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Organizing for Representation: A Study of American Labor Unions and the Legislative Process

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Abstract

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Despite shifting political dynamics, labor unions continue to pursue political action at every level of government. Using the principal-agent framework for representation, I argue that while union characteristics – including membership size and resources – can reliably predict representative behavior, unions implement specific strategies for concretizing the relationship between its members and their elected representatives. To measure the degree to which elected representatives behave in organized labor's political interests I introduce a novel dataset, drawing on national union stances on legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives and associated sponsorship and co-sponsorship activity. Testing Congressional district-level union characteristics against my measure of labor representation, supplemented by interviews with union political organizers, I partially confirm my district-characteristic hypotheses and am able to identify and assess several strategies unions utilize to sway representative behavior. My specific findings offer insight into not only the collective action-based strategies employed by unions, but also the collective action problems among unions and the overall organized labor political network. These findings have implications for our understanding of political participation and the role interest groups play in representative democracies, particularly those formed by collective action.

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Section 1: Introduction

How do we explain variation in elected representatives' responses to the interests of organized labor? What strategies do labor unions rely on to influence the behavior of representatives and to what extent are these strategies realized? These questions emerge in a context of labor's weakened political leverage. Organized labor in US politics has been historically represented by unions, which are groups of individual workers whose ties to the Democratic party date back to the New Deal Era. These relations have become increasingly strained in the past few decades, largely due to the marked decline in unionization levels – from 20.1% in 1983 to 10.7% in 2016[1]. Ahlquist argues that the declining levels of unionization in the past few decades are reducing labor's legislative influence at the federal level, "culminating in the stinging 2009 defeat of the Employee Free Choice Act despite Democratic control of the House, presidency, and supermajority in the Senate" (Ahlquist 2017, 424)[2]. But since 2009, working-class voters have seemingly re-mobilized, albeit with fragmented and varying support, for presidential candidates, and local and federal employment issues (Hohmann 2018). By analyzing the effects of labor union characteristics and other district-level variables on the level of representation by their corresponding member of Congress (MC), this study will address the question of whether and how organized labor currently successfully articulates its interests to local representatives.

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[1] Unionization defined as share of the workforce that has joined a union
https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2017/union-membership-rate-10-point-7-percent-in-2016.htm
[2] The Employee Free Choice Act would reform the union-formation election process by allowing workers to form a union by a simple majority sign-up process; it also raises penalties on violations of labor laws and creates protections for union members in the arbitration process with their management.

2

This question has important political ramifications in terms of democratic participation and its effects. Unionization has been empirically found to not only give politically unrepresented working- and lower-class citizens an opportunity to access political power, but also creates a more politically engaged citizenry (Ahlquist 2017). Analyzing union characteristics and variables can provide insight into how unions overcome collective action problems, including among unions, associated with constituent political participation. Successful unions are able to articulate the interests of their members, foster political participation of members, and ultimately have members of Congress (MCs) representing their interests. The implications from learning union strategies for garnering representation can be broadly applicable to interest groups, especially those born out of collective organizing around a collective interest. This is significant not only in the context of understanding methods of influence in US politics, but also in understanding how under-represented individuals can organize to successfully and more meaningfully participate in the political process.

I am interested in the actions and potential coordination among local unions, or unions that represent and organize workers generally geographically confined to the congressional district-level, often acting as local chapters for a national-level union. The strategies local unions employ to induce representative behavior in their members of Congress exemplify solutions to both collective action and principal-agent problems. Combining these two institutional political theories helps explain both local coordination and national-local linkages in political representation demonstrating successful interest articulation by unions. Labor specifically is a valuable topic for research on political representation, not only because of its aforementioned history of organizing and political involvement, but also due to its relatively successful

organizing of individuals around their collective interest. Labor issues are also currently very topical, and union membership encompasses nearly every US congressional district.

Following this introduction (Section I), Section II establishes the historical context of unions' political strength. Section III explains the theoretical foundations for the three key components of my study – my outcome of interest (MC behavior), the independent variables (union characteristics), causal mechanisms (union strategies), and related – and relevant hypotheses. I propose that stronger union networks – characterized by greater numbers, resources, and grassroots organizing – induce more action and favorable support by their corresponding MC. Section IV describes the data, methods and research design for analyzing the quantitative data. Here I introduce an original measure of the dependent variable – MC's representative behavior – and offer a more robust operationalization of this outcome than is found in the existing literature. This is part of an original data set described below.[3] Section IV also outlines the qualitative component of the thesis involving interviews with local union organizers, providing insight into unions' strategies for gaining representation uncaptured by statistical analysis. Section V presents the results of both the quantitative and qualitative methods. Section VI provides a discussion of the significant findings and the concluding section (VII) provides suggestions for future research. Overall, this paper offers empirical support for the political strategies and challenges faced by unions today: mainly the use of campaign contributions to grant political access to their individual union members and the coordination problem unions face when they have different interests based on sectoral differences.

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[3] A preview of the dataset can be found in Appendix Section III. A full version of the dataset can be accessed at http://tinyurl.com/haasthesisdata

Section II: Historical Context

This section begins with a brief review of the recent political history of labor unions, providing context to labor policy networks in the U.S. In Section III, the literature review will lay the foundation to analyze union policy networks, specifically the principal-agent relationship between union members and their representatives.

To provide context, it is helpful to begin with a brief historical review of labor unions policy interests and outcomes. Many of the aspects of the modern labor union were implemented in the New Deal Era. Franklin Delano Roosevelt restructured labor policy domain with regulatory institutions meant to balance labor and capital political interests (Knoke et al. 1996, 37). These reforms "empowered unions to expand membership vastly," and can be narrowed down to six major pieces of legislation that established an "industry-based collective bargaining system" (Knoke et al. 1996, 48):

1) *Davis-Bacon Act (1931):* required locally prevailing rates of pay on federal construction projects

2) *Anti-Injunction/Norris-LaGuardia Act (1932):* restricted employer use of court injunctions against their employees and made yellow dog contracts (employment contracts in which the worker agrees to not join a union as a stipulation of employment) unenforceable

3) *National Industrial Recovery Act (1933):* enabled employee rights to organize without interference from employers

4) *National Labor Relations Act (1935):* replaced NIRA; creating regulations for collective bargaining and union elections, defined unfair labor practices, and created an enforcement mechanism, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to monitor and penalize workplace rights violations

5) *Walsh-Healy Act (1936):* created minimum labor standards for government contractors

6) *Fair Labor Standards Act (1938):* extended labor standards to more workers; minimum wage, 40-hour work week, overtime pay, and child labor regulations

Throughout the next few decades, business interests were able to lobby away many of these rights, leading to the consolidation of organized labor internationally in the AFL-CIO merger in 1955. This coalition was relatively successful in preventing a dismantling of fundamental labor rights (Knoke et al. 1996, 39). In 1964 the Johnson Presidency and sweeping Democratic majorities in Congress led to the establishment of further regulatory bodies lobbied for by labor unions: the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). This was followed by a period of Republican control, which overall saw the rise of business interests and decline of labor influence. Three major forces helped drive this shift: campaign finance laws following the Nixon scandal, fragmenting power of Democrats in the legislative and executive branches, and a large increase in the number of interest groups lobbying legislators. In this era, five of the six presidents were Republicans and business interests were largely able to block labor action. In 1976 the Democratic Congress voted to overturn the Taft-Hartley Act, which was subsequently vetoed by Ford. The Taft-Hartley Act amended the National Labor Relations Act and created more regulations on union behavior, finances, and activities. This bill was predictably greatly opposed by unions and the failed effort to repeal it dealt a devastating blow to the Democratic-controlled Congress. In the 1980's, Reagan's presidency began with the air traffic controller strike, their firing, and his fiscal policy of cutting spending in social welfare programs (Knoke et al. 1996, 40-41).

Today federally, labor interests are fundamentally stalled – unions constantly lobby to block legislative attempts to repeal those six foundational bills and to ensure they are fully enforced. Any sort of progressive legislative action on behalf of labor interests is impossible to imagine passing both legislative chambers, let alone making it to the president's desk. For

example, the Employee Free Choice Act would make it easier to unionize by allowing workers to form unions through a simple majority sign-up process while protecting workers from management intimidation. As discussed above, it failed to pass despite solid Democratic control of the government (Ahlquist 2017). More recently, in *Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees Council 31* (AFSCME), the Supreme Court ruled that public sector employees who opt-out of union membership cannot be required to pay the fee covering the union's costs to negotiate the collective employee contract, known as "fair share" or "agency" fees (535 U.S. ___ (2018)). This decision is seen as detrimental to labor interests, especially to public-sector unions, who now face legal free-riding of their benefits limiting the resources and potential behavior of unions.

The interest group network established following Nixon's administration largely remains intact today, as many interest groups navigate the political arena through campaign contributions and other forms of directly and indirectly lobbying MCs. These more recent political blows to labor unions, coupled with steady decline in membership levels, and the increase in local laws limiting collective bargaining rights have indisputably damaged their political clout. Interest groups born out of collective action have a great significance in modern representative democracies, as their most successful strategies for gaining representation reflect the experiences of their individual members in addition to their collective interest as an organization. The existing literature and framework for analyzing interest group behaviors and effects recognizes all interest groups as "formal organizations, not individual persons," demonstrating the previous assumption that interest groups as a principal (in the principal-agent relationship) are a singular entity with a singular focus (Knoke et al. 1996, 7). In studying labor unions as interest groups, I hope to better understand interest groups that do not necessarily share a singular policy interest

and goal as a result of being formed by a group of inherently heterogeneous individuals. This gives the members of these interest groups an extra barrier to successfully articulating their interests to their elected representatives – agreeing on shared interests. Understanding the personal nature of policymaking and the ability for collective action to elevate working-class citizens to articulate their interests is fundamental to a complete realization of democratic representation. Especially given the inherent lack of institutional access granted to the working-class, these interest group strategies provide a solid foundation for future work regarding expanding active political participation and strengthening democracy. This historical perspective highlights the importance of theorizing the relationship between unions and policymaking decisions as exemplified by a "principal-agent" relationship between unions and MCs.

