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Jackson Eckel March 29, 2024

Investigating Global Attitudes Towards Dual Citizenship

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Abstract

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What explains the variation in public attitudes towards dual citizenship? This study tests the relationship between subjective individual and country-level economic circumstances and personal approval of dual citizenship. Using survey data from South Korea, Germany, and 19 African countries, I test my theory that poor economic prospects should be associated with greater approval of dual citizenship in one's country of origin. I largely find null results, which indicates that, in most places, economic considerations do not play a large role in determining attitudes towards dual citizenship.

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Table of Contents

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Introduction

What explains the variation in public attitudes towards dual citizenship? Citizenship endows an individual with certain rights and privileges in a particular country. With the recent increase in the number of countries allowing dual citizenship–meaning individuals can be a citizen of more than one country–there has been a sharp increase in the number of dual citizens around the world. In 1960, just under 40% of countries accepted expatriate dual citizenship; by 2018, that figure increased to over 75% of all countries (Vink et al. 2019). Despite the growing prevalence of dual citizenship, however, there is little research investigating public tolerance of the practice, particularly at the individual level.

This paper hopes to expand our understanding of how dual citizenship is perceived and what factors are most important in shaping individual attitudes. By examining dual citizenship as perceived by individuals, this study will investigate what it means to "belong" to two countries and what motivates acceptance of that belonging. Dual citizenship can be contentious because it fundamentally disrupts the traditional view of citizenship as a "single and exclusive link between an individual and a sovereign nation-state" (Bloemraad 2004). Although dual citizenship acceptance and integration of immigrants share some conceptual similarities, dual citizenship arguably goes well beyond integration by providing immigrants with "a voice on an equal basis with native-born citizens" (Papademetriou et al. 2008). This "equal voice" and membership in one country is allowed even while individuals are allowed to retain full membership in another. This usually means the ability to vote and travel freely in two countries; it can also mean dual obligations, such as taxes owed to both countries and requirements for military service.

Because of the potential tension in "double loyalty" between two countries, individual tolerance of dual citizenship policies is worth investigating because it is informed by normative views towards political membership. Attitudes towards dual citizenship, then, may reflect different levels of openness towards expansion of who should be allowed to belong where, which will be increasingly relevant as globalization continues, international travel becomes more accessible, and economic integration deepens between countries. Addressing this question might also help explain why some countries adopt more hostile postures towards dual citizenship while others have much more lenient.

There is also an important distinction between immigrant and emigrant dual citizenship. Immigrant dual citizenship refers to when a citizen of one's country acquires citizenship in another country without giving up their original citizenship. Emigrant dual citizenship refers to when a foreign citizen acquires citizenship in one's own country without giving up citizenship in their country of origin. These related, but separate, types of dual citizenship must be accounted for in any analysis of dual citizenship more generally. I will argue below, however, that attitudes should reflect beliefs about whichever type of dual citizenship—emigrant or immigrant—is more relevant for an individual, and that this relevance is determined by the hierarchy in desirability of different citizenships.

To evaluate my hypotheses, I use data collected from Germany, South Korea, and nineteen African countries. Because of differences in when data were collected and discrepancies in questions across surveys, I conduct three different analyses for each survey available, instead of combining them into one large model.

This paper begins with a review of the current literature on dual citizenship. I follow this with a review of previous theoretical work and an explanation of my data, operationalization of

the variables, and methods. After discussing the empirical findings, I conclude by situating those findings within existing work on dual citizenship.

Context

Africa

Like the rest of the world, dual citizenship Africa has become increasingly accepted by governments across the African continent (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 2013; Manby 2016; Whitaker 2011). More lenient dual citizenship laws became more common starting in the 1960s, following the start of decolonization in the 1950s. As of 2016, over half of African countries allowed dual citizenship in some form (Manby 2016). The most recent change took place in 2022, when Liberia formally recognized dual nationality. This comes over a decade after a dual citizenship bill was introduced in 2008, only for its passage to be substantially delayed due to extreme domestic backlash (Pailey 2021).

Although many countries have moved in the same direction, there is still a large amount of variation in dual citizenship policy and enforcement because "interpretation and application of these laws varies widely, or small differences in wording result in different outcomes" (Manby 2016). This includes countries that allow dual citizenship, countries that technically prohibit dual citizenship but do not strictly enforce this prohibition, and countries in which the law is ambiguous but dual citizenship is functionally allowed (Manby 2016). There are also unique cases such as Sudan, which permits dual nationality except for those "who acquired South Sudanese nationality on the secession of South Sudan" (Manby 2016). The wide variety of dual citizenship policies reflect both common challenges many countries face (such as concern over divided national loyalty) as well as other challenges more specific to postcolonial Africa. The specific policies of countries included in my analysis are listed in Table 2. I list the country

policy towards dual citizenship today and in 2011, which was the year in which the Afrobarometer started conducting Round 5 of the survey.

The reasons for the shift towards dual citizenship in African countries are numerous, but the primary explanation is engagement with and pressure from the African diaspora (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 2013; Whitaker 2011). Allowing dual citizenship allows members of the African diaspora to maintain stronger ties with their country of origin, increasing the strength of the connection between citizen and country. Dual citizenship, then, is a way to incentivize economic contribution, maintain linkages with nationals abroad, attract investors, and accrue advantages from increased economic activity between connected countries (Bob-Milliar & Bob-Milliar 2013). Remittances play a key role in this relationship: among countries in the Economic Community of West African States, countries that recognize dual citizenship have higher levels of foreign direct investment, gross capital formation, and household consumption (Siaplay 2014). Although this is correlation and not causation, dual citizenship as a diaspora-engagement strategy has become increasingly common (Whitaker 2011).

Whitaker 2011 also argues that there is a political element to dual citizenship laws. Specifically, in analyzing the case studies of Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya, she finds that there is a relationship between democratization and the "political leanings of the diaspora community" on the decision to allow dual citizenship (Whitaker 2011). If such emigrants appear to be opponents of the current leadership, then that may be a disincentive to granting them dual nationality and the right to vote at home (Whitaker 2011).

Germany

Until recently, Germany was one of eight states in the European Union that still had a renunciation requirement, i.e., most individuals seeking citizenship in Germany had to renounce

their previous citizenship (Vink, Schmeets & Mennes 2019). On January 19th, 2024, the German Bundestag passed legislation that, among other things, made it much easier to gain dual citizenship for foreign nationals and allowed German nationals to gain citizenship outside of Germany without losing their German passport (Schuetze 2024; Smith Stone Walters 2024). This change is most notable for non-E.U. citizens, most of whom were barred from acquiring German citizenship without giving up their previous citizenship (Smith Stone Walters 2024).

