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Schleiermacher's Narrative of *Bildung*: Polarity and Family in *Christmas Eve*

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Abstract

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By Liberty A. Hall

The following study interprets Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve: A Dialogue* as a narrative of *Bildung* (formation, or education). *Christmas Eve* reflects both literary and ethical dimensions of Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*. The literary backdrop for *Christmas Eve* forms during Schleiermacher's participation in the Jena-Romantic circle in Berlin (particularly between 1798 and 1800). In the Jena-Romantic milieu, *Bildung* evolves in connection with the reception of Goethe's novel, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* (*Wilhelm Meisters Apprenticeship*) as well as Friedrich Schlegel's elaboration of a theory of poesy. At the core of Schleiermacher's work on *Bildung* lies the notion of "polarity," which he defines broadly as the dyadic activity that propels life, from the basic physical functioning of the universe to humans' means of relating to one another. The conceptions of *Bildung* espoused by Goethe and Schlegel also draw upon the notion of polarity, and although the three men understand polarity differently, their common reference to polarity provides the point of comparison that illumines the link between Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung* and his narrative, *Christmas Eve*. Schleiermacher expands his polar conception of *Bildung* in his lectures on ethics (1805/1806), where he focuses on the role of social institutions in *Bildung* and situates the family as the arena for the intersection of the social "goods" that promote *Bildung*, the highest good.

Schleiermacher's polar theory of *Bildung* clarifies the major themes of *Christmas Eve*, showing their underlying connection to one another. Moving beyond Schleiermacher scholarship, *Christmas Eve* also offers a critical vantage from which to assess the historical development of *Bildung* later in the nineteenth century. In the socio-political realm, *Christmas Eve*'s narrative of familial *Bildung* implicitly critiques the isolation and redefinition of *Bildung* within the academy and the state. In the literary realm, *Christmas Eve*'s introduction of multiple protagonists poses a challenge to the definition of *Bildung* narratives as works that follow the formation of a single person.

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I. Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve* and Eighteenth-Century *Bildung* Theories

We are on a mission: we are called to the Bildung of the earth.[1]
--Novalis, *Blütenstaub*

Statement of Thesis

Friedrich Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve*: *A Dialogue* (1805) depicts the interactions of a group of friends gathered to celebrate the Christmas festival. The company discusses a variety of topics, including child-rearing, differences between men and women, the relationship between art and religion, baptism, the loss of a child, and the purpose of church community. This thematic diversity, interwoven with theological observations, presents readers with a narrative of *Bildung*. The concept of *Bildung* has no exact translation in English and is usually rendered formation, education, or cultivation. Analyzing *Christmas Eve* as a *Bildung* narrative reveals an underlying structural frame that provides the work with both formal and thematic cohesion and clarifies the relationship of *Christmas Eve* to Schleiermacher's larger corpus. Read through the lens of *Bildung*, *Christmas Eve* illumines Schleiermacher's contribution to nineteenth-century theories of *Bildung* as well as to the literary history of *Bildung* narratives.

In this introductory chapter, I discuss the concept of *Bildung* in the late-eighteenth century, placing the dissertation within scholarship on Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve*, within scholarship on his theory of *Bildung*, and in relation to his definition of "polarity" (a term inherent to his understanding of *Bildung*).

A. What is *Bildung*?: The Concept of *Bildung* in the Late-Eighteenth Century

[1] My translation of Novalis, *Blütenstaub* #32, in *Athenaeum: Eine Zeitschrift 1798-1800*, ed. Curt Grützmacher (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt-Taschenbuch-Verlag, 1969), 57: "Wir sind auf einer Mission: zur Bildung der Erde sind wir berufen."

Histories of *Bildung* in both German and English scholarship trace its roots in the eighteenth century to various sources, the most common of which fall into three categories: those that place it in a philosophical context, those that place it in an aesthetic context, and those that place it in a spiritual or religious context.[2]

The philosophical roots of *Bildung* develop in large part due to Gottfried Leibniz's (1646-1716) *Monadology*, popularized by his disciple Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Wolff was the first philosopher to write in German, and following Leibniz he drew from an Aristotelian notion of formation. The aesthetic roots of the term find a major starting point in German thinkers drawing on translations of Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1771-1713),[3] who was using a Platonic notion of form. Shaftesbury's references to "inward form" and to "forming form" consistently translate as *Bildung*, beginning with the publication of his *Soliloquy: Advice to an Author* in 1738.[4] The religious roots draw largely from the German mystical tradition associated with Meister Eckhart (1260-1328), which addressed the notion of *Bildung* through the ideal of the image of God (*Bild Gottes*) in humans. This partial list of sources suggests

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[2] Angus Nicholls develops this schema in *Goethe's Concept of the Daemonic: After the Ancients* (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2006), 184-185. The best major histories that address the developing conception of *Bildung* in the eighteenth century include, Fritz-Peter Hager, *Wesen, Freiheit und Bildung des Menschen: Philosophie und Erziehung in Antike, Aufklärung und Gegenwart* (Bern: Haupt, 1989), as well as his more focused *Bildung, Pädagogik und Wissenschaft in Aufklärungsphilosophie und Auflklärungzeit* (Bochum: Dr. Dieter Winkler, 1997); Ernst Lichtenstein's, *Zur Entwicklung des Bildungsbegriffs von Meister Eckhart bis Hegel* (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1966) is a standard reference for those piecing together a definition of *Bildung* in this period, and Angus Nicholl's schematization reflects the influence of Lichtenstein's introduction, particularly 12-15; Norbert Ricken provides a Foucauldian genealogy of *Bildung* in his, *Die Ordnung der Bildung: Beiträge zu einer Genealogie der Bildung* (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006); and Hans Weil's classic, *Die Entstehung des deutschen Bildungsprinzips* (Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1930) still rightly receives praise for its historical depth.

[3] For more on this historical line of transmission from Shaftesbury to Hamann and Herder, especially, see chapter two, under the first part.

[4] For an overview of the German transmission of Shaftesbury in the eighteenth century, see Rebekka Horlacher, "*Bildung*—A Construction of a History of Philosophy of Education," in *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 23.5 (2004): 409-426.

the breadth and complexity of the theories of *Bildung* that arose in the eighteenth century. *Bildung* maintained various philosophical, aesthetic, and religious connotations at the end of the century.

Complicating the matter, eighteenth-century theorists struggled with two irreconcilable positions concerning human nature and its *capacity* for formation. Does a process of formation awaken and cultivate innate potential, or does it reform damaged, or destroyed, faculties? If your prelimary assumption is that humans possess innate potential, why bother teaching religious codes, when morality, at its purest, is available to all those who learn to exercise their rational faculty? If your starting point is human fallenness, why focus on developing skills of higher reason, if you have not yet recovered a moral faculty to guide such endeavors?

Such diversity of opinion and range of application continues to make *Bildung* a rich concept: *Bildung* can refer to one's intellectual education. *Bildung* can refer to one's emotional formation. *Bildung* can refer to the cultivation of one's genius. *Bildung* can refer to the moral and spiritual formation of oneself in the image of God. All of these meanings co-existed in the late-eighteenth century. The following sections help to orient readers in the cultural milieu in which Schleiermacher encountered the term.

1. *Bildung* and *Erziehung*

A helpful way to clarify the meaning of *Bildung* is to look at comparisons of the terms *Bildung* and *Erziehung* (education) in the late-eighteenth century. The vocabulary of *Bildung* and *Erziehung* often arises together in eighteenth-century discussions of human formation. *Erziehung* offers a stable counterpoint to *Bildung*, translating more consistently as education. It commonly connotes the type of academic or intellectual

training that one receives in school. One can invoke *Bildung* in a similar manner, but *Bildung* also occurs in broader allusions to the type of formative training one receives as a young child at home (in morals and manners), or through one's experiences in life, more generally.

Schleiermacher, himself, offers an example of the way these terms were used during the era. Schleiermacher's understanding of *Erziehung* follows directly from his understanding of *Bildung*.[5] *Bildung* serves as the more encompassing concept, referring to a process of formation to full humanity. Schleiermacher associates *Erziehung* more narrowly with the process of education that occurs in an academic setting.[6] The two concepts remain related, but are not equated. In this understanding of the two terms, Schleiermacher follows a trend of the latter part of the eighteenth century that intellectual historian John Zammito describes as the separation of *Bildung* from *Schulphilosophie* (scholasticism).[7]

This distinction between *Bildung* and *Erziehung* reflects a broadly shared notion that *Bildung* tends toward formation for life, in general, rather than vocational training, or knowledge acquisition. *Bildung* remains tied to educational theories, but Schleiermacher

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[5] Hartwig Fiege, who publishes the first major study of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher's work, elaborates this point in his dissertation, *Schleiermachers Begriff der Bildung* (Diss., Hamburg: Martin Riegel, 1935), 101. See also Hermann Fischer's section on the relationship of *Erziehung* and *Bildung* in Schleiermacher in his "Schleiermachers Theorie der Bildung," in *Bildung in evangelischer Verantwortung auf dem Hintergrund des Bildungsverständnisses von F.D.E. Schleiermacher*, ed. Joachim Ochel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 145-148.

[6] For example, in his early lectures on ethics at Halle (published posthumously as *Brouillon zur Ethik, 1805/1806*, Schleiermacher defines *Bildung* as the "highest good" and the "perfection of culture," while *Erziehung* refers to the part of *Bildung* that occurs in the academy. See Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Brouillon zur Ethik/Notes on Ethics (1805/1806), Notes on the Theory of Virtue (1804/1805)*, trans. and ed. John Wallhausser and Terrence Tice (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003), 45; *Brouillon zur Ethik (1805/06)*, ed. Otto Braun and Hans-Joachim Birkner (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1981), 16. Hereafter, *NE* and *BE*, respectively.

[7] John Zammito, *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 16.

follows a common trend in pursuing *Bildung* as a process of formation that extends well beyond conventional notions of schooling.

2. Moses Mendelssohn's Definition of *Bildung*: Recognition of Variation

In his 1784 essay, "What is *Aufklärung*?," Moses Mendelssohn explores this expansive conception of *Bildung*, clarifying the cultural milieu in which Schleiermacher's understanding of *Bildung* developed.[8] Mendelssohn's essay arranges and responds to the diverse applications of the term *Bildung* in the late-eighteenth century by defining *Bildung* as a process composed of *Kultur* (culture) and *Aufklärung* (Enlightenment). His contemporaries have made understanding all three terms difficult, he alleges, because they continue to bandy about this constellation of catchwords without providing any precise definitions.[9] To answer the question, "What is Enlightenement?," Mendelssohn insists, he has to sort through this confusion; that is, he has to define *Bildung* and *Kultur* in order to define *Aufklärung*.[10] He offers some guidelines for understanding the distinction between the terms, writing that,

> Education [*Bildung*] is composed of [divides into] culture [*Kultur*] and enlightenment [*Aufklärung*]. Culture appears to be more oriented toward

[8] Mendelssohn was one of the leading *Aufklärer* of his generation, as well as the father of Dorothea Veit, a member of the Jena circle. He penned his essay on enlightenment for the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* as a response to Johann Friedrich Zöllner's plea in an earlier issue for the journal's readers to provide an answer to the question, what is enlightenment? This scenario—writing an essay to define *Aufklärung* (Enlightenment)—sounds familiar to an American audience, because Immanuel Kant took up the same theme, in the same journal, and also in response to Zöllner. Although Kant's essay, "What is Enlightenment?," has gained the greatest renown and maintains a wide European and American readership, Kant was, in fact, neither the only nor the *first* one to write an essay on the topic, as Kant clarifies in the postscript to his own essay.

[9] Moses Mendelssohn, "On the Question: What is Enlightenment?" in *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, trans. and ed. James Schmidt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 53. The essay, "Über die Frage: was heißt aufklären?," appeared in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* 4.3 (Sept., 1784): 193-200 (hereafter, *Aufklärung*). He may have had Herder in mind in this passage, in particular. As Ernst Lichtenstein notes in *Zur Entwicklung des Bildungsbegriffs*, 22, Herder used the three terms synonymously.

[10] Ehrhard Bahr argues that contemporary scholarship misses the importance of Mendelssohn's focus on *Bildung* in this essay, which, at the time, was a catalyst for the development of actual educational programs. See his "Goethe and the Concept of Bildung in Jewish Emancipation" in *Goethe in German-Jewish culture*, ed. Klaus Berghahn and Jost Hermand (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2001), 17 and 22-25.

> practical matters. . . . The more these correspond in a people with the destiny of man, the more culture will be attributed to them. . . . Enlightenment, in contrast, seems to be more related to theoretical matters."[11]

Bildung, then, is the broadest term—even the far-reaching goals of "enlightenment" serve only as a subset of the activity of *Bildung*.

In the passage above, Mendelssohn not only locates *Bildung* in relation to the other two terms, but in setting out this relationship, he provides an assessment of what *Bildung* involves: Through *Kultur*, Mendelssohn sees his contemporaries exploring the "practical" side of *Bildung*, which, he continues, would include formation in "goodness, refinement, and beauty in the arts and . . . inclinations, dispositions, and habits in social mores."[12] That is, *Kultur* has to do with social activity. As he says in a letter on the same subject, "*Kultur* is concerned with morality, sociality, art, with things done and things not done."[13] *Aufklärung* represents the "theoretical" aspect of *Bildung*, which focuses on formation in "rational knowledge . . . and rational reflection about matters of human life,"[14] as well as, he adds in the letter quoted above, "with the elimination of

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[11] Moses Mendelssohn, "Enlightenment," 53-4. "Bildung, Kultur, und Aufklärung sind Modificationen des geselligen Lebens; Wirkungen des Fleißes und der Bemühungen der Menschen ihren geselligen Zustand zu verbessern. . . . Bildung zerfällt in Kultur und Aufklärung. Jene scheint mehr auf das Praktische zu gehen. . . . Je mehr diese bei einem Volke der Bestimmung des Menschen entsprechen, desto mehr Kultur wird demselben beigelegt; . . . Aufklärung hingengen scheinet sich mehr auf das Theoretische zu beziehen" ("Aufklärung," 194).

[12] Ibid., "Enlightenment," 53-54. "Jene [Kultur] scheint mehr, auf das Praktische zu gehen: auf Güte, Feinheit, und Schönheit in Handwerken Künsten und . . . Neigungen, Triebe und Gewohnheit in diesen [Geselligkeitssitten]" ("Aufklärung," 194).

[13] Translated by Schmidt in the notes for "Enlightenment," 57.

[14] Moses Mendelssohn, "Enlightenment," 54. "Aufklärung hingegen scheinet sich mehr auf das Theoretische zu beziehen. Auf vernünftige Erkenntniß . . . und . . . zum vernünftigen Nachdenken, über Dinge des menschlichen Lebens" ("Aufklärung," 194).

prejudices."[15] In a more succinct comparison, he states, "Enlightenment is related to culture as theory to practice, as knowledge to ethics, as criticism to virtuosity."[16]

Bildung encompasses and connects all of these pursuits. Thus, Mendelssohn argues for a reciprocal relationship between the practical and theoretical arms of *Bildung* in its advancement of its goals, noting that "objectively," the two "stand in the closest connection, although subjectively they very often are separated."[17] In this way, Mendelssohn understands *Bildung* to refer to the process by which humans should cultivate their rational faculties, and he also recognizes that *Bildung* refers to the formation of a nation and that it can include a wide array of activities that may occur individually or socially. Precisely because the parameters of *Bildung* were *so* broad, the term, as Mendelssohn defines it, refers to almost all aspects of human development that concerned eighteenth-century thinkers. Mendelssohn's essay illustrates how *Bildung* could embrace topics ranging from childhood development to nation-building; from literary theory to etiquette lessons.[18]

The profuse intellectual activity after Mendelssohn published his 1784 essay only increased the complex connotations of *Bildung*. When Schleiermacher first addresses *Bildung* in the Schlegel brothers' journal, the *Athenaeum* (1798-1800), and in his

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[15] Translated by Schmidt, "Enlightenment," 57.
[16] Moses Mendelssohn, "Enlightenment," 54. "Aufklärung verhält sich zur Kultur, wie überhaupt Theorie zur Praxis; wie Erkenntniß zur Sittlichkeit; wie Kritik zur Virtuosität" ("Aufklärung," 195).
[17] Ibid. "(objective) stehen sie in dem genauesten Zusammenhange; ob sie gleich subjective sehr oft getrennt sein können" ("Aufklärung," 195).
[18] The two examples of treatises with which I began the chapter—Niemeyer's *Über den Geist des Zeitalters in pädagogischer Rücksicht* (1787) and Wilhelm von Humboldt's *Theorie der Bildung des Menschen* (1793) address, respectively, childhood development and nation-building in their interpretations of *Bildung*. Friedrich Schiller propounded one of the aesthetic theories of *Bildung*; see note above. All of these thinkers wished to present their theories as superior to French and English theories of cultivation, which German thinkers often characterized as focusing on external manners (etiquette) to the unfortunate exclusion of the cultivation of internal moral and rational faculties. See Norbert Elias' observations on the development of national sentiment in the antithesis between German *Kultur* (*Bildung*) and French and English *Zivilisation* in *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners and State Formation and Civilization*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 24-28.

Speeches (1799), he does so in the wake of publications that added to thinking on *Bildung*, including Immanuel Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (1790), Johann Gottlieb Fichte's *Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre* (1794/1795), and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's novel, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* (1795/1796). As the members of the Jena circle[19] devote themselves to the cause of *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum*, the diverse mix of these new theories lies at their disposal.[20]

Not surprisingly, no *one* definition of *Bildung* emerges in the *Athenaeum*: The Jena circle's understandings of the faculties and activities involved in *Bildung*, as well as the relationship of *Bildung* to society, vary over time and across members. In the following chapters I explore how Schleiermacher develops his own approach to *Bildung* from within this milieu. After leaving Berlin in 1802, Schleiermacher's extends his theory on *Bildung* in his lectures on ethics (*Brouillon zur Ethik*, 1805/1806), which he

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[19] Jena Romanticism, or Early German Romanticism, arose in Berlin and Jena in the 1790's. The Jena circle included Friedrich Schlegel and his brother August Wilhelm, Dorothea Mendelssohn Veit, Novalis, Ludwig Tieck, Wilhelm Heinrich Wackenroder, Henrietta Herz, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Caroline Schlegel Schelling, and Friedrich Schleiermacher. The group reached the highpoint of their collective thinking between 1798 and 1801. The deaths of Wackenroder (1798) and Novalis (1801) as well as the waning of the friendship between F. Schlegel and Schleiermacher contributed to the demise of the group.

[20] August Wilhelm and his brother Friedrich Schlegel, in the foreword to their journal the *Athenaeum* (1798-1800), state that *Bildung* is the universal aim around which the pieces in the journal cohere. And, as Frederick Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 212, describes, the contributors to the journal followed the oath laid out in Friedrich Schlegel's poem "Das Athenaeum," which proscribes a devotion to *Bildung*: "We strive steadfast in free association,/ To grasp the rays of *Bildung* all in one,/ And separate the weak parts from the strong." My translation from the German in *Kritische Friedrich-Schlegel-Ausgabe*, ed. Ernst Behler and Hans Eichner (München: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1962), I.5, 317 (hereafter, *KFSA*): "Der Bildung Strahlen all' in eins zu fassen/ Vom Kranken ganz zu scheiden das Gesunde/ Bestrebten wir uns treu im freien Bunde." The sonnet continues, 317-318: "Und wollten uns auf uns allein verlassen:// Nach alter Weise konnt' ich nie es lassen,/ So sicher ich auch war der rechten Kunde,/ Mir neu zu reizen stets des Zweifels Wunde,/ Und was an mir beshcränkt mir schien, zu hassen.// Nun schreit und schreibt in Ohnmacht sehr geschäftig,/ Als wär's im tiefsten Herzen tief beleidigt,/ Der Platten Volk von Hamburg bis nach Schwaben.// Ob unsern guten Zweck erreicht wir haben,/ Zweifl' ich nicht mehr; es hat's die That beeidigt,/ Daß unsre Ansicht allgemein und kräftig." In a letter to A.W. Schlegel, *SKGA*, V.4, 115, Schleiermacher writes in praise of Schlegel's sonnet, declaring that after reading it, "the whole world" ("die ganze Welt") will respond to its message (and, more broadly, that of the *Athenaeum*).

gives as a professor at Halle, and, I argue in this study, in his concurrent work on *Christmas Eve*.

B. Placing the Study: Scholarship on Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve* and His Understanding of *Bildung* and Polarity

In this study I engage three sectors of Schleiermacher scholarship: that which addresses *Christmas Eve*, that which explores Schleiermacher's conception of *Bildung*, and that which focuses on the incorporation of "polarity" (*Polarität*) in his thinking. Studies of *Christmas Eve* and of Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung* have existed, until now, as non-intersecting areas of research. I bring together these arms of research in order to organize *Christmas Eve*, both structurally and thematically, using the underlying polar methodology that remains consistent throughout Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*. This approach not only clarifies the internal coherence of the work, but also places *Christmas Eve* in conversation with nineteenth-century theories of *Bildung*.

1. Scholarly Reception of *Christmas Eve*

Critical and analytical responses to *Christmas Eve* began soon after its publication, with the first appearing in 1806 in the journal *Neue Theologische Annalen*, indicating its initial reception among theological circles.[21] Anonymous reviews from both an orthodox and a rationalist perspective panned the work for, respectively, tending towards impiety and not constructing a cohesive argument.[22] Friedrich von Schelling

[21] For a detailed and exhaustive history of the scholarly reception of *Christmas Eve*, extending from 1806-1984, see Ruth Richardson's dissertation, *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry": the Impact of Friedrich Schlegel on the Intellectual Development of the Young Schleiermacher* (Diss., Drew University, 1985), 240-478.

[22] Both reviews appeared in the first volume of *Neue Theologische Annalen* (1806), on p. 604, and then on pp. 693-698, respectively.

(1775-1854) provided a third anonymous review in *Jenaischen Allgemeinen Literaturzeitung* in 1807.

This third review is of note, because Schelling was a contributor to the work of the Jena circle in the *Athenaeum* and because Schleiermacher's comments on the review survive. Schelling had already penned a caustic critique (in verse) of Schleiermacher's *Speeches*, and the two shared little personal affection.[23] Not surprisingly, then, Schelling's review presents a negative assessment of the piece as concerns its content: the bulk of the review argues against the different positions taken by the male characters in their speeches and concludes that the collection of speeches never accomplishes a sustainable theological argument on the meaning of Christmas. Even when Schelling addresses it in a broader scholarly context, he reads the work mainly for its *theological* import rather than its *literary* import. All three early reviews reflect how, from its publication, *Christmas Eve* was discussed in terms of its theological significance.

Based on the synopsis of Schelling's review, one would expect Schleiermacher to have found little to enjoy when he read it. On the contrary, he writes to a friend in 1808 that he is almost certain the author of the review is Schelling and that he could not have hoped for a better review.[24] What Schelling *did* say in praise of *Christmas Eve*, though he paused considerably less over it, concerned its form. He wrote that the piece was a "tender work of art [*Kunstwerk*]" whose uniqueness as regards form was "to be

[23] Schelling wanted the poem published in the *Athenaeum*, but August Wilhelm Schlegel refused. Schleiermacher, however, did see a copy of the poem.

[24] Schleiermacher writes in a letter, *Aus Schleiermachers Leben: In Briefen*, ed. Wilhelm Dilthey (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1863), IV, 151 (hereafter, *Briefe*), that the review is "beautifully written," and he is certain that a conversation between himself and Schelling would immediately yield complete agreement between the two.

admired."[25] Schleiermacher's pleasure in the review would appear to arise from this appraisal of its artistic form rather than its theological content.[26] Multiple letters survive in which Schleiermacher clearly indicates to his friends that he desires their comments, in particular, on the form of the piece.[27] In these letters, Schleiermacher provides no hint concerning the genre, saying only that *Christmas Eve* is the "first of its kind" that he has written,[28] that it is "really something like a work of art [*Kunstwerk*]."[29] In commentary after his friends have read the piece and responded, he asserts that *Christmas Eve* presents the way he wants to go on to write novellas (particularly the section on the women's narratives), and that it was not, as Johannes Müller had suggested in his critique, a Platonic dialogue.[30] Thus, Schleiermacher's letters consistently suggest that he was more interested in responses to the work's literary form than its theological content.

The major nineteenth-century commentaries on *Christmas Eve* as well as some twentieth-century studies, however, continued the trend of earlier responses, emphasizing theological content and viewing the literary form as a vehicle for it.[31] For example, in 1839, David Friedrich Strauss wrote that he found the form wanting, and focused his

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[25] Friedrich von Schelling, "Über Schleiermachers Weihnachtsfeier," in *Schellings Werke*, ed. Manfred Schröder (Munich: C.H. Beck & Oldenbourg, 1959), III, 445.

[26] Ruth Richardson, *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry,"* 259-260, argues that Schleiermacher must have appreciated the review because Schelling accepts Schleiermacher's position from the *Speeches* that he formerly had rejected and now treats Schleiermacher as a serious thinker. Considering that Schleiermacher sent *Christmas Eve* to the Schlegels and others asking for them to focus on the form of the piece (see below), I think it just as likely that Schelling's positive comments on form gave Schleiermacher the impression that Schelling understood, as others (including his friends in the Jena circle) had not, what Schleiermacher was attempting to accomplish in *Christmas Eve*.

[27] See respectively his letter to J.C. Gass, *Briefe*, II, 54; his letter to Georg Riemer, *Briefe* IV, 122; and Friedrich Schlegel's letters to him concerning both his and his brother's responses, *Briefe* III, 408 and 414.

[28] *Briefe*, II, 54.

[29] *Briefe*, IV, 122.

[30] *Briefe* II, 58.

[31] The most important exception to this statement is Wilhelm Dilthey's "*Die Weihnachtsfeier*" (1879), found in his *Leben Schleiermachers*, in *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Martin Redeker (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), XIV, 146-174. Dilthey spends considerable time with the importance of the form, but he reads the overall form of *Christmas Eve* as a Platonic dialogue—a form that Schleiermacher himself only saw at work in parts of the piece (see above).

comments on the men's speeches, each of which, he argued, offered a perspective that contributed to Schleiermacher's overall theological thinking.[32] Following this trend of focusing on the men's speeches, though with disagreement over the extent to which they reflected Schleiermacher's theological views, were David Schenkel,[33] Carl Schwartz,[34] Emanuel Hirsch,[35] and Wilhelm Dilthey.[36] Beginning with Hermann Bleek[37] at the end of the nineteenth and moving into the 20th century, a second line of scholarship began to incorporate more discussion of the women's narratives. This included Karl Barth,[38] E.H.U. Quapp,[39] Terrence Tice,[40] B.A. Gerrish,[41] Ruth Richardson,[42] and Dawn De Vries.[43] These interpreters argue that the inclusion of both the women's narratives and the men's speeches (as well as the introductory gift-giving) enhances theological

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[32] David Friedrich Strauss, *Characteristiken und Kritiken: Eine Sammlungzersträuter Aufsätze aus den Gebieten der Theologie, Anthropologie und Aesthetik* (Leipzig: O. Wigand, 1844), 39-43.
[33] David Schenkel, *Friedrich Schleiermacher: Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild* (Eberfeld: Friedrichs, 1868), 264-280. David Schenkel's work, though it asserts that the women are superfluous, presages my own in one way: he suggests that the work is "therapeutic" for Schleiermacher. The act of writing *Christmas Eve* was formative for Schleiermacher as he moved from one stage of his life to the next.
[34] Carl Schwartz, "Schleiermacher's *Monologen*, *Weihnachtsfeier*," in *Bibliothek der deutschen Nationalliteratur des achtzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhunderts*, ed. Carl Schwartz (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1869), i-xxiii.
[35] Emanuel Hirsch, "Schleiermacher's *Weihnachtsfeier*," in *Schleiermachers Christusglaube: Drei Studien* (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1968), 7-52.
[36] Wilhelm Dilthey, *Leben Schleiermachers*, XIV, 162. This is the only page he spends on the women, whose narratives he views as an introduction to the speeches of the men—the meat of the argument.
[37] Hermann Bleek, *Die Grundlagen der Christologie Schleiermachers*, (Freiburg: J.C.B. Mohr, 1898), 187. The problematic way in which Bleek then views the women as a means of understanding men's redemption obviates his initial suggestion that he is going to remedy past neglect of the women's narratives. See Ruth Richardson's comments in *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry,"* 317.
[38] Karl Barth, "Schleiermacher's Celebration of Christmas (1924)," trans. Louise Pettibone Smith in *Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 1920-1928* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 136-158.
[39] E.H.U. Quapp, *Barth contra Schleiermacher? 'Die Weihnachtsfeier' als Nagelprobe* (Marburg: Karl Wenzel, 1978).
[40] Terrence Tice, *Christmas Eve: Dialogue on the Incarnation* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1990), 7-22, and his earlier "*Christmas Eve*, *The Christian Faith*, and the Christmas Sermons," in *Journal of Religion* 47.2 (1967): 100-126.
[41] Brian Gerrish, *A Prince of the Church: Schleiermacher and the Beginnings of Modern Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 27-31; 46-47.
[42] In addition to her dissertation, see *The Role of Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher (1768-1806)* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1990), 133-164.
[43] Dawn De Vries, "Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve Dialogue*: Bourgeois Ideology or Feminist Theology?" in *Journal of Religion* 69.2 (1989): 169-183.

understandings of *Christmas Eve*. In this way, recent studies of *Christmas Eve* have taken a more holistic approach to the text, bringing all three parts of *Christmas Eve* (the gift-giving, the women's narratives, and the men's speeches) into discussions of both form and content.

Most contemporary scholarly differences arising within the holistic approach originate, in some way, in interpretations of the relationship between *Christmas Eve* and its historical context. The issues move beyond, simply, how one reads *Christmas Eve* in relation to the rest of Schleiermacher's theological thinking—whether it belongs more to the writing he did as part of the Jena-Romantic circle (though he had moved from Jena and had little contact with the Schlegels by 1805), or whether it belongs more to Schleiermacher's later theological writings (despite its unorthodox form).[44] Interpretations of the piece shift as scholars emphasize, for instance, Schleiermacher's concurrent translation of Plato's *Dialogues*,[45] the end of his relationship with Eleanor

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[44] These differences, for the most part, amount to whether one sees the work as more akin to his earlier thinking or his more mature and systematic thought. Horst Stephan, in his "Schleiermachers Weihnachtsfeier 1805," in *Die Christliche Welt* 51 (1901): 1214-1217 and 52 (1901): 1243-1246, reads *Christmas Eve* in terms of its connection to Schleiermacher's later theology, thereby marking a definitive break from his early Romanticism. Richard Niebuhr, in his *Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), also reads the content of the piece in terms of Schleiermacher's later theological thinking in the *Glaubenslehre*. In the other historical direction, Carl Schwarz (v; xvii-xxiii) suggests that Schleiermacher's *Speeches, Soliloquies,* and *Christmas Eve* should be read together as Schleiermacher's early corpus, reflecting his participation in the Jena-Romantic circle and his lingering attachment to Moravian piety, although their core themes point towards Schleiermacher's later work. Terrence Tice, in the introduction to his translation, *Christmas Eve: Dialogue on the Incarnation* (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1990), 16-17, reads the central themes of *Christmas Eve* in light of Schleiermacher's 1799 *Vertraute Briefe über Friedrich Schlegels Lucinde*, placing it in his earlier work done as part of the Jena-Romantic circle.

[45] Hermann Mulert views the piece as a Platonic dialogue, but also a novella in his introduction to a critical edition of the work: *Weihnachtsfeier* (Leipzig: Dürrschen Buchhandlung, 1908), VIII, v-xxxiv. The tradition of reading *Christmas Eve* as a Platonic dialogue continued throughout the twentieth century, with both Karl Barth and Richard Niebuhr weighing in with affirmations of its dialogic form. In Karl Barth's Göttingen lectures, ed. Dietrich Ritschl and trans. G. Bromiley in *The Theology of Schleiermacher: Lectures at Göttingen, Winter Semester 1923/24*, ed. Dietrich Ritschl (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1982), 49-71, from which he drew to write his article "Schleiermacher's Celebration of Christmas (1924)," Barth argues that in form the work is a dialogue (*Lectures*, 57) and in content it is a theological exploration of the importance of music and the religiosity of women.

Grunow,[46] the influence of Novalis' writing on his thinking,[47] or his friendship with Friedrich Schlegel.[48] These all develop plausible perspectives that yield helpful observations on the key themes of *Christmas Eve*, none of which completely negates the others, if one acknowledges that multiple motivations shape authorial endeavors.

Despite the recent advances beyond formal dissections of *Christmas Eve*, current holistic approaches to form have not yielded a comprehensive interpretation of content. Terrence Tice's introduction to *Christmas Eve* represents a common approach used to interpret the piece: he lists a variety of "themes" (*CE*, 15), "motifs" (*CE*, 16) and "noteworthy factors" (*CE*, 18) that the reader should "look out for" (*CE*, 15). He reads love and joy as the overarching themes of the work, though many of the 'noteworthy factors' he mentions do not connect back to these central themes.[49] His commentary on the various themes illumines Schleiermacher's concerns as a theologian, his social views, and the relationship of the piece to his personal history. But, love and joy cannot function to pull all of the elements of the piece into a coherent whole.

In fairness to Tice, his intention is to introduce readers to the text, and not to prove its cohesion. Tice's commentary does, however, reflect the prevailing situation in scholarship on *Christmas Eve*. The state of *Christmas Eve* scholarship has developed

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[46] In addition to David Schenkel, *Friedrich Schleiermacher: Ein Lebens- und Charakterbild*, 264-280, see Georg Wehrung's 1953 editorial introduction to *Die Weihnachtsfeier: Ein Gespräch* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), and Richardson, *The Role of Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher (1768-1806)*, 133-142.

[47] Marilyn Chapin Massey, *Feminine Soul: The Fate of an Ideal* (Boston: Beacon, 1985), 135-146, argues that *Christmas Eve* is an intentional reversal of the powerful connection between women and the divine present in Novalis' *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*.

[48] Terrence Tice, in his introduction to *Christmas Eve: Dialogue on the Incarnation*, 16-17, reads *Christmas Eve* in relation to Schleiermacher's response of Schlegel's novel, *Lucinde*. Richarson's dissertation interprets *Christmas Eve* in terms of Schleiermacher's association with the Jena Romantics and, in particular, the idea of "symphilosophy" (co-philosophizing) practiced by Schleiermacher and Friedrich Schlegel.

[49] For example, Tice inserts in a manner unconnected to any surrounding themes the "small grace note of politics" (*CE*, 18) added through Leonhardt's reference to invading Napoleonic forces.

from the work, itself: *Christmas Eve* offers a hodge-podge of thematic elements that reflects, on one hand, Schleiermacher's hasty construction of the piece, and on the other hand, what Richard Niebuhr has described as Schleiermacher's interest in "the multiform flowering of life in unrepeatable personalities."[50]

Add to these factors the 'poetic' nature of the work, in the Jena-Romantic sense of the term, which urges a universality of form that makes use of a multitude of artistic elements, and one arrives at a view of *Christmas Eve* that has forced interpretation into two categories: Interpreters have discussed various themes in a loosely connected manner. Representatives would include Tice, Niebuhr, and Dilthey. Other interpreters choose to narrow their focus to one theme and argue for its predominance. All of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century studies that focused upon the speeches of the men, to the exclusion or rigid subordination of the remaining two-thirds of the work, reflect this approach, as well as studies like Emanuel Hirsch's, which reads *Christmas Eve* rather narrowly as a response to Novalis' *Hymns to the Night*.

Ruth Richardson's dissertation offers the most comprehensive study of *Christmas Eve* to date. She uses both historical evidence focused on Schleiermacher's participation in the Jena circle and then the text itself to argue that the piece should be read as *Universalpoesie*—the highest form of Romantic literature, as defined by Jena-circle theorist, Friedrich Schlegel. As "universal poetry" [*Universalpoesie*], *Christmas Eve* participates in and responds to the literary endeavors of the Jena Romantics. Because she reads the piece as universal poesy, she pinpoints the fundamental role of polarity within *Christmas Eve*, and this focus shows the connection between key themes and embraces all three sections of the work.

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[50] Niebuhr, *On Christ and Religion*, 26.

But, Richardson reads *Christmas Eve* through only *one* polarity—poesy and philosophy (which she interprets in terms of dyadic gender relations). [51] This limited application of polarity leaves other themes loosely connected through their participation in what Richardson explains as the encompassing nature of universal poesy: universal poesy is supposed to present an "ordered confusion."[52] Richardson devotes hundreds of pages (her fourth and fifth chapters) to finding a place for all of the themes within the 'organized chaos' of poesy as defined by Friedrich Schlegel in his fragments that appear in the *Athenaeum* journal. Richardson's work is painstakingly accurate, but it misses the larger framework of *Bildung*, which would streamline and connect her observations.[53] Contra Richardson, I interpret *Christmas Eve* through the wider lens of *Bildung*, which is essential for a comprehensive understanding of the work.

My approach to *Christmas Eve* uses *Bildung* not only to bring internal coherence to the work, but also to bring into conversation various scholarly responses to the work that otherwise appear disconnected from one another. For example, Terrence Tice's arrangement of his commentary through the themes of love and joy and Ruth Richardson's arrangement of her reading through the relation of poesy and philosophy appear to engage *Christmas Eve* from divergent directions, although both Tice and Richardson respect one another's work and have consistently tried to establish lines of

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[51] Ruth Richardson, *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry,"* 842-843. She concludes that each of the women's narratives presents an example of poesy that pairs with an example of philosophy explored in the men's speeches. The pairings reflect the religious activity of "symtheology"—an outgrowth of the "symphilosophy" (co-philosophizing) theorized and practiced by Friedrich Schlegel with his friend Schleiermacher during their time together in Jena. Symtheology develops as a reciprocal activity between female passivity (poesy; realism) and male activity (philosophy; idealism) (Ibid., 833-834). In this way, Richardson reads the dyadic relation of male and female as the focus of the piece, occasioned by Schleiermacher's break with Eleanor Grunow and his need to think through his "relation to women and marriage" (Ibid., 732).

[52] Ibid., 605.

[53] As I will show in chapter two, the fragment in the *Athenaeum* that defines "universal poesy" itself suggests a connection to *Bildung*.

connection between their approaches.[54] Reading *Christmas Eve* through the lens of *Bildung* reveals the overlap between the two perspectives: Richardson's emphasis on poesy and philosophy explores one manifestation of the feeling/reason polarity within the piece, and Tice's emphasis on love and joy adds further insight to the pole of feeling.

The framework of *Bildung* also adds structure to some past commentary. A good example of this application of the study places it in relation to Richard Niebuhr's analysis of *Christmas Eve*. In his *Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion*, Niebuhr uses *Christmas Eve* as a foundation from which to build a reading of Schleiermacher's later theological thinking. The multiplicity of themes in *Christmas Eve* offers Niebuhr a wide palette from which to draw the foci for his study. In his analysis of the text, he repeatedly refers to polarity at work in *Christmas Eve*, which "imparts movement to the whole dialogue."[55] But these comments occur among many equally perceptive assertions that never find a common grounding. Reading *Christmas Eve* as a polar approach to *Bildung* brings the observations on polarity to the fore in Niebuhr's assessment, helping to organize his claims within an overarching framework.

In addition, Niebuhr's reads *Christmas Eve* as a dialogue in the Platonic tradition. This adds a false observation on Schleiermacher's use of polarity, as Schleiermacher clearly rejected that notion when responding to an early review of the piece (see above). However, introducing the dyadic activity of *Bildung* at the heart of the work amends and

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[54] In a bibliographic note on previous scholarly work on *Christmas Eve*, Tice follows a description of his own work with a description of Richardson's, suggesting that her contribution "offers important background," clarifies Schleiermacher's views on women, and adds comparisons to texts and analysis of scholarship not treated in his own interpretation (*CE*, 89). In her dissertation, Richardson writes that she is "in more agreement with his approach than with any other commentator," but wishes he had spent more time drawing out the connections he notes between all three sections of the work, moving beyond the connective theme "joy and love" to include more discussion of the overall role of the women (*Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry,"* 406-407).

[55] Richard Niebuhr, *On Christ and Religion*, 67. For further references to polarity, see 40 and 52.

at the same time preserves Niebuhr's observation concerning the fundamental dialogic nature of *Christmas Eve*. Using Niebuhr as a prominent example, I suggest that, rather than overturning previous scholarship, this study provides a guiding principle for better assessing the claims made in studies of *Christmas Eve*.

2. Literature on Schleiermacher and *Bildung*

Discussions of Schleiermacher's conception of *Bildung* divide into three categories: 1) studies on his early theory of *Bildung* during his tenure among the Jena Romantics (1798-1802); 2) studies focused on his later pedagogical thinking, which began in earnest as he participated in the formation of the new University of Berlin (1808); and 3) studies that trace Schleiermacher's notion of *Bildung* from his early education among the Moravians to his later pedagogical and ethical thinking. The categories suggest chronological divisions, but they also reflect two distinct areas of research: Schleiermacher receives attention, independently, as an educational theorist (category two) and as a theologian (categories one and three).

Those addressing Schleiermacher's early (pre-1808) work on *Bildung* focus mainly on his *Speeches* and his *Soliloquies*—his largest publications during his tenure with the Jena Romantics.[56] Scholarly interest revolves around Schleiermacher's

[56] Schleiermacher's *Speeches* has received the most scholarly attention. Two full-length studies focus exclusively on the *Speeches*: Terry Foreman's dissertation, *Religion as the Heart of Humanistic Culture: Schleiermacher as exponent of Bildung in the* Speeches on Religion *of 1799* (Diss., Yale University, 1975) and Hans Ulrich Wintsch, *Religiosität und Bildung: Der anthropologische und bildungsphilosophische Ansatz in Schleiermachers* Reden über die Religion (Zürich: Juris Druck, 1967). Kurt Nowak, *Schleiermacher und die Frühromantik: Eine literaturgeschichtliche Studie zum romantischen Religionsverständnis und Menschenbild* (Göttingen : Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), focuses mostly on the *Speeches*, but he also analyzes the role of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher's work for the *Athenaeum*, his essay "Versuch einer Theorie des geselligen Betragens," and, briefly, his *Soliloquies*. Ursula Frost emphasizes Schleiermacher's work for the *Athenaeum*, his *Speeches*, and *Soliloquies* in her "Das Bildungsverständnis Schleiermachers und Humboldts im Kontext der Frühromantik" in *200 Jahre 'Reden über die Religion': Akten des 1. Internaionalen Kongresses der Schleiermacher-Gesellschaft Halle, 14. – 17. März 1999*, ed. Ulrich Barth and Claus-Dieter Osthövener (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 859-877. Christiane Ehrhardt, *Religion, Bildung, und Erziehung bei Schleiermacher: Eine Analyse der Beziehungen*

participation in the Jena-Romantic conception of *Bildung*, both as a literary theme and a social goal. These studies solidify Schleiermacher's focus on the connection between religion and *Bildung* as well as art and *Bildung*, arguing that Schleiermacher shapes the Jena-Romantic incorporation of religion into the process of *Bildung*.[57] None of these early studies connect Schleiermacher's literary interest in *Bildung* with his publication of *Christmas Eve*, a gap in the assessment of Schleiermacher's early thinking on *Bildung* that the current study will address.

A less-prevalent line of scholarship also connects Schleiermacher's early conception of *Bildung* to his ethical thought. Brent Sockness argues that *Bildung* was a key, if evolving, concept in Schleiermacher's pre-systematic ethical thinking, from 1793 through his *Soliloquies* (1800).[58] Schleiermacher's connection of *Bildung* and ethics expands during his time at Halle as he begins to systematize his ethical thinking. John Wallhausser's work on this topic shows ways in which Schleiermacher's developing theory of ethics at Halle carried his notion of *Bildung* beyond his thinking during the period of the *Athenaeum*.[59]

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und des Widerstreits zwischen den 'Reden über die Religion' und den 'Monologen' (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Unipress, 2005), provides a comparison of the *Speeches* and *Soliloquies* in the first two-thirds of her book, giving equal time to each. One study focuses solely on the *Soliloquies*: W.H. Bruford, *The German Tradition of Self-Cultivation: 'Bildung' from Humboldt to Thomas Mann* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 58-87.

[57] Both W.H. Bruford and Terry Foreman focus their arguments on Schleiermacher's religious perspective as the driving force of his uniqueness as a thinker on *Bildung*. For example, although W.H. Bruford emphasizes Schleiermacher's developing conception of individuality, he maintains the connection of this idea to religion in *Bildung*, stating: "The idea of individual development put forward by Schleiermacher with religious fervor as a kind of mystical ideal was immediately taken up by Friedrich Schlegel and the *Athenäum* group" (Bruford, 75).

[58] Brent Sockness, "Was Schleiermacher a Virtue Ethicist? *Tugend* and *Bildung* in the Early Ethical Writings," in *Zeitschrift für neuere Theologiegeschichte* 8.1 (2001): 30-31.

[59] John Wallhausser considers the relationship between Schleiermacher's early work on ethics and his notion of *Bildung* both in his introduction to his translation of the *Brouillon*, in *Brouillon zur Ethik/Notes on Ethics (1805/1806), Notes on the Theory of Virtue (1804/1805)*, trans. and ed. John Wallhausser and Terrence Tice (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003) and also in his earlier article, "Love and Dialectic in Schleiermacher's Ethics" in *Understanding Schleiermacher: A Festschrift in Honor of Terrence Nelson*

In this study, I will elaborate the link between *Christmas Eve* and Schleiermacher's early articulation of *Bildung* among the Jena circle as well as connecting it to the system of ethics in the *Brouillon* that Schleiermacher would continue to elaborate in later lectures at the University of Berlin.

The second focus of scholarship connecting Schleiermacher and *Bildung* occurs in German pedagogical circles, and therefore requires more explanation for an English-speaking audience. Schleiermacher's pedagogics (the *Bildung* of the individual through *Erziehung*) developed as he participated in the formation of the University of Berlin, beginning in 1808.[60] During his years at the university, Schleiermacher gave a number of lectures on pedagogy, which have earned him a prominent place in German educational theory. Schleiermacher appears frequently in German histories of education, like the massive *Handbuch der Deutschen Bildungsgeschichte*, in whose third volume references to Schleiermacher exceed even those to the famed educational theorist, Pestalozzi.[61] Though his primary task was framing a theory of higher education for the new university, he also presented a wider pedagogical vision that addressed educational

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Tice, ed. Ruth Richardson and Edwina Lawler (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), especially 260-262. More detailed discussion of Wallhausser's work appears in chapter three.

[60] His earliest reflections on pedagogy occurred during his work as a tutor for the Dohna family in 1793, but most assessments on Schleiermacher's pedagogy focus on his scholarship after 1808. For assessments of Schleiermacher's pedagogical interests from the period of the founding of the University of Berlin, see Friedhelm Brüggen, *Schleiermachers Pädagogik* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2001); Friebel Horst, *Die Bedeutung des Bösen für die Entwicklung der Pädagogik Schleiermachers* (Ratingen: A. Henn, 1961), 25; Georg Jäger and Heinz-Elmar Tenorth, "Pädagogisches Denken," in *Handbuch der deutschen Bildungsgeschichte*, *Band III, 1800-1870*, eds. Karl-Ernst Jeismann and Peter Lundgreen (München: C.H. Beck, 1987), 71-103; Franz Kade, *Schleiermachers Anteil an der Entwicklung des preussischen Bildungswesens von 1808-1818*, (Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1925); and Gunter Schmidt, "Friedrich Schleiermacher, a Classical Thinker on Education," in *Educational Theory* 22 (1972): 450-459.

[61] *Handbuch der Deutschen Bildungsgeschichte*, *Band III: 1800-1870*, ed. Karl-Ernst Jeismann and Peter Lundgreen (München: C.H. Beck, 1987). Of course, Schleiermacher also figures prominently in histories of religious education. For example, Schleiermacher receives extensive discussion in *Religionspädagogik: Texte zur evangelischen Erziehungs- und Bildungsverantwortung seit der Reformation*: *Band 1: Von Luther bis Schleiermacher*, ed. Karl Nipkow and Friedrich Schweitzer (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1991).

approaches at all levels as well as reflections upon the social mechanisms for education.[62]

Outside of German circles, Schleiermacher has remained all-but-unknown as an educational theorist. The primary reason for this situation is that he offers no easily transmissible educational method, as did thinkers like Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827) and Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841).[63] In summarizing Schleiermacher's approach to pedagogics for an English-speaking audience, Günter Schmidt describes his focus on "views for differentiation," by which Schmidt means that Schleiermacher emphasizes the inability of any one pedagogical method to suffice for all situations.[64]

Schleiermacher's pedagogical thought addresses this "differentiation" methodology particularly in the education of children. However, his rejection of prescriptive approaches to pedagogy, combined with his primary concern with the function of universities (through his participation in the founding of the University of Berlin), result in *Christmas Eve*'s providing the most concrete articulation of Schleiermacher's understanding of early childhood education.[65]

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[62] On the former, see for instance Ehrhardt, *Religion, Bildung, und Erziehung bei Schleiermacher*, 256-294; on the latter, see Birgitta Fuchs's "Das Verhältnis von Staat und Erziehung nach Schleiermacher" in *Christentum—Staat—Kultur: Akten des Kongresses der Internationalen Schleiermacher-Gesellschaft in Berlin, März 2006*, ed. Andreas Arndt, Ulrich Barth, and Wilhelm Gräb (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), 475-494.

[63] As a result, his pedagogical lectures remain untranslated. Recent work, as yet unpublished, by Columbia University educational theorist Robbie McClintock, does much to promote Schleiermacher's usefulness for contemporary American education. In a decision that would have appealed to Schleiermacher, McClintock has posted his work online, with the idea of having other scholars collaborate with him in the creation of the book. His work-in-progress can be found at http://www.studyplace.org/wiki/Defining_education. The book is slated for publication with Edwin Mellen Press.

[64] Gunter Schmidt, "Friedrich Schleiermacher, a Classical Thinker on Education," in *Educational Theory* 22 (1972): 453. Schmidt, 450, suggests that this fundamental starting point of Schleiermacher's educational theory has limited his popularity among American and English theorists who find the step-by-step methods of Pestalozzi and Herbart more easily applicable.

[65] Hermann Fischer, "Schleiermachers Theorie der Bildung," 129-132, provides a representative example of the scholarly omission of *Christmas Eve* from discussions of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher's pedagogy. Fischer's review of the literature on Schleiermacher and *Bildung* narrates existing studies according to the chronology of Schleiermacher's writing on *Bildung*. Fischer, 130, asserts that Schleiermacher expressed an interest in pedagogy early in his career, in conjunction with both his work as a tutor after he left Halle as a student (1790-1793) and his work as a preacher in the ensuing years. After covering the relationship of his

The narrative reflects the main points that Schleiermacher would incorporate into his 1820/1821 lectures. The majority of these pedagogical observations occur in the first section of *Christmas Eve*, when, questioned by Leonhardt concerning Sofie's religiosity, Eduard and Ernestine describe how they guide their daughter, Sofie's, *Bildung*. In regard to the formation of her piety (one of the aspects of her *Bildung*), they allow Sofie to act on her own predilections, never forcing her to submit to any particular regimen of religious practice at home. In effect, Eduard and Ernestine describe Schleiermacher's position in his later lectures on pedagogy. In these lectures, Schleiermacher recommends that the teacher should allow innate strengths to arise through the course of instruction, with no attempt to elicit any particular facility in the student.[66] That is, the teacher should not set predetermined goals. When a particular strength arises, it should then receive support, but not to the exclusion of other areas of study. The teacher presents material, remaining open (indifferent) to the pupil's self-differentiation (manifestation of individuality) in the learning environment.[67]

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pedagogical thought to his early works (the *Speeches, Soliloquies*, and his "Essay on a Theory of Social Behavior"), Fischer moves to Schleiermacher's tenure at the University of Halle. From Fischer's perspective, Schleiermacher's budding interest in educational theory solidifies with the publication of his 1805 critique of Johann Zöllner's *Ideen über Nationalerziehung* (1804), and this dominates Schleiermacher's developing conception of *Bildung*. The narration moves directly from the Zöllner critique to Schleiermacher's own thinking about the educational goals of the new university in Berlin in his *Gelegentliche Gedanken über Universitäten in deutschem Sinn* (1808). Neither Schleiermacher's extensive discussions of *Bildung* in his work on an ethical system in the *Brouillon* nor his *Christmas Eve* appear in Fischer's chronology. Nor does an 1804 essay, in which Schleiermacher proposes the reunification of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in Prussia, " Zwei unvorgreifliche Gutachten in Sachen des protestantischen Kirchenwesens: Zunächst in Beziehung auf den Preußischen Staat" in Schleiermacher, *Kritische Gesamtausgabe* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2002), I.4, 359-460 (hereafter, *SKGA*). Both the essay and *Christmas Eve* discuss notions of communal *religious* formation outside of academic institutions, so they do not fit the schema of *Bildung* scholarship interested in Schleiermacher's educational theory.

[66] For a helpful distillation of this approach, see his section, "The application of the universal principle to the particular moment of instruction" ("Anwendung des allgemeinen Prinzips auf die einzelnen Momente des Unterrichts"), in Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Pädagogische Schriften: Erster Band: Die Vorlesungen aus dem Jahre 1826*, ed. Erich Weniger (Düsseldorf: Helmut Küpper, 1966), 271-277, especially 274-275.

[67] For example, appealing to a scenario more recognizable to an American audience, Schleiermacher's approach would mitigate against the separation of students according to aptitude tests.

In *Christmas Eve*, Eduard and Ernestine follow this *ad hoc* method: They foster Sofie's strengths, for example, by providing her music to encourage her self-expressed love of singing. But, they insist, they don't tell Sofie to sing. Nor do they remove other elements of her development to make more time for music. In fostering the formation of their child, Eduard and Ernestine act as gentle facilitators. Leonhardt fears this approach gives too much free rein to Sofie's own intuition, but Schleiermacher would uphold the position of Ernestine and Eduard in his later theory of education.

In addition to addressing early childhood education through discussion of the *Bildung* of Sofie, the entire piece functions as an elaboration of Schleiermacher's fundamental pedagogical principle in his later lectures: *Bildung* forms a person *as* an individual, but *for* participation in community. In so doing, Schleiermacher's theory of educational differentiation proceeds, Günter Schmidt observes, through "polarities," including individual and community, "domestic" and public education, and "the rôle of education to preserve and to ameliorate the present society and culture."[68] Education is an "art" (*Kunst*) that negotiates these polarities and prepares the student for participation in the "life-communities (*Lebengemeinschaften*)," recognizable as the four communal goods discussed in the *Brouillon*: "church, state, free sociable intercourse [*Freier geselliger Verkehr*] and science [*Wissenschaft*]."[69] Schmidt's discussion of Schleiermacher's later pedagogy recapitulates the major elements upon which this study will focus in the *Brouillon* and *Christmas Eve*, placing *Christmas Eve* as a text that can participate in understandings of Schleiermacher's educational theory.

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[68] Gunter Schmidt, 453.
[69] Ibid., 453.

Further contributing to this connection, in his study on the centrality of the concept of individuality in Schleiermacher's pedagogy, Karl-Ernst Nipkow also focuses on the relationship between the individual's *Bildung* and participation in church, state, academy (*Wissenschaft*), and free sociality. Nipkow goes one step further than Schmidt in establishing points of contact between Schleiermacher's educational theory and *Christmas Eve*, however: he emphasizes the crucial role of family in *Bildung*. Nipkow discusses Schleiermacher's view of the family as the hub of *Bildung* in all realms. He notes Schleiermacher's emphasis in his pedagogical lectures on the relationship between family and state, in particular, as key to the full "domestic and public education" ("*häusliche und öffentliche Erziehung*") of the individual.[70] As *Christmas Eve* depicts in detail, the *Bildung* of individuals continues in adulthood to find its root in familial interactions.

The most immediate connection of communities that Schleiermacher makes in *Christmas Eve* is that between family and church: the gathering is religious in nature and complements the activities of the larger church community, allowing for the negotiation of "the most varied ways of understanding Christianity" (*CE*, 25), as Schleiermacher states in his 1826 introduction to *Christmas Eve*. Schleiermacher also states in this introduction to the second edition that contemporary socio-political concerns would have dictated thematic changes in the narrative. Given the emphasis of his pedagogical lectures, such amendments may have included a greater account of the relationship between family and state, as well as family and academy, which remain largely absent from the piece.

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[70] Karl-Ernst Nipkow, *Die Individualität als pädagogisches Problem bei Pestalozzi, Humboldt, und Schleiermacher*, 108-113; quotation from 109.

Schleiermacher's later pedagogical work would turn to a fuller description of the four communal goods, but even in these lectures, as Nipkow points out, *Bildung* finds its nexus in the family. What *Christmas Eve* offers, and what Schleiermacher's later educational theory lacks, is a concrete depiction of his polar approach to *Bildung* within the extended family unit.

The third focus of scholarship on *Bildung* in Schleiermacher traces Schleiermacher's conception of *Bildung* throughout his career.[71] The three outstanding contributions in this area are Matthias Riemer's *Bildung und Christentum* (1989), Ursula Frost's *Einigung des geistigen Lebens* (1991), and Christiane Ehrhardt's *Religion, Bildung, und Erziehung bei Schleiermacher* (2005). Reflecting division between assessments of Schleiermacher as an educational thinker and as a theologian, all three studies emphasize a theological understanding of Schleiermacher, using the relationship of *Bildung* and religion to orient a comprehensive view of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher.[72]

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[71] Matthias Riemer, *Bildung und Christentum: Der Bildungsgedanke Schleiermachers* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989); Ursula Frost, *Einigung des geistigen Lebens: Zur Theorie religiöser und allgemeiner Bildung bei Friedrich Schleiermacher* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1991); and Christiane Ehrhardt, *Religion, Bildung, und Erziehung bei Schleiermacher*. Riemer offers a chronological overview of the evolution of Schleiermacher's *Bildung* theory, which reads Schleiermacher's early thinking on *Bildung* through his involvement with the Jena Romantics and reads his mature thinking on *Bildung* as beginning with his work on ethics in 1803. Frost provides a thematic rather than chronological approach, but with much more sophistication than Hartwig Fiege's seminal work in his 1935 dissertation (below). Frost's work offers the most encompassing approach, even mentioning *Christmas Eve*. Ehrhardt's monograph is the most recent, and, despite the title of the study, it moves beyond a comparison of Schleiermacher's approach to *Bildung* in the *Speeches* and *Soliloquies*, exploring *Bildung* in Schleiermacher's later work on religious instruction. Hermann Fischer offers a short chronological overview of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher, "Schleiermachers Theorie der Bildung," 129-150. Fischer traces *Bildung* using Schleiermacher's pedagogical thinking as the frame of orientation. The volume above, in which Fischer appears, provides additional perspectives on Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*, covering a range of more focused topics and their relevance for contemporary theological thinking. Book-length studies also include two dissertations: Wilfried Eckey's, *Der christliche Glaube und die Bildung bei Friedrich Schleiermacher* (Münster, 1958) and Harwig Fiege's dissertation, *Schleiermachers Begriff der Bildung* (Diss., Hamburg: Martin Riegel, 1935). Fiege does not move chronologically, but thematically, through Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*, which can limit its usefulness, as it does not stress development in Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*.

[72] Ursula Frost offers the most focused interpretation of *Bildung* and religion in Schleiermacher. Her smaller essay, "Das Bildungsverständnis Schleiermachers," 859-877, offers more perspective on

Ursula Frost's study eschews chronological division and addresses Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung* thematically. Most helpful for my work in this dissertation, she emphasizes the theme of polarity in his thinking on *Bildung*, laying the groundwork for elaborating Schleiermacher's polar approach to *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve*.

