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Taste and See

Perceptual Metaphors in Israelite and Early Jewish Sapiential Epistemology

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by

Nicole L. Tilford
M.A., Florida State University, 2008

Advisor: Carol A. Newsom

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Abstract

Taste and See
Perceptual Metaphors in Israelite and Early Jewish Sapiential Epistemology
By Nicole Tilford

This dissertation examines the role of perception in Israelite and early Jewish epistemology through cognitive linguistics and conceptual metaphor theory. In particular, I argue that the regular and repeated experience of the environment through the senses provided the basic cognitive patterns for ancient Israelite and early Jewish scribes to understand the abstract experience of cognition, define the proper means of acquiring knowledge, and prescribe appropriate behaviors for their community members to follow.

Chapters 1 and 2 lay the theoretical and cultural foundations for the study. Chapters 3–5 examine the biological and cultural understanding of perception in the Hebrew Bible and the metaphors derived from them. I begin my analysis in Chapter 3 by establishing a set of "prototypical properties" associated with each of the senses in ancient Israel. Such properties, I argue, were mapped to varying degrees onto the abstract domain of cognition, creating distinctive sets of "primary" metaphors (KNOWING IS SEEING, UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, IDEAS ARE FOOD, etc.), which were then extended, blended, and clustered together to create complex, imaginative metaphors about wisdom (WISDOM IS A GARMENT, WISDOM IS A PATH OF LIGHT, WISDOM IS A TEACHER, etc.). Chapter 3 examines these primary metaphors as they appear in three biblical texts (Proverbs, Job, Qohelet), while Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the various complex, imaginative metaphors in the book of Proverbs. Chapter 6 concludes this study by examining how these imaginative perceptual metaphors became conventional modes of expression in early Jewish literature.

My study of the embodied nature of wisdom metaphors, then, is a study of the cognitive hermeneutics of ancient Israel and early Judaism. Because it postulates that both universal and cultural factors influenced the formation, expansion, and interpretation of epistemological metaphors, my study offers a fresh perspective by which to study biblical traditions and their early interpretations. Most importantly, my dissertation suggests that our study of the Hebrew Bible and its reception would benefit from taking into account not only the cultural milieu of the cultures that produced and interpreted these texts but also the common corporeal experiences that shaped their literary ventures.

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Introduction

Where is wisdom found? Where is the place of understanding?
Men do not know its length. It is not found in the land of the living.
God understands its ways. He knows its place.
—Job 28:12–13, 23

What is "wisdom"? Where is it to be found? How is it to be acquired? According to many modern individuals, wisdom is a construct of the mind, an intellectual capacity gained after years of study and mental contemplation. The Bible tells a slightly different story. Throughout the Hebrew Bible, wisdom is spoken of as a physical entity—an object that can be tasted, a word that can be seized, a path which can be walked upon. According to the psalmist, for instance, one can "taste and see that God is good" (Ps 34:8). The fatherly sage of Proverbs asserts that one can "hear" wisdom and "take" it into one's self (e.g., Prov 2:1–4, 7:1). Even Job, who argues that only God truly has wisdom, speaks of it as a location to which one can travel (Job 28:12). Perceptual experience is the foundation of cognitive experience; metaphor is the *modus operandi* of abstract thought.

Until recently, scholars paid little attention to these metaphors. Although they generally recognized that metaphorical language existed in the Bible, scholars assumed that such metaphors were mere literary embellishments, stylistic ornaments that made a text aesthetically pleasing but distracted the serious scholar from more important considerations. In Wisdom scholarship, for instance, many scholars have focused on the historical or theological dimensions of Wisdom literature, arguing that the increased literary demands of the early monarchal bureaucracy or the theological crises of the Exilic and Persian periods necessitated the development of a scribal class and with it the promulgation of certain sapiential values.[1] Others have examined the cultural dimensions of Wisdom literature, arguing that the nuances of these texts reflected the social

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[1] See, for example, Gerhard Von Rad, *Wisdom in Israel* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1972); Claus Westermann, *Roots of Wisdom: The Oldest Proverbs of Israel and Other Peoples* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1994); and John Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age* (OTL; Louisville, Kent.: Westminster John Knox, 1997).

context and beliefs of the ancient Israelite scribal class or borrowed from the sapiential values of ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia.[2] In the 1980s, scholars began to explore the literary dimensions of Wisdom literature, especially the metaphorical language used to describe wisdom or the poetic structures use to express it.[3] Still, even these scholars have persisted in viewing biblical metaphors as stylistic embellishments, expressions derived from real life but distinct from it.

Discussions of personified Wisdom in the book of Proverbs provide particularly good examples of this predisposition.[4] As Carole Fontaine so aptly put it,

> חכמה has been through a lot: She has been a 'Dame,' a 'Lady,' a 'Frau,' a hypostasy [Ringgren], a figure ('Gestalt,' Baumann), an 'exalted' female (Camp, the early years), a trickster (Camp, the latter years), a cosmic scribe (Clifford), a literary construct (Hadley), a convergence (McKinlay), a domestic survival (Fontaine), and an inchoate personification (Fox). She has been the voice of Creation, turned to men (*sic*) in self-revelation (von Rad), the voice of the Father's teaching (Newsom), or the rant of the scolding Mother (Brenner).[5]

Well into the 1980s, it was common for scholars to argue that personified Wisdom had her origin in a Semitic or Egyptian goddess. Thus, William Albright (1920) argued that Proverbs' Wisdom

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[2] See, for instance, John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue, eds., *The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East* (Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbrauns, 1990); Leo G Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus: An Introduction to Wisdom in the Age of Empires* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2008); Bernhard Lang, *Wisdom and the Book of Proverbs: A Hebrew Goddess Redefined* (New York: Pilgrim, 1986); and Nili Shupak, *Where Can Wisdom be Found? The Sage's Language in the Bible and in Ancient Egyptian Literature* (Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 130; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1993).

[3] See, for instance, James Crenshaw, "Wisdom Psalms?" *CRBS* (2000): 9–17; Michael Fox, *Proverbs 1–9: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (New York: Doubleday, 2000); ibid., *Proverbs 10–31: A New Introduction and Commentary* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); and Peter Hatton, *Contradiction in the Book of Proverbs: The Deep Waters of Counsel* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008). Of course, these three approaches are not mutually exclusive. When Fox focuses on the literary dimensions of Wisdom literature, for instance, he does not neglect the historical or social dimensions. Similarly, when Perdue focuses on the social context of Wisdom literature, he also attends to the historical and literary circumstances that influenced these social worldviews.

[4] In the pages that follow, I shall use a lower case "w" to refer to the concept of wisdom, except when referring to the literary genre ("Wisdom literature") or its personified form ("personified Wisdom").

[5] Carole Fontaine, *Smooth Words: Women, Proverbs, and Preformance in Biblical Wisdom* (New York: T & T Clark, 2002). For useful surveys of these and similar positions, see Claudia Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine in the Book of Proverbs* (Bible and Literature 11; Sheffield, Eng.: JSOT Press, 1985), 23–77; and Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 331–45.

developed from the Phoenician Ishtar; Wilfred Knox (1937) noted her similarity to the Egyptian goddess Isis; Christa Bauer-Kayatz (1966, 1969) likened her to the Egyptian goddess Maat; and Bernhard Lang (1986) argued that she was the Canaanite patron goddess of the king.[6] She was, in other words, a literary expression of a theological reality. Others rejected a cultic explanation in favor of theological or historical explanations. Helmer Ringgren (1947), for instance, argued that personified Wisdom was a hypostatization of qualities typically assigned to YHWH, while Burton Mack (1970, 1985) defined her as a literary response to the social and ideological insecurity of the exile.[7] More recently, scholars have recognized personified Wisdom as a metaphorical construct and have looked to the sociological reality of women in ancient Israel to discover her cultural archetypes. Claudia Camp (1985), for instance, argued that the sages drew upon at least six common female roles to depict personified Wisdom: the wife as household manager, the wife as counselor, the lover, the wise woman, the trickster woman, and the female authenticator of tradition.[8] To this, Gerlinde Bauman (1996) added the Israelite prophetess, and Michael Fox (2000) added the roles of hostess, spurned woman, mother, and teacher.[9] Fontaine (2002) attempted to take a medial approach, arguing that Wisdom was stylized upon both cosmic female goddesses and the Israelite woman as wife and sage.[10] Such scholars maintain that Wisdom "abstracts" elements from these female personages; yet, the lived experiences themselves remain largely inconsequential to the wisdom experience itself.

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[6] William Albright, "The Goddess of Life and Wisdom," *AJSL* 36 (1919–1920): 258–94; Wilfred Knox, "The Divine Wisdom," *JTS* 38 (1937): 230–37; Christa Bauer-Kayatz, *Studien zu Proverbien 1–9* (Wissenschaftliche Monographien zum Alten und neuen Testament 22; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Nuekirchener, 1966); Christa Bauer-Kayatz, *Einführung in die alttestamentliche Weisheit* (Biblische Studien 55; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1969); Lang, *Wisdom and the Book of Proverbs*, 60–70.

[7] Helmer Ringgren, *Word and Wisdom: Studies in the Hypostatization of Divine Qualities and Functions in the Ancient Near East* (Lund: Haken Ohlssons Boktryckeri, 1947), esp. 95–106; Burton Mack, "Wisdom Myth and Myth-ology," *Int* 24 (1970): 46–60; ibid., *Wisdom and the Hebrew Epic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 143–50.

[8] Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine*, 79–147.

[9] Gerlinde Baumann, *Die Weisheitsgestalt in Proverbien 1–9* (Forschungen zum Alten Testament 16; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1996), 289–91; Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 338–41.

[10] Fontaine, *Smooth Words*, 12–149.

These diverse conversations have been helpful in uncovering the social, literary, and historical dimensions of ancient Wisdom literature (the *who*, *what*, and *when* of wisdom), although the specifics of the debates have often obscured more than they have revealed. These scholars have even provided some reasonable suggestions about *why* certain trends in Wisdom literature emerged. However, scholars have yet to adequately address *how* the concept of wisdom developed. Scholars assume that wisdom is an intellectual, theological, or literary figure and sometimes make vague references to the way that wisdom "abstracts" elements from real life, but they rarely detail the exact processes by which wisdom develops or the cognitive mechanisms responsible for its development.[11]

In the pages that follow, I shall attempt to rectify this situation. Drawing upon the conceptual metaphor theories of George Lakoff, Mark Johnson, Giles Fauconnier, and Mark Taylor (the "LJTT" theory), I shall examine the processes by which ancient Israelite and early Jewish sages developed and communicated the meaning of wisdom.[12] In particular, I shall argue that "wisdom" in ancient Israel was not a sophisticated literary construct or an elaborate theological figure, the imaginings of an elite class divorced from the normal operations of real life; rather, it was a set of deep and abiding cultural metaphors that enabled ancient Israelites and early Jews to comprehend their world, define the proper means of acquiring knowledge, and prescribe appropriate behaviors for their community members to follow. The concept of wisdom, in other words, was a set of pre-linguistic cognitive structures that organized individuals'

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[11] See, for example, Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine*, 215–22; Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 314. Some scholars have attempted to detail the processes by which these metaphors develop, but so far their efforts have been limited. See, for instance, Knut Heim, *Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver: An Interpretation of Proverbial Clusters in Proverbs 10:1–22:16* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001); Greg Schmidt Goering, "Sapiential Synesthesia: The Conceptual Blending of Light and Word in Ben Sira's Wisdom Instruction," in *Cognitive Linguistic Readings of Biblical Texts* (eds. Bonnie Howe and Joel Green; Berlin: De Gruyter, forthcoming); and Mary B. Szlos, "Metaphor in Proverbs 31:10–31: A Cognitive Approach" (Ph.D diss., Union Theological Seminary, 2001).

[12] Although most of the texts to be discussed in the following pages were compiled during or after the Exile, many contain traditions that pre-date 586 B.C.E. I shall thus refer to the communities whose traditions are represented in these texts as both "ancient Israelites" and "early Jews." However, since I have limited my discussion to texts written in and around the land of Israel, I shall refer to their geographical origin as "ancient Israel." For more information on the historical context of the Wisdom texts under discussion, see Chapter 2.

conception of and interaction with the environment, and the authors of Wisdom texts consciously manipulated these structures to convey specific meanings to their audience.

Moreover, it is my contention that the regular, repeated experience of the environment through a variety of perceptual modalities led to the formation of wisdom metaphors in the first place and ensured their enduring appeal to future communities.[13] Thus, after providing an overview of the main tenets of conceptual metaphor theory (Chapter 1) and the historical context of Israelite and early Jewish Wisdom texts (Chapter 2), I begin my analysis proper by examining the physical and cultural conceptualizations of perception in ancient Israel and how these conceptualizations led to the formation of distinct metaphors for cognition in the books of Proverbs, Job, and Qohelet (Chapter 3). For instance, by drawing upon common perceptual experiences, the authors of these texts could describe thinking as an act of seeing (e.g., Prov 6:6; Job 8:8; Qoh 2:12), grasping (e.g., Prov 3:13, Qoh 2:3), or walking (e.g., Prov 6:6; Job 38:16; Qoh 2:1). In Chapters 4 and 5, I then examine how these metaphors extended, blended, and clustered together to create more complex metaphors about wisdom, particularly in the book of Proverbs.[14] Through such processes, wisdom became conceptualized as a crown that adorns the head (e.g., Prov 1:8–9), a path upon which one can walk (e.g., Prov 4:11, 10:17), and a teacher who proclaims her message upon the city streets (e.g., Prov 1:20–33; 8:1–6, 32–36). In other

[13] By the term "perceptual modality," I mean the "special faculties, [often] connected with a bodily organ, by which [humans] and other animals perceive external objects and changes in the condition of their own bodies." "Sense, n.," n.p. in *Oxford English Dictionary Online* [cited 5 February 2011]. Online: http://www.oed.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/Entry/175954. In the modern West, we typically describe these faculties as "senses" and limit their number to five (sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch). However, as shall be discussed in Chapter 3, there are many forms of perception, and each culture has enumerated and conceptualized these forms in its own unique way. In the discussion that follows, I will thus privilege the broader nomenclature of "perceptual modality" or "perceptual experience" in order to provide a greater flexibility when describing the perceptual experiences of other cultures and avoid imposing a limited modern impression of the "senses" onto ancient literature. However, for reader convenience, I will not completely eliminate the use of the terms "sense" and "sensory," especially when referring to previous scholarship.

[14] The (Hebrew) book of Proverbs was chosen for particular emphasis in Chapters 4 and 5, since it is one of the prototypical examples of Israelite Wisdom literature and since many of the sapiential texts which follow it chronologically draw upon the traditions present within it. In the final chapter, I return to the books of Job and Qohelet, as well as other early Jewish Wisdom texts, to explore how the imaginative metaphors of Proverbs became conventionalized modes of expression.

words, wisdom in ancient Israel was a multimodal affair; it was not simply a quality that could be thought about; it was an experience that could be heard and spoken, grasped and embraced, walked upon and worn, tasted and seen. Chapter 6 concludes the study by exploring how these metaphors eventually became conventional modes of expression in later Jewish texts such as the Qumran document the book of Ben Sira and the Wisdom of Solomon.

One of the most important implications that will emerge in the course of this study is the realization that the concept of wisdom in ancient Israel was influenced by universal *and* cultural factors. As intimated above, scholars who study this material have focused largely on the culturally-specific dimensions of ancient Wisdom literature, how these texts reflect the social or historical developments of Israelite and early Jewish society or how they borrow from the Wisdom literature of contemporaneous cultures. While not denying the importance of these cultural influences, a study of these ancient biblical texts through conceptual metaphor theory reveals that the cognitive processes responsible for the concept of wisdom are also highly influenced by universal human experiences. Common perceptual experiences provided the basic cognitive *patterns* by which ancient Israelite scribes understood the abstract experience of wisdom; the unique practices of the ancient Israelites determined how they *described* it. The common experience of hearing, for instance, has led to cognition being understood around the world as a spoken word (e.g., in modern America, in ancient Israel, in aboriginal Australia), while the specific cultural experience of Israelite teachers led to wisdom being described specifically as public teacher (e.g., in Prov 1:20–33). Because these complimentary impulses not only influenced the initial development of these biblical metaphors but also enabled later communities to adopt these metaphors for their own religious needs, my analysis of this literature suggests that our study of the Hebrew Bible and its reception would benefit from taking into account not only the cultural milieu of the communities that produced and interpreted these texts but also the common corporeal experiences that shaped their literary ventures.

In the final analysis, then, it is my hope that conceptual metaphor theory shall not only advance our understanding of the cognitive processes by which these specific biblical wisdom metaphors developed but also illuminate the different physical and cultural factors that contributed to the development of biblical traditions more generally throughout history. Only by examining both culture and biology can we understand where wisdom truly comes from, what it meant for ancient biblical communities, and how it was to be engaged. Only by doing so can we understand the formation, development, and interpretation of ancient biblical traditions.

Chapter 1: Embodied Meaning

Mind-Body Dualism?

Since the early Greek Platonists, philosophers have speculated about a dichotomy between the mind (or "soul" [1]) and the body. In the *Phaedo*, for instance, Plato argues for a radical separation between the σῶμα (body) and the ψυχή (soul), with the σῶμα being that which is mortal and perceived by perception and the ψυχή that which is invisible, divine, and immortal: "Are we not also on the one hand body (σῶμα), on the other hand soul (ψυχή)?...the soul (ψυχή) is most like that which is divine and undying and of the mind (νοητός) and of one form and indissoluble and always in the same manner, but the body is most like that which is human and mortal and of many forms and not of the mind (ἀνόητος) and dissoluble and always changing" (*Phaed*. 79c, 80b). Since the soul resembles the mind (the νόος) and is the only part of the human being able to access intangible realm of ideas, it is deemed permanent and good, while the body is disparaged as transient and corruptible.[2] This dualistic attitude, with its moral connotations, gradually became a dominant stream in Western thought.

Particularly under the influence of René Descartes (1596–1650), who distinguished ontologically between the purely intellectual (non-material) realm of the mind and the material physical realm of the body, modernity has largely continued to perceive a sharp distinction

[1] While not every culture or individual conceives of the human intellect as residing in the soul, it is appropriate to speak of the "mind" and "soul" synonymously here. Although there were different terms for each, ancient thinkers often assign those functions that popular Western society associates with the mind (e.g., cognition, reasoning, rationality) to the soul. In the writings of Plato, for instance, rational thought was performed by the ψυχή. Similarly, the Stoics viewed the soul as the mechanism that governed the perceptual and cognitive functions of the body (see, for instance, the discussion of Chrysippus below). Moreover, in popular Western culture, the "mind" is often considered that which is unique to a person and defines his or her identity of "self." It is this "self," at least for religiously-oriented individuals, that is thought to survive a person after death in the concept of the "soul."

[2] See discussion of this passage in Dale Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 11. For more on Plato's conception of the soul, see Hendrick Lorenz, "Plato on the Soul," in *The Oxford Handbook of Plato* (ed. Gail Fine; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 243–66, esp. his discussion of the *Phaedo*, 251–54.

between mind and body.[3] It is not uncommon for the modern Western individual to operate with a paradigm in which a person consists of two parts, the "higher" rational inner portion (mind/soul) and the "lower" physical emotional portion (body). Under this paradigm, reason is seen as a faculty distinct from the "base" realms of bodily movement.[4] It is commonly believed in popular culture, for instance, that the mind can force the body to perform or abstain from certain "base" activities such as eating, drinking, or sexual intercourse. Similarly, common conceptions of life after death envision the separation of the immaterial, "pure" soul from the "corrupt" body. This dualistic perception is reinforced by our use of language and by the processes of the body itself, since the normal processes of the body (such as that of the internal organs) hide below the surface while our senses and intellectual perceptions are directed outward beyond the body.[5]

Embedded in this intellectual climate, modern Western scholars of religion easily fall victim to the same assumptions, viewing the "mind" and "body" as two distinct entities and believing that meaning resides solely in the cognitive sphere, in the words of the individual author or the discourse of the culture in which the text is situated. In the study of Judaism, for instance, many scholars have focused on the religion's "mental" achievements—scriptures, exegesis, liturgies, commentaries, etc.—denying that the body played a prominent role in the creation of such texts. Such scholars have been uncomfortable with studying the body, either because they fear it would to lead to the equation of Judaism with "savage" religions or because they feel that it diminishes the unique character of Judaism.[6] In a rather impassioned critique of the "history of the body" in Jewish scholarship, Leon Wieseltier insists that it is Judaism's *texts*, its intellectual view of the world, that makes Judaism unique. According to him, the study of Judaism should be

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[3] For a brief summary of Descartes and his influence on Western thought, see Mark Johnson, "Mind Incarnate: From Dewey to Damasio," *Daedalus* 135 (2006): 46–54. For Descartes' impact on modern scholarly interpretations of ancient texts, see Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 4– 6.

[4] George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 17.

[5] Mark Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 4; ibid., "Mind Incarnate," 47.

[6] For more on these prejudices, see the extended discussion in Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, *The Savage in Judaism: An Anthropology of Israelite Religion and Ancient Judaism* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1990), 1–87.

a study of Jewish ideas; to do otherwise would turn Jews into just "another tribe."[7] While this situation is slowly changing with the works of such scholars as Howard Eilberg-Schwartz and Daniel Boyarin, such a *conscious* interest in the body reflects the pervasiveness of an *unconscious* division between mind and body. Jews are either "people of the *book*" or "people of the *body*."[8]

Less consciously, but no less pervasively, there has been an implicit division between mind and body in the study of ancient Wisdom literature. Many scholars, for instance, have focused on this literature as scribal "discourse," as if it is solely an intellectual endeavor of an elite class divorced from the praxes of everyday life. Fox, for instance, argues that "experience does not translate directly into wisdom." While a few proverbs may be based on experiential data, he insists, proverbs are generally "statements of faith, not abstractions from experiential data."[9] Other scholars have focused on Wisdom teachings as the "encoding of a lived experienced."[10] Thus, Leo Perdue maintains that Wisdom texts are "not cold abstraction or the deductions of principles obtained by pure logic" but the product and application of practical experience and sensual pursuits.[11] There is an implicit "either…or" mentality. Either Wisdom literature is based on bodily experience *or* it is a mental construct. Such treatments, although useful for understanding the *Sitz im Leben* of Wisdom literature, unknowingly reflect and perpetuate the mind-body dualism of the modern scholars who produce them.

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[7] Leon Wieseltier, "Jewish Bodies, Jewish Minds," *JQR* 95 (2005): 435–42 (esp. 442).

[8] This dichotomy reflects the debate between Eilberg-Schwartz, Boyarin, and Wieseltier. Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, for instance, specifically sought to counter the image of Jews as "People of the Book." Eilberg-Schwartz, *The Savage in Judaism*; ibid., "The Problem of the Body for the People of the Book," in *Reading Bodies, Writing Bodies: Identity and the Book* (eds. T. Beal and D. Gunn; London: Routledge, 1997); repr. from *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 2 (1991), 1–24. Daniel Boyarin, likewise, sought to introduce the body back into scholarship of antiquity, arguing that the hermeneutical system of the rabbis developed out of rabbinic perceptions of the human body, especially of human sexuality. See Daniel Boyarin, *Carnal Israel: Reading Sex in Talmudic Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). Wiesleltier, while recognizing that Jews have bodies, sought to preserve this image, insisting that the mental achievements of the Jews are more important than any other cultural achievements. Moreover, contra Eilberg-Schwartz and Boyarin, Wieseltier argues that the insistence that Jews are "'people of the body'…bases its revisionism upon the same coarse dualism of mind and body for which it indicts the scholarship it wishes to revise." See Wieseltier, "Jewish Bodies, Jewish Minds," 436–37.

[9] Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 965–66. He argues, for instance, that a sage did not need to physically observe ants bringing food to an anthill to build a proverb that praises diligence (Prov 6:6–11).

[10] Roland Murphy, "Wisdom in the OT," *ABD* 6: 920–31 (925).

[11] Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 5.

Yet, this sharp division between mind and body is problematic. Although modern Western individuals think in terms of a mind-body divide, this division is not naturally predetermined. Since the late 19th century/early 20th century, such philosophers as William James (1890), John Dewey (1958), Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962), and the cognitive scientists who followed them have increasingly argued that there is no autonomous "faculty of reason," distinct from normal bodily functions.[12] Rather, as shall be discussed below, the human being's ability to think, derive meaning, and communicate with others stems from his or her daily corporeal experience. As Mark Johnson states, "no body, never mind."[13]

More importantly for this study, the ontological division between mind and body is a cultural construct of the modern West, one that does not seem to have been prevalent amongst the majority of ancient communities. In Old Babylonian cosmology, for instance, humankind was said to be created out of the *body* of a god (see *Atraḫasīs* I 192–226). It is through this god's blood (*damu*) in particular that humanity's intelligence (*ṭēmu*) is derived.[14] Moreover, although surviving him or her after death, an individual's "ghost" (*eṭemmu*)—"the power for thought, the ability of the individual to plan and deliberate so that he may act effectively and achieve success"—remained intimately connected to the body, deriving its form from it, being able to be perceived by it, and ceasing to exist without it.[15] Even dead, the body served as the "locus" for the continued existence of the *eṭemmu*; without it, the *eṭemmu* lost its social and individual identity.[16] In this Mesopotamian cosmology, then, there is an intimate connection between an

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[12] For an extended discussion of this trajectory, see Johnson, "Mind Incarnate," 46–54; Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 16–17.

[13] Johnson, "Mind Incarnate," 47.

[14] Tzvi Abusch, "Ghost and God: Some Observations on a Babylonian Understanding of Human Nature," in *Self, Soul & Body in Religious Experience* (eds. Albert Baumgarten, et al.; Leiden: Brill, 1998), 363–83 (378). Abusch argues that it is no coincidence that *damu* and *ṭēmu* sound alike, but rather suggests that this connection between blood and intelligence is integrated into the language itself.

[15] Abusch, "Ghost and God," 382. By reading *eṭemmu* as intellect, Abusch is drawing upon Thorkild Jacobsen's reading of *ṭēmu* as the "power for effective thinking, planning, and inspiration." See Thorkild Jacobsen, *The Treasures of Darkness: A History of Mesopotamian Religion* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 156.

[16] Abusch, "Ghost and God," 374–75. As Abusch argues, proper burial was crucial to the survival of the *eṭemmu*; destroying the body deprived the eṭemmu of its individual and social identity (475).

individual's intellectual capacities, his or her sense of self, and the corporeal experience.

Similarly, as Dale Martin argues, amongst the ancient Greeks, the prevailing view was not a Platonic mind-body dualism, but a "one world" model, in which parts of the body fell upon a hierarchal spectrum, rather than into sharp oppositions (e.g., the mind being "higher" and more divine-like than other parts of the body, but not distinct from them).[17] The Stoics, for instance, argued that the body was not a container for the soul; rather, the soul was a specific type of πνεῦμα (breath), a natural element that was integrated into the body. Chrysippus (280–207 B.C.E.), one of the most prolific of the Stoic writers, argued that "the soul (ψυχή) is breath (πνεῦμα) inherent within us, extending through the entire body (σῶμα) as long as the breath (εὔπνοια) of life remains in the body (σῶμα)" (see Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 287).[18] According to Chrysippus, the soul was responsible not only for human perception but also for "governing" the body (i.e., rational thought) (see Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato* 288).[19] The soul-mind was thus a part of nature that could be studied like any other natural entity.[20] Even Platonic thought may not have been as radically dualistic and anti-materialistic as it first appears. As Martin explains, Plato postulated the existence of three different forms of the soul, the highest being associated with the invisible, the lowest being close to and intermingled with the body. All three forms, however, were "mixed together" to form one composite being (*Tim.* 35a, 69c–71a; *Resp.* 434e–444d; *Phaedr*. 246b–249d).[21] Thus, even Plato's model seems closer to the hierarchical spectrum of his contemporaries than a strict contrast between mind and body.

Amongst the Israelites and early Jews, the same lack of dualism seems to have been

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[17] Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 15. For more on the tripartite nature of the soul, esp. in the *Republic*, see Lorenz, "Plato on the Soul," 254–63.

[18] See the discussion of this passage in Julia Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of the Mind* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 61–62.

[19] Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of the Mind*, 61–70.

[20] In concluding that the soul was a part of nature that could be studied as such, the Stoics are following Aristotle. For a fuller discussion of the natural-ness of the soul, see Annas, *Hellenistic Philosophy of the Mind*, 5–6, 43– 56.

[21] Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 11–12.

dominant, with Jews affirming the intimate connection between mind and body well into the medieval ages. Throughout the Hebrew Bible, cognition seems to reside within the body itself, for example, in the לבב/לב ("heart") and the כבד ("liver"). In Deut 29:3[4], Josh 23:14, etc., the לבב/לב is the faculty associated with the ability to "know" (לדעת), while elsewhere the לבב/לב is seat of emotions (Neh 2:2, Ps 38:9[8], etc.).[22] As in Akkadian, the כבד was probably perceived as the seat of human emotions and not the "soul" (e.g., Ps 7:6[5], 16:9, 30:13[12], 57:9[8], 108:2[1]).[23] It is unclear if the לבב/לב and the כבד coincides exactly with the organs we call "heart" and "liver" (the לבב/לב, for instance, often connotes "chest" more generally and the כבד "innards");[24] yet, they clearly reside in the body. Moreover, there does not seem to have been a sharp bifurcation between these cognitive centers and the rest the body. The psalmists, for instance, describe a cacophony of "seemingly independent body parts" (tongue, mouth, ear, etc.) of which the cognitive centers are but specific examples.[25] See, for instance, Ps 22:15–16, where the לב is listed alongside the "bones," "innards," and "tongue" as congruent categories of body parts.[26] While these parts could operate individually, each could also be controlled and integrated into a composite whole.

There is also no idea that a soul has been placed in the body temporarily and only vague notions that the individual would experience any life divorced from the body hereafter.[27]

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[22] Heinz-Joseph Fabry, "לֵב, לֵבָב," *TDOT* 7: 399–437 (414, 419–20). See also Silvia Schroer and Thomas Stabli, *Body Symbolism in the Bible* (trans. L. Maloney; Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 2001), 43–44.

[23] P. Stenmans, "כָּבֵד," *TDOT* 7: 21–22.

[24] Stenmans, *TDOT* 7: 21; Fabry, *TDOT* 7: 411.

[25] Susanne Gillmayr-Bucher, "Body Images in the Psalms," *JSOT* 28 (2004): 301–26 (321).

[26] Gillmayr-Bucher notes how the bones and heart in v. 15 combine to give a "general impression of a total disintegration. The bones and the heart, that is, the support of a physical as well as a mental unity, are lost" (Gillmayr-Bucher, "Body Images in the Psalms," 312). As two central parts of the human body, the bones and heart represent the entire individual.

[27] See Philip Johnston, *Shades of Sheol: Death and Afterlife in the Old Testament* (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity, 2002), esp. 218–229; Ellis Brotzman, "Man and the Meaning of נֶפֶשׁ," *Bibliotheca Sacra* 145 (1988): 400–09. Brotzman argues, for instance, that such passages as Ps 16:10a, Ps 30:3, and Ps 89:48, each of which refer to Sheol, do not refer to a disembodied afterlife but to the "grave" (408–09). Psalm 49:16, on the other hand, may "hint" at life beyond the grave, but that concept is not developed (409). Similarly, Isa 26 26:19 and Dan 12:2 seem to refer to individual resurrection, but their theme is never fully realized in the rest of the books in which they are found (Johnston, *Shades of Sheol*, 224–27).

Although often translated as “soul” or “spirit,” both נפש and רוח were closely tied to the body. The נפש, for instance, was originally associated with the “throat” or “breath” of an individual (see the Akkadian *napištu*). While this meaning is largely absent from the Hebrew Bible, it probably lies behind the most frequent meaning of נפש as the center of a person’s physical and emotional “appetites.”[28] Even when it came to represent the person as a whole, his or her “self,” or life in general, נפש could still be used synonymously with “blood” (Gen 9:4; Lev 17:11, 14), “breath” (Gen 35:18, 1 Kgs 17:21–22, Job 41:13, Jer 15:19), or “corpse” (Lev 19:28; 21:1, 11; 22:4; Num 5:2; 6:6, 11; 9:6–7, 10; 19:13; Hag 2:13). The most basic meaning of נפש, then, seems to have remained a “creature that breathes,” a connotation intimately connected to the corporeal condition.[29] Similarly, רוח, though translated as “spirit,” more generally means “breath,” “life,” seat of “emotions,” or center of “cognition.” Like the נפש, the רוח of an individual resided in the body and does not seem to have survived it after death.[30]

Finally, even the Israelite conception of divinity is embodied. The Divine walks in the primeval garden (Gen 3:8), wrestles with Jacob along the banks of the Jabbok wadi (Gen 32:22–32), has a divine “breath” (רוח; Ps 18:16[15]), etc.[31] Since humanity was made “in the image” of the divine, the Israelite conception of an embodied God reflects their perception of themselves as

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[28] For the Akkadian etymology of *napištu* and its connection to נפש as “throat” in the Hebrew Bible, see Brotzman,“Man and the Meaning of נֶפֶשׁ,”405; H. Seebass, “נֶפֶשׁ,” *TDOT* 9: 497–519 (499–502, 504). Brotzman (“Man and the Meaning of נֶפֶשׁ,” 405 n.11) identifies five possible occurrences of נפש as throat: Jer 4:10, Jon 2:6, Ps 69:2, 105:18, Prov 3:22.

[29] Brotzman, “Man and the Meaning of נֶפֶשׁ,” 403, 404–05, 406. That a person’s corpse could be referred to as a נפש supports this connection between the body and the נפש. A person’s נפש did not survive him or her after death in an ethereal plane, but either evaporated (when his “breath” expired) or remained tied to his “corpse.”

[30] S. Tengström and Heinz-Joseph Fabry, “רוּחַ,” *TDOT* 13: 365–402 (375–76). Tengström notes that “nothing explicit is said of a person’s own rûaḥ” at death (with the possible exception of Zech 12:1), but since the רוח comes from God, presumably it returns to God at death (386–87). In fact, רוח more frequently refers to a property of God than a human.

[31] This brief sample comes from a variety of time periods, sources, and traditions. It is only intended to reflect a general picture of ancient Israelite perceptions of the divinity. It is not my intent to suggest that ancient Israel had a single, monolithic religion or unchanging view of divinity. For more on רוח as divine “breath,” see Tengström and Fabry, *TDOT* 13:375. For more on the interpretive difficulties of speaking of “God’s body,” see Howard Eilberg-Schwartz, “Does God Have a Body? The Problem of Metaphor and Literal Language in Biblical Interpretation,” in *Bodies, Embodiment, and Theology of the Hebrew Bible* (eds. S. Tamar Kamionkowski and Wonil Kim; New York: T & T Clark, 2010), 201–37.

embodied creatures.[32] As Susanne Gillmayr-Bucher argues, the Israelites "do not so much *have* a body," as if it was something distinct from their true being (i.e., the soul); they "*are* a body."[33]

This lack of dualistic thought continued in early Jewish texts, including those influenced by Greek culture. For instance, 4 Maccabees, although allowing for a body and soul, does not seem to make a sharp distinction between them. The passions (esp. pleasure and pain) are said to be "in the body (σῶμα) as well as the soul (ψυχή)" (4 Macc. 1.20). Likewise, in the *Testament of Reuben*, the intellectual aspects of the individual are intimately connected to the body: seeing leads to desire (*T. Reu*. 2.4), hearing provides instruction (*T. Reu.* 2.5), and strife resides in the liver (*T. Reu* .3.4). In the *Testament of Naphtali*, the strength of the body corresponds to that of the spirit and vice versa (*T. Naph*. 2.2). In the *Letter of Aristeas*, although the processes of the body (digestion, movement of limbs, etc.) are constructed separately from those of the perceptual modalities, they do not seem to be sharply divided (e.g., *Let. Aris*.1.156). Even Philo, one of the most Platonic and dualistic of the Jewish writers, envisions a close integration of body and soul, with the perceptual experiences of the body being a necessary first step of the soul's progress towards wisdom (e.g., *De congress eruditionis gratia*). Like Plato, Philo (*QG* 2.59) also seemed to envision three gradations of the soul, two of which (the "nutritive" and the "sense-perceptive") were intimately connected to the blood and the perceptive capabilities of the body. The third ("rational") portion of the soul was composed of the divine πνεῦμα, which in keeping with common medical theories was "comingled" with the blood in the arteries and veins.[34] In antiquity as in modernity, then, "mind" and "body" are not two distinct, conflicting entities operating within an individual; rather they are merely two of many abstract terms that societies use to

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[32] Regardless of the exact exegetical nuances of Gen 1:26–27—"let us make humanity in our image"—this phrase captures the well-argued theoretical point that a culture's conception of the divine and the cosmos reflects their perception of their own human state and society.

[33] Gillmayr-Bucher, "Body Images in the Psalms," 325. Gillmayr-Bucher here is speaking specifically about the psalmist perceptive, but the statement could easily apply to the Israelites as a whole.

[34] Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 13–14.

describe how the individual experiences the world.[35]

Embodied Meaning

Perhaps one of the most important implications of this intimate connection between mind and body is the recognition that the development and communication of meaning does not occur on the linguistic level alone. Contra traditional theories of language and cognition, one cannot assert that abstract meaning is a secondary development that occurs after and apart from concrete experience.[36] Indeed, as George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have argued, words are dependent, not on some disembodied mind, but on the immanent nature of the biological, and therefore "embodied," human experience. As Johnson states,

> meaning grows from our visceral connections to life and the bodily conditions of life. We are born into the world as creatures of the flesh, and it is through our bodily perceptions, movements, emotions, and feelings that meaning becomes possible and takes the forms it does. From the day we are brought kicking and screaming into the world, what and how anything is meaningful to us is shaped by our specific form of incarnation.[37]

In other words, meanings emerge "from the bottom up," through the biological engagement of individuals with their changing environment.[38] Only after meaning has been acquired through bodily processes is it then extended by principles of analogy into language and abstract thought.

For example, every day, a human being engages in simple, physical activities. You walk *out* of the house and sit *in* your car. You reach *into* a bag and take *out* a can of soup. Your very body is a container *into* which you place certain properties (e.g., water, food, air) and *out* of

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[35] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 2–15 (esp. 11–12). As Johnson states, "mind" and "body" are simply "shorthand ways of identifying aspects of ongoing organism-environment interactions" (117).

[36] Johnson's view of "embodied meaning," for instance, is specifically aimed at countering "representational" theories of cognition. Broadly defined, this view states that "cognition (i.e., perceiving, conceptualizing, imagining, reasoning, planning, willing) operates via mental 'representations' (e.g., ideas, concepts, images, propositions) that are capable of being 'about' or 'directed to' other representations and to states of affairs in the external world." Such a position presumes a radical division between "mind" and "body." Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 114.

[37] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, ix.

[38] Ibid., 10.

which you expel others (e.g., carbon dioxide, excrement, sweat). Because this physical experience is regular and repetitive, the human brain takes note of these activities and organizes its perception of reality based on those activities. Certain "neurons and neuronal clusters fire in response to certain patterns," and they become fixed "topological features of our neural maps."[39] These neural clusters, in turn, combine into a complex neural network of what Johnson calls "image schemas," that is, "dynamic, recurrent pattern[s] of organism-environment interactions" by which the human brain shapes and organizes its experience of these ongoing physical activities.[40] For instance, the physical experience of putting objects into and taking them out of certain containers creates a basic neurological impression of CONTAINMENT—a sense of boundaries, of belonging and alienation, of similarity and difference—by which the human brain categorizes a very complex environment into a coherent, predictable system, an IN-OUT schema in which some entities are "in" and some are "out."[41] Thus, prior to the formulation of any words or conscious thought, the human being has created a complex neural network through which it experiences, organizes, and finds meaning in its environment. In this way, "every aspect of our [corporeal] experience [is] defined by recurring patterns and structures (such as up-down, front-back, near-far, in-out, on-under) that constitute the basic contours of our lived world."[42] Even aspects of cognition that seem like highly rational, second-order thought (like categorization) already exist on the most basic level of an individual's interaction with his or her environment.

Not surprisingly, then, many image schemas develop directly from a specific perceptual faculty or concrete perceptual experience. Our movement through space, for instance, governs the creation of such schemas as UP-DOWN and INTO-OUT OF. Not every schema, however, can be

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[39] Ibid., 159, 135.

[40] Ibid., 136. Johnson uses the label "image schemas," not because these structures are connected to vision alone (quite the contrary) or specify "mental pictures," but to emphasize that schemas are "imagistic." More general than "rich" images (e.g., a mental image of a cat) and more concrete than true abstract concepts, image schemas are the structures by which we organize our perception of reality Mark Johnson, *The Body in the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 23–30.

[41] Johnson, *The Body in the Mind*, 30–40. Here, I follow the standard practice of Lakoff, Johnson, and their followers by denoting image schemas with small caps.

[42] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 135.

linked to a specific perceptual experience. For instance, the CYCLE schema—"the general pattern of recurring states" (e.g., circular motion)—does not develop from any particular perceptual facility but rather more generally from our human experience of being embodied.[43] Because of this, Joseph Grady prefers to distinguish between image schemas, which he views as "fundamental units of sensory experience…self-contained dimensions of our richer perceptual experience,"[44] and other types of schemas, such as "response schemas" (e.g., CYCLE), which "relate to our interpretations of and responses to the world, our assessments of the physical situations we encounter, their nature and their meaning."[45] Yet, even schemas that seem to have little connection to the human modalities develop from our physical experience of them. It is by *seeing* the sun rise and set and by *feeling* the rhythm of our breathing that we develop a sense of cyclical time and a CYCLE schema. Like image schemas, such schemas construct meaning from the embodied human experience and rely upon the perceptual facilities to do so.

Image schemas are effective ordering devices, because they focus an individual's experience of his or her complex environment on a selected number of particular aspects of that experience. This occurs through a process that Anthony Wallace calls "abstraction": "Abstraction involves a restriction of attention to selected dimensions both of the environment and of the organism's own response potentialities, and the exclusion of others as irrelevant; it necessarily involves the ignoring of variations within the minimum resolution range permitted by the physiology of the animal."[46] The IN-OUT schema, for instance, focuses the individual's experience of a cup on its ability to act as a container for liquid, rather than its ability to be, say, picked up

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[43] Joseph Grady, "Image Schemas and Perception: Refining a Definition," in *From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics* (ed. Beate Hampe; Cognitive Linguistics Research 29; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), 35–56 (38, 40–41).

[44] Grady, "Image Schemas and Perception,"44.

[45] Ibid., 47.

[46] Anthony Wallace, "Culture and Congition," in *Language, Culture and Cogntion: Anthropological Perspectives* (ed. R. Casson; New York: Macmillan, 1981), 67–74 (70). Wallace here is writing about schemas more generally, and without reference to Lakoff & Johnson's image schema theory. His conclusions, however, are consistent with similar statements sprinkled throughout the works of Lakoff & Johnson. For instance, speaking of conceptual metaphors (see below), Lakoff and Johnson state that "metaphor highlights certain features while suppressing others." George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 141; see also 10–13.

and used as a projectile. By extracting a limited amount of principles out of the variety of information taken in by the perceptual modalities, schemas order our perception of and future engagement with our environment.

By the time one reaches adulthood, an individual has acquired thousands of image schemas; however, they tend to be governed by a small number of "prototypical schematic structures," that is, basic image schemas before any conscious imaginative extension. For instance, Susan Lindner, having examined nearly six hundred occurrences of the English construction *verb + out* (e.g., "take out," "spread out," "draw out") determined that the particle "out" was governed by only three basic schemas: (1) OUT_1, in which a concrete object is removed or departs from within another object or place (as in the example "John went *out* of the room);[47] (2) OUT_2, in which an object changes to occupy a greater area then it initially did (e.g., "roll *out* the cookie dough")[48]; (3) and OUT_3, which designates movement away from a single point of origin (e.g., "they set *out* for Alaska").[49] Each of these basic schemas can be extended in a variety of unique and novel ways, but these three alone form the foundation for all other "out" expressions. Indeed, the second and third schema may even be subsumed under the first, in which case all instantiations of "out" stem from a single spatial "superschema" (OUT_1).[50]

Of course, these basic image schemas and the processes by which they develop are taken for granted. When you grasp a cup, you do not think of the neural clusters firing in your brain, the image schemas such clusters create, or the meaning they engender. This all occurs on a

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[47] Susan Lindner, "A Lexico-Semantic Analysis of English Verb Particle Constructions With Out and Up" (Ph. D. diss., University of California, 1981), 75.

[48] Lindner, "A Lexico-Semantic Analysis," 123.

[49] Ead., 138.

[50] Ead., 139–40. Here, like John Taylor, Lindner follows the "instantiation model" (see note 79 below), arguing that the extension of schematic meaning occurs through the instantiation of a general schema into more specific domains and not through conceptual-mapping. Earlier, however, she notes that the extension of schematic meaning need not be hierarchical. Drawing upon Lindner's observations, Johnson argues that the IN-OUT schema itself stems from the human body's own physical spatial movement. If this is the case, "the projection of *in-out* orientation onto inanimate objects is already a first move beyond the prototypical case of *my* body movement" (Johnson, *The Body in the Mind*, 33– 34; see also discussion above).

subconscious, preverbal level (what Lakoff and Johnson call the "cognitive unconscious").[51] Such can be seen by studying infants, to whom the world becomes meaningful, even before they acquire verbal capabilities. Through their perceptual faculties—by seeing, hearing, moving, tasting, etc.—infants make sense of their environment and are able to communicate with their caretakers. As Johnson notes, such communication occurs not only through words (which are a late development) but also through eye-contact, nonverbal vocalization, and movement.[52] Although more sophisticated, adults are, in essence, "big babies." Like infants, adults develop meaning by physically seeing, tasting, and moving through their environment, without continuously verbalizing (internally or externally) the various processes by which they do so.[53]

Factors behind Schema Formation

Because of their strong focus on the embodiment of meaning, cognitive scientists often give the impression that a schema's development is primarily determined by universal, biological factors. Certainly, some cognitive scientists would be comfortable with such an assessment. Examining cultures from across the globe, such scholars as Anna Wierzbicka (1972ff), Cliff Goddard (1985ff), and Hilary Chapel (1986ff) have compiled lists of universal primitives that lie behind human cognition.[54] These modern scholars "tend to obscure the sociocultural dimensions of human cognition,"[55] pointing to the pre-linguistic universal development of meaning in infants and treating the development of meaning as "situation-independent."[56] Although recognizing that

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[51] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 139.
[52] Ibid., 32.
[53] Ibid., 33.
[54] Anna Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 9–10.
[55] Beate Hampe, "Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics: Introduction," in *From Perception to Meaning : Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics* (ed. Beate Hampe; Cognitive Linguistics Research 29; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), 1–12 (5).
[56] Michael Kimmel, "Culture Regained: Situated and Compound Image Schemas," in *From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics* (ed. Beate Hampe; Cognitive Linguistics Research 29; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), 285–312 (287, 288). This line of reasoning dates back at least to the seventeenth century, with such thinkers as Gottfried Leibniz, Descartes, and Blaise Paschal arguing that "every human being is born with a set of innate ideas which become activated and developed by experience but which latently exists in our minds from the beginning" (Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture,*

cultural specifics influence our guiding principles and ideals, such "universalist" scholars view cultural factors as secondary to the more important and primary universal dimension of human thought. As Wierzbicka claims, the search for "a universal and 'culture-free' analytical framework" is "an urgent task" and "indispensable for a rigorous analysis" of language.[57]

Many cultural anthropologists and historians, however, vehemently disagree, arguing the opposite extreme that there is no universal understanding of the human modalities and that cultural specifics are the primary factor for determining the formation of meaning. For instance, in their study of the human perceptual modalities, such scholars as Walter Ong, David Howes, and Anthony Synnott have argued that cultures vary greatly with respect to their evaluation of the human perceptual modalities. Since most metaphors are based in some way upon perceptual experience, the resulting "conceptual apparatus" of cultures likewise varies. Ong, for instance, argued that the "ancient Hebrews'" value of the auditory modality led to a different conception of understanding than the "Greeks," who privileged the visual modality.[58] Such "relativists," although drawing upon biological data in their studies, thus emphasize that it is culture and not biology that determines how a society develops meaning.

On the one hand, the universalists are correct in drawing attention to the biological dimensions of the development of meaning that is shared across cultures. The "mechanics of metaphor," the process by which abstract meaning develops, *is* "fundamentally universal."[59] Since human beings share the same neurological blueprint and cerebral functions, one would expect a certain degree of commonality amongst schemas across cultures. In fact, our modalities

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and Cognition, 8).

[57] Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition*, 10. Although Wierzbicka vehemently opposed Lakoff and Johnson's conceptual metaphor theory—see her critique in Anna Wierzbicka, "Metaphors Linguists Live By: Lakoff & Johnson contra Aristotle," *Papers in Linguistics* 19 (1986): 287–313—she does not seem to dispute the embodied nature of meaning.

[58] Walter Ong, "The Shifting Sensorium," in *The Varieties of Sensory Experience: A Sourcebook in the Anthropology of the Senses* (ed. David Howes; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 25–30, 26–27; repr. from *The Presence of the Word* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). As shall be discussed in Chapter 3, this evaluation of the modalities is highly problematic, for the evaluation of perception in ancient Israel (as well as ancient Greece) is more complex than Ong presents.

[59] David Aaron, *Biblical Ambuiguities: Metaphor, Semantics, and Divine Imagery* (The Brill Reference Library of Ancient Judaism 4; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 3.

may be "pre-wired" in such a way as to make the formation of certain schemas (CONTAINMENT, PATH) more likely than others.[60] For instance, studies have shown that by five and a half months of age, infants already have developed a basic sense of CONTAINMENT, being "surprised when containers without bottoms appear to hold things."[61] It is hard to believe that such an early development occurs solely as the result of specific cultural influences. Some schemas, then, are universal in that they are neurologically "wired into" the human being like instincts, are "genetically determined," and are the products of a long process of evolution.[62]

On the other hand, the relativists are correct to note that the meanings cultures *ascribe* to the human corporeal experience and the words by which cultures express those meanings vary greatly, depending upon such variables as social locale, gender, historical context, and language. The ancient Greeks, for instance, did ascribe particular value to the visual domain, such that the expressions they used to describe cognitive endeavors often privileged visual language. Thus Aristotle proclaims "sight" to be above all other senses for it "enables us know and [makes] many different things visible" (*Metaph.* 980a).[63] Some schemas will thus likely be more prominent in a particular cultural or sub-cultural unit than others or will be even unique to the individual, based on his or her idiosyncratic experience of the environment.

Therefore, as Lakoff and Johnson themselves point out, the development of meaning does not stem exclusively from biology *or* culture. Rather, embodied cognition relies on an individual's reaction to both biology *and* culture. As many cognitive scientists including Johnson

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[60] Jean Mandler, "How to Build a Baby: II. Conceptual Primitives," *Psychological Review* 99 (1992): 587–604 (592). Mandler presents this as one possibility. Alternatively, [she] suggests that schema formation is "simply the outcome of the way an infant's immature input systems process the spatial structure that exists in the world" (592).

[61] Mandler, "How to Build a Baby: II," 597.

[62] Wallace, "Culture and Congition," 69. Of course, it is unlikely that any one schema will be entirely universal, occurring in every culture; but many are so widely circulated as to be "nearly universal" and thus can be spoken as such (Joseph Grady, "Primary Metaphors as Inputs to Conceptual Integration," *Journal of Pragmatics* 37 (2005): 1595–614 [1610]).

[63] See also *Ethica nicomachea* 1176, *De Anima* 429a. For a brief discussion of these passages and how they demonstrate Greek value of vision, see Anthony Synnott, "Puzzleing over the Senses: From Plato to Marx," in *The Varieties of Sensory Experience: A Sourcebook in the Anthropology of the Senses* (ed. David Howes; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 61–76 (63).

have argued, meaning develops out of a biological interaction with one's environment, and that environment includes not only the natural world but also the society to which one belongs.[64] For example, as noted above, infants develop meaning by physically engaging their environment via their perceptual faculties. Such faculties and their functionings are not the product of culture but are characteristic of the human biological condition and naturally ingrained in the infant. At birth, infants instinctively know how to understand and communicate with their caregivers through direct eye-contact and nonverbal vocalizations. Yet, they also learn about their environment by observing and physically imitating their elders. These elders, in turn, are conditioned by their social environment, namely, the cultural artifacts and practices (ritual, language, institutions, art, architecture, etc.) that prescribe socially-correct behavior.[65] Ultimately, then, a full account of the development of meaning must examine both the "evolutionary and physiological" influences and also the "social and cultural behaviors" by which societies educate "successive generations of children so that they may communicate and perform abstract reasoning."[66] Which schemas are given priority at any given moment may depend largely upon the subculture to which one belongs, the context of the situation, and one's individual preference, but they are also shaped by a common biological experience of the world.[67] As Johnson states, "no brain, no meaning; no body, no meaning; no environment, no meaning."[68]

Keeping this in mind allows one to recognize that while cultures throughout history are

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[64] Hampe, for instance, calls this the "Mind-Body-Culture" triad (Hampe, "Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics: Introduction," 5). See also Kimmel, "Culture Regained." As Kimmel notes, the mainstream position in cognitive science is that of the universalists (Kimmel, "Culture Regained," 297–98); however, many cognitive scholars including Lakoff and Johnson argue for both cultural and biological influences. Admittedly, the works of such scholars, although arguing for cultural influences, tends to focus on the universal dimensions.

[65] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 36, 152.

[66] Ibid., 123. See also Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 23.

[67] As Anthony Wallace explains, every individual has the ability to distinguish between what he calls "mediating schemas," that is, "conceptual abstractions [i.e., Johnson's image schemas] stored in the brain that mediate between stimuli received by the sense organs and behavior responses." See Wallace, "Culture and Congition," 68–69; Ronald Casson, "Language, Culture, Cognition," in *Language, Culture, and Cognition: Anthropological Perspectives* (ed. Ronald Casson; New York: Macmillan, 1981), 11–22 (19).

[68] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 154.

distinct, they also share certain commonalities that allow one to engage in cross-cultural comparisons and apply certain universal principles to ancient texts. Therefore, while the specific cultural manifestation of a text must take precedence in analysis, universal commonalities should not be overlooked. There *is* a certain universality to the human experience that enables various cultural units to develop and communicate via similar linguistic expressions, regardless of social, historical, or linguistic context. A modern English reader from North America, for example, can understand the command to “walk in the way of the good, and keep the paths of the righteous” (Prov 2:20) based on his or her own biological experience of walking, even though the biblical verse has been translated and he or she is far removed from its original context. The “conceptual systems” may vary but the “conceptualizing capacities” remain the same.[69] Even staunch relativists seem to recognize this, drawing upon modern scientific observations about universal biological functions to describe modal interactions in different cultures.[70] Therefore, as Chris Sinha states, “we do not have to choose between biological determinism, on the one hand, and cultural arbitrariness and autonomy, on the other hand…there is simply no contradiction involved in proposing that our cognitive world is constituted by culturally specific variations on universal (or more general) themes.”[71]

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[69] George Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 311.

[70] See, for instance, the work of Deborah Green. At the 2010 SBL session on “Sensory Perception in the Bible and Early Judaism and Christianity,” Green vocally insisted on a relativist approach to the senses, arguing that the senses were culturally specific. Yet, in her dissertation, she draws upon modern scientific theories to argue that smell, due to its location in lowest portion of the human brain, is the oldest and most primordial sense and is thus most strongly connected to memory and emotion. Deborah Green, “Soothing Odors: The Transformation of Scent in Ancient Israelite and Ancient Jewish Literature” (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 2003), 8–12. An exception to this compromising approach is the work of Yael Avrahami, who purposefully avoids drawing upon these universalist conclusions and rejects such connections as “smell-memory” or “sight-analytical thought.” As she states, “even if these connections exist…we cannot take their cultural expression for granted. A culture can assign a function to a certain sense that is different from its biological function.” Yael Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture: Sensory Perception in the Hebrew Bible* (The Library of Hebrew Bible/Old Testament Studies 545: T & T Clark International, 2011), 36.

[71] Chris Sinha, “The Cost of Renovating the Property: A Reply to Marina Rakova,” *Cognitive Linguistics* 13 (2002): 271– 76 (273, 272).

Pre-verbal Extension of Meaning

On the one hand, image schemas are definite structures; they are stable in that they contain regular features by which we construe order. On the other hand, they are not rigid or fixed; they are dynamic, being flexible enough to be altered in their application.[72] In other words, image schemas construct our experience of the world and are, at the same time, continually constructed and transformed by that evolving experience. Although our evidence of this process stems largely from analyzing linguistic expressions, this extension of schematic meaning begins prior to its expression in linguistic form.

As noted above, image schemas form the basis for our interactions with our environment. Yet, although possible on the most basic level, these image schemas rarely operate independently. Typically, different image schemas interact, creating new neural patterns, extending the meaning of the original schemas, and in turn effecting new image schemas. In large part, this extension of meaning is possible because the creation of image schemas is "multimodal," that is, the perception of and interaction with any given object activates neurons used for multiple modes of action and perception. Even if one is having a visual experience of a cup, one is also experiencing the cup as something that could be grasped (tactile), raised (movement), and drunk from (and thus tasted). The CONTAINMENT schema, then, is inherently multimodal, developing from a concurrent operation of the visual, tactile, kinesthetic, and gustatory modalities in the experience of cups and other such containers. Thus, as Lakoff and Vittorio Gallese have shown, even the simplest of activities like engaging a cup involve complex, integrated "cross-modal neural links."[73]

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[72] Johnson, *The Body in the Mind*, 30.

[73] Studying sensorimotor experience in both monkeys and humans, Vittorio Gallese and George Lakoff demonstrated that the sensorimotor processes are multimodal and hypothesized that this multimodality transfers into and explains the formation of concrete and abstract concepts (Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 160–61). An extreme, albeit rare, form of this multimodality is the phenomenon of synesthesia, where the cross-modal associations are so complete that one modality is neurologically understood in terms of another (e.g. one "hears" colors). For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Yanna Popova, "Image Schemas and Verbal Synaesthesia," in *From Perception to Meaning: Image Schemas in Cognitive Linguistics* (ed. Beate Hampe; Cognitive Linguistics Research 29; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005), 395–420 (397).

This "neural co-activation" becomes the basis for the extension of schematic meaning, the end product of which Lakoff and Johnson call "conceptual metaphors."[74] The neural parameters of one schema (the "source domain") become "mapped" onto another (the "target domain"), such that the latter is now understood in the terms of the former.[75] For example, in the conceptual metaphor CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS, the concepts associated with the source domain (CONTAINMENT) become mapped onto the target domain (CATEGORY).[76]

Mapping Diagram 1 : CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS

Source Domain (Containment)		*Target Domain (Category)*
Items Have A Boundary	→	Categories Have Limits
That Contain Some Entities	→	That Include Some Entities
That Exclude Other Entities	→	That Exclude Other Entities

Just as a cup is perceived as a bounded space with liquid *inside* of it, so too a category such as

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[74] Not all cognitive scholars agree with this classification of schematic extension as metaphor. Similar to traditional theories of metaphor, Ronald Langacker, Wierzbicka, and others argue that the term "metaphor" is not the appropriate in a model for understanding this basic level of meaning. See Wierzbika's critique in "Metaphors Linguists Live By," and the summary of Langacker and other alternatives to conceptual metaphor in John R. Taylor, *Cognitive Grammar* (Oxford Textbooks in Linguistics; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 506–35. Lakoff and Johnson, however, continue to advocate for the validity of the term, arguing that metaphor is intrinsic to the cognitive processes. As Pierre van Hecke aptly phrases it, "metaphor is considered not so much as a way in which people speak, but rather as a way in which people think." Pierre van Hecke, "Conceptual Blending: A Recent Approach to Metaphor. Illustrated with the Pastoral Metaphor in Hos 4, 16," in *Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible* (ed. Pierre van Hecke; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005), 215–31 (218). Lakoff concedes, however, that there is a difference between pre-verbal "conceptual metaphor" described here and "metaphorical expression," the latter of which refers to "a linguistic expression (a word, phrase, or sentence) that is the surface realization of such cross-domain mapping." George Lakoff, "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor," in *Metaphor and Thought* (ed. Andrew Ortony; 2nd ed.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 202–51 (203).

[75] Lakoff and Johnson call this process the sharing of "entailments." Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 94. As Grady notes, the directionality of this mapping is important; in conceptual mapping, the transference of elements does not flow in both directions. Joseph Grady, "Foundations of Meaning: Primary Metaphors and Primary Scenes" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1997), 9. Anthony Wallace, on the other hand, calls this process "autistic thought," that is, a process of reorganizing and recombining elements into novel arrangements and eventually creating new schemas. This is accomplished through dreaming, meditating, personality development, and other "creative" work (Wallace, "Culture and Congition," 69).

[76] This chart is based on similar charts that Lakoff and Johnson construct throughout their works (see example of UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING below). The information for the chart comes from their discussions in Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 51, 380–81, 544–55; Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 141.

"fruit" is perceived as a bounded space that can include items such as tomatoes or apples *inside* of it.[77] Based on the observation that common items tend to be located in the same bounded area, the physical experience of space and containment thus becomes the basis for conceptualizing categorization. In this way, the sharing of these characteristics establishes a "cross-metaphorical correspondence" that focuses the audience on a specific aspect shared by both schemas while suppressing other elements of the individual schemas, creating a new perception of reality.[78]

Arguably, the existence of neurological conceptual mapping is difficult to prove, leaving many cognitive scientists to argue alternative models for explaining how meaning is developed and extended, such as the idea that schematic extension results from "blending" the elements of different schemas together (e.g., Giles Fauconnier, Mark Turner) or from cognitively transforming an abstract prototypical "type" (e.g., 'tree') into more specific "instances" of that type (e.g., 'oak tree,' 'elm tree,' 'birch') (e.g., Ronald Langacker).[79] Each of these alternatives

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[77] Tomatoes, in fact, are an interesting case. Though scientifically classified as fruit by virtue of their characteristics, tomatoes tend to be equated in popular American culture with vegetables because of the way people use them. Their category, therefore, is contested depending upon the sub-cultures who use it and which features they emphasize (thanks to Rebecca Falcasantos [personal communication] for pointing this out). Such flexibility of categorization is inherent in the CONTAINER schema itself. While some containers can have rigid boundaries (e.g., a cup), others are more amorphous (e.g., a cloth bag, which can expand or contract depending upon the items placed within it).

[78] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 51; ibid., *Metaphors We Live By*, 96.

[79] Ronald Langacker, *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar* (2 vols.; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987, 1991); Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner, *The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the Mind's Hidden Complexities* (New York: Basic Books, 2002). See also Taylor, *Cognitive Grammar*, 520; Ellen van Wolde, *Reframing Biblical Studies: When Language and Text Meet Culture, Cognition, and Context* (Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2009), 35–38. In his Introduction, Taylor attempts to merge the findings of Langacker's "Cognitive Grammar" model with that of "conceptual mapping" by arguing in favor of a taxonomic relationship between schemas. Where Johnson argues that all extension of meaning occurs through conceptual-mapping of schemas, Taylor argues that a "conceptual metaphor" is "schematic for the metaphorical expressions which instantiate it"; that is, it represents what is common between the specific metaphorical expressions, many of which relate to each other in a hierarchical fashion (e.g. A CONCLUSION IS A DESTINATION is an instantiation of IDEAS ARE LOCATIONS). Taylor, *Cognitive Grammar*, 493. Wallace ("Culture and Cognition," 72) advocates a similar position, listing taxonomic relationships as but one of several different ways in which schemas relate. Lindner also recognizes schematic hierarchy; however, unlike Taylor, Lindner argues that not all schemas can be related taxonomically. A star (celestial object) and a star (celebrity) share certain commonalties, "but we probably would not want to posit a higher order category of which the concepts 'celestial body' and 'celebrity' are instances" of a higher order schema" (Lindner, "A Lexico-Semantic Analysis," 98).

The "conceptual blending" model of Giles Fauconnier and Mark Turner was also initially conceived as an alternative to the "conceptual-mapping" model; but, as shall be discussed below, these two models can be read as successive stages in the development of meaning and thus are complementary to

suggests that pre-existing commonalities between source and target domain are necessary for the extension of schematic meaning. Johnson, however, argues that his model of conceptual mapping is not only possible but also highly plausible. For example, based on neuroimaging studies comparing literal and metaphorical sentences about the manipulation of the body to the actual manipulation of the body, Johnson argues that "there must be neural connections between sensorimotor areas of the brain and parts of the brain responsible for higher cognitive functioning."[80] While not definitive, such "existence proofs" suggest that the sensorimotor functions of the brain "do both jobs at once," perceiving external reality and also structuring our conceptions about it.[81]

The conceptual mapping model, then, offers a reasonable explanation for the neurological foundations of schematic extension. Fauconnier, Turner, Langacker, and other such scholars, however, are correct to note that the extension of schematic meaning is not simply the result of concrete source domains being superimposed upon unrelated abstract target domains. Although a domain can extend its parameters over another, as in the example of CATEGORIES ARE CONTAINERS above, certain mappings are more likely to occur than others. Domains that correspond in experience are more likely to map onto each other than those which do not. For instance, being angry causes us to feel warm, which is subsequently reflected in the conceptual metaphor ANGER IS HEAT.[82] Similarly, since the physiological experience of hunger is associated with the emotional experience of wanting, the schema DESIRE IS HUNGER forms (e.g., "she was *starved* for affection").[83] Additionally, domains that share structural features are more likely to map: properties map onto other properties (e.g., SHARPNESS to INTELLIGENCE), actions onto other

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each other.

[80] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 167–68. He points, for example, to the studies of Tim Rohrer, who has shown that both literal and metaphorical body sentences about the hand (e.g., she handed me the apple"; "he handed me the theory"), "activate primary and secondary hand regions within the primary and secondary sensorimotor maps." Rohrer then compared this mapping to that which occurred when participants actually moved their hands. He found a "high degree of overlap" between the two mappings.

[81] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 38.

[82] Grady, "Primary Metaphors as Inputs to Conceptual Integration," 1600.

[83] Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 87– 89.

actions (e.g., BALANCING to CONSIDERING ALTERNATIVES), etc.[84]

Moreover, the mapping of schematic concepts generally occurs from more physically accessible domains to less accessible ones. Therefore, it is more likely for schemas formed from concrete, sensorimotor domains (e.g., UP-DOWN, CONTAINMENT, IN-OUT) to be mapped onto less concrete domains (e.g., SADNESS, ANGER, KNOWING, AND SIMILARITY).[85] The conceptual metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, for instance, builds upon the concrete experience of GRASPING in order to provide meaning to the abstract experience of UNDERSTANDING. Just as an object is grasped with greater or lesser intensity, an idea can be "grasped" to varying degrees (being fully understood, somewhat understood, or not understood at all).[86] What we call abstract concepts, then, are actually "systematic mappings from body-based, sensorimotor source domains onto abstract target domains."[87] Thus, modern Western culture understands AFFECTION as WARMTH, IMPORTANT objects as being BIG, TIME as in MOTION, and so forth. The list of mapping relationships could go on, but the important point is that the end-products of such combinations are not random expressions; rather, they fit into a complex, coherent system of mapping that draws upon our physical experience to communicate meaning.[88]

Grady has argued, and Lakoff and Johnson have since adopted his line of reasoning, that most metaphors are "molecular," that is, they are combinations of simpler "atomic" parts called "primary metaphors."[89] A primary metaphor is the most basic form of conceptual metaphor, being derived directly from a "subjective (phenomenological) experience of a basic event" (a "primary scene"). UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, for instance, is a primary metaphor for knowledge acquisition, deriving directly from a close "correlation between close manipulation of

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[84] Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 163.

[85] Eve Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 27; Johnson, *The Body in the Mind*, 107. As Grady notes, these latter domains are just as "'real,' psychologically and neurologically," as their corresponding source domains; they just lack the ability to be engaged concretely through the human modalities (Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 28).

[86] See the discussion in Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 166.

[87] Ibid., 177.

[88] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 105.

[89] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 46.

an object and access to information about it."[90] Such primary metaphors as PURPOSES ARE DESTINATIONS and ACTIONS ARE BODILY MOTIONS subsequently combine to form more complex metaphors such as LIFE IS A JOURNEY.[91] Because of this, conceptual metaphors can have varying levels of complexity, ranging from relatively simple primary metaphors to intricately connected complex metaphors.

It is important to reiterate that, whether simple or complex, these conceptual metaphors are still pre-verbal. They order our experience of reality without relying upon a conscious verbal reflection upon that process. The concept that UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, for instance, not only develops out of a physical engagement with the world but helps us understand and structure that engagement even when we do not consciously verbalize the process. While an infant may not know the term "understand," he or she can figure out that "if you can grasp something and hold it in your hands, you can look it over carefully and get a reasonably good understanding of it."[92] No words or conscious thought need occur for this to happen.

Linguistic Extension

This is not to say that there is no development of schemas on the linguistic level. Some of the most creative extension of meaning occurs linguistically, and one can find conceptual metaphors hovering beneath the surface of most, if not all, linguistic expressions. Indeed, it is our ability to extend meaning abstractly in novel ways that distinguishes human beings from other types of animals. Yet, there is a great degree of continuity between the pre-verbal extension of schematic meaning and the verbal extension. "More complex levels of [schematic development] are just that—levels, and nothing more."[93]

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[90] Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 27.

[91] For a discussion of this complex metaphor, see below.

[92] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 20.

[93] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 122. Here, Johnson draws upon John Dewey's concept of "continuity." As Dewey argues, "there is no breach of continuity between operations of inquiry and biological operations and physical operations. 'Continuity'… means that rational operations *grow out of* organic activities, without being identical with that from which they emerge… The distinction between physical, psychophysical, and mental is thus one of levels of increasing complexity and intimacy see of

For instance, grasping a cup creates a cluster of neural patterns in the human brain associated with the concept "grasping," such as agency, locality, and force. By extension, the visual perception of a cup or encountering the word "grasp" or "cup" in a text results in the activation of the same neural patterns, the same schemas, as those that would have been activated if one were actually grasping a cup or moving it through space.[94] From this perspective, linguistic "concepts are not inner mental entities that re-present external realities. Rather, concepts are neural activation patterns that can either be 'turned on' by some actual perceptual or motoric event in our bodies, or else activated when we merely think [or speak] about something, without actually perceiving it or performing a specific action."[95] The linguistic manipulation of a conceptual metaphor, therefore, activates the same cognitive processes as its non-linguistic predecessor and in doing so contributes to our conceptualization of our environment.

There are three basic types of conceptual metaphors in language: (1) conventional; (2) imaginative; (3) and post-imaginative.

1. Conventional Metaphors

Many of the expressions we use on a daily basis are governed by "conventional" metaphors, that is, basic conceptual metaphors that "structure the ordinary conceptual systems of our culture."[96] Through constant, unconscious repetition, conventional metaphors express and reinforce the perception of reality that had been gained through the individual's corporeal experience.

For example, the individual human experience is often perceived of as a journey (LIFE IS A JOURNEY). Through this conceptual metaphor, the kinesthetic experience of walking is "mapped" onto the individual's experience of life, becoming the way we understand and speak about our

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interaction among natural events" (quoted in Johnson, "Mind Incarnate," 49).

[94] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 160–62.

[95] Ibid., 157.

[96] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 139.

daily experience: [97]

Mapping Diagram 2: LIFE IS A JOURNEY

Source Domain (Journey)		*Target Domain (Life)*
Starting Point	→	Birth
Ending Point	→	Death
Destination	→	Life Goals/Purpose
Motion from Point A to B	→	Process of Achieving Purpose
Path	→	Life Plan/Progress Made towards Goal
Obstacles To Motion	→	Difficulties in Achieving Purpose

Every person is supposed to have a purpose in life, their "destination" that they strive to reach by following a specific itinerary. Without hesitation, we routinely speak of the challenges we face as "obstacles" we encounter, the people we meet as "companions on the road," people who have come "very far, very fast," and people who are "behind schedule." We speak of college students who have yet to "find direction in life," adults who have "missed the boat," and people "having a long way to go" to achieve their goals.[98] The LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, then, becomes a "structure with long-term status in the minds of speakers, which transcend[s] particular linguistic instantiations."[99] Its iterations in speech are not the result of individual creativity at any given moment, but rather stem from collective unconscious conventions.

Because conventional metaphors reinforce pre-existing schemas, we are predisposed to accept their validity when we encounter them in language.[100] Speakers can use that favorable predisposition to highlight specific elements of our experience and persuade us to view our environment in certain ways. By describing a theory as that which can be "grasped," one is using

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[97] The following chart is based on the discussions found in Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 62 and Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 177–78.

[98] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 61–63; Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 177.

[99] Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 13.

[100] George Lakoff and Mark Turner, *More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 63.

a conventional metaphor (UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING) to draw the reader's attention to the theory as something which is sustainable, enduring, and able to be committed to. Likewise, in the phrase "his climb to the top of the class was arduous," one is drawing attention to the particular process by which a person reached his current station in life. Note that in the latter example, one does not need to mention the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor as a whole or even the notion of walking for the reader or listener to understand the meaning of the phrase and that it applies to the man's overall life (and not, for example, his daily commute); instead, a specific part of the conceptual metaphor can be used to evoke the whole.[101]

2. Imaginative Metaphors

Although many of our schemas are ingrained in us by physical experiences, human beings are by nature imaginative creatures. Not only do we extend schematic meaning pre-verbally, but we consciously manipulate linguistic forms in order to construct new meanings for our experiences. We do so by extending image schemas beyond their ordinary usages; "if ideas are objects, we can dress them up in fancy clothes, juggle them, line them up nice and neat, etc."[102] These "imaginative" conceptual metaphors bring new meaning to our experience by creatively (1) extending a dominant part of an image schema, (2) developing a previously dormant portion of the schema, or (3) creating novel metaphors by blending multiple schemas together.[103]

(1) Extension of a dominant element: Since the process of achieving one's goals in life is conventionally viewed as movement through space from point A to point B along a defined path, when Robert Frost speaks of choosing the "road less traveled by,"[104] he is creatively extending a

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[101] This is an example of metonymy. Although metonymy is a process distinct from the development of conceptual metaphor, it often compliments the use of metaphor. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 35–40; Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, 100–04.

[102] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 13.

[103] Ibid., 53. Here, Lakoff and Johnson do not speak of the process of "blending," but they do note the creation of novel metaphors as a third category. See the discussion of "novel metaphors" below for how blending fits into this process.

[104] See the final stanza of Frost's poem, "The Road Not Taken": "I shall be telling this with a sigh/Somewhere ages and ages hence:/Two roads diverged in a wood, and I,/I took the one less traveled by,/And that has made all the difference."

dominant part of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor to speak of making difficult choices in life. Because he is drawing upon the dominant element of the metaphor, Frost's image seems conventional; yet its creative and conscious application marks it as imaginative. By extending dominant elements of the schema, common conventional metaphors can thus appear in a variety of unique linguistic expressions.

(2) Extension of a dormant element: Because a journey can occur on land, on sea, through the air, or in space, a language user has the option of conceiving of life's journey as one that occurs on foot or by means of any number of vehicles (e.g., car, plane, boat, etc.).[105] However, many linguistic expressions that rely upon the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor ignore this aspect of the metaphor; the vehicle element remains dormant. When Tom Cochrane sings that "life is a highway; I want to ride it all night long," he extends this previously dormant element of the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor to create a creative linguistic expression in which the speaker's passage through life is envisioned as enjoyable drive through various destinations despite the challenges one faces.

(3) Novel metaphors: Some metaphors, on the other hand, do not extend dominant or dormant parts of a schema; rather, they combine two or more similarly structured schemas to create a new metaphor.[106] Instead of mapping elements from a source domain onto a target domain, such "novel" metaphors "blend" together attributes shared by their inherited domains ("input" spaces), a process that Fauconnier and Turner call "conceptual blending." Rather than having two domains, this model has at least "four" spaces: two or more "input" spaces, a "generic" space (the abstract concepts shared by the input spaces), and a "blended" space (the end result).[107]

Take, for instance, the metaphor of SURGEON IS BUTCHER.[108] This metaphor begins as two

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[105] Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, 64.
[106] Ibid., 70.
[107] Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 47.
[108] This metaphor is described in Joseph Grady, et al., "Blending and Metaphor," in *Metaphor in Cognitive Linguistics* (eds. G. Steen and R. Gibbs; Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 1999), 101–124 (103–07). Cited 14 July 2011. On-line: http://cogweb.ucla.edu/CogSci/Grady_99.html. The charts that follow are

separate input spaces, the surgeon and the butcher:



Blend Diagram 1: SURGEON and BUTCHER Input Spaces

These input spaces share certain characteristics (a generic space): both entities have agency, wield a sharp instrument in a procedure on another entity, have a defined workspace, etc.



Blend Diagram 2: SURGEON and BUTCHER Generic Space

Because of their similar structure, concepts associated with both "butcher" and "surgeon" can combine to create a novel metaphor. The surgeon becomes a butcher who mutilates the flesh of his patient:

modified versions of the charts found therein.



Blend Diagram 3: SURGEON IS BUTCHER (Blended Space)

Most importantly, by blending elements from each space, the metaphor contains its own "emergent properties," that is, content distinct from its input spaces. In this case, the notion that the surgeon is incompetent emerges when the *modus operandi* of the butcher blends with the context of the surgeon.[109] Because neither "butcher" nor "surgeon" inherently contains a notion of incompetence, the resulting metaphor cannot be the result of a simple one-way mapping of concepts from one domain to another; rather, it is a blend of both.

These emergent properties are not the result of systematic mappings of one domain to the other; rather they develop by means of "composition," "completion," or "elaboration." Through "composition," one or more corresponding element from each input space can be projected into the blend and become "fused" together, creating a new property in the novel metaphor. For instance, in the example above, two independent agents (surgeon and butcher) are projected and blend into one (surgeon-butcher). Alternatively, each input space may project distinct concepts to be fused in the new metaphor. For instance, in the phrase "We're spinning our wheels in this relationship," the schemas LOVE IS A JOURNEY (similar to the above schema LIFE IS A JOURNEY)

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[109] Grady, et al., "Blending and Metaphor," 105.

and RELATIONSHIPS ARE BOUNDED SPACES each respectively project their concepts of *movement by vehicle* and *constriction* to evoke the frustration of being trapped in a relationship that is stagnant.[110] Composition is especially powerful in poetic speech, where the constraints of everyday communication are loosened to allow for more imaginative expression in a single sentence or passage. Patterns from each input space can also be "completed" by filling-in information from long-term memory. When the butcher is projected into the surgery room where he is not qualified to act, we fill in the notion of him being incompetent. Once established, blends can be continually "elaborated" in new and imaginative ways. Thus, we can speak of a surgeon "packaging the patient's tissue" as if they were "cold cuts."[111]

In this way, "we can create many different blends out of the same inputs."[112] This does not mean, however, that the creation of novel metaphors is limitless. Certain "constraints" limit the types of blends that are created.[113] For instance, whenever possible, blends attempt to complete their constitutive elements using pre-existing patterns. Blends also attempt to create a well-integrated scene, regardless of how different and conflicting their inherited elements are. Moreover, if an element appears in the blend, there must be a good reason for it being there. These constraints, which Fauconnier and Turner call "governing principles," drive blends toward one primary goal, achieving "human scale," that is, portraying reality within natural and familiar structures that can be engaged through direct action and concrete perception.[114] Even poetry, which seems like the most novel form of human expression, operates within this framework. "These cognitive constraints, while allowing a certain amount of 'freedom' for poetic language, guarantee its interpretability by minimizing the use of other options."[115] Poetic language, however

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[110] Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 200–07.
[111] Grady, et al., "Blending and Metaphor," 107.
[112] Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 26.
[113] Ibid., 29.
[114] Ibid., 322. In addition to the three principles listed here—that of "pattern completion," "integration," and "relevance"—Fauconnier and Turner identify twelve others. For a complete list and corresponding discussion, see 309–52.
[115] Yeshayahu Shen and Michal Cohen, "How Come Silence is Sweet but Sweetness is Not Silent:

imaginative, is still driven by constraints towards that which can be understood by the perceptual modalities.

Because it postulates the mutual influence of multiple input spaces (rather than a one-way directionality) and the creation of novel short-lived conceptualizations (rather than long-term universal concepts), conceptual blending was initially viewed as an alternative to the conceptual-mapping model of Lakoff and Johnson. Yet, as Grady et. al. argue, it is best to see the two models as complementary approaches to the same data, conceptual mapping describing the formation of innate and conventional schemas and conceptual blending the creation of short-lived novel extensions of those familiar schemas.[116] Indeed, although any immediate experience could elicit the creation of novel metaphors, the formation of novel expressions generally relies upon pre-existing conventional metaphors, and any basic conceptual metaphor is capable of serving as an input space and thus being extended through blending.[117]

3. Post-Imaginative Metaphors

Once imaginative metaphors enter into a language, they frequently become part of the standard conceptual system of the culture. Lakoff and Johnson speak briefly of this post-imaginative stage, noting that as new conceptual metaphors become part of the dominant conceptual system, they "alter" that conceptual system.[118] As John Taylor argues, "the metaphorical nature of an expression can fade over time and with repeated use. An expression

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A Cognitive Account of Directionality in Poetic Synaesthesia," *Language and Literature* 7 (1998): 123–40 (124).

[116] Grady, et al., "Blending and Metaphor," 120. In fact, as Eve Sweetser and other cognitive linguistics have pointed out, even primary metaphors can be depicted using the four-space model, since the source domains must share some common features in order for the mapping to occur. However, since primary metaphors rely upon a different cognitive process than imaginative ones (mapping one source domain onto the other, rather than blending them together), I will continue to use "mapping" terminology when discussing primary metaphors and limit my use of the blended-space diagram to my discussions of imaginative metaphors.

[117] Grady, et al., "Blending and Metaphor," 110.

[118] Lakoff and Johnson do not actually use the term "post-imaginative," instead speaking of this stage as a natural progression of novel metaphor. I use the term "post-imaginative" here simply to highlight the cyclical nature of the linguistic process by which metaphors develop. In practice, there is a high degree of overlap between "conventional metaphors" and "post-imaginative" ones, and it is often impossible to sharply distinguish between them.

which might in the past have been perceived as metaphorical becomes, over time, the normal conventionalized way of talking."[119] An idiom is a good example of this. Once an imaginative metaphor of a single individual, an idiom is an expression that has become the "established lexical means of expressing metaphorical conceptualizations."[120] William Shakespeare's once novel extension "come full circle" (*King Lear*), for instance, is now a standard expression for expressing our conception of circular argumentation, the sequence of events, progression of time, etc. Because it was successful in expressing some concept, the imaginative metaphor is repeated over and over again and becomes the standard way by which individuals perceive their environment.[121] What once was a product of creative imagination thus becomes a conventionalized metaphor.

Traditionally, such metaphors are considered "dead"; they are "mere historical relics" and no longer part of the dynamic development of the living language.[122] However, as Lakoff and Turner argue, post-imaginative metaphors are very much still "alive." As conventionalized metaphors, they continue to actively structure our ordinary perception of reality even though we are not consciously aware of them.[123] While there are some metaphors that could truly be considered "dead" (or better yet "historical") in that they no longer fit with our perception of reality on a conceptual level,[124] many of our everyday expressions—such as "come full circle"—consist of conventionalized metaphors that were once the product of imaginative processes and that still continue to structure our perception of the environment. Although "stock phrases" in the

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[119] Taylor does not fully agree with Lakoff and Johnson's model, though he finds "considerable explanatory power" in many of its key premises (Taylor, *Cognitive Grammar*, 492). This quote, for instance, is actually a critique of Lakoff and Johnson, with Taylor implying that some metaphors are simply "dead" when they are no longer seen as metaphorical. However, as noted below, these metaphors are still very much alive, even when their users do not perceive them as such.

[120] Grady, "Primary Metaphors as Inputs to Conceptual Integration," 1598.

[121] Grady, et al., "Blending and Metaphor," 111.

[122] Lakoff, *Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things*, 111.

[123] Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, 128–31; Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 124–26.

[124] Lakoff and Turner give the example of "pedigree," based on the Old French "*pied de grue*" meaning "foot of a crane." Since a crane's foot no longer serves as the concept by which we understand family lineage and modern English, this metaphor can be considered "dead" or rather "historical." Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, 129; Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 124.

language, these expressions continue to structure our conceptions of reality.

Moreover, as Grady argues, a newly formed conventional metaphor can in turn serve as the input space for subsequent blends.[125] For instance, based upon the idea that the goal of a journey (its destination) is desirable, at some point the LIFE IS A JOURNEY metaphor became elaborated to insist that "the journey itself is the destination"; it has now become a standard metaphor (JOURNEY IS DESTINATION) routinely elaborated upon by advertisers and authors alike to convince the listener to focus on the pleasure in the daily activities of life or buy a product that will help them do so. Once conventionalized, such conceptual metaphors as the JOURNEY IS DESTINATION or SURGEON IS BUTCHER metaphors can serve as "stored templates" for the input for subsequent blends. Thus, the cycle continues—conventional metaphor, imaginative metaphor, conventional metaphor—a continuous process of increasingly complex schematic extensions.