Political controversy surrounding dual citizenship had been relatively constant during the last few decades, although there have been attempts to ease restrictions before the current government. In 1998, when a coalition of Social Democrats and Green Party Members formed a new government, the new chancellor Schröder announced the coalition's intentions of allowing dual citizenship (Hofhansel 2021). After suffering electoral losses in the Bundesrat, however, the coalition instead reached an agreement with the Free Democrats to create an 'option model' under which children born in Germany to foreign parents could decide if they wanted to keep German citizenship (Hofhansel 2021; Falcke and Vink 2021). In 2014, this option was relaxed by the Merkel-led grand coalition, prompting backlash from some members of the CDU (Hofhansel 2021).

Generally, members of the CDU continue to oppose dual citizenship, demonstrating the somewhat partisan divide on dual citizenship. While there is ideological opposition to dual citizenship among more right-leaning political parties, particularly AfD, this opposition is not total, and there is some level of tolerance that allows for exceptions to restrictions (Hofhansel 2021). The recent legislation allowing for dual citizenship demonstrates both its political salience and the importance of understanding the variance in individual attitudes towards dual citizenship.

South Korea

Like Germany, South Korea has, at least institutionally, become increasingly accepting of dual citizenship, moving from zero tolerance before the 1990s to de jure acknowledgement of dual citizenship today (Hui-Jung Kim 2013). Legislation passed in 1997 required that Korean nationals with dual citizenship rescind their foreign citizenship by the age of 22 (Hui-Jung Kim 2013). The 2005 Nationality Amendment Act prevented South Koreans from rescinding citizenship before completing their military service obligations, and in 2010 Nationality Amendment Act removed the requirement to rescind entirely, thereby allowing dual citizenship (Hui-Jung Kim 2013). Like in many other countries, however, dual citizenship in South Korea can still be difficult to acquire. For non-Korean immigrants who aren't married to a Korean citizen, there are 17 requirements for naturalization that includes factors such as length of residency, occupational status, and knowledge of Korean culture (Park 2014).

Although institutional acceptance has progressed quickly, public opinion has not entirely followed. One reason for this is a social reluctance to embrace ethnic diversity (Hundt et al. 2018; Kim 2021). Hundt et al. conduct an analysis of South Korean print media and finds that the print media tends to portray multiculturalism as inevitable but expects migrants to adapt to Korean ways of life (Hundt et al. 2018). The result is a form of "conditional citizenship," in which an "increasing level of ethnic diversity is thus evident in South Korea *as a society*, but not necessarily *as a political community*. That is, South Korea's willingness to host people of different ethnicities has been stronger than its willingness to accept non-Koreans as citizens" (Hundt et al. 2018).

Another objection pertinent to emigrant dual citizenship specifically is the idea that dual citizenship is used as a way for the wealthy to transmit class-based privilege to their children. South Korea has used dual citizenship to entice ethnic Koreans abroad to bring their skills and

resources to South Korea (Hui-Jung Kim 2013). This instrumental approach used by South Korean government to attract resource-rich emigrants is at least partially responsible for public hostility towards dual citizenship (Hui-Jung Kim 2013).

Finally, South Korea requires every male citizen to serve in the military for two years, and dual citizens are not exempt from this obligation. This has caused problems in the past, with documented instances of dual citizens (without knowledge of their South Korean citizenship) visiting South Korea and getting detained by the Korean police so that they could fulfill their military obligation (Woo 2022). The South Korean government has detailed conscription laws that ensure dual citizens—who are often wealthy Korean emigrants—don't avoid their military service (Woo 2022). This military obligation is relevant for any male who is considering gaining (or losing) South Korean citizenship.

Literature Review

Dual citizenship as a legal subject is widely studied (Bauböck 2021; Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple 2004; Sejersen 2008; Spiro 2011, 2016). However, work investigating individual attitudes towards dual citizenship is much scarcer (*cf.* Vink, Schmeets, & Mennes 2019; Jasinskaja-Lahti 2020; Verkuyten, Gale, Yogeeswaran, & Adelman 2022).

To begin, I understand citizenship as a legal institution of social closure, determining membership within a political community and attaching both rights and obligations to that membership (Brubaker 1992). This idea is used as a starting point for studying dual citizenship by more recent scholarship as well (Vink et al. 2019; Harpaz 2019). Importantly, citizenship is not a stable institution, but rather a "*contested* [emphasis added] object of closure. In other words, the boundaries of citizenship reflect the distribution of power in society, and determine the present and future contours of the national collective" (Harpaz 2019, introduction p. 4).

When investigating attitudes towards citizenship status, much of the relevant work over the past few years has been concerned with cultural or social explanations. For example, multiple authors looked at the relationship between citizenship status and national loyalty, often finding that there is a perception of "divided loyalties" among both immigrants without citizenship and dual citizens (Verkuyten et al. 2022; Jasinskaja-Lahti 2020; Kusow & Delisi 2016). Brochmann et al. conducted interviews with elite public officials in Scandinavian countries, identifying differences in opinion that may influence policy outcomes (Brochmann & Midtbøen 2021).

In a study examining attitudes towards dual citizens, Vink et al. compares attitudes towards immigrant dual citizens with emigrant dual citizens. They find that respondents who display greater national pride and a tendency towards out-group derogation tend to disapprove of immigrant dual citizenship more so than emigrant dual citizenship (Vink et al. 2019). However, individuals that indicate a fear of cultural change disapproved of both types of dual citizenship (immigrant and emigrant) (Vink et al. 2019). This study provides evidence for the relevance of social identity theory in explaining tolerance of dual citizenship.

On the economic implications of dual citizenship, one author has argued for a global hierarchy of citizenship, citing the fact that some countries receive more applications for dual citizenship than others (Harpaz 2019). Harpaz moves away from studying dual citizenship in Western countries, arguing that citizens in non-Western countries are more likely to have more "instrumental" or practical reasons for applying for dual citizenship (Harpaz 2019). This is because, for individuals from poorer countries (compared to the West), secondary citizenship in a Western country provides the "potential for better opportunities, more extensive rights, improved security and greater freedom of movement" (Harpaz 2019). These practical reasons can be contrasted with reasons that are "specific and personal," which characterize the

motivations of most citizens from Western countries that seek dual citizenship elsewhere (Harpaz 2019). In the West, secondary citizenship "makes it easier for individuals to capitalise on pre-existing economic, political or social connections but does not act as an independent resource" (Harpaz 2019). This means that a secondary citizenship is not treated instrumentally but more likely has symbolic, sentimental value (Harpaz 2019; Bloemraad 2004). Additionally, the reason for applying may itself influence native attitudes towards dual citizens as well: Verkuyten et al. find that natives are more tolerant of applicants who apply for dual citizenship for emotional reasons (like a feeling of belonging) versus those who apply for instrumental reasons (like securing free movement) (Verkuyten et al. 2022).

