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The Rise and Fall of the Suetsugu Maritime Dynasty of Tokugawa Japan, 1571-1676

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An abstract of
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the
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Abstract

The Rise and Fall of the Suetsugu Maritime Dynasty of Tokugawa Japan, 1571-1676
By Timothy Reid Romans

The Suetsugu Heizō dynasty of Nagasaki was a family of samurai-merchant shipbuilders whose members were Tokugawa officials, transnational intermediaries, and adventurers. During their heyday, the Suetsugu captured Pieter Nuyts, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) Governor of Taiwan, planned an attack on Spanish Manila, suppressed the 1638-1639 Shimabara Rebellion, and explored the Ogasawara Islands. Remarkably, the Suetsugu did so as the Tokugawa were contracting Japan's international contacts. Japanese authors have recounted the adventures of the Suetsugu through nativist tracts, pirate stories in juvenile fiction, textbooks, moral education lessons, and film, but they have so far been overlooked in scholarly historical inquiry. As transnational people, they fit poorly into more conventional national-history narratives. The Suetsugu were political intermediaries who helped the Tokugawa regime contend with the uneven imperial geography that remained in the aftermath of Japan's Warring States Period (1467-1600). Under the aegis of Tokugawa power, the Suetsugu sought to build their own maritime domain, attain peer recognition with Japan's warrior elite, and gain increasing independence. The Tokugawa regime and its constituent landed lords came to view the Suetsugu as dangerous because of their connections to the Zheng Empire, which emerged in Southeastern China and Taiwan during the wars of the Ming-Qing transition (1618-1683) under the leadership of the Chinese warlord Koxinga and his descendants. The Suetsugu also risked drawing the Tokugawa into the Revolt of the Three Feudatories (1673-1683), a potential global conflict. The risk of a catastrophic conflict in East Asia demanded that the Tokugawa shogunate, the Qing Empire, Chosŏn Korea, and the Kingdom of Ryūkyū implement a higher degree of state consolidation. That, in turn, led to the rise of an East Asian multistate framework. It was within this international environment that Tokugawa Japan and the Qing Empire subjugated the Dutch as vassals and at the same time, destroyed the Suetsugu and their Zheng partners. At the end of the seventeenth century, East Asia was no longer a haven for pirates, warlords, or their kingdoms.

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In memory of Bridget Waldron Steele: A friend whose bravery was only outmatched by her kindness and compassion

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Chapter One: Introduction: The Suetsugu Heizō Dynasty as a Story of Empire

The sound of the Gion Shoja temple bells echoes the impermanence of all things; the color of the sala flowers reveals the truth that to flourish is to fall. The proud do not endure, like a passing dream on a night in spring; the mighty fall at last, to be no more than dust before the wind.[1]

The Tale of the Heike

In early 1676, Tokugawa officials began preparations to banish an inmate incarcerated in Denma-chō, a prison in the capital city of Edo that was reserved for Japan's most heinous criminals. The inmate in question was Suetsugu Shigetomo (Heizō IV), the leader of the Heizō dynasty and former shogunal intendant of the port city of Nagasaki.[2] Heizō IV stood accused of high crimes against the state and undermining shogunal authority after his actions nearly pulled Tokugawa Japan (1600-1868) into a wider East Asian war with the Qing Empire (1644-1911). Heizō IV had been the owner of a vast fortune which his forebearers had painstakingly accumulated over the course of four generations. Upon taking possession of the Suetsugu fortune in Nagasaki, Tokugawa officials completed an inventory which can help introduce this remarkable maritime dynasty in global history:

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[1] Helen Craig McCullough., *The Tale of the Heike*., Stanford: Stanford University Press., 1988., 23.

[2] The official title of the Suetsugu was the 代官 or *daikan* of Nagasaki which roughly translates into "shogunal intendant" who shared power with the Nagasaki 奉行 or *bugyō* which also roughly translates into governor. The Suetsugu remained in their role as the shogunal intendants and passed on the title to each successive generation of men who also adopted the name of Heizō. By contrast, the Tokugawa regime appointed the Nagasaki governors which came to number two and who would sit in office during alternating times of the year. Scholars in the past have wrongly assumed that the Suetsugu were subordinates of the Nagasaki governors however, the important work and research of Suzuki Yasuko and Oka Mihoko has argued that the Suetsugu wielded considerable power through continuity and functioned more like peers of the governors. See Suzuki Yasuko., 鈴木康子., *Nagasaki bugyō no kenkyū*., 長崎奉行の研究., Kyōto-shi: Shibunkaku Shuppan., 2007., 35 and Oka Mihoko/岡美穂子., *Shōnin to senkyōshi: Nanban bōeki no sekai/*商人と宣教師 南蛮貿易の世界., Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai., 2010., 95.

8,700 kanme of gold; 30 boxes of gold, each containing 3,700 ryō; 10 boxes each containing 1,000 large gold coins; 10,000 kanme of silver (this sum loaned to many persons); a sword and a short sword made by Masamune; 1 godown containing swords and short swords; aloe wood: one piece 14 feet by 6 inches, seven pieces 9 feet by 5 inches, and smaller pieces; 5 wooden clogs made of aloe wood; 5 long chests containing red sandal wood; 3 boxes of coral; 3 boxes of branch coral; 17 tea-pots of Seiko ware; 5 pots, very old; 75 new foreign tea cups; 500 tea-cups; 5 casks of Chinese wine; 700 hanging pictures by Chinese artists; 1,500 boxes of Chinese articles; 600 boxes of colored dishes, plates, and other articles; 1 large agate ink-slab; 17 folding screens; 5 long chests containing old Chinese brocades; 200 swords and short swords; various other articles in the godown, estimated at 600,000 ryō of gold."[3]

Within this vast fortune, the set of Masamune swords, Chinese tea implements and priceless works of art, and the 10,000 *kanme* of silver, equivalent to $32,000,000 contemporary U.S. Dollars, are indicative of the hybrid position that the Suetsugu occupied within the Tokugawa shogunate and their transnational influence.[4] The artifacts point to an intersection of political and cultural capital. Masamune swords are world famous for their beauty and craftsmanship and were coveted by Japan's most prominent warrior families, chief among them, Japan's three unifiers: Oda Nobunaga (1534-1582), Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1537-1598), and Tokugawa Ieyasu (1543-1616). As owners of a set Masamune swords, the Suetsugu claimed status equivalent to Japan's great warrior houses while maintaining an identity as maritime adventurers and commercial entrepreneurs. The tea implements and works of art in the possession of the Suetsugu reveal how their entrepreneurial and political ambitions depended upon transnational networks, chief among them, their fateful and important alliance with the Zheng family of Southeastern China and Taiwan.[5] The Suetsugu alliance with the Zheng allowed the Heizō

[3] For a more elaborate description of this inventory, see Hayashi Fukusai, Tsūkō ichiran, 通航一覧, 国書刊行会本, 第4 (国書刊行会, 1913), 438. Yosaburō Takekoshi, *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan* (Taylor & Francis, 2004), 186–187.

[4] A Kanme (貫目) was a Japanese unit of weight roughly equal to 3.75 kilograms. This rough estimate is based on the current U.S. value of silver at $26.02 USD per ounce.

[5] For an excellent, summative, and lively discussion of the Zheng family and later, empire of Southeastern China and Taiwan, see Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

dynasty to participate in Tokugawa Japan's culture of tea ceremony and competitive material accumulation, an integral part of the "politics of sociability" among Japan's warrior elite during the Tokugawa period, specifically in how "association defined membership in the class."[6] Finally, the 10,000 *kanme* of silver which Heizō earmarked as loans to various persons are illustrative of the extensive financial networks of lending and investment that provided much of the basis for Suetsugu power.[7]

What can account for the meteoric rise of the Suetsugu and their precipitous fall during a time when Tokugawa Japan was supposedly an isolated regime that had severed ties with the outside world? If Tokugawa Japan was a centralized state with a rigid and highly stratified society, how were the Suetsugu, as a family of commoners, able to claim equivalent status with the great warrior houses while engaging in commercial affairs? Lastly, what led the Tokugawa regime to destroy the Suetsugu in 1676 by confiscating their fortune and banishing Heizō IV and his family to outlying islands off the coast of Western Japan?

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[6] Morgan Pitelka., *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability*., University of Hawaii Press., 2015., 13, 66.

[7] Recently, networks have experienced a groundswell of interest as a means of explaining a plethora of historical phenomena from groups of artists to the high politics of empires and the development of complex legal frameworks within the context of international frameworks. Necessary wiring diagrams aside, the current lexicon of network theory in its application to historical scholarship is no longer confined to the simple study of " nodes, circuits, and loops." As an illustration of the increased popularity of network theory, there are imperial networks, transimperial networks, self-organizing networks, social networks, and even network states, and these are just a few examples of how networks have become essential to the lexicon of global history. It is this groundbreaking work with networks in global history that allows scholars to retrieve individual narratives, such as those of the Suetsugu, that do not fit neatly within national histories. In thinking of networks that encompass the local, regional, and global, I argue alongside of Cátia Antunes and Amelia Polónia that "individual actors and informal networks do not always act against monarchs or states. Indeed, cooperation between individuals and the state has often been a decisive means of empire-building." All states then are the result of networks of client-patronage relationships and although instructions can function as nodes, they are bound by personal and symbolic relationships. These relationships provide the impetus for either attenuating or supporting expansion. Ultimately, such relationships call upon the metropole to account for the actions of its clients within the network and either support or disavow their actions. Support for clients by their patrons can result in expansion while disavowal results in severing relationships and a reconfiguring of the network." See Tonio Andrade., "Trans-Imperial Networks: The Dutch East India Company and the Overseas Chinese," International Journal of Maritime History, 21(1) [2009]: 302–309., 302. See Cátia Antunes and Amélia Polónia (eds.), *Beyond Empires: Self-Organizing Cross Imperial Economic Networks vs Institutional Empires, 1500-1800* (Brill: Leiden, 2016)., 5. Also see Kerry Ward, *Networks of Empire: Forced Migration in the Dutch East India Company*. New York: Cambridge University Press., 2011.

The answer to the first question requires reconceptualizing early seventeenth century Tokugawa Japan as a maritime empire instead of an isolated, "absolutist" regime.[8] Tokugawa Japan was a maritime empire in the sense that it inherited from earlier warlords a cluster of overseas territorial claims, including parts of Ming China, Chosŏn Korea, Taiwan, Spanish Manila, and the Kingdom of Ryūkyū. Tokugawa claims in the maritime world were not exclusive, and instead comprised a larger ecosystem in which the East Asian states divided and shared sovereignty.[9] In its efforts to navigate this patchwork overlapping, conflicting, and coincident sovereign claims, the early Tokugawa regime employed transnational, civil-military intermediaries such as the Suetsugu. As transnational political intermediaries for Japan, every encounter that the Heizō dynasty had in the East Asian maritime world forced the Tokugawa regime to reckon with where, how, and to what degree it would maintain an empire.[10] Tokugawa

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[8] Rather than argue for comparatives and degrees of absolutism between Japan and Western Europe as James White has done, I argue that it is more fruitful to examine Tokugawa Japan through the lens of comparative imperial history. James White. "State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan" Journal of Japanese Studies 14:1 (1988). 1-25.

[9] On questions of sovereignty and empire in East Asia, I engage with the recent and very important works of Lauren Benton, Adam Clulow, and Erik Ringmar. The prevailing scholarly notion of sovereignty in early modern empires is its unevenness and how it could be "shared and functionally divided or made relative to the time and place in which it comes to be asserted." "Sovereignty in a relational system is not a binary notion and land can have several masters or no master at all." See Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*, 1 edition (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), Lauren Benton and Adam Clulow. "Legal Encounters and the Origins of Global Law," in *The Cambridge World History*, edited by Jerry H. Bentley, Sanjay Subrahmanyam, and Merry E. Wiesner-Hanks, 6:50–79. The Cambridge World History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015., and Erik Ringmar, "Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order." *International Organization* 66, no. 1 (2012): 1-25., 13.

[10] As Benton argues, "anomalous legal zones" were the defining characteristic of early modern empires. Benton further explains that "empires did not cover space evenly but composed a fabric that was full of holes, stitched together out of pieces, a tangle of strings. Even in the most paradigmic cases, an empire's spaces were politically fragmented; legally differentiated; and encased in irregular, porous, and sometimes undefined borders. Although empires did lay claim to vast stretches of territory, the nature of such claims was tempered by control that was exercised mainly over narrow bands, or corridors, and over enclaves and irregular zones around them." Benton further explains So then sovereignty implies the extension of law beyond the center not as a gradually dissipating force but as a set of relationships that, through spatial and temporal prisms may endow distant actors with greater specific powers." Central to Benton's argument on early modern sovereignty is the concept of the "portability of subjecthood" which were a "set of political and legal relationships" that transcended territorial bounds." Benton further argues that the "portability of subjecthood," "the delegation of legal authority," and the "uneven imperial geographies" they helped to create were characteristic of sovereignty in the early modern world. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*., 2-3, 8, 164, 285, 287, 292.

decisions regarding their empire did not originate from an overarching policy of isolation that manifested in the 1630s; rather, they manifested in response to transnational events that threatened to undermine shogunal authority or presented a danger to the realm.

In answer to the second question, the Heizō dynasty, as a hybrid family of samurai-merchant officials, thrived on the chaos and ambiguity of the early seventeenth century Tokugawa Period.[11] Early Tokugawa society did not consist of a clearly defined class structure and a rigid social hierarchy; instead, it maintained elements of fluidity and mobility that were more characteristic of Japan's sixteenth century unification. Seventeenth century Tokugawa consolidation overlapped with over two centuries of war in East Asia that began with Japan's Warring States Period and continued through the wars of the Ming-Qing transition (1618-1683).[12] As products of war and upheaval in a society with no clear distinction between warrior and merchant, the Suetsugu operated within the ambit of indistinct, Tokugawa domestic and transnational spheres of control. As intermediaries, the Suetsugu sought practical independence, but within the limitations of Tokugawa authority. Unlike sixteenth century Japanese warlords, who disregarded central authority, save invocations of a powerless emperor, the Suetsugu could not ignore the commands of their Tokugawa masters. For the Suetsugu, such practical

[11] As Tokugawa intermediaries, the Suetsugu existed on a spectrum between the Dutch East India Company (VOC) (1602-1799) and their long-standing allies, the Zheng family of Southeastern China and Taiwan. Like the VOC, the Suetsugu oversaw a vast portfolio of transnational, corporate interests and at times claimed the authority of the Tokugawa regime as representatives of the shogun's military, political, and economic might. Like the Zheng, the Suetsugu were a "quasi-governmental familial organization" in which power and political office passed to four successive generations of men who adopted the name of Heizō and assumed the office of shogunal intendant in Nagasaki Here, I would like to thank and acknowledge my intellectual debt to Xing Hang and Adam Clulow and their illuminating video on their Maritime Asia website which helped me to conceptualize the Suetsugu as being the Tokugawa regime's answer to the VOC and the Zheng, see Xing Hang and Adam Clulow., "Maritime Asia: War and Trade, Possession and Power Promo.," https://maritime-asia.org/

[12] Scholars often collectively refer to these events under the blanket term of the "Wars of the Ming-Qing Transition." Robert J. Antony cites Lynn Struve in regarding the Ming-Qing transition as a "cataclysm," see Robert J. Antony. 2014. ""Righteous Yang": Pirate, Rebel, and Hero on the Sino-Vietnamese Water Frontier, 1644-1684". *Cross-Currents: East Asian History and Culture Review.* (11): 4-30., 8.

independence as Tokugawa intermediaries meant loosely interpreting shogunal commands as a means to further their own ambition of building a maritime domain.[13]

Regarding the third question, the Tokugawa regime eliminated the Suetsugu in 1676 as an act of state consolidation in response to the emergence of a peaceful, multipolar East Asian world order. In that new order, the longtime alliance between the Suetsugu and the Zheng family was no longer a potential asset but a threat. Qing consolidation from 1644 to 1683 forced the Tokugawa regime to reconsider its relationship with the Zheng, whom Edo considered to be at best, unpredictable, and at worst, dangerous partners. Suetsugu advocacy for their Zheng allies in terms of providing material and legal support, as well as legitimacy from the shogun, threatened to pull Tokugawa Japan into the wars of the Ming-Qing transition. The Tokugawa decision to destroy the Suetsugu did not stem from the mandate to enforce a policy of "isolation." Instead, it was a response to a stable international environment in which Suetsugu opportunism could lead only to trouble. This emerging East Asian world order demanded that its constituent states, namely, the Qing Empire, Tokugawa Japan, Chosŏn Korea, and the Kingdom of Ryūkyū, restrain their subjects and implement a higher degree of political consolidation and codification of state identity.[14] That increased consolidation and the sharpening of state identities left little

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[13] In arguing that the Suetsugu operated under the constraints of Tokugawa authority, my argument supports that of Thomas D. Conlan in his criticism of Peter Shapinsky. As Conlan argues, " For all of its strength in illuminating the history of the Murakami, Shapinsky's thalocentric overcorrection to terracentrism diminishes this book. His "terracentric" lords were anything but that, as they, and not the Murakami, controlled the most important chokepoints in the Inland Sea. If a "Leviathan" existed, it was not the Murakami, but rather lords such as the Ōuchi, who controlled the Inland Sea and bent the Murakami and others to their will." See Thomas D. Conlan, "Layered Sovereignties and Contested Seas: Recent Histories of Maritime Japan." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 76, no. 2 (2017): 518-29., 523.

[14] I use Tokugawa codification of Japanese identity as opposed to "national" identity and in doing so, my definition parallels that of Victor Lieberman's concept of the "politicization of ethnicity" as a means of acknowledging the fluidity of the early Tokugawa regime as an early modern empire as opposed to a nation state. As Lieberman argues, "To the extent that cultural motifs became linked to rival political centers, conflict could transform such motifs into a public marker, a badge, of political loyalty…In periods of insecurity, people seized, often arbitrarily on symbols - language, hairstyles, dress, tattoos, religious emblems - to erect boundaries that could strengthen their common claim to resources in competition to outgroups deemed to be alien and minatory…Over time, however, by yoking

room for ambitions of social mobility through conquest and freelance diplomacy.[15] Nonetheless, the new multistate framework that emerged after 1683 reconstituted the layered and shared notion of sovereignty that had long guided interstate relations in East Asia. Late seventeenth century East Asian sovereign authority still left room for Edo, Beijing, and Seoul to finesse their territorial conflicts in the interests of peace. Within this framework, East Asian monarchs such as the King of Ryūkyū could rule over their island domains while simultaneously serving as vassals to Japanese, Chinese, and Manchu overlords. This new international framework brought relative peace and stability to East Asia that endured for two centuries without pirates, warlords, or their kingdoms.

Exploring the Suetsugu through global and comparative imperial history requires a rethinking of piracy. As St. Augustine of Hippo reminds in his parable of Alexander the Great and the

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the welfare of diverse local groups to that of the sheltering royal capital, a recurrent dread of external attack could combine with thicker communications to popularize ethnic symbols and to reify and standardize identities." Victor B. *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context c. 800-1830, Vol 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009)., 39-40.

[15] Morris V. Dixon has provided definitions and distinctions between autonomy and independence in the context of early modern Japan that has well stood the test of time and has been useful for nearly four decades. Dixon argues that the merchants in the city of Sakai emerged from Japan's Warring States Period as autonomous as their domains did not exist separately from landed sovereignty. As Dixon further argues, "Sakai's experience indicates that even foreign trade needed official sponsorship. The independence of port and temple towns was only relative. The contention that merchants might have supplied a viable alternative to Tokugawa feudalism or absolutism is further weakened by their affiliation with the military class. They sought to cultivate no sources of legitimacy other than those available to them through the warriors and the shogunate." However, we must reevaluate Dixon's definition considering more recent scholarship, particularly in the realms of sovereignty and law. Dixon's definition forces an artificial dichotomy between the idea of autonomy and independence. Such a false dichotomy obscures possible categories that lie in between autonomy and independence and in the case of the Suetsugu who enterprising and innovative historical actors and made freelance decisions for their own benefit in their attempts to use state authority as a means of legitimizing their actions after the fact. In this regard, Lauren Benton's scholarship is most instructive, particularly her discussion of the hodgepodge nature of early modern sovereignty and the need for historical actors, most infamously those labeled as "pirates," to use state legitimacy as "lawyers" in narrating the justification for their actions. Dixon's definition, inadvertently and by extension, imposes the "teleology of the nation state" as the preordained endpoint of Japanese political consolidation. See Morris, V. Dixon. "The City of Sakai and Urban Autonomy." In Elison, George, and Bardwell L. Smith. *Warlords, Artists, & Commoners: Japan in the Sixteenth Century. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1981*., 23-54, 1981., 32-33., Benton., *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*., 7, 8, 19. Mark Ravina. "State-Making in Global Context: Japan in a World of Nation-States." In *The Teleology of the Modern Nation-State*, edited by Joshua Fogel, 87-104. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005.

pirate, "empires are piracy writ large."[16] Thievery is the essence of empire and the Suetsugu adeptly combined acts of violence on the high seas with "creative legal posturing" and narrative that each generation of the Heizō dynasty tailored to fit their ambition of building a maritime domain.[17] Thus, such large-scale acts of thievery are in the narrating and at the heart of every

[16] My inspiration for including the parable of Alexander the Great and the pirate comes from Roxani Margariti who, in turn, received the idea from the works of Anne Perotin-Dumon. See Margariti, 572. Anne Pérotin-Dumon, "The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 1450–1850," in C. R. Pennel (ed.), *Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader* (New York, 2001), 25–54 Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, *The City of* God, Book IV, Chapter IV in Whitney J. Oates, ed. *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine: Volume II*. 354-430, New York: Random House, 1948., 51.

[17] Although the history of the Suetsugu is transnational and does not conveniently fit within national narratives, their informal domain was very much a part of the early Tokugawa settlement. The informal domain that the Suetsugu presided over emerged from the sixteenth century wave of globalization and was a combination of domestic and international networks but was essentially dependent on the state framework of Tokugawa Japan. As Michael Mann and Kären Wigen argue regarding the concept of "socio-spatial networks," "decentralized power actors competed with one another within an overall framework of normative regulation." According to Mann, "Empires of domination combined military concentrated coercion with an attempt at state territorial centralization and geopolitical hegemony. So they also combined intensive authoritative powers along the narrow routes of penetration of which an army was capable, with weaker, but still authoritative and far more extensive, power wielded over the whole empire and neighboring clients by its central state. The principal reorganizing role is here played by a mixture of military and political power, with the former predominating. 2. In multi-power-actor civilizations, decentralized power actors competed with one another within an overall framework of normative regulation. Here extensive powers were diffuse, belonging to the overall culture rather than to any authoritative power organization. Intensive powers were possessed by a variety of small, local power actors, sometimes states in a multistate civilization, sometimes military elites, sometimes classes and fractions of classes, usually mixtures of all of these. The predominant reorganizing forces were here economic and ideological, though in varied combinations and often with political and geopolitical help." Within his schema, Mann establishes a dichotomy between "multi-power actor civilizations" and "empires of domination," but acknowledges that in historical reality, the distinction between these two types of states was not clear. It is within the schema of Mann and Wigen that the Tokugawa settlement emerges as the political and cultural framework in which the Suetsugu operated as historical actors with autonomy, but not independence. Or to phrase it another way, the Tokugawa regime firmly anchored the Suetsugu and their informal domain of transnational networks to land-based sovereignty. In arguing for the existence of areas of hybrid, transnational political authority in the early modern world, I also apply Lauren Benton's useful framework and understanding of sovereignty. As Benton argues, "So then sovereignty implies the extension of law beyond the center not as a gradually dissipating force but as a set of relationships that, through spatial and temporal prisms may endow distant actors with greater specific powers." Central to Benton's argument on early modern sovereignty is the concept of the "portability of subjecthood" which were a “set of political and legal relationships” that transcended territorial bounds." Benton further argues that the "portability of subjecthood," "the delegation of legal authority," and the "uneven imperial geographies" they helped to create were characteristic of sovereignty in the early modern world. Benton's concept of "corridors of control" further connects to the arguments of Roxani Margariti and Maria Grazia Petrucci regarding islands and "peripheral but strategic areas." These explanations offer valuable insight into the messiness and haphazard nature of state-building in the premodern world that was not bounded by territory and certainly not only limited to or constrained by land-based interests. As Margariti correctly asserts regarding islands and her arguments especially apply to Japan "for the islanders their territory does not stop at each island’s end." For a more contemporary examination of the nature of hybrid, transnational political spaces in the 21st century and its relationship to globalization, Jean-Christophe Graz argues "that the concept of hybrid allows for seeing such ambiguity as an ontological attribute transforming the relationship between transnational capitalism and territorial sovereignty. Ambiguity thus imbues not only the status of the actors involved in standardisation and regulation but also the scope of the issues on which they operate and the spaces on which they exert their authority… A prominent

empire is a good pirate story such as that of the Suetsugu Heizō dynasty of seventeenth century Nagasaki. Although the business of empire may, in fact, be thievery, the sovereign power of empires creates legal systems that insist otherwise. That non-sovereign thievery was the ultimate downfall of the Suetsugu.

Historiography and Methodology

According to traditional narratives about early Tokugawa consolidation, the story of the Suetsugu is a tale that should not exist. A more traditional, scholarly narrative of state consolidation in early modern Japan, such as that of Sir George Sansom in 1932, argues that Japan under the Tokugawa labored under a repressive and static feudal regime.[18] Within Sansom's schema of the Tokugawa shogunate, a rigid class system of peasants, merchants, and samurai kept those with ambitions of social mobility in check. Meanwhile, the central government in Edo hermetically sealed Japan off from any outside influence or interaction with the outside world, keeping Japan in a state of perpetual "arrested" development until the Tokugawa regime collapsed in 1868.[19] In 1974, Harold Bolitho's examination of the Tokugawa

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feature of contemporary global politics is indeed the ability of a wide range of agents to cooperate across borders to establish rules recognised as legitimate by states and non-state actors that have not formally delegated their sovereign rights for such mandates. The scale at which globalisation is transforming the spatial organisation of social relations and production processes has magnified not only the way in which communities and issues are linked across nations, regions, and continents but also the power relations behind them. It is in this respect that international standards and global governance can be viewed as parts of a policy project supporting the involvement of new actors in the policy process, assuming that they would better tackle complex issues across borders." See Roxani Margariti., "An Ocean of Islands: Islands, Insularity, and Historiography of the Indian Ocean" in Peter N. Miller., *The Sea: Thalassography and Historiography*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press., 2013., 208 Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*, 1 edition (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)., 3, 8, 285, 287, 292. Jean-Christophe Graz. *The Power of Standards: Hybrid Authority and the Globalisation of Services*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 24-53. Kären Wigen. “Mapping Early Modernity: Geographical Meditations on a Comparative Concept.” Early Modern Japan 5:2 (Dec. 1995), 1-13. Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: Volume 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760*, 2 edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Pp 533-534.

[18] My inspiration for thinking of older models of Tokugawa consolidation here comes from Marcia Yonemoto's essay, Marcia Yonemoto., "Tokugawa Japan: An Introductory Essay" in *Imagining Japanese History*., The Program for Teaching East Asia, University of Colorado at Boulder., 2008., 1.

[19] Sir George Bailey Sansom., *Japan: A Short Cultural History*. New York: The Century Co., 1932., 455, 457.

shogunate conformed to Sansom's earlier model of stagnation and isolation. As Bolitho famously argues, "by the middle of the seventeenth century the Tokugawa bakufu seemed well on the way to achieving centralized control over Japan."[20] In the same year, John Whitney Hall's essay "Rule by Status in Tokugawa Japan" affirmed Bolitho's arguments regarding Tokugawa centralization by the 1650s. Hall likewise echoes Sansom's assertions regarding the rigidity of the social system, arguing that the natural inertia of the Tokugawa society, which the Toyotomi put into place, was to "rigidify in such a way as to severely limit mobility. Although there was mobility and competition within units, movement from one to another was extremely difficult, and certainly movement between classes was almost impossible."[21] The afterlife of the narrative which regards Tokugawa Japan as stagnant and isolated has, up until the present day, led generations of scholars to erroneously categorize the Suetsugu and their ambitions as those of petty criminals and smugglers.[22]

Two evolving, scholarly debates within the field of premodern Japanese studies provide justification to reexamine the Suetsugu within a broader, transnational context. The first debate of major consequence is the evolving refutation of the persistent myth of Tokugawa isolationism

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[20] I credit Mark Ravina's insightful essay for drawing my attention to Bolitho's arguments and for so eloquently framing the debate over Tokugawa consolidation. See Mark Ravina., "State-Building and Political Economy in Early-Modern Japan." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 54, no. 4 (1995): 997-1022. Harold Bolitho., *Treasures among men: The Fudai Daimyo in Tokugawa Japan*. New Haven, [etc.]: Yale University., 1974.

[21] John Hall. “Rule by Status in Tokugawa Japan.” Journal of Japanese Studies 1:1 (Autumn 1974): 39-49.

[22] Yamawaki Teijirō places the smuggling of Heizō IV within the broader context of Tokugawa legal history, and his work also serves as much of the basis for Noell Wilson's discussion of the Suetsugu. According to Wilson, the Tokugawa arrest and banishment of Heizō IV in 1676 was part of the *sakoku* process and the shogunate's desire to create a "monopoly on violence" through state formation" and maritime defense. As Wilson argues, the Tokugawa eliminated smugglers with Chinese connections, such as the Suetsugu, in order to exert central authority over Japan's maritime defense system. Similarly, Jurre Knoest views the arrest of Heizō IV and the Tokugawa elimination of the Suetsugu as a simple act of law enforcement. See Jurre Knoest., "The Japanese Connection”. Self-Organized Smuggling Networks in Nagasaki Circa 1666-1742" in: Cátia Antunes and Amélia Polónia (eds.), *Beyond Empires: Self-Organizing Cross Imperial Economic Networks vs Institutional Empires, 1500-1800* (Brill: Leiden, 2016)., 114-120., Yamawaki Teijirō 山脇悌二郎., Nukeni: Sakoku Jidai no Mitsubōeki 抜け荷: 鎖国時代の密貿易. 日本経済新聞社, Tōkyō : (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1965)., Noell Wilson, *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*, 1 edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015)., 7, 11, 56-58, 62-64.

in the aftermath of the so-called *sakoku* or "closed country" edicts of the 1630s. Beginning in the late twentieth century, Arano Yasunori and Ronald Toby argued that the "closed country" edicts of the 1630s did not lead to an isolated Tokugawa Japan. Instead, Arano and Toby assert that the idea of a "closed country" emerged as a reaction to western imperialism in the early nineteenth century.[23] More recently, Michael Laver connects the so-called "closed country" edicts to a longer process of Tokugawa consolidation that took place over the course of the seventeenth century, arguing that the edicts were not a "monolithic piece of legislation that irrevocably cut off Japan from the outside world but rather a series of edicts in response to specific historical stimuli."[24] Xing Hang likewise views the "closed country" edicts as an evolving "process" which the Tokugawa regime invoked as a means of shoring up "domestic political and ideological legitimacy.[25] Robert Hellyer underscores that the *sakoku* policies were not an "overriding ideology of seclusion," emphasizing instead the pragmatism and open-endedness of the Tokugawa settlement that allowed for regional participation in foreign diplomacy and commerce.[26] Instead of being a centralized regime with a Weberian "monopoly on violence," the seventeenth century Tokugawa shogunate was a diffuse collection of interests and the Suetsugu were but one ambitious family who sought to exploit the ambiguity of the governmental settlement to win increasing power and independence for themselves.[27]

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[23] Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu*, 1 edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1991)., 22, 235, Arano Yasunori, "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order," *International Journal of Asian Studies* 2, no. 2 (2005): 185–216., 190-191. Arano Yasunori 荒野泰典, *"Sakoku" o Minaosu,* 鎖国を見直す (Kawasaki: Kawasaki shōgai gakushū shinkō jigyōdan, 2003).

[24] Michael S. Laver, *The Sakoku Edicts and the Politics of Tokugawa Hegemony* (Cambria Press, 2011), 13, 115.

25 Xing Hang, "The Shogun's Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth-Century Maritime East Asia," The Journal of Asian Studies 75, no. 1 (2016): 111–136, 120.

[26]Robert I. Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640 - 1868* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Asia Center, 2010), 8.

[27] Noell Wilson., *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*, 1st ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), 7. In thinking of the Tokugawa regime as a diffuse collection of interests or "cliques," I credit Conrad Totman. See Conrad Totman., *Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1600-1843.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

The second important debate that justifies reexamining the Suetsugu as ambitious intermediaries within a fluid and hybridized Tokugawa settlement of civil-military control questions the timing and degree of state centralization in early modern Japan. Whether they look from the 1868 Meiji Restoration back or from the 1600 Battle of Sekigahara forward, scholarly characterizations of the Tokugawa regime run the gamut of political organization, ranging from absolutist, differing gradients of feudalism, federalism, "performative state," "compound state," and even, a proto-nation state.[28] Regardless of political characterization, these studies raise a very common and key question: When, exactly, did the Tokugawa shogunate complete the task of state consolidation? This question is important in evaluating Tokugawa power and by extension, arguing for an appropriate label of political characterization. Until very recently, most studies of the Tokugawa shogunate default to Bolitho's date of 1650 as the high watermark of political consolidation. As Mark Ravina persuasively argues, however, the default to 1650 is problematic, not only because it elides the importance of the next two centuries of political consolidation under Tokugawa rule, but also because it also mischaracterizes what came before and valorizes the decisions of policy makers before 1650 as deliberate measures who had a finite

[28] For classic discussions of Tokugawa feudalism, see Reischauer, Edwin O. “Japanese Feudalism.” Feudalism in History. Edited by Rushton Coulborn. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956. 26-48., John Whitney Hall., "Feudalism in Japan-A Reassessment.," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Oct., 1962), pp. 15-51. For "non-authoritarian" feudalism, see Kiri Paramore., "The Nationalisation of Confucianism: Academism, Examinations, and Bureaucratic Governance in the Late Tokugawa State”. Journal of Japanese Studies 38:1 (2012). 25-53. For Tokugawa federalism, see Totman., *Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1600-1843.*,
For a discussion of Tokugawa absolutism, see James White., “State Growth and Popular Protest in Tokugawa Japan” Journal of Japanese Studies 14:1 (1988). 1-25., For Tokugawa federalism, see Mary Elizabeth Berry., *Hideyoshi*. Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies Harvard University, 1989., Mary Elizabeth Berry., *Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period*. Berkeley: University of California Press., 2007., For the idea of a performative, Tokugawa state, see Philip C. Brown, *Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the Formation of Early Modern Japan: The Case of Kaga Domain*, First Edition (Stanford, Calif: Stanford Univ Press, 1993), and Luke S. Roberts, *Performing the Great Peace* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2012). For a discussion of the compound state, see Mark Ravina., "State-Building and Political Economy in Early-Modern Japan." The Journal of Asian Studies 54, no. 4 (1995): 997-1022., Mark Ravina., *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*. 1 edition. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1999. For an argument which suggests that Tokugawa Japan was a proto-nation state, see Ronald P. Toby., "Rescuing the Nation from History: The State of the State in Early Modern Japan." *Monumenta Nipponica* 56, no. 2 (2001): 197-237.

goal in mind: centralized control of Japan.[29] Mary Elizabeth Berry's appraisal of the Tokugawa shogunate as an "improvisational agreement" and as a "system" of government that "reflected an experiment rather than a blueprint" refutes the idea that Edo, at any time, had a unified plan for centralized control.[30] How then, should scholars conceptualize the Tokugawa shogunate?[31]

The rise of the Tokugawa and their process of political consolidation did not bring an end to imperial ambition in Japan. Although "federalism" and even "compound state" can be useful descriptors for the Tokugawa regime, the story of the Suetsugu suggests that early modern Japan at the dawn of the seventeenth century was an empire in the sense that Edo recruited the Heizō dynasty as its intermediaries in navigating an uneven imperial geography.[32] The early Tokugawa regime inherited a patchwork of sovereign claims left over from ambitious warlords and Japan's unifiers carrying the conflict of the Warring States Period to the various shores of Asia. Perhaps the most challenging inheritance was that that of Hideyoshi's imperial ambitions, which included claims to Goa, Manila, Taiwan, Korea, and China. For all of his bluster and posturing, Hideyoshi invaded Korea (Imjin War, 1592-1598), proving that his threats were not empty, and his demand that Manila submit and offer him tribute was enough to make the Spanish scramble to organize that outpost's defenses. After Hideyoshi's death in 1598, his retainer and Japan's third unifier, Tokugawa Ieyasu, defeated his enemies at the 1600 Battle of Sekigahara, and laid claim to the

[29] Ravina., "State-Building and Political Economy in Early-Modern Japan," 999.
[30] Mary Elizabeth Berry, *Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period*. Berkeley: University of California Press., 2007., 109.
[31] Authors note: I do not use the term *bakufu* 幕府, translation, "tent government" and agree with Luke Roberts that this was a term that the Meiji government used after 1868 to delegitimize the Tokugawa regime that came before as an aberration and something temporary. I prefer instead to engage the Tokugawa on their own terms and my use of the terms "regime," "polity," "state," and even "shogunate" acknowledge the overall ambiguity of the Tokugawa settlement. See Luke S. Roberts. 2012. *Performing the Great Peace: Political Space and Open Secrets in Tokugawa Japan*. University of Hawaii Press., 187.
[32] In referring to an uneven, imperial geography and a patchwork of sovereign claims, my arguments draw upon and dovetail with those of Adam Clulow and Lauren Benton. See Benton and Clulow. “Legal Encounters and the Origins of Global Law.”

tile of shogun in 1603. For Ieyasu and his descendants, the greatest task still lay ahead, and that was to win the peace, at home, by co-opting Japan's various landed lords, and also abroad by recruiting intermediaries. Such intermediaries were, in the conceptualization of Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, "creative political entrepreneurs" who assisted the Tokugawa in navigating the uneven patchwork of sovereign claims that remained from Japan's unification.[33]

As an empire, the Tokugawa regime exercised decentralized power through intermediaries such as the Suetsugu as a means of contending with the fluidity and ambiguity of sovereignty that was characteristic of the early modern world. Lauren Benton's *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900* suggests that the early modern concept of sovereignty related to the need for empires to prove governmental legitimacy in domestic and international contexts through its subjects who worked as intermediaries. Benton captures the role that the Suetsugu played as intermediaries and the nature of their ambition to achieve increased practical independence "empire formed as multiple agents positioned themselves to act as subjects of and proxies for imperial powers and as polities and populations negotiated scope for their own autonomy, sometimes urging radical reconfigurations of rule."[34] As Benton illustrates, intermediaries reconfigured imperial rule through narrative creativity and the Suetsugu, like their contemporaries, the Arima family of Shimabara, the Shimazu family of Satsuma, the Matsuura of Hirado, and the Sō family of Tsushima, sought to exploit the

[33] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper., *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press., 2010., Charles S. Maier., "Empire Without End: Imperial Achievements and Ideologies." *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2010): 153-59.

[34] As Lauren Benton also argues which can apply to the Suetsugu in their role as ambitious intermediaries, "By definition and in practice sovereignty and Empire formed as multiple agents positioned themselves to act as subjects of and proxies for imperial powers and as polities and populations negotiated scope for their own autonomy, sometimes urging radical reconfigurations of rule." See Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 279. cxv

ambiguity of the Tokugawa settlement to advance their own ambitions through a mixture of military conquest and narrative creativity.

Such "creative legal posturing," as Benton argues was "not merely to give their actions the color of law but also render them secure parts of an administrative order" and that intermediaries justified their actions as "producing logical variations in the law of the empire."[35] Within the "anomalous legal zones" of Tokugawa sovereign claims such as Tsushima, the Ryūkyū Islands, Macau, Taiwan, Manila, and the Ogasawara Islands, the Suetsugu and their contemporaries compelled the shogun and his councilors to decide where and to what degree, Japan would maintain an early modern maritime empire.[36]

An important subtext in the discussion of the Heizō dynasty as transnational intermediaries is the surprising weakness of European powers such as the Portuguese and the VOC along with the growing strength of Asian maritime powers such as the Zheng. Oka Mihoko argues that the

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[35] Benton., 290.

[36] Benton's concept of "corridors of control" further connects to the arguments of Roxani Margariti and Maria Grazia Petrucci regarding islands and "peripheral but strategic areas." These explanations offer valuable insight into the messiness and haphazard nature of state-building in the premodern world that was not bounded by territory and certainly not only limited to or constrained by land-based interests. As Margariti correctly asserts regarding islands and her arguments especially apply to Japan "for the islanders their territory does not stop at each island's end." For a more contemporary examination of the nature of hybrid, transnational political spaces in the 21st century and its relationship to globalization, Jean-Christophe Graz argues "that the concept of hybrid allows for seeing such ambiguity as an ontological attribute transforming the relationship between transnational capitalism and territorial sovereignty. Ambiguity thus imbues not only the status of the actors involved in standardisation and regulation but also the scope of the issues on which they operate and the spaces on which they exert their authority… A prominent feature of contemporary global politics is indeed the ability of a wide range of agents to cooperate across borders to establish rules recognised as legitimate by states and non-state actors that have not formally delegated their sovereign rights for such mandates. The scale at which globalisation is transforming the spatial organisation of social relations and production processes has magnified not only the way in which communities and issues are linked across nations, regions, and continents but also the power relations behind them. It is in this respect that international standards and global governance can be viewed as parts of a policy project supporting the involvement of new actors in the policy process, assuming that they would better tackle complex issues across borders." See Roxani Margariti., "An Ocean of Islands: Islands, Insularity, and Historiography of the Indian Ocean" in Peter N. Miller., *The Sea: Thalassography and Historiography*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press., 2013., 208 Lauren Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*, 1 edition (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009)., 3, 8, 285, 287, 292. Jean-Christophe Graz. *The Power of Standards: Hybrid Authority and the Globalisation of Services*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019. 24-53. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*., 2-3, 8, 164, 285, 287, 292.

Suetsugu functioned like an *armaçāo*, or "company" in the Portuguese and Japanese interests they represented. As Oka illustrates, the Suetsugu entrapped and subordinated the Portuguese within web of increasing debt and higher interest rates for loans of silver to the extent that government officials in Macau became Heizō I's personal agents.[37] Regarding the relationship between the Tokugawa shogunate and the VOC, Adam Clulow's work has likewise been crucial in exposing the surprising weakness of the Dutch in seventeenth century East Asia. As Clulow argues, the Tokugawa shogunate ensnared and subjugated the VOC in its increasingly robust and restrictive legal framework and within his narrative, the Suetsugu emerge as important intermediaries who helped to render the Dutch powerless, often by turning the company's own narratives of their willingness to serve the shogun against them.[38]

Xing Hang's work has been revolutionary in transnational Japanese studies and adds a critical dimension to the Suetsugu story in their role as Tokugawa intermediaries with arguably, the most destabilizing and unpredictable force in late seventeenth century East Asia: The Zheng family of Southeastern China and Taiwan. In his work, Hang illustrates how the Tokugawa regime never successfully subdued the Zheng through their intermediaries, the Suetsugu, and ultimately came to view the partnership between the two families as dangerous, necessitating their ultimate decision to destroy the Heizō dynasty in 1676.[39] As Tokugawa intermediaries, the Suetsugu succeeded in subduing the relatively weaker Portuguese and the VOC, feats that increased their perceived worth to Edo. However, the Zheng Empire proved to be too powerful and

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[37] Oka Mihoko/岡美穂子., Shōnin to senkyōshi: Nanban bōeki no sekai/商人と宣教師 南蛮貿易の世界., Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai., 2010., 90-92, 96-98.

[38] Adam Clulow, "Finding the Balance: European Military Power in Early Modern Asia," *History Compass* 13, no. 3 (March 1, 2015): 148–57., 154-155., Adam Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2013., 123-124, 135-140.

[39] Xing Hang, "The Shogun's Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth-Century Maritime East Asia," The Journal of Asian Studies 75, no. 1 (2016): 111–136, 120., and Xing Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720* (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

unpredictable for the limited abilities of Heizō IV. Furthermore, transnational events, namely the emergence of a relatively peaceful East Asian international framework proved to be the end of the Suetsugu.

One of the more contentious debates in East Asian and global history involves the question of whether a multistate framework existed and if so, who were the constituent states and what were the institutional rules and norms? The debate over international frameworks in East Asia is part of the transnational turn in history and is central to the narrative of Suetsugu demise at the end of the seventeenth century as part of Tokugawa state consolidation in response to transnational events. These major events were the rise of the Qing Empire, the Manchu defeat of the Zheng Empire, and the Revolt of the Three Feudatories (1673-1683). The idea that this early modern, international framework in East Asia was a "Chinese World Order" originated with John King Fairbank and Ta-tuan Ch'en in 1968 and since its inception, it has attracted a firestorm of criticism, notably from John E. Wills, Jr., and more recently from Joshua Van Lieu, Hendrik Spruyt, and James Hevia.[40] The idea of a "Sinocentric" world order has recently resurfaced in the works of David Kang. Although Kang abstains from using the word "Sinocentric" in his work, he nonetheless advocates for a hierarchical, unipolar East Asian tributary framework in which

[40] See John King Fairbank and Ta-tuan Ch‘en, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); John E. Wills, Jr., “Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas about Mid-Ch’ing Foreign Relations,” Annals of the Southeast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, 8 (1986): 84–90. Joshua Van Lieu, Etsuko Hae-jin Kang, James B. Lewis, and Gregory Smits argue for a clearer understanding of a multistate, East Asian international system. See Hendrik Spruyt, “Collective Imaginations and International Order: The Contemporary Context of the Chinese Tributary System”; Joshua Van Lieu, “The Tributary System and the Persistence of Late Victorian Knowledge”; Joshua Van Lieu, “Divergent Visions of Serving the Great: The Emergence of Chosŏn-Qing Tributary Relations as a Politics of Representation” (PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 2010); James Louis Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).,

China emerges as the sole hegemon. Similarly, Arano Yasunori argues for the emergence of a separate, "Japanocentric" world order under Tokugawa Japan beginning in the 1630s.[41]

The story of the Suetsugu highlights problems with both the "Sinocentric" and "Japanocentric" frameworks. Instead, the downfall of the Suetsugu highlights the rise of a transnational framework of rules and norms with the Qing Empire, Tokugawa Japan, Chosŏn Korea, and the Ryūkyū Islands as its major constituent states. The idea of a multipolar framework answers the call of Van Lieu, Spruyt, Hevia, Etsuko Hae-jin Kang, James B. Lewis, and Gregory Smits for a clearer understanding of the relatively peaceful international system which arose in East Asia during the early modern period.[42] This new, international framework emerged in East Asia between the rise of the Qing Empire in 1644 and the end of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories in 1683 and was a response to the chaos and turmoil of that period. State

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[41] For David Kang and his supporters, see David C. Kang, *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 10, 71; David C. Kang, "Response: Theory and Empirics in the Study of Historical East Asian International Relations," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 77, no. 1 (2017): 111–122. Saeyoung Park. "Long Live the Tributary System! The Future of Studying East Asian Foreign Relations," Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 77, no. 1 (2017): 1–20. For the idea of a "Japanocentric" world order, see Arano Yasunori, "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order," International Journal of Asian Studies 2, no. 02 (2005): 185–216, 206–208. Mizuno Norihito's interventions are crucial as they contextualize the "Japanocentric" world order, 日本型華夷秩序 or *Nihon-gata ka-i chitsujo* within a larger East Asian international framework with Yi Dynasty Korea, the Qing Empire, and the Kingdom of Ryukyu. See Mizuno Norihito, "China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu's Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China," Sino-Japanese Studies 15 (2003): 111, 140–144.

[42] In referring to an international framework of institutional rules and norms in East Asia, I build upon the international relations turn in history and particularly the current debate between David Kang, Hendrik Spruyt, Joshua Van Lieu, and Saeyoung Park. Over the years, scholars have spilt much ink arguing for or against the existence of a "Sinocentric" and its East Asian counterpart, a "Japanocentric" world order. See Arano, "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order," 185–216., 206-208., Mizuno "China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu's Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China," 111, 140–144., Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*., Wills, "Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas about Mid-Ch'ing Foreign Relations," Spruyt, "Collective Imaginations and International Order: The Contemporary Context of the Chinese Tributary System." Van Lieu "The Tributary System and the Persistence of Late Victorian Knowledge.," Van Lieu., "Divergent Visions of Serving the Great: The Emergence of Chosŏn-Qing Tributary Relations as a Politics of Representation" Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*., Kang, *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute.*,10, 71., Park. "Long Live the Tributary System! The Future of Studying East Asian Foreign Relations.," Spruyt, "Collective Imaginations and International Order: The Contemporary Context of the Chinese Tributary System." Van Lieu, "The Tributary System and the Persistence of Late Victorian Knowledge." And Kang "Response: Theory and Empirics in the Study of Historical East Asian International Relations.

legitimacy in this new, East Asian multipolar framework hinged on a higher degree of state centralization, a sharper codification of ethnic identity, and a conceptualization of sovereignty that was malleable, layered, and shared. The end result by the closing decades of the seventeenth century was an international framework of rules and norms that tolerated flexibility and ambiguity as a means of avoiding interstate conflict. It was a transnational environment where warlords such as the Zheng and intermediaries with ambitions for independence such as the Suetsugu could no longer survive.

Chapter Structure: Walking through Nagasaki's Past Along the Waterfront

Today, the urban landscape of Nagasaki bears silent witness to a near-century of Suetsugu influence and ambition, the stage of the epic story of their rise and fall. Close to the waterfront, the remnants of the manmade island of Dejima, and "Chinatown," two important thoroughfares and city wards carry the names of Hakata and (Suetsugu) Kōzen, an important intersection in Nagasaki which serves as reminder of the central role that the Heizō dynasty played in the city's emergence onto the world stage. Chapter Two discusses the origins of the Heizō dynasty under the leadership of Kōzen, a wealthy Hakata merchant and real-estate magnate who had purchased the areas near the streets that bear his name and that of his home to develop into residential areas in the growing city of Nagasaki. Kōzen was responsible for laying the foundations for the domestic and transnational networks of patronage which his descendants in the Heizō dynasty would use in their ambition to build a maritime domain for the Suetsugu. As a Christian convert, Kōzen was a useful intermediary for the Toyotomi regime with the Jesuits and Portuguese Macau. What made Kōzen a remarkable, transnational figure was his simultaneous patronage of local Buddhist temples while maintaining a Christian identity. Kōzen's patronage of Buddhist temples allowed him access to Japan's warrior elite and landed lords along with the networks of

tea culture and material accumulation which proved crucial in providing patronage for the Suetsugu in the decades to come.[43]

Although Kōzen remained in Hakata, he sent his son who was also a Christian convert, Heizō Masanao (Heizō I), to manage the family's interests in Nagasaki. True to his volatile nature, Heizō I quickly became embroiled in local politics, particularly in a rivalry with the shogunal intendant and former Hideyoshi favorite, Murayama Tōan (????-1619). During his rivalry with Tōan, Heizō I understood that his Christian faith was becoming a liability because the Tokugawa regime's political consolidation involved a narrowed sense of Japanese identity. At a critical moment in the rivalry, Heizō I, in a politically calculated move, apostatized and accused Tōan of aiding the Toyotomi against the Tokugawa and hiding renegade Christian missionaries. Tokugawa officials executed Tōan and promoted Heizō I as the new shogunal intendant of Nagasaki. Heizō I's victory over Tōan and his promotion as the new shogunal intendant of Nagasaki marked a critical juncture in the Suetsugu family's multi-generational accumulation of wealth and power and was reflexive of the networks which they had become enmeshed in. Heizō I came to rely on a coalition of Jesuits, the Portuguese government in Macau, and constituent landed lords in Western Japan. These networks were a reflection of the chaotic and fluid international environment and a decentralized Tokugawa regime which the Suetsugu depended on for practical independence and realizing their ambition of building a maritime domain.

Next to Kōzen Ward in neighboring Sakura Ward and on land that Tōan had owned, Heizō I built his luxurious mansion over the ruins of Santo Domingo Church which Tokugawa officials had destroyed in 1614. It was from this new headquarters in Nagasaki that Heizō I plotted the

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[43] Pitelka, *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability*, 11. Oka Mihoko, "The *Nanban* and *Shuinsen* Trade in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Japan" in Manuel Perez Garcia and Lucio De Sousa, eds., *Global History and New Polycentric Approaches: Europe, Asia and the Americas in a World Network System*, 1st ed. 2018 edition (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). 168-169.

events of Chapter Three which coincided with the rise of the Suetsugu through the vermilion seal trading system. Under Heizō I, the Suetsugu built a small fleet of ocean-going ships that incorporated maritime technology from Europe, China, and Japan, and sailed to ports as far away as India. Under the vermilion seal system, Heizō I built a maritime domain and a vast fortune, all under the aegis of Tokugawa power. Recipients of Tokugawa vermilion seal permits such as the Suetsugu not only used them for safe passage on the seas. In the hands of enterprising and ambitious mariners such as Heizō I, vermilion seal permits could become a license for Tokugawa sanctioned maritime violence. In his designs for a maritime domain for the Suetsugu, Heizō I aspired to control VOC Taiwan and contrived an embassy from the island's aboriginal "king" to the shogun in Edo. Heizō I's fantastic embassy on behalf of an imaginary kingdom inflamed tensions between the VOC and the Suetsugu. For the Suetsugu, the ensuing conflict and turmoil represented an opportunity for increased power at the expense of the VOC.

In the conflict with the VOC over Taiwan, Heizō I appealed to the Tokugawa regime to sanction an attack against the Dutch in the name of the shogun and in the interests of "pirate" suppression. The high shogunal councilors in Edo granted Heizō I's request and issued a vermilion seal permit to the Suetsugu with the directive to "inflict reprisal and redress" on the VOC Governor of Taiwan, Pieter Nuyts (1598-1655), for the crime of interfering with vermilion seal carrying ships. Heizō I broadly interpreted this vermilion seal permit as a license to kill Nuyts and proceeded to outfit an armed expedition under his most trusted captain, Hamada Yahyōe. Hamada arrived in VOC Taiwan in June 1628 and captured Nuyts. In the ensuing standoff, both parties exchanged hostages and instead of killing the governor, Hamada returned with five Dutch prisoners including Nuyts's young son, Laurens, his lieutenant, the veteran sea captain, Pieter Muyser, and the polyglot interpreter and French Huguenot, Francois Caron (1600-

1673). Heizō I initially imprisoned the Dutchmen in the Suetsugu compound located in Sakura Ward, Nagasaki and focused his attention on breaking Muyser's will.

Heizō I 's obsession with Muyser stemmed from the Suetsugu patriarch's realization that he had overstepped his authorization from the Tokugawa. The Suetsugu had not received authorization to start a war, and Heizō I's actions angered the high shogunal councilors in Edo and powerful lords in Western Japan such as the Matsuura of Hirado domain. In desperation, Heizō I first threatened Muyser with execution and when this did not break the Dutchman's will, the Suetsugu patriarch became even more irate and vowed that the Tokugawa regime would invade Taiwan. Heizō I realized that he had reached the limits in claiming authority as a Tokugawa intermediary and in a calculated move to save his own neck, he demanded that Muyser write a letter to VOC Governor General Jan Pieterszoon Coen (1587-1629) advising that the Dutch immediately leave Taiwan or face an imminent attack. In the end, Heizō I got his letter, but it did nothing to resolve the impasse between the company and the shogun as the Tokugawa regime implemented an embargo on the Dutch which remained in place until 1633.

That deadlock between the VOC and the Tokugawa shogunate began to break with the death of Heizō in July 1630. The mantle of Heizō and shogunal intendant passed on to Masanao's son, Shigemasa, and Chapter Four explores the new Suetsugu patriarch's efforts to build the family's fortunes and repair political relations by establishing a partnership with the VOC. Heizō II, navigated an uncertain future. His family had fallen into political disfavor as a result of his father's actions and Tokugawa curtailment of the vermilion seal trading system. The Tokugawa regime also began curtailing diplomatic and commercial relations with the Portuguese, who had been the major trading partners and allies of the Suetsugu. Despite these adversities, Heizō II did not abandon his father's ambitions to build a maritime domain for his family. Heizō II recognized

that the best way to realize his ambitions was a new partnership with the VOC. Heizō II needed the VOC as a replacement for Portuguese commercial connections and, in exchange, the Suetsugu patriarch offered to help the Dutch repair their relations with Tokugawa officials. The first successful endeavor of the new Suetsugu-VOC partnership was the 1637 voyage of the Dutch yacht *Grol* to Tonkin in which Heizō II was a major investor in order to buy up Southeast Asian silks. This emerging partnership between the Suetsugu and the VOC was not only lucrative for both parties; it was an opportunity for Heizō II to prove that he was an indispensable intermediary between the Dutch and the Tokugawa regime.

Heizō II's partnership with the VOC allowed him to ingratiate himself with the Tokugawa. Due to Heizō II's role as the chief intermediary with the VOC, the Suetsugu patriarch enjoyed almost uninterrupted access to Chinese and Southeast Asian goods which were vital in establishing a friendship with the famous tea master and gardener, Kobori Enshū (1579-1647). Heizō II's friendship with Enshū allowed the Suetsugu patriarch to network with the inner circles of the Tokugawa regime, including members of the shogun's family. These networks of socialization allowed Heizō II to add legitimacy to Suetsugu claim to warrior status through the culture of tea ceremony and material accumulation.

Heizō II also sought to claim warrior status for the Suetsugu through an act of military prowess and enlisted the aid of the VOC in a plan to invade Spanish Manila. Heizō II's plan to invade Spanish Manila underscores the importance of the chaotic international environment which the Suetsugu power depended on. The great success of Heizō II was that he managed to strongarm the VOC into pledging military support for the shogun in the planned invasion of Spanish Manila. Although Heizō II's planned invasion of Manila stemmed from his own ambition, he worked within the apparatus of Tokugawa regime. The Suetsugu sought

independence, but only through symbiosis with Tokugawa power. Heizō II's planned invasion of Manila was precluded by the outbreak of the 1638-1639 Shimabara Rebellion. Instead, he invoked the VOC's pledge of military support in the suppression of domestic rebels. This shift again illustrates the fluidity of the early Tokugawa settlement and the regime's reliance on a hybridized civil-military order. The Suetsugu reached their zenith under Heizō II and after battling a prolonged illness in 1643, Shigemasa retired in favor of his eldest son, Shigefusa (Heizō III).

After a brief tenure as Heizō III and in the aftermath of breaking his leg in a horse-riding accident, Shigefusa ceded control over the Suetsugu to his younger brother, Shigetomo who became Heizō IV. Under Heizō IV, the Suetsugu began to pivot away from their partnership with the VOC and instead embraced an alliance with the various Chinese maritime networks such as the Zheng organization of Taiwan and Southeastern China which is the subject of Chapter Five. The emergence of the Zheng Empire after Koxinga's (1624-1662) 1662 conquest of VOC Taiwan was a tectonic event that reconfigured sovereign relationships and the balance of power in East Asia. By the early 1670s, Tokugawa officials increasingly viewed the Zheng as a destabilizing force who threatened to pull Japan into a wider East Asian war with the outbreak of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories (1673-1683). Even as Edo took steps to censure and punish the Zheng for their acts of maritime violence, the alliance deepened between Heizō IV and Koxinga's heir, Jing. Under Heizō IV, the Suetsugu became important investors, suppliers of the materials of war, and even shipbuilders for the Zheng Empire. Despite increasing alarm by officials in Nagasaki and Edo over Heizō IV's ties to the Zheng, the Suetsugu continued to enjoy Tokugawa patronage until the end of 1675.

While their ties to the Zheng remained covert, the Suetsugu continued to enjoy Tokugawa patronage. Edo commissioned Heizō IV to build an ocean-going vessel, the *Fukokuju*, to explore the Ogasawara Islands in 1675. The exploration of the Ogasawara Islands, 540 nautical miles south of Tokyo mark the Tokugawa regime's brief interest in extending its claims to the Pacific Ocean. Heizō IV shared the ambition of his Suetsugu predecessors and saw the Ogasawara Islands as an opportunity to build a maritime domain under the aegis of Tokugawa power. Although the *Fukokuju* succeeded in mapping the Ogasawara Islands and bringing back a variety of plant and animal specimens, Edo had no further interest in laying claim to them or validating Heizō IV's aspirations for a maritime domain. In retrospect, the voyage of the *Fukokuju* also marked the beginning of the end for the Suetsugu. With the outbreak of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories in 1673 and the potential of a Japanese proxy war with the Qing Empire, Tokugawa officials became increasingly dubious of Heizō IV's abilities to function as a viable foreign intermediary. Heizō IV's diminished value was compounded by his mismanagement of domestic affairs. After the 1663 Great Fire of Nagasaki, starving residents of Bungo Ward rebelled in an insurrection that hearkened back to the 1638-1638 Shimabara Rebellion, the last existential threat that the Tokugawa regime had faced. Edo became further convinced of Heizō IV's unreliability in the summer of 1675, when they learned that a group of drunken Suetsugu retainers had vandalized Ise Grand Shrine, one of the holiest places in all Japan. In the end, Heizō IV could not escape the stain of corruption and incompetence and in July 1675, the Nagasaki governor placed the last Suetsugu patriarch under house arrest. In December 1675, the Lord of Shimabara domain, Matsudaira Tadafusa, made a chance discovery of a Zheng ship with a suspicious cargo and ties to the Suetsugu, a key event which led to Heizō IV's formal imprisonment and eventual banishment from Japan.

Chapter Six returns to the Nagasaki waterfront and specifically, to the dock where the Matsudaira discovered a ship that jointly belonged to Heizō IV and Zheng Jing in December 1675. The Matsudaira discovered a large hidden cache of swords, armor, and maps, a sign that the Suetsugu were entangling Japan in Zheng resistance to the Qing. An interrogation of the ship's crew produced still more incriminating evidence. The crew admitted to being agents of Zheng Jing and produced a trading permit which also proclaimed them to be subjects of his majesty, the shogun. The signatory authority on the trading permit which proclaimed Zheng agents to be Tokugawa subjects was none other than Heizō IV. When Tokugawa officials received news of the trading permit, they ordered the Nagasaki governor to transport Heizō IV from house arrest to the infamous Denma-chō prison and execution grounds in Edo.

