that they are not rent-seekers (Gugerty N.d.; Gugerty and Prakash 2009). This signal could influence the support the international and domestic communities provide the INGO.

This basic framework is the back-bone of the game-theoretic model developed to understand the conditional impact of service INGOs. Figure 3.1 outlines the structure and payoffs of the game between a service INGO and the international and domestic communities.

Figure 3.1: Service INGO Game-Theoretic Model - Structure of the Game



The structure of the game is as follows. First, "Nature" moves, selecting the type of service INGO that will be involved in the interaction. With a set and known probability, referred to as P, Nature can select the service INGO to be an altruistic or non rent-seeking type. I refer to this organization as $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$. Likewise, with probably *1-P,* Nature can select the service INGO to a non-altruistic rent-seeking organization. I refer to this organization as INGO_{Bad}. Importantly, reflecting the idea that this is private information, both the international community and the domestic population are unaware of what type of INGO they are interacting with. In other words, these actors do not know how Nature moved.

The next move, as shown in Figure 3.1, involves the signal service INGOs can send to the international and domestic communities. A few assumptions about this signaling move are important. First, very basically, signals sent to indicate that a

service INGO is not a rent-seeker involve registering with voluntary accountability programs and other actions designed to signal an INGO's transparency and accountability, as discussed in Chapter 2. Second, though it might be self-evident, it is worth noting that both types of INGOs, $INGO_{GoodS}$ and $INGO_{BadS}$, can signal. In the case of rent-seeking INGOs, for example, rent-seekers can also try to signal their transparency or register with voluntary accountability programs just like non rent-seekers (Ben Attia 2004). In order for the signal to actually be important to the domestic and international community, therefore, non rent-seekers must send more of the signal than rent-seekers can stomach.

Relatedly, these signals by service INGOs are costly. INGOs have a continuous choice of the amount of the signal they want to send. If it chooses to send more of the signal, the INGO faces more costs. This is consistent with the non-profit literature and many of the practitioner description of these signals (Akhtar 2006; Gugerty N.d.; SP 2008; UN 2008; Gugerty and Prakash 2009).[3] These signals add an additional burden on the part of the INGOs, forcing them to hire additional staff for "endless meetings, paperwork, and accounting" (Dolhinow 2005: 165). In the game-theoretic model, these costs are paid ex ante, or prior to the offering of support by the international and domestic communities. Additionally, the choice is continuous because INGOs could, in theory, register with unlimited numbers of voluntary accountability programs. In other words, the signal is costly because (a) it involves a loss of resources and time and (b) it could result in critiques about the business practices of the NGO (Gugerty N.d.; SP 2008; UN 2008; Gugerty and Prakash 2009). As Akhtar (2006) pointed out, the requirements of many of these programs make "report writing ...a mandatory skill" of INGOs, often taking time and resources away from other more mission-oriented activities (94).

To illustrate the costliness of one possible signal, let me outline the process of

[3]It is also consistent with much of the current international relations signaling literature (Fearon 1994, 1997; Weeks 2008).

gaining consultative status with the UN ECOSOC. The first step of gaining consultative status involves a formal letter of intent, copies of financial statements, annual reports, and the by-laws of the organization (Willetts 2000; Wieczorek-Zeul 2005; UN 2008). The organization also has to fill out a questionnaire of how their organization "contributed to any areas with substantive UN concern", their structure, and the executive board of the organization (UN 2008). More importantly, the organization has to fill out information on all donations and expenses (UN 2008). As many of commented, these reports take a large portion of time for even the most professional of INGOs (Dhunpath 2003; Dolhinow 2005; Akhtar 2006).

After this information is submitted, it is then screened by the NGO Committee of ECOSOC. In 2009, 64 of the 153 applications were recommended for consultative status by the Committee (UNECOSOC 2009). Typically, the [I]NGO is also questioned by members of the Committee. If the Committee recommends the organization, the organization's status is then decided by ECOSOC, typically within the same year (UN 2008). Once consultative status is granted, the organization must provide quadrennial reports and can be suspended for not keeping with the goals of ECOSOC, for failing to submit required reports, or at the request of UN members.

After observing the costly signal sent by the INGO, there are then simultaneous moves by the international and domestic community; these actors can choose to invest or support the INGO or not, as seen in Figure 3.1. These are the last moves in the game. Supporting the INGO is costly for the international and domestic communities. For the international community, this cost would entail funds directed at the INGO. For the domestic community, these costs include time, effort, and energy spent working on the programs and projects of the INGO. For example, domestic support of a service INGO that provides training on sustainable agriculture practices, like the Asian Farmers' Association for Sustainable Rural Development, entails real opportunity costs to the individuals sitting in on the training programs instead of

partaking in their normal income-generating activities.

A brief overview of the notation and parameters used in the game is provided in Table 3.1. With reference to this notation, let me walk through the payoffs each actor in the game-theoretic model receives. Each actor's utility equation for the game is provided in Figure 3.1.

Table 3.1: Notation and Symbols Used in the Service INGO Model

Symbol	**Parameter**
P	Probability that Service INGO is not a rent-seeker ($\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$)
C_{INGO}	Costly Signal by Service INGO
H_{I}	Value of High Outcome to $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$
L_{I}	Value of Low Outcome to $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$
H_{L}	Value of High Outcome to International Community
L_{L}	Value of Low Outcome to International Community
C_{L}	Cost of Investing in the INGO to International Community
H_{D}	Value of High Outcome to Domestic Community
L_{D}	Value of Low Outcome to Domestic Community
C_{D}	Cost of Supporting the INGO to Domestic Community
K	Value of rent to rent-seeking INGO (INGO_{Bad})

First, a rent-seeking INGO, INGO_{Bad}, fails to produce any outcome of value to the international or domestic communities. Therefore, the international and domestic communities receive no benefit for supporting INGO_{Bad}; they just entail the costs of their support. These costs are summarized as C_L, in the case of the international community, and C_D, in the case of the domestic community. Additionally, an INGO_{Bad} does not produce any outcome of value for itself besides the rent it receives if it gets the international community to support and invest in it; this rent is summarized as K. INGO_{Bad} does have to pay for its costly signal; this is summarized as C_{INGO} in the model. Consistent with the formal signaling literature, C_{INGO} is endogenously determined (Kreps 1990).

When the service INGO is a non rent-seeking INGO, $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$, consistent with the extant literature, it critical that the domestic community supports the INGO;

without their support, any effect of the INGO$_{\text{Good}}$'s activities are not sustainable (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Petras 1997, 1999; Cooley and Ron 2002; Ahmed and Potter 2006; *NGOs: Achievers or Deceivers?* 2004). Also, the international community's support can be critical to getting a higher outcome for the INGO$_{\text{Good}}$'s activities. Therefore, if INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ gets both relevant actors to support the project or service provision, all actors receive a high outcome. I call this value H and subscript it for each relevant actor. If INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ is only supported by the domestic community, each actor receives a value for a low outcome, L, also subscripted for each actor. And, as mentioned, if the actor is only supported by the international community, any impact of the service INGO is not sustainable and, thus, all actors receive no benefit from the project or activity. Like the case with INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$, if the INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ sends a signal, the cost of this signal, C_{INGO}, is subtracted from the overall payoff to INGO$_{\text{Good}}$. Also, both the international and domestic community incur costs for supporting the INGO$_{\text{Good}}$. Again, these costs are summarized as C_L for the international community and C_D for the domestic community.

3.2 Model Equilibria

Solutions to the service INGO game-theoretic model provides a variety of important insights into the likely behavior of each actor in the model. Attention to these dynamics is the first step in deriving logically-consistent empirical implications concerning the conditional impact of service INGOs. Below, I first walk through the equilibria for the model and then focus on the model results and empirical implications.

I use Perfect Bayesian Equilibria as the solution concept of the game. This solution concept allows me to focus on equilibria that involve sequentially rational moves given certain consistent beliefs about the incomplete information critical to the game. I restrict my focus to pure strategy equilibria.

There exists both separating and pooling equilibria to the model. Proofs of these equilibria can be found in this chapter's Appendix. Separating equilibria occur when the INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ and the INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$ send different signals to the relevant actors and, thus, these actors are able to know for certain which type of INGO they are facing based solely on the signal they observe. In the pooling equilibria, both types of INGOs send the same signal and, thus, the international and domestic communities' behavior depends on the pre-existing probability that they are facing a non rent-seeker, not on the signal sent by the INGOs.

I identify two separating equilibria. In each of these equilibria, the INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ sends a costly signal of C_{INGO*} and the INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$ sends a signal less than C_{INGO*}. This could be a situation where the INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ registers with a greater number of voluntary accountability programs than the INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$.. I first outline these equilibria formally in the propositions below and then discuss them informally.

Proposition 3.1. Ideal Behavior Equilibrium *– The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model:*

set*1) For* $C_{INGO*} \leq H_{I1}$*, the* INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ *sends a signal of* $C_{INGO*} = K$*.*

2) For $C_{INGO*} \geq K$*, the* INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$ *sends a signal less than* C_{INGO*}*.*

3) For $C_L \leq H_L - L_L$*, the international community supports INGOs iff they observe* C_{INGO*} *or greater.*

4) For $C_D \leq H_D$*, the domestic community supports INGOs iff they observe* C_{INGO*}*or greater.*

Separation requires updating to certainty. Therefore, respective beliefs for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

*a) P' = Prob(*INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ | C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 1*

*b) P' = Prob(*INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ | *less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 0*

c) $P'' = Prob(\text{INGO}_{\text{Bad}} \mid C_{INGO*}$ *or greater)* $= 0$

d) $P'' = Prob(\text{INGO}_{\text{Bad}} \mid$ *less than* $C_{INGO*}) = 1$

Proposition 3.2. Domestic Desires Equilibrium *– The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model:*

1) For $C_{INGO*} \leq L_{I1}$*, the* $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ *sends a signal of* $C_{INGO*} = K$*.*

2) For $C_{INGO*} \geq K$*, the* INGO_{Bad} *sends a signal less than* C_{INGO*}*.*

3) For $C_L \geq H_L - L_L$*, the international community does not support any INGO, regardless of signal sent.*

4) For $C_D \leq L_D$*, the domestic community supports INGOs iff they observe* C_{INGO*} *or greater.*

Separation requires updating to certainty. Therefore, respective beliefs for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) $P' = Prob(\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}} \mid C_{INGO*}$ *or greater)* $= 1$

b) $P' = Prob(\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}} \mid$ *less than* $C_{INGO*}) = 0$

c) $P'' = Prob(\text{INGO}_{\text{Bad}} \mid C_{INGO*}$ *or greater)* $= 0$

d) $P'' = Prob(\text{INGO}_{\text{Bad}} \mid$ *less than* $C_{INGO*}) = 1$

The equilibrium space for these separating equilibria is graphed in Figure 3.2. On this graph, where C_L is the Y-Axis and C_D is the X-Axis, it is easy to see how the costliness of support for the international and domestic communities drives the behavior of each of these actors. If the costs to each actor are sufficiently small, below the value of the difference between the high and low outcomes for the international community and below the value of the high outcome for the domestic community, we have the *Ideal*

Behavior Equilibrium and each actor, seeing C_{INGO*} or greater, supports the INGO. If the costs to the international community rise past the difference between the high outcome and the low outcome, we have the *Domestic Desires Equilibrium*. However, this equilibrium only holds only if the costs to the domestic actor are smaller than the value of the low outcome, L_D.

Figure 3.2: Service INGO – Separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibria



Also important, the costly signal must not be too costly or the INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ will not want to signal. In the *Ideal Behavior Equilibrium*, the costs must be lower than or equal to the value of the high outcome. In the *Domestic Desires Equilibrium*, the costs must be even lower, equal or below the value of the low outcome. In addition to this upper bound on C_{INGO*}, C_{INGO*} must also be higher than or equal to the value

of the rent for the rent-seeking INGO, INGO_{Bad}.

Therefore, the $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ must be willing to incur as much cost as the INGO_{Bad} would get benefits. Though this might seem straightforward, it represents a powerful constraint for voluntary accountability programs: in order for these programs to work, they must be costly, as costly as the rent received by INGO_{Bad}. However, if the value of the rent received is greater than the value of the high outcome for $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$, we will never see separation.

I also find three pooling equilibria. In each of these pooling equilibria, both types of service INGOs do not signal. The international and domestic actors must rely on the base probabilities that they are facing a non-rent seeking INGO, *P*, and a rent-seeker, *1-P*, when determining whether to support the INGO.

Proposition 3.3. Take Your Chances Equilibrium *– The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model:*

1) The $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ *does not signal.*

2) The INGO_{Bad} *does not signal.*

3) For $P \geq (C_L)/\ (H_L - L_L)$*, the international community supports all INGOs, regardless of signal sent.*

4) For $P \geq (C_D)/\ (H_D)$*, the domestic community supports all INGOs, regardless of signal sent.*

Pooling on no signal doesn't allow updating. Therefore, rational beliefs given strategies for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) p' = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$*)= P*

b) p'' = Prob (INGO_{Bad}*) = 1-P*

Proposition 3.4. Throw Out the Baby Equilibrium *– The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model:*

1) The $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ *does not signal.*

2) The INGO_{Bad} *does not signal*

3) The international community does not support any INGO, regardless of signal sent.

4) For $P \leq (C_D)/\ (L_D)$*, the domestic community does not support any INGO, regardless of signal sent.*

Pooling on no signal doesn't allow updating. Therefore, rational beliefs given strategies for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) p' = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$*)= P*

b) p'' = Prob (INGO_{Bad}*) = 1-P*

Proposition 3.5. Small Potatoes Equilibrium *– The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model:*

1) The $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ *does not signal.*

2) The INGO_{Bad} *does not signal*

3) For $P \leq (C_L)/\ (H_L - L_L)$*, the international community does not support any INGO, regardless of signal sent.*

4) For $P \geq (C_D)/\ (L_D)$*, the domestic community supports all INGOs, regardless of signal sent.*

Pooling on no signal doesn't allow updating. Therefore, rational beliefs given strategies for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) p' = Prob ($\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$*)= P*

b) p'' = Prob (INGO_{Bad}*) = 1-P*

The equilibrium space for these separating equilibria is graphed in Figure 3.3. On this graph, where P is the Y-Axis and C_D is the X-Axis, it is easy how the underlying probability of facing a non rent-seeker drives the behavior of the domestic and international community. In an environment where it is easy for non rent-seekers to flourish, the costs of support for the international and domestic community must be very low; otherwise, without signals, these actors will not want to risk supporting an INGO_{Bad}. If this occurs, domestic and international actors will *Throw out the Baby* with the bathwater and not support any INGO for fear of supporting a rent-seeker.

Figure 3.3: Service INGO – Pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibria



If the probability of facing an INGO$_{Good}$ is higher than the (a) ratio of the cost of support to the difference in value of the high outcome to low outcome for the international community and (b) ratio of the cost of support to the high outcome value for the domestic community, the domestic and international community will *Take Your Chances* and support all service INGOs without a signal.

If the probability of dealing with an INGO$_{Good}$ is in a mid-range, too small for the international community to want to support it (determined by the ratio of the cost of support to the difference in value of the high outcome to low outcome for the international community again) and yet too large for the domestic community to want to *Throw out the Baby* (determined by the ratio of the cost of support to the low outcome value for the domestic community), then the domestic community will

still support all INGOs. Because this probability implies that the cost of support for the domestic community must be smaller than the cost of support constraint in the *Take Your Chances Equilibrium* (smaller than L_D instead of H_D), I have called this equilibrium *Small Potatoes*.

3.3 Model Results

From the model, I identify several novel and yet straightforward implications relating to the questions of most concern to the service INGO community. First, how does the presence of both altruistic and non-altruistic service INGOs impact the interactions of INGOs with domestic and international communities and, thus, the likelihood of political or developmental outcomes? Second, what makes support by domestic and international communities to service INGOs more likely? Third, what makes policy and behavior outcomes provided by service INGOs more likely? I will first make formal statements of the model results and then discuss these predictions informally. Comparative statics concerning all exogenous parameters are outlined in Table 3.2.

> **Result 3.1.** *Without signals, as P, the probability of facing an* $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$*, increases, the likelihood of seeing a high policy and behavior outcome increases.*

Result 3.1 is derived by taking comparative statics over the constraints of the *Take Your Chances Equilibrium*. In this equilibrium, both the international and domestic community support the INGO, leading to a high policy and behavior outcome. As seen in Figure 3.3 and outlined in Proposition 3.3, the international and domestic communities are only willing to support all INGOs if P, the probability of facing a non rent-seeker is sufficiently high. This makes intuitive sense: as the world of INGOs

Table 3.2: Comparative Statics Predictions of Service INGO Model

	Increase in Parameter:									
	P	***C*$_L$**	***L*$_L$**	***H*$_L$**	***C*$_D$**	***L*$_D$**	***H*$_D$**	***K***	***H*$_{I1}$**	***L*$_{I1}$**
Ideal Behavior Equilibrium	No change	Less likely to hold move to *Domestic Desires*	Less likely to hold move to *Domestic Desires*	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold move to *Throw out Baby*	No change	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold move to *pooling equilibria*	More likely to hold	No change
Domestic Desires Equilibrium	No change	More likely to hold	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold move to *Ideal Behavior*	Less likely to hold move to *Throw out Baby*	More likely to hold	No change	Less likely to hold	No change	More likely to hold
Take Your Chances Equilibrium	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold move to *Small Potatoes*	Less likely to hold move to *Small Potatoes*	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold move to *Throw out Baby*	No change	More likely to hold	No change	No change	No change
Throw Out the Baby Equilibrium	Less likely to hold move to *Small Potatoes*	No change	No change	No change	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold move to *Small Potatoes*	No change	No change	No change	No change
Small Potatoes Equilibrium	Less likely to hold move to *Take Your Chances*	More likely to hold	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold move to *Take Your Chances*	Less likely to hold move to *Small Potatoes*	More likely to hold	No change	No change	No change	No change

becomes more "altruistic," it is easier for both sub-state actors and the international community to support INGOs, thus leading to a high policy and behavior outcome. Conversely, where "bad apples" flourish the international and sub-state community do exactly what Lee (2007) predicted: they throw out the barrel. In these situations, we should see little or no impact of the service INGO sector.

Result 3.2. *When not all INGOs are altruistic, the domestic and international communities will endure higher costs of support if a separating signal is sent by* INGO$_{\text{Good}}$. *If P is less than 1,* $H_D > P\ (H_D)$ *and* H_L - $L_L > P\ (H_L$ - $L_L)$.

Result 3.2 highlights differences in the constraints on C_D and C_L for the equilibria *Take Your Chances* and *Ideal Behavior*. In the *Ideal Behavior Equilibrium*, because sub-state actors and the international community both know they are only supporting INGOs that will provide them with valued policy and behavior change, they are willing to invest more in supporting INGOs. Result 3.2 implies that where there are voluntary accountability programs or other ways for INGO$_{\text{Good}}$s to signal their transparency and accountability, we are more likely to see political or economic outcomes by INGOs because it is more likely that the international and domestic community will support INGOs.

Result 3.3. INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ *are more likely to send a separating signal as their value of the high and low outcomes increases.*

Result 3.3 is based on the comparative statics of H_{I1} and L_{I1} in the two separating equilibria, *Ideal Behavior* and *Domestic Desires.* Although the exact value of C_{INGO}

is set to make INGO_{Bad} indifferent, $\text{INGO}_{\text{Goods}}$ are more likely to send this signal as H_{I1} and L_{I1} increase. This result implies that an $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ is more likely to sign up for voluntary accountability programs in states that they value. This implies a potential selection dynamic on the behalf of $\text{INGO}_{\text{Goods}}$: they should be more willing to enter into voluntary accountability programs in countries where high outcomes are assured. This potential selection dynamic has not been theoretically argued within the burgeoning cross-disciplinary literature on these programs (Reinhardt 2006; Gugerty and Prakash 2009; Reinhardt 2009).

Result 3.4. *As H_L increases, the international community is more likely to support INGOs.*

Result 3.5. *As C_L increases, the international community is less likely to support INGOs.*

Result 3.6. *As L_L increases, the international community is less likely to support INGOs.*

Results 3.4 - 3.6 are derived by taking comparative statics over the international community's equilibria constraints. Results 3.4 and 3.5 are very intuitive. As Result 3.4 shows, when the international community highly values the policy or behavior outcome that the service INGO is providing, it is more likely to support the INGO. Likewise, as Result 3.5 shows, if support is too costly, the international community will not extend any assistance to INGOs, even if they know they are facing an $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$. Taken together, these results imply that the amount of funds invested in service INGOs by the international community should cause greater policy and behavior outcomes. This implication, though straightforward, has not been readily articulated within the INGO literature.

Additionally, rent-seeking INGOs are more prevalent where there is a history of more funds directed at service INGOs. This result, together with Result 3.1, implies that funds directed at INGOs are somewhat of double-edged sword for political and development outcomes. Though donor funds can drastically increase results, they also can make it less likely for communities to broadly fund service INGOs. In these situations, we should see voluntary accountability programs being utilized.

Though it may appear counterintuitive, Result 3.6 is also straightforward. It states that, as L_L, the value of the policy or behavior change the INGO can achieve with just domestic support, increases, the international community is more likely to not offer support to the INGO and simply reap the benefits of L_L. In other words, the international community won't support projects where their support doesn't greatly improve project outcome; if L_L is sufficiently large, the international community is more likely to not support INGOs at all. Taken together, Results 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 imply that the international community should have a great impact on the observable policy and behavior outcomes by INGOs.

Result 3.7. *As H_D increases, the domestic community is more likely to support INGOs.*

Result 3.8. *As C_D increases, the domestic community is less likely to support INGOs.*

Result 3.9. *As L_D increases, the domestic community is more likely to support INGOs.*

Results 3.7-3.9 are derived by taking comparative statics over the domestic community's equilibria constraints. Results 3.7 and 3.8, which highlight how changes in the value of the high outcome and the costliness of support impact model predictions,

are similar to predictions concerning the international community that were outlined in Results 3.4 and 3.5, respectively. As the value of the high outcome increases, the domestic community is more likely to support INGOs. Conversely, as the costs of support increase, the domestic community is less likely to support INGOs.

These results imply that service INGOs might not be able to impact political or economic outcomes in areas where the domestic community's costs of travel to work with service INGOs are high, such as in rural communities. This empirical implication is interesting because it runs counter to the conventional wisdom on when and where development INGOs are necessary. Most often, service INGOs are thought to be necessary in rural areas (Hulme and Edwards 1997).

Additionally, not all issues tackled by service INGOs will result in policy and behavior outcomes. As these results imply, issues or projects that are of little value to the domestic community will not be affected, despite attention by service INGOs. For example, some issues, such as those dealing with basic health and development provision, could be argued to be of more value to domestic communities than controversial birth control goods provision or women-in-development programs. As the value of the program diminishes, the domestic community will be less likely to invest their time and energy into the development INGO. These implications highlight the tremendous attention service INGOs need to devote into making their agendas and programming relevant to the domestic communities in which they work.

Unlike outlined in Result 3.6, Result 3.9 shows that as L_D, the value of the policy or behavior outcome the INGO can achieve with just domestic support, increases, the domestic community is more likely to offer support to INGOs. As discussed above, a service INGO cannot produce sustainable policy and behavior outcome unless supported by the domestic community but can produce a low amount of change if only supported by the sub-state population. Therefore, as the low outcome increases in value for the domestic community, the population is more likely to support the

INGO, even if it knows that the international community is not going to be extending support to the INGO. These comparative statics concerning the behavior of the domestic community all indicate that when the domestic community values the work of non rent-seeking INGOs, there is a greater likelihood of increases in political and developmental outcomes as a result of service INGOs.

3.4 Testable Implications of the Model

The model results listed above provide rich empirical implications concerning the behavior of service INGOs, the support international and domestic actors can provide to service INGOs, and the factors which condition the impact these organizations have on political and developmental outcomes. Taken together, the core hypothesis of conditional impact of service INGOs is as follows:

> **Service INGO Hypothesis 1.** *Service INGOs will have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes in (a) transparent countries with little corruption, (b) when there are larger numbers of INGOs belonging to voluntary accountability programs present, (c) when highly supported by the international community, (d) in urbanized states, (e) and on service issues of more value to domestic communities. When examining the impact of voluntary accountability programs in particular, special attention will have to be paid to self-selection.*

Part (a) comes from Result 3.1 and, most basically, reflects the idea that the underlying proportion of rent-seeking service INGOs impacts the likelihood of support from the domestic and international communities. Existing practitioner and journal-

istic accounts point out that rent-seeking service INGOs tend to flourish in states where they are not likely to get caught (Berhan 2002; Roy 2004; Lee 2007). Additionally, similar reports often highlight how some corrupt regimes will actually use rent-seeking service INGOs themselves to gain international donations or take bribes from rent-seekers (Steinberg 2001; Ben Attia 2004). Given this observation, along with Result 3.1, it is implied that the impact of service INGO should be conditional to the overall level of corruption within the state. The role of state corruption has not been theoretically linked to the behavior or effectiveness of service INGOs.

Part (b) of the Service INGO Hypothesis is a restatement of Result 3.2. When service INGOs signal, the domestic and international communities are more likely to offer their support; thus, the impact of service INGOs will be greater. However, as Result 3.3 pointed out, there are issues of self-selection that arise when service INGOs signal; these INGOs are more likely to pay the costly signal when they expect a higher outcome. This makes empirical attention to self-selection necessary when examining the role of voluntary accountability groups. This has not been theoretically examined in the non-profit and cross-disciplinary literature on these programs.

Results 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 provide the basis for Service INGO Hypothesis 1 (c). Because the international community will tolerate higher costs for greater benefits from the service INGO, the impact of service INGOs should be conditional to the support this community provides the service INGO. This argument, if empirically supported, could have important policy implications; much of the support service INGOs receive from the international community is often questioned; not much is currently known about the impact this support has on political and developmental outcomes by service INGOs (Masud and Yontcheva 2005).

Part (d) of the hypothesis is based on Result 3.8. When the domestic community faces less costs for associating with and supporting service INGOs, the domestic community is more likely to support INGOs. Thus, the impact of service INGOs

on political and developmental outcomes should be greater. In empirically examining this model result, I contend that urbanized states have less costs of interaction for the domestic community simply because of lower travel costs for the domestic population. Therefore, the impact of service INGOs should be conditional on the urbanization of the state where the service INGO is working.

Finally, Results 3.7 and 3.9 are the basis for part (d) of the hypothesis. Because the domestic community is more likely to support service INGOs when they place greater values on the services the INGO is providing, there should be some issue-specific factors that condition the effectiveness of service INGOs.

Conclusion

Under what conditions do service INGOs impact policy and behavioral outcomes? Previous theory has failed to offer many insights into this question. The model and results discussed in this chapter provide many empirical implications concerning the factors which condition the impact of service INGOs. Underlying these implications is an attention to the heterogeneous motivations of service INGOs. In other words, unlike the dominant TAN framework, the theoretical framework of service INGOs provided above relaxes the assumption that all INGOs are altruistic. Instead, for service INGOs, there exists both INGOs motivated to provide goods and services within a host state and INGOs motivated solely by private rents. Attention to both service INGOs that are altruistically and non-altruistically motivated brings attention to the signals service INGOs can provide to indicate their motivations. It also allows us to focus on when and where the international and domestic communities are most likely to support service INGOs. These factors are critical in developing a theory of the conditional impact of service INGOs.

The next chapter provides a theoretical framework for understanding the condi-

tional effects of advocacy INGOs. After outlining this framework, Chapter 5 returns to a focus on service INGOs. In that chapter, the implications of the service INGO model are empirically examined.

Chapter 3 Appendix

Proof for the Pure-Strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Service INGO Model

I focus on pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. As discussed below, there exists both separating and pooling equilibria for the service INGO model.

Separating Equilibria

There exist two separating equilibria. In each of these equilibria, $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ sends

$C_{INGO}*$ and INGO_{Bad} sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO}*$. The equilibria are as follows:

1. both the international and domestic actor support the INGO if they observe $C_{INGO}*$ or greater and don't support an INGO if they observe less than $C_{INGO}*$;
2. the domestic actor supports an INGO if it observes $C_{INGO}*$ or greater and doesn't support an INGO if it observes less than $C_{INGO}*$ and the international actor doesn't support any INGO, regardless of the signal sent

As to beliefs, in all of the separating equilibria, the international and domestic actors know for certain that they are facing a good type ($\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$) if they see $C_{INGO}*$ or greater and know for certain that they are facing a bad type (INGO_{Bad}) if they see less than $C_{INGO}*$.

Sequentially rational strategies for the equilibria are as follows:

Separating Equilibrium - International and Domestic support if observe $C_{INGO}*$ or greater

First, for the $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$, it is sequentially rational to signal $C_{INGO}*$ if:

$$U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Good}} (C_{INGO}* \mid \text{International and Domestic support} C_{INGO}* \text{ or greater}) \geq U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Good}} (C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO}* \mid \text{International and Domestic actors don't support } C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO}*)$$

and

$$U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Good}} (C_{INGO}* \mid \text{International and Domestic actors support } C_{INGO}* \text{ or greater}) \geq U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Good}} (C_{INGO''} > C_{INGO}* \mid \text{International and Domestic support} C_{INGO}* \text{ or greater}).$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \leq H_{I1}.$$

Because signaling is costly, the second equation is always true. In other words, it is never rational for the INGO to signal more than it has to in order to get a response from the international and domestic communities.

Comparative statics of this constraint imply that as $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ values the higher outcome more, it is more willing to endure higher costs, and thus the equilibrium space expands.

Next, for not signaling to be sequentially rational for the INGOBad, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Bad}} (C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*} \mid \text{International and Domestic actors don't support } C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Bad}} (C_{INGO*} \mid \text{International and Domestic support} C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater})$$

This is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \geq K.$$

This constraint implies that as the value of K increases, the costliness of the signal must increase or the the INGO_{Bad}'s move will not be sequentially rational.
Likewise, for the international community to want to support only INGOs that send CINGO* or greater, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ International (Support } | C_{INGO*} \text{or greater}) \geq U \text{ International (~Support } | \ C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)}$$

and

$$U \text{ International (~Support } | \ C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ International } (C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}).$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_L \leq H_L - L_L.$$

This constraint implies that as the value L_L of increases, the costliness of the support must decrease. Additionally, as the costliness of the support increase, the difference in value for the high outcome over the low outcome must also increase for this constraint to be met.Because supporting the INGO_{Bad} can offer no benefit for the international actor, the second equation is always true.

Finally, in order for the moves by the domestic actor to be sequentially rational, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO}* \text{or greater)} \geq U \text{ Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO}* \text{or greater)}$$

and

$$U \text{ Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO}*)) \geq U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO}*).$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_D \leq H_D.$$

This constraint implies that as the value of the high outcome increases, the domestic community will be willing to endure greater costs and still this move will be sequentially rational.

And the second equation, like above, is always true.

Therefore, if these conditions are met, this equilibrium holds.

By constructing a constrained optimization problem, I find that the optimal $C_{INGO}*$for this equilibria is:

$$C_{INGO}*=K$$

Separating Equilibrium - Domestic supports if it observes $C_{INGO}*$ or greater and International doesn't support any INGO, regardless of the signal sent

This final separating equilibrium is much like the one discussed above. For the $\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$, it is sequentially rational to signal $C_{INGO}*$ if:

$$U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Good}} (C_{INGO}* \mid \text{Domestic supports } C_{INGO}* \text{ or greater and International never supports}) \geq U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Good}} (C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO}* \mid \text{Domestic doesn't support } C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO}* \text{and International never supports})$$

and

$$U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Good}} (C_{INGO}* \mid \text{Domestic supports } C_{INGO}* \text{or greater and International never supports}) \geq U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Good}} (C_{INGO''} > C_{INGO}* \mid \text{Domestic supports } C_{INGO}* \text{or greater and International never supports}).$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \leq L_{I1}.$$

This constraint implies that as the value of the low outcome increases, the INGO is willing to endure more costly signaling.

Because signaling is costly, the second equation is always true.

Next, for not signaling to be sequentially rational for the INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$, the following must be true:

U INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$ ($C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ / International and Domestic actors don't support $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$) $\geq U$ INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$ (C_{INGO*} | Domestic supports C_{INGO*}or greater and International never supports)

This is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \geq K.$$

Like discussed in the previous proof, this constraint implies that as the value of K increases, the costliness of the signal must increase or the the INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$,'s move will not be sequentially rational.

For the international community to not want to support any INGO, regardless of signal sent, the following must be true:

U International (~Support | C_{INGO*}or greater) $\geq U$ International (Support | C_{INGO*} or greater)

and

U International (~Support | $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$) $\geq U$ International (Support | $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$).

The first equation is true when:

$$C_L \geq H_L - L_L$$

This constraint implies that as the value of L_L increases, the costliness of the support can increase and this move remains sequentially rational.

Because supporting the INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$ can offer no benefit for the international actor, the second equation is always true.

Finally, in order for the moves by the domestic actor to be sequentially rational, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)} \geq U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)}$$

and

$$U \text{ Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}).$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_D \leq L_D.$$

This constraint implies that as the value of the low outcome increases, the domestic community will be willing to endure greater costs and still this move will be sequentially rational.

Again, the second equation is always true.

Therefore, if these conditions are met, this equilibrium holds. By constructing a constrained optimization problem, I also find that the optimal CINGO* for this equilibria, like the equilibria above, is:

$$C_{INGO*} = K.$$

No other separating equilibria hold.

Pooling Equilibria

Three separate types of pooling equilibria hold for the service INGO model:

1. one where both the international and the domestic actors support the INGO, regardless of signal sent;
2. an equilibrium where neither the international or the domestic actor support the INGO, regardless of signal sent; and
3. an equilibria where the domestic actor supports all INGOs and the international community does not support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent.

In each of these pooling equilibria, both types of service INGOs set C_{INGO} to 0 in order to minimize costs.
The beliefs on path are thus P that the international and domestic actors are facing an INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ and 1-P that they are facing an INGO$_{\text{Bad}}$.