Section III: Theory and Hypotheses

My core argument is that while labor-friendly district-level characteristics can on their own be influential with regards to the level of pro-labor legislative behavior, union political strategies are the main mechanisms for inducing greater political representation. Specifically, unions rely on three key strategies to utilize their membership base and resources to directly sway legislator behavior. This is reflected in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Local union policy network and mechanisms for representation

I begin by reviewing the dependent variable (representative MC behavior), independent variables (district-level characteristics), then mechanisms (union strategies).

Agent-Legislator Behaviors and the Dependent Variable

A principal-agent problem in political science and economics literature is generally defined by the relationship between a principal and an agent – the principal relies on the actions or decisions made by the agent, which possess authority and often has incentives to act in its own interest. In this situation, "the election process itself sets up a principal-agent relationship" with the "principal" actors as the union member constituents and the "agents" as legislator MCs (Holcombe and Gwartney 1989, 696). The literature identifies two main factors that prevent the agent-legislator from accurately representing their constituents' interests, causing principal-agent problems: legislators can break their promises after elections and voters have "little incentive to monitor the performance of legislators – to see whether promises made are actually kept" (Holcombe and Gwartney 1989, 670). The natural first step in determining the extent to which agents are successfully representing their constituents' interests is examining their behavior. In this section, I review potential agent-legislator behavior to justify the construction of the dependent variable measure – amount of behavior in the interests of labor unions.

A fair amount of the literature on representation relies on roll call votes for measure of MC behavior. However, to gauge the complete picture of all representative MC behavior, roll-call votes may simply not be enough. In operationalizing representative behavior in the principal-agent relationship, previous literature argues that the political institutions within legislative bodies, such as a roll-call vote, can provide "legislator-agents" some slack in their relationship with "constituent-principals." (Kalt and Zupan 1990, 106). Since constituents as individuals are

constrained in their monitoring and policing of their representatives, legislators can stray from their constituent preferences toward their own ideological preferences by simply voting along party lines (Kalt and Zupan 1990). It's further safe to assume constituents may have different interests, making it more appealing for legislators to default to party-line votes.

Intuitively, roll call votes require a limited amount of the MCs' time. In measuring their role as agents, more legislator behavior should be taken into account. MCs possess many more avenues for action than casting roll call votes – writing legislation, delivering speeches on the House floor, holding and participating in congressional hearings, attending townhalls, exercising congressional oversight, meeting with groups and lobbyists, increasing publicity via interviews, press releases, and social media, and more. The difficult task here is determining which legislative actions are valid and reliable measures of representative action given study limitations and the potentially heterogeneous interests of organized labor as a whole. This also represents a second factor that may contribute to principal-agent problems that is not fully anticipated in the existing literature: multiple different principal interests.

One study addresses these problems by focusing conceptually on substantive representation. Since substantive representation refers to active advocacy of elected representatives on behalf of their constituents' interests, the most important MC behaviors are those that advance policymaking. Measuring substantive representation of Latino constituents through voting behavior of MCs, bill sponsorship, and co-sponsorship captures the bulk of possible policymaking behaviors (Wallace 2014). Wallace justifies these actions as measures in terms of the different levels of constraint in roll-call vote and non-roll call vote actions: roll-call votes are dependent on the legislative docket, which is controlled by the House leadership and majority party's specific interests, limiting MC action to a yes/no outcome. Bill introduction and

bill co-sponsorship provide signaling and costly actions that MCs may pursue to represent their constituents (Wallace 2014).

Costs to bill sponsorship include the resources expended to write the bill, the opportunity costs, and potential political costs associated with signaling, or associating an MC's name with a piece of legislation directly (Wallace 2014; Rocca and Gordon 2010). Each action – *sponsoring*, *originally co-sponsoring*, *co-sponsoring*, and *voting* – varies in costliness, both in terms of time and financial resources expended and signaling. Bill introduction, or *bill sponsorship*, would be the costliest action, as the MC has to expend the time and resources to draft legislation and formally propose the bill to Congress. An *original co-sponsor* needs to dedicate time to deciding to fully support the legislation at the time of its introduction. Sometimes, this additionally means assisting the sponsor in writing the bill. MCs can also sign on as *co-sponsors* following its introduction, requiring more resources in terms of time and signaling relative to a yes/no *roll call vote*. Additionally, interest groups strategically monitor non-roll call actions to learn about MCs' preferences, making it a realistic operationalization of how MCs are perceived through their behavior (Rocca and Gordon 2010). In translating these actions into quantified and manageable data, bills need to be selected representing overall labor unions' political interests and preferences.

A review of the interest group literature indicates that one of the main problems with studying interest group influence is the difficulty in establishing their "genuine preferences" (Dür and Bièvre 2007). In the study that is most similar to my research question and design, Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner (2018) overcome the potential heterogeneity of labor union members' political preferences by operationalizing labor representation in the US House of Representatives by "liberal" roll call votes. Research tying unions to Democratic policies more broadly are based

on faulty assumptions, as "American workers end up in a particular union for reasons that are almost entirely job-related, alleviating most concerns of self-selection and sorting based on political views" (Ahlquist 2017, 420). This suggests that defining labor representation should not begin on a partisan basis and defining labor's policy interests requires careful consideration. Further, Ahlquist's definition of unions operates under the assumption that wage bargaining is a central tenant of labor policy interests, and that the labor movement overall relies on a "proredistributive message" at its core (Ahlquist 2017). Based on this evidence and the nature of union mobilization of historically disenfranchised lower-income voters, policy interests and legislation unions favor will generally favor redistributive and social welfare policies (Flavin 2016).

Ultimately, however, the best policy interests for labor are "notoriously difficult to describe in terms of a single overarching objective because they must balance competing demands with uncertain trade-offs" (Ahlquist 2017, 411). For example, Jansa and Hoyman's 2018 study on how labor unions monitor and punish MC behavior focuses solely on roll call votes on free-trade related policies; this singular policy focus fails to account for how MCs may respond to punishment from interest groups and accordingly adjust their behavior in other labor-related policy interests. For example, a single labor union group is likely to support greater funding for social programs (i.e. education and health), protection and expansion of bargaining rights, and civil rights expansion. Members can act to support any combination of labor interests. Thus, the representation index is built first from selecting the largest national unions and looking for specific bills or policies that they took a public position on. The focus on national unions for building this index is justified due to their monitoring and policing function and relationship with Congress, especially the House of Representatives. Further, the House is a valuable research

subject due to its relatively extensive reliance on a smaller constituency with unique interests, regular reelection period, and its symbolic and institutional power at the federal level of policymaking.

My labor representation index weighs sponsorship, original co-sponsorship, co-sponsorship, and roll-call vote of labor-endorsed or -opposed legislation. The legislation is chosen by looking at the largest national unions' public positions on legislation and the corresponding public record data on the representatives associated with that bill. Both "pro-labor" and "anti-labor" legislation is included in calculating the composite score for labor representation. In an ideal world, a complete index of behavior would include more potential representative behavior, such as floor speeches and press releases. However, due to time, resource, and data limitations, I focus solely on bill sponsorships and votes.

By nature of studying how lawmakers decide which policy proposals to support as a result of union strength (which is often contingent on laws governing labor organization), a potential endogeneity problem emerges: how do policies enacted by lawmakers subsequently affect labor organization? An example of this problem in action is the passage of right-to-work laws that weaken unions and the resulting decline of Democratic vote shares and overall voter turnout (Feigenbaum 2018). In terms of how elected "labor allies" may change labor organization policies once elected to office, a study of Democratic state governors found that their election to office did not significantly alter union membership levels (Beland and Unel 2015). The bulk of the literature speaks to changes in collective bargaining rights at state or local levels but fails to mention any significant recent legislative proposals at the federal level to reform unionization. A comprehensive review of political and economic representation of labor unions concludes there has been more success federally in "lobbying for broad-based labor

market policy than in securing legislation directly beneficial to unions and union organizing"
(Ahlquist 2017, 424). This suggests that federal representatives may not have any direct effect on
legislation that impacts the ability for unions to organize.

Union District-Level Characteristics, the Independent Variables, and Hypotheses

This section outlines the district-level characteristics that on their own may have an effect
on how MCs behave in or against the interests of labor unions. The first union-related
characteristic of congressional districts that may affect the representative behavior of lawmakers
is the *ability for labor to organize*. The legal rights for workers to form labor unions are
sometimes referred to as enabling rights, specifically referring the ability of workers to organize,
negotiate, and bargain for improvements in their working conditions to improve their overall
well-being (Barrientos, Gereffi, and Rossi 2011). These enabling rights are not only by nature
necessary for the formation of unions, but also identified reliably in the United States by
measuring the effect of right-to-work (RTW) laws at the state level. More importantly, RTW
laws have been used by their proponents to weaken the ability of labor to organize (Feigenbaum
2018).

*H1: Districts with unions that have lower barriers to collective action will have greater
representation in the US House.*

Through providing a means by which citizens can politically engage and join together to
articulate their interests, unions with lower barriers to collective action (demonstrated by weaker
right-to-work laws and higher numbers of unions) should have a positive effect on representative
pro-labor activity by their member of Congress. Being able to organize and form a union

translates into a more direct and organized means to articulate pro-labor principal interests to legislator-agents.

