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Colin McQuillan April 16, 2010

Critical Philosophy:
Immanuel Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason

By

Colin McQuillan

B.A., Loyola University Chicago, 2002
M.A., Boston College, 2004

Philosophy

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An abstract of
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Abstract

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Immanuel Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason

By

Colin McQuillan

This dissertation explores Immanuel Kant's reasons for calling the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1787) a "critique." While many readers assume that Kant intended his "critique" to establish the "limits" of reason, this work shows that Kant intended to determine the "sources" of metaphysics, through a "critique" of the "the faculty of reason itself."

By surveying other eighteenth century conceptions of "critique," this dissertation shows that "critique" was not associated with the "analysis of and reflection upon limits" during the enlightenment, as many contemporary scholars assume. Philologists, literary critics, aestheticians, and logicians all used "critique" in a primarily "positive" sense that was only derivatively and secondarily concerned with the "negativity" of setting limits and determining bounds during the eighteenth century.

After establishing historical context in which Kant's references to a "critique" of pure reason are to be situated, this dissertation traces the course of Kant's "pre-critical" philosophy from his earliest attempts to present a systematic treatise on metaphysics to the correspondence in which Kant first announces his "critique" of pure reason. This study demonstrates that Kant's "critical" philosophy is consistent with his "pre-critical" attempts to determine the "proper method" of metaphysics. While there are many differences between Kant's "pre-critical" works and his "critical" philosophy, they share a similar goal: The determination of the "proper method" of metaphysics.

This dissertation argues that what is novel about the *Critique of Pure Reason* is not Kant's attempt to "transform the accepted procedure" of metaphysics, but his attempt to do so through a "critique" of pure reason. By studying the possible sources of Kant's use of the term, the different senses in which he employed it at different times, and the definitions of a "critique" of pure reason that Kant offers in his notes, lectures, correspondence, and in the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself, this dissertation reconstructs the manner in which Kant thought a "critique" of pure reason would decide the possibility of metaphysics in general, as well as the possibility of metaphysics as a science.

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CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY:
IMMANUEL KANT AND THE "CRITIQUE" OF PURE REASON

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In support of the claim that "happiness is activity in accord with virtue" and his identification of this activity with "the activity of the understanding," Aristotle argues that "self-sufficiency... will be found in study more than in anything else."[1] Although he may study "better" when he is with his colleagues, Aristotle thinks "the wise person is able, and more able the wiser he is, to study even by himself."[2]

This dissertation is either the refutation of Aristotle's claim or the proof that I am not wise enough to study by myself. Neither my studies nor this dissertation would have been possible without the support of my family, the kindness of my friends, and the teachers who have challenged and encouraged me.

I would like to begin by thanking my parents, James and Eileen McQuillan, and my sister, Lauren McQuillan, for their love and support. Their faith in my philosophical vocation has perhaps been excessive, but it has encouraged me to become what they think I am. This work is dedicated to them.

My friends have also played an important role in my life and in my work. I would like to thank Nate Holdren and Angelica Mortenson, Tom Strunk and Jamie Leslie, Amber Schaub, Karen Mack, Owen Caliento, Phil Suda, Tzuchien and Amy Tho, Joseph Tanke and Molly Slota, Stephen Blackwood, Ericka Tucker, Steven Farrelly, Andrew Ryder, Christopher Edelman, Alexander Cooper, Ahmed Abdel Meguid, Matthew and Jamie McAndrew, Luke Scripter, Lauren Caryer, Jonghwan Lee, Smaranda Aldea and James Ives, Julia Haas, and my fellow students in the philosophy department at Emory University. The reasons are too numerous to mention, but they are more than sufficient.

I owe much to the guidance of my advisor, Dr. Rudolf Makkreel, and to the careful readings he gave to the innumerable drafts I sent him. My committee members, Dr. Ursula Goldenbaum, Dr. David Carr, Dr. David Pacini, and Dr. Karl Ameriks have all devoted a great deal of time to this project. I have learned from each of them and admire their insight and rigor. Dr. Andrew Cutrofello, Dr. Thomas Flynn, and Dr. Joseph Tanke all read parts of this dissertation in its very early and very late stages and offered very helpful advice. Tzuchien Tho, Alexander Cooper, Matthew McAndrew, and Andrew Ryder have done the same, for which I am grateful.

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[1] Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics (Second Edition)*. Translated by Terence Irwin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999. pg. 163 (1177a)

[2] *Nicomachean Ethics*, pg. 163 (177b).

Alexander Cooper, Christopher Edelman, Matthew McAndrew, and Jacob Rump have done much to help me retain my German since my return to Atlanta. Our weekly *Stammtisch* has been both invaluable and enjoyable. I owe Dr. Garth Tissol a great debt for the many hours he devoted to my Latin. Deborah Ayer, Jennefer Callaghan, David Morgen, the graduate fellows, and the undergraduate tutors have also made the Emory Writing Center an ideal place to spend the 2009-2010 academic year.

If one were to take my dependence on my family, my friends, and my teachers as proof that philosophy is, in fact, not as self-sufficient as Aristotle supposed, then one would only be admitting that philosophy, like happiness itself, requires external goods. Although I am inclined to side with the Stoics on this issue–the Stoics maintained that the sage can be happy, even when he is being stretched on the rack–I am thankful for the good friends and good fortune I have received. I am also glad that I have never been stretched on the rack.

INTRODUCTION

A typical account of the origins of the "critical" philosophy would begin with Kant's education and the beginnings of his academic career. It would say that Kant started off as a more or less "dogmatic" Wolffian, writing several works within the framework of a rationalist metaphysics during the 1750's and early 1760's (*Thoughts on the True Estimation of the Living Forces*, 1747; *New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition*, 1755; *Physical Monadology*, 1756; *Reflections on Optimism*, 1759; *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, 1763).[1] The account might spend a few pages commenting on these works, but it is more likely to dismiss them as the products of an "immature" mind and "unexceptional" works of the German enlightenment.[2]

The account would then turn to the "crisis" Kant is said to have experienced in the 1760's. It would explain that Kant began to recognize the futility of his earlier undertakings, abandoned his metaphysical commitments, and began an entirely new phase of his intellectual development during this time. Under the influence of Rousseau, it would say, Kant began to concern himself with "the

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[1] It is important to qualify ("more or less") any claim regarding Kant and Wolffianism. While it is true that Kant was never an "orthodox" Wolffian, and that many of his works are sharply critical of certain aspects of Wolffian philosophy, it is also true that Kant identified himself more closely with Wolffianism than with any other contemporary philosophical movement or school. Claims that Kant identified with Crusius and the pietists or the Newtonians of the Berlin Academy are, I think, either unfounded or overstated. Kant was certainly interested in the criticisms of Wolff leveled by these philosophers and he was suspicious of Wolff's attempts to apply mathematical methods to philosophy, as well as his "merely logical" distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition. Yet Kant identified with Wolff's attempt to form fully determinate concepts and his systematic approach to metaphysics. He called this aspect of Wolffianism "the spirit of well-groundedness" and sought to equal it in his "critical" philosophy. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 119-120 (Bxxxv-xxxvii).

[2] Beck, Lewis White. *Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. pg. 426.

one consideration alone" that "gives worth to all others, namely, to establish the rights of man."[3] As a result, his thought then shifted toward more "popular" subjects like physical geography and anthropology, subjects which were less "rationalist" and therefore "more humane."[4] The works wrote during this time (*Observations on the Feeling of the Sublime and the Beautiful*, 1764; *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by the Dreams of Metaphysics*, 1766) bear witness to this change. They are even sometimes said to be the work of an "entirely different" Kant.[5] This "entirely different" Kant avoided dogmatic rationalism and scholastic metaphysics, subjecting their more speculative practitioners to parody and ridicule. The crisis he experienced in the 1760's, it is said, ultimately led him to see metaphysics as "the science of the limits of human reason."[6]

Depending on the persuasion of the scholar recounting the story, the return of Kant the rationalist metaphysician in the early 1770's would either be lamented or celebrated. Lamented, because it turned Kant away from the popular works to which he had devoted himself in the 1760's, wrenching him away from his more "humanistic" concerns.[7] Others would celebrate the return to metaphysics for introducing an as yet unknown rigor into German academic philosophy.[8] Either way, the inaugural dissertation Kant wrote for his chair in logic and metaphysics at the Albertina in Königsberg (*On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, 1770) would be taken as a return to metaphysics after an extended absence.

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[3] See Beiser, Frederick."Kant's intellectual development: 1746-1781." Included in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*. Edited by Paul Guyer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. pp. 43-44.
[4] *Kant's intellectual development*, pp. 42-43.
[5] Zammito, John. *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. pp. 4-8, 83-219. While Zammito's *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* is, in many respects, written in response to the kind of perspective on Kant's "pre-critical" works that is to be found in Lewis White Beck's *Early German Philosophy*, it shares a similar and ultimately dismissive view of Kant's rationalist predecessors and of metaphysics.
[6] *Notes and Fragments*, pg. 24 (XX:181). See also *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 354 (II:368). See also *Kant's intellectual development: 1746-1781*, pp. 43-46.
[7] *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, pp. 4-13, 134-135, 255-307.
[8] *Early German Philosophy*, pg. 323.

Although the work is considered to be insufficiently "critical" by most accounts, *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World* is nevertheless said to represent an "entirely different" approach to metaphysics. Because it was written by a Kant who was or had been "entirely different," it is taken as an attempt to formulate a metaphysics purged of Wolffian dogmatism. This metaphysics is said to have avoided the confusions of its rationalist predecessors by introducing a distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, separating what can be known by experience from that which is known by pure reason. By checking the metaphysical pretensions of rationalism while at the same time avoiding the temptations of Lockean empiricism and Humean skepticism, many scholars see the inaugural dissertation as the work in which Kant began to clear a space for the "critical" philosophy he would began to formulate in the following years.[9]

A typical account of Kant's intellectual development would take great care in recounting how he struggled to purify his new philosophy of the last vestiges of the "pre-critical" metaphysics that remained in his inaugural dissertation. During the years of silent reflection which preceded the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1787), it would say, Kant awoke from his dogmatic slumber and began to the light a fire from a "spark" that had been struck by Hume.[10] Or else it

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[9] This view of the significance of Kant's distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition is, I believe, fundamentally implausible. The distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition in Kant's inaugural dissertation is derived from Alexander Baumgarten, who made a similar distinction. Like Baumgarten, Kant presents the distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition as a "real" distinction in the origin and kinds of perfection belonging to sensible and intellectual cognition. Unlike Baumgarten, however, Kant also conceives of the distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition in terms of the difference between a "passive" cognition, derived from the affection of "the subject's own representative state" by "the presence of some object," and the "active" production of purely intellectual concepts by the understanding. See *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*, pp. 384-388 (II:392-396). This difference is, I believe, of considerable importance. I would like to thank Matthew McAndrew for pointing it out to me.

[10] *Prolegomena to any future metaphysics*, pp. 54-55 (IV:257). The idea that Kant's "critical" philosophy was inspired by Hume is also, I think, fundamentally implausible. Although Kant says "the remembrance of David Hume was the very thing that many years ago first interrupted by dogmatic slumber and gave a completely different direction to my researches in the field of speculative philosophy," there is no evidence of this in Kant's "pre-critical" works or in his correspondence from the years before the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Certainly there are parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, particularly in the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' and in the 'Analogies

would say that Kant discovered the antinomies and began to consider the necessity with which reason contradicts itself, when it strays beyond "the bounds of possible experience."[11] Either way, Kant is said to have finally realized that the pure concepts of the understanding applied only to appearances, making knowledge of the thing in itself impossible. This revolutionary insight allowed him to publish the *Critique of Pure Reason* with the confidence of one who had ascended the summit of philosophical reflection and kicked away the ladder he had climbed. The conventional histories of philosophy therefore treat Kant's "critical" philosophy as one which owes as little to its "pre-critical" past as any of the other new sciences which changed the face of modern learning. Like Copernican astronomy or Newtonian physics, it resigned its predecessors to antiquity and obsolescence.[12]

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of Experience' in the 'Analytic of Principles,' which are to be seen as responses to Hume. But this does not mean that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was, in general, intended as a refutation of Hume's skepticism or as a solution to a particular, "Humean" problem. Manfred Kuehn has noted that the *Prolegomena* approaches the problem of the "critique" of pure reason through the "Humean" problem, which might suggest that the "Humean" problem was more significant for the *Prolegomena* than it was for the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In an earlier article, however, Kuehn makes the stronger case that "all of the specific doctrines of Kant's critical enterprise are intimately bound up with Hume's influence on Kant," a claim which I believe is far too strong, especially Hume's absence from Kant's correspondence regarding the *Critique of Pure Reason*. See Kuehn, Manfred. *Kant: A Biography*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. pp. 255-265. See also Kuehn, Manfred. "Kant's Conception of Hume's Problem." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 21 (1983). pp. 190-191. See also Watkins, Eric. *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. pp. 160-170, 362-430.

[11] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 111-113 (Bxviii-xii). See also *Kant to Garve*, 09.21.1798, (XII: 257-258). In this late letter to Garve, written in the context of Kant's work on the *Opus Postumum*, Kant claims that it was the antinomies "which first roused me out of the dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself, in order to lift the Scandal of the apparent contradiction of reason with itself" (*dies war es welche mich aus dem dogmatischen Schlummer zuerst aufweckte und zur Critik der Vernunft selbst hintrieb, um das Scandal des scheinbaren Wiederspruchs der Vernunft mit ihr selbst zu heben*). Norbert Hinske has taken this claim seriously as an account of the origins of the "critical" philosophy. See Hinske, Norbert. *Kants Weg zur Transzendentalphilosophie: Der dreißigjährige Kant*. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1970. See also Hinske, Norbert. Lothar Kriemendahl has attempted to reconcile Hinske's view with the account which sees the "critical" philosophy as a response to Hume. He has also done a great deal to show what Kant knew of Hume in the "pre-critical" period. See Kreimendahl, Lothar. *Kant–Der Durchbruch von 1769*. Köln: Jürgen Dinter Verlag für die Philosophie, 1990.

[12] On the historical significance of the rhetoric of "novelty" and "revolution" in the early modern science and philosophy, see Rutherford, Donald. "Innovation and Orthodoxy in Early Modern Philosophy." Included in *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*. Edited by Donald Rutherford. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. pp. 11-38. On the effects of this rhetoric on later views of the scientific developments of the 17th century, see Cohen, H. Floris. *The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical Inquiry*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

While there are many different variations on this account, scholars rarely question its theme. They debate exactly when Kant abandoned "Wolffian orthodoxy" and "scholastic metaphysics," how much of his "critical" philosophy was implicit in his "pre-critical" works, which passages are to be considered turning points and which are to be regarded as remnants of earlier periods, and when Kant first saw the "great light" that shone on his "critical" philosophy.[13] Yet the distinctions between Kant's "pre-critical" and "critical" periods and "pre-critical" and "critical" works are all too often taken for granted. The distinction between the "pre-critical" and "critical" periods of Kant's intellectual development is frequently treated as if it were a fact, instead of an attempt to find points of reference and clear distinctions in a diverse and confusing body of literature. What is worse, the distinction between "pre-critical" and "critical" works is all too often taken to be the standard of philosophical seriousness or the guarantee of contemporary relevance, as if anything "pre-critical" were, for that reason, also "uncritical."

The relationship between the two distinctions is, moreover, almost entirely neglected. The influence of Kant's life on his works and the appropriateness of using his published works and literary remains as evidence of his opinions, his character, and the course of his intellectual development is treated as if it were self-evident. The difficulties involved in historically establishing and philosophically justifying claims about how they relate to one another are passed over without comment more often than not. Too often scholars simply ignore the historical circumstances in which specific works were written and the possibility that they do not reflect more general trends in Kant's intellectual development. Or they construct elaborate but improbable narratives, accounting

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[13] On the "great light" that shone on Kant "in the year '69," see *Notes and Fragments*, pg. 207 (XVIII:69, *Reflexion* 5037). See also *Kant–Der Durchbruch von 1769*, which presents an interpretation of the "great light" in terms of Hume and the problem of the antinomies. See *Kant-Der Durchbruch von 1769*, pp.

for the differences between what they take to be Kant's position in one work or during a particular period and the positions they attribute to him in other works written at different times. Views for which there is very little evidence then become authoritative, as they are repeated by one scholar after another. The various attempts to divide Kant's "pre-critical" intellectual development into distinct periods of "dogmatism" and "skepticism" and "rationalism" and "empiricism" are only the most egregious examples of this process.[14]

In what follows, I will attempt to integrate what I think are more sound historiographical principles into an account of the "origins" of the "critical" philosophy. The account I will present is markedly different from the one suggested by the standard narrative of Kant's intellectual development, in part because it is not oriented by either of the causes which are typically thought to motivate the "critical" philosophy, namely, the response to Hume and the problem of the antinomies. While both of these accounts have their sources in Kant's own works, his *Prolegomena* to any future metaphysics (1783) and his correspondence with Garve (1798), respectively, I do not find evidence for either view in Kant's "pre-critical" works. My account differs from the standard account in treating the development of the "critical" philosophy as a series of more or less consistent responses to a problem Kant had dealt with in many of his "pre-critical" works, namely, the problem of the "proper method" of metaphysics. It denies that Kant ever abandoned the rationalist metaphysical commitments of his "pre-critical" period, even as he began to develop his "critical" philosophy. The works of the 1760's are simply not sufficient evidence of a "crisis" in Kant's attitude toward

[14] Manfred Kuehn is careful to note that such claims are always to be taken *cum grano salis*. See Kuehn, Manfred. *Kant: A Biography*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. pp. 178-179. Kant scholars are only beginning to adopt the more sophisticated historiographical standards which have added so much to studies of ancient and early modern philosophy in recent years. On the benefits of a more historical approach to the philosophical developments of the early modern period, see Rutherford, Donald. "Introduction." Included in *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*. Edited by Donald Rutherford. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. pp. 1-4.

metaphysics, much less proof that he "abandoned" metaphysics, as many scholars have claimed. Indeed, they provide all the more evidence that Kant was committed to the belief that "the true and lasting welfare of the human race depends on metaphysics."[15]

The remarks that many scholars take to be evidence of Kant's growing hostility toward metaphysics in the 1760's in fact serve a very different purpose when they are read in their proper context. They give voice to Kant's insistence that we approach metaphysics in a manner that befits its importance. Far from abandoning metaphysics, Kant became more committed to its reform, and, eventually, its revolutionary transformation, in the course of the 1760's. I believe this view corresponds more precisely to the evidence we find in Kant's published works, his correspondence, and his literary remains than the view that one finds in the standard narrative about the "crisis" in Kant's intellectual development, and therefore gives us a better understanding of the context in which Kant began to formulate his "critical" philosophy.

There can be no doubt that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a "revolutionary" work. Yet it announces a revolution that was a long time in coming and which has many antecedents in Kant's "pre-critical" period. The revolutionary "transformation" that it tried to bring about in "the accepted procedure of metaphysics" is the solution to a particular philosophical problem, namely, the proper "method" of metaphysics.[16] Kant first addressed this problem as early as1755, when he devoted the work he submitted for his teaching license *(venia legendi)*, the *New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition*, to the identification of four principles which he thought would help metaphysics "proceed along the straight path of enquiry and knowledge."[17] Kant later

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[15] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70). Kant admits that this view might seem "fantastic and audacious," but I would contend that it is a view he held consistently, throughout his intellectual career.
[16] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 113 (Bxxii).
[17] *New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition*, pg. 45 (I:416).

experimented with a combination of *a priori* and *a posteriori* proofs in his attempt to "illuminate" the "bottomless abyss of metaphysics" in *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763).[18] Yet it was not until Kant wrote the first three sections of his prize-essay *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* (1764) on the difference between the "methods" appropriate to philosophy and mathematics that the developments leading to the"critical" philosophy really began to take shape.[19]

After the *Inquiry* won second place in the prize-essay competition sponsored by the Prussian Royal Academy, Kant announced a more general treatment of the "method" of metaphysics in the catalog of the Leipzig book fair. He called the work *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*.[20] Only a year after the publication of his *Inquiry*, it seems, Kant was ready to extend his reflections on the "proper method" of metaphysics–the kinds of evidence on which it relied, the manner in which its could be demonstrated, and its relation to other sciences–into an more systematic treatise. Although Kant never completed *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*, he discussed it in his correspondence with Johann Heinrich Lambert, who had devoted his own answer to the Academy prize-question to the same problem. Lambert's correspondence with Kant shows that both men were preoccupied with the "proper method" of metaphysics and sought to bring order and clarity to its exposition.[21]

Another work which Kant conceived in the same period as his *Inquiry* and *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* can be seen as a further reflection on the same problem and may give us

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[18] *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*, pp. 111, 134-136 (II:66, 91-92).
[19] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pp. 256-263 (II:283-290).
[20] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pg. 77 (10:51).
[21] Lambert emphasizes that he wishes to bring "architectonic" order to metaphysics and that he maintains that "a complete system of metaphysics must include more than has previously been thought." Though Lambert writes as though he expects objections, Kant says he takes the similarity of their projects to be "a logical confirmation that shows that our methods satisfy the touchstone of universal human reason." See *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pp. 77-78 (X:51-53). See also *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pp. 81 (X:81).

some indication of what Kant would have said, had he completed his work on the "proper method" of metaphysics. *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by the Dreams of Metaphysics* (1766) is often taken to be a work which in which Kant denies the "possibility and desirability" of metaphysics and "abandons" his "pre-critical" commitments to rationalist metaphysics. It is, in fact, a work in which Kant attempted to define the "proper" method of metaphysics "negatively," by means of what he called "the euthanasia of erroneous philosophy" in a 1765 letter to Lambert.[22] The appropriateness of this reading of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* is confirmed by a 1766 letter to Moses Mendelssohn, in which Kant tries to explain the peculiarities of the work and assuage Mendelssohn's fears that he had come to regard metaphysics as something "trivial or dispensable."[23] Kant insists that he has been "convinced for some time now that I understand its nature and its proper place among the disciplines of human knowledge and that the true and lasting welfare of the human race depends on metaphysics."[24]

Given the course of his intellectual development and the works he subsequently published, it is clear that Kant was sincere in his letter to Mendelssohn. He only intended to "exterminate" what he called the "confounded contagion" of "the dream science" and "the methods now in vogue" in metaphysics in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.[25] The fact that he continued to formulate more "positive" accounts of the "proper method" of metaphysics after publishing *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer,* both in his inaugural dissertation *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World* (1770), then in his correspondence with Marcus Herz in the early 1770's, and, finally, in the *Critique*

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[22] *Kant to Lambert,* 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:57). For a reading of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* as "the height of Kant's growing disaffection with metaphysics," see "Kant's intellectual development: 1746-1781," pg 45. See also Schönfeld, Martin. *The Philosophy of the Young Kant: The Precritical Project*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. pp. 229-246.
[23] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[24] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[25] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).

of Pure Reason (1781/1787) shows that Kant remained committed to the metaphysical concerns of his "pre-critical" period. It also shows that the "pre-critical" and "critical" periods of Kant's intellectual development are not as "entirely different" as some scholars maintain. The "great light" that shone on the "critical" philosophy was present throughout the "pre-critical" period.

If Kant lacked the "all-encompassing metaphysical position" that he would advance in the *Critique of Pure Reason* during his "pre-critical" period, it is perhaps because he was still "searching" for the "proper method" of metaphysics. Neither Kant nor his contemporaries were fully satisfied with the solutions he proposed in his prize essay in 1764 or in his inaugural dissertation in 1770.[26] The fact that Kant never made any of his "pre-critical" works the systematic foundation for later works could indicate a certain restlessness on Kant's part, as has been suggested by Ernst Cassirer.[27] Or it might be a sign that Kant was disposed to reflect on his own claims and to take seriously the objections raised by his contemporaries and correspondents.[28] In any case, the many works which Kant proposed and left unfinished, the ones he promised to publish immediately but delayed, as well as the discoveries he claimed to have made but to which he never again referred are all the more evidence that Kant was not the kind of philosopher who had one brilliant idea and then devoted the rest of his life to the orderly exposition of its consequences. He was instead a thinker whose work advanced in fits and starts, sometimes finding itself trapped in blind alleys, at other times forging ahead and blazing new trails. These features of the "pre-critical" works are almost entirely neglected in the contemporary scholarship and in the image of Kant as a great systematic philosopher, overshadowed as they are by the looming presence of the "critique" of pure reason and

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[26] *Kant: A Biography*, pg. 175.
[27] Cassirer, Ernst. *Kant's Life and Thought*. Translated by James Haden. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981. pp. 92-93.
[28] See *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pp. 126-127 (X:122).

the architectonic of the "critical" philosophy.

In what follows, I will examine some of the contours of Kant's search for the "proper method" of metaphysics in his "pre-critical" period and explore the outcome of some of these "experiments" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. By demonstrating that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is, in fact, the "treatise on method" that Kant declares it to be in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition, and by showing that Kant had already written or proposed several such "treatises" in his "pre-critical" period, I hope to determine what it is that distinguishes Kant "critical" philosophy from his "pre-critical" philosophy. Although it has often been overlooked by scholars who see the origins of the "critical" philosophy in Kant's response to Hume or in the antinomies, I take the most important difference between the "pre-critical" philosophy and the "critical" philosophy to be the one which is the most obvious: Kant began the "critical" philosophy with a "critique" of pure reason. It is the "critique" of pure reason that supplies Kant with the exposition of the "laws" of pure reason and which is therefore to be credited with the "genesis" of metaphysics as a "science." In order to explain why Kant thought this could be achieved by a "critique" of pure reason, I will examine his reasons for calling the *Critique of Pure Reason* a "critique." The assumption guiding this dissertation is, therefore, the following: If one wishes to understand the "critical" philosophy, then one must understand what makes it "critical." If one is to understand what makes the "critical" philosophy "critical," one must understand the "critique" of pure reason. In order to understand the "critique" of pure reason, one must know what it is, what it is intended to achieve, how it goes about its task. These assumptions may appear simpleminded or even naive, but I believe they raise fundamental questions about the "critical" philosophy, which Kant scholarship has not even begun to answer.

CHAPTER 1: THE GENUINE AGE OF CRITICISM

1.1: ANALYSIS AND REFLECTION UPON LIMITS

Near the end of his life, at a time when he was engaged in the reconstruction of the idea of the "care of the self" in Hellenistic philosophy and early Christianity, Michel Foucault began to rethink his views on Kant and the eighteenth century.

For most of his career, Foucault had characterized the appearance of Kant's "critical" philosophy as the historical transformation that made "man" (*l'homme*) the privileged object of scientific knowledge. The effects of this transformation were so profound that Foucault says "the Kantian critique" (*la critique kantienne*) marks "the threshold of our modernity," and calls it "a fundamental event–certainly one of the most radical that ever occurred in Western thought."[1] Because it brought about "the dissolution of the positivity of Classical knowledge," Foucault also claims that Kant's "critique" constituted "another positivity," one which allowed the human sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to fall into the "anthropologism" that characterizes the epistemological field (*episteme*) of modernity.[2] It is for this reason that Foucault denounces Kant as the philosopher who has "stupefied Western thought, leaving it blind to its own modernity for nearly two hundred years."[3]

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[1] Foucault, Michel. *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*. New York: Vintage Books, 1994. pp. 220, 242.
[2] *The Order of Things*, pp. 220, 248, 341.
[3] To be fair, it should be noted that Foucault blames "the Kantian enigma" (*l'énigme kantienne*) rather than Kant himself for stupefying and blinding western thought. See Foucault, Michel. "Une histoire restée muette." Included in *Michel Foucault: Dits et Écrits (I:1954-1975)*. Edited by Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and Jacques Lagrange. Paris: Gallimard, 2001. pg. 574. See also Djaballah, Marc. *Kant Foucault, and the Forms of Experience*. New York: Routledge, 2008. pg. 3.

Foucault claimed that Kant was responsible for "stupefying" (*méduser*) and "blinding" (*aveugler*) Western thought in a short review of the French translation of Ernst Cassirer's *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, published in *La Quinzaine littéraire* in 1966.[4] He was not, however, afraid to explain why and how the "critical" philosophy had brought about the "stupefaction" and "blindness" of Western thought. Foucault made the case for his claim in a work which appeared in the same year, a work which is regarded by many as his most important work. *The Order of Things* (1966) is, in many ways, the culmination of Foucault's early "archaeological" studies of the asylum and the clinic.[5] Both *The History of Madness*, (1961) and *The Birth of the Clinic* (1963) concern different aspects the human sciences and take different perspectives on the "fundamental event" that separates them from the sciences classical age. While Kant is not often mentioned in either work, his influence is still present. *The Order of Things* shows that it is Kant's "critique" which "marks the threshold of our modernity" and which defines the epistemological field in which sciences like psychiatry and clinical medicine can appear. Because he took on the "archaeology" of the human sciences in general in *The Order of Things*, Foucault was forced to confront the "fundamental event" of the "critical" philosophy and the "modernity" it inaugurated more directly.

The place Kant occupies in *The Order of Things* has been called "enigmatic" by some scholars.[6] It is nevertheless essential for understanding Foucault's "archaeology" of the human sciences, for at least three reasons: First, because *The Order of Things* grew out of the 'Introduction'

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[4] See *Une histoire restée muette*, pg. 574.
[5] See Foucault, Michel. *The History of Madness*. Translated by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa. New York: Routledge, 2006. See also Foucault, Michel. *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1994.
[6] This should be understood as an homage to Foucault's own reference to "the Kantian enigma" in his review of *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*. See *Kant Foucault, and the Forms of Experience*, pp. 1-22.

to the translation of Kant's *Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798) that Foucault submitted as the complementary thesis to *The History of Madness* in 1961. When the jury that reviewed his thesis advised him not to publish his 'Introduction,' but to transform it into a book, Foucault took their advice.[7] The result was *The Order of Things*, whose analysis of the relation between "anthropology" and the "critical" philosophy answers several questions Foucault had raised in his 'Introduction.'[8] Second, because Foucault claimed to have derived his conception of "archaeology" from Kant, who refers to "a philosophical history of philosophy" as a "philosophical archaeology" in the drafts of his late essay on the progress of metaphysics.[9] Foucault made this

[7] This is confirmed by Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and Frédéric Gros, the editors of the French edition of Foucault's 'Introduction.' See Foucault, Michel. *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*. Edited by Roberto Nigro. Translated by Roberto Nigro and Kate Briggs. Cambridge: Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents, 2008. pg. 9

[8] At the beginning of his 'Introduction,' Foucault notes that "it would not be uninteresting to discover what fixed coefficient the Anthropology shares with the critical enterprise. In 1772, was there already, perhaps, even subsisting in the very depts of the Critique, a certain concrete image of man, which no subsequent philosophical elaboration would substantially alter and which emerges at last, more or less unchanged, in Kant's last published text? Moreover, if that image of man managed to reap the rewards of the critical experience and yet, for all that, still not be subject to any distortion, is this not because it had–if not quite organized and determined that experience–then at least indicated the direction it might take, acting as its secret guide? The critique would therefore have been inclining toward the Anthropology from the beginning, and would in some obscure sense be concluded by it. But it is also possible that key elements of the Anthropology were modified as the critical enterprise progressed. In which case, if an archaeology of the text were possible, would it not reveal the genesis of a *homo criticus*, the structure of which would be essentially different from the image of man that went before? Which is to say that, in addition to its particular role as a propadeutics to philosophy, the *Critique* would have also played a constitutive part in the birth and the development of the concrete forms of human existence. Hence there would be a certain critical truth to man, a truth born of the critique of the conditions of truth." See *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, pp. 19-20. These questions seem to inspired by Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), which claims that Kant's "critical" philosophy depends upon and repeats his "anthropology," in addition to focusing on the "analytic of finitude." See Heidegger, Martin. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Fifth Edition, Enlarged)*. Translated by Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. pp. 14-24, 144-162 (§4-§5, §36-§41). The editors of Foucault's 'Introduction' confirm this influence, when they note that Foucault was reading "Kant and Nietzsche" through Heidegger by 1953. See *Introduction to Kant's Anthropology*, pg. 10. The timing of Heidegger's influence on Foucault's reading of Kant is also significant, because Foucault studied Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* with Jean Beaufret at the *École Normale Superieure* in in 1949. Beaufret was Heidegger's foremost French disciple and the recipient of the famous *Letter on Humanism* (1947). Foucault's biographer, Didier Eribon, notes that Beaufret "also talked a great deal about Heidegger" during his lectures on the *Critique of Pure Reason*. See Eribon, Didier. *Michel Foucault*. Translated by Betsy Wing. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991. pg. 31.

[9] According to Kant, "a philosophical history of philosophy is itself possible, not historically or empirically, but rationally, i.e. a priori. For although it establishes facts of reason, it does not borrow them from historical narrative, but draws them from the nature of human reason, as philosophical archaeology. What have the thinkers among men been able to reason out concerning the origin, the goal, and the end of things in the world? Was it the purposiveness in the world, or merely the chain of causes and effects, or was it the purpose of mankind from which they began?" See *What*

claim in response to a particularly harsh review of *The Order of Things*, which claimed that he had called the work an "archaeology," because "the word has its aura of depth and genesis, outside its normal field, since Freud."[10] "The reviewer does not know," Foucault retorted, "that Kant used this word in order to designate the history of that which renders necessary a certain form of thought."[11] Foucault advises the reviewer "to leaf through Kant," even though he is "not as fashionable as Freud," but he never explains the significance of Kant's comments on "philosophical archaeology" for his own work.[12] Foucault only gestures to an unspecified passage in an unspecified text, in which he claims to have "pointed to this use."[13] Finally, because Kant plays such an important role in *The Order of Things* itself. Foucault acknowledges, in the text, the groundbreaking and epoch-making significance of the Kant's "critique." At the same time, he blames Kant for the "stupefaction" and "blindness" which have descended upon modernity, as the human sciences have fallen deeper into their "anthropological sleep" (*le sommeil anthropologique*).

The role Kant's "critical" philosophy plays in the development of the "anthropologism" of the human sciences is, to be sure, no less "enigmatic" than Foucault's own attitude towards Kant. Foucault thinks Kant's "critique" effects the withdrawal of the "ground" of representation and "the dissolution of the homogeneous field of orderable knowledge" that had characterized the sciences of the "classical" age.[14] Because it denies these sciences "the background of a unified and unifying

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real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?, pg. 417 (XX:341).
[10] Steiner, George. "The Mandarin of the Hour–Michel Foucault." *New York Times Book Review*, 02.21.1971.
[11] See Foucault, Michel. "The Monstrosities of Criticism." Translated by Robert J. Matthews. *Diacritics* 1(1971). pg. 60. See also Foucault, Michel. "Les Monstrousités de la critique." Included in *Michel Foucault: Dits et Écrits I (1954-1975)*. Edited by Daniel Defert, et al. Paris: Gallimard, 2001. pp. 1089-1090.
[12] *The Monstrosities of Criticism*, pg. 60 (1090).
[13] *The Monstrosities of Criticism*, pg. 60 (1090). For an account of the influence of Kant's and Freud's conceptions of "archaeology" on Foucault, see Agamben, Giorgio. "Philosophical Archaeology." Included in *The Signature of All things: On Method*. Translated by Luca D'Isanto with Kevin Attell. New York: Zone Books, 2009. pp. 81-111.
[14] *The Order of Things*, pp. 242-248.

mathesis," Foucault thinks the "critical" philosophy poses the problem of the "foundation," "origin" and "limits" of knowledge, from which "there arises the problem of the relation between the domain of empiricity and the transcendental foundation of knowledge."[15] These problems were then taken up by the human sciences, as they began to establish themselves at the end of the eighteenth century.

While Kant attempted to separate the pure and empirical parts of theoretical and practical philosophy, Foucault thinks the empirical and the transcendental began to "double over" onto one another in the human sciences.[16] Because they approached the empirical through a kind of "transcendental reflection," in which a transcendental subject, "which is never given in experience (since it is not empirical), but which is finite (since there is no intellectual intuition), determines in its relation to an object = *x* all the formal conditions of experience in general," the human sciences came to view the empirical as something which was revealed in the "infinite explicitations" (*les explicitations infinies*) of transcendental subjectivity.[17] At the same time, a more positivist approach emerged, in which "man" was treated as a being whose "transcendence" could be seen in "the concrete existence" of his life, labor, and language.[18] Instead of viewing the empirical as something which is revealed in the "infinite explicitations" of transcendental subjectivity, the empirical became a "positivity" which from which something "transcendent" could arise.[19] As a result, there emerged a kind of circularity within the human sciences, in which transcendental subjectivity provided the ground for empirical knowledge and empirical knowledge was, in turn, seen as the basis for our knowledge of man's transcendence.

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[15] *The Order of Things*, pg. 242-248.
[16] *The Order of Things*, pg. 341.
[17] *The Order of Things*, pg. 247.
[18] *The Order of Things*, pg. 313.
[19] *The Order of Things*, pg. 313.

The "doubling over" of the empirical and the transcendental makes the "transcendence" of man both the ground and the consequence of the human sciences. The circularity of this procedure leads to a kind of "anthropologism," which Foucault calls "the great internal threat to knowledge in our day."[20] The threat of "anthropologism" is for Foucault the "anthropological sleep," which forgets the contingency of the historical developments that placed "man" at the center of the human sciences and the human sciences at the center of modernity.[21] While he thinks this "sleep" is so deep that "thought experiences it paradoxically as a vigilance," Foucault also points to a structural limit that is essential to the "anthropologism" of the human sciences.[22] Because transcendental subjectivity can never be experienced as something "empirical" and because it is impossible to close the gap between empirical grounds and transcendental consequences, the "anthropological" circle can never be closed. When the "sovereignty" of "man" as an organizing principle for the human sciences "reaches its limits," however, the human sciences do not acknowledge the failure of their enterprise. Instead, they treat the "limits" of their epistemological field as the constitutive elements of knowledge.[23] In the same way that the bounds of sense were transformed into something which was constitutive of the domain of possible experience in Kant's "critical" philosophy, the human sciences make the "finitude" of "man" something essential to their scientific undertaking. Far from being a concession to philosophical and scientific modesty, however, Foucault regards the "analytic of finitude" that emerges in the human sciences as a sign that they have stubbornly refused to recognize the conditions of their own existence.

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[20] *The Order of Things*, pg. 348. Foucault also discusses the "circularity" of "anthropologism" in the last chapter of *The History of Madness*. See *The History of Madness*, pp. 512-538.
[21] *The Order of Things*, pg. 348.
[22] *The Order of Things*, pg. 341.
[23] *The Order of Things*, pp. 312-318.

At the end of *The Order of Things*, Foucault champions the new sciences that have disturbed the "anthropological sleep" of the human sciences. By showing that "man" and the "analytic" of his "finitude" were not, in fact, essential for science, that sciences like psychoanalysis and ethnology could move beyond the epistemological field of the "critique" of pure reason, Foucault demonstrates that the "age of man" is coming to a close, and with it the relevance of the "critical" paradigm that Kant had established for modern philosophy and science.[24] Not only do the new sciences, based on "new forms of the mathematical *a priori*," and the contemporary fascination with "the being of language" deny the validity of the "Copernican" hypothesis that Kant proposed in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781/1787), a hypothesis which states that we might "get farther" in metaphysics if we assume "that the objects must conform to our cognition," but they also reject the very idea of organizing the sciences around a "critique" of the "faculty of knowledge in general."[25] Such a "critique" is bound up, in Foucault's eyes, with the determination of the "limits" of knowledge and the "finitude" of "man." The "future thought" that Foucault announces at the end of *The Order of Things* will not be hampered by the of "man" nor by the "analytic of finitude."[26]

The course of Foucault's intellectual development took him away from the "archaeology" of the human sciences in the years following the publication of *The Order of Things*. In *Discipline and Punish* (1975), Foucault began to consider the "normalizing" practices through which "knowledge" of "man" was transformed into "power" over him. By laying out the techniques that were used "for controlling or correcting the operations of the body," Foucault showed how the

[24] *The Order of Things*, pp. 373-387,
[25] *The Order of Things*, pg. 383. See also *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 101, 110 (Axii, Bxvi).
[26] *The Order of Things*, pg. 386.

knowledge of "man" was implicated in the forms of "power" that both constituted and subjugated him.[27] Then, in the first volume of his *History of Sexuality* (1976) and in a series of lectures at the *Collège de France* (1977-1984), Foucault began to extend his analysis of discipline into a more general theory of the ways in which human beings are "governed."[28] At the same time, he became interested in what he called "practices of freedom."[29] Foucault's studies of the "ascetic" ethical practices of classical Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman philosophy were part of a very complicated study of the history of ethics and role it plays in the constitution of subjectivity, but there can be little doubt that he saw these as possible sources of resistance to the "power-knowledge" matrix of discipline and governmentality.

Foucault did not, however, confine his search for practices of freedom and resistance to classical antiquity. He considered a movement analogous to the care of the self in the eighteenth century, exploring the virtues of the enlightenment in a series of essays, interviews, and incidental pieces during the same period.[30] The laudatory comments about the enlightenment that one finds in Foucault's late writings surprised many readers when they were first published, leading some to question whether Foucault's newfound "self-understanding as a thinker in the tradition of the Enlightenment" did not contradict the "unyielding critique of modernity" that was to be found in

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[27] *Discipline and Punish*, pg. 136.

[28] Foucault, Michel. *The History of Sexuality (Volume 1: An Introduction)*. Translated by Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage Books, 1990. pp. 139-145. See also Foucault, Michel. *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977-1978.* Translated by Graham Burchell. New York: Palgrave Macmillon, 2007. pp. 229-230.

[29] Foucault, Michel. "The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as a Practice of Freedom." Translated by P. Aranov and D. McGrawth. Included in *The Essential Foucault*. Edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose. New York: The New Press, 2003. pp. 34-36.

[30] Foucault generally did not integrate his studies of the enlightenment into his more general analysis of governmentality. It is not until the introduction to the 1983 course *The Government of the Self and of Others* that Foucault explicitly brings his discussion of the enlightenment as a form of resistance to bear on his analyses of governmentality. See Foucault, Michel. *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres: Cours au Collège de France, 1983.* Edited by François Ewald, Alessandro Fontana, and Frédéric Gros. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard, 2008. pp. 8-39.

"archaeological" works like *The Order of Things*.[31] The fact that Foucault's answer centered on Kant's essay *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* (1784) was all the more perplexing. If Kant's "critical" philosophy marks "threshold of our modernity," and if that modernity leads to the "analytic of finitude" and the "anthropological sleep" of the human sciences, then one would expect Foucault to find in Kant's essay a confirmation of the complicity of the enlightenment in the attempt to subject "man" to special forms of observation and correction. Instead, Foucault finds evidence of an alternative modernity in Kant's essay, a modernity shaped by the "critical" attitude of the enlightenment.

Foucault returned to Kant's essay on enlightenment again and again in the late 1970's and early 1980's. In one of his lectures, Foucault told his audience that the text had become for him "a small coat of arms, a small fetish" (*un peu blason, un peu fétice*).[32] Kant's essay was so important for him because, Foucault said, "this little text is located, as it were, at the crossroads of critical reflection and reflection on history. It is a reflection by Kant on the contemporary status of his own enterprise. No doubt, it is not the first time that a philosopher has given his reasons for undertaking

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[31] Habermas, Jürgen. "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucault's Lecture on Kant's *What is Enlightenment?*" Included in *The New Conservativism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate*. Translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989. pg. 176. In an earlier work, Habermas had accused Foucault of being a "young conservative" who had attempted to "justify a wholly irreconcilable anti-modernism." See Habermas, Jürgen. "Modernity versus Postmodernity." Translated by Seyla Benhabib. *New German Critique*, No. 22 (Winter, 1981). pg. 13. Habermas seems to retract this charge in *Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present*, attributing the change in Foucault's attitude towards modernity to his discovery of a "different" Kant. Habermas assumes that this "new" Kant is "different" than "the epistemologist who thrust open the door to the age of anthropological thought and the human sciences with his analyses of finitude" that Foucault had described in *The Order of Things*. Edward McGushin has argued, against Habermas, that Foucault's later reflections on *What is Enlightenment* are, in fact, consistent with his discussion of the Kant's critical philosophy in *The Order of Things*. See McGushin, Edward F. *Foucault's Askēsis: An Introduction to the Philosophical Life*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007. pp. 251-253.

[32] *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres*, pg. 8. The texts in which Foucault discusses *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, include *What is Critique* (1978/1990), *Introduction to Canguilhem* (1978), *For an Ethic of Discomfort* (1979), *The Subject and Power* (1982), *The Government of the Self and Others* (1982-1983), *Structuralism and Poststructuralism* (1983), *What is Revolution* (1983/1987), *What is Enlightenment* (1984), and *Life: Experience and Science* (1985).

his work at a particular moment. But it seems to me that it is the first time that a philosopher has connected in this way, closely and from the inside, the significance of his work with respect to knowledge, a reflection on history, and a particular analysis of the specific moment at which he is writing and because of which he is writing."[33] These remarks could be said to understate Foucault's interest in *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* While he was certainly interested in the "contemporary status" (*l'actualité*) of Kant's conception of enlightenment and its relation to the present (*l'actualité*), Foucault also stressed the importance of the "critical" attitude that is to be found in Kant's essay.

An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment is for Foucault an expression of the enlightenment's attempt to formulate "a permanent critique of ourselves" and "a critical ontology of ourselves as a historico-practical test of the limits we may go beyond."[34] It is this "critical" relation to itself and to the present that marks the enlightenment as a characteristically "modern" attitude for Foucault, one whose "virtue" of this attitude is to be found in its resistance to authority and its efforts to make itself intellectually and morally responsible for itself. Foucault even calls this attitude"virtue in general" in one of his lectures, because its "critical" relation to the present makes the "critical" attitude of the enlightenment resistant to the authority of those who would make human beings docile, in order to make them governable.[35] The modernity of the enlightenment is the spirit of defiance with which human reason declares that it "does not want to be governed like that

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[33] Foucault, Michel. "What is Enlightenment?" Translated by Catherine Porter. Included *The Essential Foucault*. Edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose. New York: The New Press, 1994. pg. 48. The circumstances under which Foucault wrote *What is Enlightenment?* are unclear. It was presumably written for a private conference to which Foucault had invited Jürgen Habermas, Hubert Dreyfus, Richard Rorty, and Charles Taylor to discuss Kant's enlightenment essay, but Foucault died before the conference could take place. His essay was published posthumously by Paul Rabinow in *The Foucault Reader* in 1984.

0. What is Enlightenment, pp. 52-54.

[35] *What is Enlightenment,* pg. 48.

anymore," insisting on the free exercise of its own capacities, as well as the right to "criticize" those who would seek to govern it.[36]

Foucault draws upon two significant aspects of *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* in order to support the claim that the modernity of the enlightenment is to be found in its "critical" relation to the present. Not only does Kant frame his discussion of enlightenment in terms of an "exit" or "way out" (*Ausgang*) of the "self-incurred minority" (*selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit*) that had left human reason to be dominated for so long by ignorance, prejudice, and superstition, he also treats the possibility of enlightenment as a question which defined the historical moment when it was asked.[37] Foucault thinks this makes Kant's conception of enlightenment as "the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority" into "a philosophical *ethos* that could be described as a permanent critique of our historical era."[38] By establishing such a "direct relation" between "the progress of truth" and "the history of liberty" in the thought of the enlightenment, Foucault says, Kant's essay gives rise to "a philosophical question that remains for us to consider."[39]

Despite his late enthusiasm for the "critical" attitude he found in Kant's essay on enlightenment, Foucault remained suspicious of the virtues of Kant's "critical" philosophy. In his

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[36] Foucault, Michel. "What is Critique?" Included *The Essential Foucault*. Edited by Paul Rabinow and Nikolas Rose. New York: The New Press, 1994. pp. 265-266.

[37] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 17 (VIII:35). Mary Gregor translates the famous sentence "*Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit*" of Kant's essay as "enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority." Gregor's decision to translate "*der Ausgang*" as "emergence" is slightly problematic, at least for Foucault. The primary sense of "*Ausgang*" is "exit" or "way out," as Foucault indicates in his reflections on Kant's essay. Yet "*Ausgang*" can also refer to a beginning, starting point, or point of departure. Gregor's translation emphasizes the latter sense of the term, while Foucault emphasizes the former. The play of the various meanings of "*Ausgang*" may be important to the sense of Kant's conception of enlightenment, but it is not "wholly negative," as Foucault claims. See *What is Enlightenment*, pg. 48. See also *Le gouvernement de soi et des autres*, pg. 27.

[38] *What is Enlightenment*, pg. 51.

[39] *What is Enlightenment*, pg. 51.

reflections on *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, Foucault often contrasted the conception of "critique" that is to be found in Kant's "critical" philosophy with the"critical" attitude of the enlightenment. In the "critical" philosophy, Foucault says, "critique indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits."[40] Unlike the "critical" attitude of the enlightenment, which addressed itself to "the limits we may go beyond," Foucault thinks the "critique" that Kant undertook in his "critical" philosophy regarded limits as lines which could not be crossed. If the"critique" of pure reason attempted to determine "what limits knowledge must renounce exceeding," instead of the possibility of a liberated human reason that Kant announced in his essay on enlightement, it is because his "critical" philosophy attempted to determine what could be known "negatively," by excluding what it was not possible to know. According to Foucault, this led Kant to think it was "the role of philosophy" to "prevent reason from going beyond the limits of what is given in experience."[41]

Because it attempts to determine "the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known, what must be done, and what may be hoped," Foucault sees Kant's "critical" philosophy as an attempt to subject the free use of human reason to the authority of a transcendental philosophy, one which would decide upon the appropriate uses of reason, the terms under which it may be applied, and the conditions of its legitimacy. That it does so entirely ahistorically, neglecting the place of "whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints" in its account of the "necessary limitation" of reason is particularly troublesome for Foucault.[42] Because it denies the importance of the present and its actuality,

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[40] *What is Enlightenment*, pg. 53.
[41] Foucault, Michel. "Omnes et Singulatim: Toward a Critique of Political Reason." Included in *The Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (Volume 3: Power)*. Edited by James D. Faubion. New York: The New Press, 2000. pg. 298.
[42] *What is Enlightenment*, pg. 53.

Foucault rejects the pretensions of transcendental philosophy at the end of his essay *What is Enlightenment?*, declaring that the "philosophical *ethos*" of the enlightenment must be separated from "the search for formal structures with universal value."[43] Critique must become "genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method" if it is to serve the historical-philosophical project of enlightenment.[44]

While I find Foucault's late reflections on enlightenment and critique to be very suggestive, I think they are too quick to distinguish the "critical" attitude of the enlightenment from the spirit of Kant's "critical" philosophy. The "gap" that Foucault identifies between the "positivity" of Kant's conception of enlightenment and the "negativity" of his "critical" philosophy seems to me to be the result of a cursory and unfinished consideration of the virtues of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[45] Had he been able to undertake a more extended investigation of the role that "critique" played in Kant's "critical" philosophy, I believe Foucault would not have said that critique "indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits."[46] A "critique" of the "critical" philosophy that really was "genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method" would have recognized that this conception of "critique" is the result of an unfortunate but widespread misunderstanding of Kant's "critical" philosophy, one which has acquired an almost unquestioned authority in modern intellectual history.[47]

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[43] *What is Enlightenment*, pg. 53.
[44] *What is Enlightenment*, pg. 53.
[45] *What is Critique*, pg. 268.
[46] *What is Enlightenment*, pg. 53.
[47] *What is Enlightenment*, pg. 53.

1.2: CRITIQUE IN THE AGE OF ENLIGHTENMENT

The misunderstanding which leads Foucault to claim that critique "indeed consists of analyzing and reflecting upon limits" is only one of the consequences of Kant's reputation as a philosopher and the prominent place he has been afforded in the history of philosophy. Scholars depend on this history to tell them what the "critical" philosophy is about and where it stands in relation to its predecessors (rationalism and empiricism), its contemporaries (the enlightenment), and its successors (German Idealism). Because there has been so little debate about the ways in which the "critical" philosophy has been historicized, scholars feel free to rely on standard interpretations of the "critical" philosophy and the conventional narratives about the history of modern philosophy. Even when they go back to Kant's texts, they tend to find what they already thought they knew, because their expectations guide their reading.

In an important article on "Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant" (1978), Giorgio Tonelli has noted that the conventional histories of modern philosophy have allowed scholars to treat Kant's conception of "critique" extremely casually. This has led to the remarkable situation in which "the boundless secondary literature about Kant does not offer a single account of the history of the term *critique* prior to its appearance in his works."[1] Tonelli says the neglect which Kant scholarship shown the term "critique" is partially justified, because "critique" and its cognates became "so fashionable" during the eighteenth century and "their use grows so extended in all branches of knowledge" that "they lose much of their old specific meaning." Yet he also points out that the locutions "critique" and "critical" were "used by Kant not just casually, as obvious fashionable

[1] Tonelli, Giorgio. "Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant: A Historical Survey." *Kant-Studien* 69 (1978). pp. 119.

terms of his time, but also, and, I think, primarily, in a hitherto unsuspected meaningful way which will offer important indications for a better understanding of Kant's work."[2]

Tonelli's article is a wake-up call to those who think that "critique" consists of "analysis and reflection upon limits," forcing them to reconsider what they think they know about Kant's "critique" of pure reason, its place in the history of modern philosophy, and its relation to the enlightenment. Tonelli's article examines the "specific meanings" of "critique" prior to Kant in disciplines such as medicine (where it referred to the "point of decision" or "crisis" in the course of a disease), biblical hermeneutics, philology, and literary criticism (where it originally concerned the determination of ancient sources, the correction of texts and manuscripts, the analysis of their style, and the evaluation of their contents), aesthetics (where "criticism" referred to the "critique" of taste), logic (where the term pertained to the "rigorous examination of reason"), as well as the later, more general application of the term (meaning "to judge").[3] Many of the different senses of "critique" bear some relation to Kant's use of the term and play a significant role in one part or another of his "critical"philosophy. By following Tonelli and considering the different senses of "critique" in the eighteenth century, it might be possible to see more clearly what Kant means by a "critique" of pure reason.

One important sense of the word "critique" in the eighteenth century is to be found in the *Historical and Critical Dictionary* (*Dictionnaire historique et critique*, 1697) of Pierre Bayle. Bayle's dictionary is famous for its "critical" attack on conventional wisdom and religious orthodoxy. It is, in effect, a "dictionary of mistakes" (*Dictionaire de Fautes*), documenting the errors

[2] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant,* pp. 119-120.
[3] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant,* pp. 121-131.

of Bayle's predecessors and exposing the ignorance and superstition of his contemporaries.[4] In this sense, a "critique" would be a work that finds fault, errors, and mistakes in the works of others. While this use of the term certainly accounts for the intentions of Bayle's dictionary, it does not explain its title. The title of Bayle's dictionary is not, in fact, an indication of its "critical" attitude toward its predecessors or the reigning orthodoxy.

Bayle called his dictionary "critical" because it contained "critical" accounts of the lives and opinions of historical figures, correcting the works of other historians and biographers with reference to the original sources.[5] Bayle's entry on Pyrrho, for example, attempts to show that "the stories of Antigonus Carystius to the effect that Pyrrho did not prefer one thing to another and that neither a chariot nor a precipice could ever make him take a step forward or backward and that his friends who followed him around often saved his life" are to be regarded as "bad jokes or impostures."[6] The recognition of the illegitimacy of this source allows Bayle to paint a much more sympathetic portrait of the ancient skeptic than is to be found in *Le grand Dictionairre historique* (1674) by Louis Moreri. Bayle's entry on Spinoza is likewise meant to correct Moreri, who accused Spinoza of advocating "atheism, libertinage, and the freedom of all religions."[7] Bayle refers to the accounts of peasants who had met the philosopher and testified that he was "sociable, affable, honest, obliging,

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[4] See Bayle, Pierre. "Preface de la Premiere Edition." Included in *Ouvres Diverses, Volumes Supplementaires I.1: Choix D'Articles Tires Du Dictionaire Historique et Critique.* Edited by Elisabeth Labrousse. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1982. pg. 10.

[5] Tonelli points out that "for Bayle the term *critique* properly meant *philology* and *erudition* only..." See *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant,* pg. 131. Richard Popkin confirms this view, explaining that Bayle's dictionary "began as an attempt to eliminate errors in previous histories" by questioning the sources and the interpretations of other historians. See Popkin, Richard H. *The History of Skepticism from Savonarola to Bayle (Revised and Expanded Edition)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pg. 270. See also Koselleck, Reinhart. *Kritik und Krise: Eine Studie zur Pathogenese der bürgerlichen Welt*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973. pg. 89.

[6] Bayle, Pierre. *Historical and Critical Dictionary (Selections)*. Edited and Translated by Richard H. Popkin. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1991. pg. 195 ©.

[7] Moreri, Louis. *Le grand Dictionairre historique (Tome 9)*. Lyon, 1671. pp. 541-542.

and of a well-ordered morality," despite his alleged atheism.[8] What distinguishes Bayle's accounts of the lives of Pyrrho and Spinoza and makes them "critical" is their claim to authenticity. The word "critique" should therefore be understood in the philological sense in the title of the *Historical-Critical Dictionary*, following an important tradition of "source" criticism in early modern philology.[9]

The tradition of philological "critique" dates back to the renaissance, when humanist scholars like Poliziano and Erasmus began to question the authenticity of the pagan and Christian texts that had been handed down to them from antiquity.[10] The fifth book of Julius Caesar Scaliger's *Poetics* (1561) is, for example, addressed to the "critique" (*criticus, de imitatione et iudicio*) of Latin and Greek poetry, with respect to "imitation" (*imitatio*) and "judgment" (*iudicio*).[11] Using many of the same principles, his son, Joseph Justus Scaliger, went on to produce a number of "critical" editions of classical authors, as did other sixteenth-century figures like Justus Lipsius and Isaac Casaubon.[12] Francis Bacon may not have been as interested in the practice of "criticism" as the Scaligers, but he used the term in the same way when he discussed the three aspects of "critique" (*critica*) that belong to "the art of transmission" (*Traditivae*) in *Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning* (1605).[13]

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[8] *Historical and Critical Dictionary*, pg. 295 (E).
[9] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant,* pp. 119-120.
[10] See D'Amico, John F. *Theory and Practice in Renaissance Textual Criticism: Beatus Rhenanus Between Conjecture and History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988. pp. 8-38. See also Grafton, Anthony. *Defenders of the Text: The Traditions of Scholarship in an Age of Science, 1450-1800.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. pp. 23-46.
[11] Scaliger, Julius Caesar. *Poetices Libri Septem*. Edited by August Buck. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Fommann-Holzboog Verlag, 1964. pp.214-294.
[12] See Bernays, Jacob. *Joseph Justus Scaliger:1540-1609.* New York: Franklin, 1965. pp. 269-307. See also Grafton, Anthony. *Joseph Scaliger: A Study in the History of Classical Scholarship (Volume I: Textual Criticism and Exegesis)*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. pp. 134-226. See also Bravo, Benedetto. "*Critice* in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries and the Rise of Historical Criticism." Included in *History of Scholarship: A Selection of Papers from the Seminar on the History of Scholarship Held Annually at the Warburg Institute*. Edited by Christopher Ligota and Jean-Louis Quantin. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 135-196.
[13] Bacon, Francis. *Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning*. Included in *The Works of Francis Bacon (Volume IV: Translations of the Philosophical Works, Volume I*). Edited by James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath. New York: Garrett Press, 1870. pg. 493.

