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Taking Up Arms:

A Study of Ethnicity, Inequality, and Poverty as Predictors of Conflict

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An abstract of
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Abstract

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By Ayisha Tahir

Often previous studies have concluded that ethnicity has little significance in determining the onset of civil war. However, ethnicity is an important concept in ethnic conflict and we need to improve our analysis of why ethnicity matters by focusing on the conditional relationship of ethnicity. In this article, I will examine the effects that ethnicity has when it interacts with variables such as inequality and poverty. When there are other conditions present, ethnicity's role is heightened and matters when determining the onset of conflict. Additionally, I will be examining whether ethnicity, inequality, and poverty increase the severity of conflict once it has begun.

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"*My first exposure to murder occurred when I was eleven. This was in 1944, in the communal riots that characterized the last years of the British Raj, which ended in 1947. I saw a profusely bleeding unknown person suddenly stumbling through the gate to our garden, asking for help and a little water. While he was being rushed to the hospital in our car, Kader Mia told my father he had to go out in search of work, for a little income, because his family had nothing to eat. The penalty of necessity, caused by economic deprivation, turned out to be death. The terrible connection between economic poverty and comprehensive unfreedom (even the lack of freedom to live) was a profoundly shocking realization that hit my young mind with overpowering force…that Kader Mia, a Muslim day laborer, would be seen as having only one identity- that of being a member of the "enemy" community who "should" be assaulted and if possible killed- seemed altogether incredible. For a bewildered child, the violence of identity was extraordinarily hard to grasp.*"

- Amartya Sen

INTRODUCTION

Ethnicity is becoming an important topic to discuss in part because of the role ethnicity plays in the politics of various countries. But mostly, the significance can be attributed to the challenges that ethnicity creates in regards to state building and international relationships. As Donald Horowitz (2000) wrote "the importance of ethnic conflict, as a force shaping human affairs, as a phenomenon to be understood, as a threat to be controlled, can no longer be denied." Ethnic conflicts around the world bring pernicious results; they are responsible for thousands if not millions of deaths, destruction to nations' infrastructures, and devastation to several people. Studying ethnic conflict should not only take place because of the abundance of ethnic-related conflicts, but also because of the consequences that the conflicts bring.

Explanations that determine why conflict occurs are necessary because they allow us to examine the issues that shape ethnic politics. By continuing to improve and build on our theories we can establish potential sources of conflict. It is with these explanations that political scientists and other social scientists can use to resolve conflicts, and hopefully, even prevent them from occurring in the future. We have seen the powerful effects of resolving ethnic conflicts, such as in Northern Ireland and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The implications of ameliorating these conflicts are great. Finding approaches that include intergroup cooperation would be very beneficial towards achieving peace and stability in countries that include several ethnic groups (Horowitz 2000). Ethnic conflict studies have progressed into a multifaceted discipline. Many different academic circles have analyzed the issue within their respective specialty.

Hopefully, with these varied explanations we can find real solutions to the problems that exist in multiethnic nations.

The aim of my thesis is to investigate some of the more pressing questions that exist among the political science academy concerning ethnic conflict. I am interested in exploring the sources of the conflicts and more specifically, the motivations that ethnic groups have when they go to war with other groups. For the purposes of this study, I am primarily driven by what factors or conditions make conflict more likely to arise given the ethnic composition of the state. Do groups resort to violence when they are economically deprived? Are groups that economically unequal to other groups more likely to resort to arms?

Although my research is driven by what conditions make it more likely that groups will enter conflict, I will be limiting the scope of my research to testing whether certain factors (in this case poverty and inequality) increase the probability of a conflict. I am concerned with the theory or idea that groups that experience income disparity or have economic grievances are more attuned to resorting to violence. The example of India serves as an illustration of the point that I wish to make. Many of the groups, especially in India, have shown characteristics of being economically aggrieved. Thus, I was more inclined to believe that the groups were reacting against the more dominant and prosperous groups. Welfare economist Amartya Sen articulated this sentiment, "it is not hard to see that the injustice of inequality can generate intolerance and that the sufferings of poverty can provoke anger and fury" (Sen 2008). There is a considerable amount of evidence that links economic inactivity with political discord. One would only need to look at the current situations in Algeria, Egypt, Pakistan, and India to demonstrate this

connection. To further prove this point, the 2005 job riots in France demonstrated the frustration that French immigrants were experiencing when left with no job. These rioters attributed their aggravation with the French government to feelings of neglect and deprivation of any economic participation (Sen 2008).[1] Thus, the theory that poverty and inequality are determinants of political violence cannot and must not be put to rest. There is an abundance of information and examples that point to the relevance that the theory still holds.

I seek to demonstrate that poverty and inequality hold bearing in the discussion of ethnic group conflict. Although it is empirically understood that ethnicity itself does not explain the outcome of violence, ethnicity is still a significant component of conflict studies. I am primarily interested in the socio-economic influence of ethnicity. I believe that factors such as inequality and poverty elevate the role that ethnicity plays in determining conflict. The interactions between poverty and inequality with ethnicity shape the importance that ethnicity has on predicting violent conflicts. Poverty and inequality are two important factors that must not be ignored and should be tested to see how they shape ethnicity.

Amartya Sen (2008) argues that the connection between poverty, inequality, and violence remains to be an important one in part because of the theories put forth that assume that solving the problem of poverty could potentially end violence altogether. Many people have suggested the idea that the riddance of poverty mitigates incidents of violence. Sen writes that "given the visibility and public anxiety about wars and disorders, the indirect justification of poverty removal- not for its own sake but for

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[1] Sen (2008) argues that the French riots are examples of incidents that are hard to ignore and puts forth the idea that violence and poverty co-exist. He writes that "it is not at all unnatural to ask whether poverty kills twice- first through economic privation, and second through political carnage."

pursuing peace and quiet- has become, in recent years, a dominant part of the rhetoric of

fighting poverty" (Sen 2008). It is generally accepted that in order to tackle violent

protests or acts, governments must pursue actions that reduce or eradicate poverty

altogether.

Thus it is important to note, as Sen (2008) does, that poverty and inequality by

themselves do not create violence and instability, but that there are other forces at work.

This thesis seeks to make a connection between ethnic fractionalization or the presence of

a minority and majority ethnic groups and the prevalence of poverty and inequality. It is

with these measures that I hope to dispel any pretenses that poverty and inequality alone

are responsible for political violence. For instance, it is not enough to attribute high levels

of violence in Pakistan to poverty and lack of access to adequate resources without

mentioning the rise of religious fundamentalism in the country, the war in Afghanistan,

etc. Equally important is the source that laid the seed of fundamentalism. Often, poverty

and deprivation are interlinked with fundamentalism (Sen 2008).

My thesis seeks to make a link between identity and economics. I do not believe

that the two are isolated from each other. Identity, whether it is religious, ethnic,

linguistic, nationalistic, plays an instrumental part in the construction of groups. It is the

tie that binds people together. People throughout the world cast their votes and support

those with whom they share an ethnic similarity. "In Nigeria, a person's loyalty 'should

be to his region rather than to his country', and a child's 'should be taught to protect the

welfare of his own people and let other tribal groups look out for themselves'"

(Horowitz, 2000). Ethnic identity can be a factor in governing the behavior of a person or

people.[2] Although ethnic identity is the not the only rationalization of how people act and organize, it can be a significant factor in extremely divided societies (Horowitz, 2000).[3] As Horowitz explains, ethnic identity can permeate different spheres of society and can be rallying factor.

Identity

It is important to first address the role identity plays in ethnic group formation. Since I will be addressing ethnic group conflict, I find that it is necessary to first discuss what ethnic identity is and the role it has in ethnic conflict. Having a good foundation and understanding of ethnic identity will allow us the capability to adequately assess theories and concepts that are based on ethnic identity.

Before beginning the discussion of ethnic identity and politics, I would first like to define what I mean by "ethnic identity" and explain the criterion I am using and where it is coming from. For this thesis, I will primarily be pulling from a couple of sources to help me fully explain the concept of "ethnic identity." Horowitz defines this concept in his book as "established at birth for most group members…ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry, which usually carries with it traits believed to be innate (Horowitz,

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[2] Horowitz (2000) in his book *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* states that ethnic identity is not the sole factor in determining a particular group's actions. He points to the many bonds that multiethnic societies have. "Everywhere there exist buyers and sellers, officials and citizens, co-workers, and members of professions; all of these roles are to some degree independent of the ethnic origin of their incumbents."

[3] Horowitz (2000) writes that "ethnic affiliations can be compartmentalized-that is, their relevance can be limited to some spheres and contexts-there is nonetheless a tendency to seepage. In deeply divided societies, strong ethnic allegiances permeate organizations, activities, and roles to which they are formally unrelated. The permeative character of ethnic affiliations, by infusing so many sectors of social life, imparts a pervasive quality to ethnic conflict and raises sharply the stakes of ethnic politics." It is here that Horowitz is specifically referring to societies in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Caribbean.

52, 2008). Here Horowitz is trying to account for groups that are racially, nationally, and religiously related by highlighting the importance of the descent of a group. According to Vayrynen, Horowitz means that ethnic identity is established at birth and "ethnic group is a form of extended kin-group and as such fulfils certain individual needs (e.g. a need for security)" (Vayrynen 1999).[4]

Descent-based attributes include traits that were inherited genetically (such as skin color) and through cultural inheritance, such as birth place or the origins of one's family (Chandra 2006). Descent-based qualities can also be believed when in fact they might not be true. As Horowitz (2000) and Chandra (2006) explain, sometimes the traits can be fictionally attributed to an individual or group. Horowitz (2000) calls this fictionalized attribution "putative descent."

