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Shame in a Kindred:
Reading Scenes of Shame in American Fictions
from Henry James to Octavia Butler

By

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English

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An abstract of
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James T. Laney School of Graduate Studies of Emory University
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Abstract

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Reading Scenes of Shame in American Fictions
from Henry James to Octavia Butler

By Wenwen Guo

Is shame irredeemably shameful? What can the experience of shame inform us of our physical and sociopolitical conditions, besides subjecting us to emotional turmoil? Might literary representations of shame offer new insights beyond social scientific interpretations? I strive to answer these challenging questions with my dissertation. Zooming in on scenes of shame and shaming, I seek to free our imagination of shame from established theoretical and clinical conventions. Despite its painful effects on the individual, shame is an extremely productive critical site that engenders ongoing discussions concerning its nature, symptoms, socio-cultural impact, and historical significance, among psychologists, psychoanalysts, psychotherapists, sociologists, philosophers, and literary critics. The authors whose works anchor this study--Henry James, Nella Larsen, Ernest Hemingway, Toni Morrison, and Octavia Butler--demonstrate a shared interest in portraying the experience of shame as paradoxically isolating and socially generated and interpreted. This exteriorization of shame, as well as the attention the authors lend to the affect, marks these fictional texts out as close "kindred" in the vast landscape of American literary history, despite their wide variances in style and overt content. I read shame as a biopsychosocial phenomenon that responds to the sociopolitical powers that seek to discipline the human body. I conceive of my project as gesturing at a capaciousness of shame that might dismantle personal, communal, species, social, cultural, spatial, temporal, disciplinary, and epistemological boundaries.

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Chapter One--Introduction: The Shameless Turn

A Beautiful Dream and No Indiscretion

On June 9, 1898, Sigmund Freud wrote a letter to Wilhelm Fliess, an otolaryngologist whose friendship with Freud has played a controversial role upon the development of psychoanalysis. After the usual cordial exchanges, Freud confesses--

> I am reasonable enough to recognize that I need your critical help, because in this instance I myself have lost the feeling of shame required of an author. So the dream is condemned. Now that the sentence has been passed, however, I would like to shed a tear over it and confess that I regret it and that I have no hopes of finding a better one as a substitute. As you know, a beautiful dream and no indiscretion--do not coincide. (*Complete Letters* 315)

Freud is on this occasion responding to Fliess's feedback on an analysis of a dream as he worked on the manuscript for *The Interpretation of Dreams*, which would be published in 1900.[1] Freud's confession of the loss of shame in a process of intense self-reflexive writing takes place just before a large-scale turn to shame in literature, which I shall elaborate upon in this introduction and in the chapters that follow. When Freud comments on his lack of shame, he is likely referring to his invasion of privacy in wishing to publicize that "beautiful dream."[2] Fliess's judgment, which Freud holds perhaps even

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[1] Freud's *The Interpretation of Dream* has been read in an autobiographical light. Maud Ellman, for example, characterizes Freud as a modernist writer who participates in the modernist tradition with narrative innovations of his own. Ellman cites *Dream* as representative of "a breakthrough in the genre of autobiography," which contains "scandalous" contents of his personal and professional lives. Ellman regards the book as a partial product of Freud's dialogue with Fliess, who "served as interlocutor for Freud's self-analysis" (526). See "A Technique of Unsettlement: Freud, Freudianism, and the Psychology of Modernism," in *The Cambridge History of Modernism*, edited by Vincent Sherry, 2016, pp. 515-32.

[2] As his letter to Fliess suggests, Freud is ready to publicize this "beautiful dream" of his, which very likely concerns Martha Freud. After Fliess's death, Marie Bonaparte purchased his correspondence with Freud, and preserved the documents against Freud's will to destroy them. On one occasion, Jeffrey Masson cites Marie Bonaparte's notebook, Freud acknowledges that important correspondence is missing, including the "one about a dream relating to Martha Freud" (*Complete Letters* 316). This 1898 letter, according to Masson, is the first reference to the only completely analyzed dream, which, per Fliess's objection, Freud eventually takes out of the final draft. Together with Anna Freud, Masson believes that the Martha Freud dream has not been preserved in any other forms.

above his intellectual ambitions, demands Freud to mobilize his sense of shame, to destroy the dream, and to regain his "discretion." The alternative—of keeping the beautiful dream *and* remaining discreet, is a paradox that Freud could not even imagine. This *almost* shamelessness of Freud, or a professed readiness for it, is a posture that some of his contemporaries are willing to take further. Freud's "shameless"[3] tendency precedes a broader cultural shift that begins to articulate itself in the literary realm in the late nineteenth century. Whereas Freud grows wary of his shameless use of a personal anecdote, the later writers are ready to disregard their sense of shame as they "capitalize" upon the experiences of shame of their characters. Viewed in this light, the subsequent century, with its literary and epistemological projects, furthers Freud's *near* shamelessness, engendering a proliferation of the "primary" loss. My work seeks to uncover that heretofore underestimated fascination and carefully gauge their interest in shame. Starting with Freud's contemporary, Henry

[3] My use of the term "shameless" is to be distinguished from the shamelessness that some social scientific studies have identified in regard to modernity. The loss of shame's meaning is an argument that Christopher Lasch develops in his 1992 article, "For Shame: Why Americans Should Be Wary of Self-Esteem." Lasch identifies a "vogue" of shame that sweeps across the mass media and the academia, which he regards as symptomatic of an underlying loss of shame's connotation of "decent respect for privacy and the fear of disgrace" ("For Shame" 29). This "immoral overflow" in the academic and general public domains, Lasch argues, parallels the decline of the psychoanalytic enterprise, which used to grant moral insights and serve as a " to the conduct of life" ("Abolition" 212). Building upon Lasch's work, Benjamin Kilborne elaborates on shame's lost connotation, in an article-length review of books on shame that were published between 1989 and 1993. The Greek/Mediterranean notion of shame as the "obverse of honor," Kilborne argues, has become an alien concept since modernity's eschewal from the messy, contagious aspect of emotion (Kilborne 279). Kilborne speaks of "destructive, toxic" effects of contemporary shame experiences that could find no correlation with shame's remaining connotations (283). What Lasch identifies as the loss of moral relevance is taken by Kilborne as responsible for a "failure of collective representations," with which individuals used to achieve "sublimation" of their shame through "identification" with the Greek/Mediterranean shame (Kilborne 296). Related to Lasch and Kilborne's understandings of the shameless turn of society is Thomas Scheff's sociological research on the nature of human aggression. In his 1994 book, *Bloody Revenge*, Scheff pins shame at the root of some of the most violent antagonism in modernity. World War I happens, Scheff demonstrates, partly due to the modern denial of shame, which initiates self-perpetuating "cycles of insult, humiliation, and revenge" (*Bloody Revenge* 3). Unlike the traditional societies, which "emphasize, or even exaggerate" shame, Scheff laments the aggravation of alienation and loss of solidarity in modernity (43). Scheff characterizes what he calls the "repression of shame" as "institutionalized" in modern Western societies, a proposition that he first put forth in *Microsociology* (17). With the modern belittlement of the value of social bond, shame and pride, emotions that "serve as instinctive signals...to communicate the state of the bond," become "systematically repressed"(*Microsociology* 15). In contrast, my use of the word "shameless" does not invoke the same moral registers as in Lasch, Kilborne, and Scheff's works. When I speak of an almost "shameless" turn in Freud and a more developed "shamelessness" in the later modern and contemporary writers, I am commenting on their readiness to engage with the topic of shame. Their writings have demonstrated an interest in the affect of shame that more "discreet" writers before them and of their time have sought to avoid. It is their curiosity in this "private" affect that makes them nearly voyeuristic and shameless. Freud's self-identified "almost" loss of shame in publicizing his Martha dream is a metaphor, which I find speaks to the modern writers' daring investment in shame representations. The chapters that follow this introduction will gauge the extent and nature of the modern novelistic engagement with the affect of shame.

James, this turn to the "shameless" or shame-ful engagement with the affect of shame is subsequently well registered in works of authors as diverse as Nella Larsen, Ernest Hemingway, Toni Morrison, and Octavia Butler.

My project of analyzing shame's representations in American fictions between 1902 and 2005 demonstrates how these authors favor a peculiar understanding of shame that writers in the previous century have either refrained from pursuing or did not deem plausible. The array of texts that the following chapters engage with--Henry James's *The Wings of the Dove* (1902), Nella Larsen's *Passing* (1929), Ernest Hemingway's *The Sun Also Rises* (1926) and *The Garden of Eden* (1986), Toni Morrison's *Sula* (1973), and Octavia Butler's *Kindred* (1979) and *Fledgling* (2005)--stands out particularly in this regard. Together the chosen texts exhibit a shared phenomenological dimension in the portrayal of shame. These American fictions from the late nineteenth century to the early twenty-first century showcase a fascinatingly "shameless" interest in their characters' embodied experience, featuring scenes in which the affect[4] of shame not only inscribes itself on the body, but manifests in other spatial and physical configurations as well. This exteriorization of shame, as well as the attention this group of authors lend to the affect, marks these fictional texts out as close "kindred" in the vast landscape of American literary history. Zooming in on scenes of shame and shaming, I create a conversation between the authors, who on the surface seem quite distant from

[4] In what follows, I mostly use the terms, "affect," "emotion," and "feeling" interchangeably. Nonetheless, in discussions that feature a certain scholar's work, I will maintain any distinction they draw and keep the terms they use. I tend to use "affect" more frequently than the other two terms due to my references to Silvan Tomkins and his *Affect Imagery Consciousness*. Many scholars have elaborated on the differences between affect, emotion, and feeling. Basch (1983, 1988) for instance, understands *affect* as innate, involuntary somatic responses that provide physiological foundations for *emotion* and *feeling* (Broucek 4). The distinction is significant for Nathanson as he spends quite a few pages in the 1992 volume, *Shame and Pride*, developing these ideas (pp. 49-51). In his "Prologue" for the 2008 Springer edition of Tomkins's *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, Nathanson gives a much easily digestible summary of the differences. He defines *affect* as "highly specific unmodulated physiological reactions present from birth," *feeling* as "awareness that an affect has been triggered," and *emotion* as "the combination of whatever affect has just been triggered as it is coassembled with our memory of previous experiences of that affect" (*AIC* xiv). Carnes and Adams (2002) give a pithy summary of Nathanson's distinction--*affect* as biology, *feeling* as psychology, and *emotion* as biography (76). Other attempts at distinguishing these terms are made by Damásio (1994) and Massumi (2002), among others. See Damasio's phrasing regarding feeling (pp. xiv-xvi) and emotions (pp. 131-141), or Massumi's discussion on the difference between affect and emotion (pp. 27-28, 35, 223, 227-228).

one another with their distinct thematic concerns and sociocultural conventions. The lens of shame is an effective means of inquiry for me not only because it connects different authors and texts, but demands a particular modality of literary criticism that is labor-intensive on the ground level of close reading, as well as conducive to local, contingent connections between literary representation and theoretical understandings. Despite its painful effects on the individual, shame is an extremely productive critical site that engenders ongoing discussions concerning its nature, symptoms, socio-cultural impact, and historical significance among psychologists, psychoanalysts, psychotherapists, sociologists, philosophers, and literary critics. I read shame as a biopsychological performance that responds to the sociopolitical powers that seek to discipline the human body. The kindred bonds of shame function as a conduit through which these discourses could respond to one another, resulting in deepened understandings both of shame and the literary texts.

This modern literature of shame is inseparable from the particular conditions of modernity, which put an increasing emphasis on the issue of consciousness. In his 1879 book-length criticism on Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry James makes an interesting comment on the American consciousness. The "constant mistrust and suspicion of the society" that he identifies in Hawthorne's work, James rationalizes, is a national characteristic, since Americans are "the most self-conscious people in the world" (*Hawthorne* 153). This argument begins with the way James characterizes Hawthorne's birth, on July 4, 1804, the day in which "the great Republic enjoys her acutest fit of self-consciousness" (*Hawthorne* 6). What this line of quasi-astrological thinking points out is the rise of self-consciousness as a sociocultural phenomenon in the last few decades in the nineteenth century. Understood as the affect that most defines the space wherein a sense of self will develop," shame seems to be a "natural" development following the focus on consciousness (*Shame and its Sisters* 6). Shame's proximity to self-identity and consciousness, confirmed by studies in the

humanities and social sciences,[5] also makes it a favorable trope to dissect the afflicted consciousness in the modern era. To a very large extent, the shameless turn of the modern writers since Henry James is a direct corollary to the disorienting experience of modernity, particularly to the radical[6] technological, economic and urban advances. Technological innovations such as steam engines and electricity help boost the national economy, from the fourth in worldwide manufacturing in the 1860s, to the first in the 1890s (Timmons 3). By the turn of the century, the railroads and steamships had enabled traveling at unimaginable speeds. Technology has thus created a disembodied experience of traveling, in which the physical effort of the moving body is less and less expressive of the distance of the journey and the speed of the body. As bodies dart across the country, the connection to one's organic self becomes weaker. Instantaneous communications via telegraph and telephone also have the alienating side effect of furthering the distance between organic bodies. The mechanization of farming, coupled with the advancement in transportation methods, alters the rural

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[5] Helen Merrell Lynd's 1958 monograph, *On Shame and the Search for Identity*, is one of the representative works on the relationship between shame and identity. Best known for her co-authored sociological *Middletown* series, Lynd becomes interested in shame via her concern with the issue of identity, which she understands to be "as strategic in our time as the study of sexuality was in Freud's time" (14). Not only does Lynd build upon the Freudian psychoanalyst Erik Erikson's earlier work on shame's devastating effects and its potential for undermining a child's self-image, her references to Freud are central to her main arguments for a dynamic, quantitative model of personality. She argues that only through a heroic transcendence of shame through love and work, could one counteract the baneful effects of the modern search for identity and maintain vital sociability with other beings.

[6] The history of modernity is radical as it is a history of "turning points." Virginia Woolf's proclamation that human character changed its nature on or about December 1910 is a good example of the change-minded modern sensibility. Vincent Sherry gives a few other examples; the 1895 Oscar Wilde trial, the end of the Edwardian era in 1910, the Post-Impressionist Exhibition by Woolf's friend Roger Fry in December 1910, the outbreak of First World War in 1914--all are possible alternatives for the *real* turn of modernity. If, according to Terry Eagleton, the early nineteenth century writers were able to "grasp their own present as *history*," or what Georg Lukács calls "the pre-history of the present," then the modern era's demand for the *new* and the *now* has created a caesura between the always in-the-making now and the already *past* past (Eagleton 27). The overwhelming degree of instability prompts the modern thinkers to look elsewhere for a sense of security. This physical as well as metaphorical homelessness is for Lukács a "defining condition" of modernity, with which the turn to consciousness helps the *lost* individual gain some solid purchase on such a "tractionless world" (Lukács 78; Trask 44). Issues of consciousness, Karn's reading of Darwin yields, have taken on such "a sense of urgency" to the degree that "affirming" one's consciousness is tantamount to "an act of self-preservation" (Karn xiii). In a profoundly open and fluid universe, full of what William James calls "pure experience," attention to interiority creates a strong sense of self-consciousness, which while offering a foothold on a groundless world, renders the self vulnerable to attacks on consciousness such as sensations of shame. Following decades of rapid development, the basis of civilization, Simon Patten puts forth in 1907, has shifted to a logic of "surplus" for both the economic and personal sectors (8). Amid such radical scales of socio-cultural development, the inward turn of understandings of the self sparks interests in consciousness in the literary realm as well, which generates a veritable shameless turn that will be the focus of the following chapters.

experience, rendering rural communities prone to the capitalist economy with its emphasis on the commodification of labor and other aspects of human life. Cheaper modes of transportation make daily commuting a possibility, which also prompts reflections upon the self as it travels across the space through objects and crowds, in a seemingly disconnected way. Optical gadgets, for example, while expanding the limits of the eye, create a fantastical self that blurs the boundaries between subject and object, beings and things. The emergence of the cinema and personal Kodak camera provides additional alienating experiences as the individual begins to form identificatory ties with objectified or even commodified representations of the self. As exhilarating as automobile, airplane, and trolley bus are, such modern amenities also challenge traditional ideals of self-sufficiency and rugged individualism. With the successful explorations of the North and South Poles in 1909 and 1911, the conquering of space seems complete; and through the 1912 International Conference on Time in Paris, time becomes manageable as well.[7] Vincent Sherry connects this feat in the manipulation of time with the burgeoning interest in consciousness, from Henri Bergson's concept of the *durée* and William James's work on the stream of consciousness ("Long Turn" 85). All the changing conceptions of time, space, and the body keep pushing the individual to move inward for reliable sources of identity. The modern experience thus offers overabundant opportunities for intense self-reflections. It is at this juncture, with the growing cultural emphasis on self-consciousness, that writers and thinkers start to turn to issues of shame with a rising interest. As my later section on the shameful figure of consciousness will demonstrate, questions of self-sameness and the constituents of identity thus figure as gateway to experiences of shame.

[7] Tim Armstrong reads modernism as a string of crises in relation to time. With the rapid advance of technology, time becomes tabulated and commodified, whose connection to capitalist productivity has overshadowed and invalidated all the other intrinsic qualities. Even the experiences with train, car, plane, and other leisurely activities, Armstrong contends, contribute only to "a sense of the individuals as externally mandated by job, scheduling, and the pace of the city" (Armstrong 34).

Shame is ambiguous. The contradictory nature of shame has found expressions in several areas--its effects upon the body, the roles it plays in our lives, and its presence in the 20th century. No longer conceived of as an utterly negative emotion, shame has inspired a myriad of scholarly conversations in various disciplines. In 1903, George Bernard Shaw informs us in his four-act drama *Man and Superman* that shame is pervasive and fundamental.[8] Near the turn of the twenty-fist century, Frederick Turner, writing in response to James Hans's 1991 socio-political deliberations on the issues of the human condition, paints a similarly gloomy picture of the extent to which human beings are prone to shame.[9] On the other hand, when Peter Stearns presents his historicist overview of shame in Western Europe and in the United States in 2017, he understands most of the twentieth century as a part of what he calls a period of "reconsideration," in which shame, an emotion that "had been ubiquitous at least since the advent of agriculture, as part of both social and personal experience, was now being downgraded, perhaps for the first time" (Stearns 68-69). The scholarship

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[8] Written in 1903 and premiered at the Royal Court Theatre in London in May 1905, *Man and Superman* features an intriguing conversation between Jack Tanner, Octavius Robinson, and Roebuck Ramsden early in act one, during which Tanner makes a passionate argument on shame--"We live in an atmosphere of shame. We are ashamed of everything that is real about us; ashamed of ourselves, of our relatives, of our incomes, of our accents, of our opinions, of our experience, just as we are ashamed of our naked skins. Good Lord, my dear Ramsden, we are ashamed to walk, ashamed to ride in an omnibus, ashamed to hire a hansom instead of keeping a carriage, ashamed of keeping one horse instead of two and a groom-gardener instead of a coachman and footman. The more things a man is ashamed of, the more respectable he is. Why, you're ashamed to buy my book, ashamed to read it: the only thing you're not ashamed of is to judge me for it without having read it; and even that only means that you're ashamed to have heterodox opinions" (61). To increase the power of his statement, Tanner prefaces his speech by admitting to be "the most impudent person," who should be in the best position to "wholly conquer shame" (Shaw 61). Usually taken as a comedy of manners, the play does offer valuable insight into the turn-of-the-century mentality in relation to shame. By Tanner's account, shame is pervasive and fundamental; it interferes with almost everything man does and can be triggered by matters as rudimentary as one's heritage and as trivial as a book purchase. Contained in his confession is a fascinating view that shame is directly correlative to respectability, which gestures at shame's proximity to social norms and collective values.

[9] As a science fiction writer, a Shakespearean scholar, and a poet influenced by Homer, Dante, Milton, among others, Frederick Turner has exposed an innate linkage between shame and beauty in his 1995 essay on the full impact of history upon humanity. He begins his discussions on the conditions of possibility for *beautiful* encounters with an astonishing overview of the shame of our life--"we are ashamed about our sexuality, about how we came into the world, about how we did not at one time exist, either as a species or individually. We are thus ashamed of our parents, especially when adolescence forces on us a constant attention to the process of reproduction that originated us and the reflexive appetite of the mind makes us at the same time seek out the nakedness of father Noah, the nakedness of mother Jocasta. We are ashamed at our bodies, which display an impure and inextricable mixture, a mutual *adulteration*, of the intentional and the instinctive. We are ashamed about eating, because whatever we eat, we are assuming, upon the confessedly untrustworthy warrant of our own biased judgment, that we must be more valuable than what we destroy with our teeth and digestive juices...We are ashamed about our economic system…we are ashamed at what we have made…We are, finally ashamed at our own feelings of shame, our own reflexiveness, our awareness of our awareness" ("Shame, Beauty, and the Tragic View of History" 1061-62).

on shame studies commands a discourse lamenting shame's neglect in the history of thought.[10] Starting in the 1990s, however, divergent accounts of shame's presence in modernity begin to emerge across various disciplines.[11] The fact that scholars keep addressing the question of shame

[10] Formulations of this critical oversight began to appear around the late 1950s, when Helen Merrell Lynd framed her 1958 study on the question of identity in a lack of shame in the contemporary setting. Not only were "experiences of shame little studied" (17), but the word shame, or "talk" of shameful encounters "does not occur as frequently in conversation today as it did...in the conversations of Tolstoy's characters" (19). Ten years later, psychoanalyst Charles Rycroft still echoed Lynd's concern by calling shame the "Cinderella of the unpleasant emotions" (152), mulling over its lack of attention in comparison to anxiety, guilt, and depression. This pessimistic view carried on through the 70s and 80s when Helen Block Lewis and Léon Wurmser reaffirmed its "long-standing neglect" among the clinicians (H.B. Lewis xi). Given its paucity in psychoanalytic literature, Wurmser in 1981 characterized shame as the "underdog of a clinical and theoretical concept," while evincing a personal aspiration to "see almost everything in the light of shame" (6). The 90s saw a sudden outpour of publications on shame, all attesting, quite doggedly, to the neglect over this important affect. Starting with Carl Goldberg's 1991 monograph on shame, scholars and practitioners from psychology, psychoanalysis, psychiatry, and humanities outperformed one after another in proclaiming the "rediscovery" of shame. Whereas Carl Goldberg in 1991 was only slightly apologetic how "shame has too often been overlooked" (xi), Donald L. Nathanson, follower of Tomkinsian affect theory and cofounder of nonprofit Silvan Tomkins Institute, understood shame in 1992 as having been "until quite recently...almost totally ignored by the various schools of psychotherapy" (*Shame and Pride* 21). The recognition that shame should and should have already been the center of our scholarly and clinical inquiries came during the 90s with a fascinated disbelief and boastful achievement. The resolute turn to the study of the affect read very much like a triumphant self-congratulation upon a feat accomplished. Even Tomkins couldn't resist the temptation when he proudly proclaimed in the last two volumes of *Affect Imagery Consciousness* (1991-92) that the "next decade or so belongs to affect," adding, quite emotionally, that he had "waited twenty years for this development" (640). Clinician and trained psychoanalyst, Susan Miller in 1996 confirmed Tomkins's observation of a "radical increase in the numbers of grant applications, papers, book manuscripts in affect theory and research" (640) with her own discovery of a "recent explosion of shame literature in psychology, psychoanalysis, and the popular culture" (1). Her guarded embrace of this "trend" was evident in her concern with a "reductionist effect" upon the clinical mindset. Other than Miller, the "renaissance" of shame was almost unanimously well-received among developmental psychologists, psychoanalysts, neuroscientists, literary critics, and social scientists during this time, even if they didn't agree upon the exact "trajectory" of its reception. In the same year, Psychotherapist Gershen Kaufman echoed Miller's rhetoric of "explosion" and announced the end of shame's social exile. Rejoicing that shame was "no longer the neglected emotion it once was" (xi), Kaufman made obsolete psychiatrist Michael Lewis's 1992 news that the affect have just begun to attract serious academic and clinical attention in 1980s.

[11] A strand of scholars in English, cultural studies, and sociology—James B. Twitchell (1997), Thomas Scheff (1997), and Joseph Adamson (1997)—remained oblivious to the discourse of an "affective turn" (Patricia Clough), and continued to moan its absence. Together with Turner (1995), who also received his training in English, Twitchell found shame "rarely pictured" (24) in contemporary literature and art. His account of an abrupt "detoxification" (51) of shame since the mid 19th century with the commercialization of photography was redolent of Susan Sontag's 1977 critique of the de-Platonization of the medium. Both Scheff and Adamson were cognizant of the psychoanalytic and psychological interests in shame, but neither was convinced of a seismic shift in its critical reception. Adamson was perhaps more appreciative of the psychoanalytic attention to affects, and while he lamented the biased conception of emotions as a "negative or atavistic feature" (*Melville* 2), he also called for a mimetic "turning" in the field of literary studies. This reluctance on the part of literary scholars was again commented on another co-edited volume in the following year; their response, "slow" and arguably lukewarm at the moment, left Adamson and Clark hopeful of a potential "enhancement" in literary criticism in the future. Unlike Turner, Twitchell, Scheff, and Adamson, psychologists Paul Gilbert and Bernice Andrews (1998) leaned towards Tomkins, Nathanson, Miller, and Kaufman in their perception of a "turn" of shame's role in psychopathology in particular and in society in general. They too subscribed to a discourse of "neglect for so long" and "fast moving up" (30). At the same time, in 1998, 27 years after Helen Block Lewis's discovery of a "rapid increase in the literature on the psychology of shame" (xi), and despite the multi-discipline assertion of "explosion" and "radical increase" in the early 90s, Sandra Edelman, a Jungian therapist, spoke quite surprisingly, of the "scant attention from psychologists" upon the affect of shame "until recently" (21). Sampling her sources from philosophy, mythology, theology, and developmental psychology, Edelman could only have a very distinct understanding of scarcity. Moving

attests to shame's peculiar binding force throughout the twentieth century. My project figures as one possible response to the riddle of shame. Between Stearns's account for shame's decline in the past century, and affect theorists and novelists' elevation of shame to a central place in the lexicon of modern life, is the newly configured concept of shame. Shame in the twentieth century slowly departs from the public scenes of shaming, and becomes increasingly domestic and private. As my following chapters will demonstrate, shame lingers on as a private affect after it begins to loosen its grip upon society as a whole. The shamed body internalizes and reflects historical forces of discipline and subordination.

Shame is not discovered by the novelists in the 20th century; their engagement with shame is more appropriately an "evolution," in which depictions of shame assume prominently phenomenological and performative traits. Per Sharon Bassett's critique of Adamson and Clark's collection of essays on shame, I understand my project as conducting the "labor-intensive ground level engagement" that forms local and contingent relations with the texts (Bassett 162). The slowing, weighing down effect of this critical trope of shame is not unrelated to its stickiness as an affect, which corresponds to a trait of shame that I frequently revisit in my readings--that shame is activated by an *incomplete* reduction of interest and joy, which Silvan Tomkins develops in his four-volume *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, whose work I shall expand upon later. Shame thus gestures at the gray area between complete rejection and total embrace. The individual gripped with sensations of shame is unable to completely relinquish their attachment. I strive to present readings of shame in

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into this century, the lack of critical consensus on the "how" of shame's neglect was even more dramatic. On the one hand, shame was *back*—theologist Stephen Pattison (2000) found shame "now one of the main objects of attention at academic, cultural and clinical balls" and a "major phenomenon of the times, a basic and prevalent condition of individual and social life" (1). Ruth Leys (2007), who was trained in the physiological and psychological sciences, pointed to the period of World War II and its aftermath as a specific site that engendered the "systematic shift" from guilt to shame across the disciplines in the U.S. (13). Her genealogical sketch of shame was corroborated by Peter L. Stearns (2017), historian and cultural critic, who likewise cited WWII as a watershed in shame's growing hold among the psychologists. On the other hand, shame was still *missing* or has *just reappeared*. Researchers in this camp protested any romanticized conception of shame's ascendency. Salman Akhtar (2015), psychoanalyst by training, countenanced only a moderate account of shame's comeback, still holding fast to a timeframe of the "only recently" (xix) almost two decades after Edelman's 1998 rehashing of an early 1990s cliché of a "recent" shift in academic and clinical interest.

context—the symptoms, defenses, its relations to the existential, the temporal, and the biological. I regard shame not so much as a discrete feeling as an occasion for engaging with the physical and sociopolitical conditions of the particular individual. What I aspire to demonstrate with my close reading of the texts and their fascinating portrayals of shame is that such risks--of exposing ourselves to the shame of the characters--are necessary and worthwhile. Together the selected literary texts point to an "evolution" of shame in the twentieth century, in which shame becomes not only a private sensation, but also an affect that could be "read" in public and enjoyed by the public. Literary shame serves as an important mechanism of social critique that highlights the societal forces that bear upon the body. I read shame not only as a specific product that derives from confrontations between the subjects and the disciplinary forces, but also as a condition of possibility for subversion. The particular sketches of shame, with the phenomenological dimension, are thus defiant performances of the body that would not be held still and always comes loose again.

The Shameful Figure of Consciousness

Silvan Tomkins and his *Affect Imagery Consciousness* play a central role in my mapping of the representation of shame in twentieth-century American fictions. His understanding of shame as a dynamic that features embodied, phenomenological aspects offers a refreshing approach to the literary texts. Tomkins is known for his affect theory, which he has developed mostly in *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, a four-volume work published between the 1960s and the 1990s. Shame is one of nine primary affects that Tomkins maps out with his careful, and often idiosyncratic schematization. After his death, his work on affects was revived partly due to Eve Sedgwick's interests in the productive and performative potentials of the affect of shame. Whereas Sedgwick highlights shame's liminal and self-effacing qualities in her work on queer performativity, I'm most drawn to the innate ambivalence with which Tomkins defines this affect. Conceived of as a negative

affect, shame takes on a fundamental ambiguity by nature of its proximity to positive affects such as joy or interest.

Tomkins's interest in consciousness bears traces of William James's influence. Tomkins began his postdoctoral fellowship at Harvard and joined the staff at the Harvard Psychological Clinic in 1937, thirty years after James retired from the psychology department after thirty-two years of teaching. As one of the founding faculty members of psychology at Harvard, James would not be a stranger to Tomkins, who shares James's interests in questions of consciousness and freedom. When Tomkins proposes that both Freud and James would have "concerned themselves with affect as a central phenomenon," by virtue of their "deep concern with either mind or body, or both," he probably does not have shame in mind (*AIC* 639). But Tomkins's phrasing of shame as "an inner torment, a sickness of the soul," does recall James's lectures on the sick soul (*AIC* 351). Moreover, Tomkins singles out shame as the only affect that offers "an experience of the self by the self," a "torment of self-consciousness," as James discovers that the "peculiar form of consciousness" that the sick souls possess can "spoil and vitiate" all the goodness in life (*AIC* 359; *Varieties* 136, 139). Both of them conceive of different stages of the affliction. For Tomkins, shame and humiliation could aggravate into paranoia and paranoid schizophrenia. For James, the sickness of the soul increases in the degree of morbidity as it evolves from sadness, an incapacity for joyous feeling, to religious melancholy, and panic fear (*Varieties* 140-162). And it is with this "worst kind of melancholy"--"panic fear" (160)--that James associates a dressing room incident that took place in 1870. Turning to his 1901 reflection upon that experience, I hope both to fortify my argument for the connection between Tomkins and James, and to point out a forerunner of the externalized shame that I identify in the modern American literary imagination.

In the spring of 1870, at the age of twenty-eight, William James had a fit of "horrible fear of [his] own existence," following a series of physical and mental struggles in his life, including the

death of his cousin, Minny Temple, in early March (R. Richardson 117). This experience found its way into his 1902 collection of Gifford lectures, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, as "an excellent example" for the "worst kind of melancholy" by an anonymous French correspondent (*Varieties* 159-160).

> Whilst in this state of philosophic pessimism and general depression of spirits about my prospects, I went one evening into a dressing-room in the twilight to procure some article that was there; when suddenly there fell upon me without any warning, just as if it came out of the darkness, a horrible fear of my own existence. Simultaneously there arose in my mind the image of an epileptic patient whom I had seen in the asylum, a black-haired youth with greenish skin, entirely idiotic, who used to sit all day on one of the benches, or rather shelves against the wall, with his knees drawn up against his chin, and the coarse gray undershirt, which was his only garment, drawn over them inclosing his entire figure. He sat there like a sort of sculptured Egyptian cat or Peruvian mummy, moving nothing but his black eyes and looking absolutely non-human. This image and my fear entered into a species of combination with each other. That shape am I, I felt, potentially. Nothing that I possess can defend me against that fate, if the hour for it should strike for me as it struck for him. There was such a horror of him, and such a perception of my own merely momentary discrepancy from him, that it was as if something hitherto solid within my breast gave way entirely, and I became a mass of quivering fear. (*Varieties* 160)

Several biographical accounts of William James have addressed this incident in relation to his increasing attention to the issue of consciousness.[12] As a mental affliction, neurasthenia (close to the

[12] Phil Oliver identifies this experience as "revelatory" for James and alerts him to the "fundamentally precarious" condition of an individual (47). This mode of philosophic pessimism, or what Oliver labels "invalidism," speaks to in George Cotkin's opinion James's own realization of the perennial tension between worldly "order or progress" and the individual "lack of free will" (Cotkin 59). Robert Richardson reads this episode in relation to the nineteenth-century

contemporary understanding of depression), takes on such a prominent embodied dimension in James's account that it *becomes* the brooding figure of the black-haired, greenish-skinned man. That shape is not only a simple mimicry of or identification with the patient's epilepsy; it is, with James's panic attack, the physical equivalence of his mental composition that engenders his nervous condition as well as his philosophical accomplishments. It is this sculpted human figure that is to haunt James months afterwards, becoming indistinguishable from the ailment itself. Jill McNish offers an interesting reading of this scene, and connects it to James's contemplation on the "sick soul." She discusses James's experiences of psychic anguish not only in light of the limitations of human free will and rationalism, but also as indicative of the conflict between the ideal of autonomy and the longing for intimacy. Given shame's proximity to the "experienced self" and its built-in desire for "union with the source of being," McNish pronounces James as one who "suffer[s] from profound shame," and recounts the dressing room incident as "fundamentally [an] experience of the affect of shame" ("Failure" 399, 401, 394). Like Freud's confession to his "shamelessness" as an author, James's susceptibility to shame is not a singular development and idiosyncratic trait in the intellectual history around the turn of the century. He shares this sensibility not only with his brother Henry, but with many other novelists who come after the *fin-de-siècle*. The "spell" of modernity has generated a myriad of responses to the question of consciousness and identity, which, compounded with the rapid advancement of technology, has bound the modern writers together in a shared sensitivity to the affect of shame. This shameful figure of the epileptic becomes in this light a near corporeal correspondence to shame, a heightened consciousness incarnate. In it, consciousness takes its toll on itself; with it, the productivity of shame reaches its limit.

This epileptic figure is significant through the following chapters as it almost "embodies" shame in a phenomenological dimension. "Almost" because in itself, the posture that greenish man

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knowledge of neurasthenia, as conducive to a resolution on James's part to "abstain from the mere speculation and contemplative grubelei" and to "voluntarily cultivate the feeling of moral freedom" (Richardson 121).

adopts does not involve any thoughts of shame. Rather, it is what this figure could invoke in the spectator, William James, that grants it an undeniable *shameful* effect. This sedentary position--"knees drawn up against his chin," undershirt "drawn over them inclosing his entire figure"--mirrors another "quintessential" figure of shame, one that Tomkins draws to define the shame response. According to Tomkins, in an interpersonal setting, when the level of interest and joy experiences an *incomplete* reduction, the individual shall respond with a bodily response that aims to prevent further communication with the object of interest. "By dropping his eyes, his eyelids, his dead and sometimes the whole upper part of his body," Tomkins proposes, the ashamed individual "calls a halt to looking at another person...and to the other person's looking at him" (*AIC* 352). Even internalized shame could feature such a "dropping" posture. In fear that "one part of the self be seen by another part," the head "may also be hung in shame symbolically" when a person is stricken by shame towards themselves (352). Tomkins postulates that clothing is an invention that accompanies the "generalization of shame to the whole body," in order that no part of the body becomes vulnerable to "the stare of the other" (352). Tomkins revisits this phenomenological formula in the third volume of his *Affect Imagery Consciousness* as well, where he puts forth a similar but more physiologically-informed phrasing of the shame position. Mainly in response to "a barrier or perceived impediment" to interest or joy, the response of shame "includes a lowering of the eyelid, a lowering of the tonus of all facial muscles, a lowering of the head via a reduction in tonus of the neck muscles, and a unilateral tilting of the head in one direction" (630). The embodied phenomenology of shame serves an important role in my readings of the fictional texts. It allows me to identify several unnamed instances of shame, while directing me to the externalizable, performance-based, other-oriented aspects of shame. Shame, as performed by the "unruly" bodies, is an unusual site of negotiation with the socio-political conditions of the society. These shame-ful

performances, my close readings shall demonstrate, also contain valuable insights for the individual to battle the discriminatory forces and to (re-)gain their sense of identity.

Beauty and Beast: The Sketches of Shame

The authors that this project engages with--Henry James, Nella Larsen, Ernest Hemingway, Toni Morrison, and Octavia Butler--inherit and expand upon Gustave Flaubert's literary commitment to "the moral history of the men of [his] generation...the history of their *feelings*" (Flaubert 80). Interestingly, in the same 1864 letter, Flaubert admits to a sickness[13] of mind similar to William James's. Flaubert testifies that his work serves a therapeutic function, not to cure, but to "stifle the melancholy [he] was born with" (80). Shame is one such *feeling* through which all of these modern writers delve into the interiority of their characters; together, their portrayals of shame constitute a rough sketch of the *history* of shame as well. Beginning with Henry James, who signed the contract for *The Wings of the Dove* when his brother William was taking goat's lymph shots in Bad Nauheim, these novelists violate the code of decency that has persuaded earlier writers not to fully engage with the topic of shame in their works.[14] Taking an almost "shameless" turn, these authors have not only not evaded shame, but stayed long enough to observe shame in all its intricate manifestations, even seeming to linger in an embrace of shame. In them, the protagonists no longer maintain a "simple" pathological relation to shame--borne down by the weight of such a psychological burden. Rather, the depictions of shame in these modern fictions have demonstrated a prominent *phenomenological* aspect. Shame has moved away from the purely emotional realm onto the spatial and temporal dimensions. The portrayals of shame in the novels generate "prosthetic" beings

[13] In his 1864 letter to Mademoiselle Leroyer de Chantepie, Flaubert gives a brief description of his chronic mental ailment, in a language that reads very similar to William James's characterization of the sick soul. He confesses that even with the help of writing, the "old dregs resurface, the old dregs that no one knows of, the deep, secret wound" (80). Using James's terms, here we have a portrait of someone who seems to be healthy-minded, but who is rather tormented with morbidity of the soul.

[14] Harriet Wilson, for instance, confessed in the introduction to her 1859 narrative, *Our Nig*, that she "purposely omitted what would most provoke shame in [her] good anti-slavery friends at home" in (3).

of shame, who become "bound" up with nonhuman objects. Such a symbiotic "fold" unsettles the autonomy of the individual, capturing the reader in a shameful bind with characters as well. As an "experience of the self by the self," shame gains favor in the literary imagination in the late nineteenth and twentieth century partly as a response to modernity. When new modes of perspective become available, when technology radically changes the human experience, consciousness is one of the only sites left that individuals can rely upon to construct a stable sense of identity. Interest in consciousness is thus transferred to one of its heightened forms, shame.

As William James was theorizing upon his vision of the greenish, idiotic figure who preyed upon his mind many years ago, much around the same time, his brother Henry was developing peculiar sketches of shame himself. In early July 1901, right after William delivered the Gifford Lectures in Edinburgh in May and June, Henry began working on *The Wings of the Dove*, having finished *The Ambassadors* earlier in the summer. If the death of their cousin Minny Temple in 1870 is partially responsible for William's nervous breakdown and his hallucination of the epileptic figure in his dressing room, Minny's tragedy becomes for Henry as much a source of inspiration as a haunting ghost in writing *The Wings of the Dove*. Having played with the idea for over eight years, Henry has finally found a means to "lay the ghost by wrapping it...in the beauty and dignity of art" (*Autobiography* 544). As his March 1870 letter to William shows, it took him over thirty years to transport Minny from "the steady realm of thought" to an even steadier one of art (*William and Henry James* 71). It's interesting how the "noble and unique" figure of Minny could spawn such a diverse range of portraits, from the brooding epileptic, to the angelic and heroic Milly Theale, to the handsome but conniving Kate Croy (Matthiessen 47). What's more interesting is how the splendor of Minny and her memory could generate simultaneously one beautiful and one beastly response, both wrapped up with sensations of shame.

Side by side with the beast stands Kate Croy, the beauty in *The Wings of the Dove* who will become the focus of my next chapter. As a tribute to his cousin Minny Temple,[15] who died at twenty-four of tuberculosis, the novel not only assures her permanence, but guarantees her robust afterlife with a whirlwind of energies and emotions. As fascinating as Milly is, my attention is mostly drawn to the handsome figure of Kate Croy in my reading of *The Wings*. On the surface, Kate has nothing in common with William's image of horror, the greenish, epileptic who remains sedentary; Kate is a widely acknowledged beauty in the prime of her life who impresses all those around her, particularly Merton Densher, as possessing a "pure talent for life" (*WD* 284). What my close reading of several key passages in the novel reveals, however, is that Kate is a deeply troubled person struggling with pathological shame. Moreover, several major characters in the book could also be read via the theme of shame to the extent that James seems to have built the entire novel upon an underlying structure of shame.

A peculiar complexion of Kate's serves as a point of departure for my discussion. In the very first scene of the book, James greets the reader with a striking vision of Kate's beauty. Waiting for her father to appear at the decrepit lodging, Kate carefully surveys the room and the street down below, before settling upon the tarnished glass that reflects her beautiful figure--"the thick fall of her dusky hair," the "beautiful oval," her blue eyes, her "stature," "grace," and "charm" (*WD* 21). By this point, the reader is only vaguely aware of the very first feature that Kate appears with. In the first sentence of the book, before the beauty of Kate strikes in, James chooses to present Kate scarcely at her best--

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[15] The similarities between Milly and Minny are abundant, as many scholars interested in doing biographical criticism have pointed out. For instance, the mystery of Milly Theale mirrors that of Minny's, whose life is a "strenuous, almost passionate *question*, which [James's] mind...lacked the energy to offer the elements of an answer for" (*Selected Letters* 83). Minny's spirit, which James testifies in the same letter to Grace Norton, as "the supreme case of a taste for life as life," fuels Milly's outburst that she shall "tak[e] full in the face the full assault of life" (*WD* 89). More examples see Virginia Fowler (1984), *Henry James's American Girl*; Lyndall Gordon (1999), *A Private Life of Henry James*; Elizabeth Stevenson (2018), *Henry James: The Crooked Corridor*.

> She waited, Kate Croy, for her father to come in, but he kept her unconscionably, and there were moments at which she showed herself, in the glass over the mantel, a face positively pale with the irritation that had brought her to the point of going away without sight of him. (*The Wings of the Dove* 21)

Irritated, alone, kept waiting--the charming, gregarious, usually waited upon Kate Croy presents herself almost at the worst at the very outset of the story. More extraordinarily, Kate is *pale*--a characteristic she could hardly be associated with. Interestingly, James has Kate all dressed in black in this particular situation, which makes her paleness stands out even more, but at the same time, downplays the curiously uncharacteristic trait. Contrasted with the "black, closely-feathered hat," the "thick fall" of her dark hair, and her black attire, her face becomes almost *naturally* pale. By the time the reader is introduced to Kate's extraordinary beauty, her pale face has already been forgotten. It is not until half way into the story that we see Kate becomes pale again. These instances of uncharacteristic complexion may have been easily overlooked, if not for Charles Darwin's work on the physical expression of emotions. Darwin's *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872) contains an interesting section on paleness, nestled in the chapter on blushing. He lists five areas within which pallor could occur--rage, terror, grief, envy, and lastly, shame. After a brief but interesting account for the pale complexion's biophysiological basis, Darwin shares an anecdote of an "extremely pale" shame-laden person. In that case, a lady who has embarrassed herself in public later finds out that her face has been ghastly white, rather than flushed, during the incident. Guided by this "exception" and Darwin's explications on paleness, I collate all five instances of Kate Croy's unwonted pallor in *Wings*, carefully sift through the intricately layered circumstances of each occasion, and arrives at the conclusion that the pale Kate is the Kate in shame, and more precisely, the Kate who fails miserably at staving off shameful sensations. Her father, Lionel Croy, and his

scandalous lifestyle, have cultivated in Kate a primal aversion to shame, which, according to Tomkins's explications on shame, makes her a total shame-bound person.