The first aspect, according to Bacon, pertained to "the true correction and amended edition of approved authors, whereby both themselves receive justice and their students light."[14] The second refers to "the interpretation and explication of authors–commentaries, scholia, annotations, collections of beauties, and the like."[15] Finally, Bacon says it is appropriate, in a "critique," to insert "some brief judgment concerning the authors edited, and comparison of them with other writers on the same subjects; that students may by such censure be both advised what books to read and better prepared when they come to read them."[16] This "last office" was, for Bacon, "indeed the critics chair; which has certainly in our age been ennobled by some great men,–men in my judgment above the stature of critics."[17]

Although Tonelli claims that the use of the word "critique" that one finds in the title of Bayle's *Dictionary* was slowly replaced by the term "philology" in the eighteenth century, he provides a number of examples which show that the philological sense of "critique" persisted throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.[18] Tonelli even notes that "philology" and "critique" were used synonymously in Germany in Kant's time, "especially in connection with Biblical criticism and/or with oriental languages."[19] Kant himself made use of this sense of "critique" when he referred to a "critique of the Latin language" (*Critick der lateinischen Sprache)* in an early *Reflexion* (1755) on Meier's *Vernunftlehre* (1752).[20] Schleiermacher used the term in the

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[14] *Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning*, pg. 493.
[15] *Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning*, pg. 494.
[16] *Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning*, pg. 494.
[17] *Of the Dignity and Advancement of Learning*, pg. 494.
[18] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant,* pp. 133-140.
[19] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant,* pp. 135-136.
[20] *Reflexionen zur Logik 1956* (XVI: 170). This *Reflexion* is Kant's earliest documented use of the word "critique." Under the heading "Ignorance. Horizon of cognition" (*Unwissenheit. Horizont der Erkenntnis*), Kant says "this impoverishment arises in two ways. 1. If one has no object of learned cognition. 2. If one has a very small object of learned cognition. For example the critique of the Latin language. 3. If one has it in an incomplete way" (*Diese Armseeligkeit entstehet auf zweyerley Art. 1. Wenn man von keiner Sache eine gelehrte Erkenntniß hat. 2. Wenn man von einem sehr kleinen obiect eine gelehrte Erkentniß hat. e.g. die Critick der lateinischen Sprache. 3. Wenn man es auf*

same way when he said that "hermeneutics" and "critique" were both "philological disciplines" whose practice depended on one another in his *Hermeneutics and Criticism, with Particular Reference to the New Testament* (1838).[21] Even Nietzsche referred to this sense of "critique" when he called for a "critique of moral values" to document "the conditions and circumstances in which they grew, under which they evolved and changed" in *On the Genealogy of Morals* (1887) [22]

The conception of "critique" associated with literary "criticism" developed out of the philological sense of "critique" in Britain during the first half of the eighteenth century. In 1710, Shaftesbury called etymologists, philologists, grammarians, and rhetoricians "critics of an inferior order" because they "subdivided the several provinces of the empire" and separate what naturally "belongs to a single art," namely, the art of "criticism."[23] Shaftesbury defended a unified conception of "critique," one which takes into account all of the different parts of humanistic learning and brings them to bear on every questions relevant to the arts and sciences. Yet he also recognizes the value of specialists in particular areas. These "would everywhere appear and vindicate the truth and justice of their art by revealing the hidden beauties which lay in the works of just performers and by exposing the weak sides, false ornaments and affected graces of mere pretenders."[24] Shaftesbury swears that he would take it upon himself "absolutely to condemn the fashionable custom of inveighing against critics as the common enemies, the pests and incendiaries of the commonwealth

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eine unvollständige Art hat). The *Reflexion* may be a reference to J.G. Walch's *Critical History of the Latin Language* (*Historia critica linguae latinae*, 1715). See *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant,* pg. 134.

[21] Schleiermacher, Friedrich. *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*. Translated and Edited by Andrew Bowie. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. pp. 3, 158.

[22] Nietzsche, Friedrich. *On The Genealogy of Morals*. Translated by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale. New York: Vintage Books, 1969. pg. 20 (Preface, §6).

[23] Cooper, Anthony Ashley (Third Earl of Shaftesbury). *Soliloquy, or advice to an author* . Included in *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times*. Edited by Lawrence E. Klein. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. pg. 108.

[24] *Soliloquy*, pg. 108.

of letters," because he regards critics as "the props and pillars of this building."[25] "Without the encouragement and propagation of such a race," he says, "we should remain as Gothic architects as ever."[26]

Shaftesbury's contemporaries and countrymen John Dryden, Joseph Addison, Alexander Pope, and Samuel Johnson did much to drive out the "Gothic architects" of modern letters. Each moved to separate the literary "criticism" from philology more decisively, applying it more specifically to the judgment of works of art and literature. Dryden seems to have been the first to use the word "critique" in this way, in his *Author's Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic License* (1677). He explains that "criticism, as it was first instituted by Aristotle, meant a standard of judging well," in order to correct those who "wholly mistake the nature of criticism" and "think its business is principally to find fault."[27] Addison further developed this line of thinking, arguing that the task of the "true critic" was "to discover the concealed beauties of a writer and communicate to the world such things as are worth their observation."[28] Johnson took a more objective view than Addison on this point, arguing that "the duty of criticism is neither to depreciate, nor dignify by partial representations, but hold out the light of reason, whatever it may discover; and to promulgate the determinations of truth, whatever she shall dictate."[29] Pope took a view similar to Johnson, though he hoped that the character of the critic would join "good nature" and "good sense," bringing charity

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[25] Soliloquy, pg. 106.
[26] *Soliloquy*, pg. 105.
0. Dryden, John. "Author's Apology for Heroic Poetry and Poetic License." Included in *The Works of John Dryden (Second Edition, Volume V)*. Edited by Sir Walter Scott. Edinburgh: Constable, 1821. pg. 106.
[28] Addison, Joseph. "Qualities Necessary for a just Critic of *Paradise Lost*." Included in Richard Steele and Joseph Addison. *Selections from the Tatler and the Spectator (No. 291, 02.02.1712)*. Edited by Angus Ross. New York: Penguin Classics, 1982. pg. 423..
[29] Johnson, Samuel. *The Rambler (No. 93, 02.05.1751)*. Included in *Samuel Johnson: Selected Essays*. Edited by David Womersley. New York: Penguin Classics, 2003. pg. 187.

and moderation to his judgment.[30] All of these conceptions of "criticism" differed from Shaftesbury's unified conception of the "art of criticism" by emphasizing the judgment of literature. Yet each retains from philology the sense that literary "criticism" takes ancient works as its models and therefore judges modern literature according to an "authentic" standard.

Philosophers like Francis Hutcheson and David Hume had extended the use of the word "critique" beyond philology and literary criticism by the middle of the eighteenth century, applying it to the "critique of taste" that would serve as the foundation for philosophical aesthetics. Because it addressed the general question of "the standard of taste," which he defined as "the rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be reconciled; at least, a decision, afforded, confirming one sentiment and condemning another," Hume came to see "criticism" as one of the "four sciences which comprehend almost every thing, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with, or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human mind."[31] This raised "criticism" to the level of logic, morals, and politics, giving it a prominent place in the "science of man" that Hume called "the only solid foundation for the other sciences."[32] The subject was so important to Hume that he planned to devote one of the later volumes of his *Treatise of Human Nature* (1739-1740) to "criticism," though poor sales of the earlier parts eventually led him to abandon the project. Hume nevertheless continued to reflect on the nature of "criticism," ultimately publishing an essay called "Of the Standard of Taste" (1757) that contains much of what was to have been included in the part of the *Treatise* on "criticism."[33]

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[30] Pope, Alexander. "An Essay on Criticism." Included in *Alexander Pope: The Major Works*. Edited by Pat Rogers. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 33.
[31] Hume, David. "Of the Standard of Taste." Included in *Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary (Revised Edition)*. Edited by Eugene F. Miller. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1987. pp. 226-249. See also Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Edited by P.H. Nidditch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. pp. xv-xvi.
[32] *A Treatise of Human Nature*, pg. xvi.
[33] *A Treatise of Human Nature*, pg. xii (*Advertisement*).

In Germany, the concept of "critique" continued to play an important role in philology and literary criticism throughout the eighteenth century, even as aesthetics became a more distinct philosophical discipline. The most important use of the term in Germany before Kant can probably be attributed to Johann Christian Gottsched and his *Attempt at a Critical Poetics for the Germans* (*Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst vor die Deutschen*, 1730). Gottsched argued that his poetics was "critical" because it was "founded on a philosophical theory of art." [34] Without this foundation, Gottsched did not think a critic could presume to judge a particular work of art, much less poetry itself. Because a poetics must contain the basic principles of poetry, it must be able to make general claims about what poetry is and what makes for good poetry. Because these general claims must be made on the basis of sound principles, and because the soundness of those principles is to be determined by philosophy, Gottsched maintained that a "critical" poetics needed a philosophical foundation.

While he thought that it was essential to present the German-speaking public with a "critical" poetics, Gottsched doubted that it would be well-received. He knew that "it will not please many, that I have called my poetics a critical poetics; partly because they misunderstand everything critical; partly because they do not trust that I have sufficient capacity to bring a work of this kind to completion" in the preface to the first edition of the work[35] He responds to these "enemies of critique" (*Feinde der Critick*) by saying that they "either do not have the right concept of criticism;

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[34] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*, pg. 141.

[35] Gottsched, Johann Christoph. *Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst vor die Deutschen*. Leipzig: Bernhard Christoph Breitkopf, 1730. pg. 5. The foreword ("*An den Leser*") in which Gottsched makes this remark was excised from subsequent editions of the *Dichtkunst*. It is not included in the critical edition of Gottsched's *Ausgewählte Werke*, which includes the prefaces from the second, third, and fourth editions, but not the first edition. See Gottsched, Johann Christian. *Versuch einer Critischen Dichtkunst*. Included in *Ausgewählte Werke* (*Band 6.1-4*). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1973. A trip to the *Universitätsbibliothek* in Göttingen, generously supported by the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences at Emory University, allowed me to consult a copy of the first edition of the text. See also Mitchell, P.M. *Johann Christoph Gottsched: Harbinger of German Classicism*. Columbia: Camden House, 1995. pg. 29.

or they understand it very well, but hate it, because they have a bad conscience, and do not like to see their writings put in danger of being found to be bad."[36] The former can be taught that "critique is a very noble art" (*Die Critick ist eine weit edlere Kunst*), much like Geometry, which contains "a proof or investigation of a thing according to its own basic principles" (*eine Prüfung oder Untersuchung eines Dinges nach seinen gehörigen Grundregelen*).[37] In order to respond to those who oppose "critique" because of their own bad conscience, Gottsched thought he had to prove that he was qualified to present a "critical" poetics.

The aesthetic and the philological senses of "critique" seem to coincide in Gottsched's response to those he takes to be its enemies. He argues that he is qualified to present a "critical" poetics, containing the basic principles of poetic work of art, because of his "critical" understanding of ancient and modern literature.[38] Because his knowledge of art and literature is "authentic," it reveals their basic principles, which, in turn, allow Gottsched to prove the correctness of his "critical" judgment, even to those whose hostility to "critique" is grounded in their own bad conscience. The "correctness" of these principles is based on "the employment of sound reason," though Gottsched's appeal to "sound reason" did not exclude the evidence of the senses or the affective dimension of the work of art.[39] Indeed, Gotttsched argues that "one should consider nothing beautiful or ugly because one has heard it so called, or because one's acquaintances consider it so, but rather, one should investigate it in and for itself, to see whether it really is to." To do so," he says, "one must "consult one's own five sense, which will soon learn to uncover all deceptions–to

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[36] *Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst,* pg. 5.
[37] *Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst,* pg. 6.
[38] *Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst,* pg. 11.
[39] See Gottsched, Johann Christoph. "Critical Poetics." Translated by Timothy J. Chamberlain. Included in *Eighteenth Century German Criticism*. Edited by Timothy J. Chamberlain. New York: Continuum, 2002. pp. 3-4.

distinguish false beauty from true, veneer from real marble, tinsel from genuine gold."[40] By reasoning for themselves and from their own experience, Gottsched says the ancient Greeks were able to become "the most rational people in the world" and formulate "the rules of most of the liberal arts, thus making good taste immutable there for a number of centuries."[41] In many ways, Gottsched's work was an attempt to reformulate the same "critical" principles for modern German art and literature.

Although Gottsched insisted that the rules that guided Greek art to perfection "were not mental phantoms, but were drawn up from actual examples that were deemed beautiful according to the judgment of the best minds," his own rules appeared artificial to many of his contemporaries and seemed to follow the example of academic French neo-classicism too slavishly.[42] His account of the "critical" principles of tragedy in particular provoked a heated exchange with the Swiss critics Johann Jakob Bodmer and Johann Jakob Breitinger.[43] In his *Critical Poetics*, Gottsched argued that it was the reversal of fortune which gave rise to the characteristic emotions of pity and fear in a tragedy. He therefore urged playwrights to pay close attention to the Aristotelean unities of place, time, and action in the plots of their tragedies, because he thought it was the action of the drama which framed the reversal of fortune. Bodmer and Breitinger insisted that it was not the action, but the feeling of "wonder" (*das Wunder*) at the "miraculous events" (*das Wunderbare)* that transpired

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[40] "Critical Poetics," pg. 4.
[41] "Critical Poetics," pg. 4.
[42] "Critical Poetics," pg. 4.
[43] See *Johann Christoph Gottsched (1700-1766)*, pp. 69-71. The contributions from Bodmer and Breitinger have not been translated. See Bodmer, J.J. and Breitinger, J.J. *Critische Briefe*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1969. The exchanges between Gottsched, Bodmer, and Breitinger were followed by a "*kleine Dichterskrieg*" between Gottsched in Leipzig and Georg Friedrich Meier in Halle. The documents from the latter controversy have been collected in a volume by Hans-Joachim Kertscher and Günther Schenk. See Meier, Georg Friedrich. *Frühe Schriften zur ästhetischen Erziehung der Deutschen in 3 Teilen (Teil 2: Der "kleine Dichterkrieg" zwischen Halle und Leipzig)*. Edited by Hans-Joachim Kertscher und Günter Schenk. Halle: Hallescher Verlag, 2000.

in a tragedy that engaged the emotions and ennobled the drama.[44] While Gottsched singled out English poetry for its lack of "a single principal action, on account of which everything else occurs" and criticized Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* as an especially poor example of a modern tragedy, the followers of Bodmer and Breitinger praised Milton and Shakespeare for the genius of their imagination and the sublimity of their writing, despite their violation of basic Aristotelean principles.[45] They followed Addison in arguing that a good "critic" needed to possess an appropriate sensibility in order to recognize works of genius and discover "the concealed beauties of a writer."[46] To do this one did not need to arm oneself with a set of general, philosophical principles. One need only cultivate one's senses and feelings.

The confrontation between the defenders of philosophical principles and the advocates of genius, which began with the debate between Gottsched, Bodmer, and Breitinger, changed the landscape of German criticism and aesthetics. It moved German letters away from Gottsched's rationalist classicism and toward the sentimentalism of *Sturm und Drang* and romanticism. Bodmer and Breitinger were, in effect, the precursors of Hamann, Herder, and the young Goethe. Yet the shift from rationalism to sentimentalism in German art and literary criticism and aesthetics did not take place immediately and it was not without its critics. One finds, for instance, a curious mixture of the two positions in Alexander Baumgarten's *Aesthetica* (1750-58). Baumgarten insisted that aesthetics could not be reduced to "critique" (*critica*) because "critique" was only one part of the general, theoretical "science" (*scientia*) of aesthetics (*aesthetica*). Without certain "preconceptions"

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[44] See *Critische Briefe,* pp. 12-19. See also Bodmer, Johan Jakob and Breitinger, Johann Jakob. *Critische Abhandlung von dem Wunderbaren in der Poesie* (1740). Stuttgart: Metzler, 1966.
[45] See Paulin, Roger. *The Critical Reception of Shakespeare in Germany: Native Literature and Foreign Genius*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2003. pp. 49-53, 283-284.
[46] *Qualities for a just critic of Paradise Lost*, pg. 423.

(*praenotio*) drawn from that "science," Baumgarten thought "critique" would be unable to go beyond " mere taste" in judgments regarding "beautiful thoughts, sayings, and writings."[47] Unlike Gottsched, however, who thought that something like a science of the beautiful could be founded on the agreement of reason and the senses, Baumgarten excluded "reason" from aesthetics. The "preconceptions" which aesthetics provides for critique are not rational principles, because aesthetics is for Baumgarten the science of "sensible cognition" (*cognitio sensitiva*).[48] Baumgarten distinguished "rational " or "logical" cognition *(cognitio rationalis*, *cognitio logica*) from sensible cognition by virtue of its "distinctness" (*distinctio*).[49] While sensible cognition may be "clear" (*clara*), it can never be "distinct" (*distincta*), because it is the cognition of the "inferior cognitive faculty" (*facultas cognoscitiva inferior*) of "sensibility" (*sensitiva*).[50] Sensibility lacks distinctness for Baumgarten because the "perfection"of sensible cognition (*perfectiones cognitionis sensitivae*) is not the "distinctness" of rational cognition but "beauty" (*pulcritudo*).[51] This makes beauty, sensible cognition, and the "preconceptions" of the "science" of aesthetics something less than rational. Baumgarten's aesthetics may proceed as though it were a rational science like metaphysics or logic, but it differs from those sciences in important respects.[52]

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[47] Baumgarten, Alexander. *Ästhetik (Band1)*. Translated into German by Dagmar Mirbach. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007. pp. 12-13 (§5).
[48] *Ästhetik (Band1)*, pp. 10-11 (§1).
[49] *Ästhetik (Band1)*, pg. 21 (§17). See also Baumgarten, Alexander. *Reflections on Poetry*. Translated by Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954. pg. 42 (§14). See also Baumgarten, Alexander. *Metaphysik*. Selections included in *Texte zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik*. Edited and Translated into German by Hans Rudolf Schweizer. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983. pp. 10-11 (§521). See also Baumgarten, Alexander. *Metaphysica*. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1963. pp. 228-241 (§-624-§650).
[50] *Metaphysik*, pp. 8-11 (§520-521).
[51] *Ästhetik (Band1)*, pp. 20-23 (§14-§17).
[52] Most scholars regard Baumgarten as a rationalist and a Wolffian. While this may be true to a certain extent, the innovations of his empirical psychology and his aesthetics represent a significant philosophical departure, not only from the letter, but also from the spirit of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. See my *Two Kinds of Knowledge or Two Sources of Knowledge: Baumgarten and Kant* (forthcoming).

The conception of criticism advanced by Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Nicolai in their *Letters Concerning the Newest Literature* (1759-1760) takes a very different approach to aesthetics than is to be found in either Gottsched or Baumgarten and constitutes a considerable advance in both literary theory and aesthetics. Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Nicolai differed from Gottsched by privileging the practice of criticism over the formulation of general rules. They nevertheless opposed the enthusiasm of the Bodmer and Breitinger and the peculiar conception of a "science" of aesthetics that is to be found in Baumgarten. Because they did not think criticism needed to be separated from logic, Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Nicolai came to see "criticism" as a process of reasoning from examples. The famous seventeenth letter of the *Letters Concerning the Newest Literature*, in which Lessing accuses Gottsched of seeing "only with the eyes of the French" and privileging the "mechanical compositions" of Corneille over "Shakespearean genius," is a good example of their new approach.[53] While Lessing emphasizes the role of genius in poetry, he does not banish reason from aesthetic judgment. By following the example of Shakespearean tragedy and analyzing its different features and its effects, the critic can show that the work of a genius makes sense, even if it does not follow a pre-established rule. It does not depend on a sense of "wonder" before "inexplicable" and "miraculous" events, which would just evoke confusion, but appeals to reason and the emotions, allowing the work to understand and appreciate the work on a cognitive and an emotional level.

A work of genius was simply a perfect work of an art for Lessing, one which made the best possible use of the means available to the artist.[54] He believed that such a work would not be

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[53] Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend (17. Brief)*. Included in *Sämtliche Schriften (8. Band)*. Edited by Karl Lachmann. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1892. pp. 41-44.
[54] *Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend (17. Brief)*, pg. 43.

opposed to the formal principles of an art, as many of the defenders of genius claimed, but would express them perfectly.[55] To say that rules oppressed genius was therefore to suggest that genius was stifled by his its own "example and practice," a suggestion which Lessing considered absurd.[56] A genius is no less a genius because he understands and appreciates what is at stake in his own work, any more than he is oppressed by his knowledge of the skills his art requires or the techniques he uses to create different artistic effects. If he is really a genius and "has the proof of all rules within himself," then he ought to be the best judge of the works of others and the most capable critic. "Not every critic is a genius," Lessing says, "but every genius is a born critic."[57] By engaging with particular works of art and literature and finding rational ways of accounting for both their structure and their effects, Lessing, Mendelssohn, and Nicolai thought gifted critics could improve the quality of artistic production and the aesthetic experience of the spectator. Nicolai, in particular, stressed that only "the sharpest criticism" (*die schärfste Kritik*) would about the greatest improvement in German literature, declaring that "precise and sound criticism is the only means of achieving and determining good taste."[58]

While Kant took a great interest in aesthetics, he does not seem to have involved himself in the efforts to shape a German national literature or the controversies surrounding the role of "criticism" in its development. He has little to say about the debates concerning the nature and value

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[55] Given the theological commitments of many of the early German aestheticians, it seems reasonable to assume that their defense of the violation of the rules of art by the genius is of a piece with the theological defense of the existence of miracles, against the mechanistic determinism of modern physics. The theological and scientific terms of this debate are admirably reconstructed by Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park in their beautiful book *Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750.* One only wishes that they had extended their study to include the theological and scientific implications of the debate on the miraculous in enlightenment aesthetics. See Daston, Lorraine and Park, Katharine. *Wonders and the Order of nature, 115-1750.* New York: Zone Books, 2001.

[56] *Hamburg Dramaturgy*, pg. 254.

[57] *Hamburg Dramaturgy*, pg. 254.

[58] Nicolai, Friedrich. *Briefe über die itzigen Zustand der schönen Wissenschaften in Deutschland (17. Brief)*. Included *Kritik ist überall, zumal in Deutschland, nötig: Satiren und Schriften zur Literatur*. Edited by Wolfgang Albrecht. Leipzig: Gustav Kiepenheuer, 1987. pg. 197

of literary "criticism" or the principles of tragedy or the role the feeling of "wonder" played in the experience of works of art.[59] This is because Kant took a more pragmatic approach to aesthetics. He regarded the "critique" of taste as an means of cultivating sound reason, good judgment, and moral sense. His concern with aesthetics was, therefore, primarily pedagogical during the "pre-critical" period. Kant thought the "critique" of taste would help to educate the "ordinary understanding."[60] Unlike the "refined and learned" understanding of the scholars or the "inspiration" of the genius, the ordinary understanding "serves the life of action and society."[61] In this respect, the aesthetic education of the ordinary understanding was a matter of practical concern for Kant. The frequency of his remarks on the subject, particularly in his lectures on logic and anthropology in the late 1760's and early 1770's have led some, like Norman Kemp Smith, to believe that Kant derived the conception of "critique" that he employed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* from aesthetics.[62]

Others, like Tonelli, have suggested that Kant's use of the term is derived from a more obscure tradition that regarded logic as the art of criticism (*ars critica*). There is very little scholarship on the *ars critica* tradition, though Tonelli claims that the use of terms related to "critique" in logic constitutes "the most specific and interesting evolution of the terms Critique, etc." in the eighteenth century.[63] This makes it decisive for understanding Kant's "critical" philosophy, according to Tonelli, who ends his article on *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant* by saying

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[59] Certain passages from Kant's *Observations Concerning the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764) show that Kant was at least aware of these debates. His association of tragedy with the sublime (*das Erhabene*) is probably attributable to Burke, but it also suggests a position with respect to the earlier German debates about tragedy. Kant would have been aware of these debates, but he seems to be more interested in the moral implications of the feelings of the beautiful and the sublime and their place in anthropology than he is in literary criticism. See *Observations Concerning the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, pg. 24 (II:208).

[60] *M. Immanuel Kant's Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester,* pg 297 (II:310-311).

[61] *Announcement*, pg. 297 (II:310-311).

[62] Kemp Smith, Norman. *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. pg. 1. Kemp Smith's view that Kant derived his "critical" conception of "critique" from aesthetics has been generally regarded as authoritative in the scholarship. It will be more closely examined in Chapter 3 of the present work.

[63] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*, pg. 141.

"it can be assumed that if Kant selected the title of Critique for his major work, this not only reflected the prestige of a term very fashionable in that time, and the generical meaning of that term in philosophy: but, in accordance with the spirit of his enterprise, he selected it as a qualification of his work as a work primarily on Logic, and in particular of a Logic centered on verification and correction."[64] There is, in the end, very little connecting Tonelli's sweeping conclusion to the broad survey of the different senses of "critique" that precedes it. Nor does Tonelli cite any evidence from Kant's own works in support of such a radical claim. It nevertheless remains one of the only alternatives to Kemp Smith's account of the aesthetic origins of Kant's use of the word "critique" in the scholarly literature.

While there are many ways in which the different senses of "critique" might bear on Kant's "critical" philosophy, one thing that is certain: None of the most important senses of "critique" in the eighteenth century was primarily "negative" or concerned itself with "analyzing and reflecting upon limits," as Foucault suggests. One could, perhaps, interpret philological "critique" as a process of identifying errors, corruptions and mistakes in texts and in scholarship, just as one could treat literary "criticism" as an attempt to separate good writing from bad. One might also suspect that the "critique" of taste was an attempt to police the borders of aesthetic judgment, in the same way that the "critique" of reason might be seen to guard the benevolent dictatorship of enlightenment rationality in logic. These are all legitimate suspicions, which were held by many opponents of the enlightenment during Kant's time. They are worthy of investigation, but they are not the only ways of looking at "critique." There is, in fact, a much more "positive" history of "critique" in the period that Kant called "the genuine age of criticism."

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[64] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*, pg. 147.

Philological "critique" certainly had more ambitious goals than "analyzing and reflecting upon limits" during the eighteenth century. The identification of "errors" and "corruption" and other "negative" features of philological "critique" were secondary with respect to the primary and "positive" attempt to reach an authentic understanding of ancient texts, both secular and sacred, as well as their authors, and the historical contexts in which they were written.[65] Some scholars have even gone so far as to attribute the development of modern historical consciousness to the labors of philologists during this period, because their investigations into the language and history of ancient Israel, Greece, and Rome forced them to confront the differences between the past, the present, and the possibilities of the future.[66] If this is true, then the "new scholarship" certainly deserves to be counted, along with the "new science" and the "new philosophy," as one of the revolutionary innovations that marks the "threshold" of our modernity.[67]

For all the complaints about literary "critics" that one finds in the broadsheets and pamphlets of the eighteenth century, they were still acknowledged to be "most useful" and their writings were the subjects of intense public debates.[68] People like Hamann may have compared geniuses to martyrs and critics to their persecutors, and Goethe and Schiller may have lambasted critics like Nicolai as philistines and profiteers, yet even these "enemies of critique" had to acknowledge that

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[65] There were, of course, those who saw the elimination of error as the "primary" function of philological "critique." Giambattista Vico, for instance, argues that "the main purpose" of "philosophical" or "speculative" criticism is "to cleanse its fundamental truths not only of all falsity, but also of the mere suspicion of error." As a result, Vico thinks it "places upon the same plane of falsity not only false thinking, but also those secondary verities and ideas which are based on probability alone, and commands us to clear our minds of them." Vico considers it dangerous to undermine the "probability" of traditional wisdom, because it plays an important role in the constitution of common sense. See Vico, Giambattista. *On The Study Methods of Our Time*. Translated by Elio Gianturco. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. pg. 13.

[66] See "*Critice* in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries and the Rise of Historical Criticism," pp. 135-196.

[67] See Hazard, Paul. *The European Mind 1680-1715: The Critical Years*. Translated by J. Lewis May. New York: Fordham University Press, 1990. pp. 119-238. See also Israel, Jonathan. *Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of Man, 1670-1752.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. pp. 409-435.

[68] "Criticks are useful, that's most certain, so are Executioners and Informers..." See Gay, John. *The English Theophrastus, or, the Manners of the Age (1702)*. Gloucester: Dodo Press, 2007. pg. 14.

the best critics could "contribute to the *rousing* of genius." [69] If Goethe's account in *Truth and Poetry* is to be believed, Herder was particularly effective in this endeavor. Goethe describes his "acquaintance and subsequent closer connection with Herder" in Strasbourg in 1770 as "the most significant event, the one destined to have the most important results..."[70] And it is noteworthy that Goethe writes as though Herder were the critic that "roused" his own genius and set him on the path to his momentous literary career.

The "critique" of taste in aesthetics was likewise geared towards the development of a culture of "fine feeling" and the appreciation of natural beauty and works of art, just as the logical "critique" of reason was meant to promote the exercise of good judgment and sound reason. Philosophers like Kant thought there was much to be gained by the study of the beautiful and the true, not only because these things were intellectually valuable in themselves, but also because they were indispensable if the citizens of the world were to emerge from the "self-incurred minority" that had for so long limited their potential and restrained their progress. Many of them believed that enlightenment had to shape the"sensibilities" of the people in addition to the developing a "critical" philosophical consciousness. They therefore turned to both aesthetics and logic, in the hope that "the

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[69] Hamann and Herder both opposed the "analytical" dimension of literary criticism, which they thought approached the work of art as a "fault-finder." See Hamann, Johann Georg. *Aesthetica in Nuce*. Included in *Hamann: Writings on Philosophy and Language*. Edited and Translated by Kenneth Haynes. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. pp. 91-92. Herder therefore advocated a kind of criticism that would "contribute to the *rousing* of genius." See Herder, Johann Gottfried. *On Recent German Literature: Selections from the Second Collection of Fragments*. Included in *Johann Gottfried Herder: Selected Early Works, 1764-1767.* Edited by Ernest A. Menze and Karl Menges. Translated by Ernest A. Menze and Michael Palma. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. pg. 172. Goethe and Schiller may not have liked Nicolai's taste in literature or the values he tried to promote as a critic, but the fact that he devoted so much of his time and money to the publication of the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*, which attempted to review every single work of German literature published between 1764 and 1805, is evidence of his commitment to the "true value" of good writing and his attempt to provide it with a public readership. See Selwyn, Pamela. *Everyday Life in the German Book Trade: Friedrich Nicolai as Bookseller and Publisher in the Age of Enlightenment, 1750-1810.* University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. pp. 251-297.

[70] Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von. *From My Life: Poetry and Truth (Part Two)*. Translated by Robert R. Heitner. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987. pg. 298.

rules of the one at all times serve to elucidate the rules of the other," and both would help advance the cause of the enlightenment.[71]

Clearly, one finds very "positive" ways of thinking of "critique" in philology, literary criticism, aesthetics, and logic in the eighteenth century. Because the "positivity" of these undertakings defined the "ends" towards which their "critiques" were oriented, they can be said to take priority over the "negativity" of the "means" which critics may have sometimes employed in their efforts to bring about the enlightenment of the age. By "negative means," I mean the identification of error in philology, the dismissal of works of inferior quality in art and literary criticism, the denunciation of poor taste in aesthetics, and the correction of faulty reasoning in logic. Eighteenth-century critics certainly employed these "negative means" in the process of answering "positive" questions of authenticity, quality, value, and truth. And their judgments regarding what was "not" authentic, good, beautiful, or true were no doubt closely related to their judgment of what was, in fact, authentic, good, beautiful, and true. Yet the latter are not defined solely in terms of "what they are not." They exemplify the positive and affirmative spirit the enlightenment, which refuses to be defined by "what it is not." By asking "what it could become" instead of "what it is not," the "critical" spirit of the enlightenment went beyond the "negative" conception of "critique" that Foucault identified with limiting, delimiting, and boundary-setting.

1.3: THE GENUINE AGE OF CRITICISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

"Critique" was obviously an important part of the philosophical discourse of the eighteenth century. Not only was the term employed in a number of different disciplines and contexts, but there were many very "positive" senses of "critique" in use at the time. The fact that Kant wrote the

[71] *M. Immanuel Kant's Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester*, pg. 297 (II:311).

Critique of Pure Reason during the age of enlightenment does not, however, prove that his "critique" is to be understood in any of the senses familiar to what he called "the genuine age of criticism." Kant may have used the word idiosyncratically, in effect creating his own private "critical" language. Or it may be the case that he emphasized the "negative" aspects of "critique" that I called secondary at the end of the preceding section. If either were the case, then Kant's "critique" really would be the "analysis and reflection upon limits" that Foucault describes. A more rigorous examination of "the Kantian critique" will be necessary, in order to demonstrate the "positivity" of conception of "critique" that Kant employs in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) is a natural place to begin exploring Kant's conception of "critique" and its relation to other uses of the term in the eighteenth century. Before introducing the idea of a "critique" of pure reason in his 'Preface,' Kant argues that everything, even the "holiness" (*Heiligkeit*) of the church and the "majesty" (*Majestät*) of the state, must "submit"(*unterwerfen*) to "the genuine age of criticism" (*das eigentliche Zeitalter der Critick*).[1] While these remarks are to be found in a footnote, they play an important role in framing the discussion of the "critique" of pure reason in the pages to come. Kant says that both the "critique" of the church and the state and the "critique" of pure reason are effects "not of the thoughtlessness of our age" or the "superficiality" of its "way of thinking," but of "its ripened power of judgment."[2] The indifference with which it regards the controversies between dogmatism and skepticism in metaphysics and its willingness to subject everything to "strict criticism" are for Kant signs that his age possessed "a well-grounded way of thinking."[3] It is this "well-grounded way of

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 100-101 (Axi).
[2] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Axi).
[3] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Axi).

thinking" which gives rise to both the "critique" of the church and state and the "critique" of pure reason.

The "critique" of the church and state plays an important role in Kant's discussion of the "genuine age of criticism," because the church and state were institutions that claimed special privileges, in order to remove themselves from public scrutiny. Kant denies that any institution has such a privilege. By claiming to be exempt from criticism, Kant thought the church and state had set themselves against reason and enlightenment and compromised their own legitimacy. He says that institutions which seek to exempt themselves from criticism "excite a just suspicion against themselves," so that they cannot "lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able withstand its free and public examination."[4] It is only when they submit themselves to criticism, expose themselves to "free and public examination," and undertake the reforms deemed necessary by the "court" of reason that Kant thinks these institutions may command the respect of the enlightened citizens of the world.

The "free and public examination" which Kant identifies refers to as "critique" (*Critic*) in the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* does not seem to differ in any substantial way from the "public use of reason" that he discusses in *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*? Both the "genuine age of criticism" and the "public use of reason" in an "age of enlightenment" refuse to be governed by an authority whose legitimacy they have not established for themselves. Each confers upon itself the right to judge the conduct of those who consider themselves to be of greater rank than themselves, and dismisses their claims of privilege and exemption. Finally, both "critique" and the "freedom of *spirit*" that is born by the "public use

[4] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Ax).

of reason" contribute to what Kant calls "the enlightenment of the age." At the end of his essay on enlightenment, Kant even says that "the propensity and calling to *think* freely gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of *freedom* in acting) and eventually even on the principles of *government*, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping with his dignity."[5] Because the state must submit to the "critique" of the age if it is to win the "unfeigned respect" respect of its citizens, it is forced to see reason and permit the "freedom of *spirit*" that leads to its own liberalization. If this is what Kant had in mind in his discussion of the "well-grounded way of thinking" and "ripened power of judgment" of "the genuine age of criticism," then it is clear that he had a very "positive" conception of "critique," one that was consistent with the "critical" attitude of the enlightenment.

Despite their many affinities, one should not be too quick to identify the conception of "critique" that Kant associates with "the genuine age of criticism" and the "public use of reason" with the "critique" of pure reason itself. Both the "public use of reason" and the "critique" of pure reason are "positive" forms of "critique" and both are expressions of the "critical" attitude of the enlightenment. Yet the "critique" of pure reason differs from the kind of "critique" that Kant associates with "public use of reason" in at least one important respect. The "critique" of pure reason is not a "critique" of an institution like the church or the state, but an investigation of "the faculty of reason itself."[6] It is reason's attempt to achieve"the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge."[7] Reason does not seek to exempt itself from criticism, as many of the

[5] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 22 (VIII:41-42).
[6] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axi).
[7] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axi).

"critics" of the "critical" philosophy have claimed. It claims only that it is too important not to be subject to "critique."[8]

There is, however, a special difficulty involved in the "critique" of pure reason, one that makes its self-knowledge "the most difficult of all its tasks." One possible source of this difficulty is the reflexivity of the "critique" of pure reason. The "critique" of pure reason is reason's "critique" of itself, while the "public use of reason" addresses its "critique" to things other than itself, things which have want of reason and receive it in the form of "criticism." This is not as significant a difference as it might at first appear. In addition to his remarks on the way the "freedom of spirit" works back on the "mentality of the people" and the "even on the principles of government," Kant famously says it is more likely "that a public should enlighten itself" than "any single individual" who seeks "to extricate himself from the minority that has become almost nature to him" in *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*?[9] These remarks show that Kant thought the "critique" of institutions was also reflexive. It brings about the reform of institutions in question, but also the enlightenment of those engaged in their "critique." Because it allows the people to exercise their reason for themselves, as scholars, the "public use of reason" allows them to develop the capacity to judge and the intellectual maturity which is necessary for their self-determination.

The philosophical character of the "critique" of pure reason is another possible source of its difficulty. The "critique" of pure reason aims at "reason's self-knowledge," while the "public use of reason" is to bring enlightenment to the people and to the institutions which govern them. It is, however, unclear that the distinction between philosophy and politics is really relevant to the

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[8] Hence Kant's interest in refuting the "indifferentism" (*Indifferentism*) which he thought had come to dominate his contemporaries' views on metaphysics. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Ax). See also Chapter 5, Section 5.2 of the present work.

[9] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 17 (VIII:36).

distinction between the "critique" of pure reason and the "critique" of institutions. Kant thought the enlightenment would win the political freedom (freedom of action) of the people by means of the freedom to philosophize (freedom of spirit). When Kant says it is "almost inevitable" that the public will enlighten itself "if only it is left its freedom" at the beginning of *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, he is politicizing what might otherwise be an individual and purely philosophical conception of enlightenment.[10] The "freedom of spirit" that Kant identified with the "public use of reason" in "the age of enlightenment" proves that his hopes for "the genuine age of criticism" were no less political than philosophical.

The way in which Kant defines the "freedom" of "the public use of reason" in his enlightenment essay is worth noting, because it contains the key to understanding the difference between the kind of "critique" that made the enlightenment "the genuine age of criticism" and Kant's "critique" of pure reason. Kant argues that the "freedom" of "the public use of reason" is the freedom to address oneself "as a *scholar* before the entire public of the *world of readers*."[11] The fact that Kant says the freedom of the public use of reason belongs to "scholars" (*die Gelehrten*) is significant, because it qualifies the degree to which he thought the freedom to reason in public was actually to be made available to the public. If Kant thought that only scholars were to be allowed to reason in public, then he would have a much more restricted view of the "public use of reason" than has been generally recognized.[12]

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[10] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 17 (VIII:36).
[11] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 18 (VIII:36-37).
[12] Hannah Arendt is one of the few to note the restrictions Kant places on the exercise of the public use of reason when he indicates that it is a freedom to be exercised by "scholars." She then distinguishes scholars as citizens of the world from the citizens of particular nations. See Arendt, Hannah. *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*. Edited by Ronald Beiner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. pg. 39. Katerina Deligiorgi rejects Kant's restrictions and Arendt's distinctions on the basis of what she calls "the principle of inclusion" necessary for an enlightened political culture. See Deligiorgi, Katerina. *Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. pg. 72.

While Kant has often been criticized for coupling his defense of the freedom of the "public use of reason" with arguments for the necessity of obedience in its "private" employments, his restriction of the kinds of people he thought were capable of exercising this freedom poses a more serious problem, one which is more relevant to his "critical" philosophy. The problem of obedience can be easily solved, if one recognizes that Kant was concerned with the moral duties of truth-telling and promise-keeping in his discussion of the "private use of reason."[13] Unlike Moses Mendelssohn, who argued that one is not obliged to keep oaths which one does not understand, which one can prove to be false, or which one opposes for reasons of conscience in his *Jerusalem, Or, On Religious Power and Judaism* (1783), Kant thought those who took oaths upon entering a civil or ecclesiastical office were morally obligated to uphold them, regardless of their own opinions or the arguments they could produce concerning the truth or falsity, virtue or vice of the principles they had sworn to uphold.[14] Because he thought the duties of truth-telling and promise-keeping admitted no exceptions, Kant was committed to the view that those who held civil or ecclesiastical office could not "criticize" the institutions of which they were a part in ways that conflicted with their oaths of office.[15]

Scholars were not bound by any oaths, so Kant did not think their debates should be restricted by any of the conditions oaths of office impose on the "private" use of reason. He

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[13] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,* pp. 18-21 (VIII: 37-40).

[14] Mendelssohn, Moses *Jerulsalem, Or, On Religious Power and Judaism*. Translated by Allan Arkush. Hanover: Brandeis University Press, 1983. pp. 71-72. Kant's discussion of the distinction between the public and private uses of reason, the problems these pose for holders of state and ecclesiastical offices, the extent of the intellectual and moral freedom afforded to those who have sworn oaths, as well as their relation to the enlightenment ought to be seen as a response to Mendelssohn's *Jerusalem*, which is, in fact, a more significant point of reference for the differences between Mendelssohn and Kant than the comparison of their respective essays on enlightenment. Kant praised the "penetration, subtlety, and wisdom" of *Jerusalem* in a letter to Mendelssohn, calling it "the proclamation of a great reform that is slowly impending, a reform that is in store not only for your own people but for other nations as well," but his essay on enlightenment clearly demonstrates that he did not agree with all of its claims. See *Kant to Mendelssohn, 08.16.1783*, pg. 204 (X:347).

[15] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,* pg. 19 (VIII: 38).

therefore advocated the broadest possible freedom for scholarly debates. Although it is not often recognized, his essay on enlightenment is, in fact, an argument for even broader freedom of speech and freedom of the press than existed in Prussia at that time. When Kant praises Frederick as a head of state who does not meddle in debates concerning the arts and sciences and who "goes still further and sees that even with respect to his *legislation* there is no danger in allowing his subjects to make public use of their own reason and to publish to the world their thoughts about a better way of formulating it, even with candid criticism of that already given," he is giving the King credit for a liberalism he had not yet achieved.[16] Frederick was indeed quite tolerant of debate, compared to the other absolutist monarchs of the time. Yet his behavior towards critics of his policies shows that he was by no means "a shining example of this, in which no monarch has yet surpassed the one whom we honor."[17] Frederick was not above censoring or silencing those who disagreed with his policies.[18] By encouraging the King to be more tolerant of political debate, Kant thought he could convince Frederick to grant scholars greater freedom to criticize the state.

Kant apparently did not believe that limiting the freedom of "the public use of reason" to "scholars" compromised the integrity of the enlightenment's "freedom of *spirit*" or "the propensity and calling to *think* freely*"* that he defended in his essay.[19] Like other German authors of his time,

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[16] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 21 (VIII:41).
[17] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 21 (VIII:41).
[18] Lessing complained to Nicolai that while Frederick was tolerant of religious criticism, he was not tolerant of political criticism. He even challenges Nicolai, a proud subject of the "enlightened despot" of Prussia, to "find someone who wants to raise his voice in Berlin for the rights of subjects (*Unterthanen*) and against absorption (*Ausfaugung*) and despotism (*Despotismus*), as it now appears even in France and Denmark: and you will soon have the experience, which country is up to the current day, the most slavish land in Europe (*das sklavischste Lan von Europa*)." See Lessing to Nicolai, 08.25.1769. Included in *Gotthold Ephraim Lessings Sämtliche Schriften (Siebzehnter Band: Briefe von und an Gotthold Ephraim Lessing)*. Edited by Karl Lachmann. Leipzig: Göschen'sche Verlagshandlung, 1904. pg. 298. Kant recommends that Frederick allow less religious criticism, because he does not think the people are sufficiently mature to engage in debates about religion, but more political criticism, which will do more to bring about the maturity that would make them able to discuss religious matters rationally. See *An Answer to the Question, What is Enlightenment*, pg. 21 (VIII:41).
[19] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 22 (VIII:41).

he distinguished scholars (*die Gelehrten*) from the rest of the educated public (*die Gebildeten*).[20] Kant placed a high value on general education (*Erziehung*) because he thought it cultivated sound reason (*die gesunde Vernunft*) and the common understanding (*der gemeine Verstand*).[21] Yet he stressed that it did so by applying empirical principles to ordinary experience.[22] While this constituted a necessary "logic of the common understanding (*Logica des gemeinen Verstandes*)," which served to "enrich the common and healthy understanding and to cultivate (*zu Bereicheren*) this healthy reason (*diese gesunden Verstand*) for learnedness *(Gelahrsamkeit)*," Kant thought the principles of "scholarship" (*die Gelehrsamkeit*) were very different.[23] "A learned man," Kant says, "is one whose learnedness is not grounded on common experience" (*Ein Gelahrter heißt, deßen Gelahrtsamkeit sich nicht auf gemeine Erfahrung gründet*).[24] The "learnedness" of the "learned

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[20] This distinction is especially prominent in Kant's logic lectures, though some of the emphasis Kant places on the difference between the common understanding and learned cognition may be the result of the text from which he was lecturing.. Kant lectured from a selection from Meier's *Vernunftlehre* (172), which addresses the constitution of learned cognition and its elevation above the common understanding. According to Meier, "the doctrine of reason or the art of reason (logic, instrumental philosophy, rational philosophy) is a science which deals with the rules of learned cognition and of learned speech" (*Die Vernunftlehre oder die Vernunftkunst (logica, philosophia instrumentalis, philosophia rationalis) ist eine Wissenschaft, welche die Regeln der gelehrten Erkenntniss und des gelehrten Vortrages abhandelt*). See *Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre* (Included in *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, XVI:150). The analysis of the distinction between *die Gelehrten* and *die Gebildeten* is curiously absent from the otherwise very helpful discussion of public argument as a social practice during the enlightenment in *Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment* by Katerina Deligiorgi. Deligiorgi argues that the designation "scholar" (*Gelehrter*) does not sufficiently answer the question of "who" Kant thought might legitimately reason in public. She then takes this ambiguity as license to suggest that "Kant's references to learning can in fact be interpreted as meaning that no *other* qualifications are necessary for participating in public argument." While this is a noble and, I think, necessary correction to Kant's account, it fails to consider Kant's reasons for identifying "scholars" as the bearers of the freedom of the "public use of reason" in the historical, social, and cultural context in which he made his remarks. See Deligiorgi, Katerina. *Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005. pp. 69-85.

[21] *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 6-9 (XXIV:18-21). Kant rarely used the word "*Bildung*" (education, formation) which would correspond more precisely to the kind of education possessed by "*die Gebildeten*." He uses the word to describe the formation of physical objects (planets, bodies) and languages more frequently than he uses it in connection with education. In his late (1803) lectures on pedagogy, however, Kant does indicate that formation (*Bildung*) is the part of education (*Erziehung*) dealing with training (*Zucht*) and instruction (*Unterweisung*), distinguishing it from the care (*Wartung*) that human children require, because they are not animals. See *Lectures on Pedagogy*, pg. 438 (IX:443).

[22] *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 6-9 (XXIV:18-21).

[23] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 6 (XXIV:17). Kant stresses that the distinction between the healthy understanding and science is a difference in kind and not a difference in degree. He insists that "healthy reason and learnedness are distinct not merely in degree but also in species."

[24] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 6 (XXIV:18).

man" is instead based on the "universal cognitions of the understanding" and their "universal rules."[25] These, Kant says, are "the rules of the good use of the understanding and of reason in general."[26]

If Kant thought arguments based on purely rational principles were really the engines of enlightenment, then he must have thought a scholar's ability to address the public depended upon his ability to separate the purely rational principles of science from ordinary experience. This, in turn, would allow scholar to present arguments that were convincing, not just because they appealed to the prejudices of the people and the things they thought they already knew, but because they were supported by sound reasoning. What is curious is that Kant thought these arguments were subject to debate. One would presume that an argument based purely rational principles would be obviously, incontestably true. But in the same way that he thought it unlikely that any individual would achieve enlightenment on his own, Kant thought it unlikely that an individual scholar would hit on the best arguments by himself. He therefore defended the rights of scholars to bring their views before the public and debate any subject they saw fit to discuss. He saw this as an integral part of the "freedom of spirit" of the enlightenment. Kant regarded public debate as an essential feature of the transition from an "age of enlightenment" to an "enlightened age," but he restricted participation in public debates to those he thought qualified to advance the cause they served.[27]

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[25] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 11 (XXIV: 23-24). Kant curiously excludes morality from his catalog of sciences which must be based on "science or learnedness," among which he includes mathematics, surveying, and pharmacy. If science or schoalrship were necessary "to pass judgment on morality, on right and wrong," Kant says, "the human race would be very imperfect." Therefore, he says that "the common understanding is the judge of science" with respect to morality. This view seems not to be attributable to Meier, as it is included in a section under the heading "*Introduction to the doctrine of reason according to the thoughts of Professor Kant*." See *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 5, 11 (XXIV:16, 24).
[26] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 12 (XXIV:25).
[27] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 21 (VIII:40).

Despite his enthusiastic support for "the public use of reason," Kant was careful to distinguish his own "critique" of pure reason from the "free and public examination" of the church and state that he described in the Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* and advocated in *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*. Several remarks that appear later in the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the work and in Kant's responses to his critics suggest that he did not regard the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a contribution to the "public use of reason." Instead, he saw it as a "scholastic" work meant to be read by other philosophers. Although he thought of his "critique" as a work that would refute the "indifference" with which many of his contemporaries regarded metaphysics and denounced the pretense with which other "scholastic" philosophers who claimed to possess "higher or more comprehensive insight" regarding "matters of universal human concern" than "the insight that is accessible to the great multitude (who are always worthy of our respect)," Kant repeatedly denied that the "systematic critique of the faculty of reason itself, along with all that can be established only by means of it" could ever be "popular."[28] He did not therefore think it appropriate to address his "critique" to "the entire public of the *world of readers*."[29]

Kant was aware that the *Critique of Pure Reason* would have a very small readership, even before its first reviewers excoriated the work for being "much less agreeably and popularly presented" than Kant's other works and for straining the attention of its readers "to the point of exhaustion."[30] He therefore decided to treat his subject "in a dry, merely scholastic manner."[31] It was, he said, "inadvisable" to further enlarge such an already extensive work "with examples and

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[28] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 100, 118 (Ax, Bxxxiii). See also *The Metaphysics of Morals*, pg. 366 (VI:206).
[29] *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*, pg. 18 (VIII:37).
[30] These remarks are included in the Garve/Feder review published in the *Zugabe zu den Göttischen Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen* (1782) and the longer review by Christian Garve published in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* (1783). See Sassen, Brigitte. *Kant's Early Critics: The Empiricist Critique of the Theoretical Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 59, 53.
[31] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 103-104 (Axviii).

illustrations, which are necessary only for a popular aim, especially since this work could never be made suitable for **popular** use, and real experts in this science (*die eigentliche kenner der Wissenschaft*) do not have so much need for things to be made easy for them..."[32] Kant also feared that the "bright colors" of the examples and illustrations necessary for a popular work would "paint over and make unrecognizable the articulation of the structure of the system, which yet matters most when it comes to judging its unity and soundness."[33] While he remained convinced that metaphysics was a matter to which human beings could not afford to be indifferent, Kant apparently did not think they needed to concern themselves with scholarly treatises on the subject.[34] Nor did he think they were capable of judging the merits of such treatises for themselves. The metaphysician was,for Kant "the exclusive trustee of a science that is useful to the public even without their knowledge, namely, the critique of pure reason..."[35]

Kant expands upon these themes and connects them more closely to the idea of a "critique" of pure reason at the beginning of the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), where he responds to Christian Garve's charge that the style of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was not sufficiently "popular." Kant says his "critique" has to do with "the distinction of the sensible in our cognition from that which is supersensible but yet belongs to reason."[36] Because this distinction requires "scholastic precision" and the public censures such precision for "hair-splitting," Kant denies that the public will be able to appreciate his "critique" of pure reason.[37] While Kant believes the results of his"critique" could be "most illuminating for the healthy reason (of an unwitting metaphysician)," he does not think

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[32] *Critique of Pure reason*, pg. 104 (Axviii).
[33] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 104 (Axix).
[34] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Ax).
[35] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 118 (Bxxiv).
[36] *The Metaphysics of Morals*, pg. 366 (VI:206).
[37] *The Metaphysics of Morals*, pg. 366 (VI:206).

they can be translated into ordinary language and made available to the "entire public of the *world of readers*."[38] If this is true, then it would appear that the "critique" of pure reason is not open to the "free and public examination" which Kant believed confers legitimacy on institutions and commands the respect of the enlightened citizens of the world.

No less troubling than Kant's failure to address "the entire public of the world of readers" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* are the aims of the "critique" itself. When he first refers to a "critique of pure reason," Kant says he does not mean "a critique of books and systems, but a critique of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience, and hence the decision about the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all however, from principles."[39] One could take this conception of a "critique" of pure reason as a sign that the "age of enlightenment" was willing to turn its "critique" on itself and call even its own right to "criticize" into question, forcing it to justify itself.[40] Its refusal to make exceptions and excuses for itself would be all the more proof that the "critical" attitude of the enlightenment was a virtue, as Foucault suggested. Yet it is unclear what is to be won by the exercise of this virtue: Does the "critique" of pure reason find that "the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience" do not amount to anything? Does the attempt to establish the

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[38] *The Metaphysics of Morals*, pg. 366 (VI:206). See also *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment,* pg. 18 (VIII:37).

[39] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).

[40] If critique is really to criticize itself, as I believe it always was, then what Gadamer calls the "fundamental prejudice of the enlightenment," namely, "the prejudice against prejudice," would not be a prejudice at all, but the rational and eminently reasonable conclusion of an inquiry into the nature and principles of critical judgment. To judge "before all the elements that determine a situation have been finally examined" is by definition "uncritical," because it judges "prematurely," before all the relevant features of the situation have been determined in their truth, opening the door to bias, interest, and other aids to error. Tradition and authority are illegitimate grounds for judgment precisely because their judgment is guided by such "uncritical" principles. See Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method (2nd revised edition)*. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall. New York: Continuum, 2003. pg. 273.

possibility of metaphysics declare it to be impossible? Could it be that the means the enlightenment employs to investigate "the faculty of reason in general" confounds its ends? While many scholars would answer these questions in the affirmative, a close reading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows that the answer to all three questions is a definite "no," confirming that even though Kant did not address his "critique" to the enlightened public, his work was still meant to achieve ends consistent with the "critical" spirit of the enlightenment.

Exactly how he expected these ends to be achieved by a "critique" of pure reason remains a source of confusion and misunderstanding, even after two hundred years of scholarly commentary, reflection, and criticism. The fact that Kant never wrote an essay answering the question "What is a critique of pure reason?" is certainly part of the problem. There exists no formula in any of Kant's works which expresses the aims of his "critique" of pure reason as simply or as precisely as "the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority" expresses his concept of "enlightenment." Nor is there any indication of the procedure a "critique" of pure reason is to follow, if "critique" is indeed "the preparatory activity necessary for the advancement of metaphysics as a well-grounded science," as Kant argues in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[41] While the same could perhaps be said of many other aspects of the "critical" philosophy, the obscurity of his conception of "critique" is particularly problematic. It all but guarantees that the complacency with which scholars have regarded the idea of a "critique" of pure reason will continue to stand in marked contrast to their precise and exacting analyses of many of the central arguments of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

[41] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 119 (Bxxxvi).

In what follows, I will do what I can to reconstruct the history, meaning, function, and significance of Kant's decision to call the work he published in 1781 a "critique" of pure reason, in the hope of achieving a better understanding of the "critical" philosophy and its relation to the historical-philosophical project of the enlightenment. In Chapter 2: So Far No Metaphysics has ever been Written, I will consider the context in which Kant began to develop his "critical" philosophy and the problem it was meant to solve. Then, in Chapter 3: The Key to the Whole Secret of Metaphysics, I will examine Kant's correspondence with Marcus Herz between 1771 and 1772. It is in these letters that Kant transitions from the paradigm that he sought to establish for metaphysics in his Inaugural Dissertation On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World and the "critique" of pure reason he would publish in 1781. Kant's 1772 letter to Herz is also the first text in which he announces his "critique" of pure reason. Because Kant does not explain why he chose to call the work he announced in his 1772 letter to Herz a "critique" of pure reason or in any of his other writings from the period, Chapter 4: The Elements of Criticism will explore the sources from which Kant might have derived his use of the term. Finally, Chapter 5: The Possibility of a Metaphysics in General will consider the definitions of a "critique" of pure reason that Kant offers in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, paying special attention to the difference between the definitions he proposes in the 'Preface' to the first (A) and second (B) editions. Chapter 5 will also conclude with a consideration of the "negative" and "positive" utilities of the "critique" of pure reason, in the hopes of laying to rest the idea that Kant intended to define the "limits" of reason with his "critique."

CHAPTER 2: SO FAR NO METAPHYSICS HAS EVER BEEN WRITTEN

2.1: THE DISTINCTNESS OF METAPHYSICS

Even more than logic, mathematics, or natural science, it was metaphysics that preoccupied Kant in the years before he published the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[1] As Kant attempted to define his philosophical position and find his philosophical voice during the "pre-critical" period, he often declared metaphysics to be "the most difficult of all things into which man has insight."[2] The fact that he could claim, in the same sentence, that "so far no metaphysics has ever been written" says a great deal about Kant's attitude towards his predecessors and the impediments which he believed stood in the way of a new and improved metaphysics.[3] That Kant still thought there to be "good reason to ask about the path in which one proposes to search for metaphysical understanding in the first place" shows that he had not given up on the prospect of reform. Even at a time when most scholars believe him to have experienced a "crisis" in his intellectual development, Kant remained committed to his search for the "proper method" of metaphysics.[4]

While Kant often proposed ways in which the "science" of metaphysics might be more

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[1] Here I take issue with Michael Friedman, Martin Schönfeld, and many others, who claim that Kant was primarily concerned with problems in natural science or with reconciling physics and metaphysics in his "pre-critical" period and in his "pre-critical" works. While Friedman and Schönfeld have both helped to clarify many of the details of Kant's views on mathematics and natural science, I believe a close study of the various "mission statements" of Kant's "pre-critical" writings shows that Kant was more concerned with the implications of various metaphysical positions than he was with problems in natural science. This is not the place to attempt to prove such a claim, so I simply state it as a hypothesis.

[2] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 255 (II:283).

[3] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 255 (II:283). Walford and Meerbote's translation divides Kant's one German sentence into two English sentences. Kant's German reads "*Die Metaphysik ist ohne Zweifel die schwerste unter allen menschlichen Einsichten; allein es ist noch niemals eine geschrieben worden.*"

[4] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 255 (II:283).

"carefully cultivated" so that "its soil will be found not to be so barren," the path to the scientific revolution that Kant announced in the *Critique of Pure Reason* began with a question.[5] Specifically, it began with a question posed by the Prussian Royal Academy in the *Berlinische Nachrichten von Staats und Gelehrten Sachen* on June 23, 1761. It was the question for the Academy's 1763 prize-essay competition. Johann Georg Sulzer, the head of the Academy's Class of Speculative Philosophy, asked "whether metaphysical truths in general, and the first principles of the *Theologiae naturalis* and morality in particular, admit of distinct proofs to the same degree as geometrical truths; and if they are not capable of such proofs, one wishes to know what the genuine nature of their certainty is, to what degree the said certainty can be brought, and whether this degree is sufficient for complete conviction."[6]

Sulzer's question was clearly inspired by the work of the former president of the Academy, Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis. In his *Philosophical Examination of the Proof of the Existence of God Employed in the Essay on Cosmology* (*Examen philosophique de la preuve de l'existence de Dieu employée dans l'Essai Cosmologie,* 1756), Maupertuis had argued that only proofs in mathematics could be considered scientific, because they concerned only the ideas of number (which allows for the distinction of essential differences) and quantity (which admits of addition and subtraction).[7] Their focus on determinate relations of number and quantity allowed mathematical proofs to be reproduced and compared, unlike "the variety of sentiments that one observes in the subjects of morals, politics, natural law, metaphysics, and other subjects."[8] The latter are so diverse

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[5] *New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition,* pg. 45 (I:416).
[6] See *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1781,* pg. lxii.
[7] de Maupertuis, Pierre Louis Moreau. *Examen philosophique de la preuve de l'existence de Dieu employée dans l'Essai Comologie*. Included in *P.L.M. de Maupertuis: Oeuvres (I)*. Edited by Giorgio Tonelli. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1974. pp. 394-399 (XIII-XXIV).
[8] *Examen philosophique de la preuve de l'existence de Dieu employée dans l'Essai Comologie,* pg. 399 (XXIV).

that they "rarely agree with one another" according to Maupertuis.[9] Any attempt to prove anything in these subjects was doomed to fail, because they concerned something more than determinate relations of greater and lesser quantities. Because these subjects concerned "sentiments," Maupertuis argued, the "truths" they claimed to prove remain probabilistic at best.[10]

Such views had dominated the questions of the Academy's prize-essay competitions for more than twenty years. Throughout the 1740's and 1750's, Maupertuis had used the competitions to undermine the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy which dominated the German universities. With the support of the Prussian King Frederick II, he sought to promote the Lockean empiricism and Newtonian physico-theology which were then popular in France. As a result, the Academy's 1747 question on monadology and its 1755 question on optimism became sources of public controversy, in which German philosophers struggled to defend their intellectual traditions from the encroachment of British empiricism and French materialism.