With Heizō IV on his way to Denma-chō prison in January 1676, the Tokugawa regime expanded their investigation to focus on Nagasaki's officials and the Chinese interpreter's office. Citing further evidence of corruption and malfeasance, Tokugawa officials dismissed Heizō IV's allies in the Nagasaki government and executed his retainers. One last indignity awaited Heizō IV. In June 1676, the Tokugawa regime confiscated all his possessions, down to the last silver piece, and exiled the last Suetsugu patriarch, and his son, to the Oki Islands, and his mother, to Iki Island. The century of the Suetsugu, as Nagasaki's silver lords, had come to a catastrophic and violent end.

International factors were even more serious than Heizō IV's incompetence and corruption in the Tokugawa decision to banish the Suetsugu to outlying islands. In January 1676, when Tokugawa officials discovered the permit bearing Heizō IV's signature that proclaimed a Zheng crew to be subjects of the shogun, Japan was on the verge of war with the Qing Empire. Agents of the Zheng and of the three feudatories of Yunnan, Guangdong, and Fujian had worked to

bring both Chosŏn Korea (1392-1910) and Tokugawa Japan into the war against the Qing through both overt appeals and dangerous rumors. A particular rumor spread by agents of the Zheng and the three feudatories was that the Tokugawa intended to land invasion forces on the Shandong Peninsula, link up with the Korean military, and march on the Qing capital in Beijing. The plausibility of the rumor was such that the Kangxi Emperor (1661-1722) mobilized Qing forces and deployed them to the Korean border. Upon learning of the rumor, the Chosŏn court mulled over an alliance with Japan and the high shogunal councilors of the Tokugawa regime in Edo debated the merits of an amphibious landing on the Shandong Peninsula to topple the Qing. In the end, the Qing, the Chosŏn, and the Tokugawa stepped back from a wider East Asian war and yet, shogunal officials in Edo had become increasingly aware of Heizō IV's dangerous ties to the Zheng. This moment which marked the emergence of a relatively peaceful East Asian world order indeed signified that intermediaries such as the Suetsugu and their ambitions for independence and power were dangerous. It was a world that no longer had patience for pirates, warlords, and their kingdoms.

Chapter Two: The Rise of the Suetsugu

It is impossible to buy things in Nagasaki without consulting both Heizō and his silver[44]

Hosokawa Tadaoki


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In the aftermath of one of the most famous and bizarre legal proceedings of early Tokugawa Japan in 1619, shogunal officials sentenced the "silver lord" and former shogunal intendent of Nagasaki and favorite of Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Murayama Tōan, to execution by beheading.[46] Tōan's list of legal infractions were extensive and his rival, Heizō Masanao (Heizō I), the son of Suetsugu scion, Kōzen, had provided much of the evidence leading to the former shogunal intendant's conviction. Heizō I accused Tōan of, among other things, concealing renegade Catholic priests, treason in providing material aid and comfort to an enemy of the Tokugawa regime, Toyotomi Hideyori (1593-1615), and last, but not least, the murder of a young woman

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[44] Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵". 福岡大學商學論叢 / 商学論叢編集委員会 編. 1976, 20 (3): 271-291., 272-273., Kumamoto ken shiryō kinsei hentai 1 (bubun gokyūki dai 21) 熊本県史料. 近世篇 第 1 (部分御旧記 第 21), 熊本県, 1965.

[45] Figure 2-1. The Former Suetsugu residence and compound. Once the Santo Domingo Church of Nagasaki and now, part of the grounds are a city museum and also Sakuramachi Elementary School. https://www.city.nagasaki.lg.jp/shimin/190001/192001/p000835.html

[46] The term 銀主/*ginshi* or "silver lord" was a Tokugawa period colloquialism which described an extremely wealthy man who engaged in the investment and lending of silver, particularly to daimyo. In the late eighteenth century, it came to describe the wealthy backers of theatrical productions in the Kyoto area. Takeno Yoko uses the term "silver lord" of Nagasaki to describe both Tōan and Heizō I. See Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 173-174.

and her family.[47] Tōan stood guilty of murder and high crimes against the state, but the circumstances behind why the former shogunal intendent faced trial and execution are far more interesting and complex. In a rare agreement, the Tokugawa shogunate, the Society of Jesus (Jesuits), and the Portuguese government of Macau wanted Tōan gone, creating an opportunity for Heizō I's complaints to gain validity, and allowed the Suetsugu to step into their new role as the shogunal intendants of Nagasaki. This legal victory helped secure the ascent of the Suetsugu into the ranks of one of the wealthiest and most powerful maritime dynasties of early Tokugawa Japan.

The promotion of Heizō I to shogunal intendant of Nagasaki was a defining moment in the family's multi-generational accumulation of wealth and power. What could have possibly united the Tokugawa regime, the warrior households of Western Japan, the Jesuits, and the Portuguese government of Macau in seeking Tōan's death in order to promote Heizō I as the new shogunal intendant of Nagasaki? What were the origins of the Suetsugu and how did they factor into Heizō I's rise to power in Nagasaki? What ambitions compelled Heizō I to take on the role as the new shogunal intendant, despite the risks and high cost of failure that had, quite literally, cost Tōan his head? How did Heizō I reshape the role of shogunal intendant of Nagasaki to realize his ambitions while conforming to the state framework of the early Tokugawa regime?

[47] Twenty-one-year-old Hideyori was the nominal head of the Toyotomi during the family's collapse in 1615. For a thorough accounting of the Siege of Osaka Castle, see Stephen R. Turnbull, *Osaka 1615: The Last Battle of the Samurai*. Oxford: Osprey., 2006. 47 Several works discuss the dramatic legal battle between Suetsugu Heizō I and Murayama Tōan, most notably C. R. Boxer. See C. R. Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650* (Manchester: Carcanet Press Ltd, 1993), 333. More recently, Reinier Hesselink views the dispute between Heizō I and Tōan within the transnational dimensions of early Tokugawa consolidation, see Reinier Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki: World Trade and the Clash of Cultures 1560-1640* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2015)., 171-174.

Japanese records from the early medieval period indicate that the Suetsugu were a hybrid family of warrior-merchant pirates who held lands on Western Japan's islands and coastal areas. The strength of the Suetsugu had always been in their liminality and hybridity, and as a minor maritime power, they thrived in periods of warfare and chaos such as the era of the Northern and Southern Courts (1336-1392) and the Warring States Period.[48] The medieval Suetsugu also warred and allied with some of Western Japan's most powerful warrior households such as the Shimazu and the Mōri. In the sixteenth century, a branch of the Suetsugu family moved to Hakata and rose to great prosperity and wealth alongside the great merchant families of that port city.[49] The founding of Nagasaki in 1575 as a new port city and global entrepôt provided the Suetsugu with more opportunities to expand the family's wealth and power. Suetsugu patriarch, Kōzen, converted to Christianity, purchased land in Nagasaki and moved his son, Heizō Masanao, to the new port city to manage the family's lands and business. Heizō Masanao's 1583 arrival in Nagasaki marked the rise of the Heizō dynasty as vital intermediaries for the constituent landed lords in Western Japan and the Tokugawa regime.[50]

Heizō I's rise to power in Nagasaki was the result of patronage from Western Japan's most important warrior households, in particular, the Hosokawa of Kumamoto, the Kuroda of Fukuoka, and the Mōri of Chōshū. In late sixteenth century Japan, transnational intermediaries such as the Suetsugu maintained a dual, Japanese-Christian identity out of economic and political necessity. In the early 1600s, Edo proscribed the Christian religion and the resulting Tokugawa

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[48] This era of Japanese history is the 南北朝/*Nanboku-chō* or the era of the Northern and Southern Courts when the Northern Court in Kyoto backed by the Ashikaga shogunate and the Southern Court in Yoshino warred against each other to claim legitimate status to the imperial throne. For more detail on the *Nanboku-chō* era, see John Whitney Hall, "The Muromachi Bakufu" in John Whitney Hall., ed., *The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 4*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 175-230.

[49] For a recent accounting of Hakata and its merchants, see Andrew Cobbing., *Hakata: The Cultural Worlds of Northern Kyushu*. Leiden: Brill., 2013.

[50] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki: World Trade and the Clash of Cultures 1560-1640*., 106, 171-172.

codification of identity made a Japanese-Christian identity impossible by the mid-1610s. The Tokugawa regime enacted a series of maritime bans in 1609 and 1616 that further threatened the transnational networks of trade and commerce that existed between the warrior households of Western Japan, the Portuguese, and the Jesuits of Macau.[51]

Western Japan's warrior households turned to Heizō I and the Suetsugu in order to maintain their networks of overseas commerce, maintain fiscal solvency, and participate in the growing culture of tea ceremony and material accumulation that was a hallmark of the early Tokugawa period.[52] For Heizō I, his association with the most powerful warrior families of Western Japan was a pathway for the Suetsugu to achieve social mobility and build a maritime domain. The rise of the Suetsugu as the premier intermediaries in Nagasaki led to Heizō I's rivalry with shogunal intendant, Murayama Tōan. Heizō I's legal battle against Tōan secured the future of the Suetsugu as Tokugawa intermediaries and the new shogunal intendants of Nagasaki. In his victory over Tōan, Heizō I inadvertently redefined the role of shogunal intendant of Nagasaki. Although the Suetsugu strove for their ambitions under the aegis of Tokugawa authority, Heizō I and his

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[51] In the 1609 edict, Ieyasu specifically forbade the lords of Western Japan from building or owning large ships over 500 *koku* in displacement. Ieyasu also ordered the lords of Western Japan to transport any ships over 500 *koku* to the ship graveyard at Awaji Island that year. See Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Keichō 14, 1609 September., 慶長１４年９月是月,（第三条）家康、西国諸大名に命じて、五百石積以上の大船を淡路に廻漕せしめ、九鬼守隆等をして之を検収せしむ、647-650., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1206/0647?m=all&s=0647. In July1616, the Tokugawa regime first forbade the Shimazu from allowing Ming Chinese ships to moor in Satsuma domain and directed maritime commerce to Nagasaki. A continuation of the 1616 edict in September coincided with a general ban on Christianity was more extensive as it forbade all foreign ships, except for Ming Chinese ships, from calling at ports other than Hirado and Nagasaki. See Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 2, 1616 July, 元和２年６月是月,（第二条）島津家久、令して明船の領内に繋留することを禁じ、長崎に赴きて、貿易せしむ, 231-233., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1225/0231?m=all&s=0231., Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 2, 1616 18 September, 元和２年８月８日,（第一条）幕府、吉利支丹宗を禁じ、明国商船を除き、外国商船の長崎平戸の外寄港するを禁ず, 349., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1225/0349?m=all&s=0349.

[52] Pitelka, *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability*, 11.

descendants would have to maintain control over their retainers and avoid building dangerous and destabilizing alliances with foreign powers.

The Origins of the Suetsugu and the Heizō Maritime Dynasty

The precise origins of the Suetsugu are ambiguous; however, early medieval Japanese records offer some clues as to the family's origins and hybridity as a household of pirates, warriors, and merchants. A document from 1363 refers to Suetsugu Kakuei as the family patriarch during the era of the Northern and Southern Courts, a time of civil war between the Ashikaga shogunate (1336-1573) and the Emperor Go-Daigo (1288-1339).[53] The lord of Satsuma domain, Shimazu Ujihisa (1328-1387), requested that the Nejime of Ōsumi Island domain, who had close ties to Japanese pirate bands, attack the Suetsugu.[54] Later, in 1394, the Shimazu awarded their vassals, the Tokumaru, with lands from the Suetsugu manor in Aira, a town perched on the shores of Kagoshima Bay, and an area infamous for its association with Japanese pirates.[55]

The Suetsugu reappear in a 1563 document, under the leadership of family patron, Heizaemon, who shared his given name with the later Heizō II. In the document, the warlord,

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[53] Hall, "The Muromachi Bakufu," 175-230.

[54] Maria Grazia Petrucci refers to the Nejime as a "pirate clan,' further noting " In the mid-fifteenth century, Tanegashima Tokiuji married into the Nejime pirate clan, as did Tanegashima Tokitoki in the mid-sixteenth century, although his main wife was a woman of the Shimazu clan. The Tanegashima included pirates like the Nejime clan among their retainers. However, the Nejime had been offering their mercenary services as pirates between the southern coast of Miyazaki and Kagoshima since the late fifteenth century to the early sixteenth century under the patronage of Shimazu Tadaharu, shūgo of the provinces of Osumi, Hyuga, and Satsuma between 1508 and 1515. It was under Tadaharu, who died the next year in 1516 at only twenty-seven years of age that the Nejime fought for their patrons the Shimazu of Oushu, at Kagoshima in the conflict that resulted in the murder of Miyake Kunihide, for competition on the Ryukyu maritime routes." See Maria Grazia Petrucci., *Cast in Silver: The Rise and Demise of Kyushu Corsairs in a Unifying Japan, 1540-1640*., Electronic Theses and Dissertations (ETDs) 2008., University of British Columbia., 2017., 83-84.

[55] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Jōji 2, 1363 July 12., 貞治２年６月１日, 島津氏久、末次覚栄一族を撃たんとし、禰寝氏一族を招致す、98., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/0625/0098?m=all&s=0098., Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料., Ouei 18, 1394 February 10., 応永１８年１２月２８日., 薩摩島津久豊、徳丸某に、大隅姶良荘末次内の地を充行ふ., 22., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/0715/0022?m=all&s=0022.

Mōri Motonari, whose family had long standing connections to Japanese pirate bands and the maritime world as vassals of the Murakami and the Ōuchi, presented Suetsugu Heizaemon with lands in Izumo domain.[56] Two years later in 1565, Mōri Motonari granted Suetsugu Kagekatsu lands in the island and coastal region of Shimane in Izumo domain, a place that also became infamously associated with sixteenth century bands of Japanese pirates.[57] The picture that emerges of the medieval Suetsugu from Japanese records is that they were a liminal people who inhabited Western Japan's islands and coastal regions. Medieval Japanese documents likewise indicate that the Suetsugu were a minor power in Japan's maritime world, who warred and allied with Western Japan's most prominent warrior households and enjoyed robust connections to pirate bands.

A branch of the Suetsugu moved to the thriving port city of Hakata between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries, adding a merchant dimension to the already hybrid family of warrior pirates. During the sixteenth century, the Hakata merchants and the bands of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean pirates became interdependent on one another as competition between Japan's warrior houses and port cities intensified.[58] In this period of intense economic and military competition that coincided with Japan's Warring States Period, the Hakata merchants emerged as important intermediaries in the silk for silver trade between Japan's warrior houses, the Kingdom of Ryūkyū, and Chosŏn Korea.[59] As intermediaries, the Hakata merchants capitalized on Asian

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[56] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Eiroku 6, 1563 December 27, 永祿 6 年閏１２月２２日, 毛利元就、末次平右衛門尉に出雲森脇の地を充行ふ, 581., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1563/13-5-1/12/0001?m=all&s=1000.

[57] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Eiroku 8, 1565 March 12, 永祿 8 年２月１０日, 毛利元就、末次景勝、益田藤兼に出雲島根郡の地を充行ふ, 607., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1565/13-6-1/1/0001?m=all&s=1000.

[58] Petrucci, *Cast in Silver: The Rise and Demise of Kyushu Corsairs in a Unifying Japan, 1540-1640*., 84.

[59] Petrucci, 77.

demands for Japan's boom in silver mining and exports, which allowed for a small group of families such as the Kamiya, the Ōga, the Ito, the Shimai, and the Suetsugu, to become extremely wealthy and powerful.[60] As the sixteenth century and Japan's Warring States Period came to a close, the founding of Nagasaki in 1571 by the Jesuits and the Christian warlord, Ōmura Sumitada, provided the Suetsugu and the Hakata merchants with opportunities to expand their financial and political influence. One of the leading Hakata merchants, Suetsugu Kōzen (1525-1600), positioned himself to become a key intermediary between Japan's warlords, the Portuguese, and the Jesuits by converting to Christianity and purchasing real estate in the outskirts of Nagasaki.[61]

Kōzen's conversion to Christianity was motivated by economic and political ambition. Western Japan's sixteenth century warlords and merchants adopted a Christian identity as a means of gaining advantage against their rivals in securing firearms and in establishing economic relations with the Portuguese and Jesuits. Kōzen was a man of high regard among the Portuguese and the Jesuit chronicler, Luis Fróis, commented that the Suetsugu patriarch was a "good Christian," was extremely wealthy, "had many houses elsewhere," and was "involved in large business transactions."[62] Fróis also commented on Kōzen's efficacy as an intermediary as the Suetsugu patriarch was "taking care of all the things for us [Jesuits] in Japan."[63] For ambitious men like Tōan, Kōzen, and the merchants of Nagasaki's rival port city, Sakai, acting as transnational intermediaries in the chaotic international environment that accompanied Japan's

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[60] See Takeno Yōko, 武野要子., Hakata no gōshō, 博多の豪商, Fukuoka: Ashishobō., 1980. Arthur L. Sadler, *Cha-no-yu: The Japanese Tea ceremony*. Rutland, Vt: Tuttle., 1933., 144.

[61] Takeno Yōko, 武野要子., Hakata no gōshō, 博多の豪商, Fukuoka: Ashishobō., 1980., 50-54.

[62] Frois, Luis. 2015. *First European Description of Japan*, 1585. (London: Routledge, 2015). Oka, "The *Nanban* and *Shuinsen* Trade in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Japan," 168-169.

[63] Oka, 168., Frois, *First European Description of Japan*.

Warring States Period allowed them to secure the patronage of powerful warlords.[64] Securing the patronage of a powerful warlord provided a pathway to social mobility for men like Kōzen and allowed families such as the Suetsugu to occupy an ambiguous position as a warrior-merchant household of pirates.

As an intermediary for Japan's warlords, Kōzen became enmeshed within overlapping transnational and domestic networks of material culture which complimented Suetsugu hybridity as a warrior-merchant household. Fróis lauded Kōzen as "quite the master of Hakata," noting that the Suetsugu patriarch enjoyed extensive ties with the Hibiya family of the port city of Sakai who were also recent Christian converts.[65] In addition to Christianity, the Hibiya family were enthusiastic practitioners of tea ceremony and likewise enjoyed an extensive commercial and cultural network which extended to Kyoto and none other than the renowned tea master, Sen no Rikyū.[66] Under Kōzen, the Suetsugu used their connections to the Hibiya family to become active participants in Japan's growing culture of tea ceremony and material accumulation, two movements which dovetailed with the international instability and domestic chaos of the Warring States Period. Tea ceremony and consumerism of rare and valuable objects in late sixteenth century Japan became central to warrior socialization. Furthermore, the participation of Heizō I and II in tea ceremony and the culture of material accumulation allowed the Suetsugu to claim membership among Japan's warrior elite. [67] The reliance of sixteenth century Japanese warlords on warrior merchant intermediaries provided families such as the Suetsugu with a path to social mobility through patronage. According to Fróis, Kōzen maintained a residence in Akizuki

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[64] Andrew M. Watsky, "Commerce, Politics, and Tea. The Career of Imai Sōkyū." *Monumenta Nipponica* 50, no. 1 (1995): 47-65.
[65] Frois, *First European Description of Japan*., Oka Mihoko, "The *Nanban* and *Shuinsen* Trade in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Japan," 168.
[66] Oka, 168., Haruko Nawata Ward, *Women Religious Leaders in Japan's Christian Century, 1549-1650*, 1 edition (Farnham, England ; Burlington, VT: Routledge, 2009).
[67] Pitelka., *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability*, 13, 30-31, 66.

domain where the warlord, Tanezane, treated the Suetsugu patriarch with "great importance."[68] For the Suetsugu, Kōzen's friendship with the warlord, Akizuki Tanezane, an obsessive collector of rare tea implements, was a critical juncture in the rise of the Suetsugu through Japan's culture of tea ceremony and material accumulation.[69]

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As an intermediary, Christian, and warrior-merchant connoisseur of material and tea culture, Kōzen's influence drew upon a chaotic international and domestic environment to accumulate wealth and power for the Suetsugu. Although Kōzen's power relied on domestic and international fluidity, the Suetsugu patriarch's ambitions also incorporated the increasing

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[68] Oka, "The *Nanban* and *Shuinsen* Trade in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Japan," 168., Sadler, Arthur L. *Cha-no-yu: The Japanese Tea Ceremony*. Rutland, Vt: Tuttle., 1984., 166. Frois, *First European Description of Japan*.

[69] A rather famous episode regarding Akizuki involved a Narashiba tea caddy which the prominent warrior houses of Japan coveted. In the anecdote, Hideyoshi laid siege to Akizuki's castle. As part of his surrender, Akizuki presented Hideyoshi with the Narashiba tea caddy. See Sadler, 165, 169. Cobbing, *Hakata: The Cultural Worlds of Northern Kyushu*, 106-107. Pitelka., *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability*, 11.

[70] Figure 2-2. As with most storied and coveted objects of material culture, the Narashiba tea caddy disappeared and there is currently no knowledge of its whereabouts. A company in Japan currently manufactures an approximate reproduction of the Narashiba tea caddy. See https://www.sadogu.co.jp/sadouguhanbai/ProductList/tyaire/narasibatyaire.html

codification of Japanese identity that was taking place under Japan's sixteenth century unifiers. The sponsorship of Buddhist temples was an important aspect of the sixteenth century codification of Japanese identity and built upon the competitive warrior culture of patronage, material accumulation, and legitimacy.[71] As a Japanese Christian-Buddhist, Kōzen literally maintained a dual-identity under the baptismal name, Cosme, and the Buddhist name, Zennyū. In the wake of Hideyoshi's unification of Japan and promulgation of the edicts which expelled the Jesuits and proscribed the Christian faith in 1587, Kōzen did not apostatize. Instead, Kōzen contributed to the founding of Chōshō-ji, a Sōtō shū Buddhist temple within the domain of his friend, Akizuki Tanezane.[72] The patronage of religious and cultural institutions were a means for maritime dynasties such as the Suetsugu to transform wealth and power into "social and symbolic forms of capital and vise-versa."[73] Instead of hypocrisy, Kōzen's actions were reflexive of the eclecticism of religious and cultural patronage of late sixteenth century Japan and were a necessity for an intermediary in a chaotic and fluid domestic and international environment. Kōzen's dual identity as a Christian and a Buddhist with his patronage of local temples highlights his role as a transnational figure who simultaneously administered domestic and international

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[71] Alexander Vesey's arguments regarding warrior patronage of Buddhist temples compliments the research of Morgan Pitelka, "Samurai-Buddhist relations were influenced by long-standing undercurrents of tension and mistrust and samurai applied extensive regulations to Buddhist temple communities with doctrines and policies denying shogunal and *daimyō* authority. Nevertheless, the *daimyō* continued to use Buddhist services, such as ancestor veneration through Buddhist auspices, and to patronize temples as a means of asserting the legitimacy of their houses by situating their house within a larger system of social practice." See Alexander Vesey., "For Faith and Prestige: Daimyo Motivations for Buddhist Patronage.," *Early Modern Japan: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, v12 n2 (Fall 2004), pp. 53-67.

[72] Oka, "The *Nanban* and *Shuinsen* Trade in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Japan," 168-169. For Hideyoshi's edicts proscribing Christianity in detail, see David J. Lu, Japan: A Documentary History: V. 1: The Dawn of History to the Late Eighteenth Century, Volume 1 (Armonk, NY: Routledge, 2005)., 196-197.

[73] Jonathan Miran, *Red Sea Citizens: Cosmopolitan Society and Cultural Change in Massawa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press., 2009., 20.

networks through ecumenical opportunism and laid the foundations for an informal Suetsugu maritime domain.[74]

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[74] Margariti, "An Ocean of Islands: Islands, Insularity, and Historiography of the Indian Ocean," 208., Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*., 3, 8, 285, 287, 292. Graz. *The Power of Standards: Hybrid Authority and the Globalisation of Services*., 24-53. Wigen. "Mapping Early Modernity: Geographical Meditations on a Comparative Concept," 533-534.

[75] Figure 2-3. Chōshō-ji temple in Fukuoka today. https://www.tripadvisor.com/Attraction_Review-g298207-d17412347-Reviews-Chosho_ji_Temple-Fukuoka_Fukuoka_Prefecture_Kyushu.html#photos;aggregationId=101&albumid=101&filter=7&ff=392599518

The Rise of the Heizō Dynasty in Nagasaki

The Suetsugu maritime domain consisted of domestic and international networks that were dependent on the state framework of Tokugawa Japan.[76] Nagasaki's founding in 1575 provided Kōzen with the opportunity to purchase real-estate along Nagasaki's waterfront and was foundational to the rise of the Heizō dynasty in the new port city. In 1583, Kōzen's son, Heizō Masanao (Heizō I) moved to Nagasaki to manage his father's investments and set about developing land into residential areas for arriving entrepreneurs from Hakata. Two of these residential wards and their corresponding thoroughfares in Nagasaki still bear the names of "Hakata" and "Kōzen," the former acknowledging the origins of its original residents and the latter in honor of Heizō I's father.[77] Hakata and Kōzen wards are in close proximity to the present day Nagasaki City Hall and prefectural office, a testament to the centrality of the Suetsugu in city's founding and expansion.

The Heizō dynasty's growing power in Nagasaki depended on the ecumenical opportunism of the Suetsugu in serving as intermediaries between the Jesuits, the Portuguese, the Hakata merchants, and Japan's Christian warlords. Like his father, Heizō I maintained a dual identity as Japanese and as a Christian convert with the baptismal name of João.[78] After 1600, the rise of the Tokugawa shogunate intensified the proscriptions on Christianity which its predecessor, the

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[76] For discussions regarding sixteenth century globalization, see Wallerstein. *The Modern World-System*. Flynn and Giráldez, "Born With a “Silver Spoon:” The Origins of World Trade in 1571." Parker, "Crisis and Catastrophe: The Global Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Reconsidered." Wills, "Maritime Asia, 1500-1800: The Interactive Emergence of European Domination." Andrade, "The Rise and Fall of Dutch Taiwan, 1624-1662: Cooperative Colonization and the Statist Model of European Expansion.," Jennings, *Globalizations and the Ancient World*. Osterhammel, "Globalizations," in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*. O'Rourke and Williamson. "Once More: When Did Globalisation Begin?" Flynn and Giráldez, "Born Again: Globalization's Sixteenth Century Origins (Asian/Global Versus European Dynamics)." Flynn and Giráldez, "Path Dependence, Time Lags and the Birth of Globalisation: A Critique of O'Rourke and Williamson."

[77] Takeno Yōko, 武野要子., Hakata no gōshō, 博多の豪商, Fukuoka: Ashishobō., 1980., 50-54.

[78] Oka Mihoko, “A Great Merchant in 17th Century Nagasaki: Suetsugu Heizo and the System of Respondencia,” *Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies* 2 (June 2001)., 38.

Toyotomi regime, had put in place.[79] Tokugawa proscriptions on Christianity sharpened the boundaries between Christian and Japanese identities and made ecumenical opportunism increasingly difficult for Western Japan's warlords and their Nagasaki intermediaries. For example, Heizō I's rival, Tōan, found that Tokugawa proscriptions on Christianity curtailed his ability to launder money through the Church of Jesus Christ in Nagasaki and facilitate loans to the Portuguese, Jesuits, and constituent lords of Western Japan. Tōan's compounding financial difficulties provided Heizō I and his Hakata merchant supporters with an opening to undermine and replace the Murayama as the predominant financiers in Nagasaki.[80]

The Tokugawa maritime bans of 1609 and 1616 facilitated the rise of the Suetsugu as the edicts made the constituent lords in Western Japan dependent on the Heizō dynasty in Nagasaki for overseas commerce. The 1609 edict prohibited constituent lords in Western Japan from

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[79] Lu, Japan: A Documentary History: V. 1: The Dawn of History to the Late Eighteenth Century, Volume 1.

[80] The 1612 and 1614 edicts which outlawed Christianity and called for the expulsion of Catholic clergy diminished trade with the Portuguese and with it, Tōan's finances and credibility with the lords of Western Japan. For the 1612 edicts which ordered the destruction of churches and served as a general ban of the Christian religion in Japan, see Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Keichō 17, 1612 April 11, 慶長１７年３月２１日, （第四条）幕府、耶蘇教を禁じ、所司代板倉勝重に命じて、京都の耶蘇寺院を毀たしめ、又、旗下の士等の耶蘇教を奉ずるものを罰す、尋で、肥前日野江城主有馬直純、長崎奉行長谷川藤広に令して、その教徒を禁圧せしめ、また、僧幡随意を有馬に遣して、教徒を誨諭せしむ, 558., https://clioimg.hi.utokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1209/0558?m=all&s=0558. Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Keichō 17, 1612 April 11, 慶長１７年３月２１日, (第四条) 幕府、耶蘇教禁制の条, 273., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1211/supple/0273?m=all&s=0273. For the 1614 edict which ordered the banishment of Portuguese Jesuit missionaries, see Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Keichō 18, 1614 January 28, 慶長１８年１２月１９日, （第三条）幕府、申ねて耶蘇教を禁じ、伴天連及び教徒を追放せしむ、よりて、是日、大久保忠隣を京都に遣す, 189., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1213/0189?m=all&s=0189. Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Keichō 17, 1612 April 11, 慶長１７年３月２１日, （第三条）大久保忠隣京都に着し、耶蘇教の寺院を毀ち、伴天連を追放する条、34, https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1222/supple/0034?m=all&s=0034.

building and owning ships with a displacement of over 500 *koku* or approximately, 75 tons.[81] As for the 1616 edict, it also forbade Western Japanese lords from receiving foreign ships at ports in their domains.[82] Additionally, the 1616 edict directed all incoming foreign ships to call at Nagasaki, an act that effectively placed them under the purview of the Suetsugu. With the Tokugawa promulgation of these two edicts, it also became increasingly difficult for constituent Japanese lords to obtain vermillion seal trading passes.[83] Arguably, the 1609 and 1616 edicts created a dynamic in which the lords of Western Japan, with some exception, became

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[81] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Keichō 14, 1609 September., 慶長１４年９月是**月**,（第三条）家康、西国諸大名に命じて、五百石積以上の大船を淡路に廻漕せしめ、九鬼守隆等をして之を検収せし**む**、647-650., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1206/0647?m=all&s=0647. Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 2, 1616 July, 元和２年６月是**月**,（第二条）島津家久、令して明船の領内に繋留することを禁じ、長崎に赴きて、貿易せしむ, 231-233., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1225/0231?m=all&s=0231., Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 2, 1616 18 September, 元和２年８月８**日**,（第一条）幕府、吉利支丹宗を禁じ、明国商船を除き、外国商船の長崎平戸の外寄港するを禁ず, 349., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1225/0349?m=all&s=0349.As Michael Laver notes, "Most *daimyo* did not have oceangoing ships in their harbors even before the *bakufu* decreed in 1609 that no *daimyo* have ships of more than 500 *koku* in size, and so were forced to either build a ship or contract one, usually from the Chinese at Nagasaki. After this prohibition, powerful *daimyo* such as the Shimazu and Date families, although previously able to furnish their own oceangoing vessels, usually resorted to chartering suitable ships in Nagasaki," see Laver, Michael S., *Japan's Economy by Proxy in the Seventeenth Century: China, the Netherlands, and the Bakufu*., Amherst, New York Cambria Press., 2008., 62-63. As William Wayne Farris points out regarding the conversion from *koku* to contemporary naval tonnage are a "best guess" estimate. "References to the tonnage of boats can be difficult, since it may refer to the cargo, the weight of the ship or its displacement. the term usually used in Japanese (koku) also varied over time." See William Wayne Farris., "Shipbuilding and Nautical Technology in Japanese Maritime History: Origins to 1600," *The Mariner's Mirror*, 95:3, 260-283., 280. For this reason, I base my *koku* conversion to naval tonnage estimates on the Institute for the Study of Japanese Folk Culture at Kanagawa University. Their ratio is .15 *koku* per naval ton and they base their calculations on the Tokugawa period barges in their exhibit. See http://jominken.kanagawa-u.ac.jp/en/topics/2017/n2qs4o00000000ul.html

[82] Hellyer notes that the Shimazu of Satsuma and Sō of Tsushima largely ignored this edict, see Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640 - 1868*., 46-47.

[83] For example, Takeno Yoko notes that it became increasingly difficult for the western *daimyo* to obtain vermilion seal trading permits and had to increasingly rely on sources such as the Hakata merchants, the Suetsugu, and even Chinese merchants to obtain these permits., See Takeno Yoko., *Han bōekishi no kenkyū*, 藩貿易史の研究., 181-184, 222-223.

increasingly dependent on the Suetsugu for foreign commerce, especially in obtaining highly valued luxury goods from abroad.[84]

Tokugawa proscriptions on Christianity along with the 1609 and 1616 maritime bans provided the Suetsugu with the opportunity to serve as intermediaries in Nagasaki for some of Western Japan's most powerful warrior households. The most important relationship of patronage that the Heizō dynasty established in the early seventeenth century was with the Hosokawa lords of Kumamoto domain. The Hosokawa had been allies of the Tokugawa at the 1600 Battle of Sekigahara and for their loyalty received the 540,000 *koku* domain of Kumamoto.[85] The Hosokawa were also an old maritime family who had an extensive history of international commerce that spanned centuries.[86] During the early years of the vermillion seal trading system, the Hosokawa were one of the few constituent lords in Western Japan who could afford a standing merchant fleet and were frequent recipients of shogunal trading passes.[87] In fact, Hosokawa ships frequently called at Ayutthaya in the early seventeenth century.[88] However, as in the case of the Mōri and Kuroda, the 1609 and 1616 Tokugawa maritime prohibitions curtailed the commercial activities of the Hosokawa who came to increasingly rely on intermediaries such as the Suetsugu in order to maintain local autonomy and fiscal solvency.

The Hosokawa partnership with the Suetsugu was one of mutual political and economic benefit. From the Hosokawa perspective, reliance on the Suetsugu as intermediaries provided

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[84] The three major exceptions here were the Shimazu of Satsuma, the Matsuura of Hirado, and the Sō of Tsushima. However, it is important to note that all three of these families maintained trading houses in Nagasaki and also engaged in relations with the Suetsugu. In addition to Chinese goods, other luxuries that the Suetsugu played an important role in was obtaining silks, agarwood, and teas.

[85] Totman, *Early Modern Japan*, 119.

86 The Hosokawa also had a long history of sponsoring maritime predation, see Petrucci, *Cast in Silver: The Rise and Demise of Kyushu Corsairs in a Unifying Japan, 1540-1640*, 27, 51-52, 55-58, 60-61.

87 Kawashima Motojirō, *Tokugawa shoki no kaigai bōekika*, 徳川初期の海外貿易家 (朝日新聞, 1916)

[88] Laver, *Japan's Economy by Proxy in the Seventeenth Century: China, the Netherlands, and the Bakufu.*, 70.

them with the necessary deniability to remain engaged in international trade without arousing suspicions that they were forging alliances with foreign powers. Partnership with the Suetsugu also allowed the Hosokawa to extend political influence into Hakata and Nagasaki, the former territory of their vanquished rivals, the Ōuchi.[89] For the Suetsugu, partnership with the Hosokawa meant obtaining a strong political ally to further their aims within the Tokugawa central government in Edo.

The earliest record of Hosokawa patronage dates from a 1615 letter from the Kumamoto lord, Hosokawa Tadaoki (1563-1646). In the letter, Tadaoki mentions that Heizō I had recently established a residence in Edo and that the Hosokawa lord could "discuss a great many things in confidence" with the Suetsugu patriarch.[90] Hosokawa family records provide needed context for the vagaries in Tadaoki's letter as the Kumamoto lord in a 1624 diary entry expressed the need to borrow an unspecified amount of silver from Heizō I. Tadaoki further clarifies in a 1635 diary entry in the Hosokawa family records that "it is impossible to buy things in Nagasaki without consulting both Heizō and his silver."[91] Nagasaki city records further indicate that in 1629, Tadaoki's successor and heir, Hosokawa Tadatoshi (1586-1641) requested that Heizō I

[89] Regarding the rivalry between the Hosokawa and the Ōuchi, I refer to the infamous "Ningpo Incident" of 1523. Hosokawa and Ōuchi crews both claimed to have legitimate trading passes and squabbled over who would unload their cargo first. Fighting broke out between the Hosokawa and Ōuchi which spread to the streets of Ningbo and ended when both parties sailed back to Japan, but not before killing Ming port officials. This incident would catalyze Ming perceptions of Japan as a haven for pirates and would also lead to a series of maritime bans against Japan. For more information on the "Ningpo Incident," see Petrucci, *Cast in Silver: The Rise and Demise of Kyushu Corsairs in a Unifying Japan, 1540-1640.*, 53-54.

[90] Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 272, Kumamoto ken shiryō kinsei hentai 2., 熊本県史料. 近世篇 第 2., 熊本県, 191., 1965.

[91] Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵". 福岡大學商學論叢 / 商学論叢編集委員会 編. 1976, 20 (3): 271-291., 272-273., Kumamoto ken shiryō kinsei hentai 1 (bubun gokyūki dai 21) 熊本県史料. 近世篇 第 1 (部分御旧記 第 21), 熊本県, 1965.

personally look after his affairs and residence in Nagasaki.[92] This request reveals that the close association between Tadaoki and Heizō I extended to the heirs of both men, Hosokawa Tadatoshi and Suetsugu Heizō Shigemasa (Heizō II) and the partnership between the two families continued through the initial decades of the seventeenth century.[93]

This partnership also extended to the financial realm as the emergence of Nagasaki as a global entrepôt and early Tokugawa maritime prohibitions necessitated that the Hosokawa increasingly rely on the Suetsugu for international trade. Furthermore, Hosokawa involvement in the Warring States Period and the Battle of Sekigahara strained the family's coffers. After their move to Kumamoto, the Hosokawa relied on loans from the Tokugawa central government. A letter from 1642 indicates that Matsui Okinaga (1582-1661), a famous samurai and retainer of the Hosokawa borrowed silver from the Suetsugu.[94] Although the Hosokawa and their retainers took loans of silver from both the Tokugawa and the Suetsugu, there is compelling evidence which suggests that the Kumamoto lords and the Heizō dynasty in Nagasaki operated as financial partners.

In 1623, Tokugawa officials permitted the Suetsugu and the Hosokawa to jointly ship a cargo of one thousand muskets, in all likelihood, to destinations in Southeast Asia.[95] A 1628 letter points to collaboration between Tadaoki and Heizō I in financing and outfitting Hamada

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[92] Nagasaki shi/**長崎市編**, Nagasaki sōsho/長崎叢書 第 1-4 巻, Vol. 3., 1926., Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 275.

[93] Takeno argues that the Suetsugu became even more valuable to the Hosokawa after the Tokugawa shogunate implemented the sakoku edicts in the 1630's, see Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵, 276.

[94] Matsui Okinaga was a friend of the famous samurai, Miyamoto Musashi. 松井文書-末次平蔵書状【注記】宛所: 長岡佐渡守. 形態: 折紙. 内容・備考: 越中守・肥後守への借銀の勘定前の処置について. 松井文書写真帳番号: 85067. 掲載頁: 111【和暦年月日】寛永１９年１月２９日

[95] Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 276.

Yahyōe's military expedition to apprehend the VOC Governor of Taiwan, Pieter Nuyts.[96] Furthermore, both the Hosokawa and the Suetsugu shared an interest in procuring agarwood from Southeast Asia. Agarwood was and still is a high demand and expensive commodity due to its unique fragrance for incense and perfumes. During the Tokugawa period, wealthy families in Japan who participated in Japan's burgeoning tea culture also desired agarwood for cups and serving implements.[97] A 1635 Kumamoto domain document discusses the arrival of a Suetsugu ship in Nagasaki with a large cargo of agarwood, a portion of which Heizō II ordered set aside for Hosokawa Tadatoshi.[98]

Due to their involvement in Western Japan's culture of tea ceremony and competitive material accumulation, the Kuroda lords of Fukuoka domain likewise turned to the Suetsugu to act as their intermediaries in the aftermath of the 1609 and 1616 maritime prohibitions. Similar to the Hosokawa, the Kuroda had been allies of the Tokugawa at Sekigahara and had witnessed an increase in their overall fortunes with the reward of the 520,000 *koku* Fukuoka domain.[99] Despite Kuroda loyalty to the Tokugawa and their corresponding increase in fortune, the aftermath of the 1609 and 1616 maritime bans led the new lords of Fukuoka to explore new ways to maintain local autonomy and fiscal solvency. The Kuroda restructuring of Fukuoka domain's economy placed greater emphasis on the domestic production of ceramics and an increased

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[96] 細川忠興同夫人等書状. 第 1 軸.細川忠興書状. Japanese and Chinese Old Materials, National Diet Library, Tokyo Japan, https://ndlonline.ndl.go.jp/#!/detail/R300000003-I1287545-00

[97] Agarwood or aloeswood continues to fetch high prices as a global commodity today. The wood comes from a special type of tree that grows in Southeast Asia that is infected with a special type of mold during the petrification process. It was also a desired commodity for perfumes, incense, and for crafting tea implements and even jewelry. A Ming period saying was that "an inch of agarwood equals an inch of gold." Today, 1kg of agarwood can sell for prices between $200 and $100,000 USD depending on quality. See Mohamed, Rozi., *Agarwood: Science behind the fragrance* (Tropical forestry). Singapore: Springer., 36, 67., Naef, Regula., "The volatile and semi-volatile constituents of agarwood, the infected heartwood of Aquilaria species: a review". *Flavour and Fragrance Journal*. March 2010., 26 (2): 73–87.

[98] Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 274-275., Kumamoto ken shiryō kinsei hentai 1 (bubun gokyūki dai 21) 熊本県史料. 近世篇 第 1 (部分御旧記 第 21), 熊本県, 1965.

[99] Kalland, Arne., *Fishing Villages in Tokugawa Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press., 1995., 16.

reliance on Hakata and Nagasaki merchants, particularly the Suetsugu, as transnational intermediaries who could provide uninterrupted access to luxury goods.

The increasing difficulty for the landed lords of Western Japan to obtain shogunal trading permits necessitated that the Kuroda rely on the merchants of Hakata and Nagasaki to act as intermediaries. With the Tokugawa promulgation of the 1616 maritime ban, foreign ships could no longer legally visit Hakata. Moreover, the aftermath of the 1616 edict witnessed a mass migration of wealthy merchants from Hakata to Nagasaki which meant that the Kuroda no longer had an active port city within their domain. In order to maintain Fukuoka's involvement in the culture of tea ceremony and competitive material accumulation, the Kuroda relied on merchant families, and in particular, the Suetsugu, to obtain shogunal trading permits and act as intermediaries.[100] As Kuroda Takamasa (1612-1639), the younger brother of Kuroda Tadayuki (1602-1654), the lord of Fukuoka domain commented: "In this year's trade and in purchasing essential articles, we impart our trust to the person of Suetsugu Heizō with whom we have discussed various important matters and in whom we have confidence in above all others."[101] Takamasa's comments reveal that the Kuroda relied on the Suetsugu for advice and to procure goods through international commerce that they otherwise could not have obtained.[102]

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[100] Laver, *Japan's Economy by Proxy in the Seventeenth Century: China, the Netherlands, and the Bakufu*., 62-63., Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640 - 1868*., 46-47., Takeno Yoko., "Kuroda Shu no Bōeki Kirishitan Seisaku," "黒田氏の貿易キリシタン政策 ," 239-241., Takeno Yoko., Han bōekishi no kenkyū, 藩貿易史の研究., 220-231.

[101] Takeno Yoko., 221., 編九州史料刊行会. 九州史料叢書., 黒田御用記., 第 12. 九州史料刊行会, 1962. After the death of Kuroda Nagamasa, who had been a powerful lord in the Warring States Period and a steadfast ally of the Tokugawa founder and first shogun, Ieyasu, Fukuoka domain passed into the hands of his son, Kuroda Tadayuki in 1623. However, Nagamasa's will also divided Fukuoka into sub-domains which came under the authority of his remaining two sons, Kuroda Nagaoki and Kuroda Takamasa. In this new generation of Kuroda leadership, Takamasa, lord of the sub-domain of Tōrenji, developed a relationship of trust with the Suetsugu and had the most contact with them. Also see Maske, Andrew L., *Potters and Patrons in Edo Period Japan: Takatori Ware and the Kuroda Domain*., Routledge., 2017., 26-27.

[102] Takeno Yoko., 221.

Takeno Yoko observes that the precise nature and volume of foreign goods that the Suetsugu obtained for the Kuroda is unclear and open for conjecture. A major reason for this obscurity in the nature and volume of trade goods is that much of it was secretive and not exclusive to exchanges between the Suetsugu and Kuroda. Intermediaries like the Suetsugu often acted on behalf of the lords of Western Japan to discreetly obtain foreign goods without the notice of the Tokugawa shogunate.[103] Contemporaries referred to this practice as obtaining "loose" or "bonus" cargo and not "smuggling."[104] Tokugawa edicts were at best unclear about restricting the practice of constituent lords obtaining "bonus" cargo until the late seventeenth century.[105] Nonetheless, intermediaries such as the Suetsugu shielded the lords of Western Japan from scrutiny and offered them a degree of deniability when engaging in foreign commerce. This deniability was important during the early seventeenth century, especially given the fluidity of the early Tokugawa regime which relied on intermediaries and its constituent lords to exercise power.

Despite a lack of aggregate trade figures, we can partly reconstruct trade networks through the role of the Suetsugu in obtaining luxury tea goods for the Kuroda. Suetsugu connections to the culture of tea ceremony and material accumulation were important for the Kuroda in reshaping Fukuoka domain's economy from manufacturing the materials of war to producing rarefied objects of high culture. Before the shogunal proscriptions on shipbuilding and contact with foreign merchants in 1609 and 1616, the Kuroda had been premier manufacturers and traders of firearms and high-quality armaments for the wider Asian market.[106] After the early Tokugawa maritime prohibitions, Kuroda domain shifted production to ceramics and pottery in what would

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[103] Takeno Yoko., 221-223.

[104] Yamawaki Teijirō 山脇悌二郎., Nukeni: Sakoku Jidai no Mitsubōeki 抜け荷: 鎖国時代の密貿易. 日本経済新聞社, Tōkyō: (Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha, 1965.), 11-13.

[105] Yamawaki Teijirō., 11-13.

[106] Takeno Yoko., "Kuroda Shu no Bōeki Kirishitan Seisaku," "黒田氏の貿易キリシタン政策," 334.

become the world-famous Takatori line of tea ware and utensils. [107] Suetsugu connections to the tea culture and the tea trade likely provided consumer outlets and demand for Takatori pottery across Japan.[108] Also, Suetsugu investments and involvement in the vermillion seal trade catered to Tadayuki's appetite for rare and exotic teas, and Heizō I was one of the main sponsors behind Tenjiku Tokubei's (1612-1692) famous voyage to India in 1627.[109] As intermediaries for the Kuroda, the Suetsugu gained an important ally in securing political advancement for the Heizō I dynasty through the culture of tea ceremony and material accumulation of the early Tokugawa period.

The Mōri family had long associated with the Suetsugu and their declining fortunes under the Tokugawa settlement necessitated that the lords of Chōshū domain depend on the Heizō dynasty as lenders and intermediaries. As the Mōri sided with Tokugawa enemies during the 1600 Battle of Sekigahara, their domain holdings were reduced from 298,000 *koku* to 220,000 *koku*, a significant drop in revenue.[110] Before the 1609 and 1616 maritime prohibitions, Mōri involvement in the trade with the Portuguese and Chinese was substantial. As a 1596 bill of sale attests, Chinese ships had regularly called at Chōshū for the purpose of commerce.[111] However, Tokugawa restrictions on the lords of Western Japan created financial hardships for the once wealthy Mōri family who had relied on overseas trade and the maritime world for their revenue.

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107 Maske, *Potters and Patrons in Edo Period Japan: Takatori Ware and the Kuroda Domain*., 26-27.
108 岩生成一 Iwao Seiichi, 朱印船貿易史の研究., *Shuinsen Bōeki Shi No Kenkyū*., 220-225., Santō Kyōden, 作山東京伝, *Tenjiku Tokubei Monogatari*, 天竺徳瓶物語. 永楽屋東四郎,, 1800., 235., Haruko Nawata Ward, *Women Religious Leaders in Japan's Christian Century, 1549-1650*., 38., Oka, "The *Nanban* and *Shuinsen* Trade in Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Japan," 168.
109 Santō Kyōden, 作山東京伝, *Tenjiku Tokubei Monogatari*, 天竺徳瓶物語. 永楽屋東四郎, 1800., 235.
110 Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 280.
111 Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵,", 279., Yamaguchi-ken monjokan/山口県文書館, 1980.

To compensate for the loss of revenue and cover expenses such as stipends for family retainers, the Mōri borrowed large quantities of silver from various sources such as the Suetsugu.

In one of the more extreme examples of lending, Mōri Hidenari, the lord of Chōshū domain alone borrowed more than 7,500 kanme of silver from various merchants in Edo, Osaka, Kyoto, and Nagasaki, enough to pay the contemporary, day wages of 52,500,000 laborers or enough rice to feed 750,000 people in one-year.[112] Between 1652 and 1655, the Mōri borrowed more than 350 *kanme* of silver from both the Hakata and Nagasaki branches of the Suetsugu family.[113] Much of the silver that the Mōri borrowed was at interest rates that fluctuated between 15 and 44 percent and these were loans that they obtained from merchant guilds in Nagasaki, Osaka, Kyoto, and Edo. By comparison, Suetsugu loans constituted a smaller amount and were at the more forgiving interest rate of 10 percent. However, Suetsugu relations with the Mōri were not merely the result of lending and investment. In all likelihood, the Heizō dynasty acted as intermediaries for the Mōri in the buying, selling, and distribution of regional specialty products from Chōshū through the main Suetsugu family in Hakata.[114] A 1672 document from the Nagasaki city archives attests to the view of the Mōri on the Suetsugu, and one of the lords of Chōshū lords' retainers commented that "In Nagasaki, there is no person who has deeper inside knowledge than Suetsugu Heizō."[115] As this statement by a retainer of the Mōri attests, the lords

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[112] Mathias, Regine. "Japan in the Seventeenth Century: Labour Relations and Work Ethics." *International Review of Social History* 56 (2011): 217-43, 237.

[113] Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵", 280-281., Suetsugu Monjo 末次文書 (TDSH, 3071.91-65), Ōta Hōsuke, ed. 毛利十一代史, 首巻、第 1 冊 (大田報助, 1910)., part 3, 39-40.

[114] Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 280-283.

[115] Takeno Yoko, Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 283., Nagasaki-shi Hakubutsukan-hō/長崎市立博物館報, 第 9 号., 1962-1975.

of Chōshū maintained a close relationship of trust with the Suetsugu who aided them in preserving local autonomy and the fiscal solvency of their domain.

The Suetsugu benefitted from the framework of the early Tokugawa regime as state codification of Japanese identity along with the 1609 and 1616 maritime bans created opportunities for the Heizō dynasty to serve as transnational intermediaries for the Hosokawa, Kuroda, and the Mōri, three of Western Japan's most powerful warrior households. In the early 1600s, the Tokugawa regime contended with a chaotic international environment through state codification of Japanese identity and proscription of Christianity. Transnational intermediaries who maintained a Japanese-Christian identity such as the rival of the Suetsugu, Murayama Tōan, found it difficult to remain financially solvent as they could no longer launder money and facilitate loans through the Church of Jesus Christ in Nagasaki. Although the Heizō dynasty in Nagasaki initially relied on ecumenical opportunism in their role as transnational intermediaries, their financial connections to the Hakata merchants through the main Suetsugu family was not dependent upon maintaining a Japanese-Christian identity. As the Tokugawa settlement entered its second decade, the religious eclecticism of the late 1500s and early 1600s ceased to exist, and Heizō I saw opportunity to bring his networks of patronage to bear against his rival, Tōan, to become the new shogunal intendant of Nagasaki.

The Silver Lord of Nagasaki

Heizō I's usurpation of Tōan in 1619 to become the shogunal intendant of Nagasaki was an important milestone in the Suetsugu family's multi-generational accumulation of wealth and power. The allegations which Heizō I brought to bear against Tōan were numerous and included accusations of murder and treasonous acts against the state. What made Heizō I's allegations credible was that by 1619, Tōan was a failure as the shogunal intendant of Nagasaki and as a

transnational intermediary. When Heizō I challenged Tōan with his allegations in 1618, he did so with the patronage of Western Japan's most powerful warrior houses.[116] Furthermore, Heizō I publicly denounced his Christian faith, a strategic maneuver which aligned the Suetsugu with the Tokugawa vision of Japanese identity that did not have conflicting loyalties with the Toyotomi regime or the Iberian world. Heizō I was ultimately victorious as the Suetsugu patriarch could validate his actions and ambitions within the scope of Tokugawa authority whereas Tōan could not.[117] As a decentralized regime that relied on intermediaries to exercise power, the Tokugawa shogunate set an important precedent in the battle between Heizō I and Tōan in that it would act swiftly against those who flaunted shogunal authority in ways that discredited Edo or brought instability to the realm.[118]

Heizō I won his *coup d'état* against Tōan by presenting his allegations within a narrative framework that the Murayama posed a threat to the Tokugawa regime abroad and political stability at home. As further proof that Heizō I's ability to connect his ambitions to Tokugawa interests ultimately won the day for the Suetsugu, there are two more, minor pieces of evidence. The first piece of evidence comes from the Jesuit, Mattheus de Couros, who noted in a letter that

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[116] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo/大日本近世史料, Genna 5, 1619., 元和５年是**歳**,（第十条）是より先、長崎の人末次政直、長崎代官村山等安の私曲を幕府に訴ふ、是に至り、幕府、之を裁決して、等安を処罰し、政直を長崎代官と為**す**, 290., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1232/0290?m=all&s=0290.

[117] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki: World Trade and the Clash of Cultures 1560-1640* (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 2015)., 172-173.

[118] Tokugawa Japan was a decentralized state that neither possessed a Weberian "monopoly on violence" or a centralized navy. In referring to Tokugawa Japan as a decentralized state, I argue that it was comparable to other early modern polities with "plural jurisdictions that were overlapping or parallel" and that it "did not possess anything approaching a monopoly on legal authority, which was divided among a jumble of often competing jurisdictions." This plurality of jurisdictions in the early Tokugawa order was a hybridized framework of civil-military control and enabled acts of violence in the maritime world under the Tokugawa aegis. To defend sovereign interests and normalize relations with other states in a changing international environment of Ming decline and European maritime expansion, the Tokugawa regime relied on intermediaries such as the Suetsugu. Wilson, *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*., Berry, “Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan.,” 240. Benton and Clulow. “Legal Encounters and the Origins of Global Law.,” 89.

Heizō I promised the Tokugawa regime that he could raise two thousand more *ryō,* or gold coins in taxes than Tōan.[119] Although the monetary incentive was enough to secure Heizō I's position as the new shogunal intendant of Nagasaki, the promise of increased taxes was not enough to topple Tōan. Similarly, Heizō I's accusation of Tōan murdering a family of eighteen people, because their daughter spurned the Murayama patriarch's hand in marriage, failed to interest Tokugawa officials. According to Richard Cocks (1566-1624), head of the British East India Company in Japan, the high shogunal councilors responded to Heizō I's accusations of murder with an admonition: "the councell told Feze Dono they would haue hym to take in hand matters of leeveing & not dead people."[120] Although Heizō I failed to depose Tōan through accusations of murder and promises of increased revenue to the Tokugawa regime, the Suetsugu patriarch found his efforts to make Tōan's loyalties suspect far more fruitful.

At the time of his rivalry with Heizō I in 1618, Tōan's identity as a Japanese-Christian undermined his effectiveness as an intermediary for the lords of Western Japan, the Tokugawa regime, and even for his Jesuit and Iberian allies. Tōan, a native of Nagoya, had arrived in Nagasaki during the 1580's and rose from servant boy to wealthy Christian trader.[121] He became a personal friend of Hideyoshi and had been both the recipient of Toyotomi patronage and the beneficiary of a close commercial relationship with the Iberian world which had made the Murayama family wealthy. Tokugawa anti-Christian measures and decrees in the 1610s degraded the financial networks that Tōan depended on and eroded the trust that the Jesuits and

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[119] One *ryō*/両 was the equivalent of one Chinese *tael*/兩. One *tael* of fine silver was a unit of currency, equal to 1.4 Spanish *real*. A *real* is equivalent to $200 in contemporary USD, a *tael* was worth about 50 percent more than that. A mace was equal to 0.1 *tael*. The contemporary USD approximation that Heizō proposed to raise in taxes was $840,000. See Tonio Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008., 291-292.

[120] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki*., 172., Richard Cocks and Edward Maunde Thomson., ed., *Diary of Richard Cocks Cape-Merchant in the English Factory in Japan 1615 - 1622: With Correspondence 2 2*., June 4, 1618., London: Hakluyt Society., 1883.

[121] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki*., 171, 136-137.

Portuguese in Macau had placed in the Murayama patriarch. For example, the Jesuit, João Rodrigues Tçuzu, wrote that he felt personally betrayed by Tōan when the Murayama patriarch did nothing to contest the Tokugawa expulsion of missionaries in 1614.[122] In addition to strained relationships with the Portuguese and Jesuits of Macau, Tōan also faced declining revenue due to further Tokugawa proscriptions on Christianity. When the Tokugawa regime banned the Christian faith in its entirety from Japan in 1612 and ordered the destruction of churches, Tōan could no longer rely on the Church of Jesus Christ in Nagasaki to launder money and facilitate loans for the Portuguese, Jesuits, and lords of Western Japan who participated in overseas commerce.[123]

The Tokugawa regime could also no longer trust Tōan as its intermediary due to the Murayama patriarch's suspect loyalties and allegiance to its predecessor, the Toyotomi regime.

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[122] The Jesuits were also displeased at Tōan for switching his allegiance from them to the Spanish supported Dominicans. See Hesselink, 171. Takase Kōichirō/高瀬 弘一郎, "Nagasaki daikan murayama to an o meguru hitotsu no dekigoto," "長崎代官村山当安をめぐる一つの出来事," Nihon Rekishi/日本歴史/日本歴史学会,72-95., 1984., 73-74., Oka Mihoko/岡美穂子., *Shōnin to senkyōshi: Nanban bōeki no sekai*/商人と宣教師 南蛮貿易の世界., Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai., 2010., 179. Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Keichō 18, 1614 January 28, 慶長１８年１２月１９日, （第三条）幕府、申ねて耶蘇教を禁じ、伴天連及び教徒を追放せしむ、よりて、是日、大久保忠隣を京都に遣す, 189., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1213/0192?m=all&s=0189.

[123] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō 大日本近世史料, Keichō 17, 1612 April 11, 慶長１７年３月２１日, （第四条）幕府、耶蘇教を禁じ、所司代板倉勝重に命じて、京都の耶蘇寺院を毀たしめ、又、旗下の士等の耶蘇教を奉ずるものを罰す、尋で、肥前日野江城主有馬直純、長崎奉行長谷川藤広に令して、その教徒を禁圧せしめ、また、僧幡随意を有馬に遣して、教徒を誨諭せしむ, 558., https://clioimg.hi.utokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1209/0558?m=all&s=0558. Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Keichō 17, 1612 April 11, 慶長１７年３月２１日, (第四条) 幕府、耶蘇教禁制の条, 273., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1211/supple/0273?m=all&s=0273. Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Keichō 17, 1612 April 11, 慶長１７年３月２１日, （第三条）大久保忠隣京都に着し、耶蘇教の寺院を毀ち、伴天連を追放する条、34, https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1222/supple/0034?m=all&s=0034.Takeno Yoko, "Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 273-274.,

Heizō I directly accused Tōan of treason, alleging that the Murayama patriarch's son, Francisco, who was a parish priest in Nagasaki, had provided the Toyotomi with provisions, armaments, and soldiers during the 1614 Tokugawa siege of Osaka Castle. According to Cocks, Heizō I "apeached Twan & his children as Christians and maintayners of Jesuistes and fryres whoe were enemies to the state."[124] The nature of Heizō I's allegations were serious, as they implied Tōan and his family had committed treason against the Tokugawa regime. Tōan's allegiances to the Toyotomi and identity as a Japanese-Christian led Edo to suspect the Murayama patriarch of forging alliances with enemies of the state. As a traitor, Tōan could no longer fulfill his duties as shogunal intendent and a Tokugawa intermediary.

In addition to accusing Tōan of treason, Heizō I further implied that the Murayama patriarch had lost control of the overseas networks which the Tokugawa regime entrusted him with managing. In his allegations, Heizō I emphasized Tōan's 1616 failure to subdue Taiwan, a military debacle that ultimately compromised shogunal authority in relations with Ming China. On June 18, 1616, Tōan received a vermillion seal trading pass from Ieyasu authorizing him to send a ship to Taiwan. Tōan must have taken considerable liberty in interpreting the instructions of the pass as he dispatched an expedition of 30 ships and 300 to 400 soldiers to subdue Taiwan.[125] Foul weather foiled the expedition, but two of Tōan's ships raided the Southeastern Chinese coast and landed in Fujian. In Fujian, one of Tōan's retainers, Akashi Michitomo,

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[124] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki*., 173., Richard Cocks and Edward Maunde Thomson., ed., *Diary of Richard Cocks Cape-Merchant in the English Factory in Japan 1615 - 1622: With Correspondence 2 2*., June 4, 1618., London: Hakluyt Society., 1883.

[125] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 2, 1616, 元和 2 年是**歳**,（第一条）家康、長崎代官村山東菴をして、台湾を伐たしむ、789., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1225/0789?m=all&s=0789. Jacques Spex notes that Tōan sent 3,000 to 4,000 men to Taiwan. However, Turnbull disputes these numbers, arguing that it was likely 1/10 of this amount, see Stephen Turnbull "Onward, Christian Samurai! The Japanese Expeditions to Taiwan in 1609 and 1616," in *Japanese Studies*, 30:1, 3-21, 11-13., Willem Coolhaas, *Generale Missiven van Gouverneurs-Generaal en Raden aan Heren XVII der Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie*. 1 1., 1960., 252.

declared he and his crew were not Japanese pirates, and then proceeded to kidnap a Ming military officer named Dong Boqi. When the ship returned to Nagasaki in 1617, Tokugawa officials ordered Tōan to immediately send Akashi and an envoy back to Fujian to repatriate Governor Dong in a bid to open commercial relations with the Ming.[126] Although the Ming were pleased with Governor Dong's return, Tōan's embassy did not change their perception of Japan as a land of pirates and they ordered the shogun to combat piracy as a condition of commercial relations.