Ever since the "positive turn" of scholarship on shame in the late 1950s (Leys 2007), a mushrooming of criticisms on the affect provides an extensive footnote to Lasch's verdict of a "vogue of shame" (1995). Positing shame as not merely painful, but positive and productive, these texts call for a reevaluation of shame, which James might have initiated with *The Wings of the Dove* more than a century ago. Amidst such a persistent wave of scholarship on shame, in which the works by Tomkins, Nathanson, Scheff, Sedgwick are marvelous examples, it is refreshing too to turn back to James, and to contemplate an early literary representation of the power of shame. In this pseudo-allegory of shame, which James adapts from the beautiful memory of Minny Temple, the joy of life and the danger of shame are so tightly bound together that to remain impervious to shame--to become shame-paranoid--is to forfeit the capacity for enjoyment in the end. Alongside the pale-faced, shame-laden Kate, Susie Stringham stands quivering with anxiety. If Kate figures as the Tomkinsian shame incarnate, then Susie is the prime example of the Sedgwickian paranoid reader. Besides Susie, the paranoid mindset also influences the actions of Kate Croy, Aunt Maud, Lord Mark, and Sir Luke Strett, to a greater or lesser degree. Mapping these affective portraits in *The Wings*, I hope to complicate the ongoing psychological readings of James's work by demonstrating his exceptional knowledge of affects, especially the affect of shame and its exacerbated development, paranoia. Shame plays such a significant role in the composite pictures he renders of the comprehensive human experience. Even as an early practitioner in this "turn to shame," James exhibits an almost unparalleled understanding of the ways in which shame could completely ravage lives without prompting any outbreak of violence.

Following Probyn (2005), I position my project as an account of shame as it is. James's *Wings* is a perfect place for me to start to re-present shame in all its complexity in the American literary

imagination in the period of what Stearns call "the reconsideration of shame" (68). Contrary to the evidence Stearns gathers from sociology, anthropology, and history, literary interests in shame have not experienced any significance decline since the late nineteenth century; rather, if shame "had been ubiquitous at least since the advent of agriculture, as part of both social and personal experience" (Stearns 69), the authors and texts I engage with in this volume demonstrate a shared desire to support that "ubiquity" with the literary experience as well. James's *Wings* figures as a concentrated study on the emotional impact of shame in a near pristine setting, in which the socio-cultural conditions do not render certain characters more prone to shame than others. Densher, for instance, remains equally sensitive to shame as Milly, despite his inferior social and economic positions. The later representations of shame, in Larsen, Hemingway, Morrison, or Butler, have embedded shame in a network of forces of unequal magnitudes. Shame has not yet been taken as an effect of the realization of sociopolitical inequality in James. Predominantly theoretical readings of characters in the Tomkinsian and Sedgwickian traditions are a possibility in *Wings*, in which personal choices rather than social or cultural circumstances assume primary importance. As the subsequent modern writers share the orientation towards shame with its physiological manifestations, their works present shame as the product of social pressures' operation upon the human body. Shame figures as the embodied text that narrates the consciousness's response to the socio-cultural disciplinary forces. Foregrounded in James's work is the dynamics of shame played out in the personal realm, when conditions of accountability and agency are still kept relatively independent from communal and collective influences. In this way, James accentuates shame's role as a fundamental human feature--as indispensable for moral or spiritual health (Smedes 1992, Fernie 2002, McNish 2004), more than as a cogent source of interpersonal bonding (Schneider 1992, Probyn 2005, Burrus 2007), or of personal freedom, which my later chapters shall focus upon. My attention to the subtle moments of affective exchange and my search for traces of shamed manifestations guide me forward, as I continue to

facilitate a genuine conversation across disciplines, in eager anticipation for a deepened and more rounded understanding of the affect.

Between the Three Wooden Steps and the Window Sill

Turning to Nella Larsen and Toni Morrison, I explore the conditions of possibility for shame's rejuvenating and liberating effects upon the individual. Together *Passing* (1929) and *Sula* (1973) present the occasions in which shame seems to subvert the hegemonic socio-cultural conditions that produce certain restrictive "inscriptions" on the body. Zooming in on scenes of interpellation in the two novels, I demonstrate how the interaction between the affective response--shame--and the drive mechanism--the smile--demands a reconsideration of the negative and positive affects, which social scientists have heretofore kept distinct in their researches. I suggest with my close readings of the texts that there might be an inherent shamed dimension in Althusser's primal scene of interpellation, in which the hail always leaves behind a difference between the pre-interpellated individual and the person who is hailed forth. That difference, which the subject retains and which ideology can never fully account for, instills in the individual an indelible sense of shame for their essential inadequacy. This critical gap also echoes the innate mechanism of shame, which the Tomkinsian tradition regards as constitutive of the affect. By the "incomplete reduction of interest or joy," Tomkins informs us, shame is automatically activated (*AIC* 353). Thus shame is not so much a response to the act of the reduction of the positive affect, as to its *remainder*. The excess is the operative principle of the mechanism of shame. Nowhere do surplus identitarian constituents abound more than in the case of racial passing. I begin my discussion with two somewhat parallel situations in which Helene Wright and Clare Kendry find themselves caught by interpellatives that leave out key components of their identity. Helene is grilled by a white train conductor after stepping into a white-only coach, while Clare becomes an unintended victim of her husband's racial

slur. The respectable Helene becomes "gal," as Clare, despite her successful passing, is "nig" again. On both occasions, the huge gap between the interpellated and the practiced identities ironically leaves no space for the individual to breathe freely. Helene is straggled by the "three wooden steps" that mark the boundary between the free space down below and the forbidden territory of the whites (*Sula* 20). Daunted by the prospect of making the extra physical effort of "go[ing] back and adown the three wooden steps again," Helene submits herself and her daughter Nel to a far more inimical situation of "embarrassment," which she has sought to avoid in the first place (20). On the other hand, Clare's perhaps unconscious predilection for thrills pushes her ultimately to the windowsill in a Harlem penthouse, where she, as a racial passer, should be nowhere near. When her white husband barges in, delirious with anger and hurt, she retreats to the window, "composed as if everyone were not staring at her in curiosity and wonder" (*Passing* 175). Hailed as "gal" and "nig," both women are pushed to the edge of viable existence. The impossible living circumstances propel them to turn elsewhere for sustenance. Shame is the unlikely ally that comes to their rescue.

The phenomenological dimension of shame becomes vividly conspicuous in both Larsen and Morrison's works as shame gets entangled with the mechanisms of interpellation in the two novels. In *On the Reproduction of Capitalism*, Louis Althusser outlines a detailed description of the workings of ideology and the ideological apparatuses. Besides the rigorous theoretizations on the relationship between subjects and ideology, Althusser depicts a hypothetical scene of interpellation, which he believes will capture the dynamic of "recruitment" that converts individuals into subjects.

> It can be imagined along the lines of the most commonplace, everyday hailing, by (or not by) the police: 'Hey, you there!'...we suppose that the theoretical scene we are imagining happens in the street, the hailed individual turns around. With this simple 180-degree physical conversion, he becomes a *subject*. Why? Because he has recognized that the hail

> 'really' was addressed to him and that 'it really was he who was hailed' (not someone else). (Althusser 190-1)

Althusser follows this demonstration of ideology's "operation" with reflections on its efficacy. He ruminates that the "practical telecomunications of hailing" enjoy such wide success that they "hardly ever misses it mark," and that the person hailed "always recognizes that *he* really was the one hailed" (191). He admits that this is a "strange" phenomenon, and allows that on certain occasions interpellation would fail, since only "nine times out of ten" does an individual turn around (191). This margin of error is what I see my interpretations of Larsen and Morrison primarily respond to. The space *beside* the unproblematic functioning of ideology supports a viable space of living that my close readings strive to accentuate. Shame is one particular condition with which the individual could negotiate with the terms of their subjecthood in the ideological apparatuses. It is at once the specific outcome that arises out of certain confrontations between the subjects and the ideological power, and a condition of possibility for subversion. Drawing from Tomkins's insight that the affect system, rather than the Freudian drive system, is the "primary innate biological motivating mechanism" (*AIC* 598), I read this affective dimension as laying the groundwork for subsequent subversion and reconstitution of the self. Intense affective junctures, such as the shame sensation, slide open the "inscribed surface" of the self (Foucault 1984), give room to a return and reversal of self-constitution and a genuine exchange of the interpersonal.

If Henry James's *The Wings of the Dove* sends a moral message of shame's indispensable role in human life in a society in which values of democracy and universal equality are uncontested, then Larsen and Morrison's sketches of shame demonstrate how shame provides much needed respite from the stringency of social disciplines. Helene and Clare's shame reveals their readiness to refrain from investing positive affects in a hostile world. Both their shame and the "dazzling" smiles they wear are ways with which they seek to negotiate a viable place in society (*Sula* 21). Racial antagonism

often makes it extremely hard for the individual to subsist, despite the comforts of the shame-induced smile--Helene's retreat from the South and Clare's tragedy in Harlem are two cases in point. But to remain unshameable--to stay beyond any shameful interpellation--is not an alternative. The titular protagonist in *Sula* has stayed on the outskirts of both the dynamics of interpellation and shame throughout the book. The mystery that surrounds Sula--her illness notwithstanding--is almost comparable to that of Milly Theale, although she is as far away from the dove figure as possible. For one, unlike Milly, she is the one who steals the husband from her best friend, Nel Wright, and remains unapologetic. She watches her mother, Hannah, burn to death, with more fascination than terror. She lives daringly beyond the prescribed proper code of behavior by her black community, unchastened by a collective enmity for her. I contrast Sula's preference for self-same "interpellability" to her resistance to shame. Her frequent failure to establish positive ties to the love objects, and to her own self in particular, renders her unable to fully account herself with any ideological frameworks, restrictive as they are. Like James's *Wings*, *Passing* and *Sula* contain morals of shame and the ethics of living; unlike *Wings*, Larsen and Morrison's tales present shame in a socio-cultural context that is underpinned with discriminatory conditions. The shame-induced smile thus signals, however briefly, a narrow but veritable space of living.

On a Shameful Quest

If shame is a potential state of mind for the characters in *The Wings of the Dove*, and an enforced condition of living for those in *Passing* and *Sula*, then in Ernest Hemingway's *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden*, it becomes a constant, though perhaps underacknowledged mode of being. Nowhere does the link between shame and modernity stand out more plainly than in the two works by Hemingway. His iceberg theory of omission that demands seven-eighths of the contents to be hidden puts shame in "dormancy" as well. As a stylistic device, his understatement of shame

helps prove the relevance, if not centrality of shame to the modern condition. Salubrious as shame could be, which readings of James, Larsen, and Morrison's texts have supported, only in Hemingway, especially with his minimalist principle, could we experience, along with the characters, the magnitude of the agony of shame. When Jake Barnes in *The Sun Also Rises* undresses himself in front of a mirror, he surrenders himself to the smarting shame of his impotence as he discloses his wounded penis.

> Undressing, I looked at myself in the mirror of the big armoire beside the bed. That was a typically French way to furnish a room. Practical, too, I suppose. Of all the ways to be wounded. I suppose it was funny. I put on my pajamas and got into bed. (*The Sun Also Rises* 30)

In a similar manner, Catherine Bourne's shame undoubtedly reaches a new height as she stares herself in the mirror, having returned from a rendezvous with her lover, Marita, and finding her husband, David, gone.

> When she came back to the room David was not there and she stood a long time and looked at the bed and then went to the bathroom door and opened it and stood and looked in the long mirror. Her face had no expression and she looked at herself from her head down to her feet with no expression on her face at all. The light was nearly gone when she went into the bathroom and shut the door behind her. (*The Garden of Eden* 115)

That the sensations of shame are painful is not a fact that my reading of shame's ethicality tries to dispute or overlook. Even in *The Wings of the Dove*, as she is enthused about the prospects of her life, Milly is to experience the full weight of her shame over Densher's betrayal, forfeiting her will to battle with the disease by "turning her head to the wall" (*WD* 334). But shame does not stop at pain. It produces a myriad of other things--feelings, responses, actions, etc., which is what my project focuses upon. It is not simply the hurt that I believe demands our attention. As literary critics, we

can map out the numerous paths along which shame travels, and point to the distance between the end products and the affect they originate from, whatever formats they might be. In this way, shame as it *is, does*, and could *become*--might be able to lead us to insights that the social scientific researches dare not imagine and could not yet corroborate. Hemingway's work furthers my reading of shame's salubrious effects after James's and Larsen's. As an entry into the complexity of the subjugating and subjectivizing dynamics, shame is not only an important constituent for a meaningful life, but an often overlooked means of leverage with which individuals negotiate the terms of their existence.

Jake's and Catherine's mirror viewing highlights shame as a site of inquiry into the impossible demands of socio-cultural conditions. Unlike the other characters in the books, such as Robert Cohen and David Bourne, Catherine remains defiant against the mockery of her shame. She keeps practice on her "unruly" body what Jake and David dare not do--exploring expressions of being that the dominant heteronormative economy takes offense at--sexual and artistic experiments that challenge conceptions of "honorable" social products such as marriage, love, femininity, loyalty, etc. Prior to her affair with Marita, Catherine confirms her "carefree" mindset in a conversation with David and Marita on the gossip she caused in Nice with her unconventional attire. Her responses--"I don't know," "I don't care either," "I didn't mind it," and "I liked it"--foreshadow the daring experiment with Marita that she is determined to conduct, in spite of David's plea. Uninhibited by her sense of shame, Catherine carries on with her self-rebuilding projects, keeping true to her belief that her and David's life should not follow any set patterns that society deems appropriate.

> "Do I look any different?" Catherine asked. "I wish they'd brought the mirror. Do I look any different to you?"
>
> "No." David looked at her. She looked very blond and disheveled and darker than ever and very excited and defiant.
>
> "That's good," she said. "Because I tried it."

> "You didn't do anything," the girl said.
>
> "I did and I liked it and I want another drink."
>
> "She didn't do anything, David," the girl said.
>
> "This morning I stopped the car on the long clear stretch and kissed her and she kissed me and on the way back from Nice too and when we got out of the car just now." Catherine looked at him lovingly but rebelliously and then said, "It was fun and I liked it. You kiss her too. The boy's not here." (*GE* 111)

Determined to be undaunted by her conscience and striving to show that love and scandal are not irreconcilable, Catherine lets her shame guide her further along the path of her creativity. To a lesser degree, Jake in the *Sun* is also prompted by his unbearable shame to explore ways with which his manhood could acquire meaning beyond the restrictive sociocultural scripts. Their affects, and shame in particular, help them glue together a complex picture of reality against which the social norms appear groundless and irrational.

In their scrambling to refill the shameful hollow of their being, the characters in *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden* turn to a variety of venues where meaning might reside. These socio-cultural locales feature professions, festivities, recreations, and social sites such as hotels and bars where shame is also likely to emerge. Catherine has to continually overcome sensations of shame in pursuing her rites of change in the tonsorial and sexual experimentation. David abandons his honeymoon narrative that recounts his clandestine pleasure with Catherine, only to grow attached to the shameful story of his betrayal of a majestic elephant. Jake's passion for *toreo* is complicated by the shameful overtone present in both the homosocial circle of the *aficionados* and the physicality of the bullfight. On one occasion, Pedro Romero, the rising star of San Fermín, is seen engaging with his bull in a peculiarly provocative manner.

> He took him out softly and smoothly...At the end of the pass they were facing each other again. Romero smiled. The bull wanted it again, and Romero's cape filled again, this time on the other side...It was all so slow and so controlled. It was as though he were rocking the bull to sleep...The bull charged and Romero waited for the charge, the muleta held low, sighting along the blade, his feet firm. Then without taking a step forward, he became one with the bull, the sword was in high between the shoulders, the bull had followed the low-swung flannel, that disappeared as Romero lurched clear to the left, and it was over. (*SAR* 217)

Capturing the dynamic of bullfighting, the macho profession par excellence, with the image of cross-species lovemaking, Hemingway's narrator, arguably Jake, travesties the concept of masculinity as defined by the heteronormative economy. The shame he has felt over his lack of manhood takes him on a quest for other valid expressions of gender and sexuality. In a similar way, when David in *Garden* chooses the African stories over the Catherine narrative, he is trading the shame over his undermined masculinity with a form of shame that may be as intense but that would at least let him preserve the "appropriate" sexual identity. If shame figures as a critical component of the embodied experience in James, and problematizes the terms of humane existence in Larsen and Morrison, then in Hemingway, shame showcases its mobilizing power in the process of negotiation. It sends characters in active pursuit for conditions of possibility of meaning and prods them along with frequent new experiences of shame in their various ventures. Shame is strikingly productive; it begets itself, and engenders other affects, thoughts, actions, and helps forge personal identities, communal ties, and interspecies relationalities.

Bloody Attachments

My project of tracing shame's manifestations in the twentieth-century American fictional landscape culminates with Octavia Butler's *Kindred* and *Fledgling*. If Henry James's *The Wings of the*

Dove is an allegory of shame in a near ideal socio-cultural setting, then Butler's two standalone novels conceive of shame as indispensable to the survival of human community. While submitting its "victims" to emotional and physical pains, shame is constitutive of the embodied experience to the extent that any permanent separation from shame poses life-threatening consequences. As a largely learned response, shame implies a precedence, so that to be shamed is to have always already been shamed. Together, *Kindred* and *Fledgling* present a commentary on the legacy of history and reveal shame's role in protecting certain collective memory from being tempered with the passing of time. Shame in Butler has been repurposed not only as an opportunity to reevaluate one's personal truths--as Larsen, Morrison, and Hemingway's texts have demonstrated--but more precisely as an occasion with which individuals access their communal past and rebuild their identity in light of that connection. If shame resides at those sites of meaning in *Sun* and *Garden* as the novels canvass the frantic responses to modernity, in *Kindred* and *Fledgling*, the present and the past are inevitably bound together, and shame *is* one such site through which the protagonists (re)familiarize themselves with crucial cultural knowledge.

The penultimate chapters of both *Kindred* and *Fledgling* feature a violent scene of bloodshed. In *Kindred*, Dana Franklin, who has been traveling back to the nineteenth-centuty Maryland to save the life of her forefather, Rufus Weylin, battles against the latter's sexual predation before killing him with a knife. In *Fledgling*, out of self-defense, the genetically engineered Ina, Shori Matthews, pounces upon the conservative old vampire, Katherine Dahlman, tearing out the latter's larynx before fainting due to her own gunshot wound. In both scenarios, the protagonists' actions retain a more or less undisclosed shamed dimension. As Shori has been struggling with her half-Ina, half-human identity that small-minded bigots such as the Silks regard as intrinsically shameful, Dana has to keep revising her conceptions of shame and humanity as she witnesses how her forebear Alice becomes a sex slave to Rufus. When the two attacks take place, as victims as well as actors, Dana and Shori are

battling the bodily and epistemological enemies that are about to overwhelm them both physically and emotionally.

> He was not hurting me, would not hurt me if I remained as I was. He was not his father, old and ugly, brutal and disgusting. He smelled of soap, as though he had bathed recently--for me? The red hair was neatly combed and a little damp. I would never be to him what Tess had been to his father--a thing passed around like the whiskey jug at a husking. He wouldn't do that to me or sell me or...
>
> No.
>
> I could feel the knife in my hand, still slippery with perspiration. A slave was a slave. Anything could be done to her. And Rufus was Rufus--erratic, alternately generous and vicious. I could accept him as my ancestor, my younger brother, my friend, but not as my master, and not as my lover. He had understood that once. (*Kindred* 260)

Caught in between Rufus's gentle but resolute touches, Dana is only able to break free when her enjoyment of the soapy fragrance and the well-groomed hair is significantly reduced by contemplation on a slave's fate. The reduction of interest sends up an acute jolt of shame that finally prompts Dana to raise the knife to her forefather. Not only is shame the critical element that justifies her patricide, the dynamic of the physical interaction between Dana and Rufus mirrors the pull and push of the positive affect of joy in shame as well. As their bodies alternately advance and retreat, interest gives way to its reduction only to return again in the bouts of shame. It is from the depths of her shame and hatred that Shori fights the savage battle with Katherine Dahlman, who refuses to acknowledge her as Ina, who takes the side with the Silks in their plan to eradicate the Matthews family, and who orchestrates the murder of Shori's symbiont, Theodora Harden. When Shori bites into the "flesh of [Katherine's] throat," to "destroy her throat, tear it to pieces," she unleashes all her shameful sensations as she proves her not only equal to, but far more superior than

Ina (*Fledgling* 312). Shame is the affect that "oversees" her rebirth after her traumatic loss of memory. It reunites her with her vampiric instincts, chastens her to take better care of her symbionts by tapping all her human and Ina potentials, and enables her to avenge for the deaths of her families and symbiont. Above all, shame initiates and empowers her awakening as a valid being.

Ultimately, I conceive of my project as gesturing at a capaciousness of shame that might dismantle personal, communal, species, social, cultural, spatial, temporal, disciplinary, and epistemological boundaries. Butler's texts further experiment with the warping logic of time that the shame-laden rituals in Hemingway have only taken as context. Shame puts the individuals in *Kindred* and *Fledgling* in a backward-facing positionality that informs their identity and assures their survival in the present. As Dana travels across time to access her past in order to understand her present, Shori needs her "time travel" to restimulate lost cultural knowledge. Both protagonists demand to be rewritten back into history to manage the hostile circumstances of their existence, often having to revise conceptions of shameful or *normal* practices as they explore the terms of survival. Conversations across the temporal, social, and species divides are built upon these shame-induced, shame-subsisting experiences of life-death struggle. As the portal through which compromise, if not total reconciliation has to be reached between disparate value systems, shame opens our minds to *other* ways of being that have not been imaginable within uniform socio-cultural settings. Eschewing linear temporality and heteronormativity, Butler's two novels also help advance our knowledge of the affect of shame. Shame's ambiguity, taken in the broadest sense, is that which challenge all fixity of notions, including identity, knowledge, community, culture, and their valued concepts. Shame starts with a peculiar difference, between complete enjoyment and utter denial, nourishes this added dimension of suspense, and inspires new forms of sociality that destigmatize shame and rewrite shame as one of the knowledge-production sites. The recontexualization of shame is indeed an effect of shame that even works to efface shame itself by demanding new definitions of pain,

negativity, injury, among its other constitutive features. While we remain undecided upon the figure of shame, the characters in the novels--Milly, Clare, Catherine, Dana--have all, to a larger and lesser extent, exhibited a readiness to participate in the "collective" history of shame. Regardless of the particular circumstances under which they reach the decision, their stories set the example that we could not, and probably shall not, stop thinking with and living with shame. However shame-prone or unshameable we are.

A "New" Beginning

Shame has always been an integral part of the tapestry of human emotions captured by the literary imagination. Starting with Nathaniel Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*, it assumes a more or less significant role in several nineteenth-century short stories. In his 1832 "My Kinsman, Major Molineux," Hawthorne registers the use of laughter in countering the debilitating effects of shame, preceding Donald Nathanson's proclamation of laughter as the best defense of shame by 155 years. With *The Scarlet Letter*, Hawthorne renders powerfully, with Hester Prynne's public shaming on the scaffold, the spectatorial nature of shame that Chamarette and Higgins claim in their introduction to the edited volume on guilt and shame in 2011. Edgar Allan Poe's 1842 story, "The Masque of the Red Death" gestures at a peculiar connection between blood and senses of guilt and shame that will return in Butler's 2005 *Fledgling*, in which I identify a shame-minded, *bloody*, but not gruesome type of sociality. The 1850s to the early 60s features a series of slave narratives, from Harriet Beecher Stowe's *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, to Solomon Northup's *Twelve Years A Slave*, Harriet Wilson's *Our Nig*, and Harriet Jacobs's *Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl*. Together they point to the divergence between the scant literal references to shame and the abundant shamed sensations, which might explain in part the contrary views on shame's presence in modernity. Testimonies of enslaved experiences mark physical and sexual exploitation as a predominant source of shame, highlighting the places where

gender intersects with senses of dignity, integrity, and autonomy. More than other genres, slave narratives understand how contingent concepts of identity, intimacy, family, and responsibility could be across human communities. Shame, as my readings of Butler's *Kindred* will show, might be one such constant, with which life takes on a stable set of meanings.

Shame in classical naturalist writings could evolve into unapologetic shamelessness, as Stephen Crane's 1893 *Maggie: A Girl of the Street* and 1898 short story, "The Monster" have demonstrated. Maggie's mother Mary is ruthless in doling out verbal abuses in public, pushing Maggie into the depths of moral degradation. Compared to Maggie Johnson, Henry Johnson, the kind-hearted African American, has apparently also lost his sensibility for shame, along with his handsome face in the fire. The faceless monster, who used to care immensely for his public image, stays oblivious to all instances of shaming and ostracization in the story. It's in the portrayals of shame in a naturalistic world that shame intersects with gender expectations. McTeague and Hurstwood voice the earliest guilty feelings when they start to live on the proceeds of their female partners. Scenes of shame are not rare in Dreiser or Crane, but they seem to share Wilson's concern for shielding reader from unpleasant emotions. Shame is left unstated in the confrontation between Drouet and Carrie over Hurswood's marriage status, or when Mac accused Trina of excessive stinginess. At the same that Wilson professes her "shame etiquette," shame finds its way into quite a few nineteenth-century writings. But it's not until Henry James's *The Wings of the Dove* that authors start to dwell on its effects on the body beyond the "sickness of the soul." In proposing to linger over, quite shamelessly, some of the most devastating moments of shame and shaming in American fictions between 1902 and 2005, I wish to present shame as it has been captured by literary consciousness. What the texts have in common—*The Wings of the Dove* (1902), *Passing* (1929), *Sula* (1973), *The Sun Also Rises* (1926), *The Garden of Eden* (1986), *Kindred* (1979), and *Fledgling* (2005)—is foremost an undeniable fascination with the affect of shame. Their understandings of shame should

not be held beneath the theoretical and clinical approaches; rather, as "equal languages or discourses" (Pattison), they are capable of yielding some equally fascinating discoveries on shame.

Ambivalence is one of the key issues that guide this volume. Tomkins's view on the innate activation of shame outlines shame's ambivalence in a concrete manner. Tomkins's formulation of shame's built-in "incompletion" points to shame's innate ambiguity.[16] As a negative affect, shame is paradoxically grounded in positivity and pleasure. As my discussions in the following chapters will show, a similar mode of ambivalence also subtends the mental as well as physical activities of the individuals caught in scenes of shame and shaming. In chapter two, "Paled Shame: Knowledge and Paranoia in *The Wings of the Dove*," I strive to map out places in James's psychological fiction where shame takes on a bodily idiosyncrasy that has been largely overlooked in the range of theoretical texts between Darwin (1872) and Tomkins (1963). I offer a detailed comparison between the paranoid postures of Susan Shepherd and Kate Croy, and the more affectively open positions adopted by Milly Theale and Merton Densher. I maintain a critical distinction between shame and its development, paranoia, while remaining open-minded to the productive potentials both positions might generate. In this intriguing allegory of shame, James showcases his interest, parallel to that of his brother William, in issues of consciousness and affect. His portraits of the inner reality flesh out the fateful consequences for closing off the affective borders of the self. My third chapter, "Interpellation and Hysteria Revisited: the Shameless Smile in *Sula* and *Passing*," investigates the curious affinity between shame and the smiling response. My readings of shamed scenes in Morrison and Larsen suggest that not only does shame appear in the primal scene of the Althusserian interpellation, it might indeed have founded the interpellative mode of subject formation. Shame

[16] Elspeth Probyn is one of the few scholars whose work is inspired by Tomkins's unique conception. In her *Blushes: Faces of Shame*, Probyn derives her central argument that shame is productive, positive, and "just *is*" from shame's ambiguity that Tomkins has outlined (xviii). Such an incomplete reduction suggests for Probyn both shame's border-like character and a probable return of interest and connection. With such a strong tie to positivity, she argues, shame deserves more critical attention than it has obtained. She also uses formulaic approaches to shame as evidence for her argument that human beings are more alike than different. Ultimately, for Probyn, a better understanding of shame can effect far-reaching political and ethical consequences.

makes it possible to rewrite the "inscribed surface" (Foucault 1984) that has been overloaded with normalizing identity categories, and to return the self to a productive fluidity that promises genuine experience. Chapter four, "The Ritual of Shame: Hemingway's *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden*" poses a daring question, "Is shame the quintessential posture of modernity?" Shame in Hemingway is not only depicted as a conditional response to life, but almost as life itself, manifested in the numerous strivings that characters have taken up in the two novels. Hemingway helps us understand why shame is highly relevant and unavoidable in our time, and how shame, rather than being a destructive emotional baggage, features as an agent for the self, anchoring individuals on the path of their self-discovery. Focusing on shame also highlights Hemingway's concern beyond the "code heroes," but also with the ordinary men and women who struggle to stand above their seven eights of shame. Chapter five, "Semper Shame," reads the various expressions of shame in Butler's two standalone novels. The dynamics of shame have given more room for issues of enslavement, violation, mastery and resistance to be played out in temporally strange narratives like *Kindred* and *Fledgling*. The role of shame as tormenter and motivator, prominent in *Fledgling*, is to be complemented by its portrayals in *Kindred*, with a more spacious conception of historicity and temporality. Butler's texts point to shame's productivity at the individual, communal, and social levels, and charges us shameniks to stay in open-minded awe for the next surprise that shame will bring.

To conclude, I want to revisit a particularly thought-provoking scene in Hawthorne's 1843 short story, "The Birthmark," which presents, among other things, a most peculiar image of shame, in the figure of a crimson hand. Disturbed by the imperfection of this birthmark on his wife, Georgiana's face, the scientist Aylmer is driven to undo the "visible mark of earthly imperfection" at all costs (*Short Stories* 178). Affected by her husband's horror and disgust, Georgiana has soon grown to hate this "horrible stigma" of hers to the extent of dismissing all other concerns in life as trivial

(190). “Remove it, remove it,” she exclaims, “whatever be the cost, or we shall both go mad!” As it happens, when she quaffs the elixir Aylmer carefully prepares for her, Georgiana dies. The narrator leaves us with an intriguing comment: “The fatal hand had grappled with the mystery of life, and was the bond by which an angelic spirit kept itself in union with a mortal frame” (193). Shame, incarnated as the birthmark, becomes tantamount to life itself in the story. Perfection, or an existence devoid of any cause of shame, Hawthorne’s story suggests, is unviable. A moral reading of Georgiana's fate is that shame is the godly present that *keeps* human beings alive. At the same time, shame is such a devastating affect that it destroys a life of near perfection for Aylmer and Georgiana. Were they not obsessed with the desire to escape shame, they might learn to enjoy life as it is. The ambivalence of shame lies in its lethal as well as life-giving qualities.

Shame, above all, stays. Painful or life-sustaining, predominant or in decline, the various accounts of shame attest to its relevance to our personal and societal well-being. Its proximity to consciousness and the sense of identity makes shame a de facto site of social monitoring as well. As shown by the 1937 WPA poster (fg. 1, left), and its adaptations on the covers of a 1994 book on psychotherapy (fg. 1, middle) and a 2017 volume on history (fg. 1, right), shame is able to travel across time and space, bringing with it imageries and positionalities that yields nearly "timeless" connotations. The force of shame makes it highly adaptable in any situation and across contexts. The ambivalent powers of shame--lethal or subversive--have kept it viable and highly relevant till this day. Between the shamefacedness and the fatality is the whole space of shame's different representations. My engagement with shame halts after five chapters, leaving in their wake something other than simply a moralistic, positivist message of shame’s values. As the health poster finds its way onto the covers of disparate disciplinary approaches to shame, I hope my project might generate some lingering effects for future research and pedagogy. Reading and thinking with shame

could perhaps effect some kind of an alchemy of our own identity, as we continue to pit the depths of our feelings against the strength of our intellect.



Figure 1. On the left, Works Progress Administration Federal Art Project, designed by Foster Humfreville and Alex Kallenberg. Date stamped on verso: Dec 1, 1937. In the middle, the front cover of the 1994 paperback edition of Nathanson's 1992 monograph *Shame and Pride*, designed by Karl Steinbrenner. On the right, the front cover of Peter N. Stearns's 2017 book, designed by Jennifer S. Fisher.

Chapter Two--Pale Shame and the Paranoia Imperative in *The Wings of the Dove*

A Lover's Spat

"Do you love me, love me, love me?" is the question Merton Densher, back from his journalistic mission to America in *The Wings of the Dove* (1902), hurls at his fiancée Kate Croy, when he comes to pay a formal visit at Lancaster Gate. The intensity of the moment unleashes itself in an anticlimactic "long embrace" that signifies for Densher an ultimate and irrefutable sign of Kate's avowal--her sincerity. What gets overlooked in this lover's spat is the ways in which a vast array of thoughts and feelings have gone into and out of, behind and beside, the vocal and gestural significations. The prodigious Kate Croy, who has romanticized her first encounter with Densher in the gallery party, attests here that "other conscious organs, faculties, feelers" (49) must have found their way into an apparently visual and minimally physical interaction. Without making categorical claims that this episode encapsulates the central drama that has begun, is being played out and will be carried to its fullest scale in the events to come, I propose, with a sharp awareness of the violence that any such interpretive gesture at dissecting James's highly interwoven textual integrity must inevitably incur, to turn and to turn again, with feelers fully forward, to the richness around this scene of shame.

Before putting the idiosyncratic question so bluntly to Kate, Densher conveys all his passion and tenderness into a simple request, "Will you take me just as I am?," to which Kate responds with a "strain" that is unprecedentedly disturbing for him.

> She turned a little pale for the tone of truth in it--which qualified to his sense delightfully the strength of her will; and the pleasure he found in this was not the less for her breaking out after an instant into a strain that stirred him more than any she had ever used with him. "Ah do let me try myself! I assure you I see my way--so don't spoil it: wait for me and give me

> time. Dear man," Kate said, "only believe in me, and it will be beautiful. (*The Wings of the Dove* 198)

What stands out most glaringly--and this is what partially, if not wholly, prompts Densher's vehement response--is the quantity of imperatives that Kate manages to squeeze into a relatively short sentence. No interjectory or exclamatory supplements would be powerful enough to make up the harm that had been done with her hurried and condescending tone. If Densher has instantly felt the sharpness of a strain as he has never been exposed to, it is because almost nowhere has Kate uttered a variety of commands so succinctly strewn together. The only temptation she still remembers to dangle in front of her dear young man is a vague promise in the form of an aesthetic abstraction, "beauty," for which Densher is asked to perform a wide range of feats--let her try, do not spoil her vision, wait for her, and give her time. The stringency of her demand results in a most "violent" response in Densher. He snaps and resorts to physical force, rattling Kate and assaulting her emotionally with an almost idiotic question. Kate's answer--"only believe in me"--figures as an alternative to her unuttered vow of "Yes I love you." The series of leaps of faith her commands ask for adopts Densher's repetitive format, and translates into "believe in me, believe in me, believe in me," with which she seeks to reign in Densher's passionate outbreak. The abruptness with which she shifts the register from direct appeal to emotion to sensible requests of reason suggests the extent to she is embarrassed or even ashamed of a lack of passion in return. Her assurance evades Densher's question and hides behind elaborate but weak abstraction.

While her response takes the form of explicit demands to Densher's emotional plea, Kate also impresses the reader with a particular hue in the scene, the like of which is seldom associated with her. Kate Croy is not *pale*. Paleness is the attribute par excellence for Milly Theale, who strikes

Susan Shepherd Stringham, her friend and companion,[17] upon first meeting, as a singularly "striking apparition"--slim, constantly pale, delicately haggard, anomalously, but agreeably angular (*WD* 77). Milly, the sole heiress to an immense fortune, the odd, queer American girl, *she* is the pale one. And she acknowledges the particularity of her complexion when confronted with the Bronzino portrait at Matcham. Her realization of the unfavorable resemblance to the painting stands as one such occasion in which the American girl would have to "tak[e] full in the face the whole assault of life" (89). The "lividness" (139) of the face, or its "greenness" (140) brings out for Milly the unquestionable fact of her *paleness*. The epithet follows her when she stations herself later on at Palazzo Leporelli, and is even more sharply intensified under the stark contrast with the overflowing luxury of her surroundings. In contrast, Kate is always the handsome girl, the girl who blithely self-identifies as "a brute about illness" and who is hailed by Densher as "strong as the sea" (218). Indeed because her health is such a well-established feature of the novel, the rare bouts of her paleness could come across as an insignificant irregularity. But her paleness is not accidental; it takes a peculiar pattern, and often appears on confrontational occasions that bear an emotional intensity.

Kate Croy has been *pale* before; in fact, she *is* pale the first time she arrives on the scene; but her paleness is perennially overshadowed by her "handsomeness" and health. During her very debut in the novel, while she is waiting for her father to come down at his shabby and irreputable lodging, *before* the acknowledgement of her stature and grace, the face with which she greets herself as well as the readers, is a "positively pale" one (21). Kate has been pale *before* anything else,[18] but her paleness is eclipsed by the rosy brilliance of her beauty, and buried under the blessings of her health and spirit. In this chapter, I trace the appearance and disappearance of the affect shame and the paranoid

[17] Though Susan Stringham had repeated referred to herself as a close confidant to Milly Theale, the latter had seldom voluntarily confided in her, which Susan was either oblivious of or chose to overlook by will in the course of the novel. Sharon Cameron goes further to claim that "Milly has nothing to confide. Milly doesn't tell Susan Stringham anything, and Milly doesn't need to." More discussions of Susan's style and habit of thinking and their significance to the novel in general and impact upon other characters in particular, see *Thinking in Henry James*, pp. 131-6.

[18] Mitchell (1987) reads her pallor in the light of the Jamesian "play of the portentous"--a stylistic principle that puts demands on symmetry and reciprocity in literary imagination (188).

mindset, which is a particular conditioning of the mind that might follow the hyper-sensitivity to and over-caution of shame. Access to shame, I argue, could be productive in ways that the adoption of paranoia is largely antithetical towards. I would first track the instances of Kate Croy's curious spell of pallor, and, referencing to Darwin and Tomkins's works on shame, interpret Kate's paleness in light of shame. I argue that in *The Wings of the Dove*, attachment to the pursuit of pleasure is singularly generative, not only of a variety of bonds between characters, but of *other* differences as well. I then give a (mimetic) reading of the paranoid relationship to knowledge in the book, paying particular attention to moments of *different* manifestations. James with his literary explorations of shame, I propose, precedes and exceeds Tomkins's schemata of the affect, which underplays its potentially positive effects. Rather than casting paranoia in an overwhelmingly negative light as Tomkins and perhaps even Sedgwick might have done, I read James as gesturing towards its productivity in his late fictions, and plumbing its gestalt potentials, not dissimilar to shame, of reversing and traversing boundaries.

In the course of Charles Darwin's contemplation on the various human emotions and their nuanced physical expressions in *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872), he gives an etiological account of paleness, and identifies, to the best of his knowledge, five occasions in which such a complexion would occur: rage, terror, grief, envy and shame. Paleness, Darwin informs us, is occasioned normally with the "contraction of the small arteries of the skin" (307). But individual differences should always be taken into account since for each of those internal conditions, usually more than one outward expression is available. While it's easy to understand the pallor brought out by fear, the pale face in shame is almost counterintuitive, and Darwin references Dr. Burgess in establishing this particular point, attributing the paleness to either a natural capillary adjustment or a rarity in physiological constitution. He even allows a personal anecdote the role of scientific evidence in which the lady who made a social faux pas at a party was surprised to find herself

"extremely pale" against her own judgment that she must have "blushed crimson" (330). This peculiar instance of paleness as opposed to blushing when ashamed becomes overlooked as soon as it has been registered, admitted as only one curious incident in the book.

Whereas an alarming sense of duty toward scientific rigor might have held Darwin back from further comments, the "feelers of our sensibility," a la Kate Croy, beckon us to pause with this shameful pallor.[19] Henry James, contemporary to Charles Darwin, might have not translated Darwin's insight on the shameful pallor in literature, but his depiction of the pale Kate suggests the extent to which his personal understanding of shame agrees with Darwin's. With Kate, I see James as proposing other manifestations of the shame sensation that are not fully verified in his time. To some degree, he has captured with literary creation what science is still skeptical about toward the shamed body. He has translated into imaginative reality the shameful pallor in the figure of Kate Croy, who is not a peculiarly pale girl per se, but whose paleness is invariably peculiar. Besides her inaugural pale irritation and the pallor following Densher's shaming of her lack of devotion, three other occasions evoke similar a facial manifestation. When the group rejoins in Venice for a party at the spectacular Palazzo in the honor of Sir Luke Strett who comes to check upon his patient, Densher has an epiphanic moment with Kate on the nature of his mission. He learns, to his disbelief, that there is "all along" a hidden layer of injunction in Kate's suggestion for him to "Go to see Milly" (*WD* 203), which only now is he able to translate into, "Since she's to die I'm to marry...so that when her death has taken place I shall in the natural course have money" (311). The thump of the revelation, forceful as it must have been on his consciousness, produces none but a "soft murmur"

[19] Paleness might also ensue a spell of vomiting, voluntary or involuntary. Jacques Derrida, in his paper "Economimesis" identifies a tautological relation between disgust and vomit, arguing that the disgusting is what is excluded and irrepresentable in the logocentric system except through vomit. In vomit, Derrida locates the foreclosed failure of any mourning work. In regard to such claims, the paleness of Kate might signify an unwillingness or incapacity to process and successfully mourn the shame of/that is her father.

which hardly interrupts the flow of their conversation. A paling spell, nevertheless, takes over Kate, when

> [s]he turned her head to where their friend was again in range, and it made him turn his, so that they watched a minute in concert. Milly, from the other side, happened at the moment to notice them, and she sent across toward them in response all the candour of her smile, the lustre of her pearls, the value of her life, the essence of her wealth. It brought them together again with faces made fairly grave by the reality she put into their plan. (*WD* 313)

Her paleness ensues, then and there, accompanied by a deadly silence that is only broken up by the music at the party. If the pallor at her father's living room is caused partly by her grief and terror at her father's tardy appearance, her facial reaction now could hardly be anything else from Darwin's list than shame. She is put to shame by the horrid contrast between the admirable trust of Milly and the ruthless pragmatism of their scheme at her fortune. As much as they cherish her generous simplicity, they can't help but look beyond her innocent presence at the monetary core, and for their purpose, the promise of her upcoming demise. It is at this critical juncture, when incongruity proves almost unbearable, and shame too acute to dismiss, that Kate Croy grows pale again. And *again* when Densher, foreseeing the end of the ailing Milly and coming back to London with a sense of mission accomplished, informs Kate of the real cause of Milly's downward turn. With a matter-of-fact calmness, Densher delivers the information that Lord Mark's visit and his confidence of *their* secret engagement are what kills Milly, while making a telltale remark that Kate's change of color isn't "put on" (360). This perceived dose of authenticity, interestingly enough, is what persuades him to drop his persistent inquiry the other time at Lancaster Gate in the shunned privacy of the ugly boudoir. That time, he was convinced of her "sublime sincerity" before consenting to "believe" her and let the matter rest (198). On another occasion, when she is "paler than she had been," occurs when her father, Lionel Croy, comes back to his elder daughter, Marian, for protection from his

"terror" (395). Having deflected Densher's first attempt at knowing what Lionel has done, Kate resorts to another emotional plea, making a direct reference to his profession of love the other time when she was shamed to pallor, "If you love me--now--don't ask me about father." The effect is instantaneous, for not only does their conversation change course immediately, the silent ban on the topic of Lionel is kept till the end.

Among the five instances of Kate's mystifying pallor, two are in proximity to her father whereas the rest are in close connection to her plot against Milly's fortune. It is precisely the ones associated with Lionel that take on an intensity that the others lack--she was only "a little" pale when Densher corners her in the boudoir and again when Milly's credulity puts their cunning to shame at the Palazzo, but she is "positively" pale waiting for her father to show up, and becomes "paler than ever" when pushed to answer about her father. Lionel makes an appearance at the beginning of the novel, and is only alluded to when absolutely necessary. It is the critical consensus now that the "silence that surrounds him" (*WD* 58) is gesturing toward a crime whose nature is as much moral as sexual.[20] The bits of information we manage to piece together from the text would get us no further than "he's odious and vile" and "he's done everything," but Kate's, as well as other close family members' reaction towards Lionel bespeaks of unequivocal shame. The "faint flat emanation of things" that shrouds her father's living room, it becomes increasingly clear, bears an overwhelming sense of shame. And the pale Kate, persuading herself to battle "the shame of fear, of individual, of personal collapse [among] all the other shames," is then as much irritated by Lionel's delay as by her

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[20] Eve Sedgwick (1995) identifies a "code" behind the homosexuality of Lionel Croy, *illum crimen horribile quod non nominandum est*, translated roughly into "the horrible crime which is not to be named." This "naming something 'unspeakable' as a way of denoting," Sedgwick claims, is among James's endeavor to explore "the limits of ... rhetorical possibilities" (75). For a fuller discussion, see "Is the Rectum Straight? Identification and Identity in *The Wings of the Dove*." A variation of this principle is also alluded to in Cameron's analyses of the intricate interrelationship between thinking and speaking in *The Golden Bowl*, when she proposes to discover a "prohibition against meaning" in the communicative strategies among characters, that meaning is to be "proposed" rather than "experienced" (104). See *Thinking in Henry James*, pp. 83-121. Sangari (1992), on the other hand, allows that "crime" to be embedded in a context that "constitute[s] a generative matrix for plural meaning or reading" (299) in a Jamesian text that centers upon the principle of uncertainty.

own insupportable sense of shame of her father. She braves herself to drown her shame an overflow of sensory stimulations. With each intake of "the street...the room...the table-cloth and the centre-piece and the lamp" (21), there is a renewed resolution to overtake shame, a bravado not unlike self-immolation in taking in sensory assaults repetitively. Her defiance of fear, of collapse, of failure and misery are all fueled by, reflected as, and permeating in each item in her father's "sordid lodgings" (24). The emotional and physical adjacency between Kate's pallor and the presence of her irrepresentable father offers a key insight to her paleness through the lens of the shame response. The shamed nuance enriches the complexity of the emotional tenor in James's characters, and provides an example for deriving local and contingent manifestations of affects from their universalizing theoretizations. Kate's pallor arises as her sense of shame intensifies, when she is confronted with her deception of the unsuspectingly romantic Milly, and more intensely so, when she comes in close contact with her father.

