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Stephen J. Blackwood

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The Meters of Boethius  
Rhythmic Therapy in the *Consolation of Philosophy*

By

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Doctor of Philosophy

Graduate Division of Religion  
Theological Studies

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Date

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MA, Dalhousie University, 1999

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An abstract of  
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the  
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Graduate Division of Religion  
Theological Studies  
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## Abstract

### The Meters of Boethius Rhythmic Therapy in the *Consolation of Philosophy*

By Stephen J. Blackwood

This dissertation examines the role of poetic meter in Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*. Composed of alternating poetry and prose, the *Consolation* contains more poetic meters than any other surviving ancient text. However, despite the work's immense popularity and exquisitely crafted structure, there has never been a systematic study of these meters. This dissertation argues that the poetic rhythms are essential to the programmatic therapy, or consolation, the text aims to achieve.

The Introduction sets the dissertation's analysis in the context of aurality, both by evoking ancient literary culture, in which books were typically read aloud, and by pointing to the *Consolation's* many references to its own sound, and particularly to the sound of its poems. Chapter 1 contains a close reading of Book 1, and attends especially to the rhythms of its seven poems, and to the interplay between these rhythms and the prisoner's physical and psychological state. Chapter 2 traces the obvious metric repetitions of the text, and posits a therapeutic purpose to each. The first part of Chapter 3 contains an extensive formal analysis, which discovers several levels of rhythmic repetition that make up an intricate system that comprehends every line of the *Consolation's* poetry. The second part of the chapter situates this intricate system in relation to recollection and the role of *memoria* in the formation of the soul, and concludes with an analogical reflection on the kinds of repetition that make up the *Consolation's* intricate rhythmic system. Chapter 4, by means of a close reading of Book 5, sets this acoustic system in relation to the *Consolation's* most comprehensive theological and psychological principles: the distinction and connection of the four modes of cognition; the divine vision that includes all things; and the human activity of prayer.

My analysis indicates that the poetic rhythms are a primary aspect of the prisoner's therapy, administered by the healing *Philosophia*. Because the text is portrayed as an after the fact encounter, the repetition of the prisoner's narration is parallel with the reader's re-reading or re-hearing, and thus the systematic rhythmic therapy has the quality of a repeated liturgical act.

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*for my mother*

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## THE AURAL TRADITION

No path to the soul is as open to learning as the sense of hearing.<sup>1</sup>

### MUSIC FOR THE MIND

Music, we are likely to agree, is an art most fully realized in performance. The genius of a composer, and the technical brilliance and innate sensitivity of an artist, together enable the highest development of the art. Regardless of our musical tastes, we are sure to believe that from our most treasured performances of our favorite works we have learned immeasurably more listening to music than we ever could from any book about music. And yet, in his *De institutione musica*, a work that would become the West's music textbook for nearly fifteen hundred years, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius [480-524/5 C. E.], seems to claim just the opposite: "How much nobler, then, is the study of music as a rational discipline (*in cognitione rationis*) than as composition and performance (*in opere efficiendi atque actu*)."<sup>2</sup> What's more, Boethius' ontological

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<sup>1</sup> "Nulla enim magis ad animum disciplinis via quam auribus," (Trans. mine). Boethius, *De institutione musica*, in *De institutione arithmetica libri duo. De institutione musica libri quinque. Accedit Geometria quae fertur Boetii*, ed. Gottfried Friedlein (Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva, 1966), I, 1, 181.1-2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 34, 224.6-7. This and all subsequent English translations of the *De institutione musica* are those of Bower (Boethius, *Fundamentals of Music*, trans. and ed. Calvin M. Bower (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989)), while references are to Friedlein's edition (see previous note), from which I have also taken all Latin quotations. References are given in the form: Book, Chapter, Page.Line, which should enable readers to consult either Friedlein's edition or Bower's translation.

devaluing of practice extends to the other arts as well.<sup>3</sup> The heavy-going, mathematical and theoretical character of the *De institutione musica* indeed makes it a forbidding text, quite unlike any experience we might associate with music. And when this text is viewed alongside Boethius' works on logic and on the other liberal disciplines, most of which are equally unwelcoming to the uninitiated reader (choose at random any page of *De topicis differentiis*, for example) and equally theoretical in their aims, one develops a view of Boethius as a highly analytical, thoroughly dispassionate thinker, whose writings are abstract in purpose and unfriendly in form.

And then there is the *Consolation of Philosophy*. A work of extraordinary beauty and broadly accessible, it celebrates the practice of the arts, and not simply their intellectual mastery. Written from a prison cell as its author awaited an unjust, tortuous execution, the exquisite elements of its literary form—drama, song, poetry, rhetoric, etc.—are the medicines of the epiphanic *Philosophia*, who comes to bring the prisoner consolation. The practice of these arts, these literary modes, amounts to a profoundly compelling and almost irresistibly seductive pedagogy that is intrinsic to the purpose of the work.<sup>4</sup> These literary aspects of the text engage the prisoner in many ways: they soften and comfort and encourage him, and also persuade, mock, and rebuke him. Although this multi-faceted consolation is designed as an ascent, in which the prisoner passes from gentler to bitterer medicines, and is lifted to higher and more abstract forms of discourse, the literary medicines of song, rhythm, rhetoric, etc., are

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<sup>3</sup> “Now one should bear in mind that every art and also every discipline considers reason inherently more honorable than a skill which is practiced by the hand and the labor of the artisan.” I, 34, 223.28-224.1.

<sup>4</sup> “. . . a pedagogy so deliberate and so complex that it can hardly be missed by any attentive exegete,” Mark D. Jordan, “*Philosophica discipula*: Learning to Teach Philosophy in a University,” in *Learning Institutionalized: Teaching in the Medieval University*, ed. John Van Engen (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 111.

not only present right through to the end of the text but are, furthermore, never presented as ontologically problematic, that is, as modes the prisoner would do better to subordinate or overcome. The practice of music, furthermore, has an especially prominent place in the *Consolation*, as Philosophy's songs, and the unequivocal importance she assigns to these, make abundantly clear. In short, the difference between Boethius' early works and the *Consolation of Philosophy*, in terms of literary genre, formal complexity, and, simply speaking—beauty, is difficult for us to bridge.<sup>5</sup> But neither this difference, nor Boethius' own devaluing of practice, have prevented commentators from engaging the *Consolation* as an intricate literary wonder.<sup>6</sup>

#### TEXTS FOR THE EAR

Nonetheless, though it is generally agreed that especially the poetry, but also the rhetoric and drama of the *Consolation* are remarkable elements of the text's composition, as a rule, remarkably little attention has been paid to how these actually

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<sup>5</sup> “Nothing in these earlier works really prepares us for the surprise engendered by a reading of the *Consolation* and a consideration of its complex literary form; and, while it is true that in some of the earlier works, especially in the first commentary on the *Isagoge* and the theological tractates, Boethius projects an authorial persona, there can be no comparison between the conventional personae of teacher and exponent in these works, and the figures of Philosophy and the prisoner in the *Consolation*. That book, read against the background of Boethius' other writings, is as startling and unpredictable as his terrible end.” Gerard J. P. O'Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 14.

<sup>6</sup> To give only a few examples: Pierre Courcelle, *La Consolation de Philosophie dans la Tradition Littéraire. Antécédents et Postérité de Boèce* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1967); Thomas F. Curley III, “How to Read the *Consolation of Philosophy*,” *Interpretation: a Journal of Political Philosophy* 14, 2 & 3 (1986): 211-63 and “The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature,” *The American Journal of Philology* 108, 2 (1987): 343-67; Michael Fournier, “Boethius' *Consolation* and Philosophy's Homer,” Unpublished; Seth Lerer, *Boethius and Dialogue: Literary Method in The Consolation of Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); O'Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius*; and Elaine Scarry, “The External Referent: Cosmic Order. The Well-Rounded Sphere: Cognition and Metaphysical Structure in Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*,” in *Resisting Representation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Others, though they believe the literary aspects of the text are important, believe they create an unresolved tension with the philosophical argument. See John Marenbon, *Boethius, Great Medieval Thinkers* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Joel C. Relihan, *The Prisoner's Philosophy* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007).

work.<sup>7</sup> There is, for example, the ubiquitous view that poetry is somehow important to the text's consolatory purpose—indeed, the figure of Philosophy insists this is so—but this ubiquitous view is normally offered as self-evident. In some oblique manner the poetry and other literary aspects of the text must surely help the prisoner along—but the real work of consolation is done by “the argument.” The poetry may anticipate or confirm the argument, or perhaps “represent” its progress, or sometimes even help to “advance” the argument, but its role is finally subordinated to whatever “the argument” might be. The emphasis on the argument at the expense of all else is perhaps a function of the largely cerebral approach most modern scholars have brought to the text. Thus, even when the drama or poetry do receive attention, they are cursorily associated with the prisoner's *sensus* or *imaginatio*, and this inherently rational justification of their presence is typically considered self-sufficient. The situation is therefore not that the literary aspects of the text have received no attention—they are, after all, quite unavoidable—but rather that the question of their underlying mechanisms, that is, of how they actually work, is left largely unexamined.

The cerebral emphasis of modern scholarship on the *Consolation* would surely come as a surprise to most of its readers, present or past. The broad appeal of the text—perhaps the most copied work of secular literature for over a thousand years—is due precisely to the power of its poetry, rhetoric, and drama—that is, the ways these actually engage and affect the reader. During the Middle Ages, for example, the poetry was often the primary object of interest in the text. Evidence of early manuscripts

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<sup>7</sup> The major exceptions are: O'Daly (*The Poetry of Boethius*), who argues that the poetry is essential to the work's affective aim as well as integrated within its overall structure; and Curley (“How to Read the *Consolation of Philosophy*” and “The *Consolation of Philosophy* as a Work of Literature”), whose intuitions, though largely undeveloped, are perhaps more in line with my own.

shows that most of the meters were neumed—that is, set to music—for a period of several hundred years.<sup>8</sup> During this period, not only was it the poetry that motivated interest in, and affection for, the text, but it was the poetry as a performed, sung, acoustic reality rather than as a silent and cerebral one.

Paradoxically, the one aspect of the *Consolation* that has received absolutely no attention from modern readers is the actual sound of its words. This neglect reveals an inverse readerly assumption as the one with which we approach the *De institutione musica*: music, we imagine, is something heard, rather than quietly contemplated; a book, by contrast, is something quietly contemplated, rather than heard aloud. However, though we modern readers are accustomed to reading silently, silent reading did not become common in Europe until the fourteenth century.<sup>9</sup> Before then, books were usually read aloud, either alone by one person to him or herself or—more typically—to a group of one or several listeners.<sup>10</sup> The encounter with a book was,

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<sup>8</sup> “Although the melodies could not have been composed by Boethius himself, the neumes may presuppose a longstanding assumption—reaching back even to the author—that the meters would be performed as true songs when the *De consolatione Philosophiae* was read aloud. In the Middle Ages the songs seem to have been sung in strophes, like hymns: each song has one melody, which is repeated exactly from the beginning until the end of the song . . . Both the Latin *prosimetrum* and the Old French *cantefable* merit comparison with those verse epics, romances, and other narrative compositions in their respective literary traditions in which intensely emotional or lyrical moments elicited musical settings, whereas the remainder of the works seems not to have had accompanied music.” Jan Ziolkowski, “The Prosimetrum in the Classical Tradition,” in *Prosimetrum: crosscultural perspectives on narrative in prose and verse*, ed. Joseph Harris and Karl Reichl, *The Prosimetrum in the Classical Tradition* (Suffolk and Rochester: D.S. Brewer, 1997), 52-3. See also Christopher Page, “The Boethian Metrum ‘Bella bis quinis’: a new song from Saxon Canterbury,” in *Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence*, ed. Margaret Gibson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981); and Jan Ziolkowski, *Nota bene: reading classics and writing melodies in the early Middle Ages*, *Publications of the Journal of Medieval Latin*, 7 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007).

<sup>9</sup> Although silent reading did not become common until very late in the Middle Ages, the evolution of textual transcription, which made silent reading possible, began in some areas as early as the seventh century. See Paul Henry Saenger, *Space Between Words: the Origins of Silent Reading* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997). The several references in this section to Saenger’s book rightly demonstrate my reliance on his work.

<sup>10</sup> Augustine’s anecdote (*Confessions*, 6, 3) of Ambrose reading silently offers an exception that proves the rule: that someone with the literary and rhetorical gifts of Augustine was amazed at Ambrose’s ability illustrates just how difficult and rare silent reading was (for reasons explained below). For a competing interpretation of Augustine’s anecdote, and for a very different assessment of the frequency of silent

therefore, primarily an acoustic, rather than a visual, activity, and principally a matter of hearing and listening rather than what we call “reading.”<sup>11</sup> Our silent reading of ancient and medieval texts negates their acoustic manifestation and thus denies what was once their primary medium of existence.<sup>12</sup> As Michael von Albrecht writes:

Since silent reading was an exception in antiquity, texts must be interpreted as an acoustic process. The reader faced the text not only as an observer, but also as a listener; he was led by the ear into a process of communication and was influenced immediately. The book thus had another function than it has today: it was not identical with the text, but only a prop for its realisation in performance. We should not overlook the fact that we act quite similarly with music today: only the initiated few will read the score silently to themselves,

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reading in antiquity, see Mary J. Carruthers, *The Book of Memory: a Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*, Second Edition, Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature, 70 (Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), esp. 212-216, 428, n. 64, and 429, n. 69. I have not, however, been able to locate any place where Carruthers directly confronts, let alone refutes, the argument and body of evidence that Saenger presents. In any case, the core theses of each are not fundamentally opposed. For more, see Chapter 3.

<sup>11</sup> Much work has been done, following the work of Milman Parry and Albert Lord (see Albert Bates Lord, *The Singer of Tales*, ed. Stephen A. Mitchell and Gregory Nagy, Second Edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000)) on *orality* and *the oral tradition*. The etymological sense of *oral* and its derivatives nonetheless describes only half of any voiced interaction, that is, the side of the speaker or singer, and I find this etymological one-sidedness reflected in the emphasis of most research. But there were always far more listeners in the audience than there were singers, rhetors, rhapsodes, poets, orators, etc., and I wish to consider this other side: *aurality* and *the aural tradition*. Though I have yet to encounter any uses of these terms, the interplay of aural and oral is, of course, nearly always present, if most often assumed. See Walter J. Ong, “Orality, Literacy, and Medieval Textualization,” *New Literary History* 16, 1 (1984): 1-12; Paul Zumthor and Marilyn C. Engelhardt (trans.), “The Text and the Voice,” *New Literary History* 16, 1 (1984): 67-92; Jan Ziolkowski, “Oral-Formulaic Tradition and the Composition of Latin Poetry,” in *New Directions in Oral Theory*, ed. Mark C. Amodio (Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2005); and Brian Stock, *The implications of literacy: written language and models of interpretation in the eleventh and twelfth centuries* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983).

<sup>12</sup> Though even silent reading normally proceeds by a some sort of silent, mental sound, and thus contains a palpable trace of the voice. Notice the difference between the following, reading silently:

◆□□◌◆	words
□■	on
◌	a
□◌◌◌	page

To me, the second has a silent sound, while the first does not.

and even they will not consider this a satisfactory substitute for a performance.<sup>13</sup>

If we extend Albrecht's analogy, we might say that our relation to ancient and medieval texts is metaphorically comparable to finding the words of a song but lacking its music, or discovering a score in a notation we cannot read. It is not an exaggeration to say that silent reading has made modern readers deaf to the sound of all ancient and medieval texts. The dominance of silent reading in our time, and the manner in which it inevitably prejudices our encounter with books of any kind, are major obstacles to our appreciation and comprehension of this vast history of literature. Of course, because we can understand the words—which is what we think reading is, fundamentally—we're not predisposed to notice that we're missing anything.

Even if we read these texts aloud, however, we do not immediately become like the listeners of the past. For it is not simply that we have lost the sound, but that the sound was the primary thing—and around it developed whole disciplines of learning,

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<sup>13</sup> Michael von Albrecht and Gareth L. Schmeling, *A History of Roman Literature: from Livius Andronicus to Boethius: with Special Regard to its Influence on World Literature*, 2 vols., Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava, Supplementum 165 (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1997), 1742. Although Albrecht evidently agrees with Saenger that the texts of antiquity were experienced primarily as aural phenomena, he argues that the difficulty of decoding texts of Latin literature composed before the second century C.E. is often overstated, given that inscriptions and texts from this period are typically separated by dots or spaces (see pp. 1741-2). Saenger, however, seems to have the better researched, and more physiologically accurate, position: "Although in the classical age, and very occasionally until the end of antiquity, Roman books and inscriptions were written with separation by medial points or interpuncts placed at midlevel in the line, these points were not usually accompanied by quantities of space any greater than that ordinarily placed between adjacent letters within a word, and never of the dimensions customary in medieval manuscripts. In the second century A.D., words in inscriptions were frequently separated by an ivy-leaf-like decorative design, forming a special, space-filling intraword character known as a *hedera*, which more closely resembled a letter of the alphabet than a point. While from a grammatical point of view texts separated by either space, interpuncts, or *hederae* may all be separated, neurophysiologically, the effect of these three modes of separation on the reading process is very different. Points, and especially *hederae*, are not susceptible to rapid visual detection, while space of sufficient quantity is readily perceived. Experiments demonstrate that the placing of symbols within the spaces between words, while preserving separation in a strictly grammatical sense, greatly reduces the neurophysiological advantage of word separation and produces ocular behavior resembling that associated with unseparated text," Saenger, *Space Between Words*, 26, with extensive references.

systems of pedagogy, and countless communal practices both civic and religious. To write was to offer something to be heard within this incredibly rich aural context—a context, furthermore, that was not static but alive and on the move.

#### SCRIPTURA CONTINUA AND READING ALOUD

What a book is today is quite simply not the same kind of thing. It is a member of a genre related to that of its predecessor, but it is so distant a descendent that we should not assume an easy familiarity. To begin with, the format of text that we now associate with books and with the reading of them, despite its apparent universality and immutability, is very different from the formats of antiquity and the Middle Ages. In addition to the different means used to capture and store characters (wax tablets, parchment, etc.),<sup>14</sup> the text is also transcribed differently. In his *Space Between Words: The Origins of Silent Reading*, Paul Saenger offers a thorough account of the evolution of graphic conventions, along with their corresponding cognitive and physiological demands, that lead to the book as we know it today. The basic distinction in transcribed text is between texts that include space between words, as well as other punctuation to aid the visual comprehension of the text, and those that do not. Text written without punctuation and without spaces between words requires more cognitive effort to be decoded than does punctuated, word-spaced text, and precipitates the physiological reaction of reading aloud. Consider, for example, the difference between the following two passages:

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<sup>14</sup> The consequences of this physical medium, its storage, and means of access, deserve much more attention than I give here. See Jocelyn Penny Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind: Cognitive Studies of Memory and Literacy in Classical Antiquity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997).

NOWWHENSHESAWTHEMUSESOFPOETRYSTANDINGBYM  
 YBEDHELPINGMETOFINDWORDSFORMYGRIEFSHEWASDIS  
 TURBEDFORAMOMENTANDTHENCRIEDOUTWITHFIERCEL  
 YBLAZINGEYESWHOLETTHESETHEATRICALTARTSINWITH  
 THISSICKMANNOTONLYHAVETHEYNOCURESFORHISPAIN  
 BUTWITHTHEIRSWEETPOISONTHEYMAKEITWORSEGETO  
 UTYOUSIRENSBEGUILINGMENSTRAIGHTOTHEIRDESTRUC  
 TIONLEAVEHIMTOMYMUSESTOCAREFORANDRESTORETO  
 HEALTH

Now when she saw the Muses of poetry standing by my bed, helping me to find words for my grief, she was disturbed for a moment, and then cried out with fiercely blazing eyes: “Who let these theatrical tarts in with this sick man? Not only have they no cures for his pain, but with their sweet poison they make it worse . . . Get out, you Sirens, beguiling men straight to their destruction! Leave him to my Muses to care for and restore to health” (1, 1, 7-8, 11,<sup>15</sup> trans. Tester).<sup>16</sup>

The first of these passages is written in *scriptura continua*, that is, without punctuation or word separation, as were nearly all texts of ancient Greece and Rome.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> All references to the *De consolatione philosophiae* are to Moreschini’s critical edition (Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica*, ed. Claudio Moreschini, Bibliotheca Teubneriana (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2005)), and are given in the form: Book, Poem (in Roman numerals) or Prose (in Arabic numerals), Line (poetry) or Sentence (prose). For example, 1, 1, 7-8 refers to the seventh and eighth sentences of the first prose of the first book, whereas 3, IX, 2 refers to the second line of the ninth poem of the third book.

<sup>16</sup> Here, as frequently elsewhere, I quote Tester’s 1912 translation (Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. S. J. Tester, in *The Theological Tractates; The Consolation of Philosophy*, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press and W. Heinemann, 1973)). However, unless otherwise noted, the English translations of the *Consolation* are those of Joel C. Relihan (Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. Joel C. Relihan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001)).

<sup>17</sup> “The uninterrupted writing of ancient *scriptura continua* was possible only in the context of a writing system that had a complete set of signs for the unambiguous transcription of pronounced speech. This occurred for the first time in Indo-European languages when the Greeks adapted the Phoenician alphabet by adding symbols for vowels. The Greco-Latin alphabetical scripts, which employed vowels with varying degrees of modification, were used for the transcription of the old forms of the Romance, Germanic, Slavic, and Hindu tongues, all members of the Indo-European language group, in which words were polysyllabic and inflected. For an oral reading of these Indo-European languages, the reader’s immediate identification of words was not essential, but a reasonably swift identification and parsing of syllables was fundamental. Vowels as necessary and sufficient codes for sounds permitted the reader to identify syllables swiftly within rows of uninterrupted letters. Before the introduction of vowels to the Phoenician alphabet, all the ancient languages of the Mediterranean world—syllabic or alphabetical, Semitic or Indo-European—were written with word separation by either space, points, or both in conjunction. After the introduction of vowels, word separation was no longer necessary to eliminate an unacceptable level of ambiguity. Throughout the antique Mediterranean world, the adoption of vowels

In the case of Greek and Latin texts, the visual ambiguity of *scriptura continua* was further increased by “grammatical structures relying on parataxis and inflection that lacked and even purposely avoided conventional word order and failed to group grammatically related words consistently.”<sup>18</sup> The result of this manner of transcription was that a reader had to initially prepare for reading by *praelectio*, or pre-reading: “for the ancients, *lectio*, the synthetic combination of letters to form syllables and syllables to form words, of necessity preceded *narratio*, that is, the comprehension of a text.”<sup>19</sup>

But why—even if *scriptura continua* can be deciphered with effort and oralization—why not separate the written words anyway, so the text could be easily read off the page without additional cognitive and physiological effort? The question betrays the prejudices of a modern reader, insofar as it assumes a text should facilitate quick and quiet reading. To confront the fact that texts were written in *scriptura continua*, therefore, is to confront the book as an essentially different kind of entity than it is in our time. Saenger explains:

Stated summarily, the ancient world did not possess the desire, characteristic of the modern age, to make reading easier and swifter because the advantages that modern readers perceive as accruing from ease of reading were seldom viewed as advantages by the ancients. These include the effective retrieval of information in reference consultation, the ability to read with minimum difficulty a great many technical, logical, and scientific texts, and the greater diffusion of literacy throughout all social strata of the population.<sup>20</sup>

By contrast:

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and of *scriptura continua* went hand in hand. The ancient writings of Mesopotamia, Phoenicia, and Israel did not employ vowels, so separation between words was retained.” Saenger, *Space Between Words*, 9.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 9.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

We know that the reading habits of the ancient world, which were profoundly oral and rhetorical by physiological necessity as well as by taste, were focused on a limited and intensely scrutinized canon of literature. Because those who read relished the mellifluous metrical and accentual patterns of pronounced text and were not interested in the swift intrusive consultation of books, the absence of interword space in Greek and Latin was not perceived to be an impediment to effective reading, as it would be to the modern reader, who strives to read swiftly. Moreover, oralization, which the ancients savored aesthetically, provided mnemonic compensation (through enhanced short-term aural recall) for the difficulty in gaining access to the meaning of unseparated text. Long-term memory of texts frequently read aloud also compensated for the inherent graphic and grammatical ambiguities of the languages of late antiquity.<sup>21</sup>

By transcribing the *scriptura continua* of ancient texts into our punctuated, word separated text, we have made it possible to read these works silently, which is indeed what we do nearly all of the time. But in the process of this transcription we lose the sound, and with it everything else in the text that makes sense only when it is heard.<sup>22</sup> Every author writes for an expected audience, medium, and context. The conditions of a work's reception are therefore inevitably in the author's mind at the time of

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 11. The passage continues: "Finally, the notion that the greater portion of the population should be autonomous and self-motivated readers was entirely foreign to the elitist literate mentality of the ancient world. For the literate, the reaction to the difficulties of lexical access arising from *scriptura continua* did not spark the desire to make script easier to decipher, but resulted instead in the delegation of much of the labor of reading and writing to skilled slaves, who acted as professional readers and scribes," Saenger, *Space Between Words*, 11. On the mellifluous sounds of rhythm and accent, see also Elaine Fantham, *Roman Literary Culture: From Cicero to Apuleius* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996): "The normal practice of listening to, rather than looking at, texts helps to explain the extraordinary importance attached by Roman critics to the rhythmic and periodic qualities of a composition . . .," 42.

<sup>22</sup> "In this sense 'medieval texts' present us with nothing but an empty form that is without a doubt profoundly distorted from what was, in another sensorimotor context, the whole potential of the spoken word." "What I have before my eyes, printed or (in other situations) handwritten, is only a scrap of the past, immobilized in a space that is reduced to the page or the book." Zumthor and Engelhardt (trans.), "The Text and the Voice," 70, 71.

composition.<sup>23</sup> If a text will be apprehended by the ears alone, then it will be written in order to be heard. This does not mean, of course, that a text must be a simple one; on the contrary, listeners in an aural culture are highly sophisticated and are likely to judge a text on the grounds of its acoustic aesthetics. But as with any aspect of a text, the aural characteristics cannot be abstracted from the meaning of the words or the overall purpose of the work. Like narrative, structure, imagery, and rhetorical technique, sound contributes to a text's living identity and purpose. And just as sound cannot be abstracted from the other aspects and considered on its own, it also cannot be removed without fundamentally altering the identity of the text. It might be objected that texts can survive this transcription, as quite evidently they do. But in what form do they survive? Imagine, for instance, the national anthem read quickly and silently in the manner of a financial report. What survives is quite simply not the same thing. When we read silently, let alone also in translation, we lose those aspects of the text that were designed for its heard existence—to be activated by the voice, and to have power in sound alone.

What this means is that even a text like Boethius' *De institutione musica*, of which the stated purpose is intellectual mastery, not the actual hearing, of music, had somehow to accommodate itself to being read aloud, that is, to being followed and comprehended by hearing. And therefore, once we begin to look and listen more closely to this abstract and at first literarily unimaginative work, should we be

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<sup>23</sup> Children's bedtime stories, for example, are written, almost without exception, to be read aloud. Much of their literary character is contained in cadence, rhythm, and rhyme that lose their effects when read silently. The purpose of an epitaph, whether read silently or aloud, is inherently bound to the location of its physical inscription. A textbook of advanced algebra has a very precise purpose, though it would be absurd to say its content was dependent on the physical location of its reading. A telephone book is not meant to be read like any of these, but is nonetheless strictly organized so that the tiniest fractions of its content can be conveniently accessed by any reader. In every case, the scenario in which a text will be read is a highly determinative element in its composition.

surprised if the author—despite his claims—in fact betrays an interest in the effects of actual sound?

#### THE *DE INSTITUTIONE MUSICA* AND THE SENSE OF HEARING

Boethius' music textbook was conceived as the first of four texts on the higher liberal arts, a curriculum he called the *quadrivium*, which included astronomy, music, geometry, and arithmetic.<sup>24</sup> The quadrivium was meant to rest upon the introductory arts of the trivium, which included grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic. While any actual program of study would inevitably have been interdisciplinary, Boethius' quadrivium had a hierarchical design: mathematics, the study of number; music, the relation between numbers; geometry, number in spatial extension; and astronomy, spatially extended number in motion.<sup>25</sup> The aim of these arts was not the practice of the art for its own sake but to be a pathway to contemplation, leading the mind from "knowledge offered by the senses to the more certain things of intellect."<sup>26</sup> The *De institutione musica* is therefore one step, or moment, in a neoplatonic intellectual ascent. But as we shall see below, this abstract, contemplative text of musical theory is introduced by invoking the embodied practice of the musical art.

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<sup>24</sup> It is not known whether Boethius completed all four treatises, but only the texts on music and arithmetic are with us today. These, along with his logical and rhetorical treatises, were highly influential during the Middle Ages, and played a pivotal role in the transmission of ancient learning.

<sup>25</sup> See Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica*, in *Boethian Number Theory: A Translation of the De Institutione Arithmetica*, ed. and trans. Michael Masi (Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi B. V., 1983), 1, 1, p. 72. I have used "spatial extension" and "spatial extension in motion" for Masi's "stable magnitude" and "magnitude in motion" and Boethius' "*magnitudo immobilis*" and "*magnitudo mobilis*" (See Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica*, in *De institutione arithmetica libri duo. De institutione musica libri quinque. Accedit Geometria quae fertur Boetii*, ed. Gottfried Friedlein (Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva, 1966), 1, 1, 9.4-5.

<sup>26</sup> Boethius, *De institutione arithmetica* (trans. Masi), 1, 1, p. 73.

The title of the introductory chapter of the *De institutione musica*<sup>27</sup> introduces the maxim for which the introduction offers a veritable flurry of evidence: “*Music forms a part of us through nature, and can ennoble or debase character*” (1, 1, 178.22-3). Citing the authority of Plato, and clearly following his *Timaeus*, Boethius sets out the two sides of a musical aesthetic, in which cosmos and soul are united in sound:

What Plato rightfully said can be likewise understood: the soul of the universe was joined together according to musical concord. For when we hear what is properly and harmoniously united in sound in conjunction with that which is harmoniously coupled and joined together within us and are attracted to it, then we recognize that we ourselves are put together in its likeness. (1, 1, 180.3-9)

This is the ideal purpose of music—the soul is moved by sounds that embody cosmic harmony. But the innate connection of soul and cosmos by music is not limited to music that is good for the soul; the soul is so designed that it is involuntarily affected by what it hears, such that music gives rise to “radical transformations in character” whether for better or for worse. This irresistible power of music leads Boethius to conclude that the sense of hearing, more than any other sense, offers direct access to the soul:

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<sup>27</sup> The *De institutione musica*, like several of Boethius’ works, is a translation of one or several Greek texts. Boethius’ translations, however, are not aimed at literal precision but at the transmission of the text from a Greek audience to a Roman one. Modifications, omissions, additions, and other editions are undertaken that serve the aim of better rendering the text for his contemporaries. As Bower writes in his introduction, “Boethius’s translations are more than literal translations of works from one language to another; they represent a scholar’s efforts to make a foreign text his own,” Bower, introduction to *Fundamentals of Music*, by Boethius, xxv. Furthermore, “the specific Greek background of *Fundamentals of Music*, unlike those of *Fundamentals of Arithmetic* and the logical works, is not easily determined.” According to Bower, only book 5 can be positively identified, with Ptolemy’s *Harmonica*; while the remaining extant books might be based on the lost *Eisagoge musica* of Nicomachus. In any case, the text of the *De institutione musica* is certainly incomplete, as it breaks off in the middle of the fifth book, which contains several additional chapter titles. Moreover, the fifth book was probably not the last (see Bower, xxxviii). The upshot of all this is that that the text we have, whatever its sources were, and however they were modified, is a genuinely Boethian work. I offer this clarification because I ascribe the views in this text to Boethius, whether as translator, author, or editor.

Indeed no path to the mind (*animus*) is as open for instruction as the sense of hearing. Thus, when rhythms and modes reach an intellect through the ears, they doubtless affect (*afficiant*) and reshape (*conformant*) the mind according to their particular character (*aequo modo*). (1, 1, 181.1-4)

Boethius is not alone in believing that the sense of hearing has a privileged access to the soul. He may indeed have been thinking of Aristotle, who claimed:

the objects of no other sense . . . have any resemblance to moral qualities . . . On the other hand, even in mere melodies there is an imitation of character, for the musical modes differ essentially from one another, and those who hear them are differently affected by each. The same principles apply to rhythms . . .<sup>28</sup>

Though the *De institutione musica* will be principally concerned with the arithmetic of harmony, Boethius consistently asserts that the other aspects of musical sound—melody and rhythm—also have power over the soul. In fact, it is a story of rhythmic sound that sits at the apex of the introduction:

It is common knowledge that song has many times calmed rages, and that it has often worked great wonders on the affections of bodies or minds. Who does not know that Pythagoras, by performing a spondee, restored a drunk adolescent of Taormina incited by the sound of the Phrygian mode to a calmer and more composed state? One night, when a whore was closeted in the house of a rival, this frenzied youth wanted to set fire to the house. Pythagoras, being a night owl, was contemplating the courses of the heavens (as was his custom) when he learned that this youth, incited by the sound of the Phrygian mode, would not desist from his action in response to the many warnings of his friends; he ordered that the mode be changed, thereby tempering the disposition of the frenzied youth to a state of absolute calm.<sup>29</sup> (1, 1, 184.7-185.9)

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<sup>28</sup> Aristotle, *Politica*, trans. Benjamin Jowett, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 1340a29-b10.

<sup>29</sup> Boethius gives not one but two accounts of this anecdote, the second from Cicero's *De consiliis suis*, which is no longer extant.

It is thus the power of real, heard-by-the-ear sounds that give rise to the text's abstract analysis of numerical ratio. The ultimate priority of grasping music's principles over performing it in practice is therefore less straightforward than the book's largely theoretical analysis might suggest. It is silent reason that must prove itself, not the music, sound, or rhythm that is heard by the ears.

The importance of the role of reason emerges only after a closer look at sensation. Boethius begins the introduction by acknowledging that "perception through all the senses is so spontaneously and naturally present in certain living creatures that an animal without them cannot be conceived."<sup>30</sup> While the senses are both primary and necessary to our experience, however, they are not sufficiently accurate judges of the data they present. For this, reason is required:

If, for example, a circle is drawn by hand, the eye may judge it to be a true circle, but reason knows that it is by no means what it appears to be. This occurs because the sense is concerned with matter, and it grasps species in those things that are in flux and imperfect and that are not delimited and refined to an exact measurement, just like matter itself is. (5, 2, 352.14-21)

Boethius proceeds to give ever more complex examples to make the point: hearing can judge a difference in pitch, but cannot be trusted to precisely perceive the distance between tones, just as sight can easily perceive the difference in length of two lines but will struggle to measure "some precise degree larger or smaller" (5, 2, 353.20-21).

Faced with such a multitude of tasks, the sense is helpless; all its judgment, hasty and superficial, falls short of weakness and perfection. For this reason the entire judgment is not to be granted to the sense of hearing; rather, reason must also play a role. Reason should guide

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<sup>30</sup> Boethius, *Fundamentals of Music*, 1.

and moderate the erring sense, inasmuch as the sense—tottering and failing—should be supported, as it were, by a walking stick. (5, 2, 354.6-12.)

Boethius' insistence on a certain hierarchy in matters of measurement and degree should therefore not mislead us into devaluing the role of sense. It is, rather, in the context of the primary, necessary, immediate power of the senses—in this case, of the sense of hearing—that reason “must also play a role.” What begins in sense is perfected by reason, so that the two faculties turn out to be complementary:

We propose, concerning these matters, that we should not grant all judgment to the senses—although the whole origin of this discipline is taken from the sense of hearing, for if nothing were heard, no argument whatever concerning pitches should exist. Yet the sense of hearing holds the origin in a particular way, and, as it were, serves as an exhortation; the ultimate perfection and the faculty of recognition consists of reason, which, holding itself to fixed rules, does not falter by any error. (1, 9, 195.16-23)

And so, while sense and reason can disagree, they are not meant to be in a tension simply, but rather synthesized. This synthesis of the faculties is the ultimate purpose of the study of music, and it is to this enticing possibility that Boethius has been building throughout the introduction. After giving a barrage of examples that illustrate music's ability to shape character, calm the soul, etc., he rhetorically asks “But to what purpose is all this?” He answers: “So that there can be no doubt that the order of our soul and body seems to be related somehow through those same ratios by which subsequent argument will demonstrate sets of pitches, suitable for melody, are joined together and united” (1, 1, 186.8-13). The whole introduction leads to the conclusion that the body and soul are involuntarily related by the sounds and ratios of music; that it is “beyond doubt that music is so naturally united with us that we cannot be free from it even if we

so desired” (1, 1, 187.9-10). And therefore, because we cannot escape music’s hold upon us, “the power of the intellect ought to be summoned, so that this art, innate through nature, may also be mastered, comprehended through knowledge” (1, 1, 187.10-12).

We cannot escape music’s control, but we can grasp it through knowledge, and thereby harness its power. If the soul and body are subject to the music they hear, then mastering music would come with the power to relate body and soul, as the great Pythagoras could do. Making use of a musical metaphor, Boethius concludes that this is the aim of the harmonic scholar (*armonicus*)—to blend (*miscere*) sense and reason into a concord).<sup>31</sup> The purpose of the study of music is no less than the integration, and the harmonization, of the human personality.

Even this cursory glance at Boethius’ *De institutione musica* reveals the text has a far more nuanced relation to aural experience than its abstract focus might initially suggest. The power of heard music is taken as axiomatic, rhythm is ascribed a therapeutic influence, the sense of hearing has a unique access to the soul, and the purpose of the *armonicus* is to harmonize the human person. Hearing is thus not only the sensitive capacity that allows us to be affected, for good or for ill, by sound, but also a faculty that itself needs to be harmonized. Accordingly, the prioritization of knowing over practice does not imply a degradation of heard music, but rather an intention to master its power. The phenomenal fact of hearing is the foundation of the enterprise, from beginning to end.

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<sup>31</sup> 5, 3, 355.10-12. Bower notes that “Boethius’s general rendering of Ptolemy’s ‘goal of harmonics’ is accurate . . . However, this particular musical metaphor—the blending of sense and reason into a concord—is not found in Ptolemy,” Bower, in Boethius, *Fundamentals of Music*, 166, n. 15.

SOUND, RHYTHM, AND SONG: HEARING THE *CONSOLATION OF PHILOSOPHY*

The case for investigating the aural character of the *Consolation of Philosophy* does not, however, rest simply on the fact that all texts of its period were aural phenomena, or on the surprising interest Boethius reveals in sound and hearing in the *De institutione musica*—though either of these on its own is compelling enough to ask why readers have not done so before now.<sup>32</sup> But in addition to these, the strongest reason to consider the *Consolation's* auality is, quite simply, because the text contains so many explicit references to its own sound. To begin with, the *Consolation* is a dramatic dialogue, in which the characters' speech and song comprise most of the narrative. Furthermore, the past tense narration that is used to recount this dialogue requires constant use of the past tenses of verbs that describe an oral exchange: *inquit*, *dixit*, *ait*, *inquam*, *cantabas*, *delatravi*, *dixerat*, *cecinisset*, *modulata est*, etc. These words are not only technically necessary (that is, to describe a past act of speaking or singing), but they also give clear signposts to the listener, marking the transition of speakers while tracing the development of the narrative. In this vein, it is pertinent that the opening phrases of the second to fifth book are typical of transitions in oral performance, phrases that alert the listener to a change while maintaining continuity within the narrative.<sup>33</sup> It is striking that every one of these also contains a reference to the sound of the preceding words, whether spoken or sung.

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<sup>32</sup> It is remarkable to note that, although none have considered the *Consolation* as a specifically aural phenomenon, nonetheless some of the more sensitive commentators seem to be aware of their own aural engagement with the text, occasionally referring to the 'hearer.' See Curley, "The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature," 358; and O'Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius*, 34.

<sup>33</sup> See Mark W. Edwards, *Sound, Sense, and Rhythm: Listening to Greek and Latin Poetry* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 53-58.

## Book 2

Post haec paulisper obticuit atque ubi attentionem meam modesta taciturnitate collegit sic exorsa est: (2, 1, 1)<sup>34</sup>

Then she was silent for a little, and having gained my attention by her quiet modesty, she began thus:<sup>35</sup>

## Book 3

Iam cantum illa finiverat, cum me audiendi avidum stupentemque arrectis adhuc auribus carminis mulcedo defixerat. (3, 1, 1)

She had just finished singing, while the sweetness of her song held me with still attentive ears, struck silent, and eager to listen further.

## Book 4

Haec cum Philosophia dignitate vultus et oris gravitate servata leniter suaviterque cecinisset, tum ego, nondum penitus insiti maeroris oblitus, intentionem dicere adhuc aliquid parantis abrui et: (4, 1, 1)

When Philosophy had finished softly and sweetly singing these verses, while preserving the dignity of her face and visage, then I, not yet having completely forgotten my inward grief, interrupted her as she was preparing to say something more, and said:

## Book 5

Dixerat orationisque cursum ad alia quaedam tractanda atque expedienda vertebat. Tum ego: (5, 1, 1-2)

She finished speaking, and was going to turn the course of her speech to deal with and explain some other questions; then I said:<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> All Latin quotations are taken from Moreschini's critical edition (Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica*, ed. Claudio Moreschini, Bibliotheca Teubneriana (Munich: K.G. Saur, 2005)).

<sup>35</sup> Trans. Tester, as are the other three book beginnings quoted below.

<sup>36</sup> The beginning of the first book evidently does not require any such transition. It begins immediately with the metered poetry of the prisoner. Curiously, in the subsequent prose, the prisoner describes this poem with the words: "*Haec dum mecum tacitus ipse reputarem querimoniamque lacrimabilem stili officio signarem . . .* (While I was thinking these thoughts to myself in silence, and set my pen to record this tearful complaint . . .)" (1, 1, 1, trans. Tester). If by *tacitus* the prisoner means to indicate that the previous poem was composed silently, then it contrasts with the oral dialogue that makes up the remainder of the text. Saenger notes, however, that *tacitus* and *in silentio* can be ambiguous, "since these terms in the Vulgate Bible, the Rule of Saint Benedict, and in medieval monastic customaries connoted vocal activities, including chanting, which although relatively quiet were not entirely mental." Saenger,

So, while there is inevitably an aural aspect to every ancient or early medieval text, in the *Consolation* Boethius takes pains to redouble, emphasize, and in general leave no room for doubt that the narrative it contains is an acoustic one meant to be heard. And when a text is written to be heard, the constraints and possibilities of a listening audience are necessarily inherent to its facture. In the case of the *Consolation*, its many references to its own sound beckon us to attend to it as an acoustic reality, a thing to be heard by the ears. But what of its aural existence still survives, some fifteen hundred years later?

By far the most prominent acoustic feature of the *Consolation* is its regular alternation between poetry and prose, that is, its *prosimetric* form.<sup>37</sup> To any listener, as well as to any reader, the shifts between prose and verse are unavoidable—syntax and rhythm immediately change to meet the basic requirements of each genre. But between syntax and rhythm, rhythm is the more acoustically outstanding: syntax has to do with the order of words, and is highly variable; poetic rhythm, by contrast, is a consistent repetition of the same beat, over and over, throughout the whole length of a poem. The listener of the *Consolation* thus hears a regular alternation between sounds whose rhythms are relatively free, and sounds whose rhythms are strictly repeated. This is not to say there is no rhythm in the prose sections; indeed, the *Consolation* exhibits a “prodigious mastery of prose rhythm.”<sup>38</sup> But prose rhythms are highly

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*Space Between Words*, 299, n. 43, with references. On the prisoner’s description of his composition, see p. 208 and n. 246, below.

<sup>37</sup> For a brief history of the genre of *prosimetrum* in the ancient and medieval West, see Ziolkowski, “The Prosimetrum in the Classical Tradition.” For the complex issues surrounding definition of the genre, see especially pp. 55-6, as well as Steven Weitzman’s “The ‘Orientalization’ of Prosimetrum: Prosimetrum in Biblical and Ancient Near Eastern Literature” in the same volume (pp. 225-48).

<sup>38</sup> Albrecht and Schmelting, *A History of Roman Literature*, 1720.

variable, and when they are repeated, this repetition is not at strict, clearly discernible temporal intervals, as prose rhythms are employed only according to the rhetorical purposes of the author, and not according to the formal rules of prosody.<sup>39</sup> The rhythm of a poem,<sup>40</sup> by contrast, is repeated according to an invariable temporal pattern.<sup>41</sup> The frequent alternation between the relatively free rhythms of prose and the highly regular ones of poetry, is the most aurally striking feature of the *Consolation*.

The poems and poetic rhythms of the *Consolation* seem still more auricularly prominent when we look more closely at their sheer number: thirty-nine poems, and eighteen different meters.<sup>42</sup> No surviving work from Boethius' period, or from any time before then in western history, contains so many poetic meters.<sup>43</sup> The aural significance

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<sup>39</sup> I do not mean to underestimate the rhythms of prose, but simply to describe the undeniable generic difference between the *Consolation's* prose and poetry. For a formalist linguistic approach to the difference between prose and verse, see Kristin Hanson and Paul Kiparsky, "The Nature of Verse and its Consequences for the Mixed Form," in *Prosimetrum: crosscultural perspectives on narrative in prose and verse*, ed. Joseph Harris and Karl Reichl (Suffolk and Rochester: D.S. Brewer, 1997). "If the essential principle of literary language is an extraordinary recurrence of linguistic equivalences, then all literature is rhythmic in the most general sense of the term. VERSE is distinguished by the regularity of its recurrences, and METER is distinguished from other verse forms in that its recurrences are defined by prominence. Meter is thus defined by the requirement of a regular recurrence of a linguistic equivalence defined by prominence, and represents the literary form which is rhythmic in the most restrictive sense of the term," 23.

<sup>40</sup> Though I may seem to use *rhythm* and *meter* interchangeably, they are not reciprocally interchangeable: every meter is a rhythm, but not every rhythm is a meter (see also n. 39, above). For a more expansive consideration of the difference, see Chapter 3.

<sup>41</sup> Of course poems frequently contain variations of rhythm, but this is normally variation within an overall pattern and within a consistent temporal frame, a point to which I return in Chapters 2 and 3.

<sup>42</sup> The precise number of meters is, to a certain extent at least, a matter for interpretation, as the number depends on whether certain variations are considered different metric forms or are grouped under one meter. Jan Ziolkowski, for example, puts the number at twenty-nine. See Ziolkowski, "The Prosimetrum in the Classical Tradition," 52. How I count and group the meters is described in Chapters Two and Three and visually represented by accompanying figures.

<sup>43</sup> At least not that I have so far been able to discover. Many, if not most, ancient prosimetric works have been lost, however, including most of Varro's enormous oeuvre (see *ibid.*, 50). Nonetheless, the variation of meter was not limited to prosimetry. Boethius is also clearly influenced by the *procreatio metrorum* of earlier poets, Horace in particular, who wrote works entirely in poetry. On the tradition of the *procreatio metrorum*, see L. Pepe, "La Metrica di Boezio," *Giornale Italiano di Filologia* 7 (1954): 227-43. For traces of Horace in Boethius, see Joachim Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae*, 2., erweiterte Auflage, Texte und Kommentare, 9 (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006). On the complex unity and design of Horace's *Odes*, see Matthew S. Santirocco, *Unity and Design in Horace's Odes* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press, 1986). It seems likely that the design of Horace's *Odes*, as

of the poems is still further emphasized by the fact that several of them are specifically recorded as sung by Philosophy and, as a whole, they are presented as her music or song. They contain both rhythm and melody—essential characteristics, according to Boethius, of musical sound.<sup>44</sup> Finally, while their number, the prodigious variation of their meters, and their musical nature, implicitly grant the *Consolation's* poems a mysteriously elevated stature, *Philosophia* explicitly attributes them healing power. An imposing figure, she arrives on the scene of the prisoner's despair, and her very first words proclaim the either noxious or restorative effects of poetry:<sup>45</sup>

But when she saw the Muses of poetry standing by my bed, helping me to find words for my grief, she was disturbed for a moment, and then cried out with fiercely blazing eyes: "Who let these theatrical tarts in with this sick man? Not only have they no cures for his pain, but with their sweet poison they make it worse . . . Get out, you Sirens, beguiling men straight to their destruction! Leave him to *my* Muses (*meis Musis*) to care for and restore to health." (I, 1,7-8,11, trans. Tester)

*Philosophia* thus dramatically enacts the Boethian (Platonic) view of music, in which music can shape character for better or worse. Boethius casts Philosophy specifically as a Pythagoras figure, an *armonicus* who can restore the harmony of body and soul, a poet whose poetry is ascribed healing power. The poetic meters are therefore not only the most auricularly striking element of the *Consolation*; they are also an unmistakable instrument for the consolation Philosophy promises to effect. *Philosophia* appears, as it

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described by Santirocco, may have served as a partial inspiration for the intricate metric structure of the *Consolation* (a structure I elucidate in Chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation).

<sup>44</sup> Whether Boethius had particular melodies in mind is something we will probably never know. On the neuming of his meters in the Middle Ages, however, see Page, "The Boethian Metrum 'Bella bis quinis': a new song from Saxon Canterbury"; Ziolkowski, *Nota bene*; and Ziolkowski, "The Prosimetrum in the Classical Tradition," esp. 52-3.

<sup>45</sup> As Curley writes: "In the first book Dame Philosophy removed the 'pharmakon' of verse from Boethius' hands much as a mother would take a potentially dangerous object from her infant child. Philosophy then proceeds to make use of that same 'pharmakon' as one means among many in the course of Boethius' therapy." Curley, "How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy," 250.

were, as Pythagoras with his spondee, to restore to health, by music, a man whom music has made ill.

To summarize: the *Consolation* is a text that emerges from a predominantly aural literary culture, and it is narrated in an explicitly aural form; it contains, moreover, an auricularly striking, prodigious variation of poetic rhythm; these poems, finally, are ascribed therapeutic power. By presenting the *Consolation's* poetry as a therapeutic program in a text of an explicitly aural character, Boethius offers us a rare point of access into the vibrant auditory existence of ancient and medieval texts.

#### POETRY AS THEOLOGICAL PRAXIS

But must we not still reconcile the Boethius of the abstract treatises, who prefers intellectual mastery to embodied practice, with the one who goes to such lengths to make his masterpiece an acoustic reality, one that actually exists for the ears? To begin with, we ought not to conflate an ontological hierarchy, in which contemplative unity is higher than embodied practice, with a wholesale rejection of bodily mediation of any kind. It is easy to forget that the importance, and systemization, of mediation is in fact directly correlated with the extent to which this hierarchy is articulated: if the human is inescapably embodied—then the only route to salvation is an embodied one. The questions of hierarchy and mediation are therefore intrinsically, if dynamically, related. How the *Consolation* speaks to these matters is one of the motivating queries of this dissertation.

What we can say for certain, even at the outset, is that the *Consolation's* literary form is essential to the consolation it aims to achieve. Because this consolation is a

spiritual ascent, a recovery of self in relation to God, this embodied pedagogy serves an ultimately theological purpose. Literary form takes on theurgical power. “Consolation is merged in the conversion to God” so that the work becomes “α προτρεπτικός εἰς θεόν rather than a *consolation*.”<sup>46</sup> This is nowhere more visible than in the alternation of poetry and prose. As Albrecht writes:

The alternation of prose and poetry is typical of the *satura Menippea*, which from Varro to Martianus Capella and Fulgentius served as a vehicle for popular treatment of moral problems. [But Boethius'] . . . personality and destiny, his artistic sense and severe taste transformed that genre past recognition. The *Consolatio* is the beginning of a new serious literary genre in which poetry and prose alternate; it lies closer to Dante’s *Vita Nuova* than to Varro.<sup>47</sup>

The *Consolation* became a primary text in the history of theology. To explore its auralty is therefore to rethink how such texts worked, how their purposes were conveyed and achieved. It is to consider how acoustic form was employed to shape and reform the personality and thus to hear how sound, by accomplishing the deep-down purpose of all works of theology and moral science, became the means of divine return.

## PURPOSE, METHOD, AND STRUCTURE OF THIS INVESTIGATION

### *Purpose*

How do we go about entering the *Consolation*’s aural existence? It is one thing to hear Philosophy claim a medicinal purpose for her poetry, but how do we trace the effects of her measured song? We are so far removed from the aural culture of

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<sup>46</sup> Albrecht and Schmelting, *A History of Roman Literature*, 1715.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 1713.

Boethius' time that we cannot hope to know how much of the text has forever been lost. Reading aloud does not make us suddenly like the listeners of the past, for we have not been habituated, educated or otherwise prepared for this kind of listening. We lack the experience this aesthetic form assumed. An able listener, like a good reader, has not only mastered particular skills but also gained familiarity with a wide range of texts by means of that skill, a process that, in turn, further develops those abilities.

But these formidable obstacles do not make the task impossible. To begin with, we can read the *Consolation* in its original language. Boethius' Latin can be confidently understood. Second, while the poetic meters are widely varied, it is not generally difficult to ascertain their rhythmic form. Though Latin is an accented language, classical Latin poetry adopted Greek quantitative meters; in other words, the poetic rhythm is established not by word accent, but by long and short syllables. And in the *Consolation*, the length of syllables, at least of the vast majority of them, is easily identified. We can, therefore, confidently understand Boethius' Latin, and confidently follow his rhythmic lines.

Naturally readers who are intimate with a large number of Latin texts are more akin to the listeners of Boethius' time, and are likely to hear a great deal that reminds them of these other texts. In his line-by-line commentary on the *Consolation*, the German classicist, Joachim Gruber, lists hundreds of possible illusions to Latin and Greek literature. This intertextuality not only illustrates Boethius' brilliant intellect and wondrous memory, but also situates his *Consolation* at the culmination of more than ten centuries of aural literature. As Gerard O'Daly writes, "Virgil, Ovid, and Senecan tragedy, no less than Plato and the Neoplatonists, Cicero's philosophical writings, and

Epictetus, form the imaginative and intellectual world of the *Consolation*.”<sup>48</sup> Identifying and deciphering these illusions has greatly enriched our appreciation of the work; however, despite the monumental efforts of Gruber, O’Daly, and others, it remains an inherently endless task. Because Boethius is rather judicious with direct quotations and generally silent about his sources, most of these associations are difficult to prove conclusively—as though he wished to direct his listeners within his text rather than outside of it.

A more direct approach to the *Consolation*’s auralty is to limit ourselves to the aural features intrinsic to the text. Rather than deferring to external, intertextual possibilities, we can entrust ourselves to the text as a singular phenomenon that offers itself as its own hermeneutical tool, and its own pedagogical method.<sup>49</sup> This is not meant to discount the importance of reading and listening to many texts in order to hear their reverberations in the *Consolation*—but rather to insist that learning to read or listen begins with repeated exposure to the inner consistency of a particular text. The *Consolation*’s intrinsic aural features, therefore, offer the best place to begin consideration of its aural character.

This thesis is devoted to the most prominent of the *Consolation*’s intrinsic aural features—that is, the variation of poetic meter throughout the work’s thirty-nine poems. In this introduction I have argued, principally on the basis of the aural

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<sup>48</sup> O’Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius*, 237.

<sup>49</sup> On the literary form, or intrinsic pedagogy, of philosophic genre, see Mark D. Jordan, “A Preface to the Study of Philosophic Genres,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 14, 4 (1981): 199-211; the entire 2007 summer issue of *Poetics Today*, which Jordan’s 1981 article inspired (the issue is introduced in Jonathan Lavery, “Philosophical Genres and Literary Forms: A Mildly Polemical Introduction,” *Poetics Today*, Summer (2007): 171-89); and Mark D. Jordan, “Ancient Philosophic Protreptic and the Problem of Persuasive Genres,” *Rhetorica* 4, 4 (1986): 309-33. In a similar spirit, but directed at literature (not “philosophy”), see Michael D. Hurley, “How Philosophers Trivialize Art: *Bleak House*, *Oedipus Rex*, ‘Leda and the Swan,’” *Philosophy and Literature* 33, 1 (2009): 107-25.

implications of *scriptura continua*, and of Boethius' comments in his *De institutione musica*, that we might consider taking his *Philosophia* at her word when she claims that her poems have, or are intended to have, a therapeutic power. The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, is to understand the *Consolation's* rhythms, and rhythmic variations, as medicaments of Philosophy.

### *Method*

If the poetic rhythms are an essential means of the consolation the text is designed to achieve, then the therapeutic intentions of the text cannot be wholly appreciated without consideration of the rhythmic patterns of its poetry. This does not mean that the text does not offer any comfort apart from its rhythms—indeed, the variety of, and demand for, translations, indicates how powerful the book can be even when every trace of its rhythms is lost. The question is not, therefore, whether it is possible to read the book without paying attention to these rhythms, but rather, what is lost when we do? Or, to put it positively, what happens when we read this book listening to the rhythms of its song?

Simply put, the method of this investigation to listen to these rhythms in the context of their poems and in relation to each other and to the narrative as a whole.<sup>50</sup> The obvious objection to this approach is that we cannot listen to a text if we do not know how the words were meant to sound when they were written some fifteen hundred years ago. We cannot simply read the text aloud and imagine we hear the text

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<sup>50</sup> In this sense, my investigation is limited to what O'Daly calls the *Consolation's* "immanent poetics." O'Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius*, 32.

like the listeners of Boethius' time.<sup>51</sup> But our distance from the listeners of Boethius' day does not mean that all is lost, or that we have no access whatsoever to the text's acoustic existence. As I have already suggested, the poetic rhythms provide us with a reliable place to begin. In addition to rhythm, we can also reliably determine accentual stress. And though we cannot know precisely how every word was pronounced, we can be relatively sure about the basic sounds of each syllable,<sup>52</sup> and the component vowels and consonants, that make up each word. And so, however unbridgeable the distance between us and the listeners of the sixth century may be, much of the *Consolation's* acoustic character remains accessible to us today. We can, and must, read the *Consolation* aloud.

My own research on this project began by making audio recordings of each poem, read with an emphasis on the metric form. For all the obvious limits of this approach, I found it enormously beneficial to have to confront the meter directly as an aural reality. In order to facilitate the reading aloud of my own readers, I have marked the long and short syllables for all quotations of Boethius' poetry. I have also included Joel Relihan's English translations, which preserve the basic meter of each poem, as an occasional aid to readers who, like me, are more fluent in English than in Latin, as these translations help to convey a sense of the rhythmic sound of each poem.<sup>53</sup> These translations, however, cannot ultimately substitute for reading the original Latin text. I

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<sup>51</sup> "Admitting to the orality of a text is, paradoxically, to become aware in an active fashion of a historical fact. This fact cannot be confused for the setting which we still have the written symbol for, nor will it ever appear in the mirror." Zumthor and Engelhardt (trans.), "The Text and the Voice," 72.

<sup>52</sup> On the syllable, not the letter, as the smallest element, see Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind*, 62-63.

<sup>53</sup> Relihan imitates the Latin quantitative rhythm by means of English stress accent, and some results are more metrically successful than others. Although he is the first English translator to imitate all of Boethius' meters, many English poets have imitated classical meters quite effectively. See "Classical Meters in Modern English Verse," (Appendix D) in Edwards, *Sound, Sense, and Rhythm*, 166-178.

urge the reader not to take my word for how the poetry sounds, but to read it for her or himself. As imperfect as our pronunciations may be, we have no better way to hear the sound of the text than to speak it and listen for ourselves. By doing so we adopt a phenomenological stance most similar to the listeners of the past, and most faithful to the *Consolation's* own insistence upon its aural existence.

My approach to the *Consolation's* auralty does not, however, depend primarily on re-creating the sound of the text. As helpful as this may be for intensive readings of particular passages, poetic ones in particular, it is nonetheless an elusive method: different readers will read and hear the same text in many different ways. The main weight of my argument rests not on re-creating sounds as such but on acoustic features that are intrinsic to the text, such as the repetition of particular poetic rhythms. That is, though we cannot be certain how any poetic line would have been pronounced, we can confidently identify places a particular rhythmic line is repeated. We don't have to be sure about the sound to be sure about the fact of its repetition. The argument of this dissertation rests primarily on aural features that are formally intrinsic in this way.

Finally, the dialogue between Philosophy and the prisoner serves as a guide to interpret these intrinsic features. Like the other literary and dramatic aspects of the text, sound is an instrument of Philosophy's consolation, a pedagogical tool used for the prisoner's recovery. And as with other medicines, the role of the acoustic elements can be judged in relation to the prisoner's progress. We can, therefore, evaluate the role of the *Consolation's* poetic rhythms by paying attention to when and how they are used, and observe their effects by the prisoner's response to them. How the prisoner is

affected by what he hears gives us an objective basis to judge the role of certain sounds in the text.

Naturally, even this objective guide to the intrinsic aural features of the text requires the intervention of our own reading. But this, surely, is not accidental. For while the *Consolation* may have been designed as an intricate, self-contained therapy, it was also written as a text meant to be heard, as a therapy meant to be experienced. The prisoner's listening is simultaneous with our own, and his responses become a guide not only to thinking about his experience, but also about our own. At least when Philosophy is doing the speaking or singing—that is, most of the time—the prisoner and the reader listen together.

Simply because we concentrate on the intrinsic aspects of the text does not mean that we wholly escape—or even that we wish to escape—the contingencies of our own reading. But it does mean that we focus our inquiry on the act of reading as it is informed by the text's intrinsic technical data. If we are able to isolate certain aural features, arrange them into formal patterns, etc., it is to hear how these affect the listener as they flow by in the temporal experience of the text. This dissertation thus approaches the *Consolation of Philosophy* as an experiential phenomenon, and is interested specifically in the effects of this experience upon the reader as listener. In this phenomenological approach, textual analysis cannot be separated from the act of reading.<sup>54</sup> It is my intention that the primary act of this dissertation be an encounter,

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<sup>54</sup> On the phenomenology of reading, and of reading poetry in particular, see Michael D. Hurley, "The Audible Reading of Poetry Revisited," *The British Journal of Aesthetics* 44, 4 (2004), "Interpreting Dante's *Terza Rima*," *Forum for Language Studies* 41, 3 (2005): 320-31, and "How Philosophers Trivialize Art"; as well as Clive Scott, *The Poetics of French Verse* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), esp. 1-9, 82-104. For the implications such readings have for the history of philosophy, see Mark D. Jordan, "Rhetorical Form in the Historiography of Philosophy," *New Literary History* 23, 3 (1992): 483-504.

an experience, in which the process of interpretation is pushed back towards the experience of reading, so that the result is less a closed interpretation than it is a “shareable spiritual autobiography”<sup>55</sup> of my own reading self.<sup>56</sup> The aim is thus not to extract meaning from the text, which is, in this sense, a kind of theft,<sup>57</sup> but to encounter the book as an act—in its primary mode of existence, and through the original source of its power.

To treat the text in this way is not only to acknowledge a “radical consubstantiality of style and content” but also to endeavor to observe “how this consubstantiality is effected as a temporally governed event.”<sup>58</sup> If the *Consolation*’s literary form is intrinsically necessary to its pedagogy, then we cannot engage with this pedagogy but by submitting to its method in the form and time in which it was designed. Broadly speaking, then, this dissertation aims to document an experience of a work of art—asking not what we can take from this work but how it works on us.

### *Structure*

Repeated reading and hearing of a text is a kind of literary archeology: successive encounters hear and see more clearly, more deeply. The chapters of this dissertation are the layers of my own investigation: the literary-rhythmic analysis of particular poems (Chapter 1); the exploration of obvious metric repetitions (Chapter 2); the discovery of a rhythmic system that comprehends every poem (Chapter 3); and the

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<sup>55</sup> Scott, *The Poetics of French Verse*, 6.

<sup>56</sup> “I, for my part, intend not so much to claim once again, as on other occasions, the importance of orality in the transmission and indeed in the creation of medieval poetry, but rather to try to appreciate and gauge what this orality implies; not so much to evaluate the size of the “oral part” in the corpus of extant texts as to integrate into my perception and my reading the properties thus explained.” Zumthor and Engelhardt (trans.), “The Text and the Voice,” 68.

<sup>57</sup> Scott, *The Poetics of French Verse*, 7.

<sup>58</sup> Hurley, “How Philosophers Trivialize Art,” 113.

placement of this system with the psychological and theological principles that govern the work as a whole (Chapter 4). Though these chapters were written discretely, and sequentially, each successive one relies on what precedes it. For me, this graduated structure is experiential evidence that the text was intended for repeated listening. In any event, the following pages of analysis and reflection arrive at one incontestable fact: the *Consolation* contains an exquisite aural structure. And so I hope this dissertation elicits the reader's own listening, however and whatever he or she hears.

## THE POETIC RHYTHMS OF BOOK 1

How does it come about that when someone voluntarily listens to a song with ears and mind, he is also involuntarily turned toward it in such a way that his body responds with motions somehow similar to the song heard?<sup>59</sup>

There has never been a comprehensive or systematic study of the *Consolation's* poetic meters. A survey of three recent major works represents the state of things in modern scholarship rather accurately. Joachim Gruber, the author of the only major modern commentary,<sup>60</sup> like several others before him, is intrigued by the prosimetric form, but rarely ventures beyond simply classifying and naming the meters. Though he does observe that a few meters recur with near symmetrical regularity, he makes little of this observation. He also notes a small handful of poems for which scholars have suggested the metric choice may be significant, but these are few and fleeting and disconnected from each other. Gerard O'Daly, in a nonetheless very important book, neglects metrical analysis entirely—incredible though it may seem for a work entitled *The Poetry of Boethius*.<sup>61</sup> Henry Chadwick's *Boethius: The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy*,<sup>62</sup> now a cornerstone in Boethius scholarship, evidently omits

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<sup>59</sup> “Quid? quod, cum aliquis cantilenam libentius auribus atque animo capit, ad illud etiam non sponte convertitur, ut motum quoque aliquem similem auditae cantilenaе corpus effingat . . .” Boethius, *De institutione musica* (ed. Friedlein), 1, 1, 187.3-6.

<sup>60</sup> Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*.

<sup>61</sup> O'Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius*.

<sup>62</sup> Henry Chadwick, *The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

poetry from the consolations it considers. The summary of neglect, dismissal, or half-hearted attempts, could go on.

For although most scholars insist that the poetry is important, their methods belie their protestations. Had you never read the *Consolation*, but only its secondary literature, you would think the poems were odd moments of prose, containing little action or thought but many images. Aside from a small handful of exceptions,<sup>63</sup> there is virtually no engagement with the poems as poetry—as verbal art that is painstakingly composed so its words and images fall at particular places in a metric line. Discussion of downbeats, upbeats, glottal stops, poetic syntax and caesurae, meter and its exceptions, and generally of “the poem’s sound shape in time”<sup>64</sup> is virtually nonexistent. Rather than reflect something genuine about the *Consolation*, the modern critical approach to its poetry seems to be symptomatic of much present day literary criticism, in which “verse-form is . . . figured as cognitively dispensable: it is insubstantial prettifying ornament, or, at best, mimetic of the referential sense. Either amounts to the same thing: poetry as the experience of patterns of sound moving in time is denied a knowledge-bearing function.”<sup>65</sup> Whatever the state of present day criticism, it is fair to

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<sup>63</sup> Reading either of his two spectacular articles, published in quick succession and now considered foundational in Boethius scholarship, both of which approach the *Consolation*’s literary form with great creativity and seriousness, one is moved to lament the death of Thomas F. Curley III at such a young age. His comments on metric choices are noted throughout this and the next chapter. See Curley, “The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature,” 346-347, 354, and “How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy,” 260-261. The other notable exceptions in recent scholarship to the general neglect of the *Consolation*’s poetry are: O’Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius*; and the metered English translation of Joel C. Relihan (Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. Joel C. Relihan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001)). Though I don’t generally find Relihan’s analysis of particular metric choices very compelling, I have frequently quoted his translations in the recognition that he undertook the project with very much the same intuition as I do this dissertation, namely, that the meters are an essential element of the text’s identity.