Metaphorical Clusters

At any given moment, a language user can combine multiple conceptual metaphors within close proximity to create unique and unusual expressions. Take, for instance, the sentence "he is very *bright*, but his *delivery* could use some work," which combines two complementary conceptual metaphors, INTELLIGENCE IS A LIGHT SOURCE and IDEAS ARE OBJECTS (i.e., that can be moved from one point to another). Such "metaphorical clusters" are not the products of mappings or blends, but rather the juxtaposition of ontologically distinct conceptual metaphors. Unlike blending, in which elements from distinct schemas combine to form a single novel metaphor, juxtaposed metaphors "play" with each other while preserving the distinctiveness of each underlying metaphor. In the above example, the elements of the two conceptual metaphors do not map or blend together to become a new metaphor (in the way that the constituent parts of SURGEON IS BUTCHER do); yet they form a cohesive picture of a poor verbal performance by an

[125] "Once a blend has become conventionalized it may be recruited and serve as an 'input' to subsequent blends" (Grady, "Primary Metaphors as Inputs to Conceptual Integration," 1598).

intelligent individual.[126]

Lakoff and Turner speak vaguely of this stage, choosing instead to focus on instances of creative blends. They only briefly note that "of course, a poet may use…two separate and apparently converse metaphors adjacently, and bring them into play with each other…this would be a use of two different conceptual metaphors performing different mappings."[127] Yet, elsewhere, they (and Johnson) focus on the coherence inherent in the entire system of conceptual metaphors and do not address how different metaphors can appear distinct from each other within a single pericope. Other scholars are completely dismiss metaphorical clusters (which they call "mixed metaphors") as "humorous" or "defective speech."[128]

However, metaphorical clusters, like mappings and blends, are a vital means by which language users imaginatively extend meanings. As Michael Kimmel notes, metaphorical clusters grab the listener's attention, clarify "complex and unfamiliar subject matters," and "connect and dynamize" discourse, making communication between the language user and his audience more memorable and effective.[129] Metaphorical clusters are particularly common in poetic works, where the poet plays with the audience's expectations by creatively juxtaposing conceptual metaphors, but they also occur in ordinary speech. For this reason, a full examination of conceptual metaphors should take into account how these metaphors combine in linguistic

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[126] While DISCOURSE IS A LIGHT MEDIUM is a conceptual metaphor in modern English (e.g.," that was an illuminating remark," see Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 48), here the discourse is not seen as a light source but as an object to be transmitted.

[127] Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, 133. In this book, Lakoff and Turner do not distinguish sharply between "blends" and what I am calling metaphorical clusters (a term they do not use); yet they seem to envision two separate categories here and focus on the former. They note, for instance, that one can "easily imagine, for example, a poem about the relationship between a human and his computer, in which the human is metaphorically presented in terms of his machine, and the machine is metaphorically presented in terms of its user" (133). Both, however, are two separate and distinct mappings. They form a coherent picture, but not an integrated blend.

[128] Metaphorical clusters are typically called "mixed metaphors" and derided as abnormal speech. Take, for instance, the common admonition not to "mix metaphors." For the derogatory attitude towards "mixed metaphors" in scholarship, see Michael Kimmel, "Why We Mix Metaphors (And Mix Them Well): Discourse Coherence, Conceptual Metaphor, and Beyond," *Journal of Pragmatics* 42 (2010): 97–115 (98). I prefer Kimmel's term "metaphorical clusters" as it more adequately reflects the distinctiveness of the underlying metaphors in the final combination.

[129] Kimmel, "Why We Mix Metaphors," 98.

utterances.

Having studied the appearance of metaphorical clusters in a select group of British newspapers from 2004–2005, Kimmel proposes that there are three degrees of connections between adjacent metaphors in metaphorical clusters: "(1) *conceptual complementation or elaboration*, (2) *conceptual overlap*, (3) *no apparent conceptual coherence at the level of metaphor proper*."[130] First, metaphors can "enrich each other conceptually," often creating a casual or temporal progression or elaborating a scene in an unconventional way. For instance, the phrase "the *mountain of red tape* which *swamps* business" combines the metaphors REGULATIONS ARE A MOUNTAIN and DIFFICULT IS HEAVY (i.e., to be "swamped" is to be "weighed down").[131] Although the cluster creates a cohesive scene, the underlying metaphors remain intact and do not blend together. Second, metaphors may cluster due to a conceptual overlap between them. Kimmel points, for instance, to the sentence, "by *deft footwork* on his part and clumsiness by France's Jacques Chirac, he *turned a dud card on Europe into a winning hand*." Here, the conceptual metaphors POLITICS IS A DANCE and POLITICS IS A CARD GAME share a conception of politics as a matter of skill and strategy.[132] In this way, metaphorical clusters can share the same target domain (e.g., politics) yet remain distinct. Some metaphorical clusters, however, have no conceptual coherence, although they still form a coherent picture. Kimmel notes, for instance, the sentence "While preaching the *pro-business gospel*, he has done nothing to *stop the tide of EU rule and red tape*…" in which the metaphors POLITICAL SPEECHES ARE RELIGIOUS SERMONS and REGULATIONS ARE A TIDE have no conceptual linkages, but are merely placed alongside each other.[133]

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[130] Ibid., 106.

[131] Ibid., 107. In repeating Kimmel's examples, I am using italics to emphasize the metaphors where he uses bold font. In most cases, I also insert the underlying conceptual metaphor that he leaves unstated (the exception being the third example from Kimmel below, where he specifically notes the conceptual metaphors). Here, REGULATIONS ARE A MOUNTAIN is constructed by comparison with Kimmel's REGULATIONS IS A TIDE below.

[132] Kimmel, "Why We Mix Metaphors," 108.

[133] Ibid., 109, 112.

Coherence between metaphors can occur in a single clause, over several tightly integrated clauses, or in a larger passage of loosely connected clauses.[134] The further apart the occurrence of metaphors is, the easier it is to integrate disparate metaphors into a cohesive and natural scene. The reason for this, according to Kimmel, is that language users do not tend to expect consistency across disparate ontological "planes" (e.g., agent belief, background knowledge, speaker's evaluation) as long as they are not in same clause (although he notes that such "intra-clause clusters" do occur).[135] Moreover, because they draw upon conventional metaphors, most metaphorical clusters seem to flow naturally. They are neither ridiculous nor impossible to understand and thus do not strike us as juxtaposed metaphors. However, a language user can juxtapose contradictory or dissimilar metaphors, thereby compelling the audience to focus simultaneously on the contradictions and creating (intentionally or unintentionally) a sense of irony or dissonance.[136]

A Special Case: The Proverb

Before concluding, it is important to briefly mention the case of the proverb, whose form is relevant for the present study. Although short, proverbs are particularly rife with conceptual metaphors. In their brevity, they evoke common knowledge in order to inform their listener about broader issues in life and prescribe certain behaviors. They do so by invoking the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor, that is, by explaining a general concept in terms of a specific example of it. As Lakoff and Turner note, this metaphor "maps a single specific-level schema onto an indefinitely large number of parallel specific-level schemas that all have the same generic-level structure as the source-domain schema."[137] In other words, the schema extracts generic information from the source domain that could be applied to a broad class of people and allows

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[134] Ibid., 110.
[135] Ibid., 114.
[136] Mark Turner, *The Literary Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 64–67; see also Wallace, "Culture and Congition," 72. Turner, in particular, is speaking of the irony created by inverted schemas within a single blend. However, one can apply the same sentiment to cases of completed conceptual metaphors such as the ones discussed above.
[137] Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, 162.

the language user to map them onto any number of situations. For example, in the proverb "the early bird gets the worm," the individual automatically extracts the generic concept that "an individual who anticipates a situation will obtain a limited quantity good." We can either understand this proverb on the generic level, or we can apply this information to any number of situations (e.g., the businessman who beat his competition to a deal or the student who registers first for a class with limited enrollment). When applied to other situations, the generic elements of the source domain map onto specific target domains (e.g., the businessman, the student). This GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor thus "allows us to understand a whole category of situations in terms of one particular situation."[138]

Summary

What we have, then, is a complex, yet cohesive model for understanding the development and communication of meaning. Before moving on to the implications this model has for the study of ancient Wisdom literature, it is worth reiterating a few of its key points:

- Under this model, the construction of meaning is envisioned as "embodied." Abstract meaning is not the purview of language alone, but develops naturally and automatically from our daily corporeal experiences.
- Studying the biology behind cognition does not preclude studying the cultural or individual dimensions of cognition. Although difficult to distinguish, each factor is equally important in the development and communication of meaning. Thus, a study of the development of meaning must account for both the evolutionary and physiological dimensions of meaning as well as the social and cultural factors.
- The regular and repeated experience of our environment leads to the development of "image schemas," neurological patterns by which we order our perception of the environment.

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[138] Ibid., 165.

- When a concrete image schema maps onto a less concrete concept, it creates a primary conceptual metaphor for understanding our daily interactions. Such primary metaphors in turn combine, creating an increasingly expanding network of complex metaphors.
- Most of this schematic development and its extension into conceptual metaphors occurs prior to linguistic expression. It is an automatic process and occurs without our conscious knowledge.
- Conceptual metaphors do, however, continue to develop linguistically. We use conceptual metaphors in our everyday speech ("conventionalized metaphor"), elaborate upon and blend them together into new metaphors ("imaginative metaphors"), which in turn become the conventional metaphors by which we order our experience. We also manipulate these metaphors, artistically juxtaposing them to create metaphorical clusters that focus our attention on multiple aspects of human experience.

Given that the perceptual modalities provide the means by which humans acquire their perception of reality, it is not surprising that they play a significant role in this development of meaning and linguistic expression. Image schemas are directly linked to the individual's engagement with the environment, and it is through the perceptual modalities that this linkage happens. The daily operation of the modalities governs what schemas are and are not likely to occur. "The metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING is presumably motivated by the fact that we gather so much information, so much of our knowledge of the world, via the visual channel. An arbitrary pairing like KNOWING IS SQUEEZING is unlikely to arise, according to this theory, because there is no motivation in experience for associating the two concepts in this way."[139] Similarly, goal-oriented modal interactions, such as lifting a heavy object, are more likely to create a meaningful impression than those which are not, such as seeing the color blue.[140] Primary metaphors rely upon this direct modal engagement for the source of their metaphor, and it is thus common for elements from the

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[139] Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 12.
[140] Ibid., 21.

perceptual modalities to appear in the verbal articulation of conceptual metaphors (e.g., UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING: "he doesn't *grasp* the theory"). It is this linguistic dimension of the perceptual modalities and their interactions in the conceptual metaphors of ancient Israelite and early Jewish Wisdom literature that will be examined in more depth in the following chapters.

The Lakoff-Johnson-Turner Theory and Ancient Literature

Before doing so, however, one must ask: how valid is this approach to study of ancient literature? It is my contention that the Lakoff-Johnson-Turner Theory (LJTT)[141] is relevant to the study of ancient literature, since it allows scholars to examine the conceptual systems of ancient cultures and the modes by which they communicate abstract concepts. In particular, the model's dismantling of the difference between poetry and ordinary prose enables scholars to examine the corporeal basis of poetic texts and to use poetic metaphor as an avenue by which to understand the conceptual systems of ancient cultures.[142] Although the texts that survive are in form "discourses," they still preserve the greater embodied experience of the cultures that produced them.

In this assessment I am not alone. The model's novelty, intuitiveness, and overall explanatory power had attracted scholars from multiple disciplines, biblical and antiquity studies included. As David Aaron states, since its release, "no work [on metaphor] has been as influential on biblical scholarship as that of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, who short book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980) is cited with unparalleled frequency."[143] For instance, the majority of the articles in the 1993 special volume of *Semeia* on *Women, War, and Metaphor* in the Bible either adopt or implicitly respond to this model.[144] The title of Mieke Bal's article—*Metaphors He*

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[141] Here, I am adopting the abbreviation noted in Aaron, *Biblical Ambuiguities*, 102.

[142] Claudia Camp, for instance, praises the model's ability to examine the status of women across genres, including poetry. Claudia Camp, "Metaphor in Feminist Biblical Interpretation: Theoretical Perspectives," *Semeia* 61 (1993): 3–36(19).

[143] Aaron, *Biblical Ambuiguities*, 101.

[144] Camp, "Metaphor in Feminist Biblical Interpretation: Theoretical Perspectives," 24; Aaron,

Lives By—specifically plays with the title of Lakoff and Johnson's first book in order to draw attention to the problematic masculinization of the model's universal tendencies.[145] Mary B. Slzos' 2001 dissertation on "Metaphor in Proverbs 31:10–31" was specifically aimed to "shape" this model to suit the needs of biblical scholarship, and several book-length treatments and articles have since drawn upon the LJTT for their examination of ancient texts such as Hosea, Jeremiah, and 1 Peter.[146]

Such widespread adoption has not been without criticism, however. For instance, Ellen Van Wolde's *Reframing Biblical Studies* could be read as an implicit critique of the LJTT. A monograph devoted to examining what the field of cognitive linguistics can contribute to biblical studies, van Wolde's book only briefly mentions the LJTT as a possible and ultimately unhelpful strand of cognitive linguistics. When compared with Langacker's model, which she eventually settles on for the duration of her study, the LJTT is deemed inconsistent and without external scholarly support.[147] Moreover, the LJTT, she implies, lacks the capacity to focus on specifics because of its general, universalistic focus.[148] While she does not fault scholars who use the LJTT, van Wolde herself argues that Langacker's model provides a more appealing model for biblical scholars who wish to analyze the cognitive processes behind words as they relate to specific historical and cultural contexts. Von Wolde's critique is striking, since her earlier work drew upon Fauconnier's and Taylor's model of conceptual blending, and, as she states in her

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Biblical Ambuiguities, 10 n. 15.

[145] Mieke Bal, "Metaphors He Lives By," *Semeia* 61 (1993): 185–207.

[146] Notable examples include Bonnie Howe, *Because You Bear This Name: Conceptual Metaphor and the Moral Meaning of 1 Peter* (Leiden: Brill, 2006); Job Jindo, *Biblical Metaphor Reconsidered: A Cognitive Approach to Poetic Prophecy in Jeremiah 1–24* (Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbrauns, 2010); Mary B. Szlos, "Body Parts as Metaphor and the Value of a Cognitive Approach: A Study of the Female Figures in Proverbs via Metaphor," in *Metaphor in the Hebrew Bible* (ed. Pierre Hecke; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005), 185–95; van Hecke, "Conceptual Blending," 215–31; Ellen Van Wolde, ed., *Job 28: Cognition in Context* (Biblical Interpretation Series 64; Leiden: Brill, 2003).

[147] Van Wolde never specifically calls the LJTT "inconsistent." However, she cites René Dirven, who notes that "Lakoff's proposals have met with far more internal and external critiques [than Langacker's] concerning a number of his basic insights, tenets, and tools, with the result that certain changes of orientation and alliances have followed." She then contrasts this with Langacker's model, which she calls the "most comprehensive and fully articulated approach" (*Reframing Biblical Studies,* 33).

[148] van Wolde, *Reframing Biblical Studies*, 34. See, however, the counter to this impression in the section "Factors behind Schema Formation" above.

book, *Reframing Biblical Studies* began with the intention of combining Fauconnier's and Taylor's model with Langacker's model.[149] Yet, in the final evaluation, van Wolde decided that only Langacker's grammatical approach provided the means necessary to study ancient texts.

More notably, in his 2001 study of *Biblical Ambiguities*, Aaron vehemently criticizes the LJTT and those biblical scholars who espouse it. According to Aaron, the model not only generally lacks the capacity for strong analysis (its evidence is merely a "long string of examples" with little analysis) and is too universal, but it also tends to ignore the semantic range of any given term. As he notes, from our vantage point, it is impossible to know if "understand" is a derivative meaning of a word like שמע and not part of the original semantic field of the root.[150] Moreover, following traditional theories of metaphor, he argues that metaphor is "a learned technique of discourse" and need not be used automatically.[151] For instance, he argues that the language of children prior to age six is literal, not metaphorical.[152] He thus criticizes scholars for their eagerness to find metaphors behind every expression, arguing that its "the act of classifying a phrase as metaphorical may frequently turn out to be a modern-made smoke screen to obfuscate truths interpreters would rather not confront when it comes to the religion(s) of biblical literature" (e.g., judging what the speaker really believed his words when he uttered a phrase).[153] Additionally, it "robs" scholars of exact definitions needed to distinguish the "subtle nuances" of a language.[154]

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[149] Van Wolde (*Reframing Biblical Studies*, 33 n. 10) lists four of her previous works as being the "first to apply Fauconnier's mental space theory in biblical studies": J. Sanders and van Wolde, "Perspectief tekstlinguïstich onderzocht," *Gramma/TTT, tijdschrift voor taalwetenschap* 2 (1993): 181–202; ibid., "Lijken met de ogen van anderen: Perspectief in bijbelteksten," *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 3 (1994): 221–45; van Wolde, "Who Guides Whom? Embeddedness and Perspective in Biblical Hebrew and in 1 Kings 3:16–28," *JBL* 114 (1995): 623–42; ead., "Cognitive Linguistics and Its Application to Genesis 28:10–22," in *One Text, A Thousand Methods: Studies in Memory of Sief van Tilborg* (ed. P. Chatelion Counet and U. Berges; Biblical Interpretation Series 71; Leiden: Brill, 2005).

[150] Aaron, *Biblical Ambuiguities*, 106–08.

[151] Ibid., 12.

[152] Ibid., 13.

[153] Ibid., 11.

[154] Ibid., 110. To counter this, Aaron proposes distinguishing expressions along a gradient, with literal on one end of the spectrum and nonsense/paradox on the other. Most expressions, including varying degrees of figurative language, would fall in between (see 111–18).

Aaron makes some valid points, particularly concerning the uncertainty that is involved when decoding the semantic field of the essentially "dead" languages of biblical texts. Over two thousand years removed, it is difficult for scholars to completely understand the semantic nuances of ancient languages. This critique, however, could be leveled at any number of lexical enterprises and, while valid, should suggest caution and precision, not full-scale abandonment. Moreover, Aaron's critique is aimed specifically at a brief aside in the early work of Eve Sweetser, a non-biblical cognitive linguist who admits that Hebrew is not her specialty and who bases her conclusions on the Hebrew's English equivalents.[155] This is not to say Sweetser is incorrect (as shall be seen in Chapter 3). In fact, Sweetser's examination seems to recognize Aaron's concern. Although acknowledging that semantic historians often have a "good feel" for their language of study, Sweetser argues that "we have little or no idea what constitutes a reasonable semantic reconstruction, or what regularities may be generally observable in semantic change."[156] For this reason, Sweetser argues that examining the universal "realism" behind terminology can help uncover the development of semantic changes. Still, perhaps a closer examination of the semantic fields of Hebrew terminology in relation to universal norms might help alleviate some of Aaron's concerns.

As if to anticipate this need, Gary Long developed a set of criteria for distinguishing between "first-order" (i.e., conventional) and "second-order" (i.e., novel) metaphorical utterances in the biblical text, [157] based upon linguistic and iconographic comparisons with ancient Near Eastern material: (1) If an expression parallels other ancient Near Eastern usages without "substantially meaningful difference," it should be considered first-order. (2) If the expression

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[155] Aaron, *Biblical Ambuiguities*, 108; Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 42–43, 151 n. 11. Notably, Aaron does not mention any biblical scholars in this particular critique, despite the "frequency" with which the LJTT is adopted by biblical scholars.

[156] Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 26.

[157] Building upon the work of H.P. Grice and Eva Kittay, Long suggests distinguishing between first- and second-order utterances. First-order meaning occurs when an utterance's meaning is identical to the "timeless" meaning of a term. In this, it is equal to LJTT's conventional metaphor. Second-order meaning, on the other hand, occurs when an utterance diverges from that timeless meaning (LJTT's novel metaphor). Both, however, are still metaphoric in LJTT's use of the term. Gary Long, "Dead or Alive? Literality and God-Metaphors in the Hebrew Bible," *JAAR* 62 (1994): 509–37 (514–15).

parallels other ancient Near Eastern usages but *does* differ substantially, it should be considered second-order.[158] (3) If there is no parallel, the first biblical usage would be second-order and subsequent uses would be either first- or second-order.[159] Long admits the difficulty in determining the "inaugural" use of a metaphor, but still argues that such criteria can still be helpful when used with caution to highlight distinctive uses within the Hebrew Bible. The key to determining the type of metaphor behind a biblical utterance therefore lies in linguistic and iconographic comparisons with the greater ancient world.

Applauding this general approach, Mary Szlos focuses on developing Long's third criteria in order to "confirm the novelty" of poems like Prov 31.[160] Because biblical Hebrew is "no one's first language anymore," Szlos proposes combining extensive word studies, especially of body parts, with archaeological and sociological investigations in order to determine as much as possible the semantic field and development of particular terms prior to their examination in relation to the conceptual metaphors of in ancient Israel. Once this is established, she then suggests examining the conceptual metaphors themselves and how these metaphors appear in specific biblical contexts.[161] Because of the difficulties of the task, Szlos suggests only deeming a metaphor novel when it occurs only once or twice in the biblical text.[162] Other metaphorical expressions are either conventional metaphors (if they still structure the particular culture's conceptual system) or historical metaphors (if they do not).

Given the impossibility of determining a metaphor's "inaugural" usage, Szlos' caution is

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[158] Long, "Dead or Alive?," 524–25.

[159] Ibid., 527.

[160] Szlos, "Metaphor in Proverbs 31:10–31," 88. In general Szlos is approving of Long's method. She does, however, find Long's distinctions problematic in that they tend to devalue convention metaphors, essentially equating them with dead metaphors. "According to Long's explanation of the terms he uses, first-order meaning is 'conventional literal' or 'dead' metaphor" and thus dismissible (87). As noted above, however, conventional metaphors are very much alive in the LJTT. Thus, while preserving Long's "second-order" meaning (when it applies to a limited number of novel metaphors in the Hebrew Bible), Szlos suggests instead distinguishing between "first-order conventional" and "first-order historical" meaning (88). Moreover, in order to streamline her approach and avoid the problems innate in ancient Near Eastern comparative studies, Szlos favors inner-biblical comparisons rather than extra-biblical, cross-cultural examinations (88).

[161] Ead., 90 –91.

[162] Ead., 88.

certainly warranted. Yet, especially when compared to their universal counterparts, some metaphorical expressions certainly appear to be imaginative extensions of a base metaphor no matter how often they appear in a given text (see, for example, the discussion of Proverbs' WISDOM IS A PATH OF LIGHT in Chapter 4 or the personified Wisdom metaphors in Chapter 5). Thus, while in general I shall be hesitant to label an expression as the inaugural usage of a metaphor, I shall not be as limited as Szlos in counting only a few instances as "imaginative" metaphor. Such material may not be *the* inaugural usage of a metaphor, but they clearly demonstrate an imaginative extension of a base conventional metaphor that has been picked up, creatively interpreted, and eventually themselves conventionalized (as can be seen in their adoption by later literature).

Moreover, I disagree with both Szlos and Long in automatically labeling any metaphor found in both the Hebrew Bible and ancient Near Eastern texts as a "conventional" metaphor. While the correspondences certainly suggest that some of these metaphors were conventional forms of expression, the chronological and geographical gap between these texts often make it impossible to determine how many of these metaphors were conventional throughout the ancient Near East and how many metaphors were conscious, creative *literary* adaptations of earlier material by the Israelite and early Jewish sages. It would be the same if a modern American poet described the sun as a "chariot" being driven across the sky by a charioteer, a metaphor obviously derived from ancient Greek mythology. A literary critic two thousand years in the future might mistake the correspondence as proof that Western culture conventionally understood the sun as a chariot, when in fact the metaphor was conventional in ancient Greece and was imaginatively appropriated by later Western artists. Such cases of literary appropriations do not mean that the metaphor was conventional in the culture who adopted it; only that the new author was able to adopt the metaphor and use it for his or her own creative purposes. Moreover, since many of the "borrowed" metaphors in the Hebrew Bible can be explained as natural extensions of universal metaphors, it is likely that the ancient Near Eastern literature merely encouraged the development

of primary metaphors that were already native to Israelite and early Jewish cultures.

At any rate, while acknowledging the validity of Aaron's skepticism, I follow Long, Szlos, and others in finding merit in the examination of the conceptual metaphors of ancient Israel and early Judaism. Although I will not look for "inaugural" uses of metaphors, I will examine the conceptual systems of ancient Wisdom literature as they develop in ancient Israel and early Judaism. Such an approach is not only possible but highly beneficiary. As Pierre van Hecke argues, it is only by examining the structure of conceptual metaphors and their blended states that one can fully appreciate the nuanced distinctions between key conceptualizations of ancient Israel (e.g., metaphors that describe Israel as a straying cow vs. those that describe the people as roaming sheep).[163] In other words, close attention to semantic fields and conceptual systems, as much as they can be reconstructed, *can* help uncover the conceptual metaphors that lie behind the abstract concepts of ancient Israelite and Jewish wisdom literature and thus help us better understand how these ancient people conceptualized their world.

Following Szlos' approach, I shall focus my attention in the analysis that follows primarily on the biblical data, bringing in cross-cultural comparisons only when illustrative. I shall, however, draw upon modern biological findings about the various perceptual modalities, since like Lakoff and Johnson, I find that certain conceptual metaphors transcend cultural boundaries. A study of modern biological theories about the operations of the modalities and the conceptual metaphors they engender can help illuminate their functionings in the ancient world. Combined, these lexical and biological examinations of the conceptual systems behind ancient scribal culture can lay a strong foundation for study of the employment of conceptual metaphors within ancient Israelite and early Jewish wisdom texts.

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[163] van Hecke, "Conceptual Blending," 231.

Chapter 2: Contextual Considerations

Like any land, ancient Israel was comprised of many different social groups. According to the Hebrew Bible, there were priests who worked in the temples (see Leviticus, Deuteronomy), kings who governed the people (see 1–2 Kings//1–2 Chronicles), shepherds who kept goats or sheep (e.g., Gen 30:27–43; Exod 3:1; 1 Sam 16:11), farmers who tended the fields (e.g., Gen 4:2; Zec 13:5), and craftsmen who built houses or fashioned tools (e.g., 2 Kgs 22:5–6//2 Chr 34:10–11; 2 Kgs 24:14, 16).[1] There were also "scribes" (סופר) and "sages" (חכם), a professional class of educated individuals who kept written records (e.g., 2 Kgs 12:10//2 Chr 24:11; 2 Kgs 18:18–19:7//Isa 36:3–37:7; 1Ch 24:6), transcribed verbal discourse (e.g., Jer 36:4–18; Ezra 4:8), copied and composed sacred texts (e.g., 2 Kgs 22:3–11; Jer 8:8; Prov 25:1), and even provided advice to the governor or king (e.g., Jer 18:18; 1 Chr 27:32).[2] Since this latter group was primarily responsible for shaping the Wisdom texts into what they are today, it is helpful to begin the discussion here by outlining the basic cultural contexts of the scribal elite before turning to the conceptual metaphors they engendered.

Of Scribes, Sages, and Wisdom Literature

Whether the Hebrew Bible's pre-exilic presentation of scribes accurately reflects historical reality is open to debate. Yet, the presence of a similar profession in contemporary

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[1] The list here is not intended to confirm the historical accuracy of the narratives listed. For instance, to say that Jacob, Moses, and David are examples of shepherds in ancient Israel is not to suggest that Jacob, Moses, and David, if they existed at all, were actually shepherds. Rather, when a text describes its legendary figures by way of one of these professions, it projects its community's own understanding of human society back onto their ancestors. In other words, these examples are illustrative of the types of professions available in Israel when the text was composed and throughout its history. Jacob, Moses, and David may not have been shepherds, but the people who composed such stories were aware that the profession existed and used it to convey a particular message about their ancestors.

[2] Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 50. 2 Kings 22:3–11 does not actually say that Shephan, the סופר of Josiah, wrote or copied the "book of the Law," but that the priest "found" the book in the Temple during remodeling and that Shaphan then delivered it to Josiah. As many scholars point out, however, the narrative about the discovery of the book of the Law in the Temple is likely a rhetorical device, designed to legitimize Josiah's religious reforms by appealing to the antiquity of the prohibitions he enacted. If so, then Shephan's actions may reflect the participation of scribes in the composition of the "book of the Law," a legal code that may have served as the *vorlage* to the current book of Deuteronomy.

Egyptian and Mesopotamian cultures and references to scribes in the documentary evidence of ancient Israel and the Jewish community of Elephantine suggest that the profession did exist in ancient Israel by the Persian era, if not before.[3] If their Egyptian and Mesopotamian counterparts are any indication, it is likely that these scribes served in various locales. While all were part of the larger administrative system of the society, some scribes served in royal courts (e.g., 2 Kgs 18:18–19:7//Isa 36:3–37:7), some in temples (e.g., Jer 36:10, 12, 20–21), some in the army (e.g., 2 Kgs 25:19// Jer 52:25), and some in smaller cities (e.g., 2 Sam 15:12, 20:14–22).[4] In order to copy texts and record dictated speech in these diverse locations, scribes would have needed to know how to read and write in the various languages of their time, both local Semitic dialects (Hebrew, Aramaic) and international languages (e.g., Egyptian, Akkadian, Greek).[5] Initially, these skills were probably taught to the scribe by his father, since like priests or farmers, the scribal profession was probably hereditary, with male children following in the profession of their

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[3] For evidence of Egyptian and Mesopotamian scribes, see Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, esp. 15–48, 56–66. The documentary evidence includes various unprovenanced Northwest Semitic seals from Late Iron Age Judah, which attest to the existence of scribes; ten Persian era seal impressions, each containing the inscription לירמי הספר ("Belonging to Jeremai, the scribe"); and various documents from the Jewish community at Elephantine, recording the scribe who copied it (e.g., the "scribes of the province," TAD A6.1:1, 6; the "scribes of the treasury," TAD B4.4:12, 14). See Nahman Avigad, *Bullae and Seals from a Post-exilic Judean Archive* (Qedem 4; Jerusalem: Institute of Archaeology-Hebrew University, 1976), esp.16–17; Christine Schams, *Jewish Scribes in the Second-Temple Period* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), 46; David Vanderhooft, "'el-mĕdînâ ûmĕdînâ kiktābāh: Scribes and Scripts in Yehud and in Achaemenid Transeuphratene," in *Judah and the Judeans in the Achaemenid Period: Negotiating Identity in an International Context* (eds. Oded Lipschits, et al.; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 2011), 529–43 (532–33).

[4] The locations of these individuals are not always clear, especially whether they served in the royal court or the Temple. For instance, in Jer 36, Gemariah and Elishama are both said to have their own chamber (לשכת), which is near to but separate from the king's court. It is not certain that this is in the Temple complex, but Perdue (*The Sword and the Stylus*, 72–73) argues that the difference between the royal court and the לשכת suggests that "there were two groups of scribes (priestly and royal) located in two similar buildings in the temple complex, adjacent to the palace." For more on the social locale of scribes, see Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 50–57, 66–80.

[5] See, for instance, 2 Kgs 18:26//Isa 36:11, where three court officials (Eliakim son of Hilkiah, the palace master; Shebnah, the סופר; and Joah, son of Asaph, the record keeper) ask a foreign messenger to speak in Aramaic, rather than the local dialect, in order to keep the people from hearing the message of the foreign king. For more information, see Leo G. Perdue, "Scribes, Sages, and Seers in Israel and the Ancient Near East: An Introduction," in *Scribes, Sages, and Seers: The Sage in the Eastern Mediterranean World* (ed. Leo G. Perdue; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 1–34 (5).

fathers.[6] As the administrative systems of the land developed and more refined skills were needed, specialized "schools" were created to train young scribes in their craft. As André Lemaire argues, these may have been located in the house of a noted teacher, in the marketplace or other public place, or a building designated specifically for that purpose.[7] However, the nomenclature for teacher and student continued to reflect the hereditary origin of the profession. Students were בנים ("sons"), and the teachers were either אמות ("mothers") or אבות ("fathers"), even when there was no direct biological relationship between them.[8] Those scribes who excelled at their profession and demonstrated mastery of their ancestral traditions were deemed חכמים, lit. "wise ones."[9] Such "sages" were responsible not only for the administrative duties of the kingdom and

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[6] See, for instance, the family of scribes at Jabez listed in 1 Chr 2:55 and the family of Shaphan, the father and sons of which serve as royal scribes in the late monarchy (e.g., 2 Kgs 22:3–20; Jer 36:10–21).

[7] André Lemaire, "The Sage in School and Temple," in *The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East* (eds. John G. Gammie and Leo G Perdue; Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 165–81, 168; see also Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 70. There is considerable scholarly debate about the existence of schools in ancient Israel. The first solid evidence of schools in Israel does not appear until Ben Sira, who refers to a בית מדרש ("house of study," 51:23). Thus, such scholars as Norman Whybry and Friedemann Golka argue against the presence of schools in pre-exilic Israel. See, for instance, Norman Whybry, *The Intellectual Tradition in Old Testament* (BZAW 135; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974), 43; Friedemann Golka, *The Leopard's Spots: Biblical and African Wisdom in Proverbs* (Edinburg,: T&T Clark, 1993), 4–15. However, although conclusive evidence is lacking for a formal school in Israel prior to Hellenism, it is plausible that such institutions did exist. Contemporaneous Egyptian and Mesopotamian sources attest to their existence in nearby kingdoms (see, Lemaire, "The Sage in School and Temple,"168 and the more detailed list in his *Les écoles et a la formation de la Bible dans l'ancien Israel* [OBO 39; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1981], 94–95; Perdue, "Scribes, Sages, and Seers,"17–31), and "school-boy" exercises have been found in eight–sixth century outposts and cities (Lemaire, "The Sage in School and Temple,"172). The Hebrew Bible itself refers to "teachers" (2 Chr 17:7–9; Prov 5:13) and hints at the existence of royal, prophetic, and priestly schools (e.g., 1 Kgs 12:8, 10; 2 Kgs 6:1–2; 10:1, 5, 6; Isa 8:16; 28:7–13; 2 Chr 17:7–9, 22:11) (Lemaire, "The Sage in School and Temple," 171; Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 70). The increased skill set needed by scribes in late pre-exilic period bureaucracies and the spread of literacy necessitated a more formal mode of training. As Fox states, "it is likely that there were schools attached to the temple and possibly the court, as in Egypt and Mesopotamia, because there is little reason for *anyone* to write if only a scattered few could read." Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 8. As such, many scholars affirm the existence of Israelite schools, at least in the early exile if not before. See, for instance, Lemaire, "The Sage in School and Temple,"165–81; Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 7–8; Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 70–80.

[8] There is some evidence that women served as sages (see, for instance 2 Sam 14:1–24, 20:16–22), although men seem to predominate. Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 71, 104; Claudia Camp, "The Female Sage in Biblical Literature," in *The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East* (eds. John G. Gammie and Leo G Perdue; Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 185–203.

[9] Perdue, "Scribes, Sages, and Seers," 4. As Leo Perdue points out, the adjective חכם could refer to "anyone who possesses a particular skill or specialized knowledge," whether they be scribes, craftsmen, or priests. However, the nominal form often appears as a title of honor, "reserved for those who were especially acute in their powers of judgment and well known in tradition for their mastery of wisdom as both an epistemology and a body of knowledge."

likely served in positions of prestige, but also educated the next generation of scribes in the skills necessary to fulfill their duties and in the values of their community.[10]

According to the book of Ben Sira, unlike manual laborers, scribes enjoyed the "leisure" (Sir 38:24) to "study the law of the Most High" (Sir 38:34) and unravel the mysteries of creation. As the book states, the scribe

> seeks out the wisdom of all the ancients and busies himself with prophecies; he preserves the sayings of famous men and enters into the circuitous ways of parables; he seeks out the secrets of proverbs and dwells in the riddles of parables. He serves among the great and appears before rulers; he passes through the lands of foreign nations and tests good and evil in people….If the great Lord desires, he will himself be filled with the spirit of understanding; he will pour forth words of his own wisdom and give thanks in prayer to the Lord…He will reveal the education of his schooling and will boast in the law of the Lord's covenant. (Sir 39:1–8)

According to Ben Sira, the sage has the freedom to study the law, compile proverbs, and create sayings of his own. Admittedly, Ben Sira's description is an idealized presentation of scribal activities and may reflect the author's attempt to justify his own literary activities. However, this description probably still reflects actual scribal practices. The author of this poem at least seems to conceive of his own activities in this fashion, and it is likely that other scribes of his acquaintance did likewise. The poem, after all, does not attempt to defend its position; rather, it presents its description as the natural state of scribes and, if anything, defends the value of non-scribal professions (see Sir 38:31–41).

If this poem does reflect actual scribal practice, then in addition to drafting letters to foreign officials, recording important events for their kings, and educating future generations, scribes gathered the proverbial wisdom of their people, organized them according to their own

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[10] Perdue, "Scribes, Sages, and Seers," 4; Katharine Dell, "Scribes, Sages, and Seers in the First Temple," in *Scribes, Sages, and Seers: The Sage in the Eastern Mediterranean World* (ed. Leo G Perdue; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 125–44 (130, 139–40).

perception of reality, and added a few of their own. The book of Proverbs, for instance, probably developed in this very manner. As Fox describes, the majority of Proverbs (chapters 10–29) reflects the collected wisdom of pre-exilic Israel. Some sayings grew out of the oral sayings of agrarian villagers and reflect a domestic setting (e.g., Prov 10:5, 12:11, 15:17). Other sayings, however, consider the proper conduct of court officials and thus probably reflect the interests of individuals familiar with that environment (e.g., Prov 23:1–5, 25:6–7).[11] Since court scribes often engaged with foreign emissaries and probably travelled abroad themselves in order to fulfill their duties, many sayings also reflect the international milieu of the time, cast in Israelite terms (e.g., the reworking of the "Instruction of Amenemope," a twelfth-century Egyptian text, in Prov 22:17–24:22).[12] The scribal class, which spanned multiple locales, gradually collected these diverse sayings and wove them together into a coherent collection.[13] Proverbs 1–9, 31 were then added at a late, post-exilic stage by an elite scribal class who responded to the older material and recast it according to their own interests.[14] In some sense, then, the book of Proverbs as a whole reflects the collected wisdom of the entire people of Israel (common and elite) as they were

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[11] Some scholars argue that all of Prov 10–29 came from an agrarian context. See, for instance, Claus Westermann, *The Roots of Wisdom: The Oldest Proverbs of Israel and Other People* (trans. J.D, Charles; Louisville, Ky.: Westminster John Knox, 1995); Golka, *The Leopard's Spots*, 4–53. Other scholars suggest that the entire book grew out of schools connected to the royal court and thus reflect the interests of an elite class of professional scribes. See, for example, Hans-Jürgen Hermission, *Studien zur israelitischen Spruchweisheit* (WMANT 28; Neukirchen: Neukirchener Vlg, 1968); and Bernhard Lang, *Wisdom and the Book of Proverbs* (New York: Pilgrim, 1986). The reality probably is a hybrid between the two, with some sayings originating in the ordinary people of the land and others in the court or school (thus Fox). For a discussion of these scholars and their positions, see Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 6–12.

[12] Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 49, 93–94, 96–97. See also the "Sayings of Agur" (Proverbs 30), which may reflect the Akkadian *apkallu* tradition, and the incorporation of the sayings of Lemuel's mother, an Arabic queen, into Prov 31:1–9.

[13] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 9–11.

[14] Here, too, scholars differ, with some arguing that Prov 1–9, although later than 10–29, was still pre-exilic. See, for instance, Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 88; Dell, "Scribes, Sages, and Seers in the First Temple," 127. Perdue argues, however, that although the collection of 1–9 was pre-exilic, there was a post-exilic redaction of the entire book, at which stage the prologue of Proverbs (1:2–7) and poem on the "Woman of Worth" (31:10–31) were added (*The Sword and Stylus*, 99). However, Fox's argument for a post-exilic composition of 1–9 seems more plausible, given the presence of Aramaisms in some of the Proverbs, possible allusions to the book of Jeremiah, and the similarity between the intellectual and social concerns of Proverbs 1–9 and post-exilic communities (*Proverbs 1–9*, 6, 48–49, 104). Fox tentatively suggests a Hellenistic date for Proverbs 1–9 (49), but the evidence is too inconclusive to be certain exactly when the text was composed. It therefore is best to leave the exact dating open to either a Persian or Hellenistic milieu.

handed down and preserved. At the same time, Proverbs also reflects the particular interest of the scribal elite, who selected which sayings to include, arranged them in a particular manner, and shaped them to fit their particular conception of the cosmos.[15]

Later scribes reflected on such collected wisdom and reshaped it according their own perceptions of reality. The books of Job and Qohelet, for instance, each seem to be an educated response to the type of mentality set forth in Proverbs.[16] Like Proverbs, the book of Job probably developed in stages. The earliest material, the prose narrative of chapters 1–2 and 42:7–17, probably originated as a pre-exilic didactic tale about the origin of suffering and the appropriate responses to it. During the Babylonian exile, various dialogues (chapts. 3–31, 38:1–42:17) were composed in response to the earlier tale that challenged the established precepts of Israelite society, most particularly the position set forth in Proverbs and the Deuteronomic History that human righteousness guarantees prosperity while human sin results in punishment and suffering. Finally, sometime before the late Persian period, the "Speeches of Elihu" (chapts. 32–37) and a poem on Wisdom (chapt. 28) were interjected into the book, critiquing the main dialogues and reaffirming the inscrutability of God.[17]

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[15] As Fox states (*Proverbs 1–9*, 11), the authors/redactors of this text "did collect sayings and add some of their own, but most important, they *selected*. They chose what to include and what to ignore, and what they included, they reshaped."

[16] This is not to say that the authors of Job and Qohelet knew the book that we have today called Proverbs. However, the worldview presented within them responds to the type of worldview preserved in Proverbs.

[17] This reconstruction essentially follows that of Perdue (*Sword and Stylus*, 117–18), who argues that the book developed in distinct textual stages, with the narrative being the earliest text to which first the dialogues were added and then the wisdom poem of chapter 28 and the "Speeches of Elihu" in chapters 32–37. It is not clear if the dialogues were composed as an entire unit (as Perdue seems to argue) or as separate debates, in which case they may have been inserted into the prose narrative after their composition. There is, of course, considerable scholarly debate about the relationship between the different parts of Job. Many scholars support, to varying degrees, a gradual composition of the book (thus Perdue). Others scholars argue that the book was composed by one author or, at least, can be read as one continuous narrative. Norman Habel, for instance, argues in favor of a single authorship, stating that the book has a unified artistry and literary design. See Norman Habel, *The Book of Job: A Commentary* (OTL; Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1985), 35–39. Carol Newsom argues that the book could be read as a fifth-century Judean author's creative experiment in putting multiple positions on suffering into conversation with each other. Newsom agrees, however, with scholars who argue the speeches of Elihu are a later response to this exercise. See Carol Newsom, "The Book of Job as Polyphonic Text," *JSOT* 97 (2002): 87–108. Given the diversity of form and content within the book of Job, it seems most plausible that the book developed in stages, within different groups reflecting upon and responding to their received

As with Proverbs, the composition of Job thus reflects the activities of scribes who, in the process of gathering and responding to the inherited material, recast their traditions according to their own interests. Yet, these distinct positions on suffering were not harmonized into a single perspective. As Carol Newsom argues, "there is no super-authorial mediation to harmonize the…voices in the service of a single complex truth; there is only their unresolvable, unfinalizable scrutiny of each."[18] The multiple positions on suffering were put into conversation with each other without choosing one as the definitive position. The final book, as Yair Hoffman argues, is thus an "anthology on the subject of recompense," a collection of conflicting scribal voices each responding to and reshaping the pre-existing traditions of their society about the nature of human suffering.[19]

Qohelet reflects a similar process. Although some scholars have suggested a single authorship for Qohelet, the book probably contains at least two different voices, that of the narrator proper (the "Teacher," Qoh 1:2–12:8) and that of a later editor (Qoh 1:1, 7:27, 12:9–14, and perhaps other glosses within the text).[20] The material produced by the Teacher probably

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traditions. For more information on the debates about the book's development, see Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 123–31. For more on the relationship between Job and previous intellectual traditions of Israel, including the Priestly Code, the Deuteronomic History, and prophetic ideology, see Konrad Schmid, "The Authors of Job and Their Historical and Social Setting," in *Scribes, Sages, and Seers: The Sage in the Eastern Mediterranean World* (ed. Leo G. Perdue; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 145–53 (151–52).

[18] Newsom, "The Book of Job as Polyphonic Text," 103. Newsom is speaking particularly of the relationship between the prose narrative and main dialogues, but the observation can just as easily apply to the "Speeches of Elihu" and thus the book as a whole.

[19] Yair Hoffman, *A Blemished Perfection: the Book of Job in Context* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996), 99–114 (113).

[20] As with Proverbs and Job, there is considerable debate about the composition history of the book of Qohelet, with some scholars arguing for a single author and others for multiple authors. Fox, for instance, argues that the "editorial" insertions are part of the rhetoric of the text and that they were composed by the same author who penned the rest of the text. See Michael Fox, "Frame-Narrative and Composition in the Book of Qohelet," *HUCA* 48 (1977): 83–106. Choon-Leong Seow, however, argues that this position, while possible, is unlikely and that a later editor was responsible for collecting and arranging the material into the current text. See Choon-Leong Seow, *Ecclesiastes: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (The Anchor Bible 18C; New York: Doubleday, 1997), 38. Still other scholars point to various inconsistencies within the text (e.g., pleasure is affirmed in 2:24–26, 5:17–19 but questioned in 2:2–3, 10–11) to suggest a plethora of authors. For instance, C. G. Siegfried suggests the presence of as many as nine editorial hands. See C. G. Siegfried, Die Sprüche, *Prediger und Hoheslied* (Handkommentar zum Alten Testament 2.3; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1898), 2 –12. The simplest explanation—that the words of a teacher has been collected by a later editor—seems the most

stems from the late Persian period (ca. fifth–fourth century B.C.E.) or early Hellenistic period (ca. third century B.C.E.) and presumes an audience already familiar with and committed to the idea that the proper attention to the normative wisdom of Israelite society results in the acquisition of righteousness and prosperity.[21] The Teacher challenges this convention by reflecting at length on the nature and limitations of human knowledge. Although adopting the persona of the "king of Israel" (e.g., Qoh 1:12), the social class of the narrator is unclear. However, the rhetoric of the text suggests that this Teacher belonged to and directed his musings toward an educated elite. The introduction and epilogue specifically casts the book as the "sayings of the wise" (Qoh 1:1, 12:11) and describes the Teacher as one who "taught the people knowledge, considered carefully and investigated, and arranged many proverbs" (Qoh 12: 9). While this phraseology was added after the fact and may reflect scribal convention, it at least indicates that, by the time the book was redacted, the Teacher was conceived of as a scribe, performing scribal functions similar to the scribe of Ben Sira.

A later editor collected the material produced by this Teacher, arranged it into its current form, and added an introduction and conclusion. In doing so, the editor reshaped the material bringing it more in line with conventional scribal conceptions. Thus, where the Teacher encourages the sage to explore the limitations of human knowledge through direct experiments, the editor encourages the audience to attend to the wise words of the Teacher and be wary of

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plausible given the difference in voice and tone between the main text and "editorial" passages (first person versus third person). As Seow argues, one need not posit the existence of multiple editorial hands to explain the internal inconsistencies. The tensions within the book can easily be explained as a rhetorical device used by the author to "lead his reader to recognize that what one perceives at first glance many not necessarily be reality" (*Ecclesiastes*, 43). The inconsistencies present within the book thus reflect Qohelet's main point that life is not as orderly as first appears. For more on the positions of these scholars and the larger scholarly debate about Qohelet's composition, see Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 38–43.

[21] Seow suggests a Persian dating, based on the presence of Persian loan words (e.g.,פרדסים, "parks," Qoh 2:5; פתגם, "word," Qoh 8:11), Late Biblical Hebrew features (e.g., frequent use of ־שׁ instead of אשר), Persian era idioms (e.g., חלק, "lot," Qoh 3:22, 5:18–19; כף, with the sense of "small handful," Qoh 4:6; בית הסורים, "prison," Qoh 4:14), and Persian-era concerns (e.g., focus on economic issues and economic inequalities). Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 12–36; Ibid., "The Social World of Ecclesiastes," in *Scribes, Sages, and Seers: The Sage in the Eastern Mediterranean World* (ed. Leo G. Perdue; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 189–217. Other scholars, however, suggest a Hellenistic dating due to similarities between Qohelet and Hellenistic philosophy (see, for instance, Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 198–255).

making books of their own (Qoh 12:11–12). Unlike the words of the Teacher, the editor specifically addresses himself to בני ("my son," Qoh 12:11), the scribal student. Whatever the social class of the original narrator and his audience may have been, the book of Qohelet itself reflects the hand of a scribal elite, who collected the sayings of the "Teacher" and reshaped them according to their perception of life.

Later early Jewish authors continued this trend, as their respective communities reflected upon and/or challenged the scribal traditions they had inherited. For example, in the early second century B.C.E., the Jewish sage Yeshua ben Eleazar ben Sira collected sayings and reinterpreted them in light of a community facing increasing Hellenistic influences.[22] Ben Sira's grandson (or student?) then translated the teachings of Ben Sira into Greek, in the process reinterpreting them according to the Alexandrine community he found himself in.[23] Other early Jewish sages, such as those who composed *1 Enoch* and the writings from Qumran, also reflected on the traditions of their ancestors, gathering texts from a variety of contexts, reinterpreting them in light of their eschatological aspirations, and composing new texts that responded to them.[24] The resulting texts added a particularly apocalyptic flavor to the sapiential tradition, predicting the ultimate

[22] Unlike Proverbs, Job, or Qohelet, the book of Ben Sira specifically ascribes its writing to a particular sage, Yeshua ben Eleazar ben Sira (Sir 50:27). Moreover, the prologue states that the book's translator came to Egypt in thirty-eighth year of Euergetes, that is, Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II, who reigned from 145–117 B.C.E. Although it is possible that these ascriptions provide a fictional setting for the text and that an Alexandrine author used the name of Ben Sira to obtain authority for his own work, scholars generally accept these ascriptions as accurate representations of the book's composition. If so, then Ben Sira probably composed his text between 200 and 175 B.C.E. and the book was translated around 132 B.C.E. Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 259.

[23] Given the use of familial terms for students amongst scribes, it is possible that Ben Sira was not the translator's "grandfather" (πάππος) but his teacher. Yet, grandson or student, the translation that this unknown translator provided is not neutral; that is, in the process of translating the text, he incorporated his own values into the translation through his choice of words and the insertion of addition material.

[24] For the complicated relationship between apocalyptic literature and wisdom literature, see especially Benjamin G. Wright, III, "1 Enoch and Ben Sira: Wisdom and Apocalypticism in Relationship," in *The Early Enoch Literature* (eds. Gabriele Boccaccini and John Collins; Leiden: Brill, 2007), 159–76; Armin Lange, "Sages and Scribes in the Qumran Literature," in *Scribes, Sages, and Seers: The Sage in the Eastern Mediterranean World* (ed. Leo G Perdue; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 271–93. Wright, for instance, argues that there was a "social connection" between the people who wrote apocalyptic literature and wisdom texts (160). Similarly, as Lange notes, although the term "scribe" (סופר) rarely appears among the Qumran texts and only in the non-sectarian literature, various sapiential figures do appear including the חכם ("wise one"), יודע ("knowing one"), מבין ("understanding one/teacher"), משכיל ("teacher"), and נבון ("understanding one"). While חכם, נבון, and סופר do not seem to refer to a specific profession, the מבין and the משכיל may designate specific functions in the community (282).

destruction of the wicked (i.e., those who failed to follow the correct wisdom) and the redemption of the wise.[25] In each case, the sages gathered the traditions of their people, reflected upon them, and shaped them according to the concerns and values of their community.

While not every scribe would have had the capability or opportunity to engage in such literary activity, the small, elite group of scribes who did were thus able to shape the tradition of their ancestors as they saw fit and produce the distinctive collection of texts that scholars today refer to collectively as "Wisdom literature" (Proverbs, Job, Qohelet, Ben Sira, select psalms, Wisdom of Solomon, 4QInstruction, etc.). Because of their organic development, the so-called "Wisdom" books of ancient Israel do not truly constitute a self-contained genre. They exhibit a variety of interests, stem from various social locales, and contain within them a range of literary forms (short sayings, poems, dialogue, prose, etc.). To label them a fixed "genre" would therefore be misleading. Instead, as John Collins states, it is more appropriate to consider these texts "a tradition, held together by certain family resemblances"—e.g., a concern for order, a defined social hierarchy, and a relative absence of Israelite-specific theology—"rather than by a constant essence."[26] Most importantly, these texts share a common worldview originally grounded in the conviction that human beings were capable of understanding the world and thriving by their own innate intellectual capacities. Although this optimism gradually collapsed, the tradition continued to maintain that the individual's ability to reason—his "wisdom"—was paramount for understanding how humanity related to the world around him and the divine.

What is Wisdom?

Given the importance ascribed to the category, one should ask: what exactly is "wisdom"? Although scholars often use "wisdom" as a standard translation for the Hebrew term חכמה, "wisdom" is best understood as a broad semantic domain, denoting a wide range of

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[25] For more on the apocalyptic nature of Qumran's sapiential literature, see Perdue, *The Sword and the Stylus*, 372–87.

[26] Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 1.

interrelated Hebrew terms that, when combined, constitute the ancient Israelite conception of cognition. In his commentary on Proverbs, for instance, Fox classifies eleven Hebrew nouns as "wisdom" terms, and their meanings range from technical expertise (חכמה), discipline (מוסר), and the ability to devise plans (עצה; תחבלות) to intellectual acumen (בינה, שכל, תבונה, תושיה), shrewdness (מזמה, ערמה), and "cognition itself" (דעת).[27] "Wisdom," in other words, describes the ability to obtain and retain knowledge about the world and the understanding of how that knowledge applies to practical, everyday situations.

As Fox has pointed out, Hebrew "wisdom" terms—as well as their corresponding verbs (e.g., ידע, בין) and other associated terms (e.g., למד, חסב)—are often not sharply distinguished in their applications. בינה and תבונה, for instance, are often used interchangeably and do not reflect distinct forms of cognition.[28] Likewise, although חכמה is frequently used as a general term for "wisdom," it is virtually indistinguishable in application from terms like דעת and תבונה, which often stand parallel to it (e.g., Prov 2:2, 6, 10; 3:13, 19; 5:1; 8:1). To a certain extent, such terminological slippage is to be expected. As Michael Fortescue notes, the semantic fields of cognitive terms throughout the world tend to overlap. In English, for example, we routinely conceptualize cognition as *knowing, considering, recognizing, understanding, thinking*, and so forth without conscious reflection on how these terms vary.[29] So, too, in Hebrew, where any given wisdom term itself could denote a range of cognitive activities, including the faculties of cognition, the cognitive process itself, and the by-products of such cognitive activities. עצה, for instance, can denote the ability to "plan" (e.g., Job 12:13, 38:2, 42:3), the actual process of "planning" (e.g. Prov 20:18), and the result of such planning, i.e., "a plan" (e.g., Job 29:21; Prov 12:14, 19:20).[30] Similarly, בינה can refer to the individual's ability to reason (e.g., Prov 3:5; Sir 38:6) as well as the content produced by that reasoning (e.g., Prov 30:2–3, 9:10; Job 28:12, 20,

[27] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 28–38.
[28] Ibid., 28; Fox, "Words for Wisdom," *ZAH* 6 (1993): 149–69 (150).
[29] Michael Fortescue, "Thoughts about Thought," *Cognitive Linguistics* 12 (2001): 15–45 (16).
[30] Fox, "Words for Wisdom," 160.

38:4; Sir 6:35).[31] As Fox notes, such "applications" are not "separate meanings" but rather different "possible realizations of a single meaning."[32] בינה *means* reason, but that reason can be realized in the individual's innate ability or in his words and actions. Thus, although recognizing that there is a semantic distinction between various Hebrew terms for "wisdom," it is best to think of Israelite "wisdom" as a cohesive "network of experiential categories" used to conceptualize a wide range of cognitive activities, rather than a specific term (חכמה) or a series of distinct terms (חכמה, בינה, etc.) each representing different forms of cognition.[33]

At the same time, "wisdom" in sapiential circles was not simply a biological process. Although wisdom terms did describe the physiological means by which an individual processed information about the world, they also reflected the expectation that the individual would apply the resulting knowledge to his or her daily interactions. As Fox states, terms such as חכמה and תבונה involve more than "inert knowledge"; one must also "carry out what one knows."[34] Wisdom was an attitude, a moral character, and a practice as much as it was an intellectual capacity, and it required the individual to be willing to embody that attitude in everyday situations.[35] As such, "wisdom" was a normative concept; that is, it was "good" to have wisdom, and there was an appropriate way to obtain and use it.

Scribal attempts to describe "wisdom" or prescribe its appropriate means are, therefore, epistemological endeavors. They are attempts to describe how human cognition works, how knowledge itself can be acquired, and to what ends it could be put. Cognition, however, is an abstract concept. Terms such as "think," "consider," בינה, הכמה, and דעת are imperceptible to daily

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[31] Ibid., 154–58.

[32] Ibid., 151.

[33] Fortescue ("Thoughts about Thought," 32) uses this phrase with respect to cognition in general. As he states, with cognition, "we are dealing with a network of experiential categories that are intertwined in such a way that words used to refer to them will also tend to overlap in meaning and interact in terms of mutual implications." Fox, in his discussion of Qohelet's epistemology, speaks of a similar "unitary conception of wisdom." Despite its various nuances, wisdom is "a single, known attribute that can be praised, described, and personified without further definition." Michael Fox, "Qohelet's Epistemology," *HUCA* 58 (1987): 137–55 (139).

[34] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 33.

[35] Michael Fox, "Ideas of Wisdom in Proverbs 1–9," *JBL* 116 (1997): 613–33 (620).

perceptual experience. We cannot actually see our points, hear ourselves thinking, or grasp a concept. We cannot buy בינה (Prov 4:5), seize מוסר (Prov 4:13), or walk on paths of הכמה (Prov 4:11). Yet, like us, the ancient scribes routinely spoke of cognition by means of these concrete experiences. Proverbs 4, for instance, frequently describes the abstract concept of wisdom as something that comes forth from the "mouth" of the teacher (v. 5), enters the body of the student through the "ear" (v. 20), is stored in the "heart" (vv. 4, 21, 23), and is placed upon the "head" (v. 9). Wisdom is "heard" (vv. 1, 10), "seen" (vv. 21, 25), "grasped" (vv. 13), and experienced through "walking" (vv.11–12, 26–27). As Lakoff and Johnson note, it is nearly impossible to speak of cognitive activities without recourse to such concrete experiences.[36] Whether we speak of "*grasping* an idea," "*following* a claim," or "*showing* an argument" (e.g., "as I will *show*"), we use metaphors to conceptualize the abstract concept of cognition in terms of concrete experiences.

For this reason, the LJTT proves an invaluable resource, since it provides a helpful model for examining how these ancient Israelite and early Jewish conceptions of wisdom developed and communicated the values of the scribal elite who recorded them. In the pages that follow, I shall discuss two main categories of conceptual metaphors for "wisdom," primary metaphors and complex metaphors. As noted in Chapter 1, a primary metaphor is the most basic form of conceptual metaphor, being derived directly from a "subjective (phenomenological) experience of a basic event" (e.g., MORE IS UP, ANGER IS HEAT, DESIRE IS HUNGER).[37] Primary metaphors for wisdom are those that describe the general acquisition and contemplation of "factual" information, namely, the color of objects, the workings of the human body, or the properties of food. This is information that can be obtained directly through the perceptual modalities and is therefore, at least in theory, accessible to everyone, regardless of social class or station. Because they rely directly on experiences common to the human condition, primary metaphors tend to transcend cultural boundaries. While their specific iterations vary from culture to culture, their

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[36] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 235.
[37] Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 27.

general contours are relatively universal. What this means is that the primary metaphors for cognition that we find in this material are not unique to Wisdom literature.

Complex metaphors, on the other hand, are formed when primary metaphors extend, blend, and are juxtaposed together. In the case of ancient conceptions of wisdom, complex metaphors transform wisdom from a basic biological process into a normative concept by which individuals evaluate their environment and societies prescribe specific human behaviors. Complex metaphors may transcend cultural boundaries, especially when they are fairly straightforward extensions of primary metaphors. However, because they are based on specific cultural iterations of primary metaphors, they tend to be culturally-specific; that is, the way complex metaphors for wisdom develop and communicate their meaning relies upon their specific cultural provenance, the Wisdom tradition.

Since complex metaphors rely on primary metaphors for their meaning, I shall devote the next chapter (Chapter 3) to examining the primary metaphors for wisdom before turning to their more complex manifestations (Chapters 4 and 5). In order to distinguish the two in discussion, I shall refer to the primary metaphors as different metaphors for COGNITION (COGNITION IS SEEING, COGNITION IS HEARING, etc.), since they reflect more universal metaphors for cognition. Complex metaphors, on the other hand, shall be referred to as metaphors for WISDOM (WISDOM IS A WORD, WISDOM IS A TREASURE, etc.), since they mostly reflect the specific Wisdom tradition of the ancient Israelites and early Jews.[38] Metaphors of COGNITION structure the conceptual system of

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[38] In his examination of visual and auditory conceptual metaphors in Ben Sira, Gregory Schmidt Goering similarly distinguishes between primary metaphors (which he calls metaphors of "knowing"; e.g., KNOWING IS SEEING, KNOWING IS HEARING) and wisdom metaphors (e.g., WISDOM IS LIGHT, WISDOM IS WORD), although to slightly different ends. Primary metaphors, he argues, form from direct experience and, while influenced by culture, are thus relatively universal. Wisdom metaphors, on the other hand, are "cultural metaphors"; that is, they develop from cultural perceptions of knowledge acquisition (e.g., "the cultural belief in the divine outpouring of wisdom upon creation…leads Ben Sira to the cultural metaphor WISDOM IS LIGHT"). These two types of metaphors combine to form complex metaphors. For instance, KNOWING IS SEEING combines with the cultural metaphor WISDOM IS LIGHT to create the complex metaphor DIRECT PERCEPTION OF WISDOM IS SEEING. These, in turn, combine to form complex blends, such as SAGE-AS-A-RADIANT-MOON (DIRECT PERCEPTION OF WISDOM IS SEEING + INDIRECT PERCEPTION OF WISDOM IS HEARING). See Schmidt Goering, "Sapiential Synesthesia." However, as shall be discussed in the next chapter, since cultural understandings of knowledge and perception influence the creation of primary

Israelite thought; that is, they are conventional metaphors. Metaphors of WISDOM, on the other hand, begin as imaginative metaphors, although (as shall be seen in Chapter 6) many of them become conventionalized over time.

It should be stressed, however, that there is a great fluidity between these categories, and it is not always clear when the primary metaphor has given way to a more complex metaphor. This is particularly evident in imaginative linguistic extensions, which create new meaning by extending a dominant or dormant part of an image schema. The metaphors KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD and WISDOM IS A WORD, for example, are often hard to distinguish in Wisdom literature, since the latter is a fairly straightforward imaginative extension of the former and since Wisdom literature places a premium on knowledge that has been heard. Moreover, although complex metaphors develop from primary metaphors, they do not negate them; that is, a culture can conceptualize their environment by primary and complex metaphors at the same time. This means that primary metaphors can continue to appear in Job or Qohelet, although the texts are chronologically later than the complex metaphors found in Proverbs. The larger literary unit in which a primary metaphor appears may even assume an awareness of more complex metaphors, such as when the Job 20:12–23 describes wickedness as a poisonous banquet, even if the narrow linguistic unit only expresses primary metaphors (e.g., Job 20:12a, "though wickedness *tastes sweet* [תמתיק] in their mouths"; GOOD IS SWEET, JUDGING IS TASTING).

The labels "primary" and "complex," then, do not necessarily equate to chronological sequence; rather, the nomenclature refers to the degree to which a conceptual metaphor is connected to concrete experience. When an example illustrates a primary conception of cognition, it will be discussed as a primary metaphor, even if the larger literary unit in which it appears is

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metaphors (a fact that Schmidt Goering himself acknowledges), the directness or indirectness of wisdom is not limited to complex metaphors but is inherent to the primary metaphors themselves. It is thus unnecessary to postulate the existence of a separate category of "cultural metaphors" to explain the existence of these properties in wisdom metaphors. Although I agree that WISDOM metaphors are the result of cultural processes, they seem to be the result of imaginative extensions or complex blends, rather than being derivative solely from cultural ideologies.

more complex. Likewise, complex metaphors will generally be discussed separately, even when they are fairly straight-forward imaginative extensions of primary metaphors. I will, however, include in the discussion of primary metaphors a number of "compound" metaphors, basic complex metaphors that are not the result of any particular feat of cultural imagination but are the simple combination of a primary cognitive metaphor and another primary metaphor (e.g., a metaphor of SELF). Unlike the imaginative extensions and complex blends to be discussed in Chapter 4, such compound metaphors preserve the integrity of their base metaphor; that is, they clarify the agency of the action involved without significantly altering the primary metaphor itself. They thus function as more specific iterations of their primary metaphors, rather than as new, independent metaphors.

Chapter 3: Metaphors of Cognition

Primary Metaphors and their Basic Derivatives

As Lakoff and Johnson state, "the metaphor system conceptualizing thought itself does not give us a single, overall, consistent understanding of mental life."[1] As imaginative creatures, we have more than one conceptualization of cognition and often express conflicting conceptualizations in close proximity to each other. Thinking can be a struggle (e.g., I *wrestled* with the idea), an act of digestion (e.g., he *digested* the information), a motion through space (e.g., he *followed* my *train* of thought), and a visual encounter (e.g., I *examined* the argument). Although some conceptualizations of cognition are opaque, seeming to refer exclusively to the cognitive sphere (e.g., we *think*, we *know,* we *believe*), most are intimately connected to human perception; that is, we describe how we think by the things we do. We *see* points*, hear* ourselves think, *grasp* concepts, and *follow* arguments. The phenomenological experience of perception serves as a natural source domain for cognition across the world, such that cognition is frequently conceptualized as a visual, oral, tactile, or kinesthetic experience.

COGNITION IS PERCEPTION

According to Sweetser, whose 1990 monograph systematically analyzed perceptual metaphors and thrust them into the forefront of cognitive linguistic research, perceptual metaphors for cognition belong to a larger system of conceptual metaphors in which the "internal self is pervasively understood in terms of the bodily external self and is hence described by means of vocabulary drawn (either synchronically or diachronically) from the physical domain."[2] This MIND-AS-BODY metaphor, as she calls is, presents cognition as physical processes acting upon physical agents. Ideas, thoughts, and concepts are independent entities that can be seen, heard, moved, or grasped. Since the perceptual apparati are primary ways by which humans engage the

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[1] Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 235.
[2] Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 45.

world, a major sub-class of this system conceptualizes COGNITION AS PERCEPTION.[3]

Sweetser's paradigm has fueled scholarly discussion, and many scholars have since identified various metaphors throughout the globe that fit her system (e.g., COGNITION IS SEEING, COGNITION IS HEARING, COGNITION IS TOUCHING). Since human beings around the world have similar perceptual experiences, most scholars have classified these cognitive metaphors as universal metaphors and have taken their existence for granted.[4] For instance, operating with a Western bias, many scholars have assumed that the metaphor COGNITION IS SEEING is a universal metaphor by which the human intellect is conceived of as a visual process (e.g., I *see* what you mean).[5] However, while the COGNITION IS PERCEPTION paradigm is itself universal, specific

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[3] The designation of this class of metaphors follows that of Rosario Caballero and Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Ways of Perceiving, Moving, and Thinking: Re-vindicating Culture in Conceptual Metaphor Research," *Conceptual Metaphor Theory: Thirty Years After. Special Issue in Cognitive Semiotics 4* (2012): forthcoming; accessed 5 December 2011; available at: http://www.unizar.es/linguisticageneral/articulos/Caballero-Ibarretxe-CognitiveSemiotics.pdf. A variety of terms have been used to describe this sub-group of metaphors. Sweetser (*From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 37) labels them "metaphors of perception," and this designation is reflected in the IDEAS ARE PERCEPTION sub-group of George Lakoff, *et. al*. "Master Metaphor List," 86–89; accessed 4 December 2011; available from http://araw.mede.uic.edu/~alansz/metaphor/METAPHORLIST.pdf. On the other hand, Lakoff and Johnson (*Philosophy in the Flesh*, 236–43) classify this sub-group according to their physical functions: THINKING IS MOVING, THINKING IS PERCEIVING, THINKING IS OBJECT MANIPULATION, and ACQUIRING IDEAS IS EATING.

[4] Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 3; Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs: A Cross-Linguistic Study" (Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh, 1999); Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 236–43; Ning Yu, "Chinese Metaphors of Thinking," *Cognitive Linguistics* 14 (2003): 141–65.

[5] In Western philosophy, sight is commonly privileged as the primary mode of engaging the world. Aristotle, for instance, described sight as the "highest" of all the senses: "sight is the most highly developed sense" (*On the Soul* 429); it is "the clearest, and it is for this reason that we prefer it to the other senses" (*Dialogues*). Western epistemology in general has followed this evaluation. Christian theologians, for instance, encouraged visual experience, but warned that the "lower" senses (taste, smell, and touch) lead humanity into sin and damnation (e.g., John Chrysostom, Homilies on the Statues to the People of Antioch 11.414, ca. 4th cent. C.E.; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* 3.51, 60, 13th cent. C.E.; Ignatius). Synnott, "Puzzleing over the Senses," 63, 65–66, 68–69. Influenced by this heritage, many Western scholars have assumed that sight is a primary perceptual mode across cultures and that vision is used around the world to describe objective knowledge. See, for example, Grady, "Foundations of Meaning," 3; Lakoff and Johnson, *Philosophy in the Flesh*, 236–43; Fred McVittie, "The Role of Conceptual Metaphor within Knowledge Paradigms" (Ph.D. diss., Manchester Metropolitan University, 2009), esp. 34–36, 47–48. This does not mean, however, that there have been no significant studies of non-Western metaphors of cognition. See, for instance, Zoltán Kövecses, "Anger: Its Language, Conceptualization, and Physiology in the Light of Cross-Cultural Evidence," in *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World* (eds. John Taylor and Robert Maclaury; Trends in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs 82; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995), 181–96; Keiko Matuski, "Metaphors of Anger in Japenese," in *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World* (eds. John Taylor and Robert MacLaury; Trends in Linguisitics: Studies and Monographs 82; Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995), 137–51; Yu, "Chinese Metaphors of Thinking"; etc.

aspects of the paradigm vary from culture to culture. For instance, as Sweetser herself notes, cultures differ over which organ governs cognition. Americans locate cognition in the brain, while the Israelites located it in the לב/לבב, כבד, נפש, or רוח.[6] Similarly, the properties associated with each modality vary from one culture to the next. Western cultures associate intellection with vision and obedience with hearing, while Australian aboriginal cultures associate intellection with hearing and desire with sight.[7] There are, in other words, varying degrees of specificity to this system of interrelated metaphors, such that a hierarchy of metaphors emerges:[8]

However, the tendency remains to project Western philosophical ideals onto non-Western cultures. "Universal" essentially becomes a code word for "Western."

[6] Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 45. For the Israelite location of cognition, see the discussion in Chapter 1 above.

[7] Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Vision Metaphors for the Intellect: Are They Really Cross-Linguistic?" *Atlantis: Journal of the Spanish Association of Anglo-American Studies* 30 (2008): 15–33 (24–25, 28). See also the detailed discussion in Nicholas Evans and David Wilkins, "In the Mind's Ear: The Semantic Extensions of Perception Verbs in Australian Languages," *Language* 76 (2000): 546–92546–92.

[8] In establishing this hierarchy, I differ from Sweetser and Ibarretxe-Antuñano. Since Sweetser (*From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 45) argues that perceptual metaphors are universal, she does not allow for a gradation of metaphors. Ibarretxe-Antuñano, on the other, argues that there are two-levels of metaphors, generic-abstract (COGNITION IS PERCEPTION) and specific-concrete (COGNITION IS SMELLING, COGNITION IS HEARING, etc.). The first is universal, the second culturally-dependent. However, since COGNITION IS HEARING, COGNITION IS SEEING, etc. often have similar nuances across congruous cultures, it is reasonable to assume that there is also a degree of universality among these cognitive metaphors. What differs is not the metaphor itself, but the specific cultural nuances of it. This observation is consistent with Ibarretxe-Antuñano's research, which hypothesizes a certain degree of continuity among the perceptual metaphors of like-minded cultures (e.g., Western). See, for instance, her comparison of metaphors in English, Spanish, and Basque (a non-Indo-European language) in "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs." As she states, "although some of the extended meanings were particular to one of these languages, these three languages [English, Spanish, and Basque] shared the majority of these meanings, despite the etymologically different origin if these verbs…and the differences between these languages. In sum, the results seem to support the universal character of these mappings between the physical domain of perception and that of internal self and sensations" (200).

Although the chart here is original, the culturally-specific examples within it are derived from the various examples listed in Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," esp. 53–89; ead., "Mind as Body," *Miscelánea* 25 (2002): 93–119; ead.,"Vision Metaphors for the Intellect," 15–33. The examples listed are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

<table>
<tr><td colspan="5">MIND-AS-BODY</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">COGNITION IS PERCEPTION
(universal)</td><td>Non-Perceptual Metaphors</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Relatively Universal</td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>COGNITION IS SEEING</td><td>COGNITION IS HEARING</td><td>COGNITION IS SMELLING</td><td>etc. (e.g., COGNITION IS MOVING, COGNITION IS TOUCHING)</td><td rowspan="6">e.g., MENTAL FITNESS IS PHYSICAL FITNESS, DIFFICULT SUBJECTS ARE ADVERSARIES, IDEAS ARE CHILDREN</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Culturally-Specific</td></tr>
<tr><td>KNOWING IS SEEING (e.g. United States, Spain)</td><td>KNOWING IS HEARING (e.g., Australia)</td><td>KNOWING IS SMELLING (e.g., the Jahai of the Malay Peninsula)</td><td rowspan="4">KNOWING IS MOVING, UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, etc.</td></tr>
<tr><td>DESIRE IS SEEING (e.g., Australia)</td><td>AGREEING IS HEARING (e.g., Basque)</td><td>GUESSING IS SMELLING (e.g., United States)</td></tr>
<tr><td>OBEYING IS SEEING (e.g., Basque)</td><td>OBEYING IS HEARING (e.g., United States, Spain)</td><td>PROPHESYING IS SMELLING (e.g., Basque)</td></tr>
<tr><td>Etc.</td><td>Etc.</td><td>Etc.</td></tr>
</table>

Table 1: Hierarchy of Perceptual Metaphors for Cognition

The fairly abstract metaphor COGNITION IS PERCEPTION is universal and governs how cultures across the globe conceptualize cognition. More specific metaphors such as COGNITION IS SEEING, COGNITION IS HEARING, or COGNITION IS SMELLING do not appear in every culture but are still relatively universal, recurring consistently across the globe. Specific iterations of these metaphors, however, vary, across cultures. At times, sight is a source domain for desire (DESIRE IS SEEING; e.g., Australian aboriginals); elsewhere it is a form of intellect (KNOWING IS SEEING; e.g. United States). A culture can, of course, have more than one conceptualization of cognition. Americans, for instance, frequently conceptualize cognition as seeing, hearing, and smelling. Yet, each perceptual metaphor reflects a distinct mode of engaging the world. Thus, in the modern West, seeing is connected to objective knowledge, hearing to subjective knowledge, and smelling to guesswork. These conceptualizations interact, but they are as distinct as their corresponding

perceptual apparati.[9]

Since COGNITION IS PERCEPTION is a universal metaphor that is realized in similar yet distinct fashions across the globe, the challenge lies in determining the specific cultural nuances of conceptual metaphors without assuming *a priori* that they are identical to modern perceptual sensibilities. As a solution, Iraide Ibarretxe-Antuñano proposes establishing a "typology of prototypical properties," a culturally-relative paradigm based not only on the phenomenology of perception but also the psychology of perception with which a given culture operates:[10]

[9] Malul argues that ancient epistemology differs from modern Western mentalities in that "primitive" peoples viewed the senses synthetically while modern individuals view the senses disjunctively: "whereas in the former the interplay looks like being dynamic, holistic, and synthetic, in our contemporary epistemic process we tend to be disjunctive in terms of letting each sense play its own role without being interactively affected by the other senses. We, in short, apply an analytic mode of thinking, whereas the primitive applies a synthetic mode." Meir Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex: Studies in Biblical Thought, Culture, and Worldview* (Tel Aviv: Archaeological Center Publications, 2002), 31. In arguing this, however, he overstates the contrast between modern and ancient thought. Although modern Western individuals view the modalities distinctively, no one modality truly operates alone. They are interconnected, and this interconnectivity is realized in linguistic expressions (see, for instance, phrases that describe vision as a tactile experience; e.g., "my eyes picked out the correct item"). Similarly, while there are passages in which the modalities are viewed synthetically in the Hebrew Bible (e.g., Ps 34:8; Prov 4:18), there are also multiple examples of the modalities operating independently and even in contrast to each other (e.g., Deut 4:12; Job 42:1–6). The difference between ancient and modern epistemology lies in the values each society assigns to the individual modalities and how their interconnectivity is realized, not in an innate difference between disjunctive and synthetic thought patterns.

[10] The following chart has been reproduced with permission from Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Vision Metaphors for the Intellect," 20. For a full discussion of each property, see ead., "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 143–56.

Properties	Description (PR=Perceiver; OP=Object of Perception; P=Act of Perception)
<contact>	Whether the PR must have physical contact with the OP in order to be perceived
<closeness>	Whether the OP must be in the vicinity of the PR to be perceived
<internal>	Whether the OP must go inside the PR to be perceived
<limits>	Whether the PR is aware of the boundaries imposed by the OP when perceived
<location>	Whether the PR is aware of the situation of the OP when perceiving
<detection>	how the PR performs the P: how PR discloses the presence of an object, and distinguishes one object from another
<identification>	how well the PR can discriminate what he is perceiving, the P
<voluntary>	whether the PR can choose when to perform a P
<directness>	whether the P depends on the PR directly or is mediated by another element
<effects>	whether the P causes any change in the OP
<briefness>	how long the relation between P and OP should be in order for the perception to be successful
<evaluation>	whether the P assesses the OP
<correction of hypothesis>	how correct and accurate the hypothesis formulated about the OP in the P are in comparison with the real object of P
<subjectivity>	how much influence the PR has on the OP

Table 2: Distribution of Prototypical Properties with Descriptions

The property of <identification>, for instance, refers to the perceiver's ability to identify its object. When we see a dog or tree, we easily recognize the nature of the object, assuming we do not have visual impairments and we know what the object is. However, it is often difficult to identify an object solely by its odor. The property of <identification> is thus associated with sight, but not with smell.[11] The property of <correction of hypothesis> is somewhat more complicated. When we perceive an object, especially with vision, hearing, or smell, "we formulate hypotheses about the nature and character of the OP."[12] How close these hypotheses come to the actual nature of the object varies—with sight being most accurate, followed by hearing, and then smell—but each forms a hypothesis. Touch and taste, however, actually come into contact with the object, so no hypothesis is necessary.[13]

[11] Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 147–48.

[12] Ead., 153.

[13] However, the discussion of this property in touch below, which suggests that the inapplicability of this modality to touch may not be universal. According to Ibarretxe-Antuñano, <correction of

According to Ibarretxe-Antuñano, the <effects> property refers to whether a perceptual modality causes any change in the perceived object. In Western epistemology, for instance, only "touch" is an affective sense. It physically alters the object it encounters by exerting pressure on it, moving it from one location to another, or inflicting pain.[14] However, perception can also affect the person engaging in a perceptual act, a fact that Ibarretxe-Antuñano fails to consider. Touch, for instance, not only alters the perceived object but also the perceiver. As Hans Jonas argues, whether initiated by the perceiver or the object perceived, both perceiver and perceived "do something to each other" in the act of touching.[15] The bite of an insect or the touch of a fingertip will elicit, at the very least, a sensation of pressure in both the object perceived and the perceiver. Such pressure may even elicit a sensation of pain or pleasure. The exact effect on the perceiver may be hard to measure, since the degree to which we experience pressure, pleasure, and pain, for instance, varies from person to person as do our responses to such stimuli (e.g., one person may cry out in pain when bitten by an insect, while another would barely notice the sensation).[16] However, the perceiver is still affected by the act of perception. Thus, the property of <effects> should also consider we whether the act of perception causes any change in the perceiver.

Each culture can be evaluated according to this typology. Thus, Ibarretxe-Antuñano summarizes modern Western conceptions of perception as follows, with the tags $_{\text{yes}}$ or $_{\text{no}}$ indicating the role that the property plays in the evaluation of the modality. These properties are

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hypothesis> is a "second-order" property; that is, it relies on the values a culture assigns to <directness> and <identification>. Since in Western epistemology these "first-order" properties are both affirmative for vision, vision's hypothesis are considered the most accurate. Hearing and smell, while still forming hypothesis, are less accurate since hearing is not a direct form of perception and smell has difficulty identifying the object perceived. For a more detailed discussion of this phenomenon, see Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 153–54; ead., "Vision Metaphors for the Intellect," 21–23. One might also add that both of these first-order properties depend upon the manner of <detection> assumed for the modality. Thus, <correction of hypothesis> also relies upon the exact nature of the <detection> property.

[14] Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 150.

[15] Hans Jonas, "The Nobility of Sight: A Study in the Phenomenology of the Senses," in *The Phenomenon of Life: Toward a Philosophical Biology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 135–56 (146).

[16] Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 44.

organized according to the relationship between the perceiver (PR), the object perceived (OP), and the act of perception (P). The first five properties reflect the relationship between the perceiver and the object perceived (PR→OP), the next seven between the perceiver and the act of perception (PR→P), and the final three between object perceived and the act of perception (OP→P).[17]

PR, OP, P	Properties	VISION	HEARING	TOUCH	SMELL	TASTE
PR→OP	<contact>	no	no	yes	no	yes
	<closeness>	no	no	yes	yes	yes
	<internal>	no	yes	no	yes	yes
	<limits>			yes		
	<location>	yes	yes			
PR→P	<detection>	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
	<identification>	yes	yes	yes	no	yes
	<voluntary>	yes	no	yes	no	yes
	<directness>	yes	no	yes	yes	yes
	<effects>		yes	yes	yes	
	<correction of hypo.>	yes	yes		yes	
	<subjectivity>[18]				yes	yes
OP→P	<effects>			yes		
	<evaluation>	yes				yes
	<briefness>			yes		yes

Table 3 Distribution of Prototypical Properties in the Modern West

In Western schemas, for instance, sight is considered a "distant" modality. The perceiver does not need to have physical contact with an object or be in close proximity to it for vision to occur. It

[17] This chart follows the one in Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Vision Metaphors for the Intellect," 21; reproduced with permission. In keeping with the previous discussion of <effects>, however, I have included this property in both the PR→P and OP→P categories. I have also corrected what seem to be errors in Ibarretxe-Antuñano's representation of <subjectivity> (see footnote 18). In her charts, Ibarretxe-Antuñano further arranges the properties according to their distribution, whether all of the modalities exhibit the property (A) or only some of them do (B). The A/B distribution varies among cultures, so I have not included it here. Ibarretxe-Antuñano does not seem to discuss this possibility, but she only includes the A and B labels on culture-specific charts, suggesting that she also recognizes this variability.

[18] In her chart, Ibarretxe-Antuñano places <subjectivity> under the category PR→OP; however, as she argues in her dissertation ("Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 155–56), the <subjectivity> property reflects the relationship between the perceiver and the act of perception, a conclusion she maintains in the description of the property in her later article ("Vision Metaphors for the Intellect," 20). The property thus properly belongs to the PR→P category. Ibarretxe-Antuñano also incorrectly tags this property, labeling "touch" and "taste" as subjective. But the discussion in her dissertation ("Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 155–56, 161) makes it clear that <subjectivity> is a property associated with *smell* and taste in Western epistemology.

thus receives a $_{no}$ tag for <contact> and <closeness>. Touch, on the other hand, requires physical contact and closeness, so it receives a $_{yes}$ tag in <contact> and <closeness>. Since touch and taste do not form hypotheses, they do not receive a tag for <correction of hypothesis>.

Some modalities vacillate between tags, depending upon the context of its usage. For instance, any modality can be <voluntary> (we can be conscious of seeing, hearing, smelling) or passive (we can passively receive light waves, sound waves, or olfactory stimuli without initiating the act). Ibarretxe-Antuñano recognizes this and discusses it in her dissertation; yet she does not note it in her chart, instead tagging a modality according to its "default" property (i.e., sight as <voluntary $_{yes}$> but hearing as <voluntary $_{no}$>).[19] I have generally preserved Ibarretxe-Antuñano's notation style here, except in cases where the assignation of a property is clearly debatable; however, one should keep in mind that, like any heuristic device, this typology is not as black-and-white as it first appears. Although one can assign default tags to the properties, one should remember that reality is often more complicated and allow for a certain amount of flexibility in the analysis of actual linguistic uses.

As Ibarretxe-Antuñano argues, this typology is influenced by both biology and culture. Biology, for instance, determines what properties are associated with perception in the first place. "Human beings have the same physical configuration and our organs work in the same way; therefore, these prototypical properties do not need to change."[20] Biology, in other words, constrains the properties inherent to the modalities. Cultures, however, determine how these properties are conceived and what values are assigned to them. For instance, in physiological terms, vision and touch are both <internal> processes. "Light waves enter into the eyes, and the skin vibrations do also trigger the mechanoreceptors that will carry the neural input to the spinal cord."[21] However, while modern Westerners conceive of smell, hearing, and taste as <internal> processes—smells enter into the nose; sound enters into the ears; food must be put into the

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[19] Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 149.
[20] Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Vision Metaphors for the Intellect," 27.
[21] Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 145.

mouths to taste it—they do not conceive of vision or touch as <internal> processes. The cultural understanding of perception thus constrains the properties identified with sight and touch, creating a conception of these modalities that is unique to modern Western cultures. Moreover, the values assigned to the modalities are determined by the culture. Since Western cultures conceive of sight as a distant modality (<contact $_{no}$>, <closeness $_{no}$>), sight is considered comparable and thus an "objective" means of obtaining knowledge. "Objectivity" is a value assigned to sight by the culture, not a property inherent to it. One cannot automatically assume that cultures who do not assign the same properties to sight attribute the same values to it.