Her pallor during the lovers' spat in the beginning of the chapter in response to Densher's querying outburst highlights the difference between Densher's demand and the reality of her situation. Just as her color is to change, when Milly's credulity and unbounded trust in her two marvelous English friends provides too shocking of a contrast to the truth of their friendship, Kate falls short of Densher's expectation of how she *should* take him. The "tone of truth" is none so shocking in itself as when accompanied by the circumstances under which it is to be evaluated. When and only when Kate *never* plans to "take Densher as he was" could she become ashamed into pallor by such a supplication. And if shame is indeed "innately activated" by the "incomplete reduction of interest or joy" (*Affect Imagery Consciousness* 353) as Silvan Tomkins avows, what, we might be tempted to ask, triggers the decrease of excitement or enjoyment[21] for Kate on the present

[21] Silvan Tomkins differentiates between the interest-excitement and the enjoyment-joy affects, the only two positive among the nine primary human affects; the former he claims follows one simple rule--"a range of optimal rates of increase of stimulation density" (187). The smile of joy, on the other hand, doesn't necessarily indicate a joyful mood; it

occasion, and more challengingly perhaps, if such an "incompleteness" bespeaks both a "reduction" and a "continuation" of the "investment of excitement or enjoyment" (*AIC* 361), what protects the remainder of her interest from being sipped dry? I argue in the next section that the pursuit for joy underlies their mutual attachment and nourishes the relationship through the most trying times. Not only has this positivity been written into one of the most significant relationships in the novel, it affects major characterizations as well. James's portrayal of shame, too, retains a peculiar *positive* component that offers interesting complements to Tomkins's theoretical probing of the affect.

The Saving Romance of Fun

Attempts have been made to account for "the nature of the tie"[22] between Kate and Densher, and to wonder at the ardor, vouched for by the author, of a "worried and baffled, yet clinging and confident" peculiarity, through the "mere force of the terms of their superior passion combined with their superior diplomacy" ("Preface" 14). If passion stands behind her attachment to Densher, and if it provides incentives for turning to her notorious father for shelter, then her disavowal of such a connection is particularly mind-boggling. Kate proceeds, with deadpan matter-of-fact-ness, with a "I don't," to assure Densher of the absence of any such romantic considerations beneath her action. Densher covers up his disappointment with a gentlemanly irony, "Heaven be praised" (*WD* 59). He

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is "innately activated...by any relatively steep reduction of the density of stimulation and neural firing" (204), which makes it possible to appear with the reduction of pain, fear, distress, aggression, anger, pleasure, and excitement. The key to the activation of smile, Tomkins points out, is the "steepness of the gradient of stimulation reduction," not the nature of stimulation itself. See *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, pp. 185-218.

[22] The critical stances vary as to the exact nature of the bond between the two lovers; the budding and consolidation of their romance are as ineffable as mystical. Elissa Greenwald in her "Transcendental Romance" (1986) maps the mystery onto a Hawthornian mode of romance, interpreting their connection in the light of a "temporary relief from social bonds" and an "access to the uplifted state of romance" that is otherwise denied the two (180). Kumkum Sangari (1992) adopts a much more sobering view in blasting apart the density of their tie and replacing it with a money-oriented realistic Kate and a "plastic" Densher adept at "speak[ing] the language of hard cash transactions" with Kate (294). Positioned in between and prior to them both, Rowe (1973) romanticizes their love as born from the "timeless space" of the "temple" and the "garden wall" while acknowledging its eventual return to the "material and physical" (137). For Van Slyck (2005), the nature of their bond takes on a powerful Lacanian overtone, making his desired object Kate ultimately "inaccessible," the symbol of his "lack," "incompletion," and "emptiness" (308). He contrasts this pre-*jouissance* desire with love, an admirable transformation gained only with the final sacrifice of Milly.

wishfully mistakes Kate's "being turned back" by her chastening father and disapproving sister in light of her relation to *him* while *her* prior concern is simply to "escape Aunt Maud" (59). Kate is not afraid of making herself clear to the degree of being almost ruthless in confessing to a willingness to "give [him] up" as well. Her possible desertion is aborted only through an adamant refusal to cooperate by Lionel Croy, who "declin[es] [Kate] on any terms" (59). What then underwrites the proclamation with an "extraordinary beauty" with which Kate promises to engage herself forever to Densher, to pledge "every spark of [her] faith," and to dedicate "every drop of [her] life" (73), is perhaps her unreserved emotional investment in Densher, which starts to deplete with the latter's unapologetic stance "as he is." Densher *as he is* is not what she has stamped faith and life for. What she originally saw in him, with a consensus of her organs, faculties and feelers, was an "*arrange*-ability," a mixture of his density and intelligence that would *fit* perfectly into her scheme, the singular feat of achievement that could magically deflect her from running away from Aunt Maud, and turn her mystically around to wanting to "keep her" instead (61). What fuels and sustains their attachment, I contend, is there in Kate's crude but genuine disclosure when she comments on their mutual habit of mind as being,

> hideously intelligent. But there's *fun* in it too. We must get our *fun* where we can. I think ...our relation's quite beautiful. It's not a bit vulgar. I cling to some saving romance in things. (*WD* 60; emphases mine)

The secret component of their bond, the salvaging ingredient in Kate's lingering attachment, I argue, is her pursuit of fun, which she deems as readily present in their relationship, and which overrides any other aesthetic, moral, spiritual or materialistic concerns. Pleasure, then, before anything and anyone else, prepares and preserves their attention and attraction to one another.[23] As Densher

[23] And we can turn to their shared sense of perchedness in the first meeting as a confirmation of their mutual investment in pleasure. The metaphoric encounter on the top of a ladder suggests a shared taste for pleasure and play between the two in a formal party. Performance, with its allusions to entertainment and pleasure, also dictates their chance encounter

proves himself less and less "enjoyable," Kate's interest dwindles. And such a reduction could engender a spell of paling shame, the effect of which Densher (chooses to) misread(s). In between times when their mutual efforts at honoring the social etiquette eclipse their investment in joy and pleasure, their hedonic devotion resurfaces. It finds adequate expression in their first meeting when a heavy touch of playfulness (perched on a ladder, gazing at one another, exchanging via a multitude of channels) binds the two in mutual interest in each other. It comes up again here as Kate spells out the fundamental law of their attraction--fun--for the sensation of pleasure is inextricable from her understanding of romantic love. The continual access to enjoyment is sustainable through a joint force of perseverance and intelligence, with a beautifying and sublimating legerdemain. Their mutual enjoyment and enjoyability set the direction of their romantic on course from the very beginning. The concern for pleasure is significant for *The Wings of the Dove* not only because it undergirds one of the most important relationships in the novel, as the later sections demonstrate, casts shadows over Kate Croy's ideo-affective organization as well.

The dimension of joy in shamed response is too often overlooked. For Tomkins, it is a prerequisite; it is indeed through a later alteration of a previously aroused level of interest and joy that shame is activated. Significant for Tomkins and for many psychologists, shame exists in a spectrum[24] of affects alongside humility, embarrassment, humiliation, etc. And the incomplete reduction of joy applies to the family of shame affects equally well. As one of the fundamental aspects of a human-object relationship, pleasure is closely associated with shame in David Hume's

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on the train that results in the "real beginning" (51) of their attachment, when Densher moves all over the scene around Kate, and when the two engage one another in a series of verbal and nonverbal communications. See *The Wings of the Dove*, pp. 49-51.

[24] Tomkins uses a joint name of affects with a dash differentiating the low and high intensity. For the affect of shame, he designates it as shame-humiliation, with shame being a lower degree of emotional experience and humiliation as a severe case. He states confidently that "[s]hyness, shame and guilt are not distinguished from each other at the level of affect...They are one and the same affect" (351). The difference between the affects grouped under "shame-humiliation" lies in the "conscious awareness of [different] experiences"; but these "other components which accompany shame in the central assembly" should not make them distinct at the level of affect. See *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, chapters 10 &16.

understanding of the affective doublesidedness of things--"everything related to us, which produces pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride or humility" (Hume 209). Even though his categorical statement might have reduced the extreme complexity of human emotions to only a dichotomized duo, it highlights the role joy plays in the individual relations to objects and human beings. It also reveals an almost primeval proximity between shame and pleasure. The power of joy is not unrelated to the centrality of affects in human life, to the extent that it sanctions our every attachment to the immediate and broader environments. Nietzsche, in his denunciation of slave morality, claims Ellen Feder, has regarded the central goal of the "life-negating" morality as particularly "destructive of pleasure," perverting the noble human traits of "confidence and openness" into sick "obliquities," rife with both "fear and shame" (Feder 641). Pleasure, argues Jemima Repo, is what by Foucault's evaluation falls outside the overarching discursive totality of power, only to be "sexualised as desire when exposed to biopower" within the discourse of sexuality (Repo 81). To the extent that the hermaphroditic body of the legendary Herculine Barbin might have defied such a transcription, Repo understands Foucault as identifying a "*capacity* for love and pleasure" in Barbin's corporeal anomaly, exceeding the "orders" and disciplines of power (81-2). The *excessive* power that pleasure wields is important in reading *The Wings of the Dove* as well, particularly in light of the shamed response. As my later discussions yield, this hedonic concern is empowering for several key characters in their respective individual trajectory. It empowers Milly Theale and Merton Densher in their departure from convention and norm, which is abound with moments of excess and queerness. And though pleasure has lost its prominence in recent queer studies with its "turn to suffering," critics such as Heather Love and Elizabeth Freeman recontextualize this focus on "loss...failure, shame, negativity, grief" with "a premature turn away from a seemingly obsolete politics of pleasure" (Love 160). The centrality of pleasure and its power of transcendence persevere in James's work, and

takes on fresh characteristics that gesture towards a *different* organization and reading of the individual and social surfaces in *The Wings of the Dove*.

From time to time, an overt concern over personal happiness breaks out from under James's intricate textuality, and sheds invaluable light on the exquisitely vague intentionality of the characters. This affective undertone, eclipsed by more pressing issue of intrigue and betrayal begs critical attention. Together with instances of temporal disturbances, moments of joyful intensity signal productive tension between the affective and the epistemological organizations. These instances of affective and temporal disruptions signal underlying ideo-affective arrangements whose resistance to interpretation makes them decidedly "queer." On her seminal visit to Matcham, sipping iced coffee on the sward, Milly yields to one of the few spells of happiness in the book, much to her own amazement:

> She was *somehow* at this hour a very *happy* woman, and a part of her *happiness* might precisely have been that her affections and her views were moving as never before in *concert.* (*WD* 136; emphases mine)

Milly seems to have been swept away by an all-enveloping gush of exhilaration, the underlying source of which is as yet unknown to her. But she is somehow not oblivious to the immediate cause of her happy development, which she ascribes to a certain accord between affect and epistemology. The unanimity she confesses to have discovered is further explained in an effusive proclamation of love:

> Unquestionably she *loved* Susie; but she also *loved* Kate and *loved* Lord Mark, loved their funny old host and hostess, *loved* every one within range, down to the very servant who came to receive Milly's empty ice-plate--down, for that matter, to Milly herself, who was, while she talked, really conscious of the enveloping flap of a protective mantle, a shelter with the weight of an Eastern carpet. (*WD* 136; emphases mine)

Milly is undoubtedly happy and content, not only through her devotion to others, but for the treatment she receives. And her romantic habit of mind has sublimated Aunt Maud's meddlesome intrigue as a genuine and altruistic concern for her wellbeing, willfully ignoring any side effects of this claustrophobic "enveloping mantle."[25] Milly's loving spirit, as my later arguments will show, is central to her preference for affective vulnerability over a paranoid way of living. Paradoxically, it is her willingness to create positive affective investment in other people that makes her vulnerable. But her decision to remain prone to unpleasant surprises, such as pain and shame, speaks for the volumes of benefits that an affective openness yields.

Milly's resolution to be loving all around is oddly enough subsequent to a series of disconcerting discoveries. In the course of her visit, she becomes convinced of an irreducible "otherness" in her good friend Kate Croy (*WD* 134); she is reminded afresh of the "prim" righteousness of Susan's social values (135); she comes to realize the "consent" with which Lord Mark *lets* Aunt Maud "work [himself] in" (135). In light of such insights, Milly's declaration of love bespeaks a quantity that is as immense as befuddling. Her informed view of Aunt Maud's design around her and Kate is reminiscent of Susan Stringham's understanding of her "uplifted" outlook on life (88), surveying the great span of territory at her disposal from the tip of the promontory. It is with such an insight that Susan goes on to proclaim, before the deadly prognosis arrives, that the future would be for Milly "a question of taking full in the face the whole assault of life," not as a "simple release from the human predicament" (89). By her account, and Milly's later trajectory confirms perhaps just this, the American girl would engage life with all her might, in all its sticky

[25] In a rather different line of argument, Scappettone (2014) touches upon similarly "enveloping" effects in her discussion of the impact Venice, "a city of water" with its gondola-centered transportation on its tourists. She argues that submission to this physical limitation "infantilizes and discomposes the tourist," who is almost "being returned to the womb" (104). See *Killing the Moonlight*, pp. 103-5. In contrast, Milly is purportedly not in the least bothered by such protective suffocation, rather, she welcomes Aunt Maud's envelopment with a sense of privilege.

messiness, and to her very last breath. Her happy embrace[26] of life and all its offerings is but an "uplifted" version of her thus "taking it all in." To that effect her exclamation that "Oh it's a beautiful big world, and every one, yes, every one...[so] nice" (147) corroborates with her earlier euphoria at Matcham. Only this time she is on the verge of possessing a piece of information that could have shattered every illusion of happiness for her. Despite such a shameful prospect, Milly wills herself to remain uninhibited. Her sensation of purification--as a forgiven and chastened sinner after absolution--is not unlike that of shame, which scholars working in the theological and literary traditions have remarked upon. Milly's conspicuous lack of defense mechanisms against shame and other bad news gives a concrete example to Jill McNish's understanding of shame experiences as conducive to a "more authentic, more creative more compassionate, more mature, and better integrated" form of existence (41). It is not only that Milly's interest and joy are abundant, and often resistant to any significant "reduction," but that Milly chooses to "stand honestly in the godless vortex of shame," willing to stay chastened by feelings of "smallness, inadequacy, finitude, and humanness" (41). So long as she could still bear the weight of her shame, Milly utilizes such experiences as an occasion for expanding her relationship with herself and with one another.

For Milly, the "uplift" that Susan predicts also figures as a "weighing down." But the burden of knowledge hardly affects her access to an almost prelapsarian blissful conception of life. The dawn of reality two days later at Sir Luke Strett's does not at all have any effect on the ecstatic Milly; she welcomes the confirmation of her doom as a consolidation of her heretofore rickety identity. Her impending downfall, rather than being singularly discouraging and life-negating for her, is taken as "something firm to stand on," the likes of which she identifies as unprecedented and highly

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[26] Allen (1984) experiences Milly's assault-taking with a predominant religious sensitivity that allows her to see Milly as a Christ reincarnate whose "acting/dying *for* others" goes hand in hand with the "eager acceptance by others of what she *can* do for them" (160). Allen also reads a preserved layer of "personal passion" in Milly's all-encompassing resolution besides "moral or religious" claims. Fowler (1984) applies a more literal lens of criticism and pronounces Susan's prediction "ironic" since Milly "does die only six months after this Alpine scene" (90), which effectively faults the former's conviction that Milly would not attempt any "quick escape."

productive for her.[27] The mysterious sense of security Milly extracts from having been "held up," of being "put into the scales" obliterates all other considerations of danger and doom (*WD* 148). And when Sir Luke commandeers her happiness as a prerequisite for her health, stipulating that it's no longer a question of choice or will that she should be happy, her gaiety verges on levity, "Oh I'll accept any whatever!...I'm accepting a new one every day. Now *this*!" (151). It would no longer be possible or necessary to distinguish between her resilience and her buoyancy, and her almost inhumanly high spirits have clearly overflown and drowned all ill omens. Milly is now determined to cast her doom precisely in the light of *joy*, conflating cause and effect, posing disruptions to the finely policed lines between the affective and the epistemological, and the temporal and spatial dimensions.

The fluidity and openness of her logic, brought out in her conversation with Kate when the latter demands the latest news from her doctor's visit, defies Kate's faith in the causal rigor of knowledge. Pressing further the "kind of pleasure" that Milly is to undertake, Kate is assured simply "[t]he highest"; hardly satisfied, she ventures again, "Which *is* the highest?," only to be reassured that "it's just our chance to find out. You must help me" (*WD* 161). Kate is incredulous and finds herself hardly ever convinced by the open-endedness of Milly's frail logic. Kate's notion of "fun," as previously noted, calls for an "intelligence" in what Densher perceives to be a "caution" (60) that takes things in in a certain manner, the stringency of which is in direct conflict with Milly's roundaboutness. The latter's openness might bespeak for Kate a high degree of vulnerability to chance, and a susceptibility to shameful shocks to which she would never expose herself. One of the only times in the novel she deigns to take such risks occurs when Densher, after weeks' sojourn to

[27] Fowler (1984) is critical of Milly's romanticizing acceptance of her disease, interpreting her strategy as seeking "refuge from active participation in the world" in her own bleak fate, molding a idiosyncratic *modus vivendi*. She reads her character as being shrouded under a blanket of "passivity [which] she displays from her first appearance in the novel," and all her decisions and viewpoints henceforth, Fowler contends, could be understood in light of her willful "nonparticipation" (97). Scappettone (2014) on the other hand fits Milly's fluid identity into a larger Jamesian modernist realism in the "extreme abstraction," with "its resistance...to the representation of distinct 'subjects' and 'settings'" (123)--a "referential flux" with "shifting contexts and morphing connotation" (122).

the US, comes back to England. Today, and today only, Kate reasons, could she sacrifice everything else--her precaution, her alarms, her security, her sense of propriety--for the complete appreciation and "profit[]...for her joy" (189). On any other day, her fun would never forego its "intelligent" and "cautious" underpinnings. Compared to Milly Theale, Kate Croy's foreclosed mindset to surprise renders her subservient to a logic of maximizing certain positive affects, promoting access to joy while warding off the surprising element in the affect interest-excitement. I argue in the next section that James in his characterization of Kate gestures towards a close connection between the affect joy and shame that precedes and exceeds Tomkins's schemata of the affect shame-humiliation.

The Abyss of Knowledge

Among the characters in *The Wings of the Dove*, Susan Stringham and Milly Theale figure at the opposite poles, in spite of their devout attachment to one another, in their attitudes towards knowledge. Whereas Susan delights in the possession of knowledge, Milly shies away from prospects of gaining certainty. Their contrasting views regarding the worth of epistemological pursuit, at times grounded by a disparity in material and corporeal conditions, gesture towards a deeper discrepancy between two casts of mind. In this section, I focus on their radically different approaches to knowledge. In *The Wings of the Dove,* characters who retain a manifest aversion to uncertainty put up by default a defense of impatience and anxiety, which might be alleviated temporarily, but often aggravated in the long run, with an almost blind trust in knowledge and truth.

Whereas Susan's pursuit of knowledge follows a more "active" track, her capacity falls short at other critical aspects when compared to Milly's more "passive" and receptive mindset. Milly's openness of mind, susceptible to unpleasant surprises at times, does seem to relieve the mind of perennial burdens of impatience, anxiety and suspicion, and primes it for more comprehensive experiences of pleasure than that of Kate's and Susan's. Clinging tight onto the certainty that a faith

in knowledge and telos grants, the latter two characters evince a habit of mind that I shall identify as "paranoid," the cost of which, I demonstrate with my readings of Milly Theale and Merton Densher, far outweighs the benefits it brings. Paranoia clouds over the positive affects and places limits on the amount of joy and interest they might generate. The paranoid bent of mind works against shocks and derives pleasure from the mimetic cycles of anticipation-confirmation. Kate Croy's sense of joy, it seems, shares some of its internal mechanisms with that of Susan Stringham's, who professes to have derived pleasure from obtaining knowledge through technical know-how. Immediately preceding her pursuit of Milly to the tip of the promontory, Susan strikes herself as being "secretively attentive" of her companion, reaping off "scientific observation" thereof, "hovering like a spy, applying tests, laying traps, concealing signs" (*WD* 84). She performs as rigorously as she possibly could for a "culminating" scientific understanding of the "matter "of Milly. Her rationale behind such an almost pathological interest is, or so she confesses, the occupational necessity as Milly's paid companion. Translating a pathological mindset into a discourse of scientific discovery confirms Brian Massumi's understanding of scientific concern as "the institutionalized maintenance of sangfroid in the face of surprise" (*Parables* 233). Remaining "knowledgeable" is for Susan being invulnerable to news on Milly. Managing diligently her composure, Susan extracts a predominant amount of her joy from confirmed knowledge; even the "pleasure of watching...[Milly's] beauty" comes not so much from *discovering* Milly's graceful appearance as *knowing* Milly would always be beautiful (84). And for the reward of such a *reflexive* and *mimetic* joy, Susan is obviously relentless. Her project of "know[ing] everything" is thus a direct result of mimetic self-affirmation in which only *facts* that will confirm a *suspicion* will be considered, thereby leading to an *expected* confirmation of initial beliefs (*WD* 366). The pleasure that paranoia produces is in this sense none other than the pleasure of being proved *right*. Investing in no entity other than the self, and since the self *will* always be *right*, paranoia could be a very effective mechanism against sensations of shame. Kate Croy, the

unlikely *pale*-faced girl, remains almost always impervious to the shameful pallor. Rarely would she allow herself to be so *imprudent* as to incur risks of uncertainty by showing interests in *other* people. The always "pale" Milly, on the hand, with her open embrace of things, might as well have been under the constant attacks of such a shame-induced pallor.

While one might admire Susan's good fortune in thus "securing" her happiness, one needn't, for that matter, pity poor Milly too much for falling prey to the "intelligence" of the young couple. Kate, the one who has mastered "the art of seeing things as they were" (*WD* 170), assures the conscience-stricken Densher that Milly "never wanted the truth...She wanted *you*" (364). It's true that Milly has always been at odds with knowledge, quite apart from her ecstatic response to the news of her doom. Following Susan's momentous meeting with Sir Luke Strett, Milly's heart-to-heart talk with her dear companion takes the form of a riddle, in much the same manner as any allusion to her disease. On the way to making an explicit request, Milly lays out her terms of non-knowledge,

> I *don't* ask you...what he told you for yourself, *nor* what he told you to tell me, *nor* how he took it, really, that I had left him to you, *nor* what passed between you about me in any way. It *wasn't* to get that out of you that I took my means to make sure of your meeting freely--for there are things I *don't* want to know. I *shall* see him again and again and *shall* know more than enough. (*WD* 243; emphases mine)

While one might gasp at the list of areas to which she demands to be made oblivious, the vastness of her trust is nevertheless admirable. She asks to be spared of almost everything that has taken place or is to transpire between her companion and her physician. As the meticulous cataloguing and her matter-of-fact tone regarding her doomed fate suggest, her determined refrain from such information comes from anything but a feeble mind. For Milly, her non-knowledge lays out the condition for her wellbeing. In stark contrast with Susan who takes succor in knowledge, Milly finds hers by a highly selective channeling of information.

Milly's indifference to knowledge, it seems, assumes a particular temporal relation. She welcomes knowledge when it comes by its own accord. She *shall* know, or so she claims, in due time; and it is the mediated form of knowing--through Susan in this instance--that she objects. Milly demands to be informed, however unpleasantly, directly, and in the course of her own treatment, not to be rushed in any untimely fashion. The bravery embedded in her defiant stance might also be spelled out, echoing Scappettone's formulation on sentimental tourism, as a resistance to "the mortifying effect of information" through an "imbrication of knowledge and somatic experience" (105). Asking for direct and mannerly contacts with knowledge, Milly emphatically asks for no corporeal or temporal (pre-)mediation; only she takes pains to stress that, for all her seemingly deprecation of Susan as the *channel*, her gratitude towards the latter is unbounded and unequivocal. She assures Susan that *other* things, *other* possibilities might then appear, when one agrees that

> The best is not to know--that includes them all. I don't--I don't know. Nothing about anything--except that you're *with* me. (*WD* 244-5)

Her caution against knowledge takes a turn to the worse, and vows to take on an overwhelming scale here. The pause between the two "I don'ts" signals a near nervous breakdown when one approaches the limits of signification. The repetition, sanctioned by a wandering and searching consciousness, is followed the word "know"--a fallback when more complex and descriptive phrases become not readily available. To *know* is at once the most natural collocation to come after "don't," and the most comprehensive--it encompasses a wide range of possibilities and enables Milly to glide through her temporary failure of signification to arrive at meaning again. This episode is suggestive of the power of knowledge--a totalizing term that could block out all other more specific experiences in life. For Milly, contra Susan, it is the specifics, the various embodied experiences that fulfill a life-engendering role. Shame and other unpleasant sensations are but necessary prices to pay in order to experience to the fullest extent the pleasant experiences in life.

Milly's preference for practice-based knowledge, in the course of the story, results in a spectrum of responses between shameless elation and shame-laden despondency. Particularly on the questions regarding Merton Densher and her illness, Milly vows to stay "shamelessly" ignorant. Her selective non-knowledge, for the most part, guards Milly against any untimely *reduction* of interest in Densher and her life, and keeps her buoyant and happy until things *actually* happen. Embracing the unknown with open arms, Milly objects to unverified knowledge and insists on embodied knowledge. Before her consultation with Sir Luke, she has, in response to Susan's concern over her health, returned cheerfully, "it might be well to find out" (*WD* 91). Her receptivity towards lived experience and her disregard for knowledge in advance play out in the response she gives to Kate on the nature of her illness, "I *shall* know, and whatever it is it will be enough" (145). To questions regarding the relationship between Densher and Kate, Milly remains "proudly" dense. When Susan complains about the pang of "mov[ing] in a labyrinth" on such matters, Milly's "gaiety" is almost shameless--

> Of course we do. That's just the fun of it! ...Don't tell me that--in this for instance--there are not abysses. I want abysses. (*WD* 121)

The unknown, instead of evoking terror, suggests for Milly an irresistible appeal of pleasure. Her affective openness also incurs, in due time, an "abysmal quantity" of gloom. Distressed by Kate's "*other* identity, the identity she would have for Mr. Densher," Milly's *enjoyment* of Densher and Kate suffers an acute reduction (146). The unease with which the access to lived experience generates appears the first time she visited Lancaster Gate, and culminates in her "turn[ing] her face to the wall" (334). At times resulting in minor discomfort of shame, the reduction of her enjoyment in life also takes the form of life-threatening agony. What was early on "too sharp" a strain on her "sensibility" in response to the "very air of the place, the pitch of the occasion" (100), ends with a determined refusal of life.

Milly's refusal of certain knowledge and her rejection of certain manners of knowing, it becomes clear, have laid the groundwork for her final collapse;[28] it isn't simply an outright denunciation of knowledge, for which she has been at times rather receptive. Her insistence that knowing *shall* come in a natural order-*less* fashion, without unnecessary intervention, sets her decidedly apart from several of the more calculating characters. Susan Stringham is always passionate in setting up "tests" and traps; Kate Croy is forever avid in pursuing and perfecting her "arrangements"; and Lord Mark, after Milly's indifference to his proposal, lingers at her *sala* only to *know* the name of her guest after seeing "one of the gondoliers...obsequiously held out to her...a visiting-card" (*WD* 280). Lord Mark, as does Susan and Kate, chases after knowledge with a cunning determination that vows to "leave nothing unlearned" (107). They detest uncertainty almost as passionately as they prepares against shame. Sir Luke Strett too, is enabled by his unparalleled medical expertise to look "in advance...all one's possibilities" so much so that he might be deprived of exploring *other* possibilities (256). The elimination of ambiguity, then, comes at a price, for Sir Luke as well, as a loss in possibility and joy. Lord Mark, in a like manner, is burdened with "too much knowledge" (101) to ever entertain the idea of a *different* future. His conviction--the "working view" that "nothing to make a deadly difference for him...*could* happen" (275)--comes at the time of Milly's refusal to his proposal to salvage his self-esteem. But total relinquishment of all aspirations is nonetheless lamentable, and not simply for the fact pointed out by Milly that he has "no imagination"--Lord Mark rarely experiences any *joy* (108). The deep-set aversion to uncertainty manifests itself in the characters as a general impatience and a default anxiety, a trust in knowledge, and an ardent and persistent pursuit for the hidden truth.

[28] Fowler (1984) argues that Milly "fatally lacks important knowledge and abilities" (89) despite her attempts to obtain them by her European sojourn. Milly's habitual nonparticipation from life and her comfortable refuge in her illness, according to Fowler, are underlined with a preference for "objectification," for "detachment" and a "denial" of the remedial power of love, which together results in her untimely death even *before* Lord Mark's delivery of the blow (103).

The Paranoia Imperative

The second time Densher as Kate to "take him as he is," he frames it more as a threat than a plea. After his visit to Lancaster Gate upon his return from Venice, and before the arrival of Milly's posthumous letter, he acts on a whim and demands Kate's presence at the Regent's Park. Laying himself down once and for all at her mercy, Densher makes up with the strength of his will what he lacks in reason. More spontaneously and forcefully this time, he asks Kate once again to forego any elaborate plans to better their conditions. Upon Kate's somewhat condescending question of concern,

> -My dear man, what has happened to you?
>
> -Well, that I can bear it no longer. *That's* simply what has happened. Something has snapped, has broken in me, and here I am. It's *as* I am that you must have me. (*WD* 376; emphases original)

His anxiety is genuine and his request earnest. And if Kate pulls herself up from her shameful pallor this time, her chilling response is underwritten by an unwavering faith in knowledge.

> He saw her try for a time to appear to consider it; but he saw her also not consider it. Yet he saw her, felt her, further--he heard her, with her clear voice--try to be intensely kind with him. (*WD* 376)

Deliberations on Densher's request are unnecessary for Kate because she *knows*. Her knowledge on the matter is "complete" and her faith in it "absolute." In light of such knowledge, Kate has to will herself into giving off[29] a decent, appropriate response, the kind of reaction that matches the urgency

[29] Erving Goffman in his monumental work *The Presentation of Self in Everyday life* (1959) distinguishes between the kinds of impressions an individual is capable to make with the expression that he *gives* and the one that he *gives off* (2). The latter generally refers to non-verbal signs with which a spectator derives meaning and draws his own conclusions independent from a person's outward "verbal assertions" (7). Kate's articulations, body language, and particularly facial expressions as they appear to a fascinated Milly, both give and give off a multitudinous array of information.

in Densher's statement. But her performance falls short. To appease the distraught Densher, she dangles a promise of reconsideration if only Densher is in actual possession of *knowledge*.

> Of course if it's that you really *know* something...if you can *tell* me you know...I'll do what you want...I don't even ask you...for a proof. I'm content with your moral certainty...I'd consent...for an idea: I mean an idea straight *from* you, I mean as your own, given me in good faith. There, my dear!...I call that really meeting you. (*WD* 376-7)

As Densher is assured, he is also served with a demand that if, and only if he could supply this missing piece of information, Kate would be under no obligation to comply with his request and abort their plan. The certainty of knowledge is the only thing Kate explicitly asks for--an "idea," a piece of knowledge that would sanction a change to their plan. Her dogmatic adherence to "reason," verging on irrationality, denies interventions by morality, common sense, or even passion. Densher is at this juncture made freshly aware, as if for the first time, of the power of her "rationale" and her "lucidity," of her faith in knowledge, and of her attachment to a rational and solely rationalizable worldview.

Interested in the unknown, Merton Densher remains unaffected by "shocking" news that would have put the likes of Susan and Kate to shame. In contrast to Kate's almost blind faith in the vindication of knowledge, Densher, like Milly, favors the mysterious and the unknown. Densher, who at times professes that he is "to understand and understand without detriment to the feeblest...of his passions" (*WD* 64) even the intimidating Maud Manningham, and who confesses to Susan Stringham that "one must understand" (339), seems at critical junctures to have stopped pursuing knowledge altogether. In response to Kate's skepticism towards his inclination to forgo Millly's bequeathal, Densher avers, almost insolently, that "[m]y sense is sufficient without being definite" (406). In the plainest words to characterize his beloved, Densher understands Kate as "a whole library of the unknown, the uncut" (222). His complicity in Kate's plan is suggestive of an

abiding taste for mystery and secrecy. Interestingly, it is the depletion of mystery that results in a reduction of his sense of enjoyment and hence his shame. The certainty that comes with knowledge ushers in a lucid outlook on life that is not in the least palatable to Densher. After Kate's monumental visit to his room at Venice, even when his memories are fresh and the taste of victory still sharp, he succumbs to a "slightly awful" spell.

> [T]his was by the loss of the warmth of the element of mystery. The lucid reigned instead of it, and it was into the lucid that he sat and stared. He shook himself out of it a dozen times a day, tried to break by his own act his constant still communion. (*WD* 316)

The "loss of the warmth of the element of mystery" conditions a "lucidity" that allows him to access the guilt and shame in being a conniving scoundrel. Chastened by the "awful" spell of his conscience, Densher emerges from his access to shame less centered on his own desire for Kate. The shameful bouts of "sitting and staring" with his guilty lucidity provide a heightened experience of the "tyranny and prison of the self," which Ewan Fernie takes as an existential condition of being human; shame, in his opinion, is both "a painful rehearsal for" a more dreadful confinement and the gateway to the "world beyond egoism" (8). Led by his feelings of shame and guilt, Densher is forced to confront the "tyranny" of his desires and limited perspective, and eventually comes out of the confines of this room and Kate's commands.

Kate's appeal of mystery further diminishes when she, apropos his request not to open Milly's posthumous letter, destroys it by throwing it in the fireplace. Her action, so definitive and forceful, destroys Densher's conception for her as the "unknown" and "uncut." On the other hand, the dimension of the unknown increases for Milly, as Densher shall *never* know her last confession. It is his mourning over the perpetually "unknown" that most probably sparks his romantic feelings for Milly, who figures *as* the unopened letter that forever tempts his interest. Densher's propensity for the unknown and the unknowable culminates in his falling in love with a dead person, when death

revokes all means of knowing and sanctions an ultimate ignorance. It comes as one of the most poignant moments in the course of the story when, pining after the violent dispossession of "possibilities," Densher likens the smarting pang he feels to

> the sight of a priceless pearl cast before his eyes...into the fathomless sea, or rather even it was like the sacrifice of something sentient and throbbing, something that, for the spiritual ear, might have been audible as a faint far wail. This was the sound he cherished when alone in the stillness of his rooms. He sought and guarded the stillness so that it might prevail there till the inevitable sounds of life, once more, comparatively coarse and harsh, should smother and deaden it. (*WD* 402)

If he ever relishes the solitary "stillness" in the wake of Kate's visit, and fights to keep it fresh then, he struggles desperately to guard the "stillness" now against the overflow of knowledge. The advent of knowledge is shameful for Densher because it most violently depletes his enjoyment of the unknown. With all her "pure talent for life" (284), Kate, as she becomes increasingly *legible* to Densher, has ruthlessly murdered his aesthetic ideal of an *illegible* book.[30]

Susan Stringham's reading of Milly Theale, I propose, is quintessentially paranoid. In light of Eve Sedgwick's composite sketch of paranoia, Susan's scientific undertaking, the espionage she is secretly so proud of and derives immense pleasure from sets the tone for her inevitable and tautological discovery. It is inevitable because such a result has been preconditioned by her initial conception of the experiment itself, by her methodology, by the very mode of conduction and her interpretation; and paranoia has been written all across the space like an overarching guiding spirit. Paranoia, regarded by Leo Bersani as "an inescapable interpretive doubling of presence" (188), is

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[30] In contrast to Kate's talent for life, Habegger (1971) argues that Densher's is a "talent for thought" that puts him "outside English society" and its "workings"--his density in grasping Kate's plan, he points out, results from an innate unfamiliarity with the "brutal and self-seeking society" (460). Suggesting an innate psychological deficiency--American girls' sub-humanization or full subjectivation due to an "inability or fear" (103)--that is partially, if not wholly responsible for her early demise, Fowler (1984) compares Kate's "talent for life" with Milly's competitive edge of her impending doom, extrapolating that the former might have "drive[n] Milly self-destructively to seek refuge in a fatal illness" (96).

hailed as "hortative" among a set of must-have skills for an ideally sensitized reader, "vigilant" with the kind of "trickery and cunning" necessary for *Ulysses* (156). Sedgwick, building upon his insight, arrives at paranoia's mimetic nature. A paranoid reading, she allows, is quizzically imitative, for it "require[s] being imitated to be understood," and one could "understand only by imitation" (131). Thus Kate's vision that "poor Milly had a treasure to hide" (264)--a treasure in the least sense pecuniary in this instance--with her "general armoury," is but a reflection of and condition for her own guarded existence. Similar to Susan's suspicious intuition, Kate's "habit of anticipation"--her precocious aversions to things--saves her from unnecessary contact with bad surprises. But as my discussions below will show, such a strategy to adopt a paranoid stance to close off paranoid invasions is counterproductive, and conducive on the other hand to an optimization for total control of paranoia. And given the intensity of their concern for joy and pleasure, I propose to read differently than Tomkins in their genesis and maintenance of shame. And I rely on the particularity of Kate's case to demonstrate the discrepancy between theory and (literary) reality, alerting both theorists and literary critics to the limits of their vision and the constraints of their methodology.

Paranoia, Sedgwick claims, observes a "unidirectionally future-oriented vigilance" through which "badness [is] always already known (*WD* 130). And it is through such prescient vigilance that knowledge, especially foreknowledge of bad news, is secured. Paranoia thus grants its proponents an immense range of "vision." By virtue of its adequate explanatory power, it makes Lord Mark prescient, knowing *before*hand, even *before* Milly's refusal, that nothing that would make any difference could ever happen to him. Susan too, clings to her precious precaution or a ready "prepar[ation] for the worst" as firmly as her fur boa (79, 121). And it is only right that Maud Manningham is simultaneously "afraid of nothing" by Kate's estimation, and of "everything" by Susan's account (38, 248)--it is by her defense against everything that she could become impervious to any incoming

attacks. To experience everything as "of a natural" (290) is to find one prepared for every possibility, particularly the bad ones.

The access to paranoid knowledge, however reassuring at times, also closes off *other* possibilities that could be pleasurable as well. Sir Luke laments his loss of pleasure when his medical expertise allows so few surprises in the fates of his patients. Under the spell of paranoia, the future, Matthew Helmers envisions, is reduced to "a discrete system of buried knowledge that, once uncovered, can be exhausted" (Helmers 109), which is confirmed by Lord Mark's assertion that he has by that time left *nothing* unlearned. Knowledge becomes complete when it takes on a paranoid dimension, empowering it to furrow backward and forward across the linear progression of events. Shocks, which could easily lead to shamed responses, are abundant in those who are unsubscribed to a paranoid worldview. Poor Milly, with her face turned to the wall, never fully recovers from her shame of being deceived. Densher too, though from time to time seized with an "unrest" that might have progressed, if not regressed, into paranoia, couldn't foresee the course of things, and is prone to be left "shaking forever" (*WD* 371). Amazed at Densher's always "seeing his way so little" (309), Kate prepares herself in every regard, even meeting Densher's "vulgar" request for sex with shameless composure (297). Nor does she "wince and mince" upon Densher's blunt candor regarding the sordidness of their plan (311). Densher, on the other hand, like Milly, takes a romantically finite view of life, staying vulnerable to the ebb and flow of his interests. Their loss in "knowledge," it seems, finds compensation in the *good* surprises that make up the core of the "event" itself. Only through a temporary withholding of paranoid vigilance, according to Brian Massumi, could one access the real "event," penetrating its stultifying structure with "self-consistent set of invariant generative rules" that guarantees that "nothing ever happens" ("Autonomy" 87). While holding off negative affects such as shame and fear, a paranoid stance also wards off the reality of life itself.

At odds with a paranoid mode of interpretation that always demands a "habit of anticipation," Merton Densher and Milly Theale labor under a queer[31] temporality that has made them see things often in the afterlight. Milly is found to be "for ever seeing things afterwards" (*WD* 104). She is always late--she gets to meet Densher *after* Kate has gallantly offered to "engage [her]self to [him] for ever" (73); her love was finally returned only *after* she died; her illness--most probably a congenital condition--sentences her *before*hand to a fate that renders all her efforts in vain. It invariably takes Milly a longer time to take everything in--the pace and agenda of English people, the purpose of Lord Mark's visit at the Palazzo, or the meaning of her tears in front of the Bronzino portrait; for all her *nachträglichkeit*, Susan Stringham affectionately assures her that it's no matter, that she would "always find out the very next minute," and that *that* wouldn't matter either, since she "never really care[s]" (121). The quantity of lapses and returns of her perception, it seems, has opened her up for more surprises, stretched her susceptibility, and rendered her more grateful for benevolence, and much more tolerant of intrusions and impositions as well. Merton Densher, too, stands to profit from his deviation from linear temporality. But, as his posthumous love for Milly suggests, nothing could be too *late* for him, and nothing is truly over. He speaks of himself to Susan Stringham as being "dead" for Milly; his references to Milly come in the past tense well before her eventual death; his desire to announce his engagement before Milly's death is too late by the demand of social protocol and too early in the execution of their intrigue. Densher is always seeing things

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[31] Even though the word "queer" in the context of this chapter mainly connote a sense of unconventionality, a deviation from linear historicism, it retains its sexual connotations since both Densher and Milly have engaged in nonheteronormative practices. Building upon Michael Moon's argument that "for most of the novel it is the female (or pseudofemale) characters who are represented as being in possession of the phallus and in command of the phallic territory" (429), I read Densher's heterosexual bond with Kate as somewhat queer. The fact that he has been tormented by a procunced lack of control or sexual aggression, compounded with his hermetic and metaphysical way of retaining sexual gratification (by locking himself in his room and reminiscing the actual encounter), might further testify his deviation from heterosexuality. Both Densher and Milly have allowed or even welcomed homosocial or homoerotic attachments to bear upon the direction of their lives; Densher with Eugenio and arguably Lord Mark, and Milly with Susan Stringham and Kate Croy. For a brilliant discussion on the visualized queer sexuality, see Moon's "Sexuality and Visual Terrorism in *The Wings of the Dove*." For discussions of the conditions of possibility or emergence and practice of a nonparticipation and refusal of linear heteronormative historicism, see Dinshaw et al.'s "Theorizing Queer Temporalities," *GLQ*, vol. 13, no. 2-3, 2007, pp. 177-95.

afresh and anew, struck time and again by their immensity and abruptness, as well as his invariable lack of preparation. He shares thus a susceptibility to the world, with Milly, which opens him up for bad news sometimes, but for wonders too, the extraordinary "handsomeness" of his fiancée being one example (356, 375). And just when the strain of temporal and epistemic unidirectionality from a paranoid worldview threatens to break them, the queer moments burst out again. Milly's letter, arrives *after* her death and *timed* precisely for Christmas, the season of gifts, comes to signify for Densher later on as the "only proof and symbol of the sacred" in his life, and contributes to the feat of his finally falling in love with the "poor rich American girl." All those good surprises prove that after all the stringent vigilance against surprise, emotional disturbances do and need to occur. Kate and Susan's occasional admission of pleasure and joy was perhaps, inadvertently, the most persuasive evidence, given all their proclivity to "paranoia." And if we were to take their personal confessions of an inclination for "fun" and "pleasure" seriously, according to Tomkins's explications of the internal mechanisms of interest-excitement and enjoyment-joy, abrupt fluctuations of feelings are part and parcel of any genuine experience of joy. Thus psychologically speaking, Kate and Susan's reluctance or refusal to be shocked is paradoxical to their professed access to pleasure. Such odd moments, as those "waste products and blind spots" in Adorno's criticism of the dialectic, could equally "transcend" and "outwit" the immaculate linearity of knowledge and life, with their very own "impotence, irrelevan[ce], eccentric[ity]" and "incomparability" (Adorno 151). It's only through such moments of temporal, emotional, and epistemological incongruence--which for Milly and Densher often takes the form of excess and waste--that the validity and the value of such paranoid reading of life is called into question.