Horowitz (2000) places a lot of emphasis on the idea that ethnic identity is determined by birth. Although he admits that individuals can alter their identity and conform to another group, it is typically the case that an individual is born into a specific ethnic group. Horowitz (2000) does concede that identity involves components of both birth association as well as voluntary choice. What he means here is that although individuals are born into a group, the individual has a choice whether or not they want to self-identify. Birth determines whether an individual meets the requirements to be a part of the group. For ethnic groups, most members are determined by their birth. This is why Horowitz (2000) chose to highlight the importance of descent in determining membership

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[4] Political scientist Kanchan Chandra (2006) in the article "What is Ethnic Identity and Does it Matter?" contests Horowitz's definition as not adequately encompassing all the ethnic groups Horowitz recognizes in his study. For instance, Chandra notes that Horowitz "counts Hindus and Muslims in India, Christians and Muslims in Lebanon, Creoles and Indians in Guyana and Trinidad as ethnic categories, even though these groups do not possess his primary defining characteristic, namely a myth of common ancestry." Although Chandra's point is well noted, I will still use Horowitz's definition for my study since it is the mostly widely used and accepted.

of an ethnic group. Despite membership being based on birth, groups can and have altered their identity. For instance, Sikhs did this when they tried to disassociate themselves from Hinduism despite having been developed from Hinduism. They tried to end intermarriage and relations with the Hindus in order to establish themselves and create an entirely different descent group in India (Horowitz 2000).

Although the "kinship" that Horowitz (2000) discusses at length when describing ethnic identity carries fictional elements, it is important to note that the group's perception of its history and common traits are central to ethnic identity (Ronnquist 1999). In actuality, not all groups share a common heritage but the belief that groups do allows them to organize.

This definition of ethnic identity offers a glimpse into the logic that many groups use to classify and organize. Individuals tend to identify with groups that represent a commonality, whether it is gender, religion, nation, generation, ideological, or social class (Ellingsen 2000). According to Ellingsen (2000), the more bonds present between groups, the stronger they are affiliated with each other. However, Ellingsen does admit that affiliation is a more difficult term to define since ethnicity is not completely defined. Because race, religion, and language differ from one another in one state/region, it makes it more complicated to tie the two groups together. More specifically, a group that shares the same religion and language as another group can have a completely different set of interests than the other group. For instance a group of Muslims in India may have a different goals and interests than a group of Muslims in Pakistan. It is not enough that a group has the same race, religion, and language (Ellingsen 2000).

A definition of ethnicity is necessary in order to build theory and predict effects based on those theories. According to Chandra (2006), "claims as to why these variables matter for some outcome are always based on the assumption that ethnic identities have particular properties that explain the outcome." Although Chandra uses a slightly different definition for her study than other political scientists such as Horowitz, Fearon, and Laitin, her study confirms the theory that ethnic identity, (an independent variable) does not have a substantial effect in determining ethnic riots or violence. Chandra explains that there has to be other independent variables that interact with ethnic identity. My thesis will be dealing with the interactive relationship that ethnic identity has with other variables (poverty and inequality). Taking this observation into account, Chandra proposes that the theories of ethnic identity should not include some of the proposed effects i.e. conflict. For obvious reasons, Chandra rejects the explanatory aspect that has become a staple of ethnic identity.[5]

Why Do Groups Resort to Violence?

Knowing the role of identity in organizing groups allows us to seek answers for why these groups choose violence as a means of achieving their goals and interests. Although I am primarily interested in what factors or variables increase the likelihood of violence, I believe that it is vital to first address the question of: why violence? Why is it that groups do not choose other methods of obtaining their desired objectives? Violence

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[5] Chandra (2006) attempts to redefine ethnic identity as "a subset of identity categories in which eligibility for membership is determined by attributes associated with, descent (described here simply as descent-based attributes)." Chandra definition differs from previous definitions, such as Horowitz's, in that it differentiates "categories of membership and the attributes that qualify individuals for membership in that category." Additionally, Chandra's definition rids of the "common" characteristic that is present in other definitions.

often leads to disastrous results and "violence generally consumes men and goods, it seldom enhances them" (Gurr 1970).

Although it is not news that political violence has serious social implications, the frequency of political violence involving ethnic groups is one phenomenon that must not be ignored. Nearly two-thirds of conflicts that involve arms have an ethnic motivation associated with it (Toft 2003). Additionally, ethnic conflicts are two times more likely to break out in war over government control and four times more likely in an intra-state conflict (Toft 2003). Political scientist Ted Gurr provides a good discussion of ethnic groups that rebel and resort to violence as a method to achieve their goals. Conceptually, we will be employing Gurr's definition of political violence to understand conflict. Gurr (1970) defines political violence as "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors-including competing political groups as well as incumbents-or its policies" (Gurr 1970). Gurr's description includes "revolution, ordinarily defined as fundamental sociopolitical change accomplished through violence… guerilla wars, coup d'état, rebellions, and riots."[6] Gurr's characterization is adequate for this study because the definition encompasses all types and categories of political violence. I will be using data sets for my empirical analysis that include some of the categories that Gurr (1970) mentioned in his explanation.

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[6] Gurr's (1970) definition is expansive and includes provisions such as "force, the use or threat of violence by any party or institution to attain ends within or outside the political order." Gurr (1970) also clarifies his position by not "pre-judging" that violence is undesirable. "Like uses of violence qua force by the state, specific acts of political violence can be good, bad, or neutral according to the viewpoint of the observer… participants in political violence may value it as a means of expressing political demands or opposing undesirable policies…limited violence also can be useful for rulers and for a political system generally, especially as an expression of social malaise when other means for making demands are inadequate."

There is an abundance of information on the frequency of political violence; however, for my thesis I will be primarily focusing on the arguments that center on the ethnic motivations behind violence and economic incentives (poverty and inequality) that drive groups to resort to violence. I am concerned with a macroanalysis approach of political violence, determining what variables make political violence more likely to occur and the intensity of those events (Gurr 1970).

Important to the foundation and understanding of this study is Gurr's frustration-anger-aggression theory. The approach that I wish to test builds on Gurr's theory and thus it is important to outline the significance of it. Simply, this theory proposes that "the greater the frustration, the greater the quantity of aggression against the source of frustration" (Gurr 1970). The argument clearly addresses the motivations and the driving force behind some groups that resort to violence as a means of showcasing their frustration. In my study, I predict that this frustration arises because of the little economic opportunity that minority groups experience in comparison to the dominant or majority group. The "frustration-anger-aggression" idea postulates that the more frustration groups have the more likely they are to carry out severe, intense attacks (Gurr 1970). Less intense frustration correlates to short, less impactful attacks. Gurr (1970) also stipulates that attitude is a significant factor in the intensity of attacks. Low motivation means that groups will not resort to violence, especially if they are content with their current situation. In contrast to this, the more intense the feelings of deprivation are, the more likely that many people will be provoked to do something about their situations (Gurr 1970). However, the type of actions the group chooses may vary depending on the

situation and the opposition. For the purposes of my study, I will only be addressing those group actions that result in violence.

Gurr's (1970) frustration-anger-aggression theory also includes psychological components that better explain how and why actors respond to their frustrations.[7] Gurr (1970) outlines the path that this theory goes through to achieve its predicted outcome. First there is "the development of discontent, second the politicization of that discontent, and finally its actualization in violent action against political objects and actors." Gurr (1970) argues that the discontent aspect of the "relative deprivation" theory is what drives groups to violence. Gurr (1970) defines relative deprivation being the difference between the believed or "perceived" expectation of certain goods and the goods that they are able to attain given that they have the opportunity to attain them. If the "perceived" or deserved expectations exceed the actual ability to obtain those goods, then relative deprivation is present. Relative deprivation is a source in itself that is sufficient to encourage groups to act. Gurr (1970) argues that the greater the frustration or discontent, the more intense the reaction will be. Groups use their feelings of discontent to justify their violent actions towards those they believe to be responsible for these emotions Gurr (1970).[8]

Gurr (1970) writes that for intense violence to occur, the discontent has to be politicized or focused on the political system. The nature of the discontent is what determines the magnitude of the violence. Politicized violence often takes form in coups

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[7] Gurr (1970) explains that the psychological aspect of this theory is crucial because it allows scientists to link variables together. I agree with Gurr's motivation to include psychological explanations because it allows for one to understand the social relationships and identify some of the contentious sources that drive actors to react a certain way, in this case with violence.
[8] Gurr (1970) contends that the use of violence as a means to achieve desired goals can be seen as a separate motivation than that of political violence.

d'état, rebellions, and internal wars. The force that a regime exercises on opposition groups plays a crucial role in determining the intensity of a war. However, there are conditions that must be in place for groups to react against regimes; they must have adequate resources. If groups do not possess any kind of resources it is unlikely that they will react against the regime.

When groups of people feel deprived they are bound to create conflict. According to Lewis Coser's definition, conflict "is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals."[9] Conflict, as I see it, is the method that groups employ to realize their goals. Groups justify using force by arguing that their conditions will not change without it.

Deprivation can take form in economic opportunities not being realized and groups can use this as a motivation to revolt violently. There are many theories that make economic arguments for why groups resort to violence. Some of these include class theories. Class theories, according to Horowitz (2000), address the simple assumption that different classes have unique objectives when resorting to violence. However, some class conflicts do not tend to generate the same intensity that other economic conflicts do.[10]

The economic theory that drives the class based explanations of ethnic conflict is the idea that groups have competing interests and rivalries. Horowitz (2000) accredits the competitive nature to the division of labor for ethnic groups. Division of labor does not necessarily refer to the literal sense of labor, but that groups are concentrated in certain industries and that they dominate those industries (Horowitz 2000). Ethnic division of

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[9] Horowitz (2000) uses Lewis Coser's definition of conflict in his book Ethnic Groups in Conflict.
[10] Horowitz (2000) defines these low-intensity class conflicts between "businessmen vs. businessmen, businessmen vs. customer, and worker vs. worker."

labor dates back to colonial policies in certain states, but Horowitz also argues that immigration played a role in the division of labor. For instance, governments were willing to allow immigrants to come in with special skills that were deemed necessary. These immigrants came from underprivileged areas and were open to entering other markets to make a living even if it meant cheap labor. An example of this was in India, Punjabis and Pathans were employed in hard labor areas, Sikhs were primarily artisans, and Muslims were weavers (Horowitz 2000). The effects of colonial policy are present today and ethnic group divisions of labor still remain (Horowitz 2000).