<sup>64</sup> Hurley, “How Philosophers Trivialize Art,” 120.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 116. Very much ancient Greek and Latin poetry has fared far better in modern interpretation than Boethius’ poetry has. For examples that attend specifically and sensitively to the reader’s experience of poetry, see: Garth Tissol, *The Face of Nature: Wit, Narrative, and Cosmic Origins in Ovid’s Metamorphoses* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); and Edwards, *Sound, Sense, and Rhythm*.

say—at least as a rule—that while scholars of the *Consolation* have obviously read its poetry, they have rarely read it as poetry.

In the absence of any sustained, let alone conclusive, work on Boethius' meters, our investigation must begin with the most basic encounter with them—that is, as they occur in particular poems, and at particular places in the prisoner's recovery. We need to ask how each rhythm precisely functions in its poem, as well as in relation to the prisoner's development, the rhythms preceding and following, and the narrative and argument as a whole. Because to do this for all of the *Consolation's* thirty-nine poems would require several hundred pages, this chapter takes the poems of the first book as a place to begin. By attending to the rhythms of its seven poems, we can observe the interplay of rhythmic sound with poetic purpose, and situate this interplay in relation to the prisoner's development. To these seven poems, and their intervening passages of prose, we now turn.

1, I

*MAESTOS MODOS*

-- uu | -- uu | --<sup>^</sup> uu | -- uu | -- u u | -- --      (dactylic hexameter)  
 -- uu -- uu -- || -- u u -- u u --      (pentameter)

When reading the *Consolation's* first poem,<sup>66</sup> we should keep in mind that it is one of only four poems spoken by the prisoner himself. It is also the only poem that occurs before *Philosophia's* entrance. And because Philosophy arrives on the scene

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<sup>66</sup> The analysis in this section of 1, 1, though it differs in some respects, is more or less an expansion of the interpretation I put forth in “*Flēbīlīs heū maēstōs | cōgōr īnīrē mōdōs*: Boethius and Rhythmic Power,” in *Perspectives sur le néoplatonisme. International Society of Neoplatonic Studies. Actes du colloque de 2006*. Ed. Martin Achard, Wayne Hankey, and Jean-Marc Narbonne (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 2009), 153-168, 161ff.

immediately afterwards and passionately condemns this poem, it seems retrospectively to be the cause of her arrival. We will consider *Philosophia*'s response; but first, let us let us look at the poem on its own.

*Cārminā quī quōndām<sup>^</sup> stūdiō flōrēntē pērēgī,*<sup>67</sup> (1, I, 1)

*Í who was ónce at the heíght of my pówers a máster of vérsecraft—*<sup>68</sup>

The alliteration of the plosive 'k/q' sound throughout the first half of the line establishes a harsh tone, especially when uttered from the bitterness of a sweet memory. *Songs I formerly . . .* The second half of the line softens somewhat, with two gentle up-beat fricatives, a reprieve from the sadness of the present, a glimmer of a real entry into memory. By the end of the first line, the epic sound of hexameter is clear, a rhythmic momentum established. The listener, naturally, does not know the second line will alter the rhythm.

*flēbilis heū maēstōs || cōgōr ĩnīrē mōdōs.* (1, I, 2)

*Woé is me!—weéping, coérced, énter the griéf-ridden móde.*

The strong downbeat and accent on the first syllable of the fricative *flēbilis*, parallel with *cármina*—still fresh in the ear—reasserts the harshness of the first line. *Heu!*—a word that expressly draws attention to what is about to come—anticipates the change in meter that is now imminent. *Maestos* we do not yet know what to do with, only that

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<sup>67</sup> For the reader without knowledge of Latin, it may be helpful to render the Latin word order in English. With a ^ to mark the caesura, || for the diaeresis and italics used to mark spatially separated but grammatically connected words, the first couplet might read:

“Songs formerly<sup>^</sup> (with) *zeal flourishing* I composed  
Tearful alas *sad* || forced (am I) to enter *measures*.”

Throughout this chapter, I have frequently inserted such marks to indicate a caesura, diaeresis, etc. which are not found in Moerschini's text. I have also taken the liberty of italicizing poetic quotations, in both Latin and English.

<sup>68</sup> Unless otherwise noted, all translations of the *Consolation*'s poetry are those of Joel C. Relihan (Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy*, trans. Joel C. Relihan (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001)). So far as I know, Relihan's translation is the only modern English translation that, for the most part at least, preserves Boethius' meters.

*sad* is the auditory filter through which the rest of the line will be heard, until its complementary noun is supplied. The listener expects the second half of the second line to begin with the upbeat of the third foot of a line of hexameter—perhaps, as in the first line, a momentary reprieve. Instead, the meter is interrupted with another downbeat, and another plosive *C*, shattering any hope of a softening tone, while arresting the sweetness of free composition with the passive submission of *cogor*. The next downbeat, after two quick short syllables, falls on the accented middle syllable of the complementary infinitive *inire*, stretching for a moment the action that is the immediate focus of the listener’s ear. The interruptive quality of the second half of the line, the moment the meter is established as elegy, is matched with a syntactic intention: the three words occur in the order of the action, cinematically, as it were: *cōgōr inīrē mōdōs*.

*Ēccē mīhī lācĕraē^ dīctānt scrībēndā Cāmēnaē  
ēt vērīs ělēgī || flētībŭs ōrā rīgānt.*<sup>69</sup> (1, I, 3-4)

*Ló! Their cheeks hárrowed, the Múses come téll me the wórdz I must táke down,  
Ánd they now dámpen my fáce with láchrymose élegy’s trúth.*<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>69</sup>We might literally render:

“Behold me *torn* | command what must be written *muses*  
and (with) the *true* of elegy | *tears* flows my face.”

Queen Elizabeth I managed to preserve the syntax remarkably intact:

“My muses torne behold what write I shold indites

Wher tru woful verse my face w<sup>t</sup> dole bedews.” See Boethius et al., *The consolation of Queen Elizabeth I: the queen’s translation of Boethius’s De consolacione philosophiae: Public Record Office, Manuscript SP 12/289*, Medieval and Renaissance texts and studies, 366 (Tempe, Ariz.: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2009).

And though he renders in prose, it is difficult to rival Chaucer for sheer lyricism:

“Allas! I, wep[ynge, am constreyned to bygyn]nen vers of [sorwful matere, that whilom in] floryssynge [studie, made delitable ditees]. For, lo! rendynge Muses of poetes enditen to me thinges to ben writen, and drery vers of wrecchednesse weten my face with verray teeres!” Geoffrey Chaucer and Boethius, *Boece*, in *Chaucer’s Boece: a Critical Edition Based on Cambridge University Library, MS li. 3.21, ff. 9r-180v*, ed. Tim William Machan, Middle English Texts, 38 (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2008), 3.

<sup>70</sup> Relihan, as on other occasions, adds an extra syllable.

The second couplet bids the listener to look – *Ecce! behold!* and observe how he is writing what the torn muses command. The spondees over the second half of the line culminate in the long, accented second syllable of *scribéndā*; all this adds weight to the fundamental claim of the poem: that the prisoner takes up this composition involuntarily.<sup>71</sup> He is forced by the poetic muses to enter the *maestos modos*, the sad measures, the rhythmic beat of an overwhelming *tristesse*. The result confirms the validity of this claim—as his face flows with the true tears of elegy.

Any writer knows how much first lines will bear upon the reader, how those words, perhaps more than any others, must be the right ones, for they carry the weight of breaking the silence into which they are cast. We know Boethius was imprisoned when he wrote the *Consolation*, and so these lines must bear that weight, too; they will be interpreted as the words the prisoner wanted to speak; they record the freedom of his unknown mind. It is, therefore, quite surprising when the poet overturns the listener’s likely expectations: the author is imprisoned, indeed, forced to labor, and yet the cell is a rhythmic one, the bars are those of the *modus* alone. By discounting entirely the physical aspect of his entrapment, Boethius explicitly places the entirety of his imprisonment in the power of the poetry.

The remainder of the poem continues the lament. A few couplets are especially effective metrically.

*Vēnīt ēnīm prōpērātā mālīs inōpīnā sēnēctūs  
ēt dōlōr aētātēm || iūssīt inēssē sūām. (1, I, 9-10)*

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<sup>71</sup> This elegy is “composed under dictation from the Muses (line 3)—a traditional motif in poetic composition, but here emphasized by the prisoner to bring out his sense of the involuntary nature of the whole undertaking,” O’Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius*, 39. Consider also Gruber’s highly provocative, if largely undeveloped, suggestion that at 1, I the prisoner is under the spell of Fortune (*Banne der Fortuna*), and there remains until 2, I, Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 54 and 175. See also n. 131, below.

*For nów has arrived, unexpécted and hástened by évils, my óld age—  
Paín gave the órder; its yeárs nów must be ádded to míne.*

The first line moves as quickly as a line of hexameter can, all first five feet in dactyls, with no word break in the third foot,<sup>72</sup> giving audible—and appropriate—speed to *venit* and *properata*. The second line rushes over the subject *dolor*, slows slightly with *aetatem*, intimating the duration of his *dolor*, and then continues—with the again unexpected downbeat—on the first syllable of the forceful verb *iussit*. This moment is metrically exemplary, because the second half of the second line is the most dramatic moment of an elegiac couplet, each time interrupting a line and a half of hexameter. This metric interruption is all the more violent as the second hemiepes of the pentameter allows no substitutions. Every time it asserts its interrupting -- u u -- u u -- with a long downbeat that steals the anticipated upward motion of an upbeat. The poet makes careful use of this surprising rhythmic theft in each couplet, often combining this downbeat with a stress accent on words that describe the passivity and violence of the prisoner's state: *cógor, iússit, cláudere, mérserat*, and often employing the whole of the second hemiepes for the most lamenting statements of the poem: *cōgōr ĩnĭrĕ mōdōs; flĕtĭbŭs ōră rĭgānt; nŭnc mĕă fĕtă sĕnĭs; iŭssĭt ĩnĕssĕ sŭām*.

Though a hemiepes is simply comprised of two dactyls followed by one long syllable, it is a powerful combination: it begins with a strong downbeat, gains momentum through two dactyls, until the final syllable stops, as it were, in the middle of a foot—an unanswered long syllable that cuts the dactylic momentum short. Because the first hemiepes of the second line of an elegiac couplet seems to continue the hexameter, it is not until the beginning of the second hemiepes that the listener is able

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<sup>72</sup> The poet only twice skips through the caesura; here, and in line 17 where the unexpected speed of *măĕ fĭdă bŏnĭs* highlights the fleetingness of Fortune's gifts.

to retroactively interpret the first hemiepes as the first half of a line of pentameter, rather than a line of hexameter. This retrospective hearing re-interprets the downbeat of the third foot of the first hemiepes as an abrupt ending rather than as a spring point for the expected upbeat. The hemiepes easily loans itself to a lament or to an otherwise depressive poem—it is a rhythm that never really gets moving, but is always stopped short, then begins again, only to meet the same premature end, a motion that never fully becomes itself, or goes anywhere.<sup>73</sup>

-- u u -- u u -- || -- u u -- u u --

If the hexameter opens each couplet with an epic pretense, it is this incomplete, unresolved quality of the pentameter that variously expresses the insistent emotions of elegy, whether the anger of complaint or the sadness of lament. In this poem, the peak of the poet's outrage is reached in the seventh and eighth couplets. This climax is audibly built towards already in the sixth couplet, with a line composed of five spondees, cascading over *īntēmpēstīvī* and rising through *fūndūntūr*.

*Īntēmpēstīvī<sup>^</sup> fūndūntūr vērticē cānī*  
*ēt trēmīt ēffētō || cōrpōrē lāxā cūtīs.* (1, I, 11-12)

*Nów from the tóp of my heád flows down snów-white hair, quíte out of seáson;*  
*Bárren, my bódy is sheáthed, in shívering, límp, nerveless skín.*

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<sup>73</sup> It is therefore unsurprising to note that the elegaic meter likely had its origin in funeral songs (after which it is named), and was commonly used for epigram, lament, and love poetry. For a brief history of the genre, see "History" under the entry "Elegy" in Alex Preminger and T. V. F. Brogan, *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Ovid's comment on the elegaic meter is also apposite: "*sex mihi surgat opus numeris, in quinque residat; / ferrea cum uestris bella ualete modis* (Ovid, *Amores*, in *Amores; Medicamina faciei feminae; Ars amatoria; Remedia amoris*, ed. E. J. Kenney, *Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), 1, 1, 27-28). Tom Bishop translates: "*My couplets swell in sixes, then deflate to five: / farewell to iron wars and epic verse.*" Ovid, *Amores*, trans. and ed. Tom Bishop (Manchester: Carcanet Press Limited, 2003).

The poet laments the decay of his body and now turns in the climax of his lament to the wished-for death that, in the ultimate proof of Fortune's unjust character, she will not grant.

*Mōrs hōmīnūm fēlīx,^ quāe sē nēc dūlcībūs ānnīs  
īnsērīt ēt maēstīs || saēpě vōcātā vēnīt!* (1, I, 13-14)

*Háppy the deáth of a mán that would thrúst itself nót in the sweét years!  
Bút, when incéssantly cálled, cómes to those strícken with griéf*

where the almost lyrically smooth sounds of the first line and a half are interrupted by a downbeat, diphthong, and accent (*saēpe*) coinciding to stress how often death has been called. The next couplet continues:

*Ēheū, quām sūrdā^ mīsērōs āvērtītūr aūrē  
ēt flēntēs ōcūlōs || clāūdērě saēvā nēgāt!* (1, I, 15-16)

*Woé is them! Wíth a deaf ear she rejécts all pleás of the wrétched—  
Mérciless, shé will not clóse éyes that are brímming with téars.*

The couplet begins with a proclamation of Fortune's disregard for the subject—*alas how deaf the ear she turns to the miserable*. The pentameter picks up with the direct object *et flentes oculos* (*and weeping eyes*), which is followed by the pause, and then the emotional climax of the poem, *to close, cruel, she refuses!* One can hear the height of shouted accusation—*clāūdērě saēvā nēgāt!* This hemiepes is especially effective, the first dactyl beginning with a downbeat/accented/hard consonant/diphthong (*clāūdere*) and the second with a downbeat/accented/hissing *s*/diphthong (*saēva*), before the final beat ends sharply, embodying *Fortuna's* cruelty, with the hard *t* of *negat*.

If the seventh and eighth couplets are the dramatic climax of the poem, the final couplet, though of a quieter tone, seems to acknowledge what we have observed as the overall rhythmic effect:

*Quīd mē fēlicēm^ tōtīēns iāctāstīs, āmīcī?  
Quī cēcīdīt, stābilī || nōn ērāt illē grādū. (1, I, 21-22)*

*Tēll me, my friēnds, why you boāsted so óften that Í was so bléssèd—  
Sóldiers who féll never hād stáble ground ón which to stánd.*

The hexameter poses a question that the poem's final line is expected to answer. Concluding the first hemiepes of the pentameter with *stābilī* allows *nōn*, interrupting with a fresh downbeat, to immediately negate the notion of stability. *He who fell stable—nót had he position. Not* denies the stability—or expresses the interruption of that apparent stability—in the prisoner's life, just as it is rhythmically positioned to interrupt the hexametric beat. The interruption of the second hemiepes—not only in this couplet, but throughout the poem—is a rhythmic metaphor for the prisoner's sudden change of circumstance. Furthermore, the poem's final word, *gradu*, has for its primary meaning *step* or *pace*—that is, the action from which meter's terminology is derived. The words of the final hemiepes thus allude to the effect of its rhythm throughout the poem—the interruption of the foot—while they simultaneously describe the inherent instability of the prisoner's life. The suggestion is that the interruptions of rhythm and life are not accidentally coincident but inherently so: the *maestos modos* have been forced upon the prisoner—rhythm is the underlying problem, not merely its metaphorical reflection.

1, 1

*ADSTITISSE MULIER*

Haec dum mecum tacitus ipse reputarem  
 querimoniamque lacrimabilem stili officio signarem  
 adstitisse mihi supra verticem visa est mulier reverendi  
 admodum vultus . . . (1, 1, 1)

While I was thinking these thoughts to myself in silence<sup>74</sup>  
 and set my pen to record this tearful complaint, there  
 seemed to stand above my head a woman of exceedingly  
 great countenance.<sup>75</sup>

These first words of prose effect a shift of tense from an immediate present to a recollected past. The narrator tells us that he is also the poet of the preceding poem and, by doing so, obliquely introduces the reader to the narrated form of the text. This simple transition reveals a literary distinction of considerable importance; that is, the difference between the prisoner's immediate experience and his self-conscious recollection of this experience. While both of these have passed through the mediation of the author's craft, we must be attentive to the difference between them if we are to see how the author portrays the prisoner's transformation throughout the narrative. Most of the text is in a past tense narration, told as it happened, directly, without interpretive distance. But then occasionally the author inserts a comment in order to draw attention to the difference between the past's present as it happened, and how he sees it from a self-conscious distance, a distance which the artifice of narration normally hides.

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<sup>74</sup> On the retrospective description of the poem as a *tacitus* phenomenon, see n. 36, above.

<sup>75</sup> Trans. Tester, except for the "of exceedingly great countenance," which I have added to complete the Latin phrase to the first possible break (although it is likely significant, that in this most extraordinary passage, the Latin sentence continues uninterrupted for several more lines).

The prisoner's description of his becoming aware of the presence of Philosophy is mysterious, and uses the language of divine epiphany: "*adstissime . . . visa est . . . mulier*" [a woman seemed to appear].<sup>76</sup> Though she seems to appear silently, her first actions are dramatic; arriving at the scene of Boethius' mourning, she gazes at the poetic muses, and then, with eyes blazing, proclaims:

Who let these theatrical tarts in with this sick man? Not only have they no cures for his pain, but with their sweet poison they make it worse. These are they who choke the rich harvest of the fruits of reason with the barren thorns of passion. They accustom a man's mind to his ills, not rid him of them . . . Get out, you sirens, beguiling men straight to their destruction! Leave him to *my* Muses to care for and restore to health (*curandum sanundumque*). (1, 1, 8-9, 11, Tester)

Philosophy puts the blame for the prisoner's condition squarely on the poetic muses and thus confirms what the prisoner has told us in the poem—that the muses forced him into the sad rhythms. They have made him lose hope and abandon the freedom of his mind. They have no cures (*remedia*) for his soul but instead nourish it with poisons (*venena*), choking reason with passion. These accusations summarize what we observed as the depressive effects associated with the elegaic meter of the prisoner's poem. Though she will soon have some harsh words for him as well, Philosophy's immediate assessment of the prisoner's situation—is that he is listening to the wrong muses, to Sirens who will destroy him. Accordingly, she proposes, like Pythagoras, to change the mode, and to bring in different muses. If these poetic

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<sup>76</sup> 1, 1, 1, trans. mine. I have frequently taken the liberty of italicizing non block quotations from the *Consolation*, so as to set them apart from my own words, and especially to register a shift into the *Consolation's* dialogue. On the *adstissime* of this passage, see Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 62: "Die Terminus technicus für das Auftreten einer Gottheit in einer Epiphanie."

“harlots” have made him ill, have disordered his soul—then her muses, she claims, will restore and heal.

Philosophy’s prowess is then dramatically demonstrated by the fact that the company of Muses departs, dejected and ashamed. The prisoner sees that Philosophy commands the muses with unquestioned authority while the scene establishes that poetry is the primary medium through which illness is caused or health restored. The result of the first poem and prose, therefore, is that the entire narrative is placed upon the power of the poetic word. If the prisoner framed his imprisonment entirely in poetic terms, Philosophy has spoken the possibility lurking unknown within his chains: freedom by a stronger word. If poetry has the power to ensnare, it also has the power to set free.<sup>77</sup>

The prisoner is at this moment, however, still entirely captive.

I myself, since my sight was so dimmed with tears that I could not clearly see who this woman was of such commanding authority, was struck dumb, my eyes cast down; and I went on waiting in silence to see what she would do next. (1, 1, 13, Tester)

1, II

*HEU, QUAM PRAECIPITI*

-- uu -- uu -- | -- u u -- --

(hemiepes + adonic)

The extent of the prisoner’s muse-induced illness provokes a poetic lament from Philosophy. Her lament, however, is not in elegiac couplets. In her poem, all lines

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<sup>77</sup> “In the first book Dame Philosophy removed the ‘pharmakon’ of verse from Boethius’ hands much as a mother would take a potentially dangerous object from her infant child. Philosophy then proceeds to make use of that same ‘pharmakon’ as one means among many in the course of Boethius’ therapy.” Curley, “How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy,” 250.

have the same meter (this is called *stichic* composition),<sup>78</sup> and so the unsettling effect achieved by the hemiepes in the second line of each couplet in the prisoner's poem is absent here. There are similarities evident, however, as this meter also begins with what initially sounds like dactylic hexameter; in fact, it is difficult not to notice that every line of both poems begins with the same metric beat: -- uu -- uu --. And in this poem, too, this hexametric beat is interrupted in the middle of the third foot with an unexpected downbeat—here with an inalterable -- u u -- -- (adonic). But here the effect is less disturbing than in the first lament because this interruption happens in every line, and so is more easily anticipated by the listener's ear. Noticeable, too, is that the transition between these metric fragments is marked in every line with a word break, or diaeresis; this yields a very audible separation between the two sides of each line, and gives a definite stress to the first syllable of the second half of every line. And because the second half of the line (that is, the adonic -- u u -- --) is only two inalterable feet long, a mere five syllables, it leaves very little room for poetic maneuvering. In all but three lines, where the poet spreads these five syllables over three words, these are used in just two words, that is, in 24 of 27 lines—so the distinct articulation of the adonic beat is matched with a strict verbal economy. As with the prisoner's poem, the meter does not emerge until heard in its entirety. The first half of the line seems to be dactylic hexameter, until the interruption of the downbeat of the adonic metron retrospectively reveals it to be a hemiepes (-- uu -- uu --). As with the prisoner's elegy, the metric components are distinguished only after being heard two or three times.

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<sup>78</sup> From *στίχος*, or "line."

Prior even to considering the words of the poem, then, it is clear that *Philosophia* has chosen a meter that has similarities to that of the prisoner, and also crucial differences. By keeping the same meter throughout every line, she has avoided the instability of the prisoner's beat; yet, by altering the meter midway through each line, she maintains the urgency granted by the early downbeat, interrupting the expectation for the second half of a dactylic foot. By using the hemiepes, she has recalled the lamenting beat of the prisoner's elegy, and yet by pairing it with an adonic, she has given each line the resolution typical for the end of a line of hexameter. She has, then, inverted the prisoner's metric order (hemiepes followed by dactylic rather than dactylic followed by hemiepes). There is a mournful quality to her meter but it is controlled by the stability of its line ending, avoiding the rhythmic and emotional abyss of the prisoner's elegy.<sup>79</sup>

*Heū, quām praēcīpītī | mērsā prōfūdō  
mēns hēbēt ēt prōpriā | lūcē rēlictā  
tēndīt īn ēxtērnās | īrē tēnēbrās,  
tērrēnīs quōtīēns | flātībūs auctā  
crēscīt īn īmmēnsūm | nōxīā cūrā! (1, II, 1-5)*

*Woé is him! Plúnged to the dépths, súnk to the bóttom,  
Mínd loses áll of its édge, cásts off its ówn light,  
Tákes itself óff to the gloóm, álien dárkness,  
Whén deletérious cáre, fánned by the stórm winds,  
Bórn of the phýsical wórld, gróws past all meásure.*

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<sup>79</sup> "Philosophy casts her words in dactylic trimeter catalectic plus an adonic . . . a meter which echoes certain patterns in the elegaic couplets, in fact one might say that it is composed of the last half of pentameter plus the usual ending of the hexameter, but which is somewhat curtailed and severe, as befits a philosophic elegy," Curley, "The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature," 346-347. For Curley's view on this poem as a "counter-lament," see below, n. 80. Relihan likewise considers the fragments of the line, but I do not find his analysis compelling. He suggests that Philosophy is using these to "mock the narrator . . . reinforcing the complaint that the prisoner has lost his epic/didactic voice" Boethius, *Consolation of Philosophy* (trans. Relihan), 153. Her poem is clearly a reprimand of the prisoner, but it has a more constructive aim than mockery, as I explain below.

The poem's first words, *heu quam*, bring to mind the *eheu quam* (l. 15) of the prisoner's poem. But what is lamented here is very different. The prisoner's *Eheu quam surda miseros avertitur aure* laments the deafness of Fortune's ear to his plea for death. Here, with *heu quam*, Philosophy laments how the prisoner has abandoned the power and freedom of his mind. So while these lines early establish the lamenting tone of the poem, they also disclose a radically different subject of lament. With her first words of poetry, Philosophy attacks the prisoner's self-pitying despair and strikes at his indignant sense of victimization. The subject of the first lines is a *mens* that actively tends (*tendit*) towards the external, having abandoned its own light (*propria luce relictā*). Philosophy thus laments what Boethius has done to himself, not what he has suffered at Fortune's hands.<sup>80</sup>

The rhythm accentuates the active agency of the prisoner's downfall. The momentum gained by *heu quam praecipiti* is transferred to the second half of the line, *mersa profundo*, but especially to the first syllable of the accented downbeat of *mērsa*. At the end of this line, though, the listener is still waiting to hear what is the subject and action of the phrase. The second line begins with the awaited subject—*mens*—which absorbs the full force of the first line's complaint. Though it then moves quickly through the rest of the hemiepes, *hēbēt ēt prōpriā*, the active *hebet*, juxtaposed with *mens*, delivers a brutal image, especially when followed immediately by *propria*, which reasserts the active nature of the problem. The adonic begins emphatically with the

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<sup>80</sup> "Philosophy delivers a counter-lament, a *querela* corresponding to, but contrasting with, that of Boethius. Instead of bemoaning his fall from good fortune she bewails his descent from the heights of wisdom which he had attained under her tutelage." "Dame Philosophy substitutes an appropriate for a self-destructive elegy." Curley, "The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature," 346, 358. Curley likewise sees the meter as a fitting choice for the message. See above, n. 79. See also O'Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius*, 40: "Philosophy has herself engaged in a complaint . . . and has called it a *querela* (1.2.1), thus granting lament of the right kind and about the right subjects a positive literary status."

stress/early downbeat/long syllable of *lūcĕ*, anticipated by the already spoken modifier *propria*, immediately followed by *relicta*. *Mind dulls itself and abandons its own light*. But because the poet has slipped in an *et* before *propria*, the ominous *luce relicta*, is not the end of the phrase. The listener is waiting for the verb which comes at the beginning of the next line—an active one no less—*tendit*, followed by the directional *in* which immediately precedes its object’s adjective *ĕxtĕrnās*, over three long syllables, intensifying both the externality of movement and the listener’s anticipation for the object. Then follows the caesura, before an interrupting downbeat/long syllable/stress falls on the complementary infinitive *īre*, carrying out the action intuitively begun with *in externas*, before mercilessly concluding the line with a five-syllable punch, *īrĕ tĕnĕbrās*. The rhythmic-acoustic line stresses the agency of the mind’s choice, and the self-inflicted darkness into which it is lost.

Philosophy has not, however, finished with her first full phrase of lament. The fourth line repeats somewhat the structure of the first line with the ablative *terrenis flatibus* and the mournful *quotiens*, and again the listener is waiting for the subject and action of the phrase, and again one breaks in—this time the verb—with the accent of a new line. But at *crescit* the listener still has only *enlarged with earthly winds swells*. The following words of the fifth line intensify the subject’s absence, as *crescit* is enlarged over three long syllables, as if each syllable swells the unknown subject to still greater size—in *īmmĕnsūm*—and then when finally we arrive at the second half of the fifth line, the final five syllables, the poet uses the first three syllables on another modifying adjective, *noxia*, before at last granting us the subject, *cura*, a word replete with anxiety and the externality of worry.

Through this first section of the poem (ll. 1-5), the lament centers on the prisoner's underlying psychological illness. The second halves of the lines, with their emphatic adonic rhythm, often audibly underline the internal nature of his malady: *mērsā prōfūdō, lūcē rēlīctā, īrē tēnēbrās, nōxīā cūrā*. Naturally these fragments do not stand well alone, extracted from their acoustic placement to lay quietly on this page; but when listening to the poem, their syntactical counterparts are still present in the ear, where metric emphasis collides with key words in the meaning of the poem.

*Hīc quōndām caelō | libēr āpērtō  
suētūs īn aēthērīōs | īrē mēātūs (1, II, 6-7)*

*Time was when hé would ascénd to héaven unboundéd,  
Fréé to procééd in the tráck of stárs in thér cōurses.*

The sixth line begins the second of the poem's three sections. The *quondam* (formerly, once) is enough to recall the opening words of the prisoner's poem—*Carmina qui quondam studio florente peregi*—and so we are readied for Philosophy to give her own version of what the prisoner used to do, who he used to be; in short, she will conduct her own comparison between the then and the now which is the basis of her lament. Whereas the prisoner's *quondam* remains entirely within the scope of his poetic past—signifying perhaps the imprisoning force of the elegy—here, Philosophy's *quondam* invokes the intellectual grasp on nature that the prisoner once held. It is surely no accident that the most emphatic syllable of this line is the first syllable of *liber*. Though the adjective strictly refers only to the freedom he enjoyed exploring the night skies, it is significant that *liber* is the first word in this phrase that gives any description of the nominative subject and so the contrast between the psychologically depressed state of the first five lines and the liberty of the same subject in the past is in the foreground of

this section of the poem. With *aetherios*, the comparison grows stronger, as the realm of the former liberty is extended to the skies. The second half of the seventh line, *ire meatus*, invites a stark comparison with its parallel in line 3, *ire tenebras*. The imagery compares the one who goes into shadows with the one who accompanied the paths of the stars and discerned the light of the sun.

The terms of this comparison are developed throughout the rest of the poem. The remainder of this second section extends the list of things the prisoner had once intellectually apprehended: the paths of the stars, the causes of the winds, the rotation of the earth, the light of the sun, and the change of the seasons. The theme is not only the mastery the prisoner once had (*cernebat, visebat, exercet, comprehensam*, etc.) but also that this mastery was of the hidden order of the universe. In this respect, the most pointed phrase is *cōmprēnsām nūmērīs victōr hābēbāt*. The prisoner, once a *victor*, held the stars comprehended by number, an image we cannot help but compare with the prisoner's fateful self-description in *cogor inire modos*. He who once showed mastery with number, is now subject to measure.

This section of the poem is also gentler than the first (and, as we shall see, than the third). The imagery is expansive (*aetherios meatus, aequora ponti, stabilem orbem*) but also beautiful and calming (*stabilem spiritus orbem, Hesperias sidus in undas, placidas temperet horas, roseis temperet ornet*). The second halves of the lines, where the rhythmic emphasis is most pronounced, continue this gentler tone, rather than work against it, with soft, smooth, assuring line endings (*ūndē sōnōrā, sīdūs īn ūndās, tēmpērēt hōrās, flōrībūs ōrnēt*). This passage concludes with the summarizing lines:

*rīmārī sōlītūs | ātquē lātētīs*  
*nātūraē vāriās | rēddērē caūsās: (1, II, 22-23)*

*Ít was his hábit to próbe áll of these quéstions,  
Nátúre's root cáuses to sólve, áll of them hídden.*

These lines distill Philosophy's description of the prisoner's past so that the listener has in mind the fundamental basis for the comparison she then forcefully makes.

The third, and final, section of the poem is comprised of only four lines in which *Philosophia* returns to the prisoner's present state and makes explicit the comparison between his past knowledge and freedom and his current misery, ignorance, and imprisonment.

*nūnc iācēt ēffētō | lūmīnē mēntīs  
ēt prēssūs grāvībūs | cōllā cātēnīs  
dēclīvēmquē gērēns | pōndērē vūltūm  
cōgītūr, heū, stōlīdām | cērnērē tērrām.*

*Nów here he líes, and his mínd's bríghtness is bárren;  
Weíghed down, draped óver his néck pónderous sháckles,  
Weáring a fáce that looks dówn, bént by the deád weight—  
Woé is him! trúly coerced he stáres at the hárd earth.*

The comparison is between freedom and imprisonment, upright action and reclining passivity, between heavenly pathways and earthly chains. It is a pointed one metrically, as well, as the downbeat of *nunc* (now, l. 24) interrupts the 18 lines—by far most of the poem—following upon *Hic quondam* (he formerly, l. 6), with a jolting return to the prisoner's current state. *Iacet* blatantly contrasts with the verbs mentioned above (*cernebat, visebat, exercet, comprehensam*, etc.), though it is spoken quickly, drawing only a fleeting visual contrast, one which is aurally and visually expanded with the three long (tired?) beats of *ēffētō*. The prisoner's vibrant activity dissipated, the poet now turns to the results for his liberty. He who was once a *victor*, binding the heavens with number, now lays bound, heavy chains about his neck. The two plosive Cs in the five syllable

*colla catenis*, both falling on downbeats of the line, give a harsh acoustic feeling for the cold weight of the chains. The final line begins with another hard C, and T, in *cogitur*, followed by an accented *heu*: the passivity of the verb is enunciated and lamented. The second last word, beginning with another harshly accented downbeat C, *cérnere*, lamentably echoes the *cernebat* of the one who once looked at the light of the sun; at this point in the line we have only—*he is confined alas to gaze at dull*—until at last the line gives way in the final word to the object of the prisoner’s present gaze: ejected from the mouth with a sharp press of air, the sharp dental T begins the word that pronounces the verdict on a spondee: *tērrām*.

The poem has an obvious circular structure; beginning with an assessment of the prisoner’s current mental state, turning to the memory of his former intellectual prowess, and concluding with a return to his current condition. This circular movement has the effect of confirming the opening assessment. The claim that the prisoner has abandoned the light of his mind is supported by the description of the freedom and understanding that light once afforded him. This evocation of the past is what enables *Philosophia* to return to her present analysis, yet in still more severe terms. The return to his current condition in the final lines is mediated by the reversal of the relation of mastery just described, which may be summarized as follows: he abandoned his own light; recall what mastery that light gave him; now observe what slavery that abandonment has led to.

While the dead end rhythm of the hemiepes that begins each line permeates the poem with a lamentable sadness, the metrical emphasis of the adonic’s final five syllables is what keeps the poem from spiraling into an uncontrolled lament. They are

the acoustic engine that powers the revolution of the poem's narrative circle; at a rhythmic remove from the indefinitely unresolved hemiepes (-- uuu -- uuu --), they give clarity to the line's ending, and also to Philosophy's description at each stage. At first, the adonics emphasize the prisoner's agency (*lūcě rělictā, īřě těněbrās*); then the gentler evocations of freedom (*līběr āpērtō, īřě měātūs*) and the comprehension of ordered beauty (*tēmpěřēt hōrās, flōřībŭs ōrnēt*); and finally his self-inflicted subjugation (*cōllā cātēnīs, cěrněřě tērrām*). Paradoxically, the same rhythm can drive the harshness of a lament for self-inflicted sickness, or gently recall the good memory of health. Here, it is not the beat that controls the poet, but the poet who controls the beat.

Philosophy thus demonstrates not only *how* to lament, that is, how to effect metrically a lament without causing the listener to fall into despair, but also *what* to lament, that is, the voluntary surrender of one's intellectual powers. If the prisoner were able to listen, his mind might be revived; his vision might be redirected from *terram* to *lumina*. But he is not able to listen and this lament seems to do nothing to help.

1, 2

*SED MEDICINAE, INQUIT, TEMPUS EST QUAM QUERELAE*

Philosophy interrupts herself, saying now is the time for medicine, not complaint. But before beginning her diagnostic questions, she looks the prisoner directly in the eyes. The syntax of his description of her gaze communicates something of its intensity: "*Tum vero totis in me intenta luminibus*" (1, 2, 2) [*then truly she turned with*

*her whole eyes upon me*].<sup>81</sup> The order of the phrase stresses the totality, the all-consuming completeness of Philosophy's gaze, then the direction of it (*in me*), then the turning or focusing of the agent (*intenta*) and then the eyes with which she turns (*luminibus*). That *luminibus* is the last word in the phrase, the one that finally enables the meaning of the others, stresses for the listener the fact that it is from these remarkable eyes that the gaze originates. Philosophy's first direct interaction with the prisoner, then, is through the physical sense of sight. The text implies that this intense visual contact continues as she asks her diagnostic questions—and perhaps afterwards as well. We cannot overestimate the importance of this gaze.

Having established this visual contact, she proceeds to put the questions of medical triage: are you the same man who once knew me? do you recognize me? Why are you silent? By stupor or shame? When she sees that the prisoner is “*non modo tacitum sed elinguem prorsus mutumque*” (1, 2, 5) [*not only silent but speechless and entirely mute*],<sup>82</sup> she gently lays her hand on his breast and pronounces her diagnosis, “*lethargum patitur, communem inlugarum mentium morbum*” (1, 2, 5) [*he suffers from lethargy, a common disease of deluded minds*]. She then adds: “*Sui paulisper oblitus est*” (1, 2, 5) [*he has forgotten himself for a little*]. The diagnosis is oblivion, loss of memory.

But what exactly are we to make of this diagnosis? The process of deduction and diagnosis Philosophy undertakes is difficult to follow. He does not recognize her; he is entirely unable to speak; on this basis, she says, he suffers from lethargy, and has forgotten himself. But what do his inability to recognize Philosophy or his aphasia have to do with each other? And what do either of these have to do with his having forgotten

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<sup>81</sup> Trans. mine. We might literally render: “then truly *with her whole/entire* to me she turned *eyes*.”

<sup>82</sup> Translations in this section are my own.

himself? Must he recognize her in order to remember himself or regain his speech? We will continue to observe, and attempt to unravel, this complex interaction and concatenation of elements—of vision, blindness, memory, recognition, speech, and self-knowledge—as we observe the multi-faceted method of Philosophy’s treatment and the prisoner’s corresponding improvement.

The first of these to be addressed by his healer is his (re)-cognition of her. To her statement that he has forgotten himself, she adds: “*recordabitur facile, si quidem nos ante cognoverit; quod ut possit, paulisper lumina eius mortalium rerum nube caligantia tergamus*” (1, 2, 6) [*he will remember himself easily, since he knew me before. But that he may be able to remember, let us wipe his eyes for a while, seeing as they are darkened by clouds of mortal things*]. According to Philosophy, the prisoner will be able to recollect himself because he knew her once before. So she must help him to recognize her in order to begin remembering himself. These statements are not further elucidated but left in this somewhat mysterious form.

In what may be the most beautiful moment of the *Consolation*, Philosophy gathers her dress into a fold and wipes away the tears that cloud the prisoner’s eyes. She does this so tenderly and simply—not only without being asked but before the prisoner has regained himself enough even to make asking possible—that it can be understood only as a moment of pure gift, from a giver who knows what he needs before he can ask,<sup>83</sup> a purely divine intervention.<sup>84</sup> And yet the robe, Philosophy’s dress,

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<sup>83</sup> “*oculis ardentibus et ultra communem hominum valentiam perspicacibus*” (1, 1, 1) [*her burning eyes penetrated more deeply than those of ordinary men*].

<sup>84</sup> On “Die Gestalt der heilenden Philosophie,” see Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 33, as well as his commentary throughout 1, 1. He notes, as I have already quoted in n. 76, above, that *adstittisse*, the word the prisoner uses to describe the appearance of *Philosophia* is “Die Terminus technicus für das Auftreten einer Gottheit in einer Epiphanie.” Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 62, with references.

is also a material garment, and so the drying of his eyes is accomplished through the medium of a physical cloth: Philosophy holds the two worlds together, and administers the sacrament of her own mediation.

1, III

*SUBITO VIBRATUS LUMINE PHOEBUS*

-- uu | -- uu | -- ^ uu | -- uu | -- u u | -- --                   (dactylic hexameter)  
 -- uu | -- uu | -- ^ uu | -- u u   (dactylic tetrameter)

The poem that follows this extraordinary donation of *gratia* sustains the mystery of the moment. It seems not to be spoken aloud by either Philosophy or the prisoner. While it does appear that the prisoner is the narrator, as he recounts the experience he had at the moment she touches his eyes with her dress, he describes this in the past tense, retrospectively, and outside the dialogue. The poem is less a moment of action in the narrative, than it is an effort to poetically, metaphorically, embody the sacramental act that precedes it.

If we begin by abstracting the meter from the words, we see that the rhythmic structure has several notable features. The meter alternates line by line between dactylic hexameter and dactylic tetrameter. Every line has a caesura after the first beat of the third foot. That is, every line of this poem begins with the same metrical beat that has begun every line of the first two poems: -- uu -- uu --. But whereas the first poem's meter continued in dactyls until the interruption with the downbeat of the second hemiepes of each couplet's second line; and whereas the second poem was interrupted in every line by the adonic, here the dactyls are continued throughout both lines. After the caesura in the tetrameter, no fresh downbeat begins a new rhythm;

instead, the natural upbeat (uu) takes its expected place. However, after two poems in which this beat has been interrupted, is it any longer the expected pattern? Or has the expected become the unexpected and does its presence therefore bring the surprise of its return? The remainder of the second line, however, uses this continuation of the expected dactylic beat to bring about its own surprising rhythmic turn. Because the upbeat, uu, continues the dactylic meter, the listener naturally expects the remainder of the line to continue as the first line, i.e. through three more dactylic feet to complete the hexameter. But this second line has only one more foot, a dactyl. The effect, when isolated, is that the line ends prematurely and abruptly. The listener is expecting a line of at least five, if not of six feet, that is, for the line to continue  $\wedge uu | -- uu | -- u u | -- --$ , or at least  $\wedge uu | -- u u | -- --$ . Instead, the listener hears a very abrupt  $\wedge uu | -- u u$ . This plays an unmistakable role in the poem, and we will now turn to the words to hear how it sounds.

The literary structure of the poem is straightforward: the first two lines describe the return of strength to the prisoner's eyes, and the remaining eight lines develop a metaphor which describes this event. Each couplet has a notable coherence of meaning and syntax.

*Tūnc mē dīscūssā<sup>^</sup> līquērūnt nōctē tēnēbraē  
lūmīnībūsquē prīōr<sup>^</sup> rēdīt vīgōr, (1, III, 1-2)*

*Thén was night's dárkness dispélléd and its shádows released me enlíghtened,  
Thén to me éyes came their úsual pótency.*

The opening line expresses a complete statement; almost entirely spondaic, it moves slowly, and describes the dissipation of the night and its shadows, with the emphasis on the final two feet, the dactyl-spondee combination *nōctē tēnēbraē*. The second line

moves more quickly, mimicking the sudden return of vigor to the prisoner's eyes. This line offers us the first opportunity to hear the effect of the shortening of the line to four feet. The first two and a half feet give the listener the sense that the pace and contemplative, descriptive largess of dactylic hexameter will continue. After the pause, the line resumes with *rēdīt vīgōr*, an expected  $\text{^}\text{uu} | \text{--} \text{u} \text{u}$ . The two short syllables of *vīgōr* proclaim the quickness of life returning, but . . . where is the rest of the line? The listener is expecting *da da dum da da dum da da dum dum*, or at least *da da dum da da dum dum*; but instead hears *da da dum da da—*. What one expects, in other words, is for *vīgōr* to be followed by the downbeat of another foot, either a spondee to end the line or another dactyl and then a closing spondee. But these expected syllables are absent.

Or are they? If we move to the next line, that is, from the end of the first couplet's second line to the beginning of the second couplet's first line (i.e. the third line of the poem), we find the beats we are waiting for, that is, a continuation of the dactylic hexameter, albeit without the expected line ending. By shortening the line, the poet has grafted the subsequent hexameter on to the end of the tetrameter, and made the transition between these lines disappear, obliging the listener to accept the next line as though it is part of the previous one. Curiously, the result of this metric continuation, or *synapheia*, is that the transition between the couplets has a seamless quality—one leads to the next without any break in rhythm or time.

In the first instance, line 2 gives way immediately to the *ut* of line 3 that is the literary fulcrum of the poem's metaphor. We hear, as though only one line:

*Lūmīnībūsquē prīōr rēdīt vīgōr / ūt cūm praēcīpītī glōmērāntūr sīdĕră Cōrō* (1, III, 2-3)

*Thén to me éyes came their úsual pótency / júst as when másses of clóuds are compácted by squálls of the Wést Wind*

The result is that the comparison initiated by *ut* is metrically woven into a single acoustic piece with the first lines. The comparison is drawn between, on the one side, the departure of the mental shadows and the return of strength to the prisoner's eyes, described in the first two lines, and, on the other side, an analogous situation in the weather. The clouds build up, darkness covers the earth, and suddenly the north wind blows the obstructing clouds away and the sun strikes the marveling eyes below. The comparison seems straightforward until we examine it more closely, and we discover that the poet has already used the terms of the second half of the comparison in the first half. That is, the darkness of the prisoner's mind/eyes is already described in the physical terms of shadows and darkness, not only in the first line of this poem (*nocte tenebrae*), and in the preceding prose (*nubes*), but also in the preceding poem (*Heu quam praecipiti . . . tenebras*, here acoustically recalled by *praecipiti*). And so the comparison reads: the dark night of shadows dispersed just as . . . when the dark clouds disperse. The same is true for the comparison of the return of strength to the eyes with the emergence of the sun: the eyes are referred to in the first place as *lumina*, and then compared with *subito vibratus lumine Phoebus*. The eyes/lights were revealed just as . . . when the light of the sun is revealed. This doubling of the descriptive terms gives the central comparison of the poem a circular or inwardly referential character, and draws attention to a perplexing ambiguity in what *Philosophia* is doing. When she makes a fold in her dress, is she wiping away real tears, or metaphorical ones? Is she treating a problem with his physical sight, or with his mental vision? Is *lumen* the light of his eyes or the light of his mind? And what might be the relation between these two? Boethius' intention is clearly to raise, not answer, these questions, as he introduces the ambiguity

without commentary. Somehow, the touch of *Philosophia's* dress is at once physical and intellectual, and the distinction between body and soul is blurred even before it is made.

The result of the poem's metaphorical circularity is that the central comparison of the poem has a structure similar to that of the metric beat. Each couplet leads seamlessly to the beginning of itself over again, just as the metaphor's second half reuses the terms of the first. The overall effect is that the entire poem has a seamless quality, an inner unity: a repeated circle of acoustic motion, matched with a circular movement of imagery. There is no break in the space between couplets, nor any break in the visual image. The unity of these lines is therefore a poetic embodiment of the mysterious, self-contained character of the theurgical intervention it aims to describe. There is here no invitation or even possibility of ratiocination or discursivity; only a recurrent circle of sound—meter and metaphor, rhythm and representation.

Such an effect can be achieved only by internal consistency, which this poem has to a remarkable degree: there is a caesura in every line after the first beat of the third foot; the final foot of the hexameter is always a spondee, and the final foot of the tetrameter always a dactyl. One variation of interest: in four of the five tetrameters, the second beat of the third foot (that is, the beat immediately following the caesura), is comprised of two short syllables; in only one, line 6, is it a long syllable. This falls on *nox* and thus contrasts with the first line's *nocte tenebrae* and thereby emphasizes the identity of the two sides of the comparison (the mind's night of shadows / shadowy night falling on the earth) by employing the same term.

The poem's circular metric structure poses a problem, however: how to finish it? If the shortening of the second line of each couplet is used to lead to the next couplet, what happens in the final instance, when there is no subsequent couplet to absorb the otherwise abrupt ending of the tetrameter? If we stay strictly within the poem, there is no denying the abruptness of the poem's ending: *rādīs fērīt*. The sharpness of the sun's striking the eyes with its rays is a visually striking image, just as the acoustic ending is abrupt, and so there is a balance in these concluding words between rhythm and image.<sup>85</sup> And perhaps there is something appropriate to concluding the description of the mystery with a sudden ending, a jolt that alerts the listener to the end of a mystical poetic meditation. Nonetheless, it is curious to note that the first five syllables of the following prose section, when scanned poetically, continue the dactylic flow of the poem's final line, before being gently overtaken by the rhythm of the prose. What we hear is:

*ēmīcāt ēt sūbītō^ vībrātūs lūmīnē Phoēbūs*  
*mīrāntēs ōcūlōs^ rādīs fērīt . . . Haūd ālītēr trīs . . .* (1, III, 9-10—1, 3, 1)

*It flashes forth and, with light unexpected, shimmering Phoëbus*  
*Batters our eyes with his rays in our wonderment . . . Just so the sad*<sup>86</sup>

If we hear these first syllables as continuing the meter of the poem, our listening is confirmed by the meaning of the words: "*Haud aliter tristitiae nebulis dissolutis*" (1, 3, 1) [*not otherwise the clouds of sadness having been dispelled*]. That is, the first words of the prose keep within the internal circularity of the poem—metrically, imaginatively, and

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<sup>85</sup> Indeed, Gruber suggests something like this for the role of the tetrameter throughout the entire poem: "Das plötzliche Abbrechen im Tetrameter könnte die überraschende Wendung widerspiegeln." Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 100.

<sup>86</sup> I have added my own translation of these first words of prose to Relihan's translation of the poetry.

syntactically.<sup>87</sup> Heard in this way, the meter gently disappears in the sixth and seventh syllables of the prose; that is, in the second and third syllables of *tristitiaē*. And so the meter vanishes in the middle of the word *sadness*, the clouds of which sadness are in that sentence said to vanish in the very way that the poem has just described. The play is on *haud aliter*: not only are the clouds said to disappear in a meter that is not otherwise than the one used to describe their disappearance, but the statement of their disappearance coincides with, is not otherwise than, the disappearance of the meter. Here rhythmic sound, visual image, and psychophysical recovery are all one.

The experience, both acoustic and psychological, is the inverse of that of the opening elegy. There, trapped in the *maestos modos*, both by rhythm and emotion, the prisoner's poem is an enactment of his domination by the muses. Here, from a recollected distance, he composes a poem that describes an opposite effect: the blindness of emotion is lifted, and the rhythm is saturated with the unity of this divine intervention. It is remarkable that this very different rhythmic effect is accomplished by an adjustment of only a few beats, that is, by substituting for the second hemiepes of the pentameter a foot and a half of dactyls.

Before leaving this poem, it is interesting to note a provocative tension implicit in the final image that completes the central metaphor. The poem's final two couplets complete the comparison in literally striking terms.

*hānc sī Thrēicīō^ Bōrēs ēmīssūs āb āntrō  
vērberēt ēt clāūsūm^ rēsērēt dīēm,*

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<sup>87</sup> “At the purely formal level I m3 furnishes a clear illustration of the interdependence between poetry and prose, for it is an incomplete simile, introduced by ‘ut’ (v. 3), which is syntactically linked to the following prose section, introduced by ‘Haud aliter’ (I 3,1).” John Magee, “Boethius’ Anapestic Dimeters (Acatalectic), with Regard to the Structure and Argument of the *Consolatio*,” in *Boèce ou la chaîne des savoirs: Actes du colloque international de la Fondation Singer-Polignac: Paris, 8-12 juin 1999*, ed. Alain Galonnier, *Philosophes Médiévaux* (Louvain and Paris: Peeters, 2003), 147-48.

*ēmīcāt ēt sūbītō<sup>^</sup> vībrātūs lūmīnē Phoēbūs  
mīrāntēs ōcūlōs<sup>^</sup> rādīs fērit. (1, III, 7-10)*

*Thén should the Nóρθ Wind, releásed from its bóndage in Thrácian cáverns,  
Sháke out the níght and unbár captive dáy again,  
Ít flashes fóρθ and, with líght unexpectéd, shímmering Phoēbus  
Bátters our éyes with his ráys in our wónderment.*

Sometimes when the storm clouds have amassed and poured darkness upon the earth, the North wind arises from his cave and strikes away the clouds, so that the sun suddenly appears, striking the eyes below. The power and speed of the North wind is wonderfully portrayed by the seamless transition between the couplets, allowing *emicat* to absorb the sudden and forceful effects of its power. In the final couplet, the poet piles on words in an effort to convey the overwhelming effect of the sun's sudden appearance. If we parenthesize words necessary in English but not present in Latin, a translation might be: *and (the) sun suddenly shines forth, flashing (with) light, striking wondering eyes (with its) rays*. These are the words the prisoner gives us to describe the moment after the tears were cleared from his eyes. We have a sense that his language falters, just as the image ultimately supersedes itself. Anyone who has had the experience of emerging from darkness to suddenly gaze at the sun knows that its brightness initially overwhelms—and momentarily destroys—sight, rather than empowers it. Paradoxically, the moment of the return of the prisoner's sight invokes the darkness of superabundant light; blindness in the face of the sun. We soon find the prisoner's eyes will adjust, but not before the dynamic of his recovery is revealed by Philosophy's sight-restoring touch: here, consolation is the corporeal reception of divine plenty.

1, 3  
*PHILOSOPHIA*

The prose immediately following this remarkable poem stresses the healing nature of Philosophy's touch as well as the recognizing, reciprocating gaze it makes possible.

Haud aliter tristitiae nebulis dissolutis hausit caelum et ad cognoscendam medicantis faciem mentem recepi. Itaque ubi in eam deduxi oculos intuitumque defixi, respicio nutricem meam, cuius ab adolescentia laribus obversatus fueram, Philosophiam. (1, 3, 1-2)

Just so the clouds of misery were dispelled, and I drank in the clear light of my healer's face. So, when I looked on her clearly and steadily, I saw the nurse who brought me up, whose house I had from my youth frequented, the lady Philosophy. (Trans. Tester)

Finally able to return this woman's gaze and look steadily upon her face, the prisoner recognizes her as the nurse who reared him from his youth, *magistra virtutum*, whose name is *Philosophia*. We recall from the preceding prose that she predicted the prisoner would eventually recover and recognize her, as he had known her before: "*si quidem nos ante cognoverit*" (1, 2, 6). We should also note that her outrage results from seeing that the poetic muses were distracting not merely an unlettered man but one reared on Eleatic and Academic arguments (1, 1, 10). There is, then, considerable emphasis on the prisoner's prior relationship with Philosophy. The implication is that the one who had once learned the arguments of philosophic wisdom and freedom may be rescued by recovering that knowledge. It is a sensible enough assertion. What is striking, though, is the pronounced physicality and emotional depth of the dramatic scene. As in the preceding prose, when she touches his eyes with her dress, here, too,

the power of the text is in the dramatic action rather than in an isolable argument; or rather, the drama is the argument, the living manifestation of the consoling word and deed.

The prisoner's recognition of Philosophy is mediated by his recollection of her as the nurse of his youth, in whose house and presence he had dwelt since a child. This recognition thus recalls the first words she addressed to him, while holding him intently in her gaze: "are you really the same man who, once upon a time nursed with my milk, raised on my food, emerged into the strength and vigor of a mature mind?" (1, 2, 2). In this question, the metaphor is perhaps so obvious that we make the transferal immediately—she wasn't *really* his nurse, it is her role as a teacher that is being *compared* to the role of a wet nurse. But why use this comparison at all, and why so pointedly and at such pivotal moments (i.e. her first self-description and his first association of her upon recognition), unless the metaphor better expresses the truth than the bare literal truth could on its own? It is the invocation of the emotional bond of infant and nurse that first motivates the prisoner's recovery rather than the arguments which we might have supposed to be the real milk. And even the emotional bond is only metaphorically understood from *nutrix*; the truly literal emphasis is on immediately sensitive (tactile) perception, or ingestion. Drinking milk from the breast nourished the baby. Now that the nurse has returned to the man, what will be her remedies, and how will she administer them?

Even before she mentions her gentle medicines, we are attuned to the physical dimension of Philosophy's presence, and especially to the physicality of her interaction with the prisoner. First she gazes intently at him (sight), then she speaks to him

(hearing), then she wipes away his tears (touch). Only then, the activity of his senses actualized, does he recognize her: he drinks in the light (*hausi caelum*—sight, metaphorically mixed with taste); he looks at and recognizes her (sight)—this by means of remembering her as his nurse (taste and touch); and finally recovers his ability to speak. The nutritive and the sensitive aspects of soul, and the way these mediate cognition, are in the foreground of Philosophy's consolation. The imagery and narrative is incredibly rich and difficult to interpret. Would he recover his sight if her gaze were not already upon him? What is the difference in vision between the prisoner who is able to see Philosophy clearly enough to give a detailed description of her, but nonetheless does not recognize her, and the prisoner who, after Philosophy touches his eyes, recognizes her as the nurse of his youth? This much at least is clear: physical intervention—visual, auditory, haptic—restores his memory and looses his tongue.

He nonetheless does not understand why she has come to him. *I was your nurse*, she replies, *could I abandon you, when you suffer under my name? Do you think this is the first time that she, Wisdom (sapientia) has been attacked?* (1, 3, 3-6). Her answer to his question of why she has come, is that she does not desert her own. She lists several examples of other of her students whom she stood by in persecution, and this summary brings her to the concluding, assuring statement—that the forces of stupidity are inherently unable to cause any danger to those protected by wisdom. The narrative force of this history is strong; if the prisoner has really grasped what she has said, his consolation would be near complete—he would have recovered his identity, his formation with and by Philosophy, her presence with him now and always. But without pausing to see if he has understood, and without changing her theme, she continues in poetry.

## 1, IV

*INVICTUM POTUIT TENERE VULTUM*

-- -- -- u u -- x -- u -- --

(phalacean hendecasyllable)

At first glance, the meter is a confusing one. Despite the fact that all but one of its syllables is inalterable, it is nonetheless difficult to discern a consistent beat. The anceps (the seventh of the eleven syllables) in fact denies the possibility of this consistency. Were the anceps always a long syllable, the first seven syllables would be divisible into three feet: spondee, dactyl, spondee. This is in fact how four of the lines unfold. By far the majority of the lines, however, that is, the remaining fourteen, have a short syllable in the seventh position. Before examining the effect of the anceps, it is interesting to note that *if* we group the first six syllables as in a dactylic beat, we have spondee, dactyl, and long downbeat, that is, the same two and a half feet with which every line of every poem has so far begun. Not only does the beat follow that of every other line, the placement of syllables is inalterable, and so these “feet”, if that is what they are, leave no room for doubt about their rhythm. There is no substitution and so there is never any hesitation about whether an alteration will break this consistent opening of each line. It is simply the same, every time. It is also worth noting that in addition to the fact that the three previous poems each have the same beat in the first two and a half feet of every line, many also have exactly this distribution of syllables (-- -- -- u u --), twenty-four of fifty-six lines so far. Of these, seventeen occur in the only poem given by *Philosophia*, which has a total of twenty-four lines. Whatever else may prove significant about this consistency, it is at least worth noting that this beat has

been used in every poem, and that this arrangement of syllables is by now very familiar.

Turning now to the rest of the line, we observe that in most lines it continues:  $\wedge$  u -- u -- --. Of the 18 lines, fourteen have a caesura between these two sides of the line and in eleven of these the anceps is short. That is, eleven of the lines scan -- -- -- u u --  $\wedge$  u -- u -- --. Of the remaining three lines that have a caesura, the anceps is long. Of the four lines that have no caesura at this point in the line, three have the anceps as short. The fourth of these (l.6) is an exceptional line, as its seventh position has two short syllables. What this formal analysis reveals is that while the second halves of the lines demonstrate a certain regularity, there is enough alteration as to refuse a definite pattern. *Most* lines have the anceps as short, and *most* lines have a caesura. Yet nearly half of the lines lack one or the other of these characteristics. What we have, therefore, is a strong, inalterable pattern in the first half of each line, and a highly alterable, but still discernable pattern in the second half. What happens when we put the two halves together? Leaving the caesura aside, we note that all but four lines have the anceps as short, and can be represented as:

-- -- -- u u -- u -- u -- --.

If we put the first six syllables together in feet of two beats each—as we might reasonably do given their resemblance with the first half of every other line we have:

-- -- | -- u u | --

and so we might expect another full beat (with or without a caesura) to follow. Instead, what we have is only one short syllable, or a half beat followed by another long syllable, which we hear as another downbeat, that is:

--- | -- u u | -- **u** | --.

In other words, there is a syncopation of the rhythm, in which half of the upbeat is absent. This syncopation is then repeated with another half upbeat,

--- | -- u u | -- u | -- **u** | ---

before the steadiness is reasserted in the final spondee. That it is a reasserted beat is confirmed by the beginning of the rhythm of the next line. If we extend our analysis to the remaining lines, which have the anceps as long or, in one case, as two short syllables, we see that the first syncopation is missing; in its place, we have a normal upbeat to complete the third foot, that is

--- | -- u u | -- uu.

This delays the syncopation to the one that occurs in every line between the third last and second last syllables. And so we have:

--- | -- u u | -- uu | -- u ---.

We can hear this syncopation clearly, either when it is double (with a short anceps) or single (with a long one). In the first case, we have:

*dum dum dum da da dum da dum da dum dum.*

And in the second:

*dum dum dum da da dum dum dum da dum dum.*

We can already imagine how this regular beginning followed by syncopation might be an appropriate meter for the message of this poem—that the wise person is unperturbed by the change and turmoil of the world. Just as the wise person does not lose his stability amidst the changes of fortune, so, too, the meter, despite this irregular

syncopation, always returns to the course of its consistent rhythm, withstanding the assaults of the irregular beat.

In addition to the general suitability of the meter to its theme, the poem has many delightful moments where the matching of meter and words has a particularly engaging or even humorous result.

*Quīsquīs cōmpōsītō sērēnūs aēvō  
fātūm sūb pēdībūs ēgīt sūpērbūm  
fōrtūnāmquē tūēns ūtrāmquē rēctūs  
īnvīctūm pōtūit tēnērē vūltūm (1, IV, 1-4)*

*Īn trānquillity, life secūre and sētled,  
Ūprīght, feēt on the nēck of peacock Fōrtune,  
Loóking squárely at fáte, benígn or brútal—  
Hé úncónquered, who képt his beárings, dreáds not*

The imagery of the poem begins with that of the person who has ground fate underfoot, able to stand upright and hold steady, looking serenely at either good or bad fortune. It is appropriate, even rather light-hearted, of *Philosophia* to place the poem's first syncopation on *sērēnūs*, that is, on the first adjective that describes the one who is unaffected by the changes of fortune (or rhythm). The long ē for the anceps of the second line, on *ēgīt*, contrasts with the parallel, short first syllable of *sērēnūs* in the previous line, and stresses the power exerted over fate, just as the accented long ū within a spondee on *ūtrām*, brings out the equanimity of the wise man, further emphasized by the quick syncopation that leads to the closing spondee on *rēctūs*.

*nōn illūm rābīēs mīnaēquē pōntī  
vērsūm fūndītūs exāgītāntīs aēstūm  
nēc rūptīs quōtīēns vāgūs cāmīnīs  
tōrquēt fūmīfīcōs Vēsaēvūs īgnēs  
aūt cēlsās sōlītī fērīrē tūrrēs  
ārdētīs vīā fūlmīnīs mōvēbīt.(1, IV, 1-6)*

*He dreads not . . .  
Thé ínsánity óf the ócean's ménace,*

*Whén ít chúrns up the wáves from dépths abyýssal;  
 Nóř Vésúvius, whén from fráctured chímneys  
 Fíre fliés spíraling úp with smóke at rándom;  
 Nóř bríght trails of the líghtning bółts, accústomed  
 Tó démólísh the lófty tówers of prínces.*

In this section (ll. 5-10) the syncopations are used to audibly convey the instability of the events described: *mínaēquē pōntī, vāgūs cāmīnīs, Věsaēvūs īgnēs, fērīřě tūrrēs*. Similarly, the additional syllable caused by the unique resolution of the long in the anceps in line 6 (*exāgītantis aestum*) mimics the swelling of the ocean's rage.<sup>88</sup> Appropriately, too, this sentence begins with the familiar and inalterable meter matching the *nōn illūm*, that is, with the object and negation: we know that all the things about to be listed do *not* have an effect on this one mentioned. We must wait, however, for the final syncopation and last word of the sentence, *mōvēbīt*, to hear the verb we have been waiting for, and its placement amidst the syncopation has the effect of denying not only the powers of volcano, sea, and thunderbolt, but those of the unsteady beat as well.

The final section of the poem (ll. 11-18) begins with an exhortation not to fear the anger of those who have no power, where *vīřībūs* and *īmpōtētīs* are both syncopated, unsteady like the false power they describe. The final lines of the poem,

*āt quīsquīs trēpídūs pāvēt věl ōptāt,  
 quōd nōn sīt stābílīs sūīquē iūrīs,  
 ābiēcīt clīpēūm lōcōquē mōtūs  
 nēcītī quā vālēāt trāhī cātēnām. (1, IV, 15-18)*

*Bút á cóward who dreáds or lóngs for sómething,  
 Whó cánnót stand his gróund upón his ówn ríghts,  
 Hás díscárded his shíeld; out óf pósítion,  
 Hé hás fáshíoned the cháín he'll weár in slávery.*

describe the inherent instability of fear and desire and of their consequences. The syncopations are particularly vivid: *pāvēt věl ōptāt, sūīquē iūrīs, lōcōquē mōtūs*. The final

<sup>88</sup> See Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 117.

two words deliver the last punch both metrically and narratively. The result of giving over to fear and desire is that the person ties the very chain with which he may be dragged; *trāhī cātēnām* begins with the quick fastening of the rope (*trāhī*), the harsh C (*cā*) altogether foreboding, and the noose is tightened with the firm tug of the final spondee (*tēnām*): *trāhī cātēnām*.

What is surprising about this poem is that despite its irregularities, when we read it through in its entirety, the beat is actually quite regular. The first half of the line gives a steady drive to the beat, and the syncopation—as any musician might expect—picks up the tempo; and then the final spondee takes up this gained momentum, and this re-established beat, and directs it to the next line. Paradoxically, the syncopation serves to give the poem a quick pace, a fast inner movement, and even a rather catchy rhythm. The meter, at first glance confusing and disorienting, when heard repeatedly, is consistent and even attractive; the rhythm is a means of achieving the stability it describes. It sounds as a metrical foreshadowing of the argument that will appear towards the *Consolation's* conclusion—even the inconsistencies of fortune are comprehended in the order of divine knowledge. The argument is not yet developed, and is present here only in the form of rhythm and image. With these embodied medicines, Philosophy speaks the sound of freedom, as though to awaken the prisoner's desire for self-possession. So fine is her explanation and so gentle her efforts, that we are left wondering, as at the conclusion of the preceding prose—is the prisoner's consolation nearly complete, or has it even begun? Has he heard her words, or is he even listening?