Cultures also determine which modalities should be included in the typology to begin with. While modern Western societies tend to follow Aristotle in delineating five senses, Western and non-Western subgroups throughout history have provided alternative schemas, identifying more or fewer perceptual modalities (e.g., two, four, six, or seven) and grouping them differently (e.g., linking touch and taste together). The Hausa of Nigeria, for instance, only recognize two modalities, visual and non-visual.[22] Their typology would look much different than the one constructed by Ibarretxe-Antuñano for the modern West. In the case of ancient Israel, Yael Avrahami has identified at least seven modalities (sight, hearing, kinesthesia, speech, taste/eating, smell, and touch) and argues that there could be more (e.g., sexuality).[23] A full typology of the Israelite modalities would need to take this plethora into account.

According to Ibarretxe-Antuñano, these prototypical properties not only account for the concrete nuances of the modalities in different cultures, but also help explain the range of metaphorical expressions derived from them. In English, for instance, the semantic range of the

[22] Constance Classen, "Foundations for an Anthropology of the Senses," *International Social Science Journal* 153 (1997): 401–12 (401); Ian Ritchie, "Fusion of the Faculties: A Study of the Language of the Senses in Hausaland," in *The Varieties of Sensory Experience: A Sourcebook in the Anthropology of the Senses* (David Howes, ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 192–202 (195).

[23] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 109–12. Avrahami, however, notes that sexuality may instead be a "contextual pattern" that is illuminated by more than one sense, rather than a sense in itself (111). Given the strong multimodality of sexual experience and language, I tend to agree. For more on "contextual patterns," see the discussion below.

verb "to touch" covers not only the physical action of touching ("I *touched* the cat"), but also emotional experience ("the music *touched* us deeply") and the verbal treatment of a topic ("he *touched* upon the issue in his speech").[24] Such polysemy occurs because the prototypical properties associated with each modality are neurologically "mapped" to varying degrees onto abstract conceptual domains (e.g, emotion, intellectual expression), creating distinct sets of conceptual metaphors.[25] For instance, in the phrase "the music *touched* us," the modern Western conception of touch as a modality that affects its object through close physical contact (<closeness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <contact $_{\text{yes}}$>, <effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$) is mapped onto the abstract domain of emotion, thereby creating a conceptual metaphor in which emotional change is conceptualized as an act of touching (FEELING IS TOUCHING). The idea that touch is a close modality that contacts its object also influences the creation of the phrase "he *touched* upon the incident in his speech" (DEALING WITH IS TOUCHING). Here, however, the <effects> property does not map, while the idea that touch can occur briefly does (<briefness $_{\text{yes}}$>).[26] In each case, other properties are not negated, but they do not substantially influence the nuance of the final metaphor. The result is two phrases based on touch that have very different nuances.

Ibarretxe-Antuñano's model is helpful in explaining why certain metaphors for perception exist cross-culturally but why the specific nuances of perceptually-based conceptual metaphors for cognition vary across cultures. On the one hand, since biology determines the prototypical properties associated with the modalities, certain typologies of perception will occur cross-culturally and the mappings based on them will be similar (COGNITION IS SEEING, COGNITION IS HEARING, etc.). On the other hand, since cultures determine which properties and

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[24] For the various metaphorical meanings of touch in English, see Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Mind As Body," 104–06.

[25]Ibarretxe-Antuñano refers to this process as "Property Selection." Lakoff later argues that this selectivity adheres to what he calls the "invariance principle," that is, the idea that in mapping properties, "metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive typology (that is, the image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the inherent structure of the target domain." Lakoff, "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor," 215.

[26] See Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 170–72.

values are assigned to the modalities, typologies will differ as will the mappings based upon them (e.g., KNOWING IS SMELLING vs. GUESSING IS SMELLING).[27] Cultures which are closer to each other in their conception of the modalities will attribute similar properties to them and will map those properties onto cognition in similar ways. For example, Western cultures in general perceive sight to be the most direct and reliable modality for engaging the environment (<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <identification $_{\text{yes}}$>); hearing, however, is a mediated modality, still capable of identifying objects in the environment but does so indirectly (i.e., through a sound wave; so <directness $_{\text{no}}$>, <identification $_{\text{yes}}$>). Since they come from the similar cultures, both Spanish and English tend to map the properties of sight onto their conception of cognition. In each locale, the relatively universal metaphor COGNITION IS SEEING is realized as the culturally-specific metaphor KNOWING IS SEEING, in which knowledge is direct and objective. COGNITION IS HEARING remains an interpersonal form of knowledge (PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING).[28] Those cultures that vary in their evaluation of the modalities will vary in their assignment of properties and the subsequent nuances of their conceptual metaphors. For instance, unlike Western cultures, aboriginal Australian languages conceptualize *hearing* as the most direct mode of engaging the environment (<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <identification $_{\text{yes}}$>). Instead of viewing intellection as sight, these Australian languages view intellection as hearing. The relatively universal metaphor COGNITION IS HEARING is realized as the culturally-specific metaphor KNOWING IS HEARING, while COGNITION IS SIGHT remains an interpersonal form of knowledge (e.g., DESIRE IS SIGHT).[29] A typology of prototypical properties can thus help evaluate how a given culture views the modalities, how cognitive metaphors based upon the modalities develop, and how those metaphors differ among cultures.

In the discussion that follows, I shall use Ibarretxe-Antuñano's model to uncover the

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[27] For a discussion of these examples, see Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Vision Metaphors for the Intellect," 29; Caballero and Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Ways of Perceiving, Moving, and Thinking," forthcoming.

[28] Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 64.

[29] Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Vision Metaphors for the Intellect," 24–28; Caballero and Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Ways of Perceiving, Moving, and Thinking."

nuances of ancient sapiential conceptions of the perceptual modalities and the primary metaphors based upon them.[30] I shall first develop a typology for the modality amongst ancient Israelite scribes by outlining the emic conceptualizations of each modality. Admittedly, Israelite literature is not exceedingly forthcoming with its conception of perception. As Avrahami points out, their conception of the modalities was clearly "somatic," with each modal experience being connected to particular physical organs and their embodied experiences, but the Israelites lacked abstract terminology for each modality and do not detail the mechanisms by which each modality was thought to operate.[31] It is thus difficult to determine what their conception of each modality was. Yet, by analyzing how the major Hebrew terms for perception are used in the Hebrew Bible and comparing those usages to ancient and modern explanations of perception, the basic contours of the sapiential understanding of the modalities can be deduced.[32]

After outlining its typology, I shall then examine how each modality maps onto ancient sapiential conceptions of cognition. Here, Avrahami's work provides a helpful framework for comparing the metaphorical associations across the modalities. In her examination of the senses, Avrahami has identified six overarching "contextual patterns" (or semantic nuances) commonly associated with the modalities: the power to help; the power to harm; learning, understanding, and

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[30] Although referenced in Wisdom literature, smell is not a primary motivation for metaphors of cognition among these texts. I shall thus concentrate my attention on the six main modalities in Wisdom literature: sight, hearing, speech, touch, ingestion, and movement.

[31] As Avrahami states, "the Hebrew Bible offers no nouns that relate to the senses, such as 'sight' or 'smell,' nor does it offer any general terms that describe the sensorium." Only occasional is an infinitive used in a manner similar to our abstract conception of the senses (e.g., "the seeing [ראות] of the eyes," Qoh 5:10; "walking" [הליכה], Nah 2:6), and these seem to stem from contextual considerations rather than "cultural reasoning (as if there is no abstract perception of action in biblical thought)." Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 114.

[32] As Ibarretxe-Antuñano argues, a perception word alone does not reveal the semantic field of the modality; one must also look at the context in which the term occurs. For example, auditory terms themselves do not mean "obey," but "it is in the context of conversation, hence interpersonal relation, that they acquire that meaning." Thus, "I told you to listen" does not imply obedience, while "I told you to listen to your mother" does (Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 66, 117). Therefore, although this study is based upon occurrences of modality terms, it shall also examine the context in which those terms occur to determine the conception of the modality and mapping that is being put forth.

knowledge; emotional experience; moral judgment; and life, experience, and ability.[33] Visual terms, for instance, can be used to appeal to divine help (e.g., "*look* at me, answer me, O Lord," Ps 13:4); describe harmful intent ("I will command the sword, and it shall kill them; and *I will fix my eyes* on them," Amos 9:4); confirm knowledge of a situation ("we *see* plainly that the Lord has been with you," Gen 26:28); denote satisfaction ("to *see* good" is to "find enjoyment," Qoh 5:17–18); show judgment ("to *see* that" something is good, Gen 1:4); and indicate strength ("*the light of my eyes*—it is also gone from me," Ps 38:11).[34] Three of these contextual patterns structure conceptual metaphors for cognition: learning, understanding, and knowledge; emotional experience; and moral judgment. Although specific nuances vary, the conceptual metaphors for cognition associated with the modalities tend to fall into one of these three categories.

Since the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the relationship of perception to wisdom metaphors, I shall therefore limit myself to these three categories of semantic nuance, although I recognize that the modalities discussed have other semantic associations. I shall also focus primarily on the human and divine iterations of these semantic nuances, rather than thier animalistic or naturalistic connotations. The practical advantage this has is to limit the scope of the discussion that follows to those examples that are representative of human cognitive metaphors. Occurrences of the modalities that reflect other contextual contexts need not detain us, unless they impinge on the specific iterations of cognitive metaphors.[35] This limitation also allows for a clearer comparison of the conceptual metaphors for cognition across the modalities and their distributions. By combining Avrahami's three categories with Ibarretxe-Antuñano's model, I shall be able to discuss not only which cognitive metaphors appear in ancient Israel but

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[33] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 130–88. For the distribution of these patterns amongst the modalities, see especially her chart on page 185.

[34] These examples are Avrahami's and largely follow her translations. For a discussion of these specific examples, see Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 132, 151, 158, 164, 168, 176.

[35] As Avrahami (*The Senses of Scripture*, 130) notes, these six semantic fields overlap. Some discussion of non-cognitive metaphors will thus be necessary. For more on the overlapping semantics of perceptual terms, see also Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, esp. 113–24, although the paradigm he outlines differs from Avrahami's.

also how such metaphors develop and communicate meaning.

COGNITION IS SEEING

In the early twentieth century, scholars commonly dismissed the visual dimension of Israelite culture. The Israelites, they argued, were audio-centric, not visio-centric.[36] Yet, even a cursory examination of the Hebrew Bible reveals a culture permeated with sight. Not only did the Israelites rely upon sight for their daily functionings—they saw the world, people, God, etc.—they also described cognition with visual metaphors. Due to the unique properties associated with sight, the COGNITION IS SEEING metaphor reflected a distinct conception of cognition, one in which cognition was conceived of as a direct, immediate experience.

Typology of Sight

Key Terms: ראה, מראה, עין (esp. נשא עין, פקח עין), נבט, חזה, שור

In the Hebrew Bible, physical sight is clearly connected to the human eye (עין). Visual verbs (ראה, נבט, שזף, etc.) frequently appear in conjunction with עין to denote an individual's physical encounter with the environment. Thus, the eyes of miners see precious stones (כל־יקר ראתה עינו, Job 28:10), and the eyes of the scribe see the behavior of his fellow courtiers (אשר ראו עיניך אל־תצא לרב מחר, Prov 25:7–8).[37] Beyond this connection, however, the Hebrew Bible is unclear about the exact mechanisms of sight. Some subgroups of Israelite and early Jewish society may have ascribed to an extramission theory of vision in which vision was explained as an intraocular light that extends from the eye, connects with an object, and then returns to the eye

[36] Although scholars did not deny that the Israelites could see, they argued that vision was less important to the Israelite culture, textual production, and religion than audition was. See, for instance, the dismissal of visual cognition by Thorleif Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared to the Greek* (trans. Jules Moreau; The Library of History and Doctrine; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961). Carasik and Avrahami, however, have both sufficiently demonstrated that sight was not only valued in ancient Israel but that it was a prominent modality for engaging the environment. See Michael Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind in Biblical Israel* (Studies in Biblical Literature 85; New York: Peter Lang, 2006), esp. 32–42; Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, esp. 223–76.

[37] The examples provided here and in the following discussions are intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive. For instance, on the connection between the eye and visual verbs in Job, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes, one might also see: ראה+עין in Job 7:7, 8; 10:4, 18; 13:1; 19:27; 21:20; 29:11; 34:21; 42:5; Prov 20:12, 23:33, 24:18; Qoh 1:8, 11:7; נבט+עין in Job 39:29; Prov 4:25; שזף + עין in Job 20:9; שור + עין: Job 24:15; שמר+עין in Job 24:15; נצר+עין in Prov 22:12; etc.

(<contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>).[38] For instance, influenced by Hellenistic philosophy, Philo describes the eyes as “moving forward to meet” (προυπαντιάζω) objects in the environment and emitting (ἐκλάμπω) a light towards them (see *De Abr*. 150, 157), and the *Testament of Job* describes the eye as a “lamp” (λύχνος) that looks about (*T. Job* 18:3).[39] A few earlier Israelite passages also connect the brightening or darkening of the eye to its ability to see (כהה+עין/ראה: Gen 27:1; Deut 34:7; 1 Sam 3:2; Job 17:7; Zec 11:17; חשך+עין: Ps 69:23[24]; Lam 5:17; Qoh 12:3), which may suggest a belief in the presence of an intraocular light fluctuating within each individual.[40] It is unclear, however, if this light emanated from the eye. Even if it did, the evidence is too sparse to be certain how widespread such a theory may have been.

There was, however, a common belief in antiquity that the eye had the power to adversely affect the object it was directed at (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP \rightarrow P}$).[41] When Saul “sets his eye upon

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[38] This theory was promulgated most clearly by Greek thinkers such as Alcmaeon of Croton (6th–5th cent. B.C.E.), Empedocles (ca. 490–430 B.C.E.), and Plato (ca. 427–347 B.C.E.), each of whom described vision as light rays extending from the human eye. For a discussion of these thinkers, see David Chidester, *Word and Light: Seeing, Hearing, and Religious Discourse* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 3–4. Other theories also circulated in ancient Greece, such as the intromission theory of the Atomists (in which images of the objects enter into the eyes of the perceiver) or the theory of Aristotle (in which vision resulted from a change in the state of the eye, from transparent to light). Chidester, *Word and Light*, 3–5.These theories, however, do not seem reflected in ancient Israel.

[39] Francois Viljoen, “A Contextualised Reading of Matthew 6:22–23: ‘Your Eye is the Lamp of Your Body,’” *HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies* 65 (2009): 3; accessed 10 January 2012. Available at http:///www.hts.org.za.

[40] See also the various passages in which the light of the eyes is connected to life, benefit, or desire, each of which presupposes a conception of the eye as a container for light (e.g., 1 Sam 14:27, 29; Ps 13:4, 38:11; Prov 29:13; see also the discussion in Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 176). To this one might add Job 41:10, in which Leviathan’s eyes are described as the “eyelids of dawn,” the implication being that light would issue forth from them just as the sun emits light. However, the cosmological nature of the creature, as well as the non-human characteristics that are attributed to it (e.g., light issuing forth from its sneezes and mouth, smoke coming from the nostrils, see Job 41:12) make it an unhelpful example for determining how human eyes functioned. Similarly, Daniel’s vision of the angelic man with “eyes like torches of fire” (Dan 10:6) does not seem to reflect how Israelites perceived the normal functions of the human eyes. Various scholars use such evidence to argue in favor of an Israelite extramission theory: See, for instance, Viljoen, “A Contextualised Reading of Matthew 6:22–23,” 3; see also studies of the “evil eye” in ancient Israel (n. 41 below), most of which assume an extramission theory. The evidence is indeed suggestive, but hardly conclusive.

[41] I purposefully refrain from referring to this phenomenon as the “evil eye.” Scholars commonly assume that the Hebrew Bible had a concept of the “evil eye,” a belief that “certain individuals, animals, demons, or gods had the power of casting a spell or causing some damaging effect upon every object, animate or inanimate, upon which their glance fell.” John Elliott, “The Evil Eye in the First Testament: The Ecology and Culture of a Pervasive Belief,” in *The Bible and The Politics of Exegesis: Essays in Honor of Norman K. Gottwald on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday* (eds. D. Jobling, et al.; Cleveland, Oh.: Pilgrim Press,

David” (ויהי...עוין) in 1 Sam 18:9, for instance, he does so with malicious intent, and when Balaam wishes to curse the Israelites in Num 23:13, he must first “look” (ראה) at them.[42] God’s sight in particular is said to affect the individual. Thus Job asks God to “look away” (שעה) from him so that he can have a brief respite from his troubles (Job 7:19; see also Job 14:16, 40:11–12). According to Meir Malul, this affective nature of sight might also help explain why women needed to be veiled; veils protected women from male gazes while also protecting men from female gazes (e.g., Gen 24:65; Songs 4:1, 3, 6:7).[43]

Sight also had the power to affect the perceiver (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR \rightarrow P}$). It could elicit emotional responses, as when the sight of a woman evoked desire in a man or vice versa (e.g., Gen 29:10–11, 34:2–3, 39:7; Deut 21:11; 2 Sam 11:2–4; Ezek 23:14–17; see conversely the elicitation of contempt, madness, envy, or horror: e.g., Gen 16:4; Deut 28:34; 1 Sam 18:9; Nah 3:7).[44] Sight could also transfer physical properties between entities. As Malul states, “by looking one can not only exert power upon the object of looking (as in the case of the evil eye, e.g.), but also absorb the power [good or ill] of the object that is looked at.”[45] Thus, in 2 Kgs 2:9–15, Elisha absorbs the prophetic power of Elijah by seeing him ascend (see also the transference of healing

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1991), 147–59, 148. See also Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 209, 286–87, 351; Viljoen, “A Contextualised Reading of Matthew 6:22–23,” 3; Nili Wazana, “A Case of the Evil Eye: Qohelet 4:4–8,” *JBL* 126 (2007): 685–702 (685–86); Schroer and Stabli, *Body Symbolism in the Bible*, 118–21. For more on the prevalence of the phenomenon in ancient Mesopotamia, see James Nathan Ford, “Ninety-Nine by the Evil Eye and One from Natural Causes: KTU^2 1.96 in its Near Eastern Context,” *Ugarit-Forschungen* 30 (1998): 201–78. Key to this conception is the seemingly “magical” nature of the eye, drawn from the “negative moral attitude” of the individual and the negative effects it could produce. Yet, as scholars have increasingly argued, a concept of an “evil eye”—as a malevolent force with independent agency—is lacking from Hebrew Bible. Passages that mention an “evil eye” (עין רע/רעע עין) (most notably Prov 23:6–8, 28:22; see also Deut 15:9; 28:54, 56) reflect the character of the individual and his or her inclination to refrain from helping another, rather than the eye’s ability to physically inflict harm (Wazana, “A Case of the Evil Eye,” 687; Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 153; Rivka Ulmer, *The Evil Eye in the Bible and Rabbinic Literature* [Hoboken, N.J.: KTAV Publishing House, Inc., 1994], 1–4). Indeed, as Avrahami argues, “it is difficult to determine whether belief in the evil eye was widespread during the biblical period” (Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 152). That said, sight (like touch or hearing) did have the ability to affect, for good or ill, the perceiver and the object perceived (see the following discussion). Thus, while the “evil eye” may be an inappropriate way of describing the phenomenon, the affective nature of the eye cannot be ignored.

[42] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 150–51.

[43] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 209, 286–87, 351. Malul attributes this to the concept of the “evil eye.”

[44] H.F. Fuhs, “רָאָה, רֹאֶה, רְאִי, רְאוּת, מַרְאֶה, מַרְאָה,” *TDOT* 13: 208–42 (220).

[45] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 351.

by sight in Num 21:9). By the same rationale, the sight of God had the power to overwhelm the individual, and stories frequently tell of people who are surprised when they see God and live (e.g., Gen 16:13, 32:30). While the affective nature of sight does not necessitate an extramission theory of vision, it does suggest that sight facilitated the necessary contact for such properties to transfer, even if the mechanics of that contact are unclear (<contact $_{yes?}$>).

More importantly, sight is understood to be a direct experience capable of detecting objects in the external world. Unlike hearing, which provides the listener with second-hand information about the world, sight provides an instantaneous connection between the perceiver and the object perceived, such that no mediating agent is required (<directness $_{yes}$>).[46] The Israelites know what God did to the Egyptians, because they saw it with their own eyes (Exod 14:30–31; see the similar appeals to direct experience in Deut 3:21, 4:3; Qoh 5:10[11]; etc.); the sage claims to know what happens to young men when they are seduced by a “strange woman,” because he has seen it happen through his window (Prov 7:6–27).[47] Events consistently happen “before” (־ל) the eyes, not “in” (־ב) them (Gen 23:11, 18, 47:19; Exod 7:20; etc.),[48] and this same exterior focus is reflected when 1 Sam 16:7 states that “humans *see before the eyes* (יראה לעינים), but the Lord sees according to the heart (יראה ללבב)” (<internal $_{no}$>). The perceiver does not need to be near the object perceived as long as his field of vision remains unobscured by smoke, clouds, or other obstacles (e.g., Prov 10:26; Job 22:14) and there is the right amount of external light (e.g., Gen 44:3, Exod 10:23, Job 24:15, 28:11, 37:21, 38:15–17) (<closeness $_{no}$>).[49]

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[46] This <directness> property of sight is well-recognized by scholars. See, for instance, Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 39–40; Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 158; Schmidt Goering, “Sapiential Synesthesia.”

[47] This is not to say that this event actually occurred, only that the sage is claiming to draw upon direct experience for his knowledge. For more on the identity of the “Strange Woman,” see Chapter 5.

[48] As shall be discussed below, *bet* is used with עין primarily in metaphorical constructions, when an adjective or adjectival verb is paired with עין to indicate a judgment of a situation (favor, displeasure, contempt, etc.). Notable exceptions include the phrase עין בעין (Num 14:14; Isa 52:8), where seeing “eye with eye” refers to face-to-face communication. Here, *bet* refers to agency, not locality. Similarly, ראתי בעיני in Zec 9:8 seems to use *bet* to indicate the agent with which the seeing is done, not the location.

[49] The need for external light does not preclude an extramission theory. Plato, who advocated for extramission, also stressed the necessity for external light source for the connection between perceiver and object to be maintained. Chidester, *Word and Light*, 3–4.

Abraham can see the entire land of Canaan from a distant mountain top (Gen 13:14; see also Gen 13:10, 19:28), and Job can see to the highest heavens (Job 22:12, 35:5; see also Job 2:12, 36:25).

Sight is also distinguished by its “simultaneity of presentation.” As Jonas explains, “one glance, an opening of the eyes, discloses a world of co-present qualities spread out in space, ranged in depth, continuing into indefinite distance.”[50] With one glance, Lot sees the entire region of the Jordan (וישא־לוט את־עיניו ויראה, Gen 13:10), and Abraham sees three distinct visitors approaching (וישא עיניו וירא, Gen 18:2) (so: <detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{[simultaneity]}}$). Such disclosure is instantaneous and complete; although he must lift his eyes, Lot does not first see the river and then the hills and vegetation, but rather the entire plain at once (<briefness $_{\text{yes}}$>).[51] Because everything within the field of vision is instantly revealed, space is the primary structuring device for vision.[52] Sight not only detects the location of the object perceived (up, down, left, right, etc.; e.g., Gen 13:14; Prov 4:25) (<location $_{\text{yes}}$>), but relates it spatially to other objects within the field of vision (e.g., the youth is “near” [אצל] the strange woman’s corner, Prov 7:8). In doing so, sight provides an “instantaneous now,” a “continued present” that extends infinitely as long as the eyes are open.[53]

Unlike other modalities, which require conscious effort to focus on particular stimuli (e.g., one voice or one smell among many), sight can easily “pick out…and attend to one stimuli amid a multitude of input stimuli” (e.g., the sage identifies one youth among many, Prov 7:6–

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[50] Jonas, “The Nobility of Sight,” 136, see also 142, 144–45. Jonas is drawing upon the Greek model of sight to speak of the universal (i.e., Western) properties of sight. However, as the examples above illustrate, the conclusions he reaches in this respect are applicable to Israelite conceptions of sight as well.

[51] Although the use of two visual phrases “look up” (נשא עין) and “see” (ראה) in these verses indicates two stages of the visual process (opening the eyes and seeing), it does not imply that sight relies on a sequential presentation of material (as hearing or touch do, see below). Once opened, the eyes perceive the entire scene at once, rather than in sequential stages. Ibarretxe-Antuñano (“Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs,” 150–51) argues that although sight gives the impression of briefness, it is actually “the context and our familiarity with the object perceived” that allows us to recognize items by sight quickly and not the act of perception itself. However, as the Abraham examples illustrates, context does not always provide us with the sight we expect, and sight cannot always be trusted to provide accurate information (see below). Thus, at least in antiquity, sight could occur quickly (so, <briefness $_{\text{yes}}$>).

[52] Jonas, “The Nobility of Sight,” 149–52.

[53] Ibid., 144.

27).[54] Because of this, sight is generally understood to be an effective means of identifying objects and evaluating the environment. Thus, Moses sends out men into Canaan to "see" (ראה) what the land is like and who lives there (Num 13:1–14:10). Each of these men sees the same thing; they each see a land flowing with milk and honey and identify the inhabitants as strong men (<identification $_{yes}$>). Based on this sight, however, they come to different conclusions. Most of the men decide that the people of Canaan are too strong and that the land is too difficult to occupy (Num 13:32–33); Joshua and Caleb, on the other hand, determine that the land is fair and should be occupied (Num 13:30, 14:6–9). In other words, each party evaluates the situation based on his own sight of it (<evaluation $_{yes}$>).[55] Yet, although the evaluation differs, the sight itself remains the same: the land is fair and the people are strong (<subjectivity $_{no}$>).

While certain passages extol sight as the most accurate of modalities, especially when compared to hearing (e.g., 1 Kgs 10:7; Job 42:5) (<correction of hypothesis $_{yes}$>), other passages doubt the veracity of sight or recognize its limitations.[56] Judah sees Tamar, but mistakes her for a prostitute (ויראהָ יהודה וחשבה לזונָה, Gen 38:15; see also 1 Sam 21:13 [14]–15[16]); Job's friends see him, but do not recognize him (וישא את־עיניהם מרחוק ולא הכירהו, Job 2:12) (<correction of hypothesis $_{no}$>). In particular, sight has limited value for identifying God and other otherworldly beings. God can pass by the human and not be perceived by sight (e.g., הן יעבר עלי ולא אראה, Job 9:11; see also Gen 18:2; Job 4:16, 23:8–9, 33:14, 34:29), and it often takes a transformative experience to perceive God (e.g., ואחר עורי נקפו־זות ומבשרי אחזה אלוה, Job 19:25–26).

Finally, sight could either be a voluntary or involuntary action. On the one hand, the individual had to open (פחה) his or her eyes (e.g., Job 27:19; 2 Kgs 4:35) and direct them towards

[54] Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 32, see also the discussion on 38–39. Sweetser's statement is based off of the modern understanding of vision's biological processes, but is confirmed by the biblical data.

[55] Each party then uses this visual observation to verbally sway the opinions of the Israelites by the report they give. For this secondary step, see the discussion of <evaluation> in hearing below.

[56] Ibarretxe-Antuñano ("Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 153) argues that a modality must receive a $_{no}$ tag in <contact> for <correction of hypothesis> to be a property associated with it. As shall be seen in the discussion of touch and ingestion below, this is not always true, which means that an affirmative answer for <correction of hypothesis> cannot determine whether <contact> was perceived to be negative or positive.

the object perceived (see especially the idiom “lift the eyes,” נשא עין;[57] e.g., Gen 24:64; Jos 5:13; Ps 121:1; Job 2:12) (<voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>). At the same time, the eye could be opened for the person (Gen 21:19; 2 Kgs 6:17, 20; Isa 35:5, 42:7), and once opened, the object perceived could appear before the individual without his or her volition (e.g., Gen 9:14; Song 2:12; esp. with appearances of divine figure: e.g., Gen 12:7, 17:1, 18:1; Ex 3:16; Num 16:19). People must move away or avert their eyes; they cannot help but see what happens in front of them (e.g., Gen 21:16) (<voluntary $_{\text{no}}$>).

The following typology of sight thus emerges:[58]

<contact $_{\text{yes?}}$>
<closeness $_{\text{no}}$>
<internal $_{\text{no}}$>
<location $_{\text{yes}}$>
<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{simultaneity}}$
<identification $_{\text{yes}}$>
<voluntary $_{\text{yes/no}}$>

<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>
<effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$
<correction of hypothesis $_{\text{yes/no}}$>
<subjectivity $_{\text{no}}$>
<effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$
<evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>
<briefness $_{\text{yes}}$>

COGNITION IS SEEING

As Grady states, across the globe, “virtually any term which conventionally refers to the domain of vision can be used to refer to the domain of intellection: see, blind, obscure, eyes, light, etc.”[59] Ancient Israel was no exception. Scribal circles frequently conceptualized cognition as a visual experience, mapping the properties of sight onto the target domains of knowledge acquisition, emotional experience, and moral judgment.[60]

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[57] Although this is often used in narrative as a “stylistic device to introduce a new episode” (Fuhs, *TDOT* 13: 215).

[58] As with Western epistemology, <limits> does not seem to be a property associated with sight in ancient Israel. Other “B” properties not included in the Western typology for sight (e.g., <effects> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$, <effects> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$, <subjectivity>, and <briefness>) do, demonstrating that the distribution of properties do indeed vary from one culture to the next.

[59] Grady, “Foundations of Meaning,” 7.

[60] As noted above, vision also serves as a source domain for metaphors of help, harm, and life. For more on these metaphors in Israelite culture, see Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 130–57, 175–83. Sight can also serve as a source domain for metaphors of personal encounter, as when Dinah goes out to “see” the women of her land (לראות; Gen 34:1) or Moses travels to “see” what happened to his people (ואראה העודם חיים; Exod 4:18), although there tends to be a kinesthetic dimension to it.

Knowledge Metaphors

Because it is an effective means of identifying objects in the environment, sight is a common source domain for metaphors of knowing and understanding. Take, for example, the book of Qohelet, one of the clearest epistemological reflections in the Hebrew Bible. As noted in Chapter 2, Qohelet presents itself as the personal quest of the king of Israel (the "Teacher") to analyze the world and understand its contents. According to this Teacher, sight is a direct means of acquiring information about the world. The Teacher himself ראה ("sees") "all the works that are done under the sun" (Qoh 1:14). He sees the activities of human beings and God (Qoh 3:10, 4:4, 8:16–17), the dichotomy between justice and wickedness (Qoh 3:16; 4:1, 3; 5:7[8], 12[13]; 6:1; 7:15; 8:10; 10:5, 7), and life in general (Qoh 4:15). "By day or by night," he declares, "there is no end of seeing with the eyes" (Qoh 8:16).[61] No one has told the Teacher of these things; he has seen them for himself.

While some of these visual passages could refer to concrete observations, they generally connote abstract cognitive activities, such as thinking or understanding (CONSIDERING IS SEEING, UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING):

Qoh 2:12 And I turned, to *see* (לראות) wisdom, madness, and folly; for who is the person who comes after me? Shall he control[62] that which has already been done?

Qoh 3:10 I have *seen* (ראה) the occupations which God has given to the children of humanity to occupy themselves with.

Qoh 8:16–17 When I gave my heart to know (לדעת) wisdom and *to see* (ראה) the work

[61] Literally: "by day or night, they do not see sleep with their eyes." As Seow (*Ecclesiastes,* 289) notes, the phrase is awkward in its present location. At best it is intended as a parenthetical comment in anticipation of the next verse; at worst, it has been "inadvertent transposed" from the following verse. This makes it difficult to interpret. Still, the phrase itself seems to imply that the eyes do not ever close; that is, they do not cease from viewing the world around them.

[62] The second half of this verse is awkward in the MT: כִּי מֶה הָאָדאם שֶׁיָּבוֹא אַחֲרֵי הַמֶּלֶךְ אֵת אֲשֶׁר־כְּבָר עָשׂוּהוּ (literally, "for what is the man who comes after the king, that which they already do?"). Because the construction המלך את is unusual, Seow emends the MT's noun הַמֶּלֶךְ ("king") to the verb הַמֹּלֵךְ ("to rule, control"). Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 134.

> which is done upon the earth,…[63] I *saw* (ראה) all the work of God, that no one is able to find out the work that is done under the sun.

The Teacher cannot actually see *every* action that humans take or *every* wicked deed that occurs (Qoh 3:10, 8:16–17). He cannot physically *see* abstract concepts like “wisdom” (הכמה), “madness” (הוללות), or “folly” (סכלות) (Qoh 2:12, see also Qoh 10:5–6). Rather, the visual terminology indicates that the Teacher has *considered* wisdom, folly, and the divine origin of human occupations (Qoh 2:12, 3:10, and Qoh 8:17) and that he desires to *understand* (ראה) the work done upon the earth (Qoh 8:16). The term ראה frequently parallels ידע in the Hebrew Bible, sometimes as a near synonym (as in Qoh 8:16) and sometimes as a preliminary stage to it in the epistemological process.[64] Qohelet 3:10, for instance, introduces a unit of text in which ראה leads to ידע (see Qoh 3:12, 14). First the Teacher *considers* human occupation; then he *knows* about God and the world (see also ראה וידע in Qoh 6:5).[65] These and other frequent references to sight refer to cognitive perception, to the intellectual endeavor to comprehend and to catalogue the world, and not physical observation.

Such metaphors map select prototypical properties associated with sight onto the target domain of cognitive knowledge, in this case, sight’s properties of <detection $_{\text{yes}}$>[simultaneity], <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, <directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, and <subjectivity $_{\text{no}}$>. The Teacher chooses which matters to pursue; he turns to *see* (ראה) the work that is done under the sun (Qoh 2:12, 8:16–17, see also Qoh 8:9) (<voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>), but the assumption is that anyone who chooses to can consider the same matters and will have the same information available to him (<subjectivity $_{\text{no}}$>). Generally, there is no indication that the individual approaches these matters sequentially. The Teacher

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[63] See Chapter 3 n. 61 above for the difficulty of the intervening phrase. Since it is not relevant to the points being made here, I have omitted it from this discussion here.

[64] As Carasik (*Theologies of the Mind*, 39 including n. 96, 97) states, “ראה and דע are a standard hendiadys,” appearing around a dozen times in the Deuteronomic History (1 Sam 12:17, 14:38, 23:22, 23, 24:12, 25:17, 2 Sam 24:13, 1 Kgs 20:7, 22; 2 Kgs 5:7; Jer 2:19, 5:1). As he notes, other forms of ראה and ידע are equally capable of being paralleled (see, for example, Jer 2:23, 11:18, 12:3; Ps 31:8, 12; 74:9; 138:6; Job 11:11; Isa 29:15, 33:13). See also Fuhs, *TDOT* 13:214–15. ראה and ידע are not always synonyms, however, since one can see, but not know (e.g., Exod 6:3). This supports the idea that the choice to use ראה in Qohelet and other such literature to indicate knowledge carries with it a set of distinct connotations.

[65] Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 173.

considers multiple items at once (e.g., wisdom, madness, and folly; *everything* that is done under the sun), which are revealed simultaneously before him (<detection $_{\text{yes}}$>$^{\text{[simultaneity]}}$). Moreover, the frequent appeal to the personal nature of the cognitive experience highlights the <directness $_{\text{yes}}$> property inherent to the CONSIDERING IS SEEING metaphor. "*I* have seen the occupations of humanity," says the Teacher (Qoh 3:10); "*I* have seen the works of God" (Qoh 8:17; see also Qoh 1:14; 3:16; 4:1, 4; etc.). No one has seen it for him; the Teacher has seen if for himself.

Sight is also used to refer to the individual's ability to draw conclusions from thinking (CONCLUDING IS SEEING):

Qoh 1:10	Is there a matter of which it is said, "*see* (ראה), this is new"? It has already been, in the ages which were before us.[66]
Qoh 2:24	There is nothing better than to eat and drink and enjoy one's work.[67] This, too, I *saw* (ראיתי) was from the hand of God.
Qoh 4:4	And I *saw* (וראיתי) that all toil and all achievement is from a one's envy of another.[68]

Again, visual terms reflect the contemplative process. Thus, the Teacher *concludes* that all food and drink come from God (e.g., Qoh 2:24; see also Qoh 7:14) and that envy causes a person to work hard and succeed (Qoh 4:4). Similarly, the hypothetical speaker in Qoh 1:10 *concludes* (ראה) that a particular event is new. As Choon-Leong Seow states, in these passages, ראה does not mean "just to 'look at,' but to recognize as reality."[69] The use of visual terms to mean *conclude* relies on sight's ability to directly identify elements in the environment and evaluate the information it provides (<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <identification $_{\text{yes}}$>, <evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>). The metaphor, however, plays with the dual nature of sight's <correction of hypothesis> property. On the one hand, the Teacher recognizes that people are capable of producing erroneous conclusions (Qoh

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[66] For the difficulties surrounding the construction of this verse, see Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 110–11.

[67] והראה את־נפשו טוב בעמלו (lit: "to see the nephesh good in its work"). For the nuances of this metaphor, see the discussion of ENJOYMENT IS SEEING below.

[68] Thus, following the translation of Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 179.

[69] Ibid., 240.

1:10) (<correction of hypothesis $_{no}$>). On the other hand, the Teacher uses the directness of sight to lend credibility to his conclusions. Just as he has *seen* directly (ראה, i.e., *considered*) everything that is done under the sun, so his audience should believe his conclusions (Qoh 2:24; 4: see also Qoh 2:13; 9:11; etc.). The Teacher's conclusions, the book insists, are correct because they are based on his direct experience (<correction of hypothesis $_{yes}$>).

Sight can also be used as a source domain for the transference of knowledge from one person to the next (TEACHING IS SHOWING):

> Qoh 3:18 I said in my heart with regard to human beings that God is testing them to *show* (ראה) that they are but animals.

To teach a person, one "shows" him or her a point. Thus, in Qoh 3:18, the Teacher concludes that God tests individuals in order to *teach* (ראה) them that they are the same as animals. As with other knowledge metaphors, this passage maps the <directness $_{yes}$> property of sight onto the domain of knowledge. Just as the Teacher has concluded these matters for himself from direct contemplation, humans understand their bestial nature because God has *shown* it to them directly.

Fox argues that Qohelet is "revolutionary" in that a "sage chooses to seek out sensory experience as a path to insight."[70] Only rarely, he states, do other sages present their activities as visual observations.[71] While it is certainly true that the book of Qohelet presents itself as the result of empirical inquiry and favors visually-derived cognitive metaphors, other sapiential writers also appeal to visual experience to describe cognitive experience. In Job, for instance, visual cognitive metaphors appear repeatedly as Job and his friends debate their respective positions (e.g., CONSIDERING IS SEEING: Job 5:9, 27; 8:8; 32:11; UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING: Job

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[70] Fox, "Qohelet's Epistemology," 142. In making this statement, Fox is commenting particularly on the empirical nature of the Teacher's investigations, who "proceed[s] by seeking experience, observing it, and judging it, and then reporting his perceptions or reactions" (142). While I do not wish to deny that the empirical nature of the Teacher's inquiry (e.g., he drank wine, acquired wealth, etc.) vis-à-vis a book like Proverbs, it is my contention that much of Qohelet's visual language refers to abstract contemplation and in this he was not unique among the sages.

[71] Fox, "Qohelet's Epistemology," 145–46. Fox notes, for instance, the observation of a field in Prov 24:30–34 and the observation of a youth's seduction in Prov 7. These, he claims, differs from Qohelet's position in that they "are not claimed as the source of knowledge or even as its proof" (146).

9:10; 11:7; 13:1; 15:17; 24:1; 27:12; 31:21; 34:32; 36:26; CONCLUDING IS SEEING: Job 4:8; 32:5). Even Proverbs, which is generally considered to have a strong auditory focus, commands its listener to *consider* (ראה) the behavior of ants or the field of the lazy in order to learn about the value of prudence (CONSIDERING IS SEEING: Prov 6:6; 24:32). In fact, the occurrences of עין in Proverbs outnumber that of אזן (ear) almost four to one.[72] While only a fraction of those are used in cognitive metaphors, it does suggest that Proverbs is not as anti-visual as Fox supposes. Contrarily to Fox, then, it seems as though vision serves as a natural source domain for the acquisition of knowledge throughout wisdom literature, including the book of Proverbs.

Emotion Metaphors

Sight also serves as a source domain for emotional experience. For instance, a person who is happy has a satisfied eye (e.g., Qoh 2:10, 11:9); a person who is unhappy has an insatiable eye (Qoh 1:8, 4:8; Prov 27:20) (SATISFACTION IS A GOOD EYE/DISSATISFACTION IS A BAD EYE). Similarly, to "see good" (ראה טוב[ה]) is to be happy (ENJOYMENT IS SEEING).[73] Thus:

Job 7:7	Remember that my life is a breath; *my eye* will not again *see good* (לא תשוב עיני לראות טוב).
Qoh 3:13	It is a gift of God that every human eat and drink and *see good* (ראה טוב) in his toil.
Qoh 5:17–18	It is fair to eat and drink and *see good* in all the work (ולראות טובה בכל־עמלו) which is one works under the sun…to eat from it [wealth] and to carry his lot and to enjoy his work—this is a gift from God.
Qoh 9:9	*See* life (רְאֵה חיים) with the wife whom you love.

In his dejected state, Job frets at ever *enjoying* (ראה טוב) life again (Job 7:7; see also Job 9:25; Qoh 6:6), whereas the Teacher commands his listener to *enjoy* (ראה) life with a good wife (Qoh

[72] Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 150–51. See n. 49, 50 therein for specific textual examples.

[73] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 163–64; Fuhs, *TDOT* 13:222. See also sight as a metaphor for hope: "the ways of Tema *look* (הביט); the ones who travel Sheba wait for them" (Job 6:19) (EXPECTATION IS SEEING).

9:9; see also Qoh 11:7; Prov 15:30).[74] Testing the different aspects of human experience, the Teacher determines that eating and drinking and working are gifts from God; like eating or drinking, one should thus *enjoy* work (Qoh 3:13, 5:17; see also Qoh 2:1, 24; 3:22). That ראה טוב[ה] implies enjoyment is made clear in Qoh 5:18, where the phrase “enjoy work” (ולשמח בעמלו) replaces the standard ראה טוב[ה]. The “satisfied eye” or the “eye that sees good,” then, indicates the individual’s enjoyment of a situation. Such metaphors select the properties <directness $_{yes}$> and <effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$ and map them onto emotional experience. The individual’s own, direct experience of events affects his emotional state.

Judgment Metaphors

Related to the use of vision to describe mental conclusions, sight also serves as a source domain for evaluative moral judgments (JUDGING IS SEEING):

Qoh 3:22	I *saw* that there is nothing better (וראיתי כי אין טוב) than that an individual enjoy his work, for it is his lot.
Job 15:15	The stars are not pure *in his eyes* (לא־זכו בעיניו).
Prov 3:4	And you will find favor and good insight *in the eyes of* God and humanity (בעיני אלהים ואדם).
Job 32:1	And these three men ceased from answering Job, because he was righteous *in his own eyes* (כי הוא צדיק עיניו).

Just as the Teacher *concludes* that (ראה...כי) work comes from God (e.g., Qoh 2:24), he *judges* that (וראיתי כי) it is good, that there is nothing better than that a person enjoy his work (Qoh 3:22, see also Qoh 2:3, 13, 5:17, 10:5). Throughout the Hebrew Bible, “to see that” a matter is good or bad (ראה כי...טוב/רעה) indicates that one has not only arrived at a conclusion but also that one has formed an opinion or moral judgment based on that conclusion (see, for instance, the positive examples in the first creation story, Gen 1:4, 10, 12, 18, 21, 25; and a negative example in Gen

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[74] This latter example is probably a shortened version of ראה טובה.

6:5).[75] Similarly, the expression “in the eyes” (בעין/בעיני/בעיניו) indicates a personal evaluation of a situation, an opinion about the inherent moral qualities of a thing. The stars are impure “in God’s eyes” (לא־זכו בעיניו, Job 15:15; see also Job 25:5; Prov 24:18); that is God *judges* them to be so. A person to be favorable and wise (בעיני אלהים ואדם, Prov 3:4, see also Prov 26:12, 29:20; Job 11:4). A person can also evaluate his own actions, being wise “in his own eyes” (בעיניו, Prov 26:12; see also Job 11:4, 32:1), but not necessarily in the eye of his companions.

As with the CONCLUDING IS SEEING metaphor, JUDGING IS SEEING maps sight’s properties of <evaluation $_{yes}$> and <directness $_{yes}$> onto the domain of mental judgment. The Teacher himself *evaluates* the situation (Qoh 3:22); God himself *judges* (Job 15:15). With this metaphorical mapping, however, other properties shift. Although physical sight is understood to occur outside the eyes, moral sight occurs “within” (־ב) the eyes (e.g., Prov 3:4, Job 32:2). The property <internal $_{no}$> becomes <internal $_{yes}$>. Similarly, although sight itself is understood to remain consistent across individuals (<subjective $_{no}$>), moral sight is subjective (<subjective $_{yes}$>). As Avrahami argues, such phrases as “in the eyes of” “often indicate the existence of an opinion that is personal, subjective, and unconventional.”[76] Thus, individuals are described as having opinions that deviate from others, and such deviations are often condemned as erroneous (e.g., Prov 3:7; 12:15; 26:5, 12, 16; 21:2; 28:11; 30:12; Job 19:15; 32:1) (<correction of hypothesis $_{no}$>). Why these properties shift is unclear, although perhaps the possibility is inherent in the Israelite conception of sight itself. Although sight was generally perceived to be an external modality, the references to an intraocular light noted above suggest that there was also an internal component to sight, at least in the initial stages. If so, this might help explain the mapping of <internal $_{yes}$> as well as <subjectivity $_{yes}$>.[77] As Sweetser and Ibarretxe-Antuñano both argue, across cultures,

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[75] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 168.

[76] Ead.; see also the entire discussion 258–62.

[77] The reversal in <subjectivity> might also stem from the idea that people see different things if their location is different.

internal modalities tend toward the subjective.[78] If the evaluative qualities of vision were linked to the internal components of the eye when they were mapped onto the target domain of judgment, then it is reasonable to suggest that <subjectivity $_{\text{yes}}$> developed as a natural by-product of this mapping. What is clear is that JUDGING IS SEEING, unlike CONCLUDING IS SEEING, presupposes a certain degree of internal subjectivity that may or may not have been beneficial to the individual.

Summary

In summation, there are at least seven common iterations of the COGNITION IS SEEING metaphor among ancient Israelite scribes, each of which maps specific properties onto cognition:[79]

Sight	<selected properties>
CONSIDERING IS SEEING	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{[simultaneity]}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, <directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <subjectivity $_{\text{no}}$>
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{[simultaneity]}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, <directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <subjectivity $_{\text{no}}$>
CONCLUDING IS SEEING	<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <identification $_{\text{yes}}$>, <evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>, <cor. hyp. $_{\text{yes/no}}$>
TEACHING IS SHOWING	<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>
SATISFACTION IS A GOOD EYE/DISSATISFACTION IS A BAD EYE	<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$
ENJOYING IS SEEING	<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$
JUDGING IS SEEING	<evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>, <directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <internal $_{\text{yes}}$>, <subjective $_{\text{yes}}$>

Table 4: Metaphorical Mappings: COGNITION IS SEEING

The specific nuances of these metaphors vary depending upon which properties are selected. The mapping of <effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$ develops emotive metaphors, while <evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$> develops

[78] Ibarretxe-Antuñano ("Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs, 156) argues that <subjectivity $_{\text{yes}}$> is constrained by <internal $_{\text{yes}}$> and <closeness $_{\text{yes}}$>; that is, a modality can only be subjective if it is also internal and close (so, in Western epistemology: taste and smell). Sweetser (*From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 41–44) argues that a modality either needs to be internal *or* close, thereby also allowing for touch and hearing to be subjective. Given the evidence, at least in ancient Israel, it seems likely that <subjectivity> is not as constrained as Ibarretxe-Antuñano argues and that the presence of one of these properties (internal or closeness) is enough to allow for the possibility of subjectivity, though it need not necessitate it. Having both properties, however, would make <subjectivity $_{\text{yes}}$> much more probable.

[79] This chart is modeled after similar ones in Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 177.

metaphors of concluding and judging. Common to them all, however, is the mapping of sight's <directness $_{yes}$> property onto the cognitive domain. Considering, concluding, emoting, and judging are all personal events that an individual engages in directly. The COGNITION IS SEEING metaphor in ancient Israelite sapiential literature is thus characterized by its directness, and its local iterations form a distinct collection of metaphors by which Israelites scribes expressed their understanding of cognition as a direct, immediate experience.

COGNITION IS HEARING, COGNITION IS SPEAKING

Early twentieth century scholars focused almost exclusively on the oral-auditory dimension of Hebrew epistemology and for good reason.[80] From the first chapter in Genesis, speech and hearing pervade the text. God speaks creation into existence, and people discover their world through speech and sound. Not surprisingly, then, hearing and speech each serve as a source domain for cognition, especially cognition that is indirect and sequential.

As Avrahami rightly notes, hearing and speaking are two distinct modalities in Hebrew epistemology.[81] Each had its own way of engaging the environment and its own properties associated with it. However, hearing and speech were closely linked, physically and conceptually. More than any other two modalities, hearing and speech routinely functioned as an integrated unit, such that the two modalities were effectively two sides of the same perceptual process.[82] Consequently, cognitive metaphors based upon hearing and speaking are closely related and in some cases even draw upon the properties of each without discrimination.[83] It is thus appropriate to discuss hearing and speaking as a unit, recognizing their distinctiveness as well as their areas

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[80] See the auditory focus of Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared to the Greek*, noted above.

[81] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 84–93.

[82] Malul (*Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 102 n. 2), in fact, argues that speech is "not strictly a sense," but a "sub-sense" of hearing; however, in his discussion and charts, he still separates it from hearing, perhaps because of the "substantial role" the modality plays in Israelite epistemology. Avrahami (*The Senses of Scripture*, 85–90) also acknowledges these linkages, especially in their semantics domains of cognition, obedience, and divine help.

[83] Such cases are not examples of complex metaphors. By definition, complex metaphors are not based on direct experience itself, but are combinations of primary metaphors. Speech and hearing, however, are not metaphors; they are direct experiences upon which metaphors are based.

of convergence.

Typology of Hearing and Speaking

Key Terms (Hearing): אֹזֶן (esp. נטה אזן), אָזַן, שמע, שֵׁמַע, קשב, קול

Key Terms (Speaking): פה, לשון, אמר,[84] דבר, קרא, שאל, ענה, נגד, שׂיח, צוה, אמרים, דברים, קול, מלין

As with sight, hearing in the Hebrew Bible is clearly connected to a specific physical organ, the ear (אזן), which commonly appears together with auditory verbs like שמע and קשב, (Gen 23:13; Num 11:1; Deut 5:1; 2 Chr 6:40; Ps 9:38; etc.). Like sight, the exact mechanisms of hearing are unclear.[85] However, hearing is certainly an involuntary, internal modality. An external sound enters "into the ears" of its own volition (Gen 20:8; 23:10, 13, 16; 44:18; 50:4; etc.) (<internal $_{yes}$>), and the perceiver generally has no control over its production or reception (e.g., Gen 12:1–3; 1 Sam 3:4–18; Job 4:12) (<voluntary $_{no}$>).[86] More importantly, in hearing, the perceiver does not engage the object itself but a third party, the קול ("sound") (<directness $_{no}$>). There is no contact between the perceiver and the object perceived (<contact $_{no}$>), and, as Jonas states, "what the sound immediately discloses is not an object but a dynamical event [walking, speaking, etc.] at the locus of the object."[87] Thus, the first humans do not experience God himself

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[84] Although, as Carasik (*Theologies of the Mind*, 33) notes, most occurrences of אמר are indicative of third-person narration and therefore of limited use for determining how cognition is perceived.

[85] According to the ancient Greeks, hearing resulted "from a blow (*plege*) that struck the air, traveled over some distance, and impacted upon the ear" (Chidester, *Word and Light*, 6). Thus, Empedocles (ca. 490–430 B.C.E.) likened the ear to a "bell" or "gong" that reverberated when struck by sound, and Anaxagoras (ca. 500–428 B.C.E.) described speech as an "echo" (ἠχώ) created when breath crashed into the air. For a fuller discussion of these and other such thinkers, see Chidester, *Word and Light*, 6–7; Schmidt Goering, "Sapiential Synesthesia." It is unclear if the Israelites had similar assumptions about sound.

[86] Jonas, "The Nobility of Sight," 139. The phrase "uncover the ear" (גלה אזן) indicates an act of speech, which is voluntary on the part of the speaker but not on the part of the listener (e.g., Ruth 4:4; 1 Sam 9:15; 20:2, 12, 13; etc.; see metaphorical extensions below). On the other hand, those passages that mention "opening" (פתח, Isa 35:5,48:8, 50:5) , "closing" (עלם, Lam 3:56), or "turning" the ear (נטה, e.g., 2 Kgs 19:16; Ps 17:6; Prov 4:20; 5:1, 13; 22:17) generally appear to be metaphorical in nature, referring either to an act of help or to a state of cognitive readiness (or a combination of the two) and not the physical status of the ear itself. The one possible exception is Isa 35:5, where God "opens" (פתח) the ear of the deaf. This event, however, is beyond the volition of the individual receiving the healing and does not represent a voluntary condition. For more information on these phrases as metaphors of help, see Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 131. For their use as metaphors for cognition, see the discussion of PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING below.

[87] Jonas, "The Nobility of Sight," 137. The indirectness of hearing in Israelite literature has been

in the garden but the קול of God walking (Gen 3:8, 10), and Lamech's wives do not experience their husband but the קול of their husband's voice (Gen 4:23).[88] Unlike the spatial modality of sight, then, hearing provides a temporal orientation to the environment. One first detects the sound of one footstep and then another; one hears first one word and then the next (<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{[sequence]}}$). Because of this, the amount of time it takes to hear a sound varies according to the duration of the sound. A trumpet blast, for instance, can be long (משך, lit: "drawn out," e.g., Exod 19:13; Jos 6:5), while a word (דבר) can be but a brief whisper (שמץ, Job 26:14) or a "small" (קטן) or "great" (גדול) sound (1 Sam 22:15, 25:36).[89] Hearing, then, is not an inherently brief modality (<briefness $_{\text{no}}$>).

Like hearing, speech is connected with a particular physical organ (פה, "mouth") and its component parts (שפה,"lip"; לשון "tongue"), which frequently appear with verbs of saying, especially אמר and דבר (Gen 45:12; Exod 4:12; Ps 12:4; etc.). As the obverse of hearing, speech occurs when a sound issues forth from the mouth of the individual and is directed outward (<internal $_{\text{no}}$>). Unlike hearing, speech is a voluntary modality (<voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>). The individual can choose when to speak and when to remain silent (e.g., Gen 50:4; Judg 18:25; 1 Sam 3:10, 18), and an individual's character is often measured by his or her ability to know which action is appropriate at any given moment (e.g., Prov 10:19, 11:13; Qoh 3:7, 5:1, 5:3). However, in speech there is still no contact between the speaker and the object of perception, the listener.[90] Like hearing, speech is an indirect modality, connecting the speaker to the listener only via sound

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well-recognized. See, for instance, Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 158; Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 154; Schmidt Goering, "Sapiential Synesthesia."

[88] Even passages that do not mention קול, דברים, or the like presume a mediating element.

[89] While 1 Sam 22:15 could use דבר in a more generic sense to mean "anything," 1 Sam 25:36 clearly uses דבר to refer to a verbal action that Abigail decided not to take: "she did not declare to him a word, small or great (לא־הגידה לו דבר קטן וגדול), until the light of morning." It is plausible that Ahimelek's declaration in 1 Sam 22:15—"your servant did not know any of this דבר, small or great"—similarly refers to the idea that Ahimelek had not heard even a whisper of David's activities, especially when he condemns the priests two verses later for failing to disclose (גלה) the matter to him.

[90] Unlike ordinary sound, the modality of speech operates under the presumption that there is an entity waiting to receive it, the listener. Under Ibarretxe-Antuñano's rubric, this listener seems most appropriately classified as the object perceived. Ibarretxe-Antuñano, however, does not seem to discuss speech as a separate modality, incorporating it instead into her discussions of hearing.

(<contact $_{no}$>, <direct $_{no}$>). It, too, then is temporal, interacting with the listener through the sequential production of דברים, אמרים, or מלין ("words"; see, for instance, the sequential dialogue between Abraham and the Lord in Gen 18:20–33 or the litany of Judah's questions in Gen 44:16). However, although speech is temporal, the property of <detection> itself does not apply to the modality, as the goal of speech is not to acquire information about the environment but to transmit information into it.

Since neither speech nor hearing requires contact between the perceiver and object perceived, closeness is a negative property in both (<closeness $_{no}$>). The Egyptians can "hear" (שמע) Joseph weeping, even though they are in an entirely different room (Gen 45:2; see also Ezra 3:13), and an Assyrian messenger can "call" (קרא) to the people of Judah from outside the city walls (2 Kgs 18:17–36, esp. v. 28). Likewise, God can hear humanity's cries from the highest heavens (Gen 21:17; 1 Kgs 8:32, 34, 36, 39, 43, etc.) and speak to them from the same (Gen 21:17; 22:11, 15). Hearing can, however, identify and locate the object perceived, although it is not as precise as sight. Hearing, for instance, can detect footsteps entering a room and identify them as such, but not to whom those footsteps belong (1 Kgs 14:6;[91] see also Num 7:89; 1 Sam 4:6; 2 Sam 5:24//1 Chr 14:15; 1 Kgs 1:41–45; 1 Kgs 6:7) (<identification $_{yes}$>, <location $_{yes}$>). Speech, on the other hand, has no such need, and the properties are irrelevant to it.

Moreover, hearing often provides only indirect information about a situation. For instance, Job knows about the death of his livestock, servants, and children, only because another person has reported it him (Job 1:14–19; see also Gen 14:14, 24:30, 29:13, etc.). Because it does not directly engage the object perceived, hearing is not as reliable of a source of information as sight or even touch. Hearing can, for instance, correctly identify a sound of a trumpet blast as the sound of a successful campaign (e.g., 1 Sam 13:3–4) or misidentify the sound of revelry in the

[91] In 1 Kgs 14:6, the blind Ahijah identifies Jeroboam's wife, not because he heard her footsteps, but because the Lord told her he was coming. In this case, one form of hearing is reliable (God's report), while another (the sound of footsteps) only allows him to identify that type of sound (footsteps) but not the creator of the sound.

Israelite camp as a sound of war (Exod 32:17) (<correction of hypothesis $_{\text{yes/no}}$>). This is particularly problematic when multiple stimuli are present, for unlike sight, hearing has difficulty distinguishing one sound from the next (e.g., sounds of weeping from sounds of joy, Ezra 3:12–13). Speech, in particular, can be manipulated, providing the hearer with false information (e.g., Gen 34:13, 39:19; Prov 20:14, 26:19, 28:24; Job 13:7, 27:4). For this reason, passages frequently value other modalities more than hearing. Job, for instance, proclaims that although he had heard of God by the "hearing of the ear" (לשמע־אזן), now he is vindicated because he has seen God directly with his eye (איני ראתך, Job 42:5; see also Gen 18:21, 42:20). Similarly, in Gen 27:22, Isaac mistrusts the information provided by hearing ("the voice is the voice of Jacob") in favor of what his hands tell him ("the hands are the hands of Esau"). Still, some passages validate hearing, privileging information provided by hearing, especially when visual data is lacking. Thus, Deut 4:12 declares that when God spoke to the Israelites from the fire, they "heard the *sound of words* (קול דברים) but saw no form (ותמונה אינכם ראים), only a *sound* (זולתי קול)" (see also the value of teaching future generations about God, e.g., Deut 6:4–7).

Although speech itself does not evaluate or formulate hypotheses about the object perceived,[92] it can sway the impression of those who hear it, for good or ill. Thus the prophets use speech to encourage certain behaviors among the Israelites (e.g., care for the poor, Amos 2:2–8; trust in God's saving power, Nah 1:12–15) and discourage others (e.g., following foreign deities, 1 Kgs 18:17–40; migrating to Egypt, Jer 42:1–22). Based on these and other sounds, hearers assess their environment (<evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>), and false information can lead to adverse judgments. Listening to the words of the spies, the Israelites decide not to go to war with the Canaanites, which incites God's anger against them (Num 13:26–14:23).[93] Speech, then, is a subjective modality; the speaker influences the act of speaking (<subjective $_{\text{yes}}$>). Hearing, however, is not subjective; like sight, the listener can formulate hypotheses and evaluations based on hearing, but

[92] That is, the properties <correction of hypothesis> and <evaluation> are not applicable.

[93] See also the discussion of this passage in the Typology of Sight above.

the listener cannot influence the act of hearing itself (<subjective $_{no}$>).

Finally, like sight, hearing often elicits an emotional response. Thus, the hearts of the Canaanite kings are dismayed when they hear of the Lord’s activities on behalf of his people (e.g., Jos 2:11, 5:1, 10:1–2), and God is wrathful when he hears the rebellious words of the Israelites (e.g., Deut 1:34) (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$). Conversely, because the one who hears is the object of speech, speech can affect its object (e.g., Gen 50:21; Ruth 2:13) (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$). Thus, “a gentle answer averts rage but a harsh word kindles anger” (Prov 15:1, see also v. 23). Speech can also affect the speaker (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$). For instance, Elihu feels compelled to speak so that he might find relief (וירוח־לי, lit. “it be wide for me,” Job 32:20; see also 1 Sam 1:16 and conversely Job 16:6). Because speech could affect the listener, the Israelites took care to regulate it. Thus, Proverbs advises the student to “withhold speech” (e.g., Prov 10:19), and Qohelet counsels his audience to “let [their] words be few” (Qoh 5:1).

The properties of hearing and speech can thus be summarized:[94]

Hearing		Speech	
<contact $_{no}$>	<directness $_{no}$>	<contact $_{no}$>	<directness $_{no}$>
<closeness $_{no}$>	<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$	<closeness $_{no}$>	<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$
<internal $_{yes}$>	< cor. hyp. $_{yes/no}$>	<internal $_{no}$>	
<location $_{yes}$>	<subjectivity $_{no}$>		<subjectivity $_{yes}$>
<detection $_{yes}$> ^{sequence}	<effects $_{no}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$		<effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$
<identification $_{yes}$>	<evaluation $_{yes}$>		
<voluntary $_{no}$>	<briefness $_{no}$>	<voluntary $_{yes}$>	<briefness $_{no}$>

COGNITION IS HEARING/SPEAKING

According to Michael Carasik, “The directive ‘hear!’ [שמע] is always used in its literal sense, indicating an instruction or request to listen to actual sounds, ordinarily words.”[95] He goes

[94] Again, the property of <limits> does not seem applicable.

[95] Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 41. Carasik does note that hearing can “bring knowledge” and “serve as a model for mental representations of the world” (as when God commands Ezekiel to hear words in his ear, ובאזניך שמע, Ezek 3:10), but argues that vision is by far the primary means of conceptualizing thought in ancient Israel (38–39). Carasik also notes (in a brief footnote) that an exception to this general rule is the use of the imperative of שמע to mean “heed” or “obey” (41 n. 103). However, as the discussion below will demonstrate, these cases are not trivial; rather, they are integral to Israelite epistemology and should thus not be treated as simple exceptions.

on to state that "the Israelite metaphor for thought was a *visual image.* It gives a dimension to ראה that שמע does not have" (emphasis original).[96] Thus, Carasik argues that while speech did have a metaphorical dimension, being like sight a standard modality for expressing thought, hearing did not.[97] Although one cannot deny the prevalence of sight and speech as a source domain for cognition, hearing itself did not lack metaphorical extensions. In sapiential literature, both speech and hearing could serve as a source domain for metaphors of cognition, especially metaphors of knowing.

Knowledge Metaphors

As Carasik recognizes, speech often serves as a source domain for thought, such that cognition is conceived of as a mental dialogue (THINKING IS SPEAKING):

Job 1:5 For Job *said* (אמר), "perhaps my sons have sinned and cursed[98] God in their hearts."

Job 7:4 If I lie down and *say* (ואמרתי), "when will I rise?"…

Job 32:7 I *said* (אמרתי), "Let days speak and many years make known wisdom."

In each of these verses, the verb אמר ("to say") introduces the internal dialogue of the speaker. In Job 1:5, for instance, Job rationalizes his daily sacrificial practices, arguing that he should perform a sacrifice in case his children have sinned. No external listener is specified,[99] and it unlikely that Job would feel the need to justify his sacrificial actions to another; rather, the passage records the internal thoughts of Job as he conducts his affairs. Similarly, Job's nocturnal

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[96] Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 41. In this position, he is followed by Schmidt Goering, "Sapiential Synesthesia." To be fair, Carasik is operating with a different conception of metaphor than the one presumed in this study. Thus, the imperative of ראה is metaphorical because it can refer to "an invitation to be aware of an intangible situation" (41), while שמע is not because it always is connected to physical hearing. If, however, one recognizes the intimate connection between the physical and abstract dimensions of conceptual metaphor, the sharp distinction between "literal" and "metaphorical" presumed by Carasik breaks down.

[97] Carasik discusses speech's role in Israelite epistemology, in his third chapter, "The Creative Mind: Verbal Thought" (*Theologies of the Mind*, 93–104).

[98] Literally: "bless" (ברך). According to Habel, the use of the term ברך here is a "deliberate literary technique to heighten the radical nature of this unmentionable sin by employing an antonym to describe it." On the other hand, it could, as some commentators suggest, be a euphemism inserted by ancient scribes to "soften" the language of the text. Habel, *The Book of Job*, 88.

[99] This statement occurs in the narrative portion of Job, before his friends arrive.

musings, although they could theoretically be directed at his wife, do not specify a listener and probably refer to his own internal dialogue (Job 7:4). Elihu's comment in Job 32:7 certainly refers to internal speech, since in the previous verse he states that he was afraid to declare his opinion to Job (see also 7:13, 9:27, 24:15, 29:18; Prov: 5:12; Qoh 7:23; etc.).

While אמר by itself can indicate thought, according to Carasik, "when a biblical writer wishes to reveal the contents of someone's thought, it [typically] requires the combination of a verb of saying with some form of the word לב."[100] Thus, the לב speaks:

Prov 15:28	The heart (לב) of the righteous *utters* (יהגה) to *answer* (לענות), but the mouth of the wicked pours out evil.
Prov 23:33	Your heart (לב) will *speak* (ולבך ידבר) perversities.

As in the Jobian passages above, these Proverbial passages indicate cognitive speech, not concrete speech. In Prov 15:28, for instance, the heart of the righteous הגה ("utters under one's breath"). While הגה could imply an intelligible sound, here it probably refers to an internal activity, a uttering of the לב to itself (see also Prov 24:2).[101] Unlike the wicked, who are quick with their words, the righteous deliberately *consider* how they should answer. Similarly, when the heart "speaks" (דבר) in Prov 23:33, it *thinks* perversities. In such cases, the לב is the speaker of the discourse and functions as a metonymy for the person as a whole. Elsewhere, however, the לב is

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[100] Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 93. Carasik, in fact, uses a variety of indicators to determine when a verb of speech refers to concrete speech and when it refers to thought: 1) the presence of an interlocutor/listener indicates concrete action; the absence indicates thought; 2) speech within speech indicates thought; 3) the use of introductory particles (e.g., כי, הנה, אשר, פן) often indicates thought; 4) when all else fails, context often provides the indication of whether thought or physical action is implied (100). For instance, by such criteria, Carasik identifies about 350 occurrences of אמר (of the 5298 in the Hebrew Bible) as mental functions. Those in wisdom literature include: Job 1:5; 7:4, 13; 9:27; 22:29; 24:15; 29:18; 31:24; 32:7, 13; 38:11; Prov: 5:12; 20:9, 22; 24:29; 28:24; 30:9, 20; Qoh: 1:16; 2:1, 2, 15; 3:17,18; 6:3; 7:10, 23; 8:14, 17; 9:16; 12:1. See Michael Carasik, "Theologies of the Mind in Biblical Israel" (Ph.D. diss., Brandies University, 1996)120 n. 41 for Carasik's complete list. According to Carasik, however, the clearest indicator of cognitive speech is often the organ that performs the speech act. When the verb occurs with a physical organ (mouth, lips, etc.), it refers to physical action; when it occurs with לב, it indicates thought (94–96). This is especially true of verbal passages without אמר (i.e., with דבר, הגה, שיח, etc.). Carasik admits, however, that such a control is not always present or accurate. For instance, of the 350 occurrences of אמר that indicate cognitive functions, only 34 include the presence of the לב (102).

[101] Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 94. For physical "uttering" in Wisdom literature, see also Job 27:4, 37:2, and Prov 8:7, although the last could possibly refer to thought as well (95).

the one who hears the cognitive discourse:

Qoh 1:16 I *spoke* (דברתי), I with my heart (אני עם־לבי), *saying* (לאמר), "Indeed, I have grown great and added wisdom…"

Qoh 2:1 I *said* (אמרתי), I in my heart (אני בלבי), "Let us go; let us test joy…"

Here, the Teacher is conceptualized as a bifurcated entity, made up of a core Essence ("that which makes [him] unique," his "I") and a separate Self (a לב, a rational center).[102] This Self is conceptualized as a person, capable of hearing audible discourse (THE SELF IS A PERSON). When the Teacher thinks, his Essence speaks to his Self, giving it information about the world that it cannot directly access. Thus, the Teacher describes thought as a conversation "with" (עם) or "in" (ב־) his לב (Qoh 1:16, 2:1; see also 2:15a). These passages, then, reflect a simple compound metaphor in which the THINKING IS SPEAKING metaphor has combined with the conceptualization of THE SELF IS A PERSON to convey the idea that THINKING IS SPEAKING TO ONE'S SELF.

With or without לב, a verb indicating cognitive speech is frequently followed by the content of that speech, mostly commonly in the form of a direct quotation.[103] Thus, Qoh 1:16, 2:1, Job 1:5, 7:4, and Prov 23:33[104] are each followed by a direct recitation of the words that the individual thinks. For instance, Job *thinks*, "perhaps my sons have sinned" (Job 1:5), and the Teacher *thinks*, "I have grown great and added wisdom" (Qoh 1:16). The nominal forms of אמר,

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[102] As Lakoff and Johnson (*Philosophy in the Flesh*, 267–89) argue, this bifurcation is a common cross-cultural conception for the human individual. According to this conceptualization, the individual consists of a basic Subject—"that aspect of a person that is the experiencing consciousness and locus of reason, will, and judgment" (269)—and various Selves (a moral self, a physical self, a social self, etc.). The Essence of the individual (that which "makes you unique, that make you *you,*" 282) is part of the Subject. The Subject and Selves of an individual relate to another as one person would relate to another, as in this case, through speech. According to Lakoff and Johnson, the Subject/Essence takes the dominate position in this metaphor, controlling its various Selves. For more information, see also Kathleen Ahrens, "Conceptual Metaphors of the 'Self,'" *HPKU Papers in Applied Language Studies* 12 (2008): 47–67.

[103] Exceptions to this general trend include Prov 15:28, where cognitive speech is clearly implied, but the content is not recorded, probably because the point of the proverb is to indicate that the wise person considers his or her words before speaking them. See also the use of שיח (discussed below) and Qoh 8:17, where individuals are discredited who "claim to know wisdom (אם־יאמר החכם לדעת)." Qoh 3:18 introduces the content of the Teacher's thought process with the particle ש־, but this verse may be more illustrative of the CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING metaphor (see below) than THINKING IS SPEAKING.

[104] Prov 23:33 is initially followed by the noun תהפכות ("perversities"), but the content of these perversities is recorded two verses later in Prov 23:35.

דבר, and or מלין themselves seem to be reserved for cases where a sound is directed externally to another person; however, the content of cognition is clearly conceived of as words produced in a sequential order, one thought after another (IDEAS ARE WORDS). Such words can stay within the individual, with only the heart listening (e.g., Prov 23:33; Qoh 2:1, 1:16), or they can be externalized (i.e., one can "think out loud"), and it is not always clear which is intended. Thus, Job 1:5 and 7:4 could each refer to Job's internal dialogue, or they could reflect his vocalized thoughts. The same ambiguity is also present with the noun שיח, with which it is not always clear if the "complaint" or "musing" of the individual occurs audibly or silently (see Job 7:11, 13; 9:27; 23:2; Prov 23:29).[105] As Carasik states, "unless a specific point is to be made, it is left indeterminate whether this speech was audible or internal," that is, the Hebrew lacked "interest in the rigorous separation of the two categories."[106]

As with visual metaphors of cognition, such oral metaphors function by mapping the properties of speech onto the target domain of cognition. First, cognitive speech is voluntary; as with physical speech, the individual chooses of his own volition when to initiate the act of thinking (e.g., Job 1:5, 7:4) (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). It is also subjective; the לב can speak truth or falsehood (e.g., Prov 23:33, 24:2; see also Job 1:5) (<subjective $_{yes}$>). More importantly, cognitive speech is sequential and indirect (<directness $_{no}$>). Like verbal speech, cognitive speech relays information word by word, question by question, to the intended object (the thinker) that it otherwise would not have access to; that is, the word itself is a mediator of knowledge. Thus, Job reveals the reason for his actions through the sequence of his words (Job 1:5), and the heart of the righteous ponders what it is to answer through a sequence of utterances (Prov 15:28). THINKING IS SPEAKING TO ONE'S SELF preserves this metaphorical mapping. Thus, the לב itself does not know of the great wisdom of the Teacher (Qoh 1:16) or that it should test joy (Qoh 2:1), save that

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[105] Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 96–98. The clearest example of שיח as internal speech, noted by Carasik, is found in the story of Hannah, whose silent prayer is described as her שיח (1 Sam 1:10–18, esp. v. 16).

[106] Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 98.

the “I” of the Teacher tells it so.[107] Metaphors of cognitive speech also preserve the <internal $_{no}$> property of physical speaking. Although cognitive speech occurs within the individual, the activity itself is conceptualized as an external action. Thus, in THINKING IS SPEAKING, the thought is directed *out* of its point of origin (the thinker) towards an unspecified object, while in THINKING IS SPEAKING TO ONE’S SELF it is directed toward another part of the individual (the לב).

Like vision, speech can also serve as a source domain for conclusions drawn from thinking (CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING):

Job 22:29	When [others] are humiliated, then you will *say* (ותאמר), “it is pride; the lowly of eyes are saved.”
Qoh 6:3	I *said* (אמרתי), “a stillborn is better than he.”
Qoh 9:16	And I *said* (ואמרתי אני), “Wisdom is better than might…”

According to Eliphaz, if Job accepted traditional wisdom, he would *conclude* (אמר) that humiliation is the result of pride (Job 22:29). On the other hand, the Teacher’s own investigations have led him to *conclude* that it is better to be stillborn than to live a long life without enjoying it (Qoh 6:3) and that having wisdom is better than being strong (Qoh 9:3; see also 8:14, 12:1, etc.). As with THINKING IS SPEAKING, this metaphor can combine with THE SELF IS A PERSON metaphor (CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING TO ONE’S SELF):

Qoh 2:15b	I *said* (ואמרת), I in my heart (אני בלבי), this too is vanity.
Qoh 2:2	I *said* (אמרתי) concerning laughter (לשחוק), “what does it boast?”[108] and concerning gladness (לשמחה), “what does it do?”

In Qoh 2:15b, the conclusion of the Teacher’s thinking—that the wise die like the foolish, and

[107] Compare, for instance, the verbal and visual dimension of Qoh 1:16. In the first half of the verse, the Teacher informs (דבר) his heart that he has great wisdom. In the second half of the verse, the heart itself has seen (ראה) wisdom and knowledge. For an example of the sequential nature of cognitive speech, see the series of thoughts in Qoh 1–2.

[108] מהולל. Typically, this term is read as a Poal participle from הלל and is thus translated, “it is mad.” However, based on the Syriac translation and the syntactical structure of the sentence, Seow makes the convincing argument that a textual corruption has likely occurred and that the original text probably read מה הלל, “what does it boast?” This would bring the first half of the sentence into better parallel with the syntax of the latter half of the sentence, מה־זה עשה, “what does it do?” Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 126.

this is vanity—is that which he spoke “in” (ב־) his לב (see also Qoh 3:17, 18). So, too, in Qoh 2:2, where the object of the thought, the לב, is specified in the previous verse. The CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING metaphor follows the same pattern as THINKING IS SPEAKING, mapping the properties of <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, and <directness $_{no}$> onto the domain of cognition. It adds, however, an evaluative element from hearing; that is, it assumes that the individual is capable of hearing the cognitive speech and evaluating the situation based upon it (i.e., that being wise is a futile endeavor, Qoh 2:15b) (<evaluation $_{yes}$>).

Even when not spoken to one’s Self, a person’s knowledge, theological position, or general outlook on life is frequently conceptualized as his or her word (KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD):

Job 32:10 Therefore, I say (אמרתי), “Listen (שמעה) to me, I too will *declare* (אחוה) my *knowledge* (דעי).

Job 32:11 Indeed, I waited for your *words* (לדבריכם); I *gave ear* (אזין) to your *understanding* (תבונויכם) while you searched out *words* (מלין).

On the one hand, such passages hardly seem metaphorical. It seems perfectly natural to say that Elihu can “declare” (אהוה) his דעת (Job 32:10; see also Job 32:6, 17) or “give ear to” (אזין) Job’s תבונה (Job 32:11). Yet, such expressions are not physical realities; rather, they rely upon a metaphorical conception of the spoken word. Physically, when people speak, they only emit a sound, a קול. Conceptually, however, people understand this קול to have meaning, because the spoken word is understood to convey the verbal thoughts of an individual (IDEAS ARE WORDS). Thus, Elihu’s perspective is contained within the words that he “utters” (חוה, Job 32:10), while Job’s opinion is preserved in the words that Elihu “hears” (אזן, Job 32:11). The pervasiveness of such passages and the easy slippage between abstract cognitive terms and oral terms attest to how deeply ingrained this metaphor is in Israelite conceptual system. In any given passage, cognitive terms and oral terms are practically interchangeable. Consider:

Prov 1:23 I will make known (אודיע) my *words* (דברי) to you.

Job 34:33 *Speak* (דבר) what you know (מה־ידעת)!

Proverbs 1:23 could just as easily be written, “I will make known my *knowledge* (לדעתי) to you,” and Job 34:33, “Speak your *words* (דבריכם)” (see also the parallel between דברים and תבונה in Job 32:11). Sometimes, a modifier specifically marks the speaker’s words as his knowledge (see, for instance, Prov 1:2, 19:27, 22:17, 23:12). However, even by itself, the “word” of the speaker is clearly what he or she knows (e.g., Prov 1:23, Job 32:11, 34:33).

As with cognitive speech, the depiction of knowledge as a verbal utterance functions by mapping the features of physical experience onto the abstract domain of knowledge. This verbal utterance, however, can be spoken *or* heard, such that KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD draws upon properties of both speech *and* hearing. When the focus is on the act of transmitting knowledge, the properties of speech map onto cognition. Thus, in Job 32:10, the דעת that Elihu declares is voluntarily directed outside himself toward Job (see also Job 34:33, Prov 1:23) (<internal $_{\text{no}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>). On the other hand, when the focus is on the act of receiving knowledge, the properties of hearing map. Elihu, for instance, must wait (יחל) for Job’s words of understanding to reach his ear; he cannot hear until Job has discovered what to say (Job 32:11) (<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{[sequence]}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{no}}$>, <internal $_{\text{yes}}$>).[109] In either case, however, the shared property of <directness $_{\text{no}}$> take precedence. Like other cognitive metaphors that draw on speech and hearing, these metaphors refer to knowledge that is indirectly obtained. Job, Elihu, or the student only knows the knowledge in question because he has been given it by another (Job 32:10, 32:11, 34:33, Prov 1:23).

Sapiential literature does not typically describe thought itself as an act of hearing. The לב, for instance, does not appear as the subject of an auditory verb, although it is sometimes implied (Qoh 1:16, 2:1).[110] In this regard, Carasik’s evaluation is correct; שמע does not have the same

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[109] Job 32:11 does not specifically state that the knowledge of Job enters into Elihu’s ear. However, the choice of the verb אזן here, rather than שמע, draws attention to the biological apparatus through which a word enters into the body of an individual and thus, arguably, the internal dimension of hearing (see also Prov 5:1).

[110] The only exception of note occurs outside of sapiential literature in 1 Kgs 3:9, where the לב acts as the subject of the participle שמע in order to describe Solomon’s capacity to judge wisely: “Give to your

intangible cognitive nuance as ראה does. However, this does not mean that hearing is devoid of metaphorical derivations. For instance, the frequent exhortations to "hear" (שמע) that one finds in sapiential literature (particularly in Proverbs) do not simply request a biological response, but rather exhort the listener to pay attention to or heed the speaker (PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING):[111]

Job 13:17	*Hear, hear*! (שמעו שמוע), my words (מלתי), and let my declaration be *in your ears* (באזניכם).
Job 33:31	*Heed* (הקשב), Job. *Hear me* (שמע־לי)!
Prov 7:24	And now, my child, *listen* to me (שמעו־לי); *heed* (והקשיבו) the words of my mouth (לאמרי־פי).

As elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, the use of the infinitive absolute in Job 13:17 emphasizes the act of the main verb, in this case, the act of hearing (see also Job 22:2). But here, as in Job 33:31 and Prov 7:24, the speaker is not simply asking the listener to physically hear him, although that is part of the request, but to *pay attention* to what he is about to say (see also Job 9:16, 37:14; Prov 1:8; 4:10; 5:7, 13; 8:32; 15:31; 17:4). Like שמע, the more forceful command to קשב also indicates more than a simple physical act; it carries a corresponding cognitive focus. Thus, Job is to *heed* the words of Elihu (Job 33:31; see also Job 13:6), and the student is to *heed* the words of the sage (Prov 7:24; see also Prov 2:2, 7:24). Similarly, exhortations for words to be "in your ears" (באזניכם, Job 13:17) or commands that the listener "turn the ear" (נטה אזן, Prov 4:20; 5:1, 13; 22:17; 23:12) do not only refer to a physical process but rather to the cognitive process of attending to the words of the speaker.[112] As Nili Shupak states, the ear is not "merely a passive

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servant *a heart that hears* (לב שמע) to judge your people, to discern between good and evil." Although this passage is part of the Deuteronomic History, it is noteworthy that the hearts capacity to judge is connected here to Solomon, the quintessential wisdom figure in Israelite literature. For hearing as a source domain for judgment, see below.

[111] As Avrahami notes, this metaphor also corresponds to the contextual pattern of "power to help," in that an individual (esp. God) "pays attention" to the suffering of another in order to help them. For a discussion of the metaphor in this context, see Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 131–35.

[112] Similarly, "closing the ear" (אטם אזן) in Prov 21:13 means "to not heed." The phrase "uncover

organ…[it is] an instrument for understanding and evaluating words."[113]

Because it is based on hearing, this metaphor primarily maps hearing's properties onto cognition, most notably its indirectness, sequential detection, and internal orientation (<internal $_{\text{yes}}$>, <detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{[sequence]}}$, <directness $_{\text{no}}$>). Thus, external information indirectly enters *into* the ears through a sequential acquisition of words. However, as with the JUDGING IS SEEING metaphor above, the PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING metaphor shifts an inherent property of hearing; in this case, the <voluntary> property shifts from a negative to a positive value. In physical hearing, a person cannot choose whether or not he or she hears a sound; he or she cannot actually "open" the ear. A sound either reaches the ears or not, regardless of the individual's preference (<voluntary $_{\text{no}}$>). Yet, the PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING metaphor presumes a choice on the part of the listener. The student can choose not to heed the words of his teacher and must therefore be commanded to pay attention (<voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>). The reason for this shift probably lies in the biological nature of hearing itself. Like sight, hearing has the capacity to focus on one particular sound amongst a host of stimuli, although it does so with much greater difficulty than vision.[114] While this capacity does not seem to factor into the Israelite conception of hearing to any great extent, it does help account for its reappearance in the metaphorical extensions of hearing here. The student can choose whether or not to listen to the sage, and although Proverbs presents this choice as a foregone conclusion, it is this choice on the part of the student that determines his ability to acquire wisdom.

A person who gives the proper attention to a word acknowledges its validity and accepts

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the ear" (גלה אזן) in Job 36:10, 15 also seems to carry metaphorical undertones, meaning not simply to speak to (as in Job 33:16) but "to cause someone to heed." However, unlike the "turning of the ear," which is likely based on physical reality (one can turn the head and thus the ear toward a sound), the description of cognitive attention as an "uncovering" or "closing" of the ear cannot derive from physical reality (the ear cannot be "uncovered" or "closed"). Rather, these phrases are probably based on an analogy to the physical opening and closing of the eye (Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 72–73). They thus reflect a more complex metaphorical process than the metaphors discussed here.