Sequentially rational moves for each of the pooling equilibria are as follows:

Pooling Equilibrium - International and Domestic support all INGOs, regardless of signal sent

Of course, the moves by both types of INGOs are sequentially rational. They would rather not send a costly signal if it doesn't impact whether the international or domestic community supports them.

For the international community, the decision to support all INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ International (Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ International (˜Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P\,(H_L - C_L) + (1-P)(-C_L) \geq P\,(L_L) + (1-P)(0)$$

$$P \geq (C_L)/\,(H_L - L_L)$$

Comparative statics concerning this constraint are as follows. First, as the costs to the international community increase, it is less likely that this constraint will be met; P would also have to increase. Also, as the value of the high outcome increases, the probability range that makes this move sequentially rational increases. If the value of the low outcome increases, however, it is less likely that this equilibrium will hold.

Likewise, for the domestic community, the decision to support all INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ Domestic (˜Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P\,(H_D - C_D) + (1-P)(-C_D) \geq P\,(0) + (1-P)(0)$$

$$P \geq (C_D)/\,(H_D)$$

This constraint implies the following. First, as the costliness of support increases, the probability of facing a good INGO must increase. Also, as the value of the high outcome increases, the equilibrium space expands.

Pooling Equilibrium - International and Domestic don't support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent

Again,the moves by both types of INGOs are sequentially rational. They would rather not send a costly signal if they are never going to gain support through the use of the signal.

For the international community, the decision to not support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ International } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ International } (\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO})$$

Because the domestic community is also not supporting any INGOs, this is always true.

For the domestic community, the decision to not support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ Domestic } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ Domestic } (\text{Support} \mid \text{any} C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P\,(0) + (1-P)(0) \geq P\,(L_D - C_D) + (1-P)(-C_D)$$

$$P \leq (C_D)/\,(L_D)$$

This constraint implies that as the value of the low outcome increases, the probability of facing a good INGO must decrease or it is no longer sequentially rational for the domestic community to not support all INGOs. However, if the costliness of support increases, the probability of facing a good type can increase and this equilibrium constraint is still met.

Pooling Equilibrium - Domestic supports all INGO types, regardless of signal sent, International doesn't support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent

The moves by both types of INGOs are sequentially rational. They would rather not send a costly signal if they are never going to gain support through the use of the signal.

For the international community, the decision to not support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ International } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ International } (\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P\,(L_L) + (1-P)(0) \geq P\,(H_L - C_L) + (1-P)(-C_L)$$

$$P \leq (C_L)/\,(H_L - L_L)$$

Comparative statics concerning this constraint are as follows. First, as the costs to the international community increase, it is more likely that this constraint will be met; P can decrease and the constraint is still met. Also, as the value of the high outcome increases, the probability range that makes this move sequentially rational decreases. If the value of the low outcome increases, it is more likely that this equilibrium will hold.

For the domestic community, the decision to support all INGO types, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ Domestic } (\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ Domestic } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid \text{any} C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P\,(L_D - C_D) + (1-P)(-C_D) \geq P\,(0) + (1-P)(0)$$

$$P \geq (C_D)/\,(L_D)$$

This constraint implies that as the value of the low outcome increases, the probability of facing a good INGO can decrease and it is still sequentially rational to support all INGOs. However, if the costliness of support increases, the probability of facing a good type must increase for this equilibrium constraint to be met.

No other pooling equilibria hold.

No other pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria hold for the service INGO model.

Chapter 4

Modeling Advocacy INGOs

> Part of the problem, of course, is that the vaulted status of NGOs makes them more susceptible than other types of organizations to public disillusionment
> Margaret Gibelman and Sheldon R. Gelman (2001)

Advocacy INGOs seem to have had many successes in world politics. These organizations, which often focus on human rights or environmental concerns, have been praised for the creation of the International Criminal Court, the end of apartheid in South Africa, and the great strides taken to end the trade of anti-personnel land mines. They also appear to have been triumphant in advocacy to end of the use of chlorofluorocarbons in the 1990s.

Despite these well-publicized successes, not much is known about the factors which condition the impact of advocacy INGOs (Risse 2002). Why were advocacy INGOs credited with ending the mass disappearances of Latin America in the early 1980s? Why weren't their efforts to stop torture in Saudi Arabia during the same time period successful? Extant theory offers little insights into the factors which condition the impact of advocacy INGOs.

Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 2, much of the existing theoretical scholarship

considers all advocacy INGOs to be uniformly motivated altruistically. By altruism, I mean that advocacy organizations are assumed to be motivated to help a domestic population reach their own goals when unable to so on their own (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink 1999). Despite this assumption, there are many accounts of advocacy INGOs motivated not to help a domestic population reach their own goals but, rather, motivated by the foreign values of international donors (Khidr 2006; Mudingu 2006). These advocacy INGOs have preferences not in line with the domestic population they are supposedly advocating on behalf of; instead, their preferences are more internationally-biased. Many are concerned that these advocacy INGOs are more like twenty-first century missionaries and their presence could lead to lower support for all advocacy efforts (Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Omara-Otunnu 2007).

In this chapter, I outline a game-theoretic model that offers insights into the factors which condition the impact of advocacy INGOs. In doing so, I allow for the presence of both internationally-biased and domestically-aligned advocacy organizations. By looking at how the existence of advocacy INGOs with heterogeneous motivations impacts the support these organizations receive from both the international and domestic communities, a clearer picture of the behavior and conditional effects of advocacy INGOs emerges. This theoretical focus also allows me to examine the role signaling plays in advocacy efforts. Empirical implications from this chapter are tested in Chapter 6.

Below, I first outline the structure of the advocacy INGO game-theoretic model. Next, I walk through the model equilibria and results. After addressing these dynamics from the model, I outline how these results can be adapted into testable hypotheses concerning the conditional effects of advocacy INGOs. Like done in the previous chapter, I try to limit mathematical proof to the chapter appendix.

4.1 Model Structure

Figure 4.1 provides the structure of the advocacy INGO model. Though the underlying tensions of the advocacy INGO model differ greatly from the service INGO model discussed in Chapter 3, the model structures are very similar. This reflects the idea that similar actors are critical for both advocacy and service INGOs and a similar issue of private information complicates the offer of support to advocacy INGOs.

Figure 4.1: Advocacy INGO Game-Theoretic Model - Structure of the Game



As shown in Figure 4.1, the game-theoretic model centers on the interactions between an advocacy INGO and the international and domestic communities.[1] Like before, the model starts with a move by "Nature." Nature, with a probability *P,* can select an advocacy INGO that has preferences in line with the domestic population or, with a probability *1-P,* can chose an advocacy INGO that has preferences that are internationally-biased. For simplicity, I refer to the INGO that has preferences in line with the domestic population as $INGO_{Dom}$ and the INGO that has preferences that are internationally-biased as $INGO_{Int'l}$. Like outlined in Chapter 2, the $INGO_{Dom}$ has preferences that could be thought of as altruistic while the $INGO_{Int'l}$'s preferences are not consistent with the extant literature's altruism assumption and, instead, $INGO_{Int'l}$ can be thought of as non-altruistically motivated. This move by Nature is only known to the advocacy INGO. In other words, the underlying motivations of the advocacy INGO are private knowledge and unknown to the international and domestic communities.

Once Nature has moved, the advocacy INGO, either $INGO_{Dom}$ or $INGO_{Int'l}$, can send a signal to the international and domestic communities about its underlying preferences. As mentioned in the literature review, signals sent by advocacy INGOs typically involve joining intergovernmental policy positions and organizations (WRC 2001; CSD 2005; CAN 2007; *NGO Statement on US IDP Policy* 2008). These signals entail time and energy costs for the advocacy INGO; thus, they are costly in the game-theoretic model.

The international and domestic communities observe the signal sent by the advocacy INGO. After doing so, these organizations have a choice of whether to support the INGO or not. If they offer their support to the advocacy INGO, this support is costly. For the international community, these costs would entail diplomacy costs and

[1]Similar to the service INGO model, the international community can be defined as international organizations, third-party states, and donor foundations that can offer support to an advocacy INGO. Likewise, the domestic community is the sub-state population of citizens and NGOs that are located within the state where the advocacy INGO is targeting.

monetary support to the advocacy INGO. For the domestic community, these costs include a loss of time and energy in supporting the advocacy efforts of the INGO. These simultaneous moves by the international and domestic communities are the last moves in the game-theoretic model, as shown in Figure 4.1.

Though the model structure of the advocacy INGO model is similar to the service INGO model discussed in Chapter 3, the underlying tensions and actor payoffs are very different. I will refer to the notation and parameters in Table 4.1 as I walk through these payoffs. The payoffs are provided in Figure 4.1.

Table 4.1: Notation and Symbols Used in the Advocacy INGO Model

Symbol	Parameter
P	Probability that an Advocacy INGO has preferences in line with the domestic community (INGO$_{Dom}$)
C_{INGO}	Costly Signal by Service INGO
HI_1	Value of High Outcome to INGO$_{Int'l}$
LI_1	Value of Low Outcome to INGO$_{Int'l}$
B	Probability of High Outcome with Support by International and Domestic Community
Q	Probability of High Outcome with Support by either International and Domestic Community (Note: $B>Q$)
H_L	Value of High Outcome to International Community
L_L	Value of Low Outcome to International Community
C_L	Cost of Investing in the INGO to International Community
H_D	Value of High Outcome to Domestic Community
L_D	Value of Low Outcome to Domestic Community
C_D	Cost of Supporting the INGO to Domestic Community
LI_2	Value of Low Outcome to INGO$_{Dom}$

First, the underlying tension in the advocacy INGO model is that not all actors have to share the same ordering of preferences with regards to possible outcomes of the advocacy efforts. As discussed in Chapter 2, the international community and the INGO$_{Int'l}$ would prefer one outcome. Conversely, the domestic community and the INGO$_{Dom}$ would prefer a different outcome. Typically, the advocacy desires of

the internationally-biased actors can be thought of as more extreme than the desires of the domestic community.

To illustrate, these dynamics were apparent in the case of FGC advocacy, as outlined in Chapter 2. The international community and internationally-biased INGOs wanted the full eradication of FGC. However, the general domestic community and domestically-aligned INGOs would have preferred only age-specific restrictions or the medicalization of the practice. The full-eradication of FGC was definitely the more extreme possible outcome concerning FGC while the age-specific restrictions and medicalization outcome was a more moderate advocacy outcome (Boulware-Miller 1985; Boyle 2002).

To extend these dynamics to the game-theoretic model, therefore, there are two possible advocacy outcomes: H, the extreme outcome, and L, the more moderate outcome. The international community and the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ prefer the extreme outcome H, subscripted H_{I1} for the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ and H_L for the international community, to the moderate outcome, L. The domestic community prefers the more moderate outcome, L_D, to the extreme outcome, H_D. The INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ only works for the moderate outcome, for which it receives a payoff L_{I2} . In short, then, in this model, it is assumed that $L_D \geq H_D$ but that $H_L \geq L_L$ and $H_{I1} \geq L_{I1}$.

Unlike the service INGO model, outcomes in the advocacy INGO model are probabilistic, depending on regime characteristics such as the internal vulnerability of the state and its embeddedness within the international system (Keck and Sikkink 1998). This is illustrated in the model by the terms B and Q. These probabilities reflect the idea that the outcome of advocacy attempts not only depends on the support of the international and domestic community but also depends on regime-specific characteristics, as outlined in the extant TAN literature. Therefore, if both the international and the domestic communities support INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$, there is still a set probability, B, that the outcome will be extreme, H, and a set probability, *1-B*, that the outcome

will be the more moderate outcome, L. If only one actor supports the INGO, the probability of advocated change drops to Q where $B>Q$. To note, this probability is equal regardless of which one of the relevant actors supports the INGO.

As mentioned, I set up the model such that an INGO_{Dom} is never working for an extreme outcome. Therefore, there is no probability B of a high outcome when both relevant actors are supporting the INGO. Instead, if both the international and the domestic community supports the INGO, there is an assured low outcome, L. Thus, like discussed in the TAN framework, if both relevant actors support the INGO in its attempt at moderate policy or behavior outcomes, the advocacy is successful (Keck and Sikkink 1998). However, like above, if only one of the relevant actors supports the INGO_{Dom}, there is still a probability Q of the moderate outcome, L, and a probability $1\text{-}Q$ of no advocacy outcome. Finally, if no actor supports the INGO, regardless of INGO type, there is no lasting impact in advocated policy or behavior; thus, all actors receive no benefit for the activity of the advocacy INGO.

Like in the service INGO model, the international and domestic communities face costs, C, for their support of advocacy INGOs. These costs are subscripted for each actor and subtracted from any benefit they receive from the policy or behavior outcome. Additionally, advocacy INGOs face costs in time, effort, and energy for signaling. These costs, C_{INGO}, are endogenously determined in the model, and are subtracted from the utility the INGO receives from any policy or behavior outcome.

4.2 Model Equilibria

The solutions to the model provide many insights into the behavior of advocacy INGOs and the actors that can support them. By focusing on these dynamics, logically consistent empirical implications concerning the conditional effects of advocacy INGOs can be derived. I first walk through the solutions to the game-theoretic model

and then focus on the comparative statics.

Like in Chapter 3, I use Perfect Bayesian Equilibria as the solution concept of this game and again restrict my focus to pure strategy equilibria.

There exists both separating and pooling equilibria to the advocacy INGO model. Interestingly, some of the separating equilibria involve signals sent by the $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$, and some involve signals sent by the INGO_{Dom}. These different types of separating equilibria, however, are dependent on changes in the other parameters, especially the values of the moderate and extreme outcomes for all various actors. Somewhat surprisingly, the signaling equilibria that hold in the model all involve a signal that only garners the support of either the domestic or international community; the signal makes no impact on the decision of support for the alternative audience. This, in effect, could represent a *signaling dilemma* on the behalf of advocacy INGOs, in which the signals sent are not affective at influencing the behavior of both potential audiences. Proof of these equilibria can be found in the chapter appendix.

First, there exist two separating equilibria where $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends a costly signal that is not copied by INGO_{Dom}. Much differently than suggested by Keck and Sikkink (1998), these separating equilibria never involve both the support of the international and the domestic community. In other words, by relaxing the altruism assumption and focusing on how uncertainty over the preference ordering of advocacy INGOs impacts the interactions of INGOs with international and domestic communities, the model shows that signaling involves a real trade-off for $\text{INGO}_{\text{Intl}}$: signaling might gain them the support of one community but it will not impact the likelihood of support from both communities.

Proposition 4.1. Missionary Force Equilibrium *–The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the advocacy INGO model:*

1) For $C_{INGO*} \leq Q(H_{I1}) + (1-Q)(L_{I1})$*, the* $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *sends a signal of* $C_{INGO*}=Q(L_{I2})$*.*

2) For $C_{INGO*} \geq Q(L_{I2})$*, the* INGO_{Dom} *sends a signal less than* C_{INGO*}*.*

3) For $C_L \geq Q(L_L)$ *and still* $C_L \leq Q(H_L) + (1-Q)(L_L)$*, the international community supports INGOs iff they observe* C_{INGO*} *or greater.*

4) For $C_D \geq Q(L_D)$*, the domestic community does not support any INGOs.*

Separation requires updating to certainty. Therefore, respective beliefs for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom} *|* C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 0*

b) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom} *| less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 1*

c) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *|* C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 1*

d) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ *| less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 0*

Proposition 4.2. Foreign Helper Equilibrium *–The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the advocacy INGO model:*

1) For $C_{INGO*} \leq Q(H_{I1}) + (1-Q)(L_{I1})$*, the* $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *sends a signal of* $C_{INGO*}=Q(L_{I2})$*.*

2) For $C_{INGO*} \geq Q(L_{I2})$*, the* INGO_{Dom} *sends a signal less than* C_{INGO*}*.*

3) For $C_L \geq B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - L_L)$ *or* $C_L \geq Q(L_L)$ *(whichever is binding), the international community does not support any INGOs.*

4) For $C_D \leq Q(H_D) + (1-Q)(L_D)$ *and* $C_D \geq Q(L_D)$ *the domestic community supports INGOs iff they observe* C_{INGO*} *or greater.*

Separation requires updating to certainty. Therefore, respective beliefs for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom} | C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 0*

b) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom} | *less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 1*

c) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ | C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 1*

d) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ | *less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 0*

The equilibrium space for these two separating equilibrium, both when $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends C_{INGO*}. and INGO_{Dom} sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, is graphed in Figure 4.2. Like the graph for the service INGO model, C_L represents the Y-Axis and C_D represents the X-Axis. In this graph, please note that the *Foreign Helper Equilibrium* only holds when $Q(H_D) + (1-Q)(L_D) > Q(L_D)$. This is different from the *Domestic Signaling Equilibrium*, discussed below, that only holds when $Q(H_D) + (1-Q)(L_D) > Q(L_D)$. Therefore, on the graph Figure 4.2, the line $Q(H_D) + (1-Q)(L_D)$ is illustrated in red in both of these positions.

Figure 4.2: Advocacy INGO – Separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibria



Unlike the graph for the service INGO model, it is easy to see that the costliness of support is not the sole motivation for whether to support an advocacy INGO upon observing its costly signal. This is especially true for the domestic community. If costs are somewhat high, greater than $Q(L_D)$, it will not support a *Missionary Force*, what I term an INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ that is gaining support only from the international community. However, if costs are greater than this point but less than the $Q(H_D) + (1-Q)(L_D)$, the domestic community will offer support to a *Foreign Helper*, that is an INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ that is not supported by the international community.

Though this may seem a little counterintuitive, this behavior of the domestic community can be understood to be in largely a function of Q, that is the underlying likelihood of getting what the advocacy INGO is asking for from the state with the support of either the domestic or the international community. If the domestic

community is located in a state where an advocacy INGO is unlikely to get its preferred outcome if only supported by one actor, again, as captured in the model by Q, the domestic community will actually prefer to work with an $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ because it knows that if Q is low enough, it will get its preferred outcome, L_D, with a greater likelihood. This occurs because the $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$, though working for the more extreme outcome, can still get the moderate outcome with *1-Q* probability.

Therefore, as captured in the *Foreign Helper Equilibrium*, when costs for supporting advocacy INGOs are too high for the international community, the domestic community decides that it can then use the $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ for its purposes, namely moderate change under a very repressive or invulnerable regime. For example, this behavior appears to have occurred early during the Cold War, when some human rights and other advocacy INGOs from Western Europe and the United States spoke out against Communist dictators (Korey 1998; Romankov 2000; Thomas 2001). These INGOs were often not supported by the international community, which feared instigating Cold War aggressions and violating norms of non-intervention, but were supported by the domestic community (Romankov 2000; Thomas 2001; Hopgood 2006). It was only during and especially after the Helsinki Final Accords of 1975 that the costs of supporting advocacy INGOs diminished for the international community (Korey 1998; Thomas 2001).

As mentioned, we observe opposite patterns of behavior in the *Missionary Force Equilibrium*. Here, the international community only wants to support INGOs that share their same preference orderings and the domestic community, which really doesn't value any advocated outcome very much, can be thought of as ignoring or not supporting advocacy INGOs altogether, regardless of the signal sent. This *Missionary Force* behavior could be argued to have been what occurred in the case of FGC (Boyle 2002). The domestic population didn't place much value on the extreme outcome, total FGC eradication, but also, perhaps, didn't place much value on the moderate

outcome, medicalization. This issue was divisive for the domestic community; thus, costs for supporting the advocacy movement could be argued to have been relatively high (Boyle 2002). For the international community, however, costs were low in comparison to the value placed on total FGC eradication, especially considering that this was an issue in vulnerable states, as captured in the model by Q. Therefore, this behavior is likely on issues where the domestic community does not strongly value either outcome but the international community values extreme advocated outcomes and is dealing with a vulnerable state.

Environmental protection advocacy in developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s could also fall into this category (Soto 1991-1992; Jakobsen 1999, 2000). Though Western-based advocacy INGOs were very active on environmental policy-making in developed countries and widely supported by the international community, domestic citizens in lesser developed countries typically did not support their advocacy efforts (Soto 1991-1992; Brenton 1994; Jakobsen 1999, 2000). In fact, many have argued that the domestic communities saw little value from the outcomes environmental INGOs were advocating for (Soto 1991-1992; Brenton 1994; Jakobsen 1999, 2000). As Soto (1991-1992) commented:

> Air pollution, carbon dioxide emissions, and the loss of biological diversity have little meaning to people who see their children die of malnutrition and who lack even the most basic health care (680).

As Soto (1991-1992)'s comment points out, INGO advocacy on environmental protection in lesser developed countries during this time period may be thought of as missionary force behavior, with little support by the domestic citizenry. Worth noting, however, more recent advocacy INGO efforts on environmental protection that

take a sustainable development approach alongside environmental protection have been supported by local populations within developing states (Brenton 1994; Jakobsen 1999)

The equilibria outlined above both depend upon the INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ not wanting to signal as much as the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$. This occurs when either Q or the value the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ places on the low outcome, as captured by L_{I2}, are low in comparison to the costliness of the signal. This implies that, in both of these situations, the INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ really doesn't gain much utility from the issue at all, even from their preferred moderate outcome.

In addition to these separating equilibria, there exist three separating equilibria where it is the INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ that values the situation enough to signal and the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ that chooses not to signal. Unlike the above equilibria, two of these equilibria involve both support by the domestic and the international community.

Proposition 4.3. Domestic Leader Equilibrium *–The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the advocacy INGO model:*

1) For $C_{INGO*} \leq (1-Q)(L_{I2})$*, the* INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ *sends a signal of* $C_{INGO*}=B(H_{I1}-L_{I1}) - Q(H_{I1}-L_{I1})$.

2) For $C_{INGO*} \geq B(H_{I1}-L_{I1}) - Q(H_{I1}-L_{I1})$*, the* INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ *sends a signal less than* C_{INGO*}.

3) For $C_L \geq B(H_L-L_L) - Q(H_L-L_L)$ *and* $C_L \leq (1-Q)(L_L)$ *, the international community supports INGOs iff they observe* C_{INGO*} *or greater.*

4) For $C_D \leq (1-Q)(L_D)$*, the domestic community supports all INGOs.*

Separation requires updating to certainty. Therefore, respective beliefs for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom} *|* C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 1*

b) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom} *| less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 0*

c) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *|* C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 0*

d) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ *| less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 1*

Proposition 4.4. International Fad Equilibrium *–The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the advocacy INGO model:*

1) For $C_{INGO*} \leq (1-Q)(L_{I2})$*, the* INGO_{Dom} *sends a signal of* $C_{INGO*}=B(H_{I1}\text{-}L_{I1})$ *-* $Q(H_{I1}\text{-}L_{I1})$*.*

2) For $C_{INGO*} \geq B(H_{I1}\text{-}L_{I1})$ *-* $Q(H_{I1}\text{-}L_{I1})$*, the* $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *sends a signal less than* C_{INGO*}*.*

3) For $C_L \leq (1-Q)(L_L)$ *, the international community supports all INGOs.*

4) For $C_D \leq (1-Q)(L_D)$ and $C_D \geq B(H_D\text{-}L_D)$ *-* $Q(H_D\text{-}L_D)$*, the domestic community supports INGOs iff they observe* C_{INGO*} *or greater.*

Separation requires updating to certainty. Therefore, respective beliefs for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom} *|* C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 1*

b) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom} *| less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 0*

c) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *|* C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 0*

d) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Good}}$ *| less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 1*

Proposition 4.5. Domestic Signaling Equilibrium *–The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the advocacy INGO model:*

1) For $C_{INGO*} \leq (Q)(L_{I2})$*, the* INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ *sends a signal of* $C_{INGO*}=(Q)(H_{I1})+(1-Q)(L_{I1})$*.*

2) For $C_{INGO*} \geq (Q)(H_{I1})+(1-Q)(L_{I1})$*, the* INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ *sends a signal less than* C_{INGO*}*.*

3) For $C_L \geq (Q)(H_L) + (1-Q)(L_L)$ *, the international community does not support any INGOs.*

4) For $C_D \geq (Q)(H_L)+(1-Q)(L_D)$ and $C_D \leq (Q)(L_D)$*, the domestic community supports INGOs iff they observe* C_{INGO*} *or greater.*

Separation requires updating to certainty. Therefore, respective beliefs for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

*a) P' = Prob(*INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ *|* C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 1*

*b) P' = Prob(*INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ *| less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 0*

*c) P" = Prob(*INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ *|* C_{INGO*} *or greater) = 0*

*d) P" = Prob(*INGO$_{\text{Good}}$ *| less than* C_{INGO*}*) = 1*

The equilibrium space for these equilibria, where INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ sends C_{INGO*} and INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, is also graphed in Figure 4.2. As seen in the graph, these equilibria are determined not only by the costliness of support, but, more importantly, by the values each actor places on the moderate and extreme advocacy outcomes and the likelihood of achieving these outcomes from the state in question. Also, as mentioned above, the *Domestic Signaling Equilibrium* and the *Foreign Helper Equilibrium*

each depend on different orderings of $(Q)(H_L) + (1 - Q)(L_D)$ and $(Q)(L_D)$ on the X-Axis.

In these last three equilibrium, the domestic actor supports the advocacy INGO that shares its same preference ordering, INGO_{Dom}. Interestingly, however, in the *Domestic Leader Equilibrium*, the domestic community supports all INGOs, regardless of signal sent. This would occur if costs for the domestic community are sufficiently low, below $(1-Q)(L_D)$ and, very surprisingly, would also depend on the international community only supporting INGO_{Dom}. For this to occur, the international community must greatly value the assured moderate outcome that it can get with it joins the domestic community and supports INGO_{Dom}. In other words, for this move to be sequentially rational for the international community, the international community must not get a lot of utility from the possibility of the extreme outcome that the $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ is working for but get a lot of utility from the moderate outcome that it is assured when it joins the domestic community in supporting the domestically-oriented INGO. This behavior could be observed, therefore, in situations where the international community is searching for domestically-oriented INGOs to work in states that are not very vulnerable to outside intervention or requests for extreme advocated change.

A good example of this dynamic would be attempts to change environmental regulations in the United States in the early 1990s. The U.S. government was not very vulnerable to outside pressures but there was much to be gained from small advocated changes in policies and behavior (McCormick 1999; Schofer and Hironaka 2005). For example, even though the United States eventually did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, Betsill (2008) notes that environmental INGOs played a substantial role in changing the United State's position to one not solely reflecting "domestic pressure from the fossil-fuel industry" (60). Specifically, Betsill (2008) points out the role environmental INGOs had in changing the position of Vice President Gore, later awarded the

Nobel Peace Prize for his work on environmental issues. Since then, there has a been a "growing impetus for a domestic U.S. climate policy that can provide meaningful reductions in emissions of $CO_2$and other greenhouse gases" (Stavins 2008). Additionally, many individual states within the U.S. have either reduced carbon emissions through voluntary cutbacks or are projected to reduce carbon emissions voluntarily (DePalma 2005; Auffhammer and Steinhauser 2007).

In both the *International Fad* and *Domestic Signaling Equilibria*, the INGO_{Dom} is signaling to the domestic audience; its signal doesn't influence the behavior of the international community at all. Instead, the international community is either supporting all INGOs, regardless of signal, in the case of the *International Fad Equilibrium*, or not supporting any INGO, as is the case in the *Domestic Signaling Equilibrium*. For the *International Fad* to occur, the international community's cost of supporting the INGO has to be very small, below $(1-Q)(L_L)$. This could occur, for example, if the costs of support to the international community involves only office space at intergovernmental organizations or making references to the INGOs work when dealing with the state in question. For this constraint to hold, the domestic community has to value the moderate outcome and be in a situation where its support could prove valuable to the INGO_{Dom}, as determined by a low Q probability of an INGO being effective if only gaining the support of the international community.

Conversely, in the *Domestic Signaling Equilibrium*, the domestic community, being the only actor to support an INGO, wants a moderately high Q probability and must not put much value on the extreme outcome that an $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ could bring. Additionally, in this situation, the cost of support for the international community must be very high in relation to the benefits it could receive if the advocacy attempt was successful.

As mentioned, all of these equilibria where INGO_{Dom} is signaling depend on $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ not wanting to replicate the costly signal. In both the *International Fad*

and the *Domestic Leader Equilibria*, this occurs if the probability of getting an extreme outcome with both actors is not that great in comparison to the probability of getting an extreme outcome with one actor, as determined by the values of B and Q. In the *Domestic Signaling Equilibrium*, the $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ must not value either outcome very much, similar to the behavior of the international community discussed above.

In addition to these various separating equilibria, there exist four different types of pooling equilibria to the advocacy INGO model. In each of these equilibria, like the pooling equilibria of the service INGO model, advocacy INGOs do not signal and the international and domestic community rely on the baseline probabilities that they are facing an INGO_{Dom}, *P*, or an $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$, *1-P*, when deciding whether to support an INGO.

Proposition 4.6. All Support Equilibrium *–The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the advocacy INGO model:*

1) The INGO_{Dom} *does not signal.*

2) The $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *does not signal.*

3) For $\text{P} \leq \frac{B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - L_L) - C_L}{B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - 2L_L) - L_L)}$*, the international community supports all INGOs, regardless of signal.*

4) For $P \geq \frac{B(L_D - H_D) - Q(L_D - H_D) + C_D}{B(L_D - H_D) - Q(2L_D - H_D) + L_D}$*, the domestic community supports all INGOs, regardless of signal.*

Pooling on no signal doesn't allow updating. Therefore, rational beliefs given strategies for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom}*) = P*

b) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$*) = 1-P*

Proposition 4.7. No Support Equilibrium *–The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the advocacy INGO model:*

1) The INGO_{Dom} *does not signal.*

2) The $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *does not signal.*

3) For $\text{P} \geq \frac{Q(H_L - L_L) + L_L - C_L}{Q(H_L - 2L_L) + L_L)}$*, the international community does not support any INGOs, regardless of signal.*

4) For $P \leq \frac{Q(L_D - H_D) - L_D + C_D}{Q_D(2L_D - H_D) - L_D)}$*, the domestic community does not support any INGOs, regardless of signal.*

Pooling on no signal doesn't allow updating. Therefore, rational beliefs given strategies for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom}*) = P*

b) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$*) = 1-P*

Proposition 4.8. International Only Support Equilibrium *–The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the advocacy INGO model:*

1) The INGO_{Dom} *does not signal.*

2) The $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *does not signal.*

3) For $P \leq \frac{Q(H_L - L_L) + L_L - C_L}{Q_L(H_L - 2L_L) + L_L)}$*, the international community supports all INGOs, regardless of signal.*

4) For $P \leq \frac{B(L_D - H_D) - Q(L_D - H_D) + C_D}{B(L_D - H_D) - Q(2L_D - H_D) + L_D}$*, the domestic community does not support any INGOs, regardless of signal.*

Pooling on no signal doesn't allow updating. Therefore, rational beliefs given strategies for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom}*) = P*

b) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$*) = 1-P*

Proposition 4.9. Domestic Only Support Equilibrium *–The following strategy profiles and beliefs are a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the advocacy INGO model:*

1) The INGO_{Dom} *does not signal.*

2) The $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *does not signal.*

3) For $P \geq \frac{B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - L_L) - C_L}{B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - 2L_L) - L_L}$*, the international community does not support any INGOs, regardless of signal.*

4) For $P \geq \frac{Q(L_D - H_D) - L_D + C_D}{Q_D(2L_D - H_D) - L_D)}$*, the domestic community supports all INGOs, regardless of signal.*

Pooling on no signal doesn't allow updating. Therefore, rational beliefs given strategies for both the international and domestic communities are as follows:

a) P' = Prob(INGO_{Dom}*) = P*

b) P" = Prob($\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$*) = 1-P*

The equilibrium space for these pooling equilibria is graphed in Figure 4.3. Like done for the service INGO pooling equilibria, the Y-Axis represents the baseline probability that each actor is interacting with an INGO_{Dom}, P, while the X-Axis represents the cost of support to the domestic community, C_D.

Figure 4.3: Advocacy INGO – Pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibria



Extremely evident in the graph, the international and domestic communities react differently to changes in the value of P. This is somewhat self-evident: since the domestic community prefers to deal with a domestically-oriented INGO, it would prefer a world where P is very large.

Without signals, the international community's decision to support an advocacy INGO is largely determined by the probability it is interacting with an INGO that shares its preference ordering and the value it places on the extreme outcome. If either of these is sufficiently high, and the costliness of support is sufficiently low, the international community will support all INGOs, regardless of signal sent.

In a world without signals, the behavior of the domestic community is also contingent on its value for the high or extreme outcome. If the international community is going to support all INGOs, as in the *All Support Equilibrium*, or if the international community is not going to support any INGOs, as in the *Domestic Only Support Equilibrium*, the domestic community is more likely to support all INGOs as it gains more utility from H. This makes intuitive sense: if H_D is still valuable to the domestic

community, though less valuable than L_D, the domestic community will support all INGOs, even if P is relatively low.

4.3 Model Results

As a whole, the equilibria of the advocacy INGO model provide many novel empirical implications. Below, I formally outline the predictions most central to the research questions posed in this dissertation. A summary of all of the comparative statics predictions can be found in Table 4.2 & 4.3, for the separating equilibria, and Table 4.4, for the pooling equilibria.