One of the goals of this study is to put these two perspectives into conversation. There is substantive work on dual citizenship in Western countries that is concerned primarily with symbolic explanations for support and opposition. Following the example of Harpaz, there is also an established relationship between economic outcomes and dual citizenship applications. My study–which will combine data from a variety of countries in different economic conditions–will try to determine which explanations are more relevant given different economic settings. Both economic and cultural factors may be simultaneously influential in attitudes across different contexts. If, however, cultural factors grow in importance in wealthier countries, then that might provide support for the idea that cultural opposition "supplants" economic opposition towards dual citizenship in better economic circumstances.

Before continuing, it is worth mentioning that not all dual citizenship policies are alike, which makes comparing attitudes towards dual citizenship between countries difficult. Some countries do not allow dual citizenship at all (Austria, Indonesia) and others only accept dual citizenship in very few instances (Japan, Singapore) (Sejerson 2008). In cases where public

opposition to dual citizenship has been visible, oftentimes that opposition is related to national conceptions of identity and state belonging (Sejerson 2008). In Germany and the Netherlands, for example, “underlying ideas of what it is to be Danish or German seem to have underpinned the decisions to continue legislation against dual citizenship” (Sejerson 2008). This relationship between national identity and opposition towards immigrant dual citizenship has been demonstrated empirically in the Netherlands (Vink et al. 2019).

Other countries have more lenient policies regarding dual citizenship but tie citizenship to additional obligations, such as mandatory military service (Legomsky 2001). South Korea is one such country: in 2004, the law mandating military service was changed to include South Korean citizens who had permanent residency status in another country (Kim 2013). Another exceptional case has to do with kin-state dual citizenship, examples of which can be found in Romania and Hungary. Many people living in Moldova acquire Romanian citizenship, despite the fact that most of those people do not plan on living in Romania, because Romania “considers Moldovans to be Romanians” (Knott 2018). Hungary passed a law in 2011 that allows individuals living outside of Hungary to apply for citizenship if they speak Hungarian and have Hungarian ancestry, and then “afterwards Hungary provided voting rights to its trans-border citizens” (Kovács et al. 2015). These cases are the exception rather than the rule, however, and any results obtained from this study would not be generalizable to every single country that may accept dual citizenship.

While these cases are somewhat unusual, they demonstrate the diversity in dual citizenship policy between countries. Broadly stated, these differences are driven largely by either “internal” or “external” reasons (Sejerson 2008). Externally driven policies are implemented to “accommodate citizens abroad” while internally driven policies are meant to

"facilitate integration and political participation" of migrants in their new country of residence (Sejerson 2008). Dual citizenship in Hungary does not have the same significance as dual citizenship in South Korea, and those differences are potentially influential in explaining political tolerance within those countries. Theoretically, this means that understanding the context of dual citizenship for each particular country in my dataset is necessary, and expectations for how dual citizenship is perceived in certain countries should be adjusted depending on the history of policy change in each country.

Theoretical Argument

My theoretical argument stems from the idea of citizenship as a contested institution of social closure, as stated above. However, the meaning, privileges, and rights associated with citizenship varies greatly between countries. By investigating attitudes of individuals from different countries that differ greatly in their economic circumstances, this study investigates the relationship between status, wealth, and attitudes towards dual citizenship on a global scale.

Much of this theoretical work draws on Yossi Harpaz's book titled *Citizenship 2.0*, which argues for the existence of a global "hierarchy of citizenship" in which the citizenship of some countries can be categorized as more or less valuable than the citizenship of other countries (Harpaz 2019). This is because the value of citizenship is shaped not only by the formal rights and privileges associated with citizenship status, but also the opportunities (economic and otherwise) available for citizens in each country (Harpaz 2019). Specifically, Harpaz measures the value of a particular citizenship by considering three different concepts: security (operationalized using the State Fragility Index), opportunity (using the Human Development Index), and rights (using the Democracy Index calculated by the *Economist* Intelligence Unit) (Harpaz 2019). Using these three factors, it is possible to then categorize countries into three

tiers. The first-tier countries, with the highest security, most secure rights, and greatest opportunities, are located primarily in Western Europe and North America (Harpaz 2019). The second-tier countries are located mainly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, and the third-tier countries are spread out across Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Harpaz 2019). These tiers represent the benefits and potential upside granted to citizens of a particular country: stratification between states occurs in income (GDP per capita varies immensely between countries), strength of passports, as well as "almost any conceivable domain of human flourishing, including security, political rights, access to health and social services and even clean air and water" (Harpaz 2019).

Given this hierarchy of citizenship, I expect that the difference between the perceived utility and purpose of dual citizenship will influence individual attitudes towards dual citizenship in general. More specifically, my theory follows from the finding that the citizenship hierarchy is a factor in applications for dual citizenship: generally, people in wealthier countries seek dual citizenship for reasons that are "specific and personal" (Harpaz 2019). In poorer countries, dual citizenship has more "practical" benefits, as described above (Harpaz 2019). My first hypothesis, then, tests the relationship between country wealth and attitudes towards dual citizenship:

> H1: Individuals that live in poorer countries are more likely to support dual citizenship in their country of origin, because they view dual citizenship as a potential mechanism towards integration into a different country with more economic opportunity.

I use country wealth instead of Harpaz' tier categorization because my sample (which draws heavily from Africa) is primarily composed of countries with "tier three" citizenship. Only two

of 21 countries (South Korea and Germany) have “tier one” citizenship, and only one country (South Africa) has “tier two” citizenship. Ideally, I would have an even distribution of citizenship tiers, since I am not theorizing that minor changes in GDP-per-capita drive attitudes towards dual citizenship, but rather that large differences in overall economic prosperity and security (between countries like Niger and Germany) influence these attitudes. Since, however, I do not have an even distribution, I use GDP per capita as a proxy of citizenship desirability, rather than the more encompassing country tiers.

