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International Associations at the Nexus of Globalization, Religion, and Human Rights

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Abstract

International Associations at the Nexus of Globalization, Religion, and Human Rights
By David V. Brewington

Religion and human rights are often analyzed in the contexts of globalization, but the nexus in which they intersect is rarely investigated. By utilizing data on international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), I examine the religious and secular characteristics of INGOs from 1800 to 1995, the global conditions in which human rights organizations appear from 1839 through 1994, and the characteristics of how religious freedom advocates do their work. Global civil society undergoes a significant shift in the latter half of the 19th century, from a predominantly religious population of organizations to a predominantly secular population of organizations in the space of 50 years. Global human rights organizing is conditioned by the wider global civil society and global legal framework in which it is situated, and responds also to the global economy, war, and global levels of democracy. Religious freedom advocacy takes heterogeneous forms and simultaneously universalizes and particularizes in its efforts to secure liberty of conscience.

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List of acronyms

BWA	Baptist World Alliance
CBJO	Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations
CD-ROM	Compact Disc Read Only Memory
CI	Caritas Internationalis
CRI	Christian Response International
CSI	Christian Solidarity International
CSI	Church of Scientology International
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council (United Nations)
FI	Franciscans International
FIFA	Fédération Internationale de Football Association
GOAC	Greek Orthodox Archdiocesan Council of North and South America
IARF	International Association for Religious Freedom
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IHEU	International Humanist and Ethical Union
IIPC	International Institute of Projectiology and Conscientiology
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IRLA	International Religious Liberty Association
MWL	Muslim World League
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
QUNO	Quaker United Nations Office
REGEX	Regular Expression
RF-INGO	Religious Freedom
RINGO	Religious
SDA	General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists
SED	Stream Editor
SGI	Soka Gakkai International
SINGO	Secular
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UIA	Union of International Associations
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
UUA	Unitarian Universalist Association
VOM	Voice of the Martyrs
WCC	World Council of Churches
WEA	World Evangelical Alliance
WFWP	Women's Federation for World Peace
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association

Chapter 1 **- INTRODUCTION**

After the Brazilian national football team won the Confederations Cup over the United States in the summer of 2009, the Brazilian soccer superstar Kaká took off his jersey to reveal an undershirt with the message, "I belong to Jesus." He was not alone, however. A number of players and staff on the Brazilian national team "are well known for their strong religious beliefs" (quoted in King 2009, p. 76) as Pentecostalists. In a YouTube video of the Cup celebration and awards ceremony (http://youtu.be/IidMnLYiIb8), the viewer sees a number of Brazilian players, just having beaten the U.S., with their yellow Brazilian national jerseys removed and displaying white undershirts emblazoned with devotional phrases to Jesus Christ. As they are queuing to receive the actual Confederations Cup, several unidentified men, likely the official match stewards, are seen asking the Brazilian players to put their yellow jerseys back on.

This was not the first time that, Kaká, winner of the European Footballer of the Year (Ballon d'Or) of 2007, had made his religious faith public. And this would not be the first time that the Brazilian national team would essentially be censured through an official letter for religious displays on field by the international football association, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). In 2005, FIFA sent a letter to the Brazilian national team, again after the Confederations Cup, warning them that Law 4 of FIFA's rules forbids any part of the uniform from having any political, religious or personal statements. In its letter reiterating its preference that players not display signs of their religious faith too overtly, FIFA "risked accusations of being 'anti-religious' by reminding Brazil of its guidelines" banning such displays on the football field (ibid.).

On October 2, 2007, a short news report appeared on the Christian Century website (www.christiancentury.org), titled "Progress reported on proselytizing code." The report details

efforts to establish a code of conduct for Christian missionaries had been bolstered by the agreement by the World Evangelical Alliance agreeing to join. Other parties in drafting this code of conduct include the Vatican and the World Council of Churches. Several days earlier, the World Council of Churches posted to their website (www.oikoumene.org) a document titled "Towards common witness – a call to adopt responsible relationships in mission and to renounce proselytism" (Churches 2007). The third major point reads:

> God's truth and love are given freely and call for a free response. Free will is one of the major gifts with which God has entrusted humans. God does not force anyone to accept God's revelation and does not save anyone by force. On the basis of this notion, the International Missionary Council and the World Council of Churches (in process of formation) developed a definition of religious freedom as a fundamental human right. This definition was adopted by the WCC First Assembly in Amsterdam (1948), and at the suggestion of the WCC's Commission of the Churches on International Affairs it was subsequently incorporated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right includes the freedom to change his/her religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others, in public or in private, to manifest his/her religion or belief, in teaching, practice, worship and observance." The same principle is to be applied in mission work.

The effort to draft this missions code of conduct is ongoing.

Each of these organizations, with the exception of the Vatican, is an international nongovernmental organization or INGO. FIFA is the world association that organizes all of football: rules of conduct, dates of major tournaments and their branding arrangements, and so on. When adult recreational soccer players walk on the pitch in Chicago or Atlanta, the rules they play by will most likely be rules created by FIFA - an INGO in Switzerland. The World Council of Churches is a "worldwide fellowship of 349 churches seeking unity, a common witness, and Christian service." The World Evangelical Alliance is a network of churches across 128 countries

and over 100 international associations "working with local churches around the world to join in common concern to live and proclaim the Good News of Jesus in their communities."

Each is part of a global civil society that organizes vast areas of global life. In the first instance, FIFA, a secular organization, is trying not to ruffle feathers by having its players promulgating a religious message, though by doing this it risks being seen as anti-religious. In the second vignette above, protestant INGOs are joining forces with the Catholic Vatican to come to terms with how they evangelize their gospel without violating the universal human rights of the persons they come into contact with, no matter what their ultimate beliefs about reality and the cosmos are. Given the long history of conflict between Protestants and Catholics, it is at least somewhat surprising to find them agreeing in how to gain new converts.

The long quote above highlights the WCC's role in convincing the newly created United Nations to include in its Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 the freedom of belief and conscience, also known as freedom of religion, religious freedom or religious liberty. This freedom was institutionalized in the UDHR as Article 18. Yet in many places since 1948 individuals and communities of believers are nonetheless persecuted for their religious beliefs and actions. In China, religious groups must register with the government and accept the authority of state-sanctioned religious organizations. No member of these registered groups can join the Communist Party, effectively excluding believers from the Chinese government. Unauthorized religious groups and their leaders in China are subject to observation, harassment, and arrest (Persecution.org 2005). In Iran, authorities arrested Baha'i youths who were teaching non-religious subjects to children in Shiraz on May 19, 2006, and 125 Baha'is have been arrested "arbitrarily" since 2005 according to Human Rights Watch (Watch 2006). Scientologists and their high profile Hollywood advocates claimed in very public simultaneous full-page advertisements in international newspapers in the mid-1990s that the treatment of Scientologists by Germany was similar to the treatment of Jews under Hitler (Walsh and Dahlburg 1997). Germany later placed the entire Scientology operation in Germany under surveillance by the state police organization

charged to monitor extremist groups (Cowell 1997). In Serbia in 2006 a Hare Krishna believer was stabbed, and Seventh-day Adventist and Pentecostal churches face ongoing "graffiti, arson, and stone throwing attacks" (18 2006).

These are a small fraction of the reported religious liberty violations to which religious freedom advocates call attention and attempt to eliminate altogether. Like other human rights advocates, the defenders of religious liberty promote the human right of religious practitioners and believers throughout the world to practice and believe as their individual consciences dictate.

All of these examples illustrate the intertwining of religion and human rights on a now global stage. Sociologists have been trying to understand globalization at least since the beginning of the 1960s. Religion has an even longer history in sociology, as the classical authors of Marx, Simmel, Weber, Durkheim and DuBois all held religion to be an important sociological subject. Although human rights as a subject of sociological interest is rather new, it is related to the social movements literature, which likewise has a long history in the discipline. Yet in sociological literature on the subjects of globalization, religion, and human rights, we do not have many accounts of how religion and human rights intersect or interact in the context of globalization. The examples above would suggest that there is interaction, and that the confluence of these subjects is potentially a fruitful avenue of research. In the following section I take up more specifically the question of how religion has been treated by social scientists interested in issues of globalization and human rights.

Religion in Social Scientific Accounts of Transnational Movements

"Thus man was not liberated from religion; he received religious liberty."

Karl Marx (Tucker 1978, p. 45)

Marx' disappointment with the political acceptance of human rights and in particular religious liberty is clear in "On the Jewish Question." He arrives at the epigraph above after

examining a number of the existing declarations and constitutional provisions for religious liberty, including Article 10 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1791; Article 7 of the Declaration of the Rights of man of 1793; Article 9 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania; and Articles 5 and 6 of the Constitution of New Hampshire (Tucker 1978, p. 41). For Marx, real human emancipation was liberation from religion, the bonds of the state, and ultimately class society, but the pursuit of this emancipation in the end proved to be elusive at best, and catastrophic, at worst. Indeed, in the eclipse of the Marxist dream of emancipation from the need for civil, political, social and economic rights, human rights continue to be of profound importance when we bear witness to continuing abuses of human rights by states and sub-state entities.

But, measured by later human rights documents, Marx is perhaps wrong about liberation from religion. While the UDHR and other global human rights instruments instantiate religious liberty in the human rights pantheon, no specific God is present in these instruments. These documents, although they recognize the individual as sacred (Elliott 2008; Elliott 2007), are thoroughly secularized from traditional theological foundations. As early as 1951, the human rights revolution embodied in the UDHR was described by one of its philosophical proponents, Jacques Maritain, as a secular faith (Traer 1991, p. 10).

The idea of human rights begins many centuries before Marx's and Maritain's eras. Its moral and ethical sources do in fact lie in ancient religious and less ancient secular discourses. We see its beginnings in the first known codes of law and also its halting advances through revolutions, civil wars, world wars, international treaties, and often less than civil organizing in civil societies, global and national. Indeed, in the 21st century it is the global debate, action, and organizing making up the international human rights regime (Donnelly 1986) that is most striking in the history of human rights. A sizable amount of human energy and material resources are expended by nation-states, governmental and non-governmental organizations both national and international, and individuals in order to safeguard, extend, and substantiate human rights.

By invoking Marx's obvious distaste for religious liberty at the outset, I have deliberately called out concern with the religious dimensions of human rights advocacy, as well as the attention or lack thereof given by social scientists to this dimension. In much of the human rights, social movements, and globalization literature, the role of religion is given little importance despite the fact that religious groups provide clearly participate in transnational human rights movements. In this sense, Marx's ideological disdain for religion is emblematic of social scientific efforts at accurately depicting human rights advocacy and globalization. While Marx, and his classical cohort, Weber, Simmel, DuBois and Durkheim, *were* in fact very attendant to religion as a highly important variable in their social science, their successors have often forgotten the salience of the "religious factor," either through the isolation of the sociological study of religion into a highly specialized sub-discipline (Beckford 1989; Beckford 2003) or through "curious neglect" in the social movement literature to religion as the "primary source of many of the necessary ingredients of social-movement emergence and success" (Smith 1996b).

While there is good reason to correct this curious neglect, we should also be mindful that religion, while it has assets to provide to transnational human rights efforts, perhaps also has liabilities. As the source of what we would now call human rights atrocities through much of human history, religious entities carry with them the potential for alienating those they would strive to save by imposing boundaries of particularizing identity. Indeed, the potential and reality for conflict and violence to result from religious activities is part of our contemporary world and is the subject of much scholarship. Susanne Hoeber Rudolph (Rudolph and Piscatori 1997), in her edited volume on transnational religion and states, sets out to show that religion is *both* "vehicle of conflict and cooperation" (Rudolph 1997). The transition from pan-Arabism in the 1960s toward Islamism in the Middle East state system (Fraser 1997) is one example of how religion is a vehicle of conflict. In some sense we can see this transition as the harbinger of the violent revolutions in Iran, the transitions toward Shari'a law in a number of Middle Eastern and northern African states, as well as the nearly state-sponsored terrorism from Afghanistan in the form of Al

Qaeda and its attacks on the US and elsewhere. Other research covers issues from jihadist Islam, Christian Right extremism, violent new religious movements such as People's Temple or Aum Shinrikyo, to the potential for whole civilizations to engage in conflict along broadly religious fractures (Hall 1987; Hall, Schuyler, and Trinh 2000; Huntington 1996; Juergensmeyer 2000). But too little research in sociology attempts an understanding of how religion engages in transnational work that promotes human rights or social justice. Studies that focus on the national level suggest that we should indeed find a prominent role for religion in human rights and social justice discourses in the transnational sphere. Indeed, the social movements literature owes much to its studies of the role of the Black church in the expansion of civil rights in the U.S. in the 1960s (McAdam 1999; Morris 1986; Morris and Mueller 1992).

Scholarship on religion and transnational advocacy

So, what can we glean from the social scientific literature about the role religion plays in transnational human rights advocacy efforts? When it does address the issue, the literature is somewhat scant in its attention to specifically religious factors in human rights and transnational advocacy efforts. Most accounts do little more than begin with the religious moral groundings behind advocacy efforts and then move on to other topics. For example, in their history of early transnational advocacy movements, Keck and Sikkink (1998) note the religious identities of those involved with the anti-slavery, anti-foot binding, and anti-female genital cutting movements, but their larger model of the "boomerang effect" abstracts away from any specifically religious resources to the more generalized effect of norms in the transnational sphere. Is the religious involvement in early movements not striking enough to warrant explanation? Or does its absence in their model indicate a "washing out" of religious influence over these norms over time? The cases suggested here do not seem to conform to such a lessening of religious influence, suggesting that the model is inadequate in this respect.

Florini and Simmons (2000) also pay lip service to the religious character of the anti-slavery movement as the first in a "long tradition" of transnational advocacy. Risse (2000) elaborates Keck and Sikkink's (ibid.) "boomerang effect" into a dynamic "spiral of boomerangs" (Risse 2000, p. 190ff). In the process he makes reference to the involvement of the Catholic Church in highlighting the human rights abuses of the Suharto regime in Indonesia and Pinochet in Chile to the international community (ibid: 195), but the "spiral of boomerangs" model he puts forward makes no use of this information outside of a generic appeal to the mobilization of human rights norms. The fact that a uniquely globalized entity such as the Catholic church is involved at the ground level and in the dissemination of information to the global community leaves a kink in his model, especially when he highlights the instrumental role of domestic organizations at the ground level in this model (ibid:205).

Chabbott's (1999) treatment of development INGOs also briefly alludes to the role of religion in the founding of early development INGOs. Thus, once again, the anti-slavery movement is noted for its Quaker roots and thus its "common moral framework" (ibid:228). The International Society of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC), Chabbott notes in a tone of irony, is known as a "secular" organization, but of course its symbols, the cross and crescent, are highly religious. Further, she notes that in 1958 the World Council of Churches is the *first* entity to set development targets for *states* as well as churches. The Vatican also plays a role by defining the targets and agents of development assistance as individuals rather than states or state economies in its 1963 and 1967 encyclicals. Where Chabbott places emphasis on the moral grounding that religious entities provide in the area of development, it seems that religious entities are *setting agendas* and *defining the aims of development over against states*, entities with far more material resources and power. To be fair, Chabbott stresses the trend toward professionalization against the early involvement of religious entities in the field of development. Still, we have religious *leadership* in the development field as late as 1967 by her own account, without so much as an attempt at explanation of this rather important role.

McCarthy (1997) more directly addresses religion in his treatment of the "globalization of social movement theory," but at the same time he delimits the contribution of religion. Instead of bona fide transnational social movement activists, religions groups are relegated to the realm of "other institutional" actorhood (ibid: 247) in the contest for framing movement issues. Religious groups are mobilizing structures, "more or less formally organized everyday life patterns upon which movements build collective action" (ibid: 249). These mobilizing structures provide existing social relations and communications networks and other resources, including personnel and finances. These everyday life patterns *facilitate* mobilization, but are apparently not considered part of the mobilization. McCarthy cites several examples from the volume in which his essay is a concluding review (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997), including the involvement of the "traditional peace churches" such as the Quakers in working with the UN. The Quaker United Nations Office (QUNO) was instrumental in efforts to instantiate conscientious objection as a human right throughout this campaign by seeking partners and allies, educating about the issue, learning and working the UN system, which included taking the initiative to produce "an actual preliminary document for circulation," (Hovey 1997, p. 221), and getting agreement on the issues. Although Hovey includes the QUNO as a legitimate member of the movement, McCarthy seems almost to ignore Hovey's chapter when he says that although mobilizing structures are important, "the essays here could not discuss such matter in detail" (McCarthy 1997, p. 250).

While these examples suggest a gap in the social science literature regarding the role of religion in transnational human rights advocacy and global civil society, there are exceptions. Rudolph and Piscatori (1997), Juergensmeyer (2005), Lechner (2004a; 2005), Thomas (2004; 1996; 2001) and Christian Smith's edited volume on "disruptive religion" (1996b) address head-on the role that religion plays in such movements. I examine Smith's work more in depth in the theory chapter. In the next section I raise questions regarding how religion involves itself in global civil society.

The character of religious involvement in global civil society

When religious entities become involved in transnational human rights movements, they bring special assets to the table. But how do they use those assets and does the manner in which they are used indicate anything about religion in global civil society? Let's turn back to some of our examples from earlier.

The involvement of religious groups in lobbying for the United Nations Charter to include human rights, as well as advocacy for a Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is one of many global movements that involves religion. As indicated earlier, there is no mention of any specific religious content in the UDHR. The same can be said of subsequent convention or declaration documents such as the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. According to Robert Traer's (1991) account, the UDHR was to some extent the product of Protestant and Catholic advocacy efforts, corroborating the quote from the WCC earlier in the introduction. Specifically, a joint agency effort by the World Council of Churches (in formation at the time) and the International Missionary Council produced the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs in 1946. The CCIA worked to promote the inclusion of religious liberty in peace treaties with Germany and Italy, and to ensure that the Declaration itself "should reflect a basic approach to the observance of human rights which was acceptable from the Christian standpoint, even though it did not contend that a Christian position had to be enunciated therein" (ibid:175). Protestant advocates for the production of the UDHR understood that they could not insert religious language that would lead to perceptions of bias toward a particular religious viewpoint. Although these Protestant advocates could mobilize their existing organizational networks and resources and be motivated by a particular worldview, this worldview could not be represented explicitly in the document, and they understood this

implicitly, even though “the omission of any reference to God in the Universal Declaration was acknowledged as a concern for many Christians” (ibid:176).

Similarly, some religious advocates for religious human rights, a movement with a century long history, utilize universalizing language, ecumenism, and appeals to its transnational character in even its appeals for freedom of religion. For example, on the International Association of Religious Freedom's (IARF) website, it describes itself in terms of its transnational membership:

> We have over 90 affiliated member groups in approximately 25 countries from a wide range of faith traditions, including Christianity, Buddhism, Islam, Shintoism, Hinduism, and Sikhism, among others. With member organizations, regional co-ordinators, and national chapters around the world, the International Association for Religious Freedom is well placed to obtain local perspectives on religious freedom concerns and issues (2004).

Or, consider the Vatican Council II Declaration on Religious Liberty of 1965: “This Vatican Council declares that the human person has a right to religious freedom. This freedom means that all men are to be immune from coercion on the part of individual or of social groups and of any human power . . the right to religious freedom has its foundation in the very dignity of the human person” (Vatican II Council, as quoted in Tierney 1996, p. 18) . Here, no “human power” has the right to coerce any human to believe in any way other than that individual wants to believe (ibid). The universalizing language is obvious, and the consequence that individuals might not believe in Catholicism suggests, at least through stated policy, an earnest interest in the human right of religious liberty. Another example comes from the World Council of Churches Amsterdam Declaration in 1948 (quoted in Koshy 1992, p. 76):

1. Every person has the right to determine his own faith and creed.

2. Every person has the right to express his religious beliefs in worship, teaching and practice and to proclaim the implications of his beliefs for relationships in a social or political community.
3. Every person has the right to associate with others and to organize with them for religious purposes.
4. Every religious organization formed or maintained by action in accordance with the rights of individual person, has the right to determine its policies and practices for the accomplishments of its chosen purposes.

The first three declarations by the liberal Protestant INGO conclude that each person is endowed with the sole power to determine his religion, express it, and to associate with others who do so as well. In addition, the fourth declaration proclaims the right of religious organizations who abide by the rights of the individual person as stated in the previous three declarations to pursue as an organization its religious practices.

These examples suggest that when religion is involved in issues related to human rights or social justice, their religiosity is muted, and efforts are framed in a very specific manner. Instead of promoting freedom of Christians to believe how they wish in the UDHR, religious INGOs promote freedom of all to believe how they wish. Enumeration of the different faiths involved suggests an ecumenical or interfaith approach is very important to IARF. Vatican II statements on religious freedom are expressed in universal terms: religious freedom applies to everyone, everywhere, not just Catholics. The WCC also frames its principles in universal terms. There appears to be a tendency that pressures religious activists to utilize universal and inclusive language. What is this tendency, and is it the case that all religious voices involved in human rights efforts do the same?

Another tendency is illustrated by the Jubilee 2000 movement to relieve third world debt. Although the religious dimensions were critical in a number of ways, including the “moral urgency” provided by a religious inspired symbolic politics, as well as agenda setting, network

building, and access to religious symbolic resources (Lechner 2005), religious involvement was only one node amongst many in the movement (ibid). The character of Christian involvement in the movement was also not too divergent from that of the secular nodes (ibid), indicating a possible variant of the tendency toward universalism: not only can claims not emphasize a particular religion, they also cannot be too religious. That religious involvement formed only one node amongst many in the Jubilee 2000 network can also be said of nearly every other movement considered here.

These issues I have described suggest that even though religious actors working for global social justice or human rights issues may have some particular assets to bring with them to the work, they also carry with them some tendencies of which scholars should pay attention. Thus, although we should heed Christian Smith's call to correct the curious scholarly neglect of religion, in so doing we also should not overlook the *character of how religion is involved* in transnational human rights movements, and we should understand whether the tendencies I have described here delimit this religious activity in any way.

Thus far I have raised several questions about religious advocacy of social justice or human rights issues in the context of global civil society. Does religious involvement in transnational human rights advocacy always tend toward universalism, or do more particularistic strains appear? How religious are the forms in which religion and human rights "mix" in the context of globalization? Is religion an asset but also delimited by certain tendencies in the pursuit of human rights?

There are even more fundamental questions. Scholars in the sociology of religion have long drawn on the concept of secularization to express expectations that the role of religion in society will decline through time. Is this the case with respect to religion in global civil society? In other words, is there in any sense a "decline" of religion in the history of global civil society? Moving beyond religion for a moment, another fundamental question: what conditions frame

global human rights advocacy? Do these conditions frame religious human rights advocacy in the same way? These questions are formalized below.

1. *What is the nature of religious involvement in global civil society through time? Is religion a prominent component of global civil society? If so, does its contribution to global civil society change over time? Does global civil society secularize? That is, can we see any evidence that the contribution of religion to global civil society declines over time?*

2. *What factors shape advocacy of human rights at the global level? Do these factors change over time? Is there one factor that predominantly frames the institutional space in which HRINGOs operate? Or is there a mix of contributing factors?*

3. *How do religious freedom INGOs do their work? Are there any patterns with respect to the types of INGOs doing religious liberty? Are RF-INGOs religious? If so, what religions are represented? Do RF-INGOs as a whole utilize universalizing language and mute their religiosity in their advocacy? Do RF-INGOs advocate for all humans, or do they advocate for particular groups of humans, e.g., humans who practice a specific religion?*

How to answer these questions? Religion seems to be the vanguard and the rear phalanxes of the movement for global religious liberty (Lechner 2004a). Although there are secular nodes in this movement with some of the major human rights INGOs such as Amnesty International (ibid), the overwhelmingly religious character of the movement suggests that we have a sort of test-case for examining how religion interacts with global civil society when it is defending its own turf.

This dissertation is my attempt at grappling with these questions. In doing this research I examine the dynamics of religion and human rights in global civil society in three specific ways.

INGOs that advocate for religious freedom exist at the intersection of human rights and religion. These religious freedom INGOs, or RF-INGOs for short, sit predominantly between two overlapping sub-populations of INGOs: those that are religious and those that do human rights. By analyzing each of these populations (religious INGOs, human rights INGOs, and religious freedom INGOs), I can better make sense of the work that religion does in global civil society[1] and begin to answer the questions outlined above. In particular, Figure 1 displays these fundamental issues I hope to answer.

To answer these questions I utilize data on INGOs gathered by the Union of International Associations (UIA). The UIA has become the de facto chronicler of international associations, and produces an annual yearbook containing many types of data on INGOs, as well as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). I utilize the UIA's 2001-2002 CD-ROM version of their International Yearbook of International Associations as the source of all data in this dissertation. I developed several scripts that extracts the data out of this CD-ROM and utilized other software to prepare it for analysis. I utilize coding on this data from previous analysis and research where I identified and coded all human rights INGOs (Brewington 2005), and where John Boli and I identified and coded all religious INGOs (Boli and Brewington 2007).

The perspective on globalization I take is guided by analysts who understand globalization to mean much more than accelerating markets, global systems of economics, interconnected technologies, and the like. Globalization is all of these, but this only scratches the surface. Even when not privileging the economic aspects of globalization, many scholars still stop at the politics of globalization. Contemporary global politics clearly includes issues of human rights and religion, however something is still missing if we only pay attention to one facet of globalization. Global analysis that takes culture seriously is the basis of my perspective.

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[1] What "global civil society" is will be taken up in the next chapter.

The findings of this dissertation lend themselves to the outlines of a particular narrative about religion in global civil society. Religion is indeed involved in the entire history of global civil society. In fact, religion is very important to the history of global civil society in two ways. First, western Christendom of the high middle ages serves as a structural antecedent of what is now a global culture: a decentralized and expansive reach across the European continent with a highly rationalized character. Second, the religious transnationalism inhering in western Christendom spans the entire history of global civil society in the form of religious INGOs, or RINGOs. Religiously oriented INGOs dominated the population of INGOs early on, and they are still voicing their concerns at regional, transnational, and global level. However, there are many more voices at the table, so to speak, and these voices are now predominantly secular. In fact, the proportion of religious to secular INGOs changes drastically in a rather short time between 1860 and about 1905 to 1910, from nearly 100% of the population to 5%. And the content of these INGOs' objectives, measured as a function of INGO age, shows that INGOs founded after 1860 tend to have a more secular message.

During the 19th and 20th centuries, but especially after World War II and the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights as a field undergoes enormous expansion. Human rights INGOs are predominantly secular, and the models I test quantitatively suggest that HRINGOs appear in certain global conditions, and not necessarily as a response to actual human rights violations. A positive economic environment, lower global levels of democracy, the increasing size of global civil society, and expansion of the international human rights legal framework contribute to more HRINGO foundings.

As part of the human rights INGO sector, we might expect religious freedom INGOs to mirror other INGO fields. In some ways, they do, but in significant ways RF-INGOs are distinctive. With respect to religion, RF-INGOs are very different from HRINGOs and all INGOs. RF-INGOs are far more likely to be religious, and while multiple religions and secular organizations are represented, the predominant religious representation is Protestant. These

Protestant RF-INGOs are especially interesting: counter to certain theoretical expectations, they employ language that is highly particularistic with respect to religion in describing their work. Christians alone are worthy of protection from persecution by Muslims and Communists. To be sure, other RF-INGOs advocate for practitioners of all faiths, and a sizable percentage of RF-INGOs are explicitly multi-faith in their membership. But the larger point is that there are two extremes in this small subset of INGOs: one is highly particularistic and the other is highly universalistic. This defies some accounts of world culture but corroborates others. A provisional finding also suggests that RF-INGOs are less responsive to global democracy: HRINGOs as a whole tend to increase as global democracy declines. But the foundings of RF-INGOs are only slightly negatively correlated to increases in global democracy. This suggests that RF-INGOs are not related to levels of global democracy.