> **Result 4.1.** *As the value of H_D increases, the domestic community is more likely to support INGOs that do not share its preference ordering and more likely to support all INGOs when INGOs do not send separating signals.*
>
> **Result 4.2.** *As the value of L_L increases, the international community is more likely to support INGOs that do not share its preference ordering and more likely to support all INGOs when INGOs do not send separating signals. This only occurs in pooling situations when H_L is not valued sufficiently ($H_L < H_L{}^{**}$ and $H_L < H_L{}^{*}$).*

Results 4.1 and 4.2 state that as the value of each community's least preferred outcome, namely H_D for the domestic community and L_L for the international community, increases, the likelihood of support to all advocacy INGOs also increases. In other words, as the domestic community gets more utility from extreme policy and behavior outcomes, it is more likely to support $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$. Likewise, when the international community gets more utility from the moderate outcome, its is more likely to

Table 4.2: Comparative Statics Predictions of Advocacy INGO Model - Separating INGO$_{Int'l}$ Signals

	Increase in Parameter:											
	P	***CL***	***LL***	***HL***	***B***	***Q***	***CD***	***LD***	***HD***	***HI1***	***LI1***	***LI2***
Missionary Force Equilibrium	No change	Less likely to hold on first constraint *(move to Foreign Helper)* but more likely to hold on second constraint	More likely to hold on first constraint but less likely on second constraint *(move to Foreign Helper)*	More likely to hold	No change	*for INGOInt'l: more likely to hold *for INGODom: less likely to hold *(move to pooling)* *for Int'l community: more likely to hold on first constraint but less likely on second constraint *(move to Foreign Helper)* *for Domestic Community: Less likely to hold *(move to Pooling or Foreign Helper Equilibria)*	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold *(move to Pooling or Foreign Helper Equilibria*	No change	More likely to hold	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold *(move to pooling equilibria)*
Foreign Helper Equilibrium	No change	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold *(move to Missionary Force or pooling equilibria)*	No change	*for Int'l Community: less likely to hold *(move to Missionary Force)*	*for INGOInt'l: more likely to hold *for INGODom less likely to hold *(move to pooling)* *for Int'l community: more likely to hold on first constraint but less likely on second constraint *(move to Missionary Force or Pooling Equilibria)* *for Domestic community: less likely to hold *(move to pooling)*	Less likely for first constraint to hold *(move to Missionary Force or pooling equilibria)* but more likely for second constraint to hold	More likely for first constraint to be met but less likely for second constraint *(move to Missionary Force or pooling equilibria)*	More likely to hold	More likely to hold	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold *(move to pooling equilibria)*

Table 4.3: Comparative Statics Predictions of Advocacy INGO Model - Separating Equilibria when $INGO_{Dom}$ Signals

	Increase in Parameter:											
	P	***CL***	***LL***	***HL***	***B***	***Q***	***CD***	***LD***	***HD***	***HI1***	***LI1***	***LI2***
Domestic Leader Equilibrium	No change	Less likely to hold on first constraint *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)* but more likely to hold on second constraint	More likely to hold	No change	*for INGOInt'l: less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)* *for International Community: less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper equilibria)*	*for INGOInt'l: more likely to hold *for INGODom: less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)* *for Int'l community: less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)* for first constraint but easier to hold for second constraint *for Domestic community: less likely to hold *(move to pooling, Domestic Signaling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)*	Less likely to hold *(move to pooling, Domestic Signaling, or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)*	More likely to hold	No change	No change	No change	More likely to hold
International Fad Equilibrium	No change	Less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)*	More likely to hold	No change	*for INGOInt'l: less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper*	*for INGOInt'l: more likely to hold *for INGODom: less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)* *for Int'l community: less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)* *for Domestic community: less likely to hold *(move to pooling, Domestic Signaling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)*	Less likely to hold *(move to pooling, Domestic Signaling, or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)*	More likely to hold	No change	No change	No change	More likely to hold
Domestic Signaling Equilibrium	No change	More likely to hold	Less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)*	Less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)*	No change	* for INGOInt'l: Less likely to hold *(move to pooling equilibria or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)* *for INGODom: more likely to hold *for Int't Community: Less likely to hold *(move to pooling or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)* *for Domestic community: more likely to hold	Less likely for first constraint *(move to Missionary Force/Foreign Helper or pooling equilibria)* but more likely for second constraint to hold	More likely for first constraint to be met but less likely for second constraint to be met *(move to Missionary Force/Foreign Helper or pooling equilibria)*	Less likely to hold *(move to pooling equilibria or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)*	Less likely to hold *(move to pooling equilibria or Missionary Force/Foreign Helper)*	More likely to hold on first constraint but less likely to hold *(move to pooling equilibria or Missionary Force /Foreign Helper)*	More likely to hold

Table 4.4: Comparative Statics Predictions of Advocacy INGO Model - Pooling Equilibria

	Increase in Parameter: ***P***	***CL***	***LL***	***HL***	***B***	***Q***	***CD***	***LD***	***HD***	***HI1***	***LI1***	***LI2***
All Support Equilibrium	*for Int'l Community = less likely *(move to Domestic Only Support)* *for Domestic Community = more likely to hold	less likely to hold *(move to Domestic Only Support)*	When HL > HL*: less likely to hold *(move to Domestic Only Support)* When HL < HL*: more likely	more likely to hold	*for Int'l Community= more likely to hold *for Domestic Community = less likely to hold *(move to International Only Support)*	*for Int'l Community = When B > B *: less likely to hold *(move to Domestic Only Support)* When B< B *: more likely to hold *for Domestic Community = When B > B **: more likely to hold When B< B* *: less likely to hold *(move to International Only Support)*	less likely to hold (move to International Only Support)	When HD > HD*: more likely to hold When HD< HD *: less likely to hold (move to International Only Support)	more likely to hold	No change	No change	No change
No Support Equilibrium	*for Int'l Community = more likely to hold *for Domestic Community = less likely to hold *(move to Domestic Only Support)*	more likely to hold	When HL > HL **: more likely to hold When HL < HL **: Less likely to hold *(move to International Only Support)*	Less likely to hold *(move to International Only Support)*	No change	*for International Community= less likely to hold *(move to International only support)* *for Domestic Community = When HD > HD***: less likely to hold *(move to Domestic Only Support)* When HD<HD ***: more likely to hold	more likely to hold	When **HD** > HD**: less likely to hold *(move to Domestic Only Support)* When HD< HD**: more likely	less likely to hold *(move to Domestic Only Support)*	No change	No change	No change
Int'l Only Support Equilibrium	*for Int'l Community = less likely to hold *(move to No Support)* *for Domestic Community = less likely to hold *(move to All Support)*	less likely to hold *(move to No Support)*	When HL > HL **: less likely to hold (*move to No Support)* When HL < HL **: more likely to hold	More likely to hold	*for Int'l Community= no change *for Domestic Community = more likely to hold	*for International Community= more likely to hold *for Domestic Community = When B > B **: less likely to hold *(move to All Support)* When B< B* *: more likely to hold	more likely to hold	When HD > HD*: less likely to hold *(move to All Support)* When HD< HD *: more likely to hold	less likely to hold (*move to All Support)*	No change	No change	No change
Domestic Only Equilibrium	*for Int'l Community = more likely to hold *for Domestic Community = more likely to hold	more likely to hold	When HL > HL *: more likely to hold When HL < HL *: less likely to hold *(move to All Support)*	less likely to hold *(move to All Support)*	less likely to hold *(move to All Support)*	*for Int'l Community = When B > B *: more likely to hold When B< B *: less likely to hold *(move to All Support)* *for Domestic Community = When HD > HD**: more likely to hold When HD< HD ***: less likely to hold *(move to No Support)*	less likely to hold (move to No Support	When HD > HD**: More likely to hold When HD< HD **: less likely to hold (move to No Support)	More likely to hold	No change	No change	No change

support INGO_{Dom}. Given that the model assumes that support by both communities relates to a better chance of the advocated policy and behavior outcome, these results imply that advocacy INGOs will have a greater effect on non-divisive issues than divisive issues. By non-divisive issues, I am referring to issues where the international and domestic community, though still different in their exact preference orderings, place sufficiently high values on their least preferred outcome.

Result 4.3. *When both the domestic and the international communities support all INGOs, an increase in the vulnerability of the state, B, will increase the likelihood of more extreme advocacy outcomes.*

Result 4.3 is derived from comparative statics over the values of H_L , for the international community, and H_D , for the domestic community. As shown in the comparative statics tables, as these parameters increase, the domestic and international communities are more likely to support either all INGOs or $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ when there are separating signals. As assumed in the model, however, extreme policy and behavior outcomes are still dependent on the vulnerability of the state, as captured by the B parameter. Therefore, Result 4.3 implies that the effectiveness of advocacy INGOs on non-divisive issues will depend on the vulnerability of the state to both internal and external pressure. In other words, as a state becomes more vulnerable to either internal or external pressures, advocacy INGOs will have a greater impact on non-divisive policies and behavior outcomes.

Result 4.4. *As the value of C_D increases, the domestic community is less likely to support INGOs.*

Result 4.4 is derived from the comparative statics concerning C_D. Intuitively, as the costliness of support to the domestic community increases, it is less likely that the domestic community will support advocacy INGOs. This result implies two things. First, the domestic community will not support INGOs in repressive states where these costs are high. Second, because the likelihood of results depends upon domestic community support, Result 4.4 implies that if supporting advocacy INGOs is too costly for the domestic community, we should see lower levels of policy and behavior outcomes as a result of advocacy INGO efforts.

Result 4.5. *As the value of C_L increases, the international community is less likely to support INGOs.*

Result 4.6. *As H_L increases, the international community is more likely to support INGOs.*

Results 4.5 and 4.6 state that the international community is less likely to support advocacy INGOs when costs of support are high and/or when the benefits of outcomes are low. Taken together, like discussed with respect to the service INGO model, these results imply that the international community should have a great impact on the observable policy and behavior outcomes caused by INGOs. As the amount of support by the international community increases, we should see more advocacy INGO-induced policy and behavior outcomes.

Result 4.7. *Without signals, as P increases, the international community is less likely to support all INGOs but the domestic community is more likely to support all INGOs.*

Result 4.7 relates directly to P, the likelihood of facing an INGO with preferences consistent with the domestic community. As discussed with respect to Propositions 4.6-4.9, the international and domestic communities react differently to changes in P. First, the international community is more willing to support INGOs in states or on issues where there are little or no domestically-oriented INGOs. This implies that many INGOs with domestic preferences might actually lessen the support that the international community gives INGOs. In other words, if P is low solely because of a lack of domestic civil society organizations, writ large, we might see the international community more likely to support all INGOs, even though the domestic community does not prefer these internationally-oriented INGOs. In other words, in countries or on issues where domestically-oriented INGOs are nascent, the international community is more likely to support advocacy INGOs, even putting more money in advocacy projects. As the amount of domestically-oriented INGOs increases, evidenced perhaps by the amount of INGOs based out of a country, the international community is less willing to support any INGO.

Conversely, Result 4.7 also implies that the domestic community is less likely to support INGOs acting on issues where there are lots of internationally-oriented INGOs. Thus, on issues where there are lots of internationally-oriented INGOs, such as women's rights, for example, the domestic community would be less likely to support all INGOs, even those that share their preference for moderate outcomes, if INGOs are not able to send separating signals.

Result 4.8. $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ *is more likely to send a signal to the international community in vulnerable states.*

Result 4.9. INGO_{Dom} *is more likely to send a signal to the international community in invulnerable states.*

Results 4.8 and 4.9 concern the separating equilibria where the INGO types are signaling to the international community in order to gain support. Interestingly, these results imply that domestically-oriented INGOs signal in the exact opposite states as $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$s. This makes much intuitive sense, however. Because $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$'s preferred outcome depends on the vulnerability of the state, it is more likely to signal in vulnerable states. However, because no separating equilibrium holds where the INGO_{Dom} is not supported by the domestic community, the INGO_{Dom} is less likely to send a costly signal to the international community in vulnerable states because it is more likely to get its preferred outcome without the support of the international community.

4.4 Testable Implications of the Model

The results of the advocacy INGO model offer many testable implications concerning the behavior of advocacy INGOs, the support they receive, and their impacts on policy and behavior outcomes. Below, I lay out the three hypotheses derived from the model that are tested in Chapter 6.

First, the game-theoretic model offers many implications into the factors which condition the impact of advocacy INGO. Taken together, the model implies that:

> **Advocacy INGO Hypothesis 1**. *Advocacy INGOs will have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes on (a) non-divisive issues, (b) in vulnerable states, (c) in regimes with little restrictions on association to the domestic population, and (d) as support from the international community increases.*

As mentioned, non-divisive issues are advocacy issues where the international and domestic communities have preferences that are more in agreement. In these situations, it is more likely that the international and the domestic communities will support advocacy INGOs and, thus, it is expected that the outcome of the advocacy INGO activity will be greater. This hypothesis, which is based on Result 4.1 and 4.2, counters the "hot button issues" that have dominated advocacy attempts and are often thought to be where advocacy INGOs are most effective (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ahmed and Potter 2006; Carpenter 2007).

Part 1(b) stresses how regime characteristics condition the impact of advocacy INGOs. When a state is vulnerable to a combination of internal and external pressure, advocacy INGOs should have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes. This hypothesis is a restatement of Result 4.3. Though this hypothesis is consistent with extant theoretical literature, it has never been empirically tested.

As shown in Result 4.4, the domestic population of a state will only support advocacy INGOs when the costs of this support are low. When dealing with advocacy INGOs, these costs include costs domestic populations face for associating with advocacy INGOs. Thus, a testable implication from the model is that advocacy INGO impact is conditional to the ability of the domestic population to freely associate, as outlined by Hypothesis 1(c).

Finally, as an extension of Results 4.5 and 4.6, we should expect that increased amounts of funds directed at advocacy INGOs from the international community should cause greater amounts of policy and behavior change; this is captured in section (d) of Hypothesis 1.

In addition to focusing on when advocacy INGOs are likely to impact policy and behavior outcomes, the model implies a very interesting dynamic concerning support by the international community to advocacy INGOs. As outlined in Result 4.7, the relaxation of the altruism assumption implies that the international community is

more likely to support advocacy INGOs as P decreases. Therefore, this additional hypothesis from the advocacy INGO model seems necessary to adequately test the model's implication and, thus, the focus on the relaxation of the altruism assumption. Since both the domestic and international community preferred the same type of INGOs in the service INGO model, a test of the impact of the relaxation of the altruism assumption in that model involved focusing on how the impact of service INGOs was dependent on the level of corruption in the state. However, as discussed above, the relaxation of the altruism assumption in the advocacy INGO model implies that the international and domestic communities react differently to altruistic and non-altruistic INGOs. Result 4.7 highlights this dynamic: as P, the proportion of altruistic advocacy INGOs, increases, the international community is less likely to support advocacy INGOs but the domestic community is more likely. A direct test of this implication, therefore, would include the following hypothesis:

> **Advocacy INGO Hypothesis 2**. *The international community is more likely to support advocacy INGOs when there are fewer domestically-oriented INGOs*.

Moreover, as stated in Results 4.8 and 4.9, the vulnerability of a state influences signals by $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ and INGO_{Dom} differently. As Result 4.8 states, $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'ls}}$ are more likely to send signals as a state's vulnerability to internal and external pressure increases. However, as Result 4.9 points out, $\text{INGO}_{\text{Doms}}$ are more likely to send signals as a state's vulnerability to internal and external pressure decreases. These results imply the following:

> **Advocacy INGO Hypothesis 3**. *Advocacy INGOs will make more sig-*

nals concerning vulnerable states as the number of domestically-oriented advocacy INGOs decreases but will make more signals concerning invulnerable states as the number of domestically-oriented advocacy INGOs increases.

This hypothesis is a first-cut at capturing the signaling behavior of advocacy INGOs.

Conclusion

Under what conditions do advocacy INGOs impact policy and behavioral outcomes? Though previous theory has offered limited predictions on the factors which condition the impact of overall advocacy networks, no extant framework focuses on the conditional impact of advocacy INGOs themselves or on when and where these organizations are able to get the support of other critical actors in advocacy networks.

The model and results presented in this chapter offers a novel approach to understanding the conditional impact of advocacy INGOs. Underlying the implications presented in this chapter is a more nuanced understanding of the motivations of advocacy INGOs. Unlike the dominant TAN framework, not all advocacy INGOs are predominantly motivated to help a domestic population. Instead, many advocacy INGOs are internationally biased. Focusing on how the existence of advocacy INGOs with each of these motivations complicates when and where these organizations receive support is critical, I contend, to developing a theory of the impact of these organizations in world politics.

In the next two chapters, the implications of my theoretical models are empirically tested. Chapter 5 examines the implications from the service INGO model presented in Chapter 3 while Chapter 6 tests the implications concerning advocacy INGOs that have been outlined in this chapter.

Chapter 4 Appendix

Proof for the Pure-Strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of Advocacy INGO Model

I restrict my attention to pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. Also, like discussed in the text of this chapter, I'm assuming that the domestic community has preferences that are the opposite of the international community with respect to the various potential advocacy outcomes (ie $L_D \geq H_D$ but $H_L \geq L_L$).

When $L_D \geq H_D$ but $H_L \geq L_L$, there exists both separating equilibria and pooling equilibria, as discussed below.

Separating Equilibria

There exist five separating equilibria:

1. $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends C_{INGO*}, INGO_{Dom} sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the international actor supports the advocacy INGO only if they observe C_{INGO*}or greater, and the domestic actor doesn't support any advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent;

2. $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ sendsC_{INGO*}, INGO_{Dom} sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the domestic actor supports the advocacy INGO only if they observeC_{INGO*} or greater, and the international actor doesn't support any advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent;

3. INGO_{Dom} sends C_{INGO*}, $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends$C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the international actor supports the advocacy INGO only if they observe C_{INGO*} or greater, and the domestic actor supports any advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent;

4. INGO_{Dom} sends C_{INGO*}, $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the domestic actor supports the advocacy INGO only if they observe C_{INGO*} or greater, and the international actor supports all advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent;

5. INGO_{Dom} sends C_{INGO*}, $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the domestic actor supports the advocacy INGO only if they observe C_{INGO*} or greater, and the international actor doesn't supports any advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent.

As to beliefs, in the first two separating equilibria, where $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends C_{INGO*} and INGO_{Dom} sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the international and domestic actors know for certain that they are facing an advocacy INGO with an international bias ($\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$) if they see C_{INGO*} or greater and know for certain that they are facing an advocacy INGO with preferences in line with the domestic community (INGO_{Dom}) if they see less than C_{INGO*}.

Conversely, in the next three equilibria, where INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ sends $C_{INGO*}$and INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends$C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the international and domestic actors know for certain that they are facing an advocacy INGO with an international bias (INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$) if they see less than C_{INGO*} and know for certain that they are facing an advocacy INGO with preferences in line with the domestic community (INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$) if they see C_{INGO*}or greater.

Sequentially rational strategies for each of the equilibria are as follows:

Separating Equilibrium - INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ sendsC_{INGO*}, INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the international community supports the advocacy INGO only if they observeC_{INGO*} or greater, and the domestic community doesn't support any advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent

First, for the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$, it is sequentially rational to signal C_{INGO*} if:

$$U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Int'l}} (C_{INGO*} | \text{ International supports } C_{INGO*}\text{or greater and Domestic never supports}) \geq U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Int'l}} (C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*} \mid \text{International and Domestic actors don't support } C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*})$$

and

$$U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Int'l}} (C_{INGO*} | \text{ International supports } C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater and Domestic never supports}) \geq U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Int'l}} (C_{INGO''} > C_{INGO*} \mid \text{International supports } C_{INGO*}\text{or greater and Domestic never supports})$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \leq Q(H_{I1}) + (1 - Q)(L_{I1})$$

This constraint implies that as Q increases, the costly signal can increase and the equilibrium still holds. Also, if the value of the high or low outcome increases, it is easier for this constraint to be met.

Because signaling is costly, the second equation is always true. In other words, it is never rational for the advocacy INGO to signal more than it has to in order to get a response from the international community.
Next, for not signaling to be sequentially rational for the INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Dom}} (C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*} \mid \text{International and Domestic actors don't support } C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Dom}} (C_{INGO*} | \text{ International supports } C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater and Domestic never supports})$$

This is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \geq Q(L_{I2})$$

This constraint is harder to be met if either Q or the value of the low outcome for the INGO_{Dom} increases.

Likewise, for the international community to want to support only INGOs that send C_{INGO*} or greater, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ International (Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)} \geq U \text{ International (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)}$$

and

$$U \text{ International (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ International (Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}).$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_L \leq Q(H_L) + (1 - Q)(L_L)$$

This constraint implies that as Q increases, the cost of support to the international community can increase and the equilibrium still holds. Also, if the value of the high or low outcome increases, it is easier for this constraint to be met.

The second equation is true when:

$$C_L \geq Q(L_L)$$

This constraint is harder to meet if either Q or the value of the low outcome for the international community increases.

Finally, in order for the moves by the domestic actor to be sequentially rational, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)} \geq U \text{ Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)}$$

and

$$\text{U Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq \text{U Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*})$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_D \geq B(H_D - L_D) - Q(H_D - L_D)$$

This constraint is harder to meet as B increases but is easier to meet if Q increases. However, since it can be assumed that $(H_D - L_D)$ is negative and $B > Q$, this constraint is not binding.

And the second equation is true when:

$$C_D \geq Q(L_D)$$

This constraint is harder to meet if either Q or the value of the low outcome for the domestic community increases.

Therefore, if these conditions are met, this equilibrium holds. By constructing a constrained optimization problem, I also find that the optimal C_{INGO*} for this equilibria is:

$$C_{INGO*} = Q(L_{I2})$$

Separating Equilibrium - INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends C_{INGO*}, INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the domestic community supports the advocacy INGO only if they observe C_{INGO*} or greater, and the international community doesn't support any advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent

For the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$, it is sequentially rational to signal C_{INGO*} if:

U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ (C_{INGO*}| Domestic supports C_{INGO*}or greater and International never supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ ($C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ | International and Domestic actors don't support $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$)

and

U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ (C_{INGO*}| Domestic supports C_{INGO*} or greater and International never supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ ($C_{INGO''} > C_{INGO*}$ | International supports C_{INGO*}or greater and Domestic never supports)

The first equation is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \leq Q(H_{I1}) + (1 - Q)(L_{I1})$$

This constraint implies that as Q increases, the costly signal can increase and the equilibrium still holds. Also, if the value of the high or low outcome increases, it is easier for this constraint to be met.

Because signaling is costly, the second equation is always true. In other words, it is never rational for the advocacy INGO to signal more than it has to in order to get a response from the international community.
Next, for not signaling to be sequentially rational for the INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Dom}} (C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*} \mid \text{International and Domestic actors don't support } C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ INGO}_{\text{Dom}} (C_{INGO*} \mid \text{Domestic supports } C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater and International never supports})$$

This is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \geq Q(L_{I2})$$

This constraint is harder to be met if either Q or the value of the low outcome for the INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ increases.

For the international community to not want to support any advocacy INGO, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ International } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater}) \geq U \text{ International (Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)}$$

and

$$U \text{ International } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ International (Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}).$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_L \geq B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - L_L)$$

This constraint is harder to meet as B increases but is easier to meet if Q increases.

The second equation is true when:

$$C_L \geq Q(L_L)$$

This constraint is harder to meet if either Q or the value of the low outcome increases. The binding constraint for the international community can be either of these two equations; it depends on the value of the parameters. In the Figure 4.2, the first equation is assumed to be the binding constraint.

Finally, in order for the moves by the domestic actor to be sequentially rational, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)} \geq U \text{ Domestic(}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)}$$

and

$$U \text{ Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}).$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_D \leq Q(H_D) + (1-Q)(L_D)$$

Since $L_D > H_D$, this constraint implies that as Q decreases, the cost of support can increase and the equilibrium still holds. Also, if the value of the high or low outcome increases, it is easier for this constraint to be met..

The second equation is true when:

$$C_D \geq Q(L_D)$$

This constraint is harder to meet if either Q or the value of the low outcome increases. Of note, these constraints for the domestic community are only mutually true if Q is very low.

Therefore, if these conditions are met, this equilibrium holds. By constructing a constrained optimization problem, I also find that the optimal C_{INGO*} for this equilibria is:

$$C_{INGO*} = Q(L_{I2})$$

Separating Equilibrium - INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ sends C_{INGO*}, INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the international community supports the advocacy INGO only if they observe C_{INGO*} or greater, and the domestic community supports any advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent

First, please note, like discussed above, that the beliefs are opposite of the two previously laid-out equilibria.

For the INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$, it is sequentially rational to signal C_{INGO*} if:

U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$(C_{INGO*}| International supports C_{INGO*}or greater and Domestic always supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ ($C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ | International doesn't support $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ and Domestic always supports)

and

U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$(C_{INGO*}| International supports C_{INGO*}or greater and Domestic always supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ ($C_{INGO''} > C_{INGO*}$ | International supports C_{INGO*}or greater and Domestic always supports)

The first equation is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \leq (1 - Q)(L_{I2})$$

This implies that as Q increases, the costly signal must decrease for this constraint to be met. However, as the value of the low outcome increases, the costly signal can increase and the constraint still holds.

Because signaling is costly, the second equation is always true.

Next, for not signaling to be sequentially rational for the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$, the following must be true:

U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ ($C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ | International doesn't support $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ and Domestic always supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ (C_{INGO*}| International supports C_{INGO*}or greater and Domestic always supports)

This is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \geq B(H_{I1} - L_{I1}) - Q(H_{I1} - L_{I1})$$

This constraint is harder to meet as B increases but is easier to meet if Q increases.

For the international community want to support C_{INGO*} or greater, the following must be true:

U International (Support | C_{INGO*} or greater) $\geq$ U International (~Support | C_{INGO*} or greater)

and

$$U \text{ International } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ International (Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*})$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_L \leq (1 - Q)(L_L)$$

This implies that as Q increases, the cost of support must decrease for this constraint to be met. However, as the value of the low outcome increases, the costliness of support can increase and the constraint still holds.

And the second equation is true when:

$$C_L \geq B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - L_L)$$

This constraint is harder to meet as B increases but is easier to meet if Q increases.

Finally, in order for the moves by the domestic actor to be sequentially rational, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater}) \geq U \text{ Domestic } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater})$$

and

$$U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ Domestic } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*})$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_D \leq (1 - Q)(L_D)$$

This implies that as Q increases, the cost of support must decrease for this constraint to be met. However, as the value of the low outcome increases, the cost of support can increase and the constraint still holds.

The second equation is true when:

$$C_D \leq (Q)(H_D) + (1 - Q)(L_D)$$

This constraint is easier to meet if $L_D$or H_D increases. Since $L_D > H_D$, it is easier to hold if Q decreases. As long as H_D is greater than 0, this constraint is not binding.

Therefore, if these conditions are met, this equilibrium holds. By constructing a constrained optimization problem, I also find that the optimal $C_{INGO*}$for this equilibria is:

$$C_{INGO*} = B(H_{I1} - L_{I1}) - Q(H_{I1} - L_{I1})$$

Separating Equilibrium - INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ sendsC_{INGO*}, INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the domestic community supports the advocacy INGO only if they observeC_{INGO*} or greater, and the international community supports any advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent

The beliefs are identical to the above equilibria.

For the INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$, it is sequentially rational to signal C_{INGO*} if:

U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$(C_{INGO*}| Domestic supports C_{INGO*}or greater and International always supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ ($C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ | Domestic doesn't support $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ and International always supports)

and

U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$(C_{INGO*}| Domestic supports C_{INGO*}or greater and International always supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ ($C_{INGO''} > C_{INGO*}$ | Domestic supports C_{INGO*}or greater and International always supports)

The first equation is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \leq (1 - Q)(L_{I2})$$

This implies that as Q increases, the costly signal must decrease for this constraint to be met. However, as the value of the low outcome increases, the costly signal can increase and the constraint still holds.

Because signaling is costly, the second equation is always true.

Next, for not signaling to be sequentially rational for the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$, the following must be true:

U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ ($C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ | Domestic doesn't support $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ and International always supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ (C_{INGO*}| Domestic supports C_{INGO*}or greater and International always supports)

This is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \geq B(H_{I1} - L_{I1}) - Q(H_{I1} - L_{I1})$$

This constraint is harder to meet as B increases but is easier to meet if Q increases.

For the international community to want to support all INGOs, regardless of signal sent, the following must be true:

U International (Support | C_{INGO*}or greater) $\geq$ U International (~Support | C_{INGO*}or greater)

and

U International (Support | $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$) $\geq$ U International (~Support | $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$)

The first equation is true when:

$$C_L \leq (L_L)(1-Q)$$

This implies that as Q increases, the cost of support must decrease for this constraint to be met. However, as the value of the low outcome increases, the costliness of support can increase and the constraint still holds.

The second equation is true when:

$$C_L \leq (Q)\ (H_L) + (1-Q)\ (L_L)$$

This constraint is easier to meet if $L_L$or $H_L$increases. Since $H_L > L_L$, it is harder to hold if Q decreases. This constraint is not binding.

Next, for the domestic community only to want to support if C_{INGO*} or greater, the following must be true:

U Domestic (Support | C_{INGO*} or greater) $\geq$ U Domestic (~Support | C_{INGO*} or greater)

and

U Domestic (~Support | $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$) $\geq$ U Domestic (Support | $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$)

The first equation is true when:

$$C_D \leq (L_D)(1\text{-}Q)$$

This implies that as Q increases, the cost of support must decrease for this constraint to be met. However, as the value of the low outcome increases, the costliness of support can increase and the constraint still holds.

And the second equation is true when:

$$C_D \geq B(H_D\text{-}\ L_D)\ \text{-}\ Q(H_D\text{-}\ L_D)$$

Since $H_D < L_D$ and $B > Q$, this condition always holds.

Therefore, if these conditions are met, this equilibrium holds. By constructing a constrained optimization problem, I also find that the optimal C_{INGO*} for this equilibria, like the equilibria above, is:

$$C_{INGO*} = B(H_{I1}\text{-}\ L_{I1})\ \text{-}\ Q(H_{I1}\text{-}\ L_{I1})$$

Separating Equilibrium - INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ sendsC_{INGO*}, INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ sends $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$, the domestic community supports the advocacy INGO only if they observeC_{INGO*} or greater, and the international community doesn't support any advocacy INGOs, regardless of signal sent

The beliefs are identical to the previous two equilibria.

For the INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$, it is sequentially rational to signal C_{INGO*} if:

U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ (C_{INGO*} | Domestic supports C_{INGO*} or greater and International never supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ ($C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ | Domestic doesn't support $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ and International never supports)

and

U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ (C_{INGO*} | Domestic supports C_{INGO*} or greater and International never supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Dom}}$ ($C_{INGO''} > C_{INGO*}$ | Domestic supports C_{INGO*} or greater and International never supports)

The first equation is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \leq (Q)(L_{I2})$$

This constraint is easier to meet if either Q or the value of the low outcome increases.

Because signaling is costly, the second equation is always true.

Next, for not signaling to be sequentially rational for the INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$, the following must be true:

U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ ($C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ | Domestic doesn't support $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$ and International never supports) $\geq$ U INGO$_{\text{Int'l}}$ (C_{INGO*}| Domestic supports C_{INGO*} or greater and International never supports)

This is true when:

$$C_{INGO*} \geq (Q)(H_{I1}) + (1-Q)(L_{I1})$$

This constraint is harder to meet if H_{I1} or L_{I1} increases. Also, as Q increases, this constraint is harder to meet.

For the international community to not want to support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent, the following must be true:

U International (~Support | C_{INGO*} or greater) $\geq$ U International (Support | C_{INGO*} or greater)
and
U International (~Support | $C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$) $\geq$ U International (Support |$C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}$)

The first equation is true when:

$$C_L \geq (1-Q)(L_L)$$

This implies that as Q increases, this constraint is easier to hold. However, as the value of the low outcome increases, the costliness of support must increase for this constraint to hold.

The second equation is true when:

$$C_L \geq (Q)(H_L) + (1-Q)(L_L)$$

This constraint is harder to meet if $H_L$or L_L increases. Also, as Q increases, this constraint is harder to meet. This constraint is binding.

Next, for the domestic community only to want to support if C_{INGO*} or greater, the following must be true:

$$U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO*}\text{or greater)} \geq U \text{ Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO*} \text{ or greater)}$$

and

$$U \text{ Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*}) \geq U \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid C_{INGO'} < C_{INGO*})$$

The first equation is true when:

$$C_D \leq (Q)(L_D)$$

This constraint is easier to meet if either Q or the value of the low outcome increases.

And the second equation is true when:

$$C_D \geq (Q)(H_L) + (1-Q)(L_D)$$

This constraint is harder to meet if H_D or L_D increases. Also, since $H_D < L_D$, as Q increases, this constraint is easier to meet.

Therefore, if these conditions are met, this equilibrium holds. By constructing a constrained optimization problem, I also find that the optimal C_{INGO*} for this equilibria is:

$$C_{INGO*} = (Q)(H_{I1}) + (1-Q)(L_{I1})$$

No other separating equilibria hold.

Pooling Equilibria

Four separate types of pooling equilibria hold for the advocacy INGO model:

1. one where both the international and the domestic communities support the INGO, regardless of signal sent;
2. an equilibrium where neither the international or the domestic actor support the INGO, regardless of signal sent;
3. an equilibria where the international actor supports all INGOs and the domestic community does not support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent; and
4. an equilibria where the domestic community supports all INGOs and the international community does not support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent.

In each of these pooling equilibria, both types of advocacy INGOs set C_{INGO} to equal 0 in order to minimize costs.
The beliefs on path are thus 1-P that the international and domestic actors are facing an $INGO_{Int'l}$ and P that they are facing an $INGO_{Dom}$.
Sequentially rational moves for each of the pooling equilibria are as follows:

Pooling Equilibrium - International and Domestic support all INGOs, regardless of signal sent

Of course, the moves by both types of INGOs are sequentially rational. They would rather not send a costly signal if it doesn't impact whether the international or domestic community supports them.

For the international community, the decision to support all INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ International (Support | any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ International (~Support | any } C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P \leq \frac{B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - L_L) - C_L}{B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - 2L_L) - L_L)}$$

Comparative statics are as follows. First, asC_L increases, the constraint is less likely to hold. Second, as B increases, the constraint is more likely to hold. Third, as H_L increases, this constraint is more likely to hold. These comparative static predictions are all intuitive with respect to the international community's preferences; when supporting all INGOs, it would prefer B and H_L to be high and prefer $C_L$to be low.