When Tōan's envoy returned bearing directives from the Ming to subdue piracy in the aftermath of the failed expedition to subdue Taiwan, it signaled to Tokugawa officials that the Murayama patriarch had compromised shogunal authority and Tokugawa legitimacy in relations with China.[127] Akashi's act of maritime predation against the Ming and abduction of Governor Dong demonstrated to the Tokugawa regime that Tōan had lost control over his subordinates. As an intermediary and shogunal official, Tōan's lack of control over his subordinates in an international environment signaled to Ming China that the Tokugawa regime sponsored piracy, a perception that endangered Edo's attempts to reintegrate Japan and normalize relations with other Asian states.

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[126] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Genna 3, 1617 April 6, 元和 3 年 3 月是**月**, (第四条）長崎代官村山等安、明石道友を明国に遣して、通商を求めしむ、明国其請を郤く、899., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1226/0899?m=all&s=0899. Turnbull, "Onward, Christian Samurai! The Japanese Expeditions to Taiwan in 1609 and 1616," 14-15.

[127] For Ming complaints and exhortations to the Tokugawa regime to control Japanese piracy/倭**寇**, see *Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Genna 3, 1617 April 6, 元和 3 年 3 月是**月**, (第四条）長崎代官村山等安、明石道友を明国に遣して、通商を求めしむ、明国其請を郤く, 905-907., https://clioimg.hi.utokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1226/0905?m=all&s=0899&n=20

The Ming response to Tōan's efforts in reopening commercial relations between Japan and China, namely, the command that the Tokugawa regime eradicate piracy, confirmed to shogunal officials in Edo that the Murayama posed a direct threat to Japanese political legitimacy abroad. Although the high shogunal councilors were willing to condone murder by subordinate Tokugawa officials, Edo moved quickly to remove Tōan on the basis that the Murayama patriarch was a traitor who had failed in his duties as shogunal intendant of Nagasaki and Tokugawa intermediary. In 1619, the high shogunal councilors ordered Tōan's arrest and within the year, Heizō I and the governor of Nagasaki, Hasegawa Gonroku, presided over the execution of the Murayama patriarch and his family.[128] As a reward from the Tokugawa regime, Heizō I received land that belonged to Tōan, along the Nagasaki waterfront, that had been the site of the Santo Domingo church and monastery.[129] On this formerly consecrated ground in Sakura Ward, Heizō I built a magnificent mansion, compound, and gardens, which served as the headquarters for the next three generations of Suetsugu patriarchs.

Although Heizō I won his battle against Tōan, he inadvertently defined and set the expectations that the Tokugawa regime would have of the Suetsugu patriarch and his descendants in their roles as transnational intermediaries and shogunal intendants of Nagasaki.[130] In the following decades, the Suetsugu, as a hybrid, warrior-merchant family would have to carefully maneuver the ambiguity of the Tokugawa order to ensure their survival and within that context, contending with the VOC would prove to be one of their most dangerous tasks.

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[128] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki*., 184-185.
[129] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki*., 186., Santo Domingo Church Museum, City of Nagasaki, https://www.city.nagasaki.lg.jp/shimin/190001/192001/p000835.html
[130] Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, 東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 5, 1619, 元和 5 年是**歳**, (第十条）是より先、長崎の人末次政直、長崎代官村山等安の私曲を幕府に訴ふ、是に至り、幕府、之を裁決して、等安を処罰し、政直を長崎代官と為す, 291.

Conclusion

The early Suetsugu were a liminal family of hybrid, warrior-merchant pirates and a minor maritime power in Western Japan during the medieval period. In the sixteenth century, a branch of the Suetsugu moved to Hakata and became one of the port city's most prosperous merchant families. In the 1570s, the founding of the new port city of Nagasaki provided the Hakata merchants with opportunities to increase their political and economic power during Japan's Warring States Period. The chaotic domestic and international environment of the late sixteenth century provided the Hakata merchants and the Suetsugu with opportunities for social mobility through warlord patronage and participation in the culture of tea ceremony and material accumulation. Suetsugu family patriarch, Kōzen, saw opportunity in these evolving networks of patronage, and converted to Christianity for economic reasons to serve as an intermediary between Japan's Christian warlords and the Portuguese and Jesuits of Macau. Kōzen also purchased land along the Nagasaki waterfront and sent his son, Heizō Masanao, to develop and manage the family's property and business interests in the new port city. Heizō Masanao's move to Nagasaki in the 1583 was an important event in the history of the Suetsugu as it marked the rise of the Heizō dynasty as an important intermediary for the constituent landed lords in Western Japan and the Tokugawa regime.

Heizō I's rise was possible due to his developing connections and patronage from Western Japan's most important warrior households, in particular, the Hosokawa of Kumamoto domain, the Kuroda of Fukuoka domain, and the Mōri of Chōshū domain. The maritime bans of 1609 and 1616 and codification of Japanese identity that was taking place under the Tokugawa regime threatened the networks of commerce and finance that the warrior households of Western Japan relied on to maintain fiscal solvency and participate in the culture of tea ceremony and material

accumulation. In response to the maritime bans and Tokugawa codification that made a dual Christian and Japanese identity impossible in the early 1600s, the constituent lords of Western Japan increasingly turned to the Suetsugu as intermediaries with the outside world. The shift to the Suetsugu as intermediaries in Nagasaki facilitated Heizō I's rivalry with the then shogunal intendant, Murayama Tōan. Heizō I's victory over Tōan might have brought him to power in Nagasaki, but the ensuing legal battle inadvertently set Tokugawa expectations for how the Suetsugu functioned as transnational intermediaries for the realm. In realizing their ambitions of social mobility and building a maritime domain, the Suetsugu operated under the aegis of Tokugawa authority and in doing so, Heizō I and his descendants would have to maintain control over their retainers and avoid building dangerous and destabilizing alliances with foreign powers. The Suetsugu would not have to wait long for their first test as Tokugawa intermediaries as trouble brewed between Heizō I and the VOC over Taiwan.

Chapter Three: Suetsugu Heizō Masanao and the Vermillion Seal System

The howling of the wind and the raging of the waves and the mighty roar of the thunder are signs of the wrath of the god whom my lord offends, who would slay the dragon of the deep, for through the dragon is the storm raised, and well it were if my lord offered a prayer…[131]

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Pieter Muyser, who had been deputy to Dutch East India Company (VOC) Governor Pieter Nuyts, in Taiwan, experienced a harrowing series of ordeals from June to October of 1628. Muyser was a combat hardened sea captain who had fought against the Spanish and had captured Chinese junks in 1625. He had even survived the loss of his ship, the *Victoria* in action against the Spanish in April 1625.[133] Muyser's ordeals at the hands of the shogunal intendent Suetsugu Heizō Masanao (Heizō I) began in June when the vermillion seal ship captain, Hamada Yahyōe attacked Castle Zeelandia and captured Nuyts. A standoff ensued in which the VOC Council of

[131] This excerpt is from the story "The Jewel in the Dragon's Head" which is regarded as being among the oldest in Japanese oral tradition, see Bush, Martha H., F. Victor Dickens, and Carol Schwartzott., eds. *The Old Bamboo Hewer: A Japanese Romance of the Tenth Century/Taketori no okina no monogatari*. Freeville, N.Y.: C. Schwartzott., 2000.

[132] Figure 3-1. Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1797-1861), *Recovering the Stolen Jewel from the Palace of the Dragon King*, 1853.

[133] José Eugenio Borao Mateo., *The Spanish Experience in Taiwan, 1626-1642: The Baroque Ending of a Renaissance Endeavor*. Hong Kong: Hong Kong Univ. Press., 2010., 19.

Taiwan and Hamada agreed to a contract and the exchange hostages, among them Nuyts' young son, Laurens, as a guarantee of good faith and behavior. The contract specified that both parties would sail to Japan and exchange hostages. In July, as Muyser sailed to Japan, he encountered a fierce, multi-day storm which the Japanese sailors referred to as "Daygnon."[134] This was a reference to Dainagon Ōtomo no Miyuki, a seventh century government official and central character of the Japanese folktale "The Jewel in the Dragon's Head." In the story, Ōtomo no Miyuki had angered the gods in his quest to slay the dragon king of the seas and retrieve a rainbow-hued jewel from its head to win the hand of the Princess Kaguya. In their anger, the gods sent a storm of wind, thunder, lightning, and rain against Ōtomo no Miyuki. Although Muyser was not a contemporary of Ōtomo no Miyuki, he faced a similar storm: the wrath of Heizō I. When Muyser arrived in Nagasaki in July 1628, the Dutchman learned that he and his fellow VOC hostages faced death. Muyser then proceeded to do what Ōtomo no Miyuki did when faced with the wrath of the dragon king of the seas, he said his prayers.

Muyser's predicament raises several perplexing and important questions, the first of which is how did the Dutchman find himself in such a dire situation after sailing to Japan as a hostage to find that he might be executed? Secondly, what convinced Heizō I that he could abduct and demand the assassination and execution of VOC officials? Third, under whose authority did Heizō I claim legitimacy in making his decisions which led the Suetsugu to attack Dutch Taiwan, take VOC officials as prisoners, and threaten them with execution?

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[134] Muyser's journal is a daily record of events that begins with Hamada's attack on VOC Taiwan in June 1628 and ends on 31 October 1628. See Pieter J. Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.,

First, Muyser became the victim of Heizō I 's ambition to annex Taiwan as part of a Suetsugu maritime domain. The vermilion seal trading system and its corresponding permits provided a robust, legal framework that bolstered Heizō I 's claims to Taiwan, legitimized the attack on Nuyts, and empowered the Suetsugu patriarch to take VOC hostages and promptly sentence them to death. In making his decisions, Heizō I used his ambiguous role as an intermediary to claim Tokugawa authority and that he was acting in the best interests of the subjects of the shogun, namely, the aboriginal people of Taiwan.

To elaborate, the vermilion seal system and its corresponding permits provided the Tokugawa regime with a means to exercise transnational power through intermediaries in the uneven imperial geography that remained after the Warring States Period. For Heizō I, the vermilion seal system served as a legal framework to legitimize his freelance actions in accumulating transnational power under the aegis of the Tokugawa shogunate.[135] In his role as shogunal intendant and as an intermediary, Heizō I upheld shogunal authority by exhorting Ming China and the governor general of Fujian to do their part in eliminating Chinese pirates. This was a reversal of almost three centuries of Sino-Japanese relations regarding piracy. Heizō I also suppressed seventeenth century East Asia's most notorious pirates: the VOC in response to the company's interference with vermillion seal permit carriers and imprisonment of shogunal subjects in Taiwan. As pirate suppressors, the Suetsugu emerged through the vermillion seal

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[135] The best studies of the vermilion seal system up to today are in Japanese. See Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一., Shuinsen Bōeki Shi No Kenkyū/朱印船貿易史の研究., Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1985. and Nagazumi, Yōko. *Shuinsen/*朱印船. Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan., 2001. For an approximate English language study, see Michael S. Laver., *Japan's Economy by Proxy in the Seventeenth Century: China, the Netherlands, and the Bakufu*., Amherst, New York Cambria Press., 2008. Margariti., "An Ocean of Islands: Islands, Insularity, and Historiography of the Indian Ocean" in Peter N. Miller., *The Sea: Thalassography and Historiography*., 208., Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*, 2-3, 8, 164, 285, 287, 292. Graz. *The Power of Standards: Hybrid Authority and the Globalisation of Services*, 24-53.

system as agents of Tokugawa power who did not diminish, but rather, upheld shogunal authority in interactions with rival states such as the Ming and the VOC.[136]

As a legal framework, the vermilion seal system also served to legitimize the ambitious and violent actions of intermediaries such as the Suetsugu under the umbrella of Tokugawa authority. In serving as a legal framework that sanctioned freelance maritime violence, the vermilion seal system was a means for intermediaries such as the Suetsugu to further their ambitions to carve out areas of personal dominion from the fragmented patchwork of Tokugawa sovereign claims in the East Asian maritime world.[137] Heizō I desired Taiwan and in the 1620s, the major rival who emerged to challenge the Suetsugu patriarch over claims to the island and its inhabitants was the VOC. Heizō I first tried to lay claim to Taiwan by establishing that its aboriginal inhabitants were Tokugawa subjects and to that end, created a "king" of that island whom he sent to Edo in order to pay tribute to the shogun.[138] When Heizō I's embassy failed, the Suetsugu patriarch used the vermilion seal system and in particular, VOC interference with Japanese ships near Taiwan

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[136] As Charlotte Von Verschuer argues "Piracy featured as the main issue in the Ashikaga shogun's early correspondence with the sovereigns of China and Korea." For a more elaborate discussion of Ming demands to the Ashikaga to suppress piracy as a condition of receiving trading tallies, see Charlotte Von Verschuer,. "Ashikaga Yoshimitsu's Foreign Policy 1398 to 1408 A.D.: A Translation from "Zenrin Kokuhōki," the Cambridge Manuscript." Monumenta Nipponica 62, no. 3 (2007): 261-97. For the contention over subduing pirates between Hideyoshi and the Ming and the early Tokugawa regime and the Ming, see Mizuno, "China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu's Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China.," 15. For an excellent narrative of how the Tokugawa shogunate subdued the VOC, see Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*.

[137] Recently, Clulow examines how the Tokugawa shogunate projected state power into the interimperial arena that was the early seventeenth century Asian maritime world. According to Clulow, the Tokugawa regime pragmatically severed relations with the recipients of its vermilion seal trading passes who caused trouble in the Asian maritime world to the extent of revoking their status as subjects of the shogun and turning them over to the judicial processes of local authorities. However, Clulow also notes that Tokugawa officials could and did act with swift reprisal against those who attacked the bearers of vermilion seal trading permits. As Clulow argues, vermilion seal permits transformed ships and their crews into "mobile outposts" of shogunal authority. See Benton and Clulow, "Legal Encounters and the Origins of Global Law," in *The Cambridge World History*., 40., Adam Clulow, "Like Lambs in Japan and Devils outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia." *Journal of World History* 24, no. 2 (2013): 335-58.

[138] For an expanded look at Heizō I's embassy from the "King" of Taiwan, see Adam Clulow., "A Fake Embassy: The Lord of Taiwan and Tokugawa Japan " in Adam Clulow ed. *Statecraft and Spectacle in East Asia: Studies in Taiwan-Japan Relations*. Routledge, 2013., 23-41.

as legal justification to plan an attack on the Dutch. Heizō I used his political influence in Edo to solicit a vermilion seal permit to sanction his own, freelance ambitions for violence against the VOC. Although the text of the vermilion seal permit directed Heizō I to "drive the Dutch from Taiwan" in an unspecified manner, the Suetsugu patriarch loosely interpreted the directive, and of his own accord, as permission to kill Governor Nuyts.[139] With his recently acquired vermilion seal permit in hand, Heizō I ordered his most trusted ship captain, Hamada Yahyōe, to outfit a military expedition and sail to Taiwan.

Unlike sixteenth century Japanese warlords, who ignored central authority, save invocations of a powerless emperor, the Suetsugu always defined their actions as acting in the capacity of shogunal officials. They did not, however, feel constrained by shogunal commands and Heizō I loosely interpreted his claim to Tokugawa authority by deciding to kill Governor Nuyts in accordance with his own ambitions.[140] The early Tokugawa regime may have been a

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[139] See *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* (大日本史料編纂所, 寛永 Kan'ei 4, 1627 October 25, ９月１７日), 2, "(第二条）是より先、和蘭国、高砂国を占領す、和蘭バタビヤ総督ピーテル・カルペンチール、高砂国に於ける日本商人に輸出入税を課す、仍りて、末次政直「平蔵」の船長浜田弥兵衛、其不法を訴ふ、カルペンチール、高砂総督ピーテル・ノイツ等を日本に遣し、書を致して高砂への渡航朱印状の下付を二・三年間中止せられんことを幕府に請ふ、是日、幕府、年寄及び伊勢安濃津城主藤堂高虎・儒官林信勝「羅山」・同信澄・金地院崇伝「以心」等をして、之を議せしめ、書辞無礼なるに依り、ピーテル・ノイツ等を逐ふ," 10., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1627/18-7-1/5/0010?m=all&s=0010. Pieter Muyser also mentions in his journal that a nobleman from Hirado domain visited him in captivity in August 1628. The nobleman explained to Muyser that Heizō I had written to the lord of Hirado domain that he had received a shogunal pass to arrest Muyser and the VOC hostages and due to this pass, the shogun had granted him jurisdiction in the matter. Muyser's unpublished and untranslated journal is also an indispensable resource for understanding how Heizō I leveraged his conflict with the VOC to bring the Suetsugu to a position of power within the Tokugawa shogunate. In his journal, Muyser recorded his conversations not only with Heizō I, but also with the Suetsugu patriarch's chief subordinates, Hamada and Sanzō. Muyser's conversations with Heizō I and his subordinates are important as they reveal that the Suetsugu dispute with the VOC arose from contested notions of sovereignty over Taiwan. Pieter J. Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270., doc. 3446.

[140] Contra Noell Wilson, I argue that the Tokugawa regime did not possess a Weberian "monopoly on violence." Wilson, *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*, 10. As Mary Elizabeth Berry reminds, "The institutionalization of power-the creation of regular, independent, and impersonal organs of rule with an explicitly public and professional character-was attenuated at best on the national level. Aspects of 'state' formation, defined archetypally by Weber and still central to the Western literature, remain problematic in early

decentralized government that relied on intermediaries to exercise power, but it acted swiftly against state agents who flaunted shogunal authority in ways that discredited Edo or threatened to bring instability to the realm.[141] When Hamada returned to Nagasaki in July 1628 with Muyser and five VOC hostages instead of Nuyts' head, it escalated Heizō I's personal vendetta into an international crisis between the Tokugawa regime and the Dutch. Heizō I's failure to kill Nuyts and remove the Dutch from Taiwan prompted the Suetsugu patriarch to create a narrative in which he was victorious. For Heizō I's narrative to work, he needed to coerce Muyser to write a letter renouncing VOC claim's over Taiwan that the Suetsugu patriarch could present before the high shogunal councilors in Edo. Heizō I attempted to threaten and intimidate Muyser but did not get the letter he desired and instead, sent his own demands to VOC headquarters in Batavia. In the end, Heizō I's plan failed as neither the Tokugawa shogunate or the VOC were interested in escalating tensions to the point of open warfare over Taiwan. After nearly driving the Suetsugu to destruction, Heizō I died in 1630 with his ambition for Taiwan unfulfilled and in his wake, he left a diplomatic and commercial deadlock between the Tokugawa shogunate and the VOC.[142] However, Heizō I's efforts inadvertently laid the foundation for the rebirth of the Suetsugu under his son, Shigemasa, as Tokugawa intermediaries in a new age of partnership with the Dutch.

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modern Japan-whether we are concerned with a public treasury, a separate judiciary, or a national bureaucracy." See Berry, Mary Elizabeth. "Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan." Journal of Japanese Studies 12.2 (Summer 1986), 237-71., 240.

[141] Examples of Tokugawa intermediaries who earned the wrath of Edo in the early seventeenth century were the Sō lords of Tsushima domain who forged documents bearing the shogun's signature to the Chosŏn Dynasty of Korea, Arima Harunobu (1567-1612), lord of Shimabara domain, who conspired with fellow Christians to swindle land from other, constituent lords, and the adventurer, Yamada Nagamasa (1590-1630), who swore allegiance to foreign monarch.

[142] Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 244-254.

Piracy in East Asia and the Rise of the Vermilion Seal System

One of the most important institutions which emerged after the sixteenth century wave of globalization was the duty of East Asian monarchs to eliminate piracy.[143] The ability of an East Asian monarch to subdue pirates was the hallmark of a legitimate state which other peer monarchs could recognize within a transitioning framework of East Asian states.[144] At times, East Asian monarchs subdued pirates through their use of military force such as when the Chosŏn kings of Korea (1392-1910) invaded Tsushima in 1419 to subdue the Sō family and the enclaves of pirates they sponsored.[145] Another means that East Asian monarchs used to combat piracy was to incorporate them into the realm as landed lords. For example, Japan's second great unifier, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, issued an anti-piracy edict in 1588 and then proceeded to award

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[143] For discussions regarding sixteenth century globalization, see Immanuel Wallerstein. *The Modern World-System*. Immanuel Wallerstein. Berkeley: University of California Press., 2011. Flynn, Dennis O. and Arturo Giráldez. 1995. 'Born With a "Silver Spoon": The Origins of World Trade in 1571'. Journal of World History 6:201–221.On the "general crisis," of the seventeenth century, see Geoffrey Parker, "Crisis and Catastrophe: The Global Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Reconsidered." The American Historical Review 113, no. 4 (2008): 1053-079. John Wills, "Maritime Asia, 1500-1800: The Interactive Emergence of European Domination." AHR 98. 1993. 83-105 and Andrade, Tonio. "The Rise and Fall of Dutch Taiwan, 1624-1662: Cooperative Colonization and the Statist Model of European Expansion." Journal of World History 17, no. 4 (2006): 429-50. Scholars such as Dennis O. Flynn, Arturo Giráldez, Michael O'Rourke, Jurgen Osterhammel, Justin Jennings, and Jan De Vries, just to name a few, have argued over key questions that I sum up thusly for convenience: When did globalization began? Was globalization a singular wave or a series of waves? Were the multiple globalizations? What types of exchanges characterized it? What did globalization look like? See Justin Jennings, *Globalizations and the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Jürgen Osterhammel, "Globalizations," in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, ed. Jerry H. Bentley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Kevin H. O'Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson. "Once More: When Did Globalisation Begin?" *European Review of Economic History* 8, no. 1 (2004): 109-17. Dennis Flynn & Arturo Giráldez, "Born Again: Globalization's Sixteenth Century Origins (Asian/Global Versus European Dynamics)." Pacific Economic Review., 2008., 13. 359 - 387. Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Path Dependence, Time Lags and the Birth of Globalisation: A Critique of O'Rourke and Williamson." European Review of Economic History 8, no. 1 (2004): 81-108.

[144] In referring to a multistate framework of institutional rules and norms in East Asia, I build upon the international relations turn in history and particularly the current debate between David Kang, Hendrik Spruyt, Joshua Van Lieu, and Saeyoung Park, see Kang, *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute*., 10, 71., Park, "Long Live the Tributary System! The Future of Studying East Asian Foreign Relations." Spruyt, "Collective Imaginations and International Order: The Contemporary Context of the Chinese Tributary System." Van Lieu, "The Tributary System and the Persistence of Late Victorian Knowledge.," and Kang., "Response: Theory and Empirics in the Study of Historical East Asian International Relations."

[145] This event was the Ōei Invasion of 1419, see Etsuko Hae-Jin Kang., *Diplomacy and Ideology in Japanese-Korean Relations from the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century*.

landed domains and admiralty titles to the infamous pirates of the Seto Inland Sea, the Noshima and Kurushima Murakami.[146] The Ming investiture of Zheng Zhilong as "patrolling admiral" is also an example of East Asian monarchs incorporating pirates into their realm was as a means of controlling his network to subdue other pirates.[147] While force and incorporation were important tools for East Asian monarchs in subduing pirates, a third, and arguably riskier measure was to issue trading tallies and permits. However, trading tallies and permits also carried the allure of high rewards that could enrich the monarch and the realm, but also brought rulers into the question of enforcement.

The challenge of projecting power through maritime intermediaries while safeguarding state legitimacy was common to both East Asian and European empires at the close of the sixteenth century. The Toyotomi regime issued permits with Hideyoshi's vermillion seal as a means of suppressing piracy and was also a means for Asian monarchs to distinguish between the ships that sailed under his protection and pirates.[148] Although the success of Hideyoshi's measures to subdue piracy are debatable, he ultimately failed to reintegrate Japan within the broader East Asian multistate framework. Indeed, one of Hideyoshi's claims regarding his decision to invade Ming China in 1588 was the result of the Wanli Emperor's failure to recognize his success in suppressing piracy.[149] Maritime violence likewise accompanied European expansion into East Asia during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and monarchs and company states issued

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[146] For a good discussion of the "anti-piracy" and "sword hunt" edicts and their impact on the Noshima and Kurushima Murakami maritime dynasties, see Peter D. Shapinsky, *Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence, and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan* (University of Michigan, Center for Japanese Studies, 2014)., 12-13, 16, 70, 108, 136, 150-151, 232, 236, 242, 247, 250.

[147] Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c.1620-1720*., 51-54.

[148] Laver, *Japan's Economy by Proxy in the Seventeenth Century: China, the Netherlands, and the Bakufu*. Young, 50-51.

[149] Mizuno, "China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu's Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China," 115.

trading permits as a means of extending state protection and legitimizing violence the high seas. Adam Clulow notes that Dutch and English East India Company officials struggled with establishing legitimacy among Asian monarchs in the aftermath of their employees' wanton acts of maritime violence. Although the Dutch and English East India Companies provided state support to its agents, this did not translate into legitimization and recognition from other Asian monarchs who increasingly came to view Europeans as stateless pirates.[150] Although trading permits and tallies aided East Asian states and Europeans in the subjugation of pirates by incorporating them into their respective realms, they also carried the risk that monarchs would have to account for or disavow acts of maritime violence.[151]

The vermilion seal system that emerged under the Tokugawa shogunate in the milieu of globalization, competition, and maritime violence combined elements of the permits of the Toyotomi regime, the Portuguese *cartaz*es, or licensing system, and the Ming tally trade.[152] Like the Ming tally and the Portuguese *cartazes*, Tokugawa vermillion seal permits theoretically

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[150] Clulow, "Like Lambs in Japan and Devils Outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia," 348-349. The issue of state support and the projection of power into the maritime world has become an important subtext within the larger revisionist debate in global history. Tonio Andrade argues that East Asian states were disinterested in manifesting state power in the maritime arena in contrast to Western European monarchs and company states who sought to establish outposts and sovereign enclaves. Andrade argues that Koxinga changed the dynamic of European dominance of the seas when he conquered VOC Taiwan and established a maritime empire of his own, the Kingdom of Tungning. More recently, Adam Clulow examines how the Tokugawa shogunate projected state power into the interimperial arena that was the early seventeenth century Asian maritime world. According to Clulow, the Tokugawa regime pragmatically severed relations with the recipients of its vermilion seal trading passes who caused trouble in the Asian maritime world to the extent of revoking their status as subjects of the shogun and turning them over to the judicial processes of local authorities. However, Clulow also notes that Tokugawa officials could and did act with swift reprisal against those who attacked the bearers of vermilion seal trading permits. See Andrade., "The Rise and Fall of Dutch Taiwan, 1624-1662: Cooperative Colonization and the Statist Model of European Expansion.," 429-50., 447-450. See also Clulow, "Like Lambs in Japan and Devils Outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia."

[151] See Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*, 292.

[152] My inspiration for arguing that the Tokugawa vermilion seal system was the product of a "hybrid maritime culture" builds on the innovative, global history scholarship of Nagazumi Yoko, Mizuno Norihito, and Peter Shapinsky. See Nagazumi Yōko. *Shuinsen* 朱印船. Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan., 2001., 9-19., Peter D. Shapinsky, "Polyvocal Portolans: Nautical Charts and Hybrid Maritime Cultures in Early Modem East Asia," *Early Modern Japan*, XIV (2006), 4-26., 4, 9. Mizuno, "China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu's Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China," 109, 111, 121.

served as a means for other Asian monarchs to contend with an early modern world of layered sovereign claims and differentiate between state-sponsored mariners and dangerous pirates. On the surface, Tokugawa vermillion seal permits resembled Ming tallies except they included the current Japanese imperial reign name as a dating convention. Tokugawa vermillion seal permits also emulated the Portuguese *cartazes* system in that they granted their recipients state protection and temporary status as subjects for a fee, usually in exchange for bribes or gifts to government officials.[153]

However, the danger in the Tokugawa regime's granting of subject status through the vermilion seal permits, even in a temporary capacity necessitated that shogunal officials either defend the actions of its recipients or disavow them within the context of an international audience. This dilemma of disavowing or defending the actions of subjects was symptomatic of the Tokugawa regime as a decentralized state that exercised power through intermediaries which stemmed from the efforts of Edo to contend with the uneven imperial geography that remained after Japan's Warring States Period.[154]

Tokugawa permits transformed vermilion seal ships, such as those of the Suetsugu, into "mobile outposts of state authority" and specified that their crews were Tokugawa subjects for the duration of the voyage.[155] Rare vermilion seal permits such as the one that Tokugawa Ieyasu issued to the VOC in 1609 could even grant a more permanent status of protection and

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[153] As Mizuno notes, "Kamiya Nobuyuki 紙屋敦之 also maintains that Ieyasu was seeking equality with China, bearing the title “King of Japan” (*Nihon kokuō*) bestowed by the Ming emperor. However, he does not clearly argue that it meant that Ieyasu wished to become a Chinese vassal, for Kamiya also argues that the Japanese considered the vermilion seal as equivalent to the tally." And that "the use of the Japanese era name in the trade certificate and its resemblance to the Chinese-issued tally, for example, announced nothing more than the Japanese rejection of becoming an inferior constituent of the Sinocentric world order or of recognition of China’s superiority." See Mizuno, 109, 111, 121. Nagazumi Yōko. *Shuinsen* 朱印船. Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan., 2001. 7-13, 18-19., Laver, *Japan's Economy by Proxy in the Seventeenth Century: China, the Netherlands, and the Bakufu*., 61-62.
[154] See Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*, 285.
[155] Benton and Clulow. “Legal Encounters and the Origins of Global Law.,” 91.

recognition to its recipients as subjects of the realm. From 1604 to 1635, approximately 356 ships sailed to destinations throughout Asia carrying Tokugawa vermilion seal permits.[156] During this three-decade period, the Suetsugu family received 10 vermilion seal permits and sailed their ships to locations throughout South and Southeast Asia.[157] By comparison, the Suminokura family received the most vermilion seal permits at 16 and lower averages fluctuated between one to three permits per organization. Although the Suetsugu might not have received the most permits, they were nonetheless one of the more important families within the vermilion seal system. The term "Suetsugu ship" attests to the influence of Heizō I and his descendants in this system as well as it is nomenclature for a hybridized style of ship that fused Western, Japanese, and Chinese shipbuilding techniques.[158] Vermilion seal craft such as the Suetsugu ships featured

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[156] As for the best, at a glance, all-encompassing reference for vermilion seal permits, Iwao Seiichi's monumental study of the vermilion seal system still remains the best resource In particular, his table that delineates the year, number of permits, destination, and recipient of the vermilion seal permit. See Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一., Shuinsen Bōeki Shi No Kenkyū 朱印船貿易史の研究. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1985., 220-221. For source material on the vermilion seal permits, see Nakamura Tadashi., ed., 中村**質**., Ikoku Nikki/異国日記 : 金地院崇伝外交文書集成 影印本., Tokyo: Tokyo Bijutsu., 1989., Naitō Chisō/内藤耻叟, ed., *Tokugawa jikki/*徳川実紀. 巻 1-186.,Tōkyō: Tokugawa Jikki Shuppan Jimusho/徳川実紀出版事務所., Meiji 29-32 [1896-1899]., *Edo Bakufu nikki* 江戸幕府日記., Tōkyō: Nogami Shuppan., 1900. Laver's work is also a useful and instructive for research into the vermilion seal system, see Laver, *Japan's Economy by Proxy in the Seventeenth Century: China, the Netherlands, and the Bakufu*.

[157] The Suetsugu obtained their last vermilion seal permit in 1633 for a voyage to Cambodia. See *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*., 1631 July 9, 寛永８年６月２０日, （第一条）是より先、幕府、外国渡航の貿易船には、朱印状の外に、奉書を下すことに定む、是日、末次茂房「平蔵」に之を下す., Iwao Seiichi 岩生成一., Shuinsen Bōeki Shi No Kenkyū 朱印船貿易史の研究. Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1985., 220-221.

[158] Ishii Kenji and Iwao Seiichi were pioneers in exploring the hybridity of maritime culture and its influence on shipbuilding and referenced the shipbuilding efforts of the Suetsugu that incorporated Western, Japanese, and Chinese techniques, see Ishii Kenji石井謙治, "*Suetsugu Heizō no Tōsen*"“末次平蔵の唐船,” *Nihon Rekishi*日本歴史 5, no. 180 (196): 30-33., Iwao Seiichi 石井謙治, "*Sakoku Jidai no Kōyōbune Kenzō Kambun no Tōsen to Tenmei no Sangokumaru* “鎖国時代の航洋船建造寛文の唐船と天明の三国丸,” in *Nihon no Kaiyōmin*日本の海洋民 (未来社, Tōkyō Miraisha, 1974),. 大阪府立図書館編., 南方渡海古文献図錄, Ōsaka Furitsu Toshokan. 1943. *Nanpō tokai kobunken zuroku*. Kyōto: Kobayashi Shashin Seihanjo Shuppanbu., 17. For a more recent and excellent discussion on maritime hybridity, see Peter D. Shapinsky, "Polyvocal Portolans: Nautical Charts and Hybrid Maritime Cultures in Early Modem East Asia," *Early Modern Japan*, XIV (2006), 4-26.

vermilion colored markings along the bow, the stern, and along the top of the hull. In addition, vermilion seal ships adopted the use of distinctive flags to mark them as the carriers of shogunal authority. For example, the Araki trading family of Nagasaki flew an upside-down VOC flag as a warning, especially to the Dutch, that their ships sailed under shogunal authority. Suetsugu ships flew flags with Heizō I's personal emblem within a vermilion circle on the stern.[159] Ship owners such as the Suetsugu likely incorporated vermilion coloring along with these distinctive symbols and flags as a visible connection to Tokugawa authority and the permits they carried. In addition to the eclecticism of distinctive shipbuilding techniques and symbols, sixteenth century globalization further catalyzed the vermilion seal system as a hybrid product of the maritime world and a transitioning multistate framework in East Asia.

[159] 大阪府立図書館編., 南方渡海古文献図錄, Ōsaka Furitsu Toshokan. 1943. *Nanpō tokai kobunken zuroku*. Kyōto: Kobayashi Shashin Seihanjo Shuppanbu., 17-18.

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As a decentralized state within a transitioning multistate framework in East Asia, the Tokugawa regime relied on vermilion seal carriers, such as the Suetsugu, to act as state intermediaries in foreign diplomacy and to assist in rebuilding Japan's economy after the Warring States Period. However, Tokugawa reliance on vermillion seal permit carriers as its intermediaries did not come without risk as Asian monarchs never knew if they were receiving

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[160] Figure 3-2. An example of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's vermilion seal at the lower right-hand portion of the document. This particular document is from around 1590 and Hideyoshi mentions thanks for the gift of two salted mackerels and mentions one of his cadastral surveys. See https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/DAS/pickup/view/detail/detailArchivesEn/0406000000/0000000614/01

[161] Figure 3-3. This is the vermilion seal pass that Tokugawa Ieyasu awarded to the VOC in 1609 and bears his seal at the upper left portion of the document. Image courtesy of the *Nationaal Archief*. Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21., 1A1 1A1 Akte van vrijgeleide voor alle havens in Japan door de Shogun Ieyasu aan Jacques Groenewegen verleend ten behoeve van de Nederlanders, in Japanse karakters, 1609, met bijlagen in het Nederlands en Engels, [1620,1800, 1935] 1609 1.

[162] Figure 3-4. An Araki family vermilion seal ship. Note the upside-down VOC flag at the stern. Image courtesy of the National Archives of Japan. http://www.archives.go.jp/event/jp_vn45/ch02.html

[163] Figure 3-5. This is a famous depiction of a Suetsugu ship from a votive plaque which the Heizō dynasty commissioned and donated to the Nagasaki Kiyomizu Temple in 1634. Note the distinctive lateen sail, markings, and Heizō's personal emblem on the stern flag. Image courtesy of the city of Nagasaki. http://www.city.nagasaki.lg.jp/nagazine/column/201510/index.html

"peaceful merchants or dangerous pirates, legitimate traders or opportunistic marauders."[164] Consider Yamada Nagamasa (1590-1630), a contemporary of Heizō I, and vermillion seal trader who traveled regularly to Southeast Asia. Yamada began sailing to the Kingdom of Ayutthaya (modern Thailand) around 1614 and became the leader of the local Japanese community. While in Ayutthaya, Yamada earned the reputation as a capable military commander of Japanese mercenaries on land and at sea. Yamada's reputation also earned him the privilege of personally commanding armies for the King of Ayutthaya who also made the Japanese sea captain a vassal king of Ligor in return for his service. Yamada returned to Japan in 1624 to renew his expired vermillion seal permit but after a lengthy process of three years, shogunal officials denied his application in 1627.[165] The Tokugawa regime considered Yamada a foreigner and bade him to return to his own country of Ayutthaya. In revoking Yamada's vermillion seal permit and expelling him from Japan, Edo made the conscious decision to sever ties with an individual they deemed dangerous to the international standing and domestic stability of the Tokugawa regime. Had Tokugawa officials renewed Yamada's vermillion seal permit, they risked not only involving Japan in Ayutthaya's wars, but also the reputation of the realm among other Asian monarchs. In other words, Tokugawa officials exercised caution through the vermillion seal system as intermediaries and their rogue ambitions could potentially complicate Japan's political legitimacy within a transitioning East Asian world order.

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164 Clulow, “Like Lambs in Japan and Devils Outside Their Land: Diplomacy, Violence, and Japanese Merchants in Southeast Asia,” 347.

165 For the story of Yamada Nagamasa, see Iwao Seiichi "Nanyō Nihonmachi no kenkyū 南洋日本町の研究," in Yamada Nagamasa shiryō shūsei 山田長政資料集成, ed. Yamada Nagamasa kenshōkai 山田長政顯彰会, (Shizuoka: Yamada Nagamasa kenshōkai, 1974)., Polenghi, Cesare. 2009. Samurai of Ayutthaya: Yamada Nagamasa, Japanese warrior and merchant in early seventeenth-century Siam. Bangkok: White lotus Press., Nagazumi, Shuinsen 朱印船., 112-131., For the Tokugawa shogunate's denial of Yamada Nagamasa's vermilion seal permit renewal, see *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*., 寛永１年１０月２０日, 山田長正の商船、暹羅国より来航し、帰帆許可の朱印状を請ふ、幕府、之を許さず

In contrast to Yamada's experience, the Tokugawa regime increasingly came to rely on the Suetsugu as its transnational intermediaries during the time of Heizō I. As transnational intermediaries for the Tokugawa regime, the Suetsugu used their position as one of the vermilion seal system's most prominent families to reintegrate Japan within the East Asian international environment. As Yamada awaited the rejection of his vermilion seal permit in 1625, shogunal officials ordered Heizō I to correspond with the Governor-General of Fujian, Nan Juyi, as an attempt to open "friendly relations" between the Ming and Tokugawa Japan.[166] In 1624, Nan wrote a letter to the Governor of Nagasaki, Hasegawa Gonroku, demanding that the Tokugawa take all measures to eradicate the Japanese pirates who had been raiding the coast of Southeastern China. Heizō I responded to Nan that there were no Japanese Pirates. As Heizō I declared, the Tokugawa shogunate had taken harsh measures, to include maritime patrols, and had successfully eliminated all the pirates from its coastal waters. As Heizō I observed, "if any pirates remained, they originated from Ming China, disguised themselves as Japanese, and received their inspiration for villainy from Westerners and the teachings of Jesus."[167] Heizō I assured Nan that Japan would do its best to prevent the Japanese from committing acts of

[166] For Heizō I 's letter to the Ming Governor-General of Fujian, see Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo大日本近世史料., 1625, 寛永２年是歳,（第十条）肥前長崎代官末次政直「平蔵」、幕府の命に依り、明の福建総督某に復書し、其沿海を侵寇する者は邦人に非ざるを弁じ、親誼を修む, 51-53. As Andrade observes, Nan Juyi had also sent Chinese troops to the Penghu Islands in order to attack the VOC. See Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*., 13.

[167] See Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料，寛永２年是歳, 1625,（第十条）肥前長崎代官末次政直「平蔵」、幕府の命に依り、明の福建総督某に復書し、其沿海を侵寇する者は邦人に非ざるを弁じ、親誼を修む, 51-53.

maritime predation, but also recommended to the Governor-General of Fujian that if the Ming truly wished to eliminate piracy, perhaps they should begin with their own pirates.[168]

The exchange between the Ming Governor-General of Fujian and Heizō I is instructive for three major reasons, and most of all, why the Suetsugu were effective intermediaries for the Tokugawa shogunate. First, both the Tokugawa and Ming governments sought to reconcile their relationship within a transitioning multistate framework in East Asia. As a long-standing institution in East Asian diplomatic relations, the topic of state subjugation of pirates served as an opening for Tokugawa and Ming officials to discuss normalizing relations between their respective states. Heizō I likewise emphasized the need for both the Ming and the Tokugawa to normalize relations and affirmed that the Tokugawa shogunate had its subjects well in hand. Although Heizō I admitted that Japan had problems with piracy in the past, he argued the pirates who had attacked Korea under Hideyoshi's leadership were part of a defunct state that was no longer in power. In his exchange with the Governor-General of Fujian, Heizō I's correspondence contained two of the key ingredients to suggest that Tokugawa Japan was a sovereign and legitimate state, namely that it exerted control over its subjects and had eliminated piracy. Although the correspondence between Heizō I and the Governor-General of Fujian did not reopen diplomatic relations between the Tokugawa and the Ming, it at least began the process of normalizing Japan's reemergence within the East Asian multistate world order as a legitimate state.

The correspondence between Heizō I and the Ming Governor-General of Fujian is also illustrative of the fluidity of the early Tokugawa settlement and how the Suetsugu leveraged the

[168] Mizuno also provides some discussion regarding the correspondence between Heizō I, Hasegawa Gonroku, and the Ming Governor-General of Fujian, see Mizuno, "China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu's Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China," 134-135.

ambiguity of their own standing to exert power and influence in an international environment. First, Heizō I used the Japanese calendar and corresponding imperial reign name of Kan'ei, a prudent decision on behalf of the Suetsugu patriarch, which signaled Tokugawa rejection of Ming suzerainty. Although Edo welcomed friendly and normalized relations, Heizō I's letter substantiates that the Tokugawa regime refused investiture by the Ming and increasingly viewed itself as a peer of China within a reemergent East Asian multistate framework. [169]

Arguably, the more important part of Heizō I's introduction to Nan Juyi was the Suetsugu patriarch's invention, for himself, of a peer title with that of the Fujianese Governor General. In the introduction of the letter, Heizō I referred to himself with his full name of Suetsugu Heizō Masanao and claimed the title of "Governor/Garrisoned Official of Nagasaki," a decision which is reflexive of how the Suetsugu leveraged their ambiguous position within the fluid Tokugawa order to amass political and economic power in their dealings with foreign officials.[170] It is also important to note that Heizō I's choice of title as "Governor/Garrisoned Official of Nagasaki" has no ready equivalent in the history of Japanese officialdom and suggests that the Suetsugu patriarch possessed a working knowledge of Ming bureaucracy. More importantly, Heizō I knew how to exploit his knowledge of Ming bureaucracy and Chinese officialdom to his benefit, allowing the Suetsugu patriarch to claim to represent the Tokugawa regime while advocating for a resumption of commercial relations in line with his own ambitions. Heizō I's successful

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[169] I argue alongside Mizuno that Tokugawa Japan did not perceive itself as Chinese tributary state. As Mizuno notes, " Along with the new shogunal diplomatic title of *taikun* 大君, the bakufu decided to use a Japanese era name in its diplomatic letters. This decision was based on the claim that Japan was not a Chinese tributary, which had been indeed the bakufu's consistent stance toward China since the beginning of the seventeenth century." See Mizuno, "China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu's Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China," 135.

[170] In the letter, Heizō I introduced himself as "顧官" which carries the meaning of "garrisoned official," "commander," or "governor." See Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, 寛永２年是歳, 1625,（第十条）肥前長崎代官末次政直「平蔵」、幕府の命に依り、明の福建総督某に復書し、其沿海を侵寇する者は邦人に非ざるを弁じ、親誼を修む, 51.

engagement with the Ming then was a watershed moment in the political rise of the Suetsugu as important Tokugawa intermediaries.

Heizō I's correspondence with the Ming Governor-General of Fujian is emblematic of the type of "creative legal posturing" that early Tokugawa intermediaries employed in simultaneously furthering the interests of Edo and their own ambitions through selective engagement with an uneven imperial landscape that remained after Japan's Warring States Period.[171] Heizō I was ultimately successful in normalizing Japan's relationship with the Ming because he did not diminish the international legitimacy of the Tokugawa regime. The major contribution of Heizō I to Tokugawa-Ming relations was his portrayal of piracy as a problem that emanated from China.[172] Heizō I's claims that Japan had eliminated its pirates was important in portraying Tokugawa Japan as sovereign and legitimate to its peer states, Ming China and Chosŏn Korea. In order to gauge just how successful Heizō I was in his duties as a Tokugawa intermediary, it is instructive to briefly compare the Suetsugu to the trajectory of their contemporaries, most notably, the Sō lords of Tsushima domain who were working to normalize Japan's relations with Korea during the 1620s.

As Heizō I prepared his correspondence to the Governor-General of Fujian in 1624, his contemporary, Sō Yoshinari, the lord of Tsushima domain, forged a letter from the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu (1604-1651) to the Chosŏn King of Korea. In Yoshinari's letter, Iemitsu introduced himself as the "King of Japan." This was the third such letter that the Sō family forged which incorporated "King of Japan" as the title for the Tokugawa shogun and as Jurgis

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[171] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 290.

[172] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, 寛永２年是歳, 1625,（第十条）肥前長崎代官末次政直「平蔵」、幕府の命に依り、明の福建総督某に復書し、其沿海を侵寇する者は邦人に非ざるを弁じ、親誼を修む, 53.

Elisonas so aptly phrased it "this was a diplomacy based on outright forgery."[173] Tokugawa officials initially tolerated the Sō forgeries as they were the hallmark of effective "creative political entrepreneurs," and helped to normalize Japan's relations with Korea.[174] What Tokugawa officials could not ignore was the Sō reference to the shogun as the "King of Japan," a peer to the King of Korea, and implied vassal of the Ming Emperor. When the Sō forgeries became public in 1635, Tokugawa officials executed and banished several if the family's retainers. However, the Sō remained the "key intermediaries" with the Chosŏn in Tsushima, but "they were no longer in full charge."[175]

Much like the Sō and their relationship with Chosŏn Korea, Heizō I was useful to the Tokugawa regime in helping to normalize Japan's relations with Ming China as a peer state. Unlike the Sō, Heizō I did not compromise the sovereign legitimacy and standing of his monarch, the Tokugawa shogun, in relation to the King of Korea or the Ming Emperor while furthering his own ambitions as the Suetsugu patriarch. Heizō I's correspondence with the Governor-General of Fujian was a peer exchange that avoided the issue of the Tokugawa shogun's standing in relation to the Ming Emperor. Due to the ambiguity of the Suetsugu as a warrior-merchant family, Heizō I's transactions with foreign officials allowed the Tokugawa regime to avoid troublesome questions regarding shogunal authority in relation to other Asian monarchs. Furthermore, the ambiguous position which the Suetsugu occupied as Tokugawa intermediaries was less of a concern to Edo in contrast to any of the lords of constituent domains who could potentially build troublesome and destabilizing alliances with foreign powers. In

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[173] Jurgis Elisonas., n.d. "The Inseparable Trinity: Japan's Relations with China and Korea" in Hall, John Whitney., ed., 2008. *The Cambridge History of Japan. Vol. 4, Vol. 4*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 295-299.
[174] Burbank and Cooper., *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*., Maier., "Empire Without End: Imperial Achievements and Ideologies.,"153-59.
[175] Elisonas, 298-299.

short, Suetsugu involvement in foreign diplomacy as intermediaries gave Tokugawa officials both deniability and reassurance that the actions of Heizō I and his descendants would not undermine the regime.

The Suetsugu proved their effectiveness to the Tokugawa regime in one other major area: enforcers of shogunal sovereignty and legitimacy within the vermillion seal system.[176] In the 1620s, Tokugawa Japan did not have a centralized navy that was capable of projecting power across the oceans to manifest shogunal authority. Hence, the Tokugawa shogunate did not possess a "monopoly on violence" when the need arose to project state authority into the maritime world in response to attacks on shogunal prestige.[177] A useful comparative to the Suetsugu in this instance is Jean and Pierre Lafitte and the Early American Republic's need for ships, sailors, and maritime expertise to bolster its nascent naval forces. The Brothers Lafitte had amassed a small fleet of ships and administered an independent state on the island of Barataria off the coast of New Orleans. Although the Brothers Lafitte had earned a reputation as pirates, General Andrew Jackson sought their aid against British forces during the 1815 Battle of New Orleans.[178] As a weak and consolidating state, the Early American Republic needed agents such as the Brothers Lafitte to augment its navy and coastal defense forces. In the absence of a powerful navy, the ships, manpower, and multinational networks of the Brothers Lafitte allowed the Early American Republic to project state authority into maritime space during a war for survival against the British Empire. As a decentralized regime that exercised power through intermediaries, the Tokugawa needed the Suetsugu whose ships, resources, and multistate

[176] Again, I draw upon Clulow's observations that attacks against Tokugawa authority and the vermilion seal system "invariably produced a disproportionate response" in terms of violent attacks against the violator. See Clulow, “Finding the Balance: European Military Power in Early Modern Asia,” 5.
[177] Wilson, *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*., 10.
[178] William C. Davis., *The Pirates Laffite: The Treacherous World of the Corsairs of the Gulf*. Orlando, Fla: Harcourt., 2005., 211-213.

networks could respond to foreign threats and challenges to shogunal authority in the maritime world. In the late 1620s, the VOC challenged Tokugawa Japan in the maritime world and its claims to Taiwan were in direct conflict with shogunal sovereignty and legitimacy. Worst of all for the VOC, Dutch claims to Taiwan stood in the way of Heizō I's ambitions to make the island part of a Suetsugu maritime domain. It was a challenge that neither the Tokugawa shogunate or Heizō I could leave unanswered.

Heizō I's Attack on VOC Taiwan

Heizō I's ambitions to make Taiwan part of his maritime domain began as a personal conflict between the Suetsugu patriarch and the VOC, lasting three years from 1627-1630, and during that time, hostilities risked escalation into open warfare between the company and the Tokugawa shogunate.[179] As a Tokugawa intermediary, Heizō I was cautious in presenting his ambitions for Taiwan in the guise of acting as a legitimate representative of the shogun. This need for the Suetsugu patriarch to legitimize his freelance ambitions under Tokugawa authority shaped Heizō I's initial plan in 1627 to create a monarch for Taiwan and an accompanying embassy to travel to Edo and pay tribute to the shogun. Heizō I hoped that the shogun's investiture of his contrived embassy would legitimize the Suetsugu patriarch's claim to Taiwan in a direct challenge to the VOC's presence on the island. Having failed at peaceful means to remove the VOC from Taiwan, Heizō I resorted to violence and planned an attack on Governor Nuyts in 1628. To legitimize his attack on VOC Taiwan, Heizō I once again appealed to Edo to legitimize his freelance ambitions, citing that the Dutch had violated shogunal authority through their interference with vermilion seal ships. Heizō I's use of Tokugawa authority to justify his freelance ambition to

[179] The best two discussions of the conflict between the Suetsugu and the VOC are Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., and Clulow., "A Fake Embassy: The Lord of Taiwan and Tokugawa Japan."

make Taiwan part of a Suetsugu maritime domain invited danger when his captain, Hamada Yahyōe, returned to Nagasaki with hostages instead of Nuyts' head. As tensions escalated with the VOC and the danger of the high shogunal council finding out about the extent of Heizō I's failure, pressure mounted on the Suetsugu patriarch to construe his actions as successful or else, face destruction.

In October of 1627, Heizō I put his first plan to claim Taiwan under the aegis of Tokugawa authority into action when his ship captain, Hamada, arrived in Nagasaki with a group of Taiwanese aboriginal people from the village of Sinkan. For Heizō I, the task at hand was to transform the Sinkanese villagers into an envoy whom Tokugawa officials would deem legitimate upon scrutiny. Heizō I gave the Sinkanese villagers expensive clothing, a quick education in Edo court protocol, and a Chinese interpreter. As a final touch, Heizō I appointed one of the Sinkanese villagers, a man whom Japanese records call "Rika," as the "lord of Taiwan," and the Suetsugu patriarch provided the envoy with gifts to present to the shogun.[180] What happened next was a series of events that nearly defy probability which combined to sabotage Heizō I's embassy. First, all the Sinkanese villagers, including Rika, contracted smallpox during their protocol training. As a result of the disease, Rika's face was, as Tokugawa records report, "a strange color," and two of the Sinkanese villagers perished from the illness.[181] Second, Nuyts arrived in Japan, publicly denounced Heizō I's embassy for what it was: false, and

[180] "Sinkanese" refers to the inhabitants of the village of Sinkan in Taiwan which was approximately a mile from Fort Zeelandia. As Adam Clulow astutely points out, Japanese diplomatic records, particularly, *Ikoku nikki shō* simply lists "Rika" or 理加 as being a "person from Taiwan," signaling that Tokugawa officials did not accept Heizō I's narrative that the envoy, in any shape or form, represented the (nonexistent) Taiwanese monarchy, and quickly caught onto the fact that the Suetsugu patriarch made the embassy up. See Ishin Sūden, 以心崇伝., Murakami Naojirō, **村上直次郎**, ed. *Ikoku nikki shō,* 異國日記抄., Tōkyō : Shima Rentarō, Meiji 44 [1911.,] 195., Clulow., "A Fake Embassy: The Lord of Taiwan and Tokugawa Japan.," 31, 38.

[181] Ishin Sūden, 以心崇伝., Murakami Naojirō, **村上直次郎**, 222- *Ikoku nikki shō,* 異國日記抄., Tōkyō: Shima Rentarō, Meiji 44 [1911.,] 195., Clulow., "A Fake Embassy: The Lord of Taiwan and Tokugawa Japan.," 38.

demanded that Tokugawa officials immediately turn the Sinkanese villagers over to his jurisdiction as VOC Governor of Taiwan. The effectiveness of Heizō I's embassy points to failure and although the Sinkanese villagers received gifts from the shogun, Tokugawa officials had no interest in legitimizing the Suetsugu patriarch's claim to Taiwan.[182] What does become clear is that Heizō I was infuriated at Nuyts to the point of murderous intent. Having failed to claim Taiwan by peaceful means, Heizō I determined to win by violence with a plan that would deliver the island to him and satisfy the Suetsugu patriarch's personal vendetta against Nuyts by killing the governor.

With Heizō I's ambitions for Taiwan in jeopardy, the Suetsugu patriarch began planning an armed raid to wrest control of the island from the VOC, one that would appeal to Tokugawa legitimacy through the vermilion seal system. In the intervening months between Heizō I's failed embassy in the Fall of 1627 and the Spring of 1628, the Suetsugu patriarch actively lobbied the high shogunal councilors, master castle builder, Tōdō Takatora (1556-1630), the Zen Buddhist monk and diplomat, Ishin Sūden (1569-1633), and the Neo-Confucian scholar Hayashi Razan (1583-1657), that Nuyts and the VOC were detaining and illegally taxing ships which carried Tokugawa vermilion seal permits in Taiwanese waters.[183] Heizō I's complaints led the high shogunal councilors to label Nuyts and VOC officials on Taiwan as "red haired pirates" who

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[182] For an accounting of Nuyts' antics which led to a diplomatic debacle for the VOC, see Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 27-28, 93-94, 222-228, and 267, note 7.

[183] *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*, 大日本史料編纂所, 寛永 Kan'ei 4 年 9 月 １ ７ 日, October 25, 1627., 2., （第二条）是より先、和蘭国、高砂国を占領す、和蘭バタビヤ総督ピーテル・カルペンチール、高砂国に於ける日本商人に輸出入税を課す、仍りて、末次政直「平蔵」の船長浜田弥兵衛、其不法を訴ふ、カルペンチール、高砂総督ピーテル・ノイツ等を日本に遣し、書を致して高砂への渡航朱印状の下付を二・三年間中止せられんことを幕府に請ふ、是日、幕府、年寄及び伊勢安濃津城主藤堂高虎・儒官林信勝「羅山」・同信澄・金地院崇伝「以心」等をして、之を議せしめ、書辞無礼なるに依り、ピーテル・ノイツ等を逐ふ, 10., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1627/18-7-1/5/0010?m=all&s=0010

then empowered the Suetsugu patriarch, as a Tokugawa intermediary, with a special vermilion seal permit in 1628 granting "permission to reproach the lawlessness [of the Dutch] in not permitting [Japanese ships] to return to their home country, and for obstruction of commerce."[184] In making his case against the VOC, Heizō I succeeded in two major areas: his portrayal of the Dutch as a direct threat to Tokugawa sovereign claims to Taiwan and placing the VOC outside the boundaries of the emerging East Asian world order by labeling them as pirates. In response to Heizō I's complaints, the high shogunal councilors ordered the Suetsugu patriarch to "drive Peter Nuyts and party [from Taiwan]".[185]

To understand the context of why the high shogunal councilors empowered Heizō I to drive the Dutch from Taiwan, it is useful to briefly step back to the preceding two decades of the 1600s to gain an understanding of how the Tokugawa regime employed intermediaries to uphold the vermilion seal system. In 1608, conflict erupted between the Portuguese on Macau and a group of sailors who belonged to Arima Harunobu (1567-1612), lord of Shimabara domain, who carried a vermilion seal permit. The ensuing confrontation between Arima's men and the Portuguese resulted in the deaths of an unspecified number of Japanese merchants. In retaliation,

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[184] *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*, 大日本史料編纂所, 寛永 Kan'ei 5, 1628 5 年, 14, "(第八条）和蘭国高砂総督ピーテル・ノイツ、長崎商人末次政直「平蔵」の船長浜田弥兵衛の商船の武装を解き、貿易を妨げ、帰国を許さずして報復を計る、弥兵衛、死を決して、ノイツと交渉し、人質及び賠償を得て帰国す、幕府、和蘭人の人質を監禁す," 15-28., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1628/18-7-3/11/0014?m=all&s=0014.

[185] *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*, 大日本史料編纂所, 寛永 Kan'ei 4, 1627 October 25, ９月１７日), 2, "(第二条）是より先、和蘭国、高砂国を占領す、和蘭バタビヤ総督ピーテル・カルペンチール、高砂国に於ける日本商人に輸出入税を課す、仍りて、末次政直「平蔵」の船長浜田弥兵衛、其不法を訴ふ、カルペンチール、高砂総督ピーテル・ノイツ等を日本に遣し、書を致して高砂への渡航朱印状の下付を二・三年間中止せられんことを幕府に請ふ、是日、幕府、年寄及び伊勢安濃津城主藤堂高虎・儒官林信勝「羅山」・同信澄・金地院崇伝「以心」等をして、之を議せしめ、書辞無礼なるに依り、ピーテル・ノイツ等を逐ふ," 10., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1627/18-7-1/5/0010?m=all&s=0010

Tokugawa officials ordered Harunobu and the governor of Nagasaki, Hasegawa Sahyōe to capture the Portuguese Captain Major of Macau, André Pessoa and is ship, the *Nossa Senhora da Graça,* on behalf of the shogun.[186] When the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* arrived in Nagasaki on June 29, 1609, Arima demanded that the Portuguese surrender Pessoa. The standoff lasted for over six months as the Portuguese refused to surrender Pessoa and when the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* attempted to sail out of Nagasaki in January 1610, Arima surrounded and attacked the warship. Pessoa resisted capture until the end and set fire to the powder magazine of the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* which sank after two successive explosions in full view of Nagasaki's inhabitants, shaking the entire city as the remnants of the ship disappeared beneath the waves. Harunobu enjoyed a wide degree of latitude as a Tokugawa intermediary and by orchestrating the sinking of the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* and Pessoa's death, the lord of Shimabara satisfied a personal vendetta against the Portuguese while defending the vermilion seal system against challenges to shogunal authority. As a reward for his spectacular act of destruction and violence in sinking the *Nossa Senhora da Graça* and killing Pessoa, Ieyasu presented Harunobu with a sword and married one of his granddaughters into the Arima family.[187]

The second precedent for Heizō I's quest to satisfy his personal vendetta against Nuyts along with the Suetsugu patriarch's freelance ambitions for Taiwan stemmed from unresolved Japanese sovereign claims to the island, which past intermediaries had attempted to exploit. In 1593, Japan's second unifier, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, wrote a threatening letter to the nonexistent King of

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[186] *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*, 大日本史料編纂所, Keichō 14, 1610 January 1, 慶長１４年１２月９日, （第二条）是より先き、葡萄牙人、我が商人を嫣港に殺す、是日、肥前日野江城主有馬晴信、家康の命を奉じ、長崎奉行長谷川藤広兄弟と、共に葡萄牙商船を長崎港に捕へ、十二日、之を撃沈す、尋で家康、之を賞し、舶載の貨物を分与す., 177., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1210/0177?m=all&s=0177.

[187] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki: World Trade and the Clash of Cultures 1560-1640.*, 140-142.

Taiwan, demanding that the imaginary monarch submit and offer tribute to the Japanese warlord.[188] The first two Tokugawa shoguns, Ieyasu and his son Hidetada (1579-1632) both ordered military invasions of Taiwan in 1609 and in 1616 which were unsuccessful. In 1609, the Tokugawa regime empowered Arima Harunobu as its intermediary to conquer Taiwan; however, the lord of Shimabara's forces skirmished with some aboriginal people and upon failing to find a monarch or any central authority, the expedition returned home to Japan.[189] In 1616, the Tokugawa regime employed a different intermediary to subdue Taiwan, Heizō I's predecessor and nemesis, Murayama Tōan. The 1616 expedition similarly met with failure as Tōan's invasion fleet encountered a storm and abandoning course, some of the ships turned back to Japan whereas others turned to piracy off the Chinese coast.[190]

The failure of the 1609 and 1616 expeditions along with Hideyoshi's letter to the Taiwanese monarch left the Tokugawa regime with a legacy, sovereign claim to Taiwan. When the VOC moved its China operations from the Penghu Islands to Taiwan in 1624 and the company began construction of the state-of-the-art artillery fortress, Castle Zeelandia, the Tokugawa regime viewed the Dutch presence on the island as a direct infringement on its sovereign claims.[191] In

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[188] Berry, Hideyoshi., 212–13.