To summarize: the history of global civil society includes religious voices from its earliest history to now. Religious INGOs dominated the early history, but in a very short time and by the first world war secularly oriented INGOs were the more dominant type. Human rights INGOs are predominantly secular and we tend to see more of them in certain global environments rather than in response to human rights violations. RF-INGOs are similar in some respects to HRINGOs, but show variation along key dimensions. RF-INGOs tend to be religious more often than all INGOs and HRINGOs, and some RF-INGOs defy universalistic expectations by restricting their advocacy to those of their own religious faith.

Global civil society most definitely includes religion, but its strength has declined over time relative to more secularized entities, and religious INGOs themselves show their age so to speak – younger religious INGOs tend to speak of themselves in less religious terms than their older counterparts. Even so, some INGOs that advocate and organize religious liberty, founded only within the last 50 years, are highly religious and contravene world cultural norms by expressing their advocacy solely in terms of their religious practitioners, all of whom are Christian and most often Protestant.

The organization of the dissertation

In the following chapter I will explore the terrain of religion, human rights, and globalization by sketching key theoretical accounts of each. Because globalization is the ultimate environment in which I am interested, I start there. I provide an overview of two of the main sets of perspectives that drive much of the scholarship in global cultural analysis in sociology: the globalization theory of Roland Robertson, and the world-society/world-polity perspective of John Meyer and his associates. I then turn to sketching out global accounts of religion, again utilizing Robertson's work, but supplementing it with the work of a related scholar of religion and globalization, Peter Beyer. I then turn to an examination of human rights and global civil society. Here I utilize work from the world polity account to examine human rights, and I then turn more directly to INGOs and the global civil society of which they are a part.

Following this theory chapter, I discuss the data and methods I use in the dissertation. The data comes from the 2001-02 Union of International Associations (UIA) CD-ROM. The UIA is the premier chronicler of international associations. I explain in this chapter the techniques I used to extract data from the CD-ROM, and provide details on how I coded and prepared the data for analysis.

In chapter 4, I turn to examining how the INGO population has changed over time with respect to religion. By charting the founding dates of religious and secular INGOs over time, I show how the INGO population, once almost completely made up of religious associations, changed in a very short time to be predominantly secular. I also examine the objectives of religious and secular INGOs to ascertain if the language they use changes based on the age of the organization. *This chapter addresses questions from the first item above*.

In chapter 5, I utilize advanced quantitative statistics to explore the factors that impact the creation of new human rights INGOs. Using global level variables and a technique called negative binomial regression, I show that HRINGO foundings are sensitive to certain types of global influences. *This chapter addresses questions from two above.*

For chapter 6, I directly examine the small population of religious freedom INGOs. In this chapter I explore the data on these RF-INGOs to build a typology that helps us understand how RF-INGOs do their work, and *addresses the third set of questions above.*

In the concluding chapter, I summarize my findings, and turn my attention back to the question of how RF-INGOs, as both human rights and religious INGOs are affected by these overlapping domains. I then reflect back on the theoretical work in chapter 2 to offer an historical narrative that tries to account for the patterns that emerge in the data.

Chapter 2 – THEORY AND THE HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The relationship among religion, human rights, and globalization is the central issue in this dissertation. Each subject is in its own right expansive, so to attempt to provide enough substance with clarity to understand the three issues simultaneously is necessarily difficult. The approach I take in providing a treatment of the relationships of the three with each other will be limited to providing theoretical sketches based in sociology. I do this by providing overviews of relevant sociological theory on each of the three subjects. I start with globalization partially as a matter of convenience, but also because I believe the global condition serves as the dominant social context through which the major issues taken up by this dissertation interact. Then I discuss religion and human rights as separate sections. In the human rights section I also take up the task of describing global civil society, as these two concepts are complementary with respect to my overall subject. First, however, I provide a brief history of religious freedom to provide context for the rest of the dissertation. In the process, I will also cover secularization theory. The history of religious freedom and secularization theory are intertwined, and provide a basis through which to understand much of what follows.

From Institutional Differentiation to Religious Freedom

Religious liberty is part of the contemporary and global human rights regime (Elliott 2007), but historically religious liberty is the first acknowledged human right (Curry 1987; Miller 1986; Richardson 2006). Religious freedom is codified as Article 18 in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,

worship and observance" (United Nations 1948). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed in1966 and ratified into force in 1976, provides further clarification of the international norms surrounding religious freedom. In addition to non-discrimination clauses that reference religion in Articles 2 and 4, Article 18 states:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, signed in 1966 and ratified in 1976, also provides anti-discrimination clauses which include reference to religion. In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. The General Assembly again took up the issue of religious liberty in 1993, when it adopted a resolution on the Elimination of all Forms of Religious Intolerance. Although highly contentious on the sensitive issue of religion, the international legal framework for religious liberty is quite elaborate, if not binding.

At a national level, nation-states do more than pay lip-service to the international norm of religious freedom. Based on recent research by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life (2009), only 4% (7) of countries out of the 198 they surveyed had no constitutional protection for

religious freedom. Another 20% (40) of countries surveyed did not have specific protections for religious freedom, but the constitution or basic law of the country provides some protection for religious practices. Over three-fourths (151) of countries had specific language protecting religious freedom in their constitutions or basic law. At the same time, the Pew report finds that for the 191 national constitutions that provide some level of protection of freedom of religion, 146 (74%) of these national constitutions also include language that appears "to qualify or substantially contradict the concept of 'religious freedom'" (Ibid, p. 54). Only 44 nations (22%) do not have contradictory or qualifying language circumscribing religious freedom. The above measures are combined into a Government Restrictions Index that measures restrictions on religion across 20 dimensions. Countries scoring high or very high on this index (43, or 21.7% of countries), meaning that there are high levels of restriction, include Saudi Arabia, Iran, China, Myanmar, Indonesia, Russia, Greece, Israel and Cuba. Moderate levels of restriction (36 countries, or 18.2 %) are assigned to France, Mexico, Germany, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Venezuela, among others. States with low restrictions (119, or 60.1%) as measured by the Government Restrictions Index include the United Kingdom, Poland, Senegal, Argentina, South Korea, the United States, Costa Rica, Japan, and Australia.

The national governments of 141 countries (71%) either fully respects religious freedom in practice or generally respects religious freedom in practice with exceptions in some locations. National governments in 59 countries (29%) do not respect religious freedom in practice generally or at all. Countries in this latter category tend to be from the Middle East and North Africa or in Asia-Pacific regions. However, European nations are not exemplars in religious freedom. Former communist countries tend to favor one state-recognized religion and Western European countries "have laws aimed at protecting citizens from what the government considers dangerous cults or sects" (ibid, p. 15).

How did we arrive at this level of elaboration and institutionalizing of the religious liberty norm? From a unitary Western Christendom where religious dissent was heresy, treasonous, and an affront to the Christian God (Tierney 1996), to a fractured and war-torn Europe after the Protestant Reformation, religious liberty arises and with it rises the broader global human rights regime. In reaction to the very bloody religious wars, scholars such as Hugo Grotius and John Lilburne called for religious tolerance. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which provided a peace from the wars of religion, re-situated the question of religion in Europe within the nascent nation-state form. This Hobbesian solution to the religious question provided that the sovereign ruler of each territory could choose the sanctioned religion for that territory, and granted the privilege for dissenters to emigrate to a territory in which their beliefs aligned with the sovereign ruler (Ishay 2004). In 1690, John Locke's "Letter Concerning Toleration" moved the impetus for religious tolerance from the sovereign leader's prerogative to the individual. In the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789 and in the Bill of Rights (1791) in the Constitution of the United States respect for religious opinion is situated amongst a larger body of rights.

While this brief excursus into the evolution of religious liberty provides some context, William Garrett (1987) provides an account of the history and evolution of religious liberty and human rights, and in the process, locates the beginning of secularization in the west[2] as institutional differentiation in the Papal Revolution of the 11th to 13th centuries. Prior to this period, the religious and political bodies were one and the same,[3] as "but different dimensions to a singular societal order" (ibid, p. 294). This was the case on the European continent with the Holy Roman Emperor and under William the Conqueror in Normandy and the English Isles. The

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[2] To my knowledge, though it is believed to be a universal process, there is no scholarly account of secularization outside the west.

[3] Garrett uses the term "state" anachronistically. The nation-state form does not appear for several centuries.

process that unfolds from the Papal Revolution and the lay investiture controversy converts natural law to natural rights law, and then, in its American version, from natural rights law to human rights, and specifically, religious liberty.

Garrett writes that the papacy underwent a series of mishaps causing a "miserable state of affairs" and by the mid-11th century a reform movement led by Cluny monks was able to garner sympathy from the Holy Roman Emperor Henry III, and secured a series of sympathetic nominations to the papacy. This series of popes wished to "restore the integrity of the papacy, but also to enhance its power amid the chaos of overlapping jurisdictions of feudal loyalty and patronage which prevailed in secular social life" (ibid, p. 295). Pope Gregory VII then began to assert the power of God over the secular power of the emperor in selecting churchmen for church offices. This is known as the lay investiture controversy – the Pope felt that non-churchmen were exerting too much power over the church, and this issued the question of religious integrity. Only God and his men on Earth should have the power to appoint church offices.

For Garrett this was an interesting problem for the papacy. How does a pope establish a novel claim to authority "when he lacked both an army and customary practice to lend credibility to his innovations" (ibid.). The answer for Garrett is that the pope turned to legal authority, and this unleashed 150 years of research, development, and codification of canon law through a revival of Roman law and Stoic natural law. This extended act of legal codification for Garrett is the big bang of western secularization because it "transformed the church into a corporation" (ibid.), a body unto itself, and in return created the need for the political body to do the same:

> No longer was the *ecclesia* merely a dimension of the total societal order, but now it was conceived as an institutionally discrete entity which stood over against all worldly and mundane institutions. Furthermore, once the church attained a corporate status, the state [sic] was thrust into a position wherein it, too, had to take on the character of a corporation and develop its own legal structure as a basis for articulating its peculiar rights, powers, and prerogatives (ibid., 296).

Thus, in a dialectic of legal corporatizing, religious and political institutions of the west devolve out of each other as separate bodies. Not without its own consequences for each institution, it was the same body of natural law drawn up by students of the same law schools of the era that were used to devolve these newly corporatized bodies.

Though much legal innovation occurs in the intervening centuries, what is important for Garrett as the second great movement of secularization is that the lawyers and scholars working out the rules and laws of the secular realm endeavored to develop secularized legal foundations without resorting to religious grounds for political institutions. Substantively they were not successful, but they did succeed in convincing later scholars that non-religious institutions needed to be grounded in secular foundational theories rather than religious foundations. This secular foundational thrust culminated in the US colonies' specific solutions to church and state: human rights law emerges as a wall forbidding the state to intervene in religious issues.

How does this occur? Garrett finds the first appeals to unlimited guarantee of freedom of religion and conscience (ibid., pp. 322ff) with Roger Williams and the settlement he founded in Rhode Island, the Levellers serving in Cromwell's New Model Army, and with Isaac Backus, a Baptist minister who emerged out of the first Great Awakening in the colonies. By Garrett's account, each of these approaches to religious liberty are developed independent of each other; the Levellers' and Williams' accounts of religious liberty were historically earlier (in the 1640s), while Backus, who was writing on the subject in the 1770s and proposed a bill of rights for the Massachusetts constitution of 1779, only found out about Williams ideas after he had constructed his understanding of citizen relations to civil authority. Each of these developed understandings of rights in the face of "a similar set of religiously repressive social conditions."

Williams came to the Rhode Island territory by escaping Massachusetts as he was set to be exiled back to the UK for his religious views. For Williams, governing institutions had no business enquiring into its denizens' religious views. Affairs between a government and its people were legitimated through agreed upon principles of the duties of government and people.

In short, this is the Lockean solution to how to establish a civil authority without God at its source. But, as Garrett notes, it was not Williams' theory of government authority derived from its people that led to his approach to citizen conscience. It was only through a deeply free conscience that individuals could come to a right understanding of the Christian god. Williams was arguing at this time with thinkers such as John Cotton, who thought that civil authority should be utilized to ensure religious uniformity as the best means toward religious reform.

The Levellers came to their notions of human rights through conflict with their higher status gentry subsequent to the English Civil War. They had served in Cromwell's New Model Army and defended Parliament, but found that their rewards for doing so did not include the rights they believed they and their lower status brothers were due. They came to their understanding of human rights by a belief that the Christian god granted each person an ownership of his or her own person. From this ownership all other rights were derived. The Leveller movement came to an abrupt end, however after the execution of Charles I and Cromwell's efforts to crush the movement by force. Their ideas found no subsequent social carriers.

Isaac Backus was a Baptist member of the clergy during the Great Awakening, subsequent to membership in the Congregationalist church in New England. Incensed by the treatment of Baptists and Methodists by the establishment Congregationalists, Backus defended members of these separatist sects throughout New England. The human rights framework he derived was based in his pre-millenarian "pietistic-revivalist bent" and started with the idea that "all persons are born equally free and independent" (ibid., p. 327).

The religious origins of each of these early enunciations of comprehensive human rights derived from the sacred origins of individuals and were born in religious repression. Where the ideas from the Leveller movement in the UK did not survive the demise of the movement without subsequent social carriers, by Garrett's account the religious environment in the United States afforded the ideas of Williams and Backus a means of fermentation and dissemination to the

masses. Baptist and Separatist sects were bustling at the seams with new converts after the Great Awakening of the 1730s and 1740s, and their clergy preached religious and other freedoms borne of their own religious persecution.[4] This created a mass-appeal for rights discourse that resonated later with Jefferson's more Lockean natural rights theories:

> [W]hen Jefferson asserted in Lockean rhetoric, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights . . . ," Separatists and lower status evangelicals readily voiced their assent – not because they had been carefully schooled in the finer points of Lockean political theory, but because these principles resonated with precisely what their ministers had been asserting all along in the pulpit and in court (ibid., p. 329).

The religious reasoning behind the American human rights tradition and the political reasoning behind the natural law tradition found expression in the American context in such a way as to effect resolution of what Garrett regards as a significant sociological problem: how to build a secular state and keep it out of the business of religion while simultaneously keeping religion out of the business of the state.

> The significance of this feat is difficult to overestimate. By divorcing the state from any religious connection, the human rights tradition accomplished what the natural law school had set out to do: it set the state on secular foundations without having to give up an avenue to the sacred altogether. Yet, because the connection to the supernatural or spiritual domain was located in the sphere of the individual self, the powers of government were of necessity limited to those areas which did not infringe on god-given prerogatives (ibid., p. 330).

Religious reasoning behind freedom of conscience defined sacredness as a property of the human individual deriving directly from Christian divinity, while political reasoning defined the state as

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[4] Unfortunately, Garrett provides no citations on this point.

a secular entity divorced of religious foundations and connections. These lines of reasoning converged in the Bill of Rights of the US Constitution, legally institutionalizing human rights and serving as the institutional model for human rights and religious liberty in subsequent constitutions and international instruments.

Secularization: Religion and Society

This history of religious freedom and human rights is embedded in a larger history of the relationship of religion to society. Social science has for much of its history viewed the role of religion in societies through the lens of secularization. The idea itself has a long history and has taken many forms, but in its very basic form secularization means a decline of religion in some form. Although much criticized in recent decades, scholars utilizing the concept of secularization find it defensible and useful in sociological thinking. Lechner (1992), Casanova (1994), Beyer (Beyer 1994), Chaves (1994), Yamane (1997), and Gorski (2000) maintain that when secularization is properly defined as institutional differentiation and declining religious authority, secularization is a fruitful research program.

The Enlightenment mythology version of secularization critiqued by sociologists of the so-called new paradigm (Warner 1993) should be distinguished from theories of secularization that emphasize a historical and institutional argument about the role of religion in advanced industrial society. Proponents of this understanding of secularization cite the changing nature of authority in society and its institutions (Chaves 1994), and regard the "core" of secularization theory as institutional differentiation (Tschannen 1991). This secularization narrative begins with the historical dominance of religious authority in society. Religion is the dominant institution, and religious authority is the dominant form of legitimation. Over time through a process of rationalization, the internal logic of politics, economics, law, education, and science become elaborated as institutions separated from religion, often as a result of the internal logic of religion itself (Garrett 1987; Weber, Gerth, and Mills 1946). The important result is that religion as *the*

authoritative institution becomes one societal institution amongst several, each with their own internal and highly rationalized institutional logics of operation (Friedland and Alford 1991) (Fr. Religion is no longer the dominant societal authority in a differentiated institutional system. It is the loss of dominant societal authority vis-à-vis the growth and autonomy of multiple societal institutions, otherwise known as institutional differentiation.

This latter story is not a narrative about the wholesale decline of religion in all its manifestations. In Chaves' (1994) account, the new defenders of the old paradigm are promulgating a "new differentiation" theory that dispenses with *some* of the legacy of Parsons' work (ibid., p. 751). Four main Parsonian assumptions are dropped: (1) that there is a master trend toward differentiation in all spheres; (2) that institutions, because they exist, must meet some societal need; (3) value integration is no longer a necessary requirement; and (4) the aims of any given institution are not misidentified as the primary aims of society as a whole. This understanding of religious authority in society allows for variation in how a particular society experiences religious change vis-à-vis other institutions with which it now must contend (see especially Martin 1978). Religious practice and belief can remain incredibly high in a given society even as religion as an institution does not dominate that society. Scholars in this tradition for the most part make arguments not about religious adherence and practice, but how religion as an institution interacts with other institutions in particular societies, and increasingly, at the global level.[5] Note also that this second account of secularization does not make any claim about the future demise or "end" of religion, and in fact does not rule out a present or future where religion as an institution is the authoritative and dominant institution in a society. The telic dimension of the inevitable death for religion is dropped – history has not come to an end for religion, and it may or may not be a powerful institution in the future.

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[5] These interactions of course have consequences for religious practice and belief.

Chaves (1994) makes another very consequential point about new secularization approaches, which concerns Dobbelaere's (Dobbelaere 1981) approach to secularization analysis. Dobbelaere's contribution to secularization theory is that secularization can occur at multiple levels of reality. Dobbelaere cites three levels in particular – the societal, the organization, and the individual. Secularization is in this view a far more nuanced process and can occur in different directions at different levels. Thus, variation in secularization is very much alive to the old-school secularization paradigm, and this is echoed in other neo-secularization studies.

There are two further wrinkles added if we take Martin's (Martin 1978) general theory of secularization seriously – path dependency, and as a result, societal variation. Martin provides one of the most comprehensive attempts at a sociological theory of secularization (Lechner 1991). Martin begins with the historical manner in which a society enters secularization. This frames or limits the society's subsequent history: "at certain crucial periods in their history societies acquire a particular frame and . . subsequent events persistently move within that frame" (Martin 1978, p. 15). Thus, a society's path from secularization is very much dependent on the frame through which it begins.

Martin postulates two ideal typical initial frames for secularization: that of the "vicious" and "beneficent" circles. Vicious circles are societal dynamics characterized by binary hostilities reinforcing their binary character – a "mutual antagonistic definition which reinforces [itself]" (ibid., p. 16). Beneficent circles are also reinforcing but in the direction of compromise and adaptation – a forced acceptance of the relative power of the other which mitigates drastic antagonism. The orientation of conflict within and without a society also impinges on these spirals: if political conflict is originates within a society, it is most likely that this conflict will be part of a vicious circle and characterized by disunity between religion and state. Conversely, unity and a beneficent circle is usually the product of political conflict imposed by an external entity on a society.

The vicious circle is crucially important for the religious path of a society. Religious monopolies, and especially Catholic monopolies in history, are associated politically with one side in the antagonism. The other side usually aligns against the religious monopoly and tends toward an extreme anti- or irreligious pole. The beneficent circle, on the other hand, is reinforced through compromise between similarly politically powerful religions, but with shifting issues one group may ally and array itself against the same group at different times. The upshot is that the beneficent circle does not tend to array along a religious – irreligious opposition, where "secularization [is] a central requirement in final victory" (ibid., p. 17).

To summarize, Martin postulates that three issues affect whether it is the vicious circle or the beneficent circle that is the initial path of a society through secularization. A vicious circle is likely to be the initial frame, if:

1. there is a strong presence of Catholicism;
2. there is the presence of a religious monopoly; and/or
3. there is an internal frame of conflict.

These are not determinative conditions, but indicate ideal typical poles within which we can situate societies to understand their initial frame and their subsequent histories with respect to secularization. Thus, the categories Catholic/Protestant, monopoly/plurality and internal/external revolution are essentially key variables, but are not nominal binaries. They are more like ordinal poles or continuums and the socio-logics proceeding from the initial constellation of a society along these continuums is the determinative frame of secularization for that society.

Martin then posits four basic categories that identify the first two postulates above as the principal factors. These four patterns indicate a continuum from the most monopolistic frame to the least monopolistic frame (or, the most pluralist frame). The first of the four basic categories concerns Catholic monopolistic situations, and covers Spain, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, France, Austria, and all Eastern Orthodox societies. The Catholic monopoly these societies have, in

Martin's model, nearly assures a strong binary secular opposition: "It is monopoly, above all Catholic monopoly, which ensures abrasive division and militant secularism" (ibid., p. 19).

The second category concerns religiously duopolistic situations such as in Holland, Germany, and Switzerland. This, the so-called 60:40 pattern, indicates a near even split, often territorially north and south, between Protestants and Catholics. The consequence of such a pattern is a split society, where Catholics can partially organize their own political institutions separate from the Protestant majority institutions, but extremism and secularism are mitigated because the minority status of Catholics predisposes them to take a centrist-left political path. Societies entering the initial frame with a state church countered by a pre-existing set of dissenting minority religions comprise Martin's third category. England, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada are exemplars here. Typically the state church is balanced against a dispersed set of dissenting, middle class Protestant sects and this creates an environment where Catholic minorities, typically of lower status, form essentially a sociologically similar form as the Protestant minorities. The result is "moderate political division, with all kinds of religious dissidence . . thus increasing the tendency to moderation and excluding any militant secularism" (ibid., p. 21).

The final category is exemplified by America and is the most pluralistic. Here, normative separation of church and state allows for a competitive religious environment mitigating militant secularity and, important politically, linking the extremes of status. Catholics tend to be left-of-center contra the Protestant establishment, and overall the system is balanced against the extreme left by this fact plus the moderation of Protestant individualism.

Martin caveats these four patterns with allusion to the outlier Orthodox countries and Scandinavia. Orthodox countries tend to follow the monopolistic pattern, but the influence of the Soviet Union and the external domination of the Turks tends to quash any variation. Scandinavia also tends toward the external domination variable, but also there are characteristics present which align it with the state church pattern of England.

Martin strongly associates religious pluralism with democratic pluralism and religious monopoly with strong secularism, while considering the impact of the size of religious minorities. The intrinsic qualities of religion also play a role: while Catholicism is associated with strong political organicism in the monopoly situation, in the minority situation Catholics stress the universal aspects of their beliefs. Protestants are intrinsically inclined toward individual achievement, inhibiting organic formations in both majority and minority situations. However, Martin associates Protestantism with intrinsic pluralism and democracy – salvation for all tends to produce tolerance unintentionally.

Lechner (1991) points out one of the key consequences of Martin's general theory for secularization as institutional differentiation when it comes to globalization. In response to an argument by Robertson that secularization does not matter because globalization is the dominant fact of social change now, Lechner responds that if we take Martin seriously, then the path through which a nation-state society enters secularization should also significantly affect its entrance into globalization. Lechner maintains that precisely because the western secularized experience is intimately tied into the process of globalization is why secularization theory matters: it affects the trajectory of globalization through its origins. With the backdrop of both the evolution of religious freedom and secularization theory in sociology, and the importance of secularization for globalization established, I now more directly turn to theoretical issues concerning globalization.

Sociological Theories of Globalization

Sociologists paid early attention to globalization. Even in the classical sociology of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim we see hints of awareness that something beyond modernity taking place within national societies is on the horizon, in that modernity is conceived of being universalistic – that it

applies or will apply to everyone, everywhere (Beyer 2001a, p. 8; Robertson 1992).[6] Robertson is arguably the contemporary father of globalization theory in sociology, followed the world-polity or world-society approach of John Meyer and colleagues.

Much of the scholarly and popular discourse on globalization has focused greatly on the economic implications of a single world capitalist economic system where goods, services, and ideas flow with increasing acceleration. More recently, the political aspects of globalization have been taken up in the international relations literature. These approaches to globalization, while popular and fruitful, leave aside much of what makes globalization distinctive. Following Robertson, Meyer, and their respective colleagues, I focus on the cultural aspects of globalization, especially as they relate to religion and human rights. With this in mind, I will detail Robertson and his colleague's approaches to globalization, and then draw on Meyer and colleagues to detail their world-society view of globalization.[7]

Globalization as Consciousness of Global Reality

Robertson's deeply cultural analysis of globalization points to issues of how actors in the modern world comprehend their place in it and highlights the actions that result from a consciousness that includes the dilemma and compulsion of understanding a global whole. For Robertson, globalization is "the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness

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[6] Roland Robertson is reading Marx, Durkheim, Weber and other classical sociologists through Martin Albrow's periodization of sociological thinking on globalization (Albrow, Martin and Elizabeth King. 1990. *Globalization, knowledge, and society : readings from International sociology*. London; Newbury Park: Sage Publications.)

[7] While Wallerstein's approach has been fundamental for the development of scholarly discourse on globalization, his view that culture and religion are largely epiphenomenal (Robertson, Roland. 1992. *Globalization : social theory and global culture*. London: Sage.) in some sense brackets his work out of the discussion. However, more recently Wallerstein has retraced some of his thinking regarding culture with respect to the potential for new social movements to be anti-systemic to the capitalist world system (Wallerstein, Immanuel Maurice. 1991. "Culture as the Ideological Battleground of the Modern World System." Pp. 158-183 in *Geopolitics and geoculture : essays on the changing world-system*, edited by I. M. Wallerstein. Cambridge [England]; New York; Paris: Cambridge University Press ; Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.)

of the world as a whole" (Robertson 1992, p. 8). This consciousness includes the fact that actors know of themselves in a relative sense: they are actors of a kind embedded in multiple systems of similar actors interacting with each other and other systems of actors.

Robertson details four key components in the global field: national societies, the world system of societies, selves, and humankind as a means of making sense of globality (ibid, p. 27). Each in turn is related to the other through processes of relativization, or the "*comparative interaction* of different forms of life" (ibid., emphasis in original). Thus, "processes of societalization, internationalization (the making of the system of societies), individuation (institutionalized individualism) and generalization of consciousness about humankind constitute the contemporary form of globalization" (Robertson 2001, p. 13). All of these entities are compared to and compare themselves to each other in their relative environments. This mutual conditioning (Beyer 2001a, p. XV), or *relativization,* is a key dynamic for Robertson. Actors (national societies, individuals) construct themselves with reference to the systems of which they are a part (the world system of societies, humankind), and in turn the broader systems (world system of society, humankind) are themselves conditioned by the constructions of their constituent elements (national societies, individuals). In turn, individuals act and construct themselves in relation to their national society, which is itself constructed with reference to understandings of humankind. Relativization as a process also applies to associations like INGOs, religious bodies, and businesses.

Relativization creates a dilemma of sorts: when I am very alike others of the same kind, then who am I? What is my purpose? What do I believe? How do I define the world in which I live? This existential dilemma - the "search for fundamentals" – is the stuff of which world culture is made. Actors become compelled to distinguish themselves from all others, and must of necessity define themselves in relation to the global whole, whether they be individual selves, organizations, religions, societies or nation-states. This self-differentiation dynamic produces innovative and novel responses to the global condition, and is a source of heterogeneity in world

culture. Robertson's world culture is contentious as a result - there is no singular narrative that holds together the world, and the answers found in the search for fundamentals show that the global era is one of innovative change.