As discussed in the body of the chapter, this constraint provides some interesting non-monotonic comparative statics as well. First, the impact of changes in L_L on the equilibrium space can be thought of as dependent on the value of H_L. In other words, whether an increase inL_L increases or decreases the equilibrium space is dependent on the value of other parameters. This can be seen by first taking the derivative of the above constraint with respect to L_L, and then setting this partial derivative equal to 0 and solving for H_L*, the critical point in determining the impact of L_L on the equilibrium space:

$$H_L^* = (-C_L - BC_L + 2QC_L) \;/\; ((B-Q)(Q-1))$$

Therefore, when $H_L > H_L^*$, as L_L increases, this constraint is less likely to hold. However, if $H_L < H_L^*$, as $L_L$increases, then this constraint is more likely to hold.
Likewise, the impact of Q on the equilibrium space defined by this constraint can be thought of as dependent on the value of B. In other words, Q has a non-monotonic impact on the equilibrium space. Following the procedure just mentioned, the critical point in determining the impact of Q is:

$$B^* = \frac{-C_L H_L + 2C_L L_L + H_L L_L - L_L^2}{(H_L - L_L)(L_L)}$$

Therefore, when $B > B^*$, as Q increases, this constraint is less likely to hold. However, if $B < B^*$, then this constraint is more likely to hold as Q increases.

Likewise, for the domestic community, the decision to support all INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ Domestic (}\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P \geq \frac{B(L_D - H_D) - Q(L_D - H_D) + C_D}{B(L_D - H_D) - Q(2L_D - H_D) + L_D}$$

This constraint provides some interesting comparative statics as well. First, as C_D increases, this constraint is harder or less likely to hold. Second, as B increase, this constraint is harder to hold. Conversely, as H_D increases, this constraint is easier to hold. As discussed in the body of the chapter these comparative statics make intuitive sense with regards to the preferences of the domestic community. It will support all INGOs if costs are low, if INGOs that don't share its preference ordering are not likely to get extreme change, and if it gains some utility from H_D.

Like the similar constraint on the international community, this constraint provides some interesting non-monotonic comparative statics as well. First, like above, the impact of changes in L_D on the equilibrium space can be thought of as dependent on the value of H_D. In other words, whether an increase in L_D increases or decreases the equilibrium space is dependent on the value of other parameters. This can be seen by first taking the derivative of the above constraint with respect to L_D, and then setting this partial derivative equal to 0 and solving for H_D*, the critical point in determining the impact of L_D on the equilibrium space. This critical point is:

$$H_D^* = (-C_D - BC_D + 2QC_D) \;/\; ((B-Q)(Q-1))$$

Therefore, when $H_D > H_D^*$, as L_D increases, the above constraint is more likely to hold. However, if $H_D < H_D^*$, as L_D increases, this constraint is less likely to hold. This makes intuitive sense. Since$L_D > H_D$, when H_D is sufficiently high, as L_D increases and the domestic community becomes more willing to support all INGOs, even those that prefer extreme change. If the domestic community does not sufficiently value H_D, however, as L_D increases, the domestic community community becomes less willing to support all INGOs and would prefer to not support any INGOs, given that INGOs are not sending a separating signal.

Q also has a non-monotonic impact on the equilibrium space. Like outlined with respect to the international community, the impact of Q on the equilibrium space defined by the domestic community's constraint can be thought of as dependent on the value of B. Following the procedure discussed above, the critical point is determined

as:

$$B^{**} = \frac{-C_D H_D + 2C_D L_D + H_D L_D - L_D^2}{(H_D - L_D)(L_D)}$$

Therefore, when $B > B^{**}$, as Q increases, this constraint is more likely to hold. However, when $B < B^{**}$, then this constraint is less likely to hold as Q increases. This implies a similar dynamic for the domestic community, which, because $L_D > H_D$ would always prefer the outcome associated with *1-B* instead of with B and would prefer the outcome associated with Q when dealing with an INGO with its same preferences but would prefer the outcome associated with *1-Q* when dealing with an $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$. In other words, if B is sufficiently small, as Q increases, P must increase for the the domestic community to want to support all INGOs.

Pooling Equilibrium - International and Domestic don't support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent

Again, the moves by both types of INGOs are sequentially rational. They would rather not send a costly signal if they are never going to gain support through the use of the signal.

For the international community, the decision to not support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ International } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ International (Support} \mid \text{any} C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$\text{P} \geq \frac{Q(H_L - L_L) + L_L - C_L}{Q(H_L - 2L_L) + L_L)}$$

This constraint is easier to hold as C_L increases. As H_L or Q increases, this constraint is harder to hold. The impact of an increase in L_L, however, is non-monotonic. In other words, for certain values of H_L, as L_L increases, it is easier for this constraint to be met but for other values of H_L, it is harder for this constraint to be met.

This can be seen through first taking the derivative of the constraint with respect to L_L, and then simplifying, setting this derivative equal to zero, and solving for a cutpoint, H_L **:

$$H_L{}^{**} = (\text{-}C_L + 2\text{Q}C_L) \ / \ (Q^2)$$

Therefore, when $H_L > H_L{}^{**}$, as L_L increases, the constraint is more likely to hold. However, when $H_L < H_L{}^{**}$, as L_L increases, the constraint is less likely to hold.

For the domestic community, the decision to not support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ Domestic } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid \text{any} C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P \leq \frac{Q(L_D - H_D) - L_D + C_D}{Q_D(2L_D - H_D) - L_D)}$$

Therefore, as C_D increases, this constraint is easier to hold. Also, as H_D increases, this constraint is harder to hold.
The impact of Q appears to be non-monotonic. Like above, this is determined by taking the partial derivation and setting it equal to 0. Solving for $H_D{}^{***}$ yields:

$$H_D{}^{***} = (2C_D\ L_D \text{ - } L_D{}^2)\ /\ (C_D)$$

Therefore, when$H_D > H_D{}^{***}$, as Q increases, this constraint is less likely to hold. However, when $H_D < H_D{}^{***}$, as Q increases, this constraint is more likely to hold. This makes sense: if the extreme outcome is valued sufficiently enough by the domestic community, $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$s, though not preferred, are not as problematic for the domestic community. Therefore, for it to be sequentially rational for the domestic community to not want to support any INGOs, as Q increases, the probability of facing a $\text{INGO}_{\text{Int'l}}$ must Increase as well.

Finally, the impact of L_D is also non-monotonic. There is a cut point, $H_D{}^{**}$:

$$H_D{}^{**} = (\text{-}C_D + 2\text{Q}C_D)\ /\ (Q^2)$$

Therefore, when $H_D > H_D{}^{**}$, asL_D increases, this constraint is less likely to hold. However, when $H_D < H_D{}^{**}$, as L_D increases, this constraint is more likely to hold. The intuition for this comparative static prediction is similar to the above discussion concerning changes in Q.

Pooling Equilibrium - International supports all INGO types, regardless of signal sent, Domestic doesn't support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent

The moves by both types of INGOs are sequentially rational. They would rather not send a costly signal if they are never going to gain support through the use of the signal.

For the international community, the decision to support all INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ International (Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ International (~Support} \mid \text{any} C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P \leq \frac{Q(H_L - L_L) + L_L - C_L}{Q_L(H_L - 2L_L) + L_L)}$$

This constraint is harder to hold as C_L increases. AsH_L or Q increases, this constraint is easier to hold.
The impact of an increase in L_L, however, is non-monotonic. In other words, for certain values of H_L, as $L_L$increases, it is easier for this constraint to be met but for other values of H_L, it is harder for this constraint to be met. This can be seen through first taking the derivative of the constraint with respect to L_L and then simplifying, setting this derivative equal to zero, and solving for a cutpoint, H_L**:

$$H_L{}^{**} = (\text{-}C_L + 2\text{Q}C_L) \ / \ (Q^2)$$

Therefore, when $H_L > H_L{}^{**}$, as L_L increases, the constraint is less likely to hold. However, when $H_L < H_L{}^{**}$, as L_L increases, the constraint is more likely to hold.

For the domestic community, for not supporting any INGOs, regardless of signal sent, to be sequentially rational, the following must be true:

$$EU \text{ Domestic (~Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P \leq \frac{B(L_D - H_D) - Q(L_D - H_D) + C_D}{B(L_D - H_D) - Q(2L_D - H_D) + L_D}$$

This constraint provides some interesting comparative statics as well. First, as C_D increases, this constraint is easier to hold. Second, as B increases, this constraint is easier to hold. Conversely, as H_D increases, this constraint is harder to hold. As discussed in the body of the chapter, these comparative statics make intuitive sense with regards to the preferences of the domestic community. It will support no INGOs if costs are high, if INGOs that don't share its preference ordering are likely to get extreme change, and if it gains little utility from H_D.

Like the similar constraint on the international community, this constraint provides some interesting non-monotonic comparative statics as well. First, like above, the impact of changes in L_D on the equilibrium space can be thought of as dependent on the value of H_D. In other words, whether an increase in L_D increases or decreases the equilibrium space is dependent on the value of other parameters. This can be seen by first taking the derivative of the above constraint with respect to L_D , and then setting this partial derivative equal to 0 and solving for H_D*, the critical point in determining the impact of $L_D$on the equilibrium space:

$$H_D{}^{*} = (\text{-}C_D \text{ -}BC_D + 2\text{Q}C_D) \ / \ ((B\text{-}Q\ )\ (Q\text{-}1))$$

Therefore, when $H_D > H_D^*$, as L_D increases, the above constraint is less likely to hold. However, if $H_D < H_D^*$, as L_D increases, this constraint is more likely to hold.

Q also has a non-monotonic impact on the equilibrium space. Like outlined with respect to the international community, the impact of Q on the equilibrium space defined by the domestic community's constraint can be thought of as dependent on the value of B^{**}:

$$B^{**} = (-C_D H_D + 2C_D L_D + H_D L_D - L_D^2) \;/\; ((H_D - L_D)(L_D))$$

Therefore, when $B > B^{**}$, as Q increases, this constraint is less likely to hold. However, when $B < B^{**}$, then this constraint is more likely to hold as Q increases.

Pooling Equilibrium - Domestic supports all INGO types, regardless of signal sent, International doesn't support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent

The moves by both types of INGOs are sequentially rational. They would rather not send a costly signal if they are never going to gain support through the use of the signal.

For the international community, the decision to not support any INGOs, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ International } (\tilde{}\text{Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ International (Support} \mid \text{any} C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P \geq \frac{B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - L_L) - C_L}{B(H_L - L_L) - Q(H_L - 2L_L) - L_L}$$

Comparative statics are as follows. First, as C_L increases, the constraint is more likely to hold. Second, as B increases, the constraint is less likely to hold. Third, as H_L increases, this constraint is less likely to hold.

As discussed in the body of the chapter, this constraint provides some interesting non-monotonic comparative statics as well. First, the impact of changes in L_L on the equilibrium space can be thought of as dependent on the value of H_L. In other words, whether an increase in L_L increases or decreases the equilibrium space is dependent on the value of other parameters. This can be seen by first taking the derivative of the above constraint with respect to L_L, and then setting this partial derivative equal to 0 and solving for H_L^*, the critical point in determining the impact of L_L on the equilibrium space:

$$H_L^* = (-C_L - BC_L + 2QC_L) \;/\; ((B-Q)(Q-1))$$

Therefore, when$H_L > H_L{}^*$, as L_L increases, this constraint is more likely to hold. However, if $H_L < H_L{}^*$, as L_L increases, then this constraint is less likely to hold.

$$B^* = \frac{-C_L H_L + 2C_L L_L + H_L L_L - L_L^2}{(H_L - L_L)(L_L)}$$

Therefore, when $B > B^*$, as Q increases, this constraint is more likely to hold. However, if $B < B^*$, then this constraint is less likely to hold as Q increases.

For the domestic community, the decision to support all INGO types, regardless of signal sent, is sequentially rational when:

$$EU \text{ Domestic (Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO}) \geq EU \text{ Domestic (~Support} \mid \text{any } C_{INGO})$$

This is true when:

$$P \geq \frac{Q(L_D - H_D) - L_D + C_D}{Q_D(2L_D - H_D) - L_D)}$$

Therefore, as C_D increases, this constraint is harder to hold. Also, as H_D increases, this constraint is easier to hold.

The impact of Q appears to be non-monotonic. Like above, there is a cut-point, $H_D{}^{***}$:

$$H_D{}^{***} = (2C_D\ L_D\ -L_D{}^2)\ /\ (C_D)$$

Therefore, when $H_D > H_D{}^{***}$, as Q increases, this constraint is more likely to hold. However, when $H_D < H_D{}^{***}$, as Q increases, this constraint is less likely to hold.

The impact of L_D is also non-monotonic, with cut-point:

$$H_D{}^{**} = (-C_D + 2QC_D)\ /\ (Q^2)$$

Therefore, when $H_D > H_D{}^{**}$, as L_D increases, this constraint is more likely to hold. However, when $H_D < H_D{}^{**}$, as L_D increases, this constraint is less likely to hold.

No other pooling equilibria hold. No other pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria hold for the advocacy INGO model.

Chapter 5

The Impact of Service INGOs: Development INGOs

The Conditional Impact of Development INGOs

This chapter tests the empirical implications derived from the service INGO model, providing the first large-scale evidence of the conditional nature of the effects of development INGOs, as an important issue area of service INGOs, on development outcomes. The results provide widespread support for the derived hypotheses, indicating that development INGOs *can* have a powerful impact on development. As expected, however, the results also show how tenuous the effects of service INGOs often are. Specifically, the results indicate that:

- Service INGOs have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes in states where corruption is not widespread. In countries where corruption is not widespread, there are less rent-seeking service INGOs, leading to greater overall effects by service INGOs.
- Service INGOs who belong to voluntary accountability programs have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes. However, as expected, there is some self-selection that occurs by service INGOs. Specifically, service INGOs are more willing to signal their underlying motivations through voluntary accountability

programs when involved in "easier" states. When this is accounted for, however, the impact of service INGOs who belong to voluntary accountability programs is still substantial.

- The international community's support conditions the impact of service INGOs. When more money is committed to INGOs in lower-income countries, the marginal effects of service INGOs increase dramatically.
- Domestic costs condition the impact of service INGOs. In states where citizens are able to easily interact with service INGOs, such as in urbanized states, the impact of service INGOs is greater.
- The impact of service INGOs are conditional to the domestic community's utility for the outcome in question. When the domestic community sees more utility in the service INGO's activities, the impact is greater.

I outline the empirical models and analyses in support of these statements below. First, I restate the service INGO hypotheses outlined in Chapter 3. Next, I walk through the research design used to test these derived hypotheses. Finally, I discuss the statistical results and the implications of these results for service INGOs and the development community writ large.

5.1 Service INGO Hypotheses

As Chapter 3 addresses, the service INGO theoretical model provides many interesting and testable implications concerning the factors which condition the impact of service INGOs. For convenience, let me restate the general hypothesis and then work through the individual components:

Service INGO Hypothesis 1. *Service INGOs will have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes in (a) transparent countries with little corruption, (b) when there are larger numbers of INGOs belonging to voluntary accountability programs present, (c) when highly supported by the international community, (d) in urbanized states, (e) and on service issues of more value to domestic communities. When examining the impact of voluntary accountability programs in particular, special attention will have to be paid to self-selection.*

First, as the service INGO model results point out, the impact of service INGOs is conditional to the proportion of rent-seeking service INGOs that are active within a country. When this proportion is greater, service INGOs are less likely to get the support of the domestic and international communities and, thus, less likely to have an effect on policy and behavior outcomes. In short, where "bad apples" flourish, the service INGO model predicts that the domestic and international communities do exactly what some in the INGO community fear: they throw out the barrel (Lee 2007). Empirically, I contend, through Hypothesis 1(a), that the proportion of rent-seeking service INGOs is higher in states where there is widespread corruption. This is due to the idea that rent-seeking INGOs are less likely to be identified and prosecuted in corrupt states (Lee 2007). Recent reports from Afghanistan also highlight this dynamic (Huggler 2005).

Second, the service INGO model results highlight that the international and domestic communities are more likely to support service INGOs who signal; it follows that when there is a greater proportion of service INGOs who signal their motivations through memberships in voluntary accountability programs, service INGOs will have a greater impact on policy and behavior, as outlined in Hypothesis 1(b). However, also as implied from the service INGO model results highlighted in Chapter 3,

INGO$_{\text{Goods}}$ are more willing to send a separating signal as their value of the potential outcomes increases. This implies a potential selection dynamic on the behalf of INGO$_{\text{Goods}}$: they should be more willing to enter into voluntary accountability programs in countries where high outcomes are more likely. Because of this, empirical methodology that accounts for possible self-selection dynamics will have to be utilized when examining the impact of voluntary accountability programs, as outlined in Hypothesis 1(b). This will be discussed in further detail below.

Additionally, as the service INGO model results show, the international community is willing to endure higher costs of support if the effect of the INGO is greater. Therefore, as Hypothesis 1(c) contends, the amount of funds invested by the international community should condition the impact of service INGOs.

Finally, as outlined in the service INGO model results in Chapter 3, support by the domestic community to service INGOs is contingent on the costs the domestic community faces for supporting service INGOs and the values it places on the services the INGO is providing. Urbanized states could be argued to have less costs for the domestic community to interact with service INGOs simply because of lower travel costs for the domestic population. In other words, if the domestic community can readily interact with service INGOs in an urban environment, these interactions are less costly. Thus, in urbanized states, service INGOs will have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes because it is more likely that service INGOs are able to gain the support of the domestic population. This is the logic underpinning Hypothesis 1(d). Additionally, as Hypothesis 1(e) points out, in states where the domestic population could be argued to place a greater value on the services provided by INGOs, the domestic population is more likely to support the organizations and, therefore, the impact of service INGOs is predicted to be greater.

5.2 Research Design

I test these empirical implications of the theoretical service INGO model by focusing on the impact of development INGOs, a dominant subcategory of service INGOs, on development outcomes in developing countries.[1] I focus on development INGOs because of both their previous attention within the cross-disciplinary development literature and the prominent position development concerns have had within political science (Bratton 1990; Barro and Lee 1993; Cameron 2000; Cooley and Ron 2002; Ahmed and Potter 2006; Easterly 2006; Acemoglu and Johnson 2007).

In this section, I outline the development outcome used as the dependent variable in this chapter, the new data used on development INGOs, and the possible confounding variables that must be controlled for in the statistical models. I then walk through the statistical model specifications for each hypothesis.

Development Outcomes

Within the last twenty years, many researchers have concluded that economic development is central to reducing conflict, promoting democracy, and improving human rights performance within a state (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004, 2005; Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti 2004; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Przeworski 2007). A commonly-cited precondition to economic development is improvements in human capital or human development (Lucas 1988; Mankiw, Romer and Weil 1992; Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez 2000; Baum and Lake 2003; de la Fuente and Doménech 2006).[2] Human capital or human development concerns are important for economic growth in that they impact the production capabilities of the

[1] Consistent with the larger literature, I restrict my empirical focus to countries that have a GDP per Capita below the yearly median world's GDP per Capita. This serves as my definition of developing countries (WDI 2008; Murdie and Davis 2008; Murdie and Kakietek 2009).

[2] Human capital is defined as the deliberate investment in the accumulation of knowledge or skills.

labor force. An educated and healthy labor force is able to use physical capital advantageously and, without high levels of human capital, returns on physical capital investment, such as the purchase of new machinery, will not be realized (Lucas 1988). Along these lines, Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez (2000) argue that human development projects should be preferred to general monetary investment in an economy because of the "virtuous" spillover of human development on economic growth (213).

A general understanding of development INGOs, defined as INGOs with a focus on economic development and poverty reduction, shows that Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez (2000)'s central argument has been well-received. Most development INGOs, though their mission might generally reflect a goal to improve economic well-being within at state, work first to improve human capital or human development. Development INGOs provide basic sanitation services, health care, vocational education, and/or access to business-development training to local populations (Streeten 1997; Makoba 2002). In the Middle East and North Africa, for example, development INGOs' activities encompass a wide array of programs from community organization and sanitation to provision of pre- and post-natal health care (Carapico 2000). As Makoba (2002) points out, in many developing countries, these organizations "are considered good substitutes for weak states and markets in ... the provision of basic services to most people" (62). In fact, recent research has shown that NGOs and INGOs have enjoyed more success in improving infant mortality rates than governmental actors (Masud and Yontcheva 2005).

In line with the importance of human development on economic growth, together with an understanding of what development INGOs on the ground actually do, within this chapter, I focus on the impact development INGOs have on improving access to potable water (UN 1990; Ranis, Stewart and Ramirez 2000; UN 2005; USAID 2006; Nelson 2007). Basic access to an improved water source is critical for a labor force's health, reflects a basic human right, and is a service that development INGOs

often work to provide (USAID; UIA; Nelson, 2008/2009). In fact, potable water is often the first project development INGOs undertake within a state (Gleick 1996; Fyvie and Ager 1999; Gleick 2000; Fowler 2002; Ward et al. 2008). Also, it is a project that the majority of development INGOs provide, even if their focus includes other service provisions or labor force training (UIA, 2008/2009). Thus, in the basic statistical models utilized in this chapter, the dependent variable used captures the percent of the population with *Access to an Improved Water Source* (WDI 2008).[3] This development outcome provides a good first look, I feel, at a possible impact of development INGOs.

Data Sources on Development INGOs

An ideal measure of development INGOs for this study would capture their activities, specific projects, and their funds invested in developing countries over a large time span. Unfortunately, this ideal measure does not exist. As a proxy, within this chapter, I utilize a variety of measures of the number of development INGOs active within a state. This data is all coded from the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, a publication of the Union of International Associations (UIA), an INGO who works to improve connections between civil society actors (UIA, 2008/2009).

As discussed more in depth in the next chapter with respect to human rights INGOs, the UIA data is far from perfect at capturing all the activities of INGOs. However, with respect to service INGOs specifically, data compiled from the *Yearbook* on both the number of issue-specific INGOs with a permanent location within a state

[3]This data is collected every few years; following convention, this data is linearly interpolated (Baum and Lake 2003; Nancy and Yontcheva 2006; Murdie and Kakietek 2009). This variable is stationary in all empirical models, as determined by the Fisher unit-root test for panel data(Maddala and Wu 1999). In another project, I have shown the impact development INGOs have on improving educational enrollment, life expectancy, and economic growth (Murdie and Kakietek 2009). The results in this chapter are also robust to using as the dependent variable improved access to a sanitation source and somewhat robust to using female educational enrollment as the dependent variable.

and the number of INGOs that have volunteers or members within a state serves as a useful proxy. Unlike advocacy INGOs, such as human rights INGOs, service INGOs, as the category encompassing development INGOs, typically have to be active within a state to work; in other words, there must be an active front of the service INGO on the ground for service provision (Ahmed and Potter 2006). Because of this, data taken from the *Yearbook* on service INGOs are a more reliable proxy for service INGO activities than the data from the *Yearbook* on advocacy INGOs, which often work to impact advocacy outcomes without having an on-the-ground presence within a state.

Therefore, to get a reliable proxy on the activities of development INGOs, I first restrict my focus to only INGOs that have mission statements that refer to sustainable economic development outcomes. A list of the 762 organizations that can be defined in this way is provided in this chapter's Appendix 1. Second, I use data that captures yearly the number of these organizations that have volunteers/members within a state. This previously unreleased data was provided by Smith and Wiest (2005) and was collected from hard-copies of the *Yearbook*. Because the Fisher test for panel unit roots indicated variance nonstationarity in this series, I use the natural log of this this raw data, *Number of Development INGOs (ln),* in all models (Maddala and Wu 1999).[4]

In order to assess the validity of the Smith and Wiest (2005) data, I coded similar data on the number of development INGOs that have a permanent location within a state and also coded data on the voluntary accountability programs these organizations are involved in, which will be discussed in detail below.[5] Worth noting, when my self-coded data on the number of development INGOs that have a permanent

[4]Unlike the relationship between human rights performance and similar data on human rights INGOs from the UIA, as discussed in Chapter 6, the *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* is not endogenous to development outcomes, as determined by both the Wu-Hausman F test and the Durbin-Wu-Hausman chi-squared test (Wooldridge 2006).

[5]Additionally, Jakub Kakietek and I re-coded the Smith and Wiest (2005) data for the years 1998 and 2001. The correlation between our data and the Smith and Wiest (2005) data was over 0.97.

location within a state is substituted for the Smith and Wiest (2005) data, *Number of Development INGOs (ln)*, which captures, again, the number of these organizations with volunteer/members within a state, the empirical results in this chapter are substantively and statistically similar.

Statistical Controls

There are many potential variables that could be correlated with both the dependent variable and the key independent variables used in this study and, thus, must be controlled for in the empirical models. First, as Baum and Lake (2003) point out, democracies are often better at human capital provision. Regime type could also be correlated with the number of development INGOs active within a state. Thus, I account for regime type in the statistical models in this chapter by including as a control *Polity* scores, which range from -10 for strongly autocratic to +10 for strongly democratic regimes (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).

Additionally, many have contended that larger populations impact both service provision and civil society (Boli and Thomas 1999; Baum and Lake 2003; Smith and Wiest 2005). Therefore, I include a control for the natural log of *Population* (WDI 2008). Finally, because of the impact that higher levels of economic development have on service provision and on civil society, I include a control for *GDP Per Capita (ln)*, in constant US dollars, in all statistical models (WDI 2008).[6]

[6] Additional controls were examined, such as annual rainfall amounts in the largest city within each state. Statistical and substantive findings were consistent.

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(a) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional on a State's control of Corruption

Hypothesis 1(a) contends that the impact of development INGOs, as a subset of service INGOs, on the percent of the population with *Access to an Improved Water Source* is conditional to the state's level of corruption. To examine the validity of this hypothesis, I create the key independent variable by interacting the *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* with the World Bank Governance Indicator on control of *Corruption.* This corruption control indicator is a measure of the perceptions of state corruption, defined as the use of public power for private gain (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005). This indicator is based on a compilation of dozens of different variables measuring perceptions of corruption, combined using an unobserved component model (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2005). The indicator ranges from -2.5, indicating widespread corruption, to 2.5, indicating little to no corruption.

Again, the focus is on the impact of development INGOs in developing countries, defined as countries in the lower half of yearly GDP per Capita levels. Because I am interested in the effect development INGOs have on future access to an improved water source, I measure the dependent variable at *t+1* and the independent variables at *t.* When the necessary controls were merged, I have a data set of roughly 71 states and a total of 515 observations for the years 1996 to 2003. Tests for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity indicated that the issues were present, resulting in the use of Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of 4.[7] The statistical equation for the empirical model used to test Hypothesis 1(a) is as follows:

$$\textit{Access to an Improved Water Source}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\ \textit{Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs (ln)}_{i,t-1}\ *\ \textit{Control of Corruption}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2$$

[7] Following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), all constitutive terms are included in the models using interaction terms in this chapter.

$$Number\ of\ Development\ INGOs\ (ln)_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Control\ of\ Corruption_{i,t-1} + \beta_4\ Population\ (ln)_{i,t-1} + \beta_4\ Polity\ Score_{i,t-1} + \beta_5\ GDP\ per\ Capita\ (ln)_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(b) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional to the Number of INGOs Belonging to Voluntary Accountability Programs

Next, Hypothesis 1(b) contends that service INGOs will have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes in countries where there are more service INGOs belonging to voluntary accountability programs. To test Hypothesis 1(b), special attention must be paid to the self-selection of service INGOs into these programs. As mentioned, service INGOs are more likely to enter into these programs in "easy" states, where they *a priori* expect a higher outcome. Thus, empirically, this hypothesis requires the use of a simultaneous equations approach, where the first stage predicts the number of INGOs belonging to voluntary accountability programs and the second stage then focuses on the impact of these INGOs on the policy and behavior outcome in question.

To statistically model this hypothesis, I run a two stage least squares regression with robust standard errors, clustered on country, and a lagged dependent variable. The first stage dependent variable is newly coded data on the *Number of Development INGOs with Consultative Status,* as I coded from the *Yearbook of International Organizations,* using a coding procedure similar to Smith and Wiest (2005) but focusing only on the number of development INGOs that are members with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), arguably the most well-known voluntary accountability program (Dieng 2001; Gugerty N.d.). The second stage dependent variable is *Access to an Improved Water Source.*

For instruments, first, I draw on sociology literature and use the natural log of

Tourism Arrivals (Boli and Thomas 1999; Zinnes and Bell 2002; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; WDI 2008). This variable captures the idea that tourist states generally have more INGOs involved within them and are states where INGOs are simply more likely to flourish (Boli and Thomas 1999; Zinnes and Bell 2002; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004; WDI 2008). Second, consistent with the argument that INGOs are more likely to enter into these programs in "easy" states, I need a variable which captures the assured nature of an "easy" effect on the development outcome and yet is still properly exogenous: For this, I use the *Previous Year's Change in Access to an Improved Water Source.* In using this variable, I am capturing a previous change in access to an improved water source which, theoretically, might make a higher outcome the next year more likely in the calculations of the INGO, and thus, might make the INGO more likely to signal its underlying motivations through registering with a voluntary accountability program. Importantly, this variable is statistically established to be properly exogenous to the current year's *Access to an Improved Water Source* (Dhrymes 1994; Wooldridge 2006).

In addition to the controls outlined in the previous section, I include a control for the number of development INGOs who do not have consultative status that are active within the country, *Development INGOs without Consultative Status (ln).*[8] The statistical equations for this two stage approach are:

First Stage:

$$\textit{Number of Development INGOs with Consultative Status}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\ \textit{Access to Improved Water Source}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2\ \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_3\ \textit{Development INGOs without Consultative Status}_{i,t} + \beta_4\ \textit{Polity Score}_{i,t} + \beta_5\ \textit{Population}_{i,t} + \beta_6\ \textit{Tourism Arrivals (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_7\ \textit{Previous Year's Change}$$

[8]The inclusion of this variable does not change results. Importantly, this variable does not lead to problems with multicollinearity.

$in\ Access\ to\ Water_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

Second Stage:

$Access\ to\ an\ Improved\ Water\ Source_{,i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\ Number\ of\ Development\ INGOs\ with\ Consultative\ Status(instrumented)_{\ i,t} + \beta_2\ Access\ to\ Improved\ Water\ Source_{i,t-1} + \beta_3\ Development\ INGOs\ without\ Consultative\ Status_{\ i,t} + \beta_4\ Population\ (ln)_{i,t} + \beta_5\ GDP\ per\ Capita\ (ln)_{i,t} + \beta_6\ Polity\ Score_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(c) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional on Support for the International Community

Hypothesis 1 (c) predicts that service INGOs have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes when support by the international community increases. Therefore, the key independent variable in this statistical model is an interaction term between *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and *ODA Aid to NGOs.* The measure *ODA Aid to NGOs* is the amount, in millions of constant U.S. dollars, dispersed to civil society organizations, predominantly INGOs, operating within the given state by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Because this aid is used to increase service provision from year *t-1* to year *t*, the *ODA Aid to NGOs* variable is lagged 1 year in the analysis. I also include a control for overall bilateral ODA Aid (natural log), *Overall ODA Aid (ln).* Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of 4 are used to account for both autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. The statistical equation for this hypothesis is as follows:

$Access\ to\ an\ Improved\ Water\ Source_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 Interaction\ Term\ of\ Number\ of\ Development\ INGOs\ (ln)_{i,t-1} * ODA\ Aid\ to\ NGOs_{i,t-2} + \beta_2\ Number$

$$of\ Development\ INGOs\ (ln)_{i,t-1} + \beta_3\ ODA\ Aid\ to\ NGOs_{i,t-2} + \beta_4\ Overall\ ODA\ Aid\ (ln)\ _{i,t-2} + \beta_5\ Population\ (ln)_{i,t-1}\ + \beta_6\ Polity\ Score_{i,t-1} + \beta_7\ GDP\ per\ Capita\ (ln)_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(d) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional to State's Urbanization

In states where it is less costly for the domestic population to interact with service INGOs, the effect of service INGOs on policy and behavior will be greater. This is the logic underlying Hypothesis 1(d), which contends that the impact of development INGOs on development outcomes is conditional to a state's urbanization. In states that are becoming more urbanized, it is easier and less costly for domestic populations to interact with development INGOs, thus, the domestic population is more likely to support INGOs, leading to a greater effect on development outcomes.

To test this hypothesis, I again use an interaction term, this time between the *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and *Urbanization (Annual Growth Rate).* I use the annual growth rate of a country's urban population because it is stationary and reflects the concept of interest; it captures the idea that if is becoming easier for the domestic population to interact with INGOs in time *t,* the impact of development INGOs will be greater in time *t+1.*

As a robustness check, I re-run the analysis with an interaction term between *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and *Urban Population (Percent Total)* and with an interaction term between *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and *Urban Agglomeration (Percent Total).*[9] *Urban Agglomeration (Percent Total)* is collected every five years, I linearly interpolate the missing years. *Urban Agglomeration (Percent Total)* is a particularly interesting measure, capturing populations both in urban and sub-

[9]Of course, I include the correct constituent terms in the analysis. Also, in these robustness checks, the key independent variable and constituents were lagged one year.

urban areas (WDI 2008). All data on urban population characteristics are from the World Bank World Development Indicators (2008).

Like before, Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of 4 are utilized. In sum, the following statistical model is used to test Hypothesis 1(d):

$$\textit{Access to an Improved Water Source}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \textit{Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs (ln)}_{i,t-1} * \textit{Urbanization (Annual Growth Rate)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{Number of Development INGOs (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \textit{Urbanization (Annual Growth Rate)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \textit{Population (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 \textit{Polity Score}_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(e) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional to the Value the Domestic Community Places on the Service Provision

Finally, Hypothesis 1(e) contends that the effect of development INGOs will be conditional to the domestic community's utility for the specific development outcome or service the INGO is providing. To test this hypothesis, I need a dependent variable where a domestic community's utility for the service provision could be argued to vary. Therefore, I focus on another common service provided by development INGOs: contraceptives (Carapico 2000). Consistent with literature on contraceptive prevalence rates in married women of child-bearing age, contraception is more desired by women who work outside the home (Bankole and Singh 1998; Bawah, Phillips and Wak 2005; WDI 2008). Therefore, in states where the percentage of women in the labor force is greater, the effect of development INGOs on contraception prevalence should be greater.