Divisions in labor can cause some strife among differing groups. This is primarily due to competitive nature that is inherent in a system that determines labor by ethnic composition. Some of the trades that groups are involved in are likely to provide good economic opportunities while other trades may confine or constrict groups from progressing (Horowitz 2000).

Although class conflict theory is important, it does not fully explain the source of disagreement for many groups. Horowitz (2000) argues in favor of a theory he calls "group entitlement." Group entitlement is when groups believe that they deserve recognition. However, since recognition is earned through the political system, groups struggle to gain political legitimacy (Horowitz 2000). Competition to earn legitimacy can sprout conflict, especially among groups that are unranked (Horowitz 2000). Ethnic groups are motivated by fear of ethnic domination and potential suppression and they try to obtain power to avoid this. Power is the ultimate tool that ethnic groups want to achieve so as to assert their status as an ethnic group (Horowitz 2000). Group legitimacy

is only a part of the explanation for ethnic groups' behavior and inclination towards conflict.

The Impact of Ethnic Groups on Violence

Since I am examining the determinants that make violence more likely to occur, it is necessary that I address the impact that ethnic groups present.

Many studies have tested and postulated that the presence of several ethnic groups makes violence more likely to occur. Although there are only a few studies that argue in favor of this theory; the overwhelming majority of existing literature testing this theory reject the idea that the presence of ethnic groups causes conflict. Most studies conclude that ethnic groups as a variable by itself is not robust enough to cause conflict. The most prominent and extensive study was completed by political scientists James Fearon and David Laitin (2003). Their study was a comprehensive analysis of whether or not ethnic fractionalization was sufficient to incite violence. They tested for other variables and found that alternative variables were better predictors of conflict than ethnicity. Some of these variables include poverty, population, and terrain.

Poverty was one variable that produced interesting results in the Fearon and Laitin (2003) study. This is primarily because both scientists tested per capita income for its effect on being a predictor of violence. Their results indicated that $1,000 less in per capita income is associated with a 41% increase in the likelihood of war occurring (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Ethnicity is an important concept in ethnic conflict, but we need to improve our analysis of why ethnicity matters by focusing on the conditional relationships. I am

interested in discovering what effects ethnicity will have when it interacts with other variables such as poverty and inequality. Ethnicity may have a significant impact in determining violence when there are other conditions present.

Ethnic and Inequality Theories

There are several theories that address ethnicity; however, since I am testing two interactive variables I will limit my scope and focus on theories that shed some light on those points. I am primarily interested in testing inequality and the effects that it might have when it is present in an ethnically diverse society. Fearon and Laitin (2003) attempted to test this variable, but were unable to do so because the data available (GINI coefficient estimates of income inequality) had too many data values missing from the set. However, they observed from the available data values that inequality did not appear to have an effect. Yet, because they were not able to derive any substantial or statistical evidence of this, I do not believe that the variable should be ignored and I will be using a different data set to test for inequality.

Besancon (2005) addresses the significance that inequality has on ethnic conflicts and revolutions. Besancon (2005) attributes previous results from studies that tested for inequality as not being complete. Besancon (2005) still believes that inequality is worth taking a look at because inequality between ethnic groups has not been fully studied. Most of the earlier studies were directed towards different social classes and the impact that social classes have on the likelihood of conflict. Besancon (2005) suggests disaggregating studies on inequality and focusing on specific types of conflicts and case studies. By doing so, the results are likely to turn out differently.

At the forefront of the inequality theory is Gurr's (1970) relative deprivation theory. Relative deprivation is the impetus for groups to act. In extreme cases, scientist Bueno de Mesquita speculated that groups will risk everything in conflict because they have nothing to lose when they react (Besancon 2005). Deprived groups have expectations to gain something from conflict. Besancon (2005) applies the theory of victory to explain group behavior. The theory of victory stipulates that a group's belief they can win will resort to violence. Equally, the power parity theory posits groups that are close to achieving resource equality are likely to resort to war (Besancon 2005). The power parity theory could extend to include the confidence that groups may have when they believe that they can win if they resort to war. Their belief in victory is compounded when they have the adequate resources to do so. Ellingsen (2000) proved this theory in her analysis that the size of an ethnic group increased likelihood of war. Ellingsen (2000) was able to find support for the hypothesis that dominant groups that were less than 80% of the total population were more likely to experience conflict.

Although there have been numerous studies that have produced results that conclude that inequality does not increase conflict, Ostby (2008) argues that these studies focus too much on the individual rather than the group. Ostby (2008) attributes these findings to the methodology and testing done in those studies. Ostby (2008) called earlier studies "vertical inequality" because those studies focused on the impact that individual inequality has on conflict. Ostby (2008) insists that previous conclusions about inequality are not accurate because they do not address the group component of conflict. Conflicts, particularly civil wars, are a group phenomenon. Thus, they should be studied on a group level rather than an individual level. Ostby (2008) also finds that earlier inequality studies

carry too much focus on economic inequality when there are other components to inequality. Inequality can come in different forms, such as inequality of rights and liberty for groups. Ostby's (2008) study demonstrates the importance that inequality has in determining conflict. For this reason, inequality should be measured and analyzed for the effects it may have on ethnic conflict.

Ostby (2008) differs from other theorists in arguing that polarization is what mobilizes groups. Polarization increases when there are a few large groups with very little similarities. These groups form based on identity and use their ethnicity to gain goods. Ostby (2008) posits that it is easier for groups to mobilize because they are few groups to choose from. Polarization theory argues that there are not enough similarities between groups to avoid conflict. As the word itself suggests, polarization radically separates groups from each other. Inequality can exacerbate the polarization that exists between groups. When one group feels deprived in comparison to the other group, the deprived group may be motivated to change their circumstances. Conversely, the non-deprived group may also resort to violence to prevent the deprived group from making demands (Ostby 2008).

Discriminatory Politics

Discriminatory policies are not unlike Gurr's theory of relative deprivation and inequality theories. When certain groups are deprived of opportunities because of their ethnic group status, this constitutes inequality. Certain groups are deprived of resources and economic opportunities while other groups are benefiting from these discriminatory policies. Discriminatory policies are defined as "government-enacted policies mandating

that certain goods, services, or opportunities be withheld from members of specific ethnic groups" (Peoples 2004). Some of the discrimination policies are put in place as a measure to reduce violence, but Peoples (2004) argues that these policies increase the likelihood that ethnic groups will be involved in conflict. The policies put in place can create disparity and inequality among ethnic groups and change the perceptions of inequality.

Unfair policies come in different forms. According to Gurr, there are three categories that fall under discrimination. They are: political discrimination, economic discrimination, and cultural discrimination. An example of political discrimination, according to Peoples (2004), would be barring certain groups from holding political office. Economic discrimination includes employment restrictions. An example of cultural discrimination would include preventing groups from enjoying their religious or cultural traditions (Peoples 2004). Establishing different categories for discrimination allows us to evaluate the impact that some of these policies may have on ethnic groups. For instance, economic discrimination may be more of a motivator for groups to take up arms than political discrimination. Each type of discrimination affect groups differently (Peoples 2004).

Peoples (2004) argues that of all the discrimination categories, political and economic discrimination are the most contentious for groups. Groups are more likely to resort to arms if there is a perceived discrimination in any of these areas. Cultural discrimination has the least effect on groups' motivation to react violently. Peoples (2004) claims that in spite of policies that are enacted to prevent cultural practices, groups can still avert these policies by practicing their cultural and religious traditions in privacy. Hierarchically, political discrimination is the most likely to cause groups to

become violent because political discrimination delegitimizes a group's ability to take part in the public sphere. Groups are prevented from holding office or having a say in the policies that are enacted against them (Peoples 2004). Economic discrimination, Peoples (2004) argues, can be avoided by bribes and is not monitored effectively.

Another component of discriminatory politics to consider is the strength of the groups they target. Sowell (1990), described by Peoples (2004), posits that policies can be placed against heavily disadvantaged groups or relatively strong minority groups. The virtue of distinguishing different groups being targeted is that the effects can vary among the groups. They result in different outcomes (Peoples 2004). Peoples (2004) argues that policies enacted against strong minority groups can reduce the likelihood of violence because it levels the inequality among the different groups. In contrast to this, discrimination towards disadvantaged groups increases the disparity between groups. These situations are more conflict-prone.

Poverty

With inequality being the best predictor of Gurr's relative deprivation theory, it is not unreasonable to assume that poverty, also, is a good predictor of relative deprivation. Poverty and inequality are two measures that share a similar relationship with each other. On its face, it is not unfounded to believe that impoverished groups are inclined to revolt. Typically, groups that live in abject poverty are more likely to blame others for their woes. Members of these groups are unhappy with their situation and are motivated to do something about their condition. As a concept, poverty has certain elements that are in conjunction with the relative deprivation theory. Gurr's theory assumes that groups are

more willing to resort to arms when they feel deprived in relation to other groups. We can apply this theory to conditions of poverty. Groups that are impoverished, in contrast to wealthy groups, are likely to have feelings of deprivation. Seeing wealthy groups motivates poorer groups to change their circumstances and often, this can be in the form of violence.

