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Ombudsman Responsiveness and Political Trust

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Abstract

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Does the presence of a monitoring, representative institution increase a country's level of political trust? The Ombudsman is intended to serve as a type of intermediary between governmental institutions and a country's citizenry and also keep watch for issues of maladministration. I hypothesize that variations in responsiveness of the Ombudsman institution will lead to more or less generalized political trust. This project aims to explain responsiveness in the Ombudsman institution across countries and how it affects a country's level of political trust.

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I. Introduction and Background

Does the presence of a monitoring, representative institution increase a country's level of political trust? The Ombudsman institution originated in Europe and has spread across countries over the past two centuries. The Ombudsman is intended to serve as a type of intermediary between governmental institutions and a country's citizenry and also keep watch for issues of maladministration. The institution has experienced varying levels of successful adoption to governmental systems and functions differently depending on a country's adherence to the original Swedish model, along with other factors that may help or hinder the office's development.¹ In the second half of the twentieth century, European liberal democracies became more attracted to the idea of an Ombudsman because "in an era of 'big' government it seemed the ideal device for promoting accountable administration," and the institution was more widely adopted (Gregory and Giddings 2002, 7).

Governments liked the institution because it resolved disputes without having to resort to the law in an expensive and time-consuming way (Gregory and Giddings 2002, 7). Individuals liked the Ombudsman because in avoiding litigation, they were able to avoid a more aggressive legal atmosphere and utilize an institution that encouraged solutions rather than the rehashing of conflict (Gregory and Giddings 2002, 7). The Ombudsman accepts a wide array of complaints and individuals feel that although a complaint may not be of a legal nature, public authorities may still not behave appropriately and these issues required consideration and redress on behalf of the citizen (Gregory and Giddings 2002, 8).

¹ Sweden founded the Ombudsman institution in 1809. See Table 1 for variations in Ombudspersons across countries.

The historical evolution of the Ombudsman becomes clearer as one recognizes the growth in size and increasing complexity of governments and bureaucracies. As these organizations grew over time, their policies increasingly intervened in the lives of the citizens, inevitably causing friction, which resulted in complaints and the eventual need for redress (Gregory and Giddings, 2002).

The objectives of the Ombudsman institution have evolved over time. The Ombudsman was created as a way to ensure high quality public administration. Understanding the original intent in the creation of an Ombudsman goes hand-in-hand with the understanding of the Swedish origins of the institution. In Sweden, public officials are held more accountable to the law than to the Parliament or the Crown (Gregory and Giddings 2002, 18). As a result, the Ombudsman was focused more on the monitoring of other institutions to ensure that maladministration was addressed. As former Swedish Ombudsman Ulf Lundvik pointed out, the goal of the institution is to maintain a “good standard within public service” (Gregory and Giddings 2002, 19). In other places, such as New Zealand or the United Kingdom, the Ombudsman is intended to address grievances, and recognize ‘systemic’ faults within certain governing bodies (Gregory and Giddings 2002, 20). There is a variation in the focuses of the Ombudsman from country to country. Some offices of the Ombudsman are meant to be a more administrative, monitoring body, whereas other Ombudspersons were created to work for the citizens more directly. The institution’s role is to protect the citizenry’s right to good administration (Heede 2000, 24). This study attempts to demonstrate the positive effect that the Ombudsman has on a

country, through healthy administration and serving as a protector of individuals' rights and complaints.

II. Theory

a. Theories of Monitoring and Institutional Trust

I propose that monitoring, representative institutions increase a country's trust in governmental institutions. The Ombudsman institution is meant to serve as a representative to its citizenry and ultimately monitor other administrative institutions through investigations, the redress of grievances, and recommendations². Because of the premise it operates on and its close connection to the people, it is important to consider the success of the Ombudsman and the institution's potential for further applicability outside of Europe. Many studies have explored and evaluated different aspects of this study's research question and overarching theory. Yet, there exists little literature about the specific impact that the Ombudsman has on citizens' political perceptions³. This study will contribute to existing literature by evaluating the relationship between the specialized Ombudsman institution and the perception of political trust. With the growing disenchantment with governmental institutions and the widening gap between national and supranational institutions and the citizenry, it is valuable to highlight the positive contributions that this specialized institution makes to the people.

² For the purposes of this study, an institution refers to a collaboration of people, processes and procedures, which make up an administrative entity. Examples range from the Ombudsman to Parliaments to court systems. (Askvik, Jamil and Dahkal 2011, 418).

³ The current literature surrounding the Ombudsman institution is descriptive and outlines the historical context of the Ombudsman, the procedure of the Ombudsman and specific examples of complaints filed by citizens to different Ombudsman offices (Gregory and Giddings, 2002; Heede, 2000; Utley 1961).

Theories of monitoring have been addressed in relation to the topic of collective action and how “common-pool resources” are to be divided among a community in a way that benefits all. This form of monitoring refers to the benefits and conflicts that come with having a monitor, such as the Ombudsman. Elinor Ostrom (1990) outlines different examples of collective action problems and how monitors can play a role in the management of common-pool resources (generally environmental resources) in her book *Governing the Commons* (1990). While her work helps to make tangible the concept of having a monitor to look after a group of people, the Ombudsman as an example of a monitor and its role in monitoring other governmental bodies and fostering political trust is not addressed. Ostrom’s (1990) work can be applied to the Ombudsman, as the Ombudsman may be responsible for helping to manage the “resource” of governance.

Ostrom (1990) writes about an issue in California concerning the common resource problem of pumping water out of public water basins (111-142). The West Basin in California employed a watermaster whereas another Californian basin, the Raymond Basin, took a litigation route to seek out water rights (Ostrom 1990, 111-142). In this example, the watermaster of the West Basin shares many qualities with the Ombudsman. The watermaster “tries to be a neutral, monitoring agency...and does not need to initiate punitive actions against nonconformers” (Ostrom 1990, 125). Instead, the watermaster “inform[s] the active parties of any infringements and leave[s] affirmative action up to them” (Ostrom 1990, 126). The Ombudsman is a neutral office that monitors the government for signs of maladministration and issues recommendations, not legal action, upon uncovering poor governance. Ostrom (1990) explains that no water pumper can

“expect to overextract without everyone else learning about any noncompliance” (126).

This serves as a deterrent against poor behavior and promotes trust amongst the waterpumpers, as they expect that the watermaster is monitoring the water resource.

I argue that good governance is a commons issue. The Ombudsman is meant to monitor the government on the citizenry's behalf and ensure that the national government is performing its job properly. A country strives to have a strong government in place, yet good governance is still hard to achieve, as evidenced by citizens' disenchantment with politics and issues of maladministration. Strong monitors such as the Ombudsman help to properly manage the commons issue of good governance. I equate the Ombudsman to the watermaster because the Ombudsman makes problems of maladministration (or overpumping of the water basin in the case of Ostrom's work) public. Through public reports of maladministration and issuing recommendations, the Ombudsman helps to counteract and monitor future maladministration. The monitor promotes trust in the government because the citizenry is assured of the fact that the government is being watched and good governance is in place. If the Ombudsman makes a useful contribution to the people, other governments may want to adopt this institution to better support the citizenry and also promote stronger and more accountable administrative practices.