[113] Shupak, *Where Can Wisdom be Found?* 278.

[114] That is, through hearing, one cannot choose whether or not to receive a sound, but he or she can choose to focus one particular sound among many that reaches his or her ears. Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 38–39.

it as true; that is, he understands and knows it.[115] Hearing thus becomes a source domain for understanding, such that a person who *hears* knowledge *knows* it (UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING):

Prov 4:1	*Be attentive* (והקשיו) to know insight.
Job 5:27	Thus it is; *hear* it (שמענה) and know it for yourself.
Job 13:1	Indeed, all of this my eye has seen, *my ear has heard* (שמעה אזני) and understood it.

While PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING inherently contains the concept that hearing leads to understanding, UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING draws this out more explicitly. Thus, in Job 5:27, the imperative of שמע is equivalent to that of ידע, while in Prov 4:1 קשב is. In Job 13:1, both eye (עין) and ear (אזן) are used to indicate the cognitive perception of the matters being debated, with the ear in particular paralleling understanding (בינה), not merely as a prerequisite to it but as its functional equivalent (see also Job 23:5, 26:14, 36:12, 37:14).[116] As Carasik points out, שמע and ידע are rarely linked, a notable fact when compared to the prolific equation of ראה and ידע.[117] Yet, this scarcity should not suggest that hearing is only superficially connected to cognition.[118] Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, auditory terms and terms of knowing commonly appear in conjunction with one another, mostly notably שמע with בין (e.g., Gen 42:23; Deut 4:6; 1 Kgs 3:9, 3:11; Neh 8:2; see also Isa 6:9, 10, 52:15; Dan 12:8).[119] In such cases, hearing does not simply

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[115] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 194. For a discussion of the legal ramifications of שמע, see 194–97.

[116] G. Johannes Botterwick ("יָדַע, דַּעַת, דֵּעַ, דֵּעָה, מוֹדָע, מֹדַעַת, מַדָּע, מַנְדָּע," *TDOT 5:* 448–81 [462]) argues that "in such parallelisms, *yāḏa'* can function as the superior term, summarizing the sensory perception and processing it intellectually"; that is, first one hears and then one knows. Yet, as he goes on to argue, this combination (as well as the combination of ידע and ראה) "do not always point to a deliberate distinction between sensory and intellectual apperception; more generally, the totality of human knowledge is addressed." I would argue that this latter statement is generally the case, at least in Wisdom literature. Avrahami (*The Senses of Scripture*, 158) argues a similar point, stating that both "sight and hearing express knowing and learning when they are not parallel to the heart/mind."

[117] For examples of the pairing of שמע and ידע, Carasik (*Theologies of the Mind*, 39–40) lists Deut 9:2, 29:3, 31:13; Num 24:16; Ps 78:3; Job 5:27; Isa 40:21, 28; 41:22, 26; 48:6–8; 50:4; Jer 6:18. To these, I might add: Gen 42:23; Exod 3:7; Isa 33:13; Jer 5:15; Mic 3:1; Ps 81:5[6]. For ראה and ידע, see note 64 above.

[118] Carasik (*Theologies of the Mind*, 40) states that it indicates that שמע means "'understanding' only in a specific and limited sense: comprehending verbal information."

[119] See also בין+אזן in Ps 5:2. קשב only appears with ידע in Prov 4:1; it does not appear with בין. As

refer to a physical action, even if it is closely tied to it, but also to cognitive comprehension. As Ibarretxe-Antuñano states, “when we use hearing verbs in these situations, we are not simply saying that we heard somebody saying something, we imply that we ‘know’ something, and that the information that we have is second hand—although the informant does not necessarily have to be mentioned.”[120] Thus, like other oral or auditory metaphors, UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING is principally governed by hearing’s <directness $_{no}$> property, such that the nominal form of שמע can even refer simply to second-hand information, a “report” (e.g., Job 28:22). Like PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING, however, it also witnesses a shift in the <voluntary> property from a negative value to a positive one; one can choose to hear and thus understand a concept.

Given that a speaker often expects a particular response from the individual, hearing also comes to indicate obedience (OBEYING IS HEARING):[121]

Prov 5:7–8	And now, my child, *listen* (שמע) to me…keep your way far from her; do not approach the door of her house.
Job 3:18	The prisoners are at ease together; they do not *hear* (שמעו) the voice of the one who confines them. The small and the great are there, and servants are free from their lords.

In such cases, one not only pays attention to the speaker’s word but cognitively assents to it and acts upon its advice. Thus, the prisoners of Job 3:18 are normally expected to *obey* (שמע) their taskmaster, but in death they, like servants, are free from such expectations. Similarly, the sage of Prov 5:7–8 commands his student to *obey* (שמע) his word and not enter into the house of the

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Malul notes (*Knowledge, Control, Sex*, 145), hearing, speech, and cognitive terms (שמע, דברים, לשין, ידע, בין) are interchangeable when referring to the comprehension of languages (e.g., Gen 11:7; Deut 28:49; Jer 5:15; Isa 33:19; Ezek 3:6). Malul (145, 196) also points to the phrase לשמע הטוב והרע (“to hear good and bad”) in 2 Sam 14:17, which functions like the phrase לדעת טוב ורע (“to know good and bad,” Gen 3:22; see also 2:9, 17; 3:5; 2 Sam 19:36; etc.). Note: Carasik (*Theologies of the Mind*, 40) argues that the use of בין with שמע is more common than that of ידע with שמע, but by my reading, the evidence from the Hebrew Bible does not suggest a great difference statistically between the two.

[120] Ibarretxe-Antuñano, “Mind As Body,” 102.

[121] Thus, Ibarretxe-Antuñano (“Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs,” 65) argues that OBEYING IS HEARING metaphor is, in many respects, an extension or specialized form of the PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING metaphor.

strange woman.[122] Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, it is God's voice that the individual or community heeds and acts upon (Exod 19:5, 24:7; Judg 2:20; Jer 11: 3, 6; etc.);[123] in Proverbs, however, it is the sage's voice that the listener is directed to obey. The frequent appeals to "hear" in Proverbs (e.g., Prov 1:8, 4:10, 5:13, 7:24, 15:31, 17:4) also implicitly carry this connotation. The student should not only heed the words of his teacher; he should behave as his teacher prescribes. Like the PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING metaphor, OBEYING IS HEARING is governed by hearing's properties of<internal $_{\text{yes}}$>, <detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{[sequence]}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, <directness $_{\text{no}}$>. It also relies, however, upon the notion that hearing is capable of affecting its listener (<effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{PR}\rightarrow\text{P}}$). The words of the sage are intended to elicit a response in the individual, a corresponding action or the adoption of a particular worldview.

In brief, while Carasik is certainly correct to note that hearing is not used to refer to the internal dimensions of thought, hearing is not devoid of abstract metaphorical extensions. As the above survey indicates, together, oral and auditory metaphors for cognition are as prolific as visual metaphors and exhibit a wide range of nuances.

Emotion Metaphors

While hearing and speaking can affect the participants (e.g., Prov 15:30, 23:16; Job 7:11, 16:6, 32:20), hearing and speaking do not seem to serve as source domains for emotional experience itself in sapiential literature.[124] For instance, unlike the phrase to "see good" (ראה טוב[ה]), the phrase to "hear good" or to "hear bad" does not indicate satisfaction, enjoyment, or lack thereof. Similarly, a "good" or "bad" דבר may elicit an emotional state in an individual (Prov 12:25; 15:1, 23; Qoh 8:5), but it does not itself refer to that emotional experience. Rather, it

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[122] For more on the metaphor of the Strange Woman, see Chapter 5 below.

[123] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 194; Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 13.

[124] See Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 165–166 for the connection between hearing/speaking and the emotions throughout the Hebrew Bible. Although not framed in terms of conceptual metaphor, Avrahami's conclusions would seem to argue in favor of hearing/speaking as source domains for emotions. She states, for instance, "just as listening to a song (2 Sam 19:36), speech (Prov 23:16), or good tidings (Prov 15:30) denotes enjoyment and happiness, so evil tidings denote sadness and pain" (166; see her example of Hab 3:16). However, from my reading, unlike visual phrases, which do appear as the equivalent of emotional experience, hearing and speaking only cause emotional states; they do not stand in for them.

indicates the “eloquence” of the speaker or the “morality” of its content.[125]

Judgment Metaphors

Elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, speaking and hearing can be used to signify the act of judgment (e.g., Solomon asks for a לב שמע, a “heart that hears,” 1 Kgs 3:9; the king וידברו אתו משפט, “speaks judgment” 2 Kgs 25:6; see also Jer 1:16, 4:12, 39:5, 52:9),[126] which suggests that the metaphor may have been familiar to scribal circles as well, although the nuance itself is not prevalent in Proverbs, Job, and Qohelet. However, the results of judgment—specifically, conclusions about the moral character of an individual or situation—are described in terms of oral experience (MORAL QUALITIES ARE WORDS). For instance, as already seen above, perversity is something that can be spoken:

Prov 23:33 Your heart (לב) will *speak* (ולבך ידבר) perversities.

Similarly:

Prov 8:6 *Hear* (שמעו), for I will *speak* (אדבר) candid things[127] and *from the opening of my lips* (ומפתח שפתי) will be straightness.

Job 13:7 Will you *speak* (תדברו) falsehood to God or *speak* (תדברו) deceit to him?

As Avrahami states, “falsehood and truth are presented as verbal entities.”[128] Thus, truth is spoken (Prov 8:6; see also Qoh 12:10), as is falsehood and deceit (Job 13:7; see also Job 27:4), perversity (Prov 23:33; see also Prov 2:12, 24:2), and righteousness (Prov 8:6; see also Prov 16:13, 23:16). Although such qualities could theoretically be heard (Prov 8:6 commands as much), the focus of these passages is on the *spoken* aspect of these qualities. As such, speech’s properties dominate the mapping. Moral qualities are conceptualized as words that indirectly convey information to an external object (<internal $_{no}$>, <directness $_{no}$>). More importantly, the

[125] See, for instance, Shupak (*Where Can Wisdom be Found?* 332–33), who notes the דבר טוב “denotes the eloquent speech of the sage and the poet” or its “moral perfection.”

[126] W.H. Schmidt, “דָּבַר, דָּבָר,” *TDOT* 3: 84–125 (98); Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*, 38–39.

[127] So Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 263, 269. According to Fox, נגידים means “honest or forthright things, things that are directly before (*neged*) a person” (269).

[128] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 173.

speaker can choose when to speak and what to speak, a choice that reflects both the voluntary nature of the act and the speaker's influence over it (<voluntary $_{yes}$>, <subjective $_{yes}$>). However, it also presumes that the listener will be able to judge the value of what is spoken, its truth or falsity; as such, it adopts hearing's evaluative property (<evaluation $_{yes}$>).

Summary

In summation, there are various metaphors of cognition in sapiential circles derived from oral/auditory domain of human experience, some of which derive directly from the experience of speaking, others from hearing, and others from a combination of the two. As with visual metaphors, each of these maps the properties of their respective modalities onto the target domain of cognition:

Hearing/Speaking	<selected properties>
THINKING IS SPEAKING	<internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{no}$>, <subjective $_{yes}$>
THINKING IS SPEAKING TO ONE'S SELF	<internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{no}$>, <subjective $_{yes}$>
CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING	<internal $_{no}$> , <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{no}$>, <evaluation $_{yes}$>
CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING TO ONE'S SELF	<internal $_{no}$> , <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{no}$>, <evaluation $_{yes}$>
KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD	<directness $_{no}$> + <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$> or <detection $_{yes}$> ^{sequence}, <voluntary $_{no}$>, <internal $_{yes}$>
PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING	<internal $_{yes}$>,<detection $_{yes}$> ^{sequence}, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{no}$>
UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING	<voluntary $_{yes}$>,<directness $_{no}$>
OBEYING IS HEARING	<internal $_{yes}$>,<detection $_{yes}$> ^{sequence}, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{no}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$
MORAL QUALITIES ARE WORDS	<internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{no}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>, <evaluation $_{yes}$>

Table 5: Metaphorical Mappings: COGNITION IS HEARING/SPEAKING

As with sight, the specific metaphors vary depending upon which properties map. Thus, THINKING IS SPEAKING is a subjective enterprise while CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING is evaluative. Yet, there is also a good deal of continuity across these metaphors, with the same properties consistently mapping onto cognition: a concern for cognition's voluntary nature, the sequential

nature of the detection or revelation, and its indirectness. These last two properties are especially important. Unlike sight, hearing and speaking provide an indirect, sequential engagement with the environment, and this translates into a conception of knowledge that is similarly indirect and sequential.

COGNITION IS TOUCHING

To include a section on tactility in a discussion of Israelite epistemology may strike some readers as odd. As Constance Classen notes, "the sense of touch, like the body in general, has been positioned in opposition to the intellect and assumed to be merely the subject of mindless pleasures and pains."[129] Yet, touch is as fundamental to universal conceptions of knowledge as sight and sound are. Like vision, orality, and audition**,** tactility provides individuals an important means of engaging their environment and serves as a natural source domain for how people conceptualize cognition.[130] As with other perception-based metaphors, conceptual metaphors based on tactility reflect a distinct conception of knowledge, one in which knowledge is conceived of as a direct, manipulable experience.

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[129] Constance Classen, "Fingerprints: Writing about Touch," in *The Book of Touch* (ed. Constance Classen; Oxford: Berg, 2005), 1–9 (5). For instance, until recently, antiquity studies have ignored touch and the other "lower senses" (taste, smell), preferring to focus instead on the opposition between hearing and seeing. See, for instance, Chidester, *Word and Light*; Carasik, *Theologies of the Mind*; George W. Savran, "Seeing is Believing: On the Relative Priority of Visual and Verbal Perception of the Divine," *BI* 17 (2009): 320–61. Exceptions to this tendency include Susan Ashbrook Harvey, *Scenting Salvation: Ancient Christianity and the Olfactory Imagination* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006) and D. Green, *The Aroma of Righteousness: Scent and Seduction in Rabbinic Life and Literature* (University Park, Penn: Penn State University Press, 2011).

[130] Taste could be considered part of the tactile domain. As A.D. Smith states, "we can taste *objects* in our mouths…only because we *feel* them there." A.D. Smith, "Taste, Temperatures, and Pains," in *The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives* (ed. Fiona Macpherson; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 341–54 (343). Indeed, the Hebrew Bible even occasionally refers to the act of eating as an act of touching. "My appetite (נפשׁ) refuses to *touch* (לנגוע) them; my food is like a disease" (Job 6:7; see also Lev 7:21). However, although taste is closely related to touch, I would argue in favor of preserving ingestion's relative autonomy. As shall be discussed below, it has different properties associated with it, relies on different processes for its acquisition of knowledge, and is generally distinguished as a separate modality across cultures. Moreover, although there is some overlap between the semantic realms of touch and taste in the Hebrew Bible, tactile terms (e.g., נגע, לקח, אחז) are not generally interchangeable with ingestive terms (e.g., אכל., שתה, טעם), suggesting that they are conceptualized as separate modalities. Thus, I will discuss taste below as a separate category.

Typology of Touch

Key Terms: שים, נתן, חזיק, תפש, תמך, אחז, לקח, מוש/משש, נגע, כף, יד

Tactility is a difficult modality to analyze. Although we often associate it with the hand, touch is not limited to any one part of the body; it can be experienced by the hand, the head, the arm, the foot, and the skin more generally.[131] Moreover, tactility is associated with a range of complex functions, from grasping, kissing, and simply coming into contact with an object to assessing temperature and evaluating pressure.[132] For the purposes of understanding cognitive metaphors in Wisdom literature, however, two types of actions are particularly relevant: the generic act of touching (frequently represented by the verb נגע, “touch”; see also מוש/משש, “feel”) and specific acts of object manipulation (לקח, “to take”; אחז, “to seize, hold”; תמך, “to grasp”; תפש, “to seize”; חזיק, “grip strongly”[133]; נתן, “to give”; and שים, “to put, place”). While both types of actions are commonly associated with the hand (the יד or כף; Gen 3:22; Exod 19:13; 1 Sam 6:9; Ps 115:7; etc.), they can also be experienced by any part of the body (e.g., the רגלים, “feet,” Exod 4:25; the ירך, “thigh,” Gen 32:25; the עבק, “heel,” Gen 25:26; Job 18:9; and the ראש, “head,” Gen 28:11, 18; 48:17; 2 Sam 18:9).

Regardless of the apparati used, touch is a direct modality. Like sight, touch requires a direct connection between the perceiver and the object perceived (<directness $_{yes}$>).[134] Thus, when describing his angelic vision, Isaiah appeals to touch (the seraph ויגע על־פי, “touched me upon the

[131] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 127.
[132] Jonas, “The Nobility of Sight,” 140.
[133] Although the meaning of the *hiphil* itself is derivative from חזק, which in the Qal means “to be strong,” the hiphil clearly refers to the concrete experience of “grip strongly” with the hand (see, for instance, 2 Sam 15:5, where הזיק is parallel to שלח את־ידו, “sending forth the hand”).
[134] Like vision and hearing, the exact mechanisms of touch were debated by ancient philosophers. Aristotle’s *De Anima* 422b11–423b15 (ca. 350 B.C.E.), for instance, contains a lengthy discussion of the indeterminate nature of touch, that is, a debate concerning what part of the body touch was located in and how it conveyed its perception. Similarly discussions of the “non-localization” of touch can be found in theories of Plato (ca. 427–347 B.C.E.), the Hippocratics (ca. 400 B.C.E.), and Cleidemus (ca. mid-4th cent. B.C.E.). However, it was commonly assumed (including by Aristotle) that touch was a direct modality, requiring the perceiver to come into physical contact with the object perceived. For more information, see Richard Sorabji, “Aristotle on Demarcating the Five Senses,” in *The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives* (ed. Fiona Macpherson; New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 64–82 (78–79).

mouth," with a coal) to indicate that he has personally experienced the cleansing power of God (Isa 6:7; see also 1 Kgs 19:5, 7; Jer 1:9). Similarly, Jacob experiences God directly when he "wrestles" (אבק) a divine man by the side of a wadi at night (Gen 32:22–32).[135] Even more so than sight, however, touch involves actual contact between the perceiver and the object perceived (<contact $_{yes}$>). The perceiver physically connects with another individual (Gen 32:22–32; Exod 19:13; Lev 12:4, 15:7; Num 19:11; etc.), the carcass of animal (Lev 11:24, 27, 31, etc.), or an object (Isa 6:7; Exod 7:9, 15; 9:10; 39:12; Lev 15:21–23, etc.).[136] Touch, therefore, requires the perceiver and its object to be in close proximity to one another (<closeness $_{yes}$>). Abraham must "approach" (הלך) the ram that is caught in a bush in order to "seize" (לקח) it (Gen 32:13; see also 1 Kgs 1:50, 2:28; Est 5:2). Touch does not, however, require the object to enter into the body. Although the hand can serve as a temporary container for an object (ביד, e.g., Gen 38:18, 39:13; 1 Sam 14:43; בכף, e.g., Exod 4:4; 2 Sam 18:14), the object itself remains outside the body, and the perceiver's attention is directed towards elements outside him- or herself (<internal $_{no}$>).

Like other modalities, touch is capable of detecting and identifying objects within the environment (<detection $_{yes}$>, <identification $_{yes}$>), although this dimension of touch is underrepresented in the Hebrew Bible. In fact, it only seems to surface when sight is unable to

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[135] The meaning of אבק is uncertain; the verb only occurs within these two verses and likely originated as a word play on wadi Jabbok (יבק) and Jacob (יעקב). Yet, given the other actions in this section, a possible connection with the root חבק ("to embrace"), and the earlier brotherly contest in Gen 25:19–26, אבק probably refers to a physical, tactile experience between the two characters, somewhat akin to the modern idea of wrestling. For the connection of אבק and חבק, see Gordan Wenham, *Genesis 16–50* (WBC 2; Dallas, Tex.: Word Books, 1994), 295. Alternatively, since אבק elsewhere has the connotation of "dust," the verb might carry the connotation of "wrestling in the dust." Allen Ross, "Studies in the Life of Jacob, Pt 2: Jacob at the Jabbok, Israel at Peniel," *Bibliotheca Sacra* 142 (1985): 338–54 (344). Interestingly, the end of the narrative recasts this episode as a visual encounter. In v. 31, Jacob articulates and understands his experience, not as having "touched" the body of God, but as having "seen God face-to-face" (כי־ראיתי אלהים פנים אל־פנים).

[136] Touch can also occur through the use of a mediating object, such as when an angel of God "touches" (נגע) meat and bread with a staff (Judg 6:21). In such cases, touch (like hearing or speech) has an indirect component to it in that the perceiver (e.g., the angel) indirectly experiences an object (e.g., meat and bread). Unlike hearing or speech, however, this indirect perception is the result of two separate perceptual acts: (1) the perceiver (e.g., the angel) touches an object (e.g., a staff), and (2) an object (e.g., a staff) touches another object (e.g., meat and bread). It is only when these two separate tactile acts are combined that an indirect experience arises. The two primary acts of perception, however, remain experiences of direct contact (between, for instance, the angel-staff and the staff-meat/bread). As such, <direct $_{yes}$> and <contact $_{yes}$> are the default properties for touch.

adequately assess the situation, for instance, in the middle of the night (e.g., Gen 32:22–32; Deut 28:29) or after an individual has become blind (e.g., Gen 27:21–30).[137] Modern theorists have demonstrated, however, that touch is capable of identifying the same core characteristics of an object as sight—namely, its size (e.g., big, small), its dimensions (e.g., where the edge of an object is), and its relative orientation (e.g., vertical, horizontal, left or right of the perceiver)—a capacity hinted at in a few biblical passages (see, for instance, the story of Jacob's blessing below).[138] More importantly for the Hebrew Bible, touch can also identify the "material properties" of an object (e.g., weight, texture, temperature),[139] and it is this felt quality in particular that can be found hovering below the surface of many biblical passages. Thus, Gen 27 specifically connects touch to its ability to determine the relative smoothness (חלק) or hairiness (שעיר) of an individual (see vv. 11–12, 23), while other passages simply label objects as "smooth" (e.g., חלק, 1 Sam 17:40; Ps 55:22; Prov 5:3; Isa 57:6), "soft" (e.g., רכך, Ps 55:22; Isa 1:6), "sharp" (e.g., חד, Job 41:30; Ps 57:4; Prov 5:4; מלטש, Ps 52:4; etc.), "heavy" (e.g., כבד, Prov 27:3), "cold" (e.g., צנה, Prov 25:12), and so forth.[140]

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[137] One might also consider the odd tactile experience of Zipporah, which occurs at night (Exod 4:24–25).

[138] For a modern discussion of tactile manipulation and its capacity to identify, see Roberta Klatzky and Roberta Lederman, "The Haptic Identification of Everyday Life Objects," in *Touching for Knowing: Cognitive Psychology of Haptic Manual Perception* (ed. Yvette Hatwell; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2003), 105–22, as well as the other articles in that edited volume. According to Ibarretxe-Antuñano ("Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 146), touch also has the capacity to recognize the boundaries between the perceiver and the object perceived, such that when the perceiver touches an object, it invades its space (<limits $_{\text{yes}}$>). It is unclear, however, if this property was associated with touch in the Hebrew Bible. Similarly, modern theorists such as Klatzky and Lederman ("Haptic Identification," 112–13) note that touch is capable of determining the relative location of an object vis-à-vis the perceiver, though not as precisely or as quickly as sight (so <location $_{\text{yes}}$>). Ibarretxe-Antuñano ("Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 146) disagrees, assigning this property only to vision and audition. While, from a modern standpoint, the former position seems closer to the way touch interacts with the environment (at least in its haptic capacity), it is again unclear what value the Israelites would have assigned to the modality.

[139] According to Klatzky and Lederman ("Haptic Identification," 117), it is this dimension of touch that is the defining feature of haptic identification. "Haptic object identification cannot rely virtually entirely on information about the spatial layout of edges….because spatial information is extracted coarsely and slowly by means of touch. Material information [is] suggested as a potential supplement, if not alternative, to information about spatial layout, and material properties [are] shown to be more available than spatially coded properties under haptic exploration."

[140] In many of these passages, a physical object (curd, oil, path, etc.) is physically described as חלק, רכך, or חדוד in order to form the basis for the metaphorical extension in which words are conceived of as

Unlike sight, however, the scope of touch is limited to its "zone of contact" with the object perceived.[141] A single touch gives only a partial impression of an object, that the tip of an arrow is "sharpened" (e.g., Ps 45:5, 120:4; Isa 5:28) or that the hand of an individual is "hairy" (שעיר, e.g., Gen 48:17). It takes the additive experience of multiple touching sensations to construct a complete impression of an object.[142] Thus, Laban must "feel" (משש) the entirety of Rachel's tent in order to determine if his stolen *Teraphim* are in it (Gen 31:34, 37), and an individual must "grope" (משש) in the dark in order to determine how they should go (e.g., Deut 28:29). Like hearing and speaking, then, touch acquires its information in successive stages and is thus a sequential modality.

It is not, however, a temporal modality. Touch can engage the constituent parts of its object in any order and then arrange that information into a static spatial presentation of its object.[143] Thus, Laban acquires a full impression of the interior of Rachel's tent by combining his multiple tactile sensations of it. Even if only a single touch occurs, the individual can extrapolate, based on memory, what the rest of the object feels like. The blind Isaac, for instance, "feels" (משש) only Jacob's hands, which have been covered with goat skin to make them feel like the hands of Esau, his brother (Gen 27:21–30). Isaac then extrapolates, based on that single touch and his prior knowledge of Esau, that the entire person who stands before him is Esau. In such cases, the individual does not physically experience the entire object; Isaac does not feel his son's neck, torso, or head. Rather, his or her brain fills in the gaps in perception based on the information

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smooth, soft, or sharp. For a discussion of this metaphor in Wisdom literature, see below.

[141] Yvette Hatwell, "Introduction: Touch and Cognition," in *Touching for Knowing: Cognitive Psychology of Haptic Manual Perception* (ed. Yvette Hatwell; Amsterdam: John Bengamins, 2003), 1–14 (2).

[142] Jonas, "The Nobility of Sight,"140; Klatzky and Lederman, "Haptic Identification," 2.

[143] As Hatwell ("Touch and Cognition," 2) notes, "although touch is highly sequential, it is nevertheless a spatial modality because it does not explore in a linear way and in an imposed order. In audition, the order of the sequence of stimuli cannot be changed since its carries meaning (in speech, music, etc.) By contrast, touch can explore the stimulus in any order and it can contact several times the same part of the object or set of objects…Therefore, touch provides information about the spatial properties of the environment." See, however, Klatzky and Lederman, "Haptic Identification," esp. 113, 117 (and note 139 above) for the relative spatiality of touch.

obtained from the first experience.[144] The end result, however, is the same; a static impression of the object (in Isaac's case, a person) is achieved. By way of comparison to vision and audition, Jonas calls this process a "presentation of simultaneity through sequence" (so, <detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $_{\text{[simultaneity through sequence]}}$).[145]

Yet, no matter how complete the impression constructed by touch, it is still an "elaborate synthesis of many single perceptions." Unlike sight, touch provides an impression of an object that is bound to have "blank spaces" and remain incomplete.[146] Because of this, the hypotheses that touch forms about the environment may or may not be correct (<correction of hypothesis $_{\text{yes/no}}$>).[147] Since it comes into contact with the object, touch is generally perceived of as reliable; thus both Isaac and Laban trust their hands as if it is appropriate to do so. Yet, as these examples demonstrate, touch can provide false information, misleading Laban about the status of his Teraphim or Isaac about the identity of his son. Thus, individuals often rely on other modalities to confirm the information provided by touch. Isaac, for instance, relies upon smell (וירח את־ריח בגדיו, "he smelled the smell of his garments," Gen 27:27) to confirm his impression that Esau stands before him. Correct or not, like sight or hearing, touch provides the individual with information by which to evaluate the environment (<evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>). Based on their tactile experiences, Isaac determines that it is appropriate to bless Jacob, and Laban decides to capitulate to Jacob and form a covenant with him (Gen 31:44).

More importantly, in the Hebrew Bible, touch is connected to the individual's ability to affect the environment and be affected by it. Through touch, the individual is able to physically manipulate the object perceived (<effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{OP}\rightarrow\text{P}}$). One can grab bread and water (e.g., Gen

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[144] Hatwell ("Touch and Cognition," 2), for instance, notes that haptic manipulation requires "a mental integration and synthesis in order to obtain a unified representation of the whole." See also Jonas, "The Nobility of Sight," 141.

[145] Jonas, "The Nobility of Sight," 142.

[146] Jonas, "The Nobility of Sight," 143.

[147] Contrary to Ibarretxe-Antuñano, I would argue that touch does form a hypothesis, even in modern conceptions of tactility. For Ibarretxe-Antuñano's position, see "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 153–54 and her chart summarizing the typologies of Western modalities, reproduced on page 76 above.

6:21; 18:4, 8; 21:14), animals (e.g., Gen 8:9, 22:13), jewelry and clothing (Gen 24:22, 65), plants (e.g., Gen 30:37), sharp instruments (e.g., Gen 22:10), and so forth and move them from one place to the next. One can hold onto parts of building and shake them until the structure collapses (e.g., Judg 16:3, 26–30). One can also seize people, moving them from one spot to another (e.g., Gen 19:16) or holding them stationary in order to injure them (Gen 34:2; Judg 1:6, 16:21, 20:6).[148] Touch can also cause pain, as when a person “strikes” (נכה) a slave with a staff (e.g., Exod 21:20; see also Prov 23:13–14; Isa 10:24) or inflicts some other “wound” (מכה: Deut 25:3; 1 Kgs 22:35; פצע: Gen 4:23; Exod 21:25; 1 Kgs 21:37; etc.).[149] The degree to which individuals create and experience pressure, pleasure, and pain, however, varies from person to person as do their responses to such stimuli (<subjective $_{yes}$>).[150] One blow may injure a person (Exod 21:18; Prov 23:13–14), while another might kill him or her (Exod 21:12, 20). Moreover, a person only knows the pain of their own body (e.g., Job 14:22), and while one person may cry out in pain when struck (Exod 3:7), another person may be unaffected or choose to ignore it (e.g., Jer 5:3; Job 6:10). In such cases, the degree to which a person is affected by a touch is not due to the individual’s physiology but the force with which they are struck and the character of the individual.[151] Thus, a great blow kills (Exod 21:12), while a lesser blow only maims (Exod 21:18); and arrogance keeps people from feeling the blow of God (Jer 5:3), whereas faithfulness allows Job to endure it (Job 6:10).

Moreover, because touch brings the individual into contact with the object perceived, it also allows for the transference of inherent qualities from the object to the perceiver (<effects $_{yes}$>

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[148] Most references to “taking” (לקח) a woman or “taking” (לקח) a person are not concrete actions but metaphorical extensions of the concrete action, meaning to “marry” (e.g., Gen 11:29, 16:3, 24:67) or to accompany from one geographic location to another (e.g. Gen 11:31, 12:5). Each of these depends upon the conception that PEOPLE ARE MANIPULABLE OBJECTS.

[149] God’s touch in particular is lethal, such that DISEASE IS THE TOUCH OF GOD becomes a common metaphor in the Hebrew Bible. See, for instance, Gen 12:17, where God “touches” (נָגַע) Pharaoh’s household and causes “plagues” (נֶגַע) in its (see also 2Kgs 15:5; Job 1:11, 2:5, 19:21).

[150] Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 44.

[151] Wine can, however, also dull the individual’s sensations (e.g., Prov 23:35), in which case the chemical state of the person affects the degree to which he or she experiences environmental stimuli and he or she has little influence over the act of perception.

$^{PR\rightarrow P}$). Uncleanness, for instance, can be transferred by touch (טמא, Lev 5:2, 3, 7:1, etc.) as can holiness (קדש, Exod 29:37, 30:29; Lev 6:18; etc.). Unlike sight or speech, which also affects the object perceived, touch has the potential to create a more lasting effect on its participants such that, foregoing the performance of certain rituals, the same property could be transferred to any subsequently person or object who comes in contact with the contaminated entity (e.g., Lev 15:22–23, 26–27; 22:3–6).

Touch, then, has a permanence that sight and hearing do not have, and its improper or accidental usage must therefore be guarded against. Thus, the first woman reports that God has instructed the first humans not to touch (נגע) the fruit of the tree in the middle of the garden, lest their touch result in their death (Gen 3:3; see also Exod 19:12, 13).[152] Touch is also assumed to be a voluntary modality (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). Moses can choose to "send out his hand" (וישלח ידו) and "seize" (ויחזק) a serpent by its tail (Exod 4:4; see also Gen 7:2; Deut 25:11; 1 Sam 15:27; 2 Sam 1:11; etc.), and Jael can choose to "take" (לקח) a tent peg and hammer it into Sisera's skull (Judg 4:21).[153] As this latter example illustrates, the individual can also be on the receiving end of a touch, in which case the act is not initiated by him or her (as is the case for Sisera in Judg 4:21; see also Gen 19:16, 21:18; Isa 6:7; etc.) (<voluntary $_{no}$>). Touch can also happen accidently (ונעלם ממנו, Lev 5:2–4; see also 2 Sam 18:9; <briefness $_{yes}$>),[154] and the individual must therefore be careful lest he or she involuntarily comes into contact with the object perceived. A good intention can even result in a negative effect. Uzzah touches the ark to steady it, but is killed for the action anyway (2 Sam 6:6; see also Lev 5:2–4). Regardless of intent or volition, touch affects the individual.

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[152] Gen 2:16–17, God tells the first humans that they may not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil; he says nothing about touching it, although the first woman later reports that he does in 3:3.

[153] The individual can also choose how much force to apply when moving an object and how far that object is moved, which further supports the conclusion that touch is a subjective modality.

[154] Ibarretxe-Antuñano ("Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 150) notes that with even a brief touch, one can determine the texture and temperature of an object. That the inherent properties of an object can transfer to a person without a person being aware that they touched the object suggests that briefness was also a property associated with touch in ancient Israel.

The properties of touch can thus be summarized:

<contact $_{\text{yes}}$>
<closeness $_{\text{yes}}$>
<internal $_{\text{no}}$>
<limits $_{\text{???}}$>[155]
<location $_{\text{???}}$>[155]
<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{simultaneity through sequence}}$
<identification $_{\text{yes}}$>
<voluntary $_{\text{yes/no}}$>

<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>
<effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{PR \rightarrow P}$
<correction of hypothesis $_{\text{yes/no}}$>
<subjectivity $_{\text{yes}}$>
<effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{OP \rightarrow P}$
<evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>
<briefness $_{\text{yes}}$>

COGNITION IS TOUCHING

Given that the Hebrew Bible shows little interest in tactility as a modality by which to identify items in the environment, it is not surprising that metaphors derived from tactility do not focus on <identification>. Like its physical counterpart, the only notable occurrences of this dimension of tactility among sapiential metaphors for cognition occur in complex metaphors in which sight's failure to identify objects in the environment is also a prominent feature.[156] Yet, like vision, hearing, and speech, tactility frequently serves as a source domain for cognitive experience, particularly in its capacity to manipulate the environment and experience the material properties of objects.

Knowledge Metaphors

Just as thought is conceived of as an internal dialogue or a visual observation, thinking is also conceptualized as an act of cognitive manipulation (THINKING IS MANIPULATING OBJECTS). For instance, etymological studies suggest that various Hebrew terms for cognition conceptualize thought as a process of "binding" or "twisting" ideas within oneself. The term זמם ("to think, devise"), for instance, may derive from the same root as the Arabic *zamma, zimām* ("rein") and the Modern Hebrew זמם, זְמוּם ("muzzle"), which suggests that its original meaning was "to bind."

[155] Although these properties are applicable to tactility, the values of these properties in ancient Israel remain unclear. See footnote 138.

[156] IGNORANCE IS GROPING IN THE DARK. See, for instance, Job 5:14, 12:25, in which "twisted" individuals (נפתלים) and self-aggrandizing leaders are described as "groping" (משש) in the dark. Here, the idea that UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING and UNDERSTANDING IS FEELING combine to create the metaphor IGNORANCE IS GROPING IN THE DARK. Although UNDERSTANDING IS FEELING is not attested independently, it seems to be the primary metaphor upon which this complex metaphor is based.

If so, the wisdom term זמם (e.g., Prov 30:32, 31:16) may indicate thoughts that are "bound" within the individual. Similarly, the term "חשב" ("to think," e.g., Prov 17:28) may literally mean to "bind within oneself knowledge," since its nominal form (חֵשֶׁב) indicates a decorative band that binds the priest's ephod (e.g., Exod 28:28). The term שכל ("to examine," noun: "insight, discretion") is probably related to the root שָׂכַל, which means "to over cross [the legs, hands, etc.]" (see, for instance, Gen 48:14). To speak without "שכל" (e.g., Job 17:4; 34:27, 35) may thus indicate speech that occurs without first having "crossed ideas over within oneself." [157] The same tactile connotations can be conjectured for תחבלות ("guidance, plan"). Related to the Hebrew noun חבל ("rope"), a תחבלות (e.g., Prov 1:5, 11:14, 12:5) may be a "bound" thought, a "saying that is tightly phrased, well constructed, a pithy maxim made like a series of knots and loops" that directs the behavior of the individual.[158]

Admittedly, such readings are based upon conjectured etymologies,[159] and even if they are correct, the terms may have lost some of their tactile associations by the time they were included in sapiential literature, becoming instead abstract constructs. As James Barr argued in his examination of biblical semantics, "root meaning" does not always indicate the actual semantic value of a term: "hundreds of examples could be adduced where words have come to be used in a sense widely divergent from, or even opposed to, the sense of the forms from which they were derived."[160] The English term "comprehend," for instance, derives from the Latin

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[157] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 107 n.33; 113 n. 38; see also Juda Lion Palache, *Semantic Notes on the Hebrew Lexicon* (Leiden: Brill, 1959), 26, 35. Although Malul and Palache do not go as far as to suggest a tactile definition for thought like the ones provided in the discussion above, Malul argues that these and similar etymologies clearly reflect the "sensory concrete nature of the epistemic process" of ancient Israel (107).

[158] Shupak, *Where Can Wisdom be Found?* 315–16. The definition proposed here is that provided by Shupak, with some slight modifications.

[159] The term זמם, for instance, has also been connected with the Arab. *zāmam* ("murmer, hum"), in which case it would reflect an oral connotation, rather than a tactile one. Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 107 n. 33.

[160] James Barr, *The Semantics of Biblical Language* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 107, see also his critique of specific etymologies on 108–60. Barr, in fact, argued that it is a complete "fallacy" to use etymology or word "roots" to speak about the meaning of individual words or the conceptual systems of ancient peoples more generally. Language, he argued, could not reveal *how* a people thought (33–45, 100–106). Barr's critique was directed particularly at scholars like Johannes Pedersen and

comprehendre, "to seize," but few English speakers would consider it to have a tactile orientation. In many cases, however, we find language users playing with the perceptual nuances of a term's etymology, which suggests that the metaphorical nuances of the abstract term have not been completely lost. For instance, when translating Prov 1:5 into Greek, the Septuagint renders תחבלות with κυβέρνησις:

> Prov 1:5 Let the wise hear and add learning, and those who have understanding acquire *direction* (תחבלות/κυβέρνησιν).

Such a translation not only preserves the tactile nuances of the Hebrew term but also injects a nautical connotation into the passage. Like the rope that allows a navigator to steer a boat, the proverb becomes a "tightly phrased maxim that *steers* the life of the individual" (see also Prov 11:14, 12:5). Philo makes this explicit. Like a skilled "navigator" (κυβερνήτης), he argues, the properly trained intellect "steers" (κυβερνάω) the individual through the trials of life (*Leg*. 3.80; see also *Abr.* 1.84, *Agr*. 1.69, *Det*. 1.53, *Sacr*. 1.105).[161] In such cases, the metaphor represented in the etymology is itself not "dead"; it has merely become so entrenched in the society's

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Thorleif Boman, who used etymology and the semantics of biblical Hebrew more generally to argue for the distinctive nature of Israelite thought (esp. when compared to the ancient Greeks). Johannes Pedersen, *Israel: Its Life and Culture I–IV* (trans. A. Møller and A. I. Fausbell; 2 vols.; London: Oxford University Press, 1926–1947); Boman, *Hebrew Thought Compared to the Greek*. As such, many of Barr's critiques were valid. These nineteenth and early twentieth century scholars did have the tendency to haphazardly project modern theological assumptions onto ancient languages and thus falsely assert the distinctiveness of the biblical data. Yet, linguists since Barr have consistently proven that language *is* closely linked to the cognitive systems of individuals. As discussed in Chapter 1 above, embodied experience continually influences how we conceptualize the world and how we express that conceptualization verbally. While Barr is correct in asserting that there is nothing distinctive about the way that ancient Israelites thought, the meaning of individual words does derive from the embodied experiences of the people who use them and conveys specific conceptions of the world to the people who hear or read them. As Enino Mueller states, "we have 'words'; 'we have 'concepts'; and we have 'entities in the world.'…the whole structure of human language and thought supposes that there is a relation between them, and that it is this relation that allows us to know something." Etymology, and semantics studies more generally, can help uncover these meanings when direct experience is unavailable. For more on the modern linguistic challenges to Barr, see Enio Mueller, "The Semantics of Biblical Hebrew: Some Remarks from a Cognitive Perspective," in *A Semantic Dictionary of Biblical Hebrew*, 1–18 (8–12). Cited 5 February 2012. Available on-line at http://www.sdbh.org/documentation/EnioRMueller_SemanticsBiblicalHebrew.pdf.

[161] In making this assertion, Philo is largely drawing upon the prevailing Greek philosophical concepts of his day. Yet, steeped as he was in the Jewish traditions of his community, Philo is probably also being influenced by the Septuagint's treatment of Proverbs here.

conceptual system that its usage is "so automatic as to be unconscious and effortless."[162] We must, of course, be careful when using etymology to determine the metaphorical nuances of a given term, especially in ancient contexts where the data is limited; yet, etymology can suggest possible embodied nuances behind abstract terms that may otherwise remain hidden.

At any rate, that the same tactile conceptualizations can be found elsewhere in Wisdom literature suggests that thought was frequently conceptualized as a tactile event in ancient Israel.[163] For instance, various passages convey an impression of thought as an act of "transferring" information *to* the לב (THINKING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ONE'S SELF):

Qoh 7:2 [Death] is the end of every person, and the living *give* it to heart (יתן אל־לבו)

Qoh 9:1 For I *gave* (נתתי) all of this to my heart (אל־לבי).

According to Qohelet, people should "take" it to heart (יתן אל־לבו) that death is their end (Qoh 7:2), that is, they should *consider* it, just as the Teacher *considers* (נתתי אל־לבי) the nature of human toil (Qoh 9:1). As with THINKING IS SPEAKING, these passages assume a bifurcated person, one in which the core Essence of the individual can interact with his or her component Selves, which is again conceptualized as a person (SELF IS A PERSON). Like its verbal counterpart, then, this metaphor probably results from a simple combination of its primary metaphor, THINKING IS MANIPULATING OBJECTS, and a SELF metaphor. Here, however, abstract concepts are not conceptualized as words but as objects which can be physically manipulated (IDEAS ARE MANIPULABLE OBJECTS).

Similarly, sapiential literature frequently conceptualizes thought as an act of manipulating one's Self (THINKING IS MANIPULATING ONE'S SELF):

Qoh 1:17 And I *gave my heart* (ואתנה לבי) to know wisdom and to know foolishness and folly.

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[162] Lakoff and Turner, *More Than Cool Reason*, 129.

[163] In addition to the examples that follow, see the discussion of the complex metaphors in Chapter 4, especially WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD and WISDOM IS A TREASURE.

Job 1:8 And the Lord said to the satan,[164] “have you *put your heart* (השמת לבך) upon my servant Job?”

Like THINKING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ONE’S SELF, these passages combine THINKING IS MANIPULATING OBJECTS with an assumption of a bifurcated person, a core Essence and a Self. Here, however, the Self is conceptualized not as a person but as the object itself that can be “given” or “put” to a matter (THE SELF IS AN OBJECT). Thus, the Teacher “gives” his heart (ואתנה לבי ל־) to understand wisdom and folly, that is, he *thinks* about the nature of these categories (see also Qoh 1:13; 8:9, 16). Similarly, in Job 1:8, God asks the satan if he has “put” his heart upon the behavior of Job (השמת לבך אל־), that is, if has he *considered* it (see also Job 2:3, 7:17; Prov 22:17, 24:32, 27:23). The notion that IDEAS ARE MANIPULABLE OBJECTS is thus superseded by the idea that Self is itself an object that can be manipulated in the cognitive process.

As with other perceptually-based metaphors, THINKING IS MANIPULATING OBJECTS and its compound iterations functions by mapping the properties of their concrete modality onto cognition. Like concrete tactile experience, cognition is conceptualized as an experience of direct contact between the individual (or his לב) and the matter under consideration, wisdom, the nature of human conduct, death, *et cetera* (<contact $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>). Since these concepts are considered to be objects that can be physically manipulated, these metaphors presume tactility’s ability to manipulate the environment, to move the לב or abstract concepts (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$). Cognition is also considered to be voluntary (<voluntary $_{yes}$>); the Teacher can choose whether or not to consider human toil (Qoh 9:1), and the satan can choose whether or not to consider Job’s behaviors (Job 1:8). When this metaphor combines with a SELF metaphor, tactility’s <internal $_{no}$> property is emphasized. Cognition becomes a process that involves concepts that originate outside and remain external to the Self (<internal $_{no}$>), although the relative position of the לב during the cognitive process varies; either it is moved toward an external concept (THINKING IS

[164] השטן. As is well recognized, השטן is not equivalent to the Christian “Satan” figure but is rather a title meaning “adversary” or “opponent.”

MANIPULATING ONE'S SELF) or an external concept is moved toward it (THINKING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ONE'S SELF).

The idea that IDEAS ARE MANIPULABLE OBJECTS also surfaces in conceptualizations of understanding, which view cognition as an act of grasping or taking a concept (UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING):

Prov 1:3 for *taking* (לקחת) discipline of discretion, righteousness, judgment, and uprightness

Qoh 2:3 I scouted about with my לב…[how] to *seize* folly (ולאחז בסכלות).

According to the superscription of Proverbs, one of the purposes of recording the proverbs of Solomon is that the wise might *understand* (לקח) such abstract qualities as discretion, righteousness, and justice. Likewise, the Teacher of Qohelet sets out to consider how best to *understand* (אחז) the nature of folly (Qoh 2:3; see also Qoh 7:17–18). Again, such passages presume a conception of ideas as objects that can be grasped (IDEAS ARE MANIPULABLE OBJECTS). As Avrahami states, such associations make sense "in a culture where all learning is by way of apprenticeship and participation."[165] Just as one must first "grasp" a lyre or oar in order to understand how to use it, so one must "grasp" a concept in order to *understand* it.

Similarly, learning is depicted as an act of adding up, obtaining, or acquiring ideas (ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRING OBJECTS):

Prov 1:5 Let the wise hear and *add* learning (ויוסף לֶקַח); let the ones who discern *acquire* (יקנה) guidance.

Prov 3:13 Happy the one who finds wisdom and the one who *obtains* (יפיק) understanding.

[165] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 160. In making this statement, Avrahami is speaking particularly of the way that verbs such as תפש ("to grasp") and אחז ("to seize") are used to describe professions, such as lyre players (תפש כנור ועוגב, "the one who holds a lyre and pipe," e.g., Gen 4:21), mariners (תפש משוט, "the one who holds an oar," e.g. Ezek 27:29), and soldiers (אחזי חרב, "the one who holds a sword," e.g., Song 3:8). Yet, her larger point—that tactility and learning are closely associated in apprenticeship cultures—is applicable to the broader discussion here.

Prov 4:5 *Acquire* (קנה) wisdom; *acquire* (קנה) insight; do not turn away from the words of my mouth.

Prov 21:11 When the wise one is taught, he *takes* (לקח) knowledge.

Again, in each of these examples, an abstract concept is described as an object experiencing physical manipulation (IDEAS ARE MANIPULABLE OBJECTS). Thus, learning is "added up" (יסף, Prov 1:5), guidance and wisdom "acquired" (קנה, Prov 1:5, 4:5), understanding "obtained" (פוק, Prov 3:13), and knowledge "taken" (לקח, Prov 21:11; see also Qoh 1:16, 18, and the loss of understanding in Job 12:24). לֶקַח ("learning, instruction") itself derives from the verb לקח ("to take") and thus probably carries the connotation of "learning by taking."[166] Thus, the phrase "adding לֶקַח" in Prov 1:5 is doubly tactile, with both noun and verb conceptualizing the cognitive process as a tactile experience (see also Prov 4:2, 9:9; 16:21, 23; etc.). חכמה and its verbal equivalent חכם could also, according to Malul, carry a tactile connotation, due to a possible derivation from the Akkadian verb *ekēmu*, "to hold, grasp, appropriate."[167] If so, then the reference to "acquiring חכמה" in Prov 4:5 (see also Prov 4:7; 16:16; 17:16) might also inherently refer to an act of "acquiring that which is known by grasping."

Like THINKING IS MANIPULATING OBJECTS, ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRING OBJECTS can combine with a bi-furcated conception of the individual. Here, again, the Self is conceptualized as an object that can itself be manipulated; in this case, it can be acquired (THE SELF IS AN OBJECT). Thus, the possession of the heart itself (or lack thereof) is indicative of a person's cognitive abilities (HAVING KNOWLEDGE IS POSSESSING HEART):

Prov 6:32 The one who commits adultery *lacks heart* (חסר־לב); he who ruins his נפש does it.

Prov 15:32 The one who hears an argument *acquires heart* (קונה לב).

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[166] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 135. The definition proposed here is my own.
[167] Ibid., 138.

Job 15:12 What has taken (יקחך) your לב from you?[168]

Whether the individual has a physical organ called the לב is not in question; presumably, every individual has this organ. Rather, what is at stake is the individual's intellectual capabilities. Contrary to the modern Western idiom, in which "having heart" indicates moral fortitude, "having heart" in sapiential literature is equivalent to having knowledge. Thus, "acquiring heart" (קנה לב) is commended (Prov 15:32; see also Prov 19:8), while "lacking heart" (חסר־לב) or having heart "taken" away (יקחך לבך) is equivalent to lacking knowledge, being foolish, and being destined for destruction (Prov 6:32; see also Prov 7:7; 9:4, 16; 10:13, 21; 11:12; 12:11; etc.).[169]

Like the tactile THINKING metaphors above, ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRING OBJECTS and UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING map tactility's <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$, <contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, and <directness $_{yes}$> properties onto cognition. The individual can choose to "acquire" or "seize" abstract concepts, as the frequent commands to do so make clear, and such actions require the individual to come into direct contact with external concepts to do so. More importantly, unlike visual cognition, this form of knowledge acquisition is by no means a distant, passive endeavor. As Classon writes, such tactile metaphors "acknowledge and grapple with the tangled, bumpy and sticky nature of the topic" in question such that a personal "active involvement with the subject matter" forms.[170] One personally acquires knowledge (Prov 1:5); wrestles with folly (Qoh 2:3); and takes hold of discipline (Prov 1:3). There is nothing between the individual and the concept he or she is trying to understand, not even space (so <closeness $_{yes}$>), which means that the degree of understanding is based on the amount of effort the individual puts into the endeavor (<subjectivity $_{yes}$>). In the case of HAVING KNOWLEDGE IS

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[168] As Habel argues, the לב can act as the subject or object of the verb here. Based on a comparison with Hos 4:11, he prefers the latter, suggesting that the meaning of the idiom is akin to the English expression to "take leave of one's senses" (*The Book of Job,* 247). Given the other metaphors in this grouping, Habel's reading seems appropriate.

[169] See also the phrase לב־אין, "there is no heart" in Prov 17:16.

[170] Classen, "Fingerprints," 5. Classen is speaking of tactile knowledge in general, but the sentiments are well suited to these particular metaphors in Israelite culture and the complex metaphors formed from them.

POSSESSING HEART, this <closeness $_{\text{yes}}$> property becomes the primary element in the metaphorical mapping, although the fact that the individual's actions affect whether or not he or she has heart suggests that tactility's <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$> property also factors in.

Teaching is also conceptualized as a manipulative action, as one "gives" or "puts" a concept to another (TEACHING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ANOTHER):

Prov 9:9 *Give* (תן) to the wise, and they will be wiser still, make known to the righteous and they will *add learning* (ויסף לקח).

"Giving" (נתן) to the wise is equivalent to making something known (הודע) to them. God, in particular, is said to "put" knowledge within the human:

Prov 2:6 For the Lord *gives* (יתן) wisdom; from his mouth is knowledge and understanding.

Qoh 2:26 For to one who is good before him, [God] *gives* (נתן) wisdom and knowledge and joy, but to the one who sins, he *gives* (נתן) the work of gathering and colleting; only to the one who is pleasing before God is it *given* (לתת).

According to Prov 2:6 and Qoh 2:26, God "gives" (נתן) wisdom, knowledge, and joy to the individual, that is, he endows the person with information about the world and the capacity to understand it (see also Qoh 3:11). Like the metaphor THINKING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ONE'S SELF, such expressions function by mapping <contact $_{\text{yes}}$>, <internal $_{\text{no}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, <directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$ onto the target domain of instruction. Here, however, the focus is not on the information one can give to one's Self, but on information that can be given to and taken from another.

Teaching is also conceptualized as an act of physical discipline (INSTRUCTION IS A LASHING):

Prov 3:11–12 My son, do not reject the *discipline* (מוסר) of God, and do not loathe his reproof, for the Lord reproves the one whom he loves, like a father does

to the son who pleases him.

Prov 15:33 The fear of the Lord is the *discipline* (מוסר) of wisdom.

Prov 22:15 Folly is *bound* (קשורה) within the heart of a youth; *the rod of discipline* (שבט מוסר) sends it far from him.

Like other cognitive terms, “discipline” (מוסר) itself is a tactile term, connected to the physical sensation of יסר, to “punish” an individual by striking him or her with a rod (e.g., Prov 13:24, 23:13). At its root, then, מוסר invokes learning that is obtained through the tactile sensation of a beating.[171] Thus, in Prov 22:15, discipline is conceptualized as a physical rod that beats folly out of the heart of the youth where it is bound (קשר), while in Prov 15:33, the abstract behavior “fear of the Lord” is conceptualized as physical discipline that brings wisdom (see also Prov 1:3). Such passages presume that learning is not without a certain degree of pain; it takes effort to correct incorrect behaviors such as folly. Thus, in addition to mapping <contact $_{\text{yes}}$>, <internal $_{\text{no}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{yes/no}}$>[172], <directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$, INSTRUCTION IS A LASHING relies upon tactility’s ability to create a physiological response (i.e., pain) in the one who is on the receiving end of the touch. As Shupak notes, the roots of this metaphor probably lie within Israelite childrearing practices, with parents physically disciplining their children in order to teach them proper behavior (see, for instance, Prov 13:24: “the one who withholds the rod hates his child, but the one who loves him is diligent to discipline him”). However, over time, it came to be applied to any number of situations, especially religious contexts where God was the “parent” disciplining his children Israel.[173] Thus, in Prov 3:11, the parental-child metaphor has been extended to God and the student, with the “discipline” (מוסר) of God being the means by which

[171] Malul does not discuss this example. See, however, the discussion in Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 34–35. In many cases, discipline does have a verbal connotation, where the “rod” is metaphorically replaced by a word that strikes the individual. See the discussion of WISDOM IS A VERBAL LASHING in Chapter 4 below. The point, however, is that the primary metaphor INSTRUCTION IS A LASHING is, at its core, a tactile metaphor.

[172] It is voluntary for the one who performs the lashing (i.e., the parent), but involuntary for the one who receives the lashing (i.e., the child).

[173] Shupak, *Where Can Wisdom be Found?* 33–34.

the student is taught.

Emotion Metaphors

Avrahami does not connect emotion to tactility, in part because she limits her examination to expressions of happiness/sadness and joy/suffering.[174] Indeed, the generic act of touching (e.g., "to touch" or "feel," נגע, משש/מוש) does not connote an emotive response as it does in English, which suggests that generic tactility was not as prominent of a source domain for conceptualizing emotion in sapiential literature as other modalities were.[175] Yet, tactility does serve as a source domain for emotion, particularly its capacity to manipulate objects and identify their material properties. For instance, negative emotions can "seize" an individual (TERROR IS BEING SEIZED):

Job 18:20 Horror *seizes* (אחזו) those of the east.

Job 21:6 And if I remember, then I am disturbed, and a shuddering *seizes* (ואחז) my flesh.

In these examples, a negative emotion is portrayed as a person who seizes the individual (EMOTIONS ARE PEOPLE). Thus, horror (שאר) and fear (represented by פלזות, "a shuddering") "seize" (אחז) people, effectively paralyzing them from action. Persistence is similarly described as a seizure (PERSISTENCE IS GRASPING):

Job 2:3 Still, he *seizes firmly* (מחזיק) his integrity.

Here, however, it is the individual who "seizes" an abstract concept (IDEAS ARE MANIPULABLE OBJECTS), and his action displays the steadfastness of his character. Thus, despite egregious affliction, Job *persists* (מחזיק) in his commitment to God (Job 2:3; see also Job 2:9, 27:6).[176] Such metaphors derive from tactility's ability to directly connect with an object and to hold it still

[174] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 163–67.

[175] By way of comparison, consider the English terms "feel" and "touch," which not only refer to physical sensations but emotional responses (e.g., "I do not *feel* well"; "the music *touched* him"; "her *feelings* were hurt"). See also the discussion in Sweetser, *From Etymology to Pragmatics*, 37, 42.

[176] Persistence seems to be a neutral quality. In Job, it is commended, but in Exodus (4:21, 7:13, 22, 8:15, etc.) it is condemned.

(<contact $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <closeness $_{yes}$>, and <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$). Given the subject matter of the literature, it is not surprising that these emotive metaphors in sapiential literature are concentrated in Job. However, these metaphors appear elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible (Exod 15:14, 15; Deut 1:38; Isa 13:8, 21:3; Ps 48:7; etc.), which indicate that they are not the unique invention of the author.[177]

Emotions are also conceptualized as objects with physically characteristics. Negative emotions, for instance, "weigh" a person down (ANGER IS HEAVY, SORROW IS HEAVY):

Prov 27:3	A stone is heavy (כֹּבֶד), sand is weighty (נטל), but the anger of a fool is *heavier* (כָּבֵד) than both.
Job 6:2–3	Oh, surely let my vexation be *weighed* (שקול ישקל); let my misfortune[178] *be lifted* (ישאו) as one onto the *scales* (במאזנים). For it would *be heavier* (יכבד) than the sands of the sea.

Just as an English speaker would speak of having a "heavy heart," the Hebrew speaker can say that he or she is burdened by heavy emotion. Thus, anger is as "heavy" (כבד, נטל) as a stone and anxiety as sand (Prov 27:3; Job 6:2–3). Here, emotions are conceptualized as manipulable objects that have material weight (EMOTIONS ARE MANIPULABLE OBJECTS), thus mapping tactility's ability to identify that quality onto abstract emotional experience (<identification $_{yes}$>). Similarly, the heart can be "hard" or "soft," qualities which reflects the emotional status of the individual (FEAR IS A SOFT HEART/STUBBORNNESS IS A HARD HEART):

Prov 28:14	Happy the person who fears continually, but the one who *hardens* his heart (ומקשה לבו) will fall into evil.
Job 23:16	God has *softened* my heart (הרך לבי); the almighty has terrified me.

Here, the Self is once again conceptualized as a material object with physical characteristics (THE

[177] See also Ps 119:53, where "heat" (זלעפה) "seizes" (אחז) the speaker. In this latter example, temperature is used as a source domain for the emotion of anger.

[178] Thus following Habel (*The Book of Job*, 139) in reading the וְהַיָּתִי of the *ketiv*, rather than the וְהַוָּתִי ("my desire") of the *qere*.

SELF IS AN OBJECT).[179] In Job 23:16, fear is described as a “softening” (הרך) of the לב, while in Prov 28:14 the one who does not fear is described as having a “hardened” (מקשה) לב. While neither metaphor is positive, the latter metaphor in particular is condemned. Like the pharaoh of Exodus, who does not show proper fear towards God—he כבד (“made heavy”) or חזק (“made firm”) his לב to the words of God’s messenger (see Exod 4:21; 7:13, 14, 22; 8:11, 32; etc.)—the one who makes his heart “hard” is destined for destruction. Stubbornness is also described as a “hard” neck (STUBBORNNESS IS A HARD NECK):

Prov 29:1 The chastised man who *hardens* his neck (מקשה־ערף) will be suddenly broken, and there will be no healing.

Again, the act of hardening part of one’s body is equated to a negative emotion that condemns the individual to destruction (compare the condemnation of the עם־קשה־ערף, “stiff-necked people,” in Exod 32:9; 33:3, 5; 34:9; etc.). Given the agricultural context of ancient Israel, the individual here may be envisioned as an animal, who refuses to be properly harnessed (THE SELF IS A DOMESTICATED BEAST), rather than as an object or person.[180] Yet, whether referring to the לב, the neck, or the entire person, such passages combine tactility’s ability to identify the material properties of objects with its ability to affect the perceiver (<identification $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR \rightarrow P}$).

Judgment Metaphors

As with emotion, Avrahami does not identify judgment with touching and for good reason.[181] In sapiential literature, at least, tactile manipulation does not play a prominent role as a source domain for moral judgment. There are, however, two notable exceptions. The first is the root חלק (vrb: “make smooth”; adj: “smooth”), which appears frequently in Proverbs as an adverse judgment on the moral character of the individual in question (e.g., Prov 2:16; 5:3; 6:24;

[179] By analogy with the THINKING metaphors above, which combine a primary cognitive metaphor with a SELF metaphor, one would assume that these FEAR metaphors are compound iterations of a simpler metaphor, perhaps FEAR IS SOFTNESS/STUBBORNNESS IS HARDNESS. That stubbornness is also described as a “hard neck” seems to support this suggestion (see STUBBORNNESS IS A HARD NECK).

[180] Thanks to Carol Newsom (personal communication) for suggesting this possibility.

[181] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 167–75.

7:5, 21; 26:28; 28:23; 29:5; see also Job 17:5). The use of the term, however, occurs only in complex metaphors in which words are deemed "smooth" and is probably a direct result of the combination of WISDOM IS WORD and IDEAS ARE MANIPULABLE OBJECTS. As such, a discussion of these examples is best reserved for the discussion below (see the discussion of WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD in Chapter 4).

The second are passages that depict judgment as an act of "weighing" (JUDGING IS WEIGHING):[182]

Prov 21:2	All the ways of a person are upright in his eyes, but the Lord *measures out* (ותכל) the heart.
Job 31:6	Let me be *weighed* (ישקלני) in the scales of righteous; let God know my integrity.

Here, the person is conceptualized as a manipulable object with weight that can be measured (THE SELF IS AN OBJECT) (see also Prov 16:2, 24:12). In each case, however, it is God who performs the evaluation, not humanity, which suggests that evaluative aspect of this metaphor derives from more complex theological speculations about God's function as judge than basic notions about human epistemology. Tactility, in other words, is not an important source domain for human evaluative cognition.

Summary

Tactility, then, provides a source domain for a plethora of cognitive metaphors, each of which envisions cognition as a manipulable experience:

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[182] In this regard, one might also point to Job 1:22 and 4:8, each of which depicts judgment as an act of "putting" or "giving" a charge to another (see also Job 9:33, where the execution of judgment is a "laying on" of the hands). These passages, however, seem to derive from the legal sphere of Israelite life and envision judgment as a verbal charge brought upon another. They are, in other words, complex legal metaphors, rather than primary cognitive metaphors.

Touching	<selected properties>
THINKING IS MANIPULATING OBJECTS	<contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$
THINKING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ONE'S SELF	<contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$
THINKING IS MANIPULATING ONE'S SELF	<contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$
UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING	<closeness $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$; also:<contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>
ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRING OBJECTS	<closeness $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$; also: <contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>
HAVING KNOWLEDGE IS POSSESSING HEART	<closeness $_{yes}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>
TEACHING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ANOTHER	<contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$
INSTRUCTION IS A LASHING	<contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$
TERROR IS BEING SEIZED	<contact $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>,<closeness $_{yes}$>, and <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$
PERSISTENCE IS GRASPING	<contact $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>,<closeness $_{yes}$>, and <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$
ANGER/SORROW IS HEAVY	<identification $_{yes}$>
FEAR IS A SOFT HEART	<identification $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$
STUBBORNNESS IS A HARD HEART/NECK	<identification $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$

Table 6: Metaphorical Mappings: COGNITION IS TOUCHING

Since they each rely upon tactility's ability to manipulate objects, these metaphors consistently map tactility's properties of <contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$ onto the target domain of cognition. What varies between them is emphasis those properties have and the object and direction of the manipulation, specifically whether the object is the לב (e.g., THINKING IS MANIPULATING ONE'S SELF) or an abstract concept (e.g., ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRING OBJECTS) and whether it is moved toward (e.g., THINKING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ONE'S SELF) or away from (e.g., TEACHING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ANOTHER) the perceiver. INSTRUCTION IS A LASHING and the emotive metaphors also rely upon tactility's ability to initiate physiology change (pain, terror, etc.) in the object

perceived. Of utmost importance throughout, however, is the conception of cognition as an experience of direct, manipulable contact between the perceiver and its object.

COGNITION IS INGESTION

Just as touch is commonly dismissed as an epistemological modality due to its associations with base sensations, taste has often been regulated to the realm of subjective preference and emotional experience. Such connotations are certainly not absent from the Hebrew Bible, where taste serves as a frequent source domain for emotive and evaluative metaphors. Yet, emotional experience and moral judgment are important components of the human cognitive system, and it is thus appropriate to include a discussion of this modality here. Like other modalities, conceptual metaphors based on taste reflect a distinct conception of cognition, in this case, one in which cognition is understood as a personal, subjective experience.

Typology of Ingestion

Key Terms: אכל, טעם, שתה, בלע, פה, לשון, חך, שפתים, נפש, צמא, רעב

As Avrahami notes, in biblical Hebrew, there is not a "sharp semantic distinction…between the common verb 'to eat' (אכל) and the rare verb 'to taste' (טעם), nor the tasting process and eating" more generally.[183] 1 Samuel 14:24, for instance, equates the two functions: "'Cursed be the one who *eats* bread (אכל לחם) before evening'…So none of the people *tasted* bread (טעם לחם)" (see also Jonah 3:7). Moreover, while אכל and שתה can respectively refer to the consumption of solid or liquid foods (e.g., Gen 27:25; Exod 34:28; Deut 2:6), they frequently operate in tandem to signify the entire process of ingestion (e.g., Gen 24:54, 25:34, 26:30). It is appropriate, therefore, to broaden the examination here to include the entire act of ingestion—the act of putting food or drink into the mouth, tasting it, and swallowing it—rather than limiting the discussion to "taste" specifically.

Like speech, ingestion is associated with the mouth (פה) and its component parts (חך,

[183] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 93. Malul similarly notes an overlap between "taste" and the domain of eating (*Knowledge, Control, and Sex,* 131–32).

"roof of mouth, palate"; שפתים, "lips"; לשון, "tongue"; גרון, "throat"), which appear in conjunction with verbs of eating (אכל, לחם), drinking (שתה, שקה), swallowing (בלע), and tasting (טעם). Unlike speech, however, ingestion is an internally-oriented modality, acquiring information by bringing external objects from the environment into the body through the mouth and throat (Neh 9:20; Ps 78:30; Dan 10:3,; etc.; cf. 1 Sam 14:27, where putting the hand to the mouth is equivalent to ingesting) (<internal $_{\text{yes}}$>). Because the object must enter the perceiver, ingestion requires direct, close contact between the perceiver and the object perceived (<contact $_{\text{yes}}$>, <closeness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <directness $_{\text{yes}}$>). Thus, David's son Amnon arranges for his sister Tamar to bring food to him so that he may eat it (2 Sam 13:5–6), and God worries that the first human will reach out to the tree of life and bring the fruit close to him in order to eat (Gen 3:22).

Once the object is inside the perceiver's mouth, it immediately comes in contact with the taste buds, "clusters of between 50 and 150 taste receptor cells" that transmit chemical stimuli to the human brain and enable the perceiver to detect and identify with great precision the flavor of the object.[184] Of course, the Hebrew Bible does not refer to these taste buds, yet it recognizes their function, connecting ingestion with the ability to classify objects according to their basic flavors: "sweet" (מתק, Exod 15:25; Judg 9:11; Ps 19:11; Prov 24:13, 27:7), "bitter" (מר/מרר, Exod 15:23; Num 5:18–19, 23–2; Prov 27:7), "salty" (מלח, Exod 30:25; Job 6:6), or "tasteless" (תפל, Job 6:6).[185] It also recognizes the mouth's capacity to detect the temperature and moisture of an object, for instance, whether an object is "cold" (קר, Prov 25:25), "hot" (e.g., עגת רצפים, a "cake of hot coals," 1 Kgs 19:6), or "dry" (e.g., חרב, Prov 17:1).

Through such means, ingestion is capable of identifying the objects that enter into the

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[184] Carolyn Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), 73.

[185] Four flavors—sweet, bitter, acid, and salt—have frequently been identified across cultures, which has led to their classification as *the* four fundamental flavors. However, the flavors individuals identify vary across cultures. The ancient Greeks, for instance, commonly identified six basic flavors (bitter, sweet, sour, salty, harsh, astringent, and pungent), while sixteenth century Westerners identified nine basic tastes (sweet, sour, sharp, pungent, harsh, fatty, bitter, insipid, and salty). Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste*, 13–14, 75–76. It is uncertain how many flavors the Israelites identified, although the Hebrew Bible notes at least four, מתק ("sweet"), מר/מרר ("bitter"), מלח ("salty"), and תפל ("tasteless").

mouth (<detection $_{yes}$>, <identification $_{yes}$>). For instance, by ingestion, an individual can determine whether a liquid is wine (יין), vinegar (חמץ), strong drink (שכר), water (מים), or grape juice (משרת ענבים) (Num 6:3; Judg 13:4, 7, 14; Ps 69:21; etc.).[186] Like touch or hearing, this detection occurs sequentially.[187] The individual puts an object into his or her mouth, tastes it, chews it, and swallows it before the act of ingestion is finally complete. Ezekiel "opens his mouth" (ואפתח את־פי), "eats" (ואכלה) the scroll given to him, and "fills" his stomach with it (ומעיך תמלא את המגלה הזאת) (Ezek 2:8, 3:2–3).[188] The specific act of taste itself is also sequential in that only the part of the object in contact with the taste buds is perceived. To perceive the entire object, one must either rotate it on the tongue or break it into component parts so that the entire object can connect with a taste receptor.[189] Since the taste receptors vary in their sensitivity to tastes—the taste buds on the tip of the tongue, for instance, are more sensitive to sweetness, while those on the back of the tongue are prone to bitterness[190]—the intensity of an object's taste can change, depending upon which taste receptors it is connecting with. Given this sequentially, it is hardly surprisingly that Job 12:11, 34:3 finds taste a dynamic experience, comparing it to a "test" (הלא־אזן מלין תבחן חך אכל תטעם־לו, "does not the ear test words and the palate tastes food").[191]

The Hebrew Bible, however, does not often reflect upon this sequentiality, instead presenting ingestion as an instantaneous action ("she ate," Gen 3:6; Ruth 2:14; "he drank," Gen 9:21; Judg 15:19; 1 Kgs 17:6; "they ate and drank," Gen 24:54, 26:30; etc.). This is perhaps

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[186] Num 6:3 and Judg 13:4, 7, 14 specifically command the Nazarite *not* to drink wine, strong drink, or grape juice. However, the cultural distinctions between these objects in the first place presumably stem from their difference in flavor and not solely on their chemical make-up or appearance.

[187] Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste*, 82.

[188] A scroll is an unusual object to ingest and probably represents the ingestion of the divine word. However, despite its symbolic meaning, within the context of the vision, concrete ingestion is clearly intended, indicating that ingestion is not limited to "food" and "water" in the strict sense, but anything that enters the body through the mouth.

[189] In this respect, taste is like touch, a modality upon which it relies (see the discussion in Chapter 4 below).

[190] Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste*, 74. This distribution, she argues, likely arose as a biological "safety" mechanism: "Many poisons are intensely bitter. The bitter receptors thus stand guard as the last point where swallowing can be halted."

[191] This comparison is the bases for a complex metaphor in which the ear is likened to the palate in its ability to "test" words. Such a complex metaphor assumes, however, that the mouth has the ability to "test" food.

because ingestion, like touch, creates an impression of simultaneity through its sequence. As modern science suggests, each individual has thousands of taste receptors spread throughout the mouth—in various papillae (the small observable "bumps" on the tongue), on the roof of the mouth, on the cheeks, and on the throat—which makes it possible to connect with multiple parts of the object at once and experience a variety of flavors simultaneously.[192] This lends taste a spatial quality in that concurrent taste sensations are related to each other according to their location on the tongue.[193] Unlike images in a visual field or touch sensations, however, such disparate taste sensations are never completely integrated together. While flavors may blend together or intensify one another, the basic flavors of an object remain distinctive enough that a perceiver can separate the taste of an object into its component parts. To use a modern example, one can discern both the sourness of the lemons and the sweetness of the sugar that are used to create a glass of lemonade.[194] The result is what I would call a "composite simultaneity," an impression of an object that is complete, yet composed of distinctive units. By analogy with Jonas, one might therefore argue that ingestion's detection is one of "composite simultaneity through sequence." Because of this complexity, individuals are more likely to describe the taste of an object by comparing it to another object (e.g., כדבש, "like honey," Ezek 3:3; see also Exod 16:31), than to describe it via flavor ("sweet with a touch of bitterness").[195]

On the one hand, this process of detection makes ingestion a fairly dynamic modality and enables the individual to consciously reflect on the process of tasting food (as in Job 12:11, 34:3). On the other hand, ingestion is fairly limited in the scope of its identification. Its concerns are confined to the interior of the body, making the initial location and the limits of the object largely

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[192] Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste*, 72–73; Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 142. In this regard it is telling that the Hebrew Bible associates taste with a variety of locations in the mouth, not only the פה ("mouth") more generally but also the חך ("roof of mouth, palate"), the לשון ("tongue"), and the גרון ("throat") (Judg 7:5; Job 12:11, 34:3; Ps 69:4, 119:103; etc.).

[193] Paul Breslin and Liquan Huang, "Human Taste: Peripheral Anatomy, Taste Transduction, and Coding," in *Taste and Smell: An Update* (eds. Hummel T. and Welge-Lüssen A.; Advances in Oto-Rhino-Laryngology 63; Basel: Karger, 2006), 152–90 (154).

[194] Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste*, 77.

[195] Ead., *Making Sense of Taste*, 78.

irrelevant.[196] To fill this gap, ingestion is heavily influenced by other modalities: touch, which brings the object into contact with the perceiver; sight, which influences the object's appeal and identification; and smell, which contributes to the perceiver's experience of an object's flavor. Thus, Gen 3:6 states that the first humans "take" (לקח) fruit and eat (אכל) it, and Num 11 describes manna not only by its taste ("its taste was like the taste of cake made with oil," v. 8) but by its color ("its appearance was appearance of bdellium," v. 7). Moreover, because taste is limited to the confines of the mouth, ingestion is largely incomparable. As Carolyn Korsmeyer explains, the number of papillae in the mouth and the number of taste receptors per papillae varies from person to person.[197] Since the taste receptors vary in their sensitivity to tastes, two people, eating the same piece of food, can have vastly different responses to it depending upon the predisposition of the taste receptors in their mouth (<subjectivity $_{yes}$>). Yet, despite is subjectivity, ingestion is still capable of evaluating the relative value of an object, whether it is safe to eat or poison (<evaluation $_{yes}$>). Thus, a company of prophets determines that a stew is poisonous by eating it (מות בסיר, "there is death in the pot," 2 Kgs 4:40; see also Ps 69:22). That they are able to do so without having long-lasting effects suggests that taste can evaluate the nature of the object quickly (so <briefness $_{yes}$>).

Although a person can be provided food or water by another and commanded to eat or drink (Gen 24:18, 44, 46; 25:34; etc.), the individual chooses whether or not to do so, making ingestion a voluntary modality (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). Abraham's servant waits until speaking his message before eating the food that Laban lays before him (Gen 24:33–54), and Moses does not

[196] Therefore, although one can detect the relative location of an object within the mouth, the property of <location> itself, in as much as it applies to the relationship of the perceiver to his or her environment, does not apply, nor does the property of <limits>.

[197] According to Linda Bartoshuk (cited in Korsmeyer, *Making Sense of Taste*, 87), "about 20 percent of the population are…'superstasters," people with densely packed papillae who are especially sensitive to flavors (especially to sweet and sour). Another 20 percent have relatively few taste buds and dull taste perception. Most of us fall in between." Although there is a universal predisposition for sweet tastes, the amount and distribution of taste receptors is affected by genetics and can vary over a person's lifetime. This is because the taste buds constantly regenerate every ten to fourteen days, but the older one becomes, the number of taste buds that regenerate declines (74, 87–88). In this regard, one might consider 2 Sam 19:35, which notes how the aged Barzillai has lost his ability to "taste that which he eats."

eat bread or drink water for forty days (Exod 34:28; Deut 9:9, 18). One can also choose what to eat, and the choice has direct effect on the perceiver and the object perceived (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$). Eating and drinking, for instance, clearly provides nourishment for the individual. Lack of food or water causes “faintness” (עיף; e.g., 1 Sam 14:28; 2 Sam 16:2, 17:29; Isa 29:8, 44:12) and “lack of strength” (e.g., כח לא־היה בו, 1 Sam 28:20; see also 28:22, 30:12; Isa 44:12), while adequate food or water provides nourishment (e.g., 1 Sam 30:12; 1 Kgs 19:7–8; Qoh 10:17; Neh 5:2) and “satisfies” (שבע) any sensations of “thirst” (צמא) or “hunger” (רעב) that an individual might have (e.g., Deut 8:3; 2 Sam 17:29; Ruth 2:9; Prov 25:21; see also the combination אכל ושבע, “eat and be satisfied,” in Deut 8:10, 12, 11:15, etc.). Ingestion can also alter the disposition of an individual, causing contentedness (e.g., וייטב לבו, Ruth 3:7), happiness (e.g., שמח, 1 Kgs 4:20; Qoh 10:19), or drunkenness (e.g., שכר, Gen 9:21, 43:34; 2 Sam 11:13; 1 Kgs 16:9, 20:6).

Moreover, as food or water is broken down and absorbed into the body, ingestion can transfer the inherent qualities from the object to the perceiver. For instance, the one who eats “holy” (קדש) food is endowed with “holiness” (לקש, Exod 29:33), and the one who eats “unclean” (טמא) or “detestable” (שקץ) animals becomes “unclean” (תטמאו, Lev 11:2–24a, 40–43). To prevent unintended contagion, the Hebrew Bible thus contains a plethora of commands regulating the consumption of food, some of which identify the intended effect (e.g., removal of guilt, Lev 10:17; avoidance of uncleanliness, Lev 11; 22:8; Deut 14:3–21) and others of which do not (e.g., Gen 32:33; Exod 12:9, 21:28). Still, the individual maintains the freedom to choose when and what to eat. Thus, although God commands them not to eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, the first humans choose to eat from the forbidden tree and are punished for it (Gen 2:16–17, 3:1–22).

The properties of ingestion can be summarized as follows:[198]

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[198] As mentioned in n. 196, <location> and <limits> are not properties associated with taste. <Correction of hypothesis> may be a property (although Ibarretxe-Antuñano does not believe so, see

<contact $_{\text{yes}}$>
<closeness $_{\text{yes}}$>
<internal $_{\text{yes}}$>
<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{composite simultaneity through sequence}}$
<identification $_{\text{yes}}$>
<voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>

<directness $_{\text{yes}}$>
<effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{PR \rightarrow P}$
<subjectivity $_{\text{yes}}$>
<effects $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{OP \rightarrow P}$
<evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>
<briefness $_{\text{yes}}$>

COGNITION IS INGESTION

As Avrahami notes, the Hebrew Bible rarely connects ingestion to an individual's knowledge of a situation apart from his or her capacity to pass moral judgment.[199] This is perhaps due to the subjective nature of taste. Even more so than seeing, touching, or hearing/speaking, which can be experienced to varying degrees by different people and compared, ingestion is a personal experience, limited to the inside of the mouth and thus largely incomparable. It is thus better suited as a source domain for personal evaluations of situations than simple mental contemplation of them. In the Hebrew Bible, this is exactly what we find, with ingestion serving as a frequent source domain for cognitive experience that is emotive and evaluative.

Emotion Metaphors

Ingestion is commonly associated with the subjective experience of emotion. Desire, for instance, is described as a hunger or thirst (DESIRE IS HUNGER, DESIRE IS THIRST). The clearest example of this, of course, occurs in non-sapiential Psalms, which describe the psalmist's longing

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Ibarretxe-Antuñano, "Polysemy and Metaphor in Perception Verbs," 153–55) in that the perceiver forms a hypothesis about the identification of an object when he or she tastes it, which may or may not be accurate. However, the Hebrew Bible does not seem to reflect on this aspect, so I have no assigned this property to the Israelite typology.

[199] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 162. She notes, in fact, only two exceptions, Ps 34: 9 and Qoh 2:25. Qohelet refers to a concrete experience and thus does not affect our discussion of cognitive metaphors here. Psalms 34:9, on the other hand, may be a good example of טעם being used to indicate thinking: the individual is commanded to "taste (טעמו) and see that the Lord is good," that is, to *consider* the saving power of God in order that to *conclude* that God is good. However, since ingestion rarely expresses thought apart from moral evaluation, טעם may have been chosen here in order to fulfill the need of the poem's acrostic structure, *tet* being a difficult Hebrew letter to find a suitable term to use in a psalm of thanksgiving. If so, then the use of טעם here is probably an imaginative extension of one of טעם's usual judgmental metaphors (see JUDGING IS TASTING below), rather than reflective of a primary metaphorical usage of the term. This suggestion is supported by the fact that, even here, the final result of cognitive "tasting" is a moral judgment about God. Avrahami herself recognizes this connection, since she also includes this verse in her discussion of other judgment metaphors (170). Alternatively, Avrahami suggests that this verse could indicate "being satisfied through faith" (98), in which case the emotional effect of taste, rather than the evaluative property, would be the governing property.

for God as an insatiable “thirst”:

Ps 63:2 My God, you are my God. I seek you; my נפש *thirsts* (צמאה) for you; my flesh is *faint* (כמה) for you in a dry and weary land without water.

Like a person who cannot find water to drink in a dry land, the psalmist *desires* (צמא) God’s saving presence (see also Ps 42:3). Similar longings, although not for God specifically, appear in Wisdom literature, where the desires of individuals are described as hungers and thirsts:

Prov 10:3 The Lord does not let the righteous נפש *hunger* (ירעיב), but he drives away the desire[200] of the wicked.

Job 5:5 The *hungry* (רעב) *eat* (אכל) [the fool’s] harvest…and the *thirsty* (צמים) *pant* (ושאף)[201] after their wealth.

Job 20:20 For [the wicked] did not know rest *in his belly* (בבטנו); in his desire (בחמודו), he let nothing escape.

On the one hand, Prov 10:3 clearly refers to the concrete experience of food consumption: the righteous *eat*; the wicked *go hungry*. Yet, as Fox notes, this proverb can easy apply to any number of desires (the desire for wealth, the desire for knowledge, the desire for vindication, etc.).[202] Job 5:5b demonstrates this clearly, where “thirst” indicates a *desire* for the fool’s חיל. Since the noun חיל does not refer only to a person’s material possession of water, the “thirst” described here is clearly metaphorical.[203] Similarly, the “hunger” described in Job 20:20 is not for

[200] הוּה. As Fox (*Proverbs 10–31*, 512) argues, הוּה (“destruction”) should probably be emended to חיה (“living thing”) and functions here as a synonym for “desire” or “appetite” (see Job 33:20 and 38:39 for concrete examples of חיה with this meaning).

[201] Although שאף could refer to the act of “gasping” for air (e.g., Ps 119:131; Isa 42:14), here it parallels eating and is thus clearly connected to thirst.

[202] Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 512.

[203] As Habel notes (*The Book of Job*, 131, 117), the “hungry” (רעב) and “thirsty” (צמים) in this passage could be mythological references to supernatural forces of destruction, the “Hungry One,” the “Thirsty Ones.” Yet, whether referring the human poor or supernatural agents of death, the basic metaphor here is the same, those without wealth desire it and consume their ill-begotten goods. Note that, while “thirsting” is connected to desire here, “eating” is not. Unlike Job 20:20, “eating” here refers to the physical consumption of food, represented by the “harvest.” It is thus a physical image. Like Prov 10:3, the combination of concrete consumption and metaphorical thirst here highlights once again the close connection between physical action and metaphorical meaning and effectively demonstrates how authors can use this connection to advance their rhetoric.

physical food and water but material possessions more generally (see vv. 18–19). Through the conceptual metaphor DESIRE IS HUNGER, a similar generic lesson can be extracted from Prov 10:3, namely, that "God fulfills the desires of the righteous but thwarts the wishes of the wicked."[204] Indeed, the value of Prov 10:3 as a piece of communal knowledge lies in the fact that it can be applied to any number of situations and is not limited to the material surfeit of the righteous and wicked.