Adding on to this, I borrow from the literature on attitudes towards immigration, which is a useful starting point for investigating social attitudes: both immigration and dual citizenship are concerned with territorial admission and belonging, and hypotheses concerning tolerance of dual citizenship have also relied on social identity theory, which is also used to explain attitudes towards immigrants (Mangum & Park 2021; Vink et al. 2019). There are two broad categories of opposition to immigration: cultural and economic (Malhotra et al. 2013). Both forces contribute to the political attitudes towards immigration, whether that is nativist backlash or changes in support for welfare (Alesina & Tabellini 2021). However, there are key differences between cultural and economic motivations. Specifically, all studies that compare these two attitudes find, “without exception,” that there is strong evidence that cultural factors influence opposition towards immigration (Malhotra et al. 2013). However, evidence of economic factors (such as fear of labor-market competition) is mixed, and one comparative study argues that this threat is not common among the general population, especially when compared to cultural threat, and is therefore less detected in national surveys (Malhotra et al. 2013). However, I will argue that because concern for one’s own economic prospects do factor into opinions towards immigration, then those concerns will also have an influence on attitudes towards dual citizenship, which

reflect many of the same concerns about economic wellbeing in one's own country (Dancygier & Donnelly 2013).

When considering these economic concerns, another important distinction is the type of economic outcome that drives individual attitudes. Here, I borrow from the literature on sociotropic vs pocketbook voting to distinguish between potentially similar drivers of attitudes towards dual citizenship. "Sociotropic" attitudes concern an individual's perception of the overall economy, while "pocketbook" attitudes concern an individual's assessment of their personal financial situation. This distinction is relevant in the political economy literature and is used to describe how people vote (Curtis 2014; Klašnja et al. 2014). I will also apply it to my hypotheses on the relationship between economic attitudes and attitudes towards dual citizenship; however, I do not expect the relationship to change significantly for either sociotropic or pocketbook attitudes. I expect that, for both sociotropic and pocketbook outcomes, individuals that are less optimistic about their own economic future or their country's economic future will show higher support for dual citizenship, since acquiring citizenship in another (wealthier) country could grant the possibility of upward mobility:

H2: Individuals that are less optimistic about their country's economic future are more likely to be supportive of dual citizenship in their country of origin.

H3: Individuals that are less optimistic about their future financial condition are more likely to be supportive of dual citizenship in their country of origin.

One assumption embedded in these hypotheses concerns the type of dual citizenship in question, i.e., immigrant vs emigrant dual citizenship. If a respondent is not confident in their

economic future at home, then I expect them to be specifically supportive of *emigrant* dual citizenship in particular. If they are confident, then I expect them to be less concerned with emigrant dual citizenship, and possibly more antagonistic towards *immigrant* dual citizenship. I argue, however, that these attitudes will "spill over" to characterize an individual's tolerance of dual citizenship in general. In a survey experiment conducted among residents of the Netherlands, Vink et al. point out that dual citizenship might be viewed as a threat in a country like the Netherlands, where "migration" usually refers to immigration (Vink et al. 19). However, in poorer "countries of emigration," the connotation of dual citizenship will likely be less threatening, because dual citizenship is more likely to be perceived as an opportunity (Vink et al. 2019).

Whether this complication is meaningful is dependent on individuals holding substantively different views towards immigrant and emigrant dual citizenship. Is there evidence that these issues are viewed separately? Partly, yes. In the survey referenced above, Vink et al. found that respondents who favored immigrant over emigrant dual citizenship

> are characterized only by significantly lower levels of national identification…By contrast, persons characterized by high levels of ethnocentrism are intolerant towards dual citizenship among both groups, but where they show discrepancy this is in favour of those perceived as part of the native in-group: emigrants. (Vink et al. 2019)

Additionally, higher levels of perceived cultural threat were found, as predicted, to be associated with intolerance of both emigrant and immigrant dual citizenship (Vink et al. 2019). Practically, this idea of interpretative "spillover" is relevant in two of the three surveys from which I draw data. These surveys (described in detail below) do not specify immigrant vs emigrant dual

citizenship when asking for a respondent's opinion. One of the three surveys specifically asks about immigrant dual citizenship; the spillover mechanism, then, is less important in this case.

Data & methods

To test the hypotheses stated above, I use survey data from 19 African countries, Germany, and South Korea. Each survey collected information on individual opinions concerning several different political, economic, and social issues. Each of the three surveys occurred in different years; apart from one round of the German General Social Survey, all responses were gathered between 2006 and 2016.

The largest survey I will be using is from the Afrobarometer, a non-profit organization that administers surveys across many African countries. The goal of the Afrobarometer is to collect attitudinal information from Africans on a wide variety of subjects. There have been eight total rounds of the survey, the last of which (Round 8) was completed in 2021. I use data from Afrobarometer Round 5, which was administered in 34 countries across the continent from 2011 to 2013. However, my analysis narrows down the sample to only 19 of those countries. This is done for two reasons. First, and more simply, the survey question on dual citizenship was not asked in five of those countries (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia). Second, there are several countries represented in the Afrobarometer that have experienced either a major civil war within 20 years of survey administration or ongoing, widespread conflict during the time of survey administration. We exclude these countries because major conflict may be a confounding variable in the relationship between attitudes towards future economic conditions and attitudes towards dual citizenship. Severe conflict likely makes individuals more pessimistic when considering their economic outlook, since conflict dampens economic activity and make growth

much more difficult, especially in the short term (Murdoch and Sandler 2002; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002). Conflict also may make respondents more likely to support dual citizenship, especially if they or people they know have been victims of conflict-induced displacement. Citizenship in another country may be viewed as an "escape route" from violence in one's country of origin. Burundi, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra Leon, and Uganda are all dropped from the analysis as a result. Table 1 lists all the countries included and excluded from the sample and specifies why each of the previous countries were dropped; Table 2 specifies the current legal status of dual citizenship in each of the included countries.

For all Afrobarometer countries, responses were collected with face-to-face interviews, and all respondents were citizens of their respective country and over the age of 18. Survey questions were standardized across countries and over time, and respondents were chosen with a

> …nationally representative, random, clustered, stratified, multi-stage area probability sample. The sample is designed as a representative cross-section of all citizens of a voting age in a given country. The goal is to give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of selection for an interview. (Mattes et al. 2016).

There was a total of 51,587 total respondents to this round of the Afrobarometer. The missing data includes 5,989 subjects who were not asked and 28 subjects for whom data is missing. Additionally, 2,831 respondents answered by saying "I don't know" in response to the question on dual citizenship, and I chose to treat these respondents as missing. Once I narrowed the sample to include only the above 19 countries, the number of respondents for which complete data was available was 22,710 (after I dropped 7,300 observations are dropped for missing data or answering "I don't know"). There are a disproportionate number of dropped observations

from Malawi (707) Mozambique (951); however, this is likely because 2,400 people were surveyed in each of these countries (as well as Zimbabwe), compared with the standard 1,200 in all other countries.