I use the term political trust to refer to trust in public governing institutions. In other terms, political trust “refers to the faith people have in their government” (Citrin and Muste 1999, 465). Because a responsive, monitoring Ombudsman is meant to address citizens' complaints through the investigation into other governing institutions, I anticipate that a country trusts the Ombudsman, which results in an increase in generalized trust in

governing institutions. Because political trust captures “the citizenry’s attitudinal underpinnings for the effectiveness of government,” I think that the evaluation of different Ombudsman offices will further the study of the source of political trust across countries⁴.

It is necessary to highlight that this study is not about having or not having an Ombudsman and how the presence of this institution can serve as a sole agent of change in a country’s perceptions. This study is about how variations in an Ombudsman institution affect a country’s perceptions of political trust. This study will evaluate theories about the value of institutions and how variations in an Ombudsman’s responsiveness relate to levels of political trust. Andrain and Smith (2006) define confidence in institutions as an attitude of trust and the positive evaluation of an institution (Andrain and Smith 2006, 122, 141). They argue that institutions that adopt a “representative, inclusive, responsive and accountable process,” will experience greater citizen support (Andrain and Smith 2006, 20). Andrain and Smith (2006) point to a political exchange model to explain why citizens trust institutions and what it is about institutions that allows citizens to secure benefits and a greater sense of trust in the political process (Andrain and Smith 2006, 3). The political

⁴ It is important to highlight that this study applies only to institutions within democratic regimes, because the democratic context shapes citizens’ perceptions of government (Jamal and Nooruddin 2010, 46). Understanding the role of democracy is important in evaluating the Ombudsman because this institution operates in a democratic context. Relatively accustomed to a more active civic society, citizens from democratic countries with an Ombudsman are more likely to trust an institution whose main function is to serve the people, compared with those who come from non-democratic contexts or have had experiences with unresponsive institutions. Furthermore, citizens who feel that their interests are being looked after in stable, democratic institutions feel a higher sense of generalized trust in public institutions, as compared to those who feel their interests are being looked after in unstable or non-democratic institutions (Torney-Purta, Barber, Richardson 2004, 380).

exchange model is the theory that any institution that acts in a trustworthy way and promotes civic virtue will in exchange receive citizens' trust in the political process (3).

While *Political Democracy, Trust, and Social Justice* does not directly mention the Ombudsman institution, this theory can be adapted to the study of the Ombudsman, as I argue that the Ombudsman is a monitoring, representative, inclusive, responsive and accountable institution, which leads to a country's level of political trust.

In *Citizens and the State* (1995), Listhaug and Wiberg similarly define confidence in an institution as support and trust in an institution (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995, 299). They expect that if the institution is effective and executes the expected procedures, then this relationship will yield greater trust in the institution (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995, 302). Listhaug and Wiberg's (1995) theory of confidence in institutions is thus applicable, because they find confidence synonymous with trust when the institution carries out tasks that it is designed to address. The Ombudsman was designed to address citizens' grievances and I argue that this institution generates political trust in a country because of the extent to which it performs this function. The scholarly works' definition of confidence as it relates to institutions addresses the same concepts of trust that my study evaluates because confidence is a measure of support and citizens' trust (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995, 302; Andrain and Smith 2006, 20).

Further exploring the theory of institutional trust, Sztompka (1999) explains that trust in institutions occurs as a result of procedure (44). He points to "procedural trust," which is based on the belief that if the individual follows institutional procedure, he or she will experience a fair outcome (Sztompka 199, 44). This definition of procedural trust is

relevant to the study of the Ombudsman because according to Sztompka (1999), the individual believes that ultimately the institution will execute the actions expected of it and trusts that issues will be dealt with according to planned. Sztompka's (1999) casual mechanism between trust and an institution is linked to the execution of the expected procedure but he still is able to confirm that the relationship exists (41-45).⁵ The Nepalese study performed in 2011 by Askvik, Jamil and Dahkal also employs Sztompka's theory of institutional trust. The article is similar to the study of the Ombudsman as Askvik, Jamil and Dahkal (2011) relate the performance of public institutions to citizens' positive perceptions (430). Both the Nepalese governmental institutions and the Ombudsman follow institutional procedures, which fosters political trust (Askvik, Jamil and Dahkal 2011, 418; Heede 2000, 263). Performance is defined through measures such as democracy development, policy performance, politicians and personal well-being (Askvik, Jamil and Dahkal 2011, 430). The conclusions of the Nepalese study show that citizens' trust depends on institutional performance (Askvik, Jamil and Dahkal 2011, 430). This conclusion is applicable to the study of the Ombudsman because the Ombudsman institution's function is to perform for the citizens, demonstrating a high level of political trust based on the findings in the Nepalese study (Askvik, Jamil and Dahkal 2011, 430).

Applying the ideas of procedural trust to the Ombudsman, citizens trust institutions that fulfill expectations and follow procedure. In contrast, citizens of a country are less trusting of institutions that do not fulfill expectations and follow procedure. The purpose

⁵ Sztompka uses the Ombudsman as an example of an advanced institution that holds a "high position in the trust hierarchy" (Sztompka 1999, 44).

of the Ombudsman is to listen to citizens whose grievances have previously been ignored and help individuals address these grievances. The Ombudsman then follows a series of procedures, where the Ombudsman processes the complaint, begins an investigation, and issues a recommendation. The Ombudsman fosters procedural trust because the institution follows a specified procedure, which is directed to the benefit of the citizen and helps to establish a precedent of Ombudsman responsiveness. Likewise, the Ombudsman is designed to make other governmental institutions follow procedures and fulfill expectations.

Similarly, Gunnarson (2008) subscribes to the notion of political trust as and an effect of responsive governmental performance and procedure. Institutions can build trust by the establishment of “fair procedures...credible courts, and the involvement of citizens in policy-making” (Gunnarson 2008, 24). Gunnarson (2008) explains how responsive institutional measures lead to higher levels of trust in the citizenry. Yet, Gunnarson (2008) ultimately is interested in social factors that help to influence the public’s trust in institutions and integrates theories of social capital to better understand the relationship between institutions and trust. This study aims to find an institutional explanation for a country’s level of political trust. Gunnarson (2008) opens up the discussion of institutional trust to include factors that may affect the individual such as school influences, education, families’ socio-cultural level, neighborhood environment, and economic disadvantage (26-33). While I am not interested in the role of social factors as they influence a country’s political trust, these factors are important to consider when evaluating which control variables may have an effect in the causal relationship between a responsive Ombudsman

institution that follows a certain set of procedures and a country's level of political trust. The relationship between the Ombudsman and the concept of political trust and other potential factors that may affect this relationship can be visualized through the following schema:

[Figure 1 about here]

b. Institutional Responsiveness Theory

Because I want to gauge variation in the quality of the Ombudsman's services, I will evaluate different Ombudsman institutions' levels of responsiveness. I expect that more responsive Ombudsman offices will increase a country's level of political trust more than less responsive ones. This expectation represents the key co-variation in my study of the Ombudsman. Responsiveness can be defined as an institution's reactivity to requests made by citizens (Craig 1979, 228). It is therefore necessary to evaluate theories of the responsiveness of institutions and how responsiveness serves as a potential cause of political trust. Weber (1975) defines political responsiveness as the condition in which institutions "take some form of action consistent with the demands for actions by individuals and groups." (Weber 1975, 193). Both Craig's (1979) and Weber's (1975) definitions of institutional responsiveness evaluate an institution's action taken or procedures and structure adopted. This definition is applicable to the study of the Ombudsman because the Ombudsman's role, as mentioned earlier, is to take action (investigate and issue recommendations) based on the demands (complaints) of individuals.