Ehrhardt comes closest to bridging both chronological and disciplinary divides: she spends the first half of her book on a comparison of the *Speeches* and *Soliloquies*, and then considers Schleiermacher's theory of religious instruction. She helpfully suggests continuous evolution in Schleiermacher's thinking, rather than a shift between his earlier and later thinking on *Bildung*. And she also pulls Schleiermacher's pedagogical and theological thinking into conversation through her discussion of religious instruction. Adding *Christmas Eve* to this line of argumentation deepens Ehrhardt's observations on the connection between Schleiermacher's early work on *Bildung* and his views on religious instruction.

Riemer, in contrast, argues explicitly *for* a chronological divide in Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*: he considers Schleiermacher's earlier work in the *Speeches* and *Soliloquies*, placing emphasis on religion. Riemer argues that when Schleiermacher begins his work on ethics in 1803, his theory of *Bildung* shifts away from his previous understanding of the concept, which remained tied to his tenure with the Jena Romantics.[73] Riemer assesses Schleiermacher's ethical theory of *Bildung*, but he

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Schleiermacher's participation in the Jena Romantic circle. In her essay, she presents similarities, but focuses on differences, between Schleiermacher and the Jena Romantics, particularly as they understand the relation of *Bildung* and art (*Kunst*).

[73] More recently, John Wallhausser's introductory essay to his translation of the *Brouillon* also centralizes Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung* in the construction of his ethics, in *Brouillon zur Ethik/Notes on Ethics (1805/1806), Notes on the Theory of Virtue (1804/1805)*, trans. and ed. John Wallhausser and Terrence Tice (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2003). Wallhausser's reading of *Bildung* in the *Brouillon* will receive more treatment in chapter four.

fails to show how Schleiermacher continues to articulate the polar approach to *Bildung* he had embraced in the *Speeches* and *Soliloquies*.

Schleiermacher's ethical thinking, rather than overturning his previous conception of *Bildung*, *begins* with the insight on polarity from his earlier thinking on *Bildung*. The theme of polarity in *Christmas Eve* illumines *Bildung* as an evolving concept in Schleiermacher's thinking as he matures, but one that maintains an underlying methodological consistency throughout. Schleiermacher's articulation of a polar approach to *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve* provides the point of connection between his early and later work on *Bildung*, rejecting a strict division between Schleiermacher's pre- and post-"Romantic" conception of *Bildung*. In this way, adding a reading of *Christmas Eve* to scholarship on *Bildung* connects the "ethical" and "romantic" arms of research and clarifies disagreement concerning the chronological development of Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*.

This review of literature on Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung* illustrates the omission of *Christmas Eve* from this line of scholarship: no study to date has focused on *Christmas Eve* to address the topic of *Bildung.*[74] Within Schleiermacher scholarship, three reasons stand out that explain the lack of studies connecting *Christmas Eve* to Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*: 1) Those interested in tracing the evolution of Schleiermacher's conception of *Bildung* during this period can turn to the *Brouillon*, which presents the outline of a systematic theory that incorporates *Bildung*. 2) Those

[74] One major study does mention *Christmas Eve* in the context of Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung*. Ursula Frost, in her *Einigung des geistigen Lebens*, 113-116, places *Christmas Eve* in the context of the *Speeches* and *Soliloquies*. She asserts that the three pieces all make an argument about the correlation between religion and *Bildung* and its centrality in Schleiermacher's understanding of *Bildung*, but she does not draw from *Christmas Eve* to support the assertion. In addition, Christiane Ehrhardt, *Religion, Bildung, und Erziehung bei Schleiermacher*, 113, mentions *Christmas Eve* in a footnote on Schleiermacher's interest in the relationship of music and religion. She does not mention *Christmas Eve* in relation to *Bildung*, though.

interested in Schleiermacher's pedagogy would not likely look to his one piece of fiction as a source for his understanding of *Bildung* and *Erziehung*,[75] when Schleiermacher's corpus contains many pieces that directly address these topics. 3) Those interested in *Christmas Eve* are Schleiermacher scholars most often considering his theological thinking; thus, even when such scholars place the piece in the context of Jena Romanticism, they would have little need to situate *Christmas Eve* in the context of *Bildung* in order to make sense of the narrative and its theological themes.

In the following study, I expand and clarify each of these lines of scholarship by bringing them into conversation: Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve* offers both cross-disciplinary and chronological connections between the three categories of scholarship on *Bildung* explored above. Written in 1805, *Christmas Eve* bridges the chronological divide in scholarship (the first category focuses on pre-1803 thinking, while the second category focuses on post-1808 thinking). Through its depiction of polar *Bildung*, *Christmas Eve* provides a link back to the literary milieu of his thinking on *Bildung* among the Jena Romantics and provides a link forward to his ethical (and pedagogical) articulations of *Bildung* at the University of Berlin.[76] Aiding cross-disciplinary connections, Schleiermacher's articulation of *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve* draws upon literary, ethical, and theological threads of his thinking. Indeed, *Christmas Eve* offers Schleiermacher's most concrete portrayal of the interaction of these realms in relation to *Bildung*.

3. Schleiermacher's Polar Approach to *Bildung*

[75] And, in the case of Christiane Ehrhardt's study of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher, the connection to *Unterricht*, or instruction.

[76] For Schleiermacher, ethics and pedagogy are related fields: pedagogy, he states, is a combination of ethics and anthropology.

As a *Bildung* narrative, *Christmas Eve* reflects both Schleiermacher's participation in Jena Romanticism and his early attempts to systematize his ethical thinking. Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung* does evolve between his work on the Jena-Romantic journal, the *Athenaeum* (1798-1800),[77] and his lectures on ethics at Halle (1805/1806); however, his consistent articulation of the fundamental role of "polarity" (*Polarität*) in *Bildung* provides the basis for connecting these strands of thinking within *Christmas Eve*. Schleiermacher's use of polarity situates the piece alongside his other work on *Bildung*. In so doing, polarity also establishes the methodology at work in *Christmas Eve* that organizes it both structurally and thematically.

Schleiermacher scholars have noted that "polarity" provides an orienting principle for his articulation of *Bildung*.[78] Gehrhard Ebeling asserts that Schleiermacher's use of polarity "paves the way for the interpretation of the relationship between piety and *Bildung*" in his thinking.[79] Ursula Frost argues that polarity in Schleiermacher provides both a moral and a spiritual framework ("*sittliche Grundstruktur*" and "*geistige*

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[77] Schleiermacher's participation in the Jena circle extends beyond these years: He becomes involved in the salon of Henriette Herz soon after his arrival in Berlin in 1797, and I would place the end of his participation with the demise of his last literary endeavor associated with the circle: Friedrich Schlegel finally ends the plans for co-translating Plato with Schleiermacher in 1803.

[78] Ursula Frost, for example, in her *Einigung des geistigen Lebens*, 116-123, explores Schleiermacher's incorporation of polarity into his understanding of *Bildung*, both through his theological and his ethical thinking. See also John Clayton, "Theologie als Vermittlung," in *Internationaler Schleiermacher-Kongreß Berlin 1984*, ed. Hermann Fischer, Hans-Joachim Birkner, Gerhard Ebeling, Heinz Kimmerle, Kurt-Victor Selge (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), 905; Hermann Fischer, "Schleiermachers Theorie der Bildung," 132-140; Bruno Laist, *Das Problem der Abhängigkeit in Schleiermachers Anthropologie und Bildungslehre*, (Ratingen: Aloys Henn, 1965), 121-122; Gerhardt Ebeling, "Frömmigkeit und Bildung," in *Fides et communication: Festschrift für Martin Doerne zum 70. Geburtstag*, ed. Dietrich Rössler, Gottfried Voigt, and Friedrich Wintzer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), 79-82; Christiane Ehrhardt, *Religion, Bildung, und Erziehung bei Schleiermacher*, 150-155; Max van Mannen explores polarity as the grounding principle of his later pedagogical lectures (1826) in "Romantic Roots of Human Science in Education" in *The Educational Legacy of Romanticism*, ed. John Willinsky (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1990), 132-134; and John Wallhausser, "Schleiermacher's *Brouillon zur Ethik*, 1805/1806," in *Schleiermacher in Context: Papers from the 1988 International Symposium on Schleiermacher at Herrnhut, the German Democratic Republic*, ed. Ruth Richardson (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1991), 114.

[79] My translation of Ebeling, 81: "Diese Formel [of polar oscillation] ist für die Interpretation des Verhältnisses von Frömmigkeit und Bildung wegweisend."

Grundstruktur") for understanding *Bildung*. Some state even more broadly that polarity functions as a fundamental element of Schleiermacher's thinking, in general.[80] Not surprisingly, then, scholars apply polarity to *Christmas Eve*, as well. As Richard Niebuhr asserts in his interpretation of *Christmas Eve*, "polarity . . . imparts movement to the whole dialogue."[81] In this dissertation, I build upon this well-established line of scholarship, placing polarity at the foundation of Schleiermacher's thinking, though focusing on the evolving role of polarity in his thinking on *Bildung*, which facilitates a reading of *Christmas Eve* by framing its themes dyadically.

What, then, is polarity? The ubiquity of "polar" approaches to thinking in the late-eighteenth century almost matches the pervasiveness of *Bildung* theories and yields

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[80] A number of major contributors to Schleiermacher scholarship make this observation. See Karl Barth, *Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl*, trans. B. Cozens (New York: Harper, 1959), 313, who argues that Schleiermacher's use of polarity was a hindrance to his thinking, stating that he could have written "more lucidly and more concisely, if he had been able to say it in the form of a circle with one centre, instead of as an ellipse with two foci" (see below on Schleiermacher's use of the elliptical image). Barth returns to this image to frame his closing summary of Schleiermacher's thinking (352-354). Richard Niebuhr, in *On Christ and Religion*, 74, couches his comments on polarity in Schleiermacher in terms of *Christmas Eve*, but referring to Schleiermacher's writing more generally, Niebuhr writes that, "Schleiermacher's style is not one of indirectness in antithesis but directness in polarity." Kurt Nowak has also noted the centrality of polarity for Schleiermacher without invoking *Bildung* in his *Schleiermacher und die Frühromantik: Eine literaturgeschichtliche Studie zum romantischen Religionverständnis und Menschenbild am Ende des 18. Jahrhunderts in Deutschland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1986), 162-166. In addition, in F. LeRon Shults' fifth chapter, "Anthropology and Theological Method: Regulative Relationality in Schleiermacher," *Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality* (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Publishing, 2003), 97-116, he argues that polarity lies at the very heart of Schleiermacher's theology: not as an element among many, but as its foundation. This foundational principle of polarity occurs not just in his theological thinking, but as Mark Chan, *Christology from within and ahead: Hermeneutics, Contingency, and the Quest for Transcontextual Criteria in Christology* (Boston: BRILL, 2001), 171-2, asserts, "The interrelating polarity between unity and individuality, generality and specificity, an approach not untypical of Romantic discourse plays a major role as an operational principle in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics." James Duke, "New Perspectives on Schleiermacher's Ethics: An Essay," in *Journal of Religious Ethics* 17.2 (Fall 1989): 73, also notes the foundational role of polarity in Schleiermacher's systematic articulation of a theory of ethics, stating that Schleiermacher's ethics "is unfailingly bipolar, or dialectical, or 'elliptical,' whether viewed in the context of theology, philosophy, or lived experience." See also John Clayton, "Theologie als Vermittlung," 899-916 (especially 904-912); John Hoffmeyer, "Schleiermacher und die Relativierung zweipoliger Schemata in der Theologie" in *Evangelische Theologie* 56.5 (1996), 457-464; and Robert Williams, *Schleiermacher the Theologian: The Construction of the Doctrine of God* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978), 14. This list, though extensive, is not comprehensive. For additional sources, see the list of literature on polarity in Schleiermacher in Shults, 99, as well as Hoffmeyer, 457-458.

[81] *On Christ and Religion*, 67. Though noting polarity repeatedly, he never elaborates it as a cohesive explanatory principle for interpreting the piece.

as many definitions. In his assessment of the German literary tradition, Ronald Gray defines polarity in terms of the literary application of dyadic oppositions, which he argues recurs as a fundamental motif of German literature. Though he traces the theme in the German context back to Luther and the more mystical tradition of Jacob Böhme (1575-1624), he locates the first use of the vocabulary of "polarity" (*Polarität*) in Jena-circle member Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854), who culls the term from its recent application in descriptions of electrical forces.[82] Schelling espouses a broad notion of the role of polarity, stating that "the condition of all formation is duality."[83]

Polarity requires not just pairing, however, but pairing opposites. Theories of polarity, not only in Schelling, but also in Goethe, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher (as the following chapters show) all stress such oppositional duality in *Bildung*. Despite a common dipolar focus, great diversity develops between various definitions of polarity in the era. Ronald Gray observes:

> The preoccupation with polarity and synthesis in the German tradition is a certain fact. Less certain is what the precise implications of these words may be in any particular circumstances. For the very reason that the so-called opposites are differently conceived by different authors, and that in general the idea of describing them as opposites (rather than as contrasts,

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[82] Ronald Gray, *The German Tradition in Literature 1871-1945* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), 1-2. I will use the terms duality, polarity, and dipolarity, as well as the terms polar and dyadic interchangeably in this study. I separate the terms duality and dualism. Referring to duality, I mean to invoke dipolarity and not "dualism," and its accompanying scholarship. I follow Michael Nealeigh's discussion of polarity in Schleiermacher's theory of knowledge, "The Epistemology of Friedrich Schleiermacher from a Dipolar Perspective," in *Schleiermacher in Context*, in which he draws on the work of Charles Hartshorne to distinguish dipolarity and dualism: "Hartshorne maintains that no subject can have predicate P and not-P at the same time. The missing element, he insists, is the insertion 'in the same respect.' Thus, contrary poles can both be true as long as they refer to the same reality in different aspects of its characters or are related as part to whole. Dualism is avoided in the same way. As long as the polar elements are referring to distinct aspects of the same reality, the charge of dualism cannot apply."

[83] Schelling, *Werke*, I, 213/54. Though I will not separate the terms polarity and dipolarity in this study, noting possible distinctions between polarity and dipolarity is appropriate, since some theories of polarity, like that of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, expand polarity to include more than two poles. Thus, Coleridge's theory of polarity is a tri-polarity that emphasizes multiplicity-in-unity rather than duality-in-unity.

> or gradually differentiated groups) is somewhat vague, a variety of meanings can be supposed, all within the overall pattern.[84]

Thus 'polarity,' and the dyadic opposition it implies, takes on various meanings, depending on the author.

This multiplicity in definitions of polarity correlates with the multiplicity of *Bildung* theories reviewed above. Catriona Macleod clarifies the relationship between polarity and the German tradition of *Bildung* literature in her *Embodying Ambiguity*.[85] MacLeod establishes the relationship between *Bildung* and polarity in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, but she focuses on gender polarity to build her argument, arguing that the process of *Bildung* depicted in literature requires the embrace of male and female aspects of human nature.[86] Schleiermacher's authorial use of polarity does develop as *di*polarity, which includes gender polarity and places him within the larger German tradition suggested by both Gray and MacLeod. However, Schleiermacher's use of dipolarity extends beyond gender, as the reading of *Christmas Eve* in chapter four will clarify.

Schleiermacher also begins to distinguish his use of polarity through his focus on the activity of "wavering" ("*Schweben*") occurring continuously between the two poles.[87]

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[84] Ronald Gray, 5.

[85] Catriona Macleod, *Embodying Ambiguity: Androgyny and Aesthetics from Winckelmann to Keller* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998), 42-44. Not only are *Bildung* and polarity fundamentally connected, but Macleod reads *Bildung* as "male." I agree with her reading in terms of the way *Bildung* functions as a male pursuit for Goethe, Schlegel, and Novalis, but Schleiermacher disrupts the association of maleness and *Bildung*, beginning with his fragment on *Bildung* for women in the *Athenaeum*.

[86] Ruth Richardson's work on *Christmas Eve* presages these elements of Macleod's study, though Richardson does not emphasize Schleiermacher's incorporation of the concept of "polarity" or of *Bildung* in his thinking to explain the dyadic relation of poesy (female) and philosophy (male) in *Christmas Eve* that she traces in her dissertation (see above).

[87] Chapter three will explore the activity of oscillation as Schleiermacher describes it in the *Brouillon*. The most fundamental dyad participating in this activity of oscillation is the universal and the particular. Indeed, having introduced polarity as the foundational structure of *Bildung* for Schleiermacher, Ursula Frost, *Einigung des geistigen Lebens*, 258 f., explores the *activity* of *Bildung* as the "oscillation between universal and particular" ("*Oszillation zwischen Allgemeinem und Besonderem*"); see also, Frost, 118-119.

In his early systematization of his ethical thinking (1803-1805), he integrates the vocabulary of polar "oscillation" ("*Oscillation*") to describe this activity.[88] Using the vocabulary of oscillation, Schleiermacher places emphasis on dyadic *movement*, rather than the "synthesis" of oppositions that Gray observes in the larger tradition. As chapters two and three will show, this particular emphasis divides Schleiermacher from the Jena-Romantic focus on the vocabulary of "*Schweben*" understood in the Fichtean sense of a hovering state of indeterminacy that occurs between states of determination, when dyadic poles clash with one another.

Schleiermacher's letter to Georg Reimer in 1803 and then one to Jacobi in 1818 provide common reference points that help establish Schleiermacher's understanding of polarity.[89] In both letters, Schleiermacher discusses a geometric figure he has in mind that expresses his vision of polarity: two, entwined ellipses. Wallhausser translates Schleiermacher's description of the symbol as "a 'mathematical figure of two interwoven ellipses of the same axis but of [four] different foci with the characteristic lines for each

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John Clayton, "Theologie als Vermittlung," 905-909; Gerhard Ebeling, "Frömmigkeit und Bildung," 81; and Christiane Ehrhardt, *Religion, Bildung, und Erziehung bei Schleiermacher*, 152-155 also emphasize the centrality of oscillation (*Oscillation*) between poles in Schleiermacher's notion of polarity.

[88] Oscillation, for Schleiermacher, requires humans to exist *within* polarities, rather than envisioning the clash between polarities, as Schlegel does, as a means of transcending polarity altogether. Oscillation, and Schleiermacher's later use of the term "wavering" ("*Schweben*") to describe the activity (*Briefe*, II, 343) is also distinct from the "wavering" ("*schweben*") between opposites described in Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*, upon which Schlegel draws. See discussion of these distinctions in the second part of chapter two. Continual oscillation also prevents the unity achieved in the dyadic relation from creating a third, separate element, as is the case in Hegel's notion of dialectical activity. Throughout the following study, I avoid the terms "dialectic" and "dialectical" to describe polarity in Schleiermacher. The terms are applicable, and Schleiermacher used them himself, particularly as his thinking evolved in his *Dialektik*. However, currently, the common connotations of the terms quickly conjure a Hegelian mindset, which stands in diametrical opposition to Schleiermacher's understanding of polarity, which is why I have chosen to use the terms "polarity" and "duality" exclusively. On the contrast between Schleiermacher and Hegel's dialectical thinking, see Wallhausser, *NE*, 8, and especially 15. Matthias Riemer, in his study of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher, 59-66, also discusses the understandings of *Bildung* in Hegel and Fichte in relation to Schleiermacher.

[89] See Ehrhardt, *Religion, Bildung, und Erziehung bei Schleiermacher*, 154-155; 158; Frost, *Einigung geistiges Lebens*, 119; and Wallhausser, *NE*, 7. Clayton, "Theologie als Vermittlung," 909-912, focuses on oscillation in terms of its association with theories of electricity, which does not conflict with the elliptical model, although he does not invoke the letter to Jacobi.

ellipse.'"[90] The figure would have appeared as two elliptical 'orbits' with four points of intersection, perhaps oriented as a cross or an X (no drawing of the figure survives). In this way, the figure introduces multiple dyadic relations, which Wallhausser argues represent the two most fundamental polarities in Schleiermacher's thinking: universal and particular, and nature and reason.[91]

In 1803, Schleiermacher writes to Reimer (his publisher) that he wants this figure printed on the cover of his *Outline of a Critique of Previous Ethical Theories* (1803), but he writes back soon thereafter, telling Reimer that he has decided the figure is "too mystical" and should not go to publication.[92] Though "too mystical" for the reading public, Schleiermacher does not discard his symbolic representation of polarity. The figure appears to have continued to function for him, personally, to make sense of the dyadic activity he viewed as foundational in human life. Thus, fifteen years later, he describes the symbol in a letter to Jacobi, focusing on oscillation as the activity that animates the figure and ascribing this activity to *all* worldly existence. He writes, "Oscillation is the universal form of all finite existence, and there is an immediate consciousness [that detects the interwoven ellipses], from which this wavering ["*Schweben*"] arises, and I have in this wavering the entire fullness of my earthly life."[93] Between 1803 and 1818, at least, a working model of dyadic oscillation shaped

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[90] Wallhausser, *NE*, 7; *SKGA*, V.6, 277-278: "Ich hätte gern eine symolische Vignette auf dem Titel, die meine moralischen Prinzipien sehr gut ausdrückt. Es ist nur eine mathematische Figur, nämlich zwei in einander geschlungene Ellipsen von gleicher Achse aber ungleichen Brennpunkten mit den charakteristischen Linien für beide."

[91] See chapter three for a discussion of Wallhausser's interpretation of polarity in Schleiermacher.

[92] Wallhausser, *NE*, 7; *SKGA*, V.6, 391-392: "Die Vignette möchte ich lieber für die Moral selbst (wenn diese jemals zu Stande kommt) versparen wo sie noch passender und verständlicher ist. Hier kommt sie mir doch fast zu mystisch vor."

[93] My translation, from *Briefe*, II, 351: "Die Oscillation ist ja die allgemeine Form alles endlichen Daseins, und es giebt doch ein unmittelbares Bewußtein, daß es nur die beiden Brennpunkte meiner eigenen Ellipse sind, aus denen dieses Schweben hervorgeht, und ich habe in diesem Schweben die ganze Fülle meines irdischen Lebens. "

Schleiermacher's depiction of polarity as a fundamental orienting principle of human existence.

Scholars have various ideas concerning Schleiermacher's adoption of polarity as an orienting principle for his thinking. Ursula Frost, for example, names Schelling as the largest influence upon it, which makes sense, given Schelling's introduction of the term.[94] However, as Kurt Nowak observes, polarity *thematically*, though not terminologically, enters Schleiermacher's thinking very early—in 1792 (a year before *Bildung* emerged as a topic of his writing).[95] John Wallhausser locates the theme early in Schleiermacher's thinking as well, disputing the influence of Schelling, since, he notes, Schleiermacher's "polar construction of finite being and forms of knowing" develops into a "polar model" that is "already at work . . . in the literary structure of the *Speeches on Religion*."[96] A variety of sources, equally influential on both Schelling and Schleiermacher, offer models of polarity from which both men drew: a theory of polarity was already a pronounced feature of Goethe's conception of *Bildung* at this time (see the first part of chapter two), and Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* also offered material that served as the basis for Friedrich Schlegel's development of the role of polarity in *Bildung* (see the second part of chapter two). Like Schleiermacher's, Schelling's mature theory of

[94] Ursula Frost, *Einigung des geistiges Lebens*, 117. Frost bases her observations on Hermann Süskind, *Der Einfluß Schellings auf die Entwicklung von Schleiermachers System* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1909), 97.
[95] On the advent of polarity in Schleiermacher's thinking, see Nowak, 164. On the introduction of *Bildung* into his thought, see Brent Sockness, "Was Schleiermacher a Virtue Ethicist?," 2.
[96] Wallhausser, "Schleiermacher's *Brouillon*," 114. Nowak, 164,-166, also discusses polarity in the *Speeches*.

polarity had not formed fully during his Jena period[97] and would continue to grow through multiple influences.[98]

Christiane Ehrhardt argues convincingly that Schleiermacher's pre-1803 thinking on *Bildung* can benefit from the application of the concept of polar oscillation: although Schleiermacher had not yet developed the idea explicitly in his writing, it was functionally present in his elaboration of polar pairs like "*Gefühl und Verstand*" (feeling and understanding) and "*Theologie und Philosophie*."[99] Ehrhardt points to the work of Fichte and Schlegel, in particular, as early influences of Schleiermacher's thinking on polarity.[100] For the purposes of discussing Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve*, however, Goethe serves an equally important role that Ehrhardt misses in her interpretation. The next chapter applies the concept of polarity to Schleiermacher's early work on *Bildung*, but it begins with an assessment of Goethe's relationship with the Jena Romantics. This background contextualizes the literary understanding of *Bildung* in the era, and an examination of Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meister* provides a literary model of polar *Bildung*, that, in some ways, would resonate more with Schleiermacher than would Friedrich Schlegel's Fichtean theory of "transcendental poesy."

Chapter Summary and Outline of Chapters

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[97] Schelling did, however, begin to develop his theory of polarity during his tenure with the Jena circle between 1797 and 1800, when Schleiermacher was also participating in the circle, so some degree of influence is possible.

[98] For both Schleiermacher *and* Schelling, such influence includes that of Henrich Steffens, Schleiermacher's close friend at Halle during the time in which he wrote *Christmas Eve*. Indeed, Schleiermacher spent Christmas 1805 with Steffens and his family. See Schleiermacher's description of his Christmas in *SKGA* V.8, 445-447. Steffens was one of a very few professors at Halle who was friendly towards Schleiermacher when he arrived at the university. Steffens even goes so far as to write of Schleiermacher (as Schleiermacher had once written of Schlegel) that his friendship with Schleiermacher "was destined to form an epoch in my life." Translated in *The Life of Schleiermacher as Unfolded in His Autobiography and Letters*, trans. Frederica Rowan (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1860), II, 2. On Steffens' influence on Schelling, see Henry Silton Harris, *Hegel's Ladder I: The Pilgrimage of Reason* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 155.

[99] Christiane Ehrhardt, 158-159.

[100] Ibid., 155.

Schleiermacher's interest in *Bildung* and his narrative, *Christmas Eve*, have received much attention individually, but no study of *Christmas Eve* incorporates the role of *Bildung* in its construction and no study of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher's thinking incorporates a reading of *Christmas Eve*. Bringing these strands of scholarship together provides a solid foundation both for demonstrating thematic and structural coherence in *Christmas Eve* and for clarifying the evolution of Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung*. Polarity offers a focal point for tracking the development of his theory of *Bildung* during his time with the Jena Romantics and then at Halle, laying the groundwork for an analysis of *Christmas Eve* as a narrative of *Bildung*.

In the second chapter, I take up the influence of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) and Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829) on Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung* in the literary sphere. The first part of the chapter treats the literary impact of the relationship between Goethe and the Jena circle and addresses the reception in the Jena circle of Goethe's novel of *Bildung*, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship* (1795/1796). The second part of the chapter moves to the development of *Bildung* theories in the Schlegel brothers' journal, *Athenaeum* (1798-1800). The chapter concludes by introducing Schleiermacher's concurrent work on the topic within the *Athenaeum* and in his *Speeches on Religion* (1799) and *Soliloquies* (1800). The assessment of all three authors (Goethe, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher) emphasizes the role they saw for polarity in *Bildung*, which provides a consistent point of comparison for their thinking on *Bildung*. In addition, the focus on polarity highlights both Schleiermacher's association with the Jena-Romantic milieu and ways in which he diverges from it.

In the third chapter, I consider Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung* in his lectures on ethics, published posthumously as his *Brouillon zur Ethik* (*Notes on Ethics*, 1805/1806), which he gave while he was writing *Christmas Eve*. The *Brouillon* reflects a more systematic attempt to discuss the polar approach to *Bildung* he explored in his earlier work. The reading highlights the role of *Bildung* as "the highest good" in his ethics and prepares for an interpretation of *Christmas Eve* by establishing the role of polarity and of family (and social institutions, more broadly) within an ethical understanding of *Bildung*.

In the fourth chapter, I then analyze the text of *Christmas Eve* as a narrative informed by the literary and ethical background of Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*. The analysis brings both thematic and structural unity to the piece. The reading provides thematic coherence by tracing how elements of the plot and the topics invoked contribute to the process of *Bildung* that Schleiermacher depicts within the social functioning of the family unit. The polar *activity* depicted within each dyad grounds the methodological structure of *Christmas Eve*, focusing polarity on the historical realities of family life.

The use of polarity in *Christmas Eve* formally structures the work as a narrative of *Bildung*, thereby clarifying its place in Schleiermacher's corpus. As a narrative of *Bildung*, *Christmas Eve* poses new questions for scholarship beyond research on Schleiermacher. The conclusion highlights two such applications: The familial center of *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve* offers a historical counterpoint to the centralization of nineteenth-century *Bildung* within the institutions of academy and state. And, *Christmas Eve* adds a new dimension to literary assessments of nineteenth-century *Bildung* narratives through its depiction of multiple protagonists.

II. *Bildung* in the Jena-Romantic Milieu: Goethe, Schlegel, and Schleiermacher on the Connection of Polarity and *Bildung*

[M]uch that has been lying dormant in me, is . . . set in motion. . . . [A]s regards my activity in the world of philosophy and literature, my more intimate acquaintance with him forms an epoch.[1]
--Schleiermacher to his sister, Charlotte
October 22, 1797

Introduction

Within the matrix of eighteenth-century *Bildung* theories, its literary dimensions remain prominent,[2] and the Jena-Romantic circle in Berlin continues to explore the meaning of *Bildung* in the literary realm as the new century dawns. Schleiermacher alludes to this milieu when he proclaims in the quotation above that his new friend, Friedrich Schlegel, offers a literary and philosophical perspective that marks an epoch—a "*neue Periode*"—in his life. In the literary world that Schlegel opens to Schleiermacher, a second figure looms: Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Together, Goethe and Schlegel frame the literary background of Schleiermacher's development of the polar approach to *Bildung*, which Schleiermacher will employ in his construction of *Christmas Eve*.[3]

I assess in the first part of the chapter the Jena-Romantic reception of Goethe's novel *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, emphasizing Friedrich Schlegel's understanding of it as '*Bildungsbuch*'[4]—a book *about Bildung*, but also for the inculcation *of Bildung*. As

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[1] From a letter from Schleiermacher to his sister, expressing his thoughts on his new friendship with Friedrich Schlegel. *Life of Schleiermacher: As Unfolded in his Autobiography and Letters*, trans. and ed. Frederica Rowan (London: Smith, Elder and Co., 1860), I, 159; *SKGA*, V.2, 177: "[I]n mir manches in Bewegung gesezt was geschlummert hatte. . . . für mein Daseyn in der philosophischen und litterarischen Welt geht seit meiner nähern Bekanntschaft mit ihm gleichsam eine neue Periode an."

[2] As Moses Mendelssohn asserts in his 1784 essay, "What is *Aufklärung*?," 53, discussed in chapter one, *Bildung* has occurred up to that time chiefly within "literary discourse" (*Büchersprache*).

[3] *SKGA*, I.5, xlviii. Patsch argues that *Christmas Eve* is a "*Formexperiment*" for Schleiermacher, and that his sources in creating it included, most prominently, Goethe and Schlegel. This chapter elaborates this observation.

[4] *KFSA*, II.16, 287, #413. Schlegel uses the vocabulary in the plural, "*Bildungsbücher*," but names only *Meister* as an example of a "*Bildungsbuch*."

Schlegel states, *Wilhelm Meister* is an "educational theory in living progression [*lebendige . . . Bildungslehre*]."[5] In the second part of the chapter, I then turn to Schlegel's *Bildung* theory as it develops in his journal, the *Athenaeum* (1798-1800), demonstrating how Schlegel's use of polarity increasingly creates a divide between his notion of *Bildung* and Goethe's. The chapter closes by situating Schleiermacher's comments on *Bildung* during the *Athenaeum* period in this context: Schleiermacher stakes his early claim for *Bildung* by incorporating polarity in a way that both builds on and responds to Goethe and Schlegel.

A. A Literary Blueprint for Polar *Bildung*: Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* and Its Reception in the Jena Circle

Anyone who has browsed the fragments of the Jena Romantics in the Schlegel brothers' journal, the *Athenaeum*, has maneuvered their use of "polarity": The fragments brim with playful contrasts and koan-like contradictions that depict the dyadic relation of oppositional elements. In his famous Mellon lectures, Isaiah Berlin even defines the romantic movement (in its broadest sense) in terms of fragmentariness and the reflection of this fragmentariness in polarities: "It is, in short," he states, "unity in multiplicity. It is fidelity to the particular . . . and also mysterious tantalising vagueness of outline. It is beauty and ugliness. It is art for art's sake, and art as an instrument of social salvation. It is strength and weakness, individualism and collectivism, purity and corruption, revolution and reaction, peace and war, love of life and love of death."[6] Goethe, however, was not a romantic, and casual readers of *Meister* are not likely to come to the

[5] Friedrich Schlegel, "On Goethe's *Meister*," in *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism: The Romantic Ironists and Goethe*, ed. Kathleen Wheeler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 63; *KFSA*, I.2, 132.
[6] Isaiah Berlin, *The Roots of Romanticism*, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton: Bollington, 2001), 18.

end of the novel with the sense that polarity has functioned as a central feature in Wilhelm's process of formation.

The Jena Romantics were not casual readers of *Meister*, though; they were critics, authors, and people with philosophical interests, who viewed Goethe as the dominant literary voice of their age. The Jena circle both looked to Goethe to orient their literary voices *and* projected their perspectives and interests upon him. Polarity *does* function within Goethe's conception of *Bildung* in *Meister*. The circle would bring this element to the fore in their readings of the novel.

T.J. Reed, in his assessment of Goethe's influence on modern literature, encapsulates the underlying commonality between Goethe and the Jena Romantics that captures *Meister*'s resonance with the young Romantics. He asserts,

> Whereas the French and English novel of this period is firmly rooted in society, the *Bildungsroman* seems wholly unsocial. In *Wilhelm Meister*, the reality the hero knows is made up of a traveling theatre troupe, a mysterious beneficent masonic society, rich noblemen's estates and a utopian educational province located nowhere—all these are primarily catalysts to provoke his or others' personal development. . . . The sense of fragmentariness he transmits corresponds to the fragmentariness of German society. . . . But the pursuit of personal maturity had social implications, because, for Goethe and Schiller, . . . the quality of the individual was the only guarantee of the quality of any social structure to come.[7]

Meister offered the Jena Romantics (whose "disenchantment" with their world has spawned more scholarly response than they spawned literature) a poetic reflection upon their own feelings of dissonance—with their age, with their fellow Germans, and also within themselves. Schlegel refers to *Meister*'s "cultivated randomness [*gebildeten*

[7] T.J. Reed, "The *Goethezeit* and Its Aftermath," in *Germany: A Companion to German Studies*, ed. Malcolm Pasley (London: Methuen, 1982), 534.

Willkür]"[8] And yet, the work of art manages to hold its random (opposing) elements together. *Meister* provides a depiction of *Bildung* that treats 'fragmentariness' seriously, and it does so by incorporating polarity fundamentally into the process of *Bildung*.

But, as Reed notes above, Goethe advises addressing social fragmentation through a literary relationship with individual readers rather than through treatises overtly calling for particular social and political changes. Goethe plays a dual role in the Jena-Romantic articulation of *Bildung*: Goethe, the author, offers a literary articulation of *Bildung* that the Jena circle find compelling. At the same time, Goethe, the bureaucrat, convinces the Jena Romantics to focus their commitment to *Bildung* in the literary sphere.

1. Goethe's Polar Approach to *Bildung* in *Meister*

Although literary scholars broadly associate Goethe with the genre of the *Bildungsroman*—a novel (*Roman*) that narrates a process of formation or education (*Bildung*)—recent scholarship often distinguishes a mature theory of the *Bildungsroman* from Goethe's construction of novels of formation.[9] The same observation applies to the Jena Romantics and their novels of formation: Goethe did not coin this now-popular literary term; nor did he or the Jena Romantics refer to his seminal novel of formation, *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre*, or their own novels using the term *Bildungsroman*.[10]

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[8] *KFSA*, I.2, 134.

[9] See Todd Kontje, *The German Bildungsroman: History of a National Genre* (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1993), as well as Kurt May, "Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre ein Bildungsroman?" in *Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte* 31 (1957), 1-37. Other scholars continue to locate the genesis of the genre with Goethe and discuss *Meister* as a *Bildungsroman*, like Thomas Jeffers in his *Apprenticeships: the Bildungsroman from Goethe to Santayana* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Some recent scholarship, like Marc Redfield in his *Phantom Formations: Aesthetic Ideology and the* Bildungsroman (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), argues that the term is a concept employed ideologically and not really a genre at all, since there is no universal proto-type. On my reading Redfield misses, as Kontje argues that critics of the *Bildungsroman* often do, the irony associated with the perpetual becoming of the genre.

[10] Todd Kontje, *The German Bildungsroman*, 15-16, describes how Wilhelm Dilthey was, until recently, credited with the first application of the term in 1870 in his *Leben Schleiermachers.* However, Kontje

Goethe and the Jena Romantics do, however, participate in the creation of what would become the *Bildungsroman* through their interest in *Bildung* and the literary means of its expression. *Bildung* does not simply provide a means of understanding the plot of these novels, but in novels like Goethe's *Meister* and Friedrich Schlegel's *Lucinde* (as well as in Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve*), *Bildung* becomes a topic discussed within the work.

a. *Bildung* and Polarity in Goethe's Thinking

Bildung occurs as a central topic of *Meister* and as a focus of Goethe's thinking more broadly. Ernst Cassirer, the great 20th-century philosopher and inheritor of the Jena-Romantic tradition, writes that when scholars consider Goethe and his work,

> The idea of '*Bildung*' should [be] positioned and established as the ultimate unifying idea, which bridges all differences and oppositions—which takes up into itself, which unites in itself, and which in a certain sense reconciles in itself all the moments of Goethe's being and activity. . . . We must again seek to see and to understand, how Goethe himself saw it [*Bildung*] and how he interwove it into his whole being, into his idea of life and of nature.[11]

And how, then, *did* Goethe define *Bildung*, since it has such wide applications for him? Both before and after Cassirer's injunction, scholars have worked to piece together Goethe's definition of *Bildung*.[12] Cassirer's explanation of *how* the concept of *Bildung*

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notes, the term was first used in 1803 by a little-known writer named Karl Morgenstern, and first disseminated by him in a publication in 1817.

[11] My translation of Ernst Cassirer, *Kleinere Schriften zu Goethe und zur Geistgeschichte 1925-1944*, ed. Barbara Naumann and Simon Zumsteg (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2006), 14: "Der Begriff der Bildung soll hier als der letzte Einheitsbegriff hingestellt und erwiesen werden, der alle Unterschiede und Gegensätze überbrückt—der alle Momente von Goethes Sein und Wirken in sich aufnimmt[,] in sich vereint u[nd] in gewissen Sinne in sich versöhnt. . . . Wir müssen ihn wieder so zu sehen und so zu verstehen suchen, wie Goethe selbst ihn gesehn und wie er ihn in sein ganzes Sein, in seine Lebens- und Naturanschauung verwoben hat." Cassirer implies in this passage that *Bildung* is a neglected facet of Goethe scholarship. However, the history of scholarship suggests that Goethe's idea of *Bildung* has consistently functioned prominently in interpretations of Goethe and his work. I would place Cassirer in the long-standing scholarly tradition of invoking Goethe as a "symbol of *Bildung*." See Ilse Schaarschmidt, "Der Bedeutungswandel der Worte 'bilden' und 'Bildung' in der Literatur-Epoche von Gottsched bis Herder," in *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Bildungsbegriffs*, ed. W. Klafki (Weinheim: Beltz, 1965), 68.

[12] Before Cassirer's 1934 comments Ludwig Kiehn published a piece entirely devoted to Goethe's idea of *Bildung*: *Goethes Begriff der Bildung* (Hamburg: Boysen, 1932); another example is Ilse Schaarschmidt's

brings coherence to interpretations of Goethe's thinking suggests his debt to the Jena-Romantic tradition: Cassirer asserts that looking to *Bildung* "bridges all differences and oppositions—. . . reconciles in itself all the moments of Goethe's being and activity." For Friedrich Schlegel (see below), embracing oppositions *is what Bildung does*. Thus, reconciliation of opposites *is the role of* Bildung, not just the role of *Bildung* as a concept that unifies Goethe's thought. In Schlegel's thought, and as Schlegel interprets Goethe, the concept of *Bildung* is a *process for* and a *product of* 'reconciling oppositions.'

The association of polarity and *Bildung* in Goethe does not remain confined to Schlegel and Cassirer: Ronald Gray's assessment of the German literary tradition asserts the prevalence of the motif of polarity in German literature (see chapter one), and he locates Goethe as a key figure in its development, declaring that, "from Goethe onwards the flood begins."[13] Gray notes the remarkable array of polarities invoked in Goethe's writing: male and female; heavenly and earthly; doubt and certainty; and even "the poet and the practical man of affairs."[14] For Goethe, Gray argues, polarity involves working "with a duality which [he] seek[s] to bring to a singularity or unity."[15] Goethe explores several ways of envisioning the type of polar activity Gray ascribes to his thought,

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1931 dissertation, which I referred to in its reprinted form above, 24-87. More recent investigations take analyze *Bildung* in individual works of Goethe: Fotis Jannidis, *Das Individuum und sein Jahrhundert: Eine Komponenten- und Funktionsanalyse des Begriffs 'Bildung' am Beispiel von Goethes "Dichtung und Wahrheit"* (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1996), and Eric Klaus, "The Formula of Self-formation: Bildung and Vospitanie in Goethe's *WMA* and Gorky's *Mother*" in *Germano-Slavica* 14:1 (2003), 75-86. Other recent attempts to take up *Bildung* in Goethe have connected his thinking on *Bildung* to other, non-literary areas of scholarly interest—for example, colonialism and architecture. See respectively, John Noyes, "Goethe on Cosmopolitanism and Colonialism: Bildung and the Dialectic of Critical Mobility," in *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 39:4 (2006), 443-462 and Susan Bernstein, "Goethe's Architectonic Bildung and Buildings in Weimar," in *Modern Language Notes* 114:5 (1999), 1014-1036. The literature on *Bildung* in Goethe is vast and diverse, and Goethe continues to act for scholars as a 'symbol of *Bildung*.'

[13] Ronald Gray, *The German Tradition in Literature*, 1-2.

[14] Ibid., 2.

[15] Ibid., 3.

including his extensive work on a rather confusing theory of color, his discussions of electricity, and his interest in the grafting of plants.[16]

I read Goethe's clearest description of polarity in his theory of plant-grafting: he links polarity to horticultural experiments designed to tie two plants together, with the purpose of guiding their growth into one plant.[17] This organic metaphor for polar activity captures Goethe's connection of polarity and the process of *Bildung*: *Bildung*, for Goethe, consists in the activity of moving (or growing) upward through polarities, maintaining the tension therein.[18] In this sense, Goethe invokes the term "*Steigerung*," as a 'heightening' or 'intensification' that indicates the process of formation through which the embrace of opposites, indeed their "fusion," occurs.[19] This pattern of dyadic growth, as Goethe develops it in *Wilhelm Meister*, presents the *fundamental function* of *Bildung*,

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[16] See Ronald Gray's summary of Goethe's color theory and its limitations in describing polarity and ascent. On the relationship of Goethe's color theory and polarity, see also, Angus Nicholls, "The Philosophical Concept of the Daemonic in Goethe's 'Mächtiges Überraschen,'" in *Goethe Yearbook 14*, ed. Simon Richter and Martha Helfer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 160.

[17] Pierre Hadot, *The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature*, trans. and ed. Michael Chase (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 220-223, offers a section that describes Goethe's understanding of polarity and the ascent of plants. He writes that Goethe described "fundamental laws that preside in a general way over natural movements, particularly the two forces of polarity (*Polarität*) and intensification or ascension (*Steigerung*), which we see at work, for example, in the growth of a plant. Indeed, the double movement of spirality and verticality that characterizes it corresponds to the fundamental rhythm of nature that is the opposition between *Polarität* and *Steigerung*, or between 'splitting in two' and 'ennobling' or 'intensification.'" As Goethe observes in his essay, "*Polarität*," "The separated parts seek each other out once again and may find one another and reunite . . . This reunification may be carried out in a transcendent mode, insofar as that which has been separated is initially ennobled [*sich steigert*], and by the linkage between ennobled parts it produces a third, which is new, superior, and unexpected." Translated into English by Michael Chase in Pierre Hadot, *The Veil of Isis*, from *Goethes Werke*, ed. Großherzogin Sophie von Sachsen (Weimar: Hermann Böhlau, 1887-1919), II.11, 166: "Das Getrennte sucht sich wieder, und es kann sich wieder finden und vereinigen. . . . Die Vereinigung kann aber auch im höhern Sinne geschehen, indem das Getrennte sich zuerst steigert und durch die Verbindung der gesteigerten Seiten ein Drittes, Neues, Höheres, Unerwartetes hervorbringt."

[18] See Benjamin Sax's discussion of Goethe's description of Faust's *Bildung* in these terms in his *Images of Identity: Goethe and the Problem of Self-Conception in the Nineteenth Century* (New York: Grove/Atlantic, 1988), 243. The growth of the plants also reflects the marrying of nature and culture in the process of *Bildung* (see below): The growth would occur both naturally (the plants are inherently suited to the grafting activity), but it also demands the involvement of the horti*culturalist* to set up and guide the experiment.

[19] Ronald Gray, 3. Adding an additional layer of dyadic activity, *Polarität* and *Steigerung* act as opposing poles: as Angus Nicholls, "The Philosophical Concept of the Daemonic," 159, points out, polarity represents "matter" and the heightening is "*geistig*."

and this ability to embrace opposites will become increasingly central to the very *definition* of *Bildung* as we move from Goethe to the Jena Romantics and Schleiermacher.

b. Discussions of *Bildung* in *Meister*: the *Abbé* as Guide

Goethe uses the term *Bildung* approximately thirty times in the course of *Wilhelm Meister*,[20] referring to any number of characters, but the plot revolves around Wilhelm and his process of formation. Characters do not simply use the term in passing, but at points reflect in depth upon the meaning and purpose of *Bildung*.

The two main characters who engage in such reflection are Wilhelm and the *Abbé*, who appears, incognito, at various times. The *Abbé* is an enigmatic figure who heads the "Tower Society" that, the reader finds out towards the end of the novel, has secretly guided Wilhelm's adventures in order to help in his process of formation. On the significance of the Stranger/*Abbé*, Friedrich Schlegel writes that,

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[20] Fotis Jannidis, *Das Individuum und sein Jahrhundert*, 4-5, helpfully presents the specific problems of discussing what *Bildung* means for Goethe, bringing out points similar to those I introduced in chapter one in regard to defining the term in the context of eighteenth-century uses, as well as those cited above. Like Moses Mendelssohn in the last chapter, he connects *Bildung* to both theoretical and practical pursuits; to education in external manners as well as internal mores; and to both the formation of an individual and the formation of a nation. The first mention of *Bildung* in the novel refers to the *Bildung* of "the Nation and the world." See Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister's Apprenticeship*, ed. and trans. Eric Blackall (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 32 (hereafter, *WMA*); *Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre* in *Johann Wolfgang Goethe Sämtliche Werke: Briefe, Tagebücher und Gespräche*, ed. Wilhelm Voßkamp and Herbert Jaumann (Frankfurt am Main: Deutcher Klassiker Verlag, 1991), I.9, 412 (hereafter, *WML*). However, much of the work concentrates on the process of *Bildung* undergone by individuals—particularly, of course, Wilhelm. In addition, interpretations of *Bildung* often arise in *Meister* along the dyadic lines of *Bildung*-as-theoretical-education (book-learning) and *Bildung*-as-practical-education (life lessons), and this polarity winds throughout the novel. For example, Wilhelm decides that Mignon, the young girl who has been traveling with him and his friends, must now be sent off to receive *Bildung*—an education. Here education refers to "schooling." Mignon retorts that she has "been educated enough" (*bin gebildet genug*), not by books but by life, so that she knows love and sorrow (*WMA*, 299). "Er stellte ihr vor, daß sie nun herangewachsen sei und daß doch etwas für ihre weitere Bildung getan werden müsse. 'Ich bin gebildet genug,' versetzte sie, 'um zu lieben und zu trauern'" (*WML*, 866). Goethe's characters suggest various ways to pursue *Bildung*, asserting at different points that it occurs best through an emotional connection with another person—that a love affair provides a method of *Bildung*—and that until the quite recent developments in German literature, the *only* available source of *Bildung* had been French literature. See *WMA*, 226 (on love) and 207 (on French literature).

> in order that our feelings should not strive merely in an empty infinity, but rather that the eye might estimate the distance according to some higher point of view and set some bounds to the vast prospect, the Stranger is there. . . . Alone and incomprehensible, . . . the Stranger acts as a measure of the heights to which the work has yet to rise, where art will become a science, and life an art.[21]

Schlegel focuses on the *Abbé*'s guidance, not of Wilhelm, but of *the reader*. The *Abbé*, for Schlegel, points both to the artistic merit of the piece (showing how 'art becomes a science') and to the impact of the novel on the reader (so that the reader's 'life becomes an art').

The "higher point of view" that the *Abbé* offers the reader (and Wilhelm) has to do with his invocation of *Bildung*. The *Abbé*'s discussions help Wilhelm think through his own process of formation by introducing *Bildung* as a general topic of conversation—pointing both Wilhelm and the reader towards the "heights to which the work has yet to rise," where, Schlegel asserts, 'life becomes an art.'

In one such encounter, Wilhelm meets the disguised Abbé shortly after leaving the theatre group with whom he has traveled, and he complains to the Stranger about the time he wasted with his theatrical cohorts. The Stranger suggests a broader view of *Bildung*, which does not negate Wilhelm's theatrical experiences: "Everything that happens to us leaves its traces, everything contributes imperceptibly to our development [*Bildung*]. But it is dangerous to draw up a balance sheet . . . . The safest thing remains to concentrate on what lies immediately ahead."[22] He suggests, in effect, that one need not go out in search of *Bildung* and amass it here and there, like some quantitative asset. *Bildung* happens continuously: not *just* in the theatre, not *just* in school, not *just* in one's

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[21] Friedrich Schlegel, "On Goethe's *Meister*," 61.

[22] *WMA*, 257-8; *WML*, 798: "Alles, was uns begegnet, läßt Spuren zurück, alles trägt unmerklich zu unserer Bildung bei; doch es ist gefährlich, sich davon Rechenschaft geben zu wollen. . . . Das Sicherste bleibt immer, nur das Nächste zu tun, was vor uns liegt."

travels, not *just* in the reading of books like *Meister*, but through *all* of these, if one directs oneself (with the help of others) aright.[23] Life is an endless opportunity for *Bildung.* The *Abbé* keeps both Wilhelm and the reader focused on *Bildung*, and the next section discusses what Wilhelm—and the reader—learn about *Bildung* when they train their attention on it.

c. Nature and Culture: Polarity and the *Bildung* of (a) Genius in *Meister*

The association of polarity and *Bildung*, for Goethe, was introduced above, and one of the fundamental polarities explored in discussions of *Bildung* in *Meister* is that between nature and culture. The polarity follows broadly the Rousseauian division between the 'state of nature' and society: Nature refers to an organic realm—what is innate *within* humans as well as their naïve interactions with the world (and people) around them, while culture refers to a humanly-inscribed realm of social expectations and codes ordered by theoretical structures. Goethe associates this dyad with the cultivation of genius, arguing in *Meister* that the genius must hold both together to accomplish *Bildung*.

Genius presents another fluid concept of the era, which for Goethe was related to both *Bildung* and polarity. As the notion of genius recurs in the Jena-Romantic understanding of *Bildung*, a brief history of its development in the German context helps to orient the reader.

The term *Genie* (genius) entered the German lexicon via the French term *génie*, but the German use of the term that Goethe drew upon came by way of the English. Edward Young's *Conjectures on Original Composition* (1759) argued that genius is not a

[23] Goethe (as will Schlegel and Schleiermacher) follows this strain of thinking on *Bildung* introduced in chapter one: *Bildung* may occur in educational settings, but *Bildung* is formation for life, more generally, and does not amount to the acquisition of knowledge and vocational skill-sets.

skill that one acquires: "Learning is borrowed knowledge; genius is knowledge innate."[24] For Young, the author becomes the creator of an original work; the ancients become models not of artistic content, but of creative activity.[25] Developing the theme of authorial self-sufficiency and originality, Young relied upon the Renaissance tradition of linking genius and divinity: "With regard to the moral world, *conscience*, with regard to the intellectual, *genius*, is that god within. Genius can set us right in Composition, without the rules of the learned; as conscience sets us right in life, without the laws of the land."[26] But, Young cautions, the "most fatal error" of genius is to place the products of genius above divine revelation.[27]

Young's definition of genius made its way to German lands through Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), who introduced the work to Herder.[28] Herder built upon Young (and others)[29] to argue against the prevailing trends of imitative genius espoused

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[24] Edward Young, *Conjectures on Original Composition: In a Letter to the Author of Sir Charles Grandison* (London: Printed for A. Millar and R. and J. Dodsley, 1759), 37.
[25] Ibid., 20-21.
[26] Ibid., 31.
[27] Ibid., 37-39. Genius reaches its limits below the heights of divine truth. The 'god within' takes the place of external rules that one learns, but in the sense of an internal measure. Thus, the genius recognizes 'the god within,' but is not thereby divinized. Though Young stressed originality and the divine spark of creativity in composition, he attempted to counter the assumption that the genius is a rare exception, rising like a god above the rest of humanity. For Young, a consequence of the detachment of learning and genius was that genius could become more commonly attributable: "Many a genius, probably, there has been, which could neither write, nor read. So that genius, that supreme lustre of literature, is less rare than you conceive" (Edward Young, 36). Although not crossing the threshold himself, Young opens the door, through this definition of genius, to the idea that genius may be a pervasive element in human nature, which flowers artistically in some and not others.
[28] Hamann spent time in England before finally settling in Königsberg, where he met Herder. On the transmission of Young between the two, see Michael Beddow, "Goethe on Genius," in *Genius: The History of an Idea*, ed. Penelope Murray (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 99. On Young's influence on Herder, see Gregory Moore's introduction in Johann Gottfried Herder, *Shakespeare*, trans. and ed. Gregory Moore (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
[29] The 'others' include Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671-1713), who was highly influential in the realm of aesthetics in the eighteenth century and was a popular thinker among the members of the Jena circle. Shaftesbury describes genius as creative power mimicking divine creativity—a Promethean power. The genius is intuitive, but also abides by the general rules of art. Within the German tradition, Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock argued before the advent of Young's *Conjectures* that genius imitates nature, but in new orderings that make the genius a true creator. Hamann potentially introduced the writing of Klopstock to Herder during the same period he introduced Young's. See Frederick Adler's

by German literary scholars like Bodmer, Breitinger, and Gottsched.[30] Herder's concept of genius also emphasized its intuitive nature,[31] following Young's separation of genius and learning.[32] Herder, however, would temper the irrational aspect central to the idea of genius that Hamann developed from Young. The genius, in Herder's view, intuits the character of his nation and then puts this into language through works of art—he heralded Shakespeare as an example. But for Herder, the nation itself has a genius as well—the role of the artistic genius is to express the nation's genius.[33]

As the above observations suggest, a spectrum of positions arose in the eighteenth-century German context concerning genius. As a faculty, genius was linked with an innate power[34] that was productive and original rather than imitative, with arguments concerning whether the faculty was linked more to intuition and feeling or to

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chapter "The Conception of the Poet" in his dissertation *Klopstock and Herder* (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1913), 58-72 for a lively, if at times convoluted, discussion of the connection between their ideas of genius. For Klopstock, though genius mediated access to the sublime, it was not, itself, divine creativity, but the balancing of multiple powers. It was also, thus, not an irrational force (along the lines suggested by Hamann). Influential for Herder, Klopstock stressed the role of genius in moving the soul of the reader, advancing towards the eventual link between genius and feeling.

[30] Michael Beddow, "Goethe on Genius," 98-99.

[31] While Young's separation of learning and genius was influential for Hamann, Herder, and Goethe as they developed their own concepts of genius as linked to intuition or feeling, it was also Rousseau's description of the link between genius and feeling/emotion that contributed to the thinking of the era along these lines.

[32] Recall here the parallel separation of *Bildung* and *Erziehung* in chapter one.

[33] Martin Berman, in his article "Kant contra Herder: Almost against Nature" in *Florida Philosophical Review* 6:1 (2006), 56, provides an apt summary of Herder's concept of genius, which emphasizes the distinction between intuition and irrationality, the role of language, and the role of national culture (*Kultur*): "The Genius, even as a thinker, is in touch with his feelings, in a fullness of feeling which, simultaneously, is rooted in the "deep down under things" of nature. . . . For Herder, language is at the basis of the cultural genius of a nation, and formed by a literary Genius, say Goethe. When the Genius intuitively grasps culture, he creates further a national language. The process is a creative, organic development of the natural feelings of the historical development of a nation. The genius/personality of a nation is thereby to be found in its literature and art; it precludes a foreigner and this doctrine of national romanticism, tied to nature cum native soil (*Heimat*), alienates the humanity of the outsider: historically for Germany, it is particularly urban, anti-Jewish, and in a sense, anti-intellectual." The Jena circle, I will argue below in chapter four, finds a use for the 'foreigner' in its vision of the development of national culture, but one that continues to promote the 'national romanticism' heralded by Herder.

[34] Some debate arises over a possible distinction between talent and genius, as in, for example, Jean Paul Richter's *Vorschule der Aesthetik* (1804). And genius is also still described at times as an accompanying spirit, following one of its classical definitions.

reason. Increasingly, as a personality, the genius evolved from a superb imitator to an original creator.

The young Goethe entered this conversation through his friendship with Herder, which began in 1770. Though Goethe produced much less literary theory than actual literature, he indirectly presents his own evolving theory of the concept in several of his literary productions.[35] Pairing Goethe's early poem *Prometheus* (1774) with *Wilhelm Meister* showcases the evolution of Goethe's thinking on genius. [36]

In *Prometheus*, Goethe defines creative genius through a poetic revision of Genesis 1:26-27, which reads, "And God said: *Let us make humans—an image that is like us* . . . So God created man in God's image, in the image of God he created him; and he created them, a male and a female" (*Laßt uns Menschen machen, ein Bild, das uns gleich sei*).[37] Goethe espouses a transfer of creative independence. Indeed, Goethe reverses the speaking roles, so that it is Prometheus who utters the words, addressing the gods: "Here I sit, forming humans/ In my image/ A race that is like me" (*Hier sitz ich, forme*

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[35] I follow Michael Beddow, "Goethe on Genius," 98-112 in addressing the concept of genius in Goethe. David Wellberry, *The Specular Moment: Goethe's Early Lyric and the Beginnings of Romanticism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 299, presents an interesting case that, for Goethe, genius was "not a concept at all, but a multivalent symbolic position." I agree with his assertion that discussing the 'concept of genius' in Goethe oversimplifies what Goethe wishes to express, because it represents genius is a monolithic subject for Goethe in his writing. But Wellberry overly complicates the issue in order to re-present the complexity of Goethe's thinking on genius. The best approach is a middle ground that recognizes Goethe's multiple perspectives on genius (as Wellberry calls it, the 'genius problematic') without overlaying Goethe's thinking with an equally complicated vocabulary (as Wellberry does) not organic to Goethe's own discussions of the subject.

[36] The theme of genii as Promethean figures was not new, and Goethe had at least read Shaftesbury's description of the genius as Prometheus in the years shortly following his first meeting with Herder in 1770.