To test this argument, my key independent variable is an interaction term between the *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and *Percent Female Labor Force* and, as

mentioned, the dependent variables is *Contraceptive Prevalence Rates.* Consistent with the literature, I include additional controls for *Latin America* and *Sub-Saharan Africa* locations; it is argued that countries in these regions have less contraceptive prevalence due to cultural or historical reasons (Bankole and Singh 1998). I again use Newey-West standard errors (lag length of 4) to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. This statistical model can be represented as the following equation:

$$\textit{Contraceptive Prevalence Rates}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \textit{Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs (ln) * Percent Female Labor Force}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{Number of Development INGOs (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \textit{Percent Female Labor Force}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \textit{Latin America}_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 \textit{Sub-Saharan Africa}_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \textit{Population (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_7 \textit{Polity Score}_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

5.3 Results

The service INGO hypotheses are supported by the analyzes, highlighting, overall, both the impact development INGOs have on development outcomes and the factors which condition their impact. As a whole, these results show the utility of relaxing the assumption that service INGOs all share the same motivations and, instead, examining how differences in the underlying motivations of INGOs condition when and where they are supported by the international and domestic communities. As expected, the effects of development INGOs are conditional to:

1. the overall level of corruption within a state,
2. the number of service INGOs belonging to voluntary accountability programs (after accounting for self-selection),

3. support service INGOs are provided by the international community,

4. overall levels of urbanization, which relates to costs faced by domestic populations for interacting with service INGOs, and

5. the value the domestic community places on the services provided by service INGOs.

The models all fit the minimum standard of accuracy, meeting a minimum goodness of fit to the population (Prob > F is less than 0.05). Below, I outline these results and discuss the substantive implications of these findings.

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(a) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional on a State's Level of Corruption

Hypothesis 1(a) is supported by the analysis: the impact of development INGOs on the percentage of the population with access to an improved water source is conditional to a state's control of corruption. The statistical results are shown in Table 5.1. As illustrated, the interaction term between the *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and control of *Corruption,* is positive and statistically significant ((β *(Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs and Control of Corruption)* = 11.230), (P(β *(Interaction Term of Human Rights INGO Activity and NGO Aid)*) <0.01). The control *GDP Per Capita (ln)* is also statistically significant and in the expected direction.

Figure 5.1 highlights the marginal effects of *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* on access to an improved water source as control of *Corruption* goes from its minimum to maximum value in the sample; this figure is in line with Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006)'s best practices for interpreting interaction terms. When corruption is

controlled, and, thus, there can be argued to be a lower prevalence of rent-seeking service INGOs, the impact of service INGOs on access to an improved water source is greater. These results highlight the need to relax the assumption that all INGOs have similar motivations and would support efforts by the INGO community to control and monitor rent-seeking INGOs, especially in states with little overall control of corruption (Ben Attia 2004).

Table 5.1: The Impact of Development INGOs on Access to an Improved Water Source (+1 Year), Conditional on Control of Corruption, Newey West Standard Errors, 1996-2003

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction term of Dev INGOs and Control of Corruption Score	11.23** (4.05)
Development INGOs (ln)	9.22† (4.72)
Control of Corruption	-49.0* (19.6)
Population (ln)	0.509 (0.899)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	0.0118 (0.233)
GDP per Capita (ln)	14.5** (1.48)
Intercept	-67.9** (19.5)
N	515
$F_{(6,508)}$	28.8

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Figure 5.1: Marginal Effects of Development INGOs on Access to Improved Water Source as Corruption Estimates Change



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(a), Table 5.1

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(b) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional to the Number of INGOs Belonging to Voluntary Accountability Programs

The statistical results support Hypothesis 1(b): within a state, the impact of development INGOs on development outcomes is greater when more development INGOs belong to voluntary accountability programs. However, as predicted by the theoretical model, there is self-selection of INGOs into these programs; in "easier" states, more development INGOs join voluntary accountability programs. These results are shown in Table 5.2.

As shown, the instrumented *Number of Development INGOs with Consultative Status* has a positive and statistically significant impact on access to an improved water source ((β *(Number of Development INGOs with Consultative Status (IV))* = 0.759), (P(β *(Number of Development INGOs with Consultative Status (IV))*) <0.05). When self-selection is accounted for, holding everything else at its mean/median value in the data set , the substantive effect of an increase from the minimum to the mean of the instrumented *Number of Development INGOs with Consultative Status* equates to over a 5 percent increase in the percent of the population with access to an improved water source (95% confidence interval from 4.324 to 7.528). The Durbin-Wu-Hausman test shows that a two-stage approach was necessary. Additionally, the instruments are validated both by being statistically significant in the first stage and by the above 10 Cragg-Donald F-Statistic (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2003; Wooldridge 2006).[10] The insignificant Hansen's J Statistic also shows that the instruments are properly exogenous (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2003; Wooldridge 2006). This finding adds to the literature on voluntary accountability programs by highlighting both their usefulness and the factors which encourage INGOs to join these programs.

[10]Worth noting, however, *Tourism* is only marginally statistically significant in the first state. However, Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2003) would point out that the Cragg-Donald F-Statistic would be enough to validate the instruments.

Table 5.2: The Impact of Development INGOs with Consultative Status on Access to an Improved Water Source, 1995 - 2003.

	Access to an Improved Water Source
First Stage	
Access to Improved Water Source (t-1)	.0680** (.0120)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	-1.16** (.315)
Development INGOs without Consultative Status (ln)	7.65** (.422)
Polity (-10 to 10)	.0320 (.0296)
Population (ln)	2.01** (.160)
Tourism Arrivals (ln)	.0241^ (.154)
Previous Year's Change in Access to Water	1.14** (.223)
Constant	-56.7** (2.54)
Cragg-Donald F-Stat	16.6
Second Stage	
Development INGOs with Consultative Status (Instrumented)	.759* (.357)
Access to Improved Water Source (t-1)	.944** (.0288)
Development INGOs without Consultative Status (ln)	-6.01 * (2.93)
Population (ln)	-1.61 ‡ (.823)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	.707 (.648)
Polity (-10 to 10)	-.0197 (.0585)
Constant	44.6* (20.8)
Hanson's J Statistic	0.609
Number of Observations	459

Robust standard errors, clustered on country.

Sample only includes lower income countries.

Standard errors are in parentheses.

*p <.05 ** p<.01‡ p<.10 (two tailed tests), ^p<.10 (one tailed test)

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(c) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional on Support for the International Community

Like expected by Hypothesis 1(c), support by the international community greatly aids development INGOs. Table 5.3 shows, there is a positive and statistically significant effect of the interaction of *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and *ODA Aid to NGOs* ((β *(Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs and ODA Aid to NGOs)* = 7.601), (P(β *(Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs and ODA Aid to NGOs)*) <0.01). All statistically significant control variables are also in the expected direction.

The marginal effects of increases in *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* on access to an improved water source as *ODA Aid to NGOs* increases is illustrated in Figure 5.2. As this figure shows, aid to NGOs by the international community greatly helps development INGOs provide services. When this aid is large, development INGOs have a rather substantial positive impact on access to an improved water source. These results would support policy positions for increasing aid to civil society actors for its developmental benefit (Clark, Sprenger and VeneKlasen 2006).

Table 5.3: The Impact of Development INGOs on Access to an Improved Water Source (+1 Year), Conditional on ODA Aid to NGOs, Newey West Standard Errors, 1996-2003

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction Term of Development INGOs and ODA Aid to NGOs	7.60** (1.15)
Development INGOs (ln)	-0.847 (3.05)
Lagged ODA Aid to NGOs (Committed)	-39.0** (5.67)
Lagged ODA Aid (Committed, ln)	-0.15 (1.24)
Population (ln)	0.74 (1.00)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	0.0278 (0.231)
GDP per Capita (ln)	13.5** (1.53)
Intercept	-20.0 (15.0)
N	503
$F_{(7,495)}$	27.37

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Figure 5.2: Marginal Effects of Development INGOs on Access to Improved Water Source as ODA NGO Aid Changes



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(c), Table 5.3

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(d) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional to State's Urbanization

Hypothesis 1(d) is also supported by the statistical analysis. As shown in Table 5.4, the key independent variable, the interaction term between *Number of Development INGO*s and *Urbanization (Annual Growth Rate),* is positive and statistically significant ((β *(Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs and Urbanization)* = 2.354), (P(β *(Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs and Urbanization)*) <0.05). As expected, this supports the idea that the impact of development INGOs is conditioned by a state's urbanization. As urbanization increases, and thus the costs of the domestic population to interact with development INGOs diminish, the effects of development INGOs on access to an improved water source increase. This finding could imply that the touted role service INGOs have in rural areas has been exaggerated, something long argued by INGO practitioners (Edwards and Hulme 1996).

Figure 5.3 illustrates this statistical result. As shown, the effects of increases in *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* on access to an improved water source are greater as *Urbanization (Annual Growth Rate)* increases. This finding highlights the need for development INGOs to make it easier for domestic communities to interact with them and would support efforts by development INGOs to move into rural areas.

As mentioned, two additional robustness checks were done using a key independent variable that was an interaction term between *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and either *Urban Population (Percent Total)* or *Urban Agglomeration (Percent Total).* Table 5.5 shows the results where the interaction term was between *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and *Urban Population (Percent Total);* Table 5.6 reports the similar results where the interaction term was between *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* and *Urban Agglomeration (Percent Total).* These results highlight the robustness of this finding. Service INGOs require a local population that is able to

interact with their service providers. This interaction is less costly in urban areas, bringing into question the conventional wisdom of service INGOs as important predominantly in rural areas. The marginal effects graphs for these additional measures are also provided in Figures 5.4 and 5.5.

Table 5.4: The Impact of Development INGOs on Access to an Improved Water Source (+1 Year), Conditional on Urban Population (Annual Percentage Growth), Newey West Standard Errors, 1996-2003

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction Term of Development INGOs and Urban Population Growth	2.35* (1.14)
Development INGOs (ln)	-1.65 (3.07)
Urban Population Growth (Annual Percentage)	-12.2* (5.21)
Population (ln)	0.315 (0.931)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	-0.0835 (0.234)
GDP per Capita (ln)	12.6** (1.84)
Intercept	-1.64 (14.3)
N	531
$F_{(6,524)}$	19.7

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Figure 5.3: Marginal Effect of Development INGOs as Urban Population (Annual % Growth) Changes



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(d), Table 5.4

Table 5.5: The Impact of Development INGOs on Access to an Improved Water Source(+1 Year), Conditional on Urban Pop (Percent Total), Newey West Standard Errors, 1996-2003

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction Term of Development INGOs and Urban Population	2.13** (0.564)
Development INGOs (ln)	-81.1** (31.2)
Urban Population (Percent Total)	-13.4** (4.21)
Population (ln)	1.11 (0.811)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	0.0335 (0.191)
GDP per Capita (ln)	13.0** (1.49)
Intercept	-27.0† (13.9)
N	531
$F_{(6,524)}$	25.2

Figure 5.4: Marginal Effect of Development INGOs as Urban Population (% Total) Changes



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(d), Table 5.5

Table 5.6: The Impact of Development INGOs on Access to an Improved Water Source (+1 Year), Conditional on Urban Agglomeration (Percent Total)

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction Term on Development INGOs and Urban Agglomeration	2.26*
	(1.02)
Development INGOs (ln)	-15.5
	(24.5)
Urban Agglomeration (Percent Total)	-32.8**
	(7.22)
Population (ln)	1.92**
	(0.693)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	0.252
	(0.165)
GDP per Capita (ln)	20.1**
	(1.45)
Intercept	-84.8**
	(14.0)
N	341
$F_{(6,334)}$	43.4

Figure 5.5: Marginal Effect of Development INGOs as Urban Agglomeration (% Total) Changes



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(d), Table 5.6

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(e) - The Impact of Development INGOs is Conditional to the Value the Domestic Community Places on the Service Provision

Finally, Hypothesis 1(e), which argued that the impact development INGOs have on contraceptive rates depends on the value the domestic community places on this particular service provision of the INGO, is supported by the statistical analysis. Table 5.7 provides these results. As expected, the interaction term of *Number of Development INGO*s and *Percent Female Labor Force,* is positive and statistically significant ((β *(Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs and Percent Female Labor Force)* = 0.136), (P(β *(Interaction Term of Number of Development INGOs and Percent Female Labor Force)*) <0.05).

The marginal effects are outlined in Figure 5.6, which shows how the *Percent Female Labor Force* conditions the effect of *Number of Development INGOs (ln)* on contraceptive prevalence. These finding would support efforts by service INGOs to tailor their service provisions to reflect the desires of the domestic population.

Table 5.7: The Impact of Development INGOs on Contraceptive Use, Conditional on Percent Female Labor Force, Newey West Standard Errors, 1980-2000

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction Term of Development INGOs and Percent Female Labor Force	0.136*
	(0.0659)
Development INGOs (ln)	-4.18
	(4.72)
Percent Female Labor Force	-0.215
	(0.299)
Latin America	-7.68*
	(3.87)
Sub Sahara Africa	-26.0**
	(2.81)
Population (ln)	2.50**
	(0.93)
Polity (-10 to 10)	0.0633
	(0.192)
GDP per Capita (ln)	13.8**
	(2.00)
Intercept	-84.9**
	(25.1)
N	241
$F_{(8,232)}$	66.5

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Figure 5.6: Marginal Effect of Development INGOs as Female Labor Force Changes



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(e), Table 5.7

5.4 Implications

Do service INGOs matter? Focusing on organizations with a development mission, as an important subset of service INGOs, the results of this chapter highlight the dramatic potential these organizations have for improving access to potable water, both a basic human right and a Millennium Development Goal of the United Nations (Nelson 2007). Because access to an improved water source is such a crucial component to improvements in health, well-being, and economic growth, the potential impact, as shown in this chapter, of development INGOs in developing countries could be argued to be a critical link in the development puzzle.

Nonetheless, the results here further show the conditional nature of the impact of development INGOs and, moreover, stress the need for our theoretical understanding of service INGOs to account for the existence of both altruistic and rent-seeking organizations. First, the overall effect of service INGOs can be dampened in areas where rent-seekers are allowed to flourish, as proxied by a country's overall corruption levels. Where corruption is not controlled, and, thus, where rent-seeking INGOs are more likely to flourish, there can be little effects of development INGOs on development outcomes. This result supports arguments for the importance of accountability for INGOs; these arguments come from both within the INGO community and within the theoretical literature,(Brown and Moore 2001; Grant and Keohane 2005; HAI 2008).

Further, the results presented here serve as the first evidence of the effect of voluntary accountability programs and add to the cross-disciplinary theoretical literature on their utility by highlighting the factors which influence an organization's self-selection into these programs (Gibelman and Gelman 2001; Grant and Keohane 2005; Gugerty N.d.; Gugerty and Prakash 2009). Additionally, the potential role the international community has in aiding development INGOs is shown in the results presented here. International community support to development INGOs may be an effective strategy for the fulfillment of Millennium Development Goals (Ahmed and

Potter 2006; Nelson 2007).

Finally, the results here stress the need for development INGOs to work to limit the costs domestic community's face for interacting with their organizations and, moreover, show the need for INGOs to structure their service provision to reflect the preferences of the domestic population. When these practical implications are utilized and, moreover, when development INGOs do not rent-seek, these organizations seem to really deliver on their promises and aid in poverty relief and development in poor countries.

Chapter 5 Appendix

Appendix 1. List of Development INGOs Included in the Sample

2020 Global Stakeholders Panel
Across
Action for Solidarity, Equality, Environment and Diversity
ADEID - Action pour un développement équitable, integré et durable
Adventist Development and Relief Agency International
African Association of Remote Sensing of the Environment
African Capacity Building Foundation
African Centre for Technology Studies
African Council for Sustainable Health Development
African Development Aid Association
African Mountain Association
African Sustainable Cities Network
African Youth Network for Sustainable Development
AfriMAB Network
Aga Khan Foundation
Agence pour un développement durable
AGRECOL Afrique: Networking and Information Centre for Sustainable Agriculture in Africa
AGRECOL Andes
Agromisa Foundation
Alianza Centroamericana para el Desarrollo Sostenible
Alliance for a Sustainable Information Society
Alliance for Beverage Cartons and the Environment
Alliance for Chemical Sciences and Technologies in Europe
Alliance for Global Sustainability
Alliance for Sustainability
Alliance for United Nations Sustainable Development Programs
Alliance of Communicators for Sustainable Development
Alliances for Africa
Amazonian Agroforestry Research Centre
AMDA International
Andean Institute of Ecology and Development
Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre
APME Technical and Environmental Centre
Aprovecho Research Center
Arab Organization for Agricultural Development
Arab Region Ecotechnie Network
Archipelago
ASEAN Institute of Forest Management
Asia Network for Sustainable Agriculture and Bioresources
Asia Pacific Mountain Network
Asia Sustainable Forest Management Network
Asian Alliance of Appropriate Technology Practitioners
Asian Conservation and Sustainable Use Group
Asian Farmers'Association for Sustainable Rural Development
Asian MetaCentre for Population and Sustainable Development Analysis
Asian NGO Coalition for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development
Asian Society for Environmental Protection
Asian Watershed Management Network
Asian Wetland Bureau
Asia-Pacific 2000
Asia-Pacific Association of Forestry Research Institutions
Asia-Pacific Centre of Educational Innovation for Development
Asia-Pacific Programme of Education for All
Associates of the European Foundation for Heritage Skills
Association for Better Land Husbandry
Association for Cooperation on Sustainable Development and Sustainable Construction in the Mediterranean
Association for Personnel Services Overseas
Association for Progressive Communications
Association for Sustainable and Responsible Investment in Asia
Association for the Sustainable Use and Recovery of Resources in Europe
Association of African Development Finance Institutions
Association of Cities and Regions for Recycling and for Sustainable Resource Management
Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa
Association of Petrochemicals Producers in Europe
Association of Tourism and Culture for Peace
Association of University Leaders for a Sustainable Future
Association of World Citizens
Balkan Environmental Association
Baltic Sea Project
Baltic Sea Tourism Commission
Banana Link
Beijer Institute - International Institute of Ecological Economics
Bellagio Forum for Sustainable Development
Biofocus Foundation
Biomass Users' Network
Biosphere Reserves for Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Development in Anglophone Africa
BirdLife International
Black Sea NGO Network
Bolton Institute for a Sustainable Future
Bridge Fund Europe
Bridges/dot/Org

Brothers to All Men
Business Council for Sustainable Development
CABI Bioscience
Cámara Forestal Andina
Canadian Council for International Co-operation
CARE - VISION 2000
Care International
Caribbean Alliance for Sustainable Tourism
Caribbean Conservation Association
Carrefour de solidarité internationale
Caspian Environment Programme
Center for Global Peace, Washington DC
Center for Indigenous Knowledge for Agriculture and Rural Development
Center for International Baeredygtig Udvikling
Center for International Development, Research Triangle Park NC
Center for International Environmental Law
Center for International Forestry Research
Center for Sustainable Development in the Americas
Central American Programme for Sustainable Democracy
Centre africain de recherche et de promotion environnementale pour le développement durable
Centre africain pour l'auto-promotion
Centre de documentation internationale pour le développement, les libertés et la paix
Centre de réflexion et d'information et de solidarité avec les peuples d'Afrique, d'Asie et d'Amérique latine
Centre for a Sustainable Future
Centre for African Settlement Studies and Development
Centre for African Wetlands
Centre for Biological Information Technology
Centre for Development and Environment, Berne
Centre for Documentation, Research and Training on the Islands of the South West Indian Ocean
Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development
Centre for International Rural Development, Kassel
Centre for Our Common Future
Centre for Research and Information on Low External Input and Sustainable Agriculture
Centre for Research on Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development
Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand
Centre for Sustainability Studies, Lviv
Centre for Sustainable Studies, Beirut
Centro Ambiental Latinoamericano de Estudios Integrados para el Desarrollo Sostenible
Centro Internacional de Política Económica para el Desarrollo Sostenible
Centro Latinoamericano para la Competitividad y el Desarrollo Sostenible
CHF Partners in Rural Development
Christian Mission Aid
Christian Relief and Development Association
Circum-Pacific Council
Cities for Climate Protection Campaign
Citizens for a United Earth
Citizens Network for Sustainable Development
City and Shelter
Civil Initiative International Organization
Civil Society Indian Ocean Rim Network
Civil Society Task Force
Climate Action Network
Climate Action Network Central and Eastern Europe
Climate Network Africa
Club Planet - Global Network of Young Business Leaders for Sustainable Development
Coalition for Environment and Development
Coalition of African Organizations on Food Security and Sustainable Development
Commission on Global Governance
Commission on Science and Technology for Sustainable Development in the South
Commission on Trade in Goods and Services and Commodities
Commonwealth Human Ecology Council
Confederation of American Associations for the Production of Sustainable Agriculture
Confederation of Environmental and Development NGOs of Central Africa
Conservation and Management of Tropical Forests Association
Consortium for International Crop Protection
Consortium for the Sustainable Development of the Andean Ecoregion
Consortium for Tropical Soil Cover and Organic Resources Exchange
Consultation-recherche-éducation en environnement pour un développement durable en Afrique
Consumers International
Cooperative Information Network Linking Scientists, Educators and Professionals in Africa
Cooperative Program for Rural Development of the Southern Countries from Latin America
COS West and Midden Brabant Centrum voor Internationale Samenwerking
COSTED-IBN
Council for Sustainable Development of Central Asia
Council for Trade and Economic Development
CoverCropNet
Danish Association for International Sustainable Development
Decrease in Europe of Military Investment, Logistics and Infrastructures and the Tracing of Alternative Regional Initiatives to Sustain Economic Development
Department of International Environment and Development Studies
Development Workshop Austria
Dienste in Übersee
DIVERSITAS - International Programme of Biodiversity Science
Drylands Programme
Earth Council Alliance
Earth Ethics Research Group
Earth Pledge Foundation
Earth Restoration Corps
Earth Village Network
EarthAction Network

Earthlife Africa
EarthRights International
Earthwatch Europe
Earthwatch Institute
East African Wild Life Society
East and Southeast Asia Federation of Soil Science Societies
Echanges Sud Sud-Ouest en milieu rural
EcoCorps
Ecologic - Institut für Internationale und Europäische Umweltpolitik
Ecological Council of the Americas
EcoMediterránia
EcoNet
Economic Justice Network for Churches in Eastern and Southern Africa
Ecosystem Conservation Group
Ecumenical Coalition for Economic Justice
Ecumenical Coalition on Tourism
El Taller
ELC International
ENA - Ecovillage Network of the Americas
Energy Strategies for Sustainable Development
Engender Health
Engineers for a Sustainable World
Environment and Development Resource Centre
Environment and Development Service for NGOs
Environment Fellowship of Rotarians
Environment Northern Seas Foundation
Environmental Centres for Administration and Technology
Environmental Challenges for European Port Authorities
Esquel Group Foundation
Essence Economics Institute
ESSENCE Thematic Network of Environmental Sciences
ETC International Group
Euro idées
EUROCITIES Mobility Forum
Euromontana
Europa Nostra - Pan-European Federation for Heritage
Europe cite' territoir
European Alliance of Companies for Energy Efficiency in Buildings
European Banana Action Network
European Business Council for a Sustainable Energy Future
European Chemical Industry Council
European Climate Forum
European Compost Network
European Consultative Forum on the Environment and Sustainable Development
European Cooperative Research Network on Sustainable Rural Development and Energy - Energy Focus
European Cooperative Research Network on Sustainable Rural Environment and Energy - Organic Agriculture Focus
European Cooperative Research Network on Sustainable Rural Environment and Energy - Pollination Focus
European Cooperative Research Networks on Sustainable Rural Environmental and Energy
European Council for Construction Research, Development and Innovation
European Crisis Management Academy
European Eco-Efficiency Initiative
European Environment and Sustainable Development Advisory Councils
European Environmental Bureau
European Federation of City Farms
European Federation of Regional Energy and Environment Agency
European Forest Institute
European Forum for Sustainable Property Development
European Forum on Agricultural Research for Development
European Heritage Group
European Housing Ecology Network
European Institute for Water, Resources, Management and Development
European Mountain Forum
European Network for Low-External-Input and Sustainable Agriculture
European Network for Sustainable Tourism Development
European Network of Building Research Institutes
European Network of Cities and Regions for the Social Economy
European Network of Environmental Research Organizations
European Network of Experiences in Sustainable Development
European Parliament Intergroup on Sustainable Development
European Partners for the Environment
European Regional Commission on Sustainable Development to Implement Agenda 21
European Rio + 10 Coalition
European Roundtable on Sustainable Consumption and Production
European Rural Network Virgil
European Society for Ecological Economics
European Society for Environment and Development
European Solidarity towards Equal Participation of People
European Study and Training Centre in the Agricultural Sector
European Sustainable Cities and Towns Campaign
European Sustainable Energy Education Forum
European Sustainable Packaging Action Network
European Timber Trade Association
European Topic Centre on Nature Protection and Biodiversity
European Tropical Forest Research Network
European Union Road Federation
European University Centre for Peace Studies
European University on Environment
European Youth for Action
European-Asian Network for the Development

of Strategies to Enhance the Sustainable Use of Sea Buckthorn
Farmer-Centred Agricultural Resource Management Programme
FARMnet Asia
Federation of Associations for Hunting and Conservation of the EU
Femconsult - Consultants on Gender and Development
Findhorn Foundation
Firemen without Borders
Food and Agricultural Research Management
Forestry Research Support Programme for Asia and the Pacific
Foro Latinoamericano de Ciencias Ambientales
Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa
Forum for Corporate Sustainability Management
Forum of African and Arab Parliamentarians on Population and Development
Foundation for Aviation and Sustainable Tourism
Foundation for Ecodevelopment
Foundation for Environmental Security and Sustainability
Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development
Foundation for Self-Sufficiency in Central America
Foundation for Sustainable Development in Latin America
Foundation for Sustainable Development, Padasjoki
Foundation for Sustainable Food Security in Central West Africa
Foundation for the Economy and Sustainable Development of the Regions of Europe
Foundation for the Sustainable Development of the South American Chaco
Fridtjof Nansen Institute
Friendly Favors
Friends of the Earth Europe
Friends of the Earth International
Friends of the Earth Middle East
Fumeterre
Fund for Technology Transfer
Fundación Centroamericana para el Desarrollo Sostenible
Fundación Desarrollo Sostenido
Fundación Futuro Latinoamericano
Future Generations Programme
Gaia Network
Gaian Democracy Network
Gatsby Charitable Foundation
Genetic Resources Action International
GEN-Europe
George and Cynthia Mitchell Center for Sustainable Development
Global Action and Information Network
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
Global Campaign for Good Urban Governance
Global Change Impacts Centre for Southeast Asia
Global Coral Reef Monitoring Network
Global Ecovillage Network
Global Education Associates
Global Energy Network Institute
Global Environmental Management Initiative
Global e-Sustainability Initiative
Global Forum on Sustainable Energy
Global Forum on Sustainable Food and Nutritional Security
Global Green University
Global Heart Coalition
Global Higher Education for Sustainability Partnership
Global Labour Institute
Global Media Network
Global Network for Social Threefolding
Global Network on Energy for Sustainable Development
Global Partnership for Safe and Sustainable Agriculture
Global Peace Containers
Global Peatland Initiative
Global Plan of Action for the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
Global Programme in Population and Sustainable Development
Global Reporting Initiative
Global Scenario Group
Global Society Dialogue
Global Village Network (GVN)
Global Vision Corporation
GLOBUS - Institute for Globalization and Sustainable Development
Grassland Society of Southern Africa
Green Belt Movement
Green Cross International (GCI)
Greenpeace International
Groupe volontaires outre mer
Harvest Help
Healthy Cities Project
Helen Keller International
HELIO International
High North Alliance
Histocity Network
IACR-Rothamsted International
Ibis - Denmark
ICC Commission on Environment
Ieder Voor Allen
IFDC - An International Center for Soil Fertility and Agricultural Development
IGU Commission on Land Degradation and Desertification
IGU Commission on Mountain Geoecology and Sustainable Development
IGU Commission on Sustainability of Rural Systems
IGU Commission on Water Sustainability
IIED América-Latina
Independent World Commission on the Oceans
infoDev
Infra Eco Network Europe (IENE)
Initiative africaine pour un développement durable, Cotonou
Initiative on Science and Technology for Sustainability (ISTS)

Institut du développement durable et des relations internationales

Institut panafricain pour le développement, Afrique centrale francophone

Institut panafricain pour le développement, Afrique de l'Ouest / Sahel

Institute for Global Environmental Strategies

Institute for International Training in Sustainable Development

Institute for Sustainable Communities

Institute for Sustainable Development

Institute for Sustainable Development - International Foundation, Sofia

Institute for Sustainable Development in Mesoamerica, Mexico

Institute for Sustainable Power

Institute for Sustainable Rural Development Foundation

Institute for Sustainable Tropical Agriculture and Resource Management

Institute for Transportation and Development Policy (ITDP)

Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

Institute of Tropics and Subtropics, Prague

Instituto para el Desarrollo Sostenible de la Amazonia

Integrated Biodiversity Strategies for Islands and Coastal Regions

Inter-African Forest Industries Association

Inter-American Centre for the Sustainable Development of Ecosystems

Inter-American Consortium on Agroecology and Sustainable Development

Inter-American Parliamentary Group on Population and Development (IAPG)

Inter-American Water Resources Network (IWRN)

Inter-Mediterranean Commission

International Academy of Noosphere - Sustainable Development

International Academy of the Environment - Geneva

International Agency for Sustainable Projects

International Agricultural Centre (IAC)

International Allelopathy Society

International Association for Commodity Science and Technology

International Association for Democracy in Africa

International Association for Technology Assessment and Forecasting Institutions

International Association for Transformation

International Association of Sustainable Cities (IASC)

International Biotechnology Forum (IBF)

International Campaign for Responsible Technology (I-CRT)

International Center for Peace and Development

International Center for Tropical Ecology, St Louis MO

International Centre for Chemical Studies (ICCS)

International Centre for Coastal Resources Research

International Centre for Conservation Education

International Centre for Creativity, Innovation and Sustainability

International Centre for Island Technology

International Centre for Protected Landscapes

International Centre for Sustainable Cities, Vancouver

International Centre for the Sustainable Management of Tropical Rainforests, Georgetown

International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva

International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology

International Chair-Network UNESCO/ICES on Transfer of Technologies for Sustainable Development

International Consortium for Information and Sustainable Development (ICISD)

International Cooperative Biodiversity Groups

International Coordinating Committee on Religion and the Earth (ICCRE)

International Coordinating Committee on Reservoir Sedimentation

International Council for Adult Education

International Council for Sustainable Agriculture

International Council of Environmental Law

International Council on Mining and Metals

International Environmental Bureau

International Facilitating Committee (IFC)

International Federation for Alternative Trade

International Federation for Peace and Conciliation

International Federation of Automotive Engineering Societies

International Federation of Training and Development Organizations

International Federation of Young Sustainability Professionals

International Food Policy Research Institute

International Forum for Development of Sustainable Land Use Systems (INFORUM)

International Friends of Nature

International Fund on Plant Genetic Resources

International Hydrological Programme (IHP)

International Initiative for a Sustainable Built Environment (IISBE)

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

International Institute for Energy Conservation - Europe

International Institute for Energy Conservation (IIEC)

International Institute for Environment and Development

International Institute for Industrial Environmental Economics

International Institute for Land Reclamation and Improvement

International Institute for Soil Fertility Management

International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)

International Institute for Sustainable Future,

Mumbai
International Institute for Sustainable Tropical Forestry
International Institute for the Urban Environment
International Institute of Entomology
International Intellectual Property Institute
International Juridical Organization for Environment and Development
International Lake Environment Committee Foundation (ILEC)
International Marinelife Alliance (IMA)
International Model Forest Network Secretariat (IMFNS)
International Mountain Society
International Navigation Association
International Network for Farming Systems Research Methodology
International Network for Sustainable Energy
International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility
International Network of Resource Information Centers
International Network on Gender and Sustainable Energy
International Network on Small Hydro Power
International Network on Soil Fertility and Sustainable Rice Farming
International Oak Society
International Office for Water
International Organization for Sustainable Development
International Park Documentation Centre
International Polar Foundation
International Potato Center
International Project for Sustainable Energy Paths
International Science Initiative in the Russian Arctic
International Seed Federation
International Service
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications
International Society for Environmental Protection
International Society for Mangrove Ecosystems
International Society of Environmental Botanists
International Soil Conservation Organization
International Steering Committee for Global Mapping
International Subterranean Heritage Association
International Sustainable Development Research Network
International Sustainable Energy Organization
International Sustainable Social and Economic Responses
International Technical Tropical Timber Association
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources - The World Conservation Union
International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences
International Union of Societies of Foresters
International Union of Technical Associations and Organizations
International University of Sustainable Development
International Water Management Institute
International Waterfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau
International Young Professionals Foundation
Inter-University Consortium on International Social Development (IUCISD)
INZET - Association for North South Campaigns
Islamic Relief Agency
ISRIC - World Soil Information
IUAES Commission on Indigenous Knowledge and Sustainable Development
IUCN Biodiversity Policy Programme
IUCN Commission on Environmental Law
IUCN Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy
IUCN Environmental Law Centre
IUCN/SSC Sustainable Use Specialist Group
IUCN/SSC Veterinary Specialist Group
Iwokrama International Centre for Rain Forest Conservation and Development
Jemison Institute for Advancing Technology in Developing Countries
John E Mack Institute
John Knox International Reformed Centre
Jóvenes del Tercer Mundo
LA21 in Latin America Network
Latin American Art Resource Project
Latin American Association for Human Rights
Latin American Consortium on Agroecology and Development
Latin American Plant Sciences Network
Latin American Research Network for Sustainable Animal Production Systems
Latin American Youth Network for Sustainable Development
Leadership for Environment and Development
Legacy International
Links between Actions for the Development of the Rural Economy
Living Economy Network
Local Agenda 21
Local Governments for Sustainability
MABNetAmericas
Macedonian Centre for International Cooperation
Marine Science and Technology Programme
MEDCITIES Network
Medicus Mundi Internationalis
Mediterranean Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development
Mediterranean Conference
Mediterranean Environment and Development Observatory
Mediterranean Global Ocean Observing System
Mediterranean Information Office for Environment, Culture and Sustainable Development
Mediterranean Island Network
Mediterranean NGO Network for Ecology and Sustainable Development