Baum (2011) identified the relationship between institutional responsiveness and trust by studying changing Korean policy. His research is applicable to the Ombudsman because Korea has adopted administrative procedure acts (APAs) to better respond to the demands and interests of the Korean citizenry (Baum 2011, 18). The APAs aim to support those with social welfare issues and allow for a more transparent bureaucracy just as the Ombudsman addresses those with social justice issues (Baum 2011, 18, 121; Utley 1961, 147-158). The passage of these new policies is representative of Korean institutional attempts to better address the citizen's needs (Baum 2011, 121). Baum finds that the APAs (representative of institutional responsiveness) lead to higher levels of confidence and public trust in democratic institutions (Baum 2011, 118-120, 144-145). Like Baum (2011), Craig (1979) also contributed to institutional responsiveness theory. Craig (1979) defined institutional responsiveness as "the belief that authorities will be responsive to the influence attempts of the citizens generally," and utilized questions on an American national election survey to operationalize the relationship between trust and institutional responsiveness (230-236). His findings show a positive relationship between trust and institutional responsiveness (230, 236).

The theories presented by Baum (2011) and Craig (1979) explain the relationship that exists between the increase of political trust as a result of a responsive institution. This theory is useful for the study of the Ombudsman as I expect that Ombudsman offices that are more responsive will lead to increased political trust in a country. Using the definition of responsiveness mentioned above (institutional responsiveness evaluates an institution's action taken or procedures and structure adopted as a result of the citizenry's

interest and influence) I will evaluate the varying levels of responsiveness in different Ombudsman offices.

Despite theories about the positive effects of institutions and institutional responsiveness on a country's sense of political trust, some scholarly works have discounted the positive effects of institutions. These works instead point to falling levels of citizens' trust in institutions as a result of failing institutions⁶. Reiselbach (1975) explains the citizen's disillusionment with the political process as a total lack of responsiveness on the institutions' part (Reiselbach 1975, 4). As institutional performance declined, citizens' trust in government declined as well (Andrain and Smith 2006, ix). Theory surrounding the decline of trust in institutions points to economic issues such as low growth rates and high unemployment, as a result of institutional failure (Andrain and Smith 2006, ix). Because institutions were unresponsive to citizen's demands, issues of social justice and unaccountability rose (Andrain and Smith 2006, ix). While theories of the unresponsive institution are relevant to economic and administrative failures, I argue that certain Ombudsman institutions are more responsive, whereas other Ombudspersons are less responsive. The Ombudsman's sole function is to answer to the demands of citizens while monitoring administrative errors, confirming that there still exist some institutions that are meant to help the citizenry.

I propose that because of the Ombudsman's expansive sphere of authority and concurrent accessibility to the people, it is able to attain a high level of trust in itself and

⁶ Likewise, as addressed in the theory above, efficient and responsive institutions, in addressing citizen problems lead to greater trust.

initiate a change in a country's political perceptions. Despite my argument, some have argued that trust leads to better institutions (Uslaner 2003, 172-3). I acknowledge the potential for endogeneity but argue that the causal arrow goes from Ombudsman responsiveness to a change in political perceptions. The study of political science assumes that sudden changes produce attitudinal difference, because theory has shown this causal pattern. Ostrom (1990) explains that institutional change "dramatically change[s] the incentives and behaviors of participants and the resulting outcomes" (141). A change in the performance of the Ombudsman represents institutional change, which leads to a change in the behaviors and attitudes of a country's citizenry.

III. The Ombudsman Institution

The office of the Ombudsman originated in nineteenth-century Sweden, where it was meant to ensure that administrative authorities and courts complied with the law. The institution's function and definition are rooted in the word itself: "the Swedish word 'ombud' refers to someone who acts as the agent, proxy, spokesman or authorized representative of another person" (Gregory and Giddings 2002, 6). Despite the success and endurance of the Ombudsman in Sweden and later in other Scandinavian countries, diffusion of the Ombudsman as an institution into other regions did not come until 1962 in New Zealand⁷. Gregory and Giddings (2002) highlight New Zealand's establishment of the institution because it represented the institution's introduction into the English-speaking world (6). After New Zealand adopted the Ombudsman, the institution came to be established throughout the European nations.

⁷ Finland adopted an Ombudsman in 1919. Denmark adopted the 'Ombudsmand' in 1954. Norway established an Ombudsman in 1962. (Gregory and Giddings 2002, 5)

[Table 1 about here]

The result of the institution's work is the redress of grievances and the investigation of maladministration. The Ombudsman's process begins when the individual files a complaint, initiating the Ombudsman's investigation. In the case where the Ombudsman only finds an abstract or minimal error in another institution's administration, a recommendation is made without criticism as a way to motivate future improvements (Heede 2000, 40). When a tangible error is found (such as a case where the investigation shows that an official committed a legal error), the Ombudsman will make a criticism of the investigated institution, which generally implies that the original decision made by the offending institution should be withdrawn (Heede 2000, 40). The Ombudsman generally is part of a country's Parliament. Depending on a country's law, the Ombudsman is appointed and may be removed by Parliament or an independent body. While the Ombudsman is associated with Parliament, the Ombudsman is viewed as an independent body whose goal is to address complainants and monitor for signs of maladministration.

The Ombudsman has a representative quality because of the types of functions it performs. Because it addresses grievances that one may have with another institution, I expect that the Ombudsman is able to mitigate the alienation that citizens may feel towards governmental institutions. If an institution's sole purpose is to address grievances with other institutions of the same national or supranational level, that institution may be able to lessen both the sense of disconnect and intimidation felt towards other governmental institutions. Secondly, the Ombudsman tradition is meant to give the individual the ability

to address grievances of a social welfare nature (Utley 1961, 147-158). Because of the general nature of the grievances that the Ombudsman addresses, I assume that the institution is viewed as one that operates for the people, which increases the Ombudsman's representative quality.

IV. Dependent Variable

Political trust is a way to understand how a country, representative of the citizens' perceptions as a whole, feels about public governing institutions. Political trust can be considered to be a political attitude, but specifically taps into the "general expectations people have about the quality of the product that the political system produces" (Gamson 1971, 41). In theory, because the Ombudsman institution fosters a more personal connection between a country's citizenry and governing institutions, my study defines trust as an attitudinal variable measuring the relationship to institutions. It is valuable to understand that political trust can measure both how a citizen feels about the Ombudsman and how a citizen feels about governing institutions more generally. Put in a way that is useful to my study, Gamson (1971) summarizes trust as a "diffuse support which forms a reservoir of favorable attitudes" (45).

The survey data used to measure my dependent variable comes from the European Social Survey. The data that I plan to use is from Phase I-V, which was conducted in waves in 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010. I include multiple European Social Surveys as a way to study variations in a country's political trust, or generalized trust towards governing institutions. I am interested in studying the patterns in political trust across different

countries (paired with different years, as my unit of analysis indicates) with Ombudspersons. The European Social Survey provides attitudinal responses from the countries that have Ombudspersons⁸. I aggregated the individual responses collected from the survey data as a way to keep my dependent variables on the same unit of analysis as my independent variable. I aggregated the surveys by finding the averages of the individual responses to the survey questions. I then used these means as a representation of a country's perception of concepts of trust in governing institutions and other key variables.