[37] Emphasis mine. Genesis 1:26-27 is quoted from *The Holy Bible: Revised Standard Version Containing the Old and New Testaments* (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1952), 1-2. The German is from the Luther Bible: "Und Gott sprach: Lasset uns Menschen machen, ein Bild, das uns gleich sei . . . . Und Gott schuf den Menschen ihm zum Bilde, zum Bilde Gottes schuf er ihn; und schuf sie einen Mann und ein Weib." From, *Die Bibel: oder die ganze heilige Schrift des Altens und Neuens Testaments nach der deutschen Übersetzung d. Martin Luthers* (Stuttgart: Privileg, Wurt, Bibelanstalt, 1953), 5-6.

Menschen/ Nach meinem Bilde,/ Ein Geschlecht das mir gleich sei).[38] The words of divine revelation now issue from Prometheus, not from the gods.[39] With this reversal of speaking roles, Prometheus authors his own creativity—he announces to the gods his own godlike (creative) nature.

Prometheus acts both as a creator (of humans) and a self-creating subject.[40] The notion that genius is originality rather than imitation reaches an apex: Originality was often described as a 'divine spark' or 'god within,' preserving some notion that original artistic productions, though not imitative of a preceding artistic form, replicate divine creativity. In a certain sense, then, human originality would remain an imitation of divine creativity. The utter perspectival shift in *Prometheus* replaces the notion of divine creativity with self-creativity. Nothing earthly *or* divine contributes to Prometheus' creative activity. Prometheus' creation of humans in *his* image means that Prometheus makes humans with this attribute of self-creativity—the formation of their subjectivity depends upon them alone.[41]

Goethe tempers his early position in *Prometheus* when he returns to the idea of genius in *Meister*, now describing the self-creative genius as prone to faltering. This discussion of genius occurs in the context of conversations about *Bildung*, in the course

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[38] Goethe, *Werke*, I, 204.

[39] Although it's worth noting that in the same year that Goethe penned *Prometheus*, Herder focused in his *Älteste Urkunde des Menschengeschlechts* on how the description of creation in Genesis is written from the perspective of humans, not God, as if an already existing earth-bound creature reported the divine activity of creation. Herder and Goethe both were interested in the perspectival shift from God to humans in the creation narrative in Genesis.

[40] See David Wellberry, 332-333 as well as Karl Otto Conrady (upon whom Wellberry builds), "Goethe: 'Prometheus,'" in *Zum jungen Goethe*, ed. Wilhelm Große (Stuttgart: Klett Cotta, 1982), 81-91. I follow Wellberry's interpretation here, although he makes this argument in order to show how Goethe subverts the 'theological' notion of genius. I agree that Goethe creates an anthropocentric definition of genius in *Prometheus*, even more so than Herder, but my own argument in discussing the Genesis passage in the various figures in this dissertation has been to emphasize the consistent anthropological function of the verses rather than a shift from the theological to anthropological usage.

[41] David Wellberry, 334, elaborates this point.

of the first of two episodes in which a Stranger appears (the Abbé of the Tower Society in various disguises) and converses with Wilhelm.[42]

In his first encounter with 'the Stranger,' Wilhelm and the man begin by discussing the 'game' that they and the theatre company are in the midst of playing: they have all chosen a character and are interacting with each other and those they meet only in character. The stranger applauds this exercise, stating that, "It is the very best way to take people out of themselves and, by way of a detour, return them to themselves."[43] He goes on to express how he believes such extemporaneous performances would benefit a public audience as well. Of course, looking back from the final chapters of the novel, the stranger's remarks indicate that he views the exercise as useful to *Bildung*, since the Society manual explicitly defines the process of *Bildung* as going beyond or outside of oneself (cultivating others) in order to truly cultivate oneself.[44]

But the incognito Abbé does not leave Wilhelm to his own devices to draw the connection between artistic expression and *Bildung*: he explicitly states the relation through the introduction of genius (*Genie*). The Stranger suggests that actors must strive beyond natural talent to perfect their skills. Wilhelm asks in response, "shouldn't natural talent, as the first and last, be all that an actor, like any other artist, or indeed any human

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[42] The significance of the stranger does not escape Friedrich Schlegel, who writes in his "On Goethe's *Meister*," in *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism*, 61, that "in order that our feelings should not strive merely in an empty infinity, but rather that the eye might estimate the distance according to some higher point of view and set some bounds to the vast prospect, the Stranger is there—so rightly called the Stranger. Alone and incomprehensible, . . . the Stranger acts as a measure of the heights to which the work has yet to rise, where art will become a science, and life an art."

[43] *WMA*, 67; *WML*, 473: "Es ist die beste Art die Menschen aus sich heraus und durch einen Umweg wieder in sich hinein zu führen."

[44] *WMA*, 301; *WML*, 871.

being, needs to enable him to reach the high goal he has set himself?"[45] And with this question, Wilhelm sets up the Stranger/Abbé to direct him to the crux of the conversation: Certainly natural talent forms the base of success, but, the *Abbé* continues, one "will be deficient if [one] does not somehow cultivate [*Bildung . . macht*] what [one] has, and what [one] is to be, and that quite early on [*frühe Bildung*]. It could be that those considered geniuses [*Genie*] are worse off than those with ordinary abilities, for a genius can more easily . . . go astray."[46] *Bildung*, the *Abbé* argues, is necessary even for—indeed, especially for—geniuses.

How *Bildung* occurs for the genius, Wilhelm suggests, is best left to Fate rather than human direction, since one always attempts to form the other into oneself. Oh no, replies the Stranger, "I would rather entrust myself to the reason of a human tutor," since "Fate . . . may well have in Chance a very clumsy means through which to operate."[47] Here a genius is one who possesses some sort of natural artistic talent and who will rarely (or at least clumsily) cultivate that talent to its highest potential apart from the direction of more advanced talents who can "tutor" the person in the cultivation and use of genius.

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[45] *WMA*, 67; *WML*,474: "'Sollte aber nicht,' versetzte Wilhelm, "'ein glückliches Naturell, als das Erste und Letzte, einen Schauspieler wie jeden andern Künstler, ja vielleicht wie jeden Menschen, allein zu einem so hochaufgesteckten Ziele bringen?'"

[46] *WMA*, 67; *WML*, 474: ". . . dürfte dem Künstler manches fehlen, wenn nicht Bildung das erst aus ihm macht, was er sein soll, und zwar frühe Bildung; denn vielleicht ist derjenige, dem man Genie zuschreibt, über daran als der, der nur gewöhnliche Fähigkeiten besitzt; denn jener kann leichter verbildet und viel heftiger auf falsche Wege gestoßen werden als dieser." Immanuel Kant's comments in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and ed. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), echo the *Abbé*'s, although Kant's insistence on the need for "academic training" receives expression in the *Abbé*'s speech to the need for *Bildung*. Kant, 189, writes: "Now since the originality of his talent constitutes one (but not the only) essential element of the character of the genius, superficial minds believe that they cannot show that they are blossoming geniuses any better than by pronouncing themselves free of the academic constraint of all rules, and they believe that one parades around better on a horse with the staggers than one that is properly trained. Genius can only provide rich material for products of art; its elaboration and form require a talent that has been academically trained."

[47] *WMA*, 68; *WML*, 475: "Ich würde mich immer lieber an die Vernunft eines menschlichen Meisters halten. Das Schicksal, für dessen Weisheit ich alle Ehrfurcht trage, mag an dem Zufall, durch den es wirkt, ein sehr ungelenkes Organ haben."

Again, the Society's message emerges from the lips of the Stranger: an individual's *Bildung* requires both self-management (natural ability) and the management of others (cultural influence)—particularly, it becomes clear later, those 'others' involved in the same process, but at a higher stage. One's genius forms *through* the cultivated genius of others.

This conversation on *Bildung* in *Meister* points to the evolution in Goethe's thinking that has occurred since *Prometheus*: *Bildung* combines nature and culture. In his study, "Goethe on Genius," Michael Beddow's statement on Goethe's later views of genius encapsulates Goethe's portrayal of genius in *Meister*:

> He [Goethe] no longer holds that the true genius must speak with the original voice of Nature and shun the influences of received culture; genius now involves marrying individual invention with a sense of what human beings have collectively achieved in civilization by intertwining individuality with tradition. The genius consequently needs an informed sense of what others have done and what others need as well as a powerful sense of spontaneous creative energy.[48]

The genius in *Prometheus* sits in isolation. The genius in *Meister* develops, because those who have come before along the path of *Bildung* help those on the path behind them. Moreover, the genius develops through the "marrying" of nature and culture.

But such a marriage remains a combination of opposites that requires thoughtful negotiation. Wilhelm does not encounter nature and culture as a unified pair: Goethe's *Meister* reflects the "fragmentariness" of German society.[49] The process of *Bildung* requires that Wilhelm bring these fragmentary aspects of his experience together. Wilhelm struggles with this task throughout the novel. For example, he reflects at one

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[48] Michael Beddow, "Goethe on Genius," 106. Interestingly, Beddow makes no mention of *Meister*, first noting this shift in Goethe's thinking in 1798 and finding its full expression in *Dichtung und Wahrheit* (1811-1833). I would argue that *Meister* proves the shift occurred, in full, by 1795.
[49] T.J. Reed, "The *Goethezeit* and Its Aftermath," 534.

point that nature provides the only sure means of *Bildung*, rejecting the *Abbé*'s observation (above) that whatever lies before him can contribute to his *Bildung*. He soliloquizes,

> All this moralizing is unnecessarily strict . . . Nature turns us [*uns . . bildet*], in her own pleasant way, into what we should be. Strange indeed are those demands of middle class society that confuse and mislead us, finally demanding more from us than Nature herself. I deplore all attempts at developing us [*Bildung*] which obliterate the most effective means of education [*Bildung*] by forcing us towards the endpoint instead of giving us a sense of satisfaction along the way.[50]

The statement appears to discount the role of culture—"Nature" cultivates us into "what we should be," and no human intervention needs to aid cultivation. However, this speech does not represent *Bildung* in full: it presents a fragment of *Bildung*. In the culmination of his formation, Wilhelm must embrace the participation of culture in *Bildung* as well. The fusing of nature and culture, which marks Goethe's mature theory of the cultivation of genius in an individual, requires that *Bildung* not eschew the contribution of either nature or culture, nor allow one or the other to rule alone in the process of cultivation. Nature and culture organically entwine, much like Goethe projected in the grafting of plants.

This view rejects certain forms of didacticism that work *against* the natural inclinations of the pupil; i.e., it resists the over-moralizing, brow-beating manner of inculcating *Bildung* associated with etiquette classes, grammar drills, moral tracts and philosophical treatises, which in the end produce culturally-inscribed automatons, but not

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[50] *WMA*, 307; *WML*, 881: "O, der unnötigen Strenge der Moral!" rief er aus, "da die Natur uns auf ihre liebliche Weise zu allem bildet, was wir sein sollen. O, der seltsamen Anforderungen der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, die uns erst verwirrt und mißleitet und dann mehr als die Natur selbst von uns fordert! Wehe jeder Art von Bildung, welche die wirksamsten Mittel wahrer Bildung zerstört und uns auf das Ende hinweist, anstatt uns auf dem Wege selbst zu beglücken!"

internal dispositions.[51] Indeed, when the Tower Society puts on a theatrical event as the culmination of drawing Wilhelm into their fold, they practice this method of working *with* rather than against the 'pupil': they know that Wilhelm's theatrical predilections make him more receptive to hearing their message through a staged production.[52] And the final passages on *Bildung*, framed by the reading of the Society's manual,[53] do not stand in direct opposition to Wilhelm's effusive account of natural *Bildung*; they temper his statements by reinforcing that "Nature" cannot get one very far without its dyadic pole: culture.

In *Meister*, the negotiation of nature and culture in *Bildung* presents the embrace of polarity as *fundamental* to the process of formation: No true genius develops without the reconciliation of this opposition. Goethe's literary expression of this activity emphasizes the "fragmentariness of German society" in the late-eighteenth century and the ability of the genius to negotiate fragmentariness through a process of *Bildung* based on the embrace of polarities.

As the following section will show, Friedrich Schlegel also experiences "fragmentariness" as reflective of human life in the world, and he will agree that the negotiation of polar opposition *defines* the activity of *Bildung*, but Schlegel will view the nature/culture dyad as a subset of a grander dyadic opposition: that between particularity

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[51] Here I am confident in associating this view with Goethe, given his view (discussed above) that social and political changes occur through cultural and aesthetic means. See also Todd Kontje's account of the Weimar intellectuals' association of the political implications for *Bildung* with "organic growth" rather than revolution, in *The German Bildungsroman: History of a National Genre* (Columbia, SC: Camden House, 1993), 5.

[52] And, indeed, the reader learns that this "staging" has occurred not simply in this theatrical event, but that the Society has plotted/staged many of the events of the novel, drawing Wilhelm along his path of *Bildung*. When the Jena Romantics point to the irony of *Meister*, this situation, which ironically plays with the notion of *Bildung* as *self*-actualization, must have figured prominently.

[53] When Wilhelm takes up the Society's manual, he finds the Society's assessment of itself as a force for promoting *Bildung*, and this discovery provides the impetus for his most advanced realizations about his own process of *Bildung*.

and universality. Fragmentariness, for Schlegel, takes on cosmic dimensions, of which current social situations are but the reflection.

2. Schleiermacher, Schlegel and *Meister*

Schleiermacher arrived in Berlin and joined the Jena circle with a pre-established interest in *Meister* and other literary trends. When *Meister* was first published, Schleiermacher was working for a relative as clergy in a parish in Landsberg. There he pursued his vocation as a preacher and focused on the religious instruction of the children of the parish.[54] A letter to his friend Alexander Dohna in 1795 offers Schleiermacher's preliminary reflections on Goethe's novel. Schleiermacher tells Dohna that he has just read the first two parts of *Meister* and is awaiting the third. On the basis of these first two installments, Schleiermacher effuses that Goethe's writing is the pinnacle of prose, adding that Goethe's Weimar compatriot Schiller represents the pinnacle of poetry.[55] Schleiermacher not only comes to Berlin having read *Meister*, he has formed an opinion of Goethe that matches the enthusiasm for *Meister* shared by his new friends in Berlin.

The letter also provides a glimpse into Schleiermacher's reading world at this time: In the few quiet moments he could find, Schleiermacher continues his philosophical studies, delving into Kant in particular, but his intellectual tastes are much broader.[56] Schleiermacher recommends to his friend Friedrich Schiller's journal, *Die Horen* (1795-1797), which, in Schiller's words, would be devoted "to instruction [*Unterricht*] and to *Bildung*."[57] Contributors to the issues from 1795 included Schiller,

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[54] *SKGA*, V.1, 367.
[55] *SKGA*, V.1, 394: "Göthe treibt jetzt die deutsche Prose zu einem Grade der Vollkommenheit, auf dem sie, besonders in der erzählenden Gattung, noch nie gestanden hat . . . So thut Schiller der Poesie."
[56] *SKGA*, V.1, 392-394.
[57] "Man widmet sie der *schönen* Welt zum Unterricht und zur Bildung, und der *gelehrten* zu einer freien Forschung der Wahrheit und zu einem fruchtbaren Umtausch der Ideen." The full text of *Die Horen*,

Goethe, Herder, Fichte, and August Wilhelm Schlegel. Thus, even before his encounter with the Jena Romantic circle, Schleiermacher maintained an interest in literature as well as philosophy and theology. The letter also reflects Schleiermacher's appreciation of the *Bildung*-focused intellectual productions of the era. Indeed, his reading interests prepare him well to participate in the Jena circle discussion of the future of literature and its role in the *Bildung* of their countrymen and fellow Europeans. When Schleiermacher joins the Jena circle in 1797, their attention to the current state—as well as the future—of German literature is trained, in particular, on Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*.

a. Schleiermacher and Schlegel: the Period of Sym/philosophy

The friendship between Friedrich Schlegel and Schleiermacher propels Schleiermacher's literary interests during this period, and the closeness of their relationship helps to clarify the way in which the two men think *together*. Schlegel even developed a concept for how this co-thinking would occur through his discussions of "symphilosophy" and "sympoesy." The terms can refer both to multiple people creating a common philosophical/artistic statement and to an author entering with a reader in a "sacred relationship" in which the author draws the reader into the artwork with agency intact.[58]

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beginning with Schiller's letter concerning the purpose of the journal, from which the above quotation is drawn, can be accessed online at http://www.wissen-im-netz.info/literatur/schiller/horen/index.htm.

[58] See Firchow, 34, #125; *KFSA*, I.2, 185 on communal construction of a statement and Firchow, 14, #112; *KFSA*, I.2, 161 on the relationship of author and reader. Symphilosophy was originally, it appears, Schlegel's idea. He wanted to pursue experiments with his brother, Novalis, and Schleiermacher, in thinking philosophically *together*. See Schlegel's letter to his brother August Wilhelm in *KFSA*, III.24, 45. Ruth Richardson reads Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve* as an outgrowth of the symphilosophy that Schleiermacher and Schlegel both theorized and practiced. See Ruth Richardson's sixth dissertation chapter, "'Weihnachtsfeier'as Sym/theology," in *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry,"* especially 832-854, wherein she argues that the female/male relationships in *Christmas Eve* demonstrate sym/theology. She defines sym/theology as a combination of poetry and philosophy—a combination necessary for Schleiermacher's definition of religion as *Gefühl*.

Schleiermacher and Schlegel participate in symphilosophy in both of these senses: both conversationally crafting ideas and entering the sacred author/reader relationship through one another's literary productions. *Athenaeum* fragment 35 presents an example of symphilosophy of the first type, where Schlegel provides the first part and Schleiermacher writes the second part.[59] Schleiermacher, though primarily a chaplain rather than an author, is urged by his friends to join them in creating his own literary productions. In this way, Schlegel and Schleiermacher enter into symphilosophy of the second type, with Schleiermacher writing his *Speeches* for his cultivated friends ("*die Gebildeten*"), and Schlegel responding to it with his review of the work in the *Athenaeum*. Indeed, Schleiermacher would follow suit: after Schlegel wrote *Lucinde* (which, in part, addressed Schleiermacher directly), Schleiermacher responds, in defense of Schlegel, with his *Confidential Letters Concerning Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde*.[60]

By 1798, Schleiermacher's friends had already drawn from him the promise to write what would eventually become his *Speeches*.[61] Though he writes much of the work the following year, he begins in 1798, both living and working alongside Schlegel as

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[59] Firchow, 22-23, #35: "A *cynic* should really have no possessions whatever: for a man's possessions, in a certain sense, actually possess him [Schlegel]. The solution to this problem is to own possessions as if one didn't own them. But it's even more artistic and cynical not to own possessions as if one owned them [Schleiermacher]." *KFSA*, I.2, 171: "Der *Zyniker* dürfte eigentlich gar keine Sachen haben: denn alle Sachen, die ein Mensch hat, haben ihn doch in gewissem Sinne wieder. [Schlegel] Es kömmt also nur darauf an, die Sachen so zu haben, als ob man sie nicht hätte. Noch künstlicher und noch zynischer ist es aber, die Sachen so nicht zu haben, als ob man sie hätte [Schleiermacher]."

[60] Neither of these productions nor the pieces written in response displayed or produced unanimity in the thinking of the two men. Schlegel's reaction to the *Speeches* was to acknowledge that they had had a strong impact on his new religious orientation, but that he was not persuaded (at this time) to embrace institutional Christianity. And *Lucinde*, itself, covertly contained Schlegel's concerns about the growing separation between himself and Schleiermacher. While Schleiermacher would defend his friend's novel from its critics (which included practically the whole of the German reading public), he was dismayed that Schlegel had aired their personal relationship in the novel.

[61] Schleiermacher describes both the insistent prodding of Schlegel, *Life of Schleiermacher*, 160, and the details of his birthday, when Schlegel, Herz, the Dohna brothers and Dorothea Mendelssohn Veit surprised him with a party and a song of Schlegel's creation, whereby they finally elicited the promise from Schleiermacher to write something original within a year. *Life of Schleiermacher*, 162-163; *SKGA*, V.2, 212-214.

Schlegel writes his own piece on religion—his novel *Lucinde*. Schlegel and his older brother August Wilhelm also begin work on the *Athenaeum* in 1798, an effort to which both Friedrichs contribute. By May, however, Schleiermacher's friendship with Henrietta Herz rouses Schlegel's jealousy. Schleiermacher reports Schlegel's admission of jealousy to his sister, writing that Schlegel was concerned about being "limited to participation in my [Schleiermacher's] intellectual life and my philosophical ideas; to *her* [Herz] I opened my heart."[62] The spat soon ends, but in early 1799, Schleiermacher is sent by his superiors to Potsdam to fill in temporarily as court preacher.

Upon his return to Berlin in May 1799, with his *Speeches* in hand to read to his friends, Schleiermacher and Schlegel do not return to cohabitation. They work together on the *Athenaeum* fragments, plan future collaborations, and talk more about their project for a co-translation of Plato's *Dialogues*—an idea that sprouted while Schleiermacher was in Potsdam.[63] But, there is both the old joy and the new understanding of limitations in their exchanges. Schleiermacher relays this sentiment to Henrietta Herz:

> I had a wonderful conversation with Schlegel about myself, during which, probably, neither understood the other. He is writing a notice of the [*Speeches*], and is, in consequence, making a regular study of me. He wants to know what is my centre, and we have not been able to agree upon the subject. I wonder if I understand myself as he wishes to understand me?[64]

Increasingly, Schleiermacher realizes that the answer to this question is, "No." In fact, he may have known with certainty after the above exchange, which Schleiermacher

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[62] *Life of Schleiermacher*, 171; *SKGA*, V.2, 322: "Schlegel bekannte mir aufrichtig er wäre eifersüchtig auf die Herz, meine Freundschaft mit ihr wäre so schnell und so weit gediehen als er es mit mir nicht hätte bringen können, er sei fast nur auf meinen Verstand und meine Philosophie eingeschränkt, und sie habe mein Gemüth."

[63] *Life of Schleiermacher*, 210; *SKGA*, V.3, 101.

[64] *Life of Schleiermacher*, 219. *SKGA*, V.3, 126: ". . . habe ich mit Schlegel noch ein wunderbares Gespräch über mich gehabt, wobei wir uns wahrscheinlich beide nicht verstanden haben. Er notizirt jetzt die Religion, und da studirt er mich ordentlich; er will mein Centrum wissen und darüber haben wir nicht einig werden können. Ob ich mich wol selbst so verstehe wie er mich verstehen will?"

describes to Herz with unwarranted delicacy: Schlegel had accused Schleiermacher during this conversation of refusing him access to his 'centre,' made quite a fuss, and would soon thereafter send Schleiermacher a letter announcing the end of their friendship.[65]

Although they are shortly on speaking terms again, by the end of 1799, with Schlegel spending the majority of his time in Jena and Schleiermacher in Berlin, the two friends drift further apart. Rather than one, particular falling out, the two simply continue to fall prey to mutual misunderstandings and to move, increasingly, in different directions. The friends longed perpetually to interweave their lives and their thinking, but from early in their relationship, they struggled with the inherent differences in their personalities.

In 1803 Schlegel, from France, officially relinquishes to Schleiermacher the project to translate Plato, and the epoch of symphilosophy ends.[66] But as the above description of their life together shows, symphilosophy was not simply an airy and abstract idea thrown about in the *Athenaeum* fragments, but a plan for thinking together that both men undertook seriously in their daily lives.

b. The Jena-Romantic Reception of *Meister*

The period of intellectual fertility between Schleiermacher and Schlegel also marks the period in which the Jena circle published their first reflections upon the meaning of Goethe's *Meister.*[67] Although Schleiermacher never aspired to be a literary

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[65] *SKGA*, V.3, 138-139.

[66] *SKGA*, V.6, 363-365. Ruth Richardson, *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as 'Universal Poetry,'* reads *Christmas Eve* as a continuation of symphilosophy, but given Schlegel's curt response to Schleiermacher's request for feedback (see chapter one), his attempt to symphilosophize with Schlegel concerning the piece ended rather one-sidedly.

[67] The circle's comments upon *Wilhelm Meister* attest to what often appeared, particularly for Friedrich Schlegel, to border on 'Goethe-worship' in their early assessments of the novel. A.W. Schlegel's poem,

critic and consequently never published critical assessments of Goethe's literary endeavors, he did spend many hours with his friend Friedrich Schlegel as Schlegel mapped out a critical appraisal of Goethe during the late 1790's.

As the section above detailed, Friedrich's voice is one that Schleiermacher heard often and trusted implicitly during his Jena period. Schleiermacher participated in Schlegel's formation of the new form of modern literature that Schlegel was interested in developing. As Ruth Richardson notes, "although Schleiermacher did not agree with all of the views expressed by Schlegel . . . he clearly agreed with Schlegel's understanding of modern literature as he had read about it in Schlegel's notebooks. Schleiermacher helped sym/philosophize as to what the new literature would entail."[68] In consequence, Friedrich Schlegel will provide the primary voice of the Jena circle's perspective on Goethe's writing in the following section.

In the heyday of the Schlegel-Schleiermacher friendship (1797-1800), Goethe remains an esteemed figure among the circle. In a letter to his sister in 1798, when Schleiermacher's daily activities revolve around the Jena circle, he declares that, "Novels do not generally come before my eyes now. Instead of all others," he says, he has again taken up *Meister*, where he notes Goethe's "audacity" for having "effectively embraced the whole of human nature" in a book.[69] Not simply Goethe, then, but Goethe's *Meister*,

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which Friedrich quotes in his essay, "On Incomprehensibility," provides an instance in which Goethe approaches divinization at the hands of the Schlegels. He writes, "Admire only idols finely graven,/ And leave us Goethe: master, ally, leader. . . . // The gods in kindness sent you to us bod'ly,/ Such envoys made the world your friendly reader,/ Your form, appearance, name and nature godly." My translation of *KFSA*, I.2, 367-368: "Bewundert nur die feingeschnitzten Götzen,/ Und laßt als Meister, Führer, Freund uns Goethen; . . . // Uns sandte, Goethe, dich der Götter Güte,/ Befreundet mit der Welt durch solchen Boten,/ Göttlich von Namen, Blick, Gestalt, Gemüte."

[68] Ruth Richardson, *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry,"* 585.

[69] *SKGA*, V.2, 331: "Die Anmaßung auch so etwas in einem Buch zu haben, welches gewissermaßen die ganze menschliche Natur umfassen soll, hat sich selbst gestraft." Also in the letter, Schleiermacher tells his sister he is reading *Meister* with Jena-circle member Henrietta Herz and is working on the *Athenaeum* with

in particular, served as a focal point for Schleiermacher's assessment of the literary scene. The language matches Schleiermacher's 1800 Christmas letter to his sister, which describes what *he* would want to accomplish were he to write a novel: his novel would contain "everything that I believe I understand about men and women and human life altogether."[70] Goethe's *Meister* did not simply represent the "perfection" of prose for Schleiermacher, as he had written to Dohna in 1795, it also presented him, in particular, with a model for the literary elaboration of "the whole of human nature."[71]

During this period, Schlegel also locates the epicenter of Goethe's thinking in *Meister*. As one of the characters in his *Dialogue on Poetry* writes in an essay, "*Wilhelm Meister* is for me the most comprehensive essence, from which to a certain extent one can survey the entire compass of [Goethe's] versatility united, as it were, in one center

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the Schlegel brothers. Schleiermacher's re-reading of *Meister* is thus steeped in the Romantic milieu associated with the production of fragments for the *Athenaeum*.

[70] *Life of Schleiermacher*, 241. *SKGA*, V.4, 375.

[71] With such glowing recommendations in his letters to Dohna (1795) and his sister (1798), readers might naturally expect to find Schleiermacher peppering his publications with references to Goethe—and to *Meister*. And in so doing, Schleiermacher would have followed the lead of his friends in the circle: In 1798 Novalis published "On Goethe" and Friedrich Schlegel published "On Goethe's *Meister*." But Schleiermacher's first published reference to Goethe did not appear in his contributions to the *Athenaeum* (1798-1800), his *Speeches* (1799), or his *Soliloquies* (1800). Instead, Schleiermacher first invokes Goethe in *Christmas Eve* (1805)—Schleiermacher's only foray into what he termed a '*Kunstwerk*' or artistic work—in a passage whose broader topic is *Bildung*. Schleiermacher quotes from Goethe's "Winckelmann and His Century," in which Goethe takes up Winckelmann's biography as, explicitly, Winckelmann's process of *Bildung*. Goethe asserts that Winckelmann's biography reflects a successful process of formation, because it combines intellectual pursuits with involvement in a larger community. In the *Christmas Eve* passage, Leonhardt, the stalwart rationalist in the company, refers to Goethe's statement in the Winckelmann biography that religious conversion leaves an indelible stain on one's character. Leonhardt's purpose is to voice his concerns about young Sophie's development (the discussion is put in terms of her *Bildung* by her father). Leonhardt suggests that Sophie's parents' lenience in allowing her exuberant piety free rein will have a negative impact on her development. Sophie's father, Eduard, replies that her piety springs up naturally and does not attach itself to any formal type of religiosity, and that these particular religious sensibilities accord "so well with the rest of her development [*Bildung*] that [Eduard] cannot see how the Roman or even the Herrnhuter way of life could ever attract her" (*CE*, 39; *DW*, 54: "Denke ich nun dies in Harmonie mit ihrer übrigen Bildung so fortgehend, so sehe ich nicht ab, wie das römische Wesen oder auch das herrnhutische für sie jemals könnte anlockend werden.") Schleiermacher's invocation of Goethe in *Christmas Eve*, in the midst of a discussion of *Bildung* between his characters, accords with the Jena circle's easy association of Goethe with the topic of *Bildung*.

point."[72] Two fragments from the *Athenaeum* capture best the scope and magnitude of Goethe's novel as the circle understood it. The first of these two fragments recognizes the literary depth of the piece: "Whoever could manage to interpret Goethe's *Meister* properly would have expressed what is now happening in literature. He could, so far as literary criticism is concerned, retire forever."[73] The phrasing suggests the improbability of ever producing a full interpretation of *Meister*. The difficulty with a full interpretation, the fragment explains, is that *Meister* embodies *everything* that "is now happening in literature."[74] The late-eighteenth century had no lack of contributions to literature: the Jena circle may have thought that much of contemporary literature was vapid and crass,[75] but they also felt that they were surrounded by a number of literary geniuses (most in their own circle, like Jean Paul and Novalis) who merited comparisons to giants from the

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[72] Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry and Literary Aphorisms*, trans. and ed. Ernst Behler and Roman Struc (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968), 106; *KFSA*, I.2, 340: "Mir selbst bleibt der *Meister* der faßlichste Inbegriff, um den ganzen Umfang seiner Vielseitigkeit, wie in einem Mittelpunkte vereinigt, einigermaßen zu überschauen."

[73] Firchow, 15, #120; *KFSA*, I.2, 162: "Wer Goethes *Meister* gehörig charakterisierte, der hätte damit wohl eigentlich gesagt, was es jetzt an der Zeit ist in der Poesie. Er dürfte sich, was poetische Kritik betrifft, immer zur Ruhe setzen."

[74] This would include, the fragment implies in its reference to 'everything,' the literary efforts of the Jena circle (the fiction and essays of Tieck, Wackenroder, Jean Paul, Novalis, the Schlegels, etc.). The fragment, most likely, would not refer to all German literary efforts, but to those that could contribute to the "New School" that Schlegel envisioned (see above). German writers respected by the circle included the writer and philosopher August Ludwig Hülsen (a friend of the circle), Johann Heinrich Voß (a novelist and writer on mythology, of whom Friedrich Schlegel, *KFSA*, II.16, 292, #469, declares, "*Voß* is for poesy what *Kant* is for morality ["*Voß* für π[Poesie], was *Kant* für Moral"]."), and the famed poet Friedrich Gottlieb Klopstock (whom Schlegel thought rose above Goethe and Voß in certain respects, see *KFSA*, II.16, 93, # 105).

[75] A fragment by A.W. Schlegel intimates that he found much of the work reviewing current literature tedious, because of the low quality of the material. He writes, "Bad writers complain a great deal about the tyranny of reviewers; I think the latter would be more justified in complaining. They're supposed to find beautiful, ingenious, and first-rate what is nothing of the sort" (Firchow, 25, #59; *KFSA*, I.2, 174: "Die schlechten Schriftsteller klagen viel über Tyrannei der Rezensenten; ich glaube diese hätten eher die Klage zu führen. Sie sollen schön, geistvoll, vortrefflich finden, was nichts von dem allen ist."). In the fragment, A.W. Schlegel names the dramatist August von Kotzebue as one of these bad writers. Others who would make the list of "bad writers" at various times were Schiller (because of personal rivalries) and Christoph Wieland (who represents the 'old school' of poetry, that has been surpassed by Schlegel's "New School").

past such as Dante, Shakespeare, and Cervantes.[76] The fragment reinforces Goethe's place on this literary scene: The interpreter who could manage fully to treat *Meister* would have covered all topics available to the literary critic. The critic need not pick up any other book to assess the state of literature.

As the second fragment suggests, Goethe's literary accomplishment, itself a great feat, does not yet bring us to the end of *Meister*'s significance: Goethe's literary production has 'revolutionary' social implications. The fragment—one of the most controversial in the *Athenaeum*—asserts that,

> [t]he French Revolution, Fichte's philosophy, and Goethe's *Meister* are the greatest tendencies of the age. Whoever is offended by this juxtaposition, whoever cannot take any revolution seriously that isn't noisy and materialistic, hasn't yet achieved a lofty, broad perspective on the history of mankind. Even in our shabby histories of civilization, . . . many a little book, almost unnoticed by the noisy rabble at the time, plays a greater role than anything they did.[77]

Goethe's *Meister* is not only the most important literary work of the era, but also (and as such) "one of the greatest tendencies of the age" in terms of both theoretical and practical achievements. In fact, the argument of the fragment goes, literature can have a greater revolutionary effect on society than any militaristic mob. Even adjusting interpretation of these fragments for the expected hyperbole of the circle's ironic rhetoric,[78] it remains clear that the members of the Jena circle saw Goethe's *Meister* as central for their

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[76] As Schlegel's idea of the novel genre developed more fully, his highest praise shifted from Goethe (as in "On Goethe's *Meister*") to fellow Jena-circle members, Ludwig Tieck and Jean Paul Richter (as in Schlegel's "Letter on the Novel" in his *Dialogue on Poetry*).

[77] Firchow, 46, #216; *KFSA*, I.2, 198-199: "Die Französische Revolution, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre und Goethes Meister sind die größten Tendenzen des Zeitalters. Wer an dieser Zusammenstellung Anstoß nummt, wem keine Revoluzion wichtig scheinen kann, die nicht laut und materiell ist, der hat sich noch nicht auf den hohen weiten Standpunkt der Geschichte der Menschheit erhoben. Selbst in unsern dürftigen Kulturgeschichten, . . . spielt manches kleine Buch, von dem die lärmende Menge zu seiner Zeit nicht viel Notiz nahm, eine größere Rolle als alles, was diese trieb."

[78] In addition, it was no great compliment to Goethe to hold him up with Fichte and the French Revolution, when the latter two were looked upon by many in German society with a mixture of horror and disgust.

understanding of literature and its potential as a practical force for the transformation of society.[79]

Schlegel's further commentary on the combination of these three 'tendencies of the age' in his notebooks suggests what, in particular, *Meister* offers in the context of literary expression: "what is best in *Wilhelm Meister* is its *method*"—a method, Schlegel states, wherein "everything is treated completely as a *character*" (as in an alphabetic character).[80] In line with Schlegel's understanding of hieroglyphics,[81] treating 'everything as a character' means giving each element of the plot, each character (person in the novel), and each descriptive detail a representative function. This method, as Schlegel puts it in his *Dialogue on Poetry*, is what every author must now imitate: "Nothing is required but that the Germans continue using these (literary) methods, that they follow the example set by Goethe."[82]

Following a method of writing every element as a representative character (symbol) takes on a crucial function, in terms of *Bildung*, when one considers the characters (people depicted in the novel) as symbolic elements. As Schlegel writes in "On Goethe's *Meister*," Goethe "endows even the most circumscribed character [person in the novel] with the appearance of a unique, autonomous individual, while yet possessing another aspect, another variation of that general human nature which is

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[79] See discussion of the shape these goals take below, under the section on *Bildung* and the social goals of literature.
[80] My translation of *KFSA*, II.16, 475, #195: "Das beste im W.[ilhelm] M.[eister] ist d.[ie] *Methode*, wie in der W[issenschafts]l[ehre] und im Grund auch in der Revoluz[ion]"; and #197: "Die Methode im M.[eister] ist das alles ganz als *Buchstabe* behandelt."
[81] Hieroglyphics pique his interest particularly after the discovery of the Rosetta Stone in 1799.
[82] Friedrich Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry*, 74; *KFSA*, I.2, 303: "Es fehlt nichts, als daß die Deutschen diese Mittel ferner brauchen, daß sie dem Vorbilde folgen, was Goethe aufgestellt hat."

constant in all its transformations."[83] Each persona in the novel, then, offers a representation of "general human nature," acting as a symbol of universal humanity.

In this way, Schlegel locates the "method" of *Meister*, in terms of the representative function of the people depicted, in its embrace of universality (universal human nature) and particularity (the individual). Schlegel continues "every cultured reader [*Gebildete*] believes he recognizes only himself in [*Meister*], whereas he is raised far beyond himself."[84] That is, *Meister* encourages a 'heightening' of the reader as the novel guides individuals beyond their particularity in the embrace of universal human nature.[85]

Schlegel precedes his comments on universality and particularity with the observation that, "[t]here is nothing extraordinary about what happens or what is said in [*Meister*] . . . The outlines are light and general, but they are sharp, precise and sure. The smallest trait is meaningful."[86] Goethe's skill lies in his ability to create this movement 'beyond' the self/individuality without the reader recognizing that this has occurred. As Schlegel's interpretation of *Meister* suggests, the embrace of universality and

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[83] Friedrich Schlegel, "On Goethe's *Meister*," 60; *KFSA*, I.2, 127: "Die Art der Darstellung ist es, wodurch auch das Beschränkteste zugleich ein ganz eignes selbständiges Wesen für sich, und dennoch nur eine andre Seite, eine neue Veränderung der allgemeinen und unter allen Verwandlungen einigen menschlichen Natur, ein kleiner Teil der unendlichen Welt zu sein scheint."

[84] Ibid., 60: ". . . jeder Gebildete nur sich selbst wiederzufinden glaubt, während er weit über sich selbst erhoben wird."

[85] In this description, Schlegel intimates a shift in Goethe's metaphor of grafting plants: for Schlegel, the person undergoing *Bildung* uses the novel's characters as a stabilizing prop for the raising of the reader, so that the reader grows up and around the character, without noting the participation of the character in this growth. This subtle shift in perspective between Goethe and Schlegel foreshadows Schlegel's description of Julius' *Bildung* in his novel *Lucinde*, wherein Julius grows because of his relationship with Lucinde, though Lucinde is not depicted undergoing similar growth, but providing the support for Julius' growth. As chapter five will show, Schleiermacher rejects Schlegel's approach, returning to a vision of inter-relational *Bildung* that reflects Goethe's metaphorical description of the grafting of two plants.

[86] Friedrich Schlegel, "On Goethe's *Meister*," 59-60; *KFSA*, I.2, 126: "Was hier vorgeht und was hier gesprochen wird, ist nicht außerordentlich . . . . Die Umrisse sind allgemein und leicht, aber sie sind genau, scharf und sicher. Der kleinste Zug ist bedeutsam."

particularity in *Meister* develops in the fine details of human life, and Goethe's artistic mastery lies in his ability to describe this embrace.[87]

In sum, Schlegel recognizes the greatness of Goethe's "*Bildungsbuch*," as he called *Meister*, in its ability to stimulate growth in readers by facilitating their dyadic embrace of particularity and universality. Goethe accomplishes this in a gentle manner that works with readers giving—as Wilhelm asserts that *Bildung* should give—"a sense of satisfaction along the way," so that readers barely notice they have been 'raised far beyond themselves.'

As Schlegel begins to explore his own theory of *Bildung*, he becomes less certain that *Meister* offers the most efficacious literary means to promote *Bildung* in the reader. The following section investigates both the similarities and the differences that arise between the Jena-Romantic vision of literature and Goethe's vision.

3. The Weimar Context and the Jena Circle's Approach to *Bildung*

The members of the Jena circle look to Goethe as they develop the literary dimensions of their understandings of *Bildung*. But, as Goethe admits, there was never complete literary consensus in this milieu. In 1813, he retrospectively writes, "[i]mportant persons lived here who did not get along with each other, but this fact alone

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[87] Although Schlegel does not refer to a specific passage in *Meister* to make this argument, his comments echo those of Goethe's character, the *Abbé*, in a scene in which the disguised *Abbé* commends a game played by the theater troupe to which Wilhelm belongs. In this 'game,' the members of the troupe choose a persona and stay in that character for an entire day (an early form of method-acting). The *Abbé*/Stranger discusses the benefits of this exercise in the context of a conversation about *Bildung*, stating that "[i]t is the very best way to take people out of themselves and, by way of a detour, return them to themselves" (Goethe, *WMA*, 67; *WML*, 473: "Es ist die beste Art, die Menschen aus sich heraus und durch einen Umweg wieder in sich hinein zu führen."). Taking on 'characters,' the theater troupe participates in *Bildung* by raising themselves beyond their own particularity to explore universal character traits of human nature. Readers of *Meister*, Schlegel argues above, do just that: they view themselves in a character (persona) in the novel, and this process of projection "takes people out of themselves" (as the *Abbé* states), or 'raises people far beyond' themselves (as Schlegel writes). And like the members of the theater troupe, the readers of *Meister* "return to themselves," but in a new way: they have grown through the dyadic embrace of their individuality and "that general human nature which is constant in all its transformations."

kept social contacts lively, was inspiring, and helped preserve everyone's individual freedom."[88] Although the members of the Jena circle acclaim *Meister*, they have their own literary goals, which sometimes come into conflict with those of Goethe. These conflicts help make for the "lively" relations to which Goethe refers.

a. *Bildung* and the Social Goals of Literature

The foundations of these relationships reach back to Goethe's arrival in Weimar, when Friedrich Schlegel and Schleiermacher were still young boys just beginning to learn to read. Goethe visited Weimar in 1775 in his search for patronage and a stable position, and Duke Karl August took a personal interest in the talented young man. In order to provide him with monetary support, Karl August made Goethe a member of the Conseil of Weimar, where Goethe remained as a civil servant for many years. The University of Jena was overseen, in part, by the Duchy of Weimar, and thus Goethe had a hand in much of the goings-on in Jena in the 1790's.

Standing alongside Goethe in the Weimar/Jena context was his professional and personal ally, Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805). Goethe first met Schiller in 1788, but the two do not strike up a true friendship until 1794, when Schiller approaches Goethe to help edit his journal, *Die Horen*. Despite some theoretical differences, they become fast friends—a friendship that strains the relationship of Goethe with the Jena circle as the animosity between the Schlegels and Schiller grows throughout the 1790's.[89]

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[88] From Goethe's letter to Kanzler von Müller, June 6, 1813. Quoted in Gerhart Hoffmeister's editorial introduction to, *A Reassessment of Weimar Classicism*, (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1996), 1.

[89] One particularly famous exchange between the two men sums up the fundamental conflict between their philosophical worldviews: The two attend a talk on natural science in Jena. Both are unhappy with the proceedings, which had portrayed nature in a way that was inorganic and fragmentary. But as they talk, they find that they are dissatisfied for opposing reasons. Goethe sketches a 'symbolic plant' that reflects the idea of 'plant' expressed in all forms a plant assumes (all phenomena known as 'plants'). He asserts that he has concocted this from his *experience*; his idea of the plant arises from and cannot be separated from his experience of particular plants (and so, upon later reflection, he believes that this plant that he

Goethe and Schiller agree that social transformation occurs through *cultural* rather than *political* change.[90] That is, literature offers not just a space to elaborate a theory of social change, but can catalyze social change. Schiller's influential *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (*Briefe über die aesthetische Erziehung des Menschen*, 1795) make this argument that he and Goethe share, insisting that rather than focusing on political transformation, focusing on the transformative nature of art and beauty would lead to freedom. Inculcating *Bildung* in individuals through artistic means makes revolution (particularly, revolutions like that in France) unnecessary.

In the mid-1790's, Goethe and Schiller worry that the Schlegels and their circle express some extreme social positions in their political writing. In 1796, in a treatise that Frederick Beiser describes as "one of the most progressive political writings in the 1790's in Germany,"[91] Friedrich Schlegel argues publicly for the benefits of a republican form of government (even entertaining the usefulness of rebellion).[92] Such a public political statement, in itself, is something that Goethe and Schiller are unlikely to receive with pleasure. But, adding insult to injury, Schlegel deploys classical Greek sources to make his arguments. The more flappable of the two Weimar classicists, Schiller feels the sting

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drew must exist somewhere in nature!). Schiller responds that the realm of ideas and the realm of experience are separable; more, "the characteristic nature of the idea consists in the fact that no experience could ever coincide with it." Goethe, *Schriften zur Biologie*, ed. Konrad Dietzfelbinger (München: Langen Müller, 1982), 46; 77. Put crudely, Goethe tends toward an Aristotelian worldview and Schiller towards a Platonic one. On the increasing strain between Goethe and the Jena circle because of the Schiller/Schlegel feud, see John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe, 1790-1802: A Study in Early German Romanticism" in *Publications of the Modern Language Association* 21.1 (1906), 99-100.

[90] Dennis Mahoney, in his essay, "The Channeling of a Literary Revolution: Goethe, Schiller, and the Genesis of German Romanticism," in *A Reassessment of Weimar Classicism*, 117-131, provides a compelling depiction of the relationship between the Jena Romantics and Goethe as Goethe tries to tame their public political statements.

[91] Frederick Beiser, *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*, ed. Frederick Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 95.

[92] Friedrich Schlegel, "Versuch über den Begriff des Republikanismus," in *Deutschland* 3 (1796): 10-41. Frederick Beiser provides a full English translation of the article in his edited volume, *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 93-112.

of having classical authorities so misused, and Schiller and Schlegel develop a mounting mutual dislike. After Schlegel pens a critical review of Schiller's journal *Die Horen* in Johann Friedrich Reichardt's rival journal *Deutschland* (where his political piece could also be found), Schiller writes tempestuously to Goethe that Schlegel and Reichardt constitute an annoying insect that must be smashed, lest it continue to bother them. [93]

Goethe, however, does not wish to smash the annoying young insect; rather, he wants to clip Schlegel's wings. With both the anarchic undertones of the French Revolution, and then later with the example of J.G. Fichte's 1799 dismissal from his Jena professorship as a backdrop, Goethe repeatedly discourages the Jena circle from making overt statements concerning the need for political and social change in Germany.[94] Despite Goethe's own misgivings about Schlegel, he continues more congenial interactions with the circle, and with a bit of censorial strong-arming, he keeps the young Romantics' 'revolutionary' tendencies in check.[95] Goethe's dual role as Jena bureaucrat and Weimar literary *grand sieur* gives him significant leverage as the Jena circle contributes to and edits issues of the *Athenauem* and as they begin to work out their theories for the new path their literary endeavors would take.

During this period, August Wilhelm, Friedrich Schlegel's older brother, focuses on ensuring continued relations between the Jena Romantics in Goethe. With varying

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[93] See Schiller, *Nationalausgabe*, ed. G. Kurscheidt and N. Oellers (Weimar: Böhlau, 1991), II, 486.

[94] Fichte lost his professorship over a charge that he was an atheist, although atheism acted as a catch-all that also covered bureaucratic discomfort with Fichte's political statements—he had written in support of the French Revolution as late as 1793 (*Beitrag zur Berichtigung der Urteile des Publikums über die französische Revolution*). Though he promised Goethe in 1794 that he would refrain from writing any more anonymous political pieces, he continued to face a variety of accusations that could not be easily dismissed.

[95] A description of Goethe's role as a primary censor of the circle's material can be found in the letters of Dorothea Veit Schlegel. Dorothea was the first in the circle to express concerns about the ability of Novalis' *Christianity or Europe* to pass the censors, which Goethe confirmed, saying that it should be left out of the *Athenaeum* (December 9, 1799).

degrees of success, the elder Schlegel brother tries to keep both his younger brother Friedrich and Schleiermacher out of trouble and in the good graces of Goethe.[96] After Schleiermacher's review of Kant's anthropology, Goethe believes that Schleiermacher is the most 'revolutionary' of the circle, at which point August Wilhelm reins in Schleiermacher's reviews for the journal.[97] August Wilhelm also refused to include his brother's fragments attacking Schiller in the *Athenaeum*, for fear of alienating Goethe.[98] Although the circle did not always agree with Goethe, they continued to respect his opinion. More to the point, they feared his ability to discredit them in the eyes of the German literary world.[99] As a result, the *Athenaeum* presents no manifesto that lists and elaborates needed social and political changes.

Three concrete examples in the thinking of Schleiermacher help to orient readers to the social and political problems that lay behind Jena-Romantic literary productions. The first example appears in his concern for the *Bildung* of his women friends, which he considers disrupted by social codes, like those that had led to the marrying of a very young Dorothea Veit and Eleanor Grunow to their much-older husbands. Such social expectations limited the ability of these women to engage fully in "free society" ("*freie Geselligkeit*"), and thereby form themselves to full humanity. Thus, Schleiermacher states in his fragment on *Bildung* for women, that they should have the ability to cultivate

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[96] In letters to his brother and Schleiermacher at the end of 1799, August Wilhelm tried to impress upon the two headstrong young men the need to heed the censorial decisions of Goethe and show him due respect. Novalis, *Novalis Schriften*, ed. Richard Samuel (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1960), IV, 648-649 (Hereafter, *NS*). A.W. Schlegel would have had in mind not only Schlegel's writings, but also Schleiermacher's anonymous publication that July of his "Letters on the Occasion of the Political-Theological Task and the Open Letter of Jewish Householders," which argued for full civil rights for Jews.
[97] See discussion of this in Richard Brandt, 69.
[98] John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe," 100.
[99] Dennis Mahoney states in *A Reassessment of Weimar Classicism*, 124, that, "As Schlegel became ever more explicit in his praise for Goethe's writings, as in his famous study *Über Goethes Meister* in the second issue of the *Athenäum*, the discussion of political matters became ever more oblique."

themselves regardless of sex.[100] He stops short, however, of proscribing *how* this should occur, given established social expectations for women.

Schleiermacher also addresses civil discrimination against Jews in Prussia in a collection of letters (1799). In this series of letters, published anonymously (this was just the kind of writing Goethe hoped to discourage and which could ruin Schleiermacher's career in the church), Schleiermacher argued that Jews should have full civil rights and that 'quasi-conversions' through submission to baptism, which had recently gained popularity as a way to make Jewish citizens more 'acceptable' to the state, were unnecessary.[101]

Schleiermacher was worried, correlatively, about the relationship of church and state, particularly as it concerned the development of Christianity in Prussia. Schleiermacher embeds this issue within his *Speeches*, especially in his third speech ("The *Bildung* of Religion") and his fourth speech ("Association in Religion"), where he upholds the necessity of religious freedom for *Bildung*, which he sees hindered by bureaucratic leaders who increasingly move the church into the position of a political arm of the government. In this vein, he writes, "Would that even the most distant inkling of religion had ever remained foreign to all heads of states, all virtuosos and artists of politics . . . if they did not know how to separate their individuality from their profession

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[100] As part of the creedal statement he develops for women, he writes, "I believe in the power of the will and of education [*Bildung*] to make me draw near the infinite once more, to deliver me from the chains of miseducation [*Mißbildung*], and to make me independent of the restraints of sex" (Firchow, 75, #364; *KFSA*, I.2, 231: ". . . ich glaube an die Macht des Willens und der Bildung, mich dem Unendlichen wieder zu nähern, mich aus den Fesseln der Mißbildung zu erlösen, und mich von den Schranken des Geschlechts unabhängig zu machen.").

[101] Richard Crouter, *Friedrich Schleiermacher: Between Enlightenment and Romanticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), in his fifth chapter, "Schleiermacher's *Letters on the Occasion* and the Crisis of Berlin Jewry," 123-139, presents a careful historical discussion and textual analysis of Schleiermacher's publication of these letters.

and their public character. For that has become for us the source of all corruption."[102] Schleiermacher's *Speeches* approach social and political issues *in*directly, and they become even further submerged in the *Soliloquies*.

As Schleiermacher's concerns highlight, what the circle members have in mind to address through their literary projects are rigid social and political structures that affect basic human freedoms needed to cultivate oneself. These practical goals associated with the notion of *Bildung*, as Ruth Richardson asserts, are the same for Schlegel and Schleiermacher:

> Our purpose for being is to become all that we are meant to be by participating in the co-creative act of forming oneself (*Bildung*). . . . Our highest *Beruf* [vocation] is the development of our God-given individuality. For both Schlegel and Schleiermacher this means overcoming socially contrived and conceived boundaries and stereotypes, especially those related to gender, which leave us locked in incompleteness.[103]

I do not follow Richardson's emphasis on gender alone (see chapter four), however, I do agree with her assessment that the purpose of *Bildung* is the full expression of individuality by "overcoming socially contrived and conceived boundaries and stereotypes." In this sense, the *Bildung* that Schlegel and Schleiermacher commit themselves to pursuing in the *Athenaeum* resembles the *Bildung* encouraged by Herder and Mendelssohn in the first chapter: it is a process of formation more expansive than education/*Erziehung* (the acquisition of knowledge and skills). *Bildung* is the formation

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[102] Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers*, trans. and ed. Richard Crouter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 85 (hereafter, *Speeches*); *SKGA*, I.2, 281: "Möchte doch allen Häuptern des Staats, allen Virtuosen und Künstlern der Politik auf immer fremd geblieben sein auch die entfernteste Ahndung von Religion! . . . wenn sie doch ihre Individualität nicht zu scheiden wußten von ihrem Beruf und ihrem öffentlichen Charakter! Denn das ist uns die Quelle alles Verderbens geworden." See his more detailed description of the mixing of roles between church and state in *Speeches*, 86-88; *SKGA*, I.2, 282-283. He then concludes, *Speeches*, 90, "Away, therefore with every such union of church and state! [*SKGA*, I.2, 287: "Hinweg also mit jeder solchen Verbindung zwischen Kirche und Staat!"]"

[103] Ruth Richardson, "The Berlin Circle of Contributors to 'Athenaeum,'" 840-841.

of dispositions (e.g., moral, rational, and aesthetic) that form a person as an individual. In large part, their view capitulates to Goethe's vision of *Bildung* in *Meister*, where he portrayed *Bildung* as a means to negotiate social fragmentation through the embrace of the nature/culture dyad. But, such formation would require the alteration of certain socio-political impediments in order for *all* Germans (e.g., women and Jews) to participate fully. The Jena Romantics continue to feel frustration with the slowness of such change through Goethe's gentle literary means.

Schlegel's development of a "progressive" (*Progressiv*) literary genre—*Poesie*—as a vehicle for social change becomes clearer in the context of this situation: Moved to respond to the pressing social issues of their day and "called," as Novalis put it, "to the *Bildung* of the earth,"[104] the circle was restricted to expressing themselves in the literary sphere. And in the literary sphere they were directed to write a-politically, if they wished to accomplish changes in the social and political state of their homeland without losing their credibility in German social and literary circles. Friedrich Schlegel, who but a few years previous penned his avant-garde essay on republicanism, begins to encourage his friends in the circle to subsume their political concerns in this manner.[105] In so doing, he continues to associate the quest for social transformation with *Bildung*. "Do not dissipate Faith and Love into the world of politics," he writes to Novalis, "but in the holy world of science and art offer up thine innermost being into the holy blazing torrent of eternal

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[104] My translation of Novalis, *Blütenstaub* #32, in *Athenaeum: Eine Zeitschrift 1798-1800*, 57: "Wir sind auf einer Mission: zur Bildung der Erde sind wir berufen."

[105] As Dennis Mahoney argues, only *after* Schlegel had published his article supporting republicanism in 1796 and received a slap on the wrist from Goethe did the circle embrace Schiller's position. See also Frederick Beiser's editorial introduction to *The Early Political Writings of the German Romantics*, xv: "Following Schiller's lead in his *Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man* (1795), they gave primacy to art because it is the chief tool for the education and enlightenment of the public in the post-revolutionary age. They believed that art, and art alone could inspire the people to act." They *did* follow Schiller's lead, but not because they were thrilled with Schiller's position when his piece was published.

culture [*Bildung*]."[106] With gentle pressure, Goethe makes clear that a-political literary production offers the surest path open to the Jena Romantics to manifest their commitment to the transformational possibilities of *Bildung* in individuals. Social transformation, he insists, will follow of its own accord.

b. Emerging Differences: Weimar 'Classicism' and Jena 'Romanticism'

Although *Meister* inspired the circle's interest in the literary potential of *Bildung* and Goethe's censorial activities kept their social concerns channeled through the literary milieu, the Jena Romantics did not prostrate themselves before Goethe and embark upon projects of slavish imitation. From their introduction to *Meister*, the Jena Romantics turn to the work with a critical eye. *Meister*'s defect, Schlegel argues, is that it is an "imperfect" (*unvollkommener*) novel that is not quite "mystical" or "romantic" enough. [107] After he begins to work out his own theory of the novel in conjunction with his writing of *Lucinde*, Friedrich Schlegel writes in his personal notebooks in 1799 that *Meister* possesses the "form of relevance" without producing "real poetic significance."[108] It cannot carry out the Herculean aspirations the circle eventually harbors for the novel genre (see below). In a less caustic critique in 1798, Novalis declares *Meister* "the Absolute Novel, without qualification" and only then insists that "Goethe will and must be surpassed."[109] Goethe need not be opposed, but, as Novalis suggests, writers should (and would) push farther along the path that Goethe forged.[110]

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[106] *NS*, III, 492. Elsewhere, in relation to Goethe's writing of *Meister*, Schlegel discusses the way in which art, itself, can become a science. See "On Goethe's *Meister*," 61.
[107] On the imperfection of *Meister* in terms of its romantic and mystical qualities, see *KFSA*, II.16, 108, #289; and 114, #352.
[108] *KFSA*, II.16, 267, #159.
[109] Novalis, "On Goethe," in *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism*, 104.
[110] See Dorothea von Schlegel, *Briefwechsel im Auftrage der Familie Veit*, ed. J.M. Raich (Mainz: Franz Kirchheim, 1881), I, 262. For a description of this breakdown in personal relations, see John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe," 46-48. At least for Friedrich and his wife Dorothea Veit Schlegel,

Though the Jena circle wishes to move beyond Goethe, we have seen already that the Jena Romantics were not gathering their literary energies against Goethe. Friedrich Schlegel encourages his brother August Wilhelm to settle in Jena, where his literary endeavors could benefit by living in proximity to Goethe and Herder.[111] And when Friedrich critiques *Meister*, it is not for being *classical*; his critique is that Goethe is not being romantic *enough*.[112] Schlegel may define the Jena circle by 1799 as "the New School," but he sees that school as developing out of the 'educational theories' of the 'old school's' headmaster: Goethe.[113]

The moniker scholars often attribute to Goethe's 'old school' is "Weimar Classicism," and he and Schiller serve as the central figures of this movement.[114] Weimar Classicism generally denotes a literary perspective that returns to ancient Greek forms, which emphasized the importance of form in creating a harmonic aesthetic product (form and content) that would in turn elicit a response in the reader, much like the vibrations of a tuning fork. In this vein, Goethe tempers the view of literature as a didactic hammer, writing that poetry "draw[s] our attention to something worth learning: but it should be left to us to draw the lesson from it, just as we learn from life."[115]

Goethe has completely lost his luster by 1810, when Dorothea wholeheartedly critiques the literary merit of *Meister*, reflecting the lasting divide that had arisen between the Schlegels and Goethe by around 1804.