What do the likes of Milly and Densher stand to gain with their openness towards the whimsical (re-)inscriptions of time and knowledge that might have steadied them against the repetitive blows with regard to love, friendship, ethics, illness and responsibility? Are such acts of

"folly" inevitable and repeatable, or are they merely idiosyncratic manifestations that have wrought personal failures? Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick approaches the matter from the psychological and psychoanalytic perspectives, casting unfavorable light upon a paranoid defensiveness, which allows the individual to get attached to the more negative and destructive aspects of things while disregarding the positive and the reparative.[32] A paranoid way of reading,[33] by the very nature of its fervent prediction of bad news, hunts for and forestalls the emergence of negative affects. Among the four "general images" of the ideo-affective organization of human beings, Silvan Tomkins maintains, the maximization of positive affects, desirable as it is, should be kept in moderation since an overt and passionate pursuit of such affects could be "self-defeating," and result in "failure and misery" (*AIC* 181). Any affect theory, according to Tomkins, yields, after "a simplified and powerful summary of a larger set of affect experiences" (411), a generalized scheme of filtering incoming information and generating customized behavior in response to a particular affect. The strength of any negative theory derives, Tomkins alerts us, not from its efficacy but from its failure, the repetition of which expands the breadth of its operative domain, and consolidates its power in the ideo-affective organization of an individual. Thus when a theory is increasingly ineffective in preventing intrusive negative affects from occurring in an increasing number of situations, its growing strength might assume a monopolistic scale, so that one affect becomes dominant in an

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[32] Adorno (2005) 's critique of dialectic, I propose, could be likened to Sedgwick's objection to an uncritical embrace of paranoia. His denunciation of dialectical positivism that derives its power in the "absolute rule of negation" (150) echoes Sedgwick's arguments that paranoia denies accidents and rejoices in the triumphalism of knowledge and certainty.

[33] In their brilliant introductory essay, "Surface Reading," Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus conduct a brief survey of what they call "symptomatic reading," which is to some extent synonymous to Sedgwick's "paranoid reading." They reference Umberto Eco who dates the practice back to the Second Century with the Gnostic tradition. Later revivals with the Marxist readings of ideology and commodity, the Freudian interpretations of dreams and the unconscious, and the Althusserian symptomatic reading, they argue, tend to presume and foreground the shaping forces of the "phantom questions" in the texts. They hope to resituate the surface as "an affective and ethical stance" that counters the "depth model of truth" (10), and call for more immediate "immersion" that would "free us from the apathy and instrumentality of capitalism" (14). I read their central claim, which I concur, as an affective call for "a true openness to all the potentials," without reducing the richness of a text by accentuating one particular understanding and discounting all others. While it might be ultimately beneficial remain utterly disinterested in literary criticism, I have to, for the purpose of contributing to such a disinterest, lean more heavily on some standpoints and distance myself from others. The "fertile paths of inquiry" demands while discounts such interests.

individual's affective life. With the assistance of over-interpretation and over-organization, the paranoid, maintains Tomkins, processes every bit of incoming information by its connection to one single "affect and its avoidance," and launches the "entire cognitive apparatus in a constant state of alert" in forecasting and inhibiting such an affect (519). Under the paranoid posture, the general image of positive affect has to be sacrificed when the individual becomes obsessed with over-avoidance of and over-escape from the negative affects, to the degree that, in the case of a monopolistic humiliation theory, the "strategy of maximizing positive affect has to be surrendered...[and the] only sense in which he may strive for positive affect at all is for the shield which it promises against humiliation" (532). I propose, in my reading of *The Wings of the Dove*, with insights from Sedgwick and Tomkins, that a strong affect-shame bind takes over Kate Croy's ideo-affective life to the extent that all her other affective experiences are clouded over by a hypersensitivity to shame. Overly cautious of shame experiences, Kate is enslaved by a "shameful" mindset that closes off other joyful possibilities for her while prompting her to find alternative pleasure in the proximity to shame. Not only do I want to contribute to the already robust scholarship that interprets James's œuvre as prominently psychological, I hope to draw attention to his deployment of affects, in particular the affect shame, the engagement with which well precedes comprehensive theorizations of shame in the late 1950s.[34]

What Sedgwick sees as amiss in paranoid knowledge is precisely the blockage of "the potentially operative goal of seeking positive affect" when the paranoid reader clings to an internalized, constant fear of the "mushrooming, self-confirming strength" of negative affects

[34] Helen Merrell Lynd's *On Shame and the Search for Identity* (1958) marks the virtual beginning of contemporary interests in the theoretical explorations of shame. Speaking to previous works done by Ruth Benedict, Gerhart Piers, and Franz Alexander, Lynd's monograph is concerned with aspects of personality development that are directly influenced by experiences of shame and its impact on the sense of identity. Léon Wurmser contributes to the scholarship on shame, with his *The Mask of Shame* (1981), a "systematic inquiry into shame with its manifold aspects and related attitudes and feelings" (16). He pores into its phenomenological constituents, and recognizes its protective capacities not only against exposure, but against other affects as well. He echoes Otto Fenichel in understanding shamelessness as a psychological reaction against previous experiences of intense shame.

(*Touching Feeling* 136). And in the case of Kate Croy who, despite her health, intelligence and beauty, so rarely steps outside an uncompromising self-possession and composure, not even for occasional self-indulgent vocalization of affection, a monopolistic shame-humiliation theory might be well at work. Her paleness, the condition of her complexion that never fails to arise when she is most possibly ashamed, might be considered, to echo Tomkins, as the "response auxiliary" to a monopolistic shame complex, if not an idiosyncratic feature of her complex in particular. Similar to blushing, paling could be an equally self-defeating strategy for the attention it draws to the face, so that particularly when the face pales, shame could still be "compounded" (*AIC* 360). And if her pallor was brought on directly with shame when she is waiting for her shamed father at the sordid living room, and again when Densher presses her with his *shameless* curiosity, then her paled face at other times might, in addition to the incomplete reduction of interest she most probably has felt, suggest a multiple affect-shame bind, in which the expression of all the other affects becomes inhibited by and experienced through shame. To a greater or lesser extent that "many affects are socialized by shaming techniques" (409), the shame sensation might be indirectly evoked when, under the affect-shame binds, these affects come to the affective foreground.

One explicit instance of affect-bind shaming unfolds in the course of Kate's recollection of her father's "original" downfall. Cautious as she always has been, Kate testifies, in a decidedly paranoid fashion to her mother's paranoia, which gives credence to Sedgwick's interpretation of the mimetic nature of paranoia:

> She must have had some fear, some conviction that I had an idea, some idea of her own that it was the best thing to do. She came out as abruptly as Marian had done: "If you hear anything against your father--anything I mean except that he's odious and vile--remember it's perfectly false." (*WD* 57)

Here Kate recalls a time when she was put to shame by her mother's veiled demand and subtle rebuke that she was not only not to believe any slur upon her father's character, and that she should be positively ashamed if she were even to dignify such allegations by contemplating on their validity. And if Kate has at other times struck the reader as peculiarly calm and tranquil, it might be because in the disturbing and turbulent process of her upbringing, she has been well trained in fashioning her affective articulations, the process of which, I contend, involves exhibiting appropriate behavior after explicit or implicit references to shame. Tomkins gives such a sketch in which a total affect-shame bind has worked an individual into believing "that affect per se is shameful, that shame itself is caught up in the same taboo and that even affectlessness may be shameful" (*AIC* 411). What Kate's recollection also suggests, is an ideo-affective bond that wraps knowledge and shame irrevocably together--a *total* bind. To know is to know shame and to be shamed--to be shamed by the shadows of her father. To know, moreover, is to know how best to stay alert to any shaming possibilities in order not to experience it. And to be ashamed was to have failed to anticipate knowledge, or knowledge of shame specifically. But even the shield, arguably one of her only positive affective gains, is a nominal and self-delusional one. However potent, or weak, in Kate's case, a theory of shame is, as an affective interpretation, it assures "experience of shame...of a large number of situations" (411). It takes paranoia to understand paranoia, and it takes shame theory to experience shame, or vice versa, and a monopolistic shame theory the fullest experience of shame.

What Kate Croy's total and monopolistic shame indicates, given her declaration of a dedicated pursuit of pleasure, is a veiled affinity that Tomkins has overlooked between paranoid shame and the general image of maximizing positive affects. Tomkins has understood a paranoiac to be on constant guard against any possible intrusion of the shame sensation, pointing to suppression and inhibition of affects, mostly negative in this instance, as the predominant motivation. The case of Kate Croy, while meeting this description, also bears a dissonance, an excess that makes her

somehow a misfit with Tomkins's downcast monopolistically shamed figure. That excess, I argue, is her overzealous investment in the access to joy. We have seen how her dedication to the pursuit of joy has written itself from the onset of her relationship with Merton Densher. Her change of mind towards the materiality of life's offerings gives another credible glimpse into the significance of pleasure in Kate's frame of mind. Plotting after Milly's fortune promises Kate a constant access to fun secured through her intelligence, and a copious reward that would set her mind at ease forever by severing the collusion between shame and destitute. Wealth, as demonstrated by the success of Milly in London, confirms Kate's belief in its powers of affective optimization. But rather than letting the second general strategy of minimizing negative affects taking control over her affective life, Kate's pursuit of the first strategy of maximizing positive affect assumes dominance, reversing Tomkins's figuration by rendering the former a "by-product" and "derivative" (*AIC* 181). Inasmuch as shame comes into being with a reduction of interest or joy, the particular case of Kate Croy offers a major modification. Her over-sensitivity to shame, which is not so dissimilar to an over-attachment to affective stability, begs a differentiation between interest and joy in accounting for shame. Kate Croy's aversion to surprise and faith in the comfort and defense of knowledge are akin to her pursuit of enjoyment-joy, which is activated, according to Tomkins,[35] by a decrease of neural firings. If revulsions for surprise undergird her subscription to a paranoid reading of life, then it is the reduction of joy, instead of interest-excitement, which depends on a sharp increase of neural firings, that triggers Kate's shame, and it is her concern for pleasure that motivates and maintains its bouts of attack. For Kate, shame or paranoid theory is taken up as a response to and strategy for the guaranteed access to joy and pleasure. A consideration for and from positive affects, the Jamesian

[35] Silvan Tomkins puts forth a model of the innate activators of the primary affects, in which every possible major general neural contingency will innately activate different specific affects--"increased gradients of rising neural firing will activate interest, fear, or surprise, as the slope of increasing density of neural firing becomes steeper. Enjoyment is activated by a decreasing gradient of neural firing. Distress is activated by a sustained level of neural firing which exceeds an optimal level by an as yet undetermined magnitude, and anger is also activated by a non-optimal level of neural firing but one which is substantially higher than that which activates distress" (*AIC* 621).

portrait seems to propose, takes precedence over the more potent negative image in Tomkins's schema. Moreover, such a reading of James's characterization of Kate Croy seems to have accentuated an easily overlooked affective affinity between interest and surprise that Tomkins briefly touched upon, but hardly ever contemplates. In the latter's theoretical formulation of the innate activation of affects, interest and surprise differ only in the rates of neural firing increment. Thus a paranoid figure who recoils from the possibility of surprise would by default curb any foreseeable surges of interest or excitement. And Kate's self-chastening or reluctant self-indulgence for rushing to the train station to welcome Densher from America is a case in point for the general adoption of such an inhibition. Shame, with all its connection to paranoia,[36] might be unrelated, if not totally antithetical, contra Tomkins, to the affect interest-excitement. Considering Kate Croy's particularity in being not only totally shamed but quintessentially paranoid, it is at least safe to argue that one of the distinctions between shame and paranoia is the increasing distance to the affect interest-excitement. If, a la Tomkins, that shame is an affective auxiliary to both interest-excitement and enjoyment-joy, then paranoia might be a sole collaborator to enjoyment-joy. It's only ironic how an overly passionate pursuit for happiness could blunt the heart and mind's affective sensibility to such an irrevocable degree.

If a paranoid posture is likely to close off exposure to positive affects, or all affects altogether, it is also able to retain primitive self-destructive interests and forestall reparation and

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[36] Tomkins hardly ever gives a clear and explicit definition of the term paranoia or paranoid in *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, but a majority of his discussions on paranoia are closely related to his postulations on the affect shame-humiliation. He contrasts paranoids with depressives in terms of their different shaming mechanisms. Unlike the depressives, paranoids have never "been loved (by their parents) but have been terrorized as well as humiliated" (240). Unable to find "a way back from the despair of shame to communion with the loving parent who ultimately feels as distressed as does his child at the breach in their relationship," the paranoids could be likened to members of "a truly persecuted minority group," with their "shame...imposed with a reign of terror." Tomkins positions a "paranoid posture" in relation to the monopolistic humiliation theory, when the individual has yet to reach the terminal phases of being totally defeated. The paranoid posture arises when there is still an "unrelenting warfare in which the individual generates and tests every conceivable strategy to avoid and escape total defeat at the hand of the humiliating bad object" (531). Paranoid schizophrenia, is a special case of the paranoid posture, in which "the individual is both terrorized and humiliated at the same time, and in which the only level on which the individual can respond is in his beliefs and fantasies, delusions of persecution and grandeur.

reconstruction. Melanie Klein understands paranoia as an early psychodynamic phase of a partial object relationship that may or may be completely replaced with a depressive position, in which the concerns of reparation and integration predominate. The swing between persecution and anxiety underwrites the struggle between the paranoid/schizoid and the depressive positions. While the former is mainly concerned with the "preservation of the ego" to the extent of destroying all possible threats, the latter entertain the possibility of the "good internalized objects" and allow their co-existence with the ego ("Manic-Depressive" 153). Klein regards the drive for reparation as "a more realistic response to the feelings of grief, guilt and fear of loss" when the subject's perceptions of psychic reality and the external world deepen ("Schizoid" 104). Unlike paranoia, which is driven by despair and suspicion that vows to eliminate the intrusive objects, depression relies upon a clear distinction between the good and the bad objects. The depressive position, Klein maintains, is buttressed by anxieties over the "state of dissolution" in the wake of paranoid persecutions, and works at recovering the blasted ego by "put[ting] the bits together in the right way and at the right time...pick[ing] out the good bits and do[ing] away with the bad ones...bringing the object to life when it has been put together" (104). It is this larger concern for wellbeing that prompts Sedgwick to read an "inaugural ethical possibility" in the depressive position (137). She considers reparatively executed practices as more attuned to hoping for a different future with attempts at "organiz[ing] the fragments and part-objects," particularly those that culture has "avowed...not to sustain" (146, 150). She rightly objects to an unflinching "hermeneutics of suspicion," which "impoverish[es] the gene pool of literary-critical perspectives and skills," which vehemently believes in the power of exposure and in the infallibility of knowledge, and which fails to "unpack the local, contingent relations between any given piece of knowledge and its narrative and epistemological entailments" (144, 124). Even though she does allow that paranoia knows something well, she laments the loss of the "varied, dynamic, historically contingent ways...in the ecology of knowing" that paranoia so invariably

disregards. A reparative susceptibility, not unlike what Lord Mark finds so delightful in Milly Theale, to difference, to different affects, different experiences, and a different future, promises for Sedgwick a much rewarding living experience. Unlike the more paranoia-oriented others, something *different* do happen to the more susceptible Milly and Densher, and they are able to access a wider range of affects and surprises, the likes of which the cautious Kate, Maud, Susan and Lord Mark could never imagine.

The homosocial rapport Densher experiences in his social and personal relations with the group of men--Eugenio, Pasquale, and Sir Luke Strett finds its support in his more generous affective stance, than for example, Lord Mark or Lionel Croy. Milly's attachment to Kate, which verges on proto-homosexual interests, too, would never have come into being with a foreclosed affective sensibility. Taken in this light, shame figures as a "uniting force" not because it encourages "conform[ity] to societal conventions and standards," as Fernie asserts, but precisely because it highlights differences and binds people together *by* their disparate reactions. Only with the willingness to withstand shame in the pursuit of one's interest can one establish genuine connections with others and emerge out of the sophistic, self-serving stronghold of paranoia. This connecting, socializing effect of shame is thus hinged upon the risky venture of investing interest and joy *in* another. Milly, despite all her physical frailty, exhibits such an openness to harm even as she recognizes the dangers of her "unbounded" interests.

> Strange were the turns of life and the moods of weakness; strange the flickers of fancy and the cheats of hope; yet lawful, all the same--weren't they?--those experiments tied with the truth that consisted, at the worst, but in practising on one's self. (*WD* 265)

If the paranoid positions were adopted to generate, as Stef Aupers identifies in contemporary conspiracy culture, "the construction of ultimate meaning that is resistant to the meaning-eroding forces of modernity" (Aupers 30), then reparative practices choose to stay and live with such

existential insecurity, rather than seeking any metaphysical transcendence. What the Jamesian allegory of Milly's fatal diathesis demonstrates, alongside other possibilities, I argue, is the dire consequences for closing off affective receptibility. Tomkins understands such an affective openness as intrinsic to an individual's "essential freedom" (*AIC* 68). To be paranoid and perennially guarded against the tendency to "feel strongly or weakly, for a moment, or for all his life" (68), is then tandem to forsaking the basic capacity to be humanly free. What Fernie vouches for as the "transcendence" and "freedom" from the self that shame engenders, begins with a willingness to be tethered and interdependent. In the case of Milly Theale, while she is still *open* for "abysses," whether the term stands for the fullness of life that her fortune guarantees or the bleakness of death[37] her unrevealed "condition" incurs, Milly still *lives*; but as soon as she voluntarily closes off that opening by "turning her face to the wall," she rapidly declines and dies. Affective openness, I propose, underlines Sir Luke's injunction for her to *live*. For Milly, to live is to be able to be affected. The "firm footing" of her illness that Milly finds so welcome and liberating keeps well in place the fact of her "affectedness." And an adamant rejection of that footing, or a single-minded devotion to it, will have endangered the viability of that life-engendering affective openness.

What transpires in the scene at the beginning of this chapter, when Kate, with her endearing pale face, entreating and enjoining Densher to "believe in [her], and it will be beautiful," is a curious pedagogical event in which Kate, risking her total susceptibility to shame, vouches for the beautiful certainty of knowledge. And what Densher takes to be her own sincerity, with which he could forego the demand upon her vow, is the faith paranoia places in the perfection and superiority of knowledge. In light of Sedgwick's assurance that "it is not people but mutable positions, or...practices, that can be divided between the paranoid and the reparative" (*Touching Feeling* 150), it

[37] Andrew Cutting (2005) reads Sir Luke's diagnosis as a "confirmation" and "enhancement" of Milly Theale's recognition of her "unique capability of dying" (90). Such a capacity, Cutting argues, distinguishes Milly from the rest of the characters in *The Wings of the Dove*, and bespeaks a generally applicable stratagem to secure individuality in the homogenizing power-knowledge system. See *Death in Henry James*, pp. 88-90.

behooves us to duly recognize the range of positive affects and good surprises Kate and the paranoid others might engender. The extent of trust and the depth of love that fuels it are both admirable and awe-inspiring in their own right, regardless of their (mis)appropriations. James foreshadows Sedgwick's misgivings about paranoia, and precedes her caution against its total negation, since paranoid people are also "able to, and need to, develop and disseminate the richest reparative practices" (*TF* 150). His depiction entertains the interpretive possibilities of the reparative work they might have left behind, before, beside, above, and around, and complicates even further the verdict on paranoia.

The Wings of the Dove, under my own paranoid reading perhaps, might as well be considered as a sketch of paranoia by James--his very own mimetic performance. Paranoid reading, a la Sedgwick, is a quintessential performance of mimesis, an act of self-reproduction that, regrettably, yields nothing but monotonous self-sameness. Despite all the affiliations between paranoia and shame, the performance of the former, according to Sedgwick, is to be distinguished from the latter, which "involves a gestalt"--the capacity to reverse and traverse the individuating boundaries with a "precarious hyperreflexivity" ("Shame in the Cybernetic Fold" 22). And while we lament the tedious omniscience of the paranoid positionality of the characters, we take delight, and comfort, in the productivity of James's mimetic paranoia, which lays at our mercy the critical destinies of a group of more or less personable characters, with whom we empathize to a more or less cathartic extent. Side by side with the moral disgust and indignation, there also exist joy, marvel, pity, concern, surprise, shame, anguish, fear, etc., the whole gamut of human emotions. Face to face with the *tableaux vivants* of paranoia, readers of James stand to benefit from the intricate nuances in his portrayal of a wide arrange of affective constraints and closures. And just as writers of paranoia and critics of such writers are necessarily paranoid, as readers, in our very own acts of reading--eyes down, head down, upper body down--we are on the way to perform, if not to be indeed paranoid, ourselves.

Chapter Three--Interpellation and Hysteria Revisited: the Shameless Smile in *Sula* and *Passing*

The G-Word and the N-Word

In Toni Morrison's 1973 novel *Sula*, when Helene Wright finally drags herself and the luggage into the colored coach, she comes face to face with a flustered train conductor.

> "What you think you doin', gal?"
>
> Helene looked up at him.
>
> So soon. So soon. She hadn't even begun the trip back. Back to her grandmother's house in the city where the red shutters glowed, and already she had been called "gal." All the old vulnerabilities, all the old fears of being somehow flawed gathered in her stomach and made her hands tremble. She had heard only that one word; it dangled above her wide-brimmed hat, which had slipped, in her exertion, from its carefully leveled placement and was now tilted in a bit of a jaunt over her eye. (*Sula* 20)

What Helene did to merit this response was simply to walk through the white coach. In their rush to get on the steaming train, the Wrights made the mistake of stepping onto a car with seating reserved for white men. Rather than exiting down the steps with her two pieces of luggage and a string purse, the pale yellow Helene decides to make a short cut to their coach through the train compartment. Attacked unawares with a loaded appellation "gal," Helene is infused with feelings of "old vulnerabilities" and "old fears." These averse affective burdens send an odious reminder of her "somehow being flawed," and, against Helen's avowal, have tipped her perfectly positioned hat.

The "vulnerability-gathering" sensation that Helene is experiencing recalls Helen Merrell Lynd's characterization of shame as an unexpected exposure of the "peculiarly sensitive intimate, vulnerable aspects of the self" (Lynd 27). Helene's sense of inadequacy becomes another symptomatic shamed response by psychologist Michael Lewis's conception. Lewis proposes a "four-

feature phenomenological definition" of shame in terms of "the desire to hide," "intense pain," "discomfort," and "anger"—with an overriding feeling that "one is no good, inadequate, unworthy" (M. Lewis 34). Unlike guilt, shame, Lewis reasons, "involves a critical evaluation of the total self" rather than the "actions" (71). Thus lurking just below the "carefully leveled," "wide-brimmed" hat is Helen's palpable sense of shame. The playful effect of the tilt, while gesturing on the one hand at an "instinctive" want of proper conduct, is on the other hand indicative of phenomenological symptoms of the affect shame. In light of Silvan Tomkins's mapping of shame's bodily reactions—"dropping of...eyes, eyelids, head and sometimes the whole upper part of [the] body" (*Affect Imagery Consciousness* 352), the curious "slippage" of her hat is as likely a result of shame as of physical exertion. Shame has brought the body involuntarily downward.

Rationalizing her misconduct as circumstantial, Helene is ill-prepared for the blunt questioning of the white conductor. Stung by the diminutive appellation, she misreads his intention, and with eager compliance, rummages through her purse for the proof of their lawful behavior. But the conductor, disregarding her eagerness and nervousness, or taking them for granted, is meticulous in his investigation of the stealthy duo. Insistent on being informed of their suspicious choice of route, he is given an account of the circumstances under which their breach of regulations might be understood. Yet he remains ruthless:

"We don't 'low no mistakes on this train. Now git your butt in there." (*Sula* 21)

Lost at first as to what is demanded of her, Helene soon catches the full meaning of his conjunction. Dragging Nel into the small space in between the wooden seats, the proud Medallion model citizen takes the blow to her self-esteem as best as she can. Born to a Creole prostitute, rescued and raised by her grandmother Cecile who carefully nurtures and guards her soul, Helene Sabat has been made respectable by marrying Wiley Wright, a cook on a ship on one of the Great Lakes lines, and takes refuge at the safe harbor of the Northern town. Helene has lost only one battle in her entire social

life in the Bottom by conceding to being addressed as Helen; elsewhere, she is the matron of respectability and asserts her rights with deepest convictions of her righteousness and authority. Anticipating the difficulty of the trip south, Helene has made extra preparation for the stringent journey with an extravagant wool dress with velvet details. Coupled with "her manner and her bearing" (*Sula* 19), the dress gives Helene enough cause to brave the upcoming dredge with the uttermost confidence.

With her best attire and immaculate manners, Helene is nonetheless thrown off course by the extent to which the Jim Crow laws of the segregated South still apply. When a puny conductor deems it natural to hold himself superior to a decent Northern woman, to the extent of conspicuously plucking his earwax to her face while giving out insulting injunctions, the exemplary colored citizen seems to have suddenly lost all sense of decorum.

> [F]or no earthly reason, at least no reason that anybody could understand, certainly no reason that Nel understood then or later, she smiled...Helene smiled. Smiled dazzlingly and coquettishly at the salmon-colored face of the conductor. (*Sula* 21)

The bodily reaction of the smile is particularly intriguing in this scene of intense racial confrontation. Understood as the "inscribed surface of events," the human body also signifies for Michel Foucault as the "locus of a dissociated self" and a "volume in perpetual disintegration" ("Nietzsche" 83). This meaning*less* smile figures as one such instance of dissociation and disintegration, whose *difference* from the overall signification of Helene's bodily existence becomes too confounding for the audience. This "dazzling and coquettish" smile ruptures the coherent surface upon which forces—symbolic, ideological, affective, etc.--converge. Out of the context of her *other* identitarian inscriptions, the smiling face counteracts with her efforts at being proper and respectable. This bizarre, intriguing, and maddening smile on the surface of the affectively charged individual, which at this moment intersects with sensations of shame, deserves more attention.

Instead of brushing it off as an idiosyncratic manifestation of frustration, I shall contemplate the proximity between shame and the smile before reconsidering shame's relation to the individual ego and its place in interpellation. Unraveling all the "shameful" connotations of the smile allows us to better appreciate the rich complexity of the human experience that both Morrison and Larsen are able to render fully in their projects.

According to American psychologist Silvan Tomkins, both the smile and the sensation of shame are auxiliary responses that human beings experience under certain strong psychological conditions. He understands smiling to be "innately activated by any relatively steep reduction of the density of stimulation and neural firing" (*Affect Imagery Consciousness* 204); shame, on the other hand, serves as an auxiliary mechanism to interest-excitement and enjoyment-joy, when the ongoing experience of these two positive affects is cut short. Unlike shame, which inhibits the continuation of positive affects, the smiling response could be triggered by "negative stimulation" (*AIC* 141), which makes it virtually attachable to any singular or a combination of affects, inasmuch as it involves a "reduction" in negativity. In Morrison's *Sula*, the smile response often accompanies the shame sensation. The possibility that the two affective mechanisms are somehow connected is further fueled by the appearance of queer smiles at scenes of shame in Nella Larsen's 1929 novel, *Passing*, in which the protagonist Clare Kendry often breaks into spells of amusement without any plausible explanations. Helene Wright's dazzling smile works with shame on the individual in an increasingly democratized and mobilized world in which all the racialized, gendered, sexualized, and classed forces of identification are in full power.

Unlike *Sula* (1973), *Passing* (1929) unfolds in a time when racism was still openly supported by legal and social frameworks. When Clare Kendry, a passing African American woman, is saluted with "Hello, Nig" by her Afro-phobic white husband John Bellew (*Passing* 54), it's almost inconceivable that she could react in any defiant or confrontational way. But Clare's dazzling smile

seems just a bit too *excessive* for the occasion. Introducing her husband to the two visitors—Irene Westover and Gertrude Martin—both of whom share and choose to neglect their racial heritage, Clare is found to evince "a queer gleam, a jeer" in the wake of her husband's call. Not flinching outwardly with terror, the passer braves the racial-slur-in-disguise as an innocent and loving joke. Taking his appellation head on, Clare joyfully entreats Bellew to share its backstory with her friends, with no other body language than "flutter[ing] down" her pair of beautiful black eyes (55). Her subtle physical manifestation of the inner affect, perceptible in the slight "downwardness" of her body posture, finds confirmation in Irene Westover's testimony that under her "unruffled" demeanor, Clare "must be" gripped with a seething sense of "mortification and shame" (60). That people break into smiling on the occasion of their shame is a shared characteristic by both *Sula* and *Passing*. Unlike Morrison's *Sula*, Larsen's project features individuals whose affective life is further complicated by their fraught sense of racial allegiance and who are thus able to capitalize on their shame as a "furtive" source of power.

In *Sula*, the effects of Helene's smile are immediate and tremendous; it not only silences the hostile train conductor, but has a palpable impact on all other passengers as well. Even the ten-year-old Nel Wright is made aware of the extent of her mother's impudence. Stricken by the "dazzling" and "coquettish" smile her role model has gratuitously offered the despicable conductor, Nel feels the need to "look[] away from the flash of pretty teeth" (*Sula* 21), and then from the "tighten[ed] faces" of the two soldiers among the passengers as well. Secretly gloating over but overtly sympathizing with the predicament that her mother has experienced with the "dazzling smile," Nel wills herself into finding solace in the pleats and hems of the exquisite dress. The soldiers' "bubbling hatred" towards the otherwise "graceful" and well respected mother, who charms Medallion with her breeding and brains, has resolved Nel to never let any man look at her with "midnight eyes or

marbled flesh" again (*Sula* 22). She keeps the promise for the most part in the unfolding of the novel. Forewarned of such horrors, Nel navigates her life along the courses of respectability and decency.

The scene is rich in emotions and cognitive perceptions. Besides shame and humiliation, Helene is attacked by an uncontainable sense of dread. The sting of the derogatory appellation "gal" triggers for Helene all the degrading experiences in her early upbringing in the brothel, whose "red shutters" have imprinted an indelible stigma on her existence. The shame of being born to a whore haunts every subsequent act of decency, and tempts Helene to overcompensate her lack of birth with numerous validations of her breeding and virtue. She consolidates her authority by carrying out personal investigations into the conduct of others, by establishing herself firmly in the most conservative black church, by never turning her head to the late churchgoers, and by making important amendments to ongoing religious practices. Her strong sense of rectitude nonetheless staggers and crumbles when an earwax picking salmon-colored train conductor presumes to address her, an exquisitely attired lady, in the belittling and offensive manner, without being in the least unconvinced of its propriety or his authority. As a woman aspirant of recognition and respect from a wide selection of the social body, Helene finds herself ashamed by the rebuff and curtness of the people on the train, and unacknowledged sensations of shame and humiliation overflow and permeate the scene.

Apart from the boorish conductor, every passenger in the colored coach is affected one way or another by this contagious and intense feeling as it travels beyond the immediate circle between Helene and the unaffected conductor. At this scene of implicit shaming triggered by the hail, "gal," shame's social role as boundary-drawing becomes clear. Regarded by Myra Mendible as engendering a democratic crisis in which "boundaries between full and partial citizenship" are drawn (Mendible 5), shame on this South-bound train works to confirm the unbridgeable difference between the "salmon-colored" white citizen and the "light-colored" colored citizen. Helene's shame highlights a

racist logic behind this seemingly innocuous hailing. The impeachable Helene has indeed made a regrettable but understandable faux pas by trespassing the carefully policed color line on the train, but she has been effusively apologetic about it in humoring the piqued conductor and complying diligently with his every request. Helene is determined to resort to her "presence and authority" in solving this unfortunate incident. She presents the best proof of her breeding by answering in the most "correct" way. With her careful answers--"We made a mistake, sir" and "We got in the wrong car, that's all. Sir," Helene showcases her respectfulness by observing the subject-verb-object formula, never forgetting to attach the honorific "sir" to her responses. Each time Helene gives an account of the conduct of a "we," she makes sure their comportment is held to the yardsticks of an external evaluator "sir." Despite all her efforts at making amends and demonstrating exemplary deference, the conductor remains unappeased and unaffected. And as he nonchalantly doles out the injunction in the most offensive and demeaning way, Helene loses the last drop of hope of settling the matter in a civilized and proper manner. Her recourse to provocation and coquetry is an apparent throwback to the practices of solicitation being indulged behind and around the glowing red shutters of the Sundown House. Out of frustration, anger, shame, disgust, or despair, inspired or resigned to take up the least favorable option, or simply struck numb with the overflow of emotions, Helene takes up a subject position of opprobrium when she smiles in the coquettish way. As if accosting the odious conductor, Helene parodies his level of social standing, and finally sends him away by pinning on him a badge of dishonor as well.

My close readings of Morrison and Larsen generate a conception of shame that complicates known theoretical and clinical understandings. Reading *Sula* and *Passing* side by side presents shame as constitutive of "founding" myths of the self, such as the interpellation. Both affected by a discriminatory social orderings across the race, class, gender, and sexuality divides, Larsen and Morrison's literary delineations of black female subject formation are rich with microscopic scenes

of shame and shaming. Their attention to the minutiae of shamed embodiment generates a profile of shame that interacts with the empirical and social scientific investigations. Shame becomes a useful tool for appraising the restrictive and oppressive systems to which one is subject. Disconnecting shame from a rhetoric of moral compass that originated perhaps with Aristotle, Larsen and Morrison flaunt a "shameless" stance that pinpoints "immorality" at the center of a peculiar modality of individualism, to which the overall politico-social environment is rather inimical. Both Larsen and Morrison have shown their particular reimagination of identity formation with all its "surface-" and "deep-" level complexities. Pairing physiological traits with psychological mechanisms, Larsen and Morrison make "deep" structural dynamics *resurface*. Their reconsiderations of the inscribed surface of the individual responds in interesting ways to the Foucauldian conception of power inscriptions. Without "reconfirm[ing] the surface-depth binary" or "reproducing the surface as essence" (Cheng 98), the two African American writers capture subjectivity in its distinct "openness," which becomes possible via the characters' access to shame.

Gal vs Nig: Being Hailed While Black

"Gal" not only triggers all the humiliating associations of the Sundown House, it also hails Helene Wright, the respectable Medallion citizen, back to Helene *Sabat*, one whose ignominious birth among the filth and evil requires the constant policing of the "Virgin Mary" (*Sula* 16). "Nig," on the other hand, seems to have induced a less palpable effect on Clare Kendry, while engendering a visible emotional stir among her African American friends. Gertrude Martin, a fellow passer who obtains her white husband's tacit compliance, "started" and "settled back" upon the hailing, waiting helplessly for a sign of reassurance from Irene and Clare. Irene Redfield, who prizes herself above the two passers who have forsaken their racial heritage for "immediate desire" (*Passing* 5), feels "insulted" and enraged by Bellew's impudence. Irene Redfield personifies what Candice Jenkins

proposes to be "racial essentialism," in that she clings to a set of "rigid codes of moralist behavior," such as racial allegiance, as "markers of their own blackness" (136). For Irene, Clare's transgressiveness is disturbing not only for her disregard of *innate* racial essence, but for a larger "downright selfishness" that challenges all established boundaries, including race, but also marriage, love, and motherhood (65). More than what Jenkins characterizes as an "ambiguously raced figure" for Irene's black bourgeois social world, Clare is the "unsettling presence" that threatens her existential security as a *black* person (Jenkins 137). Clare's identity performances make suspect her own "pre-passing," "inherent," black identity (Ginsberg 4). For Irene, it is her radical lack of any "authenticity" that sets Clare on a downward spiral to her doom. Irene's epistemological discomfort is compounded by her emotional turbulence. Beneath the "smooth surface" of friendship, Irene testifies to sensations of "seething shame" as a witness to Clare's passing (*Passing* 60). In both *Passing* and *Sula*, the scenes of passing feature episodes of hailing, which often engender in the passers a peculiar response of shameful smile.

What has unfolded on the train and in the living room, stripped of the subdued overflow of emotions, are essentially two episodes at the Althusserian scene of interpellation. In *Sula*, hailing the "pale yellow" woman as "gal," the "salmon-colored" conductor stages a public spectacle of the colored citizen who, by all the other criteria—class, education, breeding—would be his superior. Stripping the honorable citizen to a mere "galness," he has redeemed his own social inferiority by publicly embarrassing a misbehaving black woman. Justified by her actionable faux pas, the conductor revels in his momentary surge of power over the roomful of black passengers. Whereas Helene's temporary *passing* in the white-only coach is unidentified, the identity performances in *Passing* always feature "knowing spectators," which Samira Kawash proposes as intrinsic to the meaning of passing (Kawash 145). Both Gertrude and Irene are absorbed into the unrevealed spectacle of racial performance as witnesses, with which Clare's passing retains a meaningful

structure. Ironically, the unknowing spectator, John Bellew, unwittingly exposes his passing wife with a loving banter. The private joke is humorous only because of the stark contrast between his unalloyed hatred of blacks and his unbound admiration for Clare. Professing that he doesn't "dislike" (*Passing* 55) negroes, but "hate[s]" them, Bellew needs the backing of racism steeped in entrenched biological distinction to make his joke funny. It is within the context that the "black scrimy devils" are "[a]lways robbing and killing people" that the nickname for his wife seems *hilarious*. As he affirms that "[n]o niggers in [the] family"—"[n]ever have been and never will be" (55)--Bellew becomes the *spectacle* for the more informed racial performers.

That a hailing scene is innately *spectacular* is inseparable from Althusser's famous account of ideological interpellation. In order to render vivid the abstruse conception of interpellation, Althusser stages a "most commonplace, everyday hailing" on the street, in which some unidentified entity, possibly the police, calls out "Hey, you there!," to which the beckoned individual "turns around" (Althusser 190-1). If he's slightly apologetic about the setting of the scene—the police and the streets—he is emphatic upon the significance of the physical reaction of the hailed. The "simple 180-degree physical conversion" (191) is taken as the irrefutable evidence and a dynamic illustration of the correlation between ideology and its subject. Turning around towards the hailer/ideology not only confirms its authority over the subject, but suggests an essential lack of association between power and its executer. The powerful position of the hailer discriminates no users. Assuming the position of the hailer, the train conductor, for example, makes one *naturally* authoritative. It is thus apt that Morrison leaves the conductor nameless and solely identifiable by his "salmon-colored" skin. Any light-skinned person could police the color line; the position itself could justify any vagueness of their identity. Not that Morrison deliberately demonstrates the anonymous nature of power within such a position, but her manifest lack of interest in the conductor corroborates an Althusserian reading of the scene. However, even Althusser puzzles over the efficacy of the

interpellative power, and wonders how the individual "consciences" could always have been sufficiently addressed. This seemingly innate sense of the "obligation to respond," Althusser ponders, is singularly "strange" (191), and he relies upon the "always-already-ness" of interpellation as responsible for the readiness of the individuals to turn. Interpellation is for Althusser the immaterial correspondence to the "material forms of existence" (188). By virtue of interpellation, ideology "recruits" individuals into concrete subjects and makes them viable (190). Thus interpellative hailing becomes the point of entrance through which individual exist. Unlike Althusser, in *Sula* and *Passing*, interpellation does not assume such a sweeping significance, but the hailing scenes of "gal" and "nig" do help accentuate the undercurrents of shame with which the characters navigate their lives.

Morrison and Larsen's scenes of interpellation, while retaining some key features of the Althusserian example, contain added dimensions of identarian complexity that exceed the classic formula. Both literary instances feature idiosyncratic terms of address that carry with them tremendous epistemic baggage. The appellatives "gal" and "nig" have been heavily saturated with gendered, racialized, sexualized, and classed connotations. The word "gal" was first registered in *The Columbian Grammar* by Benjamin Dearborn, who lists the word as one instance of linguistic "improprieties"—a variant of "girl" (Dearborn 135). For Dearborn, "gal" is simply a common misuse devoid of any special affective and cognitive shadings. But its later usage as a colloquial and regional variation of "girl" signifies a deliberate choice of abuse. At times used playfully and humorously, when the conductor in *Sula* addresses the possible dissident of Jim Crow laws as "gal," he intends it to be neither funny nor endearing. Rather, he has tapped into the ready source of racial discrimination. Similar to the racial slurs of "boy," "gal" works towards what Nell Sullivan identifies as the "aphanisis of the subject," which "eclipse[s] the being of the 'racial' subject" (Sullivan 376). All the other *meanings* of Helene and Clare as a complex sociocultural being fade away in the wake of the racist signification. Suzanne Romaine's research in the British National Corpus renders that

girl/woman attracts "negative overtones" much more easily than *boy/man* (Romaine 139). Concurring with Jurafsky's claim that "the concepts of 'small' and 'child' lie at the heart of the semantics of the diminutive cross-linguistically," Romaine identifies other "evaluative meanings such as contempt, ridicule, intimacy, marginality" in diminutive markers (145). The context and speakers would often double down on the discriminatory powers of the linguistic terms. As a form of address the diminutive *girl* could signal intimacy between interlocutors, but it might yield other negative connotations such as being an object of male desire, domestic appendage, emotional weakness, and low-status occupation (Sigley and Holmes). As the train conductor pronounces "gal," he trades in a robust sociopolitical linguistic economy around a seemingly simple appellation. Calling her "gal" instead of "woman," he preserves a certain civility while dismissing what Romaine identifies as the "overly sexual" connotations of the word "woman," thereby downplaying or denying Helene's legitimate sexuality (Romaine 125). His hailing performs paradoxically the Lacanian "fading of the subject" behind the overriding signifier "gal" (*Four Fundamentals* 208). He not only liquidates Helene Sabat's apparent higher social status, but eliminates her sexual identity with his vantage point as a white male racial policeman. Not a lady, not a woman, not even a girl, Helene is rendered legible only as a black "gal" who has willfully challenged the "sacrosanct" conventions of the Jim Crow society. Viewed in this manner, her conduct warrants the appellation, and the indifference of the fellow passengers bears testimony to the lawfulness of the hail.

In *Sula* and *Passing*, the scenes of interpellation are spectacles of ideological and affective excess in which the weight of shame reacts violently with the rigidity of sociocultural codes of conduct. Similar to "gal," the interpellative "nig" contains unambiguous shameful connotations. While Morrison's scene of interpellation feeds upon open hostility, Larsen cloaks the epistemic and affective violence of "nig" under a seemingly impeccable veil of domestic harmony. It is with affection that John Bellew greets his wife "Hello, Nig." It's certainly ironic that his love is

indistinguishable from the vehement hatred he bears towards African Americans who are naturally intimidating to him. The intensity of his feelings for both converges at the junction of his endearing "Nig"—pitting the magnitude of his repulsion against the depth of his tenderness. Like "gal," "nig" interpellates the character into a life of shame beneath the respectable veneer of black bourgeois comfort. In this sense, the scenes of hailing in the two novels are also scenes of (re-)birth in which the individuals are resignified as shamed beings. Shame furnishes the point of entry through which they become interpell-able, hence viable, subjects. That Clare Kendry is desirous of subverting such a shamefully interpellated existence is seen in her decision to pass for white. It is certainly ironic that with all her carefully orchestrated phenotypical whiteness, she could not escape the racist appellation. Her "queer jeer" speaks to the difference in her professed and willed racial identification. It is a gap opened up by the shaming rhetoric of blackness and the shame of her political betrayal as a passer. Deemed a "verbal symbol of U.S. racial repression," the n-word has retained its discursive weight when it was interchangeable with "slave" prior to the 1770s (Pryor 205-6). In the first few decades of the abolitionist movement, the label was usually attached to aspiring people of color who sought greater social mobility with their newly acquired freedom. Used as a pedagogical tool to effect racial difference in the antebellum North, the word picked up its oppressive overtone as the society became more and more mobile and equal. For Pryor, the epithet "emerged as a weapon of racial containment" to help police the unstable color line upon which socio-economic hierarchy is hinged.

In his well known 1829 *Appeal*, David Walker traces the etymology of the n-word to its Latin roots as signifying "inanimate beings, which were black: such as soot, pot, wood, house [and] animals which they considered inferior to the human species, as a black horse, cow, hog, bird, dog" (Walker 61n). While scholars have questioned Walker's contention that the term is only viable as a racial slur among anti-black whites and their black underlings, consensus has been reached that the word grew virulent between the 1820s and 30s—at a time when abolition picked up force in the

North. Later as a moniker of extreme racial discrimination, the word, by Patrick Rael's account, could well be a spelling alternative to the less disparaging Latinate descriptor, *niger*, which was used since the 1570s. The divide between "negro" and "nigger" became increasingly fraught alongside the class stratification among the free blacks in the antebellum North, when the latter word was considered to be an abusive underside to the other more polite alternative. Interestingly, the bifurcation is for Rael not only indicative of divergent opinions towards the referent, but also "mark[s] in polite circles *those who uttered it* as lacking in refinement" (Rael 94; emphases original). Rael argues that regardless of the racial and social status, the n-word figures as a reliable marker of incivility and vulgarity. But such a bifurcation enjoyed a regional difference as well. As late as the turn of the 20th century, Rael claims, the disparaging slur could be just a "universal word in Arkansas" for negro, as the South was lagging behind in "generating...the nation's most potent secular blasphemy" (Rael 96). But it soon caught up. By 1863, no reputable Southerner would refer to a slave in this manner. Surprising as it may sound to a modern ear, the denigrating epithet was once simply another "impropriety" like "gal" that scholars like Dearborn viewed as indicative of a want in refinement and education. Once a rhetorical mistake or feature, in the context of *Passing*, it challenged much more than respectable societal order.