Mega Cities Project
Mesoamerican Gender in Sustainable Energy Network
Microenergía - Micro Business Habitat
Middle East - Mediterranean Travel and Tourism Association
Mountain Forum
National Forest Action Programme
Nationale Commissie voor Internationale Samenwerking en Duurzame Ontwikkeling
NatureNet Europe
Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development
Near East Regional Commission on Agriculture
NetAid-Org Foundation
Network for Academic and Cooperative Strategies in Ocean Affairs
Network for an Economical and Ecological Habitat
Network for Sustained Elimination of Iodine Deficiency
Network for the Sustainable Development of Tourism Destinations in Europe
Network of Information, Education and Communication Experts for Sub-Saharan Africa
Network of International Centres for Sustainable Development in the South
Network of Regional Governments for Sustainable Development
Network on Environment and Sustainable Development in Africa
Networking and Information Centre for Sustainable Agriculture in the Third World
New Economics Foundation
NGO Committee on Education, New York
NGO Committee on Sustainable Development, New York
NGO Debt Treaty Movement
Nickel Institute
Nonprofit Enterprise and Self-Sustainability Team
Nordic Eco-Labelling Board
Nordic Fishermen's Council
Nordic Partnership
NordNet APC Europa
North American Center for Sustainable Development
Northern Alliance for Sustainability
Northern Forum
Norwegian Missionary Society
Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development
Obor - International Book Institute
Ocean Arks International
Ocean Voice International
Oikos - Ecumenical Institute for Church and Development Cooperation
OIKOS International Foundation for Ecological Economics
OIKOS International Student Organization for Sustainable Economics and Management
One World Group of Broadcasters
OneWorld International
Operation Romanian Villages International
Opportunities Industrialization Centers International
Organización Internacional de Universidades por el Desarrollo Sostenible y Medio Ambiente
Organization for the Research, Communication and Action to further the Sustainable Development between North and South
Ornamental Fish International
Oxfam Novib
Pacific Centre for Environment and Sustainable Development
Pacific Islands GOOS
Pacific Islands Maritime Association
Pacific Rim Council on Urban Development
Pan African Institute for Development, East and Southern Africa
Pan African Organization for Sustainable Development
Pan-African Alliance for Environment and Development
Pan-African Lawyers Union
Panos Institutes
Parc des trois pays - Espace ouvert sans frontières
Parliamentary Group of the Party of European Socialists
Partnership Africa Canada
Partnership for African Environmental Sustainability
Peace Child International
Peace Education Center, Columbia University
Peace Trust
People-Centred Sustainable Development
Permaculture International Limited
Permanent Committee on GIS Infrastructure for Asia and the Pacific
Permanent Forum of Latin American Regional Parliaments for Sustainable Development and the Environment
Phare Partnership Programme
Planetwork
Plowshares Institute
Population Council
Portuguese Resource Center on Indigenous and Traditional Knowledge for Sustainable Development
Practical Action
Priority Waste Streams Programme
Program for Research and Documentation for a Sustainable Society
Programme for International Cooperation and Conflict Resolution
Programme International for Sustainable Management
Programme of Research and Liaison between Universities for Development
Progressio
Project Global 2000
Promotion of Education and Information Activities for the Advancement of Space Technology and its Applications in Europe
ProPoor
Prospective internationale
PROTERRA
Proyectos de Innovación IBEROEKA

Rainbow Warriors International
Red Centroamericana para la Sostenibilidad Democrática
Regional Commission on Farm Management for Asia and the Far East
Regional Cooperative Network for Education and Research in Agriculture and Renewable Natural Resources
Regional Network of Non-Governmental Organizations for Sustainable Development in Central America
Regional Post-Graduate Training School on Integrated Tropical Forest Management
Regional Seas Programme for the West and Central African Region
Regional Wildlife Management Program for Meso-America and the Caribbean
Research and Development Forum for Science-Led Development in Africa
Réseau de communes - Alliance dans les Alpes
Réseau femmes africaines et droits humains
Resource Centre for the Sustainable Development of Human Settlements in Central America
ResourceAfrica
Responding to Conflict
RETOUR Foundation
Re-Use and Recycling European Union Social Enterprises
Rinoceros
Rockefeller Brothers Fund
Round Table on Sustainable Development at the OECD
Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
Royal Agricultural Society of the Commonwealth
Sahel défis - développement et environnement, formation et insertion sociale
SATIS
Scan Link - No Way
Scientific Committee on Problems of the Environment
Secretariat of the Pacific Community
SeedTree
Self Help Development International
Settlements Information Network Africa
Shenzhen International Technology Promotion Centre
Sign3-Asia
SIL UK International Programmes
Small Island Developing States Network
Social Venture Network Europe
Société de coopération pour le développement international
Society for Development Alternatives
Society for International Development
Society for Research and Initiatives for Sustainable Technologies and Institutions
Society for World Sustainable Development
Solid Africa
Soul International
South Asia Enterprise Development Facility
South Asia Partnership International
South North Development Initiative
South Pacific Forestry Development Programme
Southeast Asia Consortium
Southeast Asian Sustainable Agriculture Network
South-South Solidarity
Space Applications Institute
Special Programme for African Agricultural Research
Stakeholder Forum for Our Common Future
Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden
Stockholm Environment Institute - International Institute for Environmental Technology and Management
Strategic Action Programme for the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden
SUCO
Summit Conference of Major Cities of the World
Sustainability Challenge Foundation
Sustainable Agriculture and Forestry for International Environmental Rehabilitation
Sustainable Agriculture Centre for Research, Extension and Development in Africa
Sustainable Agriculture Network
Sustainable Base Re-use Institute
Sustainable Cities Programme
Sustainable Development and Employment Alliance
Sustainable Development Communications Network
Sustainable Development Partnership of South Asia
Sustainable Energy and Economy Network
Sustainable Energy Watch
Sustainable Europe Research Institute
Sustainable Funding Initiative
Sustainable Project Management - Innovative Partnerships for Sustainable Development
Sustainable Project Management- Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environment
Sustainable Sciences Institute
Sustainable Societies Initiative
Sustainable Trade and Innovation Centre
Sustainable Transport Action Network for Asia and the Pacific
Sustainable Village
Sustainable, Innovative and United Agriculture and Food Network
Swisscontact - Swiss Foundation for Technical Cooperation
Synergos Institute
Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agriculture
The Natural Step
The Other Economic Summit
Third World Network
Third World Network of Scientific Organizations
TOUCH Network
Trade, Societies and Sustainable Development Network
TRAFFIC East Asia
TRAFFIC East-Southern Africa
TRAFFIC Oceania
TRAFFIC South America
TRAFFIC Southeast Asia
Training Center for Tropical Resources and

Ecosystems Sustainability
Trans-Baltic Network
Tropenbos International
Tropical Soil Biology and Fertility Institute
UITP Commission on Sustainable Development
UITP Commission on Transport and Urban Life
UNEP Risø Centre on Energy, Climate and Sustainable Development
Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
United Nations New Agenda for the Development of Africa in the 1990s
United Nations Transport and Communications Decade in Africa
United States-Asia Environmental Partnership
UNU Institute of Advanced Studies
Urban Agricultural Network
Urban Environment Forum
Vétérinaires sans frontières Europa
Village Earth - Consortium for Sustainable Village-Based Development
Volunteers in Technical Assistance
Vredeseilanden
W Alton Jones Foundation
Wallace Global Fund
WASME International Committee for Craft Development
Water and Sanitation in Developing Countries
Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council
West and Central African Association of Soil Science
Wetlands International
Women and Development Unit
Women in Europe for a Common Future
Women, Environment and Development Programme
Women's Environment and Development Organization
World Alliance for Decentralized Energy
World Association of Industrial and Technological Research Organizations
World Associations of Cities and Local Authorities Coordination
World Bank for Environmentally Sustainable Development
World Business Council for Sustainable Development
World Business Council for Sustainable Development - Latin America
World Cocoa Foundation
World Commission on Environment and Development
World Commission on Forests and Sustainable Development
World Council of Whalers
World Education
World Energy Council
World Engineering Partnership for Sustainable Development
World Humanity Action Trust
World Industry Council for the Environment
World Information Transfer
World Institute for a Sustainable Humanity
World Mountain People Association
World Network of Biosphere Reserves
World Solar Academy
World Spiritual Assembly
World Student Community for Sustainable Development
World Sustainable Agriculture Association
World Sustainable Agriculture Communications Network
World Sustainable Energy Coalition
World Tourism Forum for Peace and Sustainable Development
World Travel and Tourism Council
World Water Council
World Wide Fund for Nature
WORLDAWARE
Worldwatch Institute
WorldWIDE - World Women in Defense of the Environment
Youth for Intergenerational Justice and Sustainability - Europe
Youth for Intergenerational Justice and Sustainability - International
Zero Emissions Research Initiative Foundation - UNU/ZERI
Center for International Environmental Law

Chapter 6

The Impact of Advocacy INGOs: Human Rights INGOs

The Conditional Impact of Human Rights INGOs

Using a new data set of the activities of over 400 human rights INGOs throughout the world, this chapter tests the empirical implications derived from the advocacy INGO model outlined in Chapter 4. The results of the analyzes largely support the derived hypotheses, providing the first large-scale evidence of the conditional impact of human rights INGOs on a state's human rights performance. As a whole, these results show that:

- The impact of advocacy INGOs on advocacy outcomes is conditional on the characteristics of the issue. As implied by the theoretical model, advocacy issues where the preferences of the international and domestic communities are similar are the ones most affected by advocacy INGOs.
- Like originally postulated by Keck and Sikkink (1998), the impact of advocacy INGOs is conditional to the vulnerability of the state. This finding has not been previously empirically established.
- Advocacy INGOs have a greater impact in states where the domestic population

is better able to associate in groups. Though this result is straightforward, it has not been theoretically argued or empirically examined in the extant literature.

- The impact of advocacy INGOs is conditional to support from the international community. As Official Development Assistance (ODA) aid to civil society increases, the impact of advocacy INGOs increases.

- Counter to the dominant transnational advocacy network (TAN) theory, the international community prefers to support advocacy INGOs that share their preferences and does not view all expansions in civil society equally. This finding calls into questions rhetoric concerning the international community's desire to support domestically-oriented INGOs.

Moderate support is also found for Advocacy Hypothesis 3, concerning the behavior of advocacy INGOs in vulnerable and invulnerable states. Specifically, in line with Hypothesis 3, I find that advocacy INGOs make more statements concerning invulnerable states as the number of human rights INGOs with domestic preferences increases. However, I do not find support for the second half of Hypothesis 3, concerning vulnerable states. As discussed below, this could be due to limitations in the data and would be a worthwhile project for future study.

These findings offer support for the unified theory of advocacy INGO behavior that is outlined in Chapter 4. In doing so, these findings highlight the utility of relaxing the altruism assumption that has dominated the extant literature. This chapter proceeds in three parts. First, I provide a brief overview of the hypotheses derived in Chapter 4. Next, I outline the research design which will be used to test these hypotheses, paying special attention to the new ways in which I examine the activities of human rights INGOs cross-nationally. Finally, I discuss the statistical

results and implications these results have on the potential of human rights INGOs to influence a state's domestic human rights performance.

6.1 Advocacy INGO Hypotheses

As discussed in Chapter 4, the advocacy INGO model results provide many interesting and testable implications. To briefly restate, Hypothesis 1 characterizes the conditions where advocacy INGOs are predicted to have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes:

> **Advocacy INGO Hypothesis 1**. *Advocacy INGOs will have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes (a) on non-divisive issues, (b) in vulnerable states, (c) in regimes with little restrictions on association to the domestic population, and (d) as support from the international community increases.*

First, in Hypothesis 1(a), I define non-divisive issues as issues where the international and domestic communities have preferences that are in agreement. In these situations, it is more likely that the international and domestic communities will support advocacy INGOs and, thus, it is expected that the outcome of the advocacy INGO activity will be greater. This hypothesis is actually counter to much of the existing literature on INGOs and what we often see in the behavior of advocacy INGOs (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ahmed and Potter 2006; Carpenter 2007). As such, INGOs are often concerned with "hot button issues," such as women's rights or cultural practices. These are issues, however, where the preferences of the international and domestic

communities are not in line and, thus, predicted here in Hypothesis 1(a) to be the issues where advocacy INGOs have little impact.

Second, largely consistent with the dominant transnational advocacy network (TAN) framework on INGOs, the model results imply that INGOs will have a greater likelihood to impact policy and behavior outcomes in states that are vulnerable to a combination of internal and external pressure, as outlined in Hypothesis 1(b). As this vulnerability increases, therefore, we should expect advocacy INGO activity to be correlated with, in the case of human rights outcomes, high future human rights performance by the state.

As shown in Chapter 4, the domestic population of a state will only support advocacy INGOs when the costs of this support are low. Since the domestic population's costs of supporting an advocacy INGO can be thought of as including the costs they face for associating with these organizations, this model result implies that the impact of advocacy INGOs is conditional to the freedom the domestic population has to assemble and associate with organizations and groups, as argued by Hypothesis 1(c)

Hypothesis 1(d) characterizes how the impact of advocacy INGOs is conditional to the support these organizations receive from the international community. When the international community supports advocacy INGOs, it is more likely that the advocacy efforts will be successful.

Additionally, Hypothesis 2 from the advocacy INGO model highlights the novel relationship between growth in domestically-oriented INGOs and international community support:

> **Advocacy INGO Hypothesis 2**. *The international community is more likely to support advocacy INGOs when there are fewer domestically-oriented INGOs.*

As mentioned, the relaxation of the assumption that all INGOs share the preferences of the domestic population that they are working with implies, as outlined in Chapter 4, that the international and domestic communities react differently to internationally-oriented INGOs ($INGO_{Int'l}$) as opposed to domestically aligned or oriented INGOs ($INGO_{Dom}$). As the model results show, the international community is more likely to support advocacy INGOs as the proportion of advocacy INGOs active within the country that share its same preference ordering increases. This implication strongly contrasts the TAN framework, which would suggest that the international community would welcome and support any development within the advocacy network, especially at the domestic level.

Finally, as shown in Chapter 4, the vulnerability of a state impacts signals sent by $INGO_{Int'l}$ and $INGO_{Dom}$ differently. In short, $INGO_{Int'l}$s signal in the exact opposite states as $INGO_{Dom}$s. As the model results point out, $INGO_{Int'l}$ is more likely to send costly signals as a state's vulnerability to internal and external pressure increases. However, because no separating equilibrium holds where the $INGO_{Dom}$ is not supported by the domestic community, domestically-oriented INGOs are less likely to send a costly signal to the international community in vulnerable states because it is more likely to get its preferred outcome without the support of the international community. Hypothesis 3 provides a brief statement of this phenomena:

> **Advocacy INGO Hypothesis 3**. *Advocacy INGOs will make more signals concerning vulnerable states as the number of domestically-oriented advocacy INGOs decreases but will make more signals concerning invulnerable states as the number of domestically-oriented advocacy INGOs increases.*

Of course, for this hypothesis and for Hypothesis 2, a proxy for the level of domestically-oriented INGOs is necessary. This will be discussed in great detail below.

6.2 Research Design

Based on a prevalence of INGO activity within the issue area, human rights INGOs and human rights outcomes were used to examine all hypotheses derived from the advocacy INGO model. A focus on human rights INGOs allows for ready comparison to extant TAN scholarship, which has tended to focus on human rights advocacy networks, and addresses a crucial dimension of theoretical human rights performance that has been largely missing from existing empirical assessment (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Cingranelli and Richards 2001; DeMars 2005; Landman 2005; Neumayer 2005).

To capture the activities of human rights INGOs quantitatively, I use data new to the field. This data set represents the first widespread attempt to capture the activities of human rights INGOs at the cross-national scale. As Risse (2002) implied, quantitative research on the impact of human rights INGOs, as opposed to single case studies of successful campaigns, allows us to gain empirical traction on the factors which contribute to both successful and failed advocacy attempts. Below, I outline this new data source, address the statistical controls necessary in studies of human rights performance, and then discuss the model specifications for each hypothesis.

Measuring the Activities of Human Rights INGOs

Despite the central importance of INGOs in the TAN and human rights literature, to date, existing quantitative tests of the impact of INGOs on human rights has been scant. This dearth of quantitative tests is potentially problematic; as Cingranelli and Richards (2001) state, addressing this gap within the literature is necessary in order

to "provide scientific evidence of the effectiveness" of human rights INGOs (225).

Though conceptually it is clear that the activities of human rights INGOs, specifically, their *campaigns* for human rights outcomes, should be examined, empirical proxies for human rights INGO campaigns or activities have been scant. There exists no international clearinghouse for the activities of human rights INGOs; there is no existing data set on all actions taken by human rights INGOs concerning a state. To date, there have been only a few very recent studies that used a general proxy concerning the number of all types of INGOs that have a membership base within a state and examine whether this proxy is associated with human rights performance (Landman 2005; Neumayer 2005).[1] These studies all used data collected from the *Yearbook of International Organizations,* a publication of the Union of International Associations, an INGO itself whose mission is the "facilitation of the development and efficiency of non-governmental networks" (UIA, 2008/2009). The Union of International Associations (UIA) produces a list of all active INGOs in the world by asking other INGOs for new organization information, looking at lists of INGOs produced by donor foundations and international organizations, and original research of newspaper and practitioner reports. The UIA then collects data on all INGOs on its list by sending out information requests to the organizations themselves. The UIA asks these organizations to self-report a plethora of information, including the organization's mission or aims, its services and languages used, main and secondary addresses, structure, staff, and membership details (UIA, 2008/2009). It has, since 1910, published its findings in its annually released *Yearbook.*

Because both Landman (2005) and Neumayer (2005) use the UIA measure of the number of all types of INGOs that have members within a state, their studies focus

[1]By membership base, these data are capturing whether an INGO reports having a citizen-member within the state (UIA 2008/2009). In other words, this is a count of the number of INGOs that report having a volunteer or *member* within a state in a specific year. I use "member" or "membership" data with reference to the UIA data to be consistent with larger cross-disciplinary literature on INGOs (Boli and Thomas; Smith; Tsutsui and Wotipka; Smith and Wiest; Smith)

more on the human rights impact of the level of overall civil society and not specifically on the impact of the activities of specifically *human rights* INGOs. As a first cut, therefore, in looking for data that captures the activities of human rights INGOs, it seems important to use only data on INGOs with a human rights mission statement. For this, I use data collected from the *Yearbook of International Organizations* on human rights-specific INGOs; this previously unreleased data was provided by two sociologists, Jackie Smith and Dawn Wiest. Drawing on a similar procedure used by Tsutsui and Wotipka (2004) in their collection of data on the years 1978, 1988, and 1998, Smith and Wiest (2005) coded INGOs as human rights INGOs if their mission or aims reflected a human rights agenda and create a country-year variable for the number of human rights INGOs that report as having volunteers or a membership-base within a country in a given year. This data was collected from the hard-copies of the *Yearbook* at 2-3 year intervals from 1953 to 2005; linear interpolation was utilized to fill in the years not coded. Given its time span and its issue area focus, this data represents a real advance in the study of human rights INGOs.

However, one potential problem with using UIA self-reported data that has not been adequately examined in the extant cross-disciplinary literature is the large number of INGOs who are included in the *Yearbook* and yet do not supply details of their operations to the UIA. This is extremely problematic for advocacy INGOs, which, unlike service INGOs, often do not have permanent offices or membership bases in the states where they are working. Therefore, unlike the case for service INGOs, data from the UIA on secretariat or office location can not be substituted in for human rights INGO membership data as a robustness check. For example, Human Rights Watch, by most accounts the second largest human rights INGO in the world, does not report *any* membership data to the UIA, despite, according to their mission, the organization's global focus (UIA, 2008/2009). Therefore, existing studies, such as Landman (2005) and Neumayer (2005), which use UIA data as a proxy for INGO

activity are missing the activities of arguably one of the most global INGOs. This issue is also problematic in Smith and Wiest (2005)'s issue specific INGO data.

Perhaps a more serious problem than the use of overall INGO data as a proxy or the use of UIA data in general, both Landman (2005) and Neumayer (2005), together with many existing qualitative studies of the impact of human rights INGOs, fail to address the potential endogeneity between the presence of human rights INGOs with members within a state and the human rights practices of a state. Existing research within sociology interested in human rights INGOs with members/volunteers within a state as the dependent variable further highlights the potential endogeneity in this approach. As Tsutsui and Wotipka point out in their 2004 *Social Forces* article, in the years 1978, 1988, and 1998, human rights INGOs were more likely to have members/volunteers in a state where there was a high degree of political rights and civil liberties, which they measure using the Freedom House (2001) scales. Based on this finding, therefore, it is plausible that high levels of human rights performance could lead to a relaxation of restrictions of the activities of human rights INGOs with members within a state and, thus, to the proliferation of the organizations.

At the same time, as Landman (2005) and Neumayer (2005) and the general TAN literature all stress, the activities of human rights INGOs should lead to higher levels of human rights performance. These two strains of literature highlight the potential endogenous relationship between human rights INGOs with members within a state and the human rights practices of a state. Without explicitly accounting for this potential endogeneity, any observed effect of the UIA-based human rights INGO data on human rights practices could be spurious (Wooldridge 2006).

If an endogenous relationship was present between the UIA human rights INGO membership data and human rights performance and this relationship was unaccounted for, the statistical results would be biased and, in effect, useless at providing much-needed evidence for the impact of human rights INGOs (Wooldridge 2006).

As I will show below, the UIA human rights INGO membership data and the more general non-issue specific UIA INGO membership data, such as that used by Landman (2005) and Neumayer (2005), are endogenous to human rights performance outcomes.[2] Therefore, in order to correctly examine the impact of human rights INGOs to human rights performance, I have to use statistical models which account for endogeneity when using human rights INGO membership data as my key independent variable

Moreover, though the issue-specific UIA-based membership data is a useful first cut at capturing the activities of human rights INGOs, it does not adequately capture what human rights INGOs *do* within a state; in short, there is no existing measure that captures how multiple human rights INGOs target a government through gathering data on human rights abuses within a state, releasing reports on the targeted state, and working with third party actors to pressure a state to improve its human rights practices.[3] Moreover, no existing measure captures how Keck and Sikkink (1998)'s central mechanism, that of an increasing advocacy *campaign,* impacts policy and behavior outcomes within a state. These mechanisms of how human rights INGOs impact human rights performance, central to the TAN framework, are somewhat distinct from an overall count of human rights INGO that have members within a state.

[2]In a statistical robustness check, Landman (2005)'s measure of all INGOs with members within a country was substituted for the issue-specific focus on human Rights INGO memberships. Using the same two stage model as discussed below, the relationship with human rights performance was still endogenous, as determined by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test.

[3]Very recent work by Hafner-Burton (2008) focuses on the impact press releases from Amnesty International has on human rights performance. Hafner-Burton (2008) finds that the number of Amnesty International press releases concerning a state is negatively related to the human rights performance of that state. Therefore, Hafner-Burton (2008) concludes that media targeting by Amnesty International, and NGOs in general, is not a particularly robust method at reducing human rights violations. This measure, though a useful in capturing some of the activities of Amnesty International, does not focus on the totality of human rights INGOs activity or how these press releases are actually used in the media. Further, this measure does not capture how *changes in the level of targeting* by advocacy actors, as outlined in both Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) and Keck and Sikkink (1998), is theoretically supposed to cause increased human rights performance within a state. These results are questioned in Murdie and Davis (2008), who find a significant effect of human rights INGO targeting on human rights performance.

In order to more adequately capture the activities of human rights INGOs within a state, which is the central concept needed for an empirical test of the above hypotheses, I utilize newly created data from the Integrated Data for Events Analysis (IDEA) project that focuses on all Reuters Global News Reports concerning human rights INGOs within a specific state. To utilize this data, I first produced a dictionary of the names of the 432 human rights INGOs listed in the *Yearbook of International Organizations*, similar to the procedure used to identify INGOs by issue area in the Smith and Wiest (2005) data, discussed above. A list of these human rights INGOs is provided in this chapter's Appendix 1.

Using this list of human rights INGOs, Virtual Research Associates, the company that produced the original IDEA data set, then created a data set of all events in Reuters concerning these INGOs daily from 1992 to 2007. This data is organized in a 'who' did 'what' to 'whom' manner for each particular event, over 10 million events in the complete data set (King and Lowe 2003). As an example, on November 1, 2001, Human Rights Watch visited with the Macedonian government. The newly created IDEA data set reports that there was an Human Rights Watch "visit" with the Macedonian government on this particular day. The organization is the "who" or the source of the action, the action is the "visit," and the Macedonian government is the target. This procedure produced 9,543 distinct events where human rights INGOs are the source actor and a government or government official is the target. Because the various human rights performance variables, discussed below, are all measured at the country-year level, I aggregate this human rights INGOs event data set to the country-year, including the activities of all human rights INGOs in the measure.[4]

Additionally, as the key independent variable in the analysis, reflecting the central mechanism in the extant literature, I utilize yearly change in this count of human

[4]In future work, I plan to focus on the differences in activities by different human rights INGOs. In that research, therefore, it will be important to produce country-year variables of each human rights INGO.

rights INGO events and not level as my measure of human rights INGO activity.[5] Using change in this count allows me to capture the idea that a state's leadership reacts to increasing human rights INGO campaigns by improving its human rights performance (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Ahmed and Potter 2006; Okafor 2006). Unlike the membership or secretariat data on service INGOs discussed in Chapter 5, which was used to captured to level of goods or services provided by service INGOs within a year, this data on human rights INGO events is supposed to capture campaigns by human rights INGOs, often termed "shaming and blaming" tactics. A campaign is typically thought of as a concentrated effort by human rights INGOs for a brief period of time on a specific issue or targeted state (Hopgood 2006). As such, the mechanism through which human rights INGOs work to impact policy and behavior outcomes is not a constant level of "shaming" or events but, instead, an increase in events or "shaming." This more precisely relates to the central mechanism discussed in the extant TAN literature (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse and Ropp 1999). As an illustration, it was not Amnesty's constant shaming of Latin American and Asian countries that won it the Nobel Prize in 1977; rather, it was Amnesty's increase in advocacy events, particularly its shaming of despotic regimes in Latin America and Asia, that won it the Nobel Prize specifically for its "campaign against torture"(Hopgood 2006).

Campaigns, or sudden increases in advocacy events, reflects how many advocacy INGOs work. Though, for example, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and other INGOs often try to keep activities going in many areas of the world simultaneously, it is only during campaigns, when activities are concentrated and increased within a specific state or on a specific issue, that the organization's leadership expects a response in a state's human rights performance (DeMars 2005; Hopgood 2006). By utilizing change, my measure of human rights INGO activity accounts for this dynamic. Additionally, the use of change accounts for situations where human rights

[5]Results are robust if change is calculated at two year or three year intervals as well.

INGO activity is consistently high because of already high human rights performance or consistently high because of media bias or population size.[6] Additionally, unlike the UIA-based human rights INGO membership measure discussed above, this resulting measure, *Human Rights INGO events (change)*, is not endogenous to human rights performance.[7,8] In short, I contend that this newly created variable better accounts for the concept of interest, campaigns by human rights INGOs, and, thus, represents a real advance in the TAN and human rights empirical literature.

Statistical Controls

Previous research has shown a wide variety of factors that influence human rights performance. These factors could have a confounding influence with human rights INGOs and thus need to be controlled for in all the statistical models in this chapter. Let me briefly review these statistical controls and their influence on human rights performance. First, economic development has been found to increase respect for human rights within a state (Mitchell and McCormick 1988; Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Richards, Gelleny and Sacko 2001). As economic benefits are distributed throughout a state, individuals are less likely to revolt due to scarcity, eliminating some possible opportu-

[6]For recent work that uses level of human rights INGO activity and not change as the key independent variable and still finds a positive impact on future human rights performance, see Murdie and Davis (2008).

[7]This is determined by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, using the same instruments used in the human rights INGO membership models, as discussed below. Additionally, the correlation between this measure and the Smith and Wiest (2005) data on human rights INGO membership is less than 0.20.

[8]When creating *Human Rights INGO events (change),* I confronted a unique statistical modeling situation: though the state coverage of this variable is very good (human rights INGO events are recorded in 162 countries in the data set), there are many country-years where there are no human rights INGO events recorded. There are two potential ways to deal with this missing data: (1) record these missing values as zero, indicating that there was no human rights INGO events in that country year, or (2) restrict the sample to only include states where there were human rights INGO events captured by Reuters in the created data set. In this chapter, I chose to report the results using the former approach, knowing that this approach greatly increases the chance of null findings. Importantly, however, *all* of the results in this chapter are extremely robust to the alternative approach, where I restrict the sample to only states with human rights INGO events.

nities for repression by elites (Poe and Tate 1994). Likewise, as individuals have more economic resources at their disposal, they are more likely to have the capacity to work against repressive regimes (Poe and Tate 1994; Richards, Gelleny and Sacko 2001). Therefore, I include as a control the natural log of *GDP per Capita*, in constant US dollars in all statistical models (WDI 2008).

There is also a wealth of studies linking consolidated democracy to increases in human rights realization (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli 1996; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). Numerous reasons for this correlation have been given: political freedoms, civil-military relations where the military is under civilian control, normative arguments, and wealth development, to name a few (Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Schmitz and Sikkink 2001). Democracy provides alternative outlets for the handling of conflict by governmental officials and, moreover, a voice to the domestic public in order to publicize and potentially oust human rights abusers (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). Given this established relationship, I thus control for regime type by including annual *Polity* scores, ranging from -10 (strongly autocratic) to +10 (strongly democratic) (Marshall and Jaggers 2007).

Domestic and interstate conflicts, together with a large population size, have been associated with decreases in human rights performance (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994; Hofferbert and Cingranelli 1996; Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999). As population increases, this could lead to increases in scarcity (Henderson 1991; Poe and Tate 1994). Additionally, more people create more chances of repression and more opportunities to diffuse or hide human rights violations (Poe and Tate 1994). Likewise, domestic and international conflicts can create domestic situations where repression is used to prevent coup attempts, temper opposition, and can even be condoned for security reasons (Poe and Tate 1994). Therefore, I control for both domestic and interaction conflict and population size in the statistical ana-

lyzes. For population size, I utilize the natural logarithm of total national *Population* (WDI 2008). A dichotomous variable for the presence of civil or international *War* within the state is taken from the by UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Databank (2008).

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(a) - The Impact of Human Rights INGOs is Conditional to the Divisiveness of the Issue

To examine Hypothesis 1(a), the impact of human rights INGOs conditional to the divisiveness of the human rights issue, I first need measures of divisive and non-divisive human rights issues in states to serve as the dependent variables. Following a convention in the extant human rights literature, I utilize the *Cingranelli-Richards (CIRI) Physical Integrity Rights Index* as my measure of a non-divisive human rights and the CIRI measure of *Women's Social Rights* to capture a divisive human rights issue (Cingranelli and Richards 1999; Buergenthal 2000; Sundstrom 2006). The physical integrity rights measure is a compilation of scores relating to "torture, extrajudicial killing, political imprisonment, and disappearance" (Cingranelli and Richards 2007). The scores of this index range from 0 to 8, with 0 indicating no governmental respect of physical integrity and 8 indicating full governmental respect for these rights.[9] The women's social rights index is a measure, from 0 to 2, of respect for a number of conventional women's social rights, such as the right to initiate divorce, the right to education, freedom from female genital cutting without consent, and freedom for equal inheritance (Cingranelli and Richards 2007). Again, a higher score indicates more governmental respect for these rights.

When *Human Rights INGO Events (change)* is used as the key independent variable, and thus simultaneous equation methods are not used, I measure the dependent variable at $t+1$ and the independent variables at t. In other words, the statistical

[9]The Political Terror Scales (PTS) where used as robustness checks for all analyzes. Results are statistically and substantively similar.

models utilize lagged independent variables or can be thought of as measuring the impact of human rights INGO activities on future human rights performance.

When the necessary variables were merged, I have a data set of roughly 150 states and a total of around 1600 observations for the years 1993 to 2004.[10] Because tests for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity indicated the presence of each statistical issue, when the dependent variable is *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index,* Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of 4 are used. When the dependent variable is *CIRI Women's Social Rights,* due to the limited nature of the dependent variable, an ordered probit model is utilized with robust standard errors, clustered on country. [11]

Additional controls are also utilized in the models where the dependent variable is *CIRI Women's Social Rights.* These variables include the *Percent Female Labor Force, Trade (Percent of GDP),* and a dichotomous indicator for majority *Muslim* population (La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer 1999). These controls are consistent with the extant literature on concerning women's social rights (Okin 2005; Wotipka and Ramirez 2007; Freeman 2008). [12]

Therefore, when the key independent variable is *Human Rights INGO events (change),* the statistical equations for the empirical models are as follows:

Non-Divisive issue:

$$\textit{CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\ \textit{Human Rights INGO Events (change)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2\ \textit{Population (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3\ \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t-1}$$

[10] Results were also consistent if the United States and the United Kingdom were excluded from the analyzes.

[11] Following convention, I ran the physical integrity models as ordinary least squares regressions, despite the somewhat limited nature (from 0 to 8) of the dependent variable (Poe and Tate 1994; Poe, Tate and Keith 1999; Neumayer 2005; Hafner-Burton 2008). As to be expected however, when the analyzes were run as ordered probit models with lagged dependent variables, the results remain statistically and substantively the same.