The fulfillment of such desires is depicted as a state of "fatness" or "satiety," while its obverse is a state of "emptiness" (SATISFACTION IS FULLNESS, DISSATISFACTION IS EMPTINESS):

Prov 13:4 The נפש of the lazy desires but has not; but the נפש of the diligent is *fattened* (תדשן).

Prov 13:25 The righteous *eat* (אכל) to the *satisfaction* (לשבע) of his נפש, but the *belly* (בטן) of the wicked is *empty* (תחסר).

Qoh 5:9 The lover of money is not *satisfied* (ישבע) with silver, nor the one who loves with produce. This, too, is vanity.

Qoh 6:2 There is one to whom God gives wealth and riches and honor,[205] so that he does not lack according to all which his נפש desires, yet God does not empower him to *eat* (לאכל) from them, but a stranger *eats* (יאכלנו) them. This is vanity and a great ill.

Qoh 6:3 If a man begets a hundred [children] and lives many years, but complains that his days of his years will come to pass[206] and his נפש is not *satiated* (לא־תשבע) from the good…

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[204] See the discussion in Chapter 1 on the formation of proverbs via the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor.

[205] Seow (*Ecclesiastes*, 210) argues that "honor" is not an appropriate translation for כבוד, since one must be able to "partake" of these things (he prefers the translation "abundance" or "plenty"). However, as the discussion throughout this chapter demonstrates, conceptual metaphors function by mapping concrete activities onto abstract concepts, like honor. There is no reason to assume, therefore, that this cannot be the case here as well.

[206] So Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 202, 211.

As with Prov 10:3, the desires referred to in Prov 13:4 and 25 could be for actual food, but these passages can also be applied to intangible desires, in which case the resulting "empty belly" (בטן...חסר) or "fattened" (דשן) נפש refers not only to a physical state but also to a state of emotional satiety. Similarly, Qoh 6:2 connects the individual's satisfaction to his ability to *eat* (אכל). Here, despite having everything provided for him, the individual described is not able to "eat" wealth or honor, that is, he is unable to *enjoy* them.[207] שבע, which is used in the next verse (Qoh 6:3) and in Prov 13:25 to indicate the satisfaction of the נפש, is frequently connected to the physical state of being full of food (e.g., Job 27:14; Prov 12:11, 20:13, 25:16, 27:7; etc.). Its occurrence in these two passages and in Qoh 5:9 therefore probably relies upon the ingestive domain: the individual is not *satisfied* with wealth (Qoh 5:9; see also Job 20:22) or the "good" (Qoh 6:3), the latter of which is probably a reference back to the wealth and honor mentioned in Qoh 6:2.

It is no coincidence that the נפש figures prominently in these descriptions of intangible desire. As noted in Chapter 1 above, although often translated as "soul," the נפש was intimately connected with the "throat" of the individual and was often referenced as the seat of an individual's physical "appetite" (e.g., Job 6:7; Prov 6:30, 16:26, 27:7). Psalm 63:2, Prov 10:3, 13:25, and Qoh 6:2 explicitly draw upon this connection with the physical appetite, using the biological appetite for food or water as a model for non-physical desires. Presumably, the frequent references to the desires of the נפש throughout this literature also draw upon this connection, even when the domain of ingestion is otherwise specifically referred to.[208] For instance:

Prov 21:10	The wicked נפש desires wickedness.
Job 23:13	His נפש desires, and he does it.

[207] As Seow notes, it is unclear why the individual cannot enjoy his material goods. "One can only guess whether the author is thinking of economic, physical, or psychological hardship" (*Ecclesiastes*, 225).

[208] This is not to say that the connection between the נפש and ingestion is ubiquitous. The נפש is also frequently connected to the "breath" of the individual and through it the domain of speaking. Yet, when it desires, the נפש seems to be envisioned as a consuming (ingestive) entity.

Rather than simply stating that the "lazy" (עצל) or the "wicked" (רשע) desire (see, for instance, Prov 21:25), Prov 21:20 and Job 23:13 note that the *נפש* desires, thereby highlighting the ingestive capability of the human individual. In many cases, this נפש seems to function as a metonymy for the entire person.[209] Thus, the righteous נפש of Prov 10:3 *is* the righteous individual who hungers for various desires (see also Prov 21:10); that is, the *entire* person is a consuming נפש, craving satisfaction. Other passages, however, seem to presume a bifurcated individual, with the נפש functioning as a separate Self within the individual that can direct his movements and be filled or fattened (THE SELF IS A PERSON). Thus, the righteous eat to satisfy their נפש (Prov 13:25)—that is, the Essence of the righteous feeds its Self—while the ungrateful man cannot "satiate" his נפש (e.g., Qoh 6:3). Like the visual and tactile THINKING metaphors above, then, these primary metaphors of desire can combine with a SELF metaphor to create the idea that DESIRE IS A HUNGRY SELF/DESIRE IS A THIRSTY SELF (e.g., Ps 63:2; Job 23:13) and SATISFACTION IS A FULL SELF/DISSATISFACTION IS AN EMPTY SELF (e.g., Prov 13:4, 5; Qoh 6:2, 3).

In themselves, desire and satisfaction appear to be neutral emotions, engaged in by both the righteous and wicked. They can, however, be deemed negative qualities. Thus, according to Prov 19:2, "*desire* (נפש) without knowledge is not good" (see also, Prov 12:11, where the opposite of physical satisfaction is חסר־לב, a "lack of heart"). Yet, good or bad, DESIRE IS HUNGER/THIRST and the related metaphors SATISFACTION IS FULLNESS/DISSATISFACTION IS EMPTINESS operate by mapping the properties of ingestion onto the abstract domain of desire, most notably, the properties of <contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, and <subjectivity $_{yes}$>. Each metaphor presumes a direct connection between the perceiver (or his Self) and the object of his or her desire, whether that desire be God, wealth, or an abstract quality like wickedness. For such desire to be fulfilled, the object of the desire must then enter into the

[209] In this, it functions like the לב in the primary iteration of THINKING IS SPEAKING above. That the primary metaphors can occur without reference to the נפש (e.g., Job 5:5, 20:20; Qoh 5:910) supports this reading.

perceiver and "fill" his or her body. Here, then, the person is also conceptualized as a container (THE SELF IS A CONTAINER), which can be filled with intangible desires that can be consumed (IDEAS ARE FOOD/LIQUID).[210] Having enough to "eat" leaves one satisfied, while having too little leaves one craving more. Such desires, however, vary from person to person. Wealth seems to have been a popular desire, considering how frequently sapiential literature reflects upon it (e.g., Job 5:5; Qoh 5:9; 6:2–3), but individuals could also desire wickedness (Prov 21:10), honor (e.g., Qoh 6:2), or even God (Ps 63:2). In the case of Prov 10:3, 13:4, and 25, the subjectivity of desire enables the application of the proverb to multiple situations, which remain unnamed in the text. Yet, although the object of desire varies as the proverbs are applied to new situations, the metaphorical mapping remains consistent. Desire is a personal, subjective experience.

Emotions are also commonly described as flavors (ENJOYMENT IS SWEET, DISTRESS IS BITTER):

Prov 9:17	Stolen water is *sweet* (ימתקו), and secret bread is pleasant.
Job 9:18	He does allow me to return my breath, but *satiates* me (ישבעני) with *bitterness* (ממררים).
Qoh 5:11	*Sweet* (מתוקה) is the sleep of the worker, whether he eats (יאכל) little or much, but the surfeit (והשבע) of the rich does not give rest for him to sleep.

Sleep is *enjoyable* (מתוקה) to the worker, because he does not have to worry about material possessions as the rich person does (Qoh 5:11; see also Prov 2:10, 3:24, 13:19, Qoh 11:7), and ill-begotten goods are *pleasant* (מתק) to a person who obtains them (Prov 9:17). On the other hand, a person in sorrow is "full" of bitterness; that is, his entire body tastes sorrow (Job 9:18; compare ושבעתי נדדים, "full of tossing" in Job 7:4 and ושבע־רגז, "full of trouble" in Job 14:1). When combined with a SELF metaphor, this last conceptualization creates a compound metaphor in

[210] Just as desire can be a hunger or thirst, ideas can be solid or liquid foods.

which distress is understood to be a "bitter" נפש (DISTRESS IS A BITTER SELF):[211]

Prov 14:10 The heart knows the *bitterness* (מרת) of its נפש.

Job 21:23–25 This one dies with sound bone, completely secure and at ease, his loins full of milk (מלאו חלב) and the marrow of his bones drunk (ישקה). But this one dies in a *bitter soul* (בנפש מרה) and does not *eat good* (ולא־אכל בטובה).

Job 27:2 By the living God, who takes away my judgment and Shaddai, who *makes bitter* (המר) my נפש.

Here, bitterness is localized in one part of the individual, the נפש, which is "made bitter" (המר) by God (Job 27:2) or by circumstance (Prov 14:10; Job 21:23–25).[212] According to Prov 14:10, the heart can know the "bitterness" (מרת) of its נפש; that is, one Self of the individual can experience the *distress* of another Self. The individual can also act "with" or "in" a bitter נפש. Thus, unlike the "sweetness" experience by the sleeping worker in Qoh 5:11, the individual in Job 21:25 dies "in" a bitter נפש (בנפש מרה ; see also Job 7:11, 10:1); that is, he dies without being able to *enjoy* the simple pleasures of life or אכל בטובה ("eat good"). Like the phrase ראה טוב[ה] ("see good"), אכל בטובה indicates enjoyment, in this case, the *enjoyment* of health and security ("loins full of milk," עטיניו מלאו חלב; "marrow of his bones drunk"; ומח עצמותיו ישקשה; "sound bone," בעחם תמו).[213] אכל בטובה is thus the functional equivalent of מתוק (ENJOYMENT IS TO EAT GOOD). As Malul notes, the root טוב is frequently connected to taste (e.g., "good wine," "good oil") and may itself be derived from the domain of eating and being satisfied.[214] A "good heart" (טוב לב/לב טוב, etc.), for instance, frequently "refers to the state of satisfaction after having eaten and drunk one's fill" (e.g., 1 Kgs

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[211] By the same process, enjoyment could theoretically be conceptualized as a "sweet" נפש (ENJOYMENT IS A SWEET SELF), but this does not seem to be attested.

[212] See also Job 3:20 and Prov 31:6, which speak of individual being bitter *of* נפש. Although these could envision the נפש as a metonymy for the person as a whole (as in the primary DESIRE metaphors above), the use of the construct state in these passages suggest a more localized effect.

[213] Each of these phrases evokes metaphors of health and security, that is, metaphors of life. For more on ingestion and metaphors for life, see Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 176, 180–82.

[214] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 132. In making this argument, Malul follows the conclusions of Yochanan Muffs (*Studies in the Aramaic Legal Papyri from Elephantine* [Leiden: Brill], 1969).

8:66; Esth 1:10; Prov 15:15; Qoh 9:7).[215] Given the prolific use of טוב[ה] in the Hebrew Bible as an abstract quality without any connection to eating, I would be hesistant to push this etymology too far. Yet, it does suggest that, like נפש or שבע, טוב[ה] is not as divorced from concrete experience as might otherwise be assumed.

Like the DESIRE metaphors, ENJOYMENT IS SWEET and DISTRESS IS BITTER map ingestion's properties of <internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, and <subjectivity $_{yes}$> onto the abstract domain of emotional experience, creating an impression of emotion as a personal, subjective experience. They also conceptualize the human body as a container into which emotions can be put (BODY IS A CONTAINER). In these cases, however, "being full" is not necessarily a positive experience; although one can be full of happiness, one can also be full of sorrow and trouble. More importantly, ENJOYMENT IS SWEET and DISTRESS IS BITTER rely upon ingestion's capacity to identify the flavor of an object, mapping such identification onto the emotions themselves (<identification $_{yes}$>). Positive emotions are deemed "sweet" (מתוק/ערב) or "good" (טוב[ה]), while negative emotions are "bitter" (מר/מרר). One might therefore collectively conclude that EMOTIONS ARE FLAVORS, which the individual can "taste." When the נפש is involved, as in Job 21:23–25, Prov 14:10, and the like, it is probably envisioned as that part of the individual that does the tasting (as opposed to being the object that is tasted).[216] Just as an English speaker might say that a situation left a "sour taste" in his or her mouth to indicate dissatisfaction, biblical Hebrew states that a person has a מר נפש that can be given -ל ("to," Job 3:20; Prov 31:6) or spoken -ב ("in, with" Job 7:11, 10:1, 21:25).[217] The result is an experience that can only be understood by the one who experiences it.

Judgment Metaphors

As noted above, ingestion is frequently used as a source domain for an individual's moral

[215] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 132.

[216] It thus relies upon the same understanding of the SELF AS A PERSON that THINKING IS SPEAKING and THINKING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ONE'S SELF do above.

[217] See also Prov 14:10, where the "לב knows the bitterness (מרת) of its נפש" (no preposition included), and Job 27:2, where the נפש is "made bitter" (המר).

evaluation of a situation. "Taste," for instance, can indicate an individual's capacity to evaluate a situation (JUDGING IS TASTING):

Prov 31:18 She *tastes* (טעמה) that her wares are good.

Job 6:30 Is there any injustice on my tongue? Can my *palate* (חך) not understand calamity?

The industrious woman of Prov 31 does not physically taste her wares; rather, she *judges* (טעמה) that her wares are good (טוב). Similarly, Job scolds his companions for questioning his ability to *evaluate* (חך...בין) the nature and cause of his calamity. Presumably, everyone has the capacity to "taste" their environment; however, as Job 6:30 implies, not everyone can execute it effectively. Therefore, the noun טַעַם is used more specifically to indicate a person's ability to *judge wisely*:[218]

Prov 11:22 A ring of gold in the nose of a swine is the woman beautiful but without *taste* (טעם).

Prov 26:16 The lazy person is wiser in his eyes than seven who bring back *taste* (טעם).

Job 12:20 He removes the speech of those who are trusted and takes away the *taste* (וטעם) of the elders.

The lazy person of Prov 26:16 and the beautiful woman of Prov 11:22 are incapable of *judging wisely* (טעם), while the "elders" of Job, who are listed elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible as leaders of the community (e.g., Num 11:16; Deut 19:2, 21:2–4, 22:15–18; Ruth 4:2–11; etc.) and therefore presumably need this ability to fulfill their official duties—have this capacity taken away from them (e.g., Job 12:20). [219]

By extension, flavors are used to express the end result of such evaluation (GOOD IS SWEET/BAD IS BITTER):

[218] The Hebrew Bible rarely specifies that this judgment is טוב (e.g., Ps 119:66), but the adjective is clearly implied in these passages.

[219] Compare this to superscription of Ps 34:1 and the corresponding story of David's "madness" in 1 Sam 21:13, where the choice to "change one's taste" (שנה...טעם) does not indicate a true loss of judgment but a change in demeanor, a conscious choice to feign madness.

Prov 5:4 In the end, she is as *bitter* (מרה) as wormwood.

Prov 27:9 Oil and incense gladdens the heart; but the *sweet [advice]* (מתוק)[220] of a friend [gladdens the heart] more than the counsel of the נפש.

Qoh 7:26 And I found more *bitter* (מר) than death the woman, for she is a snare...

Similar to emotional metaphors, “sweet” (מתק) indicates a positive evaluation, while “bitter” indicates a negative evaluation.[221] Here, however, the “sweetness” (מתק) of a friend’s counsel lies not in its capacity to elicit an enjoyable emotional experience but in its evaluation as a word that is beneficial to the individual (Prov 27:9). Similarly, a woman deemed “bitter” (מר/מרה) is not sorrowful but one that is harmful to an individual (Prov 5:4; Qoh 7:26).

Like desire metaphors, the JUDGING IS TASTING and GOOD IS SWEET/BAD IS BITTER metaphors function by mapping ingestion’s properties of <internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, and <subjective $_{yes}$> onto the abstract domain of moral evaluation. Subjectivity is particularly important, since the evaluation of an object as “sweet” or “bitter” depends upon the individual: the unsuspecting individual may think a woman sweet (e.g., Prov 5:3), but the wise know that she is “bitter” (Prov 5:4; Qoh 7:26). Moreover, in order to come to a conclusion about the relative value of an abstract quality in the first place, these metaphors rely upon the mapping of ingestion’s <evaluation $_{yes}$> property. Like a tongue testing food, the individual tests qualities to determine whether or not they are safe for the individual to consume.

Another important ingestive metaphor in sapiential texts is one in which moral identity is equated to the abstract quality an individual consumes (MORAL IDENTITY IS FOOD EATEN):[222]

Prov 4:17 For [the wicked] *eat* (לחמו) the *bread of wickedness* (לחם רשע) and *drink*

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[220] Literally: sweetness. As Fox (*Proverbs 10–31*, 807) notes, the comparison between מתוק and עצה (“counsel”) is obscure. Yet, the structure of the verse suggests that it is the good advice of the friend that is “sweet” here.

[221] See also the discussion of the possible ingestive nuances of טוב[ה] above.

[222] Szlos, “Metaphor in Proverbs 31:10–31,” 138–39. Szlos labels this metaphor FOOD IS IDENTITY (with the source domain in the position of the target domain?). However, what is at stake here is not simply the physical composition of the individual but his or her moral state. I have thus modified the nomenclature of the metaphor to reflect this.

(ישתו) the *wine of violence* (יין חמסים).

Prov 15:14	The *mouths* (פה) of fools *feed upon* (ירעה) folly.
Prov 31:27	She guards the way of her house and does not *eat* (תאכל) the *bread of idleness* (לחם עצלות).
Job 15:16	Indeed, he is abhorred and corrupted, the one who *drinks* (שתה) iniquity *like water* (כמים).

In these passages, ideas are once again conceived of as consumable objects (IDEAS ARE FOOD/LIQUID). Here, however, as Szlos states, "you are what you eat"; that is, who a person is can be described by the foods he or she consumes. This is particular evident in what Szlos calls the "bread of" constructions (לחם + an abstract term) found in Prov 4:17 and 31:27. Here, the one who "eats" (לחם) the *bread of wickedness* (לחם רשע) is wicked, and the one who "eats" (אכל) the *bread of idleness* (לחם עצלות) is idle.[223] Similarly, the one who "drinks iniquity" (שתה כמימ עולה) is corrupt (see also Prov 19:28), and the one who *feeds on* (ירעה) folly is a fool (Prov 15:14).[224] In this last example, such corruption has gone so far that the person is conceptualized as animal, feeding upon wickedness (THE PERSON IS AN ANIMAL). It is striking that MORAL IDENTITY IS FOOD EATEN often carries a negative connotation; yet, the metaphor itself is probably not inherently negative, since complex metaphors based upon it can carry positive connotations (see the discussion of WISDOM IS A HOSTESS in Chapter 5 below). Like the JUDGING IS TASTING metaphor, MORAL IDENTITY IS FOOD EATEN maps ingestion's properties of <internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjective $_{yes}$>, and <evaluative $_{yes}$> onto the abstract domain of judgment. It

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[223] As Szlos ("Metaphor in Proverbs 31:10–31," 138) notes, not all "bread of" constructions indicate moral identity. She distinguished, for instance, between "'bread of' + abstract noun constructions" and other "bread of" constructions (e.g., Prov 23:6, 27:27, 30:8). I would add that even "bread of" construction that do include an abstract quality do not necessarily indicate moral identity. For instance the "bread of secrecies" (לחם סתרים) listed in 9:17 and the "bread of deceit" (לחם שקר) in 20:17 indicates ill-begotten bread not 'secret' or 'deceitful' individuals. Similarly, the "bread of lies" in 23:3 does not make one a "liar" but is bread that deceives the individual, because "the pleasure it gives is fleeting" (Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 720, see also 897).

[224] On the other hand, to "drink down violence" (חמס שתה; Prov 26:6) indicates that the individual is inviting destruction, not that he is violent. For more on the connection between ingestion and metaphors of harm, see Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 146–50.

focuses, however, on the effective nature of ingestion (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$). Just as concrete food transfers its inherent qualities onto the perceiver as it is broken down and absorbed into the body, moral "food" transfers its essential character onto the one who eats it. Thus, the industrious woman of Prov 31 is said to avoid eating the "bread of idleness" (לחם עצלות) lest she become idle.

Summary

Ingestion, then, serves an important function as a source domain for emotive and evaluative metaphors by mapping ingestion's key properties onto cognition:

Ingestion	<selected properties>
DESIRE IS HUNGER/THIRST	<internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>
DESIRE IS A HUNGRY/THIRSTY SELF	<internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>
SATISFACTION IS FULLNESS/ DISSATISFACTION IS EMPTINESS	<contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>
SATISFACTION IS A FULL SELF/ DISSATISFACTION IS AN EMPTY SELF	<contact $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>
ENJOYMENT IS SWEET, DISTRESS IS BITTER	<internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>, <identification $_{yes}$>
DISTRESS IS A BITTER SELF	<internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>, <identification $_{yes}$>
ENJOYMENT IS TO EAT GOOD	<internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjectivity $_{yes}$>
JUDGING IS TASTING	<evaluation $_{yes}$> : also <internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, and <subjective $_{yes}$>
GOOD IS SWEET/BAD IS BITTER	<evaluation $_{yes}$> : also <internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, and <subjective $_{yes}$>
MORAL IDENTITY IS FOOD EATEN	<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$; also: <internal $_{yes}$>, <directness $_{yes}$>, <subjective $_{yes}$>, <evaluative $_{yes}$>

Table 7: Metaphorical Mappings: COGNITION IS INGESTING

While DESIRE IS HUNGER/THIRST and SATISFACTION IS FULLNESS/DISSATISFACTION IS EMPTINESS focus on whether the individual is "filled" with an abstract quality, the GOOD IS SWEET/BAD IS BITTER metaphors draw heavily upon ingestion's ability to identify objects from the environment. Similarly, evaluative metaphors focus on that aspect of ingestion, although MORAL IDENTITY IS FOOD EATEN also relies upon ingestion's capacity to affect the perceiver. Yet, regardless of their

individual focus, each ingestive metaphor envisions cognition to be an internal experience, largely incomparable from one individual to another and dependent upon the subjective, personal perspective of the individual involved.

COGNITION IS MOVING

Although sight and sound are generally considered to be the primary modalities by which individuals gain knowledge of their environment, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone has convincingly argued that movement is foundational for nearly all of our experience with the world. As she states, from the beginning, we "are simply infused with movement—not merely the *propensity* to move, but with the real thing." We are either "still-born" or "movement-born."[225] We walk, squirm, move our arms and legs, open and close our eyes, and swing our head from side to side. Air enters into our body and expands our lungs; blood courses through our veins and establishes our pulse. It is by movement that we know ourselves to be alive, and it is by lack of movement that we classify other entities as inanimate or even dead.[226] Movement, then, is a very real mode of perception, and it governs all other modalities.[227] Movement also offers a distinct way of engaging the world and serves as a frequent source domain for metaphors of cognition. Like other modalities, such kinesthetic metaphors reflect a particular conception of cognition, in this case, one in which cognition is conceived of as a continual, self-perpetuated process.

Typology of Movement

Key Terms: עמד, ישב, קום, שכב, נוח, יצב, דרך, הלך, שיט, נגש, אשר, בוא, ירד, רגל, תור

Like touch or ingestion, movement belongs to a more complex system of bodily functions, in this case, the system of "proprioception" ("perception of one's self"), that is, the

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[225] M. Sheets-Johnstone, *The Primacy of Movement* (Advances in Consciousness Research 14; Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1999), 136, 232.

[226] Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy of Movement*, 135–36.

[227] For instance, it is by movement that the eyes track objects (sight), food is put into the mouth (ingestion), and objects are moved from one location to another (touch). This foundational aspect shall be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4 below. Movement is not, however, simply a prerequisite to other modalities. As Sheets-Johnstone (*Primacy of Movement*, 139) argues, sensations of movement are "in their own right, *perceptual experiences*, the most fundamental of perceptual experiences."

system of mechanisms by which individuals perceive their bodily movement (“kinesthesia”) and their bodily position (“statesthetesis”).[228] While there are many types of kinesthesia, the most important for the construction of Israelite epistemology is locomotion, which is reflected in various Hebrew terms for “walking” (הלך, בוא, נגש, שוט, אשר, קרב, ירד) and which, though experienced by the entire body, is commonly grounded in the “foot” (רגל; e.g., +דרך, “walk the foot,” Deut 11:24; Josh 1:3; + בוא, “come by foot,” 2 Sam 15:18; 1 Kgs 14:12; Isa 41:3; + יצא, “go out by foot,” 2 Sam 15:16–17; +נשא, as in “to lift the foot,” Gen 29:1; +עבר, “cross over by foot,” Num 20:19; Deut 2:28; Ps 66:6). Statesthetesis is more difficult to pin down, referring as it does to the position of the entire body. Yet, since it is often realized through vertical motion or the minute sensations of the stationary body, it is best reflected by Hebrew verbs of “standing” (עמד, קום, יצב), “sitting” (ישב), “lying down” (שכב), and “being still/at rest” (נוח). While statesthetesis can also be represented by the foot (e.g., Josh 3:13; Ps 26:12, 122:2; Ezk 2:2), its location in the body is often left unspecified. One simply “stands” (e.g., Gen 18:8, 19:27, 41:17), “sits” (e.g., Exod 2:14; Isa 47:1; Ezk 26:16), or “lies down” (e.g., Gen 1:4; Josh 2:8; 1 Sam 3:2).

Like other modalities, proprioception is capable of detecting its object and identifying its current status, i.e., whether the body is standing, walking, or lying down (<detection $_{yes}$>, <identification $_{yes}$>). Unlike other modalities, however, the object of proprioception is not distinct from the individual who experiences it. As the name suggests, in proprioception, there is nothing external to the body to detect or identify, nothing tangible, audible, or visual to inspect. Rather, as

[228] Olivier Gapenne, “Kinesthesia and the Construction of Perceptual Objects,” in *Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science* (eds. John Robert Stewart, et al.; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2010), 183–218 (186). The relationship between kinesthesia and proprioception is debated. Some scholars use the two terms synonymously to refer to the same modality, while others argue that they are two separate modalities capable of being distinguished based on the presence or absence of equilibratory sensations (proprioception being connected to equilibrium, kinesthesia not). Sheets-Johnstone (*Primacy of Movement*, passim), for instance, does not distinguish between the two, preferring to use the term “self-movement” or “movement” to refer to the entire phenomenon of bodily movement. Malul (*Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 102 n. 3, 127), on the other hand, distinguishes between “motion” (e.g., walking, digging, separating) and “equilibratory sensations” (e.g., standing), both of which he groups under the general heading of “kinesthesis.” He argues, however, that in biblical Hebrew the two sensations are inexorably linked. Here, I follow Gapenne in regarding proprioception as a generic term used to refer to a variety of sensations, including kinesthesia, equilibrium, and statesthetesis.

Sheets-Johnstone states, "*what is created and what is constituted are one and the same*" (emphasis original), that is, the perceiver *is* the object perceived (PR=OP).[229] This creates a more intimate connection between proprioception and the individual's sense of corporeal being than any other perceptual modality enjoys.[230] The Hebrew Bible recognizes this when it speaks of movement as a prerequisite of life. Thus, Qohelet speaks of the living as "the ones who *walk* (המלכים) under the sun" (4:15), and 2 Kings as those "*rising* (קום) upon the *feet* (רגליו)" (13:21; see also Ezek 37:10, 3:24; Zech 14:12).[231] As Brenda Farnell would say, "I move, therefore I am."[232]

On a practical level, this convergence between object and perceiver means that many of the properties identified by Ibarretxe-Antuñano are irrelevant to proprioception, particularly those of the PR→OP category (<contact>, <closeness>, <internal>, <limits>).[233] More importantly, this intimate connection between perceiver and object makes proprioception difficult to analyze. As modern researchers have argued, proprioception is both subjective and "indeterminate." Although others can see the individual move, the actual experience of movement is experienced in and determined by the body of the individual (<subjective $_{\text{yes}}$>). Job knows when he is "standing" (עמדתי, Job 30:20) and when he is "lying down" (שכב, Job 7:4), not because he has seen it or someone has told him, but because he has detected movement in his body and identified its position. Similarly, the psalmists knows themselves to be "sitting" (ישב, e.g., Ps 137:1), "standing" (ישב, Ps 122:2), or "lying down" (שכב, Ps 3:5, 4:9), because they have experienced it for themselves. Proprioception is also indeterminate in that, although one can choose when to walk and when to stand (Gen 24:58, 33:14; Exod 9:29; Neh 2:12; Hab 2:1; etc.) (<voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>), bodily movements and positions are so ingrained in us that individuals are not typically conscious

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[229] Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy of Movement*, 153–54.

[230] Ead., 139.

[231] Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 181.

[232] Brenda Farnell, *Dynamic Embodiment for Social Theory: "I Move Therefore I Am"* (New York: Routledge, 2012). In titling her book as she does, Farnell is playing of the famous phrase of Descartes, "I think, therefore I am."

[233] Also irrelevant are the properties of <directness>, <correction of the hypothesis>, and <evaluation>. However, as shall be discussed below, <location> (which is from PR→OP) is still highly relevant.

of their operation except when they deviate from the habitual norms (e.g., the individual כשל, "stumbles," 2 Chr 28:15; Job 4:4; Isa 40:30; Lam 5:13; צלע, "limps," Gen 32:32; or is פִּסֵּחַ, "lame," Lev 21:18; 2 Sam 9:13, 19:27; etc.).[234] Consequently, although movement is commonly described in the Hebrew Bible, it is rarely reflected upon. Individuals "walk," "lie down," or "take their stance"; they do not pause to consider the nature of their actions or their import.

Yet, as Sheets-Johnston has demonstrated, it is precisely through such routine activities that the individual detects his or her body and establishes a sense of self. By moving in the world, people discover what they can and cannot do, who and what they are, and how they relate to others.[235] For instance, movement reveals what Sheets-Johnstone calls the "amplitudinal quality" of the body, that is, the "expansiveness or contractiveness of [the] moving body and the spatial expansiveness or contractedness of [its] movement."[236] Statesthetesis, for example, detects the amplitude of the stationary body, whether it is contracted (ישב, "sitting," Gen 31:34; Exod 17:12; 1 Sam 20:25; etc.; שחה, "bowed down," Gen 18:2, 19:1, 24:52, etc.; כרע, "kneeling," Judg. 7:5–6; 2 Kgs 1:13; etc.) or stretched out (vertically: e.g., עמד, "standing," Job 29:8; Ezek 2:1, 37:10; etc.; horizontally: e.g., שכב, "lying down," Gen 28:11; Judg 5:27; 1 Sam 3:5; etc.). Generally, the individual can affect this amplitude (<effects $_{yes}$>[237]). Samuel can choose to stand (קום, 1 Sam 3:5); Abraham can choose to bow down (שחה, Gen 18.2). Yet, this ability can be hampered by age, natural deformity, or circumstance. Thus, Laban accepts Rachel's explanation that she is unable to stand because of her menses (Gen 31:35), and the law prescribes restitution for the person who is forced to lie down (ונפל למשכב, "fall to a bed") because of an injury (Exod 21:18).

Locomotion, on the other hand, creates a sense of contracted or expansive space. As Sheets-Johnstone states, "it is erroneous to think that movement simply takes place *in* space…on the contrary, we formally create space in the process of moving; we qualitatively create a certain

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[234] Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy of Movement*, 142–44.
[235] Ead., 135–38.
[236] Ead., 143.
[237] Since the perceiver and the object are the same, there is no need to distinguish between <effects> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$ and <effects> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$.

spatial character by the very nature of our movement—a large, open space, or a tight, resistant space, for example."[238] Thus, the Hebrew Bible classifies some spaces as "broad" (רהב, Exod 3:8; Judg 18:10; 1 Kgs 6:2; etc.; see also the nominal form רהוב, a "broad place," Gen 19:2; Judg 19:17; 2 Sam 21:12; etc.) and other spaces as "narrow" (משעול, Num 22:24; צר, Num 22:26; 2 Kgs 6:1; Isa 49:20), classifications deduced by how an individual might move through them (2 Sam 22:37). When combined with other modalities, especially visual observation and haptic exploration, such motion enables one to detect information about the external world. Thus, according to Gen 13, Abram is to get a sense of the land he is to inherit by looking at (ראה) it from afar (v. 14) and walking (התהלך) its length and breadth (v. 17) (see also Josh 1:3). Similarly, when the satan "walks about" the earth (הלך/שוט, Job 1:7, 2:2) or when individuals "foot about" the land (רָגַל, e.g., Num 21:32; Deut 1:24; Jos 2:1, 6:25, 7:2), they do so, not simply for the pleasure of walking or to reach a destination, but in order to acquire information about their surroundings.[239]

Proprioception also reveals the "linear quality" of the body and its movement. Physically, a body can be vertically or horizontally "straight" (ישר; see, for instance, the description of the legs and wings of the creatures on the divine chariot in Ezek 1:7, 23)[240] or "curved" (גהר, "bent over," 1 Kgs 18:42; 2 Kgs 4:34–35; עות, "bent," Qoh 12:3). Kinesthetically, a person can move "forward" (נגד, Jos 6:5, 20; Amos 4:3; Neh 12:37; קדם, Job 23:8), "backwards" (אחרנות, Gen 9:23;

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[238] Ead., 143–44; see also Gapenne, "Kinesthesia and the Construction of Perceptual Objects," 200–208.

[239] Hence, the common translation of the verb רגל as "to spy" (NRSV). See also the verbs שוט ("to roam") and תור ("to walk about, scout"), each of which expresses locomotion that has as its goal the acquisition of knowledge. Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 141–43; Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 160–62. בקש ("searching, seeking") may also carry kinesthetic connotations. Yet, as Malul (*Knowledge, Control, Sex*, 105 n. 14) points out, the etymology and thus modal domain is unclear (he, for instance, tentatively places בקש with oral terms).

[240] Although there are no clear concrete examples of a human body being "straight," it is the linear quality of the body (as opposed to its movements) that seems to be of concern in metaphorical extensions of the term, ישר being the opposite of a "bent" or "crooked" body. Given that cross-culturally, up is typically associated with good (GOOD IS UP), vertical straightness is probably envisioned (see discussion of a MORAL PERSON IS A STRAIGHT PERSON in Chapter 4 below). Hence, many scholars translate ישר as "upright" when it refers metaphorically to the human person, thereby preserving the term's vertical linearity.

אחור, Job 23:8), in a “straight” line (ישר, 1 Sam 6:12; Jer 31:9; Ps 107:7; Prov 9:15; Isa 40:3; נכח, Ezek 46:9), circuitously (סבב , Jos 6:3–4, 7, 14–15), or aimlessly (תעה, Gen 21:14, 37:15; Ps 107:4; etc.).[241] Such routine linear motion creates what Johnson calls a source-path-goal schema, an expectation that every movement has a beginning point, an end, and a trajectory that takes a person between the two.[242] In the Hebrew Bible, the point of origin and the destination can be a specific location or a broader geographical region. Thus Isaac “walks” (הלך) to Gerar (Gen 26:1), and Jacob “goes out” (יצא) from Beer-sheba and “walks” (הלך) to Haran (Gen 28:10; see also Gen 29:1, 36:6). Although deviations from the path are possible (the individual can “turn to the left or to the right,” סור ימין ושמאול, Deut 2:27; 2 Sam 2:21; see also Num 22:26), the perceiver expects movements to have a point of origin, a path, and a destination. Thus, it is noteworthy when someone “wanders about” (תעה) without a defined path or destination (e.g., Gen 21:14, 37:15).

Because proprioception creates a sense of space, linear movements enable the perceiver to determine his or her relative location vis-à-vis other bodies in the environment (<location $_{\text{yes}}$>).[243] Lot can sit *in* (ישב ב־) the gateway of Sodom (Gen 19:1; see also Gen 18:1; 2 Sam 23:12//1 Chr 11:14); Hagar can walk away and sit *in front of* (ישב מנגד) of her son (Gen 21:16); and each is aware of their own relative location. Similarly, when biblical texts classify some objects as “near” (קרוב, Gen 19:20; Exod 13:17; etc.; אצל, 1 Sam 5:2, 20:1, etc.) and others as “distant” (מרחק, e.g., Gen 22:4, 37:18; Exod 2:4, etc.), it does so based upon kinesthetic appreciation of the environment. Unlike sight or touch, however, proprioception does not present a static spatial body. The body is not simply an object *in* space; it is an object *moving through* space. Even a seemingly stationary body, standing still or resting, exhibits subtle movement (e.g., the tightening of muscles, minute changes in position) and contains within it the potential for still

[241] Again, the individual can typically affect the quality of his or her movement, save when his or her ability has been hampered by nature or circumstance (e.g., when Jacob is struck on the thigh by a divine man in Gen 32:22–32, he is unable to walk properly).

[242] Johnson, *The Meaning of the Body*, 138–39.

[243] Frédérique de Vignemont, “Bodily Awareness,” in *The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (ed. Edward Zalta), n.p. [cited 20 April 2012]. On-line: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bodily-awareness.

greater movement (e.g., to stand up, to start walking).[244] Thus, in one fluid motion, Esau “arises” (קום) and “walks” (הלך); that is, his stationary body transitions smoothly into an ambulatory one (Gen 25:34). The question, then, is not whether movement is present or absent but the degree to which the individual exerts.

Proprioception can detect this as well. As Sheets-Johnstone argues, through proprioception, the individual can detect the “tensional” and “projectional” qualities of movement, that is, the sense of how much effort or force is exerted by the body.[245] Movement can be fast (רוץ, Gen 18:2, 7; 24:17, etc.; מהר, Gen 18:6, 27:20, 43:30, etc.) or slow (לאטי לרגל, “by gentle foot,” Gen 33:14; מהה, lit. “linger, delay” Gen 19:16; Exod 12:39; Judg 3:26), easy (e.g., one can “stand firmly,” Josh 3:17, 4:3; see also the vast majority of cases where movement is performed without conscious thought or qualification) or difficult (e.g., “one stumbles,” כשל, Lev 26:37; 2 Chr 28:15; etc.). For this reason, descriptions of terrain as “level” (מישור, e.g., Deut 3:10; Josh 13:16; Ps 26:12; etc.) or “uneven” (עָקֹב, “hilly,” רֶכֶס, “rough,” Isa 40:4) are instructive, not because of their aesthetic value but because they reflect the relative effort the individual perceives that it would take to traverse them.

Like speech or hearing, then, proprioception is a temporal modality. It does not present a static spatiality of the body but its “unfolding kinetic dynamic,” the quality and manner of its constant changes.[246] Unlike hearing or speech, however, this temporality is not sequential. There is not a sense of “befores, nows, or afters,” but rather one continuous “streaming present,” in which actions and consequences fluctuate and unfold in a dynamic pattern.[247] Movement is a process that begins with birth and ends with death; although the quality of it and the degree of the perceiver’s awareness of it may change, its presence remains constant (so <briefness $_{no}$>). In this respect, it is hardly surprising that in the Hebrew Bible, the classic verb of “walking” (הלך) comes

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[244] As Gapenne states, “except when dead, the body is never really static” (“Kinesthesia and the Construction of Perceptual Objects,” 185)

[245] Sheets-Johnstone, *Primacy of Movement*, 143.

[246] Ead., 142, 160.

[247] Ead., 151–54. In this argument, she follows Edmund Husserl.

to mean "continually" when it is paired with another verb. Thus, Tamar walks away, "crying continually" (הלוך וזעקה, 2 Sam 13:19; see also Gen 8:3, 5; 12:9; 15:2; etc.). By analogy with the other modalities, one might therefore call this type of detection one of "dynamic continuity."

The properties of proprioception can thus be summarized as follows:

<location $_{\text{yes}}$>
<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{dynamic continuity}}$
<identification $_{\text{yes}}$>
<voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>
<effects $_{\text{yes}}$>[248]
<subjectivity $_{\text{yes}}$>
<briefness $_{\text{no}}$>

COGNITION IS MOVING

As with other modalities, proprioception serves as a natural source domain for metaphors of cognition. Sapiential texts frequently conceptualize cognition as horizontal motions, vertical positions, or directional orientations of the body, thereby drawing upon both locomotion and statesthetesis to structure the cognitive experience. Movement also serves as a source domain for human behaviors. Although not technically cognitive metaphors, these behavior metaphors greatly influence the development of complex metaphors for wisdom and thus also warrant consideration here.[249]

Knowledge Metaphors

Since movement is a common means of acquiring information about the environment, it naturally becomes a source domain for cognition. For instance, thinking can be described as an act of moving towards an abstract concept (THINKING IS WALKING):

Prov 6:6 *Go* (לך) to the ant, you lazy one; see its ways (דרכיה) and be wise.

Qoh 2:1 I spoke, I with my heart, "Let us *go* now (לכה־נא), I will test pleasure and see good. But indeed, this too vanity."

Qoh 2:3 I *scouted about* (תרתי) with my לב [how] to induce[250] my flesh with

[248] See footnote 237.

[249] Although they carry certain cognitive connotations, these behavior metaphors are more appropriately classified as life metaphors. See Avrahami, *The Senses of Scripture*, 179–80.

[250] So Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 127. For the debate surrounding the translation and connotation of this term, see the same.

> wine—and my לב was leading (נהג) me with wisdom—and [how] to seize folly...

Like the imperative of ראה, the command to “go” challenges the listener to *consider* the subject at hand. Thus, the command to “go” to the ant is not a request to physically walk to an ant but rather an injunction to *contemplate* the nature of ants (Prov 6:6).[251] Similarly, the Teacher’s attempt to “scout out” (תור) the nature of pleasure does not indicate physical walking but cognitive exploration (Qoh 2:3; see also Qoh 1:13, 7:25).[252] The Teacher’s command to his Self in Qoh 2:1 to “go” (לכה) is likewise a command to *consider* the nature of pleasure. In these latter two examples, the Self is conceptualized as a person (THE SELF IS A PERSON) who can accompany the Essence of the speaker on his cognitive journey.[253] In Qoh 2:3, the לב even “guides” (נהג) the cognitive expedition. The root metaphor itself, however, assumes that the concept under consideration—the ant’s behavior, the nature of pleasure—is a location to which one can go (IDEAS ARE LOCATIONS). In doing so, it relies upon proprioception’s ability to detect the movement of the body and its intended goal (<detection $_{yes}$>). Because it specifies thought as an act of walking, there is a projectional quality to cognition; it progresses in a sustained manner at a regular speed. There is also, however, a certain linear quality to thought; it has a beginning, middle, and an end, although here only the latter is clearly defined. Unlike visual metaphors, in

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[251] In his essay on the empiricism of Proverbs, Fox seems to imply that the lazy person is commanded to physically *go* to the ant in order to consider it (*Proverbs 10–31*, 216); however, as he states in his comment on the verse, the main point of the passage is that “the sluggard is directed to *consider* the ant as a paragon of enterprise” (emphasis added; Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 216).

[252] Comparing Qoh 2:3 with Num 15:39 (תתרו אחרי לבבכם, “to follow the heart”) and Qoh 11:9 (והלך בדרכי לבך, “to walk in the ways of the heart”), Seow (*Ecclesiastes*, 126–27) suggests that “to go about with the heart” (תור לב) here indicates an emotional experience, not an intellectual one. By this reading, the Teacher actually *enjoys* wine; he does not contemplate *how* to do so. Yet, as Seow points out, all of the ancient versions of this passage understand תור here to indicate an intellectual activity. The LXX, for instance, reads κατεσκεψάμην (“I examined”); Aquila and Symmachus, ἐνοήθην (“I considered”); Theodotion, διανοήθην (“I purposed”); and the Vulgate, *cogitavi* (“I thought”) (Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 127). Given the similar usages of תור in Qoh 1:13 and 7:25, the intellectual connotation seems to make sense here. Although there may be emotional ramifications to the Teacher’s cognitive exploration, the act itself is an intellectual activity.

[253] For a discussion of the relationship between the Essence of the individual and his various Selves, see KNOWING IS HEARING/SPEAKING above. Here, however, the presence of the לב does not affect the primary metaphor, which still envisions the action of the walking being done by the person as a whole. In other words, these passages here do not witness a significant extension of this primary metaphor.

which conclusions appear to the individual instantaneously and seemingly without effort, the THINKING IS WALKING metaphor therefore conceptualizes thought as an on-going process that takes times and effort. Like one walking to a location, one must first "go" to the ant; only then, can he or she "see" it. Moreover, like physical motion, such cognitive motion is voluntary (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). Although presumably thought is always present, one chooses when to begin a particular line of reasoning.

Thinking can also be described as a bodily position. For instance, one can "stand" to consider an idea (THINKING IS STANDING):

Job 37:14 Give ear to this Job. *Stand* (עמד) and understand the wonders of God.

As Malul argues, the parallel between עמד and the verb בין ("understand") suggests that, like ראה, the bodily position of standing carried an epistemological nuance.[254] Physically, standing is a stationary position, reflecting a temporary cessation of horizontal motion; metaphorically, the individual is commanded to cease all other motion—that is, all other activity and thought—in order to contemplate the matter at hand, the wonders of God. One can also "turn" towards an abstract concept (THINKING IS TURNING):

Qoh 2:12 And I *turned* (ופניתי) to see wisdom, madness, and folly.

Qoh 7:25 I *turned around* (סבותי), I and my heart, to know and to spy out and to seek wisdom and the accounting of things and to know wickedness and foolishness and folly and madness.

Qoh 9:11 I *turned again* (שבתי) and saw under the sun that the race was not to the swift…

Like a body turning towards or away from a particular object or destination, the individual "turns" towards or away from a specific abstract concept. Thus, the Teacher "turns" towards wisdom (Qoh 2:12, 7:25), folly (Qoh 2:12), and the like (see, for example, בכל־מעשי שעשו ידי, "all

[254] Malul, *Knowledge, Control, and Sex*, 141. Malul compares the usage here to similar constructions in Exod 9:16; 1 Sam 9:27; 2 Chr 20:17; Cant 2:9; Jer 6:16, 48:19; Hab 2:1, each of which connect עמד to obtaining knowledge, either metaphorically or concretely.

the doings which are done by my hands," in Qoh 2:11). Qoh 9:11's use of שוב also connotes a cognitive turn. Although often translated as "again" (NRSV) or "further" (Seow),[255] שוב itself connotes a kinesthetic turn towards or a return to a previously held position or locale (see, for instance, Gen 14:7; Num 33:7; Judg 8:13; etc.). Here, the Teacher "turns again" to contemplate a matter, in this case, the equal fate destined for all (Qoh 9:11; see also Qoh 4:1, 7). As with the oral, tactile, and ingestive metaphors above, THINKING IS TURNING can combine with a SELF metaphor (THINKING IS TURNING ONE'S SELF):

> Prov 2:2 To make your ear attentive to wisdom and *turn* your heart (תטה לבך) to understanding.

In Prov 2:2, the sage commands his student to נטה his Self towards understanding. While נטה can be used to signify the extension of an object to someone (e.g., "stretch out one's hand," Exod 7:19, 8:1, 6, etc.; "extend a sword," Josh 8:18, 26; Ezk 30:25), it often connotes a person's change in direction toward or away from something (e.g., Gen 38:16; Num 20:17, 21:22, 22:23).[256] This latter connotation seems to be the nuance in Prov 2:2, where the act of turning reflects a distinct change in the position the Self, which is conceptualized as a person (THE SELF IS A PERSON). In any case, as Fox notes, this cognitive turn does not "demand understanding," only a "receptivity" towards it,[257] that is, the change in position represents a preliminary stage towards understanding, not the actual arrival at it.

As with the THINKING IS WALKING metaphor, THINKING IS STANDING and THINKING IS TURNING rely upon proprioception's ability to detect the motion of the body (<detection $_{yes}$>). In these metaphors, however, it is the motion of the stationary body that is under examination. As

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[255] Seow, *Ecclesiastes*, 177. These translations thus treated שוב as an auxiliary verb. Although שוב, like הלך, does indicate repeated action when paired with another verb (see, for instance, Exod 32:27; Ezek 35:7; Dan 11:10; Zech 7:14, 9:8), the kinesthetic value of שוב should not be lost.

[256] H. Ringgren, "נטה," *TDOT* 9 (1998): 381–87 (381–83). The reading of נטה as "stretch out" or "extend" still connotes kinesthesia, although of a different sort: that of movement which is localized in the arm or hand, rather than distributed throughout the entire body. Such cases describe how the person manipulates objects, and any metaphors based on them therefore belong to the tactile domain.

[257] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 109. Fox is speaking specifically about the directive in Prov 2:2, but the sentiment is applicable to the entire conceptual metaphor.

with physical statesthetesis, the concern of THINKING IS STANDING is with the tensional quality of motion, the degree of force that the individual exerts in the cognitive act, in this case relatively little. Thus, when one "stops" to consider a particular matter (as in Job 37:14), there is a temporary decrease in the amount of force exerted in other activities in order to focus on the contemplation at hand. THINKING IS TURNING, on the other hand, relies on proprioception's ability to detect the directional orientation of the body, whether one faces towards one concept or another. Yet, as with THINKING IS WALKING, both of these metaphors assume that the cognitive act is voluntary and continuous (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). The individual chooses when to stand and when to turn (e.g., Qoh 2:12, 7:25, 9:11) and often must be cajoled into doing so (e.g., Job 37:14; Prov 2:2), but the movement itself is part of a larger cognitive motion, either a cessation of motion that has gone before (as in THINKING IS STANDING) or a preparatory stage for motion that is to come (as in THINKING IS TURNING).

If contemplating a matter is going *to* or turning *towards* it, than understanding a matter is arriving *at* it (UNDERSTANDING IS ARRIVING AT A LOCATION):

Job 28:12 Where shall wisdom be found? And where is the *place* (מקום) of understanding?

Job 38:16 Have you *come* (הבאת) to the depths of the sea or *walked about* (התהלכת) the hidden places of the deeps?

Job 41:5 Who can uncover the front of its garments? Who can *come* (יבוא) into his double coat of mail?[258]

Qoh 3:22 I saw that there is nothing better than that an individual enjoy his work, for it is his lot. But who can *bring* him (יביאנו) to see what will be after him?[259]

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[258] As Habel (*Book of Job*, 555) notes, רסנו normally means "halter," but the LXX translates it as θώραξ ("coat of mail)," which seems to fit the context here.

[259] אחריו ("after him") is also a kinesthetically derived expression, referring here to the passage of time. The past is conceptualized spatially as that which comes "before" a person while the future is that

In Job 38:16, God questions Job about his ability to “come” to the otherwise inaccessible locales of creation, the sea and the deep (see also Job 38:22; Prov 30:3). That the same action can be done of Leviathan’s mouth (Job 41:5), a destination one would not physically want to walk, suggests that a physical journey through the heavens à la Enoch[260] is not intended here but rather a cognitive one. The point of these Jobian passages is that humans are not God. They cannot *comprehend* such matters; they cannot come to the “place” (מקום) of understanding (Job 28:12, see also Job 28:20). Likewise, the Teacher reflects upon the impossibility of “bringing” (יביאנו) others to understand their fate. By the same token, that which is unknown remains “far” away (LACK OF UNDERSTANDING IS FAR):

Qoh 7:23–24 All of this I have tested by wisdom; I said, “I will be wise,” but it was *far* (רחוקה) from me. That which is, is *far* (רחוק), and that which is exceedingly deep, who can find it?

Just as he laments of “bringing” others to understanding, the Teacher despairs of ever obtaining knowledge himself, stating that it remains “far” (רחוק) from him (Qoh 7:23–24). These two metaphors focus on proprioception’s locative and amplitudinal detective capabilities (<location $_{\text{yes}}$>, <detection $_{\text{yes}}$>). The individual can detect his or her relative position vis à vis knowledge and how much distance lies between. They also, in many respects, reflect the final stage of the previous cognitive motions. The process that began with stopping, turning, and moving toward a concept culminates when one finally arrives *at* it.

Emotion Metaphors

Proprioception also serves as a source domain for emotional experience. Pride, for instance, is described as having an elevated character (ARROGANCE IS BEING HIGH, HUMILITY IS

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which comes “after” (PAST IS BEFORE, FUTURE IS AFTER). See, for instance, Qoh 1:10, 11, 16; 2:7, 9, 16, 18; etc. Such time metaphors belong to the semantic domain of life.

[260] Enoch, the ancestor of Abraham that is said to have “walked with God” (ויתהלך חנוך את־האלהים) in Gen 5:22. In Genesis, “walking with God” is probably a metaphor for death (TO DIE IS TO WALK WITH GOD), but early Jews took this as a reference to a literal journey through the cosmos (see, for instance, *1 Enoch*).

BEING LOW):

Prov 3:35	The wise will possess honor, but *high* (מרים) fools [will inherit] dishonor.
Prov 21:4	*High* eyes (רים־עינים) and a *broad* heart (ורחב־לב), the lamp of the wicked are sin.
Prov 30:32	If you have been foolish, *lifting yourself* (בהתנשא) or if you have schemed [with] hand to mouth…
Job 22:29	When [others] are humiliated, then you will say, "it is pride; the *lowly of eyes* (ושח עינים) are saved."

In general, to be "lifted up" is a sign of honor. Thus, a city is "lifted up" (רום) through the blessing of the upright (Prov 11:11; see also Job 24:24) and a nation is "lifted" (רמם) through it righteousness (Prov 14:34; see also Prov 4:8). However, being inappropriately "high" is condemned. Thus, the fool who is "high" (רום, Prov 3:35) or who has "lifted himself up" (Prov 30:32) is inappropriately prideful and will come to disgrace. Similarly, having "raised" eyes (רים־עינים) is a characteristic of the proud and therefore condemned as a sin (Prov 21:4, see also Prov 6:17, 30:13), while having "lowered" eyes (שח עינים) is a sign of humility and praised (Job 22:29). As Prov 21:4 illustrates, the wicked are also distinguished by the "broadness" of their Self (רחב־לב). Although elsewhere having a "broad לב" is a sign of intellectual aptitude (see, for instance, 1 Kgs 4:29; Ps 119:32; HAVING KNOWLEDGE IS HAVING A BROAD HEART), here it is condemned as a negative quality. Like "high eyes," a "broad" Self belongs to someone who over-exaggerates their own worth (ARROGANCE IS A BROAD SELF).[261] A similar negativity is found in Prov 28:25, where a "broad" Self indicates greed (GREED IS A BROAD SELF):

Prov 28:25	A *broad* (רחב) נפש stirs up strife, but whoever trusts in the Lord will be fattened.

[261] For the reading of "broad לב" as an indicator of arrogance, see Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 680. Alternatively, the phrase could indicate "greed," as a "broad נפש" does in Prov 28:25 (see GREED IS A BROAD SELF below). Yet, as Fox points out, while the נפש is clearly connected to appetite elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, the לב is not. Given the connection of רחב־לב with haughty eyes here and in Ps 101:5, "arrogance" seems to be a more appropriate nuance for this construction.

As noted in the discussion of DESIRE IS HUNGER above, the נפש is frequently connected to physical appetite. Here, like a mouth wide open to receive food, the נפש is a broad cavity waiting to be filled. In each case, these spatial metaphors map proprioception's detective ability onto the emotional experience. In ARROGANCE IS BEING HIGH and HUMILITY IS BEING LOW, the emphasis is on the locative dimension of proprioception, that is, where the body is in relation to other bodies (<location $_{yes}$>). Pride and humility are characterized as the location at which one is situated (EMOTIONS ARE LOCATIONS). ARROGANCE IS A BROAD SELF and GREED IS A BROAD SELF, on the other hand, emphasize the amplitudinal qualities of proprioception, conceptualizing the Self as a space with width and breadth (THE SELF IS A SPACE) (<detection $_{yes}$> ^{amplitudinal}).[262]

Behavior Metaphors

Like thinking metaphors, specific actions can be conceptualized as either horizontal motions or changes in bodily position. A single action, for instance, is described as an act of "walking" (ACTING IS WALKING):

Prov 12:11	The one who works the land will have enough food, but the one who *pursues* (ומרדף) empty things will lack heart.
Prov 20:19	The one who reveals secrets *walks* (הולך) slander.
Job 31:5	If I have *walked* (הלכתי) with falsehood or my *foot* (רגלי) has *hurried* (ותחש) to deceit…

Fools "pursue" worthless goals (מרדף ריקים, Prov 12:11; see also Prov 11:19, 15:9, 21:21, 28:19), gossips "walk" slander (הולך רכיל, Prov 20:19, see also Prov 11:13), and individuals "walk" with falsehood (Job 31:5).[263] The goal of the actions determines the direction in which one moves. In Prov 12:11, the goal seems to be person that the individual chases (A PURPOSE IS A PERSON); in

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[262] By analogy with other cognitive metaphors, one would assume that these two "broad Self" metaphors arise when a primary metaphor (ARROGANCE IS BROADNESS or GREED IS BROADNESS) is combined with a SELF metaphor (THE SELF IS A SPACE). The primary metaphors themselves, however, do not seem to be reflected in the literature.

[263] For the metaphorical nuance of "hastening" in Job 31:5, see the discussion of ACTING IMPETUOUSLY IS RUNNING in Chapter 4 below.

Prov 20:19 and Job 31:5 the form of the goal is not specified. Yet, in each case, the root metaphor clearly conceptualizes behavior as a horizontal motion moving purposefully through space. Like the THINKING IS WALKING metaphor, ACTING IS WALKING maps proprioception's capability to detect motion onto an abstract domain, in this case, that of human behavior. In particular, it conceptualizes behavior as a progressive, linear motion, with a beginning, middle, and end (<detection $_{\text{yes}}$>$^{\text{projectional/linear}}$). Again, the destination of this motion is of primary importance, whether one moves toward evil (Prov 1:16, Job 31:5) or worthless pursuits (Prov 12:11). ACTING IS WALKING also presumes that such activity is voluntary (<voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>).

Action can also be described as a change in bodily posture, a turning *towards* or *away from* a behavior (ACTING IS TURNING):

Job 36:21	Take care; do not *turn* (אל־תפן) to iniquity.
Prov 3:7	Do not be wise in your eyes; fear the Lord and *turn* (וסור) from evil.
Job 1:1	There was a man in the land of Uz; his name was Job. That man was perfect and straight (וישר), and he feared God and he *turned* (וסר) away from evil.
Job 27:5	Until I die, I will not *turn* (לא־אסיר) integrity from me.
Job 33:17	[God disciplines] in order to *turn* (להסיר) a person from his deeds.

Engaging in a behavior is turning *towards* it. Thus, Elihu warns Job not to "turn" (פנה) towards iniquity (Job 36:21). Avoiding behavior, on the other hand, is turning *away* from it. Thus, the sage warns his student to "turn" (סור) from evil (Prov 3:7, see also Prov 14:16, 16:6; Job 28:28, and the command to שוב, "turn back," from iniquity in Job 36:10). Job is well known for doing just that (Job 1:1; see also Job 1:8, 2:3); in fact, he insists that he will not *avoid* (סור) behaving with integrity (Job 27:5). As with THINKING IS TURNING, ACTING IS TURNING relies upon proprioception's ability to detect directional orientation of the stationary body (<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{directional orientation}}$). Thus, the individual can detect the "direction" of behavior, whether he or she turns towards integrity (e.g., Job 27:5), iniquity (e.g., Job 36:21) or evil (Prov 3:7; Job 1:1).

Moreover, as with THINKING IS TURNING, the choice to behave in a certain manner here is voluntary (thus mapping kinesthesia's <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$> property onto behavior), although another individual can influence this choice. Thus, in Job 33:17, God "turns" (סור) the individual away from his actions towards better behavior (see also the negative realization of this in the complex metaphor of Prov 7:21).

Most importantly for sapiential metaphors, routine behavior is conceptualized as a "path" upon which individuals walk (BEHAVIOR IS A PATH):[264]

Prov 5:21 — For the *ways* (דרכי) of humans are in front of the eyes of the Lord, and he makes level (מפלס)[265] all their *tracks* (מעגלתויו).

Prov 6:6 — Go (לך) to the ant, you lazy one; see *its ways* (דרכיה) and be wise.

Job 13:15 — Indeed, he will kill me, I have not hope; but I will argue my *ways* (דרכי) to his face.

Job 26:14 — Indeed, these are the ends (קצות) of [God's] *way* (דרכו),[266] but what a whisper of a word we hear of it!

Just as repeatedly walking the same route marks out a path upon the ground, routine behavior establishes the path of one's life. Ants, for instance, routinely gather and prepare food in the summer; that is their "way" (דרך) (Prov 6:6; see also Prov 6:8, 30:19, 29). Similarly, people have "ways" (דרכי־איש) that can be observed by others (Prov 5:21). Thus, Job's actions conform to certain patterns (Job 13:15; see also Job 23:10, 31:4–5), as do God's (Job 26:14). According to Norman Habel, God's דרך is the "law or principle of God's cosmic design"; that is, it is not the

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[264] Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 128–29) also identifies this metaphor, arguing that it is the "ground" metaphor upon which Prov 1–9 is based. By "ground metaphor" he means that "it is an image that organizes other perceptions and images and conveys a way of perceiving the world." According to Fox, there are two forms of this metaphor, MANY PATHS and TWO PATHS. What Fox calls the MANY PATHS iteration is, I would argue, the primary metaphor seen here, a conception of human behavior as a plethora of paths from which the individual may choose over his or her lifetime. What Fox calls the TWO PATHS iteration, on the other hand, is an imaginative extension of this primary metaphor, whereby human behavior is restricted to two main courses by which the individual can travel. As this latter iteration is a complex metaphor for wisdom, I shall return to it in more detail in Chapter 4 below.

[265] For the nuance of this kinesthetic expression, see the discussion of LIVING WELL IS WALKING LEVEL in Chapter 4 below.

[266] Thus following the *ketiv*. The *qere* suggests דרכיו ("his ways").

works of creation themselves but the established principles by which creation is structured.[267] God, like humanity, operates according to consistent patterns. As Fox states, “once a person enters onto [a] path, he is likely to follow it to the end. It becomes his natural course and, in spite of its difficulties, is easier to stay on than to leave.”[268] Like physical markings on the terrain, then, such “paths” have an enduring quality; they are imprinted, so to speak, on the landscape of a person’s life.

Because it conceptualizes behavior as a path, this metaphor draws upon proprioception’s expectation that motion has a beginning, a middle, and an end and that the individual can detect these different stages (<detection $_{yes}$>^{linear}). Here, however, the focus is on the middle of the motion, the path it takes to get from point A to point B. As such, this metaphor highlights the continual nature of motion. One can change direction or choose a different path, but the movement of life never ceases. Moreover, like ACTING IS WALKING, BEHAVIOR IS A PATH assumes that the individual has the choice of which path they follow (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). Thus, the student must be warned:

> Prov 1:15 My son, do not *walk* (אל־תלך) in their *way* (בדרך), withhold your *feet* (רגלך) from their *tracks* (נתיבתם).

The student is not to “walk” on the “path” (דרך, נתיבה) of robbers, that is, he is not to *mimic* their behavior (see also 3:31, 16:29). Such a warning presumes that the student can choose the path upon which he walks and must therefore be instructed about proper behavior.

Like the OBEYING IS HEARING metaphor discussed above, these behavior metaphors assume that more is going on than simple bodily activity; conscious choices are being made. Job, for instance, can choose to “turn” from evil (Job 1:1), just as the student can choose to disregard the “path” of robbers (Prov 1:15). What is at stake is not simply the behavior of the individual but the mindset that such behavior represents. There is, then, a certain inherent overlap between the

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[267] Habel, *The Book of Job*, 365–66.
[268] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 129.

semantic domains of cognition and these behavior metaphors. Still, the focus of such metaphors remains on the behavior of the individual, not his or her intellectual or emotional status.

Judgment Metaphors

Morality is also described in terms of proprioception: GOOD IS UP/BAD IS DOWN, GOOD IS STRAIGHT/BAD IS CROOKED, GOOD IS BALANCE/BAD IS IMBALANCE. For instance, in the Hebrew Bible, a word can be "straight" (ישר, e.g., Prov 16:13; Job 6:25) or "crooked" (פתל, עקש, הפך, e.g., Prov 8:8, 17:20, 19:1); a person can be "straight up" (ישר, e.g., Prov 3:32; Job 8:6; Qoh 7:29) or "bent" (לוז, עוה, e.g., Prov 3:32, 12:8); and a path can be "straight" (ישר, e.g., Prov 14:2), "level" (פלס, e.g., Prov 4:26–27), or "crooked" (לוז, עקש, e.g., Prov 14:2, 28:6). Although the property of <evaluation> is itself largely irrelevant to proprioception, some motions are presumably conceptualized as being more efficient means of obtaining a goal than others. These judgment metaphors draw upon this notion, evaluating specific motions as good and bad (<evaluation yes>). However, as these metaphors are only realized in complex blends, an extended discussion of them is best reserved for below (see the discussion of BEHAVIOR blends in Chapter 4 below).

Summary

Proprioception provides a natural source domain for a variety of cognitive and behavioral metaphors, each of which relies upon the kinesthetic inclination of the body:

Proprioception	<selected properties>
THINKING IS WALKING	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{projectional/linear}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>
THINKING IS STANDING	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{tensional}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>
THINKING IS TURNING	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{directional orientation}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>
THINKING IS TURNING ONE'S SELF	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{directional orientation}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>
UNDERSTANDING IS ARRIVING AT A CONCEPT	<location $_{\text{yes}}$>, <detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{amplitudinal}}$
LACK OF UNDERSTANDING IS FAR	<location $_{\text{yes}}$>, <detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{amplitudinal}}$
TO BE IGNORANT IS TO BE WIDE OPEN	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{amplitudinal}}$
ARROGANCE IS BEING HIGH	<location $_{\text{yes}}$>
HUMILITY IS BEING LOW	<location $_{\text{yes}}$>
ARROGANCE IS A BROAD SELF	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{amplitudinal}}$
GREED IS A BROAD SELF	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{amplitudinal}}$
ACTING IS WALKING	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{projectional/linear}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>
ACTING IS TURNING	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{directional orientation}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>
BEHAVIOR IS A PATH	<detection $_{\text{yes}}$> $^{\text{linear}}$, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>

Table 8: Metaphorical Mappings: COGNITION IS MOVING

In each of these metaphors, proprioception's <detection $_{\text{yes}}$> property motivates the conceptualization of the abstract domain of cognition. What differentiates these metaphors from one another is the quality of movement that is detected. The THINKING IS WALKING metaphor, for instance, conceptualizes thought via the body's linear quality, while THINKING IS STANDING focuses on the tensional quality of the body's movement, and THINKING IS TURNING focuses on the directional orientation of the body. Yet, whatever the quality emphasized, the continuous movement of the kinesthetic body is preserved throughout these mappings. Cognitive metaphors based on proprioception consistently conceptualize cognition as a continual, self-perpetuated process.

Summary

Although the Israelites did not produce cogent theories about human perception, the preceding analysis has suggested the following typology:[269]

PR, OP, P	Properties	VISION	AUDITION	SPEECH	TACTILIY	INGEST.	PROPR.
PR→OP	<contact>	yes?	no	no	yes	yes	
	<closeness>	no	no	no	yes	yes	
	<internal>	no	yes	no	no	yes	
	<limits>				???[270]		
	<location>	yes	yes		???[270]		yes
PR→P	<detection>	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes
	<identification>	yes	yes		yes	yes	yes
	<voluntary>	yes/no	no	yes	yes/no	yes	yes
	<directness>	yes	no	no	yes	yes	
	<effects>	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes[271]
	<cor. hyp.>	yes/no	yes/no		yes/no		
	<subjectivity>	no	no	yes	yes	yes	yes
OP→P	<effects>	yes	no	yes	yes	yes	yes[271]
	<evaluation>	yes	yes		yes	yes	
	<briefness>	yes	no	no	yes	yes	no

Table 9: Distribution of Prototypical Properties in Israelite Culture

Given the common biological foundation of perception and the fact that modern Western societies are contiguous with Israelite culture, at least in terms of its religious-philosophical heritage, it is unsurprising that the two systems contain many similar conceptions of the perceptual modalities. There are, however, significant differences. Most notably, perception in Israelite culture was much more affective than in the modern West. Although modalities still affect the modern individual (more so than perhaps Ibarretxe-Antuñano recognizes), this dimension of perception remains in the background of Western thought. We do not typically

[269] In order to provide a clear comparison with Ibarretxe-Antuñano's typology of Western modalities, I have preserved her order. For reasons noted above, I have excluded olfaction from this chart, although a full typology would include them.

[270] Although these properties are applicable to tactility, the values of these properties in ancient Israel remain unclear. For more information on <limits> and <location>, see footnote 138 above.

[271] As noted above (n. 237), in proprioception, the perceiver and the object perceived are the same, so there is no real need to distinguish between the two. However, in order to facilitate comparison with the other modalities, I have preserved the distinction on this chart here.

think of how smell, hearing, or touch affects us. In Israelite thought, however, this dimension was foregrounded. The Israelites recognized the affective nature of perception and took special precautions to ensure that each modality was properly utilized. Instructions were given on what one could look at, whom one could listen to, how one should speak, what one could touch, and what one could eat.

The preceding discussion has also suggested distinctions between the modalities based on how they detect objects or operate in the environment:

Vision	Hearing	Speech	Touch	Ingestion	Proprioception
Direct	Indirect	Indirect	Direct	Direct	---------------------
Simultaneity	Sequence	Sequence	Simultaneity through sequence	Composite simultaneity through sequence	Dynamic continuity

Table 10: Modes of Detection in Ancient Israel Modalities

Each modality provides a distinct mode of engaging the world. Hearing, for instance, is an indirect, sequential experience, while sight is a direct, instantaneous one. Admittedly, since the Israelites did not reflect upon the operation of the modalities, these distinctions are largely based on comparisons with ancient Greek and modern western theories of perception. They may not, therefore, accurately reflect the full complexity of Israelite understandings of perception. However, in as much as the biblical data conforms to these theories (and the data does seem to do so frequently), these distinctions can help differentiate between the modalities and how they operate in ancient Israelite thought.

Because they offer distinct modes of engaging the world, the modalities generate distinctive sets of metaphors, each of which provides a unique way of conceptualizing the cognitive experience:

Vision	Hearing/Speech
CONSIDERING IS SEEING	THINKING IS SPEAKING
UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING	THINKING IS SPEAKING TO ONE'S SELF
CONCLUDING IS SEEING	CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING
TEACHING IS SHOWING	CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING TO ONE'S SELF
SATISFACTION IS A GOOD EYE	KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD
DISSATISFACTION IS A BAD EYE	PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING
ENJOYING IS SEEING	UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING
JUDGING IS SEEING	OBEYING IS HEARING
	MORAL QUALITIES ARE WORDS
Touch	**Ingestion**
THINKING IS MANIPULATING OBJECTS	DESIRE IS HUNGER/THIRST
THINKING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ONE'S SELF	DESIRE IS A HUNGRY/THIRSTY SELF
THINKING IS MANIPULATING ONE'S SELF	SATISFACTION IS FULLNESS
UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING	DISSATISFACTION IS EMPTINESS
ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRING OBJECTS	SATISFACTION IS A FULL
HAVING KNOWLEDGE IS POSSESSING HEART	DISSATISFACTION IS AN EMPTY SELF
TEACHING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ANOTHER	ENJOYMENT IS SWEET/DISTRESS IS BITTER
INSTRUCTION IS A LASHING	DISTRESS IS A BITTER SELF
TERROR IS BEING SEIZED	ENJOYMENT IS TO EAT GOOD
PERSISTENCE IS GRASPING	JUDGING IS TASTING
ANGER/SORROW IS HEAVY	GOOD IS SWEET/BAD IS BITTER
FEAR IS A SOFT HEART	MORAL IDENTITY IS FOOD EATEN
STUBBORNNESS IS A HARD HEART/NECK	
Proprioception	
THINKING IS WALKING	HUMILITY IS BEING LOW
THINKING IS STANDING	ARROGANCE IS A BROAD SELF
THINKING IS TURNING	GREED IS A BROAD SELF
THINKING IS TURNING ONE'S SELF	ACTING IS WALKING
UNDERSTANDING IS ARRIVING AT A LOCATION	ACTING IS TURNING
LACK OF UNDERSTANDING IS FAR	BEHAVIOR IS A PATH
ARROGANCE IS BEING HIGH	

Table 11: Conceptual Metaphors for Cognition in Proverbs, Job, and Qohelet

While the overarching metaphors that govern these metaphors are relatively universal (e.g., COGNITION IS SEEING, COGNITION IS HEARING, COGNITION IS MOVING), these specific iterations reflect the distinct culturally-nuanced properties of the modalities from which they are drawn. For instance, CONSIDERING IS SEEING maps vision's ability to directly, simultaneously, and voluntarily detect objects in the environment onto the abstract domain of cognition (<detection

$_{\text{yes}}$> [simultaneity], <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, <directness $_{\text{yes}}$>, <subjectivity $_{\text{no}}$>). THINKING IS SPEAKING, however, focuses on speech's indirect, subjective, and voluntary nature (<internal $_{\text{no}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, <directness $_{\text{no}}$>, <subjective $_{\text{yes}}$>). Because their properties vary, the distribution of these metaphors across the semantic domains of cognition also varies. Vision, for instance, serves as a source domain for various types of cognition: knowledge, emotion, and judgment. Ingestion, on the other hand, is primarily used as a source domain for emotional and judgmental experience, and touch is a source domain for intellectual and emotional experience. Moreover, metaphors within the same perceptual field may vary, depending upon which properties are emphasized (e.g., ENJOYING IS SEEING focuses on the <effect $_{\text{yes}}$> [PR→P] property of vision, while JUDGING IS SEEING focuses on the <evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>); however, because they draw on the same perceptual experience, they tend to portray similar conceptions of cognition. Visual metaphors, for instance, routinely portray cognition as a direct, immediate experience, while oral/auditory metaphors describe it as an indirect, sequential experience. Tactile metaphors depict cognition as a direct, manipulable experience; ingestive metaphors portray it as a subjective, personal experience; and kinesthetic metaphors render it as a continual, self-perpetuated process.

Finally, the distribution of these metaphors across the texts varies, depending upon how an author conceptualizes the origin of human knowledge. As scholars have long recognized, sapiential literature contains three distinct positions on the origin of human knowledge.[272] One position holds that knowledge resides in the elders of the community and can only be transmitted to successive generations verbally. Another position argues that each person is capable of comprehending the world and thus prioritizes human experience as a means to human understanding. A third position, marginal in early sapiential literature, suggests that that knowledge is a divine attribute and must be revealed to humanity by God.

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[272] For the enumeration of these three positions, sans the conceptual metaphors, see, for example, Collins, *Jewish Wisdom in the Hellenistic Age*, 2–14; Alex Jassen, *Mediating the Divine: Prophecy and Revelation in the Dead Sea Scrolls and Second Temple Judaism* (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 241–45; Shupak, *Where Can Wisdom be Found?* 241–42.

Which position an author subscribes to largely influences the metaphors he chooses to utilize in any given passage. If knowledge is a direct experience, the direct metaphors of sight, touch, ingestion, and kinesthesia prevail; if indirect, the indirect metaphors of hearing and speaking take precedence. In the few cases where divine revelation is reflected upon, the metaphors are mixed, with the divine experiencing knowledge directly and humanity indirectly. Most of the book of Qohelet, for instance, values human experience as the most effective means of acquiring knowledge. It therefore favors direct metaphors of cognition, especially visual metaphors. Thus, the Teacher routinely "sees" the occupations of humankind (e.g., Qoh 3:10, 8:16, CONSIDERING IS SEEING); he "sees" that human toil is from God (e.g., Qoh 3:22, JUDGING IS SEEING) and "sees" good in his work (e.g., Qoh 5:17, ENJOYMENT IS SEEING). He also "seizes" folly (e.g., Qoh 2:3, UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING), "gives" knowledge to his Self (e.g., Qoh 7:2, 9:1, THINKING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ONE'S SELF), and "tastes" how "bitter" a woman is (e.g., Qoh 7:26, MORAL EVALUATIONS ARE FLAVORS). Each of these metaphors conveys an impression of knowledge as something that can be directly experienced.

Conversely, as the book of Job contains a variety of positions. Eliphaz, for instance, frequently presents his knowledge as that which he has obtained through direct experience (e.g., Job 4:8; 5:3, 27; 15:17). Similarly, Job responds that he has "seen" all that his friends have told him (e.g., Job 13:1) and describes his emotional distress as the "bitterness" of the נפש (e.g., Job 3:20, 7:11, 9:18, 10:1, 27:2). In such passages, direct metaphors dominate (e.g., UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, CONCLUDING IS SEEING, DISTRESS IS BITTER). Many passages in Job, however, portray knowledge as the verbal transference of information. Thus, Elihu defers to the words of his elders (Job 32:6–7, 11–12), and Job is implored to "ask" for wisdom from the generations past (Job 8:8–10). Indeed, the greater part of the book is constructed as a verbal dialogue between different individuals, which assumes that verbal persuasion is as effective a means of acquiring knowledge as direct experience, if not more so. Because of this cultural bias, various passages in Job favor indirect metaphors. The dialogues, for instance, contain frequent exhortations for Job or his

friends to *pay attention* (שמע, קשב, e.g., Job 13:6, 17; 33:31; PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING) and *understand* (שמע, e.g., Job 5:27, UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING) the words being spoken. In such passages, the individual is not commanded to experience knowledge for himself but to accept the knowledge given to him by his community.

Finally, various passages in Job present human knowledge as the product of divine revelation (e.g., Job 4:12–21, 12:12–13, 15:2–16, 28:1–28, 32:8, 33:13–18, 38:1–30, 42:2–6).[273] In them, God experiences knowledge directly, while humans must rely on God to inform or inspire them. Thus, humans can "turn back" from God's spirit (שוב, Job 15:13, ACTING IS TURNING); they can "drink" iniquity (שתה, Job 15:16, MORAL IDENTITY IS FOOD EATEN) and refuse to attend to God's knowledge; but they cannot "see" the gates of death (ראה, Job 38:17, UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING) or "walk about" the deep (התהלך, 38:16; UNDERSTANDING IS ARRIVING AT A LOCATION). Even Abbaddon and Death can only "hear a rumor" of understanding (באחנינו שמענו שמעה, Job 28:22, UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING). Only God knows can directly *judge* the stars (לא־זכו בעיניו, Job 15:15; JUDGING IS SEEING), "see" (חקר, ראה, נבט) everything under heaven (Job 28:23–24, 27, UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING), and "open the ears of humanity" (יגלה אזן אנשים) to that knowledge (Job 33:16, PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING).

Like Job, Proverbs also contains various positions on the origin of knowledge. Although on the surface, the book seems to privilege audition, many passages in Proverbs value direct experience. The clearest examples of this are Prov 6:6 and 24:32, the first of which directs the student to "see" the ways of the ant and the latter of which describes the sage's visual observation and consideration of the fool's vineyard (CONSIDERING IS SEEING). These direct visual experiences, though rare, are not accidental. Passages that focus on the kinesthetic or tactile dimensions of cognition similarly support the need for human experience in knowledge

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[273] Jassen, *Mediating the Divine*, 243 n. 7. Job 38:1–30 does not actually say that knowledge is revealed to humanity, but it reflects on the limitations of human knowledge and thus fits with this list. The only other passages in this early sapiential literature that seem to depict knowledge as divine revelation are Prov 16:1–2 and perhaps Prov 2:6 (see the discussion of WISDOM IS A DIVINE WORD in Chapter 4 below).

acquisition. Thus, the sage "goes" to the ant (Prov 6:6, THINKING IS WALKING), "turns" his heart to understanding (Prov 2:2, THINKING IS TURNING ONE'S SELF), and "seizes" abstract concepts (e.g., Prov 1:3, UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING). Individuals "run" towards evil (Prov 1:16, ACTING IS WALKING), ingest moralities (e.g., Prov 4:17, 15:14, 31:27, MORAL IDENTITY IS FOOD EATEN), and "walk" on specific "paths" (e.g., Prov 1:15, BEHAVIOR IS A PATH). According to these passages, knowledge is not simply something that is passively heard; it is actively grasped, ingested, and continually engaged throughout the individual's life. Of course, in the final rendition of Proverbs, all of this is subsumed under the rubric of transmitted knowledge. The student knows that he is to seek knowledge or to walk towards righteousness only because the sage has instructed him to do so. The book of Proverbs, then, reframes the direct experience of the student as an indirect experience. Knowledge becomes that which is accessible only through the sages, the elders of the community. Thus, in the superstructure of Proverbs, indirect metaphors dominate. The student is to "pay attention" (e.g., Prov 7:24, PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING) and *obey* the words of his teacher (e.g., Prov 5:7–8, OBEYING IS HEARING).

These distribution patterns, however, are not ubiquitous. For instance, although the text favors direct metaphors, Qohelet does not hesitate to draw upon indirect metaphors to describe the cognitive experience. Thus, the Teacher "speaks" *in* and *to* his לב (e.g., Qoh 1:16, 2:1, THINKING IS SPEAKING TO ONE'S SELF) and *concludes* that all is vanity (e.g., Qoh 2:15, CONCLUDING IS SPEAKING TO ONE'S SELF). Such passages imply that indirect experience is not completely without its worth for the author of Qohelet. This slippage stems from the inherent complexity of Israelite thought. Contrary to the claims of earlier scholars, Israelite conceptions of cognition were not one-dimensional. The Israelites did not conceptualize thought *only* in terms of sound or *primarily* in terms of vision.[274] Rather, the Israelites used a variety of metaphors to describe the abstract domain of cognition, a diversity that mimics the diversity of human experience itself. Like other humans, the Israelites routinely engaged the world through a variety

[274] See the discussion of these positions in the footnotes above.

of modalities: they saw their environment, spoke to others, touched and ingested objects, and moved through space. Except in cases of extreme disability, no one modality was experienced to the exclusion of others. Sight, hearing/speech, touch, ingestion, and movement were habitually repeated, such that each formed lasting impressions in the neural pathways of the brain that structured subsequent abstract experiences, in this case, the experience of cognition.

The diversity of expression found in cognitive metaphor is therefore neither haphazard nor accidental, but reflects the biological predisposition of the human condition. Each sapiential text contains a plethora of cognitive metaphors stemming from a variety of perceptual domains and reflecting a variety of cognitive perspectives. It is this multi-modal dimension of Israelite cognition that enabled individuals to extend primary metaphors in creative and imaginative ways and transform routine cognitive activities into a normative and praiseworthy pursuit of “wisdom.” This imaginative dimension, however, shall be the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 4: Metaphors of Wisdom

Imaginative Extensions, Complex Blends, and Creative Clusters

Like other peoples, the ancient Israelites and early Jews did not limit their understanding of cognition to primary metaphors. Utilizing the full force of the human perceptual experience, these ancient scribes creatively extended, blended, and clustered metaphors together to form new modes of conceptualizing knowledge and prescribe the appropriate means of obtaining it. Such imaginative metaphors could draw upon one modality or many, depending on which primary metaphor(s) they were based upon and whether those primary metaphors themselves came from one modal domain or several. As such, the normative pursuit of wisdom in ancient Israel as a whole was neither a one-dimensional nor unimodal experience; rather, it was a complex, multimodal pursuit of those values that the Israelites and early Jewish scribes held most dear.

Because imaginative metaphors rely heavily upon the context of their authors, I will limit my discussion here to complex metaphors from the book of Proverbs. This is not to say that there are no imaginative metaphors in other wisdom texts, quite the opposite in fact. However, the narrow focus here better illuminates the unique contours of the complex, imaginative metaphors in Proverbs, which in turn enables us to examine in Chapter 5 how those metaphors developed into the various metaphors surrounding Lady Wisdom and the Strange Woman.

Imaginative Extensions

As noted in Chapter 1, some metaphors develop new meaning by creatively extending a dominant or dormant element of a conventional metaphor. In the case of wisdom metaphors, such "imaginative extensions" extend the base elements of a primary metaphor in order to clarify the means by which knowledge is formed and the roles humans play in its acquisition. Because the primary metaphors upon which they draw tend to rely upon only one modality, these imaginative

extensions also focus on one key modality and the mappings associated with it.[1] Yet, in the process of extending their underlying metaphors, each of these imaginative extensions transform cognition from a basic biological process into a normative concept by which an individual could evaluate his or her environment and effect change in it.

Examples in Proverbs

Imaginative extensions are primarily motivated by the creativity of their authors. There are, however, various factors that facilitate this creative activity.

WISDOM IS A COMMODITY

Some extensions extend unexplored possibilities in a primary metaphor. Inherent to the ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRING OBJECTS metaphor, for instance, is the idea that knowledge is an object that can be physically accumulated: it can be "added up" (יסף, e.g., Prov 1:5), "obtained" (פוק, e.g., Prov 3:13), "taken" (לקח, e.g. Prov 21:11), or "acquired" (קנה, e.g., Prov 4:5). There are, however, many ways that physical objects can be accumulated. They can be "found" (מצא, e.g., Gen 30:14, Exod 16:27), "stolen" (גנב; e.g., Gen 31:19), "gifted" (נתן, e.g., Gen 42:25), or "paid for" (קנה, e.g., Gen 33:19). Most linguistic expressions that draw upon the ACQUIRING KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRING OBJECTS metaphor ignore this aspect, focusing simply on the fact that knowledge is acquired.

Proverbs 17:16 and 23:23, however, expand upon this dormant element, using the semantic flexibility of the verb קנה to clarify the means of wisdom's acquisition (WISDOM IS A COMMODITY):

Prov 17:16 Why is this *price* (מחיר) in the hands of fools to *buy* (לקנות) wisdom when he has no heart?