[189] *Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Keichō 14, 1609 March, **慶長**１４年２月是**月**,（第三条）有馬晴信、家臣を遣し、台湾を視察せしむる条, 100, https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1211/supple/0100?m=all&s=0100. Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Keichō 14, 1609 March, 慶長１４年２月是**月**,（第三条）有馬晴信、幕府の内命により、部下の士卒を台湾に遣し、之を視察せしむ, 132., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1206/0132?m=all&s=0132. Also Turnbull., "Onward, Christian Samurai! The Japanese Expeditions to Taiwan in 1609 and 1616."

[190] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 2, 1616, 元和２年是**歳**,（第一条）家康、長崎代官村山東菴をして、台湾を伐たしむ, 789., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1225/0789?m=all&s=0789. Stephen Turnbull provides a useful contextualization and narrative for Hideyoshi's letter to the nonexistent "King of Taiwan" and the subsequent Tokugawa expeditions to subdue the island. Again, see Turnbull, "Onward, Christian Samurai! The Japanese Expeditions to Taiwan in 1609 and 1616," 6-18.

[191] Tonio Andrade, *Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013), 14.

this environment of increased tensions between Edo and the VOC, Heizō I found a sympathetic ear among the high shogunal councilors. The Suetsugu patriarch's plan must have seemed viable as Heizō I not only received permission from the high shogunal councilors to chase the Dutch from Taiwan, he also received an investment from the family's longtime patrons, the Hosokawa lords of Kumamoto domain, to arm and outfit the expedition.[192] For the time being, Heizō I seemed to have succeeded in gaining Tokugawa legitimacy to act on his personal vendetta against Nuyts and freelance ambitions for Taiwan. Heizō I's plan was simple, or so he thought: Send his most dangerous man, the ship captain, Hamada Yahyōe, to kill Nuyts, and the Dutch would flee Taiwan, delivering the island to the Suetsugu. However, Heizō I had not planned for what would happen if Hamada failed and returned to Nagasaki with hostages instead of the governor's head, complicating factors which provided the foundation for a drawn out conflict between the VOC and the Tokugawa regime.

Returning to the issue at hand, on June 16, 1628, the VOC Governor of Taiwan, Pieter Nuyts, watched as a fleet of Japanese ships approached Taiwan. Nuyts felt an impending sense of dread that there was "evil brewing" as the ships sailed into the Zeelandia roadstead when he recognized the Suetsugu emblem on the ships' flags.[193] The largest of the Suetsugu ships was armed with fifteen cannons with six of the guns on deck and the other nine mounted below deck. The most dangerous man in the Suetsugu organization aside from Heizō I, Captain Hamada Yahyōe, led a multinational expeditionary force consisting of 470 Japanese and Chinese mercenaries and the

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[192] Hosokawa Tadaoki-dō bunin nado shojō/細川忠興同夫人等書状. 第 1 軸.細川忠興書状. Japanese and Chinese Old Materials, National Diet Library.

[193] William Campbell, *Formosa Under the Dutch, Described from Contemporary Records: With Explanatory Notes and a Bibliography of the Island* (SMC Publishing Incorporated, 1903), 39. Pieter Nuyts amassed a reputation for malfeasance and incompetence during and after his lifetime that is almost unmatched among VOC employees and officials, much of it deserved. For good discussions regarding Nuyts and his antics, see Leonard Blussé., "Bull in a China Shop, Pieter Nuyts in China and Japan (1627-1636)." In *Around and about Formosa, Essays in Honor of Professor Ts'ao Yung-Ho,* n.d., Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*. New York: Columbia University Press.

ships carried an arsenal of cannons, firearms, swords, pikes, and bows and arrows. Nuyts had earlier received warning via letter from the VOC chief factor of Hirado, Cornelius van Nijenroode, that the Suetsugu were planning trouble for the company in Taiwan. Some of the Chinese crewmembers who had arrived in Taiwan on the Suetsugu ships also warned Nuyts of Heizō I's ill-intentions.[194] True to his boastful and proud nature, Nuyts did not really heed Van Nijenroode's warnings and believed that the VOC's legal posture in Taiwan and the company's ties to the Matsuura lords of Hirado were sufficient enough to protect him from the Suetsugu patriarch's ill will. To his credit, Nuyts did have the good sense to have the arriving Suetsugu ships searched and upon discovering the veritable arsenal they carried, confiscated all of Hamada's weapons. Nuyts' goal in detaining Hamada and his men was to prevent them from returning to Japan and further escalating the conflict between the Tokugawa regime and the VOC.

[194] Campbell, *Formosa Under the Dutch, Described from Contemporary Records: With Explanatory Notes and a Bibliography of the Island*, 39-40.



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During his detention on Taiwan, Hamada learned that Nuyts had imprisoned the Sinkanese villagers whom Heizō I had brought to Japan as part his embassy in 1627. Hamada further discovered that Nuyts had also confiscated all the gifts which the shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu,

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[195] Figure 3-6. Hamada Yahyōe holding a dagger to a panicked Pieter Nuyts in his bedchamber. Matsumoto Aicho. *Honchyō Risshi Dan* 愛重松本, and 著松本愛重. 本朝立志談 : 少年叢書. 東京: 少年園, 1890., 10.

[196] Figure 3-7. A magic lantern slide the Japanese used for "moral education" depicting Hamada startling a sleeping Nuyts by holding a dagger to his throat. Okumura Takie,, “Lesson on Moral: Volunteer Army 2,” http://digicoll.manoa.hawaii.edu/lanternslides/Pages/viewtext.php?tid=704&route=browseby.php&start=732&by=title.

[197] Figure 3-8. Contemporary illustrations from Taiwanese manga of Hamada's arrival and attack on Nuyts. Kinono., *Lan ren yi wen lu: bin tian mi bing wei shi jian,* 蘭人異聞錄 : 濱田彌兵衛事件., Tai bei shi: Gai ya wen hua chu ban, **蓋亞文化出版** ; **聯合發行公司總經銷**., 2016.

had presented to the Sinkanese villagers upon their investiture as his subjects.[198] Nuyts' decision to imprison the Sinkanese villagers and confiscate their gifts directly violated Tokugawa notions of sovereignty, in particular the notion of "the portability of subjecthood" in which the shogun claimed the Sinkanese villagers as subjects on the basis of a legal relationship that was not bound to territory.[199] In lieu of territory, such narrative, legal relationships between subject and sovereign were the basis of early modern European and Asian empires.

On the morning of June 29, 1628, Hamada took advantage Nuyts' arrogance and together with his brother, Shinzō, and his son, Yozaeimon, stormed into the governor's office in Castle Zeelandia to demand that they be allowed to return to Japan. When Nuyts refused to allow the Japanese to depart, "with friendly motives and sympathetic words," Hamada and his men "flew upon him [Nuyts] like roaring lions, took him by the head, bound his hands, feet, and waist with a long cloth band, and threatened to cut off his head if he called out."[200] Jacob Hooman, the chief merchant who had just been in the room with Nuyts and Hamada, returned to investigate the sounds of the scuffle and screamed that Nuyts was "being murdered."[201] Pieter Muyser, Nuyts' lieutenant, climbed up to the gallery which was adjacent to the window of the governor's quarters. As VOC soldiers opened fire on Hamada and his men, Muyser could see Nuyts tied up and looking pitiable through the window. Hamada threatened that if the Dutch did not cease fire, he would cut off Nuyts' head and throw it at their feet. In response, the VOC Council of Taiwan assured Hamada that they would slaughter him and his men if they did not release Nuyts and

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[198] The gifts from the shogun consisted of an array of money, fabrics, muskets, and armor. See Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*., inventarisnummer 270.
[199] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900,* 285-287
[200] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*., inventarisnummer 270.
[201] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

surrender. Meanwhile, the other part of Hamada's group, numbering around 150 men, had gathered together outside Castle Zeelandia with Chinese and Taiwanese natives to lay siege to the Dutch.[202] Hamada, as he would later admit on numerous occasions, had fully intended to kill Nuyts, confessing that the governor "would never have made it to Japan alive."[203]

What ultimately saved Nuyts was Hamada's own realization that if he killed the governor, his own life was forfeit, and it led the Suetsugu ship captain to sign a legally binding agreement with VOC representatives in order to end the deadly standoff. The first article of the accord specified that the Dutch would provide Nuyts's young son, Laurens, the governor's lieutenant, Muyser, Francois Caron, the French Huguenot and polyglot VOC interpreter, and three other company employees as hostages in Heizō I's ship.[204] In exchange, Hamada agreed to provide five hostages to travel to Japan aboard the Dutch yacht *Erasmus*. The VOC representatives believed that the accord specified Japan as a general destination for both ships and wrongfully presumed the *Erasmus* had freedom to sail to Hirado and the protection of the Matsuura. Caron later revealed that in the Japanese version of the accord, the Frenchman specified that both ships would sail to Suetsugu headquarters in Nagasaki as he knew that Hamada would have never agreed to the Dutch sailing for Hirado.[205] The second article of the accord specified that the VOC would free

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[202] Campbell, Formosa *Under the Dutch, Described from Contemporary Records: With Explanatory Notes and a Bibliography of the Island*, 43-44.

[203] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270., Campbell, Formosa *Under the Dutch, Described from Contemporary Records: With Explanatory Notes and a Bibliography of the Island*, 39-42.

[204] Laurens would die in captivity in Ōmura Jail in 1630. When Nuyts shared the news of Laurens' death with his wife who had joined him in Batavia, she also died from grief the next day. See Blussé, “Bull in a China Shop, Pieter Nuyts in China and Japan (1627-1636),” 105.

[205] No known copies of the Japanese version of the accord exist although references to it exist in Muyser's journal and emerge in his conversations with the Frenchman. See Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

the Sinkanese villagers who had taken part in Heizō I's embassy, and the third article mandated that the Dutch restore the gifts that the aboriginal people had received from the shogun. As for the fourth article, the Dutch agreed to remove the rudders from their ships and bring them onto land to immobilize the VOC ships in order to prevent pursuit. The fifth and final article of the accord stipulated that the VOC were to provide Heizō I with 13,540 *taels* and eight *maces* in silk for financial restitution.[206] Nuyts also later reported that Hamada stole a gold chain, a small silver oil can, a saltcellar, three plates, two forks, and some knives from the governor's office.[207]

Under the direction of Heizō I, Hamada had committed an act of maritime violence which the high shogunal councilors in Edo had broadly sanctioned due to the Suetsugu patriarch's labeling of the VOC as pirates. The accord which Hamada and the VOC representatives signed likewise provided sanction for the actions of the Suetsugu against the Dutch on Taiwan; however, before the ink dried on the document, both parties were already thinking of ways to circumvent the agreement. For Nuyts and the VOC, they schemed to sail to Hirado domain and the protection of the Matsuura lords, who would complain on behalf of the Dutch, and demand that Edo provide the company with financial restitution and punish Heizō I. The problems that the Suetsugu faced were equally problematic and in signing the accord, Hamada signaled the Suetsugu ship captain's acceptance that his mission to kill Nuyts and drive the Dutch from Taiwan had been a failure. Hamada's imminent arrival in Nagasaki with hostages instead of Nuyts' head further complicated the legitimacy of Heizō I's actions as it introduced living, breathing witnesses, chief among them,

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[206] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*., inventarisnummer 270., A *picul* was a unit of measurement, roughly equal to 60 kg. A *tael* of fine silver was a unit of currency, equal to 1.4 Spanish *real*. A *real* is equivalent to $200 in contemporary USD, a *tael* was worth about 50 percent more than that. A mace was equal to 0.1 *tael*. See "Units: M," accessed April 28, 2016, https://www.unc.edu/~rowlett/units/dictM.html and Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*, 291-292.,

[207] Campbell, Formosa *Under the Dutch, Described from Contemporary Records: With Explanatory Notes and a Bibliography of the Island*., 51.

Muyser, who challenged the Suetsugu patriarch's claims to Taiwan. Despite the willingness of both the Suetsugu and the VOC to challenge and undermine the accord, it became a central fixture of the coming legal debates between Muyser, who was fighting for his life and those of his fellow captives and Heizō I, who found himself battling for the continued existence of the Suetsugu.

Heizō I's Prisoners

The contest between the Suetsugu and the VOC over who could more effectively narrate their legal claim to Taiwan entered a new and equally dangerous phase as Heizō I's ship and the *Erasmus* left Taiwan on July 11, 1628. The accord which Hamada and the VOC representatives had signed became the object of a legal contest for Taiwan and a struggle for survival as the Suetsugu and the Dutch sought to interpret and circumvent the document to their advantage. When Heizō I's ship was two miles away from Castle Zeelandia, Muyser noticed that it was not following the usual course which the Dutch took to Hirado, along the coast of China, as they sailed northeast straight towards the "Islands of Satsuma," the Kingdom of the Ryūkyū Islands.[208] Muyser questioned Hamada about their destination, and the Suetsugu ship captain affirmed that they were indeed headed to Heizō I's headquarters in Nagasaki, which at the time, seemed contrary to the Dutchman's understanding of the accord. Meanwhile, the skipper of the *Erasmus*, Lambrecht Heronemus, suddenly broke away from the other ships and attempted to sail the VOC yacht to Hirado. When the five Japanese hostages aboard the *Erasmus* discovered that the yacht was not following course with the Suetsugu ships, they attacked and bound up the VOC skipper, Lambrecht Heronemus "head and foot" as they did to Nuyts in Zeelandia, punched

[208] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

him in the ears, and threatened to "break his face" if he did not immediately set a course for Nagasaki. When the skipper of the *Erasmus* agreed to sail to Nagasaki, Hamada's men decided to let him live.[209] Caron later informed Muyser that although he agreed with Hamada to send the ships to Nagasaki, the Frenchman had secretly conspired with Heronemus, skipper of the *Erasmus*, to sail the VOC yacht to Hirado. If the *Erasmus* had made it to Hirado, it would have delivered its crew and Suetsugu hostages to the Matsuura. As the Matsuura lords of Hirado were the primary Tokugawa intermediaries with the VOC in the 1620s, they would have provided the *Erasmus* with protection and a legal platform for the Dutch to challenge Heizō I in Japan. However, the Dutch had no further opportunities to escape to a safe haven as both Heizō I's ship and the *Erasmus* made landfall at the Suetsugu lair in Nagasaki on July 25, 1628.

With the arrival of both ships in Nagasaki, the ongoing dispute over the accord threatened to escalate into a wider conflict between the Suetsugu, the VOC, and the Matsuura that the Tokugawa regime would have to adjudicate or risk domestic turmoil in the realm. Furthermore, Heizō I had failed in his mission to remove the Dutch from Taiwan, which he had pledged to do. What Heizō I found even more complicating was that Hamada had brought hostages back to Japan who, to the right audience, could serve as witnesses against the Suetsugu patriarch's claims to Taiwan. Hamada's failure to satisfy Heizō I's personal vendetta against Nuyts by killing the governor was also enough to drive the Suetsugu patriarch, who was already prone to violent outbursts, into a mad fury. With his claims to Taiwan in jeopardy and the legitimacy of his actions in question, Heizō I had to quickly concoct a new plan amidst mounting pressure from the Tokugawa regime and the rivals of the Suetsugu, the Matsuura. The new plan required Heizō

[209] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

I to compel Muyser, as the senior representative among the hostages, to confess, in writing, that VOC claims to Taiwan were illegitimate. Although Heizō I wanted the letter to reach VOC leadership in Batavia, his main audience was the high shogunal councilors in Edo. Heizō I reasoned that if he could dispute the VOC's claims to Taiwan, using words from one of the company's own officials, the Suetsugu patriarch might convince the Tokugawa regime to retaliate against the Dutch and launch a full-scale military invasion of Taiwan.[210] Goading the Tokugawa shogunate into a war with the VOC was risky move, but in sensing peril, Heizō I thought it the best course of action to ensure the survival of the Suetsugu.

Heizō I decided to imprison Muyser and the rest of the VOC hostages upon their arrival in Japan of his own volition as the Suetsugu patriarch did not receive official orders from the high shogunal councilors in Edo to incarcerate the Dutchmen until August 16, 1628.[211] Hamada had even warned Muyser within mere days of their arrival in Japan that it was with "great pity" and "sadness in his heart" that he had orders from the shogun and the high shogunal councilors to imprison the Dutch ship captain and the VOC hostages, adding that "great trouble and peril" awaited them and that perhaps they might even "meet the devil himself."[212] Hamada knew that he and his master, Heizō I, needed time to devise a coherent narrative to maintain the cover of

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[210] As Clulow points out, Tokugawa intermediaries such as the Suetsugu became particularly adept at appropriating and redeploying rhetoric from the VOC and its agents "the ideas first introduced by VOC agents could no longer be restrained as the company's rhetoric had become accessible to a range of groups with their own interests. By simply reciting VOC declarations of loyalty, the magistrate offered a script for the Dutch to follow, demanding, as was the case in the *hofreis* [journey to the court at Edo], that they act out the role they had claimed for themselves. See Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 123-124.

[211] Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Kan'ei, 5 1628 August 16, 寛永５年７月１７日, 是より先、末次政直「平蔵」の船長浜田弥兵衛等、再び高砂に航して、和蘭人の不法を譴め、人質を交換して帰国し、幕府に訴ふ、是日、幕府、政直に命じ、人質蘭人を投獄し、其船を抑留す., 185., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1628/18-7-3/6/0001?m=all&s=1000.

[212] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

Tokugawa legitimacy for their actions against the VOC and preempt any counterarguments that the Dutch might lodge with the Matsuura or shogunal officials. These emergent threats to Heizō I's legitimacy from the Matsuura and the VOC required the Suetsugu patriarch to produce a convincing narrative explaining his actions against Nuyts while accounting for his failure to drive the Dutch from Taiwan. Crafting an effective narrative required both time and cooperation from his VOC hostages which accounts for why Heizō I kept the Dutch incarcerated in his personal jail three months after the high shogunal councilors ordered him to transport Muyser and company to the public prison at Ōmura.[213]

Heizō I's fear of being called to account for his failure to drive the Dutch from Taiwan and of retaliation from the Matsuura drove the Suetsugu patriarch's efforts to break Muyser's will and compel the Dutchman to produce a letter for the high shogunal councilors that delegitimized the VOC presence in Taiwan. Although Heizō I never resorted to physical torture, the Suetsugu patriarch and his chief retainer, Sanzō, and ship captain, Hamada, subjected Muyser to a four-month barrage of threats, intimidation, and verbal abuse. Upon their arrival in Japan, Heizō I's chief retainer, Sanzō, escorted Muyser and the VOC hostages to the gallery of the Suetsugu manor. Using Caron as an interpreter, Heizō I asked Muyser:

> Under what pretense did you so scandalously treat the villagers from Sinkan, whom my captain [Hamada] brought to this place [Japan] on orders from the shogun, who were treated with affection, bestowed with honors, with gifts, and received as vassals, whom you hauled away in chains and imprisoned while subjecting them to further outrages? Did you not think that his majesty, the shogun, would not take grave notice over such a great disturbance and take to heart such an affront? Did you think that he [the shogun] would let such a thing go unpunished?[214]

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[213] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

[214] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

In berating Muyser, Heizō I took considerable liberties with the truth. First, there is no documented evidence in either Dutch or Japanese sources to indicate that the shogun ever ordered Heizō I to bring the Sinkanese villagers to Japan as the Suetsugu patriarch did of his own accord. Second, as Tokugawa records reveal, neither the shogun or his councilors expressed interest in recognizing Heizō I's embassy from Sinkan as subjects.[215]

The Suetsugu were not strong enough to confront the VOC alone which required Heizō I to operate under the aegis of Tokugawa power. In his attempts to fabricate a sovereign relationship between the Sinkanese villagers and the shogun, Heizō I hoped to intimidate Muyser into providing a written confession that VOC claims to Taiwan were illegitimate and in so doing, prove that his efforts against the Dutch had some measure of success, and provoke a full-scale, Tokugawa invasion of the island. During his initial conversation with Muyser in July 1628, Heizō I threatened:

> That the shogun and the high shogunal councilors were currently deliberating the matter, but should they discover and hear about the illegitimate, sovereign claims that we [the Dutch] professed over Taiwan [at this point, Muyser noted that Heizō I cackled], and said, outright, that the shogun would find out, and there was nothing we could do as his majesty did not even begin to have lands enough and what should stop him from possessing that which he desires? You tossed up a molehill of a fort [Castle Zeelandia] and what little power do you have? He [Heizō I] said that even if you have one thousand men, and ships with one hundred guns, we shall send there twenty thousand men with one thousand guns and free the place from your control."[216]

To clarify, Heizō I was bluffing as there was no imminent Tokugawa invasion of Taiwan, and Muyser knew it. By October, Muyser had become so used to Heizō I's threats that the Dutchman dismissed them as one of a "thousand desperate declarations that he [Heizō I] would swear by,"

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[215] Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 27-28, 93-94, 222-228, and 267, note 7., Clulow., "A Fake Embassy: The Lord of Taiwan and Tokugawa Japan.," 31, 38.
[216] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

laughing whenever the Suetsugu patriarch left the room.[217] As Muyser's observations illustrate, Heizō I's threat of a Tokugawa invasion of Taiwan were patently false and stemmed from a sense of desperation and fear. Heizō I became increasingly erratic in his efforts to compel Muyser to produce a letter delegitimizing VOC claims to Taiwan and upon seeing that his threats were not producing the desired result, the Suetsugu patriarch moved to convince the Dutch that their lives were in imminent peril.

Threatening the lives of Muyser and the VOC hostages was Heizō I's last effort to compel the Dutch sea captain to produce a letter delegitimizing the company's claims to Taiwan that the Suetsugu patriarch could display before the high shogunal councilors. Heizō I's ship captain, Hamada, insinuated as early as July 1628 that lives of Muyser and his compatriots were in danger, informing the Dutchman that although he was uncertain what the ultimate judgement of the shogun and high shogunal councilors would be, it made no difference to him if they spent two to three years in prison or if he received orders to "cut off their heads."[218] Heizō I, out of his own awareness that he had failed to expel the Dutch from Taiwan and increasing fear that the high shogunal councilors in Edo would soon find out the extent the Suetsugu patriarch's failure, intensified his threats against Muyser and the VOC hostages. At first, Heizō I threatened to transport Muyser and the VOC hostages to the public prison in Ōmura, insinuating that the Dutch, and especially, Nuyts' young son, Laurens, might not fare so well among the general inmate population. Having failed to sway Muyser with his previous threats, Heizō I invited the Dutch sea captain to his office on October 12, 1628 and there, the Suetsugu patriarch "again

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[217] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.
[218] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

began with his usual preaching and belittling, opened a book, and pretended to be busy writing something."[219] Heizō I then turned to Muyser and began showing the Dutchman various letters which he claimed bore the signatures of the high shogunal councilors and various, constituent landed lords in Japan as a production of the Suetsugu patriarch's legitimacy as a Tokugawa intermediary. In one last, desperate effort to force the Dutchman to write a letter for the Suetsugu patriarch, Heizō I informed Muyser that the VOC hostages lived at his pleasure and that he could "cut off their heads" at his whim. Drawing upon his experience and insight commanding men on fighting ships at sea, Muyser again knew that Heizō I was bluffing, and responded that he was "the shogun's prisoner and if his majesty ordered his head cut off, it would be a sad affair, but instead of bringing him shame it would be a great honor."[220] In response, Heizō I "roared" at him with "wide-open eyes like a lion," which greatly unsettled Muyser, and then stormed out of the room.[221] Heizō I's outburst prompted Muyser to consider the vulnerability of his fellow VOC hostages, in particular, Nuyts' son, Laurens, and the Dutchman reconsidered that he had pushed the Suetsugu patriarch too far. At last, Muyser relented, and decided to write a letter for Heizō I.

The letter which Heizō I ultimately received from Muyser ultimately did not prove to be useful for the Suetsugu patriarch to dispute VOC claims to Taiwan before the high shogunal councilors in Edo. Heizō I wished for Muyser to write to VOC Governor General, Jan Pieterszoon Coen, with the offer that if the VOC agreed to cede sovereignty over Taiwan to the

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[219] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.
[220] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.
[221] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

Tokugawa regime, the shogun would release him and the other VOC hostages.[222] Muyser countered that while he could not ask the governor general to renounce sovereignty over Taiwan, he would write to inform Coen that he was in good health, but in a state of deep sadness due to his predicament. Heizō I could, of course, read the letter before Muyser sent it to Batavia. Or, Muyser acknowledged with due deference, Heizō I could simply "hack off their heads" if it pleased him.[223] Heizō I and Muyser decided on a compromise in which the Dutchman would write his own letter to Coen and the Suetsugu patriarch would work with Caron to translate his demands and include them in an attachment.

For Heizō I, time was running out for him to travel to Edo with a useable document to prove his efficacy as a Tokugawa intermediary and that he had succeeded in his mission of driving the Dutch from Taiwan. Although Heizō I had an agreement with Muyser, the Suetsugu patriarch secretly pressured Caron into translating his own, separate letter in which he would demand that Coen and the VOC cede all sovereign authority of Taiwan over to the Tokugawa shogunate. Heizō I then prepared for a journey to Edo where he would present Caron's letter to the shogun and the high shogunal councilors during a personal audience. Caron's letter would be the centerpiece of Heizō I's "narrative creativity" and corresponding performance of service for his lord, the shogun, that he had subdued VOC pirates and was in the process of driving the Dutch from Taiwan.[224] Heizō I hoped that his performance would be convincing enough for the shogun and his councilors to escalate the conflict with the VOC and order a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. In the end, Heizō I's ambitions for Taiwan failed as the Tokugawa regime neither had

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[222] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.
[223] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.
[224] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 279.

interest in an invasion of Taiwan or war with the Dutch. Instead, Heizō I's actions led to an impasse in the form of a five-year Tokugawa embargo on commerce and formal diplomatic relations with the VOC.[225] For the time being, it seemed that Heizō I's scheming and plotting had only served to bring the Suetsugu to the brink of destruction.

Heizō I's private war with the VOC did have one, last secondary effect in that it drove the Dutch and their sponsors, the Matsuura lords of Hirado, further apart.[226] During the crisis between Heizō I and the VOC, the Suetsugu patriarch worked to undermine the Matsuura in order to prevent them from helping the Dutch. After Hamada had returned to Japan with Muyser and the VOC hostages, Heizō I worked behind the scenes to diminish the standing of the Matsuura within the Tokugawa shogunate. In a serious blow to Hirado domain which had come to depend on Dutch commerce, Heizō I appealed to the high shogunal councilors in Edo to order the Matsuura to seize the VOC ships in the harbor, confiscate all the company's goods in the warehouses, and place all personnel under house arrest. Heizō I also desired for Muyser to write to Coen in his letter that the Matsuura family could no longer represent VOC interests in Japan and although the lords of Hirado had requested an audience with the shogun, his majesty refused to hear their pleas due to the intercession of the Suetsugu patriarch. Muyser was to also inform Coen and the VOC Council of the Indies in Batavia that from now on, the company was to address all of their concerns to Heizō I who "held all of the affairs of the Hollanders in his hands."[227]

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[225] For an account of the five-year embargo against the VOC, see Clulow, Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 244-254.

[226] Adam Clulow provides an excellent narrative regarding how the Matsuura served as early intermediaries for the Dutch and also the accelerating tensions between the VOC and the lords of Hirado Domain. See Adam Clulow., "From Global Entrepôt to Early Modern Domain: Hirado, 1609- 1641." Monumenta Nipponica 65.1 (Summer 2010), 1-35.

[227] Pieter Muyser, *Extract bij de E. Muyser zaeliger gehouden van het journael gedurende onse ellende hier in exyl etc*.; dagregister, gehouden door Pieter Jansz. Muyser. 1628 juni 29 - oktober 31 1 deel., Nationaal Archief, Den Haag, Nederlandse Factorij in Japan, nummer toegang 1.04.21, inventarisnummer 270.

Although Heizō I would not live to see it, the Suetsugu patriarch's interference in the relations between the Matsuura and the Dutch had inadvertently planted the seeds of his family's rebirth as Tokugawa intermediaries with the VOC. The critical moment for the Suetsugu reemergence as intermediaries with the VOC would, however, have to wait for the rise of Heizō I's son, Shigemasa, as the new patriarch who would plot a new course for the family in partnership with the Dutch.

Conclusion

As the Suetsugu rose to power in the early seventeenth century, Heizō I behaved much like a sixteenth century warlord in committing acts of maritime violence to satisfy his personal ambitions for expansion. However, unlike his Warring States Period predecessors, Heizō I could not ignore his lord, the Tokugawa shogun, and had to carefully frame his actions and ambitions within the context of acting as an intermediary for Edo. The vermilion seal system and its corresponding permits provided Heizō I with a convenient legal framework to define his role as a Tokugawa intermediary and peer to Japan's warrior elite in interactions with Ming officials and later, with the VOC. As the head of a hybrid, warrior-merchant household, Heizō I's power was rooted in ambiguity, which the Tokugawa shogunate found useful as a decentralized regime that exercised power through intermediaries. On a transnational level, the Tokugawa regime relied on the vermilion seal system and intermediaries such as the Suetsugu as a way of contending with the uneven imperial geography that remained after the Warring States Period and Japan's unification.[228]

The fragmented patchwork of Tokugawa imperial claims in the early seventeenth century provided opportunities for intermediaries such as Heizō I to further their own ambitions and

[228] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*, 285.

build maritime domains.[229] As a legal framework, the vermilion seal system served as a vehicle for intermediaries to engage in freelance acts of maritime violence under the umbrella of Tokugawa authority. The unresolved Toyotomi and early Tokugawa claims to Taiwan gave Heizō I the legitimacy to challenge the VOC for control of the island. When the Suetsugu patriarch failed to establish his claims to Taiwan through Tokugawa power by peaceful means, namely, in contriving a tributary embassy, the Suetsugu patriarch switched from diplomacy to violence. Heizō I built a convincing case that the VOC in Taiwan were pirates and as a result, the Suetsugu patriarch received a special vermilion seal permit to drive the Dutch from Taiwan.

In formulating his plan to expel the Dutch from Taiwan, Heizō I loosely interpreted shogunal orders, of his own accord, and decided to send an armed expedition to kill Governor Nuyts. Heizō I failed to kill Nuyts and drive the Dutch from Taiwan and when his ship captain, Hamada, returned with hostages in July 1628, it set the stage for a prolonged international crisis between the Tokugawa regime and the VOC. In a desperate feat of "narrative entrepreneurship" to maintain the cover of Tokugawa legitimacy and transform his failures into success, Heizō I devised a plan to pressure Muyser, as his hostage, to produce a letter renouncing VOC claims to Taiwan which the Suetsugu patriarch could present to the high shogunal councilors in Edo.[230] Despite his best efforts to intimidate Muyser, Heizō I did not get the letter he desired and instead, sent his own written demands to VOC headquarters in Batavia. Despite his best efforts to escalate a war between the VOC and the Tokugawa regime, Heizō I's efforts to claim Taiwan failed again and nearly destroyed the Suetsugu in the process. Heizō I's death in 1630 was the first step in breaking the impasse between the company and the shogun, allowing for the rise of

[229] Benton and Clulow, "Legal Encounters and the Origins of Global Law," 44.
[230] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 290.

Shigemasa as the new Suetsugu patriarch who would plot a new course for the family in partnership with the Dutch.

Chapter Four: Tea, Silver, Silk, and War: The Ambition of Suetsugu Heizō II

His words were no commandment, but only friendly advice. He affirmed that the instruction he gave was not for the sake of his own profit, but simply amiable advice by which he would show the Hollanders that he was a good friend as his father had been an evil enemy to them.[231]

Nicolaes Couckebacker on Suetsugu Heizō II, February 1638

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The Death of Heizō I

On July 4, 1630 Suetsugu Heizō Masanao died, bequeathing his legacy, fortune, and title as the shogunal intendant of Nagasaki to his son, Shigemasa, who would become Heizō II. The circumstances of Heizō I's death became the topic of widespread speculation and rumors among the residents of Edo and Nagasaki. One account of Heizō I's death theorized that the Suetsugu patriarch suffered a crisis of conscience for the wrongs that he had inflicted on the Dutch during

[231]17 February 1637, Letter from Chief Factor Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen, *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten. Minuten en afschriften.*, 1623 - 1786., , VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

[232] Figure 4-1. The grave of Heizō I. http://www.city.nagasaki.lg.jp/nagazine/hakken0609/index.html.

the 1628 incident with Governor Pieter Nuyts and the Matsuura family of Hirado. In this version of events Heizō I's inherently "good heart" could not withstand his overwhelming sense of guilt due to the pain and suffering he had caused, driving him to lunacy.[233] In his mania, Heizō I shut himself away from the world in his manor in Edo and died as a recluse. A far more scandalous rumor alleged that Heizō I ordered the 1628 assassination of Tokugawa bannerman, Inoue Masanari (1577-1628). According to the rumor, Inoue, as a high shogunal councilor, discovered that Heizō I was investing in his own ships. In order to conceal his criminal activity, Heizō I paid assassins to ambush Inoue in the West Wing of Edo Castle. The shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu, was not only outraged over the death of one of his bannermen, but also that the murder had taken place inside of Edo Castle. In this version of events, Iemitsu retaliated against the Suetsugu for the death of Masanari and ordered an assassin to kill Heizō I in his Edo mansion.[234]

Although the accounts which speculate on the circumstances of Heizō I's death differ, they agree that the Suetsugu had fallen into disfavor with the Tokugawa regime by the time of his passing in 1630. In his new role as Heizō II, Shigemasa used his twelve-year tenure (1630-1642) to repair the Suetsugu's political relations by starting joint ventures with the Dutch and networking at the highest levels of Tokugawa society. Heizō II's ambitions included plans to enlist the VOC in an invasion of Spanish Manila. When the Shimabara Rebellion put those plans on hold, Heizō II instead worked to make himself a key intermediary between the shogunate and

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[233] Nagazumi Yōko. *Shuinsen* 朱印船. Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan., 2001., 186-187.

[234] Inoue Masanari was the older brother of the famous inquisitor and grand commissioner, Inoue Masahige. After an investigation, officials determined that Tokugawa inspector, Toshima Nobumitsu had murdered Inoue. Inoue had promised his daughter's hand in marriage to Toshima's son, but reneged on the arrangement. In a fit of rage, Toshima killed Inoue his murder was one of the first to take place inside Edo Castle. See *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 5, 1628 September 7, 寛永５年８月１０日), 9, "幕府目付豊島信満、年寄遠江横須賀城主井上正就に怨あり、是日、之を殿中に殺す、小十人番士青木義精等、信満を誅す、尋で、幕府、正就の子正利をして、封を襲がしめ、信満の子主膳某を死罪に処す.," http://wwwap.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ships/shipscontroller-e and Nagazumi Yōko. *Shuinsen* 朱印船. Tōkyō: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan., 2001., 187-188.

the VOC and was rewarded by the Tokugawa for his service in suppressing the uprising. At the time of his death in 1642, Heizō had restored much of the family's wealth and status.

To elaborate, Shigemasa proved himself to be the most capable head of the Heizō dynasty during its four generations of existence and the reasons for this are threefold. First, Heizō II knew that he needed the VOC as allies instead of enemies as the Dutch could assist the Suetsugu in surviving the collapse of the vermilion seal system in the 1630s. An alliance with the VOC also enabled Heizō II to prove to the Tokugawa regime that he was an effective intermediary in subduing the Dutch where others, such as the Matsuura family of Hirado, had failed.[235] Second, Heizō II's partnership with the VOC provided the Suetsugu with the means to build their second alliance of importance with the famous tea master, artist, and gardener, Kobori Enshū. In return for uninterrupted access to rarities, silks, and tea utensils from China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, Enshū provided Heizō II with connections and patronage from the inner circles of Edo, specifically to the lords of Mito and Owari domains who were members of the ruling Tokugawa family.[236] Third, the alliance with the VOC and the inner circles of Tokugawa power provided Heizō II with the means to plan a military campaign against Spanish Manila while coercing the Dutch to provide the necessary ships and logistical support. Although the outbreak of the 1638-1639 Shimabara Rebellion derailed Heizō II's plans for the invasion of Spanish Manila, the Suetsugu patriarch succeeded in transferring the VOC's pledge of support to the Tokugawa regime in order to defeat the rebels. In recognition of Heizō II's successful display of control over the VOC and defining the role that the Dutch would play as vassals of the shogun, the

[235] For a discussion of the Matsuura family's repeated attempts and failures to control and subordinate the VOC for the Tokugawa shogunate, see Clulow., "From Global Entrepôt to Early Modern Domain: Hirado, 1609- 1641," 1-35.
[236] Fujimi Asumi/藤生明日美., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō." 研究紀要/ Kenkyū kiyō., 野村美 術館学芸部/Nomura Museum of the Arts and Sciences, 編. Vol. (28): 33-50., 36-37.

Tokugawa regime rewarded the Suetsugu by moving the Dutch from Hirado domain to Nagasaki. The Tokugawa decision to move the Dutch from Hirado to Nagasaki was also an affirmation of Suetsugu ambition for increased independence in international affairs.

Heizō II's actions and ambitions again illustrate the fluidity of the early modern world order in the opening decades of the seventeenth century which the Tokugawa settlement reflected in its implementation of a decentralized, hybrid regime of civil-military control. Although scholars have viewed the 1630s in Japanese history as synonymous with the "closed country" edicts and the apotheosis of Tokugawa centralization, the Suetsugu illustrate that this was instead, a decade of great ambiguity.[237] Within the ambit of indistinct, Tokugawa spheres of control, there was no clear distinction between warrior and merchant and this fluidity allowed Heizō II to pivot from advocating an invasion of Manila to assisting in domestic control during the Shimabara Rebellion. Heizō II knew he was playing a dangerous game and even acknowledged that like his father, his actions were under scrutiny from Edo. Heizō II's father, Masanao, had attempted to go

[237] Again, for a brief English language explanation of the vermilion seal trading system and the impact of the *sakoku* edicts, see Laver, *The Sakoku Edicts and the Politics of Tokugawa Hegemony*., 32-33., and Mark Ravina, "Tokugawa, Romanov, and Khmer: The Politics of Diplomacy in Eighteenth Century East Asia," *Journal of World History, University of Hawaii Press* 26, no. 2 (June 2016): 267–92., 280. For Japanese language scholarship on the vermilion seal trading system, see 岩生成一 Iwao Seiichi, 朱印船貿易史の研究 Shuinsen Bōeki Shi No Kenkyū. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1985). For the series of edicts which proscribed Japan's relations with the Portuguese, see *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanj*o/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 11, 1634, 寛永 11 年, 18,（第四条）幕府、南蛮人の肥前長崎市内に雑居するに依り、切支丹宗の絶えざるを憂へ、新に出島を築き、之を移住せしむ.," https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1634/19-3-3/14/0064?m=all&s=0064., *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 13, 22 June 1636,寛永 13 年, 5 月, 19 日), 19, " (第二条）幕府、目付馬場利重及び肥前長崎奉行榊原職直に条令を下して、日本人の異国渡海を一切禁じ、南蛮人の子孫の追放を命ず.," https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1636/19-4-3/6/0006?m=all&s=0006 *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 13, 22 October 1636, 寛永 13 年, 9 月, 24 日), 20, "(第二条）幕府、肥前長崎奉行榊原職直・同神尾元勝をして、南蛮人並に其妻子二百七十八人を悉捕して、之を明国阿媽港に追送せしむ.," https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1636/19-4-3/6/0012?m=all&s=0012.

to war with the VOC. The son, Shigemasa, had watched his father's descent into madness, and as the new Suetsugu patriarch, Heizō II knew that for the family to survive, he had to align his interests more closely with that of the Tokugawa regime. This realignment of Suetsugu interests led Heizō II to seek patronage from the Tokugawa family and opportunities to engage and defeat the shogun's enemies at home and abroad.

A parallel goal that Heizō II held in addition to winning peer recognition with Japan's warrior elite was to build a maritime domain for the Suetsugu on the scale of the powerful families of Western Japan such as the Arima, Shimazu, and the Sō.[238] In his desire to achieve peer recognition with Japan's warrior elite, Heizō II's ambitions closely matched those of the Saki merchants under Japan's first two great unifiers, Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi.[239] Specifically, Heizō II sought to perform an act of military service against Spanish Manila, who were the enemies of both the VOC and the Tokugawa regime. Although Heizō II planned a joint invasion of Manila with the VOC that never materialized, the 1637-1638 Shimabara Rebellion provided the Suetsugu patriarch with the opportunity to prove his efficacy as an intermediary for the Tokugawa shogunate who could simultaneously manage military operations and succeed in the important task of subordinating the VOC to Japan.

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[238] Heizō II's ambitions to build a maritime domain for the Suetsugu were comparable to the 1609 Shimazu conquest of the Kingdom of Ryūkyū. As for the Sō family and Korea, they forged correspondence from the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu in order to reopen diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries. Heizō I's ambitions for Taiwan paralleled those of Arima Harunobu and Suetsugu Heizō I's predecessor as shogunal intendent, the merchant and Toyotomi intermediary, Murayama Tōan. See Turnbull, "Onward, Christian Samurai! The Japanese Expeditions to Taiwan in 1609 and 1616." Elisonas, "The Inseparable Trinity: Japan's Relations with China and Korea."

[239] Andrew M. Watsky., "Commerce, Politics, and Tea. The Career of Imai Sōkyū." *Monumenta Nipponica* 50, no. 1 (1995): 47-65., Asao Naohiro. "The Sixteenth-Century Unification." In Early Modern Japan (The Cambridge History of Japan, vol. 4). New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. pp. 40-95., Stephen Turnbull., "The Ghosts of Amakusa: Localised Opposition to Centralised Control in Higo Province, 1589–1590.," Japan Forum, 25:2, 191-211,

The Silver Lord, the Tea Master, and the VOC

On October 3, 1634, the independent Dutch trader and VOC affiliate Willem Verstegen (1612-1659), arrived in Nagasaki with expensive gifts, many of which the Dutchman considered rarities, for the port city's governors and officials. Verstegen's display of gifts was also meant to showcase the company's reach, power, and legitimacy, as he had brought a veritable menagerie of cranes, hounds, and monkeys with him. On that day, Verstegen had an unexpected visitor whom he referred to as the "current Heizō," Suetsugu Shigemasa, the son of the VOC's old enemy, Suetsugu Heizō Masanao.[240] It was an awkward moment as the two men faced each other and Heizō II began looking over the animals which the Dutch had brought to Japan. Heizō II asked Verstegen "if the hound was a Shikoku breed dog?"[241] Heizō II then walked over to the fabrics that the Dutch had on display and swung them back and forth like a pendulum on a clock while beating them with his hand. Verstegen noted that Heizō II left the cloth in such disarray that no one would possibly want them. Moving on to the rarities, Heizō II picked up the four largest and best pieces of tack coral, which he also inspected and shook about before putting them back. By the time that Heizō II was finished, he had left few, if any, of the VOC's goods unmolested. Heizō II then asked Verstegen "why is it that you gentlemen when you say that you bring rarities and curiosities they do not appear to be so, or at least that is the impression you give, and that would also be a most generous appraisal?"[242]

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[240] 3 October 1634, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277.
[241] 3 October 1634, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277.
[242] 3 October 1634, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6545

The point of Heizō II's words and outlandish actions was to illustrate that the VOC suffered from a legitimacy problem in Japan and that more importantly, the Suetsugu patriarch could be of service in proving to the shogun that the Dutch were merchants and not pirates. With his stated intent of helping the Dutch prove their legitimacy in Japan, Heizō II offered crucial financial advice along with the prospect of his friendship and an alliance between the Suetsugu and the VOC. First, Heizō II informed Verstegen that having been to the shogun's residence in Edo, he was privy to the rumors about the Dutch and insinuated that the Matsuura family of Hirado domain were actively working against VOC interests. Heizō II explained that the Matsuura lords of Hirado had made the shogun quite aware that the rarities and curiosities which the VOC brought to Japan did not originate from their native country of Holland and therefore, confirmed his majesty's suspicions that the Dutch were pirates.[243] What Heizō II offered to the VOC in terms of an alliance was his assistance in lifting the negative perception that Tokugawa officials had of the VOC. Furthermore, Heizō II advised that "now is the time to lick the gravy from the trade while it is profitable" and held out the promise that an alliance with the Suetsugu would be lucrative for the VOC.[244]

Although Heizō II made a compelling case regarding how he could be of service to the Dutch, the truth of the matter was that the Suetsugu needed the VOC in order to maintain their

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[243] I build on Clulow's arguments that the VOC's problems with legitimacy in Japan stemmed from a "pirate stain," a negative perception which Tokugawa officials held of the VOC and its agents and it served as a means for the Japanese to constrain the company. As Clulow explains, the "pirate stain" which the Dutch endured in Japan also undermined the legitimacy of the company's agents in their efforts to prove to Tokugawa officials that the representatives of the VOC were "respectable merchants" from a legitimate state. See Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 165-166. 3 October 1634, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6545

[244] 3 October 1634, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6545

commercial connections with the outside world. The shogunal edicts of the 1630s, which attenuated Japan's relations with the Iberian powers, also threatened to end the vermilion seal system which the Suetsugu depended on. Heizō II confided in Verstegen that like his father, his actions were under scrutiny from Edo and that under other circumstances, a small gift would be enough to secure a vermilion seal permit. However, Heizō II also informed Verstegen that at best, he could only expect a vermilion seal permit to sail to Taiwan as the high shogunal councilors would in no way allow one of his ships to travel to a location like Cambodia. With these limitations in mind, Heizō II proposed a solution to Verstegen in which he would obtain a vermilion seal pass for Taiwan that he would in turn lend to a VOC ship to carry on the second leg of its voyage to Southeast Asia.[245] Although Heizō II needed the VOC along with their ships and crews to maintain his connection to the world of foreign commerce, the Dutch needed Tokugawa legitimacy in dealing with Southeast Asian monarchs. An alliance with Heizō II held the promise of granting the VOC legitimacy through their affiliation with the Suetsugu. However, the partnership that Heizō II proposed was not one of equals. Heizō II arguably envisioned that he could succeed where the Matsuura had failed in subordinating the VOC, an

[245] For a valuable overview of the so-called *sakoku* edicts, see Laver., *The Sakoku Edicts and the Politics of Tokugawa Hegemony*., 61-62. For the full text of the order which prohibited the Japanese from traveling abroad and prohibited overseas Japanese from returning to Japan, see *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 13, 1636 June 22, 寛永 13 年 5 月 1 5 日), 43, "（第二条）幕府、目付馬場利重及び肥前長崎奉行榊原職直に条令を下して、日本人の異国渡海を一切禁じ、南蛮人の子孫の追放を命ず.," 6-8., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1636/19-4-3/6/0006?m=all&s=0006&n=20. Although the Tokugawa regime did not promulgate the formal edict which prohibited Japanese from traveling abroad until 1636, Takeno Yoko notes that it became increasingly difficult before this time to obtain vermilion seal trading permits, see Takeno Yoko/武野要子., *Han bōekishi no kenkyū*/藩貿易史の研究., Kyōto: Minerva Shobō., 1979., 181-184, 222-223. 3 October 1634, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6546

act that would solidify the status of the Suetsugu as key intermediaries for the Tokugawa regime.[246]

Heizō II's proposed alliance indeed carried the prospect that the VOC and its agents could gain legitimacy in Asia, but at the same time, he worked to devise a plan to financially subordinate the company to the Suetsugu. The Suetsugu had a long history as transnational lenders and financiers who leveraged their expertise to great effect in undermining rival trading companies. Earlier in the 1630s, Heizō II became the majority shareholder in various trading associations on Macau in exchange for Portuguese indebtedness, a move that made colonial officials Suetsugu agents.[247] By 1634, Portuguese debts to Japanese merchants, whom the Suetsugu represented, amounted to 150,000 *taels* of silver, the equivalent to $42,000,000 U.S. Dollars.[248] In addition to this tremendous amount of principal debt that government officials and private merchants on Macau owed Japanese merchants, the Portuguese were responsible for paying yearly interest that averaged between 30 to 40 percent and accrued an additional interest of 10 percent if their ships could not make the voyage to Ming China and buy silk as the promissory notes specified. Furthermore, the Suetsugu and their clients continued to force the Portuguese to accept further loans of silver until they had paid off all of their debts.[249] Such debt entrapment provided the Suetsugu patriarch with a unique opportunity to wrangle further concessions from his Portuguese clients. Private merchants and government officials on Macau provided Heizō II with an increasing number of shares in their trading associations in exchange

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[246] Clulow., "From Global Entrepôt to Early Modern Domain: Hirado, 1609-1641."
[247] Oka Mihoko discusses how Heizō I was able to undermine the colonial government of Macau and transform Portuguese trading associations into agents for the Suetsugu. See Oka Mihoko/岡美穂子., *Shōnin to senkyōshi: Nanban bōeki no sekai/*商人と宣教師 南蛮貿易の世界., Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai., 2010., 96-97,
[248] Oka, "A Great Merchant in 17th Century Nagasaki: Suetsugu Heizo and the System of Respondencia," 47.
[249] Suetsugu Monjo 末次文書 (TDSH, 3071.91-65), Oka, *Shōnin to senkyōshi: Nanban bōeki no sekai/*商人と宣教師 南蛮貿易の世界, 82, 85. Oka, "A Great Merchant in 17th Century Nagasaki: Suetsugu Heizo and the System of Respondencia," 50.

for their debt and the Suetsugu patriarch's personal guarantee that he would advocate for Portuguese interests in Nagasaki. By the mid-1630s, officials such as the former captain major and factor, Agostinho Lobo, and the merchant, Rodrigo Sanchez Paredes, became commercial agents for Heizō II and represented Suetsugu interests within the government of Macau until the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639.[250]

Heizō II hoped to similarly subvert and subdue the VOC and when the Suetsugu patriarch offered to organize the financing for the Dutch expedition to Southeast Asia, all the while planning for his contribution to be a high interest loan. For the initial financing meeting, Heizō II invited two Chinese merchants and his father's old friend, the Dutch venture capitalist, Melchior van Santvoort (1570-1641), to pool their resources along with the VOC for the voyage to Southeast Asia.[251] Van Santvoort was one of the surviving crewmembers of the first Dutch ship to arrive in Japan in 1600, *De Liefde*, and he lived in Nagasaki as an independent merchant who

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[250] Oka, *Shōnin to senkyōshi: Nanban bōeki no sekai/*商人と宣教師 南蛮貿易の世界, 91-92, 94-102.

[251] 3 November 1634, Letter from VOC Merchant Hendrick Hagenaar to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6561
Van Santvoort moved to Nagasaki as a private merchant and was a regular investor in the trade between Japan and Southeast Asia, see C. R. Boxer., *The Affair of the "Madre de Deus." A Chapter in the History of the Portuguese in Japan ... Reprinted from "The Transactions and Proceedings of the Japan Society."*. Pp. 94. pl. VI. Kegan Paul & Co: London., 1929. Dutch correspondents often referred to Van Santvoort as a *patroon*, which connoted manorial rights, land ownership, and local, legal jurisdictional authority that was independent from the company. As a *patroon*, Van Santvoort had similar status, rights, and privileges with that of Killaen van Rensselaer (1586-1643) who established the *patroonship* of *Rensselaerswyck* in 1639 in what is today, upstate New York. This provides an interesting perspective as it suggests that the VOC viewed Nagasaki as a space of hybrid, transnational political authority in a manner that was similar to how the Dutch West India Company viewed upstate New York. See Jaap Jacobs., "Dutch Proprietary Manors in America: The Patroonships in New Netherland," in Roper, Louis H., and Bertrand Van Ruymbeke., *Constructing Early Modern Empires: Proprietary Ventures in the Atlantic world, 1500-1750*. Leiden: Brill., 301-326. " *Rensselaerswyck* was actually a separate landholding grant (a patroonship) that the Dutch West India Company sold to Killian van Rensselaer, a wealthy Amsterdam diamond merchant, who was also a shareholder in the company. Van Rensselaer enjoyed a small degree of autonomy in the early seventeenth century." See Timothy R. Romans., "The Boschlopers of New Netherland and the Iroquois, 1633-1664.," (M.A. The Florida State University, 2005)., 13. For a contextual discussion of pooling capital to minimize risk and fund maritime expeditions in East Asia, see Oka, "A Great Merchant in 17th Century Nagasaki: Suetsugu Heizo and the System of *Respondencia*."

offered his consulting services to the VOC.[252] On November 3, 1634, the two Chinese merchants and Van Santvoort gathered at Verstegen's house in Nagasaki to pool their financial resources and discuss expenses for the voyage to Southeast Asia, agreeing on the total amount of 200,000 *taels*.[253] After discussion, Van Santvoort and the two Chinese merchants quickly came to the realization that they could, at present, only raise 77,500 of the 200,000 *taels* worth of silver coins yet Verstegen held out hope as they had yet to receive Heizō II's contribution.[254]

Heizō II's intention to entrap the company within a web of debt became clear to Verstegen when the Suetsugu patriarch's contribution to the expedition arrived two months later on January 9, 1635. When Verstegen opened the small boat that transported Heizō II's contribution, the Dutchman was shocked to discover that it only contained 22,500 taels, half the amount of what the Suetsugu patriarch had originally promised. Verstegen characterized the situation and Heizō II's shortfall as "unthinkable" as the total contributions only amounted to around 100,000 taels, only half of the 200,000 taels necessary for the voyage to Southeast Asia.[255] When Verstegen inquired about the shortfall, Heizō II replied that "if their honors in the company thought it necessary, he would lend them the money with interest," and to "not be shy about asking."[256]

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[252] For an account of the voyage of *De Liefde*, the first Dutch ship to reach Japan in 1600 and its famous pilot, William Adams, see F. C. Wieder (ed.), *De Reis van Mahu en De Cordes door de Straat van Magallanes naar Zuid-Amerika en Japan, 1598-1600*, 3 vols, The Hague, 1923-25. Volume 3 is especially relevant to Adams in Japan. In English, a good, popular accounting of Adams' voyage and career in Japan is Hiromi Rogers., *Anjin - The Life and Times of William Adams 1564-1620: As Seen Through Japanese Eyes*. [Place of publication not identified]: Renaissance Books Ltd., 2015.

[253] Tonio Andrade provides a very useful reference for currency conversion regarding Chinese taels/兩. For example, one tael of fine silver was equal to 1.4 Spanish *real*. "Thus, a *real* was worth on the order of US $200 (today's dollars), and a tael about 50 percent more." See Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*. Appendix A "Weights, Measures, and Exchange Rates."

[254] 3 November 1634, Letter from VOC Merchant Hendrick Hagenaar to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6561

[255] 9 January 1635, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277.

[256] Heizō II was asking for the rough equivalent of a $6,000,000 USD down payment for a $30,000,000 USD loan. 9 January 1635, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen*

Unbeknownst to Verstegen, Heizō II had likely invested the other portion of his promised contribution in a Chinese voyage to Tonkin.[257] By investing in two voyages to Southeast Asia, Heizō II sought to split his overall risk and buy up as much silk as possible. If Heizō II could convince VOC agents to accept a loan of 100,000 taels with interest, it would provide him with the means to financially subordinate the company to the Suetsugu.

Heizō II's offer divided the VOC's agents and the Council of the Indies in Batavia as it carried a tremendous financial risk, but also the promise of gaining the Suetsugu as a powerful ally for the company in Japan. The offer also came at a time when relations between the company and the Matsuura lords of Hirado was under considerable tension.[258] As proof of his good intentions, Heizō II sent two barrels of *sake* to Nicolaes Couckebacker (1597-1671) in Hirado "according to Japanese custom," and then communicated to Verstegen his expectations that the company would provide him with a down payment of 20,000 taels for the loan.[259] Although Verstegen did not doubt Heizō II's willingness to help the VOC, the Dutchman communicated to Couckebacker his fear that "he would get burned" if he took the loan on his own accord.[260] When Couckebacker relayed the company's shortage of silver and need for a loan from the Suetsugu to Batavia, Governor General Hendrik Brouwer (1581-1643) blamed the Matsuura lords of Hirado as they had yet to pay the VOC back for silver they had borrowed from the company. Brouwer

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brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6566

[257] Mention of Heizō II investing in a Chinese junk is in the journal of the voyage of the Dutch yacht, *Grol*. See A. J. C. Geerts and Morris Dixon., "Voyage of the Dutch Ship Grol from Hirado to Tonking," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, XI, Part 2. (1883): 180-219., 205.

[258] Again, see Clulow., "From Global Entrepôt to Early Modern Domain: Hirado, 1609-1641." 24.

[259] 1 February 1635, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6570

[260] 1 February 1635, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6570

communicated more disturbing news to Couckebacker as he had heard from the Nagasaki governors that Japanese Roman Catholic priests were fomenting rebellion against the shogun in Hirado domain. In reference to these difficulties with the Matsuura, Brouwer and Couckebacker came to the conclusion that a partnership with the Suetsugu was the most viable option for the company's future in Japan, notwithstanding Heizō II's extortionary loan terms.[261] In the end, Verstegen was relieved when Van Santvoort and Vincent Romeyn, another former crewmember of the *Liefde* and an independent Dutch merchant in Nagasaki, agreed to take the loan from Heizō II at their own risk in order to finance the voyage which the investors agreed would proceed first to Taiwan and then on to the Kingdom of Tonkin.[262] The Suetsugu and the Dutch were now business partners in the voyage of the VOC yacht *Grol* which sailed from Hirado to Tonkin in March 1637.

[261] 5 July1635, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6586

[262] 24 February 1637, Letter from Willem Verstegen to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277. 6641. Vincent Romeyn would also later accompany the *Grol* during its voyage to Tonkin, see See Geerts and Dixon., "Voyage of the Dutch Ship Grol from Hirado to Tonking." 189.

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The voyage of the *Grol* was a watershed event as it marked the beginning of a partnership between the Suetsugu and the VOC in earnest. During the negotiations with the king of Tonkin, the crew of the *Grol* heard from locals that a Chinese junk had anchored near the "Pirate's Island" on April 26, 1637.[264] As the Dutch soon learned, Heizō II was a major investor in the Chinese junk which had sailed out of Nagasaki carrying 20 cases of silver to buy up silks in Tonkin. The crew of the *Grol* later lamented that the price of silks had raised since the previous year from 45 taels to 65 taels for a *picul*, or roughly 132 pounds of silk.[265] As the Dutch

[263] Figure 4-2 Painting of a seventeenth century VOC Yacht. Jacob van Strij (1756-1815)., "Het jacht van de Kamer Rotterdam van de VOC begroet een Rotterdamse Oostindiëvaarder en een Nederlands oorlogsschip op de rede van Hellevoetsluis," Kunsthandel Bob P. Haboldt & Co., Parijs, 1999; Maritiem Museum Rotterdam, inv. nr. P3370. https://www.verenigingrembrandt.nl/nl/kunst/het-jacht-van-de-kamer-rotterdam-van-de-voc-begroet-een-rotterdamse-oostindi%C3%ABvaarder-en-een-nederlands-oorlogsschip-op-de-rede-van-hellevoetsluis.

[264] Geerts and Dixon., "Voyage of the Dutch Ship Grol from Hirado to Tonking." 199.

[265] A picol/擔 equals 60 kilograms/132 lbs or 100 catty/斤. See Andrade., *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*., Appendix A.

discovered, they could only buy poor to medium quality silk at exorbitant prices due to competition from the Chinese, Portuguese, and Macau Jesuits.[266] The surprise arrival of Heizō II's Chinese junk in Tonkin illustrates two important points, the first being that the VOC partnership with the Suetsugu was not one of equals. Secondly, Heizō II not only had two ships bidding against one another, but likely three as the Macau Jesuits were Suetsugu agents. This is an important point as it is reflexive of Heizō II's desire to monopolize Japan's silk imports, especially since the Suetsugu patriarch was already the senior partner in the domestic silk trade and distribution union.[267]

Heizō II's resolve to establish a monopoly over Japan's silk imports mean putting aside his father's quarrel with the VOC. The decline of the vermilion seal trading system and the Tokugawa curtailment of maritime relations with the Iberian powers caused the Suetsugu to increasingly rely on the Dutch as trading partners. In the 1630s, the VOC proved to be the most viable commercial allies for Heizō II by proving the Suetsugu patriarch with access to commercial goods that he needed. Specifically, Heizō II needed uninterrupted access to silks, rarities, and tea implements from Korea, Southeast Asia, and China. Heizō II's ability to procure these goods allowed him to build a network of powerful patrons in Edo in order to secure the future of the Suetsugu as rising peers of Japan's warrior elite.

The partnership with the VOC was a necessary precondition for Heizō II's friendship with the tea master, Kobori Enshū, who helped the Suetsugu rebuild their networks of political patronage in Edo. Enshū's tea ceremonies were famous for their displays of Chinese, Southeast Asian, and

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[266] Geerts and Dixon., 192, 205, 214.

[267] The domestic silk trade union was the *itowappu* (糸割符) and as Oka Mihoko argues, Heizō II was using the *itowappu* system after 1634 to " gain his profits properly by using the investment association system in Macau." See Oka Mihoko/岡美穂子., *Shōnin to senkyōshi: Nanban bōeki no sekai/*商人と宣教師 南蛮貿易の世界., Tōkyō: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai., 2010., 96-97.

Korean tea utensils. During the Tokugawa period, tea ceremony and material gift exchange became an important fixture in the ordering and sociability of the warrior elite.[268] Enshū came to utilize his friendship with Heizō II and Suetsugu maritime connections to the Dutch and Chinese for their uninterrupted access to foreign commerce in obtaining tea utensils and rarities, which fueled the competitive consumption of the warrior class of the early Tokugawa period.[269] By the end of the 1630s, the Tokugawa curtailment of relations with the Iberian powers and closure of the vermilion seal system severely limited Enshū's access to foreign tea implements and rarities. Enshū's relationship with the Suetsugu spanned three generations, beginning with the tenure of Heizō I (1619-1630) to that of Heizō III (1643-1648).[270] A series of letters and gifts substantiate the relationship between Enshū and the Suetsugu, and not only provide insight into the needs of the famous tea master, but also clues as to what Heizō II sought most of all: recognition as a peer of Japan's warrior elite.