1, 4

*ANIMO ILLABUNTUR?*

*Philosophia* puts this very question to her patient upon finishing her poem:

Sentisne, inquit, haec atque animo illabuntur tuo, an ὄνος λύρασ? (4, 1, 1)

She said: Do you understand this? Does it work its way into your mind?  
Or are you like an ass to the lyre?

Though it is clear Philosophy is invoking a common proverb, going back at least to Menander,<sup>89</sup> employed by way of metaphorical comparison, ὄνος λύρασ is also literally appropriate. If normally the proverb (“like an ass hearing the lyre”) is metaphorically employed to describe, as O’Donnell suggests, someone who is “obtuse to higher things,”<sup>90</sup> it is worth asking whether here it is rather the literal origin of the words that Philosophy intends. She has just concluded a poem in lyric poetry, that is, the poetry accompanied by a lyre—and it seems she is asking him: do you hear this? Her use of the word *illabuntur* with *animo* supports this more literal interpretation: has her music slid into, penetrated, flowed into, his soul? We don’t need to choose between the metaphorical and literal meanings, but we must acknowledge—as with the touch of her dress, and as with the description of her as *nutrix*—there is a reversal of the direction of metaphor, so that we end up with more of a literal description than of an implied association. Of course, in this case, the metaphor is still present, as the prisoner is not really an ass; but the critical interpretive jump we would normally make upon hearing that proverb—leaving music and the lyre behind in favor of an abstracted deeper meaning—we are not meant to make. Philosophy’s intention really is to touch the

<sup>89</sup> On the history of the ὄνος λύρασ phrase, which includes a Menippean satire under this title by Varro, see Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 119-120.

<sup>90</sup> See his commentary on ὄνος λύρασ in Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae*, ed. James J. O’Donnell, Bryn Mawr Latin Commentaries (Bryn Mawr: Bryn Mawr College, 1990).

prisoner's soul with her poetic lyre. How she can touch his soul—still another contradiction that begs for metaphorical resolution—is the mystery at hand.

She then quotes part of a line of Homeric hexameter: “Ἐχάυδα, μή κεῦθε νόω (Speak out, don't hide it in your mind)” (1, 4, 1).<sup>91</sup> This poetic exhortation precipitates the prisoner's first truly active engagement in the narrative. “*Si operam medicantis expectas*” she says, “*oportet vulnus detegas*” (“If you are expecting the work of healing, you must bare the wound”) (1, 4, 1). So encouraged, the prisoner now states his complaint, and at great length. It amounts to this: that wicked men are able to accomplish their designs and remain unpunished, while good men suffer at their hands unjustly.

1, V

FORTUNAE SALO

uu uu | uu uu || uu uu | uu -- (anapaestic dimeter)

His poem continues the charge of the preceding prose, though here he acknowledges God's order to be effective in the realm of nature. Only the affairs of men seem to him to be exempt. Looking at the meter on its own, we immediately see that the prisoner has broken from the pattern of the poetry up to this point. Every other poem was either dactylic or could at least be heard in the line openings as dactylic. Here the beat is quite noticeably different. To begin with, whereas every other line thus far has begun with a long syllable, here the long syllable may be resolved into two shorts, a possibility that radically changes the expectation of each line's beginning.

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<sup>91</sup> *Iliad*, 1.363. The words are spoken by the goddess Thetis, to her son, the hero Achilles, when he is sitting alone in quiet grief. She appears at his side to comfort him as his mother; he responds to these words by explaining the grievance behind his sorrow. By putting this metered Homeric quotation in Philosophy's mouth, Boethius gives her words an epic sway. The prisoner, suddenly cast as Achilles speaking to his goddess mother, is persuaded to state his complaint in full, as Achilles does in reply to the same words.

Furthermore, the line is divided into two metrons of equal value. Whereas in the other poems, the caesura was normally placed after the first beat of the third foot, here there is a diaeresis after the second foot, that is, a word break between the two halves of the line, each half comprised of a one anapaestic measure, or metron. The meter's most pronounced formal characteristic is this equality of division: two metrons of two feet of two beats each, each of which can be divided into two equal syllables.<sup>92</sup>

It is the prisoner's third poem. His second poem, however (the clearing of his eyes), is retrospectively written, and does not seem designed to convey the prisoner's state of mind *at the time* but rather to enact or represent the clearing of his eyes that Philosophy's touch mystically effected. This poem, and his first poem (the elegy), by contrast, are represented to occur when and as they did in real time; and therefore, their differences, both in terms of meter and message, are telling. Whereas in the first poem he could only lament Fortune's inconstancy, here he acknowledges that the planets and seasons—and, in fact, all things except human affairs—are governed by law. Whereas in his first poem, he cries to an unknown listener, here he addresses the *conditor* of the universe. And whereas in the first he is overtaken by the sad measures, the *maestos modos* of its elegiac rhythm, here he at least attempts to harness a consistent beat. All these are early signs that his recovery has begun, that Philosophy's presence, her touch, voice, and gaze have had some effect. Despite this progress, however, the message of the poem is not order, but a lack thereof, and the character of the address is not prayer, but complaint.

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<sup>92</sup> “. . . the rhythm of anapaests is firm and regular, suitable for the musical setting of marches and processions.” James W. Halporn, Martin Ostwald, and Thomas G. Rosenmeyer, *The Meters of Greek and Latin Poetry* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 20.

Especially notable metrically, given the poem's high degree of rhythmic symmetry, are the two exceptions to the meter: lines 36 and 45. In line 31 we have the sole monometer of the poem: *crimen iniqui*. These words conclude the complaint that human affairs alone are exempt from divine law.

*Ōmniā cērtō || finē gūbērnāns  
hōmīnūm sōlōs || rēspūis āctūs  
mērītō rēctōr || cōhibērē mōdō.  
Nām cūr tāntās || lūbricā vērsāt  
Fōrtūnā vicēs? || prēmīt īnsōntēs  
dēbītā scēlērī || nōxiā poēnā,  
āt pērvērsī || rēsīdēt cēlsō  
mōrēs sōlīō || sānctāquē cālcānt  
īniūstā vicē || cōllā nōcētēs.  
Lātēt ōbscūrīs || cōndītā vīrtūs  
clārā tēnēbrīs || iūstūsquē tūlīt  
crīmēn īnīquī.  
Nīl pēriūrīā, nīl nōcēt īpsīs  
fraūs mēndācī cōmptā cōlōrē,  
sēd cūm lībūit vīrībūs ūtī,  
quōs īnnūmērī mētūūnt pōpūlī  
sūmmōs gaūdēt sūbdērē rēgēs. (1, V, 25-41)*

*Cóntrólling all thǐngs towárd their set óbject,  
Only húmán deéds you disdaín to rein ín  
In the wáy they desérve—you, their hélmsmán.  
So it ís; whý cán slíppery Fórtune  
Cause such chángē and such spórt? Hárd púnishment dué  
For the breách of the lāv quáshes the guíltless;  
Dégénerate wáys on a lóftý thróne  
Crush beneáth their heél, guíltý and sínful,  
Thé nécks of the goód in hórrid revérsal.  
Ánd glórious ríght is shrouéded in sháddow,  
Búried in dárkness; thé júst man accépts  
Bláme for the wícked.  
Nó, nó t pérjury, nó proud impósture  
Hárms ór húrts thé, dréssed in false cólors;  
Bút whén they delíght in fléxing their músclēs,  
Gládlý they óverthrow prómīnent prínces,  
Thóse whó térrorize númerless nátions.*

The just bear the punishment that ought to be borne by the wicked. The silence of a metron places a rhetorical emphasis on the statement, especially the words that

break this silence, that is, on the comparison he makes beginning in line 37 (at *Nil periuria*) with the unpunished lives of wicked men. More pointed still, is not what the silence does to the words that follow, but what it is in itself—an acoustic break which undermines the metric rule, a defiant violation of an order that is revealed to be merely apparent.

The second exception to the meter is in line 45:

*Ō iām mīserās || rēspicē tērrās,  
quīsquīs rērūm || foēdērā nēctīs!  
ōpērīs tāntī || pārs nōn vīlīs  
hōmīnēs quātīmūr || fōrtūnaē sālō. (1, V, 42-45)*

*Nów, nów have regárd for pítiful nátions,  
Whóever you áre who bīnd the wórlđ's cóncord.  
We are nó póór párt óf thís vást wórlđ,  
But we mén are thrown róund bý Fórtúne's salt wáve,<sup>93</sup>*

where *hōmīnēs quātīmūr fōrtūnaē sālō* has an extra beat. After scanning the first three words of this line as uu -- | uu -- || -- -- | --, the meter can only be completed with a single long syllable. Instead, we have u --, a trochee, on the word *sālō* (*wave*). The extra short syllable is slipped in and trips up the meter just as the lives of humans are overturned by the billowing wave of fortune, the fickleness of which contrasts—and undermines—the importance of human kind which was asserted by the successive spondees of the previous line. Taken with the rest of the poem, its otherwise strict equality and regularity of measure, these two exceptions disclose more precisely the prisoner's psychological state: it is not that he is unable to perceive any order, but that he is unable to see it as effective all the way down the cosmic chain; order in the lives of humankind, for him, is pure illusion.

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<sup>93</sup> As Relihan does not include the extra beat, of line 45 is my own. Relihan translates: “*Wé mórtals, storm-tóssed on Fórtune's salt ócean—*.”

These exceptions to the meter—both of which describe injustice in human affairs—seem to be foreshadowed a few lines above:

*Ōmniā cērtō || finē gūbērnāns  
hōmīnūm sōlōs || rēspūis āctūs  
mēritō rēctōr || cōhibērē mōdō. (1, V, 25-7)*

*Cóntrólling all thǐngs towárd their set óbject,  
Only húmán deéds you disdáin to rein ín  
with desérved meásúre—you, their hélmsmán.<sup>94</sup>*

If we recall the poet's use, in 1, I, of *modus* to refer to poetic measure—in particular, to the measures the prisoner was forced to enter—it is appropriate that he would describe the unrestrained character of human affairs as discordant with their rightful *modus*, and that his examples of this discordance would violate the otherwise consistent meter.

As with 1, I, there are also indications of how we are to see this poem in the surrounding prose. Retrospectively, the prisoner's *Itaque libet exclamare (and so I must exclaim)* (1, 4, 46) which precedes the poem, is clearly part of the real-time narrative, and serves as his implicit justification both of the poem and of its form. But the perfect tense postlude to the poem—*Haec ubi continuato dolore delatravi (When I was through barking all this out in my protracted lamentation)* (1, 5, 1)—is a comment from the author's after the fact perspective. The first of these confirms the self-certainty of the prisoner's complaint, while the second undermines this apparent surety by retrospectively comparing the poem to a barking dog. The two tenses of the narrative are used to describe both the prisoner's state in real time and assess that state from a more self-conscious standpoint in the future.

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<sup>94</sup> I have altered line 27 of Relihan's translation in order to emphasize *merito modo*. His translation reads: "In the wáy they desérve-- you, their hélmsmán."

1, 5

*LENIORIBUS PAULISPER UTEMUR*

But perhaps the clearest indication of the success, or failure, of his poetic effort is again in the explicit reaction of the listening Philosophy. After the first poem, she gave a tirade against the *scenicas meretriculas*, whose powers she blamed for his state of lethargy, and thereby confirmed the metrical effects we had perceived in the poem. Here, however, Philosophy's response is markedly different—the prisoner recounts: "*Haec ubi continuato dolore delatravi, illa vultu placido nihilque meis questibus mota*" (1, 5, 1) [When I was through barking all this out in my protracted lamentation, Philosophy maintained her serene expression and was in no way moved by all my complaining]. Whatever the prisoner hoped to accomplish with this poem, it has no visible effect on his doctor.

Yet she does have something to say about it. On the basis of his complaint—both in prose and in poetry—Philosophy is able to make a more complete diagnosis of her patient: to her, his grief demonstrates that he has banished himself from his (and her) homeland. Her summary of his complaint refers to the end of the prisoner's "raging poem."<sup>95</sup> To her, his poem demonstrates a madness, or delirium, and it is this emotional agitation that most urgently requires her treatment. She explains: "*Sed quoniam plurimus tibi affectuum tumultus incubuit diversumque te dolor ira maeror distrahunt, uti nunc mentis es, nondum te validiora remedia contingunt*" [But since a diverse tumult of affections now possesses you, and sorrow, anger, and sadness are tearing you apart, it is not yet the time for stronger remedies].<sup>96</sup> She then states her prescription: "*Itaque lenioribus paulisper utemur, ut quae in tumorem perturbationibus influentibus induruerunt ad acrioris vim medicaminis*

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<sup>95</sup> "*in extremo Musae saevientis,*" 1, 5, 10.

<sup>96</sup> 1, 5, 11, trans. mine.

*recipiendam tactu blandiore mollescant*” [And so let us for a while use gentler medicines, so that what has hardened into a tumor by disturbing emotions, may be softened by a lighter touch for the receiving of a stronger medicine].<sup>97</sup> It is the first time Philosophy has mentioned any intention or system behind her actions—what she calls her medicines—toward the prisoner, and it invites us to observe what her various medicines are, and how and why they work.

1, VI

*SIGNAT TEMPORA PROPRIIS*

-- -- -- u u -- u --

(glyconic)

The following poem summarizes the medicinal wisdom Philosophy has just mentioned: applying harsher remedies to her patient, at this point in time, would be like sowing seeds in the heat of the sun or plucking grapes in spring to make wine. The poem is not strictly limited to this poetic expression of her method, however. It also hints at a response to the complaint of his poem: contrary to the prisoner’s claim that human affairs lie outside of God’s ordered harmony, Philosophy says “*nec quas ipse coercuit / misceri patitur vices*” [nor what he himself ordains / does he allow to be changed].<sup>98</sup> At this point she does not explain how that order is manifest; she simply says that it cannot be violated. The final lines:

*Sīc quōd praēcipītī vīā  
cērtūm dēsērīt ōrdīnēm  
laētōs nōn hābēt ēxītūs* (1, VI, 20-22)

*Só, déféctiōn frōm fīxēd désīgn  
Dōwn á réckless and heádstroḡ páth,*

<sup>97</sup> 1, 5, 12, trans. mine.

<sup>98</sup> 1, VI, 18-19, trans. mine.

*Fínds nó prófitablé resúlt*

are read most directly read in relation to Philosophy herself: if she rushes ahead of what her patient can handle, her treatment will fail. Yet because it is unlikely we are to believe that Philosophy would err in her treatment, the prisoner is a more likely subject for the indefinite subject of *quod* than she is. This reading is strengthened when we consider that one of the two former uses of the adjective *praeceps* was used (1, II) by Philosophy to describe the prisoner's darkened mind. In this case, *deserit ordinem* refers not only to the importance of appropriate treatment but also confirms Philosophy's earlier claim that the prisoner had exiled himself. The order the prisoner believes is absent is in fact implicitly present in that absence, his distraught state proof of his self-inflicted alienation from it.

The meter of the poem is an invariable glyconic one:

-- -- -- u u -- u --.

Glyconic is an Aeolic meter, among the oldest rhythms of lyric poetry, and has a plainly lyrical sound. This particular glyconic, with all three of its first syllables inalterably long, is especially gentle in its effects. It is the first poem of the work to have a perfectly inalterable rhythm; each line is a perfect measure, which results in an unflagging repetition of methodical sound. The inalterable *dum dum dum da da dum da dum* does have a soothing feel; the three long syllables establish a repetition, the next two shorts pick up the pace of the line, but within the space of one long, that is, within the established rhythm, which is further continued with the next long; while the final short-long achieves a finality by syncopating the rhythm ever so slightly, and this brief alteration is enough to give the final syllable a conclusory weight. Despite the fact that

lyric is measured in a whole metron and not by feet, it is nonetheless evident that the first six syllables (as in 1, IV) are divisible into two and a half dactylic feet. It is worth nothing this feature because it brings out the fleetness of the final two syllables, which is further accentuated by a preceding word break in nine of twenty-two lines. After listening to the poem repeatedly, one also notices that the sixth syllable takes on a slightly greater weight than the other long syllables do. Wedged between two short syllables, it is slightly stretched, as though its role is to slow the poem down, or bear its weight, before the iambic ending—a remarkably fluid one, like the light skip of a dancer’s step.

The result of the stretched long syllable, followed by the final short-long combination, is that these final syllables in each line stir the pace ever so slightly, and gently. All these effects can be heard in English:

*Óh goód Lórd have I cóme so fár?  
Thére mý lóve is it yoú, I seé?  
Cóme thís wáy over hére to mé.*

Indeed, it is difficult to find anything harsh about this poem’s rhythm. And appropriately so, as Philosophy’s objective here is not to stir the prisoner’s emotions, but to settle them. In the preceding prose, she has remarked on how he is pulled in different directions by the tumult of his affections, and here her aim is surely to calm the emotional storm with a gentler touch (*tactu blandiore*).

The unfailing repetition of the lyrical rhythm is matched with gentleness in the poem’s message. If there is a slight stirring of the rhythm at the end of each line, this is appropriate to the rather maternal, didactic character of the theme and imagery. *If you sow seeds in the heat of day, you’ll be looking for acorns in the woods. No one looks for violets in*

*the cold wind of autumn. You don't pick grapes in the spring if you want to make wine; Bacchus gives his gifts in the autumn rather.* It is the plainly obvious character of these examples that makes them reassuring, as there is a calming effect to things so simple they could never be mistaken. Something with a greater degree of risk or chance would have the effect of stirring up the prisoner's already volatile sense of disorder in the world. Instead, the images have a childlike simplicity, free from the anxiety of an unfaithful world. As a result, the meter and imagery are united in their effect of lulling the prisoner into a more peaceful state.

*Nūmquām pūrpūrēūm nēmūs  
lēctūrūs viōlās pētās (1, VI, 7-8)*

*Tó píck víolets, néver trý  
Púrplé fórests and gróves, not whén*

Here, the gentleness of the meter is underlined by the repetition of gentle nasal consonants in the first line (2 “n”s and 4 “m”s), and in both lines with the repeated soft rhyming endings on *nemus/lecturus* and *violas/petas*. Further, *violas/petas* falls on the end of a line, with the elongated sixth syllable on the last syllable of *viōlās*, while the rhyming second syllable of *pētās*, is on the next long syllable, the final sound of the line, a parallel placement which provides another link between these soft rhyming sounds.

A delightful effect is achieved just above, in line 5, right after the poet describes the one who sows seeds under the burning sun. The phrase concludes *ēlūsūs Cērērīs fīdē*. Here the three long syllables draw out the confusion of the one who has been eluded, while the quickly moving *Cērērīs fīdē* playfully portrays the elusive character of Ceres' trust.

*nēc quaērās āvidā mǎnū  
vērnōs strīngērē pālmītēs (1, VI, 11-12)*

*Nór wóuld you, with a greédy hánd,  
Rúsh tó prúne back the vínes in spríng,*

In the first of these lines, *nēc quaērās* nicely illustrates the stable gentleness of the three long syllables, while *āvīdā mǎnū* is an exemplary use of the uu -- u --, the two short syllables darting through the *āvīdā* like a hand reaching too soon into the vines, while the iamb matches the noun, *mǎnū*, with its preceding adjective.

In the following three lines, the right time for harvesting grapes is calmly explained:

*ūvīs sī lībēāt frūī;  
aūtūmnō pōtīūs sūā  
Bācchūs mūnērǎ cōntūlīt. (1, VI, 13-15)*

*If you wánt to enjój their grápes—  
Bācchús ráther in aútumn bríngs<sup>99</sup>  
Hís pártícular gifts to ús.*

In each of these, the opening three long syllables help to effect a certain reassurance which is complemented in each case by the line endings: take for example, the *dum dum dum* of *ūvīs sī* and its rhyming *da da dum da dum*, *lībēāt frūī*. The emphasis of the comparison then emerges on the slow *aūtūmnō*, followed by the light-footed *pōtīūs sūā*, which grammatically anticipates the gifts of Bacchus, described in the next line. This leads seamlessly into a summary of the poem so far: God marks each of the seasons to its proper duty. If we look at the three lines consecutively

*Bācchūs mūnērǎ cōntūlīt.  
Sīgnāt tēmpōrǎ prōprīīs  
āptāns ōfficiīs dēūs (1, VI, 15-17)*

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<sup>99</sup> I have slightly altered Relihan's translation of line 16 to better preserve the meaning of the quotation. His translation reads: "Nó, búť Bācchus in aútumn bríngs."

they constitute something of a grammatical palindrome: *Bacchus* (1) *gifts* (2) *confers* (3) || *marks* (3) *seasons* (2) *God* (1). The juxtaposition of gentle images, the reversal of the syntactical order, and the reassuring sound of the rhythm, together portray the stability of the divine axis upon which the temporal *exitus* and *reditus* revolves.

I, 6

*MODUS CURATIONIS*

In the prose following, Philosophy asks the prisoner if she may ask him a few diagnostic questions to determine more precisely what *modus curationis* (1, 6, 1) to employ for his recovery. Though *modus* again has a range of meanings, including *manner*, *way*, *method*, etc., it is difficult not to hear the more primary musical and rhythmic meanings—*mode*, *measure*, *beat*—and thus to hear *modus curationis* as a direct allusion to the rhythmic measures Philosophy will decide to employ. The prisoner's answer seems already to demonstrate an improved state of mind, when compared to his spoken words, precipitated by a similar moment in 1, 4, when Philosophy asks him in the words of Homer to lay bare his wound. In that instance, the prisoner responded with a lengthy lament in prose, followed by one in poetry, which poem he later derisively compared to a barking dog. Here, he calmly answers: "*Tu vero arbitrato, inquam, tuo quae voles ut responsurum rogato*" (1, 6, 2) [*As you think best, I said, ask whatever you like and I will answer*].<sup>100</sup> His answers to her subsequent questions, however, reveal that while he knows the origin of all things, he has forgotten their end, and that while he knows he is a rational animal, he does not know that he is something more than this as well. These answers are enough for Philosophy to decide on his treatment, and also

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<sup>100</sup> Trans. mine, resembling Relihan's.

to predict that he will recover—although it is only much later that she says why. On the basis of what she calls this tiny spark (*minima scintilla*)—his belief that the world is not ruled by chance but by divine reason—she says his *vitalis calor* can be restored.<sup>101</sup>

Before proceeding with her gentler medicines, she pauses to give a psychological justification for her method. Human minds, she says, are of such a nature that they take up false opinions as soon as they abandon true ones. Her statement suggests a view of the human mind in which there is no vacuum of belief possible; why the faculties of the soul cannot lie dormant she does not say, but it is according to this view that she believes the prisoner's current fog of false affections can be removed *lenibus mediocribusque fomentis* (1, 6, 21). Throughout this prose—as often throughout the first book—Philosophy makes declarative statements (about human minds, the prisoner's chance of recovery, etc.) with little explanation. Viewed from the point of view of what is often called “the argument,” these seem disjointed and out of place, because they are not philosophically justified at the time. But as the primary medicine at this stage is administered not by the exercise of the mind but through the senses, these isolated statements serve only as assuring declarations of fact, mixed in with the primary forms of consolation. The explanations will come later in her work, when they, too, can be medicine.

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<sup>101</sup> 1, 6, 20.

1, VII  
 GAUDIA PELLE,  
 PELLE TIMOREM  
 SPEMQUE FUGATO

-- u u -- -- (adonic)

The first lines give metaphorical description to the mental cloudiness *Philosophia* wishes to dispel, while the second half of the poem directly admonishes the prisoner to cast these emotions away. The adonic meter stands alone in this poem, giving us short, invariable lines. These are the shortest lines of the text so far, and are indeed the shortest of the entire work, most having only two words. This short length translates into speed, as the rhythm recurs more quickly than in a longer line. And because the poet generally chooses words so that accentual stress falls on the first and fourth syllables, the poem has an extremely steady rhythmic and accentual character.<sup>102</sup> This overall steadiness and quickness is combined with an invigorating second beat, which contains the only two short syllables of the line. The abiding feel is of a consistency that is both calming and exhortative, even enlivening. *Dum da da dum dum // dum da da dum dum // dum da da dum dum*. This combination of brevity, inalterability, and stress makes the poem totally anticipatable. It is no coincidence that the first two poems following Philosophy's promise of gentle medicines (this one and the preceding glyconic) have simple, inalterable meters which are easily anticipated and have rather soothing effects.

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<sup>102</sup> "But in addition, the meter, stichic adonics, is that of short-lined hymns popular at the period . . ." Curley, "The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature," 355.

A further result of this adonic design is that phrases of only one metron (that is, only one adonic line) must be very succinct, while most phrases—and all three of the poem’s central images—necessarily involve several repetitions of the rhythm.

*Nūbībūs ātrīs  
cōndītā nūllūm  
fūndērē pōssūnt  
sīdērā lūmēn.  
Sī mārē vōlvēns  
tūrbībūs Aūstēr (1, VII, 1-6)*

*Stárs that lie hídden  
Báck of the bláck clouds  
Cáannot províde us  
Líght we can sée by.  
Shoúld the mad Souúth Wind  
Roíling the wáters*

In addition to their rhythm, these opening lines contain another auditory repetition that occurs frequently in this poem, in the form of repeated consonant and vowel sounds from one line to the next. We have a repeated “n” throughout most lines: *Nubibus* (l. 1), *condita* and *nullum* (l.2), *fundere* and *possunt* (l.3), *lumen* (l.4) and *volvens* (l. 6) There is also the repeated “t” in *atris* (l. 1), *condita* (l. 2), and *possunt* (l. 3), the repeated “ū” in *Nūbibus* (l.1), *nūllūm* (l.2), *Fūndere*, *possūnt* (l. 3), *lūmen* (l.4), and the “s” of *possunt* (l. 3), *si* (l.4 and l. 5) and, *Turbibus* and *Auster* (l. 6). This is not an exhaustive list ( “ī” and “ō” “ēr,” are also repeated), but if we now reread these lines with an ear to these repetitions

*Nūbībūs ātrīs  
Cōndītā nūllūm  
Fūndērē pōssūnt  
Sīdērā lūmēn  
Sī mārē vōlvēns  
Tūrbībūs Aūstēr (1, VII, 1-6)*

we can hear what care has been taken to give the poem a high degree of stability; by repeated rhythm, accent, and phonetic sound, the change between each line nearly dissolves in an incantatory blur.

The first two principal metaphors of the poem (ll. 1-4 and ll. 5-13) have a similar structure. Each begins with the cause of the natural obstruction (*Nubibus atris, Turbidus Auster*) and ends with the object or capacity that is obstructed (*lumen, visibus*). By the third metaphor, we are practically lulled into the rhythm such that we enter a free descent with the water described; here, however, the different structure of the metaphor, beginning with the stream and ending with the rocks that block its descent, brings an abrupt ending:

*quīquē vāgātūr  
mōntībūs āltīs  
dēflūūs āmnīs  
saēpē rēsistīt  
rūpē sōlūtī  
ōbīcē sāxī. (1, VII, 14-19)*

*The streám that leaps dównward,<sup>103</sup>  
Dówn the high móuntains,  
Choósing its cóurses,  
Óften is cóuntered  
By rócky obstrúctions,  
Bóúlders fresh-loósened.*

We are halted with the water; jolted into attention, and the poet turns to address the listening prisoner directly:

*Tū quōquē sī vīs  
lūmīnē clārō  
cērnērē vērūm,  
trāmītē rēctō  
cārpērē cāllēm: (1, VII, 20-24)*

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<sup>103</sup> Relihan understandably struggles to render the Latin syllabic economy into English, and sometimes resorts to an extra syllable.

*Só with you álso,  
Desíring to seé truth  
Ín the light's bríghtness—  
Stárting your jóurney  
Ón the straight páthway—*

This final section begins with the only line of four words, a further gathering of attention and a delineation of the shift in address, but without slowing the rhythmic pulse. Philosophy's address of the prisoner focuses the accumulated power of the images and the incantatory sway of the meter directly upon him. *If you wish with clear light to see the truth and to seize the right pathway* (note that *trames* can also be the course of a river), *then*—and what follows are a series of imperatives that are the acoustic and dramatic climax of the poem. Each takes only one line and is comprised of only two words: the imperative and the emotion to be shunned. These are the clouds that obscure vision or the rocks that obstruct the free flow of reason's natural return.<sup>104</sup>

*gaūdīā pēllē,  
pēllē tīmōrēm  
spēmquē fūgātō (1, VII, 25-27)*

*Dríve away pleásure  
Dríve away térror  
Exíle expectátion*

If we put these together with the lines that precede them, we again hear the repetition of key phonetic sounds in each line.

*Tu quoque si vis  
lumine claro  
cernere verum,  
tramite recto  
carpere callem,  
gaudia pelle,  
pelle timorem*

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<sup>104</sup> The poem's final lines make the already familiar cloud metaphor explicit: *Nubila mens est / vincitaque frenis / haec ubi regnant.* (1, VI, 29-31)

*spemque fugato* (1, VII, 20-27)<sup>105</sup>

These three lines of command are a culmination of the effects we have noted throughout the poem. There is a supreme economy of words per phrase and an unmistakable repetition of sound, all with the same undulating, inalterable, two foot beat. It is as if the meter is a wave that washes over the prisoner and recedes, and recurs, rhythmically washing away the emotions that cloud his soul. He is confused by the pull of different emotions, and Philosophy begins with the simplest, most focused rhythm, and repeats it thirty times, allowing this steady sound to be a raft to which he can cling amidst the storm. Or, to put it slightly differently: because an adonic is simply the last two feet of a hexameter (-- u u -- --), to use it alone in this way is to comprise a poem of nothing but line endings, to distill the conclusory force of a hexameter and drink it straight. It may be a gentle medicine, but it is a potent one, aimed at the particular ailment the physician wishes here to treat.

The admonition of these final lines is not an abstract piece of exhortative counsel, but rather the result the poem's aesthetic form is designed to accomplish. The prisoner's tumult of affections is calmed not by persuasion, or argument, or logical force, but by this steady, yet invigorating, rhythmic beat. The rhythm is not merely appropriate to the message of the poem, but is its primary acoustic content; not a medium of other medicinal forms, but the very medicine itself.

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<sup>105</sup> Curley also hears an echo in these lines, but of meaning rather than sound. Curley, "The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature," 354.

## RHYTHMIC SUMMARY, POEMS OF BOOK 1

If we cast a summarizing glance over the poems of the first book, we have the following:

1, I  
 -- uu | -- uu | -- ^ uu | -- uu | -- u u | -- --      (dactylic hexameter)  
 -- uu -- uu -- || -- u u -- u u --                              (pentameter)

The prisoner is forced by the muses to enter the *maestos modos*. He is overwhelmed by the meter's unresolving sadness, which is largely due to the interruption of the pentameter's second hemiepes.

1, II  
 -- uu -- uu -- | -- u u -- --      (hemiepes + adonic)

Philosophy gives a lament of her own, but her combination of the hemiepes with a firm adonic beat avoids elegy's spiral into despair.

1, III  
 -- uu | -- uu | -- ^ uu | -- uu | -- u u | -- --      (dactylic hexameter)  
 -- uu | -- uu | -- ^ uu | -- u u                              (dactylic tetrameter)

The prisoner's after the fact dactylic poem is designed to flow as a rhythmic whole with an epic beat, and thus poetically embodies the wholeness of the divine intervention it describes.

1, IV  
 -- -- -- u u -- x -- u -- --      (phalacean hendecasyllable)

Philosophy's enfolding somewhat unpredictable syncopations within an overall steady beat aims to stabilize the prisoner even as he prepares to deliver his complaint.

1, V  
 uu uu | uu uu || uu uu | uu --           (anapaestic dimeter)

The prisoner's choice of rhythm reflects his acknowledgement of a certain order, yet his poetic violations of the meter express his underlying disbelief in its sovereignty.

1, VI  
 - - - - u u - - u - -           (glyconic)

With this reassuring and inalterable rhythm Philosophy describes, and begins to apply, her gentle medicines. The prisoner immediately displays a calmer temperament.

1, VII  
 - - u u - - - -           (adonic)

Philosophy continues her gentle medicine with the undulating repetitions of a simple five syllable meter, but shifts from reassurance to exhortation with this enlivening beat.

What we have observed—and heard—through this reading of the first book is that the rhythms have all been relevant to the prisoner's physical and psychological state, whether because they reflect it (I, III, V), or because they are aimed to address and improve it (II, IV, VI, VII).<sup>106</sup> A strong link has been established between the prisoner's state of recovery and the kind of rhythm Philosophy uses to further restore his health. It has not been our purpose to establish any system of how these rhythms are employed, but simply to determine whether a careful reading of the first book

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<sup>106</sup> One of the very rare suggestions that the *Consolation's* meters might have a therapeutic function, a tentative statement by Albrecht, is consistent with this summary: "The contrast between the elegaic surrender to grief (at the beginning of book 1) and the exhortation to get rid of emotions (at the ending of the book) is also depicted in the different character of the meters adopted. While the elegaic introduction is written in distichs, the finale is in stichic Adonics, the brevity and regular pulse of which suggest solemn tranquility . . . It may be tempting to interpret Boethius' use of rhythms in terms of ancient musical therapy." Albrecht and Schmeling, *A History of Roman Literature*, 1725. Indeed it is.

furnishes adequate evidence for a more expansive treatment of rhythm throughout the remainder of the text. We may tentatively conclude that the rhythms 1. Are not random; 2. Are highly relevant to the prisoner's stage of recovery; and 3. Are in some cases meant to directly mediate his restoration to health.

Finally, though there is a kind of interplay in Book 1 between the poems by the prisoner and the poems by *Philosophia*—which respectively reflect or address his state of health—this interplay is largely confined to the first book. Of the remaining thirty-two poems, the prisoner speaks only one.<sup>107</sup> While the opening poetic dialogue provides a means of portraying, and thus of diagnosing, the prisoner's state; this now achieved, the poetry will be spoken almost exclusively by Philosophy, who, according to the conceit of the text, alone knows how to wield its power. The prisoner—will listen.

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<sup>107</sup> “Philosophy, like a good doctor, knows how to apply this ambiguous substance [i.e. verse] in a beneficial way. And it is indicative of the extent to which she has made verse her own instrument that, whereas in Book 1 Boethius speaks three of the seven verse sections, he speaks but once in verse in the remaining four books.” Curley, “The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature,” 360.

## REPEATED METERS

How does it happen that the mind itself, solely by means of memory,  
picks out some melody previously heard?<sup>108</sup>

### SIX REPEATED METERS: GRUBER'S DIAGRAM AND 3, IX

The previous chapter established a method for interpreting the *Consolation's* poetic rhythms as they occur in the chronological development of the narrative. Each rhythm is understood in its particular context: the sound, syntax, and message of its poem, the details of the poems and prose that precede and follow, and, above all, the narrative of the prisoner's development. This is a chronological or as it were linear approach to the *Consolation's* poetic rhythms, which we could continue for the work's remaining thirty-two poems. This kind of linear analysis, however, would neglect the possibility that, in addition to their immediate contextual purpose, the rhythms might also function structurally, that is, within a pattern that cannot be detected when we focus on the instance as isolated from the whole.

Though comparatively little has been published on the *Consolation's* formal structure, several aspects of the text have been shown to function both linearly and

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<sup>108</sup> "Quid? . . . quod omnino aliquod melos auditum sibi memor animus ipse decerpat?" Boethius, *De institutione musica* (ed. Friedlein), 1, 1, 187.3, 6-7.

structurally. These include the divisions of books and chapters,<sup>109</sup> the fourfold cognitional modes,<sup>110</sup> the quadrivial sciences,<sup>111</sup> the occurrence and recurrence of particular arguments and themes,<sup>112</sup> the various forms of the circle,<sup>113</sup> and the five quotations of Homer.<sup>114</sup> Elaine Scarry has shown,<sup>115</sup> for example, that the arithmetical divisions of the books can be arranged to form a sphere, and thus that the text embodies the self-contained unity Philosophy maintains is necessary for the argument's form to be adequate to its subject.<sup>116</sup> Robert McMahon's numerological analysis,<sup>117</sup> which relies in part on Ptolemaic cosmology, is no less compelling. In all of these cases, the structure reveals something consonant with, but nonetheless hidden within, the linear narrative. The structural, systematic arrangement of these elements makes the text both a formal reflection, and a temporal embodiment, of the higher truths it contains.

The success of these formal analyses at revealing a hidden structural complexity behind particular elements of the text makes it tempting to imagine that its prodigious prosody should follow a similar design—in which each poetic meter fulfills a purpose not only in its immediate context, but also relative to a structural program for the whole. Indeed, the allure of the *Consolation's* prosody dates back as far as the earliest

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<sup>109</sup> Robert McMahon, *Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent* (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 214ff; Scarry, "The External Referent," 155-177; Myra L. Uhlfelder, "The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius' *Consolatio*," in *Boethius and the Liberal Arts*, ed. Michael Masi (Berne and Las Vegas: P. Lang, 1981), 31.

<sup>110</sup> Curley, "How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy"; Scarry, "The External Referent."

<sup>111</sup> Michael Fournier, "Boethius and the Consolation of the Quadrivium," *Medievalia et Humanistica* 34 (2008): 1-21.

<sup>112</sup> Scarry, "The External Referent."

<sup>113</sup> Fournier, "Boethius and the Consolation of the Quadrivium"; McMahon, *Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent*, 226ff.

<sup>114</sup> Fournier, "Boethius' Consolation and Philosophy's Homer."

<sup>115</sup> Scarry, "The External Referent," 169.

<sup>116</sup> 3, 12, 37.

<sup>117</sup> McMahon, *Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent*, 249ff.

manuscripts, with the first recorded attempt to classify the meters, that of Lupus of Ferrières,<sup>118</sup> in the ninth century. Despite a few valuable attempts,<sup>119</sup> however, discovery of a structural pattern that enfolds every instance of poetic meter has so far remained elusive.

The only obvious formal feature of the *Consolation's* meters is that several of them occur more than once. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Joachim Gruber notes that these six meters appear to occur in a loosely symmetrical manner around the work's only stichic hexameter, 3, IX. Gruber represents these repetitions and their symmetrical occurrence in a now well-known diagram (see figures 1 and 2). Though he fails to draw any deeper meaning from these clearly structural repetitions, they provide us with a place to begin this next stage of our analysis.

These obvious recurrences point to a structural role of meter in addition to its role in the immediate context of each poem, as each recurrence contains something beyond its linear position, that is, its rhythmic similarity to the earlier instances. The distinction between the immediate and structural aspects of rhythm indicates there are different layers of rhythmic repetition within the text. The first layer is what we know simply as poetic rhythm, or the repetition of a rhythm throughout the temporally consecutive lines of a poem. The second layer is the repetition of this rhythm through temporally separate poems. This repetition by poem includes the first layer, while it introduces a structural phenomenon the first layer does not contain when considered

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<sup>118</sup> Virginia Brown, "Lupus of Ferrières on the Metres of Boethius," in *Latin Script and Letters A.D. 400-900: Festschrift presented to Ludwig Bieler on the occasion of his 70th birthday*, ed. John J. O'Meara and Bernd Naumann (Leiden: Brill, 1976).

<sup>119</sup> Magee, "Boethius' Anapestic Dimeters"; Uhlfelder, "The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius' *Consolatio*," 31-34. Uhlfelder offers very succinct analyses of each series of repeated meters—three pages in all. Magee's article concerns only the anapaestic dimeters, and suggests there is nothing to unify the others. Neither examines the form, sound, or purpose of any meter.

on its own. Furthermore, unlike other structural recurrences, such as the number of chapters and books, whose divisions are not apparent to a listening audience, the structural repetition of rhythmic sound is an acoustically striking feature of the text. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to consider whether, and how, these structural rhythmic repetitions, like the instances that comprise them, can be understood as acoustic instruments of Philosophy's medicine. Because Philosophy speaks (or sings) all but one of the remaining poems, it is clear that these repeated sounds are meant for the prisoner's ears.

Before proceeding with this inquiry, however, there is one aspect of Gruber's diagram that requires some preliminary justification. Why is the hexameter at 3, IX taken as the center point of the symmetrical recurrence (see figures 1 and 2)? Though the poem is roughly at the center of the text, it is not precisely situated as such; nor, as the 24<sup>th</sup> of the 39 poems, is it the mathematical mid-point in terms of the number of poems. And therefore, because the poem's formal placement does not make it an obvious midpoint, we must look for this justification in the poem itself.

3, IX  
HEXAMETER

-- uuu | -- uu | --^ uu | -- uu | -- u u | -- --                      (dactylic hexameter)

In the prose preceding 3, IX, Philosophy brings to a conclusion the examination of various temporal goods: these do not bring happiness either alone or amassed together, as desire can be satisfied only by the Good which is essentially all things sought at once (self-sufficiency, power, fame, joy, etc.). The problem is with the human approach to the object of desire:

Therefore it is human perversity (*pravitas humana*) that has divided this thing up, which is one and simple by nature; and while this perversity strives to secure a part of a thing that has no parts, it neither acquires this portion, that is a nonentity (*quae nulla est*), nor the whole itself, which it tries very ineffectually to win. (3, 9, 16)

To address this problematic division, inherent to human seeking, the prisoner, prompted by Philosophy, says they must pray to the father of all things.<sup>120</sup> Their precise words are laden with religious weight: “*Invocandum, inquam, rerum omnium patrem, quo praetermisso nullum rite fundatur exordium*” (3, 9, 33) [*The father of all things must be invoked, she said, without whom no beginning is solemnly founded*].<sup>121</sup> *Invocandum*—to call upon, invoke, literally, to summon or put in voice or speech. *Rite* is also religious in meaning—rightly, but more primarily according to religious ceremony, with due religious observance, solemnly. The poem is thus introduced as a religious act, in particular as a religious speech act which seeks to summon the god through, and into, language. The last line of the prose reads “*Recte, inquit; ac simul ita modulata est*” (3, 9, 33) [*Right, she said, and immediately sang in this way*]. These last words ready the listener for the intonation of hymnic song.

Ō quī pērpētūā mūndūm rātīōnē gūbērnās,  
tērrārūm caēliquē sātōr, quī tēmpūs āb aēvō  
irē iūbēs stābilisquē mānēns dās cūnctā mōvērī  
quēm nōn ēxtērnaē pēpūlērūnt fingērē causāe  
mātēriaē flūitāntis ōpūs, vērum ĩnsitā sūmmī  
fōrmā bōnī līvōrē cārēns, tū cūnctā sūpērnō  
dūcis āb ēxēmplō, pūlchrūm pūlchērrimūs ĩpsē  
mūndūm mēntē gērēns sīmīlique ĩn ĩmāgīnē fōrmāns  
pērfēctāsquē iūbēns pērfēctum ābsōlvērē pārtēs. (3, IX, 1-9)

You who contról all the wórlđ everlástingly bý your own reáson,  
Sówing the seéds of the eárrth and the heávens, commáding the éons  
To róll from etérnity; résting unmóved, you put áll things in mótion,  
You whom no álien causes demáded to fáshion création

<sup>120</sup> On the necessity of prayer to bridge the “gulf between *ratio* and *intellegentia*,” see John Magee, *Boethius on Signification and Mind*, vol. 52, *Philosophia Antiqua* (Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1989), 142-149.

<sup>121</sup> Trans. mine.

*From mutable matter, but only the unstinting essence of true good  
Planted within you; and from their celestial exemplar you lead things,  
All of them, out and, most splendid yourself, in your own mind you carry  
This splendid world and you shape it to mirror your image and likeness,  
And you command that its perfect components accomplish perfection.*

The opening spondee, *ō quī*, confirms that what follows is, indeed, a hymn. The sung poem immediately broaches the mystery of creation; how an unchanging God can give birth to the world of time and change. God is addressed as the creator who creates not according to external causes or compulsion but according to the unchanging inner unity of His own goodness. While the poem (following the language of the *Timaeus*), describes divine creation, the character of the description is one of mystery rather than analytical comprehension as, for example, with the juxtaposition in the first two lines of *perpetua* with *mundum* and *tempus* with *aevo*, or *stabilisque manens das cuncta moveri*. The mystery of creation becomes the very means of address to God. *You who bid time from eternity, who remaining the same give all things motion . . . .*

Seeking a remedy to the dividing *pravitas humana*, the supplicant thus robes herself in theological mystery. But it is not just any mystery, but the mystery at the heart of the prisoner's (and indeed, the universal human) problem: how is the world of time related to, and included in, the timeless unity of Divine simplicity? The first nine lines of the prayer are a single sentence; as a seamless grammatical whole, the phrase imitates the unity of the divine act therein described.

*Tū nūmērīs ēlēmētā ligās, ūt frīgōrā flāmmīs,  
ārīdā cōnvēniēt līquīdīs, nē pūrīōr īgnīs.  
ēvōlēt aūt mērsās dēdūcānt pōndērā tērrās. (3, IX, 10-12)*

*You bind in number and ratio the elements, ice and flame matching,  
Dry matching moist, so there is no flight up for the rarefied fire,  
Earth is not dragged by its weight to sink down to the depths of the waters.*

These subsequent three lines continue in the same vein as the first nine: God orders the material elements of the world so that they exist in harmony. The emphasis is again on addressing God through this ordered reality, not on offering an explanation of how God maintains the order.

The middle section of the prayer (ll. 13-21) turns to the creation of the world soul and the lesser souls; God divides the world soul and causes it to return upon itself (*in se reditura*). As for the other souls (and here must be included the human one):

... *lēgě bēnīgnā*  
*ād tē cōnvērsās rēdūcī fācīs īgně rēvērtī.* (3, IX, 20-21)

... *by your generous stātutes*  
*You make them túrn back toward you and retúrn—a regréssion of fire.*

The prayer has now moved through the basic aspects of creation: God's inner *exemplum* and goodness as cause, the created harmony of the inanimate elements, and now animate beings, both cosmic and individual. The focus of the prayer has thus moved from God, the origin of all creation, to the nature of individual souls, from the creator to the prisoner's own personality. In other words, the cosmic hymn now becomes a personal prayer, having arrived at the prisoner himself by speaking of—and to—the returning fire in his own soul. The prayer's final lines emerge from the very desire whose origin has just been described.

*Dā, pătěr, aūgūstām mēntī cōnscēnděřě sēdēm,*  
*dā fōntēm lūstrārě bōnī, dā lūcě řěpěrtā*  
*īn tē cōnspīcūōs ānīmī dēfigěřě vīsūs.*  
*Dīssīcě tērrēnaē nēbūlās ēt pōnděřā mōlīs*  
*ātquě tūō splēndōřě mīcā; tū nāmquě sērēnūm,*  
*tū rēquīēs trānquīllā pīs, tē cērñěřě finīs,*  
*prīncīpīūm, vēctōr, dūx, sēmītā, tērmīnūs īdēm* (3. IX, 22-28)

*Gránt to the mínd, Fāther, thát it may ríse to your hólý foundátions;*  
*Gránt it may ríng round the sǒurce of the Goód, may díscóver the trúé light,*  
*Ánd fíx the sóul's vísion fírmlý on yóu, vísion keén and clear-síghted.*

*Scátter these shádows, dissólve the dead weíght of this eárthly concrétion,  
Shíne in the spléndor that ís yours alóne: only you are the bríght sky,  
You are serénity, peáce for the hólý; their goál is to sée you;  
You are their sóurce, their convéyance, their leáder, their páth, and their háven.*

In these final words of intercession, the prayer becomes the cry of the soul desiring its return. The movement downward through the stages of divine creation now changes direction and becomes a movement of the created soul back upward: *exitus* becomes *reditus* by its own nature.<sup>122</sup> The soul's desire is to be taken into the circular movement of creation.

The final words of the prayer, however, ask for more than simply a place in the cosmic return. What is asked for is light to see God, who is addressed not only as beginning (*principium*) and end (*terminus*), but also as the pathway (*semita*) and the means of being carried along the way (*vector*). The prayer asks not merely for the completion of the cosmic circle, but that the prisoner may see himself within this divine activity at each moment of his life; for the vision of God—the very unity he seeks—to be visible from within his earthly division.

It is not surprising that for this prayer Philosophy chooses dactylic hexameter, the meter typically chosen for epics and hymns. But what are the acoustic characteristics that made it suitable for these most solemn occasions and for this poem in particular? To begin with, the beat is always perfectly regular, either long-long (a spondee), or long-short-short (a dactyl), and so this is one of only a few poems in the *Consolation* that could be read to a metronome. Each foot begins with a long downbeat, while the variation between long and short-short is reserved for the upbeat; reversing

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<sup>122</sup> This theological movement is mirrored by a grammatical one through the parallel pronouns at the beginning and end of the poem: *qui, qui, quem—tu, tu, te* (see Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 276). Their case and subject (God) are the same and yet the shift from *qui* to *tu* reveals the spiritual ascent, and theurgical power, of the poem.

this order (as is sometimes the case with anapaestic dimeter) gives a very different rhythmic pace. The always-long downbeat gives the rhythm a steadiness not unlike the rhythm of a trampolinist whose acrobatics are comprehended within an evenly paced rebound: -- uu | -- uu | -- uu. The variation of dactyl and spondee allows considerable syllabic freedom in each line, while the inalterable adonic ending gives the line a predictable finality. The six feet allow each line to include up to seventeen syllables, and so there is ample space in each line to develop a thought or scene. Each foot has the same number of beats as every other, and every line the same number of feet. The overall effect is one of a beat that moves steadily, always recurring upon itself, in every foot, and in every line. This repetition upon itself is an acoustic representation of what philosophers call motionless motion, the activity of *nous*. Such a combination of strong downbeat, equality of measure in foot and line, and amplitude of time per line is not found in any other poem of the *Consolation*. Retrospectively, the words immediately preceding the poem ("*Recte, inquit; ac simul ita modulata est*")<sup>123</sup> seem to allude to this equality of measure, as the primary meaning of *modulor* is *to measure off properly, to regulate, to measure rhythmically*. The poem's rhythm is thus an acoustic depiction of the mystery it describes, of temporal movement emerging from unchanging unity. But prayer is no mere *techné*, and this is not artistry simply, but a religious hymn, where the rightness and likeness of the words is what allows them to *invoke* the God. The acoustic unity of the hexameter mediates between the prisoner's dividing activity and the divine unity he seeks. By so praying the mystery of creation, Philosophy weaves the prisoner into the return her words describe.

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<sup>123</sup> 3, 9, 33, quoted above.

It is little wonder, then, that Gruber chose 3, IX as the poetic center of the *Consolation*. Its lofty content, hymnic character, and rhythmical unity give it a stature unlike any other poem. In addition to these, 3, IX is also the turning point in the argument between the consideration of false goods, and the examination of where true happiness is to be found.<sup>124</sup> And so though it is not the midpoint of the *Consolation's* poetry, it is a midpoint for the argument—and not coincidentally so: as an effective prayer, it brings about this redirection of vision. All this gives weight to taking 3, IX as a centerpoint, and we must now return to the symmetrical recurrence of poetic meters around it, and to the primary question of this chapter—whether Philosophy uses these recurrences for the prisoner's consolation.

### 1, I AND 5, I

#### ELEGIAIC COUPLETS (figure 3)

-- uu | -- uu | --^ uu | -- uu | -- u u | -- --      (dactylic hexameter)  
 -- uu -- uu -- || -- u u -- u u --                      (pentameter)

The meter of elegiac couplets is used twice in the *Consolation*.<sup>125</sup> We saw it first in the first words of Book 1, where the prisoner, overcome with emotion, claimed he had been forced into *maestos modos*. The unresolved sadness of the meter was largely effected by the harsh interruption of the hexametric beat by the second hemiepes. The meter occurs for the second time in the first poem of the fifth and final book, where it follows the prisoner's request that Philosophy explain whether chance exists and what it is, if so. She explains that chance is simply "an unexpected outcome, deriving from

<sup>124</sup> See Scarry, "The External Referent," 156.

<sup>125</sup> My analysis here of 5, I, as with that of 1, 1 (above), is an expansion of an interpretation I gave in an early exploration of the *Consolation's* metric repetitions. See Stephen J. Blackwood "Boethius and Rhythmic Power," 161ff.

confluent causes” (5, 1, 18) as, for instance, when “someone plows the earth in order to cultivate a field, and finds a mass of buried gold” (5, 1, 13). The discovery, while accidental, is owed to the confluence of causes, i.e. one person plowing where another buried gold. 5, I gives a poetic rendering of this explanation: the confluence of two rivers would result in an apparent chaos of water and debris, yet this apparent chaos is governed not by chance but by the slope of the land that brings the waters together; there is rational, if hidden cause behind what seems disordered. The poem begins:

*Rūpīs Āchaēmēniāē scōpūlīs, ūbī vērsā sēquēntūm  
Pēctōrībūs fīgīt spīcūlā pūgnā fūgāx, (5, I, 1-2)*

*Dówn from the crágs of the Párthian móuntains, where gálloping árchers  
Sénd arrows shót in retréat into the énemy's breást,*

While the first couplet gives an ancient geographical reference for the following metaphor, it is not strictly necessary to the poem's message. What this reference does do very effectively, however, is set the tone for the re-use of the elegaic meter. The first line introduces an epic theme with the subject of war, and the second seems to continue its dactylic hexameter. *Pēctōrībūs fīgīt* (*breasts pierces . . .*) ends at the expected place for a caesura, leading the listener to expect uu --, to continue the rhythmic line. Instead of the upbeat, however, comes the interrupting downbeat of the second hemiepes, fittingly matched with the first syllable of the subject the listener is waiting for—*spicula*, the spear that suddenly pierces the breast, entering unseen through the back of the one fleeing. The poet makes use of the downbeat of the second hemiepes in the second couplet as well:

*Tígrīs ēt Eūphrātēs ūnō sē fōntē rēsōlvūnt  
ēt mōx ābiūntīs dīssōcīāntūr āquīs. (5, I, 3-4)*

*Thére the Euphrátes and Tígris, twin rívers, are fréed from the sáme source,*

*Soón flowing séparate wáys, kéeping their wáters apárt.*

Describing the separation of the Tigris and Euphrates, rivers which originate from a common source, the beat falls on the first syllable of *dissociantur*, and thus the caesura, or acoustic break, the rhythmic break, and the break in the rivers, all coincide.

Conversely, the only elision of the poem falls on the only place in the lines of hexameter where a caesura does not occur after the first beat of the third foot:

*Sī cōēānt cūrsūmque ĩtērūm rēvōcēntūr ĩn ūnūm (5, 1, 5)*

*Shoúld they combíne and be súmmoned agáin into óne single cúrrēt*

—and so the exceptional joining of the words and tightening of the rhythm acoustically represents the re-joining of the rivers.

The poem's main message is saved for the final lines. While the confluence of the rivers results in an apparent chaos of ships and debris, this apparent confusion is ruled by the slope of the ground: the water is merely following the natural course of gravity. Philosophy delivers the conclusion:

*Sīc quaē pērmīssīs flūitārē vidētūr hābēnīs  
fōrs pātītūr frēnōs ĩpsāquē lēgē mēāt. (5, 1, 11-12)*

*Cháncē then that séems to be gíven frēe reín, to bob úpward and dównward—  
Ít has the bít in its móúth, ít too must rún on by lāw.*

While the word *fortuna* is not used in this poem, English translations obscure the obvious visual, acoustic, and etymological relation between *fors* (*chance*) and *fortuna*. Philosophy's final stanza concludes that, despite appearances, chance—and thus *Fortuna*—is subject to law. The power of fortune, therefore, disappears in the same meter once used by Fortune's muses to display her power. The elegaic couplets are again used for lament, but this time they lament playfully, ironically, the nonexistence

of Fortune's domain.<sup>126</sup> The intervening chapters and books contain the essential steps of the argument; here I wish only to draw attention to the rhythmic strain that runs through these narrative poles.

With this repetition of the meter in mind, other moments of the poem take on new significance. It is notable, for instance, that the word in line 5, *revocentur* (*revoco*), used to describe the recalling of the waters into one course, is vocal in its origin—to *re-voice*, to *call back*, even to *call for the repetition of a speech*, and thus indirectly calls attention to the acoustic repetition of the meter. The subsequent couplet, however,

*cōnvěniēnt pūppēs ēt vūlsī flūmīnē trūncī*  
*mīxtāquē fōrtūtōs īmplicēt ūndā mōdōs.* (5, 1, 7-8)

*Shíps would collíde and the trúnks of the treés tórnr loóse by the tórrent;*  
*Wáves thus confóunded would bríng tángles of rándom evénts.*

is still more curious. *Modos* here recurs at exactly the same place in the couplet—the final word of the second line—as it occurred in the opening poem; and, as it was there modified by an adjective just before the caesura (*maestos*), in the same place here it is modified by *fortuitos*. Likewise, *implicet* (*enfolds*) is parallel with the prisoner's *cogor* (*I am forced*). Just how to take the elusive *modos*, however, is unclear. Translators have variously suggested *appearances*, *paths* and *events*. Yet none of these is so convincing that the use of the word is not still rather strange. *Fortuitos modos* presumably refers to the seemingly random appearance of tree trunks and ships and frothing water, appearances actually enfolded by the water's course. Yet by this reuse of the word in precisely the same place in the only other poem of the same meter, it seems more than a little likely that the poet might also be recalling the earlier meaning—*measures*.

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<sup>126</sup> “. . . wo an einem praktischen Beispiel gezeigt wird, daß es keinen Zufall gibt, also inhaltlich ein Gegenstück zur Klage über die trügerische Fortuna.” Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 55.

Furthermore, its attached adjective, *fortuitos*, is derived from the name of *Fortuna* herself. If in the earlier poem the prisoner was forced into *maestos modos* (*sad measures*) by (Fortune's) muses, here *fortuitos modos*—*Fortune's measures*—are themselves enfolded into, and thus comprehended by, the stability of law. The elegiac *modus*, once carried by *Fortuna's* stream, is now caught in the sway of Philosophy's stronger current.<sup>127</sup>

But what does this rhythmic repetition do for the prisoner? Repetition of a sensitive experience can produce immediate and involuntary recollection—as for example when the scent of a familiar perfume recalls a particular person and time, no matter how remote in one's memory. Here the repeated sound of the elegiac meter recalls its earlier occurrence, as well as its circumstances—in this case, the prisoner's despair, his slavery to the muses, etc.—making these present to him through memory. But the context for this recollection has been designed by Philosophy to address the situation of the sound's first occurrence. The terms of this recollection—*Fortuna* now overcome—allow for a reconciliation with, and a redemption of, the brokenness of the earlier sound.

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<sup>127</sup> As Uhlfelder writes: "Now Fortune herself is revealed as held in check by cosmic order although she appears to follow her own course without restraint," Uhlfelder, "The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius' *Consolatio*," 33. Despite my frequent agreement with Uhlfelder's assessment of the prisoner's progress or of the advance of the argument, I find she sometimes succumbs to the view I definitively wish to refute: that the poems "*represent* the progress achieved through the philosophical argument" (italics mine)—that is, *represent* rather than *accompany* or even *accomplish* this progress. Why must the "philosophical argument" do all the work?

## 2, I AND 3, XI

## CHOLIAMBUS, OR LIMPING IAMBIC TRIMETER (figure 4)

x -- u -- | x ^ -- u -- | x -- -- --

The first of these poems attests to what Philosophy has argued in its preceding prose: *Fortuna's* inconstancy is her very nature. Having just introduced the image of Fortune's wheel, Philosophy now gives examples of this whirling inconstancy, and does so in a meter with an uneven, or limping, beat. The limping effect of the meter is derived from the penultimate syllable of the third metron, where the short syllable is replaced with a long one.<sup>128</sup>

x -- u -- | x ^ -- u -- | x -- -- --

It is important to keep in mind that, like most standard meters, certain variations and substitutions are possible. In 2, I, this meter takes the following form:

uu -- u uu | -- ^ -- u -- | x -- -- --

Occasional substitutions aside, however, the first two metra are simply:

-- -- u --

and so the limping, or syncopated, effect occurs in three places in this meter: in the stand alone short syllable of each of the first two metra, -- -- u --; in the first syllable of the final metron, x -- -- --, where we expect a long but sometimes hear a short; and in the third syllable of the same metron, where we expect a short and hear a long (the syllable after which the meter is named). While the listener easily hears the cumulative effect of a decidedly unreliable rhythm, a few moments are especially effective.

*Haec cūm sūpērbā vērtērīt vicēs dēxtrā* (2, I, 1)

<sup>128</sup> See Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 175, with references.

*When wíth a haúghty hánd she túrns things úpsíde-dówn*<sup>129</sup>

The short syllables fall in the second metron on *verterit*, and in the third on the downbeat of *vices*, both altogether appropriate.

*ēt aēstūāntīs mōrē fērtūr Eūrīpī.* (2, 1, 2)

*Like the wíld Boeótian stráits swíft-rúshing báck ánd fóρθ*

The short syllable on the second of *aēstūāntīs* conveys the unpredictable billowing of the waves of Euripus, just as the long syllable instead of a short one (i.e. the limping one) on the second syllable of *Eūrīpī* further increases the swell.

*dūdūm trēmēndōs saēvā prōtērīt rēgēs* (2, 1, 3)

*Then shé, inhúman, tópples ónetime feársóme kíngs,*

Here we have the sense that the seething torment of the first two lines crashes violently upon the once tremendous kings. The iamb in the first metron doubles the accent of the second, long syllable of *trēmēndōs*, while the short syllable on the second of *saēvā* marks the sharpness of *Fortuna*'s cruel turn with an acoustic point. Finally, the unexpected syncopation of the first syllable of the third metron on the second of *proterit* brings out the contrast in the fall from fortune—from *tremendos* to *proterit*, while the spondee on *rēgēs*, in place of an iamb, lengthens to absorb the full force of *Fortuna*'s harsh rule.

The pinnacle of the poem is in the fifth and sixth lines:

*Nōn íllā mīsērōs aūdīt aūt cūrāt flētūs  
Ūltrōquē gēmītūs, dūrā quōs fēcīt, rīdēt.* (2, 1, 5-6)

*She dóes not heár the wrétched bút rejécts theír teárs;  
She láúghs to scórn the wáiling thát her hárd heárt bríngs.*

<sup>129</sup> Relihan's translation simplifies and regularizes all but the ends of each line into iambs, and thereby loses much of the poem's unpredictability.

These lines share with each other a metric arrangement that no other lines have, that is, a substitution of two short syllables for the final beat of the first metron. Because the third beat is already short, these additional short syllables accelerate the line. In the first of these, this acceleration is transferred to the final syllable of *mīsērōs*, and then on through the caesura to the first syllable of *aūdīt*. *Not she to the miserable listens or cares for their crying*. The next line continues the phrase, but slows slightly over *ūltrō* (*furthermore*), and then accelerates through the remainder of the first metron, placing emphasis on the next long syllable, the final one of *gēmītūs*, parallel with *mīsērōs*, though here the ‘s’ of the first syllable of the metron is interrupted by the hard dental, acoustically reflecting the meaning of *dūrā* (*harsh*), an adjective which we assume functions as the subject. The second, short syllable of *dūrā* leads quickly to the long one of *quōs*, in which we hear alliterative echoes of the long “ō” of *ūltrō* and the “qu” of *que*. Yet these echoes are stronger than their acoustic antecedents, absorbing as they do the power of the line and its words. The grammatical antecedent of this echo is *gemitus* (*groans*), a word that has been hanging throughout the line, its case and number unknown until *quos*, a relative pronoun that increases the intensity of its antecedent as it does the anticipation for its subject and verb. At this point—the end of the second metron—however, we still do not know what action is to be applied to this object by the fearfully *dura* subject. The final metron brings the poem to a climax, with only the verb lacking grammatically. *Fēcīt* (*she has made*) identifies *Fortuna* as the cause of the *gemitus* (*groans*), but extends the suspense as to what is the main action of the phrase; this we are given only in the final two syllables, both long, the first of these (the limping one)

possessing also an accent: *rīdēt*. Further, at the groans—harsh!—which she has caused, she laughs!

If the poem’s rhythm combines with its message and syntax to portray the instability of Fortune, it does so by creating something of the anxiety caused to those who are foolish enough to trust her. Unlike 1, IV, where the syncope of the beat and the variability of the seventh syllable anceps was transcended by an overall anticipatable rhythm, here the overall sound is the instability itself, a direct acoustic counterpart of Fortune’s whirling wheel.<sup>130</sup> As with other early poems, the rhythm is a primary means of Philosophy’s message, and a medicine she administers directly through the ears of her patient. Together, the message and rhythm stimulate in the listener a desire to escape the powers of Fortune—and of her unsteady beat.<sup>131</sup>

The second occurrence of the limping iambic trimeter is at 3, XI. It takes a slightly different form, but the limping beat is still clearly discernible:

x -- u -- | x ^ -- u -- | x -- -- --

The preceding prose has established that all things seek unity; and, since good and unity have been shown to be the same, that therefore all things seek the good. The prisoner is thus reminded of what he earlier claimed not to know, that is, the end of all

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<sup>130</sup> In addition to this immediate resonance between rhythm and message, the meter is also appropriate here—as with the elegaic couplets of 1, I—because of one of its generic associations, as *Philosophia*’s denunciation of *Fortuna* can be read as an invective, a genre often written in choliambics. See Julia W. Loomis, *Studies in Catullan verse. An analysis of word types and patterns in the Polymetra*, Mnemosyne, Bibliotheca Classica Batava, Supplementum 24 (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 102ff.

<sup>131</sup> Gruber suggests that this poem, in conjunction with its preceding prose, undoes the “Banne der Fortuna,” the spell Fortune had cast over the prisoner in 1, I. See Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 175. While I don’t fully agree with Gruber’s matching of 1, I with 2, I, especially given that he makes no effort to relate 2, I with 3, XI (the two poems of the same meter), nonetheless I like this way of thinking. See also n. 71, above.

things. The poem, however, begins with what initially seems to be an unrelated piece of advice:

*Quisquīs prōfūdā mēntē vēstīgāt vērūm  
cūpītquē nūllīs illē dēvīs fālī  
īn sē rēvōlvāt īntīmī lūcēm vīsūs  
lōngōsque īn ōrbēm cōgāt īnflēctēns mōtūs  
ānīmūmquē dōcēāt quīcquīd ēxtrā mōlītūr  
sūīs rētrūsūm pōssidērē thēsaurīs; (3, XI, 1-6)*

*Whoéver trácks the trúth from óut the mínd's gréat dépth  
And néver wánts to bé misléd on fálse síde-trácks,  
Must túrn the líght of ínner víson deép wíthín  
And bénd and fórcé intó a w hél the sóul's lóng páth,  
Must téách the mínd that whát it stríves for fár óutside  
It ówns alreády, hídden ín its ówn stórehouse;<sup>132</sup>*

The argument of the prose finally arrived at the end of all things, and we might well have expected the poem to contain a survey of related images, or a didactic summary of the preceding argument. Instead, Philosophy gives a poetic exhortation to turn within. Why?