Encompassing a wide range of complex connotations, the n-word, according to Pryor, might signal subservience, class hierarchy, respect, manipulation, dissemblance, reproach, or a shared social identity (Pryor 216). But when John Bellow blurts it out, it blends his racial disgust with an equally strong dose of endearment towards his wife Clare. As Pryor's reading of Harriet Wilson's *Our Nig* demonstrates, when employed on the right side of the color line, the word "nig" could take on a neutral tenor that "revealed a close relationship between the two men, a familiarity"; at other times, however, the epithet brands the addressed with an unapologetic "un-Americanness" that forcefully "united white Americans along racial lines" (Pryor 221, 227). By assuming the injurious moniker,

Pryor argues, Wilson "fractured" herself not only into a writer and a mother, but into an ostracized American citizen who could never claim the white North her lawful "home" (Pryor 245). In a similar vein, in *Passing*, the respondent to "nig" undergoes a form of racial alienation that bars her from ever being *herself* even in the privacy of her own home. More fracturing and ostracizing than "*gal*-ing" a married, respectable lady, "*nig*-ging" announces to a passing body a fundamental homelessness and deprivation of identity. At the same time when the interpellated are made homeless, the hailers are well at home. These interpellating moments have fractured the fragile "stasis of identity," to use Sarah Chinn's term, that the ambiguously raced body performs for an ignorant white audience as well as the informed black spectators. Called out by the stigmatizing discourse of racism, the passing bodies are pinned down at the scene of interpellation, only to come loose again through the sheer force of their shame.

Turning Problematic

Unlike the episodes of recognition mentioned above, *Sula* also features a scene in which the force of interpellation breaks down completely. The dynamic of misrecognition is fully registered when Shadrack, a shell-shocked black soldier who has lost his memory, mulls over the appellation "Private" and its connection to his identity.

> He wanted desperately to see his own face and connect it with the word "private"--the word the nurse (and the others who helped bind him) had called him. "Private" he thought was something secret, and he wondered why they looked at him and called him a secret. (*Sula* 10)

In comparison to "private," both "gal" and "nig" span a much narrower stretch of meaning that renders interpellative misrecognition unlikely. The arbitrariness of all free-floating signifiers is brought out most vividly in the interpellative "private." As Shadrack's bafflement indicates, the difference between interpellated and lived identities could happen quite "naturally." Shadrack's

metaphorical failure to "turn" to "private," when contrasted with Helene Wright's and Clare Kendry's responses, highlights the importance of the affective component to interpellation and subject formation. Emotionally disconnected with the word "private," Shadrack is only able to tease out a secretive layer of his identity, which torments rather than cements the hollowness of his being. As an alternative, he desperately seeks the reflective power of mirror to pin down his existence, and finally finds "reality" in the "definite" and "unequivocal" blackness of his face in the toilet water (13). In contrast, the intensity of affect and shame in particular allows Helene and Clare to hold on to their identity, even during the fraught moments of their passing. Affective reality is particularly critical for them because their ambiguously raced body could never reflect back a self-same blackness "definitely" and "unequivocally."

In Morrison and Larsen's scenes of interpellation, the Althusserian anonymous "you" is specified and takes on contextualized sociocultural connotations. This resultant affective revision of the Althusserian scene also comes with a twist. Gone is the perfect subject who turns 180 degrees to a hail. Henry Krips's reading of Althusser has pointed out that the hailing, which Althusser takes as evidence for the existence of ideology, is "floating free of anyone's intention" (Krips 86). Both the unnamed train conductor in Morrison and the racist husband in Larsen are "powerful" only to the extent that they occupy a certain *position* within a "discursive" dynamic. As public and private race policemen, they walk around identifying complete and intimate "strangers" as "*gal*s" and "*nig*s," thereby contributing to the ongoing circulation of the terms and adding to the "myth" of their efficacy. The continual circulation of names, for both Laclau and Krips, is a prerequisite to the potency of ideology, which becomes palpable only through the "unmindful" enunciators. As Krips demonstrates, neither the act of calling out nor the appellation itself is intrinsically meaningful or authoritative. Assessing the scenes of interpellation through a psychoanalytic lens, Krips identifies the source of power in the subject and in their voluntary conferral of love. Krips follows Laclau in

stripping the "articulatory signifiers" of their coherence and content (Krips 84). After becoming empty free-floaters, however, the interpellations are able to wield a maximum of influence over the hailed. Whether it is love or shame, the presence of intense affective response bridges the gap between the signifier and the signified, allowing the individual to be interpellated into existence while retaining subversive potentials.

Ashamed for her momentary transgression through the white-only coach, Helene Wright fulfills the obligation to play the part of the dutiful "gal," first by demonstrating the lawfulness of their presence--"I have [the tickets]," then the exigency of their misdemeanor--"Oh...I...We made a mistake, sir" (*Sula* 20-21). Helene's response corroborates with the fact that "gal" has been invoked with its full scope and tenor: gender and racial inferiority, sociopolitical subordination, emotional immaturity, etc. The shaming by "gal" mirrors the earlier shameful indiscretion, which diminishes the distance between the respectable Helene and a recalcitrant *gal*, and makes Helene accountable for responding, even existing, as *gal*. Mendible's reading of shame, not simply shaming, as an effective ideological tool that "maintain[s] fundamental social divisions and antagonisms" is highlighted on this occasion with the dynamic of interpellation as well (Mendible 9). The epithet retroactively validates the denigrating question; and the speaker is confirmed as a figure of authority as soon as Helene utters the personal pronoun "I." What follows the "I" hardly ever matters; as long as she responds to "gal," Helene unfolds herself in the interpellative dynamic, rendered legible, (hyper)visible, and audible. Smiling is perhaps her only recourse to dispute the hailing power, an approximate act of rebellion, and her protest *against* the sensations of shame that consume her. The right not to *respond*, precisely because it "belongs to responsibility itself" (*On the Name* 17), is inaccessible to individuals not reaching full citizenship in the Jim Crow South. Speaking as the "gal" is taking a *silent* position as a partial citizen; reacting with a "jeer," on the other hand, is the first step

towards negotiating the mechanisms of shame and shaming that a racist politico-social setting employs to regulate diverse bodies.

Even though the politics of shame "attends the process of subjection in general" (Adamson and Clark 3), the Jim Crow South's exclusionary, xenophobic, and racist culture fashions particularly positioned bodies. Deprived of the right to respond *fully*, the body becomes the *uncountable* excess to the totalizing logic of the Althusserian interpellation. At the hailing scenes, the body in passing is *not* turning. The hailing has to come from the head-on manner because it is Helene's walking *towards* the colored coach that outs her as a trespasser before. The personification of law has to come from *ahead*, as its power to hail multiplies with particular positionalities between itself and the undisciplined bodies. The figure of law will in due time personify as a source of Helene's shame, towards which she could only smile to dispute its hold upon her. Althusser has pinpointed the act of turning--the "180-degree physical conversion"--as symbolic of the ideological transformation of an individual. In Morrison's portrayal, the "founding" moment lies in Helene's response--her verbal acknowledgement of and resignation to the legitimacy of her treatment. Turning, which inspires Judith Butler to argue for the pre-existence of a guilty conscience, is for Althusser a tool of dramatization. Althusser informs his readers, in anticipation of doubts over the individual's uncanny readiness to turn, that the temporal and motive sequence around the physical turning is entirely fictive. The *real* works of ideology, he guarantees, "happen *without succession*" (Althusser 191; emphases original). Interpellation and the symbolic turning are simultaneous and identical; the existence of the appellations has always already guaranteed the completion of such a bodily response. Before being hailed on the street, before walking onto the street, even before being taught how to walk, the individual has always already turned. His turning is almost instantaneous to his existing. The turning becomes entirely metaphoric in the scene of interpellation in Morrison also because the politics of shame has rendered the act of turning--submission to the power--utterly unnecessary.

With or without such an act of recognition, some bodies have already been deprived of full citizenship with as long as the "literature" and "vocabulary" *designating* their shameful presence *exist*. Read in this light, Helene's shame might come even less from her dislike of the *term* as from her vulnerability to such terms, in spite of all her "preparations" against these possible shameful scenarios.

The turning, metaphorical or not, is for both Althusser and Butler an uncontested fact that is not fully acknowledged in Morrison and Larsen's literary imagination. When John Bellew growls "damned dirty nigger," Larsen depicts Clare as only "stand[ing] at the window," "with a faint smile on her full, red lips, and in her shining eyes" (*Passing* 175). No change in Clare's physical posture is registered in response to the hailing. Helene's walking towards the hailer reads as an intriguing variant to the Althusserian scene. On the one hand, the eagerness for lawful recognition skyrockets when the subject undertakes a voluntary chase; on the other hand, the march towards the figure of law suggests its waning influence over the subjects. A third option features in *Sula* as Nel Wright's halfway turn. Such an incomplete turn corresponds with Pierre Macherey and Stephanie Bundy's assertion that unlike theoretical postulations, the "obligation to turn oneself around following the shouted summons" is unfounded in real life (Macherey and Bundy 14). Suspicious of the preconditioned turning, Macherey and Bundy ponder the existence of a "free and conscious subject," who might just as well not turn as turn away from the interpellation altogether (15). Their faith in the "circumstantial equilibria" lets them to believe that the response to ideological hailing could be other than "turning around toward" (15). Morrison's portrayal of Nel's half turn confirms such a hypothesis. Bed-ridden and in pain, the pugnacious Sula is now irreparably declining. Three years and her approaching death seem to have softened Nel's intense animosity towards Sula. Intending to make deathbed amends with Sula, Nel is ill prepared for the dying woman's unabated

vigor and sharp tongue. As she is leaving, Nel confesses that this would be their final meeting and that she has no intention of coming back.

> She opened the door and heard Sula's low whisper.
>
> "Hey, girl."
>
> Nel paused and turned her head but not enough to see her.
>
> "How you know?" Sula asked.
>
> "Know what?" Nel still wouldn't look at her.
>
> "About who was good. How you know it was you?"
>
> "What you mean?"
>
> "I mean maybe it wasn't you. Maybe it was me."
>
> Nel took two steps out the door and closed it behind her. (*Sula* 146)

Unlike the flustered train conductor, the ailing Sula acknowledges Nel with a "whisper." Similar to the Althusserian account, Nel is hailed from behind, with an epithet--"girl"--to which she responds with a pause and a turn. Similar to the other hailing scenes, Nel also does not perform the trademark 180-degree turn.

The manner with which Sula performs the hailing is inseparable from the choice of her interpellative. Sula's uncharacteristic feminine gesture--her "low whisper"--is as much conditioned by her failing health as by the intense affective meaning the word "girl" commands. With reference to a deep attachment prior to their rupture, the appellation triggers a whole stash of pleasant memories as well as the eventual shameful betrayal. Poised at the doorway, Nel perhaps recalls the *other* time when she entered a bedroom scene, which I shall discuss in detail in the next section. Both the hail and her positionality drag Nel back in shame. All her tender spots for Sula are touched by the latter's whisper and the appeal to "girl"--a term of endearment between the two originating when they were little. It has reappeared in their reunion after ten years since Nel's wedding to Jude. It occurs again

towards the end of the book, when Nel, standing by Sula's grave, finally realizes the depths of her yearning for Sula. Moaning "We was girls together...girl, girl, girlgirlgirl," Nel buries her anger and shame under the unbounded sorrow for her loss. What Philip Novak takes to represent the grieving for "an African American cultural past...[that is] irrevocably lost" is at the most immediate narrative level a "ceaseless circulat[ion]" of shame (Novak 191). Every invocation of "girl" recalls a form of strong emotional bond that is tainted with shame and humiliation. Each time "girl" accompanies scenes of reunion and departure, marking an incomplete severing of the tie. As she utters "girl," Sula not only reinvokes a defunct license of friendship that, while it lasted, renders Nel "the only respite...from her stern and undemonstrative parents" but also appeals to the full scope and tenor that the simple word wields. Nel, "embarrassed" and "ashamed," is hailed to respond (*Sula* 83).

Nel's incomplete turn to the hailing "girl" also illustrates the role that powerful affects such as love and shame play at the scene of interpellation. The lingering attachment to Sula makes the appellation "girl" forceful enough to interpellate Nel, but the shame over this weakness and Sula's earlier disloyalty prevents a complete turning. Shame opens up a space of subversion and replaces the dualism of gain-or-loss with the circular logic of return. This incompletion is also redolent of the incomplete reduction of interest or joy, which Silvan Tomkins takes as the innate activator for the affect of shame. The incompletely hailed individual could be said to retain a covert "shamed" dimension in their very subject formation. In his conception of ideology, Althusser allows a slight chance of failure—"nine times out of ten, it is one who is meant" (Althusser 191). For Mary Bunch, the small rates of misrecognition make it possible that the individual "might not answer" at all (Bunch 53). She reasons that if the laws are liable to err, then there is a remote likelihood that they might even be altered or repealed. Similarly, Mladen Dolar critiques the "clean cut" structuralist cast of mind in Althusser; ideological transformation, he proposes, is "never complete" and always contains a "remainder"—"an element of 'pre-ideological' and 'presubjective' *mataria prima* that comes

to haunt subjectivity"(Dolar 77). Noela Davis takes the ideological misrecognition to be suggestive of an "agential 'gap'" (Davis 884). Nel Wright's incomplete turn is a dramatic illustration of the possibility of such ideological failure. Not willing to completely assume the "girliness" of her past and aware of her *difference* now from the more submissive version of herself, Nel makes clear that being a "subject" is not tantamount to being "subjected" with no agential power. Her ability to "negotiate" with the interpellative forces could actually manifest in moments of "inaction" such as this one. Shadrack's earlier bafflement and Nel's "lack" of action both point to an excess within the interpellative economy that Morrison and Larsen are interested in exploring. If shame comes as a response to Shadrack's unnameability--his having to remain "private," Nel's shame keeps her uneasily named--trapped in between the comfort of "girl" and the pain of Sula's betrayal. In both instances, shame problematizes the uncontested power of interpellation.

The Hysterical Smile

With Helene's coquettish response and Clare's faint smile, both Morrison and Larsen seem to have exhibited a shameless abandon that rejects shame's traditional role as "moral compass." Starting with Aristotle who believes shame is "becoming" to youth and keeps them from "commit[ting] many errors" (*Nicomachean Ethics* 4.9), Freud also emphasizes how such "mental dams" could "keep us on an ethical and civilized course" (Lansky and Morrison 9-10). The call for solidarity and a unifying social force is not observed in the social realities Morrison and Larsen are interested in; rather, they seem to propose a deliberate shamelessness that problematize the meaning of morality altogether. Contra James Twitchell and Thomas Scheff's interpretation of shame as the guardian of culture, *Sula* and *Passing* present shame in a positive and productive light *against* the well-established moralist reading of shaming, and cast it in the feminist recuperation of hysteria. That affect, or shame in particular, could furnish an exterior to ideology has been confirmed by

scholarship on hysteria. Abusively viewed as "Oedipally inadequate," sexual minorities, Janell Watson argues, can attain viable subject position through hysteria (Janell Watson 309). Understood by Žižek as "failed interpellation," hysteria embodies some unsignifiable "psychic content" in the symbolic language (*Enjoyment* 101, 142). Žižek also dissociates hysteria from its Freudian and feminist postulations, and casts it in a gender-neutral light. It emerges as the subject's momentary hesitation at the scene of interpellation. Nel's pause to Sula's "girl" could be one such minor instance of hysteria, while Clare's "queer gleam" dramatizes this "hesitation" into open defiance.

Challenging the psychoanalytic and ideological orderings of the world, hysteria, as *Sula* and *Passing* demonstrate, often takes shape as a maddening smile. Embarrassing as it seems to Nel, Helene's smile is peculiarly effective. It is simultaneously arresting and alienating. The black soldiers couldn't help but be drawn to the enchanting smile; the boorish conductor becomes disturbed enough to leave the trespassers in peace. Taken as a sign of slavish subservience by all the witnesses--the soldiers, Nel, and the train conductor--Helene's smile is at once a resort to her denied femininity by the appellation "gal," and to her repressed "wild blood" bound under the elegant folds of her dress. It is through her smile that Helene reconstitutes herself from being merely an object of pity and a spectacle for male viewership. She has announced her own agential possibilities by *reacting* to the male actors. In *Passing*, Clare's smile maddens the otherwise composed Irene, who assists in the latter's death and ultimate release from the torturous double life. Combing through these hysterical smiles, I intend to reassess the relations between negative and positive affects, as well as their possible transmutation. The smile serves as a curious point of departure in which the affective and the epistemic diverge as well as converge.

The smile, which for Nel and the soldiers is utterly unjustified, could be a telling sign of the shame sensation that Helene is experiencing, coupled with the downward posture of her head. Silvan Tomkins identifies the smiling face as one of the adult modifications of the shame-humiliation and

contempt-disgust affects. He argues in *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness* that since "it is not altogether acceptable for the adult to express shame too openly," the shame response is liable to undergo modifications among shamed adults (*Affect, Imagery, Consciousness* 364). The typical shame response—"a lowering of the eyelid, a lowering of the tonus of all facial muscles, a lowering of the head via a reduction in tonus of the neck muscles, and a unilateral tilting of the head in one direction" (*AIC* 630)—demonstrates an intensity not advisable for adulthood. The abbreviated, prolonged, and sub-clinical transformations of the affect are adopted instead. Laughter, a facial defense mechanism, is one such particular medium with which the affect shame finds expression. The response of shame is attachable to an array of other affects including fear, distress, excitement, enjoyment or anger, in either a chronic or momentary fashion. When shame intersects with excitement, at the locus of sexual desire, the face smiles. Tempered with the sense of shame, the smiling face features dropped eyelids and a downward gaze. The shy smile of the Victorian maiden, Tomkins claims, encapsulates such a shamed sensation of enjoyment. When a smile is tinged with shame, the individual is resolved to be "impunitive either toward himself or others" (*AIC* 366). The shamed smile is symbolic of the decision to "forgive and forget" all the "insult to dignity" that shame incurs (366). In accord with the nobler interests of mutuality and inner harmony, the affected individual is willing to settle with a smile. Smiling checks, however temporarily, the continuing pursuit of interest that renders one vulnerable to shame in the first place. It nurses the injured heart and sets in a healing spell. But when the pull of the original object of desire is forceful enough, sensations of shame can also overpower the release of the smile.

In both *Sula* and *Passing*, the smile response signals the loci of shame and humiliation. Despite his detailed case descriptions, Tomkins never sets any parameters with which the smile response can make sense. Smiling, he avows, could be activated by a "relatively steep reduction of the density of stimulation and neural firing" (*AIC* 203), which makes it indicative of relief, triumph,

pleasure, recognition or familiarity. When Helene Wright, observing the rules for propriety, is synecdochically ordered around by reference to her "butt," she can no longer contain her tumultuous feelings. Similarly, when Clare Kendry is disparaged before a roomful of respectable people whose affection and admiration she has been eager to maintain, she has to release her shame and frustration. Smiling is the only affordable option for both characters to discharge their pent-up emotions while remaining out of reach of the wrath of law. With a release from the biting pangs of shame, the smiling episode provides a much needed respite from the harassing racial policemen--the train conductor and the furious husband--and takes their presence out of the stifling context of racial antagonism. The smiling reaction signals the body in revolt against what Kawash calls the "structuring order of race" (Kawash 156). At fraught moments like these, the body speaks when linguistic articulation fails or does not suffice. Refusing to converse in the dichotomous language of the racist other and unsatisfied with the response of their passive, white bodies, Helene and Clare smile to resignify their presence as belligerent and unruly. The smiling body speaks back against the interrogating whiteness of the conductor and the husband. It constitutes a kind of speech that Judith Butler finds powerful enough to "reinvok[e] and reinscrib[e] a structural relation of domination" (*Excitable* 18). In response to the disparaging "gal," the mistrust, and the insult of "butt," Helene screams with her smile the rejoinder she dare not utter. For Clare, her smile is the excess that the neat structuring of racial order could not account for. Like the mysterious, racially indeterminate body that would not reveal itself, the peculiar smile withholds meaning and defies interpretation.

Morrison and Larsen manage to capture the dazzling and maddening smile in all its shameful and hysterical undertones. With the rupture of the smile, both novelists are able to convey the intensity of emotion beneath the deceptively immaculate surface. The smile marks the place where the affects of shame and enjoyment intermingle. It signals an effusion of affective discharge, and flags the limits of discourse. The literary portrayal of such a close affinity between shame and the joy

of the smile confirms Tomkins's postulation that affects do combine and co-exist with one another. But the peculiarity of the smile also exceeds Tomkins's prognostics. Smiling is more than indicative of affective co-presence. Entangling the positive affect of enjoyment and the negative affect of shame, smiling is also an anti-shaming tactic that facilitates successful release from the shameful sensation. The hysterical smile works to attenuate "the positive wish," which Tomkins takes as an effective way to relieve the "sting of shame" (*AIC* 361). Hailed as "gal" and "nig," the characters in Morrison and Larsen's depiction resort to self-imposed acts of mockery. By belittling their own efforts, the law-abiding, respectable citizens managed to disentangle themselves from an obsessive devotion to form and authority. The divergence between their dedication to law and the shame-engendering references to "butt" and "nigger" finally jolts them out of their attachment. The repudiation of their desire lessens the smarting pains of shame while eliciting a smiling response. Symbolic of their eschewed fealty, the smile exteriorizes their decision of final relinquishment. Other than a sign of coquetry or joy, the dazzling and maddening smile thus features as an auxiliary affective mechanism with which the self could better regulate and maintain its affect system.

Complementing Tomkins's schemata of the affect shame, Morrison and Larsen demonstrate with their literary imagination the significance of the smiling response to the shame sensation. Alongside Helene Wright's smile, Morrison also showcases in *Sula* another instance in which the proximity between shame and smiling might be more than circumstantial. Opening her bedroom door to one of the most erotic and enigmatic sex scenes, Nel Wright finds herself mesmerized and petrified by what she sees:

> Nibbling at each other, not even touching, not even looking at each other, just their lips, and when I opened the door they didn't even look up for a minute and I thought the reason they are not looking up is because they are not doing that. So it's all right. I am just standing here. They are not doing that. I am just standing here and seeing it, but they are not really doing it.

> But then they did look up. Or you did. You did, Jude...And I did not know how to move my feet or fix my eyes or what. I just stood there seeing it and smiling, because maybe there was some explanation, something important that I did not know about that would have made it all right. (*Sula* 105)

Walked in on by his wife when having sex with her best friend, Jude Wright refuses to be shamed in the slightest degree. He remains concentrated on attending to his object of interest at the moment, and braves himself against moral condemnation with his right to pleasure. Jude is uncompromising about freeing his right to joy from the yokes of morality. Holding himself beyond the sanctions of conscience and conventions, Jude's disregard of his humiliated wife works to brand her action as *voyeuristic* while making his *legitimate*. Securing his access to self-indulgence, his resistance to shame is guaranteed by buoying up the original interest and joy against all attempts of reduction.

Jude's "immoral" defense against shame is in stark contrast to Nel's surrender. Read by Barbara Johnson as a "figuration of the dissociation between affect and event," this scene of illicit passion concerns what Johnson recognizes as issues of detachment (aesthetics) and connectedness (rapport), rendered in a more embodied manner (B. Johnson 169, 170). The polar forces between observing the intercourse as a spectator, and responding with indignation and horror as the wife and friend, converge at Nel's shamed paralysis. Her emotional attachment to both Jude and Sula does not allow her to completely renounce her interest in what they do. This incomplete reduction of positive affect that Tomkins takes as an unfailing formula of shame glues her to the spot of shame. Nel's paralysis is a physical translation of the dynamics of shame she experiences at the moment. Shame puts Nel at an aestheticized distance from the scene of her husband and friend's betrayal, which figures as one of the conjunctures of "brutality, aestheticism, and lyricism" that Philip Novak identifies in *Sula*. Bound to the writhing bodies on the floor through her marital and friendly ties, the affronted Nel is unable to completely sever the emotional bonds and turn away; instead, she stays

transfixed at the "nibbling dogs" that refuse to honor even her right to condemn. Her inability to fully dismiss the original attachment is critical for the dawning of shame that subjects her to the most trying spectacle, and conjures up the memory of the hateful response of the soldiers on the train.

The intensity of Nel's emotional disturbance is revealed in the most blatant terms by the temporal and perspectival con-fusion. The initial first-person recounting of a scene switches midway to an illusory conversation with a "you." Nel's attempt at distancing and disowning a piece of memory by narrating in the third-person perspective collapses as the recollection of the nibbling bodies proves too cumbersome on her fragile nerves. It is not the factuality of the affair that breaks her defense against the affront of the memory—she was doing well with the narrative--but rather the affective realm causes her to collapse. When memories of shame and humiliation strike in, all defense crumbles. As the specificity of the sexual position is recalled, Nel's determination to relinquish her ties to the scene begins to weaken. With each detail revealed, she is pulled closer and closer to the writhing bodies, first with a personal pronoun "I"--to reclaim the memory--then with an identifying a "you" that enforces a direct confrontation. The adoption of a first-person point of view coincides with the entrance of powerful affects. Shame doubles up with the animalistic acts and the looks of resentment. The affect of shame, by virtue of its residual connection to the renounced object of interest, catapults Nel back to the scene in despite of her wishes to the contrary. Temporal disorder, too, occurs alongside the involuntary recovery of her traumatic memory. The distance and security the past tense offers are being encroached upon as details come welling up—"nibbling," "not touching," "not looking at each other," "didn't look [up]"—and fall apart completely when the "I" enters the picture and "opened the door." As Nel Wright finds herself pulled closer and closer to the stunned bystander by the door, things *are* happening once again in the present—they *are* not

looking up, and she *is* standing there and seeing it. The reliving of the scene and the affect shame transports her across time and space, back to the irrefutable and timeless *being* of the betrayal.

At the crossroad of her temporal and affective turmoil, Nel starts to smile. Set on an involuntary emotional replay of her tragic train ride with her mother over twenty years ago, Nel is held hostage by Jude's forbidden look; and in her confusion at the "apparent" irrelevance of her presence, she stands there waiting and smiling. She waits for an explanation just as her mother had waited for a gesture of kindness from the passengers with her luggage. On the other hand, as the "faint smile" steadies Clare Kendry over John Bellew's snarl, it maddens Irene, and ultimately sets Clare free from the agony of a double life. Smiling seems to be an effective way to release the stored-up negative affects and set the characters moving again. It takes the ashamed individuals out of the grip of shame--Helene from the train conductor's injunction over her "butt," Nel out of her husband and best friend's infidelity, and Clare past her husband's abuse. Smiling also frees them from the paralysis and makes them motive again—Helene picks up her own trunk, Nel stands up and walks out the bathroom, and Clare possibly jumps out of the window. The inexplicable smiling spell sets the women free, however temporarily, from their pent-up shame and humiliation, and relieves them from close contact with their positive wishes. The proximity between the smile response and the shame sensation in Morrison and Larsen testifies and expands Tomkins's theoretical expostulations—not only could negative and positive affects coexist at any given time, they might be translatable into one another through certain auxiliary mechanisms. Smiling, they seem to propose, could be one such creative device through which even shame, the severest torture of the soul, could be alleviated. The physical proximity of smiling and shame indicates an affective transmutation that casts the negative affects in Tomkins's formulation in a uniquely productive light.

The Affected Surface of Self

> She had no center, no speck around which to grow. She was completely free of ambition, with no affection for money, property or things, no greed, no desire to command attention or compliments--no ego. For that reason she felt no compulsion to verify herself—be consistent with herself. (*Sula* 119)

Sula Peace is not in the least a popular character in the Bottom; she has always been accused of being completely devoid of morality, loyalty, affection, etc. While her lack of moral compass has been taken up by feminist critics who find in her daring pursuit of pleasure a progressively individualist spirit of mind, her behavior, including her remorseless betrayal of Nel's love and trust, points to an uncanny *self*-less-ness that resists any sympathetic understandings. Jennifer Henton is one of few critics who draws a positive conclusion from the case of Sula. Instead of being an unsolvable mystery, Sula reads like an inspiring "joke on psychoanalysis" to her. As "a character without ego," Sula, she argues, is destined to "remain[] a nonsubject, and therefore nonsubjugated" (Henton 102). Unlike Nel Wright who dispenses her loneliness with somebody else, Sula bears her "[first]hand lonely" with no "unworthy" male companions (*Sula* 143). Sula signifies for Henton as having carved a hollowness out of the "solid pattern" of human connectedness (Henton 104). Her refusal of any long-term relationship stems not from fears of pain and abandonment, but from an openness and courage to embrace the immensity of any suffering. Willingly forgoing the morbid attachment to order and safety, Sula is able to detach her agony from "a schema of self," and to bear to the fullest extent the consequences of her choice of egolessness (105). For Henton, the allegiance with which Sula once dedicated herself to Nel is no more than an involuntary fascination for the ego-work in Nel, and her detachment thereafter manifests her disappointment in such a life. The moral of Sula's story, according to Henton, lies in the exposure of the "faulty ego-work" that glosses over the "unsafe," "vulnerable," but incredibly generative texture that weaves around the capaciousness opened up by egoless freedom (106). Resistant to the injurious injunctions of the

society, the centerless, hollow subject falls beyond the Freudian tripartite schematization of the human psyche, stays unrestrained by the interpellations of the superego, and remains true to the ideals and whims of a pre-egoized self.

This center-less, ego-less being who "commands no attention" is to be contrasted with Clare Kendry, who's bewitching smile and stunning appearance *always* grips attention. A smile accompanies every prominent performance of Clare's racial passing. Other than the "a queer gleam, a jeer" to Bellew's "Hello, Nig," Clare keeps her "smiling face" all through Bellew's rant of his hatred of the African American race (*Passing* 54, 56-57). She carries her is "peculiar," "caressing," and "seductive" smile to the Negro Welfare League dance as well as Felise's penthouse party. The perpetual shield of affect epitomizes the failure to disarticulate identification from passing. Joy and shame become indistinguishable for Clare, and so is her passing identity from her "authentic" one. On the other hand, Sula, while never *pass* for anyone else other than her "self," exhibits a likewise inconsistency when there is "no compulsion to verify herself." This shared phantasmatic *core* with a passer speaks to what Anoop Nayak and Mary Jane Kehily calls the "fragile, unreliable and potentially porous" body (Nayak and Kehily 472). The instability of surface signifiers renders the body ideologically unstable. If gender be "undone" and redone, as Judith Butler has argued, other points on the grid of intelligibility--race, class, etc.--might be fundamentally illusory, too. They are constitutive of what Nayak and Kehily understand as an act that is "open to splittings, self-parody, self-criticism, and those hyperbolic exhibitions of the 'natural'" (Nayak and Kehily 469; *Gender Trouble* 146-7). As a recalcitrant gender rebel, the incoherent Sula signifies for Gurleen Grewal as continually wielding a "divisive...centrifugal force" against all *identi*-fication (Grewal 45). She departs radically from the conventional "black race personified" that Hortense Spillers elaborates as the "tragic mulatto," the "mammie," "coon" or "maid" (Spillers 297). But unlike Clare, whom Martha Cutter considers an utterly "disruptive" person, Sula remains interested in one form of "social

inscription" (Cutter 86). Her attachment to the sanctity of names and the potency of naming greatly affects the extent of her revolt against the norm and its subjugating desires.

While Sula was able to remain elusive and indifferent to "established habits of behavior" (*Sula* 127), as soon as she begins to fall in love with Ajax, her hardcore carelessness starts to crumble as well. Her desire for Ajax blasts the "self"-sufficient myth of her being and triggers ongoing realization of her fundamental deficiency. Tipped off by the first signs of her attempts to "nail[] him," Ajax takes off as he has left all the other women who have wanted to pin him down. For Sula, his departure is not as loathsome as the betrayal he has dealt her by concealing his real name.

> Albert Jacks? His name was Albert Jacks? A. Jacks. She had thought it was Ajax...When for the first time in her life she had lain in bed with a man and said his name involuntarily or said it truly meaning him, the name she was screaming and saying was not his at all...Sula stood with a worn slip of paper in her fingers and said aloud to no one, " I didn't even know his name. And if I didn't know his name, then there is nothing I did know and I have known nothing ever at all since the one thing I wanted was to know his name. (*Sula* 135-6)

Not being privy to the correct spelling of her lover's name is for Sula a devastating shame that offsets all redeeming qualities of their relationship. A person's name is for Sula of such significance that it represents the basis upon which one could ever be known. It is for her an ultimate logos that transcends the corporeality of the person and the immediacy of their situation. The withholding of such a piece of information is in Sula's estimation counterproductive to all further attempts at getting to know the person--one's name *is* one's identity, and no other identic frameworks could shed any light upon the being. Ultimately Sula is asking for a self-sameness that she herself is unwilling and perhaps unable to present. Ajax *does not* equal A. Jacks, and certainly *doesn't* mean Albert Jacks. The shorthand is for her a distortion of one's identity that must remain unaltered at any time. For all her eschewal of norms and convention, Sula blindly subscribes herself to the authority

of an arbitrarily assigned symbol. Her refusal to look beyond one's name is in stark contrast with her resolution to "make [her]self" and to give full expression to all that's "burning in [her]" (*Sula* 92-3). Her firm belief in the nonnegotiable integrity of one's own life, guided by its own whims and intuition, is clearly non-transferrable to another human being. The value of her existence--her precious inconsistency and the admirable lack of desire for verification--translates in Ajax's case to his very valuelessness.

Taken by Rachel Lee as representative of the anxiety over the "limitation and elusion" of words and meaning, Sula's disappointment might also have come from her role as a frustrated interpellator (R. Lee 574). The "inscribed difference" that Lee identifies as "ironically negates Ajax's identity" is the remainder that an ideological ordering of the world fails to fully capture. The pain and humiliation she felt in "screaming and saying" a name that "was not his at all" come as much from unrequited trust as from the disappointment in the failure of interpellation. Calling out "Ajax," even as he invariably *turns*, always already creates a difference from *the* subject "A. Jacks." This uninterpellatable excess is a perennial source of Sula's of anxiety, a self-difference that she sees as different from her self-same incoherence. Even if she doesn't need to "be consistent with herself," her inconsistency is interpellated within the purview of "Sula"; A. Jacks's inconsistency lies beyond what "Ajax" is able to command. Her desire for a comforting self-sameness is seen later in her passionate declaration that "If I live a hundred years my urine will flow the same way, my armpits and breath will smell the same" (*Sula* 147). What Lee takes to be Sula's change of mind from her initial "desire for absolute meaning" to a later belief in "meaninglessness" is thus a consistent affective investment in the sufficiency of interpellation. Sula will always be just "Sula"--no more no less--as should Ajax. While I do not dispute Lee or Deborah McDowell's reading of Sula's "striving toward identity" as "process" rather than "essence" (R. Lee 76; D. McDowell 81), I do believe Sula's confession that "the one thing I wanted was to know his name" suggests a passion for interpellation

and its "naming" power, which does not fall neatly under an overriding concern with meaning. The contentment and exhilaration in having “said his name” when he’s lying next to her in bed come back as the most insupportable sensation of shame. For all her eschewal of ideological apparatuses—norms safeguarding sexuality and friendship, Sula attaches herself to a supreme ideological symbol—the name with which one is interpellated. Sula’s faith in names confirms the always already occurred interpellation on even a most apparent "rebel." As she struggles to remain defiant against the socio-economic orderings around race, gender, sexuality, and class, her most courageous endeavors have already been undermined by her unconscious subscription to interpellation.

Unlike Clare Kendry and Helene Wright who are able to "confirm" their *particular* existence in the realm of interpellation via another's hailing, Sula Peace often exists as an unspecified and uncontested "you." One time she is *almost* hailed as "Sula" is when she overhears the conversation between her mother Hannah and her friends. Hannah's admission that "You love [your child], like I love Sula. I just don't like her. That's the difference" sends the twelve-year-old Sula "flying up the stairs" (*Sula* 57). As Sula's attachment to Ajax's "real" name suggests, she demands the love for her and for what her name signifies to be identical. But knowing *her* name doesn't guarantee an attachment that is untethered by maternal responsibility. That "difference"--between Sula's desire for her mother's genuine affection and Hannah's avowed indifference engenders, by Tomkins's innate activator theory, a sharp pang of shame. In its stead, Sula could only register a sense of "bewilderment" besides the "sting in her eye" (57). The "cycle of negation" that Spillers characterizes as subsequent to this traumatic incident thus comes as a direct result of this conspicuous failure to access shame (Spillers 317). Whereas Clare and Helene need to resort to a self-annihilating smile to reduce their initial enjoyment and release themselves from the pain of shame, Sula's absence of shame suggests an initial lack of positive attachment--this time not to another human being, but to

herself as a worthy object of love. But her imperviousness to shame is not at all wholesome; to some extent, it triggers a chain of traumatic incidents in Sula's life. Immediately following this "bewildering sting," Sula plays with Nel near the river. At first lying in the grass in an almost Edenic harmony, the two girls end up digging a "grave" for some debris. The innocent childlike play turns even more macabre when Chicken Little slips from Sula's hands and drowns in the river. Labeled by Ashraf Rushdy as one of the primal scenes of the novel, witnessing (or causing) Chicken Little's death again fails to put Sula to shame. Concerned less with the deadly peacefulness of the water, both Sula and Nel are more interested in the "figure [that] appeared briefly on the opposite shore" who might have witnessed their crime (*Sula* 61). Despite all the "tears [that] roll into her mouth and slide down her chin to dot the front her dress," Sula soon "relaxed" their tightly hands that withstand them through the funeral (65). Remaining beyond the grip of shame, Sula has distanced herself from all the other references to herself. As she has decided to run away from Hannah's "call," Sula refuses to confront the agents of her interpellation. Unlike Clare Kendry and Helene Wright, she directs her defiance not at the interpellating structures but at their concrete manifestation in marriage, sexuality, and friendship. The question that haunts her to the end--whether she is the good one--bespeaks her concern that all her rebellious acts might have missed the target--a target she is unable to recognize without her *shame*.

As "loose" figures unbound by allegiances of race, blood, or morality, both Sula and Clare Kendry contest vigorously the sociocultural inscriptions on their bodies. Clare strives to stay loyal to no other entity but her self just as Sula vows to "make [her]self." Like Sula's devout self-making, Clare's acts of passing are also performances that her *unalienated*, *decentered* "self" simply does. The readiness with which Clare denounces her racial identity for affluence and possibly betrays her friendship for passion, manifests less a mindful wickedness than a Foucauldian self-care that overrides Enlightenment products and privileges the body and its experience. The most severe

instance of moral judgment befalls Sula when she watches with inhuman aloofness at her mother being burnt to death. When Hannah's dress catches fire, Eva throws her one-legged body out of the window in her desperate effort to save her daughter's life; but Sula, feet away from Hannah on the porch, looks transfixed at the enflamed body. Her "just looking" has been taken by Eva as evidence not of terrified paralysis, but of her wicked "interest" (*Sula* 78). Sula confides later on that she was simply "thrilled" at the time and just wanted her mother "to keep on jerking like that, to keep on dancing" (147). "Evil" as it seems by normal standards, Sula's fascination is pure and free from any intention. Her radical departure from any scripts of virtue and morals prompts Spillers to label her as a "hateful" rebel who is representative of a "countermythology"--one who pits her irreducible self against the "received moralities" (Spillers 298, 320). Free of the "mimetic desire" and any "discursive/imaginative project," Sula is able to defy even the "allegiances of kinship" at the moment of her mother's death by fire, and Spillers calls for an "absolute suspension of final judgment" in response to Sula's "radical freedom" (317, 296, 314). The dancing body signifies for her a form of unbounded freedom and an ultimate autonomy that infuses life with a momentary overflow of meaning and matter. Sula looks shamelessly interested at her mother's overwhelmed body just as she sits shamelessly naked in Nel and Jude's bed. The "heartlessness" that shields Sula from what Tomkins calls the "affect of indignity, of defeat, of transgression and of alienation" (*AIC* 351), also bars the self from being "misrecognized" by interpellative hailing.

In *Passing* and *Sula*, Larsen and Morrison play with the idea of an inscription-resistant body that is sometimes placed at a scene of interpellation. The untimely death of both Clare Kendry and Sula Peace might have revealed the novelists' verdict of the inviability of such *free* bodies. But the courage with which they resist the inscriptive powers of the ideological apparatuses outlives their shortchanged rebellion. Where Clare and Sula's lives end, their stories live on and *affect* the audience they touch. Nel's poignant cry at Sula's tomb is as much an elegy for the loss of her ally as of her

own absolute selfness outside the realm of interpellation.

> She got out of bed and lit the lamp to look in the mirror. There was her face, plain brown eyes, three braids and the nose her mother hated. She looked for a long time and suddenly a shiver ran through her.
>
> "I'm me," she whispered. "Me."
>
> Nel didn't know quite what she meant, but on the other hand she knew exactly what she meant.
>
> "I'm me. I'm not their daughter. I'm not Nel. I'm me. Me."
>
> Each time she said the word *me* there was a gathering in her like power, like joy, like fear..."Me," she murmured, "I want...I want to be...wonderful. Oh, Jesus, make me wonderful." (*Sula* 28-9)

The moment when Nel looks beyond the interpellated surface of herself and into her *me*-ness, the energy she has inadvertently gathered up with the shame-proof self-shattering flows into the numerous bodies of her readers. The absolute distinction she draws between *herself* and "Nel" recalls the difference Shadrack experiences between *himself* and his hailed existence as a "Private." "Touching" Nel's "me-ness" through our absorbed eyes and fingers as a reader, we feel a gathering of power, joy, and fear, with each repetition of her murmuring, that fuses and annuls the temporal and spatial confines of the different worlds. Our consumption of their affects, stories, and lives comes also with a blurring of cultural, ethnic, and racial differences, the con-*fusion* of which might lead to some different futures that are simply too "dazzling" for us to conceive.

As we peel off each "surface" feature[38] of the self, we end up revealing an "internal core or

[38] Arguing against the modernist suspicion and critical alertness and urging a return to a susceptibility that could undo the subject-object dichotomy, Anne Cheng contrasts the "discourse of 'pure' modern surface" against "notions of excessive adornment," the former associated with meanings of "purity, cleanliness, simplicity, anonymity, masculinity, civilization, technology, intellectual abstractism," while the latter entail "inarticulate sensuality, femininity, backwardness" (103). See "Skins, Tattoos, and Susceptibility," in *Representations*, vol. 108, no. 1, 2009, pp. 98-119.

substance," which is as illusory and deceptive as the cumulative "effect" produced through the "acts, gestures and desire" (Nayak and Kehily 468). The piercing of this Foucauldian "inscribed surface," highlighted at the moments of strained interpellation, affective conflicts, and baroque staring, gives room to a return and reversal of the (self-) interpellative process of self-constitution. How we regard and remake the surface concerns more than the question of our gender, but all the other identitarian frameworks. Such an opening up of sealed spaces renders readily available the explorative reevaluation of the natural and the unnatural, the normal and the abnormal, the real and the phantasmatic, the affective and the affected, the inside and the outside, and the superficial and the in-depth. The "core"-less, interpellation-resistant characters in Toni Morrison and Nella Larsen's novels offer refreshing takes on the meanings of integrity, self-esteem, vulnerability, and shame. Rather than a merely negative emotional experience, shame figures also as an occasion with which hegemonic forces might be restrained, however momentarily. Risky at times, keeping the self unmoored--not self-identical and not sufficiently interpellated--is at others peculiarly rewarding and productive. The excessive, fluid matters of the self take Helene, Clare, Shadrack, and Nel out of a rigid, often repressive self-other relationality, and allow them to experiment with forms of detachment that defy reason and morality. Smiling enables the characters to survive episodes of shame and shaming, which become reconfigured as sources of self-knowledge. Even as the smile has not managed to transport Helene, Nel, and Clare from the predatory conditions indefinitely, for the brief moments while it lasts, it lifts the fragile bodies above the punishing circumstances. It effects something no less than a new dimension of being.

Chapter Four--The Ritual of Shame: Hemingway's *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden*

Defining the Field of Play: The *Sun*, the *Garden*, and Shame

> "You are all a lost generation."
>
> ——Gertrude Stein in Conversation

> "One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh; but the earth abideth forever...The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to the place where he arose...The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the north; it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits...All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full; unto the place from whence the rivers come, thither they return again."
>
> ——*Ecclesiastes*

The two epigraphs of *The Sun Also Rises* have been cited as a valuable source to critique Ernest Hemingway's 1926 novel. Themes of loss and nature have in various ways supported readings of moralism, ecocentrism, new historicism, symbolism, masculinism, etc. In significant ways the two quotes signal the moral depravity of the American expatriates in the 1920s,[39] the venomous consequences of anthropocentrism,[40] and an omnipresence of human struggle and suffering.[41] In a

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[39] Michael Reynolds in his 1987 essay, "The *Sun* in its Time: Recovering the Historical Context," points out that this novel should be understood as "a study in moral failure, a jaded world of unemployed and irresponsible characters...a fable of ideological bankruptcy" (45). For Reynolds, the general moral indulgence in Paris undoes the more orthodox upbringing Hemingway receives in Oak Park, and allows expression of his otherwise suppressed erotic inclinations. See "The *Sun* in its Time: Recovering the Historical Context," in *New Essays on The Sun Also Rises*, edited by Linda Wagner-Martin, pp. 43-64.