From Germany, I use data from the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS) collected by researchers from the Leibniz Institute for the Social Sciences. This is a biennial project that surveys a representative sample of German households "on the attitudes, behaviour, and social structure of persons resident in Germany" using face-to-face interviews (GESIS 2021). While data has been collected every two years since 1980, we use data from two years in which a question on dual citizenship was asked: 2006 and 2016. In total, 6,606 respondents were questioned during the survey administration in these two years. Data before 1990 were collected only from West Germany. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, researchers were able to gather data from East Germany as well. Due to this novel access, a disproportionate number of East Germans have been surveyed since 1990 (GESIS 2021). I correct for this by re-weighting observations from West and East Germany.

The smallest sample (N=1,445, 131 dropped observations due to missingness) comes from the Korean General Social Survey, which started in 2003 (Kim et al. 2019). The KGSS is conducted by the Sungkyunkwan University Survey Research Center to "gauge social changes in and the stability of Korean society" (Kim et al. 2019). Survey respondents include anybody living in South Korea over the age of 18. Like the Afrobarometer, the KGSS uses a "multi-stage area probability sampling method" and responses are gathered using face-to-face interviews (Kim et al. 2019). The question on dual citizenship was included only in the 2010 iteration of the KGSS, which is why there are fewer respondents than the previous two surveys. Table 3 displays the demographic makeup of each of the surveys by sex, age, and education level.

In all surveys, respondents are asked for their opinion on dual citizenship. In the Afrobarometer, respondents were asked the following for different groups of people: “In your opinion, which of the following people have a right to be a citizen of the country?” One of these groups included dual citizens: “A person who wishes to hold dual citizenship, that is, to be a citizen both of the country and some other country?” (Mattes et al. 2016). Respondents could say either yes or no (or that they did not know, which was 2,831 people in total) (Mattes et al. 2016).

In the German Social Survey, the statement reads as follows: “Foreigners living in Germany should be able to acquire German citizenship without having to give up their own citizenship, i.e. DUAL CITIZENSHIP should be possible.” Respondents indicated their agreement with the statement on a Likert scale between one and seven, with one indicating “Completely disagree” and seven indicating “Completely agree”. In deciding whether to combine the results for the dependent variable across time or to separate them by year, we looked at the distribution of responses across each year. For each year, the histograms demonstrated continuity: each distribution has a disproportionate number of ones and sevens, indicating strong opinions, with a relatively even number of all other responses. Because of this, I decided to combine datasets across years, checking to ensure that the final model did not contain a disproportionate number of observations from a single year.

In the KGSS, survey respondents were asked to rate statements. The question on dual citizenship was included in 2010; it asked: “How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?” One of the statements included was the following: “Anybody who is eligible can be allowed to have the dual citizenship [sic] of South Korea and other country [sic] at the same time” (Kim et al. 2019). Respondents were asked to give their answer on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly disagree).

Although all three of these survey questions will be treated as the "same" dependent variable, the operationalization is not uniform because each of the questions are different. Besides the fact that the wording is not identical across all questions, there are two limitations that should be acknowledged before continuing. First, two of the surveys–Afrobarometer and KGSS–ask about dual citizenship in a respondent's home country without referring directly to immigrant or emigrant dual citizens. The GGSS, on the other hand, specifically refers to *immigrant* dual citizenship. Nonetheless, I argue that these questions are still similar enough to give a comparable estimate of the relationship across different regions in timeframes. All hypotheses are in the context of dual citizenship in a respondent's country of origin, which includes immigrant and emigrant dual citizenship. The specification of immigrant dual citizenship in the GGSS is potentially problematic if the explicit focus on foreigners alters how respondents think of dual citizenship in general. If this were to unduly emphasize the possibility of foreigners gaining dual citizenship in Germany, I would expect to see a stronger negative relationship for Hypotheses 2 and 3 in Germany, not a different relationship in terms of directionality. Because I am already arguing that immigrant dual citizenship will be much more salient in Germany and South Korea compared to the African countries, I do not predict that the specification of immigrant dual citizenship in the GGSS will have a particularly large effect. While I argue that these questions are still similar enough to give a comparable estimate of the relationship between different regions and timeframes, the lack of precision means that there should be some doubt that each measurement is equally likely to be accurate across South Korea, Germany, and all the included African countries.

The second limitation is the different measurement scales respondents were given. In the Afrobarometer, respondents could either indicate yes or no when asked if they support dual

citizenship. In contrast, the KGSS and the GGSS both used Likert scales (of five and seven points, respectively) to indicate the extent to which respondents agreed with statements on their approval of dual citizenship. To correct this second issue, I re-scaled the response variable in both the KGSS and GGSS. The 1-5 and 1-7 scales were transformed into binary response variables, where the lower numbers (1-2 for the KGSS, 1-3 for the GGSS) were coded as 0, the higher numbers (4-5 for the KGSS, 4-7 for the GGSS) were coded as 1, and the middle number (in this case, 3) was randomly assigned to either 0 or 1. The random assignment of the middle option means that, on average, the two groups assigned to either 1 or 0 should be roughly the same in terms of other covariates as well as responses to the independent variable questions.

In testing Hypothesis 1, I use ordinary least squares regression to estimate the relationship between per-capita GDP and attitudes towards dual citizenship. The unit of analysis for this hypothesis is country, and the dependent variable (dual citizenship attitude) is represented as the proportion of respondents who support dual citizenship. The second and third hypothesis examine the relationship between economic attitudes and attitudes towards dual citizenship. Specifically, the second hypothesis tests the relationship between prospective sociotropic views and dual citizenship, while the third hypothesis tests the relationship between prospective pocketbook views on personal finances and dual citizenship. The specific survey questions that I will use for the second (sociotropic) variables are as follow:

> *Afrobarometer*: What about the overall direction of the country? Would you say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction? (Scale: binary variable, with one representing “Going in the wrong direction” and two representing “Going in the right direction.”)

GSS: What do you think the economic situation in Germany will be like in one year? (Scale: Five-point Likert scale, with one representing "Considerably better than today" and five representing "Considerably worse than today.")

KGSS: Do you think the economic conditions in South Korea will be much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much worse? (Scale: Five-point Likert scale, with one representing "Much better" and five representing "Much worse.")

Of note for this hypothesis is that, due to high multicollinearity, I replaced the Afrobarometer question asking about the economy with a broader question about the direction of the entire country. This encompasses more than the economic situation—it includes government leaders, perceptions of corruption, cultural changes, etc. While the original variable was much more precise, the high correlation between it and the question on pocketbook financial prospects meant that these variables were likely not independent. This change captures a significantly less precise opinion of overall economic performance but avoids the problem of multicollinearity.