The argument for poverty follows by ascribing the economic failures of government to the rise in conflict. Lower standards of living are more conducive to breeding conflict among groups (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) conducted a study of conflicts in Africa. They assert that many conflicts in Africa are typically attributed to the amount of ethnic diversity in the continent. However, Elbadawi and Sambanis argue that "a systemic analysis of the causes of civil war suggest that Africa's civil wars conform to a global pattern that is better explained by political and economic factors as well as by the extent of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity in the society" (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). In this study, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) ran tests that concluded that countries with low levels of per capita income are more prone to violence. Additionally, Elbadawi and Sambanis observed that poor and uneducated young people were more likely to take up arms. They accredited this relationship to the fact that young people are the best recruits for rebellion because they lose less by joining.

It is important to mention that as poverty increases, so too does the likelihood of conflict. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) study indicated that this happens because the economic opportunity to rebel increases. The costs of rebellion are less when poverty is high. Additionally, they noted that this relationship is strongly influenced by ethnic

heterogeneity. Impoverished societies that are ethnically polarized carry a higher risk of war. Collier and Hoeffler (2000) found that societies with high levels of ethnic diversity create problems when they are polarized (when there is an ethnic group that occupies 40-60% of the population and dominates over other groups). Collier and Hoeffler (2000) concluded that these types of situations are more conducive to conflict.

In my study, I attempt to make a distinction between poverty and inequality. Often these two terms are conflated and mean the same thing. However, I believe that the two terms are different and will use various measurements to demonstrate the dissimilarity between the two. By doing this, it is possible that the two variables will present different effects. Moreover, it is likely that inequality may matter more than poverty when interacting with ethnicity or vice-versa.

Poverty theories demonstrate the relationship between poorer groups and conflict; however, greed theories argue the opposite. Arguments regarding poverty speculate that poorer people are more likely to get involved in conflict. However, the greed theory opposes the poverty argument. Greed theorists claim that groups with more resources are more likely to revolt. That is, wealthy groups will revolt because they have the resources to do so and the opportunity to rebel is present. That is, the survival of rebel groups is dependent on the right opportunities (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Maintaining a war is a rather expensive endeavor, economically and otherwise. Groups that are able to sustain their effort and mobilize have resources to do so (Regan and Norton 2005). Regan and Norton (2005) also argue that "grievance forms the backbone of protest and rebellious movements but that resources become necessary to pay selective benefits to keep the

rational rebel soldier supporting a rebellious movement and to offset government efforts to lure the rebel soldiers away."

The greed theory is interesting to highlight because it presents a different face of ethnic conflict. Basically, the theory assumes that if there a lot of resources to be won, then groups will fight. If the costs outweigh the benefits, then groups are less motivated to fight. In my study, I am primarily interested in refuting this theory. I believe that Gurr's relative deprivation theory is more of a motivator for groups than greed based theories.

HYPOTHESES

Based on the theory discussion above, I have devised my own hypotheses that will address what determinants make conflict more likely. As I mentioned earlier, I will be focusing solely on economic variables that incite violence among groups. I realize that conflict between groups is a very complex topic and issue that may involve other causes that are not economically related; however, for the purposes of my study, I will be testing only economic theories.

Theories such as Gurr's relative deprivation theory and discrimination policies revolve around ideas that involve inequality and poverty. I believe that inequality and poverty motivates groups to rebel and incite conflict. Comparatively, when groups are unequal feelings of deprivation begin to stir. Deprived groups believe that they deserve better and are willing to fight for it. They believe that they are at a disadvantage and are unable to pursue economic opportunities that would improve their lives. Impoverished

groups blame others for their misfortune and will be more likely to revolt. The other element of this theory is ethnic composition. I know from previous literature that the ethnic composition of groups does not create conflict. However, I believe that there is a conditional or interactive relationship between ethnic composition and economic factors such as inequality and poverty. In my study, the dependent variables will be conflict or violence that arises and intensity of the conflict after it has begun. These hypotheses follow the assumption that the dependent variables will be influenced by the independent variables. The hypotheses are an attempt to understand and explore the impact that my independent variables have, which include measurements of percent of people that live in urban areas, energy consumption, and ethnic composition, in creating conflict.

Hypothesis 1: *Measurements of inequality interacting with ethnic composition of groups is positively related to conflict. More specifically, ethnic groups who experience disparity are among those who are likely to resort to conflict.*

This relationship is explained by the idea that ethnicity is conditional. Ethnicity matters when it interacts with another variable. Since I will be testing inequality for its significance, it seems only fitting to see if ethnicity and inequality have any kind of effect on groups resorting to violence. This relationship is largely an extension of the relative deprivation theory that Gurr presented. A conditional relationship such as this one

speculates that ethnic heterogeneity along with inequality should increase the chances of violence occurring.

Hypothesis 2: *It is expected that the intensity of a conflict will increase in highly fractionalized areas where ethnic groups are experiencing inequality.*

This link is explained by the idea that unequal ethnic groups in conflict are likely to increase the intensity of the conflict. This means that conflicts involving inequality of ethnic groups is an impetus for increased violence once in conflict. This hypothesis is attempting to address the effects of the conflict after it has begun.

Hypothesis 3: *Ethnic groups that experience poverty are more likely to resort to conflict.*

This relationship is determined by the argument attempting to explain that impoverished groups are more likely to resort to arms. That is, poorer groups are more likely to take up arms than wealthy groups. Poverty is believed to cause conflict because groups want to change their circumstances and to do so would require violent methods.

Hypothesis 4: *The intensity of the conflict increases when there are impoverished ethnic groups in conflict.*

This hypothesis is addressing the effects of the conflict once it has begun. It is expected that groups that are impoverished will increase the intensity of the conflict. Poorer groups will be more willing to prolong their battle and fight.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In this study, ethnicity is an important component. Both Gurr and Horowitz have observed that groups that are in conflict tend to be ethnic. Hence, it is premature to disregard the importance that ethnicity has on conflict. Although ethnicity may not influence groups to revolt, ethnicity can be a condition for groups to rebel. That is, ethnicity can interact with another variable to influence groups to revolt. This can be used to explain why ethnic groups are the ones in conflict and explain the relevance that ethnicity has on conflict. What interactive determinants make conflict more likely?

For this study, there are 3 independent variables that will be tested. They are: energy consumption, urban population, and ethnic fractionalization.

My dependent variables in this study, conflict and battle deaths, have extensive existing literature. Conflict, according to Lewis Coser (as related by Gurr), is "is a struggle in which the aim is to gain objectives and simultaneously to neutralize, injure, or eliminate rivals." In this study, conflict refers to the violence that groups engage in. For research purposes, conflict will include rebellion, coup d'état, revolutions, civil war, and

minor skirmishes between groups. Minor armed skirmishes include at least 25 battle deaths per year. A major armed conflict is defined as having 1,000 or more battle deaths. All of these figures come from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/PRIO Armed Conflict data center. UCDP defines armed conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year" (UCDP 2008). Conflict is the outcome that I am trying to predict.

Armed Conflict data

My conflict data set in this study comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). The data set consists of both internal and external conflicts from 1946 to 2007. However, since I am interested in domestic conflicts, I formatted the set to highlight only the domestic conflicts. Additionally, I was able to fill in the gaps for the years that were not recorded to make the set a times series.

Although the UCDP/PRIO set is a rather extensive set that has records for the location, start date, end date, the primary party in the conflict, the opposition, the supporters, territory, and region. The only variables that I need to test are the start of the conflict. The years in which conflict was on-going were omitted in my study since I was only interested in the onset of conflict.

Poverty data

Poverty is an independent variable in this study. Initially, I was looking at the World Poverty Net data base and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals data base to test for inequality; however, these data bases were not recorded properly. There were a lot of missing GDP and GNP values for several countries and much of the data collection was reliant on household surveys. To counter this problem, I decided to test for energy consumption as a measurement of poverty. My energy consumption data are from the National Military Capabilities set. Energy consumption will be used as a proxy for how wealthy a society is. There are obvious distinctions in the amounts of energy that certain cities and areas consume. Societies that consume less energy are more prone to violence. Conversely, if energy consumption levels in urban or city areas (where energy consumption is higher because of the bigger population and etc) is a factor in determining the outcome of violence.

Inequality data

Theoretically, groups at tension are more likely to resort to violence when another group is economically better-off than the other group. To look at inequality, I had originally wanted to look at the GINI data set. The GINI coefficient is a statistical set that measures the inequality of income among different groups. However, the set was missing a lot of values and I would not have been able to produce substantial results. In order to remedy this problem, I went to the National Military Capabilities data set and use percent of the population that lives in urban areas. The logic of bringing in percent of people living in cities as a proxy for inequality is that the more people living in cities mean

decreased levels of economic opportunities. Simply put, when there is small percent of

people living in urban areas, this indicates a predominantly rural population where the

opportunities are distributed evenly. The higher percentage of city dwellers demonstrates

a predominantly urban society where there are vast disparities among the rural and urban

occupants. People living in cities, in relation to rural dwellers, have more economic

opportunities. Rural inhabitants are at a disadvantage because their capabilities are

constricted. Rural societies tend to be primarily driven by agrarian activities. It is

important to note that urban societies are more conducive to having economic inequalities

because of the various jobs and sectors that urban areas have. Some groups may be

discriminated against because certain jobs are held by only by specific ethnic groups.

Rural dwellers tend to be more homogenous as far as economic opportunities are

concerned. Urban populations are likely to have a higher number of people living

unequally. This is a potential source of conflict. Another theoretical justification for

bringing in the percent of people living in urban societies is that big cities tend to put

strains on the resources that a country has and this in effect is likely to cause discontent in

those areas. Additionally, deprivation is likely to occur in societies with a higher

percentage of people living in cities and this could threaten the stability of the state

(Melander 2005).

Ethnicity data

Measurements for diversity and the amount of ethnic groups within a given area

came from the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization index or commonly known as ELF data.