Prov 23:23 *Buy* (קנה) truth, do not *sell* (ואל־תמכר) it; [acquire] wisdom and discipline

[1] This is not to say that all primary metaphors rely on one modality. For instance, as already discussed in Chapter 3 above, KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD and MORAL QUALITIES ARE WORDS each draw upon two modalities, speech and hearing. Complex metaphors based upon these metaphors are also inherently multimodal. However, since most primary metaphors for cognition in sapiential literature focus on a single modal domain, the extensions based on them tend to do the same.

and understanding.

The basic lexical meaning of קנה is "to acquire." Thus, one "acquires" children (e.g., Gen 4:1) or "acquires" insight (e.g., Prov 4:5). Frequently, however, קנה indicates acquisition that occurs via commercial transaction. One does not simply "acquire" a field or a slave; one "buys" it with money (Gen 25:10, 33:19, 47:19–22, etc.). [2] It is this latter nuance that Prov 17:16 and 23:23 draw upon, using it to transform wisdom from a simple acquisition into a commercial transaction. Thus, truth, wisdom, discipline, and understanding can each be "bought" (קנה) and "sold" (מכר) as if they are physical commodities (Prov 23:23), and fools can attempt to "buy" (קנה) wisdom with currency (מחיר; Prov 17:16). Although the latter example could refer to the attempt of a fool to pay a teacher for instruction,[3] both passages are probably intended as metaphors about wisdom's value. Proverbs 23:23 indicates that wisdom is so valuable that one should be willing to pay for it whatever the price, while Prov 17:16 indicates the exact opposite: even if the fool could buy wisdom, it would do him no good, because he does not have the intellectual capability to effectively use it. Wisdom itself, then, is not inherently valuable; one must also have the capacity to utilize it.

In extending wisdom to the sphere of commerce, WISDOM IS A COMMODITY preserves the tactile properties of its underlying metaphor. Wisdom remains a direct, voluntary experience that requires contact between the perceiver (the student) and the object perceived (wisdom) (<contact $_{\text{yes}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, and <directness $_{\text{yes}}$>).The new metaphor, however, makes a value claim about wisdom. Although knowledge can be acquired by anyone, *wisdom* can only be bought by

[2] According to Shupak, the basic meaning of קנה is to "acquire by paying" (*Where Can Wisdom be Found?* 61). However, that קנה does not simply mean "to buy" is indicated by the fact that קנה can be used to indicate acquisition that occurs by means other than commercial transactions. For instance, Eve "acquires" a son by giving birth to him (Gen 4:1), and God "acquires" Israel by establishing them as a people (Deut 32:6). Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 279–80. These could theoretically be conceptual metaphors (e.g., BIRTH IS BUYING, RULING IS BUYING); yet, neither of these verses seem to carry a commercial nuance, suggesting that "acquire" is a better translation for the base meaning of קנה.

[3] So argues William McKane, *Proverbs: A New Approach* (Old Testament LIbrary; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970), 504–05. Fox acknowledges the possibility that the reference could refer to payment for services, but argues that the mention of payment probably is used to indicate how foolish the notion is that such a valuable commodity as wisdom could be bought (Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 633).

those who have the innate capacity to effectively utilize it, namely, the sages and their students.

MORAL/IMMORAL BEHAVIOR IS A PATH

The moral consensus of the author's social group can also motivate imaginative extensions. For instance, the BEHAVIOR IS A PATH metaphor assumes that there are many possible behaviors an individual can routinely choose to engage in over the course of his or her lifetime. One can behave violently (Prov 3:31, 16:29), be greedy (e.g., Prov 1:19), engage in sexual intercourse (e.g., Prov 30:19, 20), *et cetera*. Such behaviors in themselves are not good or bad (e.g., violent action is necessary in times of war but can be disruptive among members of the same community). The primary metaphor itself, then, does not evaluate these different paths but leaves it up to individuals to determine the relative value of a behavior and whether or not they will choose to engage in it (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). Thus, Job chooses to behave in a certain way and must subsequently argue that his "paths" are good (Job 13:15, see also Job 31:37), and the sage must argue that the "paths" of robbers are harmful and should not be followed (Prov 1:15). God himself examines the "paths" of people to determine whether their behavior is beneficial or harmful (Prov 5:21, see also Job 13:27, 14:16, 24:23, 31:4, 33:11, 34:21).

Vaious passages in Proverbs eliminate this individual evaluation, injecting morality directly into the path metaphor. Some paths are inherently "good," others inherently "evil" (GOOD BEHAVIOR IS A PATH, EVIL BEHAVIOR IS A PATH):

Prov 2:9 Then you will understand righteousness, justice, and uprightness, *every good track* (כל־מעגל־טוב).

Prov 8:13 Fear of the Lord hates evil; pride and arrogance and an *evil path* (דרך רע) and a mouth of perversity I hate.

Prov 16:29 A violent man entices his companion and causes him to walk (והוליכו) on *a path that is not good* (בדרך לא־טוב).

Similarly, some behaviors are deemed "paths of righteousness," while others are considered "paths of wickedness" (RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH, WICKEDNESS IS A PATH):

Prov 2:20 Therefore, walk in the *way of the good* (בדרך טובים), keep the *paths of the righteous* (אחרות צדיקים).

Prov 15:9 An abomination to the Lord is the *path of wickedness* (דרך רשע), but he loves the one who pursues righteousness.

Like the BEHAVIOR IS A PATH metaphor, such expressions presume that people can be identified by the behavior they routinely engage in.[4] Good people walk on "good paths" (e.g., Prov 2:9, 20); evil people walk on "evil paths" (e.g., Prov 8:13, see also Prov 2:12, 8:13, 28:10, and the "path that is not good," Prov 16:29). Similarly, righteous people walk on "paths of righteousness (e.g., Prov 2:20, see also Prov 4:18, 8:20, 12:28); wicked people walk on "paths of wickedness" (e.g., Prov 15:9, see also Prov 4:14, 12:26).

Paths can also be identified by the rewards they bring. Thus, the GOOD/EVIL BEHAVIOR IS A PATH metaphors extend further to describe some behaviors as "paths of life" and others "paths of death" (GOOD BEHAVIOR IS A PATH OF LIFE, EVIL BEHAVIOR IS A PATH OF DEATH):

Prov 2:19 All who go to her do not return (ישובון); they do not reach (ולא־ישיגו) the *paths of life* (ארחות חיים).

Prov 14:12 There is a way (דרך) that seems straight to a person, but its end is the *path of death* (דרכי־מות).

The Egyptian sources with which the sages were familiar frequently conceptualized appropriate behavior as a "path of life."[5] No doubt, this provided a helpful precedent for the writers of Proverbs. Yet, in describing certain behaviors as "paths of life," the Israelite sages were not simply borrowing an image from the Egyptians. Rather, they creatively appropriated and nuanced the image based on their own system of beliefs. Most importantly, the extension of GOOD/EVIL

[4] Paths can either be described by the people who walk on them or the qualities those people possess. For instance, righteous behavior can be described as the "path(s) of the righteous" (e.g., ארחות צדיקים, Prov 2:20, see also Prov 4:18) or a "path of righteousness" (e.g., ארח־צדקה, Prov 8:20, 12:28); similarly, wicked behavior can be the "path of the wicked" (e.g., דרך רעים, Prov 4:14, 12:26), or a "path of wickedness" (e.g., דרך רשע, Prov 15:9). Although such expressions carry slightly different nuances, I do not ascribe any great conceptual significance to this variation of form.

[5] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 130.

BEHAVIOR IS A PATH into a PATH OF LIFE/PATH OF DEATH relies upon a belief that there is a direct correlation between the behavior of an individual and his or her material surfeit. As first articulated by Klaus Koch, this "Tat-Ergehen Zusammenhang" ("Acts-Consequence Connection") presupposes that an individual who performs good deeds will be rewarded with good things, while an individual who acts wickedly will be punished.[6] Later scholars have since demonstrated that the Acts-Consequence Connection is not as rigid, simple, or all-encompassing as Koch assumed, nor does it exclude God's agency as Koch argued.[7] However, many of the sayings in Proverbs do presuppose that certain actions have positive effects while others have negative effects.[8] Certain behaviors, for instance, lead to prosperity, health, and long life (e.g., Prov 10:16, 11:19, 21:21, 22:4). Others harm the individual, destroy his or her wealth, and ultimately led to death (e.g., Prov 10:2, 11:19, 19:16). Because of this conception, certain behaviors are inherently deemed "paths of life" (Prov 2:19, see also Prov 5:6, 10:17, 15:24) and others "paths of death" (Prov 14:2, see also Prov 16:25). This latter designation is absent in the Egyptian material,[9] which suggests that a belief in an Acts-Consequence Connection is indeed the primary motivation for the extension in Proverbs here. If good deeds lead to life, evil deeds must lead to death. In other words, because of an underlying belief in the nature of human behavior, the sages developed a deliberate polarity in the path metaphors by which to encourage their students to choose a path of life.

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[6] Klaus Koch, "Is There a Doctrine of Retribution in the Old Testament?," in *Theodicy in the Old Testament* (ed. James Crenshaw; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 57–87; repr. from *ZTK* 52 (1955). See also the discussion of Koch and the scholars who elaborated on his theory in Peter Hatton, "A Cautionary Tale: The Acts-Consequence 'Construct,'" *JSOT* 353 (2011): 375–84. The translation of Koch's "Tat-Ergehen Zusammenhang" follows that of Hatton.

[7] See, for instance, Patrick D. Miller, *Sin and Judgment in the Prophets* (SBLMS 27; Chico, Calif.: Scholars Press, 1982), 121–29; Lennart Boström, *The God of the Sages* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1990), 90–140; Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 91–92; Hatton, "A Cautionary Tale," 378–79.

[8] This is not to say that *every* passage presumes this connection. As Hatton argues, there are "unresolved tensions" in the book of Proverbs, particularly between human agency and divine retribution. Hatton, *Contradiction in the Book of Proverbs*, 83–116. For instance, when Prov 10:15 states that "the wealth of the rich is a strong fortress" and that "poverty is the destruction of the poor," there is no presumption that material surfeit or scarcity results from one's moral character (92–93). Indeed, Prov 18:10–11 suggests that wealth is negative, a false security enjoyed of those who do not cling to God's ways, i.e., the wicked (94–95).

[9] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 130.

As in the base metaphor, these various paths have a beginning, a middle, and an end, although the focus is on the continual linear trajectory of the movement, the path upon which one walks (<detection $_{yes}$> ^{linear}). Unlike the primary metaphor, however, such expressions simplify the moral choice of the individual. Although there are still many different behaviors one can choose to engage in (righteous deeds, good deeds, wicked deeds, evil deeds, etc.), there are "really only two paths, or types of path, of fatal importance": moral paths and immoral paths.[10] Individuals wishing to be moral choose moral paths; individuals who do not wish to be moral choose immoral paths. Since presumably the student who hears such statements wishes to be moral, the book gives the impression that there is really no choice to be made (<voluntary $_{no}$>). The properly-trained student will choose those paths that are inherently good.

On the one hand, such designations are not unique to Wisdom literature. Throughout the Hebrew Bible, paths are described as "good" (e.g., 1 Kgs 8:36, 2 Chr 6:27, Isa 65:2, Jer 6:16), "evil" (e.g., 2 Kgs17:13, Jer 18:11, 26:3, 31:15, 36:7, Jon 3:8, 10), "righteous" (e.g., Ps 1:6, Isa 26:7), "wicked"(e.g., Ps 1:6, Jer 12:1), "of life" (e.g., Ps 16:11, Jer 21:8), and "of death" (e.g., Jer 21:8).[11] This suggests that it was conventional in Israelite society to extend the BEHAVIOR IS A PATH metaphor into such stark moral dichotomies.[12] However, the specific behaviors approved or condemned in any given passage depended on the specific morality of the community. Thus,

[10] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 129. Fox designates all such paths as "paths of life" and "paths of death." The conflation of these different paths, however, is the result of more complex blends (see the discussion of RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIFE, WICKEDNESS IS A PATH OF DEATH below). It is thus more appropriate to understand the basic distinctions being made as a choice between moral behavior and immoral behavior.

[11] These are just six of the types of paths mentioned throughout the Hebrew Bible. See also the "paths of the Lord" (דרך יהוה, Gen 18:19, Judg 2:22, 2 Sam 22:22, Ps 18:22, Prov 10:29, etc.) and the "paths of justice" (ארח משפט, Prov 2:7, 8:20, 17:23; Isa 26:8, 40:14), which extend the BEHAVIOR IS A PATH metaphor is a similar fashion.

[12] Although some of these path extensions (e.g., in Psalms and Jeremiah) may reflect a relationship between sapiential thought and other generic forms. For the relationship between sapiential literature and the psalms, see, for example, Crenshaw, "Wisdom Psalms?"; J. Kenneth Kuntz, "Reclaiming Biblical Wisdom Psalms: a Response To Crenshaw," *Currents* 1 (2003): 145–54; William. Brown, "Come, O Children...I Will Teach You the Fear of the Lord (Psalm 34:12): Comparing Psalms and Proverbs," in *Seeking Out the Wisdom of The Ancients: Essays Offered to Honor Michael V. Fox on the Occasionan of his Sixty-Fifth Birthday* (eds. Ronald Troxel, et al.; Winona Lake, Ind: Eisenbrauns, 2005), 85–103. For the relationship between sapiential literature and prophetic texts, see Raymond C. Van Leeuwen, "The Sage in Prophetic Literature," in *The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East* (eds. John G. Gammie and Leo G. Perdue; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 295–306.

pride, arrogance, duplicitous speech, and violence are each “paths” that are condemned in Proverbs (Prov 8:13, 15:9, 16:29; see also Prov 2:12, and the “path of the guilty” in Prov 21:8), because the sapiential community believed that they were behaviors that should be avoided. Righteous, just, and equitable behaviors, on the other hand, are good “paths” (Prov 2:9; 2:20; see also in Prov 2:8, 4:14, 8:20, 17:23), because the sapiential community wished their members to routinely engage in them. While there were, of course, certain values that transcended Israelite society as a whole (e.g., sexual morality), the nuances of the paths in Proverbs depended on the specific morality of the scribal community.

WISDOM IS A WORD

Finally, some extensions are prompted by prevailing cultural practices or beliefs. Most important for discussions of Israelite epistemology are those metaphors influenced by the different beliefs in the origins of knowledge. Such cultural beliefs not only affected the distribution of primary metaphors, but they also transformed knowledge from a simple acquisition of information into an enduring truth that transcends the limitations of any single individual.

For instance, the cultural belief that knowledge was a divine attribute prompted the extension of KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD into WISDOM IS A DIVINE WORD:

Prov 2:6 For the Lord gives wisdom; *from his mouth* (מפיו) is knowledge and understanding.

Here, God’s word becomes his wisdom that he transmits to humanity.[13] To be sure, the instruction envisioned here is not the Torah of Moses or the revelation of the prophets, as neither is of great importance to the rhetoric of Proverbs. Rather, God’s word “refers to the endowment of an individual with the spirit of wisdom or the communication of principles not verbally or

[13] As mentioned in Chapter 3, the “giving” of wisdom is a tactile metaphor (TEACHING IS TRANSFERRING AN OBJECT TO ANOTHER). Yet, the *speaking* of understanding and insight that is mentioned in the second half of this verse is auditory in nature.

directly but via the human spirit of wisdom."[14] In other words, God is like a master sage. The wisdom that he verbally imparts gives the individual the ability to discern the operations of the world and behave correctly. Yet, although not verbal revelation per say, the passage clearly conceptualizes wisdom as an auditory experience that transcends the purview of any single human individual. It thus preserves the properties of speech and hearing from its base metaphor. As speaker, God is able to voluntarily initiate an interchange that extends beyond himself (<internal $_{\text{no}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>); as a listener, the sage is able to hear that wisdom and internalize (<internal $_{\text{yes}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{no}}$>). The sage who hears God's word obtains wisdom—his intellectual capacities—indirectly (<directness $_{\text{no}}$>); it is mediated to him by God.

For the book of Proverbs, however, the most important cultural belief about knowledge's origin was the belief that knowledge is best obtained from the elders of the community. This belief was no doubt promulgated by the institutional setting of the individuals who created Proverbs, the scribal "school," in which individuals learned about their craft by listening to the oral discourse of their teachers.[15] When combined with the idea that words carry the knowledge, theological position, or perspective of the individual (KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD), this setting and its accompanying belief in the transgenerational origins of human knowledge resulted in a creative extension in which the collective wisdom of the community was understood to be a word, mediated to the student by his or her particular teacher (WISDOM IS A WORD).

An early expression of this in Israelite Wisdom literature can be found in Prov 22:17, the introduction to a collection of thirty sayings based loosely on the Instruction of Amenemope, the book of Ahiqar, and similar texts from ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt.[16] Here, "wisdom" is

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[14] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 113.

[15] See the discussion of the scribal context of Wisdom literature in Chapter 2 above.

[16] The relationship between Prov 22:17–24:22 and foreign wisdom texts has long been recognized. See, for instance, François Chabas, "Hébraeo-Aegyptiaca," *Transactions of the Society Biblical Archaeology* 1 (1872): 173–82; Adolf Erman, "Eine ägyptische Quelle der 'Sprüch Salomos,'" *SPAW* (1924): 86–93; Hugo Gressmann, *Israels Spruchweisheit im Zusammenhang der Weltliteratur* (Berlin: Karl Curtius, 1927); Shupak, *Where Can Wisdom be Found?* As noted in Chapter 1, such foreign literature often

described as the "words" of the wise:

Prov 22:17 Turn your ear and hear the *words of the wise* (דברי חכמים);[17] set your heart to my *knowledge* (דעתי).

Taking its cue from Amenemope, which describes its contents as "the things that are said," Prov 22:17 presents its collection as "words" that the listener is to "hear." More specifically, the sage who collected these sayings considers his work to be the "words of the wise" (דברי חכמים); that is, they are not merely his particular "knowledge" (דעת) on the subject, but they also represent the collected wisdom of the ancient Near East that he has sifted through and distilled into thirty maxims for his listener's benefit. The "wise" here many even be a social designation, denoting the particular subgroup of Israelite society that has collected the aforementioned foreign Wisdom texts, translated them, and created sayings of their own, namely, the Israelite sages.[18] In any case, the listener is to "hear" these sayings (שמע: Prov 22:17, 23:19; אזן: Prov 23:12), "be wise" (חכם, Prov 23:19), and, in turn, pass these sayings on to others (Prov 22:21, 23:16).

Other collections in Prov 10–31 follow this practice, presenting their contents as the "words" of their authors. Thus, Prov 24:23–34 are the דברים of the "wise"; Prov 30:1–9 are the דברים of Agur, an otherwise unknown figure; and Prov 31:1–9 are the דברים of King Lemuel. Although these latter two examples present their work as the product of a single figure, both take care to argue that their words have authority that transcends the individual who produced it. Thus,

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provided the impetus for a creative extension or blend, but the specific nuances of the metaphor in Israelite culture would have been the result of emic imaginative processes.

[17] Thus, following the MT. Gressman, Fox, and others suggest emending the text here so that דברי חכמים reads as a section title, rather than part of the poetic verse (as Fox translates: "Words of the wise: Incline your ear and hear my words…"). This would be in keeping with the similar title found in Prov 24:23, which marks the beginning of a new section with the notion "these too are of the wise" (גם־אלה לחהמים) and which seems to presume an earlier ascription of certain sayings to the "wise." See Gressmann, *Israels Spruchweisheit im Zusammenhang der Weltliteratur*, 274; Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 707, 1031. However, the sayings in Prov 22:17–23:11 can be understood as "words of the wise" without emending the text. Like 23:12 and the exhortations in Prov 1–9, the poetic verse itself introduces the content of its passages as the sages' "words." There is no reason to conjecture a separate title for this meaning to come across.

[18] As discussed in Chapter 2, חכם was a common designation for the professional class of individuals responsible for administering the bureaucracy of ancient Israel.

Prov 30:1 notes that Agur's word was a "pronouncement" (המשא) and an "oracle" (נאם),[19] and Prov 31:1 states that Lemeul learned his wisdom from his mother. While the second clearly denotes transgenerational knowledge, the first suggests that the ultimate source of wisdom is divine. Yet, even here, the words spoken are those of a human, not God, and are intended for a human audience that will hear and repeat them. They thus reflect the same process found in Prov 22:17–24:22, 24:23–34, and 31:1–9. A certain perspective is deemed authoritative by a communal representative (a king, a wise man, or an unnamed sage) and is transmitted to a new generation as that representative's "word."

Two collections (Prov 10:1–22:16, 25:1–29:27) present their contents not as דברים but as משלים:

Prov 10:1a	The משלים of Solomon.
Prov 25:1	These too are the משלים of Solomon, which the men of Hezekiah, king of Judah, transcribed.[20]

Hebrew משלים are short, pithy sayings that have "currency among the people."[21] Although they are often ascribed to a well-known figure, the origins of such "proverbs" are often unknown. Yet, whatever their origin, their brevity, repetitive nature, and frequent sound-plays allowed them to be easily memorized, circulated, and reused. As they circulated among the populous, they provided a particular perspective on a situation that enabled a listener to interpret an experience

[19] Although המשא could be a proper noun referring to a tribe from northern Arabia, Toy argues that it the term is best understood as a common noun meaning "pronouncement" or "oracle," and most scholars have since followed him. Crawford Toy, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Proverbs* [International Critical Commentary; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1899], repr. 2009), 517–18. By this reading, משא and נאם both refer to a prophetic experience and the subsequent recitation of that experience to others.

[20] העתיקו. As Fox notes, the meaning of this verb is uncertain. However, the etymology suggests that the verb refers to "the gathering of proverbs from a variety of sources, whether written or oral" (*Proverbs 10–31*, 777).

[21] The term משלים derives from one of two משל roots, the one meaning "to rule over" and the other "to be similar to." Fox assume the latter connection, arguing that the noun משל refers to 1) a trope: "a word, statement, or image displaced from its primary, surface meaning so as to represent something else, by virtue of an imputed similarity." One finds such משלים, for example, in Ezek 24:3–5, Hab 2:6, and Num 23:7, 18, 24:3, 15, 20, 21, 23. Alternatively, it can refer to 2) a "saying that has currency among the people." Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 54. According to Fox, the latter is the sense with which משל is used in Proverbs.

according to the specific values of his or her community.[22] They are, in other words, short pieces of communal wisdom transmitted in oral form.

Indeed, the sayings of Prov 10:1–22:16 and 25:1–29:27 fit this description well. They are short, easy to articulate sayings that provide some sort of instruction for the listener. Whether those in Proverbs were ever actually circulated orally is difficult to determine.[23] Yet, in the rhetoric of Proverbs, they are presented as such, being ascribed to Solomon (Prov 10:1, 25:1), the quintessential "wise" king of the tenth century B.C.E. (see, for example, 1 Kgs 3:16–28, 5:9–14), and only being "transcribed" (העתיקו), at least in some cases, some two centuries later during the reign of Hezekiah (Prov 25:1). The Solomonic and Hezekian ascriptions are themselves probably fictions, intended to bolster the validity of the sayings being collected into Proverbs. Yet, as Fox states, merely "by calling the proverbs *m^{e}šalim* (rather than simply 'words of…' as in Prov 30:1, 31:1, and 22:17), the author-editor is implicitly asserting that these saying are validated not only by their source (a wise man) but also by their use: they are current in public wisdom."[24] The description of these sayings as משלים thus reinforces the notion that the wisdom being collected and transmitted is the word of the community.

The prologue to the final book of Proverbs (Prov 1:1–7) continues this presentation, describing the contents of the book as a whole as "the משלים of Solomon, son of David, king of Israel" (Prov 1:1). Here, the abstract term "wisdom" is consistently paired with auditory and oral terms. The proverbs are preserved so that the listener may "know wisdom" and "understand *words* (אמרים) of understanding" (Prov 1:2). The wise are specifically instructed to "hear" (שמע)

[22] Carole R. Fontaine, "Brightening Up the Mindworks: Concepts of Instruction in Biblical Wisdom and Rinzai Zen," *Religious Education* 79 (1984): 590–600 (594).

[23] Otto Eissfeldt suggests that many of the sayings were probably originally one-line proverbs that circulated widely and that were later expanded with a parallel line. Otto Eissfeldt, *Der Maschal im Alten Testament* (BZAW 24; Giessen: Töpelmann, 1913), 45–52. Similarly, Claus Westermann and Friedemann Golka argue that most of the sayings were originally oral sayings that were later written down. Westermann, *Roots of Wisdom: The Oldest Proverbs of Israel and Other Peoples*, 2–3; Friedemann Golka, *The Leopard's Spots: Biblical and African Wisdom in Proverbs* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993), 4–53. As Fox argues, however, it is difficult to determine with any certainty what the original form of these sayings was. Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 485.

[24] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 55.

the contents of the book (Prov 1:5) so that they may understand "a *proverb* (משל) and an *expression* (מליצה), the *words* (דברים) of the wise and their *riddles* (חידתם)" (Prov 1:6). Such language conceptualizes the contents of the book that follows as an oral recitation, meant to be heard and reflected upon.

Originally, Prov 10:1 probably began an independent collection of proverbs. However, at some point, prior to the insertion of the final prologue in Prov 1:1–7, a series of ten lectures were added to it, each of which begins by depicting wisdom as the "word" of a father or mother. In many of these, the student is explicitly commanded to "hear" and "attend to" the words of the father:

Prov 1:8 — *Hear* (שמע), my son, the discipline of your father, and do not hand over the *teachings* (תורת) of your mother.

Prov 4:1 — *Hear* (שמע), my sons, the discipline of a father, and *pay attention* (והקשיבו) to know understanding.

Prov 4:10 — *Hear* (שמע), my son, and take my *words* (אמרי) and the years of life will lengthen for you.

Prov 4:20 — My son, *pay attention* (הקשיבה) to my *words* (לדברי); to my *words* (לאמרי) *turn your ear* (אזנך).

Prov 5:1 — My son, *pay attention* (הקשיבה) to my wisdom, *turn your ear* (אזנך) to my understanding.

Only once is the father's instruction explicitly referred to as his "wisdom" (חכמה: Prov 5:1). Instead, these introductory verses use a verbal command to refer to the wise activities of the sage. The son must "hear" (שמע: Prov 1:8, 4:1, 10; נטה אזן: Prov 4:20, 5:1) and "pay attention to" (קשב: Prov 4:20, 5:1) the wisdom of the father. Elsewhere, the auditory experience is implicitly invoked through verbal nouns:

Prov 2:1 — My son, if you take my *words* (אמרי) and you store up my *commandments* (מצותי) within you.

Prov 3:1	My son, do not forget my *teachings* (תורתי), but let your heart guard my *commandments* (מצותי).
Prov 3:21	My son, do not let [my words] escape from your eyes; guard prudence and discretion.
Prov 6:20	Guard, my son, the *commandments* (מצות) of your father, and do not forsake the *teachings* (תורת) of your mother.
Prov 7:1	My son, keep my *words* (אמרי) and store up my *commandments* (מצותי) with you.

Wisdom is the "words" (אמרים: Prov 2:1, 4:10, 20, 7:1; דברים: Prov 4:20) of the father, his "commandments" (מצות: Prov 2:1, 3:1, 6:20, 7:1), and his "teachings" (תרות: Prov 3:1; see also the mother's instruction in Prov 1:8, 6:20).[25] Auditory perception is not explicitly referred to. Yet, the nouns used here encourage the student to conceptualize wisdom as an auditory experience. Just as one "hears" the words of the father, one "hears" his wisdom.

Although the terms used to depict wisdom vary, they consistently portray the contents of the lectures as the oral discourse of the father or mother. In the rhetoric of Proverbs, this "father" or "mother" is most likely the student's teacher, who acts as the representative of the entire community.[26] The content of the passages that follow these statements are thus not merely the knowledge of a single individual or household, but the sanctioned wisdom of the larger community to which the student belongs. Like the "words" in Prov 10–31, much of this knowledge has probably been transmitted from one generation to another for some time. Thus, Prov 4:3–4 specifically notes that the "father" has learned his wisdom from his own "father," who, presumably, learned it from his "father." When the sage speaks in these discourses, then, he is not emitting a meaningless sound or even his own particular opinion; rather, he is transmitting

[25] Proverbs 3:21 does not include a reference to "words," but implies that its contents are such, with "words" (דברים or אמרים) being the implicit subject of ילזו ("let escape"). Fox suggests that a copyist's error may account for the missing subject. Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 163.

[26] See the discussion in Chapter 2 above.

a societally-sanctioned opinion, knowledge, or perspective on a situation. In other words, his spoken word acts as a container, holding within it the collective wisdom of the community.

Whether words of the wise, words of a king, or words of the father, wisdom in each of these passages is clearly depicted as a "word" that can be spoken and heard. As such, WISDOM IS A WORD preserves the oral-aural metaphorical mappings of its underlying metaphor (KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD). It is voluntarily spoken by the sage (<internal $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>) and involuntarily internalized by the student (<voluntary $_{yes}$>, <internal $_{yes}$>). Yet, like PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING or UNDERSTANDING IS HEARING, the WISDOM IS A WORD metaphor presumes that the student himself must make a conscious choice to pay attention to this word if it is to do him any good (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). Finally, and most importantly, wisdom remains an indirect experience (<directness $_{no}$>). The student does not experience knowledge for him- or herself; rather, wisdom is mediated to the student by his or her teacher.

The propensity of Proverbs to describe wisdom as a human word suggests that the WISDOM IS A WORD extension became a conventional metaphor by which to speak about wisdom early in Proverb's development. That WISDOM IS A WORD forms the basis for many other metaphors confirms this. Similarly, that the MORAL PATH metaphors are found throughout the Hebrew Bible and form the basis for subsequent metaphors suggests that they, too, may have become conventional metaphors fairly quickly. WISDOM IS A DIVINE WORD, on the other hand, are relatively insignificant in Proverbs, suggesting that they remained imaginative extensions in their immediate context; they did not substantially structure the common perception of wisdom until much later in early Jewish history, if at all. I shall return to this question of conventionalization again in Chapter 6. For now, it is enough to note that imaginative extensions are not static metaphors; they can be picked up, reused, and even conventionalized by a community.

Complex Blends

Unlike imaginative extensions, imaginative "blends" create new meaning by blending the

attributes of two or more schemas together. As noted in Chapter 1, these "input" schemas can be independent experiential domains (e.g., light, treasure) or conventional metaphors (e.g., UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, BEHAVIOR IS A PATH). In the case of wisdom metaphors, however, at least one of these schemas tends to be a primary metaphor for cognition or the extension WISDOM IS A WORD. The other schema(s) can be a rich image or another conventional metaphor, depending on the creativity of the author and the message he or she is trying to convey. There is, however, a limit to such creativity. Even the most imaginative of poets is constrained by his or her physiology, prior experience, and cultural conventions.[27] As such, it is helpful to begin the discussion here by examining in more depth the factors that constrain the creation of blends.

Constraints on Blends

In order for two schemas to blend together, the input domains chosen must be structurally similar; that is, there must be some observable relationship between the constituent parts of each input space or a blend will not occur. Fauconnier and Turner identify fifteen such "vital relations":[28]

Change	Space	Representation	Disanalogy	Category
Identity	Cause-Effect	Role	Property	Intentionality
Time	Part-Whole	Analogy	Similarity	Uniqueness

Two input spaces, for instance, may share a similar Time frame (e.g., one input space occurs on New Year's Day 2000, the other on New Year's Day in 2001) or occur in similar Spaces (e.g., both input spaces occur in a room). Alternatively, an element in one input space may have the same Identity as an element in the other (e.g., a baby named Mary in one space and a woman named Mary in another), or an element in one space may Change into an element in the other (e.g., as a sapling changes into a tree). While not all of these relations need to be present, there must be some perceived relationship between the input spaces if a blend between them is to

[27] Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 102–03.
[28] Ibid., 92–102.

occur.

In some cases, conventional metaphors themselves provide the necessary relationship between input spaces. As Grady argues, "primary metaphoric associations stored in memory, which are ultimately based on correlations in experience, provide a means of linking objects in [input spaces] which would otherwise not be mapped onto another."[29] In other words, primary metaphors can either serve as the input space for a blend or as the relation that connects two input spaces. Take, for example, A RIGHTEOUS PERSON IS A STRAIGHT PERSON and its obverse A WICKED PERSON IS A CROOKED PERSON, two complex metaphors found throughout Proverbs (Prov 2:21, 3:32, 11:3, 6, 11, etc.):



Blend Diagram 4: A RIGHTEOUS PERSON IS A STRAIGHT PERSON, A WICKED PERSON IS A CROOKED PERSON

A RIGHTEOUS PERSON IS A STRAIGHT PERSON begins as two similarly structured input spaces: a Righteous Person and a Straight Person. Each has an agent (a person), an identifying characteristic (moral behavior or physical posture), a key property (good or straight), and a time frame for its condition (permanent or temporary). These structures correspond, but they are not directly related; that is, the person in the Righteous Person space is not innately conceptualized as

[29] Grady, "Primary Metaphors as Inputs to Conceptual Integration," 1603.

the same person as the one in the Straight Person input space (there is no relation in their Identity). Nor are their identifying characteristics or time frames the same; one deals with permanent behavior, the other with temporary physical status. Instead, the conventional metaphor GOOD IS STRAIGHT provides the necessary relationship to bring the two input spaces together. Without it, the two input spaces could not combine. The same can be said of the A WICKED PERSON IS A CROOKED PERSON blend. Two structurally similar, but not identical input spaces blend together via the BAD IS CROOKED metaphor.

Metaphors are also constrained in how they project information into the blended space. Relations between input spaces, for instance, tend to "compress" in the blend; that is, they scale-down into tighter relationships. As Fauconnier and Turner explain, "one relation may be compressed into a tighter version of itself," as when a lifetime of experiences is compressed into a single event (relation: Time).[30] Similarly, "one or more relations may be compressed into another relation." Thus, a Cause-Effect relation between two entities can compress into a Uniqueness relation in the blend as two entities become conceptualized as one.[31] Alternatively, if one input space already contains a tightly integrated scene, it may simply project its structure onto the blended space, where the other input space compresses into it.[32] At any rate, the selection and compression of vital relations is not a "free-for-all." Properties are selectively chosen in an attempt to create well-integrated scenes with at least a modicum of "human scale"; that is, they attempt to portray reality with natural and familiar structures that can be easily engaged through concrete experience.[33] This means that, all things being equal, blends will present a scenario with as few participants and as direct intentionality as possible.

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[30] Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 311–12.

[31] Ibid., 311. Fauconnier and Turner point, by way of example, to a hypothetical blend in which an "automobile company produces the automobile, but in the blend the company and the automobile are the same thing" (315). The cause-effect relationship between the company in one input space and the automobile in the other becomes a Uniqueness relation in the blend.

[32] Ibid., 320–21. For other constraints on projections, see 309–25, as well as the discussion in Chapter 1 above.

[33] Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 29, 309–12.

Take, again, the example of the righteous person. Based on the GOOD IS STRAIGHT relationship, elements from each input space blend together to form a composite metaphor. Thus, both spaces project their separate Identities onto the blend, where they merge into a single individual, the moral person (two Identities→one Identity). Similarly, both input spaces project their key property onto the blend, where they combine into one: good-straight (two Properties→one Property). Thus, the individual can be identified either by his "goodness" (טוב, e.g., Prov 13:2, 14:14, 15:3; see also צדיק, "righteousness," e.g., Prov 2:20, 3:33, 9:9; תם, "innocence," e.g., Prov 10:29, 29:10) or by his "straightness" (ישר, e.g., Prov 2:7, 21, 3:32, 11:3); the semantic fields are conceptually synonymous. The "straightness" envisioned here is probably a vertical straightness; the person who is straight stands "straight up."[34] The common English translation "upright," then, captures the double nuance of the blend. The one who is "upright" is physically and morally straight. On the other hand, only the RIGHTEOUS PERSON input space projects its Time frame onto the blend. Physical straightness is a temporary state. One can temporarily stand up or straighten one's body, but one must also sometimes lie down or bend over; that is, one cannot always stand straight up. On the contrary, morality is an enduring quality, at least in the rhetoric of Proverbs. One either is a moral person, or one is not (e.g., Prov 2:21; 10:25, 30; 12:3, 7).[35] It is this enduring conception of morality that dominates the blend. In the final metaphor, the righteous person does not typically alter his or her state; he or she remains moral-straight. The desire to present a simple, well-integrated scene thus focuses the blend onto a single, enduring time frame.

A similar process occurs with A WICKED PERSON IS A CROOKED PERSON. Based on the

[34] Although there is no definitive evidence that "straight" here indicates a vertical straightness, rather than a body that is stretched out horizontally, vertical straightness is probably implied when ישר is used to refer to a person. There is no practical advantage for a reclining body to be straight, but standing straight up, with no crookedness to one's body, does have its advantages. One can see further, breath more easily, walk with less difficulty. This physical advantage seems to be basis for the metaphorical extension of ישר here. Horizontal straightness is reserved for cases in which movement is described as "straight" (see the discussion of ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT below).

[35] This position is, at least, the impression that the rhetoric of Proverbs wishes to convey to its reader. As shall be discussed in more detail below, the moral worldview of Proverbs is more complex than this stark dichotomy suggests.

BAD IS CROOKED metaphor, elements from each input space blend together to form a new metaphor. Again, both spaces project their separate Identities and Properties onto the blend, where they become a single person, the immoral person (two Identities→one Identity), with a single composite quality, wicked-crooked (two Properties→one Property). Here, however, the Time frame operates differently. Although, like straightness, crookedness can be a temporary state (i.e., when one bends down), it can also be a permanent state. A person can be physically deformed such that he or she cannot ever straighten out fully. There exists, then, a similarity between the Time frames of the two input spaces that projects onto the blend. The final blend, however, is essentially the same as A RIGHTEOUS PERSON IS A STRAIGHT PERSON. The wicked person cannot alter his or her state; he or she remains immoral-crooked.

In the wisdom metaphors of Proverbs, the input domains chosen also tend to be constrained by the primary goal of the scribal community, namely, the desire to motivate the student to seek the wisdom of the community and to embody it in his or her daily interactions. Thus, primary metaphors for knowledge and behavior figure prominently in wisdom blends, as do images that make wisdom more appealing (e.g., images of wealth, prosperity, and longevity). At the same time, because wisdom is an abstract concept, there is an attempt to bring a human scale to the endeavor, to make its acquisition more physically accessible. Thus, more abstract experiences, such as the verbal acquisition of wisdom, tend to be described in terms of more concrete experiences, such as grasping wisdom or tasting it. Yeshayahu Shen and Michal Cohen refer to this as a "low to high" constraint.[36] In their discussion of poetic synesthesia, Shen and Cohen argue that perceptual metaphors follow the same cognitive principle that governs other

[36] Shen and Cohen, "How Come Silence is Sweet but Sweetness is Not Silent," 128. The "low to high" nomenclature is based on the standard Western hierarchy of the senses, which Shen and Cohen use as the basis for their analysis (ranked from high to low: sight, sound, smell, taste, touch; 125). As noted in Chapter 2, there is not a universal conception of the perceptual modalities, nor (as shall be discussed momentarily) is there a universal hierarchical relationship between them. Yet, in as much as a given culture will view some modalities as more accessible than others, maintaining the "low to high" nomenclature can be helpful, with "low" being understood as "more accessible" and "high" being understood as "less accessible." In maintaining the nomenclature, however, I do not wish to maintain the value judgments that the nomenclature often assumes. Touch and smell are no less valuable than sight and hearing just because they are more concrete than their counterparts.

metaphors, namely, the tendency to map a more accessible (concrete) concept onto a less accessible (abstract) one.[37] In the case of perceptual metaphors, this suggests that more accessible modalities (e.g., tactility, ingestion) tend to project their properties onto less accessible ones (e.g., sight, hearing). Thus, a speaker is more likely to describe “silence” as “sweet” than to describe “sweetness” as “silence.”[38] Wisdom metaphors tend to follow this general constraint, projecting more accessible modalities onto less accessible ones. Thus, the more abstract metaphor WISDOM IS WORD, so prominent in the conceptual system of Proverbs, is frequently described by more accessible activities (e.g., grasping, eating, walking). The result is a transformation of wisdom from an abstract concept into a more direct, personally-relevant, embodied activity.

There is no universally accepted hierarchy of perceptual accessibility. Individual cultures determine whether a modality is conceptualized as accessible or inaccessible. The degree of accessibility, however, directly correlates to the basic properties that a culture assigns a modality. More accessible modalities are direct and close (<directness $_{yes}$>, <closeness $_{yes}$>); less accessible ones are indirect and distant (<directness $_{no}$>, <closeness $_{no}$>). If modalities share the same proprieties, the deciding factor seems to be how correct the modality is when forming its hypotheses about the object perceived (<correctness of hypothesis>). The more correct the hypothesis, the more accessible the modality. On these principles, a basic hierarchy of accessibility can be speculated for ancient Israel (from most accessible to least accessible):[39]

[37] For a discussion of this tendency, see Chapter 1 above. Although Shen and Cohen’s arguments are restricted to the mapping of conceptual metaphors, their conclusions are applicable to the ways in which input spaces project their properties onto the blended space.

[38] Shen and Cohen, “How Come Silence is Sweet but Sweetness is Not Silent,” 128–29.

[39] As Avrahami notes, there is no conscious value-driven hierarchy of the senses in ancient Israel. Sight is not inherently more valuable than hearing nor is it more valuable than touch or taste (see especially her discussion in *The Senses of Scripture*, 223–25, 274–75). However, based on the typology established in Chapter 3, the perceptual modalities can be arranged according to their accessibility. This does not mean that hearing is more valuable than kinesthesia because it is less accessible (or vice versa), but it does mean that hearing is less concrete than the other modalities.

Proprioception →	Touch →	Ingestion →	Olfaction →	Vision →	Hearing/speech
(——)	(direct)	(direct)	(direct)	(direct)	(indirect)
(——)	(contact)	(contact)	(contact)	(distant)	(distant)

Table 12: Hierarchy of Perceptual Metaphors in Ancient Israel

Ingestion is more accessible than sight, because it is a direct, close modality, but less accessible than touch since its ability to correctly identify its object is fairly limited. By such reasoning, proprioception would be the most accessible of all the modalities, because the perceiver and object are so integrated that the properties do not even apply, while hearing would be the least accessible, since it is neither direct nor close.

However, as a poetic work, Proverbs sometimes breaks these expectations, projecting less accessible qualities onto more concrete domains ("high to low"; e.g., vision onto kinesthesia) or using one inaccessible domain to describe another ("high to high"; e.g., vision onto hearing).[40] Thus, behavior can be described as paths of light or darkness (e.g., Prov 2:13, 4:18), and commandments can be lamps that shine upon one's life (e.g., Prov 6:23). Such metaphors are counterintuitive. As David Chidester explains, they "break through structured limitations that organize experience" and produce a kind of an "antistructure" that grabs the reader's attention, disrupts expectations, and open up "new possibilities of signification."[41] According to Chidester, the resulting paradoxes provide a more immediate, charged, transcendent, and complete experience of the matter at hand than ordinary perception can.[42] The most notable example of this in Proverbs is chapter 8, where wisdom is personified as a woman that transcends the normal structures of reality to stand with God at the creation of the cosmos. However, we find these

[40] The terminology here is my own, although it is derived by analogy with Shen and Cohen's "low to high" constraint.

[41] Chidester, *Word and Light*, 17. In making these comments, Chidester is specifically speaking about the convergence of light and word imagery as it relates to poetic synesthesia in the work of Augustine.

[42] Ibid., 16–22. Chidester notes, for example, how Philo blends the domains of vision and hearing to depict God's word at Sinai as a "visible voice" (*Decal*. 47, *Mig*. 47–49), thereby highlighting the supernatural nature of this pivotal event in Israelite history (41–43).

paradoxical moments on a smaller scale throughout Proverbs as words shine light onto behavior and people walk on dark or light paths. Yet, however contrary to expectation they may be, such metaphors follow the same patterns as other blends, combing input spaces through vital relations, selectively projecting properties onto the blend, and attempting to achieve, even in their anti-structure, a modicum of human scale.

Examples in Proverbs

Complex blends for wisdom within the book of Proverbs can divided into two basic categories, those based on the idea that wisdom is a word and those based on the idea that wisdom is a set of behaviors. Situated at opposite ends of the accessibility spectrum, the modalities upon which these metaphors are based (hearing/speaking and kinesthesia) focus the student on the two central aspects of wisdom, its acquisition and its application. By combining these metaphors with other conventional metaphors and images, the book of Proverbs clarifies the means by which the student is to obtain wisdom, the intrinsic value of doing so, and the qualities associated with it.

Word Blends

Because hearing and speaking are fairly inaccessible modalities, the conventional extension WISDOM IS A WORD frequently blends with other metaphors in an attempt to make wisdom a more accessible concept.

WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD

For instance, various passages in Proverbs describe wisdom as a word that can be physically manipulated (WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD):

Prov 2:1a My child, if you *take* (תקח) my *words* (אמרי)…

Prov 4:4 [My father] taught me and said to me, “let your heart *grasp* (יתמך) my *words* (דברי)…”

Prov 4:10 Hear, my son, and *take* (וקח) my *words* (אמרי), and the years of your life

will be many.

Prov 10:8 The heart of the wise will *take* (יקח) *commandments* (מצות), but a fool lips will be thrown down.

According to these passages, wisdom is a word that can be "taken" (לקח, Prov 2:1a, 4:10, 10:8) or "grasped" (תמך, Prov 4:4). Since words are intangible, these descriptions cannot describe a physical reality. Rather, they rely upon a metaphorical construction, in this case, a blending of WISDOM IS A WORD and the primary metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING.



Blend Diagram 5: WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD

Because IDEAS are conceptualized as WORDS and as OBJECTS and because LEARNING is an act of HEARING and an act of GRASPING, the two conceptual metaphors are equated (relations: Identity, Category), and the processes of one input space become associated with the other. Hearing becomes an act of grasping, and ideas become words that can be conceptually manipulated. Auditory and tactile experiences merge. Since both metaphors involve voluntary choices, the final blend is also voluntary: the student must choose to manipulate the wisdom-word (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). However, because they draw upon different modalities, the input spaces each have specific properties that clash with the properties of the other input space: WISDOM IS A WORD is indirect

and involves no contact between the perceiver (the student) and the object perceived (wisdom); it requires an external mediator, the community, to transmit knowledge to the student. UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, on the other hand, is direct and requires contact between the student and knowledge. The "low to high" constraint mitigates between these properties, determining which of them are projected onto the blend. Since tactility is the more accessible modality, its properties are generally preserved. Thus, WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD conceptualizes the acquisition of wisdom as a direct process that involves contact between the perceiver (the student) and the object perceived (wisdom) (<direct $_{yes}$>, <contact $_{yes}$>).The student not only hears the words of his teacher, but he directly "seizes" the wisdom of his community. However, wisdom is still a "word"; that is, it is still mediated to him by the sage (<indirect $_{yes}$>). There is then, a certain tension in the blend, what I would call a "direct indirectness," a more engaged form of acquiring knowledge than pure auditory experience that is still dependent on the mediation of the community. Because hearing and tactility both have the capacity to affect the perceiver (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$), the combination of these two modalities also creates a new property. By seizing wisdom, the student will receive its positive effects: he will live (Prov 4:10), fear God (Prov 2:5), and be wise (Prov 10:8).The end result is a metaphor for wisdom that is more conceptually accessible and appealing than a simple auditory encounter with words.

WISDOM IS A VERBAL LASHING

Wisdom is also commonly conceptualized as a verbal lashing (WISDOM IS A VERBAL LASHING):

Prov 1:8 *Hear* (שמע), my son, the *discipline* (מוסר) of your father, and do not forsake the *teaching* (תורת) of your mother.

Prov 4:1 *Hear* (שמע), my children, the *discipline* (מוסר) of your father, and *be attentive* (והקשיבו) to know insight.

Prov 12:1 The one who loves *discipline* (מוסר), loves knowledge; but the one who hates *reproof* (תוכחת) are boorish.

Prov 13:1 A wise son loves *discipline* (מוסר); but the scoffer does not *listen* (שמע) to *rebuke* (גערה).

As mentioned in Chapter 3 above, the term מוסר derives from the physical sensation of a lashing, as when a parent disciplines their child by beating them with a rod (e.g., Prov 13:24, 23:13). Here, however, this מוסר can be "heard" (שמע, e.g., Prov 1:8, 4:1, see also Prov 6:23, 8:33, 10:17, 19:20, etc.) and is equivalent to a verbal "rebuke" (גערה, e.g., Prov 13:1) or "reproof" (תוכחת, e.g., Prov 12:1, see also Prov 13:18, 15:10, 32). Indeed, most passages in Proverbs that mention מוסר (Prov 1:2, 3, 7, 5:12, etc.) probably conceptualize "discipline" as a verbal form; the father disciplines his child by speaking to him.

This conceptualization blends together the WISDOM IS A WORD metaphor and the INSTRUCTION IS A LASHING metaphor:



Blend Diagram 6: WISDOM IS A VERBAL LASHING

Here, the *oral* dimensions of the WISDOM IS A WORD metaphor facilitate the blend. Because speaking and beating are both means of instruction (relation: Category), the two input spaces are equated. Speaking becomes an act of striking, hearing an act of being struck. Again, the "low to high" constraint determines which properties map onto the blend. Due to the tactile nature of

INSTRUCTION IS A LASHING, the final blend is conceptualized as a direct contact between the student and the wisdom he is experiencing (<contact $_{yes}$>, <direct $_{yes}$>). Like the WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD metaphor, however, this wisdom is still mediated to the student by the teacher (<direct $_{no}$>). Again, then, it is a direct indirectness that is envisioned here. Since the voluntary/involuntary dimensions are largely the same in each input space, they are both preserved in the blend. The verbal lashing remains an act voluntarily initiated by the teacher (<voluntary $_{yes}$>), but involuntarily received by the student (<voluntary $_{no}$>), although again there is a certain choice on the part of the student as to whether he will benefit from the (auditory) experience (<voluntary $_{yes}$>). Finally, because speaking and tactility both have the ability to affect the object perceived, the student (the object) in the blend is capable of being affected by the verbal lashing. Through discipline, he gains knowledge (e.g., Prov 4:1, 12:1, 15:32, 19:20), honor (e.g., Prov 13:18), and life (e.g., Prov 6:23, 10:17). Presumably, this process is envisioned as somewhat painful, just as a lashing instructs its object through pain. This dimension is not, however, ever explicitly stated, although it explains why discipline would be disliked by the foolish (e.g., Prov 12:1, 13:1). The wise may not enjoy physically discipline, but they recognize its benefit and therefore love it. The wise student should do likewise.

WISDOM IS A (VERBAL) TREASURE

Other passages describe wisdom as a word that can be “stored” or “guarded” within the heart of the student (WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE):

Prov 2:1–4 My son, if you take my *words* (אמרי) and *store up* (תצפן) my *commandments* (מצותי) within you…if indeed you cry out for insight, give your voice to understanding, if you seek it like *silver* (ככסף), search for it like *hidden treasures* (כמטמונים)…

Prov 3:1 My son, do not forget my teaching, but let your heart *watch over* (יצר) my *commandments* (מצותי).

Prov 7:1 My son, *keep* (שמר) my *words* (אמרי) and *store up* (תצפן) my

commandments (מצותי) within you.

Wisdom is a "word" (אמר, Prov 2:1, 7:1; מצות, Prov 2:1, 3:1, 7:1, see also Prov 4:4, 6:20) that can be "watched over" (נצר, Prov 3:1, see also Prov 3:21, 5:2, 6:20), "kept" (שמר, Prov 7:1; see also Prov 4:4, 4:21, 5:2, 22:18), or "stored up" (צפן, Prov 2:1b, 7:1; see also Prov 10:14) by or within the heart of the individual. Such words are to be sought like "silver" (כסף) or a "hidden treasure" (מטמונים) (Prov 2:4).

Like WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD, these passages combine auditory and tactile experience to provide a more accessible impression of wisdom. The statements here, however, develop as the result of two successive blends, rather than just one. First, the idea that WISDOM IS A COMMODITY blends with the rich image of a Treasure to create a metaphor in which WISDOM IS A TREASURE (see Prov 8:10–11, 16:16).



Blend Diagram 7: WISDOM IS A TREASURE

Because both input spaces are conceptualized as tactile objects that can be bought and sold (relation: Category), the two input spaces become conceptually linked and project their properties onto the blend. Wisdom becomes a precious treasure. Both input spaces contribute a strong tactile focus to the blend, although the tight structure of WISDOM IS A COMMODITY focuses this tactility

on the direct, voluntary contact involved in the acquisition of wisdom (<direct $_{\text{yes}}$>, <contact $_{\text{yes}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>). Thus, wisdom is a treasure that can be “taken” (לקח, Prov 8:10) and “acquired” (קנה, Prov 16:16). The Treasure input space also contributes a sense of “value” to the endeavor. Like physical gold or silver, two precious metals that were costly to acquire but good to have, wisdom is a rare commodity. It is hard to acquire and requires effort and diligence on the part of the student. However, once it was obtained, wisdom is more valuable than all the riches in the world, “better” (טוב...מ־) than “gold” (חרוץ), “silver” (כסף), or “rubies” (פנינים[43]) (Prov 8:10–11, 16:16). This superlative is not inherent in either input space. The idea that WISDOM IS A COMMODITY does not necessitate that it is better than all other commodities, nor does the image of Treasure necessitate that one treasure is better than others. Rather, the idea that wisdom is the best treasure to hold emerges as a unique property of the blending process. The result is an impression of wisdom that is not only accessible, but highly appealing. By using the image of a treasure, the poet is attempting to motivate the listener to seek wisdom and to hold onto it above all else.

Since words themselves are conceptualized as objects that can be grasped (i.e., WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD), it is not surprising to find this WISDOM IS A TREASURE metaphor taking on verbal qualities. By another blend, wisdom becomes a treasure of words.

[43] As Fox notes (*Proverbs 1–9*, 157), it is difficult to know the exact meaning of פנינים. Presumably, it is some kind of precious stone with a reddish tint (see, for instance, Lam 4:7), perhaps rubies, corals, or pearls.



Blend Diagram 8: WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE

Since both input spaces describe wisdom (relation: Identity) and because they conceptualize wisdom as a tactile object (relation: Category), the two input space blend together; wisdom becomes a verbal treasure. Both spaces contribute a strong tactile dimension to the blend. Wisdom-as-verbal-treasure remains a voluntary encounter that requires direct contact between the student and the wisdom of the community (<direct $_{yes}$>, <contact $_{yes}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>). Yet, like WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD, this treasure still carries verbal connotations; it indirectly conveys information to the student through the teacher (<direct $_{no}$>).

Latent properties of hearing and vision also resurface in the blend. On the one hand, because treasure can be seen, the WISDOM IS TREASURE input space contributes a visual dimension to the blend. Wisdom-as-treasure can be "sought" (בקשׁ) and "searched for" (חפשׂ) (Prov 2:4). On the other hand, because hearing is an internal property, the WISDOM IS MANIPULABLE WORD inverses the <internal $_{no}$> property of tactility that is inherent in both input spaces. Wisdom is not merely externally touched, but it is "stored" within the listener. The student becomes, in a sense, a storehouse for the wisdom of the community. He must not only "take" (i.e., listen to) the wisdom of his teacher, but he must "watch over" (נצר, Prov 3:1, 21, 5:2,

6:20), “guard” (שמר, Prov 4:4, 21, 5:2, 7:1, 22:18), and “hide” this wisdom within his heart (צפן, Prov 2:1b, 7:1, 10:14). Doing so will have positive effects on the student (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR \rightarrow P}$, a property projected from WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE OBJECT): he will live (Prov 3:2, 22, 4:4, 22, 7:1), prosper (Prov 3:2), fear God (Prov 2:5, 22:19), and be wise (Prov 5:2). Again, the result is a more accessible, appealing impression of wisdom that motivates the student to seek wisdom above all else.

WISDOM IS A WREATH, NECKLACE, OR RING OF WORDS

By similar processes, wisdom is conceptualized as an ornament of words, worn on the head, neck, heart, or fingers (WISDOM IS A WREATH, NECKLACE, or RING OF WORDS):

Prov 1:8–9 Hear, my child, your father’s discipline and do not forsake the instruction of your mother. For they are *wreath* of grace (לוית חן) for your head and *necklaces* (ענקים) for your neck.

Prov 7:2–3 Keep my commandments and live; [keep] my instructions as the pupil of your eye. *Bind them* (קשרם) upon your *fingers* (אצבעתיך); write them upon the tablet of your heart.

Prov 25:11–12 *Apples of gold in engravings of silver* (תפוחי זהב במשכיות כסף) is a *word* (דבר) *spoken* (דבר) to the situation; a *ring of gold* (נזם זהב) and an *ornament of fine gold* (חלי־כתם) is a wise *rebuke* (מוכיח חכם) to the *listening ear* (אזן שמעת).

Not only is the student to “take” wisdom, but he is to wear it. The words of the father are wreaths (ליוה) that can be placed upon the head (Prov 1:9; see also Prov 3:22), necklaces (ענקים) worn about the neck (Prov 1:9; see also 6:21), and rings worn upon the fingers or ears (Prov 7:2–3;[44]

[44] Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 240) argues that Prov 7:2–3 probably does not refer to a finger ring, since rings are not “tied” (קשר) upon the fingers but are slipped on. He thus suggests that there is “no specific practice underlying the metaphor” here. Yet, just as “words being taken” does not reflect a concrete reality but a blend of two metaphors (see WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD above), “rings being bound” does not represent a concrete reality. It is a combination of two separate metaphors. The mention of “fingers” conjures an image of rings (WISDOM IS A RING); the verb קשר implies a sense of commitment (COMMITTING

25: 11–12[45]).

As with WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE, this metaphor is the result of two successive blends. First, WISDOM IS A COMMODITY combines with different images of adornment, namely, a wreath, a necklace, or a ring:



IS BINDING). The verb may have specifically been chosen here to link this passage with the similar passage in Prov 3:3. Just as one "ties" moral qualities around the neck and writes them upon the heart there (Prov 3:3), one ties wisdom on the fingers and writes it upon the heart (Prov 7:3). At any rate, the choice of terms reflects a metaphorical conception, not a concrete reality.

[45] Although elsewhere נזם means "nose-ring" (e.g., Gen 24:22, 30, 47; Is 3:21), the part of the body on which the נזם was worn is not always clear. See the discussion of this issue in Abigail Limmer, "The Social Functions and Ritual Significance of Jewelry in the Iron Age II Souther Lavant" (Ph.D. diss., The University of Arizona, 2007), 69–71. The connection to the ear here may suggest that an earring was envisioned, but the reference to other ornaments leaves open the possibility that a nose or finger ring or just adornment more generally is conceptualized here.



Blend Diagram 9: WISDOM IS A WREATH, NECKLACE, or RING

Like WISDOM IS A TREASURE, each of these blends combine WISDOM IS A COMMODITY with a rich image based on a perceived similarity in the category of the input spaces; wreathes, necklaces, ring, and ideas are all "objects" that can be acquired and experienced through tactility (relation: Category). When they become linked, the properties of each space are projected onto the blend. In each case, WISDOM IS A COMMODITY focuses the blend on tactility's <direct $_{yes}$>, <contact $_{yes}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$> properties. Wisdom remains a direct, voluntary experience that requires contact between the perceiver and wisdom.

Yet, because wreathes, necklaces, and rings can each be seen, the individual's wisdom also becomes a visible sign that others can see. The function of this sight varies, depending upon the rich image upon which the metaphor draws. In WISDOM IS A WREATH, wisdom is conceptualized as a wreath that encircles the head. Wreaths beautify the individual, making them more attractive to others. They may also have been visible signs of public honor, given to an individual for military bravery or for service to the ruler.[46] By conceptualizing wisdom as a

[46] Although there is no clear evidence that wreaths served such a function in ancient Israel, they were signs of honor in Hellenistic Judaism and may have been so earlier. "Crowns," for instance, were signs of royal authority (Jer 13:18, Ezek 21:26), and when a ruler fell, the victor was granted the honor of

wreath, the metaphor asserts that wisdom will beautify the individual and bring him or her honor in the community. In WISDOM IS A NECKLACE, on the other hand, wisdom is conceptualized as a necklace that hangs around the neck. Like wreaths, necklaces were used to beautify an individual and bring him or her honor. More importantly, they may also have served an apotropaic function, protecting the individual from harm.[47] WISDOM IS A NECKLACE, then, emphasizes that wisdom was not only a beautifying agent, but a protective agent that shielded the student from harmful behavior. Finally, WISDOM IS A RING depicts wisdom as a ring that is worn upon the fingers or in the ears. Like wreaths and necklaces, rings beautified the individual; however, they also served as a visual sign of a person's social identity and a marker of his or her status.[48] WISDOM IS A RING, then, signified the status that the individual would enjoy in the community should he or she embrace wisdom. Since items bound upon the hand serve as mnemonic devices, the comparison to a ring may also have highlighted the vital need to remember wisdom in all one's practices.[49]

Each of these metaphors, in turn, blends with WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD to create a conception in which wisdom is a wreath, amulet, or ring of words:

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wearing it (e.g., 2 Sam 12:30//1 Chr 20:2). While most of these "crowns" were probably made of metal, some may have been made of vegetation woven together. Limmer, "The Social Functions and Ritual Significance of Jewelry," 90. At the very least, they suggest that circlets on the head were signs of honor.

[47] Philip King and Lawrence Stager, *Life in Biblical Israel* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2001), 276.

[48] In Gen 41:42, for instance, a finger ring is given to Joseph as a sign of his office (see also Ahasuerus' ring in Est 2:10, 12; 8:2, 8, 10). Similarly, as Limmer argues, nose and ear rings could signify social status (e.g., a woman's status as a bride-to-be, Gen 24:22, 30, 47; Ezek 16:12) or ethnic identity (e.g., Judg 8:24–26). The mere fact that such rings were made of precious metals would have symbolized that the owner was a person of wealth and status. Moreover, the fact that many rings also contained seals may have also signified that the owner was literate. Limmer, "The Social Functions and Ritual Significance of Jewelry," 66–73, 289–90, 294.

[49] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 240. As evidence, Fox points to a number of items that are metaphorically bound to the hands, namely, bread (Exod 13:9), the dedication of the first-born (Exod 13:16), and God's commandments (Deut 6:8, 11:18). Later Jews understood the binding of commandments in Deut 6:8 and 11:18 as phylacteries, but as Fox argues, these verses were probably originally understood metaphorically.



Blend Diagram 10: WISDOM IS A WREATH, NECKLACE, or RING OF WORDS

Again, since the input spaces in each metaphor conceptualize wisdom as a manipulable object, they are equated (relation: Identity, Category). Wisdom becomes a wreath of instructions (Prov 1:8–9), a necklace of words (Prov 1:8–9, 6:20–21), or a ring of commandments (Prov 7:2–3). In each case, wisdom becomes a more accessible, direct, and voluntary experience that requires contact between the student and wisdom (<direct $_{yes}$>, <contact $_{yes}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>), while still

remaining an indirect verbal mediation of information to the student by the sage (<direct $_{no}$>). However, because they ultimately draw upon different rich images, each metaphor provides a different motivation for seeking wisdom. WISDOM IS A VERBAL WREATH motivates the student by promising him or her honor in the community; WISDOM IS A VERBAL NECKLACES promises protection and guidance; WISDOM IS A VERBAL RING promises status within the community. Unlike WISDOM IS A TREASURE, each of these motivations remains external to the student; he wears wisdom *upon* his body, not in it.

WISDOM IS THE FRUIT OF THE MOUTH, WISDOM IS HONEY

Wisdom, and words more generally, can also be conceptualized as edible objects (WISDOM IS THE FRUIT OF THE MOUTH, WISDOM IS HONEY, GOSSIP IS A DELICACY):

Prov 13:2 From the *fruit of his mouth* (מפרי פי־איש), a person *eats* good (יאכל טוב), but the desire of the faithless is for violence.

Prov 24:13–14 My son, eat *honey* (דבש), for it is good (טוב), and *honeycomb* (נפת) is *sweet* (מתוק) upon the palate. Know that wisdom is thus to your נפש; if you find it, then you will have a future, and your hope will not be cut off.

Prov 18:8 The *words* (נרגן) of the gossip[50] are like *delicacies* (כמתלהמים). They go down to the *bottom of the belly* (חדרי־בטן).

On the one hand, wisdom is conceptualized as a "fruit" (פרי) produced by the "mouth" (פה). He who "eats" (אכל, Prov 13:2) of it is "satisfied" (שבע) with good things (Prov 13:2, see also Prov 12:14, 18:20, 21). Similarly, wisdom is a sweet "honey" (דבש), bringing life and healing to the נפש (Prov 24:13–24, see also "pleasant words," אמרי־נעם, as honey in Prov 16:24). Gossip, on the other hand, is described as מתלהמים (Prov 18:8, see also Prov 26:22). The exact meaning of מתלהמים is unclear. Commonly translated as "delicacies," מתלהמים (root: להם) is probably related to the Arabic *lahima*, which means "to devour greedily." The hithpael participle here, then, would

[50] Alternatively, "slanderer." As Fox (*Proverbs 10–31*, 640) argues, the verb "seems to mean more broadly 'complain' or 'say bad things about,'" as when the Israelites grumble against God in the desert (Deut 1:27, Ps 106:25). As I read it, the sense here seems to be that of someone who gossips maliciously.

give the impression of "someone wolfing down gossip" as if it were a delicious and savory morsel.[51]

Each of these expressions ultimately derives from a combination of IDEAS ARE FOOD[52] and KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD.



Blend Diagram 11: WORDS ARE FOOD

Because the subject of these input spaces share a common Identity (they are "ideas"), the two input spaces are equated. Words become consumable objects. The processes associated with each also become equated. On the one hand, since hearing and ingestion are both internal actions (<internal $_{yes}$>), hearing becomes an act of eating. Due to the "low to high constraint," hearing takes on the qualities of ingestion; it is a direct acquisition of information through the mouth (<direct $_{yes}$>, <contact $_{yes}$>) that can affect the listener, providing him or her with nourishment

[51] Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 640–41.

[52] As discussed in Chapter 3, the notion that IDEAS ARE CONSUMABLE OBJECTS is a common entailment of ingestive metaphors.

and/or knowledge (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR \rightarrow P}$). On the other hand, because it is an externally-oriented process (<internal $_{no}$>), speaking becomes understood as the process by which food is produced and by which the listener is affected (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP \rightarrow P}$). It is an act of "scattering seeds" (זרה, e.g., Prov 15:7) or "bearing fruit" (see, for example, the reference to the speaker being a "tree" in Prov 15:4). Yet, whether the focus is on speaking or hearing, there is still an indirectness envisioned here (<direct $_{no}$>). The student may consume the word of the teacher, but he still does not directly experience the information that that word conveys.

There are various types of food available to be eaten (fruit, honey, etc.), some more appealing and beneficial than others. There are also various types of speech a person can engage in (gossip, wise speech, etc.). The base metaphor WORDS ARE FOOD thus easily becomes elaborated, with various food items being used to clarify different types of speech. Which food item is linked with which type of speech depends upon the value of the speech that the sage wishes to highlight. Thus, gossip is likened to a quickly-devoured delicacy in order to highlight the tendency of false information to be quickly and uncritically "consumed" by the listener (Prov 18:8, see also Prov 26:22). Once eaten, this delicacy sits in the "bottom of the belly" (חדרי־בטן); that is, it remains lodged within the listener prejudicing him or her against the gossip's referent. Wisdom, on the other hand, is described as the "fruit of the mouth" (מפרי פי־איש, Prov 13:2, see also Prov 12:14, 18:20). Fruit of various sorts were staples of the Israelite diet.[53] By comparing wisdom to a fruit, the proverb thus highlights the nourishing qualities of wisdom. Finally, wise words are also likened to "sweet honey" (מתוק דבש, Prov 24:13–14). In ancient Israel, honey was a natural sweetening agent; it was found in wild or domestic bee hives and fruit syrups (Exod 3:8, Deut 8:8, 32:13; Judg 14:8) and was used to sweeten the palate (e.g., Exod 16:31, 1 Sam 14:27).[54] More importantly, honey was thought to have medicinal value; it was used by ancient Near

[53] See the various references to figs, grapes, olives, and other unnamed "fruit" (פרי) throughout the Hebrew Bible.

[54] Tova Forti, "Bee's Honey: From Realia to Metaphor in Biblical Wisdom Literature," *VT* 56 (2006): 327–41 (327–29).

Eastern cultures as an anti-inflammatory agent to cure illness of the eyes, ears, mouth, or stomach.[55] By comparing wisdom to honey, then, the proverb highlights both the pleasant and therapeutic nature of wisdom. Wisdom not only tasted good (i.e., was a pleasant experience), but it healed the נפש, curing it of its ailments (anger, avarice, etc.) by helping the individual discern what behavior was right and what behavior was wrong so that he or she could enjoy a long and productive life.[56] Given that flavor is elsewhere used to describe positive values (see the discussion of GOOD IS SWEET in Chapter 3 above), the description of wisdom as sweet here also makes a normative claim about the quality. For the scribal community, wisdom was good to have.

GOSSIP IS A DELICACY and WISDOM IS HONEY both focus on the hearing-eating dimensions of WORDS ARE FOOD. Delicious gossip and sweet wisdom are food products that are consumed directly by the listener (<internal $_{yes}$>, <direct $_{yes}$>, <contact $_{yes}$>) and that affect his or her cognitive state (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR \rightarrow P}$), either prejudicing the individual against another or healing the individual's נפש of moral ills. Gossip and wisdom themselves, however, are still indirect words (<direct $_{no}$>); that is, they convey information about an individual or a behavior that the listener otherwise would not have access to. WISDOM IS THE FRUIT OF THE MOUTH, on the other hand, focuses on the oral dimensions of WORD IS FOOD (<internal $_{no}$>, <contact $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP \rightarrow P}$). Although wisdom can still be eaten, the focus of the metaphor is on the sage's mouth. Like a fertile tree which produces fruits of various kinds, the sage produces fruit for his student to eat.[57]

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[55] Forti, "Bee's Honey," 333–34.

[56] Fox and Forti both focus on the "pleasant" aspect of this metaphor. Fox, for instance, argues that one of the main points of this proverb is that, "if pursued with love, learning is a joy" (*Proverbs 10–31*, 748). While this dimension is present, it is not the only focus of the proverb. As the second half of the proverb makes clear, the value of wisdom is not only that it pleasurable but that it heals the נפש.

[57] The idea that the sage is a "tree" that produces fruit for the student is probably inspired in some part by the "tree of life" motif that pervades ancient Near Eastern literature. In mythological texts and iconography, the sacred tree was an independent divine agent that granted immortality to those who ate it (e.g., the *Kuntillet 'Ajrud* drawings, ninth–eight cent. B.C.E.; see also the "tree of life" in Gen 3:22). In Israelite and Jewish texts, this tree was often connected to the Torah, thereby presenting God's commandments as a life-giving entity (e.g., *Tg. Ps.-J.* 3.22; *Sipre Deut.* 47). For a discussion of specific examples, see Carol Meyers, *The Tabernacle Menorah: A Synthetic Study of a Symbol from the Biblical Cult* (ASORDS 2; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1974); Menahem Kister, "The Tree of Life and the

Frequently, the person who eats the fruit of wisdom is the very same person as the one who produces it (e.g., Prov 12:4, 13:2, and 18:20). This strange convergence is the result of a yet another blend, this time between WISDOM IS THE FRUIT OF THE MOUTH and SATISFACTION IS FULLNESS.



Blend Diagram 12: WISDOM IS A SATISFYING FRUIT

Here, the two input spaces are related to each other through a shared Location (in the mouth) and through a retributive Cause-Effect relation. Within the framework of the Acts-Consequence Connection, appropriate speech is thought to have beneficial effects for the speaker. The sage speaks, and his words encourage others to behave in a way that is conducive to his or his community's well-being. The speaker is then rewarded for his speech, perhaps because the behavior of others that he inspires directly benefits him or because God rewards him for his

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Turning Sword: Jewish Biblical Interpretation, Symbols, and Theological Patterns and Their Christian Counterparts," in *Paradise in Antiquity* (eds. Markus Bockmuehl and Guy G. Stroumsa; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 138–55. Proverbs does not contain the same mythological nuances, but it builds upon these common motifs in order to depict the sage as a tree that produces life-giving fruit. Because of these sapiential nuances, Wisdom itself also comes to be presented as life-giving tree or plant more generally (e.g., Prov 3:18, Sir 1:20, 2:12–14).

efforts.[58] In either case, proper speech ultimately leads to the satisfaction of the speaker's נפש. The WISDOM IS A SATISFYING FRUIT metaphor presupposes this sequence. The wise man produces fruit, which satisfies others. Others then produce fruit of their own, which satisfies the sage. The metaphor, however, compress this sequence into a single event. The one who speaks eats the fruit of his own mouth. By compressing the time frame of this Acts-Consequence Connection, the metaphor increases the immediacy of the speaker's reward and emphasizes the inherent benefit of speaking wisely. Wise speech is itself a satisfying fruit, one that fills the speaker's stomach and provides him with good things. The student is thus encouraged to speak wisely, so that he may reap the benefit of his words.

WISDOM IS A WATER OF LIFE, FLATTERY IS A SMOOTH OIL

Wisdom is also conceptualized as flowing water, while false obsequious words are smooth oil (WISDOM IS A WATER OF LIFE, FLATTERY IS A SMOOTH OIL):

Prov 13:14 The *teachings* (תורת) of the wise is a *fountain of life* (מקור חיים), to turn aside the snares of death.

Prov 18:4 The *words of the mouth* (דברי פי־איש) are *deep waters* (מים אמקים); the *fountain* (מקור) of wisdom is a *flowing wadi* (נחל נבע).

Prov 26:28 A lying tongue hates its victims; a *smooth mouth* (פה חלק) causes stumbling.

Prov 28:23 The one who reproves a person will find more favor afterwards than the one who *makes smooth* (ממחליק) with the *tongue* (לשון).

Wisdom is a stream of words, flowing from the mouth of the sage and providing life to its listener (Prov 13:14, 18:4, see also Prov 16:22 and the "fear of the Lord" in Prov 14:27). Flattery, on the other hand, is likened to "smooth" oil (חלק, Prov 28:23, see also Prov 26:28, 29:5); it drips from

[58] The tension between human agency and divine retribution in the book of Proverbs that Hatton points out (see Chapter 4, n. 8 above) makes it difficult to determine the exact mechanisms by which humans were rewarded for their speech.

the mouth of the speaker and loosens up the listener, making him or her easier to handle.[59]

Again, these passages presuppose a blend between KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD and a conventional conception about the nature of ideas. Here, however, ideas are not food items but liquids, namely, oil and water (IDEAS ARE LIQUIDS).[60]



Blend Diagram 13: WORDS ARE LIQUIDS

Again, because the subjects of each input space share a common Identity (they are "ideas"), they can be equated. Words become liquids that "pour forth" from the mouth of the speaker (e.g., Prov 1:13, 15:2, 28, 25:25). The blend does not specify whether these liquids are then consumed by the

[59] That the smoothness envisioned here is that of oil is suggested by the description of the Strange Woman's words as "oil" in Prov 5:3. Interestingly, wisdom does not seem to be conceptualized as oil, despite the fact that oil can have positive connotations.

[60] The notion that IDEAS ARE LIQUIDS is a common entailment in ingestive metaphors (see the discussion in Chapter 3 above), but it is also appears without specific reference to ingestion (see, for example, Prov 20:5, 21:1).

listener or whether the listener is envisioned as a plant or field that is watered; both are possible.[61] What is important here is the production of words, which takes on the qualities of the production of liquid. Words become liquids that are emitted from the mouth, convey information indirectly to the listener, and directly affect the listener (<external $_{yes}$>, <direct $_{yes/no}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $_{PR \rightarrow P/OP \rightarrow P}$).

Just as there are many types of food, there are many types of liquids. Because of this, WORDS ARE LIQUIDS easily elaborates to describe different types of speech. As with the food metaphors above, the type of liquid chosen reflects the value of the speech that the sage wishes to emphasize. For instance, as an agricultural society in an arid climate, ancient Israel depended on water to sustain its people and grow its crops. By describing wisdom as water, the sage could emphasize the life-giving properties of wisdom (e.g., Prov 13:14, 14:27, 16:22, 18:4). Wisdom sustained the נפש and encouraged its “fruits” (knowledge, good deeds, proper speech, etc.) to grow. Oil was also a common commodity in ancient Israel. It was an ingredient in cooking (Exod 29:3, 23, 40, Lev 2:4–7), a base for cosmetics and perfumes (Exod 30:25, Prov 29:9, Song 1:3, 4:10), fuel for lamps (e.g., Exod 25:6, 27:20, 35:8), and a liquid used in ritualistic anointings (e.g., Gen 28:18, 35:14, Exod 29:7).[62] Yet, verbal metaphors based on oil are not concerned with the function of oil but rather its texture. Oil was smooth and made whatever it touched slick and slippery. By describing flattery as oil, the sage could suggest that obsequious words made the listener “smooth” and more amenable to the speaker’s cause without providing the listener with any real benefit (Prov 26:28, 28:23, 29:5).

Again, the extensions preserve the properties of their base metaphor, in this case, the oral dimensions. Wisdom and flattery are both liquids emitted from the mouth that directly contact the listener, indirectly convey information to him or her, and affect his or her behavior (<internal $_{no}$>,

[61] Proverbs 25:25 envisions words as water that an individual drinks to refresh his thirsty נפש. Yet, the fact that the elaborations of this metaphor vary on how they conceptualize the listener (see below) suggests that the base metaphor itself does not limit the listener to one role or the other.

[62] For the cultivation and function of olive oil in ancient Israel, see King and Stager, *Life in Biblical Israel*, 97–98.

<direct $_{yes/no}$>, <contact $_{yes}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP \rightarrow P}$). In WISDOM IS A WATER OF LIFE, the speaker's mouth is a deep fountain, which never ceases to produce life-sustaining water (Prov 18:4). In FOLLY IS A SMOOTH OIL, on the other hand, the speaker is but an earthen jar, whose contents may seem beneficial in the short run, but is ultimately of limited value (e.g., Prov 26:28, 28:23, 29:5). In either case, like the image of food, the image of liquid encourages the student to choose one type of speech (wisdom) over another (flattery).

SPEAKING MORALLY/IMMORALLY IS SPEAKING STRAIGHT/CROOKEDLY

Words can also be described as "straight" or "crooked" (SPEAKING MORALLY IS SPEAKING STRAIGHT, SPEAKING IMMORALLY IS SPEAKING CROOKEDLY):

Prov 4:24 Turn (הסר) from you a *twisted mouth* (עקשות פה), and let *crooked lips* (לזות שפתים) be far from you.

Prov 15:4 A healing tongue is a tree of life, but *crookedness* (סלף) in it breaks the spirit.

Prov 16:13 The lips of the righteous is favorable to kings, for he loves *the one who speaks straight* (דבר ישרים).[63]

Prov 17:20 The crooked of heart (עקש־לב) do not find good, but the *bent of tongue* (נהפך בלשונו) fall into calamity.

Prov 19:1 Better to be lacking and walk (הולך) in innocence, than to be *crooked of lips* (מעקש שפתיו) and be a fool.

An immoral person has a "crooked" (סלף, הפך, עקש) "mouth" (פה, Prov 4:23), "lip" (שפתים, Prov 4:24, 19:1), or "tongue" (לשון, Prov 15:4, 17:20), that is, he or she *speaks* immorally. The righteous person speaks "straight" (ישר, Prov 16:14).

How these metaphors develop is difficult to explain. They seem to combine KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD with the idea that GOOD IS STRAIGHT or BAD IS CROOKED.

[63] Literally, "speaks straight things."



Blend Diagram 14: SPEAKING MORALLY IS SPEAKING STRAIGHT, SPEAKING IMMORALLY IS SPEAKING CROOKEDLY

Yet, there is no apparent connection between speech and the linear quality of the body, and the properties associated with each are quite different given that they derive from modalities from opposite ends of the accessibility spectrum. It is possible that the metaphors develop via an analogy with the ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT and ACTING IMMORALLY IS WALKING CROOKEDLY metaphors (see below). Just as good behavior is an act of walking straight, good speech is an act of speaking straight. Alternatively, the evaluation of certain speech as good or bad may have itself provided enough of a link for the two input spaces to combine. Whatever the reason, the final result is somewhat disconcerting, combining oral and kinesthetic properties to portray speech. Speaking correctly becomes an act of speaking straight; speaking immorally is an act of speaking crookedly. The latter type is typically referred to by the parts of the body that control speech, namely, the “mouth” (פה, Prov 4:23), “lips” (שפתים, Prov 4:24, 19:1), or “tongue” (לשון, Prov 15:4, 17:20). Like the WICKED IS A CROOKED PERSON metaphor above, then, the body itself reflects the moral character of the individual. Yet, in either metaphor, the properties of each input space are projected onto the blend. Speaking remains indirect, voluntary, and requires no contact between the speaker and listener (<contact $_{no}$>, <voluntary $_{yes}$>, <direct $_{no}$>); at the same

time, it indicates that the moral character of the individual is either good-straight or bad-crooked (<evaluative $_{yes}$>).

WISDOM IS A VERBAL LIGHT

Finally, auditory and visual experience can combine to create an impression of wisdom as a verbal light (WISDOM IS A VERBAL LIGHT):

Prov 6:23 For the *commandment* (מצוה) is a *lamp* (נר), and the *teaching* (תורה) is a *light* (אור)….

Words are "lamps" (אור/נר) that shed light on the student and allow him to see the dangers of the adulteress (see Prov 6:24). Because light and word are both fairly inaccessible perceptual experiences ("high to high"), the image here is somewhat counterintuitive. Yet, the blending of these two modalities follows predictable patterns, combining WISDOM IS A WORD with the notion that UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING.



Blend Diagram 15: WISDOM IS A VERBAL LIGHT

Although words and light are not inherently related, they are both necessary components of the perceptual experience. Words are the medium by which oral-aural exchange occurs; light is the medium that enables sight. Since the conceptual system of ancient Israel perceived speaking as a

means of producing knowledge and seeing as a means of understanding it, one form of understanding comes to be conceptualized as the result of the other, and the mediums of each become equated. Speaking leads to seeing. Words become light. On the one hand, the properties of each input space map onto the blend.[64] The act of speech itself remains a voluntary, indirect experience without contact between the speaker and the student (<contact $_{\text{no}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, <direct $_{\text{no}}$>), while the act of understanding remains a voluntary, direct experience (<contact $_{\text{yes}}$>, <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>, <direct $_{\text{yes}}$>). Yet, when the two act meet, the properties of each metaphor conflate. As Greg Schmidt Goering argues, this "verbal-to-visual" transformation makes "the distant immanent, the discontinuous continuous, and the represented present."[65] Word transforms into light. Indirectness transforms into directness. Like the word metaphors above, then, a more direct indirectness emerges here. The sage's words become the primary experience that directs the student's understanding and guides his behaviors.[66]

Behavior Blends

At the other end of the spectrum are those passages that use kinesthetic metaphors to prescribe the appropriate behavior for the scribal community to follow. Already grounded in very concrete experience, such metaphors tend to remain kinesthetic; that is, rather than combining with metaphors from other modal domains, they typically acquire new meaning by blending with other kinesthetic metaphors.

WALKING STRAIGHT OR WALKING CROOKEDLY

Take, for instance, the following passages, each of which describes an individual who walks "straight" (ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT, THINKING CORRECTLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT, LIVING WELL IS WALKING STRAIGHT):

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[64] Although I identify a different set of metaphors as the input spaces of this metaphor, the observations that follow conform well to those made by Schmidt Goering about the "bring-to-light" metaphor in Ben Sira. See Schmidt Goering, "Sapiential Synesthesia." For a discussion of how my analysis differs from Schmidt Goering's, see Chapter 2, n. 41above.

[65] Ibid.

[66] Ibid.

Prov 14:2 Those who *walk straight* (הולך בישרו)[67] fear the Lord…

Prov 15:21 Folly is a joy to the one lacking heart, but a person of understanding *walks straight* (יישר־לכת).

Prov 11:5 The righteousness of the innocent *makes straight* (תישר) his path (דרכו).

In the first example, walking "straight" indicates an evaluation of an individual's morality. He who walks straight behaves righteously (Prov 14:2, see also Prov 9:5). In the second example, walking "straight" evaluates an individual's intellect. He who walks straight thinks correctly (Prov 15:21). In the final case, making "straight" indicates financial and personal security. He whose path is made straight enjoys peace and prosperity (Prov 11:5, see also Prov 3:6).

Each of these passages blends two kinesthetic metaphors: a WALKING metaphor (ACTING IS WALKING, THINKING IS WALKING, or LIVING IS WALKING[68]) and a judgment metaphor (GOOD IS STRAIGHT).



[67] Literally: "walk with straightness."

[68] Like ACTING IS WALKING or THINKING IS WALKING (see Chapter 3), LIVING IS WALKING is a primary metaphor. See references to life and death as a series of "comings" (בוא) and "goings" (הלך) in Job 5:26, Qoh 1:4, 3:20, 5:14–15, 6:6.; conversely, see Qoh 1:4, where that which does not die "stands" (עמד).



Blend Diagram 16: ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT, THINKING CORRECTLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT, LIVING WELL IS WALKING STRAIGHT

As noted in Chapter 3 above, horizontal motion has various qualities. One can move fast or slow (projectional quality); in a straight line or circuitously (linear quality). Because walking and moving in a straight line are each Properties of horizontal motion, input spaces based upon them can be conceptualized as referring to the same horizontal motion: walking in a straight line.