Although the King supported Maupertuis and the Academy, German philosophers were not entirely unsuccessful in their defense of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. Moses Mendelssohn and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing put the matter concisely in their response to the Academy's 1755 prize-essay question, which called for "an examination of the system of optimism as it is contained in the dictum *everything is good*."[11] Their satirical essay *Pope, A Metaphysician!* (*Pope, Ein*

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[9] *Examen philosophique de la preuve de l'existence de Dieu employée dans l'Essai Comologie*, pg. 399 (XXIV).

[10] The idea of a "probable" truth was an important concept during the enlightenment. In the Roman-canon legal system, widely studied in law schools in the eighteenth century, probability related to the kind of proof which was assigned to different kinds of evidence. If evidence was "probable," it meant that it "depends on causes whose effects are uncertain," meaning that it was dubitable and contestable. Locke used the term in this way in his discussions of probability and degrees of assent. See Locke, John. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Volume II).* Edited by Alesander Campbell Fraser. New York: Dover Publications, 1959. pp. 363-384. The probable later came to stand for the concept of a quantifiable degree of certainty in mathematics. Ian Hacking and Lorraine Daston have produced impressive and intriguing studies of the history of probability in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Hacking, Ian. *The Emergence of Probability (2nd Edition).* New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. See also Daston, Lorraine. *Classical Probability in the Enlightenment.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.

[11] See the editorial comments included in *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770*, pg. lv.

Metaphysiker, 1754) objected to the reduction of Leibniz's philosophical system to a line from the *Essay on Man* by Alexander Pope.[12] Pope was a poet who had told his friend Jonathan Swift that he did not presume "to wear the philosopher's beard" in anything but "jest."[13] The Academy, Mendelssohn and Lessing suggested, could not tell the difference between a real philosopher (Leibniz) and a poet wearing a beard (Pope).[14] As such, they were in no position to judge the submissions to their own prize-essay competition.

Kant apparently took much the same view of the academy's question, despite his admiration for Pope.[15] His *Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism* was originally written for same prize-essay competition as Mendelssohn and Lessing's essay. Kant's *Reflections* were not published until 1759, but they already contained a forceful defense of Leibniz in a number of drafts from 1755. Kant praises Leibniz for having found a new "employment" for optimism, using it to "cut the knot, so difficult to untie, of the difficulties relating to the origin of evil."[16] Kant did not presume to challenge

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[12] Mendelssohn, Moses and Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. *Pope ein Metaphysiker!* Included in *Moses Mendelssohn: Gesammelte Schriften (Jubiläumsausgabe, Band 2)*. Edited by Fritz Bamberger and Leo Strauss. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1972. pg. 79. The editors of the Cambridge edition of Kant's *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770* argue that Mendelssohn and Lessing's essay was written in response to the prize-winning essay *Comparison of Mr. Pope's theory of the Perfection of the World with the System of Leibniz* (*Verleichung des Lehrgebäudes des Herrn Pope von der Vollkommenheit der Welt, mit dem Sistem des Herrn vont Leibnitz*) by Adolf Friedrich Reinhard, published in French by the Academy in 1755 and then in German in 1757. It is, however, far more likely that Mendelssohn and Lessing wrote in response to the Academy's question, rather than the winner of the competition, given the opening paragraphs of the essay and the absence of any reference to Reinhard in the text. See *Pope ein Metaphysiker*, pp. 47-52. It should be noted that the question asked for an analysis of "the system of Pope as it is contained in the dictum: everything is good, " referring to the passage in Pope's *Essay on Man* which reads "all nature is but art, unknown to thee; all chance, direction, which thou canst not see; all discord, harmony, not understood, all partial evil, universal good: And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite, one truth is clear, whatever is, is right."The question did not mention Leibniz, but it was, evidently, an invitation to use Pope's more straightforward optimism to refute Leibniz's more sophisticated metaphysics.

[13] *Pope ein Metaphysiker*, pg. 79.

[14] *Pope ein Metaphysiker*, pg. 48.

[15] Kant often quoted German translations of Pope's *Essay on Man* and his *Moral Essays* in his "pre-critical" works. His references in the *Universal Natural History* (1755) are particularly noteworthy, because Kant began each section of the work with an epigraph from Pope, in the same year as the Academy's prize-essay competition. See Kant, Immanuel. *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*. Translated by Stanley J. Jaki. Edinburgh: Scottish University Press, 1981. pp. 97, 158, 182, 190.

[16] *An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism*, pg. 71 (II:29).

the conclusions Leibniz had drawn from his use of this principle. Yet he thought he could formulate a "much easier" and "less scholarly" way of "arriving at the truth" than Leibniz, inasmuch as he thought the claim that "this world was the best of all possible worlds, or, which amounts to the same thing, that the totality of all that God has created outside Himself was the best which could possibly have been created" was obviously and necessarily true.[17]

Kant thought philosophy was "put to a poor use" when it was "employed in overturning the principles of sound reason" and "little honored if it is found necessary to mobilize her forces in order to refute such attempts."[18] The Academy's question was in other words an insult to philosophy and it was beneath the dignity of philosophers to respond to an attempt to undermine an obvious truth. Though Kant admitted that obvious truths often suffer the fate of "those songs which become intolerable as soon as they start to ring out from the mouths of the common masses," he insists that philosophers should not indulge the "extravagance of opinion" which says that "the Supreme Wisdom could find the worse better than the best, or that the Supreme Goodness should prefer a lesser good to a greater," simply because it was more difficult to prove.[19]

Many suspect the Academy planned to continue its campaign against the "obvious truths" of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy in its 1763 prize-essay competition, despite the objections of philosophers like Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Kant. They find indications that the Academy sought submissions which would deny the certainty of proofs in metaphysics, natural theology, and moral philosophy in the wording of the question the Academy posed for the competition. The question emphasizes the kinds of certainty metaphysics, natural theology, and morality might

[17] *An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism,* pg. 71 (II:29).
[18] *An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism,* pg. 71 (II:29).
[19] *An Attempt at Some Reflections on Optimism,* pg. 75 (II:33).

possess if they do not admit of geometric proof and the level of conviction they might achieve, if their proofs are not sufficient for complete conviction. Such questions could be said to suggest a certain kind of answer.

These fears begin to recede when one recalls the changes that were already taking place in the Academy when the question for the 1763 prize-essay competition was announced. Maupertuis had given up the presidency of the Academy in 1756 and its management had been taken over by the mathematician Leonhard Euler while the king sought a replacement for Maupertuis.[20] Euler was, to be sure, no more sympathetic to rationalism or metaphysics than Maupertuis. He had been Wolff's "chief tormentor" in the 1740's and had even helped to engineer the defeat of the Wolffians in the 1747 prize-essay competition on monadology.[21] By suggesting that all four classes of the Academy (mathematics, medicine, philosophy, and philology) judge the submissions and decide the winner of the competition, Euler was able to ensure the success of Johann Justi's *Investigation of the Doctrine of the Monads and Simple Things* (*Untersuchung der Lehre von den Monaden und Einfachen Dingen*, 1748).

Justi's work was amenable to Euler because it maintained, in no uncertain terms, that "nothing in the world" was "so poorly tied together" as "the doctrine of monads."[22] Euler himself had defended a similar position in his *Thoughts on the Elements of Bodies* (*Gedancken von den Elementen der Körper*, 1746).[23] Yet his interference in the 1747 prize-essay competition was not

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[20] Harnack, Adolf. *Geschichte der königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Band I)*. Berlin: Verlag von Georg Stilke, 1901. pg. 263.

[21] See Clark, William. "The Death of Metaphysics in Enlightened Prussia." Included in *The Sciences in Enlightened Europe*. Edited by William Clark, Jan Golinski, and Simon Schaffer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. pg. 439.

[22] "The Death of Metaphysics in Enlightened Prussia," pp. 440-441.

[23] Though the work was published anonymously, Euler's authorship was well-known. The fact that Euler published a work on the subject of a prize-essay competition he would judge, in the time when submissions were still being submitted, was taken was seen as a conflict of interest by many, including D'Alembert, to whom Frederick would offer

well received by the members of the Academy or by the public. Even a journal as hostile to Leibniz and Wolff as the *Göttingische Zeitungen von gelehrten Sachen* thought Justi did not understand enough about metaphysics to answer the question. They judged his contribution to be of particularly poor quality when it was published in 1748.[24] A reviewer for the journal also thought the Academy owed its members an apology for its selection, because its decision "did not come about with the consent of all its members."[25]

Euler did not write the Academy's prize-essay question in 1761. Nor does he seem to have been involved in the selection of the winners of the competition in 1763. Instead, it was Sulzer, the head of the Academy's Class of Speculative Philosophy, who was responsible for the question and the prize-essay competition. Sulzer was an aesthetician who was sympathetic to the Wolffians. He had been elected to the Academy in 1750 and had vigorously opposed the judgment against Johann Samuel König in 1752, when Maupertuis and Euler accused König of forging a letter showing Leibniz to have discovered the principle of least action in 1707, almost forty years before Maupertuis claimed to have discovered the same principle.[26] Euler accused König of forging the letter in order to humiliate Maupertuis. He then put the matter to a vote in the Academy, before the authenticity of the letter from Leibniz had been established.

Although Sulzer was listed as one of the judges who had voted to censure König, he was never consulted in the matter, and vigorously objected to the "disorder" (*Unordnung*) of the process

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the presidency of the Academy in 1763.

[24] "The Death of Metaphysics in Enlightened Prussia," pp. 442-443.

[25] "The Death of Metaphysics in Enlightened Prussia," pg. 441.

[26] On the "judgment of the Royal Academy," see Goldenbaum, Ursula. "Das Publikum als Garant der Freiheit der Glehrtenrepublik: Die öffentliche Debatte über den *Judgement de L'Académie des Sciences et Belles lettres sur une Lettre prétendue de. M. De Leibnitz*, 1752-1753." Included in *Appell an das Publikum: Die öffentliche Debatte in der deutschen Afklärung, 1687-1796 (Teil 2)*. Edited by Ursula Goldenbaum et al. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2004. pp. 510-651

in a meeting of the academy.[27] Sulzer was forced to claim that he had raised no "formal" objections to the judgment against König, but he continued to challenge the leadership of the Academy.[28] After the seven years' war (1756-1763), he called for a royal commission to investigate the Academy's finances. The commission would eventually show that David Köhler, the Academy's accountant, had embezzled between twenty-five and fifty percent of the funds raised by the Academy's monopoly on calender sales in Prussia.[29] Euler had defended Köhler and in doing so tarnished his reputation with the King and the members of the Academy. The scandal eventually led to Euler's departure from Berlin and his return to St. Petersburg in 1766.[30]

The death of Maupertuis and the decline of Euler's influence in the Academy presented Sulzer and the Wolffians with an opportunity to treat the metaphysical contributions of the rationalists more even-handedly than had been done in the previous decade. Against the suspicion of an "anti-metaphysical bias" implicit in the Academy's 1763 prize-essay question, then, it would seem likely that Sulzer posed the question in order to encourage enlightened German philosophers to respond to Maupertuis' skepticism about the value and the certainty of metaphysics. He did so in a manner that was respectful of the former president of the Academy and in a way that was in keeping with the tastes and preferences of the King, who followed Voltaire in his distaste for German philosophy.[31] Yet the results of the competition prove that the Academy had a very different

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[27] *Das Publikum als Garant der Freiheit der Glehrtenrepublik*, pg. 529.
[28] *Das Publikum als Garant der Freiheit der Glehrtenrepublik*, pg. 529.
[29] See Biermann, K.-R. "Was Leonhard Euler driven from Berlin by J.H. Lambert?" Included in *Euler and Modern Science*. Edited by Bogolyubov, N.N., Mikhaĭlov, and Yuskevich, A.P. Translated by Robert Burns. Washington DC: The Mathematical Association of America, 2007. pp. 91-93.
[30] There were, in fact, many reasons Euler left the Berlin Academy in 1766. According to some scholars, he might have been planning his leave Berlin as early as 1763, when the king began making overtures to D'Alembert to come to Berlin to assume the presidency of the Academy. On the conflict between Euler and D'Alembert, see Hankins, Thomas L. *Jean D'Alembert: Science and Enlightenment*. New York: Gordon and Breach, 1990. pp. 55-65.
[31] In his first letter to Voltaire–written on August 8, 1736–Frederick praised Wolff as a philosopher "who has been cruelly accused of irreligion and atheism because he carried light into the most shadowy recesses of metaphysics and because he treated this difficult subject in a manner as elevated as it was clear and precise." Voltaire responded, with

conception of the value of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy and the seriousness of metaphysics in 1763 than it did in 1747 or 1755.

Kant's *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* took second prize in the Academy's 1763 prize-essay competition. It was the work that introduced Kant to the German public and established his relationships with the enlightened philosophers of Berlin, especially Sulzer, Moses Mendelssohn, and Johann Heinrich Lambert. While Kant admitted that his essay was wanting in "what concerns the care, precision, and elegance of execution," it was declared "to have come extremely close to winning" and was said to merit "the highest praise" by the Academy[32] It was published in a special volume in 1764,the prize-winning essay *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences* (*Abhandlung über die Evidenz in Metaphysischen Wissenschaften*) by Mendelssohn. The two essays differ significantly in both form and content, yet they share a common goal. Each sought to refute the claims of that "that discerning mind" who, according to Mendelssohn,"rejects the first principles of metaphysics and believes that no science other than mathematics can be utterly convincing."[33]

In his essay, Mendelssohn conceded that mathematics, metaphysics, natural theology, and moral philosophy were different sciences. He nevertheless insisted that each possessed the same degree of certainty. According to Mendelssohn, proofs in mathematics and metaphysics differ only

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the deference due to a king, saying that he saw Wolff's "metaphysical ideas as things which do honor to the human mind" and "flashes in the midst of a dark night." Later, under the influence of Voltaire, Maupertuis, and Euler, Frederick came to believe Germans lacked "two things, language and taste" and that none of them had "meddled" with philosophy since "the genius of Leibnitz and the great monad Wolff." See *Letters of Voltaire and Frederick the Great*. Edited and Translated by Richard Aldington. New York: Brentano's, 1927. pp. 20, 26, 364.

[32] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 275 (II:301).See also *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1781*, pg. lxiii.

[33] Mendelssohn, Moses. "On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences." Included in *Moses Mendelssohn: Philosophical Writings*. Edited and Translated by Daniel Dahlstrom. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. pg. 255 (II:271).

with respect to their "perspicuity" (*die Faßlichkeit*, "comprehensibility").[34] "To say that a truth is perspicuous," Mendelssohn argues, "is to say that anyone who has ever grasped the proof must immediately be fully convinced of the truth and so set at ease that he not feel the slightest resistence to assuming it."[35] Mathematical proofs are more "perspicuous" than those of metaphysics, because they concern only the "coherence of ideas" and the "coherence of appearances."[36] They merely "unpack" (*entwickeln*, "un-wind" or "develop") what is already contained in a concept and show that appearances "stand in a necessary connection with one another in such a way that one can infer from one of them the presence of another."[37]

Mendelssohn argues that metaphysical proofs are less "perspicuous" than mathematical proofs because philosophy lacks the precise forms of notation found in mathematics. While he considers mathematical notation to stand in a "natural" and "essential" relation to mathematical objects, Mendelssohn contends that "everything in the language of philosophers remains arbitrary," so that "the slightest inattentiveness makes it possible for thought to lose sight of the subject matter, leaving behind merely empty signs; in which case even the most cogent philosopher must appear to be playing with words."[38] Metaphysical proofs are also less "perspicuous" than mathematical proofs because philosophers cannot assume a proof to be correct without first examining it. The perspicuity of mathematical proofs allows mathematicians to grasp the "essential" connection

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[34] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences*, pg. 255 (II:271). Though Kant thinks that the kinds of certainty found in mathematics and metaphysics are "altogether different in nature," he agrees with Mendelssohn that the fundamental difference between them is that mathematical certainty is "easer and more intuitive" than metaphysical certainty, which is more difficult, because it involves "indemonstrable propositions which provide the primary data" for demonstrations. Moreover, he agrees that the first principles of metaphysical demonstrations cannot be assumed in metaphysics, as they are in mathematics. See *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 269 (II:296).
[35] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences*, pg. 255 (II:271).
[36] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences*, pg. 267 (II:284).
[37] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences*, pp. 260-266, 266-268 (II:277-286).
[38] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences*, pp. 272-273 (II:290-291).

between concepts and their implications immediately, while philosophers must acknowledge "the necessity of always returning to the first principles with every step forward that one takes in philosophy."[39] Mendelssohn was enthusiastic about this peculiarity of philosophical inquiry, noting that "one never makes this journey back to the beginning without enormous benefit, since philosophical concepts cast rays of light that reciprocally lend distinctness to one another and must be pursued," but he admitted that it makes metaphysics less "perspicuous" than mathematics.

Because philosophers are always questioning one another's principles, they frequently find reason to refute one another. In advancing alternatives to "refuted" positions, they also tend to reinvent the wheel, presenting new arguments for old positions, instead of developing or discovering new ones. Metaphysics does not seem to make much progress as a science, because philosophers busy themselves with verbal disputes and the clarification of concepts, Mendelssohn thinks they are only rarely able to demonstrate that "the object of his basic concepts, from which he infers his truths, is actually to be encountered, so that he can infer from those truths the actual existence of its consequences."[40] The task is, however, a difficult one, considering the lack of pure philosophical notation and the more rigorous criteria Mendelssohn thinks philosophers must meet in making "the transition from concepts to actualities."[41] These conditions make "conviction" more difficult to

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[39] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences,* pg. 273 (II:291).
[40] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences,* pg. 274 (II:294).
[41] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences,* pg. 275 (II:293). Mendelssohn specifies two ways in which one might make the transition from concepts to actualities. The first is "experiential," though Mendelssohn only gives the example of a thought-experiment in which "I am" necessarily follows from "I think" as an example of this first method. He calls the second method "extraordinary and nonpareil," and says it "moves with sure-footed steps directly from the domain of possibility to the realm of actuality and, of course, that of the supreme and most perfect actuality thinkable." The example Mendelssohn gives is the inference from "the necessary being is possible" to "the necessary being is actual." He then says "We have Descartes to thank for these two transitions from the possible to the actual. Before his time one was accustomed in philosophy to laying experiential propositions as the foundation, which left one vulnerable to the skeptics. In fact, the dogmatist was totally defeated as soon as the skeptic cast doubt on the testimony of the senses and thereby dispatched his otherwise so compelling system to the land of chimerae." See *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences,* pg. 276.

achieve in metaphysics than in mathematics.

Despite their differences, Mendelssohn believes that mathematics and metaphysics are interdependent and mutually reinforce the "conviction" of the "truths" that are proven in each science. Presuming that it finally takes the fateful step into "the realm of actuality," the philosophical investigation of "qualities" provides us with "profound insights" into things which mathematics is unable to account for, namely, the "inner constitution of things as well as their place."[42] By itself, mathematics is incapable of defining terms like "magnitude" and "extension" as qualities. It can only measure distinct and discreet quantities. The mathematical analysis of "quantities" nevertheless teaches philosophers how to "measure" different qualities, distinguish them, and define their relations. While this does not imply an "immediate" connection between progress in mathematics and progress in metaphysics, Mendelssohn hopes that it holds out "the promise of reciprocally furthering and bringing advantage" to both mathematics and metaphysics.[43]

Kant agrees with Mendelssohn that there is no reason why metaphysical proofs should be any less certain than mathematical proofs. Unlike Mendelssohn, however, he did not believe that metaphysics had discovered the "method" which would allow it to demonstrate its principles with the certainty of a science. Kant thought there was much to be done before metaphysics could claim to be a science. Not only would its "proper method" have to be discovered, but it would also have to be distinguished from the methods of other science. Kant therefore interpreted the Academy's question as a challenge to philosophers to break new ground and take metaphysics in a new direction, one that would eventually put it on the "secure path of science."[44]

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[42] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences*, pg. 271 (II:288-289).
[43] *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences*, pg. 271 (II:289).
[44] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxv).

Kant begins his *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* by stating the challenge he takes the Academy to have posed for philosophers: "The question proposed for consideration is such that, if it is appropriately answered, higher philosophy must as a result acquire a determinate form. If the method for attaining the highest possible degree of certainty in this type of cognition has been established, and if the nature of this kind of conviction has been properly understood, then the following effects will be produced: the endless instability of opinions and scholarly sects will be replaced by an immutable rule which will govern didactic method and unite reflective minds in a single effort."[45] Just as "Newton's method transformed the chaos of physical hypotheses into a secure procedure based on experience and geometry," Kant claims his *Inquiry* will show metaphysics "the true degree of certainty to which it may aspire, as well as the path by which certainty may be attained."[46]

The brevity of Kant's essay suggests that it could not possibly achieve the ambitious end that set for his *Inquiry*, but the work does address a number of fundamental issues in metaphysics. The most important of these is the distinction Kant draws between the methods of mathematics and metaphysics. While Mendelssohn argued that mathematics and metaphysics depended on one another for their respective skill in the analysis of "qualities" and "quantities," Kant argues that mathematics and metaphysics follow opposed methods. Their proofs therefore result in different kinds of certainty. While metaphysics is no less scientific than mathematics, its method is specific to philosophy. It has little to do with the "mathematical" or "geometrical" methods employed by Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, or Wolff.

Kant says mathematics "draws up its definitions" by means of "the *arbitrary combination*

[45] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 247 (II:275).
[46] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 247 (II:275).

(*willkürliche Verbindung*) of concepts," while, in philosophy, "the concept of a thing is always given, albeit confusedly or in an insufficiently determinate fashion."[47] Philosophical definitions are then formulated by "*separating out* that cognition which has been rendered distinct by means of analysis."[48] In other words, mathematics follows a synthetic method, while the method of philosophy is analytic. Here, it is worth noting that Kant assigns to philosophy the role Mendelssohn assigns to mathematics, that of "unpacking" what is already contained in a concept. Kant says it is the "business" of philosophy to "analyze concepts which are given in a confused fashion, and to render them complete and determinate." When philosophers have finished "clarifying" the confused concepts with which it is presented, mathematics may then combine them "with a view to establishing what can be inferred from them."[49]

Before mathematics can begin its constructive or synthetic operations, Kant says that philosophers must take the "characteristic marks" which have been "separated out" by analysis and "compare" them with one another "in all kinds of contexts."[50] By comparing the different "marks" of a concept, Kant thought it was possible to "clarify" that concepts and then "collate" its marks, in order to see "whether one characteristic mark does not partly include another withing itself."[51] Having established this much, a philosopher may determine whether the marks of a concept can be "combined together to see whether they yield an adequate concept."[52] If their combination yields an adequate concept, then, Kant says, "abstract thought" has been rendered "complete and determinate."[53] If not, then further analysis, collation, and comparison is required, in order to

[47] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 248 (II:276).
[48] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 248 (II:276).
[49] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 250 (II:278).
[50] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pp. 248-249 (II:276).
[51] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 249 (II:277).
[52] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 249 (II:277).
[53] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 249 (II:277).

"clarify" the concept in question.

Although Kant maintains that philosophical analysis eventually yields "adequate concepts," he also says that it "inevitably leads to concepts which are unanalyzable" and "propositions which are indemonstrable."[54] Among the "uncommonly many" unanalyzable concepts (*unauflösliche Begriffe*) with which philosophy must concern itself, Kant lists "the concept of *representation*, the concepts of *being next to each other* and *being after each other.*"[55] He then includes "*space*, *time*, and the many different *feelings* of the human soul, such as the feeling of the s*ublime*, the *beautiful*, the *disgusting*, and so forth" as well as "pleasure and displeasure" and "desire and aversion" in a list of concepts which may only be "partly" analyzed.[56] He does not enumerate the "indemonstrable propositions" *(unerweislichen Sätzen*) which he says lie "at the foundations" of metaphysics, but Kant is confident they are numerous and are to be found "throughout its "whole extent."[57]

Unlike Mendelssohn, who argued that the "arbitrary" language of philosophers and their proclivity to refute one another only affected the "perspicuity" of metaphysical proofs, Kant seems to suggest that metaphysics is incapable of demonstrating the fundamental truths on which its existence as a science depends, insofar as these are to be found in "unanalyzable concepts" and "indemonstrable principles." Yet Kant had a very specific reason for suggesting that"the most important business of the higher philosophy consists exclusively in the search for these indemonstrable, fundamental truths," reasons that he did not think compromised the scientific integrity of metaphysics.[58]

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[54] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 252 (II:280).
[55] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 252 (II:280).
[56] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pp. 252-253 (II: 280).
[57] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 252 (II:280).
[58] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 253 (II:281).

Instead of tying metaphysics to the immediacy of the "empirical" or the "given," Kant's "unanalyzable concepts" and "indemonstrable principles" are the results of the "analytic" method he defends in his *Inquiry*. According to Kant, there are many "unanalyzable" or "partly analyzable" concepts and "indemonstrable propositions" in philosophy because philosophy, and particularly metaphysics, is a science in which these fundamental truths serve as "data"for the formation of definitions and the construction of propositions.[59] Kant did not believe that the fundamental truths of metaphysics could be determined arbitrarily, as they are in mathematics, so they cannot be regarded as "given" and may not be "assumed." Instead, they must be shown to be the results of an analysis which has proceeded until it can advance no further. Whatever remains may be unanalyzable, but it is also, according to Kant, a fundamental truth.

Kant thought that such unanalyzable truths "can well be explained if they are examined *in concreto* so that they come to be cognized intuitively; but they can never be proven. For on what basis could such a proof be constructed, granted that these propositions constitute the first and simplest thoughts I can have of my object, when I fist call it to mind?"[60] The recognition that demonstration rests on unanalyzable but intuitable truths and the claim that these truths may not be subjected to further analysis is, Kant says, "actually necessary, for both the distinctness of cognition and the possibility of valid inferences."[61] If philosophers were to combine one concept with another, without first rendering their concepts and their "characteristic marks" into more "fundamental" truths, Kant thinks they would only compound the confusion of the concepts with which they began. They would not be able to produce adequate concepts or convincing demonstrations.

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[59] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 253 (II:281).
[60] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 254 (II:281).
[61] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 252 (II:280).

In order to ensure that metaphysics follows the "proper course" for formulating adequate concepts and convincing demonstrations, Kant lays out two principles which he says will "govern the method by which alone the highest possible degree of metaphysical certainty can be attained."[62] First, he says that philosophers should not start with definitions, because "there are only a few cases where one can confidently establish a distinctly determinate concept right at the beginning."[63] As a rule, concepts should be considered "confused" at the beginning of any inquiry. Kant thought that philosophers should "clarify" the concepts with which they are presented, instead of elevating them to the status of definitions.

After they have "clarified" the concepts with which they have been presented, Kant says philosophers should "distinguish those judgments which have been immediately made about the object and relate them to what one initially encountered in that object with certainty."[64] This is the second methodological Kant recommends in the *Inquiry*. He proposes that philosophers distinguish "what is known for certain, even if that knowledge does not amount to a great deal" from what is not known with certainty. They should then place "certain" judgments at the beginning of demonstrations, so that they serve as "the foundation of all one's inferences, like the axioms of geometry."[65] If philosophers follows this principle, Kant thinks they will be able to produce clear, sound, and convincing metaphysical demonstrations.

Despite their considerable differences, both Mendelssohn and Kant defended the integrity of metaphysics as a science in their submissions to the Academy's prize-essay competition in 1763. They both thought that metaphysics concerned the clarity of concepts and rigorous demonstration

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[62] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 258 (II:285).
[63] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 258 (II:285).
[64] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 258 (II:285).
[65] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 258 (II:285-286).

from first principles. They also thought the methods of philosophy were primarily analytical. Analysis led to the clarification of concepts, which in turn led to the formulation of principles, which could then be used in demonstrations. The esteem in which the works of Mendelssohn and Kant were held by the Academy suggests that they, or, at least, Sulzer, wished to encourage the conception of philosophy that they defended, against the "anti-metaphysical biases" of the Academy under Maupertuis and Euler.

2.2: THE PROPER METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

When Kant's *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* and Mendelssohn's *On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences* were published by the Academy in a special volume in 1764, Kant became a recognized and important figure in German philosophy.[1] He began to correspond with the enlightened philosophers of Berlin, particularly Mendelssohn, Sulzer, and Lambert. These contacts would have a lasting influence on his intellectual development and his professional prospects. Kant was now in touch with the leading lights of the German intellectual world and they were beginning to see him as one of their own.

Mendelssohn published a series of reviews of Kant's works in the *Briefe, die neueste Litteratur betreffend* following Kant's success in the Academy's prize-essay competition. Kant and his students Christian Jacob Krauss and Johann Gottfried Herder believed Mendelssohn to be the author of the reviews of *The False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures* (1762), *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763), *Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy* (1763) that appeared in the

[1] *Kant's Life and Thought*, pg. 77. Manfred Kuehn attributes Kant's fame to a slightly different source, though one which is the exact contemporary of his prize-essay, namely, the review of Kant's *Only Possible Argument* in the *Litteraturbriefe*. See *Kant: A Biography*, pg. 142.

Litteraturebriefe, even thanking him for introducing Kant to the public with his reviews.[2] It is more likely that Mendelssohn simply commissioned the reviews from his friend Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz, though the editors of Mendelssohn's collected works suggest that he also might have rewritten substantial portions of them in his capacity as editor.[3] Even if he did not, their publication did much to promote Kant's philosophical reputation.[4] When one of Kant's colleagues in Königsberg objected to the review of the *Only Possible Argument*, the philosophers and theologians around Mendelssohn sided with Kant, calling him "the subtlest philosophical brain, who had the gift to present the most abstract truths in the simplest way and to make them distinct for everyone."[5]

If the reviews Mendelssohn published in the *Litteraturbriefe* and the ensuing controversy served as a kind of letter of recommendation to the philosophical public, Sulzer did more to promote Kant behind the scenes. He gave copies of Kant's works to a number of friends and visitors, several of whom later became important correspondents of the philosopher from Königsberg. For example, Sulzer gave copies of Kant's *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* and *Only*

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[2] Malter, Rudolf. *Immanuel Kant in Rede und Gespräch.* Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990. pg. 342 (423).

[3] With the exception of his review of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* in the *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek* in 1767, Mendelssohn's authorship of the reviews of Kant's works has been vigorously and forcefully contested. The reviews in the *Litteraturbriefe* were attributed to Friedrich Gabriel Resewitz by Nicolai, but Kant and his students Christian Jacob Kraus and Johann Gottfried Herder believed Mendelssohn to be their author. The editors of Mendelssohn's *Gesammelte Schriften* contest this view, questioning the scholarship of many prominent Kantians (Fischer, Adickes, Vörlander, Cassirer, etc.). They nevertheless think it likely that Mendelssohn wrote or rewrote extended sections of the reviews in his capacity as editor of the *Litteraturbriefe*. They have therefore included the reviews in their edition of Mendelssohn's writings. John Zammito includes translations of some selections from the reviews in his *Kant, Herder and the Birth of Anthropology*, though he does not account for the debates regarding their authorship. See *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, pp. 75-78. See Mendelssohn, Moses. "Briefe, die neueste Litteratur betreffend (4. Januar 1759-4. Juli 1765)." Included in *Moses Mendelssohn:Gesammelte Schriften (Jubiläumsausgabe, Bände 5,1-5,4)*. Edited by Eva J. Engel et al. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog Verlag, 2004. pp. 602-616, 657-669(5,1), 414-423, 505-506 (5,3a), 817-819 (5,3b).

[4] At the end of the review of Kant's essay on *Negative Magnitudes*, Resewitz/Mendelssohn notes that he has spent many pages reviewing a very short article. He justifies the attention he has devoted to Kant's essay by saying "my spirit has found more nourishment there than in many large systems." (*Mein Geist hat mehr Nahrung darin gefunden, als in manchen großen Systemen*). See *Litteraturbriefe 324* (09.05.1765). Included in *Moses Mendelssohn:Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 5,1, pg. 669.

[5] See *Kant: A Biography*, pg. 142.

Possible Argument to Johann Caspar Lavater while he was visiting Berlin in 1763-1764, inspiring the peculiar fascination with Kant that would emerge in Lavater's correspondence and travel journals in the 1770's.[6] Sulzer also gave a copy of Kant's *Only Possible Argument* to Johann Heinrich Lambert, who saw in Kant's work a number of parallels to his own ideas.[7] It is the correspondence which Lambert soon began with Kant that gives us the clearest picture of Kant's intellectual development during this period. It also tells us a great deal about how Kant planned to capitalize on his success in the Academy's prize-essay competition.

Lambert wrote to Kant on November 13, 1765, after seeing that Kant had announced a work called *The Proper Method of Metaphysics (die eigentliche Methode der Metaphysic)* in the catalog of the Leipzig book fair. In his letter, Lambert tells Kant that the announcement inspired him to write directly and in a way that omitted the "customary circumlocutions" and "artificial mannerisms" of correspondence.[8] This sense of urgency can be explained by the title of Kant's announced work and its subject matter. Lambert had written a work with a similar title for the Academy's 1763 prize-essay competition (*Über die Methode die Metaphysik, Theologie, und Moral richtiger zu beweisen*, 1762).[9] Between 1763 and 1765, he had extended his comments on the "proper" method of proving metaphysics into an "architectonic" treatment of "the primary elements of philosophical and mathematical knowledge" (*Anlage zur Architectonic oder Theorie des Einfachenund des Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntniss*, 1771).[10]

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[6] Lavater, Johann Caspar. *Reisetagebücher, Teil I: Tagbuch von der Studien- und Bildungsreise nach Deutschland 1763 und 1764*. Edited by Horst Weigelt. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997. pg. 797.
[7] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pg. 77 (X:51).
[8] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pg. 77 (X:51).
[9] Lambert's *On the Method of More Correctly Proving Metaphysics, Theology, and Morals* was not published until 1918, when the manuscript was edited and published as a special volume of *Kant-Studien*. See Lambert, Johann Heinrich. *Über die methode die Metaphysik, Theologie, und Moral richtiger zu beweisen (Kantstudien, Erganzungshefte, Nr. 42).* Edited by K. Bopp. Berlin: Verlag von Reuther & Reichard, 1918.
[10] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pg. 77 (10:51).

In his first letter to Kant, Lambert claims that his new work had been ready for publication for a year when he saw the announcement of Kant's forthcoming work.[11] Whether Lambert's remarks are those of a jealous competitor or a potential collaborator is difficult to discern. If Lambert was upset that Kant would publish a treatise on the "proper method" of metaphysics before he was able to get his own into print, he never says so directly.[12] Instead, he inquires about the kind of method that Kant will propose for metaphysics, asking "what could be more natural than my desire to see whether what I have done is in accord with the method you propose?"[13] Lambert says he expects they will in large part agree. He says he has "no doubts about the correctness of the method" Kant would propopose, although he thinks own method might be more far-reaching than Kant's. According to Lambert, "a complete system of metaphysics must include more than has previously thought," taking into account "all that is *simple* and *primary* in *every* part of human cognition."[14]

Elaborating on what he clearly takes to be a very radical claim, Lambert explains that he thinks a complete system of metaphysics must include "not only the *principia* which are grounds derived from the form, but also the *axiomata* which must be derived from the matter of knowledge and actually only appear in simple concepts, thinkable in themselves and without self-contradiction,

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[11] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pg. 77 (10:51).

[12] Lambert certainly had many purely intellectual reasons for writing to Kant, but he also had some practical matters in mind. He thought Kant might help him find a publisher for his *Anlage zur Architektonic oder Theorie des Einfachen und des Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntniss*. Lambert expresses considerable frustration with the readers and booksellers in Berlin, who, he says, "corrupt each other, both of them wanting to avoid any thorough thinking." Because they "philosophize exclusively about so-called *belles-lettres*," he could not find anyone willing to print a serious work on metaphysics, leaving his *Architektonic* to languish for want of a publisher. Lambert enclosed a number of pages from the work with his first letter to kant, so that he would be able to inquire whether the publisher who had announced *The Proper Method of Metaphysic*s might also be interested in Lambert's work. Kant showed the pages to his publisher, Kanter, who then wrote to Lambert himself and arranged a meeting in Berlin. While Kanter declined to publish the work himself, it was eventually brought forward by his partner and former apprentice Johann Friedrich Hartknoch. Hartknoch was the same publisher who would bring the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the public in 1781. See *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pg. 78 (X:53). See also *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 81 (X:54-55).

[13] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pg. 77 (X:51).

[14] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pp. 77-78 (X:52).

and also the *postulata* which state the universal and necessary possibilities of composition and connection of simple concepts."[15] He must have been aware that Kant had made similar claims in his *Inquiry*. Kant had argued that philosophy contained all of the formal and material principles of human reason.[16] He may not have emphasized the ways in which these principles would enlarge the scope of metaphysics, as Lambert did, but he clearly thought the kind of analysis he recommended would allow metaphysics to catalog the fundamental truths that constitute "all that is *simple* and *primary* in *every* part of human cognition."[17]

If Lambert thought his *Architectonic* would differ from Kant's work with respect to the number of principles, axioms, and postulates it contained, he nevertheless recognized the more fundamental agreement of their respective undertakings. Lambert could assure Kant that he had "no doubts as to the correctness of the method" Kant would propose in *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*, because the method Kant had defended in his *Inquiry* was, for all intents and purposes, the same one Lambert had developed in his sketches for *On the Method of More Correctly Proving Metaphysics, Theology, and Morality*.[18] Like Kant, Lambert advocated a thoroughly analytic approach to metaphysics, one which would reduce metaphysical concepts to their fundamental principles, in order to more correctly determine how they might be more correctly combined.[19]

Kant makes it clear that he has also "noticed the fortunate agreement of our methods" in his response to Lambert, telling him that it had "increased my confidence," because it was "a logical confirmation that shows that our methods satisfy the touchstone of universal human reason."[20] The

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[15] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pp. 77-78 (X:52).
[16] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 268 (II:295).
[17] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pp. 77-78 (X:52).
[18] *Lambert to Kant*, 11.13.1765, pg. 77 (X:51).
[19] *Über die methode die Metaphysik, Theologie, und Moral richtiger zu beweisen*, pg. 20 (§45).
[20] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 81 (X:55).

recognition of the Academy and the support of his new philosophical correspondents in Berlin must have also bolstered his confidence, allowing Kant to present a more ambitious work on metaphysics with the assurance of someone who had achieved a prominent position in his field. Yet Kant did not forget his earlier failures. "After many capsizings, on which occasions I always looked for the source of my error or tried to get some insight into the nature of my blunder," he writes, "I have finally reached the point where I feel secure about the method that has to be followed if one wants to escape the cognitive fantasy that has us constantly expecting to reach a conclusion, yet just as constantly makes us retrace our steps, a fantasy from which the devastating disunity among supposed philosophers also arises; for we lack a common standard with which to procure agreement from them."[21] The failure of Kant's earlier experiments seems to play an important role in shaping his insight into the "cognitive fantasy" (*Blendwerk des Wissens*) that plagued metaphysics, as well as his insight into its "common standard" (*gemeines Richtmaas*). They had taught him to ask "what it is I have to know in order to solve a particular problem" and "what degree of knowledge is possible for a given question." By taking these conditions into account, Kant thought his judgment had become "more limited but also more definite and secure than is customary in philosophy."[22]

Kant thought his method for reflecting on problems and rendering "more definite and secure" judgment was applicable to *The Proper Method of Metaphysics,* telling Lambert that he had devoted all of his attention to the project. "All of my endeavors are directed mainly at the proper method of metaphysics," Kant wrote, "and thereby also the proper method for philosophy as a whole."[23] Yet he was forced to admit that the announcement of *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* had been

[21] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pp. 81-82 (X:55-56).
[22] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).
[23] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).

premature.[24] Kant blamed his publisher for announcing the work, "in true bookseller's fashion," before it was ready and with a "somewhat distorted" title, but he also confessed that his own troubles had contributed to the delay in the publication of *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*. He told Lambert that he had "departed so widely" from his "original plan" that the work had become unmanageable.[25]

It is difficult to say what was contained in Kant's "original plan" for *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*. Eckart Förster has argued that we possess "a fairly clear idea of what Kant, at this time, understood by the proper method of metaphysics," based on the announcement of his lectures for the winter semester of 1766.[26] The announcement was written and published in October of 1765, only a month before Kant received his first letter from Lambert. It contains a description of the courses he would offer in the coming semester and a short account of the method his lectures on metaphysics would follow. Förster thinks this account serves as a summary of Kant's conception of the "proper method" of metaphysics at the same time as he was struggling to give shape to a work bearing that title.

Förster notes that Kant begins the description of his metaphysics course in the *Announcement* with a reference to the *Inquiry*. Kant reminds his students that he had "sought to show in a short and hastily composed work that this science (metaphysics) has, in spite of the great efforts of scholars, remained imperfect and uncertain because the method peculiar to it has been misunderstood."[27] Metaphysicians had continued to confuse the methods of mathematics and metaphysics, he said, forgetting that the method of metaphysics "is not *synthetic*, as is that of mathematics, but *analytic*."[28]

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[24] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.32.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).
[25] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:54-57).
[26] Förster, Eckart. "Kant's Notion of Philosophy." *The Monist* 72 (1989). pp.285-286.
[27] *Announcement*, pg. 294 (II:308). See also *Kant's Notion of Philosophy*, pg. 287.
[28] *Announcement*, pg. 294 (II:308). See also *Kant's Notion of Philosophy*, pg. 287.

Kant claims that his efforts to correct this misunderstanding had revealed "both the source of the errors which have been committed and the criterion of judgment by reference to which alone all those errors can be avoided, if they can be avoided at all."[29] He hoped to be able to present "a complete account" of his findings "in the near future."[30] The "complete account" to which he refers is *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*, whose publication had already been announced.

Kant may not have been ready to publish *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*, but he assured his students that his insight into the "source of the errors" which had plagued metaphysics and the "criterion of judgment" that would correct them would still "serve as the foundation of my lectures in the aforementioned science."[31] "By applying gentle pressure," Kant said he could "induce A.G. Baumgarten, the author of the text book on which this course will be based–and that book has been chosen chiefly for the richness of its contents and the precision of its method–to follow the same path."[32] Förster seizes on these remarks, using the "syllabus" Kant goes on to describe to argue that Kant's modification of Baumgarten "essentially corresponds" to the method Kant "intended to develop in his book on *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*."[33]

I am less convinced than Förster that Kant's description of his plans for his lectures corresponds to his idea of the "proper method" of metaphysics. In the *Announcement*, Kant says his course will begin with the study of empirical psychology, "the metaphysical science of *man* based on experience," before moving on to a discussion of "corporeal nature in general," drawn from "the chapters of the Cosmology which treat of matter."[34] Yet the reasons Kant gives for organizing the

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[29] *Announcement*, pg. 294 (II:308). See also *Kant's Notion of Philosophy*, pg. 287.
[30] *Announcement*, pp. 294-295 (II:308). See also *Kant's Notion of Philosophy*, pg. 287.
[31] *Announcement*, pp. 294-295 (II:308). See also *Kant's Notion of Philosophy*, pg. 287.
[32] *Announcement*, pg. 295 (II:308-309). See also *Kant's Notion of Philosophy*, pp. 287-288.
[33] *Kant's Notion of Philosophy*, pg. 288.
[34] *Announcement*, pg. 295 (II:309).

course in this manner seem to privilege the pedagogical benefits of beginning with a discussion of empirical psychology and corporeal nature, rather than any clear methodological principles. Kant even says that he has placed empirical psychology at the beginning of the course because it is the most beneficial subject for students who will not continue to study philosophy.

Having listened to lectures on empirical psychology, Kant says, the student "whose enthusiasm has already evaporated even before he has got to the end of empirical psychology (though this is scarcely to be expected if such a procedure as the one I have described is adopted) will nonetheless have benefitted this much: he will have heard something which he can understand, on account of its easiness; he will have heard something which he can enjoy, in virtue of its interest; and he will have heard something which he can use, because of the frequency which it can be given an application in life."[35] Given the "eagerness" with which "the spirited and volatile youth attend the start of a course, and how subsequently the lecture theaters grow gradually increasingly empty," Kant thinks it is necessary to put the most useful parts of his course at the beginning.

Whether Kant also thought it was methodologically necessary to begin metaphysics with a study of empirical psychology and corporeal nature remains unclear.[36] There is no indication in the

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[35] *Announcement*, pg. 296 (II:309-310).

[36] Kant's lectures on logic and metaphysics make it doubtful that he thought metaphysics as such could take empirical psychology as a starting point. In *Metaphysik L*, dating from the mid-1770's, Kant remarks that "Empirical psychology belongs to metaphysics no more than empirical physics does. For the doctrine of experience of inner sense is the cognition of the appearances of inner sense, just as bodies are appearances of outer sense. Thus just the same happens in empirical psychology as happens in empirical physics; only that stuff in empirical psychology is given through inner, and in empirical physics through outer, sense. Both are thus doctrines of experience... Metaphysics distinguishes itself from physics and all doctrine of experience through this, that it is a science of pure reason, physics on the other hand borrows its principles from experience. It is quite proper to determine the boundaries of the sciences and to comprehend the ground of the classifications that one has a system; for without this one is always an apprentice, and one does not know how the science, e.g., psychology, has come into metaphysics and whether it would not be possible that various sciences could be brought in here." See *Lectures on Metaphysics*, pg. 43 (XXVIII:223). These remarks are admittedly later than 176501766, but I do not believe that Kant's views on the place of the empirical in metaphysics changed considerably before, during, or after this period. He consistently defines metaphysics as a rational science, meaning that it is a science which has separated itself from everything empirical.

Announcement that Kant thought empirical psychology and corporeal nature had any methodological priority with respect to more traditional metaphysical subjects like ontology, rational psychology, rational cosmology, and rational theology. The fact that he affords them a certain pedagogical priority in the *Announcement* does not mean that he thought they were the foundation for metaphysics as such. Even if he did, there is no evidence of this in the *Announcement*, which does not mention the "proper method" of metaphysics after the introductory comments in the description of the metaphysics course. Consequently, the work provides us with considerably less insight into his views on the "proper method" of metaphysics than Förster suggests. Kant's plans for *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* remain obscure.

Kant's reasons for departing from his "original plan" for *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* are clearer than the contents of that plan. The problem, Kant says, is that "I noticed in my work that, though I had plenty of examples of erroneous judgments to illustrate my theses concerning mistaken procedures, I did not have the examples to show *in concreto* what the proper procedure should be."[37] In order to provide himself with more "positive" examples of the "proper procedure" of metaphysics, Kant told Lambert he had resolved to "publish a few little essays, the contents of which I have already worked out. The first of these will be the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Philosophy*, and the *Metaphysical Foundations of Practical Philosophy*. With the publication of these essays the main work will not have to be burdened excessively with detailed and yet inadequate examples."[38] Having these examples before him in his essays, Kant could refer to them,

[37] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:54-57).

[38] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56). In his notes to Kant's correspondence, Arnulf Zweig remarks that "Kant's *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft* did not in fact appear until 20 years later, in 1786." See *Immanuel Kant: Correspondence*, pg. 83. It is certainly possible that the essay Kant mentioned in his letter to Lambert was as an early draft or sketch for his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, but it is not clear that there is any connection between them, just as it is not clear that the essay on the metaphysical foundations of practical philosophy has anything to do with any of Kant's later writings on moral philosophy. It would be a mistake to think the essay Kant proposes in

elaborate the method they followed, and explain why that method was correct.

The fact that Kant never published his "little essays" or the work they were intended to promote is indicative of the problems he began to face and the more technical difficulties he began to encounter in his search for the "proper method" of metaphysics. These difficulties were nothing new for Kant. They were the same ones which led him to reflect on his earlier "capsizings" and to continue experimenting with different approaches to philosophical problems. The only difference was that his work now had a more clearly methodological focus and greater ambitions. Like Lambert, he intended to give an extensive and systematic account of the "proper method" of metaphysics, which would build on the remarks of his *Inquiry*. The next work he published would, however, be chastened by the many "erroneous judgments" and "mistaken procedures" he had encountered in his struggles with *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*. That work was *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by the Dreams of Metaphysics.*

2.3: ERRONEOUS JUDGMENTS AND MISTAKEN PROCEDURES

Moses Mendelssohn published a short review of Kant's *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by the Dreams of Metaphysics* (1766) in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* in 1767. Although Kant had published *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* anonymously, Mendelssohn identified him as the author of the work in his review, remarking that "The joking profundity with which this work is written leaves the reader in doubt whether Mr. Kant wants to make metaphysics laughable or spirit-seeing plausible" (*Der scherzende Tiefsinn, mit welchem dieses Werkchen geschriben ist, läßt den Leser zuweilen in Zweifel, ob Herr Kant die Metaphysik hat lächerlich, oder die Geisterseherey glaubhaft*

his letter to Lambert and the works he later published have anything in common, without further evidence of their connection.

machen wollen).[1] Mendelssohn must have expressed similar concerns in a letter to Kant shortly after receiving the work, because Kant wrote to assure him that he did not consider metaphysics to be anything "trivial or dispensable" on April 8, 1766.[2]

Today few scholars doubt that Kant was laughing at metaphysics in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. Many take the "joking profundity" of the work as evidence that Kant no longer held metaphysics in such high esteem as he had when he called it "the most difficult of all things into which man has insight" in his *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*.[3] Some think Kant intended his satire of "fantastical visionaries" like Emmanuel Swedenborg as an attack on rationalist metaphysicians like Wolff and Mendelssohn.[4] Others see it as a kind of self-criticism, a way of disavowing the speculative excesses of his own "pre-critical" works.[5] They nevertheless agree that *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* represents "the height of Kant's growing disaffection with metaphysics."[6] This view has dominated contemporary scholarship and shaped our understanding of Kant's intellectual development and his relationships with his

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[1] Mendelssohn, Moses. *Kant: Träume eines Geistersehers (AdB, 1767, 4.2).* Included in Included in *Moses Mendelssohn:Gesammelte Schriften (Jubiläumsausgabe, Band 5,2).* Edited by Eva J. Engel et al. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog Verlag, 2004. pg. 73.

[2] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70). Kant sent a copy of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* to Mendelssohn on February 7, 1766, along with copies for Lambert, Sulzer, Formey, Sack, Spalding, and Süsmilch. The number of copies Kant sent and their recipients show that Kant was eager to solidify his relations with enlightenment circles in Berlin. See *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 02.07.1766, pg. 88 (X:67-68).

[3] *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, pp. 210-212.

[4]Although *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* has received a great deal of attention since her work was published, Alison Laywine's *Kant's Early Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical Philosophy* still provides a very helpful survey of scholarly reception of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. Laywine associates this position with Kuno Fischer and Ernst Cassirer. See Laywine, Alison. *Kant's Early Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical Philosophy*. Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1993. pp. 15-24.

[5] Laywine argues that "the satire directed against Swedenborg in this work is equally directed against Kant himself–and this for the following reason: Kant and the Swedish spirit-seer both treat immaterial things as thought they could be objects of human sensibility. Swedenborg stands in for Kant here." See *Kant's Early Metaphysics and the Origins of the Critical Philosophy*, pg. 8. Similar readings have also been proposed by Frederick Beiser and Martin Schönfeld. See especially Schönfeld, Marton. *The Philosophy of the Young Kant*: The Precritical Project. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. pp. 229-244.

[6] *Kant's Intellectual Development: 1746-1781*, pg. 45.

contemporaries. Because scholars see *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* as an expression of Kant's "growing disaffection with metaphysics," they tend to see his letter to Mendelssohn as a series of "tenuous rationalizations."[7] They treat it as a disingenuous attempt to satisfy a philosopher who was far more committed to "dogmatic" and "scholastic" metaphysics than Kant himself. Not only is this an inaccurate and uncharitable way of characterizing Mendelssohn's philosophical position and Kant's attitude towards him, it is also an implausible way of reading Kant's letter.

Given the circumstances, it is likely that Kant meant everything he said in his letter to Mendelssohn. Only a month before the first copies of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* appeared in print, Kant told Lambert that he was working on a book that he believed to be "the culmination of my whole project."[8] The work to which he referred was not *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, but *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*. Kant planned to extend the claims of his *Inquiry* in *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* and capitalize on his success in the Prussian Royal Academy's prize-essay competition in 1763. If his "growing disaffection with metaphysics" had led Kant to doubt the "possibility" and even the "desirability" of metaphysics, it is hardly likely that he would have announced the publication of a systematic treatise on the subject.

Kant told Lambert that he had been forced to "postpone" his work on *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* because he "lacked examples to show *in concreto*" what the "proper procedure" of metaphysics should be.[9] Yet he remained convinced that "the great, long-awaited revolution in the sciences is not too far off" and hoped he would soon be able to provide metaphysics with the "common standard" which would resolve the "devastating disunity" that had prevented philosophers

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[7] *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, pg. 211.
[8] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).
[9] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).

from making .[10] He was of the same opinion when he wrote his letter to Mendelssohn. Kant's attitude does not seem to have changed in the four months between his letter to Lambert and his letter to Mendelssohn, despite the miscarriage of his plans for *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* and the publication of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. He tells Mendelssohn that "it befits brilliant men such as you to create a new epoch" in metaphysics, "to begin completely afresh, to draw up the plans for this heretofore haphazardly constructed discipline with a master's hand."[11] Kant nevertheless thinks he has something to contribute to these plans, because he has "reached some important insights in this discipline since I last published anything on questions of this sort, insights that will establish the proper procedure of metaphysics."[12] "To the extent that my other distractions permit," Kant writes, "I am gradually preparing to submit these ideas to public scrutiny, but principally to yours; for I flatter myself that if you could be persuaded to collaborate with me (and I include in this your noticing my errors) the development of the science might be significantly advanced."[13]

Kant's remarks in his letter to Mendelssohn are proof of his continued search for the "proper method" of metaphysics and his intention to write a systematic treatise on the subject. There is no evidence that anything he says in his letter to Mendelssohn is disingenuous or that Kant felt the need to offer "tenuous rationalizations" in place of his real commitments. He says he understands why Mendelssohn would have an "unfavorable impression" of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, given the "tone" of his "little book," but he assures Mendelssohn that he is far from regarding "metaphysics itself, objectively considered" as something "trivial or dispensable."[14] Kant even says that he believes "the

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[10] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).
[11] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[12] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:71).
[13] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:71).
[14] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).

true and lasting welfare of the human race depends on metaphysics," a view that he says anyone but Mendelssohn would find "fantastic" (*phantastisch*) and "audacious" (*verwegen*).[15] The sincerity with which Kant maintained such an "audacious" a claim can hardly be doubted.

Even if Kant and Mendelssohn agreed that "the true and lasting welfare of the human race depends on metaphysics," they were not of the same mind in all things. If the two philosophers differed in their attitudes towards metaphysics, as is suggested by Mendelssohn's discomfort with Kant's tone in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, it is in their estimation of its progress as a science. Kant was far more critical of the state of metaphysics in his time than Mendelssohn was. This much is evident in their submissions to the Academy's prize-essay competition in 1763. While Mendelssohn had treated metaphysics as a science with an established method, Kant insisted that metaphysics still had to "acquire a determinate form" if it was to "unite reflecting minds in a single effort" and lay to rest "the endless instability of opinions and scholarly sects."[16] He became even more insistent on this point in the years following the prize-essay competition, as he struggled to refine the claims of his *Inquiry* and extend them into *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*.

In his correspondence with Lambert, Kant blamed his inability to finish *The Proper Method of Metaphysics* on the many "erroneous judgments" which were available to "illustrate my theses concerning mistaken procedures" and the lack of "examples to show *in concreto* what the proper method of metaphysics should be."[17] His frustration with these "erroneous judgments" and "mistaken procedures" led Kant to complain bitterly about "the methods now in vogue" in metaphysics in his letter to Mendelssohn.[18] Even as he assured Mendelssohn that he remained

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[15] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[16] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 247 (II:275).
[17] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).
[18] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X70).

committed to the search for the "proper method" of metaphysics, Kant admitted that he could not "conceal my repugnance, and even a certain hatred, toward the inflated arrogance of whole volumes full of what are passed off nowadays as insights."[19] I am fully convinced," Kant writes, "that the path that has been selected is completely wrong, that the methods now in vogue must infinitely increase the amount of folly and error in the world, and that even the total extermination of all these chimerical insights would be less harmful than the dream science itself, with its confounded contagion."[20] He thought they would have to "create a new epoch in this science" and "begin completely afresh" if they were to save metaphysics and, with it, "the true and lasting welfare of the human race."[21]

Dreams of a Spirit-Seer does not announce the beginning of this "new epoch" in metaphysics and Kant never intended it to be "the culmination of my whole project."[22] It is, to be sure, a less ambitious work than *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*. Kant told Mendelssohn that he intended *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* to serve the "merely negative purpose" of a "*katharticon*."[23] By purging philosophy of the"folly" and "error" that were being promoted by "the methods now in vogue" in metaphysics, it would help to achieve what Kant called "the *euthanasia* of erroneous philosophy" in his letter to Lambert.[24] While Kant told Lambert that it would be "far worse" for the "erroneous philosophy" to be "carried to the grave ceremoniously, with serious but dishonest hairsplitting," he told Mendelssohn that it was necessary to intervene. Instead of letting nature take its course and leaving the "erroneous philosophy" to destroy itself through "eternal trifling" and "wearying

0. *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:71).
[20] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[21] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pp. 90 (X:70).
[22] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).
[23] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:71).
[24] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:71). See also *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56-57).

chatter," Kant thought that he had to dispense with "the pseudo-insights of a spoiled head," so that philosophers like Mendelssohn and himself could provide metaphysics with its "specific criterion" and "proper procedure" and "the innocence of a healthy but uninstructed understanding" could acquire an "*organon*."[25]

Kant's reasons for taking Swedenborg's visions of the "spirit-world" as an occasion for reflection on the "erroneous judgments" and "mistaken procedures" of metaphysics remain somewhat obscure. Kant could have attacked the "folly" and "error" of the "methods now in vogue" in metaphysics more directly. Or he might have exposed the vacuity of one of the other pseudo-sciences which populated the intellectual landscape of the European enlightenment. Yet Kant chose to comment on the work of a Swedish mystic and expose the absurdities of tales he was already inclined to regard with suspicion.[26] These decisions have added to the confusion surrounding *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, confusions which have produced a distorted image of Kant's intellectual development.[27]

In his letter to Mendelssohn, Kant says he wrote about Swedenborg because "everything depends on our seeking out *data* for the problem, how is the soul present in the world, both in material and in non-material things," suggesting that questions concerning rational psychology were of particular importance.[28] Yet Kant also says that this investigation leads towards more basic questions regarding "whether one can by means of rational inferences discover a primitive power,

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[25] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:71). On the relationship between "catharticon" and "organon" in Kant's critical philosophy, see Tonelli, Giorgio. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic*. Edited by David H. Chandler. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1994. pp. 39-40.
[26] *Kant to Charlotte von Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/1763, pg. 71 (X:44).
[27] On the problems involved in reading and interpreting *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* and their history, see my "Reading and Misreading Kant's Dreams of a Spirit-Seer" (forthcoming).
[28] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:71).

that is, the primary, fundamental relationship of cause to effect."[29] And because he believes that questions regarding the "fundamental power" that relates a cause to its effect cannot be answered, insofar as "these powers are not given in experience," Kant says they can "only be the product of poetic invention."[30] This, in turn, leads Kant to ask "how far one can go in philosophical fabrications, completely unhindered, when there is no *data*."[31] It is the passage from a specific cases of "erroneous judgment" regarding the nature of the soul, its relation to the body, and its place in the world to general questions concerning the "mistaken procedures" of metaphysics that makes *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* such a fine example of the experimental and reflective approach to philosophical problems which characterized Kant's thought in the 1760's. His reflections on these "mistaken procedures" are meant provides an account of how metaphysics goes wrong when it constructs positions for which there is no evidence in experience. What was interesting about Swedenborg for Kant, was that there seems to be evidence for the validity his claims in the testimony of "rational and and firmly convinced eyewitnesses."[32]

Though he confesses to Mendelssohn that he "cannot rid myself of the suspicion that there is some truth to their validity," Kant does not seem to have ever believed the tales of Swedenborg's visions contained any serious metaphysical claims regarding the nature of spirit, the relation between soul and body, or anything else.[33] Swedenborg's views on these subjects were nothing more than "curiosities" for Kant and the tone of "joking profundity" in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* was meant to help avoid "exposing myself to derision" for having written about such an embarrassing subject.[34]

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[29] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:71).
[30] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:72).
[31] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pp. 91-92 (X:71-72).
[32] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 305 (II:317).
[33] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[34] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).