V. Independent Variable

Responsiveness of the Ombudsman institution will serve as the primary independent variable. As reviewed in the literature above, responsiveness in institutions can lead to variations in political trust. A responsive institution can be understood as having an efficient way to address citizens' problems, being effective in its execution of expectations, being free from influence which in turn allows the institution to follow its expected set of procedures, and having the resources and capabilities to handle issues in a fair and transparent way.

VI. Hypothesis

I hypothesize that variations in responsiveness of the Ombudsman institution will lead to more or less generalized political trust. I expect that more responsive Ombudsman

⁸ Due to the constraints of the survey data available, all countries included in the data have Ombudspersons. Nevertheless, certain countries have a very ineffective or low-grade Ombudsman according to the Global Integrity Report and Sustainable Governance Indicator values, as demonstrated in Table 1. Therefore, I argue that an Ombudsman institution that is very weak or subject to heavy political interference is equivalent to a country having no Ombudsman at all, as this Ombudsman does not have the flexibility nor the resources to address citizens' complaints.

institutions will lead to more trust in governing institutions, whereas less responsive Ombudsman institutions will lead to lower individual levels of trust.

H₀= varying levels of Ombudsman responsiveness lead to no change in a country's level of political trust

H₁= more responsive Ombudsman institutions lead to a country's increased levels of political trust

H₂= less responsive Ombudsman institutions lead to a country's decreased levels of political trust

VII. Conceptualization/Operationalization

a. Dependent Variable

The European Social Survey asks individuals if they trust certain institutions, including Parliament and politicians, on a scale of 0 (no trust at all) to 10 (complete trust). The survey question asks the respondent to "please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions...[country]'s parliament? ...the legal system? ...politicians?" The way that the questions are worded allow the respondent to view Parliament and the politicians involved in Parliament as institutions, which is important because my study works to identify and evaluate the relationship that the individual has with the institution. This survey data is a strong measurement of the concept of political trust because the Parliament and politicians represent the government as a whole, especially in countries that have a parliamentary system. The survey question is a valid

measure of trust because the question is transparent and clearly identifies what it is the question is meant to ask, making it easier for the respondent to answer accurately.⁹

After further reviewing the potential relationship between the Ombudsman and the concept of political trust, I chose to single out the variable “trust in Parliament” and highlight it as my key dependent variable for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Ombudsman is an office that comes from the parliamentary body. The relationship between variation in the responsiveness of the Ombudsman and political trust is best studied by focusing on a variable that encompasses the Ombudsman as a way to hone in on a potentially causal relationship. Furthermore, the Parliament variable indicates a survey questions gauging trust in a governing body, whereas the politician variable indicates the trust level in a single partisan. The term politician carries heavy electoral and party-oriented baggage, which is not what this project is aiming to better understand. I also chose to exclude the variable “trust in legal system” because this variable may include issues of judicial fairness.

I decided to not average all of these responses into one value because this value would not be indicative of institutional trust as a whole but rather would be averaged measures of each of the survey questions combined into one score. Furthermore, the inclusion of the politician and legal system variables would inevitably include the issues

⁹ I understand the potential for this study to commit an ecological fallacy. Although I may have lost information by aggregating the data, I had to for methodological reasons. No survey data exists that asks respondents about their views towards a national Ombudsman. Ombudspersons are not on the individual-level of analysis and therefore I chose to use a country-level unit of analysis, as one must analyze data at the lowest level. Furthermore, this is a hypothesis-testing paper. This project is not meant to explain the phenomenon of political trust, but rather test a specific relationship. Therefore, while some information may have been lost in aggregating the data, I argue that I am still able to focus on the key relationship.

that were mentioned above (biases towards the courts, political party focus, politicians' negative election motives). "Trust in Parliament" is more indicative of the results of the policies an institution sets forth and the decisions an office makes once in power, which makes this variable a better dependent variable than other potential dependent variables. For these reasons, the variable "trust in Parliament" will be the key variable in question and is meant to operationalize the concept of political trust.

b. Independent Variable

The Global Integrity is an organization that issues reports, which evaluate nations' governance as it relates to corruption and transparency. The Global Integrity Report, a project under the organization Global Integrity, uses local researchers, journalists and in-country experts to assign values to various measures of responsiveness of the Ombudsman institution in different countries. The Global Integrity Index offers data about the varying levels of responsiveness of the Ombudsman institution across countries, which will serve as the key independent variable. The report assigns values to measurements such as whether or not an Ombudsman can initiate investigations on its own, if the Ombudsman is protected from political interference, the regularity of funding that the Ombudsman receives, if the Ombudsman may issue public reports, the Ombudsman's imposing of penalties, the Ombudsman's action within a reasonable time frame after the filing of a complaint, and the government's acting on the findings of the Ombudsman. These values are then combined and averaged by the Global Integrity Report and produce a value demonstrating how effective the Ombudsman is in each country. Each country is placed on a scale from 0 to 100, representing how responsive or effective the Ombudsman is. These

values are determined by country-specific experts and are readily available in the Global Integrity Index from 2004-2010¹⁰. The Global Integrity Report values measure responsiveness and the quality of performance, because the values encompass the Ombudsman's reactivity to a citizen's complaint and the capacity that the institution has to address grievances.

The Sustainable Governance Indicators provides an alternative measure of my independent variable. The Sustainable Governance Indicators assign values to the effectiveness of an Ombudsman from 2009 and 2011. The Sustainable Governance Indicators utilized two experts per country studied, coupled with a regional coordinator and the Sustainable Governance Indicator Board to avoid biases in assigning values to variables. This data source assigns values to the Ombudsman based on how effective the office is, breaking the scoring into four parts¹¹ on a 10-1 scale. The variation in values assigned to the countries' Ombudsman offices shows the variation in responsiveness that I want to study.

¹⁰ Theories of institutions, such as historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism indicate that institutions are sticky, in that they do not experience much change over time. Theories of institutional change accept that "the idea of persistence of some kind is virtually built in to the very definition of an institution" (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 4). Mahoney and Thelen (2010) present a theory of gradual institutional change, with theorists from all schools of institutionalism in mind, as a way to understand the enduring nature of institutions (31-32). Because institutions do not change over a relatively short period of time, I have chosen to use data for my dependent variables from 2002-2011, and use data for my independent variable from 2004-2011 for the sake of increasing the numbers of observations and variation in my data.

¹¹ (10-9= the legislature has an effective ombuds office, 8-6= the advocacy role of the legislature's ombuds office is somewhat limited, 5-3= the advocacy role of the legislature's ombuds office is considerably limited, 2-1 the legislature does not have an ombuds office)

As illustrated in the results section, the two datasets seem to measure the concept of Ombudsman responsiveness differently. I will focus on France as an example of the discrepancy in the two differing datasets. On taking a closer look in the disparate values assigned to the responsiveness of the Ombudsman, or the Mediator of the French Republic, it became clear that one data source had not measured Ombudsman responsiveness in a representative way. The French Ombudsman does not operate in a way that is "representative of what the Ombudsman traditionally stands for nor does it function in an effective way, which would indicate that France should receive a lesser value for the responsiveness of its Ombudsman. For example, the French Ombudsman has nearly 300 delegates who represent him on the local level. Furthermore, the delegates deal with about 90% of all cases that are filed to the Ombudsman. Therefore, the Ombudsman does not serve as a representative figure to the citizenry and is less a unified institution than a system of parliamentary actors who manage the Ombudsman's cases. As opposed to a stronger Ombudsman, such as the Spanish Ombudsman, the 'Defensor del Pueblo', whose website very clearly delineates the Ombudsman procedures and expectations. Furthermore, the Spanish Ombudsman has a page designated as a type of biography about the Ombudsman, which would makes clear the fact that the Ombudsman is a representative for the people.