The two input spaces of each metaphor nuance this motion by projecting distinct elements onto the blend. On the one hand, the WALKING input space clarifies the type of motion involved. In the ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT blend, walking signifies action; in THINKING CORRECTLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT, it signifies thought; and in LIVING WELL IS WALKING STRAIGHT, it signifies the entirety of a human life. Since acting and thinking are voluntary activities, metaphors based on these input spaces are also voluntary (<voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>). One chooses to act morally or think correctly. LIVING WELL IS WALKING STRAIGHT, however, is involuntary, presumably because individuals often have little control over whether or not they live, let alone prosper. Instead, “righteousness” (Prov 11:5) or God (Prov 3:6) makes one walk straight. On the other hand, the trajectory and its evaluation depend on the GOOD IS STRAIGHT

input space. Walking itself is a neutral motion. Yet, because walking in a straight line is often the most effective means of arriving at a location, the GOOD IS STRAIGHT metaphor projects its evaluative dimension onto the blend (<evaluation $_{yes}$>). Walking in a straight line becomes an indicator of what is good for the individual: moral action, correct thought, prosperous living. Thus, the one who "walks straight" fears the Lord (Prov 14:2); the one who "thinks straight" thinks correctly (Prov 15:21);[69] and the one who keeps the trajectory of his feet straight is saved from trouble and death (see Prov 11:4, 6, 8).

While acting morally, thinking correctly, and living well are each conceptualized as walking straight, in Proverbs only immoral action is typically conceptualized as walking crookedly (ACTING IMMORALLY IS WALKING CROOKEDLY or TURNING):

Prov 10:9	Whoever walks (הולך) in integrity walks securely, but whoever *twists* (ומעקש) his *ways* (דרכיו) will be known.
Prov 18:5	It is not good to be partial[70] to the wicked or to *turn* (להטות) the righteous in judgment.
Prov 19:3	The folly of a person *turns* (תסלף) his way, but his heart is vexed against the Lord.
Prov 22:6	Train youth concerning his path, and when he is old, he will not *turn* (לא־יסור) from it.

In the first example, walking in a crooked line indicates immoral behavior; he who "twists" (עקש) his trajectory errs (Prov 10:9, see also Prov 28:6, 18). Similarly, in the latter three examples, "turning" indicates moral error; he who "turns" (נטה: Prov 18:5; סלף: Prov 19:3; סור: Prov 22:6) from the proper path commits a moral offense (Prov 1:3, 18:5, 22:6; see also Prov 13:6, 17:23,

[69] That "walking straight" here indicates intellect rather than morality is indicated by the chiastic structure of the proverb. As noted in Chapter 3 above, "lacking heart" indicates a lack of understanding (HAVING KNOWLEDGE IS POSSESSING HEART). The "person of understanding" is thus the direct opposite of the ignorant person. Similarly, "folly" is the direct opposite of "walking straight."

[70] Literally, to "lift the face." This phrase presumes that SHOWING PARTIALITY IS SHOWING FACE, perhaps because people tend to face each other when talking, but turn away when ignoring each other.

7:21).

Like the WALKING STRAIGHT metaphors above, these expressions blend two kinesthetic metaphors: an action metaphor (ACTING IS WALKING or ACTING IS TURNING) and a judgment metaphor (BAD IS CROOKED).



Blend Diagram 17: ACTING IMMORALLY IS WALKING CROOKEDLY or TURNING

Like walking and moving straight, turning and moving in a crooked fashion are both properties of horizontal motion. One details the direction of the movement, the other its linear quality. Because of this, they can combine with other horizontal metaphors. Thus, BAD IS CROOKED combines with ACTION IS WALKING to form a single motion: walking crookedly. Similarly, bad is crooked and acting is turning combine into a single motion: turning crookedly.

Like the WALKING STRAIGHT metaphors, the input spaces each project distinct elements onto the blend. ACTING IS WALKING and ACTING IS TURNING clarify the type of motion involved (i.e., action) and its voluntary nature (<voluntary $_{yes}$>), while the BAD IS CROOKED metaphor evaluates this activity (<evaluation $_{yes}$>). As noted above, walking is a neutral action. Yet, since walking in a crooked line is an inefficient means of arriving at a location, walking crookedly becomes an indicator of what is ineffective for the individual: immoral action. On the other hand,

turning is a neutral motion. One can turn from evil (e.g. Job 1:1) or towards it (e.g., Job 36:21). Yet, when combined with the BAD IS CROOKED metaphor, turning becomes a negative event, a sign of moral deviation.

WALKING STEADILY OR STUMBLING

Elsewhere in Proverbs, moral behavior and personal vitality are also described as walking "levelly" or "securely" (ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING LEVELLY, LIVING WELL IS WALKING STEADILY):

Prov 3:23 Then you will *walk securely* (תלך לבטח)[on] your way (דרכך), and your feet (רגלך) will not stumble (תגוף).

Prov 4:26 *Keep level* (פלס) the *track* (מעגל) of your *feet* (רגלך), and all your ways will be established (יכנו).

Prov 5:21 For the ways (דרכי) of humans are in front of the eyes of the Lord, and he makes *level* (מפלס) all their tracks (מעגלתויו).

When Prov 3:23 states that the student's feet will walk "securely" (בטח; i.e., they do not "stumble," נגף, over any obstacle), it is insisting that the student will enjoy peace and prosperity if he follows the commands of his teacher (see also Prov 10:9, 28:6). On the other hand, when Prov 4:26 advises the student to פלס the movement of his feet, it admonishes the student to *behave* morally (see also Prov 5:6). According to Fox, the verb פלס is equivalent to ישר; one who walks פלס goes "straight" (see, for instance, Isa 26:7, which equates the two).[71] Yet, I would argue that a slightly different motion is envisioned here, that of maintaining a smooth and steady stride. As Fox himself notes, the basic meaning of פלס is to "keep level," as when two equally-weighted arms on a scale are kept level (e.g., Prov 16:11, 40:12). A person who "keeps level" does not necessarily walk straight, but he or she does maintain his or her equilibrium; that is, he or she

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[71] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 187. In making this argument, Fox draws upon the work of David Dorsey, who argues that פלס refers to the pointer that shows when the scales are balanced and that the verb thus means "to align" or "make straight." See David Dorsey, *The Roads and Highways of Ancient Israel* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991), 234–35.

does not trip or fall over anything. This seems to be the meaning here. The one who keeps his stride balanced, who maintains his moral equilibrium, will walk without difficulty.

Like the WALKING STRAIGHT metaphors above, then, such expressions blend a WALKING metaphor (ACTING IS WALKING, LIVING IS WALKING) with a primary judgment metaphor, in this case, the GOOD IS BALANCE metaphor.[72]



Blend Diagram 18: ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING LEVELLY, LIVING WELL IS WALKING STEADILY

Again, because walking and maintaining one's balance are both properties of horizontal motion (projectional, tensional), the two input spaces of each metaphor can blend together. The WALKING input space specifies the referent of the final blend (action or human life) and whether this referent is voluntary or involuntary (action: <voluntary $_{yes}$>; life: <voluntary $_{no}$>). The GOOD IS BALANCE metaphor, on the other hand, evaluates the type of motion engaged in (<evaluation $_{yes}$>). Walking steadily becomes an indicator of morality or prosperity.

Conversely, immorality and personal misfortune are conceptualized as "stumbling" or "falling" (ACTING IMMORALLY IS STUMBLING, DESTRUCTION IS STUMBLING):

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[72] GOOD IS LEVEL is not independently attested, but can be presumed based on analogy with the GOOD IS STRAIGHT metaphor.

Prov 4:16 For they cannot sleep if they do not do wrong; they are robbed of sleep if they do not *stumble* (יכשולו).[73]

Prov 24:16 For the righteous will *fall* (יפול) seven times and rise up (וקם) again; but the wicked will *stumble* (יכשלו) in evil.

In the first case, a person who "stumbles" (כשל) does wrong (רעע) (Prov 4:16, see also Prov 4:19). More commonly, when a person "stumbles" (כשל, Prov 24:16; see also Prov 3:23b, 4:12; 24:17) or "falls" (נפל, Prov, 24:16a; see also Prov 7:26; 11:5, 28; 17:20, 24:17; 28:14), he or she experiences some form of personal misfortune, although what this misfortune is often is not specified. In these passages, there does not seem to be any substantial conceptual difference between כשל and נפל. Both can refer to temporary or permanent states. Thus, the righteous "fall" (נפל) but can "rise" (קום) again, while the wicked "stumble" more permanently (Prov 24:16).

As with the previous metaphors, these expressions blend a WALKING metaphor with a primary judgment metaphor, BAD IS IMBALANCE.

[73] Thus following the *ketiv*. The *qere* and various ancient versions instead read יכשילו, "they cause [someone else] to stumble." Although this variant shifts the focus onto how the wicked affect other people, the meaning of כשל is essentially the same. Either the wicked themselves or those whom they encounter err morally.



Blend Diagram 19: ACTING IMMORALLY IS STUMBLING, DESTRUCTION IS STUMBLING

Again, because walking and losing one's balance are both properties of horizontal motion (projectional, tensional), the two input spaces of each metaphor can blend together. The WALKING input space determines the referent of the final blend (action or life), and its voluntary or involuntary nature (action: <voluntary $_{\text{yes}}$>; life: <voluntary $_{\text{no}}$>). The BAD IS IMBALANCE metaphor, on the other hand, evaluates the motion (<evaluation $_{\text{yes}}$>). Stumbling or falling becomes an indicator of immorality or personal misfortune.

Several passages elaborate upon these STUMBLING metaphors, either describing the act of falling more specifically or elaborating upon the nature of the item that causes one to stumble. In several passages, for instance, destruction is described more specifically as "falling into a pit" (DESTRUCTION IS FALLING INTO A PIT):

Prov 26:27 The one who digs a *pit* (שחת) will *fall* (יפל) in it; a stone will return to the one who rolls it.

Prov 28:10 The one who leads the straight astray (משגה ישרים) on the path of evil (בדרך רע) will *fall* (יפול) into his own *pit* (בשחותו); but the innocent will inherit good.

Like "falling" more generally, "falling into a pit" indicates personal misfortune. He who "falls into a pit" (Prov 26:27, 28:10; perhaps also see Prov 28:18[74]) experiences disaster. The image here is one in which a person digs a pit in order to trap another person, but ends up falling into it him or herself. As with the WISDOM IS A SATISFYING FRUIT metaphor above, then, there is an inherent Acts-Consequence Connection envisioned here. People who plan evil are punished accordingly. The metaphor here preserves the <voluntary $_{no}$> and <evaluative $_{yes}$> properties of ACTING IMMORALLY IS FALLING. An individual cannot choose whether he or she falls into disaster; he or she can only choose which behavior to engage in. The metaphor thus warns the student to control his behavior, lest he commit himself to an action that will have dire consequences.

Other passages detail the behavior that causes one to stumble. In such cases, immoral behavior is not itself an act of falling or stumbling, but the thorn or snare that causes the person to fall (IMMORAL BEHAVIOR IS A SNARE, LAZINESS IS A HEDGE OF THORNS):

Prov 11:6 The righteousness of the straight (ישרים) will save them, but the desires of the faithless will *trap* them (ילכדו).

Prov 15:19 The way (דרך) of the lazy is like a *hedge of thorns* (כמשכת חדק), but the path (ארח) of the straight is level (סללה).

Prov 22:24–25 Do not associate with the angry;[75] do not come to the heated person, lest you learn his ways (ארחתיו)[76] and take a *snare* (מוקש) for your נפש.

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[74] The MT of Prov 28:18 reads, "and the crooked of ways will fall באחת ('in one')," which some translators understand to mean "at once" or "immediately." According to Fox (*Proverbs 10–31*, 828, 1055), however, the text is best read with the Syriac as בשחת ("in a pit"). If so, then Prov 28:18 also envisions misfortune as an act of following into a pit.

[75] Literally: masters of the nose. The nose is often connected with anger.

[76] Thus following the *qere*. The *ketiv* reads ארחתו ("his way").

Prov 29:25 — Fear of people will place a *snare* (מוקש), but the one who trusts in God will be elevated.

Anger is listed as a “snare” (מוקש, Prov 22:25), as is fearing others (Prov 29:25) or behaving wickedly in general (Prov 11:6, see also Prov 5:22, 29:6). Laziness, on the other hand, is a “hedge of thorns” (כמשכת חדק) that slows a person down (Prov 15:19). As in ACTING IMMORALLY IS STUMBLING, the individual voluntarily chooses to behave in a certain way, thereby setting snares or thorns for his or her own feet (<voluntary $_{yes}$>, <evaluation $_{yes}$>). The actual act of falling that follows, however, is beyond the individual’s control, a result of the Acts-Consequence Connection.

When combined with the idea that words carry the intellectual or theological perspective of an individual (KNOWLEDGE IS WORDS), words themselves can become “snares” (IMMORAL WORDS ARE SNARES):

Prov 6:1–2 — My son, if you pledge yourself to your neighbor, if you have clasped your hand to a stranger, you are *snared* (נוקשת) by the words of your mouth, *caught* (נלכדת) by the words of your mouth.

Prov 18:7 — The mouth of a fool is his destruction; his lips are *snares* (מוקש) for his נפש.

Prov 29:5 — The one who flatters[77] his neighbor spreads a *net* (רשת) for his step (פעמיו).

Words trap the one who hears them, tangling his or her foot in “nets” (רשת, Prov 29:5). A person’s own words can “snare” (יקש) the individual, committing him or her to a specific course of action that is not necessarily in the individual’s best interest (Prov 6: 1–2, 18:7, see also Prov 12:13, 20:25).

Such expressions blend the IMMORAL BEHAVIOR IS A SNARE metaphor with KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD.

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[77] Literally, “makes smooth.” See FLATTERY IS A SMOOTH OIL above.



Blend Diagram 20: IMMORAL WORDS ARE VERBAL SNARES

Since words elicit certain behaviors (relation: Cause-Effect), the two input spaces are equated and compress into a single identity: words become the snares that trap the individual. The blend preserves properties from each input space. Both input spaces, for instance, project a voluntary nature onto the blend (<voluntary $_{yes}$>); the individual chooses to speak in a certain way. The IMMORAL BEHAVIOR IS A SNARE input space also projects an evaluative quality onto the blend (<evaluation $_{yes}$>); like other forms of behavioral snares, these verbal snares are deemed detrimental to the one who hears them. Finally, the KNOWLEDGE IS A WORD input space projects oral properties onto the blend; verbal snares are indirect, require no contact between the speaker and the object, and affect the behavior of the listener (<direct $_{no}$>, <contact $_{no}$>, <effects $_{yes}$> $^{PR\rightarrow P}$). The listener behaves in a certain way, which causes him or her to stumble. The speaker can also be caught by a verbal snare, as a vow or a specific perspective commits him or her to a specific course of action that causes him or her to stumble (i.e., err morally). In any case, the verbal snare itself is voluntary initiated; the subsequent fall, however, is beyond the individual's control.

A STRAIGHT PATH, A CROOKED PATH

Just as individual actions can be considered "straight," "crooked," "balanced," or

“unbalanced,” certain lifestyles are inherently deemed “straight and level” or “crooked and full of snares.” Righteousness, for instance, is inherently a straight and level path, while wickedness is a crooked and uneven one (RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A STRAIGHT AND LEVEL PATH, WICKEDNESS IS A CROOKED AND UNEVEN PATH).

Prov 2:12–15	It will save you from *the path of the wicked* (מדרך רע)…, from those whose *paths are twisted* (ארחיתם עקשים), who are *crooked in their tracks* (ונלוזים במעגלותם).
Prov 15:19	The way (דרך) of the lazy is like a hedge of thorns (כמשכת חדק), but the path (ארח) of the *straight* (ישרים) is *level* (סללה).
Prov 21:8	The way of the guilty is *crooked* (הפכפך), but the deeds of the pure are *straight* (ישר).
Prov 22:5	*Thorns* (צנים) and *traps* (פחים) are in the *crooked path* (בדרך עקש); those who guard their נפש will keep far (ירחק) from it.

The path of wickedness is inherently “crooked” (עקש: Prov 2:15, 22:5; לוז: Prov 2:15; הפכפך: Prov 21:8) and full of snares (“thorns and traps,” Prov 22:5), but the way of righteousness is “straight” (ישר, Prov 21:8) and “level” (סללה, Prov 15:19).

These blends combine three kinesthetic metaphors: a STRAIGHT metaphor (ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT or ACTING IMMORALLY IS WALKING CROOKEDLY), a LEVEL metaphor (ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING LEVELLY or ACTING IMMORALLY IS STUMBLING), and a BEHAVIOR metaphor (RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH or WICKEDNESS IS A PATH).



Blend Diagram 21: RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A STRAIGHT AND LEVEL PATH, WICKEDNESS IS A CROOKED AND UNEVEN PATH

Since each of these metaphors refer to the same abstract quality (righteousness or wickedness) and describe that abstract quality via proprioception, they are equated. Righteousness becomes a straight and level path; wickedness becomes a crooked and uneven one. The evaluative dimension of each input space is preserved in the final blend (<evaluation $_{yes}$>). Righteousness remains good; wickedness bad. However, because RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH and WICKEDNESS IS A PATH presume that certain paths are inherently good and others inherently bad, the final blend here lacks the voluntary nature of the other two input spaces (<voluntary $_{no}$>). The moral choice presented by the RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A STRAIGHT AND LEVEL PATH and the WICKEDNESS IS A CROOKED AND UNEVEN PATH metaphors is simple: because he wishes to be moral, the student will choose the righteous path.

A PATH OF LIFE, A PATH OF DEATH

Finally, righteousness comes to be conceptualized as a "path of life"; wickedness, on the other hand, is conceived of as a "path of death" (RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIFE; WICKEDNESS IS A PATH OF DEATH):

Prov 11:19 Thus, righteousness *to life* (לחיים); but the one who pursues evil, *to his*

death (למותו).

Prov 12:28 On the *path* of righteousness (בארח־צדקה) is *life*; the *path* (דרך) of [wickedness] is a *path to death* (נתיבה אל־מות).[78]

Righteousness is a path that leads to life, while wickedness is a path that leads to death (Prov 12:28). Although Prov 11:19 does not specifically mention a "path," it expresses a similar sentiment. The pursuit of righteousness will lead to life; the pursuit of evil to death (see also Prov 21:21, 22:4).

Such expressions blend RIGHTEOUSNESS/WICKEDNESS IS A PATH with the notion that GOOD/EVIL BEHAVIOR IS A PATH OF LIFE or DEATH.



Blend Diagram 22: RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIFE, WICKEDNESS IS A PATH OF DEATH

Since righteousness is a good behavior and wickedness is a bad behavior, the two input spaces of each metaphor easily blend together (relation: Category). Righteousness becomes a path of life;

[78] The MT of this verse is difficult. Literally, the verse reads: "on the path of righteousness is life; and the path of the way, there is no death (אל־מות)." As Fox notes, the second half of the verse "makes little sense." Not only is the construct phrase "path of the way" (דרך נתיבה) unusual and the syntax of "אל־מות" impossible, but one would expect the second half of the verse to be antithetical to the first half, as the verses in this section typically are. Fox suggests a plausible emendation in which it is a term for "wickedness" is supplied and the אַל ("not") at the end of the verse is read instead as an אֶל ("to"). Thus, the idea that the path of wickedness leads to death is contrasted with the idea that the path of righteousness leads to life. Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 560.

wickedness a path of death. Since the structures of each input space are identical, they are preserved in the blend. RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIFE indicates a positive evaluation of a behavior, while WICKEDNESS IS A PATH OF DEATH indicates a negative evaluation of a behavior (<evaluative $_{\text{yes}}$>). Since presumably the student wishes to engage in positive behaviors and avoid negative behaviors, there is really no choice in the path he will choose (<voluntary $_{\text{no}}$>). The properly-trained student will choose the righteous path of life.

Righteousness and wickedness are also conceptualized as paths of light or darkness (RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIGHT; WICKEDNESS IS A PATH OF DEATH):

Prov 2:12–13 [Wisdom will] save you from the path (דרך) of the wicked, from those who speak perversity, who leave the *straight paths* (ארחות ישר) to *walk* (ללכת) in the *ways of darkness* (בדרכי־חשך).

Prov 4:18–19 And the *path* (ארח) of the righteous is like the *light of dawn* (כאור נגה), *continually shining* (הולך ואור) until the day is established. The *path* (דרך) of the wicked is like a *deep darkness* (כאפלה). They do not know over what they *stumble* (יכשלו).

Righteousness is a path of light that grows brighter as the day progresses (Prov 4:18–19); wickedness, however, is a path of darkness; the one who walks upon it stumbles about like a person in the dead of night (Prov 2: 12–13, 4:18–19).[79]

As with the SPEAKING MORALLY IS SPEAKING STRAIGHT and SPEAKING IMMORALLY IS SPEAKING CROOKEDLY metaphors discussed above, these expressions combine modalities from opposite ends of the accessibility spectrum. In this case, kinesthesia takes on visual qualities ("high to low"), resulting in a conception that breaks with expected norms and defies human experience. Yet, again, the development of these metaphors follows predictable patterns, with RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIFE and WICKEDNESS IS A PATH OF DEATH blending with the

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[79] Although it would be tempting to read such phrases as if the paths are lit or darkened by an external light source (e.g., God, wisdom), Prov 4: 18–19 clearly states that the path itself is light or darkness, and this nuance is presumably the implication for Prov 2:12–13 as well.

semantic fields of light and darkness:



Blend Diagram 23: RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIGHT, WICKEDNESS IS A PATH OF DARKNESS

Since life is elsewhere connected to light and death to darkness (LIFE IS LIGHT, DARKNESS IS DEATH; e.g., Prov 13:9, 16:15, 20:20, 24:20, 29:13), righteousness and wickedness become conceptualized as paths of light and darkness. The PATH input space projects its structure onto the blend. Thus, the righteous path of light remains a positive evaluation of behavior that the student should naturally choose, while the wicked path of darkness remains a negative evaluation that he should naturally avoid (<evaluation $_{yes}$>, <voluntary $_{no}$>). Yet, the semantic fields of light and darkness bring a new affective dimension to the blend (<effects $_{yes}$> $^{OP\rightarrow P}$). Because light illuminates the environment, righteousness becomes a quality that illuminates proper behavior and keeps one from erring. Wickedness, on the other, follows the example of darkness; it obscures proper behavior and causes one to stumble (cf. ACTING IMMORALLY IS STUMBLING ABOVE). Finally, because kinesthesia and vision are both direct forms of experience, the final blend envisions the righteous path of light and wicked path of darkness as direct forms of experience (<direct $_{yes}$>). Righteousness and wickedness themselves influence the behavior of the individual, no external guidance is necessary. The kinesthetic-to-visual transformation here, then,

reinforces the message of the other PATH metaphors. By following the righteous path of light, the student will continue to do good and live; by following the wicked path of darkness, the student will err and eventually be destroyed.

Creative Clusters

Finally, some passages develop new meaning by clustering different metaphors together. Each metaphor in the cluster remains distinct, with its own unique properties; yet, the complete unit forms a cohesive scene by which to describe an object, event, or abstract concept. In the case of wisdom literature, clusters create a more dynamic conception of wisdom. Often riddled with contradiction, clusters juxtapose metaphors from one or more modal domains in order to grab the listener's attention and portray the pursuit of wisdom as a multi-faceted affair.

Examples in Proverbs

As noted in Chapter 1, metaphors can cluster within a single phrase, across several related clauses, or over an extended passage. A single proverb, for instance, typically contains two or three metaphors (e.g., Prov 14:27, 17:20, 28:18), while an extended pericope may contain over twenty (e.g., Prov 4:10–19). In each case, however, clusters tend to follow certain patterns, bringing metaphors together that complement each other or overlap conceptually.[80] For instance, a single verse can express the same conceptual metaphor twice:

Prov 7:1 My son, *keep my words* (שמר אמרי) and *store up my commandments within you* (ומצותי תצפן אתך).

Although worded differently, each stich of Prov 7:1 utilizes the same conceptual metaphor, WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE. The duplication of this metaphor is emphatic; it emphasizes the need for the student not only to hear the wisdom of his teacher, but to internalize it. A verse can also juxtapose two distinct, yet complementary metaphors:

Prov 13:25 *The righteous eat to the satisfaction of his נפש* (צדיק אכל לשבע נפשו), but

[80] For a detailed discussion of the different ways metaphors cluster together, see Kimmel, "Why We Mix Metaphors," 106–09. Kimmel's categories form the basis for the discussion that follows here.

the belly of the wicked is empty (בטן רשעים תחסר).

Here, two analogous metaphors from the same modal domain complement one another: SATISFACTION IS FULLNESS and DISSATISFACTION IS EMPTINESS. One uses ingestion to express a positive state enjoyed by the righteous, the other a negative state suffered by the wicked. By juxtaposing these two complementary ingestive metaphors, the proverb can establish a stark dichotomy between the reward enjoyed by the righteous and the punishment suffered by the wicked. Two complex metaphors derived from the same primary metaphor can also cluster together with the same effect:

Prov 2:20 Therefore, walk in the *way of the good* (בדרך טובים); keep the *paths of the righteous* (אחרות צדיקים).

Prov 14:2 *Those who walk straight* (הולך בישרו) fear the Lord, but *the one who is crooked of way* (נלוז דרכיו) despises him.

In Prov 2:20, GOOD BEHAVIOR IS A PATH and RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH cluster together, because they extend the same primary metaphor (BEHAVIOR IS A PATH). The effect is similar to that of Prov 7:1; near synonyms combine to emphasize the need to behave properly. In Prov 14:2, on the other hand, ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT and ACTING IMMORALLY IS WALKING CROOKEDLY cluster together, because they each blend the same primary metaphor (ACTING IS WALKING) with an analogous judgment metaphor (GOOD IS STRAIGHT or BAD IS CROOKED). As in Prov 13:25, these metaphors work together to depict a stark dichotomy between good and bad behavior. In each case, however, such expressions complement each other without blending their metaphors together.

A single verse can also bring together metaphors that are more loosely connected. For instance, metaphors that share the same source or target domain can cluster:

Prov 6:6 *Go* (לך) to the ant, you lazy one; see *its ways* (דרכיה) and be wise.

Prov 21:4 *High* eyes (רים־עינים) and a *broad* heart (ורחב־לב)—the lamp of the wicked—are sin.

In Prov 6:6, THINKING IS WALKING and BEHAVIOR IS A PATH cluster together, because they both use the concrete experience of walking to conceptualize an abstract concept (thinking or behaving). In Prov 21:4, ARROGANCE IS BEING HIGH and ARROGANCE IS A BROAD SELF cluster together, because they both attempt to clarify the same target domain, arrogance. Although not inherently complementary, such metaphors flow well together, because they share a similar conception of their subject. Metaphors can also cluster together if they share the same modal or semantic domain:

Prov 19:1 Better to be poor *walking* (הולך) in integrity than to be *twisted of mouth* (מעקש שפתיו) and a fool.

Prov 13:14 *The teachings of the wise is a fountain of life* (מקור חיים), to turn the *snares of death* (ממקשי מות).

Rather than simply state that it is "better to be poor and have integrity than to be wicked and a fool," Prov 19:1 uses two kinesthetic metaphors, ACTING IS WALKING and IMMORAL SPEECH IS SPEAKING CROOKEDLY. These metaphors flow easily together, not because the metaphors are themselves connected, but because they both draw upon the same modal domain.[81] Similarly, although fountains and snares are not inherently similar, the WISDOM IS A WATER OF LIFE metaphor can cluster with the IMMORAL BEHAVIOR IS A SNARE in Prov 13:14, because both relate wisdom or folly to complementary semantic fields, namely, life and death (see also Prov 14:27). As with the other clusters above, the juxtaposition of these metaphors enhances their subjects, clarifying the nature of wise speech or righteous behavior and their relative value without blending them with other metaphors.

Longer passages function in a similar fashion, clustering diverse metaphors together around a single image or concept. Take, for example, Prov 2:1–5:

v. 1 My son, *if you take my words* (אם־תקח אמרי) and *store up my*

[81] Compare the variant in Prov 28:6, where two metaphors cluster together, because the metaphor in the second stich (ACTING IMMORALLY IS WALKING CROOKEDLY) draws upon the same primary metaphor as the metaphor in the first stich (ACTING IS WALKING).

commandments within you (מצותי תצפן אתך).

v. 2 *To make your ear attentive* (לקשיב...אזנך) to wisdom and *turn your heart* (תטה לבך) to understanding.

v. 3 If indeed you *cry out* (קרא) for insight, *give your voice* (תתן קולך) to understanding,

v. 4 *If you seek it like silver* (תבקשנה־ככסף), *search for it like hidden treasures* (כמטמונים תחפשנה),

v. 5 Then, you will understand fear of the Lord and find knowledge of God.

Proverbs 2:1–5 clusters various verbal and tactile metaphors together to form a coherent impression of wisdom. The pericope begins by defining WISDOM as a MANIPULABLE WORD (v. 1a) and a VERBAL TREASURE (v. 1b), two distinct conceptions linked to one another by the fact that each derives from the same metaphor, WISDOM IS A WORD. Verses 2–4 play with this double nuance, defining how the student is to engage wisdom either verbally (PAYING ATTENTION IS HEARING, v. 2a; CONSIDERING IS CRYING OUT, v. 3a, b)[82] or tactilely (THINKING IS TURNING ONE'S SELF, v. 2; WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE, v. 4a, b). Verse 5 concludes the unit by noting that all of these actions, tactile or verbal, will lead one to fear and understand God. This short pericope thus contain eight distinct metaphorical expressions deriving from five different conceptual metaphors, all of which cluster neatly together, because they envision wisdom as a word that can be verbally or tacitly manipulated by the student.

Immediately after describing wisdom as verbal and tactile manipulation, Prov 2:6–8 use another eight conceptual metaphors to describe how wisdom ultimately comes from God:

Prov 2:6 For the Lord *gives* (יתן) wisdom; from *his mouth* (מפי) is knowledge and understanding.

[82] Like speaking to one's self, crying out seems to be a metaphorical expression indicating mental consideration. Here, the student does not physically "cry out" to his teacher or another individual; he "cries out" to wisdom; that is, he seeks insight and understanding through the mental contemplation of the teacher's word.

Prov 2:7 He *stores up* (יצפן) sound wisdom for *the upright* (לישרים); he is a *shield* (מגן) for those who *walk* (להלכי) with integrity,

Prov 2:8 *to guard* (לנצר) *the paths of justice* (ארחות משפט), and *keep* (ישמר) *the path of the faithful* (דרך חסידיו).[83]

The connections between these metaphors vary. For instance, TEACHING IS GIVING (v. 6a), WISDOM IS A DIVINE WORD (v. 6b), and WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE (v. 7a) are clustered in verses 6 and 7, because they all envision their common subject (knowledge/wisdom) as a verbal entity. This verbal wisdom is given to the righteous, who are described in verses 7 and 8 with kinesthetic terms: the upright (A RIGHTEOUS PERSON IS A STRAIGHT PERSON, v. 7a), those who walk with integrity (ACTING IS WALKING, v. 7b), those who walk on paths of justice and faithfulness (JUSTICE IS A PATH, v. 8a; FAITHFULNESS IS A PATH, v. 8b). These verbal and kinesthetic subunits are united by their common agent, God, who grants wisdom to the righteous and protects them from harm. Since shields are carried by those who protect highways, God becomes a "shield" (מגן, v. 7b) for the upright, "guarding" (נצר, v. 8a) and "keeping" (שמר, v. 8b) their paths safe (GOD IS A SHIELD). Although the metaphors themselves vary, the pericope as a whole flows smoothly from one metaphor to the next, thereby presenting a coherent picture of God as one who gives knowledge and protects the upright.

Several distinct units can also cluster together. Prov 2:1–5 and Prov 2:6–8, for instance, are each relatively self-contained units.[84] The first describes human wisdom, the second divine wisdom. Yet, they cluster together, because the subject of verse 6 (the Lord) is the same as the object of verse 5 (fear of the Lord). The end result is a complete, integrated unit that flows naturally from verse 1 to verse 8. This type of conceptual linkage across units is especially

[83] Thus, following the *qere* and the LXX.

[84] This does not mean that they were composed or existed independently of one another. As Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 125–26) argues, Prov 2:1–11 in its entirety functions as an exordium for the second lecture of the book. The point here, however, is that Prov 2:1–5 and 2:6–8 (and vv. 9–11) are *conceptually* distinct, even if they are integrated together in the final arrangement of the chapter.

common in Prov 10–29.[85] For example, Prov 18:20–21 juxtaposes two distinct proverbs that draw upon the same conceptual metaphor, WISDOM IS A SATISFYING FRUIT:

Prov 18:20 From the *fruit of the mouth a person's stomach is satisfied* (מפרי פי־איש תשבע בטנו); *the produce of his lips satisfies* (תבואת שפתיו ישבע)

Prov 18:21 Death and life are in the power[86] of the tongue (לשון), and *those who love it will eat its fruit* (אהביה יאכל פריה).

Both proverbs conceptualize words as fruits that are produced and consumed by the speaker. Drawing upon the Acts-Consequence Connection, they each presume that the effects of eating these fruits will be proportional to the type of speech uttered. Proverbs 18:20 focuses on the positive effects. He who speaks appropriate words will be satisfied. Proverbs 18:21, on the other hand, explores the positive *and* negative effects of words. Appropriate words bring life; inappropriate words produce death. The one loves the tongue (i.e., fine rhetoric) will therefore either live or die by it. The juxtaposition of the same conceptual metaphor thus slows the reader down and forces him or her to reflect upon the different consequences of speech.

Similarly, a series of different proverbs can gather together if their metaphors elaborate the same abstract concept:

Prov 15:1 *A soft answer averts rage* (מענה־רך ישיב חמה), but *a hurtful word brings up anger* (דבר־עצב יעלה־אף).

Prov 15:2 The tongue of the wise makes knowledge good,[87] but *the mouths of fools pour out* (פי כסילים יביע) folly.

Prov 15:4 A healing tongue is a *tree of life* (עץ חיים), but crookedness in it *breaks*

[85] Scholars who have studied proverbial clusters in Prov 10–29 have identified a number of criteria that bring proverbs together, including educational principles, paronomasia, catchwords, theological reinterpretation, syntax, etc. See Heim, *Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver*, 28–68. My discussion here is not intended to contradict these other structuring devices, but to provide an additional criteria that helps explain how these passages become grouped together.

[86] Literally, hand. Like elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible, the hand here signifies control over something (CONTROL IS A HAND). In this case, the tongue controls life and death.

[87] According to Fox, "to make knowledge good" (תיטיב דעת) implies "ornamenting" it, that is, phrasing it nicely. If so, there might be an underlying conception of WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE at play here.

(שבר) the spirit.

Prov 15:5 A fool spurns the *discipline* of his father (מוסר אביו), but the one who keeps (שמר) a reproof is shrewd.

Prov 15:7 *The lips of the wise spread* (שפתי חכמים יזרו) knowledge, but not so the heart of the fool.

Each of these five proverbs contrasts a positive form of speech with a negative one, using various metaphors to do so.[88] Proverbs 15:1 describes speech as an act of kinesthetically manipulating an emotion (SPEAKING IS MOVING): a soft word "turns" (שוב) rage; a harsh word "brings up" anger (עלה). Proverbs 15:2 describes speech as an act of "pouring out" (נבע) (SPEAKING IS POURING), while Prov 15:4 describes it as a "tree of life" (עץ חיים, 4a, THE SAGE IS A TREE OF LIFE) or a rod that "breaks" the spirit (שבר, 4b, FOLLY IS A VERBAL LASHING). Finally, Prov 15:5 conceptualizes speech as a verbal lashing (WISDOM IS A VERBAL LASHING), while Prov 15:7 conceptualizes it an act of sowing seed (SPEAKING IS PLANTING).[89] In short, they indiscriminately mix kinesthetic, tactile, and ingestive metaphor together. However, the arrangement works, because each proverb seeks to elaborate the same target domain, speech. Similarly, proverbs can cluster around the same rich image:

Prov 25:25 *Cool water* (מים קרים) to a thirsty נפש, thus is *good news* (ושמועה טובה) from a distant land.

Prov 25:26 *A muddied spring* (מעין נרפש) or *a polluted fountain* (מקור משחת) is the righteous person who is shaken before the wicked.

The implications of Prov 25:25 and Prov 25:26 are quite different. Prov 25:25 draws upon the

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[88] Proverbs 15:3 and 15:6 are unrelated to speech and break the verbal flow of the cluster. According to Heim (*Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver*, 192, 195), v. 3 is related to the preceding verse simply by the repetition of the root טוב, while v. 6 relates to those around it (vv. 5–12) via a themes of acceptance and rejection.

[89] SPEAKING IS POURING OUT and SPEAKING IS PLANTING are both extensions of the WORDS ARE LIQUIDS metaphor; like the metaphors based on different types of liquids, they specify how the liquid-words are distributed. Similarly, THE SAGE IS A TREE OF LIFE metaphor extends WORDS ARE FOOD to specify how words are distributed. FOLLY IS A VERBAL LASHING is analogous to WISDOM IS A VERBAL LASHING, but conveys a more negative impression of speech.

ingestive properties of water to describe the refreshing quality a good report has on a person who is anxious to hear it (GOOD NEWS IS A COOL WATER). Prov 25:26 draws upon agricultural imagery to describe the adverse repercussions that occur when the righteous person capitulates to a wicked person (A RIGHTEOUS PERSON WHO ERRS IS A POLLUTED WATER). Yet, although serving different purposes, these two proverbs are grouped together in chapter 25, because they each draw upon the same rich image, water.

Metaphors can, however, cluster together for no apparent reason. Thus, a statement comparing a good wife to precious object (A GOOD WIFE IS A GOOD THING, Prov 18:22) immediately follows the WISDOM IS A FRUIT OF THE MOUTH sayings of Prov18:20–21 without any clear connection. Metaphors can even contradict one another, creating a sense of irony or dissonance. Thus, Prov 2:1 presumes that WISDOM IS A WORD of a human teacher, while Prov 2:6 defines it as a DIVINE WORD. The further apart the metaphors are, however, the less consistent they need to be. As noted in Chapter 1, language users do not expect complete consistency across different ontological planes, as long as the metaphors are not in close proximity. Thus, an extended passage can contain many distinct and even contradictory metaphors without alienating the listener as long as the metaphors are interwoven in such a way as to create a natural scene. For instance, because WISDOM IS A WORD and WISDOM IS A DIVINE WORD are separated by four verses in chapter 2 and because the units in which they fall flow naturally, the reader accepts the tension between the proposed origins of wisdom that the two units establish.

The presence of contradictions and the frequent absence of any observable connection between the proverbs of chapters 10–29 have led scholars to debate the function and level of intentionality of proverbial groupings in the older collections. Some scholars, for instance, have denied the presence of proverbial groups at all, arguing that the arrangement of the proverbs in

the older collections was for the most part random and haphazard.[90] Others have recognized that relationships exist between proverbs, but have dismissed such relationships as editorial and thus unimportant to the primary meaning of the proverbs.[91] Most scholars, however, have agreed that relationships between proverbs not only exist but that they enhance the meaning of the proverbs.[92] As Knut Heim argues, proverbial clusters are "designed to prepare young Israelites for constructive social interaction in various spheres of private and public life."[93] As such, they purposefully bring together discrete and often contradictory material in order to force to student to consider the various ramifications of individual topics and to mold the student's character into one that conforms with the community's most basic moral values.

From Cluster to Blend: WISDOM IS RIGHTEOUSNESS

A cluster can turn into a blend. Take, for instance, the relationship between wisdom and righteousness in the book of Proverbs. In Proverbs 10–29, intellectual acumen and moral virtue are two related, yet relatively distinct themes. As Fox states, "within individual sayings, the concept of wisdom is rarely implicated in matters of moral virtue."[94] One is צדיק (Prov 10:2, 7, 16, 20, etc.) or one is חכמה (Prov 10:1, 8, 14, 17, etc.); one either behaves wickedly (Prov 14:2, 5, 11, 14, etc.) or acts foolishly (Prov 14:3, 6, 7, 8, etc.). Yet, as Fox argues, the editors of the older

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[90] See, for example, R. B. Scott, "Wise and Foolish, Righteous and Wicked," in *Studies in the Religion of Ancient Israel* (ed. G. W. Anderson; VTSupp 23; Leiden: Brill, 1972), 145–65; McKane, *Proverbs*. For a review of these scholars, see Heim, *Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver*, 7–11.

[91] See, for example, Claus Westermann, *Forschungsgeschichte zur Weisheitsliteratur 1950–1990* (AzTh 71; Stuggart: Calwer Verlag, 1991), 35–36; Stuart Weeks, *Early Israelite Wisdom* (Oxford Theological Monographs; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 20–40. For a review of these scholars, see Heim, *Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver*, 11–18. As Heim points out, McKane (*Proverbs*) also recognized some coherence in the editorial stage of the proverbs, but his greater focus was on the *randomness* of the proverbial collections (9).

[92] Most notably, see Roger Norman Whybry, "Thoughts on the Composition of Proverbs 10–29," in *Priests, Prophets, and Scribes: Essays on the Formation and Heritage of Second Temple Judaism in Honour of Joseph Blenkinsopp* (eds. E. Ulrich, et al.; JSOT Sup. 149; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1992), 102–14; Leo G. Perdue, *Proverbs* (Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching; Louisville: John Knox Press, 2000); Heim, *Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver*, esp. his exegesis of Proverbs 10–22 on pgs. 112–311; Hatton, *Contradiction in the Book of Proverbs*, 46–82. For a discussion of these and other scholars who find intentional linkages between proverbs, see Heim, *Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver*, 27–66.

[93] Heim, *Like Grapes of Gold Set in Silver*, 316.

[94] Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 937. As Heim (*Like Grapes Set in Silver*, 81) states, wise/righteous and fool/wicked are "co-referential" pairs; they refer to the same referent, but they are not synonymous terms.

proverbial collections purposefully chose to intersperse wisdom sayings with sayings about righteousness so that the reader would conclude that the two concepts refer to the same thing. "The reader of Proverbs naturally assumes that all the qualities and behaviors ascribed to the righteous are wise, and that the deeds of the wise, when moral factors are at play, are all righteous and honest."[95] In other words, the superstructure of the book clusters the concepts of righteousness and wisdom together in such a way that the ideas associated with wisdom come to be associated with righteousness and vice versa. Righteous people (Prov 15:6, 8, 9, etc.) become wise people (Prov 15:5, 7, 10). Wise speech (Prov 10:17, 19, 20:5, etc.) becomes righteous speech (Prov 10:19, 20, 20:7, etc.). Although the metaphors used to describe each remain largely distinct, righteousness and wisdom slowly blend in the mind of the reader.

One sees this clearly in Proverbs' use of path metaphors. In Prov 10–29, righteousness and wickedness are frequently described as "paths" (Prov 10:9, 11:5, 12:28, 15:19, 17:23, 22:25, etc.); wisdom and folly are not.[96] Yet, by juxtaposing proverbs that describe wisdom as proper speech with those that describe righteousness as a path, the editors of the older collections lead the reader to believe that one who speaks properly walks on the path of righteousness. Take, for example, Prov 10:6–9:

Prov 10:6 Blessings are on the head of the righteous, but the mouth of the wicked conceals violence.

Prov 10:7 The memory of the righteous is a blessing, but the name of the wicked will rot.

Prov 10:8 The wise of heart will take a commandment, but the foolish of lips will

[95] Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 937; see also 928–30.

[96] Proverbs 23:19 could be a reference to wisdom as a path. Here, the phrase "make your heart go straight (ואשר) on the *the way* (בַּדֶּרֶךְ)" is poetically parallel to "hearing [the father] and being wise." Yet, that wisdom itself is not described as a way here suggests that "the way" mentioned here is probably conceptualized more generically as the "way" of the sage (cf. Prov 23:26), rather than as the specific "way" of wisdom. Alternatively, following the LXX and Syriac, Fox (*Proverbs 10–31*, 736) repoints בדרך as a construct and suggests reading v. 19b as "go straight (ואשר) in the way (בְּדֶרֶךְ) of your heart." By such reading, the implication would be that the student should follow the desires of his heart. in either case, then, a specific path of wisdom would not be envisioned here.

be thrust down.

Prov 10:9 The one who walks in integrity will walk securely, but the one who twisted of ways will be known.

Situated within a series of proverbs about righteousness, Prov 10:8 describes the wise as the one who heeds a commandment (WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD) and the fool as one who is destroyed (DESTRUCTION IS FALLING), presumably because he fails to heed the commandment. On the one hand, this verse is connected to those around it, because they all detail the reward or punishment that a person receives for their behavior. The righteous receive blessing (v. 6), a lasting remembrance (v. 7), and prosperity (v. 9); the wicked are forgotten by later generations (v. 7), and their schemes are discovered and thwarted during their lifetime (v. 9). Although v. 8a does not explicitly state that the wise are rewarded for their actions, the parallel with v. 8b implies as much. Unlike fools who are destroyed (v.8b), the wise are rewarded. By grouping verse 8 with these other verses, the editors draw out this implication, making it explicit. Like the righteous, the wise are rewarded. On the other hand, the juxtaposition of these verses serves to equate the wise person with the righteous person (and fools with the wicked). Having encountered several verses about the righteous and wicked, the reader of this section would automatically assume that the categories mentioned in v. 8 are the same as those mentioned in the verses around it. The righteous person is wise; the fool is wicked. While wisdom itself is not described as a path, it becomes a quality possessed by those who walk on the path of righteousness. Clusters like this can be found scattered throughout Prov 10–29 (see, for example, Prov 11:19–23, 13:14–16, 14:2–3, etc.), such that by the end, the reader of the older collections assumes that righteousness and wisdom are synonymous.

Because the two concepts are so closely related, wisdom and righteousness eventually blend together. Metaphors associated with one become associated with the other. A few verses in Prov 10–29, for instance, use the language of wisdom metaphors to describe righteousness or the language of righteous metaphors to describe wisdom. For instance:

Prov 10:17 The one who keeps discipline is [on] the path of life, but the one who forsakes rebuke goes astray.

Prov 11:30 The fruit of righteousness is a tree of life; the one who takes נפשות is wise.[97]

Proverbs 10:17 describes wisdom as a path of life, a description typically reserved for the righteous (see also Prov 21:16). Proverbs 11:30, on the other hand, describes righteousness as a tree of life, a description typically reserved for the wise speaker. In each case, the metaphor itself remains intact, but the referent changes. Thus, in Prov 10:17, the properties of RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIFE do not change; the path of life remains a positive evaluation of certain behavior that the student will presumably follow without question (<evaluation $_{yes}$>, <voluntary $_{no}$>). Yet, it is wisdom, not righteousness, that brings one to this path. Similarly, in Prov 11:30, the fruit of the speaker remains a life-giving food; yet, it is the righteous who produce this fruit, not the wise. Righteousness and wisdom become interchangeable.

In Proverbs 1–9, the blend of these two concepts is complete. Righteousness is consistently portrayed as a quality of the wise, and wisdom is a quality of the righteous. Thus, immediately following the descriptions of human and divine wisdom in Prov 2:1–8, the effects of wisdom are enumerated. Not only does the wisdom of God guard the paths of the upright (Prov 2:6–8), but wisdom enables the individual to "understand righteousness, justice, and uprightness, every good track" (Prov 2:9) and to avoid the "way of evil, those who speak crookedly, who forsake the paths of straightness, to walk in the ways of darkness, who rejoice at doing evil, who delight in the crookedness of evil, whose paths are crooked and whose tracks are bent" (Prov 2:12–15) (see also Prov 1:8–19; 3:1–4, 21–26; 4:10–19; 6:20–24, etc.). Similarly, the prologue to

[97] The second half of the verse is hard to decipher. It could be read that the wise man "captivates souls," that is, he wins their hearts by his words or behaviors (so Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 545). Alternatively, it could mean that the wise man "saves souls," that is, he keeps them from danger (so Riyqam). The term לקח here could also mean to "teach," in which case the wise man "teaches souls" (so Ramaq). It could also mean to "kill," as when one "takes a life" (so Toy, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Proverbs*, 238; McKane, *Proverbs*, 432; etc.). In this last reading, חכם is typically emended to חמס ("violence"). In any case, Prov 11:30b is a separate metaphor from 11:30a.

the book specifically states that its contents have been recorded so that one might "gain instruction in wise dealing, righteousness, justice, and equity" (Prov 1:3). As in Prov 10–29, the metaphors themselves remain largely distinct: wisdom is a word or treasure (Prov 2:1–8; 3:1; 4:1, 10; 7:1; etc.); righteousness is a path (Prov 2:9–15, 20, 4:18, etc.). Yet, the metaphors can also be conflated. Thus, righteousness can be a necklace bound around the neck (Prov 3:3, cf. WISDOM IS A NECKLACE), and wisdom can be referred to as the "path of the straight" (Prov 4:11, cf. RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A STRAIGHT PATH) and a "path of life" (Prov 6:23, cf. RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIFE). In either case, the clustering of moral virtue and wisdom leads the reader to presume that, whichever concept is being discussed at the moment, both are involved.

Summary

The book of Proverbs does not present a single unified perspective on wisdom. As the preceding analysis demonstrates, it draws upon a variety of conceptual metaphors from diverse perceptual domains in order to encourage the student to engage wisdom and embody it in his daily affairs.

Tactile Imaginative Extensions	Kinesthetic Imaginative Extensions
WISDOM IS A COMMODITY	GOOD BEHAVIOR IS A PATH EVIL BEHAVIOR IS A PATH GOOD BEHAVIOR IS PATH OF LIFE EVIL BEHAVIOR IS A PATH OF DEATH RIGHTEOUSNESS/WICKEDNESS IS A PATH
Verbal Imaginative Extensions	
WISDOM IS A DIVINE WORD WISDOM IS A WORD	
Tactile Blends	Verbal + Tactile Blends
WISDOM IS A TREASURE WISDOM IS A WREATH WISDOM IS A NECKLACE WISDOM IS A RING	WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE WISDOM IS A WREATH OF WORDS WISDOM IS A NECKLACE OF WORDS WISDOM IS A RING OF WORDS
Verbal + Ingestive Blends	
WORDS ARE FOOD GOSSIP IS A DELICACY WISDOM IS HONEY WISDOM IS THE FRUIT OF THE MOUTH WORDS ARE LIQUID WISDOM IS A WATER OF LIFE FLATTERY IS A SMOOTH OIL	
Verbal + Kinesthetic Blends	Kinesthetic Blends
SPEAKING MORALLY IS SPEAKING STRAIGHT SPEAKING IMMORALLY IS SPEAKING CROOKEDLY IMMORAL WORDS ARE VERBAL SNARES	A RIGHTEOUS PERSON IS A STRAIGHT PERSON A WICKED PERSON IS A CROOKED PERSON ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT ACTING IMMORALLY IS WALKING CROOKEDLY ACTING IMMORALLY IS TURNING THINKING CORRECTLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT LIVING WELL IS WALKING STRAIGHT ACTING MORALLY IS WALKING LEVELLY ACTING IMMORALLY IS STUMBLING IMMORAL BEHAVIOR IS A SNARE LAZINESS IS A HEDGE OF THORNS LIVING WELL IS WALKING STEADILY DESTRUCTION IS STUMBLING DESTRUCTION IS FALLING INTO A PIT RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A STRAIGHT AND LEVEL PATH WICKEDNESS IS A CROOKED AND UNEVEN PATH RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIFE
Verbal + Visual Blends	Kinesthetic + Visual Blends
WISDOM IS A VERBAL LIGHT	RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIGHT WICKEDNESS IS A PATH OF DARKNESS

Table 13: Conceptual Metaphors for Wisdom in Proverbs

Some of these metaphors are relatively straight-forward extensions of a primary metaphor. Others are complex blends derived from different metaphors or rich images. Yet, by whatever mechanisms these metaphors are formed, the book of Proverbs clusters them together to present a more dynamic, multimodal depiction of wisdom. Wisdom becomes a concept that is experienced simultaneously by the ear, mouth, eye, hand, foot, and entire body.

This multimodality provided the means by which the sages could enact the educational program of the scribal community. Although the book of Proverbs often presents a rather stark moral dichotomy—one is righteous, or one is not; one is wise, or one is not—the moral worldview of Proverbs is more complicated than it at first appears.[98] As Anne Stewart has argued, the book of Proverbs presumes that an individual's character is a malleable entity, that he or she is not born righteous or wicked, but that virtue is a trait that must be "cultivated" continually and that vice is a trait that must be ardently avoided lest it corrupt the individual's moral character.[99] Thus, the many descriptions of righteousness and wickedness throughout the book are designed to educate the student, not merely on how to recognize goodness and wickedness in others, but also on how to cultivate positive morality in himself. Proverbs presumes, in other words, what Stewart calls an "educated moral selfhood," a belief that "one's moral selfhood must be disciplined into being."[100]

The multimodality of wisdom metaphors provides the sages one means by which to

[98] As Anne Stewart notes, the "pervasiveness of binary character oppositions in the book [of Proverbs] has led many scholars to presume that its moral psychology is similarly binary and simple." She points, for instance, to James Crenshaw and John Barton, each of whom adopt the rhetoric of Proverbs when they insist that the worldview of the sages inherently identifies individuals as either righteous or wicked. Anne Stewart, "A Honeyed Cup: Poetry, Pedagogy, and Ethos in the Book of Proverbs" (Ph.D. diss., forthcoming). Stewart and Hatton (*Contradictions in the Book of Proverbs*), however, have both argued that the book of Proverbs is more complex than it first appears. Hatton, for instance, has revealed many contradictions in the belief system of Proverbs, including tensions between human and divine agency, the qualities leading to reward and punishment, and the value of speech and silence. Similarly, Stewart's attention to the poetry of Proverbs has revealed a complex moral psychology revolving around the need to discipline the student's moral character. Together, Hatton's and Stewart's observations suggest that the worldview of Proverbs is anything but simple.

[99] Stewart, "A Honeyed Cup."

[100] Eadem.

accomplish this moral education.[101] Some passages, for instance, encourage the student to pursue wisdom (and thus behave morally) by using multimodal metaphors to make it a more accessible concept. As noted in Chapter 2, wisdom itself is an abstract concept. Listening to the sage speak, on the other hand, was a common experience for the scribal student. By portraying wisdom as a word that is spoken to the student by the teacher, the sage could thus make the abstract experience of wisdom more familiar and commonplace. A word, however, is still intangible. Thus, the sages combine WISDOM IS A WORD with even more accessible modalities (touch, taste, kinesthesia) in order to make wisdom seem more physically obtainable. Wisdom becomes a word that can be grasped, a treasure that can be stored up, or a food that can be tasted and swallowed.

Other passages encourage the student to pursue wisdom by making it more physically appealing. There is nothing inherently desirable about obtaining wisdom or listening to the word of the sages. Yet, there is something appealing about obtaining treasure, eating honey, or living a long life. By blending WISDOM IS A WORD with these images and clustering metaphors together that draw upon such blends, wisdom becomes a quality that the student wishes to obtain. He no longer obeys his teacher out of simple obedience, but ardently desires to obtain wisdom and behave morally out of his own self-interest.

Finally, the sages employed metaphors from multiple modalities in order to extend the ramifications of wisdom to the entire corporeal experience. For the sapiential community, the pursuit of wisdom was not a disembodied, mental activity; it was an embodied enterprise, affecting not only how one thought, but also how one spoke, with whom one associated, and in what activities one engaged. By presenting wisdom as a multimodal pursuit, the sages could mold the student's entire character and shape it into one that conformed to the expectations of the

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[101] Stewart ("A Honeyed Cup") identifies four main "models" that the sages use to shape the moral character of the student: rebuke, motivation, desire, and imagination. According to her, the use of metaphors facilitates each of these models of formation, as do other poetic devices such as imagery, word play, and the use of various voices. Stewart indicates that the way in which the book talks about character and uses poetic form is part of the didactic mode itself. Here, I shall only focus on the functions of the complex metaphors in Proverbs.

scribal community. The multimodality of wisdom metaphors thus transforms cognition from a set of fairly straight-forward propositions into a complex, all-encompassing engagement with the human corporeal experience.

Chapter 5: The Personification of Wisdom and Folly

Some of the most complicated metaphors in the book of Proverbs are those surrounding personified Wisdom and Folly. In the first nine chapters alone, Wisdom is depicted as a teacher who calls to the student (Prov 1:20–33; 8:1–21, 32–36), a hostess who feeds him a lush banquet (Prov 9:1–6), and a lover who showers the sage with honor and jewels (Prov 8:17–18). Wisdom is a guard (Prov 2:11, 6:22), a guide (Prov 8:20), and a personified attribute of God (Prov 8:22–31). Folly, on the other hand, is likened to a זרה ("strange woman") who seduces the student with smooth words (Prov 2:16; 5:3; 6:24; 7:5, 21), overt sexuality (Prov 6:24–25, 7:6–20), and stolen food (Prov 9:13–17). As noted in the Introduction, scholars have proposed various religious, literary, and historical models for explaining such personifications. Yet, cognitively, these passages can be explained by the same cognitive processes that account for other complex wisdom metaphors, namely, blending and clustering.

The Cognition of Personification

There are many different types of personifications, each of which reflect slightly different blending processes. In the wisdom metaphors of Proverbs, for instance, there are two main types of personifications: 1) those in which an abstract concept takes on limited human qualities and 2) those in which an abstract concept is depicted as a human being. The first type is exemplified by what Fox calls "inchoate personifications" of wisdom; that is, passages that depict wisdom with agency, grammatical gender, and limited human qualities, but do not envision the abstract concept as a human figure.[1] For instance, Prov 6:22 describes how the words of the sage "lead" the student, "guard" him while he sleeps, and "speak" to him while he is awake, but the verse does not develop these actions into a coherent image of a woman (see also Prov 2:11, 3:13–18,

[1] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 331–32.

4:8–9).[2] The second type of personification is found in the "Lady Wisdom Interludes" of Prov 1:20–33; 8: 1–21, 32–36; and 9:1–18.[3] There, wisdom is depicted as a complete human being who speaks to the student (Prov 1:20–33; 8:1–21, 32–36), counsels kings (Prov 8:15–16), and provides food for her guests to eat (Prov 9:1–6). Proverbs 2:16–22, 5:1–23, 6:20–35, 7:6–27, and 9:13–18 also reflect this type of personification, although they do so implicitly. In these passages, the antithesis of wisdom is depicted as a "strange" (זרה) or "foolish" (כסילות) woman who speaks, eats, and seduces young men. Although these women are never explicitly referred to as "Folly," it is clear from the context of the passages that they exemplify the abstract concept.

It is frequently assumed that each of these personifications derive from one of two metaphors: WISDOM IS A WOMAN or FOLLY IS A WOMAN.[4] Yet, there is no single blending process that explains all of these personifications. As Lakoff and Johnson "personification is a general category that covers a very wide range of metaphors, each picking out different aspects of a person or ways of looking at a person."[5] In other words, each metaphorical expression reflects its own distinct blend of two or more similarly-structured input spaces. In the case of inchoate personifications, one of these input spaces tends to be a conventional metaphor while the other is what Fauconnier and Turner call a "causal tautology." The full personifications include an additional input space, that of a concrete human persona. Although these input spaces blend together simultaneously, it is helpful to discuss them here as three separate stages.

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[2] Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 332) also lists Prov 7:4 as an inchoate personification of wisdom, since it describes wisdom as a "sister" and "lover" but does not fully develop wisdom into a complete human figure. Unlike other inchoate metaphors, however, this passage clearly envisions wisdom as a person and the metaphor in this passage seems to develop like the full personifications of Prov 1:20–33, 8:1–36, and 9:1–18. The passage is thus somewhat of a hybrid between the two types of personifications. In the discussion that follows, I will discuss Prov 7:4 with the full personifications, recognizing that its depiction of wisdom is still somewhat underdeveloped.

[3] One might also include Prov 8:22–31in a discussion of full personifications. Yet, although wisdom has agency in these verses, it is never depicted as a fully developed human being with form and substance. I will thus discuss this personification separately.

[4] See, for instance, Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine*, 13, 218–220, 228; Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 332, 338–340; Fontaine, *Smooth Words*, 12–149. Although each of these scholars recognizes the diversity and complexity of female imagery behind Wisdom's personifications, they presume that the operative metaphor behind all of these personifications is WISDOM IS WOMAN.

[5] Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors We Live By*, 33–34.

1. Causal Tautology

According to Fauconnier and Turner, most personifications begin with a "causal tautology," an abstract cognitive pattern by which we expect a class of external events to be caused by a generic causal agent:[6]



Blend Diagram 24: Causal Tautology

"Death" causes dying; "Hunger" causes hunger; "Lust" causes lust. Fauconnier and Turner do not specify where this causal tautology pattern comes from. Presumably, our concrete experiences lead us to expect that every event has an identifiable cause and that events of a similar kind are caused by similar causal agents.[7] Of course, as Turner notes, this expectation "does not stand up scientifically."[8] Even events with similar results, like dying, have various causes. One individual dies when her organs shut down; another dies when a bullet pierces his heart or his lungs fill with water. Yet, we still seek to extract a generic cause that explains all manners of dying. The causal tautology pattern allows us to do so. By blending an individual event with the causal tautology pattern, we can transform the event itself into its own generic cause.

For instance, when someone says that "Death took him from us," the individual event of dying blends with the causal tautology pattern. "Death" becomes the generic agent by which "dying" occurs:

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[6] Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 291–295. The charts on death included below are modified versions of those found on page 292.

[7] So argue Lakoff and Johnson in their earlier book (*More Than Cool Reason*, 73), although there they explain personification via conceptual mapping.

[8] Turner, *The Literary Mind*, 77.



Blend Diagram 25: Death-the-generic-cause

The event input space specifies the type of event (e.g., dying) and the possible methods by which it could occur (e.g., stabbing, organ failure, impalement). The causal tautology pattern provides a generic cause for the event. The name given to this cause derives from the category of the event itself. As Fauconnier and Turner explain, "from [an] Event, we read off a Cause that is tautologically and exclusively defined in terms of the event category and is referred to by the very terms for that category."[9] The general phenomenon of "dying" becomes its own cause, "Death."

The ascription of agency to wisdom occurs the same way. When the sages say that wisdom "cries out" (e.g., Prov 1:20) or "feeds" the student (e.g., Prov 9:5), they blend the act of acquiring wisdom with the causal tautology pattern to create a generic cause for all wisdom activities:

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[9] Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 291.



Blend Diagram 26: Wisdom-the-generic-cause

The wisdom input space specifies the type of event (i.e., wisdom) and the possible methods by which it could be obtained (e.g., seeing, hearing, eating, etc.). The causal tautology pattern provides a general cause for the event. "Wisdom" becomes the generic cause of "wisdom" and the various benefits derived from it.

In as much as they ascribe agency to an abstract concept, these causal tautologies represent the first step towards personification. Yet, the generic causes they produce remain "empty causes";[10] that is, we cannot locate Death-the-generic-cause or Wisdom-the-generic-cause in our environment through perception or adequately describe them. To satisfy our need for specificity, we fill in this causal tautology with details from other input spaces.

2. Inchoate Personifications

In the case of inchoate wisdom personifications, this information is provided by conventional metaphors for wisdom, which specify what causes wisdom or how the student engages it. For instance, the conventional metaphor WISDOM IS A WORD specifies the manner in which wisdom is acquired, namely, by listening to the word of the teacher (e.g., Prov 4:10,

[10] Fauconnier and Turner, *The Way We Think*, 292.

22:17). Similarly, the conventional metaphor WISDOM IS A TREASURE specifies how the student is to engage wisdom; he is to "guard" wisdom and "keep" it close (e.g., Prov 2:1, 4; 3:1). When Prov 6:22 states that Wisdom "guards (תשמר)" the student and "speaks (תשיחך)" with him, it blends these conventional metaphors with the wisdom casual tautology.[11] Wisdom-the-generic-cause becomes the agent responsible for teaching and guarding the student.

When the wisdom causal tautology blends with WISDOM IS A WORD, Wisdom-the-generic-cause becomes the agent who "speaks" wisdom to the student (WISDOM IS A SPEAKER):



Blend Diagram 27: WISDOM IS A SPEAKER

The casual tautology and the conventional metaphor are brought together, because they deal with the same topic (wisdom) and have similar structures: they each have an agent (the sage or Wisdom-the-generic-cause), an action (speaking or "causing by specific means"), and an object (wisdom-word or abstract wisdom). In the final blend, the conventional metaphor specifies how

[11] Prov 6:22: "when you sleep, it will *guard* (תשמר) you, and when you are awake, it will *speak* (תשיחך) to you." See also Prov 2:11, in which "discretion" and "understanding" are depicted as guards. Prov 6:22 also depicts wisdom as a guide: "when you walk, it will *guide* (תנחה) you." This metaphor develops like the WISDOM IS A SPEAKER metaphor below, but blends the wisdom causal tautology with the conventional metaphor WISDOM IS A PATH (As noted in Chapter 4, WISDOM IS A PATH is a variant of the RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH metaphor). Like a teacher who speaks to his student and guides him on his path, Wisdom-the-generic-agent speaks to the student and guides him.

the agent acts and what the object is like. Wisdom remains an indirect spoken word. Yet, the causal tautology replaces the conventional metaphor's agent, projecting its generic cause (Wisdom) onto the blend. Wisdom-the-generic-cause becomes the speaker of the wisdom-word instead of the teacher.

When WISDOM IS A TREASURE blends with the wisdom causal tautology, Wisdom-the-generic-cause becomes an agent that "guards" the student (WISDOM IS A GUARD):



Blend Diagram 28: WISDOM IS GUARD

Again, the two input spaces have similar structures. They have an agent (the student or Wisdom-the-generic-cause), an action (guarding or "causing by specific means"), and an object (wisdom-treasure or abstract wisdom). Here, however, the projection of these input spaces is different. The wisdom causal tautology still projects its agent onto the blend (Wisdom does something), and the conventional metaphor still projects its action (guarding), which is direct, voluntary, and requires contact. The object of the blend, however, is no longer wisdom. Rather, the *subject* and the *object* of the conventional metaphor conflate into a single entity within the blend. The student becomes a treasure that Wisdom-the-generic-cause must protect.

Similar blends can explain the inchoate personifications of Prov 3:14 and 4:8–9, which

speak of wisdom as an agent that produces income or honors the student with a beautiful crown (WISDOM IS A PRODUCER, WISDOM IS ONE WHO HONORS):

Prov 3:14 For [wisdom's] *profit* (סחרה) is more profitable than silver, and its *produce* (תבואתה) is better than gold.

Prov 4:8 Exalt it, and it will *lift you up* (ותרוממך); it will *honor* you (תכבדך), if you embrace it.

Prov 4:9 It will *place* (תתן) upon your head a wreath of grace; a crown of beauty it will *bestow* upon you (תמגנך).

Scholars often propose that these passages model wisdom upon a specific human archetype. Thus, William McKane argues that Prov 4:8–9 is modeled upon the image of a wealthy patroness, while Camp argues that the passage is modeled upon the activities of the Israelite wife, who brings her husband honor by providing him with good counsel.[12] Similarly, Prov 3:14 could be read as a reflection of the Israelite wife, who brings income to her household by efficiently managing its production of food and clothing.[13] Yet, unlike the full personifications found elsewhere in Proverbs, there is probably not a specific human archetype upon which these passages are modeled. Rather, like other inchoate personifications, these metaphors develop when the wisdom causal tautology blends with a conventional metaphor for wisdom, one in which WISDOM IS A COMMODITY or A WREATH. When these metaphors are combined with the wisdom causal tautology, Wisdom becomes the agent that produces income or honor (WISDOM IS A PRODUCER, WISDOM IS ONE WHO HONORS).

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[12] McKane, *Proverbs*, 306; Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine*, 93–94.

[13] See, for example, the activities of the Prov 31's woman of worth. As far as I can tell, most scholars do not explicitly connect this depiction of Wisdom with the economic activities of Israelite wives. Yet, Camp and Fontaine imply as much, linking virtually any productive female activity in Proverbs with the economic activities of Israelite wives and mothers. See, for instance, Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine*, 84–85, 137–138; Fontaine, *Smooth Words*, 19–22, 28–35.



Blend Diagram 29: WISDOM IS A PRODUCER, WISDOM IS ONE WHO HONORS

Like other inchoate metaphors, the input spaces here are brought together by their similar subject matter (wisdom). Yet, they are not similarly structured. The conventional metaphors do not specify what causes wisdom or how it is produced (no agent, no action), only what its identity is: it is a commodity or an object that brings honor to the individual through direct, voluntary, contact. The wisdom causal tautology takes this identity and uses it to describe how Wisdom-the-generic agent affects the environment. Wisdom is no longer a passive commodity or an object of honor; it is an active agent that produces a commodity or causes honor for the student.

It is important to note that Wisdom is not a person in any of these metaphors. The abstract concept has grammatical gender (feminine) and limited human agency, but it is not fully developed into a human person and it does not rely substantially upon any prior conceptions about Israelite farmers, guards, or teachers to convey its meaning.[14] Wisdom remains inchoate, a generic causal agent without human form or substance.

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[14] I would thus caution against using "she" to translate these metaphors into English. Since English primarily uses gendered pronouns for human beings and animals, a feminine pronoun would give an English speaker the impression that these passages actually envision wisdom as a woman, a degree of personification that is seemingly absent from the original Hebrew.

Proverbs 8:22–31

A similar statement can be made of Prov 8:22–31, although the highly abstract poetry of this passage poses a unique challenge for the interpreter:

Prov 8:22 The Lord created *me* (קנני)[15] first of his work,[16] before his deeds of old;

Prov 8:23 Long ago, *I* was formed (נכסתי), first, before the earth;

Prov 8:24 When there was no deep *I* was brought forth (חוללתי); when there was no sources[17] of water;

Prov 8:25 Before the mountains were established,[18] before the hills, *I* was brought forth (חוללתי);

Prov 8:26 He had not yet made the land or the fields[19] or the first dust of the earth;

Prov 8:27 When he established the heavens, *I was there* (שם אני); when he inscribed a circle on the face of the deep;

Prov 8:28 When he made strong the clouds above, when he strengthened the fountains of the deep;

Prov 8:29 When he established the boundaries of the sea, so the waters could not pass over his command; when he inscribed the foundations of the earth.

Prov 8:30 Then *I was beside him* (ואהיה אצלו), *growing up* (אמון),[20] and *I* was [his]

[15] As noted in Chapter 4, קנה is typically translated "buy," but its more basic sense is "acquire. Thus, one can acquire goods through commercial transaction or one can acquire children through birth (e.g., Gen 4:1). Here, God acquires Wisdom by creating it.

[16] דרך: literally, "way." As noted in Chapter 3 above, terms for walking can be used to indicate routine behavior (BEHAVIOR IS A PATH).

[17] נדבדי־מים: As Fox notes, most commentators read the participle here to indicate a large quantity of water. Fox, however, suggests emending the text to נבכי, "sources," as one finds in Job 38:16. Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 283. Although perhaps unnecessary, Fox's emendation is reasonable given the focus of the passage on the "origins" of creation. I thus follow it here.

[18] הטבעו: literally, "sunk." Fox suggests that the image here is one of "sinking the mountains' pillars in their sockets" (i.e., the underworld or the deeps). Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 283.

[19] הוצות: literally, "outside." Here, it probably indicates the fields outside the city, although it could indicated uninhabited spaces (so interprets the LXX) or "ground" more generally (so Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 283).

[20] So argues Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 285–87). Alternatively, this term may mean "artisan" (as the Syriac and Vulgate interpret it) or "constant" or "constant friend" (as Targum of Proverbs, Symmachus,

delight (ואהיה שעשעים) daily, *laughing* (משחקת) before him always,

Prov 8:31 *laughing* (משחקת) in the world of his earth, and *my* delight (שעשעי) was with the sons of man.

Like other inchoate personifications of wisdom, wisdom in this passage has agency but no form. It stands with God (היה אצלו, Prov 8:30; see also Prov 8:27) and rejoices with him in creation (שחק, Prov 8:30, 31), but has no definitive physical body. Yet, unlike the inchoate personifications, wisdom in this passage is self-aware. It knows that it has been created (קנה; Prov 8:22; נסך, Prov 8:23; הלל, Prov 8:24, 25) and possesses a definite sense of self—a sense of being an "I" (אני, Prov 8:27; see also the use of the first person verb and first personal pronominal suffix in Prov 8:22, 23, 24, 25, 30, 31). It also "grows" (אמון, Prov 8:30) and "laughs" (שחק, Prov 8:30, 31), which suggests a certain limited physical presence. The passage, in other words, is a medial stage, more developed than the inchoate personifications of wisdom above but less defined than the more developed personifications of Prov 1:20–33; 8:1–21, 32–36; and 9:1–6.

3. Full Personifications of Wisdom

Yet, it is not until the wisdom causal tautology blends with the image of a human persona that wisdom takes the form of human being. When the wisdom causal tautology blends with the image of lover, for instance, wisdom becomes a lover (e.g., Prov 8:17); when it blends with the image of a host, wisdom becomes a hostess (e.g., Prov 9:1–6). By my count, there are four main personas that the authors of Proverbs use to fully personify wisdom: the teacher, the royal advisor, the host, and the lover.[21] Which of these personas is chosen depends largely upon the conception of wisdom with which the sage is working with at the moment, whether wisdom is a word, a food, or a desirable object. Yet, each persona is based upon the concrete experiences of the sages in

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and Theodotion interpret it). Since Fox's suggestion fits the tone of the verse and requires no emendation, I have followed it here.

[21] As noted in the Introduction, scholars have proposed various personas as models for Wisdom: Camp, for instance, identifies the wife as household manager, the wife as counselor, the (female) lover, the wise woman, the trickster, and the authenticator of tradition. Bauman adds "prophetess," and Fox adds the hostess, spurned woman, mother, and teacher. If, however, one leaves out inchoate metaphors, the personas of Wisdom can be grouped into four main personas: teacher, royal advisor, host, and lover.

Israelite society and thus brings with it its own distinct set of characteristics that the authors of Proverbs could project onto Wisdom-the-generic-cause.

The dominant persona used to personify Wisdom, for instance, is a public instructor (WISDOM IS A TEACHER). Thus, Prov 8:1–6 asks:

Prov 8:1 Does not wisdom *call* (תקרא), and understanding *raise her voice* (תתן קולָהּ)?

Prov 8:2 On the top of the heights, on the way, at the cross-roads,[22] she stands

Prov 8:3 besides the gates, before the city, at the opening of the doors, she *cries* (תרנה),

Prov 8:4 "To you, men, *I call* (אקרא); *my voice* (קולי) is to all people.

Prov 8:5 Understand prudence, simple ones; fools, gain knowledge.[23]

Prov 8:6 *Hear* (שמעו), for *I will speak* (אדבר) noble things; *from the opening of my lips* (מפתח שפתי) will be what is right…."

And again in Prov 8:32–36, Wisdom proclaims:

Prov 8:32 "And now, children, *listen to me* (שמעו־לי), for blessed are those who keep my ways.

Prov 8:33 *Hear* (שמעו) instruction and be wise; do not neglect [it];

Prov 8:34 Happy is the one who *listens to me* (שמע לי); watching at my gates daily, keeping the entrance of my doorways,

Prov 8:35 For the one who finds me, finds life, and obtains favor from the Lord,

Prov 8:36 But the one who sins hurts his נפש, all who hate me love death."

Like the father figure in the rest of Prov 1–9, Wisdom instructs the simple. She "calls out" to them (קרא, נתן קול, רנן, Prov 8:1–4; see also Prov 1:20–22, 9:4), exhorts them to "listen" (שמע, Prov 8:5–6, 32–33; see also Prov 1:23, 8:8–10), and details the benefits of following wisdom

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[22] Literally: "house of the paths" (בית נתיבות).

[23] Literally: "understand heart" (הבינו לב). As noted in Chapter 3 above, gaining "heart" indicates the acquisition of knowledge.

(Prov 8: 34–36; see also Prov 1:33; 8:11, 13, 18–19; 9:6).[24] She speaks with the authority of a sage and publicly proclaims the message of the scribal community. She calls out in the streets (Prov 8:2; see also Prov 1:20–21), at the city gate (Prov 8:3; see also Prov 1:21), at the doors to her house (Prov 8:3, 34), upon the heights of the city (Prov 8:2; see also Prov 9:3)—anywhere that her message could be heard. She is, in essence, the quintessential sapiential teacher, instructing not only a few students but the entire world.

Cognitively, this portrayal of Wisdom reflects a blend of three input spaces: the wisdom causal tautology, the image of the scribal teacher, and the conception of wisdom as a word:



Blend Diagram 30: WISDOM IS TEACHER

As noted above, the wisdom causal tautology and WISDOM IS A WORD can blend together, because both deal with wisdom and have similar structures (they have an agent, an action, and an object). In inchoate personifications, the agent of the wisdom causal tautology replaces the agent of the conventional metaphor: Wisdom-the-generic-cause becomes the one who speaks the wisdom-word (WISDOM IS A SPEAKER). In these full personifications, however, the agent of the conventional metaphor does not disappear; rather, it blends with the generic causal agent to

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[24] As Fox points out, the speech of Wisdom in these passages follows the same basic pattern as that of the father-teacher in Prov 1–9: she addresses the audience, teaches them a lesson, and then concludes. Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 340–41.

provide a fuller picture of who Wisdom is. The Wisdom-Speaker becomes the Wisdom-Teacher.

In preserving the image of the scribal teacher, this personification projects the qualities of actual sages onto Wisdom. As noted in Chapter 2, much is still unknown about the social setting of sages in ancient Israel. However, the evidence we do have suggests that sages were a professional class of individuals who kept written records for the royal court, transcribed discourse, advised kings, and copied sacred texts. They also trained others to fulfill these duties, teaching students in their homes, in designated "schools," and in the marketplace.[25] They were, in short, well-educated, authoritative, *public* figures. They were also predominantly male. We do, of course, have evidence of women serving as scribes throughout the ancient Near East, and "wise" women do occasionally appear in the Hebrew Bible as public figures.[26] However, in ancient Israel, women were primarily defined by their domestic duties. They were wives and mothers (e.g., Gen 11:31, 20:12; Exod 4:20, 6:23; 1 Sam 18:27; Ps 113:9); they counseled their husbands (e.g., Gen 16:2, 27:42–28; 1 Sam 19:11; 1 Kgs 1; Job 2:9), instructed their children (e.g., Deut 21:18–21; Prov 10:1, 15:20, 31:26; see also the instruction of King Lemuel by his mother in Prov 31:1–9), and managed their households (e.g., Prov 31:13–31).[27] They did not publically instruct students.[28] Yet, this is exactly what Wisdom does. She rebukes the simple on the street corner

[25] For a fuller discussion, see Chapter 2 above.

[26] For evidence of women as scribes throughout ancient Mesopotamia, see Rivkah Harris, "The Female 'Sage' in Mesopotamia Literature (with an Appendix on Egypt)," in *The Sage in Israel and the Ancient Near East* (eds. John G. Gammie and Leo G Perdue; Winona Lake, Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 3–17; and Fontaine, *Smooth Words*, 51–57, 82–85. Harris (6–7) specifically cites the example of the *nadītu* women of Sippar, who served as scribes for their (female) community during the Old Babylonian period, and ten women who are mentioned as scribes in the Mari texts. Comparing post-exilic Israel to medieval Europe, Fontaine (52–53) adds that upper class women would have had the opportunity and freedom to be educated as sages and suggests that the variety of "folk" genres used in Wisdom literature (lullabies, working songs, love songs, etc.) may indicate that women were intimately involved in the composition of books like Proverbs, although their compositional work was controlled by their male counterparts. Biblical evidence for women acting as public figures include 2 Sam 14, where a woman from Tekoa provides counsel to King David, and 2 Sam 20:15–22, where a woman from Abel speaks broadly to an invading general (Joab) and convinces her neighbors to capitulate to his demands.

[27] For a discussion of the social reality of women in ancient Israel, see Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine*, 79–90; Fontaine, *Smooth Words*, 19–51.

[28] Of course, Prov 1:8, 4:1, and 6:20 instructs the student to listen to both the "mother" and the "father." As noted in Chapter 2, "father" in this literature often designates the scribal teacher. Given the parallel in these verses, it is likely that "mother" was also a title for a teacher. There is no indication,

(Prov 1:20–33), calls out to people on the streets (Prov 8:1–20), and instructs students at her doorway (Prov 8:34). She is, in short, functionally male; she is literate, well-educated, and active in the public discourse of the city.

Indeed, unless one presumes *a priori* that the archetype of Wisdom must have been female, there is little to suggest that Wisdom was primarily modeled upon the experience of concrete human women. Although Wisdom is grammatically female—s*he* calls out to the student (אָמְרָה, Prov 9:4); *she* raises *her* voice (תִּתֵּן קוֹלָהּ, Prov 1:20)—she is not described in overtly feminine ways nor does she act as an ideal Israelite woman. Unlike the strange woman (e.g., Prov 7), her body is never described and her sexuality is negligible. Unlike the good wife (Prov 31:10–31), her responsibilities extend beyond the household into the public sphere. She walks about the city, converses with its citizens, and instructs its kings. She does not marry the sage, bear his children, or manage his household.[29] This lack of obvert femininity leaves open the possibility that the personas used to describe Wisdom are actually masculine or at least gender-neutral, and it is not until these personas blend with conventional metaphors for wisdom that Wisdom becomes female. In other words, the final gender of Wisdom is not contained in the personas used to personify her. Rather, it emerges as a unique property of the personification blend. The use of a human archetype necessitates a gender; the grammatical gender of wisdom terminology provides it. Wisdom becomes a feminine figure with masculine qualities.

At any rate, by portraying Wisdom as a scribal teacher here, the sages could emphasize the universal nature of sapiential wisdom. Unlike a real sage, whose instruction could reach only a few students, Wisdom was a global teacher. Her message transcended the confines of the scribal community and was available to anyone who cared to listen: the "simple" (Prov 1:22, 8:5), the "foolish" (Prov 8:5), the "scoffer" (Prov 1: 2), the "men" of the city (Prov 8:4), all humanity

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however, that any of this instruction occurs outside of the home or scribal school, and even if it did, it is probable that women teachers were more the exception than the norm in this patriarchal society.

[29] One exception, of course, is when Wisdom is modeled upon a lover, which may be modeled upon the sages' marital experience. But, as shall be discussed below, even then, it is possible that the lover upon which Wisdom is modeled is not female.

(Prov 8:4). So too, imply the sages, was their own wisdom. The words of the sages were not intended for only a few individuals but would benefit anyone who cared to listen.

In ancient Israel, sages not only taught students; they also counseled kings. Not surprisingly, then, Wisdom is also personified as counselor (WISDOM IS A COUNSELOR):

Prov 8:15 By me, kings rule, and rulers decree justice.

Prov 8:16 By me, princes rule and nobles, all who judge righteously.

Not only does Wisdom instruct students, she gives advice to kings, princes, and nobles so that they may rule effectively (Prov 8:15–16).

As with the WISDOM IS A TEACHER metaphor, this portrayal of Wisdom blends three input spaces: the wisdom causal tautology, a human persona, and the conception of wisdom as a word:



Blend Diagram 31: WISDOM IS COUNSELOR

Here, however, the teacher persona of the conceptual metaphor is not preserved. Rather, a different conception of the sage projects itself onto Wisdom-the-generic-cause. The Wisdom-Speaker becomes the Wisdom-Counselor. This slight change in identity shifts the focus of the metaphor. Rather than instructing students or the community at large, Wisdom instructs the ruling elite. The power, authority, and political influence of concrete Israelite sages thus projects onto

Wisdom. She becomes a powerful, authoritative, influential figure. As with the previous personification, portraying Wisdom as counselor heightens the value of the sapiential message. The wisdom of the sages, argued the authors of Proverbs, not only influenced people but had the potential to shape the political system of ancient Israel.

Sages also seemed to have been frequent participants at banquets. Thus, presuming that sage will at some point dine with the elite, Prov 23:1–8 provides instructions about proper dinner etiquette, and Ben Sira 32:1–13 describes how the sage is to behave when hosting a banquet himself.[30] This experience also influenced the personification of Wisdom, who is depicted in Prov 9:1–7 as a hostess (WISDOM IS A HOST):[31]

Prov 9:1	Wisdom has built her house; she has hewn her seven pillars.
Prov 9:2	She *has slaughtered her animals* (טבחה טבחָהּ); she *has mixed her wine* (מססכה יינָהּ); she *has arranged her table* (ארכה שלחנָהּ).
Prov 9:3	She *has sent* (שלחה) her maids out; she *calls out* (תקרא) upon the heights of the city,
Prov 9:4	"You who are simple, turn here." To the one how lacks understanding,[32] she says,
Prov 9:5	"Come, *eat my bread* (לחמו בלחמי) and *drink the wine* (ושתו ביין) that I have mixed,
Prov 9:6	Abandon simpleness and live; walk in the way of understanding."

Like a good host, Wisdom has prepared her table and sent out invitations to her feast (Prov 9:1–3). She provides food, drink, and instruction (Prov 9:4–5).

[30] See also discussion of general dinner etiquette in Ben Sira 31:12–31 as well as the discussion of dinner etiquette in Egyptian Wisdom literature in Fox, *Proverbs 10–31*, 721–23.

[31] Camp suggests that Wisdom's activities in this chapter are not those of a hostess (wealthy "patroness") but of a "wise wife who builds her home." Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine*, 95. However, Wisdom here is not setting a table for her husband but is hosting a dinner party for the larger community. Unless one presumes *a priori* that Wisdom's activities have to be modeled upon an Israelite woman here, the more natural model for this depiction is the activity of male sages at banquets.