A key dynamic for Robertson in the process of coming to terms with the global whole is the issue of *how* actors differentiate in response to the global condition. Robertson calls this "the universalization of the particular and the particularization of the universal" to describe this dynamic (Robertson 1992). What this unwieldy phrase means is that in their efforts to differentiate, actors have a tendency to ascribe universality to their particular situation. Highly localized meanings, norms, and definitions of the situation are believed and understood to apply everywhere at all times. At the same time, actors tend to inflect others' (other civilizations', other religions') definitions of the universal through interpretations based on their own localized situation. This is "glocalization" or interpretation of that which is understood to be "universal" with local eyes, inflecting it with particular knowledge and local point of view. Through these parallel processes the global condition engenders multiple definitions of the situation within a definition of the situation of the world as one place. This global whole produces difference at all levels of social reality, and can be a source of innovation and novel answers to the dilemma of a global whole.

Robertson's global sociology helps illuminate some of the processes that INGOs face as they do their global work. The relationship of the self to humankind and to national societies implicates human rights as a concomitant ideology and INGOs as intermediaries between selves and national societies. By this I mean that the international human rights regime and the role of INGO's in that regime is one answer or solution to how individuals and national societies relate to each other through the relationship to humankind.

Because I include Robertson in the section on religion below, I discuss how his work helps illuminate the issues in this research in that section.

Globalization as Ontological and Institutional Environment

The work of John Meyer and his associates (Boli and Thomas 1999; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Thomas, Meyer, and Boli 1987) began out of observations that models of behavior that describe individuals or nation-states as rational actors, as self-interested actors maximizing their interest, did not seem to account for much of the behavior they saw empirically. Instead of actors serving their individual interests, what the "neo-institutionalists" found was that actors were following scripts that told those actors how they should act within a given environment. The environment contained models that told the actors how to be proper actors in that environment.

These ideas were first applied to the organizational world (Meyer and Rowan 1977), but these insights were applied to global issues as these analysts researched the world wide diffusion of education. Modern education systems, teaching algebra, reading, and science, were established in all manner of under-developed nation-states with highly differentiated functional needs. Modern science curricula were being taught to students who were formerly farmers, and would more than likely return to being farmers because their countries' infrastructure could not functionally support the practical use of science. There was no *functional* need to teach an entire countries' population of students in this way, yet these states developed highly rationalized education systems with the help of western experts. Meyer and colleagues thus saw this as evidence of the presence of a "world polity" replete with models and scripts of what it means to be a contemporary nation-state, a contemporary organization, and a contemporary human being.

In this point of view, actors and their actions are viewed as culturally constructed and institutionalized, and embedded in a culture organized on a world-wide basis (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997, p. 147). Culture is broadly defined, and "includes the institutional models of society itself . . [and] defines the ontological value of actor and action" (Thomas, Meyer, and Boli 1987, p. 21-2). Individuals, organizations, and political bodies as actors constituted by institutions do not so much act as "enact" according to scripts of a global cultural structure (Ibid: 22).

From where did this single world cultural environment providing models, scripts, and norms to be enacted come? For Meyer and his associates, the answer is Western Christendom: "the church as a symbol system provided the fundamental ontological structure of the west" (ibid. 28). The Catholic Church

> was the overarching cathedral within which the modern cultural system developed: a common, highly legitimated, boundaryless polity where ultimate authority was located at the peak of the vaulted dome (God) and devolved on human entities (popes and priests, kings and nobles) as subordinate beings, with much to say about social ontology, actors, and the relationships among action, nature, and the ultimate (ibid).

The universalizing institutional order of Western Christendom set the pattern for our world situation today. But where the institutional order of Western Christendom was one of glorifying the ultimate authority of God, the institutional order that dominates the world now is one of rationalization in the Weberian sense (ibid.: 24), such that “the structuring of everyday life within standardized impersonal rules . . . constitute[s] social organization as a means of collective purpose” (ibid.). Further, “rationalization results in the constitution of society as a means to collective ends” (ibid.: 25). These rationalized, collective ends have distinctive content: “the means [to collective ends] are technical development and the expansion of exchange; the ends are the twin pillars of Western thought, progress and justice” (ibid.). In our daily lives, progress and justice are taken for granted as obvious and natural; but behind them lie an immense institutional apparatus that structures individual and collective action at an unprecedented level. This global institutional structure tells us what our primordial entities are and how we are to relate to them via the global cultural principles of progress and justice.

What would world polity theorists expect with respect to the questions I pose in this research? With respect to whether and how the relationship of religion to global civil society changes through time, these scholars would expect to find that religion plays a part in generating global civil society. After all, world polity scholars believe western Christendom to be the source

of the modern world polity. But the processes of rationalization would lessen the role of religion through time. This might take the form of more bureaucratically-organized associations directing their attentions to secular problems.

With respect to the global conditions that shape human rights organizing, world-polity scholars would expect that the environments in which human rights advocacy takes place would be the most important factors. Candidate environments would likely include the population of INGOs and the international human rights legal environment. Going further, much of the world-polity work also expects that many world processes are not shaped by functional need. In the context of forces that generate human rights INGOs, this would mean world polity theorists would not expect human rights violations to propagate HRINGOs more so than the institutional environments would.

Finally, with respect to the question of how RF-INGOs do their work, world polity scholars would predict that religious identity would not be a salient factor in the work, and that the advocacy itself would indeed be framed in universalist terms, as we saw with the cases described in the introduction. To the extent that religious identity and more particularistic religious approaches are utilized by RF-INGOs, world polity scholars would expect that these RF-INGOs would be less legitimate in the contexts in which they work.

Macro approaches to religion

What role does religion as an institution play in society? The question is deceptively simple, and sociologists from the classical era to the global era have attempted answers. Here I will detail several approaches to religion that will prove relevant to understanding religion in the era of globalization, starting with Roland Robertson.

Relativization and Religion

Sociological understandings of religion have long been concerned with the relative importance of religion in society. Until the 1960s, the predominant frame in the sociology of religion was secularization, or "the historical process in which religion loses social and cultural significance. As a result of secularization the role of religion in modern societies becomes restricted" (Lechner 2004b). Yet, as early as 1965, David Martin (1965) began to question the utility of the term. By the 1980s, with the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the rise of the American Christian Right, and the Solidarity movement led by Catholics in Poland amongst many examples, more and more critics began to question the idea and reconsider the ways that religion can play a role in society. The global dimension of this question was taken up by Roland Robertson (Robertson and Chirico 1985). For Robertson, in effect, the worldwide resurgence of religious voices into the public sphere could only be understood with reference to global circumstances. The resurgence of the search for fundamentals was driven by globalization, and the global dimension of religion was slowly taken up by sociological scholars, led by Robertson.

For Robertson, the process of relativization in a globally compressed world has important implications for religion in all its manifestations. The relativization process works on religious actors, much in the same way that it does for national societies and individuals. Religious actors, including individuals and religious associations, construct themselves with reference to other religious actors. But they also create definitions of reality with reference to Robertson's four main elements: the individual, national societies, the international system of national societies, and humankind. Two final reference points are that of the world itself, conceived of as a whole, and world history. In essence, "a generalized global circumstance in which units (ranging from civilizations through societies and communities to individuals) seek to find their place in an overall world historical scheme of things" (Robertson 2001, p. 17) is the condition in which we find ourselves. And religion as an institution plays and an important role here for Robertson. religion. In line with Durkheim's position that "religion does not merely respond to but both registers and maps the human condition" (ibid., p. 14), religion is especially important in the

ongoing construction of definitions of the world. To use Ann Swidler's work, religion is an important and traditional part of the cultural toolkit used for sense-making (Swidler 1986).

To recap thus far: globalization entails a process of relativization in which actors are more compelled to construct definitions with reference to the consciousness of the world and its history as a whole and to the other entities in it. Religion is a historical category of thought, of Western source but now global, through which definitions of the world and its history can be and are created and sustained. The need for definitions of the world and its history, and the historical place of religion as a traditional institution that takes up the role of defining means for Robertson that religious activity – sense-making and the action it produces – should proliferate in conditions of globality. Globalization should be expected to "enlarge the space for religious movements" (ibid., p. 17).

The proliferation of religious movements, and their definitions of the global whole produce "religious diversity" (ibid.). The seeking of place in the context of the consciousness of a both a global whole and a global history propagates multiple understandings of the world, which may or may not cohere with each other. Relativization also means that religions are also referencing each other in their world defining, so the question of how they relate to one another becomes relevant. Indeed, as religions pose multiple definitions of the "serious life," religious definitions have the capacity for conflict and contention – with other religious definitions, but also with secular definitions of the global whole. Globalization, for Robertson, creates the space for religious (and secular) diversity and innovation, but also contention and conflict as these diverse and innovative approaches collide with each other. Conflict with other religions, as well as secular movements and/or institutions, is of course one possibility. By Robertson's account (Robertson and Chirico 1985), this is in fact what we see. But other possibilities exist in Robertson's formulation: "In any case, from a sociological…point of view we need to pay much more attention, in historical perspective, to the themes of syncretization and harmonization" (Robertson 2001, p. 15). Here the issue is that of religious movements eschewing conflict and

working out amongst themselves how to exist in a world with multiple definitions of the serious life. Religious fundamentalism, such as that seen in the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Christian Right in the U.S. , is one response to the global condition. Another response is interfaith approaches, such as those of the World Parliament of Religions in 1893 and its centennial convening in 1993, again in Chicago.

Robertson's globalization approach has much to say about religion. With respect to the questions I pose, Robertson's work would suggest that religion would matter very much in the context of religious freedom advocacy. He would expect there to be both universal and particular approaches to doing religious freedom, and that there should be a diversity of religious solutions in how religious liberty is organized. With respect to whether and how the relationship of religion to global civil society changes through time, Robertson would perhaps predict that religion responses would proliferate through time as compression of global consciousness advances and accelerates.

Beyer and the Possibilities of Religion in Globalization

As a "reader" of globalization theories, Peter Beyer's efforts at understanding globalization are centered on how religion works "in the process of globalization" (Beyer 2001b). In effect, he attempts to reflect on globalization by focusing on religion, and is concerned with the possibilities that the global condition affords religion. Beyer's approach to understanding both globalization and religion borrows heavily from Niklas Luhmann's functional differentiation approach, but utilizes other globalization theorists, especially Robertson, but also of Meyer and his colleagues.

Following Luhmann, Beyer conceives of modern society as a system of functional sub-systems, and these are made up of communications rather than humans. These sub-systems are the economy, the polity, science, religion, the arts, education, and so on. Each functional system operates under its own institutional rules and logics – it communicates with its own language, so

to speak. These sub-systems are "functional" with respect to the whole system – "what fundamental problem an action addresses" (Beyer 1994, p. 35) . Functional sub-systems are thus purposeful, and in this purposefulness they propagate and sustain themselves.

For Beyer, this has deep implications for religion as a sub-system in the era of globalization. In his account, the function of the religious sub-system is to account for the social system as a whole, which includes problems that are not taken up by the other sub-systems. In other words, the residual problems. With globalization, the social system is consonant with the whole world, thus the function of religious communication is to account for the whole of the world. A fundamental problem for Beyer then is how does a sub-system, with its own institutional logics and rules, account for a whole made up of other sub-systems with their own communicative rules, especially where accounting for the whole means addressing the residual problems of other sub-systems. There is a translation problem of sorts, and this translation to other sub-systems compromises the "pureness" of the functional message of the religious sub-system. In communication with other sub-systems, religion moderates its own function through this communication. Religion faces a structural problem in fulfilling its function.

Given this fundamental tension, how might religion as a functionally differentiated sub-system respond? Beyer offers a two-by-two matrix of sorts, affording four basic possibilities. One dimension of religious response is that of privatized function to public performance. Here Beyer is making a distinction between private and public spheres, and the nature of the communication is different in each. The former remains functional communication, that is, it speaks in religious terms of ritual, faith, meditation, and the like, and applies to the private choices of the individual. The public performance option is that of explicit, public engagement with the residual problems of the other sub-systems, but the religious communication is moderated through engagement with the other sub-systems, and solutions, "while religiously inspired, will tend to take on the characteristics of the target system: economic solutions to economic problems, political solutions to political problems" (Beyer 1994, p. 87) and so on.

The other dimension Beyer cites is that of the liberal to conservative option,[8] and in basic terms is the difference between a diffused sense of evil in the world versus an embodied sense of evil as a real entity in the world. Thus, the response of the liberal privatized function entails propagation of beliefs of "the possibility of enlightenment for all, the possibility of wisdom for all, the possibility of salvation for all" (ibid.)and where evil is "in all of us, in all of our social structures" (ibid., p. 86). A certain "indeterminacy" in "specifying both the benefits and the requirements" (ibid., p. 87) of this approach provides a natural segue to liberal public performance, "to re-establish the importance of religion and hence the influence of the religious system" (ibid.). Problems such as political oppression, racism, and poverty are often the target of this liberal religious performance. Another key characteristic of this approach for Beyer is the deliberate preference to utilize the affected sub-systems techniques as the solution to the residual problem. The liberal religious performance response is self-regulating – though the impetus for offering a solution might be religious, the solution should not be. There is "respect for the independence of the other sub-systems" (ibid., p. 88). In Weberian terms, this-worldly problems are met with this-world solutions, and differentiation in global society is not problematic in the liberal option, making it somewhat coherent with global structures.

The conservative response takes the reality and presence of evil in the world seriously. The private functional conservative response is that of asserting a "personal holism in the face of (and hence, impersonal) differentiated social structures (ibid., p. 90). Globalization itself is an evil direction for the world. The conservative public performance responds to this-worldly problems with other-worldly intentions, to again borrow Weber's typology. Beyer points out that this response has some advantages in terms of mobilization over that of the liberal public performance: because religious adherents are localized, they are more easily mobilized in terms

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[8] This is perhaps an unfortunate choice of labels. Whether intended or not, the politics of the word choices (at least in the U.S. context) inflect the discussion unnecessarily.

of discrete territories and populations (often coterminous with national boundaries), which can correlate "us and them" in religious terms as good and evil (ibid., 92). At the same time that this might be an advantage, this response still faces tension in its confrontation with other sub-systems. In attempting to de-differentiate the world, it necessarily engages with other sub-systems on their terms, and this has the tendency to dilute the de-differentiating effort. Religious communication must speak in terms of law, economics, politics, and so on, and by doing so, the communication loses its religious specificity.

To summarize, for Beyer globalization and the modern legacy of functionally differentiated sub-systems creates tensions for religion. As a sub-system in the midst of other sub-systems, religion attempts to account for the whole global social system with communication that is a property of the religious sub-system. This difficulty is enhanced because it is often the residual problems of other sub-systems to which religion speaks. Beyer offers four possible avenues for how religious communication can approach these problems. The private functional response and public performance response each have a liberal and conservative option, and there is a tendency in each to move from private to public. The liberal response is typified by acceptance of the differentiated global whole, the legitimacy of other sub-systems in it, and a concern with the unequal treatment of various identities. It is "an ecumenical [possibility] that looks to the global problems generated by a global, functionally differentiated society," while the conservative response is one of defiance in the face of differentiated sub-systems, of efforts at de-differentiation, and of assuming control over territories, and is " a particularistic [possibility] that champions the culture distinctiveness of one region through a reappropriation of traditional religious antagonistic categories" (ibid., p. 93).

Beyer, like world polity theorists, would expect that the relationship of religion to global civil society would shift through time such that the role of religion would be lessened. Implicit in his systems approach is a secularization narrative: religion formerly held more of the whole system in its domain, but through time and the processes of rationalization, other sub-systems

such as the economy and the polity gained traction and religion became one amongst several sub-systems, each with their own functional logics and rules for operation.

How would Beyer expect RF-INGOs to do their work? The problems that religious liberty addresses shade into both the political sub-system and the religious sub-system. On the one hand, though the freedom of religion is typically conceived as universally applicable to all humans, it is through the state that the right is granted, and where there is violation of that right, it is usually the state that is the liable entity in a double sense: the state is responsible for the protection of its citizens, but is also often the violator of citizen rights. Advocacy of freedom of religion in this interpretation would implicate more of a religious performance. On the other hand, a lack of freedom of religion is an obstruction to religious function, so a functional religious response may be possible. It is quite possible that both functional and performative religious responses occur simultaneously.

Human Rights and Global Civil Society

The subjects of human rights and global civil society are increasingly the interest of social science scholars. In this section I will describe the global expansion of human rights ideology in documentary and organizational form since the mid 19th century, and the mechanisms through which global civil society operates to advocate for human rights.

The Field of Human Rights: Documents and Organizations

In his 2008 dissertation, Elliott (2008) examines the history of international human rights documents. Through identification of 779 international human rights instruments and codification of 145 "core" documents in the United Nations collection (ibid., p. 111), starting in 1863 and ending in 2003, he shows a dramatic expansion in international human rights documents. His data

show several distinct periods of international human rights document activity. The first period shows a trickle of one or two signed documents[9] every 5 years in the first 35 years (approximately 1863-1900), and the second period relatively more but still inconsistent numbers of documents per year from 1900 through the end of the first world war. In the interregnum between the world wars, international human rights documents are unveiled on a regular basis, but suffer a predictable lull during WWII. After WWII, with the hallmark Universal Declaration of Human Rights, international human rights documents were presented for signing at an increasing pace. In sheer numbers of instruments, the pre-WWII period saw 113 total documents drafted, while from 1940 to 2003, 666 international human rights documents were drafted (ibid., p. 110). The sheer number of rights declared in a sample of 145 of these 779 documents is astonishing, at 1593.

Importantly, Elliott analyzes the content of this sample of rights documents. The sample contains human rights instruments put forth between 1926 and 2002. He codes for the entities being protected in these documents (e.g., all persons, women, children, peoples/nations, gypsies, etc), entities that are responsible for protecting human rights (e.g., nation-states, the United Nations, educators & scientific experts, etc), the entities that are empowered or acknowledged as to as an entity in participating in the realization of human rights (e.g., NGOs, the UN, religious leaders, etc), and the means to actualize these human rights.

He finds that "individuated entities were the subject of protection in human rights discourse at a ratio of greater than 3:1 over collective entities" (ibid., 124). In terms of distinct rights, 666 rights are attributed to individuated entities, while 117 distinct rights are attributed to collectivities (a ratio of 5:1). States are by far the most duty bound entity cited in the documents (73.7% of all mentions), while the UN in second place is mentioned a mere 11.8% of the time. In

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[9] According to Elliott, "these dates represent the years that various instruments were drafted and opened for signature" (ibid., p. 108).

examining a smaller sample of instruments that all countries in the world were eligible to ratify, Elliott also finds that there is no statistical difference amongst countries ratifying documents based on their World Bank income bracket, even though the nation-state was by far the most likely to be the entity responsible for these human rights. Among empowered entities cited, the top three are NGOs (26.4% of all mentions), the UN next (12.5%), and the category of individuals/Public Sphere/Civil Society following (11.1%). The top three means of actualizing human rights are law and legislation (22.8%), education and training (17.5%), and security/state co-operation/multilateralism (11.2%).

Elliott finds that individuals are the most protected entities, the state is the duty-bound protector of these rights, NGOs, the UN, individuals, the public sphere, and civil society are empowered to help realize the human rights as set forth in these documents, and law, education, and multilateral security are the means for actualizing these rights. As explanation, he relies on neo-institutional and world cultural ideas to account for his findings. In particular, he finds that "an ongoing cultural emphasis on the individual as a sacred and inviolable entity, around which many core institutions of global society...are increasingly organized" (ibid., p. 205). He locates the development of human rights in the structures of medieval Christian society, and claims that this is also the source that "structured the trajectory of Western development" (ibid., p. 206) and much of current global society. For Elliott, certain structural characteristics of the Catholic Church during the high middle ages served as a "foundational model" for the contemporary global society where a variety of highly legitimated actors thrive as they pursue secular, rational progress. These organizational characteristics are " [the Church's] expansive yet decentralized authority structure and its highly rationalized character" (ibid.), and its transnational reach in the European theater. He finds that the impact of Medieval Christian ideology on contemporary global ideologies such as individualism, universalism, and progress are "fundamental" to the history of human rights expansion and the articulation of human rights ideology. For Elliott,

"human rights are a rational-legal means of protecting and empowering 'the sacred' in modern society" (ibid., p. 208).

Elliott's work cites NGOs as a highly empowered force in the field of human rights. In other research (Brewington 2005), I have directly examined the population of international non-governmental organizations dedicated to human rights (hereafter, HRINGOs), and the rights that they advocate for over the 19th and 20th centuries. I found that human rights advocacy by HRINGOs largely mirrors the foundings of the broader INGO population. In addition, the patterns of human rights advocacy mirror Elliott's findings in terms of the expansion of human rights instruments – a trickle in the late 19th century, with consistent but small amounts of advocacy in the run up to both world wars, with a period of growth in the intervening years, followed by an explosion of human rights advocacy from 1945 to 1995.

In addition to establishing the overall parallel growth of human rights advocacy with other INGO sectors, this data show that in many respects religious liberty advocacy is similar to all other human rights advocacy in growth patterns throughout the 20th century. Although representing only 2.4% of all human rights advocacy cases, in most respects growth characteristics of religious liberty advocacy resemble those of all other human rights advocacy. Rates of human rights advocacy increase in the period 1875 to 1995 for both religious liberty and all other rights, with half of all religious liberty advocacy occurring by 1975, and half of all other human rights advocacy occurring by 1977.

Repression response or favorable institutional environment for HRINGOs

What institutional environments or factors shape human rights INGOs foundings? If HRINGOs are similar to the larger population of which they are a part, then we would expect comparable dynamics. The war years depressed INGO foundings, and so we might expect the same for HRINGOs. At the same time, foundings of HRINGOs may actually increase in times of war as a response to human rights atrocities committed in the conduct of war . War is a significant factor

in increasing human rights repression (Poe et al 1994; 1999, p. 305). This increased repression may activate global civil society processes that ignite foundings of HRINGOs. Different effects have been found for international and civil wars (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), therefore any analysis should disaggregate these variables. These scenarios can be categorized as repression response effects in that the foundings of HRINGOs are reactions or responses to violations of human rights.

Other repression response pathways may exist. Poe et al (1994; 1999) and Hathaway (Hathaway 2002) find that population size and growth contribute significantly to political repression. This suggests, as with the presence of war, that with increased population size and/or growth, human rights repression increases, and in response, HRINGO foundings increase.
The role of democracy in understanding human rights repression is a key focus in the political science and international relations literatures (cf. Davenport 2007). A bevy of scholars have found that democracy is a strong mitigating factor in human right repression (Apodaca 2001; Bueno de Mesquita 2003; Davenport 1995; Davenport 1999; Hofferbert and Cingranelli 1996; Keith 2002; Poe and Tate 1994; Poe and Tate 1999)**.** Davenport summarizes this literature:

> Democratic institutions are believed to increase the costs of using repressive behavior because, if state actions are deemed inappropriate, authorities can be voted out of office. Individuals in democracies generally accept specific values regarding passivity, toleration, communication, and deliberation—values that are challenged and undermined by the use of repression. Democracies provide an alternative mechanism of control through participation and contestation. They also weaken the justification for coercive activity by reducing the likelihood for human conflict and facilitating the conveyance of grievances (Davenport 2007, pp. 10-11).

If democracy mitigates human rights repression in these ways, a repression response effect interpretation would suggest that foundings of HRINGOs would decrease. At the same time, a world society interpretation, as discussed in chapter 2, would suggest that increased

democracy improves the institutional conditions for human rights advocacy and social movement organizing, and although there is less "need" for HRINGOs, the conditions in which activists found new organizations improve with higher levels of democracy.

At an international and global level, nation-states work together through intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). IGOs such as the United Nations, the World Bank, or the Organization of American States are formed by groups of nations to address international, global, and regional issues. The coming together of nation-states in IGOs, like democracy, may have contrasting effects on the foundings of HRINGOs. On the one hand, increased memberships in IGOs may increase the foundings of HRINGOs. The mechanism here is similar to that of democracy: IGOs improve the institutional conditions in which HRINGOs can proliferate by fostering an environment of international cooperation that lowers the barriers of organizing for human rights. But this mechanism may also serve to mitigate war, and as a result human rights atrocities. This mitigation of human rights atrocities, following the logic of the repression response effect, would then mitigate the foundings of HRINGOs because there is less functional need.

Another possibility is that levels of economic development contribute to the shaping of the HRINGO environment. Again, this may have either a mitigating or propagating effect on foundings, depending on the mechanisms at work. Though mechanisms are not specified, researchers find again and again that economic development mitigates repressive behavior violating human rights (Davenport 2007, p. 14). With higher levels of economic development we thus may find that HRINGO foundings are dampened. Alternatively, HRINGO foundings may be responsive to the improved conditions which economic development elicits such that with higher levels of economic development there are increased foundings.

Because HRINGO foundings mirror INGO foundings, we would expect that there would be a high correlation between the two. But can we isolate INGO foundings out as a contributing factor in the foundings of HRINGOs? Does the proliferation of the INGO form in global civil

society propagate the human rights subpopulation of INGOs regardless of the myriad substantive issues in which the form manifests itself? If this is the case, then we would expect that as the entire population of INGOs grows, so would HRINGOs.

International human rights law is still another potential contributing factor to the foundings of HRINGOs. Here we find similar mechanisms: on the one hand, with more international treaties concerning human rights being signed and/or ratified by nation-states, we might find that human rights repression is decreased which depresses the foundings of HRINGOs. In fact, there is evidence that signing and ratifying human rights treaties does not necessarily mitigate human right violations (Davenport 2007; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). As Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui highlight, "state commitment to the international human rights legal regime does not automatically translate into government respect for human rights." In their models, state commitment to human rights actually produces a small but significant negative effect on the practice of human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005, pp. 1395-6). An alternative possibility is that as the international legal regime for human rights grows, so does the intellectual and ideological environment grow for HRINGOs, leading to more HRINGO foundings.

Many of the factors outlined above boil down to the question of whether foundings of HRINGOs are a function of human rights violations, or as labeled above, a repression response effect. Each of the factors may work to mitigate or propagate human rights violations, which mitigates or propagates HRINGO foundings. Repression response factors as described above are war (international and civil war), population size, levels of democracy, national participation in international governance, and economic development.

Other factors discussed above concern the institutional environment in which HRINGO foundings occur. The mechanism here is that as the institutional environments for human rights expand, so do HRINGO foundings. Institutional environmental factors as described above are levels of democracy, national participation in international governance, economic development, the INGO population, and international human rights law.

A final element to consider is the role of time or history as a factor. Different mechanisms may be at work during different periods throughout the last two centuries. Institutional arrangements in the late 20th century are likely different than those in the 19th century, and as a result, modeling historical shifts is an important part of understanding the HRINGO world.

HRINGOs are an important part of global civil society, but they are only one type of INGO and represent a small slice of global civil society. In the next section I turn my attention more directly to global civil society and INGOs as important elements of global civil society.

Global Civil Society and INGOs

Researchers in the constructivist wing of international relations (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram 2000; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999) and in neo-institutional sociology (Boli and Thomas 1999; Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997; Thomas, Meyer, and Boli 1987) argue that global civil society as a third force between state and market has real world effects on these latter differentiated institutions – that all this "talk" by transnational advocacy networks (TANs) (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) (Boli and Thomas 1999) is not simply hot air and empty discourse. I will explain the concept of civil society and its roots in relation to the nation-state form. Then I will examine how the idea of global civil society is related to national level civil society by comparing and contrasting their similarities and differences.