The survey questions I will use for the third (pocketbook) variables are as follows:

Afrobarometer: Looking ahead, do you expect the following to be better or worse: Your living conditions in twelve months' time? (Scale: Five-point Likert scale, with one representing "Much worse" and five representing "Much better.")

GSS: And what will your own financial situation be like in one year? (Scale: Five-point Likert scale, with one representing "Considerably better than today" and five representing "Considerably worse than today.")

KGSS: Within the next 10 years, do you think the financial situation of your household will be getting much better, somewhat better, about the same, somewhat worse, or much

worse than now (Scale: Five-point Likert scale, with one representing “Much better” and five representing “Much worse.”)

Apart from the Afrobarometer question on sociotriopic economic forecasts, the Afrobarometer and the GSS both ask about economic prospects within the same timeframe (one year). For the KGSS, the sociotropic question does not include a timeframe, while the pocketbook includes a timeframe of “within the next 10 years.” Five of the six questions utilize the same five-point Likert scale to record responses; for the purposes of this paper, the numbers representing responses for the Afrobarometer will be reversed, so that five represents “Much worse” for all three models.

For hypotheses 2 and 3, I implement three models: one with the Korean dataset, one with the German dataset, and one with the Afrobarometer. The Korean and German models will use classical logistic regression and include both sociotropic and pocketbook independent variables, along with a set of controls. Because the Afrobarometer contains nested data (individuals within countries), I use a multilevel varying-intercept, varying-slope logistic regression of dual citizenship attitude on pocketbook and sociotropic prospects:

$$\text{logit}(\Pr(Y_i = 1)) = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}X_{1ij} + \beta_{2j}X_{2ij} + \ldots + \epsilon_{ij}$$

where β_{0j} represents the varying intercept for country j, β_{1j} represents the varying slope for X_{1ij} in country j, β_{2j} represents the varying slope for X_{2ij} in country j, X_{1ij} represents the assessment of pocketbook financial prospects for individual i in country j, X_{2ij} represents the assessment of pocketbook financial prospects for individual i in country j, ϵ_{ij} and represents the error. The ellipses represent the control variables (age, sex, gender) that are also included in the model.

I employ multilevel modeling because a classical logistic regression assumes the that observations are independent; however, due to the grouping of respondents by country, this

assumption is not necessarily true (Sommet & Morselli 2017). Multilevel modeling allows me work around this problem by including varying-intercept and varying-slope effects by country. This is accomplished by disentangling within-cluster effects (the extent to which individual characteristics impact the dependent variable) from between-cluster effects (the extent to which country characteristics impact the dependent variable) (Sommet & Morselli 2017). I fit the model using the lme4 package in R (Bates et al. 2015).

To make the coefficients in this model more interpretable, I also use both cluster-mean centering and grand-mean centering of independent variables. Cluster-mean centering subtracts the cluster-specific mean (in this case, the country specific mean) of the predictor variable, which means the fixed slope of that predictor variable corresponds to the cluster-specific effect (Sommet & Morselli 2017). In the African model, I apply this to the pocketbook variable because I am interested in within-country effects of economic optimism on attitudes towards dual citizenship. The age control variable is centered using grand-mean centering, which subtracts the general mean of the predictor variable from every individual observation (Sommet & Morselli 2017). This process of centering makes each variable more interpretable: when predictor variables are centered, "the fixed intercept will become the log-odds that your outcome variable equals one when predictor variables are all set to their mean" (Sommet & Morselli 2017).

Finally, in all models, we control for sex, age, and education (Vink, Schmeets, & Mennes 2019). Education is re-coded, such that there are three categories: low, medium, and high. The "low" category represents any schooling short of completing high school, "medium" represents graduating high school, and "high" represents any postgraduate study. Additionally, age is recoded into discrete categories in the African model: 20 and below, 21 – 59, and older than 60.

This is because I expect to see non-linear differences in attitudes among these different age groups. Creating these categories will help highlight potentially significant jumps (i.e., I will be able to tell if there is a relationship between being particularly young or old on dual citizenship attitudes).

Results

I start by examining the estimates from the OLS model that regresses dual citizenship approval on per capita GDP. This is a test of my first hypothesis; namely, that individuals living in poorer countries are more likely to support dual citizenship in their country of origin. The results (or lack thereof) are displayed in model 1 of Table 4: the relationship between per capita GDP and support for dual citizenship is non-existent, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. significance ($p = 0.127$). This demonstrates that, among the countries surveyed, there is not the hypothesized relationship between country wealth and attitudes towards dual citizenship within that country.

[Insert Table 4 here]

One potential problem with this analysis is the presence of outliers: both Germany and South Korea have much higher a GDP per capita than any of the countries in Africa. To account for this, model 2 in Table 4 removes both of these countries from the regression estimate. However, removing them from the analysis does not change the results: the coefficient becomes positive but remains very small, and the p-value does change either. This rules out the possibility that the German and Korean outliers are the cause of the lack of statistically significant results.

[Insert Table 5 here]

Next, I look at each of the three models that test hypotheses 2 and 3 in their respective contexts (South Korea, Germany, and Africa). In the South Korean model, displayed in Table 5, I

find null results. Both independent variables—pocketbook financial prospects and sociotropic economic prospects—are negative, which is the expected direction of the relationship. For pocketbook financial prospects, the coefficient of -0.089 ($p = 0.2$) suggests that for a one-point increase in the Likert-scale survey response, the log-odds of approving of dual citizenship decrease by 0.089, holding everything else constant. For sociotropic economic prospects, the coefficient of -0.082 ($p = 0.21$) suggests that for a one-point increase in the Likert-scale survey response, the log-odds of approving of dual citizenship decrease by 0.082, holding everything else constant. The directionality of the relationship is as my hypothesis predicted: as people become more confident in their own financial future and in the economic future of their country, they appear to be less likely to support dual citizenship. However, given that neither of these results are significant, I fail to reject the null hypothesis that this relationship is not simply due to chance.

Education and sex both had a statistically significant association with attitude towards dual citizenship in South Korea. People with "high" educational attainment are more likely to approve of dual citizenship than people with "medium" education: compared to highly educated respondents, respondents that had only graduated high school were less likely to approve of dual citizenship ($p = 0.004$), and respondents who hadn't graduated high school were slightly less likely than those who had to approve of dual citizenship ($p = 0.04$). Sex was also a factor: the log-odds of approving of dual citizenship increases by 0.470 for females compared to males ($p < 0.001$).