[111] John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe," 58. From a letter dated November 18, 1794.

[112] He even sees Goethe's work as "fragmentary"—in other words, as contributing to Schlegel's idealization of the fragment as a literary form. See Fred Rush, "Irony and Romantic Subjectivity," in *Philosophical Romanticism*, ed. Nikolas Kompridis (New York: Routledge, 2006), 183.

[113] See Ernst Behler's "Introduction," in Friedrich Schlegel's *Dialogue on Poetry*, 6-7.

[114] Scholars remain at odds as to how to date Weimar Classicism, usually placing its beginnings around Goethe's journey to Italy (1786-1788) and pinpointing its end somewhere between Schiller's death in 1805 and Goethe's death in 1832. The problem with dating belies a larger concern: The term Weimar Classicism has come under scrutiny as an apt descriptor of Goethe and Schiller's literary pursuits: Was it really an autonomous literary movement? Was it really a form of classicism? Georg Hoffmeister reviews the highpoints of these literary discussions as they have emerged in the recent history of scholarship in his introduction to *A Reassessment of Weimar Classicism*, 4-7.

[115] Quoted in Richard Harland, *Literary Theory from Plato to Barthes: An Introductory History* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), 68. Goethe's theorizing about his literary productions developed particularly

In descriptions of literary history, Weimar Classicism often plays the foil to the contemporaneous elaboration of Early German Romanticism (Jena Romanticism), although the past thirty years of scholarship has begun to re-evaluate such stark juxtaposition.[116] Nuancing the relationship of Weimar Classicism and Jena Romanticism remains difficult, in part because descriptions of the two movements as oppositional were bandied about even during the era of their mutual development. These initial portrayals etched an accepted narrative into the collective memory of literary scholarship.

However, the most pertinent interpretations of the two movements in terms of this dissertation are those of Goethe and the Jena Romantics as *they* reflect upon their literary undertakings. Despite the *personal* opposition that develops between the Schlegels (particularly Friedrich) and Schiller, which also affects Goethe's relationship with the circle, Goethe and the Jena circle are not literary opponents in the strictest sense. Goethe does note the application of the term 'classicism' to signify an opposition to 'romanticism.'[117] As Goethe explains it, the initial application of the terms was engineered by him and Schiller, with Schiller pointing out to Goethe to what extent Goethe's work is 'romantic.' He accepts Schiller's designations to a certain extent, but

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in concert with his interactions with Schiller from the mid-1790's onward (John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe," 72).

[116] Key in beginning a new dialogue concerning the relationship between classicism and romanticism in the Weimar context was Dieter Borchmeyer's *Die Weimarer Klassik*, 2 vols. (Königstein: Athenäum, 1980). Gerhard Schulz argues in his *Die deutsche Literatur zwischen Französischer Revolution und Restauration* (Munich: C.H. Beck, 1983), that romanticism and classicism in the Weimar/Jena context should be treated together as a literary movement. See also Hoffmeister's introduction to *A Reassessment of Weimar Classicism*, 4-5.

[117] Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Conversations with Eckermann: Being Appreciations and Criticisms on Many Subjects*, trans. and ed. Wallace Wood (Washington: M. Walter Dunne, 1901), 340: "The idea of the distinction between classical and romantic poetry which is now spread over the whole world, and occasions so many quarrels and divisions, came originally from Schiller and myself. I laid down the maxim of objective treatment of poetry, and would allow no other; but Schiller, who worked quite in the subjective way, deemed his own fashion the right one, and to defend himself against me, wrote the treatise upon 'Naïve and Sentimental Poetry.' He proved to me that I myself, against my will, was romantic, and that my 'Iphigenia,' through the predominance of sentiment, was by no means so classical and so much in the antique spirit as some people supposed" (Wed. March 17, 1830).

Goethe does not himself wish to belabor this distinction. He does not view himself as a "romantic," and he states that "[t]he Schlegels took up this idea [of a distinction between the classical and romantic], and carried it further, so that it has now been diffused over the whole world; and every one talks about classicism and romanticism—of which nobody thought fifty years ago."[118] Thus, although one popular narrative of the era presents Goethe and Schiller's activities and those of the Jena circle as rival literary tendencies, Goethe did not believe that such a contrast correctly reflected the substance of their literary goals. Such a distinction was engineered by the Schlegel brothers. In fact, Goethe and the Jena Romantics are more likely to share literary enemies in this period than to be literary enemies.[119]

The question that the leading theorist of the New School, Friedrich Schlegel, seems unable to answer clearly is, what role will Goethe play as the Romantic movement emerges? Schlegel's *Dialogue on Poetry* (1800) represents the apex of such indecision. The sections of the dialogue assume very different approaches to Goethe: the "Letter on the Novel" does not discuss Goethe at all. The "Essay about the Different Styles in Goethe's Early and Late Works" inserts Goethe into the piece practically as an historical artifact, echoing the "Letter's" sidelining of Goethe's influence. But at the end of the

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[118] Goethe, *Conversations with Eckermann*, 341. Goethe's reactions to the various numbers of the *Athenaeum* reflect his mixed impressions of the artistic merit of the Jena circle's work. He finds merit in the writing of August Wilhelm, thanking him personally for the second number of the *Athenaeum* (in a letter dated March 26, 1799), but at the same time he also expresses to Schiller fundamental misgivings about the Schlegels' literary potential (John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe," 138-139).

[119] Such was the case at the time that the *Athenaeum* was published. Goethe threw his support behind the journal as it came under attack by the literary and theatrical critic Karl Böttinger, who Goethe felt unfairly critiqued his plays. See Walter H. Bruford, *Culture and Society in Classical Weimar 1775-1806* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1962), 304-305, for an account of the Goethe/Böttinger relationship (Goethe and the Jena circle found themselves with other common enemies, including Friedrich Nicholai and August von Kotzebue) and John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe," 134-135 for an account of Goethe's support of the *Athenaeum*.

"Essay about the Different Styles," Schlegel then argues extensively in favor of the centrality of Goethe in current literary productions:

> The spirit now astir must also take this direction [that Goethe has pursued] and thus, we may hope, there will be no lack of men capable of creating poetry, of creating according to ideas. If in their attempts and works of every kind, following Goethe's example, they untiringly seek the best, if they make the universal tendency and the progressive maxims of this artist, which are still capable of the most versatile application, their own, if like Goethe they prefer the certainty of understanding to the shimmer of wit; then that seed will not be lost, then Goethe will not have to share the fate of Cervantes and Shakespeare, but will be the founder and head of a new poetry for us and for posterity.[120]

Is Goethe's literary productivity at a close, his example now taken up by the next generation? Or, will he be not only founder, but also head of the new movement, leading it onwards towards greater heights?

Schlegel makes no decisive statement, and up until 1802 continues to both privately and publicly acclaim the work of Goethe.[121] At least two reasons for Schlegel's seeming indecision stand out: First, Goethe is undeniably a fine writer *and* a powerful force in the German literary world in which Schlegel is trying to make a name for himself. If Goethe were to agree with Schlegel's vision for the future of literature, then, Schlegel states above, Goethe would certainly produce new and even greater works than *Meister*, rousing German literature to further heights: he will be the "head of a new poetry for us." But, second, Schlegel wants to shape this new vision of literature, and he

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[120] Schlegel, *Dialogue on Poetry*, 113; *KFSA*, I.2, 347: "Der Geist, der jetzt rege ist, muß auch diese Richtung nehmen, und so wird es, dürfen wir hoffen, nicht an Naturen fehlen, die fähig sein werden zu dichten, nach Ideen zu dichten. Wenn sie nach Goethes Vorbilde in Versuchen und Werken jeder Art unermüdet nach dem Bessern trachten; wenn sie sich die universelle Tendenz, die progressiven Maximen dieses Künstlers zu eigen machen, die noch der mannifaltigsten Anwendung fähig sind; wenn sie wie er das Sichre des Verstandes dem Schimmer des Geistreichen vorziehn: so wird jener Keim nicht verloren gehn, so wird Goethe nicht das Schicksal des Cervantes und des Shakespeare haben können; sondern der Stifter und das Haupt einer neuen Poesie sein, für uns und die Nachwelt. "

[121] John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe," 93.

already has some inkling that Goethe (and not just Schiller) disagrees with the direction towards which Schlegel increasingly tends.[122]

Goethe remains outwardly friendly with the Jena circle, exchanging letters with Jean Paul, Tieck, and August Wilhelm Schlegel, and in early 1800 Friedrich Schlegel takes several trips to Weimar to meet with Goethe.[123] Goethe also attends some events with the circle while in Jena in the latter part of 1800, though he mostly leads a secluded existence during his visit.[124] In 1800 and through 1801, Goethe and Friedrich Schlegel do have several extensive conversations as Goethe attempts to school himself in the philosophical positions of his contemporaries, but none of these conversations leads to closeness between the two, and Goethe remains unconvinced of either the philosophical foundations or the literary merits of Friedrich Schlegel's "New School."[125]

Goethe's correspondence with Schiller, as well as statements he makes later in life and statements he *fails* to make upon the publication of the Goethe-Schiller correspondence in 1828-1829, indicate that Goethe also disbelieves the sincerity of praise accorded him by the Jena circle, even at the height of Friedrich Schlegel's Goethe-worship.[126] Goethe, all too aware of the ironic foundation of Jena Romanticism, felt an

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[122] See ibid., 160-166 for a detailed description of the exchanges between the two men during this period. Friedrich's intuitions that Goethe does not want such a friendship are well-founded, as Goethe's August 17, 1799 letter to Schiller reveals: "Leider mangelt es beiden Brüdern an einem gewissen innern Halt, der sie zusammenhalte und festhalte. Ein Jugendfehler ist nicht liebenswürdig als insofern er hoffen lässt, dass er nicht Fehler des Alters sein werde."

[123] John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe," 160.

[124] Ibid., 161.

[125] Ibid., 162-165.

[126] Goethe's comments at an 1827 event hosted by Goethe for August Wilhelm Schlegel, in *Conversations with Eckermann*, 203, indicate Goethe's take on the Schlegel brothers: "Goethe drew me [Eckermann] to the window. 'Now, how does he [A.W. Schlegel] please you?' 'Not better than I expected,' returned I. 'He is truly in many respects, no true man,' continued Goethe, 'but still, one must bear with him a little on account of his extensive knowledge and great deserts.'" On the following day, Goethe reports to Eckermann that he found "instructive" a conversation with Schlegel on "historical and literary subjects," but, he adds as a *caveat*, "one must not expect grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles" (204). For an

unmistakable bite in the laudatory statements made by the circle. Friedrich Schlegel, in particular, began to pursue a more ironic treatment of Goethe after he published *Lucinde* and had distinguished his literary projects from Goethe's.

Section Summary and Conclusions

Thus far, I have not only established Goethe and Schlegel's broad influence on Schleiermacher, but have also introduced Goethe's incorporation of polarity in *Bildung*, using the nature/culture dyad as an example central for understanding Goethe's conception of *Bildung*. Friedrich Schlegel's reading of Goethe's *Meister* draws upon the interlacing of polarity and *Bildung*: Schlegel reads *Meister* as a *Bildung* narrative whose greatest accomplishment is its ability to guide the reader in the embrace of universality and particularity and thereby raise the reader "far beyond himself." This observation emphasizes polarity, but adds the fundamental Jena-Romantic focus on the dyad, universal and particular (which chapters three and four explore as the foundational dyadic relation upon which Schleiermacher builds the themes of *Christmas Eve*). The last sections intimated differences arising between the Jena Romantics' and Goethe's visions for the future of literature, but also reinforced their shared tendency to promote the role of literature in addressing social issues.

In the second part of the chapter I will explore in greater depth Friedrich Schlegel's polar approach to *Bildung* and the emerging differences that arise between Schlegel's and Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*. The chapter turns now to the Jena Romantics' theoretical approaches to *Bildung* in their journal, *Athenaeum* (1798-1800)

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elaboration of the tenuous relationship between both Schlegels and Goethe during the 1790's, see John Scholl, "Friedrich Schlegel and Goethe," 42-44.

and Schleiermacher's concurrent thinking on *Bildung* in his *Speeches on Religion* (1799) and *Soliloquies* (1800).

B. Poesy and Polarity: Schleiermacher and the Jena-Romantic Approach to *Bildung*

Much of the recorded "symphilosophy" of Schlegel and Schleiermacher occurs as they prepare fragments for the Schlegel brothers' journal, the *Athenaeum*. In the foreward to the journal, the Schlegels described *Bildung* as the universal goal around which the pieces of the journal would cohere. The contributors to the journal followed the oath laid out in Friedrich Schlegel's poem "Das Athenaeum," which prescribed devotion to *Bildung*: "We strive steadfast in free association,/ To grasp the rays of *Bildung* all in one,/ And separate the weak parts from the strong."[127] Building upon Friedrich Beiser's argument that *Bildung* remains the central goal of the *Athenaeum*,[128] the following sections ground Schlegel and Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum* before moving to Schleiermacher's other publications from the period.

1. *Bildung*: The Shared Goal of the *Athenaeum*

Schleiermacher does not often receive attention for his participation in the construction of the *Athenaeum*, though he served as its editor while Friedrich Schlegel was in Jena, and at its inception, Schleiermacher's involvement in the journal includes even the process of choosing its name (though his title, *Herkules*, is not the favorite).

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[127] My translation from the German in *KFSA*, I.5, 317: "Der Bildung Strahlen all' in eins zu fassen/ Vom Kranken ganz zu scheiden das Gesunde/ Bestrebten wir uns treu im freien Bunde." The sonnet continues, 317-318: "Und wollten uns auf uns allein verlassen:// Nach alter Weise konnt' ich nie es lassen,/ So sicher ich auch war der rechten Kunde,/ Mir neu zu reizen stets des Zweifels Wunde,/ Und was an mir beschränkt mir schien, zu hassen.// Nun schreit und schreibt in Ohnmacht sehr geschäftig,/ Als wär's im tiefsten Herzen tief beleidigt,/ Der Platten Volk von Hamburg bis nach Schwaben.// Ob unsern guten Zweck erreicht wir haben,/ Zweifl' ich nicht mehr; es hat's die Tat beeidigt,/ Daß unsre Ansicht allgemein und kräftig."

[128] Friedrich Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative*, 212.

Indeed, Schleiermacher works so closely on the journal with Friedrich Schlegel that Friedrich's brother, August Wilhelm, complains that Schleiermacher is contributing *too* much.[129] August Wilhelm may have felt a bit of jealousy: Schlegel's idea of symphilosophy began in relation to his brother and their "brotherly fellowship"—their "*Verbrüderung*." Soon, however, Schlegel's attempts at symphilosophy grow to include not only his brother and Schleiermacher, but also Caroline Schlegel, Dorothea Veit, and Novalis.[130] These were the select group among the Jena circle who worked together to produce the fragments for the *Athenaeum*.

During the *Athenaeum* period, the circle, including Schleiermacher, repeatedly refer to *Bildung* as a paramount pursuit.[131] As Novalis reminds the circle in one of his fragments, they are called not simply to theorize about *Bildung*, but, he states, "We are on a mission: we are called to the *Bildung* of the earth."[132] They could not end their efforts with a theory of *Bildung*, nor could they end with the accomplishment of their personal cultivation: they must bring cultivation to the entire world.

Despite the frequency and urgency with which the Jena Romantics addressed *Bildung*, locating and delineating the theories of *Bildung* that the circle develops during the *Athenaeum* period presents severe challenges: Schleiermacher was not exaggerating

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[129] On the naming of the journal, see *KFSA*, III.24, 34. See also Ruth Richardson, "The Berlin Circle of Contributors to 'Athenaeum': Friedrich Schlegel, Dorothea Veit, and Friedrich Schleiermacher," in *200 Jahre 'Reden über die Religion.' Akten des 1. Internationalen Kongresses der Schleiermacher-Gesellschaft Halle 14.-17. März 1999*, ed. Ulrich Barth and Claus-Dieter Osthövener (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2000), 830. On August Wilhelm's anxiety concerning the degree of Schleiermacher's participation, see *KFSA*, III.24, 45 and Richardson, "The Berlin Circle," 834.

[130] Caroline Schlegel was the wife of August Wilhelm. Dorothea Veit was the daughter of Moses Mendelssohn and eventual wife of Friedrich Schlegel. Novalis was growing closer to Friedrich Schlegel during this period, and by the end of the publication of the *Athenaeum*, it was Novalis rather than Schleiermacher to whom Friedrich felt his closest bond of friendship. Although Schleiermacher and Novalis followed and admired one another's work, they never managed to meet.

[131] See discussion of studies of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher during the *Athenaeum* period above, in chapter one.

[132] My translation of Novalis, *Blütenstaub* #32, in *Athenaeum: Eine Zeitschrift 1798-1800*, 57.

when he gushed that he had finally found someone, in Friedrich Schlegel, with whom he could enter "the deepest abstractions."[133]

Much of the interpretive difficulty stems not simply from theoretical 'abstractness,' but also from the conception of literary expression that Friedrich Schlegel was forming. In Schlegel's view, the best writing resists interpretation, contains its own criticism, and is ever-evolving. The first two features—resisting interpretation and internal criticism—were introduced in the last section as aspects that had excited the Jena-Romantic interest in Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*: one *Athenaeum* fragment asserts that the literary critic who manages to interpret *Meister* could retire forever,[134] and Schlegel writes that, as a great novel, *Meister* contains "a theory of the novel within it," so that, "not only does [*Meister*] judge itself, it also describes itself."[135] Where *Meister* fails, for the circle, and where they hope to achieve success, is in the incorporation of the third feature: perpetual evolution in a literary genre. When Schlegel writes that *Meister* lacks "real poetic significance"[136] and that it isn't "mystical" and "romantic" enough[137] he means, in part, that it does not meet the criteria of romantic *Poesie* (poesy/poetry): it is not *Progressiv*/progressive; it is not ever-evolving.[138] Schlegel was developing a

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[133] *Life of Schleiermacher*, 159; *SKGA*, V.2, 177.
[134] Firchow, 15, #120; *KFSA*, I.2, 162. See note above, under the section on Goethe.
[135] Schlegel, "On Goethe's *Meister*," 65; *KFSA*, I.2, 134: "Ja es beurteilt sich nicht nur selbst, es stellt sich auch selbst dar."
[136] *KFSA*, II.16, 267, #159: ". . . keine wirkliche π[poetische] Bedeutung."
[137] *KFSA*, II.16, 108, #289: "Ein vllk.[ommener] Roman müßte auch weit mehr romant.[isches] Kunstwerk sein als W.[ilhelm] M.[eister]." And *KFSA*, II.16, 114, #352: "*Meister* schon desfalls unvollkommen weil er nicht ganz mystisch ist."
[138] Because of the dissonance that arises in English when discussing novels as poetry, and in order to help the reader focus on *Poesie* as a different literary type than the English word "poetry" evokes, I translate *Poesie* as "poesy" in this chapter. Where other authors translate *Poesie* as "poetry," I have let their translation stand, since poetry represents a fair translation of *Poesie*, just one that loses the deeper resonances with which the Jena circle hoped to imbue the term in the German context.

theory of literature so complicated and demanding, though, that even he would find it difficult to produce work that met these criteria.[139]

Embracing the taxing demands of this new literary theory, the members of the Jena circle determinedly set to work, experimenting with these features of writing in their *Athenaeum* fragments, in their essays, and in their novels. And therein lies the hurdle for scholars: If someone practices a style of writing meant to resist interpretation, those who wish to make sense of the ensuing literary production find themselves at a great disadvantage. Embedded self-criticism and a perpetually evolving art-form further contribute to the act of resistance.

For this reason, the fragments of the *Athenaeum* were not particularly well-received, and the journal folded after two years; so too, Schlegel's novel *Lucinde*, even beyond its 'shockingly' sexual content, was reviewed as unreadable.[140] Given these challenges, on top of the already complex and diverse understandings of *Bildung* in the late eighteenth century, sifting through the circle's literary output for a coherent theory of *Bildung* bears little fruit. Keeping in mind that exact definitions of the term remain tenuous and shifting in the *Athenaeum*, as well as the caveats regarding interpretation of the Romantics raised above, I will address Schlegel's conception of *Bildung* by tracing out its connection to his theory of *Poesie*.

2. Poesy: The Means to the Goal of *Bildung*

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[139] The most prevalent example is his *Lucinde*, which was intended as the first of three or four novels that would stand together as his theory of a religion of love.

[140] See Ernst Behler, 290-291 and Hans Eichner's introduction to *Lucinde* in *KFSA*, 5: xlvi-lv, for summaries of the history of criticism on *Lucinde*. Behler encapsulates the reception of the novel from its earliest critics to those of the early-twentieth century when he writes that the "numerous opinions about *Lucinde* can be reduced to two phrases pronounced by Wilhelm Dilthey: 'shameless sensuality' and 'aesthetically considered, a little monster.' Rudolph Haym varied these judgments slightly by calling the novel an 'aesthetic outrage' and 'at the same time a moral outrage'" (290).

According to the stated goals of the *Athenaeum*, *Bildung* is the motivating force behind its contributors' literary projects and their related interest in the improvement of their own lives and of society. As Frederick Beiser writes, "[i]t is no exaggeration to say that *Bildung*, the education of humanity, was *the* central goal, *the* highest aspiration, of the early romantics."[141] Broadly, then, they at least participate in the larger cultural conversation about *Bildung* that associated the concept with processes of formation, education, and cultivation. In addition, they agree, as Mendelssohn observed and as Goethe continued to persuade them, that *Bildung* centers in the literary sphere.

Increasingly, the fragments in the *Athenaeum* focus on a theory of *Poesie* as the apex of Romantic literature and the literary means for the inculcation of *Bildung*. Indeed, according to Schleiermacher's critique of Kant's anthropology in the *Athenaeum*, a facility for "poesy" is crucial if one wishes to understand human nature.[142] Certainly, to cultivate humanity—to promote the "*Bildung* of the earth"—one must understand human nature. And for Schleiermacher and the Jena circle, to understand human nature, one must understand poesy.

a. What is *Poesie?*

Poesie, as "poetry," in its conventional definition as versed writing, would provide a seriously limited approach to the encompassing task of *Bildung*. However, the Jena Romantics discussed *Poesie* as a concept that stretches beyond the strictures of traditional prosody. The historian Wilhelm Dilthey, in his *Poetry and Experience*, reflects upon this particularly "German" conception of *Poesie*:

> In the eighteenth century, poetry became a dominant power in Germany; it became conscious of a capacity—rooted in genius—to generate a world of

[141] Frederick Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative*, 212.
[142] See below for discussion of Schleiermacher's critique of Kant's anthropology in the *Athenaeum*.

> its own. This capacity was embodied in Goethe. Thus poetry was led to recognize the following fundamental truth: poetry is not the imitation of a reality which already exists prior to it; nor is it the adornment of truths or spiritual meanings which could have been expressed independently. The aesthetic capacity is a creative power for the production of a meaning that transcends reality and that could never be found in abstract thought. Indeed, it is a way or mode of viewing the world. Thus poetry was acknowledged as an independent power for intuiting the world and life. It was raised to an organon for understanding the world, alongside science and religion. Both truths and exaggerations were mixed in this tenet and it is clear that any future poetics will have great difficulty in separating the two.[143]

Dilthey's definition of *Poesie* looks almost nothing like conventional definitions of poetry. Instead, connected to the developing definitions of genius in the eighteenth century, it moves beyond imitation to original production; it works via intuition; as a 'creative power' it can mediate the sublime, helping the reader towards meaning that "transcends reality."[144] Dilthey states that *Poesie* is a 'capacity' that not only is 'rooted in genius,' but is 'embodied in' a particular genius: Goethe.

The Jena circle developed their concept of *Poesie* in precisely this matrix of meanings. In addition to the focus on Goethe, assessed above, the Jena circle made wide claims for *Poesie*, so that at times it did take on, as Dilthey suggests, the characteristics of an "aesthetic capacity" akin to genius and perhaps best described as 'intuitive creativity.'[145] In this sense, poesy is a way of being in the world. As Schlegel trumpets in one of his fragments on literature, "people must live, truly live poetry."[146]

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[143] Wilhelm Dilthey, *Selected Works, Volume V: Poetry and Experience*, trans. and ed. Rudolf Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 44.

[144] References to genius pepper the writings of the Jena Romantics, and Goethe receives the designation repeatedly. Like poesy, the concept of genius was fluid in the late-eighteenth century, but also developed according to broad, shared foci. See the discussion of the development of genius in the first section of the chapter.

[145] I follow the description of Ruth Richardson, in "The Berlin Circle," 825, who writes about *Poesie* as a faculty in the context of the Jena Romantics' definition of an artist: "The term 'artist' should be interpreted in the broader Romantic sense to define one who possessed a certain approach to life characterized by *Poesie*; i.e., a certain kind of feeling or intuition manifest in creative imagination. For the *Frühromantiker*,

In the *Athenaeum*, they were interested both in how poesy, as a *literary form*, could contribute to a person's cultivation and in how '*living poesy*' could describe the activity of a cultivated life. The double nature of poesy—as literary form and as aesthetic capacity, or activity—demands a layered interpretation: Poesy must receive attention both as it acts as a noun (something you read) and as it acts as a verb (something you do).[147] But, the Jena Romantics would move beyond Geothe as they explored poesy and its connection to *Bildung*.

In his comments on *Meister*, above, Friedrich Schlegel insists that *Meister* raises the reader "far beyond himself." This occurs, Schlegel writes, through a process by which the particular, in the form of a "unique, autonomous individual," manages to represent "general human nature." In other words, the individual acts as a symbol for the general, thereby guiding readers from the particular/individual to the universal/general. Schlegel, however, has a different understanding of the character of universality and its interaction with particularity. As Eric Blackall observes in his work on the Jena-Romantic novel genre, Schlegel diverges from Goethe in that he believes that "the true form of a novel should be 'elliptical,' . . . if it is to be an 'absolute' book and have 'mystical' character."[148] Blackall continues,

> By 'elliptical' Schlegel means having two centers. . . . The 'elliptical' form that Schlegel desired for the novel implies . . . opposition within a cohesive whole. Hence the image of the two centers, which probably also implied that a novel should move simultaneously on two planes, one of which should be transcendental. His remark to the effect that *Wilhelm*

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the creative principle of life was not reason, as was the standard Enlightenment view, but *Poesie*, which was creative and deemed to be possessed by all human beings. This means that epistemological certainty is not gained through reason but is rather intuited through *Poesie*."

[146] *KFSA*, II.16, 304, #692: "Romanzen sind lebendige Volksgedichte. Das Volk muß leben und zwar Poesie leben, wie Araber, Indier."

[147] I do not read the dual nature of poesy as noun and verb as an inherent "polarity" in poesy, since poesy's activity as noun and as verb do not function in opposition with each other at any point in the poetic process.

[148] Eric Blackall, *The Novels of the German Romantics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 29.

> *Meister* was not mystical enough would in that case seem to mean that the transcendental dimension was not sufficiently developed to satisfy him completely.[149]

Blackall's comments present Schlegel's literary interest in the novel as a genre that can bring together the finite and the infinite (transcendental) within the poetic product. The observations on Schegel's interpretation of *Meister* emphasize this fundamental difference in the literary endeavors of Schlegel and Goethe. I would add, drawing on the sections on Goethe, above, that Wilhelm's realization about *Bildung* in *Meister* centers on *Bildung* as a process that requires one to look beyond oneself and help others along the same path. Wilhelm has no transcendent or "mystical" experience of the inscrutable that moves him "beyond himself" in his process of *Bildung*.

The Jena circle talked about *Bildung* and its link to *Poesie* on the borders—on the elliptical foci—created by the intersection of the two planes: the immanent and transcendent. Goethe led them to the threshold in *Meister*, accomplishing, as Schlegel sees it, the embrace of individuality and "general human nature." However, when Schlegel declares that Goethe's *Meister* isn't "mystical" enough,[150] and that their novels must (and will) surpass the greatness of *Meister*, then the new arena in which the Jena circle wishes to explore *Bildung* comes into view: the transcendent realm of universality,

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[149] Ibid., 29. Schlegel also discusses the elliptical model with two centers to describe philosophy: "Philosophy is an ellipse. The one center, which we are closer to at present, is the rule of reason. The other is the idea of the universe, and it is here that philosophy and religion intersect" (Firchow, 104, #117; *KFSA*, I.2, 267: "Die Philosophie ist eine Ellipse. Das eine Zentrum, dem wir jetzt näher sind, ist das Selbstgesetz der Vernunft. Das andre ist die Idee des Universums, und in diesem berührt sich die Philosophie mit der Religion."). This elliptical model implies a transcendent realm in the "center" that lies farthest from us: the idea of the universe. The fragment, written after Schleiermacher's *Speeches*, also reinforces the difference between Schleiermacher and Schlegel on religion: Schlegel keeps religion associated with the transcendental plane, rather than the historical plane. Schleiermacher wants his friends to recognize the presence of religion in the phenomenal realm. See below, under the section on Schleiermacher.

[150] On the imperfection of *Meister* in terms of its romantic and mystical qualities, see *KFSA*, XVI, 108, #289 and 114, #352. On the need to surpass *Meister*, see Novalis, "On Goethe," in *German Aesthetic and Literary Criticism*, 104.

inscrutability, and limitlessness. And here they found a theoretical approach in the philosophical idealism of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) that could guide their articulation of the activity of *Bildung*.

b. Beyond Goethe: 'Transcendental Poesy'

The figure who stands between Goethe and the Jena Romantics and shapes the circle's descriptions of the "movement beyond oneself" is Fichte. During the *Athenaeum* period, Fichte was teaching in Jena, where he interacted frequently with members of the Jena Romantic circle, and although he was asked to leave the university in 1799, his work continued to influence the thinking of the circle.[151] Indeed, as Schlegel writes in a fragment quoted above, it is "Fichte's philosophy," along with Goethe's *Meister* and the French Revolution, that "are the greatest tendencies of the age."[152] At the intersection of Fichtean and Goethean tendencies, Schlegel developed a theory of "transcendental poesy," playing off of the "transcendental philosophy" (transcendental idealism) that Fichte explored in his *Wissenschaftslehre*.[153]

In this vein, Schlegel asserts that Fichte's philosophy is both a philosophy and "always simultaneously philosophy of philosophy"; so too, he asserts that transcendental poesy should "describe itself, and always be simultaneously poetry and the poetry of

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[151] As noted even in the case of Schleiermacher, according to his 1803 letter, cited above.

[152] Firchow, 46, #216; *KFSA*, I.2, 198: "Die Französische Revolution, Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre, und Goethes Meister sind die größten Tendenzen des Zeitalters."

[153] Schlegel's references to *Transcendentalpoesie* are numerous, but concentrated in the period of 1797-8. For several instances in addition to those in the *Athenaeum*, which use Fichtean vocabulary to develop the meaning of the term, see his notebooks, *KFSA*, II.16: 131, #560 (which uses the terms 'absolute' and 'speculative'), 144, #702 (which places it in terms of 'thesis' and 'antithesis'), and 155, #813 and #819 (which similarly evoke the Fichtean system through references to it encompassing both 'real' and 'ideal,' and moving both 'centripetally' and 'centrifugally').

poetry".[154] Schlegel even names Goethe in this fragment as an example of one who writes transcendental poesy. Indeed, the quotation sounds not only like his description of Fichte, but also like Schlegel's praise of Goethe's *Meister*, which Schlegel argued contains its own theory of criticism.[155]

What Fichte offers that diverges from Goethe is a theoretical vocabulary that treats a method for the embrace of polarities, and that includes universality within it as a *transcendental* realm. In Schlegel's interpretation of *Meister*, while Goethe excels at propelling readers to a view of universal human nature, this universality was not "mystical enough" to accomplish what poesy must. Whereas Goethe's 'movement beyond the self' in *Meister* focuses on the harmonious fusion of polarities in one's experience of the world around one, Fichte's transcendental philosophy focuses on the repeated tension between polarities through the ironic "antagonism" between the "absolute and the relative." Goethe develops a literary means to *Bildung* that emphasizes a gentle "heightening" (*Steigerung*), while Schlegel finds his focus in a jarring experience of self-transcendence.

Fragment 238 summarizes the method of "transcendental philosophy" translated to the realm of poesy: transcendental poesy begins with "absolute difference" (between real and ideal), proceeds to "hover [*schwebt*] in between" (the two poles), and then "ends . . . with the absolute identity of the two."[156] The steps repeat those of Fichte's

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[154] Firchow, 57, #281 and 50-51, #238 (*KFSA* I.2, 213: ". . . die neue Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre is immer zugleich Philosophie und Philosophie der Philosophie" and 204: "in jeder ihrer Darstellungen sich selbst mit darstellen, und überall zugleich Poesie und Poesie der Poesie sein.").

[155] Schlegel, "On Goethe's *Meister*," 65; *KFSA*, I.2, 134. As Friedrich Schlegel writes in this passage, "not only does [*Meister*] judge itself, it also describes itself." The novel judges itself, because as a great novel, it contains a theory of the novel within it. See above.

[156] Firchow, 50, #238; *KFSA*, I.2, 204: "Sie beginnt als Satire mit der absoluten Verschiedenheit des Idealen und Realen, schwebt als Elegie in der Mitte, und endigt als Idylle mit der absoluten Identität beider."

'transcendental philosophy,' which deduces the cognitive process of self-definition through repeated antagonism between the polar opposites ("I" and "not-I") as the "I" 'wavers/hovers' (*schwebt*) between states of determinacy (definition), ending finally in the identity of the "I" and "not-I."[157] Fichte's articulation of this process in the *Wissenschaftslehre* is even more cumbersome and confusing than this narrow summary suggests. And Fichte continues to revise the *Wissenschaftslehre* throughout his Jena period (and after).[158] The theory becomes ever more complicated as Fichte attempts to incorporate inter-subjectivity and reciprocity at the foundation of the process of self-definition.[159]

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[157] Fichte describes this process repeatedly throughout the *Wissenschaftslehre*. As a representative example, I offer the following passage from *J.G. Fichte*, *Science of Knowledge: With the First and Second Introductions*, trans. and ed. Peter Heath and John Lachs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 278: "Hence the ideal self [the "I"] oscillates with absolute freedom over and within the boundary. Its bounds are wholly indeterminate. Can it remain in this state? By no means; for now, according to the postulate, it is to reflect upon itself in this intuition, and thus posit itself as *determined* therein; for all reflection presupposes determination. The rule of determination in general is assuredly familiar to us; a thing is determined only insofar as it is determined by itself. Hence, in this intuition of the X [the "not-I"], the self [the "I"] would have to set its own limits to the intuition. It would have to determine itself, to posit the point C [the point of determination], indeed, as the boundary-point, and X [the "not-I"] would thus be determined by the absolute spontaneity of the self [the "I"]."

[158] As his thinking develops, the most difficult, but for Fichte the most essential part, of his philosophy is that the fundamental fact in the deduction of consciousness and the sole factor driving the process of self-consciousness is the infinite activity of the I. This principle of the I's infinite activity requires that the I somehow account for the presence of the not-I, so that the activity of the I remains the source of its own definition. The not-I, in that sense, is posited by the I (receives representation for the I only through the I), so that the I, in this way, limits (defines) itself. Fichte wants his system to form the basis for the activity of finite consciousnesses (actual humans) as well as the ideal "I," and that goal spurred his multiple revisions of the *Wissenschaftslehre*.

Indeed, Fichte does not pursue transcendental philosophy simply to create a consistent idealist system. He has a particular purpose in mind that comes into focus when he moves from consideration of absolute consciousness to finite minds. For Fichte, the basis of consciousness in (and only in) the infinite activity of the I is crucial to secure freedom and morality: if all limiting factors encountered in consciousness have a self-regulated source, then a moral agent cannot claim an outside source as the cause of her choices/behavior. In other words, Fichte attempts through his transcendental idealism to negate the moral agent's excuse that "the devil made her do it." Indeed, this practical purpose for this incredibly unwieldy philosophical system drives Fichte to revision upon revision as he tries to clarify how this theory of consciousness remains philosophically consistent.

[159] Daniel Brazeale's and Tom Rockmore's edited volume, *New Essays on Fichte's Later Jena* Wissenschaftslehre (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2002), delves into many of the specific issues encountered in Fichte's philosophical system between 1795 and 1800. In particular, Günter Zöller's article, "The Individuality of the I in Fichte's Second *Wissenschaftslehre*, 1796-1799," 120-139, explores the issue of intersubjectivity.

Not surprisingly, scholars argue over the extent to which the members of the Jena circle understood Fichte's project.[160] But what *is* certain, as introduced by Schlegel's notion of transcendental poesy, is that they picked up on the basic activity of the "I" in its process of self-definition: the process of opposition, wavering, and unity between polarities, especially the particular (finite/relative/real) and the universal (infinite/absolute/ideal). Their interest in the striving and hovering activity of consciousness, as well as the process of self-definition through the contrast of opposites, pepper their writings as they explore these themes in relation to their *Bildung*-related goals. Both Schlegel and Schleiermacher make use of this vocabulary, but Schlegel's "transcendental poesy" embraces the Ficthean perspective in a way that, we will see below, Schleiermacher would not.[161]

Elaborating the Ficthean frame, Schlegel links the 'wavering' activity of transcendental poesy with his notion of irony. Schlegel propounded the use of irony as a

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[160] For discussion of Schleiermacher's understanding of Fichte, see Richard Brandt, *The Philosophy of Schleiermacher: The Development of His Theory of Scientific and Religious Knowledge* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1941), 53.

[161] Schleiermacher remains interested in Fichte's work even after leaving Berlin. For instance, he argues in an 1803 letter that Fichte's downfall in the *Wissenschaftslehre* is *not* that it is "a philosophy . . . rooted purely in a dialectical foundation," but that it is idealism (*SKGA*, V.6, 392: "Es ist doch nichts lieber Freund mit einer Philosophie die so bloß auf dialektischem Grunde ruht ohne allen Mysticismus wie es mit dem Idealismus in Fichte der Fall ist."). That is, Fichte's basis in dialectical activity doesn't bother Schleiermacher; what does bother him, is that this activity remains removed by its idealist orientation from the activity of human life in the world. In addition, Novalis, in particular, considered Fichte a mentor, but also wanted to push further along the philosophical path that he believed Fichte had begun. In a 1796 letter to Friedrich Schlegel, he describes how he wishes to go beyond Fichte: whereas Fichte sees the "not-I" as simply a limiting factor on the I's activity, Novalis asserts reciprocity between I and not-I as the self as 'part' strives to be Self as Whole. Thus, Novalis asserts, the Whole, too, strives to find presentation in the part. Novalis wants the not-I to have agency as well. Although this suggestion collapses Fichte's monistic consistency (a problem that Fichte would wrestle with himself as he became interested in the mutual determination of finite consciousnesses), it shows the direction of Romantic thinking, which was focusing on how, in literature, the infinite could find expression in finite forms. See a helpful discussion of Novalis' relationship with Fichte in Géza von Molnár, *Romantic Vision, Ethical Context: Novalis and Artistic Autonomy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 90-94.

poetic tool that, as "the form of paradox,"[162] could direct the reader beyond the limitations of the finite/particular, both in literary forms and in life.[163] Much debate exists over the definition of irony for the Jena Romantics and for their foremost theorist, Schlegel: is it a literary trope or a philosophical perspective; in addition to the influence of Fichte, does it draw from Socratic dialectic or from the European rhetorical tradition?[164] The debate arises because the circle uses the term in multiple and sometimes contradictory ways. Debating the definition, though, obscures Friedrich Schlegel's central claim in his account of irony: he talks about irony ironically, which inherently demands paradoxical expression. How can one maintain theoretical consistency when talking about irony as the "form of paradox," if one does so in a straightforward and completely non-paradoxical manner?

The *Athenaeum* fragments were a literary form suited to ironic expression: faced with the limits of human expression, they heralded the fragment as a literary form that could act as a microcosm of a whole. The fragments, themselves, however, focused on *Poesie* as the genre best equipped for the type of ironic expression that could embrace both part and whole. Schlegel writes that "only poetry does not restrict itself to isolated ironical passages, as rhetoric does. There are ancient and modern poems that are pervaded by the divine breath of irony throughout and informed by a truly transcendental

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[162] Firchow, 6, #48; *KFSA*, I.2, 153: "Ironie ist die Form des Paradoxen. Paradox ist alles, was zugleich gut und groß ist."

[163] On the role of irony in Jena Romanticism, see chapter three, above, as well as Fred Rush, "Irony and Romantic Subjectivity," in *Philosophical Romanticism*, ed. N. Kompridis (London: Routledge, 2006), 173-195; Peter Szondi, "Friedrich Schlegel and Romantic Irony, with Some Remarks on Tieck's Comedies," in *On Textual Understanding and Other Essays*, trans. and ed. H. Mendelsohn (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), and Ernst Behler's comments in *German Romantic Literary Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 146-153. Irony, some would argue is not simply a literary tool, but a literary form for Schlegel. Here, however, I am narrowly discussing irony as a literary tool in the larger discussion of the form of poetic expression.

[164] Fred Rush, "Irony and Romantic Subjectivity," 193-194, argues for the Socratic backdrop against Paul de Man's interpretation of irony within the European rhetorical tradition, "The Concept of Irony" in *Aesthetic Ideology*, ed. de Man (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 163-184.

buffoonery."[165] Schlegel here suggests that the style of ironic expression, through 'transcendental buffoonery' (through a playful process of Fichtean 'clashing' of opposites) is meant to tease and to put off the reader. This type of 'buffoonery' is perhaps what led Schiller to write to Goethe that the fragments of the *Athenaeum* made him sick to his stomach.[166] But, Schlegel insists, this external "mimic style of an averagely gifted Italian *buffo*" pairs with an internal "mood that surveys everything and rises infinitely above all limitations, even above its own art, virtue, or genius."[167] The art form (like Fichte's "I") embraces infinity through this ironic movement, and thereby the finite transcends its finitude.

When poesy 'ironically' guides the reader to rise with its mood "infinitely beyond all limitation," then 'transcendental' poesy works towards the goal of *Bildung* by lifting one beyond oneself, connecting the two planes: the immanent particularity of one's life and a transcendent universality. Although he explicitly makes his case for irony in his essay "On Incomprehensibility" (1800), quoted above, as early as his 1797 *Lyceum* fragments, Schlegel announced that irony "contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative, between the impossibility and the necessity of complete communication. It is the freest of all licenses, for by its means one transcends oneself, and yet it is also the most lawful, for it is absolutely necessary."[168]

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[165] Firchow, 5-6, #42; *KFSA*, I.2, 152: "Die Poesie allein kann sich auch von dieser Seite bis zur Höhe der Philosophie erheben, und ist nicht auf ironische Stellen begründet, wie die Rhetorik. Es gibt alte und moderne Gedichte, die durchgängig im Ganzen und überall den göttlichen Hauch der Ironie atmen. Es lebt in ihnen eine wirklich transzendentale Buffonerie."

[166] *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Schiller und Goethe: In drei Bänden*, ed. Hans Gerhard Gräf and Albert Leitzmann (Leipzig: Insel, 1955), II, 120.

[167] Firchow, 6, #42; *KFSA*, I.2, 152: "Im Innern, die Stimmung, welche alles übersicht, und sich über alles Bedingte unendlich erhebt, auch über eigne Kunst, Tugend, oder Genialität: im Äußern, in der Ausführung die mimische Manier eines gewöhnlichen guten italienischen Buffo."

[168] Firchow, 13, #108. *KFSA*, I.2, 160: "Sie enthält und erregt ein Gefühl von dem unauflöslichen Widerstreit des Unbedingten und des Bedingten, der Unmöglichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer vollständigen

The first sentence expresses *what* irony does: it projects the reader into the midst of a paradox (the 'indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative') that points out the limits of communication. The second sentence announces *why* irony does this and places the reader squarely in the context of *Bildung*: by means of the jarring antagonism, "one transcends oneself."

Both the consistency and contrast with Goethe is clear: Again, the focus lies in a movement beyond oneself, but the "beyond" is not simply an outward extension of the self into the world, it is an upward transcendence of the self. In *Meister*, the means of *Bildung* should present "a sense of satisfaction along the way," so that one moves almost imperceptibly along the path of cultivation.[169] The literary means to *Bildung* for Schlegel do the opposite: ironic expression in poesy cuts one's ties to a sense of complacent satisfaction by exacerbating the antagonism between the relative/particular and absolute/universal. For Goethe, the means to *Bildung* work much like a friend guiding you on a walk; for Schlegel, the literary means to *Bildung* work more like a giant, invisible hand hoisting you up in the air at incredible speed and then leaving you to dangle there for a bit before plopping you back on the ground.

c. Poesy as a Literary Form

Mittleilung. Sie ist die freieste aller Lizenzen, denn durch sie setzt man sich über sich selbst weg; und doch auch die gesetzlichste, denn sie ist unbedingt notwendig." Beda Alleman, *Ironie und Dichtung* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1969), 11-14, especially, has argued that Friedrich Schlegel had already shelved his theory of irony when he wrote "On Incomprehensibility." I would agree that Schlegel is moving away from a focus on irony by 1800, but I believe that the period when Schlegel and Schleiermacher were most close and when Schlegel wrote *Lucinde*, was marked by the centrality of irony in Schlegel's conception of the romantic movement he hoped to head.

[169] Wilhelm announces, "I deplore all attempts at developing us [*Bildung*] which obliterate the most effective means of education [*Bildung*] by forcing us towards the endpoint instead of giving us a sense of satisfaction along the way" (*WMA*, 307; *WML*, 881: "Wehe jeder Art von Bildung, welche die wirksamsten Mittel wahrer Bildung zerstört und uns auf das Ende hinweist, anstatt uns auf dem Wege selbst zu beglücken!").

Though *Poesie* found diverse definitions among the circle, as a literary form the members of the circle agreed that *Poesie* was no longer simply metered verse; it was now a mixture of many (perhaps *all*) literary forms. To explore how poesy could accomplish such a feat, they turned their attention to the poetic potential of the novel (*Roman*), drawing on Goethe's recent work in the genre.[170] In this vein, Schlegel describes Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister* as "poesy without meter" (*"Poesie ohne Metr[um]"*), and as we saw above, Schlegel describes Goethe (in one of his more hopeful moments) as a writer of transcendental poesy.[171]

The link between poesy and the novel is much broader than Schlegel's reference to *Wilhelm Meister*, however. In his introduction to *The Novels of the German Romantics*, Eric Blackall notes the increasing elision of poesy and the novel as the novel genre develops in the German context at the turn of the nineteenth century: "Essentially what happened was that the novel was declared a poetic form, whereas in the eighteenth century it had been considered a prose form. In Germany the assertion was more categorical than elsewhere, embodied in such statements as Novalis's 'A novel must be poetry through and through' [*Ein Roman muss durch und durch Poesie sein*]."[172] Following the quotation from Novalis with one from Friedrich Schlegel, Blackall draws exclusively from members of the Jena circle to support his claim. Though Blackall's

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[170] Here, I follow Todd Kontje's argument in *The German Bildungsroman*, 13, that Goethe's *Meister* provided the springboard for the Jena-Romantic literary theory: "The attempt of these early Romantics [the Jena Romantics] to rewrite Goethe's novel [*Meister*] in accordance with their own artistic beliefs marks the beginning of a continuing development in the history of the Bildungsroman and its criticism." I simply make more explicit than Kontje the connection between *Poesie* and the *Roman* (novel) in the thinking of the circle (see below), so that the Bildung-related literary projects produced by the Jena Romantics might also be termed in retrospect '*Bildungspoesie*.'

[171] For the quotation on *Meister* see *KFSA*, II.16, 134, #588.

[172] Eric Blackall, *The Novels of the German Romantics*, 16.

selections reflect a somewhat 'Jena-centric' view of German literature in this era, they also confirm how closely linked poesy and the novel were among the circle.[173]

Eliding poetry and the novel offends conventional genre boundaries, but Schlegel, when he takes up the topic of *Poesie*, feels strongly that blurring the distinction is a central task of the Romantic movement. If the novel would jettison its association with banal prose, it could dissolve the strict boundaries of the genre and represent the vanguard of Romantic poesy—the *Roman* could serve as the most encompassing form of *Poesie*.[174] Returning to Goethe to solidify the link between poesy and the *Roman*, Schlegel insists that, "[t]he English—and Goethe in *Wilhelm Meister*—restored the idea of a *Romanpoesie* in prose."[175] The term *Romanpoesie* encapsulates the collapse of

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[173] The Jena Romantic definition of poesy and its link to the novel built upon precedents in writers, particularly Herder (whose thinking was also formative for Goethe), who suggested poesy as the highest form of artistic expression. Herder also directly linked *Poesie* and the *Roman*, stating that, "No type of *Poesie* is of greater breadth than the *Roman*." My translation from the German in Herder, *Werke*, VII, 548: "Keine Gattung der Poesie ist von weiterem Umfange, als der Roman."

[174] Some scholars of German Romanticism have argued that, for the Jena circle, the definition of Romantic poesy *was* the *Roman*. The textual evidence of this is compelling, although I think that making the strong claim that poesy *is* the novel (or vice versa), ossifies the relationship of poesy and the novel, whereas Schlegel often expressed this relationship in much more fluid terms. For a thoughtful discussion of the relationship of the two, see Peter Szondi, *On Textual Understanding and Other Essays*, 60-63. In contrast to Szondi's view that the novel helps make sense of Romantic poesy, Ernst Behler, *German Romantic Literary Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 154, notes that Friedrich Schlegel, "expanded the notion of the novel so far beyond generic limitations that it almost coincided with his notion of Romantic poetry, and is therefore of little help for a clarification [of Romantic literary theory]." Although I respect Behler's point, which seeks to shift the interpretive emphasis to the "task" and "object" of Romantic poetry rather than its existence as a particular genre, I side with Szondi in viewing the *Roman* as a helpful tool for piecing together the Jena Romantic vision for literature. I would argue that the fluidity and expansiveness of the *Roman* genre that worries Behler actually *is* clarifying in that it reinforces the expansive nature of the "task" of Romantic poesy as the inculcation of *Bildung*. While Behler reads the polarities inherent in Romantic thinking as indicative of a difficulty with which the Jena Romantics struggle, I read them in this chapter as reflecting the essential starting point for Romantic theory that the Jena Romantics intentionally centralize.

[175] *KFSA*, II.16, 176, #1110: "Die Engländer—Goethe im W[ilhelm] M.[eister]—haben zuerst die Idee von einer Rπ[Romanpoesie] in Prosa restaurirt." Friedrich Schlegel describes the merger of poesy and prose as crucial to understanding his literary theory, stating that, "[i]t must be clear to you why, according to my views, I postulate that all poetry should be Romantic and why I detest the novel as far as it wants to be a separate genre" (*Dialogue on Poetry*, trans. Ernst Behler and Roman Struc (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1968), 101). Schlegel prefaces this statement with a comment that clarifies the way he understands the qualitative attribute, "Romantic," in terms of the *Roman* genre: "the Romantic is not so much a literary genre as an element of poetry which may be more or less dominant or recessive, but never entirely absent." Schlegel was preceded by Herder, in his *Letters for the Advancement of Humanity* (1796)

generic boundaries that Schlegel has in mind, where no distinction between *Poesie* and the *Roman* remains. As the Jena Romantics strive ever toward more perfect poetic expression, the novel/poesy becomes the literary form Schlegel envisions as best suited for their quest.

The central goal of this quest, as described in a previous section, remains *Bildung*. The *Athenaeum* fragments, and Schlegel's notes on poesy, link poesy and *Bildung* repeatedly. Indeed, the most famous *Athenaeum* fragment on *Poesie* (fragment 116) makes the connection between poesy and *Bildung* explicit.[176] In fragment 116, *Bildung* achieves a broad definition as the poeticization of life and society through the embrace of dipolar oppositions.

I quote fragment 116 here almost in its entirety in order to present the reader with the full force of the fragment's claims and to show an example of the type of literary expression Schlegel, and those who "symphilosophize" with him, produce. The fragment states:

> Romantic poetry is a progressive, universal poetry (*Universalpoesie*). Its aim isn't merely to reunite all the separate species of poetry and put poetry in touch with philosophy and rhetoric. It tries to and should mix and fuse poetry and prose, inspiration and criticism, the poetry of art and the poetry of nature; and make poetry lively and sociable, and life and society poetical; poeticize wit and fill and saturate the forms of art with every kind of good, solid [subject] matter for [*Bildung*], and animate them with pulsations of humor. It embraces everything that is purely poetic, from the greatest systems of art, containing within themselves still further systems, to the sigh, the kiss that the poetizing child breathes forth in artless song. .

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in 'detesting' the division of literature into separate genres. This passage in Herder would have appealed to Schlegel, as Herder aims his disgust for such classifying ventures at Schiller. See René Wellek, *A History of Criticism, 1750-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), I, 185.

[176] Scholars have taken fragment 116 as the basis for the definition of poesy (its defining characteristics as well as its connection to the genre of the novel). The most notable examples include Eric Blackall, *Novels of the German Romantics*, 21-22, as well as more in-depth analysis in Ernst Behler, "Friedrich Schlegels Theorie der Universalpoesie," in *Jahrbuch der deutschen Schillergesellschaft* 1 (1957), 211-252 and Hans Eichner, "Friedrich Schlegel's Theory of Romantic Poetry," *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*, 71. 5 (1956), 1018-1041.

> . . [T]here still is no form so fit for expressing the entire spirit of an author: so that many artists who started out to write only a novel [*Roman*] ended up by providing us with a portrait of themselves. It alone can become, like the epic, a mirror of the whole circumambient world, an image of the age. And it can also—more than any other form—hover at the midpoint between the portrayed and the portrayer, free of all real and ideal self-interest, on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise that reflection again and again to a higher power, can multiply it in an endless succession of mirrors. It is capable of the highest and most variegated refinement, not only from within outwards, but also from without inwards; capable in that it organizes—for everything that seeks a wholeness in its effects—the parts along similar lines. . . . The romantic kind of poetry is still in the state of becoming; that, in fact, is its real essence: that it should forever be becoming and never be perfected. It alone is infinite, just as it alone is free; and it recognizes as its first commandment that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself.[177]

Overall, the fragment reads as a cryptic amalgamation of statements that border on incautious exaggeration, if not outright contradiction. Fragment 116 raises more questions than it answers, introducing these Romantics' wish to resist interpretation in order to propel the reader beyond herself by means of such antagonism. In the context of a discussion of poesy and *Bildung*, the intricacies and vagaries of fragment 116 should draw the critic not into the cataloguing of anomalous details, but to the purpose of such a barrage of claims—the purpose to which all *Athenaeum* contributors had devoted themselves: *Bildung*.

In describing this activity, fragment 116 states that Romantic poesy, "tries to and should . . . fill and saturate the forms of art with every kind of good, solid [subject] matter

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[177] Firchow, 31; *KFSA*, I.2, 182, #116: "Die romantische Poesie ist eine progressive Universalpoesie. Ihre Bestimmung ist nicht bloß, alle getrennte Gattungen der Poesie wieder zu vereinigen. . . . die Poesie lebendig und gesellig, und das Leben und die Gesellschaft poetisch machen. . . . Sie umfaßt alles, was nur poetisch ist, vom größten wieder mehrere Systeme in sich enthaltenden Systeme der Kunst, bis zu dem Seufzer, dem Kuß, den das dichtende Kind aushaucht in kunstlosen Gesang. . . . [G]ibt es noch keine Form, die so dazu gemacht wäre, den Geist des Autors vollständig auszudrücken: so daß manche Künstler, die nur auch einen Roman schreiben wollten, von ungefähr sich selbst dargestellt haben."

for [*Bildung*]."[178] The fragment suggests that poesy participates in *Bildung* by presenting and embracing polarities. Fragment 116 plays on its ability to move toward higher unity both through the polarities it invokes and through the verbs chosen to describe poesy's activity. The fragment introduces in its first lines well-recognized literary polarities: poesy and prose, art (technical construction) and nature (organic/spontaneous expression), and inspiration (sudden intuition) and criticism (thoughtful analysis). And when poesy encounters these polarities, it "mixes and fuses," it "hovers between," it "embraces everything purely poetic," it "multiplies . . . in an endless succession of mirrors." Here, Schlegel reinforces the ironic embrace of opposites in fragment 116 by using the Ficthean vocabulary of 'hovering' (*schweben*) between polarities (portrayer and portrayed; real and ideal) to express this movement. In this ironic movement, poesy reaches, as the fragment states, a "higher unity." Indeed, in defining *Poesie*, fragment 116 seeks to capture its very essence by painting it through polarities and *Poesie*'s ability to embrace them. And through such embrace, poesy raises its poetic reflection "again and again to a higher power," thus emphasizing the 'heightening' activity that occurs through dyadic activity.

The fragment continues to highlight poesy's embrace of polarities by presenting its activity as all-encompassing: it "makes poetry lively and sociable" and makes "life and society poetical;" it moves "from within outward" and from "without inward." In the end, the fragment suggests, *Poesie* manages to hover and embrace and reflectively multiply itself so as to hold together, to "fuse," the most inherent and troublesome polarity latent in it: *Poesie* is both a finite form of expression and yet "it alone is

[178] Firchow, 31; *KFSA*, II, 182: ". . . will, und soll . . . die Formen der Kunst mit gediegnem Bildungsstoff jeder Art anfüllen und sättigen."

infinite." *Poesie* both maneuvers and models the tension between finite (particular) and infinite (universal). As in Schlegel's description of philosophy as elliptical, above, poesy brings two opposing planes of existence together. "*Universalpoesie*" moves beyond an individual poetic production (the particular) to the realm of universality, and yet it manages to accomplish this movement through a finite work of art.[179]

d. Poesy as an Activity: Polarity and the Poetic Life

Above, fragment 116 provided a depiction of polar activity in the work of art. The fragment claims that *Poesie* "tries to and should" accomplish something beyond the literary sphere as well: it makes "poetry lively and sociable" and it also makes "life and society poetical." As Schlegel writes elsewhere, and rather cryptically of course, "The purpose of the ethical *Roman* is, quite simply, to poeticize life."[180] Schlegel here refers to an ethical imperative of the *Roman* in its connection to poesy. In so doing, he suggests that the novel/poesy is not just a form of literary expression; it is a verb concerned with, in particular, ethical agency. That is, poesy is not just words on a page; poesy is something that *happens* in a person's life—"people must live, truly live poetry."[181]

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[179] In his later *Ideen* fragments, Firchow, 93, #451, Schlegel defines universality as follows: "Universality is the successive satiation of all forms and substances [*Stoffe*]. Universality can attain harmony only through the conjunction of poetry and philosophy; and even the greatest, most universal works of isolated poetry and philosophy seem to lack this final synthesis. They come to a stop, still imperfect but close to the goal of harmony." *KFSA*, I.2, 255: "Universalität ist Wechselsättigung aller Formen und aller Stoffe. Zur Harmonie gelangt sie nur durch Verbindung der Poesie und der Philosophie: auch den universellsten vollendetsten Werken der isolierten Poesie und Philosophie scheint die letzte Synthese zu fehlen; dicht am Ziel der Harmonie bleiben sie unvollendet stehn."

[180] Schlegel also links the novel and novella to processes of rejuvenation (*verjüngen*) in his comments on the *Roman* in 1798: "Der Zweck der κρ.[kritischen] Nov.[elle] ist, die π[Poesie] zu verjüngen und ins Leben einzuführen, das Moderne modern zu erhalten . . . Der Zweck des η[ethischen] R[omans] bloß, das Leben zu poetisiren" (KFSA, II.16, 208, #46). That is, "the purpose of the critical novella is to rejuvenate poesy and bring in life, in order to preserve the modernity of the modern. The purpose of the ethical *Roman*, quite simply, is to poeticize life."