"Global civil society" as an idea derives from civil society as an indicator of a third force between the state and market at the national level. John Keane provides a succinct, if dense, definition. Global civil society refers to

> [A] dynamic non-governmental system of interconnected socio-economic institutions that straddle the whole earth, and they have complex effects that are felt in its four corners. Global civil society is neither a static object nor a fait accompli. It is an unfinished

> project that consists of sometimes thick, sometimes thinly stretched networks, pyramids and hub-and-spoke clusters of socio-economic institutions and actors who organize themselves across borders, with the deliberate aim of drawing the world together in new ways. These non-governmental institutions and actors tend to pluralize power and to problematize violence; consequently, their peaceful or 'civil' effects are felt everywhere, here and there, far and wide, to and from local areas, through wider regions, to the planetary level itself (Keane 2003, p. 8).

It is non-governmental, it is a society, it is comprised of civil acts and practices, it is pluralistic, and it is global (ibid.).

Before there was global civil society, there was civil society. Civil society as a concept has a long history, and it has gone through a number of transmutations in this long history. At various times civil society has been associated with the state (Locke, Rousseau) and the market (Hegel and Marx). Several contemporary thinkers on civil society assert a "classical" and a "modern" version of civil society (Cohen and Arato 1992; Habermas 1989; Kumar 1993).

For Cohen and Arato, the decisive sociological moment in the modern history of the idea of civil society is the development and implementation of the absolutist understanding of state-rule (Cohen and Arato 1992, p. 86). The transition is from feudal princely authority shared with a plurality of feudal power holders to the monopolistic hold by a monarchy of legitimate means of violence – the proto-nation-state. The former power holders are de-politicized – their access to princely authority is removed, but their organizations and networks and corporate status remain intact, nonetheless providing a check on monarchical power. Cohen and Arato point out that this is the genesis of the social form of civil society as a check on state power, but it still required legitimacy. Locke, Paine, Ferguson, and Smith provide some of this legitimacy in their work for this "sphere of society distinct from the state and with forms and principles of its own" (Kumar 1993, p. 377). But, the modern form emerges in Hegel according to Cohen and Arato (1992) in the syntheses of all the pre-modern understandings of civil society. Hegel's account combines

Kant's universalist definition of the individual as bearer of rights and the agent of moral conscience; a generalized Enlightenment distinction between state and civil society in a manner that also involves their interaction and entanglement; and from the political economists a stress on civil society as the locus and carrier of material civilization.

Today's concept of the third sector however, does not mesh with the latter element in Hegel's formation. The material sector – the market economy – is firmly outside the contemporary usage of civil society as a third force to counter the state and the market. Tocqueville provides the innovation to alter this disjunction with his understanding of "political society" (Kumar 1993). Tocqueville conceives of society as composed of three sectors: the state, civil society, and political society. The state is the bureaucratic political body with formal representation of the people, a police and an army. Civil society for Tocqueville is still Hegelian in its focus on the market and the modern form of capitalist economy. But *political society* is composed of "the art of association" (ibid., p. 381). Tocqueville marveled at the level of activity of associations in his visit to the US, and it is this tendency to form groups outside the state and market that provides the "super-abundant force and energy" to the national body of state (ibid.). It is the small scale political associations, leisure and recreation organizations (ibid), and religiously inspired life-politics movements (Young 2002) that compose the strength of and energize the entire society bounded by the nation-state.

In Kumar's account, the idea of "political society" transmutes into "civil society" through the work of Gramsci (Kumar 1993, p. 381), who elaborates that it is civil society that stands between the market and the state. "Civil society" for Gramsci is still associated with both the state and the economy in his neo-Marxian conceptions – civil society is part of the superstructure and as such reflects the capitalist economic system that Gramsci also recognizes is a vehicle of the state (ibid., p. 382). However, Gramsci locates within civil society the revolutionary potential of counteracting the corrosive effects of market and state.

As this selective history of the idea of civil society shows, in its modern usage civil society is a sphere of activity that lies between the market and state as a balancing third sphere of influence. It is composed of Tocqueville's associations and has the Gramscian potential for revolutionary social change. But what does civil society "do" in contemporary national societies? As one answer, I will provide the example of the Solidarity movement in Poland, possibly one of the best examples of a civil society success. Given the context of a nation-state controlled by a powerful and intolerant communist party and buttressed by the power of Soviet tanks, the Solidarity movement did not try to work with the state and its state-controlled economy. Instead, it built on existing networks and organizations to defend and manage society on its own – "The state was not to be directly challenged; it was to be ignored. Civil society turned its back on the state, and sought to build a democratic pluralist order so far as it could within the confines of a still powerful party-state" (ibid., p. 386). As Soviet military backing crumbled in the late 1980s due to its overextensions in the cold war, the "alternative" civil society that Solidarity created won out and the party-controlled Polish state began the transformation toward democracy that begin in Solidarity.

Kumar notes that much of the recent scholarship about civil society is in large part inspired by the story of the Solidarity movement (ibid.), and that we now fold the concept of "social movement" into the idea of civil society as a result. Social movements as a subject have a long history in contemporary social science, with many definitions. For Claus Offe, contemporary movements signal a sea change in social movements. An old paradigm of social movements coalesced around issues of economic growth, distribution, and security after WWII and the resulting institutional arrangements survived intact until the early seventies. The new social movements (NSMs), for Offe, engage in issue conflict which does not fit into the private or public spheres as previously construed – they act in a "space of *noninstitutional politics*" (Offe 1985, p. 826, emphasis in original) where means and actors are legitimate and ends are to be

binding upon all actors. In the context of an increasing separation of the public and private spheres, NSMs contest previously legitimated, nonpolitical aspects of the social system.

Social movements are a distinctive part of civil society, especially because, as Offe shows, they work on issues of life politics in the spaces between the private (economy) and public (state) spheres. Social movements and the other nongovernmental associations of civil society have affected the national level profoundly, as the example of the Solidarity movement shows. They work to develop national political institutions such as the civil rights laws coming out of the contentious politics of the 1960s. They negotiate with the state procedures and institutions on the very right to demonstrate (McCarthy, McPhail, and Crist 1998 as cited in Smith 1998). In short, social movements and associations as part of national level civil society, change national societies.

What then, is *global* civil society? The idea of global civil society implies that there is a type of civil society that transcends nation-state boundaries. Based on observations by scholars in international relations and sociology that an immense amount of activity is carried out beyond the national level that mimics national civil society, a global level of civil society is inferred that has similarities to national civil society, but is also profoundly different. What is this activity beyond the national level that scholars cite as evidence of a global civil society?

The first evidence that there is now a global civil society is the incredible number and variety of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) working outside the confines of state boundaries (Boli and Thomas 1999). These organizations advocate for nearly every conceivable issue area: religious organizations "juggling for Christ" and bicycling through the countryside for ecumenical religious encounters (Boli and Brewington 2007); environmental organizations such as Greenpeace and EarthFirst! (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, and Ramirez 1997), and of course human rights organizations and networks such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch (Clark, Friedman, and Hochstetler 1998; Clark 2001; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Klotz 2002; Willetts 1996). INGOs have small permanent staffs, a few academic or technical experts, a small

cadre of volunteers, small budgets, and a value rational commitment to a particular moral, technical, medical, sports or other interest.

Neo-institutional and world culture INGO Scholars (Boli and Brewington 2007; Boli and Thomas 1999; Lechner and Boli 2005) argue that international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) represent the embodiment of world culture. INGOs are global carriers *and* signifiers of cultural principles: as volunteer, member-run, internationally oriented organizations they demonstrate democratic value commitments to issues, problems and causes for which they have little ultimate responsibility (Lechner and Boli 2005). For nearly every conceivable social problem or scientific or technical issue, there is likely at least one global organization volunteering its scarce material and human resources. As such, numbers of INGOs express the level of structuration (ibid) of each particular issue or problem sector. By measuring the relative numbers of INGOs per sector through 1974, Boli and Thomas (1999) infer that world culture is predominantly oriented to highly rationalized and scientized, and thus very likely secular, principles: "In all, 60% of INGOs concentrate on economic or technical rationalization" (ibid, p. 41). By contrast, less than 5% of INGOs were oriented to religious activities (ibid). They interpret this small amount of religious INGO activity to "being out of step with evolving world-cultural principles."

For the years 1875 through 1973, the population of all INGOs expanded enormously. Starting at only two to three foundings per year in the 1870s and 1880s, INGO foundings burgeoned to over 90 foundings per year in the late 1940s and subsequent (Boli and Thomas 1999). The rate of foundings decreased during the war years of 1912 to 1918 and 1936 to 1945, reflecting decreased international orientations during periods of heightened nationalism and conflict. Since 1945, however, the entire population of INGOs has grown to well over 25,000 active organizations (UIA, 2007-08). Boli and Thomas (1999) and Smith and Wiest (2005) point to the global span of operation of INGOs, with members in nearly every nation-state and secretariats all over the world, despite the "uneven geography" of power and resources allocated

across the globe. More powerful nation-states such as the US or France host many more secretariats and have many more members than say Malawi or Indonesia, but the patterns of higher growth in INGOs come from the global south (Boli, Loya, and Loftin 1999; Boli and Thomas 1999).

INGOs have effected significant change at the global level, and they do many things: they lobby nation-states to alter their policies or create new institutions on human rights, the environment, women's rights (Berkovitch 1999), and even the rules of war (Finnemore 1999). Moreover, they are successful at lobbying nation-states to alter their policies and create new institutions precisely in the "space of *noninstitutional politics*" that Offe speaks of where problems are created by market and state alike. By successfully campaigning for changes in the rules of war-making through the formation and ratification of the Geneva Convention (ibid.) and through the rapid formation and ratification by most countries of a land mine treaty (Mekata 2000), INGOs have displayed their capability to influence even one of the most deeply embedded nation-state powers – the power to war with other sovereign states. INGOs also organize and maintain whole social sectors with little or no state influence: professional scientific organizations organize science in its professional disciplines and provide scientific evidence for rational authorization of social policies (Schofer 1999). Esperanto enthusiasts organize and structure activity toward the ongoing development of a global language (Kim 1999). The world standardization body, ISO, is highly notable because its work permeates social life almost invisibly. ISO controls such standards as the thickness of credit cards to ensure that they are operable throughout the world, as well as the tensile strength of steel cables to ensure that engineers can properly measure carrying capacity (Loya and Boli 1999). Finally, INGOs also work to influence intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and through IGOs the states that make up their members. The World Bank has changed its Big Dams policies in developing regions in response to the partnerships of INGOs and domestic interest groups (Khagram 2000).

As a whole, INGOs have no coercive power to operate with the influence they have. Instead, they operate on principles of rational-voluntaristic authority (Boli 1999), which, although not based in *Herrschaft* in the Weberian sense, are nonetheless effective at influencing entities as powerful and resource-rich as nation-states and transnational corporations. Rational-voluntaristic authority is self-authorized conduct based on "freely exercised reason" (ibid., p. 273). In other words, members of INGOs are theoretically equal individuals pursuing value rational conduct as a collective and reach group decisions that are in theory democratically open to the influence of all members of the organization. The influence and legitimacy of INGOs derives from the fact that they are predominantly disinterested actors. Actors in a world culture privileging justice and progress (Thomas, Meyer, and Boli 1987) which are seen as only acting out of "naked" self-interest are "morally questionable" (Boli 1999, p. 295). INGOs act as "disinterested 'rationalized others'" (Meyer 1994 quoted in Boli 1999p. 296), inhering interest solely in the pursuit of their value rational collective interests. To the extent that INGOs conform to the ideal structures and processes of rational voluntarism, the pursuit of "legitimated purposes through rational means" for the collective good of the world, they are highly legitimated.

"Bringing Religion Back In"

Christian Smith's volume on religion and social movements provides more guidance as to the character of religious involvement in global civil society. And although this volume is not specifically oriented toward global civil society, there are, however, elements of the global in several chapters of the volume, specifically with reference to the Catholic Church's involvement with the Solidarity movement in Poland (Osa 1996) and domestic church involvement and linkages to the World Council of Churches in the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa (Borer 1996). Yet, these are still only hints and inferences. The scholarship that Smith does provides in his opening chapter provides a synopsis of why religion should garner more attention in relation to social movements by detailing the assets or resources religion provides social movements.

These assets or resources include transcendent motivation, organizational resources, shared identity, social and geographic positioning, privileged legitimacy, and institutional interest (Smith 1996a). All of these components are arguably important for the connection of religion to transnational human rights advocacy; here I will explicate these elements by providing examples from the movements outlined above.

Transcendent motivation according to Smith means that religion can root social movement activism and protest in the ultimate or the sacred, providing "intense motivational leverage," indeed, "the will of God" (ibid:9) as a non-negotiable foundation in light of which all odds can seem surmountable. Further, this transcendence is infused with moral imperative and fervor – it provides the basis on which to evaluate concrete human conditions and whether these conditions are appropriate for humans and whether they are amenable to relief through combined social action. Keck and Sikkink's treatment of the antislavery network evoke the transcendent motivation of "intense motivational leverage" and moral imperative when tracing the movement and its societal-religious milieu to early nineteenth century Protestant revival movements.
In the case of the antislavery movement, the "vast supply of religious zeal" created by the Protestant revival movement of the early nineteenth century heightened the receptiveness of religious communities in Britain and the northeastern United States to antislavery ideas. Revival theology emphasized each individual's capacity and responsibility for salvation through good works and efforts to root out individual and social sin. In this worldview, not only was slavery a social sin, but the slave was being denied the individuality essential for personal salvation (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p. 46).

Thus, belief from a particular form of *transcendent* soteriology for the anti-slavery movement translates into individual and social *moral* imperatives to mitigate the sins of a society preventing a significant portion of its population its sacred status as an individual capable of salvation. The context of the revival movement thus provides the social movement with a cultural disposition and legitimacy of *religious* origins. This latter point illustrates the role of the

"privileged legitimacy" of religion in this 19th century transatlantic movement. Smith notes that religion, because of its dealings in the sacred, can reflect a "certain authority, legitimacy, and protection" especially when it has "a history or current status as a socially powerful institution" (Smith 1996a, p. 20).

Transcendent motivation also comes in the form of symbology and ritual - "ideological, expressive, and emotional" resources (ibid., p. 11) such as prayers, narratives, icons, and songs used "to construct [social movement] collective identities, to nurture solidarity, to express their grievances, and to draw inspiration and strength in difficult times" (ibid). The International Day of Prayer for the Persecuted Church is emblematic of this latter transcendent characteristic. Churches affiliated with the World Evangelical Alliance organize to hold prayers throughout November for their Christian brothers and sisters being persecuted throughout the world. At the very least, this prayer ritual reminds its participants of their incorporation in a global religious tradition and their connection to those who are persecuted in less hospitable societal-religious milieus. This example also illustrates Smith's emphasis on shared identity. Shared identity provides a common "super-identity" amongst strangers, both those in your church, in your country, and those across the world (ibid., p. 18).

Smith points also to pre-existing communication channels as an organizational resource, and transnational organizational linkages as facets of the geographic and social positioning of religious bodies as resources religion can potentially contribute to social movement action. Thus, the International Day of Prayer mobilizes existing evangelical church services to communicate the need for a ritual prayer for its persecuted members across the world. The World Council of Churches assisted domestic church councils and mobilized its transnational linkages to hold a conference in Zimbabwe in December of 1985 (Borer 1996; Smith 1996a). The resulting conference proceedings, known as the Harare Declaration, formed a distinct break with past church efforts to work with the South African government to reform its apartheid policies. Instead, the document called for the wholesale dissolution of apartheid (Borer 1996, p. 132).

Finally, with the transnational and trans-religious concern for global religious liberty, we see religion engaging in what Smith labels institutional self-interest. Since at least 1893, with the founding of the International Religious Liberty Association, and 1900, with the founding of the International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF), we see INGOs founded by religious entities such as the Seventh Day Adventists and the Unitarians, respectively, advocating for religious liberty. Transnational advocacy for religious liberty by religious organizations suggests that religious actors take advocate in their own self-interest in the transnational sphere.

Smith thus lays out a plausible "toolkit" (Swidler 1986) that religion brings to social justice and human rights issues. Although his focus seems to be on national level social movements, the examples I provide above suggest that they just as easily apply to supra-national levels.

Hypotheses

Figure 2.1 summarizes the foregoing theoretical approaches, poses them with reference to the relevant research questions, and provides hypotheses with respect to the theoretical approaches and research questions. With respect to the first research question concerning the nature of religious involvement in global civil society, Robertson would expect that religion will indeed be involved: globalization produces multiple responses via pressures of relativization. World polity scholars would expect that although Western Christendom is the structural antecedent to the contemporary global culture, there would be a decline in the presence and authority of religious INGOs over time, because religion is a particularizing institution and not seen as legitimate in the context of global civil society. Peter Beyer would expect that because of the contemporary structure of the world, with differentiating sub-systems such as the economy, the polity, and religion, religion would decline through time in its authority.

Concerning the factors that shape global human rights organizing, INGO scholars tend to rely on world polity theory for their theoretical foundations. As such, they are sensitive to how

environments shape and constitute actors. In this respect, the INGO world polity scholars expectations would align with those described earlier in the section on world polity. Human rights organizing is more likely to be responsive to the institutional environments in which they are situated, such as the international human rights legal framework and the size of global civil society. Social movements scholars and the constructivist side of international relations show a tendency toward a more functional interpretation of human rights. In other words, human rights organizing is seen as a response to human rights violations. As human rights violations increase, these scholars would expect to see increases in the number of HRINGOs.

The third research question concerns religious freedom organizing and the characteristics of this sub-field of HRINGOs. Robertson's global sociology would expect that there would be heterogeneous responses to globalization, and a diversity of responses would result. World polity scholars would expect that, on the contrary, religious freedom organizing would follow globalized scripts and models of advocacy: the utilization of universalizing language, advancing religious freedom for all human persons, and specifically religious advocacy efforts would be muted or in the form of an interfaith approach, or more likely even a secularized approach. Peter Beyer's approach would suggest that there is potential for multiple responses, but falling along 2 dimensions. He would expect there to be a liberal performative and a conservative functional approach to doing religious freedom advocacy. Finally, Christian Smith also provides some expectations about the toolkit that religious freedom INGOs would utilize. In particular, he would expect transcendent motivation, institutional self-interest, and shared identity to be a part of the repertoire of activities taking place.

I have sketched sociological approaches to globalization, religion, and human rights and global civil society. Robertson's global sociology emphasizes the cultural processes unleashed by globalization, especially the recognition of a global whole that compels the relativization process. World polity scholars emphasize the importance of institutional environments for providing the scripts, models and norms that provide legitimacy and constitute actors within the environment.

Robertson's sociology has much to say about religion. He expects that with globalization, religion becomes a salient response and that a diversity of religious approaches should emerge. Beyer's systems approach suggests that religion, as one sub-system amongst multiple sub-systems, faces difficulties in how it approaches more secular problems. Potential solutions include universalistic and particularistic approaches. Elliott charts the enormous expansion of international human rights law, and attributes this expansion to a global cult of the individual in a world polity whose structure owes much to western Christendom. Scholars of global civil society, including those of social movements, constructivist international relations, and world polity INGO approaches, take seriously the global and transnational dimensions of the movements and associations they study. In the next chapter I detail the methods used to extract and code the data utilized in chapters four through six.

Figure 2.1: Theoretical approaches, research questions, and hypotheses

Theoretical approach / Research Question		Robertson	World Polity	Beyer	IR constructionists / Social Movements
What is the nature of religious involvement in global civil society through time? Is religion a prominent component of global civil society? If so, does its contribution to global civil society change over time? Does global civil society secularize? That is, can we see any evidence that the contribution of religion to global civil society declines over time?	Hypo-theses	Globalization produces multiple responses; religion is one approach (therefore, religion will be extant in entire history)	Western Christendom is structural antecedent; religion as a particularizing institution not as legitimate - decline in authority over history	Differentiating sub-systems (secularization) - declining authority over time	"Curious neglect" - Smith (not a hypothesis so much as a diagnosis of the field)
What factors shape advocacy of human rights at the global level? Do these factors change over time? Is there one factor that predominantly frames the institutional space in which HRINGOs operate? Or is there a mix of contributing factors?	Hypo-theses		Institutional environments containing models, norms, scripts; through time these should matter more		Functional "repression" response to human rights conditions
How do religious freedom INGOs do their work? Are there any patterns with respect to the types of INGOs doing religious liberty? Are RF-INGOs religious? If so, what religions are represented? Do RF-INGOs as a whole utilize universalizing language and mute their religiosity in their advocacy? Do RF-INGOs advocate for all humans, or do they advocate for particular groups of humans, e.g., humans who practice a specific religion?	Hypo-theses	Relativization and U-P & P-U indicate heterogeneous approaches and diversity of responses, religious or otherwise.	Follows global scripts: universalizing language; advocacy for all human persons; interfaith or secular; otherwise legitimacy is in doubt	Multiple potential responses along 2 dimensions: Function / Performance Liberal / Conservative	Smith's toolkit: transcendent motivation ("intense motivational leverage"), institutional self-interest, shared identity ("common super identity")

Chapter 3 - **METHODOLOGY**

The following chapter describes the data utilized in this dissertation. It includes a description of the data extraction methodology created and used to make sense of the international non-governmental organization (INGO) information from the Union of International Associations (UIA) Yearbook Plus CD-ROM, 2001-02. This data set contains 33,526 records of active and defunct INGOs, and 6,203 active and defunct intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). By means of my extraction protocol, I am able to extract this data from the CD-ROM and prepare it for analysis.

I will detail the more specific methods utilized for analysis within each of the substantive chapters. In short, I use analysis of trends, as well as a descriptive linguistic analysis in chapter four to understand how global civil society changes with respect to religion. In chapter five, I use the quantitative method of negative binomial regression to analyze a global level dataset to better understand the conditions that are conducive to the proliferation of HRINGOs. In chapter six, I use descriptive statistics to describe the small population of RF-INGOs and develop a typology to help understand how they do their advocacy work.

Background

The Union of International Associations (UIA), founded in 1907, is the oldest international organization collecting data on and documenting international associations. It produced its first yearbook of international associations in 1905, titled *Annuaire de lav via internationale*. In 1910, the UIA adopted the English title, *Yearbook of International Associations,* and released the yearbook irregularly until after WWII. In 1951, it received special consultative status from the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). By 1981 the UIA had produced twenty editions of the Yearbook, and in 1995 they published the first electronic edition of their international association data as the *Yearbook Plus.*

In essence, the UIA has become the de facto chronicler of global civil society (Boli and Thomas 1999; Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2003; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Though there are criticisms of the use of this data (for example, see Bush 2007) , it is the dominant source behind much of the recent explosion in research on globally oriented nongovernmental organizations (Anheier and Katz 2003; Anheier and Themundo 2003; Boli and Brewington 2007; Boli and Thomas 1999; Chabbott 1999; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Kaldor, Anheier, and Glasius 2003; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Lechner and Boli 2005; Sikkink and Smith 2002; Smith 2004; Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Tsutsui and Wotipka 2005). Though numerous studies utilize the UIA data, there is much work to do. One of my goals in undertaking the creation of the extraction protocol was to help facilitate the use of UIA data precisely because the electronic form of the data makes it significantly more usable than the traditional yearbooks the UIA also publishes.

The Data Structure

The UIA 2001-02 CD-ROM uses a data format that makes the database more akin to an encyclopedia. It is a structured document with enhanced search capabilities, rather than a dataset immediately suited for data analysis by sociologists. To transform the data from the former into the latter, I utilize text manipulation scripts using SED and REGEX that utilize the existing structure of the data document to process the data into a more analyzable and wieldy form. While the UIA data contained in the 2001-02 CD-ROM is not optimally structured for data analysis, the data have a structure. It is this structure which makes it possible to transform it from

its CD-ROM state into a database form. This allows the researcher to focus on further data coding or other text manipulation techniques to enhance the speed of coding.[10]

All records in the UIA contain several common data: the name of the organization, a code developed by the UIA to describe the geographical reach and/or the topical issues being addressed by the organization, and a date of founding if known. Nearly all records in the data also contain more descriptive data on the organization, but not all records have all information. These data are: contact information, history of the organization, aims, organizational structure, languages used, secretariat information, finances, consultative status with IGOs, IGO relations, NGO relations, organizational activities, events, publications, and nation-state locations of their membership. Each of these parts of the data are preceded by a header, e.g., contact information is preceded by "Contact" and history of the organization is preceded by "History." The various data for each record are in the same order, but if a record does not contain one of the foregoing items, it is not listed in any way. In other words, if a record has an organizational history listed, but not organizational aims listed, it will contain organizational history and then move on to organizational structure.

Figure 3.2 below provides an example of a record for an organization called the International Institute of Projectiology and Conscientiology (IIPC). The UIA code for the IIPC is located to the right of the screenshot near the green highlighted area below the organization's name. This is an "F" organization – an organization having special form (see Appendix B for the complete list of UIA codes and their descriptions)**.** The green highlighted area indicates the founding year, and the yellow highlighted area indicates that this organization is an NGO.

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[10] For example, using Microsoft Excel's text functions to identify specific words helps clue the researcher to how a record should be coded. This latter technique greatly speeds the process of identifying relevant words in large numbers of records, allowing the research to peruse many fewer records as part of the coding process.

Figure 3.1: Screenshot of a record in the UIA 2001-02 CD-ROM



This particular record has contact, history, aims, structure, finance, activities, and publications information.

Processing the Data

The process for converting the data massages it into a state that sociologists would recognize as a data file or a spreadsheet. This means that the data themselves are processed such that the vertical, encyclopedic structure contained in the UIA CD-ROM is changed into a horizontal data record, with each data field being of the same substantive type as the cells above and below it. Figure 3.3 shows a partial record for IIPC after processing.

Figure 3.2: Partial record from post-processed UIA data

ORGNAME	CODE	ACRONYM	Contact	History
International Institute of Projectiology and Conscientiology (IIPC)	F41651988	F IIPC Instituto Internacional de Proyecciología y Conscientiología Instituto Internacional de Projeciología e Conscientiología	Central Office: Rua Visconde de Pirajá 572, 6 piso andar, Rio de Janeiro RJ 22410, Brazil. T. (55 21) 512 4735. Fax 512 9229. E-mail: iipc@ax.ibase.org.br. International Institute of Projectiology and Conscientiology Rua Visconde de Pirajá 572 6 piso andar Rio de Janeiro RJ 22410 Brazil Dir New York Office Alvaro Salgado, 262 West 38th Street, Ste 507, New York NY 10018, USA. T. (1 212) 869 4595. Fax 869 4596. E-mail: newyork@iipc.org. URL: http://www.iipc.org/ - http://www.iipc.org.br/.	1988, Rio de Janeiro. International Institute of Projectiology (IIP) -- Instituto Internacional de Proyecciología -- Instituto Internacional de Projeciología.

The procedure uses Regular Expression (REGEX) and Stream Editor (SED), two very powerful data manipulation techniques and programs originally developed as part of the UNIX operating system. Both REGEX and SED function in the Microsoft Windows XP platform; the code and techniques discussed here were created and processed in Windows XP. The technique described here was created using the UIA 2001-02 Yearbook Plus CD-ROM.

From here the data still need to be coded further for analysis. For instance, to generate a plot of the founding dates of a large set of organizations, the founding date needs to be extracted from the CODE column above. This is rather easily accomplished by using MS Excel text functions, such as “right(cell address,4)” which would print the last 4 digits in the CODE column. Most records will then be coded correctly for their founding dates, although because some records do not have founding dates, nonsensical years will appear such as “4000.” As there is no year 4000 under our current calendar system, such data is coded as missing for such records.