[Insert Table 6 here]

Applying my model to the German data, I find results that fit with my hypotheses. Table 6 demonstrates these results, demonstrating that both pocketbook prospects and sociotropic

prospects are related to attitudes towards dual citizenship. For pocketbook prospects, the coefficient of -0.170 ($p < 0.001$) suggests that for a one-point increase in the Likert-scale survey response, the log-odds of approving of dual citizenship decrease by 0.170, holding everything else constant. For sociotropic prospects, the coefficient of -0.182 ($p = 0.005$) suggests that for a one-point increase in the Likert-scale survey response, the log-odds of approving of dual citizenship decrease by 0.145, holding everything else constant. This is consistent with my hypotheses: respondents that were more confident in their financial future and in the economic future of Germany expressed more disapproval towards immigrant dual citizenship.

[Insert Table 7 here]

These same results are displayed differently Table 7, which shows the odds ratio associated with each of the predictor variables. For the pocketbook prospects question, a one-point increase on the Likert scale is associated with 15% lower odds of approving of dual citizenship. For the sociotropic prospects question, a one-point increase on the Likert scale is associated with 13% lower odds of approving of dual citizenship.

As with the South Korean data, there sex and education were both predictive of dual citizenship attitudes. The relationships between these variables are very similar: just as with the Korean model, the German model shows that the log-odds of approving of dual citizenship increases for females as compared to males (with a coefficient of 0.347, $p = p < 0.001$). Highly educated respondents were, again, more likely to support dual citizenship than respondents who have only completed high school, and much more likely to support dual citizenship than respondents who have not completed high school. Unlike the Korean model, age is also related to dual citizenship tolerance: older respondents were slightly less likely to approve of dual citizenship than younger respondents (coefficient = -0.008, $p < 0.001$).

[Insert Table 8 here]

Finally, Table 8 displays results when using data from the Afrobarometer. Within Table 8 are two models: the null model (1) and the actual model (2), which includes all the predictor and control variables. The null model allows to estimate "the extent to which the odds that the outcome equals one instead of zero varies from one cluster to another" (Sommet & Morselli 2017). In this case, the estimated intercept of the null model is -0.903, which means that for the average country in the dataset, the probability of any random individual supporting dual citizenship was $\frac{exp(-0.903)}{1 + exp(-0.903)}$ = 0.288 (Austin & Merlo 2017). Implementing the null model also allows me to estimate the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC), which is a measure how much variation there is between countries in the probability of supporting dual citizenship (Sommet & Morselli 2017). In this case, the low ICC of .102 indicates that 10% of the chances of approving of dual citizenship is explained by between-country differences (Sommet & Morselli 2017).

Turning to the full model (2), I find null results. For pocketbook financial prospects, the coefficient of 0.040 (p = 0.22) suggests that for a one-point increase in the Likert-scale survey response, the log-odds of approving of dual citizenship increase by 0.040, holding everything else constant. For country direction assessment, the coefficient of 0.030 (p = 0.57) suggests that the belief one's country is heading in the right direction is associated with a log-odds increase of 0.030 in the probability of approving of dual citizenship, holding everything else constant. Given that neither of these results are statistically significant, I fail to reject the null hypothesis, concluding that I do not have enough evidence to argue that this relationship is not simply due to chance. Like the German and Korean models, education is significantly related to approval of dual citizenship: highly educated people are more likely to support dual citizenship than those with "medium" education, and they are much more likely to support dual citizenship than those

with “low” education. Interestingly, and unlike the Korean and German models, the correlation between the two independent variables and dual citizenship attitudes is positive (although the coefficients are very small).

In sum, apart from the testing of hypotheses 2 and 3 in the German case, I find null results across all hypotheses. I explore potential reasons for this lack of findings in the next section.

Discussion

Reviewing the results from my analysis, one question immediately jumps out: why do I find support for my hypotheses in Germany, but not in South Korea or the 19 African countries I analyzed? One possibility may be due to the comparative salience of dual citizenship in Germany. Perhaps German citizenship—due to the lack of any military service requirements (such as those in South Korea) and to its favorable location in Europe—is in higher demand, making it a more relevant issue for native Germans who are worried about the economic prospects of granting dual citizenship to former foreigners. Or perhaps economic considerations are more closely linked to dual citizenship in Germany than in the other countries I studied.

Issue salience could help explain the null results in general: the randomness of responses could be attributed to the lack of importance or thought devoted to the issue of dual citizenship. The lack of salience could be because dual citizens (in countries that allow them) make up a small percentage of overall populations, and policies related towards dual citizenship feel less relevant to the lives of ordinary people compared to an issue like immigration. Additionally, there might be a broader theoretical problem with the idea of similarities in global attitudes towards dual citizenship: perhaps opinions are too particularized to certain contexts, and perhaps countries are too different from one another, to find any real results on a multi-country scale.

This is especially true in the African context: I include 19 African countries in my sample, many of which are very different. Individuals living in Mauritius, an island nation in the Indian Ocean, likely have very different political, cultural, and economic concerns when compared to individuals living in Niger, a landlocked country in Eastern Africa. Although the goal of this study was to identify potential commonalities in attitudes, the sheer magnitude of differences between countries may make that very difficult in the first place.

Finally, the lack of homogeneity in the data could absolutely be a factor, potentially introducing significant bias or error that masks true relationships. The lack of homogeneity extends to survey questions, survey scales, and years conducted, highlighting the difficulty of testing the same hypotheses with multiple sets of unrelated data.

Conclusion

While dual citizenship as a legal matter has been studied extensively, empirical analysis of attitudes towards dual citizenship has been much rarer. As globalization continues, international travel becomes more accessible, and living in other countries becomes more feasible for many, the importance of dual citizenship will only grow.

The purpose of this study was to test a set of hypotheses related to economic motivation for supporting dual citizenship. I hypothesized that respondents who felt more confident in their future financial security and in the economic future of their home country would be less likely to support dual citizenship. My theory was that dual citizenship, by allowing foreigners to naturalize in one's home country, would represent a potential economic threat to people who are comfortable with their economic situation. On the other hand, I hypothesized that respondents who felt less confident in their future financial security and in the economic future of their home country would be more likely to support dual citizenship. My logic was that dual citizenship

represents a potential “escape route” to another country, without requiring one to completely give up ties to their home country.