Levels of unionization[4], including number of unions and union members, may also have a significant relationship with representative behavior from MCs. This follows the collective action theory mentioned above since it demonstrates constituents organized and articulated their interests to their lawmakers. The mobilization of larger numbers of workers, simply by nature of becoming union members, was found to increase the equality of political representation in the policymaking process (Flavin 2016). Flavin defines equal political representation as offsetting the socio-economic bias in political activity, operationalized by MC voting behavior relative to public opinion surveys. The more the voting activity of the MC matched opinions of lower income constituents, the more equal the representation. Flavin justifies public opinion in measuring "representativeness" since MCs are tasked with voting the way the majority of the constituents would. Public opinion is a weak as measure of representative behavior for labor-interests or economic redistribution, largely because the public writ large is often uninformed on policy issues, especially the everyday work MCs undertake as a part of their representative behavior.

Another variable of interest is *union concentration* within a congressional district. Union concentration refers to the degree to which union members in a congressional district are distributed in a few unions – higher concentration means more members are in fewer, high-membership unions, and lower concentration refers to union membership being spread across several different smaller unions. A study on union concentration found congressional districts

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[4] The literature frequently uses the term "union density" as a measure of union strength; this is synonymous with union membership rates, which is the term I use throughout the paper.

with less concentrated unions are represented by MCs with more liberal voting records (Becher, Stegmueller, Käppner 2018). While the operationalization of representation with "liberal" voting records fails to account for the decreasing partisan ties of labor representation, the theoretical justification that smaller networks allow for more effective political mobilization provides credence to analyzing the impact of union concentration. Specifically, collective action theory would stipulate that larger groups fail to fully engage each member meaningfully and provides little incentive against free-riding (Olson 1965). Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner argue the smaller political networks that emerge from low-concentrated union districts enable their members to politically engage more meaningfully and actively, perhaps through grass-roots campaigns including phone banking or canvassing to get out the vote or inform voters on a current issue. However, while Olson does note "the larger the group, the farther it will fall in short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good," his theory on collective action may be misinterpreted here (Olson 1965, 35). Concentration as a variable, while showing individual local union networks, doesn't account for how unions coordinate with each other. Larger union concentration may be correlated with fewer number of unions and thus better coordination among unions in coordinating strategy. Given these mixed theories, I predict no significant relationship between concentration and representation.

H2: Districts with stronger labor organization networks – identified by large union membership levels with smaller numbers of labor unions – will have greater representation in the US House.

Unions with larger membership have larger numbers of citizens to politically mobilize, creating opportunity for votes and campaign contributions. I expect the unions that have more political leverage to induce greater political representation. Concentration of union members

spread across several different unions within a district, according to collective action theory, will yield more meaningful and effective political engagement and mobilization due to the smaller and more personal sizes of union networks (Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018).

Finally, modern unions are able to *mobilize resources* by requiring membership dues, aiming their resources at lobbying MCs to capture their attention and persuade them to take a favorable action toward labor interests. A study of union resources found that greater numbers of lobbyists and members positively affects subsequent participation in U.S. Congressional hearings (Albert 2013). Through resource utilization theory, Albert argues that unions are constrained in their activity by their resources and choose to expend those resources to garner political representation. An analysis of passage of RTW state laws furthers this argument, providing evidence that the weakening of unions through declining resource levels leads to a demonstrated decline in political participation (Feigenbaum 2018). RTW laws legalize free-riding of non-union members on union bargaining outcomes, by allowing workers to opt-out of union membership (and paying dues) even if their workplace voted to unionize. Feigenbaum argues these financial resources allow unions to mobilize through campaign contributions, contacting potential voters, and promoting working-class candidates for office. Due to limited data, I operationalize and focus on resource mobilization as reported campaign contributions prior to and following each congressional session.

H3: Districts with greater amounts of labor campaign contributions will have greater pro-labor representation in the US House.

Resource mobilization theory explains that by collecting resources from members then allocating those resources to different mechanisms, unions can achieve their pre-determined goals (Albert 2013). Unions with greater financial resources may able to make greater

contributions, hire lobbyists, grassroots organizers, and mass mobilization campaigns to influence greater representative behavior. Further research that is also able to account for total resources available to unions would provide a complete understanding of how unions utilize their mobilized resources. Specifically regarding campaign contributions, unions may help facilitate a principal-agent relationship by monitoring MCs then subsequently rewarding or punishing MC behavior through giving or discontinuing campaign contributions.

Due to limited time and available data, my study can only statistically test union district-level characteristics as demonstrated in my three hypotheses. More specifically, as outlined in Table 1, I examine RTW laws, union network size and concentration, and political contributions as independent variables. I also outline the hypothesized relationships between union strategies (causal mechanisms) and MC behavior. The theoretical justifications for these strategies as principal-behaviors are discussed in the section following Table 1.

Table 1: Variables and their hypothesized empirical relationships

Independent Variables			Dependent Variable: Representation Index Score
	Variable	**Operationalization**	Roll call votes, sponsorship, original co-sponsorship & co-sponsorship[5]
Union district-level variables	Barriers to organizing (enabling laws)	RTW laws[6]	—
	Strength of organized labor interest groups	Number of unions[7], and union membership[8]	+
	Strength and effectiveness of local union networks	Union concentration (% of union members concentrated in largest 4 unions)[9]	—
	Resources unions have to influence lawmakers	Political contributions[10]	+
Causal mechanisms (union strategies)	Information exchange	Press releases, attendance at meetings/events, email list-servers, town halls, direct lobbying of lawmakers	+
	Voter mobilization	Union voter turnout, social network effect/size	+
	Resource mobilization for elections	Grassroots organizing, rallies, campaign contributions, endorsements	+

[5] AFL-CIO, SEIU, NEA, IBT; Internet Archive <https://web.archive.org/>; Library of Congress, <Congress.gov>;

[6] National Conference of State Legislatures, <http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx>

[7] Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018

[8] Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018

[9] Becher, Stegmueller and Käppner 2018

[10] Open Secrets, <https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=P>

Principal-Labor Union Behaviors and Causal Mechanisms

On the other side of the principal-agent relationship, the literature identifies strategies or mechanisms principal-labor unions have developed to influence agent-legislator behavior. Impediments to effective principal-agent relationships largely stem from imperfect constituent-principal policing of legislator-agents (Kalt and Zupan 1990). This means constituents are largely unable to accurately monitor and punish or reward MCs for the "good" or "bad" actions. The inability to monitor and police the legislator-agent represents a collective action problem for political participation (i.e. the "my one vote doesn't count" mentality). Mancur Olson has argued that collective action problems for organizations exist when there is a group interest that could be achieved by action of group members, however it is not in the best interests of rational, self-interested individuals to act. In other words, free-riding impedes the group's ability to provide public goods, which are identified by their non-excludable and non-diminishing qualities, meaning individuals cannot be excluded from benefiting from the public good, and one's use of the good doesn't diminish another's use of that good (Olson 1965). For unions, this public good comes in many forms. The most immediate form is collective bargaining for wages (Olson 1965).

More broadly, unions can facilitate political representation of their members by providing a means to organize strategies and resources for persuading members of Congress. Labor unions have the ability to collectively organize by mobilizing resources and voters to effectively police legislative behavior. The broader interest group literature identifies how the legislator-agent is dependent on the resources of constituent-principals, specifically "campaign funding, information on constituency interests, expertise on policy issues, and information on the opinions of other policy makers," (Dür and Bièvre 2007, 5). Information dissemination, voter

mobilization, and resource mobilization through campaign funding are the three union strategies I focus on.

1. *Information dissemination*

Unions can serve an important role in facilitating information exchange to union members, providing a basis for individuals deciding which candidates and policies to support. A study of member commitment to their union indicates that committed members are more likely to support political advocacy by their unions, providing credence for the argument that members that are active in receiving information from their union are adequately represented by the political activities and interests of the union (Fields, Masters, and Thacker 1992). Further, a survey study of dockworker union members and their views on trade liberalization suggests that union members are more likely to share the political view of the union than non-members, even if that policy position doesn't benefit the demand for their labor (Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi 2014). This mobilization strategy helps inform workers of their policy interests as evidence shows union members are more politically knowledgeable than non-members, and more likely engage in political discussions, overcome free-riding on political action, and foster agreement on political issues, and disseminate information to their social networks (Ahlquist 2017; Kim and Margalit 2017).

2. *Voter mobilization*

The large-scale majoritarian elections for federal representatives make the marginal electoral benefit of voting relatively small for an individual (Kalt and Zupan 1990). Further, the relative frequency of monitoring costs of being fully informed in making voting decisions makes it difficult for the average voter to remain politically engaged and active citizens. Unions represent a mechanism for constituents, specifically workers, to collectively organize and

overcome these collective action problems associated with democratic representation. Union membership levels are also useful measures of relative power a union holds over its MC, as social pressure has been reliably studied as a causal mechanism for increased voter turnout (Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008). Further, several studies have confirmed the positive effect union membership has on voter turnout – both through increasing the likelihood union members vote and union campaigns to increase overall voter turnout (Delaney, Masters, and Schwochau 1988; Francia 2012). Rational choice theory, then provides justification for why policymakers are incentivized to appeal to larger reliably mobilized voting bases for reelection.

3. *Resource mobilization*

Labor unions as an interest group can mobilize their resources to successfully influence policy actions by representatives in the form of campaign contributions, as demonstrated by a study that argues political financial contributions from labor and business PACs significantly influenced legislators' decisions on free trade legislation roll-call voting, against and in support, respectively (Baldwin and Magee 2000). Another study finds PAC contributions from the finance industry and labor unions subsequently affected roll call votes on a bankruptcy bill in the US House of Representatives (Hayes 2017). Both studies acknowledge the endogenous nature of campaign spending – in other words, that interest groups could be attempting to either persuade or reward a favorable position. Both studies focused on roll call vote action, suggesting that the roll call vote operationalization of representation is highly susceptible to varying sources campaign contributions.