[40] David Savola faults pastoralism as supportive of "an anthropocentric vision of the natural world" in his essay, "'A Very Sinister Book': *The Sun Also Rises* as Critique of Pastoralism." The pastoral vision, he argues, operates by subjugating the "wild lands to human uses" (41). Savola interprets the passage from *Ecclesiastes* as "a powerful rebuke" against anthropocentrism because it depicted human beings as "tiny, fleeing, miniscule occurrences when measured against the indomitable rhythms of nature" (40). See "'A Very Sinister Book': *The Sun Also Rises* as Critique of Pastoralism," *The Hemingway Review*, vol. 26, no. 1, 2006, pp. 25-46.

[41] Günther Schmigalle reads the quote from *Ecclesiastes* as emphatic on "repetition" and the "vainness of the effort to create anything new" (11). See "'How People Go to Hell': Pessimism, Tragedy, and Affinity to Schopenhauer in *The Sun Also Rises*," *The Hemingway Review*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2005, pp. 7-21.

review that interrogates identity formation in both *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden*, Malcolm Magaw (1987) reads the two quotations as expressive of Hemingway's concern with "modern man's perception of himself in history" (Magaw 24). The Great War has wreaked such havoc that the "life-giving cultural and societal sun" could never rise again from the "dark wasteland" (24). At this particular juncture, the modern man, Magaw laments, is no longer able to derive sufficient meaning from history to sustain their personal identity. Their fraught relationship with history sends them into exile, in desperate need of a new axis of being. I agree with Magaw that the two epigraphs work in tandem.[42] They should not be regarded as irrelevant, tangential, or insignificant. Together they speak to the modern condition. But the import of the messages lies beyond the scope charted by an identitarian Odyssey, a departure from history, and the salvation in nature and art. Hemingway draws from both Gertrude Stein and the *Ecclesiastes* in rendering a quintessential modern portrait, and I would propose, of shame. Modernity is portrayed as in constant flux, between loss and gain, passing and coming, and ups and downs. Together the two quotations tell a story of modern man's "loss" and their persistent efforts at dispelling that debilitating disorientation. The *Ecclesiastes*, by pointing to the "earth," the "sun," the "wind," the "river," and the "sea," offers to some extent a range of "abiding" fixtures whose meaning remains steady across the centuries. Beyond the Romanticist, Transcendentalist suggestion of returning back to nature, Hemingway charts a rhythmic rebuttal to Stein's pronouncement of a "lostness." Rooted in the dynamics of "passing," "coming," "going," and "returning" is a stabilized ritual of motion and change. The guiding spirit of a "return" echoes the inevitable return of interest in the shame response. Casting the modern malaise in a similar discourse of loss and return, Hemingway astutely, if not only intuitively, comments upon the metacondition of shame in his century.

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[42] Hemingway is most emphatic about refuting Stein's verdict that his generation is "lost." In a 1926 letter to Maxwell Perkins, Hemingway asserts that "there was no such thing as a lost generation"; he allows that they might be "beat-up," but could never be "lost." See Carlos Baker's discussion of "The Wastelanders" in Harold Bloom's edited essay collection, *Ernest Hemingway's The Sun Also Rises* (1987), pp. 75-93.

In the four-volume psychological explications on affect, Silvan Tomkins has defined the innate activator of shame as the "incomplete reduction of interest or joy" (*Affect Imagery Consciousness* 353). To render the complexity of shame in the plainest formula, Tomkins speaks of a "continuing but reduced investment of excitement or enjoyment" (*AIC* 361). Outlasting the pain of shame is a far more persistent and sticky desire. The remains of positivity do not wither away but precede the revival of interest and joy. Beside the natural phenomena, the motive alternation in *Ecclesiastes* mirrors a restlessness that is innate to the dynamics of shame. Moreover, Hemingway's characters have reacted in a peculiarly "shamed" manner. Both his first novel, *The Sun Also Rises* (1926), and the posthumous book, *The Garden of Eden* (1986), feature protagonists who are caught in-between the conflicting desires. As if "ashamed" of their actions, the characters, at first adamant about pursuing their interests, oftentimes bow down in face of setbacks. "Lost" in the loops of "passes" and "returns," Barnes, the Bournes, and the others are also caught in the "ups and downs" and the of the sensations of shame. Together the two novels that nearly bookend his career capture the shame *in* and *of* modernity. Shame in Hemingway is not only depicted as a response to life, but almost as life itself, manifested in the numerous strivings that characters have taken up before abandoning, and inevitably yield to again. What Hemingway seems to suggest with his representations of shame is that it is a common and necessary reaction, one that has been nurtured almost as a survival mechanism. Reading Hemingway in this sense helps us understand why shame is highly relevant and unavoidable in our time, and how shame, rather than a destructive emotional baggage, features as an agent for the self, and anchors individuals onto the path of their self-discovery. Focusing on shame also highlights Hemingway's concern not only with the "code heroes" but also with the ordinary men who remain erect above their seven eights of shame.

The lens of shame helps bring the two novels under a common strand, and presents a strong case for the argument that *The Garden of Eden* is a crucial component in the Hemingway oeuvre. It

helps strengthen the attempt to certify the posthumous book as an authentic Hemingway creation, while alerting the scholars to the depth and width of Hemingway's fascination with the affect of shame. As a heavily edited posthumously published novel, *The Garden of Eden* retains an organic tie with *The Sun Also Rises* through the trope of shame. Despite the loss of two thirds of the original story lines, a chapter entitled "Provisional Ending," and over 15,000 words, Tom Jenks's version of *The Garden of Eden* preserves the resolute engagement with the affect of shame in Hemingway's manuscript. And it is this sustained and intense interaction with shame that most powerfully binds the two Hemingway texts together. Although traces of explicit textual reference to shame are limited,[43] shame summarizes the feeling readers experience through David when he mockingly interrogates his "girlish" look in the mirror after the first he and Catherine experiment with a same hairstyle.

> "You've done that to your hair and had it cut the same as your girl's and how do you feel?" He asked the mirror. "How do you feel? Say it."
>
> "You like it," he said. (*The Garden of Eden* 84)

Besides this heroic gesture of self-shaming with his haircut, a major source of shame derives from David's passive, but nonetheless willing participation in Catherine's sexual experiments. On one occasion soon after Catherine's first boyish haircut, she takes charge and engages David in a probable anal intercourse. David's response afterwards when "his heart said goodbye Catherine goodbye my lovely girl goodbye and good luck and goodbye" (*GE* 18) betrays an undisclosed sense of shame over the weakening, if not complete loss of his masculine identity. Sensations of shame are left unstated or dismissed as "nonsense," as when he mocks himself as a legalized gigolo (31). Shame

[43] Marita is "ashamed" when she approached the Bournes to inquire about their coiffeur and finds the idea of sleeping with David shameful; Catherine, upon walking in on David and Marita kissing one another, is "happy" that now they "have shared all the guilt," and after her sex with Marita, becomes ashamed of herself when she couldn't stop talking about it; Catherine is again "ashamed" when her book project gets stalled; David, too, finds himself "ashamed" of his angry outburst when he finds out that Catherine has burned all his clippings and stories (*GE* 90, 126, 111, 121, 190, 224).

towards his gender and sexuality also affects his evaluation of his work in progress--the honeymoon narrative. Connections exist between shamed feelings of inadequacy and unworthiness that Michael Lewis has commented and David's assessment of his own work as "worthless" (37). Shame is probably responsible for his decision to abandon the narrative for good and to turn to the less unmanning African stories. There, however, shame resurfaces as pangs of guilt as he indirectly murders the huge-tusked elephant. This childhood trauma writes shame and its variant sister emotions--guilt, embarrassment, regret--into the depths of his identity. The guilt over being an informant founds his resolution to be silent, an oath that he "shamelessly" disregards in being a professional "tattletale."[44] More than any other characters in *The Garden of Eden*, David Bourne steeps in sensations of hollowness, akin to feelings of shame. When Catherine, consumed with a passion of utmost "madness,"[45] burns all of David's clippings and stories, David is only able to experience an acute "emptiness." Enraged and dumbfounded at first by Catherine's perfect composure that verges on utter shamelessness, David swallows his "hollow" feelings as he has kept his guilt and shame (216). The "empty" sensations creep up whenever shame looms large, particularly at times when the issues of his manhood and morality are at stake—sodomy, polygamy, betrayal, and "female hysteria" (17, 149, 164, 216, 219).

Similar to *The Garden of Eden*, *The Sun Also Rises* (1926) often communicates shame in an inarticulate manner. Jake Barnes, the unmanned protagonist with the unnamed wound, has received

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[44] After the young David realized that he was responsible for the death of the gracious creature, he resolved never to be a lowly informer ever again, vowing that "Never, never tell them...Never tell anyone anything ever. Never tell anyone anything again" (*GE* 181). His vocational choice of a writer might attest to the strength of his determination, while at the same time betraying and mocking it—a writer doesn't ever *tell*, but he does write about, and the stories are to be consumed by anyone who's interested in knowing. The writer David also makes a confession shortly after reminiscing about this early traumatizing episode that only his professional identity has kept intact—all the rest of his self are "split," "marked," and "scratched" (*GE* 183). If writing alone now seems to preserve and nurture all his pain, shame, and regret, the highest regard David has accorded his professional identity bespeaks a need, an indispensable one, in a carefully channeled and guarded fashion, for shame.

[45] At least in the refines of the story, Catherine Bourne's madness becomes an established fact. Catherine admits that she is "crazy" and prone to spells of erratic behavior (*GE* 137). David and Catherine have even discussed possibilities for Catherine to consult a Swiss doctor (158). In the rage over Catherine's burning his writings, David confesses that if she were not "crazy," he would "kill" her (223). Many scholars, on the other hand, read Catherine's madness otherwise, as displaced conflict or distress. See Burwell (1993), pp. 202-207; Tellefsen (2000), pp. 63-68; A. Strong (2008), pp. 88-105.

as much sympathy as criticism[46] of his own shameful response to his debility. Unlike characters in *The Garden of Eden*, Jake Barnes's palpable loss of the masculine symbol makes it easier for readers to identify his shameful response, and to postulate subsequent actions as reaction to such a severe emotional burden. As a backdrop that furnishes the drama in both novels, shame is the "good stuff" Hemingway chooses to bury. In accordance with his rule of omission, the affect of shame is oftentimes gestured at but seldom elaborated upon. Amal Treacher (2007) has warned us that shame defies articulation because "to survive the experience shame itself has to be denied" (Treacher 288). This acute sense of pain mars the immaculate facade of grace that Hemingway is determined to create and preserve. Powerful and debilitating, shame assumes a ghostly appearance that haunts and attacks the self-conscious characters. As Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank (1995) have observed, for developmental psychologists, shame often marks the "space wherein a sense of self will develop" ("Shame in the Cybernetic Fold" 6). For characters like Catherine Bourne and Brett Ashley, shame exists only in theory or nonthreateningly in reality. Catherine 's unperturbed poise throughout the book points to an eerie lack of self-awareness, which prompts her to fill such a void with a varied range of "creative" efforts. Similarly, Brett's dalliance bespeaks an anxiety over her fundamental lack. Her inability to be content with what she has is symbolically expressed in the bull's ear she has left in the hotel drawer. The marks shame has left on Barnes, the Bournes, and the others are often kept out of sight. Following Hemingway's criteria, "the test of any story is how very good the stuff is that you...omit" ("Art of the Short Story" 88), the unremarked shame paradoxically showcases the extent of his artistry. In this chapter, I trace the remains of shame and revisit its haunts in Hemingway. Chasing the shadows of shame renders a range of shared thematic axes between the two novels, particularly along the lines of the social-temporal, the ritualistic, and the non-human. A comparative

[46] For example, Jake Barnes has been accused of his prolonged inability and refusal to reconcile with his loss of macho manhood (Rudat 1990), of his attachment to a particular conception of masculinity (Fore 2007), of his shameful use of male proxy to access vicariously a lost sense of manhood (Adair 2010), and of his greed and dogged determination to consummate with someone who subscribed to different life values (Reynolds 1987).

study of Hemingway's texts also expands the known paradigms of shame. The shameful sensations are a normalized and norming response of modernity.

Looking for Meaning and its Various Shameful Substitutions

To establish a connection between shame and the shamed modern response that is the central argument I will expand upon later, I invite readers to two peculiar scenes of looking. Much in the same self-interrogatory manner that David Bourne chastens his pleasure in his unmanly haircut, the two spectators—Jake Barnes and Catherine Bourne confront themselves full in the mirror.

> Undressing, I looked at myself in the mirror of the big armoire beside the bed. That was a typically French way to furnish a room. Practical, too, I suppose. Of all the ways to be wounded. I suppose it was funny. I put on my pajamas and got into bed. (*The Sun Also Rises* 30)

> When she came back to the room David was not there and she stood a long time and looked at the bed and then went to the bathroom door and opened it and stood and looked in the long mirror. Her face had no expression and she looked at herself from her head down to her feet with no expression on her face at all. The light was nearly gone when she went into the bathroom and shut the door behind her. (*The Garden of Eden* 115)

Both Jake Barnes and Catherine Bourne are absorbed by their images in the mirror. Both spend a long time engaging with the figure that looks back. Both hope to find something alien in the familiar and docile body. While Jake has been freshly reminded of his futile attachment to Brett by their recent meeting, Catherine has finally stepped outside of her heterosexual marriage with an afternoon tryst with Marita. Disappointment and disgust write across their faces but leaving no new marks on their bodies. Gripped by the desire to look for a justification, an alibi, or a cause for their misery, both characters eventually give up their investigation. Confronted with the signifier for the loss of

his manhood, Jake moves quickly from the embarrassing finding to the French armoire. Determined as he was to question the damaged icon of his sexuality, Jake scrambles for distractions under the strain of shame. His pajamas are a welcome covering of his shame, and at the same time, an admission of his weakness and loss. As he resolutely zooms out and displaces one object of examination with another, Jake comforts his mind with the shift in focus, creating an illusion of a line of interchangeable objects. But his wounded penis is not another object of interest as the mirror, the armoire, or the room. Looking at it side by side with other *things* does not chip away its significance, at least not for Jake Barnes. Constitutive of his manhood is his desire for Brett who demands to be taken as a woman. Glossing over this object of his shame does not help Jake dispel the shame-laden core of his manhood. Between the undressing and the putting on of the pajamas is the unbridgeable chasm of his damaged masculinity. The ease with which he reaches for just another set of clothes to cover it up bespeaks a habitual drill of this perhaps involuntary self-shaming. Frequently if not daily would Jake stand in front of the "truth" of his being and withstand the daily shame of passing as a complete man. For Jake, to walk around claiming the role of man and to always fall short of fulfilling such a description is as ridiculous as proving one's manhood by losing its primary signification. Detached from its use value, the decorative marker of Jake's manhood is as meaningless as Catherine's feminine body. Having tarnished the embodiment of her fidelity, Catherine interrogates the incongruity of her womanhood by putting herself to shame. Examining closely and unabashedly the site of her mortification or the shameful lack of it, Catherine is apparently disappointed if not bemused by an utter absence of intrinsic meaning inscribed on the surface of her body, whereas Jake tasks himself with reassembling significance around an absent signifier. Unlike Jake's near ritualized self-shaming, Catherine's act is unlike any of her previous mirror-viewing. No longer content with a glimpse of her self, she is now determined to examine "from her head down to her feet," going over every inch of her flesh to identify the culprit of her

"fall." In both scenes, shame is unstated; whereas Jake quickly turns away from the object of his shame, Catherine confronts hers for an unusual long period. In both scenes, Hemingway approaches his characters' shame indirectly and subtly, but his determination to register the shameful contexts remains. Similar to Jake's evasion, Catherine's commitment is not untainted with sensations of shame. The repetition of "no expression" is as much a denial as a self-bewitching chant signaling the extent of her efforts. The narrator's attention to her unmarked face signals the falsehood of her confessed total lack of feeling. As if to problematize such a profession of unaffectability, Hemingway takes pains to remark once and again the absence of any telltale signs. With the repetition, the unspoken context of her shame is highlighted, and the statement—"no expression...no expression...at all"—might well be translated into "yes ashamed...yes ashamed...so much." Regardless of her long and concentrated attention to the object of her study, Catherine's frustration is as overwhelmingly debilitating as Jake's with his seemingly absent-minded dabbling in the field of his inquiry.

Extant scholarship on Hemingway has captured the significance of the two scenes, mostly in terms of the characters' efforts at reconciling with their loss of gendered identity. What's left underdeveloped if not untapped is the connection between the assault of shame and a frantic search for meaning. The quest for meaning does feature in Hemingway criticisms, but usually serves as a background for more pressing issues. Jake Barnes' wound suggests to Wirt Williams a critical loss of life's intelligibility, which prompts him to explore alternative "avenues of meaning and self-definition" (Williams 45). But Jake's existential pursuit is only secondary, as a corollary to the overarching logic of loss and desire. Similarly, for David Tomkins (2008), Jake's actions are merely reactive to his original loss, as a prolonged pining after "that which is unattainable" (D. Tomkins 752). Günther Schmigalle (2005) too, understands Jake's wound in strictly metaphysical terms, as "an emblematic representation of the will [with]...the infinite capacity to create desires and the impossibility of

finding any lasting satisfaction" (Schmigalle 12). What gets eluded in such a totalizing logic of loss is the response of the characters, which is related to the loss but not necessarily in a causal fashion. That they were initially conditioned by the loss does not render their contents and aims solely intelligible in light of that loss. It is not the desire for original wholeness that sustains Jake and Catherine's pursuit of meaning; their search for meaning has merit in and of itself. What Sally Munt labels a "change agent for the self" (Munt 8), shame contributes not only to the initiation of such a quest, but to its maintenance as well. The shameful body both Jake and Catherine have to confront in the mirror poses as a site of disidentification that both characters are eager to displace with various meaning- and identity-engendering ventures. Shame, Elspeth Probyn argues, "goes to the heart of who we think we are"; our senses of what is *shameful* help "reveal our values" (x). Refusing to allow their shame dictate who they are, Jake and Catherine peer into the dynamics of their shame. In her studies on shame and the literary history of Christianity, Virginia Burrus contends that shame discloses "human limits" and underlies self-transgressing capabilities for intimacy, sociality, and ethical response (Burrus 4). For Jake and Catherine, the difference between what *should* be counted as shameful and their particular embodied experience reveals the deficiency of known cultural scripts as well as the need to explore *other* viable forms. *The Sun* and *The Garden* could be taken in this regard as an in-depth negotiation *with* shame, in search of not *transgressive* possibilities per se, but *possibilities* with which physical and affective realities can remain as they *are*, untagged by cultural knowledge on shame.

Shame inhabits a curious plane in relation to the two looking (for) episodes discussed in the beginning of this section. The act of looking at one's inadequacy induces a sense of shame whereby the intention of interrogating that shame intensifies. Visually engaging with the source of their shame, the characters' experience of shameful sensation is further complicated by the cultural taboo on looking. The result is a powerful and unalloyed experience of shame. The extensive mirror-

viewing in *The Garden of Eden* is not merely indicative of an ongoing search for identity that the characters undertake; it contributes as well to an anxiety that runs parallel to, if not conducive of such a quest. Blythe Tellefsen (2000), for instance, assesses the various episodes of mirroring in regard to the characters' identity formation, cataloging its purposes as to "re/gain a sense of self," to "confirm," and to "indicate...uncertainty" (Tellefsen 85-7). More than simply *reflecting* other problems, mirror viewing *is* a valid site of inquiry in its own right; and it is charged with incredible affective tension. In his explication of the human taboo on looking, Silvan Tomkins (2008) builds a connection between this time-honored custom and the cultural anxiety over interocular intimacy. Tomkins references psychoanalysis in his claim of the eye as "a symbol for the penis," as "an auxiliary to the mouth, to the hand and to the genitals (*Affect Imagery Consciousness* 374, 380-1). Interocular engagement is fraught, Tomkins reasons, because it could become interlaced with shades of shame in relation to sexuality. Repeatedly emphasized is the critical importance of the eyes, which are both the sender and receiver of affects and information. Because "the self lives in the face and within the face the self burns brightest in the eyes," for Tomkins, the eye invites attacks of shame as the prominent seat of the self (*AIC* 359). To the extent that "complete interocular freedom must evoke shame" (*AIC* 385), the variant to mutual looking—self-mirroring—most probably has an innate shamed component. On a social occasion, the nature of the shame response, Tomkins avers, is to discourage any further contact, mostly visual, between two people. With mirror-viewing, if the object of attention generates shame in the viewer, then the quintessential shamed response--dropping of eyelids, of head, of the upper body--should have effectively terminates the act and release the person from shame. But the remainder of interest might prompt the head to turn up again, thereby locking the self in the unrelenting grip of shame. As they look on, Jake and Catherine are trapped in the self-sufficient feedback loop of shame, and both are saved when the object of their interest becomes almost out of sight--Jake puts on his pajamas and Catherine loses the daylight.

Hemingway forces our attention on shame's fraught relationship with looking and its power to problematize socio-cultural scripts such as the taboo on looking and value judgments of masculinity and monogamy.

Shame charts out a potentially subversive space against restrictive socio-cultural expectations, which could have easily escaped previous critical attention. Reviewing Jake Barnes's bedroom scene, Carl Eby (1998) identifies Jake as a potential transvestite who obtains the garment of manhood but not its essence. He draws a parallel between Jake's "missing penis" and the "concealed penises" of fetishists and transvestites ("Mirror of Manhood" 53). Jake's shame-laden struggle against his illegitimate masculinity is overlooked in Eby's positivist reading of a consummate transvestic performance. To some extent, Jake's mirror-viewing share's David Bourne's self-denunciation of his "abnormality," using established grids of value judgment to dismiss varied expressions as deformity. While David Bourne uses the mirror as a tool for cross-examination of his reaction to gender and sexual crossings, Catherine's self-mirroring does not support any dualistic logic. Amy Strong (2008) puts David's mirroring episode in relation to the gender blurring and subversion in the novel, and reads his proclamation--"you liked it...don't ever say anyone tempted you or that anyone bitched you"--as subscribing to a "system of dichotomies and absolutes" (Strong 86). In contrast, Catherine's utter lack of bodily and verbal reaction to her image in the mirror suggests for Strong a departure from dominant gender and sexuality discourses on reigning in her "wayward" body. Significantly, it is the affect of shame that marks the space where the individual struggles pit against socio-cultural conventions. Lynd's understanding of shame as promoting "adaptation to any approved codes" does not apply to Catherine (Lynd 66), who carries on with her nonconventional vision of a domestic life, and does not shy from performing what Deonna, Rodogno, and Teroni call the "pro-social, collaborative, and non-antagonistic behavior" (57). As a "change agent for the self," shame gives expression to the clash between personal preference and societal demands, and renders

an intangible conflict onto identifiable temporal and spatial planes. It is Catherine's and Jake's shame that forces them to question the established ideological conventions and makes us readers pause at the dubious "limits" of their existence as "honorable" human beings. In the face of their affective reality, the cultural norms that police their gender and sexuality reflect back as indeed fantastical.

Up close, the two scenes of looking in Hemingway are also performances of looking *for*. In light of Floyd Watkins's 1971 reading of *The Sun Also Rises* as "a search for meaning" (Watkins 97), Jake's shame over his castrated penis is critical in prompting him to look elsewhere for meaning. The search for other expressions of his compromised masculinity triggers a more general pursuit for meaning-bound sites. The damaged phallus stands for Jake as the difference between the adequacy of his desire and the absence of his behavior. The disjunction undermines a consistent sexual identity, while at the same time alerting him to the arbitrary nature of such a signification of his own gendered behavior. Catherine Bourne, too, becomes burdened with the lightness of her being, when traditionally meaningful venues—marriage, gender, heterosexuality--fall short of adequately weighing her behavior. Their lack of meaning drives her to sites of perversion and madness as the only alternative. Freed from traditional meaning-laden bonds, Catherine sets on realigning meaning with its signifiers on her own. Initiating sodomy, triangulating the heterosexual coupling, burning David's clippings and manuscripts, Catherine keeps pushing the socially conditioned boundaries of shameful behavior. She seems to have become addicted to the power of shame in furnishing arguments in challenging the sociocultural norms. She needs the constant access to shame as an abiding source of power to blast apart the meaningless scripts of her life, even if the shameful sensations are debilitating and devastating at times. Reviewing her recalcitrant body in the mirror until the natural light goes out, Catherine goes into the bathroom possibly not only to weep over her meaninglessness, but to resort to a manmade source of illumination on the conundrum of her being. Incidentally, this perspectival change from the "natural" to the "unnatural" is the opposite of what

Jake Barnes has done. It's only after turning off the artificial light that he becomes vulnerable to the source of his shame and existential crisis. Such a contrast is perhaps explainable in terms of the two characters' opposite attitudes towards established schemes of meaning. Whereas he allows mainstream discourses on gender to dictate his sense of shame and resigns himself to the debilitating sensation, Catherine chooses to redefine marriage, sexuality, and gender with her tonsorial adventures, her sexual experimentations, and her ventures into sodomy and homosexuality.

In time Hemingway would suggest possible avenues through which many characters in the *Sun* and the *Garden* regain meaning. Shame is the first step towards a recovery of meaning and the victory over a modern rootlessness. One of the functions of what shame theorists Carl Schneider calls "mature shame" is to "protect thing of value in their vulnerability to violation" (Schneider 8). Shame in Hemingway's texts might not have served the role of *protection*, but it highlights sensitive areas of personal experience and alerts the individual to the meaning of such "sensitivity." More than celebrating shame's boundary-protecting, anti-exposure functions, Hemingway's novels problematize the limits of "human" vulnerability and features characters who wouldn't recoil from crossing the line of shame. William Doty has observed in 1981 that the contemporary culture has "lost all foundations" (Doty 18), which he retraces back to Pound's emphasis upon the Now and the subsequent loss of continuity. Citing the post-WWII media culture as a "fictionalization of history," Beatriz Ibáñez (1998) cautions against "a banalized world of reference" and its power to "empt[y] post modern experience of ontological weight" (Ibáñez 93). Interestingly, she denounces the frantic search for meaning in *The Garden of Eden* as a symptom of such a banalization. David Bourne figures for her as the tragic hero who is unable to stop the draining of significance from "life, love, and friendship" (93). What she takes as David's heroism is rather his lamentable adherence to the established rhetoric of heterosexuality and masculinity. David's blind faith in the prescribed patterns of behavior renders his shame as conducive to productive self-reflections. If Catherine or Jake is

able to take advantage of their shame as what developmental psychologists deem as a primal place of self formation (Sedgwick and Frank 6), David follows the dictates of his shame to turn away from "abnormal" self expressions. Ashamed of Catherine's gender-bending experiments and their appearance in his narrative, David terminates both endeavors in favor of more conventional and thus honorable behaviors, replacing the "mad" Catherine with the docile Marita, restoring his household to a heteronormative and gender-specific site, preferring topics of hunting, friendship, and family over gender, marriage, and sexuality, and abandoning a counter-normative present to return to a colonial and patriarchal past. Whereas Ibáñez laments the early-postmodern condition that detaches meaning from the dynamics of signification, Hemingway's portrayal of shame in the novel clearly complicates such a condition by pointing to the productivity of such a decoupling.

Shame sponsors a flow of affect and energy which sets the characters in motion. According to George Cheatham, "the war's excess" with its "financial and moral inexactitude" has made Jake Barnes an ardent believer in equivalence (Cheatham 103). The discomfort he feels towards surplus or deficiency marks him out as an easy victim to shame whose intrinsic mechanism is built upon the logic of inequality. Tomkins's understanding of shame as activated by "the incomplete reduction of interest or joy" (*AIC* 353) highlights a built-in principle of difference in the affect. A difference in the level of affects between the partners conditions the attack of shame and humiliation. Thus the pain of shame is inseparable from a sense of inexactitude. Just as the excessive affective positivity would invariably lead to an overflow of shame, Jake is ravaged by the critical difference between his professed and practiced masculinity, between his love for Brett and her demand of being loved in a particular way, and between his desire for homosocial relations and his expulsion from the aficionado community. Shame emerges along the fault lines of imbalance and snowballs as the difference increases. William Dow has built an intriguing case for the virtue of irony in *The Sun Also Rises* which might well apply to the affect of shame. He describes the innate dynamic of irony as "the

discrepancy between reality and appearance" and attaches its significance to the "communal, interrelational" interests (Dow 179; emphasis mine). He also understands irony as a tool of self-exposure, through which one becomes aware of the freedom and limitations of self-determination, before reaching self-knowledge and self-transcendence. The rhetoric of exposure, difference, and relationality is redolent of shame. As the site of heightened self-awareness, shame features episodes of exposure that are occasionally voluntarily sought. Whereas Brett Ashley has to bear the shaming and shame-engendering stares from the traditional neighborhoods in San Fermin, David, Marita, and Catherine often gaze into the bar mirror at their unconventional "co-habitation." Understood by Helen Lynd and Léon Wurmser as a particular manner of exposing one's inner reality, shame in Hemingway sometimes ushers in occasions of self-reflection following deliberate "quest" for shame. Exposed, vulnerable, and desirous of interpersonal connections, Jake Barnes, Catherine Bourne, and the others are primed for attacks of shame, which Gershen Kaufman defines as a "sudden, unexpected exposure coupled with blinding inner scrutiny" (1989; 18). Following Kilday and Nash's studies on shame in modern Britain, such a quest for shame could figure as a necessary component in identity building projects outside the queer and nonheterosexual communities. Shame becomes disassociated from a "shame-ridden sexual identity" (Kilday and Nash 267) for Hemingway's characters and conducive to other possibilities of *being* in response to the demands of modernity. The "sensitive, intimate, and vulnerable" aspects of the self are no longer to be purged from an otherwise "wholesome" identity (Nathanson, "Timetable" 4); they are to be taken as points of entry to a life-long project of identity formation.

In response to the loss of meaning upon their close contact with shame, the characters in *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden* turn in various directions for meaningful substitutes. Under most circumstances, their endeavor to recover meaning becomes a site of meaning itself. Catherine's body is one such location on which she works diligently to create meaning. Donning provocative

hairstyles, wearing men's clothes, practicing nontraditional heterosexuality, Catherine engages her body with religious piety. Continuing the feminist tradition of critique, Kathy Willingham goes beyond Steven Roe's sympathetic reading of Catherine, and explores what a female artist goes through in her creative odyssey. As a literary realization of the theoretical model of *l'écriture féminie*, *Garden* presents the female body as a legitimate venue for creativity. Willingham tries to salvage the "text" Catherine has created with her body, connecting her gesture with the Cixousian idea that "the female libido...best expresses reality" (223). Willingham positions her mirror-reviewing desires as manifest of her wish to live in "the Imaginary or pre-Symbolic condition" (228). The medium of her artistic choice, her body, is only signifiable via a "feminine language," whose "atomized, nonlinear, and unorthodox patterns of speech" are only "mad" in the phallogocentric discourse (Willingham 234). The proprietary pride she feels towards her creation is fully registered in her statements that she is "a great success in [the] world" which she has "made up" (*GE* 53), that she has taken upon herself the "project" to remake David's life as a "present" to him (188), and that it is she who has "invented" the "wonderful" new Bournes (191). Every thing she creates serves as an extensive and subversive footnote to her declaration in the very beginning of the book when she reveals, partly in jest and partly in jealousy to David's assertion that he is "the inventive type," that she is "the destructive type" (*GE* 5). Catherine breaks down set grids of intelligibility in the writing of her own text—her gender, her sexuality, marriage, love, and madness. Her protests against phallogocentric meanings are also efforts with which she contests known shame scripts. And instead of letting responses of shame terminate her endeavor, Catherine lets these "meaningless" shames guide her adventure forward. In contrast, David Bourne habitually stops where his shame arises. Choosing a far more traditional means of writing, David sets out to create meaning that would be in line with the conventions of shame. No sooner than the image in the mirror grows to be alien and meaningless does David stop working at the honeymoon narrative (*GE* 84, 93), and when his image

has become too shameful to see, David abandons the narrative altogether (177, 188). But it is in writing that he retains a constant ashamed position--both phenomenologically, with his head down, eyes down, upper body down (*AIC* 352, 630), and psychologically, when he reencounters the shameful experiences of sodomy and betrayal (*GE* 17-20, 181, 216). Thus all the benefits that writing promises--a sense of progress, a clear conscience, meaning, and aliveness (166, 146, 128, 107)--are to some degree boons of shame. As critics such as Miles Richardson, Robert Fleming and Rose Marie Burwell recognize how significant writing figures for David and his identity formation, they have overlooked the role shame plays. Even as he concedes to the biting sense of shame from time to time, his decisions have been almost invariably in response to shame. Not only his career as a writer, but his life in general thus features a "shamed" trajectory.

For Jake Barnes, work is the meaningful substitute that scrubs the "funny" taste of his identity-shattering wound off of his mind (*The Sun Also Rises* 26-7, 30-1). He keeps a schedule that is interspersed with "respites" of shame. Working from early morning to late night, Jake rejoins his shame in front of the mirror every day before he goes to bed. Each year, taking his vacation in Spain, Jake is to encounter emblems of macho masculinity that remind him of his shameful lack. Shame prompts him to be hyper-mobile. A case in point would be the day after his painful union with Brett Ashley. A full night of shame sends Jake running around town--down the Boulevard to rue Soufflot, through Luxembourg garden, taking the S bus to the Madeleine, along the Boulevard des Capucines to the Opéra, into his office, going out for a meeting at the Quai d'Orsay, returning to the office and going off to lunch with Robert Cohn (*SAR* 35-7). As shame blasts his life apart, it also makes him hold on to it as a principle of life. Shame-induced work serves as a ready stand-in for meaning until more meaningful alternatives appear—fishing in Burguete and the fiesta in Pamplona. Staking his identity at these rituals, Jake Barnes helps bringing into relief the importance of shame in the trajectory of the characters in *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden*. These meaning-making

substitutes--Pedro Romero and the *corrida de toros*, David Bourne and his regime of writing, Catherine and her rites of change--are also shame-stimulated and shame-sustained projects with a peculiar ritualized character. Ritual furbishes proven formulas of order and purposiveness, and produces meaning through cyclicality and relationality.

The Ritualized Existence and its Affinity to Shame

Disenchanted with the loss of meaning in life, chastened by sensations of shame, the meaning chasers in *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden* have developed practices with a decidedly ritualized nature. It is also through such activities that the characters maintain a constant access to shame. Hemingway forces our attention to the extent with which shame sustains the life projects of his characters. In their scramble for meaning, they have more or less lingered over the sites of shame. In the cycle of activating and alleviating the experiences of shame, the ritual practitioners mobilize a cyclic regeneration of meaning that maintains a peculiar shaming component. The search for meaning has evolved to a certain extent into a veritable quest for shame. A closer look at two intricate scenes corroborates with such a hypothesis. The first scene takes place in Napoule, France, where the Bournes are taking their extended honeymoon. After Catherine has consummated her relationship with Marita, whom she has brought into their marriage as a "present" and "future" for David (*The Garden of Eden* 103), David finds himself getting increasingly attached to the dark shy girl. On the occasion when Marita leaves the bar to check on Catherine, David

> felt of the girl's drink and decided to drink it before it got warm. He took it in his hand and raised it to his lips and he found as it touched his lips that it gave him pleasure because it was hers. It was clear and undeniable. That's all you need, he thought. That's all you need to make things really perfect. Be in love with both of them. What's happened to you since last May? What are you anyway? But he touched the glass to his lips again and there was the

> same reaction as before. All right, he said, remember to do the work. The work is what you have left. You better fork up with the work. (*GE* 127)

The second passage follows a short exchange between Juanito Montoya and Jake Barnes, when the latter arrives at the Hotel Montoya with his friends for the fiesta. The encounter, in which Montoya twice puts his hand "embarrassedly" on Jake's shoulder while they discuss real *aficion*, leads Jake to reminisce about his friendship with Montoya and the exclusive brotherhood of the *aficionados*.

> We often never talked for very long at a time. It was simply the pleasure of discovering what we each felt. Men would come in from distant towns and before they left Pamplona stop and talk for a few minutes with Montoya about bulls. These men were aficionados. Those who were aficionados could always get rooms even when the hotel was full. Montoya introduced me to some of them...When they saw that I had aficion, and there was no password, no set questions that could bring it out, rather it was a sort of oral spiritual examination with the questions always a little on the defensive and never apparent, there was this same embarrassed putting the hand on the shoulder, or a "Buen hombre." But nearly always there was the actual touching. It seemed as though they wanted to touch you to make it certain. (*The Sun Also Rises* 132)

Touching and being touched, Jake Barnes and David Bourne find themselves fluent in some covert language that has replaced the usual channel of communication. Despite Jake's sensitivity to Montoya's touching and David's qualms about his illicit pleasure, a tacit understanding arrives on both occasions. The hand and the lips have stirred up sensations and rigged up configurations of relations, the forms of which, regardless of their contents, have given rise to a temporary but strong assembling of meaning.

A sharpened responsiveness to physical contact characterizes both scenarios. David Bourne and Jake Barnes have primed themselves in a position to receive meaning. Poised with the glass and

the hands, the two characters stage peculiar physical performances that are able to convey more significance than words. This "analogic" means of communication is akin to the bee dance that Anthony Wilden references in his discussions on systems theory. Dance is the command to other bees "to put themselves into the same relationship" through which bees communicate important information to each other ("Analog and Digital Communication" 61). The bee's command to dance and to copy a particular physical act results in a ritualized relationality between them. Similarly, both Jake and David have enveloped their bodies in a "dance" of meaning. Jake's aficion status depends on the particularity of his body and the incoming hands, while David's lips touch the spot of his entrance into the triangulated phase of his marriage. In the closed circuits they've established in the two scenes, codes of communication have been tacitly observed, meanings are generated that are independent from linguistic significations. Although neither the hand nor the lip is significant for clinical and social scientific understandings of shame, they are in the two scenes proper conduits of both meaning and shame. Richard Fantina cites David's fondling of Marita's wine glass as evidence for Hemingway's interest in fetishism. Tracing an obsession with hair in both the literary and biographical realms, Fantina conducts a fetishistic reading of Hemingway that debunks the writer's larger macho stance. Originally a "fabricated object to be worn about the body" to signify its control over the bodily organs (Pietz 10), the fetish takes a sexualized turn within the frameworks of psychoanalysis when it becomes "a penis-substitute...hence a means of defense against castration anxiety" (Studlar 40). The fetish thus creates an illusion of both wholeness and macho masculinity, which wards off imminent attacks of shame, while, paradoxically, featuring as a generator of shame-faced anxiety.

When David presses his lips against the glass, he has positioned himself in a fetishistic relation to Marita, and has in that brief moment established a construct whereby meanings of his desire have become easily accessible. By the very nature of being once used by Marita, the wine glass

has taken on a fetishistic character and become a veritable symbol for the girl of his desire. The pleasure it affords David in the simple gesture of touching makes him realize the extent of his feelings, which, for him, suggests the degree of his departure from the norms of marriage and love. Though at the time remaining uninhibiting, his guilty conscience marks the strength of marriage discourses in the early 20th century. Relying upon the "infallible" rhetoric of fidelity and moral integrity, David shames his unfaithful thoughts and the depraved state of his being, only to realize the powers of his desire and his work. As much as he needs his writing to define and console him, David takes immeasurable pleasure in his shame as well, fueling one with the other. At times, his writing signifies for him as the compass to navigate his lostness, as a site of meaning whose force grows with sensations of shame. But David, unlike Catherine, subscribes to traditional discourses of marriage and sexuality, and will in due time forfeit his rebellious stance. His trust, in this case, in the rhetoric of monogamy, renders him vulnerable to the debilitating effects of shame. The marriage campaign of the early 20th century creates a strong discourse of companionship that vows to transform "problematic gap" into wholesome "source of heightened sensitivity and connection" (Carter 77). The marriage reforms even dangles rewards such as "*via perfecta* of mutual joy" (Stopes 49). Such a positivist turn generates "a parallel process of abnormalization" that aims to attack one's identity instead of the acts themselves (Moddelmog, "Who's Normal?" 146). David Bourne's plausible subscription to such a stigmatizing ethics could be seen in the shame he experiences with his fetishizing gesture. The shame of indulging in fetishism further aggravates a similar sensation produced by infidelity and sodomy, reinforcing one with the other as David strives to assemble meaning out of his life.

If the structure constitutive of David's body, Marita's lips, and the wine glass gives David a clear grasp on the "essence" of his life, the composite posture of the aficionados, connected by the embarrassed hands, has positioned Jake in privileged grid of relationality. The culture of *aficion*

infuses Jake with a new sense of being not only through a strong camaraderie, but by relating him to a "higher" truth of ritual. Claiming that the bullfighters are the only people who "live their life all the way up" (*SAR* 10), Jake, from the very beginning of the story, assigns a special significance to the tradition of bullfighting. The actions of the fiesta have given him an acute sense of existence that almost takes the "rotten" sense off his memory (97). The jolly, light-hearted, glib homosocial bonding of Burguete transitions into the serious, secretive, meaningful, and all-consuming relationship for in San Fermín. With "something *doing* all the time" (222; emphasis mine), he relates himself to rituals, and fills the void of his life with the motion of a sacred custom. In stark contrast with Robert Cohn's worst fear in life, that "life is going by and [him] not taking advantage of it" (11), the fiesta is almost overpacked—with the paseo, the desencajonada, and all the actions in the bullring. The land of the ritual is a space of excess and imbalance. As it generates *too much* action, it also departs from capitalist values of exchange. Jake grows uneasy at first when the money to pay for his drink was "picked...up and put...back in [his] pocket," but he soon gets used to the free-floating of values (155). Ritual, with its logic of inexactitude, enjoys a natural proximity to the shame response.

The connection between ritual and shame plays out on two other realms--the affective dimension of ritual and the reactive nature of shame. Although David Bourne's fetishistic gesture with the glass and Jake Barnes's bodily connection with Montoya aren't strictly ritualistic per se, they do figure as gateways to time-honored traditions that furnish their believers with larger "universal" truths. In those isolated, clandestine, and often disjoined moments, practitioners like David and Jake get connected to larger frameworks of intelligibility, and find themselves meaningful in light of these narratives. Many of the activities that attract the characters in *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden*--hunting, fishing, sexuality--are what Mircea Eliade identifies as premium examples of ritual. Eliade understands ritual as any "responsible activity" modeled after those that have been done by

the primordial actors--goads, ancestors, and heroes (*Cosmos and History* 28). Favoring the relation to the past, ritual is by nature always back-looking and reactionary. Ritual shares this backward temporal trait with the affect of shame. Like ritual, shame responds to a *previously* activated level of interest and joy. Both ritual and the shame response have privileged the past to the extent of dismissing the future. In responding to a past example, ritual initiates a circularity that doesn't see the past as fixed and unalterable. But the backward relationality might also fall into a phallogocentric mindset that honors the past as a new phallus. While ritual discourses might partake of blind faith and self-deception, they are also surprisingly useful in generating personal significance and an acute sense of life. Similarly, as shame could be prime tools to discipline abnormal bodies, it also highlights the places where the fault lines of norms become most obvious. Catherine confronts the shaming discourse of heteronormativity just as Jake disgraces the *toreo* hero. In the way shame provides points of departure within a culture that condemns sexual- and gender-bending, ritual enables Jake to reexamine the boundaries between American "degenerates" and champion bullfighters. More than what Eliade characterizes as a man-making progress inside the "mythical time" (*Cosmos and History* 35), ritual problematizes temporal as well as epistemological frameworks as it rewinds a "normally" disciplined individual.

Being touched by Montoya in a particular way confirms Jake's aficionado status, which makes the action itself symbolic of a ceremony that connects him to the timeless ritual of *corrida de toros*. The touching and its aficionado initiation connects to a larger ritualistic pattern that also includes the paseo, the desencajonada, the bullfight, and the cutting of bull's ears. Relating to one another in light of an overarching theme, the actions have taken on a significance that transcends their individual existence. Predominant in this shift of importance takes place on the affective realm. Granted with the intelligence of the *toros,* the fear, distress, startle and anger that would have been invoked by desencajonada are overtaken by sensations of excitement and joy. Similarly, *toros*

transforms the confusion of paseo, the terror of bullfight, and the disgust with *los máximos trofeos* (the ear as trophy) into interest, enjoyment, and unbounded passion. When Montoya touches Jake in the spirit of aficion camaraderie, embarrassment and shame give way to feelings of honor and sheer joy. According to mythologist Jane Harrison (1915), the superiority of primitivism lies in its conception of life as "emotional and wholly experiential" (*Alpha and Omega* 207). Primitive magic rituals, she claims, are significant not due to any rational understanding, but to the sharing of emotional experiences. She characterizes ritual as "not only *utter* emotion [but] *represent* it" (*Ancient Art and Ritual* 34). Elsewhere in *Themis*, she conceives of ritual simply as the "utterance of an emotion, a thing felt...in words or thoughts" (16). Understood in this way, ritual's affective component assumes an overwhelming degree whereas the contents of its actions are but placeholders with which the emotional reality could be articulated. And shame seems to be the premium channel of expression for rituals in *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden*. Catherine's sexual and gender experiments notwithstanding, David's rewriting of his childhood and marriage, Jake's healing of his war and love wounds, and Robert Cohen's chivalric romance are all steeped in sensations of shame. Clyde Kluckhohn identifies the primary function of ritual as "the discharge of the emotion of individuals in socially accepted channels (328). And it stands to reason that continuing ritualistic practices of *corrida*, chivalry, and (self-)writing enable the release of shameful feelings of inadequacy, betrayal, and monstrosity. Engagement in ritual is on one hand prompted by the access to shame and on the other sustained through shame-laden sensations. Supportive of this view is William Doty's interpretation of mythic narratives as a form of not simply knowing the "rational, ideational aspects of human consciousness," but also the "sensual-aesthetic, moral, and emotional" dimensions (24). The expression of desires in a relational manner also helps promote better social integration (Doty 48-9). The innate dynamic of the ritual function—transcendence of individual identity by way of a interpersonal bond—is not unlike that of the mechanism of shame, which gives rise to a heightened

sense of the self while obliterating the boundaries between the object and subject of one's judgment. Interestingly, Evan Zuesse pinpoints shame as representative of the self-consciousness that is evoked by ritualistic performances. Embarrassment, shame and guilt, he argues, mark the transition from "private eternity" to "public peripherality" (The Absurdity of Ritual" 44). The benefits of ritual are inseparable from the boons of shame that render the self other-centered and transcendent of a reductivist selfhood. The ritual of shame opens up the self-identical and self-centered individual up for more productive rewiring. And it is through the encounter with both ritual and shame that Hemingway's characters overcome their fear of rootlessness to reach a more wholesome in-between-ness.