In evaluating the responsiveness of the French Ombudsman, the two datasets assigned values to the institution in different ways. The Global Integrity Report scored the effectiveness of the Ombudsman with a 73, on a scale of 0-100. The Sustainable Governance

Indicator scored the French Ombudsman with a 2¹², on a 0-10 scale. The fact that the scores are so different in itself serves as a red flag, as other countries were assigned with such different scores as well¹³.

VIII. Research Design

This project aims to explain responsiveness in the Ombudsman institution across countries and how it affects a country's level of political trust. The unit of analysis is the country, years¹⁴ from each case I will study. The study of aggregate data allows this project to clearly identify the relationship that takes place between a country's institutions, including the Ombudsman, and the representation of a country's citizens' attitudinal trends. I will use survey data from each country to understand the average level of individual trust as they relate to their Ombudsman. I seek to explain whether varying levels of responsiveness on the Ombudsman's part affects a country's levels of political trust. Aggregated individual responses from survey data effectively allow me to explore this relationship.

I control for national-level factors that could influence the results through my selection of countries. The countries have been selected based on the common use of a

¹² These scores are the most recent scores provided by the Global Integrity Report and the Sustainable Governance Indicator data. The 73 score is from 2007, the 2 from the Sustainable Governance Indicator is from 2011.

¹³ See Portugal in Table 1.

¹⁴ Due to a discrepancy in years in the datasets, as explained on page 20, the unit of analysis must be country, years. While this is an unusual unit of analysis, it is a more representative description of the level of analysis. There are not many instances when the years of the datasets are in common. I did not want to limit the number of data points available for analysis and thus chose to expand my analysis to encompass instances where the data had a discrepancy in years.

parliamentary system and a democratic context. By selecting countries based on these characteristics, I am able to eliminate other factors that may influence levels of political trust as they relate to the presence and responsiveness of the Ombudsman (such as development differences, differences in democratic or non-democratic governing style). I selected the countries that I did by choosing to use the European Social Survey, which surveys from countries that are predominantly democratic and parliamentary-based. I include 14 countries in the Global Integrity dataset and 18 countries in the Sustainable Governance Indicator dataset to get variation in both the survey data and the Ombudsman institutional quality¹⁵.

When evaluating the relationship between the responsiveness of the Ombudsman and political trust, I group the control variables into categories that I believe may be influential. These categories will include attitude, behavior, education, sociology and economic control variables. The category of attitudinal control variables will include variables gauging citizens' satisfaction with the national government, interest in politics, feelings about whether or not politics is too complicated to understand and general levels of social trust. Satisfaction with the government and social trust levels have been found to be both synonymous to and a direct cause of political trust (Citrin and Muste 1999, 490-

¹⁵ Because of a difference in the years available between the two independent variable datasets, I chose to create two separate datasets, each merged with the European Social Survey data. The Global Integrity Report and European Social Survey dataset includes the countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine. The Sustainable Governance Indicators and European Social Survey dataset includes the countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom.

481). For this reason, I wanted to control for these attitudinal variables. I chose to also include the variables of interest in politics and politics being too complicated to understand because I suspect that these variables may have an influence on political trust. Behavior control variables include one's voting participation and contact with a politician or government official in the last year. Behavior control variables were included because trust and political participation have been correlated in past studies and, as Campbell, Gurin and Miller found, political trust and political participation are correlated and I want to control for this potentially spurious relationship (Muller and Jukam 1977, 482; Miller 1974, 482; Campbell, Gurin and Miller 1954, 425). The attitudinal and behavior control variables come from the European Social Survey and I aggregated these control variables to maintain a country-level unit of analysis.

I control for education by using a control variable for attainment of a tertiary level of education. Citrin and Muste (1999) have found that education has a strong positive relationship to feelings of confidence in governing institutions (473). Similarly, Mason, House and Martin (1985) used education as a main demographic category in describing a country's probability of having trust in government (485). I will also introduce a sociological variable, gauging a country's parliamentary voting patterns in support of a socialist or communist oriented party. This variable, known as "leftvote," will be included because those countries that have a larger percentage of votes awarded to a left-wing party tend to have more trust in the legislature, which is where the Ombudsman office comes from (Citrin and Muste 1999, 473). Finally, I include two variables measuring the economic state of the countries studied. "WDIv1" measures a country's adjusted net

national income and “WDIv3” is a measure of GDP per capita. I included economic control variables because I expect that the country’s GDP per capita may influence a member of a country to trust that the governing institutions are managing and distributing funds properly.

I expect to find a positive relationship between a more responsive Ombudsman and higher levels of trust. I do expect that a country’s trust will first be placed in the national Ombudsman, which will in turn increase a country’s sense of political trust. I attempt to identify this relationship through my testing of my hypothesis, gauging how the responsiveness of the Ombudsman institution that follows a certain set of procedures affects political trust. Because the Ombudsman is meant to promote trustworthy institutions and allow citizens to voice their complaints, I expect that an increase in political trust would originate in the responsiveness of the Ombudsman. I will ensure that the hypothesis is falsifiable by also examining the effects of a less responsive Ombudsman on levels of political trust.

IX. Data Analysis and Results

I chose to use two separate datasets, as referenced above, as a way to verify the results and have a way to check the validity of my data sources. Because of the differences in the values assigned to the Ombudsman, the two datasets yielded results that showed either a statistically significant relationship or no relationship. I propose that these opposing relationships occurred for a number of reasons, which I will elaborate on further below. By aggregating the dependent variable data from the European Social Survey, I was able to see the means of countries’ levels of political trust and draw conclusions about the

condition of political trust. The means of the variable “prltrst” (trust in Parliament, or the operationalization of political trust) varied from 1.5 to 7, on a 0-10 scale. Countries such as Hungary, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Latvia have consistently low level of trust, whereas Turkey and Denmark had high levels of trust. Nevertheless, the majority of countries included in this study had a trust value of 3-5. I suspect that this overall trend occurred over time because individuals as a whole feel that institutions are failing, as cited previously, and trust in governing bodies is decreasing. Based on the Figure 2, the generally low levels of political trust become evident.

[Figure 2 about here]

The line of best fit demonstrates the bivariate relationship that is occurring between the two key variables. The relationship is negative and shows that there is not a strong correlation between the two variables. As an Ombudsman becomes more effective, a country’s level of trust decreases. The mean values for political trust are very similar across years, making an argument for a form of test-retest evidence. As there is stability in the respondents’ answers, I can confirm that the responses about political trust are enduring attitudes.

The Sustainable Governance Indicator and European Social Survey dataset did not yield similar results. Upon analyzing the bivariate relationship between the two key variables of the Sustainable Governance Indicators dataset, there seemed to be a problem of heteroskedasticity. I then broke up the scatterplots into two separate ones to better

identify the relationships occurring between political trust and countries with less responsive Ombudspersons and political trust and countries with more responsive Ombudspersons. The scatterplots were determined by halving the scale of the scoring of

[Figure 3 about here]

the Ombudsman (one scatterplot with an x-axis of 0-5 and another scatterplot with an x-axis of 5-10). Figure 2 shows the relationship between countries with less responsive Ombudspersons and political trust. The downward slope of the line of best fit is indicative of the fact that as an Ombudsman becomes more responsive, political trust decreases. The reason that countries such as France (FR) and Switzerland (CH) have such unresponsive Ombudspersons is because the institution only receives complaints after all other members of Parliament have attempted to address a complaint or there is not an Ombudsman on the federal level but there are Ombudspersons on state level.