ELF data has been used in several studies that test for ethnic diversity. I used the set that

political scientist Matthew Krain compiled for his 1997 study "State-Sponsored Mass Murder: The Onset and Severity of Genocides and Politicides." The Krain ELF index is an improved version of the ELF index created by Taylor and Hudson (1972). The Taylor and Hudson ELF index included many inaccuracies and only recorded data for linguistic cleavages rather than ethnic cleavages. It is known that linguistic cleavages are not an accurate predictor for ethnic ones (Krain 1997). Krain (1997) added an ethnic measure to accurately include ethnic cleavages. He added and improved the data on Africa, Latin America, and some other special cases. The ELF index was designed to measure the number of groups as well as the evenness in their size (Walker & Poe 2002). ELF measures the probability that two individuals do not belong to the same group (Walker & Poe 2002). A higher fractionalization score means that the society being measured has a very diverse population. Additionally, the higher fractionalization score means more groups that are also close in population size. This constitutes the evenness of the groups (Walker & Poe 2002). The ELF scale starts from .01 to .99. These values mean that .01 is the lowest amount of diversity and .99 is the highest amount.

Intensity data

Intensity is the other dependent variable in my study. Since I am interested in the effects of conflict after it has begun, I wanted to see whether or not ethnicity has any effect on the intensity of the conflict. I already know from previous literature that ethnicity has very little effect on the outcome of war, but it might intensify the conflict and groups may be more willing to drag out a war than finish quickly. To test for this, I brought in data from the UCDP/PRIO project on Battle Deaths on the battlefield. It is a

data set that records the number of deaths in state-based conflicts. Battle deaths in this set are defined as being "as deaths resulting directly from violence inflicted through the use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict during contested combat." Contested combat is defined as "is use of armed force by a party to an armed conflict against any person or target during which the perpetrator faces the immediate threat of lethal force being used by another party to the conflict against him/her and/or allied fighters. Contested combat excludes the sustained destruction of soldiers or civilians outside of the context of any reciprocal threat of lethal force (e.g.execution of prisoners of war)."[11] The variable that I used to test was the low estimate of battle deaths variable. This variable is a low estimate of the battle deaths incurred during one conflict. This was the closest variable I could find that would be the best predictor of battle deaths and thus would allow me to predict whether ethnicity has an effect on the intensity on the conflict.

Control Variables

The control variables in my study are duration of conflict, peace years, and regime type. I generated the peace years and conflict duration variables with the PRIO data sets. Regime type came from the Polity IV set. When I tested for intensity, I wanted to see the conditional effects of inequality and poverty with ethnicity and to control for this I used duration of the conflict. The duration of the conflict is important to include as a constant in this test because the length of a conflict can affect economic factors that are related to inequality and poverty. Additionally, the duration of a conflict is kept constant as it can also affect the intensity of a conflict. Peace years were a control for the tests for the onset of conflict. Regime type was another control variable I included when I was

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[11] UCDP/PRIO battle deaths data set codebook

conducting my tests for the onset of conflict. The statistical tests that I will be including

in my study are mapped like this:

Conflict= $\alpha_0 + \alpha_1$ (*ethnicity) $+\alpha_2$ (* inequality) $+\alpha_3$ (* poverty) $+\alpha_4$

(ethnicity*inequality interaction) $+\alpha_5$ (ethnicity*poverty interaction)

Intensity= $\beta_0 + \beta_1$ (*ethnicity) $+ \beta_2$ (*inequality) $+\beta_3$ (*poverty)

$+\beta_4$ (inequality*ethnicity) $+\beta_5$ (poverty*inequality)

Conflict and intensity are the two dependent variables in this study. I will be observing

the effects of inequality and poverty on ethnicity to determine the predicted outcomes.

Statistical Design

      In order to examine Polity IV, The National Military Capabilities Set,

UCDP/PRIO, and ELF sets I used STATA version 10.0. I constructed a regression

analysis which allowed for me to observe the effect of the independent variables on the

dependent variable. After merging the data sets into one set, I created variables that

would measure the interaction terms between inequality and ethnic fractionalization.

These interaction terms were urban population interacting with ethnic fractionalization

and energy consumption interacting with ethnic fractionalization. Then I generated some

variables that would measure the duration of the conflict and then the duration of peace

or years of rest from conflict. These variables would aid me in the measurement of the

intensity as well as control for on-going conflict that has lasted for years.

After having creating these variables, I ran an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression including variables such as the ELF index, energy data, urban population, and the interaction variable with ethnicity and urban population, and ethnicity with energy data. This regression looked promising because it produced results that rather robust and in support of my theory. Yet, using an OLS regression can be problematic because my data is binary and not interval. To solve this problem, I need to use a model that will handle my data accordingly. A probit regression is needed in this type of analysis because it is used for dichotomous or binary variables or variables that are coded as 0 or 1. Since I have coded several of the conflicts as being 0 or 1, it is necessary for me to use a probit regression model to allow for me to predict the maximum likelihood of an event occurring.

After having run the probit regressions, I also ran some split samples using the median values of the population and energy consumption. Split samples are the best way for me to observe the conditional effects of ethnicity and inequality and ethnicity and poverty on determining conflict and intensity. Split samples make the relationship between ethnicity, inequality, and poverty more clear. A split sample will use one half of the variable equation to predict a certain outcome.

Having conducted the split samples, I ran clarify models to figure out the predicted outcomes and understand the probability of conflict. For these tests, I set the ethnic fractionalization scores to .01 and .88 as a means of determining the probability of conflict when there is low ethnic fractionalization (.01) and when there is high level of ethnic group diversity (.88). I tested inequality or urban population at the 25th percentile marker to be able to compare the mostly agrarian societies with little urban population.

The theory is that inequality exists in urban populations and not in agrarian populations. Testing at the 25th percentile urban population allowed for me to see whether or not urban populations are more prone to conflict. For poverty or energy consumption, I tested above and below the median (50th percentile) to observe the effects of ethnicity in determining conflict.

I completed these same steps for the battle deaths using the subsets of conflicts. I ran a regression on the lowest estimate of battle deaths variable, ethnic fractionalization variable, energy variable, ethnicity/energy interaction variable, ethnicity/population interaction variable, and duration of the conflict. After having done this, I used clarify software to generate substantive effects and ran another regression.

RESULTS

As I mentioned above in my research design section, I ran an OLS regression that showed results that were statistically significant. However, I was unable to make conclusive remarks based on the OLS results because that would present problems in the interpretation and prediction of outcomes. To remedy this, I used a probit regression to assist me in predicting the likelihood of conflict when ethnicity is interacted with population and energy consumption. The probit models I ran did not present the same results as the OLS models. The probit models differed from the OLS models in predicting the outcomes of the interactions between ethnicity and poverty and ethnicity and inequality. Furthermore, I used split samples for these probit regressions. The split samples indicate some evidence of the relationships between the interaction terms. I have

divided the tables or figures into the different tests that I conducted. The results are

represented in the following models, each of them displays the influence that the

independent variables have on the dependent variable.

Model 1: Energy Consumption and Ethnicity

These models examine the hypothesis that an interaction between ethnicity and

energy consumption will increase the likelihood of conflict. When I ran the probit

regressions for this test, I found that as energy consumption increases, the significance of

ethnicity decreases. Ethnicity matters more when energy consumption is low. These

results indicate that ethnicity matters everywhere, which is contrary to Fearon and Laitin

(2003) study which concluded that ethnicity is not a significant factor. Energy

consumption has a positive effect on ethnicity. The conditioning effects of ethnicity and

energy consumption demonstrate the importance of ethnicity when there are low levels of

energy consumption.

Table 1**: Energy Consumption and Ethnicity Interaction**

Explanatory Variables	Energy above 50th percentile	Energy at or less than 50th percentile
Ethnicity	.5461658‡ (.1845711)	.8592187 (.1340159)
Polity2	-.0055777 (0061423)	.0057682 (.0049279)
Durable	.0004817 (.0015708)	.0051965 (.0018593)
Peace years	-.0177794 (.0028034)	-.0384421 (.0035686)
Constant	-1.805961 (.1093582)	-1.489768 (.0876227)
N	4403	3682

‡ The values without parentheses are the coefficients and those with parentheses represent the standard error.

Table 1 represents the energy consumption at the median. Looking at the chart, we can see that when energy consumption is below the median or 50 percentile, ethnicity matters more. Since I am using energy as an indicator of whether nations are poor or wealthy, it is evident that poorer societies are more influenced by ethnicity. In this table, I have included the coefficients as well as the standard errors (in parentheses). Additionally, I have included the number of observations for each of the different probit regressions I ran as well as the constant for each of the tests. Durable, peace years, and polity are the control variables in this table.

The effect that energy consumption has on poorer countries indicates that poverty conditions the effect that ethnicity has on conflict. This shows that impoverished groups are more likely to resort to conflict. This is in part due to the nature of economically poor nations. The competition between groups heightens when there is a lack of resources and opportunities available (Lake and Rothschild 1998). As a result, there is a struggle between different groups to attain their goals and this can create tension between various groups. Poor economies exacerbate the likelihood of conflict because of the competition.

Figure 1

Conditional Effects of Ethnicity and Energy

Conditional Effects of Ethnicity and Energy

|	Low ELF and Low Energy	High ELF and Low Energy	Low ELF and High Energy	High ELF and High Energy
Series1	0.0220664	0.1020828	0.0071538	0.0242271

Mean

Figure 1 is a depiction of the clarify models that I ran to see the interaction between ethnicity and energy consumption. For the clarify models, I tested the effects of poverty or low energy consumption have on low ethnic fractionalization (.01). I used the median value as a marker for energy consumption. Low energy constituted consumption that was

below 50 percentile. I ran the clarify model to observe the conditional effects of low

ethnic fractionalization and low energy consumption and the same models for high

fractionalization (.88) and high/low energy consumption. Looking at figure 1, we can see

that poverty (energy consumption) conditions the effect that ethnicity has on conflict. The

second bar illustrates that poorer countries with ethnic fractionalization are more inclined

towards violence.