Generally, the null results found in this study are evidence against my hypotheses. For Hypothesis 1, I find no relationship between GDP-per-capita and aggregate attitudes towards dual citizenship at the country level. For my second and third hypotheses, I only find supportive evidence in the German case: for both South Korea and the 19 surveyed Africa countries, I find null results. The lack of findings points to a need for different theoretical starting points, or perhaps more specific models that do not assume generalizability across many different countries. Previous work has investigated not only economic starting points but also the relationship between *cultural* ideas and attitudes towards dual citizenship. Based on the limited research done thus far on the subject, it appears as though these cultural factors (national identity, in-group vs out-group dynamics) may have more explanatory power when it comes to understanding tolerance of dual citizenship. Finally, the observational nature of my study would make it difficult to make causal claims these relationships regardless; future work should rely on experimental methods (such as survey experiments) to better identify what ultimately causes attitudinal shifts.

Appendix

Table 1: Afrobarometer Countries Included

Country	**Included in the Analysis**	**Reason for Exclusion**
Algeria	No (N)	Survey question not asked
Burundi	N	Conflict
Benin	Yes (Y)	
Burkina Faso	Y	
Botswana	Y	
Cameroon	N	Conflict
Cote d'Ivoire	N	Conflict
Cape Verde	Y	
Egypt	N	Survey question not asked
Ghana	Y	
Guinea	N	Conflict
Kenya	N	Conflict
Lesotho	Y	
Liberia	N	Conflict
Madagascar	Y	
Mauritius	Y	
Mali	N	Conflict
Malawi	Y	
Morocco	N	Survey question not asked
Mozambique	Y	
Namibia	Y	
Niger	Y	
Nigeria	N	Conflict
South Africa	Y	
Senegal	Y	
Sierra Leone	N	Conflict
Sudan	N	Survey question not asked
Eswatini	Y	
Tanzania	Y	
Togo	Y	
Tunisia	N	Survey question not asked
Uganda	N	Conflict
Zambia	Y	
Zimbabwe	Y	

Table 2: Dual Citizenship Policy by Country (Africa)

Country	Dual Citizenship Permitted?	Year	Restrictions on Public Office
Benin	Yes	1965	
Botswana	Sometimes	1982	
Burkina Faso	Yes	1989	
Cape Verde	Yes	1992	President cannot be dual national
Ghana	Yes	1996	President and members of parliament cannot be dual nationals
Lesotho	No	1971	
Madagascar	Sometimes	1960	
Malawi	No	1966	
Mauritius	Sometimes	1995	
Mozambique	Yes	2004	President cannot be dual national
Namibia	Sometimes	1990	
Niger	Yes	2014	
Senegal	Sometimes	1961	President cannot be dual national
South Africa	Sometimes	2010	
Eswatini	Sometimes	1967	
Tanzania	No	1961	
Togo	Sometimes	1978	President cannot be dual national
Zambia	No	1964	
Zimbabwe	Sometimes	2013	

Source: Manby 2016

Table 3: Demographic Table for Survey Data

	Afrobarometer	GGSS	KGSS
# of Respondents:	22,710	6,606	1,445
Sex			
Male:	11,789 (51.91%)	3,300 (49.95%)	703 (48.65%)
Female	10,921 (48.89%)	3,306 (50.05%)	742 (51.35%)
Age:			
18 - 29	8,568 (37.73%)	958 (14.50%)	292 (20.20%)
30 - 49	9,433 (41.53%)	2,227 (33.71%)	712 (49.27%)
50 - 64	3,361 (14.80%)	1,803 (27.29%)	269 (18.62%

65+	1,348 (5.93%)	1,618 (24.49%)	172 (11.90%)
Education:			
Low	11,509 (50.86%)	2,120 (32.09%)	262 (18.13%)
Medium	8,903 (39.20%)	2,366 (35.82%)	466 (32.25%)
High	2,298 (10.12%)	2,120 (32.09%)	712 (49.62%)

Table 4: Regressing Dual Citizenship Approval on Per Capita GDP

	Dependent variable:	
	Approval of Dual Citizenship	
	(1)	(2)
GDP Per Capita	$3.8e-06$	$7.9e-06$
	$(2.4e-06)$	$(1.1e-05)$
Constant	0.292***	0.280***
	(0.031)	(0.043)
Observations	21	19
R^2	0.118	0.029
Adjusted R^2	0.072	−0.028
Residual Std. Error	0.127 (df = 19)	0.133 (df = 17)
F Statistic	2.545 (df = 1; 19)	0.502 (df = 1; 17)
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

Table 5: Logistic Regression Estimates - Korea

	Dependent variable:
	Approval of Dual Citizenship
Pocketbook Financial Prospects	−0.089
	(0.070)
Sociotropic Economic Prospects	−0.082
	(0.066)
Female	0.470***
	(0.109)
Age	−0.004
	(0.005)
Education (Low)	−0.362*
	(0.183)
Education (Medium)	−0.357**
	(0.125)
Constant	−0.069
	(0.303)
Observations	1,445
Log Likelihood	−979.183
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,972.366
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 6: Logistic Regression Estimates - Germany

	Dependent variable:
	Approval of Dual Citizenship
Pocketbook Financial Prospects	−0.170***
	(0.038)
Sociotropic Economic Prospects	−0.145**
	(0.045)
Female	0.347***
	(0.053)
Age	−0.008***
	(0.002)
Education (Low)	−0.630***
	(0.069)
Education (Medium)	−0.530***
	(0.064)
Constant	1.021***
	(0.175)
Observations	6,606
Log Likelihood	−4,355.467
Akaike Inf. Crit.	8,724.934
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 7: Odds Ratios - Germany

	OR	2.5 %	97.5 %
(Intercept)	2.776	1.972	3.910
Pocketbook Financial Prospects	0.844	0.783	0.909
Sociotropic Economic Prospects	0.865	0.792	0.944
Female	1.415	1.275	1.571
Age	0.992	0.989	0.995
Education (Low)	0.533	0.466	0.610
Education (Medium)	0.589	0.519	0.667

Table 8: Logistic Regression Estimates - Africa

	Dependent variable:	
	Approval of Dual Citizenship	
	(1)	(2)
Intercept	−0.903***	−0.481**
	(0.141)	(0.158)
Country Direction Assessment		0.030
		(0.053)
Pocketbook Financial Prospects		0.040
		(0.033)
Female		−0.023
		(0.031)
Education (Low)		−0.545***
		(0.053)
Education (Medium)		−0.361***
		(0.052)
Age Group: 21 - 59		−0.012
		(0.053)
Age Group: Over 60		−0.059
		(0.072)
Observations	22,710	22,537
Log Likelihood	−12,910.240	−12,745.780
Akaike Inf. Crit.	25,824.480	25,513.550
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	25,840.550	25,601.800
Note:	*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001	

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