One study argues the equal importance of both voter and resource mobilization by demonstrating that (at a certain, large enough level of membership size) mobilization of a labor union voting base is substitutable for *campaign contributions* (Bombardini and Trebbi 2010).

Bombardini and Trebbi explain that policymakers are rational and govern their representative behavior based on their goal of reelection – voter mobilization accomplishes the same goal as financial contributions and can be substituted as explanatory mechanisms due to their helping a policymaker achieve reelection.

These variables may be difficult to fully capture by data measurement alone and will be further addressed by the case study analysis. However, overall the prospect of campaign contributions, wide-spread lobbying efforts, and a large and organized voting bloc provide labor unions strategies for influencing representative behavior. These assumed relationships are again reflected above in Table 1. This may provide some insight into how labor unions with differing levels of strength and amount of resources (district-level characteristics) strategically respond to their relative decline in American society.

Control Variables: Sectoral/Industry Differences

Throughout the literature on labor politics, a central point of contention is the degree to which workers share interests – or homogeneity in labor interests to be represented. Unions across the country have some inherently heterogenous interests or characteristics – they can be organized around different work-related conditions, including sharing a common skillset or employment in similar firms or industries (Ahlquist 2017). Ahlquist, Clayton, and Levi's study of dockworkers theorizes that membership in unions fosters a broader class-based perspective encouraging worker solidarity beyond individual self-interest. I suspect that the number of unions in a district may covary with sectoral diversity in a district, providing a potential barrier to successful coordination among labor unions.

A related concern is the difference between private and public sector unions in aggregating and articulating their interests. Namely, in public sector unions "there is no profit to divide between workers and capital owners, nor are there direct competitive forces to restrain costs" (Ahlquist 2017, 411). This suggests that public sector unions may more effectively mobilize the electorate to gain leverage over public officials to enact their interests or demands due to the lower costs of monitoring and enforcing for public sector unions. On the other hand, a study directly analyzing the difference in how public and private sector unions interact with lawmakers finds that public sector unions are significantly less likely to "punish" lawmakers by withholding contributions than their private sector counterparts (Jansa and Hoyman 2018). Jansa and Hoyman conclude that public sector unions view punishment as a risky investment due to their traditional ties to the Democratic party. Other identified variables to account for the heterogenous effect of unionization (besides sectoral/industry variation) includes amount of union communication to their members, and level of income (higher communication and levels of income carry larger union effects) (Ahlquist 2017). Overall, the differences in representation may occur due to industry and sectoral differences across districts; however, while the differences are not strong or measurable enough to stand alone as an explanatory variable, sectoral and industry variation is worth controlling for in this quantitative analysis.

Section IV: Data, Methods, and Research Design

Dependent Variable Operationalization and Data: Behavior of Member of Congress

How do we know on what issues to assess MC actions? In this section, I present the basis for constructing a "representation index." The national unions selected to begin building

the representation index include the AFL-CIO (12.7 million members), then the three largest

national unions (not affiliated with the AFL-CIO) [11]:

- o National Education Association of the US (NEA) – 2.7 million members

- o Service Employees International Union (SEIU) – 1.5 million members

- o International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT) – 1.4 million members

This decision was made because the AFL-CIO includes most unions in the U.S. The

NEA, SEIU, and IBT are non-AFL affiliates.[12] Each union has a website with press releases or

"key vote scorecards" that indicate bills of interest and the unions' position on each bill. For

websites without archived data, an internet archiver was used to access press releases from 2003-

2014 to cover the 108th –113th Congresses.[13] Once bill summaries or roll call vote numbers are

found on the union websites, their sponsor, original co-sponsor(s), co-sponsor(s), and roll call

vote information can be accessed easily on public record.[14] After that data was compiled, a labor

representation index was constructed by weighing each action by their costs.

In the first construction of the labor representation score, sponsorship (of a pro-labor bill)

is weighed at 5, due to the relatively high costs associated with researching, writing, and

signaling support for a sponsored bill. Original co-sponsors are those that sign on to support the

bill at the time of its introduction. Since original co-sponsorship requires the costs of reading,

debating, and gauging the political costs of signing on to support a bill at the time of its

introduction, original co-sponsorship is weighed at 3 (per bill). Co-sponsorship indicates an MC

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[11] "National Labor Organizations with Membership over 100,000." Infoplease.
19 Nov. 2018   <https://www.infoplease.com/business-finance/labor-unions/national-labor-organizations-membership-over-100000/>.
[12] In 2005, the SEIU and IBT left the AFL-CIO to form their own labor union federation: the Change to Win Coalition.
[13] Internet Archive <https://web.archive.org/>
[14] <Congress.gov>

signed on to support a bill at some point after its introduction, with the time period for co-sponsoring a bill ending at the end of the congressional session (unless the bill is brought to the floor for a vote). Since co-sponsorship doesn't carry the same signaling costs of signing on to a bill at the time of its introduction, it is weighted at 2 points (per bill). Finally, roll-call votes will be measured, looking only at legislation that at least three unions advocated for (or against). Since there are limited costs associated with a roll-call vote, each vote is worth 1 point.

To measure the degree to which actions support labor interests, "positive" actions (non-roll call or roll call votes that agree with the union position) are tabulated by MC per congressional session. To measure the degree to which actions hurt labor interests, "negative" actions (non-roll call or roll call votes that go against the union position) are tabulated by MC per congressional session as negative scores (i.e. Sponsorship of an anti-labor bill would be worth -5 points). The index score is a combination of the two totals.

Two other different weightings for sponsorship and co-sponsorship were used to construct a "robustness" test of the dependent variable; in other words, to see if the subjective nature score-assigning for each action significantly altered the substance of the data. The second construction weighs sponsorship and original co-sponsorship equally at 3, leaving co-sponsorship and roll-call votes at 2 and 1, respectively. The third construction holds all actions equal at 1.

The robustness of the weighted dependent variable measuring representation is best demonstrated by comparing the distribution of each construction of the variable. Figure 4 (Appendix Section 2) shows the distribution of the first weighting (y_1), which weighed sponsorship of the bill at 5 points, original co-sponsorship at 3, co-sponsorship at 2, and votes at 1. Figure 5 shows the distribution of the second weighting (y_2), which weighed sponsorship and

co-sponsorship equally. Finally, Figure 6 shows the distribution of the third weighting (y_3)

which held all actions equal at one. The three weights have roughly similar and normal

distribution. Notably, they are bimodal, as what would likely be expected considering party

alignments with Republicans on the left and Democrats on the right. The correlation between the

three measures is shown below in Table 2 and Figure 2.

Table 2: Correlation between Dependent Variable Measures

	y_1	y_2	y_3
y_1	X	0.9982637	0.9784353
y_2	0.9982637	X	0.9822955
y_3	0.9784353	0.9822955	X

Figure 2: Correlation between Dependent Variable Measures

Since y_1 takes into account the varying costs associated with different actions, my preliminary models focus on this distribution.

Variable Operationalization and Data: Union Characteristics

Due to the availability of geocoded union district-level data, the data are measured at the US congressional-district level for the 108th through the 113th Congress. The unit of analysis is at the district-level, and a MC's actions in a single congressional session are the basis for the dependent variable score. This is justified because a full congressional session (two-years) represents a single term-length for a MC. The operationalization and measurement of the independent variables (union characteristics and strategies) are described and theoretically justified as follows:

1. <u>Right-to-work laws</u>: Information on right-to-work laws by state and enactment date are available via the National Conference of State Legislatures.[15] The variable will be coded dichotomously, for presence of RTW laws and absence of RTW laws.

2. <u>Number of unions and union membership</u>: Data on the number of unions and union members geocoded by congressional district level are available from Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner (2018).[16] Their dataset is compiled from the Department of Labor's database of 358,051 digitalized LM forms, which are mandatory reports kept by the Office of Labor-Management Standards. All unions must submit a report by penalty of law, and at a minimum submit their headquarters address and membership numbers. Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner then use the union addresses to geo-code the raw data by congressional district. The authors contend that since congressional districts are apportioned by population size, population is constant across districts, excluding the seven at-large districts (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming). This means the number of unions and membership levels help reliably identify districts that have greater numbers of union membership. However, it is worth noting that the addresses used to geocode reflect the address of the union office, not the addresses of each union member. This presents an issue in the data, as many districts have union membership levels greater than their population. Ultimately, this data is the most geographically accurate available data and offers a measure of organized labor interests that MCs are charged to represented. Further, a time constraint on this project prevents me from being able to compare

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[15] National Conference of State Legislatures, <http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/right-to-work-laws-and-bills.aspx>

[16] Becher, Michael, Stegmueller, Daniel, and Käppner, Konstantin, 2017, "Local Union Organization and Lawmaking in the U.S. Congress", https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/KDRXD0, Harvard Dataverse, V1

this data with survey data of union membership by district, which suffers from its own inaccuracy issues.

3. <u>Union concentration</u>: Data for calculated union concentration levels by congressional district are also available from the Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018 paper. Concentration is measured by calculating the share of all union members in a congressional district who belong to the largest four unions (Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018). The authors note that although union concentration and union membership may be correlated, the concentration variable captures a large amount of variation in the data and is modeled after Curry and George's analysis of firm concentration.

4. <u>Political contributions</u>: political contributions of unions are gathered using Open Secrets.[17] Specifically, this data reflects the monetary contribution given by labor-affiliated political action committees (PACs) and individuals to members of Congress. This directly tests the relationship between campaign contributions and representative behavior. There is a potential endogeneity problem, as it is difficult to identify if contributions are causing representative behavior, or a result of good behavior. This can be addressed by temporally examining the relationship between donations and MC action, likely best examined at the case-study analysis level. Additionally, since the unit of analysis is member of Congress per Congress (i.e. the 108th Congress), it is possible to differentiate between the election prior to actions measured and the election following those actions. Thus, the data is collected to indicate differences between potential incentives given to members in initial elections and potential punishments or rewards in the following election.