The discovery of the end of all things in the preceding prose concludes an argument that stretches back to the beginning of the second book, to the examination of external things supposed to be good (power, fame, riches, etc.). Once it was discovered that these external goods—by nature always partial—failed to satisfy, the search turned progressively inward, so the true object of desire could be discovered. The examination of external objects thus became an investigation of subjective, internal desire. Further reflection on this desire revealed that it could only be satisfied by all the goods sought together, that is, by a complete Good whose unity was its very nature. The first lines of this poem, therefore, are not a direct summary of the argument, but rather a reflection on the inward turn that led to its conclusion. The

<sup>132</sup> As in 2, I, Relihan's iambic regularization of the meter causes it to lose much of its unpredictability.

poem's final lines situate this inward turn within the theoretical frame of Platonic recollection:

*Nōn ōmnē nāmquē mēntē dēpūlit lūmēn  
 ōblivīōsām cōrpūs invēhēns mōlēm;  
 haērēt prōfēctō sēmēn intrōsūm vēri  
 quōd ēxcitātūr vēntilāntē dōctrīnā.  
 Nām cūr rōgātī spōntē rēctā cēnsētīs,  
 nī mērsūs āltō vīvērēt fōmēs cōrdē?  
 quōdsī Plātōnīs Mūsā pērsōnāt vērūm,  
 quōd quīsquē dīscīt immēmōr rēcōrdātūr. (3, XI, 9-16)*

*The bōdy thāt bore wīth it grōss forgētfūlnēss  
 Did nót from mīnd then drīve out évery trāce óf líght;  
 There clíngs wīthín the seéd of trúth—make nó místáke—  
 Aroused and fánned by próper teáching íntó fláme.  
 How cóuld you mórtals freély thínk the trúth whén ásked  
 Were thére no líve coal búried déep in heárt's cóld ásh?  
 For íf the Múse of Pláto criés the trúth óut loud,  
 All thāt forgētful mórtals leárn, they rēcólléct.*

The poem is more than a reflection on the method of the argument, however. The poet refers to the *Platonis Musa*, the muse of Plato. In the ancient world, the muses were known as the daughters of memory, and so the poet is associating Plato's cognitive theory of recollection with the mythical origin, and purpose, of song. This association is strengthened by the use of the verb *persono*, that is, *to sound through and through, to resound*. But why describe Plato as a muse who sings a theory of recollection?

To begin with, by summarizing the argument in cognitional terms, Philosophy is able to portray the interiority of mind as a safe haven from unstable externality and thus as an escape from Fortune's domain. 3, XI is therefore a direct answer to the problem of 2, I. The fickleness of Fortune's wheel is overcome when mind withdraws upon its own self-revolution. When Mind recollects itself from externality, bending its

movements back upon its own, inner circle, it moves away from the whirling circumference of Fortune's wheel.<sup>133</sup>

In Philosophy's medicinal therapy, however, it is not adequate simply to help the prisoner recall the end of things, which he had earlier forgotten. Nor is it enough simply to point out to him the inward turn which is the cognitive basis of this recollection. She must also make these intellectual conclusions speak directly to the very source of his pain. She does not leave it to the prisoner to somehow apply the conclusions retrospectively to the earlier problem, or to enfold into unity what he knew only as alienation. She herself audibly connects them through her deliberate reuse, or *resounding*, of the choliamb, the acoustic medium of these—and only these—two poems. By administering the medicine in the very meter that symbolized the pain, Philosophy precisely suits her remedy with the prisoner's wound. If it is in the nature of external goods not only to disclose their partiality but also to recall the true end of the desire which seeks them, so, too, does this unstable metric beat sing the remedy to the injury it inflicts. In the first poem, the rhythm's unsteadiness awakens the desire to be free from Fortune's fickle hands; while in the second, it is an aural recollection through which that desire is met.

To summarize: the preceding argument moves by way of an inward turn. The poem describes this movement as recollection. This recollection is said to be the idea of Plato, who is described as a singing muse. The aesthetic (rhythmic, sung) form of the

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<sup>133</sup> “. . . the moving circle is the course of man's turning from the outer to the inner world. Here his reason prevails and the inner light of *mens* makes him invulnerable to Fortune's assaults . . . The metaphor of the part of the *logos*, assuming here the form of a circle that one bends back into himself, stresses the initiative and independence of action which is the direct opposite of passive acceptance of motion externally imposed by Fortune.” Uhlfelder, “The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius' *Consolatio*,” 33-34.

poem is itself a recollection of an earlier poem—whose rhythm expressed the problem to which this later poem offers an answer. It is difficult to distinguish these related strands of the poem, let alone hear their relation to each other in the unfolding simultaneity of the listener’s reception. The poem sings of recollection, a theory of knowing transmitted by the muse in song—and at once recollects another song. The two moments of recollection—the intellectually inward one described, and the aural one enacted by the rhythmic form of this description—move in different directions, one inwards, the other a reminder of externality—yet it is precisely this simultaneous divergence which Philosophy harmonizes, revealing herself as memory’s muse.

2, V AND 3, V

ANAPAESTIC DIMETER CATALECTIC (figure 5)

uu -- uu -- u u -- --

2, V falls in the midst of Philosophy’s stripping down of the prisoner’s self, the recalling of his soul from externality. In the preceding prose, she examines riches in particular, and forcefully concludes that neither they nor any external possessions are ever truly possessed by their possessors. She claims, furthermore, that subjective attachment to external objects lowers the person—who is inherently much more valuable than anything external—beneath that to which he is attached, and thus that external goods paradoxically reduce the possessor’s value.

Humanae quippe naturae ista condicio est, ut tum tantum  
ceteris rebus cum se cognoscit excellat, eadem tamen  
infra bestias redigatur, si se nosse desierit . . . (2, 5, 29)

. . . for this is the condition of human nature: only then  
does it surpass all other things, when it knows itself; but

that same nature is degraded, brought lower than the dumb animals, if it ceases to know itself.

Following this reflection, the poem is a lament for a mythical golden age of simple human contentment, a time before the discovery of the riches that led to warfare and awakened the insatiable lust for possession. It easily divides into three sections: the state of humankind in the mythical golden age (ll. 1-12); the characteristics of later society that the golden age happily did not have (ll. 13-22); and a concluding lament that the golden age was destroyed by the madness of *amor habendi*, or *the lust for having* (ll. 23-30).

The first line,

*Fēlīx nīmīūm prīōr aētās* (2, V, 1)

*Hów háppy, that eárlīer éra,*

introduces the poem as a lament for a time past. *Felix nimium* (*happy beyond measure*) opens the listener's horizon to the possibility of a joyful poem, yet this is quickly dashed as *prior aetas* (*an earlier age*) situates this happiness in a lost past. The meter is highly regular, insofar as the long syllables in the second beat of each foot never resolve. Rather than uu uu, the basis of all four of the *Consolation's* acatalectic anapaestic dimeters (considered in this chapter below) here we have a strict uu --. This would be quite an easy rhythm to hear—essentially reversed dactyls—were it not for the catalectic ending, which adds an extra half foot. Instead of

uu -- | uu -- | u u --

or even

uu -- | uu -- | u u -- | -- --

we have

uu -- | uu -- | u u -- | --

This final beat makes the rhythmic line either a beat shorter, or a beat longer, than the ear expects, with the result that the lines do not flow together as they otherwise would, as do lines of pure dactyls or anapaests. This additional beat requires the speaker to pause briefly in order to re-establish the rhythm with the next line. Beginning in the second line, however, we have still greater difficulty maintaining the anapaestic beat, as the poet begins to place word accent consistently on the second beat of the second foot. Combined with the presence of the extra beat at the end of the line, this emphasis shifts the grouping of feet from anapaestic to dactylic,<sup>134</sup> so that the last syllables take on an adonic rhythm (-- u u -- --).

cōntēntā **fidē**libūs ārvīs  
 nēc inērtī **pē**rditā lūxū,  
 fācīlī quaē **sēr**ā sōlēbāt  
 ieūniā **sō**lvērē glāndē.  
 Nōn Bācchicā **mūn**ērā nōrānt  
 līquidō cōn**fū**ndērē mēllē  
 nēc lūcidā **vē**llērā Sērūm  
 Tŷriō mīsc**ēr**ē vēnēnō. (2, V, 2-9)

*Satisfied with reliable grain fields,  
 Not wasted in slothful excesses  
 But easing its slow-to-come hunger  
 With the nuts that were easy to gather;  
 Never knowing the bounty of Bacchus  
 Could be mixed with the free-flowing honey,  
 Nor that snow-white silk cloth from China  
 Could be tainted with Tyrian purple.*<sup>135</sup>

This shift to a dactylic beat in the midst of the line is quite willful: in every line but the first, word accent falls on the second beat of the second foot, simultaneously rearranging the metric beat. In more than half of the lines, the shift occurs even earlier,

<sup>134</sup> In technical terms, the first beat is anacrustic.

<sup>135</sup> Relihan's translation, too, slips into a largely dactylic beat.

with an accent on the second beat of the first foot (*ieiúnia sólvere glánde, Non Báčchica múnera nórant*). These accentual placements make it quite impossible to maintain an anapaestic beat throughout the poem; rather, one naturally begins to take the first syllable as introductory to a dactylic beat, thus shifting the extra beat from the end of the line to its beginning. The grouping of feet thus shifts from:

uu -- | uu -- | u u -- | --

to

uu | -- uu | -- u u | -- --.

What we have, then, is a abbreviated beginning to a line that would otherwise sound like a perfectly predictable dactylic tetrameter. But the extra beat at the beginning of the line is not something the listener will immediately grasp, and so the rhythm is initially difficult to discern. And even once we settle into hearing the first beat as introductory, it takes a few beats each line to establish the rhythm—and this delay recurs every line. Accordingly, the transition between each line is always marked by a pause, as proceeding too directly takes the first beat as a downbeat rather than as a preliminary upbeat, and causes confusion when the beat changes later in the line.

Whether this first beat is comprised of one long syllable or two short syllables, it has a very noticeable effect upon the hearing of the line. When long, it slows, and when short, it accelerates. In either case, it gives a certain degree of gravity, co-operating with the rest of the line in lament or urgency. The long syllable frequently stresses the lament for the earlier epoch, often with a negative: *Nōn Báčchicǎ, nēc lūcǐdǎ, Nōndūm mǎrĭs, nēc mērcĭbŭs, nēc praēmĭǎ*. When two short syllables, it makes the line, and thus the

lament, seem more urgent and more gripping: *nēc ģnĕrtĭ, nŃvĕ lĭtŃrĕ, Ńdĭs nĕquĕ, crŭŃr hŃrrĭdĕ, quĭd ĕnĭm, ũtĭnĕm mŃdŃ.*

In the poem's second section, Philosophy rhetorically compares the serenity and contentment of the lost golden age with the greed-driven actions that led to its demise:

*NŃndŭm mĕrĭs ĕltĕ sĕcĕbĕt  
nĕc mĕrcĭbŭs ũndĭquĕ lĕctĭs  
nŃvĕ lĭtŃrĕ vĭdĕrĕt hŃspĕs.  
Tŭnc clĕssĭcĕ saĕvĕ tĕcĕbĕnt  
Ńdĭs nĕquĕ fŭsŭs ĕcĕrbĭs  
crŭŃr hŃrrĭdĕ tĭnxĕrĕt ĕrvĕ. (2, V, 13-18)*

*NŃ mĕrchĕnt shĭp clŃve the deep Ńcean;  
NŃne trĕded the goŃds of all nĕtĭons  
On the loŃkout for ũnexplŃred shŃrelĭnes.  
NŃ trŭmpets blared mĕdly in bĕttle;  
NŃ bloŃd spilled in vĭolent hĕtred  
Hĕd yĕt stĕined rĕd the grĭm grĕĭn fĭelds.*

The rhetorical aim of the comparison is to create a longing for the lost contentment of the golden age while situating the source of unhappiness in the present attachment to material things. The poem thus appropriately concludes in a crescendo of impassioned regret, and of longing for return.

*ũtĭnĕm mŃdŃ nŃstrĕ rĕdĭrĕnt  
ĭn mŃrĕs tĕmpŃrĕ prĭscŃs!  
Sĕd saĕvĭŃr ĭgnĭbŭs Aĕtnĕ  
fĕrvĕns ĕmŃr ĕrdĕt hĕbĕndĭ.  
Heŭ, prĭmŭs quĭs fŭĭt ĭllĕ  
ĕŭrĭ quĭ pŃndĕrĕ tĕctĭ  
gĕmmĕsquĕ lĕtĕrĕ vŃlĕntĕs,  
prĕtĭŃsĕ pĕrĭcŭlĕ, fŃdĭt? (2, V, 23-30)*

*O ĭf Ńnly our wŃrld could retŭrn now  
To the ĕgelĕss wĕys of the ĕncĭents!  
NŃ; mĕdder than Aĕtnĕ's erŭptions  
Ũp blĕzes the hŃt lust for hĕvĭng.  
Woe ĭs hĭm! WhŃ wĕs that ĭnvĕntŃr  
Who ũnĕĕrthed thĕse trĕĕcherŃus trĕĕsures,*

*The deád weight of góld covered óver,  
The jéwels that lónged to lie hídden?*

The poem contains no direct exhortation, no prescription or philosophical solution to counter its lament. However much we can anticipate—and surely the poet meant for us to anticipate—what the remedy will be, it is not given here. The meter, while curious, does seem appropriate to the poem’s message. Its primary beat is dactylic, and this, combined with its narrative of a golden age, gives the poem a degree of acoustic resemblance to an epic hexameter. This epic possibility, however, is cut short by the shortness of the line (just under four feet) and also slowed by the extra first beat of each line. On the one hand, the introductory beat and dactylic line are effective in making a deliberate, measured lament. On the other hand, the refusal of this epic potential mirrors the willful loss of the golden age.<sup>136</sup>

The meter recurs at 3, V.<sup>137</sup> The preceding prose demonstrates a paradox that recalls the one that introduced 2, V (riches reduce one’s value rather than increase it). Power is insufficient for its own preservation, increases anxiety, and torments its possessor by its inevitable limits. In short, Philosophy deconstructs *potentia*, just as she did *divitia* and the other falsely considered goods. Yet while her poem does summarize this deconstruction, it also opens the horizon to real power.

*Quī sē vōlēt ēssē pōtētēm  
ānīmōs dōmēt illē fērōcēs  
nēc vīctā libīdīnē cōllā  
foēdīs sūmmittāt hābēnīs  
ētēnīm līcēt Īndīcā lōngē  
tēllūs tūā iūrā trēmēscāt*

<sup>136</sup> On epic fragments, see Relihan, xix and 153.

<sup>137</sup> The reader will notice that because 3, V occurs before 3, IX, this repetition does not follow the symmetrical pattern Gruber observes in other cases, a fact his chart readily admits. We will consider the exceptions to Gruber’s symmetrical arrangement in Chapter 3.

*ē̄t s̄ervīāt ūltīmā Thylē  
tāmēn ātrās pēllērē cūrās  
mīsērāsquē fūgārē quērēlās  
nōn pōssē pōtēntiā nōn ēst. (3, V, 1-10)*

*Lēt thóse who would wish to have pówer  
Fírst cónquer their béstial ánger,  
Nor submít to lust's fōul reins and bridle  
Nécks cónquered and bént down in báttle.  
Even thóugh distant Índia trémbles  
At your fiats and greát proclamátions,  
Though the nórthernmost ícefields obéy you—  
If you cánnot dispél dark forebóding,  
Nor roút all your désolate sórrow,  
Thén yoūrs is not pówer, not éver.*

Whereas in the first poem, Philosophy described the problem as lust for external goods (*amor habendi*), in this poem she presents the remedy we already anticipated: inner restraint, and thereby the domination of destabilizing lust. If the first poem sets out the origin of the problem—lust for and dependence on external goods—this one offers a corrective. In both cases, the infinite nature of lust (whether for riches or for power) is intuitively invoked by the mention of far off lands. In the first poem, *mercibus undique lectis* and *nova litora* symbolize the limitlessness of desire; while in the second poem, *Indica longe* and *ultima Thyle* represent the failure of even far-reaching power to overcome clouds of anxiety (*atras curas*). As with the other repetitions by poem so far considered, the thematic links are introduced so that the later poem of each pair can propose an answer to the problem that the earlier one describes or inflicts. The meter not only recalls the sound of the earlier poem, it uses this acoustic recollection to intone the recovery of the freedom lost.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>138</sup> Uhlfelder's interpretation is consistent with my own. See Uhlfelder, "The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius' *Consolatio*," 34. But I disagree with Relihan, who writes "these two poems stand in stark contrast: In the one, there is peace without ambition, a world without ships and trade; in the other, corruption and greed and their extension to the ends of the earth." Joel C. Relihan, in *Consolation of*

2, VI AND 4, VII  
SAPPHIC HENDECASYLLABLE (figure 6)

-- u -- -- -- ^ u u -- u -- --

We will consider this repetition more briefly because, as we shall soon see, it resembles the pattern of the other three pairs we have already examined.

In the prose preceding 2, VI, Philosophy argues that offices (*dignitates*) and power (*potentia*) have no inherent goodness; otherwise, she says, they could not be held by wicked men. When good men are chosen for office, therefore, their goodness is quite independent of the office they hold. 2, VI poetically represents this argument through the story of Nero: the emperor's vast power is powerless to cure his depraved madness.

The first half of the poem describes Nero's utter depravity:

*Nōvīmūs quāntās dēdērīt rūīnās  
ūrbē flāmmātā pātrībūsquē caēsīs  
frātrē quī quōndām fērūs intērēptō  
mātrīs ēffūsō mādūīt crūōrē  
cōrpūs ēt vīsū gēlīdūm pērerrāns  
ōrā nōn tīnxīt lācrīmīs, sēd ēssē  
cēnsōr ēxstīnctī pōtūīt dēcōrīs. (2, VI, 1-6)*

*Yés, we knów whát dreádful díśásters hé causéd—  
Róme in flámes, hér sénators crúelly sláughtered,  
Bróther pút tó deáth—how hé ónce, a sávage,  
Drípped the spílléd réd bloód of his véry móther,  
Cást his éyes fúll-léngth on her cóld dead bódy,  
Néver lét his fáce run with teárs, but cálmly  
Dáred apprécíáte her depárted beauty.*

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*Philosophy*, by Boethius (trans. Relihan), 173. While a certain contrast is obvious, I think Relihan neglects the crucial temporal aspect of each poem, and thus mistakes what the contrast is between. The first is a lament for something long ago lost (*prior aetas*), and an expressed wish for a return to the simplicity of that time (*utinam modo nostra redirent . . .*); whereas the second really concerns a future possibility (*Qui se volet esse potentem*). In the first, we have therefore already arrived at “corruption and greed and their extension to the ends of the earth,” which Relihan associates only with the second poem. In my view, the second poem recalls this greed and ambition, already vividly described in the first poem, in order to administer their correction. The comparison is not between “peace without ambition” and “corruption and greed,” but between what has been lost and the possibility of its recovery.

Sapphic hendecasyllable is a lyrical meter, and this particular instance is internally compounded with a glyconic: -- u (-- -- -- u u -- u --) --. The introductory trochee is quite powerful, as the first syllable is matched with a stress accent in every line. The middle section of each line has a steady beat, if grouped according to feet, while the beginning and end of each line syncopate and beckon towards a quicker pace—a kind of lyrical spring that builds force and momentum into Nero’s crimes. When repeated identically in an inalterable, stichic composition (as it is here), the effect is quite dramatic. As the poem turns to contrast the scope of Nero’s power with his wickedness, the rhythm continues to gather speed; paired with the images of Nero’s gruesome acts, the lines give rise to a flurry of image and sound:

*Hīc tāmēn scēptrō pōpūlōs rēgēbāt  
quōs vidēt cōndēns rādīōs sūb ūndās  
Phoēbūs, ēxtrēmō vēñiēns āb ōrtū,  
quōs prēmūnt sēptēm gēlīdī Trīōnēs,  
quōs Nōtūs sīccō vīōlēntūs aēstū  
tōrrēt ārdētēs rēcōquēns hārēnās. (2, VI,8-13)*

*Nónethelēss hé góvērned the dístant peóples  
Phoēbus seés whén sheáthing his líght in Ócean,  
Whén he cómes ágaín from his dístant rísing,  
Whóm the pólár stárs overhéad see snów-bound,  
Whóm the mád South Wínd with its árid stórm blast  
Blísters ás ít fórges the búrning sánd dunes.*

The repeated *quos* harshly punctuates the swirling images, violently swelling the realm over which Nero had power. The listener is caught in this barely controlled visual and rhythmical flurry, and is relieved by the verdict:

*Cēlsā nūm tāndēm vālūit pōtēstās  
vērtērē prāvī rābīēm Nērōnīs?  
Heū grāvēm sōrtēm, quōtīēns īnīquūs  
āddītūr saēvō glāđīūs vēnēnō! (2, VI, 14-17)*

*Nó; his lóftý pówer could nó at lóng last*

*Rédiréct thé frénzy of twísted Néro.  
 Woé the hárd mísfórtune, whenéver mádness  
 Ádds the únjúst swórd to its stóre of póison!*

By using the meter to convey Nero's frenetic madness, Philosophy aims to cure the prisoner of his sorrow at having lost his political position, and—as throughout the second book generally—to free him from external dependence on Fortune's deceptive gifts.

The meter repeats at 4, VII, by which time the prisoner has a much more developed interiority. He is able to accept the conclusion of the preceding prose, that to the good man, all fortune is good, as even bad fortune gives the wise man an opportunity to exercise his virtue. Philosophy tells him that he is “engaged in bitter mental struggle with every kind of fortune”<sup>139</sup>—lest ill fortune oppress or good fortune corrupt. The internal nature of this battle, however, is what offers the way to victory. Her concluding statement completely reverses the passivity of the prisoner's initial complaint:

In vestra enim situm manu qualem vobis fortunam  
 formare malitis . . . (4, 7, 22)

For it is placed in your own hands, what kind of fortune  
 you prefer to shape for yourselves . . . <sup>140</sup>

4, VII, gives examples of heroic deeds that were undertaken in this bitter struggle against fortune: Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter; Odysseus' escape from Polyphemus; and the ten feats of Hercules. 31 of the poem's 35 lines are dedicated to a gripping recount of mythological deeds. As with 2, VI, the syncopated, yet lyrical, meter builds momentum, and increases the dramatic power of the poem. The reasons behind

<sup>139</sup> 4, 7, 20, trans. Tester.

<sup>140</sup> Trans. Tester.

Philosophy's choice of the stories of Agamemnon and Odysseus is perhaps initially opaque, however, as these hardly appear unequivocal in their moral. The reason behind these choices is given in the poem's final lines, following the mention of Hercules' last labor:

*ūltīmūs caelūm lābōr īnrēflēxō  
sūstūlīt cōllō prētīumquē rūsūs  
ūltīmī caelūm mērūt lābōrīs.  
Ītē nūnc, fōrtēs, ūbī cēlsā māgnī  
dūcīt ēxēmplī vīā. Cūr īnertēs  
tērgā nūdātīs? sūpērātā tēllūs  
sīdērā dōnāt. (4, VII, 29-35)*

*Ón his néck únbówed was his fínal lābor,  
Heáven tó úphóld; his rewárd was heáven  
Fór his fínal lābor, the príce and páyment.  
Fóward, stróng mén ál, where this greát exámple,  
Whére this hígh roád leáds! Shoulder nów your búrden,  
Nów withoút déláy, for the eáarth, once cónquered,  
Gíves you the fíxed stars.*

What Philosophy is encouraging the prisoner towards is not a mere imitation of earthly determination or worldly power, but a deeper kind of virtue, an inward constancy of purpose. It is, I think, mistaken to read the poem as an anti-worldly exhortation, as the examples are of heroes wholly engaged with worldly events. To the modern reader, Agamemnon's actions are of a highly dubious moral character, which makes it difficult to read them positively. By Boethius' time, however, Agamemnon's actions, like so much else from Hellenic literature, were viewed through a wildly neoplatonized lens—through which Agamemnon's sacrifice of his daughter appears as an example of the wise man's determination in virtue.<sup>141</sup> This steadfastness of purpose is indeed the message that unifies these diverse examples.

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<sup>141</sup> See Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 365. For examples of neoplatonic readings of Hellenic poetry, see Porphyry, *On the Cave of the Nymphs*, trans. Thomas Taylor (Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1991) and Proclus,

The poem thus provides a provocative response to 2, VI.<sup>142</sup> Nero, for all his earthly power, was a slave to his lust.<sup>143</sup> Here, the prisoner is offered the possibility of a realm even greater than Nero's: *earth overcome grants you the stars*. The meter simultaneously recollects the failure of Nero's power, and promises a power much greater than his—if only the prisoner will persevere. The first instance of the meter conveys the swirling madness of Nero's power and thereby helps to cure the prisoner of his desire for worldly *dignitas* and *potentia*. The second instance recalls the first, sounding in the harmonic of memory, in order to direct this desire, now purified, to a higher end.<sup>144</sup> In Chapter 4, we will examine this poem in the context of the narrative, which sheds more light on what this higher end consists of, and to what, exactly, Philosophy is exhorting the prisoner. My aim here is only to suggest how the acoustic resonance is at work in Philosophy's method and, consequently, in the prisoner's experience.

1, V, 3, II, 4, VI, AND 5, III  
ANAPAESTIC DIMETER (figure 7)

uu uu | uu uu || uu uu | uu --

We looked at the first instance of anapaestic dimeter, 1, V, in Chapter 1. Delivered by the prisoner, the meter seemed to reflect his belief in order, while his

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*Commentaire sur la République*, trans. A. J. Festugière, 3 vols., Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques (Paris: J. Vrin, 1970).

<sup>142</sup> As Uhlfelder writes, "These two poems clearly form a diptych," Uhlfelder, "The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius' *Consolatio*," 34. Her analysis includes a persuasive contrast of the imagery and language of the two poems.

<sup>143</sup> "Nero's savage and selfishly-motivated parricide must be contrasted with Agamemnon's paternal grief at having to sacrifice his daughter in order to avenge his brother's honor," *ibid.*, 34.

<sup>144</sup> The change in meter in the final line, *sidera donat*, to an adonic beat, acoustically emphasizes this higher end, while it also recollects the rhythm of the exhortation that concluded the first book.

violations of the meter portrayed his underlying disbelief in the sovereignty of that order. In that poem, the prisoner observes order in the realm of nature—in the constellations of the sky, the alternation of day and night, the cycle of seasons, and in patterns of weather—but nonetheless to him it seems that the lives of men are exempt from that natural order. This disorder is not without cause: he forcefully claims that the *rector* of the cosmos could restrain human actions but refuses to do so:

*Ōmnīā cērtō fīnē gūbērnāns  
hōmīnūm sōlōs rēspūis āctūs  
mērītō rēctōr cōhibērē mōdō. (1, V, 25-27)*

*Cóntrólling all thíngs towárd their set óbject,  
Only húman deéds you disdáin to rein ín  
with desérved meásúre—you, their hélmsmán.<sup>145</sup>*

Finally, at the poem's end, the prisoner implores:

*Rāpīdōs, rēctōr, cōmprīmē flūctūs  
ēt, quō caelūm rēgīs īmmēnsūm,  
fīrmā stābilēs foēdērē tērrās. (1, V, 46-48)*

*Ó hélmsmán, make cálm the swíft-running seá swell,  
Máke stáble the eáarth in the sáme cóncórd  
Wíth which you pílot the límitless heávens.*

The next occurrence of the meter is at 3, II. In the preceding prose, Philosophy lays out the typical objects of human happiness—wealth, honor, power, glory, and pleasure. Here, however, rather than showing the illusory character of these perceived goods, she says: “for man’s mind, though the memory of it is clouded, yet does seek again its proper good, but like a drunken man cannot find by what path it may return home.”<sup>146</sup> She proceeds to show that in these perceived goods, what is really sought is sufficiency, respect, power, celebrity, and joy—that is, the characteristics of the true

<sup>145</sup> As in Chapter 1, I have altered the first words of Relihan’s translation of line 27.

<sup>146</sup> 3, 2, 13, Trans. Tester.

Good. And therefore, she says, “we can easily see how great is nature’s power in this, since although opinions vary and differ so much, yet they agree in loving the same end, the good.”<sup>147</sup> In other words, by means of a philosophical abstraction from the common conception of happiness, Philosophy effects an overturning of perspective, so that the misguided externality of human activity is comprehended by the Good that moves each person internally.

The following poem, 3, II, applies this conclusion to a reflection on nature. Nature governs not by external compulsion but through the instinct and desire innate in each thing. Philosophy illustrates the point with four images, three of them (lion, songbird, sapling) among the most vivid of the *Consolation*. Caged lions may endure beatings from the master and eat from their hands, yet if they taste but a drop of blood:

*rēsīdēs ōlīm rēdēūnt ānimī  
frēmītūquē grāvī mēmīnērē sūī  
lāxānt nōdis cōllā sōlūtīs  
prīmūsquē lācēr dēntē crūēntō  
dōmītōr rābīdās īmbūīt īrās. (3, II, 12-16)*

*Stréngth lóng dórmánt soón reappeáring  
Gives the térrible roár of sélf-recognition.  
As their loóséned bónds slíp from their fréé nécks,  
Their traíner first tórn by góry incísors  
Ínstrúcts by his bloód their mád ángér.<sup>148</sup>*

S. J. Tester, although he does not render the meter, perhaps captures the image more beautifully:

*Their long inactive spirits straight revive  
With rumbling growls they are themselves again,  
Shake their necks free from broken knots,*

<sup>147</sup> 3, 2, 20, Trans. Tester.

<sup>148</sup> Admirable as I find Relihan’s efforts to translate the meters of the *Consolation*’s poetry, I don’t find his anapaestic dimeters consistently preserve the highly rhythmical, even martial, sound of the Latin. Separating the line in half when reading the English can help with this, but occasionally the license Relihan takes with the meter makes this impossible.

*And the first to slake their rage, torn by their blood-stained teeth,  
Is their trainer.*

The second image is of a songbird:

*Quaē cānīt āltīs gārrūlā rāmīs  
ālēs, cāvēaē claudītūr āntrō;  
hūic līcēt īnlītā pōcūlā mēllē  
lārgāsquē dāpēs dūlcī stūdīō  
lūdēns hōmīnūm cūrā mīnīstrēt  
sī tāmēn ārtō sāliēns tēxtō  
nēmōrūm grātās vīdērīt ūmbrās  
spārsās pēdībūs prōtērīt ēscās.  
sīlvās tāntūm maēstā rēquīrīt,  
sīlvās dūlcī vōcē sūsūrrāt. (3, II,17-26)*

*The chattering bird in the high branches  
Now is imprisoned in the vault of a cage;  
Mortal attentions, playful, may offer  
With sweet concern cups rimmed with honey,  
Éxtravagant feasts for this performer.  
Fluttering upward in her close-woven cage,  
Catching sight of groves and fair shadows,  
Scratching she scatters all the food at her feet,  
And mourning her loss seeks the woods only,  
Only coos "The woods!" in her soft singing.*

Tester, again, better captures the emotion of the scene:

*The tree-top loving, chirruping bird  
Is shut in a coop like a cavern.  
Men treat her as a toy and care for her  
With kindness putting in honeyed drink  
And food in plenty :  
yet if she sees, hopping in her narrow cage,  
The beloved shade of trees,  
She scatters her food beneath her feet  
And all she wants is her woods,  
Sings sadly, softly, sweetly of her woods.*

The third image (ll.27-30) is of a sapling, which, if bent back by the hand, when released, springs back towards the sky, while the fourth image (ll. 31-33) is of the sun's daily journey—though it sinks in the West each night it finds its secret way (*secretio tramite*) back to the East.

Each of Philosophy's examples depicts a natural phenomenon, and therefore recollects the prisoner's examples of natural order in 1, V. Yet her images are not mere observations of order, as the prisoner's were, but illustrations of how that order emerges from the inherent disposition of each thing. The poem's conclusion sets these instances of *reditus* within a universal pattern, and thus connects natural inclination with cosmic return.

*Rĕpĕtũnt prŏpriŏs quaĕquĕ rĕcũrsũs  
rĕdĩtũquĕ sũŏ sĩngũľă gaũdĕnt  
nĕc mănĕt ũľľĩ trădĩtũs ōrdŏ,  
nĩsĩ quŏd fĩnĩ iũnxĕrĩt ōrtũm  
stăbilĕmqũĕ sũĩ fĕcĕrĩt ōrbĕm. (3, II, 34-38)*

*Áll seĕk out thĕir ōwn páths of reĕntry,  
Réjoíce in thĕir ōwn prĩvate retũrnings.  
Thĕre is hándĕd dŏwn nŏ lasting ōrder,  
Éxcĕpt thăt each join ĕnd and begĩnning  
Ánd máke for itsĕlf ōne stable círcle.*

It is remarkable, though, that Philosophy does not mention humankind in this poem, despite the fact that the preceding prose concludes that people are ruled internally by the Good, and thus seems to answer the prisoner's lament of 1, V—that humankind alone is exempt from natural order. Because the poem considers nature only, however, it is more precisely calibrated to match the prisoner's complaint: by showing nature to be governed internally, Philosophy builds on the knowledge the prisoner's earlier poem expressed. Rather than having the prisoner apply the conclusion of the prose retrospectively to his poetic complaint, she acoustically recalls his complaint and begins to answer it within the limits he had recognized, and with the meter he employed. While she keeps to the realm of nature, she chooses images that resonate with the prisoner's circumstance. Despite the lion's great natural strength and

the songbird's lofty flight—they are imprisoned, grow accustomed to their cages, and forget themselves. Yet it takes only a drop of blood or a glimpse of woodland to revive them. By summoning images of imprisonment, Philosophy enters the prisoner's imagination of himself, and by showing how that imprisonment is naturally overcome, she offers him the possibility of a freedom that cannot be contained. By associating him with the caged lion, she gives him the possibility of the lion's majestic recovery, and an intuitive sense of his own power. That is, Philosophy employs these extraordinarily vivid images because they intuitively and emotionally connect the prisoner with the natural order from which he thought he was excluded. As spoken words, they have the power to effect the acts they describe—they are the equivalent of a drop of blood for the lion or a glimpse of the woods for the songbird, meant to inwardly awaken the prisoner, to recall him to who he is, and remind him of what he longs for.

In the very rhythm in which the prisoner lamented a lack of order, Philosophy begins to resolve his complaint by inwardly evoking the order he sought. Unlike the prisoner's use of the meter, however, here the even quality of the beat and of each line is not interrupted, just as her account of the natural order will apply totally to each and every thing. It is surely not accidental that Philosophy begins her poem in the manner of a bard, introducing the subject in song.

*Quāntās rērūm flēctāt hābēnās  
nātūrā pōtēns, quībūs immēnsūm  
lēgībūs orbēm prōvidā sērvēt  
strīngātquē ligāns inrēsōlūtō  
sīngūlā nēxū, plācēt ārgūtō  
fidībūs lēntīs, prōmērē cāntū.*

*Whát are the réins of pówerful Náture,  
Guiiding the úniverse? Bý whát státútes  
Does her Próvidence hólđ thé ínfinite sphére,*

*Bínding and keéping thís wórld óf thínks  
In unbreákbable bónds? Ít is my pleásure  
That my sóns sínng óút tó the soft lýre.*

Her poem is a pleasing song, not meant merely to remind the prisoner of his complaint and correct it, but to recall it so that she can show him something sweeter within the order he had perceived—and awaken him to his true nature and freedom. The abstract truth of universal *reditus* is meaningless unless the prisoner comes to hear himself in its song.

The third occurrence of anapaestic dimeter is at 4, VI. Shortly before, the prisoner has asked Philosophy to explain why, if God governs the universe, it nonetheless frequently appears that good persons receive the punishment of the wicked, and wicked the rewards of the good. To the prisoner, it seems no different than if things were ruled by mere chance. Philosophy's reply, in the prose preceding 4, VI, attempts to dissolve the apparent randomness of reward and punishment by distinguishing the orders of fate and providence.

Haec [mens divina] in suae simplicitatis arce composita multiplicem regendis modum statuit. Qui modus cum in ipsa divinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, providentia nominatur; cum vero ad ea quae movet atque disponit refertur, fatum a veteribus appellatum est. (4, 6, 8)

This divine mind, collected in the citadel of its simplicity, has established a complex mode of ruling. When this mode is viewed in the very purity of the divine intelligence, it is called providence; but when related to the things it moves and disposes, by the ancients it is called fate.<sup>149</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Trans. mine.

The divine mind has a *multiplicem modum regendis* (a *multiplex mode of ruling*). There are, again, several possible senses to *modus*. *Mode* is the most obvious in English; Tester translates *manner*, which perhaps makes best sense of the passage: the divine simplicity has a complex manner of ruling things, which manner, viewed from different standpoints, can be called either providence or fate. *Mode*, *manner*, and *measure* are all closely related, and we do not need to choose between them, but rather employ them simultaneously.<sup>150</sup> In any case, *modus* with respect to God's governance makes this passage a more or less direct response to the prisoner's charge in 1, V, that God refuses to constrain human affairs by their *merito modo*, or deserved measure.<sup>151</sup>

Fate, Philosophy continues, depends on providence, as a circle depends on its point. Consequently, all things subject to fate—the movements of the heavens, the mingling of the elements, the renewing of living species by procreation, as well as the fortunes of men—are first determined by providence. This distinction accounts for the prisoner's perception that no order exists:

Quo fit ut, tametsi vobis, hunc ordinem minime  
considerare valentibus, confusa omnia perturbataque  
videantur, nihilo minus tamen suus modus ad bonum  
dirigens cuncta disponat. (4, 6, 21)

So it is that although all things may seem confused and  
disordered to you, unable as you are to contemplate this  
order, nevertheless their own measure directing them  
towards the good disposes them all.<sup>152</sup>

*Modus* reappears in Philosophy's explanation, as the *measure*, or *limit*, proper to each thing that disposes it towards the good. Philosophy thus uses *modus* both for the *manner*

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<sup>150</sup> Boethius' many uses of *modus* and its variations deserves a study of its own. Compare the entries under "*modis*," "*modo*," "*modos*," "*modum*," and "*modus*" in Lane Cooper, *A Concordance of Boethius* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1928).

<sup>151</sup> See p. 80, above.

<sup>152</sup> Trans. Tester.

of divine ruling, and for the *measure*, proper to each thing, that inwardly directs it toward the good. Viewed externally, fate seems disordered and confused, but viewed from within each creature, there is an inward measure and disposition according to which Providence orders all things.

Non enim dissimile est miraculum nescienti cur sanis corporibus his quidem dulcia illis vero amara convenient, cur aegri etiam quidam lenibus quidam vero acribus adiuvantur. At hoc medicus, qui sanitatis ipsius atque aegritudinis modum temperamentumque dinoscit, minime miratur. (4, 6, 27-28)

For the case is not unlike that which is a wonder to an ignorant man, why with some healthy bodies sweet things agree, with others bitter, or why, again, of the sick, some are helped by mild medicines, others by sharp ones. But this doctor, who distinguishes the manner and temper of health itself and of sickness, does not wonder at.<sup>153</sup>

Philosophy's third, and perhaps most provocative, use of *modus* in this prose passage implicitly compares providential governance to her own treatment, with gentle and bitter medicines, of the prisoner's malady. The physician knows which medicine to employ because she knows the inner *modus—measure, manner, way of being*—and temperament, of her patient's health or sickness. She links the discussion of providence and fate to her treatment of the prisoner, and introduces her poem with a further diagnostic comment:

Sed video te iam dudum et pondere quaestionis oneratum et rationis prolixitate fatigatum aliquam carminis expectare dulcedinem. Accipe igitur haustum, quo refectus firmior in ulteriora contendas. (4, 6, 57)

But I see that you are long since burdened with the weight of this enquiry and tired by the length of the argument, and are waiting for some sweetness in verse; therefore,

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<sup>153</sup> Trans. Tester.

take a draught, that you may be refreshed by it and go  
more firmly further on. (Trans. Tester)

Following as it does the association Philosophy has established, by her use of the word *modus*, between her treatment and divine governance, this prelude situates the poem as an instance of her medical treatment, and thus also as an instance of Providential *modus*; that is, of the divine *modus* disposing the *modus* of the prisoner, back to health and towards the Good.

Like 3, II, 4, VI returns to the topic of natural order, but this time Philosophy explicitly echoes the examples of the prisoner in 1, V. She mentions the constellations, seasons, the alternation of night and day, and the exchange of the elements. In each case she stresses the balance and harmony of the natural order.

*Sic aeternōs reficit cūsūs  
āltērnūs āmōr, sīc āstrīgērīs  
bēllūm dīscōrs ēxsūlāt ōrīs.  
Haēc cōncōrdiā tēmpērāt aēquīs  
ēlēmētā mōdīs, ūt pūgnāntiā  
vīcībūs cēdānt hūmīdā siccīs  
iūngāntquē fidēm frīgōrā flāmmīs, (4, VI, 16-22)*

*Thus, reciprocal Lōve mākes new the pāthways  
Étérnally sēt, thūs from the fīxed stars  
Wār's dīshārmony flées into éxile.  
Thīs hārmony rúles élements bálanced  
Ín their just meāsures: Moístness and drýness,  
Át wār back and fōrth, yíeld to each óther,  
Íce and flame jóining tógéther as friénds.*

While Philosophy unquestionably makes use of the prisoner's examples, she reinterprets them through the reciprocal love of inner inclination. She thereby harmonizes in this poem the two previous poems of the same meter by showing how the prisoner's examples of order (1, V) are comprehended by the rule of inner desire (3,

II).<sup>154</sup> If God did not dispose and constrain each thing, soon the order would dissolve in chaos.

*nām nīsi rēctōs rēvōcāns ītūs  
flēxōs ītērūm cōgāt īn ōrbēs,  
quāē nūnc stābilīs cōntīnēt ōrdō  
dīssaēptā sūō fōntē fātīscānt. (4, VI, 40-43)*

*If he did not recáll thése straight-line mótiōns  
Ánd bénd thém báck īnto curvéd órbits,  
Thīngs thát are képt nōw īn stāble órder,<sup>155</sup>  
Cút óff fróm thér sūrce wóuld búrst at thé seáms.*

And yet this constraint is simply the bond of created desire, the love that moves in every thing:

*Hīc ēst cūctīs cōmmūnīs āmōr  
rēpētūntquē bōnī fīnē tēnērī,  
quīā nōn ālītēr dūrārē quēānt  
nīsi cōnvērsō rūrsūs āmōrē  
rēflūānt caūsaē quāē dēdit ēssē. (4, VI, 44-48)*

*Ánd thīs īs Lóve cōmmon to áll thīngs:  
Théy seék thé embráce of thér goál, thé Goód.  
Ín nō other wáy cōuld théy be lástīng  
Únléss bý Lóve túrning thém báckward  
Théy flow báck to thé caúse thát gáv thém beīng.*

It is the love within and between things that effects the order of providence: the *modus* of divine governance is accomplished through the *modus* of earthly things. Still, as richly endowed as the poem is with theological expressions of providence and *reditus*, it is its character as a song that matters most to Philosophy. She says this is a *carmen*, and tells the prisoner to take a drink (*haustum*) of its sweetness so he may be restored and

<sup>154</sup> John Magee makes a similar point when he writes: “There is a pattern to the internal structures and philosophical implications of the poems. Each begins with a celebration of the unchanging order of things, then offers supporting illustrations. In their final sections they differ, but in such a way as to contribute to the logical progression of thought: I m5 ends pessimistically, with Fortune and earthly tyrants; III m2 concludes with the *regressus* theme; and IV m6 both corrects the pessimistic conclusion of I m5 and incorporates the *regressus* theme of III m2.” Magee, “Boethius’ Anapestic Dimeters,” 164.

<sup>155</sup> This line is metrically incomplete; perhaps an accent was intended for “nów.”

strengthened. I have suggested how the message of the poem situates the prisoner's observations of natural order in 1, V in relation to the inwardly driven *reditus* Philosophy vividly described in 3, II. It is the meter, however, that largely effects this harmonization of the earlier poems. The rhythm of the song is as carefully woven into the fabric of the poem as anywhere: anapaestic dimeter, with its two metrons of equal value, each divided into two equal feet, each foot divided into two equal beats—aesthetically expresses the equality of measure that holds the cosmos together. It is more than a little tempting to hear the *aequis modis* of

*Haēc cōncōrdiā tēmpērāt aēquīs  
ēlēmētā mōdīs (4, VI, 19-20)*

*This cōncōrd tempers thé éléments with  
équal meásúres<sup>156</sup>*

as signifying both creaturely *modus* and poetic *measure*. The sung character of the poem extends beyond even this unity of form and content, however. Philosophy instructs the patient to drink of her song just after she has compared a doctor's treatment of a patient to the providential ordering of all things. Her song is therefore situated as an instance of the ordering power of the divine *modus*, inwardly disposing the creature to return. Her song has this power *as song*, that is, as the *carmen* she instructs the prisoner to drink. It is a delicate two-sided movement, in which she attempts to hold providence and fate together, so that command is one with desire, and order with love. In these equal measures, she unfolds the unity into which she enfolds the prisoner.

The fourth, and final, occurrence of anapaestic dimeter is at 5, III. It is the prisoner's first poem since 1, V, and his last of the text. In the preceding prose, the

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<sup>156</sup> Trans. mine.

argument reaches the crisis to which Philosophy's explanation of divine providence has led: the prisoner asserts that divine knowledge, as Philosophy has (in the meanwhile) explained it, destroys human freedom, attributes all virtue and vice to an ineluctable fate, and makes prayer—the only means of connecting with God—futile. He concludes by paraphrasing a few lines (4, VI, 41-43, quoted above) of Philosophy's previous anapaestic dimeter.<sup>157</sup> He says:

Quare necesse erit humanum genus, uti paulo ante  
cantabas, dissaeptum atque disiunctum suo fonte  
faticere. (5, 3, 36)

And so it is, just as you were singing a little while ago, that it will necessarily be the case that the human race, separated and “cut off from its source, will burst at the seams.”

The balance between divine rule and human inclination, manifest in 4, VI, appears, upon closer examination, to be obliterated by the necessity of divine knowing, as human actions have no inner integrity if necessitated by divine foreknowledge. The opening lines of the prisoner's poem continue this comparison with Philosophy's previous poem in the same meter. The first lines recall the harmony of 4, VI, even as they seem to assert it has been lost:

Quāenām dīscōrs foēdērā rērūm  
caūsā rēsōlvīt? Quīs tāntā dēūs  
vērīs stātūit bēllā dūōbūs,  
ūt, quāē cārptīm sīngūlā cōnstēnt,  
ēādēm nōlīnt mīxtā iūgārī? (5, III, 1-5)

Whát dīscordant caūse tóre into piéces  
Áll the world's cóncord? Whát gód has decreéd<sup>158</sup>  
Fór thése twó trúths súch bitter wárfare?

<sup>157</sup> On how the prisoner's paraphrase slightly alters Philosophy's words, see John Magee: “But whereas at IV m6,43 the quoted words were couched in the apodosis of a weak condition, at V 3, 36 Boethius takes the hypothesis as conclusive – immediate and threatening.” Magee, “Boethius' Anapestic Dimeters,” 166.

<sup>158</sup> It seems likely an accent was intended for the second syllable of “cóncórd.”

*Eách stánding its ground séparate and équal,  
Bút dráwing the líne at jóining togéther.*

The prisoner has now twice used the rhythm of anapaestic dimeter to express a sense of discord: in 1, V, at the fact that humankind seems exempt from the order of nature, and here, to express the dissonance between divine providence and human freedom.<sup>159</sup> Initially, then, it seems the prisoner is overturning Philosophy's hard won effort by undermining her argument in the same meter, and by returning to his earlier expression of disharmony. The poem, however, quickly draws back from the contradiction, as the prisoner wonders whether the problem lies not in the objective nature of things, but in the limits of his knowledge.

*Ān nūlla^ēst dīscōrdiā vērīs  
sēmpērquē sībī cērtā cōhaērēnt,  
sēd mēns caēcīs obrūtā mēmbri  
nēquīt ōpprēssī lūmīnīs ignē  
rērūm tēnūēs nōscērē nēxūs? (5, III, 6-10)*

*Ór could it bé thére is no díscord—  
Thát définite trúths ever clíng each to éach—  
Bút mínd, búriéd bý body's blíndness,  
Éxcépt by the fíre of líght deep-conceáled,  
Cánnót see the wórld's bónds, microscópic?*

The prisoner's tone and message is, in fact, opposite to that of 1, V. Rather than rail against the disorder he perceives, he turns his vision to the nature of his perception, delving into the cognitive paradox he there observes.

*sēd cūr tāntō flāgrāt āmōrē  
vērī tēctās rēpērīrē nōtās?  
scītñē quōd āppētīt ānxiā nōssē?  
sēd quīs nōtā scírē lābōrāt?  
āt sī nēscīt, quīd caēcā pētīt?  
Quīs ěnīm quīcquām nēsciūs ōptēt?  
aūt quīs vālēāt nēscītā sēquī  
quōve^invēniāt? Quīs rēp(p)ērtām*

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<sup>159</sup> See *ibid.*, 154.

*quæät īgnārūs nōscēřě fōrmām? (5, 3, 11-19)*

*Bút why does it búrn wíth súch a gréat lóve  
To díscóver the trúth, trúth's hídden sígnposts?  
Does it knów it knóws what it frétfúly seéks?  
Whó strúggles to knów thát wích he doés know?  
Bút íf he knows nót, why look for blínd thíngs?<sup>160</sup>  
Whát ígnorant mán cóuld máke any choíce?  
Whó hás thé stréngth tó cháse the unknówn?  
Whére wóuld he fínd ít? Whó then cóuld seé ít,<sup>161</sup>  
Íts fōrm thus díscóvered, íf unenlíghtened?*

In confronting his inability to reconcile the two truths—of the integrity of human action, and the necessity of divine knowledge—the prisoner encounters the aporia of human knowing and the intermediate character of the human mind. Why does the mind seek to know what seems beyond its powers to grasp? Why does it burn with such great love to know the truth of things? While in I, V, the prisoner confidently stated that no order existed, here his manner of questioning displays a moment of true wonder, of utterly speculative thinking. By asking questions about his own knowing, the prisoner is inwardly baring himself to the problem the argument has encountered. Despite the crisis the argument has caused for the integrity of his thought and action, rather than abandon the manner of his knowing, he enters a state of deeply meditative

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<sup>160</sup> Tester's translation better captures the paradox:

*But why does it blaze with so great love  
To find the hidden characters of truth?  
Does it know what it anxiously seeks to know?  
But who is there labours to know known things?  
Yet if it does not know, why then in blindness seek?  
For who would long for anything he knows not of,  
Or who could follow after things unknown,  
Or how discover them? Who could in ignorance recognize  
The form of what he found?*

<sup>161</sup> It seems likely an accent was intended for "it."

speculation. Thus, by thinking about his thinking, the prisoner goes deeper into the inward life of the paradox. At the end of the poem, he tentatively offers a solution.<sup>162</sup>

*ān cūm mēntēm cērñērēt āltām  
pārītēr sūmmam^ēt sīngŭlā nōrāt,  
nūnc mēmbōrūrūm cōndītā nūbē  
nōn īn tōtum^est ōblītā sūī  
sūmmāmquē tēnēt sīngŭlā pērdēns?  
īgītūr quīsquīs vērā rēquīrīt  
neūtro^est hābitū; nām nēquē nōvīt  
nēc pēnītūs tāmēn ōmniā nēscīt,  
sēd quām rētīnēns mēmīnīt sūmmām  
cōnsŭlīt āltē vīsā rētrāctāns,  
ūt sērvātīs quēāt ōblītās  
āddērē pārtēs.<sup>163</sup> (5, 3, 20-31)*

*Ór, whén it behéld the dépths of dívīne mind,  
Did it knów thése trúths, thé whóle and its párts?  
Now hídden in dárk clouds, límbs of the bódy,  
Ít doés not forgét sélf absolútely,  
Ánd lóses the párts búť clíngs to the whóle?  
Thús, whóévér seárches for trué things  
Hás néither condítion: for he doés nót knów,  
Nór does he **nót** know, áll things complétely.  
With an éye on the whóle, képt and remémbered,  
Hé pónders anéw the dépths he once gázed on,  
Thát he may ádd to párts that were képt safe  
Párts once forgóttēn.*

By suggesting a solution in the language of whole and part, unity and particular, the prisoner shows how his cognitional meditation reflects the dilemma of providence and freedom—as whole and part, unity and particular, are the two sides of the problem. The conflict between freedom and providence leads, therefore, to an inward meditation on the activity of knowing which is itself at the heart of his conflict.<sup>164</sup>

<sup>162</sup> “Here, since the final return has not yet been achieved, the resolution of the questions is tentative.” Uhlfelder, “The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius’ *Consolatio*,” 33.

<sup>163</sup> It is tempting to imagine a half line’s silence following “*oblitas*,” a space for the remembering that takes place before *āddērē pārtēs*, the half line of (adonic sounding) anapaestic dimeter that ends the poem.

<sup>164</sup> We will return to examine the cause of this crisis in more detail in Chapter 4.

This meditation on the mystery of human knowing, however, reveals the mind's relation to the unity beyond itself, and thus anticipates the solution Philosophy will give to the problem in the subsequent prose—namely, that the human levels of knowing (sense, imagination, reason, intellect) are inwardly connected with each other and are not destroyed by divine providence, but upheld by it. The prisoner's cognitive meditation is at the intersection of reason and intellect, between discursive reflection and intuitive unitary apprehension. Rather than abandon his reason, therefore, he turns it upon itself, and finds it inwardly constituted to reveal its principle, the unity on which it depends.

Even without the acoustic cue of the meter, the content of the poem is evidently a response to 4, VI: the inner inclination of the creature seems to collapse next to the inescapability of divine providence; the harmony of 4, VI is threatened, until the prisoner rightly perceives the answer to lie in the nature of his own knowing. Yet the authorial intent to connect these two poems is still more pronounced. This is the prisoner's only poem in the latter four of five books of the text, and the preceding prose marks it in an unusual manner: the prisoner introduces the poem by paraphrasing from Philosophy's previous poem in the same meter (4, VI) and by recalling its sung character: *uti paulo ante cantabas* (as you sang a little while ago). He then delivers this metrically resonant poem in which he not only does not reject the harmony of her song, but exposes himself more completely to its logic, by inwardly offering himself to the aporia he perceives.

There is something very peculiar at work here: every other recurrence of a meter has been a repetition by Philosophy, an instrument of her therapeutic treatment,

whereas this poem, uniquely, is a repetition by the prisoner himself. It is, furthermore, the only poem of a repeated meter that is introduced so explicitly in relation to an earlier singing of the same sound. Paraphrasing her earlier poem of the same meter, while referring to its sung occurrence, situates this repetition as a response, both thematically and acoustically, to Philosophy's earlier poem, which itself harmonized the two previous occurrences of the meter. It is also no coincidence that by putting the aporia in terms of whole and part, the prisoner echoes the dilemma of his own earlier anapaestic dimeter, in which human actions were at odds with divine rule.<sup>165</sup> In his sole metric repetition, therefore, the prisoner responds to, and weaves together, the earlier instances of the meter in a manner that resembles that of his teacher.<sup>166</sup>

The student, however, does not have the mastery of his teacher—the poem states a question more than it proposes an answer. If Philosophy's repetitions are sounds meant to address the prisoner's condition, this one—like the prisoner's early poems—seems rather to emerge directly from the temper of his soul, just as his speculation is an honest expression of what he knows and doesn't know. Though he cannot quite understand the discord he perceives, he is nonetheless disposed to hear—and to speak—an underlying harmony. The reverberating sound of this equally measured meter is thus the true medium of the poem, the sensual balance that mediates the thought. While reason leads of itself to intellect, sense first leads through imagination to reason. The rhythmic echo thus engenders the speculative thinking the

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<sup>165</sup> Magee writes: "Thus V m3 is a reprise, at a higher level of comprehension, of the worries driving I m5, and its precise function is to trigger the final phase of argumentation," Magee, "Boethius' Anapaestic Dimeters," 168. While I agree that the prisoner is echoing the problem of his first anapaestic dimeter at a higher level of comprehension, I think—as I argue here below—it is less a reprise of the problem than an answer proceeding from within.

<sup>166</sup> See Curley, "The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature," 364-365.

poem enacts. Philosophy sings, and her song resounds, echoing in the prisoner's soul, and then returning to her in his song. The prisoner's sung speculation is thus an echo of the rhythm still ringing in his ear; an acoustic return—a *reditus* of sound.

1, VI, 2 VIII, 3, XII, AND 5, IV  
GLYCONIC (figure 8)

-- -- -- u u -- u --

As the reader will notice, Gruber's list of glyconic poems (figure 1 or 2) adds 4, III to the above four, bringing his total to five, with one in each book. In my view, however, the substitution in 4, III of a short syllable for the second long one (i.e. -- u -- u u -- u --) varies the rhythm too significantly to consider it within what is otherwise a pattern of precise metric recurrence, and therefore I have excluded it from this section.<sup>167</sup> An interesting consequence of this exclusion is that the remaining four glyconic poems now fall symmetrically around the midpoint of 3, IX; a feature we will discuss further in Chapter 3.

We looked at I, VI, the first occurrence of this glyconic meter, in Chapter 1. We heard Philosophy describe, and begin to apply, her gentle medicines in a poem that was directed at the prisoner's tumult of emotions, which she had observed in his preceding poem, his "raging (*saeviens*)" anapaestic dimeter. Using a gentle beat, she gave childlike examples that illustrated the importance of doing things in the right time or season

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<sup>167</sup> O'Donnell notates 5, IV as x -- -- u u -- u --, which would seem to exclude it also from a series of precise metric repetitions. Upon examination, however, only three of the first syllables, in forty lines, scan as short—few enough to be regarded as occasional exceptions to a meter that is otherwise identical with the other three instances.

(such as not sowing seeds in the heat of summer, or plucking grapes in the spring).

From the order of the seasons she drew the lesson:

*Sīgnāt tēmpōrā prōpriīs  
āptāns officīis dēūs  
nēc quās īpsē cōercūit,  
mīscērī pātītūr vicēs. (1, VI, 16-19)*

*Gód gíves sígns for the seásons, fít  
Fór eách óne to its próper tásks.  
Ín thé cýcles he képt in bounds  
Nó cónfúsiún does hé allów.*

The meter recurs in 2, VIII, at the very end of the second book. As we have already observed, much of the second book is dedicated to the negative movement of clearing away the prisoner's attachment to external things. The prose preceding 2, VIII delivers a surprising conclusion to this negative movement: bad fortune is better than good fortune, as bad fortune reveals the true character of *Fortuna*, which good fortune conceals. Philosophy offers a proof of this conclusion in the final lines of the prose, in which she says—almost as an aside—that the prisoner's bad fortune has had the good result of revealing his faithful friends (*amici*) and honest companions (*sodales*). She exclaims:

*Quanti hoc integer et, ut videbaris tibi, fortunatus,  
emisses? nunc et amissas opes querere; quod  
pretiosissimum divitiarum genus est, amicos invenisti. (2,  
8, 7)*

How dearly would you have bought such knowledge in your unaffected and—as you thought—fortunate state! As it is, you are even complaining of your lost wealth: but you have found the most precious of all kinds of riches—true friends.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>168</sup> Trans. Tester

Initially, the poem doesn't seem to be connected with the preceding prose—or even generally with the second book—at all. It begins with examples of the stable bonds that hold the world in harmony, including the alternation of day and night, and the boundaries between land and sea.

*Quōd mūdūs stābilī fidē  
cōncōrdēs vāriāt vīcēs,  
quōd pūgnāntiā sēmīnā  
foēdūs pērpētūm tēnēt,  
quōd Phoēbūs rōsēum dīēm  
cūrrū prōvēhīt aūrēō,  
ūt quās dūxērīt Hēsperōs  
Phoēbē nōctībūs īmpērēt,  
ūt flūctūs āvidūm mārē  
cērtō finē cōercēāt,  
nē tērrīs līcēāt vāgīs  
lātōs tēndērē tērminōs, (2, VIII, 1-12)*

*A steádfást, trústworthy únivérse  
Mákes hármónious, órdered chānge;  
Pácts étérnal restráin and cúrb  
Wárríng phýsical éleménts.  
Phoébús bríngs forth the róse-red dáy  
Fróm á cháriot máde of góld;  
Stárs thát Hésperus úshers ín  
Phoébé góverns in deád of níght;  
Seás ímmóderate kéep in chéck  
Róllíng wáves in detérmined bóunds;  
Drý lánd, shápeless and próteán,  
Máy nóť strétch out beyónd its pále.*

While the poem doesn't initially seem connected to the preceding prose, it does seem quite similar to her previous glyconic poem. The reassuring character of the examples, and the softness of the language, is again matched with the gentleness of the meter. The examples are also of the same genre: whereas in 1, VI, they describe the balanced cycle of the seasons, here they describe the balanced cycle of night day, and the balance between the domains of earth and land. Further confirmation of this similarity is Philosophy's reuse of the verb *coerceo* (to enclose, hold together, keep within limits, control,

*restrain*): at 1, VI, 18 (*ipse coercuit*), it is the verb attached to *deus* as subject, and describes the order established by God (*what God himself ordains / he does not allow to be changed*); similarly, at 2, VIII, 10 it describes the limit (*certo fine*) imposed on the waters of the sea (*that the sea restrain her floods within a fixed boundary*). However, though the verb is attached to *mare*, because the clause follows *ut*, the listener realizes he has yet to hear the cause of all of this order—the subject and main verb of the sentence—which makes the sea to keep to her bounds, day and night to alternate, etc.

This grammatical absence brings to our attention the most remarkable feature of these opening lines—and one that is nearly impossible to maintain in translation—that is, they are all part of a sentence that has not yet finished. The repeated *quod* at the beginning of lines 1, 3, and 5 (*that the world is held in a stable bond . . . that warring seeds . . . that Phoebus brings the rosy day . . .*), leads to the repeated *ut* in line 7 and 9 (*so that what Hesperus leads . . . so that the wild sea*), and the *ne* in line 11 (*lest it be allowed*) and together give a strong description of cosmic harmony, but carry on for 12 lines without naming the subject that is responsible for this order, interconnected not only cosmically but also syntactically without seam. The listener cannot but assent to the fact of the order, even though he has not yet heard its cause, just as the immediate meaning of each clause of the incomplete sentence is clear even without the apposite subject and main verb that will complete them. The listener is thus brought, or perhaps lulled, into recognition of this long list of ordered realities even as the anticipation for the apposition builds. When the final phrase arrives, it heightens this anticipation further still, delaying mention of the subject until the final word:

*hānc rērūm sērīēm līgāt  
tērrās āc pēlāgūs rēgēns*

*et cāelo ĩmpĕřitāns āmōr.* (2, VIII, 13-15)

*What binds this séquence of things so tíght,  
Whát is kíng over lánd and seá,  
Whát thé heávens obéy, is Lóve.*

The listener, having implicitly consented to the order as described throughout the unfolding of the sentence, is syntactically forced to accept its conclusion. *Amor* concludes the sentence, ends a metric line, and finishes at exactly the midpoint of the poem. Yet *amor* is hardly the expected word—*conditor, auctor, pater*, etc. but *amor*? Philosophy makes use of the extreme delay of the apposite subject to insert a word that requires the listener to retrospectively reinterpret what has been described—as *the work of love*. She proceeds immediately to describe many other things that are ruled by *amor*—all of them quite recognizable as bonds of love: between peoples, spouses, lovers, and comrades. And lest there be any doubt about her intent, for the last of these, *comrades*, she uses a word—*sodales*—that recalls the conclusion of the preceding prose. Through the presence of his absent friends, Philosophy evoked the affections of his heart; she now fans the flame of these affections as she lists the bonds of human love. The poem does, then, mirror the message of the prose, but in such a way as to extend the prisoner’s sense of *amor* to the entire cosmos. While the poem moves forward, the prisoner’s interpretive grasp moves backward; while Philosophy unfolds examples of human love, the prisoner must retrospectively associate these inward affections with the external order described above, and grasp them as governed by one and the same *amor*.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> For instance, Philosophy’s words *concordes vices* (l. 1) now sound more literally: not only *concordant changes, or harmonious change*, but also literally *changes* [which are] *of one heart*.

By connecting the two realms through the language of *amor*, Philosophy effectively puts the weight of the prisoner's affections in the service of cosmic harmony. As we know, it is still early in the prisoner's treatment, and it is not until much later that Philosophy explains how the inward, subjective inclination to seek the good is the very means by which God governs human affairs. Yet her repetition of the gentle meter of 1, VI serves already to connect the prisoner's inner life with the external order he does perceive. 2, VIII is therefore a continuation of the gentle medicine of 1, VI, but one that goes deeper within. And so in her final lines Philosophy sings:

*Ō fēlīx hōmīnūm gēnūs,  
sī vēstrōs ānīmōs āmōr  
quō caēlūm rēgītūr, rēgāt!* (2, VIII, 28-30)

*Ó hów háppy the mórtal ráce,  
Wére Lóve kíng over áll your héárts,  
Lóve thát héáven accépts as kíng!*

Though stated as an exhortation to humankind—*that love would rule your hearts*—it is also what the poem has disclosed—that love does rule within the prisoner's heart. Within the rhythm's reassuring beat, Philosophy is safely able to evoke certain of the prisoner's formerly volatile emotions; and by summoning these affections, she has the means by which she can lead the prisoner inwardly to grasp, and outwardly to embrace, the sovereignty of *amor*<sup>170</sup> now revealed.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Philosophy speaks the word *amor* at the midpoint of the poem, an appropriate place to mention the principle around which all things turn. And once she has spoken the word that governs all, it is everywhere—including at all the essential grammatical parts of speech: *amor, amat, amoribus*; the centrality, completeness, and pervasiveness of love's rule shows through even in the linguistic structure of the sentences that describe it.

<sup>171</sup> Before proceeding to the third glyconic poem, it is worth recalling that the first of these glyconics (1, VI), when considered in the chronology of the narrative of Book 1, responded directly to the prisoner's raging anapaestic dimeter (1, V). The glyconic meter and message seemed to calm the prisoner's

The third of these glyconic poems, 3, XII, concludes the third book, and is perhaps the most powerful, beautiful, and difficult poem of the *Consolation*. There is much of interest in the preceding prose. To begin with, the prisoner seems to have a stable grasp on the conclusions reached so far; he replies readily and assertively to Philosophy's questions (*Id, inquam, necesse est; vehementer assentior*, etc.). Philosophy soon arrives, by combining earlier arguments, at the conclusion that the highest good rules all things firmly and disposes them sweetly—that is, at the synthesis of the independently reached observations of God's sovereign Goodness, and of humankind's inner inclination toward the Good. It is following this conclusion that Philosophy clashes (*collidere*) these arguments together, weaving together conclusions so inter-related that the prisoner wonders if she is playing a game. She responds saying she is not playing a game but that they have, with the help of God to whom they prayed (“*dei munere, quem dudum deprecabamur*”) (3, 12, 36), examined the most important thing. She explains:

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disordered rage, incited by his perception that human affairs alone were exempt from order. His poem concluded with the plea:

*Rāpīdōs, rēctōr, cōmprīmē flūctūs  
ēť quō caēlūm rēgīs īmmēnsūm  
fīrmā stābīlēs foēdērē tērrās!* (1, V, 46-48)

*Ó héłmsman, make cáłm the swíft-running seá swell,  
Máke stáble the eáর্থ in the sáme cóncórd  
Wíth which you pílot the límítless heávens.*

We now see that 2, VIII continues the response of 1, VI to the complaint of 1, V, not only by echoing its language (*foedus, stabiles, fluctus*) but also by mimicking, and thereby overturning, its plea. If we compare *quo caelum regis* and *quo caelum regitur*—identical but for the all important verb ending—we see Philosophy has reversed the prisoner's complaint and shifted his gaze within. In this instance, the chronological occurrence of the meters is interwoven with their structural repetition. For the later developments of this interconnection, see n. 177, below. For an in depth analysis of how the *Consolation's* formal metric patterns are connected, see Chapter 3.