A series of letters between Heizō II and Enshū substantiate the friendship between the two men and affirm that the famous tea master came to depend on the Suetsugu patriarch for his overseas connections to the VOC and Chinese maritime networks. In 1636, Enshū sent Heizō II a letter and a gift of one of his famous double-tiered bamboo flower vases with a request for the Suetsugu patriarch to secure writing and tea implements from the cargo of a Chinese ship that had recently arrived in Hirado.[271] Enshū revealed that he was acting as an intermediary on behalf

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[268] Pitelka., *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability*., 11.

[269] Fujimi Asumi/藤生明日美., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō." 研究紀要/ Kenkyū kiyō., 野村美 術館学芸部/Nomura Museum of the Arts and Sciences, 編. Vol. (28): 33-50., 32-25. Pitelka., *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability*., 14-15, 17, 19-31.

[270] Fujimi Asumi/藤生明日美., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō." 研究紀要/ Kenkyū kiyō., 野村美 術館学芸部/Nomura Museum of the Arts and Sciences, 編. Vol. (28): 33-50., 34-36.

[271] In the collection of the Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture, there is a sample of one of these two-tiered bamboo flower vases which is dated to the time of the demise of the Suetsugu with Heizō IV in 1676. Art historian, Fujimi Asumi, surmises that the museum is incorrect and instead argues that the vase was likely a gift from Enshū to Heizō I that accompanied a request for a cargo of tea implements. Enshū used these double-tiered vases as gifts

of the Tokugawa bannerman and Edo magistrate, Kagatsume Tadazumi (1586-1641), in his request for tea implements and rarities.[272] In his letter, Enshū made another request of Heizō II for a uniquely styled teapot from the Suetsugu patriarch's special reserve of commodities. As for Japanese domestic teapots and in particular, the Sakuragawa style, Enshū complained that the mouth was too wide and oddly shaped. In closing, Enshū made an additional request to Heizō II for pieces of Chinese silk in of various colors. As Enshū's letter and requests illustrate, the famous tea master and the elite of Edo came to depend on the Suetsugu in order to obtain rarities and tea implements from foreign markets.[273]

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which accompanied letters that carried a request from or expressed gratitude on behalf of the famous tea master. Aside from the flower vase in the Nagasaki Museum of History and Culture/長崎歴史文化博物館, one other example and its corresponding gift box which Enshū inscribed to Heizō II in 1636 along with a letter resides in the Sanrtisu Hattori Museum of Arts/サンリツ服部美術館. Fujimi Asumi/藤生明日美., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō." 研究紀要/ Kenkyū kiyō., 野村美 術館学芸部/Nomura Museum of the Arts and Sciences, 編. Vol. (28): 33-50., 37-39.

[272] Fujimi Asumi/藤生明日美., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō." 研究紀要/ Kenkyū kiyō., 野村美 術館学芸部/Nomura Museum of the Arts and Sciences, 編. Vol. (28): 33-50., 38-41.

[273] Fujimi Asumi/藤生明日美., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō." 研究紀要/ Kenkyū kiyō., 野村美 術館学芸部/Nomura Museum of the Arts and Sciences, 編. Vol. (28): 33-50., 38-41.

挿図4　「竹二重切花入　銘　女郎花」内箱



挿図1　「竹二重切花入　銘　女郎花」（サンリツ服部美術館）

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Heizō II's involvement in tea culture gave him access to political and social connections that he otherwise might not have had. The Suetsugu patriarch's friendship with Enshū provided Heizō II with a very important association: the lords of Owari and Mito domains, who were members of the Tokugawa family, and in the line of succession to the office of shogun. In return for Heizō II's assistance in obtaining tea implements and rarities from China, Korea, and Southeast Asia, Enshū invited Heizō II to associate with Japan's warrior elite in his tea ceremonies on four occasions, twice in 1637 and twice again in 1640. The significance of Enshū inviting Heizō II to his tea ceremonies is twofold. First, Enshū invited Heizō II to his tea ceremonies at a time when he had all but ceased including the representatives of merchant families in his events.[275] Second,

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[274] Figure 4-3. Fujimi Asumi/藤生明日美., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō." 研究紀要/ Kenkyū kiyō., 野村美 術館学芸部/Nomura Museum of the Arts and Sciences, 編. Vol. (28): 33-50., 34.

[275] Fukaya Nobuko/深谷信子. 2009. 小堀遠州の茶会/*Kobori enshū no chakai*. Tōkyō: Kashiwashobō., 2009., Postscript 75, 77, Fujimi Asumi/藤生明日美., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō." 研究紀要/ Kenkyū kiyō., 野村美 術館学芸部/Nomura Museum of the Arts and Sciences, 編. Vol. (28): 33-50., 34-35.

Heizō II's participation and experience in Enshū's tea ceremonies were parallel to those of the sixteenth century Sakai merchant and favorite of Oda Nobunaga, Imai Sōkyū (1520-1593). Imai used Japan's political instability, the rising popularity of tea culture, and the competitive consumption among the warrior elite for his own social advancement. Although Imai came from a merchant house, he was eventually able to join the warrior elite and secure a landed domain. Heizō II likely envisioned a similar opportunity for the Suetsugu and viewed his relationship with Enshū as a means to expand his political connections and patronage to the inner circles of the Tokugawa court in Edo.[276]

There are two compelling anecdotes which suggest that the Suetsugu enjoyed the patronage of the lords of Owari and Mito through their connections to Enshū. The first anecdote relates to Heizō II's declining health during the winter and spring of 1639-1640. As he aged, Heizō II suffered from a cranial tumor that left the Suetsugu patriarch incapacitated and unable to communicate, much less travel for weeks at a time.[277] In December of 1639, Heizō II fell ill while visiting Edo and required a heated room for rest and recovery. Enshū interceded on behalf of his friend, Heizō II, and contacted the chief councilor of state, Tokugawa Yoshinaō, the lord

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[276] Pitelka, *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability.*, 13, 30-31, 179. Japan's unifiers such as Oda Nobunaga needed proxies such as Imai in order to peacefully gain the cooperation of other urban elites and reap the economic benefits of port cities such as Sakai. In this symbiotic relationship, Imai acted under the Oda aegis to increase his own social stature and economic fortunes. According to Watsky, " It was, however, to Nobunaga's advantage to favor all three men-and others in Sakai-to foster good relations with the various mercantile interests they represented. Nobunaga had not exercised such restraint in his initial approach to Sakai without good reason. The commercial well-being of his administration was tied to a cooperative Sakai. To elicit this cooperation, Nobunaga formed social bonds within the tea room and through other activities, such as noh. Especially prominent in these activities were Sokyui, Sogyui, and Soeki." The relationship between the Tokugawa regime and the Suetsugu is comparable to that of the Oda and Imai in that Edo needed Heizō II to align Nagasaki, as a thriving commercial entrepôt with Tokugawa interests. See Watsky, "Commerce, Politics, and Tea. The Career of Imai Sōkyū.," 51, 54, 57, 63.

[277] For more details about Heizō II's poor health, later retirement, and eventual move to Kyoto, see Fujimi Asumi/藤生明日美., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō." 研究紀要/ Kenkyū kiyō., 野村美 術館学芸部/Nomura Museum of the Arts and Sciences, 編. Vol. (28): 33-50., 34, 36, 40.

of Owari domain, who had one of the few heated rooms, which were a rarity in Edo during the early seventeenth century.[278] Yoshinaō provided a heated room for Heizō II in his Edo mansion while the Suetsugu patriarch recovered enough to make his return journey home to Nagasaki in early 1640.[279]

Heizō II 's friendship with Enshū made it possible for the Suetsugu patriarch to extend his influence into the court at Edo and specifically, to the heads of the cadet branches of the Tokugawa family of Owari and Mito. As VOC Chief Factor, Zacharias Wagenaer, recorded in 1656, the Suetsugu came to serve as intermediaries with the Dutch and the Chinese in purchasing blood coral for the lord of Mito domain, the vice-shogun, Tokugawa Yorifusa (1603-1661).[280] The convergence of early Tokugawa period tea culture with the competitive material accumulation among Japan's warrior elite directly translated into social status and political power, offering a tantalizing pathway to social mobility for the Heizō dynasty.[281]

Like the Sakai merchants, Imai and Konishi Yukinaga (1555-1600) before him, Heizō II viewed tea ceremony and competitive material accumulation as pathways to social mobility. [282]

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[278] Tokugawa Yoshinaō was also the ninth son of Tokugawa Ieyasu and became the lord of Owari domain in 1607 at the age of seven.

[279] Fujimi Asumi., "小堀遠州と末次平蔵/ Kobori Enshū and Suetsugu Heizō.," 40. Tokugawa Jikki further substantiates that Tokugawa Yoshinaō's mansion in Edo did, in fact, have heated rooms, see Naitō Chisō/内藤耻叟, ed., *Tokugawa jikki*/徳川実紀. 卷 1-186.,Tōkyō: Tokugawa Jikki Shuppan Jimusho/徳川実紀出版事務所., Meiji 29-32 [1896-1899]., Vol. 145., pp. 40.

[280] The title of "vice-shogun" was unofficial, however the lord of Mito domain acted in this capacity. 9 December 1656., Daghregister van Zacharias Wagenaer, 2 November 1656 to 26 October 1657, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 70.

[281] Pitelka., *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability*., 6.

[282] As Turnbull notes "Konishi Yukinaga prospered as a merchant, a negotiator and a general, placing each role at the disposal in turn of Oda Nobunaga and his successor Toyotomi Hideyoshi. Yukinaga's military skills included those of naval warfare, which he demonstrated in an unusual way in 1582 at the siege of Bitchū-Takamatsu Castle. Hideyoshi reduced the low-lying fortress by building a dyke and diverting a river to slowly flood the place. When the surrounding waters were sufficiently deep Konishi Yukinaga bombarded the castle from warships floated on the artificial lake. Yukinaga eventually acquired the fief of Shōdojima, a large island in the Inland Sea from where he could combine his naval expertise and business acumen in a way that greatly benefited Hideyoshi's expansionist plans." The Jesuit, Luís Fróis referred to Konishi as Hideyoshi's *Capitan Mor de Mar* or "Grand Admiral of the Seas." As Maria Grazia Petrucci correctly and brilliantly argues, "Yukinaga's work in the Seto Insland Sea demonstrated the existence of a power gap between peripheries and the not yet stabilized centrality of the Japanese Government, whose expansionistic aim was to put under control peripheral but strategic areas in order to regulate its

Heizō II's alliance with the VOC was the most important factor in his friendship with Enshū as the Dutch provided the Suetsugu with the material commodities that they needed to secure powerful patrons in Edo. However, as the precedent of the Sakai merchants proves, Heizō II needed more than just networks of patronage if he were to win recognition for the Suetsugu as peers of Japan's warrior elite. As Imai and Konishi had done for their respective lords, Oda Nobunaga and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, Heizō II would have to perform a dynamic act of military service for his Tokugawa masters. It was from this necessity to perform an act of military service that is the topic of the following discussion and investigates how Spanish Manila emerged as an ideal target for Heizō II's ambitions of winning peerage with Japan's warrior elite.

The Invasion of Spanish Manila

If an ambassador is not sent, I shall unfurl my banner and send an army against that country to conquer it with a multitude of men; so that that country will repent at not having sent me an ambassador…[283]

Excerpt from Toyotomi Hideyoshi's 1591 letter to the Governor of Manila

As an early modern empire that contended with the uneven sovereign claims of its predecessors, the Tokugawa regime relied on indirect control and intermediaries such as the Suetsugu in order to exercise domestic and international power. Heizō II's ambitions for Manila echoed those of his father's for Taiwan and like Masanao before him, Shigemasa sought to use

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domestic and international relations." See Maria Grazia Petrucci**.,** "In the Name of the Father, the Son and the Islands of the Gods: A Reappraisal of Konishi Ryūsa, a Merchant, and of Konishi Yukinaga, a Christian Samurai, in Sixteenth-Century Japan**.,**" (M.A. The University of British Columbia, 2005). Stephen Turnbull., "The Ghosts of Amakusa: Localised Opposition to Centralised Control in Higo Province, 1589–1590.," Japan Forum, 25:2, 191-211.

[283] One of the central justifications for both the Matsukura and Suetsugu plan to invade Manila was the 1628 Spanish attack on the ship of Nagasaki mayor, Takagi Sakuemon which burned and sank in the mouth of the Chao Phraya River in the Kingdom of Ayutthaya. See *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* /大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 5, 1628 May, 寛永 5 年 4 月, 71, "西班牙の艦船、暹羅国メナム河口に於て、肥前長崎の高木作右衛門の商船を焼沈し、其乗組日本人を捕ふ.," 178., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1628/18-7-2/4/0001?m=all&s=1000&n=203/6/0006?m=all&s=0006&n=20. Stephen Turnbull. "Wars and Rumors of Wars: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593–1637." *Naval War College Review* 69, no. 4 (2016): 107-21., 108.

international events as justification for of exploiting an area of hybrid, transnational political authority to build a maritime domain.[284] Although some ranking members of the Tokugawa court still viewed the VOC as a threat by 1637, court opinion in Edo viewed the Iberian presence in Macau and Manila as eminently more dangerous to the stability of the regime. In particular, Spanish Manila presented an existential threat to the Tokugawa as a bastion of Iberian military might in Asia, and as a perceived staging area for renegade Catholic priests to infiltrate Japan. The combination of Spanish naval attacks on vermilion seal ships, renegade Catholic priests, and unrest among the hidden Christian communities and peasants in Western Japan convinced Tokugawa officials to revisit old plans to conquer and remove the existential threat of Spanish Manila.[285]

Heizō II 's 1637 plan to invade Spanish Manila built on the 1591 ambitions of Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his military planner, the wealthy Sakai merchant, Harada Kiemon (1555-1599) and also those of the lord of Shimabara domain, Matsukura Shigemasa (1574-1630), under the Tokugawa regime in 1630.[286] As with the earlier plans of Harada and the Matsukura, Heizō II

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[284] In arguing for the existence of areas of hybrid, transnational political authority in the early modern world, I again apply Lauren Benton's useful framework and understanding of sovereignty. I also apply here Margariti and Petrucci's concept of "corridors of control" regarding islands and maritime peripheries. Graz's schema is useful here as well. See Margariti., "An Ocean of Islands: Islands, Insularity, and Historiography of the Indian Ocean.," 208. Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*., 3, 8, 285, 287, 292. Jean-Graz. *The Power of Standards: Hybrid Authority and the Globalisation of Services*., Petrucci**.,** **"**In the Name of the Father, the Son and the Islands of the Gods: A Reappraisal of Konishi Ryūsa, a Merchant, and of Konishi Yukinaga, a Christian Samurai, in Sixteenth-Century Japan**."**

[285] Turnbull, "Wars and Rumors of Wars: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593–1637.," 112, 115.

[286] Heizō II 's 1637 plan to invade Spanish Manila built on the ambitions of the wealthy Sakai merchant, Harada Kiemon and lord of Shimabara domain, Matsukura Shigemasa. In 1591, Hideyoshi entrusted Harada with planning and organizing an attack on Manila. Although Hideyoshi wished to punish the Spanish for not submitting and offering him tribute, Harada publicly announced his confidence that his great lord would appoint him as governor of Manila upon victory. Harada's 1591 invasion never materialized and in 1630, the lord of Shimabara domain, Matsukura Shigemasa, revived the plan to attack Manila under the Tokugawa aegis. Matsukura was enamored by the stories of Manila's wealth and envisioned that the shogun would award him with a 100,000 *koku* domain in Luzon upon completion of a successful military campaign against the Spanish. Increasing tensions over a 1628 Spanish attack on a vermilion seal ship and Tokugawa perceptions that renegade priests infiltrated Japan from the Philippines provided Matsukura with the international justification to invade Manila. As justification for his planned expedition against Manila, Matsukura reminded Edo that the Spanish had attacked a vermilion seal ship belonging to Nagasaki mayor, Takagi Sakuemon in 1628 and that the Philippines served as a staging area for Catholic priests to

built his strategy on the idea that a small invasion force could easily overwhelm the Spanish garrison of Manila. The 1591 Toyotomi plan even suggested that the Chinese communities of Luzon would welcome the Japanese as liberators and help to overthrow the Spanish.[287] Both the 1591 Toyotomi plan and the 1630 Matsukura plan under the Tokugawa also envisioned that the vast riches and wealth of Manila would make the invasion pay for itself. Much like the earlier plans, Heizō II built his 1637 plan around a minimal expenditure of Japanese financial, logistical, and military resources. Where Heizō II's 1637 plan differed from that of his predecessors was his goal to shift the burden of supplying ships, manpower, and logistics from the Tokugawa regime and Japan's domains to the VOC.

Heizō II's 1637 plan to invade Manila is also important in that it is illustrative of how the Tokugawa regime used transnational intermediaries such as the Suetsugu to consolidate power and contend with the uneven imperial geography and sovereign claims which remained from Japan's Warring States Period.[288] The Tokugawa claim to Manila stemmed from a threatening

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enter Japan and foment rebellion. Furthermore, Matsukura convinced Tokugawa officials that a Spanish invasion of Japan was imminent. In response to Matsukura's threat analysis, Edo gave him approval to begin planning and preparations for the invasion of Manila. However, Matsukura's plans and preparations never came to fruition as he died a suspicious and untimely death in his bathhouse that same year in 1630. Mention of the Matsukura plan to invade Manila is here, *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* 大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 7, 1630 December 14, 寛 7 年 11 月, 11 日), 71, "肥前島原城主松倉重政、船二隻を呂宋島に派し、家臣木村権之丞・吉岡九左衛門等をして、軍情を偵察せしむ、尋で、重政卒す、子勝家嗣ぐ.," 52. https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1630/19-1-2/9/0052?m=all&s=0052. Turnbull. "Wars and Rumors of Wars: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593–1637.," 112-114.

[287] Harada was so assured of victory that in his council of war, he suggested that the Chinese communities of Luzon would welcome Hideyoshi's army as liberators, and that one hundred Japanese were worth three hundred Spaniards. Turnbull. "Wars and Rumors of Wars: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593–1637.," 108-111.

[288] During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, East Asian monarchs from Toyotomi Hideyoshi to the Chinese warlord and founder of the Zheng Empire, Koxinga, viewed Spanish Manila as a target for their ambitions of military expansion. Beginning in 1586, the Spanish feared that maritime agents of the Toyotomi regime were planning on colonizing Luzon. In 1591, Spanish officials received a threatening letter from Hideyoshi which confirmed their earlier fears of invasion as the Japanese monarch demanded that the governor of Manila either submit to him and offer tribute or else, risk war. Spanish accounts suggest that the primary agitator for Hideyoshi's planned invasion of Manila was the Toyotomi intermediary and wealthy Sakai merchant, Harada Kiemon. Harada desired the precious metals from the Manila galleon. Charles J. McCarthy. "On the Koxinga Threat of 1662." *Philippine Studies* 18, no. 1 (1970): 187-96.,

letter which Hideyoshi wrote in 1591 demanding that the Spanish submit and offer tribute or face an imminent military invasion from Japan.[289] Heizō II was the latest in a series of Japanese intermediaries who sought to exploit Hideyoshi's claim to Manila in his freelance ambition to annex the Spanish colony as part of a Suetsugu maritime domain. In his role as a Tokugawa intermediary, Heizō II's own ambiguous status as a merchant-samurai political official made him a deniable asset for Edo in an international environment should the invasion fail. In the event of successful attack on Manila, Heizō II's plan presented the Tokugawa regime with the opportunity for overseas expansion without the danger of squandering domestic political capital and military resources with minimal risk in fomenting unrest and instability within Japan.

More importantly, the examples of Harada and Heizō II reveal that the warrior elite were not always at the forefront of Japan's military expansion. Heizō II stood only to benefit from a successful invasion of Manila, not only in terms of monetary gain, but also in terms of political prestige. If the Harada and Matsukura invasion plans of 1591 and 1630 are any indication, Heizō II expected a governorship over Luzon or perhaps an award of a formal domain that would have placed the Suetsugu on equal footing with Japan's warrior elite. At the very least, a decisive strike against the Iberian powers was an opportunity for a domestic, political victory over Suetsugu rivals in Nagasaki and Edo and dovetailed with Heizō II's ambitions to cultivate powerful patrons among the Tokugawa elite. Regarding Heizō II's rising ambitions, the Suetsugu patriarch had to find willing participants in his invasion plans for Manila that would not expend the limited material and political resources of the Tokugawa regime. To make his invasion plans for Manila a reality, Heizō II turned to his new partners, the VOC, whom he pressured into making good all their promises to perform military service for their lord, the shogun.

[289] Turnbull, "Wars and Rumors of Wars: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593–1637.," 108.

As a Tokugawa intermediary with his own freelance ambitions to build a maritime domain, Heizō II pressured VOC agents to fulfill their promises to perform military service for the shogun and live up to their own rhetoric as loyal vassals of the Tokugawa.[290] In the initial planning meeting for the 1637 invasion of Manila, Heizō II and the Nagasaki governors asked chief factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker and Francois Caron:

Why have you let Manila sit for so long unmolested? You always say that you should not allow your enemies to have so much freedom and that you should seek to subdue him more and more. We agree with you (because of their insertion of priests [into Japan]) who through their hateful teachings do us shame and disgrace so we wish to prod and advise you to destroy Manila as his majesty [the shogun] would find such an outcome to be very agreeable.[291]

Caron answered:

The Dutch seek by night and day to destroy our enemies by any means practical and in any opportunity, however most of the company's power is in its commercial activities. In light of this, Manila is too insignificant and too far from Holland to be concerned about and furthermore, the company's scarce resources are not sufficient to carry out the aforementioned regents' proposal…This would not be possible to do, that they [the Spaniards] are too many in number and too strong, and their fortifications are too powerful for our might, even with the combined help of Japanese mercenaries.[292]

At this point in Caron's answer, the Nagasaki governor, Baba Saburōzaemon (????-1657), stood up and shouted at the Frenchman to "think again about what you are saying!"[293] Caron's contradictory and non-committal statements had infuriated the Nagasaki governors, as they did not adhere to previous VOC narratives of the company's military might and readiness to perform service for the shogun. VOC agents in Japan had long boasted of the company's military prowess

[290] As Clulow argues regarding Heizō II's comments, "the ideas first introduced by VOC agents could no longer be restrained as the company's rhetoric had become accessible to a range of groups with their own interests. By simply reciting VOC declarations of loyalty, the magistrate offered a script for the Dutch to follow, demanding, as was the case in the *hofreis* [journey to the court at Edo], that they act out the role they had claimed for themselves. See Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 123-124.
[291] 30 October 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.
[292] 30 October 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.
[293] 30 October 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.

to Tokugawa officials and Caron's response did not provide the Nagasaki governors with a pledge of support that they could use to gain favor from Edo.[294]

Although the Nagasaki governors initially failed to pressure the Dutch to perform military service, the chance arrival of renegade Italian Jesuit, Father Marcello Francesco Mastrilli (1603-1637), provided Heizō II with a fabricated, but terrifying narrative of a pending missionary onslaught of Japan. Although empty, Mastrilli's threats allowed Heizō II to seize on the Jesuit's narrative and deploy it as a means to more forcefully compel the Dutch to participate in the invasion of Manila.[295] Mastrilli arrived in Satsuma domain in October of 1637 and his mission was to find and reconvert the famous missionary, Father Christovão Ferreira (1580-1650), who had apostatized from the Christian faith.[296] Instead of finding Ferreira, Tokugawa officials escorted Mastrilli to Nagasaki where he faced interrogation from the governors, Sakakibara Motonao (1564-1642), Baba Saburōzaemon, and Heizō II. During his interrogation Mastrilli exclaimed "I wish for 100,000 martyrs [in Japan]!" Heizō II and the Nagasaki governors "in very disturbed words" asked "what shall you do with them [the martyrs]?" Mastrilli replied, "I shall offer them up to my god through whatever torments you deem practical and offer myself up as a martyr. Had I not already lived so many years already, I would bring all of Japan into the Christian fold in due time."[297] At this point in the conversation, Heizō II and the Nagasaki governors sat in stunned silence and did not know how to respond to Mastrilli's "unsettling

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[294] Turnbull, "Wars and Rumors of Wars: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593–1637.," 115., Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 123-124.

[295] For a more elaborate account of Mastrilli's arrival in Japan, his interrogation, and execution, see Clive Willis. "The Martyrdom of Father Marcello Mastrilli S.J." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch* 53 (2013): 215-25.

[296] The subject of Ferreira's apostasy is quite famous and was the topic of Endō Shūsaku's novel 沈黙/*Silence* and Martin Scorsese's 2016 film by the same name. For a more scholarly account of Ferreira, see Hubert Cieslik., "The Case of Christovão Ferreira." *Monumenta Nipponica* 29, no. 1 (1974): 1-54.Willis., 217-224.

[297] 31 October 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.

answers" and "let the torturers work their trade."[298] Within three days on October 17, 1637, Mastrilli expired from torture, but his empty threats provided Heizō II with a useful narrative that Japan faced an impending Jesuit invasion from Manila. Armed with the narrative that the Spanish intended to overthrow the Tokugawa regime, Heizō II was even more emboldened to once again approach and this time demand that the VOC provide military assistance to invade Manila.

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In contrast to the Nagasaki governors' failed attempts to extract a pledge of military support from the VOC for the 1637 invasion of Manila, Heizō II orchestrated an agreement with the Dutch to provide the shogun with transports and warships. Mastrilli's arrival provided Heizō II

[298] 31 October 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.
[299] Figure 4-4. Agostinho Soares Floriano (fl. 1619-1642), "Martyrdom of Fr. Marcello Mastrilli S.J. in Japan.," Engraving. Frontispiece to Ignace Stafford S.J. (1599-1642) *Historia de la celestial vocación […] del padre Marcelo Franco Mastrili.* Lisboa: Antonio Aluarez., Biblioteca Nacional Digital (Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal)., 1639.

with the opportunity to take charge of planning the invasion of Manila and on November 3, 1637, Heizō II summoned Couckebacker and Caron to his home in Nagasaki. Heizō II's goal was to coerce both men into signing an open-ended contractual pledge that the VOC would provide military support for any Tokugawa invasion of Manila. Caron returned to Hirado that evening and was visibly distraught from his encounter with Heizō II, who apparently had the ability to be every bit as unnerving as his father, Suetsugu Heizō Masanao. Caron opened his satchel and showed his compatriots the contract and explained to them that it had mostly come from Heizō II, who had also ordered him to translate every word:

> Recently we have understood that the people of Manila are breaking the prohibitions of his imperial majesty and are sending priests who are forbidden in Japan. As a result, they are viewed as criminals by your lordships. If the high authorities decide to destroy this place, the Hollanders, who bring a good number of ships to Japan every year, are always ready, in time or opportunity, to present our ships and cannon for your service. We ask that your lordships trust and believe that we are, in all matters without exception, ready to serve Japan.[300]

In the above document, Heizō II referred to the previous promises and rhetoric from VOC agents regarding their willingness, as Adam Clulow so eloquently argues, to serve as "loyal vassals" of the Tokugawa shogunate, and sought to use them to his own ambitions in building a maritime domain for the Suetsugu.[301] The contract also emphasized the perceived existential threat that the Tokugawa regime faced from the Iberian powers, who had not only violated shogunal law, but also international rules and norms by sending priests to foment rebellion in Japan. Heizō II capitalized on the very recent arrival of Mastrilli as proof of the threats facing the

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[300] Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 124-125, and 3 November 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.

[301] As Clulow argues, "If the Dutch had started off by simply pretending to be loyal vassals eager to dupe a Japanese audience for their own benefit, they had come to play the role so well and for so long that they had in effect surrendered any alternate identity in Japan. From the Bakufu's perspective, they had indeed become dutiful subordinates, loyal vassals that could be relied upon to provide service alongside their domestic counterparts. Thus a disguise, thrown on hastily in the 1630s, had become permanent, clinging tighter and tighter until it could no longer be removed." See Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 131.

Tokugawa regime, and sought to compel the Dutch into an open-ended agreement to send warships and transports to destroy Spanish Manila.

When Couckebacker refused to sign the contract, it directly jeopardized Heizō II's freelance ambitions to build a maritime domain for the Suetsugu and challenged his status as a legitimate Tokugawa intermediary. In addition to refusing to sign the contract, Couckebacker and Caron also regretted that they could not send it to Governor General Antonio van Diemen (1593-1645) in consideration of the difficulties that the company was facing, namely that it had currently deployed an armada to Goa and Amboyna. Heizō II took the Dutch rebuff of his request as a dangerously close revelation that the Suetsugu patriarch's intentions were not those of the shogun's and therefore, loosely aligned Tokugawa policy. In an angry tirade, Heizō II berated Couckebacker and Caron for the excuses they made "with such small hearts."[302] In further admonition, an outraged Heizō II threatened the VOC's position in Japan:

I wish you would not be that way and furthermore, you would not want the Nagasaki governors to hear the answer that you have just given. Would it not be more appropriate to say 'oh, what a worthy and auspicious occasion that we have so long wished for. To show his majesty, the shogun, how willing we are to serve Japan.' And furthermore, let me explain to you what will come to fruition should you refuse. First, you will be taken for unwilling, wrongheaded people, and as liars. You tell everyone at all times how you stand ready to serve Japan in all things and if the Hollanders were to do little, it would appear contrary to what I have told and clarified to the Nagasaki governors and the high shogunal councilors on many occasions. That is, what you say from your own mouths, that you always stand ready to serve his majesty with your might, ships, and guns, which you proclaim with fervor as if you were one of his majesty's own lords. If you do otherwise and display your unwillingness and fecklessness, you will never be able to satisfy all of your wants and greedy desires, and all of your ships will be met with violence so that you will never again be able to send away a single cargo.[303]

[302] 3 November 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.
[303] 3 November 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.

Although Heizō II later clarified that Dutch ships would face violence from the Spanish as a consequence of their inaction, he had also made his larger point that the VOC position in Japan depended on his own goodwill, which they had jeopardized. Heizō II's threats reveal that the VOC's favorable position in Japan disproportionately depended on him and the extent that the Suetsugu patriarch was willing to advocate on their behalf to the Nagasaki governors and high shogunal councilors in Edo. In reminding Couckebacker and Caron about the rhetoric of VOC agents regarding their willingness to serve the Tokugawa regime, Heizō II, in the words of Clulow, exploited the "declarations of loyalty" that the Dutch had repeatedly made to the shogun. In exploiting Dutch declarations of loyalty and VOC ambitions, Heizō II sought to maneuver the company and its agents into supporting his plan to conquer Manila.[304]

In planning for the 1637 invasion of Manila, Heizō II manipulated his partnership with the VOC to pressure the Dutch into providing the majority of the manpower and ships for the attack. During the preliminary deliberations in November, Heizō II chastised Couckebacker for the VOC's "skirting around" Manila and lack of effort in subduing the Spanish. Heizō II asserted that Japanese spies informed him that only 150 Spanish soldiers garrisoned Manila and that the VOC should be able to easily storm the fortress.[305] Indeed, Heizō II reasoned that due to the Spanish garrison's limited manning, the VOC would need the help of few, if any, Japanese soldiers, and that a small contingent of Dutchmen would be sufficient enough to conquer Manila.[306] Along

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[304] Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 125.

[305] Japanese sources provide a brief enough glimpse to authenticate that the 1637 plan both existed and relied upon the Dutch offering up their warships in service to the shogun. See *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1637 寛永 14 年, 38, "(第八条）幕府、呂宋遠征を計画し、和蘭領東印度総督に軍船の提供を交渉す, https://clioimg.hi.u tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1637/19-6-2/27/0001?m=all&s=1000. 31 October 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.

[306] 31 October 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.

with his admonitions, Heizō II added that if the Dutch came the next year and asked his majesty for permission to take matters against the Spanish into their own hands and presented the shogun with their ships, the Dutch would without doubt obtain a "great honor" in receiving orders to attack Manila.[307] Although Heizō II was not incorrect in asserting that the VOC and its agents would be the recipients of a "great honor" for serving the shogun, the Suetsugu arguably stood to benefit more than the company. If Heizō II could coerce the VOC to attack Manila using its own resources in the name of the shogun, it would solidify the efficacy of the Suetsugu as Tokugawa intermediaries in the realm of foreign affairs. Furthermore, Heizō II likely calculated that the Tokugawa regime would recognize him as a peer of Japan's warrior elite and reward him with the governorship of Manila in a manner similar to Harada's aspirations under the Toyotomi regime in 1591.

Although Heizō II was an intermediary of the shogun, he acted on his own accord under the umbrella of Tokugawa policy and his demands and threats stemmed from his freelance ambition to achieve an increasing measure of independence and build a maritime domain for the Suetsugu. In response to Heizō II's demands and threats, Caron and Couckebacker called an emergency meeting of VOC employees in Japan, resolving to send the Suetsugu patriarch's request to Governor General van Diemen as quickly as possible.[308] By December 9, 1637, Heizō II's missive had arrived in Batavia and it became one of the central items of discussion during the meeting of the VOC Council of the Indies. During the meeting, Van Diemen mentioned the

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[307] 3 November 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53.

[308]3 November 1637, Daghregister van Nicolaes Couckebacker, 1 January 1637 to 31 December 1637, *Dagregisters van de factorij te Hirado (Firando) en te Deshima*. 1633 - 1833., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 53., 20 November 1637., Letter from Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften.*, 1623 - 1786., , VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

shogun's intent to destroy Manila on the basis of his conviction that the Spanish were sending priests from there to Japan by way of the Ryūkyū Islands. According to Van Diemen, the Nagasaki "regents" which included the governors, Baba Saburōzaemon, Sakakibara Motonao, and Heizō II, "advised" the VOC to assist his majesty, the shogun, by presenting him with two to three ships. Van Diemen calculated that the VOC would have to provide an additional four to five powerful warships as an escort for the transports or else risk Spanish destruction of the invasion force before it landed. Van Diemen resolved that the VOC should provide the shogun with six to eight ships in total, with the reasoning that "the shogun persists in his intentions or else we will risk having to leave Japan."[309] Van Diemen's response not only acknowledged previous promises that VOC agents had made to serve the shogun, it also took seriously the threats that Heizō II had made, which would end the Suetsugu partnership with the company and force the Dutch to leave Japan. Lastly, the deliberations of Van Diemen and the Council of the Indies further underscores that the invasion plan for Manila did not originate with the shogun and resulted from the personal ambition of Heizō II acting under the umbrella of Tokugawa power. As a result of his maneuvering and the direct pressure he placed on the VOC and its agents, Heizō II now had his invasion fleet and his ambitions for Manila could move forward.

As a decentralized polity of hybridized civil-military control, the Tokugawa regime relied on intermediaries such as the Suetsugu to exercise state control at home and abroad. As intermediaries, the Suetsugu were useful to the Tokugawa regime due to their generational knowledge of the maritime world, to include commerce, shipping lanes, and even, amphibious warfare. Furthermore, Heizō II displayed an acute awareness of the inner workings of rival

[309] 26 December 1637., Letter from Governor General Antonio van Diemen to VOC Warship *Middelburg* in Jan Ernst Heeres and Pieter Anton Tiele., 1890. *De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie : verzamling van onuitgegeven stukken uit het Oud-Koloniaal Archief. Reeks 2 Deel 2 Reeks 2 Deel 2*. 's Gravenhage: Nijhoff., 1890., 334.

organizations such as the VOC and knew where and how to apply pressure in order to force the Dutch to "dance" to his tune.[310] The Suetsugu thrived in the ambiguousness of the early Tokugawa settlement and its spheres of indistinct power and control which enabled Heizō II to apply direct pressure on Governor General Van Diemen in Batavia and all the while laying claim to shogunal authority. In confronting Heizō II, Van Diemen and the company's officials in Japan truly felt that they had no alternative to complying with the Suetsugu patriarch's demands. Perhaps the most critical weapon in Heizō II's arsenal was his ability to appropriate and redeploy the company's own narratives of Dutch eagerness to serve the shogun to advance Suetsugu ambitions. Heizō II had won and the company had agreed to provide him with an invasion fleet and for a time, it seemed that Manila would soon be part of a Suetsugu maritime domain. However, changing domestic and international events interfered with Heizō II's ambitions as the Suetsugu patriarch confronted a new threat: a rebellion of peasants, master-less samurai, and Christians in the domain of Shimabara, which threatened the very existence of the Tokugawa regime.

Rebellion

As Heizō II assembled the final pieces for his invasion of Manila on December 17, 1637, the peasants of Shimabara domain revolted. In response to the summer famine of 1637 in Western Japan, the Matsukura lords of Shimabara domain raised their peasants' taxes to pay for their sumptuous visits to the shogun in Edo, and construction of their extravagant, new castle.[311] Throughout the summer and fall of 1637, there were accounts of the Matsukura lords binding the hands of peasants behind their backs, dressing them in straw coats, and then setting them ablaze

[310] Tonio Andrade, "The Company's Chinese Pirates: How the Dutch East India Company Tried to Lead a Coalition of Pirates to War against China, 1621-1662." *Journal of World History* 15, no. 4 (2004): 415-44., 436.
[311] Matthew E. Keith., "The Logistics of Power: Tokugawa Response to the Shimabara Rebellion and Power Projection in Seventeenth-Century Japan." (PhD. The Ohio State University, 2006)., 33.

if they could not pay the new tax. On December 11, 1637, Matsukura officials tortured and murdered the pregnant daughter of a peasant from Arima village in the southern part of Shimabara domain. In retaliation, the Arima villagers apprehended and executed the local magistrate. The next day, villagers gathered armaments, supplies, and found allies in the former retainers of the Arima family. These former retainers had lost their warrior status and had become master-less samurai after the Tokugawa shogunate ordered their former lord, Arima Harunobu, to commit suicide as punishment for conspiring with a fellow Christian official to steal lands from another domain and assassinate the Nagasaki governor.[312] These master-less samurai from Arima formed the nucleus of a rebel army who besieged the Matsukura garrison at Shimabara Castle, and then burned the surrounding town. On nearby Amakusa Island, the seventeen year-old son of a master-less samurai, Amakusa Shirō Tokisada (1621-1638), led an insurrection parallel to the one in Arima village, and he would later become the symbolic and spiritual leader of the larger 1637-1638 Shimabara Rebellion, an existential threat to the Tokugawa shogunate.[313]

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[312] This was the infamous "Okamoto Daihachi/岡本大八 Incident" of 1612 which fueled fears of Christian conspiracies in Japan was an important event in turning the Tokugawa regime against the Christian faith. Tokugawa officials commanded Arima Haronobu to commit suicide which he refused to do because of his faith. The Tokugawa regime ordered Harunobu executed instead. For a full accounting of the Okamoto Daihachi Incident, see Jurgis Elisonas., "Christianity and the Daimyo" in Yamamura Kozo, Marius B. Jansen, Peter Duus, John Whitney Hall, Delmer M. Brown, Donald H. Shively, and William H. McCullough.*The Cambridge history of Japan. 4 4*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1988., 366-368.

[313] One of Amakusa Shirō's background stories asserts that his father was a retainer of the Christian lord of Higo domain, Konishi Yukinaga. See Kanda Chisato/**神田千里**., *Shimabara no ran: Kirishitan shinkō to busō hōki*/島原の乱：キリシタン信仰と武装蜂起., Tōkyō-to Bunkyō-ku: Kōdansha., 2005., 29. For a more in-depth narrative on Amakusa Shirō, see Ivan Morris., *The Nobility of Failure: Tragic Heroes in the History of Japan*. Fukuoka: Kurodahan Press., 2013., 107-132.

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The Suetsugu thrived in the ambiguity of the early Tokugawa settlement and as there was no clear distinction between foreign and domestic, warrior and merchant, Heizō II was able to pivot from advocating an invasion of Manila to a role of domestic control in suppressing the rebels during the 1637-1638 Shimabara Rebellion.[316] Heizō II's role in putting down the Shimabara Rebellion dovetailed with his ambition to increase the family's influence in Edo and led to two major inflection points that shaped the rise of the Suetsugu as effective Tokugawa intermediaries in domestic and international affairs. First, the Tokugawa regime turned to Heizō II in their efforts to organize reinforcements for the shogun's army during the siege of the rebel-controlled Hara Castle in Saga domain. This was an unprecedented move, which suggests that the Tokugawa regime did not completely trust its constituent lords in Western Japan during a

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[314] Figure 4-5. Tsukioka Yoshitoki/月岡芳年, Keisei Suikoden Amakusa Shirō/競勢酔虎伝 ot 天草四郎., Tokyo Metropolitan Library., 明治０７ (1874).

[315] Figure 4-6. "Burning" Meiji University Museum/明治大学美術館.

[316] Like Clulow, I draw a connection between the Dutch promise to the shogun to invade Manila in 1637 and their later involvement in the 1638-1639 Shimabara Rebellion. I depart with Clulow's narrative from the vantage point in seeing the Suetsugu as something more than a "subordinate official." See Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 121-128.

domestic crisis and instead, called upon the Suetsugu. The second major inflection point involved Heizō II exceeding his orders by pressuring the VOC and its agents to support Tokugawa forces during the siege of Hara Castle. Heizō II's demands on the VOC for the invasion of Manila had already pushed the company to agree to participate in an invasion of Manila as the shogun's vassals. The outbreak of the Shimabara Rebellion provided Heizō II with the opportunity to transfer the VOC's commitment from an overseas military expedition to pacifying a rebellion that presented the Tokugawa shogunate with an existential threat. In mobilizing the Dutch against the Shimabara rebels, Heizō II proved to the Tokugawa regime that the Suetsugu could command the Dutch where the Matsuura lords of Hirado had failed. Since 1609, the Tokugawa regime had relied on the Matsuura to serve as its intermediaries with the VOC; however, the relationship between the Dutch and the lords of Hirado domain had grown increasingly and publicly dysfunctional. By the late 1630s, the Tokugawa regime had all but lost confidence in the ability of the Matsuura to transform the Dutch into vassals of the shogun.[317]

As the ranks of the rebel army swelled to 30,000 strong in January 1628, the Tokugawa regime scrambled to mobilize and deploy an army under the venerable commander, Itakura Shigemasa (1588-1638). Itakura took one-month to assemble his force and march to Shimabara and in the meantime, Edo organized a local response to contain the rebellion and turned to the Nagasaki governors, Baba Saburōzaemon, Sakakibara Motonao, and Heizō II.[318] Tokugawa officials did not only doubt the loyalty of their constituent lords in Western Japan, but also their competence.[319] The high shogunal councilors in Edo compared the Shimabara Rebellion to

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[317] Clulow., “From Global Entrepôt to Early Modern Domain: Hirado, 1609-1641.," 24-29.

[318] Naitō Chisō/内藤耻叟, ed., *Tokugawa jikki*/徳川実紀. 卷 1-186.,Tōkyō: Tokugawa Jikki Shuppan Jimusho/徳川実紀出版事務所., Meiji 29-32 [1896-1899]., Vol. 136., pp. 42-45.

[319] Copies of these orders are here *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/*大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1637 December 25, 寛永 14 年 11 月 9 日, 27, "(第三条）大坂城代阿部正次・大坂定番稲垣重綱・大坂町奉行曽我古祐、肥

Nobunaga's conflict against the armies of militant Buddhist monks during Japan's wars of unification, arguing that the lords of Western Japan had no experience in fighting enemies who would rather die for their cause than surrender.[320] Tokugawa officials desired to crush the Shimabara Rebellion quickly as the rebels consisted of a dangerous cross-section of master-less samurai, Japanese Christians, and armed peasants who might inspire other disaffected people to take up arms against Edo.

前長崎代官末次茂員に令して、援兵を同国佐賀に要請せしむ、仍りて、之を城主鍋島勝茂の老臣等に告.," 61., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1637/19-6-1/15/0061?m=all&s=0061., *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1638 January 3, 寛永 14 年 11 月 18 日, 29, "(第二条）一揆の首領益田四郎「時貞」の、肥後天草富岡城を陥れ、肥前長崎に来らんとすとの流言あり、長崎代官末次茂員、急を同国大村に報じて加勢を請ふ、35., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1637/19-6-1/19/0035?m=all&s=0035. *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* /大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1638 January 21, 寛永 14 年 12 月 7 日, 45, "(第三条）肥前長崎奉行榊原職直・同馬場利重、長崎の守備を定め、往きて同国島原の軍に会す、27., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1637/19-6-2/23/0027?m=all&s=0027., *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* /大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 15, 1638 February 21, 寛永 15 年 1 月 8 日, 52, "(第二条）年寄武蔵忍城主松平信綱、令して、肥前長崎奉行馬場利重に肥後熊本城主細川忠利の子光尚の軍を、同榊原職直に肥前佐賀城主鍋島勝茂の子直澄等の軍を、豊後府内の幕府目付役林勝正に筑前福岡城主黒田忠之・肥前唐津城主寺沢堅高の軍を、同牧野成純に筑後柳河城主立花宗茂の子忠茂・同国久留米城主有馬豊氏・肥前島原城主松倉勝家の軍を監せしむ, 26., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1638/19-6-3/4/0026?m=all&s=0026.

[320] Tokugawa officials discussed their fears about master-less samurai in Western Japan and among those fears was the concern that they were stealing firearms and arming themselves. Other concerns spoke of master-less samurai roving around the countryside, baptizing peasants, and initiating them into the ranks of the rebels. There was also palpable fear that the rebellion would incite the hidden Christian and pure land Buddhist communities in Nagasaki to rebel. Another major concern that Tokugawa officials shared was that the lords of Western Japan did not know how to fight an enemy such as the Shimabara rebels. Tokugawa officials directly compared the Shimabara rebels to the *ikkō-ikki*/一向一揆 in their willingness to die for their cause and faith rather than surrender. As such, Tokugawa officials were uncertain and did not trust that the lords of Western Japan knew how to fight such an enemy. See Naitō Chisō/内藤耻叟, ed., *Tokugawa jikki*/徳川実紀. 巻 1-186., Tōkyō: Tokugawa Jikki Shuppan Jimusho/徳川実紀出版事務所., Meiji 29-32 [1896-1899]., Vol. 136., pp. 42-45.

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As shogunal intendant, Heizō II's duties overlapped with his warrior counterparts, the Nagasaki governors, and the Suetsugu patriarch received two orders to mobilize forces against the rebels in early 1638.[322] The first order which Heizō II received was on January 23, 1638 in which the Tokugawa regime directed the Suetsugu patriarch to requisition reinforcements from the chief retainer of Nabeshima Katsushige (1580-1657), lord of Saga domain. Heizō II was to also to communicate further orders that the Nabeshima deploy their forces to secure Hizen domain and link up with the main force under Itakura when it arrived.[323] The second order that

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[321] Figure 4-7. Saito Shuho, "Detail from the Screen of the Shimabara Rebellion: The Assault on Hara Castle" by Saito Shuo, Six-part folding screen. Ink and colour on gilded paper, 162.3 x 368.6cm. Akizuki Kyodo Kan. 22., 1838.

[322] Heizō II functioned as a peer to the Nagasaki governors in his office. As Suzuki Yasuko points out, the Suetsugu as shogunal intendants and the Nagasaki governors shared overlapping duties and were equal in power and responsibilities. See Suzuki Yasuko., 鈴木康子., *Nagasaki bugyō no kenkyū.*, 長崎奉行の研究., Kyōto-shi: Shibunkaku Shuppan., 2007., 35.

[323] *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1637 December 25, 寛永 14 年 11 月 9 日, 27, "(第三条）大坂城代阿部正次・大坂定番稲垣重綱・大坂町奉行曽我古祐、肥前長崎代官末次茂員に令して、援兵を同国佐賀に要請せしむ、仍りて、之を城主鍋島勝茂の老臣等に告.," 61., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1637/19-6-1/15/0061?m=all&s=0061.

Heizō II received on January 3, 1638 mentioned a rumor that Tomioka Castle, home of Terazawa Katataka (1609-1647), lord of Karatsu domain and the Amakusa Islands had fallen to the rebels. Although the Tokugawa directive mentioned that the rumor was groundless, it nonetheless ordered Heizō II to solicit reinforcements from Ōmura Suminobu (1620-1651), lord of Ōmura domain, and deploy them to the area of Tomioka Castle with all due haste.[324] The Nagasaki governors, Baba Saburōzaemon and Sakakibara Motonao also received orders from Edo to assist in preparing for the defense of Nagasaki from the rebels, mobilizing soldiers, and overseeing domain armies in the field.[325] On February 21, 1638, the Tokugawa regime ordered both of the Nagasaki governors into the field to supervise the armies of the various lords who had assembled under the shogun's banner to besiege Hara Castle.[326]

Although the Suetsugu did not have soldiers of their own, their duties overlapped with the governors of Nagasaki in organizing the mobilization of military forces and supervising their deployment in the field. In contrast to the Nagasaki governors, the Suetsugu ultimately possessed a distinct advantage in their ability to intimidate and command the VOC due to their liminal position as a warrior-merchant household. In mobilizing the Nabeshima and the Ōmura against

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[324] *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1638 January 3, 寛永 14 年 11 月 18 日, 29, (第二条）一揆の首領益田四郎「時貞」の、肥後天草富岡城を陥れ、肥前長崎に来らんとすとの流言あり、長崎代官末次茂員、急を同国大村に報じて加勢を請ふ、35., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1637/19-6-1/19/0035?m=all&s=0035.

[325] *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1638 January 21, 寛永 14 年 12 月 7 日, 45, (第三条）肥前長崎奉行榊原職直・同馬場利重、長崎の守備を定め、往きて同国島原の軍に会す、27., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1637/19-6-2/23/0027?m=all&s=0027.

[326] *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 15, 1638 February 21, 寛永 15 年 1 月 8 日, 52, (第二条）年寄武蔵忍城主松平信綱、令して、肥前長崎奉行馬場利重に肥後熊本城主細川忠利の子光尚の軍を、同榊原職直に肥前佐賀城主鍋島勝茂の子直澄等の軍を、豊後府内の幕府目付役林勝正に筑前福岡城主黒田忠之・肥前唐津城主寺沢堅高の軍を、同牧野成純に筑後柳河城主立花宗茂の子忠茂・同国久留米城主有馬豊氏・肥前島原城主松倉勝家の軍を監せしむ、26., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1638/19-6-3/4/0026?m=all&s=0026.

the rebels, Edo entrusted Heizō II to manage over 26,800 soldiers and 8,000 laborers, which constituted roughly one-third of the 100,000 strong army that the Tokugawa had assembled in the span of one month.[327] In turning to Heizō II for such a large portion of its military mobilization during the initial phase of the Shimabara Rebellion, the Tokugawa regime viewed the Suetsugu as a reliable, domestic intermediary who had a long-established relationship with its constituent lords of Western Japan. Although the Tokugawa army contained a small core of veterans such as the famous swordsman, Miyamoto Mushashi (1584-1645), and the commander-in-chief, Itakura Shigemasa, none of them had led or organized military forces since the siege of Osaka Castle in 1614.[328] By contrast, Heizō II had just finished planning the invasion of Manila, a fact which made him a logical choice for Edo to turn to as the Shimabara Rebellion intensified as an existential threat to the Tokugawa regime.

With the decreasing likelihood of a Tokugawa invasion of Manila due to the rebellion, Heizō II saw another opportunity to expand Suetsugu influence into the Tokugawa court by using the Shimabara Rebellion as justification to transfer the VOC's pledge of military support against the Spanish to defeating the Shimabara rebels. In successfully transferring the VOC's pledge of military service to fighting for the shogun in the Shimabara Rebellion, Heizō II demonstrated to Edo that he could exercise effective command and control over the Dutch, a task that the Matsuura family of Hirado had repeatedly struggled with.[329]

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[327] The Nabeshima supplied an estimated 26,000 soldiers and 8,000 laborers. Estimates of the strength of the Tokugawa army during the Shimabara Rebellion range from 100,000 to 200,000. 100,000 is the conservative estimate, see Keith, "The Logistics of Power: Tokugawa Response to the Shimabara Rebellion and Power Projection in Seventeenth-Century Japan," 82, 105-106.

[328] For more on Miyamoto, including his famous *Book of Five* Rings, see Kenji Tokitsu, *Miyamoto Musashi: His Life and Writings*. New York: Weatherhill., 2006. For a quick primer on the siege of Osaka Castle, see Turnbull, *Osaka 1615: The Last Battle of the Samurai* and Richard Hook, *Osaka 1615: The Last Battle of the Samurai*. Oxford: Osprey., 2016.

[329] Clulow., "From Global Entrepôt to Early Modern Domain: Hirado, 1609-1641.," 22-29.

Heizō II defined the role of the Dutch as vassals of the shogun by ordering public displays of VOC loyalty during the Shimabara Rebellion, beginning with his requisition of all the gunpowder and armaments that that the company possessed in Japan. On January 25, 1638, Heizō II sent a request to Chief Factor Couckebacker, "with all due haste," for gunpowder and demanded an immediate reply from the Dutch.[330] At Heizō II 's request, Couckebacker provided the shogunal intendent with 371 kilograms of gunpowder and in his letter, the Dutchman regretted that he could not send more as the VOC's "large ships had just departed; and as the two smallest of them, which remained here, had no more powder to spare than we send you herewith."[331] On February 8, 1638, Heizō II replied to Couckebacker with words of thanks and in return, offered the Dutchman his counsel which was a thinly concealed reprimand. In the letter, Heizō II wrote:

> You have written your excuse to the regents, [Baba Saburōzaemon and Sakakibara Motonao] that you have no more than two small ships remaining here...and that it is not in your power to do any further service, but you should know that five to ten picols of gunpowder simply will not do, and seeing that it is the case that your ships will not depart until next month, you should send us all of the gunpowder that you have in your ships. We shall present you with further riches upon your departure as we are using gunpowder in our operations daily. That the merchant Caron has tarried so long and has not come here in haste is unacceptable![332]

Heizō II not only intended his reprimand as a means of procuring armaments from the VOC as the Suetsugu patriarch desired the Dutch to perform a public display of loyalty for the Tokugawa regime. Although Heizō II reprimanded Caron for not offering all of the gunpowder which the VOC possessed in Japan, the Suetsugu patriarch was more irate that the Frenchman had not

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[330] 25 January 1638, Letter from Suetsugu Heizō Shigemasa to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277.

[331] 27 January 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Suetsugu Heizō Shigemasa., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften*., 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

[332] 29 January 1638, Letter from Suetsugu Heizō Shigemasa to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277.

answered his summons to appear before him and the Nagasaki governors to reaffirm the company's pledge of military service to the shogun. With the outbreak of the Shimabara Rebellion, Heizō II's ambitions to solidify the status of the Suetsugu as transnational intermediaries of the Tokugawa regime and peers of Japan's warrior elite hinged on his ability to orchestrate public displays of loyalty from the VOC. Heizō II 's requisitioning of all of the VOC's gunpowder and armaments was only the beginning as the Suetsugu patriarch would demand total commitment from the company's agents. That act of total commitment to the Tokugawa regime from the Dutch would demand their direct participation in fighting the Shimabara rebels.

Heizō II's next letter to Couckebacker on February 8th, 1638 commanded that Caron appear in Nagasaki, and at the behest of the Suetsugu patriarch, publicly offer the VOC's services to the Tokugawa regime. Couckebacker was less sanguine, and in his February 3, 1638 reply to Heizō II, the Dutchman attempted to walk back the VOC's previous promises to militarily assist the Tokugawa by citing his need for Caron to assist with closing out the company's end-of-year business. To that end, Couckebacker communicated to Heizō II his intention to send Caron to Batavia and there, the Frenchman would provide personal testimony to Governor General Van Diemen so that he could "better understand the advantages of the company's affairs [in Japan]."[333] This was a desperate attempt by Couckebacker to break Heizō II's hold over the VOC, which prompted the following reply from the Suetsugu patriarch on February 8, 1638:

I have received your letter with the arrival of the merchant Caron and from which I have a good enough understanding that you have resolved to send the aforementioned Caron to Jakarta to testify before the honorable general and thoroughly explain the opportunities in Japan. I hereby

[333] See again Adam Clulow's argument on how interested parties in the Tokugawa regime used the VOC's own narratives as a means to ensnare the Dutch for their own personal ambitions. Clulow., The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan., 131. 3 February 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Suetsugu Heizō Shigemasa., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften*., 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

guarantee these advantages myself and if my proposals please you, I trust that you will promptly relay this. Caron has long been in Japan and he himself fully understands court politics and long has he faithfully served the company, a fact that I will personally attest to. Therefore, I recommend that you yourself convey to the honorable general this understanding which I now give, which is outside my vocation and is tempered by the fondness which I have towards the Dutch company which stirs within me and many more things that I would convey to their excellencies which I am at a loss to say. It is this, that the two regents of this place [Nagasaki] have come to an agreement and all on their own that the merchant Caron should come here for an audience with them and present an offer to their excellencies [the high shogunal councilors] who have been dispatched to Arima, which is to convey an immediate desire to serve his majesty, the shogun, by any means, the seriousness of which Caron shall verbally inform you about in due time.[334]

Heizō II's reputation and ambitions hinged upon the Dutch keeping their promise to provide military service to the shogun, which VOC agents had originally given during Tokugawa preparations for the invasion of Spanish Manila in 1637. Although it might have been the decision of the governors, Baba Saburōzaemon and Sakakibara Motonao, for Caron to travel to Nagasaki and offer the VOC's pledge of loyalty to the visiting shogunal councilors, there is compelling evidence that Heizō II decided what the terms of that service would entail. First, when Caron arrived in Nagasaki for his audience with the shogunal councilors, Heizō II personally reprimanded him for his tardiness. Furthermore, as Caron later revealed to Couckebacker, the Frenchman learned that Heizō II had, on his own accord, offered the shogunal councilors all of the VOC's gunpowder, guns, and ammunition. Heizō II later explained to Caron that he had to offer the VOC's munitions of war to the high shogunal councilors on account that "he had always spoken of and extolled our willingness and great affection for serving Japan."[335] During the planning phase for the invasion of Manila in late 1637, Heizō II circulated the same

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[334] 8 February 1638, Letter from Suetsugu Heizō Shigemasa to Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker, *Registers van ingekomen brieven en van ingekomen en uitgaande brieven van en aan de Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden, diverse buitenkantoren en Japanse autoriteiten*., 1614-1736., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 277.

[335] 17 February 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften*., 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

narrative regarding the VOC and their willingness to fulfill their roles, at any time, as servants of the shogun. The reputation of the Suetsugu depended on VOC agents to confirm that they were vassals of the shogun in word and deed which necessitated that Heizō II extract a vow from the Dutch to provide military service for the Tokugawa.

[336]

As proof that the Suetsugu could exercise effective command and control over the Dutch as a Tokugawa intermediary, Heizō II devised a dynamic display of Dutch warships in action against Amakusa Shirō and the rebel army. Amakusa Shirō and his forces had enjoyed a series of initial victories over the Tokugawa in Western Japan from the outbreak of the rebellion on December 11, 1637 until January 23, 1638. During this time, the rebels had besieged the main castle of the Matsukura lords of Shimabara and had won several small skirmishes against the soldiers of

[336] Figure 4-8. Unknown Artist., "The Siege of Hara Castle."

Terazawa Katataka, lord of Karatsu. The arrival of the main body of Tokugawa forces under the command of Itakura Shigemasa on January 22, 1638 forced the rebels to seek refuge in the abandoned Hara Castle, which had stood empty since 1618 when the Tokugawa confiscated Shimabara domain from Arima Harunobu. As the rebellion continued into February 1638, the prolonged siege of Hara Castle provided Heizō II with the opportunity to order the two remaining VOC warships at Hirado into action.[337]

Heizō II believed that if he could orchestrate the appearance of VOC ships before Tokugawa officials in either Nagasaki or the battleground outside of Hara Castle, it would solidify the reputation of the Suetsugu as a consummate maritime dynasty and as peers of Japan's warrior elite. In his February 1638 meeting with Caron, Heizō II pressed the Frenchman to "provide a more liberal offer of the company's services" to the high shogunal councilors.[338] When Caron responded that he would travel to Arima and personally offer the VOC's services to the high shogunal councilors, Heizō II refused him, citing that "he could not publicly reveal in word or in writing his high esteem [for the Dutch] as it would make him suspect among the Japanese" and in clarification, counseled that a more "open-ended offer of service would work to a greater advantage [for the Dutch] than all of the gifts [that the company] has given in Japan up to this point." [339] In this explosive statement, Heizō II acknowledged that like his father, he was relying on a very loose interpretation of his role as a Tokugawa intermediary in undercutting the

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[337] For a general reference and chronology of the Shimabara Rebellion, see Keith., "The Logistics of Power: Tokugawa Response to the Shimabara Rebellion and Power Projection in Seventeenth-Century Japan." See also Kanda Chisato/**神田千里**., *Shimabara no ran: Kirishitan shinkō to busō hōki*/島原の乱：キリシタン信仰と武装蜂起., Tōkyō-to Bunkyō-ku: Kōdansha., 2005.

[338] 17 February 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften*., 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

[339] 17 February 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften*., 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

Matsuura of Hirado and pressuring the Dutch into action.[340] Heizō II knew he was playing a dangerous game and undue scrutiny from Edo or from Tokugawa officials might well lead to the destruction of the Suetsugu as his father, Heizō I, had nearly caused. In truth, Heizō II had already planned the details of the military service that the VOC would provide, but wished for the company to pledge their loyalty in an open-ended offer that would not draw undue attention to the Suetsugu or their machinations. This desire to avoid undue scrutiny compelled Heizō II to recommended to Couckebacker that the Dutchman travel to Arima and "pay his respects" to the shogunal councilors with a liberal and open-ended offer of service to the shogun.[341]

As Couckebacker soon learned, service to the shogun required the Dutchman's own participation against the Shimabara rebels with the *Ryp*, the company's remaining ship in Japan. Heizō II's intent in deploying Couckebacker and the *Ryp* was to display his control over the Dutch for Tokugawa leadership. When Heizō II initially recommended to Caron that the VOC should consider sending one of its ships to Nagasaki for the shogunal councilors to view, the Frenchman demurred, citing the need for the ships to get underway to Batavia. In response to Caron's protestations. Heizō II issued the following reprimand:

Certainly, these great lords would not like to hear your ill-considered answers and propositions of late. It is always your profit and gain that you prioritize and yes, I do not know what else. However, one should be aware and consider that no one enjoys the fruits of that which he has not planted and has not worked for and that we should observe what is proper and perform service for the advantages one enjoys![342]

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[340] For compelling arguments regarding the role of intermediaries as "creative political entrepreneurs," see Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*., Maier, "Empire Without End: Imperial Achievements and Ideologies." Regarding intermediaries and their ambitions for increased independence within an ambiguous and uneven framework of empire, see Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*., 279.