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[17] Open Secrets < https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=P>

Control variables

As previously discussed, public sector unions may be more active in political participation. The proportion of public union membership in a district is denoted by variable σ_d. The distribution of the proportion of union membership across congressional districts is shown in Figure 13. The raw data from this variable is taken from the geo-coded dataset in Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner's dataset. The data were collected by "selecting likely public unions based on their name" from filed LM forms and totaling the members in those unions (Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018, 551). This presents a possible issue with the data, as some public-sector union members may belong to unions that are not counted by these authors. Further, LM forms themselves present a flaw in measuring methodology since "some public sector unions are not covered by the relevant laws and are not required to file regular reports," but were able to validate their data against government sources to find a very high degree of coverage (Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018, 544). While there are certainly limitations to these data, they offer a good starting point for analyzing the effect of public sector union membership.

Party affiliation may sway representation scores largely due to labor's longstanding ties to the Democratic party and the tendency to vote within party lines for roll-call votes. Party affiliation is coded 1 for Democrat and 0 for Republican. Independents were coded as the party they caucused with and members who switched political party mid-term are coded as the party they switched to. This variable is denoted by P_x.

Since each Congress has its own potential influences on the policymaking in term, a dummy variable is also created to estimate the fixed-effects of each congressional session. This is to control for the differences between Republican and Democrat-controlled Congresses which

may have varying numbers of legislation introduced that piqued labor's interest. This variable is denoted by T_t.

Controls used in previous studies include ideology (% Democratic presidential vote share in last election), age, race, education, income, and other demographic information (% rural, % blue-collar) (Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018, Kalt and Zupan 1990, and Urbnati and Warren 2008). Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner's model includes district-level characteristic controls that did not statistically alter results. Also considering time constraints, these controls are then omitted from my study. However, due to variation in union support for political positions by sector (i.e. building trade and transportation unions tend to support more conservative positions), industry controls are necessary. Data readily available concerning industry employment by congressional district reflects proportion of employment in services and employment in agriculture (Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner 2018, 550). A potential hurdle here is that the Becher data for industry does not include the 108th or the 113th Congress. A dummy variable was created to omit those Congresses from analysis including sector controls. These variables are denoted by θ_{Ser} and θ_{Agr}.

Quantitative method

In constructing a linear regression model, I first checked distribution of independent variables. Since union membership numbers have extreme outliers (Figure 7), converted to logged variable; this yields relatively normal distribution (Figure 8) and is denoted by lnU_{dMem}. The number of unions and union concentration variables have relatively normal distributions (Figures 9 and 10) and are denoted U_{dNum} and U_{dCon}, respectively. Pre- and post- Congress variables also have extreme outliers, they are converted to logged variables denoted as

lnC_{tPre} and lnC_{tPost}, respectively (Figures 11 and 12). The right-to-work law variable is coded

at the state-level for presence of right-to-work legislation is dichotomous and denoted as R_s.

The correlation between independent variables is shown below in Table 3 and Figure 3:

Table 3: Correlation between Independent Variables

	lnU_{dMem}	U_{dNum}	U_{dCon}	lnC_{tPre}	lnC_{tPost}
lnU_{dMem}	X	0.4262660	0.08089364	0.26043957	0.29366947
U_{dNum}	0.42626600	X	-0.5757393	0.11779315	0.14218368
U_{dCon}	0.08089364	-0.5757393	X	-0.0319173	-0.0201794
lnC_{tPre}	0.26043957	0.1177931	-0.0319173	X	0.66164498
lnC_{tPost}	0.29366947	0.1421837	-0.0201794	0.66164498	X

Figure 3: Correlation between Independent Variables

I estimate a primary model for MC labor-representative legislative behavior as a function of district-level characteristics and plausible controls:

$$y_i = \beta_1 lnU_{dMem_i} + \beta_2 U_{dNum_i} + \beta_3 U_{dCon_i} + \beta_4 lnC_{tPre_i} + \beta_5 lnC_{tPost_i} + R_s + P_x + T_t + \sigma_d + \beta_0$$

The dependent variable is a summary index of labor-representative behavior from a given MC (x) representing a district (d) in a state (s) over a given term length (t). In the first model, MCs that did not participate in an election (due to appointment or special election mid-term) may have skewed contribution data as they were entered as "0" values. In order to add control variables for sector and to remove MCs from analysis if they did not participate in an election, a second model was created:

$$y_i = \beta_1 lnU_{dMem_i} + \beta_2 U_{dNum_i} + \beta_3 U_{dCon_i} + \beta_4 lnC_{tPre_i} + \beta_5 lnC_{tPost_i} + R_s + P_x + T_t + \theta_{Ser} + \theta_{Agr} + \sigma_d$$
$$+ \beta_0$$

This model excludes observations that were missing data for either election contributions or sector controls. The first model has 2,653 observations and the second yields 1,696. Both models are paneled to control for member-specific effects, as policy networks are strongly contingent upon establishing relationships with incumbent MCs. The only potential issue arises when MCs share the same last name and district, as in the case when a spouse or child runs for or is appointed to an MC's vacant seat. However, in these cases the changes in underlying ideology are likely minimal and the policy networks are often unaffected. Due to this, and the low number of observations with this issue, no action is taken to correct this in my study.

Qualitative Method: Union Strategies

To better understand the labor policy network and union strategies at work, I conducted interviews with five labor union political organizers in a Minnesota. Specifics for each interview

are listed in Appendix Section 1. Minnesota is a valuable arena through which to explore union strategies because of its relatively active and developed labor policy network. Due to the dispersed nature of union membership, it is nearly impossible to narrow down case study analysis to one or two specific districts. Rather, these interviews provide a nearly complete picture of the entire state's labor union policy network.

Union organizers were first selected based on affiliation to one of the national-level unions used to build the dependent variable representation index. All interview subjects held political/campaign organizing and coordinating roles in their union's political arm. Due to relatively low response rates and limited time, I was only able to interview five subjects.

The overall goal of the interviews was to understand the role of the three main strategies or mechanisms discussed earlier: information exchange, voter mobilization, and resource mobilization. Specific questions were aimed at understanding the general organization of union networks, including coordination strategies among local unions and access to MCs and their staffs. The interviews also covered issue-area topics, including legislative issue-areas of interest and prioritization of legislative goals and differences in legislative agendas at the federal and state/local level to better understand both the internal union processes for political decision-making and justifications for the representation index. Vertical and horizontal coordination of unions and disagreements between unions ideologically and politically were also topics of discussion to provide insight into collective action issues among unions – both internally and between different unions. In other words, what happens when a local union has different political interests than their national-level union or other local unions around them?

I will detail the preliminary findings of the interviews in each of these topics in the following section, after reporting the results of the quantitative analysis, with specific emphasis

on union strategies surrounding information exchange, voter mobilization, and resource

mobilization.

Section V: Results

Results: Quantitative Method

Table 2 presents the regression analysis of both models, generating coefficients, standard

error, and p-values for the variables of interest:

Table 2: Regression Table

	Model 1	Model 2
Intercept	-18.02***	-24.00***
	(1.75)	(2.69)
(ln)Union Membership	0.66***	0.92***
	(0.19)	(0.26)
---Public Unions	4.61**	5.08*
	(1.58)	(1.86)
Number of Unions	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Union Concentration	-0.51	-1.20
	(1.25)	(1.62)
(ln) Pre-Session Contributions	0.24***	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.07)
(ln) Post-Session Contributions	0.29***	0.44***
	(0.06)	(0.08)
Democratic (Party Affiliation)	18.98***	21.52***
	(0.48)	(0.59)
Right-to-Work	-2.21***	-2.77***
	(0.40)	(0.51)
109th Congress	-1.21***	
	(0.29)	
110th Congress	13.02***	14.55***
	(0.61)	(0.65)
111th Congress	9.92***	10.92***
	(0.51)	(0.55)
112th Congress	-7.15***	-6.19***
	(0.46)	(0.53)
113th Congress	-0.60	
	(0.36)	
Service Sector		17.10*
		(7.49)
Agricul. Sector		-42.80*
		(12.70)
R2	0.77	0.80
Clusters	793	645
Observations	2653	1696

***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$; Observations clustered by Member ID

These results help verify the first hypothesis, that ability for unions to organize is associated with the level pro-labor behavior of elected representatives. Both models generate a statistically significant effect with right-to-work states generating a -2.21 (±0.40) and -2.77 (±0.51) unit change in representative behavior.

The second hypothesis, that stronger union networks have greater representation, is partially proven with a statistically significant relationship between membership size and representation. However, the number of unions as well as concentration of union networks bears no statistically significant relationship. It is also worth noting that the proportion of public sector membership had a slight positive effect on representative behavior.

Finally, the hypothesis that labor campaign contributions have positive effects on representative behavior is partially proven. Both models show post-Congress campaign contributions with significant positive effects. However, the pre-Congress contributions variable becomes not statistically significant in the second model, which removes observations for MCs that did not participate in a given election.

Another significant variable is party affiliation – confirming conventional wisdom of party coalitions, Democratic members are statistically and significantly more likely to take on pro-labor legislative behavior. Democratic party membership increases representative behavior in both models by 18.98 and 21.52 units, respectively.

Congress-specific fixed effects are also included. Coefficients and standard deviations in Table 1 compare the given Congress to the control Congress – in Model 1, the 108th Congress and in Model 2 the control is the 109th Congress. With the exception of the 113th Congress in Model 1, there are significant effects on the level of representation depending on the Congress.

Finally, with regards to sector-level controls in Model 2, there is a weak statistically significant positive relationship between proportion of service sector workers in a district and representation behavior. The agricultural sector variable has a statistically significant strong negative effect on representative behavior. I will return to this issue in the discussion and conclusion sections.