Coding the data

There are three chapters in the dissertation that are based primarily on the UIA data. Chapter 4 presents the historical context of religion in global civil society and utilizes the INGO data to document systematically that the role of religion in global civil society has indeed changed. Chapter 5 focuses on the global conditions that spawn human rights INGOs. Chapter 6 utilizes the UIA data on selected religious liberty INGOs.

To better understand the changing role of religion in global civil society, I use data that I coded as part of an paper written with John Boli (Boli and Brewington 2007) on religious INGOs. We coded organizations as religious or secular and by religion in the UIA 2001-02 CD-ROM by searching all fields for over 250 terms and cognates indicating religious content (see pp. 206-08 of Boli and Brewington 2007 for further discussion of their coding scheme). In that paper we examined only the religious INGOs. In this chapter, I examine both religious and secular INGOs from 1500 through 1994.

I rely upon the definition that Boli and I utilized for INGOs. INGOs are defined as associations "that qualify as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the Yearbook of International Organizations (2001-02 CD version). These are voluntary, not-for-profit, self-organizing entities of sufficient public presence to come to the attention of the Union of International Associations, the publisher of the Yearbook." (p. 204). I exclude organizations founded prior to 1500, and include organizations that supply the UIA with organizational goals and aims, via the UIA "Aims" data field. This field contains the aspirations of the organization: what the organization sets out to do. The data include organizations from 1500 to 1994,[11] organizations deemed genuinely international in scope and geographical membership by the UIA

[11] The UIA begins to capture the entire population of international associations a number of years after new organizations are founded. Using the cutoff year of 1994 follows Boli and Brewington (2007: 207). See also Boli and Thomas (1999b: 21).

(categories A-D in UIA speak), internationally oriented national organizations (UIA categories G and N),[12] dissolved or inactive organizations, and those organizations with "Aims" data.

For the coding of the UIA data for chapter 5, I examined each record's organizational aims and activities and coded the record for all of the rights explicitly stated in these fields. This coding technique allowed me to ascertain on a per organization basis whether or not an INGO's work included human rights. When an INGO's work did include reference to human rights, these INGOs were coded as HRINGOs. These coding procedures yielded 875 HRINGOs between the years 1800 and 1995.

To analyze aims data, I identify whether individual words can reasonably be considered to have religious meaning or not. This serves as a measure for whether the language an organization uses to describe its purposes and goals is religious or not. I first utilize a set of linguistic software tools that parse each organization's aims into parts of speech (Schmid nd).[13] Each word of an aims entry is assigned a part of speech such as noun, verb, or adverb. There were 516,589 individual parts of speech identified across all of the aims entries; removing from this extract all "connector" words (e.g. conjunctions, prepositions, etc.), leaves 267,950 words with substantive meaning (e.g., nouns, verbs, adverbs, and adjectives). I focus on nouns and proper nouns, arguing that these parts of speech contain the bulk of the linguistic substance of the organizational aims data, and would be most likely to contain meanings that we can reasonably ascribe as religious or not. Of substantive words in the data, 152,697 are nouns or proper nouns, accounting together for 61.1% of all substantive words used in the aims data field. There were 6,696 unique nouns and proper nouns.

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[12] Boli and Brewington found that these organizations were international in scope and membership. See Boli and Brewington (2007: 207).

[13] I utilize Treetagger, a part-of-speech tagger built by the Institute for Computational Linguistics of the University of Stuttgart, Downloaded 09/08.

To analyze these nouns, I coded each noun or proper noun for whether the word could be considered religious in any reasonable sense, without reference to the context in which it appears in an organizations' aims description. As much as possible, I erred on the side of coding a word as religious if there was any doubt. This yielded a list of 322 unique religious terms, or 4.8% of all unique nouns and proper nouns. See Appendix A, Table 1 for this list of religious terms.

For analyzing religious freedom INGOs (RF-INGOs) in chapter 6, I first selected INGOs as RF-INGOs by searching the entire database for relevant words and phrases such as persecution, religious freedom, religious liberty, freedom of religion, freedom of conscience, and discrimination (tied to religion). This process yielded 36 RF-INGOs. I then coded the record for what type of entity was being advocated (e.g.,. all persons, a particular population such as a religious group, etc), whether the record included reference to international legal instruments such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or international law, and whether the RF-INGO focused on religious liberty as part of a larger repertoire of work (e.g., other human rights, evangelizing, etc.) or whether religious liberty was more the focus of the organization.

I leave more detailed descriptions of investigative and statistical methodologies in the chapters where they are put to use. In Chapter 4, on the role of religion in global civil society, I use descriptive statistics to chart the foundings of both religious and secular INGOs and the prevalence of religious language in the INGO aims data. In Chapter 5, I utilize negative binomial regression techniques to analyze global factors influencing the founding of HRINGOs. In Chapter 6, I examine the religious liberty INGO records in depth to create a typology of RF-INGOs.

Conclusion

This chapter has described the general procedure for extracting the INGO data I utilize throughout this dissertation. The data come from the Union of International Association's International Associations CD-ROM for 2001-2002. I also describe the various coding techniques

utilized in preparing the data for analysis. In the next chapter, I turn to the task of analyzing the INGO data as a means of understanding the changing contribution of religion to global civil society.

Chapter 4 - **RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR INGOS**

In this chapter, I will examine the relationship of religion and global civil society through a historical lens. The historical relationship between religion and civil society is important in its own right, but it is also important for understanding the multiple contexts in which religious liberty INGO advocacy takes place. I will explore this history by examining new data on the world of international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). With this data I will compare the relative trajectories of the foundings of religious and secular international INGOs from 1500 to 1994.

Religion, Civil Society and INGOs

Religion has clearly played a role in global civil society. An incomplete list of the religious bodies and the various campaigns or movements they were involved with includes, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries: the Quakers, Methodists, Unitarians, and Presbyterians as participants in the anti-slavery movement in the UK and US (Chabbott 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rabben 2002); the Woman's Christian Temperance Movement's involvement with the women's suffrage movement (Berkovitch 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998) ; the devout Calvinist Henry Dunant and the campaign that lead to the Geneva Convention and the International Society of the Red Cross/Crescent (Finnemore 1999); and Christian missionaries and the anti-foot binding movement in China (Keck and Sikkink 1998) .

In the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century we see missionaries from the Church of Scotland opposing female genital mutilation in Kenya (Boyle 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1998) ;various Protestant organizations and the Catholic Church involved in pushing for the inclusion of human rights in the UN charter, as well as in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Traer 1991); the Catholic Church and its efforts to highlight

human rights atrocities in Chile under Pinochet (with the help of the Vicariate of Solidarity) and in East Timor (with the help of Pax Christi, a Catholic peace INGO) under Suharto (Risse 2000); Pax Romana (a group of Catholic scholars) and the Quaker UN Office advocating at the UN for the inclusion of conscientious objection as a human right recognized by the international community (Hovey 1997); Catholics and other Christians as one segment of the Jubilee 2000 movement to eliminate third world debt (Lechner 2005); and finally the efforts of religious NGOs and various religious bodies advocating for religious freedom, especially in the 1990s through the millennium and beyond (Lechner 2004a). This list is summarized in Figure 4.1 below and includes approximate years in which these movements were active, the religious composition of the movement, the geographical territories where the movement originated, and the geographical territories that the movements targeted.

Figure 4.1: Religious contributions to selected transnational social justice movements

Year(s)	Movement	Religious involvement	Origin	Target
1777-1865	Anti-slavery movement	Quakers, Methodists, Unitarians, and Presbyterians	UK/USA	USA
1859-1880s	International Committee of the Red Cross	"devout Calvinist Henry Dunant"	Switzerland	Europe, USA, Turkey
1890-1902	Women's suffrage movement	Woman's Christian Temperance Union	USA	Europe, USA, Australia, New Zealand
1874-1911	Anti-foot binding movement	"Western missionaries" "London Missionary Society"	Europe/Britain	China
1923-1931	Female genital mutilation	Scottish Presbyterians	Scotland	Kenya
1943-1948	UN Charter includes human rights/UDHR	Protestant organizations and Catholic Church	USA	UN, Global
1970s	Human rights atrocities	Catholic Church	Chile/Global	Chile
1970s-mid 1990s	Conscientious Objection	Pax Romana and Quaker UN Office	Europe, USA	UN, Global
mid 1980s-1990s	Human rights atrocities	Catholic Church, Pax Christi	Indonesia/Global	Indonesia
late 1990s	Jubilee 2000 movement to forgive 3rd world debt	Catholic Church and Protestant bodies	USA/UK	Global
1893-	Religious Liberty	Various global religions, NRMs and religious NGOs	Largely western religious bodies and NGOs	Global

It is clear from this laundry list that religious organizations and churches are connected to supra-national civil society activity since the early 19th centuries. The literature recognizes this in several histories of transnational social movements, human rights movements, and INGOs: each study begins with the anti-slavery movement founded in the UK in 1787 (Chabbott 1999; Florini and Simmons 2000; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rabben 2002). Quakers and the other "dissenting denominations" were the "backbone of the movement . . . [and] brought a deeply religious, evangelical, and philanthropic spirit" to the first transnational advocacy network (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and one of the first human rights INGOs established in 1839 (Chabbott 1999). At the end point of this laundry list, current advocacy for religious human rights, although perhaps

"parochial" in representing religious interests (Livezey 1989), reflects still ongoing human rights efforts on an international level by various religious organizations (Lechner 2004a).

The second point to note is the Christian and Western origins of most movement participants. Drawing on the ideological and material resources and dominant position of core countries, we would expect this directionality by most social scientific accounts, especially that of world systems theory. However, embedded within this list is an interesting trajectory: we see the networks becoming more global in the sense of expanding their influence outside the West. Beginning with the anti-foot binding efforts of Christian missionaries in China in the late 19th century we see human rights advocacy in a non-western setting. The efforts by religious NGOs and church organizations to influence the outcomes of the UN charter to include human rights as its bedrock illustrate a truly global, universal target.

Third, a wide array of international NGOs, religious and secular, plus the policy bodies of numerous church organizations representing Evangelical, Catholic, liberal Protestant, Bahai'i, and Scientologist faiths, advocate for global religious freedom. In their advocacy, they affirm the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, measure religious liberty worldwide (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson 2001; Marshall 2000), and collaborate in adopting days of prayer for the Christian persecuted all over the world (www.idop.org), as well as celebrate November 25th each year since 1993 to mark the adoption of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief by the General Assembly of the UN in 1981.

Western, Christian religious associations and individuals were at the forefront of transnational social justice movements in the 19th century, as represented by much of the literature on the 19th century history of social movements. Two questions arise from this brief sketch: Is this transnational religious activity something new in the 19th century? And what occurs after the 19th century with respect to religious involvement in transnational associations?

In previous work with John Boli (2007), I have explored some of these questions. We used data from the 2001-02 Union of International Associations CD-ROM (Associations 2001-

02) to examine the history of religiously oriented INGOs, or RINGOs. Prior to the 19th century, the population of transnational religious organizations was predominantly Catholic religious orders. These were para-Church organizations focused on "highly disciplined, totalistic brotherhood or sisterhood committed to working primarily for the glory of God" (Boli and Brewington 2007, p. 221), and foundings of these types of RINGOs peaked in 1845. An example of this type of RINGO the Sisters of the Incarnate Word and Blessed Sacrament, founded in 1625 in France. They describe their current aim is to "Adore the incarnate word and evangelize by proclaiming the mystery of the incarnation." Another example is the Pipcus Sisters, founded in 1800 also in France, who "contemplate, live and proclaim God's love, incarnate in Jesus and in union with Mary; work among and with the poor, the afflicted, the marginalized and those who have not heard the Good News; evangelize through education and in foreign missions." A non-French example is the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer (the Redemptorists), founded in Italy in 1732, who "Maintain missions; work through preaching and inner missions."

Around the same time as this peak of foundings of Catholic religious orders in 1845, however, two transitions in the population of RINGOs are noted. The first is the rise in consistent foundings of Protestant RINGOs, and the second is the rise in consistent foundings of the voluntary membership organizations. The voluntary membership organization is made of up citizens volunteering their resources for a cause (as contrasted with religious orders where members were predominantly institutional Church members). Examples of Protestant RINGOs founded around 1845 include the International Mission Board, founded in 1845 in the U.S. as the missionary framework of the Southern Baptist Convention and the World Evangelical Alliance, founded in 1846 in London. Voluntary membership organizations founded during this time include the Hakluyt Society, founded in 1846 in London as a SINGO, and the World Alliance of the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), founded in 1855 in London as a RINGO. The aim of the Hakluyt Society "Advance education by the publication of scholarly editions of records of voyages, travels and other geographical material of the past."

Recall Elliott's work described in chapter two concerning the medieval Catholic Church. The decentralized, trans-European structures of the Church are for Elliott structural precursors to the now global, decentralized world society that Meyer and his colleagues describe in their work. Trans-nationalism is indeed part of the historical tradition of religion at least in the West. The answer to the first question posed above – is the transnational activity of the movements described at the outset new – is clearly negative.

What scholarly research has not established as of yet is the answer to the second question. What occurs after the 19th century with respect to religious associationalism? As Figure 4.1 clearly shows, religion is very much part of 20th century trans-nationalism. But to what degree? Until recently the scholarly literature on transnational social movements and INGOs seems to have ignored religion. Boli and Thomas (1999) explicitly omitted religious INGOs in their comprehensive look at the INGO population.[14] These questions (what occurs after the 19th century to religious associationalism? How much is religion part of 20th century trans-nationalism?) are what animates this chapter, and are one more effort at correcting this "curious neglect" (Smith 1996b).

To answer these questions I turn to data on INGOs. Utilizing the coding frameworks described in chapter 3, I examine the populations of INGOs to answer the question of whether the composition of the INGO field changes with respect religion. Answering this question will also add important context on the interesting confluence of events described by Boli and Brewington (2007): the peak in foundings of Catholic religious orders, the beginning of consistent Protest RINGO foundings, and the beginning of consistent voluntary membership RINGO foundings - all in the mid-19th century.

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[14] My thanks to John Boli for making this point.

Analysis

In very basic terms, out of a total of 22,111 INGOs founded between 1500 and 1995, there are 2,509 RINGOs (11.3%) and 19,602 secular INGOs (SINGOs - 88.7%). Figure 1 shows the population of RINGOs and SINGOs plotted by founding year.

Figure 4.2: Founding rates for INGOs from 1500 to 1995



The INGO environment is dominated by religious organizations up until the mid-19th century. From 1500 to 1850, 358 RINGOs are founded, while only 32 SINGOs are founded during the same time period. The first time equal numbers of RINGOs and SINGOs are founded is in 1864; each with 5 organizations founded, and for the first time in 1869 more SINGOs are founded than RINGOs (5 to 3). By 1891, more SINGOs than RINGOs are founded each year for the remainder of the period covered by the dataset. The last year in which RINGOs form over 50% of the population of INGOs is 1890, when RINGOs accounted for 67% of the INGOs founded that year. Figure 2 shows the proportion of RINGOs to INGOs founded for each of the

years covered by this inquiry, with a five-year moving average plotted in order to smooth the data. The strong variation at the beginning of the period is most likely an artifact of population size.

Figure 4.3: Proportion of RINGOs to all INGOs from 1500 to 1994



This figure dramatizes a striking shift in the population of INGOs from almost completely religious up to the 1860s to predominantly secular from the 1890s to 1994. By 1994, the proportion of RINGOs to INGOs was down to 5%.

There is variation along the way. The most striking period is from 1860 to 1905, when the proportion of religious to all INGOs shows a steep decline from 100% to just 4%. After 1905 religious INGOs recover some ground, until again in 1936 they account for just 4% of all INGO foundings. From 1937 to 1943, there is another, more muted recovery, but after 1945, the proportion of RINGOs continues its relative decline with a few peaks in the mid-1960s.

Important to note, however, is that RINGOs do not simply disappear. In fact, as John Boli and I have shown (2007), the patterns of all RINGO foundings after the 1860s are similar to those of the whole INGO population (cf. Boli and Thomas 1999). Rather, it is the secular, associational form of INGOs that appears in large numbers. Refer back to Figure 4.2 – there is an appreciable

difference of magnitude in the number of SINGO foundings compared to RINGO foundings. Figure 4.4 further dramatizes this sense of magnitude.

Figure 4.4: Cumulative foundings of RINGOs and SINGOs



It shows the cumulative foundings of RINGOs and SINGOs from 1500 through 1995, and plots a reference line on each axis. The vertical line corresponds to the year 1948, and the horizontal line corresponds to the total number of RINGOs at the end of the period, 2,509. By 1948, the SINGO population equals the total number of RINGOs founded by 1995.

Does this mean anything, substantively? The size of a subset of a population is by definition going to be smaller than the population. Is this dramatic shift from RINGO to SINGO meaningful? To answer this question, I examine the "aims" language used by all INGOs founded

in the periods 1500-1859 and 1860-1905.[15] In Figures 4.5 and 4.6 I show the top 100 noun utterances for each of these two periods. Figure 4.5 shows the first period, while Figure 4.6 shows the 1860-1905 period. For the Aims descriptions in the period 1500-1859, we see that religious language accounts for about 21% of all noun usage in this top 100 list (for all noun usage in this period, the amount of religious language drops to 18%). Twenty-four of the top 100 nouns in usage for these organizational aim descriptions are religious. They are words like mission, almshouse, ministry, God, evangelization, faith, parish, and Christ. Non-religious language for organizations founded between 1500 and1859 includes education (the number one noun used by INGOs founded in the period), work, hospital, child, woman, world, and health.

[15] Note that the language examined here is NOT meant to be attributed to the founding date of the INGO. Rather, it should be attributed to the date of the publication of the data set (2001-2002). The limitations of using the data in this way will be discussed in the next session.

Figure 4.5: Top 100 Words with organization foundings 1500-1859 (religious in bold)

Noun	Frequency	Proportion	Noun	Frequency	Proportion	Noun	Frequency	Proportion
Education	172	0.0995	Adult	11	0.0064	**salvation**	5	0.0029
Mission	84	0.0486	Form	11	0.0064	support	5	0.0029
Work	83	0.0480	**Preaching**	11	0.0064	university	5	0.0029
Home	78	0.0451	Action	10	0.0058	witness	5	0.0029
Nursing	72	0.0416	Love	10	0.0058	art	4	0.0023
Hospital	64	0.0370	**contemplation**	9	0.0052	Asia	4	0.0023
Centre	53	0.0307	**Jesus**	9	0.0052	culture	4	0.0023
Activity	52	0.0301	Member	9	0.0052	dignity	4	0.0023
People	52	0.0301	Person	9	0.0052	dispensary	4	0.0023
Service	50	0.0289	**Catechism**	8	0.0046	educator	4	0.0023
Care	49	0.0283	Country	8	0.0046	girl	4	0.0023
Welfare	49	0.0283	Family	8	0.0046	group	4	0.0023
Almshouse	43	0.0249	field	8	0.0046	**Holy**	4	0.0023
Assistance	30	0.0174	**prayer**	8	0.0046	**Kingdom**	4	0.0023
Life	30	0.0174	**apostolate**	7	0.0040	knowledge	4	0.0023
Variety	27	0.0156	order	7	0.0040	man	4	0.0023
Ministry	24	0.0139	provision	7	0.0040	mean	4	0.0023
God	23	0.0133	publication	7	0.0040	message	4	0.0023
Youth	22	0.0127	teaching	7	0.0040	**minister**	4	0.0023
Retreat	21	0.0121	way	7	0.0040	mystery	4	0.0023
Child	20	0.0116	area	6	0.0035	novice	4	0.0023
Woman	20	0.0116	**Christian**	6	0.0035	orphan	4	0.0023
world	20	0.0116	framework	6	0.0035	other	4	0.0023
evangelization	19	0.0110	Mary	6	0.0035	poverty	4	0.0023
health	19	0.0110	rehabilitation	6	0.0035		**1729**	100.00
faith	17	0.0098	right	6	0.0035			
need	17	0.0098	**spirit**	6	0.0035			
parish	17	0.0098	**spirituality**	6	0.0035			
missionary	16	0.0093	charity	5	0.0029			
school	15	0.0087	college	5	0.0029			
Christ	14	0.0081	freedom	5	0.0029			
community	14	0.0081	justice	5	0.0029			
church	13	0.0075	law	5	0.0029			
development	13	0.0075	peace	5	0.0029			
Church	12	0.0069	presence	5	0.0029			
level	12	0.0069	press	5	0.0029			
society	12	0.0069	prisoner	5	0.0029			
training	12	0.0069	promotion	5	0.0029			

	Percent of Top 100
Religious	**24**
Secular	**76**
Total	**100**

	Frequency	**Percent**
Religious	**366**	**21**
Secular	**1363**	**79**
	1729	**100**

Now consider the top 100 nouns used for organizations founded between 1860 and 1905 (Figure 4.6). The amount of religious language by frequency has dropped to 12% of all top 100 nouns used in the period, and considering all nouns used in the period, the proportion of religious nouns used drops to about 10%. The incidence of religious words in the top 100 has dropped to 15 out of 100. Religious nouns used by INGOs founded in this time period are mission, God, missionary, almshouse, church, Jesus, Christ, etc.

Figure 4.6: Top 100 Words with organization foundings 1860-1905 (religious in bold).

Noun	Frequency	Proportion	Noun	Frequency	Proportion	Noun	Frequency	Proportion
education	83	0.0425	family	19	0.0097	support	11	0.0056
development	54	0.0276	standard	19	0.0097	use	11	0.0056
people	51	0.0261	worker	19	0.0097	**Bible**	10	0.0051
life	47	0.0240	**almshouse**	17	0.0087	contact	10	0.0051
work	46	0.0235	**Christ**	17	0.0087	engineering	10	0.0051
service	43	0.0220	child	16	0.0082	individual	10	0.0051
world	41	0.0210	industry	16	0.0082	management	10	0.0051
country	40	0.0205	sport	16	0.0082	movement	10	0.0051
mission	39	0.0199	trade	16	0.0082	**prayer**	10	0.0051
organization	39	0.0199	union	16	0.0082	**religion**	10	0.0051
activity	38	0.0194	youth	16	0.0082	transport	10	0.0051
science	36	0.0184	association	15	0.0077	application	9	0.0046
information	35	0.0179	**Church**	15	0.0077	area	9	0.0046
cooperation	33	0.0169	method	15	0.0077	art	9	0.0046
home	33	0.0169	peace	15	0.0077	friendship	9	0.0046
member	31	0.0159	**church**	14	0.0072	humanity	9	0.0046
research	31	0.0159	health	14	0.0072	justice	9	0.0046
welfare	30	0.0153	level	14	0.0072	order	9	0.0046
nursing	28	0.0143	love	14	0.0072	progress	9	0.0046
study	28	0.0143	need	14	0.0072	safety	9	0.0046
centre	27	0.0138	action	13	0.0066	school	9	0.0046
woman	26	0.0133	**apostolate**	13	0.0066	variety	9	0.0046
assistance	25	0.0128	condition	13	0.0066	witness	9	0.0046
God	25	0.0128	**Jesus**	13	0.0066	experience	8	0.0041
interest	23	0.0118	promotion	13	0.0066	**faith**	8	0.0041
practice	23	0.0118	society	13	0.0066	form	8	0.0041
understanding	23	0.0118	unity	13	0.0066		**1955**	100.00
community	22	0.0113	**evangelization**	12	0.0061			
hospital	22	0.0113	language	12	0.0061			
training	22	0.0113	matter	12	0.0061	**Religious**	**Percent of top 100** **15**	
care	21	0.0107	person	12	0.0061	**Secular**	**85**	
field	21	0.0107	principle	12	0.0061	**Total**	**100**	
missionary	21	0.0107	improvement	11	0.0056		**Frequency**	**Percent**
right	21	0.0107	man	11	0.0056	**Religious**	**235**	**12**
exchange	20	0.0102	mean	11	0.0056	**Secular**	**1720**	**88**
knowledge	20	0.0102	**parish**	11	0.0056		**1955**	**100**
law	20	0.0102	public	11	0.0056			

Non-religious language in the top 100 for INGOs founded in this period still includes education (again, the top noun used by INGOs founded in the period), work, woman, child, hospital, and the like, but now also include nouns like science, research, information, engineering,

standard, trade, union, worker, industry, management, language, organization, and transport. Further, words like development, country, and world make it into the top 10 of all nouns used. The trend is away from religious words, as illustrated by the decline in overall percentage religious words occupy in the top 100 nouns used of each period, but also the content of the words change and move toward issues of science, business, country, and the like.

How do religious versus secular *organizations* use such language? We would expect that religious organizations would indeed use more religious language, and in fact this is what we find. In Figure 4.7, I cross-tabulate religious and secular nouns with religious and secular organizations for all INGOs founded between 1500 and 1994. Not surprisingly, religious organizations use religious language more often than secular organizations. Although 97.9% of all nouns used by all organizations are secular, for religious organizations this number is 84.4%. Secular organizations utilize secular language 99.6% of the time.

Figure 4.7: Religious and Secular Nouns by RINGO and SINGO cross-tabulation - 1500-1994.

			Organizational orientation		Total
			RINGO	SINGO	
Nouns	Secular	Count	14853	134563	149416
		Percent	84.40%	99.60%	97.90%
	Religious	Count	2737	544	3281
		Percent	15.60%	0.40%	2.10%
	TOTAL	Count	17590	135107	152697
		Percent	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Pearson Chi-square value = 17006.560, significant beyond .000 level.

Figure 4.8: Percentage of religious speech for religious and secular organizations founded 1500-1994.



The data from Figure 4.7 is presented graphically in Figure 4.8 as a plot of the proportion of religious to secular speech describing organizational aims as a function of founding date, for both RINGOs and SINGOs. The red dotted line is the proportion of religious to secular speech by RINGOs, and the blue line is the proportion of religious to secular speech by SINGOs. A ten year moving average is also plotted for both RINGOs and SINGOs. SINGOs very seldom use religious speech to describe their organizational aims. RINGOs are by far more likely to describe their organizational aims with religious nouns – but this seems to vary as a function of organizational age. The RINGOs founded earlier in the period (1500-1815) show a number of peaks of high proportions of religious speech. This is possibly an artifact of low total numbers of nouns, which is itself a function of the low numbers of organizations founded in this period. For instance, the peak around 1809 for RINGOs is produced by 5 religious nouns out of a total of 13 nouns, or 38.5%. Immediately after this period, however, the total amount of noun speech in the

organizational aims increases to a more robust level for interpretation purposes. For religious organizations, if we examine the 10-year smoothed average we see two peaks. One appears between 1860 and 1880, while the other appears between 1890 and 1920. After 1920, there seems to be a slight gradual decline of the proportion of religious to secular nouns utilized by religious organizations. The 10 year moving average peaks in 1920 at about 15%, but through the rest of the 20th century this moving average declines slowly to about 8% for the last 30 years of the period.

As noted earlier, we must take this analysis of organizational aims data with a grain of salt. The aims data is cross-sectional, while the INGO founding dates are longitudinal. In other words, it is quite possible that how an organization describes its aims changes through time as the organization ages. Even with these data limitations, we can twist the interpretation of the data ever so slightly by thinking about organizational age. What the data really show is that older RINGOs describe their organizational aims with more religious nouns. Younger RINGOs describe their organizational aims with fewer religious nouns. SINGOs, on the other hand, very rarely utilize religious language to describe themselves at all. What this suggests is that the environment in which a RINGO is founded leaves an imprint on the legacy of the organization.