[341] 17 February 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften*., 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

[342] 17 February 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften*., 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

Although Heizō II explained that his rebuke was not a command, but instead "came from his good-hearted nature and wanted to show the Hollanders that he was a very good friend as his father had been an enemy," his threat was clear.[343] If the Dutch were unwilling to perform military service and participate in Heizō II's designs, the Suetsugu patriarch would see that the shogunal councilors expelled the VOC from Japan. In his February 17, 1638 letter to Governor General van Diemen, Couckebacker professed that he did not doubt Heizō II's words and consigned himself to deploying the company's ships should the Suetsugu patriarch call for them. He did not have to wait long.

On February 19, 1638, Couckebacker received the order from Matsuura Shigenobu (1622-1703), the lord of Hirado, to deploy their ships to Arima where the siege of the rebel-held Hara Castle was underway. Although the order to deploy the VOC ships came from the Matsuura, VOC correspondence confirms that it, in fact, originated with Heizō II. Although Heizō II did not pressure the Dutch in an official capacity and was always careful to present his commands as "friendly advice," VOC records nonetheless affirm the unofficial power he wielded over them which stemmed from the liminality and ambiguousness of the Suetsugu.[344] In response to Heizō II's demands, Couckebacker arrived off the coast of Arima on February 24th, 1638 on board the *Ryp*. In service to the shogun, the Dutch ship's guns and mortars, together with a VOC ground battery, fired over 426 cannon balls into the rebel fortifications at Hara Castle. This display of VOC military might which Heizō II orchestrated was underwhelming and failed to be decisive in ending the siege of Hara Castle as the *Ryp* and the Dutch cannon only managed to burn down a

[343] 17 February 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften.*, 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.
[344] 17 February 1637, Letter from Chief Factor Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen, *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften.*, 1623 - 1786., , VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.

few of the rebel huts and an enemy powder magazine.[345] In response, the shogunal councilors expressed their disappointment to Couckebacker that "the much renowned Netherlanders and their ship alongside four large junks from Nagasaki would have been expected to have achieved something notable, but it appears they have failed."[346] On March 12, 1638, the shogunal councilors gave permission for Couckebacker and *the Ryp* to depart, but not before mentioning that the VOC had "performed good service for his imperial majesty [the shogun]."[347] The Shimabara Rebellion continued until the evening of April 11, 1638 when Tokugawa forces stormed the walls of Hara Castle and put to death the majority of its remaining 23,000 defenders. Tokugawa officials then ordered the heads of Amakusa Shirō and the rebel leaders displayed on poles outside of Nagasaki.[348]

Although Heizō II failed to orchestrate a military display that would bring the Shimabara Rebellion to a successful conclusion, he nonetheless demonstrated that the Suetsugu could bend the VOC to Tokugawa demands, a task that the Matsuura of Hirado had repeatedly failed at. The Suetsugu proved more effective in controlling the VOC than the Matsuura due to the Heizō dynasty's liminality and ambiguity in their role as Tokugawa intermediaries. As Clulow illustrates, the struggles that the Matsuura had with the Dutch stemmed from the company's open contempt for and flagrant attempts to undermine the lords of Hirado. The Matsuura responded in kind to Dutch effrontery and portrayed the company as pirates at court in Edo. The result was a

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[345] A.J.C. Geerts., Asiatic Society of Japan., *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, vol. 11, 1 vols. (Yokohama: R. Meiklejohn & Co., 1883)., 111.
[346] 25 March 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften*., 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.
[347] 25 March 1638, Letter from Chief Factor, Nicolaes Couckebacker to Governor General Antonio van Diemen., *Uitgaande brieven aan Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden en diverse buitenkantoren en aan Japanse autoriteiten.Minuten en afschriften*., 1623 - 1786., VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 483.
[348] Keith., "The Logistics of Power: Tokugawa Response to the Shimabara Rebellion and Power Projection in Seventeenth-Century Japan.," 166.

"constant, low-level conflict" between the Matsuura and the VOC.[349] By contrast, the Suetsugu proved far more effective in subduing the Dutch and Heizō II did so by drawing upon his role as a Tokugawa intermediary and his ambiguous connections to the court in Edo. Heizō II seized upon Dutch narratives of the VOC's willingness to serve the shogun and redeployed them to make the company and its agents act in accordance with the Suetsugu patriarch's own ambitions. As opposed to the Matsuura, Heizō II did not work to undermine the VOC by portraying them as pirates and instead, publicly praised the Dutch as being legitimate, worthy vassals of the Tokugawa regime, a label that the company would carry for the rest of its time in Japan. This new partnership between the Suetsugu and the VOC would be, for a time, one in which everybody won.

As a monetary reward for his role in restoring order to Western Japan, Heizō II received 1,000 bars of silver from the Tokugawa regime.[350] In thanks to the VOC for aiding Tokugawa forces during the Shimabara Rebellion, Heizō II arranged for the shogunal councilors to present Caron with 200 bars of "foreign silver" during his 1638 visit to the court in Edo which in all likelihood, came from Portuguese assets in Japan that Tokugawa officials had liquidated.[351] Perhaps the most significant reward which the Dutch received was the word that the shogun had decided to move the VOC from its factory under the Matsuura in Hirado, to Nagasaki. Although Tokugawa officials proclaimed the decision to move the VOC to Nagasaki as a great honor for the Dutch, it was likely an even greater reward for the Suetsugu. Heizō II had repeatedly proven that he could accomplish a task that the Matsuura of Hirado could not: exercising effective command and control over the VOC. In the planning phase of the 1637 Tokugawa invasion of

[349] Clulow., "From Global Entrepôt to Early Modern Domain: Hirado, 1609- 1641.," 24.
[350] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki: World Trade and the Clash of Cultures 1560-1640.*, 222.
[351] 11 January 1640., Daghregister van Francois Caron, 3 February 1639 to 13 February 1641, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 55.

Manila, Heizō II extracted a pledge of military service to the shogun from the governor general himself, Antonio van Diemen. Furthermore, Heizō II compelled VOC agents to keep their vow and conform to the narrative of providing service to the Tokugawa regime during the 1637-1638 Shimabara Rebellion and did so in full view of the shogunal councilors. It now seemed to Heizō II that Suetsugu peerage with Japan's warrior elite was well within his grasp.

Conclusion

Under Shigemasa, the Suetsugu house was one of the wealthiest and most powerful in Japan. Before Heizō II could realize his goal of building a maritime domain and attaining peerage with Japan's warrior elite, ill-health forced his retirement in 1643. Instead of organizing military campaigns, the once great Suetsugu patriarch spent most of his time shuttling between his mansion in Kyoto and restorative hot springs to treat his cranial tumor. However, in the 13 years that Shigemasa was the head of the Heizō dynasty of the Suetsugu in Nagasaki, he had saved the family from an uncertain future and had even increased its reputation in Edo among the inner circles of the Tokugawa regime. Heizō II had also made peace with the VOC, his father's old enemies, that grew into a lucrative partnership between the Suetsugu and the Dutch. Arguably, Heizō II's new partnership with the VOC was the most important factor that allowed the Suetsugu to successfully navigate the collapse of the vermilion seal system in the 1630s. The alliance with the VOC also provided Heizō II with the means to cultivate a friendship with Kobori Enshū, who provided the Suetsugu with connections to and patronage from the Tokugawa family itself.

Although the turmoil of the 1630s created opportunities for the Suetsugu, Shigemasa's two sons, Shigefusa and Shigetomo, who later inherited the mantle of Heizō fared less well than their father. The turmoil of the 1630s that witnessed Tokugawa proscriptions on foreign contact, the

end of the vermilion seal system, and the Shimabara Rebellion provided the impetus for Edo to embark on a new wave of state consolidation. Heizō II inhabited a different era in the 1630s in which the Suetsugu patriarch thought that the rules and norms of Japan's unification, specifically the opportunity for social mobility still existed. To that end, Heizō II viewed the example of the Sakai merchants as a measurement of what he could attain, which was to win peer recognition for the Suetsugu with Japan's warrior elite. After Heizō II's retirement, the new Tokugawa settlement which emerged between the 1640s and the 1670s would have far less tolerance for ambitious warrior-merchant families. Indeed, the turmoil of the 1630s was merely the opening act for the series of crises that defined the seventeenth century. The 1640s witnessed the beginning of the apocalyptic wars of the Ming-Qing transition that destabilized the old East Asian world order and ushered in a new framework of international rules and norms. The new East Asian world order that emerged after the 1640s demanded increased state centralization and as the world grew more dangerous and in the midst of crisis, so too did the stakes for the Suetsugu. Within the context of the seventeenth century crisis and a changing East Asian world order, could Heizō II's two sons, Shigefusa and Shigetomo, ensure the continued survival of the Suetsugu?

Chapter Five: Twilight of the Last Vermilion Seal Family: The Decline of the Suetsugu Under Heizō Shigetomo (Heizō IV)

 [352]

On June 4, 1675, a Suetsugu ship with clay colored sideboards, lime-white hull, and vermillion railings sliced through the waters to Ponafidin, one of the Ogasawara Islands.[353] Had there been any human observers on the "bird-choked island," they might have noted the black flag on the stern of the ship that was emblazoned with the gold hollyhock of the Tokugawa

[352] Figure 5-1. Shimaya Kozaemon's 1675 portolan map of the Ogasawara Islands with the arable land colored in yellow. See Jonas Rüegg. “Mapping the Forgotten Colony: The Ogasawara Islands and the Tokugawa Pivot to the Pacific.," *Cross-Currents.* 2017 (23): 108-157., 115.

[353] The Ogasawara Archipelago/小笠原島 are a group of 30 islands, the most famous of which is Iwo Jima/硫黄島. Today, the Ogasawara Islands are a subprefecture of Tokyo and are over 540 nautical miles to the south of the Tokyo metro area in the Pacific Ocean. The Ogasawara Islands have also carried the name of the Bonin, an older reading of 無人 which literally means "no people" and refers to the islands' past as being uninhabited by humans.

house. The name of the ship was the *Fukokuju* or "felicitations to a prosperous country."[354] A close observer might have noted the ship's murals which depicted themes from Chinese mythology such as a pair of phoenixes flying over the morning sun, a Chinese dragon floating in the clouds with its treasure, and a guardian lion pawing a bejeweled ball.[355] Apart from its beautiful artwork, an observer would also note the European style sails and rigging which likely made it possible for the *Fukokuju* to sail at high speeds and according to Dutch accounts, even tack into the wind.[356] As for the 32 crewmembers of the *Fukokuju* they were a mixture of Japanese and Chinese sailors which were a testament to the international networks that were responsible for Suetsugu prosperity and Japan's continued engagement with the outside world.[357] When the *Fukokuju* returned from its journey to the Ogasawara Islands in the summer of 1676 carrying exotic specimens of plants, animals, and rock samples, it was a master-less ship. The Tokugawa regime had destroyed the Suetsugu family and banished its master, Heizō IV, to the Oki Islands. The *Fukokuju* experienced a similar fate as the Tokugawa regime towed it to the ship graveyard at Awaji Island. Like Heizō IV's dreams for prosperity, the *Fukokuju* rotted away and lay forgotten, much like its master, and the Suetsugu maritime dynasty.

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[354] *Fukokuju* or *Fukokukotobuki*, 富国寿 "felicitations to a prosperous country," see Scott Kramer and Hanae K. Kramer. "The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675." *Terrae Incognitae*. 51.1 (2019): 60-76., 64-65, 74. and Sakata Morotō, **坂田諸遠**., *Ogasawaratō kiji*, **小笠原島紀事** 31 **巻首** 1 **巻**. **巻之** 2., 6.

[355] Kramer and Kramer, "The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675.," 74., Tsūkō ichiran, 通航一覧, 国書刊行会本, 第8 (国書刊行会, 1913), 511.

[356] 20 August 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89.

[357] Kramer and Kramer, "The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675.," 73-74., Sakata Morotō, **坂田諸遠**., *Ogasawaratō kiji*, **小笠原島紀事** 31 **巻首** 1 **巻**. **巻之** 26. Maritime historians Ishii Kenji and Iwao Seiichi also discuss the European influences on the *Fukokuju*, see Iwao Seiichi/ 石井謙治, "*Sakoku Jidai no Kōyōbune Kenzō Kambun no Tōsen to Tenmei no Sangokumaru* "鎖国時代の航洋船建造寛文の唐船と天明の三国丸," in *Nihon no Kaiyōmin* 日本の海洋民 (未来社, Tōkyō Miraisha, 1974),. and Ishii Kenji 石井謙治, "*Suetsugu Heizō no Tōsen*""末次平蔵の唐船," *Nihon Rekishi* 日本歴史 5, no. 180 (196): 30-33.

The story of the *Fukokuju* or as VOC observers named it, "the shogun's ship," represented the apogee of Suetsugu power and is a baffling tale, not only because of the Tokugawa desire to lay claim to a group of uninhabited islands, but also how the act of claiming reveals the fluid nature of early modern sovereignty.[358] After his older brother, Shigefusa (Heizō III) fell from a horse and broke his leg in 1648, Suetsugu Shigetomo took over leadership of the family and with it, the hereditary name of Heizō.[359] As Heizō IV, Shigetomo, bore witness to the Suetsugu rise to the height of their power and precipitous collapse in 1676. Heizō IV's exploration of the Ogasawara Islands in 1675 was the final attempt by the Suetsugu to build a maritime domain. The 1675 Suetsugu expedition to build a maritime domain in the Ogasawara Islands is illustrative of the nature of early modern sovereignty, especially in their attempt to connect the inhabitants of Hachijō Island, whom the Tokugawa claimed as subjects, to the uninhabited Ogasawara Islands. When the *Fukokuju* returned to Japan in 1676, its master, Heizō IV was an inmate at Denma-chō prison and preparing for his final exile to the Oki Islands.[360]

The immediate cause for the Suetsugu downfall was Heizō IV's loss of control of the domestic networks that he was responsible for. Heizō IV presided over a reign of terror in Nagasaki which led to a revolt in one of the city's wards under direct shogunal control. In 1675,

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[358] 2 October 1675, Daghregister van Martinus Caesar, 20 October 1674 to 7 November 1675, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 65.

[359] On 4 July 1648, Heizō IV took over the Suetsugu from his brother in a ceremony that also commemorated the 28th anniversary of the death of Heizō I on 4 July 1630, see 4 July 1648, Daghregister van Frederick Coyett, 11 November 1647 to 9 December 1648, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 65. For a discussion on death anniversaries and ceremonies of succession within premodern Japanese families, please see Morgan Pitelka, "Name and Fame: Material Objects as Authority, Security, and Legacy," 109-125., in Berry, Mary E, and Marcia Yonemoto. *What Is a Family? Answers from Early Modern Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2019. Print.

[360] Mokei Tanabe, Kankichi Niwa, and Taneo Morinaga, *Nagasaki Jitsuroku Taisei. Seihen*, 長崎實錄大成(長崎: 長崎文献社, 1973), *Nagasaki Bunken Sōsho*, 長崎文献叢書 (長崎: 長崎文献社, 1973), Kawazoe, Shōji and *Fukuoka Komonjo wo Yomu Kai Shintei Kuroda Kafu Sakuin, Kafu Nenpyō*,川添昭二and 福岡古文書を読む会,新訂黒田家譜索引・家譜年表(東京: 文献出版, 1987), Taneo Morinaga, *Hankachō Nagasaki bugyōsho hanketsu kiroku*, 長崎奉行所判決記録犯科帳, 第1巻, and Tsūkō ichiran, 通航一覧, 国書刊行会本, 第8 (国書刊行会, 1913).

public misconduct of Heizō IV's retainers at Ise Grand Shrine led to an investigation of the Suetsugu, highlighting widespread bribery, corruption, and the mismanagement of shogunal funds. This investigation by Tokugawa officials into the Suetsugu led to the defection of one of Heizō IV's top lieutenants, the Nagasaki mayor, Takagi Sakuemon, who hoped to usurp his former master. Sakuemon's testimony not only confirmed that Heizō IV was corrupt, but also served to convince Tokugawa officials that the Suetsugu patriarch was completely incapable of controlling his own retainers. This increasing distrust of the Suetsugu by Edo predisposed Tokugawa officials to assume the worst of Heizō IV in his role as a transnational intermediary, particularly in his dealings with the increasingly dangerous and destabilizing Zheng Empire. As a decentralized state with limited financial resources, the Tokugawa regime had needed the Suetsugu and their connections to wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs and investors to build and shape Nagasaki to fit its codification of Japanese identity.[361] By the end of 1675, the outbreak and escalation of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories (1673-1683) increased tensions between the Tokugawa and the Zheng over Koxinga's heir, Jing, and his use of maritime violence against Ryūkyūan ships.[362] Even more disturbing for Tokugawa officials were the Suetsugu ties to the Zheng that threatened to pull Japan into a catastrophic war with the Qing Empire at the end of

[361] I again argue that Tokugawa Japan was a decentralized state that neither possessed a Weberian "monopoly on violence" or a centralized navy. It was comparable to other early modern polities with "plural jurisdictions that were overlapping or parallel" and that it "did not possess anything approaching a monopoly on legal authority, which was divided among a jumble of often competing jurisdictions." This plurality of jurisdictions in the early Tokugawa order necessitated a hybridized framework of civil-military control. To defend sovereign interests and normalize relations with other states in a changing international environment of Ming decline and European maritime expansion, the Tokugawa regime relied on intermediaries such as the Suetsugu. See Wilson, *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*., Berry, "Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan," 240. Benton and Clulow. "Legal Encounters and the Origins of Global Law.," 89. Again, my reference to the Tokugawa codification of Japanese identity dovetails with Victor Lieberman's arguments regarding the politicization of ethnicity. See Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context c. 800-1830, Vol 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia and the Islands*., 39-40.

[362] For a discussion in English on the 1673-1683 Revolt of the Three Feudatories see Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720* and Kai-Fu Tsao, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories Against the Manchu Throne in China, 1673–1681: Its Setting and Significance" (Ph.D., Columbia University, 1965).

1675. Rather than escalate tensions with the Qing, the Tokugawa regime, who had grown increasingly dubious of Heizō IV's ability to handle domestic affairs could not trust him in his role as an international intermediary with the volatile Zheng and took steps to abolish his office of shogunal intendant and destroy the Suetsugu.

The Last Vermilion Seal Ship: The Fukokuju

Returning to 1675, the *Fukokuju* was a symbol of Tokugawa international might and mastery of the high seas which also coincided with the apogee of Suetsugu power. In an era where the Tokugawa had supposedly closed off Japan from foreign influence, the maritime hybridity of the *Fukokuju* with its Chinese designs might seem to be an aberration, a fleeting moment of experimentation that the Tokugawa abandoned on the way to laying the foundations of a Japanese ethnostate.[363] Not only would such a characterization of the *Fukokuju* be incorrect, it would be a missed opportunity in understanding the transnational dimensions of Tokugawa state building in the mid-seventeenth century. Instead of an aberration, the *Fukokuju* was a product of a transnational Japan and the power of the Suetsugu maritime dynasty. It was also an international symbol of Tokugawa might. Although the *Fukokuju* was the product of heavy

[363] The precise origins of the *Fukokuju* are nebulous, but Japanese records indicate that the Tokugawa shogunate ordered Heizō IV to build a "Dutch style" ship capable of sailing the open oceans. However, period Japanese documents are contradictory as the *Ogasawaratō kiji* repeatedly refers to the Chinese origins and influence on the *Fukokuju*. The Chinese versus Dutch origins of the *Fukokuju* were also the topic of scholarly debate between Ishii Kenji and Iwao Seiichi. Ishii Kenji and Iwao Seiichi were pioneers in exploring the hybridity of maritime culture and its influence on shipbuilding. See *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 10, 1670 April 6, 寛文１０年４月１７日), ９９, 長崎代官末次平藏に命し、模形和蘭船を造らしむ., 315, https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1670/22-2-1/3/0001?m=all. Sakata Morotō, **坂田諸遠**., *Ogasawaratō kiji*, **小笠原島紀事** 31**巻首1巻**. **巻之**26., 1-54. Iwao Seiichi 石井謙治, "*Sakoku Jidai no Kōyōbune Kenzō Kambun no Tōsen to Tenmei no Sangokumaru* “鎖国時代の航洋船建造寛文の唐船と天明の三国丸,” in *Nihon no Kaiyōmin*日本の海洋民 (未来社, Tōkyō Miraisha, 1974),. and Ishii Kenji石井謙治, "*Suetsugu Heizō no Tōsen*"“末次平蔵の唐船,” *Nihon Rekishi*日本歴史 5, no. 180 (196): 30-33. For a more recent discussion on maritime hybridity, see Peter D. Shapinsky, "Polyvocal Portolans: Nautical Charts and Hybrid Maritime Cultures in Early Modem East Asia."

Chinese influence, its ship captain, Shimaya Ichizaemon (????-1690) was Japanese, it sailed under the Tokugawa flag, and it carried a special, vermilion seal permit from the shogun designating it as his ship with the right to call at any port in Japan.[364] Whenever the *Fukokuju* docked in Japan, curious observers came from all over to see the strange ship, admire its beautiful workmanship, and revel in the majesty that was Tokugawa power. Furthermore, surviving Japanese records indicate that the *Fukokuju* was massive and much larger than the 500 *koku* limit of displacement which Tokugawa authorities instituted in 1609.[365] The chief shogunal councilors in Edo wrote to Heizō IV admonishing him that if the *Fukokuju* was any larger "it would have difficulty entering and exiting ports."[366] During its trial run, the *Fukokuju* completed

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[364] On the suggestion of Nagasaki Governor Ushigome Chūzaemon, Heizō IV sought out Shimaya Ichizaiemon. In his youth, Shimaya had apparently been a participant in the vermilion seal era trade, had traveled to the Asian continent, and had distinguished himself through service in the Tokugawa army during the 1637-1638 Shimabara Rebellion as an artillerist and had received 30 pieces of silver for his "meritorious service." Shimaya was also apparently well-versed in Western navigation techniques and mapmaking. See Kramer and Kramer, “The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675.,” 62-64, 74. Sakata Morotō, **坂田諸遠**., *Ogasawaratō kiji*, **小笠原島紀事** 31**巻首**1**巻**. **巻之**2, 26. Tsūkō ichiran, 通航一覧, 国書刊行会本, 第8 (国書刊行会, 1913). *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 15, 1639 April, 寛永15年３月, 以**降**, **島原一揆蜂起の時、石火矢打ちの功績により、浜田新蔵に銀**100**枚、六永十左衛門に銀**50**枚、島谷市左衛門に銀**30**枚、薬師寺久左衛門に銀**30**枚、手伝いの者たちに銀**50**枚を下賜さる**, SHIPS Image Viewer, https://clioimg.hi.utokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/100/1051.9/24/8/00254?m=all&s=00254

[365] Kramer and Kramer, “The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675.,” 64., Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō/大日本近世史料, Keichō 14, 1609 September., 慶長１４年９月是**月**,（第三条）家康、西国諸大名に命じて、五百石積以上の大船を淡路に廻漕せしめ、九鬼守隆等をして之を検収せし**む**、647-650., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/850/8500/02/1206/0647?m=all&s=0647.

[366] Tokugawa documents on the trial runs of the *Fukokuju* emphasize that the ship was right at the official limit of 500 *koku* of displacement which by comparison would make it about one third of the size of Christopher Columbus' two smaller ships, the *Niña a*nd the *Pinta*. An informant for the Hosokawa lords of Kumamoto described Shimaya and crew loading a cargo of rice, cannons, firearms, and armor on the *Fukokuju* that was far in excess of 500 *koku*. The assigned crew of the *Fukokuju* also numbered 32. Other vessels which had been twice the official size of the *Fukokuju* at 1000 *koku* of displacement only had half the assigned number of crewmembers. Together, these factors suggest that the *Fukokuju* was, in reality, much larger than official records suggest and most likely was similar in size and appearance to a Suetsugu ship from the vermilion seal era. See Sakata Morotō, 坂田諸遠., *Ogasawaratō kiji*, 小笠原島紀事 31 巻首 1 巻. 巻之 2, 26., Kramer and Kramer, “The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675.,” 73., Iwao Seiichi 石井謙治, "*Sakoku Jidai no Kōyōbune Kenzō Kambun no Tōsen to Tenmei no Sangokumaru* “鎖国時代の航洋船建造寛文の唐船と天明の三国丸,” in *Nihon no Kaiyōmin* 日本の海洋民 (未来社, Tōkyō Miraisha, 1974),., 195.

the journey from Nagasaki to Edo, a distance of 517.54 nautical miles in 15 days. By comparison, contemporary Japanese ships could only make the voyage to Osaka to Edo, a distance of 214.30 nautical miles, in 15 days. The *Atakemaru* gunboat of the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu, might have been a domesticated "leviathan on a leash" in the 1630s, but the *Fukokuju* was the Tokugawa leviathan unleashed.[367]

The *Fukokuju* and the 1675 Suetsugu exploration of the Ogasawara Islands are also important in understanding the transnational dimensions of Tokugawa state consolidation in the context of the last attempt by the Suetsugu to build a maritime domain. Amidst a transitioning East Asian international order where the wars of the Ming-Qing transition were prominent and Tokugawa fears of an Iberian conspiracy dominated strategic thinking in Edo to the point of obsession, the Suetsugu expedition to the Ogasawara Islands allowed the Tokugawa regime to lay claim to uncharted and uninhabited territory.[368] This leads to two important questions. First, why would the Tokugawa shogunate desire to claim a group of uninhabited, volcanic islands in the Pacific? Second, how did the Tokugawa shogunate claim the Ogasawara Islands in a manner that they could communicate to domestic and international audiences? As for the first question, surviving Japanese documents offer no clear explanation to as to the motives behind the Suetsugu exploration of the Ogasawara Islands. Regarding the second question, Tokugawa "ceremonies of possession" as they pertained to the Ogasawara Islands surprisingly paralleled those of

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[367] Shapinsky, *Lords of the Sea: Pirates, Violence, and Commerce in Late Medieval Japan*, 262-263., Iwao Seiichi 石井謙治, "*Sakoku Jidai no Kōyōbune Kenzō Kambun no Tōsen to Tenmei no Sangokumaru* “鎖国時代の航洋船建造寛文の唐船と天明の三国丸,” in *Nihon no Kaiyōmin* 日本の海洋民 (未来社, Tōkyō Miraisha, 1974),., 195.,

[368] For a good examination of Tokugawa foreign policy during the wars of the Ming-Qing transition and in the midst of the perceived Iberian threat, see Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu*.

contemporary, peer states in Western Europe.[369] Answering both questions not only further discredits the myth of early modern Japan as a closed country, it once again illustrates the importance of the Suetsugu as transnational intermediaries for the Tokugawa regime.[370]

The issue of Tokugawa motives in sponsoring Heizō IV's expedition to the Ogasawara Islands arguably originated from a plurality of competing interests at the highest levels of state which the Suetsugu sought to exploit for their benefit. As the Suetsugu were neither constituent landed lords or a warrior family, the prospect of them forming foreign alliances or building navies was less dangerous which made them effective intermediaries for the Tokugawa regime. In the past, Heizō IV's father, Shigemasa, and grandfather, Masanao, leveraged competing interests between Edo and the lords of Western Japan during their attempts to expand Suetsugu influence over Taiwan and Manila in the name of shogunal authority.[371] The return of six castaways in June 1670 and their stories of an exotic series of islands that were 538 nautical miles south of Edo captivated the imaginations of Tokugawa leadership and inspired Heizō IV to once again attempt to realize the ambitions of his father and grandfather in building a Suetsugu maritime domain.[372] Heizō IV saw the ambitions of the shogunal councilors as an opportunity to expand Suetsugu interests to the Ogasawara islands while using Tokugawa authority as the basis for his ambition. Although surviving Japanese documents do not disclose the motives of either Heizō IV or the

[369] For a discussion as to how European powers in the early modern world laid claim to colonial possessions, see Patricia Seed., *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010., 179-181.
[370] For an excellent and recent discussion as to how the Tokugawa regime attenuated international relations in conjunction with state consolidation, see again Ravina, “Tokugawa, Romanov, and Khmer: The Politics of Diplomacy in Eighteenth Century East Asia.”
[371] For a revisit and overview of Heizō I's ambitions for Taiwan, see Clulow, "A Fake Embassy: The Lord of Taiwan and Tokugawa Japan." I also argue that Heizō II played a critical role in planning the proposed Tokugawa invasion of Manila and saw it as an opportunity to expand Suetsugu influence in the form of a maritime domain, see again, Turnbull, "Wars and Rumors of Wars: Japanese Plans to Invade the Philippines, 1593-1637."
[372] Kramer and Kramer, “The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675.," 61.

shogunal councilors, VOC documents and in particular, the journal of chief factor Johannes Camphuys (1634-1695), offers some clues:

This evening I had a discussion with the chief interpreter, Brasman, regarding the newly discovered islands to the Southeast of Edo. He related to me that about two years ago, these islands were first discovered by a Japanese barque, which by bad weather and contrary winds was ran aground but returned again after a few months. The surviving crew brought with them a few unknown tree fruits as well as tidings that they had discovered a great many animals and birds, which were so tame, that they could be captured by hand. A year ago [1675], the shogun's junk was quickly dispatched to the island in order to conduct further exploration but found nothing other than three pristine and unspoiled islands full of flocks of birds and impassable groves. The largest of these islands was around 14 Japanese miles in circumference and no larger than Hirado. This group of three islands were around 270 Japanese miles sailing to the Southeast of Edo. Brasman further explained that the shogun's junk proceeded to another known, inhabited island which was named Fatsiesoo (Hachijō) which was not much farther from the other islands and not more than 100 Japanese miles Southeast from Edo which we also heard from Brasman that this entire area was under the jurisdiction of the Shogun of Japan. There, every year the Nagasaki governor and his assistants sent, among other goods, a good quantity of rice, but not more than 10 catty per person which the inhabitants use as medicine whenever they are sick. Their ordinary foodstuffs are not root vegetables as they eat fruit from trees which they send yearly to the shogun along with 7,000 silk fabrics and has made this island of Fatsiesoo famous throughout Japan. The women of this island (according to Brasman) are of such unspeakable beauty and use corn to comb and wash their hair which they devilishly cut and style in the same manner as men.[373]

The above account which chief interpreter Brasman relayed to Camphuys is fascinating, and important, as it illustrates the fluid nature of sovereignty in the early modern world which allowed the Tokugawa shogunate to lay claim to the Ogasawara Islands. Stretching the truth to manufacture stories of nonexistent monarchs or tributary natives for uninhabited islands are important in understanding the subject-centered nature of early modern sovereignty in East Asia.[374] The narrative, which likely originated with Heizō IV and the Nagasaki governors, emphasized that the exotic and beautiful native women of Hachijō Island, who also happened to pay tribute to the shogun, were not far from the Ogasawara Islands, and that this entire area was

[373] 20 August 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89.
[374] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 279.

under Tokugawa jurisdiction.[375] The narrative bonds between subject and sovereign, although contrived, were important in establishing claims over territory through people within an early modern context. This narrative about tributary natives in the vicinity of the Ogasawara Islands was an important first step for Heizō IV to lay claim to the archipelago under the aegis of Tokugawa power.[376]

The expedition's Captain, Shimaya Ichizaemon, and the crew of the *Fukokuju* also went to great lengths to visibly lay claim to the Ogasawara Islands in terms of markers and mapmaking, both of which were common practices among contemporary European colonizers in staking out their claims over lands and peoples throughout the world. That there were commonalities in the practices of claiming between Europeans and Asians suggests a hybridized understanding of sovereignty in the early modern world that arose from sixteenth century globalization and maritime culture.[377] Although sovereign claims differed between empires in their detail, they all relied on a combination of narrative subjugation of peoples, map making, and strategic placement of state symbols.[378] When the *Fukokuju* arrived at Hahajima Island on 3 July 1675, Captain Shimaya and crew enshrined the Oracles of the Three Shrines which consisted of the sun goddess Amaterasu, Hachiman, the god of war, and the syncretic, combined deity, Kasuga

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[375] If this version of events did indeed originate with the Nagasaki governors and Heizō IV, it would resemble past patterns of Suetsugu embellishment and in particular, Heizō I's 1627 embassy which presented an aboriginal leader as the "principal lord of Taiwan." As in the case of Heizō I's forged embassy from Taiwan in the 1620's, narratives about tribute bearing natives created an essential bond between the Tokugawa shogun as sovereign and his subjects. See Clulow, "A Fake Embassy: The Lord of Taiwan and Tokugawa Japan." 36.

[376] Again, for the concept of sovereignty as a series of relationships unbounded by territory and the idea of the "portability of subjecthood" and "uneven imperial geographies," see Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires*, 3, 285, 287, 292.

[377] Peter D. Shapinsky, "Polyvocal Portolans: Nautical Charts and Hybrid Maritime Cultures in Early Modem East Asia," *Early Modern Japan*, XIV (2006), 4-26., 4, 9.

[378] As Lauren Benton also argues which can apply to the Suetsugu in their role as ambitious intermediaries, "By definition and in practice sovereignty and Empire formed as multiple agents positioned themselves to act as subjects of and proxies for imperial powers and as polities and populations negotiated scope for their own autonomy, sometimes urging radical reconfigurations of rule." See Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 279.

Daimyōjin, who consisted of Shinto gods and their Buddhist counterparts. Captain Shimaya's enshrinement of the Oracles of the Three Shrines was the equivalent of Hernán Cortés' planting of the cross on what is today the shore of Veracruz in 1519 in that it was both a religious and political "ceremony of possession."[379] Shimaya then sailed back to Chichijima Group, which Camphuys mentioned in his journal, and proceeded to enshrine the Oracles of the Three Shrines on all three of the main islands. The enshrinement of the Oracles of the Three Shrines was the equivalent of "European flag planting" and served as visible evidence that the Ogasawara Islands fell under Tokugawa dominion.[380]

Heizō IV's ambition was to annex the Ogasawara Islands as part his personal maritime domain and in order to validate his claim to the archipelago under Tokugawa power, the Suetsugu patriarch ordered his agent, Captain Shimaya, to create two detailed maps. One of the maps that Shimaya created was for the purpose of navigation using "rhumb," or compass bearing lines that corresponded with certain stars in order to provide location data for the different islands.[381] This map was remarkable in that it illustrates Shimaya's knowledge of navigational concepts that originated in the broader maritime world during the sixteenth century wave of globalization. Shimaya's other map was a portolan and a product of hybridized maritime culture to the extent that it incorporated both Portuguese and East Asian mapmaking techniques. This hybridization of Japanese mapmaking emerged during the 1590's and had developed alongside

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[379] Seed. *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640*., 179-181.
[380] 20 August 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89. Kramer and Kramer, “The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675.," 66.
[381] Shimaya had also apparently produced a map that " for navigational purposes that showed the islands in a broader context and made use of standard auxiliaries—such as loxodromes that connect navigational points oriented to stars—for maritime navigation, thus giving a clear idea of the island’s location," which was part of a private collection, but has unfortunately been missing since 1963. Shimaya's portolan map is still in existence. See Rüegg. “Mapping the Forgotten Colony: The Ogasawara Islands and the Tokugawa Pivot to the Pacific.," 116., Kramer and Kramer, “The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675.," 65.

the Tokugawa vermillion seal system. Unlike the earlier Japanese portolans of the sixteenth century, Shimaya did not produce his map for a wider, cross-cultural audience, but for the "state-centered" interests of his masters, Heizō IV, the high shogunal councilors, and the shogun himself.[382] In his map, Shimaya colored the areas of the Ogasawara Islands in yellow which he deemed suitable for cultivation and human habitation. In the end, Shimaya calculated that only the equivalent of 0.875 kilometers of the islands were habitable and arable. On the surface, Shimaya's survey suggests that it was cause for disappointment. However, what survives of Shimaya's reports and the specimens of lumber, animals, and fruits that the crew of the *Fukokuju* collected also suggests that Heizō IV was indeed ambitious and interested in claiming the Ogasawara Islands as an area of hybrid transnational political authority under the Tokugawa banner.[383]

The combination of mapping, specimen collecting, shrine placement, and surveying that Shimaya and the crew of the *Fukokuju* performed is also enough to suggest that the Suetsugu were interested in claiming the Ogasawara Islands for the Tokugawa Shogunate. However, the most important part of the Tokugawa claim to the Ogasawara Islands was through peopling them with the shogun's subjects, as subjecthood was an essential component of early modern

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[382] Peter Shapinsky argues that " individuals whose decisions to adapt a particular technology were not necessarily connected to the interests of a state—the participation of individuals from Japan in the development of cartography and other nautical technologies in the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century maritime world. Studying these maps as part of a hybrid nautical culture developed by mariners in East Asia in this period also highlights the common fallacy of state-centered histories that identify a seafarer's primary identity by his or her land of origin. Seafarers whose livelihoods required them to spend months and years at sea developed identities and cultures as seafarers that set them apart from what land-based populations often considered normal." Contra Shapinsky, I argue that Shimaya's portolan map was very much the product of state-centered interests and his expedition to and claiming of the Ogasawara Islands illustrates how he viewed himself and his expedition as a direct extension of the Tokugawa regime. See Rüegg., 116., Shapinsky, "Polyvocal Portolans: Nautical Charts and Hybrid Maritime Cultures in Early Modem East Asia," 4-26., 4, 9.

[383] See Rüegg. "Mapping the Forgotten Colony: The Ogasawara Islands and the Tokugawa Pivot to the Pacific.," 116. For a discussion of the specimens that Shimaya collected, see Kramer and Kramer, "The Exploration of the Bonin Archipelago (Ogasawara Islands) by Japan in 1675.," 67-70.

sovereignty.[384] Peopling the Ogasawara Islands through the intent to colonize and narrative manipulation provided the Tokugawa shogunate with the necessary "legal posturing" to justify their improvisational claims over the archipelago to an international audience.[385] Arguably, the most important part of Brasman's conversation with Camphuys was the narrative that connected the inhabited Izu Islands to the uninhabited Ogasawara Islands through the Hachijō islanders whom the Tokugawa regime claimed as its subjects.[386] If this narrative originated with the Nagasaki governors and Heizō IV, it would not only fit the pattern of his Suetsugu predecessors, but other powerful figures in Western Japan such as the Arima, Shimazu, and Sō families who exploited the ambiguous and decentralized nature of the Tokugawa order to carve out maritime domains of their own.[387]

Unfortunately for Heizō IV, his exploration of the Ogasawara Islands and the surveys and specimens that Shimaya and the crew of the *Fukokuju* collected did not motivate the Tokugawa regime to further expand their claims over the archipelago. Japanese records likewise indicate that the *Fukokuju* served as a short-lived symbol of Tokugawa prestige as officials had it towed to the ship graveyard at Awaji Island where it succumbed to rot and was later dismantled. It was

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[384] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 3, 285, 287, 292.
[385] Benton, 113-120.
[386] As Roxani Margariti notes "The notion that islanders think of the sea and their forelands as an extension of their living space finds ample support in the anthropological literature on maritime peoples. An important contribution to this subject is that of ethnologist and anthropological writer Epeli Hau'ofa. His seminal essay, "Our Sea of Islands," takes issue with the concept of the smallness and concomitant economic helplessness of the island states and territories of the Pacific. He shatters that prevailing stereotype by countering that for the islanders their territory does not stop at each island's end." See Margariti, "An Ocean of Islands: Islands, Insularity, and Historiography of the Indian Ocean.," 208. Margariti's ideas on the connectedness of islands also relates to Benton's concept of "corridors of control." See also Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 3, 8, 285, 287, 292.
[387] In exploring the Ogasawara Islands, Heizō IV likely envisioned Suetsugu stewardship that was comparable to the 1609 Shimazu conquest of the Kingdom of Ryūkyū. As for the Sō family and Korea, they forged correspondence from the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu in order to reopen diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries. Arima Harunobu and Suetsugu Heizō I's predecessor as shogunal intendent, Murayama Tōan, both organized military expeditions to subdue Taiwan and bring it into the Tokugawa orbit in 1609 and 1616 respectively. See Turnbull. "Onward, Christian Samurai! The Japanese Expeditions to Taiwan in 1609 and 1616." Elisonas, "The Inseparable Trinity: Japan's Relations with China and Korea.," 295-299.

almost another half-century before the Tokugawa regime sent another expedition to the Ogasawara Islands in the 1720's.[388] Heizō IV's ambitions to build a maritime domain had failed and the likely cause in part stemmed from the downfall of the Suetsugu in 1676. However, the 1675 expedition of the *Fukokuju* shows that the Suetsugu remained ambitious, influential, and politically well-connected until their precipitous fall from grace the following year.

A Comet in the Sky

On 19 December 1664, the VOC Chief Factor Jacob Gruijs (1648-1705), observed a comet in the skies over Nagasaki.[389] This was the same "Great Comet" that 22-year-old Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1726) observed over Cambridge in England which Samuel Pepys (1633-1703) also recorded in his diary the next day on December 24th.[390] The appearances of this comet with the official name of C/1664 WI coincided with catastrophic events in both England and Japan. Comet C/1664 WI appeared over the skies of Japan during the downfall of the Toyotomi house at the siege of Osaka Castle in 1614 and again during the Shimabara Rebellion of 1637-1638. The English connected the appearance of the comet in 1664 as an evil omen that presaged the Great Fire of London in 1666. Gruijs reported that many in Japan likewise viewed the comet as an ill omen of doom as its appearance coincided with the Great Fire of Nagasaki in the previous year on April 15, 1663.[391] The 1663 fire destroyed 63 of Nagasaki's 66 wards, 2,900 houses, and both offices of the Nagasaki governors in one day. No known records provide an estimate for the

[388] Rüegg. “Mapping the Forgotten Colony: The Ogasawara Islands and the Tokugawa Pivot to the Pacific.," 117.
[389] 19 December 1664, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.
[390] J. E. McGuire, Martin Tamny, and Newton. "Newton's Astronomical Apprenticeship: Notes of 1664/5." *Isis* 76, no. 3 (1985): 349-65., Samuel Pepys. *The Diary of Samuel Pepys 5, 5*. London: Harper-Collins. 2000., Donald K. Yeomans., Yoemans, *Comets: A Chronological History of Observation, Science, Myth, and Folklore*. New York, NY: John Wiley & Sons., 1992.
[391] 12 February 1665, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.

number of people who died in the fire. If comets were indeed ill omens, perhaps the appearance of C/1664 WI also foretold the beginning of the end for the Suetsugu.[392]

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
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

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[392] Matsukata Fuyuko., "Fires and Recoveries Witnessed by the Dutch in Edo and Nagasaki: The Great Fire of Meireki in 1657 and the Great Fire of Kanbun in 1663". *Itinerario.* 37 (3): 172-187., 2013.,180.

[393] Figure 5-2. Depiction of the 1664 Comet from Nuremburg in Hans Kraemer, *Weltall und Menscheit: Geschichte der Erforschung der Natur und der Verwetung der Naturkräfte im Dienste der Völker*. Berlin: Deutsches Verlagshaus Bong & Co., 1900.

[394] Figure 5-3. Depiction of the 1664 Comet as observed from Edo in November 1664. See *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/*大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 5, 1664 November, 寛文４年１０月是**月**, 27, 彗星東方に出つ、十二月に至りて滅す、80., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1664/21-6-3/6/0080?m=all&s=0080.

[395] Figure 5-4. Depiction of the 1664 Comet from Frankfurt. See Johann Thomas Theyner, *Detail einer Kometenflugschrift*, Frankfurt, 1665.

In the years leading up to the 1663 Nagasaki fire, the Suetsugu administered a reign of terror over Nagasaki's impoverished and Christian residents. As the shogunal intendants of Nagasaki, the Suetsugu were responsible for the police, the judiciary system, tax collection, agriculture, natural resources, and citizen morality. Suetsugu duties also included removing the practitioners of Christianity and their places of worship from Nagasaki.[396] During the 1637-1638 Shimabara Rebellion, both Heizō II and the mayor, Takagi Luis, received 1000 bars of silver each as a gift from the Tokugawa regime for their efforts in extirpating Christianity and maintaining peace in Nagasaki.[397] The 1655 annual order that the VOC chief factor received from the shogun was remarkable in that it specifically directed the Dutch to report to Heizō IV in his capacity as "regent" of Nagasaki the activities of the "papists" and the "Romish Christians" and also any reports of the "Portuguese papist Christians" and their planned actions against Japan.[398] Heizō IV took his role in policing the Iberians and Christians seriously and on one occasion, showed the Dutch samples of Arabic writing that he confiscated from a recently arrived Chinese ship and asked if they were "Portuguese letters."[399]

In exercising his duties as the shogunal intendant of Nagasaki, Heizō IV also presided over the mass execution of Christians and Nagasaki's poor which greatly exacerbated social tensions within the city. In one of the more inhumane and catastrophic mass-execution events in seventeenth century Japan, VOC Chief Factor Jean Boucheljohn recorded in August 1658 that

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[396] Throughout the seventeenth century world, consolidating states like the Tokugawa regime sought to rid contested borderlands and port cities of influences they deemed "alien" and threatening. In some instances, agents of the state manufactured threats, as was the case with witchcraft in Germany and North America and arguably, with practitioners of Christianity in Nagasaki after the 1640's. See 396 Behringer, Wolfgang. *Witches and Witch Hunts: A Global History*., Cambridge. 2008., Lieberman. *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context c. 800-1830, Vol 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands*., 39-43.
[397] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki: World Trade and the Clash of Cultures 1560-1640*., 222.
[398] 24 July 1655, Daghregister van Leonard Winninx, 31 October 1654 to 23 October 1652, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 68.
[399] 21 August 1655, Daghregister van Leonard Winninx, 31 October 1654 to 23 October 1652, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 68.

Heizō IV and the Nagasaki governors brought 109 men, women, and children from Ōmura, where they had been imprisoned since December, to the place of judgement just outside the city on orders from Edo. According to Boucheljohn, these men, women, and children stood accused of planning to commit arson in Nagasaki and a few of them admitted to conspiring in the name of "Romish Christianity."[400] Out of the condemned, 16 of them were "strung upside down by their legs and their head lowered down into a pit" of excrement while the remaining 93 men, women, and children were decapitated.[401] Boucheljohn also reported that at the same time in Hirado, Saga, Ōmura, and Shimabara domains, another 400 "accomplices" were apprehended and put to death which brought the total number of condemned to 500 in this mass-execution event. In disgust, Boucheljohn observed that the condemned were impoverished and "the majority (of these people) who had their lives cut short were harmless and innocent."[402] In executing innocent people who counted among Nagasaki's most vulnerable, the impoverished and hidden practitioners of Christianity, Heizō IV antagonized the same disaffected elements of Japanese society who were responsible for the Shimabara Rebellion.

Instead of being concerned that his persecution of Nagasaki's vulnerable people might lead to another rebellion, Heizō IV and the Nagasaki governors oversaw another mass execution on January 4th, 1661. Heizō IV and the Nagasaki governors began the 1661 mass execution with sentencing 25 men to death by slow hanging however, many of them had the opportunity to "tread upon papist ornaments" to renounce their faith and go free.[403] Six days later on January

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[400] 25 August 1658, Daghregister van Jean Boucheljohn, 27 October 1657 to 23 October 1658, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 71.
[401] 25 August 1658, Daghregister van Jean Boucheljohn, 27 October 1657 to 23 October 1658, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 71.
[402] 25 August 1658, Daghregister van Jean Boucheljohn, 27 October 1657 to 23 October 1658, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 71.
[403] 4-5 January 1661, Daghregister van Hendrick Indijck, 26 October 1660 to 21 November 1661, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 74.

10, 1661, the VOC Chief Factor Hendrick Indijck (1615-1664), noted that another 75 men, women, and children joined the aforementioned condemned from the previous week in a large cell. According to Indijck, the executioners lowered the bodies of the men into pits underneath the women and "small, innocent children" who were crucified with iron nails.[404] The interpreters who personally witnessed this mass-execution reported to Indijck that the last words of some of the condemned were "adieu" and some shouted in a "loud voice that they were going to meet their maker" and would "know joy once they were reunited and saw each other again in heaven."[405]

Heizō IV's mass execution and persecution of Nagasaki's remaining Christians and urban poor created the conditions for rebellion in which the 1663 Great Fire of Nagasaki served as the catalyzing event.[406] On February 12, 1665, Gruijs wrote that the "comet star" was still visible in the skies over Nagasaki and its appearance had "greatly unsettled" the shogun, so much so that he feared a great threat to the realm and decreed that his constituent lords be on guard for trouble in their domains.[407] Later that same month, Gruijs made note of another, deeply disturbing rumor:

The residents of Bunga [Ward], who were under the shogun's own administration, have risen up against the government and at this time the uprising already consists of 72 villages which have

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[404] 10 January 1661, Daghregister van Hendrick Indijck, 26 October 1660 to 21 November 1661, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 74.

[405] 10 January 1661, Daghregister van Hendrick Indijck, 26 October 1660 to 21 November 1661, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 74.

[406] For a record of the 1663 Great Fire of Nagasaki, see See *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*/大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 3, 1663 April 15, 寛文３年３月８日, 216. "長崎、火あり," 7., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1663/21-6-2/4/0007?m=all&s=0007.

[407] In January 1665, Tokugawa officials blamed the comet for a series of fires at Ōtomo castle and village to the East of Edo. Tokugawa officials also connected the appearance of the comet to the wrath of heaven and that its appearance undoubtedly coincided with evil spirits "鬼神" walking the land and causing mischief. See *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 4, 1665 January, 寛文４年１０月是月, "彗星東方に出つ、十二月に至りて滅す," 80-86., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1664/21-6-3/6/0080?m=all&s=0080. 12 February 1665, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.

sworn an oath to one another to fight until the death. Regarding this affair, the Gouverneur Kjoeterrasa [Kurokawa Masanao (1602-1680)] attempted to mitigate the fecklessness of factor Sacquemondonno [Takagi Sakuemon] but had also informed the court in Edo of the cause of this affair, that their steward [Heizō IV] had been making unreasonable estimates and improper withdrawals which had also become public knowledge and through these deeds had placed the lives of many in peril.[408]

For Heizō IV, the 1665 rebellion in Bungo Ward could not have happened at a worse time, especially when the Tokugawa regime and its constituent, landed lords were on high alert against potential unrest. Furthermore, the rebellion in Bungo Ward likely brought back the specter of the 1637-38 Shimabara Rebellion of Christians, peasants, and master-less samurai which was the last existential threat the Tokugawa regime had faced.[409]

The malfeasance of Heizō IV became glaringly apparent to the Tokugawa and contributed to a growing rift between him and Nagasaki's governors. The common narrative of Nagasaki's decade-long recovery tends towards the triumphalist, emphasizing how the city grew from 66 to 80 wards by the end of reconstruction in 1672.[410] Other narratives that emerge regarding Nagasaki's reconstruction after the 1663 fire emphasize the generous gifts, such as those from the Matsuura lords of Hirado and the Kuroda lords of Fukuoka made to the relief efforts.[411] Even the shogun, Tokugawa Ietsuna (1641-1680), sent 200 chests of silver to Nagasaki to aid in relief and reconstruction.[412] However, such vignettes obscure the inhumane activities of the Suetsugu

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[408] 12 February 1665, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.

[409] For more recent and relevant scholarship on the Shimabara Rebellion, please see Kanda Chisato, 神田千里, *Shimabara no ran: Kirishitan Shinkō to Busō Hōki*, 島原の乱キリシタン信仰と武装蜂起. Tōkyō: Chuokoron-shinsha, 2005., Keith. "The Logistics of Power: Tokugawa Response to the Shimabara Rebellion and Power Projection in Seventeenth-Century Japan.," Nadia Kreeft., "Deus Resurrected - A Fresh Look at Christianity in the Shimabara-Amakusa Rebellion of 1637.," (Master of Arts, Leiden University, 2011).

[410] Matsukata., "Fires and Recoveries Witnessed by the Dutch in Edo and Nagasaki: The Great Fire of Meireki in 1657 and the Great Fire of Kambun in 1663.," 173.

[411] Mastukata., 181., 2 May 1663, 19 May 1663, Daghregister van Hendrick Indijck, 6 November 1662 to 20 October 1663, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 76.

[412] 30 May 1663, Daghregister van Hendrick Indijck, 6 November 1662 to 20 October 1663, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 76. Tokugawa sources record this as a "loan" from the shogun which amounted to 2,000 *kanme* of silver to aid in Nagasaki's relief, see *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 3, 1663 May 19, 寛文 3 年 4

before and after the 1663 fire, namely, Heizō IV's continued execution, torture, and extortion of Nagasaki's less fortunate. On December 14, 1664, eight months after the 1663 fire, Heizō IV and the Nagasaki governors apprehended, tried, and executed 49 men and women for their Christian faith when they refused to apostatize.[413] On January 20, 1665, in the midst of freezing cold temperatures and a heavy snowstorm, Heizō IV and the Nagasaki governors brought another 60 men and women, this time, including children, to the place of judgement and had them executed after accusing them of practicing the Christian faith.[414] With these two mass execution events in January 1665, Heizō IV had pushed the residents of Nagasaki to the point of open rebellion.[415]

Gruijs also reveals that Heizō IV had been demanding unreasonable taxes from the residents of Bungo ward during the city's recovery from the 1663 fire, which was another compounding factor in the rebellion. Although Governor Kurokawa attempted to alleviate the malfeasance of Heizō IV and his lieutenant, Sakuemon, by buying up rice in Western Japan and selling it cheaply to the poor, the residents of Bungo ward were on the verge of starvation.[416] Aside from

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月１２日., 217., "庚戌、幕府、長崎奉行廨舎を構造し、其市坊道渠の廣狭を定め、罹災市民に銀二千貫匁を貸す," 36., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1663/21-6-2/4/0036?m=all&s=0036.

[413] 13 December 1664, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.

[414] 20 January 1665, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.

[415] Although there was a two-year interval between the fire and the 1665 rebellion in Bungo Ward, I argue that it was a catalyzing event that was compounded by smallpox outbreaks, Heizō IV's continued persecution of Nagasaki's marginalized and vulnerable people, and even destruction from a typhoon. If we count the Dutch sources as credible, we can argue here that Heizō IV's malfeasance and incompetence in administering relief to the people of Nagasaki in the aftermath of these disasters was the chief event that led to the 1665 rebellion. A useful comparative in this regard would be the Matsukura lords' heavy-handed policies and taxation of Shimabara domain's peasants during the famine of the summer of 1638 which ultimately led to the 1638-1639 Shimabara Rebellion. For the smallpox empidemic, see *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 2, 1662, 215., "長崎痘疹流行し、嬰児多く夭す," 64., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1662/21-6-1/9/0064?m=all&s=0064., for the typhoon, see *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 3, 1663 August, 18, 寛文３年７月２６日., 219., "辛卯、西海道諸國大風雨、肥前・薩摩最甚し、長崎碇泊の清商舶三隻毀損す." 54., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1663/21-6-2/7/0054?m=all&s=0054.

[416] The Nagasaki magistrate bought rice from the Lords of Fukuoka, Kumamoto, Omura, and Saga and sold it to the poor at a low price. See Matsukata., "Fires and Recoveries Witnessed by the Dutch in Edo and Nagasaki: The Great Fire of Meireki in 1657 and the Great Fire of Kanbun in 1663.," 181., 12 February 1665, Daghregister van Jacob

demanding unreasonable taxes from Nagasaki's residents, VOC records indicate that Heizō IV did nothing to contribute to the city's recovery after the 1663 fire and instead, either saw it as something to ignore or an opportunity to profit. On June 5, 1663 just six days after the shogun sent the relief silver to Nagasaki and a mere two months after the great fire, Heizō IV approached the VOC Chief Factor Hendrick Indijck, with a request to borrow the company's sampan in order to transport some fancy woodwork to his garden.[417] On September 30, 1663, Heizō IV's secretary and his lieutenant, Sakuemon, again visited Indijck for an entire day, this time to buy up large quantities of red and black cloth, silk taffeta cloth, gingham cloth, and salempouris calico cloth, and woven cotton patch cloth, all for the "convenience of his majesty, the shogun."[418] Rather than attend to the recovery of Nagasaki, Heizō IV and Sakuemon saw the reconstruction of the city as a means to enrich themselves at the expense of both its inhabitants and the shogunal treasury.

There is also compelling evidence that the 200 chests of silver that the shogun, Tokugawa Ietsuna, had sent to Nagasaki did not go towards relief of its residents and instead ended up lining the pockets of Heizō IV and Sakuemon. Gruijs' reference to Heizō IV's "improper withdrawals" corroborates with the accounts of other VOC chief factors who observed that the Suetsugu regularly used the shogunal treasury as their personal bank account to enrich

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Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78. In addition to food shortages, Tokugawa sources note that the value of silver in Nagasaki had risen to an untenable rate and ordered the infusion of gold coins to half the amount of circulating currency into the local economy. What this likely illustrates as I explain in the next paragraph is that the relief funds which the shogun had sent along with the funds that the Matsuura of Hirado and the Kuroda of Fukuoka had contributed to Nagasaki's recovery likely ended up lining the pockets of Heizō IV and his lieutenant, Takagi Sakuemon. See *Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*/大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 4, 1664 September 9, 寛文４年８月５日., 224. "是より先、商賣の外舶物品を長崎に買ふは、悉く銀貨を以てす、銀貨騰貴す、是に至り、幕府令して、其半額は便に従ひ金貨を用せしむ," 60., https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1664/21-6-3/4/0060?m=all&s=0060.

[417] 5 June 1663, Daghregister van Hendrick Indijck, 6 November 1662 to 20 October 1663, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 76.

[418] 30 September 1663, Daghregister van Hendrick Indijck, 6 November 1662 to 20 October 1663, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 76.

themselves through speculative lending.[419] In 1660, VOC Chief Factor Jean Boucheljon noted that Heizō IV took considerable liberties with the shogunal treasury in Nagasaki to enrich himself. Heizō IV informed Boucheljon through the interpreter, Mangobe, that whenever the Dutch needed money, he would happily give them a loan without interest for a few months. Heizō IV added that he "had so much coin flowing in from his majesty's treasury that it would be wasteful and fruitless to leave such money lying around and not do anything with it."[420] Boucheljon was apprehensive of Heizō IV's offer and "unusual friendliness" and noted in his journal that he hoped that no one would borrow money from the Suetsugu that year, with or without interest, as it "all but guaranteed robbery for the borrower."[421] In 1674, VOC Chief Factor Martinus Caesar reported a candid conversation with one of Nagasaki's town elders who informed the Dutchman that the "purses of the governor, Heizō, and Sakuemon were stretched thin and without a coin to spare."[422] The town elder also informed Caesar that since Suetsugu finances were stretched thin, Heizō IV had relied on the shogun's treasury in order to lend money and had managed to generate an "excess profit of over a hundred or more chests of gold."[423]

In the aftermath of the 1663 Great Fire of Nagasaki, Heizō IV's heavy taxation and persecution of the vulnerable elements of Nagasaki society brought the city to rebellion. The 1665 rebellion in Bungo Ward was the beginning of the Suetsugu family's downfall as it prompted the Nagasaki governor, Kurokawa to complain to the shogun and high shogunal

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[419] 12 February 1665, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.
[420] 5 June 1660, Daghregister van Jean Boucheljon, 4 November 1659 to 26 October 1660, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 73.
[421] 12 February 1665, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.
[422] 28 October 1674, Daghregister van Martinus Caesar, 20 October 1674 to 7 November 1675, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 88.
[423] 28 October 1674, Daghregister van Martinus Caesar, 20 October 1674 to 7 November 1675, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 88.

councilors in Edo that Heizō IV's actions directly led to the uprising.[424] Heizō IV's blatant misuse of shogunal funds for personal enrichment was also widespread public knowledge and so much so that even the Dutch knew about it. Even with the knowledge that Heizō IV's actions and corruption directly contributed to the largest armed insurrection in Western Japan since the 1637-38 Shimabara Rebellion, the Tokugawa regime left the Suetsugu in place. Nonetheless, Heizō IV had made powerful enemies, particularly among the Nagasaki governors, and the high shogunal councilors in Edo.

The final incident that served as the catalyst for the Tokugawa removal of the Suetsugu a decade later in 1675 involved Ise Shrine, the holiest place in all Japan, vandalism, and a group of Heizō IV's inebriated retainers. On July 9, 1675 VOC Chief Factor Martinus Caesar heard from one of the Dutch interpreters that some time ago:

> Heizō had allowed his retainers to undertake a pilgrimage to Ise Shrine, the most important and holiest of all Japanese temples. Whereupon some friends of Heizō and his domestics joined together with those concerned on their journey and proceeded to have one drink too many together. By the first account of the villagers [near Ise Shrine], one of Heizō's servants then proceeded to hack down some of the shrine's cordons and it was clear that it was no accident. Heizō, having learned of this, had the offending retainer, whose indiscretions caused a riot, interrogated and then beheaded inside the Suetsugu compound. Not long after, the account of these events reached the ears of the Nagasaki governor who became as mad as the devil that Heizō had allowed the pilgrimage without first consulting him and had written a letter to Edo full of many complaints about Heizō and in the meantime jailed a few of the troublemakers until the time that he received an answer from Edo. On or about the same time, the villagers near Ise Shrine relayed their version of events to the Lord of Figen [the Nabeshima of Saga Domain] who then also made a complaint to Edo at which point, the Governor of Nagasaki received an answer from Edo. The order that the governor received was to administer justice to the incarcerated culprits and to place Heizō under house arrest until it was possible to send him to Edo.[425]

[424] 12 February 1665, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.
[425] 9 July 1675, Daghregister van Martinus Caesar, 20 October 1674 to 7 November 1675, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 88.