Model 2: Urban Population and Ethnicity

When I tested urban population and ethnicity interactions, I ran probit regressions

that split the samples by the percent of population living in an urban area. What I noticed

was that ethnicity had a stronger effect when there were higher levels of urban

population. These results indicate that ethnicity has less of an effect on rural populations.

Urban populations are more effected by ethnicity and this could be due to fact that urban

populations are more unequal than rural populations.

Table 2

Urban Population and Ethnicity Interaction

Explanatory Variables	Urban population above the 25th percentile	Urban population at or below the 25th percentile
Ethnicity	.9474884‡ (.1228551)	.7011598 (.2059331)
Polity 2	-.006272 (.0044598)	.0150768 (.0072038)
Durable	.0016284 (.0012657)	.000233 (.0026576)
Peace Years	-.0268804 (.0023777)	-.0451611 (.0062981)
Constant	-1.683155 (.079504)	-1.370395 (.1350781)
N	6433	1652

‡ The values without parentheses are the coefficients and those with parentheses represent the standard error.

In Table 2, we can see that ethnicity matters in urban populations. The effect of ethnicity extends when the urban population increases within a given area. From the results indicated on the table, urban dweller above the 25th percentile demonstrates the influence. My first hypothesis indicated that the interaction of inequality and ethnicity would have a positive effect on the outcome of violence and the results of my tests demonstrate that this is true for increased urban populations. This is in part due to the

idea that a high percentage of inequality is more likely to occur in urban areas than in rural areas.

Inequality is more prevalent in urban areas because of the different industries that are in urban areas. Urban areas tend to have an assortment of different people and groups that have varying income levels and this is more likely to have an effect. It is also important to notice that disparities between groups are more noticeable in urban areas. The dynamic of urban areas is unique to rural areas because urban areas tend to and are often segregated and polarized. Segregation between different groups has been shown to have an effect on the likelihood of violence.

Additionally, inequality is driven by theories such as Gurr's relative deprivation theory where groups who experience inequality in relation to other groups are more likely to rebel because they believe that they deserve better. If there are disparities between groups that are well off and those that are not, the likelihood of conflict increases. Urban areas provide are ideal for creating conflict because of the vast differences between groups. There are instances where some groups may be wealthier and may have benefitted from the opportunities that are present in urban areas.

Figure 2

Conditional Effects of Ethnicity and Urban Population

Conditional Effects of Ethnicity and Urban Population

|	Low ELF and Low Urban Population	High ELF and Low Urban Population	Low ELF and High Urban Population	High ELF and High Urban Population
Series1	0.0241506	0.0836691	0.0069433	0.050578

.

Figure 2 is an illustration of the clarify models that I ran when I was testing the effects that ethnicity has on urban population. Looking at the diagram, we can conclude that ethnicity has a stronger effect on higher levels of urban population. For this model, I used low ethnic fractionalization (.01) and high ethnic fractionalization (.88) as measurements to test the conditional effects. The percent of people living in cities was quantified using urban population above and below the 25th percentile. I used these figures to test for the interaction effects between the two variables.

Model 3: Intensity

The test for intensity or the effects of ethnicity on conflict once it has begun demonstrated some interesting findings. Table 3 is a display of the results I received when I ran an OLS model. Ethnicity has a negative effect on the intensity of conflict. This is surprising to see because it is assumed that ethnicity would heighten the conflict and make it more intense. However, statistically, it is shown that ethnicity has a negative effect on intensity. That is, ethnicity reduces the intensity of conflict once the event has begun.

Table 3

Regression for Battle Deaths

Explanatory Variables	Effects of Variables on Battle Deaths
Ethnicity	-19371.62‡
	(3439.974)
Energy	-371.6053
	(793.3448)
Urban Population	-29398.18
	(8916.702)
Ethnicity*Energy	1012.045
	(1493.782)
Ethnicity*Urban	48854.2
	(17230.47)
Polity 2	-35.20893
	(65.29526)
Durable	-6.613474
	(21.99112)
Peace Years	-27.6391
	(32.7387)
Constant	14370.93
	(1981.715)
N	1532

‡ The values without parentheses are the coefficients and those with parentheses represent the standard error.

Table 3 is an illustration of the negative effect that ethnicity has on intensity. Included in

this model are energy consumption and the percentage of urban dwellers measurements

and the interactions between ethnicity and percentage of urban occupants and energy

consumption. After running the split sample models, we do not see the clear interaction effects. I expected ethnicity to increase the intensity of a conflict; however, my statistical results indicate that intensity is reduced. Ethnicity matters in determining the intensity of conflict, but not in the way we expected it to. It is interesting and puzzling that ethnicity increased the likelihood of conflict, but lowered the levels of intensity.

CASE STUDY: India- Muslims and Hindus

After examining the results of this study, I chose to apply some of the findings to real life cases to corroborate the outcomes that I discovered when testing my hypotheses. I chose to apply these results to the country of India. My reason for choosing this country is due to India's high level of ethnicity and urban dwellers. Furthermore, what makes India an interesting case is that it is a democratic country plagued with conflict and violence throughout the different states. Although my thesis is focused on economic issues, I hope to demonstrate that the conflicts in India are extremely complex and involve several factors and elements. There is no one explanation for why violence erupted in these cities and looking at the conflicts retrospectively may provide only speculation as to what caused the conflicts. The cases themselves are complicated and I have done my best to fit them to the models I tested for. I will be presenting cases of Hindu/Muslim violence in the cities Aligarh, Calicut, and Bjinor, Uttar Pradesh. Then, I will be investigating the impact of inequality and poverty as potential determinants of violence in India. Additionally, a general discussion of Hindu/Muslim violence will be presented in conjunction with the analysis of the cities. The cases on view display the

arguments and theories that I introduced in my literature section as well as reflect some of the theories that I tested. The most widely known conflict in India is between the Muslims and the Hindus. These conflicts are not specified in a certain region, but are spread throughout the country. For this reason, I would like to take a closer look at the reasons why Hindus and Muslims have fought.

There is a long and detailed history of tension and conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India. Presently, there is discussion about how much of the on-going conflict is brought on by the groups themselves and the British policies that were in place when India was a British colony. The conflict between the two groups was exacerbated by the hasty and contentious partition of India and Pakistan. When Pakistan was created, many Muslims in India felt alienated and several thousands of them were victims of attacks from the Hindus. Thousands of Hindus coming from Pakistan to India were also murdered. The partition evokes bad memories for both groups involved. These bad memories seem to dominate the beliefs that Hindus and Muslims have towards the other. With the partition of Pakistan, many Muslims were left in a disadvantaged position because their power was reduced (Basu and Kohli 1998). They were restricted as far as what they could do to mobilize. Groups were banned from organizing based on religion (Basu and Kohli 1998). As a result of their inability to mobilize, Muslims could not demand equal treatment because they had no way to represent themselves. Many Hindus were also suspicious of the Muslims that stayed in India and questioned their allegiance to India. Many Muslims were placed in positions where they were dependent on the Hindus for security, education, livelihood, etc. (Basu and Kohli 1998).

Literature on Indian ethnic conflict has had its fair share of attention. Many studies look at the conflicts occurring after the break up of colonial empires into diverse states where ethnic issues were prominent (Parikh 1998). The two explanations for ethnic attachments are that it was inherent and unavoidable and that ethnic attachments were used by elites to obtain their goals. In addition, groups were violent in order to protect themselves from any kind of prejudice and discrimination. Connor (1994) argues that economic and political factors play an instrumental role in creating conflict. Connor argues that "economic arguments can act as a catalyst or exacerbator of national tensions."

One of the more puzzling questions brought out by the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India is that most of the communal violence occurs in urban areas (Varshney 2001). There is very little violence in the village areas and the violence that occurs in the urban areas is locally concentrated, with only a few cities accounting for majority of the conflict-related deaths. According to Varshney, eight cities hold the disproportionate number of deaths, and interestingly, those eight cities hold 18 percent of India's urban population. In other words, 82 percent of India's urban population is not prone to violence (Varshney 2001).

In order to understand some of the violent responses between Hindus and Muslims in India, it is important to look factors that might play a role. Some politicians, including those who belong to the Bhratiya Janata Party (BJP), have suggested the idea that Muslims are not loyal to India and that this could influence political behavior. Others have cited the population of Muslims in comparison to the Hindus, which makes them a political target. However, there are arguments made by Muslim politicians that the higher

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number of Muslims within a given area increases fear among the Hindus in that area.

They attribute this fear to why Hindus react with violence and hostility. What can be

concluded from both sides is that both name population and demographics as reasons for

violence among the groups.

Table 4: Hindu- Muslim riots in 28 Indian cities[12] (1950-1995) * From Varshney (2001)

Minimum of 15 deaths in 3 riots Over 2 five year Periods[13]	Minimum of 20 deaths in 4 riots over 3 five year periods[14]	Minimum of 25 deaths in 5 riots over 4 five year periods[15]	Minimum of 50 deaths in 10 riots over 5 five year periods[16]	Total deaths
Bombay	Bombay	Bombay	Bombay	1137
Ahmedabad	Ahmedabad	Ahmedabad	Ahmedabad	1119
Hyderabad	Hyderabad	Hyderabad	Hyderabad	312
Meerut	Meerut	Meerut	Meerat	265
Aligarh	Aligarh	Aligarh	Aligarh	160
Jameshedpur	Jamshedpur	Jamshedpur		198
Bhiwandi	Bhiwandi			194
Surat				194
Moradabad	Moradabad			149
Baroda	Baroda	Baroda	Baroda	109
Bhopal	Bhopal	Bhopal		108
Delhi	Delhi	Delhi	Delhi	93
Kanpur	Kanpur	Kanpur		81
Calcutta	Calcutta	Calcutta	Calcutta	63
Jabalpur				59

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[12] Total number of deaths from riots for all of India, 1950-1995=7173, of which 3.57 percent of deaths took place in rural India.
[13] Total number of deaths from riots in these cities=4706. This is approximately 66 percent of deaths from riots throughout India and 69 percent of all deaths in urban riots during these periods.
[14] Total number of deaths from riots in these cities=4359. This is about 61 percent of deaths from riots throughout India and 64 percent of all deaths in urban riots during these periods.
[15] Total number of deaths from riots in these cities=3887. This is about 54 percent of deaths from riots throughout India and 58 percent of all deaths in urban riots during these periods.
[16] Total number of deaths from riots in these cities=3263. This is 45.5 percent of deaths from riots throughout India and 49 percent of all deaths in urban riots during these periods.