To summarize: nearly the entire population of INGOs was composed of religious associations up until the 1860s. After this point, secular INGOs begin forming at a consistent rate. By about 1911, SINGOs overtake RINGOs in foundings per year, and the total proportion of RINGOs to SINGOs founded from the 1860s about 1905 declines precipitously, from nearly 100% to 4%. Older RINGOs founded prior to the 1920s show a tendency to utilize more religious language to describe the work they aim to do, while younger RINGOs show a tendency to use less total religious language to describe their organizational aims. The institutional environment in which a RINGO is founded leaves a lasting effect on how RINGOs describe the goals of their work. This means that the institutional environment for INGOs as a whole is dynamic with

respect to religion, and over time, not only does it support fewer RINGOs, but those RINGOs tend to speak less religiously about their work.

This research sets the context for religious liberty INGO organizing: global civil society in the form of INGOs was predominantly religious at its inception – nearly all INGOs were religiously oriented until the mid-19th century. But the abrupt transition from religious to secular orientations in the births of new INGOs from 1850 to 1900 signals a dramatic watershed moment that has lasting effects for how INGOs whose work deals with religion (e.g., like religious liberty INGOs) operate in global civil society. Global civil society itself was born of religion, but over time this institutional environment supports fewer RINGO foundings and religious speech by RINGOs less and less.

In the next chapter, I take up the question of what global conditions are important and contribute to the founding of human rights INGOs. This will provide yet more context for understanding the environments in which RF-INGOs do their work, in addition to adding to the growing literature on HRINGOs.

Chapter 5 - **HUMAN RIGHTS INGOs**

What factors shape the world of human rights INGOs (hereafter HRINGOs)? Is there one factor that predominantly frames the institutional space in which HRINGOs operate? Or is there a mix of contributing factors? Does the institutional environment for HRINGOs change over time? If so, how?

This chapter will explore these questions by analyzing HRINGOs quantitatively. After providing a description of the HRINGO population, I utilize zero-inflated negative binomial regression to model the conditions under which HRINGOs are founded. I use data for the years 1843-1995 on international and civil wars, casualties from international and civil wars, population, per capita GDP, global democracy, the participation of nation-states in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the foundings of all INGOs, and signings and ratifications of international human rights treaties.

Repression response or favorable institutional environment

Recall the discussion about repression responses and institutional environments from the theory chapter: what institutional environments or factors shape human rights INGOs foundings? If HRINGOs are similar to the larger population of which they are a part, then we would expect comparable dynamics.

Repression responses include issues related to *war*. Expansive wars definitely have an effect on INGOs, so we would expect the same with HRINGOs. This may be even more salient for HRINGOs, as war is one of the principle locations for human rights atrocities. International wars and civil wars may have different effects. *Population size* and *growth* have been found to contribute significantly to political repression: with increased population size and/or growth, human rights repression increases. In response, we may expect HRINGO foundings to increase.

Democracy has also been shown to effect the human rights field. If democracy mitigates human rights repression, a repression response effect interpretation would suggest that foundings of HRINGOs would decrease. At the same time, a world society interpretation, as discussed in chapter 2, would suggest that increased democracy improves the institutional conditions for human rights advocacy and social movement organizing, and therefore we would find more HRINGOs with more democracy. Likewise, international cooperation in the form of *IGO membership* may work through repression response mechanisms or a world society mechanism: increased memberships in IGOs may increase the foundings of HRINGOs because IGOs improve the institutional conditions in which HRINGOs can proliferate. At the same time, IGO participation may also serve to mitigate war, human rights atrocities, and depress HRINGO foundings. *Economic development* may have either a mitigating or propagating effect on foundings, depending on the mechanisms at work. With higher levels of economic development we thus may find that HRINGO foundings are dampened, but foundings may also be responsive to the improved conditions which economic development elicits such that with higher levels of economic development there are increased foundings.

Does the proliferation of the *INGO* form in global civil society propagate the human rights subpopulation of INGOs regardless of the myriad substantive issues in which the form manifests itself? If this is the case, then we would expect that as the entire population of INGOs grows, so would HRINGOs.

International human rights law is still another potential contributing factor to the foundings of HRINGOs. Here we find similar mechanisms but opposite directions: with more international treaties concerning human rights being signed and/or ratified by nation-states, we might find that human rights repression is decreased which depresses the foundings of HRINGOs. An alternative mechanism is that as the international legal regime for human rights grows, so does the intellectual and ideological environment grow for HRINGOs, leading to more HRINGO foundings.

If foundings of HRINGOs are a function of human rights violations, then we would expect that the repression response approach is operating Repression response factors as described above and in the theory chapter are war (international and civil war), population size, levels of democracy, national participation in international governance, and economic development.

If the institutional environments for human rights expand, world-polity/world-society predictions would expect that so do HRINGO foundings. Institutional environmental factors as described above are levels of democracy, national participation in international governance, economic development, the INGO population, and international human rights law.

Data

The dependent variable is the count of human rights INGOs founded on an annual basis from the UIA's 2001-02 CD-Rom (UIA 2001-02). The data were extracted using the methods described in chapter [x], and organized into aggregate counts of human rights INGOs founded per year. All variables are summarized in Figure 5.1 below. To control for population density, the size of the HRINGO population each year is included in all equations.

To measure the number of international conflicts and civil wars per year, I use Version 3.0 data from the Correlates of War project (Sarkees 2000). This data identifies international wars as conflicts between at least two members of the nation-state system, and there must be at least 1000 fatal casualties amongst all nation-state participants. To model the scale of war, I also include deaths as a result of war. I calculate the number of fatal casualties in all international and civil wars per year and the total number of international and civil wars per year. Because the Correlates of War data does not contain the exact number of deaths per year that the war is active, I distribute the total number of deaths in a particular war over the total number of years for that war. For example, the Mexican-American war of 1846 lasted for three years and sustained 19,283 deaths, so the Mexican-American war contributes 6,427 deaths to each of the years 1846, 1847,

and 1848. Finally, I multiply the aggregate number of wars per year by the natural log of the sum of deaths related to international and civil wars per year. This provides a single, composite war and death variable.

I utilize data from Angus Maddison (Maddison 2008) on world levels of population and per capita GDP. Data for the years 1843-1869, 1871-1899, 1901-1912, 1914-1919, 1921-1939, and 1941-1949 are missing, and are interpolated linearly.

For level of democracy I draw on the revised combined polity score from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jagger 2009). The variable measures the level of democracy per nation-state on a scale of -10 to 10, where higher scores mean more democracy and lower scores indicate autocracy. I average all country polity scores for each year to create a global polity variable that measures the global level of democracy for each year.

The measure for global participation rate for nation-states in intergovernmental organizations was developed utilizing yearly IGO membership data from version 2.1 of the Correlates of War IGO data (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). For each year, the number of states with full memberships are aggregated and divided by the total number of nation-states in existence during that year to yield an IGO participation rate. Data from 1840 through 1965 are reported in five year intervals. The data for intervening years are recorded as the value for the beginning of each five year period (e.g., the value is the same for the years 1845 through 1849).

Data for INGOs are aggregated into counts of foundings per year, and were extracted from the UIA 2001-02 CD-Rom (UIA 2001-02). Data for signings and ratifications of international human rights treaties are courtesy of Michael Elliott (Elliott 2008). Elliott derives his data from 779 international human rights treaties. Included in this data are years for signings and ratifications for these international legal instruments. I aggregate signings and ratifications as count data by year.

The data taken together for all of these variables covers the years 1839 to 1994. For a number of the variables there are no data prior to 1839. Because there are no data sets that provide measures on human rights violations throughout the period of study, we cannot model directly the effect of human rights violations on the foundings of HRINGOs. The inclusion of the composite variable war and deaths in war are the closest proxy with available data.

I also include four dichotomous variables for non-overlapping time periods. These periods are 1839-1859, 1860-1909, 1910-1945, and 1946-1994. These periods are constructed to reflect several important facets of global civil society history. The first, 1839-1859, represents the pre-secularizing period identified in chapter 4, and the 1860-1909 period represents the take-off period of secular INGOs. The third period, 1910-1945 roughly corresponds to the world war years, and 1946-1994 represents the incredible expansion of global civil society after WWII.

Figure 5.1: Variable descriptions and properties

Variable	Variable Description	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Human Rights INGO foundings	Human Rights INGO foundings as a count per year	156	5.474359	8.550758	0	47
HRINGO population size	Size of HRINGO population (density)	156	145.8141	202.3999	1	854
HRINGOs (1 year lag)	One year lag of HRINGOs to control for autocorrelation	155	5.36129	8.460668	0	47
War-Deaths Composite	Composite variable representing international and civil wars and total mortality in each year: (sum of wars) * natural log (sum of deaths)	156	4.20602	5.353223	0	31.51848
Population in 1000s (twice differenced)	World population – differenced twice to achieve stationarity	154	497.3279	3301.325	-11058	20826
Per Capita GDP (differenced)	Per Capita GDP – differenced once to achieve stationarity	155	29.42272	36.35472	-22.25049	178.1501
Global Democracy (differenced)	Revised, combined polity score from Polity IV dataset. Country level polity scores are averaged on a per year basis – differenced once to achieve stationarity	155	0.0491449	0.2772263	-1.023088	1.103242
Global IGO Participation (differenced)	Number of states with full memberships in IGOs are aggregated and divided by the total number of nation-states in existence during that year to yield an IGO participation rate – differenced once to achieve stationarity	155	0.3453791	0.9737722	-4.129353	5.585014
INGOs founded (differenced)	INGO foundings per year, minus HRINGO foundings – differenced once to achieve stationarity	155	3.522581	23.88999	-91	147
Int'l HR Treaties Ratified	Total number of international human rights treaties ratified per year	156	1.967949	2.736656	0	12
Int'l HR Treaties Signed	Total number of international human rights treaties signed per year	156	4.166667	5.957736	0	40

Method

Because the dependent variable is a time-series event count it does not have a normal distribution. Visual analysis of the distribution of HRINGO corroborates that it is not normal. This violation of OLS regressions assumptions suggests another model is needed. OLS regression of event count data also typically yields "inefficient, inconsistent, and biased estimates" (Long and Freese 2006). Event count data is therefore modeled with alternative methods, including Poisson or negative binomial regression.

Assumptions of the Poisson regression model include that the data exhibit equidispersion, or that the variance of the distribution equals the mean of the distribution. Negative binomial regression relaxes this assumption and allows for overdispersion, and this can be directly tested with a Likelihood-ratio test of overdispersion (Long and Freese 2006). [16]

For the dependent variable (HRINGOs), the variance is almost 21 times that of the mean, indicating that the variable is overdispersed. Although the first HRINGO is founded in 1804, the population and GDP variables do not have data prior to 1820, and there are no HRINGO foundings again until 1839. To model time dynamics, I also run all models with an autoregressive dependent variable as an independent variable. I lag the dependent variable by 1 period to control autocorrelation in the human rights INGO population. Figure 5.2 depicts a correlation matrix below.

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[16] There is also evidence of excess zeros in the dependent variable. All models were also run using zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) regression, and the Vuong test for performance of the ZINB model suggested that there was improvement over the negative binomial model. However, in each of the zero-inflation sub-models, there was evidence that the ZINB procedure was not appropriate with very large standard errors for some of the parameters. Following advice on STATA's help website (http://www.stata.com/support/faqs/stat/nbreg.html), I utilize negative binomial regression.

Figure 5.2: Correlation Matrix of variables utilized in analysis

Correlation Matrix	Human Rights INGO foundings	HRINGO population size	HRINGOs (1 year lag)	War-Deaths Composite	Population in 1000s (twice differenced)	Per Capita GDP (differenced)	Global Democracy (differenced)	Global IGO Participation (differenced)	INGOs founded (differenced)	Int'l HR Treaties Ratified	Int'l HR Treaties Signed
Human Rights INGO foundings	1.000										
HRINGO population size	0.925	1.000									
HRINGOs (1 year lag)	0.923	0.931	1.000								
War-Deaths Composite	0.015	0.061	0.005	1.000							
Population in 1000s (twice differenced)	0.029	0.039	0.018	0.011	1.000						
Per Capita GDP (differenced)	0.446	0.579	0.426	0.027	0.130	1.000					
Global Democracy (differenced)	0.254	0.185	0.214	-0.059	0.052	-0.083	1.000				
Global IGO Participation (differenced)	0.176	0.194	0.155	0.030	0.007	0.235	0.158	1.000			
INGOs founded (differenced)	0.144	0.086	0.035	0.002	0.099	0.062	0.102	0.111	1.000		
Int'l HR Treaties Ratified	0.583	0.610	0.580	0.026	0.304	0.469	0.032	0.145	0.069	1.000	
Int'l HR Treaties Signed	0.829	0.841	0.799	-0.017	0.059	0.480	0.198	0.240	0.106	0.567	1.000

All models were run with STATA software, and the NBREG command was used to generate the negative binomial regression models.

Results

For a picture of human rights organizing over time, see Figure 5.3. Figure 5.3 depicts HRINGO foundings from 1839 to 1994. Here, there are clear peaks and troughs that mirror overall INGO foundings (see Figure 1.1, p. 23 of Boli and Thomas 1999). There are slight increases in HRINGO foundings in the pre-WWI era, and then a stagnation during WWI. Immediately following WWI, there is a spike of foundings and then a period of calm, followed by stagnation in the depression and during WWII. Following WWII we see a huge spike in human rights organizing, with 98 HRINGOs being founded in the 5 years following WWII alone. There is another notable spike of foundings in the years following the end of the cold war to 1994, with 225 foundings, or 17% of all HRINGO foundings. Of even more significant interest is that more than half of all HRINGO foundings took place *after* 1976.

Figure 5.3: Foundings of HRINGOs 1839-1994



Figure 16 displays the results of the negative binomial regression of the independent variables outlined above on foundings of HRINGOs for the years 1839-1994. Figure 2 presents the models with their coefficients transformed into incidence rate ratios (IRRs) by exponentiating them. This facilitates interpretation of the coefficients. In all models, the test for overdispersion is significantly different from zero, suggesting that the negative binomial model is appropriate. All models as a whole are significant as the Wald chi-squared tests are all significant.

In Equation 1.1 in Figure 5.4 the independent variables tested are the repression response variables. Recall that the repression response mechanism is where an independent variable, such as composite measure of war and war-related deaths occurring globally, is a cause of human rights repression, and HRINGOs are founded in response to this repression. For Equation 1.1, Population, GDP per capita is significant at the 0.05 level and positive, global democracy is significant at the 0.01 level and negative, and global IGO participation is significant at the 0.10 level and positive.

What about the magnitude of the effects on HRINGO foundings? In Equation 1.1, a one thousand unit increase in population results in no real difference in HRINGOs (the IRR is 1.000),

and for a one unit increase in GDP per capita we would expect that the founding rate of HRINGOs would increase by a factor of 1.005, holding all other variables in the model constant. For global democracy, a one unit increase in the Polity IV score, would decrease the founding rate of HRINGOs by a factor of 0.517, holding all other variables constant. A one unit increase in global IGO participation would yield a factor increase of 1.124 in the rate of HRINGO foundings, holding all other variables constant.

Figure 5.4: Negative binomial regression models of HRINGO foundings 1839-1994

Models of HRINGO foundings 1839-1994

	Equation 1.1 b/p/se	Equation 1.2 b/p/se	Equation 1.3 b/p/se
Human Rights INGO foundings			
HRINGO population size	0.003**	0.002	0.001
	0.007	0.114	0.191
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
HRINGOs (1 year lag)	0.063*	0.038+	0.041*
	0.020	0.096	0.049
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
War-Deaths Composite	0.012		0.022*
	0.351		0.045
	(0.01)		(0.01)
Population in 1000s (twice differenced)	0.000*		-0.000
	0.034		0.486
	(0.00)		(0.00)
Per Capita GDP (differenced)	0.005*	0.003*	0.004*
	0.010	0.034	0.013
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Global Democracy (differenced)	-0.660**	-0.804***	-0.765**
	0.009	0.001	0.001
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.24)
Global IGO Participation (differenced)	0.117+	0.050	0.041
	0.065	0.440	0.494
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)
INGOs founded (differenced)		0.008*	0.008**
		0.010	0.007
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Int'l HR Treaties Ratified		0.117***	0.122***
		0.000	0.000
		(0.02)	(0.03)
Int'l HR Treaties Signed		0.064**	0.067**
		0.003	0.002
		(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	-0.014	-0.168	-0.264+
	0.922	0.178	0.053
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.14)
lnalpha			
Constant	-0.863***	-1.512***	-1.573***
	0.001	0.000	0.000
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)
Wald Chi-2	234.745***	363.707***	391.070***
P-value	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
N	154	155	154
AIC	665.503	626.395	625.126
BIC	692.835	656.829	661.569

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Figure 5.5: Negative binomial regression models of HRINGO foundings 1839-1994 with incidence rate ratios

Models of HRINGO foundings 1839-1994 - parameter coefficients as incidence rate ratios

	Equation 1.1 b	Equation 1.2 b	Equation 1.3 b
Human Rights INGO foundings			
HRINGO population size	1.003**	1.002	1.001
HRINGOs (1 year lag)	1.065*	1.038+	1.042*
War-Deaths Composite	1.012		1.022*
Population in 1000s (twice differenced)	1.000*		1.000
Per Capita GDP (differenced)	1.005*	1.003*	1.004*
Global Democracy (differenced)	0.517**	0.447***	0.465**
Global IGO Participation (differenced)	1.124+	1.052	1.042
INGOs founded (differenced)		1.008*	1.008**
Int'l HR Treaties Ratified		1.124***	1.130***
Int'l HR Treaties Signed		1.066**	1.069**
Constant	0.986	0.846	0.768+
lnalpha			
Constant	0.422***	0.220***	0.208***

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

In Equation 1.2 the independent variables are the institutional environment variables. GDP per capita is also positive and significant in this equation at the 0.05 level. Global democracy is significant at the 0.001 level and negative. Other variables are also significant in the institutional environment model. INGOs founded is positive and significant at the 0.05 level, international human rights treaties ratified are positive and highly significant at the 0.001 level, and international treaties signed are also positive and significant at the 0.01 level. In terms of magnitude of effect of the independent variables on HRINGOs, the variables for international human rights treaties ratification (IRR=1.124) and signing (IRR=1.1066) have strong factor increase effects on HRINGO foundings. The factor effect on HRINGOs by GDP per capita (IRR=1.003) and global democracy (IRR=0.477) are slightly changed from Equation 1. For INGOs founded the factor change in HRINGOs is 1.006.

For Equation 1.3 I combine the repression response and institutional environment variables to run the full model. In Equation 1.3, the war & death composite variable becomes significant at the 0.05 level, and is positive. GDP per capita is significant at the 0.05 level and positive. Global democracy decreases in significance to the 0.01 level and is still negative. INGOs founded remains positive and increases in significance to the 0.01 level. Signing of human rights treaties remains highly significant at the 0.001 level, while ratifications of international human rights treaties remains significant at the 0.01 level.

In terms of the magnitude of the effects these variables have on foundings of HRINGOs, the human rights treaty signing and global democracy variables have the strongest effects on the rate of HRINGOs, with a factor change on HRINGO foundings of above 1.124 and 0.447 respectively each. GDP per capita has a factor change effect on foundings of HRINGOs of 1.004, and increases in the war and death composite variable increase HRINGO foundings by a factor of 1.022. INGO foundings affect HRINGOs foundings by a factor of 1.008.

Throughout the models, GDP per capita remains consistently significant and positive. Global democracy has a mitigating effect on HRINGO foundings, and its effects are significant in models 1.2 and 1.3. INGOs founded remains consistently significant and positive, and in the full model its significance increases. The composite war and death variable becomes significant in the full model. Finally, the treaty variables show strong significance and the strongest magnitude of effect on HRINGO foundings across the models of which they are included.

Figure 5.6 shows the full model with time related dichotomous variables. Historical dynamics seem to be active with respect to the war-death variable, per capita GDP, and global democracy. The war-death variable is significant at the 0.10 level in the years 1839-1859, and increases in significance to the 0.05 level in the post WWII period. The GDP per capita variable remains consistently significant for each of the models, with the exception of the post WWII period. Global democracy is significant ($P<0.01$) through all models, again with the exception of the post-WWII period, and its effect is consistently negative and the magnitude of its effect on HRINGO foundings is consistently below 0.55.

INGOs founded and international treaties ratified and signed are consistently significant and positive through all time periods, but in the post-WWII period, the level of significance and magnitude of the effect of the treaty variables declines. INGOs founded remains consistently significant at the 0.01 level, and the magnitude of its effect increases slightly in the inter-war period of 1910-1945, but decreases again in the post-WWII period.

Figure 5.6: Negative binomial regression models of HRINGOs 1839-1994, by historical period

Models of HRINGO foundings 1839–1994 with dichotomous time variables

	Equation 2.1 b/p/se	Equation 2.2 b/p/se	Equation 2.3 b/p/se	Equation 2.4 b/p/se
Human Rights INGO foundings				
HRINGO population size	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
	0.143	0.169	0.194	0.127
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
HRINGOs (1 year lag)	0.039*	0.040*	0.045*	0.026*
	0.044	0.033	0.045	0.039
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
War-Deaths Composite	0.017+	0.014	0.017	0.024*
	0.098	0.160	0.146	0.012
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Population in 1000s (twice differenced)	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000	−0.000
	0.545	0.587	0.564	0.380
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Per Capita GDP (differenced)	0.003*	0.003*	0.004**	−0.000
	0.022	0.025	0.006	0.851
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Global Democracy (differenced)	−0.672**	−0.619**	−0.781**	−0.254
	0.003	0.004	0.001	0.231
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.21)
Global IGO Participation (differenced)	0.030	0.040	0.037	0.047
	0.582	0.489	0.524	0.433
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
INGOs founded (differenced)	0.007**	0.007**	0.008**	0.004**
	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.009
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Int'l HR Treaties Ratified	0.108***	0.097***	0.117***	0.073**
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.003
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Int'l HR Treaties Signed	0.059**	0.056**	0.069**	0.033*
	0.002	0.004	0.002	0.029
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
1839–1859 period	−1.798***			
	0.001			
	(0.55)			
1860–1910 period		−0.768***		
		0.001		
		(0.23)		
1910–1945 period			0.255	
			0.160	
			(0.18)	
1946–1994 period				1.238***
				0.000
				(0.26)
Constant	−0.058	0.100	−0.354*	−0.234+
	0.673	0.554	0.020	0.063
	(0.14)	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.13)
lnalpha				
Constant	−1.765***	−1.837***	−1.507***	−2.674***
	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.52)
Wald Chi-2	409.732***	426.747***	385.611***	596.797***
P-value	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000	0.00000
N	154	154	154	154
AIC	612.184	615.786	625.355	600.521
BIC	651.664	655.266	664.835	640.002

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

Figure 5.7: Negative binomial regression models of HRINGOs 1839-1994 with incidence rate ratios, by historical period

Models of HRINGO foundings – parameter coefficients as incidence rate ratios with dichotomous time variables

	Equation 2.1 b	Equation 2.2 b	Equation 2.3 b	Equation 2.4 b
Human Rights INGO foundings				
HRINGO population size	1.001	1.001	1.001	1.001
HRINGOs (1 year lag)	1.040*	1.040*	1.046*	1.026*
War-Deaths Composite	1.017+	1.014	1.017	1.025*
Population in 1000s (twice differenced)	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Per Capita GDP (differenced)	1.003*	1.003*	1.004**	1.000
Global Democracy (differenced)	0.511**	0.538**	0.458**	0.776
Global IGO Participation (differenced)	1.030	1.041	1.037	1.048
INGOs founded (differenced)	1.007**	1.007**	1.008**	1.004**
Int'l HR Treaties Ratified	1.114***	1.101***	1.124***	1.076**
Int'l HR Treaties Signed	1.061**	1.058**	1.071**	1.033*
1839-1859 period	0.166***			
1860-1910 period		0.464***		
1910-1945 period			1.291	
1946-1994 period				3.449***
Constant	0.944	1.105	0.702*	0.792+
lnalpha				
Constant	0.171***	0.159***	0.222***	0.069***

+ p<.10, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001

The AIC and BIC summary statistics in Figure 5.5 indicate the goodness of fit and parsimony of the models. The BIC statistic (Bayesian Information Criterion) penalizes a model with more parameters more so than does the AIC (Akaike's Information Criterion). Lower scores indicate better goodness of fit (Akaike 1974; Burnham and Anderson 2004). For the full time period, the institutional environments model scores the lowest on the BIC statistic (Equation 1.2), and the full model scores lowest on the AIC statistic in Equation 1.2

Discussion

Overall, the results for the years 1839 through 1994 suggest there is stronger support for the institutional environments argument over the repression response model, but that neither model alone can explain HRINGO foundings. Economic development (GDP per capita) is consistently significant and positive. A repression response argument would expect that as economic development expands, human rights violations would decrease, and therefore HRINGOs would proliferate at a lower rate. The opposite is indicated by all models. HRINGO foundings increase as economic development increases, providing some evidence that economic development is an institutional environment factor.

Global democracy appears to work as a significant repression response factor. As global democracy increases, foundings of HRINGOs decrease. If global democracy were an institutional environmental factor, we would expect HRINGO foundings to increase as democracy increases. National IGO participation has a slight significant and positive effect on HRINGO foundings in the repression response model, but is not significant in the institutional environments or full models. In the context of the repression response variables, IGO participation is not a repression response, but in the other models the effects of IGO participation are muted by the combination of all variables.

International human rights treaties are a key factor in HRINGO foundings. Treaty signings and ratifications have the strongest overall positive effects. This lends support for the institutional environment approach. Founding international organizations that advocate for human rights is made easier when nation-states formally subscribe to human rights ideology. INGO foundings are also strongly significant and positive in these models. This lends support that INGO foundings are an institutional environment.

The number and severity of wars in the world is significant in the full model for 1839-1994. The effect is positive and its magnitude is medium. This suggests that the presence and severity of war has a catalyzing effect on the foundings of HRINGOs, lending evidence to the repression response argument.

Global democracy levels and human rights treaty signings and ratifications are the most consistent catalyzing and strongest predictors of HRINGO foundings for 1839-1994. INGO foundings are a weaker predictor but have a positive influence on HRINGO foundings, and per capita GDP also is a relatively weak and positive predictor of HRINGO foundings. War and its severity has a medium, positive effect on HRINGO foundings. The BIC summary statistics for the institutional environment model in the full period support that the institutional environment model provides a better fit and is more parsimonious, while the AIC summary statistic suggests that the full model provides the best fit.

Historical dynamics are clearly at play in the foundings of HRINGOs. Per capita GDP and global democracy are significant until the post-WWII era, while the number of INGOs founded and the numbers of international human rights treaties ratified and signed are significant through all periods. That per capita GDP and global democracy are not significant in the post-WWII era while wars and deaths in wars becomes significant suggests that the severity of war in the post-WWII era washes out the effect of economics and democracy. The severity of war in the post-WWII era also mutes the magnitudes and significance of INGOs founded and the two treaty variables. Figure 5.8, showing line plots of the war-death composite variable, and counts of international and civil wars, suggests that it is the increase in civil wars in the post-WWII era that contributes to the effects of war and death on HRINGO foundings.

Figure 5.8: Line plots of war variables



There is no clear evidence to support either the institutional environments or the repression response arguments as wholesale explanations for what is occurring in the early and

later periods when examining the individual parameter statistics. However, the AIC and BIC scores suggest in all periods that the institutional environments model fits the data better.

Conclusion

HRINGO foundings are highly sensitive to the institutional environments in which they operate, especially the system of human rights law operating internationally, global civil society represented by all INGOs, and economic development. HRINGOs foundings also respond positively to weaker democracy and human rights violations.