The potential for heteroskedasticity arose with countries that have a more responsive Ombudsman when all of the countries were grouped together in one scatterplot. As the Ombudspersons became more responsive, it became harder to predict what was going on. When I focused on the more responsive Ombudsman alone, the issue of heteroskedasticity diminished and a clearer relationship is more easily identified. Different from the Figure 2, Figure 3 shows a clearly positive relationship. The graph visually demonstrates the relationship that I had initially anticipated: as an Ombudsman becomes more responsive, a country's levels of political trust increase. The reason that the

relationship changes in directionality between scatterplots is because a highly responsive Ombudsman influences a country's levels of political trust positively. Based on the figures above, it seems that a country that has a less responsive or moderately responsive Ombudsman affects the country's political trust levels in a negative way.

[Figure 4 about here]

After analyzing the bivariate relationship, between political trust and Ombudsman responsiveness, I introduced different types of control variables. The tables below are representative of regression analyses performed with the Global Integrity Report and Sustainable Governance Indicator datasets.

[Table 2 about here]

The Global Integrity Report dataset yielded statistically significant results for each model created. Furthermore, the results were statistically significant at the .05 level or better, showing that there is a strong negative relationship between political trust and Ombudsman responsiveness. These results are contradictory to the relationship that I initially hypothesized about. Statistically significant results contradictory to the hypothesis could have occurred for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is possible that the Ombudsman has a negative effect on levels of political trust. Despite the fact that the Ombudsman operates for the citizenry as a function of its office, the Ombudsman is an institution under a

country's parliamentary branch. Therefore, the Ombudsman could foster political distrust because it may represent failing institutions as a whole even though in fact the Ombudsman works to counteract institutional maladministration. On the other hand, it is possible that the countries available from the two merged datasets could have generally low levels of political trust, in accordance with responsive Ombudspersons. There could also be a problem with the Global Integrity Report data itself. I will elaborate on the credibility of the data source in the conclusion section.

Table 2 demonstrates that the relationship previously seen between political trust and Ombudsman responsiveness may not necessarily hold true. The Sustainable Governance Indicators dataset shows a non-statistically significant relationship. Depending on which combination of controls is introduced, the beta coefficient shows an either positive or negative relationship. The reason for this inconsistency makes more sense after discussing the control variables introduced. Model 2 for both tables shows the key relationship, controlled with attitudinal variables. I performed a correlation matrix of "trust in Parliament" and each of the attitudinal controls and the correlation values were relatively high, with "satisfaction in government" having a .83 correlation value. This is not surprising considering that political trust is a subjective attitude as well and would be associated with other attitudinal perceptions¹⁶. Therefore, it also makes sense that in both tables at least one of the attitudinal variables is statistically significant.

¹⁶ Figure 1 initially demonstrated the potential for multicollinearity. I acknowledge that this may be a problem in my data and that it may affect the key relationship. Because multicollinearity may have an influence, I utilized the controls in a way that helps to overcome the possibility of a multicollinear relationship.

[Table 3 about here]

After identifying the relationship that political trust has with attitudinal variables, I chose to not use these variables after Model 3. I wanted to include the attitude control variables because I thought that they may affect the key relationship. After seeing their effects, I realize that they may not be as meaningful controls because they could elicit similar reactions to questions gauging trust levels from survey respondents. Model 4 is a key model, as it presents the control variables that I thought would be important in the hypothesized relationship and were also variables that other scholarly works had controlled for when studying the concept of political trust (Citrin and Muste 1999, 473; Mason, House and Martin 1985, 485; Citrin and Muste 1999, 473).

The use of two separate datasets that measure the same independent variable offers an interesting opportunity for comparative analysis. In evaluating the directionality of the key bivariate relationship, it is interesting to emphasize that the Global Integrity Report dataset produced a negative relationship and the Sustainable Governance Indicator dataset yielded a positive one. This difference highlights a likely problem of conceptualization or operationalization in the two datasets. In looking further into this relationship, the Sustainable Governance Indicator dataset had a negative relationship when the attitudinal control variables were introduced (Models 2 and 3). Models 2 and 3 in the Global Integrity Report dataset had statistically significant relationships between political trust and Ombudsman responsiveness, with the attitudinal control variables included. This result may indicate that attitudinal control variables distort the key relationship, creating a

negative relationship between political trust and Ombudsman responsiveness or strengthening the negative relationship.

In analyzing which control variables were statistically significant and how this significance may or may not influence levels of political trust, it is important to note the variations across datasets. The results indicate that economic variables do not influence levels of political trust. Furthermore, Models 4, 5 and 6 in both tables show that a country's adjusted net income has a negative relationship on political trust. I suspect that this directionality exists because as a country increase its income, the country's citizenry potentially become more suspicious of a country's handling of funds. It is also interesting to note how the control variable "leftvote" functions in relation to the key relationship between political trust and Ombudsman responsiveness. Table 2 shows that as a country has a higher vote percentage for socialist or communist parties, political trust increases. Table 3 shows that as a country has a higher vote percentage for socialist or communist parties, political trust goes down. This discrepancy in datasets and lack of statistical significance could be demonstrative of the fact that a more left-leaning country may not play a role in the relationship between the Ombudsman and political trust. That is to say, countries whose citizens vote for communist or socialist parties do not find that the levels of political trust are affected by Ombudsman responsiveness.

X. Conclusions

The differences in results in the two datasets created calls for a focus on the data sources used for the independent variable, Ombudsman responsiveness. As previously

mentioned, scholars have written about the Ombudsman in a mostly descriptive way. This previous lack of focus on a causal relationship is reflected in the data available about the Ombudsman. I found Ombudsman data to be sparse and therefore also found the datasets used in this study to be limited. As a result, I chose to use two different datasets to verify the results and validate the measures used for the independent variable. In understanding the different results obtained, it is important to focus on the unit of analysis directly and look at the countries' Ombudspersons chosen for this study.¹⁷ My study is therefore an important step in highlighting the lack of data available about the Ombudsman and pointing out the limitations of the data that is available about this institution.

Upon further research, it becomes clear that the Global Integrity Report may not handle the Ombudsman effectiveness scoring in a way that is completely representative of the country's cases. This is not to imply that the Global Integrity Report is not to be understood as a valuable resource, but rather suggests that there may exist better indicators of a country's Ombudsman's responsiveness. This suggestion calls into question the potential future use of the Global Integrity Report and also strengthens the credibility behind the Sustainable Governance Indicator as a reliable data source. Therefore, the divergence in directionality and statistical significance leads me to doubt the Global Integrity Report results and rely more heavily on the Sustainable Governance Indicator as a stronger source. I find the Sustainable Governance Indicator dataset to be better because it is uniform with the information presented in Table 1. The Sustainable Governance Indicator seems to be more sensitive to the intended Ombudsman model and did not

¹⁷ See Table 1.

overlook countries' weaknesses in the Ombudsman office (such as France's Ombudsman, explained in detail previously). This finding serves as an implication for this project and for future projects that may be interested in seeking to understand a relationship that exists between countries' Ombudspersons and a political perception. Therefore, the comparison of available datasets is the true value added by this project.