What really interested Kant was, it seems, the testimony of the apparently "rational" and "firmly convinced" witnesses who attested to the "truth" and "validity" of Swedenborg's claims.[35] Because the testimony of the witnesses to Swedenborg's visions seemed to be credible, Kant wondered what kind of evidence they provided for the "fantastical" visions of "spirit-seers." Could the testimony of rational witnesses provide "data" regarding the presence of the sould in the world or the existence of the "primitive power" through which it moves the body?

Kant wrote to Swedenborg as early as 1762-1763 to confirm the reports he had heard regarding his visions, possibly during the same period he was finishing *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* and beginning his *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*.[36] While the letter Kant wrote to Swedenborg has unfortunately been lost, Kant mentions it and describes its contents in his 1762-1763 correspondence with Charlotte von Knobloch.[37] Fräulein von Knobloch was the daughter of the General who employed Kant's friend and future biographer Ludwig Ernst Borowski.[38] Borowski had apparently informed Charlotte of Kant's interest in Swedenborg and she had, in turn, written a letter "commanding" Kant to tell her what he had heard of his visions.[39] Even at this early date,

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[35] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 305 (II:317).
[36] *Kant to Knobloch*, pg. 72 (X:44-45).
[37] Arnulf Zweig provides a useful summary of the problems dating Kant's letter to Charlotte von Knobloch in the Cambridge edition of Kant's *Correspondence*. Kant indicated the day and the month he wrote to in the letter, but not the year. Borowski, the first editor of Kant's correspondence, originally dated the letter from 1758. Such an early date is impossible, because some of the events it describes took place in 1761//The letter must have been written after 1761, but whether it was written in 1762 or 1763 remains unclear. See *Immanuel Kant: Correspondence*, pp. 74-75.
[38] See the editorial comments included in *Immanuel Kant: Correspondence*, pg. 74
[39] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10/1762/3, pg. 70 (X:43). The editorial note on the composition of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* included in the Cambridge edition of Kant's *Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770* is certainly in error on this point. Walford and Meerbote, the editors of that volume, claim that the letter from Fräulein von Knobloch inspired Kant to inquire into Swedenborg's visions, "in order to satisfy the curiosity of his correspondent." John Zammito is correct to point out that Kant's interest in Swedenborg must have predated the letter from Fräulein von Knobloch. Otherwise, she would not have written to Kant to ask what he had heard regarding Swedenborg and he would have had nothing to report to her in 1762/3. See *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, pg. 426 (note 89).

Kant had heard a great deal about Swedenborg.

At the beginning of his letter to Fräulein von Knobloch, Kant assured her that he was interested in Swedenborg's visions because the matter merited "a much more complete investigation."[40] Though he says the stories he must relate "activate a shudder, the sort of horror evoked by a repetition of one's childhood experiences" and Kant says he is not disposed to believe them "without careful testing," he nevertheless thinks they are worthy of serious consideration.[41] Because it is "not impossible" that they are true, Kant does not think he can dismiss them out of hand. Even if one is "inclined to regard such tales with skepticism" and is therefore "not inclined to be afraid of graveyards or of the dark," Kant maintains that one must subject "the many tales of apparitions and actions in the realm of spirits" to the test of "sound reason."[42]

Only the test of "sound reason" could determine whether there is "sufficient evidence" to "validate" stories like those concerning Swedenborg's visions. Only "sound reason" could confirm whether what is "not impossible" might also be "actual."[43] To dismiss something which is not impossible out of hand would simply be "replacing a blind prejudice against visions and apparitions with another prejudice" and Kant did not believe such prejudice was fitting for a philosopher.[44] A philosopher must consider what is possible, make appropriate inquiries, and determine whether there is sufficient evidence to judge the truth or falsity of what he or she has heard. This procedure constitutes a "test," which Kant though philosophers could use to determine the validity of

[40] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10/1762/3, pg. 70 (X:43).
[41] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10/1762/3, pg. 71 (X:43).
[42] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10/1762/3, pg. 71 (X:44).
[43] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/3, pg. 71 (X:44).
[44] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/3, pg. 71 (X:44).

philosophical claims and the correctness of the methods employed in rendering judgments about metaphysical matters.

The reports of Swedenborg's visions that Kant recounts in his letter to Charlotte von Knobloch seem like good examples of things which could be true and which therefore merit "a much more complete" philosophical investigation. Because they are supported by the "assurances" of witnesses who seem to be "rational" and "firmly convinced," Kant insists that it would be "the utmost imaginable foolishness" for philosophers to dismiss their testimony because of "the inner resistance of an unsuperable skepticism."[45] In his letter to Fräulein von Knobloch, Kant emphasizes how "stunned" he was by the "credibility of such a report" as was given by Baron von Lützow, the Mecklenburg Ambassador to Stockholm.[46] The Ambassador had apparently conveyed stories involving both Swedenborg and the Queen of Sweden to a Dutch Ambassador. Kant found it astonishing that "an ambassador would transmit to another ambassador a story *meant for publication*, a story that reports something untrue about the Queen of a country in which he is stationed, and that describes an incident at which he and other distinguished persons were supposedly present."[47] Because an ambassador is in a politically sensitive position, Kant thinks he would be unlikely to communicate anything false or potentially embarrassing regarding his post. This, Kant thinks, is sufficient reason to treat the story with some degree of credulity.

When Swedenborg did not respond to his initial letter, Kant made further inquiries, asking visitors to Stockholm and people who had met Swedenborg to confirm the details of the stories he had heard. Kant also asked for descriptions of Swedenborg's character and manners.[48] He evidently

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[45] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 305 (II:317).
[46] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/3, pg. 71 (X:44).
[47] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/3, pg. 71 (X:44).
[48] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/3, pg. 72 (X:45).

thought that such information was relevant for the test of "sound reason" to which he intended to subject Swedenborg's claims. Without such information, Kant did not believe that he could rationally appraise the merits of the accounts of Swedenborg's visions or the possibility of their truth. The testimony Kant received did not disappoint him. Kant related two stories that he had heard to Fräulein von Knobloch, one concerning Swedenborg's alleged communication with the dead and another involving his claims to clairvoyance. Both seemed well-attested and convincing, being conveyed to Kant by a friend and former student.[49] Though Kant says he is inclined to treat such stories with suspicion, he was forced to ask "what objections can one raise against the authenticity of such a story?"[50] He could only await the publication of Swedenborg's book, in which Swedenborg told an acquaintance he would respond to Kant's letter "point by point," in order to evaluate its merits and judge its validity.[51] Hamann's correspondence shows that Kant planned to write an extended review of the work for the *Konigsbergsiche Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen* as soon as it appeared.[52]

It is unclear which work Swedenborg was preparing to publish in the reports Kant received or whether Swedenborg really intended to respond to Kant's letter. The work that Kant refers to in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, Swedenborg's *Arcana Coelestia* (1749-1756), had been published several years before Kant wrote to Charlotte von Knobloch. Kant does not mention it in his correspondence, but he must have read it at some point, because he complains that he spent good money purchasing

[49] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/3, pg. 71 (X:44).
[50] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/3, pg. 74 (X:47).
[51] *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/3, pg. 72 (X:45).
[52] *Hamann to Mendelssohn*, 11.06.1764. Included in *Johann Georg Hamann: Briefwechsel (Zweiter Band, 1760-1769).* Edited by Walter Ziesemer and Arthur Henkel. Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, 1956. pg. 272. See also *Kant: A Biography*, pg. 171.

the work and, more importantly, wasted valuable time reading it in the Preamble to *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.[53]

Kant recounts the same stories that he had communicated to Fräulein von Knobloch in the second, "historical" part of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. His tone is, however, considerably changed. While Kant described Swedenborg's visions as a matter meriting "a much more complete investigation" in his correspondence with Fräulein von Knobloch, he derides Swedenborg and his visions as "completely empty" and containing "not a single drop of reason" in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.[54] After only a few pages describing the contents of Swedenborg's work, Kant says he is tired of "reproducing the wild figments of the imagination of this worst of all enthusiasts, or of pushing his fantasies further so as to include his description of the state after death."[55] It is sufficient, Kant says, to know that there is nothing worth reading in Swedenborg's works and that one should not waste "£7 sterling" on them.[56]

Though his tone is bitter and derisive towards Swedenborg in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, Kant still feels obliged to present "an attestation of the extraordinary power of the man in question" and "at least mention that which finds some credence with the majority of people." Even though he now believes the reports he has heard regarding Swedenborg's visions "have no other guarantee than that of common hearsay" and "the proof provided by such a source is very dubious," Kant insists that he approached Swedenborg's works with an open mind.[57] "To believe none of the many things

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[53] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 306 (II:318). At the end of his letter to Fräulein von Knobloch, Kant indicates that he has made arrangements to have the work in which Swedenborg claimed that he would respond to Kant's letter sent to him "as soon as it leaves the press." See *Kant to Knobloch*, 08.10.1762/63, pg. 74 (X:48). The fact that the *Arcana Coelestia* had already been published by 1762/1763 makes it doubtful that it was, in fact, the work that Kant ordered from Swedenborg's publisher.
[54] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 346 (II:360).
[55] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 352 (II:366).
[56] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 353 (II:366).
[57] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 342 (II:355).

which are recounted with some semblance of truth, and to do so without any reason," is, Kant says, "as much a foolish prejudice as to believe anything which is spread by popular rumor and to do so without examination."[58] To avoid this prejudice, Kant says, he "allowed himself to be in part carried away" by the work and the "hearsay" which had "ripened into formal proof" of its validity.[59] He also confesses "with a certain humiliation" to having found "what one usually finds when one has no business searching, exactly nothing!"[60]

The first, "dogmatic" part of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* is intended to demonstrate how and why the kinds of claims Kant found in Swedenborg are absurd and devoid of value, detailing the ways in which such claims find their way into ordinary language and, from there, into metaphysics. The passage of "popular tales" from ordinary language into metaphysics is significant, because Kant believes it is the source of many of the "erroneous judgments" and "mistaken procedures" which plague the "methods now in vogue" in metaphysics. Kant is therefore forced to ask why "popular tales which find such widespread acceptance, or which are, at least, so weakly challenged, circulate with such futility and impunity, insinuating themselves even into scholarly theories, and that, in spite of the fact that they do not even enjoy the support of that most persuasive of proofs, the proof from advantage?" The question is even more pressing, because Kant believes that "philosophers prepare the ground plan" which "fantastical visionaries" like Swedenborg modify and exploit, taking "scholarly theories" as inspiration for their absurd claims.

Instead of addressing Swedenborg's claims directly or the testimony given in their defense, Kant attempts to show how the kind of "tales" Swedenborg tells came about. He states the basic,

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[58] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 306 (II:318).
[59] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 306, 344 (II:318, 357).
[60] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 306 (II:318).

metaphysical problem to which they pertain, namely, the nature of "spirit" (*Geist*). It is because we have no evidence from experience regarding metaphysical concepts like "spirit" that Kant adopts an "analytic" approach to the problem in the first chapter of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.[61] He admits that he has no idea what "spirit" is, but nevertheless proceeds to "unfold the concealed sense of the concept."[62] Such an "analysis" presupposes that because "I have frequently used the word or heard others use it, it follows that something or other must be understood by the term, irrespective of whether this something be a figment of the imagination or something real."[63] In a footnote, Kant acknowledges that this method is flawed. A term is not necessarily meaningful, or does not necessarily mean what it is supposed to mean, simply because it "used" in a particular way.

Because "surreptitious concepts" like "spirit" cannot be abstracted from empirical concepts, Kant thinks they can only be drawn from experience by "obscure" inferences.[64] While Kant does not go so far as to say that such concepts are"meaningless," he nevertheless argues that they do not have a legitimate origin in experience and are more likely derived from "delusions of the imagination" and the confusions of "linguistic usage" than anything else.[65] If they are "not always erroneous," they nevertheless "proceed to propagate themselves by attaching themselves to other concepts, without there being any awareness of the experience itself on which they were originally based or on the inference which formed the concept of the basis of that experience" leading to greater and greater confusion.[66] This claim is the key to understanding *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, because it

[61] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 308 (II 320).
[62] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 308 (II 320).
[63] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 307-308 (II:320).
[64] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 308 (II:320).
[65] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 308 (II:320).
[66] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 308 (II:320).

explains the "mistaken procedure" which Kant thinks gives rise to a series of "erroneous judgments" and an entire system of "occult philosophy."

Kant argues that even the most rigorous analysis of a "surreptitious" concepts involves errors of "procedure," because the analysis through which we arrive at a definition of a concept like "spirit" fails to note that "there are many concepts which are the product of covert and obscure inferences made in the course experience."[67] Kant encourages his readers to recognize "the experience itself on which they were based or the inferences which formed the concept on the basis of that experience," so that they will be able to cut the "tangled metaphysical knot" that ties the threads of "surreptitious" concepts into systems of "occult" philosophy.[68] "Occult" philosophy has, for Kant, a special relation to metaphysics, because "metaphysical hypotheses have about them such an uncommon degree of flexibility that one would have to be very clumsy not to be able to adapt this present hypothesis to any story whatever, and to do so even before investigating its veracity–something which is in many cases impossible and in many more highly discourteous."[69]

The first two chapters of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* imitate the way in which surreptitious concepts lead to the erroneous judgments of an "occult" philosophy. Kant performs the kind of errors made by contemporary metaphysicians in the first chapters of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, in order to discover the consequences of their "mistaken procedures" and ways of correcting them. When Kant offers a definition "spirit" as unextended, immaterial, rational being, he does so as an example of the ways in which "occult" philosophies make illegitimate inferences from surreptitious concepts. The fact that Kant offers a definition of "spirit" then draw conclusions from that definition,

[67] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 308 (II:320).
[68] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 308 (II:320).
[69] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 328 (II:341).

when the only evidence for its truth comes from the "analysis" of the "use" of the word "spirit" in ordinary language, is evidence that there is something wrong with the procedure he is employing. Kant admits as much when he says that he cannot prove that "spirit" exists or that its concept has been understood through the analysis he has employed. The definition of "spirit" that Kant has presented is, as such, impossible either to prove or disprove. He says there is "no hope either of our ever being able to establish their possibility by means of rational argument."[70]

Kant tries to refute the "occult" philosophy he describes in the second chapter of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* in his third chapter on "ordinary" philosophy. Such a refutation is made more difficult by the fact that the claims of "occult" philosophy are impossible to prove or disprove. One would think that Kant would simply recommend cutting the "tangled metaphysical knot" of "surreptitious" concepts and "obscure" inferences that tie "occult" philosophy together, and, indeed, he does make gestures in this direction in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. Yet Kant also proposes a much more reasonable and reflective solution, derived from "ordinary" experience, in the third chapter of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.[71] The "ordinary" philosophy Kant develops in this chapter, which lays the ground for the "practical" conclusion of the whole work, provides metaphysics with a program for improvement and reform, which will help rid it of the "folly" and "error" that have resulted from the obscurities of the "methods now in vogue."[72]

Given his "repugnance" and even the "hatred" he says he feels for the"path which has been selected" in metaphysics, it is no surprise that Kant would extend his criticism of the"surreptitious"

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[70] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 311 (II:323).
[71] See, for example, the discussion of why Kant thinks one must sacrifice knowledge of the this world if one is to speculate about "another" world at the end of the second chapter of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 328 (II:341).
[72] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).

concepts and "obscure" inferences of "occult" philosophy to contemporary metaphysics. It is in this spirit that Kant satirically characterizes metaphysicians like Wolff and Crusius as "waking dreamers" who "build castles in the sky in their various imaginary worlds, each happily inhabiting his own world to the exclusion of others."[73] While it is almost certainly this generalization which led Mendelssohn to suspect Kant's motives and his regard for metaphysics both in their correspondence and in his review of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, it serves a rather different purpose in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* than Mendelssohn and most contemporary scholars supposed. Kant is, in fact, attempting to distinguish the "waking dreams" of metaphysics from the "fantastical visions" of the spirit-seers in the third and fourth chapters of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, so that the two can finally be separated, and a "new epoch" in the "science" of metaphysics can begin.

Although Kant says there is "a certain affinity" between metaphysicians and "spirit-seers," he also says they "differ not merely in degree but in kind."[74] He calls metaphysicians "waking dreamers" because they speculate about matters like "spirit," constructing entire systems of "occult" philosophy on "surreptitious" concepts and "obscure" inferences. This leads to "folly" and "error" of the kind described in the second chapter of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. When metaphysicians draw conclusions on the basis of concepts which are neither necessary nor have any basis in experience–as Kant did when he tried to discuss the nature of spirit and the laws of the material and spiritual worlds on the basis of a definition drawn from the analysis of ordinary language. They present theories which are no clearer than the "obscure" inferences from which they derive their "surreptitious" concepts from experience and do not sufficiently distinguish knowledge from opinion and truth from error. Consequently, they fail to provide a "specific criterion" according to which the

[73] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pp. 330-331 (II:343).
[74] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pp. 330-331 (II:343).

validity of metaphysical claims can be judged or the "proper procedure" according to which they can be formulated.

Despite his sharp criticisms of the "methods now in vogue" in metaphysics, Kant still held out hope that metaphysicians could "awaken completely... if they should eventually open their eyes to a view which does not exclude agreement with the understanding of other human beings."[75] In order to achieve this view, Kant suggests that metaphysicians adopt a more "balanced" approach, weighing their judgments in "scales," according to a "standard of measure," in the fourth chapter of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.[76] Kant thinks this procedure will allow philosophers to "arrive at a unanimous result by comparing different weighings."[77] Such a "unanimous result" would finally allow metaphysics to "assume a determinate form" and put aside "the endless instability of opinions and scholarly sects," uniting "reflective minds" in the kind of "single effort" that Kant described in his inquiry.[78]

Although the "balanced" approach to metaphysics that Kant recommends is derived from very ordinary operations of the understanding, comparing and contrasting different perspectives on experience, Kant does not believe it will be easy to achieve. In order for this procedure to work, Kant says that philosophers must "purify" themselves of their "prejudices" and "eradicate every blind attachment which may have insinuated itself into my soul in a surreptitious manner."[79] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* can be seen as an experiment in just this kind of "purification." By considering the "visions" of "spirit-seers" and the possibility that they could be true, Kant makes sure that the

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[75] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 329 (II:342).
[76] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pp. 336-337 (II:349-352).
[77] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 336 (II:349).
[78] *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, pg. 247 (II:275).
[79] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 336 (II:349).

skepticism with which he regards their claims is not simply a prejudice. By showing that even the testimony of seemingly "rational" and "firmly convinced" witnesses could not substantiate the claims of a "spirit-seer" like Swedenborg, Kant believes that he has proven that the skepticism with which he regards reports from the "spirit-world" is a rational and considered judgment. More important than the conclusions he reaches, however, are the means by which arrives at them.

In *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, Kant suggests that the comparison and contrast of one's own experiences and judgments with those of others is essential for achieving the "balance" and "standard of measure" which define the "proper procedure" of metaphysics. He emphasizes this point when he says that he "formerly used to regard human understanding in general merely from the point of view of my own understanding. Now I put myself in the position of someone else's reason, which is independent of myself and external to me, and regard my judgments, along with their most secret causes, from the point of view of other people. The comparison of the two observations yields, it is true, pronounced parallaxes, but it is also the only method for preventing optical deception, and the only means of placing concepts in the true positions which they occupy relatively to the cognitive faculty of human nature."[80] By taking another perspective and comparing and contrasting one's experiences and judgments with those of others, Kant thinks a philosopher will be able to subject their own judgment to the test of "sound reason" and purge themselves of the kinds of "prejudices" which would distort their reflection and corrupt their judgment. It is ultimately their willingness to submit themselves to such a test and their desire to "purify" their judgment that truly distinguishes philosophers from spirit-seers.

[80] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 336 (II:349).

"Spirit-seers" differ from metaphysicians because they not concern themselves with the "illusions" and "parallaxes" which result from their visions. They do not place a counterweight against the particularities of their own experience or the idiosyncracies of their own judgment. Consequently, they do not realize that their visions cannot possibly be confirmed by another observer. Nor do they recognize that this is an important test of the validity of their claims. As such, they are unable to identify the "obscure" inferences which constitute their "visions" and cannot see that their visions are the result of referring "certain objects to external positions among the order of things."[81] Kant thinks these "objects" are nothing more than figments of the spirit-seer's own imagination, even though spirit-seers believe they can "really perceive" them as things external to their own mind.[82] This, Kant thinks, is a sign that "spirit-seeing" is truly pathological, the result of the disturbance of the natural harmony and balance of the nerves.[83] Kant says that he cannot blame readers if they no longer consider the possibility that spirit-seers might say something true or valid, suspend further investigation, and "dismiss them without further ado as candidates for the asylum."[84]

Kant's goal in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* is not to commit metaphysics to the same asylum as the"spirit-seers," as many contemporary scholars believe. Instead, he is trying to prevent metaphysics from keeping "such low company" that it can be confused with the delusions of "fantastical visionaries" like Swedenborg. By teaching metaphysicians the "proprieties of criticism," Kant hopes to help them keep a science on whose integrity he believes the "fate of the entire human race" depends from the "folly" and "error" to which it has succumbed.[85] The recommendations Kant

[81] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pp. 330-331 (II:343).
[82] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pp. 330-331 (II:343).
[83] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pp. 333-334 (II:346).
[84] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 335 (II:348).
[85] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (II:70)

makes for a more "balanced" approach to metaphysics play an important and positive role in establishing a more legitimate and productive approach to a subject which Kant regarded as indispensable to the "lasting welfare of the human race."

In addition to adopting a more "balanced" approach to judgment and "purging" themselves of prejudice, Kant also thinks that metaphysicians need to recognize the nature and extent of their science. Where there is no evidence–of the nature of spirit, for example–with which to render a judgment, Kant thinks one can have "all sorts of opinions" but no "knowledge."[86] This is the result of what Kant calls "the limitations of our reason, or rather, the limitations of experience that contains no *data* for our reason" in his letter to Mendelssohn.[87] These limits show that no more "positive" grounds for a philosophy of "spirit" are available, because there is simply no rational or experiential evidence of its existence, apart from prejudice, superstition, and the "fantastical visions" of enthusiastic spirit-seers. They therefore play an important role in defining the kinds of problems metaphysics can resolve and the kinds questions it can address. Because they demonstrate the impossibility of "knowing" anything about "spirit," the "limits of experience that contain no *data* for our reason" serve as what Kant calls the "negative" grounds for a philosophy of "spirit" in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.[88]

Instead of lamenting the "limits" of reason or finding in them reasons to "abandon" metaphysics, Kant regards their recognition as one of the "advantages" of metaphysics. At the end of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, Kant calls the recognition of the "limits" of human reason the second, "negative" advantage of metaphysics, which follows from the occasional miscarriage of the first,

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[86] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 338 (II:351).
[87] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 92 (X:72).
[88] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 339 (II:351).

"positive" advantage of metaphysics, namely, its ability to "solve the problems thrown up by the enquiring mind, when it uses reason to spy after the more hidden properties of things."[89] Although Kant says the hopes of the first, "positive" advantage of metaphysics are "all to often disappointed by the outcome" of its inquiries, the second, "negative" advantage allows us to learn from our mistakes and determine the kinds of questions metaphysics is able to answer.[90] By showing that it is useless to try to answer questions which require "*data* which are to be found in a world other than the one in which we exist as a conscious being," the recognition of the "limits" of reason allows us to dismiss "the illusion and vain knowledge which inflates the understanding and fills up the narrow space which could otherwise be occupied by the teachings of wisdom and of useful instruction."[91] Kant believes this insight into the kinds of questions metaphysics is able to answer will not only make metaphysics more successful in answering the questions of the "enquiring mind," but will to make metaphysics the "companion of wisdom" and a better guide to a rational and moral life.[92]

2.4: IN PURE PHILOSOPHY, METHOD PRECEDES ALL SCIENCE

Many scholars still believe that the "erroneous judgments" and "mistaken procedures" that Kant complained about in his 1765 letter to Lambert led him to renounce his "pre-critical" attempts to define "the proper method of metaphysics."[1] They claim that Kant's thought underwent "nothing less than a complete revolution" during the 1760's, leading him to "drastically redefine" his "entire conception of metaphysics."[2] During this period, they say, Kant began to see metaphysics as "a science of the limits of human reason" and came to doubt the "possibility" and even the

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[89] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 354 (II:367).
[90] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 354 (II:367).
[91] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 354 (II:368).
[92] *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, pg. 354-359 (II:368-373).
[1] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).
[2] *Kant's Intellectual Development: 1746-1781*, pg. 43.

"desirability" of any more substantive use of human reason. They find evidence of this "very marked and radical change" in Kant's views in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, a work which they say represents "the height of Kant's growing disaffection with metaphysics."[3]

It may be true that *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* is an expression of Kant's "growing disaffection" with metaphysics. Kant may have been so disgusted at "the methods now in vogue" in metaphysics that he could no longer contain himself.[4] He had after all blamed the miscarriage of the work that he saw as "the culmination of my whole project" on the abundance of "erroneous judgments" that were available "to illustrate my theses concerning mistaken procedures."[5] That he was unable to find any "examples to show *in concreto* what the proper method should be" was no doubt frustrating for him.[6] The essays in which he attempted to provide himself with these examples never materialized. Nor did the more systematic work these essays were intended to serve. Kant may have vented his disappointment in a biting and sarcastic text, making fun of a Swedish charlatan and the bad philosophical habits that had paved the way for his particular brand of metaphysical obscurantism. Yet the "repugnance" and even "hatred" Kant says he felt for "the methods now in vogue" in metaphysics does not seem to have altered the course of his intellectual development or the trajectory of his philosophical undertakings.[7]

There is no evidence that Kant came to doubt the "possibility" or the "desirability" of metaphysics as a result of his dissatisfaction with "the methods now in vogue."[8] Nor does it appear that the frustration of his own efforts deterred him from his search for the "proper method" of

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[3] *Kant's Intellectual Development: 1746-1781*, pg. 45.
[4] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[5] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).
[6] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).
[7] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[8] *Kant's Intellectual Development: 1746-178*, pg. 42.

metaphysics. Kant told Mendelssohn that he still held out hope for "the great, long-awaited revolution in the sciences" in 1766, claiming, in the same letter, that he had finally come to understand the "nature" of metaphysics and "its proper place among the disciplines of human knowledge."[9] This led him to reassert the view that Kant said he and Mendelssohn shared, the view that "the true and lasting welfare of the human race depends on metaphysics." While some scholars doubt the sincerity of this declaration, Kant's intellectual development proves that it was made in earnest.[10] Kant continued his search for the "proper method" of metaphysics, even after the publication of *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.[11]

Kant's continued interest in the "proper method" of metaphysics is a matter of no small consequence. His work on this problem unites his "pre-critical" and "critical" periods and the works he published at the beginning and end of his philosophical career. It also reveals the consistency of the concerns which motivated the different philosophical experiments Kant undertook during his "pre-critical" period and in his later "critical" philosophy. Kant may have come to see many of his earlier works as failures, but he had found ways to benefit from their repeated "capsizings." Kant reflected upon his mistakes and developed means of avoiding them in the future. "Now," he told Lambert, "I always look to see what it is I have to know in order to solve a particular problem and what degree of knowledge is possible for a given question, so that the judgment I make is often more limited but also more definite and secure than is customary in philosophy."[12] The shortcomings of his "pre-critical" works did not, as a result, lead Kant to doubt the possibility of a solution to the problem to which they had been addressed. Nor did they compromise his belief that "the true and

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[9] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[10] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70). See *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, pp. 210-211.
0. *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[12] *Kant to Lambert*, 12.31.1765, pg. 82 (X:56).

lasting welfare of the human race depends on metaphysics."[13] They only made his later works that much more certain and that much more definite.

Kant's inaugural dissertation *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World* (1770) is evidence of his continued interest in the "proper method" of metaphysics and the scrutiny to which he subjected his earlier works. Kant wrote the dissertation when he was offered a chair in logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg in 1770. Although he had been offered similar positions in Erlangen in 1768 and Jena in 1769, Kant had chosen to wait for a position to become available in his "native city."[14] His chance came on March 15, 1770, with the death of Christoph Langhansen, who held a chair in mathematics in Königsberg.[15] Immediately upon Langhansen's death, Kant wrote to the Prussian Minister of Culture and the King, recommending that Langhansen's chair be offered to either Johann Buck, the man who had been promoted over Kant for Martin Knutzen's chair in 1758, or Carl August Christiani, who held a chair in moral philosophy at the university. Kant did not hesitate to suggest that he be offered whichever chair became available.[16]

The Minister does not seem to have not regarded Kant's letters as importune or opportunistic. At the beginning of his letter to the Minister of Culture–Carl Joseph Maximilian, Freiherr von Fürst und Kupfenberg–Kant thanks him for the "gracious and undeserved concern" (*die gnädige und unverdiente Vorsorge*) he had shown regarding "the uncertainty of my fate in my mind" (*die Unsicherheit meines Schicksals in meinem Gemüthe*).[17] The Minster had, it seems, been looking out

[13] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[14] *Kant to Suckow*, 12.15.1769, pg. 101 (X:83).
[15] *Kant to Freiherr von Fürst und Kupfenberg*, 03.16.1770, (X:90).
[16] *Kant to Freiherr von Fürst und Kupfenberg* 03.16.1770, (X:91). *Kant to King Frederick II*, 03.19.1770, (X:92-93).
[17] *Kant to Freiherr von Fürst und Kupfenberg*, 03.16.1770, (X:90).

for Kant. He had most likely assured Kant that he would not leave the philosopher who had done so well in the Academy's prize-essay competition in 1763 and who was known throughout Germany without an appropriate position. As a result, Kant was probably not surprised when Langhansen's chair was offered to Buck. Nor would he have been surprised when Buck's chair in logic and metaphysics was offered to him.

Kant was officially installed as *Professore Ordinario der Logic und Metaphysic* in Königsberg on May 2, 1770. Because his chair became available in such a peculiar manner, Kant did not have much time to prepare the inaugural dissertation required for his professorship. *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, the work he submitted for disputation, was defended on August 24, 1770 by Marcus Herz, a Jewish medical student who would become one of Kant's most important correspondents in the 1770's.[18] While the work must have been written almost as quickly as Kant's *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality*, it was no less ambitious. Kant says that the concept of "a whole which is not a part, that is to say, a *world*" and the "*two-fold genesis* of the concept out of the nature of the mind" will serve as an example that will "help us to secure a deeper insight into the method of metaphysics."[19]

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[18] Herz is referred to as "*berolinensis, gente iudaeus, medicinae et philosophiae cultor*" on the title page of Kant's dissertation, meaning that he is "of Berlin, of Jewish descent, a student of medicine and philosophy." The fact that Herz defended Kant's dissertation is a testament to Herz's character and his philosophical acumen, but also Kant's liberalism. It was only recently that German universities had begun accepting Jewish students, though they were still denied advanced degrees. See Simone, Maria Rosa di. "Admission." Included in *A History of the University in Europe (Volume II: Universities in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1800)*. Edited by H. De Ridder-Symoens. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. pp. 294-295. Shmuel Feiner attributes the beginning of the *Haskalah* (Jewish Enlightenment) to the experience of Jews in German universities. See Feiner, Shmuel. *The Jewish Enlightenment*. Translated by Chaya Naor. Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. pp. 21-27. The reaction of many of Kant's contemporaries to Jewish students and Jewish philosophers like Mendelssohn and Herz was often less than tolerant, as is evident from the repeated efforts to convert Mendelssohn. See *Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study*, pp. 194-263.

[19] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World,* pg.377 (II:387).

Herz moved to Berlin shortly after the defense and Kant sent him copies of his dissertation, to be distributed to Mendelssohn, Sulzer, and Lambert, as well as the Minister of Culture. The letters which accompanied the copies of his dissertation and Kant's correspondence with Herz are a good indication of how Kant thought his dissertation would "help secure a deeper insight into the method of metaphysics." In his letter to Lambert, Kant says that he thought his dissertation contained "wholly certain and easy criteria" which could be used to examine "all sorts of metaphysical questions."[20] He thought it would "decide with certainty... the extent to which these questions can or cannot be resolved" and"preserve metaphysics proper from any admixture of the sensible," making "usefully explicit and evident without great strain" the significance of "something thought through a universal or a pure concept of the understanding."[21] Kant's remarks are clearly in keeping with his earlier plans for the "proper metaphysics." They take the method he had developed for reflecting on the shortcomings of his own failed experiments and use it to determine "criteria" for solving metaphysical problems. This is what he had done before, with varying degrees of success, in his other "pre-critical" works.

There are, however, a number of important differences between Kant's earlier works and his inaugural dissertation, the most important of which is evident in his letter to Lambert. Kant told Lambert that he thought he had finally "arrived at a position that, I flatter myself, I shall never have to change" in *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*.[22] Kant had not claimed that he would "never have to change" the positions he had adopted in his earlier works. These works were experiments and Kant acknowledged that many of them had failed. He therefore

[20] *Kant to Lambert*, 09.02.1770, pg. 109 (X:98).
[21] *Kant to Lambert*, 09.02.1770, pg. 109 (X:98)
[22] *Kant to Lambert*, 09.02.1770, pg. 107 (X:97).

lacked the confidence to assert that any of them had stated a position he would "never have to change." Kant's letter to Lambert shows that he had become more ambitious following his success in the Academy's prize-essay competition. Far from "abandoning" metaphysics or doubting its "possibility" or "desirability," Kant planned to extend the claims of his *Inquiry* into a systematic work with the imposing title *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*. He never published *The Proper Method of Metaphysics*, or the essays which were to lay the ground for it, but the ambitions which motivated his plans for that work seem to have found expression in his inaugural dissertation and, indeed, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The ambitions that found expression in Kant's inaugural dissertation are also evident in his correspondence during the 1760's. While he continued to make self-effacing remarks about his own abilities and the quality of his work, Kant began making bolder claims about his discoveries and their significance and possible applications. He told Mendelssohn, for example, that he had "reached some important insights in this discipline since I last published anything on questions of this sort, insights that will establish the proper procedure of metaphysics."[23] Kant had not yet published a work in which he detailed the nature of his insight or its implications, having confined himself to a "negative" presentation of the "folly" and "error" of the "methods now in vogue" in metaphysics in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*.[24] His inaugural dissertation and his letter to Lambert shows that Kant was not satisfied with a "negative" account of the "proper method" of metaphysics. Kant thought he could formulate a more "positive" statement of the "proper method" of metaphysics. Indeed, he thought he had done so in *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*.

[23] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 91 (X:71).
[24] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).

He was so sure of this correctness of this statement that he described it as a position he would "never have to change."

In order to understand the nature of this position and its relation to his "pre-critical" and "critical" works, it is worth noting some of the details of the "method" Kant proposes for metaphysics in *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World.* This method differs from the method he laid out in his *Inquiry,* because it does not identify the "proper method" of metaphysics with analysis. In his inaugural dissertation, Kant suggests that the "proper method" of metaphysics combines analysis and synthesis, in order to provide metaphysics with the concepts of multiplicity and totality, the simple and the whole.[25] The ideas of multiplicity and the simple emerge from analysis, when a concept is resolved into a number of different "characteristic marks."[26] They are not so different from the "indemonstrable fundamental truths" that Kant had called "the most important business of higher philosophy" in his *Inquiry*.[27] Yet Kant now says that synthesis allows the philosopher to recombine these elements, comprehend their relations, and reconstitute the whole.[28] The "composition" and "constitution" of the whole is, therefore, a matter of no less importance to metaphysics than the determination of most basic elements or parts of a thing, because it is no less essential to the clarity of its concept. The method that Kant had excluded from philosophy and assigned to mathematics in his *Inquiry* had become an integral part of metaphysics in the inaugural dissertation.

On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World also differs from *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. While Kant maintains his suspicion of "surreptitious" concepts drawn by

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[25] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World,* pg.378 (II:387).
[26] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World,* pg.378 (II:387).
[27] *Inquiry*, pg. 253 (II:281).
[28] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World,* pg.378 (II:387-388).

"obscure" inferences from experience, he adopts a more positive and constructive approach to their correction than he had in his work on Swedenborg. Kant carefully delimits the application of sensible and empirical concepts in metaphysics in *On the Form and the Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, in order to avoid what he calls "fallacies of subreption."[29] These fallacies involve the conflation of sensible and intelligible concepts. They are of particular significance for Kant, because he thinks "the illusions of sensitive cognitions, which masquerade under the guise of cognitions of the understanding, result in principles which are spurious, and, if not actually false, at least rashly and hazardously asserted."[30] When such principles become are assumed and become prejudices, sensible concepts transgress their limits and affect the understanding.[31] This leads to confusion and error about the difference between "appearances and things as they are in themselves."[32]

Kant describes the method he uses to separate sensible and intellectual cognition in his dissertation as an "art of assaying, by means of which we shall be able fairly to calculate how much may belong to what is sensitive and how much to what may belong to the understanding in our judgments."[33] Kant thinks that if we can disentangle what is sensible and what is intellectual in our

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[29] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 408-415 (II:412-419).
[30] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 408-409 (II:413).
[31] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 407 (II:411).
[32] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 387-390 (II:394-398).
[33] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 408 (II:412). The distinction between appearances and things in themselves is perhaps the most essential philosophical claim of Kant's inaugural dissertation, one which would have a marked impact on his later thinking. Kant separates sensible and intellectual cognition because he thinks that "things which are thought sensitively are representations of things *as they appear*, while things which are intellectual are representations of things *as they are*." While Kant does not dismiss sensible cognition out of hand, affirming that there is, indeed, a science of sensible things, he denies that "*phenomena*" express "the internal and absolute quality of objects." It is the pure concepts of the understanding which present us with the "fundamental concepts of things and of relations" and which represent things "*as they are*" in themselves. Kant thinks intellectual concepts express the "fundamental concepts of things and of relations" because "*the use of the understanding is real*," meaning that "such concepts, whether of objects or of relations, are given by the very nature of the understanding; they contain no form of sensitive cognition and they have been abstracted from no use of the senses." See *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pp. 386-390 (II:394-398).

cognition, then we will also be able to separate what belongs to appearances and what belongs to things in themselves, dispelling "the clouds of confusion which darken the common understanding" as well as the "confusions which continue to plague metaphysics."[34] While these clarifications are no doubt important, Kant regards them as a preliminary step. They are not by themselves sufficient to constitute "the organon of everything which belongs to the understanding, metaphysics."[35]

Kant says the distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition is not in itself metaphysical, but serves as a "propadeutic science" to metaphysics.[36] The role of the "propadeutic science" that Kant lays out in his inaugural dissertation is no doubt methodological. It precedes metaphysics, because, as Kant says in the closing section of *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, "in pure philosophy, *method precedes all science*."[37] The "propadeutic science" containing the "method" of metaphysics must therefore precede metaphysics itself, because metaphysical principles concern "fundamental concepts of things and of relations."[38] These concepts must be "given in a fundamental fashion by the pure understanding itself," since sensible cognitions "do not express the internal and absolute quality of objects."[39]And because the understanding is not "immune to error" in determining the "fundamental principles of things and of relations," the metaphysical principles that are "given" by the understanding must be "properly hammered out and firmly established" if they are not to "appear to have been rashly conceived" or "relegated to the vain playthings of the mind."[40]

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[34] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 387 (II:395).
[35] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 387 (II:395).
[36] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 387 (II:395).
[37] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 406 (II:411).
[38] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 386 (II:394).
[39] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pp. 386-390 (II:394-398).
[40] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 406 (II:411).

In order to properly "hammer out" the "fundamental concepts of things and of relations," Kant says the intellect must possess a criterion for the "right use of reason," which "sets up the very principles themselves."[41] By establishing the "criterion" according to which metaphysical principles can be "hammered out," the understanding is able to guarantee that the principles it proposes are indeed the "fundamental concepts of things and of relations" and have been determined according to "the right use of reason." "Since it is in virtue of the natural character of reason alone that objects and also the axioms, which are to be thought with respect to objects, first become known," Kant writes, "the exposition of the laws of pure reason is the very genesis of the science; and the distinguishing of these laws from suppositious laws is the very criterion of truth."[42] In other words, metaphysics becomes a science when it possesses an appropriate methodological principle and uses it to determine "the organon of everything which belongs to the understanding."

Kant's major works of the 1760's and early 1770's all share this view. Despite their many differences, Kant's "pre-critical" works show a common concern for the "proper method" of metaphysics. Whether they advocate an analytic approach to metaphysics, or a combination of analysis and synthesis, or make the distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition a "propadeutic science" to metaphysics, they all of maintain that the "method" of metaphysics must be defined before metaphysics can hope to become a science. This is also true of the works that Kant published during the "critical" period. In the Preface to the second (B) edition, Kant says the *Critique of Pure Reason* is"a treatise on method" rather than "a system of the science itself."[43] The search for the "proper method" of metaphysics apparently persisted in Kant's "critical" philosophy,

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[41] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World,* pp. 406-407 (II:411).
[42] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World,* pp. 406-407 (II:411).
[43] *Critique of Pure Reason,* pg. 113 (Bxxii).

because Kant had not yet achieved a position that he would “never have to change,” even in his inaugural dissertation.

CHAPTER 3: THE KEY TO THE WHOLE SECRET OF METAPHYSICS

3.1: THE FIRST TITLE OF THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

Immanuel Kant relates some of the difficulties he encountered while "making plans for a work that might perhaps have the title *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*" in his February 21, 1772 letter to Marcus Herz.[1] In the course of his search for the "nature" and "method" of metaphysics, Kant explains, he found that he "still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to pay attention to and that, in fact, constitutes the key to the whole secret of hitherto still obscure metaphysics."[2] Kant then indicates that the "essential something," the "key to the whole secret of metaphysics, hitherto still hidden from itself" is to be found in the answer to the question "What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call *representation* to the object?"[3]

My purpose in citing such a famous passage in so well-known a letter is not to offer a new interpretation of Kant's answer to the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." Nor is it

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[1] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 132 (X: 129). Zweig renders "D i e G r e n z e n d e r S i n n l i c h k e i t u n d d e r V e r n u n f t" (X: 129) as *The Limits of Sensibility and Reason* on pg. 132 of the Cambridge edition of Kant's *Correspondence*. Yet when Kant mentions the same title in a previous letter to Herz (06.07.1771, X:122-123), Zweig renders it *The Bounds of Sensibility and of Reason* (pg. 127). This inconsistency is problematic, not only because it renders the same title differently, but also because Kant makes a technical distinction between limits (*Schranken*) and bounds (*Grenzen*) in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (IV: 352). See Kant, Immanuel. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science*, pg. 142 (IV: 352). I have emended Zweig's translation where it appears as *The Limits of Sensibility and Reason*, replacing it with *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*. The latter translation follows the lexicon established for *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. With the exception of this and several other emendations, all citations from Kant's correspondence refer to the Cambridge edition cited above.

[2] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X: 130).

[3] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X: 130). Zweig translates the question "*auf welchem Grunde beruhet die Beziehung deienigen was man in uns Vorstellung nennt, auf den Gegenstand?"* as "What is the ground of the relation of that which in us is called representation to the object" (pg. 133). I have abbreviated this translation to "the question concerning 'the ground of the relation...' " where repeating the entire phrase would be redundant or awkward.

to enter into the debate between those who see Kant's answer in light of his "pre-critical" philosophy and those who see it as a prefiguration of the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' of the *Critique of Pure Reason.*[4] I have cited this letter because it is the first text in which Kant calls the work he would publish in 1781 a "critique" (*Critic*) of pure reason.

It should be noted that Kant does not necessarily refer to the "critique" of pure reason as the title of a forthcoming work in his 1772 letter to Herz. The standard *Akademie* edition of Kant's *gesammelte Schriften* gives no typographical indication that "critique of pure reason" is intended as a title. When Kant tells Herz that he is "now in a position to bring out a critique of pure reason that will deal with the nature of theoretical as well as practical knowledge," the phrase "a critique of pure reason (*eine Critic der reinen Vernunft*) is neither spaced, italicized, nor underlined.[5] The original letter appears to be either lost or to have been destroyed, so I have not been able to consult it to confirm or deny the proper typographical setting of Kant's reference to "a critique of pure reason."[6] It could be that Kant simply characterizes his new project as "a critique of pure reason,"

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[4] On this debate, see Wolfgang Carl, "Kant's First Drafts of the Deduction of the Categories" and Lewis White Beck, "Two Ways of Reading Kant's Letter to Herz: Comments on Carl." Both essays are included in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three Critiques and the Opus Postumum*. Edited by Eckart Förster. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989. pp. 3-20, 21-26. See also Guyer, Paul. *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. See also Carl, Wolfgang. *Der schweigende Kant: Die Entwürfe zu einer Deduktion der Kategorien vor 1781*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989.

[5] In an earlier translation of Kant's correspondence, Zweig renders the key passage in Kant's February 21, 1772 letter to Herz as "now I am in a position to bring out a 'Critique of Pure Reason' that will deal with the nature of practical as well as theoretical knowledge..." See *Immanuel Kant: Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-1799*. Edited and Translated by Arnulf Zweig. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. pg. 73. However the text of the *gesammelte Schriften* reads "*und ich izo im Stande bin eine Critick der reinen Vernunft, welche die Natur der theoretischen so wohl als practischen Erkentnis...*" (X:135). While the *gesammelte Schriften* follows the German typographical convention of spacing (*sperren*) titles, it does not space "Critick der reinen Vernunft" (X:135). As such, it is not clear whether Kant meant to announce the "Critick der reinen Vernunft" as the *title* of a new work (which would appear in type as *C r i t i c k d e r r e i n e n V e r n u n f t*) or as a *description* of that work. Zweig's quotation marks in the Chicago edition of Kant's *Philosophical Correspondence* must therefore be regarded as interpretive, because it is not clear that Kant intended "critique" as a title in the passage in question. In the more recent Cambridge edition of the Kant's *Correspondence*, Zweig eliminates the quotation marks from his translation of the phrase *Critick der reinen Vernunft*.

[6] A visit to the archive of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Science confirms that the original letter is no longer available for consultation at the archive. The Berlin Academy holds copies of Kant's *handschriftliche Nachlaß*, including his extant correspondence. The original manuscripts were returned to the library of the University of Tartu (Estonia) in

to be published under another title. Yet Kant announces his "critique" immediately after explaining his answer to the question concerning "the ground of the relation of that in us which we call *representation* to the object." And he raises the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." immediately after admitting that the work he had been planning, a work called *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* (*Die Grentzen der Sinnlichkeit under der Vernunft*) "lacked something essential."[7]

Kant does not explain the relation between *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* and the "critique" of pure reason he announces later in the same letter. He does not give any indication that the "critique" he intends to bring out is the same as *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*. The fact that he announces his "critique" after admitting his plans for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* "lacked something essential" would seem to suggest that they are two separate works. Yet most scholars assume that the two works are one and the same, as indicated by the note appended to the passage by Arnulf Zweig, editor and translator of the Cambridge edition of Kant's *Correspondence*. Zweig's note suggests that "we may assume *eine Critick der reinen Vernunft* is a description, since Kant has already announced another intended name for the work."[8] I believe such an assumption is unwarranted, if the only reason for it is Kant's reference to *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* earlier in the letter.

The *Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* is, indeed, mentioned as a title at the beginning of Kant's 1772 letter to Herz. It appears as "*D I e G r e n z e n d e r S I n n l I c h k e I t u n d d e r*

1995, but Kant's February 21, 1772 letter to Herz is not included in the catalog of that collection or the copies in held in Berlin. Searches in the catalogs of other institutions (in Berlin, Rostock, Munich, etc.) which have copies of Kant's correspondence have not provided any more information about the existence or location of this letter. Unless some new information becomes available, it may be presumed to be lost or destroyed.

[7] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 132 (X: 130).

[8] *Immanuel Kant: Correspondence*, pg. 138.

V e r n u n f t" in the *Akademie* edition of Kant's *gesammelte Schriften*. Yet it should be noted that *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* is presented as the title of a work Kant had been planning, before he encountered the question of "the ground of the relation of that in us which is called *representation* to the object." It is reasonable to ask whether Kant might have changed the title of the work he was preparing, given the significance of the new question he had encountered, yet Kant scholarship does not seem to take this option very seriously. Many scholars are so convinced of the continuity between the project that Kant describes at the beginning of the 1772 letter to Herz and the "critique" of pure reason that he announces after attempting to answer the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." that they refer to *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* is as the "first title" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The claim that *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* is the "first title" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was first advanced by Hans Vaihinger in his *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1881).[9] Vaihinger claimed that Kant had derived the title *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* from the subtitle of Lessing' *Laokoon* (1766), "On the Limits of Painting and Poetry" (*Über die Grenzen der Malerei und Poesie*). He argues that Herz would have recognized the reference, because Herz compares Kant to Lessing in his *Inquiry Concerning Taste and the Causes of its Difference* (1776).[10] Vaihinger fails to note, however, that the letter in which Kant describes *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* predates the publication of Herz's book and his comparison of Kant and Lessing by five years.[11] He also fails to account for the relation of *The Bounds of*

[9] Vaihinger, Hans. *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* Stuttgart: Spemann Verlag, 1881. pg. 153.
[10] See *Kant to Herz* 11.24.1776, pg. 160 (X:198).
[11] Herz compares Kant to Lessing in his *Versuch über die Ursachen der Verschiedenheit des Geschmacks*, published in 1776. Kant objects to this comparison in a letter to Herz dated 11.24.1776. See *Kant to Herz* 11.24.1776, pg. 160 (X:198).

Sensibility and Reason and Kant's inaugural dissertation *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*, or the place of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* in Kant's intellectual development in the early 1770's. Although these matters are essential for establishing the relation between *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* and the "critique" of pure reason that in Kant describes in 1772 letter to Herz, Vaihinger passes over them in silence.

Despite its many anachronisms and shortcomings, Vaihinger's claim was repeated in Benno Erdmann's *Anmerkungen* to the *Akademie* edition of the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1911). It is still present in many contemporary works on Kant, including Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood's 'Introduction' to their translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998) and Georg Mohr's commentary to his edition of Kant's *Theoretische Schriften* (2004).[12] While scholars like Guyer, Wood, and Mohr are more cautious than Vaihinger in treating the relationship between Kant's inaugural dissertation and the *Critique of Pure Reason*, they nevertheless seem to take the continuity between *The Bounds of Sensibility* and *Reason and the Critique of Pure Reason* for granted, accepting some version of Vaihinger's claim that *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* is the "first title" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[13]

The fact that Kant never mentions *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* after his 1772 letter

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[12] Erdmann, Benno. *Anmerkungen*. Included in *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft (I. Auflage 1781)*. Edited by Benno Erdmann. Included in *Kants gesammelte Schriften (Band IV).* Edited by The Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences. Berlin: Georg Reimer Verlag, 1911. pg. 571. Guyer, Paul and Wood, Allen W. "Introduction." Included in *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. New York: Cambridge, 1998. pp. 47-48. Mohr, Georg. *Kant's Theoretische Philosophie: Texte und Kommentar (Band 3)*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004. pp. 39-40.

[13] Wolfgang Carl is a notable exception. In *Der schweigende Kant*, Carl notes that "Die Entdeckung des Defizits führt zu einer grundlegendedn Veränderung von Kants Überlegungen zur Metaphysik: an die Stelle des Projekts *Die Grenzen der Sinnlichkeit und der Vernunft* tritt das Projekt *Die Critick der reinen Vernunft*." See *Der schweigende Kant*, pg. 17. Lewis White Beck is more hesitant, saying "In his letter of the previous year, Kant had mentioned the title, The Limits of Sense and Reason, and in the letter before us he gives us an outline of its major parts. The mention of a Critique of Pure Reason later in the letter may not denote a book planned under that title, as Kant often used these words to refer to his whole philosophic project and program, even after the book called Critique of Pure Reason had been published." See *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant*, pg. 58.

to Herz would seem to suggest that he regarded *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* as an unfitting title for a work which followed his discovery of "the key to the whole secret of metaphysics" in the question concerning "the ground of the relation of that in us which we call *representation* to the object." Kant's consistent reference to a "critique" of pure reason from 1772 onwards also suggests that he thought a "critique" was a more appropriate way of answering the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." than an account of the "bounds" of sensibility and reason. It could even be said that Kant's answer to the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." led him to abandon an account of the "bounds" of sensibility and reason and pursue a "critique" of pure reason, in his subsequent attempts to define the "proper method" of metaphysics.

While this certainly implies a rather forceful way of reading Kant's 1771-1772 correspondence with Herz, I believe the difference in the titles of the two works mentioned in the correspondence is indicative of an important change in Kant's approach to the problem of the "proper method" of metaphysics in the early 1770's, one which took place in response to criticisms of his inaugural dissertation and his discovery of the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." His response to this problem and these criticisms ultimately led Kant to away from the paradigm he had attempted to establish for metaphysics in his inaugural dissertation *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World* (1770) . In order to substantiate this claim and make the case that this turn was essential for the development of the "critique" of pure reason that Kant would publish in 1781, I would like to look more closely at the context in which Kant's announced *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* in his June 6, 1771 to Herz (Section 3.2). I would then like to consider the relation between Kant's answer to the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." and the "critique" of pure reason that he announces in his February 21, 1772 letter

to Herz (Section 3.2). Finally, I would like to explore the way in which another one of Kant's correspondents, Johann Caspar Lavater, responded to the "critique" of pure reason that Kant announced he would publish (Section 3.4).

3.2: FROM THE FORM AND PRINCIPLES OF THE SENSIBLE AND THE INTELLIGIBLE WORLD TO THE BOUNDS OF SENSIBILITY AND REASON

Kant thought he had arrived at a position that he would "never have to change" in his inaugural dissertation.[1] In a letter written on September 2, 1770, Kant told Lambert that he thought his dissertation contained "wholly certain and easy criteria" which could be used to examine "all sorts of metaphysical questions" and "decide with certainty... the extent to which these questions can or cannot be resolved."[2] He fully expected *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World* to win Lambert's approval and the favor of the most important philosophers of his time. Unfortunately, Kant's attempt to "preserve metaphysics proper from any admixture of the sensible" and make "usefully explicit and evident without great strain" the significance of "something thought through a universal or a pure concept of the understanding" was not as well-received as he had hoped.[3]

Kant sent copies of *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World* to the enlightened philosophers in Berlin, with whom he had corresponded since the success of his *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality* in the Academy's prize essay competition 1763. He asked Marcus Herz, the brilliant young Jewish medical student who had defended the dissertation, to distribute the text to the Prussian Minister of Culture, Carl Joseph Maximilian, Freiherr von Fürst und Kupfenberg, as well as Johann Georg Sulzer,

[1] *Kant to Lambert (September 2, 1770),* pg. 107 (X:97).
[2] *Kant to Lambert (September 2, 1770).* pg. 109 (X:98).
[3] *Kant to Lambert (September 2, 1770),* pg. 109 (X:98)

Johann Heinrich Lambert, and Moses Mendelssohn upon his arrival in Berlin. Herz did so, and seems to have made a great effort to promote Kant's work, but the responses were less than encouraging. Lambert agreed that "*human knowledge*, by virtue of being *knowledge* and by virtue of *having its own form*, is divided in accordance with the old *phenomenon* and *noumenon* distinction and, accordingly arises out of two entirely different and, so to speak, *heterogenous* sources, so that what stems from the one source can never be derived from the other. Knowledge that comes from the senses thus is and remains sensible, just as knowledge that comes from the understanding remains peculiar to the understanding."[4] He nevertheless questioned "to what extent these two ways of knowing are so completely separated that they never come together."[5] While Herz claimed that Mendelssohn"could not agree" with the views expressed in the dissertation "because they did not agree with Baumgarten's opinions," Mendelssohn told Kant that his "nervous infirmities" made it "impossible for me to give as much effort of thought to a speculative work of this stature" in a letter he wrote to Kant on December 25, 1770.[6]

Kant did not respond to these criticisms of his dissertation for many months after he received the letters of Sulzer, Lambert, and Mendelssohn. Nor did he respond to them directly. Kant begins his June 6, 1771 letter to Herz by saying that he has been unable to respond to Herz's correspondence, or to letters from Johann Heinrich Lambert and Moses Mendelssohn, because "the kinds of letters with which these two scholars [Lambert and Mendelssohn] have honored me always lead me to a long series of investigations."[7] Kant insists that "the mere fact that men of such insight

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[4] *Lambert to Kant (October 13, 1770)*, pp. 114-115 (X:105).
[5] *Lambert to Kant*, 10.13.1770, pg. 115(X:105).
[6] *Herz to Kant (September 11, 1770)*, pg. 110 (X:100). See also *Mendelssohn to Kant (December 25, 1770)*, pp. 122-124 (X:113-116). See also *Mendelssohn to Kant*, 12.25.1770, pg. 122 (X:113).
[7] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 126 (X: 122).

can remain unconvinced is always a proof to me that my theories must at least lack clarity, self-evidence, or even something more essential."[8] Far from becoming indignant or discouraged by the objections raised by Lambert and Mendelssohn, however, Kant tells Herz "you know very well that I am inclined not only to try to refute intelligent criticisms, but that I always try to weave them together with my judgments and give them "the right to overthrow all my previous cherished opinions," in the hope that he will be better able to "achieve an unpartisan perspective, by seeing my judgments from the standpoint of others, so that a third opinion may emerge, superior to my previous ones."[9]

If giving Lambert's and Mendelssohn's criticisms "the right to overthrow all my previous cherished opinions" led Kant to question the claims he had advanced in his1770 dissertation, it can perhaps be seen in the description of the work Kant tells Herz he is preparing, "a work which I call *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*."[10] In the 1771 letter, *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* is presented as Kant's response to Lambert's and Mendelssohn's criticisms of his dissertation. It is the result of the "long investigations" Kant says he was forced to undertake, because he had not convinced "men of such insight" as Lambert and Mendelssohn with his dissertation *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*.[11]

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[8] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 126 (X: 122).
[9] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 126 (X: 122).
[10] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 127 (X:123). Vaihinger suggests that Kant entered a skeptical phase in the early 1770's, under the influence of Hume. He also suggests that this skepticism is evident in Kant's correspondence with Herz, but does not indicate where this evidence is to be found. See *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, pg. 49. Erdmann repeats Vaihinger's analysis in the *Vorwort* to his edition of Kant's *Reflexionen* to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and even uses Vaihinger's account of Kant's intellectual development to divide the *Reflexionen* into the categories "*Kritischer Empirismus*," "*Kritischer Rationalismus*," and into different periods of "*Kriticismus*." See Erdmann, Benno. *Reflexionen Kants zur kritischen Philosophie, aus Kants Handschriftlichen Aufzeichnungen* (*Band II: Reflexionen zur Kritik der reinen Vernunft*). Leipzig: Feues Verlag, 1884. pp. XII-LX. There are good reasons to suspect the periodization Vaihinger and Erdmann use to divide Kant's intellectual development. In the end, periodizations of the kind advanced by Vaihinger and Erdmann seem to presuppose which characteristics make Kant's philosophy "critical" rather than explaining them.
[11] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 126 (X:122).

Kant does not indicate that he has been swayed by any of the particular objections raised by Lambert or Mendelssohn. Nor does he mention any of the specific the matters with which they were concerned. Kant is more concerned that Lambert and Mendelssohn "remained unconvinced" by his arguments.[12] Kant therefore concludes that his work must have lacked "clarity" (Deutlichkeit) or the requisite "self-evidence" (*Evidentz*)[13] He also considers the possibility that there might be a more serious problem with the work, acknowledging that it might be missing something "more essential" (*etwas wesentlichern fehlen*).[14] Whether his dissertation lacked "self-evidence" or something "more essential," Kant was forced to reconsider the claims he advanced in his dissertation and reformulate his arguments and his position.