Chapter 6 - **RELIGIOUS FREEDOM INGOs**

On May 25, 1900, on its 75th anniversary, the American Unitarian Association founded the *International Council of Unitarian and Other Liberal Religious Thinkers and Workers*. Its original purpose was "to open communication with those in all lands who are striving to unite *Pure Religion* and *Perfect Liberty*, and to increase fellowship and cooperation among them" (Traer 2000, p. 17; emphasis in original). Although its stated purpose was to promote the causes of liberal Christians, the International Council was ecumenically oriented across a broad range of liberal religious traditions from all over the world at its inception. Its first secretary was involved in organizing the 1893 World Parliament of Religions in Chicago, it invited liberal Indian and Japanese religious delegations to attend its first conference in London in 1901, and by its fourth conference in Boston in 1907 its opening ceremony "included Jewish, Muslim, Hindu and Roman Catholic participants" (ibid:18).

The group changed its name three times in its 100-plus year history, reflecting an increasingly universal global constituency and a more narrowly focused mission to advocate for international religious freedom as a God-ordained human right. In 1910 it changed its name to the *International Congress of Free Christians and Other Religious Liberals*; in 1930 to the *International Association for Liberal Christianity and Religious Freedom*; and in 1969 to the *International Association for Religious Freedom* (IARF), its present name. IARF was the first international non-governmental organization (INGO) to advocate specifically for religious liberty (UIA 2002), and is a strong and outspoken voice for international religious liberty to this day.

Although international religious liberty organizing is over a century old, social scientific scholars have paid it relatively little attention when studying global, transnational, or international issues and processes. This continues the "curious neglect" – the relative lack of research and analysis of religious involvement in social movements at any level (Smith 1996a). In the last 30

years, it seems anecdotally that advocacy for global religious liberty has expanded. In 1981 the UN adopted the *Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief,* and in 1986 the UN appointed a Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance to aid in implementing the Declaration (Nichols and Neuendorffer 2000). The 1990s also saw a large number of conferences held to discuss the legal, political, and cultural aspects of freedom of religion (see especially the voluminous proceedings from the conference "Religious Human Rights in the World Today" held at Emory University in 1994, in Van der Vyver and Witte 1996; Witte and Van der Vyver 1996).

In the 1990s interest in this topic also grew in evangelically oriented Christian churches, especially through the auspices of the World Evangelical Alliance. Evangelical churches have utilized their already dense networks of international churches to mobilize a large outpouring of support for their persecuted brethren throughout the world. Such support ranges from providing bibles to persecuted Christians throughout the world, to an annual "International Day of Prayer" (IDOP) for persecuted Christians around the world

A number of so-called world reports on the status of religious liberty have been published in the last decade (Boyle and Sheen 1997; Marshall 2000) and major human rights INGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Freedom House also publish country-by-country status reports online (Human Rights Watch, www.hrw.org, "Overview: Religious Freedom in Peril"; Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org, "Center for Religious Freedom: Country Profiles). A consortium of academic centers has published an expanding online database of international and state-oriented human rights and legal documents (Religion and Law Research Consortium, www.religlaw.org: "Welcome"). Finally, and most dramatically, the United States Congress passed the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) in 1998, mandating the position of Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom, an Office on International Religious Freedom within the U.S. Department of State, a 10-member bipartisan independent commission, and a Special Adviser on International Religious Freedom within the National Security Council. The U.S. State department

is further mandated to conduct yearly censuses of the status of religious freedom in *every* country of the world. Based on these reports, the President of the United States can levy sanctions against states considered to be countries of particular concern.

This potpourri of examples serves to illustrate the scope, level, and variation of activities taking place within the context of international advocacy for religious freedom. The United Nations, church networks, nation-states, academics and academic consortiums have collectively advocated for freedom of religion as an important global issue.

As chapter 2 notes, much of world society is organized through INGO activity. The very basic question, then, is what do INGOs have to do with religious liberty, if anything? INGOs take as their task the organization of a wide array of topics world society, including human rights and religion. We would therefore expect to find INGOs working for religious liberty, which we do. In previous work (Brewington 2005), I have examined HRINGOs with an emphasis on understanding the relative levels of organization of different types of human rights utilizing the same UIA data (2001-2002) as in chapters four and five. I found that religious liberty was indeed part of the work of HRINGOs, but that the majority of HRINGOs were "generalists", that is, they cited human rights in some way as part of their work or referenced human rights in general terms without enumerating specific individual rights. Other HRINGOs did enumerate specific rights, including religious liberty, women's rights, children's rights, rights of workers, and the rights of peoples or cultures. The relative levels of advocacy for these specific rights by INGOs varies, and in absolute terms, religious liberty is less organized when compared to these other families of human rights for the years 1875 through 1995. Out of a total of 1300 instances of INGOs citing rights language in their aims and activities data, the generalist category, where INGOs cite human rights in a generic fashion accounts for over 30%. The next highest are peoples' rights, which account for just under 10% of all rights enumerated by INGOs, then women's rights at 8.6%, children's rights at 5.8%, labor at 4.7%, and religious liberty at 2.4%. A plot of the advocacy rates of these rights based on the founding dates of the HRINGOs doing the work shows that

religious liberty lags behind these other human rights families throughout the entire period. Another finding of interest is that religious liberty advocacy is far more likely to be done by RINGOs: over 64% of the occurrences of religious liberty advocacy were contributed by RINGOs, while just under 10% of the occurrences of all other human rights advocacy were contributed by RINGOs. Religious liberty advocacy was also less associated with United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) consultative status than most of the other families of human rights, with the exception of labor advocacy.

From chapter 4 recall that INGOs are more likely to be secular than religious after 1891, the first year in which more secular INGOs than RINGOs were founded. Yet religious liberty advocacy is distinctive in that more RF-INGOs are religious than secular. Religious liberty organizing by INGOs is also less likely to be connected to ECOSOC work, and there are fewer overall instances of it compared to other rights families. Is religious liberty organizing distinctive in other ways? Why might RF-INGOs be distinctive?

Basic characteristics of RF-INGOs

In the 2001-02 UIA CD-ROM, there are 36 INGOs that promote or advocate for religious liberty. Just over half of these (19) focus specifically on religious liberty issues, while the rest (17) promote religious liberty as part of a larger body of work. The majority of INGOs (29) that promote religious freedom are themselves RINGOs, or religious international nongovernmental organizations (Boli and Brewington 2007), while 6 (16.7%) are secular. Of the RINGOs, 13 are Protestant in orientation, and this accounts for over 35% of RF-INGOS (see Figure 6.1). Notably, there are no RF-INGOs in the UIA data that are Islamic or Hindu.

Figure 6.1: Religious orientation of RF-INGOs.

Orientation	N	%
Protestant	13	36.1%
Secular	6	16.7%
Interfaith	6	16.7%
New	3	8.3%
Catholic	3	8.3%
Judaic	2	5.6%
Other	2	5.6%
Unidentifiable	1	2.8%
Total	36	100.00%

Of the 36 RF-INGOs, 32 had founding years. Figure 6.2 plots the cumulative foundings dates for RF-INGOs. The first INGO indicating they promote religious liberty was founded in 1881.

Figure 6.2: Cumulative foundings of RF-INGOs from 1880-2000



Foundings of RF-INGOs were sporadic from 1880 through 1945, with a 7 year period of intensified activity starting in 1946, followed by a plateau from 1952 through 1969. The period

1970 through 2000 is a period of relative growth. In fact, half of the RF-INGOs were founded after 1975.

Figure 6.3 shows the continental locations of offices for RF-INGOs and INGOs. Of the 57 offices reported by these 36 INGOs, over 45% (26) are in Europe, almost 30% (17) are in North America, over 14% (8) are in Asia, and 7 % are in Latin America. RF-INGOs have a higher percentage of offices in North America than does the entire population of INGOs (29.8% RF-INGOs to 24.6% INGOs), a lower percentage of offices in Europe than the entire population of INGOs (45.6% RF-INGOS to 55.0% INGOs), and a higher percentage of offices in Asia than the INGO population (14.0% RF-INGOs to 7.6% INGOs). The U.S. accounts for most reported secretariat offices with 17, or 29.8% of all RF-INGO offices. The U.K. holds 6 offices (10.55%), Switzerland has 5 offices (8.8%), and Belgium and Germany each have 4 offices each (7 % each).

Figure 6.3: Continental locations of offices for RF-INGOs and INGOs.

	RF-INGOs		INGOs	
	N	%	N	%
Africa	2	3.51%	1540	5.43%
N. America	17	29.82%	6989	24.63%
C-S America	4	7.02%	1314	4.63%
Asia	8	14.04%	2161	7.62%
Pacific	0	0.00%	779	2.75%
Europe	26	45.61%	15590	54.95%
Total	57	100.00%	28373	100.00%

RF-INGOs have members on all continents. To understand how these members are distributed, I aggregated the locations of countries per RF-INGO to the continent level, and for comparison I report the same aggregations for all INGOs (see Figure 6.4). Ten RF-INGOs reported no member location data. The distribution of membership for RF-INGOs is similar to that of all INGOs in North America, Asia, and the Pacific. Memberships in Africa are somewhat more numerous for RF-INGOs (21%) than INGOs (15.64%), and the same holds for Central and

South America where the distribution of RF-INGOs is 18.1% to 13.0% for all INGOs. RF-INGOs have fewer memberships in Europe than do all INGOs (37.4% to 46.9%).

Figure 6.4: Continental locations of memberships of RF-INGOs and INGOs

	RF-INGOs		INGOs	
	N	%	N	%
Africa	151	20.97%	49,958	15.64%
N. America	35	4.86%	16,105	5.04%
C-S America	130	18.06%	41,614	13.03%
Asia	112	15.56%	49,940	15.64%
Pacific	23	3.19%	12,126	3.80%
Europe	269	37.36%	149,609	46.85%
Total	720	100.00%	319352	100.00%

Eight RF-INGOs have consultative status with the UN. Two have General status, four have Special status and 2 more have Roster status.[17]

RF-INGO Aims and Activities

What are the ultimate objectives of religious freedom INGOs, and how do they set out to accomplish these objectives? At the beginning of this section, I mentioned that there were two basic types of RF-INGOs – some focus specifically on religious liberty, while the rest promote

[17] General consultative status is reserved for large international NGOs whose area of work covers most of the issues on the agenda of ECOSOC and its subsidiary bodies. These tend to be fairly large, established international NGOs with a broad geographical reach.

Special consultative status is granted to NGOs which have a special competence in, and are concerned specifically with, only a few of the fields of activity covered by the ECOSOC. These NGOs tend to be smaller and more recently established.

Organizations that apply for consultative status but do not fit in any of the other categories are usually included in the Roster. These NGOs tend to have a rather narrow and/or technical focus. NGOs that have formal status with other UN bodies or specialized agencies (FAO, ILO, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, WHO and others), can be included on the ECOSOC Roster. The roster lists NGOs that ECOSOC or the UN Secretary-General considers can make "occasional and useful contributions to the work of the Council or its subsidiary bodies, United Nations, UN. 2005. "Consultative Status with ECOSOC." vol. 2005.

religious liberty as part of a larger body of work. This assessment is based on examining the aims and activities of these 37 organizations in the UIA data.[18]

The 17 RF-INGOs that promote religious liberty as part of a repertoire of other activities and aims are predominantly secular or Protestant (see Figure 6.5). RF-INGOs that are more concentrated on religious liberty are predominantly interfaith or Protestant.

Figure 6.5: Religious orientation of RF-INGOs

	Multiple purposes		RF-focused	
	N	%	N	%
Secular	6	35.3%	0	0.0%
Interfaith	0	0.0%	6	31.6%
Catholic	2	11.8%	1	5.3%
Protestant	5	29.4%	9	47.4%
Judaic	2	11.8%	0	0.0%
Other	1	5.9%	1	5.3%
NA	0	0.0%	1	5.3%
New	1	5.9%	2	10.5%
TOTAL	17	100.0%	19	100.0%

Some examples of multi-purpose RF-INGOs (with founding dates) include the Baptist World Alliance (1905), Soka Gokkai International (1975)and Amnesty International – European Union Association (1992) . Examples of RF-INGOs more exclusively focused on religious liberty include Voice of the Martyrs (1969, the NGO Committee on Freedom of Religion or Belief (1991), and the International Association for Religious Freedom (1900).

The Baptist World Alliance (BWA) serves as "an agency of communication between Baptists; a forum for study and discussion of doctrines and practice; a channel of cooperation in extending help to each other and those in need; an agency for promoting evangelism and education; a vigilant force for safeguarding religious liberty and other God-given rights; a

[18] Out of the 36 organizations, 3 do not provide data on aims, and 13 do not provide data on activities. The 3 organizations without aims data also do not have activities data. Other data in these organizations' records were utilized to classify them as RF-INGOs.

sponsor of regional and world-wide gatherings for the furtherance of the gospel." The BWA does its work by organizing world and regional congresses, women's and youth's conferences, and study commissions. It has held 18 "quinquennial" congresses since its founding in 1905. It publishes "Baptist World" 4 times a year, and produces congress report books and resolutions and newsletters.

Soka Gokkai International (SGI) aims to "Contribute to peace, culture and education for the happiness and welfare of all humanity based on Buddhist respect for the sanctity of life." Other aims include promoting education, encouraging its members to "contribute toward the prosperity of their respective societies as good citizens," protect the environment, promote the understanding of Nichiren Buddhism, "respect and protect the freedom of religion and religious expression," respect cultural diversity, and "safeguard fundamental human rights." SGI's activities include annual meetings, exhibitions, seminars, and a culture festival. These activities are qualified with the following statement: "The activities of the SGI reflect the diverse processes of social and human engagement deemed necessary in bridging gaps and resolving conflict." SGI publishes a magazine called "SGI Quarterly."

Amnesty International – European Union Association "strive[s] for the adherence to and observance of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)." It serves as the larger Amnesty International organization's permanent representative to European Union institutions. This EU subsidiary of AI does much the same as its parent organization: promoting human rights and "demanding ratification of international human rights instruments." Its most famous purpose is its work for prisoners of conscience: "people imprisoned for their political, religious or other conscientiously held beliefs, their ethnic origin, sex, colour, language, national or social origin, economic status, birth or other status, who have not used nor advocated violence - for a fair trial within a reasonable time for all political prisoners." There is no activities data for

Amnesty International – European Union Association, but it lists an annual report under its publications.[19]

Amongst the RF-INGOs more exclusively focused on religious liberty issues, Voice of the Martyrs focuses its work on persecuted Christians in "communist, Islamic and other countries closed to the gospel of Christ and countries emerging from communism." It does this by "by providing Bibles and Christian literature and making evangelical broadcasts in their own languages; give[s] relief to families of Christian martyrs in these countries; bring to Christ communists, Muslims, etc, in the free world; educate Christians in the West about atrocities committed against Christians in communist, Islamic and other countries opposed to the gospel of Christ." It produces 12 newsletters with magazines per year, books, and pamphlets.

The NGO Committee on Freedom of Religion or Belief is an sub-committee of the Conference of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the United Nations. Its aim is to "Support the initiatives against the intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief of the Special Rapporteur on the Elimination of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights." It also strives to elucidate the relationship between religious freedom and other human rights, and how different religions approach human rights, and utilizes the UN human rights system to "take appropriate actions against intolerance and discrimination based on religion and belief." It does this work through conferences and consultations with the UN system and other NGOs, assists in putting together an annual report on religious freedom, and co-sponsors an annual "Day for Freedom of Religion or Belief" at the UN. Its publications include an "Informal report on the annual Day for Freedom of Religion or Belief." It also produces a brochure and minutes of meetings. Its members are other NGOs, and these include: Bahá'í International Community, Baptist World Alliance (BWA), Caritas

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[19] Amnesty International, the larger organization, does not stipulate in its aims or activities descriptions specifically that religious beliefs are part of the repertoire of identities it protects in its work to free prisoners of conscience.

Internationalis (CI), Catholic International Education Office, Church of Scientology International (CSI), Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations (CBJO), Franciscans International (FI), General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA), Greek Orthodox Archdiocesan Council of North and South America (GOAC) , International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) , International Humanist and Ethical Union (IHEU), Lutheran Office for World Community, Muslim World League (MWL), Order of St Augustine (Augustinians) , Sisters of Our Lady of Charity of the Good Shepherd, Soka Gakkai International (SGI), Unitarian Universalist Association (UUA) Women's Federation for World Peace (WFWP) , and Won Buddhism International.

The International Association for Religious Freedom (IARF) "promote[s] development of the religious life in which freedom of conscience is an essential element." They also seek to enhance understanding and tolerance " in the spirit of the kinship of all people," work to build relationships with individuals and organizations that are "striving for international understanding, cooperation and tolerance and a vital religious life, especially organized liberal movements in all religions throughout the world." They are clearly focused on interfaith works, citing that "constituent members include Buddhists, Christians, Hindus, Muslims, Jews, Shintoists, Sikhs, Unitarians, Universalists and members of tribal religious traditions." The organization conducts "interreligious dialogues," "intercultural encounters," "advocacy for religious freedom and other fundamental human rights," and holds study groups on "religious education, social questions, problems of theology and church." It holds a "Triennial Congress, Regional (Continental) Conferences, Commissions, [and] Chapters" and houses a library with over 8,000 volumes. It produces "IARF world" twice a year, along with announcements, reports and conference proceedings. On the occasion of its one hundred year anniversary, it produced the book *Centennial Reflections, International Association for Religious Freedom, 1900-2000*. The book contains a short history, statements by member groups across the world, personal reflections, and reflections on its programs and issues its faced over its history.

These short descriptions of RF-INGOs illustrate several important dimensions. The first has already been mentioned: some RF-INGOs pursue work in religious liberty as part of a larger repertoire of work across multiple fields, while other RF-INGOs pursue religious liberty in a more focused manner. The Baptist World Alliance cites religious liberty as one amongst many purposes which also include evangelism, education, and organizing world-wide gatherings to promote the gospel. Soka Gokkai, a Buddhist association, lists multiple purposes including education, the environment, and promoting religious liberty. The European Union Association of Amnesty International cites religious liberty as one amongst many of the reasons it promotes the cause of prisoners of conscience, and it promotes human rights and advocates for ratification of international human rights documents. Among the religious liberty focused RF-INGOs, Voice of the Martyrs focuses its work on alleviating the travails of "persecuted Christians" in communist and Islamic countries. The NGO Committee on Freedom of Religion or Belief, an association of other NGOs, works through the UN system to advocate for religious liberty. And, IARF seeks to develop the "religious life," understanding and tolerance with religious liberty as a central element.

Another dimension to note is reference to the intergovernmental system. The UN work of the NGO Committee on Freedom of Religion or Belief is clearly implicated in their aims. But other RF-INGOs also cite the UN, its documents, or international law. The Greek Orthodox Archdiocesan Council of North and South America "promote[s] the United Nations principles of: maintaining peace and security in the world; working together with the nations of the world to promote better welfare, education, health conditions and the protection of the environment; encouraging respect for the individual human rights and freedoms, including religious freedom; enhancing the status of women and of condemning racism and racial discrimination in the world." Christian Solidarity International "promote[s] religious freedom in the framework of the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights."

A closely related aspect of this dimension is consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC). Consultative status can serve as a yardstick for how institutionalized an organization is in the world governance system of the United Nations. Organizations with general status are the most institutionalized within the UN System, because of their relative size, “broad geographical reach,” and that they are considered by ECOSOC to be more firmly “established.” INGOs with special status are less institutionalized than those with general status. Although they have special competencies, they are considered to be smaller and more recently established and concern themselves with fewer of ECOSOCs issue areas than do those of general status. Finally, INGOs with roster status are the least institutionalized because they are considered by the UN to tend to have a rather narrow and/or technical focus, and do not fit the other two categories. Essentially, roster status amounts to an "other" category. Of the organizations already listed, the Baptist World Alliance has Special status, IARF has General status, and Soka Gokkai International has Roster status.

Another dimension of note is how the RF-INGOs frame their work. Voice of the Martyrs presents its work in explicit terms of persecution: "Minister to persecuted Christians," and "give relief to families of Christian martyrs" in Islamic and communist countries, and seeks to educate other Christians about atrocities committed against their fellow Christians. A very different frame is illustrated by the International Association for Religious Freedom: IARF frames its work in terms of tolerance and understanding for all, and explicitly states its inclusive religious membership. Religious liberty for IARF is an essential, positive element of religious life.

A final dimension of note is the audience or target for these RF-INGOs' efforts. Instructive again is the distinction between Voice of the Martyrs (VOM) and IARF. Voice of the Martyrs very clearly advocates for Christians.[20] IARF is clearly promoting its work in the interest

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[20] It should be noted that VOM also advocates for potential Christians: "bring to Christ communists, Muslims, etc, in the free world."

of all faiths, all nations, and all humans. Soka Gakkai International also promotes its work in the interest of all humans: "for the happiness and welfare of all humanity." This approach emanates from the "Buddhist respect for the sanctity of life."

These dimensions – multiple purposes versus singular focus, interaction with the international system, consultative status with ECOSOC, framing of the work, and the audience or target of the work – serve as ways we can clarify the work of RF-INGOs. They serve as potential dimensions in a typology of RF-INGOs. I now turn to further developing this typology.

The Dimensions of RF-INGOs

In addition to the five dimensions just mentioned, the basic characteristics of RF-INGOs described in the previous section also provide several other dimensions. Where RF-INGOs house their offices is an important indicator for understanding the trajectory of the work that they do. In other words, *from where* this work emanates has importance, especially in popular and scholarly arguments about imperialism and power. These dimensions are summarized in Figure 6.6 which summarizes the dimensions of RF-INGOs.

Along the top of Figure 6.6 we have the division between multi-purpose RF-INGOs and RF-INGOs that approach religious freedom with more singular purpose. Each of these dimensions are each divided into two more dimensions each. For multi-purpose RF-INGOs, the key difference lies in who the RF-INGO describes as the entity for which entity they are advocating protection ("Protected entity" along the horizontal axis). One set of multi-purpose RF-INGOs tends to advocate protection for specifically for Protestants, while the other set tends to advocate protection for all humans. This dimension is highlighted in Figure 6.6.

An example of the former is the World Methodist Council. Founded in 1881 in the U.K.,

Figure 6.6: The dimensions of RF-INGOs

	Multiple Purposes (18)		Singular Focus (16)	
	Advocacy for Protestants (5)	**Advocacy for all humans (14)**	**Religious Rights Violation Frame (7)**	**Religious Rights Promotion Frame (9)**
Protected entity	Mixed - but mostly Protestant	Mixed - but mostly all humans	Specific groups (Christian)	All humans / Specific + All
Religious orientation	Protestant	Secular / Other (Catholic / Judaic / New)	Protestant / Catholic	Interfaith / Protestant / New
Connection to United Nations System	ECOSOC status (Special)	ECOSOC status (General/Special/Roster)	None cited	ECOSOC status (General / Special)
Cites UN / International Law	None cited	Yes	None cited	Yes
Founded	Europe / C-S America / Asia	Europe / N America / Asia	N. America / Europe	N. America / Europe
Office locations	Globally diffuse	Europe / N. America / Asia	Europe / N. America	Europe / N. America
Notable member locations	Asia	Europe	Asia	Europe
Founding patterns	Early history (1881) / small growth in later period (1974-2000)	Middle history (1921) / two growth periods (1944 - 1951; 1969-2000)	Late history (1969) / growth in late period (1969-2000)	Early history (1888) / strong growth in late period (1971 - 2000)
Frame	Christian fellowship & evangelism	Internationalism	Persecution (mostly of Christians)	Promotion through UN system

they "link the family of Methodist and related United Churches around the world." In addition, they:

> [D]eepen the fellowship of Methodist peoples and their unity of witness; strengthen international ties, promote understanding, clarify theological and moral standards and identify priorities for the Methodist movement; strengthen the love of members for Jesus Christ as Lord and for each other as brothers and sisters in the faith; increase awareness whereby this love finds expression in keeping with the life and ministry of John Wesley to proclaim the Gospel and serve Christ in the world; advance unity of theological moral standards; encourage evangelism; promote Christian education and the care for youth; **relieve persecuted or needy Christian minorities**; provide a means for consultation and

> cooperation on an international level; study union and reunion proposals (emphasis added).

In addition to their evangelism, they endeavor to assist persecuted Christians. For an example of a multi-purpose RF-INGO advocating protection for all humans, recall Soka Gokkai International's aims:

> Contribute to peace, culture and education for the happiness and welfare of **all humanity** based on Buddhist respect for the sanctity of life; **safeguard fundamental human rights and not discriminate against any individual** on any grounds; **respect and protect the freedom of religion and religious expression** (emphasis added).

While the phrase "respect and protect the freedom of religion and religious expression" does not explicitly reference all persons, the preceding clauses making reference to "all humanity" and to protecting human rights and preventing discrimination "against any individual" suggest the religious liberty advocacy also applies to all persons.

This is not the only difference between these two groups. As might be expected, the group advocating for Protestants is Protestant in religious orientation, while the advocates of all persons are composed of secular and non-Protestant religious INGOs. The Protestant advocates have one INGO with ECOSOC Special status, while the advocates for all persons have 5 out of 12 INGOs with ECOSOC status (General: 1; Special: 2; Roster: 2), and 5 cite the United Nations, UN documents, or other international legal documents in their aims or activities descriptions, while the Protestant advocates do not.

Regardless of whether an INGO advocates for all or just Protestants, in each group most were founded in Europe (3/5 for Protestant advocates and 7/12 for advocates of all persons). Surprisingly, in each category there are foundings in Asia (1/5 for Protestant advocates and 2/12 for advocates for all persons). One Protestant advocate was founded in the Caribbean (assigned to the Central-South American continent), while 3 of the "all person advocate" RF-INGOs were founded in North America. Protestant advocates have offices in a more globally diffused pattern,

with offices in all continents with the exception of the Pacific (e.g., Australia, New Zealand). Advocates for all persons have 50% of their offices in Europe, but also have offices in North America and Asia. In terms of where their members are located, the two groups are similar with two exceptions. The Protestant advocate group is more likely to have members in Asia, while the advocates for all humans are more likely to have members in Europe.

The Protestant advocates have a longer history than the all human advocates. The first founding for the former is 1881, while the first for the latter is in 1921. The Protestant advocates have very small growth in absolute terms through their entire history through 2000, while all human advocates have two distinct growth periods – one in 1944-1951, and one in 1969-2000. These trends are charted in Figure 6.7.

Figure 6.7: Cumulative foundings of RFINGOs by type



The final dimension in the typology to discuss is that of the type of "frame" utilized by these two groupings. By frame, I mean "an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses 'the world out there' by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one's present or past environment" (Snow and Benford 1992, p. 137). For the Protestant advocates the dominant strain is that of Christian fellowship and evangelism, with concern for religious freedom as one component. For example, the Evangelical Fellowship of Asia seeks to

> Advance the Kingdom of God in Asia by building up networking and partnering among the National Evangelical Fellowships and Asia-wide Evangelical Agencies; motivate and assist the Churches to be more effectively involved in the mission of the Church.

Its work on religious freedom consists of one amongst six commissions, whose topics also include youth, women, theology, missions, and social concerns. The Baptist World Alliance provides another example:

> As a voluntary and fraternal organization for promoting fellowship and cooperation among Baptists, serve as: an agency of communication between Baptists; a forum for study and discussion of doctrines and practice; a channel of cooperation in extending help to each other and those in need; an agency for promoting evangelism and education; a vigilant force for safeguarding religious liberty and other God-given rights; a sponsor of regional and world-wide gatherings for the furtherance of the gospel.

In both cases, the evangelism and fellowship work of the organization seems more dominant than concern for religious freedom; nonetheless, religious freedom is one concern amongst several.

The frame most often illustrated by the advocates for all persons, by contrast, is an explicit internationalism. This is illustrated both by relatively more representation at the UN through ECOSOC, as well as through appeals to internationalism in their aims and/or activities, again with religious freedom as one focus amongst several. For example, the aims of the Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations, with Special ECOSOC status, are to:

> Coordinate the work at the United Nations of the 3 constituent organizations primarily in promoting human rights, with special attention to combating persecution or discrimination on grounds of race, religion or origin, runs social, humanitarian and environmental programs.