Ea est enim divinae forma substantiae, ut neque in externa dilabatur nec in se externum aliquid ipsa suscipiat, sed, sicut de ea Parmenides ait,

πάντοθεν εὐκύκλου σφαίρης ἐναλίγκιον ὄγκῳ

rerum orbem mobilem rotat dum se immobilem ipsa conservat. (3, 12, 37)

For such is the form of the divine substance that it does not slip away into external things, nor does it receive anything external into itself, but, as Parmenides says of it:

Like the body of a sphere well-rounded on all sides,

it turns the moving circle of the universe while it keeps itself unmoved. (Trans. Tester)

The prisoner should not be surprised, therefore, that they have investigated by means of arguments internal to the subject matter, for speech, Philosophy says, should be like the thing it speaks about (3, 12, 38). In Philosophy's view, the argument has reached—or nearly reached—the answer to the prayer of 3, IX. The prayer asked to see the fount of the Good (*fontem boni*), which is at once origin, pathway, means of being carried, and end (*principium, semita, vector, terminus*). The prose preceding 3, XII has shown God to be both origin and end, but also—as he disposes all things inwardly—to be the pathway, and means of being carried, as well. This answer is reached in language, which means the words, too, must represent the divine origin, end, and pathway that the interlocutors have discovered—*dei munere*—in speech. Otherwise, the means of attaining the end and the end itself would fall apart. Yet, despite his confident answers and delight at her conclusions, the prisoner's consolation is far from complete: Philosophy will make this answer to prayer—only just attained in speech—collapse with her subsequent words.

*Fēlīx quī pōtūit bōnī  
fōntēm vīsērē lūcīdūm,  
fēlīx quī pōtūit grāvīs  
tērraē sōlvērē vīncūlā. (3, XII,1-4)*

*Ó hów háppy the mán who viéwed  
Áll thé rádiánt sóurce of Goód;  
Ó hów háppy the mán who bróke  
Áll thé búrdensome chaíns of eárrh!<sup>172</sup>*

At first, the poem picks up seamlessly from the prose. The language clearly resembles the prayer of 3, IX,<sup>173</sup> which the prose has just recollected: *happy is the one who can loose earthly chains and look upon the fount of the good*. The poem then turns to the myth of Orpheus, the general outline of which is as follows: Orpheus is in grief over the death of his wife; the power of his music sways the gods of the underworld to return his wife to life; they set one condition, however, that Orpheus not look back at her as they ascend to the world above; Orpheus does look back, and thus loses his Eurydice a second time. From this mythic narrative, Philosophy draws an obvious, rather heavy-handed, moral, which she addresses to the prisoner:

*Vōs haēc fābŭlā rēspicīt  
quīcūmque ĩn sŭpērŭm dĭēm  
mēntēm dŭcērē quaērītīs;  
nām quī Tārtārēum ĩn spēcŭs  
vīctŭs lŭmīnā flēxērīt,  
quīcquīd praēcīpŭm trāhīt  
pērdīt dŭm vīdēt ĩnfērōs. (3, XII, 52-58)*

*Yóu whó seék to condúct your mínds  
Tó thé líght of the dáy abóve:  
Lét nó mán gíve a báckward glánce  
Ín défeát, to the cáves of Héll—  
Whát hé tákes with hímself as hís  
Hé wíll lóse when he seés the deád.*

<sup>172</sup> I prefer to take *potuit* in lines 1 and 3 as a proverbial use of the perfect: *Happy he who can look upon . . .* etc. This allows for a more natural transition between the conclusion of the prose and the message of the poem, without having to imply, I think misleadingly, that the subject of these first four lines is Orpheus.

<sup>173</sup> Cf. 3, IX, 39, “*da fontem lustrare boni*” with 3, XII, 1-2, “*Felix qui potuit boni / fontem visere lucidum.*”

Philosophy's moral seems to follow directly from the outline of Orpheus' story—don't look backwards or downwards, but press on to the things above. The poem thus appears to have a consistent message from its introductory lines through to its summarizing moral. This consistent, straightforward view of the poem, however, falls apart the moment we begin in earnest to read Philosophy's account of Orpheus myth.

To begin with, the myth has the searing power of a love story. Orpheus is in grief for the death of his wife; he plays *flebilibus modis*—tearful measures—a music so beautiful it makes the woods run and the rivers stop their course; it makes the deer lay down with the lion. Yet for all the power of his music, Orpheus' grief burns still more intensely.

*cūm flāgrāntiōr īntīmā  
fērvōr pēctōris ūrērēt  
nēc, quī cūnctā sūbēgērānt,  
mūlcērēt dōmīnūm mōdī, (3, XII, 14-17)*

*Yét stīll hōtter the féver búrned  
Deép ínsíde of his heárt and sóul,  
Ánd thé sóngs that subduéd all élse  
Coúld nótláccate their lórd . . .*

So he turns his music on the gods of the underworld:

*Illic blāndā sōnāntībūs  
chōrdīs cārmīnā tēmpērāns  
quīcquīd praēcīpūis dēaē  
mātrīs fōntībūs haūsērāt,  
quōd lūctūs dābāt īmpōtēns,  
quōd lūctūm gēmīnāns āmōr  
dēflēt Taēnārā cōmmōvēns  
ēt dūlcī vēnīām prēcē  
ūmbrārūm dōmīnōs rōgāt. (3, XII, 20-28)*

*Thére hé cárefully pláys his sóngs  
Ón hís lýre's sympathétic stríngs,  
Síngs ín teárs what he ónce had drúnk  
Fróm thé spríngs of his Móther's Múse,*

*Sings what obstinate grieving prompts  
And the love that redoubles grief,  
Sends a shudder through Hades' caves,  
And in gentle and lyric prayer  
Asks the lords of the shades for grace.*

Orpheus' music overpowers Cerberus, and makes the furies weep; it overturns all habits of Hades' powers, until:

*Tāndēm: „Vīncimūr” ārbītēr  
ūmbrārūm mīsērāns āīt.  
„Dōnāmūs cōmītēm vīrō  
ēmtām cārmīnē cōniūgēm;” (3, XII, 40-43)*

*Now the judge of the shades is moved,  
Criés in sympathy, “We submit!  
Now we give to this man his mate,  
Give the wife he has bought with song.”*

Overwhelmed by the power of Orpheus' song, the gods of the underworld return Eurydice to her grieving husband. But they set a condition on their gift:

*„sēd lēx dōnā cōhēcēāt,  
nē dūm Tārtārā līquērīt  
fās sīt lūmīnā flēctērē”. (3, XII, 44-46)*

*“But let this law limit what we give:  
He must not give a backward glance,  
Not before he leaves Hell behind.”*

The poet uses *coherceat*—used once in each of the two preceding glyconic poems to describe the order ordained by God (or *amor*)—here to describe the condition set upon Eurydice's return. It is at this point in the poem that the didactic message should be strongest—Orpheus disobeyed the law and was justly punished. Instead, the poet comes through on Orpheus' side. The law to which the gift must cohere is an impossible one, as the love between lovers is a law unto itself. The poet's voice is heavy with compassion:

Quīs lēgēm dēt āmāntībūs?  
 maiōr lēx āmōr ēst sībī.  
 Heū, nōctīs prōpē tērminōs  
 Ōrphēūs Eūrýdicēn sūām  
 vīdīt, pērdīdīt, ōccīdīt. (3, XII, 47-51)

Whó cán gíve to such lóve a lów?  
 Lóve ís lów to itsélf alóne.  
 Woé ís hím! At the édge of níght  
 Órphēús sáw his Eurýdicé,  
 Sáw ánd lóst her and diéd hímself.<sup>174</sup>

In the poet's—that is, in Philosophy's—view, the condition set on the gift is inherently impossible to fulfill. Thus, while the moral says one thing, the telling of the myth says quite another. Here, Philosophy appears on the side of Orpheus and his love, and—lest there be any confusion—not merely the universal *amor* which he may fail to see as his own—but earthly love in all its dreadful mortality. After these lines, the immediately following moral—*Vos haec fabula respicit*—is a stunning change of tone. But which voice is Philosophy's? the one that defends the inner necessity of human love, a love that will precisely *not* be forfeited for a supposed higher good, or the one that advocates this forfeiture? And what possible reason could Philosophy have, if her goal is to return the prisoner to a state of stable self-possession, for singing him a heartbreaking poem of singular beauty about a poet whose earthly love was ultimately lost? The poem drips with beauty in every phrase, the glyconic rhythm bearing the power of Orpheus' song, and the sadness of his grief—a grief that the prisoner feels acutely, separated from his wife and other loved ones, awaiting his own death. If inner

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<sup>174</sup> In my view, Relihan's translation of *occidit* wrongly softens the tragic sense of the sentence. In the Latin, *vīdīt, pērdīdīt, ōccīdīt* are consecutive, parallel verbs which (I would argue) all share the same subject and direct object, dramatically apposite in the previous line (*Ōrphēūs Eūrýdicēn sūām*). Literally: *Orpheus his Eurydice / saw, lost, killed*. For Relihan's line 51, we might suggest: *Sáw ánd lóst and her killed hímself*.

calm is Philosophy's aim, this poem is deeply inappropriate; it not only awakens the pain of his circumstance but also removes all hope of a worldly resolution.<sup>175</sup>

As we shall soon see, the problem with the conclusion of the preceding prose—that God rules all things sweetly by disposing them towards the good—is that it seems to lead to the total collapse of human freedom. The prisoner, though he does not yet know it, has assented rather abstractly to a proposition which will seem to imply the obliteration of his every mode and activity. The resolution of this problem will lie not in abandoning the human modes, however, but in courageously maintaining them in the face of the divine necessity that would seem to destroy them. In other words, if Philosophy is to return the prisoner to his home—that home which lies in this world and not the next, that home wherein he has been betrayed and come to grief—she must keep his pain alive, for only in and through his demand that she restore him at the very place of the wound, will his consolation be truly complete.

By awakening his earthly grief while instructing him to look above, Philosophy heightens the tension between the prisoner's (subjective) perception of the temporal world, and the realm of (objective) divine simplicity in the world above. It is this tension—the central opposition of the text—that must be resolved if human freedom is to exist in harmony with divine necessity. Notably, the two sides of this tension have been present in each of the three glyconic poems so far considered. The first of these portrayed comforting images of seasonal order, and the gentleness of the rhythm conveyed this comfort to the prisoner. In the second, the poet used the same rhythm to

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<sup>175</sup> Failure to acknowledge these competing forces within the poem makes most commentary on it unsatisfying. Curley, for example, claims that this poem represents a diminishing of the importance of verse and “also hints at the ultimate incapacity of verse to lead one to the truth, a task for which philosophy alone is fit,” Curley, “The Consolation of Philosophy as a Work of Literature,” 361-362.

connect the prisoner's inner affections with this external order. But by the third of these poems, the prisoner is at risk of losing the subjective side of the question with which he so urgently began, and so Philosophy must revive his pain, and reopen his wound, so it can become the site of the healing word. That the third glyconic poem does have this effect—of bringing his grief to the surface of his soul—is confirmed by the first words that follow, at the beginning of the fourth book:

When Philosophy has finished softly and sweetly singing these verses, while preserving the dignity and gravity of her face and visage, then I, not yet having completely forgotten my inward grief (*nondum penitus insiti maeroris oblitus*), interrupted her just as she was preparing to say something more, and said: “Lady, you who lead the way to the true light, what your speech has so far poured into my mind has clearly been both divine, contemplated on its own, and invincible because of your arguments, and you have told me things which, although lately forgotten because of the pain of my injuries (*etsi ob iniuriae dolorem nuper oblita*), I was not previously totally ignorant of. But this itself is the very greatest cause of my grief (*sed ea ipsa est vel maxima nostri causa maeroris*), that, although there does exist a good ruler of the universe, evil can exist at all and even pass unpunished; and I beg you to consider how much wonder this fact alone properly causes.” (4, 1, 1-3)

The prisoner's words confirm the poem has had the effect we anticipated, to awaken his grief within. They also confirm our observation that the glyconic meter is a soft and reassuring one: the prisoner says Philosophy has sung sweetly and gently (*leniter suaviterque cecinisset*). Paradoxically, it is the sweetness of the words and rhythm that awakens his pain such that he interrupts her with the expression of his grief. We can add, therefore, to the poem's many—and often competing—elements, that it is not only a poem about musical power, but a musically powerful poem about musical power, a song about a song. Orpheus' modes are explicitly attributed the power to calm,

subdue, or overwhelm: *iam cantu placidum canem* (l. 13); *(modi) qui cuncta subegerant* (l. 16); *captus carmine ianitor* (l. 30); *vultur dum satur est modis* (l. 38); *emptam carmine coniugem* (l. 43). His music is said to be drunk from a divine source (*quicquid praecipuis deae / matris fontibus hauserat*) (ll. 22-23). All this is recounted in a glyconic beat with a particularly lyrical feel, and in an explicitly musical manner (*cecinnisset*). When we consider these aspects of the poem alongside the fact that in it the word *modus* occurs three times (and always with a musical or rhythmical sense), we hear a musically powerful statement of music's power, designed with a measured, medicinal intent.

Musical power, *modus*, earthly love and grief, failure alongside intimations of freedom: the polyvalence of this poem illustrates the complexity of poetic speech in the *Consolation*. In one sense, the poem speaks to the prisoner's sorrow—he is Orpheus, bereft of his loves, and awaiting his wife's imminent loss of himself. Orpheus' song thus becomes the poetic crucible of the prisoner's grief; he is the master poet whose modes grant him no solace. Yet, in another sense, Philosophy is the speaker of the poem and thus, she is Orpheus, too. She sings her way through the underworld of the prisoner's sorrow that she may lead his soul to the heights of his true home. And though we sometimes hear her speak of homecoming in terms of the divine realm, fixing wings to his soul, etc., here she leaves no question about the necessity and integrity of the human demand. She is, at this moment of astonishing sympathy, on the side of the prisoner's love. All the prisoner's pain and affection and music is woven into her poem, for she is the poet whose words make the absent present and command by beauty and rhythm and truth at once.

The fourth, and final, poem in this glyconic series is 5, IV, the penultimate poem of the *Consolation*. It follows Philosophy's famous resolution of the apparent opposition between free will and divine providence, precipitated by the prisoner's statement that human freedom, virtue, and prayer are obliterated by the revelation of the Good that governs all things. The contradiction between free will and divine providence, Philosophy explains, results from thinking that things are known according to the power and nature of the things that are known. If human reason, for instance, apprehends one event as contingent, and another as necessary, it thinks these events must be of this cognitive status by their own nature. In fact, Philosophy explains, the opposite is the case (*quod totum contra est*):

omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim sed  
secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur  
facultatem. (5, 4, 25)

for everything which is known is grasped not according to  
its own power but rather according to the capability of  
those who know it.<sup>176</sup>

She proceeds to distinguish four levels, or faculties, of cognitive perception: sense, imagination, reason, and intellect (*sensus, imaginatio, ratio, intelligentia*). Each of these look at (*contuetur*) the object in different ways: sense looks at the underlying matter, imagination at the shape without matter, reason the object as universal, and intelligence, transcending the *ambitum* of reason, beholds the simple form itself. These levels of knowing are connected, Philosophy says, because the higher powers comprehend the lower. While there is an undeniable hierarchy here, nonetheless, the lower levels are necessary to the initiation of the higher ones. Imagination, for

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<sup>176</sup> Trans. Tester.

instance, takes its starting point (*exordium*) of seeing and forming shapes from the senses, even if it ultimately judges sensible things in the absence of sense, by an imaginative reasoning (*imaginaria ratione*). Philosophy has thus set out the principle according to which the contradiction between free will and divine providence may be resolved, though she does not yet apply it. She first gives a poetic meditation on the dynamic relation and interconnection between these levels of knowing.

The poem, 5, IV, begins with a rejection of Stoic philosophy, to which is attributed the belief that the mind is a blank slate onto which the impressions of the senses are received. If mind is merely passive, Philosophy asks:

*ūnde haec sic ānimīs vigēt  
cērnēns ōmniā nōtīō?  
quaē vīs sīngūlā pērspīcīt  
aūt quaē cōgnītā dīvidīt?  
quaē dīvīsā rēcōllīgīt  
āltērnūmqūē lēgēns itēr  
nūnc sūmmīs cāpūt īnsērīt,  
nūnc dēcēdīt īn īnfīmā,  
tūm sēsē rēfērēns sībī  
vērīs fālsā rēdārgūīt? (5, IV, 16-25)*

*Whēnce thīs strēngth īn thē hūman mīnd?  
Whēnce thīs knōwledge thāt sēes all thīngs?  
Whāt fōrce sēes sēparate thīngs sō cleār?  
Whāt fōrce sēparates whāt īs knōwn?  
Whāt fōrce gāthērs thē sēparate pārts?  
Whāt fōrce choóses a twófold páth,  
Thrústs its heád īn thē hīghēst réalms,  
Goēs bāck dōwn to thē dēpths belów,  
Thén rētúrns to itsēlf its sēlf,  
Thús tó cóntradict fālse with trué?*

Mind's ability to perceive all things, and to divide and unite them, manifests its active power. Beyond division and unification—the typical description of ratiocination—however, Philosophy also describes mind's ability to move above and below, and to contain these extremes within its own life—*tum sese referens sibi* (*returning itself to itself*).

The extremes of truth—above and below, unity and division—which (in the previous poem, 5, III)<sup>177</sup> the prisoner sought to reconcile, are contained in the active return of mind to itself. Mind’s encompassing of its various activities shows the Stoics are mistaken in thinking that the mind is entirely passive:

*Haec est efficiens magis  
longe causa potentior  
quam quae materiae modo  
impressas patitur notas. (5, IV, 27-29)*

*Seé á fár more prodúctive caúse,  
Móre fár-reáching, more pówerfúl,  
Thán thát caúse which, as mátter doés,  
Áccépts pássively sígns impréssed.*

No, the mind cannot be merely passive, Philosophy concludes. And yet—

*Praecedit tamen excitans  
ac vires animi movens  
vivo in corpore passio, (5, IV, 30-32)*

*Nónethéléss, there is pássive fórcé  
Whích précédes, whích excítes and stírs  
Mínd’s ówn stréngth in the bódy’s lífe,*

While the mind is not merely passive to external sensible impressions—because its active power sees, divides, and unites these—nevertheless this active power lies dormant without the prior intervention of the senses. An event of the living body is

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<sup>177</sup> Throughout this analysis (see the relevant sections of Chapter 1, and especially n. 171, above), we have noted an interplay between the poems in anapaestic dimeter and those in glyconic. In 1, VI (glyconic) Philosophy responded to the prisoner’s 1, V (anapaestic dimeter). 2, VIII (glyconic) continues this response, and even mimics the prisoner’s words. Similarly, in 5, IV (glyconic), Philosophy responds to the prisoner’s 5, III (anapaestic dimeter), his reflection on the nature of his own thinking, a meditation he takes up in relation to the paradox of freedom and divine providence. 5, IV answers the prisoner’s cognitional aporia: by explaining the relation between the modes of thinking, Philosophy unlocks the paradox of freedom and divine providence and thus confirms the prisoner’s intuitions in 5, III. This interplay, in two cases between adjacent poems, suggests that the poems continue to respond to one another in the linear chronology of the narrative (such as we observed throughout the seven poems of the first book), even as they simultaneously function in each series of metric repetition. For a like-minded interpretation on these two pairs of poems, see Curley, “How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy,” 260-261. For a sustained analysis of how the *Consolation*’s formal metric patterns are connected, see Chapter 3.

necessary to move and excite the powers of the mind. The examples Philosophy uses to illustrate this sense-induced awakening are highly significant and altogether familiar by now.

*cūm vēl lūx ōcūlōs fērīt  
vēl vōx āūrībūs īnstrēpīt.* (5, IV, 33-35)

*Ás whén líght batters át the éyes,  
Ór whén voíces ring ín the éars.*

*Cum vel lux oculos ferit* (when light strikes the eyes) recalls the prisoner's mystical description of the moment his vision returned, when Philosophy touched his eyes with her dress and wiped away his tears. The prisoner likened that experience to suddenly gazing on the sun after emerging from darkness, and there he used similar language, *Phoebus . . . oculos . . . ferit*. Philosophy thus not only uses the example of sight, but one that also recollects the healing physical touch that restored his sight. The next example, *vel vox auribus instrepit* (when voices sound in the ears), includes all of her spoken words to the prisoner, but above all her poems, whose rhythm has always been audibly perceptible, and whose sound often described as sweet song. Philosophy's two examples of sense-induced mental awakening therefore bring the sensible aspect of her treatment to the foreground, and situate it within the active unity of human knowing. In Philosophy's explanation, once the perception of the senses has been received—the light of the eyes, or the sound of the voice—

*Tūm mēntīs vīgōr ēxcītūs  
quās īntūs spēcīēs tēnēt  
ād mōtūs sīmīlēs vōcāns  
nōtīs āpplicāt ēxtērīs  
īnrōrsūmqūē rēcōndītīs  
fōrmīs mīscēt īmāgīnēs.* (5, IV, 35-40)

*Thén thé stréngth of the mínd, aroúsed,*

*Dráws áppeárances képt withín,  
 Cálled tó mótions as líke to líke,  
 Poínts thém tó these extérrnal sígns,  
 Thús tó míngle with ímagés  
 Thóse trúé fórms that were hóused withín.*

These final lines contain a dense summary of the interaction between the senses and the mind or, to put it more precisely, an account of how an object moves through the levels of cognitive perception. The sensible event awakens the strength (*vigor*) of the mind, and then the mind calls its forms to similar motions, and matches these inner forms with the sensible impressions (the imagination's images?) from without. Remarkably, the acoustic language reverberates even through this description of the internal process of mind—mind calls (*vocans*) upon the *species* it holds within. The sound calls through the ears, awakening the mind to call upon its forms through the mediation of the imagination. In Philosophy's account, sound, and the language of sound, is present throughout the whole activity of knowing.

As the most often repeated of the lyrical meters, it is appropriate that Philosophy would use the sound of this glyconic meter to describe the role of sound, and that these final lines would repeat a particular sound (*īs: nōtīs, ēxtērīs, rēcōndītīs, fōrmīs, mīscēt*). More specifically, as she has repeatedly used the lyrical sound of this glyconic meter for an emotional effect—to calm the prisoner's tumult of affections (1, VI), to awaken his inner affections to cosmic order (2, VIII), and to arouse his grief lest he lose his grip on his own perception (3, XII)—it is appropriate that she explain the relation of hearing to the rest of the soul in a repetition of that lyrical sound. She unlocks the cognitional principle of sound with the very sound with which she brought the prisoner into her restorative care.

By relating the moments of human knowing, Philosophy has also set out the principle by which the opposition between free will and divine providence may be resolved. Once the cognitive objects are distinguished relative to the kinds of knowing, rather than thought to be absolute, reason's temporality (that is, the mode associated with human freedom) is no longer opposed to divine simultaneity (or providence).<sup>178</sup> However, insofar as the earlier glyconic poems articulated, and even deepened, this apparent opposition, it is appropriate that the principle of its resolution be given in the same meter. These two strains—of sound and of cognitional exegesis—are naturally themselves related, as the former is explained by way of the latter. Yet the latter is also explained by means of the former, as the explanation is given in song and by sound. The poem is thus at once an explanation and demonstration of the interconnection of the levels of human knowing. The cognitive principle not only resolves the great contradiction of free will and divine providence; it also reveals the purpose of her spoken sound in that the theoretical frame for her poetry, and its many metric repetitions, is itself, in the last of these, now heard.

#### REPEATED SOUNDS AND THE LEVELS OF SOUL

We have just heard how sound—along with the other senses—awakens the rest of the soul. The metric repetitions, each a recollection of the others, are themselves like the levels of knowing in the personality, each higher (or subsequent) one including those which have come before, while the lower ones initiate the possibility of the later (or higher). The later metric occurrences answer, or heal, or more fully *know*, what the

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<sup>178</sup> Philosophy's detailed description of the resolution is given in the two subsequent prose sections, which we will consider in Chapter 4.

earlier perceive, while all are present in the unity that finally resounds. The lower forms of knowing awaken the higher, just as the earlier rhythms provide the basis for a more complex acoustic perception. While the body mediates the soul's awakening, it is not left behind in the higher activities. Its presence in the higher is what makes the whole soul a harmony and what makes this harmony present to the whole soul. And so Philosophy continues to speak, or sound, right through to the end of the text.

For her, the human soul is essentially harmonic, as the levels of knowing are a simultaneous activity. This simultaneity should not be conceived of in merely linear or chronological terms, however, as though the soul has only present to it the perceptions of each faculty at any given instance. What allows the repetitions of sound to be repetitions at all is that the previous instances of the sound are recalled by the aural imagination, as is the message of its words by reason, at the moment when the sound actually recurs in the ear. It is therefore not the levels of the soul, abstractly considered, that are harmonized, but rather their concrete perceptions, the actuality of their respective activities. The metric repetitions are thus precise and particular—like the experiences they recollect, just as it is always a certain wound that needs healing, not pain abstractly conceived. Philosophy's repetitions of sound knead the earlier hearing into the later insight, and it is this reworking of sound that accomplishes the penetration of the medicine through the whole personality.

In this Chapter, then, we have seen that while the metric repetitions are highly complex, they do reveal a systematic, therapeutic use of poetic rhythm. This metric system is undetectable in the linear narrative, strictly conceived, and comes alive only when we consider these repetitions in their structural patterns. Throughout this

analysis, we represented each metric recurrence with a different color in its own visual chart. This enabled us to clearly distinguish the repetitions from each other (Gruber's black and white image, while it traces the repetitions, tends to obscure the difference between them). Each of these sounds has its own character and quality—and must somehow be depicted in this particularity. If, however, we combine these separate, color representations into a single image, we have a clear, visual representation of all the repetitions at once (figure 9). If we imagine each color as a different rhythmic sound, we can begin to hear how the repetitions are interwoven throughout the *Consolation's* structure—not unlike the notes and themes and chords of a musical composition.

## REPETITION AND RECOLLECTION: A SYSTEM OF RHYTHMIC SOUND

He will remember easily, for he knew me once before.<sup>179</sup>

### PART I, FORMAL STRUCTURE

#### *Repetition by Poem and Repetition by Line*

In Chapter 2, using Gruber's chart as a point of departure, we observed a systematic use of the structural repetition of a particular rhythm through temporally separate poems. Not only do these structural repetitions recur in a roughly symmetrical fashion; the later repetitions acoustically recollect the earlier hearings of the same meter, and thereby harmonize the effects of each metric group within the overall purpose of the prisoner's consolation. Finally, we saw how color helps to visually depict the polyphonic character of this acoustic system.

Systematic, structural rhythmic repetition seems to be at the heart of Philosophy's medicine, and perhaps the most prominent aspect of the *Consolation's* aural existence. And yet, while the evidence of Chapter 2 makes a strong case for the prominence of such a system, it also delineates two objections. The first objection

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<sup>179</sup> 1, 2, 6.

concerns the inconsistencies in the symmetry of the system. As is clearly visible in Gruber's chart, neither the glyconic series nor the series of anapaestic dimeter catalectic falls symmetrically around 3, IX (figure 10). In the case of the glyconics, two fall before 3, IX, and three after. In Chapter 2, we temporarily resolved this dilemma by excluding, on the basis of its obvious metrical variation, 4, III.<sup>180</sup> The second inconsistency, noted by Gruber himself, is that the catalectic anapaestic dimeters, 2, V and 3, V, both fall before the centerpoint of 3, IX. These inconsistencies suggest that while the repetitions may be important therapeutically, they are not themselves comprehended by any structural pattern. A system perhaps, but not a structurally prominent one.

A second objection to the prominence of systematic rhythmic repetition in the *Consolation* lies not in the system itself, but in what falls outside it. For even if, discounting the symmetry, we include 2, V and 3, V, the system of rhythmic repetitions—symmetrical or not—includes only 16 of the *Consolation's* 39 poems. Why, if systematic, rhythmic repetition is at the heart of Philosophy's consolation, does her system exclude most of her poems?

We might be tempted to reply to this second objection by continuing Chapter 1's analysis of each poem's rhythm in the chapter-by-chapter sequence of the narrative. Because rhythm has been vital to the purpose of each poem so far considered, it is reasonable to expect that continuing a poem-by-poem analysis would illustrate the effects of rhythm in each of the remaining poems. Yet even if we could establish that rhythm is essential to the purpose of every poem, we would be no closer

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<sup>180</sup> See p. 147, above.

to proving that the systematic, structural repetition of rhythm extends beyond the six meters considered in Chapter 2. In this chapter, I attempt to address both of these objections—the inconsistencies in the symmetry of the system, and the exclusion of most of the *Consolation's* poems from this system, if indeed a system is what it is. To begin with the second objection first, we now take up the question of whether there the remaining 23 poems contain any rhythmic repetition.

Looking again at Gruber's metric overview (figures 1 and 2), we see that only 16 poems<sup>181</sup> (all considered in Chapter 2) have meters identical with at least one other poem; i.e. 1, I and 5, I are the only instances of elegaic couplets, 2, V and 3, V are the only poems composed entirely (that is, in stichic form) in anapaestic dimeter catalectic, and so forth. Four meters occur twice, and two meters occur four times. In Gruber's presentation, the remaining meters do not repeat. Indeed, the chart seems more a display of unpatterned (although poetically stunning) metric combinations than one of structural recurrence.

Upon closer examination, however, we observe that, while only these six meters demonstrate exact repetition, nonetheless, several meters do repeat in different combinations. We see, for instance, that the two meters that comprise the elegaic couplets, of 1, I, i.e. hexameter and pentameter, are themselves repeated either alone or in combination with other meters in two other poems each. That is, if we look for every appearance of a complete line of hexameter (figure 11), we see that after 1, I (with pentameter) it recurs at 1, III (with tetrameter), 3, IX (alone), and then finally at 5, I (with pentameter again). So while only two of these poems (i.e. 1, I and 5, I) fall within

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<sup>181</sup> That is, if, as in Chapter 2, we exclude 4, III from the glyconic pattern.

the pattern of poems with exactly repeated meters, hexameter does recur in other poems. Similarly, if we look at the occurrences of pentameter (figure 12), after 1, I (with hexameter), it recurs at 3, III (with iambic trimeter), at 4, IV (with phalacean hendecasyllable) and then finally at 5, I (again with hexameter). To take a third example, phalacean hendecasyllable (figure 13) occurs first at 1, IV (alone), then at 3, IV (with alcaic decasyllable), at 3, X (with sapphic hendecasyllable), and finally at 4, IV (with pentameter).

We must, therefore, draw a distinction between two kinds of structural, temporally separate, metric repetitions: repetition by poem, and repetition by line. Repetition by poem refers to the repetitions we considered in Chapter 2, to the repetition of the meter of an entire poem, while repetition by line refers to the repetition of any complete metric line. If we now trace the repetitions by line, we discover the following:

Hexameter

1, I (with pentameter)  
 1, III (with tetrameter)  
 3, IX (alone)  
 5, I (with pentameter)

Pentameter

1, I (with hexameter)  
 3, III (with iambic trimeter)  
 4, IV (with phalacean hendecasyllable)  
 5, I (with hexameter)

Tetrameter<sup>182</sup>

1, III (with hexameter)  
 3, I (alone)  
 4, I (with iambic dimeter)  
 5, II (alone)

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<sup>182</sup> These four instances contain a variety of endings in the fourth foot: -- uu, u --, -- u x, and -- --, which is why we did not include 3, I and 5, II as a series in Chapter 2.

Phalacean hendecasyllable

- 1, IV<sup>183</sup> (alone)
- 3, IV (with alcaic decasyllable)
- 3, X (with sapphic hendecasyllable)
- 4, IV (with pentameter)

Anapaestic Dimeter

- 1, V (alone)
- 3, II (alone)
- 4, VI (alone)
- 5, III (alone)

Glyconic<sup>184</sup>

- 1, VI (alone)
- 2, III (with sapphic hendecasyllable)
- 2, VIII (alone)
- 3, XII (alone)
- 4, III (alone)
- 5, IV (alone)

Limping Iambic Trimeter

- 2, I (alone)
- 3, XI (alone)

Lesser Asclepiad

- 2, II (with pherecratic)
- 3, VIII (with iambic dimeter)

Pherecratic

- 2, II (with lesser asclepiad)
- 2, IV (with iambic dimeter catalectic)

Sapphic hendecasyllable

- 2, III (with glyconic)
- 2, VI (alone)
- 3, X (with phalacean hendecasyllable)
- 4, VII (alone)

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<sup>183</sup> Only this instance has an anceps in seventh position.

<sup>184</sup> Here I include all instances of glyconic that can be represented: x x -- u -- u --, although only 4, III (-- u -- u u -- u --) departs from a highly regular -- -- -- u u -- u -- throughout the other five poems (in which there are a total of only four lines that substitute a short for a long in the first position).

Iambic Dimeter

- 2, IV<sup>185</sup> (with pherecratic)
- 2, VII (with iambic trimeter)
- 3, VIII<sup>186</sup> (with lesser asclepiad)
- 4, I (with tetrameter)

Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic

- 2, V (alone)
- 3, V (alone)

Iambic Trimeter<sup>187</sup>

- 2, VII (with iambic dimeter)
- 3, III (with pentameter)

This overview indicates that structural metric repetition is far more pervasive than Gruber's chart suggests. Despite the fact that Gruber himself gives a similar overview<sup>188</sup> as part of his classification of the *Consolation's* meters, he seems not to regard these as repetitions in any structural sense, as is clear from the fact that he does not trace them in his diagram. It is an easy oversight to make, however, as unless we look very precisely for these repetitions, they are lost in a jumble of names and poems. Nonetheless, if we do look at the repetitions by line from the standpoint of structural recurrence, the results are highly provocative. In the repetitions by poem, only 6 meters repeat throughout a total of 16 poems:<sup>189</sup> 4 meters occur twice, and 2 occur four times—all of which we considered in the previous chapter. If, by contrast, we now count these repetitions by line, 13 meters repeat: 5 occur twice, 7 occur four times, and 1 six times, for a total of 44 repetitions in 32 poems. Though at first it is difficult to discover, the sheer magnitude and pervasiveness of repetition by line is overwhelming.

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<sup>185</sup> The ending is catalectic.

<sup>186</sup> The second metron substitutes a *longum* for a *breve* in the second position.

<sup>187</sup> Both of these permit occasional resolution.

<sup>188</sup> See Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 20-22.

<sup>189</sup> Or 17, if we include 4, III in the glyconic series, and thereby lose its symmetrical occurrence around 3, IX.

*The Numerical Center*

A natural place to begin looking for a pattern to this great number of repetitions is again in symmetry around 3, IX. But glancing through the above overview shows the already imperfect symmetry collapses even further under the increased strain. Only 7 of these 13 meters fall symmetrically around 3, IX, not enough to assert a definite pattern, at least not for someone of the formal complexity of Boethius, for whom no pattern seems more likely than a very incomplete one.

We recall, however, that 3, IX, as the 24<sup>th</sup> of 39 poems, is not the numerical center in terms of the number of poems. The exact numerical midpoint between 1 and 39 is 20, which means the precise midpoint, in terms of the number of poems, is 3, V. We commented on 3, V in Chapter 2, as the second of two occurrences of anapaestic dimeter catalectic. It is a fine poem, and one that functions in the pattern of repetition by poem. Unlike 3, IX, however, it does not have the loftiness of a hymn, or otherwise seem to occur at a pivotal moment in the text. But this is perhaps not strictly relevant. The midpoint need not be the thematic center, or the loftiest poetic moment of the work, but simply a formal centerpoint around which this complex system of acoustic repetitions might be arranged. Furthermore, 3, IX, *qua* centerpoint, is purely formal, anyway, as the structural repetitions around it do not depend on it either thematically or acoustically. In Gruber's chart, and in our Chapter 2, it is considered merely as an approximate formal center for the repetitions by poem. There is, then, no compelling reason we should not experiment with 3, V, which is the exact formal center of the 39 poems.

The results are extraordinary. All thirteen meters of repetition by line have even numbers of recurrences (i.e. 2, 4, 6) and all but two, that is, 11 of 13, fall symmetrically on or around<sup>190</sup> the centerpoint of 3, V. Given their sheer number, it is again easiest to apprehend their recurrence in discrete, colored images (figures 14-26). The systematic occurrence of line repetition is astonishing both in complexity (44 occurrences in 32 poems) and pervasiveness (32 of 39 poems). Of the 44 occurrences, 40 fall symmetrically, as do 28 of the 32 poems in which they occur. If we capture these colored repetitions in a single image, the result is breathtaking (figure 27).

It doesn't take long to see how wondrously complex and also formally symmetrical line repetition is, and how thoroughly it pervades the poetry. Notably, taking 3, V as the centerpoint has the added benefit of answering the first objection of this chapter—that is, the symmetrical inconsistencies in Gruber's metric scheme. If we take 3, V as the centerpoint, all instances of repetition by poem<sup>191</sup> now also fall symmetrically on or around the mathematical midpoint (compare figures 28 and 29).<sup>192</sup>

In fact, we have now answered both of the objections with which this chapter began: metric repetition can now be seen to pervade most of the *Consolation's* 39 poems—and to do so, in all cases of repetition by poem, and in nearly all cases of repetition by line, symmetrically. The structural consistency and thorough pervasiveness of this polyphonic rhythmic structure is now beyond doubt. What

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<sup>190</sup> The second anapaestic dimeter catalectic, 3, V, is the centerpoint.

<sup>191</sup> Excluding, as per usual, 4, III on the basis of its metric variation.

<sup>192</sup> The reader will note that I have occasionally applied a slightly less precise standard for repetition in certain instances of Repetition by Line than I have for Repetition by Poem. Here, for example, 4, III is excluded from Repetition by Poem (in which I include only the four poems whose meter is: -- -- -- u u -- u --) but is included (along with 2, III, where glyconic is mixed with sapphic hendecasyllable) in Repetition by Line (where I include all six instances of: x x -- u u -- u --). These occasional variations are, I think, justified by the symmetry they complete and are also consistent with the respective purposes of Repetitions by Poem and by Line, as explained below. For a description of these variations, see notes 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, and 187, above, with accompanying text.

remains to be shown, however, is whether the patterns of metric line repetition are a merely formal achievement, or whether, like the repetitions by poem—and indeed, like the rhythms in each poem—they also have a therapeutic function.

*Association and Acoustic Fabric*

In Chapter 2, we explored how repetition by poem creates an acoustic echo that brings the earlier hearings of the same sound to mind. Throughout her therapeutic treatment, Philosophy uses the echoes of these repetitions systematically, harmonizing their effects in different poems and weaving together the levels of the prisoner's soul. Do the repetitions by line function similarly? Do they recollect their earlier instances for a therapeutic purpose? Before we begin, we should note that a few of the repetitions by poem are identical to the repetitions by line. These include the three meters that are used only in stichic composition—anapaestic dimeter, limping iambic trimeter, and anapaestic dimeter catalectic (figures 30-32)—which we have already considered in detail in Chapter 2. In these cases, we need investigate no further, as the repetition by line adds nothing to the repetition by poem. The remaining repetitions by line, however, are not identical with the repetitions by poem, as they occur sometimes in stichic composition, and sometimes in couplet form with other meters. Sapphic Hendecasyllable (figure 33), for example, is used twice alone, and once each with glyconic and phalacean hendecasyllable. Indeed, it is the variation within these repetitions that until now has prevented the discovery of their underlying pattern. On the one hand, then, the repetitions by line resemble the repetitions by poem, in that both are definite repetitions of rhythmic sound. On the other hand, most of the

repetitions by line are mixed with other rhythmic sounds, and this must give them a different function than the unmixed repetitions by poem.

To hear something of how these repetitions work in practice, let us let us turn to the poems in the hexameter series, all of which, as it happens, we have already examined in some detail. To begin with, there can be no doubt that the first line of each couplet of 1, III, in hexameter, is rhythmically-acoustically identical with the first lines of the couplets of 1, I, also in hexameter (figures 34 and 35). Hexameter is not heard again until 3, IX, at which point the sound of the hexameter is identical to the earlier two hearings (figure 36). Naturally the sound of these *poems* is not identical, as in the first two cases the lines of hexameter occur with other meters, and in the third case alone. While the rhythmic sound of the whole poems is not identical, however, it is incontestable that the rhythmic sounds of hexameter within them are the same. Hexameter occurs for the final time at 5, I, in a poem that completes three different metric series, because it contains: 1. the fourth of four instances of hexameter; 2. the second of two instances of the hexameter/pentameter couplet and; 3. the fourth of four instances of pentameter (figure 37). While the whole hexameter sequence can be visually apprehended in this single image, we have divided its sequence into four chronological steps so as not to lose the temporal aspect of its progression. In this visual representation (figure 37), we see that these two structural repetitions (that is, by repetition poem and repetition by line) are distinct, yet occur in counterpoint, sounding sometimes together and sometimes alone.

If we trace this phenomenon through the *Consolation* as a whole, we see the two kinds of structural repetition occur in an intricate polyphonic counterpoint throughout

the entire text (figure 38). The image is only slightly less intricate if we exclude from the repetitions by line those that are identical with repetitions by poem (see figure 39). The balance is between repetitions by line, on the left, and repetitions by poem, on the right, and therefore between exactly repeated sounds, and exactly repeated sounds occurring in different combinations alone or with other sounds. In some cases, a meter is used on both sides (hexameter, pentameter, glyconic), which serves to further intertwine the two kinds of structural repetition. And yet, while this comprehensive visual image gives us a strong impression of the abstract formal relation between these two kinds of repetition, it is far too complex to help us grasp the inner workings of the counterpoint. To do so, let us return in detail to the hexameter series we traced above (figures 34-37), but for the purpose of clarity, let us leave aside the repetition by line of pentameter that also concludes at 5, I. We are left with four poems that contain all of the repetitions by poem of hexameter/pentameter, and all the repetitions by line of hexameter (figure 40).

As for the right side of the image, we examined the hexameter/pentameter (elegaic couplet) repetition by poem in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2 we also looked at 3, IX (hexameter alone), and in Chapter 1, at 1, III (hexameter and tetrameter); in all cases, we observed a unity of meter and purpose, sound and message. We have, then, already considered each of these four poems individually as well as the instance of repetition by poem that they contain. But what can be said of this instance of repetition by line, that is, of the lines of hexameter that run through all four poems?

On the one hand, it is impossible, or at least seems unwise, to mount the kind of thematic and acoustic interpretation for the repetitions by line as we did in Chapter 2

for the repetitions by poem. In those cases, it was precisely the overall sameness of the rhythmic sound throughout a poem that mediated clear, unmistakable recollections. The interpretations were at times complex, but the precise, intentional, rhythmic repetition was always there to invite and ultimately validate those interpretations. In these repetitions of hexameter, there simply is not the overall sameness of sound to hermeneutically ground, and thus unify, any such interpretation. No doubt the richness of the text would allow us to propose possible connections within these metric patterns, but without the exact repetition of sound throughout the whole of each poem, we lack a firm basis for interpretively uniting these disparate acoustic phenomena. Nonetheless, there is a precise acoustic repetition of hexameter in these four poems, even if it is woven within different rhythmic sounds. The difficulty is in knowing how much to make of this repetition, how to recognize a clear authorial intention to link these poems acoustically, but without putting so much strain on the connection that it collapses.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that the acoustic phenomenon of repetitions by line becomes more complex, and more diffuse, the later the repetition occurs. 1, III has only 1, I to recollect—and we can perhaps even safely suggest that in 1, III the prisoner delivers a poem that is a rhythmic unity in contrast with the rhythmic fracture of his 1, I.<sup>193</sup> It is relatively easy to imagine some authorial intention in the acoustic link of the repeated hexameter in these first two occurrences. And yet, there is more than simply hexameter present in this first repetition. Because in 1, I, hexameter

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<sup>193</sup> See the sections on these poems in Chapter 1. In 1, I, there is a break between the hemiepes in the middle of each line of pentameter, interrupting the dactylic beat of the first line and a half of each couplet, whereas in the couplets of 1, III, the tetrameter's dactylic ending forms an uninterrupted rhythmic unity with the lines of hexameter that follow it.

is paired with pentameter, the repetition of hexameter at 1, III recalls pentameter as well, as this was the meter with which hexameter was last heard (figure 41).

By 3, IX, the situation has become still more complex. For 3, IX recalls not only 1, III and 1, I by means of its repeated hexameter, but also brings to mind the other rhythmic sounds with which hexameter has been explicitly associated, pentameter and tetrameter (figure 42). Because these meters have themselves been repeated, 3, IX carries the sonic resonances of their other occurrences (3, I and 3, III) as well (figure 43).

And there is still more. Because the second instance of pentameter (3, III) is in couplet form, this metric association (that is, with iambic trimeter) is also present, which means in addition to 3, III, 2, VII is also faintly present (figure 44). 2, VII, in turn, brings an association with iambic dimeter, which adds 2, IV and 3, VIII (figure 45). 2, IV adds pherecratic (figure 46) and 3, VIII lesser asclepiad (figure 47), whose combination at 2, II (figure 47) finally brings the lines of metric association to an end.

By the third occurrence of hexameter, therefore, not only the two earlier poems with lines of hexameter are acoustically recalled, but also the other rhythms present in these three poems (pentameter and tetrameter), and consequently the other rhythms of poems in which these meters are present, as well as the other poems in which those rhythms are present, and so forth—in the case of the hexameter of 3, IX, a total of 15 meters through 8 of the previous 23 poems.

While their mixed character makes them somewhat more difficult to isolate, the repetitions by line are still relatively precise and clear—these four instances of hexameter, for example, all follow an identical rhythmic pattern. The metric

associations these repetitions invoke, however, become progressively more diffuse the further each is from the repeated meter. And so, though their combinations make the repetitions by line less focused than the repetitions by poem, their resulting metric associations give them a much broader reach throughout the text. This broadness forces us to let go of the demand to interpretively gather these recurrences in a singular thematic or discursive manner—there is simply too much recollected with too little to coherently gather it. Letting go of the interpretive demand, however, allows us to trace these repetitions and associations for what they are—and that is—sounds whose repetition precipitates the recollection of their intricate acoustic history. While the broad diffusion of sounds makes explicitly relating them, according to theme or argument, difficult, or even impossible, it simultaneously allows each subsequent repetition to be increasingly interwoven into the acoustic fabric of the text. The diffusion of sound is, paradoxically, what harmonically weaves the discrete strands together.

To complete our survey of the repetitions of hexameter, we turn to its final occurrence at 5, I. As we have seen (figure 37), in addition to concluding the repetitions by poem of hexameter/pentameter, 5, I also completes the repetitions by line of hexameter and pentameter. If we broaden this image to include all occurrences of the meters matched with these meters, it enfolds tetrameter, iambic trimeter, and phalacean hendecasyllable (figure 48). If we further extend the image to include the meters that these meters, in turn, weave into the acoustic history of the poem, it includes sapphic hendecasyllable and iambic dimeter (figure 49). These, in turn, are linked with pherecratic, lesser asclepiad, glyconic, and alcaic decasyllable (figure 50). In

all, 21 of the 34 preceding poems are acoustically present in 5, I, whether by direct metric repetition or by indirect association. This is a tedious business, but the very difficulty of the task shows us the lengths to which Boethius went to embed these acoustic patterns and associations in the *Consolation's* poetry.

As this hexameter series demonstrates, the later a poem occurs, the more repetitions and resonances it is likely to have, and thus the more of the earlier text is present in its sound (compare figures 41 and 50). This aspect of the sonic framework is therefore especially pronounced in the final poems of the work. Between 5, III and 5, IV, the second and third last poems of the work, all but 10 of the previous 36 poems are present by metric repetition or association. As the prisoner's consolation proceeds, the rhythmic repetitions and associations multiply, as each successive poem is woven with rhythmic threads that extend throughout the fabric of the text.

*Repetition by Element and 5, V, Anthology*

Between repetition by poem and repetition by line, structural, symmetrical repetitions of meter pervade nearly every poem in the text. The near completeness of this system, however, leaves us with an abiding mystery: if 32 of 39 poems are involved in repetitions by line, and most of these related several times over by metric association, what about the remaining seven poems (figure 51)? Why would these not also be included so that the system of structural repetition would be complete? And why, in particular, when the repetitions and associations of the second and third last poems gather most of the preceding poems, would the final poem rest alone, with

neither repetition nor association? The exclusion of this and the other six poems seems contrary to a design that is otherwise so systematically inclusive.

Now that we know what to look, or listen, for, however, we see that this exclusion is only apparent, a result of our naming of meters rather than of their sound. If we attend to their rhythmic sounds rather than to their names, it is evident that these seven meters are comprised of fragments of rhythmic lines that occur repeatedly through many poems. This reveals a third, and still more basic, level of structural repetition—that of the metric elements out of which the metric lines are composed. If, for example, we we look for rhythmic elements of four or more consecutive syllables not interrupted by a diaeresis, we see that even these seven poems are intricately woven into the poetry’s acoustic fabric. We already noted in Chapter 1 that 1, II, the first of these seven “excluded poems” resembles 1, I.<sup>194</sup> The first half of each line (-- uu -- uu --) is identical to the first half of every line of 1, I (whether hexameter or pentameter), while the second half (-- uu -- --) repeats the final two feet of each line of hexameter (figure 52). This poem, then, despite the fact that the rhythm of its full line is never exactly repeated, is itself a careful repetition—and combination—of elements of both meters of the only preceding poem. Furthermore, if we look ahead to the other occurrences of these fragments, we see this poem is hardly a rhythmic island, as one, or both, of its two elements are present in an amazing 23 of 39 poems (figure 53), including six of the seven (formerly) excluded poems. It is easier to view this repetition by metric notation than by name (figure 54). Giving up the names for each meter, however, leaves us suddenly in a sea of notation, and reminds us of the fact that these

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<sup>194</sup> See p. 46ff. and n. 79 and n. 80, above.

meters are sounds and not names. Incredibly, these fragments occur respectively 17 and 15 times with perfect symmetry, with the ninth and eighth falling on 3, V, the numerical centerpoint (figure 54).

Something similar holds for elements of each of the seven “excluded” poems, whose sounds reverberate even more widely throughout the structure than those of either the repetitions by poem or by line. I, VII, the second of the seven, is comprised entirely of adonics (figure 55), an element we’ve just traced as part of 1, II.<sup>195</sup> 3, VI is comprised of rhythms heard repeatedly in the repetitions by line—tetrameter and ionic dimeter (figure 56). But because ionic dimeter includes adonic, and because tetrameter is itself included in other meters while it also includes the hemiepes, 3, VI, is more complex than figure 56 suggests (figure 57). The smaller the element, the more poems it includes. As for 3, VII, its first half (u u -- u) can be found in hexameter, pentameter, tetrameter, and glyconic, among other places; while its second half (-- u -- --) is identical with the final four syllables of phalacean hendecasyllable. We can observe these alongside each other (figure 58). While there are other ways to divide these meters, the prevalence, and approximate symmetry, of these elements, is remarkable. The second half of 4, II, ionic dimeter, repeats the ionic dimeter/adonic we’ve just seen in 3, VI, while its first half, trochaic dimeter, contains an oft-repeated run of five syllables (figure 59). The next in the series, 4, V, includes the three elements of 4, II while adding a fourth (figure 60).

One might object that these elements are not true repetitions but simply arbitrary occurrences of the most basic elements of Latin poetry. This objection is,

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<sup>195</sup> I haven’t included the occurrences of adonic in repetition by line because, beyond 1, VII, it is never found repeatedly in another poem, but only as a solitary line (e.g. at 1, IV, 36 and 4, VII, 35). That is, after 1, VII, it never occurs repeatedly in a line of its own in any poem.

however, misguided. To begin with, groups of at least 4 consecutive syllables are hardly the smallest elements of Latin rhythm. The most basic elements are the long and short syllable, as it is out of one, or both, of these, that all rhythms are comprised. The elements of these seven poems represent only a few of the possible combinations of long and short within groups of four to seven syllables. Furthermore, the fact that these particular rhythms are found widely outside of the *Consolation* does nothing to diminish the fact of their frequency within it. Rather, it points to an underlying reality—that repetition is the essence of rhythm, not only in the *Consolation*, or even in Latin literature generally, but in every rhythm, everywhere.

At last we return to 5, V, the final poem of the work, whose exclusion from the repetitions by poem and by line we noted above.<sup>196</sup> A combination of tetrameter and ithyphallic (-- u -- u -- --), it is remarkable as the longest metrum of the text, having 18 syllables. Its particular combination of syllables, however, contains a surprisingly large number of familiar elements, all of four or more syllables, including: -- uu -- uu -- uu -- uu; -- uu -- uu --; -- uu --; uu -- u; u -- u -- u; -- u -- u --; -- u -- --; x -- u -- x; and -- u -- u -- --. Incredibly, 5, V contains at least one major metric element of every line of every preceding poem.<sup>197</sup> Many other poems contain elements which are widely shared, but no other line of any other poem contains so many of the elements at once, or enough different elements to include at least one element of every line of every other poem.

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<sup>196</sup> See p. 184, above.

<sup>197</sup> If the reader so wishes, he or she may trace these elements through every line of every poem on figure 61.

The *Consolation's* final meter, then, is a kind of anthology, which acoustically gathers, and sonically interweaves, the whole of its poetry.<sup>198</sup>

And therefore, while these seven poems are excluded from the repetitions by poem and by line, they are constituted from the same elements as other poems, and thus point towards yet another kind of structural repetition. This repetition by element is still more diffuse than the repetitions by poem or by line, but it is also correspondingly more far-reaching. The pinnacle of this inclusive reach is the final poem of the work, which rhythmically comprehends, and thus simultaneously gathers, every line of every poem. We have by no means followed this repetition by element as thoroughly or as systematically as we did the other structural repetitions, as we've only considered a few possibilities for only these seven poems. But we have gone far enough to show that the constitutive elements of these seven poems are deeply embedded in the acoustic system—a system that, for whatever other extraordinary features it still holds undiscovered, can now be considered complete.

### *The Limits of Formal Analysis*

By this formal analysis of the *Consolation's* meters, we have uncovered an intricate, comprehensive system of rhythmic repetition in the *Consolation*. We have used a series of colored charts to represent these repetitions individually and the patterns they weave collectively. There is, however, a risk in this rather formal analysis, and especially to its fascinating revelations. To put it metaphorically, looking at Gruber's chart is a little like flying over a forest and discerning the outlines of a

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<sup>198</sup> On the recapitulatory character of the final poem in a book of Augustan poetry, see Fantham, *Roman Literary Culture*, 66.

pattern (could it be a city?) hidden in the trees below. There's no certainty anything is really there, but nonetheless the shapes are too regular to be accidental. We've walked through this forest many times and have never noticed anything unusual. But now from the air there's no doubt a trace of something can be seen. As we circle downward for a closer look, the shape becomes clearer, and other shapes around this and within it begin to appear; at first they shift and move and disappear, but then, as we circle over them repeatedly, they become more clearly defined. Imagine, if after many flights and with the aid of advanced satellite photography, we were able to discover the precise layout of these shapes and identify them as an elaborately designed ancient city. Imagine, further, that decades of excavation uncovered still intact buildings, names of streets still etched on their walls, decorated pottery, splendid mosaics and so on and so forth as your imagination imagines. It would be an exciting discovery of a place lived in long ago.

Imagine, then, that we captured all this on a few pages of intricate diagrams, taking care to show the elaborate layout of streets and buildings, the placement of doorways and mosaics and other things. These diagrams would serve as an excellent guide to the city, and would help to grasp its layout in a way that would be difficult, if not impossible, simply by walking through it. It would be absurd, however, to imagine that the diagrams could serve as a replacement for seeing the city in person, for walking through it and marveling at it on one's own. In this analogy, the *Consolation* is of course the ancient city, explored over centuries by countless readers and scholars, all of them adding in some way to our knowledge of the richness and intricacy of the text. Our analysis of rhythmic repetition amounts to a kind of literary archeology, an

excavation that lays bare an acoustic structure of this ancient text. The risk with this kind of investigation, however, is that we take our discoveries as the end point of investigation, rather than going further to ask what they mean. It is not enough to see *that* the city was designed in such a way, or *that* a text demonstrates certain patterns—the question is, what do these patterns do? It is with a certain poverty of imagination that we are likely to say, “isn’t that remarkable, it really is very intricate,” as though detecting a pattern is an answer in itself—while we forget that these maps and diagrams are mere abstractions, and that the pattern itself, the real one, is essentially embedded in the city or text itself. Both city and text are (or were) living entities. No amount of excavation or mapping can ever be adequate to the reality of a city that was once teeming with life, conversation, markets, children running, breathless lovers, summer festivals, funeral processions, and much, much else. What we forget in the abstraction of a map is that the city’s design was the condition of its existence and the medium of all experience had therein. Likewise, in the case of the text, while the rhythmical patterns can be abstractly represented on a visual chart, they exist actually only in the flowing course of the sung or spoken words. Having excavated these patterns, therefore, we can now proceed, in the remainder of this chapter, to ask how they are not merely abstract formal features of a text but rather the living sound of its consolation.

## PART II, FUNCTIONAL PURPOSE

What then, is the purpose of these patterns of rhythmic repetition? How do they mediate the prisoner's experience? Why are there several kinds of repetition? What do these achieve individually and collectively? These are, of course, the questions we've been asking since the first pages of this dissertation. We have already observed how the consecutive repetition of a rhythm throughout a poem can achieve a particular, immediate effect (Chapter 1), and how systematic repetition of a meter through several poems is used for more complex therapeutic ends (Chapter 2). In this chapter, however, we've discovered that structural rhythmic repetition is far more pervasive, much more highly structured, and more precisely symmetrical, than was previously thought. While repetition by poem includes only 16 poems, repetition by line includes 32 of the *Consolation's* 39 poems, and repetition by element pervades every line of every poem, and most lines several times. Although there can be little doubt that the repetitions by line and element, given their role in this acoustic structure, are also somehow meant to assist the prisoner's recovery, they are too diffuse and too intricately interwoven for their effects to be grasped by the literary interpretation we employed in Chapters 1 and 2. The excavation of these intricate rhythmic patterns thus leads to an interpretive paradox: on the one hand, the visual charts are lifeless and abstract; and on the other, their living reality is too complex to hold together or even to follow in its entirety as it acoustically occurs. What we need is a middle ground between simply reading the text without listening for the patterns, and representing the patterns as abstracted from the text. The challenge, then, is to bring these repetitions to audible life without losing track of them in the process, to grasp how the

pattern underlying the whole shapes each of the parts, and how these parts in turn give rise to the whole.

Seeing, or hearing, a pattern is a cumulative process: the pattern unfolds through a series of present moments, and it is by discerning the relation of these parts that the whole is revealed. For an aural pattern, this process depends on a comparison of present sound and sound past, a comparison made possible because the memory holds past sounds as present within the mind. This is why we've always had to use the words *recollection* and *repetition* together—because without the ability to remember, or recollect, no repetition could ever be perceived. Despite how heavily we've relied on these words, however, we have not yet considered the activities of recollection and repetition in themselves.

The relation of repetition and recollection was a matter of profound and intense interest throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages. It was at the heart of pedagogy, moral science, religious and cultic life, the theoretical sciences, and of rhetoric, music, poetry, and everything we might today call “literature.” These various pursuits, disciplines, and arts were, furthermore, so inwardly linked with each other that it is virtually impossible to appreciate any one of them apart from its relation to the others. This interconnection of artistic, educational, cultural, and intellectual pursuits constitutes one of the challenges in thinking about rhythmic repetition in a work entitled the *Consolation of Philosophy*—that is, what is the relation between formal “literary” patterns and the primarily psychological and theological purpose of the work in which they are embedded? The fact that this work of literature must also be considered as a fundamentally aural phenomenon only adds to the multi-dimensional

complexity of its purpose—and to the difficulty of understanding this fifteen hundred years later.

The remainder of this chapter contains two, related approaches to the *Consolation's* rhythmic patterns. Both aim to give context. The first is to evoke, however fleetingly, a few of the ways repetition and memory were intertwined with moral, aesthetic, educational, intellectual, and literary practices in the ancient world, particularly by way of texts with which Boethius was familiar. The second approach is an imaginative and biographical one—that is, to consider the interconnection of repetition and recollection from examples of my own experience, examples for which every reader will easily find parallels in his or her own mind. I hope that by the combination of these two approaches the functional purpose of the *Consolation's* rhythmic repetitions might better emerge: from the historical evocations a striking general picture, and from self-reflection, a live sense of the mechanisms at play.

#### *Repetition, Memory, and Temporal Experience*

Perhaps the reason we've managed until now without defining repetition or recollection is that they are so much a part of our daily life and so thoroughly foundational in our consciousness, that we cannot imagine ourselves or the world without them. In speech, for example, repetition is the act of saying or hearing again something that has already been said or heard, and this is an essential activity in our acquisition of language. Through heard repetition, we slowly learn to distinguish certain sounds from others, and begin to interpret an otherwise indecipherable acoustic stream. These passively heard repetitions are eventually actively repeated, as

it is by repeating words that one learns to speak. It is not coincidental that an infant's first words are often comprised of the repetition of a single syllable (*ma-ma, da-da, etc.*) or that they often reduce multi-syllable words to the repetition of the first syllable. This most basic vocal repetition distinguishes one sound from all others, and is the beginning of spoken language.

Still more elemental repetitions are present from the earliest moments of human life. In the womb, the fetal heart begins to beat as early as 3½ weeks after conception, when the embryo is only a few millimeters long, and well before the limbs, bones, internal organs or the brain have originated. The regular beating of the heart is the condition of life, and it accompanies us through to the end of our days. Respiration is another unconscious, largely involuntary, repeated function on which our lives essentially depend. Breathing brings in the oxygen that the heart pumps throughout the body. In healthy people, the rates of respiration and heartbeat are highly regular, though not static. Both vary according to the level of a person's physical and mental activity. That a person's heart must beat more quickly, and lungs exchange air more rapidly in order, for example, to hike up a mountain, serves to illustrate how essential these rhythms are for any physical activity. Yet the fact that a heart or breathing rate can also be affected by excitement or fear, even when we are not moving—that is, when there is no physical demand for more oxygen—underscores the interconnection of these physical rhythms with the activities of the mind and soul. These rhythms do not merely accompany us throughout our lives; they are the means of life itself and are entwined with every level of our being.

Nearly as fundamental to our lives as these physiological rhythms are the repetitions of nature, such as the alternation of night and day, and the cycle of the seasons to mark the year. It is difficult to imagine life without the regularity of such rhythms, for without them temporal life would be impossible. Repetition, whether of the heartbeat, breath, day, night, season or year, allows us to make time a livable dimension—which is why Aristotle says it may fairly be asked whether, without soul, time would even exist.<sup>199</sup> These are all instances of consistent, or rhythmical, repetition—of the recurrence of a thing at regular intervals, in which the recurrence is what marks the interval itself. The word *rhythm* in fact originates from these repetitions that divide the continuous flow of time. Related to *ῥεῖν*, or *to flow* (in the sense of a river), *ῥυθμός* refers to the measure of a flow of movement or time, that is, *regular, recurring motion* or *measured motion or time*. Or, as Aristotle puts it, time is “the number of movement.”<sup>200</sup>

Just as we cannot experience time without repetition, we cannot recognize repetition without memory. Without a means of holding the past perception in our minds, we cannot recognize the perception of the present as the same as the one in the past. As Aristotle, again, writes: “For whenever one exercises the faculty of remembering, he must say within himself, ‘I formerly heard (or otherwise perceived) this,’ or ‘I formerly had this thought.’”<sup>201</sup> Repetition and memory are thus essentially interdependent: without repetition there would be no way to grasp any particular amidst the flow—but without memory we would have no means of identifying these

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<sup>199</sup> Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 223a20.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.*, 223a15.

<sup>201</sup> Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscencia*, trans. J. I. Beare, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), 449b20.

repetitions.<sup>202</sup> The past, held in memory, allows us to interpret, understand, and live in, the present and thus “memory is . . . the matrix of all human temporal perception.”<sup>203</sup> Both repetition and memory, therefore, are necessary to life in time.

### *Sense Perception and Anamnesis*

For the ancients, memory was considered a fundamentally perceptual phenomenon. The world enters our memory by means of the senses, and so memory is essentially an imprint of sense perception.<sup>204</sup> Occurring within the perceptive soul—to use the foundational Aristotelian terminology—<sup>205</sup>memory is neither a perception nor a conception, but rather state or condition, an affection (a πάθος, *affectus* or *passio*). Every memory is physically inscribed upon the soul,<sup>206</sup> a mark or appearance (φάντασμα) which is “the final product of the entire process of sense perception, whether its origin be visual or auditory, tactile or olfactory.”<sup>207</sup> It is essential to stress that the physiological, affective character of particular memories makes them both “sensorily derived and emotionally charged.”<sup>208</sup> The emotional character of memory is what makes it impressively effective in the formation of character—something we will consider later in this chapter.

The primacy of repetition—as both the condition of memory and means of temporal experience—can nonetheless mask the basic simplicity of what it is—a

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<sup>202</sup> On the necessity of repetition even for those with prodigious memories, see Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind*, 203.

<sup>203</sup> Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 238.

<sup>204</sup> Aristotle, *On Memory and Reminding Oneself*, in *Aristotle on Memory*, ed. and trans. Richard Sorabji, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1972), 450b25.

<sup>205</sup> As throughout *De anima* and *De memoria and reminiscencia*.

<sup>206</sup> Aristotle, *On Memory and Reminding Oneself*, 450a25ff.

<sup>207</sup> Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 19.

<sup>208</sup> *Ibid.*, 75.

reappearance or restatement or re-whatever of the *same*. Sameness is not simply a useful descriptive term, however, but the category necessary to grasp the phenomenon itself. Reflecting on our experience of repetition thus shows that the memory is not an entirely blank page, bereft of existence prior to the perceptions of sense. Or rather, if the memory is like a storehouse, then it is a storehouse with an innate ability to arrange its contents according to distinctions we can observe and remember. Even for an infant, recognition depends on the potential capacity to grasp the actuality of experience according to certain distinctions. The face that is not familiar is unrecognizable by the very fact that it is not the same as one we have already seen. But instead of being an undifferentiated moment in an unceasing flow of unknown perceptions, this other becomes other in relation to the same. And once this other is seen again—it too becomes a repetition of the same, held in memory for future recognition.

These categories, or inherent distinctions, of consciousness are not accidental, but rather rational and universal.<sup>209</sup> We encountered something of these categories in Chapter 2, when we looked at Philosophy's penultimate poem, a glyconic meter at 5, IV. That poem gives an account of sensation, and of hearing in particular, that helps to explain the theory underlying Philosophy's acoustic medicines. At the beginning of the poem, Philosophy gives a critique of Stoic philosophy, to which she ascribes the view that the mind is a blank tablet "which has no marks,"<sup>210</sup> a merely passive receptor of external stimuli. She counters this view by appealing to the mind's active power, shown

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<sup>209</sup> As with Plato's *megista gene*: existence, motion, rest, sameness, and otherness. Plato, *Sophist*, trans. F. M. Cornford, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 254bff.