Heizō IV had once again succeeded in alienating the governor of Nagasaki and this time, one of the more powerful lords in Western Japan, the Nabeshima of Saga Domain. By allowing his retainers, friends, and domestic servants to travel to Ise Shrine without the knowledge and approval of the Nagasaki governor or Edo, Heizō IV acted autonomously and openly defied Tokugawa authority.[426] The Tokugawa regime "severely limited or altogether banned" freelance visits to shrines, particularly Ise Shrine.[427] As the actions of Heizō IV's retainers illustrates, freelance shrine visitation did not always have pious motives as their intent and sometimes were an excuse for voyages of hedonistic pleasure seeking.[428] For the most part, Edo and the constituent landed domain lords did not interfere with freelance shrine visitation unless they compromised public order which the Suetsugu retainers managed to do in 1675. Heizō IV's retainers not only caused disorder, they also publicly defaced the most important shrine in Japan and a symbol of an emergent Tokugawa codification of Japanese identity. As a testament to the severity of this incident, the Nagasaki governor ordered three additional servants of Heizō IV beheaded, banished three others to the Gotō Islands, but allowed two of the domestic servants to go free.[429] The incident at Ise Shrine signified the beginning of the end for Heizō IV as the Suetsugu had become a domestic liability for both the constituent landed lords of Western Japan

[426] The technical term for freelance pilgrimages to shrines during the Tokugawa period, especially to Ise Shrine called *nukemairi*/抜け参り which roughly translates into "freelance visiting." Laura Nenzi., "*To Ise at all Costs: Religious and Economic Implications of Early Modern Nukemairi*.," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies*. 33: 75-114., 76. Beginning in 1640, the Nabeshima family of Saga domain and the Kuroda family of Fukuoka domain provided for the defense of Nagasaki in alternating years. See Wilson, *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*., 20.
[427] Nenzi., "*To Ise at all Costs: Religious and Economic Implications of Early Modern Nukemairi*.," 81.
[428] Constantine Nomikos Vaporis., *Breaking Barriers: Travel and the State in Early Modern Japan*. Cambridge, Mass: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University., 1995., 14-15, 207.
[429] Nenzi., "*To Ise at all Costs: Religious and Economic Implications of Early Modern Nukemairi*.," 82., 9 July 1675, 14 July 1675, Daghregister van Martinus Caesar, 20 October 1674 to 7 November 1675, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 88.

and Edo. Furthermore, the incident at Ise Shrine ominously foreshadowed that Heizō IV had lost any immunity for his own misdeeds and those of his subordinates.

On January 1, 1676, Heizō IV received orders from the shogunal councilors that he was free from house arrest. The shogunal councilors then ordered Heizō IV to begin his journey to Edo and as he would need to gather provisions, he could also receive his yearly gifts from the VOC. Heizō IV's destination in Edo was Denma-chō prison, infamous for its torture and execution grounds. The shogunal councilors ordered Heizō IV incarcerated in the special annex of Denma-chō prison for high ranking Tokugawa officials and wealthy commoners which featured clean rooms, indoor plumbing, and baths. VOC Chief Factor Camphuys noted that although Heizō IV was not housed with the general prison population, his accommodations were collocated with those "sentenced to flogging."[430] While Heizō IV enjoyed relative comfort and luxury compared to his fellow inmates, he likely also had to endure the screams of the condemned. Over the next few months of Heizō IV's internment, Tokugawa officials in both Edo and Nagasaki undertook the unpleasant and daunting task of determining just how much of a liability the Suetsugu had become and what they found in terms of corruption and foreign influence far exceeded the indiscretions of a few drunken servants at Ise Shrine.

The subsequent investigation that took place during Heizō IV's internment in Denma-chō prison laid bare the extent of the Suetsugu network which extended from the mayoral offices of Nagasaki to the highest levels of the Tokugawa regime in Edo. These investigations also illustrate the process of self-destruction that led to the collapse of the Suetsugu and their associates and why they had ceased to be a domestic asset for the Tokugawa shogunate. In the

[430] 31 January 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89.
For a useful description of the Denma-chō prison and execution grounds, see Daniel Botsman., *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press., 2007., 61-69.

aftermath of the Great Fire of Nagasaki in 1663, the Nagasaki governors and the Nabeshima family of Saga domain had already turned against the Suetsugu in complaining to Edo about Heizō IV.

There is also evidence that Heizō IV's most trusted lieutenant and "steward," Sakuemon, had begun to resent his master as early as 1664. Sakuemon's goal was to usurp Heizō IV, and he actively seized upon opportunities to undermine his master as Tokugawa officials became increasingly aware of the Suetsugu patriarch's ineptitude. VOC Chief Factor Daniel Six (1620-1674) reported that on November 14, 1664, Sakuemon reproached him, stating that as the shogun's factor, he was the peer of Heizō IV and therefore deserved to receive equal gifts from the Dutch. Sakuemon added that all of the city ward leaders and the Chinese merchants in Nagasaki already recognized and treated him as a peer of Heizō IV.[431] For over a decade, Sakuemon worked to undermine Heizō IV and in 1676, the VOC Chief Factor Johannes Camphuys recorded that Sakuemon had been plotting with the cooper's guild in Nagasaki to overthrow Heizō IV and become the new shogunal intendant. Camphuys added that even though Sakuemon provided lavish gifts and bribes to the court at Edo in order to conceal his "baseness and filth," he was far more preferable to deal with than Heizō IV who was "much too expensive and greedy."[432] Although Sakuemon was ambitious and had publicly turned on his former master, Heizō IV, the stain of his own corruption and his affiliation with the Suetsugu led Tokugawa officials to remove him from all positions of responsibility and authority. The Tokugawa removal of Sakuemon from his responsibilities as shogunal factor and mayor of Nagasaki indicates that Edo had no further interest in transnational intermediaries such as the

[431] 14 November 1664, Daghregister van Jacob Gruijs, 7 November 1664 to 27 October 1665, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 78.
[432] 2 February 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89.

Suetsugu and rather than replace Heizō IV in the capacity of his office as shogunal intendant, the Tokugawa regime abolished the position. As Tokugawa officials began the process of dismantling the last remnants of the Suetsugu network, their investigation uncovered even more disturbing evidence of Heizō IV's Chinese connections. Although the Chinese connections of the Suetsugu had initially been an asset to the Tokugawa regime, they had morphed into ties to a dangerous and destabilizing foreign power, the Zheng Empire.

How Nagasaki (Almost) Became Chinese

By 1675, the Chinese community in the suburbs of Nagasaki, the chief area of Suetsugu jurisdiction, had grown to a population of around 30,000 people, and exercised considerable influence over city politics through capital infusion and building infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and Buddhist temples.[433] As Xing Hang observes, the Buddhist temples served a means for the Chinese community to exercise informal governmental power in Nagasaki and they did so through intermediaries such as the Suetsugu. In fact, the Suetsugu had been financial partners with Nagasaki's Chinese community by investing in the city's Buddhist temples as the observations of Dutch East India Company (VOC) Chief Factor Adriaen van der Burgh (????-1668) from May of 1652 attests:

> Many Chinese temples, with their wonderfully gilded and ornamented statues, and beautiful pleasure gardens with various trees, both fruit-bearing and others, most artfully laid out and planted with all manner of flowers. The flowers consisted of beautiful scented and unscented arrangements of gold and yellow lilies which were planted at even intervals with peonies in a manner similar to that in our country. As we moved through the valleys to the beautiful mountains, sown with grain, the roads we walked along had many medicinal herbs growing alongside them among other things including pleasant tasting broadleaf plants like we have in the Netherlands such as plantago, violets, byvoet, agrimonie, and prunelle which the Japanese plucked the leaves from and placed into baskets. We then came to a Japanese temple which the Nagasaki Regent Heizōdonno [Heizō II] had built almost two years ago while he was still living. The temple grounds consisted of an extremely beautiful pleasure garden and the temple itself

[433] Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World*.., 27.

consisted of detailed and meticulous woodwork with beautiful rooms inside which had just been completed and that the Japanese in our entourage had heard many things about."[434]

During his stroll through Nagasaki, Van der Burgh visited many Buddhist temples, one of which Heizō II had built in 1650. As Van der Burgh observed, Chinese entrepreneurs and investors had built the majority of Nagasaki's Buddhist temples that he visited during his outing. Between 1620 and 1650, wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs and investors settled in Nagasaki and built an estimated 30 Buddhist temples, in many cases over the ruins of Christian churches.[435] As the Tokugawa shogunate removed Christians and their places of worship from Nagasaki, the Chinese community built Buddhist temples that was complimentary of an emergent, Tokugawa codification of Japanese identity. In order to exert control over Nagasaki and enforce a codified Japanese identity on the port city, the Tokugawa regime needed the Suetsugu and their connections to wealthy Chinese entrepreneurs and investors.[436]

As a decentralized state that exercised power through intermediaries rather than direct control, the Tokugawa regime neither had the resources or local connections to bring Nagasaki under its sway which necessitated that Edo depend on agents such as the Heizō dynasty. Arguably, the most important connections that the Suetsugu established were with the maritime Chinese networks in Nagasaki and abroad. Kōzen, the founder of the Suetsugu maritime dynasty and his

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[434] 1 May 1652, Daghregister van Adriaen van der Burgh, 1 November 1651 to 3 November 1652, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 65.

[435] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki: World Trade and the Clash of Cultures 1560-1640.*, 187.

[436] Arano Yasunori engages in a parallel discussion with Victor Lieberman regarding the emergence of a Japanese identity in the early seventeenth century. As Arano illustrates, the emergence of the Chinese community in Nagasaki occurred at the same time that the Tokugawa regime accelerated their efforts to eradicate Christianity from Japan. Arano argues "If foreigners proved to be non-Christian and were willing to adopt Japanese dress and customs, the Bakufu would grant them entry no matter what nationality. Thus the early modern Japanese 'national identity' was defined by these two signifiers – being non-Christian and observing Japanese custom." Arano also argues that " The Tokugawa bans on overseas travel in the 1630s stemmed visits by Chinese vessels, and with the influx of Chinese into all the Chinese districts except Nagasaki virtually stopped, these centres of Chinese society were eventually lost. Chinatowns began to fade away after the 1630s; only one overseas Chinese community remained in Nagasaki, though not in a Chinatown as such." See Arano, “The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order.,” 185–216., 197, 212-214., Lieberman, *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context c. 800-1830, Vol 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia and the Islands*., 39-40.

son, Heizō I, were partners of the Chinese pirate, Li Dan (????-1625) and his network. After Li Dan's death in 1625, Heizō I inherited the Japanese portion of the Chinese pirate's network. Li Dan's lieutenant, Zheng Zhilong inherited the Chinese portion of his former master's network and then became close, personal friends with Heizō I.[437] This growing expatriate community of Chinese professionals, pirates, and entrepreneurs fled the turmoil of the wars of the Ming-Qing transition and brought their wealth with them to invest in Nagasaki.[438] Because of their established ties with the remnants of Li Dan's network and the Zheng organization, the Suetsugu became an important liaison between Edo and the Chinese community in Nagasaki, especially in furthering the Tokugawa mission of sweeping away the remnants of Christianity and transforming it into a Japanese port city.

Heizō IV cooperated with Fujianese entrepreneurs to introduce the new, *Ōbaku* sect of Zen Buddhism, which combined elements of *Chan* Buddhism from China with Pure Land Buddhist teachings, and one of its central tenets was calling upon the Amida Buddha for salvation in the manner of a paradoxical Zen question, or *kōan* using a Fujianese dialect.[439] *Ōbaku* practitioners also recited Pure Land sutras to traditional Chinese music. In November 1654, one of Zheng Zhilong's ships from Fujian brought the Buddhist priest, Yǐnyuán Lóngqí (1592-1673), and 30

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[437] Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century* ., 42-43, 48-51. Andrade, "The Company's Chinese Pirates.," 443. *Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 2, 1625 August 12, 寛永２年７月１０日, 1, 日本在住明人甲比丹李旦肥前平戸に歿す、97, https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1625/18-6-1/4/0097?m=all&s=1000&n=20. Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c.1620–1720*., 45.

[438] Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720*., 45-46. For excellent discussions of the increasing Chinese presence in Nagasaki during the early seventeenth century, see Patrizia Carioti, "The Origins of the Chinese Community of Nagasaki, 1571-1635". *Ming Qing Yanjiu.* 14 (01): 2006., 1-29 and Weichung Cheng, "Linking the Visible Cities: The Chinese Junks Sailing between Nagasaki and Batavia (1665-1719)", 臺大歷史學報, June 2018., 61, 289-340. (THCI).

[439] The particular *kōan* in question asked, "Who calls upon Amida for salvation?" See Helen Josephine Baroni. *Iron Eyes: The Life and Teachings of Ōbaku Zen Master Tetsugen Dōkō*. New York: State University of New York., 2006., 6. Helen Josephine Baroni., *Ōbaku Zen: The Emergence of the Third Sect of Zen in Tokugawa, Japan*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press., 2000., 109-111, 181-185.

monks to Nagasaki.[440] In the 1660s, the fifth shogun, Tokugawa Tsunayoshi (1646-1709) launched a state-directed program to reform the *Rinzai* Zen sect of Buddhism and reinvigorate the martial spirit of his warriors using *Ōbaku* teachings and in the context of Nagasaki, it served as a replacement for Christianity and illustrates Suetsugu involvement in assisting the Tokugawa regime in creating a codified, Japanese state identity.

In choosing *Ōbaku* to reform a major sect of Zen Buddhism that was central to warrior identity in Japan, the Tokugawa regime sought to provide an alternative to Christianity. The Tokugawa shogunate viewed Christianity as a threat to their regime due to its series of conflicting sovereign relationships to the pope in Rome and the Iberian monarchs.[441] In reforming *Rinzai* Zen with *Ōbaku* teachings, Tsunayoshi engaged in an act of "cosmopolitan chauvinism," or "integrating Japanese cultural distinctiveness" in a way that "made foreign ideas compatible with local practice."[442] Even though the central tenets of *Ōbaku* had originated in China and in religious doctrine that was opposed to warrior rule, the Tokugawa court deemed

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[440] The authoritative work on Yǐnyuán Lóngqí is Jiang Wu., *Leaving for the Rising Sun: Chinese Zen Master Yinyuan and the Authenticity Crisis in Early Modern East Asia*., Oxford: Oxford University Press. VOC Chief Factor Leonard Winninx referred to Yǐnyuán Lóngqí by his Japanese name of "Ingen" and mentioned that he had arrived on one of "Iquan's ships." See 14 November 1654, Daghregister van Leonard Winninx, 31 October 1654 to 23 October 1652, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 68.

[441] As Derek Massarella argues, Western Christian universality was not reconcilable "symbolically" and "bureaucratically" with the process of state consolidation in Japan. According to Massarella, Christianity posed a unique challenge to Japan's unifiers as they could not subdue either its "ritual and symbolic attributes" or its "bureaucratic talents" to the state. Christianity was an institutional rather than a cultural mismatch for both the Toyotomi and Tokugawa regimes during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Citing Hideyoshi's proscription of Christianity in 1587, Massarella points to the *kanpaku's* observations regarding the "excessive indiscretion" of the Christian daimyo to "destroy temples and shrines and abuse Buddhist clergy." Although Massarella argues that Christianity's irreconcilability was a key feature of the Toyotomi order, I argue that this irreconcilability continued with the Tokugawa Shogunate and manifested with its process of consolidation in the form of codifying Japanese identity, see Derek Massarella., "Envoys and Illusions: The Japanese Embassy to Europe, 1582-90, "De Missione Legatorvm Iaponensium", and the Portuguese Viceregal Embassy to Toyotomi Hideyoshi, 1591.," *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 15, no. 3 (2005): 329-50., 339, 347, 350.

[442] A Japanese saying reflects these universal perceptions and their applicability to the warrior class: "Rinzai for the shōgun, Sōtō for the peasants" (臨済将軍、曹洞土民)., Paul Williams., *Mahāyāna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations*. London: Routledge., 2009., 114. For a revolutionary and field-defining discussion of the concept of "cosmopolitan chauvinism" and its applicability to Japanese history, see Mark Ravina, *To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History*, 1 edition (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2017)., 9-13.

them compatible and "universally applicable" in codifying Japanese identity.[443] The central tenets of *Ōbaku* were compatible with an emerging sense of Japanese identity as they represented groups who had submitted to Tokugawa authority. As for the Pure Land sect, Japan's unifiers had crushed and subdued their warrior monks towards the end of the Warring States Period and their patriarch had pledged allegiance to Toyotomi Hideyoshi. As for the Chinese who settled in Nagasaki, the Tokugawa regime regarded them as the former subjects of a failed state, the Ming Dynasty, and many of them assumed Japanese names and identities. For example, the monk Yǐnyuán Lóngqí who introduced *Ōbaku* Zen Buddhism to Japan adopted the name of Ingen Ryūki. Beyond helping the Tokugawa regime to codify a state Japanese identity, the involvement of the Suetsugu in Nagasaki's Chinese Buddhist community again affirms that the Heizō dynasty was opportunistic in their ambition and leveraged the ambiguity and fluidity of the early seventeenth century world to bolster their own political power.

Beyond helping to codify a state Japanese identity, the Tokugawa shogunate relied on the Suetsugu for their Chinese connections that brought in a much-needed source of revenue to build and develop Nagasaki's infrastructure. Aside from the Zheng organization, one of the most important Chinese connections for the Suetsugu was to the Wei brothers, Zhiyuan and Zhiyan. The Dutch nicknamed Zhiyuan "Captain Itch One-Eye" and remarked that he could never return to China because officials there considered him a pirate.[444] The Wei brothers also made numerous monetary gifts to the city of Nagasaki and its Chinese Buddhist temples. In February 1651, VOC sources report that Zhiyuan made a very charitable gift of 770 chests of silver ingots to Nagasaki officials. Zhiyuan "One Eye" died in 1654, but Zhiyan continued making extensive

[443] Ravina., 11.
[444] 1 May 1652, Daghregister van Adriaen van der Burgh, 1 November 1651 to 3 November 1652, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 65.

monetary gifts to the city of Nagasaki and its Buddhist temples. These gifts coincided with Zhiyan's requests to Nagasaki officials for permanent residency in the city which he and his sons received in 1672 after the city governors and Heizō IV successfully interceded with the high shogunal councilors in Edo on their behalf.[445] When Tokugawa officials granted Zhiyan permanent residency in Nagasaki, his sons took the Japanese surname of Ōga and the given names of Seizaemon and Seibei. As for Zhiyan, Tokugawa officials allowed him, by special permit, to continue using his Chinese name and dress as "he had once served the Ming."[446]

Heizō IV's Chinese connections were not only useful for bringing in gifts and revenue for the Tokugawa regime, they were also important in developing the infrastructure of Nagasaki. Less than a year after Heizō IV took control of the Suetsugu family in April 1649, he met with the VOC Chief Factor, Dirq Snoecq, to inform him that the Chinese had built three stone bridges over the canals in Nagasaki and asked why the Dutch could not build just one stone bridge connecting their island of Dejima to the rest of the city? Snoecq answered that this was a nonsensical request as the Tokugawa regime forbade the Dutch to leave their island whereas the Chinese were allowed to roam about Nagasaki freely.[447] This conversation between Snoecq and Heizō IV further reveals that the Chinese community in Nagasaki were largely responsible for building the roads and bridges that comprised the city's infrastructure. More broadly, Heizō IV used his Chinese connections to position himself and the Suetsugu at the center of Nagasaki's growth into a cosmopolitan entrepôt. This move by Heizō IV to establish himself as the chief

[445] Zhiyan's sons took the Japanese surname of Ōga as well as Japanese given names, see Iioka Naoko., “Literati Entrepreneur: Wei Zhiyan in the Tonkin-Nagasaki Silk Trade.,” (Ph.D., National University of Singapore, 2009)., 96, 210-213.
[446] Iioka., 212
[447] 21 April 1649, Daghregister van Dirq Snoecq, 9 December 1648 to 5 November 1649, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 62.

intermediary in Nagasaki preceded the fall of the Suetsugu when the Tokugawa shogunate decided that they no longer wanted a commercial entrepôt after 1676.

As the war between the VOC and the Zheng intensified in the late 1650s and early 1660s, the Chinese connections of the Suetsugu were important for the Tokugawa regime in extending its power into the maritime world. Heizō IV actively intervened on the side of the Zheng to protect his own interests and at the same time, he further ensnared the Dutch within the Tokugawa legal framework by ensuring that the VOC answered for its attacks against Chinese shipping while denying the company justice for Zheng attacks against its agents.[448] As VOC Chief Factor Jean Boucheljon observed in 1657:

> At first Japan's overseas trade with the Chinese was but a trickle, except that it is not so strange that the governors place so many heavy restrictions on us in dealing with the Chinese junks, especially considering when it is of such a great benefit to Heizō who stands only to profit.[449]

Heizō IV protected his own interests and profited by ensuring that the Tokugawa regime had the opportunity to respond to VOC acts of aggression against the Zheng and other Chinese merchants who were part of the Suetsugu network. For example, in December 1656, Heizō IV advocated on behalf of a Chinese captain named Wansick who complained to the Nagasaki governors that the VOC attacked his ship on the way to Malacca and had stolen 3,000 *reales* from him. Although VOC Chief Factor Zacharias Wagenaer, remarked that Wansick was a "liar" who had never visited Malacca, the Nagasaki governors ordered the Dutch to reimburse him for the 3000 *reales* that the company had stolen from him.[450] Apparently, the 3000 *reales* proved to

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[448] Here, I refer to Adam Clulow's important argument regarding the Tokugawa subjugation of the VOC through their land-based, legal framework. See Clulow, “Finding the Balance: European Military Power in Early Modern Asia.,” 148–57., 154-155., Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 135-140.

[449] 10 November 1657, Daghregister van Jean Boucheljon, 27 October 1657 to 23 October 1658, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 71.

[450] 9 December 1656, 4 October 1657., Daghregister van Zacharias Wagenaer, 2 November 1656 to 26 October 1657, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 70., Wansick" was likely a Dutch transliteration of Wan Shi Cheng and was an independent trader who sometimes sailed with Dongjing Liuguang whom the Dutch called "Rocquan." Rocquan on

be quite the windfall for Wansick as the Chinese captain had collected his money and returned with 2,685 *taels* almost a year later in November of 1657 and built a large ship in Nagasaki with his newfound wealth.[451] Once his ship was complete, Wansick planned to sail for Siam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and the Patani Sultanate with an investment of 30 *taels* from Heizō IV. Wei Zhiyan also invested another 40 to 50 *taels* in Wansick's planned voyage to Southeast Asia.[452]

Heizō IV also likely intervened on behalf of his Zheng partners in the aftermath of the 1657 *Breukelen* and 1663 *Klaverskerk* incidents. In 1657, the VOC warship *Breukelen* attacked one of Koxinga's junks that had recently left the Sultanate of Johor near Singapore and was on its way to Nagasaki. The ensuing legal battle between Zheng agents and the VOC in Japan continued until October 1662 when the Nagasaki governors ordered the Dutch to surrender the amount of 27,096 *taels* in 27 chests of silver as recompense for their destruction of Koxinga's ship.[453] In 1663, the VOC warship *Klaverskerk* attacked and destroyed another Zheng ship that was on its way to Nagasaki near Meshima Island. Although Zheng agents demanded the sum of 150,000 *taels*, Tokugawa officials did not assess the monetary penalty, but instead issued a strong reprimand to the Dutch.[454] With their reprimand, the Nagasaki governors and Heizō IV added that the Chinese and the Zheng do so much business in Japan that it made practical sense to just "blame the Dutch."[455]

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occasion worked for the Wei brothers. According to Cheng Weichung "Wansik was not a Batavian citizen and was also not a subject or client of the Chinese Zheng clan. The Dutch records show that he was a native of Fuzhou and lived under Manchu rule." See Cheng "Linking the Visible Cities: The Chinese Junks Sailing between Nagasaki and Batavia (1665-1719)," 304-305.

[451] 10 November 1657, Daghregister van Jean Boucheljon, 27 October 1657 to 23 October 1658, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 71.

[452] 16 April 1658, Daghregister van Jean Boucheljon, 27 October 1657 to 23 October 1658, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 71.

[453] 30 July 1664, Daghregister van Willem Volger, 19 October 1663 to 6 November 1664, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 77. For a discussion of the *Breukelen* affair, see Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 188-196.

[454] For a discussion of the *Klaverskerk* incident, see Clulow., 196-201.

[455] 26 March 1664, Daghregister van Willem Volger, 19 October 1663 to 6 November 1664, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 77.

For Heizō IV, intervention on behalf of his Chinese partners also meant ensuring that the Tokugawa regime did not hold the Zheng accountable for their attacks against the VOC. On April 18, 1669, VOC Chief Factor Daniel Six traveled to Edo for the annual audience with the shogun and to present the company's case for redress against the 1667 Zheng attack on the Dutch compound in Cambodia two years earlier. The Zheng attack on the Dutch compound in Cambodia resulted in the death of VOC Chief Factor Pieter Kettingh (????-1667), three Malay servants, and 40,000 *taels* in estimated damages.[456] When Six was about to leave Edo after paying his yearly, required obeisance to the shogun, he asked the interpreter, Itsierobe, when he could expect to be summoned before the high shogunal councilors to plead the case of the VOC?[457] Itsierobe candidly replied that there would be no meeting with the high shogunal councilors, especially since the Nagasaki governors had never forwarded their complaint. Furthermore, Itsierobe informed Six that he had spoken privately with the Tokugawa commissioner who requested that the interpreter deliver the discrete admonition that "the shogun did not wish to involve himself in the affairs of a foreign kingdom so far away from his own land."[458] When Six pointed out the obvious contradiction that the shogun had, in fact, intervened on behalf of the Zheng in a faraway land against the VOC, Itsierobe replied that although Six's reasoning was correct, it went against the interests of the Nagasaki governor and Heizō IV.

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[456]At midnight on July 10, 1667 a Chinese captain and member of the Zheng organization whom the Dutch called "Piauwja," or Xian Biao, attacked the VOC compound in Cambodia with a fleet of six ships, 600 men from Taiwan, and another 1000 Quinam. Piauwja killed the VOC Chief Factor Pieter Kettingh and three Malay servants. The Zheng also burned the VOC living quarters, the company's warehouses, and all of the goods, logbooks, and accounting records., 8-11, 19 August 1667, Daghregister van Daniel Six, 18 October 1666 to 6 November 1667, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 80., Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720.*, 173-175.

[457] Itsierobe is the Dutch transliteration of the interpreter's name. To this date, I have not been able to find his accurate, Japanese name.

[458] 18 April 1669., Daghregister van Daniel Six, 25 October 1668 to 14 October 1669, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 82.

Itsierobe added that even if the Dutch did bring their complaint before the high shogunal councilors, they would find "their ears deaf to the Hollanders."[459]

Heizō IV once more intervened on behalf of his Zheng partners against the Dutch in February 1673 after chief factor Martinus Caesar, learned that the VOC *fluyt* ship *Cuylenburgh* had become caught in a storm and wrecked off the coast of Zheng Taiwan. Instead of rescuing the crew of the *Cuylenburgh*, the Zheng proceeded to drown eight of the crew members and then brought 31 of the sailors to land and executed them. Twenty-one crewmembers from the *Cuylenburgh* managed to escape and make their way to Japan.[460] When Caesar visited Edo in February 1673, the company's Japanese interpreters informed the Dutchman that they had been present at a meeting where Heizō IV and the Nagasaki governor discussed how they could sabotage the Dutch in order to favor the Chinese and the Zheng. According to the interpreters, Heizō IV and the Nagasaki governor favored the Chinese and the Zheng as "their presence in the city increased yearly and were their most important customers."[461] When VOC Chief Factor Johannes Camphuys requested that Tokugawa officials intervene to free the crew of the *Cuylenburgh* and restore its cargo to the VOC, the Nagasaki governor replied that the "Koxinga Chinese" were not subjects of the shogun and as such, he could not command them.[462] Moreover, the Nagasaki governor warned that if the shogun attempted to command the Zheng "it would cause embarrassment and might be taken as an affront and cause for the Chinese to declare war [on Japan]."[463] Camphuys' conversation with the Nagasaki governor reveals that Heizō IV's

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[459] 18 April 1669., Daghregister van Daniel Six, 25 October 1668 to 14 October 1669, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 82.
[460] Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720*., 190-191.
[461] 24 February 1673., Daghregister van Martinus Caesar, 13 November 1672 to 29 October 1673, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 86.
[462] 24 February 1673., Daghregister van Martinus Caesar, 13 November 1672 to 29 October 1673, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 86.
[463] 16 October 1672., Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 22 October 1671 to 12 November 1672, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 85.

interests and connections to the Zheng had intersected in a very dangerous way by 1673. The Zheng had proven that they were a threatening and destabilizing presence in East Asia, to the point of engaging in maritime violence against Ryūkyūan ships, who were subjects of the shogun, and even initiating a naval blockade of Japan. The presence of the Zheng in East Asia meant that war inched ever closer to Japan's shores which led Edo to view them and the Suetsugu as an existential threat.

The crucial event that made Heizō IV's Chinese connections dangerous to the Tokugawa regime was the Zheng attack of a Ryūkyūan ship in 1670. During their attack on the Ryūkyūan ship, the Zheng killed most of the crewmembers and confiscated all of its cargo.[464] When the lord of Satsuma, one of the largest domains in Western Japan and conquerors of the Ryūkyū Islands in 1609 heard about the Zheng attack on his subjects, he became enraged. The Shimazu lord of Satsuma demanded that the Tokugawa regime "must take action for the murder of his subjects or he would be forced to do so himself."[465] This threat by the Shimazu lord of Satsuma illustrates the danger which the Zheng and by extension, the Suetsugu presented to both the East Asian world order and the Tokugawa settlement. If the Tokugawa shogunate took action, it risked war between Japan and the Zheng Empire. Alternatively, if the Tokugawa shogunate did nothing, it might have compromised the Tokugawa settlement, especially if one of Japan's largest and most powerful domains took the matter of military retaliation into its own hands. The Shimazu had been one of the major rivals of the Tokugawa house and if Satsuma Domain took matters into its own hands, it could have led to domestic unrest and civil war in Japan.

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[464] I would like to thank Adam Clulow and Xing Hang for generously sharing a draft of their upcoming essay: Adam Clulow and Xing Hang, "Restraining Violence on the Seas: The Tokugawa, the Zheng Maritime Network, and the Dutch East India Company" in *A Global History of Early Modern Violence*., Manchester University Press., 2020. This field-defining study will be the first in-depth look at the 1670 Zheng attack on a Ryūkyūan ship, the Zheng naval blockade, and its wider geopolitical consequences.

[465] Clulow and Hang., 15.

Rather than risk domestic unrest, Tokugawa officials made the momentous decision to retaliate against the Zheng by seizing three of their ships at anchor in Nagasaki in December 1672. Koxinga's son and heir, Zheng Jing (1642-1681), responded in kind by ordering his navy to establish a naval blockade of Japan during the summer of 1673.[466] In the midst of growing tensions between the Tokugawa and the Zheng, Heizō IV attempted to make peace with the VOC by openly admitting to chief factor Martinus Caesar that he had actively sabotaged the company in its negotiations with Tokugawa officials.[467] At the same time that Heizō IV extended an olive branch to the VOC, he also gave a "significant gift" and provisions to Jing's ambassador, Wu Peng, who had traveled to Japan in an effort to diffuse tensions between the Tokugawa and the Zheng.[468] On November 24, 1673, Camphuys received word that the shogun had forgiven the Zheng and expected "a large number of trading junks to arrive from Taiwan in the coming year."[469] During the same week in which the shogun officially forgave the Zheng, Heizō IV and the Nagasaki governors gave permission to the city's shipbuilders to begin construction of a new, large, and powerful war junk for one of Jing's most important allies, the Viceroy of Canton.[470]

Despite the efforts of Heizō IV and the ambassador, Wu, Jing remained indignant and decided to keep his naval blockade of Japan in place. For Heizō IV, Jing's decision to maintain the naval blockade of Japan must have been particularly damaging as it resulted in the loss of international prestige for the Tokugawa shogunate. The shogun had offered his peace and forgiveness and had even given the Zheng permission to build a warship in Japan and all these things, Jing rejected.

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[466] Clulow and Hang., 17-18.
[467] 16 September 1673, Daghregister van Martinus Caesar, 13 November 1672 to 29 October 1673, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 86.
[468] 4 January 1674, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 29 October 1673 to 19 October 1674, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 87.
[469] 24 November 1673, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 29 October 1673 to 19 October 1674, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 87.
[470] 1 December 1673, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 29 October 1673 to 19 October 1674, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 87.

Heizō IV had failed in brokering peace with his Zheng partners and his actions had made a mockery of Tokugawa authority at an international level. From this point forward, the Suetsugu were on borrowed time.

Conclusion

The Zheng blockade of Japan remained in place until early 1674 when Jing allied with Wu Sangui (1612-1678), leader of Yunnan, and the two other feudatory leaders, Geng Jingzhong (1644-1682) of Fujian, and Shang Keixi (1604-1676) of Guangdong in a massive revolt against the Qing. As Jing withdrew his ships to participate in the war against the Qing, he maintained that he had been justified in attacking the Ryūkyūan ship and blockading Japan. Nonetheless, Jing agreed to a truce with the Tokugawa which prompted him to declare that "the subjects of Japan are just like our subjects."[471] As the Revolt of the Three Feudatories (1673-1683) escalated into a regional conflict that threatened to become a world war, Tokugawa officials did not reciprocate Jing's sentiments. Instead, the Tokugawa shogunate took steps to sever ties with the Zheng and the beginning of that process led to the destruction of the Suetsugu.

Tokugawa officials expanded their investigation into the Suetsugu at the beginning of 1676 and directly linked Heizō IV's corruption and financial malfeasance to an increasingly dangerous foreign power: The Zheng Empire. Investigators linked Heizō IV to the Zheng through the Chinese interpreters' office and the Nagasaki treasury. In the records of the Chinese interpreters, the Nagasaki governor discovered "many foul misdeeds and mockeries" that also implicated some of the accountants of the VOC treasury on Dejima.[472] If these accusations were true, they provide a direct link between some of the VOC accountants, Sakuemon, and Heizō IV. At the

[471] Clulow and Hang., "Restraining Violence on the Seas: The Tokugawa, the Zheng Maritime Network, and the Dutch East India Company.," 21.
[472] 23 February 1676., Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89.

request of the Nagasaki governor, the interpreters interviewed VOC employees on Dejima, asking if they knew of any among them who had given Heizō IV money to invest in trade? The VOC employees all answered that they "did not know, but that they believed that it could have been possible."[473] As for the shogunal treasury in Nagasaki, investigators found that the accountant, Yatomi Kurōemon (????-1676), had lent money to two Chinese subjects of Zheng Jing, whom Heizō IV's secretary, Kageyama Kudayu (????-1676) had also employed in the Suetsugu organization.[474]

After their investigation into Heizō IV and the Chinese interpreter's office, Tokugawa officials began the process of destroying the Suetsugu and their network which for some, meant the loss of position and prestige and for others, their lives. On January 12, 1676, VOC Chief Factor Camphuys received word that the former Nagasaki governor, Gonnemondonno who had held his post as recently as 1671 had "fallen into disfavor with the shogun and the high shogunal councilors" who ordered his removal for unspecified reasons.[475] The reasons Gonnemondonno lost his post as one of the governors of Nagasaki likely stemmed from his relationship to the Suetsugu and the Zheng as his removal coincided with the downfall of Heizō IV and his chief lieutenants. By February, Heizō IV's lieutenant, the mayor, Takagi Sakuemon, lost his position to his son. Although Sakuemon had attempted to usurp his former master, his close associations with Heizō IV and the Zheng had doomed his political career.[476] On May 31, 1676, one of the Nagasaki city elders and mayor of Dejima ward, who was a favorite of Heizō IV, mysteriously

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[473] 7 June 1676., Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 29 October 1673 to 19 October 1674, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 87.
[474] Knoest, "The Japanese Connection': Self-Organized Smuggling Networks in Nagasaki Circa 1666–1742.," 115.
[475] " Gonnemondonno" is the Dutch transliteration of a Nagasaki *bugyō* that I have yet to identify the correct Japanese name for. 12 January 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89.
[476] 2 February 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89.

died after Edo ordered him removed from his position on April 23rd.[477] The Tokugawa destruction of the Suetsugu culminated in a public execution on June 7, 1676 when Edo ordered Tokugawa officials in Nagasaki to crucify Heizō IV's secretary, Kageyama, the Chinese interpreter, Shimoda Yasōemon (????-1676), and the shogunal accountant, Yatomi. As the executioners crucified Heizō I's secretary, Kageyama, they cut the head off his 11-year-old son and held it up for his father to see as he died.[478]

The Tokugawa shogunate destroyed the Suetsugu because Heizō IV proved that he was incapable of handling the domestic affairs that the regime entrusted him with in his role as shogunal intendant. Heizō IV's mismanagement of shogunal funds and draconian treatment of Nagasaki's residents pushed the city to rebellion in 1665 and presented the Tokugawa regime with the most serious armed insurrection in Western Japan since the 1637-1638 Shimabara Rebellion. When Heizō IV's drunken retainers vandalized Ise Shrine in 1675, it affirmed for the Tokugawa regime that he could not even control his own organization. Between 1665 and 1675, Heizō IV's Chinese connections grew increasingly dangerous and Suetsugu difficulties directly corresponded to the rise of the Zheng Empire in Southeastern China and Taiwan. Although the Zheng and the Suetsugu were close partners, Heizō IV proved that he was completely incapable of serving as an intermediary with Zheng Jing. The aftermath of a Zheng attack on a Ryūkyūan ship in 1670 put Heizō IV's ineptitude on public display for Tokugawa officials. Heizō IV's inability to broker with the Zheng and end the blockade on favorable terms nearly led to civil war in Japan and resulted in international humiliation for the shogun. By 1675, the rise of the

[477] 24 April 1676, 7 June 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89.
[478] 7 June 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 to 27 October 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89., Taneo Morinaga, Hankachō nagasaki bugyōsho hanketsu kiroku 長崎奉行所判決記録犯科帳, 第1巻(森永種夫, 1958), 28–30,

Zheng Empire as a dangerous and destabilizing power and the opening campaigns of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories made East Asia a much more dangerous place than it had been during the time of Heizō IV's father and grandfather. Heizō IV had proven to the Tokugawa shogunate that he was a domestic liability and an international failure and due to those factors, Edo made the momentous decision to destroy the Suetsugu. If Heizō IV hoped that the return of the *Fukokuju* and its exploration of the Ogasawara Islands would save him, he was mistaken. Tokugawa interest in the Ogasawara Islands perished with the Suetsugu. The only decision that remained was what to do with Heizō IV and his immediate family. However, the arrival of a ship bearing a permit from Heizō IV that proclaimed its Zheng crew to be subjects of the shogun affirmed for the Tokugawa shogunate that the Suetsugu were indeed a dangerous liability they would have to destroy.

Chapter Six: Mysterious Ships, Troublesome Loans, and Rumors of War: The Tokugawa Arrest of Suetsugu Heizō Shigetomo

In the winter of 1675, the Lord of Shimabara, Matsudaira Tadafusa was in charge of security for the port city of Nagasaki. Matsudaira received a tip about a ship belonging to the powerful shogunal intendant Suetsugu Heizo Shigetomo (Heizō IV). There was a rumor that the ship had been trading weapons and armor in Southern China, and had stopped in Taiwan for "repairs" on its way back to Japan.[479] Matsudaira ordered an inspection of the Suetsugu vessel, which found that the "repairs" consisted of holes drilled above the waterline that led to a secret, false bottom in the ship.[480] The investigators also found that the Suetsugu had loaded a cache of swords, armor, and maps underneath the ship's false bottom. Matsudaira then assembled a group of over 100 Fukuoka domain soldiers and ordered them to raid the Suetsugu compound in Nagasaki. Inside the Suetsugu compound, the raiding party not only found a fortune in goods and money, but they also stumbled upon three warehouses brimming with enough swords and short-swords to outfit an entire army.[481] The Tokugawa shogunate quickly ordered an investigation along with the arrest of Heizō IV and his family. After nearly six months of house-arrest, the Tokugawa

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479 Please note that this chapter is also in the December 2018 *Journal of World History*. Timothy Romans, "Mysterious Ships, Troublesome Loans, and Rumors of War: The Tokugawa Arrest of Suetsugu Heizō Shigetomo." *Journal of World History* 29, no. 4 (2018): 507-528. Here, I would like to again extend my thanks in no order of importance to Mark Ravina, Tonio Andrade, Adam Clulow, Xing Hang, Lu Cheng-heng, John Jennings, Cynthia Vialle, Hannah Fes Abrahamson, Kyungtaek Kwon, the anonymous reviewers for the Journal of World History, and the staff at the Tokyo University Shiryō Hensanjo and the National Diet Library for their help with documents, helpful criticism, and feedback. Any errors are of course, my own. Mokei Tanabe, Kankichi Niwa, and Taneo Morinaga, Zoku Nagasaki jitsuroku taisei, 長崎實錄大成. (長崎: 長崎文献社, 1973)., 344-345

480 Tanabe, Niwa, Morinaga, 344-345, Taneo Morinaga, Hankachō nagasaki bugyōsho hanketsu kiroku 長崎奉行所判決記録犯科帳, 第 1 巻 (森永種夫, 1958), 28-30.

481 For a more elaborate description of this inventory, see Hayashi Fukusai, Tsūkō ichiran, 通航一覧, 国書刊行会本, 第 4 (国書刊行会, 1913), 438.

executed the Suetsugu retainers involved in the incident and banished Heizō IV and his family to outlying islands, signaling the end of a chapter in Japanese maritime history.[482]

Why did the Tokugawa shogunate arrest and banish Heizō IV in 1676? From 1618 to 1676, the Tokugawa shogunate supported the Suetsugu family against their commercial and political rivals, even siding with them in disputes against the Portuguese and the Dutch East India Company (VOC). During this fifty-eight-year period, Suetsugu commerce and lending created a network of clientele, or a maritime domain that incorporated China, Korea, India, Taiwan, Japan, Southeast Asia, Portuguese Macau, and even individual Dutch merchants.[483] If the arrest of Heizō IV further complicates the *sakoku* or "closed country" paradigm, what can it explain in terms of state consolidation in Tokugawa Japan in response to international events? If Suetsugu activities did not directly violate the *sakoku* edicts, was Heizō IV's arrest part of a local response by Tokugawa Japan to global events, namely the rise of the Qing Empire in 1644 and the outbreak in China of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories in 1673?[484]

What troubled Tokugawa officials was neither Suetsugu lending or their commercial practices, which largely involved arms trafficking and trade in luxury goods. Instead, Suetsugu connections, particularly their autonomy in establishing a diplomatic and commercial partnership with the Zheng Empire nearly pushed Tokugawa Japan to the brink of war with the Qing Empire in 1676. A war with the Qing Empire would have potentially undermined the Tokugawa

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[482] Hayashi, 437-438, Morinaga, Hankachō nagasaki bugyōsho hanketsu kiroku, 長崎奉行所判決記録犯科帳, 第 1 巻, 28-30., Johannes Camphuys, the VOC Chief Factor in Japan from 1675-1676 also recorded the downfall of the Suetsugu family and noted important events such as the investigation, the details of Heizō IV's activities, and the punishment of Heizō IV, his family, and retainers, see the *Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys*, 7 November 1675 tot 27 Oktober 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89, F106-111.

[483] Oka “A Great Merchant in 17th Century Nagasaki: Suetsugu Heizo and the System of Respondencia,”.

[484] This body of edicts constituted a series of memoranda from 1633 to 1639 that the Tokugawa shogunate sent to the Nagasaki *bugyō*, or governor, to expel the Spanish and Portuguese and to eliminate Christianity from Japan. See Mark Ravina's important treatise which relooks the context of the *sakoku* edicts and Tokugawa diplomacy in Ravina, “Tokugawa, Romanov, and Khmer: The Politics of Diplomacy in Eighteenth Century East Asia.” 268-269.

settlement which was still in the process of consolidation at the end of the seventeenth century.[485] Rumors of a Tokugawa alliance with Chosŏn Korea, the Zheng Empire, and the three feudatories of Yunnan, Guangdong, and Fujian nearly caused the outbreak of a wider, East Asian war. The prevention of a major war between the Qing Empire and a Tokugawa-led alliance in 1676 further reveals that multipolar East Asian order was emerging by the end of the seventeenth century, an international framework consisting of the Qing Empire, Tokugawa Japan, and Yi Dynasty Korea.[486] Zheng actions on the eve of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories cultivated the perception that they were a dangerous and destabilizing element in this emerging international framework. Instead of isolating Japan from the world or risking war with the Qing, the Tokugawa chose to arrest Heizō IV and banish the Suetsugu family, the partners of the Zheng, as a means of eliminating a dangerous liability. I argue that the Tokugawa regime arrested Heizō IV to sever ties with the Zheng Empire as an act of non-*sakoku* isolation which stemmed from their desire to avoid a larger East Asian war.[487] In this context, Heizō IV's arrest emerges not as an act

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[485] Robert Hellyer's recent study helps us to further understand the process of state consolidation between Japan's local lords and the Tokugawa central government within the context of globalization. In doing so, Hellyer's work provides a solid foundation for pushing Tokugawa Japan's development as a "compound state" to the end of the seventeenth century and as a phenomena that took place in response to international events, see Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640 - 1868*., Ravina "State-Building and Political Economy in Early-Modern Japan.," Totman. *Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1600-1843.* Berry, Mary Elizabeth. "Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan.," Luke S. Roberts, *Performing the Great Peace*.

[486] Again, my reference to an international framework of institutional rules and norms in East Asia builds on the debate between David Kang, Hendrik Spruyt, Joshua Van Lieu, and Saeyoung Park. See Arano Yasunori. "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order.," 206-208. Mizuno "China in Tokugawa Foreign Relations: The Tokugawa Bakufu's Perception of and Attitudes toward Ming-Qing China.," 111, 140-144. Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations*. Wills, "Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas about Mid-Ch'ing Foreign Relations," 84-90., Spruyt, "Collective Imaginations and International Order: The Contemporary Context of the Chinese Tributary System." Van Lieu "The Tributary System and the Persistence of Late Victorian Knowledge.," Van Lieu., "Divergent Visions of Serving the Great: The Emergence of Chosŏn-Qing Tributary Relations as a Politics of Representation.," Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793*. Kang, *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute*., 10, 71., Park, "Long Live the Tributary System! The Future of Studying East Asian Foreign Relations.," Spruyt, "Collective Imaginations and International Order: The Contemporary Context of the Chinese Tributary System.," Kang "Response: Theory and Empirics in the Study of Historical East Asian International Relations."

[487] I wish to thank Mark Ravina for helping me conceptualize the term "non-sakoku" isolation.

of simple law enforcement, but as an act of Tokugawa state consolidation within an emerging multipolar international framework that eliminated local, independent actors who had become a dangerous liability.

For most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Japanese and western historians argued that the *sakoku* edicts effectively isolated Tokugawa Japan from the rest of the world. In spite of the widespread scholarly refutation of the *sakoku* paradigm, the myth of Japan's isolation during the Tokugawa period persists in some academic circles and in popular culture. Beginning in the late twentieth century, Arano Yasunori and Ronald Toby argued that the *sakoku* edicts did not lead to an isolated Tokugawa Japan. Instead, Arano and Toby assert that the idea of a "closed country" emerged as a reaction to western imperialism in the early nineteenth century.[488] In his work *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern* Japan, Toby contends that "Japan remained integrated into the East Asian region to a significant degree throughout the Tokugawa period..."[489] As Toby argues, not only did Tokugawa Japan remain connected to East Asia, it built a parallel tributary framework in which it viewed itself as "second to none" and as a "peer of China."[490] Arano likewise mentions that instead of seeking isolation, the Tokugawa "attempted to establish a new international order that would place Japan at the helm, and neighboring countries in subordinate positions."[491] As Arano and Toby argue, Tokugawa Japan reconfigured its commercial and diplomatic relations with their East Asian neighbors to perpetuate the sovereignty and legitimacy of their own external tributary framework.

Michael Laver and Robert Hellyer argue that the *sakoku* edicts represented a Tokugawa desire to assert more direct and nuanced control over foreign policy and commerce. In *The Sakoku*

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[488] Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa Bakufu*.
[489] Toby, 22.
[490] Toby, 235.
[491] Arano, “The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order,”.190-191.

Edicts and the Politics of Tokugawa Hegemony, Laver contends that *sakoku* was not as a "monolithic piece of legislation that irrevocably cut off Japan from the outside world but rather a series of edicts in response to specific historical stimuli."[492] In Laver's estimation, the *sakoku* edicts were part of a larger process of Tokugawa consolidation that took place over the course of the seventeenth century. As opposed to constituting a policy of isolation, *sakoku* was an expression of Tokugawa power and sovereignty in their desire to control all foreign trade in order to curb the power of their rivals, the powerful lords on Japan's southernmost island of Kyūshū.[493] In *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640-1868,* Hellyer likewise does not view *sakoku* as an "overriding ideology of seclusion," arguing instead that Tokugawa Japan "consistently made pragmatic decisions, especially concerning foreign trade, in accordance with global commercial contexts."[494] In Hellyer's view, global contexts informed Tokugawa Japan's regional politics, empowering the domains of Satsuma and Tsushima to develop their own systems of engagement with the outside world.

Three recent works have emerged that specifically examine the circumstances of Heizō IV's arrest: Noell Wilson's *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*, Jurre Knoest's essay "'The Japanese Connection': Self-Organized Smuggling Networks in Nagasaki circa 1666-1742," and Xing Hang's "The Shogun's Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth Century Maritime East Asia." Similar to Laver and Hellyer, Wilson asserts that Tokugawa maritime defense emerged from the *sakoku* process as a "rational strategy to construct a Japan-centered regional diplomatic and economic order."[495] Wilson argues that the Tokugawa arrest of Heizō IV was part of the *sakoku*

[492] Laver, *The Sakoku Edicts and the Politics of Tokugawa Hegemony*, 13.
[493] Laver, 115.
[494] Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640 - 1868*, 8.
[495] Wilson, *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*, 11.

process and the shogunate's desire to create a "monopoly on violence" through "state formation" and maritime defense.[496] In creating a system of maritime defense, Wilson shows that the Tokugawa eliminated smugglers with Chinese connections, such as Heizō IV, in order to exert central authority over Japan's maritime defense system.[497]

Knoest argues that the arrest of Heizō IV was a more straightforward matter of law enforcement. According to Knoest, the Tokugawa regime discovered Suetsugu smuggling and then acted within the law to investigate, prosecute, and banish Heizō IV and his family as criminals.[498] However, Xing Hang offers a more persuasive view of Heizō IV's arrest within the dimensions of global history. According to Hang, the Tokugawa increasingly viewed the partnership between the Suetsugu and the Zheng as problematic, and even dangerous. Hang surmises that the Suetsugu fell victim to *sakoku* in the sense that it was an evolving "process" that shored up Tokugawa "domestic political and ideological legitimacy rather than enforcing a xenophobic world view."[499] In Hang's view, the Revolt of the Three Feudatories (1674-1683) was responsible for the end of the Suetsugu and he argues that the shogunate arrested Heizō IV in order to sever ties with the Zheng family, whom they determined to be on the losing side.[500] Hang asserts that the Tokugawa took a "proactive stance" regarding their commercial and diplomatic relations with the outside world, in this case, China.[501] In arresting Heizō IV, the

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[496] Wilson, 7.
[497] Wilson, 56–58, 62-64. In referring to the dynamics between Tokugawa central authority and local autonomy, I utilize Phillip Brown's concept in Brown, *Central Authority and Local Autonomy in the Formation of Early Modern Japan: The Case of Kaga Domain*., 1-30.
[498] Knoest, "The Japanese Connection". Self-Organized Smuggling Networks in Nagasaki Circa 1666-1742.," 114-120.
[499] Hang, "The Shogun's Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth-Century Maritime East Asia.," 120.
[500] Hang, 129.
[501] Hang, 112.

Tokugawa very likely anticipated that the Qing would defeat the Zheng and the Three Feudatory rebels.

Although both Laver and Hellyer agree the *sakoku* edicts did not isolate Tokugawa Japan, they differ in how they view the paradigm of central authority versus local autonomy within a larger, global context. Laver argues that the process of *sakoku* led to increased Tokugawa centralization while Hellyer maintains that it resulted in a more pragmatic, open-ended regime that allowed for regional participation in foreign diplomacy and commerce. How can we reconcile the differing views of Laver and Heller regarding central authority and local autonomy in Tokugawa Japan within the concepts of *sakoku* and global history? To answer this question, we can turn to two largely underutilized sources which are vital in understanding the historical significance of Heizō IV's arrest and banishment: *The Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty* and the 1675-1676 *dagregister* or "diary" of the VOC Chief Factor, Johannes Camphuys. In reconstructing the circumstances of Heizō IV's arrest, historians have largely turned to five major Japanese sources: *The Veritable Records of Nagasaki, The Criminal Records of Nagasaki, The Collection of Nagasaki Historical Documents, The Summary of Foreign Relations,* and the *Kuroda Family Papers.*[502] Triangulating Japanese documents with Dutch and Korean sources transforms Heizō IV's story into a global history narrative, revealing that central authority and local autonomy do not necessarily have to contradict one another. Within a global context, Heizō IV simultaneously emerges as a local historical actor, an agent of the Tokugawa central

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[502] Mokei Tanabe, Kankichi Niwa, and Taneo Morinaga, *Nagasaki Jitsuroku Taisei. Seihen*, 長崎實錄大成. (長崎: 長崎文献社, 1973.), *Nagasaki Bunken Sōsho,* 長崎文献叢書. (長崎: 長崎文献社, 1973)., Kawazoe, Shōji and Fukuoka Komonjo wo Yomu Kai Shintei Kuroda Kafu Sakuin, Kafu Nenpyō, 川添昭二 and 福岡古文書を読む会, 新訂黒田家譜索引・家譜年表 (東京: 文献出版, 1987), and Taneo Morinaga, Hankachō nagasaki bugyōsho hanketsu kiroku, 長崎奉行所判決記録犯科帳, 第 1 巻., and see Hayashi Fukusai, Tsūkō ichiran, 通航一覧, 国書刊行会本, 第 4 (国書刊行会, 1913).

government, and an international figure. Heizō IV and his arrest bridges the gap between central authority and local autonomy, revealing the "tensions and balances" that were inherent within the Tokugawa regime.[503] Heizō IV's arrest was an instance of cooperation and consensus between the coalition of the lords of Western Japan and the Tokugawa regime who had jointly sponsored the Suetsugu family.

From an international perspective, Heizō IV's arrest highlights the balance between central authority and local autonomy in response to global events. Wilson views Heizō IV's arrest, and consequently, the topic of maritime defense, in terms of the "broader political culture of the Tokugawa period."[504] Although domestic politics are important, they are only part of the story as Heizō IV's arrest was an event of global consequence. As Hang argues, the realization on the part of the Tokugawa that war and rebellion would not oust the mighty Qing led them to take steps to safeguard the sovereignty and legitimacy of their own tributary framework.

Taking Hang's analysis further, Heizō IV's arrest can illustrate non-*sakoku* isolation, a process in which Japan selectively reconfigured diplomatic and economic relations in response to international events. Such a view can provide an opportunity for moving the scholarly conversation beyond the limiting conceptions of a Sinocentric or Japanocentric world order towards the global history concept of a multipolar East Asian international framework. The Tokugawa and Qing destruction of the Suetsugu and the Zheng demonstrates that the East Asian states reconstituted an international framework of institutional rules and norms. The institutional rules and norms that the East Asian states embraced at the close of the seventeenth century echoed international agreements and the political expediency of the past. These rules and norms emphasized peaceful interactions, a series of legitimizing vassal-ruler relationships, domestic

[503] Ravina, *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*., 13-15.
[504] Wilson, *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*., 3.

tranquility, and most of all, the elimination of liminal peoples such as pirates, warlords, and their kingdoms.

The Warlord and the Silver Lord: The Suetsugu-Zheng Partnership

The partnership between the Suetsugu and Zheng families stretched back four generations to the meeting of Zheng Zhilong and Suetsugu Heizō Masanao (Heizō I) in Nagasaki in 1621. Although they came from different backgrounds, both men shared a ruthless, predatory disposition, and a mutual disdain for the VOC. Zhilong in his youth was apparently brash and rebellious. As a teenager, he ran away from his home in Quanzhou prefecture for a life of piracy. However, Zhilong also had a charismatic personality that easily won him many friends, among them, Tokugawa Ieyasu, the first Tokugawa shogun.[505] Not unlike Zhilong, Heizō I was also charismatic, calculating, and ruthless. Born the son of a wealthy Hakata merchant, Heizō I had become the shogunal intendent of Nagasaki through murder, intrigue, and sponsorship by a coalition of the Western lords of Japan.[506] In 1617, Heizō I accused Murayama Tōan, who was then the shogunal intendant of Nagasaki, of murdering the family of a woman who had scorned his affections and harboring fugitive Jesuit priests. The Tokugawa shogunate summarily executed Murayama and named Heizō the new shogunal intendant of Nagasaki.[507] Much of Heizō I's rise was itself due to the collaboration between the Tokugawa regime and a coalition of

[505] Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c.1620-1720*., 42–45.

[506] By a coalition of the Western lords of Japan, I refer to the Hosokawa of Kumamoto, the Kuroda of Fukuoka, the Nabeshima of Saga, the Shimazu of Satsuma, and the Mōri of Chōshū. An important and underappreciated article by Takeno Yoko highlights Suetsugu connections with a network of the lords of Western Japan, see Takeno Yoko, *Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō,* "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵". 福岡大學商學論叢 / 商学論叢編集委員会 編. 1976, 20 (3): 271-291., 171.

[507] Hesselink, *The Dream of Christian Nagasaki: World Trade and the Clash of Cultures 1560-1640*., 184–185. Oka, "A Great Merchant in 17th Century Nagasaki: Suetsugu Heizo and the System of Respondencia.," 38. Boxer, *The Christian Century in Japan, 1549-1650*., 273.

the Western lords of Japan as a local reaction against the wave of globalization that began in the sixteenth century.[508]

The Suetsugu and Zheng families forged a lasting friendship as Heizō I and the Nagasaki officials "really loved" Zhilong.[509] As a result, the marriage between Zheng and Suetsugu commercial interests would endure and shape the East Asian maritime world until the arrest of Heizō I's grandson, Heizō IV in 1676. In the interim, Zhilong rapidly made the Zheng one of East Asia's most prominent and powerful maritime families. Zhilong sailed with the Chinese pirate Li Dan and after earning a reputation for "bravery and audaciousness," succeeded him in 1625.[510] By the 1640s, the Zheng network had incorporated most of the pirates and smugglers in China and the waters surrounding the southern Chinese coast and Taiwan.[511] Zhilong also became an official in the Ming court as a military commander in Fujian and would possess a fortune "at tens of millions of taels" that "rivaled entire nations."[512] By comparison, the Suetsugu would build a smaller maritime domain, but nonetheless one consisted of an extensive geographic, commercial, and political network.

As Hang observes, the developing alliance between the Zheng Empire, Tokugawa Japan, and the Suetsugu family "was neither entirely foreign nor domestic but had the qualities of both."[513] Like Hang, I conjecture that a partnership between the Suetsugu and Zheng families existed

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[508] For arguments treating globalization as a process, see Flynn and Giraldez, "Born Again: Globalization's Sixteenth Century Origins.," 13. 359 - 387., 360. Jennings, *Globalizations and the Ancient World*, Osterhammel, "Globalizations," in *The Oxford Handbook of World History*, Ravina, *To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japan's Meiji Restoration in World History*., 26.

[509] Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia*, 45.

[510] Hang, 46.

[511] Hang, 64.

[512] Hang, 61., Hang, "The Shogun's Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth-Century Maritime East Asia," 117. A *tael* of fine silver was a unit of currency, equal to 1.4 Spanish *real*. A *real* is equivalent to $200 in contemporary USD, a *tael* was worth about 50 percent more than that. See Andrade, *How Taiwan Became Chinese: Dutch, Spanish, and Han Colonization in the Seventeenth Century*., 291-292

[513] Hang, "The Shogun's Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth-Century Maritime East Asia," 117-120.

which overlapped in three major areas: The Suetsugu lending of silver for Chinese silks, the convergence of Suetsugu-Zheng interests in Taiwan, and Japanese arms trafficking to Zheng forces and their allies. Due to the Suetsugu-Zheng partnership, the two families commanded enough wealth, military manpower, and naval power to establish their own political regime and in some respects, they eventually succeeded in that task with Taiwan by establishing the Kingdom of Tungning in Taiwan in 1662.[514] However, Suetsugu wealth and Zheng military might were not enough to ensure the long-term survival of an independent and warlike Taiwanese state in a multipolar East Asian international framework of consolidating states.

Pooling capital and lending silver formed the core of the Suetsugu-Zheng alliance. Although the 1638 *sakoku* edict prohibited the Japanese from lending silver to the Portuguese, the law did not make loans to Chinese merchants such as the Zheng illegal.[515] In prohibiting Japanese lending to the Portuguese, Tokugawa policy in the form of the 1638 edict likely eliminated Suetsugu competitors and pushed Nagasaki merchants and the lords of Western Japan towards increasing commercial contact with Chinese merchants. As trade with Chinese merchants such as the Zheng increased, so too did the demand for Suetsugu silver.

According to Oka Mihoko and Francois Gipouloux, pooling capital and lending silver financed the trade between Japanese merchants in Nagasaki and Chinese merchants as it mitigated expenses and helped to manage risk.[516] In the East Asian maritime world, merchants traveled vast distances over dangerous waters that teemed with storms and pirates. Ships sank or were lost to pirates with frightening regularity, leading to the popular Tokugawa maritime

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[514] Andrade, *Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West*., 154, 297., Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia*, 146-147.
[515] Oka Mihoko and François Gipouloux, "Pooling Capital and Spreading Risk: Maritime Investment in East Asia at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century," *Itinerario* 37, no. 3 (December 1, 2013): 81.
[516] Oka and Gipouloux, 78-79.

expression of "only the width of a ship's plank stood between a sailor and hell below."[517] Pooling capital and high-interest rates on loans of silver, the necessary medium of exchange in the Chinese trade, helped to manage maritime risk by guaranteeing returns on investment, and partially offset potential losses. In other words, Suetsugu lending became the lifeblood of their alliance with the Zheng and served to connect Japan to Southeastern China and the port cities of Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong. At its height, the Suetsugu-Zheng network even connected Japan to the distant Southeast Asian ports of "Ayutthaya, Patani, Banten, Sulu, Palembang, Brunei, Luzon, Hoi Anh, [and] Ryūkyū," further proving that Tokugawa isolation was a myth.[518] Furthermore, the Suetsugu network was not only limited to Nagasaki as it incorporated most of the western domains of Japan and urban centers such as Hakata, Osaka, Kyoto, and Edo.