That bullfighting partakes of the ritual is not as controversial as its function as a site of meaning and purpose. On its virtue as a substantial antidote for the modern malaise of meaninglessness, scholarships on ritual and Hemingway are divided. Malcolm Magaw (1987) claims that characters in *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden* find themselves through a series of "aesthetic forms"—bullfights, big game hunting, swimming, fishing, writing—with which they "intuit and adopt vicariously a multiplicity of long-existing rituals" (26). They overcome their lostness and recover their self-identity by eschewing history; and in the case of Jake Barnes, preferring the "cyclical aesthetics of nature and art" to the progressive logic of history (Magaw 27). The ritual practice signifies for Magaw a dedicated nurturing of inner qualities and sensibilities, and a detachment from historical events and socio-cultural development. Focusing on a specific aspect of the identity-granting characteristic of ritual, Michael Von Cannon (2012) proposes that bullfight, as a "ritualized ceremony," validates masculine aspirations (58). Participation in the ritual, even as an *aficionado*—the informed spectator—restores Jake's masculinity. Von Cannon echoes Jack Conrad's earlier studies on the symbolism of Spanish bullfighting, and understands bullfighting in terms of a "communal experience of tragedy" over the death of the bull (62), Conrad (1957) has characterized

the arena as a culturally sanctioned space where "repressed fears and frustrations find release" (185). Günther Schmigalle (2005) is less positive about the social benefits of bullfighting. Disturbed by its inherent violence, Schmigalle finds no redemptive value in *toros*. Fishing and bullfighting, he argues, are ritual correlations of Jake's wound, all of which retains a murderous component. The only message that comes across, Schmigalle argues, is the "eternal struggle for existence" and the "mutual destruction of the human race" (15). The divided opinion on bullfighting's socio-ideological values is evident in Greg Forter's inconsistent reading as well. In a 2001 article, while Forter acknowledges the violent nature of bullfight, he focuses more on the role of matador, which he characterizes as transforming "meaningless violence of modern life into meaningful aesthetic spectacle" ("Melancholy Modernism" 28). Bullfighting as "ritualized brutality" is then overshadowed by its compensation for meaning. In his 2011 reading, however, Forter debunks bullfighting as a glorified ritual redemption of violence. He cites the death at the encierro and the neglected bull's ear in the hotel drawer as evidence for the purposelessness of rituals. Ritual narratives, Forter claims, are none other than "social fiction," and in the case of bullfighting, "misrecognizes meaningless violence as purposeful, socially affirmative, meaning- and order-dispensing violence" (*Gender, Race, and Mourning* 88). Preceding Von Cannon's later redemptive reading of shared tragedy as a means of social bonding, Forter rejects tragic sensations for their innate meaninglessness.

It is true that violence is an integral part of many ritual practices—bullfighting, hunting, war, etc.—but to condemn it as utterly irredeemable is tantamount to adopting a dichotomous mode of reasoning, one that David Bourne relies upon in defending his macho identity against the shaming of the feminine. The "pacific power" of ritualized violence, contra Forter, *does* oftentimes "metabolize male aggression" in the constructed realms of the arena, and *is* usually prophylactic against unrestrained discharge (*Gender, Race, and Mourning* 56). Death, by Freud's account, is one of the basic human instincts. And not only is the destructive instinct closely related to the drive to (pro-)

create, it also signifies larger desires for renewal and restoration. The violence of shame and ritual lessens its power with the inner dynamics of cyclicality. As repleted interests and joys would eventually return, so do instances of ritualistic destruction ultimately become occasions of restoration. The violent component of ritual is inseparable from its cyclic regeneration that generates life, rebirth, as well as decay and death. Sir James Frazer too, favors viewing violent impulses as expressions of the desire for renewal. In *The Golden Bough*, Frazer uses a regenerative model to interpret the rituals of both Adonis and Attis, in which decay and regeneration work usually in tandem with one another (352, 386). An often cited model for the rhythmic cycle of life and death is the annual decline and revival of vegetation. Repetitions of consumption and replenishment thus manage to keep all life forms balanced and mobile. The idea of cyclicality is also central to Eliade's understanding of the archaic world and its mythical legacy. Constitutive of the concept of the "eternal return" is a necessary but redeemable aspect of decline. Suffering, death, and defeat are for Eliade all an integral part of the cyclic logic that will in due time become "annulled and transcended by the final victory" (*Cosmos and History* 101). The meaning*less* presence of violence and death is thus overshadowed by the meaningful certainty of natural and social cycles. Central to the Edenic bliss of the newly-wed Bournes in France is a repetitive regime that consists of eating, exercising, relaxing, making love, and eating again. An overflow of joy is evident in their "loving each other...and replenishing and starting over" (*GE* 14). While remaining critical of the violent component, Forter too, acknowledges the ritual narrative's power, to the degree that devotees, such as Jake Barnes, are able to stay "immune to the problematics of loss and unfulfillable yearning," with discourses on the "eternally recurrent cyclicality of mythic time" (*Gender, Race, and Mourning* 74). The natural cycles of recurring phenomena, even the most basic ones such as sunrise and sunset, David Savola claims, provides immense comfort and a great "sense of meaning and value" (40). Such a certainty, even a chilling one as the inevitability of death and destruction, could be much more powerful and soothing

than the modern plague of nothingness. Despite all the pains of shame, the fact that interest and joy remain and will always remain, makes shame a desirable venue for self-exploration and recreation.

The Shame of Life and the Shameless Communion

To the extent that ritual might be "primitive man's attempt to escape from the prison of time and history into the timeless" (Teunissen 223), discourses of ritual could be a powerful and ready escapist tool from the shameful immediacy of life. The rhetoric of escape, Robert Stephens proposes, becomes systematic in Hemingway's work. Not only does he engage extensively with the "possibilities and implications of escape," his novels utilize the concept of escape as a narrative motif (51-2). More than being a response to "an intolerable situation" (Stephens 52), escapism entails a subtle but certain shamed dimension. Per Tomkins's explication of the mechanism of shame as the "incomplete reduction of interest or joy" (*AIC* 353), the sensation of shame figures as a failed "escape" from joy. Unwilling to renounce one's interest in the object, one adopts the shame response to avoid further contact and attachment. Similarly, escapists often retain a physical if not affective connection to the situation, and their emotional investment weakens rather than completely disappears. In both *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden*, characters have renounced varied objects of interest even as their feelings linger—Jake Barnes and his unconsummated affair, Robert Cohn and his careers as a novelist and chivalric lover, Brett and her romance with Romero, David Bourne and his participation in sexual and gender experiments. In their frantic escape from the affective predicaments, they've taken up various alleviative strategies, and find solace in ritual and ritualized performances such as working, fishing, bullfighting, writing, and hunting. Unable to resume or relinquish their relationship, they are trapped in the limbo of shame. And as the two epigraphs in *The Sun Also Rises* indicate, to once "lost" in shame is to experience its eternal "return."

Ritual, with the comforts of cyclical certainty and relational meaning, figures as a desirable substitute to which the spurned positive affectivity could be directed. The longing for meaning that prompts the characters to establish relations becomes as strong as the desire to escape from unfulfilling relations, whether of love, work, or marriage. Unable to completely renounce such a relationship, the characters seem to have slipped into a perpetual shamed posture in life. Their unwillingness and incapacity to fully disavow the quest for meaning stop them short of being contemptuous of such an endeavor and thus cured of the pangs of shame. Rather, the craving for meaning and its redemption holds them tightly in the grip of shame. Close contact with shame, on the other hand, is generative of conditions for intersubjective communication. And as the Barneses and Bournes toil in their respective rituals—working against shame, witnessing uncompromised masculinity in bullfighting, writing of and *in* shame—they have also, to a very large extent, been constantly replenished by their engagement with shame.

That shame could be conducive to interpersonal contact is no news. Since Aristotle and Freud's recognition of shame's power over antisocial impulses, other scholars have commented on shame's socializing potentials.[47] Halina Ablamowicz, for example, addresses shame's role in relation to the *lebenswelt,* paying attention to the "meaningful, value-specific, intersubjective communication" it establishes (48). In *The Sun Also Rises* and *The Garden of Eden*, Hemingway's portrayal of shame is similarly conducive to interpersonal relationality, but it also envisions a cross-species possibility. Communion with nonhuman animals plays such a perceptible role in Hemingway's conception of life in modernity. In his depiction of hunting and bullfighting, there exists a more than friendly relationship between the human and the nonhuman, one that approaches cross-species identification, if not bestiality.

[47] Helen B. Lewis (1971) saw shamability as socially binding; Carl Schneider (1992) considered shame as revealing of human interrelatedness and deep mutual involvement; James Twitchell (1997) characterized shame as a powerful socializing device, foundational to individual responsibility; Thomas Scheff (2003) regarded shame as a regulatory device in maintaining social bond; Elspeth Probyn (2005) found in shame an innate desire for connection.

Hemingway's affective and identitarian investment in the animal begins with its anthropomorphized eyes. It is through the eyes that his protagonists in the *Garden* claim to have spotted awe-inspiring dignity and aliveness, the likes of which do no apply to any human being in the book.[48] The animal eye is foundational to the dynamic of such peculiar relations on two occasions: when David Bourne caught a fish on his honeymoon with Catherine in Southern France, and when the young Davey witnessed the killing of the elephant on his hunting trip with his father in Africa.

> Then they all went over to see him laid out on the side of the road silver as a salmon and dark gunmetal shining on his back. He was a handsome beautifully built fish with great live eyes and he breathed slowly and brokenly.
>
> "What is he?"
>
> "A *loup*," he said. "That's a sea bass. They call them *bar* too. They're wonderful fish. This is the biggest one I've ever seen."
>
> ...
>
> On the ice he was still silver and beautiful but the color on his back had changed to gray. Only his eyes still looked alive. (*GE* 9-10)

> But he was not dead. He had been anchored and now he was down with his shoulder broken. He did not move but his eye was alive and looked at David. He had very long eyelashes and his eye was the most alive thing David had ever seen.
>
> ...

[48] In contrast to the "alive" animals, human counterparts have frequently been associated with the adjective "dead"—David Bourne becomes susceptible to attacks of "deadly clarity" after sex (13), and is sometimes "dead and empty" after his intercourse with Catherine (17); Catherine is concerned with her inevitable death, which she fears will wipe out any traces of her existence (53-4); with David's seeming abandonment after her intercourse with Marita, Catherine displayed a "dead" look (117); sleep, too, is oftentimes associated with being "dead" or "deadly" (125, 165, 189); and David more than once confessed that he has a "dead heart" (210, 219).

> The eye of the elephant had opened wide on the first shot and then started to glaze and blood came out of the ear and ran in two bright streams down the wrinkled gray hide...Now all the dignity and majesty and all the beauty was gone from the elephant and he was a huge wrinkled pile. (*GE* 199-200)

In both instances, the animal eye becomes a telltale sign that makes the cross-species identification possible. Signaling the aliveness of the animal, and contrasting that with the death-like of the human existence, Hemingway seems to have proposed a remedy to the meaninglessness of modernity. Only by casting their eyes toward the nonhuman counterparts, could the death-haunted modern men experience a temporary sense of meaning and self-importance. Identifying with the animal, Hemingway suggests, is a possible way of escaping the plague of hollowness. Cary Wolfe proposes a deeper connection between the cross-species and cross-gender identifications, both of which marks David as the pre-subjective man who must renounce the pre-Symbolic identities "to enter into full subjectivity" (235). The resemblance between the elephant and Catherine has also been well explored. Rose Marie Burwell, for example, associates the two with David's "desire to save them and...his complicity in their deaths" (205). Wolfe, on the other hand, argues for a resemblance between the two, and reads the elephant's death as parallel to the demise of Catherine's feminine identity and feminist experiments. Similar to Robin Silbergleid, Wolfe critiques the phallogocentric economy that sacrifices both the elephant and Catherine. Unlike Silbergleid, who identifies David as a culprit with his "normative, heterosexual" desires (Silbergleid 113), Wolfe faults the humanist symbolic which demands a restrictive subjectivity. The focus on the eye when the elephant is being murdered suggests for Wolfe an intensification of such a cross-species association, for the eye is the "privileged sensory apparatus of the human" (Wolfe 239). The supra-human eye, its sharp aliveness in stark contrast with the morbidity of humanity, serves as a lens of criticism that highlights the

atrocities of the sacrificial humanist economy, whose threshold is piled with dead, wrinkled, torn pieces of nonhuman carcasses.

Hemingway does not stop at the sympathetic identification when he sets out to explore the cross-species relationship. In *The Sun Also Rises*, alongside his depictions of the time-bending, capitalism-resistant, carnivalesque fiesta, Hemingway stages an elaborate presentation of the bullfight. And on at least two occasions, the details of the bodily dynamics suggest a relationality that is more than collaborative or sympathetic: it verges on being aggressively sexual. Luring the bulls with his cape and ordering them around with his playful moves, Pedro Romero acts in a peculiarly arousing manner.

> At the end of the pass they were facing each other again. Romero smiled. The bull wanted it again, and Romero's cape filled again, this time on the other side...It was all so slow and so controlled. (*GE* 217)
>
> Out in the centre of the ring, all alone, Romero was going on with the same thing, getting so close that the bull could see him plainly, offering the body, offering it again a little closer, the bull watching dully, then so close that the bull thought he had him, offering again and finally drawing the charge and then, just before the horns came, giving the bull the red cloth to follow... (*GE* 218)
>
> The bull charged as Romero charged. Romero's left hand dropped the muleta over the bull's muzzle to blind him, his left shoulder went forward between the horns as the sword went in, and for just an instant he and the bull were one, Romero way out over the bull, the right arm extended high up to where the hilt of the sword had gone in between the bull's shoulders. Then the figure was broken. There was a little jolt as Romero came clear, and then he was standing, one hand up, facing the bull, his shirt ripped out from under his sleeve, the white

> blowing in the wind, and the bull, the red sword hilt tight between his shoulders, his head going down and his legs setting. (*GE* 218-9)

Throughout the bullfight, bulls have been consistently anthropomorphized as *he*, before entering a series of choreographed acts with their rival and seducer. The bull and his matador seek to lock down one another's vision during the many passes that both take pleasure in—Romero flashing the bull with triumphant smiles, the bull enjoying the tension and exhilaration. Tempting the bull to charge repeatedly at his body, Romero is as aroused by the bull's passion and stamina as the bull is by his panache and prowess. When Romero finally penetrates the bull with his sword, the two wrestling bodies are merged into one. All through the performance, the two parties have tried to postpone this climactic fusion, delaying its occurrence to induce maximal pleasure in one another. Together with the "little jolt" and the "ripped shirt," Hemingway intersperses the scene with numerous sexual innuendos. For a writer who prides himself on the magnitude of subtext and understatement, his commitment to details in the scene seems all the more peculiar.

While critics have identified the sexual overtone of the bullfighting in *The Sun Also Rises*, they tend to dispel it in relation to larger symbolic significance. David Blackmore attributes the sexualized tension in the bullring all to Jake Barnes' narrative position, with which he releases his suppressed homosexual inclinations. Jake's description of the aficionados, Blackmore asserts, is "erotically charged from the start," beginning the intimate *touching* between him and Montoya, and carried on with his interest in Romero's good looks (56-7). It is not Hemingway the writer, but Jake the bisexual narrator who responds to the fights "in sexualized terms" (Blackmore 58). Taking the novel as articulate of other masculinities, Blackmore is responding to Nina Schwartz's earlier reading. Schwartz discusses the sexualized bullfight scenes as evidence of displaced feminine power, which sustains but is overshadowed by the value of the phallus. Blackmore's critique of Schwartz's heterosexist bias misses her larger claim of the bullfight as the breakdown of the phallic power.

Although Schwartz establishes a parallel between Romero's moves and a woman's playful seduction of her lover, she also explores the parodic traits of such an erotics and highlights the gender inversion and transvestism in the scene, which exposes the limits of the patriarchal codes. In choosing to stay at the literal rendition of sexualized tensions between Romero and the bull, I do not intend to dispute the symptomatic readings of Blackmore and Schwartz, nor am I interested in defending the heterosexualist and phallic economy. The eroticization of a confrontational cross-species relationship founds itself at the intersticed crossings between ritual, shame, and relationality. And it is this intersectionality that I believe Hemingway's work deserves our attention.

The ritual of *corrida de toros*, as it seems to reify the patriarchal ideals of masculinity, works at the same time to subvert them with travestied representations of heterosexual intercourse. With innuendos of bestiality and feminine prowess, the bullfight features a cross-species relationality that undermines the myth of autonomous subjecthood. By blurring the set boundaries between humans and animals, men and women, dominator and dominated, the erotics of *corrida* attacks a line of humanist discourses that celebrate manhood, maturity, and knowledge. Most significantly, it blasts apart conceptions of shame by stationing the "ultimate" shame of bestiality at the core of the most honorable masculine tradition. Hemingway's sexualized bullfight scenes destroy the rigorously policed species line. He has supplied a most creative response to Diana Fuss's critique of the "human as a unified, autonomous, and unmodified subject" (3). In those intense moments when the bull and the matador "were one," culturally condensed notions of perversity, normalcy, subjectivity, animality, autonomy, and shame break down, and new possibilities of relationality emerge in reaction to the humanist symbolic. As Deleuze and Guattari put it in *A Thousand Plateaus*, the becoming-animal "always involves a pack, a band, a population, a peopling, in short, a multiplicity" (239), so does the "autonomous" subject usually have non-subject doublings that make up its multi-dimensional subjectivity. The shameless pleasure that binds the animal and the human in bullfighting

is contagious and spreads beyond the immediate circle to the audience—critics, aficionados, enthusiasts, amateurs—who find themselves more or less affected by the marvelous spectacle, and who are not in the least ashamed of their gratifying indulgences.

Not only does ritual, in the cases of bullfighting and David Bourne's writing, breed shame, bend the linearity of time, and generate new relationalities, its effect on producing heightened self-awareness while situating the self in a larger relational grid is not unlike that of the shame sensation. Ruth Leys has envisioned shame as a possible "site of resistance to cultural norms of identity" (*From Guilt to Shame* 124), and this subversive potential of shame translates via Hemingway's imagination as a prolonged, deliberate immersion in shame-inducing, shame-related ventures. To practice the ritualized activity is to furnish meanings for self-celebration and at the same time sacrificing individuality for a collective identity. In a similar way, shame helps strengthen bonds, placing "a persistent reminder of obligations to others" (Treacher 288), while alerting the self to the validity and necessity of its boundaries. Positing the sensation of shame in between the self-centered and other-centered consciousness, Zuesse characterizes shame as *the* effect of ritual. An emboldened and celebratory glance cast inward, shame also entails a zooming out that takes in *other* interests and concerns. Ritual's rigid formality, or what Zuesse calls its "absurdity," further encapsulates the ritual practitioners in a closed circuit between shame and shamelessness, retrieving desirable *meaning* from a strictly artificial format. To the extent that ritual doles out narratives of *logos*, it is not the diametric opposite of the existent patriarchal order that it seeks to undermine; its preference of affect over reason and its embrace of homosociality and non-hierarchical relationality, however, place ritual at a decidedly queer angle from phallogocentric discourses.

Affect, particularly shame, has replaced verbal discourse as the primary means of communication. In a way, affect is far more communicative than language, whose limitations and damages have been well recognized. Like Catholic grammars of grace, James Watson (2017) argues,

the bullfight for Hemingway operates along channels of syntactic rules, rather than upon semantics. The individual acts could only gain meaning by their "place within the larger pattern" (473). Wade Wheelock (1982) too, in his earlier discussion of the problem of ritual language, observes "little or no information" in ritual communication (58). The superfluity of ritual utterances, Wheelock reasons, is the mark of ritual's significance, as the "culturally valued information" should have been "already mastered by the participants" (66). It is not the communication of values, but the repetition of experiences and affects that renders ritual meaningful. In this manner, ritual functions in an analogic way in its communication of not information, but meaning, and the meaning of shame in particular. As Anthony Wilden understands of the analog, a mimetic mode of communication could be far more effective in conveying meaning than the discursive means. Like the analog, ritual preserves "meaning" in retaining a fundamental and probably essential ambiguity of reality.

As ritual celebrates cyclicality and relationality and discredits the linearity of time and history, it channels its meaning through formality, and relies little upon the semantic reifications. Writing, fishing, watching bullfights, the ritual practitioners invariably keep their eyes down, their head down, and oftentimes their upper body down. Much like the destroyed bull, with "the red sword hilt tight between his shoulders, his head going down and his legs setting" (*SAR* 218-9), the meaning-hungry modern men in Hemingway turn in shame to the ritual of life. But unlike the bull that died in "shame"—"his head went forward and he went over slowly, then all over, suddenly, four feet in the air"—Hemingway's men and women somehow manage to move on and find other conceptions of shame to contend with.

Chapter Five--Semper Shame

Red Impossible Agony

> Something...paint, plaster, wood—a wall. The wall of my living room. I was back at home—in my own house, in my own time. But I was still caught somehow, joined to the wall as though my arm were growing out of it—or growing into it. From the elbow to the ends of the fingers, my left arm had become a part of the wall. I looked at the spot where flesh joined with plaster, stared at it uncomprehending. It was the exact spot Rufus's fingers had grasped.
>
> I pulled my arm toward me, pulled hard.
>
> And suddenly, there was an avalanche of pain, red impossible agony! And I screamed and screamed. (*Kindred* 261)

Her scream, heart-wrenching as it must be, terminates the last of Edana Franklin's involuntary trips from her house in 1976 Los Angeles to the Weylin plantation in early 19th-century Maryland. On the eve of her twenty-sixth birthday, without any possibly rational explanations, Dana (the shortened form that she prefers) is transported back in time when the young Rufus Weylin, her several times great-grandfather, is drowning when playing near the river. Rufus, a then five-year-old boy and future owner of the plantation, is telepathically connected with Dana, and is able to summon her from across the centuries to the antebellum era where indentured labor and slavery are still the norm. Plunged into the nightmarish past of her enslaved African American ancestry with the life-threatening circumstances of Rufus, Dana obtains release from this temporal imprisonment only when her own life is at risk. Time and again, she is called into the past to save her forefather and safeguard the family line, and every now and then, she resumes her contemporary identity as a struggling writer and content housewife, with mysterious bruises and injuries from her other

enslaved life. In the course of her time-travel, Dana faces a grave ethical dilemma. She is to choose between endangering her own pedigree—disrupting the birth of her several times grandmother, Hagar, who would be born in 1831—and assisting Rufus in the sexual possession of Alice Greenwood, the future mother of Hagar. Even though Alice has succumbed to Rufus's advance and bears several children by him, after Hagar's birth, she attempts escape once again. Enraged and fearful of his potential loss, Rufus sends away two of their children and hopes to discipline Alice into a subdued "domestic companion" once for all. He is not prepared when Alice as a final gesture of protest and out of sheer desperation, takes her own life. It is immediately following this tragic turn of event that Dana finds herself transported for the final time to the Weylin plantation. And it is right in the middle of an attempted rape by Rufus, who grows ever "so lonesome" (*Kindred* 258), that Dana thrusts the dagger into his body, ending his life while waking up to a most awkward position.

Stuck in between the wood and plaster, Dana's arm is more likely to have been left behind in 19th-century antebellum Maryland than to become enmeshed with her living room wall in late 20th-century California. Slowly waking up to such an uncanny reality of hybrid physical identity, Dana is for a moment unsure of her situation. Only after repeatedly confirming the setting as "home," "[her] own house," and "[her] own time," could Dana bring herself to face the full extent of her circumstances. The *merge*, as it were, is incomprehensible to Dana at first, who has survived both the peculiarity of time travel and the cruelty of plantation life. The only clue she's given is that her arm is *lost* from below the spot Rufus held her when he assaulted her. With his last magical touch, Dana's arm is forever severed from the rest of her body, held within an unrelenting grip when Rufus takes his final breath. Instinctively, Dana withdraws her extended arm, from a nonresponsive and unyielding wall. Unfortunately, her desire to be reunited with her body results in immeasurable pain. The anguish she endures in retrieving her arm from the past produces bouts of uncontrollable wails,

the echoes of which might travel to the future, but are hardly able to revoke the past. Her instinctive pull, it seems, is what most definitely wakes and grounds Dana. The "suddenness" of her pain marks the full force of a previously subdued consciousness, without which Dana is unable to jumpstart her "uncomprehending" mind into recognizing the nature and extent of her state as "agony" and "avalanche." The blur of a "something" is followed by a consistent effort at zooming in on the details of her situation; the regain of her consciousness brings her closer and closer to the immediacy of her body. Out of the excess of information—the paint, plaster, wood, wall, room, home, emerges the singular locus of her loss—the arm, its flesh, the fingers. With the outpouring of blood comes the verdict of finality: her left forearm is gone, taken, grasped, torn out of her living body, and left forever in the sinful, blood spilled Weylin plantation of 1835.

In the penultimate chapter of both *Kindred* and *Fledgling*, the only two standalone novels by Octavia E. Butler, there is a gory scene of bloody violence. As Dana Franklin struggles with Rufus Weylin's fatal grasp and the unyielding wall in his stead, Shori Matthews wrestles with Katherine Dahlman's twisting body before biting into her larynx and breaking her neck. That both incidents feature "an avalanche of pain" and "red impossible agony" should not overshadow a consistent engagement on Butler's part with a peculiar type of "bloody" attachment (*Kindred* 261). Identifying these moments of tension, this chapter proposes to expand the shared range of issues between the two novels--race relations, trauma and identity, family history, miscegenation--to include shame and its representations. Together the two books present a commentary on the legacy of history and reveals shame's role in protecting certain collective memory from being tempered with the passing of time. Shame in Butler has thus been repurposed as an opportunity to reevaluate one's personal identity and its connection to a communal past. Shame is also one of most "reliable" sites of meaning when the protagonists in both novels have to start a life that they have no available cultural knowledge of. Apart from Marisa Parham and Jennifer Williamson, shame has always been the

backdrop of scholarly conversations around *Kindred* and *Fledgling*. More than anything else, *Kindred* is cast as a remodeled emancipatory narrative that revises and recuperates shameful history, while *Fledgling* is grounded in the science fiction tradition with a feminist, postracist, and posthumanist overtone. Shame is a useful lens of examination not only as an originary source of inspiration for *Kindred*, which I shall expand upon soon, but also as a theoretical framework with which the two stand alone novels make sense together. The affect of shame flags critical moments in both novels when the personal intersects with the socio-historical, and denaturalizes significant cultural values such as autonomy, freedom, and individualism. More "sticky" than the other emotions that Sara Ahmed identifies, shame features uneasy occasions that hook critical attention and demand close reading. Central to my discussion of shame in *Kindred* and *Fledgling* is a shame dynamic that I borrow from the American psychologist Silvan Tomkins, who was known for his four-volume work on affect theory, *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, published between the 1960s and the 1990s. Shame is one of nine primary affects that Tomkins maps out with his careful, and often idiosyncratic schematization. After his death, his work on affects is revived partly due to Eve Sedgwick's interests in the productive and performative potentials of the affect of shame. Whereas Sedgwick highlights shame's liminal and self-effacing qualities in her work on queer performativity, I'm most drawn to an innate ambivalence with which Tomkins defines this affect. Shame, he proposes, is automatically activated by a reduction in previously aroused levels of joy or interest. This operative vagueness in shame echoes and further complicates a host of ambivalent relations in Butler's two novels, including the responsibility for and resistance to one's bloodline, respecting and revising socio-cultural values on marriage and disability, and balancing articulations of desire with racial and species parameters.

Interestingly, shame is not a prominent thematic concern that has gripped critical attention over the years. Shame seemed to not merit any large scale intervention till 2009 when Marisa Parham

discussed in her *Callaloo* article the implications of the shameful response of the descendants to their enslaved ancestors. Shame, I contend with this chapter, is not the backdrop, but a backbone to both *Kindred* and *Fledgling*. Butler's emphasis on shame's relation with temporality and history adds valuable insights to understandings and representations of shame within and beyond literature. Most significant for my argument that Butler releases her theoretical engagements with shame onto the imaginative realm is her own account of the germ for *Kindred*. In a 1991 *Callaloo* interview with Randall Kenan, Butler explains her mother's influence upon her creative work briefly as:

> My mother did domestic work and I was around sometimes when people talked about her as if she were not there, and I got to watch her going in back doors and generally being treated in a way that made me...I spent a lot of my childhood being ashamed of what she did, and I think one of the reasons I wrote *Kindred* was to resolve my feelings, because after all, I ate because of what she did." (Kenan 496)

Shame, it seems, has occupied a prominent role in Butler's personal as well as professional life. It is a sticky emotion that stays throughout the years when the little girl who took offence at the slight against her mother has grown into a published novelist. Her preoccupation with the affect and her decision to "resolve" it also attest its potency, if not as a catalyst for creation and change, then most certainly as emotional baggage. The need for closure is so persistent for Butler that only a direct exposure to a similar set of shameful and dehumanizing conditions might help finally release the initial negativity. Six years later in an interview with Charles Rowell, Butler gave a fuller account of the more immediate trigger of the book.

> When I got into college, Pasadena City College, the black nationalist movement, the Black Power Movement, was really underway with the young people, and I heard some remarks from a young man who was the same age I was but who had apparently never made the connection with what his parents did to keep him alive. He was still blaming them for their

> humility and their acceptance of disgusting behavior on the part of employers and other people. He said, "I'd like to kill all these old people who have been holding us back for so long. But I can't because I'd have to start with my own parents." (Rowell 51)

Admitting that she had "carried that comment with [her] for thirty years" (51), Butler demonstrates, inadvertently, the difficulty with which one approaches experiences of shame. With *Kindred*, Butler dramatizes her own and the young man's shamed indignation at the older generation's *inaction*. Foreseeing a similar response among her readers to Dana Franklin's complicity in the perpetration of rape and the perpetuation of slavery, Butler problematizes our professed innocence. It takes a survivor (and their offspring) to condemn the crime and the villains. Foremost among the concern of the victims, Butler implies, is survival, which Lisa Dowdall in her reading of the XENOGENESIS trilogy characterizes as the "primary form of resistance" (510). The imperative to survive is all the more pressing given the dire circumstances. Butler is unambiguous on the power of endurance when Dana speaks highly of the passivity of her ancestors who "had to put up with more than I ever could. Much more" (*Kindred* 51). Shame is the subject matter that precedes and sustains her creative venture. In the cases of both Alice and Dana, it is conducive of what Dowdall calls "an identity beyond which is imposed by the colonizer" (510). Beneath the thematic overtone, shame is also threaded into micro moments not unlike that of the opening scene of this chapter. Shame's proximity to substances such as blood and flesh, and its connection to broader concerns like lineage, survival, and history find adequate expression in *Fledgling* as well. I aim to pull characters like Shori Matthews from the context from endosymbiosis, as exemplified in Joy Sanchez-Taylor's (2017) reading, and return her transgenic body to the embodied reality of its being. Together the two novels bring into relief the cultural literacy of shame. On one hand, to be shamed, Dana's family history showcases, is to have been always already shamed; on the other hand, Shori's loss of "shameful" knowledge marks the fine lines between biology and culture, as well as legitimacy and monstrosity.

Shame sustains their formative "becoming" and outlasts the painful losses they have to withstand along the way.

Dana Franklin's peculiar position, her prosthetic relationship to the wall, comes as a direct result to her *action*, the final breach from the "humility and acceptance of disgusting behavior" that Butler identifies as the source of her own shamed childhood. Giving expression to her assertion that "there're worse things than being dead" (*Kindred* 253), Dana is quick to realize the fatal prospect of being a sex slave. Violence subtends the seemingly gentle actions of Rufus's "pushing [her] back on the pallet," "lying with his head on [her] shoulder," "left arm around [her]," "right hand still holding [her] hand" (259). "Easy" is the word Dana uses to describe her potential surrender, while "hard" is how she understands the alternative of insubordination (259-260). Here, right on the verge of a possible rape, when history is bound to repeat itself with cycles of abuse and uneasy submission, Dana decides to take an *unlikely* path, a choice that could lead to the annihilation of her existence and the disruption of her heritage. This critical junction so succinctly outlines the dilemma she has been presented all this time, the impossible options between a likely nonexistent contemporary present and an undeniable collusion in a heinous crime against her own sex. Her initial submission to Rufus's force mirrors perfectly the indecision she hitherto observes. Time and again she professes the need to protect the life of Rufus, her ancestor, first to "insure [her] family's survival" and her "own birth" (36), then to prevent the sale of the estate and dissolution of the slave families (243). The strength of such savior narratives has made Dana deeply convinced of the validity of her *action*—her *inaction*—to the atrocities happening around her on the Weylin plantation. Her sole motive is to guard the *natural* occurrences from any *unnatural* tampering with by a temporal intruder. To survive at all cost and to guarantee the natural unfolding of history—this has been Dana's mission and her self-identified obligation to her family. What prompts her to consider the other alternative, and what finally makes her a patricide, is none but the affect of shame. Silvan Tomkins's

understanding of shame as the "incomplete reduction of interest or joy" (353) is a neat formula that helps identify the presence of shame. For Tomkins, a person will automatically adopt a shamed response when their interest or joy persists after a perceptible reduction, i.e., they are still *interested* but *less* so. Buried in his schematization of shame is a logic of cyclicality that follows a "attachment-loosening-persistence" sequence. "Moving" affects around, shame could also set the body in motion. Being held down, conscious of her aggressor's effort of "not hurting" her, Dana is jolted into action by the acute emotional attack, finally "rais[ing] the knife" and "s[i]nk[ing] it into his side" (260). Her shame, which derails Dana from the course of her inaction, starts, counterintuitively, with a pleasant smell. Rather than feeling elated by Rufus's "smell[] of soap" and his "neatly combed" hair (260), Dana is deeply disturbed. The signs of his affection and care are for Dana all the more outrageous and repulsive in the face of his motive. The truth of his action effectively chips away any arousal of her interest and attention by the nice gestures. The reduction of her pleasure is so abrupt that no fragrance of soap and beauty of hair could pull her back into sensations of enjoyment. But the pleasing sensory stimulants are there, thereby guaranteeing a remainder of positive emotional investment, which Tomkins regarded as critical to continued assaults of shame (361). This critical access to shame awakens Dana to the reality of the rape and alerts her to the other option that lies in her hand. The perspiration-covered knife is a solid reminder that this opportunity too might "slip" away if she waits any longer. Thanks to the rebooting effect of shame, Dana vows to pursue her final break from the rhetoric of sacrifice and rescue.

The effect of shame is unambiguous and immediate, but Dana's action is far from being uncontroversial. Eric White questions Dana's decision on "draw[ing] the line at rape" as the limit of her physical endurance (252), whereas Linh Hua criticizes her for "render[ing] [Alice's rape as] a done deal" and treating her own violation dynamically (400). What seems to be a prioritization of violence and a subscription to patrilinear time is on the other hand a lack of access to shame.

Following Sherryl Vint's reading of "becoming other" in *Clay's Ark*, I regard the shameful scenarios in *Kindred* and *Fledgling* as occasions of learning to "become," of detaching oneself from the "security and comfort" in the "current cultural formation," and of exploring new "channels of desire and potentialities" and forging "new connections" ("Becoming Other" 290). The ambivalence of shame finds echo in Dana's lingering attachment to history and family, when she desires to revisit the site of her family shame at the plantation. But her fracture with the temporal singularity is irreversible, for even though no one but Kevin shares her *other* history, her short episode of temporal disruption is real and cherished. She can never go back to her patrilinear way of embodiment just as she can never have her arm back. Dana's becoming disabled and knowledgeable of other histories and timelines is mirrored in *Fledgling* with Shori's and Wright's becoming. Coming back to being an Ina figures for Shori a series of shame-prompted and shame-inducing self-exploration, at times when she indiscriminately hunts for blood sources, when she has to take care of her relatives' human symbionts, and when she confronts her varied sexual expressions. Wright, too, is becoming *other* with his unconventional relationship with Shori. Shamed of his desire of an "apparent" minor and of his biological attachment to her venom, Wright struggles hard to shed his cultural knowledge of an honorable way of being. The duality of shame Tomkins identifies plays on the personal and communal realm as an unsuccessful denunciation and reluctant identification. Just as Dana must renounce an uncomplicated embrace of her lineage, Shori and Wright have to withstand the cultural and species blows on their relationship. Characteristically ambivalent, as shame binds people together across temporal, spatial, race, etc. divides, it also tears apart bloodlines, bodies, communities; but something remains, something as intangible as memory, or as concrete as a scar.

The rape of Alice Greenwood, her maternal forebear, is monumental for the existence of Dana Franklin. It is therefore not an exaggeration to characterize the family history of Dana as a history of shame. The originary shame of Alice's rape is passed down, throughout the centuries, to

be inherited and experienced by her offspring. Unlike the pivotal assault on Dana, Alice's suffering always takes place behind the scene, shielded from both voyeuristic interests and genuine concerns by virtue of Dana's first-person narrative voice. Such a perspective could be potent in establishing an empathetic identification between the African Americans of the past and present, as Butler and Williamson (2013) seem to propose. But to keep the violation from repeating itself atemporally is to take Dana's 19th-century present as a mere backdrop for her 20th-century privileges. The off-stage violence is not settled and sealed. Excusing herself as an insignificant player and the sole protector of her "family" and the community, Dana comfortably recuses herself from the "family business" between Rufus and Alice, whose alliance, however outrageous, preserves her lineage. Dana, an *ogbanje*-like time traveler, manages to arrive just late enough to be an effective challenger of history.

> What had happened here seemed obvious. The girl, her torn dress. If everything was as it seemed, Rufus had earned his beating and more. Maybe he had grown up to be even worse than I had feared. But no matter what he was, I needed him alive—for Kevin's sake and for my own. (*Kindred* 117)

Dana is just in time for the post-rape fight between Rufus and Isaac Jackson, Alice's lawful husband. The "obviousness" of the situation seems to have completely neutralized the heinousness of Rufus's crime. Because the rape has happened and did happen, there is nothing else Dana or Isaac could do to alter the fact. Alice's shame could not be undone even with her aggressor's death. Dana, appealing to the better sense of the Jacksons, points to the more pressing issue of escape. Her blatant overlooking of the crime is evident in her utter composure and the two incisive rhetorical questions she thrusts at Isaac, "What will they do to you if you kill him?" and "What will they do to the woman if you kill him?" (*Kindred* 118). But she is wrong, just as she is ultimately unable to prevent the breakup of the slave community. Alice and Isaac *did* get caught: Isaac lost his ear and was sold to Mississippi; Alice was ravaged by the dogs and lost much of her memory. Death would not have

been a more cruel punishment. It turns out Dana is as ineffective in fulfilling her patriarchal duties as in safeguarding the communal cohesion. Rufus *was* killed, literally by her own hand. The Weylin plantation *did* disintegrate, tearing apart the slave communities.

Not dissimilar to Rufus's assault on Dana, his rape of Alice erupts into an avalanche of violence. Rufus's "messy" face, his being "knocked down" over and over again, the exchanges of blows and body fluids? (*Kindred* 117-118) seem to echo, or rather overshadow the much milder display of force in Dana's case. With no explicit reference to shame, the rape scene reenacts the dynamics of shaming and shamed responses through the physical gestures of the two bodies. The shame response, Tomkins asserts, acts to "reduce facial communication" between the social players, through the "dropping [of] eyes, eyelids, head and sometimes the whole upper part" (*AIC* 352). It is by virtue of this attempt to forestall any additional interpersonal exchange that the shamer delivers a vital blow to the activated interest and enjoyment of the shamee. The infectious nature of shame further complicates the dynamics, locking the two bodies in a self-sufficient feedback loop of affective contagion. It is the "incomplete reduction of interest or joy," Tomkins pronounces, that activates shame (*AIC* 353). The lingering sense of pleasure, not fully wiped out by rejection, is crucial in triggering a shamed response. With manifest interest and its untimely withdrawal, shame straddles a feedback loop of affect along a cycle of separation-attachment-detachment. Amidst Rufus's bestial advance, the whiff of soapy fragrance signals an effort over personal hygiene, which sparks a perceptible amount of positivity on Dana's part. The logic of shame is not only responsible for her final act of rebellion, but is also threaded into the physical interactions of the entire scene. Shame's affective alternation is mirrored with a seesawing effect in the bodily negotiations between Dana with Rufus. Beginning with "turn[ing] his body so that he face[s] [Dana] squarely" (*Kindred* 257), Rufus is persistent in proffering his affection, whereas Dana repeatedly fends off his advance, always falling short of completely exhausting his activated interest. When Rufus "stood up and came

over," Dana "stepped back'; when he "caught [her] arm," she "pulled away"; when he "held [her hand] between his own in a grip," she "twisted [her] hand, tried to get it away from in sudden anger"; when he pinned her down, she "twisted sharply, broke away from him"; finally, when Rufus "caught [her], trying not to hurt [her]," Dana "raised the knife" and "sank it into his side"; even when she managed to kill him and "pushed him away somehow," Rufus still had "his hand...on [Dana's] arm" (*Kindred* 257-260). The bodies wrestle with one another as the affects of interest and joy wax and wane. At the fateful moment of Rufus's death, the last remainder of his interest drains, and Dana, minus the forearm, is finally released from this mutually abusive cycle of shame.

This scene of rape, while restaging the shameful cycle of interest activation and reduction, also brings to relief a proper allegory of shame. A strong and persistent desire to run away from shame, Butler's story indicates, could only lead to unbearable anguish with severe and irreparable damage to the body. If shame gestures at a primary "incompleteness of the person" (Willemsen 154), the existence of which "forms the condition of possibility of shame" (Ross 166), then Dana's loss of limb returns the body to such an originary incompletion. This restoration of a shameful lack engenders an excruciating degree of pain that sends out a primeval cry for mercy. Upon the loss of flesh and blood, both Rufus and Dana scream, and scream again. The cry they've uttered is proportional to the pain they're experiencing; the astounding volume of both makes it quite clear that shame has indeed pushed them to the edge of life and death. If her body represents for Rufus all that he desires, then Dana's materiality, with its flesh and blood, holds the seat of shame. As a perennial source of interest for Rufus, Dana's body remains vulnerable to his sexual predation, thereby inviting all future attacks of shame. Slaying Rufus's body is a last resort to put Dana's shame to rest. Between the endurance of shamed existence and the killing of her ancestor lies the impossible choice of living without shame. That option has to lie beyond the grip of history altogether. If it ever materialized in the course of her time travel, it might materialize in those brief

moments when she disappears from time completely, in between the 19th and 20th centuries. But these short-lived instances of timelessness are untenable, and the possibility of living outside of shame is denied by the uncanny situation of her body, stuck in between the viable and the nonliving. The red impossible agony that outpours from her body is thus quintessentially the symbol of her shame. With the return of her consciousness, Dana desperately wishes to rejoin the rest of her body, even at the cost of forfeiting all resistance to shame. The thing that is even "harder and stronger" than Rufus's grip of shame, it seems, is none but the force of the shame of history, reincarnated as the unyielding wall. It figures as a powerful counterpart of the death drive,[49] which has kept summoning Dana from the future and sending her home. It is only when Dana is about to break free from its grip once and for all that the shame of history seeks to take a permanent hold of her. Her dangling empty sleeve is a visible reminder of the invisibility of shame, a lasting mark of an abiding force, and a most conspicuous testament to its power.