[12] Importantly, however, results as to the key independent variable are robust to the exclusion of these additional controls as well. Results are also robust if regional dummies are included instead of *Muslim* for the Middle East and North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa.

$+ \beta_4\ WAR_{i,t-1} + \beta_5\ Polity\ Score_{\ i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$

Divisive Issue:

$$\Pr\ (CIRI\ Women's\ Social\ Rights_{i,t} = \{0-2\}\ ) = \alpha + \beta_1 Human\ Rights\ INGO\ Events\ (change)_{i,t-1} + \beta_2\ Population\ (ln)_{i,t-1} + \beta_3\ GDP\ per\ Capita\ (ln)_{i,t-1} + \beta_4\ WAR_{i,t-1} + \beta_5\ Polity\ Score_{\ i,t-1} + \beta_6\ Percent\ Female\ Labor\ Force_{i,t-1} + \beta_7\ Muslim_{i,t-1} + \beta_8\ Trade\ (Percent\ of\ GDP)_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

As a robustness check on the impact of human rights INGOs on non-divisive issues, I also use *Human Rights INGO Count,* as coded by Smith and Wiest (2005) from the UIA's *Yearbook*, as the key independent variable. As mentioned, there are potential problems with endogeneity that must be dealt with when this independent variable is used. In other words, it seems likely that states with high respect for human rights could lead to more human rights INGOs having members within the state, contrary to my expectation that high numbers of human rights INGOs with members within a state lead to higher state respect for human rights. This potential endogeneity, sometimes referred to as "reverse" causation, violates the classic ordinary least squares assumption of recursivity, leading to biased and inconsistent estimates (Dhrymes 1994; Wooldridge 2006).

Therefore, I run a two stage least squares regression with heteroskedastic- and autocorrelation- consistent standard errors. The first stage dependent variable is *Human Rights INGO Count* and the second stage dependent variable is *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index.* In this approach, exogenous instruments are used in the first stage regression to predict a new variable that does not violate the recursivity assumption. This new variable is substituted for the endogenous independent variable in the second stage approach, leading to consistent estimates (Dhrymes 1994; Wooldridge 2006).

Like all two stage approaches, it is necessary to find an instrument that has no direct causal path to *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index* but is still correlated, conditional to the covariates, to *Human Rights INGO Count*. Drawing on the Sociology literature, I use the natural log of *Tourism Arrivals* and the yearly percent increase in *Telephone Mainlines* (WDI 2008). Both of these instruments are utilized because they indicate connections to the outside world; they are crucial to the activities of human rights INGOs, but not expensive, not indicative of democracies, and, moreover, not linked to a state's human rights performance (Boli and Thomas 1999; Zinnes and Bell 2002; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2004). As I will discuss in the results section, these instruments prove to not only be theoretically exogenous to human rights performance yet still causally linked to human rights INGO memberships, but are statistically established to be so using conventional tests (Wooldridge 2006).

The statistical equations for this two stage approach is:

First Stage:

$$\textit{Human Rights INGO Count}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\ \textit{Population (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_2\ \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_3\ \textit{WAR}_{i,t} + \beta_4\ \textit{Polity Score}_{i,t} + \beta_5\ \textit{Tourism Arrivals (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_6\ \textit{Telephone Mainlines (Annual Growth Rate)}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Second Stage:

$$\textit{CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\ \textit{Human Rights INGO Count (instrumented)}_{i,t} + \beta_2\ \textit{Population (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_3\ \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_4\ \textit{WAR}_{i,t} + \beta_5\ \textit{Polity Score}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(b) - The Impact of Human Rights INGOs is Conditional to the Vulnerability of the State

Hypothesis 1(b) examines how the vulnerability of a state conditions the impact of advocacy INGOs. For this model, I use *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index* as the dependent variable and create the key independent variable by interacting *Human Rights INGO Events (change)* with (1) measures which capture the state's vulnerability in internal pressure, and (2) measures used to capture vulnerability of external pressure. To capture a state's level of vulnerability to internal pressure, I use *Democracy,* a scale from 0 (least democractic) to 10 (most democratic) in the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). Again, the expectation is that a more democractic country is more vulnerable to internal pressure, leading to a greater effect of advocacy INGOs on policy and behavior outcomes.

To capture state vulnerability to external pressure, I run three different models, each with a different measure of external vulnerability: the amount of foreign *Aid Per Capita (Current US Dollars)*, *Trade as a Percent of GDP,* and *Exports as a Percent of GDP* (Gleditsch 2002; WDI 2008).[13] Each of these measures captures a different aspect of a state's vulnerability to external pressure. If third party states, for example, are encouraged by the increase in human rights INGO activity to pressure a state from abroad, they could attach conditionality requirements on aid. Therefore, countries with higher *Aid Per Capita* levels should be more responsive to increases in human rights INGO activity, leading to a greater human rights outcome. The same is true for *Trade* and *Exports;* when a state is dependent on foreign trade, particularly exports, for economic survival, it should be more responsive to international community pressure facilitated by increases in human rights INGO activity. The international

[13]I rely on Gleditsch (2002)'s trade and exports data. Though it is available only until 2000, the coverage and reliability are much better, as discussed in Gleditsch (2002). Also, the following observations are statistical outliers, as discussed by Barnett and Lewis (1994) and Wooldridge (2006), and are omitted from the statistical analyses: Israel in 2000 when external vulnerability is measured as *Aid Per Capita* and India (1995, 2000), UK (2000), US (2000) when external vulnerability is measured as either *Trade* or *Exports.*

community writ large, including individual consumers of products from the targeted country, can retaliate by boycotting products of the targeted state. Therefore, as countries become more vulnerable, through trade and export dependency, to external pressure caused by increases in human rights INGO activity, there should be a greater impact on human rights performance.

Following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), I include all constitutive terms in the model. Like in the Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(a), I use Newey-West standard errors with a lag length of 4 to account for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation and I measure the dependent variable as future *(t+1)* human rights performance. Thus, when *Aid Per Capita* is the variable used to capture external pressure, the statistical equation of this empirical model is as follows:

$$\textit{CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \textit{ Interaction term of Human Rights INGO Events (change)}_{i,t-1} * \textit{Democracy}_{i,t-1} * \textit{Aid Per Capita}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{ Human Rights INGO Event (change)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \textit{ Aid Per Capita}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \textit{ Interaction term of Human Rights INGO Events (change)}_{i,t-1} * \textit{Democracy}_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 \textit{ Interaction term of Human Rights INGO Events (change)}_{i,t-1} * \textit{Aid Per Capita}_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \textit{ Interaction term of Democracy}_{i,t-1} * \textit{Aid Per Capita}_{i,t-1} + \beta_7 \textit{ Population (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_8 \textit{ GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_9 \textit{ WAR}_{i,t-1} + \beta_{10} \textit{ Democracy}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

For the robustness checks using *Trade* and *Exports,* the equation is similar to above, simply substituting the measures for either *Trade* or *Exports* in the interaction term and in all constitutive terms.

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(c) - The Impact of Human Rights INGOs is Conditional to the Costs to the Domestic Population

Section (c) of Hypothesis 1 is based on the advocacy INGO model result that the domestic community is less likely to support advocacy INGOs as the costliness of support rises. In other words, the impact of advocacy INGOs is conditional on the costs faced by the domestic population for associating with these organizations. Therefore, using the *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index* as the dependent variable again, I construct the key independent variable as an interaction term between *Human Rights INGO Events (change)* and the *CIRI Association* measure. The *CIRI Association* variable captures the ability of citizens to assemble freely and associate in groups without government interference (Cingranelli and Richards 2007). It ranges from 0, indicating severe restrictions on the freedom to associate, to 2, indicating no restrictions on association. Along with the control variables, I include the constitutive terms in the model. I also use Newey-West standard errors (lag length of 4) and measure the dependent variable at 1 year in the future. The statistical equation for this model is:

$$\textit{CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1 \textit{ Interaction term of Human Rights INGO Events (change)}_{i,t-1} * \textit{ CIRI Association}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{ CIRI Association}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \textit{ Population (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 \textit{ GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_5 \textit{ WAR}_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 \textit{ Polity Score}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(d) - The Impact of Human Rights INGOs is Conditional to Support from the International Community

The final section of Hypothesis 1, Section (d), predicts that advocacy INGOs have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes when support by the interna-

tional community increases. Therefore, like in the previous models, the key independent variable is an interaction term, this time between *Human Rights INGO Events (change)* and *ODA Aid to NGOs.* Previously unused in statistical analyzes of INGOs, the measure *ODA Aid to NGOs* is the amount of official development assistance (ODA), in millions of constant U.S. dollars, dispersed to civil society organizations, predominantly INGOs, by Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. To reflect the idea that this aid is used to increase campaigning from year *t-1* to year *t*, the *ODA Aid to NGOs* variable is lagged 1 year in the analysis. I use the statistical modeling techniques discussed above and, additionally, restrict my sample here to only include countries that received ODA aid.[14] The statistical equation is as follows:

$$\textit{CIRI Physical Integrity Rights Index}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\ \textit{Interaction term of Human Rights INGO Events (change)}_{i,t-1} * \textit{ODA Aid to NGOs}_{i,t-2} + \beta_2\ \textit{ODA Aid to NGOs}_{i,t-2} + + \beta_3\ \textit{Population (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_4\ \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t-1} + \beta_5\ \textit{WAR}_{i,t-1} + \beta_6\ \textit{Polity Score}_{i,t-1} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 2 - The Impact of Domestic Civil Society on International Support

Hypothesis 2 states that the international community would rather support advocacy INGOs that share its same preference ordering. To test this hypothesis, I use *ODA Aid to NGOs* as my dependent variable and restrict my sample to only include countries that received ODA aid in the current year.

As mentioned, this hypothesis requires a proxy for the level of domestically-oriented advocacy INGOs within a state. For this proxy, I turn to the *Yearbook*

[14] Newey-West standard errors have a lag length of 1 in this analysis.

of International Organizations again, this time relying on its data concerning the founding location of all human rights INGOs. The nice thing about using foundational data from the UIA is the lack of missing values, something, as mentioned, which was potentially problematic with the *Human Rights INGO Count* data. Using the *Yearbook's* CD-Rom edition, I recorded the foundation year and location for all 432 human rights INGOs in the data set . I also recorded whether the INGO had consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Because consultative status with ECOSOC can be indicative of international preferences, I created a country-year variable of the number of human rights INGOs that had been founded within the state but that did not have consultative status; this proxy is called *Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs* and, after it is logged (natural), it is the key independent variable in this empirical model. Again, the expectation is that as this number increases, *ODA Aid to NGOs* will decrease.

I use an ordinary least squares regression with robust-standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. I include the normal controls plus a control for the total amount of *ODA Aid,* in millions, that the country received. This produces the following statistical model:

$$\textit{ODA Aid to NGOs}_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\ \textit{Number of Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_2\ \textit{Population (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_3\ \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_4\ \textit{Polity Score}_{i,t} + \beta_5\ \textit{ODA Aid}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 3 - The Impact of State Vulnerability on Statements by Human Rights INGOs

Finally, Hypothesis 3 addresses how state vulnerability impacts signals sent by both domestically-oriented advocacy INGOs and internationally-oriented advocacy INGOs.

For a first cut at getting at this rather complex hypothesis, I divide my sample into two: (1) those at or above the yearly median democracy score and aid per capita value and (2) those below the yearly median democracy score or aid per capita value (Marshall and Jaggers 2007). Of course, those in the first category are being classified as states "vulnerable" to internal or external pressure while those in the latter category are being classified as "invulnerable" states.

The dependent variable for this model needs to capture the signals that advocacy INGOs send to gain the support of the international and domestic populations in their advocacy efforts. For this, I rely on my IDEA-created data set of human rights INGO events but focus only on events that were conflictual (Goldstein 1992). In other words, this measure, *Human Rights INGO Conflictual Signals,* is a count of only conflictual activities by human rights INGOs towards a state. The key independent variable is *Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs,* as discussed above. In this model, controls are included for *Population (ln)* and *GDP Per Capita (ln).* Robust standard errors, clustered on country, are used in these event-count models.[15]

I run these models two ways. First, given the large percentage of zeroes in the dependent variable, I run a zero-inflated negative binomial. In this model, I am assuming that there are two possible populations of observations that account for the zeros: there is one population where there are always zeros and one where there could be zeros. By using a zero-inflated model, I am modeling the inclusion into each group, then modeling the counts separately, and then combining the probabilities. I use measures of the *Total Coverage in IDEAS (ln)* and a total count of all *Human Rights INGO events Human Rights INGO events* as the inflation factors. For both vulnerable and invulnerable states, therefore the statistical equations using this approach are as

[15]The negative binomial model is utilized because of evidence of positive contagion (King 1989). Worth mentioning, multicollinearity is not a statistical issue, as determined by a value of less than 2 on all variance inflation factors. Additionally, due to being statistical outliers in the model, I omit the United States and the United Kingdom from the reported results, discussed below. However, the substantive and statistical significance of the key independent variable remains the same regardless of whether these outliers are included or excluded (Barnett and Lewis 1994; Wooldridge 2006).

follows:

Inflation Equation:

$$\Pr(\textit{Human Rights INGO Conflictual Signals}_{i,t} = \{0\}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \textit{ Total Coverage in IDEAS (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \textit{ Human Rights INGO events}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Negative Binomial Equation:

$$\Pr(\textit{Human Rights INGO Conflictual Signals}_{i,t} = \{COUNT\}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \textit{Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \textit{ Population (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

Second, I run an additional empirical technique. For this, I truncate the data to not include any zeros in the dependent variable and re-run the model, for both vulnerable and invulnerable states, using a zero-truncated negative binomial model. This statistical model can be represented as:

$$\Pr(\textit{Human Rights INGO Conflictual Signals}_{i,t} = \{ZERO - TRUNCATED\,COUNT\}) = \alpha + \beta_1 \textit{ Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs}_{i,t} + \beta_2 \textit{ Population (ln)}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \textit{GDP per Capita (ln)}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

6.3 Results

The advocacy INGO hypotheses are supported in a number of the analyzes, as shown in Tables 6.1 through 6.11. Additionally, the models all fit the minimum standard of accuracy, meeting a minimum goodness of fit to the population (Prob > F is less than 0.05). In total, these results show that human rights INGOs have great potential at

improving human rights performance within states but, like expected, the impact of these organizations is conditional to:

1. the characteristics of the human rights issue,
2. the vulnerability of the given state,
3. the costs domestic populations face for interacting with INGOs, and
4. the support INGOs are provided by the international community.

In addition, the results counter traditional TAN expectations that the international community is supportive of all growth in INGOs. The results also provide some support for the expectation that heterogeneous types of human rights INGOs signal differently in vulnerable and invulnerable states. Below, I outline these results and discuss the substantive implications.

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(a) - The Impact of Human Rights INGOs is Conditional to the Divisiveness of the Issue

Hypothesis 1(a) is strongly supported: human rights INGOs have a positive impact on future human rights performance concerning non-divisive issues but have no statistically significant impact on divisive issues. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 outline the results of these statistical models when the independent variable used was *Human Rights INGOs Events (change).* Table 6.3 is a robustness check of these results on non-divisive human rights using Smith and Wiest (2005)'s data on *Human Rights INGO Count.*

Table 6.1 outlines the statistical results where the dependent variable was the non-divisive human rights issue, *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights.* As the table shows, an increase in human rights INGO activity is associated with higher future human rights

Table 6.1: The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activity on Future (+1 Year) CIRI Physical Integrity: Newey West Standard Errors, 1993-2004 With Zeroes

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Human Rights INGOs Events (change)	0.00392* (0.00200)
Population (ln)	-0.610** (0.0449)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.471** (0.0508)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)	-2.10** (0.263)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	0.0890** (0.0102)
Intercept	11.0** (0.813)
N	1670
$F_{(5,1664)}$	160.514

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

performance (β *(Human Rights INGOs Events (change))* = 0.00392), (P(β *(Human Rights INGOs Events (change))* <0.05) All statistically significant control variables are in the expected direction.

Substantively, the effect of increased human rights activity on future respect for physical integrity rights is rather large. With all controls at their mean, or median if dichotomous, as the key independent variable, *Human Rights INGOs Events (change),* moves from its minimum score in the data set to the mean score, *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights* is expected to increase 2 points (95% confidence interval from 0.737 to 3.261).[16] As a reminder, the *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights* scale has a range from 0, indicating no governmental respect for physical integrity, to 8, indicating full governmental respect for physical integrity rights. This change from the minimum to

[16]These substantive effects were created using CLARIFY (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003).

the mean score is larger than the change in respect for physical integrity rights that is simulated to occur when *Polity* changes from its minimum to mean (0.385 with a 95% confidence interval from 0.163 to 0.605) and is almost as large as the simulated change that occurs when *GDP per Capita* moves from its minimum to its mean (2.737 with a 95% confidence interval from 2.169 to 3.220). A good example of this sort of change in the data set is Nigeria where the *Human Rights INGOs Events (change)* variable increased from the 10th percentile in 2003 to slightly below the mean in 2004 and increased 1 point on the *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights* in 2005. The recent *Legitimizing Human Rights NGOs: Lessons from Nigeria* by Okafor (2006) would support this increase in human rights INGO activity on physical integrity rights in Nigeria in 2004 and 2005.

Despite the potential for increased realization of physical integrity rights that is associated with increased human rights INGO activism, Table 6.2 outlines the limited association between increased activism and respect for future divisive human rights, measured here as *Women's Social Rights.* The key independent variable in this statistical model does not reach standard levels of significance. This is in line with the implications of the formal advocacy INGO model: because women's social rights is often an issue where the domestic population, as a whole, does not place sufficient value on the international community's policy or behavioral goals, advocacy INGOs are less likely to gain the support of the domestic community, leading to little or no impact of their advocacy efforts. Worth noting, of the standard Poe and Tate (1994) controls, *GDP per Capita (ln), Population (ln)* and *Polity* are statistically significant, as is the control for *Percent Female Labor Force.*[17] More large scale research into explaining the causes of women's social rights definitely seems necessary, especially given no existing published work that utilizes this measure (Cingranelli and Richards

[17]In the robustness check with regional dummies, the *Middle East and North Africa* and *Sub-Saharan Africa* controls were also statistically significant.

2008).[18]

Table 6.2: The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activity on Future (+1 Year) CIRI Women's Social Rights: Ordered Probit Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Country, 1993-2003

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Human Rights INGO events (change)	0.00172 (0.00117)
Population (ln)	-0.0878 (0.0615)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.373** (0.0667)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)	-0.161 (0.215)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	0.0544** (0.0185)
Perc Female Labor Force	0.0224** (0.00617)
Muslim	-0.398 (0.292)
Trade	0.00221 (0.00204)
N	1463
Log-likelihood	-1320.23
$\chi^2_{(8)}$	128.415

[18]Results were statistically and substantively similar when CIRI's measure of *Women's Economic Rights* was used as the dependent variable.

The results of the two-stage least squares model concerning the impact of *Human Rights INGO Count* on non-divisive human rights reiterates the potential human rights INGOs have, even after accounting for the endogeneity suspected in the key independent variable. As Table 6.3 shows, the instrumented *Human Rights INGO Count* has a positive and statistically significant impact on physical integrity rights (β *(Human Rights INGO Count (IV))* = 3.372), (P(β *(Human Rights INGO Count (IV))*) <0.01). After accounting for endogeneity, the substantive effects of an increase from the minimum to the mean value of *Human Rights INGO Count,* holding everything else at its mean and/or median, is over a 4 point increase in *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights* (95% confidence interval from 0.046 to 7.975). Further, this model allows me to reject the null of no endogeneity in *Human Rights INGO Count* at the P<0.05 level, as determined by the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, indicating that the two-stage approach was necessary. Additionally, the instruments are validated by both statistically significant coefficients in the first stage and a Cragg-Donald F-Statistic of above 10, in addition to being shown to be properly exogenous by a insignificant Hansen's J Statistic (Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 2003; Wooldridge 2006).

As a whole, these statistical tests provide overwhelming support for Hypothesis 1(a): the activities of human rights INGOs have a great impact on non-divisive issues but have an insignificant impact on those issues which divide the international and the domestic populations.

Table 6.3: The Impact of Human Rights INGOs on Human Rights Performance, 1995 - 2003.

Variable	**Coefficient (Std. Errors)**
First Stage - Human Rights INGOs Count (ln)	
Population (ln)	.165** (.0130)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	.0786** (.0164)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)	.146* (.0681)
Polity (-10 to 10)	.0339** (.00347)
Tourism Arrivals (ln)	.0617** (.0147)
Telephone (Annual Growth Rate)	.000825‡ (.000439)
Constant	-.694** (.192)
Cragg-Donald F-Stat	17.2
Second Stage - CIRI Physical Integrity	
Human Rights INGOs Count (ln) (Instrumented)	3.37** (1.21)
Population (ln)	-1.27** (.253)
GDP Per Capita (ln)	.0422 (.172)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)	-2.88**(.317)
Polity (-10 to 10)	-.0318 (.0455)
Constant	13.4**(1.44)
Hanson's J Statistic	0.180
Number of Observations	991
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent robust standard errors.	
Standard errors are in parentheses. *p <.05 ** p<.01‡ p<.10 (two-tailed)	

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(b) - The Impact of Human Rights INGOs is Conditional to the Vulnerability of the State

Empirical support is also found for Hypothesis 1(b), concerning how the effects of advocacy INGOs are conditional to the external and internal vulnerability of the state. Table 6.4-6.6 outlines the results of the statistical analyses; Table 6.4 shows the results where external vulnerability is captured by the variable *Aid Per Capita,* Table 6.5 highlights the results where *Trade* is used, and Table 6.6 is the similar model using *Exports* to capture external vulnerability. As shown, in each specification of the key independent variable, the interaction term between human rights INGO activity and state vulnerability, including the various measures of external vulnerability and the state's level of democracy, is statistically significant and positive (β *(Interaction Term of Human Rights INGO Activity and State Vulnerability)* $= 0.0001$), (P(β *(Interaction Term of Human Rights INGO Activity and State Vulnerability)*) <0.10). Additionally, all statistically significant control variables are in the expected direction. Following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006), I do not interpret the constitutive terms as if they are unconditional marginal effects.

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Table 6.4: The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activity on Future(+1 Year) CIRI Physical Integrity, Conditional to the External (Aid Per Capita) and Internal Vulnerability of the State: Newey West Standard Errors, 1993-2004

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction term of Human Rights INGO*Democracy*Aid Per Capita	0.0000834† (0.0000467)
Human Rights INGO events (change)	0.00808† (0.00467)
Aid Per Capita	-0.00347 (0.00309)
Human Rights INGO events (change) * Democracy	-0.000319 (0.00110)
Human Rights INGO events (change) * Aid Per Capita	-0.000340 (0.000232)
Democracy * Aid Per Capita	0.0000659 (0.000478)
Population (ln)	-0.728** (0.0531)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.163* (0.0700)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)	-2.09** (0.256)
Democracy (0-10)	0.140** (0.0238)
Intercept	14.6** (1.19)
N	1389
$F_{(10,1378)}$	71.7

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Table 6.5: The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activity on Future(+1 Year) CIRI Physical Integrity, Conditional to the External (Trade) and Internal Vulnerability of the State: Newey West Standard Errors, 1993-2000

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction term of Human Rights INGO*Democracy*Trade	0.0000534† (0.0000277)
Human Rights INGO events (change)	0.000936 (0.00759)
Trade Percent of GDP	0.000721 (0.00130)
Human Rights INGO events (change) * Democracy	-0.00305† (0.00177)
Human Rights INGO events (change) * Trade	-0.00000431 (0.0000137)
Democracy * Trade	-0.000512 (0.000585)
Population (ln)	-0.540** (0.0726)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.411** (0.0626)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)	-2.37** (0.341)
Democracy (0-10)	0.169** (0.0236)
Intercept	9.77** (1.24)
N	1075
$F_{(10,1064)}$	74.4

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Table 6.6: The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activity on Future(+1 Year) CIRI Physical Integrity, Conditional to the External (Exports) and Internal Vulnerability of the State: Newey West Standard Errors, 1993-2000

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction term of Human Rights INGO*Democracy*Export	0.000120* (0.0000564)
Human Rights INGO events (change)	0.00190 (0.00761)
Exports Percent of GDP	0.00141 (0.00275)
Human Rights INGO events (change) * Democracy	-0.00334† (0.00177)
Human Rights INGO events (change) * Export	-0.0000108 (0.0000286)
Democracy * Export	-0.000808 (0.00117)
Population (ln)	-0.542** (0.0732)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.410** (0.0627)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)	-2.36** (0.339)
Democracy (0-10)	0.168** (0.0236)
Intercept	9.81** (1.25)
N	1075
$F_{(10,1064)}$	76.2

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

These findings support Hypothesis 1(b), as a state's vulnerability to internal and external pressure increases, the impact of *Human Rights INGOs Events (change)* increases. This is largely in line with Keck and Sikkink (1998). When a country is highly democractic, and thus vulnerable to domestic pressure, and highly dependent on foreign aid, trade, or exports, and thus vulnerable to international pressure, human rights INGOs are able to have a greater influence on physical integrity rights.

This result also confirms some of the theoretical arguments for the potential of foreign aid from a human rights perspective (Poe 1990; Apodaca and Stohl 1999; Bhasin and Mascarenhas 2008). As Poe (1990) first pointed out, the foreign aid-human rights link is often mandated by law and there are many rhetorical arguments linking state vulnerability to aid to demands by the international community to change their human rights performance. However, most quantitative studies of the topic fail to find robust evidence for increased aid leading to better human rights performance.[19] Missing from this literature, however, is any discussion of how activists, like human rights INGOs, can be the critical link in the relationship between foreign aid and human rights. By gathering evidence of human rights abuses perpetrated by states that are dependent on foreign aid and presenting this evidence to international organizations, regional human rights bodies, and donor states, the activities of human rights INGOs bring human rights abuses to the attention of the international community, thus making human rights considerations in aid allocations more than just mandated by law.

Moreover, this research shows perhaps an unintended consequence of economic globalization (Russett, Oneal and Davis 1998; Reuveny and Li 2003; Pevehouse 2005). As a country becomes more dependent on trade or exports, its ability to be effectively "shamed" by increases in human rights INGO activity improves. This shaming could come not only from third-party states but from individuals boycotting goods from

[19]See Bhasin and Mascarenhas (2008) for a review of this literature.

the targeted state.

Figure 6.1-6.3 illustrate these findings graphically. The graphs show how the marginal effects of *Human Rights INGOs Events (change)* increases as external vulnerability, proxied as *Aid per Capita* in Figure 6.1, as *Trade Percent of GDP* in Figure 6.2, and as *Exports Percent of GDP* in Figure 6.3, and internal vulnerability, proxied as *Democracy* in all figures, increase (Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006). The y-axis of the graph shows the marginal effect of *Human Rights INGOs Events (change)* on *CIRI Physical Integrity Rights.* The x-axis represents the range of the variable used to capture external vulnerability in the sample. The various lines represent the different values of *Democracy* in the sample; again, this variable goes from 0, indicating a state is not democratic, to 10, indicating a state is a consolidated democracy. The stars above the lines indicates significance at the 95% level of the marginal effects concerning that particular *Democracy* score. In short, as this figure shows, not all human rights INGO activities are equal in their effects; when the activities of human rights INGOs occur in states that are vulnerable to both internal and external pressure, increased activism is better able to produce outcomes consistent with the goals of the organization.

Figure 6.1: Marginal Effects of Human Rights INGO Activity as State Vulnerability (Democracy and Aid Per Capita) Increases



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(b), Table 6.4

Figure 6.2: Marginal Effects of Human Rights INGO Activity as State Vulnerability (Democracy and Trade) Increases



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(b), Table 6.5

Figure 6.3: Marginal Effects of Human Rights INGO Activity as State Vulnerability (Democracy and Exports Percent of GDP) Increases



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(b), Table 6.6

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(c) - The Impact of Human Rights INGOs is Conditional to the Costs to the Domestic Population

Hypothesis 1(c) is also supported by the empirical model; Table 6.7 illustrates these results. As expected, the interaction term between *Human Rights INGOs Events (change)* and *CIRI Association* is positive and statistically significant (β *(Interaction Term of Human Rights INGO Activity and Domestic Costs)* $= 0.006$), (P(β *(Interaction Term of Human Rights INGO Activity and Domestic costs)*) <0.10).

When domestic costs are lower (a 1 or 2 on the *CIRI Association* scale), the effects of *Human Rights INGOs Events (change)* are larger and statistically different than when domestic association is more costly (a 0 on the *CIRI Association* scale). Additionally, a *CIRI Association* score of 2, indicative of the lowest association costs to the domestic population, results in a greater impact on *CIRI Physical Integrity* than when *CIRI Association* is 1, indicating moderate restrictions on a population's freedom to assemble and associate. Thus, in line with the advocacy INGO formal model results, as the costs to the domestic population for supporting advocacy INGOs diminish, advocacy INGOs have a greater impact on non-divisive policy and behavior outcomes.[20] As before, all statistically significant control variables in this model are in the expected direction.

The core insight from this result is in line with arguments given by human rights INGOs trying to do work in Saudi Arabia (Hiel 2007; AI 2008; H.R.F.S. 2008). Saudi Arabia, a state invulnerable to most internal and external pressure for changes in its human rights performance, has powerful restrictions on the citizenry's ability to associate, especially with outside groups. Like the longtime Saudi-focused INGO *Human Rights First Society* points out, the restrictions on association domestically hampers

[20]It is worth noting that the correlation between *CIRI Association* and *CIRI Physical Integrity* is only 0.44, similar to the correlation between *CIRI Physical Integrity* and *Democracy* and less than the raw correlation between *CIRI Physical Integrity* and *GDP Per Capita.*

the efforts of human rights INGOs because these restrictions limit the domestic pressure and legitimacy that human rights INGOs want to have in their activism attempts (H.R.F.S. 2008).

Table 6.7: The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activity on Future (+1 Year) CIRI Physical Integrity, Conditional to the Costs to the Domestic Population: Newey West Standard Errors 1993-2004

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction Term of Human Rights INGO * CIRI Association	0.00624* (0.00252)
CIRI Association	0.450** (0.108)
Human Rights INGO Events (change)	-0.00260 (0.00344)
Population (ln)	-0.587** (0.0433)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.483** (0.0460)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)	-2.01** (0.250)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	0.0449** (0.0128)
Intercept	10.1** (0.781)
N	1668
$F_{(7,1660)}$	149.573

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 1(d) - The Impact of Human Rights INGOs is Conditional to Support from the International Community

Like expected, the statistical results support the statement that international community support for advocacy INGOs increases their impact on policy and behavior outcomes, as postulated in Hypothesis 1(d). As shown in Table 6.8, the impact of *Human Rights INGOs Events (change)* is conditional to the aid the international community gives to civil society (β *(Interaction Term of Human Rights INGO Activity and NGO Aid)* = 0.003), (P(β *(Interaction Term of Human Rights INGO Activity and NGO Aid)*) <0.10). The controls *Population, War,* and *GDP Per Capita (ln)* are also statistically significant and in the expected direction.[21]

Figure 6.4 highlights the marginal effects of *Human Rights INGOs Events (change)* on human rights performance as *ODA Aid to NGOs* goes from its minimum to maximum value in the sample. Worth noting, though the confidence interval increases as *ODA Aid to NGOs* increases, it does stay above zero throughout. In short, therefore, these results support policy measures designed to increase international aid to civil society for its human rights benefit (Clark, Friedman and Hochstetler 1998; Clark, Sprenger and VeneKlasen 2006).

[21] As a robustness check, this model was also run with a variable capturing all ODA aid (in millions) included in the analysis; this variable was not statistically significant and did not change the sign or significance of the key independent variable.

Table 6.8: The Impact of Human Rights INGO Activity on Future (+1 Year) CIRI Physical Integrity, Conditional to ODA NGO Aid: Newey West Standard Errors, 2002-2004

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Interaction Term of Human Rights INGO * ODA NGO Aid	0.00309† (0.00186)
Human Rights INGO Events (change)	0.00425 (0.00981)
ODA NGO Aid	0.0298† (0.0173)
Population (ln)	-0.771** (0.0661)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.213* (0.0938)
War (Interstate or Intrastate)	-1.55** (0.485)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	0.0873** (0.0155)
Intercept	15.0** (1.16)
N	310
$F_{(7,302)}$	56.9

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Figure 6.4: Marginal Effects of Human Rights INGO Activity as ODA Aid Changes



Graph based on results from the empirical model for Hypothesis 1(d), Table 6.8

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 2 - The Impact of Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs on International Support

Hypothesis 2, which outlines how the international community prefers to support advocacy INGOs that share its preference ordering, is supported in the statistical analysis. As shown in Table 6.9, as *Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs* increase, the international community lowers its support of INGOs, as proxied by the *ODA Aid to NGOs* dependent variable (β *(Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs)* = -3.779), (P(β *(Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs)*) <0.05)). Statistical controls are in the expected direction: countries with higher *GDP Per Capita* receive less aid to NGOs but a *Democracy* receives more aid to NGOs. Worth noting, multicollinearity is not a problem in this model, as evidenced by a mean variance inflation factor (VIF) of 1.23 and no individual VIFs of over 2.