Preliminary Findings: Qualitative Analysis

In this section, I begin by describing the contextual information provided by union political organizers, specifically regarding their issue-area interest formation and prioritization, as well as their relationships with their legislators. Then, I review my overall findings on labor strategies for political representation. Finally, I discuss the organization of labor policy networks, including horizontal and vertical coordination and political disagreements between unions.

a) *Labor policy interests*

To begin, I define labor-related policy issues as those on which unions are unified. These include protections against wage theft, paid sick leave, pension protections, and protections for collective bargaining rights. The greater frequency of right-to-work laws, instead of weakening this particular labor union network, motivates union organizers and members to mobilize with urgency. The other legislative priorities of local unions are determined by the more union-specific interests of their members. Issue-areas where members are directly impacted largely encompass federal funding of social provisions, including public housing, expansion of healthcare services and social security, food stamps, and education funding, specifically for special needs education, Pre-K, and higher education debt relief. For instance, a service-sector union with more immigrant-heavy membership will prioritize lobbying and action for

immigration legislation (Interview 1). Further prioritization and most federal legislative priorities come from national-level union directives who handle day-to-day monitoring and lobbying of policymakers. These directives come from some coordination with local unions, encompassing the local union's existing local and state priorities. Specific pieces of legislation include the Affordable Care Act and opposition to fast-track provision of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (Interview 2).

In discussing legislative issue-prioritization, it is important to note the issues local unions prefer to lobby at the local or state level. Generally speaking, legislative action on labor-specific reforms at the *federal* level has been relatively stagnant since the early 2000's. Most action is directed at reacting to attempts to cut or repeal labor regulations. In Interview 1, the labor organizer recalled the events following September 11th, 2001 as a turning point for federal labor interests, as a large portion of union membership was laid off from airline industry employment. In the aftermath, the federal network advancing labor interests started to unravel. The beginning of the Obama Administration marked the beginning of the recession and meaningful labor reform was deprioritized, demonstrated by letting legislation like the Employee Free Choice Act fail to become law. This pushback of labor interests at the federal level enabled the following Republican majorities to continue the trend. Issues including raising the minimum wage are now more commonly advocated for and implemented at a local municipal level (Interview 1). This encapsulates labor strategy in utilizing local labor reform at the municipal level as an incubator for spreading meaningful labor reform.

b) *Union relationships with MCs*

Part of determining which issues to pursue at the federal level depends greatly on unique MC characteristics, largely based on their ideological and political signaling. This is pretty

intuitive and means unions are more eager and likely to approach an MC with a reputation for "pro-labor politics" to take action on their behalf. These MCs are more than just active legislators on behalf of labor interests; they actively invest their time in the district seeking out and listening to labor union members' perspectives. For example, these MCs organize labor-specific town-halls and roundtables for union members to voice their concerns and even join picket lines in their districts (Interview 2). These in-district interactions with MCs are very dependent on the availability, access to, and initiative taken by the MCs. On the other hand, a reliably anti-labor MC would be very difficult to schedule meetings with and would be extremely unlikely to take the initiative to schedule public forums directed at labor interests (Interview 3). Another factor in determining which MCs to approach and actively include in a union's political network is issue-specific circumstance. For example, unions were more likely to approach an otherwise moderate Democrat MC for action to increase federal funds for food stamps due to the MC's leadership position on a committee affecting funding for the agriculture department and its services (Interview 3).

   c) *Union political strategies*

   In terms of the political actions and strategies local unions undertake to advance their legislative agenda, a major strategy is to get their most affected constituents in front of the MC and secondarily show the breadth of support for their interests. The explanation is that MCs will best understand the significance of an issue and be compelled to action when they hear the lived experience of union members. In-district meetings, as discussed in the previous paragraph, are extremely important in getting union members face-to-face with their MCs. Washington D.C.-based direct meetings with MCs are coordinated in conjunction with gatherings that national-level unions organize. Sometimes referred to as the "Day on the Hill," union members will travel

to Washington to lobby their congressional delegation (Interviews 3 and 5). Union organizers emphasize the secondary benefit to these lobbying activities – the leadership development and political advocacy skills union members gain from the experience. Some unions also have designated lobbyists, but even these lobbyists rely on the union members' personal stories to persuade MC behavior.

Union political organizers who do not rely on professional lobbyists have creative, yet effective methods for developing relationships and creating opportunities for their members to access face-to-face interactions with their MCs. For example, a local union often opts to deliver their campaign contribution check at fundraisers through union members (Interview 3). This allows union members direct access to their member in way that equalizes access to politics and policymaking. These opportunities for access allow members to make personal connections with their MCs and for unions to deepen their relationship with the MC, allowing for greater strength in the overall union policymaking network. This is also a direct example of ways unions may mobilize their resources and facilitate direct information exchange between legislators and constituents.

The secondary goal of demonstrating the breadth of support for legislative interests is best encapsulated through union activities to educate and organize their membership directly. The education and information dissemination component of union political action aims to keep members up-to-date on political issues and include weekly email updates, social media use, and regular publication of a union newspaper. Union organizers, however, admit it is often a heavy lift to inform members that they have access to political information, as their main interest in union membership is their day-to-day work life (Interviews 1 and 5). Grassroots organization strategies that directly demonstrate their breadth of support include phone-banking, holding

rallies and town-halls, and active campaigning during election cycles. The informative and organizing work is especially successful during elections, as union members continue to demonstrate higher voter turnout rates than non-members. Again, these directly tie to the predicted strategies of information exchange and voter mobilization, providing context as to why membership levels alone cannot fully account for labor influence on legislative behavior.

d) Organization and coordination of labor policy interests

An interesting unanticipated finding was the coordination problems among various labor groups. Union policy networks demonstrate aspects of coordination both vertically (from the national-level to the local-levels) and horizontally (among other local-level unions). National-level organizations generally control federal legislative priorities but rely on local-level unions to engage membership, especially on local and state-level issues. National-level organizations may also coordinate legislative priorities around overlapping local union interests and can engage in a "push-pull" arrangement with the local union. For example, a local will aggressively push a national-level union to pursue a federal legislative priority that greatly impacts their membership while accepting compromising positions in other areas (Interview 3).

Coordination among unions in this union policy network is largely controlled through a peak organization, described as a confederation and "grass-tops" organization. The idea is that every labor group has a seat at the table. No position is taken without a general consensus among unions, so everyone must cooperate to make formal decisions (Interviews 1 and 2). Generally, ideally this means finding areas of broad agreement, such as expansion of worker benefits. Even so, the policy interest decisions by the peak organization have a limited impact on day-to-day union members. The only group of people bound by those decisions is the peak organization itself; member unions have the ability to act in whichever interest they prefer and are not bound

to decisions made by consensus in legislative lobbying. Union organizers believe these networks are effective because they are formal institutions with established trust (Interview 3). Despite local unions operating in their own separate universes, they are able to effectively come together on labor-specific issues like the Employee Free Choice Act and minimum wage laws. Union organizers also frequently coordinate horizontally with non-labor community partners on issues of common interest.

However, the interviews also provided tangible examples of disagreements between unions ideologically and in terms of specific interests. This suggests there may be difficulty in coordinating a full-unified campaign around a policy issue. Overall, disagreements between unions are very sectoral dependent. For example, a state bill to divert public general funds to public infrastructure construction projects was opposed strongly by service-based unions that lobby strongly for special needs education funding, which they viewed as chronically underfunded. Simultaneously, however, it was supported strongly by the construction unions, which rely on projects for their contracts and work. This bill ultimately failed after aggressive campaigning on both sides, but ultimately state legislators and union political officers reached a compromise to raise the gas tax to fund public infrastructure projects (Interview 3). However, the peak organization organizer in Interview 2 contends there is never really intense direct competition among unions. This is perhaps a product of being an umbrella organization encompassing both sides of the spectrum, therefore preferring to remain neutral in those specific circumstances.

There is also a seeming partisan ideological divide between the sectors – Democratic districts are heavily service and public sector union oriented; Republican districts tend to have more building and craft trade unions. Also, interesting to note: building and construction-based

unions dependent on contract work have their own health and wellness funds, and don't generally rely on government-sponsored health care services (Interview 3). This creates an inherent divide in that conventional labor interests prefer expansion of social services including access to health care.

Section VI: Discussion

Review of Quantitative Findings

The data generally confirms the literature's support for the relationship between collective bargaining rights and pro-labor legislator behavior. The increasing presence and looming threat of right-to-work laws then justifiably motivates union members in states without these laws to fully utilize their collective action capacity to pursue active representation and prevent their demobilization via legislation. Additionally, states without right-to-work laws are more likely to have unions with greater access to financial resources, directly increasing the influence unions have in policymaking.

Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner's argument, that small union concentration would produce more effective union networks (effectiveness measured by level of representation), is not supported by this data. Indeed, an Olsonian view would not necessarily support the notion that less concentrated unions would be better able to provide the collective good of representation. While more dispersed unions might have trouble coordinating their membership to collective political action, unions can and do coordinate among themselves. This suggest union policy network effectiveness hinges more on the collective action of unions themselves, rather than the members of those unions. Further, greater numbers of members may provide more resources overall through collection of member dues. Even if these members aren't active,

the union then has more resources to use to influence policymaking. Additionally, Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner's operationalization of representation is dependent on roll-call vote outcomes of partisan vote outcomes. My method for measuring labor representation aimed to capture more legislative actions and genuine labor union preferences. Because these preferences are not necessarily defined by party affiliation, less-concentrated union networks may in fact be more effective in pressuring roll call votes on a set of party-predetermined legislation than in building strong enough relationships and having enough access to a MC to induce costlier actions. In other words, labor unions only need enough resources to get their foot in the door for members to directly share their experiences with legislators to persuade legislators to take action in support of their cause by introducing or co-sponsoring a bill.