Bloody Shame

If the shame of history ever bears down on Dana Franklin through the grip of Rufus Weylin, then Rufus, or the patriarchal figure that he represents, also exercises a more immediate power over his unruly progeny, via the attempted rape. This unfortunate incident recalls all the past instances of rape Dana's forebear Alice has to go through. Put in a similar situation, Alice's shame finds new medium of expression through Dana's body and becomes revived by Rufus's touch. The shameful deeds of one's patriarch are passed down, together with all the "glorious" accomplishments. Rufus's abominable acts, too, have been an integral part of Dana's heritage. By virtue of being in the family

[49] In the classical Freudian psychoanalytic conception, the death drive features a persistent and innate desire for self-destruction. It was first coined by Sabina Spielrein in a 1912 paper and revived by Freud with his 1920's thesis on the "pleasure principle." There, the concept is understood to be the darker side of the dynamics of the ego, in opposition to Eros--the creative, self-preserving drives. In the context of *Kindred*, Dana's time travel is triggered by Rufus's life-threatening emergencies, the frequency of which suggests a general "tendency" in Rufus towards self-destruction. Such a psychoanalytical reading would make Dana Eros, who, ironically, is finally what kills Rufus.

line, Dana has always taken part in an originary rape of her own ancestral mother Alice. The shame of the sexual assaults and physical abuses passes on, its weight having multiplied throughout the generations of comfort and prosperity. Dana is a direct result of Alice's shame, and the modern privileges that the Danas and Kevins enjoy now are built upon the whipped and tortured backs of the Isaacs' shame. The burden of history ultimately crashes down on one, as overwhelming as Rufus's body is. Perhaps few of the instances of shame could ever materialize in such a dramatic fashion, and almost no aggressor could bend time to duplicate his crime. Time travel makes a plurality of histories possible and renders an heir complicit in a literal sense in the "originary" transgression of her ancestor.[50] To become legible in the historical time is thus to be vulnerable to the shame, and rape of history. When the burden of one's heritage is excessive enough to take the form of a violent assault, then the release from such a deadly weight is tantamount to slaying one's ancestor, thereby releasing one from the grip of history and its debilitating effects. Killing one's ancestor, a most unlikely solution to the conundrum of the shameful clench of history, ends almost disastrously, with the loss of flesh and a deluge of blood.

What Butler also highlights with both *Kindred* and *Fledgling* is a relationship between a certain freedom from linear temporality or heteronormativity, and the role of shame. In the temporally capacious structure of *Kindred*, shame figures as the portal through which two temporally and physically distinct dimensions could merge. As her story demonstrates, the "accidental" entanglement between the past and the present would not result in any change in the "hard" facts. Altered are one's perspective of a past and the emotional response to it, as well as degree to which one is reconstituted by one's affective reality. As she recognizes the dimension of courage and

[50] In the context of *Kindred*, Rufus's crime against Alice is what Dana's origin lies. As she travels back in time, Dana is given a chance to make *other* versions of history possible, one of which would be her non-existence. Butler does not discuss in detail these other temporalities even as she sets the story up for such a possibility. The raping scene is a playback of Dana's originary act--a primary scene that haunts her identity, that makes her dual-temporal existence possible, and that finally denies multiple temporality as a viable way of being.

resistance in her mother's silence compliance, Butler demands Dana to problematize the foundations of her present dignity and freedom. To some extent, Dana travels back to the slavery era *to reexperience* the shame of her ancestor and to recuperate that affect as a constitutive element of her present existence. Her discovery of the buried *shamed* dimension of her identity mirrors Butler's own modified attitudes towards her mother's shame. With Dana's time travel, Butler accentuates the role of shame in the collective memory of enslavement and violence. As the examples of Alice's, Isaac's and Dana's humiliation suggest, shame is not only generative of pain; it engenders actions and relations, some of which are decisively rebellious and subversive; it fortifies communal bonds and preserves through collective memory past atrocities from being forgotten or lessened with the passing of time. Some crimes are not justified even as they constitute the very conditions of one's existence. A "byproduct" of Alice's shame, Dana travels back in time only to recognize the extent shame gets entangled with her very being. On the other hand, *Fledgling*'s connection to time travel seems more tenuous. No character is transported back or catapulted into the future. But as Shori awakens from the trauma of her past, with the near complete erasure of her personal and cultural knowledge, she *travels* to a *timeless* dimension. Apropos Wittenberg's "expansive' understanding of time travel, as long as the "order, duration, and significance of events in time" are modified or *manipulated,* the narrative has indeed *traveled* through time or "construct[ed] 'alternate' worlds" (1). Perhaps not all literary works could be "viewed as a subtype of time travel" (Wittenberg 1), but the nonheteronormative world Butler's *Fledgling* envisions does make a strong case for the faulty logic of linearity. Shori is a product of genetic experiment whose entry upon the lineage chart creates confusion and disruption rather than building simple connections. Her fertility also remains a question within the scope of the story. Her existence is thus only tangentially connected to history and figures as a loose end or a point of collapse in an otherwise invincible linear logic. The superiority of Shori over the "traditional" Ina challenges the logic of heteronormitivity, which figures

as the "physical" embodiment of temporal linearity. More importantly, it is her *shameless* existence in an otherwise temporal and patrilinear economy, as well as her *shameless* struggle to fight for her legibility *beside* such an economy that the Dahlmans and Silks find most intolerable. Her victory in the end over Katherine Dahlman is thus suggestive of a larger triumph of a nonheteronormative and temporal capaciousness. The freedom Butler presents with both *Kindred* and *Fledgling* thus bears a decidedly shamed *dimension*.

If *Kindred* figures as an allegory of the weight of shame and the deadly effects of an ultimate breach from such an affect, then Butler's other standalone novel, *Fledgling*, contends a certain distance from as well as intermittent access to shame. Bulter's literary adventure translates theoretical interpretations of shame as the marker of humanity. Dana Franklin's failure from avoiding the shameful grip of history, and what I would later argue Shori Matthews's identity-forging proximity to shame, take Carl Schneider's view that "to extirpate shame is to cripple our humanity" one step further beyond the species confines (xix). Shame not only "touch on the very nature of what it is to be *human* in society" (Jewett, Alloway, and Lacey 9), but more generally on the nature of *being* in any community. Threaded throughout the storyline are scenes in which blood and shame become entangled. Whereas it runs quietly underneath the surface of patrilinear tradition in *Kindred*, blood ascends to a prominent position in the vampiric communities in *Fledgling*. Published in 2005, *Fledgling* features Shori Matthews, the result of genetic experimentation by Ina, a vampiric race that coinhabits the earth with human beings for centuries. The dark-skinned Shori, with her exceptional ability to withstand sunlight and stay awake during the day, has become the target of murderous attacks from the Silk family, who vow to keep the Ina bloodline pure. Unlike the traditional portrayal of vampires as vicious, greedy creatures who can "turn" humans, Butler's Ina are usually caring and reasonable, living in a peaceful, matriarchal or patriarchal community with their human symbionts. Among the list of thematic concerns Susana Morris (2012) identified in *Fledgling* are race,

sexuality, intimacy, identity, and kinship. With the fantastical setting of the contemporary vampiric genre, Butler is able to "transgressively revise" and "radically reimagine" conceptions of "autonomy, family, and race" (S. Morris 152). More specifically, *Fledgling* is regarded by a critical consensus as evincing a black feminist Afrofuturist epistemology, which insists that people of African descent are key to a more egalitarian, posthumanist future. The alternatives Butler proposes in *Fledgling* to heteronormative relationships are operative on a key precept—the human-Ina symbiosis. Feeding on human blood, the Ina also addict their human symbionts to a substance in the venom, a powerful hypnotic drug that gives enormous pleasure and makes them highly suggestible and deeply attached to the Ina. Emotional and physical satisfaction is only part of the appeal; human symbionts shall significantly extend their life expectancy and age in a much slower fashion. On the other hand, Ina need human blood, as well as their touch and presence, to stay healthy. Such vibrant dynamics of mutualism are what sustain *Fledgling* in all its communal, queer, nonmonogamous, and posthuman socialities.

Similar to *Kindred*, violence in *Fledgling* oftentimes ends with blood shedding. Unlike *Kindred*, when blood oozes out in *Fledgling*, it is not accompanied or prompted by a strong sense of shame; rather, the pleasure with which the body fluids converge around human and inhuman flesh signals a proximity between shame and sheer enjoyment and blood's critical role in that relation. Blood is no longer merely a symbol of stigma that binds Dana Franklin to a rapist ancestor; it also stands for a form of bodily gratification that is decidedly shameless. Here, repetition and wounding function in a radically pleasurable manner. Whereas Dana repeatedly witnesses the emotional and physical violations on the slave body, human symbionts joyfully await the return of hungry fangs and willingly submit their bodies to violent penetration. Just as Dana's attachment to the shame of her heritage is complete, the bond between symbionts and their Ina frequently overrides even the rhetoric of shame over such a demeaning use of the human body. The proffering of their body is an

ultimate act of submission, an invitation to examine the depths of their soul. If shame, a la Tomkins, is the "sickness of the soul"—"an inner torment" that "strikes deepest into the heart of man" (351), then the offer of blood—the inner treasure and provenance of vitality, translates as a gesture of desensitizing or dethroning the soul. The feeding, with its well-sequenced acts of intimacy as well as violence, is not unlike a ritual ceremony. Through such acts, affects can take on new meanings. Frederick Turner (1995) entertains one such possibility in the instance of sacrifice, which he claims could transform shame into beauty. The resulting harmony does attest to the priority of bodily pleasure and a realignment of spiritual importance. With Turner's formula, the shame that has been heroically remade is an originary shame that is borne collectively by the participants of the sacrifice. That shame, unlike that of the objectification of the body, is the capacity to be shamed, which has been passed down and shared as a form of cultural and social knowledge. Without the precedence of having always already been shamed, one is hardly recognize shame as such in the first experience of shame. It is with the shame of Alice's rape that Dana finds Rufus's assault of her laden with shame; the prior incident makes her present experience meaningful and significant. Having been raped and shamed prepares Dana for her present shaming and enables her to respond rapidly and correctly *as if* with hindsight. A prior shame defines shame as it is, and blood is one such substance that transports and breeds shame across time and space.

If sacrifice figures as the "productive passage" that ensures shame's transcendence into beauty (F. Turner 1063), then no transcendence could be found in Rufus's vampiric feeding on Alice and the other slaves. Their sacrifice breeds shame and shamefaced offspring, not beauty and joy. Violence and shame might be allegorical in *Kindred*, but is hardly ever transitive except turning beauty into grotesque, ravaged, and amputated bodies like those of Isaac, Alice and Dana. Even within the context of *Fledgling,* shame's seeming metamorphosis into pure joy is not always peaceful. And *other* shame does abound, beside the shame over the too easily objectified body. Wright Hamlin's

initiation into this bloody tradition, for example, involves a quite violent physical interaction, which recalls Rufus's predation of Dana.

> I unfastened the seat belt that he had insisted I buckle and pushed aside the blanket. I turned to open the car door. He grabbed my arm before I could figure out how to get it open. He had huge hands that wrapped completely around my arm. He pulled me back, pulled me hard against the little low wall that divided his legs from mine... I pulled away fromm him, dodged his hand as he grasped at me, tried again to open the door, only to be caught again...And again, he grasped my left upper arm, pulling me back from the door. His fingers wrapped all the way around my upper arm and held me tightly, pulling me away from the door...I thought I could break his wrist if I wanted to...But I didn't want to break his bones...And he did smell good...I bit him...
>
> I stared down at the bleeding marks I'd made on his hand, and suddenly I was unable to think about anything else. I ducked my head and licked away the blood, licked the wound I had made. He tensed, almost pulling his hand away. Then he stopped, seemed to relax. (*Fledgling* 16-17)

The tension created and sustained by all the physical movements is instantaneously dissolved with the merging of body fluids, between Wright's blood and Shori's saliva. A very first feeding for Shori Matthews too, after the loss of her memory. The enticing smell of Wright is crucial in awaking a key component in her identity as Ina—a natural thirst for blood. The ruthless attack on the Matthews family not only annihilates all her immediate maternal relatives, but has left Shori, the youngest Matthews of fifty-three (ten or eleven to human eyes), completely amnesic. When she awoke in the cave, blind and burnt, Shori was largely driven by her animal instincts, having only a very flimsy connection to the social and cultural conventions. She knew what a *bed* was and realized, with quite an effort, that she was on the *ground*. But who she was or how she got there was completely lost to

her. Led by her instincts, Shori managed to recover physically. Now, for the first time since her *rebirth*, she is side by side with a human being, whom she also recognizes as such with the remainder of her memory. It is also *known* to her, when the concerned stranger suggests, that a *hospital* or *police station* is not a safe place for her. It is with such trepidation that she bolts for the door. "Unfasten," "push," "open," "pull"—Shori's series of motions is matched by a sequence of actions on Wright's part as well—"grab," "pull," "catch," "wrap," "hold." All the pushing and pulling seem to be a replay of the violent encounter between Dana and Rufus in the attempted rape scene, and a rough mirroring of the attachment-separation cycle of shame. The spilling of blood is what in both scenes puts an end to this never-ending circuit of emotional and physical "abuse." Just as Dana thrusts the knife into Rufus's body, Shori penetrates Wright with her sharp teeth. Both violate and transgress a border that marks the autonomy of subject. Comparing the autonomous subject to a "well-bordered home" (Comer 96), Todd Comer in his reading of *Kindred* gestured at the negative presence of violence that undergirded subjecthood. In Dana and Shori's case, the eruption of violence and its preceding peace are two faces of the same coin—one succeeds the other with a change only in form, not in content. The inherent violence in both actions also speaks to the intensity of the emotions that grip each individual—Dana's shame and Shori's fear. While Dana is able to stay connected to her lineage, Shori drifts apart from the social and cultural grid that renders her fully intelligible to herself. Left with no compass, Shori is finally led out of her predicament by an overpowering craving for blood.

Blood is a powerful catalyst in turning people back to a raw state of being, giving Rufus "an animal sound" (*Kindred* 260) and making Shori forget her self-identified role of being a human. Shori's dive for the enticing blood shows a peculiar absence of shame that might have stopped any human being from "lick[ing] the wound," "lick[ing] away the blood," and "lick[ing] at the blood welling up where my teeth had cut him (*Fledgling* 17). Butler diligently registers, repeatedly, the

disgusting,[51] animalistic gesture of licking, as if her audience has not yet guessed the truth of Shori's identity. As a perfect symbol of subservience and affection, the innocuous act of licking glosses over the violent nature of bloodthirsty vampirism. "Almost pulling his hand away," the bitten Wright Hamlin soon "relax[ed]," "frowned and pull away" again, and was only "try[ing] to pull away" when Shori "caught his hand again," but finally "frowned" once more, "shook his head" and "dropped his hand to his lap" (17). Together, Wright's indecision, his irresolute "almost" and resigned shake of the head help stage a dramatization of the shame dynamic. Wanting to submit to the joyous sensation, ashamed of being licked by a 10-year-old, and ashamed of his shame and of his desire to submit, Wright puts on a frown that is as much as a condemnation of Shori's waywardness as of his own pleasure. His attachment to Shori is sealed from the moment when his blood meets her venom. If Dana's attachment to Rufus/history/Alice's rape/shame is near complete, the strength of which is known in the severed arm, then Wright's attachment to Shori is final, for he never even carries out any plans to escape. As his interest and joy are never fully reduced and always sustained, Wright is bound to Shori in a perpetually shamed relationship.

Joy and pleasure are an intrinsic part of shame, their presence becoming all the more clear with the shameful vampiric feeding scenario. Tomkins defines the activation of shame as an incomplete reduction of interest and joy, and it is a formula that scholars in the Tomkins tradition, such as Donald Nathanson and Gershen Kaufman, uphold. This dynamic is allegorized in *Fledgling* as the "hypnotic," morphine-like chemical that induces feelings of euphoria. Nathanson (1987) characterizes shame as an impediment and attenuator to the exultation or enjoyment associated with positive affects. Kaufman (1989) is convinced of the inhibiting effects of shame on interest and

[51] Disgust, or disgust/dissmell is one of the nine primary affects in Tomkins's affect theory. Unlike shame-humiliation, which is an innate *affective* auxiliary response to interest-excitement, disgust/dissmell is an innate *drive* auxiliary response to hunger, thirst, and oxygen drives. Tomkins understands shame as *temporarily inhibiting* but not *denying* intimacy, while disgust/dissmell keeps the self at a "safe distance" from the object of attention. He acknowledges the difference between disgust and dissmell, the former is a response to "bad taste" as the latter is to "bad smell." But the two response work in an "analogic" fashion; both are "innate distancing responses." See *Affect Imagery Consciousness*, pp. 627-629.

enjoyment. Neither of them disputes shame's continuing engagement with joy and pleasure. A cohabitation is a more apt descriptive of their relationship. Sally Munt (2008) is right in pointing out the "gluey" (24) nature of shame's inner dynamic, but her contention that it takes "enduring human aptitude" to "mutate" (28) shame into joy exhibits a narrow understanding of shame's *attachment*. As Eve Sedgwick (2003) asserts that shame figures as a "kind of free radical that ...attaches to...the meaning of almost anything" (62), shame naturally exists in a compound state, an auxiliary response that coexists with positive affects, striving to dampen their effects all the while feeding on their presence for sustenance. The transformation from shame to joy that Munt identifies as characteristic of the queer pride movement is more aptly a foregrounding of the dynamic nature of shame. By examining the "information for relevance to particular affect," Tomkins asserted, the ideo-affective organization could develop "strategies for coping with contingencies to avoid or attenuate impact" (*AIC* 458). And it is through a reexamination of relevant information that an enjoyable affect would come into being. Any attempt at severing shame, after it has been activated, from what I shall call its "host" affect, might result in a horrendous tragedy like Dana's amputation.

In an even more gory scene of bloodshed, Dana Franklin, shamed by Rufus's possessive instinct, cuts her own wrists, an act which she knows will get her home to 1976 Los Angeles. Her extreme gesture comes as a direct response to Rufus's public shaming of her, when she comes to beg him not to sell one of his slaves, Sam James, who has accosted and flirted with Dana a few times. Dana is sincere and persistent in dissuading the enraged master from selling the man away from his family; she "pleaded desperately," begging him not to "destroy what [he] mean[s] to preserve" (*Kindred* 238). Her determination to influence "Rufe" is as strong as his to punish the disrespectful slave. A head-on collision results in an impromptu scene of shaming.

> I caught Rufus by the hand and spoke low to him. "Please, Rufe. If you do this, you'll destroy what you mean to preserve. Please don't..."

> He hit me.
>
> It was a first, and so unexpected that I stumbled backward and fell.
>
> And it was a mistake. It was the breaking of an unspoken agreement between us—a very basic agreement—and he knew it.
>
> I got up slowly, watching him with anger and betrayal. (*Kindred* 238)

Together, Dana's pleading and Rufus's snubbing constitute a dramatic replay of the classical shame response, having significant interest activated and then drastically depleted. As an analogic representation of the sensation of shame that both are experiencing at the time, the interaction between the two characters culminates in a fall and rupture of bond. The "basic agreement" Dana refers to might translate to respect and equality in the context, but given the allegorical nature of the scene, it could also mean unobstructed communication, mutual interest and enjoyment, and a strong dichotomy between self and other. According to Tomkins, shame is the "most reflexive" affect in which the "phenomenological distinction between the subject and object of shame is lost" (359). With shame, attention turns inward, but the inability to completely denounce (and renounce) the object—the self—means that shame always puts one in an impossible situation. Rufus's physical attack, forceful as it must be—for it floors Dana—is not powerful enough to engender a complete rupture between the two. Even as Dana does manage to leave (as a shamed person lowers one's head and upper body to avoid further communication), she eventually returns again. Shame highlights the embodied reality that Dana could not deny. In Vint's (2007) terms, it is an emblem of the "coming to terms with the past slavery and its pernicious effects" that promotes psychic healing (245). Shame returns Dana to the embodied realm of her existence and is more powerful than physical violence in reminding her that "she is a body, an object" (*Kindred* 248). Dana's self-identified obligation to her ancestor and her family makes her unable to completely relinquish her interest, which, metaphorically, is her distant but certain biological tie to Rufus. And that attachment, bound

through blood, is unbreakable, even with the draining of her own blood. Cutting her wrists takes her back to Kevin, but even a more thorough gesture of rupture—killing the ancestor and draining the source of her blood—is not efficacious enough in severing the tie. Dana's subsequent visit to Maryland—"as soon as my arm was well enough" (262)—ends with a peculiar tone of pseudo-resignation. Dana's wish to remain "sane" in the last scene is more than a categorical surrender to the culturally sanctioned parameters of meaning making. Their knowledge of other temporalities and relationalities--what their socio-cultural conventions deem as "insane"--remains intact. Dana's desire is more than a return to the patrilinear reality; her visit completes the expansion of the established grid of intelligibility, and confirms the saneness of their insanity.

Nobody Stays in the Garden of Eden

In his essay on the psychoanalytical contribution to the theorization of shame, Malcolm Pines (2008) charts out a list of drives that are "defended against" by shame and guilt: oral suckling, passive anal-erotic, passive urethral, oral biting cannibalistic, anal sadistic, and phallic competitive (103). Shori Mathews, when she plunges in for the oozing blood, is capitalizing on her natural hunger for both the oral suckling and biting cannibalistic wishes. However prominent her Ina features are—longer life expectancy, acute sense of smell, speed, blood thirst—she was born to a human mother, and does display quite a few human characteristics—darker skin, tolerance of sunlight, and consciousness during the day. Her suckling and biting instincts as a human being is further strengthened by the Ina craving for blood. Her human shame, it seems, is no match for the Ina longing for blood. When she bites into Wright Hamlin, there is a disturbing lack of inhibition and control that almost always manages to induce a sense of shame in the reader. Shori's loss of memory, hence common decency, is invoked as a plausible explanation to excuse any possible

transgression. Few readers, however, are prepared for the truth about Hugh Tang; even amnesia does not fully excuse it.

> Then, in memory, I saw the remains of the animal, scattered around the cave. I had seen it briefly, just before I left the cave. I had been able to see then, but I had not been aware enough to understand what I was seeing. What I had killed…and eaten…in the cave had not been an animal. It had been a man. (*Fledgling* 33)

An uncanny recall of lost memory bits, Shori's realization of her cannibalistic behavior comes during her revisit to the burned houses, the Matthews estate that has been destroyed by the Silks' human symbionts. Going back as far as she could to the "memory of the cave" (33) Shori stumbles over the impossible truth of the "animal" she has "gorged" (8) in her moment of primeval hunger and utter helplessness. Why must she remember? Why should she acknowledge the horrendous nature of her act? The immediate force of her recollection makes Shori "stunned, not knowing what to think" (33). The sound of Hugh Tang's last words, which she is also able to recall, stays with her, much to her dismay—"Oh my God, it's her. Please let her be alive" (33). His concern for the critically wounded Shori, which is conveyed in the chain of actions when he first found her—"spott[ing] her in the shallow cave," coming to her, "touch[ing] [her] face," and [seeking] a pulse in [her] wrist" (33)—coupled with the words that are intelligible to her, is almost unbearable to the partly recovered Shori. When she "put [her] head down on the table" (33)—apparently deeply absorbed in her own thoughts—Shori is also held fast in the iron clasp of shame. Her posture—head down, eyes down, upper body down—is the quintessential body language of shame in Tomkins's schematization. It was as if the amnesic Shori needs the debilitating attacks of shame to fully resuscitate herself. Previously upheld as the affect of moral safeguard (Freud 1905), social bond (Scheff 1994), and queer identification (Sedgwick 2002), shame also features as regenerative therapy in Butler. It is through the access to shame that Shori is determined to uncover the full extent of her identity and

becomes reunited with her father, Iosif; and it is her extended, excruciating engagement with shame that alerts Dana Franklin to the "comfort and security" of her present life (*Kindred* 9). More than what Stephen Pattison calls the "entrée" to important features of individual and social life" (1), shame in Butler features as an entry to a society that remains hostile to *strange* beings. It functions not simply as a "profoundly shaping" force for "racial, ethnic, and religious minorities," as Gershen Kaufman has astutely observed, but works to shape identity in general (1996; xi). Shame both prompts and keeps them glued to a sustained exploration of their personal and communal past, through which a different future might become possible.

In James Baldwin's *Giovanni's Room*, in response to David's comment that Giovanni would not have died in shame if "he'd stayed down there in that village of his in Italy and planted his olive trees and had a lot of children and beaten his life," Jacques avows "Nobody can stay in the garden of Eden" (Baldwin 36). What Baldwin proposes via Jacques is most likely a critique of the alienating and dehumanizing effect of a homophobic society, but it also gestures at a close relation between one's cultural knowledge and the experience of shame. This notion of context-specific but also context-*engendering* affects *as such* is present in Milton's reimagination of the Edenic Fall as well. Knowledge of sexual pleasure transforms "love" into "lust," and "pure adoration" into "lascivious" desire (Milton 112, 245). For Shori Matheews who suffers from traumatic amnesia, she lives almost in an epistemological and ethical limbo that protects her from experiences of shame and sorrow. It's with the return of her vampiric and human instincts that Shori begins to emerge out of the garden of Eden and recover her cultural know-how. If, we are tempted to ask, Shori were fully conscious and unimpaired by memory loss, would she feel shame when she gulps up Hugh Tang in the cave? Would she even kill him in the manner that she did—"seized it...clung to it, rode it, found its throat, tasted its blood, smelled its terror...tore at its throat...fed, gorged...on the fresh meat" (*Fledgling* 8)? Would she be equally ruthless in obtaining the food she so desperately needs? In fact, she did

manage to murder three men shortly afterwards, with her bare hands, though under the mitigating circumstances of self-preservation. Before she jumps at those men, she justifies her upcoming slaughter by claiming that they are "like the deer[s] I had killed—just prey" (121). Her actions themselves demonstrate an inherent ruthlessness and shamelessness—"one hand over his nose and mouth," "arm around his head under his chin...[breaking] his neck," and "tearing out his throat" (121). When it becomes clear how ready she was to kill and "eat" Raleigh Curtis if he "had managed to shoot Wright" (51), we couldn't help but marvel at the ease and arbitrariness with which the boundary between the killable and the sacred is drawn. When it's safe to "use [her] speed and strength," the humans are prey—deer, to be "quickly dispatched" (122, 121). The powerful predatory instincts of the Ina are so hard to fend off that Shori has to specifically ask Wright not to wait on her when she is wounded; "I'll be too hungry" (52) summarizes Shori's precaution. Killing human beings is problematic for Shori—her crouched body gesture does indicate shame—but it so often is a matter of expediency that assures her survival and that of her human symbionts. On the other hand, beneath Shori's bafflement how humans would ever only smell "edible" (8) to her is an intrinsic lack of distinction between humanity and animality; humans could be simply just *prey*. When Wright jokingly comments that "It's a shame you can't eat him" (51), he is certainly not aware of the extent and nature of Shori's shame or her capacity to feel shame. Whereas Wright treats it as a shameful atrocity to devour a living human being, Shori assesses such an option by focusing on her capability to execute the mission; if she does not eat Raleigh it would not be because it's morally repulsive. The difference between Wright's and Shori's conception and capacity of shame points to the constructed aspect of its nature. Significantly though, even the species divide is not impervious to a common working knowledge of shame.

The vampiric symbiosis that binds Ina and humans together in *Fledgling* is intrinsically a shameful bond. It's not the "stigma" of (sexual) feeding that makes it a shame (although it certainly

does not make it less so); the bond is shameful due to an originary loss. The Tomkinsian dynamic of shame pivots upon a reduction of activated interest or joy. And it is this loss of a prior gain that puts the individual to shame. Unlike Tomkins's nonintentionalist approach, psychoanalysts do not view shame at the mechanical levels of neural firing and stimulation; but both have uncovered shame's connection with the sense of loss. Shame, Lacan opined, is the "facticity of the temporal subject-as-lack" and constituted an integral part of ontology (Green 93). Playing off of the phonetic similarity between *ont* (being) and *honte* (shame), Lacan coins the term *hontologie* to emphasize his point that existence is innately shameful (Lacan 209; Soler 91). Ranjana Khanna (2008) also comments on shame's affinity to lack. This "ontological affect," Khanna reasons, accompanies the "potential loss and mourning" of dignity (163). Taking the psychoanalytical discussions on cannibalistic drives as his point of departure, Fabio Parasecoli (2008) reverts our attention to what he called the "infant's first experience of object loss" (49). The mother's breast, figuring as a salient source of joy, forges such a powerful attachment that its withdrawal most certainly creates an acute sense of anxiety in the infant. Such an agony over the loss further complicates an already intense relationship. Parasecoli identifies a problematic dichotomous self-or-other strategy by the infants.

> When babies are content and well fed, they feel one with it. But if they sense that their needs are not met, then the breast is experienced as a separate entity, becoming their first psychological object and a cause of anxiety. (Parasecoli 49)

The periodic withdrawal of the breast surely contributes to its transitioning more and more towards the *other* rather than the self. Prior to the desire to devour the breast and to keep it from abandoning the self, Parasecoli seems to imply, is a primeval wish to be *one*. That powerful wish to merge and to lose oneself underscored the appeal of vampiric culture, in which the "loss of individuality" is experienced as "blissful" (46). Tomkins, too, recognizes the desire to merge as inherent to shame. In a family setting, if a child were constantly rebuffed and unable to bridge the "gulf" between himself

and the love objects, he would simulate a "communion" by "becoming in fantasy his own mother or his own father" (*AIC* 363). In a vampiric relationship, the two entities are grown into one by virtue of their biological needs. That bond is all the more potent in *Fledgling* when the attraction becomes mutual. Not only are Ina addicted to humans for blood and physical contact, humans are attached to Ina's venom. The bodily and psychological addictions to one another are so absolute that any permanent separation would have been deadly for each. This total bond between an Ina and a human being recalls the completion before the originary loss of the breast. The merging precludes the self from ever experiencing the shame of loss while at the same time writes the affect at the core of this new duo identity. Unnamed and unnamable, shame is the backdrop that makes the vampiric relation possible and meaningful.

This vampiric mutualism is further "stigmatized" by the infusion of blood. Blood, with a myriad of social and cultural connotations, is quintessentially an ambivalent figure. Johnson and Decamp (2018) traces its "duplicity...as both the source of life and the cause of corruption" to the medieval and early modern conception of the menstrual blood, which is simultaneously "good, wholesome, vital...purifying" and conducive to "madness, disease, and death" (5-6). Such a duplicity makes blood a most honorable and shameful substance—an entity to be preserved and discarded at the same time. This dual character of blood renders our relationship to it quite shameful; we are awed by our extraordinary bloodline all the while ashamed by its everyday presence—bloody wound, menstruation, hemoptysis, etc. Kept from voyeuristic interests, this salient source of vitality develops its "secrecy" and obtains a reputation of being the "internal self." Spotting blood is thus comparable to exposing the innermost self, a sensation characteristic of shame. The vampiric tie involves an objectification of blood, stripping down all its social and cultural significations to the "insignificant" substance. Metaphorically, vampirism has been associated with capitalism in the Marxian and Communist tradition; literally, the consumption of blood finds its way into many cultures and often

assumes an unapologetic, shameless stance in one's right to enjoyment and pleasure. In addition to the coagulated chicken and pig blood, which has been in Chinese cuisine for thousands of years, human blood is occasionally consumed for its mystical power in superstitious practices. Lu Xun in his short story "Yao" (medicine) (1919) records the belief in feudal China that a criminal's blood could cure pneumonia—its "wild" power dispelling the weakness of the patient. Yu Hua's *Chronicle of a Blood Merchant* (1995) presents another shameless portrait of blood usage, not with consumption but in its sale. Xu Sanguan is able to provide for himself and his family only by selling his blood for money. What Zhang Hong (1998) critiques as a "relatively primitive capitalist venture" (translation mine), the sale of blood capitalizes on the substantive aspect of blood while denying or overlooking all its other cultural and social references. The transmission of blood in *Fledgling* retains both aspects of Lu's and Yu's discussions, but with the trope of vampirism, looses some barbarity and gains a more "rational" outlook. Revisiting William Harvey's discovery of blood circulation, Margaret Healy (2018) opines that for Harvey, "spirit and matter are inseparable and are blood" (24). This testament to its dyadic composition highlights blood's duality--an innate ambivalence that also characterizes the affect of shame--which might help account for their "natural" proximity.

While Tompkins seems to have proposed a nonintentionalist noncognitive scheme of shame, the reduction phase of the affect is in fact steeped in cognition. The species divide has successfully shielded Shori Matthews from experiencing shame in taking blood as yet another edible substance, but her trauma-induced amnesia manages to make her ashamed of her vampiric instincts after all.

> Once I had tasted them, they enjoyed the way I made them feel. Instead of being afraid or angry, they were first confused, then trusting and welcoming, eager for more of the pleasure that I could give them. It happened that way each time. I didn't understand it, but I had done it in a comfortable, knowing way. I had done it as though it was what I was supposed to do...

> On the other hand, it felt wrong to me that I was blundering around, knowing almost nothing, yet involving other people in my life. And yet it seemed I had to involve them. I hadn't hurt anyone so far, but I could have. And I probably would unless I could remember something useful. (*Fledgling* 32)

Unlike Wright Hamlin, whose first experience of euphoria in being preyed on by an Ina was mixed with confusion and anger, Shori's vampiric practices have always been unambiguously pleasurable, and she takes pride in her capacity in making it so. It has been a personal triumph that with all her lost memories, she "had had no trouble taking blood from six people including Wright." Fully recognizing her victims' rapid transition from being "confused" to "trusting," "welcoming," and "eager," Shori marvels at the "comfortable, knowing" manner she has conducted her business. Her assurance in the righteousness of her way is to be contrasted with the inkling of shame in what she characterizes as "blundering around." Her shame or guilt in "involving other people" without having the capability to take good care of them speaks to the strong sense of "duty" that Milo Silk, one of the oldest Ina on earth, testifies as a quintessential Ina characteristic. The predominant emphasis on accountability makes Shori particularly prone to shame when her amnesia has made it impossible for her to fulfill her responsibility. In the Tomkinsian schematization, Shori's lost memory effects a perceptible reduction of joy over her ability to protect the symbionts. To some extent, Tomkins's phenomenological, mechanical studies of shame are inseparable from social and cultural definitions of positivity, especially in accounting for the reduction of interest in connection to concepts of defeat, failure, honor, decency, or any other deeply held values. The Ina culture takes the pleasure in feeding on blood for granted while rendering certain disabilities shameful for violating their core values. Theri Pickens (2014) drew a line between impairment and disability. Whereas Shori's amnesia only "circumscribes her ability to remember" in her interactions with humans, it becomes a disability "when she "must navigate the Ina world," thereby "carr[ying] significant social stigma" (36). Shori's

peculiar shame makes it clear that a purely phenomenological and mechanical understanding does not render shame fully intelligible; the body in shame is always a situated and culturally specific body.

Shame, it seems, is intrinsic to the formation of a society and contingent upon the access to a cultural knowledge. Placed in a "new" historical reality, both Dana and Shori are left without any ready cultural know-how to live in a dignified, unashamed way as sanctioned by the distinctive cultures. Dana's knowledge of what constitutes as "shame" is different from Alice's, as the latter's understanding of a slave's rights is also lost upon Dana. Knowledge creates sinners and shame in Milton's *Paradise Lost*, redefining Edenic "love" as sinful "lust," turning "adoration" into "lasciviousness," and rewiring Adam's and Eve's experiences of enjoyment as shame. Jacques's assertion in *Giovanni's Room* that "Nobody can stay in the garden of Eden" gestures at this relationship between knowledge and shame, between the context with which some affects acquire meaning and the experience of these affects *as such*. Knowledge gives birth to shame and each culture produces its own badges of shame. Nina Auerbach's assertion that "every age embraces the vampires it needs" (145) outlines the need for liminal cultural figures to police its borders. While the access to knowledge oftentimes entails a shameful sensation (over one's inadequacy, among others), the departure from the Garden of Eden also figures as an escape as well. Shori comes back to the history of the Ina/human with the salubrious experiences of shame and constantly needs to revise her conceptions of shameful or *normal* practices as she traverses the species line. Taken in this sense, shame is the also her portal of "time travel" in between a human and an Ina world; it helps build meaningful conversations between two sets of otherwise antagonistic value systems. The valuable insights I've drawn from reading Butler's two novels are also dependent upon a "capaciousness" that I've identified in her eschewal of linear temporality and heteronormativity. This capacity to imagine *other* ways of being is critical for advancing our knowledge of the affect of shame. In the broadest sense, shame's ambivalence puts all forms of identification in suspense, at a "safe" distance, between

complete enjoyment and utter denial. This added dimension in the wake of shame creates a buffering zone for the incoming of actions, new relationality, and new negotiation with one's situations. However painful it is, Shori, Dana, and Alice all demand their reinitiation into history and its lessons, willing to withstand all the suffering from their wounds and amnesia. Lambert Strether, David Borne, and Giovanni have made it clear that however unpleasant knowledge could be, amnesia might still be worse. Their readiness to participate in the common history of shame despite physical and mental damages points to an abiding appeal of shame across the species, national, and cultural divides.

To Be Continued

Shame's productivity is awe-inspiring. It puts the pallor on Kate Croy's ruddy cheeks, the dazzling and coquettish smile on Helene Wright, the faint smile on Clare Kendry; it sends a whole generation of Hemingway characters on an extended mission to find meaning, pulls Jake to work, fishing, and *corrida*, binds David to a rigorous ritual around writing, refreshments, and sexual intercourse; it gives birth to a host of feelings and affects—love, hatred, desperation, anger, disgust, guilt, fear, anxiety, shame, regret; it generates bonds, movements as well as interactions between characters; above all, shame is reproductive; it begets shame and the vulnerability to future shaming. Interestingly, shame's generative power is not always indisputable in Butler. While Alice's shame (re-) produces Dana and her shame, the shameful bond between Ina and their symbionts features, besides immensurable pleasure, a real case of infertility. The impossibility of interbreeding makes the Ina-human relationship almost queer. Apart from Shori Matthews—a product, or what Milo Silk and Katherine Dahlman calls a "mistake," of genetic experimentation—no "future" exists from such a coupling. This "child-aversive, future-negating" (113) queer attachment, according to Lee Edelman (2004), debunked the redemptive discourses on the child and enforced an unmediated encounter

with the death drive and one's jouissance. Stripped of the reproductive imperative, the cross-species sexual bond seems to sport what Sedgwick would call an "open mesh of possibilities...lapses and excesses of meaning" (*Tendencies* 8) that explodes known significations of gender and sexuality.

> A rather shameless manifestation of love and sexuality underlies the following interaction. She looked at me as though she were trying to read my expression. "Is there danger right now?"
>
> In the early-morning darkness with all the Gordon men awake and alert? With the Council of Judgment already being organized? "No, not now."
>
> "Good," she said. "Then tell me about it in the morning."
>
> I smiled. "It is morning. But you're right. First things first."
>
> I took her to the spare room. I had changed the bedding myself and made certain that the room was clean and ready for her. "I know I promised you more than this," I said as she looked around. "I will keep my promise. It's just going to take longer than I thought."
>
> "I want to be with you," she said. "It's all I've wanted since you first came to me. I don't truly understand my feelings for you, but they're stronger than anything I've ever felt, stronger than anything I ever expected to feel. We'll find a way."
>
> I shut the door, went to her, and began to undo her blouse. "We will," I said. (*Fledgling* 206)

It will definitely come as a surprise to a complete stranger to *Fledgling* that the *she* is Theodora Harden, a woman at least in her fifties, and the *I* is Shori Matthews, an Ina who appears to be no more than ten or eleven. The queerness of their relationship is not restricted to the attraction to one another, but to the fact that both have had *other* voluntary sexual relations to others—Shori to Wright Hamlin, a male of twenty-three, Theodora to her late husband. The sexual aspect of their tie has developed as a by-product of the euphoric feeding, for the purpose of maximizing pleasure. By

virtue of the vampiric needs, Elizabeth Lundberg (2015) reasoned, Ina were "naturally, automatically bisexual" (573) while symbionts were likely to *become* bisexual. What Tomkins called the first general "image" (*AIC* 181)—the inherent desire for more and more lasting positive affects—underlies both Ina and humans' departure from heteronormativity. Jokingly, Wright has confessed to Shori that humans "aim to please" (*Fledgling* 36). And it seems the threat of shame is no longer an inhibiting force to dictate the format of their enjoyment. Not an example of what Munt labeled "mutation of shame into joy," the Ina principle of pleasure is at times a veritable cheering "for shame" (Munt 46), particularly when it applies to the human sociocultural conditions. Wright has experienced an acute sensation of shame to Iosif's remark, "That would make things legal at least" (*Fledgling* 70), when he guessed Shori to be about eighteen or nineteen years old. The shame over being a pedophile certainly underscores Wright's change of opinion regarding Shori's age. Initially thought to be "no more than ten or eleven" (14), Wright revised his assessment after he had sex with the girl only "half his size" (14). His pedophilic inclination has surely predated his fortuitous encounter with Shori but only found uninhibited expression in their queer relationship. Esther Jones (2015) locates normativized practices of "homosexuality, pedophilia, and general queerness" in the Ina culture, which are necessary and crucial in their survival and prosperity. Unlike James Baldwin's 1950s Paris, homosexuality in *Fledgling* is a nonpathological, viable and more significantly, inconspicuous identity that people could nonchalantly adopt. No longer associated with darkness and filth, it is a protected practice that Ina take pride in alongside their pair complexion and wiry figure. Butler's texts offer a revised reading of McTaggart's interpretation of shame as "upset[ting] binary logic" (124); even prior to the adoption of shame, a critical access to the socio-cultural knowledge of shame is able to engender opportunities for resisting binarism. Championing a polyamorous model of belonging, Butler's allegory of relationality encourages revised conceptions of shame and queerness.

Shame, an experience of the self by the self, Tomkins asserted, highlighted the seat of the self in the eyes. Since the self "lives in the face, and within the face [it] burns brightest in the eyes" (359), the shame response made the self highly visible by inviting focused attention to the eyes and the face. The classical shame with the flushed face, however, is not common among adults, who have *learned* to conceal outward display of affects. "Few adults publicly hang their head in shame," Tomkins acknowledged, and resort to tactics to "transform" their shame, such as "throw[ing] his head back and his chin up and out to prevent his head from hanging in shame" (*AIC* 168). Miniaturization is another useful tool so that a "partial lowering of the lids or slight relaxation of the neck muscles" (169) was in lieu of a full-blown shamed posture. Tomkins further admitted that since shame was an affect auxiliary coexistent with positive affects, if we were set to avoid shame, we "may be forced to learn to avoid excitement, or joy" as well (102). The stories of Milly Theale and Clare Kendry suggest that shame and existence are mutually constitutive; soon after they become impervious to attacks of shame—Milly turning her head to the wall, Clare smiling at her public humiliation—their life ends. No matter how many varied forms of expression shame sports, its presence is vital to individual and communal existence.

The self-other distinction that experiences of shame have underscored is similar to the desire to be consumed, and to become *one* with one's "predator." While critics such as Sharen Green (2018) have lamented the rise of globalization and its negative impact on our singularity, shame scholars have explored its momentous drive for reattachment, which echoes an intrinsic part of the shame response. The shame-prompted cycle of individuation and subjection envelops the self in a perpetual motion of consumption and replenishment. The Ina familial networks, by decoupling reproduction from communal productivity, favor a general form of relationality over the more restricted consanguinity. Shame has been repurposed in Butler as a channel to establish and renew relations, and to reimagine agency and autonomy. It features a perpetual oscillation between

complete revelation and utter concealment, defamiliarizing the present, remaking the past, and queering the future. Shame invigorates the characters and pushes them backward and forward to forging *other* connections with temporality. It eventually calms Dana and Shori and puts them in a more robust grid of intelligibility, which *means* more than it could ever *signify* with words. Shame, above all, *acts*. It *moves* eyes, heads, bodies, families, communities, and civilizations. It points to a *becoming* that might be different than the future.

R. W. Picard (1995) raised an intriguing question on the favorable model of affective computers. Should the computer be programed to perceive emotions only or to "express itself emotionally" as well (8)? Having referenced studies that argued for the salience of emotion in decision-making processes, Picard strove to resolve the dilemma by calling for an "affective symmetry," a mechanism that would make robots' emotions "observable" (9), so as to protect humans from their dangerous moods. To some extent, these powerful affective computers that could easily slaughter humans look like the amnesic Shori in *Fledgling*, with superior physical strength, better flashback memory, quicker healing, and sounder sense of judgment. The ease with which she kills her "deer" is only inhibited by a learned sense of ethics that could get clouded over by biological needs. Her desire for survival is not unlike that of the murderous HAL in Arthur Clarke's *2001: A Space Odyssey*. Shori's eventual peaceful cohabitation with her human symbionts is conditional upon a powerful addiction. Shame is capable of acting in lieu of this addiction as the momentum for interconnectivity and interdependence. Marty Fink's comment on conscious participation in risky sexual practices might be applicable to the case of shame as well—"Denying the possibility that humans might actually *choose* to engage [with shame] ignores the complexity of social and circumstantial factors informing our behavior" (420). I close this chapter with a *touching* and *affecting* scene in *Fledgling*.

I stopped beside the car and looked through its back window at Brook and Wright, now

> lying next to each other, both still asleep. Both had been touching me. Now that I had moved, they were almost touching one another.
>
> My feelings shifted at once from fear for them to confusion. I wanted to crawl between them again and feel them both lying comfortably, reassuringly against me. They were both mine. And yet there was something deeply right about seeing them together as they were. (*Fledgling* 132)

In shame too, there is something deeply right.

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