[32] Literally, "lacks heart." See the discussion of this metaphor in Chapter 3 above.

Again, this personification blends three input spaces together: the wisdom causal tautology, a human persona, and a common conception of wisdom, in this case, the idea that wisdom is a word that can be consumed (WISDOM IS A FOOD/LIQUID).[33]



Blend Diagram 32: WISDOM IS HOST

As with the inchoate personification of WISDOM IS A PROVIDER above, the conception of WISDOM IS A FOOD/LIQUID can blend with the wisdom causal tautology, because they both have a similar subject matter, wisdom. The conventional metaphor specifies the nature of wisdom, which the causal tautology then uses to describe how Wisdom-the-generic-agent affects the environment. Wisdom becomes the one who provides food and drink. The authors of Proverbs then complete the blend by drawing upon the concrete experiences of individuals who provided food to the sages. There were, of course, many such individuals that the sage could have chosen for this personification: farmers, merchants, wealthy patrons. However, as with the teacher and counselor personifications above, the authors of Prov 9 choose to personify wisdom as a dinner host in order to highlight particular characteristics of wisdom.

[33] Like COGNITION IS PERCEPTION metaphor discussed in Chapter 3 above, WISDOM IS FOOD/LIQUID is a generic-level metaphor that governs a variety of more specific metaphors, specifically WISDOM IS HONEY, WISDOM IS FRUIT OF THE MOUTH, and WISDOM IS A WATER OF LIFE. For more information on each of these specific metaphors, see chapter 4 above.

Banquets in ancient Mesopotamia were social events. Although food was certainly served, the focus of the gathering was not on gaining nourishment but on drinking, sharing songs, celebrating important milestones, and fulfilling one's duties to the gods. Thus, various biblical texts describe men gathering together to celebrate a marriage (e.g., Gen 29:22; Jdg 14:10–19), the birth of a child (e.g., Gen 21:8), or just share companionship (e.g., 1 Sam 25:36; Amos 6:4–7). Similarly, Ugarit texts describe how a *marza'u* (a social group of men) would gathered together regularly to drink beer and honor the gods, and later Hellenistic texts describe the dinner party (i.e., symposium) as a time when elite, male aristocrats exchanged poetry, philosophy, and political discourse.[34] By portraying Wisdom as a host, the sages relied upon these types of experiences to emphasize the social nature of wisdom. Like a good host, Wisdom gathers into her home all who are simple or lack understanding. She gives them a place to eat, drink, and learn and provides companions with whom the simple can share the wisdom experience. By portraying Wisdom in such a fashion, Prov 9 emphasize that the sages' words, too, are intended to be social and enjoyable; the student should gather with like-minded companions and gladly consume the wisdom that the sapiential community provides.

Finally, a few passages use the sages' experience of love to personify Wisdom (WISDOM IS A LOVER).

Prov 7:4 Say to Wisdom, "you are my *sister*" (אחתי), and call Understanding "*friend*" (מדע).

Prov 8:17 I [Wisdom] *love* (אחב) those who *love me* (אחבי); those who seek me find me.

Wisdom is a "friend" (מדע) and a "sister" (אחות) (Prov 7:4), one who "loves" the sage and is

[34] Walter Burkert, "Oriental Symposia: Contrasts and Parallels," in *Dining in a Classical Context* (ed. William Slater; Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1991), 7–24 (7–11). It is unclear if dinner parties at the time when Proverbs was constructed focused as much on rhetorical exchanges as the Greek symposium did. Yet, the fact that ancient Near Eastern texts do describe individuals singing songs at these events (e.g., Amos 6:5) suggests that the Israelite dinner party may have functioned like a symposium as a forum for exchanging ideas amongst elite men.

"loved" by him (אהב; Prov 8:17).[35]

As with other Wisdom personifications, this depiction of Wisdom develops when the wisdom causal tautology blends with a human persona (the lover) and a common conception of wisdom (WISDOM IS A DESIRABLE OBJECT):[36]



Blend Diagram 33: WISDOM IS A LOVER

Again, the idea that wisdom is a desirable object can blend with the causal tautology, because both deal with wisdom. Like the WISDOM IS A GUARD metaphor above, the blend of these two input spaces conflates the subject and object of the conventional metaphor into a single entity: the student who loves wisdom becomes the one whom Wisdom loves. The personification then completes the blend with the image of a real person whom the sage could love. In Prov 7:4, this lover is probably a legitimate sexual partner, a wife or a betrothed woman. Although אחות can refer to one's biological sister, it is frequently used in the Songs of Solomon and Egyptian love

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[35] For further discussion of these terms, see below. Camp (*Wisdom and the Feminine,* 99–103) suggests that the language of "seeking" (שחר) and "finding" (מחר) that one finds throughout the Lady Wisdom Interludes (e.g., Prov 1:28, 8:17, 35–36) also reflect love imagery. Similarly, Fox (*Proverbs 1–9*, 338) suggests that wisdom acts as a scorned lover in Prov 1:26–28. Camp and Fox may be correct, but if such connotations are present, they are subtle and have been so intricately blended into the teacher metaphor that they are hard to distinguish. They shall thus not detain the discussion here.

[36] As with the WISDOM IS A FOOD/LIQUID metaphors (see note 33 above), WISDOM IS A DESIRABLE OBJECT is a generic-level metaphor governing such metaphors as WISDOM IS A WREATH, WISDOM IS A HONEY, and WISDOM IS A RING OF WORDS.

poetry as a designation for a "beloved."[37] Similarly, although מדע could refer to a kinsperson (e.g., Ruth 2:1) or a platonic male friend (as medieval commentators interpret it), it might also imply a level of intimacy enjoyed between a man and a wife.[38] Since Prov 7 establishes a specific contrast between the sage's relationship with wisdom and a naïve youth's relationship with an אשה זרה, the wife of another man, the designation of Wisdom here as a "sister" and "friend" probably identifies Wisdom as the wife of the sage; that is, the sage is to love wisdom and be committed to it as one might love a wife. Here, then, the grammatical gender of wisdom and the physical gender of the lover-wife persona coincide nicely, making it easier for the student (and future interpreters) to identify with eroticism demanded by this personification.[39] Yet, as with the WISDOM IS TEACHER, COUNSELOR, and HOST metaphors above, the gender of the Wisdom-lover is not predetermined by either input space but emerges in the course of the blend. Thus, one finds in Prov 8:17 a certain ambiguity surrounding the gender of the Wisdom-lover. Like Prov 7:4, the verse may convey a marital connotation, as Wisdom declares her love for the one who loves her.[40] Alternatively, the love in this passage may not between a man and a woman but between a ruler and his subject (cf. 1 Kgs 5:1), in which case "love" here is statement of loyalty and royal favor between men, not erotic or familial love.[41] In either case, by portraying Wisdom as a lover here and in Prov 7:4, the sages heighten the emotional dimension of the wisdom event. The wisdom of the sages should not merely be sought; it should be strongly desired, loved, and committed to.

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[37] Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 240.

[38] The root from which מדע is derived (ידע, "to know") often carries sexual connotations (SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IS AN ACT OF KNOWING). Thus, the first man "knows" his wife (i.e., has intercourse with her) in order to conceive offspring (Gen 4:1) and Hannah bears Samuel after her husband "knows" her (1 Sam 1:19–20). It is therefore possible that מדע indicates one whom a person knows sexually. For the alternative interpretation of מדע as "kinsperson" and "male companion," see Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 240.

[39] For the use of WISDOM AS A (FEMALE) LOVER in later Jewish literature, see Chapter 6.

[40] Thus argues Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine*, 100.

[41] Lang, *Wisdom and the Book of Proverbs*, 76. Lang uses this reasoning to argue that Wisdom served as a patron goddess to the king. While I would hesitate to read Wisdom as a goddess here, Lang's point about the "host of associations" connected with "love" in the ancient Near East is valid, and one must leave open the possibility that Wisdom's love here is not necessarily the love one would expect between a man and a woman.

Like other wisdom metaphors, these personifications can easily cluster together, because they describe the same target domain (wisdom) and draw upon congruous source domains, individuals whom the sage encountered in his daily life. Thus, in Prov 8:10–1, the WISDOM IS A TEACHER, WISDOM IS A COUNSELOR, and WISDOM IS A LOVER metaphors cluster smoothly together to portray Wisdom as a multi-faceted human being:

Prov 8:10 Take my discipline, rather than silver, and knowledge instead of gold.

Prov 8:11 For wisdom is better than rubies and all desires are not equal to it.

Prov 8:12 I, Wisdom, live prudently, and I find knowledge of discretion.

Prov 8:13 The fear of the Lord is hatred of evil; I hate pride, arrogance, the way of evil , and perverted mouths.

Prov 8:14 I have counsel and sound wisdom; I have understanding; strength is mine.

Prov 8:15 By me, kings rule, and rulers decree justice.

Prov 8:16 By me, princes rule and nobles, all who judge righteously.

Prov 8:17 I love those who love me; those who seek me find me.

Prov 8:18 Riches and honor are with me, valuable wealth and righteousness.

In Prov 8:10–13, Wisdom is depicted as a teacher. She speaks with the authority of the sage (v. 10, 12) and instructs the student about the value of wisdom (v. 11). In verses 15–16, Wisdom is a royal counselor. She instructs kings and princes on how to effectively rule. Verse 14 uses the theme of counsel to unite the two personifications. Just as Wisdom provides counsel and instruction to the student, she provides counsel and instruction to the ruler. Since sages could be royal advisors *and* teachers, this change in identity would not have surprised the ancient audience. Like an actual sage, Wisdom could be both a teacher and a royal counselor. Verse 17 then switches to the image of Wisdom as a lover. Wisdom loves the one who loves her. If the image here is one of marital love, the switch is abrupt. Wisdom is no longer a sage but the sage's wife. If, however, the love here is the loyalty and affiliation enjoyed between a ruler and his subject,

the transition to the image of the lover is less jarring. Wisdom, as the patron of rulers, not only provides counsel to the ruling elite, but she loves them (v. 17) and showers them with riches (v. 18). Since poetry allows for more flexibility when it comes to juxtaposing metaphors than prose does, both readings are equally possible. Yet, in either case, the final image is a complex, multifaceted personification of Wisdom.

4. Full Personifications of Folly

Cognitively, the personification of Folly occurs in the same way as the personification of Wisdom. The experience of foolishness blends with the causal tautology pattern to create a generic cause for all foolish activities, Folly-the-generic-cause. This causal tautology then blends with a conventional metaphor for folly (specifically, the idea that FOLLY IS A FOOD/LIQUID or a DESIRABLE OBJECT)[42] and a human persona to create a full personification of Wisdom's antithesis (FOLLY IS A HOST, FOLLY IS A LOVER):



Blend Diagram 34: FOLLY IS A HOST

[42] Again, these are generic metaphors. Specific metaphors related to FOLLY IS A FOOD/LIQUID include the idea that GOSSIP IS A DELICACY and FLATTERY IS A SMOOTH OIL. That the authors of Proverbs often warn their reader against engaging in foolish behavior suggests that they not only thought that wisdom was a desirable object, but that seemingly foolish behaviors were as well.



Blend Diagram 35: FOLLY IS A LOVER

Unlike personified Wisdom, there are only two personas used to personify Folly, the host and the (female) lover. Thus, Prov 7:5–27 describes the antithesis of Wisdom as a אשה זרה, a "strange woman" who seduces youths on the streets while her husband is away, and Prov 9:13–18 describes her as a "foolish" (כסילות) hostess who serves stolen water and bread to her guests. Presumably, the choice to focus exclusively on these two metaphors (and exclude auditory personifications) derives from the symbolic value of their underlying modalities. As Mary Douglas notes, ingestion and sexual intercourse frequently represent acts of social pollution. Just as eating the wrong food or sleeping with the wrong person can make the individual physically sick, eating and having sex symbolically blurs the boundaries between the individual's social unit and other groups.[43] By portraying Folly as an illegitimate sexual partner or an individual who feeds the student contaminated food, the authors of Proverbs presents Folly as an agent that threatens to pollute the scribal community with unsanctioned teachings.

Cognitively, these personas project the same connotations onto Folly as they do onto Wisdom. Folly becomes a desirable object that a person could commit himself to or a seemingly

[43] Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (New York: Routledge, 1966; repr. 2006), 4, 141–59.

enjoyable social event. Yet, because the conventional metaphors for Folly carry negative connotations, the final blend is also negative. Folly seems desirable, but has negative results; it seems enjoyable, but leads to death. Literarily, however, these personifications are not realized in the same manner as the personifications of Wisdom. Wisdom personifications are self-evident: חכמה, בינה, or some other wisdom term acts as a subject and takes human form (חכמות cries out, Prov 1:20; תבונה raises her voice, Prov 8:1). The abstract term אולת ("foolishness"), however, does not cry out or host a dinner party; an אשה זרה ("strange woman") or an אשה כסילות ("foolish woman") does. It would thus be easy to read Prov 2:16–22, 5:1–23, 6:20–35, 7:6–27, and 9:13–18 as warnings against real women, human adulteresses or fools that one might meet on the street.[44] These passages, however, do not merely warn against specific types of human women but are symbolic representations of what life without wisdom would be like.[45] Narratives about the strange woman, for instance, demonstrate time and again that death waits for the student if he chases after inappropriate desires (Prov 2:18–19; 5:4–6, 23; 7:26–27). Similarly, although the banquet offered by the foolish woman tastes sweet at first, it leads to death (Prov 9:18). Such dire predictions are not merely hyperbolic statements designed to keep the student from committing adultery or consorting with foolish women, although that may be a welcome side-effect. Rather, they are designed to show the student what will happen to him if he does not fully embrace the wisdom that his teacher is trying to teach him. Just as wisdom leads to life, folly leads to death.

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[44] Thus, for instance, argues Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 262; Camp, *Wisdom and the Feminine*, 112–20, 265–71, although Camp's latter work identifies the strange woman more generally as a symbol for any force that threatens the authority of the patriarchal community (= STRANGENESS IS A WOMAN). Claudia Camp, *Wise, Strange, and Holy: The Strange Woman and the Making of the Bible* (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2000), 43, 59–62. See also Gustav Boström, *Proverbiastudien: Die Weisheit und das fremde Weib in Spruche I–9* (Lunds Universitets Arsskrift 30.3; Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup, 1935), 103–55; Joseph Blenkinsopp, "The Social Context of the 'Outsider Woman' in Proverbs 1–9," *Biblica* 72 (1991): 457–73, each of whom reads the strange woman as a warning against the worshipper of a foreign goddess. Fox, *Proverbs 1–9*, 134–141, 254–62 for a more general survey of the different scholarly interpretations of the strange woman.

[45] Roland Murphy, "Wisdom and Eros in Proverbs 1–9," *CBQ* 50 (1988): 600–03 (603); Carol A. Newsom, "Woman and the Discourse of Patriarchal Wisdom," in *Reading Bibles, Writing Bodies* (London: Routledge, 1997), 116–31 (127). Newsom in particular suggests that, when read in light of Prov 9, the strange woman seem to become an "allegory of folly" throughout Prov 1–9, although Newsom is careful to note that this allegorical reading does not negate any pragmatic readings.

These two figures are able to function as personifications of Folly, because they are effectively clustered with personifications of Wisdom. For instance, the image of the foolish woman as host in Prov 9:13–18 is nearly parallel with that of Wisdom as a host Prov 9:1–6:

9:1	Wisdom has built *her house* (ביתָהּ); she has hewn her seven pillars	9:13	A foolish woman murmurs; she is simple and does not know anything.
9:2	She has slaughtered her animals; she has mixed her wine; she has arranged her table.	9:14	She sits at the opening of *her house* (ביתָהּ), on a seat at *the heights of the city* (על־כסא מרמי קרת),
9:3	She has sent her maids out; she *calls out* (תקרא) upon *the heights of the city* (אל־גפי מרמי קרת),	9:15	*Calling out* (לקרא) to those who cross the street, who go straight on their way,
9:4	"*You who are simple* (מי־פתי), *turn here* (יסר הנה)." *To the one who lacks understanding* (חסר־לב),[46] *she says* (אמרה לו),	9:16	"*You who are simple* (מי־פתי), *turn here* (יסר הנה)." *To the one who lacks understanding* (חסר־לב),[46] *she says* (אמרה לו),
9:5	"Come, eat my bread (לחמי) and drink the wine (יין) that I have mixed,	9:17	"Stolen water (מים־גנובים) is sweet, and bread [eaten] secretly (לחם סתרים) is pleasant."
9:6	Abandon simpleness and live (וחיו); walk in the way of understanding."	9:18	But he does not know that the dead (רפאים) are there, that those who encounter her are in the depths of Sheol.

Just as Wisdom calls to the simple in the streets (v. 3, 4), the foolish woman calls to the simple in the street (v. 15, 16). Just as Wisdom provides food for them to eat and instruction for them to hear (v. 5, 6), the foolish woman provides food to eat and instruction to hear (v. 17). The two figures, however, are exact opposites. Wisdom, for instance, is an active figure. She builds her

[46] Literally, "lacks heart." See the discussion of this metaphor in Chapter 3 above.

house (v.1), prepares her own food (v. 2), and actively seeks dinner guests (v. 3). The foolish woman, on the other hand, is lazy. She sits at the door of her house (v. 14), provides food that is stolen from another (v. 17), and calls only to those who happen to pass her by (v. 14–15). Moreover, Wisdom's banquet leads to life (v. 6), whereas the foolish woman's banquet leads to death (v. 18). The parallel structure of the passage makes it clear that this foolish woman is not simply a human figure. She is the exact opposite of Wisdom, a perfect example of Folly.

Similarly, when read in light of Wisdom's personification as a lover, the strange woman becomes the opposite of Wisdom. This is seen most clearly in Prov 7, where the exhortation to call Wisdom "sister" and "friend" (v. 4) is immediately followed by a lengthy description of the seductive activities of the strange woman (vv. 5–27):

Prov 7:4 Say to Wisdom, "you are my *sister*" (אחתי), and call Understanding "*friend*" (מדע).

Prov 7:5 to keep you from the *strange woman* (אשה זרה), from the *adulteress* (מנכריה) with her smooth words.

Prov 7:6 For at the window of my house, through my lattice, I looked out,

Prov 7:7 And I saw among the simple, I discerned among the youths, a man without sense,

Prov 7:8 Passing along the street near her corner, he walked the path toward her house.

Prov 7:9 In the twilight, in the evening, at the time of night and darkness,

Prov 7:10 And behold, a woman came to meet him, [in] a garment of a *harlot* (זונה), with a guarded heart,

Prov 7:11 She murmurs and is stubborn; her feet do not dwell at home.

Prov 7:12 Now in the street, now in the square, near every corner she waits.

Prov 7:13 She seizes him, kisses him, and [with] a firm face speaks to him,

Prov 7:14 "I have peace offerings; this day I paid my vows.

Prov 7:15 Therefore, I have come out to meet you, to seek your face, and I have found you.

Prov 7:16 I have spread coverings upon my couch, colored Egyptian linens;

Prov 7:17 I have sprinkled myrrh, aloe, and cinnamon upon my bed.

Prov 7:18 Come! Let us drink of our love until morning. Let us delight in love…

And so forth. In its immediate context, Wisdom's attractive qualities are subdued. She is merely a "sister" and a "friend" (Prov 7:4). The structure of the passage makes it clear, however, that the Wisdom-lover is being contrasted to the sensual love of the strange woman, and many of the qualities that are attributed to the strange woman are parallel to or opposite of those qualities attributed elsewhere to wisdom or one of her personified forms. The strange woman, for instance, directs her activities to the simple of the city, the youth (Prov 7:7), just as Wisdom does (e.g., Prov 1:22, 8:5, 9:4). She performs her activities in the public streets (Prov 7:8, 12), just as Wisdom does (e.g., Prov 1:20–21, 8:2–3). Yet, unlike wisdom, whose activities are described elsewhere as occurring in the brightest part of the day (e.g., Prov 4:18), the strange woman acts at twilight, in deep darkness (Prov 7:9). She is described as an illegitimate lover who is filled with sexuality (e.g., Prov 7:13, 16–18) and who impudently initiates the love affair (אשה זרה, "adulteress," Prov 7:5, זונה, "harlot," Prov 7:10; see also her initiation of love acts in Prov 7:13, 18, 21). Wisdom, on the other hand, is a legitimate lover (a "friend" or "sister," Prov 7:4). Her sexuality is non-existent as she waits patiently for her lover to seek her out (Prov 8:17, "I love those who love me."). Like the foolish woman, the Strange Woman murmurs (המה, Prov 7:11); she is stubborn and her paths are crooked (Prov 7:11), a stark contrast to the righteous speech and straight paths of Wisdom (e.g., Prov 8:7–9). Finally, like the foolish woman, the strange woman's activities lead the youth to death (Prov 7:22–23, 25–27) and away from the life given by Wisdom (e.g., Prov 8:36, 9:6). Again, the figure here is not intended merely as a warning against women who wish to engage in adultery. The strange woman epitomizes the attraction of behaviors that are not sanctioned by the sapiential community and warns the student about the dangers of

succumbing to these behaviors. By clustering the strange woman passages here with that of Wisdom's personification, the sages could reinforce the need for the student to attend to their teacher's advice.

The clustering of Wisdom and Folly here encourages the reader of the final text to read the other strange woman passages in a similar way. For instance, although in its immediate context Prov 2:16–19 could be read as a warning against concrete adulteresses, its portrayal of the strange woman as a woman with "smooth words" (v. 16) and paths that lead to death (v. 18) suggests that she, like the strange woman of Prov 7, functions as a exemplar of Folly (see also Prov 5: 3–7, 20). Similarly, although Prov 6:24–25 seems on the surface a condemnation of adultery, its coupling with an exhortation to follow wisdom in Prov 6:20–23 suggests that it could also be read as admonition to avoid Folly. In each case, the clustering of the strange woman passages with description of wisdom (personified or not) forces the reader to consider the broader implications of the strange woman. Adultery is no longer merely a human social event; it is a metaphor for any behavior that deviates from the sanctioned activity of the scribal community (ABERRANT BEHAVIOR IS ADULTERY).

As with the wisdom metaphors discussed above, such metaphors can cluster together because they deal with analogous subjects, in this case, opposite ends of the knowledge spectrum. Proverbs 7:4 and 7:5–27, for instance, cluster together because each depicts wisdom or its antithesis as a woman whom the student can love. Similarly, Proverbs 9:1–6 and 9:13–18 flow naturally together because each depicts wisdom or foolishness as hosts. Neither coupling disrupts the flow of the passage or clashes with the expectations of the reader. The Folly-Lover is the natural antithesis of the Wisdom-Lover; the Folly-Host is the antithesis of the Wisdom-Host.

Summary

The personification of Wisdom and Folly are complex processes, yet they are easily explained by normal cognitive processes. Each begins as a natural inclination towards ascribing

human agency to general categories of events. Wisdom becomes the cause of wisdom. Folly becomes the cause of folly. These causal tautologies then blend with other input spaces to create a fuller understanding of wisdom and folly.

causal tautology + conventional metaphor	causal tautology + conventional metaphor + human persona
WISDOM IS A SPEAKER WISDOM IS A GUARD WISDOM IS A GUIDE[47] WISDOM IS A PRODUCER WISDOM IS ONE WHO HONORS	WISDOM IS A TEACHER WISDOM IS A COUNSELOR WISDOM IS A HOST/FOLLY IS A HOST WISDOM IS A LOVER/FOLLY IS A LOVER

Table 14: Conceptual Metaphors for Personified Wisdom and Folly in Proverbs

When combined only with conventional metaphors for wisdom, the personification remains incomplete. The concept of wisdom has agency, but no form. When the causal tautology blends with both a conventional metaphor and a human persona, however, Wisdom and Folly become fully embodied figures who interact with the student like any other human would: speaking to him, feeding him, and loving him.

Like other wisdom metaphors, such personifications provide the sages with an opportunity to advance their pedagogical agenda. By personifying wisdom as a woman, they sages make wisdom more accessible. By portraying her as a teacher or royal counselor, they reinforce their own authority within the classroom and in the larger community. Finally, by portraying wisdom as a lover and host, they emphasize that wisdom is an enjoyable and desirable activity, one that the student should ardently choose to engage in. Other behaviors may seem desirable, but they are like women who lead the unsuspecting youth towards death. Wisdom and Folly personifications, in other words, provide memorable images by which to instruct the student about the benefits of adhering to sapiential values.

[47] See Chapter 5, n. 11.

Chapter 6: Metaphorical Trajectories

By the time the book of Proverbs was complete, wisdom had come to be described with a variety of metaphors. Not merely a thought that could be seen or heard, wisdom was a multimodal, embodied quality. It was a honey that could be tasted, a path that could be walked, and a treasure that could be grasped. It was a concept that could guide the student, honor him, and protect him from harm. It was a woman who spoke to him, loved him, and provided him with food. The sages who compiled Proverbs took fairly common perceptual experiences and made them their own. They expanded, blended, and clustered perceptual metaphors together in imaginative ways in order to inspire their students to listen to their instructions and live according to their statutes.

Due to their grounding in common perceptual experiences, many of these imaginative metaphors soon became conventional modes of expression in early Jewish society, where they were available for new authors to utilize and develop for their own communities. The manner of this development varied, however, depending upon how well these newly conventionalized wisdom metaphors fit the needs of the communities who encountered them. I shall thus conclude this study of Israelite and early Jewish metaphors by surveying how the wisdom metaphors of Proverbs continued to develop during the Second Temple period. Due to the constraints of space, this survey will be neither exhaustive nor thorough. Yet, by highlighting a select number of texts from this time period, I will suggest that the same impulse that led to the development of these wisdom metaphors in the first place—namely, the desire to define wisdom and make it applicable to the embodied experiences of the community—prompted later Jewish authors to challenge, adopt, or modify these newly conventionalized metaphors to suit the changing ideologies and cultural milieu of their time.

Job and Qohelet

Although it is unclear if the authors of Job and Qohelet were familiar with the actual book of Proverbs, both texts show themselves to be aware of and ambivalent towards their predecessor's wisdom metaphors. The book of Job, for instance, adopts many of Proverbs' metaphors; however, it uses those metaphors to challenge the assumptions of its community and make the concept of wisdom more applicable to its community's post-exilic circumstances. Thus, in the midst of describing human suffering, the book of Job follows Proverbs in describing WISDOM AS A WORD that can be spoken by the elders of the community (e.g., Job 11:6; 12:7–8; 15:18; 22:22; 23:12; 29:11, 22–23).[1] Yet, the text of Job also challenges this assumption, asking if a human's words can ever truly be wise. Thus, Job and his friends consistently question the validity of each other's wisdom, arguing that their seemingly wise words are just empty breaths (WISE WORDS ARE EMPTY BREATHS):

Job 15:2–6 Eliphaz to Job: Does the wise answer with *breathy knowledge* (דעת־רוח) and fill his belly with the *east wind* (קדים)? Does he reprove with a *word* (דבר) that is not profitable and *words* (מלים) that do not benefit anyone? But you do away with fear [of God] and hinder devotion to God, for iniquity teaches your mouth; you choose a shrewd tongue. Your mouth condemns you, not I; your lips answer against you.

Job 16:2–3 Job to Eliphaz: I have heard these many things. What ill comforters are all of you! Is there an end to your *breathy words* (לדברי־רוח)? What provokes you to answer?

Both Job and Eliphaz consider their respective positions to be wise. Yet, both positions are ultimantely deemed foolish, their words empty (דעת־רוח, "breathy knowledge," Job 15:2, 16:3;

[1] Note that in Job 22:22, 23:12, and 29:22–23, wisdom is not simply a word spoken. It is a word that can be "taken" (WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD), "stored" within the person (WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE), and "rained" upon the listener like water (WISDOM IS A WATER OF LIFE). Thus, complex blends derived from WISDOM IS A WORD are also conventionalized and picked up by the book of Job.

קדים, “east wind,” Job 15:2; דבר לא יסכון, “unprofitable words” Job 15:3; מלים לא־יועיל, “words without benefit,” Job 15:3). By placing these positions side-by-side and not resolving their differences, the text forces the reader to question whether a human can ever actually speak wisely. When God eventually intervenes, he reinforces this impression by condemning the entire lot of them. Job and his friends all “darken counsel by words without knowledge” (חשיך עצה במלין בלי־דעת, Job 38:2), a fact that Job later admits (Job 42:3). Job is found praiseworthy for acknoweledging his limitations while the friends remain condemned in their igrnorance (Job 42:7–8). Humans, the book concludes, are incapable of speaking wisely. Thus, wisdom becomes a word that is *not* spoken, as much as one that is (WISDOM IS SILENCE):

Job 13:5	Job to Zophar: Would that you only be *silent* (החש תחרישון), that would be as wisdom (חכמה) to you!
Job 40:4–5	Job to God: Indeed; I am small. How am I to reply to you? I place *my hand on my mouth* (ידי שמתי למו־פי). Once I have spoken, so I will not answer. Twice, but I will not do so again.

Job tells Zophar that only silence will reveal an individual’s wisdom (see also Job 6:24, 15:2–3), and later in the book, Job himself considers it wisest to respond to God’s challenge with silence (Job 40:4–5).[2] Even more so than Proverbs, the book of Job continually questions just how effective human words are for conveying wisdom.

Job also adopts Proverb’s idea that WISDOM IS A TREASURE. In the midst of questioning the efficacy of human words, Job 28 digresses into a lengthy description of human mining operations:

v. 1	There is a source for silver and a place to refine gold.
v. 2	Iron is taken from the earth, and stone melts into copper.

[2] This silence motif is not unique to Job (see, for example, the precursors to it in Prov 11:12, 17:28); however, Job expands upon this wise silence and makes it one of the central themes of its book.

v. 3 [A miner][3] puts an end to darkness, and he searches for stone at the farthest end of gloom and shadow.

v. 4 He splits the valley far from where people sojourn; [miners] are forgotten far from human feet; they sway and totter far from people.

v. 5 The earth, from which bread comes, is turned underneath as if by fire.

v. 6 Its stones are the place of sapphires; its dust has gold.

v. 7 Its path no bird knows; the falcon eye's has not looked upon it.

v. 8 Wild beasts[4] have not walked on it; a lion has not advanced upon it.

v. 9 [The miner] sends his hand against the flint and overturns the root of mountains.

v. 10 He cuts streams in the rock, and his eye sees every precious stone.

v. 11 He probes the sources[5] of the streams and brings to light hidden things.

Following this tour of the earth's underbelly, the book asks:

v. 12 But where is wisdom to be found? Where is the place of understanding?

v. 13 Men do not know its length. It is not found in the land of the living.

v. 14 The deep says, "it is not with me," and the sea says, "it is not with me."

v. 15 It is not given in exchange for a fine gold;[6] it is not weighed out for the price of silver.

v. 16 It is not valued with the gold of Ophir, with precious sapphire or onyx.

v. 17 Gold and glass cannot equal it, nor an exchange of instruments of fine gold.

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[3] Literally: "he puts" (subject unspecified). Although the text does not specify who this actor is, the context suggests that it is a human engaged in mining operations.

[4] Literally, "proud sons" (בני־שחץ). As Habel points out, fact that this term occurs in a list of wild animals (birds, falcons, and lions) suggests that the term here refers to "wild beasts" (*The Book of Job*, 390).

[5] Thus Habel, *The Book of Job*, 390.

[6] According to Habel, סגור ("setting, encasement") is a shortened form of זהבסגור, which indicates a setting of "fine gold." Habel, *The Book of Job*, 390.

v.18 Coral and crystal are not remembered, for the price of wisdom is above coral.

v. 19 Topaz of Cush cannot equal it; it is not valued in pure gold.

The conception of wisdom here is identical to that of Proverbs: wisdom is more valuable than all the gold and jewels of the world. Yet, the Job passage is much more descriptive. It provides greater detail about the different types of metals available to humans and the difficulty of mining them. On the one hand, this increased detail makes the acquisition of wisdom more vivid and appealing. As the reader follows the miner on his long journey underground, he comes to appreciate the difficulty of obtaining precious minerals from the earth and the rewards that such hard work brings. He understands that the same hard work will be needed to obtain wisdom, but is reassured that an even greater reward will be forthcoming for his efforts. Yet, the text challenges this expectation. Where Proverbs found wisdom hard to obtain, Job finds it impossible. As the chapter concludes, only "God understands its ways; [only] he knows its place" (Job 28:23). Even if one journeyed into the depths of the earth, one would not find wisdom. Only God can truly obtain it. By limiting wisdom to God, the text again decreases its accessibility to human beings. Mortals cannot neither speak wisely nor be wise. The best they can do is "fear the Lord and turn from evil" (Job 28:28).

The book of Qohelet also demonstrates a familiarity with the metaphors of Proverbs, describing WISDOM AS A WORD that could be spoken (e.g., Qoh 9:13–16, 17–18; 10:12–14) and extending the idea that WISDOM IS A COMMODITY into the idea that WISDOM IS AN INHERITANCE (e.g., Qoh 7:11–12). It also develops the visual dimensions of wisdom, describing wisdom as a light that illuminates the life of the wise man (WISDOM IS A LIGHT):

Qoh 2:13–14 I saw that wisdom is more advantageous than folly, just as *light* (האור) is more advantageous than *darkness* (החשך)—the wise man has *eyes in his head* (עיניו בראשו) and the fool *walks in darkness* (בחשך הולך)—but I knew that one fate befalls them all.

Qoh 8:1	Who is like a wise man? Who knows the interpretation of a matter? The wisdom of a person makes his face *shine* (תאיר) and changes the strength of one's face.

As in the complex metaphors of Proverbs (e.g., WISDOM IS A VERBAL LIGHT, Prov 6:3), Qohelet's wisdom is a light for the individual, giving him "eyes in his head" (עיניו בראשו; that is, giving him enough light to see properly; Qoh 2:14) and making his face "shine" (אור; Qoh 8:1). The fool, however, is left to stumble around in darkness (Qoh 2:14).

Such metaphors establish positive expectations in the reader: wisdom will benefit the individual and is thus desirable. Yet, like Job, the book of Qohelet continually challenges this established conception of wisdom. In Qoh 9:13–16, for instance, wisdom is promoted as word simply to demonstrate its ultimate ineffectiveness:

v. 13	I have also seen this wisdom under the sun, and it was great to me:
v. 14	There was a small city with few people in it, and a great king came to it, surrounded it, and built great siege works against it.
v. 15	But there was found in it a poor wise man, and he saved the city by his wisdom. Yet, no one remembered that poor wise man.
v. 16	So I said, "wisdom is better than strength, but the wisdom of the poor is despised, and his *words* (דבריו) are not obeyed."

As in Proverbs, wisdom is conceptualized as a word with positive effects; it can save a city (v. 16). Yet, if the one who utters wisdom is poor, it does not benefit the speaker himself. He is still forgotten, and his wisdom is ignored. Similarly, although light is a positive attribute and normally associated with life (e.g., Prov 2:12–13, 4:18–19), Qohelet finds that having the light of wisdom is no better than walking in darkness: "one fate befalls all" (Qoh 2:14), that is, death comes to the wise and foolish alike. By adopting conventional metaphors for wisdom, the text establishes certain expectations within its readers, namely, that wisdom will bring good things. However, like Job, Qohelet consistently concludes the opposite; being wise is no better than being foolish.

What causes Job's and Qohelet's disillusionment is not entirely clear—lingering disappointment with the exilic leadership; the looming specter of the Greek empire, who would conquer the ancient Near East in the fourth century; or simple personal discontent? Yet, whatever the cause, the disillusionment of these authors lead them to reject the conventional metaphors of their day and use them instead to point out th inability of humans to achieve wisdom and the folly of attempting to do so.

LXX Proverbs

When the book of Proverbs was translated into Greek during the second century B.C.E., the text underwent significant changes.[7] Phrases were added, passages were omitted, and foci changed. Consider, for instance, the Hebrew (MT) and Greek (LXX) versions of Prov 10:22:

Prov 10:22 (MT)	The blessing of the Lord enriches, and He does not add sorrow with it.
Prov 10:22 (LXX)	The blessing of the Lord *is upon the head of the righteous*; it enriches, and does add sorrow with it *in the heart*.

According to the Hebrew, God blesses individuals, makes their life prosperous, and keeps sorrow from them. The Greek preserves this basic sentiment but adds some additional wording. First, the Greek specifies the location where blessings and sorrows occur (on the head or in the heart). More importantly, it clarifies to whom the verse refers: not any individual, but the "righteous" individual. The Greek thus draws a sharper contrast between the righteous (in v. 22 here) and the unrighteous (in vv. 20–21, 23–24). Although some scholars argue that such variants suggest that LXX Proverbs relied upon a different Hebrew vorlage than MT Proverbs, most variants appear to

[7] Although the *Letter of Aristeas* places the translation of the Septuagint in the third century reign of King Ptolemy II (285–246 B.C.E.), many scholars argue that the translation of the non-Pentateuchal books, if not the entire Old Testament, occurred sometime during the second century B.C.E. For more information on the dating of the Septuagint, see Frank Clancy, "The Date of the LXX," *Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament* 16 (2002): 207–25.

be the imaginative work of a Greek translator, who used the text of Proverbs to promote his own social values.[8]

Whatever the exact relationship between these texts, the differences between the Greek and Hebrew versions of Proverbs are largely *textual*, not conceptual. While the literary form of the text changed, the underlying conceptual system remained basically the same.[9] Thus, LXX Proverbs preserved most of the wisdom metaphors of its Hebrew predecessor. Wisdom continued to be a treasure that could be grasped (e.g., Prov 2:1–4; 3:1; 7:1), a word that could be spoken (e.g., Prov 2:1, 4:10, 7:1), and a righteous path that could be walked (e.g., Prov 4:11, 6:23, 10:17). This does not mean that LXX Proverbs was completely immune to its historical situation. Like any translation, LXX Proverbs witnessed a certain amount of conceptual transformation when translated into Greek. Some metaphors, for instance, were completely lost. Thus, the belief that INSTRUCTION IS A LASHING (e.g., Prov 3:11–12, 15:33, 22:15) and that WISDOM IS A VERBAL LASHING (e.g., Prov 1:8, 4:1, 6:23) disappears in LXX Proverbs, because the tactile Hebrew term מוסר is rendered by the more perceptually-neutral Greek term παιδεία.[10] Other metaphors were

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[8] For the complicated textual history of LXX Proverbs, especially its relationship with MT Proverbs, compare Emanuel Tov, "Recensional Differences between the Masoretic Text and the Septuagint of Proverbs," in *Greek and Hebrew Bible: Collected Essays on the Septuagint* (VTSup 72; Leiden: Brill, 1999), 419–32; Johann Cook, *The Septuagint of Proverbs* (VTSup 69; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 1–31, 321–26. In general, Tov accounts for the variations between LXX Proverbs and MT Proverbs via different Hebrew *vorlages*, while Cook argues that the variations are the conscious work of the Greek translator. For the Greek text of Proverbs, I have followed the edition printed in Alfred Rahlfs, *Septuaginta* (rev. ed. ed.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2006).

[9] According to such scholars as Gillis Gerleman and Martin Hengel, LXX Proverbs does contain substantial conceptual differences from MT Proverbs. They argue that the translation was not only intimately familiar with Greek culture but also used his translation to espouse certain Greek values, especially Stoic ideals. See Gillis Gerleman, "The Septuagint Proverbs as a Hellenistic Document," *OTS* 8 (1950): 15–27; Martin Hengel, *Judentum und Hellenismus* (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 10; Tübingen: Mohr, 1973). Cook, however, has convincingly argued through careful linguistic analysis that the worldview of the LXX Proverbs translator is "fundamentally Jewish." Although the translator was well-versed in Greek and the culture it espoused, Hellenism's influence on him was "restricted to the area of the literary and stylistic, and did not include the world of ideas" (Cook, *The Septuagint of Proverbs*, 320). Examination of LXX Proverbs through a conceptual metaphor lens seems to confirm this, as the underlying metaphors used by the two books carry the same basic nuances, even when the literary form differs.

[10] As Cook notes, παιδεία occurs twenty-eight times in LXX Proverbs, mostly as an equivalent to מוסר (Cook, *The Septuagint of Proverbs*, 66). As argued in Chapter 3 above, the Hebrew term מוסר ("discipline") is connected to the tactile root יסר ("to strike"). However, the Greek term παιδεία is connected to the rearing of a child more generally without specific perceptual nuances (see, for example,

preserved but acquired additional nuances. Thus, although LXX Proverbs maintains that WISDOM IS A TEACHER, the text nuances its presentation of the figure. Wisdom not only "calls out" (קרא, רנן) to her students but she "sings" (ὑμνέω) to them (e.g., Prov 1:20; 8:3). The underlying metaphor remains the same (WISDOM IS A TEACHER), but the choice to render קרא and רנן with ὑμνέω suggests a more musical quality to Wisdom's message.

Such conceptual shifts, however, are largely accidental, the result of Hebrew and Greek linguistic differences rather than conscious ideological choices. The fact that the majority of Proverbs' wisdom metaphors persisted with little or no change suggests that the Greek community who adopted the text still found these metaphors highly relevant for their own community's situation and did not need to substantially alter them to fit their particular circumstances. Perhaps because it was more removed from the turmoil of the exile and the uncertainty that plagued Job and Qohelet, LXX Proverbs continued to be steeped in the Semitic worldview of its parent text and was not substantially affected by the changing Hellenistic context of its community.

Ben Sira

Other early Jewish texts, however, witnessed significant conceptual changes with the influx of Greek culture, and the way that they use conventional wisdom metaphors reflects this influence. For instance, the book of Ben Sira often uses conventional metaphors to describe wisdom: WISDOM IS A WORD (Sir 3:29; 4:24; 16:24–25; 20:13, 27), A WREATH (Sir 1:18), A WATER OF LIFE (Sir 1:19, 15:3), A PRODUCER (Sir 3:17), A TEACHER (Sir 4:11), and A LOVER (Sir 4:12). Yet, the text also infuses these metaphors with additional agricultural and cultic nuances in order to promote traditional Jewish values vis-à-vis the dominant Hellenistic culture.[11]

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the related words παιδεύω, "to bring up a child, teach"; παιδιά, "child's play"; παιδίον, "child," each of which are related to childhood).

[11] The complicated textual status of Ben Sira makes the book difficult to analyze. The original text was composed in Hebrew, but a complete Hebrew witness does not survive. Instead, we have several fragmentary Hebrew manuscripts (from Qumran: 2Q18, 11Ps[a]; from Masada: MS M; and from various Geniza: MSS A, B, C, D, E, and F), each of them containing only a few letters or a few chapters of the

Ben Sira, for instance, follows Proverbs in describing wisdom as a plant that produces good fruit (WISDOM IS A VINE, WISDOM IS A TREE, WISDOM IS A FIELD):

Sir 1:16 (LXX)	Fear of the Lord is fullness of wisdom; it *intoxicates* (μεθύσκει) men with its *fruits* (καρπῶν αὐτῆς).
Sir 1:20 (LXX)	Fear of the Lord is the *root of wisdom* (ῥίζα σοφίας); its *branches* (οἱ κλάδοι αὐτῆς) are long life.
Sir 6:19 (Hbr)	Like one who *plows* (כחורש) and *sows* (כקוצר), come to [wisdom] and wait for its *abundant harvest* (לרב תבואתה); for when you *work* (בעבדתה), you will *work* (תעבוד) but a little and soon you will eat of its *fruit* (פריה).

Wisdom is a vine that intoxicates individuals with it produce (i.e., wine, Sir 1:16), a tree that produces the fruit of long life (Sir 1:20, see also Sir 14:26), and a bountiful field (Sir 6:19). He who cultivates such a plant will enjoy its nourishment. Each of these descriptions draws upon the conventional idea that WISDOM IS A FRUIT OF THE MOUTH (e.g., Prov 13:2). Yet, Ben Sira also expands this metaphor, providing more specificity about the nature of this fruit and what produces it. Wisdom is no longer simply the fruit that the wise man's mouth produces; it is the plant itself that produces this fruit.

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entire text. The Greek witnesses (GI and GII) are more or less complete, but often vary significantly from each other and the corresponding Hebrew witnesses. Due to the fragmentary nature of the Hebrew and the cursory nature of this survey, a detailed comparison of the different witnesses will not be possible. Instead, I shall use the Hebrew witnesses to reconstruct the literary activity of Ben Sira whenever they are available, drawing upon the Greek witnesses only when there are substantial differences or the Hebrew is not available. Such an approach should suffice here, as the major conceptual modifications in Ben Sira are found in both the Hebrew and Greek versions of the text.

For the complete Hebrew manuscripts (hereafter referred to collectively as Hbr), see Pancratius Beentjes, *The Book of Ben Sira in Hebrew: A Text Edition of All Extant Hebrew Manuscripts and a Synopsis of All Parallel Hebrew Ben Sira Texts* (VTSup; Leiden: Brill, 1997). For the Greek (hereafter LXX), I have followed the text printed in Rahlfs, *Septuaginta*. For a more complete discussion of the textual history of Ben Sira, see Patrick William Skehan and Alexander Di Lella, *The Wisdom of Ben Sira: A New Translation with Notes* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 51–62.

Similarly, by drawing upon the semantic domains of hunting and domestic food cultivation, wisdom becomes the tool that helps an individual capture or produce food (WISDOM IS A NET, WISDOM IS A YOKE):

Sir 6:23–25 (LXX) Listen, child, and accept my judgment; do not reject my counsel. Put your feet *into its net* (εἰς τὰς πέδας αὐτῆς) and your neck *into its noose* (εἰς τὸν κλοιὸν αὐτῆς). Bend your shoulders and carry it. Do not be angry about *its straps* (τοῖς δεσμοῖς αὐτῆς).[12]

In verse 24, wisdom is a hunter's "net" (πέδη, v. 24; κλοιός, v. 24); it traps the individual (conceptualized here as wild game) so that he may not escape wisdom's guidance. In verse 25, wisdom is a "yoke" (κλοιός, v. 24; δεσμός, v. 25); it restrains the individual (conceptualized here as a farm animal) and steers him so that he may cultivate a fruitful harvest.[13] In both cases, the positive image of WISDOM BEING A WREATH (e.g., Prov 1:8–9) has blended with the negative image that IMMORAL ACTION IS A SNARE (e.g., Prov 11:6) to produce a new metaphor in which WISDOM IS THE SNARE that encircles the foot or neck of the individual.[14] It therefore seems like a burden at first, one that entraps the individual and keeps him from his goal. Yet, it is a burden to which the student should willingly submit, for it will protect the individual, guiding him to make good choices. Wisdom is thus not actually a restraint at all, but a beautiful garment (WISDOM IS A ROYAL GARMENT):

Sir 6:29–31 (Hbr) Its *net* (רשתה)[15] will become for you a foundation of strength, and its *cords* (וחבלתה) *garments of gold* (בגדי כתם). For its *yoke* (עולה) is a *golden adornment* (עלי זהב); its *straps* (מוסרתיה) are

[12] According to Skehan and Di Lella, (*The Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 192), δεσμός is the typical translation for מוסרת, the straps of a yoke.

[13] Skehan and Di Lella, *The Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 192–94.

[14] In this blend, the identity of wisdom (snare) is taken from the folly metaphor while its effects (honor, protection, beautification, etc.) are taken from the wisdom metaphor.

[15] The Greek tends to concur, using the same terms as in vv. 24 and 25 for the net and yoke here. The exception to this is in v. 30, where the Greek misreads the Hebrew "yoke" (עולה) as "from it" (ἐπ᾽ αὐτῆς). Skehan and Di Lella, *The Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 192.

purple cords (פתיל תכלת). You will *wear* (תלבשנה) its *glorious garment* (בגדי כבוד); you will *crown yourself* (תעטרנה) with its *splendid crown* (עטרת תפערת).

Like a royal gown (בגדי כתם, v. 29; עלי זהב, v. 30; פתיל תכלת, v. 30; בגדי כבוד, v. 31) or splendid crown (עטרת תפערת, v. 31), wisdom beautifies the individual and brings him honor. The idea that WISDOM IS A WREATH (or at least A BEAUTIFUL GARMENT) thus reasserts itself and encourages the student to seek wisdom above all else.

By expanding the agricultural nuances here, the text heightens the Jewishness of these metaphors. Wisdom is not a new development brought to the Jewish people from the cities of Athens. It has been developed and cultivated within the fields of Palestine. The same effect is achieved when wisdom is portrayed as an object of cultic devotion (WISDOM IS A CULT OBJECT):

Sir 4:12–15 (Hbr) Whoever loves [wisdom], loves life, and the one who seeks it, wins the favor of the Lord. Those who cling to it will find the glory (כבוד) of the Lord and will live in the blessing (בברכת) of the Lord. Those who *minister* to [wisdom] (משרתיה) *minister* (משרתי) to the Holy One, his tent….[16] "Those who listen to me[17] will judge the nations. Those who give ear to me will live in the splendor of *my temple* (מבית)."[18]

Building upon the idea that wisdom is an object or person to be loved (e.g., Prov 8:17), Ben Sira describes wisdom as cult object that should be ardently loved (Sir 4:12), eagerly sought (Sir

[16] The second half of this verse is unclear in the Hebrew. The LXX reads "the Lord loves those who love [wisdom]," either preserving an earlier (undistorted) Hebrew rendering or correcting the Hebrew by mimicking v. 12.

[17] The sudden shift to the first person in the Hebrew is awkward, but presumably it is personified Wisdom who speaks here. However, since the Hebrew does not contain significant personification beyond this address, I will treat the concept here in general as a cultic object, rather than a cultic personage (as Wisdom becomes in Sir 24). The Greek, in fact, does not contain any explicit personification, reading a third person pronoun instead of a first person pronoun: "those who listen to *it* will judge the nations; those who heed *it* will live securely."

[18] The Hebrew term בית can refer more generally to a "house." Yet, given the cultic connotation of this stanza, it is likely that the Jewish Temple (or a temple) is envisioned here. The Greek loses this nuance, reading live securely" (κατασκηνώσει πεποιθώς) instead.

4:13), and granted the same cultic honors as God (Sir 4:14). In fact, for all practical purposes, wisdom is God's cultic representative. Like God, wisdom has its own temple (בית, Sir 4:15), and its worship results in the same divine blessings as God's worship: he who serves wisdom is blessed, receives glory, and obtains the wisdom to judge the nations (Sir 4:13–15; cf. 2 Kgs 3:6–14, where God grants wealth, honor, and understanding to Solomon in response to his proper devotion).

Similar cultic resonances are found in the semi-autobiographical poem that is inserted into the end of Ben Sira.[19] The Hebrew version of the poem, for instance, describes how the sage ardently seeks personified Wisdom, loves her, and prays to her:

Sir 51:13–14 (Hbr)	I was young, before I erred, and I *sought her* (ובקשתיה). She came to me in her beauty, and I *will seek her* (אדורשנה) until the end.[20]
Sir 51:19–20 (Hbr)	*My נפש burned* (הריתי נפשי)[21] for her, my face never turning away. *My נפש was preoccupied* (טרדתי נפשי) with her; I did not cease from extolling her.[22] I *opened my hands on high* (ידי פת[חה למרום])[23] and discerned (אתבונן) her secrets.[24]

[19] Like the rest of Ben Sira, the textual history of Sir 51 is complicated. The presence of the poem in the Qumran Psalms Scroll, however, suggests that it originally circulated as an independent composition and was only later inserted into the Hebrew book of Ben Sira (see the Cario Geniza's MS B) and its Greek translation. In light of the substantial differences between the Qumran version of this poem and that of MS B, I have followed the Psalms Scroll for the Hebrew translation here, only noting the more significant differences between the two texts in the footnotes.

[20] MS B is significantly shorter. In v. 13, it omits בטרם תעיתי ("before I erred") and adds וחפצתי, "and I desired her," thus eliminating any notion that the sage would err after obtaining wisdom and emphasizing the desire of the sage for wisdom. Verse 14 is completely missing.

[21] MS B reads חשקה נפשי בה ("my נפש loved her").

[22] For the emendations to this verse, see Meyers, *The Tabernacle Menorah*, 575. The extant text of MS B contains a similar sense: נפשי נתתי אחריה ולנצחים לא אט[.] ממ[..] ("I put my soul to her, and I never […] from […]").

[23] 11QPs[a] is fragmentary at this point, but Di Lella convincingly argues for the reconstruction here based on the LXX (*Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 575). MS B, on the other hand, reads ידי פתחה שעריה ("my hand opened her gates"), which leads Skehan to argue for a similar reconstruction of 11QPs[a].

[24] Thus following Meyers, *The Tabernacle Menorah*, 575. The extant text of this colon in MS B is worded differently but seems to contain a similar sense: אח[..] ואביט ב[...]ולה ("and to her […] and I looked

As in Proverbs, Wisdom is the object of the sage's love. She is eagerly and willingly sought (בקש, v. 14; דרש, v. 14; xxx, v. 19; טרד, v. 19). More importantly, she is the object of his prayer. The sage "lifts his hands on high" (ידי פת[חה למרום], v. 19), a common prayer posture, in order to understand her mysteries. The Greek translation heightens these cultic resonances, placing the sage's devotional activities directly at the base of the Jewish Temple and in accordance with Jewish law:

Sir 51:13–14 (LXX) I was young, before I erred, and I sought wisdom openly *in my prayer* (ἐν προσευχῇ μου). *Before the temple* (ἔναντι ναοῦ), I asked for her, and I will seek her until the end.

Sir 51:19–20 (LXX) My soul sought her; I was precise *in keeping the law* (ἐν ποιήσει νόμου). I *spread my hands out to the heights* (τὰς χεῖράς μου ἐξεπέτασα πρὸς ὕψος) and mourned my ignorance of her. I directed my soul to her. *In purity* (ἐν καθαρισμῷ), I found her…

From the beginning of the poem, the sage's activities are defined as cultic. When he seeks Wisdom, he does so through prayer (προσευχή, v. 13). When he looks for wisdom, he does so at the Temple (ναός, v. 14). He keeps the Jewish law (νόμος, v. 19), which includes being ritually clean (καθαρισμός, v. 20), and prays in the tradition posture (τὰς χεῖράς μου ἐξεπέτασα πρὸς ὕψος, v. 19). In return for his devotion, the sage is rewarded with traditional Jewish blessings: understanding (v. 20), the ability to speak wisely (v. 22, 25–30), and peace (v. 27). Wisdom is placed squarely into the Jewish cultic sphere. She is an object to be worshipped alongside the Jewish God and that mediates that God's blessings.

Chapter 24 of the LXX expands this nuance even further, using traditional images from the Hebrew Bible to situate Wisdom as a *Jewish* priest (WISDOM IS A PRIEST):[25]

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on […]"). 11Ps[a] then breaks off mid-thought: כפי הברותי אל ("I purified my hands to…"), and MS B is largely retroverted from the Syriac (so argues Skehan and Di Lella, *The Wisdom of Ben Sira*, 575).

[25] Chapter 24 is not preserved in Hebrew, so it is impossible to know if the nuances of this chapter pre-exist the Greek translation.

Sir 24:8–11 (LXX) Then, the Creator of all things commanded me and choose a place a rest for *my tent* (τὴν σκηνήν μου). He said, "Live in Jacob and let your inheritance be in Jacob." Before the ages, from the beginning, and until all ages I will not cease to be. In the *holy tent* (ἐν σκηνῇ ἁγίᾳ), I *ministered* (ἐλειτούργησα) before Him and thus I was established in Zion. In the beloved city, he caused me to rest and Jerusalem was my domain.

Although transcending creation, Wisdom pitches her "tent" (σκηνή) amongst the people of Jacob, the Israelites (Sir 24:8). In the Hebrew Bible, "tent" (Hbr: אהל) frequently refers to the divine Tabernacle, the holy dwelling place of God where the people speak to the divine following their exodus from Egypt.[26] By calling Wisdom's dwelling place a σκηνή, the text thus suggests that her dwelling is a cultic locale, a place for the divine attribute to speak to the people and instruct them in the proper adherence to the law. Wisdom also "ministers" (λειτουργέω, v. 10) to God in her σκηνή, like a holy priest offering sacrifice and incense to the deity.[27] Wisdom becomes, as Juana Manzo states, a "true mediator between YHWH and the Israelites…[She] guides them and communicates YHWH's will to them."[28] Like God, Wisdom then makes her home in Zion/Jerusalem—the center of Jewish cultic life and the home of the Jewish Temple—where she continues her priestly functions (Sir 24:10–11).[29]

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[26] See, for example, Exod 29:4, 11, 32; 33:7–11; Num 12:5, 10; Deut 31:14–5; Chr 24:5; and 1 Kgs 2:28–30, although some early texts may envision a cultic distinction between the "tent" of God and the Tabernacle itself. Juana Manzo, "Lady Wisdom in the Book of Ben Sira, Chapter 24" (Ph. D. diss., Catholic University of America, 2009), 142–45.

[27] As Manzo notes, the poem never directly states that Wisdom performs these functions; however, the use of λειτουργέω here, which is the typical Greek translation of the Hebrew שרת ("to serve"), suggests that Wisdom fulfills all of the traditional functions of the priest, including offering sacrifices and instructing the people. Manzo, "Lady Wisdom in the Book of Ben Sira, Chapter 24," 154–57.

[28] Manzo, "Lady Wisdom in the Book of Ben Sira, Chapter 24," 149.

[29] According to Manzo, the reference to Wisdom speaking in the midst of "people" (λαός) and God's holy "assembly" (ἐκκλησία) in vv. 1–2 may also be a reference to Wisdom's Jerusalem locale, as it echoes various psalmic and prophetic references to God's divine court being held in Jerusalem (e.g., Ps 48:1–2; Isa 6:1–3). Manzo, "Lady Wisdom in the Book of Ben Sira, Chapter 24," 126–35.

After portraying Wisdom as a cultic official, the text shifts to describing Wisdom as a *Jewish* plant (WISDOM IS A PLANT):

Sir 24:12–14 (LXX)	I *became rooted* (ἐρρίζωσα) in the glorified people, their inheritance in the portion of the Lord. I *grew tall* (ἀνυψώθην) like a *cedar* (κέδρος) in Lebanon and like a *cypress* (κυπάρισσος) in the hills of Hermon. I *grew tall* (ἀνυψώθην) like a *palm tree* (φοῖνιξ) in En-gedi, like a *rose plant* (φυτὰ ῥόδου) in Jericho, like beautiful *olive tree* (ἐλαία) in the field; I *grew tall* (ἀνυψώθην) like a *plane tree* (ἐλαία).
Sir 24:15	Like *cinnamon* (κιννάμωμον) and *cassia* (ἀσπάλαθος), I *gave off the perfume of incense* (ἀρωμάτων δέδωκα ὀσμὴν), and like choice *myrrh* (σμύρνα) I *gave my fragrance* (διέδωκα εὐωδίαν), like *galbanum* (χαλβάνη), *onycha* (ὄνυξ), and *stacte* (στακτὴ), like the *odor of incense* (λιβάνου ἀτμὶς) in the Temple (ἐν σκηνῇ).
Sir 24: 16–17	Like a *terebinth* (τερέμινθος), I spread (ἐξέτεινα) my *branches* (κλάδους μου), and my *branches* (οἱ κλάδοι μου) are beautiful and graceful *branches* (κλάδοι). Like the *vine* (ἄμπελος), I produced delight (χάριν), and my *flowers* (τὰ ἄνθη μου) are glorious and abundant *fruit* (καρπὸς).
Sir 24: 19–22	Come to me, you who desire (ἐπιθυμοῦντές) me and *fill yourself* (ἐμπλήσθητε) from my *harvest* (ἀπὸ τῶν γενημάτων μου). For the memory of me is *sweeter than honey* (ὑπὲρ τὸ μέλι γλυκύ) and the inheritance of me is *sweeter than honeycomb* (ὑπὲρ μέλιτος κηρίον). Those who *eat* (οἱ ἐσθίοντές) me will *hunger*

for more (ἔτι πεινάσουσιν); *those who drink* (οἱ πίνοντές) me *will thirst for more* (ἔτι διψήσουσιν).

Wisdom is a plant; she has roots (ῥίζόω,Sir 24:12), grows tall (ἀνυψόω, Sir 24:13, 14; ἐκτείνω, Sir 24:16), and gives off sweet perfume (δίδωμαι ὀσμὴν, διαδίδωμαι εὐωδίαν, Sir 24:15). More importantly, she is a plant native to Palestine and its surrounding regions: a cedar (κέδρος, Sir 24:13), a cypress (κυπάρισσος, Sir 24:13), a palm tree (φοῖνιξ, Sir 24:14), a rosebush (φυτὰ ῥόδου, Sir 24:14), an olive tree (ἐλαία, Sir 24:14), *et cetera*. These plants are traditional Jewish images of prosperity, majesty, strength, and righteousness (e.g., Judg 4:5, Ps 92:13–15, Ezek 31) and are often connected to the Jewish Temple as symbols of God's majesty and righteousness (e.g., 1 Kgs 6:29, 32, 35; Ezek 41:18–20; Zech 4:3, 11–14).[30] They also produce a variety of fragrances, many of which were used during traditional cult rituals: cinnamon (κιννάμωμον, Sir 24:15), myrrh (σμύρνα, Sir 24:15), galbanum (χαλβάνη, Sir 24:15), *et cetera*.[31] The cultic resonances are therefore not lost in this metaphor, as the text portrays Wisdom as a *Jewish* plant growing and producing fruit for the Jewish cult. The sage, coming to the Temple, can thus experience Wisdom as a cult official and as a cultic object, a person to be heeded and an object to be eaten or smelled.

As the text continues, both of these metaphors converge into a single entity as Wisdom becomes the Jewish Torah (WISDOM IS TORAH):

Sir 24:23 (LXX) All of these things are the *book of the covenant* (βίβλος διαθήκης) of God most high, the *law* (νόμον) that Moses commanded us as an inheritance for the people of Jacob.

Just as wisdom and righteousness blend together in the book of Proverbs (see Chapter 4), wisdom and Torah blend together in Ben Sira. Wisdom *is* the Torah, the "book of the covenant" (βίβλος

[30] For a full discussion of these plants and their symbolic significance, see Manzo, "Lady Wisdom in the Book of Ben Sira, Chapter 24," 168– 78, 184–87.

[31] See, for instance, the references to the use of spices at the Tent of Meeting in the wilderness (e.g., Exod 30:23, 34; 37:29). Manzo, "Lady Wisdom in the Book of Ben Sira, Chapter 24," 180–83.

διαθήκης), the "law" (νόμος) that God gave Moses on Sinai (Sir 24:23; see also Exod 24:7; 2 Kgs 23:2, 21; etc.). The concepts and metaphors attributed to each blend together in the mind of the reader. Wisdom becomes the source of all Jewish cultic life. She tells the people how to live their lives and worship God and gives the sage the ability to do likewise (see Sir 24:30–34). Meanwhile, the Torah "pours out" (πίμπλημι, Sir 24:25; ἀναπληρόω, Sir 24:26) instruction upon the people like a fountain of living water, giving them substance and enabling their "fruits" to grow. The reader of the entire book is left to conclude that whichever concept is being discussed, both wisdom and Torah are involved.

Ben Sira never completely rejects Hellenism. Yet, by heightening the traditional Jewish nuances of these metaphors, he promotes the value of Jewish culture vis á vis Hellenism. Wisdom is a native attribute of Israel. It guides the people's history and stands at the center of their religious experience.

Wisdom of Solomon

The Wisdom of Solomon takes a slightly different approach. Although it still presents wisdom as a figure deeply rooted in Jewish tradition, the Wisdom of Solomon found an easy synthesis between Jewish and Greek culture, such that Wisdom could be both a traditional Jewish attribute and a Greek philosophical ideal.

This synthesis is clearest in the text's lengthy soliloquy of wisdom (Wis 6–10), which begins by describing wisdom with conventional wisdom metaphors. As in Proverbs, wisdom is a word (WISDOM IS A WORD):

Wis 6:1–2 *Listen* (ἀκούσατε), kings, and understand! Learn, judges, of the ends of the earth! *Give ear* (ἐνωτίσασθε), you who grasp the nations and exalt yourselves over the crowds of nations.

Wis 6:9 To you, rulers, are my *words* (οἱ λόγοι μου) so that you may learn wisdom and not fall away.

Wisdom is again the word (λόγος; Wis 6:1, 9) of the sage, which kings should listen to (ἀκούω, v. 1; ἐνωτίζομαι, Wis 6:2) in order to know how they should behave. Wisdom is also an object of desire (WISDOM IS A LOVER):

Wis 6:11–14, 16 *Desire* my words (τῶν λόγων μου); *long for* (ποθήσατε) them and be disciplined. Wisdom is bright and permanent, easily beheld by those who *love her* (ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαπώντων αὐτὴν) and found by those who seek her. She makes herself known to those who *desire* her (τοὺς ἐπιθυμοῦντας) ...She goes around seeking those who are worthy of her, kindly appears to them in their paths, and meets them in all their thoughts.

Wis 6: 17–20 For her beginning is *ardent desire* (ἀληθεστάτη… ἐπιθυμία) of instruction and care for her instruction is *love* (ἀγάπη). *Love* (ἀγάπη) is keeping her law, and keeping her law is confirmation of immortality. Immortality makes one closer to God, so *desire* (ἐπιθυμία) for wisdom leads to the kingdom [of God].

Wisdom loves those who love her. If the sage "desires" her (ἐπιθυμέω, Wis 6:11, 13), if he "longs for" her (ποθέω, Wis 6:11), and "loves" her (ἀγαπάω), she will return his affection, seeking him out of her own accord and making herself easy to find. Indeed, love defines the Wisdom experience. "Desire" (ἐπιθυμία, Wis 6:17, 20) is the foundation of wisdom, and keeping wisdom's statues is a sign of "love" (ἀγάπη, Wis 6:17, 18) and a promise of immortality (Wis 6:18–20). Even more so than Proverbs, the language of seeking and longing conveys a congenial relationship between the sage and Wisdom, one of love and affection.

As the text continues into a description of the author's own pursuit of wisdom, wisdom becomes various forms of precious treasure (WISDOM IS A ROYAL SCEPTER, A THRONE, A TREASURE, HEALTH, and BEAUTY):

Wis 7:8–10 I preferred her to *scepters* (σκήπτρων) and *thrones* (θρόνων). I thought *wealth* (πλοῦτον) to be nothing compared to her. I did not liken her to a

precious stone (λίθον ἀτίμητον), for all the *gold* (χρυσὸς) is like sand (ψάμμος) in her sight and *silver* (ἄργυρος) will be considered clay (πηλὸς) before her. I loved (ἠγάπησα) her more than health (ὑγίειαν) and beauty (εὐμορφίαν). I choose to have her rather than light, for her light never ceases.

Like Proverbs or Job, the Wisdom of Solomon describes wisdom as a treasure beyond compare. It is more precious than power (σκῆπτρον, "scepters"; θρόνος, "thrones"; Wis 7:8), minerals (πλοῦτος, "wealth"; Wis 7:8; χρυσός, "gold"; ἄργυρος, "silver"; Wis 7:9), or personal vitality (ὑγίεια,"health"; εὐμορφία, "beauty"; Wis 7:10).

The use of these conventional metaphors establishes here wisdom as a traditional Jewish concept: it is a word to be heard, a lover to be desired, and treasure to be sought. One conception flows smoothly into the next. The text, however, then shifts away from these conventional metaphors to depict wisdom as a highly abstract breath (WISDOM IS A BREATH):

Wis 7:22–26 There is in her[32] a *breath* (πνεῦμα): intelligent, holy, unique, diverse, subtle, mobile, clear, undefiled, plain, invulnerable, loving what is good, keen, without hindrance, beneficent, kind, secure, sure, free from anxiety, all-powerful, all-seeing, and comprehending all breaths that are intelligent, clean, and subtle. For Wisdom is more mobile than motion; she extends through and understands everything through her purity. She is the *breath* (ἀτμὶς) of God's power, a pure emanation (ἀπόρροια) of the Almighty's glory. Because of this, nothing impure creeps into her. She is a *reflection* (ἀπαύγασμα) of the eternal light, a spotless mirror of God, an image of goodness.

[32] Although there is little indication in this text that wisdom has agency of its own, the context of the poem and the adjectives used to describe the concept suggest that the text envisions Wisdom here as a personified being. I shall therefore treat her as such throughout this passage, even when the text slips between a personified portrayal of her and a more objective depiction of the concept.

Wisdom is God's πνεῦμα (Wis 7:22; see also Wis 1:6), "breath" (ἀτμὶς, Wis 7:25), emanation (ἀπόρροια, Wis 7:25), and "reflection" (ἀπαύγασμα, Wis 7:26). She is all-knowing (Wis 7:23), all-powerful (Wis 7:23), "more mobile than motion" (πάσης γὰρ κινήσεως κινητικώτερον, Wis 7:24; see also εὐκίνητος, Wis 7:22), more "pure" than air (ἀμόλυντος, καθαρός, Wis 7:22, 23; καθαρότης, Wis 7:24; εἰλικρινής, Wis 7:25; οὐδὲν μεμιαμμένον εἰς αὐτὴν παρεμπίπτει, Wis 7:25; ἀκηλίδωτος, Wis 7:26). She is, in short, an intangible, incorporeal spirit, describable only by comparison with light (Wis 7:6, see also Wis 29–30) or the positive attributes she embodies: intelligence, benevolence, permanence, *et cetera* (Wis 22–28). In many ways, this abstract depiction follows that of Prov 8, where wisdom is a self-aware agent without definite form. Yet, the adjectives used to describe Wisdom here are distinctly Hellenistic. They derive from popular Stoic or Platonic philosophical lists, where they are used to describe the deity or the philosophical soul. Thus, Wisdom is like the Stoic "World-Soul"; she "penetrates" (διήκεω, Wis 7:24) and "pervades" (χωρέω) everything (Wis 7:24; cf. *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 2.416, 1021, 1033). Like the god(s) of the Greek philosophers, she is a "beneficent" (εὐεργετικός, Wis 7:23; cf. Chrysippus, *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* 2.115), "unique" (μονογενής, Wis 7:21; cf. Plato *Timaeus* 31B3), and an "intelligent breath" (πνεῦμα νοερόν, Wis 7:23; cf. Posidonius, *Fragments* 100).[33] The author of this text shows himself to be familiar with Hellenism philosophy and is quite comfortable with Wisdom taking the form of an ideal Greek deity or philosophical concept.

After this digression, the text returns to more conventional descriptions of wisdom. Extending the notion that WISDOM IS A LOVER, Wisdom becomes a bride, first of God and then of sage (WISDOM IS A WIFE):

[33] David Winston, "Wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon," in *In Search of Wisdom: Essays in Memory of John G. Gammie* (ed. Leo G Perdue; Louisville, Kent.: John Knox Press, 1993), 149–64 (152–53). See also ibid., *The Wisdom of Solomon: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (Anchor Bible; New York: Doubleday, 11979), 178–83.

Wis 8:2	I loved (ἐφίλησα) her, and I sought her in my youth. I sought her to be my *bride* (νύμφην). I became enthralled (ἐραστὴς ἐγενόμην) with her beauty.
Wis 8:3–4	She glorifies her birth by *living with God* (συμβίωσιν θεοῦ), and the Lord of all loves (ἠγάπησεν) her. For she is an *initiate* (μύστις) in the knowledge of God and an *associate* (αἱρετὶς) of his works.
Wis 8:9, 16	Therefore, I decided to take her *to live [with me]* (ἀγαγέσθαι πρὸς συμβίωσιν), knowing that she would be a good *advisor* (σύμβουλος) to me and *[give] advice* (παραίνεσις) in care and grief. When I enter my house, I *shall rest by her* (προσαναπαύσομαι αὐτῇ), for her *companionship* (ἡ συναναστροφὴ αὐτῆς) has no bitterness and *living with her* (ἡ συμβίωσις αὐτῆς) has no pain, only gladness and joy.

The sage and God both love Wisdom. She lives with God (συμβίωσιν θεοῦ, Wis 8:3), knows what he knows (she is a μύστις, an "initiate" in his knowledge, Wis 8:4; see also Wis 9:9), and shares in his divine work (αἱρετίς, "associate," Wis 8:4). Although the text does not specifically describe Wisdom as God's bride, the functions she fulfills are that of the ideal wife: she provides companionship, advise, and partnership. The sage enters into the same relationship with her, taking Wisdom as his "bride" (νεότης, Wis 8:2), living companion (συμβίωσις, Wis 8:9, 16; προσαναπαύω, συναναστροφὴ, Wis 8:16; see also Wis 9:10), and confident (σύμβουλος, Wis 8:9; see also Wis 9:11). Like the prophets of old, whose relationship with Wisdom is described in Wis 10:1–11:1, the sage who seeks wisdom gains the ability to know God's law and judge wisely (Wis 8:7–8, 10–15; 9:10–18).

By bracketing the Hellenistic portrayal of wisdom (WISDOM IS A SPIRIT) between various conventional metaphors for wisdom (WISDOM IS A WORD, WISDOM IS A LOVER, WISDOM IS A TREASURE, WISDOM IS A BRIDE), the Wisdom of Solomon presents an easy synthesis between Jewish culture and Hellenistic philosophy. According to this text, the sage does not need to

choose between understanding wisdom as a Jewish norm or as a Hellenistic ideal. Wisdom is both.

Summary

Over the next two thousand years, these wisdom metaphors continued to develop. Philo of Alexandria (1st cent. B.C.E.–1st cent. C.E.) blended the biblical image of Wisdom with the Greek philosophical concept of the Logos (divine "Word") to transform wisdom into the divine Mother and Nurse of all creation (e.g., *De ebrietate* 30–32). The early Christians blended the Wisdom-Logos with the Christian Trinity and thereby transformed her into the divine Son or Holy Spirit of God (e.g., Irenaeus, *Adversus Haereses* 2.30, 3.24, 2nd cent. C.E.; Origen, *De principiis* 1.246–251, 2nd–3rd cent. C.E). Medieval mystical Jews understood her to be the Schekinah, the Queen of all creation and the living presence of God in the world (e.g., Bahir S §90).[34] By the time the book of Proverbs reached modernity, wisdom had become many things: a philosophical concept, the Torah, the Logos, the dwelling place of God, a World-Soul, the mother of creation, a hypostatization of God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, the Virgin Mary, the Jewish Schekinah, *et cetera*.[35] Yet, each of these metaphors remained rooted in a biblical conception of Wisdom and the embodied experiences that engendered it. Whether portraying wisdom as a divine Word or a human mother, Jews and Christians throughout history relied upon their embodied experiences to understand the metaphors of Proverbs and make wisdom applicable to their own situations.

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[34] Gershom Scholem, *On the Mystical Shape of the Godhead: Basic Concepts in Kabbalah* (New York: Schoken Books, 1991), 191.

[35] Each of these transformations deserves a more detailed study of its own. Yet, for an overview of the entire trajectory, see Thomas Schipfiger, *Sophia-Mary: A Holistic Vision of Creation* (trans. James Morgante; York Beach, Maine: Samuel Weiser, Inc., 1998).

Conclusions

We tend to think of metaphors as stylistic devices, rhetorical embellishments that make a text more aesthetically pleasing without substantially reflecting or altering the underlying conceptual framework of the language users who employ them. The preceding analysis, however, suggests that metaphors are more deeply embedded within the conceptual worldview of their authors and audiences than often imagined. Metaphors structure how individuals understand their environment, how cultures communicate their core values, and how authors convey specific messages to their audiences.

Primary metaphors, for instance, derive from common sensory activities and structure the way that individuals understand their most basic abstract experiences. Thus, the abstract experience of cognition is described as an act of seeing, ideas are understood as objects that can be physically manipulated, and emotions are portrayed as flavors that can be tasted. As discussed in Chapter 3, over fifty perceptual metaphors were used to describe cognition in ancient Israel. Some of these defined how an individual obtained knowledge (e.g., UNDERSTANDING IS SEEING, THINKING IS SPEAKING, HAVING KNOWLEDGE IS POSSESSING HEART); others described what happened when an individual experienced an emotion (e.g., ENJOYING IS SEEING, DISTRESS IS A BITTER SELF, HUMILITY IS BEING LOW) or passed judgment upon an environmental stimuli (e.g., JUDGING IS SEEING, JUDGING IS TASTING, MORAL QUALITIES ARE WORDS). Yet, each cognitive metaphor was rooted in a specific perceptual modality and thus drew upon the physical properties of perception in order to describe cognition. Because seeing was thought to be a direct, voluntary activity, thinking became conceptualized as a direct, voluntary activity. Because taste was understood as an internal, subjective activity, judgment became conceptualized as an internal, subjective activity. As noted above, no single metaphor dominated ancient Israelite and early Jewish understandings of cognition. Among sapiential communities, cognition was simultaneously understood as a visual, oral/auditory, tactile, ingestive, and kinesthetic activity.

Such primary metaphors were conventional modes of expression that helped individuals understand cognition and reflect upon the origins of human knowledge. With primary metaphors, the book of Qohelet could stress that knowledge was the by-product of first-hand observation, while Proverbs and Job could emphasize that knowledge was best obtained by listening to experiences of others. Yet, primary metaphors are but the first stage of metaphorical conceptualization. Language users frequently extend, blend, and cluster primary metaphors together in such a way as to create more complex understandings of their environment. Sapiential authors, for instance, creatively manipulated primary metaphors in order to develop more advance understandings of cognition and prescribe specific mores for their students to follow.

As discussed in Chapter 4, some of these imaginative metaphors simply extended the base elements of a primary metaphor in order to clarify the means by which knowledge was formed and the roles humans played in its acquisition (e.g., WISDOM IS A COMMODITY, WISDOM IS A WORD, MORALITY IS A PATH). Others blended two or more metaphors together in order to specify the means by which the student obtained wisdom, the intrinsic value of doing so, and the qualities associated with it (e.g., WISDOM IS A TREASURE, WISDOM IS THE FRUIT OF THE MOUTH, RIGHTEOUSNESS IS A PATH OF LIGHT). These latter metaphors preserved some of the properties of their base metaphors while adding additional properties of their own. When WISDOM IS A WORD blended with the primary metaphor UNDERSTANDING IS GRASPING, wisdom became a word that could be directly manipulated (WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD). When THINKING IS WALKING and GOOD IS STRAIGHT blended together, communally-sanctioned thought became a voluntary act in which the straightness of one's steps indicated the righteousness of one's character (THINKING CORRECTLY IS WALKING STRAIGHT). These imaginative extensions and blends could also be clustered together to create more dynamic depictions of wisdom. Thus, Proverbs describes wisdom as a "fountain of life" that helps one avoid the "snares of death" (WISDOM IS A WATER OF LIFE + IMMORAL BEHAVIOR IS A SNARE, e.g., Prov 13:14) and as a "word" that can be "stored" within the individual (WISDOM IS A MANIPULABLE WORD + WISDOM IS A VERBAL TREASURE, e.g.,

Prov 2:1). Through such clusters, wisdom became a more accessible, more appealing, and more all-encompassing concept that could advance the values of the sapiential community.

The personifications of wisdom and folly discussed in Chapter 5 represent the most complex iterations of these imaginative metaphors. Like other imaginative blends, wisdom personifications combined elements from various input spaces in order to present a more complete and enticing conception of wisdom. Unlike other imaginative blends, however, these personifications began by ascribing agency to wisdom, such that the abstract concept of wisdom became its own generic cause. When agency was projected onto the metaphor WISDOM IS A WORD, wisdom became a concept that spoke to the student (WISDOM IS A SPEAKER). When agency was projected onto WISDOM IS A TREASURE, wisdom became a concept that guarded the student and protected him from harm (WISDOM IS A GUARD). Such "inchoate" personifications depict wisdom as an abstract casual agent without human form or substance; wisdom "speaks to" or "guards" the student but does not have a physical body. Wisdom could, however, also be fully personified. In such cases, a wisdom metaphor blended with a human persona in order to depict Wisdom as a fully-embodied individual whom the student could hear, dine with, and embrace (e.g., WISDOM IS A TEACHER, WISDOM IS A COUNSELOR, WISDOM IS A HOST, WISDOM IS A LOVER). Although scholars often mine such personifications for evidence that the Israelites socially constrained women or worshipped a goddess figure, these personifications reflect the larger worldview and pedagogical goals of the sapiential community. By portraying Wisdom as a teacher or a lover, the sages could reinforce their own authority in the classroom and emphasize that wisdom was an enjoyable quality to pursue. Wisdom personifications, in other words, provided memorable images by which to instruct the student about the benefits of belonging to the sapiential community and adhering to its values.

Over time, these imaginative metaphors themselves become conventional modes of expression. As discussed in Chapter 6, early Jews followed Proverbs in conceptualizing wisdom as a word (e.g., Job 11:6; Qoh 9:13–18; Sir 3:29), a treasure (e.g., Job 28; LXX Prov 2:1–4; Wis

7:8–10), and a woman who loved the sage (e.g., Sir 4:12; Wis 6:11–20). Such adoptions were possible, because early Jews could relate to the underlying perceptual experiences upon which these metaphors were based. Yet, the changing cultural climate of the Second Temple period also necessitated that these authors modify the wisdom metaphors they inherited to suit their own historical circumstances. Thus, disillusioned by his personal circumstances, the author of Qohelet used the idea that WISDOM IS A WORD to reflect upon the futility of human wisdom (e.g., Qoh 9:13–16), while Ben Sira modified the WISDOM IS LOVER metaphor to transform wisdom into a cult object that could stand apart from and be superior to the Hellenistic culture that slowly infiltrated his society (e.g., Sir 4:12–15). Through such transformations, wisdom remained a helpful concept by which Jewish authors could understand the world around them and promote their own values.

Regardless of their complexity, then, wisdom metaphors were not simply literary devices. They were conceptual systems that drew upon embodied experiences to structure the worldview of ancient sapiential communities and enable those communities to communicate their core values to future generations. They helped individuals understand knowledge, how to obtain wisdom, and what benefits there were for following the teachings of the sapiential community.

Realizing that such metaphors are deeply-embedded conceptual systems, rather than mere literary devices, has important implications for the study of ancient Israelite and early Jewish literature. First, a conceptual analysis of biblical metaphor often reveals more about the nuances of specific passages and the connections between them than more traditional literary approaches. Literarily, Prov 1:9 and 4:4 have little to do with one another. One describes wisdom as a wreath or necklace that can be worn,[1] while the other describes wisdom as word that can be physically grasped or stored within the heart.[2] Yet, conceptually, each passage uses auditory and tactile

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[1] Prov 1:9: "For [the father's teachings] are a *wreath* of grace (לוית חן) for your head and *necklaces* (ענקים) for your neck."

[2] Prov 4:4: "[My father] taught me and said to me, "let your heart *grasp* (תמךי) my words; *keep* (שמר) my commandments and live."

experience to describe wisdom and thus envisions wisdom as a direct experience that the student willing undertakes. Recognizing the shared perceptual foundations of these passages enables scholars to appreciate the nuances of each passage and the differences between their conceptions of wisdom. Although both view wisdom as a direct experience, Prov 1:9 motivates the student to acquire wisdom by promising him protection, guidance, and honor in the community. Proverbs 4:4 motivates him by promising longevity. Conceptually, the two are linked, even if literarily they have little in common.

As van Hecke notes, however, the primary goal of the conceptual metaphor approach is descriptive rather than hermeneutical: "the theory answers the question how it is possible that we understand metaphors and does not deal directly with the question how an obscure metaphor should be understood."[3] Studying the conceptual framework of a book like Proverbs may reveal novel readings, but that is not its primary goal. Rather, examining the conceptual framework of metaphor helps scholars understand how the ancient Israelites and early Jews *thought*. Contrary to common opinion, the ancient Israelites and early Jews were not more concrete or simplistic thinkers than people in the modern West. Like us, ancient authors understood the world around them by physically interacting with their environment, and they used such interactions to understand more abstract experiences. They simply had different cultural assumptions about their perceptual experiences and thus used different metaphors to describe God, humanity, and the world. A conceptual analysis of biblical literature can reveal those cultural differences, while respecting the universal cognitive processes by which all people attribute meaning to their experiences.

Finally, a conceptual approach to biblical metaphor can help scholars understand how biblical traditions as a whole developed. When an author describes God as a father or Wisdom as a lover, he or she is using metaphor to express a more fundamental belief about human-divine relations. Metaphor, in other words, is a common vehicle by which biblical authors transmit

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[3] van Hecke, "Conceptual Blending," 229.

deeper religious convictions. Yet, metaphors are not static entities. They are intimately connected to embodied experiences and thus continue to develop subconsciously and be manipulated consciously within the conceptual system of the people who utilize them. Primary metaphors develop into imaginative metaphors. Imaginative metaphors develop into even more complex imaginative metaphors. Neither sits passively on a page waiting for an author to come along and borrow them. Rather, they grow and develop organically within the living conceptual systems of the people who utilize them. The same can be said of biblical traditions more generally. Biblical traditions do not sit idly on a page waiting for a later author to interpret them. Rather, they continue to develop and operate on a pre-linguistic level to structure the conceptual systems of people who transmit them. A conceptual approach to biblical metaphor can attune scholars to these organic developments and help them appreciate the deeper conceptual commitments such traditions represent.

"Taste and see." "Hear and grasp." "Stand and walk." Whatever the exact modalities drawn upon, such cognitive phrases reflect the same basic process. Embodied experiences become the foundation for religious experiences. And as long as people walk upon paths, hear words spoken, and manipulate object around them, perceptual experience will continue to structure their understanding of the environment and shape their abstract religious imaginations.

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