<sup>210</sup> 5, IV, 8 (trans. Tester).

by its ability to collect particulars under a universal and then to divide them again, to move back and forth between things “above and below.” Philosophy thus explains the role of the senses in cognition relative to the mind’s inherent ability to understand particulars according to universal categories (sameness, otherness, etc.). When sound strikes the ear, she explains, it awakens the mind, which calls the forms it holds within to similar motions, and matches them with the “marks” received from without. For Philosophy, the power of mind exists in potency prior to any external impressions, though it requires these for its awakening into actuality.

Repetition is thus the means of Platonic recollection, or anamnesis, the process by which we rise to ever higher and more universal truths. We’ve seen this, too, in one of Philosophy’s poems.<sup>211</sup> In 3, XI, the second of two choliamb, she summarizes Platonic recollection—the turn towards the inward circle, free of otherness and change. We also observed how this restoration of the prisoner’s memory requires Philosophy’s active mediation—in this case, she realizes his recollection by means of a repeated, recollected rhythm. She is his memory’s muse, and her words are the active agents of its awakening.

*Moral Character, Μουσική, and Theosophic Design*

But before we turn to think more carefully about how Philosophy actively awakens and indeed shapes the prisoner’s memory, there are other aspects of the ancient context we should first bring to bear. To use the word *recollection* in fact brings us to the second of two aspects of memory for the ancients, as evidenced by the title

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<sup>211</sup> That is, in our analysis of 3, XI in Chapter 2.

given to Aristotle's work on the subject, ΠΕΡΙ ΜΝΗΜΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΜΝΗΣΕΩΣ,<sup>212</sup> translated into Latin as *De memoria et reminiscencia*<sup>213</sup> and into English as *On memory and recollection*<sup>214</sup> or *On memory and reminding oneself*.<sup>215</sup> The distinction is between the faculty, or storehouse, of memory, and the activity of that faculty, recollection, that allows us to retrieve what the storehouse contains. A great deal of illuminating work has been done on the practice of memory throughout antiquity and the Middle ages, by figures such as Frances A. Yates, Mary Carruthers, and Jocelyn Penny Small,<sup>216</sup> so here I will do little more than allude to a few moments of the tradition.

Exposure to good, healthy, or right repetitions is a matter of vast importance because, as Aristotle writes, "frequency creates nature."<sup>217</sup> We are all well-familiar with this fact from our own experience. It would be absurd, for example, to say that the *particular* face, voice, and actions of a mother are irrelevant to an infant's developing sense of self and world. For while it is through universal categories that we interpret experience, experience itself is infinitely particular—it is particular people, voices, faces, books, tastes, colors, and embraces that make us who we are, not these considered in the abstract. These particular repetitions do quite literally make us who we are, for as repetition leads to recognition, it also gives rise to anticipation, an inward disposition towards the same repetition in the future. This anticipation, or expectation,

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<sup>212</sup> As given in Aristotle, *On Memory and Recollection*, trans. W. S. Hett, in *On the soul; Parva naturalia; On breath*, The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press and W. Heinemann, 1964), 288.

<sup>213</sup> Aristotle, *De memoria et reminiscencia*.

<sup>214</sup> Aristotle, *On Memory and Recollection*, 289.

<sup>215</sup> Aristotle, *On Memory and Reminding Oneself*.

<sup>216</sup> See, among other works, Frances Amelia Yates, *The Art of Memory* (London: Routledge and K. Paul, 1966); Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*; Mary J. Carruthers and Jan M. Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory: an Anthology of Texts and Pictures*, Material texts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); and Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind*.

<sup>217</sup> Aristotle, *On Memory and Reminding Oneself*, 452a24. References are to the nearest previous line numbers given in this edition.

indicates that we have been formed according to the pattern we perceived. When an infant learns to expect her mother, for example, she has become one with—that is, she has internalized—the pattern she experienced. The same is true for all of us in all kinds of ways—whether it’s a matter of waking up before the alarm, becoming hungry at mealtime, or the complex combination of habits, good and bad, that dispose us in relationships. We become the patterns we experience, and our personalities take shape through the repetitions we remember.

And therefore, as Mary Carruthers writes, “the choice to train one’s memory or not, for the ancients and medievals, was not a choice dictated by convenience; it was a matter of ethics. A person without a memory, if such a thing could be, would be a person without a moral character and, in a basic sense, without humanity.”<sup>218</sup> Indeed, throughout antiquity, the formative power of repetition was considered the principal means of developing moral character. Aristotle is again representative: we are not virtuous by nature but rather become so by repetition of virtuous acts, whereby, through habit, we become the good we will.<sup>219</sup> Habit is, in this sense, unconscious memory. The formative power of repetition is no less effective for vice than for virtue, however. In Augustine’s account of his conversion, he is unable to overcome the force of his habituated vice. Repetition has become nature.<sup>220</sup> Much later still, the idea is unchanged: Dante’s *Purgatorio* visually depicts the remedy for bad habits, and it is not an easy one: countless repetitions are required to counter the force of repeated vice.

The formative power of repetition underlay most aspects of education, such as with *μουσική* for the Greeks. One need only think of the fact that rote memorization of

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<sup>218</sup> Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 14.

<sup>219</sup> See Book 2 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

<sup>220</sup> *Confessions*, VIII, 5.

Homer was one of the most important aspects of Greek education to see how rhythmic repetition, memory, and pedagogy were essentially bound together.<sup>221</sup> The physiological aspect of this rhythmic formation is portrayed by Aristotle's comment that anyone who cannot dance in the tragic chorus is uneducated.<sup>222</sup> The most famous treatment of *μουσική* as a critical component of Greek education, however, is in Plato's *Republic*, when his Socrates is discussing education in the ideal state.<sup>223</sup> He surveys the various rhythms and modes, excluding some and including others, on the basis of the good or bad effect they have on the formation of character.<sup>224</sup> We've already seen that Boethius, in *De institutione musica*, argues that the sense of hearing, more than any other sense, has the power to shape the soul.<sup>225</sup> He not only shares Plato's view on the power of music and rhythm to shape character, but also cites Plato as his authority. We've also seen, in the *Consolation*, Philosophy dramatically re-enact this scene from the *Republic*, expelling the harmful muses of poetry in favor of her own muses who, she claims, will restore and heal.

Though in the *Republic*, Plato's description of *μουσική* is more or less limited (if

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<sup>221</sup> See Mark Griffith, "Public and Private in Early Greek Institutions of Education," in *Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity*, ed. Yun Lee Too (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2001), 70.

<sup>222</sup> See also the words of the Athenian in Plato's *Laws*: "So by an uneducated man we shall mean one who has no choric training, and by an educated man one whose choric training has been thorough? . . . Thus it follows that a well-educated man can both sing well and dance well." Plato, *Laws*, trans. A. E. Taylor, in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Including the Letters*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 654b.

<sup>223</sup> *Republic*, III.

<sup>224</sup> At 398cff. The discussion of music and rhythm follows the consideration of the permissible forms of imitation, also a matter of great importance, because "imitations, if continued from youth far into life, settle down into habits and (second) nature in the body, the speech, and the thought." Plato, *The Republic*, trans. Paul Shorey, 2 vols., The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press and W. Heinemann, 1937), 395d. On the powers of different rhythms and modes, see also Aristotle, *Politica*, 1340a-1340b19.

<sup>225</sup> "Indeed no path to the mind (*animus*) is as open for instruction as the sense of hearing. Thus, when rhythms and modes reach an intellect through the ears, they doubtless affect (*afficiant*) and reshape (*conformant*) the mind according to their particular character (*aequo modo*)," Boethius, *De institutione musica*, 1, 1, 181.1-4 (trans. Bower). As I mentioned in the Introduction, Aristotle held the same view: "The objects of no other sense . . . have any resemblance to moral qualities." Aristotle, *Politica*, 1340a29-30.

we can call this limited!) to a moral influence, in the *Timaeus* he describes its deeper psychological and theological purpose. By situating the creation of the human being in relation to the world soul and the actions of the demiurge, he offers an account of the human that is at once scientific and theosophic. The role of music is discussed in relation to the human senses, which are the demiurge's solution to the imperfect embodiment of the human soul.<sup>226</sup> Through the senses, the soul is able to perceive the ordered revolutions of the cosmos so that by this perception of order its own disturbed revolutions are restored. Sound and hearing are thus "gifts of the gods." The purpose of all audible μουσική, Timaeus says, is "to bring order to any orbit in our souls that has become disharmonious and make it concordant with itself." Having treated sight, sound, music, and harmony, Timaeus leaves rhythm to last: "Rhythm . . . has likewise been given us by the Muses for the same purpose, to assist us. For with most of us our condition is such that we have lost all sense of measure (ἄμετρος), and are lacking in grace." We've often noted that Philosophy frequently gives examples of harmony in order to restore the prisoner's inner concord, whether by mention of the seasons, the path of the sun, the movement of the stars, etc. But more specifically, we heard, in the 3, IX, the *Consolation's* only hymnic hexameter, Philosophy summarize the Timaeian account of the human soul's creation. The poem is more than a summary; it is also a prayer that asks for divine light so the prisoner can see God here on earth. The rhythm of the hexametric sound, entering through the ears, divinely accomplishes the inner harmonization the *Timaeus* describes. Between Philosophy's re-enactment of the scene from *Republic*, and her prayer which paraphrases, and enacts, this passage of *Timaeus*,

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<sup>226</sup> All quotations in this paragraph are from *Timaeus* 47a-e, and are taken from Plato, *Timaeus*, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000).

we begin to hear Philosophy's poetry not only as healing therapy, but one that restores inner measure by meters theosophically ordained. But forasmuch as the *Consolation's* meters are portrayed as the spoken utterances of a healing god, we must remember they were composed as a written text by a fifth century Roman author. Boethius' reliance on Plato would have us believe that not much had changed between Plato's time and his own. But between Athens in the fifth century B.C.E and Rome in the sixth century C.E. more than a thousand years had passed. Boethius' references to and general emulation of Plato cannot therefore represent an immediate cultural affinity; rather, they a sign of fidelity to the master teacher that is characteristic of the neoplatonic tradition. We will briefly return to the question of Boethius' neoplatonism later in this dissertation. Here I wish only to draw attention to his text as a work of literary craft in a literary tradition that stretches back to Plato. And this brings us to consider the relation of repetition and memory specifically with respect to literature.

#### *Memory as Cause and Effect of Literature*

Because forming the memory by repetition extended to nearly every facet of life, techniques developed to facilitate the memory's ability to retain and recollect. These techniques became known as the *ars memorativa*, or the art of memory. The story used to describe the invention of the art is of the poet Simonides, who was present at a banquet at which he was giving an ode in honor of a boxing champion. The poet was temporarily summoned from the banquet hall and, while he was absent, the hall collapsed, crushing all those within. When the family members came to collect the remains of the dead, they were unable to tell them apart, as everyone had been

completely crushed. According to Cicero:

. . . the story goes that Simonides was enabled by his recollection of the place (*loco*) in which each of them had been reclining at table to identify them for separate interment; and that prompted then by this circumstance he is said to have invented the order that especially brings light to memory. And so for those who would train this part of the mind, places (*locos*) must be selected and those things (*rerum*) which they want to hold in memory must be reproduced in the mind and put in those places: thus it would be that the order of the places would preserve the order of the things . . .<sup>227</sup>

This system of topics, or *loci*, places, was developed into a mnemonic tool with legendary abilities. Seneca the Elder wistfully boasts that in his younger days he could recall 2000 names he had just heard,<sup>228</sup> and that, when his “assembled school-fellows each supplied a line of poetry, up to the number of more than two hundred,” he could cite them in reverse.<sup>229</sup> Augustine, whose memory was certainly a highly trained one, was himself amazed by a friend who could recite the whole of Virgil and a great deal of Cicero beginning at any requested place, both backwards and forwards, and skipping around at will.<sup>230</sup> As Carruthers notes, it was not the feat of memorizing so much material that was remarkable to Augustine, but the fluency with which he could recall it.<sup>231</sup> Strength of memory and facility of recollection were highly prized, especially because texts were rare and highly inconvenient to consult, given that they were

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<sup>227</sup> Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De oratore*, trans. E. W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 vols., The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press and W. Heinemann, 1942), 2, 86, 353-354, translation as adapted in Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind*, 83.

<sup>228</sup> Although the wistful tone is somewhat rhetorical, as the subsequent ten books are presented as composed from memory alone. Seneca the Elder, *Controversiae*, trans. M. Winterbottom, 2 vols., The Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), I, Preface, 4.

<sup>229</sup> *Ibid.*, 1, Preface, 2.

<sup>230</sup> See Augustine, *De natura et origine animae*, ed. C. F. Urba and J. Zycha, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (Vienna and Leipzig: 1913), 4, 7, 9 (p. 389, lines 7-16). Translated in Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, 21.

<sup>231</sup> Carruthers and Ziolkowski, *The Medieval Craft of Memory*, 21.

written in *scriptura continua* and on the physically impracticable form of scrolls or wax tablets. And paradoxically, the art of memory became more, and not less, important as literary culture became more prominent. As the number of books dramatically increased, so did the need for techniques for remembering them.<sup>232</sup>

Given how complex ancient mnemonic schemes could sometimes be, it is certainly possible that one of the purposes of metric variation in the *Consolation* is to make it more easily memorable for recitation, a desirable characteristic in a culture of aural texts. Metered text is easier to remember, as the rhythm serves as a mnemonic aid.<sup>233</sup> The *Consolation's* symmetry of metric recurrence, furthermore, provides a kind of ring structure to follow in memorised performance. But ease of recitation is not alone a convincing reason for this intricate rhythmic structure. Though Boethius undoubtedly intended his text to be heard aloud, it was never intended for purely oral transmission—he wrote it and it would have been read. And in any case, to stop at recitation as the sole mnemonic purpose of the rhythmic patterns would be to neglect the formative effect of repetition on memory, with all of its ethical, theological, and psychological consequences, that we have touched on ever so briefly in the preceding pages. The primary mnemonic purpose of the meters is not as a mere aid to recitation—a substitute for having the book ready to hand—but in the formative effect their repetition has on the memory itself.

To consider mnemonic patterns only for the purpose of recitation is to confuse what we rather narrowly call “memorization” with what the ancients and medievals knew as the richness of *memoria*. The art of memory had a much broader application

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<sup>232</sup> Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind*, 83, 95.

<sup>233</sup> See Aristotle, 1409b1ff.

than simply the recollectable arrangement of data. Though rote memorization was fundamental, *memoria* was a multi-dimensional activity that required emotion, intelligence, and will, and was critical to rhetoric, dialectic, all types of literary composition, as well as to meditative prayer. The relation between mnemotechics and rhetoric is perhaps the most clearly articulated, as the dialectical topics, or loci, are analogous with the mnemonic ones.<sup>234</sup> Aristotle's *Topics* employs the techniques of memory to demonstrate how to construct arguments on the fly.<sup>235</sup> The importance of this tradition to Boethius is shown in the fact that he completed not one, but two, treatises on topical argumentation—<sup>236</sup>one of which, the *De differentiis topicis*, was instrumental in transmitting the tradition to the Middle Ages.<sup>237</sup> For Boethius, as for Aristotle, the topics are not about memorizing particular arguments but rather about method—that is, how to discover, or invent (*invenire*),<sup>238</sup> the right argument for the occasion. “Every topic is in this sense a mnemonic, a structure of memory for recollection.”<sup>239</sup>

Training the memory is what makes discovery, or “invention” possible. To put it

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<sup>234</sup> Eleonore Stump, introduction to *De topicis differentiis*, by Boethius, trans. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978), 16.

<sup>235</sup> Small, *Wax Tablets of the Mind*, 87-94.

<sup>236</sup> Eleonore Stump provides excellent introductions in her English translations of both of these works. See Boethius, *In ciceronis topica*, trans. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) and Boethius, *De topicis differentiis*, trans. Eleonore Stump (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). See also Eleonore Stump, “Boethius’ Theory of Topics and its Place in Early Scholastic Logic,” in *Atti: Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani, Pavia, 5-8 ottobre 1980*, ed. Luca Obertello (Roma: Editrice Herder, 1981).

<sup>237</sup> “. . . it was through Boethius’s sixth century treatise *De differentiis topicis* that the topics of argument, seen as analogous to the places of recollection, gained full currency in the earlier Middle Ages, for this was an elementary text on reasoning and logic,” Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 190.

<sup>238</sup> Eleonore Stump, “Dialectic and Aristotle’s *Topics*,” in *De topicis differentiis*, by Boethius, 159-178, 177.

<sup>239</sup> Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 40. As she points out, memory and memory arts therefore pervade the entire trivium: “in dialectic and rhetoric . . . the compositional task requires invention (discovery and recovery) of arguments, matters, and materials, which in turn derive their power and persuasion from the mental library one put away during the study of grammar. The intimate connections among the three arts of the trivium, habituated throughout a medieval scholar’s entire reading life, should never be forgotten or set aside in our own desire to analyze them separately.” Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 190-191. Nonetheless, on the somewhat vexed relation between the topics of logic and of mnemonic places, see 395, n. 126.

simply, without memory, there is nothing to find. As the work of Mary Carruthers has shown, ancient and medieval practices of rhetoric, argument, and prayer all required profound engagement with one's inner store of memories, and the better arranged and better supplied the storehouse, the more fruitful the activity of recollection, and therefore, composition, could be. Rhetoric was practiced "primarily as a craft of composition rather than as one primarily of persuading others,"<sup>240</sup> while monastic meditation was "the craft of making thoughts about God."<sup>241</sup> Composition began with *cogitatio*, the collection and mulling over of stored memories. Because memory is physiological, this encounter with memory was an emotional, pre-rational one that could be fraught with desire, frustration, and other affective states.<sup>242</sup> The result of this inner encounter was not a mere amassing of memories, but a dilation of inner capacity,<sup>243</sup> and a new knowledge, something not before thought. Even the most highly technical mnemonic schemes, therefore, were undertaken for the ways they shaped the inner depths of memory and thus for the possibilities they opened for thought, oratory, action, and prayer—because it is from what is already in memory that actions, thoughts, words, and prayers proceed.

But if a written composition emerges *from* memory, it is also intended *for* the memories of its readers and listeners. A written text therefore has memory both as its cause and its result.<sup>244</sup> It is written out of the structured stores of its author's memory, with the purpose of imparting an ordered knowledge to its reader. Mnemonic practice

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<sup>240</sup> Mary Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200*, Cambridge studies in medieval literature, 34 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 3.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>242</sup> See Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, esp. 243-249.

<sup>243</sup> *Ibid.*, 246.

<sup>244</sup> A book "both results from and furnishes *memoria*," *ibid.*, 240.

thus mediates both sides of the literary process, a process that repeats cyclically as listeners become composers, readers writers, and so forth. We have already mentioned in the Introduction some of the ways in which the *Consolation* is caused by, or results from, *memoria*. Boethius' training of his memory was indubitably what allowed him to compose while in prison, where he presumably had little or no access to books. The texts of philosophy, poetry, rhetoric, or scripture were already in his memory, and from his memory the text was born. In terms of its composition, then, the *Consolation* has memory as its cause. But memory is also its intended result. For however much the process of Boethius' composition was informed by the activity of recollection, both intellectual and physiological, both conscious and unconscious, the finished product of the text is a carefully reasoned and highly polished document.<sup>245</sup>

Mary Carruthers has even shown that the first prose of the *Consolation* begins with the prisoner referring to his preceding poem in the technical language of the craft of composition.<sup>246</sup> Her analysis is part of a larger argument about medieval composition, and she does not draw any further significance from this observation for the *Consolation*. But we can see that the implication of this literary conceit—of Philosophy's interruption of the prisoner's composition—is the negation of the text's manufacture: the subsequent dialogue is portrayed not as the result of Boethius' craft, but rather as a directly reported event—an unmade text. The *Consolation's* rhythmic patterns are therefore neither the immediate expressions of the author's memory nor—despite the prisoner's protestations—the unmediated patterns of Philosophy's poetry, but rather

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<sup>245</sup> As Carruthers says of the texts of Anselm and Aquinas. See *ibid.*, 249.

<sup>246</sup> “While I, in silence, thought to mull over this composition within myself and expected to inscribe with a stylus my tearful protest . . .,” 1, 1, 1, trans. in Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, 173.

exquisitely crafted features of a text, composed for the memories of its readers and listeners.

We've already made considerable progress in thinking about the therapeutic purposes of these rhythms and their patterns of repetition, particular with consecutive repetition within a poem (Chapter 1) and with repetitions through temporally separate poems (Chapter 2). The repetitions by line and by element, however, while they extend the system throughout every poem, are too elaborately interwoven to be interpreted through the immediate context of the argument or narrative. Nonetheless, the evidence of the mnemonic tradition—and of Philosophy's own words—suggests that these also were intended for the prisoner's recovery, or recollection. And yet, at our remove from the text, let alone from ancient memory practices, it is difficult to say precisely how they function. What we can do, however, is consider how these patterns of rhythmic repetition might be analogous to patterns of repetition in our own experience, and then reflect on whether these shed any light on the prisoner's recovery. The next section of this chapter takes this kind of self-reflective, imaginative approach to the various repetitions that structure the *Consolation's* rhythmic form. In this sense, it is an exercise of *cogitatio*, an experiment with my own *memoria*.

### *Analogies of Rhythmic Repetition*

So much a part of us is the relation between repetition and recollection that it is at once patently obvious and yet difficult to describe. Our earliest recognitions take place before our earliest conscious memories, based on repetitions we no longer remember. Who can recall the first recognition of a parent's face or voice, or of

daybreak, sunset, or the sound of one's name? In these early moments of life, the first recognitions require long periods of very simple repetitions—as with the infant's recognition of a parent, which requires hundreds of hours of a constant repetition of the same voice, same face, same laugh, same eyes. These earliest recognitions depend on memories we have long ago forgotten, memories that precede consciousness even as they imperceptibly become its foundation. Just as the heartbeat precedes—and enables—the development of every system and organ in gestation—so these early rhythms precede and enable all the complexities of one's consciousness and personality.

The most elemental repetitions of life—of a parent's face, the sound of someone's voice, sunset, seasons, etc.—bear some resemblance to the consecutive repetition of rhythm throughout a poem. This similarity is most evident in poems with inalterable, relatively short lines, such as (in the *Consolation*) 1, VII, where Philosophy gives a poem entirely in adonics (-- uu -- --), perhaps her simplest and most focused use of poetic rhythm. The focus of the rhythm is due to its inalterability and brevity—there are only a few, identical syllables between the beginning of one line and the beginning of the next. The memory needs to hold only a few moments of the past as present in order to recognize—and anticipate—its repetition. Such poetic rhythms clearly exemplify why the primary meaning of *ῥυθμός*, *measured movement or time*, came to be applied to poetic meter.<sup>247</sup>

In Chapter 1, we observed that 1, VII is indeed an extraordinarily focused use of poetic rhythm: the 31 repetitions of this simple beat leave no room for distraction,

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<sup>247</sup> On repetition in poetry, see the entry “Repetition,” by Mariane Shapiro, in Preminger and Brogan, *The New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics*.

which is precisely the purpose and message of the poem—cast away joy, fear, hope and grief, etc. Like an infant calmed by a steady rocking back and forth, the prisoner is collected out of his emotional tumult, becoming one with the beat he hears. By the poem's end, he has reached a state of sufficient calmness to follow Philosophy's words, which move to a more complex kind of argument as the prose of the second book begins. In many other poems we observed something similar, where multiple repetitions of a rhythm helped achieve a particular effect. Every repetition has power, insofar as it shapes the listener to expect the recurrence of its particular sound.

While the early repetitions of infancy provide an opportunity to reflect on the primary relation of repetition and memory, they are of course only the simplest beginnings of a process that becomes ever more complex throughout the rest of our lives. We can see the same relationship, but at an increased level of complexity when, for example, a familiar repetition is itself repeated, but with the interval of time and other experiences in between. I gave the example in Chapter 2 of encountering the smell of a perfume—my grandmother always wears the same perfume, and every time I encounter that scent, I am reminded of her. Or, to take an acoustic example—in the woods around a summer camp I attended as a boy, on a beautiful peninsula in Prince Edward Island, lives a species of songbird whose song is at once beautiful and mournful. It sounds the same every time, four successive notes, the first shorter, and on a lower pitch, than the following three. I don't know how many times I listened to that song, but whenever I chance upon it I am reminded of the times I would listen attentively as a boy, waiting for the sound to pierce again the quiet of the woods. These examples underscore the fact that later recognitions of a sound or other sense experience are

possible only because they are repetitions of a phenomenon that was itself repeated. I inhaled the scent of my grandmother's perfume repeatedly when I would go to see her, just as I would hear the songbird's mournful song many times consecutively in the space of a few minutes. These earlier, consecutive repetitions lie dormant in the memory until they are recalled by their likeness in the present. This is precisely the mystery Boethius describes when he asks: "How does it happen that the mind itself, solely by means of memory, picks out some melody previously heard?"<sup>248</sup>

These temporally separate repetitions resemble the repetitions by poem that we considered in Chapter 2, in which a whole poem's rhythm is precisely repeated after an interval of time and other sounds. Each of these repetitions, when heard in isolation of the larger pattern, gives a poem an identifiable, consecutive rhythm—as with the adonic we described above. But because these repeated rhythms are themselves repeated throughout several poems, there is an added level of complexity—that is, in the recognition that the repetition is itself a repetition of a repetition earlier perceived. The process of recognition is the same in these temporally separated instances as in the immediately repeated ones, as in both cases the memory holds the earlier sound or experience in the mind so it can be the means of recognition in the present. The difference is in the distance between the instances, and in the capacity to recognize not simply the sameness within each instance, but the sameness that unites these instances within a common experiential frame. These repetitions begin to illustrate the graduated development of memory and of its corresponding capacity for recognition. As time passes, the repetitions in the present enter the past, and the storehouse of

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<sup>248</sup> "Quid? . . . quod omnino aliquod melos auditum sibi memor animus ipse decerpat?" Boethius, *De institutione musica*, 1, 1, 187.3, 6-7.

memory grows larger. The more the memory grows, the greater the possibilities become for recollection in the present. For just as the present becomes the content of the past, the past is the means of experience in the present.

Repetitions separated by time do more than recall the earlier experience of the sound or scent or whatever is repeated; they also recollect the other sensory, emotional, and intellectual aspects of that earlier moment in time. My grandmother's perfume evokes her appearance as well. The songbird reminds me of the smell of the woods and of the sweet wild roses that always seemed in bloom and of the many experiences I had in that place. These are simple examples, but we all know how powerfully and involuntarily an experience as simple as listening to birdsong can evoke accompanying aspects of a similar experience of the past. It is for this reason that we delight in happy memories, and go to great lengths, often unconsciously, to avoid painful ones. The ancients and medievals understood this associative power of memory as related to the inherently affective, or emotional, character of perception: "the one who recollects will experience the same pleasure or pain in this situation which he would experience were the thing existing in actuality."<sup>249</sup> We are all familiar with how the present causes us to re-interpret the past, either for better (as in successful psychotherapy, when we "get over" a painful experience) or for worse (as when we learn we've been deceived or misled). As Philosophy tells the prisoner, "*If you are expecting the work of healing, you must bare the wound*"<sup>250</sup> (1, 4, 1).

In Chapter 2, we observed how the contextual depth of repetition is central to Philosophy's therapeutic use of rhythmic sound. She repeats certain meters, and

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<sup>249</sup> Averroes, *Epitome of Parva naturalia*, trans. Harry Blumberg, *Corpus philosophorum Medii Aevi*, 71 (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1961), 30.

<sup>250</sup> "*si operam medicantis expectas, oportet vulnus detegas,*" (1, 4, 1, trans. mine).

through these sounds brings the questions, wounds, and difficulties of their earlier hearings into the present. She thereby effects a simultaneity of present and past, in which the past experience is the initial means of its recognition in the present. Yet, as we observed throughout the instances of repetition by poem, the different context in the present allows these past experiences to be reassessed in light of each successive repetition. Memory therefore works in both directions—from the past to the present, by means of which we recognize and interpret what we see, hear, feel, experience—and from the present to the past—by means of which the past is itself reinterpreted. This interpretation, this placing of the present within the pattern of the past, and the past in relation to the present, demonstrates the intricate intertwining of the active and passive aspects of recollection and repetition. Philosophy chooses the rhythm and administers it with a particular therapeutic end in mind—indeed she knows what has already been said and how and when—but it is ultimately the prisoner who must integrate the present instance with the occurrences of the past.

It doesn't take long to see that the contextual depth of recollection is much more complex than my examples have so far allowed. I've aimed to give the simplest examples so we can observe the dynamic relation of repetition and recollection as closely as possible. As time passes and memory increases, however, the potential recollections and associations of memory multiply. The simple song of the songbird, for instance, reminds me not only of the smell of the woods and its wild roses, but of a whole series of remembered experiences from the several times I went to that place over the years, these memories leading from one to another. One particular memory stands out for me: I remember returning to those woods years later, one summer

afternoon long after the camp had gone bankrupt and the property been abandoned. I remember how being in that place made me experience a flood of vivid memories from those earlier years. I distinctly recall hearing the songbird that afternoon, and that the wild roses were in bloom. It is at the memory of that final afternoon that I arrive before long whenever I hear the mournful beauty of that birdsong or catch the scent of wild roses on the wind. Each of these memories, however, brings its own associations as, for example, the scent or sight of wild roses makes me recall the wild roses at the spectacular opening of a hiking trail near Pollett Cove, Cape Breton, in Eastern Canada. The roses were just above the edge of a precipice above the ocean below. This memory, in turn, reminds me of the many trips I took to the stunning valley that was at the end of that trail, its wild horses, the irises in July, and sleeping at the edge of the gurgling brook with the sound of the ocean's waves crashing only a few hundred feet away. There were many trips there, and my mind recalls several of them within a few seconds—the amazement I felt the first time I saw that valley in the late October sun, reading aloud and by moonlight the short stories of Alisdair McLeod, drinking Johnny Walker Red Label scotch on the craggy rocks near the water's spray in the fog of a rainy night, and of the last time I was there, a week before my sister's wedding, accompanied by six of my brothers and my other sister, the photo we took of ourselves on the cliff at sunset, the warm blowing wind, the waves rolling below, and the joy of that moment in time. I could go on from here, following the memories each of these memories recalls, and the ones those recall, and so on indefinitely. I trace this tiny trajectory of my own memory to show that the context of any recollection is not only multi-faceted and almost infinitely rich, but that each aspect of this context carries its own associations,

each with their own equally rich repetitions and associations, and so forth. Not surprisingly, each recognizable aspect of a recollection is comprised of several repetitions, and carries these recollections and associations within itself. There are several instances in my memory—just to take the simplest examples in this anecdote—of a particular birdsong or of the sight and scent of wild roses, or of trips to Pollett Cove, and any one of these leads of itself to the others, which in turn leads to still other associated repetitions, and so forth. Each remembered detail is recognizable within a pattern of repetition while also simultaneously interwoven with other repetitions.

From these multi-faceted trajectories of recollection, we see how consciousness is formed by a whole multitude of experiences, each of them understood within the interwoven repetitions of our history. The rhythms and repetitions of experience give memory its recollectable structure, and thereby grant us a history through which we can experience the present. This is an ever developing and dynamic relation, as past informs present and present becomes, and thus changes, past.

Each of us can easily trace countless such trajectories within our own memories, beginning with some event in the present that precipitates a recollection, or a series of recollections, each of which has its own associations, leads to another series, etc. It is not difficult to see how these repetitions and associations are similar to the rhythmical poetic ones that we traced in the repetitions by line. Each repetition of a metric line recollects not only its earlier instances, but also the sounds with which it was heard, the repetitions of those sounds, the sounds with those sounds, their repetitions, and so forth.

As we saw with the hexameter series (figures 41-50), a poem's metric associations increase in relation to the quantity of narrative that has elapsed. The further the prisoner's consolation advances, the more of it lies in his past. Philosophy uses each poem's complex web of metric recollections to invoke this earlier history by way of sound, and thereby make it present, however faintly, to his memory. While the acoustic sameness of repetition by poem allows for precise therapeutic recollection, the interweaving of different rhythms in repetition by line reaches widely throughout the memory, and precipitates a cascade of familiar and interconnected sounds. The two kinds of repetition both exploit sensory recollection, the one for direct therapeutic purposes, the other to gather the earlier moments of this treatment into the present of each successive moment. The one addresses particular wounds, laments, and questions, while the other gives this history a coherent form; and because the two repetitions occur in counterpoint (figure 38), discrete recollections are interwoven with the coherent whole of the past.

Though we can follow any trajectory of memory indefinitely, we are able to do this only because of the countless repetitions that underlie each recognition along the way. I can move from the scent of a wild rose through hiking trips on a particular landscape, and so on, because these experiences have already been given a recollectable structure. Any discrete moment of these experiences was mediated by many smaller repetitions that my memory no longer contains. I remember, for example, that on that last trip to Pollett Cove, we hiked through the woods, and I have a hazy memory of the appearance of the woods in general, but I do not remember any particular trees, and certainly not all the particular trees that I certainly did see, nor

could I ever recall all the trees I had seen before that moment that allowed me to recognize those trees as trees. I know, too, that my sister Anna was on that trip because I remember several discrete moments with her, but I could never remember all of them, or begin to recount all the times I saw her before that weekend. Yet without all those other instances, she would have been a stranger to me. As soon as we attempt to unravel any moment of recollection, we discover that the fabric of memory is woven from threads we can barely discern. While repetition is what makes the textile visible—or audible—the weave is imperceptibly fine. It is pertinent to note that the English words *text* and *line* are in fact metaphorically derived from the Latin vocabulary for making fabrics: *textus* (a woven fabric) and *linea* (a thread or string).<sup>251</sup> As a compositional tool, these repetitions quite literally, if often imperceptibly, weave the text into the aural fabric of memory. To give another simple example—from where I sit I can hear the leaves rustling in the trees beyond my window. It's a sound I recognize from having heard it many times, but only a few particular instances come to mind. The same is true for most objects in my field of vision and for every routine sound that strikes my ear. While repetitions underlie the recognitions in every aspect of our lives, whether visual, aural, haptic, emotional, psychological, temporal, etc., these repetitions have become so familiar they become the very source and shape of ourselves, and give us the means of understanding the events and perceptions they comprise.

The *Consolation's* rhythmic patterns of repetition by element resemble these patterns in our lives that unconsciously underlie more precisely memorable events and experiences. Without these elements of experience, these elements of rhythm, no

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<sup>251</sup> For a description of these etymologies in relation to a wonderfully lucid discussion of prosody, see Alfred Corn, *The Poem's Heartbeat: A Manual of Prosody* (Ashland: Story Line Press, Inc., 1998), 9-10.

single event, or line of rhythm, could ever be recognized or recalled. Who could begin to remember all the instances that led to a present recognition of the features of a lover's face, the familiar creak of a stair, our sense for the time of day, the voice of a sibling, or the intimate knowledge of a friend? And yet, without these, we would lack any means of comprehending the events that comprise our days, whether momentous or mundane. Naturally we know that memory and consciousness are far richer than these little trajectories I have traced from my own memory. Each moment of our lives adds immeasurably to the vast world of our memories, while it also transports us through this inner world, handing us to one past memory that in turn carries us to another. Our whole lives are spent in memory, richer and far more intricately interwoven than we can ever know.

The somewhat imaginative exploration of the previous pages shows that the various kinds of rhythmic repetition in the *Consolation* are analogically similar with levels of repetition we easily detect in our memories, repetitions that not only make us who we but also make ourselves, and the present in which we live, intelligible to us. To summarize, these are: 1) the consecutive repetition of the same that leads to the earliest recognitions and demonstrates the process that underlines the whole of our experience and memory, and which resembles the repetition of a rhythm within a poem; 2) the repetitions of these repetitions (repetition by poem) with intervening intervals of time and sound, which demonstrate the contextual embeddedness of any recollection; 3) patterns of repetition that are themselves mixed with other patterns (repetition by line), the interconnection of which allows us to traverse the whole of our memories through any instance of the present; and 4) the repetition of elements that

comprise, and thus make comprehensible, each of the other repetitions. This repetition is demonstrated most clearly by the rhythm of the final poem, which, because it contains elements of every line of every other poem, gathers the whole of the prisoner's past as it sounds and resounds. Finally, while we can distinguish these four levels of repetition, they are by nature interwoven, both in memory and in the text. Many lines of the *Consolation's* poetry contain all four kinds of repetition at once.

Furthermore, while the repetitions of memory are infinitely richer and far more multi-faceted than those of any text could ever be, the *Consolation's* rhythmic repetitions are not a merely acoustic phenomenon. While they certainly are primarily aural, the *Consolation's* rhythms are heard through the words through which they are conveyed, and this makes them polyvalent by nature. In addition to the acoustic divisions of rhythm, these words, individually and together, also convey various other kinds of sounds: soft, harsh, lyrical, startling, smooth, rough, etc. Individually and together, as phrases and lines and whole poems, the words also convey the images, laments, moral lessons, expressions of sympathy, exhortations to virtue, arguments, ancient myths, and all other manner of things the poems convey. Each rhythm is therefore embedded in a rich, multi-faceted context of sense, emotion, and intellect, and it is this context its repetition recollects. While we have reduced the *Consolation's* rhythmic repetitions to visual abstractions, their occurrence and recurrence are therefore more like the repetitions and rhythms of real life than these charts lead us to believe. The dialogue between Philosophy and the prisoner develops a history of its own as the text becomes a microcosm of life. By weaving her poetry into a complex acoustic fabric of rhythmic repetitions and associations, Philosophy simultaneously

gives form to the memory of the prisoner and makes intelligible each moment of his consolation.<sup>252</sup>

### *Other Kinds of Repetition*

As prominent as rhythmic repetition is, we should pause to recognize it is not the only prominent repetition within the text. The alternation of poetry and prose is also a repetition,<sup>253</sup> an undulating alternation between kinds of speech, and their respective manners of cognition. This defining feature of the prosimetric form is the most obvious literary feature of the text, and the one that makes possible the systematic repetition of poetic rhythms. The prosimetric alternation not only provides a structure for the system of rhythmic repetitions and recollections, but also interweaves this system into the narrative.<sup>254</sup> As we have frequently observed, rhythmic repetition is often used to recall the prose around an earlier instance of rhythm, as well as the poem(s) in which that rhythm occurs. The repetition of rhythm thus takes place within the overall rhythm of the alternation between poetry and prose. Also, because nearly all the repetitions by poem and by line occur an equal

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<sup>252</sup> Though he does not consider meter, its repetitions, or anticipate anything resembling this kind of system, Gerard O'Daly nonetheless arrives at a similar intuition: "... the poetry of the *Consolation* bridges the different times of the work's dramatic progress . . .," O'Daly, *The Poetry of Boethius*, 127.

<sup>253</sup> "... ist in den erhaltenen Werken nirgends der Wechsel von Prosa und Verseinlage in gleicher Regelmäßigkeit durchgeführt wie in der *Consolatio*," Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 18. He continues: "Darüber hinaus macht Boethius noch einen weiteren Schritt in Richtung auf eine besonders ausgewogene Form. Er paßt nämlich die einzelnen Gedichte nicht nur inhaltlich, sondern meist auch im Umfang an die benachbarten Prosastücke an," 18.

<sup>254</sup> "Threads thus weave themselves into the framework of the discourse and, having multiplied and crisscrossed, engender another discourse, working with the elements of the first one, as does a dream with fragments of our waking life, enhancing those fantasies to which it gives an identity. While the words are unfolding, equivalencies and contrasts become established. These (because the context changes, even if imperceptibly) entail subtle nuances, each one of which, received as new information, heightens the understanding toward which this voice beckons us." Zumthor and Engelhardt (trans.), "The Text and the Voice," 84.

numbers of times on either side of the middle poem, that is *symmetrically*, or *with equal measure*, we can say there is a kind of rhythm to these repetitions of rhythm.

Furthermore, what connects the two modes of poetry and prose, in part at least, is another form of repetition, that is, of words and ideas from one prose to the next poem and from this poem into the following prose.<sup>255</sup> Without this interweaving of the prose and poetry by word and image, there would be neither any moment-to-moment coherence for the listener, nor any unity to the work as a whole. The text is still more intricately interwoven by the structural repetition of particular themes, arguments, images, and textual divisions.<sup>256</sup> The prisoner's recovery—his recollection, as it were—is wholly mediated by these several kinds of repetition. But all of these other repetitions are expressed through the aural nature of the *Consolation* and, above all, through the rhythmic repetitions of its poetry, which give an acoustic structure to each of them, and to the whole.

### *Recognition and Recollection*

Anyone who doubts how fundamentally, and how totally, repetition makes us who we are, would do well to imagine life without sunset, or sleep, or any of the most common rhythms of a day. Or to imagine the effect of returning to one's home, only to find that the familiar shapes of one's house and door, have become unfamiliar—and that the voices and faces of one's family and friends, also, no longer resemble those we know. Without this familiarity—without the repetition of the past in the present—we would be unable to recognize—that is, re-cognize—those places and people as the

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<sup>255</sup> See Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*, 17.

<sup>256</sup> See notes 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, and 114, above.

places and people they are. This scenario may seem farfetched, but readers of the *Odyssey* will recognize it as the situation of the hero Odysseus when he finally lands on the long awaited Ithacan shores. At what should be the joyous moment of his return—the return the entire epic leads us to anticipate—Athena casts a mist around him so that all appears other (ἄλλοειδέα) than it is, and the hero is unrecognizing (ἄγνωστον) of his homeland. Without the recognition of the place, Odysseus is, in turn, unable to recognize himself, and to know himself as king of that land. By merely obscuring a few shapes of hills and trees, Athena simultaneously steals his recognition of his land and his recognition of himself, and thereby delays his homecoming until she disperses the mist.<sup>257</sup>

It is in just such a state of alienation and un-recognition that we find the prisoner at the beginning of the *Consolation of Philosophy*. Tossed about by a tumult of affections, and forced into an uneven, sorrowful rhythm, he is unable to recognize his teacher and has forgotten himself. Philosophy's first questions to him, which we considered briefly in Chapter 1, stress the relation of repetition and recognition. Are you the *same* man, she asks, who fed on my milk? Do you recognize (*agnoscisne*) me?<sup>258</sup> She then explicitly establishes the basis on which his re-cognition of her, and his recovery of himself, will depend: she says, "*he has forgotten himself for a time, but he'll remember easily enough (recordabitur facile), since he knew me once before (si quidem nos ante*

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<sup>257</sup> For a highly provocative analysis of this scene in the *Odyssey*, and in particular of how Homer's unique use of the active meaning of the adjective ἄγνωστος has profound implications for the hero's homecoming, see Naomi Blackwood, *The Activity of the Unrecognizable in Book XIII of Homer's Odyssey* (Master's Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2009).

<sup>258</sup> Philosophy uses the same verb—*agnoscere*—as Homer uses to describe the unrecognizing Odysseus (ἄγνωστος).

*cognoverit*).”<sup>259</sup> We already looked in detail at the following scene, in which Philosophy makes a fold of her dress in order to clear his eyes of the cloud (or mist!) that blinds them. The rhythmical and metaphorical seamlessness of the following poem, 1, III, is an aural and visual contemplation of the sacramental character of Philosophy’s sight-restoring touch. We also looked at the prisoner’s real-time response to her touch, given at the beginning of the following prose:

Haud aliter tristitiae nebulis dissolutis hausi caelum et ad cognoscendam medicantis faciem mentem recepi. Itaque ubi in eam deduxi oculos intuitumque defixi, respicio nutricem meam, cuius ab adulescentia laribus observatus fueram, Philosophiam. (1, 3, 1-2)

It was in no other way that the clouds of sadness were dispelled. As I drank in the daylight I recovered my mind enough to recognize the face of my doctor. When I had set my eyes toward her and fixed my gaze upon her, I recognized her as my nurse—to whose house I had been going since my youth—Philosophy.<sup>260</sup>

I especially wish to draw attention to the emphasis here on recognition and recovery (*recordabitur, cognoscendam, recepi, respicio*) as dependent on the established patterns of the past (*ante cognoverit, ab adulescentia*), both in Philosophy’s prediction preceding her clearing of the prisoner’s eyes, and in the prisoner’s description afterwards. The crux of Philosophy’s diagnosis is forgetfulness, loss of *memoria*, and thus the whole of her purpose is to enable his recollection. That he knew her before is the basis upon which she states he will know, or re-cognize her, and indeed it is recollection of this past pattern that enables him to recognize his healer’s face.

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<sup>259</sup> 1, 2, 6. Trans. Relihan, slightly modified, italics mine. “Philosophic authority, when complete, is always remembered authority—the memory of beginning in the past . . .,” Mark D. Jordan, “Authority and Persuasion in Philosophy,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 18, 2 (1985): 67-85., 82.

<sup>260</sup> Trans. mine (with resemblances to those of Relihan and Tester).

In this scene, as in every instance or example we have considered, recollection demonstrates a simultaneous unity of activity and passivity, of mind and sense, and of objective and subjective events. We have often said “this rhythm (or event or perception) *recollects*” an earlier instance, just as in our everyday lives we say “this reminds me” or even “remind him or her” as though recollection is wholly effected externally. While the external event may precipitate the recollection, however, we’ve seen how the act of relating a present moment to one, or several, in the past is effected internally by the memory itself. Once a recollection begins, it can lead of itself almost indefinitely through other memories. No present external event dictates where memory might lead. Because Philosophy speaks most of the poems, and organizes their rhythms systematically, the rhythmic sounds that strike the prisoner’s ear have a coherence of their own. Nonetheless, this coherence is one the prisoner must make his own as it enters the domain of his own memory’s power. And yet, the distinction between Philosophy’s words as external, and the prisoner’s recollection of them as internal, can hardly be made without distorting the essential interplay between these two. As I argued above, repeated perceptions lead to internal anticipations—the outward pattern, once perceived, becomes the inward pattern as well. We are not obliquely influenced, but rather directly shaped, by the repetitions we perceive and remember. Repetition leads to recollection, and recollection to anticipation so that we repeat the pattern ourselves—through all the physiological, emotional, psychological, ritual, and intellectual habits of our lives.

Such is the process behind all habits, whether of virtue or of vice. Experience gives rise to memory, and memory to expectation, and expectation to character or

personality. For better or for worse, each moment we are wading through memory, happily continuing its patterns or struggling to break their hold over us. Few things have more power over our present lives than the repetitions of our pasts. Yet even these past repetitions, with all their momentum and determining history, are subject to the future within which repetition or association might relate and re-interpret them. In this sense, at the *Consolation's* opening, the prisoner's recent history has made him re-interpret his past, and clouded his vision such that he no longer knows himself nor the world around him. Philosophy's challenge is to restore his memory so that he can re-interpret his life, and regain knowledge of himself and the world.

The intricate rhythmic patterns of her poetry are the acoustic framework of the prisoner's recollection. They grant coherence to his memory of his consolation, and also make possible the recovery, or recollection of everything to which the words of Philosophy's consolation allude—the whole history of philosophy, poetry, rhetoric, etc. The wonderfully allusive character of the *Consolation* is therefore also a recollection, a making present, of the many riches of antiquity. But this larger, external recollection would be incoherent were it not for the systematic repetitions of sound within. Recollection in the fullest sense is what the *Consolation* is, and the rhythmic patterns are the sensible matrix for the whole.

In the first part of this chapter, we uncovered patterns of rhythmic repetition that extend through every line of the *Consolation's* poetry. By representing these patterns with colored charts, we discovered that they are systematic, thorough, largely symmetrical, and elaborately interwoven. In the second part of this chapter, we attempted to bring these patterns to life by reflecting on the activities of repetition and

recollection on which they depend, both in the ancient context and in the experience of our lives. By reflecting on the ancient context, we observed that rhythm and memory were considered necessary to human temporal life; that memory is a physiological phenomenon closely tied with emotion; that it mediates our experience of cosmic harmony; that the theological and ethical implications of memory elevate the importance of forming and rigorously training it; and that, accordingly, mnemonic structure was a critical feature of literature, both in its formation and its purpose.

By reflecting on our own experience of memory, we saw that the *Consolation's* intricate rhythmic patterns are similar to the levels of repetition we can easily trace in our own memories. We observed that the relation of repetition and recollection demonstrates a double-sided dialectic, in which the present is made intelligible by the patterns of the past through the mediation of memory, and in which the present also gives rise to that past through repetition, weaving memory into a seamless whole. At the heart of this dialectic lies the power of repetition to form the personality, as the person becomes one with the patterns heard or seen or lived.

The *Consolation's* intricate rhythmic patterns are indeed a mnemonic structure, but in the deepest sense—a structure that therapeutically restores and systematically forms the prisoner's memory. The *Consolation's* metric structure reflects, and thus achieves, the repetitions according to which the soul is shaped and through which it knows itself. As a microcosm of life, Philosophy's consolation is structured so as actually to become the prisoner's memory—an intelligible, recollectable past through which his self-possession is restored.

## REPETITION AND NARRATION: A MEDITATION ON BOOK 5

Therefore let us consider, what is eternity.<sup>261</sup>

### REPETITION, NARRATION, AND THE MEDITATIVE ASCENT

In the previous Chapter, we uncovered a complex system of rhythmic repetition that pervades every poem in the *Consolation*. We discussed how repetition is essential to the formation of memory and to our experience of time and, in turn, how memory not only joins present with past but interprets the present through the very past it remembers. We then briefly considered memory in the context of the ancient and medieval view of *memoria*, with all its ethical, religious, intellectual, and literary implications. On this basis, we developed the intuition that the rhythmic patterns of the text are a mnemonic structure designed to form the prisoner's memory. We also reflected on ways that the various levels, or kinds, of rhythmic repetition in the text are analogous to the repetitions that give coherence to our history and grant us knowledge of ourselves and the world. We concluded that the *Consolation's* rhythmic patterns are not simply analogous to the formative patterns of life, but are meant to be these in actuality; as an extended temporal experience, the text becomes a microcosm

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<sup>261</sup> 5, 6, 3, Tester.

of life. The rhythmic repetitions are the acoustic patterns of the prisoner's lived experience with *Philosophia*, so far as he relates this experience to us.

The fact of the prisoner's narration of his experience brings us to another repetition—perhaps the most important one of all—and that is, the repetition, or narration, of the experience itself. The entire text is related in the past tense, and as such, is a repetition of an experience that has already occurred—or at least this is the literary device the author employs. Though we have occasionally noted the narrated fact of the text, until now we have attended primarily to the prisoner's experience from within the present of that recounted past, without giving much thought to the fact of its being retold in the present of the text itself. This literary narration introduces a distinction between the prisoner of the narrative and the one who narrates it. The first is the prisoner in the story, who is the subject of Philosophy's consolation, and the second is the prisoner who gives an account of this experience after the fact. Implied in this chronological distinction is the reflected self-awareness of the narrator. Though we do not know how much time has passed, the insertion of the past tense separates the prisoner from the state he was in at the time of the events, and the state he is in such that he can remember and recount and relive this story later on.

The distinction between the prisoner of the story and the prisoner-narrator raises the question of what relation both of these bear to author of the text, Boethius himself. We are perhaps likely to assume that Boethius didn't actually experience a dramatic dialogue with *Philosophia*—and that the story he tells is simply the imagined, literary form of his mental reflection. Even if we wholly adopt this assumption, however, we ought nonetheless to have the good faith as readers to believe that the

various features—dramatic, structural, poetic, etc.—do honestly express the author’s views, however metaphorical a form he may have given them. That is, even if the dramatic conversation with *Philosophia* did not actually occur, it is the author’s best expression of the truths such an encounter would embody.

In any case, we do need to make the distinction between the prisoner of the narrative and the narrator or author, even if the subtlety of the text’s construction allows us easily to forget that this distinction is present throughout the whole work. Nowhere does the narrator emphasize the distinction by saying he has omitted or altered or forgotten something; he merely reminds us of the distance of narration by the regular insertion of the past tense. This narrative distance is therefore both temporal and reflective. It is temporal in the obvious sense that the narration is not simultaneous with the events it recounts, but subsequent to them. If we can even imagine one, a simultaneous narration would be highly problematic from a technical standpoint: without a third person to narrate the story, the events would need to be relayed as a present conversation, consisting only of this conversation, without any description of the characters who experience this other than what they offer from their spoken words alone. The past tense narration thus paradoxically serves to make the present of the past more vivid than a dialogue in the present tense would allow.<sup>262</sup> The reader even has the feeling that the story is unfolding in the present, as the present tense is used between the narrator’s past tense insertions.

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<sup>262</sup>“The present tense verbs help to give the text its sense of immediacy, an effect which could not be achieved without the fictional framework.” Noel Harold Kaylor, *The Medieval Consolation of Philosophy: an Annotated Bibliography*, Garland medieval bibliographies, vol. 7 (New York: Garland, 1992) Past tense narration was common in ancient literature; well-known examples include the dialogues of Plato and the *Confessions* of Augustine.

This narrative distance is not merely temporal, however, but also reflective. If we think of the opening scene, for instance, it is obvious that the narrator is no longer in the despairing state out of which he claims he initially composed the elegy of 1, I, but rather calm and self-reflective. At this first moment of the text, the narrator's consolation is complete, whereas the prisoner's is only about to begin. Though the prisoner of the narrative progresses through his consolation, he is always removed from the standpoint from which the story is told. Up until now, I have been mixing these standpoints together, insofar as I have simultaneously tried to trace the consolation of the prisoner in the present as it occurs and sought to bring out the structures and methods of that consolation, which would only have been apparent to the prisoner as narrator and author.

The *Consolation's* narrative distance thus makes possible the most important repetition and recollection of all—that is, the recollection of Philosophy's consolation, and the repetition of it that is the text itself. Repetition is, as it were, the very premise of the work. Consequently, the reader is woven into the narrative's repeated structure from its first words, as the repetition of narration is clear from the start. In successive readings, furthermore, the reader explicitly repeats—also with time and reflection intervening—the prisoner's own repetition. The recounted character of the work therefore makes repetition both the means of the text's existence, and the method by which its consolation—for the prisoner and the reader alike—can be received.

Robert McMahon puts it as follows:

this distinction between Boethius the prisoner and Boethius the author proves analogous to the difference between reading through the work, on the one hand, and rereading and meditating upon it, on the other . . . In the

course of *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Boethius the prisoner receives the teaching that enables him to become Boethius the author of the work we have read. But he becomes the author not only by having a great memory, but also by meditating on his experience with Philosophy as a whole and thereby grasping its structure and meanings . . . the work enacts both an extensive and an intensive recollection, a remembering of the past and a Platonist *anamnesis*, as the prisoner recovers a sense of his immortality of soul.<sup>263</sup>

The implication is that anything designed for the prisoner is aimed at the reader as well, even primarily so. It is pertinent to note that the few references to the prisoner's life—that is, the historical or biographical details that could separate the prisoner and reader—are mostly to events or experiences for which any reader could find parallels in his or her own life: times of good and bad fortune, relations with family, etc. It is not that they are unspecific—their particularity is important to develop the prisoner's persona—but they are easily adaptable by the reader and, furthermore, virtually disappear after the opening passages of the work. Other references to temporal events outside its own narrative are rare. Unlike Augustine's *Confessions*, where the author's autobiography is used to enact the universal pattern, the *Consolation* is designed so as to construct a temporally self-contained dialogue that more immediately situates the reader as the primary interlocutor.<sup>264</sup>

The more we think of the *Consolation* as a literary invention rather than as a literal account of a historical dialogue—the more the reader becomes the principal subject of the rhythmic design and of Philosophy's other medicines as well. So while the prisoner's development allows us to discern more easily the presumed effects of

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<sup>263</sup> McMahan, *Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent*, 212-213.

<sup>264</sup> This difference between the two works should not, however, mask their profound similarity insofar as the protagonist is in both cases a paradigm for the reader.

Philosophy's medicines, we should not hesitate to assume these effects are actually directed at the reader.<sup>265</sup> This extends to every level of rhythm, from the temporally consecutive repetition of rhythm in a poem, to the structural repetitions by poem, line, and element, along with the consequences of each in terms of immediate effect, specific therapeutic recollections, and the deep formation of memory. As they occur, syllable by syllable, the rhythms are an acoustic, psychophysical phenomenon that unites the reader with the text, giving measure, particular shape, as well as an overall structure to his or her experience.<sup>266</sup> Finally, rereading or rehearing enacts a repetition of the entire system of repetitions, by means of which it becomes ever more deeply impressed upon the listener's memory.

The distinction between the prisoner and the narrator or author, made so as to unite them once again, lies at the heart of McMahon's fine study of Boethius' *Consolation*, Anselm's *Proslogion*, Augustine's *Confessions*, and Dante's *Comedy*. In each of these, McMahon discerns a literary structure that invites the reader to a meditative ascent that is not explicitly mentioned in the text itself. These texts are deliberately constructed so that "a full understanding demands not merely our reading, but our

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<sup>265</sup> "We are in the habit of thinking that readers, through the act of reading, activate or challenge the coherence of the text. The reverse is equally true, if not more so: the text activates and challenges the coherence of the reader." Scott, *The Poetics of French Verse*, 1.

<sup>266</sup> "In whatever way it is achieved, discursive recurrence is the most efficacious means of verbalizing a spatiotemporal experience and of bringing the audience to participate in it. Time unfolds in the fictional atemporality of the song, from the moment the first word is uttered. Then, within the space created by the sound, the image that is perceived by the senses becomes objectivized; a rhythm is born and a fragment of knowledge is legitimized." Zumthor and Engelhardt (trans.), "The Text and the Voice," 85. "No less than the animation of semantic sense, that of the poem's sound shape in time (itself intimately related to how one construes the "sense") determines our knowing. For each word, each turn of thought, across each line-end, and as it is embodied in each sound and driven through each cadence, is not of chronological reckoning but of human subjectivity: as Bergson would have it, not *temps* but *durée*." Hurley, "How Philosophers Trivialize Art," 120.

meditation.”<sup>267</sup> The levels of the ascent may sometimes be readily apparent but the relations between them are grasped only with meditation, or “deeply reflective rereading”<sup>268</sup> as, for example, with the relation between the autobiographical memories of Books 1-9 of the *Confessions* and Book 10, which is about memory itself. Augustine does not tell the reader what the relation between these is, but leaves it to the reader to grasp this by meditation.<sup>269</sup>

According to McMahon, in a meditative ascent, much is left unsaid. If all is fully elucidated, there is no need for meditation, and the reader (or listener) does not make the ascent. There is a difference, then, between reading the text for its obvious meaning, and rereading and meditating upon it in order to grasp what is hidden within. The ascent cannot occur without this inner engagement, in which the reader and the text become ever more intimate. We are well familiar by now with how the *Consolation* is designed to evoke such meditative reading. Though *Philosophia* does make a few general references to her method, it is left wholly to the reader to uncover the structure of her consolation, the patterns of her argument, the variations and repetitions of her poetic rhythm, etc. Designed to foster repeated, meditative engagement, it is perhaps not surprising that the *Consolation* does not contain any explicit mention of its rhythmic patterns, no matter how pervasive they may be.<sup>270</sup> It was, indeed, only by reading meditatively that we made a kind of ascent ourselves: first,

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<sup>267</sup> McMahon, *Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent*, 3.

<sup>268</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>269</sup> Brian Stock makes a similar argument: “In a single masterpiece [i.e. the *Confessions*], Augustine effectively transformed an ancient contemplative practice into a new type of mental exercise that had both literary and spiritual dimensions.” Brian Stock, *After Augustine: The Meditative Reader and the Text* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), 13.

<sup>270</sup> On chastic or symmetrical design as a feature of Augustan poetry books, detectable only by repeated rereading, see Fantham, *Roman Literary Culture*, 65.

by carefully reading and rereading the *Consolation's* first poems, we came to hear how particular rhythms help to achieve a poem's purpose; then, by carefully attending to the work's obvious metric repetitions, we discovered a therapeutic purpose to their recurrence; then, by very closely attending to the less evident repetitions, we discovered their interwoven patterns; and finally, by meditating on the activities of repetition and recollection in themselves, we reached some tentative understanding of the purpose of this intricate acoustic system. But now that we've come this far, is there still further to go?

As McMahon writes, "a meditative ascent is necessarily written from a moving viewpoint, for it progresses to stages ever 'higher': to more comprehensive categories, or to more fundamental considerations."<sup>271</sup> This moving viewpoint is partly responsible for the *Consolation's* dramatic structure, as it "progresses from level to level climactically (Greek *climax*, "ladder")."<sup>272</sup> An unexpected consequence of this climactic ascent, however, is that "like the finale of a literary work, and unlike the structure of most arguments, the end is unforeseen, and thus surprising. We cannot see where the meditative journey is going until we arrive at its end, though in retrospect we can understand it as a coherent whole."<sup>273</sup> The final book of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, which contains a heavy going reflection on providence and free will, has indeed perplexed many commentators, who have often struggled to see it as properly integrated with the work, some even speculating that the work was left unfinished, or that the whole fifth book is a later addition. Philosophy's closing words, an exhortation

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<sup>271</sup> McMahon, *Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent*, 4.

<sup>272</sup> *Ibid.*, 5

<sup>273</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

to prayer and to doing good deeds, seem particularly out of place in a work that has neither an obvious religious character nor a primarily moral purpose.

But according to McMahon, while the end of a meditative ascent may be the most perplexing, it is also its most revealing moment. What seems surprising or out of place, once viewed meditatively, often contains the work's most comprehensive standpoint. If such a comprehensive standpoint exists in the *Consolation*, it would be immensely beneficial to the foregoing analysis of the system of rhythmic repetitions. For though we've gained considerable insight into the concrete purpose and formal structure of the *Consolation's* metric repetitions, we have yet to place this system relative to the theological and psychological principles that underlie the work as a whole. Might the *Consolation's* ending encompass and even explain the acoustic system which the text as a whole enacts but at the same time never once describes?

The next section of this chapter contains a close, as it were meditative, reading of the *Consolation's* fifth book, similar to the reading of the first book in Chapter 1. The purpose of this reading is to discern whether the fifth book contains a standpoint that is comprehensive of the whole work, and if so, what principles this standpoint entails. In the final section of the chapter, we will return to ask how this reading develops the distinction between the prisoner of the narrative and the narrator of the text.

## BOOK 5: FREEDOM, PROVIDENCE, AND PRAYER

The tension between divine providence and human freedom begins to emerge in the final chapters of the fourth book, and so that is where we will begin.

*Divine Justice, Invisible*

At 4, 5, the prisoner states that he now understands how punishment and reward are implicit in the acts of virtue and vice, and thereby illustrates that he has followed Philosophy's argument up until that point. His statement also shows that he has grasped the wrongness of his initial complaint: his earlier view of the importance of external affairs signified that his soul was lost in externality; but now, with Philosophy's aid, he has recollected himself from the world in which he was lost. Nonetheless, he says, he still thinks there is some merit in the popular notion of reward and punishment, in which external punishments are given to the wicked and external rewards to the virtuous. What he observes, however, is a world in which appearances are often opposite to what justice would require. This apparent disorder of reward and punishment is all the more disturbing to the prisoner because he now believes God is the *rector* of human affairs. Worse still, God now appears as the cause of this confusion, seeming to punish the virtuous and reward the wicked, so that his governance appears no different than random chance (*fortuibus casibus*). The prisoner's progress paradoxically makes the world seem more, and not less, contradictory.

Philosophy's response to this question first takes a poetic form. The message of her subsequent poem (4, V) is that a thing seems strange until its cause is known. While some causes are easily known (that wind causes waves, sun melts snow, etc.), "All

things that time brings forth but rarely / And unexpected things, astound the excitable mob” (4, V, 19-20, Tester). This message resonates metrically insofar as the two lines of each couplet seem to alternate between two variable meters whose rhythms are unanticipatable until the principle of their variation is understood.<sup>274</sup> Without grasping the underlying cause (whether of the meter or of the phenomena the poem describes), the meter or event is novel and incomprehensible. Ironically, it is the very underlying pattern itself that surprises (*legem stupebit*) until it is understood. The meter of the poem, then, is a rhythmic expression of the view Philosophy here expresses as well as an acoustic metaphor for the variation of rhythm throughout the text.

The prisoner (that is, not the narrator) seems not to recognize—or, at least not to care about—the layers of sound and metaphor within Philosophy’s poem. Instead, he latches onto its literal message and insists, using language that refers to her initial clearing of the mist (*caligo*) from his eyes, that she explain the apparent injustice of worldly affairs. “*Ita est*,” he says, at the beginning of the prose, “Yet since it is your office to unfurl the causes of hidden things (*causas rerum velatas*) and to unfold explanations veiled in mist (*caligine*), I beseech you to explain what conclusions you draw from this, for that wonder<sup>275</sup> I mentioned disturbs me very greatly” (4, 6, 1,

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<sup>274</sup> O’Donnell painstakingly notates them as follows:

-- u | -- uu | -- || -- u u -- --  
 x -- | u uu | -- || -- u u -- --.

However, 18 of the 22 lines follow a much simpler pattern:

-- u --- -- || -- u u --- --  
 -- -- u --- -- || -- u u --- --

in which the only difference between the two lines is whether the first short syllable is in the second or third position. Of the remaining four lines, one replaces two shorts for a long in the fourth position (appropriately, on *celerēs*), while the other three (all from the second, iambic line of each couplet) replace the first syllable of each line (a long) with a short.

<sup>275</sup> That is, his wonder that good people often seem to bear the punishments of the wicked, while wicked people often receive the rewards due the good. See the prisoner’s speech at the beginning of 4, 5 (*admiror, mirarer*, etc).

Tester). Philosophy begins her response, smiling a little (*arridens paulisper*), knowing that her answer, though necessary for his treatment, is going to be a difficult one to understand. The question of God's governance is the greatest question of all, and no discourse is sufficient to answer it, she says, for it involves "the singleness of providence, the course of fate, the suddenness of chance, the knowledge and predestination of God, and the freedom of the will" (4, 6, 4). Nonetheless, she assures him, "to know these things too is some part of your medicine" (4, 6, 5, Tester).

Even as she approaches her most abstract and difficult argument, therefore, Philosophy assures the prisoner she is attending to his consolation. Given what a crisis her subsequent words cause for him, however, we will have to reflect on why they are a necessary medicine. Before proceeding, Philosophy further prepares the prisoner for this difficult argument by telling him he will have to postpone the delights of music and song for a while—which indeed is true, as her subsequent discourse is the longest prose section of the text. After this introduction, she embarks on her lengthy explanation of, and distinction between, fate and providence.