[181] *KFSA*, II.16, 312, #692: "Romanzen sind lebendige Volksgedichte. Das Volk muß leben und zwar Poesie leben, wie Araber, Indier."

Dilthey's definition of poesy, above, reflects this movement from literature to life: heralding the poeticization of life and society, the Jena Romantics were building a larger definition of poesy in relationship with *Bildung* that pushed beyond poesy as a literary form. This definition accords with the stated purpose of the *Athenaeum* to strive after *Bildung* and with statements within the *Athenaeum*, like Novalis' fragment rousing his fellow-travelers to devote themselves to "the *Bildung* of the earth." The work of *Bildung* had not only literary, but also personal and social consequences for the circle: Poesy's capacity ironically to embrace polarities, to 'rise infinitely above all limitations,' must serve the concrete cause of *Bildung*.

Authoring poesy not only encourages the reader in the *Bildung* of a poetic life, but also contributes to the poeticization of the author's life. Intimating the poetic facility for embracing polarities in a description of genius, Schleiermacher writes in an *Athenaeum* fragment that the "perfect practical genius" is someone who "never makes a futile attempt to escape the recognized limitations of the moment, and yet always burns with a longing to augment himself still further; he never struggles against fate, but forever challenges it to provide him with a broader existence."[182] The perennial challenge that the genius issues to fate accords with poetic activity: the genius pushes to move beyond the fetters of individuality and into a 'broader existence,' striving to embrace both limitation and that which lies beyond such limits.

The cultivated life of a genius, as with poesy as a literary form, demands perpetual progression, as Schlegel writes: "the life of the cultivated [*gebildeten*]and

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[182] Firchow, 89, #428. *KFSA*, I.2: 250: "Er macht nie einen vergeblichen Versuch, den erkannten Schranken des Augenblicks zu entweichen, und glüht dabei doch von Sehnsucht, sich weiter auszudehnen; er widerstrebt nie dem Schicksal, aber er fodert es in jedem Augenblick auf, ihm eine Erweiterung seines Daseins anzuweisen. " See also the discussion of genius above, under the section on Goethe.

meditative man is a continual cultivation and meditation [*Bilden und Sinnen*] on the lovely riddle of his destiny [or definition; *Bestimmung*]. He is continually defining it anew for himself, for that is precisely his whole destiny [definition; *Bestimmung*], to be defined and to define. Only in the search itself does the mind find what it seeks."[183] In this passage from his novel, *Lucinde*, Schlegel draws on the perpetual movement between particularity (the point of definition) and generality (the universal search for and unending task of definition) to describe the life of *Bildung*, echoing Schleiermacher's description of genius, above. The genius, pursuing *Bildung*, acts poetically by negotiating the polarities of definition and indefinition.[184]

Fragment 116, in keeping with these observations, addresses three instances of poetic *Bildung*: in the work of art (as shown above), but also in the artist, and in the reader. Focusing on writers, fragment 116 states that the work of art is a representation of the artist, "so that many artists who started out to write only a novel [*Roman*] ended up by providing us with a portrait of themselves." In this way the act of writing encourages the *Bildung* of the author, by moving the author outside of herself and into the work of art (and, reflectively, back to herself). Poesy, in particular, excels at this task because it "hover[s] at the midpoint between the portrayed [the work of art] and the portrayer [the artist]," wavering between both and thereby raising reflection "again and again to a higher power." The artist's projection of herself into the work of art drives the poetic production.

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[183] *Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde and the Fragments*, trans. and ed. Peter Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), 119 (Hereafter, *Lucinde*); *KFSA*, I.5, 72: "Darum ist das Leben des gebildeten und sinnigen Menschen ein stetes Bilden und Sinnen über das schöne Rätsel seiner Bestimmung. Er bestimmt sie immer neu, denn eben das ist seine ganze Bestimmung, bestimmt zu werden und zu bestimmen. Nur in seinem Suchen selbst findet der Geist des Menschen das Geheimnis welches er sucht.

[184] For Schlegel, males work from an original position of definition, while females work from an original position of indefinition. Through the interaction of male and female, then, a person achieves a sense of completeness.

As the fragment concludes, poesy "recognizes as its first commandment that the will of the poet can tolerate no law above itself." With this statement, fragment 116 ends by shifting the perspective from the literary form of poesy to the underlying activity of the poet. Poesy organizes itself under one, encompassing law: the will of the *poet*. The poet infuses poesy with polarities and propels the activity of embracing polarities. The accomplishment of poetic activity reflects the poet's genius (creative originality): poets provide their readers with "a portrait of themselves" in their uniqueness. But the portrait painted of the poet, itself, is an embrace of polarities: it portrays, at once, the individuality of the poet ("expressing the entire spirit of the author") *and* the universal poetic life (the life of all individuals "living poesy" through the embrace of polarities).

Inspired by poesy's embrace of polarities, the reader participates in *Bildung* by acting poetically—by living poesy through emulation of the poet's life as articulated in the poetic production. As fragment 116 states, poesy should make "life and society poetical," and so a reader makes her life 'poetical' by embracing polarities within herself. She should become, in the fragment's phraseology, 'entirely homogenous' within her 'limitless limits.' In addition, she should embrace polarities between herself and the world, working—like poesy—both from "within outwards, but also from without inwards."

Fragment 116 provides ways of thinking about *how* this embrace of polarities occurs in the reader. If poesy should inculcate *Bildung* socially and not simply serve the formative needs of the author, then it must model and encourage the movement beyond oneself required for *Bildung*. The way in which poesy hovers 'between the portrayer and the portrayed' provides a blueprint for the reader in this endeavor. As "a mirror of the

whole circumambient world" and "an image of the age" poesy offers readers something more than a portrait of the author—it offers them a portrait of themselves as 'poets.'

The "mirroring" activity of poesy does not mean that a reader simply gazes upon himself as he is; instead, mirroring works as an upward projection of continuous reflective activity. Poesy hovers "on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise that reflection again and again to a higher power, can multiply it in an endless succession of mirrors." Indeed, the mirroring activity works not like that of a looking-glass mirror, but more like that of telescopic and microscopic mirrors, which work in various ways to project images more clearly.

In this way, the reflective mirroring clarifies a vision of the individual and society by engaging the reader in a reflected image of the world, then the reader undergoes a period of reflection from this 'higher' perspective, and in a continuous succession of hoverings and reflections, the cycle repeats. This activity is a depiction of polar *Bildung*: through reflective mirroring, poesy carries readers outside of themselves and into poesy's activity of hovering between and embracing polarities. The polarities of finite and infinite, particular and universal, do not simply exist as abstract concepts of limitedness and limitlessness, but find expression in the play between the reader and the world.

The poeticization of life and society—the inculcation of *Bildung*—is a cultivation of awareness of both limitation and all that lies beyond those limits. It takes place through recognition of the play between universal and particular, between infinite and finite, so that the person living a poeticized life "continuously fluctuat[es] between self-creation and self-annihilation."[185] By both encouraging such activity and embodying the polarities necessary to pursue it, fragment 116 makes living poesy sound exciting, but

[185] Firchow, 24, #51; *KFSA*, I.2, 172: ". . . steten Wechsel von Selbstschöpfung und Selbstvernichtung."

what makes up the *Stoffe* (subject matter or content) of *Bildung* fragment 116 does not clarify. References to the play between finite and infinite, particular and universal, expressed through the spiritual life of the author and through readers caught up in an 'endless succession of mirrors' hardly seem the type of "solid" content the fragment suggests comprise *Bildung*.

The poetic life, as a cultivated ("*gebildetes*") life, remains, to a certain extent, shrouded by irony and complex theoretical structures in the *Athenaeum* and in Schlegel's *Dialogue on Poesy*.[186] However, these theories and pronouncements find their roots in the real sense of the "fragmentariness of German society." Social realities divide Jews and Christians; men and women; wealthy and poor. The poetic life, in this sense, is a negotiation of fragmented existence: a life that forms the sensibilities and capacities to reflect upon both personal and social feelings of fragmentation, while simultaneously finding a personal sense of wholeness therein and promoting a path to such wholeness in the social realm. Schleiermacher reflects upon this situation in his *Speeches*, describing the current state of religion: "Certainly the quantity of religion in the world has not decreased, but rather is fragmented and driven too far apart."[187] And he appeals to his

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[186] Friedrich Schlegel's *Dialogue on Poesy* helps to fill out the connection between poetic self-transcendence and *Bildung*, but remains as abstract as fragment 116: one character asserts that, "We are concerned only with the meaning of the whole [in poesy]; and things which individually excite, move, occupy, and delight our sense, our hearts, understanding, and imagination seem to us to be only a sign, a means for viewing the whole at the moment when we rise to such a view" (*Dialogue on Poetry*, 89; *KFSA*, I.2, 323: "Wir halten uns also nur an die Bedeutung des Ganzen; was den Sinn, das Herz, den Verstand, die Einbildung einzeln reizt, rührt, beschaftigt, und ergötzt, scheint uns nur Zeichen, Mittel zur Anschauung des Ganzen, in dem Augenblick, wo wir uns zu diesem erheben."). His cohort in the dialogue agrees, declaring that human works of art imitate "the infinite play of the universe, the work of art which eternally creates itself [*sich selbst bildenden*] anew" (*Dialogue on Poetry*, 89; *KFSA*, I.2, 324: "Alle heiligen Spiele der Kunst sind nur ferne Nachbildungen von dem unendlichen Spiele der Welt, dem ewig sich selbst bildenden Kunstwerk.") The universe explores infinite expressions of individuality; the Romantic artist renders in a work of art a moment of universality, a window onto the infinite play of the universe that raises the reader beyond her particularity and into the realm of the universal.

[187] *Speeches*, 66; *SKGA*, I.2, 259: "Gewiß, die Maße derselben in der Welt ist nicht verringert, aber zerstükelt und zu weit auseinander getrieben."

poetic friends to address this fragmentation: "I find that you, through your whole striving—whether consciously or not you yourselves may decide—are of no little help to a rebirth of religion."[188] As Goethe insists, though, their striving must not stray from the literary realm.

3. Polarity in Schleiermacher's *Athenaeum*-Era Discussions of *Bildung*

Schleiermacher's developing theory of *Bildung* during the *Athenaeum* period has received extensive scholarly attention (see chapter one). The following sections add to this already-lengthy conversation by drawing out Schleiermacher's use of polarity in his writing during this period. Polarity provides the facet of Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung* that helps to situate it in the Jena milieu while distinguishing his perspective from Schlegel's, emphasizing Schleiermacher's shift away from Schlegel's description of the "poetic life."

a. Schleiermacher, Poesy, and Polarity in the *Athenaeum*

Above, August Wilhelm worried to his brother Friedrich that Schleiermacher was contributing too much to the *Athenaeum*. Friedrich Schlegel's response to his brother's concern is telling. He insists that Schleiermacher has a remarkable "dialectical power" much like Fichte and a love of "audacious combinations" that rivals Novalis. This statement, in itself, situates Schleiermacher as a key figure in the *Athenaeum*'s development of poetic activity characterized by the embrace of polarities. But, Schlegel continues in his letter to his brother, Schleiermacher won't put pen to paper: "But *to write*! Oh, beloved friend, unfortunately you would assume, that he [Schleiermacher] would take too much (active) interest in our affairs. Because that is his major failing—

[188] *Speeches*, 66; *SKGA*, I.2, 260: ". . . so finde ich, daß Ihr durch Euer ganzes Streben—ob mit Eurem Bewußtsein mögt Ihr selbst entscheiden—eine Palingenesie der Religion nicht wenig zu Hülfe kommt."

that he has no real interest in *making* something, although he can. . . . All day I implore him and harass him to death."[189] Friedrich insists that Schleiermacher is not contributing *enough*; that he has to hound his friend to produce anything.

Other exchanges around this time clarify both of the Schlegel brothers' frustrations with Schleiermacher: He was not creating fragments specifically for the *Athenaeum*; instead, he was presenting the Schlegels with aphorisms he had written previously.[190] Schleiermacher's notebook from the *Athenaeum* period contains copies of many aphorisms from his earlier notebooks, giving credence to the Schlegels' concerns that Schleiermacher was recycling his old material in order to meet the demands upon him for literary output. The Schlegels eventually insist that Schleiermacher cannot simply re-copy his old aphorisms and call them fragments—he needs to craft his fragments with the circle's developing definition of the fragment genre in mind.[191]

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[189] *KFSA*, II.16, 45: "Aber *schreiben*! Ach lieber Freund, Du darfst leider nicht besorgen, daß er zu viel (thätigen) Antheil an unsrer Sache nehmen würde! Denn das ist sein Hauptfehler, daß er kein rechtes Interesse hat, etwas zu *machen*, obgleich er es kann. . . . Ich treibe und martere ihn alle Tage."

[190] August Wilhelm writes to Schleiermacher that his old notes and observations on philosophy, which he has sent in as fragments, will not do for the *Athenaeum*. In sending this old material, Schleiermacher seems to him, "wholly in the character of a man who gives away his inner riches in all kinds of unformed matter, and yet, with unspeakable sorrow, searches up and down the steps of his lost thoughts for such a treasure." *SKGA*, V.2, 261: "Aber diese Anmutung ist ganz im Charakter eines Menschen der unaufhörlich seine innern Reichthümer in allerley Ungestalten von sich giebt, und doch einen auf der Treppe verlohrnen Gedanken mit unsäglichem Kummer wie eine Stecknadel suchte."

[191] I intentionally create a distinction here between the 'aphorisms' of Schleiermacher's notebooks and the 'fragments' of the *Athenaeum*. Friedrich Schlegel and the circle saw the fragment as a genre distinct from the aphoristic tradition upon which it built. They heralded the fragment as a form of expression that could act as a microcosm of a whole, somehow embracing both complete subjectivity and complete objectivity. So Schlegel writes of Julius in *Lucinde*, 78, that, "In his imagination his whole existence was a mass of unrelated fragments. Each fragment was single and complete." The *Athenaeum* uses the simile of a hedgehog to describe a fragment: "A fragment, like a miniature work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a porcupine [hedgehog]" (Firchow, 45, #206). The *Athenaeum* fragments posit the potential for a fragment genre that points to their ideal. Fragment 77 asserts, "as yet no genre exists that is fragmentary both in form and content, simultaneously completely subjective and individual, and completely objective and like a necessary part in a system of all the sciences" (Firchow, 27). Poesy, in the form of the novel, should be a "series of fragments," as Shelton Waldrep, *The Aesthetics of Self-Invention: From Oscar Wilde to David Bowie* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), 10-11, asserts in his cogent discussion of the Jena-Romantics' interest in the novel genre. Such a work can, according to the circle's definition, embrace the polarities of isolation (the fragment) and succession (the series).

And Schleiermacher does create new material. In addition to re-copying some of his literary observations, he also expands his thinking on these issues (perhaps chastened after August Wilhelm's rejection of his old material). One aphorism notable in the context of fragment 116 is a copy from an old notebook. It reads, "Is not the *Roman* [novel] the only *Poesie* of the innovators? All else is foreign to them."[192] In this early version, Schleiermacher recognizes a connection between poesy and the novel (*Roman*) before such a connection was published as part of the *Athenaeum* fragments.[193] When Schleiermacher copies this aphorism into the new notebook that spans the dates of the *Athenaeum*, he adds the title "*Poesie*," and the new material that follows this entry focuses on a topic Schleiermacher had not yet explored: a more precise definition of the *Roman* (novel). In these entries, Schleiermacher muses that the ancients were unable to produce a *Roman* because "their *Poesie* came out of the cultivated [*bildenden*] art, which had ever only to do with [isolated] moments, and not with successive [moments], as is the

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[192] The entry continues, "Their drama has its source in the Novella [and ever inclines thereto], and the best lyric is in part a *Roman*, therefore in part one must figure out a *Roman*, in order to understand the lyric." Schleiermacher's first rendition comes from a notebook begun in 1796; the second, almost identical, appearance of the aphorism occurs in a notebook begun in 1798. I quote from the second aphorism, though I have indicated with brackets the small addition that occurred between the first and second versions. The first version appears in *SKGA*, I.2, 31, #122, the second in *SKGA*, I.2, 122, #17: "Ist nicht der Roman eigentlich die einzige Poesie der Neueren? Alles andre ist ihnen fremd. Ihr Drama hat seinen Ursprung in der Novelle [und neigt immer dazu hin], und das beste Lyrische ist theils im Roman, theils muss man einen Roman darum [herum] machen, um es zu verstehen. "

[193] In fact, if written in 1796 or early 1797, the statement could easily have referred to Herder and not reflect interactions with Schlegel at all. Herder first drew the connection between poesy and the novel in his *Letters for the Advancement of Humanity* (*Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität*, eighth collection, 1796), with which Schleiermacher was acquainted before he befriended Schlegel. Indeed, in a 1796 letter to her brother, Charlotte Schleiermacher tells Schleiermacher how much she enjoys reading Herder and begs him to send the "Briefe über Humantität" along to her as soon as possible, implying that he already had the book. *SKGA*, V.2, 15. On the novel as *Poesie*, Herder writes, "No type of *Poesie* is of greater breadth than the *Roman*." Herder, *Werke*, VII, 548: "Keine Gattung der Poesie ist von weiterem Umfange, als der Roman." Arthur Gillies, "Herder's Preparation of Romantic Theory," in *The Modern Language Review* 39:3 (1944), 252-261, argues successfully that fragment 116 draws directly from the 7th and 8th collections of Herder's *Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität* to define *Poesie*. Not only do the letters between Schleiermacher and his sister suggest that he had read these installments, but Gillies, 252, notes that Friedrich Schlegel had reviewed the 7th and 8th collections for Reichardt's journal *Deutschland*. Gillies views Friedrich Schlegel as the sole author of the fragment, and is thus uninterested in how other members of the circle might have contributed to Schlegel's thinking on *Poesie* when he wrote it.

case with the *Roman*." Schleiermacher no longer makes observations about some "innovators" equating the *Roman* and poesy; he now makes the statement himself—he has shifted his stance from observation to participation.

Schleiermacher's contemporaneous observations in his "Review of Immanuel Kant: 'Anthropology'" in the *Athenaeum* provide a broader context for his reflections on the role of poesy in his notebooks. In his critique of Kant, Schleiermacher argues that poesy offers something that contributes to our understanding of what it means to be human and how humans thereby go about a process of self-cultivation. Indeed, Schleiermacher concludes that Kant's anthropology fails because of Kant's "complete ignorance of art and especially of poesy."[194] Kant's anthropology, according to Schleiermacher, becomes "a compilation of trivialities" and the "negation of all anthropology."[195] For Schleiermacher, Kant's problem does not appear to be that he has not read enough Shakespeare and Schiller. What sort of 'poetic' perspective would turn Kant's "compilation of trivialities" into a true anthropology?

Schleiermacher offers some clues to his understanding of poesy when he argues that anthropologies (and anthropologists) should embrace diverse observations on human behavior. The poetic perspective, as Schleiermacher suggests above in his notebook fragments, moves away from isolated moments to successive ones; it brings cohesion where there once was isolation. Anthropology, arising from a poetic perspective, performs the same function as poesy, but, veering away from Schlegel's definition of "transcendental poesy," it does so for Schleiermacher in a historically-oriented rather than a transcendentally-oriented manner: it brings into relationship diverse observations

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[194] *SKGA*, I.2, 369: ". . . das gänzliche Nichtwissen um Kunst und besonders um Poesie."
[195] Ibid., 365: "eine Sammlung von Trivialitäten"; and 366: "Negation aller Anthropologie."

on the human experience, modeling in its own methodology how human nature manifests in history.[196]

A poetic anthropology, for Schleiermacher, helps one grasp humans' natural diversity while at the same time retaining a sense of common humanity. That is, according to Schleiermacher, shared human nature does not refer to a singularity, but to a multiplicity that manifests in various ways in individuals. Poesy provides a method of negotiating human diversity and commonality together. Schleiermacher's piece on Kant shows the direction of his thinking: he places poesy, along with anthropology, in the realm of the real instead of the ideal, so that their activity now addresses human life within the phenomenal realm.

Although Schleiermacher locates artistic expression centrally in the pursuit of *Bildung*, the vocabulary of poesy, with its complex theoretical implications, progressively recedes.[197] Schleiermacher never loses interest in the poetic *activity* of embracing opposition, but he does begin to explore this activity outside the realm of poesy, developing it first in the realm of religion (in the *Speeches*) and then in the realm of ethics (in the *Soliloquies*).

b. Polarity and *Bildung* in the *Speeches*

Schleiermacher's *Speeches* begin by elaborating the embrace of dipolarity that occurs at the foundation of both divine and human activity: "You know that the deity, by an immutable law, has compelled itself to divide [*entzweien*] its great work endlessly, to

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[196] As Chad Wellmon argues in his work on Schleiermacher's review of Kant, the concept of anthropology was shifting in the late-eighteenth century: anthropology becomes "interested primarily not in man's metaphysical possibilities but in his worldly exigencies." See Chad Wellmon, "Anthropology as Poesie: Schleiermacher, Colonial History, and the Ethics of Ethnography," in *German Quarterly* 79.4 (2006), 424.

[197] Schleiermacher continues to discuss poesy, but his later theory of poetics would return older systems of typologies; he leaves the lofty aspirations of the Romantic theory of poesy behind. See René Wellek, *A History of Criticism*, II, 304.

fuse together each definite being only out of two opposing forces [*zwei entgegengesezten* (sic) *Kräften*], and to realize each of its eternal thoughts in twin forms that are hostile to each other and yet exist inseparably only through each other."[198] This description introduces human experience as a negotiation of the infinite variety of creation. The Deity's creative activity divided "the great work" that is creation into infinite *dyads*. Both for humans and for God, to bring definition to this multiplicity a 'fusing together' of dyadic "opposing forces" must occur.

As creations of God, humans reflect this basic polarity in their fundamental way of being in the world. Schleiermacher appends to his description of divine activity this basic description of humans: "Each human soul . . . is merely a product of two opposing drives. The one strives to draw into itself everything that surrounds it, . . . wholly absorbing it into its innermost being. The other longs to extend its own inner self ever further, thereby permeating and imparting to everything from within."[199] Here Schleiermacher introduces internalizing and externalizing tendencies that lie at the very base of human nature, depicting this fundamental dyadic activity as an outgrowth of divine creativity.[200]

Schleiermacher reinforces this perspective on polarity in the second speech by reminding his friends that the tension and attraction between polarities describes the most

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[198] *Speeches*, 5; *SKGA*, I.2: 191: "Ihr wißt daß die Gottheit durch ein unabänderliches Gesez sich selbst genöthiget hat, ihr großes Werk bis ins Unendliche hin zu entzweien, jedes bestimmte Dasein nur aus zwei entgegengesezten Kräften zusammenzuschmelzen, und jeden ihrer ewigen Gedanken in zwei einander feindseligen und doch nur durch einander bestehenden und unzertrennlichen Zwillingsgestalten zur Wirklichkeit zu bringen."

[199] *Speeches*, 5; *SKGA*, I.2, 191: "Jede menschliche Seele . . . ist nur ein Produkt zweier entgegengesezter Triebe. Der eine ist das Bestreben alles was sie umgiebt an sich zu ziehen, in ihr innerstes Wesen ganz einzusaugen. Der andere ist die Sehsucht ihr eigenes inneres Selbst von innen heraus immer weiter auszudehnen, alles damit zu durchdringen, allen davon mitzutheilen."

[200] Schleiermacher builds not only on the Fichtean vocabulary of negotiating opposing forces in self-consciousness, but also, as Richard Crouter comments on the translation of this passage, on "a fundamental polarity that is widely shared in eighteenth-century aesthetics, literary theory, natural philosophy, and physics"(*Speeches*, 5 n.).

basic way in which the world works. Recalling advances in scientific understanding, he writes, "See how attraction and repulsion determine everything and are uninterruptedly active everywhere, how all diversity and all opposition are only apparent and relative, and all individuality is merely an empty name."[201] Schleiermacher keeps these comments focused on the phenomenal realm, suggesting that the most basic laws of physics serve as "an intuition of the universe . . . that seizes the mind."[202]

In the passages above, Schleiermacher sketches dyadic activity in broad terms that link the embrace of polarity to God, to humans, and to creation in general. This approach forms a propaedeutic to his central argument: not only should his friends not "despise" religion, they should recognize its foundational role in their poetic activity.

Although Schleiermacher described his friends as "despisers" of religion in the title of his *Speeches*, he clarifies that he understands their aversion to be a reaction against the deadening institutional aspects of religion and not against religion, *per se*. Schleiermacher points out to his friends that one can speak of religion in two different ways: one can refer to its institutionally mediated forms, but one can also refer to a more basic definition of religion that precedes its formalization in institutions.

The institutional sense of religion his friends distrust and dislike in a variety of forms: They despise the idea of doctrine and tradition passed, unthinking, from generation to generation; they also despise a 'religion of reason' expressed as a purely moral endeavor stripped of innovation and the possibility of variation or progression. Such definitions of religion, in their minds, hinder *Bildung*.

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[201] *Speeches*, 36; *SKGA*, I.2, 227: "Sehet wie Neigung und Widerstreben alles bestimmt und überall ununterbrochen thätig ist; wie alle Verschiedenheit und alle Entgegensetzung nur scheinbar und relativ ist, und alle Individualität nur ein leerer Namen."

[202] *Speeches*, 37; *SKGA*, I.2, 227: ". . . eine Anschauung des Universums, die . . . das Gemüth ergreift."

To present his own view to his friends, Schleiermacher first catalogues the places that they profess to find religion:

> You are familiar with the history of human follies and have perused the different edifices of religion, from the meaningless fables of barbarous nations to the most refined deism, from the crude superstition of our people to the poorly stitched together fragments of metaphysics and morals that are called rational Christianity, and you have found them all without rhyme or reason.[203]

He strikes all the major chords: they despise the dead letter of orthodox doctrine; they despise superstition and its fear-based practices; they despise the rarefied ethics conjured by metaphysical magicians with no eye for the exigencies of human existence. Indeed, they despise anything that has ever received the moniker, religion. Then Schleiermacher grants that they are right to reject these practices and pronouncements, insofar as they act as *definitions* for 'religion,' for none of them provides an *essential* definition of religion.

In a bold move, he proceeds to chastise his friends for lacking what they consider to be their greatest assets: their mental acuity, their ability to discern what lies hidden from plain view, their inquisitiveness, and their willingness to think for themselves; indeed, their willingness to 'move beyond' themselves. In short, he accuses his friends of ignoring the fruits of their cultivation (*Bildung*) when it comes to discussions of religion:

> In all these systems you despise, you have accordingly not found religion and cannot find it because it is not there. . . . But why have you not descended any more to the particular? I wonder at your voluntary ignorance, you good-natured investigators, and your all too calm persistence with what is simply there and praised by you! In all [theological systems] something of this spiritual material lies latent. . . . But those who do not know how to release it, no matter how finely they dissect it, no matter how thoroughly they investigate everything, always

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[203] Schleiermacher, *Speeches*, 12; *SKGA*, I.2, 199: "Ihr seid . . . bekannt mit der Geschichte menschlicher Thorheiten, und habt die verschiedenen Gebäude der Religion durchlaufen, von den sinnlosen Fabeln wilder Nationen bis zum verfeinertsten Deismus, von der rohen Superstition unseres Volks bis zu den übelzusammengenähten Bruchstüken von Metaphysik und Moral, die man vernünftiges Christenthum nennt, und habt sie alle ungereimt und vernunftwidrig gefunden."

> retain in their hands only the dead cold mass. [204]

When his friends look beyond the conventional definitions of religion that they have lazily accepted, Schleiermacher argues, then they will find that they in fact embrace religion. Indeed, as cultivated individuals (*die Gebildeten*), they are *best* suited to practice, reflect upon, and further the true definition of religion. Religion is not some*thing*, religion—like poesy—is a way of being.

As one might suspect, although many polarities arise in Schleiermacher's discussion of religion in the *Speeches*, he is keen to convince his literary friends that they should embrace *religion*, and so religion develops in dyadic relation with *art*.[205] Schleiermacher makes this argument for the polar embrace of religion and art most clearly towards the end of his third speech, "The *Bildung* of Religion,"[206] asserting that,

> Religion and art stand beside one another like two friendly souls whose inner affinity, whether or not they equally surmise it, is nevertheless still unknown to them. Friendly words and outpourings of the heart always hover ["*schweben*"] on their lips and return again and again because they are still not able to find the proper manner and final cause of their reflection and longing.[207]

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[204] Schleiermacher, *Speeches*, 13; *SKGA*, I.2, 200: "In allen diesen Systemen, die Ihr verachtet, habt Ihr also die Religion nicht gefunden und nicht finden können, weil sie nicht da ist. . . . Warum seid Ihr aber nicht mehr zu dem Einzelnen herabgestiegen? Ich bewundre Euere freiwillige Unwißenheit, Ihr gutmüthigen Forscher, und Euere alzuruhige Beharrlichkeit bei dem was eben da ist und Euch angepriesen wird! In Allen liegt etwas von diesem geistigen Stoffe gebunden . . . . aber wer es nicht versteht ihn zu entbinden, der behält, wie fein er sie auch zersplittere, wie genau er auch alles durchsuche, immer nur die todte kalte Maße in Händen."

[205] To understand either religion or art, he tells his friends, one must embrace the two together. This approach not only appeals to Schlegel's two, intersecting planes (art as real product and religion as access to the transcendent), but also remains true to Schleiermacher's emphasis on dyadic activity that occurs *within* the phenomenal realm: religion and art are much more concrete than "indefinite and definite" or "ideal and real."

[206] Scholarship approaches Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung* in the *Speeches* through his argument for religion (as in the work of Terry Foreman and Christiane Ehrhardt). Indeed, the *Speeches* offers one of the easiest opportunities for scholars to make clear statements concerning Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung* during this period, since he addresses the speeches to his "cultivated" ("*Gebildeten*") friends, and he entitles his third speech, "The *Bildung* of Religion."

[207] *Speeches*, 69; *SKGA*, I.2, 263: "Religion und Kunst stehen nebeneinander wie zwei befreundete Seelen deren innere Verwandschaft, ob sie sie gleich ahnden, ihnen doch noch unbekannt ist. Freundliche Worte und Ergießungen des Herzens schweben ihnen immer auf den Lippen und kehren immer wieder zurück weil sie die rechte Art und den lezten Grund ihres Sinnens und Sehnens noch nicht finden können. "

The passage describes art and religion as two entities experiencing both attraction and repulsion, their attempts at communicating tentative. Schleiermacher invokes the Fichtean activity of wavering, or hovering, to reinforce the character of this dyadic relation.

In the second edition of the *Speeches* (1806), Schleiermacher clarifies the relationship of religion and art further by adding the following sentence to this passage: "Like the opposite poles of two magnets, being mutually attracted, they [religion and art] are violently agitated but cannot overcome their gravity so as to touch and unite."[208] In this later depiction of the dyadic relationship of religion and art, Schleiermacher uses the metaphor of magnetic poles to emphasize the *oppositional* relationship of the two, elucidating the relationship by explicitly naming the dyadic elements as "poles."

In both editions, Schleiermacher continues to express the polarity inherent in religion and art concretely through an appeal to his friends' poetic talents. Schleiermacher hopes, it appears, that his friends will harness *their* artistic capacities to elaborate *his* vision of religion in the poetic works of art for which he feels himself unsuited, thereby fusing his and his friends' polar talents. And so he closes the third of his *Speeches* with a veiled reworking of fragment 116, which attempts to propel his friends in a slightly different poetic direction. Having described what the spheres of philosophy and natural science offer the artist, Schleiermacher expounds what *religion* offers the artist:

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[208] Friedrich Schleiermacher, *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, trans. and ed. John Oman (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994), 140; *SKGA*, I.12, 173: "Wie die ungleichartigen Pole zweier Magnete werden sie von einander angezogen heftig bewegt, vermögen aber nicht bis zum gänzlichen Zusammenstoßen und Einswerden ihren Schwerpunkt zu überwinden."

> The greatest work of art is that whose material is humanity that the universe forms [*bildet*] directly and the sense for this must soon open up for many. For even now it is creating [*bildet*] with bold and powerful art, and you will be the modern Caryatides when new structures are set up in the temple of time. Interpret the artist with force and spirit; explain the later works on the basis of the earlier and the earlier on the basis of the former. Let past, present, and future surround us, an endless gallery of the most sublime works of art eternally reproduced by a thousand brilliant mirrors. Let the history . . . reward religion with rich gratitude as its first nurse . . . See how the heavenly growth flourishes in the midst of your plantings without your aid. Neither disturb it nor pluck it out! It is a proof of the approval of the gods and of the imperishability of your merit; it is an ornament that adorns, a talisman that protects.[209]

Referring to "the sublimest works of art, eternally multiplied by a thousand brilliant mirrors," Schleiermacher places his friends in the context of fragment 116, where *Universalpoesie* encompasses the "greatest systems of art, containing within themselves still further systems" and can hover "on the wings of poetic reflection, and can raise that reflection again and again to a higher power, can multiply it in an endless succession of mirrors."

But, whereas fragment 116 places poesy under the all-encompassing will of the poet, Schleiermacher places art in the hands of the Deity. Forming humanity, artists, with the "approval of the gods," repeat the creative work of the Deity. With this reversal, Schleiermacher not only emphasizes the role of religion, he also returns to Goethe's

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[209] *Speeches*, 71. *SKGA*, I.2, 264-265: "Das größte Kunstwerk ist das, deßen Stof die Menschheit ist welches das Universum unmittelbar bildet und für dieses muß Vielen der Sinn bald aufgehn. Denn es bildet jezt eben mit kühner und kräftiger Kunst, und Ihr werdet die Neokoren sein, wenn die neuen Gebilde aufgestellt sind im Tempel der Zeit. Leget den Künstler aus mit Kraft und Geist, erklärt aus den frühern Werken die spätern, und diese aus jenen. Laßt uns Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft umschlingen, eine endlose Gallerie der erhabensten Kunstwerke durch tausend glänzende Spiegel ewig vervielfältigt. Laßt die Geschichte, wie es derjenigen ziemt, der Welten zu Gebote stehn, mit reicher Dankbarkeit der Religion lohnen als ihrer ersten Pflegerinn. . . . Seht wie das himmlische Gewächs mitten in Euern Pflanzungen gedeiht ohne Euer Zuthun. Stört es nicht und rauft es nicht aus! Es ist ein Beweis vom Wohlgefallen der Götter und von der Unvergänglichkeit Eueres Verdienstes, es ist ein Schmuk der es ziert, ein Talisman der es schüzt."

mature theory of genius in *Meister*, which tempers the independent, "god-like" nature of human creativity.

Religion, the quotation asserts, is what guides this formation and what makes it sublime. The "will of the poet" that drives poesy in fragment 116 is eclipsed: Schleiermacher tells his friends that "without your [the artist's] aid, the heavenly growth flourishes in the midst of your plantings." Schleiermacher wants his friends to continue their call to poesy. They must view this call aright, however, as a call to the service of religion rather than a call to become gods through the exercise of the 'infinite will of the poet.'

With this passage, Schleiermacher presses poesy toward the predominant influence of religion. His friends would heed his call only in part: they would take up religion, but on their own terms, still resisting its manifestation in historically-bound institutions.[210] And Schleiermacher would respond in kind: he would talk about poesy, but as his thinking develops, he limits the expansive definition of poesy, subordinating its participation in *Bildung* not only to religion, but to ethics as well (see chapter three). Schleiermacher's definition of *Bildung* within his system of ethics takes definite shape in his *Brouillon* and in *Christmas Eve*, but Schleiermacher's ethical approach to *Bildung* begins to form within his next major publication after the *Speeches*: his *Soliloquies*.

c. Polarity and *Bildung* in the *Soliloquies*

[210] Thus, Schlegel will proclaim religion the "all-animating world soul of [*Bildung*]" (Firchow, 94, #4), but his novel *Lucinde* describes religion in terms of a religion of love that even social institutions like marriage cannot contain.

Schleiermacher's developing conception of individuality propels his notion that *Bildung* looks different for each person; i.e., there is no universal route to *Bildung*.[211] This perspective manifests, above, in his critique of Kant's anthropology as well. Despite this insight, which suggests infinite multiplicity, Schleiermacher continues to work within a dyadic framework, discussing differences in terms of polarity—just as he discussed the infinite multiplicity of divine creativity in the *Speeches* in terms of its dyadic elaboration. And the polarity that orients his articulation of *Bildung* in the *Soliloquies* is, as in the *Speeches*, again the concrete polarization he feels between himself and his friends (particularly Schlegel). Indeed, the dyadic relation of religion and art prevalent in the *Speeches* becomes the orienting principle for discussing *Bildung* in the Soliloquies, in terms of the relation of religion with internality/feeling and art with externality/aesthetic production.

Along these lines, Schleiermacher returns repeatedly to the dyadic embrace of "inner humanity" and "activity turned beyond the self." Though Schleiermacher recognizes the necessity of both of these tendencies, he observes that the externalizing tendency receives emphasis to the point of obscuring the fundamental role of the internalizing tendency. Schleiermacher spends pages chastising his generation for their neglect of 'inner humanity':

> This perverse generation loves to talk of how it has improved the world. Were perfected human nature already in blossom, . . . were the seeds of self-culture [*Bildung*] for ever so many individuals already assured of their growth . . . –even then this generation could not outdo its glittering praise of mankind's present estate. . . . Oh how deeply I despise this generation, . . . which can scarcely endure the belief in a still better future and reviles everyone who dedicates himself thereto, simply because the true goal of mankind, toward which the age has risked scarcely a single step, lies

[211] On Schleiermacher's early shift toward an ethical orientation, see Brent Sockness, "Was Schleiermacher a Virtue Ethicist?," 30-32; on the role of individuality, see especially 32.

> unknown to it in the dim distance! . . . [W]hoever is content to see crude matter vitalized and to have mankind find the joy of living in the consciousness of mastering its body [i.e., the material world], —let him, for whom this is the ultimate aim, join in the noisy praise of our times.[212]

Schleiermacher directs his ire not at advancements made in cultivating external humanity ('mastery of the material world'), but more specifically, at the blind pride with which his contemporaries herald their achievements while neglecting inner humanity: the source of *Bildung*. In contrast to his brash contemporaries, Schleiermacher strives to incorporate *both* tendencies in his own cultivation, though his nature is not suited to externality: "in me self-development ["*Selbstbildung*" (as an internalizing pursuit)] and activity turned beyond the self must balance at every moment. Therefore, my progress is slow, and I shall live long before I have embraced all things equally."[213] Here, Schleiermacher suggests that he, unlike his contemporaries, achieves *Bildung* through a purposeful process that occurs internally, while also balancing itself with external activity. The theme, incorporated in the *Speeches*, repeats throughout the *Soliloquies*: humanity tends in two opposing directions (internal/contemplative and external/sensual), and the end

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[212] *Schleiermacher's Soliloquies*, trans. and ed. Horace Friess (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1926), 50-51 (hereafter, *Soliloquies*); *SKGA*, I.3, 28: "Von Verbeßerung der Welt spricht das verkehrte Geschlecht so gern. . . . O stiege von der schönen Blüte der Menschheit wirklich schon der erste süße Duft empor; wären . . . die Keime der eigenen Bildung über jede Verlezung hinaus gediehen . . . sie könnten doch nicht glänzender den Zustand der Menschheit preisen. . . . Wie tief im Innern ich das Geschlecht verachte, . . . den Glauben kaum an eine beßere Zukunft ertragen kann und schnöde Jeden dere ihr angehört, beschimpft, und nur darum dies Alles, weil das wahre Ziel der Menschheit, zu welchem es kaum einen Schritt gewagt, ihm unbekannt in dunkler Ferne liegt! . . . daß jeder rohe Stoff beseelt erscheine, und im Gefühle solcher Herrschaft über ihren Körper die Menschheit sich ihres Lebens freue: wem das ihr leztes Ziel ist, der stimme mit ein in dieses laute Lob."

[213] *Soliloquies*, 42. *SKGA* I.3: 24: ". . . in mir Selbstbildung und Thätigkeit des Sinnes in jeglichem Momente das Gleichgewicht sich halten müßen. So schreit ich denn langsam fort, und langes Leben kann mir gewährt sein, ehe ich Alles in gleichem Grad umfaßt." In the *Speeches,* 3-6, Schleiermacher frames the nature of humanity similarly, as comprised of two opposing forces.

product of one's *Bildung* (which Schleiermacher imagines he will reach imperfectly, and only shortly before he dies) lies in embracing these poles.[214]

In part, Schleiermacher's outright anger at his contemporaries in these passages appears to stem from the way in which his own internal *Bildung* is misunderstood in a cultural context that prizes external development: "My silent effort, though it appear like mere idleness from without, was not in vain; it has well-served my inward task of self-development [*Bildung*]. . . . Alas that a man's inner character should be so misjudged . . .! Alas that so many . . . confuse outward behavior and inner activity, deeming it possible to construe the latter like the former from fragmentary appearances."[215] Schleiermacher does not spend his energy belaboring his interpretation of contemporary society and his reception within it simply because he is peeved, however. In the end, Schleiermacher moves the reader to his higher purpose: a call to the *Bildung* of the world. He writes, "We are here waging a great battle for the sacred standard of humanity. . . . It is a decisive battle, but also a certain victory, to be won, independent of chance or fortune, by

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[214] In the *Speeches*, 4, Schleiermacher describes these oppositional impulses in terms of particularity (striving towards individuality) and universality (striving towards oneness with the Infinite). In the *Soliloquies*, 88, he writes, "For a nature such as mine the highest point is reached when its inner development [*Bildung*] seeks an external embodiment, since every kind of nature in its perfection approaches its opposite." He continues, emphasizing that his nature is not made for artistic expression: "The idea of perpetuating my inner being, and with it the whole outlook which humanity gave me, in a work of art is for me a premonition of death" (*SKGA*, I.3, 52: "Es ist das höchste für ein Wesen wie meines, daß die innere Bildung auch übergeh in äußre Darstellung, denn durch Vollendung nähert jede Natur sich ihrem Gegensaz. Der Gedanke in einem Werk der Kunst mein innres Wesen, und mit ihm die ganze Ansicht, die mir die Menschheit gab, zurükzulaßen, ist in mir die Ahndung des Todes.").

[215] *Soliloquies*, 43. His shift from anger to sadness here indicates the pain he has experienced because even his friends, and not just general society, misunderstand his nature. *SKGA*, I.3: 24: "Nicht war vergebens die stille Thätigkeit, die ungeschäftig müßges Leben von außen scheint; schön hat sie das innere Werk der Bildung gefördert. . . . O Jammer, daß des Menschen inneres Wesen so mißkannt werden kann . . . ! . . . daß doch auch ihrer so viele mit dem äußern Thun das innere Handeln verwechseln, dies wie jenes im Einzelnen aus abgerißenen Stüken zu erkennen meinen, und wo Alles übereinstimmt Widersprüche ahnden!"

spiritual strength and genuine art."[216] Schleiermacher sees himself and his friends waging a battle for the cultivation of humanity, just as the *Athenaeum*'s stated purpose is the pursuit of *Bildung*, through which they strive, as Schlegel's sonnet "*Athenaeum*" asserts, to separate the wheat (the 'strong') from the chaff (the 'weak parts').

Given his description of his own nature (as receptive/internal) and his literary friends' natures (as active/external), he furnishes spiritual strength while his friends must wield the weapon of genuine art (poesy). In this sense, they will take individual paths, but they will reach the same state of cultivation, which embraces both poles. Thus, Schleiermacher focuses on the embrace of polarity in the process of *Bildung*, but the concrete polarization between his personality and his friends' directs him towards less abstract expressions of the embrace of universality and particularity; his focus remains on *Bildung*'s occurrence within the historical reality of people's lives.

Although for Schleiermacher poesy reveals inner humanity and *Bildung* accomplishes the cultivation of inner humanity, he argues that the *means* for such cultivation, if it is to achieve the equilibrium he strives for in his own development, cannot simply manifest as an 'inward turn' guided by poesy (artistic expression). *Bildung* occurs through our relationships with others.

This sharing of one's natural talents enlarges one's understanding of humanity and complements the areas of one's own nature that are as yet potentialities: "When friends extend to each other the hand of fellowship, the bond should issue in something greater than each could achieve independently. . . In this wise each would find life and

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[216] *Soliloquies*, 65; *SKGA*, I.3, 37: "Dies ist der große Kampf um die geheiligten Paniere der Menschheit . . . der Kampf der alles entscheidet, aber auch das sichere Spiel, das über Zufall und Glük erhaben, nur durch Kraft des Geistes und wahre Kunst gewonnen wird."

strength in the other, and the potentialities within him would be fully realized."[217] Schleiermacher's understanding of the role of friendship in *Bildung* underscores a topic crucial for the interpretation of *Christmas Eve*: *Bildung* is a *shared process* through which *every* person in the relationship moves towards *Bildung*.

In his *Soliloquies*, Schleiermacher tends toward Goethe's, instead of Schlegel's, depiction of *Bildung*: Wilhelm learns in the Society's manual that at the highest level of *Bildung*, one must help others along the path of *Bildung* to fulfill one's own process of cultivation. For Julius, in *Lucinde*, Lucinde provides the polar opposition necessary for his *Bildung*, but Schlegel does not describe Lucinde undergoing her own process of *Bildung* together with Julius. *Christmas Eve*, I will argue, engages in the 'poetic' embrace of polarity, but it is poesy infused by Goethe's approach to *Bildung* in *Wilhelm Meister*.

Chapter Summary and Conclusions

The chapters of the dissertation build towards a reading of Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve* as a narrative expression of a theory of *Bildung*. In this chapter, I examined the relationships between Goethe and the Jena-Romantic circle in Berlin and between Schlegel and Schleiermacher within a literary milieu. The chapter focused not only on the personal influence and tensions arising in these relationships, which shape the literary direction of the Jena Romantics' interest in *Bildung*, but also on Goethe's

[217] *Soliloquies*, 56. This definition of love/friendship and its function in *Bildung* accounts for much of the sadness Schleiermacher expresses concerning his misunderstood nature: how can he cultivate himself when his closest friends will not recognize his distinctive internality as a useful pole to embrace along with their externality in their shared process of *Bildung*? *SKGA*, I.3, 32: "Wenn der Freund dem Freunde die Hand zum Bündniß reicht: es sollten Thaten draus hervor gehn, größer als jeder Einzelne . . . . So fände Jeder im Andern Leben und Nahrung, und was er werden könnte, würd er ganz."

approach to *Bildung* in *Wilhelm Meister* and the Jena-Romantic response to it, culminating in Friedrich Schlegel's elaboration of a theory of "poesy."

Schleiermacher follows the stated purpose of the *Athenaeum*, which makes *Bildung* a central focus of the circle's literary endeavors, but he does not adhere completely to Schlegel's articulations of a polar approach to *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum*. While Schleiermacher does remain within the dyadic framework common to both Goethe and Schlegel, he does *not* follow Schlegel's Fichtean articulation of 'transcendental poesy.' On this point, Schleiermacher remains closer to the Goethean focus on a more 'gentle' navigation of polarity, and one that finds its reference points in the multiplicity of human life in the world rather than a "transcendental" philosophy.

The progression in Schleiermacher's thinking from the *Athenaeum* to the *Soliloquies* points to this fundamental difference in perspective developing between Schlegel and Schleiermacher on the issue of *Bildung*: In polar *Bildung*, Schlegel wants a theory that can orient his sense of the "chaotic harmony" of the universe. Schleiermacher, however, wants a theory that can negotiate the manifestation of human diversity on the historical plane. As a result, Schlegel's approach tends towards the transcendental, while Schleiermacher's approach tends towards the historical.

Schleiermacher begins to argue, that, although all *Bildung* proceeds through the embrace of fundamental polarities like universality and particularity, this activity develops in unique ways given the concrete diversity of individual personalities. Poesy, no matter how complex a concept it became, could not quite capture Schleiermacher's approach to *Bildung*. In the next chapter, I will show how Schleiermacher's lectures on ethics (1805/1806) subordinate poesy to the ethical pursuit of *Bildung*, reinscribing poesy

in the sphere of linguistic expression and placing the fundamental activity of *Bildung* in the ethical sphere; i.e., in human relationships.

III. An Ethical Narrative of *Bildung*: Schleiermacher's Lectures on Ethics as Context for *Christmas Eve*

Bildung is the highest good, and it alone is useful.[1]
--Friedrich Schlegel,
Athenaeum fragment

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I considered the relationship between the theories of *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum* and Schleiermacher's concurrent discussions of the themes involved therein. In 1805, preparing his lectures on ethics at Halle, Schleiermacher begins to systematize his thinking on *Bildung*, categorizing and defining the dyadic forces that underlie and propel the full formation of humanity.[2] Schleiermacher's ethical orientation frames *Christmas Eve* as a narrative of *Bildung*. As his lectures on ethics will clarify, the literary sphere holds ethical implications and an ethical perspective holds implications for literary production.

Schleiermacher first elaborates the outline of his ethical system in a series of notes for his lectures on ethics at Halle between October 21, 1805 and March 27, 1806. He titles the series, *Brouillon zur Ethik*, or *Notes on Ethics*.[3] He plans to publish the

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[1] *KFSA*, I.2, 259, #37: "Das höchste Gut und das allein Nützliche ist die Bildung."

[2] Matthias Riemer has provided a study of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher that emphasizes its connection to his ethical theory. In 1803, Schleiermacher wrote an "Outline of a Critique of Existing Ethics," which Riemer reads as a shift away from his early thinking on *Bildung* and the nascent stages of his mature approach to *Bildung* in his ethics. See Riemer, *Bildung und Christentum*, especially 156-160. I follow Riemer in emphasizing a connection between Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung* and his ethics, though I focus on ways in which his ethical orientation serves to clarify strands already present in his earlier thinking on *Bildung*.

[3] *Brouillon* does not literally translate as "notes." Schleiermacher likely took the term from Novalis, as John Wallhausser observes in his introduction to his translation of the piece, *Notes on Ethics*, in *Brouillon zur Ethik/Notes on Ethics (1805/1806), Notes on the Theory of Virtue (1804/1805)*, 1n. Wallhausser relates, "During 1798-99 Novalis began gathering aphorisms and fragments toward a vast new encyclopedic project he called '*Das Allgemeine Brouillon*' ('Rough General Outline'). He hoped to replace earlier encyclopedias, with their isolation of units of knowledge, by an integration designed to exhibit the unity of knowing. The idea of such a project would have appealed to Schleiermacher, except that he typically grounded questions of knowledge and action in ethics."

lectures after he has repeated them several times and worked out any problems.[4] With the invasion of Napoleonic forces in October 1806, classes disband and Halle is closed. The lectures remain unpublished during Schleiermacher's lifetime. The *Brouillon*, though not perfected for publication, presents the outline of the system of ethics that Schleiermacher would continue to work out at the University of Berlin, later in his career.

In constructing the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher again situates himself in relation to the *Athenaeum* discussions of *Bildung*. He echoes Schlegel's claim that "*Bildung* is the highest good,"[5] and restates Novalis' assertion that they were "called to the *Bildung* of the earth."[6] Yet the mission for which Schleiermacher draws up plans in his *Brouillon* elaborates a polar theory of *Bildung* that differs from those offered by his friends. In the following chapter I consider Schleiermacher's developing theory of ethics as well as the weight of historical circumstances, both personal and social, as the immediate backdrop for Schleiermacher's approach to *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve*.

1. Historical Context: A Fiancée, a Flautist, and the French

Schleiermacher's relationship with Schlegel, so crucial to the early development of his thinking on *Bildung*, disintegrates by 1803, when the two finally call off their plans for a co-translation project of Plato.[7] Although Schleiermacher was eager to send copies

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[4] *SKGA*, V.8, 315. From a letter to Georg Reimer, September 14, 1805: "Künftiges Jahr schon einen Grundriß der Ethik drukken zu lassen davon kann ich kaum etwas erwähnt haben. Immer wollte ich wenigstens erst dreimal Vorlesungen darüber gehalten haben, und das kann wol nicht eher als 1807 geschehen. Sollte sich mir schon jezt beim zweitenmal alles recht vollkommen ausbilden, so könnte das die Sache wol beschleunigen."

[5] *KFSA*, I.2, 259, #37: "Das höchste Gut und das allein Nützliche ist die Bildung." I use my own translation here, to highlight both the use of the term *Bildung* and the reference to the "highest good" (*höchste Gut*), both of which are obscured in Firchow's translation. Firchow, 97, reads: "Culture is the greatest good and it alone is useful."

[6] My translation of Novalis, *Blütenstaub* #32, in *Athenaeum: Eine Zeitschrift* 1798-1800, 57: "Wir sind auf einer Mission: zur Bildung der Erde sind wir berufen."

[7] See Julia Lamm's discussion of the falling out between Schleiermacher and Schlegel, which paints an accurate portrait of the strained relationship between the two during these years, in "Schleiermacher as Plato Scholar" in *Journal of Religion* 80.2 (2002), 210-215.

of *Christmas Eve* to both Schlegel brothers and hear their reactions to it, the influence of Schlegel had waned. When looking at the immediate context in which Schleiermacher wrote *Christmas Eve*, a different set of historical figures arise.

In addition to Schlegel and the Jena circle, the contextual narrative that scholars have built upon in interpretations of *Christmas Eve* centralizes Eleanor Grunow's abrupt break with Schleiermacher that October.[8] Schleiermacher expected to marry Grunow as soon as her divorce was finalized. But, overcome with guilt, Grunow returned to her husband.[9] Schleiermacher, grief stricken, takes comfort in the family life of his close friends, the von Willichs, who have just had a daughter.[10]

The contextual narrative then culminates in Schleiermacher's attendance at a concert given at Halle on December 2nd by the famous blind flautist, Ludwig Dülon. The performance, as Schleiermacher indicates in the margin of his notes on ethics, delayed his thirtieth lecture by one hour. Schleiermacher writes to his friend and publisher, Georg Reimer, that his "first conception" of *Christmas Eve* came to him suddenly while listening to Dülon's performance, and that he then completed the piece within three weeks.[11]

Schleiermacher's focus in *Christmas Eve* on the relationships between men and women and the simultaneous experience of joy and sorrow are then read through the lens

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[8] See chapter one for an assessment of scholarship on *Christmas Eve*. Also, Ruth Richardson's dissertation, *Weihnachtsfeier as "Universal Poetry,"* 240-478, provides an exhaustive summary of all scholarship on *Christmas Eve* from 1806-1984.

[9] *SKGA*, V.8, 335-336. Schleiermacher recounts the sad news in a letter to Henriette von Willich, which he had begun writing on October 9th. In the midst of writing to Henriette, he receives Eleanor's letter, breaking their engagement. Schleiermacher could not bring himself to finish the letter to Henriette, sharing the news about Eleanor, until the eighteenth of October, three days before he would begin his lectures on ethics.

[10] Ibid., 336. In the same letter to Henriette (previous note), Schleiermacher tells her that the news of the birth of her daughter (Henriette Pauline, born October 6th) has sustained him and brought him joy in the midst of his unhappiness.

[11] Ibid., 466.

of his dissolved love affair.[12] His focus on family and friends, in consequence, is read through his admiration and gratitude for the von Willichs, Reichhardts, Steffens, and other close friends who supported him during his process of grieving for Eleanor.[13] His focus on the relationship of music (and more broadly, art) and religion finds its contextual basis in Dülon's concert, supported by his exposure to the writings of Novalis.[14]

The encroachment of Napoleonic forces into German territories provides a third element of the historical context in which Schleiermacher wrote *Christmas Eve*.[15] On December 2nd, 1805, while Schleiermacher sits, enraptured by the extemporaneous "fantasies" of the flautist, Dülon, armies of the Third Coalition were surrendering to the Napoleonic forces at Austerlitz. Many of Schleiermacher's students at the Halle seminary were preparing to take up arms and defend themselves and their families. Schleiermacher's letters as the Napoleonic forces draw closer to Halle in 1806 express concerns about German disunity in the face of Napoleonic advances. The phrase, "Germany is the core of Europe" ("*Deutschland . . . ist der Kern von Europa*") recurs, and to this statement he appends comments that point to the necessity of a "general

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[12] Every recent interpretation of *Christmas Eve* that takes historical context into account mentions the break with Grunow (Thus, discussions of Grunow can be found in Niebuhr, Hirsch, Wehrung, Gerrish, Tice, Nowak, Richardson's dissertation and her chapter on *Christmas Eve* in *Women*, and Guenther-Gleason's article, "'Christmas Eve' as a Work of Art"). The disintegration of Schleiermacher's relationship with Grunow was the most important event in his life that year, completely upending his plans for his life.

[13] As with the related topic of Grunow, the discussion of the influence of his friendships on *Christmas Eve* is pervasive in scholarship. For an example, see Niebuhr, *On Christ and Religion*, 22-23.

[14] Hirsch considers Novalis the primary influence on *Christmas Eve*. Richardson's review of Hirsch in *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry,"* 426-448 tempers Hirsch's interpretation and also corrects some of the historical errors in his thinking. Richardson's own interpretation of Novalis' influence on *Christmas Eve* is more circumspect and comes to the fore in her reading of Hirsch, focusing on Schleiermacher's use of Novalis' music.

[15] Niebuhr, *On Christ and Religion*, 25-26, also notes Schleiermacher's developing concern about Napoleon at the time he writes *Christmas Eve*, and his focus on Protestantism as the answer. I follow Niebuhr, elaborating his general comments on the connection and adding the connection of Schleiermacher's 1804 essay on the reunification of German Protestant denominations.

regeneration" ("*allgemeine Regeneration*") if Germans intend to rebuff invasion.[16] Schleiermacher writes that a shared Protestant identity is the tool that could bring Germans together in a unified way to fight off Napoleon's forces from 'Catholic' France.[17] The Napoleonic threat clarifies for him the pressing need to build community identity, which he linked specifically to Protestant Christianity.

Though the statements in his letters seem like vague and grandiose calls for unity, Schleiermacher had published an essay in 1804 that discussed ways in which German Protestants might achieve unity.[18] In this essay, Schleiermacher calls for the reunification of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches in Prussia.[19] He suggests that the Herrnhuter faith embraces two practices, in particular, that the Lutheran and Reformed Churches should look to as a guide for bringing their communities to union: The Brethren have developed a rich liturgical life, including the celebration of festivals[20] and

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[16] Schleiermacher's letters after March, 1806 have not, at this date, been published in *SKGA*, so I draw here from, Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Briefe Schleiermachers*, ed. Hermann Mulert (Berlin: Hugo Steiner, 1923), 232. Adam Müller's *Theory of Polarity* (1804) makes a very similar argument—Germany acts as the center of Europe in so far as it is a mediating and synthesizing force for the embrace of polarities (See René Wellek, *A History of Criticism, 1750-1950*, 1:292). But, unlike Schleiermacher, Müller did not link Germany's role to its Protestantism (see following note), and he, indeed, converted to Catholicism in 1805.

[17] Schleiermacher, *Briefe Schleiermachers*, 233; 235; 237. For example, he writes to Georg Reimer: "Certainly he (Napoleon) would then, in short, have attacked and pursued Protestantism— . . . and I hope that then a religious war of the old German sort would break out. . . . it would show that the mass of people is not as irreligious as it appears to be outwardly." *Briefe Schleiermachers*, 237: "Gewiß würde er ["Buonaparte"] dann in kurzem den Pretestantismus angegriffen und verfolgt haben— . . . und dann, hoffe ich, würde ein Religionskrieg nach alter deutscher Art ausgebrochen sein. . . . es würde sich auch gezeigt haben, daß die Masse des Volks nicht so irreligiös ist, als sie nach außen erscheint." The negative assessment of Catholicism in *Christmas Eve*, as well as the pervasively Christian nature of the gathered company's interactions and activities, parallel his concerns for the unification of Germans through a shared religious identity.