As international figures, the Suetsugu also helped to preserve the balance between central authority in Edo and the local autonomy of its constituent local lords. Suetsugu lending and their connections to the Zheng family offered the Japanese, from wealthy Hakata merchants to the powerful western lords, a chance to participate in the trade for Chinese silks and luxury goods.[519] Central to the Suetsugu capability to act as intermediaries between regional interests, the Tokugawa regime in Edo, and the outside world was the large amount of capital in their possession. In June of 1676, as the Tokugawa banished the Suetsugu to outlying islands,

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[517] "*Itago Ichimai Shita wa Jigoku"* "板子一枚下は地**獄**" or "only the width of a ship's plank stood between a sailor and hell below." Iwao Seiichi 謙治石井, "*Sakoku jidai no yōsen fune kenzō kanbun no tōsen no tenmei no sangoku maru* “鎖国時代の航洋船建造寛文の唐船と天明の三国丸,” in 日本の海洋民 (未来社, Tōkyō Miraisha, 1974), 238., 195

[518] Oka and Gipouloux, “Pooling Capital and Spreading Risk: Maritime Investment in East Asia at the Beginning of the Seventeenth Century,” 82.

519 Chief among the patrons of the Suetsugu were the Hosokawa family of Kumamoto domain, the Nabeshima family of Saga domain, the Mori family of Chōshū domain, the Shimazu family of Satsuma domain, and the Kuroda family of Fukuoka domain. See Takeno Yoko, *Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō*, "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵,"171.

Johannes Camphuys, the VOC Chief Factor in Nagasaki, mentioned Heizō IV had 10 and a half tons of gold, 300,000 *taels,* and an additional 100,000 *taels* that "he alone had lent to various people throughout Nagasaki."[520] The inventory of Heizō IV's possessions after his arrest in 1676 in the Tokugawa *Survey of Foreign Relations* states that he had had more than 10,000 *kanme* worth of silver coins that he had "borrowed from various people."[521]

VOC and Japanese sources clearly indicate that the immense wealth that the Nagasaki branch of the Suetsugu possessed in 1676 and this does not account for the assets of the main family in Hakata who survived Heizō IV's arrest.[522] In today's market, an ounce of gold is worth $1,000 U.S. Dollars per ounce, meaning that the Suetsugu possessed a fortune of gold and silver that totaled $353,648,279 in contemporary U.S. Dollars. The picture that emerges is that a significant portion of Suetsugu wealth stemmed from positioning themselves within a network of domestic and international capital of investment and predatory lending, a strategy that made them the "silver lords" of Nagasaki.[523]

A brief glance at Suetsugu lending practices, particularly three loans from 1620, 1638 and 1652 illustrates the international and domestic financial network that converged on the Suetsugu. These loans of silver by the main family in Hakata and the Heizō dynasty in Nagasaki reveal a management portfolio of calculated risk and potential returns which varied by client and circumstance. In 1620, Suetsugu Hikobei from the main Suetsugu family in Hakata provided a loan of 1.5 *kanme* in silver coins to Zheng Xinkuan with an interest rate of around 33 percent.

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520 6 June 1676, Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 tot 27 Oktober 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89, F111.

521 Hayashi Fukusai, Tsūkō ichiran, 通航一覧, 国書刊行会本, 第 4 (国書刊行会, 1913), 438. A Kanme (貫目) was a Japanese unit of weight equal to 3.75 kilograms. Suetsugu Heizo IV would have had 37,500 kilograms or 82,673.348 pounds of silver at the time of his arrest. Today's USD equivalent would be $17,648,279.60.

522 Kawashima Motojirō, Tokugawa shoki no kaigai bōekika, 徳川初期の海外貿易家 (朝日新聞, 1916), 172.

523 Takeno Yoko, *Hansei Shiryō ni mieru Suetsugu Heizō* , "藩政史料にみえる末次平蔵," 173-174.

The purpose of the loan to Xinkuan and his partner, Nishi Luis, was to transport this shipment of coins from Nagasaki to the Philippines.[524] A 1638 loan that the Suetsugu provided to the Portuguese at Macau of 4,000 silver bars required a 25 percent interest rate. In this particular loan, the Suetsugu also attached a provision that they would increase the interest rate by 10 percent if the ships did not undertake the voyage to China specified in the contract.[525] A 1652 promissory note reveals that the Mōri family of Chōshū, the lords of one of Japan's largest domains, borrowed 250 *kanme* of silver from the Suetsugu at the comparatively low interest rate of 10 percent.[526]

In comparison to Xinkuan and the Portuguese at Macau, Lord Mōri received the more forgiving interest rate at ten percent. This loan to the Mōri constituted a moderate amount of funds and what was likely a lower amount of risk for a mediocre return. However, the loans to Xinkuan and the Portuguese at Macau promised high returns, but at a much higher risk. Consider the loan to Xinkuan which bears the date of 1620, the year before Heizō I and Zhilong established their partnership, and a time of increased VOC maritime predation. Xinkuan's 1620 journey would have coincided with one of the Anglo-Dutch joint blockades of the Spanish Philippines, thus the increased risk of losing ships and cargo to piracy. In fact, Li Dan, whose network Xinkuan likely belonged to as a member of the Zheng family, would lose three junks and their cargoes of Chinese silks to the Anglo-Dutch blockade of the Philippines in 1622.[527] As for the 1638 loan to the Portuguese in Macau, the hazards involved the danger of default more

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[524] Suetsugu Monjo 末次文書 (TDSH, 3071.91-65), ff. 14., Nishi Luis or by his Christian name, Luis Melo had a remarkable career as a merchant and intermediary between Tokugawa Japan and the Spanish Philippines. He was also quite the accomplished blockade runner against Dutch and English ships, see Reinier H. Hesselink "A Metal Dealer and Spy from Nagasaki in Manila in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century." 489-510., in Leonard, Jane Kate Leonard, and Theobald Ulrich. 2015. Money in Asia (1200-1900). Leiden: Brill.

[525] Suetsugu Monjo 末次文書 (TDSH, 3071.91-65), ff.21.

526 Ōta Hōsuke, ed. Mōri jūichidai shi, 毛利十一代史, 首巻、第 1 冊 (大田報助, 1910)., part 3, 39-40.

[527] Weichung Cheng, *War, Trade and Piracy in the China Seas* (Leiden ; Boston: Brill, 2013)., 31-32.

than the risk of VOC piracy at this time. In fact, it is highly likely that the Suetsugu never received repayment with the Tokugawa restriction on loans to the Portuguese in 1638 and the subsequent expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan in 1639.

As Chinese networks replaced those of the Portuguese, Suetsugu economic connections with the Zheng Empire deepened, particularly under the leadership of Heizō IV. Two documents from 1668 and 1669 in the *Diaries of the Office of the Chinese Interpreters* can attest to the deepening economic ties between the two families. In 1668, the Suetsugu, in partnership with a member of the Masayasu banner family, arranged for the transportation of a total of 5,560 *ryō* of gold coins, or the equivalent of $6,015,475 in contemporary U.S. Dollars. The arrangement called for transporting the gold in increments aboard seven different "Chinese ships."[528] In 1669, a "Taizhou ship" anchored in Tsushima, the domain of the Sō family, with its cargo of polished rice, soybeans, linens, and vegetables. The record of this transaction reveals Suetsugu Shichirōhei as one of the chief investors for a total amount of 880 *kanme* in silver, the rough equivalent of $744,012 contemporary U.S. Dollars.[529] In each of these documents, the *Diaries of the Office of the Chinese Interpreters* lists these ships as Chinese or from Taizhou and in all likelihood, they belonged to the Zheng. The arrival of these ships coincided with the harsh Qing maritime bans from 1661 to 1684.[530] Additionally, Zheng control of East Asian sea lanes and increasing acts of maritime predation would make their ships the safest option for such large financial transactions. Furthermore, these documents highlight Suetsugu connections with

528 *Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, [3] [1] Tō tsūji kaisho nichiroku, (唐通事会所日録 1) (東京大学出版会, 1984), 60.

529 *Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, [3] [1] Tō tsūji kaisho nichiroku, (唐通事会所日録 1) (東京大学出版会, 1984), 127.

530 For an excellent discussion of maritime prohibitions during the wars of the Ming-Qing transition, see Dahpon David Ho, "Sealords Live in Vain: Fujian and the Making of a Maritime Frontier in Seventeenth-Century China.," 2011 [La Jolla]: University of California, San Diego.

Chinese networks and the Zheng under the full knowledge and complicity of Tokugawa officials, institutions, retainers, and local lords. Such evidence further complicates the circumstances of Heizō IV's arrest as a simple matter of law enforcement in the context of the *sakoku* edicts.

However, the most striking piece of evidence for Suetsugu connections to the Zheng lies in the circumstances of Heizō IV's arrest in 1676. According to the *Criminal Records of Nagasaki* and the Diary of Johannes Camphuys, Heizō IV and his retainers had provided the Chinese operating his ship, who also claimed to be subjects of Zheng Jing, with a loan of silver and a trading pass. As the issuing authority for the trading pass, Heizō IV specified that these subjects of Zheng Jing were also the subjects (*onderdanen*) of the Japanese shogun.[531] The Chinese under Suetsugu sponsorship also later informed Tokugawa officials that the year prior, a storm had shipwrecked them on Taiwan, and that their display of the pass with Heizō IV's signature led to Zheng Jing to render "all help and assistance" available in addition to providing them with a "new ship."[532]

The above episode of Jing's assistance to those carrying Heizō IV's pass combined with the circumstances that simultaneously made these Chinese mariners both subjects of the shogun and the Zheng Empire validates the partnership that existed between these two maritime dynasties. It also highlights what made the Suetsugu a dangerous liability, namely Heizō IV's autonomy to transform members of the Zheng Empire into subjects of the shogun. The Tokugawa had disbanded the vermilion seal trading system in 1635, largely out of concern for how it connected

531 Although no known copies of the pass in question currently exists, the best description comes from Johannes Camphuys' diary, see Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 tot 27 Oktober 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89, F106-109, 112., Taneo Morinaga, Hankachō nagasaki bugyōsho hanketsu kiroku, 長崎奉行所判決記録犯科帳, 第 1 巻, 28-30.

532 Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 tot 27 Oktober 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89, F108-109. Jurre Knoest also provides a detailed accounting of these events as well, see Knoest, "The Japanese Connection". Self-Organized Smuggling Networks in Nagasaki Circa 1666-1742," 114-120.

their regime to pirates and mercenaries who fomented instability throughout the East and Southeast Asian maritime world.[533] In effect, Heizō IV's freelance actions once again hazarded establishing Tokugawa Japan as sponsors of piracy and as formal allies of the Zheng who were engaged in a total war with the Qing Empire by 1676. Despite Zheng attempts to legitimize their regime within an emerging East Asian international framework, they represented an existential threat to the Qing empire. For the Tokugawa and the lords of Western Japan, the Zheng regime increasingly fostered the perception of themselves as unstable partners and at worst, a dangerous liability.

After Koxinga's conquest of Taiwan from the VOC in 1662, his successor, Jing, set about the task of consolidating the newly won Zheng Empire.[534] Part of Jing's attempts at consolidation not only involved "recentering the Ming on Taiwan as the foundation for a maritime Chinese empire," but also transforming the Zheng regime into a political entity that the states within the emerging East Asian international framework could theoretically recognize.[535] Beginning in 1667, Jing attempted to obtain formal Qing recognition of his regime on Taiwan through a series of negotiations. At first, Jing petitioned for the Qing to recognize his kingdom as a peer of their empire. When the Qing refused to recognize Zheng Taiwan as peer, Jing instead proposed that Taiwan could exist within the Chinese tributary framework as an independent kingdom, similar to Korea. Having failed in his desire to "acquire legitimacy from the most powerful empire in East Asia," Jing terminated negotiations with the Qing in 1669.[536]

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[533] Adam Clulow provides an excellent overview of Tokugawa concerns and the potential liabilities of the Vermilion Seal trading system, see Clulow, *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 144-147.
[534] For a riveting account of Koxinga's capture of Taiwan from the VOC, see Andrade, *Lost Colony: The Untold Story of China's First Great Victory over the West*.
[535] Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia*, 144–45.
[536] Hang, 181–88.

By contrast, Zheng efforts for recognition from Tokugawa Japan had initially been more successful. Beginning in 1651, the fourth shogun, Tokugawa Ietsuna, agreed to a relationship, albeit an ambiguous one, with Koxinga and the Zheng family. Hang argues that the Tokugawa likely viewed the Zheng as "internal vassals charged with supervision over a stateless community."[537] In agreeing to an ambiguous, yet formal relationship with the Zheng, the Tokugawa wished to exercise caution and nuance in their diplomacy. Beginning in the 1660s, Tokugawa support for a relationship with the Zheng began to wane as the shogunate increasingly feared involvement in a wider war in East Asia. By the 1670s, the western lords of Japan likewise withdrew their support from the Zheng and became less sanguine about supporting a Suetsugu-Zheng network that connected them to an increasingly unpredictable and dangerous Zheng Empire.[538]

At the same time, Zheng activities increasingly created the perception in Japan that they were at best unstable and at worst, dangerous partners. In 1659, Koxinga sailed a large portion of his fleet into Nagasaki harbor after his unsuccessful siege of Nanjing. The Zheng fleet consisted of 51 large ships and 12 to 13 small ships and its presence prevented the Dutch from beginning their trade for raw silk thread that year.[539] Such a large and disruptive show of force involving Zheng ships likely caused no small degree of alarm for both the Tokugawa regime and the lords of Western Japan. However, the main crisis in Tokugawa-Zheng relations revolved around the latter's 1670 attack on a Ryūkyūan ship. Nearly two years passed before the Shimazu lords of Satsuma, who had subjugated Ryūkyū in 1609, and the Tokugawa regime received word of the

[537] Hang, “The Shogun’s Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth-Century Maritime East Asia,” 120.
[538] Hang, 125.
[539] Yamawaki Teijirō, *Nagasaki no Tōjin bōeki,* 長崎の唐人貿易, 日本歴史叢書 ; 6 (吉川弘文館, 1964), 32-33.

Zheng attack on a vessel belonging to their subjects.[540] Tokugawa officials responded to news of the attack by seizing Zheng ships and assets in Nagasaki and in retaliation, Jing established a naval blockade around Japan in 1672.[541]

For the Tokugawa regime and the lords of Western Japan, the Zheng attack on the Ryūkyūan ship and subsequent naval blockade firmly established that they were at minimum, a destabilizing presence in the East Asian maritime world and at worst, dangerous allies who could potentially draw them into an unwinnable war with the Qing Empire. In 1673, the outbreak of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories threatened Tokugawa Japan with precisely that scenario: A war with the Qing Empire coupled with a potential Manchu invasion of the Japanese home islands. Rather than risk a wider war with the Qing, the Tokugawa regime and the lords of Western Japan severed their ties with the Zheng Empire, beginning with the Suetsugu family.

The Revolt of the Three Feudatories (1673-1683) and the End of the Suetsugu Maritime Dynasty

In August 1673, the three feudatories of Yunnan, Guangdong, and Fujian rose up in rebellion against the Qing Empire. Although the Qing had presented the feudatories as a reward to three generals who had assisted them against the Ming, the fourth Qing Emperor, Kangxi, took steps to drastically reduce their privileges. Not only did the Kangxi Emperor reduce the generals' privileges, he abolished all three feudatories, depriving them of their livelihoods, and their heirs from inheritance. Two of the generals, Wu Sangui and Shang Kexi, along with the son of the deceased third general, Geng Jingzhong, resurrected the Ming cause and invited the Zheng to join their rebellion against the Qing.[542] In April 1674, Jing joined the rebellion and embraced the

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[540] Gregory Smits references this incident in Gregory Smits, *Visions of Ryukyu: Identity and Ideology in Early-Modern Thought and Politics* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 22

[541] See Clulow and Hang, "Restraining Violence on the Seas: The Tokugawa, the Zheng Maritime Network, and the Dutch East India Company."

[542] Kai-Fu Tsao, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories Against the Manchu Throne in China,

cause of Ming restoration, proclaiming that the "Middle Kingdom views barbarians just as the cap views from high the rags of shoes…"[543] With his rhetoric, perhaps Jing genuinely embraced the Ming cause or, he hoped that his fervor against the Manchu would inspire military aid from potential allies, such as Japan.

The Tokugawa shogunate likewise regarded the Manchu as barbarians and the rise of the Qing Empire was a frightening reminder of the Mongol attempts to invade Japan in the thirteenth century. As Toby observes, "In Japanese eyes, there was little to distinguish the Manchus from the Mongols…" and the Tokugawa mobilized and prepared for a possible war against the Qing in the 1640s.[544] In fact, the Tokugawa regime had dispatched an expeditionary army in 1659 to assist Koxinga's attack on Nanjing. Foul weather had forced the Japanese invasion fleet to return to Nagasaki.[545] Jing knew that in the past, his father and grandfather had received military aid from the Tokugawa regime, the lords of Western Japan, and from their long-standing partners, the Suetsugu. From the 1640's until Heizō IV's arrest in 1676, the Japanese indirectly supported the Zheng by providing them with "knives and swords, armor, muskets, cannons and the iron to forge them at home. Moreover, tar and resin formed essential ingredients in the construction of naval junks."[546] In supplying the Zheng with the materials of war, Japan's involvement in the wars of the Ming-Qing transition constituted more than "arm's length involvement," but stopped just short of "direct involvement."[547] Between the 1640s and 1670, Japan's support of the Zheng had shifted from direct military action in the form of invading China to covertly supplying the

1673-1681: Its Setting and Significance.," 1–2., Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 140., Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia.*, 198-199.
[543] Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia*, 200.
[544] Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 112, 160.
[545] Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia*, 2016, 131.
[546] Hang, "The Shogun's Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth-Century Maritime East Asia," 118–19, 122–23.
[547] Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 139, 164.

materials of war. As Toby argues, the Tokugawa bore no love for the Qing, but the prospect of a catastrophic war that would wreck both Japan's trade and imperil the shogunate's legitimacy proved to be the greater menace.[548] Despite early Zheng victories against the Qing in the Revolt of the Three Feudatories, both the Tokugawa regime and the lords of Western Japan resolved to distance themselves from the conflict and would not provide aid to their former allies.

In late 1675, Jing won a major victory over the Qing. According to the Chosŏn Dynasty records, Jing arranged his cannons in three rows and used a volley-fire technique to decimate Qing forces. In January 1676, Jing wrote to the Shimazu family, the lords of Satsuma on Japan's southernmost major island of Kyūshū and described the major victory he had won over the Qing. Jing bragged about the hundreds of soldiers and ships under his command and took the opportunity to ask the Shimazu lords of Satsuma if they would send military aid to the Zheng.[549]

In a pre-1670 context, Jing's request would not have been unreasonable. In the 1640s the Shimazu, as independent regional actors, provided Jing's grandfather, Zhilong, with aid in terms of armaments and mercenaries.[550] This time, in January 1676, the Shimazu, with recollection of the recent attack on a Ryūkyūan ship, grudgingly appealed to the Tokugawa government for their decision on assisting the Zheng. When the Tokugawa regime refused on behalf of Satsuma, Jing asked for his uncle, Koxinga's half-brother, Shichizaemon, to directly approach the Tokugawa regime in Edo with a request for aid. Shichizaemon, who worked as a Zheng agent in Nagasaki,

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[548] Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan*, 140.

[549] Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty (朝鮮王朝實錄), *Joseon wangjo sillok*, National Archives of Korea in Busan http://esillok.history.go.kr/. 3-2

[550] Hang notes that the direct results of Zheng requests to local Japanese lords are vague. However, Hang points to 1649 records detailing the emergence of expatriate Japanese communities on islands near Fujian. These Japanese communities may have been communities of samurai mercenaries. See Hang, “The Shogun’s Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth-Century Maritime East Asia," 123.

approached the city's governor, Ushigome Chūzaemon Shigenori, with Jing's request.[551] Ushigome traveled to Edo, where he presented Jing's request to Koxinga's former friend and patron, the fourth shogun, Ietsuna. In response, the shogunate issued a strong warning and a reprimand to Ushigome, confirming that no military assistance would be forthcoming to the Zheng.[552]

Around the same time of Jing's request for aid in early 1676, the Tokugawa regime learned of a rumor that had circulated among the Qing, the Chosŏn Court in Seoul, and Zheng agents in Nagasaki. Chosŏn officials also discovered correspondence between the rebel leader Wu Sangui, the Zheng, and Japanese merchants at the Japan trading house on Cheju Island.[553] The rumor stated that the Japanese planned to land an invasion force on the Shandong Peninsula. Once the Japanese army had landed, it would join Korean forces, who possessed some of the best musketry corps in the world at this time, in a joint attack on Beijing.[554]

The rumor had originated with a general on the Shandong Peninsula with the surname of "Ma." General Ma had learned that there were other generals with the same surname who were serving in the Zheng and Three Feudatory armies. Eager to facilitate a militaristic family reunion, General Ma contacted Zheng agents in Nagasaki regarding his willingness to unite with other members of his lineage and cooperate with the rebels to attack Beijing. In his zeal, General Ma urged Zheng agents in Japan to petition the Tokugawa regime for assistance in his planned invasion. In response to the rumor of a Tokugawa-Chosŏn attack on Beijing, the Kangxi

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[551] “うしごめちゅうざえもん【牛込忠左衛門】 | 国史大辞典,” accessed December 16, 2016, http://japanknowledge.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/lib/display/?lid=30010zz047500., Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty, 3-2.
[552] Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty, 3-2.
[553] Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty., 31-3.
[554] Tonio Andrade makes this observation in his revolutionary work, Tonio Andrade, *The Gunpowder Age: China, Military Innovation, and the Rise of the West in World History*, (Princeton Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2017)., 166-167.

Emperor ordered Mongol and Manchu Banner Armies to the Korean border with the directive that they abandon their bows and arrows in favor of muskets if they faced an attack from the Koreans and Japanese.[555]

The news of Qing banner armies at China's Korean border and rumors of General Ma's plans reached the Tokugawa government, which then proceeded to debate the merits of invading the Shandong Peninsula.[556] Likewise, the Chosŏn court debated the prospect of an alliance with Japan, the three feudatories, and the Zheng to stage an uprising against the Qing. In the end, the Tokugawa regime and the lords of Western Japan reached a decision to not follow through with an invasion of China. When the Qing learned of the incriminating documents from the Japan trading house on Cheju Island, the Chosŏn court proclaimed them to be forgeries, and categorically denied any involvement in the escalation of hostilities.[557]

The Revolt of the Three Feudatories was not just a significant event in Chinese history, it had global consequences as it entangled the interests of Zheng Taiwan, Chosŏn Korea, Tokugawa Japan, and the VOC. The rebellion stopped just short of becoming a wider East Asian conflict because of the decisions that the Qing Empire, Chosŏn Korea, and Tokugawa Japan made that ensured the establishment of an emerging international framework of institutional rules and norms that would come to emphasize stability and coexistence instead of war and upheaval. For the Joseon, this meant cultivating "neighborly relations" with Japan and "serving the great" in

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[555] Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty, 12-2, 17-1.

[556] *Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Empō 2, 1674, 延寶 2 年是**歲**, 長崎入港の福州・廣東・阿蘭・東寧の諸舶、平西王呉三桂・東寧王鄭経移、檄を携へ来り、三桂・鄭経及ひ靖南王耿精忠等、清朝に反し、明帝の遺子を奉し、兵を挙るの状を長崎奉行牛込勝登・岡野貞明に告く、琉球・朝鮮も亦、之を鹿兒嶋城主島津光久・府中城主宗義真に報す、勝登・貞明・光久・義真等、具に之を幕府に傳達す、2. https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1674/22-3-3/8/0002?m=all&s=0002,

[557] Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty., 3-2.

their approach to the Qing.[558] For the Qing Empire and Tokugawa Japan, state consolidation at the end of the seventeenth century involved eliminating destabilizing elements such as warlords, pirates, and their states. The 1683 Qing invasion of Taiwan and elimination of the Zheng empire as an existential threat was such an act of state consolidation at the end of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories.[559]

In Japan, the 1676 decision to eliminate the Zheng's longstanding partners, the Suetsugu, did not stem from the mandate to enforce a policy of isolation from the 1630's. Instead, Heizō IV's arrest and banishment was an act of non-*sakoku* isolation, the result of consensus between the lords of Western Japan and the shogunate that reflected the nature of the Tokugawa settlement as a consolidating state at the end of the seventeenth century. The decisions of the Tokugawa regime and Satsuma domain to refuse Zheng requests for aid signaled not only an assertion of central governmental power over regional interests, but a consensus in response to international events that threatened Japan. If the threat of Iberian power and Christianity prompted the Tokugawa to issue the *sakoku* edicts of the 1630s and 1640s as a local reaction against sixteenth century globalization, Qing expansion and consolidation represented the second major international threat that the shogunate faced in the late seventeenth century.[560]

Conclusion

Returning to the ship from the beginning of our story, the Tokugawa regime ordered it burned.[561] Heizō IV's intended shipment of armaments on board this ship never reached its

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[558] Etsuko Hae-Jin Kang, *Diplomacy and Ideology in Japanese-Korean Relations: From the Fifteenth to the Eighteenth Century*., 30.
[559] Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang et al., *Sea Rovers, Silver, and Samurai: Maritime East Asia in Global History, 1550–1700*, ed. Tonio Andrade and Xing Hang, 1st edition (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2016), 18.
[560] Mark Ravina, "Tokugawa, Romanov, and Khmer: The Politics of Diplomacy in Eighteenth Century East Asia," 139, 164.
[561] Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys, 7 November 1675 tot 27 Oktober 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89, F108

intended destination. Although Heizō IV's shipment of arms was not inconsistent with the earlier Tokugawa policy of indirect involvement in the wars of the Ming-Qing transition, the pass that he had issued to the Chinese operating his ship directly implicated the shogunate as a direct sponsor of Zheng activities. Suetsugu ties to the Zheng Empire had the potential to and nearly did lead to an expansion of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories into a wider, global conflict. When Fukuoka domain soldiers, who at one time supported the Suetsugu, placed Heizō IV and his family under house arrest, it likewise signified that the lords of Western Japan had abandoned the Suetsugu to their fate of banishment. With Heizō IV's banishment and his ship ablaze, it marked the beginning of the end for East Asian state consolidation in response to the second wave of globalization. The state consolidation that took place in East Asia at the end of the seventeenth century was in direct response to international events such as the wars of the Ming-Qing transition and the Revolt of the Three Feudatories. It resulted in a multipolar framework of East Asian states that would ensure relative peace and stability for over two centuries without pirates, warlords, or their kingdoms.

Epilogue: Sunday June 7, 1676

As longtime enemies of the Suetsugu, a VOC chief factor makes for an awkward, latter-day biographer of Heizō IV's last days in Japan. To be sure, Camphuys' assessment of the Suetsugu was far from complimentary. Johannes Camphuys, the 57-year-old chief factor of the Dutch East India (VOC) Company's outpost on Dejima, was on his third and final tour in Japan, and came to be well acquainted with Heizō IV and his family. Camphuys' cramped office likely offered him little respite from the stifling heat and humidity of the Japanese summer as he narrated the day's events to his secretary for the *dagregister*, the daily journal that the VOC required each chief factor to keep. He had heard about Heizō IV's banishment from his interpreter, which was in progress as he spoke. In his mind, Camphuys kept seeing the "greedy" eyes of Heizō IV's

mother, which were always so full of envy and seething rage.[562] Camphuys reasoned with his secretary that Heizō IV's mother was likely to blame for his current predicament. She had always been the primary instigator of her son's generally "evil" nature.[563] Camphuys never liked Heizō IV's mother either and assured his secretary that the company would benefit from the removal of the Suetsugu. Besides, Camphuys reasoned, "he [Heizō IV] was never favorable towards the company" as "he was always stingy in the 'doing' [sic] of presents."[564]

Not far away from Camphuys' office on the outskirts of Nagasaki, Heizō IV and his son, Heibeidonno, were also likely sweltering inside their palanquin as they awaited the twenty-day trip to their place of banishment on the Oki Islands.[565] For Heizō IV, this would have seemed to be an unfitting end for a man who, in 1675, built one of the fastest ships in the East Asian maritime world. In that same year, Heizō IV's ship captain, Shimaya, had even sailed the vessel and explored the Ogasawara Islands on orders from the shogunate.[566] As Heizō IV and his son awaited their last ocean voyage, they possibly thought about the beautiful garden near their home in Nagasaki. Perhaps they caught one last glimpse of the garden in full bloom as they left the Nagasaki harbor. The famous chronicler, VOC employee, and German naturalist of renown, Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), mentioned that Heizō IV had planted the garden "on a flat hill at the shore, in a corner of the harbor near the city" and had dedicated it to the shogun.[567]

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[562] 7 June 1676, *Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys*, 7 November 1675 tot 27 Oktober 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89, F110
[563] Ibid.
[564] 10 June 1676, *Daghregister van Johannes Camphuys*, 7 November 1675 tot 27 Oktober 1676, VOC 1095, Inventaris nr. 89, F111
[565] Ibid., Takekoshi, *The Economic Aspects of the History of the Civilization of Japan*.., 186.
[566] Ishii Kenji 石井謙治, "*Suetsugu Heizō no Tōsen*"“末次平蔵の唐船,” *Nihon Rekishi* 日本歴史 5, no. 180 (196): 30-33., 30., "*Tokyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo* /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 10, 1670 April 6, 寛文１０年４月１７日), ９９, 長崎代官末次平藏に命し、模形和蘭船を造らしむ., 315, https://clioimg.hi.u-tokyo.ac.jp/viewer/view/idata/T38/1670/22-2-1/3/0001?m=all.
[567] Engelbert Kaempfer, edited and translated by Beatrice Bodart-Bailey., *Kaempfer's Japan*. Edited by Beatrice Bodart-Bailey., Honolulu, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press., 1999., 225.

Kaempfer marveled that it was a "most pleasant and ornamental flower garden." Now, it was a "prison" as the Tokugawa converted the Suetsugu compound into quarters for the merchants arriving from Qing China to ensure that the Chinese Emperor's subjects would not intermingle with those of the shogun.[568]

[568] Kaempfer., 226.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

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"Large empires are piracy writ large."
***St Augustine* (354-430), in Book IV of *The City of God* [570]**

The Suetsugu were a liminal family of hybrid, warrior-merchant pirates who found strength and opportunity in war, upheaval, and ambiguity. Suetsugu power over the decades required a fluid and chaotic international environment and a decentralized Japanese state. Under the seventeenth century Tokugawa regime, the Heizō dynasty of the Suetsugu reached the peak of their power and prestige as the Edo shoguns relied on a decentralized state framework and local intermediaries to exercise governmental authority. As Tokugawa intermediaries, the Heizō

[569] Figure 7-1. Contemporary artistic representation of a Suetsugu ship/末次船
https://navy.ap.teacup.com/kanzo/img/1234229991.jpg
[570] Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, *The City of* God, Book IV, Chapter IV, 51.

dynasty operated under the aegis of shogunal authority, but also sought to realize their own ambitions. Like the warrior-merchant houses of the Warring States Period, the Heizō dynasty sought to attain social mobility and peer status with Japan's warrior elite. Beginning with the sixteenth century progenitor of the Heizō dynasty, Kōzen, the Suetsugu associated with Japan's elite warrior households through the culture of tea ceremony and competitive material accumulation. Suetsugu involvement with Japan's seventeenth century culture of tea ceremony and material accumulation peaked during the tenure of Heizō II and his friendship with the famous tea master, artist, and gardener, Kobori Enshū. Through his friendship with Enshū, Heizō II earned the patronage of the Tokugawa family. As a result of Tokugawa patronage, the Suetsugu, for a time, enjoyed peer recognition with Japan's warrior elite. However, Tokugawa patronage would not be enough to save the Suetsugu from a precipitous collapse in 1676 as the ambitions of the Heizō dynasty threatened domestic and international stability for Japan.

The other major ambition of the Heizō dynasty was to build a maritime domain, a goal which the Suetsugu also shared with the warrior-merchant families of Japan's Warring States Period. For the Suetsugu, "all futures were possible, including ones that replayed the past" and the recent past of Japan's Warring States Period was one of ambitious men, from all walks of life, who had dreams of conquest and social mobility.[571] As an early modern empire, the Tokugawa regime was a decentralized state of hybrid, civil-military control that relied on intermediaries, such as the Suetsugu, in the Herculean task of winning the peace, at home, by co-opting Japan's various landed lords, and abroad, in navigating an uneven patchwork of sovereign claims that were a legacy of the Warring States Period.[572] The Suetsugu operated under Tokugawa authority as

[571] William Sunderland., *The Baron's Cloak: A History of the Russian Empire in War and Revolution*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press., 189.
[572] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 3, 8, 285, 287, 292.

"creative political entrepreneurs" and viewed the hodgepodge of uneven, Japanese imperial claims as an opportunity for building their maritime domain.[573] Beginning with Taiwan in the 1620s, Heizō I attempted to lay claim to the island by fabricating an embassy of Taiwanese aboriginals to journey to Edo in order to pay tribute to the shogun. The false Suetsugu embassy from Taiwan was an act of "creative legal posturing," an attempt by Heizō I to present his own ambitions within the scope of Tokugawa authority in a scheme that ultimately failed.[574] Tensions between the Suetsugu and the VOC escalated, leading Heizō I to again appeal to Tokugawa authority in citing Dutch infractions against the vermilion seal system. Heizō I received orders from the high shogunal councilors to outfit a military expedition to drive the Dutch from Taiwan but failed in his mission. Having failed in his mission to kill Governor Nuyts and remove the Dutch, Heizō I pressured his hostage, Pieter Muyser, to produce a letter renouncing VOC claims to Taiwan. Although Muyser wrote a letter which Heizō I presented to the high shogunal councilors, it did not renounce Dutch claims to Taiwan and failed to interest Edo in going to war against the VOC. Heizō I's great ambitions for Taiwan had met with failure, and in the process, nearly destroyed the Suetsugu.

Although Heizō I nearly destroyed the Suetsugu, his ambition for a maritime domain lived on with his son, Shigemasa (Heizō II) who set his sights on Spanish Manila as a new target for expansion. In designing his plans for the invasion of Spanish Manila, Heizō II, like his father, relied on Tokugawa authority to provide a narrative justification for his ambitions of conquest. In the late 1630s, Heizō II drew upon Hideyoshi's demands that Manila submit to Japan and offer tribute while substantiating for the Tokugawa regime that the Spanish presented an existential

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[573] Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*. Maier., "Empire Without End: Imperial Achievements and Ideologies." 153-59.
[574] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 290.

threat to the realm through Christian missionary activity. Instead of directing his efforts towards Edo and the high shogunal councilors, Heizō II devised a scheme in which he appropriated VOC narratives of willingness to perform service for the shogun to pressure the Dutch into invading Manila on behalf of Japan.[575] Heizō II leveraged the ambiguity of his position as a Tokugawa intermediary and his keen knowledge of the inner workings of the VOC to pressure Governor General Antonio van Diemen and the Council of the Indies to provide an invasion fleet for the Suetsugu conquest of Manila. Although Heizō II was successful in pressuring the Dutch to support his plans to invade Manila, the outbreak of the Shimabara Rebellion in December 1637 forced the Suetsugu patriarch to abandon his ambition of making the Spanish port city part of his maritime domain.

Heizō II operated within the ambit of indistinct, Tokugawa spheres of control, and with no clear distinction between warrior and merchant in Japan, social fluidity allowed Heizō II to pivot from advocating an invasion of Manila to assisting in domestic control during the Shimabara Rebellion. Much like a sixteenth century Japanese warlord, Heizō II commanded military forces in the field against the Shimabara rebels to satisfy the Suetsugu patriarch's personal ambitions for social advancement. However, unlike his Warring States Period predecessors, Heizō II could not ignore his Tokugawa overlords, and had to carefully frame his actions and ambitions within the context of acting as an intermediary for Edo. Heizō II's need to prove his efficacy as a Tokugawa intermediary led the Suetsugu patriarch to transfer the VOC's pledge of military service for an invasion of Manila to fighting for the shogun in the Shimabara Rebellion. In order to solidify the role of the Suetsugu as transnational intermediaries for the Tokugawa and secure status for the family as peers of Japan's warrior elite, Heizō II orchestrated the appearance of VOC ships

[575] Clulow., *The Company and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan*., 123-124.

during the siege of Hara Castle. Although Heizō II failed to orchestrate a military display to bring the Shimabara Rebellion to a successful conclusion or impress Tokugawa officials, he nonetheless demonstrated that the Suetsugu could bend the VOC to shogunal demands. As a reward for the Suetsugu, the Tokugawa regime moved the Dutch factory from Hirado to Nagasaki, and the Heizō dynasty served as the primary intermediaries between the company and the shogun until the family's precipitous collapse in 1676.

Suetsugu ambitions for a maritime domain did not end with Heizō II as his second son, Shigetomo (Heizō IV), sought to lay claim to the Ogasawara Islands. Rather than launch a military expedition in the tradition of his father and grandfather, Heizō IV sought to claim the Ogasawara Islands through "narrative entrepreneurship," and a state-of-the-art ship, the *Fukokuju*.[576] Heizō IV and his ship captain, Shimaya Ichizaemon, engaged in "creative legal posturing" by contriving a narrative that connected the inhabitants of Hachijō Island, whom the shogun claimed as his subjects, to the uninhabited Ogasawara Islands.[577] The narrative bonds between subject and sovereign, although contrived, expose the situational, fluid, and portable nature of early modern sovereignty.[578] In further substantiating his claims to the Ogasawara Islands, Heizō IV relied on visible symbols of Tokugawa power, such as the Oracles of the Three Shrines, which the Suetsugu patriarch instructed Shimaya to place at key points along the archipelago. Heizō IV's expedition also accomplished the first extensive mapping of the Ogasawara Islands, producing documents for the Suetsugu to further narrate their claims to the archipelago to an international audience. The *Fukokuju* was the most visible symbol of Tokugawa power, and the great ship, in all of its majesty, was a direct connection between Edo

[576] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper., *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*., Charles S. Maier., "Empire Without End: Imperial Achievements and Ideologies." *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2010): 153-59.
[577] Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 290.
[578] Benton, 285-287.

and Heizō IV's claim over the Ogasawara Islands. Heizō IV's expedition to the Ogasawara Islands was the last attempt by the Suetsugu to build a maritime domain and the Tokugawa regime expressed no further interest in claiming the volcanic archipelago. Although Edo was unimpressed by the surveys and specimens that Shimaya and the crew of the *Fukokuju* collected, the real reason for Tokugawa disinterest in the Ogasawara Islands coincided with Edo's destruction of the Suetsugu and banishment of family patriarch, Heizō IV, in 1676.

The Tokugawa decision to eliminate the Suetsugu was not the culmination of a series of polices that led Japan to becoming a closed country; instead, stemmed from transnational events that witnessed the rise of a relatively peaceful, multipolar state framework of rules and norms in East Asia.[579] Japan's Warring States Period and the wars of the Ming-Qing transition were the major bookends of two centuries of war and upheaval in East Asia, a time in which competition between the East Asian states and European competitors which left an uneven and layered patchwork of sovereign claims. As a legacy of the Warring States Period, the Tokugawa regime inherited an overseas empire from Japan's unifiers that consisted of layered sovereign claims in the Asian maritime world. To contend with Japan's sixteenth century legacy of empire, Edo exercised decentralized power through intermediaries such as the Suetsugu as a means of contending with the fluidity and ambiguity of sovereignty that was characteristic of the early modern world. As a multigenerational family of wealth, power, and status, the Suetsugu were

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[579] John King Fairbank and Ta-tuan Ch'en, *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968); John E. Wills, Jr., "Tribute, Defensiveness, and Dependency: Uses and Limits of Some Basic Ideas about Mid-Ch'ing Foreign Relations," Annals of the Southeast Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, 8 (1986): 84–90. Joshua Van Lieu, Etsuko Hae-jin Kang, James B. Lewis, and Gregory Smits argue for a clearer understanding of a multistate, East Asian international system. See Hendrik Spruyt, "Collective Imaginations and International Order: The Contemporary Context of the Chinese Tributary System"; Joshua Van Lieu, "The Tributary System and the Persistence of Late Victorian Knowledge"; Joshua Van Lieu, "Divergent Visions of Serving the Great: The Emergence of Chosŏn-Qing Tributary Relations as a Politics of Representation" (PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, 2010); James Louis Hevia, *Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).

possessed of great ambition. Like their contemporaries, the Arima family of Shimabara domain, the Shimazu family of Satsuma domain, the Matsuura of Hirado domain, and the Sō family of Tsushima domain, the Heizō dynasty sought to exploit the ambiguity of the Tokugawa settlement to advance their own ambitions of social mobility and building a maritime domain through a mixture of military conquest and narrative creativity.[580] As Benton reminds, "empire formed as multiple agents positioned themselves to act as subjects of and proxies for imperial powers and as polities and populations negotiated scope for their own autonomy, sometimes urging radical reconfigurations of rule."[581] Every encounter that the Suetsugu had with the Portuguese, the Dutch, and with Chinese maritime networks such as the Zheng forced Edo to consider where, how, and to what degree Japan would maintain an early modern maritime empire.[582]

Suetsugu connections to the Zheng proved to be the undoing of the Heizō dynasty as Tokugawa officials feared that claiming Koxinga's descendants as subjects of the shogun would pull Japan into a destabilizing and catastrophic East Asian war. Tokugawa officials had rebuffed Suetsugu ambitions for Taiwan and the Ogasawara Islands, but on the basis that neither of these locations were worth the exertion of shogunal authority or military force. The Tokugawa regime had initially supported the Heizō dynasty in their planned invasion of Manila, and Edo displayed no reservations in expanding hostilities with the Iberian powers during the 1630s. The major catalyst for change in relations between the Asian states was the rise of the Qing Empire after the

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[580] Again, I refer to the 1609 Shimazu conquest of the Kingdom of Ryūkyū. As for the Sō family and Korea, they forged correspondence from the third shogun, Tokugawa Iemitsu in order to reopen diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries. The Arima Harunobu and Heizō I's predecessor, Tōan, had expansionist ambitions for Taiwan in 1609 and 1616

[581] As Lauren Benton also argues which can apply to the Suetsugu in their role as ambitious intermediaries, "By definition and in practice sovereignty and Empire formed as multiple agents positioned themselves to act as subjects of and proxies for imperial powers and as polities and populations negotiated scope for their own autonomy, sometimes urging radical reconfigurations of rule." See Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900.*, 279.

[582] Benton., 164

1640s. Although the Tokugawa regime initially responded to the rise of the Manchu with covert hostilities, Qing consolidation during the Revolt of the Three Feudatories in the 1670s led Edo to consider the consequences of a wider, East Asian war. In particular, Qing consolidation forced the Tokugawa regime to reconsider its relationship with the Zheng Empire of Taiwan, whom Edo considered to be at best, unpredictable, and at worst, dangerous partners. As Tokugawa intermediaries who enjoyed a long-standing relationship with the Zheng, the Heizō dynasty came under intense scrutiny when anti-Manchu forces were actively trying to bring Japan and Korea into war against the Qing Empire during the Revolt of the Three Feudatories. Heizō IV was already under increased scrutiny due to a perceived lack of control by the Suetsugu over family retainers that resulted in the vandalism of Ise Grand Shrine. By the end of 1675, Edo began the process of removing the Suetsugu from power in Nagasaki and placed Heizō IV under house arrest. The discovery of a trading permit in early 1676, which Heizō IV had signed proclaiming a Zheng crew to be subjects of the shogun led the Tokugawa regime to move quickly in order to destroy the Suetsugu, execute their retainers, and banish the family to outlying islands. Heizō IV's ties to the Zheng threatened international peace and domestic stability in Japan.

After two centuries of war, chaos, and upheaval, the East Asian states settled into an uncomfortable, tacit truce with one another which gave rise to a new international framework of rules and norms that would last until the middle of the nineteenth century. For over two centuries, this new, international framework brought relative peace and stability to East Asia and demanded that its constituent states, Tokugawa Japan, Chosŏn Korea, and the Kingdom of Ryūkyū implement a higher degree of state consolidation. Increased consolidation among the East Asian states led to tighter control over transnational intermediaries, leaving little room for ambitions of social mobility through conquest and freelance diplomacy. Rumors of a joint

Tokugawa-Chosŏn campaign against the Qing and the Kangxi emperor's mobilization of Mongol and Manchu banner soldiers to the Korean border led East Asian heads of state to consider the impact that a wider war would have on domestic and transnational stability. As the East Asian states stepped back from the brink of a catastrophic war, the Qing Empire, Tokugawa Japan, and Chosŏn Korea took steps to tighten control over and eliminate intermediaries who were a threat to international peace and stability. In Japan, the Tokugawa regime's decision to eliminate the Suetsugu did not stem from the mandate to enforce a policy of isolation from the 1630s. Instead, the Tokugawa regime's arrest and banishment of the Heizō dynasty was an act of non-*sakoku* isolation in response to transnational events that threatened Japan. Heizō IV's incompetence and corruption might have been an important factor in the decision to banish him and his family to outlying islands; however, the Suetsugu proved to be an even more dangerous liability to the Tokugawa regime in an international context. The Tokugawa banishment of the Heizō dynasty in 1676 and the Qing elimination of the Zheng in 1683 marked the emergence of a relatively peaceful East Asian world order. It was a world order that could no longer contain pirates, warlords, their kingdoms, or their ambitions.

The story of the Suetsugu has been an attempt to view global and comparative imperial history through the lens of "maritime thieves apparently acting on their own behalf," yet the Heizō dynasty was no mere band of petty robbers or smugglers.[583] Returning to Augustine of Hippo's famous parable of Alexander the Great and the pirate, the fifth century scholastic observes that "kingdoms without justice are mere robberies, and robberies are like small

[583] Roxani Eleni Margariti, "Mercantile Networks, Port Cities, and 'Pirate' States: Conflict and Competition in the Indian Ocean World of Trade Before the Sixteenth Century" in the *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient.* 51 (4): 543-577., 573.

kingdoms; but large empires are piracy writ large." [584] If we accept Augustine's wisdom, the business of empire, at its core, is large scale thievery. If empire is in the thieving, then the thievery of imperial claims is in the narrating. Margariti and Benton's work has served as both an inspiration and framework for understanding the Heizō dynasty as imperial intermediaries who used Tokugawa power to build a Suetsugu maritime domain.[585] As Clulow indicates, the Suetsugu became adept at appropriating narratives of service from foreigners, such as the VOC, and redeploying them to further the ambitions of the Heizō dynasty. The Suetsugu found power in "creative legal posturing" through a combination of narrative and violence which forced the Tokugawa regime to contend with the "anomalous legal zones" in the maritime world that Japan's unifiers had claimed.[586]

As the story of the Suetsugu confirms, seventeenth century Tokugawa Japan was neither closed off from the rest of the world or a fully consolidated state. The works of Ravina, Hang, Berry, Hellyer, Pitelka, and Laver have provided a platform for contextualizing the ambitions of the Suetsugu within a fluid and evolving early Tokugawa polity.[587] The seventeenth century Tokugawa shogunate was not a centralized, absolutist state as Edo exercised decentralized power

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[584] Margariti, 572. Pérotin-Dumon, "The Pirate and the Emperor: Power and the Law on the Seas, 1450–1850.," Saint Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, *The City of* God, Book IV, Chapter IV, 51.

[585] The question of pirates and piracy in the maritime world comprises a central feature of Benton's work as she argues that pirates did not emerge with a "dagger in his teeth," but with a proverbial briefcase full of legal justifications and arguments, as "lawyers." See Benton, *A Search for Sovereignty: Law and Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900*, 19. Marcus Rediker, *Villains of All Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005), 19.

[586] Benton, 164, 290.

[587] Ravina., "State-Building and Political Economy in Early-Modern Japan." Ravina., *Land and Lordship in Early Modern Japan*. For an argument which suggests that Tokugawa Japan was a proto-nation state, see Ronald P. Toby., "Rescuing the Nation from History: The State of the State in Early Modern Japan." *Monumenta Nipponica* 56, no. 2 (2001): 197-237., Hellyer, *Defining Engagement: Japan and Global Contexts, 1640 - 1868*. Laver, *The Sakoku Edicts and the Politics of Tokugawa Hegemony* (Cambria Press, 2011), 13, 115., Laver., *Japan's Economy by Proxy in the Seventeenth Century: China, the Netherlands, and the Bakufu*., Hang, "The Shogun's Chinese Partners: The Alliance between Tokugawa Japan and the Zheng Family in Seventeenth-Century Maritime East Asia," 120., Hang, *Conflict and Commerce in Maritime East Asia: The Zheng Family and the Shaping of the Modern World, c. 1620–1720*., Berry., *Hideyoshi*., Berry., *Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period*., Berry, "Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan.." Pitelka., *Spectacular Accumulation: Material Culture, Tokugawa Ieyasu, and Samurai Sociability*.

domestically and internationally through intermediaries such as the Suetsugu. As an "improvisational agreement" and a "system" of government that "reflected an experiment rather than a blueprint," the early Tokugawa shogunate was not a closed country as it allowed for local and regional participation in foreign diplomacy and commerce.[588] The early Tokugawa shogunate also did not exercise a Weberian "monopoly on violence" as transnational intermediaries such as the Suetsugu exploited governmental ambiguity to win increasing power and independence.[589] However, the Suetsugu were not like sixteenth century Japanese warlords who could ignore the commands of a powerless emperor and shogunate. Although the Suetsugu had to obey their Tokugawa masters, they loosely interpreted directives from Edo as a means to further their own ambition of building a maritime domain.

In closing the early modern world that the Suetsugu inhabited is much like our own in the twenty first century in the challenges that we face in terms of globalization and its aftermath, climate change, war, and upheaval. According to the political scientist, Erik Ringmar, late twentieth and early twenty first century globalization has initiated a process of "de-territorializing" the world, leaving behind "overlapping jurisdictions" that make the "either/or conception of sovereignty look passé."[590] As in the seventeenth century, the world of the twenty first century features "entities other than states" such as quasi-governmental, large capital interests in the form of "multinational companies or nongovernmental organizations" much like the VOC, the Zheng, and the Suetsugu.[591] Global wars concerning the fate of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula also loom large and together with pandemics, climate change, and widespread racial and economic equality, the threat to civil society, humanity, and our planet is clear and

[588] Berry, “Public Peace and Private Attachment: The Goals and Conduct of Power in Early Modern Japan.” 109.
[589] Wilson., *Defensive Positions: The Politics of Maritime Security in Tokugawa Japan*, 7.
[590] Ringmar, "Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order.," 20.
[591] Ringmar, 20.

present. My accounting of the story of the Suetsugu might be just another pirate tale, or perhaps, it may it just hold lessons in creating a world order of peace and stability. Alternatives to the current Westphalian system do exist in which individual relationships and people matter as opposed to the destructive and "atomistic" ambitions of large capital interests and competitive nation states.[592] The East Asian states of Tokugawa Japan, Chosŏn Korea, the Kingdom of Ryūkyū, and the Qing Empire together with the VOC, the world's premier military and economic power, chose peace and forged an era of relative stability and prosperity that lasted for over two centuries. Might we not now do the same?

[592] Ringmar, 20.

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Abbreviations

TDSH - *Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo*

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Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Jōji 2, 1363 July 12., 貞治２年６月１日, 島津氏久、末次覚栄一族を撃たんとし、禰寝氏一族を招致す、98.

Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Eiroku 6, 1563 December 27, 永祿６年閏１２月２２日, 毛利元就、末次平右衛門尉に出雲森脇の地を充行ふ, 581.

Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Eiroku 8, 1565 March 12, 永祿８年２月１０日, 毛利元就、末次景勝、益田藤兼に出雲島根郡の地を充行ふ, 607.

Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Keichō 14, 1609 September., 慶長１４年９月是月, （第三条）家康、西国諸大名に命じて、五百石積以上の大船を淡路に廻漕せしめ、九鬼守隆等をして之を検収せしむ、647-650.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, 大日本史料編纂所, Keichō 14, 1610 January 1, 慶長１４年１２月９日, （第二条）是より先き、葡萄牙人、我が商人を媽港に殺す、是日、肥前日野江城主有馬晴信、家康の命を奉じ、長崎奉行長谷川藤広兄弟と、共に葡萄牙商船を長崎港に捕へ、十二日、之を撃沈す、尋で家康、之を賞し、舶載の貨物を分与す., 177.

*Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Keichō 17, 1612 April 11, 慶長１７年３月２１日, （第四条）幕府、耶蘇教を禁じ、所司代板倉勝重に命じて、京都の耶蘇寺院を毀たしめ、又、旗下の士等の耶蘇教を奉ずるものを罰す、尋で、肥前日野江城主有馬直純、長崎奉行長谷川藤広に令して、その教徒を禁圧せしめ、また、僧幡随意を有馬に遣して、教徒を誨諭せしむ, 558.

*Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Keichō 17, 1612 April 11, 慶長１７年３月２１日, (第四条) 幕府、耶蘇教禁制の条, 273.

*Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Keichō 18, 1614 January 28, 慶長１８年１２月１９日, （第三条）幕府、申ねて耶蘇教を禁じ、伴天連及び教徒を追放せしむ、よりて、是日、大久保忠隣を京都に遣す, 189.

*Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 2, 1616, 元和 2 年是歳, （第一条）家康、長崎代官村山東菴をして、台湾を伐たしむ、789.

*Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 2, 1616 July, 元和２年６月是月, （第二条）島津家久、令して明船の領内に繋留することを禁じ、長崎に赴きて、*貿易せしむ, 231-233.*

*Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 2, 1616 18 September, 元和２年８月８日, （第一条）幕府、吉利支丹宗を禁じ、明国商船を除き、外国商船の長崎平戸の外寄港するを禁ず, 349.

*Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Genna 3, 1617 April 6, 元和３年３月是月, （第四条）長崎代官村山等安、明石道友を明国に遣して、通商を求めしむ、明国其請を郤く、899.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, 東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Genna 5, 1619, 元和５年是歳, (第十条）是より先、長崎の人末次政直、長崎代官村山等安の私曲を幕府に訴ふ、是に至り、幕府、之を裁決して、等安を処罰し、政直を長崎代官と為す, 291.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, 1624 November 20, 寛永１年１０月２０日, 山田長正の商船、暹羅国より来航し、帰帆許可の朱印状を請ふ、幕府、之を許さず

*Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料., 1625, 寛永２年是歳, （第十条）肥前長崎代官末次政直「平蔵」、幕府の命に依り、明の福建総督某に復書し、其沿海を侵寇する者は邦人に非ざるを弁じ、親誼を修む, 51-53.

Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 2, 1625 August 12, 寛永２年７月１０日, 1, 日本在住明人甲比丹李旦肥前平戸に歿す、97.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, 寛永 Kan'ei 4, 1627 October 25, ９月１７日), 2, "(第二条）是より先、和蘭国、高砂国を占領す、和蘭バタビヤ総督ピーテル・カルペンチール、高砂国に於ける日本商人に輸出入税を課す、仍りて、末次政直「平蔵」の船長浜田弥兵衛、其不法を訴ふ、カルペンチール、高砂総督ピーテル・ノイツ等を日本に遣し、書を致して高砂への渡航朱印状の下付を二・三年間中止せられんことを幕府に請ふ、是日、幕府、年寄及び伊勢安濃津城主藤堂高虎・儒官林信勝「羅山」・同信澄・金地院崇伝「以心」等をして、之を議せしめ、書辞無礼なるに依り、ピーテル・ノイツ等を逐ふ," 10.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, 寛永 Kan'ei 5, 1628 5 年, 14, "(第八条）和蘭国高砂総督ピーテル・ノイツ、長崎商人末次政直「平蔵」の船長浜田弥兵衛の商船の武装を解き、貿易を妨げ、帰国を許さずして報復を計る、弥兵衛、死を決して、ノイツと交渉し、人質及び賠償を得て帰国す、幕府、和蘭人の人質を監禁す," 15-28.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo /大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 5, 1628 May, 寛永 5 年 4 月, 71, "西班牙の艦船、暹羅国メナム河口に於て、肥前長崎の高木作右衛門の商船を焼沈し、其乗組日本人を捕ふ.," 178.

*Tōkyō Daigaku. Shiryō Hensanjo.*東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō, 大日本近世史料, Kan'ei, 5 1628 August 16, 寛永５年７月１７日, 是より先、末次政直「平蔵」の船長浜田弥兵衛等、再び高砂に航して、和蘭人の不法を譴め、人質を交換して帰国し、幕府に訴ふ、是日、幕府、政直に命じ、人質蘭人を投獄し、其船を抑留す., 185.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 5, 1628 September 7, 寛永５年８月１０日), 9, "幕府目付豊島信満、年寄遠江横須賀城主井上正就に怨あり、是日、之を殿中に殺す、小十人番士青木義精等、信満を誅す、尋で、幕府、正就の子正利をして、封を襲がしめ、信満の子主膳某を死罪に処す.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo., 1631 July 9, 寛永８年６月２０日, （第一条）是より先、幕府、外国渡航の貿易船には、朱印状の外に、奉書を下すことに定む、是日、末次茂房「平蔵」に之を下す.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 11, 1634, 寛永 11 年, 18, （第四条）幕府、南蛮人の肥前長崎市内に雑居するに依り、切支丹宗の絶えざるを憂へ、新に出島を築き、之を移住せしむ.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 13, 1636 June 22, 寛永 13 年 5 月１5 日), 43, "（第二条）幕府、目付馬場利重及び肥前長崎奉行榊原職直に条令を下して、日本人の異国渡海を一切禁じ、南蛮人の子孫の追放を命ず.," 6-8.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo (大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 13, 22 October 1636, 寛永 13 年, 9 月, 24 日), 20, "(第二条）幕府、肥前長崎奉行榊原職直・同神尾元勝をして、南蛮人並に其妻子二百七十八人を悉捕して、之を明国阿媽港に追送せしむ.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1637 寛永 14 年, 38, "(第八条）幕府、呂宋遠征を計画し、和蘭領東印度総督に軍船の提供を交渉す.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1637 December 25, 寛永 14 年 11 月 9 日, 27, "(第三条）大坂城代阿部正次・大坂定番稲垣重綱・大坂町奉行曽我古祐、肥前長崎代官末次茂員に令して、援兵を同国佐賀に要請せしむ、仍りて、之を城主鍋島勝茂の老臣等に告.," 61.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1638 January 3, 寛永 14 年 11 月 18 日, 29, "(第二条）一揆の首領益田四郎「時貞」の、肥後天草富岡城を陥れ、肥前長崎に来らんとすとの流言あり、長崎代官末次茂員、急を同国大村に報じて加勢を請ふ、35.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo /大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 14, 1638 January 21, 寛永 14 年 12 月 7 日, 45, "(第三条）肥前長崎奉行榊原職直・同馬場利重、長崎の守備を定め、往きて同国島原の軍に会す、27.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo /大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 15, 1638 February 21, 寛永 15 年 1 月 8 日, 52, "(第二条）年寄武蔵忍城主松平信綱、令して、肥前長崎奉行馬場利重に肥後熊本城主細川忠利の子光尚の軍を、同榊原職直に肥前佐賀城主鍋島勝茂の子直澄等の軍を、豊後府内の幕府目付役林勝正に筑前福岡城主黒田忠之・肥前唐津城主寺沢堅高の軍を、同牧野成純に筑後柳河城主立花宗茂の子忠茂・同国久留米城主有馬豊氏・肥前島原城主松倉勝家の軍を監せしむ, 26.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, Kan'ei 15, 1639 April, 寛永 15 年 3 月, 以降, 島原一揆蜂起の時、石火矢打ちの功績により、浜田新蔵に銀 100 枚、六永十左衛門に銀 50 枚、島谷市左衛門に銀 30 枚、薬師寺久左衛門に銀 30 枚、手伝いの者たちに銀 50 枚を下賜さる,

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 2, 1662, 215., "長崎痘疹流行し、嬰児多く夭す," 64.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 3, 1663 April 15, 寛文 3 年 3 月８日, 216. "長崎、火あり," 7.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 3, 1663 May 19, 寛文 3 年 4 月１２日., 217., "庚戌、幕府、長崎奉行廨舎を構造し、其市坊道渠の廣狭を定め、罹災市民に銀二千貫匁を貸す," 36.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 3, 1663 August, 18, 寛文 3 年 7 月２６日., 219., "辛卯、西海道諸國大風雨、肥前・薩摩最甚し、長崎碇泊の清商舶三隻毀損す." 54.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 4, 1664 September 9, 寛文 4 年 ８月５日., 224. "是より先、商賣の外舶物品を長崎に買ふは、悉く銀貨を以てす、銀貨騰貴す、是に至り、幕府令して、其半額は便に従ひ金貨を用せしむ," 60.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 5, 1664 November, 寛文４年１０月是**月**, 27, 彗星東方に出つ、十二月に至りて滅す、80.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 4, 1665 January, 寛文４年１０月是**月**, "彗星東方に出つ、十二月に至りて滅す," 80-86.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo /大日本史料編纂所, Kambun 10, 1670 April 6, 寛文１０年４月１７日), ９９, 長崎代官末次平藏に命し、模形和蘭船を造らしむ., 315.

Tōkyō Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo/東京大学史料編纂所, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryo 大日本近世史料, Empō 2, 1674, 延寶２年是**歳**, 長崎入港の福州・廣東・阿蘭・東寧の諸舶、平西王呉三桂・東寧王鄭経移、檄を携へ来り、三桂・鄭経及ひ靖南王耿精忠等、清朝に反し、明帝の遺子を奉し、兵を挙るの状を長崎奉行牛込勝登・岡野貞明に告く、琉球・朝鮮も亦、之を鹿兒嶋城主島津光久・府中城主宗義真に報す、勝登・貞明・光久・義真等、具に之を幕府に傳達す、2.

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