#### *Divine Power, Irresistible*

Because we looked at this passage and its following poem in Chapter 2, we will mention only a few points here in order to follow the thread of the argument through to the end of the fourth book. Everything in motion and change, Philosophy maintains, has its origin in the divine mind. Fate is the "unfolding (*explicatio*)" into time of that which the divine mind holds in atemporal unity. Everything, the actions of humankind included, is therefore linked through an "indissoluble chain of causes (*indissolubili*

*causarum connexione*)” (4, VI, 19) with the divine mind. *Providence* refers to this series of events as they are collected in the simplicity of the divine mind, while *fate* is this same series unfolded in time. The relation between these can be expressed by proportion, whether intellectual, ontological, temporal, or geometric: “Therefore as reasoning is to understanding, as that which becomes is to that which is, as time is to eternity, as the circle is to its centre, so is the moving course of fate to the unmoving simplicity of providence” (4, VI, 17, Tester). This hierarchy is absolute and therefore nothing escapes the reach of the divine mind:

Ordo enim quidam cuncta complectitur, ut quod adsignata ordinis ratione decesserit, hoc licet in alium, tamen ordinem relabatur, ne quid in regno providentiae liceat temeritati. (4, 6, 53)

For a certain order embraces all things, so that that which has departed from the rule of this order appointed to it, although it slips into another condition yet that too is order, so that nothing in the realm of providence may be left to chance.<sup>276</sup>

#### *Philosophy’s Response, Inscrutable Medicine*

“So it is,” she says, referring back to the prisoner’s question and the message of her previous poem, “although all things may seem confused and disordered to you, unable as you are to contemplate this order, nevertheless their own measure (*modus*) directing them towards the good disposes them all” (4, 6, 21). We commented on Philosophy’s use of the word *modus* throughout this prose in Chapter 2 in relation to the poem that follows, 4, VI.<sup>277</sup> We noted that she uses *modus* both for the manner of divine ruling, and for the measure, proper to each thing, that inwardly directs it toward

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<sup>276</sup> Trans. Tester.

<sup>277</sup> See p. 135ff, above.

the good. We also noted that Philosophy associates her treatment of the prisoner with the divine *modus*. When, therefore, the prisoner becomes tired by the prose of this section, and Philosophy responds to his fatigue by prescribing a draught of “the sweetness of song,” the implication is that the poem (*carmen*) that follows is an instance of the divine *modus*, disposing the inward measure of the prisoner. The poem not only expresses the harmony of the divine and human *modes* through the language of desire and love, answering the prisoner’s complaint in the same meter, but also achieves this harmony through its evenly divided repeated beat, as a medicinal song Philosophy herself administers. However, as with the previous poem and prose, though this poem is clearly part of the prisoner’s medicine, to him this is not at all clear.

The final prose of the fourth book, 4, 7, reaches the surprising conclusion that every kind of fortune is good for the virtuous and bad for the wicked. For the virtuous, every kind of fortune is a chance to prove one’s virtue—or, as Philosophy puts it:

You are engaged in bitter mental strife with every kind of fortune, lest ill fortune oppress you or pleasant fortune corrupt . . . For it is placed in your own hands, what kind of fortune you prefer to shape for yourselves . . . (4, 7, 22, Tester).

The following poem, 4, VII, is the final poem of the fourth book. In Chapter 2, we concluded that its meter recollects its earlier instance, which expressed the failure of Nero’s power, while its message admonishes the prisoner to a much greater power: “*Superata tellus / Sidera donat (earth overcome / grants you the stars)*” (4, VII, 34-35, Tester). These final lines initially seems uncharacteristically out of touch with the prisoner’s state. His objection about the visibility of justice results from wanting to understand the temporal world in which he lives, and in which his consolation has occurred—not

abandon it. The poem's principal message, however, is less about transcending the world than it is about persevering in virtue (Odysseus, Agamemnon, Hercules—however strange these neoplatonized examples may seem to us). The poem is therefore more an exhortation to a constancy of purpose than it is to the renunciation of the world. But to what purpose is she exhorting him, and in what must he persevere?

What is clear at this point in the dialogue is that Philosophy's response so far has not answered the prisoner's question in the terms in which it was asked. The problem for the prisoner was not that he doubted God's governance, but that he perceived God's governance as unjust. Philosophy's reply asserts the absolute nature of divine order, despite the paradoxical appearances, and thereby, rather than resolving the prisoner's question, increases its urgency. Not only is human perception inadequate to behold the divine order, but every human act is forced to abide within it. At the end of the fourth book, the prisoner is thus faced with a choice: will he resign himself to a murky reply, forfeiting the answer he sought, or will he press on, risking a still more obliterating answer, but clinging to the conviction that his perception must contain some truth?

#### *Chance, Providence, and Freedom's Collapse*

The dialogue of the fifth book begins with the prisoner's asking about the nature of chance (*casus*). Though Philosophy at first suggests this question is a digression, it soon becomes clear that it emerges from the preceding discussion. In a passage quoted above, Philosophy asserts that divine order is so totally all-encompassing that nothing is "left to chance (*temeritas*)" (4, 6, 3). Because *temeritas* is a

synonym for *casus*, it is evident that the prisoner's question about chance, here at the beginning of the fifth book, is a direct response to Philosophy's uncompromising conclusion. Is there really nothing that falls outside of divine order, not even chance?

Philosophy's answer (which we considered in Chapter 2) reiterates her uncompromising conclusion in more detail. Chance exists only in the sense that differently caused events may be coincident as, for example, when a man digging in a field discovers a treasure buried by another. In short, Philosophy's answer is—no, nothing falls outside of divine order, not even what you call chance. We've already seen that the following poem, 5, 1, sets this answer in poetic form within the context of an exact repetition of the hexameter/pentameter couplet, and thus, as it were, overturns *Fortuna* in her own meter.

With this reply, both in poetry and in prose, to the prisoner's question about chance, Philosophy comes to the end of a series of surprising, totalizing conclusions: even bad fortune is good, even evil falls within providence, and even chance is subject to order. It is this final reply, however, that will bring the argument to a dramatic crisis. For by answering the prisoner's initial complaint—that there was no order in the lives of men—Philosophy asserts a divine order that appears to annihilate all contingency. So completely effective is God's providential order, from the furthest reaches of the cosmos to the tiniest crevices of the human heart, that it seems to undermine any freedom of the will. In response, in a final attempt to preserve some shelter for human agency, the prisoner asks whether any freedom exists for our independent judgment (*nostris arbitrii libertas*), or whether the chain of fate binds the motions of human minds (*animorum*) as well (5, 2, 2).

Philosophy replies that freedom does exist in the activity of rational judgment, such that it increases or decreases by the judgments made: human freedom increases in contemplation of the divine, and is forfeited by choosing earthly things below. But she follows this supposed affirmation of human freedom with a statement that antagonizes the prisoner's concern:

Quae tamen ille ab aeterno cuncta prospiciens  
 providentiae cernit intuitus et suis quaeque meritis  
 praedestinata disponit. (5, 2, 11)

Nevertheless, the gaze of Providence perceives these things, a gaze that from eternity looks out at all things in advance; it assigns to their merits each and every thing that has been predestined for them.

*Philosophy, Poet of the True Sun*

Before the prisoner has the opportunity to respond—and we can well imagine the despair he is waiting to unloose—Philosophy switches into poetry. While the ostensible message of the poem restates the conclusion of her prose—that God sees all—her prelude to this restatement is riveting, and revealing. For the first time in the whole of the *Consolation's* poetry, Philosophy begins to sing in Greek. The first line of her song is also her only quotation in poetry of Homer:

Πάντ' ἔφορᾶν καὶ πάντ' ἑπακούειν  
*puro clarum lumine Phoebum*  
*melliflui canit oris Homerus* (5, II, 1-3)

*That Phoebus shining with pure light*  
*"Sees all and all things hears,"*  
*So Homer sings, he of the honeyed voice; (Tester)*

The first line is a dactylic fragment of a line, and could be taken either from the *Odyssey* or the *Iliad*. If from the *Iliad*, the quotation comes from the preface of a prayer

Agamemnon makes to Zeus,<sup>278</sup> an association that would give this poem a highly elevated beginning. If from the *Odyssey*, the reference would be to an encounter between Odysseus and the all-seeing shade of Teiresias,<sup>279</sup> and the effect would be similar.<sup>280</sup> Here, a long downbeat begins with the accusative object (*Πάντ'*, *all*), which is repeated on another long downbeat, while the transitive verbs fall on either side—*all sees and all hears*. The subject of these Greek verbs is not given until the second line shifts into Latin—*puro clarum lumine Phoebum* (*that with pure light the clear sun*). This line contains a subject, but in accusative form, so the sentence is not complete until the third line—*melliflui canit oris Homerus* (*Homer of the honeyed tongue sings*). The poem's beginning thus emphasizes the comprehensiveness of the sun's gaze many times over—by the loftiness of the dactylic Greek, by its excerption from Homer, by the reminder of the sung character of Homer's words (*canit*), which is further distinguished by his epithet (*honey-tongued*), and finally by delaying the mention of Homer's name until the final word of the sentence. Yet all this loftiness is abruptly overturned with the next line:

*qui tamen intima viscera terrae  
non valet aut pelagi radiorum  
infirma perrumpere luce.* (5, II, 4-6)

*Yet even he, with the light of his rays, too weak,  
Cannot burst through  
To the inmost depths of earth or ocean.* (Tester)

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<sup>278</sup> *Iliad* 3, 276-280.

<sup>279</sup> *Odyssey* 11, 108.

<sup>280</sup> For a discussion of this quotation as an example of inspired poetry in the Procline sense, see Fournier, "Boethius' Consolation and Philosophy's Homer."

The assertion of the total comprehensiveness of the sun's gaze is suddenly denied, and the reverence of the poem's opening is redirected. The sun is overpowered and replaced by another sun—the true one:

*Haud sic magni conditor orbis:  
huic ex alto cuncta tuenti  
nulla terrae mole resistunt,  
non nox atris nubibus obstat  
quae sint, quae fuerint veniantque  
uno mentis cernit in ictu;  
quem quia respicit omnia solus  
verum possis dicere solem.* (5, II, 7-14)

*Not thus the Maker of this great universe:  
Him, viewing all things from his height,  
No mass of earth obstructs,  
No night with black clouds thwarts.  
What is, what has been, and what is to come,  
In one swift mental stab he sees;  
Him, since he only all things sees,  
The true sun could you call.* (Tester)

The sun's power is overpowered by the divine gaze, which sees through the barriers of earth, cloud, and even time. Because the statement of the sun's power is given in a quotation from Homer, the denial of the truth of that statement is therefore an implicit criticism of Homer himself. As the poem continues, it maintains its reverential, dactylic beat, while the four feet per line, and catalectic ending, endow it with a sense of urgency appropriate to the overturning it announces. The phrase *non nox atris nubibus obstat* again takes us back to the early poems of the first book, in which the prisoner's mind is described with these images—clouds obscure his mind, he is lost in darkness, etc. Here the negation of that darkness—*non*—intuitively situates the prisoner's finite knowing in relation to the infinite divine gaze. To this divine vision is ascribed the power to comprehend the totality of time past, present, and future in a line whose

spondaic form and repetitive syntax has an almost incantatory character: *quaē sīnt, quaē fuērīnt vēnīāntquē*.<sup>281</sup> I don't mean to suggest the poem advocates a complete, or even an obvious, rejection of Homer—such could hardly be believed of Boethius, anyway. But it is crafted very precisely to transcend Homer's statement about the sun, and this has the further effect of transcending Homer's poetic vision. And because this implicit critique is given in poetry—in a dactylic meter no less—it also gestures towards a poetry—and, indeed, a poet—adequate to the divine vision described.

*Prayer: the Solus Modus of Divine Grace*

From the prisoner's standpoint, things have gone from bad to worse. For him, Philosophy's assertion, in both poetry and prose, of a comprehensive, atemporal divine vision, obliterates the integrity of human affairs. As he understands it, the necessary certitude of divine knowledge wholly undermines the independence of future, and consequently also of present and past, human actions. This seems to inexorably unravel every aspect of his consolation, as the just ordering of human affairs, which answered his initial complaint, dissolves in the absolutizing divine gaze:

idque omnium videbitur iniquissimum quod nunc  
aequissimum iudicatur, vel puniri improbos vel  
remunerari probos, quos ad alterutrum non propria mittit  
voluntas, sed futuri cogit certa necessitas. Nec vitia igitur  
nec virtutes quicquam fuerint, sed omnium meritorum  
potius mixta atque indiscreta confusio; quoque nihil  
sceleratius excogitari potest, cum ex providentia rerum  
omnis ordo ducatur nihilque consiliis liceat humanis, fit  
ut vitia quoque nostra ad bonorum omnium referantur  
acutorem. (5, 3, 31-32)

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<sup>281</sup> On the possible Homeric provenance of this line, see *Iliad*, 1, 70; Fournier, "Boethius' Consolation and Philosophy's Homer"; and Robert Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist allegorical reading and the growth of the epic tradition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 279.

And that very thing will seem most unjust of all which is now judged most just, that either the wicked are punished or the good rewarded, since they have not been brought by their own wills but driven by the certain necessity of what shall be to one or the other end. And therefore there would be no vices nor virtues, but rather a mixed-up and indistinguishable confusion of all deserts, and—than which nothing more wicked can be conceived!—since the whole ordering of things proceeds from providence and nothing is really possible to human intentions, it follows that even our vices are to be referred to the author of all things good. (Trans. Tester)

We can easily see that the problem the prisoner here describes is one version of a classic philosophical aporia—variously described as the relation of the one and the many, God and creation, divine knowledge and human freedom, etc. The problem does not arise abstractly, however, but in the course of his ascent—and he states the aporia in precisely the terms that undermine his consolation. He sought to know that human affairs were subject to a just order, and though Philosophy has shown that God grants the rewards and punishments appropriate to the actions of each person, her explanation, now taken to its extreme, undermines the integrity of those actions and thus makes a mockery of the justice she asserts.

This, however, according to the prisoner, is not the worst of it; his next words bring the crisis to its climax:

*Igitur nec sperandi aliquid nec deprecandi ulla ratio est; quid enim vel speret quisque vel etiam deprecetur, quando optanda omnia series indeflexa conectit? Auferetur igitur unicum illud inter homines deumque commercium, sperandi scilicet ac deprecandi, si quidem iustae humilitatis pretio inaestimabilem vicem divinae gratiae promeremur; qui solus modus est quo cum deo colloqui homines posse videantur illique inaccessae luci, prius quoque quam impetrent, ipsa supplicandi ratione coniungi. Quae si, recepta futurorum necessitate, nihil virium habere credantur, quid erit quo summo illi rerum*

principi connecti atque adhaerere possimus? Quare necesse erit humanum genus, uti paulo ante cantabas, dissaeptum atque disiunctum suo fonte fatiscere. (5, 3, 33-36)

Therefore: There is no reason to hope for something or to pray for deliverance; for what would a person hope for or even pray to be delivered from if an unbendable sequence weaves together all the things that could be chosen? Therefore: That one and only avenue of exchange between human beings and God will be taken away, the avenue of hope and prayer for deliverance; provided, of course, that for the price of our rightful humility we deserve the return of divine grace, which is beyond price. This is the only way by which human beings seem to be able to speak with God—by an act of supplication—and to be joined to that inapproachable light even before they succeed in attaining it. Once the necessity of future events is accepted, if these hopes and prayers are then believed to have no force, what will there be by which we can be woven together with and cling to that most high ruler of all things? And so it is, just as you were singing a little while ago, that it will necessarily be the case that the human race, separated and “cut off from its source, will burst at the seams.” (Trans. Relihan)

In this impassioned conclusion, the prisoner unexpectedly distills the crisis in religious, theological terms.<sup>282</sup> Though he has already decided that Philosophy’s description of divine knowledge undermines human freedom, and thereby unravels his consolation, when it really comes down to it, he seems almost willing to let this go; for in his final words, with everything at stake, he reveals his deepest, barest, and wholly defining desire: to be one with God. The justice of virtue and vice, the overall integrity and order of human affairs—these suddenly recede as the prisoner lays everything down. In this bare state, faced with the loss of everything, the only thing that matters is

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<sup>282</sup> Christine Mohrmann has shown that the prisoner’s word choices here clearly allude to Christian liturgical texts. On *deprecandi, supplicandi ratione, commercium, iustae humilitas, pretium, vicem, divina gratia*, see Christine Mohrmann, “Some Remarks on the Language of Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae*,” in *Latin Script and Letters, A. D. 400-900: Festschrift presented to Ludwig Bieler on the occasion of his 70th birthday*, ed. John J. O’Meara and Bernd Naumann (Leiden: Brill, 1976), esp. 55-59.

that he be joined with God. For that, the supplication for divine grace, or prayer, has to be possible, for without it there is no way to bridge the distance between him and God. Supplication, the prisoner maintains, is the only means (*solus modus*) through which we are able to converse (*colloqui*) with God and to be joined (*coniungi*) with him.

The question of prayer is evidently related to the other problems the prisoner raises as resulting from divine foreknowledge. For prayer depends on the integrity of human freedom as much as do the intrinsic rewards of virtue and punishments of vice. But by reducing the problem of foreknowledge to its effect on prayer, the prisoner has shifted the terms and priorities of the argument, demanding an answer to the problem specifically in terms of the mediation between God and humankind. Philosophy must not only restore the integrity of human freedom, but must also restore the supplicating conversation that makes it possible for people to be connected (*conecti, adhaerere*) to the highest principle of all things.

This shift in the terms of the crisis reveals a profound development in the prisoner's view of himself and of the end he seeks. No longer can he be satisfied with the revelation of worldly order, for he now knows that the infinite, transcendent good alone can satisfy him. And yet, he also no longer desires simple escape from the world of time and change, for he is now unable to imagine any happiness that denies his life in the temporal world. To state the problem in terms of prayer is to ask for a way between these—to live his temporal freedom in an activity that mediates the infinite good: not to be freed from the need for prayer, but to know the grace of supplication.

To summarize, then: the argument comes to a crisis that threatens to undo its consolation. The prisoner then reduces this crisis to its consequences for mediation

between God and humankind; this he further reduces to the one activity that provides this mediation, until the entirety of his consolation depends on whether Philosophy is able to show supplication is possible, and that prayer is real.

*Rhythm Remembered, Harmony Regained*

The poem that follows this dramatic assessment is 4, III, an anapaestic dimeter that we examined at length in Chapter 2. It is the prisoner's final poem, and his only poem after the first book. He introduces it with a paraphrase from Philosophy's last anapaestic dimeter, as it is the harmony of that poem, a harmony of divine and human modes achieved by desire and love, which is now threatened. In Chapter 2, we observed that rather than assert the collapse of this harmony, however, the prisoner surprisingly turns his gaze inward, speculating that the contradiction lies in the nature of his own knowing, rather than in an actual opposition between freedom and providence. This humble, poetic speculation comes as quite a surprise, following as it does the prisoner's impassioned assertion of the impossibility of prayer, and of the total collapse of human affairs. Despite the crisis of the argument, as soon as he enters into poetry, he seems suddenly disposed to assert Philosophy's harmony rather than counter it. He withdraws from the precipice, and even proposes a solution to the contradiction. In Chapter 2, we suggested this change in the prisoner's disposition is caused, at least in part, by the pattern established through the repetition of the anapaestic dimeters. By quoting from her last poem in that meter, the prisoner recollects this pattern and places his poem within it.

The precise order of these events is curious, however, and so it merits a closer look: the prisoner forcefully asserts the opposition in the argument and the imminent collapse it portends; without pausing, he concludes this assertion of collapse with a paraphrased quotation from one of Philosophy's poems; he then delivers a poem that is of an entirely different character than that of his immediately preceding words. His tone suddenly softens, and within a few lines of the poem's beginning he begins to wonder if maybe "these two truths" are not opposed. By the poem's end, he has all but retracted his assertion of imminent collapse.

There is, then, a marked change in both what the prisoner says, and how he says it. And yet, the closer we look at this scene, the less there seems to outwardly account for this change—Philosophy has not spoken or intervened in any way, and there is nothing about the prisoner's argument that seems to contain the seeds of this sudden reversal; he admits of no inaccuracy in his reasoning, and acknowledges no objection. The only peculiar moment that precedes his change in tone and viewpoint is his paraphrased quotation of the line of Philosophy's earlier poem. It is the only time a poem is preceded by a quotation of another poem, and the fact that the quotation is from a poem in the same meter as the poem he now delivers, makes the quotation more peculiar still. When he quotes her, the prisoner doesn't seem to have any intention of changing his tone or argument. The quotation seems little more than a rhetorical flourish; that is, it is rhetorically effective to show the collapse of Philosophy's harmony by paraphrasing her own statement of this harmony.<sup>283</sup>

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<sup>283</sup> The urgency of the prisoner's argument—and thus, of his rhetoric—also accounts for his slight modification of *Philosophy's* words. "But whereas at IV, m6,43 the quoted words were couched in the apodosis of weak condition, at V, 3,36 Boethius takes the hypothesis as conclusive – immediate and threatening." Magee, "Boethius' Anapestic Dimeters," 166.

This quotation, however, seems to have a power of its own. For the recollection of those few words recollects the rest of the poem, too—its equally divided sound, the harmony Philosophy sings throughout it—and suddenly the prisoner is echoing its sound, and then its harmony, too. So while it is tempting to say that he recalls her poem and consciously, intentionally, continues the pattern of its meter's occurrence, it seems truer to the chronology of the narrative to say that he recalls her poem and this recollection exerts a force of its own, so that it is less the prisoner who brings about the repetition, than it is the pattern that repeats itself. By quoting from Philosophy's poem, the prisoner has invoked a repetition whose power he does not wholly control; and the pattern, once invoked, shapes the prisoner to its design. Strange as it may sound, it is the recollected quotation, rather than the prisoner, that seems to bring about the poem.

What brought those few words from Philosophy's poem to the prisoner's mind and voice in the first place is unclear—perhaps it was the prospect of losing the harmony that earlier poem portrays—but what we can say for certain is that the speaking of those quoted words initially seems to confirm the argument he has just made, when in fact it marks the beginning of a counter speculation, and a total change in tone. It can hardly be accidental that 1) this is the only quotation of an earlier poem preceding another poem; 2) that this quotation is from a poem in the same meter as the one it precedes; 3) that this unique quotation should occur at the statement of the argument's climactic tension; 4) that within a few moments of this quotation, the prisoner's tone and message are dramatically different; 5) that the poem that follows this quotation be a) the only of the prisoner's poems beyond the first book; b) his only

repetition of a poem's meter and c) the final repetition in a series of four anapaestic dimeters; and finally 6) that this prose and poem are practically the final time the prisoner really speaks (for the remainder of the text he says "*minime*" three times and on one of these occasions adds only a few words to clarify he has understood). All of these indicate a moment of singular importance within the text, and particularly within the acoustic system of rhythmic repetition. Whether we interpret the prisoner's use of anapaestic dimeter as a conscious continuation of the metric pattern, or whether we see him as compelled into the meter by the force of his recollection; in either case, he has internalized the pattern and continues it from within.<sup>284</sup>

As we noted in Chapter 2, in this poem the prisoner bares himself to the crisis the argument has encountered. Instead of looking externally, he turns inward, asking whether the problem might lie in the nature of his own knowing. He delves into the intermediate character of human knowing, at once between absence and presence, knowing and ignorance. This reflection leads the prisoner to the intuition that the mind retains "the whole" and recovers the "forgotten" particulars in relation to it. He says:

*sed quam retinens meminit summam  
consulit alte visa retractans,  
ut servatis queat oblitas  
addere partes. (5, III, 28-31)*

*But the whole he keeps, remembers and reflects on,  
All from that height perceived goes over once again,  
That he might to those things he has preserved  
Add the forgotten parts. (Tester)*

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<sup>284</sup> How to interpret, particularly in relation to the pattern as a whole, the fact that the prisoner also speaks the first of these four poems, is treated in Chapter 2.

As we observed in Chapter 2, rather than abandon his discursive manner of knowing—even though its integrity appears threatened by the argument—he turns it upon itself, and finds it inwardly constituted to reveal the unity on which it depends. This intuition anticipates Philosophy’s resolution of the problem, which we’ll come to in a moment. But this intuitive statement of the intermediate character of human knowing now has an additional resonance for us because it is framed in the language of memory. The prisoner here states that memory is the means of interpreting the particulars of experience—a point we made in the previous chapter in our discussion of repetition and recollection. It is more than a little interesting that he offers this account of cognition-by-memory in a poem whose sound and message recall an earlier meter after he has quite literally recollected (by quoting) an earlier poem of that sound. He is, therefore, meditating on the act of recollection in which he is engaged at that very moment; that is, he is actively grasping a particular, both intellectually and rhythmically, by means of the whole held within.

*Knower and the Known*

As the prisoner begins to intuit something of her forthcoming answer, Philosophy now turns to deal with the problem directly. She says the foreknowledge problem is an “old complaint” that has “so far been by no means sufficiently carefully or steadfastly developed by any of you” (4, 1, 1, Tester). She explains:

Cuius caliginis causa est quod humanae ratiocinationis motus ad divinae praescientiae simplicitatem non potest admoveri; quae si ullo modo cogitari queat, nihil prorsus relinquetur ambigui. (5, 4, 2)

The cause of this obscurity is that the movement of human reasoning cannot approach the simplicity of divine foreknowledge; if that could by any means be conceived, no doubt whatever will remain. (Tester)

By using the word *caligo* to describe the inadequacy of past attempts at the problem, Philosophy again evokes the whole history of her diagnosis and treatment of the prisoner, as it was to dispel the *caligo* of false ideas that she began her gentler medicines.<sup>285</sup> In this sense, the whole of his consolation has been about the restoration of his vision. The imagery of her statement thus simultaneously places her answer as a moment in her treatment of the prisoner's sight, and makes that sight relative to the divine vision, in much the same way as her previous poem, in which Homer's sun (and Homer's poetry) was transcended by the divine vision (and Philosophy's poetry).

She begins her explanation by first clarifying that the opposition between freedom and providence is primarily with regard to future contingent events. With regard to present events, the prisoner acknowledges that they are decided freely even though if they are "seen to occur" in the present. Only future events that have no prior necessity, and that are decided solely by the freedom of the will, seem to be undermined by the divine gaze. How can something be decided freely, contingently, in the future, if its outcome is already known in the present? Or, to put it the other way around, how could God have knowledge of something that isn't necessary, that is, that might not happen? According to Philosophy, this statement of the problem is rooted in the view that error results from not knowing a thing as it is. And this view, she says, rests on the false assumption that knowledge is limited by the object known. She explains:

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<sup>285</sup> Cf. 1, 6, 21.

Cuius erroris causa est quod omnia quae quisque novit ex ipsorum tantum vi atque natura cognosci aestimat quae sciuntur. Quod totum contra est: omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui vim, sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem. (5, 4, 24-25)

The cause of this mistake is that each thinks that all that he knows is known simply by the power and nature of those things that are known. Which is altogether otherwise: for everything which is known is grasped not according to its own power but rather according to the capability of those who know it. (Tester)

Though we glanced briefly at this cognitional principle in Chapter 2, we're now better situated to see it within the *Consolation* as a whole, and to consider what it might mean for its rhythmic system in particular. As we shall see, Philosophy's explanation of this principle reveals the theological and psychological principles that underlie the whole of her consolation.

To begin with, it is significant that Philosophy continues her explanation of knowledge-according-to-knower with an example taken from the senses.

Nam ut hoc brevi liqueat exemplo, eandem corporis rotunditatem aliter visus aliter tactus agnoscit; ille eminus manens totum simul iactis radiis intuetur, hic vero cohaerens orbi atque coniunctus circa ipsum motus ambitum rotunditatem partibus comprehendit. (5, 4, 26)

For—that this may become clear by a brief example—the same roundness of a body sight recognizes in one way and touch in another; the former sense remaining at a distance looks at the whole at once by the light of its emitted rays, while the latter, being united and conjoined to the round body, going right round its circuit, grasps the roundness by parts. (Tester)

This example, taken from the senses, is immediate, and incontestable. Everyone is utterly familiar with how an object is perceived differently, yet simultaneously, by the

various senses. And yet, because the example is an imagined one—there is no round object specified or mentioned as present to the prisoner—and because it serves as a matter for rational and intellectual comprehension, Philosophy’s example engages all four levels of the prisoner’s knowing. She then proceeds to connect these four levels to the cognitional formula:

Ipsum quoque hominem aliter sensus, aliter imaginatio, aliter ratio, aliter intellegentia contuetur. Sensus enim figuram in subiecta materia constitutam, imaginatio vero solam sine materia iudicat figuram; ratio vero hanc quoque transcendit speciemque ipsam, quae singularibus inest, universali consideratione perpendit. Intellegentiae vero celsior oculus existit; supergressa namque universitatis ambitum, ipsam illam simplicem formam pura mentis acie contuetur. (5, 4, 27-30)

Man himself also, sense, imagination, reason, and intelligence look at in different ways. For sense examines the shape set in the underlying matter; imagination the shape alone without the matter; while reason surpasses this too, and examines with a universal consideration the specific form itself, which is present in single individuals. But the eye of intelligence is set higher still; for passing beyond the process of going round the one whole, it looks with the pure sight of the mind at the simple Form itself.

Philosophy here distinguishes the various levels of human cognition, a distinction that will be crucial to her resolution of the apparent opposition of divine providence and human freedom. It is worth noting, however, that the grammatical form of this sentence is rather curious: while the levels of cognition are those of the human being, it is also the human being that is their object (*ipsum . . . hominem . . . sensus . . . imaginatio . . . ratio . . . intellegentia contuetur*). This curious grammatical subtlety gives a self-reflexive character to the distinction Philosophy is making: she could easily have kept

the previous example of the round object, but instead she keeps the prisoner's gaze focused on the nature of his own knowing.

Making this distinction is only the first stage in Philosophy's resolution of the problem. She proceeds to show that "the greatest consideration is to be given to this: for the higher power of comprehension embraces the lower, while the lower in no way rises to the higher" (5, 4, 31, Tester). Although sense knows nothing but the sensible object, every higher power includes the insight of the lower levels of knowing according to its own manner. The highest of these, intellect, "knows (*cognoscit*) reason's universal, and the imagination's shape, and what is materially sensible, but without using reason, imagination or the senses, but by one stroke of the mind" (5, 4, 33, Tester). And though Philosophy maintains that the lower levels cannot attain the knowledge of the higher ones, she nonetheless acknowledges that the higher levels, at least in the human being, do somehow depend on the lower ones. Imagination, for example, takes its "beginning of seeing and forming shapes from the senses" (5, 4, 37, Tester).

Philosophy's cognitive explanation accomplishes several things. First, it relativizes knowledge according to the subject's means of cognition. Second, it distinguishes four, simultaneously active, levels of knowing within the human being. Third, it shows a hierarchical development in these levels, in which the higher includes the lower while it also depends on it for its actualization. And, for reasons that are yet unexplained, Philosophy consistently makes the human being both the object and subject of her analysis.

*Prayer and the Personality*

We should pause here to see how Philosophy's explanation so far bears upon the prisoner's question. Though she has not yet shown how this cognitional principle will resolve the crisis apparently caused by divine knowledge; by distinguishing the levels of human cognition, and by simultaneously making the human being their object, Philosophy has disclosed the psychological frame that underlies her method. Each of these levels has its place within the course of her treatment. From her wiping away the prisoner's tears, singing and speaking to him, and smiling at him (sense), to her use of images and memories (imagination), to her extensive use of dialectic and logic (reason) and to her intimations (soon to be realized) of a unitary comprehension (intellect), each of the levels of cognition is engaged by Philosophy's medicines.

It is not only the distinction of the levels that we see clearly in retrospect, however, but the relation between them as well. It is already plainly obvious how the higher levels include the lower—but we can also now grasp how the activity of each lower level leads to the realization, or awakening, of the higher ones as well. The restoration of the prisoner's sense of sight, for example, allows him to recognize his teacher by means of his imagination. The activity of his imagination throughout the early books, which rely heavily on poetic imagery, in turn awakens the possibility of an abstract, rational grasp of the very same matters that were earlier treated imaginatively. Because reason is self-reflective, the moment of its turn is a conscious one. In the prose preceding 3, IX, reason recognizes the limitation of its discursive character, that is, that its temporal, divided approach can never be adequate to the good it seeks, and accordingly turns in prayer to the unity it desires, asking for the

grace of a higher vision.<sup>286</sup> The activity of each lower level awakens the activity of the next level above.

It thus begins to emerge why the prisoner framed the opposition between freedom and providence in the religious language of prayer. While his assertion, that prayer is the only means of being united with God, is most directly understood in terms of reason's prayer at 3, IX, we can now discern a kind of prayer, a conversion upward, throughout the whole personality. The restoration of sense awakens imagination, and likewise the activity of imagination awakens reason, and reason, in turn, awakens intellect. The activity of each level of knowing is, in this sense, a kind of prayer, a desiring of return, or conversion, to the unity above. It is not only reason that seeks to be one with God, but the person as a whole, and each aspect of the person has an activity that seeks that perfect good, that beseeches that good, in its own way. In this sense, the language of prayer may be applied to every level of the human soul.<sup>287</sup>

Placing the whole of the prisoner's ascent in the context of Philosophy's distinction and relation of the levels of knowing raises the stakes in the opposition of human freedom and divine providence. It is not merely virtue and vice, or an order to human affairs generally conceived, that divine providence appears to undermine, but every activity of the whole person, so that the divine vision seems to destroy the integrity of the very personality Philosophy has restored. The opposition of foreknowledge and freedom is thus not simply the crisis to which the *Consolation's* argument leads: retrospectively, it also undermines the argument as a whole, and each

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<sup>286</sup> On the necessity of prayer to bridge the "gulf between *ratio* and *intellegentia*," see Magee, *Boethius on Signification and Mind*, 142-149.

<sup>287</sup> For a more thorough account of the personality as prayer with regard to the argument of the *Consolation*, see my "Philosophia's Dress: Prayer in Boethius' *Consolation of Philosophy*," *Dionysius XX* (2000): 139-52.

of Philosophy's methods, in particular. That the argument's critical tension pervades its whole method, and thus also the whole of the prisoner, perhaps points towards the reason why (at 5, 4, 27) Philosophy makes the human both object, and subject, of the levels of cognition she describes. Though the principle of cognition is universal, it is by, and in, the prisoner in particular, that it must be understood.

5, IV, the poem that follows Philosophy's cognitive distinctions, is the penultimate poem of the work, the final of the glyconic meters, which we examined in detail in Chapter 2, and mentioned again in Chapter 3.<sup>288</sup> It contains Philosophy's account of the relation between the senses and the mind, and as such, is a further elucidation of the cognitive theory she has just outlined in the previous prose. She claims that the mind's active power must be preceded, or awakened, by the living experience of the body (*vivo in corpore passio*). She gives particular examples of bodily mediation (light and sound) in the course of this explanation. We noted in Chapter 2 that it is appropriate that she give this poetic explanation of mind's dependence on the body in the last of her exact repetitions of metric sound; that is, that she would make use of a sound that precisely awakens a series of similar sounds, whose pattern the mind has already internally grasped, to describe how sound awakens forms within the mind. It is also significant that she would use the technical terminology of the impressions of sense on the memory (*passio*) to continue the patterns the instance recollects. The poem, therefore, like its preceding prose, enacts a unity of its object and subject, and speaks to the soul it speaks about.

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<sup>288</sup> See p. 197ff.

Philosophy begins the following prose, 5, 5 (the second last of the text) by distinguishing the levels of knowledge according to different living substances: sense alone belongs to unmoving living things; imagination to beasts that move; reason to humankind; and intelligence to the divine alone. She then emphasizes the hierarchy of these levels by imagining a mutiny of the lower against the higher. Imagine, she asks, that sense and imagination, talking amongst themselves, attempted to dismiss reason's universal. We who possess reason, as well as sense and imagination, she says, would judge in favor of reason as a higher and more firm and perfect judgment, one that also comprehends—albeit in their universality—the objects of sense and imagination. By first distinguishing the levels of knowing according to various beings, and then by staging this imagined mutiny in which reason's knowledge is self-evidently superior, Philosophy has prepared the prisoner, unbeknownst to him, to accept the still greater superiority of divine knowledge. She has implicitly raised the possibility that the prisoner's rational grasp of the problem is not the highest one. The conclusion of the argument will follow easily: reason is mistaken to think that the divine intellect sees future contingent events in the same way as it (reason) does. It is a significant philosophical resolution of the problem, and we will consider it in more depth below. Nonetheless, it is still not a sufficient answer to the prisoner's original question, which sought to know not merely *that* things are ordered, but also *how*. If Philosophy is to fully answer the prisoner's question, if she is to truly console him, she will have to show him how the divine intellect sees.

*Time, Eternity, and Rhythmic Mediation*

Because the lower levels cannot reach to the knowledge of the higher ones, the argument can move no further on the basis of reason alone. Without some glimpse of the highest form of knowledge, the opposition cannot be undone. But how is the prisoner to gain the divine perspective? Philosophy herself mediates this cognitive gift:

Quare in illius summae intellegentiae cacumen, si possumus, erigamur: illic enim ratio videbit quod in se non potest intueri; id autem est, quonam modo etiam quae certos exitus non habent certa tamen videat ac definita praenotio; neque id sit opinio, sed summae potius scientiae nullis terminis inclusa simplicitas. (5, 5, 12)

Wherefore let us be raised up, if we can, to the height of that highest intelligence; for there reason will see that which she cannot look at in herself, and that is, in what way even those things which have no certain occurrence a certain and definite foreknowledge yet does see, neither is that opinion, but rather the simplicity, shut in by no bounds, of the highest knowledge. (Tester)

Philosophy suggests the possibility of being raised from the temporal division of reason to the unitary glimpse of the divine. How, though, can this happen in the dialogue, within the realm of human speech, and within the limits of temporal thinking?

Philosophy's next words move immediately into the *Consolation's* final poem, 5, V. Where we might expect a mediating poem of obvious importance, however, something like the hymn at 3, IX, in which reason prayed to the divine unity beyond itself, 5, V initially appears unremarkable, a routine restatement of the message of the prose. Philosophy describes the different kinds of beasts that traverse the earth, noting in particular the relative mobility of each one. Some "are long in body and sweep the

dust” (line 1); others fly, while others still “delight to press their footprints in the ground” (line 6). Despite their differences, Philosophy says all these share a single trait:

*Quaē vārīs vīdēās licēt ōmniā dīscrēpārē fōrmīs,  
Prōnā tāēmēn fāciēs hēbētēs vālēt īngrāvārē sēnsūs; (5, V, 8-9)*

*And all these, though you see they differ in their various forms  
Yet their downturned faces make their senses heavy grow and dull. (Tester)*

Or Relihan:

*Though you may witness in these many shapes and forms nothing but  
discordance,  
Theirs is the downcast countenance, capable of weighing down dull senses.*

Against this uniting similarity of other earthly creatures, Philosophy continues:

*Ūnicā gēns hōmīnūm cēlsūm lēvāt āltiūs cācūmēn,  
Ātquē lēvīs rēctō stāt cōrpōrē dēspīcītquē tērrās. (5, V, 10-11)*

*Nót so the ráce óf mórtál mén, who can lift their úpraised héads high,  
Stánd with bódy upríght and impónderous, loók to eárrth belów them.*

Having drawn the distinction, Philosophy concludes with an exhortation:

*Haēc, nīsi tērrēnūs mālē dēsīpīs, ādmōnēt fīgūrā:  
quī rēctō caēlūm vūltū pētīs ēxsērīsquē frōntēm,  
īn sūblīmē fērās ānimūm quōquē, nē grāvātā pēssūm  
īnfērīōr sīdāt mēns cōrpōrē cēlsīūs lēvātō. (5, V,12-15)*

*Bé not a créature of eárrth! Be not ígnorant! The pósture thús remínds you:  
Yóu whó reách for the héights with your úpturned gaze, póinting fáce to héaven,  
Yóu must lift spírīt as wéll to such áltitude—mínd must nó be weíghed down,  
Múst nó sínk down belów where the bódy is, ráised to hígher státurē.*

Philosophy describes the different kinds of movement and bodily shapes of earthly animals in order to assert that humankind alone has a body whose head points to the heavens. With this physical reminder of his species’ unique status, Philosophy encourages the prisoner to “bear his mind aloft.”<sup>289</sup> The poem’s meter is appropriate to this message. Each line begins with an epic sound (dactylic tetrameter catalectic, -- uu |

<sup>289</sup> 5, VI, 14, Tester (slightly modified).

-- uu | -- uu | -- u u) that suits the loftiness of her exhortation, and then shifts to an enlivening few syllables (ithyphallic, -- u -- u -- --.) that suit the poem's enlivening aim. At first reading, then, while the message and meter have a unity of purpose, the subject of the poem is less elevated than 3, IX. There is no address to God, no theoretical meditation on creation, cosmic return, or divine knowledge. In fact, the poem's imagery is entirely earthly, and so graphically earthly, that it seems out of place in what should be a climactic moment of transcendent vision. At the moment we expect the prisoner is to be lifted to the divine, Philosophy strangely begins a poem describing a worm that pulls himself on his belly through the dust. Though the earthly examples are admittedly in service of drawing a distinction between the beasts of the earth and the prisoner's higher nature, they still seem drastically out of place if we are expecting a glimpse of the divine perspective.

But there is more to this poem than initially appears. To begin with, the description of the various shapes of animals, with their respective kinds of mobility, is a metaphor for the different levels of knowing (some burrow through the earth, others walk upon it, and others fly above it). Curiously, even when Philosophy begins to describe the uniqueness of humankind, she does so on the basis of the human physical form, the only animal form (she says) that points towards the heavens. Physical form is therefore a metaphor for the kind of knowledge possessed. Humankind alone simultaneously walks on the earth while seeking the sky (*caelum*) above.<sup>290</sup> The metaphorical life of the poem thus illustrates the different levels of knowing. This metaphorical description also simultaneously engages the levels of knowing it

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<sup>290</sup> Here *caelum* must be taken as a metaphor for the immaterial; otherwise, the comparison makes little sense next to the mention of birds that leave the earth when they fly.

describes, insofar as grasping the metaphorical significance of an aural description of a physical being relies on sense, imagination, and reason. By keeping to plain, physical imagery, Philosophy keeps the prisoner's whole personality actively engaged. The meter, meanwhile, acoustically underlines the poem's exhortation, as the dactylic sound distills the metaphorical sense of the images, while the quick moving ithyphallic suggests the possibility of transcending these altogether.<sup>291</sup>

At the beginning of the final prose (5, 6), Philosophy returns to the promise of seeing as God sees. Because knowledge is according to knower, in order to describe the nature of God's knowledge, she must first describe the divine nature.

Deum igitur aeternum esse cunctorum ratione degentium commune iudicium est. Quid si aeternitas consideremus; haec enim nobis naturam pariter divinam scientiamque patefacit. Aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfect possessio . . . (5, 6, 2-4)<sup>292</sup>

That God is eternal is the common judgment of all who live by reason. Therefore let us consider what eternity is; this will make clear to us both the divine nature and the divine knowledge. Eternity is the complete, perfect, and endless possession of life. (Trans. mine)

The nature of God's eternal life, Philosophy says, becomes clearer in relation to temporal things. For whatever lives in time proceeds in the present from past to future and therefore "there is nothing established in time which can embrace the whole space of its life equally, but tomorrow surely it does not yet grasp, while yesterday it has already lost" (5, 6, 5, Tester). In daily life, Philosophy tells the prisoner, "you live no more than that moving and transitory moment" (5, 6, 5, Tester) [*in hodierna quoque vita*

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<sup>291</sup> The poem's meter is notated: -- uu | -- uu | -- uu | -- u u || -- u -- u -- --.

<sup>292</sup> Citing this definition, Albrecht writes: "[Boethius'] . . . definitions, with their wide, artfully structured hyperbata possess a mathematical beauty of their own." Albrecht and Schmeling, *A History of Roman Literature*, 1722.

*non amplius vivitis quam in illo mobili transitorioque momento*]. Only that which possesses its whole life completely and simultaneously is truly eternal; it must both “always be present to itself, possessing itself in the present, and hold as present the infinity of moving time” (5, 6, 8, Tester) [*et sui compos praesens sibi semper adsistere et infinitatem mobilis temporis habere praesentem*].

Anything subject to the conditions of time cannot equal the present possession of the eternal. Temporal things fall (*deficit*) from immobility into motion and from the simplicity of the divine into the infinite quantity of future and past. Nevertheless, Philosophy says, temporal life does imitate the immobile, infinite present of the divine. It binds itself (*alligans se*) to the present; because it does not cease to move, this (ever-present) present becomes an image of the eternal divine one. Time is thus the means by which temporal beings are able to embrace in movement what they cannot, by their nature, embrace by remaining unmoved (*permanendo*). And therefore—human memory is an analogue for divine being.

Only one further step is required for Philosophy to resolve the tension between human freedom and divine providence. Because God’s knowledge must be one with God’s nature, God’s nature, too, is eternal, complete, and simultaneous. This final step exposes the misunderstanding that lies at the root of the tension: God’s knowledge is not subject to the temporal restraints of human freedom. Our future actions are future only in respect to the conditions of our temporal lives, but to God they are eternally present. Thus, with respect to God’s atemporal knowledge of them, they are necessary, but with respect to us, they are entirely free. The difficulty in grasping this solution is that it attempts to bridge time and eternity, reason and intellect. Reason must suspend

its grasp on temporality in order glimpse the divine simplicity. This is, indeed, what Philosophy had said they must do—“if we can, let us be lifted up . . .” (5, 5, 12). But then, after saying this, she gives an altogether earthly poem (considered above) and then resumes in this final prose her temporal, rational reflection. So where is the moment of being lifted up? Where is the mediation Philosophy intimated was about to take place?

As I argued in Chapter 3, the meter of the intervening poem (5, V, the *Consolation*'s final poem) has a unique characteristic that is not audible when considered only in relation to itself: that is, its order of syllables is designed so that every line contains at least one substantial rhythmic segment of every line of every other poem of the *Consolation*. Each repetition of the meter throughout the poem recollects—and thus collects—the entirety of poetic speech in the dialogue. This poem gathers into itself, as a kind of universal, the particulars of past poetry, distilling past into present, so the whole of the prisoner's past collapses into the circular now of each repeated line. The rhythm's recurrence thus mediates a kind of temporal escape from time, as this comprehensive repetition becomes a temporal enactment of God's eternal present. This poem, despite its deceiving earthiness, is the mediation—the lifting up to glimpse the divine perspective—that we are expecting it to be.

*The Divine Gaze, All Sustaining*

The following prose, which contains the final words of the *Consolation*, unfolds the theology of this mediation. Philosophy's explanation of the difference between divine and human knowledge does more than dissolve the tension between freedom

and providence: it also radically relativizes the whole movement of the prisoner's consolation. Up until this point, the prisoner's gaze seems to be the primary one. Within moments of her arrival, Philosophy touches the prisoner's eyes and restores his vision. This physical, visual restoration is an apt metaphor for the remainder of her medicines, too, aimed as they are at the other levels of the prisoner's knowing. These also are restorations, a kind of clearing of vision, appropriate to the manner of knowing at hand. The sway of his passions is calmed, his imagination both formed and emboldened, his reason awakened and refined. Even in the penultimate prose, Philosophy intimates he will be lifted to see as God sees. At each stage and at every moment, the physician sets her hands to the healing of the prisoner's sight.

In the final prose, however, this prisoner-centric movement is transcended as she gives him a glimpse of the divine gaze. Just as reason includes imagination and sense, so the divine intellect includes everything below it. But here the comparison falters, because God is not an individuated substance as a human being is, but rather—as the prisoner now glimpses—the first and last, the origin and end of all things. Even to glimpse the divine vision is, therefore, to know that it contains all that was, and is, and is to come; and specifically, all that the prisoner was, and is, and will be; and more specifically still, to see that every word and gesture of his consolation, is comprehended by the divine gaze on which all else depends. In the theology of the *Consolation*, divine vision does not destroy the freedom of the human person, but rather enfolds and sustains it at every level: sense, imagination, reason, and intellect.

It is from this theological standpoint that we must consider Philosophy's final words:

Quae cum ita sint, manet intemerata mortalibus arbitrii libertas nec iniquae leges solutis omni necessitate voluntatibus praemia poenasque proponunt. Manet etiam spectator desuper cunctorum praescius deus visionisque eius praesens semper aeternitas cum nostrorum actuum futura qualitate concurrat, bonis praemia malis supplicia dispensans. Nec frustra sunt in deo positae spes precesque, quae, cum rectae sunt, inefficaces esse non possunt. Aversamini igitur vitia, colite virtutes, ad rectas spes animum sublevate, humiles preces in excelsa porrigite. Magna vobis est, si dissimulare non vultis, necessitas indicta probitatis, cum ante oculos agitis iudicis cuncta cernetis. (5, 6, 44-4)

These things being so, the freedom of the will remains to mortals, inviolate, nor are laws proposing rewards and punishments for wills free from all necessity unjust. There remains also as an observer from on high foreknowing all things, God, and the always present eternity of his sight runs along with the future quality of our actions dispensing rewards for the good and punishments for the wicked. Nor vainly are our hopes placed in God, nor our prayers, which when they are right cannot be ineffectual. Turn away then from vices, cultivate virtues, lift up your mind to righteous hopes, offer up humble prayers to heaven. A great necessity is solemnly ordained for you if you do not want to deceive yourselves, to do good, when you act before the eyes of a judge who sees all things. (Trans. Tester)

The eyes (*oculi*) of God (*spectator*) see (*cerneo*) all (*cuncta*). For us, it may be difficult not to read these lines through the narrow scope of guilt-focused mores, as though Philosophy's message is to be good or else God's judgment will externally mete out punishment. But judgment, in the sense of this passage, is simply the application of what has been said about God's knowledge to his will. In the unity of the divine essence, there can be no difference between knowledge and will, between *iudex* and *spectator*, but in the human temporal perception these logical separations are described as discrete activities. In Philosophy's account, God's judgment can no more be external to

our actions than God's knowing is to our knowledge. God's vision (as *spectator*) encompasses and, indeed, sustains, all—while God's judgment assures that each act of the human will is assured the ontological status, that is, the reward or punishment, its action contains. This is a restatement, from the divine side, of the assertion Philosophy made above—that the human is more, or less, free, depending on the choices made. From the human standpoint, the divine vision enables the divine judgment, while in God these are one and the same. Paradoxically, the necessity inherent in God's knowledge upholds, rather than undermines, human freedom. The integrity of virtue and vice, and of the whole order that seemed about to collapse, is restored.

Philosophy has also not forgotten the urgency with which the prisoner reduced the argument's crisis to the question of prayer. Without the mediation of prayer, no supplicating conversation is possible, and there is no means of grace to be joined with God. And so she returns, in these final words, to assure him that the divine vision upholds human agency and in particular the efficacy of prayer. In a broad sense, this amounts to a reaffirmation of the integrity of the whole personality, an affirmation of the intrinsic movement towards conversion that is the activity of each of its levels. Taken more literally, though, prayer is about spoken words—spoken words which, according to the prisoner, mediate union with God. This kind of prayer, the one that emerges from within rational activity as a means of beseeching the unity above, as did the prayer of 3, IX, is now restored by the very divine vision that once appeared to be its undoing.

The prisoner's complaint has been answered and his temporal life affirmed. But paradoxically, at this moment of resolution, the prisoner himself all but disappears. He

says little in the final chapters and gives no response to Philosophy's concluding poem and says almost nothing in the final prose. If the *Consolation* begins by so vividly describing the prisoner that the narrator's voice is the prisoner's own, at its end, the situation is reversed—the prisoner seems absent, and the narrator's voice merges with Philosophy's. We now turn, in the final section of this chapter, to consider what the fifth book signifies by the difference, and relation, between the prisoner of the narrative and the narrator.

#### SILENCE AND SOUND: THE NARRATIVE AND THE NARRATOR

As I suggested at this chapter's beginning, the recounted character of the *Consolation* makes repetition both the means of the text's existence, and the method by which its consolation—for the prisoner and the reader alike—can be received. The reader and the prisoner have, as it were, parallel spiritual exercises—the prisoner meditates by the repetition of narration, and the reader by the repetition of rereading. By the meditation of this chapter, particularly on the *Consolation's* fifth book, we have grasped more explicitly the work's underlying principles: its conceptions of the human soul and of the divine activity, and of how the figure of Philosophy, with her multi-layered medicines, mediates between these. These theoretical standpoints are also part of Philosophy's medicine, but their relation to the rest of the text is grasped only by meditation. The repeated narration, or rereading, of the text as a whole is therefore necessary to the consolation it intends to provide; temporal repetition enacts Philosophy's therapy, while it also discloses the theoretical standpoint upon which it depends.

The necessity of this repeated engagement is emphasized by the distinction between the prisoner who undergoes the consolation at the time it happens, and the one who narrates this at the distance of time and reflection. Many aspects of Philosophy's medicine are clearly intended for the prisoner in the immediacy of his grief—Philosophy's touch, her honeyed rhetoric and song, the imagery of her poetry, and those rhythms with an immediate effect or purpose. The prisoner explicitly acknowledges the restorative effect of many of these. Other aspects of the text are less evident, and emerge only with repeated meditation as, for example, the interwoven system of rhythmic repetition, or the implications of the discourse of Book 5 for the consolation as a whole. But while it is useful to speculate about the difference between the immediately and meditatively effective moments of the text, it is problematic to treat these as different from each other—as every moment is intended both for immediate consolation and for the meditative ascent. Philosophy's healing touch, at the beginning of Book 1, for example, is both an immediate consolation and a matter for theological reflection. Likewise, the rhythms always have an immediate purpose, but reflection upon them reveals both a complex interaction among them, as well as the systematic whole which is an object of contemplation in its own right. It is not the text that changes, but the mode of the reader's or narrator's knowledge.

The distinction between the prisoner of the narrative and the narrator or reader is brought into especially sharp relief by our reading of the fifth book. The prisoner of the narrative is certainly engaged with the argument of the prose, and shows himself to be attentive to, and at times affected by, the message and power of particular poems. Yet the prisoner's understanding in the fifth book is clearly incomplete. As for the

poems, despite the fact that many of them are among the most multilayered, metrically resonant poems of the work, the prisoner does little to show he grasps their complexity. Even his poem at 5, III, which continues and completes a metric series, has something of an involuntary character—in that sense, it offers proof of the effectiveness of Philosophy’s rhythmic system, rather than of the prisoner’s mastery of it. As for the prose, he misunderstands Philosophy’s explanation of providence, and then recedes from the dialogue in the final chapters, replying only some variation of *minime*, saying nothing at all for the last several pages.<sup>293</sup> The fact that the prisoner never responds to Philosophy’s final words suggests a kind of incompleteness to the dialogue—there is no response from the prisoner, no added details of the drama, nothing that brings closure to the events that are narrated. But the prisoner’s silence is also simultaneous with the silence of the narrator—and this silently turns the listener from the narrative to the narration itself, and to the realization that the narration is in fact the prisoner’s response.<sup>294</sup>

In the silence from which the text beckons, the mediation on its narrative can begin. We should not be surprised, then, that though the prisoner of the narrative has only a partial grasp on the significance of the prose and poetry of the fifth book, that these are extraordinarily fertile grounds for a meditative reading. As for the prose, it contains theoretical accounts of the cognitive levels of the human being, as well as a theological reflection on the divine nature. Meditation on these theoretical standpoints, furthermore, reveals that they underlie the whole of Philosophy’s method. And so, too, with the poems of the late fourth and fifth book. Upon reflection, these

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<sup>293</sup> McMahan makes similar observations; see *Understanding the Medieval Meditative Ascent*, 212.

<sup>294</sup> Though I don’t accept his reasoning, Curley’s comment on the ending is wonderful: “the only possible satisfying conclusion to the work.” Curley, “How to Read the Consolation of Philosophy,” 236.

complete, and interweave, the various kinds of rhythmic repetition, even as they elucidate this system by meter and message: the odd rhythm of the couplets of 4, V, which, in light of the poem's message, serves as a metaphor for the importance of understanding the principle behind the variation of meter throughout the whole text; 4, VI, a draft of the sweetness of song, in which Philosophy brings the prisoner's mode into harmony with the divine one; 5, I, in which Philosophy overcomes Fortune in her own meter; 5, II, where Philosophy begins by quoting Homer only to suggest a still higher poetry, adequate to the divine gaze; 5, III, in which the prisoner (whether self-consciously or not) echos the harmony of a meter whose repetition he completes; 5, IV, in which the sound of a repeated meter, which recollects the pattern it completes, is used to describe the awakening of inner pattern by outward sound; and finally 5, V, which gathers the rhythms of the work as a whole, collapsing the temporal extension of the consolation into a recurrent acoustic revolution. These are extraordinarily rich moments for meditation, but (apart perhaps from 5, III) the prisoner of the narrative shows little sign that he is aware of all they contain.<sup>295</sup>

So, while the the fifth book articulates the *Consolation's* theological and psychological principles, it is also an enactment of these at the highest level—not simply the theoretical distinction of the human levels of soul, but the full actualization of these; not simply the description of divine knowledge but the mediation of the

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<sup>295</sup> Retrospectively, it seems it is to this meditative grasp of the dialogue that Philosophy exhorts the prisoner in her curious poem (Odysseus, Agamemnon, and Hercules) at the end of the fourth book. His heroic persistence in the argument will precipitate its crisis, but this crisis becomes the means of gaining the divine standpoint from which his life can be wholly affirmed. The fact that the prisoner of the narrative obviously does not grasp much of what happens is both an invitation to the listening reader's contemplation and a reassurance that he or she, likewise, need not grasp everything the first time. The way Philosophy uses the prisoner's "distracting" question about the nature of chance, for example, as yet another means of her medicine, suggests to the reader that even his or her misinterpretations will eventually be overcome.

divine eternal gaze. And therefore, we cannot separate the repetition of the text and its rhythms from the theology these repetitions both enact and reveal. The final pages of this dissertation will now briefly locate the *Consolation's* theology, and the repetition by which it is enacted, in the theological and religious milieu of Boethius' time.

## PRAYER, MEDIATION, AND THE *CONSOLATION*'S THEOLOGY

By love, turning, they flow back to the cause that made them.<sup>296</sup>

### KNOWING, THE ONE, AND THE MANY

We mentioned in the previous chapter that the prisoner's statement of the tension between divine knowledge and human freedom describes one of the classic philosophical aporias, going back in the West to at least Heraclitus and Parmenides. But the question of divine knowledge is of particular interest in late neoplatonism, where it is "connected with two fundamental philosophical questions: an epistemological one about the nature of knowledge and a metaphysical one about the relationship between the One and the many."<sup>297</sup> Boethius' treatment of the problem has a great deal in common with those of Ammonius and Proclus.<sup>298</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> 4, VI, 47-48.

<sup>297</sup> Lucca Obertello, "Proclus, Ammonius, Boethius on Divine Knowledge," *Dionysius V* (1981): 127-64, 127.

<sup>298</sup> Boethius' immediate source was likely Ammonius' commentary on the *De interpretatione* of Aristotle, a work on which Boethius also wrote two commentaries. See Ammonius and Boethius, *Ammonius, On Aristotle's On Interpretation 9; with Boethius, On Aristotle's On Interpretation 9; First and Second Commentaries; with essays by Richard Sorabji, Norman Kretzmann, and Mario Mignucci*, trans. David Blank and Norman Kretzmann (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). The same view can be seen in Proclus (see Obertello, "Proclus, Ammonius, Boethius on Divine Knowledge"), who was Ammonius' teacher. A similar doctrine is also present in Iamblichus, (see, for example, Iamblichus, *De mysteriis*, trans. Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon, and Jackson P. Hershbell, ed. Emma C. Clarke, John M. Dillon, and Jackson P. Hershbell, vol. 4 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 71-75). On the history of the doctrine, see also Chadwick, *The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy*, 127ff; and Wayne J. Hankey, "Secundum rei vim vel secundum cognoscentium facultatem: Knower and Known in the *Consolation of Philosophy* of Boethius and the *Proslogian* of Anselm," in

As we've seen in the *Consolation*, the epistemological, or cognitional aspect of the problem is essentially related to the metaphysical one. The essence of the prisoner's initial complaint is that human affairs are random and confused, which is to say—they are sheer multiplicity and otherness with nothing to unite and stabilize them. He puts this theologically when he claims that God refuses to govern human actions. To this complaint only one answer will be adequate, and that is to show that this otherness is contained in the divine unity—not obliquely managed by or partly related to—but wholly contained by the divine unity. It is for this reason that, at 4, VI, Philosophy must “begin from a new starting point,” in order to work from unity to multiplicity, rather than the other way around. She says:

The generation of all things, and the whole development of changeable natures, and whatever moves in any manner, are given their causes, order and forms from the stability of the divine mind. That mind, firmly placed in the citadel of its own simplicity (*suae simplicitatis arce*) of nature, established the manifold manner (*multiplicem modum*) in which all things behave. (4, 6, 7-8)

Philosophy thus begins with ontological procession, and then proceeds to the epistemological consequence—that is, that this procession is comprehended in a gaze as simple as God's being. As Luca Obertello writes of a similar passage in Proclus:

the One embraces the fullness of reality as the cause contains in itself the reason of its effects; . . . and analogically . . . the knowledge that the One has about itself embraces the infinity of the knowable in a synthesis which nevertheless infinitely transcends their sum, just as the cause transcends its effects.<sup>299</sup>

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*Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: in Islam, Judaism and Christianity*, ed. John Inglis (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2002).

<sup>299</sup> Obertello, “Proclus, Ammonius, Boethius on Divine Knowledge,” 130

And so it is that the answer to the prisoner's complaint precipitates another problem. By showing that even contingent things are known by God as certain and necessary, the answer appears to undermine the justice of the order it has now made definite. It is only the total simplicity of the Divine mind that can be a stable ground of everything else. But once we have arrived at the divine simplicity, the problem is relating it to its effects—how can absolute unity permit of contingency, or freedom other than its own? The answer to this problem, which motivates much of neoplatonic theology and religion, takes many forms, but always requires both separating and relating the levels of the hierarchy.

Philosophy's cognitional principle does precisely this by distinguishing and relating the four levels of knowing and known. The formula likely goes back to Porphyry, who writes in the *Sentences* that all things are in all things, but in a mode proper to the knower.<sup>300</sup> Boethius and Proclus, however, systematize the principle—such as we've already encountered in the *Consolation*, where sense knows sensibly, imagination imaginatively, reason ratiocinatively, and intellect, intellectually. This systematic hierarchy, however, is both cognitional and ontological. To the divine vision there is neither past nor future, but all is known according to its absolute simplicity in an eternal present. This separation of God's knowing from our own articulates the ontological difference as well. For although to us the future is contingent, and the past seems necessary and fixed, the ontological status of the future contingent is no

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<sup>300</sup> “All things are in all, but in a mode proper to the essence of each (*ἀλλὰ οἰκείως ἐκάστου τῇ οὐσίᾳ*): in the intellect, intellectually; in the soul, discursively; in plants, seminally; in bodies, imagistically; and in the Beyond, non-intellectually and supraessentially.” Porphyry, *Sentences*, trans. John Dillon, in *Sentences: Études d'Introduction, texte grec et traduction française, commentaire par l'Unité propre de recherche no. 76 du Centre national de la recherche scientifique*, ed. Jean Pépin and Luc Brisson, 2 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin, 2005), vol. 2, Sentence 10.

different than what seems fixed in the past. As Obertello writes: “Each instant of time may belong to the past, the present, or the future at once. The contingency of an instant is therefore the contingency of all times and of the world’s being.”<sup>301</sup> The question at the heart of the *Consolation* is therefore as much about the substance of our lives as it is the freedom of our knowledge. These must be known in the Divine activity, and also as assured by It in their own.

The hierarchical distinction and systemization of being and knowledge implies the systematic therapy of *Philosophia*. Each activity of the prisoner’s soul must be treated according to what it is—sense, imagination, reason, and intellect. Or, as Iamblichus writes, each thing must be dealt with in the right manner, theological matters theologically, theurgical ones theurgically, philosophical ones, philosophically, ethical ones, ethically, and so forth.<sup>302</sup>

#### SEMI-PELAGIANISM, GRACE, AND THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

It is obvious enough that both the *Consolation*’s central intellectual aporia—of the relation between divine knowledge and human freedom—and the justification for its systematic therapy, are easily found in many theological works of the period, whether of pagan or Christian writers. Nonetheless, the *Consolation* addresses these questions within the specific form they had then taken in the history of Christian doctrine. During that period in the Latin West, the problem of divine knowledge in relation to human freedom was particularly the problem of Semi-Pelagianism—the Semi-Pelagians claiming that Augustine’s doctrine of divine providence implied a

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<sup>301</sup> Obertello, “Proclus, Ammonius, Boethius on Divine Knowledge,” 138.

<sup>302</sup> Iamblichus, *De mysteriis*, 11.

necessity to all human affairs, rendering virtue and grace superfluous.<sup>303</sup> The Semi-Pelagian controversy, which raged throughout the fifth and sixth centuries, was the major debate in Latin Christendom during Boethius' lifetime. The two Bishops who were the main champions of the Augustinian position were contemporaries of Boethius,<sup>304</sup> and the debate came to an uneasy resolution just five years after his death.

As Robert Crouse writes:

The problem is universal, rather than specifically Christian. It is, however, inconceivable that any theologically informed author in Latin Christendom in the early decades of the sixth century could employ such terms as *praedestinatio*, *arbitrii libertas* (IV, pr. 6), *divina gratia* (V, pr. 3), or such a phrase as *suis quaeque meritis praedestinata* (V, p. 2), without having in mind, and reminding his readers of that controversy which had its storm-centre within Theodoric's domain, and would find a temporary resolution at the Second Council of Orange, in 529.

The *Consolation* is thus written at the peak of the controversy, and employs the precise language of the debate. Indeed, the prisoner might as well be speaking for the Semi-Pelagians at 5, 3, when he states what he considers to be the consequences of Philosophy's (or Augustine's) argument: the total confusion of virtue and vice; the futility of aspiring towards the "inaccessible light," and the uselessness of prayer as a means for grace.<sup>305</sup> The Semi-Pelagians objected in particular to the Augustinian

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<sup>303</sup> See Robert Crouse, "St. Augustine, Semi-Pelagianism and the *Consolation* of Boethius," *Dionysius* XXII (2004): 95-109; and Walter Hannam, "*Unus et simplex*: An Examination of Boethius's Understanding of Divine Essence in Relation to the Semi-Pelagian Question," (Unpublished: Dalhousie University, 1993).

<sup>304</sup> Fulgentius of Ruspe, "Augustinus abbreviatus" (d. 532) and Caesarius of Arles (d. 543). See Crouse, "St. Augustine, Semi-Pelagianism and the *Consolation* of Boethius," 104.

<sup>305</sup> *Ibid.*, 105. Even the solution the prisoner mentions—that some "quidam" (5, 3, 7) attempt to solve the problem by deriving the necessity of God's knowledge from the events He knows—is a "characteristically Semi-Pelagian argument." See Crouse, "St. Augustine, Semi-Pelagianism and the *Consolation* of Boethius," 105-106, with references to the *De gratia libro duo* of Faustus of Riez. Or, as Walter Hannam writes: "Boethius' complaint is the same as that which the monks of Southern Gaul had against St. Augustine's doctrine of predestination," Hannam, "*Unus et simplex*," 9, with reference to Prosper of

doctrine of *gratia operans* on the basis that it seemed to limit the freedom of the will—if God’s grace is prior to our will, we are not free to accept or refuse it.<sup>306</sup> In other words, at the center of the debate was the status of grace, with the Semi-Pelagians wary of the Augustinian doctrine of Providence, and insisting on the integrity of the human will.<sup>307</sup>

There is no record that Boethius’ solution to the problem was known to his contemporaries, but it would perhaps have pleased both the Semi-Pelagians and the Augustinians. Not only does Philosophy’s formula maintain the efficacy of human acts, but it does so by grounding them more completely in the divine activity. The closing words of the text explicitly clarify that prayer is genuinely efficacious as a means of grace. But why, if the central question of Boethius’ *Consolation* is framed in the terms of a specifically Christian debate, does the text not offer a more specifically Christian solution? Why are there no references to Christian scriptures, or any mention of specifically Christian doctrines or prayers? Above all, why is the solution of the theological aporia not offered in the revealed language of the divine substance and its mediation, that is, of the Trinity and the Incarnation?