The Greek Orthodox Archdiocesan Council of North and South America appeals to the principles of the UN in its aims statement:

> Promote the United Nations principles of: maintaining peace and security in the world; working together with the nations of the world to promote better welfare, education, health conditions and the protection of the environment; encouraging respect for the individual human rights and freedoms, including religious freedom; enhancing the status of women and of condemning racism and racial discrimination in the world.

In each example, the organization appeals to the UN, and cites a number of purposes which include religious freedom.

Now we turn to the RF-INGOs that focus more explicitly on religious freedom. The dimension that seems to most define the distinction between the two groups here is the framing dimension (highlighted in Figure 6.6). The first group, which utilizes a religious rights violation frame, consists of RF-INGOs that focus on persecution, most of which is confined to Christians. For example, the aims of Voice of the Martyrs are:

> Minister to persecuted Christians in communist, Islamic and other countries closed to the gospel of Christ and countries emerging from communism, by providing Bibles and Christian literature and making evangelical broadcasts in their own languages; give relief to families of Christian martyrs in these countries; bring to Christ communists, Muslims, etc, in the free world; educate Christians in the West about atrocities committed against Christians in communist, Islamic and other countries opposed to the gospel of Christ.

Similarly, the aims of Aid to Special Saints in Strategic Times Ministries are:

> Provide humanitarian aid and literary to Christians who are being persecuted for their faith.

In both cases, the alleviation of the persecution of Christians is the main focus.

By contrast, the second group with a more singular focus employs a rights promotion frame with reference or connection to the UN system. For example, the aims of the International Association for the Defence of Religious Liberty, with Special ECOSOC status, are:

> In the belief that the right to religious freedom is a gift of God; encourage all those who are attached to the ideal of liberty, without any distinction of race, sex, language or religion, to participate in the crusade against all forms of intolerance and fanaticism; value human dignity such that each individual has access to true existence in every domain and to a flowering of his being so as to discover his true identity; serve freedom of faith throughout the world; create a climate of the greatest understanding and reciprocal respect among people of every faith and conviction, to assist humanity in solving the major problems of peace, liberty and justice.

The aims of the International Coalition for Religious Freedom are:

> Promote the vision of religious freedom found in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, that everyone regardless of creed, gender or ethnic origin, has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief and, alone or in community with others, in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance as his conscience leads - balanced against the requirements of generally applicable criminal law.

In both cases, there is appeal to the promotion of religious freedom in the context of an appeal to the UN human rights system or by evidence of their status with ECOSOC.

The other dimensions of Figure 6.5 also illustrate differences between these two groups of RF-INGOs. The INGOs utilizing the rights violation frame advocate protection for a very specific group: Christians. INGOs utilizing the rights promotion frame advocate for all humans.

In some cases, the rights promotion INGOs hedge somewhat, however. For instance, the aims and activities cited by Christian Solidarity International are:

> *Aims*:
>
> Promote religious freedom in the framework of the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights; give legal and material assistance to victims of oppression.
>
> *Activities*:
>
> Helps persecuted Christians and others suffering repression, victimized children and victims of disaster. Campaigns for prisoners of conscience, particularly Christians. One project involves buying back Christian slaves in the Sudan and restoring them to their families. Includes Christian Response International (CRI). Organizes: annual conference; colloquia; seminars.

In the context of promoting the UDHR, CSI also cites persecuted Christians and Christian prisoners of conscience as their predominant concern, but qualifies both statements.

Most of the RF-INGOs utilizing the rights violation frame are Protestant, but one is Catholic. The rights promotion group is the only group out of all four groups described here to contain interfaith groups, and a majority at that (6 out of 9). This group also has one Protestant INGO and two INGOs associated with new religious movements (Jehovah's Witnesses and the Unification Church).

The rights violation framing group has no INGOs with consultative status with ECOSOC and cites no connection to the UN or other international entities or laws. INGOs using the rights promotion frame cite the UN and the UDHR, and two have consultative status with the UN (one INGO with General status, and one INGO with Special status).

With regard to where these INGOs were founded and have offices, there is little difference. INGOs from both groups were originally founded in North America and Europe, and have offices on both continents as well. In terms of membership, the notable exceptions cited are

Asia for INGOs with the rights violation frame, and Europe for the INGOs of the rights promotion frame.

The foregoing analysis suggests that we can further simplify the principal dimensions of religious freedom INGOs into a two-by-two typology in Figure 6.8. The first dimension in this typology are particularization and universalization in terms of language, protected entities, and internationalism and connection to the UN system. The second dimension concerns the make-up of objectives of RF-INGOs and consists of whether religious freedom is the focus of the organization (a specialist) or if it is one amongst several of the objectives (a generalist). This simplification provides a roadmap to understanding RF-INGOs.

Figure 6.8: Typology of RF-INGOs

	Particularizing	**Universalizing**
Specialist	• Protestant • No status with UN-ECOSOC • Protection for Christians • Rights violation frame • Does not cite UN or international law	• Predominantly interfaith • All humans protected • Status with UN-ECOSOC • Rights promotion frame • Internationalism / cites UN or international law
Generalist	• Predominantly Protestant • Christian fellowship and evangelism frame • Protection for Christians • Some status with UN-ECOSOC • Does not cite UN or international law	• Secular and other non-Protestant religions • Status with UN-ECOSOC • Internationalism / cites UN or international law

Finally, as Figure 6.6 shows, the first RF-INGO with a rights violation frame was founded in 1969 (Voice of the Martyrs), and this population grows thereafter through 2000. The

first RF-INGO with a rights promotion frame was founded in 1888 (the International Religious Liberty Association), and this group of INGOs shows relatively strong growth in the late period of 1971-2000.

We can make sense of religious freedom INGOs with reference to a number of dimensions. Structurally, some RF-INGOs do religious freedom as one aspect of a larger repertoire of work, while others devote more of their attention to religious freedom. Some RF-INGOs advocate for the protection of a very specific group – namely Christians – while others refer to the more universal group of all persons. Some are involved in or cite the intergovernmental or international law systems, for others this is absent.

In the final chapter, I will summarize my data findings and situate them with respect to the findings other chapters, and with respect to theoretical reflections of chapter 2.

Chapter 7 – **CONCLUSION**

In the three preceding chapters I have examined three population aspects of INGOs. In chapter 4 I examined the INGO population to understand how it has changed with respect to religion. For chapter 4, I quantitatively analyzed the global factors that contribute to foundings of human rights INGOs. Finally, in the last chapter on religious freedom INGOs, I explored this small population in depth and created a typology of RF-INGOs that suggests that there are distinctive patterns of organizing religious liberty in global civil society.

In this concluding chapter, I will revisit the basic findings of each of these three chapters. I will then examine the implications that the findings regarding religious versus secular INGOs and the findings on human rights INGOs have with respect to the set of RF-INGOs. Religious freedom INGOs are human rights INGOs, and the majority of them are also religious INGOs. Finally I will recall the theoretical reflections in chapter 2 and utilize them to build a narrative that helps explain these findings and sheds light on how global civil society operates with respect to religion, human rights, and globalization.

Religious and Secular INGOs

In my analysis of RINGOs and SINGOs, the questions I set out to answer was derived from concern with the "curious neglect" afforded to the study of religion in global civil society. I demonstrated that religion has indeed been a part of global civil society by sketching out the involvement of religious actors in transnational social movements that spanned causes such as anti-footbinding, anti-female genital mutilation, women's suffrage, the anti-slavery movement, and so on. These movements spanned more than 200 years, and religious actors served in important roles in these movements. And religious involvement in transnational activities was not new – transnational religious associations had existed for quite some time. The question I posed

then was: What occurs after the 19th century with respect to religious involvement in transnational associations?

My analysis of INGO data showed that nearly the entire population of INGOs was composed of religious associations up until the 1860s. After this time, secular INGOs begin forming at a consistent and expanding rate. By about 1911, SINGOs overtake RINGOs in foundings per year, and the proportion of RINGOs to SINGOs founded from the 1860s to around 1905 declines precipitously, from nearly 100% to 4%. It was not that the RINGO population decelerated in foundings, however, it was the SINGO population accelerating in foundings per year that altered the entire population of INGOs.

By analyzing the aims of INGOs with respect to religious and secular language, I showed that there is a shift in language utilized by INGOs, and that RINGOs in particular seem to be affected by this shift. Older RINGOs showed a tendency to utilize more religious language to describe the work they do, while younger RINGOs show a tendency to use less religious language to describe their organizational aims, and the language they did use describes more this-worldly concerns. Secular INGOs rarely use religious language at all. The entire population of INGOs founded after 1860 are less concerned with ministry, God, evangelization, faith, parish, and Christ and more concerned with issues of education, science, development, research, information, engineering, standards, trade, unions, workers, industry, and management.

These findings indicate a vast institutional shift in transnational associationalism from a population of religiously inspired INGOs to a population of (mostly) secular INGOs in little over 50 years (approximately 1860 to 1910), and even those religious INGOs that are founded after 1860 are less likely to express their associational objectives in religious terms.

Human Rights INGOs

In chapter 5, I turned my attention to the question of what conditions are favorable to human rights INGO foundings in the period 1839-1994. Utilizing annual global-level data on democracy,

civil and international wars, the international human rights legal framework, intergovernmental organization participation by nation-states, economic development, population, and the size of the INGO population and negative binomial regression, I tested three basic models: a repression response model, an institutional environment model, and a full model. The first posits that HRINGOs foundings are responsive to human rights violations, and includes a composite war variable made up of international and civil wars and mortal casualties in each, population, world GDP per capita, global levels of democracy, and global levels of IGO participation. The second includes world GDP per capita, global democracy, global civil society size, and international human rights treaties ratified and signed. The institutional environment model provides a better fit and is more parsimonious than the repression response model, while the full model provided the best fit, but was less parsimonious than the institutional environments model.

In terms of individual variables, foundings of HRINGOs are most sensitive to foundings of INGOs the international human rights legal framework, and the global economy. They are also sensitive to some of the repression response variables: as the level of democracy in the world increases, this depresses HRINGO foundings, while the number of civil wars in the world increases human rights organizing by INGOs.

These findings indicate that HRINGO foundings are sensitive both to institutional environments such as the global economy and the international legal system, and they respond to actual repression as evidenced by weaker global democracy and civil wars.

Religious Freedom INGOs

In chapter 6, I show that the advocacy of RF-INGOs takes multiple forms across several dimensions. RF-INGOs vary with respect to the populations they aim to protect. In particular, many religious freedom INGOs are advocating for a very specific population – that of Christians. This population is also, not surprisingly, Protestant. By contrast, others identify all persons, the entire world, or all faiths as under their protection. Interfaith RF-INGOs, those that explicitly

connect their organization to multiple religious faiths always declare their work in universal terms as applying to all faiths and individuals everywhere. Some RF-INGOs are also more likely to connect themselves with the UN with either explicit ties via ECOSOC status or through framing their work in terms of international human rights instruments or international law.

Finally, RF-INGOs vary in how they frame their work. Multi-purpose organizations where religious freedom is one aspect of a larger body of work are Protestant and frame their work in terms of Christian evangelism and fellowship. Another set of multi-purpose organizations frames their work as applying to all humans and in terms of internationalism. RF-INGOs that more exclusively focus on religious freedom vary as well. One of these groups employs a very specific frame of persecution – in almost all cases of Christians. The other group frames their work in terms of rights promotion and internationalism, meaning they advocate the promotion of religious freedom in more universal terms than the set of INGOs utilizing the persecution frame.

Religious Freedom Advocacy and its Institutional Environments

Throughout this dissertation I have referred to institutional environments. In very basic terms, this phrase refers to a larger environment in which an entity is embedded. Institutional environments exist for individuals (students are part of an educational system), other types of organizations (computer business firms are part of an economic environment of other business firms working with computers), and even countries (nation-states are part of an institutionalized societalism – a system of nation-states (Lechner 2001).

Part of my overall argument in this dissertation is that those international associations that advocate for religious liberty, RF-INGOs, are embedded in multiple and overlapping institutional environments. I have focused explicitly on two of those institutional environments: all INGOs and human rights INGOs. In the first case I examined how the INGO population has changed over time with respect to religion. In the second case I examined how human rights INGO foundings are influenced by two sets of global level variables.

Figure 7.1: Summary of results of analysis

Theoretical approach / Research Question		Robertson	World Polity	Beyer	IR constructionists / Social Movements
Nature of religious activity in global civil society through history	Results	Religion did not disappear (trivial); Decline is coincident with 'take-off' period of globalization indicated (age of INGO matters)	Decline in proportion, though not presence over time; decline in authority over time; rise of highly rationalized and more secular INGO field	Differentiation in the INGO field in evidence	Religion did not disappear (trivial)
Conditions favorable to HRINGOs	Results		Institutional environments model most parsimonious and good fit; Variables: + int'l human rights legal framework, + GDP +INGOs; historical dynamics are present		Some variables significant: +war & death in war; - global democracy
RF-INGO work	Results	Evidence for heterogeneous approaches and religious diversity; U-P & P-U; relativization as an interpretation	Strong universalizing AND particularizing; evidence that particularizing is less legitimate in the context of GSC (Consultative status & Networks)	Evidence for Beyer's framework: conservative functional response and liberal performative response; **Multiple models**	Evidence for "institutional self-interest", transcendent motivation and shared identity; but, legitimacy in the context of GSC is questionable

For neo-institutional sociologists like Meyer and his colleagues, globalization scholars like Robertson and Beyer, and world culture sociologists like Boli and Lechner, it is not that important that any given actor is part of an environment, rather, it is how that environment

influences the actor that is of sociological interest. With this in mind, what can be said about how the wider INGO and HRINGO institutional environments might affect RF-INGOs, and can we discern any of these environmental influences in what RF-INGOs say they do?

How might the INGO environment, with respect to its historical transition toward secularity, impact RF-INGOs? First, we might expect that there would be more secular RF-INGOs based on the results of chapter 3. In fact, of all human rights advocacy, RF-INGOs are the most likely to be themselves religious (Brewington 2005), and in the set of RF-INGOs examined here, only 6 out of 36 are secular. We might also expect that the language the religious RF-INGOs use to describe what they do would perhaps be less religious. The language utilized by RF-INGOs is mixed on this point. Some RF-INGOs, notably those of a Protestant persuasion, utilize very religious language in describing their organizational objectives. Others are more clearly utilizing secular language, and orient this language toward protecting all persons with reference to global institutions such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or work explicitly within the UN system through consultative status with ECOSOC. So even though all RF-INGOs were founded after the secular take-off period (post-1860), when INGOs were less likely to utilize religious language, a large enough portion of the RF-INGOs utilize intensely religious language, whether in talking about evangelization and fellowship, or persecution of their fellow Christians. In essence, the more secular INGO environment seems to only partially affect the population of RF-INGOs.

How might the findings of chapter 5 on the influences of HRINGO foundings affect the RF-INGOs? HRINGO foundings are sensitive in a positive direction to levels of global economic development, INGO foundings, international human rights treaty signings and ratifications, and civil wars, while negatively sensitive to levels of democracy worldwide. A bivariate correlation of the cumulative foundings of all RF-INGOs with each of these variables shows very strong positive correlation with international human rights treaty signings (0.81), global economic levels (0.96), and civil wars (0.92), intermediate positive correlation with treaty ratifications (0.58), and

weak negative correlation with global democracy (-0.04). With the exception of global democracy, there seems to be correspondence between the HRINGO population and the RF-INGO population on the conditions that shape RF-INGO foundings. This suggests that RF-INGOs are not as sensitive to global democracy levels as is the rest of the HRINGO population.

So how, then, do we situate these findings? First, I will reflect on the results of this analysis in light of the research questions, theoretical approaches, and hypotheses presented in chapter 2. Secondly, I will offer up a narrative that draws on the three sets of data and the theoretical reflections in chapter 2. I will admit that there are gaps in the evidence for this narrative, but I will try to highlight these gaps.

Figure 7.1 summarizes the results of my analysis and is derived from Figure 2.1. Regarding the first research question concerning the nature of religious activity in global civil society through history, Robertson's approach seems to fit the data. Religion did not disappear in global civil society – in fact the foundings of religious INGOs are rather stable even as secular INGOs undergo a precipitous take-off. The timing of this take-off fits with Robertson's understanding of the overall timing of globalization as a whole as well. World polity theorists would expect the decline of religious involvement in global civil society over time. In fact, the presence of religious INGOs throughout the entire period of analysis does not support this. What is supported is that there is a decline in the relative authority of RINGOs with respect to the rise of secular INGOs, and a shift in INGO form from religious order to voluntary membership organization. For Peter Beyer, the evidence suggests that there is differentiation in the entire INGO field with respect to the language that all INGOs utilize after 1860. This language is less marked by religious terminology and more with terms that indicate the differentiation of the INGO field: education, science, law, and so forth.

The question of what shapes the human rights INGO field are better answered by world polity theorists than international relations constructivists who advocate for a more functional approach. In particular, global civil society and the global legal framework of human rights shape

the foundings of HRINGOs. But some results do not fit completely with the world polity approach. War and deaths associated with war are factors in increasing HRINGO foundings, suggesting that these foundings are responsive to increased human rights violations. The level of democracy in the world tends to depress HRINGO foundings, suggesting that as democracy increases, there is less "need" for the work of HRINGOs.

Finally, with respect to RF-INGO advocacy, Roland Robertson's approach is useful. The analysis of RF-INGO work shows that there are heterogeneous approaches and religious diversity. The mechanics of this are unclear, but relativization may be at play. World polity expectations of RF-INGO work are partly confirmed. There is both strong universalizing and particularizing going on, where world polity theory would likely expect only the universalizing. However, given the evidence for lower legitimacy within the UN and small to non-existent network sizes, there seems to be a cost to a particularizing approach. There is also evidence for Peter Beyer's framework: the particularizing approach to religious liberty advocacy seems consistent with the conservative functional form of doing religion in global civil society: there is evil in the world, and particular religious imagery and language is utilized to combat it. The liberal performative form seems analogous to the more universal approach taken by interfaith RF-INGOs. Finally, there is some evidence that the toolkit described by Christian Smith. Institutional self-interest seems to be operating in religious freedom organizing, and transcendent motivation and shared identity are in evidence by the very religious nature of the particularizing RF-INGOs. However, these latter two concepts suggest that what is religious about religious advocacy can come at the cost of legitimacy.

Despite the schematic nature of this description of the results, they can be described in narrative form: Prior to the mid-19th century, religious, predominantly Catholic associations did their work across Europe. This work consisted of both religious function and religious performance in Beyer's terms. The "religious performance" of caring for the sick and educating children went along with the "religious function" of being concerned for the salvation of souls. As

the mid-19th century approaches, more and more Protestant AND secular associations are forming, and by 1860 secular INGOs start forming at a more rapid pace. Religious concerns for salvation and spreading the Gospel – Beyer's religious function – start to share space with more religious performance, along with more and more secular concerns overall.

What accounts for these trends and their timing? Globalization scholars refer to the latter half of the 19th century as the "take-off" period of globalization (Lechner and Boli 2005, pp. 59; 69-73). This is the era of the first world's expositions (starting in 1851 in London), the explosive growth in the ideological legitimacy of science (Drori 2003), and the era where nation-states crystallized, organized and constructed themselves as "coherent, rationalized, secular, progressive" entities with common national identities and common purposes - trade, education, and expanding bureaucracies (Lechner and Boli 2005: 70). This era is precisely the era when secularism in its institutional manifestations – the nation-state, business and trade, education, and science, is expanding precipitously, along with an expanding consciousness of the world as one place (Robertson 1992).

Part of this take-off period of globalization then is a secularization of the INGO population, both in terms of the types of organizations that become more numerous and in the way that these organizations think about themselves. Here the world polity approach helps to understand this shift – world polity theory is implicitly a stylized secularization narrative: western Christendom serves as the backdrop against which world culture develops, providing an overarching institutional and symbolic framework, that through rationalization processes over time creates new institutional spaces and corresponding institutional logics such as a capitalist economy, a sovereign nation-state system, professionalizing scientific academies, less explicitly religious education systems, and so on. Recall that religious INGOs do not disappear in all of this globalization tumult. In fact, they grow with INGOs as a global civil society develops around, and through them. But the religious voices are contending with other voices now, and they are speaking in a more secularized language.

Meanwhile, one particular type of INGO work is also growing. HRINGOs are appearing in similar patterns as all other INGOs, and they seem to appear more often as the international human rights legal framework expands, as global civil society grows, as global economic levels expand, and with more human rights violations in the context of civil wars. They appear less often as global democracy expands. The HRINGO population is about as religious as the INGO population (Boli and Brewington 2007; Brewington 2005). RF-INGOs on the other hand, are predominantly religious, and there is some preliminary evidence that suggests RF-INGOs defy other aspects of the HRINGO environment.

The field of RF-INGOs is predominantly religious and applies itself to a subject that is fundamentally about safeguarding the functional practice of religion. In terms of the larger population of INGOs and even the sub-population of HRINGOs, the work is largely considered to be secular, and approaches to that work are predominantly secular themselves. As a result of these overlapping institutional environments in which RF-INGOs exist, they are relativized, to use Robertson's term (more research is needed to establish the point that RF-INGOs are *reacting* in the directions I imply). But the secular directions behind this relativization do not make for automatic secularity. In fact, for the RF-INGO population, there is variation.

When predominantly Protestant RF-INGOs articulate that the people they are trying to protect are in fact Christians, they are running counter to the universalistic ethos of human rights. Recall Elliott's extensive coding of international human rights instruments: though particularistic groupings appear, the dominant protected entity is the individual – all humans everywhere are eligible. What these RF-INGOs seem to be doing is articulating a religiously functional message when a religiously performative message is more in line with institutional expectations. They are articulating a highly particularistic mode of doing religious freedom.

At the same time, another group of RF-INGOs does engage with the universalistic language of human rights, and endeavors to protect all of humanity. The religious performance matches the expectations of the institutional environment, and we have some evidence that they

are seen as more legitimate by the international community (seven of the these organizations have ECOSOC status versus one for the more Christian evangelical organizations).

The juxtaposition of these fundamentally different approaches within a very small population of associations highlights the simultaneity of Robertson's particularization of the universal and the universalization of the particular. Evangelically oriented RF-INGOs seem to be re-interpreting and appropriating universalistic human rights language in an effort to protect their brothers and sisters from the threat of oppression as they conceive it. At the same time, other RF-INGOs are utilizing the universalistic language of human rights across national boundaries for all faiths, even as this language is derived from the particular experience of western Christendom. Despite institutional environments that are embedded with highly legitimated models, scripts, and norms, we find variation.

As mentioned at the outset of this theoretical narrative, there are gaps. In particular, it is quite difficult with the evidence collected here to say that how RF-INGOs frame their work is a consequence of particular dynamics of world culture such as relativization. At the very least, this requires further research.

The present research, however, is an attempt at further clarifying only a small number of empirical gaps in our knowledge on how religion, human rights, and globalization interact. In particular, I have tried to highlight how the INGO population, and by extension, global civil society, has changed over time with respect to religion. Regarding human rights, I sought to clarify some of the global level factors that influence the startup of new HRINGOs. Finally, I have attempted to establish that RF-INGOs, in doing their work, have distinctive patterns of objectives and actions, some of which run counter to world cultural principles and some of which run parallel.

APPENDIX A

7.1: List of religious nouns

abbess	Calvinist	creation	Exaltation	Jewry	Nazareth	purity	Sharia
abbey	catechism	creed	Existence	Jews	non-Catholics	Quaker	Shia
abnegation	Catholic	Creed	Exodus	jihad	non-Christian	rabbi	shrine
abortion	Catholicism	Crescent	Exorcism	Judaism	non-Jews	Rael	Sikh
Abraham	catholicity	cross	Faith	Kingdom	nun	Ramadan	Soka
abstinence	Catholics	Cross	Faith	kingdom	occult	rebirth	sorcery
Adventist	celibacy	crucifer	faithful	Knights	occultation	reformation	Spirit
agnostic	celibate	crusade	faithfulness	Koran	Orthodox	Reiki	spiritualism
Allah	chapel	cult	Father	Krishna	orthodox	religion	spiritualist
almshouse	chaplain	deacon	Fatima	layman	orthodoxy	repentance	spirituality
Ananda	chaplaincy	Dei	fellowship	liturgist	out-of-body	reverence	stigma
Anglican	charism	deism	Gandhi	liturgy	Palestine	revival	Sufi
anti-semitism	chastity	deliverer	glory	Lord	Palestinians	righteousness	Sunni
anti-Semitism	chi	diaconate	God	Loyola	Pali	ritual	synagogue
Apostles	choir	dianetics	gospel	Luther	Pan	rosary	taboo
apostolate	Christ	diocese	Hebrew	Lutheran	pantheism	Sabbath	Talmud
Aquarian	Christchurch	dioceses	heretic	Maharishi	pantheist	sacrament	Templar
Aquinas	Christian	discipleship	Hindu	Mahatma	papacy	Sacred	Teresa
asceticism	Christianity	divination	Hinduism	Maitreya	pilgrim	sacrifice	testament
Assisi	Christianization	divine	holiness	Mandala	pilgrimage	Sahib	theologian
astrologer	Christmas	Divine	holocaust	martyr	Pontiff	Saint	theology
astrology	church	divinity	Holy	Mennonite	Pontifical	saint	theosophy
atheism	Church	dogma	Hubbard	Methodism	Pope	salvation	Theresa
atheist	Churches	Dominican	Ignatius	Methodist	post-Vatican	Salvation	Torah
baptism	cleansing	ecumenicism	imam	minister	praise	Samaritan	Total
Baptist	clergy	ecumenism	incarnation	Ministers	prayer	sanctity	transgression
belief	cleric	Emanuel	interfaith	ministry	Prayer	Sangha	unbelief
believer	clerical	Emunah	irreligion	Ministry	preacher	Sanskrit	unbeliever
Benedict	clericalism	Ephesus	Islam	mission	preaching	scholasticism	universalism
Benedictine	commandment	Episcopal	Islamic	Mission	priest	Scientology	Vatican
Bible	communion	episcopalian	Islamization	missionary	priesthood	Scripture	Virgin
bible	congregation	ethicist	Ismaili	monastery	pro-family	sect	wiccan
Bibles	conscience	Ethics	Israel	monastic	prophet	secularism	witch
blasphemy	consciousness-raising	Eucharist	Israeli	monk	Prophet	secularity	witchcraft
brotherhood	consecration	evangelical	Israelis	moral	Protestantism	seeker	worship
Brotherhood	contemplation	evangelism	Jehovah	mosque	Protestants	seminarist	Yiddish
Buddhism	contemplative	evangelist	Jerusalem	Muslim	providence	seminary	YMCA
Buddhist	coven	Evangelist	Jesuit	Muslims	pulpit	Seventh-day	Yogi
caliph	Covenant	evangelization	Jesus	mystic	purgatory	shaman	YWCA
calling	covenant	evil	Jew	mysticism	purification	shamanism	Zen
Zionism	Zionist						

Appendix B

Union of International Association Organization Codes
Core codes included
A : federations of international organizations;
B : universal membership organizations;
C : intercontinental membership organizations;
D : regionally defined membership organizations;
E : organizations emanating from places, persons or other bodies;
F : organizations having a special form, including foundations and funds;
G : internationally-oriented national organizations;
K : subsidiary and internal bodies;
N : national organizations;
R : religious orders, fraternities and secular institutes;

Inactive
U : currently inactive non-conventional bodies (not listed in this edition).
H : inactive or dissolved international organizations;

Filtered out
T : multilateral treaties and agreements;
J : recently reported or proposed international organizations;
S : autonomous conference series.

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