[18] Friedrich Schleiermacher, " Zwei unvorgreifliche Gutachten in Sachen des protestantischen Kirchenwesens: Zunächst in Beziehung auf den Preußischen Staat," in *SKGA*, I.4, 359-460.

[19] He would, to a large extent, achieve this goal in 1817, through his work on the Prussian Union of Churches. See chapter five.

[20] *SKGA*, I.4, 437. Schleiermacher visited Barby during Holy Week in 1805, celebrating with the Brethren during the highpoint of their liturgical year. It was also the year he wrote *Christmas Eve*, and in a letter describing this journey, he broached again the superiority of Herrnhuter worship: "There is in the whole of Christendom in our time no public worship that more worthily embodies or more certainly awakens true Christian piety than that of the Brethren! And while I wholly ensconced myself in heavenly faith and love[among the Brethren], I yet felt very deeply, how far behind we others are [in our churches], in which

the central incorporation of music into their worship.[21] Music and festivals, Schleiermacher argues, both unite God and humans *and* unite Christians with one another. The Lutheran and Reformed Churches would do well to focus on these facets of religious worship to bring the denominations into communion. Schleiermacher's epistolary calls for the regeneration of Protestant identity in 1806, then, find a concrete basis in his published suggestions for the reunification of Protestant denominations in 1804.

Christmas Eve, set during the celebration of the Christmas festival and framed by the gathered company's music and singing, sits between his 1804 essay on German-Protestant reunification and his 1806 comments on Protestant unity in the face of the Napoleonic threat. In this context, *Christmas Eve* offers a literary portrayal of various tendencies in German Protestantism and their unification through the celebration of the festival and the use of music. Schleiermacher's development of a polar theory of *Bildung* during his participation in the Jena circle continues in *Christmas Eve*, but it now addresses a more concrete need to imagine the formation of Protestants in a Germany strong enough to resist Napoleon.[22]

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the poor speech serves as everything, and this still bound in a miserable style, and thus rarely animated by the true living Spirit." Ibid., V.8, 198: " . . . es giebt in der ganzen Christenheit zu unsrer Zeit keinen öffentlichen Gottesdienst, der ächt christliche Frömmigkeit würdiger ausdrückte und sichrer erweckte, als der in der Brüdergemeine! Und indem ich mich ganz in himmlischen Glauben und Liebe versenkte, mußte ich es recht tief fühlen, wie weit wir andern zurück sind, bei denen die armselige Rede Alles ist, und diese noch an ärmliche Form gebunden, allem Wechsel der Zeit sich unterwerfend, und so selten von dem rechten lebendigen Geiste beseelt." Schleiermacher carried with him, when he returned to the Reformed Church, a great respect for the devotional style of the Brethren.

[21] Ibid., I.4, 423. In *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher would incorporate prominent roles for both Christian festivals (as the title suggests) and for music. See chapter five.

[22] Schleiermacher's 1799 essay "Versuch einer Theorie des geselligen Betragens" (Approach to a Theory of Social Behavior) in *SKGA*, I.2, 163-184, clarifies this position. While *Christmas Eve* is not a didactic piece, it does serve the purpose of the "narrative" approach to ethics that Schleiermacher describes in the *Brouillon*.

The contextual pieces introduced above help to frame Schleiermacher's thematic choices in *Christmas Eve*. But, Schleiermacher was also concerned about the artistic merit of the piece. The artistic nature of the piece, "the first of its kind" that Schleiermacher had written, likely propelled his interest in hearing his literary friends comment on the *form* of *Christmas Eve* rather than its thematic content.[23] His requests for feedback on form suggest both that he was sending something his friends would recognize—a literary "work of art" (*Kunstwerk*), as he called it[24]—and also that he was sending something new. On my reading, the novelty of the piece develops in concert with Schleiermacher's concurrent elaboration of a polar theory of *Bildung* in his *Brouillon*.

While the *con*-textual elements discussed above shape the themes Schleiermacher employs, the *inter*-textual relationship between *Christmas Eve* and the *Brouillon* shapes his vision of *Christmas Eve* as an ethical *Bildung* narrative. Before taking up the lectures in detail, the following two sections introduce Schleiermacher's definitions of poesy and *Bildung* in the *Brouillon* to clarify the link between his literary and ethical concerns in 1806.

2. The *Brouillon* and *Christmas Eve*

[23] See respectively his letter to J.C. Gass, *SKGA*, V.8, 456; his letter to Georg Reimer, *SKGA*, V.8, 466; and Friedrich Schlegel's letters to him concerning both his and his brother's responses, *Briefe*, III, 408, 414. With Friedrich Schlegel, this epistolary conversation about the form of the work ended rather quickly, however, when Schlegel wrote back that he thought it was a prose piece, but that Schleiermacher's handwriting made it difficult to be certain (408). The symphilosophizing of the two friends had ended long ago, and Schlegel's letter must have served only to further clarify to Schleiermacher that the two no longer shared an intellectual vision. I follow Hermann Patsch's introduction to *Die Weihnachtsfeier* in *SKGA*, I.5, xlvi-xlvix, especially, wherein he argues that *Christmas Eve* acts as a "*Formexperiment*" (xlviii) for Schleiermacher, and that his sources in creating it included Goethe and Schlegel.

[24] *SKGA*, V.8, 466: "Und es hat doch wirklich etwas einem Kunstwerk ähnliches und könnte zu einer von Vollendung gebracht werden; wenigstens mir scheinen die Gestalten hiezu bestimmt genug zu sein."

In his notes, Schleiermacher divides the study of ethics into three parts: the highest good, virtue, and duty. In December 1805, while Schleiermacher writes *Christmas Eve*, he lectures on the first part of the triad, the highest good. Therein he elaborates the highest good as *Kultur*, or *Bildung*, and he delineates the family as the arena in which the communal goods that contribute to *Bildung* intersect. John Wallhausser, in the introduction to his recent translation of the *Brouillon*, parenthetically notes that *Christmas Eve* acts as a "vivid portrayal" of Schleiermacher's notion of family in the *Brouillon*.[25] In the following section, I will argue more broadly that the *Brouillon* lays out a polar theory of *Bildung* in the abstract that *Christmas Eve* makes concrete. In this way, the *Brouillon* acts as a stepping stone between Schleiermacher's developing theory of *Bildung* in the Jena-Romantic context and his construction of *Christmas Eve* as a *Bildung* narrative. The *Brouillon* becomes the key to unlocking the ethical theory that drives Schleiermacher's understanding of the formation of human nature in *Christmas Eve*.

a. *Bildung* and the *Brouillon*

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[25] Wallhausser, 21. Scant scholarly work has been done on the connection between the *Brouillon* and *Christmas Eve*. In Wilhelm Dilthey's assessment of *Christmas Eve*, he notes the centrality of Schleiermacher's ethical thought in his construction of *Christmas Eve*, but he never invokes the *Brouillon* or otherwise draws out this connection. See Ruth Richardson's discussion of Dilthey on this issue in, *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry,"* 291. Richard Niebuhr, *Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion*, 66, notes that the character of Eduard "outlines the systematic principles operative in the ethics and theology as they are to take shape for Schleiermacher in the future." Though these major scholarly assessments find a connection between Schleiermacher's ethical thinking and *Christmas Eve*, neither takes up the *Brouillon* to prove this connection. Niebuhr, 30, does invoke the *Brouillon*, though, in discussing the style in which *Christmas Eve* was written: Niebuhr suggests that Schleiermacher's work in the *Brouillon* may have encouraged him to write in a dialogic form, based on the dialectical movement of life, though Niebuhr rightly asserts that the dialogic form "is not its main attraction," and that Schleiermacher thought of the work more as a "precursor of the *novella* . . . . he hoped to write" (31). Ruth Richardson, *The Role of Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher (1768-1806): A Historical Overview*, 134; 143-144, explicitly refers to the *Brouillon*, but in so far as it clarifies Schleiermacher's notion of gender difference. In this more narrow observation Richardson does note, in accord with my own approach, that in *Christmas Eve* Schleiermacher "attempts to evoke through literary description and dialogue what he had previously attempted to define philosophically" concerning gender difference (143).

When Friedrich Schlegel wrote in an *Athenaeum* fragment that, "*Bildung* is the highest good, and it alone is useful,"[26] he could have been stating one of the central theses of Schleiermacher's *Brouillon*. Of the ninety-four sets of lecture notes in the *Brouillon*, 70% (lectures eight through seventy-one) elaborate the highest good. A systematic articulation of the highest good, then, remains the central focus of the *Brouillon*. In the eleventh lecture, Schleiermacher lays out more fully what he means by the highest good: In the current historical age, Schleiermacher states, the idea of the highest good receives expression in terms of "perfected culture [*vollkommenen Kultur*]," or *Bildung*.[27]

In past ages, Schleiermacher notes, the idea of the highest good was expressed as "the image of God" ("*Ebenbild Gottes*") in humans, in terms of humans' powers of formation and governing organization (lordship): "The lordship of the human over the earth is like complete organ formation [*Organbildung*], for one has lordship only over one's organs and what is ruled becomes organ. This lordship requires a complete understanding of nature, possible only in absolute community; each individual can contribute one's maximum only through uniqueness" (*NE*, 45).[28] The shifting expression of the highest good from the image of God in humans to *Bildung* does not simply represent a broad historical observation made by Schleiermacher, but one linked to his

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[26] *KFSA*, II, 259, #37: "Das höchste Gut und das allein Nützliche ist die Bildung."
[27] *NE*, 45; *BE*, 16. I follow John Wallhausser's interpretation of the passage quoted above. Wallhausser argues that in the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher employs the vocabulary of *Kultur* as a synonym for and referring to *Bildung* (See also, 59, n.). Wallhausser also includes *Bilden* as a synonym for *Bildung* (84, n.). His extension of the idea of *Bildung* to these other terms, likely developed through consultation with Terrence Tice and Edwina Lawler, appears warranted in light of the overall focus on *Bildung* as the representation of the highest good (the main topic at hand in these lectures), as well as, in this particular instance, the repeated use of the verbal forms of *Bildung* in the paragraph introducing the statement above.
[28] *BE*, 16: "Herrschaft des Menschen über die Erde gleich vollständiger Organbildung, denn man beherrscht nur seine Organe, und alles Beherrschte wird Organ. Diese Herrschaft erfodert ein gänzliches Durchschauen der Natur; sie ist nur möglich in absoluter Gemeinschaft; jeder kann sein Maximum nur betragen durch Eigenthümlichkeit."

own thinking as well. Brent Sockness suggests in his appraisal of Schleiermacher's early ethical thought that *Bildung* entered Schleiermacher's ethical thinking in 1793 as "a subsidiary concern." The concept of *Bildung* expands, however, by the time Schleiermacher writes the *Soliloquies* "into one of the two central categories of Schleiermacher's ethics."[29] Schleiermacher, like Schlegel, places *Bildung* as the highest good, the goal of ethical action, and this emphasis on *Bildung* continues in the *Brouillon*. However, Schleiermacher now attempts to systematize the ethical implications of the equation of *Bildung* with the highest good. In so doing, Schleiermacher reads *Bildung* as the most recent vocabulary used to refer to the unchanging "highest good" (see below, on lecture eleven).[30]

Like older ideas that have represented the highest good, Schleiermacher stresses, *Bildung* requires "complete organ formation": the formation of one's own faculties as well as, by extension, the formation of community.[31] Schleiermacher categorizes four central goods, all communal, that serve the highest good of *Bildung*. These he discusses in terms of "free sociality" ("*freie Geselligkeit*"), the academy, the state, and the

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[29] Brent Sockness, "Was Schleiermacher a Virtue Ethicist?," 2. Sockness goes on to assert in this passage that the second main concept at work is individuality (*Individualität*) and that Schleiermacher's ethical emphasis on *Bildung* remained confined to his "'romantic phase.'" I would argue that this shift has to do in part with Schleiermacher's later focus on pedagogics in the *academy*, for which he uses the vocabulary of *Erziehung* even in the *Brouillon* (*NE*, 113).

[30] In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher is not so much attached to the terminology of *Bildung* as he is to the underlying ideal it represents. As a result, Schleiermacher uses the terms *Kultur* and *Bildung* synonymously in the piece. See below. *Kultur* would fade from use in his ethical lectures, however, and was omitted completely by 1816. On this terminological shift, see Christel Keller-Wentorf, *Schleiermachers Denken* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1984), 26-27 as well as Wallhausser's note, *NE*, 11.

[31] In these passages, by organ, Schleiermacher means anything over which one can exert control or use. Thus, internal faculties, farm animals, tracts of land, and other people are all potential organs. He also finds in this idea the reason that the Greek articulation of the state as the highest good was wrong: the state cannot control other states, and this limitation thwarts it from evolving into an expression of the highest good. As complete self-actualization that extends into community, *Bildung* (as well as the earlier expression of the idea of the highest good, the image of God in humans) acts as a more encompassing idea of the highest good, which allows for a developed system of complete organ-formation.

church.[32] In the *Athenaeum*, the Jena circle members (including Schleiermacher) had committed themselves to striving "in free association" ("*im freien Bunde*") to "grasp the rays of *Bildung*," but Schlegel resisted the role of institutions, especially religious institutions (churches), in these endeavors.[33] The *Brouillon* marks Schleiermacher's most systematic argument to this point for the inclusion of multiple social institutions in *Bildung*. Schleiermacher makes "free sociality" central in this theory, but free sociality flourishes in all three of the other three goods (academy, church, and state). In this way, Schleiermacher does not simply argue that these socially institutionalized communities can aid rather than inhibit *Bildung*, he argues for their necessity for the accomplishment of *Bildung*.

Despite these differences, particularly with Schlegel's views in the *Athenaeum*, Schleiermacher's comments on *Bildung* in the *Brouillon* retain a connection to Schleiermacher's earlier work among the Jena circle. The most striking proof of this continued link to the discussions of *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum* is Schleiermacher's re-statement of Novalis' proclamation: "We are on a mission: we are called to the *Bildung* of the earth."[34] Schleiermacher makes explicit his interest in *Bildung* and its connection to *artistic* expression by referring back to this fragment from the *Athenaeum*. The last lecture notes of the section he gives while he writes *Christmas Eve* end with the following:

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[32] Wallhauser's introduction to the *Brouillon* provides a helpful chart and explanation of the four goods (*NE*, 21). In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher uses the term *Erziehung* instead of *Bildung* when he discusses the role of the academy (*NE*, 113; *BE*, 92).

[33] My translation from the German quoted in Frederick Beiser, *The Romantic Imperative*, 212: "Der Bildung Strahlen All in Eins zu fassen, Vom Kranken ganz zu scheiden das Gesunde, Bestreben wir uns treu im freien Bunde." For more on Schlegel's resistance to institutional religion during the *Athenaeum*, see chapter two.

[34] My translation of Novalis, *Blütenstaub* #32, in *Athenaeum: Eine Zeitschrift* 1798-1800, 57.

> Just as self-formation [*Selbstbildung*] in culture [*Kultur*], the permeation of its body by consciousness, is the one function of the state's moral life, so too each individual view of culture is a necessary idea and each state is an organic planetary work of art; its ideas and works of art are, in turn, single organizing individualities. Accordingly, in this view the presentation of the organizing function of moral life is now completed, in its turn, with the motto: we are called to the [*Bildung*] of the earth. (*NE*, 96)[35]

The notes may be dense, but the final sentence, invoking Novalis' fragment, provides the key to interpreting the direction of Schleiermacher's thinking: Reviving the *Athenaeum* vocation to *Bildung*, Schleiermacher (not surprisingly, given his concurrent artistic endeavor) affirms the participation of "works of art" in the process of *Bildung*. But, he presents a broad definition of art, so that the organization of the state itself could be a work of art—a technical creation versus a natural creation.

Thus, he will go on in the *Brouillon* to assert that "all people are artists" ("*alle Menschen sind Künstler*," *NE*, 126; *BE*, 108).[36] The *Bildung* of the earth comes to fruition as individuals communicate through this wider vision of artistic expression, and as communities (states, churches, etc.) do so as well. Schleiermacher's emphasis on community at this time denotes a shift in his thinking.

The lectures on the highest good move beyond the *Athenaeum*, as well as the *Speeches* and *Soliloquies*, to lay out systematically how *Bildung* occurs in, *and only in*,

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[35] *BE*, 73: "Wie nun die Selbstbildung in der Kultur, das Durchdringen seines Leibes mit Bewußtein die eine Function seines sittlichen Lebens ist, so ist jede individuelle Ansicht der Kultur eine nothwendige Idee, und jeder Staat ein organisches planetarisches Kustwerk, dessen Ideen und Kunstwerke wiederum die einzelnen organisirenden Individualitäten sind; und durch diese Ansicht ist erst die Darstellung der organisirenden Function des sittlichen Lebens vollendet, wiederum mit dem Motto: zur Bildung der Erde sind wir berufen."

[36] This position is a more positive appraisal of artistic potential than Schleiermacher expressed in the *Soliloquies*, where he doubted his own artistic ability. However, now that he had been inspired to create his own "*Kunstwerk*," *Christmas Eve*, and having expanded the definition of 'art,' he seems more willing to assume that all can be artists.

forms of community, making the *Bildung* of the earth not just a literary vocation, but an ethical imperative.[37]

b. An Ethical Definition of Poesy

Schleiermacher develops both Novalis' literary vocation to *Bildung* and an ethical imperative to *Bildung* in his re-definition of poesy in the *Brouillon*. Though the *Athenaeum* served as a breeding ground for aesthetic theories of *Bildung*, Schleiermacher's ethical turn was not unwarranted, and indeed, his friends would have expected it. Schlegel viewed Schleiermacher as the bearer of morality among the circle, especially in reference to Schleiermacher's own accomplishment of *Bildung*. Schlegel writes, "Schleiermacher is a man in whom humanity is cultivated (*gebildet*), and therefore, for me, certainly, he belongs to a higher caste. . . . His whole being is moral, and really predominates among all the distinguished people I know; he has (the most) morality of all the rest of them."[38] In his *Speeches*, Schleiermacher resists the Kantian tendency, which subordinates religion to morality, stating, for example, that "the common idea of religion is that it is a mixture of fragments of metaphysics and ethics, but it is time this idea was quite annihilated" (*SR*, 276). As Tice paraphrases Schleiermacher's point in this passage, "Religion, morals and metaphysics are equals,

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[37] Niebuhr, *On Christ and Religion*, 35, notes a significant shift in Schleiermacher's emphasis on community between his earlier work (his *Speeches* and *Soliloquies*) and *Christmas Eve*: as a professor at Halle, Niebuhr asserts, Schleiermacher's "interest in other persons, times, and modes of thought has lost some of its aesthetic curiosity, and we now see in Schleiermacher a starker realization of the fatefulness for the individual of the unity as well as the diversity of human nature. Furthermore, he no longer seeks the source of religion primarily in individual piety, . . . now he recognizes the original rôle of community in the molding of religious feeling and intuition."

[38] *KFSA*, III.24, 45-46: "Schl.[eyermacher] ist ein Mensch, in dem der Mensch gebildet ist, und darum gehört er freylich für me in eine höhere Kaste. . . . Sein ganzes Wesen ist moralisch, und eigentlich überwiegt unter allen ausgezeichneten Menschen, die ich kenne, bey ihm <am meisten> de Moralität allem andren."

different but complementary" (*SR*, 277).[39] In the second edition of the *Speeches*, published the same year as *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher makes the relationship between religion and ethics, as well as religion and aesthetics, hierarchical. He now asserts that, on their own, morality and genius "would be only fragments of the ruins of religion, or its corpse when dead. Religion were then higher than both." (*SR*, 29).[40] Ethics and aesthetics serve religion, he argues, however, both ethics and art play crucial roles in religion as well.[41]

Between his *Athenaeum*-era thinking and the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher develops a further hierarchical conception: not only do art and ethics serve religion, but now, "all theories of art [*Kunstlehren*]," Schleiermacher insists, "must proceed from ethics" (*NE*, 34).[42] In other words, art flows from ethics, which in turn flows from religion.[43] Not

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[39] *SKGA*, I.2, 208-209: "Und doch scheint das, was man Religion nennt, nur aus Bruchstüken dieser verschiedenen Gebiete zu bestehen. Dies is freilich der gemeine Begriff. Ich habe Euch lezthin zweifel gegen ihn beigebracht; es ist jetzt Zeit ihn völlig zu vernichten."

[40] Ibid., I.12, 45: ". . . so wären Sittlichkeit und Genie in ihrer Vereinzelung ja nur die einseitigen Zerstörungen der Religion, das Heraustretende, wenn sie abstirbt; jene aber wäre in der That das höhere zu beiden."

[41] For this reason, as Niebuhr asserts in *On Christ and Religion*, 76-77, "each element of Schleiermacher's style must be scrutinized in its reciprocity with the other—the religious in the context of the ethical, and the ethical in the context of the religious." Karl Barth, in his *Protestant Thought: From Rousseau to Ritschl*, 317, argues more forcefully that Schleiermacher subordinates theology to ethics. He writes, "I venture to assert that Schleiermacher entire philosophy of religion, and therefore his entire teaching of the nature of religion and Christianity, the things we first think of when his name is mentioned, was something secondary, auxiliary to the consolidation of this true concern of his, the ethical one. The face that, in academic theory, he ranked theology below ethics, is but an expression of this state of affairs." My own reading follows Niebuhr, viewing Schleiermacher as upholding ethics and religion on equal and interrelated terms. I view *Christmas Eve* as a case in point. I do, however, believe that Barth was correct in the statement he makes preceding the quotation above, writing that what Schleiermacher wants most of all to accomplish through his work is "to draw men into the movement of education, the exaltation of life, which at bottom is the religious, the Christian movement" (317).

[42] *BE*, 4: " . . . so wie aus der Naturwissenschaft alle Wissenschaften hervorgehen müssen, so aus der Ethik alle Kunstlehren."

[43] Despite these continued similarities to the theory of poesy in the *Athenaeum*, his high aspirations for poesy in the 1799 edition of the *Speeches* dampened a bit by his 1806 edition of the *Speeches*, which scales back the role of poesy. Robert Richards discusses this shift between the two editions of the *Speeches* in *The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 101 n. Though Richards views the shift as a consequence of Schlegel's conversion to Catholicism (and move away from poesy), I read the shift as a consequence of Schleiermacher's work on

surprisingly, then, Schleiermacher returns to the topic of poesy in the *Brouillon*, but his discussion of it is subordinated to this ethical perspective.[44]

Schleiermacher first asserts that, "Poetry is intrinsically the reaction of the way in which the individual is affected by the ethical aspect of the world. One sees this through poetry's great productions, the drama and the novel, in which poetry forms [*bildet*] history and thus seeks to affect people through its ethical aspect" (*NE*, 129).[45] Schleiermacher still conceives of poesy as contributing to *Bildung*, as *Athenaeum* fragment 116 had suggested, but he wishes to stress how poesy fits into an ethical theory of *Bildung* as the highest good. In so doing, he does not discuss poesy as an aesthetic capacity, as it had evolved in the *Athenaeum*;[46] instead, he narrows his emphasis to its forms of linguistic expression, like "the drama and the novel." Poesy, Schleiermacher states in the *Brouillon*, "has no other medium than language" (*NE*, 129).[47] The ethical element of these linguistic forms, he insists, 'forms [*bildet*] history' in order to "affect people." In this way, Schleiermacher continues the Jena-Romantic vision of poesy possessing social implications.

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his ethics, which clarifies for him the place of poesy in the *Bildung* of religion (his concern in the *Speeches*), as well as in *Bildung*, more generally (his concern in the *Brouillon*).

[44] On my use of the terms poesy/poetry see chapter two.

[45] *BE*, 111: "Poesie ist eigentlich die Reaction der Art, wie das Individuum von der ethischen Seite der Welt afficirt wird. Dies sieht man aus ihren großen Productionen, Drama und Roman, wo sie Geschichte bildet und also durch das Ethische afficiren will."

[46] Including in his own review of Kant's anthropology, see chapter two.

[47] Although limiting poesy to language, Schleiermacher suggests that language divides into two "elements" (*Elemente*): ". . . in its plastic element, the word, and in its musical element, rhythm" (*NE*, 130; *BE*, 112). *Christmas Eve* reflects this definition of poesy through its integration of musical interludes and the songs of Novalis into the interactions between the gathered company. This integration of music into a *Bildung* narrative mimics Novalis' integration of music and song lyrics into his novel, *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*. On the relationship between Novalis' work and *Christmas Eve*, particularly concerning the issue of music, see Richardson's critique of Hirsch in *'Die Weihnachtsfeier' as Universal Poetry*, 437-448. On the role of music (and its connection to poetry) in Schleiermacher's thinking through *Christmas Eve*, see Folkart Wittekind, "'Die Musik meiner Religion': Schleiermachers ethische Funktionalisierung der Musik bis zur 'Weihnachtsfeier' und seine Kritik der frühromantischen Kunstreligion," in *Christentum—Staat—Kultur*, 271-315.

Poesy fulfills its ethical purpose by acting as a presentation of "subjective knowing," by which Schleiermacher indicates the realm of "feeling" (*Gefühl*); i.e., poesy is the presentation of feeling.[48] Such "feeling," for Schleiermacher, indicates a realm related to emotion, but is not equated with it: emotion is a *reaction to* feeling.[49] As the presentation of feeling, poesy works in the realm of reason to mediate the immediate relational knowing that occurs in feeling. Indeed, poesy's 'job,' in so far as it is *ethical*, is precisely this mediation of feeling, as Schleiermacher continues, "[linguistic] presentation is then moral and genuine only to the extent that it completely refers and corresponds to feeling [*Gefühl*]" (*NE*, 130).[50] Morality in poesy depends not just on its presentation of feeling, however. Solidifying the connection between poesy and language ensures that the presentation of feeling always functions *socially*—one would never write or speak poetically for one's own consumption, but as a means of expressing one's individual experience of "feeling" (*Gefühl*) to others.

In this vein Schleiermacher writes, "From this [linguistic basis] it follows where poetry must emerge in life—namely, in being affected morally, which, in turn, itself originates from social relationships and wherever language is used" (*NE*, 130).[51] The reasoning Schleiermacher offers behind this statement is that "[p]ersonal existence . . . nowhere exists for moral potency in isolation; together with every organic system, it is

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[48] Discussing the relationship between feeling and poesy, Schleiermacher writes that, "to the extent that feeling is made ethical it also steps forth as a presentation of art" (*NE*, 130; *BE*, 113).

[49] Schleiermacher argues that, "emotion [*Gemüthsbewegung*] is necessarily connected with feeling [*Gefühl*]," but not synonymously; instead, emotions are the "reaction of feeling," or its "effects" (*NE*, 124-125; *BE*, 106: "was man Effekt nennt, ist nicht mehr das Gefühl allein, sondern die Reaction des Gefühls, die Gemüthsbewegung. Diese ist freilich mit jenem nothwendig verbunden."). The central characteristics of feeling are receptivity, relationality, and immediacy, and Schleiermacher places religious consciousness in this realm.

[50] *BE*, 113: " . . . ist auch diese nur insofern sittlich und wirkliche Darstellung, als sie sich durchaus auf das Gefühl bezieht und ihm correspondirt."

[51] Ibid., 112: "Hieraus ergiebt sich, wo die Poesie im Leben hervortreten muß, nemlich beim sittlichen Afficirtsein, das selbst wieder aus den geselligen Verhältnissen hervorgeht und überall, so die Sprache gebraucht wird."

rooted in a larger whole, be it family, state, free sociality, or academy" (*NE*, 122).[52] Concisely stated, then, poesy fulfills its ethical function by presenting individuality (individual feeling) in community.

Based on these observations, Schleiermacher concludes that "the form of poetry in its highest developments is dialogue" (*NE*, 130).[53] Dialogue reflects the highest form of poesy, because dialogue, by definition, integrates sociality in its presentation. Therefore, dialogue reflects an essentially ethical perspective. Though *Christmas Eve* is not a "dialogue" in the Platonic tradition, Schleiermacher does assert that it incorporates dialogic elements, and he even titles it "*ein Gespräch*": a dialogue or discussion.[54] *Christmas Eve* represents an approach to poesy that centralizes its ethical, dialogic function. This approach moves beyond the focus of Jena-Romantic *Bildung* narratives on a male protagonist, emphasizing dialogic activity within the life of a community.[55] To accomplish this shift, Schleiermacher centers the plot on an extended family unit, whose interactions mirror his description in the *Brouillon* of family as the nexus of ethical community.

c. Polarity and Family in the *Brouillon*

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[52] Ibid., 102: "Allein die Persönlichkeit existirt für die sittliche Potenz nirgends isolirt; sie ist mit jedem organischen System in ein größeres Ganze eingewurzelt, es sei Familie, Staat, freie Geselligkeit, Akademie."

[53] Ibid., 112: "Auch ist die Form der Poesie in ihren höchsten Bildungen das Gespräch."

[54] *Briefe* 2:58. See further commentary on scholarship concerning the form of *Christmas Eve* in chapter one.

[55] Following the work of Ruth Richardson and Patricia Guenther-Gleason, I place *Christmas Eve* among Jena-Romantic literary productions that strive for Schlegel's ideal, as explored in *Athenaeum* fragment 116, of "universal poesy." Ruth Richardson, *'Die Weihnachtsfeier' as Universal Poetry*, and Patricia Guenther-Gleason, "'Christmas Eve' as a Work of Art: Implications for Interpreting Schleiermacher's Gender Ideology," in *Understanding Schleiermacher*, 117-162. Both Richardson and Guenther-Gleason use this connection as a basis for approaching Schleiermacher's views on gender, and balancing interpretive emphasis between the men's speeches and women's narratives in *Christmas Eve*. In chapter four, I refocus the connection between *Christmas Eve* and poesy on *Bildung*, particularly through Schleiermacher's use of polarity. My approach takes gender into account, but highlights a broader spectrum of themes in *Christmas Eve* (see the four dyads in chapter four).

The invocation of dia-logue does not simply invoke community, but *dyadic* communal interaction, further propelling connections between *Christmas Eve* and Schleiermacher's ethical theory in the *Brouillon*. A reviewer of scholarship on Schleiermacher's ethics observes that the assessments agree on this point: his ethics "is unfailingly bipolar, or dialectical, or 'elliptical,' whether viewed in the context of theology, philosophy, or lived experience."[56]

John Wallhausser's work on Schleiermacher's *Brouillon* falls within this pattern of scholarship, providing an appropriate preface to the next chapter, which will build similar connections in a reading of Schleiermacher's concurrent work in *Christmas Eve*.[57] Wallhausser asserts that Schleiermacher's ethics finds its basis in his notion of the "polar construction of finite being and forms of knowing," which Wallhausser argues was present already in the *Speeches*[58] and had become central in Schleiermacher's thinking by 1803.[59] Wallhausser sees polarity in Schleiermacher's ethics develop according to two fundamental dyads, in which further dyads find their root: nature and reason, and universal and particular.[60] These pairs serve as the basis for the expression of dipolarity in the process of *Bildung* in various realms of life. For example, the dyad expressed as

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[56] James Duke, "New Perspectives on Schleieramacher's Ethics: An Essay" in *Journal of Religious Ethics* 17.2 (Fall 1989), 73.

[57] I will treat here Wallhausser's comments in his introduction to his translation of the *Brouillon*. He makes similar statements in his preceding essay on the *Brouillon*, "Love and Dialectic in Schleiermacher's Ethics," in *Understanding Schleiermacher*, 255-272.

[58] Wallhausser does not elaborate much on this point, educing a vague reference to the "literary structure" of the *Speeches* as an expression of his polar orientation. However, in chapter two, above, I have explored further Schleiermacher's use of polarity in the *Speeches*.

[59] Wallhausser, *NE*, 7, quotes a letter Schleiermacher wrote to Georg Reimer in 1803, followed by others that extend to his communication with F. H. Jacobi in 1818.

[60] The invocation of these polarities conforms to the notion of polarity in *Bildung* developed in the *Athenaeum*, which focused, in particular, on the universal/particular dyad (see above, chapter two).

nature and reason in the moral realm can also be expressed as religion and reason (or, feeling and reason) in the spiritual realm.[61]

Schleiermacher depicts "oscillations" between these polarities, Wallhausser observes, which form the basic activity of moral life and propel humans towards the highest good (*Bildung*).[62] Wallhausser stresses that polarity in the *Brouillon* does not refer to an either/or opposition, nor does it refer to the type of Hegelian dialectic that posits a third element that collapses the previous two elements (thesis and antithesis) into a synthesis. Finite being, for Schleiermacher, demands continual "oscillation of life" (*NE*, 42; "*Oscillation des Lebens*," *BE*, 13) between dyadic poles, wherein both poles remain distinct, but are constantly united through this activity of oscillation.[63]

Both of the polar dyads that Wallhausser locates at the core of Schleiermacher's ethical thought (nature and reason, and universal and particular) repeat dipolar oppositions explored in chapter two: nature and reason in Goethe's focus on nature and culture and universal and particular in the *Athenaeum*'s depiction of poesy as the polar activity that propels *Bildung*. But, as Wallhausser's commentary makes clear, Schleiermacher's approach to these polarities does not simply mimic the role of polarity in Goethe's *Meister* or in the *Athenaeum* theories of poesy. He writes, "Schiller and Schelling [and I would add Goethe and Schlegel] pursued *Bildung* as an aesthetic vision for the future; Schleiermacher wanted to present the new *Bildung* as a moral possibility,

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[61] On this point, see Ursula Frost's assessment of polarity in Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung*, 118-120. Frost explores both of these dipolar pairs in terms of their participation in Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung*, noting their consistent occurrence from the *Speeches* through the *Brouillon* (and beyond).

[62] Wallhausser, *NE*, 8.

[63] Schleiermacher refers to such oscillation repeatedly in the *Brouillon*. Schleiermacher applies it, for example, to knowledge (49), to the way communities relate (95), to the relationship between the individual and the community (97), and more abstractly, to the relationship between the universal and the particular (100).

as the most fruitful and comprehensive ideal for his 'total vision.'"[64] This 'total vision' to which Wallhausser refers points toward Schleiermacher's emphasis on the participation of social institutions outside the aesthetic sphere (academy, state, and church), which serve as "goods" that promote *Bildung*.

Wallhausser considers this situation more broadly as he focuses on Schleiermacher's elliptical image as the representation of his ethics.[65] He interprets Schleiermacher's double-ellipse, which intersects at four points (see chapter one for further description), as the symbolic articulation of the fundamental dyads that ground Schleiermacher's ethics: the focal points correspond to nature, reason, universal, and particular.

Recall in the previous chapter that Schlegel applied elliptical imagery in distinguishing his position from Goethe's: For Schlegel, as Eric Blackall explains, "The 'elliptical' form that Schlegel desired for the novel implies . . . opposition within a cohesive whole. Hence the image of the two centers, which probably also implied that a novel should move simultaneously on two planes, one of which should be transcendental."[66] Schlegel developed the elliptical image in the literary milieu in order to elaborate the transcendental realm he saw lacking in *Wilhelm Meister*.[67] Now, Schleieramacher revives this image, but uses it to focus on the immanent realm in his theory of ethics: polar oscillation works to keep one grounded in historical life (Schleiermacher) rather than propelling one beyond it (Schlegel). In this sense,

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[64] Wallhausser, *NE*, 17.
[65] See chapter one, under the discussion of polarity in Schleiermacher for a detailed description of this image and its application in scholarship to explain Schleiermacher's position on polarity.
[66] Eric Blackall, *The Novels of the German Romantics*, 29.
[67] On Schlegel's move beyond *Meister*, see chapter two.

Schleiermacher reclaims the ellipse on behalf of the Goethean perspective, which embraces polarities within the midst of everyday life.

However, unlike Goethe, Schleiermacher envisions social life marked by cohesion rather than fragmentation. Although ideal, Schleiermacher's depiction of social institutions stresses their balanced relationship, and it is his ideal portrayal of family, in particular, that bridges the *Brouillon* and *Christmas Eve*. Indeed, the central communal arena for dyadic activity explored in the *Brouillon* is the family.[68]

Wallhausser stresses family as a "microcosm of the entire ethics," arguing that Schleiermacher's

> four types of goods are not communities of nature. They extend beyond the natural communities of family, ethnicity, and people . . . . The family is itself presented as the transition from natural to historical (ethical) being. The family, however, has no specific place within Schleiermacher's framework of the moral agencies. It is not one sphere among others but is the nexus of all communities, natural as well as historical, and hence a microcosm of the entire ethics.[69]

Wallhausser not only views the extended family unit as the wellspring of community (and therefore moral) formation, he also sees family as the ground for bringing together one of the two major polarities that Schleiermacher uses to organize his ethics: nature and reason (the historical). Family, itself, is a community of nature, and its functioning brings it into relationship with historically created communities: the four goods of sociality, academy, state, and church.

In Schleiermacher's 1818 sermons on marriage, he gives a more concrete portrayal of how this interaction of communities occurs in terms of the roles of men and women: because women remain in the home and do not participate directly in the

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[68] The twenty-ninth through the fortieth lectures—almost 20% of his total lectures on the highest good—deal with family and friendship.
[69] Wallhausser, *NE*, 21.

academy or state, the job of the husband, according to Schleiermacher, is to bring this realm into the home. Women, in contrast, predominate in the spheres of sociality and religious sensibility. They bring this knowledge into the familial community.[70] In this way, the family unites the natural and historical.

Wallhausser further expands the role of family in embracing polarity, stating that, "[a]ll the polarities of reason are so integrated into this 'complete individuality' [the family] that it becomes 'a complete representation of the idea of humanity.' [internal quotations from *NE*, 82] As primal community the . . . family [contains] all functions which will be extended through it to form the moral world."[71] The family unit not only integrates 'all the polarities of reason,' then, but it also acts as the pole of nature (feeling) in dyadic relation to the pole of reason. In addition, the pole of reason contains its own polar subsets, indicated by Wallhauser's reference to the 'polarities of reason,' and reason expresses as the historically created forms of community (the four goods). The

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[70] Schleiermacher, *Selected Sermons of Schleiermacher*, trans. by Mary Wilson (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1890), 137-138: "And when the apostle bids the wives be subject to their husbands, . . . undoubtedly he was thinking of the necessary relations in which every Christian home stands to the larger economy of the community with which it is associated; in which the husband alone represents the household, and in relation to which it is therefore he who must act, while the wife takes part, not directly, but only through her connection with her husband." (For the German, see, *Predigten über den Christlichen Hausstand* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1860), 12-13.) And then later, "it is the part of the man, to whom God has assigned the binding word and public deed [activity], to represent the household; and it is never well if the wife takes a direct part in those larger concerns" (141). *Predigten*, 17-18: " . . . der Mann, welchem Gott das bindende Wort und die äußere That angewiesen, das Hauswesen zu vertreten geeignet ist, das Weib sich aber nie ungestraft unmittelbar in jene größeren Angelegenheiten einmischt." But the wife does come to understand the public spheres of academy and state through her husband, as the husband understands the private sphere shepherded by the wife: ". . . the wife, without leaving her quiet, modest sphere, becomes ever more like her husband, because she both understands and influences him in all his ways and actions" (143). *Predigten*, 21: "wiewol in ihrem stillen, bescheidenen Kreise bleibend, das Weib immer mehr dem Manne gleich wird, weil sie ihn in allem seinem Thun und Sein versteht und durchdringt."

[71] Wallhausser, *NE*, 21.

functioning of the family also introduces the key polarity between the particularity of "individual existence" and "universality in community."[72]

My reading of *Christmas Eve* in the next chapter expounds the four major dyads in *Christmas Eve* in terms of their connection to the nature/reason and particular/universal polarities that provide the organizing structure for the *Brouillon*. Wallhausser briefly describes *Christmas Eve*, in relation to the *Brouillon*, as "a vivid portrayal of the structure and dynamic he found in the fullness and completeness of the extended family unit."[73] Though he does not elaborate upon this parenthetical statement, his previous commentary emphasizes that the extended family unit that Schleiermacher defines in the *Brouillon* plays a fundamental role in integrating polarities in the pursuit of the highest good (*Bildung*).

The sections below address the themes of family, friendship, and formation (*Bildung*) in the lectures that Schleiermacher was giving up to and during his writing of *Christmas Eve*. Then, in the next chapter, my reading of *Christmas Eve* will draw out the parallel connections between *Bildung*, polarity, and family in the two texts.

d. Lectures One to Twenty-Eight: Those Given Prior to *Christmas Eve*[74]

Schleiermacher gave lectures one through twenty-nine before he began to write *Christmas Eve*. These early lectures, many meant as introductions to Schleiermacher's approach to the study of ethics in the course, provide a helpful basis from which to understand the rest. After some preliminary, schematizing remarks, Schleiermacher begins to outline his system (lectures nine through 18) with this statement: "Life

[72] Ibid., 17. Wallhausser uses polarity as the principle Schleiermacher uses to organize the material of the *Brouillon* (Ibid., 17-20).
[73] Ibid., 21.
[74] On the chronology of lectures, see note above.

everywhere appears as diverse functions standing in relative contrast [*Gegensäzen*] to each other. Yet, in isolation these functions can neither be understood nor exist; rather, they must stand together in necessary connection" (*NE*, 41).[75] In this way, Schleiermacher begins with the necessity of polarity (though not clearly dipolarity at this juncture): the 'functions' that comprise life stand in 'relative contrast' as well as in 'necessary connection' to each other. To understand life, one must hold these functions together, despite their essential opposition. Schleiermacher describes these functions as having to do with the "individual" (particular) and with the "whole" (universal).

Schleiermacher then begins an outline of his theory of the highest good by building on the statements above: "To exhibit this relation of individual function and the whole correctly, we must proceed from the vision of life: self-contained existence and community with the whole. . . . Self-contained existence is the binding of all natural powers in a center. Community is a taking-into-oneself and a bringing-forth-from-oneself" (*NE*, 41).[76] Schleiermacher elaborates particularity and universality not in terms of an individual and abstract totality, but in terms of an individual and community, quickly establishing dipolarity. As Wallhausser observes in his note on this passage, Schleiermacher reiterates the dipolar drives that he introduced at the beginning of his *Speeches*: an internalizing movement and an externalizing movement.[77] In chapter two,

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[75] *BE*, 12: "Das Leben erscheint überall in verschiedenen Functionen, die mit einander in relativen Gegensäzen stehn, aber doch einzeln weder verstanden werden noch existiren können, sondern in nothwendiger Verbindung stehen."

[76] *BE*, 12: "Um diesen richtig zu zeichnen, müssen wir von der Anschauung des Lebens ausgehn. Abgeschlossenes Dasein und Gemeinschaft mit dem Ganzen. . . . Das abgeschlossene ist das Gebundensein aller Naturkräfte in einem Centro. Die Gemeinschaft ist ein in sich Aufnehmen und ein aus sich hervorbringen."

[77] The two drives (internalizing and externalizing) relate to both of the polarities that Wallhausser depicts at the core of Schleiermacher's ethics: nature and reason and particular and universal. The externalizing drive to move beyond 'oneself' is not simply a universalizing movement, but also the process of bringing nature into relationship with reason (as the internalizing drive brings reason into relationship with nature).

above, I discussed this polarity both in the *Speeches* and in the *Soliloquies*. In the *Brouillon* the dyadic activity, though stated in an abstract manner, explicitly refers to the concrete reality of community.[78] Schleiermacher's articulation of the highest good, he indicates, will illumine the relationship between individuals and historical (real) communities.

In the crux of this relationship between individual and community, Schleiermacher first expands his view of art, linking art to the externalizing function. Schleiermacher defines art as the "presenting of the idea" ("*Darstellen der Idee*") in community that an individual has cognized through the internalizing function (*NE*, 42; *BE*, 12). In this way, art is reason relating to nature; the "setting forth of feeling" ("*Aeußerlichwerden des Gefühls*"), as he states later, in the realm of reason (*NE*, 51; *BE*, 22). These two functions *never* occur independently: they "stand in a necessary reciprocity, in a living organic continuum," so that art always participates in moral life in community (life beyond the individual/internalizing function) (*NE*, 43).[79] Thus, art is also a universalizing, or externalizing, of an individual's particular feeling. What is definitive of humanity versus animality, in consequence, is the coinherence of these internalizing and externalizing functions (*NE*, 44; *BE*, 14-15), and in this way humans embrace the polarity of nature and reason as well as that of particular and universal *by definition*.

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[78] Thus, he asserts in a later lecture, "In this polar character [of reason, i.e., individual reason and universal reason] . . . lies . . . the readiness to acknowledge the individual members of that totality and the impulse toward community" (*NE*, 62). *BE*, 35: "In diesem Charakter liegt . . . die Bereitwilligkeit die einzelnen Glieder anzuerkennen, der Trieb auf Gemeinschaft."

[79] *BE*, 14: "Diese beiden Functionen stehen also in einer nothwendigen Wechselverbindung, in lebendigem organischen Zusammenhang."

At this point in the lectures, Schleiermacher introduces his conception of the highest good and the ideas that have represented the highest good, historically. He refers first to the image of God in humans, and then to the more recent expression of the idea of the highest good in *Bildung*/*Kultur*. Both as the image of God and through *Bildung*, humans negotiate the polar dyad of nature and reason (*NE*, 46; *BE*, 17). In this process (the process of *Bildung*), humans become 'ensouled' ("*beseelendes Princip*"), by which Schleiermacher means that reason (as a universal function) is individualized (as a particular function) (*NE*,46; *BE*, 17). Here, the universal/particular polarity and the reason/nature polarity intersect in the basic definition of *formation* of humans, as they did above in the definition of humans in terms of their most basic capacities. And neither pole can occur without its opposite: ensouling upholds uniqueness (individuality/particularity) and universality at the same time.

In this process of ensouling, Schleiermacher stresses that the embrace of polarity occurs in community, so that "the kingdom of God is the highest idea within which the complete cognizing [internalizing] and organizing [externalizing] also resides" (*NE*, 46).[80] Thus, Schleiermacher continues, "Where knowledge is lacking, indeterminacy remains; where organ is lacking [externalizing control], the fragmentary remains; and without community, both indeterminacy and the fragmentary remain" (*NE*, 46).[81] With these statements on ensouling, Schleiermacher divides his theory of *Bildung* from those found in the *Athenaeum*: one transcends individuality through the embrace of polarity in *Bildung*, but one does so *through community*, which Schleiermacher will now define in specific terms not just of "free sociality" (up to which point Schlegel would agree with

[80] Ibid., 17: "So ist das Reich Gottes die höchste Idee, in der auch totales Erkennen und Organisiren liegt."
[81] Ibid.: "Wo Erkenntniß fehlt, bleibt Unbestimmtes; wo Organ fehlt, bleibt Lückenhaftes und ohne Gemeinschaft beides."

him), but also of the academy, the state, and the church. The embrace of universality requires an externalizing move that transcends the particular (individuality), but this transcendence of particularity and embrace of universality does *not* remove the individual from the historical, finite modes of being found in the four goods. Moving away from Schlegel's views in the *Athenaeum*, Schleiermacher now argues with systematic specificity that transcendence of the particular occurs *within* these four concrete forms of community.[82]

Schleiermacher then spends several lectures exploring how uniqueness (particularity; individuality) and communality (universality) can exist together in pursuit of the highest good (*NE*, 46-48; *BE*, 17-19); i.e., he explores how humans maintain the individuality crucial for 'ensouling' when the moral life is communal/universal. In line with his overarching approach to polarity, he upholds what he calls a "dual perspective" ("*zwiefachen Ansicht*") that argues for the continued activity of both particularity and universality (individuality and communality) in moral life (*NE*, 49; *BE*, 19). This occurs through a "unifying principle" of "communal uniqueness"—uniqueness preserved in communal forms (*NE*, 49).[83] In part, these statements repeat his assertions in previous lectures, but he uses the vocabulary of 'communal uniqueness' here to introduce the distinctive roles polarity plays in the four goods. Schleiermacher thus ends his lectures outlining the theory of the highest good by explaining how humans uphold the 'dual perspective' in different ways in different communal forms.

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[82] The roots of this view extend back to Schleiermacher's discussion of the role of polarity in the *Speeches*, but in the *Brouillon*, the view achieves systematic explication, with reference to the particular historical communities involved and their functions in the larger process of *Bildung*. For a discussion of Schleiermacher's role of polarity in the *Speeches* already intimating this distinction, see Jack Forstman, *A Romantic Triangle: Schleiermacher and Early German Romanticism* (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977), 95-97.

[83] *BE*, 19: "Eine gemeinschaftliche Eigenthümlichkeit muß also das vereinigende Princip sein."

This final part of the outline for the theory of the highest good distinguishes the role of academies and churches (two of the four goods) as such communal forms. First, he reaffirms the coinherence of nature and reason in human beings in terms of "feeling" (*Gefühl*) and "thinking" (*Denken*). He then connects feeling to its expression in church communities through art and thinking to its expression in academic communities through philosophy (*NE*, 51-54; *BE*, 22-26). Having sketched different expressions of polarity in the community of church and of the academy, Schleiermacher concludes his outline of the theory of the highest good by reminding his students that,

> Everything converges on the identity of the universal and particular [*des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen*]. . . . Ethical unity is precisely this identity. . . . Because the universal and the particular are one, community and individuality are grasped as reciprocally generated through each other, as are philosophy and religion, while art [the 'presentation of feeling'] and language [the presentation of thinking] are grasped as constantly merging into each other. (*NE*, 55)[84]

The universal and particular, whose oneness collapses neither pole, provide the fundamental polarity under whose auspices moral life develops. Schleiermacher emphasizes these themes again in *Christmas Eve*: a discussion of Sofie's *Bildung* propels Leonhardt to question the viability of embracing art and religion at once in one's life (see below). The characters verbally resist this notion, and Schleiermacher's use of polarity in the piece consistently counters Leonhardt's position, presenting instead the vision of "ethical unity" he describes in the *Brouillon*, where universal and particular, philosophy and religion, and art and language are "constantly merging into each other" (see chapter four).

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[84] Ibid., 26-27: "Es läuft alles hinaus auf die Identität des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen. . . . Die ethische Einheit ist eben diese Identität. . . . Weil das Allgemeine und das Besondere eins ist, sind Gemeinschaft und Eigenthum, Philosophie und Religion wechselseitig durch einander hervorgebracht, Kunst, Sprache in beständigem Uebergehn ineinander begriffen."

Having outlined his theory of the highest good, Schleiermacher proceeds first to articulate the "organ" formation of an individual through reason (by which he means here sensibility and understanding) as well as the most basic interactions between individuals.[85] Schleiermacher then discusses the role of individuality in moral action: individuality must not recede in moral activity, but be preserved within its communality (*NE*, 72-74; *BE*, 46-49). Having shown how individuality does not disappear within the moral life, Schleiermacher is now ready to discuss forms of community in terms of the four goods.

e. Lectures Twenty-Nine to Forty-Two: Those Given while Writing *Christmas Eve*

On the day he begins to write *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher gives lecture thirty in this series, near the beginning of his lectures on family and friendship.[86] An overview of these lectures introduces initial correlations to *Christmas Eve*, which chapter four will flesh out: Lecture thirty concludes his discussion of the role of free sociality and friendship in the formation of 'communities of individuality' through relationships between "feeling" ("*Gefühl*") and "cognition" ("*Erkennen*") (*NE*, 75; *BE*, 50).[87] In *Christmas Eve* the relationship between feeling and cognition recurs, but now in terms of

[85] Some examples include language, money, and contracts, *NE*, 65-66; *BE*, 37-38.
[86] Schleiermacher records in the margin of his lecture notes for the thirtieth lecture that the lecture was delayed an hour by Dülon's concert. Schleiermacher later wrote to his publisher, Georg Reimer, that it was during Dülon's concert that he arrived at the idea for *Chrismas Eve*, finishing it just three weeks hence (see below).
[87] Schleiermacher's use of the vocabulary of feeling, perception/intuition, and intuition (*Gefühl*, *Anschauung*, and *Intuition*) on one hand and cognition, reason and scientific knowledge (*Erkennen, Vernunft,*and *Wissenschaft*) on the other can become complicated. I don't fully agree with Wallhausser's assessment (*NE*, 24 n.), which conflicts with Schleiermacher's contrast of feeling and cognizing (*NE*, 75), though it gives a good initial overview. Each term has a technical use in Schleiermacher's thinking that has to do with modes or ways of knowing, but most important to understand in the context of this dissertation is the way in which the two groups are distinct: feeling (and sometimes intuition/*Anschauung*, depending on contextual use) denotes immediacy as well as receptivity on the part of the feeler/intuiter, while reason (and sometimes cognition, depending on the context) denotes a mediating experience, marked by activity on the part of the reasoner/knower. These distinctions contribute to the basic polar oscillations involved in human life.

religion (feeling) and art (presentation of feeling). And, paralleling the focus on differences between men and women in *Christmas Eve*, the lectures following thirty move to the topic of gender difference in an elaboration of a sub-section on "Sexuality, Love, Marriage, and Family." Before the Christmas holiday, by which time he finishes *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher completes that section in his lecture series, which introduces the four goods as 'extensions' from the family.[88]

In *Christmas Eve*, the family provides the setting for the plot. The *Brouillon*, then, takes up the topics above in an abstract manner, while *Christmas Eve* elaborates upon them through a concrete depiction of a family unit, composed of both friends and family, both male and female, who exhibit, as well as discuss, the relationship between feeling (*Gefühl*) and ways of knowing. These thematic similarities point to a common interest in *Bildung* in both the *Brouillon* and *Christmas Eve*, since the *Brouillon* makes clear that all of the themes listed above function in a process of *Bildung*.

Lecture thirty, at which point Schleiermacher begins *Christmas Eve*, does not begin a new section, but continues lectures on the topic of free sociality and friendship. Free sociality and friendship, Schleiermacher writes, are always found together, forming a basis for "community of individuality" ("*Gemeinschaft der Individualität*") (*NE*, 74-79; *BE*, 49-54). Free sociality is a reciprocal relationship between individuals marked by "mutual, open hospitality" ("*gegenseitige Gastfreiheit*") that recognizes the individuality

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[88] Schleiermacher averaged approximately six lectures per week on ethics, beginning October 21, 1805 and ending March 27, 1806. A marginal note records January 6th as the date for lecture forty-three. Schleiermacher does not generally note the date of each lecture, so I take this note to indicate the re-commencement of lecturing after the Christmas holiday (*BE*, 74). This dating indicates that lecture forty-two would have been the last lecture on ethics that Schleiermacher gave while writing *Christmas Eve*. The natural section break between lecture 42 and 43 confirms this assessment: Lectures 25-42 fall under the heading "Uniqueness [Particularity] in the Formative Activity of Reason," which were preceded by a section entitled "Universality in the Formative Activity of Reason" (on the polar dyad, universality and particularity in the *Brouillon*, see below). Lecture 43 begins a section on "The Cognitive Function of Reason."

of each (*NE*, 75; *BE*, 50). Free sociality is "found in all spheres at once, thus in all the doings of a people, the state, the church, or the academy. Wherever there is life, there also is individuality active, and every communal activity of this individuality must also have the character of free sociality" (*NE*, 78).[89] Free sociality, then, is a reciprocal relationship between individuals that permeates the three other goods.

The breeding ground for free sociality occurs in a sphere where gender difference allows reciprocity to bring together the realms of feeling (which Schleiermacher soon clarifies is the mark of sociality and of church) and reason (which Schleiermacher associates with the academy and the state). He writes,

> for the cognitive process [internalizing], from the male side, there is a preponderance of thinking, from the female side a preponderance of higher feeling. For the presenting process [externalizing], from the male side there is a preponderance of art or individual presentation, from the female side a preponderance of attire, of morality as communal presentation. (*NE*, 80)[90]

Within both the internalizing and externalizing drives, Schleiermacher asserts that men and women possess distinctive talents. The reciprocal sharing of these talents must occur in order to reach the highest good. The four goods, themselves, tend either to emphasize feeling (sociality; church) *or* thinking (academy; state). A sphere in which men and women interact, and in which thinking and feeling receive equal weight, must develop so as not to create an imbalance between the four goods.

At this point, as Schleiermacher simultaneously pens *Christmas Eve*, he briefly pauses in his elaboration of the four goods in order to introduce the extended family unit

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[89] *BE*, 54: "Die freie Geselligkeit ist aber zugleich in allen Sphären, dann in allem Thun des Menschen, Staat, Kirche, Akademie; wo Leben ist, da ist auch die Individualität thätig, und jede gemeinschaftliche Thätigkeit dieser muß auch jenen Charakter haben."

[90] Ibid., 55: "Für das Erkennen männlich Uebergewicht des Denkens, weiblich Uebergewicht des höhern Gefühls. Für das Darstellen männlich Uebergewicht der Kunst oder der individuellen Darstellung, weiblich Uebergewicht des Costüms, der Sitte als gemeinschaftliche Darstellung."

as the nexus of the four goods (*NE*, 79; *BE*, 54). The family unit brings together adult males and females in both sexual relationships (which perpetuate the family unit) and in friendships (*NE*, 80; *BE*, 55).

The family provides the overarching social unit of *Christmas Eve*, creating a plot distinctive from Schlegel's *Lucinde* or Novalis' *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*, the most famous *Bildung* narratives to emerge from the Jena-Romantic milieu. Indeed, up to this point, German *Bildung* narratives had all proceeded from the perspective of a male protagonist pursuing *Bildung*. Instead, *Christmas Eve* proceeds from the perspective of multiple protagonists, male and female.

Placing Schleiermacher's theory of the highest good from the *Brouillon* beside *Christmas Eve* provides the schema that allows the reader of *Christmas Eve* to understand the full ramifications of the scenario of gathered friends, who form an extended family unit through their interactions in the home of Ernestine and Eduard, and their daughter Sofie. The themes explored in *Christmas Eve* (religion and art, the spiritual development of men and women, etc.), which I will consider in the next chapter in terms of the dyadic polarities through which Schleiermacher introduces them, reflect the role family plays in the pursuit of the highest good (*Bildung*), wherein family provides the arena for the intersection of the communal goods of free sociality, church, academy, and state.

After his statement of gender difference in the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher follows out this line of thought, arguing that the "integration" ("*Integrirung*") of gender characteristics, which are "marked by absolute one-sidedness," cannot occur in free sociality or friendship, but only in marital love (*NE*, 80; *BE*, 55-56). And, he continues,

as "love = marriage, so marriage = *family*" (Schleiermacher's emphasis, *NE*, 81).[91] Schleiermacher quickly moves to include friends in the extended family unit.[92] Family, he insists,

> becomes a complete representation of the idea of humanity. Thus, the family itself is also a complete individuality and gains a soul of its own in which those limitations are likewise suspended. This individuality is the *family character* [*Familiencharakter* as opposed to "gender characteristic," or *Geschlechtscharakter*], which is actually a pure indifference with respect to gender and bears an eternal maturity. In its manifestation there is, to be sure, either an enduring preponderance of masculine or feminine or their alternation in particular moments. (*NE*, 82)[93]

The extended family unit, though it may alternate between "moments" in which masculine or feminine characteristics predominate, offers a realm wherein its members can achieve an "eternal maturity" that espouses "indifference with respect to gender."