#### THEOLOGY AS SPECULATIVE SCIENCE

One of the frequently suggested explanations for the lack of specifically Christian doctrine in the *Consolation* is that it is a work of philosophy rather than theology. In the *Tractates*, Boethius writes about the theology of revealed doctrine,

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Aquitaine, “Epistula ad Augustinum,” in *Epistulae S. Aureli Augustini*, ed. A. Goldbacher, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* (Vienna and Leipzig: 1911), CCXXV, 2, p. 455.

<sup>306</sup> Hannam, “Unus et simplex,” 7.

<sup>307</sup> “Nec enim talem Deus hominem fecisse credendus est, qui nec velit umquam nec possit bonum. Alioquin nec liberum ei permisit arbitrium, si ei tantummodo malum ut velit et possit, bonum vero a semetipso nec velle nec posse concessit.” John Cassian, *Collatio XIII, De protectione dei*, vol. 49, *Patrologia Latina*, Caput XII, p. 924.

while in the *Consolation*, he limits himself to secular philosophy. This hypothesis is deeply flawed both for the anachronism of its distinction, and for its mistaken assertion about Boethius' methodology. To begin with, the distinction between philosophy as based on reason and theology as based on faith, is not made until the late scholastic theologians, mostly of the fourteenth century. For Boethius, theology is simply the highest form of speculative science, the enterprise of the whole Platonic tradition, both Christian and pagan.<sup>308</sup> Both the *Tractates* and the *Consolation* are theological, insofar as both consider questions pertaining to the divine nature and its operations. The division between philosophy and theology simply will not do.

But neither can we distinguish the *Consolation* from the *Tractates* on the basis of method. In both cases, theology proceeds *intellectualiter*.<sup>309</sup> As Thomas Aquinas noted concerning the *Tractates*, Boethius proceeds not according to revelation but according to reason alone.<sup>310</sup> Nowhere does Boethius argue on the basis of Christian *auctoritates*, and so the absence of references to Christian Scriptures or Church Fathers does not distinguish his method in the *Consolation* from that of his other works. To see this more clearly, it is useful to describe the method of theology more positively. For Boethius, as generally in the Platonic tradition, theology is an itinerary: "the movement from belief, through the discursive reason of *scientia*, to the unified intellectual grasp of principle in

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<sup>308</sup> Here I am following the work of Robert Crouse. See Robert Crouse, "St. Augustine's *De trinitate*: Philosophical Method," ed. E. A. Livingstone, *Studia Patristica* (Berlin: 1985); "In Aenigmate Trinitas' (*Confessions*, XIII, 5, 6): and "The Conversion of Philosophy in St. Augustine's *Confessions*," *Dionysius XI* (1987): 53-62. For Boethius' definition of theology as speculative science, see *De sancta trinitate*, 1, 2 in Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica*, (ed. Moreschini).

<sup>309</sup> See *De sancta trinitate*, 1, 2 in Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica* (ed. Moreschini).

<sup>310</sup> "Boethius vero elegit prosequi per alium modum, scilicet per rationes, praesupponens hoc quod ab aliis per auctoritates fuerat prosecutum." Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio super librum Boethii de trinitate*, ed. Bruno Decker (Leiden: Brill, 1955), Prologue, 5, p. 47-48.

*sapientia*.”<sup>311</sup> This itinerary is common to both works: in the *Tractates*, Boethius begins from universal character of Christian *cultus* and doctrine,<sup>312</sup> and proceeds logically to rational demonstration. In the *Consolation*, likewise, Philosophy begins with the prisoner’s *minima scintilla*, his true belief that the world is governed by God,<sup>313</sup> and leads him *intellectualiter* to a discursive grasp of that belief. So far as the character of their theological discourses are concerned, the difference between the *Consolation* and the *Tractates* is their purpose and style, rather than their method. In the *Tractates*, Boethius uses an intentionally obscure and succinct style<sup>314</sup> to elucidate abstract points of doctrine that are “matters of contention even among Christians,” while the *Consolation* is “ecumenical and protreptic;” and Philosophy is “the whole of wisdom.”<sup>315</sup>

If in the *Tractates*, Boethius works out in logical precision various doctrines of Christian theology, in the *Consolation* he sets out wisdom as universal and entire. Robert Crouse puts it beautifully:

. . . in his final work, he is most directly concerned with the problems—not pagan or Christian, but universal—of understanding the rational order of the world, the vagaries of fortune, and the nature of man’s freedom. Lady Philosophy is not natural or revealed, not philosophy or theology; she is simply *Sapientia*, who can lift her head to pierce the very heavens. She is not Platonist or Aristotelian, a Stoic or a Neoplatonist: conflicting scholars have violently torn away fragments from her vesture, yet she stands with unabated vigour. She is simply wisdom, old and young, all philosophy, which in its highest speculative form is called theology.<sup>316</sup>

<sup>311</sup> Crouse, “St. Augustine’s De trinitate,” 503.

<sup>312</sup> See *De sancta trinitate*, 1, 1 in Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica* (ed. Moreschini).

<sup>313</sup> 1, 6, 20.

<sup>314</sup> See *De sancta trinitate*, Prologue, in Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica* (ed. Moreschini).

<sup>315</sup> As described by Robert Crouse, “*Semina Rationum*: St. Augustine and Boethius,” *Dionysius* 4 (1980): 75-86, 81.

<sup>316</sup> Robert Crouse, “The Doctrine of Creation in Boethius: the *De Hebdomadibus* and the *Consolatio*,” *Studia Patristica* 17 (1982): 417-21, 418.

This does not mean, of course, that we cannot detect the theology of the *Tractates* in the *Consolation*; indeed, the Christian doctrines of creation, the Trinity, and the Incarnation are present and even presupposed. But, unlike Augustine, Boethius does not need to polemically distinguish the Christian from the Platonic.<sup>317</sup> Though Augustine is as thoroughly Platonic in his theology as is Boethius, Augustine nonetheless, for reasons of historical necessity, had to specify in what way the Platonic theology was inadequate, namely, that it did not have the Word made flesh.<sup>318</sup> But by Boethius' time, even those Christian doctrines which Augustine distinguished against Platonism (however Platonic his understanding of those Christian doctrines may have been) have been universally acknowledged, both in teaching and ritual. Augustine's particular has become universal—and thus there is nothing absent from Boethius' Philosophy.

In the moments in which it contains passages of truly speculative theology, the *Consolation's* doctrine are clearly consistent with Christian teaching. As we saw above, the divine activity is *simplex* while the distinctions of its activity cause, comprehend, and embrace all creation. The human levels of soul, in particular, are said to be in God. From the general outlines of these statements we can easily see that the *Consolation's* basic theology is wholly, though not exclusively, Christian. But the *Consolation* is not principally a work of speculative theology. It is principally a work of consolation, of mediation, of redemption—of what we might call practical or dramatic or even embodied theology. Much of the *Consolation's* theology is therefore hidden in plain sight—not stated speculatively but expressed by gesture, poetry, and the various other

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<sup>317</sup> On the relation between the Platonism of Boethius and Augustine, see Crouse, "Semina Rationum."

<sup>318</sup> See *Confessions*, VII. On Platonism as thoroughly constitutive of Augustinian theology, see Crouse, "In Aenigmatate Trinitas."

medicinal means of Philosophy's intervention. And so if we wish to define the *Consolation's* theology more precisely, we need to go beyond what is stated speculatively to what is expressed otherwise; that is, we need to think about the gesture, rhetoric, poetry and other non-discursive medicines *theologically*. While each aspect of these merits a study of its own, we are, after the analysis and argument of this dissertation, uniquely well-situated to ask about the theological stature of Philosophy's poetry, and of its rhythms, in particular.

#### POETRY AS MEDIATING PRAYER

In the previous chapter, I argued that the *Consolation's* final poem is a mediation of the divine eternal vision, a mediation Philosophy intimates is about to take place in the final words of her preceding prose. The meter's particular combination of syllables allows each line to gather the whole of the *Consolation's* poetry, while the repetition of this rhythm, an acoustic revolution, is a temporal manifestation of the divine eternal present. While this combination of syllables is unique, and uniquely appropriate to this climactic moment in the prisoner's restoration, the other poems of the text are likewise revolutions upon an acoustic circle. Every poem is a repetition of a rhythm, and as such, every poem's acoustic existence is a recurring circle of sound. Every poem is, in this sense, a collapsing of temporally subsequent moments into a kind of simultaneous present. A similar phenomenon is described by Augustine (and for similar purposes), at *Confessions* 11, 27, where he reflects on the experience of saying the words of Ambrose,

*Deus creator omnium*.<sup>319</sup> The saying or hearing of the words requires holding each syllable as it is pronounced in memory, so the phrase can be understood as a whole. Of course, at some level, this holding of the past as present is true for every moment of our waking experience. As both *Philosophia* and Augustine explain, every instant is infinitely divisible such that the present would disappear if it were not for memory holding the past within, effectively slowing the present to a pace that can be experienced. This is true not only of acoustic experiences, but also for ones that are visual, emotional, gustatory, etc. No comprehension of present experience would be possible without this holding of the past as present. But Boethius and Augustine are on to something still more particular here, more precise than simply articulating the dependence of present experience on the memory of the past. For it is not just any moment of experience they choose to demonstrate this underlying truth; but, in the case of Augustine, words from a hymn, and in Boethius' case, a carefully crafted, and deliberately placed, poem.

While reading or hearing prose also depends on the relating of past to present—as indeed does any conscious activity—rhythmic poetry is essentially constituted in this relation. For it is not merely that the sentences or phrases of a poem require the earlier words to be held in the memory, or that the rhythm requires this as well. But because the rhythm is repeated until the poem's end, the whole poem takes place by circling and recircling upon the same rhythmic sound. So while only 5, V encompasses some metric element of every other poem, every other poem nonetheless also bridges the movement of time and the stillness of eternity. When Philosophy says that time is a

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<sup>319</sup> Angus Johnson, "Time as a Psalm in St. Augustine," *Animus* 1 (1996). Online at [www.swgc.mun.ca/animus](http://www.swgc.mun.ca/animus).

moving image of eternity, she is stating the relation between time and eternity in philosophical terms. When the prisoner hears the repeated sound of a repeated rhythm, however, this relation is no longer philosophically abstract but one he enters into and lives. By memory and anticipation, he internalizes the rhythms he hears, holding the entirety of each as present as it unfolds in time. In this rhythmic consolation, the prisoner comes to imitate God's eternal present and his temporal existence becomes an instance of the divine life.<sup>320</sup> In this sense, all of the *Consolation's* poetry is a kind of mediating prayer, an activity that—according to both the prisoner and his doctor—bridges the human and divine, the temporal and eternal.

While each of the poems has this prayerful character on its own, the intricate system of rhythmic repetition makes each poem something more as well. The system gives to each poem—indeed to each syllable—a place within the acoustic structure of the whole, so that while every moment has a unique purpose in the temporal flow of sound, it also becomes recollectable in relation to every other sound as well.

As I have stressed repeatedly, the rhythms do not occur in isolation, but rather in the complex context of image, metaphor, drama, argument, rhetoric, etc. I have isolated the rhythmic patterns simply to expose them, not to suggest they possess their mediating powers all on their own. But in addition to image, metaphor, argument, etc., there is a still more primary context for the hearing of the work's poems, and that is that all but four of them are spoken or sung by *Philosophia*. To grasp more fully the

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<sup>320</sup> As Colin Starnes puts it, God is known in the world, rather than simply the world known in God. C. J. Starnes, "Boethius and the Development of Christian Humanism: the Theology of the *Consolatio*," in *Atti: Congresso Internazionale di Studi Boeziani, Pavia, 5-8 ottobre 1980*, ed. Luca Obertello (Roma: Editrice Herder, 1981), 38.

mediating role of the poetry in the *Consolation*, therefore, we need to think theologically about who and what this captivating woman is.

#### PHILOSOPHIA, HER PERSON AND HER POETRY

At the time of the prisoner's first mention of Philosophy, he does not know who she is. In the midst of his sorrow, he simply became aware that there was a woman standing over him ("*adstitisse mihi supra verticem visa est mulier*") (1, 1,1). She is not a part of him, or a creation of his imagination: the consolation is presented as dialogue, not inner monologue. In his description of her, he tells us she is of an ambiguous stature: sometimes she confined herself (*cohibebat*) to the common measure of man, sometimes she would touch the heavens with her head, and then, when she lifted her head still higher, "she would pierce the heaven itself and disappoint the vision of those mortals who tried to contemplate her" (1, 1, 2) [*ipsum etiam caelum penetrabat respicientiumque hominum frustrabatur intuitum*]. This mysterious figure comes unbidden in the midst of human suffering, taking human form, though her nature is at once clearly divine.

Her first action is to throw out the muses of poetry (*poeticas Musas*), whom she calls "theatrical harlots" (*scenicas meretriculas*). These muses accustom a man to his ills, she says, rather than cure him of them. With blazing eyes, she addresses them: "Get out, you Sirens, beguiling men straight to their destruction! Leave him to my Muses to care for and restore to health" (1, 1, 11, Tester) [*Sed abite potius, Sirenes usque in exitium dulces, meisque eum Musis curandum sanandumque relinquite!*].

So while she acknowledges that even these *scenicas meretriculas* have a certain degree of power, she claims that the power of her poetry is of another order entirely:

not merely to comfort, but to heal and make whole. Right from her arrival, therefore, Philosophy's stature, at once human and divine, is matched with her authority to speak the rhythmic words that heal. She is, then, a divine mediator who takes human form and who teaches her disciple how to pray. Her rhythms are a carefully crafted intervention, a focused and unrelenting medicine for a man who has nearly been lost; these patterns of sound give stability to the prisoner's present, structure to his memory, and become the means of his active engagement with the world.

This intervention takes place by means of his flesh. All of Philosophy's words are spoken or sung; that is, the prisoner's ears hear them, receive them. This bodily intervention is not merely a temporary necessity, or something that can be left behind once higher steps have been reached. There are moments in the text that can be so interpreted—as when Philosophy says she will affix wings to the prisoner's soul so he can look down upon the earth, or when she exhorts him to look above, etc., but these moments must themselves be interpreted within the logic that governs the whole. When the argument threatens to collapse on itself, the prisoner's plea is not that she remove him from this finite, material world, but that she restore the supplicating prayer that mediates between it and eternity. It is highly significant that when Philosophy turns to resolve the foreknowledge problem by explaining knowledge according to the knower, that she begins with the knowledge appropriate to sensation: “the same roundness of a body sight recognizes in one way and touch in another” (5, 4, 26). The rhythms, likewise, are interpreted by every level of the prisoner's knowing: the ears (sense) to begin with; then an acoustic imagination, or memory, holds the whole of each line, or poem, as present, while reason can discursively comprehend the

systematic interweaving of repetitions, and intellect, however fleetingly, grasps it not by part, but as an instantaneous whole.<sup>321</sup> The bodily senses, and above all the sense of hearing, are not left behind, but become the site of Philosophy's mediation.

Philosophy thus embodies something very like the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation: the reconciliation of finite and infinite, of time and eternity, and of divine and human. She is a moment of the divine activity that takes human form, the Word made flesh. But she is also the Word within, that by means of which the creature returns to God. Her rhythms are simultaneously both the internal and external aspects of her operation. They are both the physical manifestation of the divine *logos* and the inward patterns by which the soul ascends. The soul contains within its own nature the structure by which the content of its temporal life can be known and thus returned to itself in a harmony of its own self-relation. But this inherent structure is realized by the intricately interwoven rhythms of Philosophy's poetic speech, which actively brings about the formation of the prisoner's memory. Recollection is thus the prerequisite of knowledge and the origination of love, which is the active movement of the creature in its return to God.<sup>322</sup> As Philosophy sings:

*Hic est cunctis communis amor  
repetuntque boni fine teneri,  
quia non aliter durare queant  
nisi converso rursus amore  
refluent causae quae dedit esse. (4, VI, 44-48)*

*This is the love common to all things,  
And they seek to be bound by their end, the good,  
Since in no other way could they endure,*

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<sup>321</sup> It is also remarkable that when Philosophy describes the instantaneous character of divine knowledge, she frequently has recourse to the word *ictus*, the most basic component of rhythm. See 5, II, 12; 5, 4, 33; and 5, 6, 40.

<sup>322</sup> Aquinas noted (Aquinas, *Expositio super librum Boethii de trinitate*, Prologue, 4, p. 47) that the *Tractates*, taken as a whole, exhibit "the typical pattern of *exitus* and *reditus*." See Crouse, "Semina Rationum," 82.

*Except by means of love, that turns them,  
To flow back to the cause that gave them being.*<sup>323</sup>

The patterns of Philosophy's poetry therefore serve the ultimately theological or religious purpose of mediating the prisoner's return to God. As a sensibly perceived and physically embodied divine grace, they are a theurgical act, and—by the design of their repetition—a liturgical prayer.

#### PHILOSOPHIA AS SAPIENTIA: THE CONSOLATION AND THE BOOK OF WISDOM

But as we develop an appreciation for the theological and religious character of the *Consolation*, we encounter afresh its problematic absence of explicitly Christian references. Even if it is written principally as a protreptic that assumes Christian cultus and doctrine as already universal—why not also give these their particular names and speak in the language of scripture as well?

It is widely recognized that the *Consolation* contains one clear allusion to the Christian Scriptures—when at 3, 12, 22 Philosophy quotes from the Book of Wisdom (Sap. 8. 1) to describe the world's governance: “*Est igitur summum, inquit, bonum, quod regit cuncta fortiter suaviterque disponit*” (3, 12, 22, Tester) [‘*It is therefore the highest good, she said ‘which rules all things firmly, and sweetly disposes them’*’].<sup>324</sup> The prisoner replies that her conclusion delights him, and that he is especially pleased with the words she has used: “*haec ipsa . . . verba delectant*” (3, 12, 23). Though it has become practically axiomatic that this is the only clear allusion to Christian Scriptures, this is quite simply

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<sup>323</sup> The translation of the first three lines is Tester's. The final two lines are difficult to render in English. We can translate them literally as: “unless by means of love having turned back, they flow back to the cause which gave them being.” Tester takes *causae* as the subject, which confuses the ontology of procession and return.

<sup>324</sup> Sap. 8, 1 reads: “*adtingit enim a fine usque ad finem fortiter, et disponit omnia suaviter.*”

not true. Though it is true that Boethius never cites Scripture directly, either in the *Consolation* or the *Tractates*, he often weaves into a sentence an allusion that, while subtle enough to be missed by the uninitiated, is quite obvious to any trained ear. After drawing our attention to nearly forty such allusions in only the first few pages of the *Consolation*, Robert Crouse writes:

An examination of the lamentation of Boethius and the appearance of Philosophy at the beginning of the *Consolation* reveals a text rich in biblical allusions, which, although they are not literary *similia* in the strictest sense, could hardly be missed by any sixth-century Christian closely familiar with the Latin Bible: *divinarum scripturarum mentibus eruditi*, as Boethius puts it in *De fide catholica*.<sup>325</sup>

These allusions are only for *those minds learned in the Scriptures*. As Crouse points out,<sup>326</sup> this is not a casual comment—there are several other places in the *Tractates* where Boethius speaks of the usefulness of veiled language and hidden meaning.

From the *Quomodo substantiae*:

But I think over my *Hebdomads* with myself, and I keep my speculations in my own memory (*ad memoriam meam*) rather than share them with any of those pert and frivolous persons who will not tolerate an argument unless it is made amusing. Wherefore do not you take objection to the obscurities consequent on brevity (*obscuritatibus brevitatis*), which are the sure treasure-house of secret doctrine (*arcani fida custodia*) and have the advantage that they speak only with those who are worthy (*his solis qui digni sunt*).<sup>327</sup>

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<sup>325</sup> Robert Crouse, “*Haec Ipsa Verba Delectant: Boethius and the Liber Sapientiae*,” in *Verità nel Tempo. Platonismo, Cristianesimo e Contemporaneità: Studi in onore di Luca Obertello*, ed. Angelo Campodonico (Genova: il melangolo, 2004). The reference is to *De fide catholica*, ll. 128-130, in Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica* (ed. Moreschini). As the many quotations and references to Crouse make abundantly clear, this section is completely indebted to his work.

<sup>326</sup> The following passages are footnoted but not cited in Crouse, “St. Augustine, Semi-Pelagianism and the Consolation of Boethius,” 101, n. 27.

<sup>327</sup> *Quomodo substantiae*, Prologue, in Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theologica* (ed. Moreschini).

From the *De trinitate*:

So, apart from yourself, wherever I turn my eyes, they fall on either the apathy of the dullard or the jealousy of the shrewd, and a man who should cast his thoughts before such unnatural creatures of men, I will not say to consider but rather to trample under foot, would seem to bring discredit on the study of divinity (*divinis tractatibus*). So I purposely use brevity and wrap up the ideas I draw from the deep questionings of philosophy in new and unaccustomed words (*stilum brevitae contraho et ex intimis sumpta philosophiae disciplinis novorum verborum significationibus velo*) such as speak only to you and to myself, that is, if you ever look at them. The rest of the world I simply disregard (*submovimus*) since those who cannot understand seem unworthy even to read them (*ut qui capere intellectu nequiverint ad ea etiam legenda videantur indigni*).<sup>328</sup>

Boethius makes similar comments in the *De fide catholica*.<sup>329</sup> We should not, then, be surprised to learn that the *Consolation* contains hidden references to Christian doctrine or Scripture. But what is their purpose?

As Crouse convincingly demonstrates, the scriptural allusions in the first pages of the *Consolation* are not arbitrary, but intentionally recall particular Biblical passages in order to subtly weave them into the first portrayals of the prisoner and of Philosophy. The description of the prisoner allusively casts him as Job:

weary of his life (Job 9, 21; 10, 1: *Tadebit me vita mea*), oppressed by grief (Job 16, 8: *Nunc autem oppressit me dolor*), his face drenched with tears (Job 16, 7: *Facies mea intumuit a fletu, Et palpebrae meae caligaverunt*). Untimely age has come upon him (Job 17, 1: *Spiritus meus attenuabitur, Dies mei breviabuntur, Et solum mihi superest sepulchrum*). He longs only for death, which will not hear his cries (Job 3, 21): *Qui expectant mortem et non venit, Quasi effodientes thesaurum*).<sup>330</sup>

<sup>328</sup> *De sancta trinitate*, Prologue, ll. 11-21, in *ibid.*

<sup>329</sup> *De fide catholica*, ll. 90-95 and 137-137, in *ibid.*, as noted by Crouse in, "St. Augustine, Semi-Pelagianism and the *Consolation* of Boethius," 101, n. 27

<sup>330</sup> Crouse, "*Haec Ipsa Verba Delectant*," 57.

Crouse continues: “Just as historically the Book of Wisdom is a conscious response to the questions raised by Job, so Philosophy appears as a response to Boethius’ Job-like lament.” Crouse proceeds through a breathtaking tour de force examination of the allusive language of the description of Philosophy and of her first words to the prisoner. This meticulous analysis yields a total of twenty-four places, in only the *Consolation’s* first few pages, where the description of, and words spoken by, *Philosophia* clearly parallel the description of, and words spoken by, *Sapientia* in the Book of Wisdom. They are too many to cite here, but I will give the first several to convey just how compelling the comparison is:

*Sapientia*, mistress of all virtues (Sap. 7, 23: *omnem habens virtutem*), descends from on high, for she would never desert the innocent (Sap. 10, 13: *Haec venditum justum non dereliquit, . . . Descenditque cum illo in foveam, Et in vinculis non dereliquit eum*). She comes to the sick man unanticipated (Sap. 6, 14-17: *Praeoccupat qui se concupiscunt, ut illis se prior ostendat*), a figure of awesome countenance, with blazing eyes (Sap. 7, 26: *Candor est enim lucis aeternae*), with discernment beyond the common powers of men (Sap. 7, 22-23: *Est enim in illa spiritus intelligentiae . . . acutus . . . omnia prospiciens*), of unexhausted vigour (Sap. 6, 3: *nunquam marescit sapientia*), although she seems so ancient as not to belong to the present age (Sap. 9, 9: *Adfuit tunc cum orbem terrarum faceres*).<sup>331</sup>

Crouse proceeds through many similar allusions with respect to: Philosophy’s stature, her dress, her purpose, her book and sceptre, her roles as *medicans* and *nurse*, and her diagnosis of the prisoner; his true destiny as a likeness of God; the *scintilla* of his true opinion, and so forth. Finally, perhaps the clearest indication that Philosophy may be

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<sup>331</sup> *Ibid.*, 58.

identified with *Sapientia*, is that she calls herself by that name in her first words to the prisoner.<sup>332</sup>

As Crouse goes on to suggest, these parallels do not mean that Philosophy is Christian *rather* than pagan—indeed, he acknowledges elsewhere that the tradition of Wisdom Literature is syncretistic and also that the biblical description of *Sapientia* is itself closely paralleled by Stoic and Neoplatonic descriptions.<sup>333</sup> “Still,” Crouse writes “no sixth-century Latin Christian author or reader could be unmindful of the Christian—indeed the Christological—dimension of *sapientia*, which had been underlined especially by St. Augustine.”<sup>334</sup> He concludes: “That is the understanding of *Sapientia* which informs Boethius’ portrait of Philosophy, and that is the ground of his great delight in her reference to the *Liber Sapientiae*: she speaks at last her native tongue, the language of divine revelation.”<sup>335</sup>

Indeed, it is the special genius of Boethius to be able to allude to Christian scriptures precisely where they reveal a universal mediation. Consider the following passage from his commentary on the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, perhaps his most explicit discussion of *Sapientia*, and where her personification is deeply resonant with the *Consolation’s* *Philosophia*:

Philosophy is the love and study and in a certain way the friendship of wisdom: not indeed of that wisdom which is concerned with various arts and the science and knowledge of mutable things, but of that wisdom which, lacking nothing, is lively mind and alone the primeval reason of all things. Moreover, this love of wisdom is the

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<sup>332</sup> 1, 3, 6.

<sup>333</sup> Crouse, “St. Augustine, Semi-Pelagianism and the Consolation of Boethius,” 102.

<sup>334</sup> *Ibid.*, 105, where he references Augustine, *De trinitate*, 7, 3, 5: “When Scripture mentions wisdom either itself speaking, or when something is said concerning it, the Son is especially meant.” As translated in Crouse, “St. Augustine, Semi-Pelagianism and the Consolation of Boethius,” 105.

<sup>335</sup> Crouse, “*Haec Ipsa Verba Delectant*,” 61.

illumination of the understanding soul by that pure wisdom, and in some way a summoning and recalling of it to itself, so that the study of wisdom seems to be the study of divinity, and the friendship of that pure mind. Therefore, this wisdom impresses the beneficence of its own divinity upon every kind of soul, and leads it back to the strength and purity of its own nature. Hence arise the truth of thought and speculation, and holy and pure chastity of actions.<sup>336</sup>

#### CHRISTIAN RITUAL AND LITURGICAL PRAYER

The esoteric language specific to Boethius' treatment of theological questions was also typical for Christians of the period in relation to liturgy. As James O'Donnell writes of Augustine: "In all the years after his baptism and ordination, in all of the five million surviving words of his works, Augustine never describes or discusses the cult act that was the centre of his ordained ministry."<sup>337</sup> We should therefore not be surprised to learn that in many places the *Consolation* mirrors the words of the Christian liturgy without referring to it explicitly, as Christine Mohrmann has shown.<sup>338</sup> What is particularly interesting relative to the argument of this dissertation, is that, according to Mohrmann, the most emphatic allusions to Christian liturgy occur where Philosophy and the prisoner specifically use the language of prayer—that is, preceding the hexametric prayer of 3, IX, the prisoner's statement of the crisis at the end of 5, 3, and Philosophy's final words at 5, 6. Mohrmann shows quite convincingly—just to

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<sup>336</sup> Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta*, ed. Samuel Brandt, vol. 48, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (Vienna and Leipzig: 1906), 1, 3, p. 7, as translated in Crouse, "Haec Ipsa Verba Delectant," 55.

<sup>337</sup> James J. O'Donnell, introduction to *Confessions*, by Augustine, 3 Vols., ed. James J. O'Donnell (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press and Oxford University Press, 1992), Vol. I, xxix.

<sup>338</sup> Christine Mohrmann, "Some Remarks on the Language of Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae*," in *Latin Script and Letters, A. D. 400-900: Festschrift presented to Ludwig Bieler on the occasion of his 70th birthday*, ed. John J. O'Meara and Bernd Naumann (Leiden: Brill, 1976).

summarize her analysis of the middle of these three passages—that the prisoner’s word choices (*deprecandi, supplicandi ratione, commercium, iustae humilitas, pretium, vicem, divina gratia*) clearly allude to Christian liturgical texts.<sup>339</sup>

Relative to the above-mentioned allusions to the book of *Sapientia*, it is fascinating to consider Mohrmann’s suggestion that Philosophy’s “*fortiter suaviterque*,” which elicits the prisoner’s “*haec ipsa . . . verba delectant*,” is, in addition to its biblical and patristic connotations, also resonant with a Christian liturgical text (the Antiphona ad Magnificat, Dec. 17).<sup>340</sup> She asks: “is it the Biblical or the liturgical flavour that pleases him so much in these words?” To follow her question with one of our own: is this not to say, therefore—that the only widely-recognized reference to the Christian Scriptures, where, as it were, *Sapientia* quotes *Sapientia*, where the Word made flesh quotes the written Word—is from a liturgical text set in the very season that anticipates Christ’s incarnation?

The final place in which Mohrmann finds traces of the Christian liturgy is in the last sentences of the text, in Philosophy’s reassurance of the efficacy of prayer, and her

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<sup>339</sup> Ibid., 55-59. Of Mohrmann’s analysis, Chadwick writes: “We have too little pagan Latin liturgy to be able assert that such language is distinctively Christian. One would expect such vocabulary to be neutral in itself,” Chadwick, *The Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology, and Philosophy*, 251. Nonetheless, he agrees, albeit with utmost caution, that Mohrmann’s observations give “marginal reinforcement to the view that there is a latent awareness of Christianity beneath the surface of Boethius’ text,” *ibid*, 251. Mohrmann, I expect, would, not have been dissuaded by Chadwick’s scepticism. She acknowledges the connection would be tenuous were it based only on solitary, ambiguous words. As she writes (in relation to the passage in 5, 3), for example: “if this parallel [i.e., to Christian liturgical texts] concerning *commercium* is partial, there is in this passage such a concentration of Christian and particularly liturgical terms (and thoughts), that it is not only beyond doubt that Boethius speaks here as a Christian, but also that he had in mind certain liturgical texts.” Mohrmann, “Some Remarks on the Language of Boethius,” 58.

<sup>340</sup> See Mohrmann, “Some Remarks on the Language of Boethius,” 60. This identification of Philosophy’s words with one of great “O antiphons” of Advent had in fact been made earlier, by J. Allen Cabaniss, who argued that the words more directly echo the antiphon than the Scriptural text on which it is based: “. . . the order of the words, *fortiter suaviterque disponit* (antiphon: *disponens*), is precisely that of *O Sapientia*, not that of the Bible text.” J. Allen Cabaniss, “A Note on the Date of the Great Advent Antiphons,” *Speculum* 22, 3 (1947): 440-42, 441. The full text of the antiphon reads: “*O Sapientia, quae ex ore Altissimi prodiisti, attingens a fine usque ad finem, fortiter suaviterque disponens omnia: veni ad docendum nos viam prudentiae.*”

exhortation to its practice: *spes precesque, in excelsa, porrigere, humiles preces*. In fact, Mohrmann rightly found her own analysis so compelling that she seems somewhat perplexed not to have found still other traces of the Christian liturgy or—to suggest what her intuition seems to have been—not to have found an underlying liturgical purpose in the *Consolation*. Indeed, after the argument of this dissertation, it is difficult not to hear in these final liturgical allusions a reference to the liturgical character of Philosophy's preceding poetic intervention, and in her exhortation to prayer a reference to the repetition implied by the narrated form, which—as we have already remarked—draws attention to itself by the silence that follows these very words.

As I promised in the Introduction, the method of this dissertation has been primarily an intensive one, analyzing the images and argument and formal acoustic patterns from within the text, while generally shying away from its richly allusive character, which has already been well-documented. I have made this one major exception to consider the Biblical allusions of the first few pages and the several allusions to Christian liturgical language not only because it is the only way to definitively put to rest the ubiquitous insistence that the *Consolation* contains only one, or at most a few, references to Christian Scripture and practice, but also because these allusions provide a powerful subtext for the central claim of this dissertation.

I do not raise these matters in order to argue that the *Consolation's* allusiveness to Christian scripture and ritual are somehow the key to unlocking an esoteric, exclusively Christian message. That would be wholly contrary to Boethius' method and to the spirit of his intellect, whether as the author of the *Consolation*, the *Tractates*, or of the quadrivial or logical treatises. The argument of this dissertation is evidently in no

way dependent on the accuracy of these allusions or on the subtext they suggest. We can perhaps conjecture that to the Christian listener these allusions would serve as an invitation to the *Consolation* as a liturgical act; that is, to the memory already shaped by the Christian scriptures and liturgy, these allusions intimate the practice of *memoria* the text will engage, and do so specifically in terms of Christian revelation and ritual.<sup>341</sup> But perhaps what is most remarkable about these allusions is that they are not part of the rhythmic system by which the text shapes the listener's memory and through which it primarily establishes its character as liturgical prayer. This universal *Sapientia* accomplishes her liturgical purpose not principally by means of Scripture but by mastery of the poetic rhythms of the pagan world.

The pervasive inter-relation and similarity of these textual modes is perhaps a reminder that we should not worry ourselves overly much about the precise relation of the Platonic and Christian or the religious and philosophical aspects of the text. For Boethius, *Philosophia* and *Sapientia* were one and the same, and—as for the ancients generally—philosophy was religious and religion was philosophical.<sup>342</sup>

But whatever we do, we ought not to let the esoteric character of these Biblical allusions, or any other allusions or, for that matter, of the rhythmic system, or of any other underlying structures, no matter how impressive they may be—distract us from the *Consolation's* total purity of purpose, which has plainly spoken to its listening

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<sup>341</sup> Indeed, Cabaniss suggests the “*fortiter suaviterque*” “quotation is presumably unconscious, being simply a rhythmical and haunting phrase recalled by the prisoner from his memory of the liturgy.” Cabaniss, “A Note on the Date of the Great Advent Antiphons,” 441-442. I don't think we have to suggest the quotation is only unconscious—as to do so is precisely to deny the relation of unconscious and conscious that lies at the heart of memory as craft. See Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought* and Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, esp. 234-249.

<sup>342</sup> See, for example (all from the same volume): Kevin Corrigan, “Body and Soul in Ancient Religious Experience,” in *Classic Mediterranean Spirituality*, ed. A. H. Armstrong, *World Spirituality: An Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest* (New York: Crossroad, 1986); Pierre Hadot, “Neoplatonist Spirituality: Plotinus and Porphyry”; and H.D. Saffrey, “Neoplatonist Spirituality: Iamblichus to Proclus and Damascius.”

readers for fifteen hundred years. This purpose is consolation. Consolation is the end of every word, every song, every argument. And for all its readerly designs, it is a text pervaded by a gaping and painful honesty. The consolation is for the author, a man stripped of everything he once knew as his own, and who knew his death might be as near and as brutal, as it actually was. The only record we have of his time in prison is the *Consolation of Philosophy*. Its difference from his other works is unmistakable, and he encourages us to see this difference as the result of his imprisonment. The difference is this: it is not the abstract theory of music, poetry, rhetoric, mathematics or theology, but their embodied practice. His theoretical mastery of all these is omnipresent, but this rational grasp was not adequate. The plain meaning of the work, and the incontestable source of its power, is that it speaks to the whole soul—sense, imagination, reason, and intellect.

We have seen that this consolation culminates in a vision of divine knowledge. This vision reveals that the divine life comprehends the fragmented particularity of time, every human activity and all created things. This is to look from above. The same truth, viewed from below, is that the divine gaze radically grounds and affirms—that is to say—consoles, every level of the prisoner's soul. His every temporal, divided moment is a revelation of divine activity; *he* is *amor*, turning, returning. *Philosophia* reveals the eternal in the temporal by redeeming *his* life in all its broken particularity. In this consolation, the ancient wisdom is not subordinated or overcome, but ever so subtly rewoven so as to reveal the mystery that remains unspoken. It is a redemption that takes place by means of words heard in the flesh and thus manifests an Incarnate Word—the rhythms of Philosophy's poetry especially so, as they shape the prisoner,

syllable by repeated syllable, to a pattern of heavenly design. And therefore, though the *Consolation* is a stunning example of the aural existence of ancient and medieval texts, it is much more than this as well. Philosophy takes the rhythms of the ancient world and transposes them into a divine song, a poetic liturgy that heals body and soul.

## FIGURES

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Figure 1. Joachim Gruber, Meters and their Recurrence.<sup>343</sup>

Überblick über die Gedichte der Consolatio

Gedicht	Metrum	Verknüpfung
1,1	Hexameter / Pentameter	←
1,2	3 da ^ + 2 da ^ (Adoneus)	
1,3	6 da ^ (Hexameter) / 4 da	
1,4	Phalaeceus	←
1,5	2 an	
1,6	Glyconeus	←
1,7	2 da ^ (Adoneus)	
2,1	Hinkiambus	←
2,2	Asclepiadeus minor / Pherecrateus	
2,3	Sapphischer Elfsilbler / Glyconeus	←
2,4	2 ia ^ / Pherecrateus	
2,5	2 an ^ (Paroemiacus)	←
2,6	Sapphischer Elfsilbler	
2,7	3 ia / 2 ia	←
2,8	Glyconeus	
3,1	Metrum Faliscum	←
3,2	2 an	
3,3	3 ia / Pentameter	←
3,4	Phalaeceus / Alkäischer Zehnsilbler	
3,5	2 an ^ (Paroemiacus)	←
3,6	4 da ^ + 2 io	
3,7	2 io	←
3,8	Asclepiadeus minor / 2 ia	
3,9	Hexameter	←
3,10	Phalaeceus / ab 4 Sapphischer Elfsilbler	
3,11	Hinkiambus	←
3,12	Glyconeus	
4,1	4 da / 2 ia	←
4,2	2 tro + 2 io	
4,3	Glyconeus	←
4,4	Phalaeceus / Pentameter	
4,5	3 tro ^ + 2 da ^ / 3 ia ^ + 2 da ^	←
4,6	2 an	
4,7	Sapphischer Elfsilbler (Klausel: Adoneus)	←
5,1	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5,2	4 da ^	←
5,3	2 an (Klausel: Adoneus)	
5,4	Glyconeus	←
5,5	4 da + ith	

<sup>343</sup> Gruber, *Kommentar zu Boethius*. The chart occurs between pages 20 and 21. Used with permission.

Figure 2. Gruber, Meters and their Recurrence (translated).<sup>344</sup>

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter Catalectic / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

<sup>344</sup> For the English names of meters, I have used those given by James J. O'Donnell in his Bryn Mawr Latin Commentary (Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae*, ed O'Donnell).

Figure 3. Repetition by Poem, Elegaic Couplets.

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter Catalectic / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 4. Repetition by Poem, Limping Iambic Trimeter, or Choliamb.

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	←
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter Catalectic / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	←
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 5. Repetition by Poem, Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic.

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter Catalectic / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	←
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	←
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 6. Repetition by Poem, Sapphic Hendecasyllable.

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter Catalectic / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 7. Repetition by Poem, Anapaestic Dimeter.

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	←
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter Catalectic / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	←
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	←
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	←
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 8. Repetition by Poem, Glyconic.

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	←
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter Catalectic / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	←
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	←
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic <sup>345</sup>	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	←
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

<sup>345</sup> On the exclusion of 4, III from the glyconic repetition, see p. 146 and n. 167.

Figure 9. All Repetitions by Poem, in Color.

Poem	Meter	Repetition	
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	←	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic		
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter		
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable		
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter		←
1, VI	Glyconic	←	
I, VII	Adonic	←	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter		
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic		
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic		
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter Catalectic / Pherecratic		
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	←	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	←	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	←	
2, VIII	Glyconic		
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)		
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter		←
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter		
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	←	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic		
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter		
3, VII	Anacastic Ionic Dimeter		
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter		
3, IX	Hexameter	←	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter		
3, XII	Glyconic		
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter		←
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter		
4, III	Glyconic		
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter		
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic		
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter		
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	←	
5, II	Tetrameter	←	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter		
5, IV	Glyconic		
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic		

Figure 10. Gruber's Metric Overview (symmetrical inconsistencies noted with dotted lines).

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	←
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	←
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	←
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	←
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	←
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	←
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	←
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	←
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	←
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	←
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	←
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	←
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	←
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	←
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	←
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	←
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	←
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	←

Figure 11. Hexameter, All Occurrences.

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 12. Pentameter, All Occurrences.

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / <b>Pentameter</b>	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / <b>Pentameter</b>	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / <b>Pentameter</b>	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / <b>Pentameter</b>	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 13. Phalacean Hendecasyllable, All Occurrences.

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	
I, VII	Adonic	
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 14. Repetition by Line, Hexameter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	
→	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	→	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter		
2, VIII	Glyconic		
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)		
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter		
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter		
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable		
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic		
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter		
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter		
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter		
→	3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter		
3, XII	Glyconic		
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter		
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter		
4, III	Glyconic		
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter		
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic		
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter		
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
→	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter		
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter		
5, IV	Glyconic		
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic		

Figure 15. Repetition by Line, Pentameter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
● →	1, I	Hexameter / <b>Pentameter</b>
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
● →	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / <b>Pentameter</b>
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
● →	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / <b>Pentameter</b>
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
● →	5, I	Hexameter / <b>Pentameter</b>
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 16. Repetition by Line, Tetrameter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / <b>Tetrameter</b>
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	<b>Tetrameter</b> (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anacletic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	<b>Tetrameter</b> / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	<b>Tetrameter</b>
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 17. Repetition by Line, Phalacean Hendecasyllable.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 18. Repetition by Line, Anapaestic Dimeter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 19. Repetition by Line, Glyconic.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 20. Repetition by Line, Limping Iambic Trimeter, or Choliamb.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 21. Repetition by Line, Lesser Asclepiad.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 22. Repetition by Line, Pherecratic.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 23. Repetition by Line, Sapphic Hendecasyllable.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 24. Repetition Line, Iambic Dimeter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 25. Repetition by Line, Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 26. Repetition by Line, Iambic Trimeter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter
	2, VIII	Glyconic
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter
	3, IX	Hexameter
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	3, XII	Glyconic
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter
	4, III	Glyconic
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	5, II	Tetrameter
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter
	5, IV	Glyconic
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic

Figure 27. Repetition by Line, All Meters.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter
	1, VI	Glyconic
	I, VII	Adonic
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
5, II	Tetrameter	
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 28. Repetition by Poem (3, IX centerpoint, exceptions shown with dotted lines).

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	←
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	←
I, VII	Adonic	←
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	←
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	←
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	←
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	←
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	←
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	←
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	←
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	←
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	←
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	←
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	←
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	←
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	←
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	←
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	←
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	←
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	←
5, II	Tetrameter	←
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	←
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	←

Figure 29. Repetition by Poem (3, V centerpoint).

Poem	Meter	Repetition
1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	←
1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
1, VI	Glyconic	←
I, VII	Adonic	←
2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	←
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	←
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	←
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	←
2, VIII	Glyconic	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	←
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	←
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	←
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	←
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	←
3, IX	Hexameter	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	←
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
3, XII	Glyconic	←
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	←
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
4, III	Glyconic	←
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	←
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	←
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	←
5, II	Tetrameter	←
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
5, IV	Glyconic	←
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	←

Figure 30. Repetitions by Line and by Poem, Anapaestic Dimeter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 31. Repetitions by Line and by Poem, Limping Iambic Trimeter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 32. Repetitions by Line and by Poem, Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 33. Repetitions by Line and by Poem, Sapphic Hendecasyllable.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 34. Repetition by Line, Hexameter, First Occurrence.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 35. Repetition by Line, Hexameter, First Two Occurrences.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 36. Repetition by Line, Hexameter, First Three Occurrences.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 37. Repetition by Line, Hexameter and Pentameter, with Repetition by Poem, Hexameter/Pentameter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 38. Repetitions by Line and by Poem, All Meters (shown in counterpoint).

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter Catalectic / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 39. Repetitions by Line and by Poem, All Meters (in counterpoint, duplicates excluded).

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 40. Repetition by Line, Hexameter, with Repetition by Poem, Hexameter/Pentameter.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 41. Repetition by Line, First 2 Occurrences of Hexameter. Pentameter indirectly recalled.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 42. Repetition by Line, First 3 Occurrences of Hexameter, with its paired meters.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 43. Repetition by Line, First 3 Occurrences of Hexameter, with all instances of its paired meters.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 44. 3, IX, Repetitions and Indirect Associations.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 45. 3, IX, Repetitions and Indirect Associations (cont'd).

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
● →	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
● →	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 46. 3, IX, Repetitions and Indirect Associations (cont'd).

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
● →	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
● →	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
● →	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
● →	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
● →	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
● →	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
● →	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
● →	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
● →	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
● →	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
● →	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
● →	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
● →	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
● →	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
● →	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
● →	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
● →	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
● →	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
● →	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
● →	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 47. 3, IX, Repetitions and Indirect Associations (complete).

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
● →	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	● →
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic		
2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic		
2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic		
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter		
2, VIII	Glyconic	● →	
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)		
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter		
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter		
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable		
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic		
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter		
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter		
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter		
3, IX	Hexameter	● →	
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter		
3, XII	Glyconic		
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter		
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter		
4, III	Glyconic		
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter		
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic		
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter		
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter		● →
5, II	Tetrameter		
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter		
5, IV	Glyconic		
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic		

Figure 48. 5, I, Repetitions and Indirect Associations.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	1, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 49. 5, I, Repetitions and Indirect Associations (cont'd).

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 50. 5, I, Repetitions and Indirect Associations (complete).

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
●	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	← ●
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter		
2, VIII	Glyconic		
3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)		
3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter		
3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter		
3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable		
3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic		
3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter		
3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter		
3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter		
3, IX	Hexameter		
3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter		
3, XII	Glyconic		
4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter		
4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter		
4, III	Glyconic		
4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter		
4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic		
4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter		
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	← ●	
5, II	Tetrameter		
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter		
5, IV	Glyconic		
5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic		

Figure 51. The seven poems not included in either Repetition by Poem or by Line.

Repetition by Line	Poem	Meter	Repetition by Poem
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	1, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 52. 1, II, Repeated Elements.

Repetition -- uu -- uu --	Poem	Meter	Repetition -- u u -- --
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 53. Repetition by Element, 1, II.

Repetition -- uu -- uu --	Poem	Meter	Repetition -- u u -- --
	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic	
	1, III	Hexameter / Tetrameter	
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable	
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	1, VI	Glyconic	
	I, VII	Adonic	
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic	
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic	
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic	
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter	
	2, VIII	Glyconic	
	3, I	Tetrameter (meiuric)	
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter	
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable	
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic	
	3, VI	Tetrameter (catalectic) + Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter	
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter	
	3, IX	Hexameter	
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable	
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter	
	3, XII	Glyconic	
	4, I	Tetrameter / Iambic Dimeter	
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + Ionic Dimeter	
	4, III	Glyconic	
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter	
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic	
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable (final line)	
	5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter	
	5, II	Tetrameter	
	5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter	
	5, IV	Glyconic	
	5, V	Tetrameter + Ithyphallic	

Figure 54. Repetition by Element, II, IV (shown with rhythmic notation).

Repetition -- uu -- uu --	Poem	Meter	Repetition -- u u ---
(possibilities noted only once per line)	1, I	-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	1, II	-- uu -- uu --    -- u u ---	
	1, III	-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- u u	
	1, IV	--- u u -- x -- u ---	
	1, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	1, VI	--- u u -- u --	
	I, VII	-- u u ---	
	2, I	uu -- u uu -- <sup>^</sup> u -- u -- x ---	
	2, II	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / uu --- u u ---	
	2, III	-- u --- <sup>^</sup> u u -- u --- / --- u u -- u --	
	2, IV	uu -- u -- u --- / --- u u ---	
	2, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	2, VI	-- u --- <sup>^</sup> u u -- u ---	
	2, VII	x -- u uu x <sup>^</sup> uu u uu x -- u -- / x -- u -- x -- u --	
	2, VIII	--- u u -- u --	
	3, I	-- u u -- u u -- u u u --	
	3, II	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	3, III	x -- u -- x <sup>^</sup> -- u -- x -- u -- -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	3, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u u -- u u -- u ---	
	3, V	uu (-- uu -- u u --) --	
	3, VI	-- uu -- uu -- uu -- uu --- uu ---	
	3, VII	u u -- u -- u ---	
	3, VIII	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / x -- u --- u --	
	3, IX	-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu -- u u ---	
	3, X	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u --- <sup>^</sup> u u -- u ---	
	3, XI	x -- u -- x <sup>^</sup> -- u -- x ---	
	3, XII	--- u u -- u --	
	4, I	-- uu -- uu -- uu -- u x / x -- u -- x -- u --	
	4, II	-- u -- x -- u -- x uu --- u u ---	
	4, III	-- u -- u u -- u --	
	4, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	4, V	-- u -- uu --- u u --- / x -- u uu --- u u ---	
	4, VI	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	4, VII	-- u --- <sup>^</sup> u u -- u --- / -- u u --- (final)	
	5, I	-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	5, II	-- uu -- uu (-- u u ---)	
	5, III	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	5, IV	--- u u -- u --	
	5, V	-- u u -- u u -- u u -- u u -- u ---	

Figure 55. Repetition by Element, 1, VII.

Poem	Meter	Repetition -- u u ---
1, I	-- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	← ●
1, II	-- uu -- uu --    -- u u ---	← ●
1, III	-- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- u u	← ●
1, IV	--- u u -- x -- u ---	
1, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
1, VI	--- u u -- u --	
I, VII	-- u u ---	← ●
2, I	uu -- u uu -- ^ u -- u -- x ---	
2, II	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / uu --- u u ---	← ●
2, III	-- u --- ^ u u -- u --- / --- u u -- u --	
2, IV	uu -- u -- u --- / --- u u ---	← ●
2, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	← ●
2, VI	-- u --- ^ u u -- u ---	
2, VII	x -- u uu x ^ uu u uu x -- u -- / x -- u -- x -- u --	
2, VIII	--- u u -- u --	
3, I	-- u u -- u u -- u u u --	
3, II	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
3, III	x -- u -- x ^ -- u -- x -- u -- -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
3, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u u -- u u -- u ---	
3, V	uu -- uu -- u u ---	← ●
3, VI	-- uu -- uu -- uu -- uu --- uu ---	← ●
3, VII	u u -- u -- u --	
3, VIII	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / x -- u --- u --	
3, IX	-- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- uu -- u u ---	← ●
3, X	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u --- ^ u u -- u ---	
3, XI	x -- u -- x ^ -- u -- x ---	
3, XII	--- u u -- u --	
4, I	-- uu -- uu -- uu -- u x / x -- u -- x -- u --	
4, II	-- u -- x -- u -- x uu --- u u ---	← ●
4, III	-- u -- u u -- u --	
4, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
4, V	-- u -- uu --- u u --- / x -- u uu --- u u ---	← ●
4, VI	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
4, VII	-- u --- ^ u u -- u --- / -- u u --- (last)	← ●
5, I	-- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	← ●
5, II	-- uu -- uu -- u u ---	← ●
5, III	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
5, IV	--- u u -- u --	
5, V	-- u u -- u u -- u u -- u u -- u --	

Figure 56. Repetition by Element, 3, VI.

Repetition <b>Tetrameter</b>	Poem	Meter	Repetition <b>Ionic Dimeter</b>	
(As noted above, syllables of fourth foot vary)	1, I	Hexameter / Pentameter		
	1, II	Hemiepes + Adonic		
	1, III	Hexameter / <b>Tetrameter</b>		
	1, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable		
	1, V	Anapaestic Dimeter		
	1, VI	Glyconic		
	1, VII	Adonic		
	2, I	Limping Iambic Trimeter		
	2, II	Lesser Asclepiad / Pherecratic		
	2, III	Sapphic Hendecasyllable / Glyconic		
	2, IV	Iambic Dimeter (catalectic) / Pherecratic		
	2, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic		
	2, VI	Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
	2, VII	Iambic Trimeter / Iambic Dimeter		
	2, VIII	Glyconic		
	3, I	<b>Tetrameter</b> (meiuric)		
	3, II	Anapaestic Dimeter		
	3, III	Iambic Trimeter / Pentameter		
	3, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Alcaic Decasyllable		
	3, V	Anapaestic Dimeter Catalectic		
	3, VI	<b>Tetrameter</b> (catalectic) + <b>Ionic Dimeter</b>		
	3, VII	Anaclastic Ionic Dimeter		
	3, VIII	Lesser Asclepiad / Iambic Dimeter		
	3, IX	Hexameter		
	3, X	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Sapphic Hendecasyllable		
	3, XI	Limping Iambic Trimeter		
	3, XII	Glyconic		
	4, I	<b>Tetrameter</b> / Iambic Dimeter		
	4, II	Trochaic Dimeter + <b>Ionic Dimeter</b>		
	4, III	Glyconic		
	4, IV	Phalacean Hendecasyllable / Pentameter		
	4, V	Trochee + Adonic / Iamb + Adonic		
	4, VI	Anapaestic Dimeter		
4, VII	Sapphic Hendecasyllable			
5, I	Hexameter / Pentameter			
5, II	<b>Tetrameter</b>			
5, III	Anapaestic Dimeter			
5, IV	Glyconic			
5, V	<b>Tetrameter</b> + Ithyphallic			

Figure 57. Repetition by Element, 3, VI (cont'd).

Repetition -- uu -- uu -- and -- uu -- uu -- uu xx(x)	Poem	Meter	Repetition -- u u --- and --- u u ---
(Possibilities noted only once per line)	1, I	(-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu) -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	1, II	-- uu -- uu --    -- u u ---	
	1, III	(-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu) -- u u --- / (-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- u u)	
	1, IV	--- u u -- x -- u ---	
	1, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	1, VI	--- u u -- u --	
	I, VII	-- u u ---	
	2, I	uu -- u uu -- <sup>^</sup> u -- u -- x ---	
	2, II	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / uu -- -- u u ---	
	2, III	-- u --- <sup>^</sup> u u -- u --- / x -- u u -- u --	
	2, IV	uu -- u -- u --- / --- u u ---	
	2, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	2, VI	-- u --- <sup>^</sup> u u -- u ---	
	2, VII	x -- u uu x <sup>^</sup> uu u uu x -- u -- / x -- u -- x -- u --	
	2, VIII	--- u u -- u --	
	3, I	(-- u u -- u u -- u u u --)	
	3, II	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	3, III	x -- u -- x <sup>^</sup> -- u -- x -- u -- -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	3, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u u -- u u -- u ---	
	3, V	uu (-- uu -- u u --) --	
	3, VI	(-- uu -- uu -- uu -- uu) (--- uu ---)	
	3, VII	u u -- u -- u ---	
	3, VIII	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / x -- u --- u --	
	3, IX	(-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu) -- u u ---	
	3, X	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u --- <sup>^</sup> u u -- u ---	
	3, XI	x -- u -- x <sup>^</sup> -- u -- x ---	
	3, XII	--- u u -- u --	
	4, I	(-- uu -- uu -- uu -- u x) / x -- u -- x -- u --	
	4, II	-- u -- x -- u -- x uu (--- u u ---)	
	4, III	-- u -- u u -- u --	
	4, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	4, V	-- u -- uu -- -- u u --- / x -- u uu -- -- u u ---	
	4, VI	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	4, VII	-- u --- <sup>^</sup> u u -- u --- / -- u u --- (final)	
	5, I	(-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu) -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	5, II	(-- uu -- uu -- u u ---)	
	5, III	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -	
	5, IV	x -- u u -- u --	
	5, V	(-- u u -- u u -- u u -- u u) -- u -- u ---	

Figure 58. Repetition by Element, 3, VII.

Repetition <b>u u - u</b>	Poem	Meter	Repetition <b>-- u ---</b>
(possibilities noted only once per line)			
	1, I	-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	1, II	-- uu -- uu --    -- u u ---	
	1, III	-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- u u	
	1, IV	--- u u -- x -- u ---	←
	1, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu --	
	1, VI	--- u u -- u --	
	I, VII	-- u u ---	
	2, I	uu -- u uu -- <sup>^</sup> -- u -- x ---	
	2, II	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / uu --- u u ---	
	2, III	-- u --- <sup>^</sup> (u u -- u) --- / x --- u u -- u --	←
	2, IV	uu -- u -- -- u --- / --- u u ---	←
	2, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu --	
	2, VI	-- u --- <sup>^</sup> (u u -- u) ---	←
	2, VII	x -- u uu x <sup>^</sup> uu u uu x -- u -- / x -- u -- x -- u --	
	2, VIII	--- u u -- u --	
	3, I	-- u u -- u u -- u u u --	
	3, II	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu --	
	3, III	x -- u -- x <sup>^</sup> -- u -- x -- u -- -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	3, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u u -- u u -- u ---	←
	3, V	uu -- uu -- u u ---	
	3, VI	-- uu -- uu -- uu -- uu --- uu ---	
	3, VII	u u -- u -- u ---	←
	3, VIII	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / x -- u -- --- u --	
	3, IX	-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu -- u u ---	
	3, X	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u --- <sup>^</sup> (u u -- u) ---	←
	3, XI	x -- u -- x <sup>^</sup> -- u -- x ---	
	3, XII	--- u u -- u --	
	4, I	-- uu -- uu -- uu -- u x / x -- u -- x -- u --	
	4, II	-- u -- x -- u -- x uu --- u u ---	
	4, III	-- u -- u u -- u --	
	4, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	←
	4, V	-- u -- uu --- u u --- / x -- u uu --- u u ---	←
	4, VI	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu --	
	4, VII	-- u --- <sup>^</sup> u u -- u --- / -- u u --- (last)	
	5, I	-- uu -- uu -- <sup>^</sup> uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --	
	5, II	-- uu -- uu ( -- u u --- )	
	5, III	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu --	
	5, IV	x --- u u -- u --	
	5, V	-- u u -- u u -- u u -- u u -- u ---	←

Figure 59. Repetition by Element, 4, II.

Repetition $x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } x$	Poem	Meter	Repetition $\text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } \text{--}$ or $\text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } \text{--}$
	1, I	$\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --}^\wedge \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --} \parallel \text{-- } uu \text{ -- } uu \text{ --}$	← ●
	1, II	$\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --} \parallel \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	← ●
	1, III	$\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --}^\wedge \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --}^\wedge \underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \text{ } u$	← ●
	1, IV	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	
	1, V	$\underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \parallel \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \text{ --}$	
	1, VI	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	I, VII	$\text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	← ●
	2, I	$\underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \underline{uu} \text{ --}^\wedge \text{-- } u \text{ -- } x \text{ --} \text{--} \text{--}$	
	2, II	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \parallel \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} /$ $\underline{uu} \text{ --} \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	← ●
	2, III	$\text{-- } u \text{ --} \text{--}^\wedge u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--} /$ $x \text{ --} \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	2, IV	$\underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{-- } u \text{ --} \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	← ●
	2, V	$\underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \parallel \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \text{ --}$	← ●
	2, VI	$\text{-- } u \text{ --} \text{--}^\wedge u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	
→ ●	2, VII	$x \text{ -- } u \underline{uu} x^\wedge \underline{uu} u \underline{uu} x \text{ -- } u \text{ --} /$ $x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
→ ●	2, VIII	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	3, I	$\text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --}$	
	3, II	$\underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \parallel \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \text{ --}$	
→ ●	3, III	$x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } x^\wedge \text{-- } u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$ $\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --} \parallel \text{-- } uu \text{ -- } uu \text{ --}$	
	3, IV	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	
	3, V	$\underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	← ●
	3, VI	$\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ (} \text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ --} \text{--)}$	← ●
	3, VII	$u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	
	3, VIII	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \parallel \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} /$ $x \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--} \text{-- } u \text{ --}$	
	3, IX	$\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --}^\wedge \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	← ●
	3, X	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } u \text{ --} \text{--}^\wedge u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	
→ ●	3, XI	$x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } x^\wedge \text{-- } u \text{ -- } x \text{ --} \text{--}$	
	3, XII	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	
→ ●	4, I	$\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \text{ } x /$ $x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
→ ●	4, II	$\text{-- } u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } x \underline{uu} \text{ (} \text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ --} \text{--)}$	← ●
	4, III	$\text{-- } u \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	
	4, IV	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --} \parallel \text{-- } uu \text{ -- } uu \text{ --}$	
	4, V	$\text{-- } u \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --} \parallel \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--} /$ $x \text{ -- } u \underline{uu} \text{ --} \parallel \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	← ●
	4, VI	$\underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \parallel \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \text{ --}$	
	4, VII	$\text{-- } u \text{ --} \text{--}^\wedge u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--} / \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--} \text{(last)}$	← ●
	5, I	$\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --}^\wedge \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ --} \parallel \text{-- } uu \text{ -- } uu \text{ --}$	← ●
	5, II	$\text{-- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } \underline{uu} \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	← ●
	5, III	$\underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \parallel \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \underline{uu} \text{ --}$	
	5, IV	$x \text{ --} \text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	
	5, V	$\text{-- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ -- } u \text{ } u \text{ --}$	

Figure 60. Repetition by Element, 4, V.

Repetition $x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } x$ and $u \text{ - - - -}$	Poem	Meter	Repetition $\text{-- } u \text{ u } \text{-- } \text{--}$ and $\text{-- } u \text{ u } \text{-- } \text{--}$
	1, I	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } ^\wedge u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- }    \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ --}$	
	1, II	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- }    \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	1, III	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } ^\wedge u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } ^\wedge u u \text{ -- } u u$	
	1, IV	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	1, V	$u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ }    \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } \text{--}$	
	1, VI	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	I, VII	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	2, I	$u u \text{ -- } u u u \text{ --} ^\wedge u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	2, II	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- }    \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} /$ $u u \text{ -- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	2, III	$\text{-- } u \text{ -- } \text{-- } \text{--} ^\wedge u u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } \text{--} /$ $x \text{ -- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	2, IV	$u u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } \text{-- } u \text{ -- } \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	2, V	$u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ }    \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } \text{--}$	
	2, VI	$\text{-- } u \text{ -- } \text{-- } \text{--} ^\wedge u u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	2, VII	$x \text{ -- } u \text{ } u u \text{ } x \text{ } ^\wedge u u \text{ } u u \text{ } x \text{ -- } u \text{ --} /$ $x \text{ -- } (u \text{ -- } x \text{ --}) u \text{ --}$	
	2, VIII	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	3, I	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u u \text{ --}$	
	3, II	$u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ }    \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } \text{--}$	
	3, III	$x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } x \text{ } ^\wedge u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$ $\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- }    \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ --}$	
	3, IV	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	3, V	$u(u \text{ -- } u u \text{ --}) u u \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	3, VI	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ (} \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--})$	
	3, VII	$u u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	3, VIII	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- }    \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} /$ $x \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } \text{-- } u \text{ --}$	
	3, IX	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ --} ^\wedge u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--} \text{--}$ $\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } u \text{ -- } \text{-- } \text{--} ^\wedge u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	3, XI	$x \text{ -- } (u \text{ -- } x \text{ } ^\wedge \text{--}) u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	3, XII	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	4, I	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u x /$ $x \text{ -- } (u \text{ -- } x \text{ --}) u \text{ --}$	
	4, II	$\text{-- } (u \text{ -- } x \text{ -- } u) \text{ -- } x u u \text{ (} \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--})$	
	4, III	$\text{-- } u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	4, IV	$\text{-- } \text{-- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- }    \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ --}$	
	4, V	$\text{-- } u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- }    \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--} /$ $x \text{ -- } u u u \text{ -- }    \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--}$	
	4, VI	$u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ }    \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } \text{--}$	
	4, VII	$\text{-- } u \text{ -- } \text{-- } \text{--} ^\wedge u u \text{ -- } u \text{ -- } \text{--} / \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--}$ (last)	
	5, I	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ --} ^\wedge u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } \text{--} /$ $\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- }    \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ --}$	
	5, II	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ --}$	
	5, III	$u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ }    \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } u u \text{ } \text{--}$	
	5, IV	$x \text{ -- } \text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --}$	
	5, V	$\text{-- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u u \text{ -- } u \text{ --} \text{--}$	

Figure 61. Repetition by Element, 5, V (at least one element present in every poem).

Poem	Meter
1, I	-- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --
1, II	-- uu -- uu --    -- u u ---
1, III	-- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- u u
1, IV	--- u u -- x -- u ---
1, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -
1, VI	--- u u -- u --
I, VII	-- u u ---
2, I	uu -- u uu -- ^ -- u -- x ---
2, II	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / uu --- u u ---
2, III	-- u --- ^ u u -- u --- / x -- u u -- u --
2, IV	uu -- u --- u --- / --- u u ---
2, V	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu
2, VI	-- u --- ^ u u -- u ---
2, VII	x -- u uu x ^ uu u uu x -- u -- / x -- u -- x -- u --
2, VIII	--- u u -- u --
3, I	-- u u -- u u -- u u --
3, II	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -
3, III	x -- u -- x ^ -- u -- x -- u -- -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --
3, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u u -- u u -- u ---
3, V	uu -- uu -- u u ---
3, VI	-- uu -- uu -- uu -- uu (--- uu ---)
3, VII	u u -- u -- u ---
3, VIII	--- u u --    -- u u -- u -- / x -- u --- u --
3, IX	-- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- uu -- u u ---
3, X	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- u --- ^ u u -- u ---
3, XI	x -- u -- x ^ -- u -- x ---
3, XII	--- u u -- u --
4, I	-- uu -- uu -- uu -- u x / x -- u -- x -- u --
4, II	-- u -- x -- u -- x uu (--- u u ---)
4, III	-- u -- u u -- u --
4, IV	--- u u -- u -- u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --
4, V	-- u -- uu --    -- u u --- / x -- u uu --    -- u u ---
4, VI	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -
4, VII	-- u --- ^ u u -- u --- / -- u u --- (last)
5, I	-- uu -- uu -- ^ uu -- uu -- u u --- / -- uu -- uu --    -- uu -- uu --
5, II	-- uu -- uu -- u u ---
5, III	uu uu uu uu    uu uu uu -
5, IV	x -- u u -- u --
5, V	-- u u -- u u -- u u -- u u -- u ---

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