Kant did not expect that he would be able to respond to Lambert's and Mendelssohn's criticisms in short order. He tells Herz that "long experience has taught me that one cannot compel or precipitate insight by force in matters of the sort we are considering; rather, it takes quite a long time to gain insight, since one looks at one and the same concept intermittently, and regards its possibility in all its possible relations and contexts, and, furthermore, because one must above all awaken the skeptical spirit within, to examine one's conclusions against the strongest possible doubt and see whether they can stand the test."[15] If he is able to "awaken the skeptical spirit within," which will allow him to determine the validity of the positions he advanced in the dissertation with more assurance, then Kant says he will be able to "distinguish with certainty and with clarity that which depends on the subjective principles of human mental powers (not only sensibility but also the

[12] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 126 (X:122).
[13] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 126 (X:122).
[14] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 126 (X:122).
[15] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 127 (X:122).

understanding), and that which pertains directly to the facts."[16]

Clearly, the "skeptical spirit" (*der skeptische Geist*) that Kant intends to "awaken" (*aufwachen*) in himself is of a rather moderate variety. It is not the skepticism which struck Hume with "melancholy" and reduced him "almost to despair."[17] Nor is it the Pyrrhonian skepticism that some claim Kant to have espoused in *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer.*[18] It is not even the "skeptical method" that Kant employed in the 'Antithetic of Pure Reason' in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[19] It does not call reason into question, seek the "limits" of human reason, or presume that reason must contradict itself, when it extends itself "beyond the bounds of sense."[20] The "skeptical spirit" that Kant invokes in his 1771 letter to Herz seems to be no more than a methodological skepticism, designed to help him formulate a "unpartisan" (*unparteyish*) perspective from which he could consider his own views and test their validity.

The moderate and methodological character of the "skeptical spirit" that Kant hoped to awaken in himself is significant, given the course of Kant's intellectual development and the context

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[16] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 127 (X:122-123). The German text of Kant's letter does not correspond precisely to Zweig's translation. Kant tells Herz "*Sie wissen welchen großen Einflus die gewisse und deutliche Einsicht in den Unterschied dessen was auf subiectivischen principien der menschlichen Seelenkräfte nicht allein der Sinnlichkeit sondern auch des Verstandes beruht von dem was gerade auf die Gegenstände geht in der gantzen Weltweisheit ja so gar auf die wichtigsten Zwecke der Menschen überhaupt habe*." Zweig translates "*die Gegenstände*" as "the facts," opposing the "subjective principles of human mental powers" to matters of fact. A literal translation would oppose the "subjective principles of the powers of the human soul" to "what belongs to objects." Because Kant seems to be emphasizing what belongs to objects themselves, independently of the "subjective principles of the powers of the human soul," Zweig's interpretation seems appropriate and I will continue to refer to his translation without further emendation. The difference between the text and interpretation should, however, be noted.

[17] Hume, David. *A Treatise of Human Nature (Second Edition)*. Edited by P.H. Nidditch. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. pg. 264.

[18] See Forster, Michael N. *Kant and Skepticism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008. pp. 16-20, 33-51.

[19] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 468-469 (A423?b451-A424/B452).

[20] Manfred Kühn emphasizes that Kant was skeptical of particular accounts of metaphysical and moral matters and particular metaphysical claims, but was never skeptical of the possibility or desirability of metaphysics in itself or the possibility of legitimate claims and sound arguments in metaphysics, as Frederick Beiser claims. See *Kant: A Biography*, pp. 180-181. See also Beiser, Frederick. "Kant's Intellectual Development: 1746-1781." Included in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant*. Edited by Paul Guyer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. pp. 42-43.

of his1771 letter to Herz.[21] Just a few months later, in a concerned letter dated July 9,1771, Herz informed Kant that another one of his students, David Friedländer, had said that Kant was "no longer such a great devotee of speculative philosophy."[22] According to Friedländer, Kant had said that metaphysics was "pointless head scratching, a subject understood only by a handful of scholars in their study chambers but far too removed from the tumult of the world to bring about any of the changes that their theorizing demands."[23] He had also, according to Friedländer, said that "moral philosophy for the common man is thus the *only* appropriate subject for a scholar, for here one may penetrate the heart, here one may study human feelings and try to regulate them by bringing them under the rules of common experience."[24] Herz tells Kant that he "trembled" at this news, but took his June 6, 1771 letter as proof that Kant was still the same man that "on so many occasions extolled the value of metaphysics" and shouted about "the pleasures of the mind" and the "happiness that springs from the works of the understanding, happiness which is closest to that of the gods themselves."[25] Kant's June 6, 1771 letter convinced Herz that Kant was still "the same devotee of metaphysics as ever." Herz even speculates that it must have been a "bad mood" which motivated the remarks that had been reported to him by Friedlander.[26]

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[21] It is worth noting that Herz would have heard Kant "extol the virtues of metaphysics" in lectures and in conversation between 1764 and 1769, when Herz was a student in Königsberg. Many scholars assume this to be a time in which Kant experienced a "crisis" in his views on metaphysics. They find evidence of this "crisis" in works like *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764) and *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics* (1766). Some even go so far as to suggest that Kant "abandoned" metaphysics during this period and devoted himself to more popular, practical, and pragmatic subjects like physical geography and anthropology. Herz's testimony regarding Kant's concerns during this period should qualify any such claims and check the more exaggerated and absurd claim that Kant "abandoned" metaphysics during the 1760's.. Herz says that Kant's June 6, 1771 letter convinced him that Kant was "still the same devotee of metaphysics as ever," and concluded that it must have been a "bad mood" which drove Kant to doubt its value in his discussion with Friedländer. See *Herz to Kant*, 07.09.1771, pp. 128-130 (X:124-127).
[22] *Herz to Kant*, 07.09.1771, pp. 128-129 (X:124).
[23] *Herz to Kant*, 07.09.1771, pp. 128-129 (X:124).
[24] *Herz to Kant*, 07.09.1771, pp. 128-129 (X:124).
[25] *Herz to Kant*, 07.09.1771, pg. 129 (X:125).
[26] *Herz to Kant*, 07.09.1771, pg. 129 (X:125).

Herz's interpretation of Kant's letter is not unreasonable. The "unpartisan perspective" Kant hoped to achieve by "awakening the skeptical spirit within" is obviously far removed from the more general skepticism about the value of "speculative philosophy" that was attributed to Kant by Friedlander. Kant's letter shows that he planned to use the "spirit" of "methodological" skepticism to deal with the criticisms of Lambert and Mendelssohn and as a means to determine the validity of the positions he had defended in his dissertation. By "weaving" the criticisms of Lambert and Mendelssohn "together with my judgments," Kant thought he could look at his own judgments "from the standpoint of others, so that a third opinion may emerge, superior to my previous ones."[27] Kant hoped this "third opinion" would allow him to "work out in some detail the foundational principles and laws that determine the sensible world, together with an outline of what is essential to the Doctrine of Taste, of Metaphysics, and of Moral Philosophy."[28] He announces *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* as the work which will contain the results of these reflections.

Kant told Herz that he had already "surveyed all the relevant materials, and have considered, weighed, and harmonized everything" for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* in the letter of June 6, 1771.[29] He seemed confident of his ability to finish the work he described, and seems to have believed that he would have it ready for publication in a very short time. As was often the case, however, Kant's plans seem to have outstripped his ability to finish the work he had announced. By looking more closely at what Kant says about *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* in his correspondence with Herz, however, it will be possible to see what Kant hoped to achieve in *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* and why he never published it.

Kant does not describe the contents of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* in any great

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[27] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 126 (X: 122).
[28] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 127 (X:123).
[29] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 127 (X:122).

detail in his 1771 letter to Herz. When he says he hopes to"work out in some detail the foundational principles and laws that determine the sensible world, together with an outline of what is essential to the Doctrine of Taste, of Metaphysics, and of Moral Philosophy" in *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*, Kant thought this could still be done with the same distinction he had emphasized in his inagural dissertation, namely, the distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition.[30] While Kant had only sought to use the distinction between sensible and intellectual representations as a "propadeutic" to metaphysics in *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, his plans for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* show that he planned to apply the distinction between "that which depends on the subjective principles of the human mental powers (not only sensibility but also the understanding) and that which pertains directly to the facts" to aesthetics and moral philosophy as well.[31] Instead of simply responding to the criticisms of Lambert and Mendelssohn, it seems that Kant planned to extend the claims of his inaugural dissertation into areas he had yet treated in *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*.

Kant does not describe the organization of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* in his 1771 letter to Herz, but he treats the matter in some detail at the beginning of his letter of February 21, 1772. Kant explains to Herz that he thought of dividing *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* into two parts, one theoretical and one practical.[32] Each part would then be divided into two sections. The first (theoretical) part would be divided between 1) "general phenomenology," and 2) "metaphysics,

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[30] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 387 (II:395).
[31] Kant to Herz, 06.07.1771, pg. 127 (X:122).
[32] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 132 (X:129). Kant writes "*Ich dachte mir darinn, zwei Theile, einen theoretischen und practischen*." In this passage, the verb "*denken*" is in the imperfect tense (*präteritum*), and appears as "*dachte*." Its conjugation in this form could either be stylistic, or could indicate that at some point in the past, Kant "thought" of dividing *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* into two parts. Kant uses this tense to discuss *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* in the 1772 letter to Herz, though he discusses the "critique of pure reason" he announces later in the letter in the present tense.

but this only with regard to its nature and method."[33] The second (practical) part would deal with 1) "the universal principles of feeling, taste, and sensuous desire," and 2) "the basic principles of morality."[34]

Benno Erdmann has argued that the outline of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* that Kant presents in his 1772 letter to Herz is Kant's starting point for "the later complete system of critical philosophy."[35] It should be noted, however, that the plan Kant proposes for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* differ considerably from the structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, too much for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* to be the obvious antecedent of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. One could perhaps treat Kant's description of the structure of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* as an early "draft" of the structure of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in the way that Paul Guyer and Wolfgang Carl regard certain of Kant's *Reflexionen* and *lose Blätter* as "drafts" of the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.'[36] Yet there is no clear indication in Kant's letter that the outline of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* has anything to do with the "critique" that Kant announces after he has answered the question concerning "the ground of the relation...."Nor is there any evidence from Kant's correspondence and *Reflexionen* from the 1770's that the organization of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* gradually took the shape that Kant gave the *Critique of Pure Reason* in the period in which he composed the work.

Even if Kant's description of the organization of *The Bounds of Sensibility* served as an early model for the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the differences between them are so profound that there is very little continuity between them. The *Critique of Pure Reason* contains no "phenomenology,"

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[33] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 132 (X: 129).
[34] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 132 (X: 129).
[35] *Anmerkungen*, pp. 572.
[36] "Kant's First Drafts of the Deduction of the Categories," pg. 5. *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, pp. 26-27.

and does not distinguish "phenomenology" from "metaphysics" as Kant suggests in his outline of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*. Instead, the *Critique of Pure Reason* is divided into (1) a Transcendental 'Doctrine of Elements,' containing a 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and a 'Transcendental Logic,' and (2) a 'Transcendental Doctrine of Method,' containing the 'Discipline,' 'Canon,' 'Architectonic,' and 'History' of pure reason. None of these divisions correspond to anything Kant describes in his outline for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* in 1772. From the evidence of his correspondence, it would appear that the "critique" of pure reason that Kant announces at the end of the 1772 letter to Herz was to have two parts, one dealing with theoretical knowledge, and the other dealing with practical knowledge. It is only the first division, concerning theoretical knowledge, that Kant says he will have ready for publication "within three months."[37] Kant planned to deal with "the sources of metaphysics, its methods and limits" in this division of his "critique." While this could be said to mirror the division between the theoretical and practical parts of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*, the resemblance is not substantial enough to identify the "critique" of pure reason with *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*. There are profound differences between the elaborate structure of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* that Kant described at the beginning of his 1772 letter to Herz, the simplified description of the "critique" of pure reason that is to be found at the end of the letter, and the form the *Critique of Pure Reason* took when it was finally published in 1781.

The indecision which characterized Kant's plans for his "critique" should give scholars pause, whenever they are tempted to use structural similarities to identify Kant's proposed works.[38]

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[37] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 135 (X:132).

[38] Kant struggled with the organization of his treatise on theoretical philosophy until at least 1776. In a letter from November of that year, Kant tells Herz that "what we need in order to indicate the divisions, limits, and the whole content of that field [pure reason], according to secure principles, and to lay the road marks so that in the future one can

The discussion which follows Kant's description of the organization of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* is all the more reason to see a profound difference between the work Kant had described in his 1771 letter to Herz and the "critique" of pure reason that he announces near the end of the letter from 1772. Because Kant's description of the structure of *The Bounds of Sensibility* and Reason is presented retrospectively, as the structure of a work he "had been planning," a work which "might perhaps have the title The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason," something appears to have changed in Kant's plans for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* and, more generally, in his approach to the foundations of metaphysics, between 1771 and 1772.

3.4: FROM THE GROUND OF THE RELATION BETWEEN REPRESENTATIONS AND OBJECTS TO THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

At the beginning of his 1772 letter to Herz, Kant tells his former student that he had "already made considerable progress in the effort to distinguish the sensible from the intellectual in the field of morals and the principles that spring therefrom."[1] He also says that had already "outlined, to my tolerable satisfaction, the principles of feeling, taste, and power of judgment, with their effects–the pleasant, the beautiful, and the good–and was then making plans for a work that might perhaps have

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know for sure whether one stands on the floor of true reason or on that of sophistry–for this we need a critique, a discipline, a canon, and an architectonic of pure reason, a formal science, therefore, that can require nothing of those sciences already at hand and that needs for its foundations an entirely unique vocabulary." At this point, the organization of Kant's "critique" had still not taken its definitive shape. See *Kant to Herz*, 12.24.1776, pg. 160 (X: 199). In *Reflexion* 4858, Kant repeats the critique, discipline, canon, and architectonic division. He writes "Die transscendentalphilosophie erfodert zuvorderst Critick (sie von der empiricischen zu unterscheiden). 2. Disciplin. 3. Canon. 4. Architectonic" (XV: 268). Kant's "critique" probably did not assume its final form until four or five months before the *Critique of Pure Reason* was published, judging from Kant's remarks in his correspondence with Mendelssohn and Garve in 1783. See *Kant to Garve*, 08.07.1783, pg. 197 (X: 338). *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 08.16.1783, pg. 202 (X: 345). In both letters, Kant remarks that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was the result of twelve years of reflection, but was completed in four or five months. This is not, however, sufficient reason to assume that "the Critique is not a unitary work" as Hans Vaihinger and Norman Kemp Smith have argued. See *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. xxviii-xxx. For a refutation of this "patchwork" approach to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, see H.J. Patton in "Is Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* a Patchwork?" Included in *Kant: Disputed Questions*. Edited by Moltke S. Gram. Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1967. pp. 62-91.

[1] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 132 (X: 129).

the title *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*."[2]

Curiously, Kant presents the outline of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* which follows his account of the "progress" he had made "in the effort to distinguish the sensible from the intellectual" retrospectively, as an account of the concerns which had occupied him before he made an important discovery. When Kant tells Herz he was "then making plans" (*nun machte ich mir den Plan*) for a work called "that might perhaps have the title, *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason" (welches etwa den Titel haben könte: Die Grentzen der Sinnlichkeit und der Vernunft)*, he is referring to the time when Herz visited Königsberg and the "project" they had "debated" (*disputirt*) at that time.[3] He is not explaining what he was working on as he was writing his letter at the end of February in 1772.

Kant explains the change in his attitude towards *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* by telling Herz that "after your departure from Königsberg I examined once more, in the intervals between my professional duties and my sorely needed relaxation, the project that we had debated, in order to adapt it to the whole of philosophy and other knowledge in order to understand its extent and limits."[4] In the course of these reflections, Kant noticed "that I still lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, had failed to consider and which in fact constitutes the key to the whole secret of metaphysics, hitherto still hidden from itself."[5] The "key to the whole secret of metaphysics" is, of course, the answer to the question "What is the

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[2] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 132 (X: 129).
[3] While "*nun*" generally means "now," the appropriateness of Zweig's translation ("then") is confirmed by the tense of Kant's description of his plans for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*. Kant writes "*nun machte ich mir den Plan zu einem Werke welches etwa den Titel haben könte: Die Grentzen der Sinnlichkeit und der Vernunft*." The fact that Kant uses the verbs "*machen*" and "*können*" in the imperfect tense ("*machte"* and *"könte*") indicates that he was referring to the past (*Vergangenheit*). A more literal translation might read "And now I made the plan for a work which might perhaps have had the title: *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason.*"
[4] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 132 (X:129).
[5] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X:130).

ground of the relation of that in us which we call representation to the object?"[6]

Kant's reference to the "debate" (*Disput*) which took place when Herz visited Königsberg have often been overlooked in readings of the 1772 letter. Yet this debate seems to have been essential for Kant's discovery of the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." It also gives some indication that Herz was concerned about the "project" Kant had described.[7] The "debate" that took place between seems to have raised questions in Kant's mind about his plans for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* and the appropriateness of the paradigm he was attempting to establish, both for "the whole of philosophy" (*die gesammte Philosophie*) and for "other knowledge" *(übrige Erkenntnis*).[8]

There is no reason to assume that the "debate" that took place while Herz was visiting Königsberg was contentious or that Herz rejected the work of his teacher and friend. Indeed, Herz defends the distinctions Kant drew in his inaugural dissertation in his *Observations on Speculative Philosophy* (1771), a work which is comparable, in many ways, to Kant's plans for *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*. Herz presents his *Observations* as a commentary on Kant's *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*. He agrees that the principles of metaphysics can be derived from the distinction between matters of fact and the "subjective principles of human mental powers."[9]

Herz also follows Kant in his account of the "main difference" (*Hauptunterschied*) between sensible and intellectual cognition, saying "what is sensible in our cognition is that by means of

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[6] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X:130).
[7] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 132 (X:129).
[8] *Kant to Herz*, 07.06.1771, pg. 127 (X:122).
[9] Herz, Marcus. *Observations from Speculative Philosophy*. Selections included in *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials*. Edited and Translated by Eric Watkins. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009. pg. 283 (18-20). See also Herz, Marcus. *Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990.

which our state behaves passively in the presence of external objects; what is intellectual [in our cognition] is the faculty to represent such things to which, due to their makeup, no access is permitted through the senses" (*Das Sinnliche in unserer Erkenntnis ist dasjenige, vermittels dessen unser Zustand sich bei der Gegenwart äußerer Gegenstände leidend verhält; das Intellektuelle ist das Vermögen, sich solche Dinge vorzustellen, denen ihrer Beschaffenheit wegen durch die Sinne kein Eingang verstattet wird*).[10] This definition preserves the account of the "origins" of sensible and intelligible representations that Kant had proposed in his inaugural dissertation in 1770.

Kant had argued that "sensibility" concerned "the receptivity of a subject in virtue of which it is possible for the subject's own representative state to be affected in a definite way by the presence of some object," producing "sensible representations" or "*phenomena*."[11] "Intellect," on the other hand, was "the faculty of a subject in virtue of which it has the power to represent things which cannot by their own quality come beefore the senses of that subject," producing "intellectual representations" or "*noumena*."[12] Like Kant, Herz was committed to the idea that "things which are thought sensitively are representations of things as they appear, while things which are intellectual are representations of things as they are" in 1771-1772.[13]

Although much of his work is dependent on distinctions Kant makes in his inaugural dissertation, Herz also raises skeptical questions about the necessity of the agreement between intellectual representations and their objects in his *Observations.* He asks, for instance, how the existence of "external things" can be said to "agree" with "the basic laws of our cognition," when

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[10] *Observations from Speculative Philosophy*, pg. 286 (27).
[11] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 384 (II:392).
[12] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 384 (II:392).
[13] See also *Observations from Speculative Philosophy*, pg. 299 (88). See also *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 384 (II:392).

those things exist "independently of all representation as well."[14] If our cognition is in every case a judgment, as Herz claims, then it is unclear how we are to know the subject to which judgement attributes its predicates, when that subject remains "independent of our representations."[15] According to Herz, the grasp of this subject can only be intuitive, which would make Kant's claim that intellectual representations present things "as they are" dependent on a faculty of intellectual intuition.[16] Kant himself had defined the understanding as "the faculty of a subject in virtue of which it has the power to represent things which cannot by their own quality come before the senses of that subject" in his dissertation, but he had not asked how intellectual cognition was to "produce" concepts that corresponded to the necessary but independent existence of their objects.[17]

The "debate" between Kant and Herz that took place in Königsberg must have convinced Kant that this was a serious problem for the "method" he had proposed for metaphysics in his inaugural dissertation. It led Kant to announce the discovery of a question which he called "the key to the whole secret of metaphysics" in his 1772 letter to Herz.[18] Kant's answer to this question, which asks "what is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call representation to the object?" (*auf welchem Grunde beruhet di Beziehung desienigen, was man in uns Vorstellung nennt, auf den Gegenstand?*), marks a decisive change in his intellectual development and his approach to the "proper method" of metaphysics, because the solution he proposed made Kant turn from the "bounds" which distinguished sensibility and reason to the "ground" of their relation." Evidence that

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[14] Herz is particularly concerned to prove the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. See *Observations from Speculative Philosophy*, pg. 299 (88). See also *Betrachtungen aus der spekulativen Weltweisheit*, pg. 47. See also Watkins, Eric. "The Critical Turn: Kant and Herz from 1770 to 1772." Included in *Kant und die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongress (Band 2).* Edited by Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, and Ralph Schumacher. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001. pg. 72.
[15] See "The Critical Turn: Kant and Herz from 1770-1772," pp. 72-73.
[16] See "The Critical Turn: Kant and Herz from 1770-1772," pp. 72-73.
[17] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 384 (II:392).
[18] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X:130).

the idea of a "critique" of pure reason followed directly from Kant's insight into the role the "pure concepts of the understanding" played in establishing this relation, and from the more general shift from a concern with "bounds" to a concern with "grounds," is also to be found in his 1772 letter to Herz.

Kant's answer to the question concerning "the ground of the relation of that in us which we call *representation* to the object" hinges on the "ground" (*Grund*) or "source" (*Quell*) of the relation between "representations" (*Vorstellungen*) and objects (*Gegenstände*). "Bounds" (*Grenzen*) are different from "grounds" (*Gründe*) and "sources" (*Quellen*). According to a distinction Kant makes in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783), "bounds" simply determine what lies inside and what lies outside of a particular context of reference.[19] As such, "bounds" do not explain the "ground" or "priciple" according to which different contexts differ or explain the relation between them. Because it is the "ground" of the relationship between representations and objects that determines the "validity" (*Gültigkeit*) of their relation, an account of the "bounds" between sensibility and reason simply cannot answer the question concerning "the ground of the relation..."

The "bounds" in the title of *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* could be said to adequately describe the purpose of that work. Kant says he intended to "distinguish with certainty and with clarity that which depends on the subjective principles of human mental powers (not only sensibility but also the understanding), and that which pertains directly to the facts" in *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*.[20] By distinguishing what belongs to the facts, what belongs to sensibility,

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[19] *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, pg. 142 (IV:352). On the relationship of a "boundary" to its particular *topos* (field, territory, domain, or abode), see Makkreel, Rudolf. "The Role of Judgment and Orientation in Hermeneutics." *Philosophy and Social Criticism.* 34.1-2 (2008). pp. 31-33.

[20] *Kant to Herz,* 06.07.1771, pg. 127 (X:122). This account of the "bounds" of sensibility and reason is obviously a restatement of the purpose of Kant's inaugural dissertation, which proposes a "propadeutic science" which "teaches the distinction between sensitive cognition and the cognition which derives from the understanding" so that metaphysics will be able to determine "the *first principles* of the use of the *pure understanding.*" See *On the Form and Principles*

and what belongs to the understanding, Kant believed that he could prevent them from being confused with one another. One is unlikely to mistake (objective) matters of fact for the "subjective principles of human mental powers," or confuse the respective forms and contents of sensibility and the understanding if one has distinguished them and marked the "bounds" between them. Between 1770 and 1771, it would appear that Kant thought this was sufficient to determine "the first principles of the use of the pure understanding" and "what is essential to the Doctrine of Taste, of Metaphysics, and of Moral Philosophy."[21]

It is reasonable to assume that the distinctions between "the principles and laws that determine the sensible world" and "what is essential to the Doctrine of Taste, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy" that Kant draws in his 1771 letter to Herz follow from the distinction between that which belongs to the facts, that which belongs to sensibility, and that which belongs to the understanding. Kant also seems to believe that the "essentials" of "the Doctrine of Taste, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy" can be derived from the distinction between sensibility and the understanding within the context of the "subjective principles of human mental powers" and the "bounds" between sensibility and the understanding. If these assumptions are correct, then it is clear that every contribution Kant expected to make in *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* can be traced back to the"bounds" which are given such a prominent place in the title of the work, and which he found so inadequate to answer the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." in 1772.

While he no longer thinks the "bounds" between sensible and intellectual cognition are

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of the Sensible and the Intelligible World, pg. 387 (II:395).

[21] *Kant to Herz*, 06.07.1771, pg. 127 (X:123). See also *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 387 (II:395).

sufficient "grounds" for metaphysics, Kant still argues that the "ground" of the "relation" between "representations" and "objects" must be something "in us" in his 1772 letter to Herz.[22] Kant admits that it is "understandable" to think that the object itself is the "cause" of the representation of the object "in us," but he ultimately rejects the empiricist attempt to derive ideas from sensation. He says "passive or sensuous representations have an understandable relationship to objects" while "the principles that are derived from the nature of our soul have an understandable validity for all things insofar as those things are supposed to be objects of the senses." The philosophical issue at stake is the distinction between what Kant calls an "understandable relationship" (*begreifliche Beziehung*) between representations and objects and the "understandable validity" (*begreifliche Gültigkeit*) of that relationship. The latter is not reducible to the former. Kant rejects empiricism, because he does not think the "understandable relationship" between representations derived from sensation and objects is sufficient to guarantee the "objective validity" of that relation.

In his 1772 letter to Herz, Kant still maintains the distinction he had established in *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*, that "sensible representations present things as they appear, the intellectual presentations present them as they are."[23] Any attempt to make sensibility the "ground" of the relation between representations and objects risks making those representations invalid, by deriving the "being" of things (things "as they are") from their "appearance" (things "as they appear"). If the "appearance" is unclear or illusory, then the representation of the thing will be indeterminate, and consequently will not produce an objectively valid representation of the object. The "ground" of intellectual representation is therefore irreducible

[22] *Kant to Herz,* 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X: 130).
[23] *Kant to Herz,* 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X: 131). See also *On The Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World,* pg. 382 (II: 392).

to "the reception of representations through the senses" and cannot be "abstracted from sense perceptions," because this would threaten to invalidate the representations in question.[24]

Against the empiricist position, Kant maintains that the objective validity of sensible and intellectual representations must "have their origin in the nature of the soul," in such a manner that "they are neither caused by the object nor bring the object itself into being."[25] For Kant, this seems to be the condition of a valid relationship between objects and representations. Kant is committed to maintaining that the origin of the "relation of that in us which we call *representation* to the object" is something "in the nature of the soul," but resists the kind of idealism that would make the existence of objects dependent on their representation. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant relegates this relation to objects of the "divine understanding, which would not represent given objects, but through whose representation the objects would themselves at the same time be given or produced."[26] He makes it quite clear that this kind of understanding has nothing to do with "human understanding," which "cannot form for itself the least concept of another possible understanding, either one that would intuit itself or one that, while possessing a sensible intuition, would possess one of a different kind than one grounded in space and time."[27]

Kant's emphasis on the "human understanding" has important implications for his answer to the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." in 1772, and caused him to raise another decisive question, a question regarding "how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible."[28] Mathematics provides an unproblematic example,

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[24] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X: 130).
[25] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X: 130).
[26] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 253 (B145).
[27] *Critique of Pure reason*, pg. 250 (B139).
[28] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X: 131).

because Kant thinks the objects of mathematics are "quantities and can be represented as quantities only because it is possible for us to produce their mathematical representations."[29] Mathematical objects are constructed in pure intuition, so they can be unproblematically represented by the subject to him or herself. Such constructions need not correspond to anything outside of the subject's own intuition, so that "the concepts of the quantities can be spontaneous and their validity determined *a priori*."[30]

Where representations concern objects which are not reducible to mathematical quantities, Kant acknowledges that his account of the "ground of the relation" between representations and objects is more troublesome. He writes "in the case of relationships involving qualities–as to how my understanding may form for itself concepts of things completely *a priori*, with which concepts the things must necessarily agree, and as to the possibility of such concepts, with which principles of experience must be in exact agreement and which nevertheless are independent of experience–this question, of how the faculty of the understanding achieves this conformity with the things themselves, is still left in a state of obscurity."[31] Kant rejects the Platonic idea of a "previous intuition of divinity," Malebranche's suggestion of a "still-continuing perennial intuition of this primary being," as well as Crusius' suggestion that there are "certain implanted rules for the purpose of forming judgments and ready-made concepts that God implanted in the human soul just as they had to be in order to harmonize with things" as possible explanations of the correspondence of intellectual representations and their objects.[32] While he specifically identifies Crusius' position with the"*deus ex machina*" which would "encourage all sorts of wild notions and every pious and

[29] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X: 131).
[30] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X: 131).
[31] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X: 131).
[32] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X: 131).

speculative brainstorm," Plato and Malebranche are subject to the same objection, because both of their positions depend on the intuition of the divine. All three philosophers rely on a kind of intellectual intuition, which serves as the "ground" of the relation between representations and objects.

Even if human beings did possess a faculty of intellectual intuition, it would not be clear how it could be regarded as an objectively valid ground for a relation between a representation and an object. The accounts of intellectual intuition that Kant considers all presuppose a theological account of the goodness of God, which Kant never admitted in the realm of theoretical philosophy or speculative theology. They assume that the representations given by God to a being possessing a faculty of intellectual intuition will necessarily be valid, because God is necessarily good and cannot be an evil deceiver. Because the existence of God as the highest good is speculative, it cannot serve as the guarantee of the validity of our representations without introducing "the greatest absurdity one could hit upon in the determination of the origin and validity of our cognitions."[33] In addition to the lack of sufficient reason or proof for such arguments, Kant feared that they would also lead to a "deceptive circle in the conclusion concerning our cognitions."[34] Consequently, he did not regard the "intuition of the divine" or intellectual intuition as suitable "grounds" for an objectively valid relationship between representations and objects.

Instead of relying on a faculty of intellectual intuition to establish the validity of the relation between representations and objects, Kant turns to the understanding itself. In his 1772 letter to Herz, Kant says "while I was searching in such ways for the sources of intellectual cognition, without which one cannot determine the nature and limits of metaphysics, I divided this science into

[33] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X: 131).
[34] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X: 131).

its naturally distinct parts, and I sought to reduce the transcendental philosophy (that is to say, all concepts belonging to completely pure reason) to a certain number of categories, but not like Aristotle, who, in his ten predicaments, placed them side by side as he found them in a purely accidental juxtaposition. On the contrary, I arranged them according to the way they classify themselves by their own nature, following from a few fundamental laws of the understanding."[35] By reducing "all concepts belonging to completely pure reason" to a few categories, and then classifying these categories "according to the way they classify themselves by their own nature" as they follow from "a few fundamental laws of the understanding," Kant turns away from both the empirical and the theological accounts of the objective validity of our representations that he had discussed earlier in his letter. In their place, he begins to develop an immanent account of the validity of that relation within the understanding. Because the categories follow from the concepts of pure reason and the fundamental laws of the understanding, they express the necessary conditions of valid representation. In 1772, Kant thought this was nothing less than the capacity to represent things "as they are" in themselves.[36]

Though Kant does not present any evidence that he had begun to compose the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' when he wrote his 1772 letter to Herz, he says he has "succeeded" and is "now in a position to bring out a critique of pure reason," containing the first part of his findings, the part dealing with "the sources of metaphysics, its methods and limits."[37] This success was no doubt predicated on going beyond the "bounds" of sensibility and reason, because a work addressing the "bounds" of sensibility and reason could only distinguish between matters of

[35] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X:132).
[36] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1771, pg. 133 (X:131).
[37] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X: 132).

fact, those parts of human cognition which depend on sensibility, and those parts of human cognition which pertain to the understanding. It cannot show how the "representations" of sensibility and the understanding are to be "related" to the "facts." Nor can it show, "with certainty and clarity," that this relationship is "valid." A considerably different kind of account must be made, if one wishes to explain the sources of intellectual cognition, which guarantee the validity of representations and provide the ground of intellectual cognition.

It is worth noting that Kant calls a philosophical work which provides an answer to the question of the "ground of the relation of that in us which we call *representation* to the object" and identifies the "sources of intellectual cognition, without which one cannot determine the nature and limits of metaphysics" a "critique." A "critique" is therefore a kind of inquiry which goes to the "ground" and "origin" of the "relation of that in us which we call representation to the object." If it is to avoid the "wild notions" of "every pious and speculative brainstorm," a "critique" of pure reason must show how intellectual representations, which have their origin "in the nature of the soul" may be legitimately related to objects, without the aid of a theological "*deus ex machina*."[38] In other words, it must demonstrate the objective validity of representations which have their "origin" in "the nature of the soul" through categories derived from "a few fundamental laws of the understanding."[39]

A determination of the "sources" of intellectual cognition is the condition of any determination of the "nature" and "limits" of metaphysics. A "critique" must therefore be undertaken, if philosophers are to understand the "ground" of the relation between representations

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[38] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X:131).

[39] One could, perhaps, understand th determination of the "grounds" of the relation between representations and objects, based on the fundamental laws of the understanding, as the achievement of reason's "self-knowledge" that Kant describes in the Preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).

and objects. Because the "grounds" of these representations are "in us" and because the categories are derived from "a few fundamental laws of the understanding," the "sources" of intellectual cognition must also be sought "in us." If Kant intended to provide this account in the "critique" of pure reason that he described to Herz, then it is clear that he calls this an account of the "sources" of intellectual cognition "in us" and the "ground" fo their relation to objects a "critique." It is, moreover, clear that a "critique" of pure reason is distinct from an account of the "bounds" of sensibility and reason.

If a "critique" of pure reason were simply an account of the "bounds" of sensibility and reason, then Kant could have published *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason* as planned. He would not have needed to rename the work he was preparing when he encountered the question concerning "the ground of the relation ..." The fact that Kant never again referred to a work called *The Bounds of Sensibility and Reason*, a work which was intended to distinguish between "that which depends on the subjective principles of human mental powers (not only sensibility but also the understanding), and that which pertains directly to the facts," suggests that a work whose title emphasizes the "bounds" of sensibility and reason, and the distinction between them, cannot answer the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." To answer this question, one needs an account of the "sources" of intellectual cognition and the "grounds" for a valid relation to objects. In the process of determining the "sources" and "grounds" of objectively valid representation, Kant thought his "critique" of pure reason would provide "the key to the whole secret of metaphysics." It would also determine the "proper method" of metaphysics, because Kant thought that these "sources" and "grounds" were essential for determining "the nature and limits of metaphysics."[40]

[40] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X:132).

The "sources" and "grounds" of objectively valid representation are also, therefore, the conditions of the possibility of metaphysics.

By undertaking "a critique of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience, and hence the decision about the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all, however, from principles" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant thought he would finally be able to determine "all the concepts belonging to completely pure reason, which would allow him to set metaphysics on the "sure path" of science.[41] Although he struggled to present his "critique" with the utmost clarity, not everyone understood that this is what Kant intended his "critique" to achieve.[42]

3.4: WILL YOU MAINTAIN THE FOLLOWING THINGS IN IT?

Unlike the 1772 letter to Herz, Kant's 1774-1775 correspondence with Johann Caspar Lavater refers to the *Critique of Pure Reason* as the title of a forthcoming work. The letter in which Kant must have informed Lavater about the "critique" he had decided to publish is unfortunately lost. Yet Kant must have mentioned it to him in a letter written early in 1774, because Lavater tells Kant "I am eagerly awaiting your *Critique of Pure Reason*, as are many people in my country" in a response dated April 8, 1774.[1]

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[41] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii). See also *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X:132).
[42] Kant emphasized his struggle to bring clarity to the *Critique of Pure Reason* in a letter to Herz on August 20, 1777. Kant explains that "the thing that detains me is the problem of presenting these ideas with total clarity... I know that something can seem clear enough to an author himself and yet be misunderstood even by knowledgeable readers, if it departs entirely from their accustomed ways of thinking." See *Kant to Herz*, 08.20.1777, pg. 164 (X: 213).
[1] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:165). I have confirmed that Lavater referred to the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a title by examining a copy of his original letter in the archives of the Berlin Academy. Lavater not only underlined titles in his correspondence, but also made extensive use of double-underlining for emphasis. His handwriting could be said to be a testament to his enthusiasm...

Although Goethe assures us that Lavater was an "incredibly patient, persevering, and persistent person," he was not the audience Kant intended to reach with his "critique." Lessing described him as "an enthusiast fit for a mental asylum to a surpassing degree."[2] Lavater had become famous in Germany after a controversial attempt to convert Lessing's friend Moses Mendelssohn to Christianity in 1769. Lavater had challenged Mendellsohn to refute "the *essential* arguments adduced in support of the facts of Christianity" in Charles Bonnet's *Philosophical Palingenesis (La Palingénésie philosophique ou Idées sur l'état passé et sur l'état futur des êtres vivans*, 1769) or "to do what prudence, love of truth, and honesty bid you to do–what Socrates would have done, had he read this treatise and found it irrefutable," namely, to convert to Christianity.[3] Lavater had, morevoer, offered his challenge in print, in the 'Preface' he had written for Bonnet's work.[4] To attempt the refutation of Christianity would have been dangerous for a German Jew, but Lavater knew that conversion would have been unconscionable for Mendelssohn, who had described his commitment to Judaism to him in personal conversations. Taking offense at Lavater's indiscretion and recognizing the difficulty of the position in which he had placed him, Mendelsssohn ignored his challenge for a time, before finally making his reply. In an open letter to Lavater, Mendelsson maintained that he did not have to refute Bonnet's arguments in support of Christianity, or convert, because his was a religion of "virtue and wisdom" that posed no threat to the moral order of society.[5]

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[2] On Lavater's character, see Lessing to Nicholai, 01.02.1770. Included in *Gotthold Ephraim Lessings Sämtliche Schriften (Siebzehnter Band: Briefe von und an Gotthold Ephraim Lessing)*. Edited by Karl Lachmann. Leipzig: Göschen'sche Verlagshandlung, 1904. pg. 310. See also Goethe, Johann Wolfgang. *From My Life, Poetry and Truth (Parts One to Three)*. Translated by R. Heitner. Edited by Thomas P. Saine and Jeffrey L. Sammons. New York: Suhrkamp Publishers, 1987. pg. 446. Lavater's hostility to the enlightenment is implicit in many places in his writings, but reached its height during the controversy over the "poisoned" communion wine in a church in Zurich in 1776. See Freedman, Jeffrey. *A Poisoned Chalice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. pp. 93-125.

[3] See Altmann, Alexander. *Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study*. London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1998. pg. 209.

[4] Lavater had included his challenge to Mendelssohn in his 'Preface' without Bonnet's permission, which caused another controversy between Lavater and Bonnet. See *Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study*, pg. 227.

[5] See *Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study*, pg. 221.

Although Mendelssohn's response made him a hero of philosophical insight and liberal toleration, Lavater did not pass into obscurity following their dispute. After the publication of his *On Physiognomy (Von der Physiognomik)* in1772, Lavater became a genuine European celebrity. His works were translated into French and English, and he established a vast network of correspondents. Among these correspondents was Johann Gottfried Herder, who had studied in Königsberg in the 1760's, and had been a particularly favored student of Kant. Kant admitted him to his lectures without charge, and Herder set Kant's lectures into verse. Even later, after their falling out, Herder would look back on Kant as "a philosopher who was for me a true teacher of humanity."[6] Herder presumably still held this view of Kant in the early 1772, when he wrote to Lavater in defense of Mendelssohn. The exchange between Herder and Lavater soon became extremely personal, full of dedications to one another and to their friendship. Herder came to see Lavater as a kindred soul, as a result of their passionate attachment to religion and their peculiar approach to anthropology. Yet he did not warn Lavater of the potential conflict he faced in writing to Kant, a defender of the enlightenment with a deep-seated hostility to enthusiasm. When Lavater wrote to Kant in 1774, he introduced himself as a friend of Herder, just as Herder had introduced himself to Lavater as a friend of Mendelssohn and Kant.

Despite his fame, Lavater addressed Kant with considerable deference in their correspondence. Lavater had read Kant's essays *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755), *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763), and *Inquiry Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals* (1764) during his travels in Germany in 1763-1764, after he was expelled from Zurich for making

[6] See *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, pg. 141.

public accusations against one of the city's ministers.[7] The works apparently made quite an impact on the young preacher. Journals from his subsequent travels show that Lavater spent a great deal of time studying Kant's most recent publications, and talking about his philosophy with almost everyone he met.[8] Being one of the most well-connected men of letters of the eighteenth century, Lavater naturally met a great many people.

In 1774, Lavater wrote to see if Kant could secure the release of Johann Rudolf Sulzer from his military duties in Königsberg. Despite the similarities of their names and their connection to Zurich, Johann Rudolf seems not to have been related to Johann Georg Sulzer, who had been Lavater's guide while he was traveling in Germany in 1763-1764. Johann Georg was also a friend of Mendelssohn, and one of the Berlin philosophers to whom Kant had sent a copy of *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World* in 1770.[9] The Sulzer on whose behalf Lavater wrote to Kant in 1774 was, however, a tanner like Kant's father. He had became ill, leaving his wife and daughter in need of their son and brother. Kant was able to secure Johann Rudolf's release from his military duties shortly before his father's death and Lavater wrote to thank Kant for the "trouble, care, and loyalty" he had shown his friends on April 8, 1774.[10]

In the same letter, Lavater expresses a great deal of interest in Kant's "critique" of pure reason. After telling Kant that he is his "favorite author, the one with whom I identify the most,

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[7] Lavater, Johann Kaspar. *Reisetagebücher, Teil I: Tagbuch von der Studien- und Bildungsreise nach Deutschland 1763 und 1764*. Edited by Horst Weigelt. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997. pg. 797.

[8] Lavater, Johann Kaspar. *Reisetagebücher, Teil II: Reisetagebuch nach Süddeutschland 1778, Reisetagebuch in die Westschweiz 1785, Brieftagebuch von der Reise nach Kopenhagen 1793.* Edited by Horst Weigelt. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1997. pp. 150, 185,.

[9] *Sulzer to Kant*, 12.08.1770, pp. 120-121 (X:111-113). Sulzer responded to Kant's dissertation in a letter from December 8, 1770, but he is not mentioned in the 1771 letter in which Kant asks Herz to apologize to Lambert and Mendelssohn for his failure to respond to their criticisms of his dissertation. It is not until the end of the 1772 letter to Herz that Kant asks his former student to extend his apologies to Sulzer as well as Lambert and Mendelssohn. See *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 137 (X:135).

[10] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 149 (X:165). Kant apparently paid a small ransom, so that Johann Rudolf would be released from his duties.

especially in metaphysics, but also with your style and method of thinking in general" Lavater writes "And now since you are after all writing a critique of pure reason, I want to ask you: will you maintain the following things in it?"[11] He asks whether Kant will say that "our critique could hardly be more remote from pure reason than it is. I mean our principles–or rather our maxims (for the two are always confused with each other)–in all non-mathematical sciences, are as remote from pure reason as our particular judgments which so often contrast absurdly with our most respected maxims."[12] Lavater then inquires whether Kant will show that "until we fix our *observations* more on *human beings*, all our wisdom is folly," and if he will argue that "the reason we always fall so horribly into error is that we seek to find outside of us what is only within us."[13] Lavater asks if Kant does not agree that "we cannot and may not have any knowledge whatsoever of the inner nature of things but only of their *relations* to our needs," so that "any and every occupation, writing, meditation, reading is mere childishness and foolishness unless it be a means of sedation and a means of satisfying human needs."[14] Finally, he wonders whether Kant finds that "out of a thousand books and ten thousand bookish judgments there is hardly one that is not a would-be sedative of the author's needs–though this is by no means noticed by particular readers."[15] Although he castigates himself for the "indiscretion" of his questions, Lavater appears quite eager to have them answered.

Unfortunately, Kant does not answer any of Lavater's questions in his response of April 28, 1775. His letter focuses exclusively on an unrelated theological question which Lavater appended to his letter.[16] Lavater had asked whether Kant thought the "actual view of scriptural faith and

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[11] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:165).
[12] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:165).
[13] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:165).
[14] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:165-166).
[15] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:165-166).
[16] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 151 (X:166).

prayer" that he described in the first volume of his *Vermischte Schriften* (1774) agreed with "the teaching of Scripture." Although Lavater confessed that the question concerned the "most intimate matter of the heart," Kant returned a blistering indictment of the very idea of "scriptural faith."[17] Kant said that scripture was only the "report" of the teachings of Christ, a report which was to be distinguished from the true religion.[18] While Kant acknowledges that the Christian gospels express the "fundamental doctrines" of the true religion, he also believed them to be replete with dogmas and concessions to popular superstition, including "miracles" and "revelations."[19] The gospels therefore tell us "only what God has done to help us see our frailty before him," and how he communicated with a particular people at a particular time. Kant thought these pedagogical digressions detracted from the communication of the "moral law," which "tells us what we must do to make ourselves worthy of justification."[20] He therefore regarded the "presumptuous confidence" which attends "acceptance of certain Gospel disclosures" as deleterious to true religion. By placing his "unconditional trust" in a "moral faith" of "purity of conscience" and "the good transformation of our lives," Kant believed he had committed himself to the true religion in such a way that "the holy law lies perpetually before our eyes, and continually reproaches us for even the slightest deviation from the divine will, just as though we were condemned by a just and unrelenting judge."[21] He had little use for ideas like "scriptural faith," because he believed that "no book, whatever its authority... can substitute for the religion of conscience."[22]

Lavater could not have been pleased by Kant's letter. Though he cited Kant's essay

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[17] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 151 (X:166).
[18] *Kant to Lavater*, 04.28.1775, pg. 152 (X:176).
[19] *Kant to Lavater, 04.28.1775*, pg. 152 (X:176)
[20] *Kant to Lavater, 04.28.1775*, pg. 152 (X:176)
[21] *Kant to Lavater*, 04.28.1775, pg. 154 (X:178).
[22] *Kant to Lavater*, 04.28.1775, pg. 155 (X:179).

concerning the difference of the races (1775) as evidence for his own views on "national" physiognomy in later editions of *On Physiognomy*, Lavater wrote to Kant only once more, in 1776, to repay Kant the ransom he had paid to have Johann Rudolf released from his duties.[23] The disappointment in this last letter is palpable, as Lavater thanks Kant for his "instructive tips" (*lehrreichen Winke*). Though he notes that he "thinks differently on a few points," Lavater takes responsibily for Kant's harsh tone, saying that he "lives in a tangle, a crowd" (*ich lebe in einem Gewirre, einem Gedränge*). One could hardly blame Lavater, had he been more confrontational. In addition to his caustic remarks regarding "scriptural faith," Kant had taken more than a year to respond. He had also ignored the long list of questions regarding the *Critique of Pure Reason* that Lavater included in his letter, questions which showed a great deal of interest in Kant's work and in the nature of his "critique."

This last omission has not received much attention in Kant scholarship, perhaps because the difference of perspective between Lavater and Kant is so obvious. Even the most casual reader of Kant's 1772 letter to Herz sees that Kant and Lavater had very different ideas about the kind of things a "critique" of pure reason should "maintain." In his correspondence with Herz, Kant said that he planned to unlock "the secret to the whole hitherto obscure metaphysics" by locating "the ground of the relation of that in us which are called representation to the object" in "the concepts belonging to completely pure reason."[24] Kant could not agree that the principles which guided his "critique" could "hardly be more remote from pure reason" if he intended to determine the "proper method" of metaphysics according to "concepts belonging to completely pure reason."[25] It is therefore

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[23] Lavater, Johann Caspar. *Physiognomische Fragmente: Zur Beförderung des Menschenkenntnis und Menschenliebe (Band IV)*. Zurich: Orell Füssli Verlag, 1969. pp. 275-277. See also *Lavater to Kant*, 03.06.1776, (X:190-191).
[24] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X:132).
[25] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X:132).

unlikely that Kant would affirm any of the things Lavater suggests a "critique" of pure reason might maintain "twenty times more powerfully, more clearly, with embellishing examples, so much more humanely, more popularly, with more appropriate humility, more *epoch-making*."[26] Although Lavater did not realize it, he and Kant differed as radically in what they expected from a "critique" of pure reason as they did on matters of religion.

While the differences between Kant and Lavater are striking, they are not so obvious that they may be taken for granted. Lavater praised Kant and assured him that he was sympathetic to Kant's views on metaphysics before introducing his questions about the *Critique of Pure Reason*. And the questions Lavater poses to Kant in his letter even seem to anticipate certain positions Kant developed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, inasmuch as they emphasize the importance of the subjective conditions of cognition and the impossibility of knowledge of things in themselves. There are certainly differences between the Copernican Revolution that Kant announced in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and Lavater's psychological conception of self-observation, but Lavater had hoped that Kant would say "until we fix our *observations* more on *human beings*, all our wisdom is folly."[27] Such a statement could be said to prefigure the turn toward the subject which is so characteristic of Kant's "critical" philosophy. Similarly, Lavater's suggestion that "we cannot and may not have any knowledge whatsoever of the inner nature of things," seems to reflect an important change in Kant's thinking between the publication of his inaugural dissertation and the *Critique of Pure Reason*–Kant's admission, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, that

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[26] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:166).

[27] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:165). Lavater developed his conception of "self-observation" in his *Nachdenken über mich selbst* (1770), *Geheimes Tagebuch von einem Beobachter seiner selbst* (1771), and *Unveränderte Fragmente aus dem Tagebuch eines Beobachters seiner Selbst* (1773). In the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798), Kant said that Kant said that such self-observation "easily leads to enthusiasm and madness." See *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, pg. 243 (IX:132, §4)

the concepts of the pure understanding represent objects "as they appear," and not "as they are," as he had maintained in *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*.[28] Kant certainly had other reasons for denying knowledge of things in themselves than the ones which inspired Lavater's purely instrumental conception of knowledge.[29] Yet there must have been reasons why Lavater thought Kant shared the views which motivated his questions.

While he mentions reading Kant's works and discussing them with his friends and correspondents, Lavater does not tell us why he found Kant's writing so appealing. He told Kant that he "sympathizes" (*sympathisire*) with him on metaphysics, but there is no evidence that he interpreted Kant's views on metaphysics in a manner contrary to the enlightenment rationalism Kant espoused. Even if several of Kant's "pre-critical" works have been taken to be expressions of skepticism about the possibility or even the desirability of metaphysics, Lavater does not mention any of these works.[30] Nor does he seem to have taken the works he read as indictments of metaphysics. If Lavater did not believe Kant's "pre-critical" writings called metaphysics into question, then perhaps it was the title of Kant's work that led Lavater to suppose that Kant would maintain that "our critique could hardly be more remote from pure reason than it is."[31]

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[28] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 384 (II:392). Kant continued to maintain the position he defended in his inaugural dissertation until at least 1772. See *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 133 (X:131). It is only in the Critique of Pure Reason that Kant denies that concepts represent things as they are, apart from the matter of sensible intuition. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 276-277 (A147/B186-A147/B187).

[29] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:165).

[30] It is common to regard a number of Kant's pre-critical works as expressing a general skepticism about the possibility of metaphysics, particularly *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (1764) and *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* (1766). Some have even gone so far as to claim that Kant regarded metaphysics with "complete" skepticism, and denied that a scientific metaphysics was even desirable. While I believe I have refuted these interpretations in Chapters 1 and 2, I do not deny that Kant's contemporaries may have viewed his works in this way. Although Lavater does not seem to have read Kant's "skeptical" works, such mis-interpretation probably motivated his questions about the "critique" of pure reason. On Kant's alleged skepticism about metaphysics, see "Kant's Intellectual Development: 1746-1781," pp. 36-46. For a response to Beiser's characterization of Kant's intellectual development, see Chapters 1 and 2 above.

[31] *Lavater to Kant*, 04.08.1774, pg. 150 (X:165)

Evidence for the latter view can be found in Lavater's April 8, 1774 letter to Kant. Lavater does not seem to have known anything about Kant's plans for the *Critique of Pure Reason* when he wrote his letter. He does not seem to have been aware of its contents, which would have discouraged many of his questions. He only mentions the title of the work. This suggests that Kant informed Lavater of the title of the *Critique of Pure Reason* without explaining its contents in the letter of 1774. Kant most likely excused the lateness of his response with reference to his work, as he did with so many of his correspondents during the 1770's. If these conjectures are correct, then it is most likely the title of Kant's work that is responsible for Lavater's assumptions about the *Critique of Pure Reason* and his expectations regarding its contents. Not knowing anything else about the work, Lavater expected Kant to maintain that "our critique could hardly be more remote from pure reason than it is," simply because Kant called the *Critique of Pure Reason* a "critique." The difference between Lavater's expectations and Kant's plans shows that the two men understood "critique" in very different ways.

CHAPTER 4: THE ELEMENTS OF CRITICISM

4.1: SOURCE CRITICISM

Kant did not explain his reasons for calling the *Critique of Pure Reason* a "critique" in his 1772 letter to Herz. It seems that Kant was so engrossed in overcoming the "obstacles" which prevented him from completing what he called "an intellectual project of such a delicate nature" that he did not notice the ambiguity of the term that figured so prominently in its title.[1] Kant missed another opportunity to explain the title he gave his work in 1774, when Lavater asked what he would maintain in his "critique." His response to Lavater shows that Kant was either unaware of the assumptions brought to bear on his work by readers unfamiliar with his concern for the "proper method" of metaphysics or that he was unwilling to explain why he chose to call his work a "critique" to enthusiasts like Lavater. These missed opportunities would have lasting consequences for the reception of the "critical" philosophy.

Even Kant's most devoted followers had trouble understanding why he called his work a "critique." Reinhold thought the *Critique of Pure Reason* was a "critique" because it answered "the problem regarding what is possible through reason."[2] Fichte thought it was a "critique" because it did not contain the complete "system" of metaphysics, but only a preliminary investigation of "the possibility, the real meaning, and the rules governing such a science."[3] Schelling and Hegel agreed

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[1] *Kant to Herz, Late 1773,* pg. 140 (X:144).
[2] Reinhold, Karl Leonhard. *Letters on the Kantian Philosophy*. Translated by James Hebbeler. Edited by Karl Ameriks. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. pg. 14 (123).
[3] Fichte, Johann Gottlieb. *Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre (Preface to the Second Edition)*. Included in *Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings*. Edited and Translated by Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988. pg. 97 (I:32). Kant rejected Fichte's interpretation of his conception of a "critique," which is, indeed, very close to many things Kant says in the 'Introduction' to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in his *Public Declaration Concerning*

that the "critique" of pure reason was "a critique of the cognitive faculty," but differed in their understanding of the implications that "critique."[4] Schelling thought Kant's "critique" was a necessary challenge to the "still-persisting reign of dogmatism," but suspected that because it was a "critique," the "critical" philosophy could "not proceed farther than the negative refutation of dogmatism."[5] Hegel had a more damning view of the shortcomings of the "critical" philosophy. He regarded Kant's "critique" as the contradictory attempt to "inquire into the faculties of knowledge... before obtaining knowledge."[6] Because he thought Kant believed that we "must know the faculty of knowledge before we can know it," Hegel concluded that any "critique" of pure reason begged the question and had to be "superceded" as a "method" if philosophy were to become scientific.[7] Such disagreements about the nature and value of a "critique" of pure reason were so common that Friedrich Schlegel suggested that "the philosophy of the Kantians" was either called "critical" in a sense opposite to the meaning of the word (*per antiphrasin)* or else as a merely decorative phrase *(epitheton ornans*).[8]

The same problems plague contemporary interpretations of the "critical" philosophy. While the locutions "critique" and "critical" philosophy are common enough in the scholarly literature on Kant, their meaning has merited little attention in either German- or English-language Kant scholarship. When they do attempt to address the issue, most scholars follow the account given

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Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre. On this issue, see Zöller, Günter. "From Critique to Metacritique: Fichte's Transformation of Kant's Transcendental Idealism." Included in *The Reception of Kant's Critical Philosophy: Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel*. Edited by Sally Sedgwick. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000. pp. 129-130.

[4] Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph. *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*. Included in *The Unconditional in Human Knowledge*. Edited and Translated by Fritz Marti. Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1980. pg. 163 (I:3:59-60).

[5] *Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism*, pg. 163.

[6] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Volume III)*. Translated by E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson. New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1974. pg. 428 (XX:333-334).

[7] *Lectures on the History of Philosophy (Volume III)*, pg. 428 (XX:333-334).

[8] Schlegel, Friedrich. *Athenaeum Fragments*. Included in *Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde and the Fragments*. Edited and Translated by Peter Firchow. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971. pg. 167 (§47).

in the *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (1918) by Norman Kemp Smith. Kemp Smith claimed that Kant introduced the word "critique" (*Critick*) into German, deriving its use from the English word "criticism" and extending its application from "the field of aesthetics" to "that of general philosophy."[9] A discussion of Henry Home's conception of "criticism" in Kant's *Logic* (1800) leads Kemp Smith to the conclusion "that it was Home's use of the term which suggested to him [Kant] its wider employment."[10] While Kemp Smith's commentary has exerted a great deal of influence on contemporary scholarship, there are several important problems with his account of the origins of Kant's use of the word "critique."[11]

The idea that Kant introduced the word "critique" into the German language is simply false. The word "critique" was present in German long before the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as is evident from the titles of Gottsched's *Attempt at a Critical Poetics* (1730) and his *Contributions to the Critical History of German Language, Poetry, and Oratory* (1732-1744).[12] While Kemp Smith's claim regarding the originality of Kant's use of the word "critique" is easily dismissed, the suggestion that Kant derived his use of the term from English aesthetics merits more serious consideration. Though I believe that this claim too is deeply flawed, it is plausible enough to be convincing to those who are unfamiliar with Kant's "pre-critical" views on aesthetics and the reasons Kant preferred Home's "critique" of taste to Baumgarten's "science" of aesthetics.

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[9] Kemp Smith, Norman. *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan and Co., 2003. pg. 1.
[10] *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 1.
[11] Guyer and Wood repeat this claim in the notes to their translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as does Georg Mohr in his recent commentary on Kant's theoretical philosophy. See Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. New York: Cambridge, 1998. pg. 715 (n. 6). See also Mohr, Georg. *Kant's Theoretische Philosophie: Texte und Kommentar (Band 3)*. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2004. pg. 40.
[12] See *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm (Band 11)*. München: Deutschen Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991. Pp. 2333-2334. See also Holzhey, H. "Kritik." Included in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Band 4)*. Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe Verlag, 1976. pp. 1255.

Despite the general approval with which Kemp Smith's account has been met in the scholarly literature on Kant, there remain those, like Tonelli, who maintain that Kant derived his use of the word "critique" from logic, instead of aesthetics. In his lectures, Kant sometimes distinguished between "dogmatic" and "critical" approaches to philosophy, arguing that "Among critical philosophers Locke deserves priority. Wolff, however, and the Germans generally, have a methodical philosophy."[13] The difference between dogmatic and critical philosophy is not explained in this passage, and Kant does not give any reasons for regarding Locke as a critical philosopher. Yet he says that "now, finally, Locke's book *de intellectu humano* is the ground of all true logic."[14] If one were to connecting Kant's remarks on the "critical" approach to philosophy with his comments on "the ground of all true logic," then one might reach a position similar to the one with which Tonelli concludes his article on "Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant." "If Kant selected the title of *Critique* for his major work," Tonelli argues, "this not only reflected the prestige of a term very fashionable in that time, and the general meaning of that term in philosophy: but, in accordance with the spirit of his enterprise, he selected it as a qualification of his work as a work primarily on Logic, and in particular on a Logic centered on verification and correction."[15]

The present chapter seeks to determine Kant's reasons for calling the work he announced in his 1772 letter to Herz and published in 1781 a "critique" of pure reason. While my approach is historical and philological, my aims are philosophical: I believe that scholars will come to a better understanding of what Kant intended the *Critique of Pure Reason* to achieve if they understand his reasons for calling the work a "critique." Section 4.2 will show that a more accurate assessment of

[13] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 24 (XXIV:37)
[14] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 24 (XXIV:37).
[15] "Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant: A Historical Survey," pg. 147.

Kant's references to Hentry Home makes Kemp Smith's account untenable. Even if Home influenced Kant's pre-critical conception of a "critique" of taste," it is unlikely that Kant derived his use of the word of "critique" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* from Home or from English aesthetics. Section 4.3 will show that there is also insufficient evidence that Kant intended the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a work on logic. It notes some of the other shortcomings of Tonelli's account of the sources of Kant's use of the word "critique." Section 4.4 summarizes the results of Sections 4.2 and 4.3, and then draws several conclusions about Kant's reasons for calling the *Critique of Pure Reason* a "critique." While it does not conclude with a definitive statement of the source of Kant's use of the term, it does suggests different possible account of the reason Kant decided to call his work a "critique."