After his break with Eleanor Grunow, Schleiermacher holds no hope of marriage for himself. He continues to participate, instead, in the marriage of his friends the von Willichs, however. Indeed, since the von Willichs' betrothal in 1804, Schleiermacher had spoken of himself as *part of* the von Willich's marriage, experiencing marriage and family through them (he later marries the widow, von Willich).[94] The type of family unit that Schleiermacher describes makes space for those like himself (and his sister Charlotte), who would not personally experience the love generated by the sexual union of marriage. Because "marriage = family," for Schleiermacher, and the family unit

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[91] Ibid., 57: "Also wie Liebe = Ehe, so Ehe = *Familie*."
[92] See Wallhausser's discussion on this point, *NE*, 21.
[93] *BE*, 58: " . . . die Familie eine vollständige Repräsentation der Idee der Menschheit. Daher ist sie auch selbst ein völliges Individuum und gewinnt eine eigne Seele, in welcher ebenfalls jene Beschränkungen aufgehoben sind: der *Familiencharakter*, der eigentlich reine Indifferenz des Geschlechts ist und ewige Maturität. In der Erscheinung freilich ist entweder bleibendes Uebergewicht des Männlichen oder Weiblichen oder wechselndes in einzelnen Momenten."
[94] See Julie Ellison's discussion of this marital "arrangement" in *Delicate Subjects: Romanticism, Gender, and the Ethics of Understanding* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 37-38.

extends to include friends, the family offers a realm in which all people, regardless of marital status or gender, can reach "eternal maturity." *Christmas Eve* depicts just such a family unit.

Having clarified the role of family, Schleiermacher turns in the *Brouillon* to the communal goods that flow from the family. He starts by returning to free sociality, now that he has shown that family "is the original sphere of free sociality" "*die ursprüngliche Sphäre der freien Geselligkeit*" (*NE*, 83; *BE*, 59). The state also functions as such an extension, with Schleiermacher arguing that the state is based on a shared culture formed in families, so that "the idea of a state based [instead] either on peril or on reason alone is totally wrong" (*NE*, 88).[95] This statement helps to make sense of why Schleiermacher would place his hopes for the unification of Germans in the face of the Napoleonic threat on Protestant Christian community. Neither fear nor rational argumentation can unite Germans against Napoleon, but the shared culture developed in German families can. This shared culture is marked by Protestant forms of religiosity, as he argues both in his 1804 essay on the unification of German denominations *and* in his depiction of these forms of religiosity in *Christmas Eve*.[96]

Chapter Summary and Conclusions

This chapter has provided the immediate textual and contextual background necessary to read Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve* through his polar approach to *Bildung*. Contextually, the chapter focused on the mounting Napoleonic threat, which raised

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[95] *BE*, 64: "Ganz falsch daher die Vorstellung von einem Nothstaat und Vernunftstaat."

[96] Schleiermacher's last seven lectures in this section, which he likely completes before Christmas, continue to discuss the formation of the state and relationships between states, saving discussion of the academy and the church for the second half of his lectures on his theory of the highest good. I read *Christmas Eve* as the concrete portrayal of his lectures on family, and so my appraisal of the remainder of the *Brouillon* requires only the brief sketch I have already included in the section on Wallhausser's reading, which solidifies the role of the family in relation to the four goods.

Schleiermacher's concerns about the ability of the German people to unite against this force. Schleiermacher's letters during this period suggest that he sees hope for German unification in the cultivation of a shared Protestant identity. At the same time, Schleiermacher is working on his lectures on ethics (his *Brouillon*), outlining a systematic articulation of the highest good, in its current historical representation, as *Bildung*. The work is abstract, but it echoes Schleiermacher's more practical concerns about the cultivation of community, categorizing the "goods" that serve *Bildung* in terms of free sociality, as well as the communal institutions of academy, state, and church. Schleiermacher locates the "nexus" of these goods in the family. The family serves as the fundamental arena for *Bildung* and for all forms of community that contribute to it.

For Schleiermacher, a most basic concern in the formation of community is the concomitant maintenance (and celebration) of individuality. In the *Brouillon*, he seeks to answer the question, how can an ethical system uphold both community *and* individuality without creating a hierarchical relationship between the two? This concern provides the most concrete entrée into Schleiermacher's articulation of the dipolar character of moral activity, the "oscillations" of moral life, which propel his entire ethical theory. Schleiermacher's polar approach to *Bildung*, already prevalent in his *Speeches* and *Soliloquies*, receives systematic articulation in the *Brouillon*. Universality and particularity become the fundamental dyad from which emerge all other polarities that participate in *Bildung*, including nature (feeling) and reason, as well as the related internalizing and externalizing tendencies that marked his thinking on polarity in the *Speeches* and *Soliloquies*.

Christmas Eve depicts the interactions of a circle of friends, gathered together as an extended family unit to celebrate the Christmas festival. Reading *Christmas Eve* through Schleiermacher's polar approach to *Bildung* will situate the work as a companion piece to his *Brouillon*, viewing the use of polarity in *Christmas Eve* as a narrative expression of his ethical theory, particularly in terms of the role of the family therein.

IV. Schleiermacher's Polar Approach to *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve*

[T]he family itself is also a complete individuality
and gains a soul of its own.[1]
--Schleiermacher,
Brouillon zur Ethik, 1805

Introduction

In *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher turns again to the emphasis on polarity that marked his thinking on *Bildung* in his *Athenaeum*-era writing and in his *Brouillon*. From the first paragraphs of *Christmas Eve*, where Schleiermacher describes the efforts of Ernestine to display the Christmas gifts, he focuses on dyadic activity. Ernestine's task is "to order what alone would be unremarkable into a stately whole,"[2] and she accomplishes this by harmonizing polar opposites: She places blooming flowers in the windows, but opens the curtains so that the snow acts as their backdrop; she sets the lights high up, so that light and shadow play about the room, interlacing clarity and concealment. Schleiermacher narrates Ernestine going about her task "half in jest, half in earnest" (*CE*, 27) describing her *method of working*, as well, as an embrace of polarity.[3]

Schleiermacher's arrangement of *Christmas Eve* follows this pattern throughout: the narrative presents dyads, ordered into a 'stately whole' around the central pair, universality and particularity. And just as Ernestine's effort is at once playful and serious, so too is Schleiermacher's arrangement of *Christmas Eve*. Yes, the piece

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[1] *NE*, 82; *BE*, 58: " . . . die Familie eine vollständige Repräsentation der Idee der Menschheit. Daher ist sie auch selbst ein völliges Individuum und gewinnt eine eigne Seele."
[2] *DW*, 43: "und so was vereinzelt unscheinbar würde, zu einem stattlichen Ganzen zu ordnen. " I have used my own translation here. Tice reads: "thus grandly conjoining things which would look undistinguished by themselves" (*CE*, 27). Tice's translation captures the sense of the passage, but neglects the vocabulary of singularity and wholeness. This vocabulary reflects the role of individual perspectives in (ethical) community: alone (*vereinzelt*); i.e., outside of fullness of community, such individuality remains unremarkable (*unscheinbar*). One's participation in the greater whole (*Ganzen*) is what facilitates the cultivation and expression of one's individuality.
[3] *DW*, 43: "halb im Scherz, halb ernsthaft."

presents a lighthearted rendition of his friends' character traits, but Schleiermacher publishes *Christmas Eve* broadly, and republishes it in 1826. *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher states in 1826, offers something substantial to the wider reading public in its descriptions of the interactions of his fictional characters.[4] In this chapter I explore the substantial contribution of *Christmas Eve* in terms of its literary articulation of Schleiermacher's polar theory of *Bildung*.

While Schleiermacher sharpens his theory of *Bildung* as he works on his lectures on ethics, in *Christmas Eve*, he creates a literary "*Kunstwerk*" to clarify his position for his friends through a concrete portrayal.[5] The gathered company in *Christmas Eve*—an extended family unit of the type Schleiermacher describes in the *Brouillon*—provides the arena for the elaboration of four thematic dyads that contextualize the fundamental polarities that propel Schleiermacher's ethical theory: universal and particular, and nature (feeling) and reason.[6] Through an analysis of these dyads, I argue that *Christmas Eve* presents Schleiermacher's conception of *Bildung* as it had evolved both through the literary plans for the pursuit of *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum* and his work on ethics in the *Brouillon*.

A. The Vocabulary of *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve*: Religion, Art, and the Church

In his *Speeches, Soliloquies*, and lectures on ethics, Schleiermacher discusses his views on *Bildung*. In *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher's characters also refer explicitly to

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[4] *CE*, 25. See chapter five for further commentary on Schleiermacher's 1826 introduction to *Christmas Eve*.

[5] The *Brouillon* remained unpublished and consists of lecture notes on ethics that he gave to his students at Halle in 1805 and 1806 (see chapter three).

[6] See Wallhausser's discussion of the role of these polarities in the *Brouillon*, as well as my observations on the connection between the two polarities in chapter three, above.

Bildung and to its verbal and adjectival forms (*bilden*; *gebildet*).[7] These invocations of *Bildung* lead to discussions of the relationship of religion and art as well as the definition of a church.[8] The following section introduces the vocabulary of *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve*, before turning to consider the role of polarity therein.

1. Narrative Versus Scientific Approaches to *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve*

The most striking aspect of the use of *Bildung*/*bilden* in *Christmas Eve* is that it consistently provokes tensions in the group over divergent notions of religiosity and its cultivation. In contrast, the narrative incorporates and models practices of formation without provoking disagreement: The gathered company all partake, without hesitation, in the communal celebration of the festival, which affords the opportunity for such practices (ranging from singing to learned discussion). But, explicit discussions of *formation* (*Bildung*), fostered mainly by the circle's resident rationalist (Leonhardt), serve as a lightning rod for differences of opinion among the group.[9]

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[7] Other terms for formation/education rarely appear in the text. *Erziehung* does not appear at all. In his speech in the third section, Eduard once uses the term "*erbauen*" in a sense similar to "*bilden*," but this vocabulary is nowhere else invoked in the piece: "Only if the individual views humanity and builds [*erbaut*] humanity as a living community of individuals, . . . only then does the individual have the higher life and the peace of God within." *DW*, 95: "Nur wenn der Einzelne die Menschheit als eine lebendige Gemeinschaft der Einzelnen anschaut und erbaut, ihren Geist und Bewußtsein in sich trägt, und in ihr das abgesonderte Dasein verliert und widerfindet, nur dann hat er das höhere Leben und den Frieden Gottes in sich."

[8] Henning Schröer notes this combination of themes in his brief section "Kunst, Religion und Kirche" in "Zur ästhetischen Dimension von Schleiermachers Bildungsbegriff," in *Bildung in evangelischer Verantwortung auf dem Hintergrund des Bildungsverständnisses von F.D.E. Schleiermacher*, 181-182. Schröer, however, discusses the combination in relation to the *Brouillon*, not *Christmas Eve*. Schröer's comments further support my reading of *Bildung* as the connective link between the *Brouillon* and *Christmas Eve*.

[9] The root of these tensions is that Leonhardt is the one person in the circle in a serious mood, during a festival marked by joy. Leonhardt fears that their festive mood mars their ability to comprehend the serious state of affairs in their country. Though the company protests this accusation, this does not allay Leonhardt's concerns. The text is not explicit, but the historical context suggests a reference to the advance of the Napoleonic army into German territories—this was Schleiermacher's own concern that December (see above). Just after one of the oppositional exchanges between Leonhardt and the company, he reminds them that they should remember the seriousness of the situation: "Aber wenn auch das nicht ist, sehet Euch wol vor; es können Euch andere Prüfungen bereitet sein, daß Ihr sie bestehet. Die Anstalten sind schon

Schleiermacher's articulation of the methodology of ethics in the *Brouillon* helps to clarify the tension between Leonhardt and his friends: Schleiermacher defines ethics as the "description of the laws of human action" (*NE*, 34; *BE*, 4: "*Beschreibung der Geseze des menschlichen Handelns*"). He continues that "the appropriate form for ethics is simple narration: exhibiting those laws of human action in history" (*NE*, 34).[10] Ethics is a science, and proceeds scientifically, but as "the science of history" (*NE*, 34)[11] ethics requires a narrative approach that incorporates the scientific (a-historical) approach within it: Narration combines scientifically derived 'laws of human action' with historical reality; i.e., narrative contextualizes the expression of universal principles in real people's lives (*NE*, 34-35; *BE*, 4-5).

Leonhardt's character in *Christmas Eve* tends to proceed scientifically (via universal laws), while his friends emphasize a narrative approach in discussions of *Bildung*, bringing particular historical circumstances and scientific observation together to provide more realistic reflections upon human experience.[12] In this way, the explicit references to *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve* all focus on the importance of understanding human formation narratively, by bringing together historical reality (particularity) with (universal) laws of human action.

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gemacht. Ein großers Schicksal geht unschlüssig auf und ab in unserer Nähe, mit Schritten unter denen die Erde erbebt, und wir wissen nicht wie es uns mit ergreifen kann."

[10] *BE*, 4-5: "Die eigentliche Form für die Ethik also ist die schlichte Erzählung: das Aufzeigen jener Geseze . . . in der Geschichte."

[11] Ibid., 4: "Darum ist die Ethik Wissenschaft der Geschichte."

[12] As Wallhausser, 5 n., notes, Schleiermacher's critique of Kantian ethics was tied to this definition of ethics' narrative methodology. Leonhardt, in a sense, represents a more Kantian perspective, while the rest of the company argues for the soundness of a narrative methodology. The distinction between scientific and narrative approaches recurs in the formal progression of *Christmas Eve*, whose second section consists of the women's stories (narrative reflection) and the third, the men's speeches (abstract analysis). This observation supports the more recent interpretations of *Christmas Eve*, which have resisted the common nineteenth- and early 20th-century interpreters, who focused mainly on the men's speeches in their readings of the text. From the perspective of a narrative methodology, *both* the women's narratives and the men's speeches are equally important to a full interpretation of *Christmas Eve*.

2. Sofie's *Bildung*

The discussion of *Bildung* begins in the first section, where Leonhardt expresses concern about the way Sofie's parents are treating her religious development. The discussion of the piety (*Frömmigkeit*) of the young girl, Sofie, continues with her father arguing that her piety expresses itself "in harmony with the rest of her *Bildung*."[13] Even after the rest of the company produces proofs of the right formation of Sofie's piety and her parents' correct approach to the formation of her piety, Leonhardt continues to insist that "the beauty of piety . . . must be an inward thing and stay that way. When it moves out [*äußerlich hervertreten*] so as to mold the actual circumstances of life, it leads to [*bilden*] fossilizing separatism and spiritual pride—the most destestable consequences one can imagine and the exact opposite of what piety ought to produce" (*CE*, 41)[14] Here, Leonhardt warns of the de-formation of piety when it moves towards outward expression. The company tries to contextualize Leonhardt's approach by looking at the particular reality of Sofie's instantiation of piety. Leonhardt's continued insistence on a scientific approach, through which he attempts abstractly to associate piety only with internality, leads him to state that religion (internal experience) and art (external expression) should never combine (*CE*, 44; *DW*, 59).

At this point, Ernst recalls previous statements Leonhardt has made about *Bildung* (outside of the *Christmas Eve* text), wherein Leonhardt has demanded that life and art form a unity. In the past, Leonhardt fervently claimed to the circle that "a truly cultured life" ["*ein gebildetes Leben*"] would be a "work of art" ["*Kunstwerke*"], which acts as

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[13] *DW*, 54: " . . . in Harmonie mit ihrer übrigen Bildung." I use my own translation to preserve the reference to *Bildung*, which Tice translates as "development," as well as to the "harmony" of formative elements. Tice reads: ". . . fits in well with the rest of her development" (*CE*, 39).

[14] *DW*, 56: "Religiosität . . . muß ein Innerliches sein und bleiben. Wenn sie äußerlich hervortreten und eigenthümliche Verhältnisse im Leben bilden will: so entsteht das verhaßteste daraus."

"the most unobstructed union of plastic and musical art."[15] If Leonhardt truly believes in the unity of life and art, does he then, Ernst asks, suggest that religion is not part of life?

Leonhardt's position creates multiple problems that Ernst points out by historicizing Leonhardt's assertions: Leonhardt's argument also entails that "religion is therefore to have no existence except in words, where you occasionally need it for some reason or other" (*CE*, 44); that is, religion is not integrated into one's life, but functions as a tool used when needed, and only then in abstract assessments of rational truths.[16] Leonhardt's view of *Bildung* becomes tortuously fragmented by his fear of associating religion with anything external and emotional. Ernst and the rest of the company continue to try to draw him gently—narratively—to a broader view of life and *Bildung*.

In the *Speeches* and his *Soliloquies*, the relationship between religion and art also functioned centrally in Schleiermacher's conception of *Bildung*. In the *Speeches*, he upholds the interrelation of religion and art in a cultivated life. Playing on the themes of fragment 116 (see chapter two), he reminds his friends (the artists) that religion holds primacy in this relationship:

> Let the past, the present, and the future surround us with an endless gallery of the sublimest works of art, eternally multiplied by a thousand brilliant mirrors. Let the history of the worlds be ready with rich gratitude to reward religion its first nurse . . . See how, without your aid, the heavenly

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[15] *CE*, 44: "Watch out Leonhardt!" said Ernst. "Your critics may just throw your words back at you when you least want them! Have you not only recently pressed upon us your view that life and art are as little opposites as life and science, that a truly cultured life would be a work of art, a production of beauty, the most unobstructed union of plastic and musical art?" *DW*, 62: "Sieh dich vor, Leonhardt, sagte Ernst, daß sie dich nicht zur Unzeit an deine eignen Worte erinnern. Hast du uns nicht neulich noch auseinander gesezt, daß Leben und Kunst eben so wenig ein Gegensatz wären, wie Leben und Wissenschaft, das ein gebildetes Leben recht eigentlich ein Kunstwerk wäre, eine schöne Darstellung, die unmittelbarste Vereinigung des plastischen und musikalischen?" This discussion mirrors a more abstract statement of this issue in the *Brouillon* (*NE*, 51; *BE*, 22).

[16] *DW*, 62: "Religion . . . sollte also nirgends sein als in Worten, wo ihr sie bisweilen braucht aus allerlei Ursachen."

> growth flourishes in the midst of your plantings. It is a witness of the approval of the gods and of the imperishableness of your desert.[17]

The right relationship between religion and art requires a difficult act of balancing, and here Schleiermacher warns of the tendency for artists to forget their relationship to religion. Leonhardt's problem is similar: he resists the relationship of religion and art.

Schleiermacher states his own position in the *Brouillon*, which accords with that of Eduard: "religion and art must . . . converge, and the moral view of art consists precisely in its identity with religion. The true practice of art is religious" (*NE*, 52-53).[18] What saves the interaction of religion and art from marring one's *Bildung*, the company argues against Leonhardt,[19] is the right relationship between the two: true religious feeling (*religiöses Gefühl*) focuses not on the art, itself, but on "something higher still" (*CE*, 34; "*etwas noch Höheres*," *DW*, 50). That is, art always points beyond its product to the religious feeling that was its impetus, as the passage from Schleiermacher's *Speeches* suggests above. Art and religion, in this way, are never equated. The company agrees that religion is an internal experience linked to feeling (*Gefühl*), but they feel that

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[17] *Speeches*, 71; *SKGA*, I.2, 264-265: "Laßt uns Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft umschlingen, eine endlose Gallerie der erhabensten Kunstwerke durch tausend glänzende Spiegel ewig vervielfältigt. Laßt die Geschichte, wie es derjenigen ziemt, der Welten zu Gebote stehn, mit reicher Danbarkeit der Religion lohnen als ihrer ersten Pflegerinn. . . . Seht wie das himmlische Gewächs mitten in Euern Pflanzungen gedeiht ohne Euer Zuthun. Stört es nicht und rauft es nicht aus! Es ist ein Beweis vom Wohlgefallen der Götter und von der Unvergänglichkeit Eueres Verdienstes."

[18] *BE*, 24: "Also muß . . . Religion und Kunst zusammenfallen, und die sittliche Ansicht der Kunst besteht eben in ihrer Identität mit Religion. Die wahre Ausübung der Kunst ist religiös."

[19] In addition to the exchange with Eduard, section one presents a variety of counter-arguments to Leonhardt's concerns about the coinherence of art and religion in *Bildung*. Sofie's diorama of the nativity and surrounding scenes from Christian history along with Ernestine's arrangement of the gifts, and Friederike's piano music, all word-less, artistic gestures, serve to build this understanding of the relationship between word-less artistic expression and religious feeling. And Eduard, countering Leonhardt, argues that music (no matter if there are words or if one can understand those words) comes closest to expressing religious feeling (*religiöses Gefühl*) (*DW*, 63-64). Religion, in itself, is not literary or philosophical: it needs no words. As a result, non-verbal expression comes closer to religious feeling than verbal expression. Schleiermacher confided in a letter that his impetus for writing *Christmas Eve* was a musical performance, which he had found both overwhelming and inspiring, and so this association of musical and artistic expression with religion likely accords with Schleiermacher's own insight.

such religious feeling can achieve external expression without deforming the original feeling.[20]

3. *Bildung* and the Relationship of Art (Reason) and Religion (Feeling)

Schleiermacher's discussion in the *Brouillon* of the relationship of feeling and art in *Bildung* helps to elucidate Leonhardt's position as well as the company's resistance to it. Art, Schleiermacher writes in the *Brouillon*, is the "setting forth [externalization] of feeling" ("*Aeußerlichwerden des Gefühls*") in the (shared) realm of reason (*NE*, 51; *BE*, 22). Feeling, however, is that internal, subjective knowing—cognition that occurs uniquely in every individual—that is thus "nontransposable" ("*Unübertragbarkeit*") even between separate occurrences of feeling in one individual's life (*NE*, 51; *BE*, 22).[21] That is, feeling "is not to be transposed but is only presented [*dargestellt*] and through this presentation the feeling of another is to be stimulated" (*NE*, 124).[22] What is nontransposable in a person is what makes that person unique; it is the mark of individuality.

Schleiermacher develops the concept of "nontransposability" to indicate that which belongs to an individual and to no other individual; it literally suggests that which cannot be 'carried over' from one place to another. Leonhardt worries that religious feeling will become compromised in artistic expression; the *Brouillon*'s answer to this concern is the idea of "nontransposability."

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[20] Schleiermacher's 1806 edition of his *Speeches* incorporates more centrally the relationship of *Gefühl* and religion and piety (*Frömmigkeit*). For a discussion of the shift between the earlier and later edition of the *Speeches* on this theme, see Richardson, *Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher 1768-1806: A Historical Overview*, 171-174. Richardson goes on to read the shift in terms of Schleiermacher's connection of women and piety, whereas, in *Christmas Eve*, I read the connection between piety and *Gefühl* in terms of the gender-neutral attitude of childlikeness (see below).

[21] For further discussion of nontransposability in the *Brouillon*, see *NE*, 24-27; and 45-48.

[22] *BE*, 105: " . . . das Gefühl nicht übertragen, sondern nur dargestellt und dadurch das Gefühl des Andern erregt werden soll."

Since this nontransposable feeling, which Schleiermacher associates with religion in the *Brouillon* as well as in *Christmas Eve*,[23] cannot be replicated from one moment to the next, even in one's own life, doesn't Leonhardt have a point? Shouldn't religion and art remain separate, to preserve the purity of religion as something internal and subjective? Nontransposability, Schleiermacher will insist to the contrary, does not mean that one cannot communicate feeling. Both the *Brouillon* and the gathered friends in *Christmas Eve* argue that art can present feeling, *but* "this setting forth of feeling," Schleiermacher writes in the *Brouillon*, "does not occur as the means of exciting the same activity in others; rather, it is simply to be acknowledged [*erkannt werden*]" (*NE*, 51).[24] Art, as the presentation of feeling, *does not excite the feeling it presents* in its audience. Individual, subjective feeling may be presented communally (and must be if it is religious; i.e., if it is feeling 'raised to the potency of morality,' and therefore to the communal level), but it remains "nontransposable"; it simply connects the creator of the art and its audience in the recognition of the realm of feeling. Thus, art can (and must) be created and shared without ever marring religious feeling.[25]

As Schleiermacher writes in the *Brouillon*, the reason the externalizing, or "setting forth of feeling" and its "acknowledgement" is necessary is because otherwise the most basic "unity of life" that affords humans a sense of self (a way to connect the moments of their knowing and doing) and of community, "would thus be totally negated

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[23] *NE*, 121: Religion is "feeling raised to the potency of morality."
[24] *BE*, 22: "Dieses Aeußerlichwerden des Gefühls . . . .geschieht nicht als Erregungsmittel derselben Thätigkeit in Andern; sondern es soll nur erkannt werden."
[25] The notion of nontransposability aids Schleiermacher's attempts to reconcile individuality and communality in his ethics: both individuality and communality are necessary, and they can co-exist if feeling is communicated, but remains essentially "nontransposable," thereby protecting individuality in community.

if what is nontransposable could not, in turn, become communal and communicable" (*NE*, 51).[26]

Individuals cultivate this unity of life through a life-long process of "oscillation" between "cognizing and presenting," or feeling (subjective knowing) and presentation of feeling (art).[27] A musical interlude in section one of *Christmas Eve* serves as a depiction of the right relationship of religion (feeling) and art in *Bildung*. The entire company, including Leonhardt, participates together in singing and music: "when they had finished, all remained still, as so often happens with religious music, in a mood of inner satisfaction and retirement" (*CE*, 34).[28] The experience of artistic expression intensifies first internality: the "oscillation" moves from external presentation to internal cognition. Then, the passage continues, "This reaction was followed, however, by a few silent moments in which they all know that the heart of each person was turned in love toward all the rest and toward something higher still" (*CE*, 34).[29] The music draws the company to internal reflection, and yet this reflection incorporates their connections with one another and with "something still higher"—their individual experience of religion (religious feeling).

The music has acted as a mode of expression that facilitates movement (oscillation) between individually experienced religious feeling and communally acknowledged religious feeling, the "heart" of each member, interwoven with the others

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[26] *BE*, 22: "Die Einheit des Lebens . . . würde also ganz aufgehoben, wenn das Unübertragbare nicht wieder ein Gemeinschafliches und Mitteilbares werden könnte."
[27] These are the same internalizing and externalizing movements that marked Schleiermacher's notion of *Bildung* in the *Soliloquies*. See chapter two.
[28] *DW*, 50: " . . . als sie geendet hatten, geschah es, wie immer, daß religiöse Musik zuerst eine stille Befriedigung und Zurückgezogenheit des Gemütes bewirkt."
[29] Ibid., 50: "Es gab einige stumme Augenblicke, in denen aber jeder wußte, daß eines jeden Gemüt liebend auf die übrigen und auf etwas noch Höheres gerichtet war."

and directed towards the "higher" origination of their individual religious feelings.[30] This artistic expression does not lead the community away from religion or mar the uniqueness ("nontransposability") of their individual experiences of religious feeling; rather, it gives shape to the communal arena necessary for the company's continued religious development. Despite Leonhardt's qualms, the company continues their incorporation of artistic expression into the formation of piety, presenting the combination of art and religion as key to both individual and communal formation.

Leonhardt remains persistent, though, and in section three, he returns to the topic *Bildung*, ironically musing that the difference between "us who are well educated" ("*wir Gebildetem*") and those who are "uneducated" ("*des ungebildeten Volkes*") lies in the appreciation of religion (*CE*, 71; *DW*, 84). He suggests that since their circle is among the 'cultivated' they could celebrate the Christmas festival simply by reading the Bible and receiving doctrinal instruction, whereas all the 'uncultivated people' must have activities to help them remember the importance of it.[31] Leonhardt's comment returns, by ironically jabbing at the company's festive enjoyment of the evening's activities, to his uneasiness with Sofie's *Bildung* in section one: while he insists that a "cultivated life," as a "work of art," should be a combination of *life* and art, he cannot reconcile this

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[30] Ernestine makes a similar point earlier in section one: She tells her friends when they gather around her to praise her artistry, "I am glad if you like the way I have arranged things . . . but please do not forget the picture for the frame. I have only tried to do honor to the day we are celebrating and to your own joyful love, whose tokens [whose symbolization; "*Zeichen*"] you have entrusted to me" (*CE*, 29). The use of the term "*Zeichen*," in the German, points towards Schleiermacher's discussion in the *Brouillon* concerning the presentation of feeling in art as a creation of shared symbols, which he uses as the basis for establishing the unity of religious community. Thus, I have added this connotation in brackets to the translation. *DW*, 44-45: "Wenn ich es euch zu Dank bestellt habe, ihr Lieben! sagte sie, so vergeßt nur nicht über dem Rahmen das Bild, und bedenkt, daß ich nur den festlichen Tag und eure fröhliche Liebe geehrt habe, deren Zeichen ihr mir anvertrautet." Artistic expression should point beyond the individual to the divine.

[31] *DW*, 84: "Denn wenn man sagen wollte, dies Andenken werde weit mehr durch die Schrift erhalten, und durch den Unterricht im Christenthum überhaupt, als durch das Fest, so möchte ich dieses läugnen. Nemlich wir Gebildetem zwar, so meine ich, hätten vielleicht an jenem genug, keinesweges aber der große Haufen des ungebildeten Volkes."

combination with a combination of *religion* and art. Sofie's intertwining of artistic expression (outward expression of piety) and religion appears to Leonhardt to contribute to a process of *mal*formation, rather than formation. Sofie's piety leaves her prey to religious malformation, just as the adults' festive mood, Leonhardt suggests, distracts them from the threatening political events on the horizon.

4. *Bildung* and Church

Leonhardt provides a final reference to the vocabulary of *Bildung* by applying it to the formation of the Christian church. He wonders if it was truly Jesus' intention that his followers "form," or cultivate [*bilden*], a church marked by the type of separateness and exclusivity that defines Christianity in their day (*CE*, 73; *DW*, 86). Eduard's speech implicitly answers Leonhardt's concern by providing a different definition of "church" that falls in line with the company's more encompassing view of human religious formation: "Now this community . . . by which man-in-himself is thus exhibited or restored [*dargestellt wird oder wiederhergestellt*] is the church. . . . Everyone, therefore, in whom this [higher] self-consciousness . . . arises enters . . . the church" (*CE*, 83).[32] The definition of "the church," according to Eduard, is limited not by doctrinal unity, but by a shared sense of community in a process of the formation of a "higher self-consciousness" (*CE*, 83; *DW*, 95: "*höhere Selbstbewußtein*"), which he relates to the

[32] Tice complicates the translation in this passage by adding words not found in the original. I have deleted his addition of extraneous words, which I found made the passage more difficult to understand, and I included brackets with the German for "exhibited or restored," which lose their etymological association in Tice's translation. *DW*, 95: "Diese Gemeinschaft aber, durch welche so der Mensch an sich dargestellt wird oder wiederhergestellt, ist die Kirche . . . Jeder also, in dem dieses Selbstbewußtsein aufgeht, kommt zur Kirche."

recognition of the embrace of earthly and divine in the individual.[33] Eduard further elaborates the creation of this community, stating that the church is a

> community of individual persons, . . . which has come into being through communication of persons with each other. We also seek, therefore, for a single starting-point from which this communication can proceed—although we recognize that it must further proceed from each person out of his own self-activity—so that man-in-himself may also be born and formed in each one" (*CE*, 83-84).[34]

Eduard finds this starting point in the "God-man" ("*Gottmensch*," Jesus), but not in a doctrine of the nature of Christ; rather, in Christ as a model of higher self-consciousness, a model of the embrace of earthly and divine (*CE*, 84; *DW*, 96). The church, then, serves as a gathering point for the formation of individuals in higher self-consciousness, which finds a common model (for Christians) in Christ.

Eduard's speech elaborates Schleiermacher's discussion in the *Brouillon* of the church as one of the four goods/communities that participate in *Bildung* as the highest good. In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher states that the church contributes to the highest good as the "highest individuality" (*NE*, 131; *BE*, 114: "*höchsten Individualität*"): the most advanced instantiation of communal uniqueness. Rather than an organized set of doctrinal statements, "the idea of *a church*" consists in "individuated unity of feeling together with its presentation" (*NE*, 54).[35] This community forms not around doctrine,

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[33] See my discussion of this definition of higher self-consciousness below in the section on the earthly/divine dyad.

[34] *DW*, 95: ". . . eine Gemeinschaft der Einzelnen ein durch Mittheilung derselben Gewordenes, und wir suchen also auch Einen Punkt, von dem diese Mittheilung ausgegangen, wiewol wir wissen, daß sie von einem Jeden wieder selbstthätig ausgehn muß, und der Mensch an sich, sich in jedem Einzelnen gebären und gestalten." Though Schleiermacher changes the wording in this passage slightly in the 1826 edition, the changes only serve to clarify that it is the individual's self-activity that leads to the birth and formation of higher self-consciousness in the individual.

[35] *BE*, 25: ". . . diese individuelle Einheit des Gefühls selbst und der Darstellung ist die Idee *einer Kirche*." This communication, as we saw above, does not mar the subjectivity of religious feeling; it simply provides an arena for its shared communication, so that through such communication and its acknowledgment, religious feeling fulfills its moral function and thereby contributes to *Bildung*.

but flows from religious *feeling* as the highest form of individual uniqueness (*NE*, 131; *BE*, 114). A church, in this sense, offers a shared set of symbols that communicate religious feeling. In Christian churches, the central symbol, as Eduard discusses it in *Christmas Eve*, is Jesus Christ.

Not only does Eduard redefine the church in a broader sense than Leonhardt's focus on doctrinal differences allowed, but also he then explicitly de-emphasizes the role of scientific knowledge (Leonhardt's approach) in the church. He insists that, although "no one can truly and vitally possess the fruits of science who is not himself within the church," such scientific prowess is not necessary for participation in the church community: "there may very well be those within the church who do not possess science for themselves; for these can own that higher self-consciousness in immediate experience [*Empfindung*], if not in conceptual awareness [*Erkenntniß*] as well" (*CE*, 83).[36] Thus, the shared symbol of Christ can achieve communication in the church without a doctrinal discussion of his nature as at once human and divine. Individuals need only find an "immediate experience" of the embrace of earthly and divine within themselves and then communicate that experience in a shared symbol-system in order to participate in the church.

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[36] *DW*, 95: "Darum kann Niemand wahrhaft und lebendig die Wissenschaft in sich haben, der nicht selbst in der Kirche ware. . . . Wol aber können in der Kirche sein, die nicht die Wissenschaft in sich haben; denn sie können jenes höhere Selbstbewußtein in der Empfindung besizen, wenn auch night in der Erkenntniß." In the 1826 edition, Schleiermacher replaces *Erkenntniß* with the term *Anschauung* (the sense of which is still in accord with Tice's translation of *Erkenntniß*). Both vocabulary choices reflect his assertion that women find roles more easily in the church community, since science is not required, and they do not necessarily possess a talent for it. The shift in vocabulary denotes a standardization in the vocabulary that Schleiermacher used to discuss these gender differences. In dividing men's and women's talents in this area, Schleiermacher often pairs women with feeling (*Gefühl*) and men with conceptual intuition (*Anschauung*), as he does in the *Confidential Letters on Lucinde* (1800). Richardson has a discussion of this division between men and women in *Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher*, 154. See also my variant interpretation in the section of the male/female polarity, below.

Though Eduard counters Leonhardt's speech with another speech, thereby remaining, to a certain extent, rooted in 'scientific' rather than narrative discourse, Schleiermacher immediately provides the narrative response to Leonhardt's position with the advent of Josef and the cessation of analysis. Josef's arrival treats at once Leonhardt's hesitance in combining religion and art as well as his narrow definition of "the church": at the end of Eduard's speech, Josef enters and chastises the company for falling into learned discourse (doctrinal banter), when the festival calls for childlike expressions of joy (presentation of feeling). He stops discussion and calls the community to sing festive songs, recalling them to a more occasion-appropriate expression of religious community. Leonhardt's analytical approach to *Bildung*, along with all the men's speeches, are laid aside in favor of the 'activities' that Leonhardt had so recently disdained as only for the "uncultivated."

Section Summary and Conclusions

In sum, the explicit discussions of *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve* are introduced by the resident rationalist, Leonhardt. Leonhardt's main concerns surround the relationship of art (outward expression of piety) and religion as purely internal. The point maintained throughout is that, though religious feeling is internal, external presentation of religious feeling does not mar, but contributes positively to *Bildung*, aiding the formation of piety, as well as human nature more broadly. The handling of this issue reflects Schleiermacher's concerns about the formation of Protestant Christian community, particularly through the use of music and festivals; i.e., through external expressions of religiosity.

The gathered company models how to integrate music and festival activities into the life of the community. And, if not for the presence of Leonhardt, discussion and analysis of these elements would not need to occur: these elements of religiosity arise naturally and integrate themselves seamlessly, along the "narrative" lines that Schleiermacher articulated in the *Brouillon*. But, Leonhardt's perspective remains one that contributes to the overall formation of the community, since a narrative approach incorporates historical particularity *with* universal laws (the scientific approach). The gathered friends may not have incorporated fully a scientific approach to the festival (abstract analysis), if not for the presence of Leonhardt. Schleiermacher's presentation of this tension in *Christmas Eve* indicates a real tension in German Protestantism—one that should not dissolve, but one that he believed must not lead to division, so that German Protestantism might engender the unity needed to overcome of the Napoleonic threat.

B. Polarity in *Christmas Eve*

At the heart of the Jena-Romantic understanding of the connection between *Bildung* and polarity lies the tension between the universal (infinite) and particular (finite). "Living poesy" means embracing one's particularity and also moving beyond oneself to embrace universality as well. For Schlegel, the poetic activity through which "one transcends oneself" ("*setzt man sich über sich selbst*") is an ironic movement, which "contains and arouses a feeling of indissoluble antagonism between the absolute and the relative, between the impossibility and the necessity of complete communication." [37]

[37] Firchow, 13, #108. *KFSA*, I.2, 160: "Sie enthält und erregt ein Gefühl von dem unauflöslichen Widerstreit des Unbedingten und des Bedingten, der Unmöglichkeit und Notwendigkeit einer vollständigen Mittleilung." See chapter two, above, for more detailed discussion of irony and poesy in the Jena-Romantic understanding of polarity in *Bildung*.

Living poesy requires a constant striving, through which one attempts to 'place oneself above' one's finitude.

Schleiermacher, from the time he writes his *Speeches*, explores the embrace of polarity in *Bildung* in a manner distinct from that found in the *Athenaeum* (see chapter two). As Jack Forstman notes in his study of the relationship between Schleiermacher, Schlegel, and Novalis,

> [w]hen Schlegel found religion it was only by soaring above the polarities [built into the structure of his worldview; i.e., universality and particularity] . . . by means of esoteric visions of the unity beyond and behind the opposing poles. Schleiermacher thought a person could perceive or receive a presentiment of a ground of unity from within the polarity without straining his finitude. Life confined to the polarities was irreligious for Schlegel.[38]

Schleiermacher consistently depicts the movement "beyond oneself" through the embrace of polarity not as a catapulting into an ethereal stratosphere, but as living "within the polarity without straining . . . finitude."

Schleiermacher more fully articulates his own approach to polarity in *Bildung* in the *Brouillon*, depicting two types of "oscillation" ("*Oscillation*") in moral life.[39] The first oscillation occurs between internality (subjective cognizing; feeling) and externality (objective reasoning; presentation of feeling) (*NE*, 42; *BE*, 12). The second oscillation consists in "the positing of a personal and temporal condition, and simultaneously of a transcending [*Aufheben*] of person and time within that condition" (*NE*, 42-43).[40] In other words, the first oscillation refers to the embrace of internality (feeling) and

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[38] Forstman, *Romantic Triangle*, 95-96.

[39] Recall that Schleiermacher locates the highest good in the *Brouillon* in *Bildung*, thus defining the moral life as the pursuit of *Bildung*. See chapter three, above.

[40] *BE*, 12-13: "Dieses Sezen eines Persönlichen und Zeitlichen und Aufheben der Persönlichkeit und der Zeit darin ist die andere Oscillation des Lebens." See Wallhausser's discussion of Schleiermacher's use of the term *Aufheben* in the accompanying note for the passage.

externality (reason), and the second oscillation is the oscillation between finitude/particularity and infinitude/universality, which occurs *within the condition* of particularity. While one *transcends* particularity and subjectivity through the process of oscillation, one does not propel oneself *outside of* the universal/particular or subjective/objective polarity. Dyadic oscillations between feeling and reason allow humans, within various spheres of life, to reflect upon the relation of infinite and finite (religion) that is "immediately given" to feeling.[41] Indeed, the activity of continual oscillation between the poles defines the ethical (cultivated) life.

Following this pattern, the embrace of dyads in *Christmas Eve* involves neither a collapse of distinction between the poles invoked nor an ultimate rupture between them; instead, the embrace of polarity in *Christmas Eve* affords a perception of unity *within* duality.[42] As a result, in *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher takes up the dyad of universal and particular, prominent in the *Athenaeum* theories of *Bildung*, but he gives shape to it as a historical, lived polarity that functions within the life of the community.

His primary instantiation of the universal/particular dyad becomes the divine/earthly, as modeled both by the person of Jesus and in the relationship of Jesus and Mary. The other three major dyads analyzed in this chapter reflect polarities that serve as necessary parts of the process of formation—a process that remains rooted in the embrace

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[41] Schleiermacher clarifies both the centrality of religion in human life and the spheres involved in feeling and its presentation in one of the most famous passages from his 1806 edition of the *Speeches*. He bemoans to his friends, "[e]ach [of the spheres of science, religion, and art/*Bildung*] is for you a part, a fragment. Because you do not deal with life in a living way, your conception bears the stamp of perishableness, and is altogether meagre. True science is complete vision; true practice is culture and art [*Bildung und Kunst*] self-produced; true religion is sense and taste for the Infinite" (*SR*, 39). *SKGA*, I.12, 56: "Es wird Euch jede ein Getrenntes, ein Abgerissenes, und Eure Vorstellung ist überall dürftig, das Gepräge der Nichtigkeit an sich tragend, weil Ihr nicht lebendig in das Lebendige eingreift. Wahre Wissenschaft ist vollendete Anschauung; wahre Praxis ist selbsterzeugte Bildung und Kunst; wahre Religion ist Sinn und Geschmack für das Unendliche."

[42] See note on duality and dipolarity in chapter one under the section on Schleiermacher's polar approach to *Bildung*.

of earthly and divine. Thus, Schleiermacher introduces childlikeness (feeling) and adulthood (reason) as concrete representational models of the faculties necessary for the perfection of spiritual development. The emotional dyad, joy and sorrow, explores further the realm of feeling, and male/female gender polarity explores a dyadic means of communicating knowledge (reason). In this way, Schleiermacher repeats the two polarities that propel his ethical theory in the *Brouillon* (see chapter three)—universal/particular and reason/feeling—but he makes them concrete through their expression in lived community.

Each of these four dyads (earthly/divine; childlikeness/adulthood; joy/sorrow; female/male) participates in the cultivation of human nature within the family, encouraging the simultaneous formation of individuals and of Protestant Christian community. The concrete familial model of Mary and Jesus provides the means of depicting *together* all four major polar dyads named above. The sections below first introduce the model of Mary and Jesus and then consider each dyad in turn, beginning with the earthly and divine, in order to elaborate *Christmas Eve*'s expression of Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung*.

1. The Familial Model: Mary and Jesus

In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher delineates four goods that serve *Bildung* (the highest good), each of which is a form of community: free sociality, academy, state, and church.[43] Though the family does not function explicitly as one of the four goods, it establishes the arena *from which* the four goods emerge and *within which* they interact.

[43] Schleiermacher observes in the *Brouillon* that the highest good, though unchanging, has received diverse historical 'representations' ('*Vorstellungen*'), the oldest of which is the image of God ("*Ebenbild Gottes*") and the most recent of which is "perfected culture" ("*vollkommene Kultur*"), both of which refer to humans' complete formation (*bilden/Bildung*) (*NE*, 45; *BE*, 16). For more discussion of this topic, see chapter three.

In this way, the family acts as the relational nexus for the pursuit of *Bildung*. Schleiermacher's theoretical discussion of family in the *Brouillon* places the sexual union between a husband and wife as the basis for the development of the family unit (providing a loving "unity of consciousness" between the two as well as procreation); however, he also widens the notion of family to include close friends. Schleiermacher depicts this expanded family unit in *Christmas Eve* through the gathering of friends in the home of Ernestine, Eduard, and their daughter Sofie.

The Christmas narrative, as discussed within *Christmas Eve*, offers a third familial model that differs from both the traditional nuclear family and the extended family unit: Schleiermacher presents the *holy* family in *Christmas Eve* in terms of the dyadic relation of mother and child.[44] The emphasis on Mary and Jesus as a familial model serves two purposes in this context: First, it ensures that the notion of family remains rooted, not simply within a spiritual or religious worldview, but within a specifically Christian worldview. Second, it provides the foundation for a polar theory of *Bildung* that proceeds according to oscillating activity.

Recall that polarity, for Schleiermacher, does not follow the transcendence-through-conflict model found in conceptions of *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum*, but provides the needed framework for the activity of oscillation.[45] The most fundamental polarities

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[44] The characters in *Christmas Eve* consistently refer to the holy family not in terms of husband, wife and son (Joseph, Mary, and Jesus), but in terms of mother and child. Joseph does not even appear in the description of Sofie's diorama of the nativity. Even in the nativity, the focus remains on mother and child: ". . . and there in an enclosure, . . . one looked upon the holy family. All was dark in the lowly shed, save one beam of light streaming down from some hidden source upon the infant's head and casting a reflection on the bowed face of his mother" (*CE*, 33). *DW*, 49: ". . . und man erblikkt in einem Gemach, . . . die heilige Familie. Alles ist dunkel in der ärmlichen Hütte, nur ein verborgenes starkes Licht bestrahlt das Haupt des Kindes, und bildet einen Widerschein auf dem vorgebeugten Angesicht der Mutter.").

[45] Put another way, the *Athenaeum* model remains Fichtean, while Schleiermacher's model, which continues in *Christmas Eve*, resists the Fichtean approach. See below, under the section on universality and particularity.

in the *Athenaeum*—the dyads of universal and particular; infinite and finite; active and passive—find expression in the novels of Schlegel and Novalis in the relationship of heterosexual love, which has at its base a fundamental clash between oppositional elements.

For example, as Julius, Schlegel's protagonist in the novel *Lucinde*, writes to his lover, "it is love that first makes us true and complete human beings and is the essence of life," and in so doing, that love "shouldn't avoid conflict . . . the peace of love will ensue . . . only after a struggle of opposing forces."[46] Schlegel insists that his religion of love works through the negotiation of opposites, so that "[w]ith eternally immutable symmetry both [definite and indefinite] strive in opposite directions toward the infinite and away from it."[47] Schleiermacher's dyads in *Christmas Eve*, however, place the heterosexual love relationship in a larger context that encompasses multiple relational models, which all (save heterosexual love) find their root in their common reference to the model of Mary and Jesus.

The mother-and-child relationship offered by the model of Mary and Jesus accords with Schleiermacher's focus in the *Brouillon* on oscillation between poles, rather than opposition: the bond of love between mother and son focuses on their underlying unity, which heightens the communication between them. Ernestine's depiction of the mother and child, which appeared to her "living exemplars" ("*lebendige Gestalten*") of Mary and Jesus, bears out this shift. She recalls,

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[46] *Lucinde*, 110. *KFSA*, I.5, 64: "Und wenn die Liebe es ist, die uns erst zu wahren vollständigen Menschen macht, das Leben des Leben ist, so darf auch sie wohl die Widersprüche nicht scheuen, so wenig wie das Leben und die Menschheit; so wird auch ihr Frieden nur auf den Streit der Kräfte folgen."
[47] *Lucinde*, 120. *KFSA*, I.5, 73: "Mit ewig unwandelbarer Symmetrie streben beide auf entgegengesetzten Wegen sich dem Unendlichen zu nähern und ihm zu entfliehen."

> I stood before the noblest scene I had ever witnessed. . . . Her [the mother's] countenance seemed to display gladness one moment, then dejection; her breath now trembling with joy, now holding the sighs of contentment back. Yet what was communicated through it all was a sense of affable serenity, of loving devotion—radiating gloriously from her dark, downcast eyes . . . . The child . . . stirred energetically and yet quietly, and seemed absorbed in a half-unconscious dialogue of love and yearning with his mother. (*CE*, 58)[48]

The description of "yearning" and the alternation between joy and sorrow introduce the elements of striving and the "opposing forces" that Schlegel uses in his depiction of heterosexual love. But, Schleiermacher has shifted these facets of Schlegel's polar approach to *Bildung* to the realm of familial love, particularly as expressed between a mother and child.

With this shift, Schleiermacher can now emphasize the "sense of affable serenity, of loving devotion" that undergirds all of the "yearning," which is now expressed a-sexually in the oscillation between joy and sadness. This model not only offers a relational pairing (mother and son) that emphasizes a harmonious oscillation between polarities, but also removes the male and female dyad from an exclusive basis in sexualized love.

Within *Christmas Eve*, the gathered company enacts and explores the various roles suggested by the model of Mary and Jesus, often with explicit reference to the pair. For example, in section one, Sofie approaches her mother, asking, "You might just as well be the happy mother of the divine babe! And are you perhaps sorry that you are not?

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[48] *DW*, 73: "Ich stand vor der edelsten Bildung die ich je gesehn. . . . Ihre Mine schien mir bald lächelnd bald schwermüthig, ihr Athem bald freudig zitternd bald frohe Seufzer schwer unterdrükkend, aber das Bleibende von dem Allen war freundliche Ruhe, liebende Andacht, und herrlich stralte diese aus dem großen schwarzen niedergesenkten Auge . . . . [D]as Kind . . . regte sich lebendig aber still und schien mir in einem halb unbewußten Gespräch von Liebe und Sehnsucht mit der Mutter begriffen."

And is this, then, do you suppose, why mothers would rather have boys?" (*CE*, 33)[49] Sofie's questions draw all mothers into a comparison with Mary as mother, but the comments with which she immediately follows the questions intimate that relational roles exist for Christian women outside of motherhood: "But think of the holy women who followed Jesus and of all that you have told me about them. Certainly I will become such a woman some day, will I not, as you are now?" (*CE*, 33)[50] Though the familial relation of mother and child forms the basis for Sofie's question, the second half of Sofie's appeal to her mother clarifies that Christians' relational roles extend to the pairing of adult females and adult males outside of sexualized love relationships, as well as to the relational pairing of human and divine. Both of these relational pairings are also expressed in terms of Mary's later relationship (along with other "holy women") with the adult Jesus. Sofie narrativizes the theoretical point that Schleiermacher makes in the *Brouillon*: social relationships expand outward from the family in the process of formation. This example points to the versatility of the model of Mary and Jesus, which provides a number of ways to invoke dyadic relationships.

In sum, the familial model of Mary and Jesus allows Schleiermacher to focus on the activity of oscillation in a polar theory of *Bildung*, and it also allows him to expound from a dyadic familial model (Mary and Jesus) the four polarities that clarify this distinctive approach to formation (earthly/divine; childlikeness/adulthood; joy/sorrow; female/male). In the following sections, the model will recur: The embrace of earthly and divine occurs within the child, Jesus, as well as in the relationship of earthly mother

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[49] Ibid., 49: "Du könntest ebensogut die glückliche Mutter des göttlichen Kindleins sein, und tut es dir denn nicht weh, daß du es nicht bist? Und ist es nicht deshalb, daß die Mütter die Knaben lieber haben?"
[50] Ibid.: "Aber denke nur an die heiligen Frauen, welche Jesum begleiteten, und an alles, was du mir von ihnen erzählt. Gewiß, ich will auch eine solche werden, wie du eine bist."

and divine child. The model of Mary and Jesus also provides depictions of adulthood (Mary's reflective attitude towards her son) and childlikeness (in the openness and purity of the newborn, Jesus). Mary provides a model for the embrace of joy and sorrow (joy at her son's birth; sorrow at his death). Further, Mary represents female relational roles and Jesus represents male relational roles. As the four polarities receive treatment below, the model of Mary and Jesus will recur as it interweaves with the community's embodiment of the various relational roles and emotional states that it depicts.

2. Particularity and Universality: The Earthly and Divine Polarity

In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher writes that, "[i]n every single person the life of the person is presented in its identity of universal and particular" (*NE*, 123).[51] Although the life of an individual finds its orientation in bringing together universality and particularity, the "identity" ("*Identität*") of universal and particular to which Schleiermacher refers is not a collapse of particularity within the "Whole." Rather, identity indicates a multi-layered process of *identification*—a cognitive process of recognition and relation—that occurs through an "oscillation between the universal and the particular" (*NE*, 100; "*eine Oscillation . . . zwischen dem Allgemeinen und Besondern*," *BE*, 77).

The activity is multi-layered, because the identity of particularity and universality repeats in various arenas, both within humans (e.g., in the unity of perception and cognition), and relationally (e.g., in the unity of an individual with the world and with God). In this way, Schleiermacher asserts, "[e]verything converges on the identity of the universal and particular. . . . Ethical unity is precisely this identity. Everything posited

[51] *BE*, 104: " . . . in jedem Einzelnen das persönliche Leben in seiner Identität des Allgemeinen und Besonderen dargestellt wird."

outside it is only a fragment or an element" (*NE*, 55).[52] The universal and particular dyad, then, forms the foundation of the life of an individual, and the ethical life, in particular, which develops through oscillation between the two poles.[53]

The emphasis on the dyadic relationship of universal and particular has roots in the *Athenaeum* depictions of the relationship of poesy and *Bildung* (chapter two). But, Schleiermacher's additional focus on the "identity" of universality and particularity as an activity of "oscillation" shifts away from Schlegel's connection of *Bildung* to a poetic transcendence of particularity. Schleiermacher clarifies how this approach to the universal/particular dyad differs from the "transcendental philosophy" (the Ficthean approach) upon which the *Athenaeum* discussion builds its definition of poesy: "The usual formulas of transcendental philosophy depart totally from this understanding [of "earthly knowing" as the "identity of universal and particular"]. Transcendental philosophy seeks to posit a universal objective knowing abstracted from all individuality, but in this manner it can achieve only a contentless and indefinite form" (*NE*, 119-120).[54] Schleiermacher insists that his approach to the universal and particular polarity and that espoused by transcendental philosophy "depart totally."[55] In *Christmas Eve*,

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[52] Ibid., 26: "Es läuft alles hinaus auf die Identität des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen. . . . Die ethische Einheit ist eben diese Identität. Alles außer ihr Gesezte is nur Fragment oder Element."

[53] The statements support John Wallhausser's argument that Schleiermacher's ethics in the *Brouillon* proceeds from a basis in two inter-related polarities: universal and particular and reason and feeling (see chapter three, above). In this section, I focus on the universal/particular dyad, and I will elaborate its relationship to the reason/feeling dyad in the next section, continuing Wallhausser's emphasis on these two pairs, but placing them in a hierarchical relationship that preferences the universal/particular dyad. This relationship seems particularly clear within the passage I have quoted from in this paragraph, where Schleiermacher goes on to state that reason/*Vernunft* acts as an "oscillating element" ("*oscillerendes Element*") that participates in the relation of particular and universal (*CE*, 100; *BE*, 77).

[54] *BE*, 99: "Hievon weichen gänzlich ab die gewöhnlichen Formeln der Transcendental-Philosophie, die ein allgemeines objectives Wissen abstrahirt von aller Individualität sezen will, auf diese Art aber nur eine gehaltlose und unbestimmte Form erhalten kann."

[55] Matthias Riemer's study of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher, *Bildung und Christentum: Der Bildungsgedanke Schleiermachers*, especially 156-157 and 169, reads Schleiermacher's mature theory of *Bildung* in large part as a response to Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre*.

Schleiermacher reinforces this observation, historicizing the dyadic relation between universal and particular found in the *Brouillon* in order to portray within lived experience the abstract formulation of oscillation.

The relational polarity earthly and divine first finds expression in *Christmas Eve* through symbolic representations in section one. Sofie's diorama continues to employ a similar set of polar symbols: within the diorama, real water and real fire play against one another.[56] Sofie had intentionally arranged these opposing elements: "The child had obviously taken pains to employ flame and water throughout the whole composition, making a fine pattern with the two conflicting elements" (*CE*, 33).[57] But these artistic efforts merely provide the trappings for the central piece of artistry: "one sought for a long time in vain for the birth scene itself, for she had wisely contrived to conceal the Christmas star" (*CE*, 33)[58] Fire and water give way, in her carefully hidden presentation of the nativity scene, to another set of polarities: earthly light and heavenly light.

The symbolic use of light, itself, provides a means to highlight opposition: "All was dark in the lowly shed, save one beam of light streaming down from some hidden source upon the infant's head and casting a reflection on the bowed face of the mother. In contrast to the wild flames on the other side, this mild splendor seemed like a heavenly

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[56] Also in section one, in Ernestine's arrangement of the gifts, polarities of light and darkness and of Spring (new life) and Winter (death) are embraced and harmonized in order to 'symbolize the festival' (*CE*, 27; *DW*, 45). Although Ernestine does not reflect upon the meaning of the symbols she employs, Ernst's speech in the third section does. He clarifies both light and Spring as symbols of God, connecting God to such symbols as "the rising and circling sun" and "the springtime of the spirit" (*DW*, 92: "als die aufgehende, wiederkehrende Sonne, als der Frühling des Geistes"). The festival celebrates the birth of God in the world, and so Ernestine's symbolic expression of the festival naturally brings together the divine (light/Spring) and the earthly (darkness/Winter).

[57] *DW*, 48: "Mit besonderem Fleiß hatte die Kleine überall Feuer und Wasser behandelt, und die streitenden Elemente recht herausgehoben."

[58] Ibid., 48: "Unter allen diesen stark hervortretenden Gegenständen suchte man eine Zeitlang die Geburt selbst vergeblich; denn den Stern hatte sie weislich zu verstecken gesucht."

over against an earthly light" (*CE*, 33).[59] The dark hut and the brash flames outside the hut both stand in opposition to the glow that illumines the head of the baby, Jesus. In this depiction of Sofie's use of light, the symbolization of earthly and divine through oppositional elements becomes explicit. Sofie considers this arrangement "her masterpiece" (*CE*, 33; "*ihr höchstes Kunststükk*," *DW*, 49), the artistry of the diorama succeeding in holding these elements together while highlighting their opposition.[60]

In the women's narratives in section two, the earthly and divine polarity finds expression in the relationship of earthly mother and divine child. Ernestine makes the comparison explicit: she describes viewing a "living exemplar" of Mary and Jesus, as we saw above. The middle narrative (Agnes') presents a baptismal scene. The scene employs some elements of the nativity scene, and the company discusses this correlation: Leonhardt suggests that the scene depicts "a reversed-negative of a Christ child in which the aureole streams toward him [as he receives his baptismal blessing], not outward" (*CE*, 63).[61] Agnes agrees, and adds that in this scene "only the mother also sees the heavenly rays already streaming from him [as well as toward him]; and only upon her farseeing face is formed that beautiful reflection which Sophie has represented [in her diorama]" (*CE*, 63).[62] In the third narrative, Ernst suggests that the mother-and-child relationship in

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[59] Ibid., 49: "Alles ist dunkel in der ärmlichen Hütte, nur ein verborgenes starkes Licht bestrahlt das Haupt des Kindes, und bildet einen Widerschein auf dem vorgebeugten Angesicht der Mutter. Gegen die wilden Flammen draußen verhielt sich dieser milde Glanz wirklich wie himmlisches Feuer gegen das irdische."

[60] This success in holding the opposing elements together also signals the beginning of Sofie's transition from childhood to adulthood: she had made the diorama in lieu of giving gifts, because she had not perfected her artistic talents enough to be allowed to participate in the gift-giving. The success of the diorama now signals that Sofie will likely be ready to participate in gift-giving the following year.

[61] Ibid., 78: "Ein umgekehrtes negatives Christkindlein, in welches der Heiligenschein einströmt, nicht aus."

[62] Ibid.: "Nur die Mutter . . . sieht auch den himmlischen Glanz schon ausströmen aus ihm, und nur auf ihrem profetischen Angesicht bildet sich der schöne Widerschein, den in unbewußtem kindlichen Sinn Sofie dargestellt hat."

the tale depicts an "inverted Mary," who experiences first sorrow at the impending death of her child and then joy at his recovery.