This point serves as a channel into the discussion about ideas for further research. In studying the effects of the Ombudsman, it would be more meaningful to study a political perception using individual level data. Just as this study may have benefitted from the use of individual level data, I think that a future study would benefit from using a dataset that includes survey responses from individuals about perceptions of the Ombudsman. This would allow a study to further understand how a country's citizens feel about the national Ombudsman. A case study that focuses on a specific country may also bring greater attention to the Ombudsman institution. If a study was able to utilize data that showed political trust levels before the Ombudsman and then analyze a country's level of political trust directly after the introduction of a responsive Ombudsman, the causal relationship would be further highlighted. Furthermore, this study has created the opportunity to reflect on other potentially significant attitudinal variables. This study began by including political efficacy as a dependent variable. Again, due to a lack of data availability it was no longer feasible to include this variable. Nevertheless, I think that a future study that addresses how the Ombudsman may influence levels of political efficacy would be meaningful. As the Ombudsman is meant to receive complaints from individuals, if an

Ombudsman is responsive then an individual may feel that his or her voice matters to the governing institutions of a country.

The Ombudsman is an institution that is recognized in many European countries but is not highly effective, as evidenced by varying scores assigned to the effectiveness of the Ombudsman. Nevertheless, after studying the Ombudsman across countries, I have found that it is an important institution. The results of this study indicate that national governments need to improve the resources allocated to the Ombudsman to make it a more attractive institution. Development of the Ombudsman would make it a more useful public institution for the citizenry and allow the office to be more responsive and efficient while staying true to the historical intentions of the institution. The Ombudsman has a strong foundation, in that it is meant to connect to the people and operate for the people. More attention should be paid to the Ombudsman because it is an institution that has the potential to build on the relationship between a country and its citizenry. Through the performance of future research, the need for stronger Ombudspersons may be uncovered and elucidate the potential for a more significant relationship between the Ombudsman and individuals. The results of this study, therefore, help to demonstrate the need for attention to the Ombudsman and how this area of study requires more analysis and development.

Appendix

Variables and Reference

Variable *trstprl*: Trust in country's parliament

Literal Question: Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ? [country]'s parliament?

Variable *trstplt*: Trust in politicians

Literal Question: Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ... politicians?

Variable *trstlgl*: Trust in the legal system

Literal Question: Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly... ... the legal system?

Variable *polintr*: How interested in politics?

Literal Question: How interested would you say you are in politics ? are you?

Variable *polcmpl*: Politics too complicated to understand

Literal Question: How often does politics seem so complicated that you can't really understand what is going on?

Variable *stfgov*: How satisfied with the national government

Literal Question: Now thinking about the [country] government , how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?

Variable *ppltrst*: Most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful

Literal Question: Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted.

Variable *vote*: Voted in last national election

Literal Question: Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national election in [month/year]?

Variable *contplt*: Contacted politician or government official last 12 months

Literal Question: There are different ways of trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Firstly ... Contacted a politician, government or local government official

ESS Round 1: European Social Survey Round 1 Data (2002). Data file edition 6.2. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.

ESS Round 2: European Social Survey Round 2 Data (2004). Data file edition 3.2. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.

ESS Round 3: European Social Survey Round 3 Data (2006). Data file edition 3.3. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.

ESS Round 4: European Social Survey Round 4 Data (2008). Data file edition 4.0. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.

ESS Round 5: European Social Survey Round 5 Data (2010). Data file edition 1.0. Norwegian Social Science Data Services, Norway – Data Archive and distributor of ESS data.

Variable omb4: Is the national ombudsman effective

Literal Question: In law, the ombudsman is protected from political interference; In practice, the ombudsman is protected from political interference; In practice, the head of the ombudsman agency/entity is protected from removal without relevant justification; In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) has a professional, full-time staff; In practice, agency appointments support the independence of the ombudsman agency (or agencies); In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) receives regular funding; In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) makes publicly available reports; In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) initiates investigations; In practice, when necessary, the national ombudsman (or equivalent agency or agencies) imposes penalties on offenders; In practice, the government acts on the findings of the ombudsman agency (or agencies); In practice, the ombudsman agency (or agencies) acts on citizen complaints within a reasonable time period.

Global Integrity Report. 2004. Global Integrity Report- Data. [Online]. Global Integrity. URL: <http://www.globalintegrity.org/report>.

Global Integrity Report. 2006. Global Integrity Report- Data. [Online-Excel]. Global Integrity. URL: <http://www.globalintegrity.org/report>.

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Variable SGIomb: Ombuds office, does the parliament have an ombuds office?

Literal Question: This question asks whether parliaments have institutions that listen to the concerns of citizens, publicly advocate the issues raised by citizens and initiate governmental action to address them.

Sustainable Governance Indicators. 2009. SGI09_Scores. [Online-Excel]. Bertelsmann Stiftung. URL: http://www.sgi-network.org/index.php?page=download_2009.

Sustainable Governance Indicators. 2011. SGI11_Scores_Values. [Online-Excel]. Bertelsmann Stiftung. URL: http://www.sgi-network.org/index.php?page=download_2011.

Variable attain: Persons with upper secondary or tertiary education attainment, 25 years and older

Eurostat. 2011. Persons with upper secondary or tertiary education attainment by age and sex (%). [Online-CSV]. European Commission. URL:

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_08&lang=en.

Eurostat. 2010. Persons with upper secondary or tertiary education attainment by age and sex (%). [Online-CSV]. European Commission. URL:

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_08&lang=en.

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Eurostat. 2002. Persons with upper secondary or tertiary education attainment by age and sex (%). [Online-CSV]. European Commission. URL:

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_08&lang=en.

Variable WDIv1: Adjusted net national income (annual % growth)

Variable WDIv3: GDP per capita (constant LCU)

World Development Indicators. 2011. Economic Policy and Debt. [Online-CSV]. World dataBank. URL: <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2>.

World Development Indicators. 2010. Economic Policy and Debt. [Online-CSV]. World dataBank. URL: <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2>.

World Development Indicators. 2009. Economic Policy and Debt. [Online-CSV]. World dataBank. URL: <http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do?Step=12&id=4&CNO=2>.

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Variable leftvote: Voteshare percentages for socialist or communist parties in national parliamentary elections

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Figure 1. Schema of Relationships and Influential Factors of Political Trust





Figure 2. European Social Survey and Global Integrity Report data, Scatterplot of Political Trust and Ombudsman Responsiveness, 2002-2010¹



¹ Turkey is omitted from this figure because of it received a score of 0 for responsiveness of the Ombudsman from the Global Integrity Report. Because Turkey was over 50 points below the rest of the countries in the effectiveness axis, I chose to not include Turkey in the scatterplot so that the line of best fit would be more representative of the relationship between the two key variables. As of 2010, Turkey did not have an Ombudsman. In 2010, the creation of an Ombudsman institution was made part of a series of constitutional amendments proposed, but as of the date of the values collected, an official Turkish Ombudsman did not exist.