4.2: AESTHETICS AND THE CRITIQUE OF TASTE

An anonymous review of Henry Home, Lord Kames' *Elements of Criticism* appeared in the *Königsbergische Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen* on March 5, 1764.[1] The author of the review expresses considerable interest in aesthetics, and attributes a great deal of importance to matters of taste. He says, for example, that when one possesses a fine understanding (*feinen Verstand*), sufficient to observe "all the small conceptual relations" which are part of "abstract thinking" (*abgezogenen Denken*), he will also possess a "fine feeling" (*feines Gefühl*). Someone who possess a fine understanding will therefore appreciate the "composed and multifaceted influence of favorable or unfavorable emotions" which are "felt by every fiber of the heart which has been touched by the

[1] The review referred to the second part of J.H. Meinhard's German edition of Home's *Elements of Criticism*, translated as *Grundsätzen der Kritik* in 1764. Later parts were published subsequently between 1763 and 1766. See Randall, Helen W. *The Critical Theory of Lord Kames*. Northampton: Smith College Studies in Modern Languages, 1944. pp. 77-78.

object and is harmonious with its movement."[2]

The author of the *Königsbergische* review does not dwell on the theme which fascinated Kant in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), namely, the "harmony" (*Harmonie*) of the cognitive faculties, that is established as a result of aesthetic judgment. The review is more concerned with the "art of analysis (*Zugliederungskunst*) of our pleasures and our frustrations" that Home tries to develop from "fine feeling," and which the reviewer calls "a kind of logic, which brings the confused games of our feelings under rules."[3] These rules "do not serve so much to link and order as they do to help us understand the nature of our soul, in which we bring under concepts the multifaceted perceptibility (*mannigfaltige Fühlbarkeit*) which is caused by observation," but the reviewer praises Home's attempt to make them into the principles of a science called "critique" (*Kritik*).[4]

Despite his praise for Home's "critique," the author of the *Königsbergische* review suggests that it would be better to call this science "the *critique of feeling*, just as logic is properly called a *critique of understanding*" (*Man würde sich genauer ausdrücken, wenn man sie die Kritik des Gefühles nennete, so wie die eigentlich gennante Logik eine Kritik des Verstandes ist*).[5] The contrast the reviewer draws between aesthetics as a critique of feeling (*Kritik des Gefühles*) and logic as a

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[2] Schlapp, Otto. *Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik des Geschmacks und des Genies, 1764 bis 1775*. Göttingen: Vandenhoedt & Ruprecht, 1890. pp. 44-45. See also Randall, Helen W. *The Critical Theory of Lord Kames*. Northampton: Smith College Studies in Modern Languages, 1944. pp.78-79.

[3] *Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik des Geschmacks und des Genies,* pp. 44-45. See also *The Critical Theory of Lord Kames*, pg.79.

[4] *Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik des Geschmacks und des Genies,* pp. 44-45. See also *The Critical Theory of Lord Kames*, pg.79. Both Meinhard and the author of the *Königsbergische* review use the German "*Kritik*" to render Home's "criticism." The same word appears in the title of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) and in many other places in Kant's works. In order to maintain the consistency of my citations from Kant, I have rendered "*Kritik*" as "critique" where it is a translation from the German. I have left "criticism" as such where it appears in English in Home's text.

[5] *Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik des Geschmacks und des Genies*, pp. 44-45. See also *The Critical Theory of Lord Kames*, pg. 79.

critique of the understanding (*Kritik des Verstandes*) echoes the distinction between aesthetics as a critique of taste (*Kritik des Geschmacks*) and logic as a critique of reason (*Kritik der Vernunft*) that Kant introduces a year later, in the announcement of the program of his lectures for the winter semester 1765-1766.[6] The resemblance between the two texts is so great that some believe Kant to be the author of the *Königsbergische* review.[7]

Kant was acquainted with Hamann, who was the editor of the *Königsbergische Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen*, and he had already published an unsigned article as well as an anonymous review in the journal in the same year.[8] So it is not impossible that he was, in fact, the author of the review of the *Elements of Criticism*. The way Kant characterizes the relationship between aesthetics and logic in the review would, however, be somewhat unusual, if he were indeed the author. In the *Announcement*, Kant says that the relationship between aesthetics and logic is such that "the rules of the one at all times serve to elucidate the rules of the other."[9] While this might suggest a view similar to the one expressed by the author of the *Königsbergische* review, a view in which aesthetics is to be considered "a kind of logic," Kant goes on in the *Announcement* goes on to say that

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[6] *M. Immanuel Kant's Announcement of the Program of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765-1766*, pg. 297 (II: 311).

[7] Otto Schlapp is equivocal about attributing the authorship of the review to Kant. He says that "*Wenn man den Stil allein in Betracht zieht, so erscheinen uns allerdings einige Wendungen auch nicht als Kantisch. Doch können wir nicht umhin, zu bemerken, dass inhaltlich mehreres direkt auf Kants Urheberschaft hinweist."* Schlapp concludes that *"Wir sind überzeugt, dass die Recension direkt oder indirekt von Kant herrührt. Wenn sie nicht von ihm selbst geschrieben ist, ist sie doch ganz in seinem Geiste concipiert.*" See *Die Anfänge von Kants Kritik des Geschmacks und des Genies,* pp. 44-45. Randall take this equivocation into account. See *The Critical Theory of Lord Kames*, pg.78.

[8] Kant published his *Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes* and a review of Esaias Silberschlag's *Theorie der am 23. Juli erschienenen Feuerkugel* anonymously in 1764 in the *Konigsbergsiche Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen*, the same year the review of Home's *Elements of Criticism* appeared in the journal. Kant's other anonymous publications in the *Konigsbergsiche Gelehrte und Politische Zeitungen* include his review of Peter Moscati's *Von dem körperlichen wesentlichen Unterschiede zwischen der Structur der Thiere und Menschen* (1771), and his *Aufsätze, das Philanthropin betreffend* (1776). Among the signed works published in the journal are Kant's *Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume* (1768), *Anzeige des Lambertschen Briefwechsels* (1782), and *Nachricht an Ärtze* (1782). While this only amounts to circumstantial evidence of Kant's authorship of the Home review, it should not be ignored.

[9] *Announcement*, pg. 297 (II:311).

"defining the distinction" between aesthetics and logic "is a means to a better understanding of them both."[10] The insistence with which he "defines the distinction" between aesthetics and logic in his *Reflexionen* and in his lectures on logic shows that the distinction between aesthetics and logic was of considerably more importance to Kant than their similarities.

Remarks associated with Kant's attempts to "define the distinction" between aesthetics and logic prove that he was familiar with Home and the *Elements of Criticism*, even if he was not the author of the *Königsbergische* review. Kant makes frequent reference to Home in his *Reflexionen* and in his lectures on logic, in order to explain why he regarded aesthetics as an empirical "critique of taste."[11] In one of his *Reflexionen* from the early 1770's, for example, Kant says "beautiful (cognition) art permits only of critique. Home. Therefore no science of the beautiful."[12] The related *Reflexionen* concern the difference between *a priori* and *a posteriori* principles, and their relationship to logic. In the *Reflexion* immediately preceding the one in which he mentions Home, Kant says "the rules can either be known *a priori* and can therefore be demonstrated, and then they are dogmatic. Logic. Or only *a posteriori*, and then they are critical. In the first case they are

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[10] *Announcement*, pg. 297 (II:311). I have modified Walford and Meerbote's translation of the *Announcement*, which says "defining the limits of the two is a means to a better understanding of them both." Kant does not refer to the "limits" (*Schranken*) or "bounds" (*Grenzen*) of aesthetics and logic in his *Announcement*, but their "distinction," "division" or "partition" (*ihre Abstechung*), which serves as a "medium" (Mittel) through which both can be better understood. He says "*Wobei zugleich die sehr nahe Verwandtschaft der materien Anlaß giebt, bei der Kritik der Vernunft einige Blicke auf die Kritik des Geschmacks, d.i. die Ästhetik, zu werfen, davon die Regeln der einen jederzeit dazu dienen, die der andern au erläutern, und ihre Abstechung ein Mittel ist, beide besser zu begreifen*" (II:311).

[11] Norman Kemp Smith takes these references as evidence that Kant derived his use of the word "critique" from Home. According to Kemp Smith, Kant extended the application of Home's "critique" from "the field of aesthetics" to "that of general philosophy" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The content of Kant's references to Home suggest otherwise. They suggest that Kant was more concerned with restricting the application of "critique" and distinguishing it from "science" than he was with extending it to "general philosophy." It is the distinction between "critique" and "science" that "defines the distinction" between aesthetics and logic for Kant in the 1770's. Home's conception of "critique" helped him define these distinctions, but the present account shows that it should not be taken to be the source of Kant's use of the word "critique." See *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 1.

[12] *Reflexionen zur Logik 1588* (XVI: 27). The dates of this *Reflexion* and the other *Reflexionen* cited here are uncertain. Adickes marks them as *χ?-λ? (υ-ξ?) ρ??* in the *Gessamelte Schriften*. The series *χ* and *λ*, to which they most likely belong, were composed between 1769 and 1770. That means they were probably written after the translation of Home's *Elements of Criticism* and after the *Announcement*.

doctrine, in the second, critique. Grammar. Sound understanding consists only of critique."[13] Kant also writes that "logic is doctrine, aesthetics is critique. Critique (because the principles are not *a priori*, but empirical and nevertheless contain general subjective laws, the form). Taste is pleasing (*gefällig*), logic is demanding (*gebietend*)."[14] In each of these *Reflexionen*, Kant stresses that the rules of logic are *a priori* while those of aesthetics are *a posteriori.* The former are doctrine and constitute a "science," while the latter are empirical and constitute a "critique." The difference between logic and aesthetics is therefore, according to Kant, the difference between the *a priori*, doctrinal principles of "science" (logic) and the *a posteriori*, empirical principles of "critique" (aesthetics).

While this distinction is helpful for understanding Kant's views on both aesthetics and logic, it sometimes becomes obscure in Kant's writings. In notes related to these *Reflexionen*, Kant says that aesthetics is "the science of all the general rules of sensibility," and then stipulates that logic "serves for critique."[15] At one point, Kant even calls logic "Critique of general reason, of science... it is a critique whose rules are demonstrable *a priori.*"[16] While these claims seem to confuse the distinction between "logic" and "aesthetics," "science" and "critique" that Kant develops in other *Reflexionen*, the ambiguities are clarified by the *Logik Jäsche*, which contains a more systematic treatment of the subject. Relying on the *Logik Jäsche* in order to clarify Kant's views on the "distinction" (*Abstechung*) between aesthetics, as a "critique" of taste, and logic, as a "critique" of reason, is problematic, of course, because the *Logik Jäsche* does not come directly from Kant's hand. It was edited by Kant's student, Benjamin Jäsche, and published as a handbook for his logic

[13] *Reflexionen zur Logik 1587* (XVI: 26).
[14] *Reflexionen zur Logik, 1901* (XVI:152).
[15] *Reflexionen zur Logik 1585* (XVI:25-26).
[16] *Reflexionen zur Logik 1585* (XVI: 26).

lectures in 1800. On many issues, the *Logik Jäsche* is inconsistent with Kant's "critical" philosophy.[17] On the difference between aesthetics and logic, however, the *Logik Jäsche* is consistent with the views of the *Reflexionen* from the 1770's, and is confirmed by other transcripts of Kant's lectures. It illuminates, rather than obscures, the sense of the *Reflexionen*, and it is likely that it reflects Kant's "pre-critical" understanding of the difference between aesthetics and logic.

In the *Logik Jäsche*, Kant praises Home, because he "more correctly called aesthetics *critique*, since it yields no rules that determine judgment sufficiently, as logic does, but instead derives its rules *a posteriori*, and since it only makes more universal, through comparison, the empirical laws according to which we cognize the more perfect (beautiful) and the more imperfect..."[18] Though it "contains the rules for the agreement of cognition with the laws of sensibility," aesthetics is a "critique" and can never be a science, because it "derives its rules *a posteriori.*"[19] Rules which are derived *a posteriori* are empirical principles, and those rules can only be made "more universal" through "comparison." They can never possess the "true universality" (*wahre Allgemeinheit*) and "strict necessity" (*strenge Nothwendigkeit*) of scientific principles.[20] For that reason, the validity of empirical rules cannot be demonstrated *a priori* and a discipline like aesthetics, which contains only empirical principles, "can never be a science or doctrine, provided one understands by doctrine a dogmatic instruction from principles *a priori*, in which one has insight

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[17] See Boswell, Terry. "On the Textual Authenticity of Kant's *Logic*." *History and Philosophy of Logic* (9), 1988. pp. 193-203.

[18] Kant, Immanuel. *Lectures on Logic*. Edited and Translated by J. Michael Young. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. pg. 530 (IX:15). The well-known problems associated with the authenticity of the *Logik Jäsche* do not seem to effect this part of the text, as the formulation in question is repeated in many other places in Kant's *Reflexionen* and logic lectures. In the *Logik Pölitz* Kant repeats the claim from the *Logik Jäsche*, saying "aesthetics cannot be a doctrine, therefore it can never be a science. Home is therefore better to call it critique" (*Asthetik kann nichte Doktrin seyn, denn sie kann nie eine Wissenschaft seyn. Home nennt sie daher beßer Kritik*). See *Vorlesungen über die Logik* (XXIV:506).

[19] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).

[20] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 128 (A2/B5).

into everything through instruction from other quarters attained from experience, and which gives us rules, by which we procure the required perfection."[21] Because it contains only empirical principles and can never be a science, Kant says that aesthetics is unable to "determine judgment sufficiently" or "hand down a decisive judgment concerning taste."[22]

Although he denies that aesthetics could ever be a science, Kant maintainsthat the empirical principles which serve as "general rules of sensibility" are sufficient for a "critique" of taste. These rules serve as a "norm" (*eine Norme*) for aesthetic judgment, allowing it to compare one judgment with another, in the hope of finding sufficient grounds for general claims.[23] Although it serves as a "model or standard for passing judgment" and seeks "universal agreement" for its claims, however, Kant does not believe that the "norm" which guides the"critique" of taste could ever be a sufficient "canon" (*einen Kanon*) for judgment. Because it "takes its rules *a posteriori* and generalizes, through comparisons, the empirical laws by which we cognize the less perfect and the perfect," Kant says, the legitimacy of the comparisons and generalizations of aesthetic judgment must be established with reference to a logical "canon."[24] Kant says logic "serves for critique" (*zur Kritik dient*) because it supplies aesthetic judgment with the "canon," which in turn provides aesthetic judgment with the "principle of passing judgment on all use of the understanding in general."[25] This principle belongs to logic, rather than aesthetics, but it guarantees that aesthetic judgments could be met with "universal agreement" with respect to their form. Without the supplement of such a logical principle, the judgments rendered by a "critique" of taste would be merely subjective and would not

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[21] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).
[22] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).
[23] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).
[24] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (X:14-15).
[25] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).

have the "form" necessary for "universal agreement."

As an objective "science *a priori* of the necessary laws of thought," logic could not be more different from aesthetics for Kant. Logic is a "propadeutic to all use of the understanding in general, although only on its correctness in regard to mere form, since it is not an organon..."[26] Because it is concerned "merely with the universal and necessary laws of thought in general" and "rests on principles *a priori*, from which all its rules can be derived and proved," Kant considers logic a "science" and an established "doctrine," one which is "more than mere critique."[27] These qualities allow Kant to draw a sharp contrast between logic and aesthetics, a contrast which he used to define logic in many of his lectures. The *Logik Blomberg*, *Logik Pölitz,* and *Logik Wien* all confirm the central place of the opposition between aesthetics and logic in Kant's thought, and the role this opposition played in determining the methods Kant thought appropriate to each of them.[28]

If Kant is correct in his *Announcement*, and "defining the distinction" between aesthetics and logic is essential for understanding each discipline, then his decision to call aesthetics a "critique" and logic a "science" in the *Logik Jäsche* can be seen as an attempt to more precisely define the distinction between the two disciplines. Although Kant called aesthetics a critique of taste (*Kritik des Geschmacks*) and logic the critique of reason (*Kritik der Vernunft*) in the *Announcement,* he calls logic a "science" of reason (*eine Vernunftwissenschaft)* in the *Logik Jäsche*, indicating that he

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[26] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).
[27] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).
[28] *Logik Blomberg* (1770-)*:* "All perfections of cognition are, 1st, aesthetic, and consist in agreement with subjective laws and conditions, 2nd, logical, and consist in agreement with objective laws and conditions..." See *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 30 (XXIV:43-44). *Logik Pölitz* (1780-): "Logic is a doctrine. –Doctrine is a science which can be proven from *a priori* principles. This name cannot be attributed to empirical sciences. Every doctrine is dogmatic, that is, it can be proven *a priori*. Aesthetics cannot be a doctrine, therefore it can never be a science. Home is therefore better to call it critique." See (XXIV:506). *Logik Wien* (1780-1782): "A science that extends our cognitions is called an organon. Logic cannot be called such because it abstracts from all content. A few insist [that it is] the art of making definitions. But these must always be closely tested, and taste, by which to judge according to laws of the senses, has no canon, because it arises a posteriori. Thus logic and aesthetics are distinguished by the difference of their objects." See *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 253 (XXIV:792).

preferred to reserve the term "critique" for aesthetics.[29] And while the author of the *Königsbergische* review suggests that Home's "critique" could be considered "a kind of logic," Kant praises Home for calling aesthetics "critique," precisely because the term distinguishes the methods and claims appropriate to aesthetics from those of logic.[30] "Critique" is an appropriate title for aesthetics, but not for logic.

The *Logik Jäsche* helps us to understand why the distinction between aesthetics and logic was so important to Kant, and why he was so insistent about calling aesthetics a "critique." Like many German philosophers of his time, Kant was deeply dissatisfied with the plan for a "science" of aesthetics that Baumgarten laid out in his *Aesthetica* (1750-1758).[31] In the *Logik Jäsche*, Kant singles out Baumgarten as a philosopher who had "tried to engage in reasoning (*vernünfteln*) concerning taste," and was unable to "hand down a decisive judgment."[32] Baumgarten failed to see that aesthetics "yields no rules *a priori* that determine judgment sufficiently, as logic does, but instead derives its rules *a posteriori*..."[33] By calling aesthetics a "science," Kant thought, Baumgarten had suggested that aesthetics followed from *a priori* principles. If this were true, then there would no longer be a distinction between aesthetics and logic. Kant therefore praises Home's decision to call aesthetics "critique" because Home regarded aesthetics as an empirical "critique"

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[29] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).
[30] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15). Röttgers makes a similar point in *Kritik und Praxis*, though he takes it for granted that "the new sphere of the aesthetic can no longer be integrated into the established scholastic logic" after 1750. Because Röttgers fails to explain why Kant used the word "critique" against Baumgarten's proposal for a "science" of aesthetics, Röttgers does not show why Kant called an aesthetics derived from "empirical concepts" a "critique." See *Kritik und Praxis*, pp. 27-29.
[31] Lessing had already objected to the tendency of German aestheticians to "deduce anything we want in the most beautiful order from a few postulated definitions" In the introduction to his *Laocoön* (1766). He then notes that his own examples "smack more of the source" even if his "reasoning may not be so compelling as Baumgarten's," indicating that Baumgarten was object of the previous remark. See Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. *Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry*. Translated by Edward Allen McCormick. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984. pg. 5.
[32] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).
[33] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).

of taste, a position which maintained the distinction between aesthetics and logic that was so important to Kant.

Although Kant criticizes Baumgarten for conflating the principles of aesthetics and logic, it must be recalled that Baumgarten was the first two distinguish them. Baumgarten distinguishes aesthetics and logic according to the "cognitive faculty" (*facultas cognoscitiua*) to which they belong In his *Reflections on Poetry* (*Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus*, 1735), the work in which he first announced his plans for a "science" (*scientia)* of aesthetics. "Sensate representations," Baumgarten claims, are "representations received through the lower part of the cognitive faculty."[34] In the last section of the *Reflections on Poetry*, Baumgarten explains that this "inferior faculty" is concerned with "things perceived," so that the "science of perception" (may be called "aesthetics" (*aesthetica*).[35] Aesthetics is opposed to "logic," the science of the "superior faculty," because logic concerns things "removed from sense" which may therefore be said to be "known" in a philosophical sense.[36]

Baumgarten mentions the distinction between aesthetics and logic as the sciences of the lower and higher cognitive faculties in the *Metaphysics* (*Metaphysica*, 1739), but focuses exclusively on the "theory of free arts, under the doctrine of cognition, art of beautiful thoughts, art of analogies of reason" in the *Aesthetics* (*Aesthetica*, 1750-1758).[37] Inasmuch as he intended to complete the "science of perception" that he announced in the *Reflections on Poetry* in the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten seems to have thought he could proceed without mentioning the distinction

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[34] *Reflections on Poetry,* pg. 38 (§3).
[35] *Reflections on Poetry*, pg. 78 (§116).
[36] *Reflections on Poetry*, pg. 78 (§116).
[37] In the *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten seems to confuse his own distinction, referring to aesthetics as "the logic of the inferior cognitive faculty. See *Metaphysica*, pg. 120 (§533). See *Ästhetik,* pp. 10-11 (§1).

he had drawn in his earlier work. Because he had already shown how "sensible cognition" (*cognitio sensitiva*) differed from"intellectual cognition" (*cognitio rationalis*) in the *Reflections on Poetry* and the *Metaphysica*, Baumgarten believed he could define aesthetics as "the science of sensible cognition" and proceed as though the distinction between aesthetics and logic were uncontroversial.

According to Baumgarten, the "rather narrow limits to which it is as a matter of fact confined" made it impossible for logic to be applied to sensible matters, so that "philosophers might still find occasion, not without ample reward, to inquire into those devices by which they might improve the lower faculties of knowing, and sharpen them, and apply them more happily for the benefit of the whole world."[38] The "science" of aesthetics therefore takes for granted that logic is a purely formal enterprise, which bears no relation to empirical questions. Logic is as such, a "strict science," or a science that contains philosophical cognition, which may be demonstrated with complete certainly.[39] Because it is concerned with sensible representations, and because these representations are given in experience, Baumgarten regards aesthetics as a very different kind of science.

Aesthetics is not, for Baumgarten, a science in the "strict sense" (*sensu stricta*), like logic. It is instead a "discipline" (*Disciplina*) containing "rules" (*leges*) for the "fine arts" (*artes liberales*).[40] Baumgarten does not claim that these rules are *a priori*, though he does indicate that they are to be regarded as "general concepts" (*notiones generales*), similar to the ones which are to be found in metaphysics.[41] Like the "general concepts" of metaphysics, Baumgarten thinks the

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[38] *Reflections on Poetry*, pp. 77-78 (§115).
[39] Baumgarten, Alexander. *Acroasis Logica in Christianum L.B. de Wolff*. Included in *Christian Wolff: Gesammelte Werke (III. Abt. Bd. 5)*. Edited by Jean École, et al. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1983. pg. 102 (§349).
[40] *Aesthetica*, pp. 48-61 (§62-§77).
[41] *Aesthetica*, pp. 58-59 (§75). Baumgarten takes his conception of "general concepts" from Leibniz, citing a passage from Leibniz's *On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance* (1694), citing a passage in which Leibniz tries to explain why "those who take pleasure in the mathematical sciences shrink away from metaphysics." Leibniz

"rules" of the "discipline of the fine arts" (*disciplinis artium liberalium*) had become "ambiguous and obscure through the carelessness and changeableness of human thinking."[42] He intended his *Aesthetics* to provide his readers with a "practical familiarity with the rules of beautiful thinking," at least as much as was needed to promote the improvement of the fine arts.[43] While this "practical familiarity" is a far cry from the conception of "science" that Kant attributes to him, it is for Baumgarten the "most important and foremost part" of the "science" that he proposes in his *Aesthetics*.

Kant privileges Home's empirical "critique" over Baumgarten's "science" of aesthetics in the *Logik Jäsche* in order to separate aesthetic judgment from formal definition and logical demonstration, despite the fact that Baumgarten had not included these kinds of arguments in the "discipline of the fine arts" he had proposed in the *Aesthetics*. Home's belief that aesthetics could "ascend gradually to principles from facts and experience, instead of beginning with the former, handled abstractly, and descending to the latter..." remained much closer to Kant's conviction that aesthetics "derives its rules *a posteriori*" and "only makes more universal, through comparison, the empirical law according to which we cognize the more perfect (beautiful) and the more imperfect."[44] Like Kant, Home insists that aesthetic judgment follow from the material of experience, rather than formal logical definitions or demonstrations. Home is, however, much more optimistic about the "scientific" prospects of an "empirical" aesthetics than Kant. Not only does Home never distinguish

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suspects that they "find light in the former but darkness in the latter," because "general concepts, which are thought to be very well known to everyone, have become ambiguous and obscure through the carelessness and changeableness of human thinking," so that "the definitions commonly given of these concepts are not even nominal definitions and in fact explain nothing." See Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. "On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance." Included in *Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters (Second Edition)*. Edited and Translated by Leroy E. Loemker. Dodrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. pg. 432.

[42] See *On the Correction of Metaphysics and the Concept of Substance*, pg. 432. See also *Aesthetica*, pp. 58-59 (§75).

[43] *Aesthetica*, pp. 58-59 (§75)

[44] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).

"critique" from "science" in the *Elements of Criticism*, but he also hoped to found a "rational science" of "criticism" on the model of Locke's revolution in "logic."[45]

In the *Elements of Criticism*, Home praises Locke, who "after much care and labor... removed a mountain of rubbish, and molded logic into a rational and correct form."[46] He then notes that "to reduce the science of criticism to any regular form, has never once been attempted: however rich the ore may be, no critical chemist has been found to analyze its constituent parts, and to distinguish each by its own name."[47] Home believes himself to be the "critical chemist" who will "reduce" aesthetics to "a regular form, " and repeatedly says that he aims to make criticism a "rational science."[48] While he admits that he has not "completed the list" of critical principles in the *Elements of Criticism,* Home is confident that "criticism" can be made a science comparable to Locke's "logic."[49] To be sure, this science is not a science of *a priori* principles, any more than Baumgarten's Aesthetics. While Kant thinks the empirical method Home recommends would make a science of aesthetics impossible, Home believes empirical observation to be considerably more scientific than the vagaries of "mathematical and metaphysical reasonings."[50] These, Home says, "have no tendency to improve our knowledge of man."[51] He therefore dispenses with *a priori* rules altogether, and places his faith in observation, in the hope that a "rational science" of "criticism" will finally refute the claim that "there is no disputing about taste" and determine what is universal and invariant in moral and aesthetic judgment. While certainly not *a priori*, Home believes the "universal and invariant" standards of taste will constitute a "regular science" of criticism, one

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[45] Home, Henry. *Elements of Criticism*. Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2002. pg. 193.
[46] *Elements of Criticism*, pg. 193.
[47] *Elements of Criticism*, pp. 193-194.
[48] *Elements of Criticism*, pg. 194.
[49] *Elements of Criticism*, pg. xvi.
[50] *Elements of Criticism*, pg. xiii.
[51] *Elements of Criticism*, pg. xiii.

which stands on "rational principles."[52]

If Home and Kant agree that it is only where it is "conformable to principles" that a judgment can "pronounce with certainty that it is correct," then Kant is much more pessimistic than Home about the prospects of a "science" of "criticism."[53] When he praises Home's decision to call aesthetics a "critique," Kant is, in fact, criticizing what he takes to be Baumgarten's program for aesthetics as a "science." In order to prove that aesthetics could never be a science, Kant argues that science is "occupied, not with the common and as such merely empirical use of the understanding and of reason, but rather merely with the universal and necessary laws of thought in general."[54] Logic is a science because it "rests on principles *a priori*, from which all its rules can be derived and proved, as ones with which all cognition of reason has to be in conformity."[55] Aesthetics, by contrast, "has no *canon* (law) but only a *norm* (model or standard for passing judgment) which consists in universal agreement," because it "takes its rules *a posteriori* and generalizes, through comparisons, the empirical laws by which we cognize the less perfect and the perfect..."[56] This means that aesthetics can only be a "critique," and can never be a "science." By freely appropriating Home's conception of "critique" in his polemic against Baumgarten, Kant was able to deny the existence of *a priori* principles of aesthetics in a way that did not compromise his own, rationalist conception of science.

A note he appended to the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) makes it clear that Kant's opposition to a "science" of aesthetics persisted

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[52] *Elements of Criticism*, pg. xiii.
[53] *Elements of Criticism*, pg. xii.
[54] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX: 14-15).
[55] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX: 14-15).
[56] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX: 14-15).

throughout the early development of his "critical" philosophy. In his note, Kant calls Baumgarten's attempt to "bring the critical estimation of the beautiful under principles of reason, and elevate its rules to a science" a "futile" effort, because "the putative rules or criteria are merely empirical as far as their sources are concerned, and can therefore never serve as a priori rules according to which our judgment of taste must be directed..."[57] Such a view is entirely consistent with Kant's "pre-critical" attitude toward aesthetics. As in Home, aesthetics is an empirical "critique" of taste.

It was not until 1787 that Kant began to develop a conception of aesthetics on the basis of his "critical" philosophy. In letter from December 28, 1787, Kant told Reinhold that he had finally discovered the *a priori* principles for a "critique of taste," based on an analysis of "the faculties... of the human mind" and the feelings of pleasure and displeasure.[58] Nothing like the *a priori* principles Kant tells Reinhold he has discovered are to be found in Home, or in Kant's "pre-critical" aesthetics. The discovery of the *a priori* principles of aesthetic judgment therefore marks the beginning of Kant's "critical" aesthetics. This aesthetics is a "critique" of taste in a different way than the earlier, empirical taste. After 1787, Kant was confident that the conditions of the possibility of aesthetic judgment could be determined *a priori*, providing aesthetics with a standard which was more than an empirical "norm," even if it remained less than a logical "canon."[59]

Kant's letter to Reinhold gives some indication of the process which led to the "critical"

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[57] *Critique of Pure Reason*, A21/B35.
[58] *Kant to Reinhold, 12.28/31.1787*, pg. 272 (X:515).
[59] Kant does not go so far as to say that the "critique" of taste that he presents in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is "doctrine." And he still maintains that "no objective principle of taste is possible" because there is no sufficiently objective "determining ground" for aesthetic judgment apart from "the reflection of the subject on his own state (of pleasure or displeasure)." Yet he also says that the "critical" principles which guide the "critique" of taste constitute "an art or science of bringing under rules the reciprocal relation of the understanding and the imagination to each other in the given representation (without relation to an antecedent sensation or concept), and consequently their concord or discord, and of determining it with regard to its conditions." See *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, pg. 166 (V:286, §34).

revolution in his aesthetics. Kant compares the *a priori* principles which he discovered for the "critique" of taste with the principles which guided the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. He says that by "looking back at the general picture of the elements of knowledge and of the mental powers pertaining to them," he was able to identify the "three faculties of the mind," and was then able to determine the *a priori* principles of the "faculty of cognition" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the "faculty of desire" in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. By applying the same method to the "faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure," Kant says he was able to discover the *a priori* principles of the "critique" of taste.[60]

If this is true, then the conception of "critique" that Kant employs in his "critical" philosophy must differ considerably from the one he used to distinguish between aesthetics and logic in the "pre-critical" period. Within the context of his "critical" philosophy, Kant must have found a way to determine the *a priori* principles of "the faculty of reason in general."[61] Without these principles, Kant would never have been able to determine "the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[62] And without this determination, he never would have been able to discover the *a priori* principles of the "faculty of desire" or "the feelings of pleasure and displeasure," which are the foundation of his "critical" moral philosophy and his "critique" of aesthetic judgment. The "critical" philosophy depends in its entirety on the development of a kind of "critique" which "yields *a priori* principles."[63]

Instead of extending the application of "critique" from "the field of aesthetics" to "that of

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[60] *Kant to Reinhold*, 12.28.1787, pg. 272 (X:514).
[61] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).
[62] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).
[63] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).

general philosophy" as Norman Kemp Smith suggests, it would appears that Kant was originally concerned to restrict the use of "critique" to the empirical "critique" of taste, in order to distinguish aesthetics from "logic" and "science." Then, Kant developed the conception of "critique" that he employed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This latter conception of "critique" allowed Kant to identify what he called the "*a priori* principles of determination" of the "faculty of cognition" in his letter to Reinhold, and these principles ultimately led him to reformulate his views on aesthetics.[64] If this is true, then Kant's decision to call the *Critique of Pure Reason* a "critique" is not easily explained by his earlier discussions of an empirical "critique" of taste. The "critique" of taste would seem to be a different kind of "critique" than the "critique" of pure reason. The former is constituted by *a posteriori* comparisons and generalizations, while the latter concerns itself with the "secure course of a science" of metaphysics, one which follows from "universal cognitions, which at the same time have the character of inner necessity."[65] Kant says the "universal cognitions" which guide the "critique" of pure reason and the "science" of metaphysics are "*a priori* cognitions" inasmuch as they must be "clear and certain for themselves, independently of experience."[66] These cognitions cannot belong to the "critique" of taste that Kant described in his *Reflexionen* and lectures on logic, because that "critique" is empirical and "yields no rules *a priori* that determine judgment sufficiently, as logic does, but instead derives its rules *a posteriori*..."[67] It would therefore appear that Kemp Smith was wrong to suppose that Kant derived his use of the word "critique" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* from "the field of aesthetics."

4.3: LOGIC AND THE CRITIQUE OF REASON

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[64] *Kant to Reinhold*, 12.28.1787, pg. 272 (X:514).
[65] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 127 (A2).
[66] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 127 (A2).
[67] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).

Shortly after it was published, a review of the *Critique of Pure Reason* appeared in the *Neueste Critische Nachrichten.*[1] The *Nachrichten* was a journal published in Greifswald by Johann Georg Peter Müller. Though a previous issue had contained an enthusiastic review of *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime* (1764), the rest of Kant's "pre-critical" works had gone unnoticed by the journal.[2] The author of the review of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was, however, familiar with the "until now only short writings" that Kant had published.[3] They were enough to convince him that Kant was a man who "follows his own course in thought," even though he "lectures on Meier's logic and Baumgarten's metaphysics at his university."[4]

The *Nachrichten* review does not give a detailed account of the direction of Kant's thought, or what distinguished its course from Meier and Baumgarten. Because the reviewer regarded the *Critique of Pure Reason* as "a work to be studied, not a work to be reviewed" (*ein Werk für das Studium, und nicht für eine Recension*), he presents only the most general survey of its "perspective"

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[1] "Critik der reinen Vernunft, von Immanuel Kant, Prof. in Königsberg." *Neueste Critische Nachrichten* 44 (1781): 345-346. Also included in *Rezensionen zur Kantischen Philosophie, 1781-1787*. Edited by Albert Landau. Bebra: Albert Landau Verlag, 1991. pp. 6-9. In the index of authors in his *Rezensionen zur Kantischen Philosophie*, Albert Landau lists Kant as the author of the *Neueste Critische Nachrichten* review as well as reviews of the *Critique of Pure Reason* published in the *Frankfurter gelehrte Anzeigen* (July 17 and 20, 1781), *Zugabe zu den Göttingisce Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen* (July 19, 1781), *Gothaische gelehrte Zeitungen* (August 24, 1782), *Russische Bibliothek* (1782), *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* (September, 1783), and *Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung* (July 12-30, 1785). Because these reviews were published anonymously and Landau does not provide any evidence of Kant's authorship, I have followed the example of Manfred Kuehn. While Kuehn indicates that the *Nachrichten* reviewer may have been someone who "either knew Kant or someone who had studied with Kant," he does not go so far as to attribute the authorship f the review to Kant. Unfortunately, Kuehn mis-identifies the date of the *Nachrichten* review, confusing the date of the review of the *Critique of Pure Reason* published in the *Gothaische gelehrte Zeitungen* (July 25, 1781) with the date of the *Neueste Critische Nachrichten* review (November 3, 1781). See Kuehn, Manfred. "Kant's Critical Philosophy and its Reception: The First Five Years (1781-1786)." Included in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*. Edited by Paul Guyer. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. pg. 634.

[2] "Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, von M. Imm. Kant." *Neue Critische Nachrichten* 2.44 (1766): 345-349. Following the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the *Neueste Critische Nachrichten* reviewed almost every new work Kant published in the year it was published. It reviewed the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* in 1784, the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (along with Schulz's *Erlauterung über des herrn Prof. Kant Critick der reinen Vernunft*) in 1785, and announced the publication of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in 1787. After Kant's death, the journal reviewed the accounts of Kant's life by Borowski, Jachmann, and Wasianski.

[3] "Kant's Critical Philosophy and its Reception: The First Five Years (1781-1786)," pg. 634.

[4] *Neueste Critische Nachrichten*, pg. 345.

(*Absicht*) and "objectives" (*Gegenständen*).[5] The greater part of the review is consequently devoted to recounting the "main parts" (*Hauptstücken*) of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, particularly the "architectonic" distinctions between the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Elements' and the 'Transcendental Doctrine of Method,' the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Transcendental Logic,' and the 'Transcendental Analytic' and the 'Transcendental Dialectic.'

Despite the generality his treatment of the "main parts" of the work, the reviewer offers a very unusual account of the "objectives" of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Before enumerating its divisions, the reviewer says "the present work is a logic in the most authentic understanding, as the Stoics already called logic a critique" (*Das gegewärtige Werk ist eine Logik in dem eigentlichsten Verstande, so wie de Stoiker schon eine Logik Critik nannten*).[6] This statement serves as the most general account of the "objectives" of the Critique of Pure Reason in the review, and may provide an insight into the sources of Kant's use of the word "critique."

Manfred Kuehn takes the *Nachrichten* reviewer to mean "it is far from unusual to call logic critique, because the Stoics had already done this" when he says the *Critique of Pure Reason* is "a logic in the most authentic understanding..."[7] If this were true, then Kant might have derived his use of the word "critique" from Stoic logic. Yet there is no evidence that the Stoics ever called logic a "critique." One finds very few references to the word "critique" in the extant sources on Stoic logic, and none which identify logic as a "critique." The closest one comes is a text called *A Reply to Critics, addressed to Diodorus* (*Πρὸς τοὺς κρικοὺς πρὸς Διόδωρος*), which Diogenes Laertius includes in a list of works by the Stoic Chryssipus. Diogenes seems to have erred in classifying the

[5] *Neueste Critische Nachrichten*, pg. 345.
[6] *Neueste Critische Nachrichten*, pg. 345.
[7] "Kant's Critical Philosophy and its Reception: The First Five Years (1781-1786)," pg. 634.

work, listing the title in a series of works "under logic" dealing with ethical concepts, but it remains unlikely that *A Reply to Critics* was meant to define logic as "critique."[8] The title is listed in a series of works devoted to poetry and oratory, so it is reasonable to assume that *A Reply to Critics* was a defense of Chryssipus' views on those subjects, addressed to other "critics."[9] It would be difficult to conceive of it as a text on logic, much less a work which defined logic as "critique."

A fragment from Ioannes Stobaeus casts further suspicion on the claim that the Stoics called logic a "critique." Stobaeus indicates that the Stoics believed the sage to be the only good "dialectician, critic, poet, orator, and diviner."[10] Stobaeus is careful to note these arts follow from different principles and are not reducible to one another–the fact that the sage is the master of all of these arts does not make them the same.[11] If logic and critique are indeed different arts, then they would follow from different principles, and "logic" (λογική) would not be a "critique." The fragment lends itself to this reading, because Stobaeus does not give any indication that "critique" (*κριτικὸς*) is to be identified with "dialectic" (*διαλεκτική*), which is the usual Stoic term for logic. As in the list of works attributed to Chryssipus by Diogenes Laertius, "critique" seems to be something akin to literary criticism. It might have been included "under" logic in the Stoic division of the sciences, but "critique" was not identified with logic in any of the extant sources. The tradition associating Stoic

[8] Diogenes Laertius. *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers (Volume II.7:Chryssipus)*. Translated by R.D. Hicks. Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, 2000. pp. 314-315 (200).
[9] *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*, pp. 314-315 (200).
[10] "They say that the sage is the only good diviner, the only good poet and orator and dialectician and critic. But not in the case of all arts, since some of these [arts] also require acquiring certain theorems. They say that divination is the knowledge of signs from the gods or daimones that are relevant to human life. The species of divination are defined similarly." See von Arnim, Hans. *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (Volume III)*. Munich: KG Saur Verlag, 2005. pg. 164 (SVF III.654). I would like to thank Professor Steven Strange of Emory University (Department of Philosophy) for translating this passage from the Greek.
[11] *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta,* pg. 164 (SVF III.654).

logic with "critique" therefore appears to be quite dubious.[12]

Even if the *Nachrichten* reviewer was taken in by a "dubious" tradition, and was wrong to say "the Stoics already called logic a critique," his defense of the "authenticity" of the "understanding" of logic in the *Critique of Pure Reason* merits serious consideration. The reviewer is eager to distinguish the *Critique of Pure Reason* from logic "of the usual form and content" because "the usual logic contains rules for cognition of truth, which mediate any use of reason" (*Doch wollen wir, daß es nicht für eine Logik von gewöhnlichem Inhalt und Form gehalten werde. Denn da die gewöhnliche Logik Regeln zur Erkenntniß der Wahrheit, vermittelst einer jedweden Anwendung der Vernunft, enthält*).[13] The *Critique of Pure Reason* is to be distinguished from "the usual logic" because it is "a critical instruction in the capacity of reason from the perspective of knowledge, after which we strive independent of all experience, or of the material and aid of experience, consequently thoroughly *a priori*" (*so ist dieses Werk eine critische Anleitung des Vernunftsvermögens in Ansehung der Erkenntniße, nach welchen wir unabhängig von aller Erfahrung, oder auch wenn uns aller Stoff und Beistand der Erfahrung genommen würde, mithin durchaus a priori streben*).[14] The difference between these two approaches is significant, because

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[12] Giorgio Tonelli calls the tradition associating Stoic logic with "critique" dubious in *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*. Although it is less dubious, Tonelli also mentions the British followers of Rudolph Agricola and Petrus Ramus, who are said to have called the part of logic dealing with judgment "critique." See *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*, pp. 123, 131. See also Ong, Walter J. *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004. pp. 112-113.

[13] *Neueste Critische Nachrichten*, pg. 6. The distinction the reviewer draws between the "authentic" (*eigentliche*) logic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the "usual" (*gewöhnliche*) logic is significant. Erich Adickes has criticized Kant for failing to distinguish between "transcendental" (*transzendentale*) and "ordinary" (*gewöhnliche*) logic. According to Adickes, general (*allgemeine*) and special (*besondere*) logic were parts of "ordinary" (*gewöhnliche*) logic, and Kant should have classified them accordingly. His failure to do so leads Adickes to dismiss the entire introductory section on "The Idea of a Transcendental Logic" as unworthy of commentary. See Adickes, Erich. *Immanuel Kant: Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Berlin: Mayer und Miller, 1889. pp. 100, 183. For a criticism of Adickes,, see Pozzo, Riccardo. "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic: The Role of the Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic." Included in *Review of Metaphysics* 52.2 (1998): 297.

[14] *Neueste Critische Nachrichten*, pg. 6.

it shows that authentic logic "instructs" reason in the proper employment of its own capacities, rather than imposing rules on its application and "mediating" the relation between reason and its object.[15]

Instead of "mediating" the use of reason, "authentic" logic sets reason on the right path in its search for knowledge.

According to the *Nachrichten* review, the *Critique of Pure Reason* instructs reason in its search for a specific kind of knowledge, knowledge which may be gained "independently of all experience."[16] By abstracting from the "material and aid of experience" and dismissing all empirical content, the *Critique of Pure Reason* determines what may be known "thoroughly *a priori*." This knowledge allows the *Critique of Pure Reason* to serve as "a guide for speculative philosophy and pure mathematics" (*ein Wegweiser für die speculative Philosophie und die reine Mathematik)* and as a "propadeutic" to "the system of pure reason itself."[17] Because the reviewer believes this instruction depends on an "authentic" understanding of logic, this understanding serves as the most general statement of the "objectives" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* in his review. It is, moreover, the same "authentic" understanding of logic that leads him to praise the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a work to be studied rather than reviewed.

The *Nachrichten* reviewer was not alone in regarding the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a work on logic, though many of Kant's first readers and critics debated the "authenticity" of the "understanding" of logic that it represents. Reinhold defended the *Critique of Pure Reason* by

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[15] Riccardo Pozzo has placed a great deal of emphasis on the pedagogical function of logic in the eighteenth century. According to Pozzo, logic was often treated as instruction in good "habits" of thinking, rather than an independent science. See Pozzo, Riccardo, *Kant und das Problem einer Einleitung in die Logik: ein Beitrag zur Rekonstruktion der historischen Hintergründe von Kants Logik-Kolleg*. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1989. pp. 17, 48-79.

[16] *Neueste Critische Nachrichten*, pg. 6.

[17] *Neueste Critische Nachrichten*, pg. 6.

arguing that an "authentic" philosophy "neither can nor may be founded in any way on logic" in *On the Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge* (*Über das Fundament des philosophischen Wissens*, 1794), but later championed C.G. Bardili's *Outline of Primary Logic purified of the errors of previous logics generally and of the Kantian logic in particular* (*Grundriß der Ersten Logik, gereiniget von den Irrthümern bisheriger Logiken überhaupt, der Kantischen insbesondere* ,1800).[18] Bardili specified that his work was "not a *critique* but a *medicina mentis*, to be employed mainly for Germany's Critical Philosophy," because he was so convinced of the logical shortcomings of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[19] While Hegel heaped scorn on Bardili and Reinhold for their attempts to "reduce philosophy to logic" in *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy* (*Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie*,1801), his own work has been regarded as the culmination of the same tendency.[20] In the Introduction to *The Science of Logic* (*Wissenschaft der Logik*, 1812-1816), Hegel argues that "the critical philosophy had, it is true, already turned metaphysics into logic," but had failed to carry this transformation through to its conclusion.[21] Because it "remained burdened with the object it had avoided and was left with a residue of a thing-in-itself, an infinite obstacle, as a beyond," Hegel believed it was up to him to complete the "reconstruction" of metaphysics as logic.[22]

The idea that Kant had "turned metaphysics into logic" in the *Critique of Pure Reason* has

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[18] Reinhold, Karl Leohard. *On the Foundation of Philosophical Knowledge*. Translated by George di Giovanni. Included in *Between Kant and Hegel: Texts in the Development of Post-Kantian Idealism (Revised Edition)*. Edited by George di Giovanni and H.S. Harris. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000. pg. 89 (121).
[19] Bardili defends a modified version of Wolffian logic, based on the principle of identity. See Bardili, C.G. *Grundriß der Ersten Logik, gereiniget von den Irrthümern bisheriger Logiken überhaupt, der Kantischen insbesondere*. Bruxelles: Impression Anastaltique, 1970. pg. 1. For a defense of Kant against Bardili, see Benjamin Jäsche's preface to his edition of Kant's *Logic*. See *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 525-526 (IX:9-10).
[20] Hegel, G.W.F. *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*. Edited and Translated by Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. pg. 79.
[21] See Hegel, G.W.F. *Hegel's Science of Logic*. Translated by A.V. Miller. Amherst: Humanity Books, 1998.
[22] *Hegel's Science of Logic*, pp. 51-52.

found contemporary defenders as well. In his introduction to the English translation of Hegel's *Differenzschrift* (1977), H.S. Harris argues that "the reduction of philosophy to logic, in the sense in which Hegel took it up, was the project of Kant in the three Critiques... Careful attention to the Kant section of *Faith and Knowledge* will show that Hegel's *Logic* grew out of the critical philosophy."[23] While Harris does not defend the claim that Kant himself sought to "reduce philosophy to logic" or demonstrate how this laid the foundation for Hegel's *Logic*, Giorgio Tonelli made the case for the same claim in his address to the Fourth International Kant Congress in Mainz, published as *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic* (1974). At the end of his address, Tonelli claimed that "Kant's position corresponds, historically speaking, to a more or less pronounced incorporation of ontology into logic; and this fact has the greatest historical significance both as the major precedent to Hegel's analogous endeavor, and as a basic alternative to it."[24]

Tonelli died before finishing the work in which he planned to substantiate the ambitious claims of his address, but much of his research has been collected in a volume titled after Tonelli's address to the Kant congress (1994). The publication of this volume allows scholars to trace a possible source of Kant's use of the word "critique" and examine the evidence Tonelli collected in

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[23] *The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy*, pg. 64. In his Introduction to Hegel's *Faith and Knowledge*, Walter Cerf shows how Hegel's speculative logic grew out of his critique of the philosophy of reflection, which includes "most of Kant's transcendental idealism." It should, however, be noted that neither Cerf nor Harris show that Kant intended to "reduce philosophy to logic." See Hegel, G.W.F. *Faith and Knowledge*. Translated by Walter Cerf and H.S. Harris. Albany; State University of New York Press, 1977. pp. xvi-xviii, 9-12. Béatrice Longuenesse has made a similar claim more recently, arguing that one "cannot affirm too strongly the relation between Hegel's project in the *Science of Logic* and Kant's project in the three *Critiques* (and, first of all, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*), whatever appearances one may find to the contrary." Her remark is meant to imply that the link between Kant and Hegel is certain, not that it is questionable. See Longuenesse, Béatrice. *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*. Translated by Nicole J. Simek. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. pp. 14-15.

[24] Tonelli, Giorgio. "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic." Included in Tonelli, Giorgio. *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic: A Commentary on its History*. Edited by David H. Chandler. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1994. pg. 4.

support of his claims. Before turning to these texts, however, I would first like to consider the conclusion of *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant* (1978) an article published shortly after Tonelli's death. *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant* is an invaluable contribution to the study of the "general intellectual and social change" with which the word "critique" was associated in the eighteenth century, because it is among the very few works to examine the significance of the term for Kant's "critical" philosophy.[25]

Yet Tonelli is not entirely disinterested in his survey of the different senses and uses of the word "critique" from antiquity to the eighteenth century. The relation between *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant* and Tonelli's address to the Kant congress becomes apparent in the conclusion of the article, where Tonelli says that "if Kant selected the title of Critique for his major work, this not only reflected the prestige of a term very fashionable in that time, and the generical meaning of that term in philosophy: but, in according with the spirit of his enterprise, he selected it as a qualification of his work as a work primarily on Logic, and in particular on a Logic centered on verification and correction"[26] The survey which precedes the conclusion of *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant* provides little support for this claim, as it includes a number of different senses which bear some relation to Kant and the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Tonelli clearly privileges the use of "critique" in logic, because he regards the reformulation of logic as an "*ars critica"* to be "the most specific and interesting evolution of the term critique" in the eighteenth century, and the most likely source for Kant's use of the word "critique."[27]

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[25] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*, pg. 120.
[26] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*, pg. 147. Richard Velkley and Riccardo Pozzo follow Tonelli in regarding the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a logic. See Velkley, Richard. "Kant on the Primacy and Limits of Logic." Included in *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, New School for Social Research* 11(1988): 156. See also"Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic: The Role of the Introduction: Idea of a Transcendental Logic," pg. 297.
[27] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*, pg. 141.

Tonelli does not provide any evidence that Kant was aware of the figures or works which defined logic as an *"ars critica"* in *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*. Nor does he show that there is any relation between Kant's conception of logic and the conception of logic developed within this tradition.[28] Indeed, Tonelli does not offer a single citation from the *Critique of Pure Reason* in support of his conclusion in *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*. By listing a series of works which defined logic as an *ars critica*, and showing them to have been written either before or within the same period that Kant wrote the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Tonelli seems to draw his conclusion historical proximity, rather than the internal evidence of Kant's works. This approach poses several methodological problems, because with the exception of Baumgarten, who included a short discussion of "critique" in the "widest" and "critique" in the "wider" sense (*critica significatu latiori, critica significatu generali*) in his *Metaphysica*, Kant never mentions any of the figures or works that Tonelli takes to be so important for the historical development of "critique" prior to Kant.[29] There is not a single reference to Doria, Crousz, Fortunato da Brescia, Vico, Genovisi, Ziegler, Siebert, Osterrieder, Nicholai, Monteiro, Lumm, or Mehler in any of Kant's works.[30] Nor are their works cited by the authors–Wolff, Baumgarten, Meier, and Crusius–who most

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[28] Tonelli also fails to note that works like Caspar Schoppe's *De arte critica* (1597) and Jean Le Clerc's *Ars Critica* (1697) were works on philology and biblical hermeneutics rather than logic. They probably served as models for the later *ars criticae* that Tonelli discusses. See Wellek, Rene. *Concepts of Criticism.* Edited by Stephen G. Nicholas. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. pp. 23-24. See also *Enlightenment Contested,* pp. 421-426.

[29] Baumgarten distinguishes two types of "critique" in the chapter on 'Empirical Psychology' in his *Metaphysica*. The first is critique "in the widest sense," which pertains to "the art of judgment." The second is critique "in the wider sense," which is "the science of the rules of clear judgment." In the *Aesthetica*, Baumgarten denies that critique belongs to aesthetics in particular, because "there is also a logical critique." See Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb. *Metaphysik*. Translated by Georg Friedrich Meier. Edited by Dagmar Mirbach. Jena: Dietrich Scheglman Reprints, 2004. pp. 139-140 (§452). See also *Metaphysica,* pp. 220-221 (§607). See also *Aesthetica*, pp. 12-13 (§5).

[30] In an article in *Kant und sein Jahrhundert*, a *Gedenkschrift* for Tonelli, Craig Walton claims that Kant had read Vico, and that Vico had influenced Kant's views on universal history. See Walton, Craig. "Corsi, Ricorsi, and the Way Out of Modern Barbarism in Vico's New Science." Included in *Kant und sein Jahrhundert*. Edited by Claudio Cesa and Norbert Hinske. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1993. pg. 5. Nathan Rotenstreich denies that Kant had ever read Vico in a work cited by Walton. The absence of any mention of Vico in Kant's published works or Nachlass seems to substantiate the Rotenstreich's claim. See Rotenstreich, Nathan. "Vico and Kant." Included in *Giambattista Vico's*

directly influenced Kant's views on logic. Kant never mentions them in the surveys of the history of logic with which he began some of his logic lectures.[31] Kant's knowledge of the history of logic appears to be relatively superficial, notwithstanding his familiarity with Aristotelean terminology, so he does not seem to have been aware of developments in logic outside of Germany or the works of the authors Tonelli names. If Kant was so ignorant of the tradition which Tonelli says defines "the spirit of his enterprise" in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, how could it have exerted such a decisive influence his decision to call the *Critique of Pure Reason* a "critique?"

The absence of any direct connection between Kant and the *ars critica* tradition did not deter Tonelli from further developing the conclusion of "Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant." Returning to his address to the Kant congress, we see that Tonelli thought he could substantiate his claims and demonstrate that Kant used the term "critique" under the influence of "several Catholic German philosophers" who accepted the "correction and verification trend in logic," which was "developed abroad under the name *Art of Criticism.*"[32] Instead of establishing the influence of these figures by means of citations or direct references, Tonelli relies on Kant's statement that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a "treatise on method" rather than a system of metaphysics in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[33] This statement is central to the account Tonelli seeks to develop, because it allows Tonelli to associate the *Critique of Pure Reason* with other

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Science of Humanity. Edited by Giorgio Tagliacozzo and Donald Phillip Verene. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976. pg. 221.

[31] *Lectures on Logic*, pp. 257-264 (XXIV: 3-5, 335-339, 509, 613, 796-804). See also Hinske, Norbert. *Kant-Index (Band 14: Personenindex zum Logikcorpus*). Stutgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1991. pp. 3-103.

[32] *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic*, pg. 8.

[33] Tonelli notes that the statement "it is a treatise on method" only appears in the Preface to the Second Edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but he argues that the various references to the "king's road" and the "high road" of metaphysics refer to the "method" of metaphysics were "traditionally and unequivocally referred, for obvious etymological reasons, to method." See *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic*, pp. 1-4. See also *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 113 (Bxxii).

works on "methodology." According to Tonelli, logic "was never dissociated from the methodological consideration of the substance of thought" in the eighteenth century, and works on methodology were always considered to be part of logic. Tonelli therefore claims that "a careful reading of the *Critique* shows that this work is one of the special logics for the particular sciences, which Kant opposes, as methodologies, to general logic," because he takes it to be consistent with other contemporary "treatises on method," which were included within logic, especially in the *ars critica* tradition.[34]

Tonelli provides an extensive list of topics which were "usually included in logic" in the eighteenth century in order to show that questions of "methodology" belonged to logic in Kant's time. He notes that "the theory of sensible and rational knowledge (including the theory of observation, experimentation and induction, and sometimes the origin of ideas), the theory of division (that is, of the way of establishing a classification of things in genuses and species), the theory of the methods of invention and demonstration (through analysis and synthesis), the theory of teaching, of learning, of arguing, of writing and of criticizing books" were all considered "parts" of logic by Kant's contemporaries, because logic was "basically concerned with the origin, proper method, extent, and limits of human knowledge."[35] If Kant conceived of his "treatise on method" along these lines, then his attempt to define the "proper method" of metaphysics as well as his search for the "ground of the relation of that in us which we call *representation* to the object" could be said

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[34] "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic," pg. 4.

[35] "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason within the Tradition of Modern Logic," pg. 3. See also Tonelli, Giorgio. "The Problem of the Classification of the Sciences in Kant's Time." *Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosofia* (1975): 243-294 Following Tonelli, Norbert Hinske makes a great deal of the relation of logic to the idea of philosophy in general and its different parts in Kant's time. He regards Kant's logic lectures as the "breeding ground" (*Keimzelle*) of Kant's "critical" philosophy, but does not go so far as to say that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a logic. See Hinske, Norbert. "Zwischen Aufklärung und Vernunftkritik: Die philosophische Bedeutung des Kantschen Logikcorpus." *Aufklärung* 7.1 (1992): 60-61, 66-71.

to belong to logic. This would indeed revolutionize the interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and Kant's "critical" philosophy, if it were true. Yet there are good reasons to doubt the appropriateness of Tonelli's attempt to situate the *Critique of Pure Reason* within the "tradition" of modern logic.

Tonelli fails to note that Kant has a much more restrictive definition of logic than many of his contemporaries. Kant follows Baumgarten in excluding the theory of sensible knowledge from logic, insofar as he distinguishes aesthetics and logic. Because aesthetics concerns "the general rules of sensibility," Kant distinguishes it from logic as a "science *a priori* of the necessary laws of thought, not in regard to particular objects, however, but to all objects in general."[36] This distinction persists in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where logic is defined as "the science of the rules of the understanding in general" and aesthetics as "the science of the rules of sensibility in general."[37] The restricted definition of logic which is so evident in these attempts to "define the distinction" between aesthetics and logic suggests that Kant was not interested in a conception of logic which include all of the "parts" Tonelli enumerates. Kant conceived of logic in very specific terms, as nothing more than "the absolutely necessary rules of thinking."[38]

For Kant, the "absolutely necessary rules of thinking" constitute "general" logic. "General" logic abstracts from "the influence of the senses, from the play of imagination, the laws of memory, the power of habit, inclination, etc., hence also from the sources of prejudice, indeed in general from all causes from which certain cognition or may be supposed to arise, because these merely concern

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[36] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:16).
[37] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 194 (A52/B76). It is worth noting that Kant here refers to aesthetics as the "science" of the rules of sensibility in general. The terminological decision is significant, when considered in light of the distinction Kant draws between aesthetics as a "critique" of taste and logic as a "science."
[38] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 194 (A52/B76).

the understandding under certain circumstances of its application and experience is required in order to know these."[39] A "general but pure logic" addresses only the "strictly *a priori* principles" which serve as "a canon of the understanding and reason," but only concerns "what is formal in their use, be the content what it may (empirical or transcendental)."[40] Kant's conception of logic is therefore considerably more formal than that of many of his contemporaries. It even seems to exclude many of the subjects addressed by Meier in his *Vernunftlehre* and by Kant himself in his logic lectures.