Table 4: Hindu- Muslim riots in 28 Indian cities[17] (1950-1995) * From Varshney (2001)

Minimum of 15 deaths in 3 riots Over 2 five year Periods[18]	Minimum of 20 deaths in 4 riots over 3 five year periods[19]	Minimum of 25 deaths in 5 riots over 4 five year periods[20]	Minimum of 50 deaths in 10 riots over 5 five year periods[21]	Total deaths
Bangalore	Bangalore	Bangalore		56
Jalgaon	Jalgaon	Jalgaon		49
Sitamarhi				47
Indore	Indore	Indore		45
Varanasi	Varanasi	Varanasi		42
Allahabad	Allahabad	Allahabad		37
Nagpur	Nagpur	Nagpur		37
Jaipur	Jaipur			32
Aurangabad	Aurangabad	Aurangabad		30
Srinagar	Srinagar	Srinagar		30
Ranchi				29
Malegaon	Malegaon			23
Godhra				18

Looking at Table 4 (from Varshney), we can deduce that most of the deaths and violence in India, between 1950-1995, took place in urban areas. However, there are not many explanations for this trend. Varshney (2001) argues that in urban areas there are divides among the different groups. This is especially the case with Hindus and Muslims because they often live in segregated neighborhoods. Varshney (2001) posits that if there

[17] Total number of deaths from riots for all of India, 1950-1995=7173, of which 3.57 percent of deaths took place in rural India.
[18] Total number of deaths from riots in these cities=4706. This is approximately 66 percent of deaths from riots throughout India and 69 percent of all deaths in urban riots during these periods.
[19] Total number of deaths from riots in these cities=4359. This is about 61 percent of deaths from riots throughout India and 64 percent of all deaths in urban riots during these periods.
[20] Total number of deaths from riots in these cities=3887. This is about 54 percent of deaths from riots throughout India and 58 percent of all deaths in urban riots during these periods.
[21] Total number of deaths from riots in these cities=3263. This is 45.5 percent of deaths from riots throughout India and 49 percent of all deaths in urban riots during these periods.

were more communication between the groups, they would be able to organize in times of conflict and come up with peace-building strategies instead of fighting. Varshney suggests that these "peace committees consist of members of both communities, they policed neighborhoods, killed rumours, provided information to the local administration, and facilitated communication between communities in times of tension… such neighborhood organizations were difficult to form in cities where everyday interaction did not cross religious lines."

Varshney(2001) argues that everyday interactions with members of other groups allows for associations to develop that deal with issues of economic, cultural, and social needs of the communities. Varshney expressed that the need for peace is reinforced when the two communities generate such a level of trust. More importantly, these associations and meeting with the other group reduces the fear and tension that the other may hold towards each other. This is often attributed as the reason why majority Hindu or Muslim cities are prone to violence. A dominant group in a city makes the minority group feel threatened; the latter are more likely to resort to arms if tensions arise. Yet, this scenario is more likely to occur in cities where the groups are segregated. In cities where open communication is encouraged, can build an atmosphere of trust and confidence between groups. The lack of community interaction makes cities more inclined to violence. This explanation could also extend towards rural areas where there tends to be less violence. In villages of India, people meet face to face on a regular basis; however, villages tend to be segregated and organized in a manner where there are strictly Muslim or Hindu villages. Varshney (2001) suggests that cities breed rumors and skirmishes that are strategically placed to target certain groups. These rumors often escalate into a conflict,

with groups fighting each other. Varshney postulates that "a multi-ethnic society with few connections across ethnic boundaries is very vulnerable to ethnic disorders and violence." However, it must be noted that these are generalizations on inter-ethnic relations; as always, there are exceptions to the case and this principle is not a one- size- fits- all type of model.

Aligarh and Calicut: Two Worlds Apart

There are cities in India that experience relative peace and others that are violence prone. Often, rumors are spread around India about Hindus and Muslims and some cities erupt in violence and others remain relatively stable. The reactions of cities to these rumors and occasions of breaking the peace have been different across the country. In 1992, Hindu nationalism was exacerbated by BJP leader LK Advani to destroy the Babri Mosque in Ayodha, because it was allegedly built on top of a Hindu temple. The mosque was destroyed by thousands of Hindu nationalists despite the promises of the Indian Supreme Court to protect the masjid. After the destruction of the temple, violent riots erupted throughout the country. Several thousands of people perished as a result of the violent conflict. Aligarh was one of the cities that experienced a lot of violence in reaction to the destruction of the mosque. Newspapers in Aligarh reported to have spread rumors of Muslim doctors killing their Hindu patients, which set off Hindu groups. These groups then hunted Muslims in the city of Aligarh, leading to instances of gruesome violence towards Muslims in Aligarh (Varshney 2001).

In contrast to Aligarh, a city that experienced a lot of violence, Calicut went unscathed during the Babri mosque conflict. Calicut is an example of a city that has

traditionally been peaceful and has stayed away from any kind of violent conflict. For instance, during the Babri mosque conflict Calicut papers reported to take a neutral stance on the issue and did not spread any kind of rumors as did the papers in Aligarh. The difference, according to Varshney (2001), between the two cities was that Calicut had the proper mechanisms in place to maintain law and order in the area. There were peace committees and newspapers that were stopping the spread of the rumors. By contrast, Aligarh's administration did not have the appropriate mechanisms for dealing with the rumors. The groups and criminals involved in the event were not implicated for their deeds. They were protected by politicians and other groups. These groups were also connected to the press: the Muslims had an established relationship with the Urdu press and the Hindu groups were connected to the Hindu press. There were no peace committees in Aligarh because it was impossible to get Hindu and Muslim politicians together to speak out against these issues together. Instead, politicians took advantage of the rumors that were spread (Varshney 2001).

Varshney attributes the lack of cooperation in Aligarh to the segregation and polarization of the Hindu and Muslim groups. According to surveys done in the cities, 83 percent of the Calicut Hindu and Muslim population eats together, 84 percent of Calicut Hindu and Muslims visit each other, and 90 percent of them report that Hindu and Muslim children play together. The figures in Aligarh are much lower and the Hindu and Muslims do not interact with each other that often (Varshney 2001).

Calicut's city dynamic is much different, in that there is an emphasis on assimilation and it is often called a city of "joiners" (Varshney 2001). There are several associations and organizations that emphasize interaction among the different groups.

There are more professional organizations in Calicut as well. Most of the inhabitants of the city are traders and most of them join the local trade organization. These organizations refuse to be associated with a political organization during elections because they fear that they will break up the unity of the group. They deal with each other on the basis of trust. One of the Hindu traders commented that "our relationships with Muslim businessmen are entirely based on trust… there is no breach of trust" (Varshney 2001). In contrast to Calicut, there is no economic unity and no system of trust between traders in Aligarh. In Aligarh, the informal credit system is run entirely by Hindus where Muslim workers depend on them for support. There has been some development of the credit system in Aligarh for Muslims, but it is primarily within the Muslim community rather than with the Hindus (Varshney 2001).

Literacy and education may have something to do with the differing reactions. Calicut enjoys one of the highest levels of literacy in India. There is an abundance of social and educational activities in Calicut. People organize book clubs and the like and get together to discuss issues openly with each other (Varshney 2001). There is also an element of networking taking place in Calicut. When Hindus and Muslims get together in a friendly atmosphere to discuss issues, there is little animosity and the two groups begin to trust each other and this reduces the fear that one group may have toward the other. Another astonishing statistic is that 95 percent of the Hindus and Muslims in Calicut read newspapers. In Aligarh, Hindus reported reading the newspapers while only 30 percent of the Muslims reported reading the Aligarh newspapers (Varshney 2001). In the Aligarh Muslim community, the mode of communication is through word of mouth, rather than reading (Varshney 2001).

The cities of Aligarh and Calicut present two different stories of how the cities function and which may explain why the cities reacted differently to the news of the destruction of the Babri Masjid. There were contrasts in the interactions of the different groups, economic interests, political interests, etc. Although there is no one explanation for why Hindus and Muslims reacted differently in both cities, it is evident that there were some powerful forces at work that caused the two groups to react violently in one city and peacefully in other city to the same conflict.

Bijnor, Uttar Pradesh

In October 1990, the city of Bijnor in the state of Uttar Pradesh was the site of a major clash between Hindus and Muslims. The dispute was a culmination of different issues that the Hindus had with the Muslims. One of the issues, which I will be highlighting, was the economic climate in Bijnor. Specifically, the issues involved property and wealth of some Muslims. The interesting thing about this case is that the economic inequality was experienced by the Muslims or the victims of this conflict. The paradox of this conflict is why the Hindus, who were economically dominant, would attack the Muslims, who constituted the poor in the city of Bijnor? The Muslims were not the prosperous business class in Bijnor, the only thing that they had in their favor was their size. The Muslim population in Bijnor was bigger than the Hindu population (Basu 1994). Interviews with some of the Hindus in the city demonstrated that some of the Hindus expressed some fear over the size of the Muslims in the area. Hindus were fearful that the more Muslims that were in the area, the more aggressive they would become (Basu 1994).Therefore, the Hindus tried to assume control over the area by declaring

certain areas their own. They refused to share spaces with Muslims and proclaimed that there were no safe areas for Muslims (Basu 1994).