Substantively, an increased number of human rights INGOs that do not share the international communities preferences has serious consequences on *ODA Aid to NGOs*. When this number increases from the 25% to 75% percentile, with all other variables at their mean, *ODA Aid to NGOs* is simulated to drop by over 2 million dollars (95% Confidence Interval from a 5.4 million drop to a .08 million drop in funding) (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003). Therefore, unlike predicted by the TAN framework, all growth in civil society is not viewed positively by the international community, especially international donors. A recent case study on Israeli-based domestic NGOs highlights that this dynamic is also occurring internally within countries, with NGOs that operate in line with the wishes of donors receiving the most international or governmental donations (Berkovitch and Gordon 2008)

Table 6.9: The Impact of Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs on International Community Support

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Number of Domestically Oriented Human Rights INGOs (ln)	-3.78* (1.71)
Population (ln)	3.21** (0.603)
GDP per Capita (ln)	-2.63** (0.543)
Polity Score (-10 to 10)	0.409** (0.0988)
Total ODA Aid (in millions)	-0.000579 (0.000417)
Intercept	-28.0** (7.89)
N	145
R^2	0.444
$F_{(5,139)}$	7.89

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1% (two-tailed)

Empirical Model for Hypothesis 3 - The Impact of State Vulnerability on Statements by Human Rights INGOs

Hypothesis 3 receives moderate support in the statistical analyzes. First, as shown in Table 6.10 and 6.11, in invulnerable states, domestically-oriented INGOs are associated with an increase in conflictual statements by human rights INGOs (Table 6.10, Zero-inflated negative binomial, (β *(Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs)* = 0.498), (P(β *(Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs)* <0.10); Table 6.10, Zero-truncated negative binomial, (β *(Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs)* = 0.921), (P(β *(Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs)* <0.10)). This is as expected by Hypothesis 3. However, as shown in Table 6.12 and 6.13, in vulnerable states, no statistically significant relationship appears between domestically-oriented INGOs and conflictual statements by human rights INGOs, although the coefficients are in the expected negative direction. This fails to confirm Hypothesis 3's expectation that domestically-oriented INGOs are associated with a decrease in conflictual statements by human rights INGOs in vulnerable states.

Table 6.10: The Impact of Domestically-Oriented Human Right INGOs on Signals to the International Community - Invulnerable States: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model, Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Country, 1992-2004

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Count of Conflictual Human Rights INGO Signals (+1 Year)	
Number of Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs	0.498† (0.299)
Population (ln)	0.106 (0.178)
GDP per Capita (ln)	-0.0444 (0.194)
Intercept	-1.46 (3.50)
Inflate	
Total Coverage in IDEAS (ln)	-0.317 (0.207)
Human Rights INGO Events	-0.120* (0.0514)
Intercept	3.56* (1.64)
N	313
Log-likelihood	-230.248
$\chi^2_{(3)}$	3.61

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Table 6.11: The Impact of Domestically-Oriented Human Right INGOs on Signals to the International Community - Invulnerable States: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Model, Robust Standard Errors, 1992-2004

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Number of Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs	0.921† (0.495)
Population (ln)	0.127 (0.204)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.268 (0.268)
Intercept	-5.91 (8.36)
N	63
Log-likelihood	-99.8
$\chi^2_{(3)}$	3.47

Significance levels : $\dagger$: 10% $*$: 5% $**$: 1%

Though the results concerning invulnerable states supports Hypothesis 3, future research that can better account for the relationship between domestically-oriented INGOs and statements made in vulnerable states is obviously necessary. As a first attempt, I looked at alternative ways to define vulnerability, including dividing the sample into two by the median number of human rights treaties ratified and using trade as a percentage of GDP median levels as a dividing point along with democracy. The results were substantively and statistically similar, however. In addition, I controlled for actual human rights levels, both in the current year and in the past year, and for the total number of human rights INGOs present. However, the main findings did not change and the additional variables were not statistically significant. In the end, I think a larger data set of specifically conflictual human rights INGO events would help confirm this portion of Hypothesis 3.

To restate, however, robust statistical support is found for the statement, consistent with Hypothesis 3, that advocacy INGOs make more statements concerning

Table 6.12: The Impact of Domestically-Oriented Human Right INGOs on Signals to the International Community - Vulnerable States: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Model, Robust Standard Errors Clustered on Country, 1992-2004

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Count of Conflictual Human Rights INGO Signals (+1 Year)	
Number of Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs	-0.179
	(0.232)
Population (ln)	0.412**
	(0.144)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.844*
	(0.351)
Intercept	-14.1**
	(4.41)
Inflate	
Total Coverage in IDEAS (ln)	-0.593**
	(0.158)
Human Rights INGO Events	-0.136
	(0.0881)
Intercept	7.41**
	(1.48)
N	265
Log-likelihood	-188.221
$\chi^2_{(3)}$	25.1

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

invulnerable states as the number of advocacy INGOs as the number of advocacy INGOs with domestic preferences within the state increases. This finding provides the first widespread empirical support for differences in the signaling strategies or behavior of different types of human rights INGOs.

Table 6.13: The Impact of Domestically-Oriented Human Right INGOs on Signals to the International Community - Vulnerable States: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Model, Robust Standard Errors, 1992-2004

Variable	**Coefficient** (Std. Err.)
Number of Domestically-Oriented Human Rights INGOs	-0.327 (0.324)
Population (ln)	0.576** (0.224)
GDP per Capita (ln)	0.966* (0.477)
Intercept	-17.9* (7.21)
N	57
Log-likelihood	-128.804
$\chi^2_{(3)}$	26.7

Significance levels : † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%

6.4 Implications

Do human rights INGOs matter in world politics? As an important issue area for advocacy INGOs, the results of this chapter give a resounding "yes" to the potential human rights INGOs have on stopping human rights abuses and improving human rights performance within states. However, consistent with the empirical implications of the advocacy INGO model, this chapter also highlights many factors which condition the extent of the impact these INGOs have on policy and behavior.

First, these results highlight the utility of relaxing the assumption that all INGOs are "altruistic" and share the preference ordering of the domestic population of the state who the INGO, by its very mission statement, is working to help. Like the statistical tests confirm, not all human rights INGOs have similar strategies or are supported equally by the international community. Additionally, some of the goals of these heterogeneous types of INGOs are not embraced by the domestic population of the state where the INGO is working and, because of this, not all human rights

INGO advocacy has a great impact on actual human rights performance. Non-divisive issues, such as the protection of physical integrity rights, are the ones where advocacy INGOs have the greatest impact. Perhaps this is why Amnesty International took so long to adopt a focus on economic, social, and cultural rights; it knew that these more divisive issues, such as women's social rights, would be less successful advocacy attempts (Hopgood 2006).

These results also highlight how the international community can aid advocacy, both directly, through the allocation of funds to advocacy INGOs, and indirectly, through increasing pressure on vulnerable states already targeted by advocacy INGOs. Thus, it provides a missing link in the long examined relationship between foreign aid and human rights performance (Poe 1990; Bhasin and Mascarenhas 2008).

However, the results also support a cautionary footnote into the behavior of the international community towards advocacy INGOs: because INGOs can be dependent on financing from international donors, some human rights INGOs can be easily swayed by their donors' preferences, often at the expense of the desires of the domestic population. As Clark, Sprenger and VeneKlasen (2006) points out, this donor dominance in North Africa made many internationally-aligned human rights INGOs jump on the bandwagon for the full eradication of female genital cutting; there was simply little money for any other form of human rights advocacy in the region during the 1990s. The results in this chapter would support ongoing efforts by human rights INGOs to set up permanent locations and long-term relationships with local groups, to work to ease the costs the domestic population faces for interacting with INGOs, and, moreover, to structure their advocacy to reflect the desires of the domestic population.

Chapter 6 Appendix

Appendix 1. List of Human Rights INGOs Included in the Sample

AACC Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
Academy of European Law, Florence
Action - Research for Peace and Children's Rights International
Advisory Council on Religious Rights in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
Africa Fund
Africa Human Rights and Justice Protection Network
Africa Watch
African Association for Human and Peoples' Rights in Development
African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies
African Commission of Health and Human Rights Promoters
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
African European Organization for Development, Education and Reintegration
African Human Rights Committee
African Human Rights Organization
African Human Rights Research Association
African Institute of Human Rights
African Jurists' Association
African Society for Human Rights
All India Women's Conference
Alliance for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
American Association of Jurists
American Council for the Advancement of Human Rights
Americas Watch
Amnesty International
Amnesty International - European Union Association
Andean Commission of Jurists
Anti-Slavery International
Arab Institute for Human Rights
Arab Lawyers' Union
Arab Organization for Human Rights
Arche de la Fraternité - Fondation internationale des droits de l'homme
Arusha School on International Criminal Law and Human Rights
Asia Watch
Asian Centre for Women's Human Rights
Asian Coalition of Human Rights Organizations
Asian Committee for Peace-Solidarity and Human Rights
Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances
Asian Human Rights Commission
Asian Legal Resource Centre
Asian Volunteers' Network
Asia-Pacific Centre for Human Rights and the Prevention of Ethnic Conflict
Asia-Pacific Human Rights NGOs Facilitation Committee
Asociación pro Derechos Humanos
Association de solidarité femmes du Maghreb et de la Communauté européenne
Association des femmes de l'Europe méridionale
Association for the Defence of Human Rights and Democratic Liberties in the Arab World
Association for the Safeguard of the Identity and Rights of Autochthonous Peoples
Association for the Support of Committees Against Repression in Morocco
Association internationale des femmes francophones
Association of Christian Institutes for Social Concern in Asia
Association of Interbalkan Women's Cooperation Societies, Thessaloniki
Association of International Consultants on Human Rights
Association of Latin American Lawyers for the Defense of Human Rights
Association of Reformers in Psychiatry
Bangladesh Peace and Human Rights Journalists Forum
Belarus Republican League for Human Rights
Black Women and Europe Network
B'nai B'rith International
Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies
Canada-Asia Working Group
Canada-US Human Rights Information and Documentation Network
Caribbean Human Rights and Legal Aid Company
Caribbean Human Rights Network
Caribbean Initiative on Equal Rights and Non-Discrimination
Carter-Menil Human Rights Foundation
Central America Human Rights Committee
Central American Association of Families of Missing Detainees
Central American Coordination for Human Rights Organizations
Centre de recherches interdisciplinaires pour la promotion et la protection des droits de l'homme en Afrique Centrale
Centre for Defense of Human Rights, Budapest
Centre for Human Rights and Responsibilities
Centre for Human Rights Education, Accra
Centre for the Defense of Human Rights, Bucharest
Centre for the Defense of Human Rights, Ponta Grossa
Centre for the Defense of Human Rights, Viçosa
Centre for the Europe of the Citizens and the Human Rights
Centre for the Promotion of Human Rights and the Protection of the Environment, Costa Rica
Centre for Training and Research on Human Rights and the Rights of Peoples, University of Padua
Centre international d'étude et de promotion des droits humains et de l'information
Centre of Documentation and Information on Human Rights in East Europe

Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions
Centro de Defesa dos Direitos Humanos / Assessoria e Educação Popular
CHANGE
Christians for Human Rights in Latin America
Church Committee for Human Rights in Asia
Churches' Commission for Migrants in Europe
Churches' Human Rights Programme
Coalition of NGOs Concerned with Impunity for Violators of Human Rights
Comisión de Defensa y Promoción de los Derechos del Pueblo Maya
Comisión Internacional de Derechos Indígenas de Sudamérica
Comisión Jurídica para el Autodesarrollo de los Pueblos Originarios Andinos
Comité international pour la défense des droits de l'homme
Commission for the Defense of Human Rights in Central America
Commission internationale des droits de l'homme contre les genocides et pour la paix
Commission to Investigate Human Rights Violations
Committee for Human Rights in Central Europe - Mutual Aid and Fraternity
Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in the Southern Cone Countries
Committee of European Journalists for Children's Rights
Commonwealth Judicial Human Rights Association
Community Connections
Conference for Basic Human Rights in ASEAN Alliance Countries
Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations
Corporation for Cultural and Social Development
Council for Human Rights in Latin America
Crown Commonwealth League of Rights
Culture et communication
Danish Centre for Human Rights
Direct Information Access Network Association
Droits de l'homme et solidarité
EarthAction International
Education in an Interdependent World
Education International
Egyptian Society of Human Rights Supporters Cultural Club
Equal Rights International
Escarre International Centre for the Ethnic Minorities and Nations
Europa Institute, Utrecht
Europa Pro Vita
European Association for Non-Governmental Organizations Working on Palestine
European Association of Lawyers for Democracy and World Human Rights
European Conference for Human Rights and Self-Determination
European Conference for Human Rights in the Church
European Coordination Committee on Human Rights Documentation
European Council of WIZO Federations
European Democrat Students
European Federation for Research and Information on Sectarianism
European Federation of National Organizations Working with the Homeless
European Federation of Overseas Repatriates and East-European Refugee Organizations
European Forum of Disabled People
European Human Rights
European Human Rights Foundation
European Institute for People's Rights
European Lawyers Union
European League for the Child's Rights
European Magistrates for Democracy and Liberties
European Ombudsman Institute
European Organization for Human Rights in Kurdistan
European Peace Initiative
European Roma Rights Centre
European Society for Human Rights
European Solidarity
European Youth Forum
Europese Coördinatie van de Rechten van Migranten and Vreemdelingen om in Familieverband te Leven
Faculty for Human Rights in El Salvador and Central America
Federal Union of European Nationalities
Fondation internationale pour la promotion des droits de l'homme
Foundation for Health and Human Rights
Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy in China
Foundation for Human Rights in Asia
Foundation for Human Rights, Caracas
Foundation for International Human Rights
Foundation of Human Rights and Peace - Homo Homini
Foundation Second World Centre
Fourth World Youth
Franciscans International Human Rights and Ecology Network
FREE World Government, Earthbank (FWGE)
General Arab Women Federation
Global Democracy Network (GDN)
Gloria - Women Network in Human Rights (Gloria-WNHR)
Hague Appeal for Peace
HCA Legal Centre for Human Rights
Help and Action Coordination Committee
Helsinki Watch
Human Rights Advocates International (HRAI)
Human Rights Africa (HRA)
Human Rights and Peace Centre
Human Rights Caucus
Human Rights Centre, Krakow
Human Rights Centre, St Petersburg
Human Rights Education Centre, Prague
Human Rights Group, Edinburgh (HRG)
Human Rights Info Network (HURINet)
Human Rights International
Human Rights Media Service for Rapid Flow of Human Rights News (HURMES)
Human Rights Movement for the Emancipation of Discriminated Peoples of the World
Human Rights Network
Human Rights Organization for East Africa (HURO-

EA)
Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch Arms Project
Human Rights Watch Children's Rights Project
Human Rights Watch Free Expression Project
Human Rights Watch Prison Project
Human Rights Watch Women's Rights Project
Human Rights without Frontiers International
Human Rights Worldwide (HRW)
Humanitas International Human Rights Committee
Hungarian Centre for Human Rights
IBA Human Rights Institute
Ibero-American Down Syndrome Association
IGU Commission on Gender and Geography
Independent Commission for Population and Quality of Life (ICPQL)
Indian Council of South America
Information and Scientific Documentation Network in Human Rights and Mental Health
Institut de formation en droits de l'homme, Paris
Institut d'études européennes et droit de l'homme "Benedictus a Nursia - René Cassin"
Institut international de droit d'expression et d'inspiration françaises
Institut international des droits de l'homme et des peuples, Genève
Institut kurde de Bruxelles
Institute for Human Rights, San Antonio TX
Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, Malta (IPCS)
Institute for Research and Education on Human Rights (IREHR)
Institute of Human Rights and Peace in Africa (IDHP)
Instituto Internacional de Direitos Humanos, Desenvolvimento e Paz
Inter-African Union of Human Rights
Inter-African Union of Lawyers
Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom
Inter-American Bar Association
Inter-American Institute of Human Rights
Inter-American Legal Services Association
Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America (ICCHRLA)
Interfaith Council for Human Rights (ICHR)
Intergroup on the Family and the Rights of the Child
INTERIGHTS - International Centre for the Legal Protection of Human Rights
International Academy for Peace and Human Rights
International Action for the Rights of the Child (IARC)
International Advisory Committee on Population and Law
International Animation Consortium for Child Rights
International Association "CAUCASUS - Ethnic Relations, Human Rights, Geopolitics" (IACERHRG)
International Association for Democracy in Africa
International Association for the Protection of Private Rights
International Association for the Respect of Autochthonous Peoples' Rights
International Association of Democratic Lawyers
International Association of Human Rights Teachers and Researchers
International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists
International Association of Judges
International Association of Law, Ethics and Science
International Association of Official Human Rights Agencies (IAOHRA)
International Association of Peace Foundations
International Bioethics Committee of UNESCO
International Bureau for Children's Rights
International Bureau of Education
International Campaign for the Defence of Women's Rights in Iran
International Catholic Child Bureau
International Catholic Migration Commission
International Catholic Union for the Study of the Rights of Men according to Christian Principles
International Centre for Teaching Human Rights and Peace, Strasbourg
International Centre for University Human Rights Teaching
International Centre of Studies for the Protection of Human Rights (ICSPHR)
International Commission for the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples
International Commission of Catholic Prison Pastoral Care
International Commission of Jurists
International Committee for a World Conference on Human Rights
International Committee for European Security and Cooperation
International Committee for Human Rights in Taiwan (ICHRT)
International Committee for Human Rights in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula
International Committee for Human Rights in the South of the World (CIDUS)
International Committee for Palestinian Human Rights
International Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in Iran
International Committee for the Defence of Salman Rushdie and his Publishers
International Committee for the Support of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia
International Committee of Lawyers for Democracy and Human Rights in South Korea
International Committee on the Minority Situation and Human Rights in the USSR
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
International Council of AIDS Service Organizations
International Council of Voluntary Agencies
International Council of Women
International Council on Human Rights Policy
International Criminal Law Commission (ICLC)
International Federation for East Timor
International Federation for Peace and Conciliation
International Federation for the Protection of the Rights of Ethnic, Religious, Linguistic and Other Minorities
International Federation Musique Espérance
International Federation of ACAT - Action by Chris-

tians for the Abolition of Torture
International Federation of Free Journalists
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues
International Forum on Human Rights
International Foundation for the Promotion of Human Rights by Audiovisual Means
International Foundation of Human Rights
International Foundation of the Rights of the Child
International Friends of the Chilean Human Rights Commission
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights
International Human Rights Council
International Human Rights Law Association
International Institute for Human Rights and Democracy in Africa
International Institute for Human Rights Studies, Trieste
International Institute for Human Rights, Environment and Development
International Institute for Non-Aligned Studies
International Institute of Children's Nature and their Rights
International Islamic Commission on Human Rights
International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations
International Juridical Organization for Environment and Development
International Lesbian Information Service
International Medical Forum for Human Rights
International Movement - Educators for Peace and Mutual Understanding
International Non-governmental Organizations Committee on Human Rights
International Organization for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq
International Organization for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
International Organization for the Right to Education and Freedom of Education
International Organization for World Peace, Disarmament, Development and Human Rights
International Organization of Journalists
International Parliamentary Group for Human Rights in the Soviet Union
International Progress Organization
International Relations and Human Rights Research Centre, Brussels
International Right to Life Federation
International Society for Health and Human Rights
International Society for Human Rights
International Society for Human Rights and Environmental Law
International Society for Military Law and the Law of War
International Society of African Lawyers
International Solidarity for Human Rights
International Training Centre on Human Rights and Peace Teaching, Geneva
International Transport Workers' Federation
International Union of Socialist Youth
Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM)
Interparliamentary Human Rights Network
Inter-Parliamentary Union
Iranian Human Rights Working Group
Islamic Relief Agency
IUAES Commission on Anthropology, Peace and Human Rights
Japanese Association of International Women's Rights
Joint Organization of Nordic Women's Rights Associations
Judaica Society
Justice International, Commission on Human Rights
Kazem Radjavi International Association for the Defence of Human Rights
Khmer-Laotian-Vietnamese Committee for Human Rights Defence
Latin American Association for Human Rights
Latin American Association of Constitutional Law
Latin American Central of Workers
Latin American Commission for the Rights and Freedoms of the Workers and Peoples
Latin American Congress to Defend the Rights of the Jewish Minority in the Soviet Union
Latin American Council for Peace Research
Latin American Federation of Associations for Relatives of the Detained and Disappeared
Latin American Foundation for Human Rights and Social Development
LAWASIA - Law Association for Asia and the Pacific
Lawyers Emergency Defence Committee
League for Human Rights and Freedoms
Lebanese Association of Human Rights
Letelier-Moffitt Memorial Fund for Human Rights
Liberty for the Muslim World
Lifeforce Foundation
Lutheran Communion in Southern Africa
Maison du Tiers-monde et des droits de l'homme, Ottignies
Media and Entertainment International
Mediterranean Centre for Human Rights
Middle East Christian Committee
Middle East Watch
Missionary Sisters of Our Lady of the Apostles
Moscow Research Centre for Human Rights
Movement for Peace, Human Rights and National Independence
Muslim Home, The
Network of Activists and Researchers on Integrated Human Rights in Africa
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security, New York NY
NGO Committee on Freedom of Religion or Belief, New York NY
NGO Forum on Human and Children's Rights in PALOP Countries
NGO Group for the Convention on the Rights of the Child
No to the Right to Starve
Non-Aligned Students and Youth Organization
Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League to Champion Human Rights
NordNet APC Europa
Organisation internationale pour la diffusion des droits de l'homme
Organization for the Protection of Human Rights in Vietnam of Vietnamese Abroad

Palestine Human Rights Campaign
Pan African Centre for Research on Peace and Conflict Resolution
Pan African Women's Organization
Pan African Youth Movement
Parliamentary Human Rights Foundation
Parliamentary Human Rights Foundation Europe
Peace and Human Rights in Education
Peace and Human Rights Institute, Padua
Peace, Ethics, Animals and Consistent Human Rights
People's Movement for Human Rights Education
Permanent Committee for Defence of Human Rights and Basic Freedoms in the Arab Homeland, Baghdad
Philippine International Center for Human Rights, Brussels
PIOOM Foundation - Interdisciplinary Research Programme on Root Causes of Human Rights Violations
Portuguese Association for the Defence of Human Rights
Poznan Human Rights Centre
Pro Vita International
Quaker Council for European Affairs
Research Center for Religion and Human Rights in Closed Societies
Réseau droits de l'homme - droits des peuples
Réseau femmes africaines et droits humains
Resource Renewal Institute
Romanian Independent Human Rights Society
Romanian Institute for Human Rights
Romanian World Congress
SAARC Federation of University Women
Secretariado Latinoamericano de Derechos Humanos
Slovak Union for Peace and Human Rights
Social Justice Secretariat
Société des juristes francophones du Commonwealth
Society for the Defense of Human Rights in Central Asia
Society for the Protection of East Asians' Human Rights
Soroptimist International of the Americas
South and Meso American Indian Rights Center
South Asia Human Rights Action Programme
South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre
South Asian Forum for the Rights of the Child
Southern African Human Rights Foundation
Special Committee of NGOs on Human Rights, Geneva
Theme School on International Justice and Human Rights
Tibet Justice Center
Trans-Baltic Network
Tropical Biology Association
Tucson Committee for Human Rights in Latin America
Union internationale des organisations des droits de l'homme et des libertés
Union internationale d'étudiantes pour la paix et les droits de la femme
Union internationale pour la paix et les droits de l'homme
Union maghrébine des droits de l'homme
Union of Arab Jurists
Union of Resistance Veterans for a United Europe
Union Syndicale Fédérale of the European and International Public Services
Unione Mondiale per la Pace ed i Diritti Fondamentali dell'Uomo e dei Popoli
United Nations Family Rights Committee for Spouses and Children
United World for International Protection of Children's Rights
Universal Taoist Study League, Esperantist
US Council for Human Rights in the Balkans
Vakgroep Internationale Betrekkingen en Volkenrecht
WAO-Afrique
WE ARE for Human Rights
Wilberforce Council for Human Rights
Women of One World - Action-Forum North-South
Women, Law and Development International
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
Women's World Organization for Rights, Literature and Development
World Association for the School as an Instrument of Peace
World Association of Law Professors
World Coalition for the Abolition of Experimentation on Mankind and Animals
World Commission of Human Rights and International Labour Standards
World Committee on Human Rights for India
World Council for Psychotherapy
World Court of Human Rights
World Federation of Right to Die Societies
World Federation of UNESCO Clubs, Centres and Associations
World Federation of United Nations Associations
World Habeas Corpus
World Interfaith Association
World Kashmir Freedom Movement
World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry
World Spiritual Assembly
World Veterans Federation
Yokohama International Human Rights Centre
Yuri Orlov Committee

Chapter 7

Conclusion

> If you are like me, there could be nothing more rewarding than using your skills and experience to help people...
> Helene D. Gayle, President and CEO of CARE-USA (2007)

7.1 Contributions

With tremendous growth in numbers and attention, INGOs have often been heralded as the solution to global poverty and repression. However, INGOs are non-state actors in a state-centric world. Some contend that their potential impact is limited because of their lack of formal powers (Waltz 1979). In addition, with little oversight and lots of secrecy, the organizations have also been heavily critiqued for their private motivations (Ben Attia 2004; Bob 2005; Sundstrom 2006).

With these competing viewpoints in mind, this dissertation has examined the conditional impact INGOs have on human rights and development outcomes. It has acknowledged that there are organizations who are motivated to help a domestic population reach its own goals and it has acknowledged that some organizations have motivations either for private rents, in the case of service INGOs, or, in the case of advocacy INGOs, for policies and behaviors that are biased away from the desires

of the domestic population they are supposedly trying to help. From this basic insight, the first theoretical framework for understanding the conditional impact of both advocacy and service INGOs was developed.

This dissertation has also acknowledged that INGOs need the support of other actors, both at the domestic and international levels, in order to affect policy and behavior outcomes. I've argued that the underlying motivations of INGOs are private knowledge and complicates the decisions to support INGOs. In an effort to limit the uncertainty in both the international and domestic communities, INGOs often send signals of their underlying motivations. Attention to these signals allows the international relations literature on INGOs to build on and add to the extant literature on American non-profits and for-profit firms (Gugerty N.d.; Gugerty and Prakash 2009).

My approach provides many insights into when and where INGOs can impact advocacy and service outcome. Specifically, this theoretical approach implies that:

1. The characteristics of the issue conditions the impact service and advocacy INGOs have on policy and behavior outcomes. The impact of service INGOs are conditional to the domestic community's utility for the outcome in question. When the domestic community sees more utility in the service INGO's activities, the impact is greater. For advocacy INGOs, issues where the preferences of the international and domestic communities are similar are the ones most affected by advocacy INGOs.

2. Characteristics of the regime and state where the INGO is working also matters. In countries where corruption is not widespread, rent-seeking service INGOs are not allowed to flourish, leading to greater overall effects by service INGOs. Additionally, in states where citizens are able to easily interact with service

INGOs, such as in urbanized states, the impact of service INGOs is greater. In addition, the impact of advocacy INGOs is implied to be conditional to the vulnerability of the state. Additionally, advocacy INGOs have a greater impact in states where the domestic population is better able to associate in groups.

3. The impact of both service and advocacy INGOs is conditional on support from the international community. As their support increases, the impact of both service and advocacy INGOs increases. However, for advocacy INGOs specifically, this framework also implies that the international community does not reward the growth of domestically-aligned advocacy INGOs. It would prefer to support only advocacy INGOs that are internationally-aligned. This insight is counter to both the dominant framework and to frequent international rhetoric which stresses the need of domestic civil society and INGO growth.

4. Signals by INGOs can also condition their impact and can greatly increase the likelihood they receive support from both the international and domestic audiences. These signals only occur in equilibrium by non rent-seeking INGOs. Specifically, service INGOs who belong to voluntary accountability programs, argued to be a common signal by these organizations, have a greater impact on policy and behavior outcomes. However, as expected, there is some self-selection that occurs by service INGOs when deciding to send this signal. When this is accounted for, however, the impact of service INGOs who belong to voluntary accountability programs is still substantial.

5. Conversely, signaling by advocacy INGOs is really a signaling dilemma; though it affects the decision of support by one community, it has no impact on both communities simultaneously. Advocacy INGOs that are domestically-aligned and those that are internationally-biased both make signals in the various equilibria of the model. These findings highlight differences in the signaling behavior

of advocacy and service INGOs and provide useful intuition for future studies. Additionally, the theoretical framework on advocacy INGOs implies that signals made by advocacy INGOs are complicated by the vulnerability of the state.

Hypotheses based on these arguments were supported in statistical tests using new data on the activities of over 1000 of these organizations in all areas of the world during the 1990s and 2000s. Specifically, I focused on the conditional effects of development INGOs on development outcomes to test the implications concerning service INGOs (Chapter 5) and the impact of human rights INGOs on human rights outcomes to test the implications concerning advocacy INGOs (Chapter 6). I also utilized new data on aid given INGOs by the international community.

7.2 Extending the Theoretical Framework & Implications for International Relations

What does this project imply for INGO scholarship, specifically, and international relations, more generally? I contend that this project, in providing more nuanced account of the behaviors and motivations of INGOs, adds much to existing scholarship on INGOs and, in doing so, can be applicable to larger debates in the discipline. It also provides many avenues of future research.

First, this project brings service INGOs into the international relations literature on INGOs. As mentioned, previously, the focus has been predominately on advocacy INGOs. Little discussion has been on service INGOs, such as development or health service organizations. Addressing these organizations and the differences between advocacy and service INGOs adds both to our understanding of INGOs overall and provides a missing link in scholarship on development and developing countries. Extensions to this approach could look at organizations that might be classified as

"hybrids," providing both advocacy and service provisions, and how their motivations could be colored by both rent-seeking and internationally-oriented biases. Many health INGOs could possibly be classified as both advocacy and service organizations.

Second, this project highlights how the preferences of the international and domestic communities matters both for their support of INGOs and, moreover, for the overall impact of INGOs on policy and behavior outcomes. Much of the previous scholarship on INGOs has assumed this support to be almost automatic. This is especially informative for scholarship on advocacy INGOs and their connections to other advocacy actors. Given that the international and domestic communities often have very divergent preferences with respect to advocated outcomes, the theoretical framework outlined in this dissertation would suggest that advocacy networks might not be as cohesive or inclusive as previously thought. Extending this logic to behavior within the advocacy network could be informative for scholarship on why certain issues are avoided by norm entrepreneurs (Carpenter 2007).[1]

This dissertation also addresses how the impact of signals sent by advocacy INGOs is colored by the divergent preferences of the international and domestic communities. The impact of the signals sent by advocacy INGOs is determined, in part, by the preferences of the audiences of these signals. This result from the model is consistent with larger debates on how audience preferences matter in international relations (Weeks 2008; Chapman 2009). Extensions to the theoretical framework could examine what happens when there are further chasms within the international or domestic communities with respect to the advocated policy or behavior outcomes. For example, what happens if the international community is divided in its preferences concerning the advocacy efforts? Further research that focuses on these divisions could provide a more-nuanced account of how overall foreign policy concerns could condition the impact of advocacy INGOs.

[1]This logic is extended to a focus on networks in the recent Brewington, Davis and Murdie (2009).

Further, I show that non-state actors do matter, even on issues as critical to a state as development and the regime's use of repression to its own citizenry. This is largely counter to state-centric realism and would provide evidence consistent with liberalism or constructivism. As an extension, it would be useful to examine how further differences in the capabilities and structures of individual INGOs matters for their impact. Do INGOs with longer histories better impact world politics? Does their base location matter? Though these questions are beyond the scope of this dissertation, a focus on how the motivations of INGOs could be impacted by additional structural factors would provide another important extension to this project.

Finally, though it has been repeatedly stressed, this project accounts for the varying motivations of INGOs. Not all INGOs are altruistic and motivated solely to help the domestic population in its struggle with a recalcitrant state. In this way, this research counters the constructivist literature on advocacy networks. Some INGOs want private rents and some are internationally-biased. Acknowledging this adds to our overall theory of INGOs and their impact. It also adds to larger discussions of how biases and private motivations color many international interactions (Kydd 2003; Svensson 2007; Beardsley 2008). It must be stressed, however, that, even through a framework that relaxes the altruism assumption, the impact of these organizations is still substantial. As this dissertation shows, seeing the INGO community as comprised only by altruistic actors is not necessary to see their impact on policy and behavior outcomes.

7.3 Policy Recommendations

What does this study imply for INGOs themselves and the actors that they interact with? Overall, this project shows that INGOs often do exactly what they contend to: they often have great effects on development and human rights outcomes. How-

ever, these results highlight many policy and practical implications that could greatly increase the impact of these organizations in service provision and advocacy. More recommendations are provided in Chapter 5, for service INGOs, and Chapter 6, for advocacy INGOs.

First, a more nuanced scholarly understanding of the varying motivations of INGOs can actually help the achievements of the overall INGO community through drawing attention to the situations and issues where non-altruistic INGOs are more likely to flock. For example, as the empirical results point out, the impact of service INGOs is less in states with greater levels of corruption. This, as was addressed in Chapters 3 and 5, is due to the large percentage of rent-seeking INGOs in these states. As such, efforts to redirect aid to INGOs instead of directly at a government in a corrupt state might not matter as much as previously thought. Instead, these efforts would only matter if donating states and aid organizations are only redirecting aid to non rent-seeking INGOs. As the previous chapters made clear, a reliance on the signals sent by INGOs would be useful here in gaging which organizations are rent-seekers.

Additionally, this study implies that the most successful issues for both service and advocacy INGOs are the ones that are greatly valued by the domestic community *and* the international community. This insight offers a lot of food-for-thought for INGOs. Some of these organizations, especially advocacy INGOs who are internationally-biased, want to focus only on issues which are attracting the most international support. However, focusing on these issues can make overall INGO efforts appear to have little actual results. Instead, as the theoretical framework implied, when INGOs focus either on non-divisive issues, in the case of advocacy INGOs, or on issues that are of greater importance for the domestic community, in the case of service INGOs, their effects are greater. Structuring INGO programs to reflect these preferences is necessary for increasing the impact of INGOs in world politics.

Finally, this dissertation highlights the utility of INGO self-regulation. For service INGOs, voluntary accountability programs can curb rent-seekers. For advocacy INGOs, signaling through joint issue statements can make underlying motivations clear. These efforts should be commended. In continuing to address problems as a collective group, overall civil society is strengthened.

In short, INGOs hold much promise for world politics. Their observed effects are not dependent on assuming they are all altruistic. Instead, through acknowledging that INGOs differ in their motivations, a richer understanding of when and where INGOs matter in world politics can be developed. As shown, the conditional impact of these organizations in development and human rights are substantial. As such, the overall growth of the INGO sector bodes well for those interested in eradicating poverty and improving human well-being.

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