While Kant does distinguish "general" from "special" logic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, what Tonelli calls "special logic" seems to fall under the category of "applied logic" in the 'Introduction' to the 'Transcendental Logic' of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[41] Here, Kant includes "applied logic" under "general logic," arguing that it is "a representation of the understanding and the rules of its necessary use *in concreto*, namely under the contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote this use, and which can be given only empirically."[42] This definition clearly refers to what Tonelli calls "special logic," but Kant distinguishes "applied general logic" from "transcendental logic" by arguing that "transcendental logic" pertains to that *a priori* cognition "by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely *a priori*, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use *a priori*)."[43] "Applied general logic" does not concern the conditions of possible cognition, but the application of general, logical rules to the "contingent conditions of the subject," that is, to different empirical fields of inquiry.[44] The different conditions which obtain in these fields may "hinder or promote"

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[39] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 194 (A52/B77-A53/B77).
[40] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 194 (A52/B77-A53/B77).
[41] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 194 (A52/B77-A53/B77).
[42] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 195 (A54/B78-A55/B79).
[43] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 196 (A56/B80-A56/B81).
[44] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 195 (A54/B79-A55/B79).

the understanding of the subject matter, so "applied general logic" must address the questions of "attention, its hindrance and consequences, the cause of error, the condition of doubt, of reservation, of conviction, etc." from which general logic abstracted.[45] It nevertheless remains a part of "general" logic, because "applied logic" serves to "verify" or "correct" the use of the understanding with respect to a particular empirical field. Yet "applied logic" is not constitutive of understanding, because the principles of "verification" and "correction" in "applied logic" are "given only empirically," because the conditions under which the subject exists "*in concreto*" are "contingent."[46] "Applied logic" must therefore be distinguished from "transcendental logic," because it concerns itself with the contingent, empirical, and material differences between one subject and another, rather than the *a priori* principles which determine the possibility and application of cognition in general.

Unlike general logic, transcendental logic is concerned with the "origin" of cognition, or that "faculty of cognition" which makes cognition "possible." The 'Transcendental Logic' in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is therefore concerned with that cognition "by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied *a priori*, or are possible (i.e., the possibility of cognition or its use *a priori*)."[47] It does not abstract from "all content of cognition" as does general logic, because it concerns "the rules of the pure thinking of an object." Transcendental logic must address the object of possible cognition, but it differs from applied logic because it excludes "all those cognitions" which are "of empirical content."[48] Instead of founding principles of "verification" and "correction" on the contingent, empirical conditions of a particular subject-

[45] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 195 (A54/B79-A55/B79).
[46] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 195 ((A54/B79-A55/B79).
[47] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 196 (A56/B80).
[48] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 196 (A55/B80).

matter, transcendental logic articulates the necessary relation between the form and content of cognition *a priori*, determining the "possibility" of an objectively valid relation between cognition and its object.

While "transcendental logic" certainly has a "special" field, in the sense that it specifies the "subject" to which the logic in question is applicable, it is also "transcendental," inasmuch as it pertains to "the particular use of the understanding" rather than to "general logic," in either its "pure" or "applied" forms.[49] Tonelli's various studies of Kant's distinctions between the different kinds of logic and their various divisions do not change the fact that, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant regards "special logics" as "applied" forms of "general logic," whose differences "can be given only empirically."[50] They cannot belong to "transcendental" logic, because the empirical conditions which distinguish one science from another are not determined *a priori*.[51] Instead, they are given *a posteriori*, in the study of the subject matter with which they are concerned. This is of decisive importance for Kant, because transcendental logic is one of the "elements" of the scientific metaphysics that Kant attempts to develop in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and Kant must define its principles, as well as the difference between transcendental logic and the other "element" of his scientific metaphysics, transcendental aesthetics, entirely *a priori*.

By founding the relation between cognition and its object and establishing the conditions of the possibility of such a relation, transcendental logic shows that sensibility and the understanding, intuitions and concepts, stand in a relation of matter and form in judgment, so that there is no "possible experience" and no "object" of cognition without these two "elements" of cognition. It is

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[49] *Critique of Pure Reason,* pg. A11/B24.
[50] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. A54/B78.
[51] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. A55/B80.

the "unification" of intuitions and concepts which is the condition of the possibility of all cognition, a principle which is nicely summarized in Kant's dictum "thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind."[52] Tonelli ignores this feature of Kant's transcendental logic, presuming instead that Kant maintained Baumgarten's distinction between aesthetics and logic.[53] In fact, Kant transformed Baumgarten's distinction between aesthetics and logic, as well as his own pre-critical attempts to "define the distinction" between them in the *Critique of Pure Reason* by bringing aesthetics and logic together and subsuming intuitions under concepts in judgment. "The key to the whole secret of metaphysics" is consequently not to be found in either aesthetics or logic, but in the principles which govern their relation. If this is true, then the "critique" of pure reason would belong to metaphysics, rather than logic. It would not be solely concerned with the "correction" and "verification" of principles, as Tonelli contends, but with their "discovery."

4.4: THE CRITIQUE OF BOOKS AND SYSTEMS

Kemp Smith and Tonelli take similar approaches to explaining Kant's use of the term "critique." Each identifies what he takes to be the most important way in which "critique" was used in the eighteenth century, and then tries to explain Kant's use of the term, in light of that sense of "critique." This approach leads Kemp Smith to suggest that Kant derived his conception of "critique" from British aesthetics.[1] Because Kant regarded aesthetics as an empirical "critique" of taste, a "critique" which "yields no rules *a priori* that determine judgment sufficiently, as logic does," it is unlikely that he derived the conception of "critique" that one finds in the *Critique of Pure Reason* from aesthetics, as Kemp Smith claims.[2] Taking the opposite approach, and claiming that "the most

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[52] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 193-194 (A51/B75-A52/B76).
[53] *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason Within the Tradition of Modern Logic*, pg. 314.
[1] *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 1.
[2] *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 530 (IX:15).

specific and interesting evolution of the terms critique, etc." took place in logic, Tonelli argues that Kant derived his use of the word "critique" from logic.[3] Because Kant was unfamiliar with any of the developments in logic that Tonelli describes, his account is as implausible as the one proposed by Kemp Smith.

While it is certainly possible that Kant transformed the empirical "critique" of taste that he found in aesthetics into "a critique of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all the cognition after which reason might strive independently of all experience" when he extended that "critique" to "philosophy in general," as Kemp Smith claims, it is unlikely that aesthetics is the "source" of Kant's use of the term.[4] Kant continued to regard aesthetics as an empirical "critique" of taste and continued to deny that there could be any *a priori* principles for judgments of taste until after he had written the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[5] It is therefore likely that he had a different kind of "critique" in mind, when he decided to call the *Critique of Pure Reason* a "critique." It is, however, unlikely that Kant had the conception of "critique" that Tonelli attributes to him in mind. When Kant says that his "critique" of pure reason is "a critique of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all the cognition after which reason might strive independently of all experience," he does not think it is concerned with "the logic of verification and correction," as Tonelli claims, but "the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all, however, from principles."[6] Instead of using his "critique" of pure reason to "verify" the truth of logical propositions or "correct" errors of judgment, Kant addressed his "critique" to questions of "possibility" (*Möglichkeit*) and "impossibility" (*Unmöglichkeit*), "sources"

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[3] *Critique and Related Terms Prior to Kant*, pg. 141.
[4] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii). See also *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 1.
[5] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 156, 173 (A21/B35). See also *Kant to Reinhold*, 12.28/31.1787, pg. 272 (X:514-515).
[6] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).

(*Quellen*), "extent" (*Umfang*) and "bounds" (*Grenzen*) of metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Kant was concerned with questions of "possibility" and "impossibility," "sources," "extent," and "bounds" as early as 1772. His "critique" of pure reason was already oriented towards these questions in his February 21 letter to Herz, the first text in which he announced his "critique" of pure reason. There too Kant had said that his "critique" would address "the sources of intellectual cognition, without which one cannot determine the nature and limits of metaphysics."[7] In 1772, Kant's conception of "intellectual cognition" still followed the definition he had proposed in his inaugural dissertation in 1770, a definition which was primarily concerned with the distinction between sensible cognition and intellectual cognition. Kant claimed that sensible cognition "is subject to the laws of sensibility," and therefore concerns "the receptivity of a subject in virtue of which it is possible for the subject's own representative state to be affected in a definite way by the presence of some object" in *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*. It was to be distinguished from intellectual cognition, which follows "the laws of intelligence" and represents things "which cannot by their own quality come before the senses of that subject."[8] By distinguishing these two kinds of cognition and excluding anything derived from sensible cognition, Kant believed that metaphysics would acquire the "method" which would make it "the philosophy which contains the first principles of the use of the pure understanding."[9]

As a result of the investigations of the "grounds" of intellectual cognition and the conditions of a valid (*gültig*) and understandable (*begreiflich*) relation between "representations" (Vorstellungen) and their "objects" (*Gegenstände, Objecte*), Kant came to see things rather

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[7] *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.1772, pg. 134 (X:132).
[8] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 384 (II:392).
[9] *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World*, pg. 387 (II:395).

differently. By the time he published the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant maintained that the "pure" concepts of the understanding were only applicable to appearances.[10] If one were to separate sensible and intellectual cognition entirely, Kant claimed, then the concepts that are to be employed in metaphysics would be "empty" (*leer*) and they would inevitably lead human reason in to "obscurity" (*Dunkelheit*) and "contradiction"(*Widerspruch*).[11] It was doubtless his investigation of the "sources" (*Quellen*) of intellectual cognition and the "grounds" (Gründe) of its relation to "objects" that led Kant to this conclusion and inspired the more restricted use he made of "intellectual" cognition in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. These investigations are, moreover, essentially connected to the idea of the "critique" of pure reason. The sense in which Kant used the word "critique" has to correspond to the investigation of the "sources" of intellectual cognition that he began in his 1772 letter to Herz, and which established the conditions of the possibility of objectively valid cognition of objects in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

If these are the general contours of what Kant intended his "critique" of pure reason to achieve, then it may be possible to find a sense of "critique" that corresponds to Kant's use of the term. This approach would be the opposite of the one taken by Kemp Smith and Tonelli, because it would attempt to find a sense of"critique," which was in use in Kant's time, but which corresponds to his use of the term. Instead of finding a significant way in which "critique" was used in the eighteenth century, and then assuming that Kant must have used the term in that way, as Kemp Smith and Tonelli have done, it would work back from Kant's use of the term to the "sources" of his conception of "critique." When one approaches the question in this way, I think the "philological" sense of "critique" becomes a more promising possible "source" for Kant's conception of "critique"

[10] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 243-244, 255-256, 347-348, 356 (A128-A130, B148-BB152, A249-A252, B298).
[11] See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 99, 193 (Aviii, A51/B75).

than either aesthetics or logic. It is precisely because philological "critique" is concerned with "sources" that it provides the best model for understanding Kant's "critique" of pure reason.

That Kant was aware of the philological sense of "critique" is evident from an early note on Meier's *Vernunftlehre*, where Kant refers to a "critique" of the Latin language.[12] The "critique" of language and literature belonged to philology, long before literary "criticism" came on the scene. During the eighteenth century, philology made great strides in the understanding of ancient literature and culture, particularly the Bible and the Greek and Roman classics. The distinction between "authentic" and "doctrinal" interpretation that plays such an important role in Kant's essay *On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy* (1791) was central to this discussion, showing that Kant was aware of important philological distinctions and placed a great emphasis on the value of "authenticity."[13] The concept of "authentic" interpretation, which Kant says corresponds to the "rational inference" which is "made by the legislator himself," was already present in Hobbes, who discusses the need for an "authentique" interpretation of the laws in his *Leviathan* (1651).[14] Hobbes was drawing on the work of Italian and French philologists, who had undertaken a study of the "intention" and "meaning" of Roman law.[15] The conception of philological "authenticity" was also applied to the study of the bible, when Catholic and Protestant scholars began to distinguish the

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[12] *Reflexionen zur Logik 1956* (XVI: 170). See also Chapter 1, pp. 20-21, note 20 of this dissertation.

[13] *On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy*, pg. 31 (VIII:264). See also Makkreel, Rudolf. "The Confluence of Aesthetics and Hermeneutics in Baumgarten, Meier, and Kant." *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 54:1 (1996). pp. 68-70.

[14] *On the Miscarriage of all Philosophical Trials in Theodicy*, pg. 31 (VIII:264). See also Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*. Edited by Richard Tuck. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. pp. 190-191 (Book II, Chapter 26, pp. 142-144). Despite his "naturalistic" approach to law, Hobbes followed the humanists of the "historical" school in rejecting the injunction against interpretation in the Institutes of Justinian. Hobbes insists that "all laws, written and unwritten, have need of interpretation." See *Leviathan*, pg. 190.

[15] See Kelley, Donald R. "Vera Philosophia: The Philosophical Significance of Renaissance Jurisprudence." Included in *History, Law, and the Human Sciences: Medieval and Renaissance Perspectives*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1984. pp. 267-279. See also Kelley, Donald R. *Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the French Renaissance.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1970.

"original" meaning of the scriptures from the "doctrinal" interpretations supported by the authority of the Church.[16] The same desire to go "back to the sources" of civil law and religious scripture that animated early modern philology could be said to be present in Kant's "critique" of pure reason.

To be sure, Kant distinguishes his "critique" of pure reason from the "critique of books and systems" with which philology was usually concerned. When he says that the "critique" of pure reason is "a critique of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience" in the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant is careful to note that he does not understand by this "a critique of books and systems."[17] He repeats the same warning in the 'Introduction,' noting that his readers should not expect "a critique of books and systems of pure reason, but rather that of the pure faculty of reason itself." "Only if this is one's ground," Kant explains, "does one have a secure touchstone for appraising the philosophical content of old and new works in this speciality." "Otherwise," Kant claims, "the unqualified historian and judge assesses the groundless assertion of others through his own, which are equally groundless."[18] It is possible that Kant made these remarks because he feared readers might mistake his "critique" for a work of philology. Yet it is more likely that he wished to emphasize the philosophical character of his "critique," by distinguishing it from the"scholarly" preoccupation with the works of learned authors. The fact that Kant felt compelled to point out the differences between his "critique" of pure reason and the "critique of books and systems" that was to be found philology might, however, suggest that Kant had philological "critique" in mind, when

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[16] 'Part II: *Philosophia Christi*: Erasmus and the Reform of *Doctrina*, 1511-1522' of James Tracy's *Erasmus of the Low Countries* is both eloquent and informative on this point. See Tracy, James D. Erasmus of the Low Countries. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996. pp.53-126. See also Sheehan, Jonathan. *The Enlightenment Bible: Translation, Scholarship, Culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005.
[17] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).
[18] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 150 (A13/B27).

he decided to call his investigation of "the faculty of reason in general" a "critique" of pure reason.

None of these speculations are decisive. It remains unclear whether Kant derived the conception of "critique" that he employed in his "critique" of pure reason from aesthetics, logic, or philology. I would nevertheless submit that the philological conception of "critique" corresponds more precisely to the conception of "critique" that Kant employs in the *Critique of Pure Reason* than the use of the term in either aesthetics or logic. Like the "critique" of pure reason, philological "critique" is concerned with "grounds" and "sources." Like the "authentic" interpretations of the law and the bible undertaken by early modern philologists, Kant's "critique" derives its authority from its account of the "sources" of human cognition and determines the "method" according to which those "sources" are to employed. In the process, it determines the extent to which they may be considered legitimate and the limits of their efficacy. The fact that some of the most eminent German philologists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries–among them Friedrich Schlegel, Friedrich Schleiermacher, and even Friedrich Nietzsche–were inspired by Kant and found his"critique" amenable to the kinds of "critique" in which they were engaged as philologists, suggests that the "critique" that defines Kant's "critical" philosophy might have more in common with philology than philosophers have so far been willing to admit.[19]

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[19] The influence of Kant's "critique" on philology is evident in Schlegel's views on philology, when he says that "the critique of philosophy = the philology of philosophy, they are one and the same." See Schlegel, Friedrich. *Kritischer Schriften und Fragmente (Bd. 5)*. Edited by Ernst Behler and Hans Eichner. Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh. 1988. pg. 18. See also Bowie, Andrew. *From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy of German Literary Theory*. New York: Routledge, 1997. pg. 54. The difference between Kant's "critique" of the "faculty of reason in general" and Schlegel's "philology of philosophy" is the role of history. Kant was for Schlegel only a "half-critic," because his "critique" of pure reason "is not at all historical enough, even though it is filled with historical relations and he attempts to construct various systems." see Millan-Zaibert, Elizabeth. *Friedrich Schlegel and the Emergence of Romantic Philosophy*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007. pp. 127-131. Schleiermacher discusses philological, doctrinal, ethical, and historical criticism in his *Hermeneutics and Criticism, with Particular Reference to the New Testament* (1838), but does not discuss "philosophical" or "transcendental" critique, despite his close association with Schlegel and the importance of Kant for his early views on art and literature. The lack of reference to Kant in Schleiermacher's writings on hermeneutics and criticism can, perhaps, be explained by the technical nature of the texts and the time of their publication, which postdates Schlegel and Schleiermacher's initial enthusiasm for Kant by almost

fifty years. See Schliermacher, Friedrich. *Hermeneutics and Criticism and Other Writings*. Edited and Translated by Andrew Bowie. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. For the influence of Kant and Fichte on Schleiermacher's early views on criticism, see Dilthey, Wilhelm. "Schleiermacher's Hermeneutical System in Relation to Earlier Protestant Hermeneutics." Translated by Theodore Nordenhaug. Included in *Wilhelm Dilthey: Selected Works (Volume IV: Hermeneutics and the Study of History)*. Edited by Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996. pp. 100-110. Kant and Schopenhauer also exerted a decisive influence on the philological works of the young Nietzsche. This is apparent to a certain extent in *The Birth of Tragedy* (1872), but it is even more pronounced in Nietzsche's earlier works on Diogenes Laertius and Democritus of Abdera, where he Nietzsche attempted to formulate a new kind of philology "as critique," under the influence of Friedrich Albert Lange's Kantian materialism. It is in this context that Nietzsche was able to reverse Seneca's lamentation "what was philosophy has become philology" (*quae philosophia fuit facta philologia est*) and declare "what was philology will become philosophy" (*philosophia facta est quae philologia fuit*). See Nietzsche, Friedrich. "Homer und die klassische Philologie" Included in *Friedrich Nietzsche: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Werke, II.1)*. Edited by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967. pg. 268. See also Porter, James I. *Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. pp. 35-36, 51-62.

CHAPTER 5: THE POSSIBILITY OF A METAPHYSICS IN GENERAL

5. 1: DEFINING THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON

Most scholarly reflection on the difference between the first (A) and second (B) editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason* has centered on the changes Kant made to the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding.' In the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant said he knew "no investigations more important for getting to the bottom of that faculty we call the understanding, and at the same time for the determination of the rules and boundaries of its use" than those he had undertaken "in the second chapter of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding."[1] Because Kant placed such great emphasis on the 'Deduction,' many regard the changes he made to its central arguments in the second (B) edition as the key to understanding the *Critique of Pure Reason* itself. Even if his new 'Deduction' did not solve the problem Kant intended it to solve, namely, the "obscurity" of the 'Deduction' in the first (A) edition, it did not fail to catch the attention of scholars, who have pored over every comma and semicolon in both versions of the 'Deduction.'[2] As a result, there seems to be no end to the number of studies of Kant's 'Deduction' and the difference between its articulations in the first (A) and second (B) editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Although they may not be considered to be as important as the changes Kant made to the 'Deduction,' scholars have also noted the significance of the changes Kant made to the 'Transcendental Aesthetic,' the 'Analytic of Principles,' and the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason,' as

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 103 (Axvi).
[2] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 120 (Bxxxviii).

well as the addition of the 'Refutation of Idealism' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Like the changes to the 'Deduction,' these changes appear to be more than mere "improvements" to the "mode of presentation" of the work.[3] As is well known, Kant claimed that his changes were intended to "remove as far as possible those difficulties from which may have sprung several misunderstandings into which acute men, perhaps not without some fault on my part, have fallen in their judgment of this book."[4] Few, if any, scholars today believe the extensive revisions Kant undertook left the substance of his "critique" unchanged. Even where his general point remained the same, the changes Kant made in the second (B) edition affected the articulation of his arguments, which in turn affected the relation of those arguments to the whole "system" of the "critique." If Kant really thought "pure speculative reason" was "a truly articulated structure of members in which each thing is an organ, that is, in which everything is for the sake of each member, and each individual member is for the sake of all," as he says he does, then it is hardly imaginable that his "critique" would remain "unaltered" by the many changes he made to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[5]

While many suppose them to be of considerably lesser philosophical consequence than the changes he made to other parts of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the differences between the ways in which Kant characterizes the "critique" of pure reason in the first (A) and the second (B) editions are as striking as those he made to any other part of the work. There are, of course, a number of similarities between the way Kant characterizes the "critique" in the two editions. He uses many of the same adjectives to describe his "critique," calling it strict (*streng*), just (*gerecht*), sober

[3] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 120-121 (Bxxxviii).
[4] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 120 (Bxxxvii).
[5] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 120 (Bxxxvii-xxxviii).

(*nüchtern*), acute (*scharf*), complete (*vollendet*), and mature (*reif*).[6] Kant also promises that his "critique" will treat its subject with "completeness" (*Vollständigkeit*), comprehensiveness (*Ausführlichkeit*), and certainty (*Gewißheit*) in both the first (A) and second (B) editions.[7] More significant similarities are also to be found in the 'Introduction' to the first (A) and second (B) editions, where Kant characterizes the "critique" of pure reason as a "special science" (*einer besondern Wissenschaft*), which will "provide the principles of cognition *a priori*" for a future "organon" (*Organon*) of pure reason.[8] Kant goes on to identify this "organon" with a "system of pure reason" that he calls "transcendental philosophy."[9] Because he characterizes the "critique" of pure reason as the "propadeutic" (*Propädeutic*) to that system, rather than a part of its "doctrine" (*Doctrin*), the distinction between the "critique" of pure reason and the "complete system" of metaphysics that Kant hoped one day to bring forward must seen as a consistent feature of his "critical" philosophy.[10] Even if he later denied that the "critique" of pure reason was "only a *propadeutic* to transcendental philosophy and not the actual system of this philosophy," the work in which Kant presented his "critique" bears witness to the contrary in both its first (A) and second (B) editions.[11]

By examining the ways in which Kant's definition of the "critique" of pure reason differs in the 'Preface' to the first (A) and 'Preface' to the second (B) editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* I hope to shed new light on his reasons for thinking of his "critique" as a "propadeutic" to a future "system" of transcendental philosophy, and how Kant thought it would determine the

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[6] *Critique of Prue Reason,* pp. 439, 508, 590, 647 (A395, A486/B514, A642/B671, A747/B775).
[7] *Critique of Pure Reason,* pp. 101-103, 113-114 (Axiii-xvi, Bxxii-xxiv).
[8] *Critique of Pure Reason,* pp. 132-133 (A10/B24-A13/B26).
[9] *Critique of Pure Reason,* pg. 133 (A11/B24-A12/B26).
[10] *Critique of Pure Reason,* pg. 133 (A11/B24-A12/B26).
[11] See *Public Declaration Concerning Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre,* pp. 599-600 (XII:371).

"proper method" of metaphysics. Studying the differences between the way in which Kant defines the "critique" of pure reason in the 'Preface' to the first (A) and second (B) editions will instructive in this endeavor, in the same way that Kant claimed that "defining the difference" between the "critique of taste" (*Kritik des Geschmacks*) and the "critique of reason" (*Kritik der Vernunft*) would lead to a better understanding of both aesthetics and logic in the *Announcement* of his lectures in 1765.[12] Studying the differences between Kant's definitions of the "critique" of pure reason has an added advantage, in this respect, because his understanding of the "critique" of pure reason is, at least presumably, the same in both editions. Understanding the difference between the ways in which the idea of a "critique" of pure reason is characterized in the 'Preface' to the first (A) and second (B) editions should theefore serve to illuminate their common features, as well as their differences.

Section 5.2 will focus on the identification of the "critique" of pure reason with a "court of justice" (*Gerichtshof*) in the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason.* By analyzing the claim that the "critique" of pure reason is to secure reason's "rightful claims"and distinguish them from its "groundless pretensions," it will focus on the "juridical" dimension of the "critique" of pure reason and the way in which it is to define the "correct" (*richtig*) or "proper" (*eigentlich*) method of metaphysics. Section 5.3 will then consider how Kant says the "critique" of pure reason is to set metaphysics on the "sure path of science" (*sicherer Weg der Wissenschaft*) in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition. This inquiry will also clarify what it means for metaphysics to become a "science" (*Wissenschaft*) through a "revolutionary" (*revolutionär*) transformation of its "method" (*Methode*). Finally, Section 5.4 will discuss the "negative" and "positive' utilities

[12] *Announcement*, pg. 297 (II:231).

(*Nutzen*) that Kant attributes to this transformation in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition fo the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in order to determined their value for the "system" of transcendental philosophy which Kant hoped to one day present. In so doing, it will confirm the working hypothesis of this dissertation, namely, that Kant intended the "critique" of pure reason as an account of the "proper method" of metaphysics, one that would finally allow metaphysics to become a science.

5.2: THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON AS A COURT OF JUSTICE

Kant frames his "critique" of pure reason in juridical terms in the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, calling it "a court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and this not by mere decrees, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws."[1] While these comments are no doubt familiar to readers of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, they contain a number of points which are usually overlooked by Kant scholarship. Because they bear on Kant's attempt to determine "the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general," it is worthwhile to examine them more closely.[2]

Before turning to the philosophical implications of the "juridical" terms that Kant employs, I would like to establish the context in which he calls the "critique" of pure reason a "court of justice." The context of Kant's announcement is particularly difficult to navigate, because Kant does not make use of the kind of arguments one would expect from an author who promises to write in a "dry, merely scholastic manner."[3] Kant introduces his "critique" in the context of a highly figurative discussion of the "peculiar fate" of human reason, the loss of the "title of honor" of metaphysics, and the contradictions of the "indifferentism" with which Kant thought his age had

[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axi-xii).
[2] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).
[3] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 103 (Axviii).

come to regard metaphysics. In order to understand the "critical" court that Kant institutes at the end of this discussion and his reasons for thinking it could secure reason's "rightful claims," it is essential to understand the relation of these claims to the discussions which precede them.

Having sufficiently accounted for the context in which Kant introduces his "critical" court, I will then examine the philosophical implications of the "juridical" language that Kant employs when he calls the "critique" of pure reason a "court of justice." While it would be a mistake to think that Kant's "critique" is essentially "juridical," the concepts of the "rightful" and the "lawful" are closely connected to Kant's conception of a "critical" philosophy.[4] In order to prove that they do not compromise the philosophical integrity of his "critique," I will consider the reasons why Kant decided to identify his "critique" of pure reason with a "court of justice" and how he thought this would decide "the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general."[5]

THE PECULIAR FATE OF HUMAN REASON

Kant begins his 'Preface' by describing the "peculiar fate" (*besondere Shicksal*) of human reason. He says that human reason falls into "perplexity" (V*erlegenheit*) because it is "burdened with questions which it cannot dismiss, since they are given to it as problems by the nature of reason

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[4] The claim that Kant's "critique" is "essentially" juridical has been advanced by a number of scholars in a number of different contexts. Andrew Cutrofello has extended Dieter Henrich's claim that Kant's "deductions" follow a "juridical" model to the "critique" or pure reason itself. Unfortunately, he does not demonstrate that what may be true of the "deduction" is also true of the "critique," See Cutrofello, Andrew. *Discipline and Critique: Kant, Poststructuralism, and the Problem of Resistance*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. pp. 5-7. Maria Chiara Pievalto also approaches the "juridical" nature of "critique" through the idea of "deduction." See Pievalto, Maria Chiara. "The Tribunal of Reason: Kant and the Juridical Nature of Pure Reason." *Ratio Juris* 12.3 (September, 1999). pp. 311-327. Onora O'Neill places more emphasis on the relationship between Kant's 'Preface' and the 'Discipline' of pure reason, arguing that a series of "juridical" and "political" metaphors provide the "deep structure" of Kant's "critique" and his "critical" philosophy. While she is right to note the prominence and importance of these metaphors, including the metaphor of the "critical" court, O'Neill does not prove that these metaphors are actually "foundational" for Kant's "critique" or his "critical" philosophy. See O'Neill, Onora. *Constructions of Reason*: Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. pp. 3-27. Kimberly Hutchings provides a helpful analysis of O'Neill's position, though it is not clear that she endorses it. See Hutchings, Kimberly. *Kant, Critique, and Politics*. New York: Routledge, 1996. pp. 28-33.

[5] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).

itself, but which it also cannot answer, since they transcend every capacity of human reason."[6] While he says it is "through no fault of its own" that human reason is unable to answer the questions which are "given to it as problems by the nature of reason itself," the unwitting guilt that it assumes in the process of trying to answer them forces human reason to institute the "critical" court that Kant describes just a few paragraphs later.

Elaborating upon the "peculiarity" (*Besonderheit*) of the fate of human reason and its descent into "perplexity," Kant describes a kind of tragedy, in which human reason loses its natural innocence and becomes corrupted.[7] "In the beginning," Kant says, human reason employed principles "whose use is unavoidable in the course of experience and at the same time sufficiently warranted by it."[8] It then "takes refuge in principles that overstep all possible use in experience," because the questions it attempts to answer drive human reason to "rise even higher, to more remote conditions."[9] The principles it had drawn from experience were not sufficient to address these "even higher, more remote conditions," so human reason appealed to principles that "surpass the bounds of all experience."[10] As a result, it loses "any touchstone of experience" against which to measure the appropriateness of its principles. Without realizing that it is "proceeding on the ground of

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[6] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Avii). Kant says human reason is only subject to these perplexities "in one species of its cognitions" (*in einer Gattung ihrer Erkenntnisse*) Kant does not indicate which "species" (*Gattung*) he means, but it is presumably reason in its speculative employment, as opposed to reason in its practical employment.

[7] The influence of Rousseau on Kant's conception f the development of the sciences is evident in Kant's remarks (*Bemerkungen*) to his *Observations on The Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* and in Herder's notes on Kant's Practical Philosophy. See *Notes and Fragments*, pp. 6-8 (II:215-217). See also *Lectures on Ethics*, pp. 20-21 (XXVII:45). See also Ameriks, Karl. "Kant, Human Nature, and History after Rousseau." (Forthcoming).

[8] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Avii). The idea that the use (*Gebrauch*) of empirical principles is "sufficiently warranted" (*hinreichend bewährt*) "in the course of experience" (*im Laufe der Erfahrung*) is of particular interest in this passage. The applicability of empirical principles to experience would, in this case, seem to be guaranteed by their derivation from experience. Because the "pure" principles of metaphysics are not derived from experience, it would be less clear that one is "sufficiently warranted" in applying them to experience. Because human reason has not yet "deduced" the applicability of the "pure" principles it employs to experience, it is mistaken in applying at least some of its principles to experience in at least some cases, at least in the context Kant is describing.

[9] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii).

[10] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii).

hidden errors," human reason is led into "obscurity and contradiction" by the principles it employs.[11] It is left in a state of "perplexity," because human reason does not know how to identify the source of these "hidden errors" (*verborgene Irrthümer*) and so does not know how to avoid its descent into "obscurity and contradiction" (*Dunkelheit und Widersprüche*).[12]

Kant calls metaphysics the "battleground" (*Kampfplatz*) where the "endless controversies" (*endlosen Streitigkeiten*) of human reason are played out.[13] His reference to "endless controversy" is somewhat obscure, because Kant had not indicated that the "hidden errors" which led human reason into "obscurity and contradiction" had been a source of "controversy" in the preceding paragraph. Kant had emphasized the "perplexity" into which human reason fell as a result of its "peculiar fate," rather than the disputes which arose as a result of that "perplexity." One can surmise that where there is "perplexity" there will also be "controversy," especially when there is no "touchstone of experience" with which to settle disputes. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that the "endless controversies" that have made metaphysics a "battlefield" follow directly from human reason's appeal to principles which "surpass the bounds of all experience."

Kant did not think the "endless controversies" that have made metaphysics a "battleground" could be avoided by returning to principles whose use is "sufficiently warranted" (*hinreichend bewährt*) by experience. Nor did he think that human reason was wrong to appeal to principles which "surpass the bounds of all experience" in its attempt to address the "even higher, more remote conditions" of metaphysics. Kant thought it was the nature of human reason to rise to "even higher, more remote conditions." He even says that the "nature" of human reason "requires" it to go beyond

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[11] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii).
[12] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii).
[13] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii).

experience and consider more elevated things.[14] It has every right to make use of principles which "surpass the bounds of all experience" in these endeavors, because experience "can give neither guidance nor correction" with respect to "the investigations of our reason."[15]

Kant denies that the "objects" with which metaphysics is concerned can be addressed by means of "empirical" principles in the 'Introduction' to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, precisely because he thinks human reason must appeal to "pure" principles if it is to address the "even higher, more remote conditions" of metaphysics. Empirical principles are "merely borrowed from experience" and "cognized only *a posteriori*."[16] They are, as such, equivalent to the principles whose use was "unavoidable in the course of experience and at the same time sufficiently warranted by it." In the 'Introduction,' Kant stipulates that "pure" or "*a priori*" principles "have the character of inner necessity," so that they are "clear and certain for themselves, independently of experience."[17] They are the sole concern of the "critique" of pure reason, according to Kant, because empirical principles "give us no true universality."[18] Lacking any "true universality," empirical principles do not allow us to "uncover the ground of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments with appropriate generality to gain insight into the conditions that make every kind of them possible."[19] "Pure" principles are required for this task, making principles which "surpass the bounds of all experience" indispensable for the determination of "the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in

[14] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Avii). The word Kant uses is *mitbringen*, "to bring with." A literal translation of the passage would read "which it [human reason] also by its nature brings with it" (*wie es auch ihre Natur mit sich bringt*). Guyer and Wood's translation, while not entirely literal in claiming "as its nature also requires," is, however, entirely appropriate.
[15] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii).
[16] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 127 (A2).
[17] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 127 (A2).
[18] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 127 (A1).
[19] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 132 (A10/B23).

general."[20]

In some cases, Kant says, the "pure" principles that human reason employs in its investigations of the "even higher, more remote conditions" of metaphysics "seem so unsuspicious that even ordinary common sense agrees with them."[21] This makes sense, because "pure" principles are supposed to possess an "inner necessity" (*innern Nothwendigkeit*) which justifies their use "independently of experience." The "inner necessity" of these principles is, however, more obscure in other cases, so that their "origin" (*Ursprung*) and "credit" (*Credit*) remain uncertain.[22] While the risk of "proceeding on the ground of hidden errors" is considerably greater in cases where the "origin" and "credit" of the principles human reason employs remains uncertain, Kant does not think reason should ever be too hasty to "erect an edifice" on principles it has not first subjected to "careful" and thoroughgoing "investigations" (*sorgfältige Untersuchungen*). He demands that human reason undertake a "critique" of pure reason, in order to determine the "domain, validity, and value" (*Umfang, Gültigkeit, und Werth*) of even those principles whose "origin" and "credit" seem to be obvious and to possess an "inner necessary."[23]

When human reason fails to ask "how the understanding could come to all these cognitions *a priori* and what domain, validity, and value they might have," Kant thinks it will overlook the "hidden errors" that will eventually undermine its "foundation" and reduce human reason to a state of "perplexity."[24] However "proper" and "reasonable" it may be for human reason to ask about the

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[20] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 133 (A12/B26-A13/B26). Here Kant says "our object is not the nature of things, which inexhaustible, but the understanding, which judges about the nature of things, and this in turn only in regard to it's a priori cognition, the supply of which, since we do not need to search for it externally, cannot remain hidden from us, and in all likelihood is small enough to be completely recorded, its worth or worthlessness assessed, and subjected to a correct appraisal."
[21] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Avii).
[22] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 128 (A3/B7).
[23] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 128 (A4/B7).
[24] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 128 (A3/B7).

"domain, validity, and value" of the principles it employs, Kant says it is"only natural" for human reason to fail to ask these questions, "if by that one understands that which usually happens."[25] The "natural" carelessness of human reason and the haste with which it proceeds to make use of principles whose "origin" and "credit" it has not established for itself may be "no fault of its own," but they are responsible for the "peculiar fate" of human reason and the "perplexity" into which it falls in Kant's view.

THE TITLE OF HONOR OF METAPHYSICS

The fact that Kant calls the "controversies" which have made metaphysics a "battlefield" "endless" suggests that he did not think human reason could draw itself out of the "perplexity" into which it had fallen. In order to do so, human reason would have to identify the "hidden errors" that had led it into "obscurity and contradiction." It would have to find a different way of proceeding, so that it did not employ principles whose "origin" and "credit" remained uncertain. It would also have to exercise a kind of care in using its more reliable principles, a care that Kant thinks is "unnatural" for human reason, "if by that one understands that which usually happens."[26] Any one of these things would be a great accomplishment for human reason, but to achieve all three would seem to be out of its reach, if human reason really is destined to fall into a state of "perplexity" by its "peculiar fate."

Although it would appear that the "peculiar fate" of human reason really is "fatal" to any attempt to extricate metaphysics from the "endless controversies" to which it has been subjected, Kant gives some indication that metaphysics was not always the "battlefield" that it has become.

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[25] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 128 (A4/B8).
[26] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 128 (A4/B8).

"There was a time," he says, when metaphysics was called "the queen of all the sciences."[27] Metaphysics deserved the "title of honor" (*Ehrennamen*) it enjoyed as "the queen of all the sciences," according to Kant, because of the "preeminent importance" (*vorzüglichen Wichtigkeit*) of its "objects" (*Gegenstandes*).[28] While these "objects" no doubt "surpass the bounds of all experience," their "importance" justifies and even necessitates the risk of "error" that human reason runs in going beyond principles which are "sufficiently warranted" by experience. Kant's reference to the "preeminent importance" of the "objects" of metaphysics helps to explain why human reason is compelled to rise to "even higher, more remote conditions" and attempts to answer questions which "transcend" its "every capacity."

While it might, in principle, be possible to return metaphysics to the position it once occupied, Kant says it has lost its "title of honor, so that "the queen proves despised on all sides" and "the matron, outcast and forsaken, mourns like Hecuba."[29] He blames the decline of metaphysics on two parties, which he calls the "dogmatists" (*Dogmatiker*) and the "skeptics" (*Skeptiker*).[30] Kant's treatment of dogmatism and skepticism takes the form of a political drama in which the "dogmatists" play the part of the "ministers" of metaphysics, "the queen of all the sciences." The "rule" (*Herrschaft*) of metaphysics under the "administration" (*Verwaltung*) of the dogmatists was "despotic" (*despotisch*) according to Kant.[31] Because its legislation (*Gesetzgebung*) "retained traces of an ancient barbarism," he says, the dogmatic administration"gradually degenerated through internal wars into complete anarchy."[32] The skeptics, who Kant calls "a kind of nomads who abhor

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[27] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii).
[28] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii).
[29] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii-ix).
[30] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aviii-ix).
[31] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aix).
[32] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aix).

all permanent cultivation of the soil," then came along and"shattered civil unity from time to time."[33] There were "fortunately only a few" skeptics, Kant says, so they "could not prevent the dogmatists from continually attempting to rebuild, though never according t a plan unanimously agreed to among themselves."[34] Kant thought this lack of agreement had so far prevented the return of the "title of honor" of metaphysics.

Kant thought he had found a different way of approaching metaphysics, one which would fare better than either dogmatism or skepticism. Yet he constantly referred back to them, treating dogmatism and skepticism as if they were the Scylla and Charybdis between which he had steered his "critical" philosophy. This is particularly evident in the 'History of Pure Reason' with which Kant concluded the *Critique of Pure Reason.* Here Kant declares that dogmatism and skepticism are similar to the "critical" philosophy, inasmuch as the dogmatists and skeptics are to be considered "observers of a scientific method."[35] Dogmatists and skeptics therefore share "the obligation of proceeding systematically" with the "critical" philosophy.[36] Unlike the "critical" philosophy, however, Kant thinks dogmatism and skepticism are unable "to bring human reason to full satisfaction in that which has always, but until now vainly, occupied its lust for knowledge."[37] Kant says "the critical path alone is still open," because it succeeds where dogmatism and skepticism had failed. It provides solid and incontestable grounds for establishing the "lawfulness" (*Rechtmäßigkeit*) of all the "competing claims" (*jener Ansprüche*) in metaphysics, which will bring an end to the "endless controversies" which have made it a "battlefield." In this the "critical" philosophy differs

[33] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 99-100 (Aix).
[34] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Aix).
[35] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 704 (A855/B883).
[36] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 704 (A855/B883).
[37] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 704 (A855/B883).

from even the most recent dogmatic attempts to reconstruct the authority of metaphysics, which Kant associates with Locke's "physiology of the human understanding" in his 'Preface.'[38]

Kant thought that metaphysics had fallen "back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism, and thus into the same position of contempt out of which the science was to have been extricated" as a result of Locke's attempt to trace "the birth of the purported queen" back to "the rabble of common experience."[39] While he was convinced that Locke's "genealogy" of metaphysical principles was, in fact, "attributed to her falsely," because it suggested that the "pure" principles of metaphysics could be derived from experience, Kant did not think he could simply propose a more appropriate alternative, if he wished to extricate metaphysics from "the position of contempt" into which it had fallen. He thought disputes internal to the dogmatic "administration," on the one hand, and the conflicts between the dogmatists and the skeptics, on the other, had given rise to "tedium and complete indifferentism" (*Überdruß und gänzlicher Indifferentism*) with respect to metaphysics.[40]

Where "tedium and complete indifferentism" rule (*herrscht*), the return of the "title of honor" of metaphysics is impossible, regardless of the claims of dogmatism, skepticism, or any other philosophy, because "tedium and complete indifferentism" deny the "preeminent importance" of the

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[38] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Aix). Paul Guyer compares Kant's and Locke's approaches to metaphysics, arguing that they each approach metaphysics by determining its limits. While his article is very helpful, I think it would be more helpful and more appropriate to compare Locke and Kant's respective genealogies of concepts. The important difference between Locke and Kant comes from a shared starting point, namely, their commitment to providing a genetic account of concepts. Locke thinks the mind is passive and that concepts are abstractions from sense impressions. Kant thinks the mind is active and produces concepts through its own activity, independently of sensible affection. This is the key to understanding what Locke and Kant have in common and where they differ on the issue of the limits of knowledge, reason, and metaphysics, because it explains why Locke denies the possibility of a priori knowledge and Kant affirms not only its possibility, but its necessity. See Guyer, Paul. "Kant's Transcendental Idealism and the Limits of Knowledge: Kant's Alternative to Locke's Physiology." Included in *Kant and the Early Moderns*. Edited by Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
[39] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Aix).
[40] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Ax).

"objects" of metaphysics. Because they treat the "objects" of metaphysics as matters to which human reason can be "indifferent" (*Gleichgültig*), Kant thought "tedium and complete indifferentism" posed a more serious threat to metaphysics than either dogmatism or skepticism, one which was all the more pressing, given its place in contemporary history.[41] His "critical" philosophy would have to refute "indifferentism" and demonstrate the "preeminent importance" of metaphysics, if it were to restore to metaphysics its lost "title of honor."

THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF INDIFFERENTISM

While many scholars see Kant's "critical" philosophy as an attempt to avoid the "extremes" of dogmatism and skepticism, the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* shows that it has a different and much more difficult task. Kant thought he had to demonstrate the "preeminent importance" of metaphysics, if he was to refute the "tedium and complete indifferentism" with which his age had come to regard metaphysics. This set the bar considerably higher for the "critical" philosophy, because it forced Kant to prove that metaphysics deserved the "title of honor" it once enjoyed as "the queen of all the sciences," in addition to proving that it could be extricated from the "position of contempt" into which it had fallen. If the "title of honor" of metaphysics was to be restored, so that it could once again be regarded as"the queen of all the sciences," Kant thought it would have to be won from those who regard metaphysics with "complete

[41] The "contemporaneity" of "indifferentism" with respect to metaphysics was as much a part of Kant's time as it is of our own. There are no doubt historical as well as philosophical reasons why this is the case, though the specific historical referent of Kant's discussion of "indifferentism" remains unclear. D.A. Rees traces Kant's reference to indifferentism to the entries on Pyrrho, Zeno, and Zabarella in Bayle's *Historical-Critical Dictionary* in one of the very few articles to discuss the subject. Unfortunately, there is very little direct evidence to support his claim. See Rees, D.A. "Kant, Bayle, and Indifferentism." *The Philosophical Review* 63.4 (1954). It should also be noted, against the claims of John Sallis, that Kant not only "left open" the question of the "historicity" of philosophy in the 'History of Pure Reason' with which he concluded the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but began to pay a great deal of attention to this question in his later works, particularly his unfinished essay on the progress of metaphysics. Had Sallis considered these texts, he might not have claimed that Kant had attempted to "suppress" the history and historicity of metaphysics. See Sallis, John. *Spacings–Of Reason and Imagination in Texts of Kant, Fichte, Hegel*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987. pp. 1-4.

indifferentism."

The refutation of "indifferentism" cannot be achieved by "moderating" the claims of dogmatism and skepticism or by "mediating" between them, as some scholars have suggested.[42] In his later work, Kant indicates that skepticism "cannot properly be considered a serious view that has been current in any period of philosophy," because it lacks any determinate philosophical position.[43] Kant calls skeptics "nomads" who "abhor all permanent cultivation of the soil," so they have nothing with which to justify their own philosophical position or, perhaps more significantly, lack thereof.[44] At most they can call the authority of the dogmatic "administration" into question, challenging the dogmatists "to demonstrate those *a priori* principles on which the very possibility of experience depends."[45] Because the dogmatists had only presumed the authority of their "administration," their "way of presenting those principles" is riddled with contradictions.[46] Eventually, the philosophical shortcomings of dogmatism lead its "ministers" to make competing claims, instigating the "internal wars" which will bring about the collapse of the dogmatic "administration."[47] This naturally give

[42] A particularly noteworthy example of the attempt to see the "critical" philosophy as an attempt to "mediate" between dogmatism and skepticism is *The Genesis of the Critical Philosophy* (1898) by Jacob Gould Schurman. Schurman explained Kant's discussion of dogmatism and skepticism in light of his tendency to "mediate between extremes." The desire to avoid "extreme" positions like dogmatism and skepticism was, according to Schurman, a feature of Kant's "native disposition" as well as "a conservative tendency animating German philosophy as a whole." Drawing on the account of Kant's intellectual development in Hans Vaihinger's *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, 1881)–an account which divides Kant's "pre-critical" intellectual development into periods of dogmatism, skepticism, rationalism, empiricism, and, finally "criticism"–Schurman describes the "critical" philosophy as an attempt to mediate between "the rationalist philosophy of Germany," which tends toward dogmatism and "the empiricism of England," which tends toward skepticism. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Schurman says, Kant brought together the best of German and English philosophy and did away with their rationalist and empiricist "excesses." By avoiding the "extremes" of dogmatism and skepticism, Schurmann suggests, Kant thought metaphysics could avoid controversy and conflict, settling its disputes in a more judicious manner. See Schurman, J.G. "The Genesis of the Critical Philosophy (I: Logical)" *The Philosophical Review* VII(1), 1898. Manfred Kuehn notes the imprecision which plagues accounts of this kind in his biography of Kant. See *Kant: A Biography*, pp. 177-187.

[43] *What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff*, pp. 356-357 (XX:263).

[44] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aix).

[45] *What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff*, pp. 356 (XX:263).

[46] *What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff*, pp. 356 (XX:263).

[47] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 99 (Aix).

rise to "indifferentism," because it is only reasonable to regard controversies in which no party is able to definitively assert its rights or bring the conflict to a conclusion with indifference.

Although he calls "indifferentism" "the mother of chaos and night in the sciences," Kant says it is "at the same time also the origin, or at least the prelude, of their incipient transformation and enlightenment, when through ill-applied effort they have become obscure, confused, and useless."[48] The shortcomings of dogmatism and skepticism are no doubt what Kant had in mind when he said the sciences have become "obscure, confused, and useless" through "ill-applied effort." The recognition that it is pointless to continue pursuing metaphysics in a way that has turned it into a "battlefield" is, to be sure, a sign of the "ripened power of judgment" of an age that will "no longer be put off with illusory knowledge."[49] Yet it is not sufficient grounds for "indifference." The same "ripened power of judgment" that led his age to treat metaphysics as a matter of "indifference" will, Kant thinks, be forced to "take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely that of self-knowledge." This, in turn, will force it to recognize that "it is pointless to affect indifference with respect to such inquiries, to whose objects human nature cannot be indifferent."[50]

Like Etienne Gilson, who said that "philosophy always buries its undertakers," Kant thought it was impossible to avoid metaphysics, no matter how much one disavowed it.[51] Even those who claimed to be "indifferent" to metaphysics would ultimately make metaphysical claims in Kant's view. "However much they may think to make themselves unrecognizable by exchanging the

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[48] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Ax).
[49] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 100-101 (Axi).
[50] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Ax).
[51] Gilson, Etienne. *The Unity of Philosophical Experience*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1999. pg. 246. It should also be noted that Gilson makes this remark in the context of a discussion of the "breakdown" of Kant's "philosophical restoration" of metaphysics and its ultimate degeneration "into the various forms of contemporary agnosticism, with all sorts of moralisms and would-be mysticisms as ready shelters against philosophical despair." Gilson thinks these "moralisms" and "would-be mysticisms" are proof that "the so-called death of philosophy" is "regularly attended by its revival," but he is by no means endorsing them.

language of the schools for a popular style," Kant says, "these so-called indifferentists, to the extent that they think anything at all, always unavoidably fal back into metaphysical assertions, which they professed so much to despise."[52] This would be true even if one were to limit the scope of what one considers "metaphysical assertions" to the subjects traditionally included in scholastic metaphysics. One makes "metaphysical assertions" as soon as one thinks or says anything at all, because any thought or any determinate claim about any "thing" presupposes that the thing in question exists, that it is not contradictory, that has a cause, and so forth. The same holds true when one extends one's conception of "metaphysical assertions" to Kant's "critical" philosophy. In order to think about any "object" or to have any "experience," one must presuppose the possibility of "objects" and "experience." In so doing, one relies on the "conditions" of their possibility, however unconsciously or implicitly. If this is true, then Kant is correct to say that would-be "indifferentists" cannot avoid "metaphysical assertions," "to the extent that they think anything at all."

The "preeminent importance" of the "objects" of metaphysics provides another reason why "indifference" to metaphysics is impossible. Kant had said metaphysics deserved its "title of honor" as "the queen of all the sciences" because of the "preeminent importance" of its "objects."[53] He goes further in his refutation of "indifferentism," saying that metaphysics is an inquiry "to whose object human nature cannot be indifferent" (*deren Gegenstand der menschlichen Natur nicht Gleichgültig kann*).[54] It may be the case that human reason cannot be indifferent to the "object" (*Gegenstand*) of metaphysics because it belongs to the "nature" (*Natur*) of human reason to "rise even higher, to more remote conditions," as Kant had suggested in his discussion of the "peculiar fate" of human

[52] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Ax).
[53] Critique of Pure Reason, pg. 99 (Aix).
[54] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Ax).

reason. This would imply that human reason is compelled to consider metaphysical questions, but it would not prove that "true and lasting welfare of the human race depends on metaphysics" as Kant claimed in his April 8, 1766 letter to Moses Mendelssohn.[55] The "obscurity and contradiction" into which human reason falls as a result of its "natural" proclivity for metaphysics, as well as the "endless controversies" that result from its"perplexity," would suggest that metaphysics is harmful to human nature, even if it is, in fact, entirely "natural." Against this suggestion, Kant argues that "indifferentism" is "a phenomenon deserving our attention and reflection" precisely because it occurs "amid the flourishing of all sciences" and is "directed precisely at those sciences whose results (if such are to be had at all) we could least do without."[56] He therefore maintains the same view he had expressed in letter to Mendelssohn: The "true and lasting welfare of the human race" depends on metaphysics. We cannot afford to be "indifferent" to metaphysics, because its "objects" (*Gegenstandes*) and "results" (*Kenntnisse*) are essential for our well-being as human beings.

The decision regarding the possibility of the "objects" and "results" of metaphysics, the demonstration that they will extricate metaphysics from the "position of contempt" into which it has fallen, and the proof of the "preeminent importance" of metaphysics for human reason are the difficult but important tasks that Kant sets for his "critique" of pure reason. They are not, however, sufficient to explain why Kant identified that "critique" with a "court of justice." His reasons for doing so will the subject of the remainder of this section.

A COURT OF JUSTICE

Kant thought the "ripened power of judgment" of his age would eventually lead it beyond "indifferentism." Sooner or later, he thought, human reason would have to recognize that it was

[55] *Kant to Mendelssohn*, 04.08.1766, pg. 90 (X:70).
[56] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Ax).

"pointless to affect indifference with respect to such inquiries, to whose object human nature cannot be indifferent."[57] No longer willing to be "put off with illusory knowledge," human reason would be inspired to "take on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely that of self-knowledge."[58] In order to do so, Kant thought it would have to institute "a court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and this not by mere decrees, but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws."[59]

Kant's identification of "the critique of pure reason itself" (*die Critick der reinen Vernunft selbst*) with this "court of justice" (*Gerichtshof*) is, to a certain extent, overdetermined by his discussions of the "peculiar fate" of human reason and its consequences for metaphysics, as well as his indictments of dogmatism, skepticism, and indifferentism.[60] While it would be a mistake to overemphasize the purely "literary" character of these discussions, it would also be a mistake to overlook the way in which they contextualize Kant's identification of "critique" of pure reason with a "court of justice." The figures he employs have a great deal to contribute to a properly "philosophical" understanding of the "critique" of pure reason.[61] Unless one takes them into consideration, one will not be able to understand what Kant means when he calls his "critique" a "court of justice." Nor will one be able to determine the purpose that Kant intended his "critique" of pure reason to serve.

Kant's discussion of the loss of the "title of honor" (*Ehrennahmen*) of metaphysics, for

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[57] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 100 (Ax).
[58] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 100-101 (Axi).
[59] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axi).
[60] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axi-xii).
[61] Although I have serious doubts regarding his claim that Kant's "critique" is to be understood as "a self-sufficient literary genre," Willi Goetschel offers a helpful introduction to the "literary" and "metaphorical" aspects of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. See Goetschel, Willi. *Constituting Critique: Kant's Writing as Critical Praxis*. Translated by Eric Schwab. Durham: Duke University Press, 1994. pp. 114-143.

instance, makes it very clear that he did not think of the "critique" of pure reason as a "critique" of dogmatism or skepticism. Kant saw no need for a "critique" of dogmatism or skepticism, because he did not think skepticism could be considered "a serious view that has been current in any period of philosophy."[62] Because skeptics "abhor all permanent cultivation of the soil," their views are unprincipled and represent no determinate philosophical position. If they are of any value at all, it is only as "a challenge to the dogmatists, to demonstrate those *a priori* principles on which the very possibility of experience depends."[63] Kant thought dogmatism was incapable of responding to skeptical challenges, because he thought the "legislation" (*Gesetzgebung*) of the dogmatists was "despotic" (*despotisch*). It was "despotic" because it did not recognize the "lawfulness" (*Rechtmäßigkeit*) of any of the "competing claims" that were made in the "endless controversies" concerning metaphysics. As a result, the "rule" of the dogmatists degenerated into "internal wars" (*innere Kriege*), before collapsing into "complete anarchy" (*völlige Anarchie*). The failure of the dogmatists to establish a consistent "legal" (*rechtmäßig*) basis for their "administration" (*Verwaltung*) was for Kant sufficient proof that they had no "rightful claims" (*gerechten Ansprüchen*) on reason.

Because they had no "rightful" claim on reason, Kant did not think there was any need to secure reason's "rightful claims" from either dogmatism or skepticism. His discussions of the "peculiar fate" of human reason and the impossibility of "indifferentism" show that Kant intended his "critique" to secure the "rightful claims" of human reason from reason itself. His discussion of the "peculiar fate" of human reason explains how he thought reason had fallen into "obscurity and contradiction" in its attempt to address the "even higher, more remote conditions" of metaphysics.

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[62] *What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff*, pg. 356 (XX:263).
[63] *What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff*, pg. 356 (XX:263).

Kant then tried to compel human reason to discover the "source" of its "errors" in his discussion of "indifferentism," so that metaphysics could be freed from the "endless controversies" that had made it a "battlefield." He insisted that human reason could not be "indifferent" to this task and urged it to institute a "court of justice," which would distinguish the "rightful claims" *(gerechten Ansprüchen)* of human reason from its "groundless pretensions" (*grundlose Anmaßungen*). As a "critique" of pure reason, Kant thought this "court" would be able to reach a decision about "the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general" and determine "its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all, however, from principles."[64] This, in turn, would help reason achieve "the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge."[65]

Some readers might think it curious that Kant ties reason's "self-knowledge" so closely to metaphysics."Self-knowledge" is often seen as a more "personal" philosophical concern, one which is fundamentally opposed to the more "abstract" and "speculative" questions metaphysics is intended to answer. Kant, however, saw the relationship between metaphysics and self-knowledge rather differently. He thought metaphysics was necessary, not only to determine the "origin," "extent," and "boundaries" of the human reason, but also to affirm the "freedom" (*Freiheit*) and "dignity" (*Würde*) of the human person. Kant's investigations of the "proper method of metaphysics" (*die eigentliche Methode der Metaphysic*) and his attempts to distinguish that "method" from the "erroneous judgments" (*Verkehrtheit im Urtheilen*) and "mistaken procedures" (*unrichtigen Verfahren*) which were to be found in the works of his contemporaries might have been motivated by purely theoretical concerns, but he did not neglect its practical and moral implications,

[64] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).
[65] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).

or the unacceptable moral consequences of "erroneous judgments" and "mistaken procedures."[66] Because he thought "the true and lasting welfare of the human race depends on metaphysics," Kant could not abide "the inflated arrogance of whole volumes full of what are passed off nowadays as insights."[67] "The fancies and unintelligible notions that infect their rational foundations and undermine their value" elicited "repugnance" (*Wiederwillen*) from Kant "and even a certain hatred" (*einigem Hasse*), proving that his humanistic concern for metaphysics was affective as well as rational.[68]

One can find "juridical" turns of phrase in many of Kant's "pre-critical" works. The distinction between what happens in fact (*de facto*) and what happens by right (*de iure*) is one which Kant seems always to have respected. He was likewise consistent in his concern for the "ground" (*Grund*), the "right" (*Recht*), and "validity" (*Gültigkeit*) of philosophical claims. The "juridical" terms that Kant employs in the 'Preface' to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are, however, both novel and significant. They show that Kant was not content to simply assert reason's "rightful claims" by "mere decrees" (*Machtsprüche*). He committed himself to securing reason's "rightful claims" (*gerechten Ansprüchen*) and establishing the "possibility" of metaphysics in a way that was both more "lawful" (*rechtmäßig*) and more "republican" (*republikanisch*) in the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

The "mere decrees" (*Machtsprüche*) that Kant disavows in his 'Preface' could also be called "executive orders" or "sovereign declarations."[69] If these "decrees" are valid, it is not because of the legitimacy of the assembly which legislated them. Nor is it because of their form, whose

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[66] *Kant to Lambert, 12.31.1765*, pg. 82 (X:56).
[67] *Kant to Mendelssohn, 04.08.1766*, pg. 90 (X:70).
[68] *Kant to Mendelssohn, 04.08.1766*, pg. 90 (X:70).
[69] Guyer and Wood's decision to translate *Machtsprüche* as "mere decrees" in their translation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* neglects the most important part of Kant's comment, which implies that "mere decrees" are established by force *(Macht)*. For this reason, I find Kemp Smith's translation of *Machtsprüche* as "despotic decrees" vastly preferable to the "neutralization" of *Macht* that takes place in Guyer and Wood's translation.

universality, Kant says, makes the categorical imperative "fit to be a law."[70] "Decrees" (*Machtsprüche*) are only valid because of the "force" (*Macht*) that stands behind them. That this "force" is the force of arms (*Waffengewalt*) and not the force of law (*Gesetzkraft*) is evident from the 'Discipline of Pure Reason,' where Kant argues that "assertions and claims" (*Behauptungen und Ansprüche*) made by "decree" can only be made "valid or secure" (*geltend, sichern*) by "war" (*Krieg*).[71]

Reason goes to "war" when it lacks any other means of justifying its claims. Without the benefit of the "court of justice" of the "critique" of pure reason, Kant says, human reason is left in a state of nature. Kant follows Hobbes when he calls the state of nature "a state of injustice and violence" (*ein Stand des Unrechts und der Gewalttätigkeit*), in which human reason is only able to secure its claims through "victory" (*Sieg*).[72] The "peace" that it wins through "victory" nevertheless remains "uncertain" (*unsicher*). Because no "victory" is ever decisive, the "victor" is still "exposed to the enemy."[73] "Each can take advantage of the exposure of his enemy," Kant says, "so there follows for the most part only an uncertain peace" (*auf den mehrenteils ein nur unsicherer Friede folgt*).[74] The "uncertain peace" of "victory" leaves reason in the same lawless state as it began, the threat of endless war denying it any enjoyment of the peace it has won.