Figure 3. European Social Survey and Sustainable Governance Indicator data, Scatterplot of Political Trust and Ombudsman Responsiveness, 2008 and 2010




Figure 4. European Social Survey and Sustainable Governance Indicator data, Scatterplot of Political Trust and Ombudsman Responsiveness, 2008 and 2010




Table 1. Descriptive Table of Countries' Ombudspersons

Country and Country Code	Title of Ombudsman	Year Founded	Part of Parliament?	Global Integrity Report Responsiveness Value	Sustainable Governance Indicator Responsiveness Value	Website
Sweden, SE	Riksdagens ombudsmän – JO (Ombudsman for Justice or Parliamentary Ombudsman)	1809	yes	-	10	http://www.jo.se/Page.aspx?Language=en
Finland, FI	Oikeusasiamies valvoo laillisuutta (Parliamentary Ombudsman of Finland)	1920	yes	-	10	http://www.oikeusasiamies.fi/Resource.phx/ea/english/index.htm
Norway, NO	Sivilombudsmannen (Parliamentary Ombudsman for Public Administration)	1962	yes	-	10	http://www.sivilombudsmannen.no/front-page/category511.html
United Kingdom, UK	Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman	1967	yes	-	7	http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/
Switzerland, CH	Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Canton of Zurich, Parliamentary Ombudsman of the city of Zurich, Parliamentary Ombudsman of the city of Winterthur, Parliamentary Ombudsman of the city of Bern, Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Canton of Basel country and Parliamentary Ombudsman of the Canton of Basel city and Mediation Bureau of	First office in Zurich, 1971	no	-	2	http://ombudsman-ch.ch/

	the Canton of Vaud					
France, FR	Le Médiateur de la République (Mediator of the Republic)	1973	yes	73	2	http://mdr.defenseurdesdroits.fr/fr-citoyen.html
Germany, DE	(Petitionsausscuss) Petitions Committee	1975	yes	69	7	http://www.bundestag.de/hdocs_e/bundestag/committees/a02/index.html
Portugal, PT	Provedor de Justiça (Portuguese Ombudsman)	1975	yes	94	4	http://www.provedor-jus.pt/Ingles/Index.htm
Ireland, IE	Office of the Ombudsman	1980	no	-	7	http://www.ombudsman.gov.ie/en/
Spain, ES	Defensor del Pueblo (Defender of the People)	1981	yes	80	8	http://www.defensordelpueblo.es/en/index.html
Netherlands, NL	Nationale ombudsman (National Ombudsman of the Netherlands)	1981	yes	-	9	http://www.nationaleombudsman.nl/english
Poland, PL	Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich (Human Rights Defender)	1987	yes	73	8	http://www.rpo.gov.pl/index.php?s=3
Hungary, HU	Alapvető Jogok Biztosának Hivatala (Office of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights)	1990	yes	86	9	http://www.obh.hu/indexen.htm
Denmark, DK	Ombudsmand des dänischen Parlaments (Danish Parliamentary Ombudsman)	1996	yes	-	10	http://en.ombudsmanden.dk/
Romania, RO	Institutia Avocatul Poporului (Romanian Ombudsman)	1997	yes	57	-	http://www.avp.ro/
Russia, RU	Перенаправление домена не осуществляется (Commissioner on Human Rights)	1997	yes	66	-	http://www.ombudsman.gov.ru/
Belgium, BE	de federale Ombudsman (The Federal	1997	yes	-	9	http://www.federaalombudsman.be/homepage

	Ombudsman)					
Ukraine, UA	УПОВНОВАЖЕНИЙ ВЕРХОВНОЇ РАДИ УКРАЇНИ З ПРАВ ЛЮДИНИ (Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights)	1998	yes	43	-	http://www.ombudsman.kiev.ua/om_01_e.htm
Greece, GR	Συνήγορος του Πολίτη (The Greek Ombudsman)	1998	no	-	2	http://www.synigoros.gr/languages?i=stp.en&l=en
Czech Republic, CZ	Veřejný ochránce práv (Public Defender of Rights)	1999	yes	84	8	http://www.ochrance.cz/en/
Israel, IL	Ombudsman of the Israeli Judiciary	2003	no	89	-	http://www.justice.gov.il/Ministry/OJEng/Ombudsman/
Bulgaria, BG	омбудсман на Република България (Bulgarian Parliamentary Ombudsman)	2004	yes	84	-	http://www.ombudsman.bg/
Latvia, LV	Tiesībsarga Birojs (Ombudsman of the Republic of Latvia)	2007	yes	70	-	http://www.tiesibsargs.lv/en/
Turkey, TR	KAMU DENETÇİLİĞİ KURUMU KANUNU (Office of Public Controller)	2010	yes	0	2	http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/kanunlar/k5548.html

Table 2. Global Integrity Report and European Social Survey Regression Analyses of Responsiveness of Ombudsman on Political Trust with Control Variables

Variable Type	Variable Name	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Institutional	National Ombudsman Responsiveness Coefficient (Std. Err.)	-.030* (.004)	-.021* (.005)	-.024* (.004)	-.024* (.005)	-.037* (.005)	-.031* (.005)
Attitudinal	Politics too complicated?	-	-.563 (.468)	-.065 (.473)	-	-	-
	Satisfaction in government	-	.638* (.092)	.749* (.093)	-	-	-
	Interested in politics?	-	-.432 (.379)	-.274 (.417)	-	-	-
	Can people be trusted?	-	.499* (.140)	.466* (.145)	-	-	-
Behavioral	Contact politician/government recently?	-	-	-.000* (.000)	.000 (.000)	-	-
	Voted in last national election?	-	-	.000 (.000)	.001* (.001)	-	-
Sociological	Vote share % for socialist/communist party in parliamentary elections	-	-	-	.010 (.007)	.020* (.008)	-
Educational	Upper secondary or tertiary education attainment	-	-	-	-.022* (.004)	-.011* (.005)	-.017* (.004)
Economic	National annual % growth	-	-	-	.026 (.019)	-.002 (.026)	-.013 (.027)
	GDP per capita	-	-	-	.000* (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Number of Cases	N=	78	78	78	58	58	58
Coefficient of Determination	R ²	.382	.764	.796	.817	.650	.605

Notes: * $p < 0.05$ (two-tailed)

Table 3. Sustainable Governance Indicators and European Social Survey Regression Analyses of Responsiveness of Ombudsman on Political Trust with Control Variables

Variable Type	Variable Name	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Institutional	National Ombudsman Responsiveness Coefficient (Std. Err.)	.064 (.070)	-.008 (.082)	-.104 (.082)	.064 (.089)	.088 (.084)	.081 (.080)
Attitudinal	Politics too complicated?	-	-.628 (1.722)	.144 (1.531)	-	-	-
	Satisfaction in government	-	.893* (.197)	.496** (.235)	-	-	-
	Interested in politics?	-	-.396 (1.072)	-.280 (.991)	-	-	-
	Can people be trusted?	-	-.160 (.288)	.724 (.459)	-	-	-
Behavioral	Contact politician/government recently?	-	-	.001* (.000)	.000 (.001)	-	-
	Voted in last national election?	-	-	-.004* (.002)	-.001 (.002)	-	-
Sociological	Vote share % for socialist/communist party in parliamentary elections	-	-	-	-.001 (.021)	-.006 (.018)	-
Educational	Upper secondary or tertiary education attainment	-	-	-	.013 (.020)	.007 (.014)	.009 (.013)
Economic	National annual % growth	-	-	-	-.029 (.058)	-.026 (.056)	-.025 (.055)
	GDP per capita	-	-	-	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Number of Cases	N=	33	18	18	33	33	33
Coefficient of Determination	R ²	.027	.787	.867	.143	.107	.104

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.10$ (two-tailed)