These findings do not provide clear empirical support for the particular importance of the size of local unions – that is, it is not entirely clear if larger union membership or smaller union membership directly impacts a single union's political influence. Larger union membership means unions are able to collect more dues, and therefore have more resources to spend on political action. Smaller unions may be able to better engage their members to encourage unified political action. However, Olson's arguments about the sources of collective action provide a basis to evaluate the overall network of unions and the collection action problems they may face: a large number of unions in a single union policy network, especially if those unions have heterogenous interests, would be less likely to successfully coordinate political action. This suggests that a larger number of unions in a single policy network will not have as much success in influencing legislative behavior. This does not appear in the data of number of unions in a district, since union networks appear to encompass entire states or regions. Further, this could help explain the lack of political will to implement labor-specific policy changes at the federal

level: since the federal-level union policy network encompasses all national-level unions and their local counterparts, it is much more difficult for unions to coordinate meaningful political action.

Finally, the hypothesis regarding campaign contributions based on a body of empirical work linking campaign contributions to pro-interest group behavior was partially confirmed. In the second model, contributions made to the election campaign prior to the given Congress term had no significant relationship with legislator behavior, while contributions made to the campaign during the congressional session for the election to the following Congress had a statistically significant positive relationship. The differences between the two are compatible with the assumption that interest groups actively monitor non-roll call actions of legislators (Rocca and Gordon 2010). This implies sponsorship, original co-sponsorship, and co-sponsorship are costly signaling actions that unions monitor and enforce with penalties and rewards throughout the session. Further, these signaling actions may help unions determine which legislators are most aligned with their interests, making them the most accessible and trustworthy to continue building relationships with, often through providing campaign contributions directly as a means of initial or regular contact.

As discussed earlier, a complete union budget as well as its expenditure breakdown would help explain how unions mobilize their resources beyond the campaign contributions given directly to a representative. While campaign contribution correlates with labor representation, it does not necessary speak to how mobilization of union resources actually influences MC behavior. So how might unions actually use their resources? The literature suggests several specific mechanisms, including "hiring halls, team-based work, meetings, and social functions," and political training for members through organized protests and strikes,

conducting meetings, endorsing candidates, training candidates for office, and get-out-the-vote

campaigns (Ahlquist 2017, 420). This was the main aspect of my qualitative research, producing

interesting implications in how unions may strategically use their resources.

Union collective action strategies compared to conventional interest group strategies

Overall, union political organizers repeatedly emphasize the importance of conveying

union members' experiences to a member of Congress – especially in-person. This kind of

lobbying seems to have been the most important and influential – adding to the initial

assumption of three strategies. However, union labor contributions can serve to grant their

members political access, modifying the intention, strategy, and purpose of the campaign

contribution mechanism. While previously thought to be mostly a means of "buying" votes or

action, unions often use contributions to simply put their members in front of legislators. This

merits attention in terms of concretizing the principal-agent relationship between a constituent

and their elected representative. These union members would otherwise not have access to these

interest group policy networks, making their participation in a collective political organization

the qualifying factor in their ability to directly communicate their needs to their representatives.

This collective political organization completes another important political function on behalf of

the principal-constituent: monitoring the agent and providing an enforcement mechanism.

Monitoring an agent-legislator takes time and rewarding or punishing legislator behavior takes

access and financial resources. Since individual constituents on their own lack the incentives to

pursue these monitoring and enforcement activities, unions can fill the gap and allow a more

functional principal-agent relationship to develop.

Additionally, the collective action capacity of unions is further demonstrated in the importance union organizers place on elevating individual members' experiences and stories. While the collective action strategies utilized by unions are most directly demonstrated through their secondary reliance on mobilizing a breadth of support for their legislative agenda, they constantly rely on the specific interests, needs, and experiences of their members. By providing an organization of collective political interests, each of these members is likely individually impacted by federal policymaking. Further, unions are formed through their common interest and pooled resources, which enable them to adequately perform their monitoring and enforcement activities on behalf of their union members. Without union dues, local unions would be unable to pay full-time political organizers or make access-granting campaign contributions. The collective capacity of unions through their shared experiences and resources then enables the development of an active and informed membership and a well-functioning principal-agent relationship.

Sectoral and political differences

At times, different unions possess divergent interests. This was especially true between construction workers and teachers over public financing: infrastructure vs. education. This is a key collective action problem among unions, as coordination among community partners and demonstrating broad support for their position is impossible without consensus. It is worth noting that tensions are more likely to occur on this issue, an immigration bill, or even health care legislation including the Affordable Care Act. Labor-specific legislation that directly and broadly impacts the enabling rights and collective capacity of unions, such as Citizens United or RTW laws, are reliable areas of consensus. Since this issue was specifically a state bill, its outcomes are not the most helpful for evaluating the effects of these tensions on MC behavior.

In the 109th Congress there was one bill with divergent union opinions – the IBT supported its passage and the AFL-CIO and SEIU opposed it. Examining the voting outcomes of this bill in the interview subjects' policy network can demonstrate how the tension between trade and service unions may resolve. While it is not a perfect representation of infrastructure vs. education funding, it still provides a proxy for how MCs would behave when choosing to act to advance one interest over the other. All MCs in the state congressional delegation with an overall positive labor representation score (dependent variable values) voted against the bill, except for a moderate Democrat representing the district with the lowest levels of unionized workers. This MC not only voted in favor of the bill, but also co-sponsored it. This legislator receives a high level of union financial support, as do the other Democrats in the state, however a large portion of this particular MC's union contributions come from building trade, industrial, and transportation unions. This suggests labor works well within its established relationships and their reconciliation of these interests vary case-by-case based on the relationships formed with legislators. A broad significance of this finding is that the sectoral divide provides evidence of internal variables and divisions within labor policy networks. Collective action is then most successful when unions can successfully navigate these divisions to arrive at consensus. However, inevitable disagreement is eventually resolved one way or another and labor groups can cooperate on other issues despite disagreeing on others.

Another interesting aspect of the sector results in light of the interviews was the significant negative relationship between the size of the agricultural sector and pro-labor representative behavior. In Minnesota, the case study state, the Democratic party is one-of-a-kind in its unique name – the Democratic Farmers Laborers. This suggests an inherent tie between

these interests, at least in the Minnesota policy network, potentially demonstrating an extreme case of sectoral heterogeneity between industry and agriculture interests.

My data analysis also produced slight empirical support for the greater political influence of public union membership. Public sector unions, in addition to potentially being more intertwined with service-based sectors, can have more politically active membership, potentially explaining the statistical findings. Public sector unions are also more frequently targeted by anti-labor legislation. For example, right-to-work laws and the *Janus* Supreme Court decision both specifically limit the ability for public sector unions to collect agency fees. This could indicate that these unions that feel more under-attack may more actively pursue political representation.

Further, the sectoral-dependence of legislator behavior demonstrates the collective power of organizing by shared economic workplace interests. These interest groups are formed by their shared workplace environment and general industry. Union networks are not strictly confined to a single legislator and change their strategies frequently with the issue at hand.

Union policy network and differences between state & federal-level issues

The structure of the union policy network in addressing issues at the state/local level and the federal level provide very different levels of decision-making autonomy to local unions. In pursuing specific issues at the local level, unions demonstrate that the principal-agent relationship between labor union members and their elected representatives is very multifaceted; not only are there multiple principals, but there are also multiple agents. Intuitively, when the principal-agent problem exists on the agent's end, the principal can fill the gap by relying on a different agent-actor. In this case, unions move from federal-level agents to local-level agents based on the political will behind their legislative interests.

Another relatively new finding is that national-level union organizations largely determine the federal legislative priorities, communicating with the local unions to relay the information and coordinate issue-priorities to some degree. The inherent structure of the networks, in addition to interview responses, demonstrate the equal if not greater importance of state and local legislation for maintaining basic enabling rights. The bulk of the policy work local union organizers undertake is related to legislation at the municipal and state level. The federal issues local union organizers mentioned tended to be more appropriations-oriented and the labor representation index is largely built on bills that signal support or opposition to labor rights. I consider these bills to be signaling-focused, as no meaningful change to labor laws is achieved in the timeframe of my study – bills advancing union rights are hardly successfully signed into law and bills dismantling rights almost never pass both chambers. Unions know this and pursue labor-specific advancement, including minimum wage laws, at the municipal level with the goal of gradually spreading the policy from the local-up. This demonstrates another strategy developed and utilized by labor unions in response to gradually declining influence and membership, specifically at the federal-level. In other words, a union may rely on local-agents for the gradual piecemeal labor reform, while simultaneously relying on the signaling actions of their federal representative to help induce gradual change at the local level.

Section VI: Conclusion

Overall this paper has two main original contributions to the labor union and interest group literature: a novel measure and dataset for labor representation, and an evaluation of the principal-agent problems when the principal is group formed by individuals around a collective purpose. Variation in elected representatives' responses to the interests of organization can be

explained to some degree by the breadth and strength of labor union policy networks. To my surprise, I found that unions rely on different strategies and foci than anticipated by the existing literature on labor organization and political activity, and often need to adapt their strategies to specific district environment and challenges they face. These differences in anticipated strategies and foci are reflective of a changing, broader political landscape of declining union influence and membership.