The "critique" of pure reason does not set out to achieve "victory." Nor does it attempt to

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[70] *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, pg. 81 (IV:431). Kant says the "universality" which belongs to the "form" of the moral law is also to be found in the "laws of nature," so he claims that "the ground of all practical lawgiving lies (in accordance with the first principle) objectively in the rule and the form of universality which makes it fit to be a law (possibly a law of nature)." The form of the moral law nevertheless contains two elements which are not to be found in the "form" of the laws of nature. The form of the moral law is "stripped of any admixture of the sensible" as well as "any spurious adornments of reward or self-love." See *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, pg. 77 (IV:426).
[71] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 649 (A751/B779).
[72] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 649 (A751/B779).
[73] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 649 (A751/B779).
[74] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 649 (A751/B779).

secure reason's "rightful claims" by the "force" of its "decrees." Kant thinks the "critique" of pure reason will raise human reason out of the "state of nature," allowing it "the peace of a state of law" and "the freedom to exhibit the thoughts and doubts which one cannot resolve oneself for public judgment, without thereupon being decried as a malcontent and a dangerous citizen."[75] Because it is able to voice its concerns in such a "civil" manner, Kant thinks reason will also be able to settle its disputes in a more "judicious" fashion. With its "critical" court, reason will be able resolve the "endless controversies" of metaphysics, by rendering a just "verdict" (*Sentenz*) according to "due process" (*als durch Prozeß*).[76] Because this "due process" responds to "the origin of the controversies themselves" and draws its conclusions from the "ground-rules" of reason's own constitution," Kant says, "it must secure perpetual peace" (*weil sie hier die Quelle der Streitigkeiten selbst trifft, einen ewigen Frieden gewähren muß*).[77]

When one compares the "perpetual peace" (*ewigen Frieden*) that is won through the "critique" of pure reason and the "uncertain peace" (*ein nur unsicherer Friede*) that is afforded by "victory," the value of Kant's "critical" court is clear. Kant thinks the "justice" of the "critical" court's "verdict" guarantees reason the "peace" (*Ruhe*) and "freedom" (*Freiheit*) it deserves, because it justifies its claims by "right" (*Recht*) and not by "force" (*Macht*). While the balance of power (*Kräftverhältnis, Machtbalance*) might shift, robbing one party of a "victory" it had claimed in one "controversy" or another, the "legislation" (*Gesetzgebung*) of the "critique" of pure reason is both "universal" and "necessary." The "peace" and "freedom" that it affords to reason are, therefore, "perpetual" (*ewig*). Even if reason has doubts or questions, makes mistakes or disagrees with itself,

[75] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 650 (A752/B780).
[76] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 650 (A752/B780).
[77] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 650 (A752/B780).

it is able to avoid controversy and conflict, because it possesses institutions and procedures with which to deal these disturbances.

It should, however, be noted that Kant's "critical" court has to appeal to a very special body of law (*Gesetz*) in order to bring about the "perpetual peace" of human reason. Kant insisted that the "rightful claims" of reason were to be secured by the "eternal and unchangeable laws" (*ewigen und unwandelbaren Gesetzen*) of reason itself. He no doubt thought these "eternal and unchangeable laws" possessed the "inner necessity" and the "true universality" that were required of metaphysical principles, as well as the clarity and certainty that distinguish "pure" principles from "empirical" principles. Because they consider the "sources" (*Quelle*) of reason's "controversies," Kant thinks judgments from these laws also possess a special kind of "right." This "right" follows from what Kant calls "the original right of human reason, which recognizes no other judge than universal human reason itself, in which everyone has a voice."[78] Human reason "recognizes no other judge than universal human reason itself," according to Kant, because it "derives all decisions from the ground-rules of its own constitution."[79] By following the judgments of the "critical" court, Kant says, human reason judges "in accordance with the principles of its primary institution."[80]

The return of the "title of honor" (*Ehrennahmen*) of metaphysics as well as its "authority" (*Autorität*) as "the queen of all the sciences" depend on the lawfulness (*Rechtmäßigkeit*) of its rule (*Herrschaft*). While Kant characterizes this rule in monarchical terms in the 'Preface,' it is important to note the republican imagery that he employs in the 'Discipline of Pure Reason.' Because it is founded on "laws" which derive from the "primary institution" of human reason and because

[78] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 650 (A752/B780).
[79] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 649 (A751/B779).
[80] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 649 (A751/B779).

"everyone has a voice" in that institution, the "court of justice" that Kant identifies with the "critique" of pure reason is an expression of the "autonomy" of human reason, the "freedom" of its "ripened power of judgment," and the "equality" of competing claims before the law.

Because it does not have the right to simply "assert" (*behaupten*) or "declare" (*angeben, ausrufen*) what the law will be, the "critical" court that Kant institutes does not possess the "absolute" power of a monarchy. It can only appeal to the distinctively republican authority of a law that is consistent with its own "original institution" and derives from the "constitutive power" of the people. For that reason, the 'First Definitive Article for Perpetual Peace' that Kant announces in *Towards Perpetual Peace* (1795) could very well be applied to the "critique" of pure reason itself: "A constitution established, first on principles of the freedom of the members of a society (as individuals), second on principles of the dependence of all upon a single common legislation (as subjects), and third on the law of their equality (as citizens of a state)–the sole constitution that issues from the idea of the original contract on which all rightful legislation must be based–is a republican constitution."[81] The "critical" court that Kant announces would then be the constitutional court of the republic of pure reason, a republic in which philosophy might finally enjoy "perpetual peace."[82]

5.3: THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON AS A SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

Kant abandons almost entirely the political imagery that figured so prominently in the

[81] See *Toward Perpetual Peace*, pg. 322 (VIII:349-350).
[82] It is both curious and unfortunate that Kant makes no reference to "republicanism" in his *Proclamation of the imminent conclusion of a treaty of perpetual peace in philosophy* (1796), though this could, perhaps, be explained by the polemical interests guiding that work.

'Preface' to the first (A) edition in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition.[1] In place of Kant's discussions of metaphysics as "the queen of all the sciences," the failures of the "administration" of the "dogmatists," the "insurrection" of the skeptics, the contradictions of "indifferentism," and the identification of the "critique" of pure reason with a "court of justice," one finds in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition the rhetoric of scientific revolution. Kant now says that the "critique" of pure reason is "an attempt to transform the accepted procedure of metaphysics," declaring that this transformation will bring about "an entire revolution" in metaphysics.[2] By following "the example of the geometers and natural scientists," Kant says, it will finally set metaphysics on the "sure path of science" (*sicherer weg der Wissenschaft*). In the process, the "critique" of pure reason will not only "catalog the entire outline of the science of metaphysics, both in respect of its boundaries and in respect of its internal structure," but it will also "measure" (*wählt*) the capacity (*Vermögen*) of pure speculative reason (*reinen speculativen Vernunft*) "according to the different ways for choosing objects of its thinking" and "completely enumerate" (*vollständig vorzählen*) all of the "manifold ways of putting problems before itself," laying a solid foundation for "a whole system of metaphysics."[3]

In what follows, I will examine the relation between the "critique" of pure reason and the "scientific" revolution in metaphysics that Kant describes. Here again the context of the discussion will play a significant role, altering the conventional, scholarly view of some of Kant's most important claims. Kant's understanding of the relation between metaphysics and the sciences, his

[1] The image of the "critique" of pure reason as a "court of justice" remains in the 'Discipline of Pure Reason,' which Kant did not alter in the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant also refers to a "judge" at one point in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition, which will be noted in what follows.
[2] *Critique of Pure Reason,* pg. 113 (Bxxii).
[3] *Critique of Pure Reason,* pg. 113 (Bxxii-xxiii).

plans to set metaphysics on the "sure path" of a science, the hypothetical and experimental status of the "Copernican" revolution, and the relation between the "critical" philosophy and the "dogmatism" of rationalist metaphysics will all be shown to be quite different than they are usually presented in the scholarly literature. By developing my analysis of Kant's "scientific" revolution in metaphysics with an eye to these issues, I hope to shed new light on the nature and function of his "critique" and confirm that Kant intended the "critique" of pure reason as a work on the "proper method" of metaphysics, one which was not only consistent with his "pre-critical" experiments in metaphysics, but which also retained a fundamentally rationalist approach to the subject.

METAPHYSICS AND THE SCIENCES

The relationship between the "critique" of pure reason and the sciences that Kant discusses at the beginning of the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is to a certain extent prefigured by his *Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as a science* (1783) and his *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (1786). Both works appeared between the publication of the first (A) and second (B) editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Each dealt with the relationship between metaphysics and the sciences, albeit in different ways.

Kant intended the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* to be a serious contribution to the philosophy of nature, one which would provide the sciences of phoronomy, dynamics, mechanics, and phenomenology with their metaphysical foundations.[4] In the process, it would begin the transition from the "critique" of pure reason to the metaphysics of nature, which Kant considered

[4] *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, pg. 191 (IV:477).

to be the next step in the elaboration of his "system."[5] He had very different aims in the *Prolegomena*, which was supposed to present a more popular and accessible account of the "critical" philosophy. His objective in the *Prolegomena* was, Kant says, "to convince all of those who find it worthwhile to occupy themselves with metaphysics that it is unavoidably necessary to suspend their work for the present, to consider all that has happened until now as if it had not happened, and before all else to pose the question: *whether such a thing as metaphysics is even possible at all*.[6] In the course of answering this question, Kant points out that metaphysics must be possible, if "pure mathematics" and "pure natural science" are to be possible, because "pure mathematics" and "pure natural science" are both made possible by metaphysics.[7] Kant then uses the actuality of "pure mathematics" and "pure natural science" to demonstrate the possibility of metaphysics, before arguing that metaphysics is itself made possible "as a science"by the "critique" of pure reason.[8]

The discussion of the sciences in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* has more in common with the discussion of "the possibility of pure mathematics" and "the possibility of pure natural science" in the *Prolegomena* than it does with the principles of the metaphysics of nature that are to be found in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*.[9] As in the *Prolegomena*, the discussion of the sciences in the 'Preface' is related to a discussion of the "possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general" and the necessity of the "critique" of pure reason. Instead of showing how the possibility of the sciences depends upon metaphysics, however, Kant contrasts the scientific achievements of logic, mathematics, and natural science with the

[5] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 696-699 (A841/B869-A847/B875). The problems which Kant faced in achieving the "transition" from the "critical" philosophy to the metaphysics of nature are detailed in Förster, Eckart. *Kant's Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus Postumum*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. pp. 1-23.
[6] *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, pg. 53 (IV:255).
[7] *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, pp. 70-71, 77-82, 89-90 (IV:275, 280-286, 294-296)
[8] *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, pg. 70, 154-160 (IV:274-275, 365-372).
[9] *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, pp. 187-188 (IV:472-473).

scientific failures of metaphysics in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*.[10]

By showing that logic, mathematics, and natural science were already sciences, and, at least in the case of logic and mathematics, had been since antiquity, Kant is able to drive home the need for a scientific revolution in metaphysics. Kant maintains that metaphysics is "older than all the other sciences" and claims that it "would remain even if all the others were swallowed up by an all-consuming barbarism," but he does not think it has advanced beyond "a mere groping, and what is the worst, a groping among mere concepts."[11] Kant insists that the time has come to bring this "restless striving" to an end, and finally set metaphysics on the "sure path" of science.[12]

Kant asks a number of rhetorical questions about the possibility of a scientific metaphysics in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, but he does not appear to have had any real doubts about its ability to meet the challenge issued to it by the sciences. Nor did Kant think metaphysics had anything to fear from the most recent scientific revolution, namely, the "revolution" in the natural sciences.[13] While many of his contemporaries argued that metaphysics had little left to offer after the appearance of the "new science," Kant remained committed to the "priority" of metaphysics and the attempt to discover its "proper method." His own attempts to determine the "proper procedure" and "specific criterion" of metaphysics makes it perfectly clear that the ambitious program for a "transformation in the whole procedure of metaphysics" which follows Kant's questions about the possibility of a scientific metaphysics is entirely in keeping with his understanding of the philosophical problems of the age.

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[10] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 106-100 (Bviii-Bxvi).
[11] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxv).
[12] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxv).
[13] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxv).

THE SURE PATH OF A SCIENCE

The comparison between metaphysics and the sciences that one finds in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of *the Critique of Pure Reason* issues a challenge to metaphysics, demanding that it finally become more than "a mere groping, and, what is worst, a groping among mere concepts."[14] In order to meet this challenge, Kant thought metaphysics would have to undergo a complete transformation. A scientific "revolution" would have to take place in metaphysics, just as it had taken place in mathematics and the natural sciences.

Instead of presenting metaphysics with a set of "revolutionary" demands, Kant begins with a short history of the sciences, in which he defines the conditions that allowed each of them to set off on the "sure path" of science. Logic was the first to "travel the secure course" of a science, according to Kant, because it had the easiest and most certain path to follow.[15] "Since the time of Aristotle," Kant says, logic "has not had to go a single step backwards, unless we count the abolition of a few dispensable subtleties or the more distinct determination of its presentation, which improvements belong more to the elegance than to the security of that science."[16] Logic owes its security as a science and the clarity of its "path" to the fact that it concerns only "the formal rules of all thinking."[17] Because it is solely concerned with the understanding and the form of its thinking, however, logic can be no more than "the outer courtyard, as it were, of the sciences."[18] Sciences like mathematics, physics, and metaphysics may resemble logic, inasmuch as they are "rational" sciences in which something "must be cognized *a priori*," but they also differ from logic, insofar as they

[14] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxv).
[15] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 106 (Bviii).
[16] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 106 (Bviii).
[17] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 106-107 (Bix).
[18] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 107 (Bix).

concern "objects" which go beyond the "formal rules" of the use of the understanding.[19]

After remarking that in logic the understanding "has to do with nothing further than itself and its own form," Kant notes "how much more difficult, naturally, it must be for reason to enter upon the secure path of a science if it does not have to do merely with itself, but has also to deal with objects too."[20] It took mathematics and natural science longer to "enter upon the secure path of a science" than logic, precisely because mathematics and natural science are "theoretical cognitions of reason" which are "supposed to determine their objects *a priori*."[21] The determination of these objects requires the understanding to consider something other than itself, even when it is determining an object entirely *a priori*. The means of achieving this determination, the determination of an object other than the understanding by the understanding entirely *a priori*, poses unique difficulties for sciences like mathematics, natural science, and metaphysics.

Kant thinks mathematics is able to determine its objects "entirely purely," while natural science is to determine them "at least in part purely but also following the standards of sources of cognition other than reason."[22] Mathematics was therefore able to make swifter progress as a science than natural science, precisely because it could determine its "objects" for itself, entirely *a priori*,

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[19] That which "goes beyond" the purely "formal" rules of the understanding is the "matter" of cognition, which Kant here calls "objects" (*Objecte*). Because "formal" logic concerns only the "forms" of thinking in general, it is incapable of addressing the "material" components of "objects" of possible experience, which Kant identifies with sensible intuition. Because Kant thinks the understanding must apply "formal" concepts to this "material" element of cognition, in order to cognize "objects" of possible experience, he thinks the understanding must appeal to a different set of categories, if it is to cognize those objects. The pure concepts of the understanding, which are the categories of Kant's "transcendental" logic, therefore go beyond the logical "forms" of judgment, which belong to general or "formal" logic, and which cannot be applied to anything other than the "form" of the thought of the understanding in general. Béatrice Longuenesse overlooks this problem in her important work *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*. As a result, she identifies the logical forms of judgment and the pure concepts of the understanding, even though the former has nothing to contribute to the judgment of the "material" component of "objects" of possible experience. See Longuenesse, Béatrice. *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Charles T. Wolfe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.

[20] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 107 (Bx).

[21] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 107 (Bx).

[22] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 107 (Bx).

by "producing" them in pure intuition. Because the properties of mathematical objects follow from the "rule" for their "construction," Kant thinks they can be derived directly from the "construction" of the "figure." And because the "construction" of the "figure" depends on nothing more than the pure forms of sensible intuition, space and time, mathematics is thus able to provide itself with a kind of cognition which is both pure and synthetic.[23] Mathematical cognition cannot be empirical, because mathematical objects are constructed in pure intuition and their properties follow from construction rule of the figure with necessity.[24] It also cannot be analytic, because Kant thinks the mathematician must construct the figure, if its properties are to be determined.[25] By constructing a mathematical figure in pure intuition, the mathematician produces and determines the properties of the mathematical object entirely *a priori*. Kant thought the discovery of this procedure had allowed "the happy inspiration of a single man" to bring about a "revolution," in mathematical thinking, so that "the road to be taken onward could no longer be missed, and the secure course of a science was entered on and prescribed for all time and to an infinite extent."[26]

Natural science had only recently become a science, in Kant's view, because it had to deal with things other than the "formal laws" of the understanding and the construction of mathematical "figures" in pure intuition. It had to do with "nature," which is something "other than" and "external to" human reason and its cognitive faculties. To take nature as an "object" of science therefore poses difficulties that one does not encounter in logic or mathematics. Yet Kant says natural science became a science by applying the same insight that had allowed logic and mathematics to become

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[23] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 108, 631 (Bxii, A715/B743-A716/B744). See also *Prolegomena*, pp. 77-80 (IV:280-284). Michael Friedman presents a very helpful reconstruction and defense of Kant's conception geometry in Friedman, Michael. *Kant and the Exact Sciences*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. pp. 55-66.
[24] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 143-144 (B14).
[25] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 144 (B15-16).
[26] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 107-108 (Bxi).

sciences. Natural science became a science when it realized that "reason has insight only into what it itself produces according to its own design."[27] Kant thought this insight was the foundation for the experimental method, which allowed natural scientists to approach their object "with its principles in one hand, according to which alone the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, in the other hand, the experiments thought out in accordance with these principles."[28]

The experimental method allowed the natural scientist to approach nature "in accordance with what reason itself puts into nature," in Kant's view, because it made natural science a matter of principles.[29] It required the natural scientist to formulate these principles beforehand and then confirm their validity by means of an experiment. He thought scientists were to behave "not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge, who compels witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them," because he did not think experiment was a matter of observation. Experiments confirm or disconfirm the validity of those principles the natural scientist claimed to be the "laws" of nature.[30] Observation alone would never allow a scientist to make such general claims, no matter how often the same phenomenon was observed, so Kant did not think natural science could become a science until it had acquired the kind of principles that would allow it make "lawful" claims about what happens universally and necessarily.

What is striking about Kant's account of the "revolution" in natural science is not only the momentary return of the "juridical" language that Kant had employed in the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The "rationalism" of his understanding of the "experimental" method is also noteworthy, particularly when it is compared with more "empiricist"

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[27] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 109 (Bxiii).
[28] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 109 (Bxiii).
[29] *Critique of Pure Reason*. Pg. 109 (Bxiv).
[30] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 109 (Bxiii).

accounts of the "revolution" in the natural sciences. The empiricists thought the "experimental" sciences took what was "given" in experience as their point of departure, and then either abstracted general principles from those experiences, or imaginatively recombined and reshaped them to form scientific theories.[31] Because he categorically rejects the "scientific" pretensions of both of these approaches, Kant's conception of the "method" that allowed the natural sciences to set off on "the sure path of science" has more in common with the "rationalism" of Galileo and Hobbes than the empiricism of Locke and Hume. For Kant, the "revolution" that made natural science a science is not the "revolution" which sought its principles in experience, but the science which approached nature with principles in mind, and then tested those principles with its "experiments."[32]

Kant thought the same model could be fruitfully applied to metaphysics, which had yet to set off on the "secure course of a science."[33] Yet he was also cognizant of the differences between natural science and metaphysics, which prevented him from applying the experimental method of natural science to metaphysics without qualification. Because Kant thought metaphysical "propositions of pure reason.... admit of no test by experiment with their objects," he argued metaphysics could only experiment with "concepts and principles."[34] If we assume these concepts and principles *a priori*, Kant says, "by arranging the latter so that the same objects can be considered from two different sides, on the one side as objects of the senses and the understanding for

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[31] See Kant's discussion of the insufficiency of empiricism for science, the context of his discussion of Locke and Hume at *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 225-226 (AA95/B127-A95/B129).
[32] One of the most significant differences between the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition is Kant' rehabilitation of the use of hypotheses in science in the 'Preface' tot he second (B) edition. In the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition, Kant calls the hypothesis "a forbidden commodity, which should not be put up for sale even at the lowest price, but must be confiscated as soon as it is discovered," while he describes the "Copernican" Revolution as a hypothesis in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 102, 110, 113 (Axv, Bxvi, Bxxii).
[33] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 109-110 (Bxiv-xvi).
[34] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxviii-xix).

experience, and on the other side as objects that are merely thought at most for isolated striving beyond the bounds of experience," then Kant thinks we will find "that there is agreement with the principle of pure reason when things are considered from this twofold standpoint, but that an unavoidable conflict of reason with itself arises with a single standpoint."[35] In one sense this is a thought experiment which is analogous to many of the other thought experiments that are to be found in the history of early modern science.[36] It is, however, an experiment that is solely concerned with concepts and principles and the conditions of their agreement with one another and with experience. To that extent, it is noticeably different from natural scientific experiments, which are concerned with empirical principles and their place in experience.

Kant describes another metaphysical experiment in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, one for which he is rightly famous. What has come to be known as Kant's "Copernican revolution in metaphysics" is not, in itself, the "revolution" that will finally set metaphysics on the "sure path" of science. It is, in fact, an experiment in metaphysics. Kant presents the results of this experiment "merely as a hypothesis" in his 'Preface,' but he believes they will be "proved not hypothetically but rather apodictically from the constitution of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding" in "the treatise itself."[37] In order to understand how this is possible and how it is to make metaphysics a science, it will be worthwhile to examine more closely the experiment which lies at the heart of Kant's "Copernican revolution."

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[35] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxviii-xix).
[36] Thought experiments played a crucial role in the development of early modern science and contemporary philosophy. See Brown, James Robert. *The Laboratory of the Mind: Thought Experiments in the Natural Sciences.* New York: Routledge, 1993. On the role of thought experiments in contemporary analytic philosophy, see Sorenson, Roy A. *Thought Experiments*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
[37] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 113 (Bxxii).

THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION AS AN EXPERIMENT IN METAPHYSICS

The experiment with which Kant proposes to set metaphysics on the “sure path” of science runs directly contrary to the methodological assumptions he attributes to "traditional" metaphysics. According to Kant, metaphysics has always assumed “that all our cognition must conform to the objects.”[38] Because he thinks every attempt to reach an understanding of the “objects” of metaphysics according to this method has “come to nothing,” Kant recommends the opposite assumption as a new experimental hypothesis for metaphysics. In order to see whether metaphysics might "get farther" (*besser Fortkommen*) than it did when it assumed that "all our cognition must conform to the objects," Kant assumes that "objects must conform to our cognition.”[39] He even compares this hypothesis with "the first thoughts of Copernicus, who, when he did not make good progress in the explanation of the celestial motions if he assumed that the entire celestial host revolves around the observer, tried to see if he might not have greater success if he made the observer revolve and left the stars at rest."[40] Like the "Copernican" hypothesis, Kant's assumption appears at first to be a radical one. It seems to be contrary to common sense and to imply a number of contradictions. Yet it is also an assumption which is amazingly productive, when one considers its possible applications.

The most important of the possibilities afforded by the “Copernican” hypothesis is a method that is appropriate to and consistent with the nature of metaphysics. Kant thinks his "Copernican" hypothesis better agrees with "the requested possibility of an *a priori* cognition" of the "objects" of metaphysics than the assumptions of "traditional" metaphysics, because he thinks metaphysics must

[38] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxvi).
[39] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxvi).
[40] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxvi).

"elevate itself entirely above all instruction from experience" and attain its cognition through "concepts."[41] Kant thinks it would be inconsistent for metaphysics to derive "*a priori* cognition" of objects from the "objects" themselves, because all cognition of objects must be derived *a posteriori* from experience, if our cognition is to "conform" (*richten*) to the object.[42] The "traditional" hypothesis therefore excludes the possibility of the "pure" rational cognition with which metaphysics is concerned, because it attempts to derive *a priori* cognition *a posteriori* from experience. Because the "Copernican" hypothesis would have to "establish something about objects before they are given to us," if it were to assume that objects must "conform" to our cognition, Kant thinks it is more in keeping with the nature of metaphysics.[43] Even if it could only establish that it is in principle possible for the "objects" with which metaphysics is concerned to "conform" to our cognition, then it has established something about those objects *a priori*, which could not be established *a priori* by the "traditional" hypothesis. For this reason, Kant thinks a great deal more can be expected from the "Copernican" hypothesis than from the assumptions which have left metaphysics "groping among mere concepts."

Kant tests the "Copernican" hypothesis by applying it to both intuitions (*Anschauungen*) and concepts (*Begriffe*). When the "Copernican" hypothesis is applied to intuition, it reveals that intuition can provide no *a priori* cognition of objects, if it is made to conform "to the constitution of objects."[44] If the intuition of an object, as an object of the senses, can be said to "conform to the constitution of our faculty of cognition," however, Kant says "I can very well represent this

[41] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxvi).
[42] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxvi).
[43] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxvi).
[44] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxvii).

possibility to myself," namely, the possibility of *a priori* cognition of objects of the senses.[45] This is only reasonable, because nothing could be given through the senses, if we did not already possess a faculty of sensible intuition *(Anschauungsvermögens)*.[46] The possibility (*Möglichkeit*) of sensible intuition (*sinnliche Anschauung*) is determined by that faculty (*Vermögen*), so the faculty must precede any actual sensible intuition which is given in experience. Knowledge of this faculty and the pure "forms" it imposes on sensible intuition may be considered a kind of *a priori* cognition, because they must precede anything which is actually given in experience. This faculty can even be said to make our "receptivity" to what is given in sensible intuition possible, insofar as it determines the formal conditions under which sensible intuition may be "given."

More fundamental than faculty of intuition, however, is the understanding (*Verstand*) and its "concepts" (*Begriffe*).[47] The faculty of intuition is, for Kant, dependent upon the faculty of the understanding, because sensible intuition is not sufficient to determine the "objects" which are given in experience. Intuitions must therefore be referred "as representations" (*als Vorstellungen*) to something "as their object" (*als Gegenstand*) by the understanding.[48] To do this, however, Kant thinks we must assume "either that the concepts through which I bring about this determination also conform to the objects" or else "that the objects, or what is the same thing, the *experience*, in which

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[45] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 110 (Bxvii).

[46] The use of the word "faculty" to translate the German *Vermögen* has been the source of a number of confusions regarding Kant's epistemology. A "faculty" is often thought to be a "part" of the mind, because this is how the term is supposed to have been used in "faculty" psychology. In Kant, however, the idea of a "faculty" *(Vermögen*) should be understood etymologically. Just as the English word "faculty" is derived from the French *faculté* (power, ability), which is, in turn derived from the Latin *facultas* (power, ability), the German *Vermögen* is derived from the word for "possibility" *(Möglichkeit*). A more appropriate translation of Kant's *Vermögen* might be "capacity," because this would at least preserve the equivalence of the German terms *Vermögen* and *Fähigkeit*, which best preserves the role that *Vermögen* plays in Kant's epistemology. I would suggest similar translations for Wolff and Baumgarten, who have a more "capacity" oriented psychology than is usually acknowledged, but that is beyond the scope of the present work.

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[48] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 110-111 (Bxvii).

alone they can be cognized (as given objects) conforms to those concepts."[49] On the first assumption, the assumption that concepts must conform to objects, Kant says that we encounter the same difficulty we faced when we assumed that intuitions must conform to objects. This assumption makes any *a priori* cognition of objects, and thus any metaphysics impossible, because it requires us to derive our concepts of objects from the objects themselves.[50] On the second assumption, however, the assumption that objects and experiences must conform to concepts, if they are to be cognized "as given objects," Kant thinks we can "immediately see an easier way out of the difficulty, since experience itself is a kind of cognition requiring the understanding."[51] The "pure" concepts of the understanding must, in other words, precede the "givenness" of the object, because they are necessary for the cognition of the object. The understanding and its concepts are, therefore, the conditions of the possibility of all experience and of every possible "object" of experience.

The proof that all cognition pertaining to experience requires the understanding can, Kant thinks, be seen in the necessity with which I must presuppose this understanding "in myself, before any object is given to me, hence *a priori*."[52] In order to "understand" an object, Kantthinks I must possess a "concept" of it. Because that concept must precede the "object," it may be considered a kind of *a priori* cognition, which functions as a rule "to which all objects of experience must therefore necessarily conform, and with which they must agree."[53] Even the "objects" of the senses must agree with this rule, if they are to be considered "objects," because sensible intuition does not, by itself, possess the concepts which are necessary for our "experience" of objects. When considered

[49] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxvii).
[50] Kant rejected this approach in his 1772 letter to Herz. See *Kant to Herz*, 02.21.2772, pg. 133 (X:130).
[51] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxvii).
[52] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxvii).
[53] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxvii).

in themselves, Kant thinks sensible intuition contains merely a manifold of intuitions, which are distributed in a certain fashion in space, and according to a particular temporal sequence.[54] They must therefore be "referred" to objects by means of a concept, if they are to possess the unity and continuity necessary for the cognition of an "object."[55] The spontaneity of the understanding and the priority of its concepts must therefore serve as the conditions of the possibility of sensible intuition and all other determinations of "objects" of possible experience.[56] The insights gained from the application of the "Copernican" hypothesis to intuitions and concepts demonstrate the possibility of metaphysics, because they confirm that "we can cognize of things *a priori* only what we have put into them." Just as mathematics constructs its "objects" in pure intuition and natural science presupposes the principles which guide its experiments, metaphysics possesses *a priori* principles that determine the conditions of the possibility of any "object" of possible experience. Instead of deriving these principles from the "objects" themselves, metaphysics generates them from the "faculties" of sensible intuition and the understanding. The pure forms of intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding serve as the "forms" of possible experience, because "sensible objects" must "received" by the faculty of sensible intuition and subsumed under the pure forms of intuition. They must then be related "as representations" to concepts, which provide them with the unity and continuity necessary for "objects" of possible experience. Because these are the conditions of the possibility of any and all "objects" of possible experience, Kant thinks the experiment based on the "Copernican" hypothesis "succeeds as well as we could wish" and

[54] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 228-229 (A99-A100).
[55] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 224 (A92/B125-A94/B127).
[56] Heidegger famously claimed that all human knowledge is dependent on givenness in intuition, making receptivity and passivity prior to any spontaneity or activity on the part of the mind. He therefore declares Kant's conception of "transcendental" logic to be impossible. See *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, pp.14-17, 170-171 (§4, §45). Kant maintains the opposite view, namely, that the possibility of givenness is dependent on the activity and spontaneity of the understanding. See *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 230-234 (A103-A110).

"promises to metaphysics the secure course of a science in its first part, where it concerns itself with concepts *a priori* to which the corresponding objects appropriate to them can be given in experience."[57]

With respect to a "second" part of metaphysics, however, the experiment based on the "Copernican" hypothesis produces what Kant calls "a very strange result, and one that appears very disadvantageous to the whole purpose with which the second part of metaphysics concerns itself."[58] Kant is, of course, referring to practical philosophy when he refers to the "second" part of metaphysics and distinguishes it from the "first," theoretical part. The "strange result" to which he refers is the "check" (*Gegenprobe*) the experiment sets on the extension of metaphysical principles "beyond the bounds of possible experience."[59] By showing that "objects, insofar as they are thought merely through reason... cannot be given in experience at all," the experiment shows that metaphysics cannot "give" itself objects, simply by thinking them.[60] This is significant, because it defines the "boundaries" (*Grenzen*) of our understanding and the limits (*Schranken*) of our capacity to determine "objects" (*Objecte*) of possible experience. Metaphysics must not be expected to determine "objects" of possible "experience" through pure reason alone, because Kant thinks it inevitably contradicts itself, when it attempts to extend its determinations of objects beyond the "bounds" of possible experience.

Kant explains the reasons for this "contradiction" in a footnote. While the "pure" concepts of the understanding are necessary for thinking of any "object," demonstrating the necessity of the possibility of "thinking" an object of possible "experience,"Kant does not think "thinking" is

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[57] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxviii-xix).
[58] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 112 (Bxix).
[59] Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 111-112 (B
[60] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxviii).

sufficient to determine that object by itself. When objects can be considered "in a twofold manner" (*aus jenem doppelte Gesichtspunkte*) as both "objects of the senses and understanding" (*Gegenstände der Sinne und des Verstandes*) and "objects that are merely thought" (*Gegenstände, die man bloß denkt*)), Kant thinks "there is agreement with the principle of pure reason."[61] He then claims that "an unavoidable conflict of reason with itself arises" when an object is considered from "a single standpoint" (*bei einerlei Gesichtspunkte*), so that objects which are purely "objects of the senses and the understanding" or "objects that are merely thought" are impossible, when considered in themselves, apart from the one another.[62] This means that every object of possible experience must be able to be thought and as every object of thought must be an object of possible experience. The idea that an object of possible experience could not be thought is obviously absurd, because the object in question would have to be logically impossible, in order to be unthinkable. No object of possible experience can be logically impossible, so the correspondence of "objects of the senses and the understanding" and "objects that are merely thought" makes sense. The requirement that every object of thought be an object of possible experience is, however, more troublesome, as it suggests that nothing can be thought determinately, unless it can also be given in experience. Because he thinks this is, in fact, the case, Kant expects the understanding to respect the "boundaries of possible experience" (*die Grenze möglicher Erfahrung*) and the "limits" (*Schranken*) of its ability to determine "objects" through pure reason.[63]

The "boundaries of possible experience" that Kant identifies when he applies the "Copernican" hypothesis to the *a priori* cognitions of reason seem to pose a threat to practical

[61] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxviii-xix).
[62] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 111 (Bxviii-xix).
[63] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 111-113 (Bxviii-Bxxii).

philosophy, because they seem to exclude the possibility of determining the will purely intellectually, through pure practical reason.[64] In order for the will to be determined by pure practical reason, Kant thinks that reason must be able to determine itself in a way that is entirely independent of sensible intuition or inclination. Because Kant says reason necessarily contradicts itself, whenever it attempts to go beyond the bounds of possible experience and determine itself without reference to sensible intuition, he must show that pure practical reason does not fall into the same contradiction. Kant has various ways of addressing this problem in his practical philosophy, most of which follow from the demonstration of the possibility of freedom in the 'Antinomy of Pure Reason.' Although the arguments of the 'Antinomy' show that it is indeed possible for human reason to determine "the transcendent rational concept of the unconditioned, in such a way as to reach beyond the boundaries of all possible experience, in accordance with the wishes of metaphysics," Kant insists that this "determination" is only possible "from a practical standpoint."[65] It is impossible for "speculative" philosophy or the "first," theoretical part of metaphysics to determine its "objects" in the same way.

For that reason, the concept of the "unconditioned" (*das Unbedingte*) along with the concept of the "thing in itself" (*das Ding an sich*) must be excluded from the "theoretical" part of metaphysics.[66] Metaphysics must "assume that our representation of things as they are given to us does not conform to these things as they are in themselves but rather that these objects as appearances conform to our way of representing," because it is unable to determine any objects which are not also given as objects of the senses and the understanding. This excludes any cognition

[64] For the determination of the will through pure practical reason, see *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, pg. 66 (IV:412-413).
[65] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 112 (Bxxi).
[66] *Critique of Pure Reason* pg. 112 (Bxx).

the "thing in itself" from the theoretical part of metaphysics, because any cognition of an object "in itself" would have to be "unconditioned" by our cognitive faculties. We could only know such an object if pure reason could determine it as it is "in itself," because cognizing it through the pure forms of intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding would "condition" our understanding of the object, contradicting the idea of an "unconditioned" object or a "thing itself." Because Kant says reason necessarily contradicts itself when it attempts to determine objects which cannot also be given as objects of the senses and the understanding, however, the "bounds of possible experience" necessary exclude the possibility of any cognition of the "unconditioned" and of "things in themselves." The "bounds of possible experience" therefore represent an important "check" on the extension of speculative philosophy "beyond the bounds of sense" (*die Grenzen der Sinnlichkeit*), one that has important consequences for the "method" of metaphysics

When Kant says the "critique" of pure reason "consists in that attempt to transform the accepted procedure of metaphysics, undertaking an entire revolution according to the example of the geometers and natural scientists," he makes his "critique" the experiment prove the results of his "Copernican" hypothesis "apodictically from the constitution of our representations of space and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding."[67] The fact that he characterizes the "critique" of pure reason as "a treatise on method" is also important in this context. Not only does this distinguish the "critique" of pure reason from the " system" of metaphysics, which is to be based on the "critique," but it also makes it clear that Kant intended to formulate a new way of approaching metaphysics, one that was consistent with the results of his "Copernican" experiments. Once it is in possession of this "method," Kant says, metaphysics will not only be a science, it will

[67] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 113 (Bxxii).

be the only science "that has to do with objects" that will be able to "fully embrace the entire field of cognitions belonging to it and thus can complete its work and lay it down for posterity as a principal framework that can never be enlarged, since it has to do solely with principles and the limitations of their use, which are determined by the principles themselves."[68]

5.4: NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE UTILITIES

The "court of justice" that Kant describes in the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the "entire revolution" that he undertakes, in order to change the "accepted procedure" of metaphysics in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the work, are both ways of describing the origin, nature, and function of the "critique" of pure reason. Despite their differences, and the differences in the contexts in which Kant frames his conception of "critique" in his first and second 'Prefaces,' they represent a single philosophical project and a single, basic conception of a "critique" of pure reason.

I take the statement of purpose in the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition, where Kant says his "critique" is "a critique of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience, and hence the decision about the possibility or impossibility of a metaphysics in general, and the determination of its sources, as well as its extent and boundaries, all, however, from principles," to be the definitive of Kant's aims and intentions for the "critique" of pure reason.[1] Not only does this account of the aims of Kant's "critique" agree precisely with the answer to the question concerning "the ground of the relation..." that Kant had proposed in the 1772 letter to Herz in which he had first announced his "critique," but it also provides the foundation for the more ambitious program Kant lays out in the 'Preface' to the second

[68] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 14 (Bxxiii-xxiv).
[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).

(B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The discussion of the scientific "revolution" in metaphysics in that text makes the transition from the possibility (*Möglichkeit*) of metaphysics to its actuality (*Wirklichkeit*) as a "science." Yet this transition would not be possible (*Möglich*), if it had not first been demonstrated that "a metaphysics in general" were possible.

To be sure, not everyone accepted the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a demonstration of the "possibility" of "a metaphysics in general." A number of reviewers had not taken kindly to his attempt to determine the "possibility" of metaphysics with reference to "all the cognitions after which reason might strive independently of all experience."[2] They responded with very critical reviews. Instead of focusing on the methodological dimension of the "critique" and its role in establishing the "principles" which would show "a metaphysics in general" to be "possible," however, many reviewers had focused on the more specific, doctrinal claims of the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and the 'Transcendental Analytic.'[3] Kant responded in kind more often than not, explaining again and again how the 'Transcendental Aesthetic did not deny the reality of space and time.[4] He likewise insisted that Transcendental Idealism was essentially different from the "dogmatic"idealism that was to be found in Berkeley and even the "problematic" idealism of Descartes.[5] Only rarely did Kant defend the very idea of a "critique" of pure reason or the "altered method" that it proposed for metaphysics.

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[2] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 101 (Axii).
[3] C.G. Selle is a notable exception to this tendency. Selle situated his objections to the 'Transcendental Aesthetic' and 'Transcendental Analytic' within a more general objection to the possibility of *a priori* cognition and "pure" principles of metaphysics. It is also interesting to note the reduction of Kant's "universal and necessary principles" to mere "words." This review could be said to blaze a trail that Hamann, Herder, and many contemporary philosophers would follow, reducing philosophical argument to language games. See Selle's review of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, published in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, included in *Kant's Early Critics*, pp. 193-198. Interestingly, Selle's review appeared in the same issue of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* in which Kant's *An Answer to the question: What is enlightenment?* Was published in December, 1784.
[4] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 187-188 (A46/B63-A49/B66).
[5] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 326 (B274).

The 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* can be seen as an exception to this rule. There are a number of places in the second 'Preface' where Kant attempts to justify the basic approach to metaphysics that his "critique" represents ,as well as the achievements that he thinks are to be gained by establishing the "proper method" of metaphysics. To those who asked "what sort of treasure it is that we intend to leave to posterity, in the form of a metaphysics that has been purified through criticism," for example, Kant responded with a discussion of the "negative" (*negativ*) and "positive" (*positiv*) "utilities" (*Nutzen*) of the "critique" of pure reason. Because several reviewers had focused on what Kant calls the "negative utility" (*der negativ Nutzen*) of his "critique," Kant felt compelled to defend the "utility" of its "positive" accomplishments. In the process, he gave a helpful, though perhaps sometimes misleading, account of the concerns that motivated the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

Kant initially emphasizes the "negative" utility of the "critique" of pure reason, the "utility" which "teaches us never to venture with speculative reason beyond the boundaries of experience."[6] Kant himself had claimed that the "utility" of his "critique" was "only negative" in the 'Introduction' to the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where he had argued that the "critique" of pure reason was to be considered a "propadeutic" to the "system of pure reason," which Kant called "transcendental philosophy."[7] Because the claims of the "critique" could not be considered "positive" statements of the doctrine of a complete system of "transcendental philosophy," Kant had argued that the "utility" of the "critique" of pure reason must be "only negative" (*nur Negativ*) insofar as it "serves not for the amplification but only for the purification

[6] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 114 (Bxxiv).
[7] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 149 (A11/B25).

of our reason, and for keeping it free of errors."[8] Although Kant insisted that "a great deal is already won" by the merely "negative" utility of his "critique," he continued to the present the achievements of the "critique" of pure reason in "negative" terms throughout the work.[9]

Kant's comments about the "negative utility" of the "critique" of pure reason, along with his discussions of "the bounds of possible experience" and "the bounds of sense," led Christian Garve to claim that the "real purpose" of the *Critique of Pure Reason* was "to determine the limits of reason" in a review published in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* in 1783. This review, it would seem, moved Kant to qualify the purely "negative" utility he had attributed to the "critique" of pure reason in the 'Introduction' to the first (A) edition.[10] While he still acknowledges that the "negative" utility of the "critique" is, in fact, its "first" (*zuerst*) utility in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition, Kant denies that the "first usefulness" (*ihr erster Nutzung*) of the "critique" of pure reason is the only "utility" (*Nutzen*) it possesses. He goes on to discuss the "positive and very important utility" (*positivem und sehr wichtigem Nutzen*) that is to be "won" (*gewonnen*) through his "critique" in greater detail than he had in the 'Introduction.' By showing that the "first," "negative" utility of the "critique" of pure reason immediately gives way to a "positive and very important" utility, Kant hoped to prove that his "critique" had more to contribute to metaphysics than "the limits of reason." One might even go so far as to say that Kant hoped to show that the "primary" (*anfänglich*) utility

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[8] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 149 (A11/B25).
[9] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 149 (A11/B25).
[10] This claim was removed from a considerably more critical version of Garve's review that appeared a year earlier in the *Zugabe zu den Göttingischen Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen*. The review had been substantially rewritten by Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, who went on to become one of the leading empiricist critics of the "critical" philosophy. See *Kant's Early Critics*, pp. 53-58. See also Beiser, Frederick. *The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993. pp. 180-184. Garve's original review (published in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* in 1783) was more reasonable in its tone and more charitable in its presentation of the central claims of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Yet Garve does not seem to have been very sympathetic to the aims of Kant's "critique," whose "real purpose" is, he claims, "to determine the limits of reason, and its content consists in showing that reason goes beyond these limits whenever it asserts something about the actuality of any one thing." See *Kant's Early Critics*, pg. 59.

of his "critique" was "positive," even if its "first" (*zuerst*) utility was "only negative" (*nur Negativ*).

Reinhold's defense of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as an aid to morality and religion led Kant to emphasize the "positive" utility of his "critique" for the practical philosophy in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition[11] Because it makes us aware "that the principles with which speculative reason ventures beyond its boundaries do not in fact result in extending our use of reason, but rather, if one considers them more closely, inevitably result in narrowing it by threatening to extend the boundaries to sensibility, to which these principles really belong, beyond everything and so even to dislodge the use of pure (practical) reason," Kant thought the "critique" of pure reason could be said to "remove an obstacle that limits or even threatens to wipe out the practical use of reason."[12] The obstacle to which he refers is the contradiction that inevitably results when reason proceeds beyond the bounds of possible experience. By showing that this contradiction does not affect the "practical extension of pure reason" (*die praktische Erweiterung der reinen Vernunft*), Kant thinks the "critique" of pure reason preserves the possibility of "an absolutely necessary practical use of pure reason (the moral use), in which reason unavoidably extends itself beyond the boundaries of sensibility, without needing any assistance from speculative reason, but in which it must also be made secure against any counteraction from the latter, in order not to fall into contradiction with

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[11] The value of the "critique" of pure reason for reason in its "practical" employment is emphasized in the 'Canon of Pure Reason' in the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Yet even the discussion in the 'Canon of Pure Reason' treats the possibility of morality as an important effect of the "critique" of pure reason, rather than the cause motivating the enterprise. Whether Reinhold's influence and his attempts to popularize the "critical" philosophy are the sufficient reason for the change in the priority afforded to practical philosophy in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition is unclear, but it seems at least to have been involved in Kant's thinking. The influence of Reinhold on the development of the "critical" philosophy has, however, been disputed by Manfred Kuehn, who thinks that Kant's early critics had more of an effect on the elaboration of the "critical" philosophy than Reinhold. See *Kant's critical philosophy and its reception–the first five years (1781-1786)*, pp. 657-658. Karl Ameriks has argued that Reinhold's "moral" interpretation of the "critique" of reason was essential for the development of German Idealism, even if it did not exert an influence on Kant's own thought. See Ameriks, Karl. *Kant and the Fate of Autonomy: Problems in the Appropriation of the Critical Philosophy*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

[12] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 114 (Bxxiv-xxv).

itself."[13] "To deny that this service of critique is of any positive utility," Kant says, "would be as much as to say that the police are of no positive utility because their chief business is to put a stop to the violence that citizens have to fear from other citizens, so that each can carry on his own affairs in peace and safety."[14]

The discussion of the "positive" utility of the "critique" of pure reason for practical philosophy in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition is quite extensive, so much so that it often obscures Kant's discussion of the "positive" utility of the "critique" of pure reason for theoretical philosophy. This is not surprising, given the fact that Kant incorporates his discussion of the value of "the analytical part of the critique," which includes the discussion of the transcendental ideality of space and time and the distinction between appearances and things in themselves, into the defense of the "positive" utility of the "critique" of pure reason for practical philosophy.[15] These are doubtless some of the main "theoretical" contributions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Yet Kant acts as though he had come to these positions in an effort to save practical philosophy from the "unfounded groping" and "frivolous wandering" of "speculative" metaphysics.[16] Because theoretical philosophy "would have to help itself to principles that in fact reach only to objects of possible experience, and which, if they were to be applied to what cannot be an object of experience, then they would actually transform it into an appearance," Kant argues that theoretical philosophy would have to "declare all practical extension of pure reason to be impossible" if it were not strictly limited by the bounds of possible experience.[17] His rhetoric is so extreme that some readers have taken Kant

[13] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 114-115 (Bxxv).
[14] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 115 (Bxxv).
[15] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 115-116 (Bxxvi-xxix).
[16] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 117 (Bxxx-xxxi).
[17] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 117 (Bxxx).

at his word when he says that he found it necessary "to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith."[18]

Because all the evidence concerning the development of the *Critique of Pure Reason* indicates that it was theoretical concerns that shaped Kant's ideas about a "critique" of pure reason and led him to devote more than a decade to the composition of a work which would "secure reason's rightful claims" and alter the "accepted method" of metaphysics, the rhetoric of the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* should be taken with a grain of salt. While practical philosophy remained an abiding concern throughout Kant's life, it seems to have been purely theoretical concerns which led him to defend the ideality of space and time and the distinction between appearances and things in themselves in the first (A) edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He makes no mention of the need "to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" in the 'Preface' to the first (A) edition. Nor does he frame his discussion of the most important claims of his "critique" in terms of practical philosophy. In the (A) edition, it would appear that Kant defends the "critical" distinction between appearances and things in themselves, simply because he thinks it is true and necessary for metaphysics. The "positive" utility of the "critique" of pure reason for theoretical philosophy can therefore be said to take precedence over both its "negative" utility and the "positive" utility of the "critique" of pure reason for practical philosophy in the first (A) edition.[19] Kant thinks there is something "positive and very important" to be "won" for theoretical philosophy by the "critique" of pure reason, even though he claims that its "first" utility is negative.

The same concerns persist in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition of the *Critique of Pure*

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[18] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 117 (Bxxx).
[19] Kant insists that even the "negative" utility of the "critique" of pure reason is also positive at *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 149 (A11/B25).

Reason, despite Kant's newfound emphasis on practical philosophy. Kant begins his defense of the "positive" utility of the "critique" of pure reason for theoretical philosophy by qualifying the effects of its "negative" utility. "With this important alteration in the field of the sciences, and with the loss of its hitherto imagined possessions that speculative reason must suffer," Kant says, "everything yet remains in the same advantageous state as it was before concerning the universal human concern and the utility that the world has so far drawn from the doctrines of pure reason."[20] By checking the excesses of "the dialectic that is natural to reason" and depriving it "of all disadvantageous influence, by blocking off the source of errors," the "negative" utility of the "critique" of pure reason does nothing more than disabuse "the dogmatism of metaphysics" of the fantasy of its "imagined possessions" (*eingebildeten Besitze)*.[21] In the process, the "critique" of pure reason brings metaphysics back to its "real" (*real*) possessions, making it possible for metaphysics to end its "groping among mere concepts" and finally set off on the "sure path" of science.

The only real "loss" (*Verluste*) that theoretical philosophy suffers as a result of the "negative" utility of "critique" concerns "the monopoly of the schools."[22] Here too Kant says something "positive" is already won through the "negative" utility of the "critique" of pure reason. He argues that the philosophy of the schools has never been able to "reach the public or have the least influence over its convictions."[23] Even in matters which concern the "the interest of human beings," Kant thinks the schools have set themselves up as the "guardians" of metaphysical truths, "sharing with the public only the use of such truths, while keeping the key to them for themselves."[24]

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[20] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 117 (Bxxxii).
[21] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 117 (Bxxx-xxxii).
[22] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 117 (Bxxxii).
[23] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 117 (Bxxxii).
[24] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 118 (Bxxxiii).

While Kant admits that it may "never happen" and "can never be expected to happen" that the public will take an interest in the more technical aspects of theoretical philosophy, "owing to the unsuitability of the common human understanding for such subtle speculations," he still regards scholasticism's pretensions to guardianship and authority as a kind of disrespect for the public.[25] This disrespect is, for Kant, a sign that scholasticism does not appreciate the powers of human reason or understand its limits. He thinks a "critique" of pure reason is necessary, in order to teach scholastic philosophers "to pretend to no higher or more comprehensive insight on any point touching the universal human concerns than the insight that is accessible to the great multitude (who are always most worthy of our respect), and to limit themselves to the cultivation of those grounds of proof alone that can be grasped universally and are sufficient for a moral standpoint."[26] Not only will this "critique" undermine the idea that philosophers are the "guardians" of truths which do not concern the public, it will assure that metaphysics is developed in a way that will serve the interests of humanity and advance the cause of human reason. The fact that the "critique" of pure reason undermines the "monopoly" of the schools and their pretensions to authority is therefore a "positive" utility, one which will make a more humane and useful metaphysics possible.[27]

While he continued to insist that the "critique" of pure reason c never be popular, Kant argues that "care" must be taken "for a more equitable claim on the part of the speculative

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[25] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 118 (Bxxxii).
[26] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 118 (Bxxxii-xxxiii).
[27] Kant's repeated claims that the "critique" of pure reason is a "merely scholastic work" which "can never be popular" should not prevent us from seeing evidence of his desire to move from a scholastic philosophy to a more cosmopolitan way of thinking (*Denkungsart*). While this desire runs is a constant feature of his intellectual biography and the development of the "critical" philosophy, it is perhaps most cogently expressed in the distinction Kant draws in the *Logik Jäsche* between the "scholastic concept" (*Schulbegriff*) of philosophy, which concerns only "the system of philosophical cognitions" and the "worldly concept" (*Weltbegriff*) of philosophy, which addresses the "final ends of human reason" and "gives philosophy dignity, i.e., an absolute worth." See *Lectures on Logic*, pg. 537. I am grateful to Dr. Rudolf Makkreel for pointing out the significance of this distinction.

philosopher," as a result of the "critique" of pure reason.[28] Insofar as the speculative philosopher "remains the exclusive trustee of a science that is useful to the public even without their knowledge, namely, the critique of pure reason," Kant thinks there is much to be gained from theoretical philosophy.[29] Some of the "utilities" of a "critical" theoretical philosophy are, to be sure, merely "negative." Kant says, for instance, that the "critique" of pure reason "is bound once and for all to prevent, by a fundamental investigation of the rights of speculative reason, the scandal that sooner or later has to be noticed among the people in the disputes in which, in the absence of criticism, metaphysicians (and among these in the end even a few clerics) inevitably involve themselves, and in which they afterwards even falsify their own doctrines."[30] Because Kant thinks his "critique" will "sever the very root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, of freethinking unbelief, of enthusiasm and superstition, which can become generally injurious, and finally also of idealism and skepticism, which are more dangerous to the schools and can hardly be transmitted to the public," he emphasizes its "negative" utility.[31] Yet Kant also thinks that there is a "positive" utility to the "fundamental investigation of the rights of speculative reason" that is undertaken by the "critique" of pure reason. Because the "critique" of pure reason must be given the "freedom" to investigate the "claims" of reason and separate its "rightful claims" from its "groundless pretensions" according to its own standards, its investigations justify the "freedom" to philosophize, against the censorship of the church and the state. Kant argues that it would "accord better with their own wise solicitude both for the sciences and for humanity," if these institutions respected "the freedom of such a critique, by which alone the treatments of reason can be put of a firm footing, instead of supporting the

[28] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 118-119 (Bxxxiv).
[29] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 118 (Bxxxiv).
[30] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 118-119 (Bxxxiv).
[31] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 119 (Bxxxiv).

ridiculous despotism of the schools," in their dealings with "the affairs of scholars.[32] The justification of the freedom to philosophize is most certainly a "positive" utility of the "critique" of pure reason for Kant.

In what is perhaps the most important step of his defense of the "positive" utility of the "critique" of pure reason for theoretical philosophy, Kant argues that neither its opposition to scholasticism nor its justification of the "freedom" to philosophize prevent the "critique" of pure reason from agreeing with "the dogmatic procedure of reason in its pure cognition as science."[33] Because he thinks science "must always be dogmatic" if it is to "prove its conclusions strictly *a priori* from secure principles," Kant maintains that the "critique" of pure reason is not opposed to the "dogmatic procedure," but only to "dogmatism."[34] Dogmatism is "the presumption of getting on solely with pure cognition from (philosophical) concepts according to principles which reason has always been using for a long time without first inquiring in what way and by what right it has obtained them," while the "dogmatic procedure" concerns the systematic development and completion of a science, once its principles have been investigated and demonstrated to be sound and correct.[35] Because the "critique" of pure reason undertakes a "fundamental investigations of the rights of speculative reason" and determines the principles of metaphysics in accordance with those rights, it cannot be accused of being dogmatic, even when it prepares the way for a positive statement of the "doctrine" of transcendental philosophy.[36]

What may be more surprising about the agreement of the "critique" of pure reason and "the

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[32] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 119 (Bxxxiv-xxxv).
[33] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 119 (Bxxxv).
[34] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 119 (Bxxxv).
[35] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 119 (Bxxxv).
[36] Rudolf Makkreel has made a similar point in Makkreel, Rudolf. "Kant's Responses to Skepticism." Included in *The Sceptical Tradition around 1800. Scepticism in Philosophy, Science and Society*. Edited by J. van der Zande and Richard H. Popkin. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. pp. 102-103.

dogmatic procedure" is the proximity it establishes between Kant's "critical" philosophy and the "dogmatic" metaphysics of Christian Wolff. Wolff is often decried as a dogmatic rationalist and a scholastic metaphysician. His reputation and even the memory of his importance for eighteenth century German philosophy have been obscured and covered over by philosophers who see the "critical" philosophy as the antithesis of Wolff's "scholastic" metaphysics. Kant sometimes encouraged this view, identifying Wolff with "the dogmatic procedure" in the 'History of Pure Reason' in the Critique of Pure Reason and "dogmatism" in general in a number of other texts.[37] He nevertheless invokes Wolff as an exemplary philosopher in the 'Preface' to the second (B) edition, saying that he the "greatest among all dogmatic philosophers," because he "gave us the first example (an example by which he became the author of a spirit of well-groundedness in Germany that is still not extinguished) of the way in which the secure course of a science is to be taken."[38] Kant argues that Wolff's only mistake was to overlook the importance of supplementing "the dogmatic procedure of pure reason" with "an antecedent critique of its own capacity."[39] "Through the regular ascertainment of the principles, the clear determination of concepts, the attempt at strictness in the

[37] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 704 (A855/B883). Kant does not mention Wolff in many of his subsequent discussions of "dogmatism," but his attacks on dogmatism were associated with attacks on the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy by his contemporaries, and seem to have been intended as such by Kant. For example of a text in which Kant identifies Wolff and dogmatism, see *What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff*, pp. 354-356 (XX:261-262).

[38] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pp. 119-120 (Bxxxvi).

[39] Although its significance is not often noted, Wolff also claims that the examination of the cognitive powers of human beings is necessary, before any further science can be elaborated. Unlike Kant, who thinks this examination is to be a part of a "special science" called "the critique of pure reason," Wolff thinks this examination is a part of logic, which must show "whether our abilities are fitted to philosophical enquiries" and must therefore "learn what are the powers of the human understanding, together with their right use and application in the knowledge and search of truth." "That brance of philosophy, which teaches this," Wolff says, "is called logic." See Wolff, Christian. *Logic, Or Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the Human Understanding*. Included in *Christian Wolff: Gesammelte Werke (III. Abt. Bd. 77)*. Edited by Jean École, et al. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2003. pg. 5 (X). Doubtless this is one of the reasons Eberhard maintained that "the Leibnizian philosophy contains just as much of a critique of pure reason as the more recent one, whereby it nevertheless introduces a dogmatism grounded in a careful analysis of the cognitive faculties, therefore containing everything that is true in the latter, but still more besides in a grounded extension of the domain of the understanding. See *On a discovery whereby any new critique of pure reason is to be made superfluous by an older one*, pg. 283 (VIII:187).

proofs, and the prevention of audacious leaps in inferences," Kant says, Wolff had shown that he "had the skills for moving a science such as metaphysics into this condition," the condition of a science which Kant hoped to establish for metaphysics with his "critique."[40] "If only it had occurred to him to prepare the field for it by a critique of the organ, namely pure reason itself," Kant says that would have discovered the "critical" philosophy himself.[41]

Wolff's "method" and the "altered method" that Kant proposes for metaphysics in the *Critique of Pure Reason* share the same "spirit of well-groundedness" (*Geist der Grundlichkeit*). For Kant, the "spirit of well-groundedness" is not merely the insistence that a science be grounded in principles, but the commitment to the rigorous demonstration of those principles according to the "proper method" of that science. Kant fundamentally disagreed with Wolff about the role that logic and mathematics were to play in determining the "proper method" of metaphysics, turning instead to the "critique" of pure reason, which Kant characterized as "the preparatory activity necessary for the advancement of metaphysics as a well-grounded science, which must necessarily be dogmatic, carried out systematically in accordance with the strictest requirement..."[42] Yet he remained committed to the idea that it is "strict method" that makes a science.[43] And, like Wolff, Kant was committed to applying this insight to metaphysics. His "critical" philosophy is nothing less than the systematic application of the "methodological" principles determined by the "critique" of pure reason, to the theoretical and practical "parts" of metaphysics.

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[40] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 120 (Bxxxvi).
[41] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 120 (Bxxxvi).
[42] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 119 (Bxxxvi).
[43] *Critique of Pure Reason*, pg. 119 (Bxxxvi).

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