During the conflict, Hindu groups were responsible for trying to cripple Muslims economically by burning and destroying the source of their livelihoods. Hindu groups were seen burning rickshaws and shops had been looted. Some of this resentment was directed towards one prominent Muslim in the area, Zafar Khan, who was very affluent and was voted as chairman of the municipal council (Basu 1994). Basu (1994) argues that this conflict carries two different explanations: one was that of the Hindus irrational fears and the other was that the violence was tied to the economic rivalries between groups. What remains to be understood is why there were fears in the first place. That is, why were the Hindus nervous when they commanded the top spot in the economic sector? This case presents some interesting questions as to why the roles were reversed when addressing the deprived group. The increasing Muslim population was troubling for the Hindus.

As with the Babri mosque conflict, there were other forces at work that exacerbated the conflict. The BJP was instrumental in painting a derogatory picture of the Muslims in Bijnor. Some members of the BJP were responsible for spreading rumors about Muslim men and women and were making accusations about Zafar Khan, the affluent Muslim member of Bijnor (Basu 1994). The actions of the BJP explain why Hindus turned on their Muslim neighbors. What made the rumors sound real were the institutions that they were coming from. People believed politicians and newspaper rumors because they often relied on them for information. The local press was equally

instrumental in worsening the conflict between the Muslims and Hindus. Just as they were in Aligarh, the local press was biased and inaccurately described events.

There was also an economic element to this conflict that included handicapping the Muslims from earning a living. The Hindus not only destroyed their shops and their rickshaws, but made deliberate attempts to ruin their means of production (Basu 1994). However, Basu argues that there was deep hatred towards men like Zafar Khan because of their economic achievements. Hindus were concerned with Khan because he had "transgressed caste and 'communal' boundaries." Hindu nationalism plays an important role in this conflict. Many Hindus felt that they were the only ones who were entitled to power and control.

Although there were a lot of different factors at work in the Bijnor conflict, what can be understood is that the Hindus were driven to conflict by their irrational fear of what the Muslims were becoming. The Hindus were fearful of that the Muslims would become the dominant group. Statistical studies demonstrate that highly fractionalized cities with a non dominant Hindu population in India are more prone to Hindu-Muslim violence (Urdal 2008). One of the reasons for this may be because Hindus in non-dominant positions in cities feel more threatened when they are not in the majority. This was certainly the case with the Bijnor conflict.

 Looking at Hindu-Muslim relations

We can see from the previously mentioned examples of Hindu-Muslim violence, there is a lot of mistrust between the two groups, which is frequently manifested into violence. Despite these occasions of violence, there are several areas where Hindus and

Muslims reside with each other peacefully, but it is important to bring to light the fact that many Muslims in India maintain a distance from their Hindu counterparts in an attempt to preserve their religion and tradition (Ghosh and Kumar). The change in their once social and political dominance for four hundred years to the current condition of being socially and economically underprivileged in the post-Partition time period has lent itself to advancing their alienation from the community (Ghosh and Kumar).

Some of the general studies that were conducted on Hindu and Muslim students conclude that ethnocentrism between both groups remains high. Furthermore, studies done by Hassan (1984) indicate that group minority status strengthens their ethnic identity. Many of the high caste Hindus and Muslims held a favorable attitude about their own group and their attitudes were formed by the group's social status (Ghosh and Kumar). The reason for Muslim's positive attitude toward their own group was a result of their relative deprivation (Ghosh and Kumar). They were more empowered to believe that their own group was more superior.

When it came to attributing the blame of the violence, the highly deprived Muslims claimed that Hindus were more to blame for the violence (Ghosh and Kumar). The effects of the deprivation that they were experiencing and their status had an impact on whom they were blaming. The groups were bias in explaining the cause of the violence. They were more likely to blame the other group because of ethnocentric attitudes. Studies done demonstrated that Hindus authorized more power to themselves in comparison to Muslims (Ghosh and Kumar). "A study conducted by Chaterjee, Singh, and Roy (1967) showed that a complex combination of socio-economic, demographic,

historical, and ethnic factors together with the spread of rumors led to some of the worst phases in these relations" (Ghosh and Kumar).

What can be said of the violent episodes that occurred between Muslims and Hindus in India? Although we cannot definitively say what the causes of violence are, we do have something to work from. We know that violence can be attributed to the historical relationship between the two groups. There remain deep wounds that are constantly being reopened. The bad memories of Partition remain to be a contentious issue for Hindus and Muslims. Additionally, the alienation and segregation of the Hindus and Muslims exacerbates the issues that the two groups have with each other. The violence between the Muslims and Hindus is a very complex issue that cannot be dwindled down to one cause. There are a lot of forces at work when evaluating the situation. The violent history between the Hindus and Muslims is historical, social, political, economic, and demographic in nature. There are several factors that play an instrumental role in bringing about violence between groups.

CONCLUSION

Despite the abundance of literature on concepts and theories that address ethnic conflict, the amount of literature that is focused on the interactions between inequality and poverty with ethnicity is surprisingly small. Though there are several studies that outline what factors and determinants make conflict more likely, there is not enough that addresses the effects of other variables may have on each other. In this study, I was primarily interested in the effects that inequality and poverty had on ethnicity. I knew

from previous studies that ethnicity was not a statistically significant determinant in predicting conflict as an outcome. However, I believe that ethnicity matters when addressing ethnic conflict. There are certain conditions that heighten the importance that ethnicity has in determining conflict. The results of my study demonstrate that ethnicity has a significant influence in higher percentage of urban dwellers. These results indicate that ethnicity matters and should not be ignored in future discussions about conflict.

Despite the results presenting promising conclusions, the results did not quite conform to the Indian case studies that I analyzed. We see that the statistical applications did apply to Gurr's theory of relative deprivation; however, the case studies present a different conclusion from Gurr's theory. This is possibly due to the limitations that Gurr's theory presents. Because Gurr's theory is primarily a socio-economic explanation for conflict, the theory does not take into account some of the more social and environmental explanations that might be present in conflict-like situations. For instance, the case studies in India presented an entirely different explanation for why there was violence between the Hindus and the Muslims. In Bijnor, we see that the majority, not the minority, is the instigator. This is contrary to Gurr's theory that minority groups are more likely to take up arms. Additionally, it was not the deprived group that started the attack, but the wealthier and more well-off group that began the conflict. For this reason, the case studies present some interesting implications for how we should look at socio-economic explanations of conflict.

I fully realize that my study only accounts for a small portion of why conflicts occur, and this is a clear limitation that both my and Gurr's theory present. My explanation stipulates that poorer groups that are deprived are likely to revolt. However,

we see the opposite occurring in the case studies. Another limitation of my study was my measure of inequality. I used urbanization as a proxy for inequality because I observed that societies that are primarily urban are more likely to experience inequality as opposed to agrarian societies. Using this as a measure could create some skepticism as to whether or not urbanization is an appropriate measurement of inequality.

The situation in Aligarh is interesting because there were so many different factors that my study did not account for. These factors include: local politics, nationalism, ethnocentrism, lack of civil society, media, political elites, literacy, education, community dynamics, etc. All of these factors account for why there was violence in Aligarh but not in Calicut. There is very little evidence that relative deprivation played a role in creating the conflict. These societal explanations account for the difference in reaction to the Babri Masjid incident. Examining the Aligarh conflict, the media and the BJP played a significant role in creating the conflict. It was the rumors that these two groups spread that cost so many lives in the city. Additionally, as Varshney points out there was little to no interaction between the Muslims and Hindus in Aligarh. They were segregated and this created an atmosphere of mistrust and fear.

Another component I believe is significant is the role of literacy and education. I would have liked to take a closer look at the education levels and look at whether or not literacy is an important factor in avoiding conflict. I am interested in literacy rates because Calicut had a very high literacy rate (one of the highest in the entire state of India) and Aligarh had a low number of literate citizens. I think that education may have some part in determining violence. Although I was not able to take a closer look at it

statistically, the case studies indicate that literacy may have had something to do with the differing reactions of Aligarh and Calicut.

The Bijnor conflict did not confirm the results of my theory because in Bijnor we saw that the majority group was attacking the minority group. This was attributed to the fact that the Hindus were fearful of the Muslims gaining too much power. This incident demonstrated the idea of when groups that are already dominant and powerful want to gain more power or clamp down on others so as to solidify their power. I think that this was occurring in Bijnor.

The Indian case studies offer a glimpse into how complex the study of conflict is. The cases did not align with the explanations or determinants that I tested for. There were other forces that were at work that better explain why conflict arose in Aligarh and Bijnor. I think that this is another example of how there are always a lot of different elements involved that cause conflict and one explanation does not suffice.

Intensity proved to be a puzzling component of this study because of the negative impact that ethnicity had on determining the intensity of a conflict. Ethnicity reduced the intensity of a conflict, which was a confounding result. One would think that ethnicity would make the conflict more severe, but it does the opposite. The conditioning effects of ethnicity and inequality and poverty also produced similar results. The relationships were not as clear. For future studies, it would be interesting to be able to take a closer look at why ethnicity has a negative effect on intensity.

The conclusions of my study would provide a good foundation for future research. I would probably take a closer look at other interactive relationships between ethnicity and another variable. It would be interesting to take a look at the education

levels of various countries and interact the educational values with ethnicity. Education levels may present different results than the socio-economic factors that I tested for in my study. Additionally, I would examine the conditions that make people more likely to join a rebellion. I think that my findings could be extended into a larger project that includes more variables that interact with ethnicity. I would like to see the impact that ethnicity has with other non socio-economic factors.

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