However, there are several limitations to my research that may provide ground for further research. First, in addition to relying on qualitative analysis or interviews, union strategies could be potentially quantified and empirically tested. Information dissemination can be measured by the number of press releases, newsletter subscriptions, or attendance at labor union political events. Voter mobilization could be operationalized with district-level union member turnout statistics and resource mobilization could be measured with total union budgets and specific breakdowns of expenditures. Another limitation with my study is that the Becher, Stegmueller, and Käppner data on union membership is based on the address of the union office, not where the union members actually live. This means the data do not demonstrate the number of union member constituents in a district, making it difficult to estimate the electoral effect of union membership. Further, the data was limited in time availability, and did not provide construction or building trade employment data, which would be specifically useful given the findings from the case study. This would have been extremely pertinent, especially given the significance and implications of sector differentiation in coordination between local unions. With more time, the district-level construction/building trade employment data as well as a more reliable source for union breakdown by public and private sector would have been included as control variables. On the dependent variable, it may have been useful to include specific building

trade or craft union legislative priorities. Additionally, adding an ideology score to the robustness check of the dependent variable would further help demonstrate the potential value of measuring representation with non-roll call actions. Finally, in an ideal world I would have been able to interview more union organizers from more diverse trades; it is worth noting that interviews were conducted solely with service-sector union organizers and reflect only their perspectives on the policymaking process.

I found that overall, unions serve an important role in facilitating and maintaining a well-functioning principal-agent relationship between constituents and their legislators. The principal-agent model offers high utility in explaining the role unions fill in facilitating this relationship. While adjustments need to be made to account for the heterogeneity of principal interests and potential for multiple agents, this model offers a helpful starting point for identifying and assessing the capacity for unions to solve barriers encountered by union member constituents in articulating their interests to their elected representatives. Principals often struggle with both active monitoring and overcoming heterogenous interests. Local unions' power and capacity for collective action is driven by the interests and organization of workers around a common goal, as well as their ability to resolve ideology and policy differences to coordinate unified political action. Further, unions' collective capacity enables them access to elevate and encourage active political participation of its members, which can enable the development of such meaningful relationships between legislators and organizations that face-to-face meetings become a regular function of a congressional office. This engagement with legislators also allows unions to build collective action internally, by developing the leadership and advocacy skills of their members.

This suggests that in light of declining unionization, unions may not be able to fully rely on conventional and predicted interest group strategies. This has broad implications beyond

simply union politics; the ability for individuals to influence policymaking decisions is a central tenant of representative democracy. The strategies unions use to collectively organize then produce political results can provide lessons for other groups formed by collective action. This formation of groups organizing collectively around a singular issue provides the means for more individuals without traditional access to these spheres of influence to participate, improving the quality of representative democracy in policymaking.

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Appendix

Section 1: Interview details

Interview 1: conducted over the phone in Minneapolis, Minnesota on February 25, 2019. Interviewee is the current Political Director for UNITEHERE, an organization representing a wide-variety of service employees including hotel and food service. UNITEHERE is also a current AFL-CIO affiliate both in Minnesota at the state-level and the national-level but was disaffiliated from 2005-2009.

Interview 2: conducted in-person in St. Paul, Minnesota on February 26, 2019. Interviewee is the Campaigns Director for the Minnesota AFL-CIO, the umbrella state-level organization for labor unions.

Interview 3: conducted in-person in St. Paul Minnesota on February 27, 2019. Interviewee is a Political Organizer for a local AFSCME Council. AFSCME is an AFL-CIO affiliate.

Interview 4: conducted in-person in St. Paul, Minnesota on March 1, 2019. Interviewee is the Political Coordinator for the local SEIU. In Minnesota, unlike at the national-level, the SEIU is an affiliate of the Minnesota AFL-CIO.

Interview 5: conducted over the phone on March 14, 2019. Interviewee is a staff member for the Minneapolis Regional Labor Federation (RLF), a subsidiary of the Minnesota AFL-CIO.

Section 2: Figures

Figure 4:

Weighted Score Distribution

Figure 5:

Sponsorship and Original Co-Sponsorship Equal

Figure 6:

All Actions Held Equal

Figure 7:

Raw Membership Levels

Figure 8:

Membership Levels (log)

Figure 9:

Number of Unions

Figure 10:

Union Concentration

Figure 11:

Pre-Session Campaign Contributions

Figure 12:

Post-Session Campaign Contributions

Figure 13:

Districts % Public Sector

Section III: Dataset Preview

Please Note: Full spreadsheet can be accessed at https://tinyurl.com/haasthesisdata

Table 4: Dataset

ID	State	Sess	CD	P	Member	Y_SP	Y_OCS	Y_CS	Y_RC	N_SP	N_OCS	N_CS
1	1	108	AL-04	R	Aderholt	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
1	1	109	AL-04	R	Aderholt	0	0	0	1	0	0	3
1	1	110	AL-04	R	Aderholt	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
1	1	111	AL-04	R	Aderholt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1	1	112	AL-04	R	Aderholt	0	0	0	0	0	3	2
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2	1	109	AL-06	R	Bachus	0	1	1	0	0	1	1
2	1	110	AL-06	R	Bachus	0	1	0	2	0	0	0
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2	1	112	AL-06	R	Bachus	0	0	0	0	0	8	3
2	1	113	AL-06	R	Bachus	0	1	0	1	0	2	1
3	1	108	AL-01	R	Bonner	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
3	1	109	AL-01	R	Bonner	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
3	1	110	AL-01	R	Bonner	0	0	1	1	0	0	0
3	1	111	AL-01	R	Bonner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
3	1	112	AL-01	R	Bonner	0	0	1	0	0	4	2
3	1	113	AL-01	R	Bonner	0	0	0	0	0	1	2
4	1	111	AL-02	D	Bright	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
5	1	112	AL-05	R	Brooks	0	0	1	0	0	3	4
5	1	113	AL-05	R	Brooks	0	0	1	0	0	1	3
6	1	113	AL-01	R	Byrne	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	1	108	AL-05	D	Cramer	0	1	3	2	0	1	1
7	1	109	AL-05	D	Cramer	0	1	0	2	0	1	0
7	1	110	AL-05	D	Cramer	0	1	5	7	0	0	0
8	1	108	AL-07	D	Davis	0	0	4	2	0	0	1

(Table 4 continued)

N_RC	dep1	dep2	dep3	U_Mem	U_Num	U_Concen	lnUMem	Dem	Contrib_Pre
2	-5	-5	-3	19295.5	66.5	0.589229	9.867679	0	7500
2	-7	-7	-4	14991.5	65	0.578086	9.615305	0	9500
4	-2	-2	-2	11021.5	61	0.559425	9.307693	0	4000
2	-2	-2	-2	9274.5	55.5	0.503089	9.135132	0	-500
2	-15	-15	-7	9898.5	51	0.592157	9.200239	0	200
4	-7	-7	-5	22772.5	72.5	0.451039	10.03335	0	6000
2	2	2	-1	10989	60	0.354196	9.304741	0	3000
3	-3	-3	-3	13625.5	53	0.435246	9.519772	0	5500
6	-1	-1	-3	19486	55	0.511816	9.877502	0	4500
2	0	0	-1	18099.5	54	0.550901	9.803695	0	0
2	-32	-32	-13	24731.5	52.5	0.59735	10.11587	0	1000
3	-7	-7	-4	20537.5	52	0.543491	9.930057	0	11500
2	-2	-2	-2	21818.5	70.5	0.61436	9.99056	0	6500
3	-3	-3	-3	22645	68	0.607319	10.02774	0	10500
7	-4	-4	-5	22944	71.5	0.604719	10.04086	0	9000
2	-2	-2	-2	23886.5	67	0.640738	10.08111	0	7000
2	-16	-16	-7	17936	64	0.625628	9.794621	0	4000
2	-9	-9	-5	18682.5	65	0.6273	9.835396	0	0
2	4	4	0	14322.5	41.5	0.612747	9.569656	1	116500
2	-17	-17	-8	16833	66	0.313937	9.731156	0	0
4	-11	-11	-7	7135	36	0.459282	8.872908	0	0
0	0	0	0	18682.5	65	0.6273	9.835396	0	0
0	6	6	4	29878.5	74.5	0.418025	10.30493	1	62500
1	1	1	1	28747.5	76	0.422564	10.26634	1	27000
1	19	19	12	27148	73.5	0.409684	10.2091	1	65000
0	8	8	5	69836	125.5	0.357793	11.15392	1	31000

(Table 4 continued)

Contrib_Post	PAC_Pre	PAC_Post	Ind_Pre	Ind_Post	No_Pre	No_Post	RTW	Sec
9500	7500	9500	0	0	0	0	1	0
4000	9500	4000	0	0	0	0	1	1
-500	4000	-500	0	0	0	0	1	1
200	-500	200	0	0	0	0	1	1
6000	200	6000	0	0	0	0	1	1
22000	6000	22000	0	0	0	0	1	0
5500	3000	5500	0	0	0	0	1	0
4500	5500	4500	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	4500	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
1000	0	1000	0	0	0	0	1	1
11500	1000	11500	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	11500	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
10500	6500	10500	0	0	0	0	1	0
9000	10500	9000	0	0	0	0	1	1
7000	9000	7000	0	0	0	0	1	1
4000	7000	4000	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	4000	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
21500	116500	21500	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
2000	0	2000	0	0	1	0	1	0
27000	62500	27000	0	0	0	0	1	0
65000	27000	65000	0	0	0	0	1	1
22500	65000	22500	0	0	0	0	1	1
101250	31000	101250	0	0	0	0	1	0

(Table 4 continued)

Sec_Service	Sec_Agricul	PublicUMem
0	0	273.5
0.153329529	0.013396797	341
0.147275669	0.009173842	143
0.150532128	0.012123233	293
0.16952628	0.010458496	299.5
0	0	276.5
0	0	326
0.112644078	0.002126193	283
0.116848792	0.000762574	268
0.131076219	0.003177221	288
0.137115325	0.003645041	281.5
0	0	230
0	0	65
0.166243382	0.008151016	61
0.163072456	0.007763901	78
0.189591038	0.006208071	101
0.171510301	0.006005405	110.5
0	0	74.5
0.180228177	0.017988856	1029.5
0.166204059	0.004218234	1174
0	0	1461
0	0	74.5
0	0	930
0.128990714	0.004589865	979.5
0.140488151	0.004671947	849
0	0	2385.5