Each of these descriptions of mother and child, and their relational model, Mary and Jesus, reflects the deepest of connections. This connection is expressed, as Ernestine puts it, in "a half-unconscious dialogue of love and yearning" between mother and child. Making concrete the embrace of earthly and divine in the mother-and-child relationship emphasizes the 'identity of universal and particular' that Schleiermacher had discussed in the *Brouillon*: the earthly mother and the divine child participate in a form of immediate relation and communication that mimics the immediacy of religious consciousness in its oscillating motion between mother (earthly/finite) and child (divine/infinite).

Narrative explorations of the model of Mary and Jesus set the tone for the analytical approach to the earthly and divine polarity in section three, where the focus shifts from the relational model of Mary and Jesus to the model of the person of Jesus as the embrace of both the earthly and divine. In section three, the men's speeches clarify that the earthly and divine polarity is not just one among the others. Eduard's discussion of the earthly and divine polarity highlights that the relationship between God and humans forms the basis for understanding human nature and, consequently, human formation.

Eduard's speech in section three makes the embrace of earthly and divine the centerpiece of the formation of an individual: In celebrating the birth of the divine child, the Christmas festival, he asserts, celebrates the "union of the divine and the earthly" (*CE*, 82; "*Einerleiheit des Göttlichen und Irdischen*," *DW*, 94). This unity, he tells his friends, thereby celebrates "ourselves as whole beings—that is, human nature, . . . viewed

and known from the perspective of the divine" (*CE*, 82).[63] Recognition of the unity of divine and earthly in Jesus points humans to their own "higher life" and "higher self-consciousness," indeed, their "higher birth" as earthly creatures who have, as well, an inherent connection to the divine (*CE*, 82-83).[64]

The description echoes Schleiermacher's definition of religion in the *Brouillon* as "the immediate relation of the finite to the infinite" (*NE*, 121), but the abstract notions now find a historical reference point in Eduard's speech: The recognition of the oneness of earthly and divine *in Jesus* directs Christians to their participation in "human nature" at its fullest. Whereas in section two depictions of Mary and Jesus as an expression of the earthly/divine dyad focused on relational oscillation, in section three, Eduard's depiction of the union of earthly and divine within Jesus analyzes the goal of this activity: complete formation of human nature.[65]

Although one recognizes the embrace of the divine and earthly *within oneself* through the model of Jesus, such recognition does not then negate the role of God *or* of the community. As Schleiermacher insists in the *Brouillon*, religion is a "process" by means of which "feeling is then raised to the potency of morality" (*NE*, 121). In this

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[63] Ibid., 94: "Was wir sonach feiern, ist nichts anders als wir selbst, wie wir insgesammt sind, oder die menschliche Natur, oder wie ihr es sonst nennen wollt, angesehen und erkannt aus dem göttlichen Princip."
[64] Ibid., 95-96: ". . . höhere Leben . . . höheres Selbstbewußtsein . . . höhere Geburt."
[65] Although this quest for "higher self-consciousness" bears some resemblance to the portrayal of the process of *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum*, Schleiermacher's invocation of the divine and earthly polarity in the formation of individuals contrasts with the *Athenaeum* definition of *Bildung* through its basis in Christianity. Living poesy—the activity associated with *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum—does* require a spiritual component, and the later *Athenaeum* fragments reflect Schleiermacher's position, introduced in his *Speeches*, concerning the centrality of religion in *Bildung*. In this vein, Friedrich Schlegel proclaims in one of the later *Athenaeum* fragments that, "Religion is the all-animating world soul of *Bildung*" (Firchow, 94, #4). But, Schlegel's definition of religion goes on to label religion as one among four distinct "elements" (religion, philosophy, poesy, and ethics) that function equally to make up *Bildung*. Eduard's speech argues that the full development of human nature must be viewed *through* the model of the embrace of earthly and divine *in Jesus*.

process, religion is "at once community with God" and with others (*NE*, 121).[66] Eduard repeats this assertion in *Christmas Eve*, insisting that, "[i]n the individual person . . . this union [of earthly and divine] must come into being both as his own thinking and as the thinking which arises within a common life and activity with other men; for it is in community that that knowledge . . . not only exists but develops" (*CE*, 83).[67] The focus on Jesus's birth in the celebration of the Christmas festival serves to clarify this point. Eduard asserts in his speech: "in Him we celebrate not only ourselves, but all who are yet to come" (*CE*, 84).[68] This connection to future community occurs through the overarching auspices of a connection to Jesus—it is *in Jesus* that the perfection of human nature is celebrated.

Central to this experience is a connection not only to the future community ('all who will yet come'), but also to the present community.[69] A connection to one's present spiritual community, Eduard insists, offers the *only* way that an individual can fully cultivate his or her humanity: "Only when a person sees humanity [and builds humanity] as a living community of individuals, . . . bears its spirit and consciousness in his life, and within the community both loses his isolated existence and finds it again in a new way—only then does that person have the higher life and the peace of God within."[70] For

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[66] See also Wallhausser, 21.

[67] *DW*, 95: ". . . im Einzelnen aber muß sie, wie sie in ihm ist, auch werden als sein Gedanke, und als der Gedanke eines gemeinschaftlichen Thuns und Leben, in welchem eben jenes Erkennen der Erde ist nicht nur, sondern auch wird."

[68] Ibid., 96: ". . . in ihm feiern wir nicht nur uns, sondern Alle, die da kommen werden."

[69] In the 1826 edition of *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher enlarges these comments a bit in order to clarify the connection between *past*, present, and future community as well as to God. The revised version extends the sentence quoted above, and I have noted the additions in italics (ibid., 96): ". . . in ihm feiern wir nicht nur uns, sondern Alle, die da kommen werden, *sowie Alle, die gewesen sind; denn sie waren Alle nur insofern er in ihnen war und sie in ihm*."

[70] Ibid., 95: "Nur wenn der Einzelne die Menschheit als eine lebendige Gemeinschaft der Einzelnen anschaut und erbaut, ihren Geist und Bewußtsein in sich trägt, und in ihr das abgesonderte Dasein verliert und widerfindet, nur dann hat er das höhere Leben und den Frieden Gottes in sich." I have shifted Tice's

Eduard, the process of an individual's cultivation of humanity is concurrent with communal cultivation: the activities are one and the same.

This process of communal cultivation is how Eduard defines "the church." He states, "This community, however, through which the man-in-himself is formed or reformed, is the church. . . . Everyone, therefore, in whom this [higher] self-consciousness arises, comes into the church."[71] In this abstract portion of Eduard's speech, church appears to lack historical concreteness; it sounds like church is simply all those in whom this process of cultivation occurs. Though articulated without reference to a particular church/institution, Schleiermacher places these comments within the discussion of the Christian festival of Christmas, and Eduard refers repeatedly to basic Christian beliefs and stories (e.g., the Trinity and Pentecost) in order to elaborate upon the topic. Thus, although Eduard states the definition of church abstractly, the surrounding narrative clarifies that 'church' occurs in concrete, historical communities.

In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher clarifies the historical concreteness of the church further: He refers to Moses and Aaron, Mohammed and Ali, and Christ and his disciples, as individuals whose cultivation of religious community became a church (*NE*, 131-132; *BE*, 114). In both the *Brouillon* and *Christmas Eve* church does not simply refer to an ethereal spiritual kinship shared by those who possess a higher self-consciousness, but to those who participate in a historical tradition that expresses higher self-consciousness in

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translation here, in order to avoid his translation of "*erbaut*" as "cultivate," which might otherwise indicate the use of the verb *bilden*.

[71] I use my translation here. Tice's translation correctly conveys the sense of the passage, but he adds some terms not present in the German and buries the etymological link between "formed" and "reformed." Tice writes: "Now this community, or fellowship, by which man-in-himself is thus exhibited or restored is the church. . . . Everyone, therefore, in whom this genuine self-consciousness of humanity arises, enters within the bounds of the church" (*CE*, 83). *DW*, 95: "Diese Gemeinschaft aber, durch welche so der Mensch an sich dargestellt wird oder wiederhergestellt, ist die Kirche . . . Jeder also, in dem dieses Selbstbewußtsein aufgeht, kommt zur Kirche."

particular ways. Religion, as the immediate relation of finite and infinite, of earthly and divine, will acquire different symbolic expressions in different church communities. In *Christmas Eve*, Eduard discusses the central symbolic expression of the embrace of earthly and divine in the Christian tradition: the person of Jesus.

What Eduard's speech intimates, then, is not a broadening of the definition of church to the extent that Schleiermacher elsewhere broadens the definition of religion; instead, it marks a broadening of a shared Christian identity. "The church" that Eduard refers to is clearly Christian, but, he suggests, the communal cultivation of human nature in individuals, through the celebration of the Christmas festival, greatly expands whom the *Christian* church includes. If, through the celebration of Christmas and the acceptance of its symbols, one recognizes one's "higher self-consciousness," then one is part of the Christian community. This position reflects Schleiermacher's argument in the 1804 essay on the reunification of the Reformed and Lutheran Churches: emphasis on shared festivals and music—rich sources for the expression of religious symbols—can unite Protestant Christians despite the presence of certain doctrinal disagreements.

In sum, Schleiermacher does not simply provide a Christian context for his characters to discuss the embrace of earthly and divine, he also provides models from the Christian tradition to express the functioning of this polarity in human formation. These models reinforce Schleiermacher's concurrent concerns: With practical considerations concerning the unification of German Protestant communities in the background (see chapter three), Schleiermacher's emphasis on the earthly and divine polarity, made concrete in various ways through the model of Mary and Jesus, provides a focal point around which Christians with varying doctrinal viewpoints can unite. The sets of

polarities discussed in the following sections (childlikeness and adulthood, joy and sorrow, and male and female) will again develop in relation to the model of Mary and Jesus. They will also provide concrete depictions of the second polarity that stands with universality and particularity at the heart of Schleiermacher's articulation of his ethical theory of *Bildung* in the *Brouillon*: feeling and reason.

3. Feeling and Reason: The Polarity of Childlikeness and Adulthood

Just as earthly and divine provide concrete reference points in *Christmas Eve* for the particular/universal dyad, so too, childlikeness and adulthood provide concrete descriptors for the relation of feeling and reason in human life. In chapter three I introduced John Wallhausser's argument that universality and particularity function co-equally alongside feeling and reason at the foundation of Schleiermacher's ethical theory in the *Brouillon*. Contra Wallhausser, I read reason and feeling in subordination to the universal/particular dyad in both the *Brouillon* and in Schleiermacher's approach to *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve*.

In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher finds the root of the 'life oscillations' that make up an ethical life in "an oscillation between the universal and the particular" (*NE*, 100).[72] He immediately adds that reason/*Vernunft*, though necessary "from the outset" in this process (*NE*, 42; *BE*, 12), "is only an oscillating element belonging to a greater unity" (*NE*, 100).[73] Indeed, Schleiermacher depicts reason in terms of its participation in universality (reason links to the realm of objective knowledge), and he depicts feeling in terms of its participation in particularity (feeling links to the realm of subjective knowledge). In this way, the immediate relation of universal and particular forms the

[72] *BE*, 77: ". . . eine Oscillation . . . zwischen dem Allgemeinen und Besondern."
[73] Ibid.: ". . . nur ein oscillirendes Element einer grössern Einheit ist."

basis of ethical life, and reason and feeling function to mediate this relation. As Schleiermacher states, "[e]verything converges on the identity of the universal and particular. . . . Ethical unity is precisely this identity" (*NE*, 55).[74] The reason/feeling dyad guides this activity of convergence. That is, reason and feeling are those 'oscillating elements' that move humans towards the "higher consciousness" that embraces earthly (particular) and divine (universal).

Schleiermacher highlights the childlikeness/adulthood polarity in *Christmas Eve* by focusing on Christmas as a festival marked by childlike joy. Schleiermacher frames the piece with the evocation of this childlike attitude. Section one begins with Ernestine's arrangement of the gifts, which Eduard asserts "gave appropriate expression to our sense of Christmas; the being made young again, the movement backwards into the feeling of childhood [*das Gefühl der Kindheit*], the buoyant joy in the new world."[75] And at the close of *Christmas Eve*, Josef returns the company to the realm of childlikeness with his call for the child, Sofie, to be brought to him and for the circle to cease all discussion and end their evening with joyful singing. Rousing his friends to follow his lead, Josef declares that on Christmas "all [human beings] are children" to him and that he, himself, has "become just like a child again" as well in his celebration of the festival (*CE*, 85).[76] Christmas, as a festival meant to engender childlike joy, provides an arena in which to explore the role of childlikeness in religiosity.

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[74] Ibid., 26: "Es läuft alles hinaus auf die Identität des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen. . . . Die ethische Einheit ist eben diese Identität. Alles außer ihr Gesezte is nur Fragment oder Element."

[75] I have used my own interpretation here to preserve the emphasis on the use of the term *Gefühl* as well as the repeated reference to a movement *back* to childhood. *DW*, 62: ". . . unsern Weihnachtssinn so recht ausgedrükkt; das Verjüngtsein, das Zurükgehn in das Gefühl der Kindheit, die heitre Freude an der neuen Welt." Tice reads: ". . . expressed our own awareness of Christmas so aptly. We were young again, felt like children. We had the serene joy of living in the new world" (*CE*, 45).

[76] *DW*, 97: "Alle Menschen sind mir heute Kinder." And then, ibid., 98: "Auch ich selbst bin ganz ein Kind geworden zu meinem Glükk."

In *Christmas Eve*, a lengthy discussion of the young girl, Sofie's, *Bildung* elaborates the nature of childlikeness, particularly in reference to her developing piety. The discussion of Sofie provides a preface for the discussion of *adult* formation, however, clarifying the basic capacities that participate in *Bildung* as feeling and reason. Sofie's piety, which reflects her capacity for feeling, is a well-developed area of her *Bildung*, while her reasoning capacities have not developed fully; inversely, the discussion of the adults' development focus on their need to maintain a sense of childlikeness (feeling) that is often lost in adulthood (a realm of reason).[77]

The centrality of polarity in *Christmas Eve* guides my assessment of childlikeness, viewing it in relation to adulthood, and reading the description of the child, Sofie, in terms of Schleiermacher's overarching concern with the role of the feeling/reason polarity in human formation.[78] Thus, although Schleiermacher's characters encourage childlikeness as a necessary attitude to cultivate as one strives

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[77] Adults' development of spirituality depends upon the embrace of the feeling/reason dyad: Ibid., 70: "So hätten, sagte Eduard, Männer und Frauen auch in der Entwikkelung des Geistigen, das doch in beiden dasselbe sein muß, ihre abgesonderte Weise, um sich durch gegenseitiges Erkennen auch hierin zu vereinigen." *CE*, 55: ". . . we see that in the development [*Entwikkelung*] of their spiritual nature, although it must be the same in both, men and women have their different ways—to the end that here too they may become one by sharing knowledge [*durch gegenseitiges Erkennen*; through reciprocal knowledge]."

[78] The role of childlikeness and the character of Sofie have received scholarly treatment from many prominent Schleiermacher scholars. Richardson, *Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher*, 147-148, discusses the role of childlikeness in terms of both Sofie and the boy Anton (a minor character), focusing on how the two children present the basic differences between men and women: Sofie excelling in *Gefühl* and Anton in analysis. However, Anton is older than Sofie, and therefore at a different stage of development. Also, Anton's character is so minor that Richardson's reading interpolates much from a very few lines. Along the lines of Elisabeth Hartlieb's critique of this point in Richardson, Elisabeth Hartlieb, *Geschlechterdifferenz im Denken Friedrich Schleiermachers* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2006), 48, I read Sofie as an example of gender-neutral childlikeness that serves as a model for both men and women to emulate. The male character, Josef, supports my reading: he embodies this attitude of childlikeness, and, indeed, calls both men and women to return to it. Whether reflective of a male-female dichotomy or not, the general scholarly consensus is that childlikeness is a central motif in *Christmas Eve*. Niebuhr, for instance, focuses attention on childlikeness in his assessment of *Christmas Eve* in his first chapter of *Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion*, 49-50; 53-54. Hartlieb, 47-49, considers the role of Sofie in the context of gender issues in *Christmas Eve*. With this emphasis on polarity, I offer a fresh approach to the theme of childlikeness in *Christmas Eve*, asserting that the theme of childlikeness cannot be understood apart from the dyadic relation of childlikeness and adulthood in the process of *Bildung*.

towards a full expression of human nature, they do not advocate a simple embrace of childlike naiveté.

a. The Discussion of Sofie's Piety

The discussion of childlikeness in section one uses Sofie as a springboard for the universal need for childlike attitudes, and childlike openness receives praise as key to the full expression of religiosity.[79] But, the company draws a clear distinction between being a child (who lacks developed reasoning capacities) and maintaining a child*like* attitude (while using reason as well).[80] In a discussion of the development of men and women from childhood to adulthood, the women, who excel in maintaining a "unity" between the capacity for feeling and for reason, reflect upon the necessity of the embrace of both for attaining a fullness of human nature.[81] "Think of the man," Agnes implores, "who has achieved a mature awareness of himself and the world and who has found God [through] struggle and conflict. Do his joys, then, depend upon destroying not only what is evil in his life, but also what is . . . childlike?" (*CE*, 54)[82] Agnes suggests that mature consciousness does not reach full expression until an individual embraces childlikeness

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[79] For example, even in the philosophical speeches of the men, Ernst reflects analytically on the importance of childlikeness (*DW*, 93).

[80] Thus, though Leonhardt continues to express his concerns about encouraging expressions of piety in *children* (Sofie, in particular), the company agrees that an attitude of child*like*ness remains essential to the cultivation of true piety.

[81] *CE*, 55: "the contrast [opposition; *Gegensaz*] between the spontaneous and reflective [*Unbewußten und Besonnenen*] emerges more strongly in us [men]. And during the period of transition [to adulthood] it reveals itself in that restless striving, that passionate conflict with the world and within oneself you referred to. But within the calm, graceful nature of women comes to light the continuity and inner unity of the two [oppositional elements]." *DW*, 70: ". . . in uns der Gegensaz des Unbewußten und des Besonnenen stärker hervortritt, und sich während des Ueberganges in jenem unruhigen Streben, jenem leidenschaftlichen Kampf mit der Welt und sich selbst offenbart. Dagegen in Eurem ruhigen und anmuthigen Wesen die Stätigkeit beider und ihre innere Einheit ans Licht tritt."

[82] Ibid., 69: "Fangen die freuden des Menschen der Besinnung über sich und die Welt gekommen ist, der Gott gefunden hat, mit Streit und Krieg an, mit der Vertilgung nicht des Bösen, sondern . . . das Kindliche?" Tice's translation reflects Schleiermacher's later editing of this passage to clarify its meaning.

and adulthood together, maintaining both poles despite 'struggle and conflict.'[83] Throughout these exchanges in section one, childlikeness and adulthood function as concrete means to pursue a discussion of the relationship between feeling and reasoning capacities in human development.

Before considering the necessity of childlikeness in adults, Schleiermacher offers a vignette of childlikeness in Sofie.[84] The role of Sofie's piety (as part of her *Bildung*) becomes the focus of discussion in section one, her interactions with the company portraying the realm of receptive feeling (in contrast to active reasoning).[85] The ensuing conversation of the necessity of both childlikeness and adulthood rests on this elaboration of childlikeness in Sofie.

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[83] The discussion occurs in the context of the difference in how men and women reach adulthood. Whereas men strive to bring reflective and non-reflective elements into a unity, women reach adulthood with less effort, since they embrace these oppositional tendencies more naturally. Ibid., 70: ". . . in uns der Gegensatz des Unbewußten und des Besonnenen stärker hervortritt, und sich während des Ueberganges in jenem unruhigen Streben, jenem leidenschaftlichen Kampf mit der Welt und sich selbst offenbart. Dagegen in Eurem ruhigen und anmuthigen Wesen die Stätigkeit beider und ihre innere Einheit ans Licht tritt." Although the company agrees that the full spiritual development of humans requires the embrace of both the reflective realm (women's narrative's and men's speeches) *and* the realm of feeling (linked to childlike openness), the discussion preceding these comments present a lengthy assessment of the formation (*Bildung*) of the child, Sofie, without yet introducing the polar pair of childlikeness and adulthood. On my reading, Schleiermacher spends more time introducing this half of the dyad, because a) he uses the theme of childlikeness in a manner distinct from his Jena-Romantic friends' invocation of childlikeness in their writing, and b) childlikeness (the realm of feeling) receives less attention in late-eighteenth century theories of *Bildung*, which most often focus on the cultivation of reasoning capacities; thus, this preliminary emphasis on childlikeness (feeling) provides a needed counterweight to the role of reason in *Bildung*.

[84] Readers of *Christmas Eve* have long noted the implausibility of Schleiermacher's portrayal of Sofie: Sofie is precocious and often saccharine in her interactions with the adults. The stilted feel of Sofie's character is not a consequence of the datedness of the piece, as even some of Schleiermacher's contemporary readers found Sofie an almost insufferable character. See Rahel Varnhagen's 1816 letter on her thoughts on *Christmas Eve* in *Briefwechsel mit Ludwig Robert*, ed. Consolina Vigliero (München: C.H. Beck, 2001), 142-143. Schleiermacher had not had much experience with children at this point in his life. Sofie represents for him an *ideal* of childlikeness, and her role in *Christmas Eve* is to represent open and receptive religious feeling in an unadulterated form. Sofie's character portrays an idealized realm of feeling, for which an accompanying realm of reasoning has not developed fully.

[85] In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher defines piety (*Frömmigkeit*; *Pietät*), as "moral consciousness of the relationship of the individual to the whole" (*NE*, 148; *BE*, 134: "Das sittliche Bewußtein von dem Verhältniß des Einzelnen zum Ganzen ist Pietät"). Schleiermacher names this state of consciousness as a feeling (*Gefühl*) (*NE*, 148-149; *BE*, 134-135).

Sofie's childlike openness represents as example of a pureness of piety—she expresses religiosity not out of compulsion, but, as is the practice in their extended family unit, "when the mood strikes," her piety depicted as springing directly from indwelling religious feeling (*Gefühl*).[86] The feeling, itself, as well as Sofie's participation in the community's presentation of feeling (singing, worship) arises naturally, without a process of reasoned reflection on Sofie's part. Thus, Caroline asserts that Sofie exhibits "that childlike attitude . . . without which one cannot enter into the Kingdom of God. It is simply to accept each mood [*Stimmung*] and feeling [*Gefühl*] for itself and to desire only to have them pure and whole" (*CE*, 53).[87] Sofie clarifies this childlike state of receptivity when Leonhardt asks her to reflect upon which emotional state she prefers, happiness or sadness.[88] She at first says only that she doesn't "particularly favor one or the other," stating that, "I always just like to be whatever I am at the moment" (*CE*, 52).[89] What she appears to mean by this enigmatic statement is that she does not like to sort out her emotions; she likes to accept what arises without reflection.[90]

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[86] This approach to the cultivation of Sofie's religiosity replicates that of the adult community. As Eduard states, "there is no formalism of a religious sort in our family circle, . . . [but everything is done only when the mood strikes us]" (*CE*, 39). *DW*, 54: ". . . es gar nichts Förmliches Religiöses in unserm Kreise giebt, . . . sondern Alles nur wenn es uns so zu Muth ist." My own partial translation of the passage appears in brackets. Tice reads, "but that everything like this is done only as the spirit leads." Tice's phrasing has a connotation of religious inspiration, which narrows the meaning of the German.

[87] Ibid., 68: "Das hat sie uns doch deutlich gezeigt, . . . welches der Kindersinn ist, ohne den man nicht ins Reich Gottes kommen kann; eben dies, jede Stimmung un jedes Gefühl für sich hinnehmen und nur rein und ganz haben wollen."

[88] Through his questioning, Leonhardt hopes to elicit proof that Sofie's piety simply operates according to the emotions associated with religious feeling. That is, he believes that she yearns to be happy and will pursue religious activities with the purpose of creating this happiness, instead of pursuing religious activities (like singing) because of a natural swelling of pious feeling that leads her to them. Presumably, with this information in hand, he could then argue that Sofie places the locus of religion in those external elements rather than internally—a practice that he believes fundamentally misinterprets religion.

[89] Ibid., 67: ". . . ich bin beides nicht außerordentlich gern; aber am liebsten wäre ich immer das, was ich jedesmal bin."

[90] See the discussion of joy and sorrow below for further comment.

Although the company reflects upon the development of Sofie's piety, Sofie, herself lacks that capacity. Leonhardt continues to press Sofie to discuss her emotional states to no avail. Sofie cannot comprehend the analytical mode of expression with which Leonhardt approaches her. She finally turns to her mother for help, insisting, "I don't understand at all what he is getting at. Let him ask the grownups, for they will certainly know better how to answer him" (*CE*, 52).[91] As Ernestine reminds Leonhardt, Sofie has not yet the aptitude to reflect comparatively upon her own life experiences.[92] Children lack developed analytical skills, depending upon the use of reason by the adults around them.[93] Within the extended family unit, Sofie can participate in the oscillations between religious feeling and the presentation of feeling with ease, but she is not yet old enough to analyze this process; i.e., she is not yet old enough to move beyond participation in communal presentations of feeling to the analytical presentation of her own feeling.[94]

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[91] Ibid., 68: ". . . ich verstehe gar nicht was er eigentlich will. Laß ihn lieber die Großen fragen, die werden ihn ja besser verstehen."

[92] Ibid., 68: ". . . sie ist eben noch gar nicht in dem Geschikk des Vergleichens mit ihrem Leben." These observations parallel, to some extent, the young (androgynous) girl Mignon in Goethe's *Wilhelm Meister*. Sofie lacks the reflective capacity necessary for full formation at this time, just as Mignon struggles with the 'book-learning' that Wilhelm wants to incorporate into her *Bildung* (see above, chapter one). Sofie and Mignon are not "barred" from *Bildung*, but they have not developed the reflective capacity necessary to participate fully in a process of formation.

[93] The role of family in Sofie's *Bildung* Schleiermacher's assertion in the *Brouillon* that "the child's indwelling reason is also initially part of the communal reason. . . . [T]he parents will have formed [*gebildet*] organic capacities in the child, capacities that depended on them and . . . these organic capacities of the child are always partially to be seen as their [the family's] own extended organs" (*NE*, 85). *BE*, 61-62: ". . . ihre einwohnende vernunft ist auch zuers ein Theil der gemeinschaftlichen. . . . haben sie [die Eltern] also organische Vermögen gebildet, die von ihnen abhingen . . . die also immer zum Theil als ihre erweiterten Organe anzusehn sind." The child has an indwelling capacity for reason that, at first, is exercised as part of the communal reason of the family. In this way, parents cultivate the use of reason in their children, but they do not thereby inculcate reason or feeling, which remain 'indwelling capacities' that need only the appropriate familial setting to flourish.

[94] The examples of Sofie's singing and her diorama appear to contradict Schleiermacher's argument in the *Brouillon* that the presentation of feeling occurs through reason. Schleiermacher notes, however, that children partake of the "communal reason" of their family. Thus, Sofie can participate in presentations of feeling, but she cannot yet analyze these presentations of feeling alone (without the help of her family). Her nascent use of reason remains unreflective, as Agnes suggests in her assessment of Sofie's perfect

b. Discussion of Childlikeness in Adults

In addition to Leonhardt's concerns about the free rein given to Sofie's expressions of piety, Eduard's reference to adult religious converts "acting like children" clarifies the need for the embrace of both a childlike *and* an adult attitude: he denounces the tendency among some converts to grasp zealously at their new experiences without additionally applying reflection and analysis to these activities (*CE*, 41; *DW*, 56). Their attitudes are open and childlike to a fault: they leave reason to the side, unreflectively demonizing their old religiosity and idealizing their new religiosity, and in this type of repentance, Eduard insists, "something of their sin ever remains" (*CE*, 41).[95] For Eduard, such sin consists in forgetting to apply the analytical tools one possesses in adulthood to one's childlike attitude of receptivity.

Agnes makes the inverse point, again concluding that both childlike receptivity and adult reflection must work together in one's development, but stressing that one should not lose one's childlike attitude upon reaching adulthood. Agnes urges them to consider: "Is it really true that our first objects of delight as children have to be dropped behind before we can attain to higher [adult] things? May there not be a way of attaining these [higher things] without letting the first go?" (*CE*, 54)[96] Agnes puts this question to the men who have just been speaking, bringing the discussion back to the point Karoline had made before the men's exchange: Karoline had related that, "Only yesterday I was saying that my [adult] capacity for lively enjoyment [lively joy; *lebhafter Freude*] is as

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arrangement of key elements of her diorama. Sofie, she feels, "represented" the play of light in the diorama in an "unconscious, childlike" way (*DW*, 78 "in unbewußtem kindlichen Sinn Sofie dargestellt hat"). I use my own translation here, as Tice's obscures the reference to "unconsciousness," which removes the statement from its clear link to the discussion of the feeling/reason dyad in the piece. Tice reads: "which Sophie has represented in the innocent manner of a child" (*CE*, 63).

[95] *DW*, 56: ". . . in ihrer Buße immer etwas von der Sünde zurükbleibt."

[96] Ibid., 69: "Müssen denn die ersten kindlichen Gegenstände der Freude verloren gehen, damit man die höheren gewinne? Sollte es nicht eine Art geben, diese zu gewinnen, ohne jene fahren zu lassen."

great as ever it was [in childhood], in fact greater" (*CE*, 53).[97] Together, Karoline and Agnes frame the discussion of childlikeness by stressing that childlikeness is not just for children—or for women.[98] The embrace of adulthood and childlikeness is possible, and indeed, necessary, but as Ernestine asserts above (an assertion to which the entire company acquiesces), such embrace is more difficult for men than for women.

Eduard clarifies men's difficulty in embracing childlike and adult attitudes by noting that women balance "the spontaneous [unconscious] and the reflective" (*des Unbewußten und des Besonnenen*) more naturally than men in the move from childhood to adulthood (*CE*, 55; *DW*, 70). This unconsciousness, as Sofie models as a childlike quality, is a general receptivity to all that one encounters. As Karoline states of children, they "accept each mood and feeling [*Gefühl*] for itself and . . . desire only to have them pure and whole" (*CE*, 53).[99] It is, then, an unimpeded openness to the experience of feeling. Of course, the 'feeling' with which the company remains most concerned is religious feeling. As Eduard asks rhetorically, "what is the festival of the childhood of Jesus other than the distinct recognition of the immediate union of the divine with childlike?"[100]

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[97] Ibid.: "Nur gestern noch mußte ich mich wundern über die Verwunderung von einigen, denen ich behauptete, ich wäre jezt noch eben so lebhafter Freude fähig, nur mehrerer."

[98] Karoline and Agnes's contributions to the conversation do reflect a continued association of women with childlikeness: women, it appears, naturally tend towards childlike receptivity and must embrace analytical skills as well, whereas men naturally tend towards analytical attitudes and must strive to embrace childlike receptivity.

[99] Ibid., 68: "Das hat sie uns doch deutlich gezeigt, . . . welches der Kindersinn ist, ohne den man nicht ins Reich Gottes kommen kann; eben dies, jede Stimmung und jedes Gefühl für sich hinnehmen und nur rein und ganz haben wollen."

[100] I use my own translation here, as Tice reads the term "*Kindheit*" as "infancy" and "*Kindlichen*" as "the being of the child," which unnecessarily removes the vocabulary of childlikeness from the statement. Tice reads: ". . . what is the celebration of Jesus' infancy but the distinct acknowledgement of the immediate union of the divine with the being of a child" (*CE*, 55). *DW*, 71: ". . . was ist die Feier der Kindheit Jesu anders als die deutliche Anerkennung der unmittelbaren Vereinigung des Göttlichen mit dem Kindlichen."

The embrace of this joyful receptivity and pro-active thoughtfulness defines a fully-cultivated Christian, as the company concludes among much jesting over whether men or women can be said to be more Christian by these standards (*CE*, 55-56; *DW*, 70-71). Adults, then, should continue to practice childlike openness, but combine it with reflection, as well. Eduard describes the writer of the Gospel of John in these terms: First, he insists that, "in [the Gospel writer's] heart prevails an everlasting childlike Christmas joy" (*CE*, 82).[101] Eduard immediately follows this statement with reference to gospel writer's more abstract and philosophical approach to the story of Christmas, stating that the John "gives us the higher, spiritual [or intellectual (*geistige*)] view of our festival" (*CE*, 82).[102] The gospel writer embraces an internal attitude both of childlike joy and of 'higher' reflection. Only in this combination, do Christians reach full maturity.

c. Childlikeness and Gender

As we saw above, the discussion of childlikeness in *Christmas Eve* also overlaps with the discussion of the differences between men and women (a polarity addressed in more depth, below), as the company debates how men and women move on separate paths from childhood to adulthood. Not surprisingly, the discussion of the openness and receptivity of children in *Christmas Eve* parallels characterizations of women as childlike, receptive, and passive creatures common to this era, and to the Jena Romantics. Whereas adult and childlike attitudes reflect polarity in terms of reason and feeling, male and female polarity represents a dyadic split based on the differing approaches men and women use to *integrate* the realm of feeling (subjective knowing) into the realm of reason

[101] Ibid., 94: ". . . in dessen Gemüth aber eine ewige kindliche Weihnachtsfreude herrscht."
[102] Ibid.: "Dieser giebt uns die geistige und höhere Ansicht unseres Festes."

(objective knowing), bringing the two realms into a relation of dyadic oscillation.[103] In *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher depicts as necessary for human formation *both* the preservation in adulthood of a gender-neutral childlike realm *and* the development of clearly gendered realms of reflection and analysis of knowledge.[104] The talent of the women in *Christmas Eve* is that their "female" ways of reflecting upon their lives allow them to embrace without effort the attitudes of childlikeness and adulthood.[105] And the women in *Christmas Eve* are described, in consequence, as more easily balancing childlike receptivity and adult reflection as they reach adulthood—they possess a talent for employing both feeling and reason in the activity of *oscillation*.

On my reading, the point Schleiermacher makes is less about women's association with childlikeness, and more about women's gender-specific approach to reflection—a facility for reflection that, as Schleiermacher describes in the example of Sofie, children lack. Gender polarity develops particularly along the lines of different

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[103] Thus, while Schleiermacher continues to make comments, both in the *Brouillon* and in *Christmas Eve* that associate women with the realm of feeling and men with the realm of reason, the more basic division consists not in their ability to experience these realms, but in how their gendered ways of approaching *Bildung* shape the way they bring these realms into relationship.

[104] S.K. Seung, *Goethe, Nietzsche, and Wagner: Their Spinozan Epics of Love and Power* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2006), 152, notes that this approach holds true, in particular, for Goethe, Schlegel, and Novalis. Richardson, *Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher*, 147-148, argues that childlikeness is not a gender-neutral realm, reading the children in *Christmas Eve* as reproducing the adult male/female polarity. This is one point where I disagree with Richardson's reading of *Christmas Eve* (see section on women and men, below).

[105] In Catriona MacLeod's study of the progression to a feminized androgyne in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century German literature, *Embodying Ambiguity: Androgyny and Aesthetics from Winckelmann to Keller* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998), she clarifies the ideals of childlikeness during the era as they intersect with femininity. A discussion of Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve* could well have accompanied her readings of Goethe's *Meister* and Schlegel's *Lucinde*. MacLeod's thesis surrounds the connection between androgyny and *Bildung*: She asserts that the progressive "metamorphosis of Winckelmann's [mid-eighteenth century] beautiful boy androgyne into the [early-nineteenth century] female androgyne . . . has important implications for the notion of *Bildung*" in German narratives of *Bildung* (46). She notes that critics consistently view Winckelmann's earlier and more gender-neutral androgyne as both capable of *Bildung* and as harmonizing the faculties necessary for *Bildung* (i.e., helpful as a model for the reader's *Bildung*). But, she continues, "[t]he later [feminized] androgynes, now posed in a heterosexual relationship based on difference and complementarity, tend, like other female characters, to be barred from development; instead, they facilitate the progress of the male hero of the *Bildungsroman*, static stages along the path of male development" (46). In *Meister* and *Lucinde*, MacLeod traces the role of this shifting presentation of androgyny in the literary marginalization of female *Bildung*.

ways of knowing and communicating knowledge. For Schleiermacher, the embrace of the two opposing internal attitudes of childlikeness (receptive feeling) and adulthood (analytical reason) does not fully describe the cultivated Christian. In addition, formation occurs through interactions with one's community, demanding reciprocity of knowledge that *Christmas Eve* presents in the embrace of dipolar male and female perspectives. The following sections will first explore joy and sorrow, which builds upon the focus on childlikeness (feeling), and will then turn to the female/male dyad, which focuses on the communication of knowledge (reason).

4. Joy and Sorrow: Emotional Polarity and Its Relationship to Feeling.

In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher refers to multiple 'oscillations of life,' and the structure of related dyads in *Christmas Eve* elaborates the manner in which these oscillations function within an extended family unit.[106] This section considers how joy and sorrow function as a polar dyad that provides a further subset of oscillation that develops in relation to *feeling*.

a. Emotions and Feeling (*Gefühl*)

As Schleiermacher writes in his *Brouillon*, "emotion [*Gemüthsbewegung*] is necessarily connected with feeling [*Gefühl*]," but not synonymously; instead, emotions are the "reaction of feeling," or its "effects" (*NE*, 124-125).[107] Emotions make feeling concrete (*NE*, 124; *BE*, 106). Thus, although the Christmas festival finds its emotional focus in joy, it points towards religious feeling through the polar relationship between joy

[106] Oscillation occurs, for example, in knowledge (*NE*, 49), in the way communities relate (ibid., 95), in the relationship between the individual and the community (ibid., 97), and more abstractly, in the relationship between the universal and the particular (ibid., 100).

[107] *BE*, 106: ". . . was man Effekt nennt, ist nicht mehr das Gefühl allein, sondern die Reaction des Gefühls, die Gemüthsbewegung. Diese ist freilich mit jenem nothwendig verbunden."

and sorrow.[108] Invoking an emotional polarity (joy and sorrow) helps Schleiermacher to emphasize that no one emotion can capture the participation of feeling in the process of human formation: the oscillation between emotions points to feeling as 'something higher,' just as the oscillation between feeling and reason points to the immediate relation of universal and particular.

By introducing an emotional dyad, Schleiermacher distinguishes his theory of *Bildung* in two ways: 1) he broadens the emotions that the Schlegel and Novalis associated with *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum* and in their novels; and 2) he uses polarity, which in the *Athenaeum* always serves to propel one to a higher vantage point for reflection, to move his characters and the reader beyond the realm of reflection altogether; i.e., to the realm of religious feeling (*Gefühl*).

b. Contextual Basis for Joy and Sorrow

The choice of joy and sorrow, in particular, has roots in Schleiermacher's personal experiences that autumn. Schleiermacher wrote *Christmas Eve* just months after Eleanor Grunow had called off their plans for marriage. He was emerging from a time of great personal sorrow, but as Richard Niebuhr notes, Schleiermacher continued to return to the theme of sorrow and joy *together* during this period. Niebuhr quotes from a letter Schleiermacher wrote at the time to his friends, the von Willichs: "with such friends as all

[108] In *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher continues to develop his understanding of *Gefühl* (feeling), so central in *The Christian Faith*, but places greater emphasis in *Christmas Eve* on the "effects" of feeling – emotion. The vocabulary used for emotion varies, and can often be translated as feeling. Along these lines, the company discusses Sofie's piety in terms of her expression of multiple emotions (*Regungen*), which Leonhardt insists tend to the extreme and her parents insist are completely unconscious and natural (*DW*, 54). In addition to the term *Regungen* ("feelings") to describe the emotional content of Sofie's piety, he also uses *Empfindung* (feeling, sensation) to denote the same role as *Gefühl* in religiosity, having Eduard assert that humans' "higher self-consciousness" can occur either in the realm of cognition (*Erkenntniß*) or in the realm of feeling/sensation (*Empfindung*). I have noted throughout when the term *Gefühl* occurs, which remains distinct from other terms that could also be translated as 'feeling,' but for Schleiermacher have a different connotation, according to his understanding of the difference between feeling/*Gefühl* and emotions as the reactions of feeling.

of you are to me, it is simply not possible that I should be defeated by any kind of grief; it must leave room for joy." Niebuhr then comments, "The motifs of friendship, joy and sorrow often combined themselves in his mind during these days, and more than once Schleiermacher was evidently struck by the peculiar capacity of these moods to arise, apart from any special circumstance, and to exercise a transforming power upon his whole subjectivity."[109] Schleiermacher's break with Grunow at the time he wrote *Christmas Eve* elucidates both why Schleiermacher found joy and sorrow such a compelling polarity and why he would use this dyad to continue to move the process of human formation away from an emphasis on sexualized love.

c. Love as the Guiding Principle of Joy and Sorrow

Love, of all kinds, continues to play a thematic role in *Christmas Eve*. As Terrence Tice observes in his introduction to *Christmas Eve*, when Schleiermacher discusses love, he is "not, of course, speaking only of the deepest, 'romantic' love between a man and a woman, but of all love."[110] Tice believes that love "is important for understanding both the arrangement of the *Christmas Eve* dialogue and its message," because Schleiermacher defines love through "the mutual involvement of persons. Without it, a man's nature is divided in two. He cannot become a whole person."[111] In this sense, *all* of the interactions in *Christmas Eve* between the characters—men and women and children—reflect Schleiermacher's theory of love as relational activity that propels humans toward the fullness of human nature.

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[109] Niebuhr, *On Christ and Religion*, 22-23.
[110] Tice, "Introduction," *CE*, 17.
[111] Ibid. Tice bases his position on Schleiermacher's statements on love in his *Confidential Letters on Friedrich Schlegel's Lucinde*, which he argues Schleiermacher "never abandoned" in the course of his scholarly career.

For Schleiermacher, then, love functions in *Christmas Eve* not as a simple emotion, but as a guiding principle for human activity. Schleiermacher's work on ethics just before he begins the *Brouillon* confirms this assessment of love and clarifies that for Schleiermacher love is not just the connective activity for relationships of all kinds: In his *Theory of Virtue* (1804/1805), Schleiermacher defines love as "the real principle of all moral action" and "of all actual moral development" (*NE*, 201).[112] As such, love finds expression as "the work of a community" and is also the "product" of the community, "woven into it [the community] as the feeling of what is right [*Rechtsgefühl*] or piety [*Pietät*]" (*NE*, 201-202). Love, then, is neither a simple emotion, nor is it synonymous with feeling; instead love functions as a way-of-being-in-relation that operates as a guiding principle in the realm of feeling. Indeed, as the "feeling of what is right [*Rechtsgefühl*]," love acts as the moral arm of feeling, bringing humans into right relationship with each other, with God, and with the world.

Joy and sorrow are emotions that operate in *Christmas Eve* under the auspices of love as a guiding principle. In this sense, they are reactions of feeling that are guided by the principle of love and thereby 'woven into' the moral development of the community. In *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher builds upon the traditional model for the embrace of joy and sorrow in Christian life in the experience of Mary, whose joy at the birth of Jesus mingles with her sorrow at his death (as in the famous depiction of the *Pietà* by Michelanglo). Maternal love serves as the framework for the interplay of these emotions,

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[112] The translation of the *Theory of Virtue* by Tice appears with Wallhausser's translation of the *Notes on Ethics*, since the two works together comprise the material for Schleiermacher's various courses on ethics given at Halle during his tenure there (1804-1806). I have referred only to the *Brouillon* up to this point, because the *Brouillon* lectures are concurrent with the actual composition of *Christmas Eve*. Schleiermacher's clearest definition of love, however, occurs in the context of his previous lectures on virtue. With Tice, I hold that Schleiermacher's theory of love remains consistent, and thus it does not shift during his writing of the *Brouillon* and *Christmas Eve*.

so that, throughout *Christmas Eve*, love is not simply an emotion alongside joy and sorrow, but the guiding principle for the moral (relational) expression of emotions. Love is what ensures that emotions, as the reactions of feeling, participate in the right-development of individuals in community. These connections between feeling, love, and emotions frame and understanding of the joy/sorrow dyad as it finds expression in *Christmas Eve*.

d. Discussion of Joy and Sorrow in *Christmas Eve*

Though the *embrace* of joy and sorrow recurs in *Christmas Eve*, the company's discussion in the first section begins by considering joy, in itself. Ernst suggests that those whose lives hold particular joys at the moment experience a more heartfelt joy in the *Christmas* festival. He is certain that he and his betrothed, Friederika, as well as Agnes, who is expecting a child, feel a more intense joy than the others. Eduard protests that such intense joy "never grows old. It can always be aroused anew" (*CE*, 36).[113] He continues, chiding Ernst,

> Can you regard Ernestine's feeling [*Gefühl*] at our Sophie's expression of childish [childlike; *kindlicher*] devotion and piety as something comparatively indifferent? Or isn't it true that you can look at it with liveliest imagination, in which past, present, and future are all intertwined? Just see how deeply moved she is, in what a sea of purest happiness she bathes. (*CE*, 36)[114]

Eduard's point is that people can feel the most intense joy at any time, regardless of their circumstances.

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[113] *DW*, 51: ". . . etwas nie Veraltendes und immer Erregbares ist. "

[114] Ibid.: "Oder kannst du dir Ernestinens Gefühl bei dem Ausdruck kindlicher Andacht und tiefer Innigkeit in unserer Sofie als etwas Gleichgültiges, kannst du es ohne die lebendigste Tätigkeit der Phantasie denken, in welcher Gegenwart, Vergangenheit un Zukunft sich umschlingen? Sieh nur, wie sie im Innern bewegt ist, wie sie in einem Meere der reinsten Glückseligkeit badet."

Eduard also suggests above that the expression of religious feeling in another can 'move' one to such joy. Schleiermacher argues similarly in the *Brouillon*, that emotion, as a "reaction of feeling," presents the original feeling in such a way that "the feeling of another is to be stimulated" (*NE*, 124; *BE*, 105).[115] Ernestine's feeling (*Gefühl*) is evoked by Sofie's piety, and the company see the reaction to this feeling, which is expressed emotionally: she "bathes" in "a sea of purest happiness." With this introduction to the feeling evoked by Sofie's piety and its consequent, visible emotional effect, Eduard also intimates the complexity of Ernestine's feeling (*Gefühl*): such joyfulness is an imaginative activity "in which present, past, and future are all intertwined." Ernestine's bliss as she admires Sofie's "childlike devotion" is not simple happiness.

Similarly, when the company discusses the meaning of Christmas, marked by the "feeling of childhood" (*Gefühl der Kindheit*)[116] and "serene joy" (*heitre Freude*) that Ernestine's arrangement evokes, Karoline clarifies that particular expressions of emotion are "enhanced" ("*erhöht*") by the "higher, more universal joy," or "religious joy" ("*höhere allgemeinere Freude*;" "*religiösen Freude*") that stands behind such expression (*CE*, 45; *DW*, 62-63). Particular expressions of emotion would be part of the complex 'reaction of feeling' that Schleiermacher discusses in the *Brouillon*. As a result, Karoline continues, at the level of emotional expression, the higher religious feeling associated with joy entwines as well with sorrow. She observes, "I still clearly feel what has been very much a part of my own experience: I mean, even with the deepest pain this joy can blossom within us unhindered, can cleanse [purify; *reiniget*] and soothe the pain without

[115] The individual feeling that is presented in emotion is not, thereby, "transposed" to another, however. The feeling that is stimulated through such presentation is equally subjective and unique. See more on transposability in the *Brouillon* in chapter three, above.
[116] I use my own translation here, as Tice's masks the reference to the noun *Gefühl*, translating the phrase, "we . . . felt like children" (*CE*, 45).

being destroyed by it" (*CE*, 46).[117] Joy and sorrow are oppositional emotions, but reflective adults can embrace the two without destroying either, guided in emotional oscillation by the preceding and perduring religious feeling. One cannot simply equate the emotional expression of joy with religious feeling, and the dyadic oscillation of emotion (joy and sorrow) helps to maintain the distinction between the presentation of feeling in emotional expression and feeling (*Gefühl*), itself.[118]

Even Sofie, from her childlike perspective, upholds the interlacing of emotional polarities in human experience, though she is not yet able to reflect upon the feeling that underlies emotional polarity. When Leonhardt quizzes Sofie regarding her preference to be happy (*Lustig*) or sad (*Traurig*) in the context of Sofie's feeling of piety, he presents her the opportunity to reflect upon emotional polarities. Though she does not directly respond to Leonhardt's questioning, Schleiermacher does depict Sofie noting the interplay of emotional opposition. Sofie talks of her struggle with conflicting emotions when she attempts to answer Leonhardt's questions: "All I know," she insists, "is that sometimes gladness [*Lustigkeit*] and sorrow [sadness; *Traurigkeit*] get strangely mixed up and fight each other" (*CE*, 52).[119] From her childlike perspective, which has yet to develop analytically, Sofie notes both the simultaneous occurrence and the conflict between happiness and sadness. Lacking the mature analytic skills to reflect upon this

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[117] *DW*, 63: "ich fühle es noch lebhaft, wie ich es schon einmal erlebt habe, daß auch neben dem tiefsten Schmerz jene Freude ungehindert in uns aufblüht, und daß sie ihn reiniget und besänftiget, ohne von ihm gestört zu werden."

[118] Overall, Schleiermacher's theoretical distinction between feeling and emotion in the *Brouillon* persists in *Christmas Eve*. However, colloquial vocabulary for the communication of emotion, which involves references to the "feeling of joy" ("*Gefühl der Freude*"), can muddy this distinction in the text at certain points.

[119] Ibid., 67: ". . . ich weiß weiter nicht, als daß bisweilen die Lustigkeit und die Traurigkeit so wunderlich durch einander gehn und sich streiten."

observation, Sofie simply relates that she experiences a sense of anxiety when polar emotions conflict within her.

The adults, however, do reflect more on the conflict of emotions, and they find an underlying unity in the realm of feeling. As Ernestine points out, drawing on the model of Mary and Jesus, "Mary's pain [*Schmerz*] could not but vanish in her feeling [*Gefühl*] for the divine eminence and glory of her son, just as from the very beginning, in view of her faith and her hopes, everything which externally confronted him could only appear to her as suffering, as separation [self-emptying; *Entäußerung*] (*CE*, 68).[120] Ernestine suggests that the dyad of joy and sorrow finds a model in the life of Mary and her relationship to her son, undergirded by Mary's "feeling [*Gefühl*]" for his "divine eminence." And just as joy in his life and in his divinity always mingles with sorrow in his human death, so too the Christmas festival embraces both elements.[121]

Schleiermacher consistently depicts joy and sorrow entwined, so that even during a festival associated with joy, sorrow has its place alongside joy. A fully cultivated person can embrace these conflicting emotions and also use them as a means of reflecting upon the religious feeling (*Gefühl*) that continues unabated beyond the individual emotions that exist only as 'effects' of feeling. This model of religiosity finds expression both in the maternal figures in the women's narratives as well as in the overarching movement between joy and sorrow *between* the narratives.

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[120] Ibid., 82: "Mariens Schmerz mußte doch verschwinden in dem Gefühl der göttlichen Größe und Herrlichkeit ihres Sohnes; so wie ihr auf der andern Seite von Anbeginn an bei ihrem Glauben und ihren Hofnungen Alles, was ihm äußerlich begegnete, nur als Leiden, als Entäußerung erscheinen konnte."

[121] Though the emotional polarity finds its model in Mary, I do not conclude an exclusive link between the realm of feeling and women. For example, the attitude of childlikeness, associated with feeling, finds its model in both a male (Jesus) and a female (Sofie). Overall, the realm of feeling in *Christmas Eve* is applied to both genders. The distinction between male and female, I will maintain in the next section, occurs in the way feeling and reason are incorporated as "oscillating elements" in the pursuit of "higher consciousness." Women excel in the oscillation between feeling and reason, whereas men's forceful striving in their ways of knowing impairs this oscillation.

The oscillation of joy and sorrow between the narratives of the second section begins with Ernestine's joyous depiction of a mother and son in church, but has a sad ending as she relates the death of the child, just as he reached manhood. Agnes' narrative then moves back to the joyous element, depicting the presentation of gifts and the baptism of a new baby. In this way, the central narrative focuses on joy, as does the Christmas festival itself. In the third narrative, Karoline explicitly states that she will shift back to the pole of "woefulness" (*Wehmuth*), but will end her tale by returning to the state of joy. These alternations between joy and sorrow in the course of the narratives allow section two, as a whole, to hold the two oppositional tendencies together: the joy related in each narrative finds a polar counterpoint in an experience of maternal sorrow either within that narrative or within another narrative.

Within the individual narratives, models of the embrace of joy and sorrow abound. In the first narrative, Ernestine describes how as a young girl she observed the mother whom she sees in the church "display gladness one moment, then dejection [*bald lächelnd bald schwermüthig*]" (*CE*, 58).[122] The mother and her baby act as "living figures of the beautiful pictures of Mary and the child," and in this way, the mother's embrace of joy and sorrow embodies the model of Mary.[123] Ernestine, then, encountered a model at a very young age of this embrace of joy and sorrow. The encounter marks the beginning of Ernestine's development of her own "inner being" ("*inneres Sein*") as the woman she meets becomes a guide in her formation from childhood to adulthood (*CE*, 59; *DW*, 73).

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[122] Ibid., 73: "Ihre Mine schien mir bald lächelnd bald schwermüthig."
[123] Ibid.: "lebendige Gestalten zu den schönen Bildern von Maria und dem Kinde." I use my own translation here to avoid Tice's overly-complex one, which reads: ". . . an artist's picture of Mary and child in living exemplar" (*CE*, 58).

Karoline presents another account of a Mary-figure embracing joy and sorrow, as introduced above. Ernst notes explicitly how this relationship of mother and child in the tale replicates that of Mary and Jesus, asking Leonhardt whether he finds in the story "an inverted Mary, as it were, who begins with the most profound maternal suffering, the Stabat Mater, and ends with rejoicing over the divine child" (*CE*, 67).[124] In contrast to Ernestine's narrative, however, Karoline's narrative proceeds from an adult perspective, so that the model of Mary is no longer simply visual, but also includes verbal reflection on the embrace of emotion. Karoline's friend explains to her, "Good child, there is no more beautiful and also no more appropriate frame for a great sorrow [*Schmerz*] than a string of small joys [*Freuden*] that one prepares for others."[125] Though devastated by the expected death of her sick child, the mother continues to prepare for the Christmas festival, holding both joy and pain together in her experience.[126]

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[124] *DW*, 82: "eine umgekehrte Maria, die mit dem tiefsten Mutterleiden, mit dem Stabatmater anfängt und mit der Freude an dem göttlichen Kinde endigt?" The relational embrace of earthly and divine in both Ernestine and Karoline's depictions of earthly mother and divine child continue to build an understanding of the activity of embracing polarities as an oscillation: the mother-and-child tales hold both a oneness of spirit in the mother/child bond and a sense of separation as each mother must grapple with the death of the child. This relational embrace will receive further treatment in the discussion of joy and sorrow, below.

[125] Ibid., 80: "Gutes Kind, es giebt keinen schöneren und auch keinen schiklicheren Rahmen um einen großen Schmerz, als eine Kette von kleinen Freuden, die man Andern bereitet." I have used my own translation here, as Tice's obscures the vocabulary of joy and sorrow. Tice reads: "My very good friend, there is no finer or more befitting frame to put about a painful burden than a chain of small pleasures prepared for others" (*CE*, 66).

[126] Having given Karoline this insight into her emotional state as she watches her son die, the mother in the tale then embodies her inner turmoil: at one point the mother of the sick child undergoes "a fierce struggle" internally ("*einen innern Kampf*"), and "for an hour she paced up and down, up and down, with the child in her arms, to all appearances in utter agony" (*CE*, 66; *DW*, 80: "Tief in sich gekehrt ging sie wol eine Stunde mit allen Zeichen der innersten Bewegung, das Kind in dem Arme, auf und nieder."). The physical activity reflects the internal struggle: the mother wrestling with the impending death of her child paces in an oscillating manner, first one way and then the other. After an hour of this activity, the mother lays down the child and says to Karoline, "now I have overcome [*überstanden*] it. . . . I now look calmly for his death, . . . I can even wish to see him soon depart, so that the marks of pain and ruin may not distort the angelic picture which has impressed itself so deeply and irrevocably upon my soul [*Gemüth*]" (*CE*, 66; *DW*, 80: "Nun habe ich es überstanden . . . . ich sehe nun ruhig seiner Auflösung entgegen . . . . ja ich kann wünschen, ihn bald verscheiden zu sehen, damit die Zeichen des Schmerzens und der Zerstörung mir das Engelsbild nicht trüben, das sich tief und für immer meinem Gemüth eingeprägt hat."). The mother's episode of anxious, agonized pacing mirrors Sofie's anxious pacing at the beginning of *Christmas Eve*, which also reflects an inner struggle (for Sofie, between expectant joy, and agony at its delay). As a child,

Karoline's narrative depicts a process of oscillation between the joy of love and the agony of loss, which ends in acceptance of both. That is, Karoline's friend accepts as part of her maternal emotional experience both the 'angelic picture' of her son that will always bring her joy and the his 'pain and ruin' in death, which will always bring her sorrow. The activity of "overcoming," or transcendence, does not propel the mother beyond joy and sorrow to some third (either emotion-less or uni-emotional) position. Though she views the joy and sorrow from a higher vantage, she does so to find a way of negotiating within them.

The depiction of the embrace of joy and sorrow in Karoline's narrative, as well as Ernestine's more subdued depiction of such embrace, provide a contrast to the 'conflict-and-transcendence' model associated with the function of polarity in *Bildung* in the *Athenaeum*. Schleiermacher emphasizes female models for the embrace of joy and sorrow, because, as the company agrees in section one, women possess a "calm, graceful nature" that focuses on the "continuity and inner unity" of oppositions, whereas men tend towards "restless striving" and "passionate conflict" (*CE*, 55).[127] Women are better at embracing polarity, in general. This aptitude for embracing dyads works at multiple levels: Women have a greater ability to maintain a sense of childlikeness (a link to the realm of feeling). In turn, this embrace of the realm of feeling makes them natural models for the embrace of polar emotions (the reactions of feeling). In line with section three's one-sided philosophical approach, the men's speeches that follow the women's

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however, Sofie cannot reflect upon or resolve her state of inner emotional conflict, and she finally sits in a corner with her head in her hands.

[127] *DW*, 70: ". . . in uns [Männer] der Gegensaz des Unbewußten und des Besonnenen stärker hervortritt, und sich während des Ueberganges in jenem unruhigen Streben, jenem leidenschaftlichen Kampf mit der Welt und sich selbst offenbart. Dagegen in Eurem [Frauen] ruhigen und anmuthigen Wesen die Stätigkeit beider und ihre innere Einheit ans Licht tritt."

narratives reflect upon religiosity analytically without evoking religious feeling, and the discussion of the joy/sorrow dyad recedes.

Ernst does, in his speech, explore Christmas as a festival whose purpose is to evoke universal joy, but without stressing the embrace of sorrow as well (*DW*, 91-92). The absence of sorrow accords with his presentation of the joy of redemption as a dissolution of oppositions. For Ernst, Christmas joy celebrates, in particular, human redemption, which Ernst insists is a movement out of "discord and division." Redemption, Ernst states, "is precisely nothing other than the removal of these oppositions."[128] Such joy is the source of all other joys. Whereas Schleiermacher portrays the women embracing oppositions naturally (both emotional oppositions and those that occur between feeling and reason), following the distinction of male and female natures in the first part of the narrative, he portrays Ernst finding redemption in the removal of his struggle with the embrace of oppositional tendencies. Ernst's one-sided focus on joy reflects men's difficulty with the embrace of oppositions, more generally.

At the end of the speeches, Josef returns the company to a focus on feeling by invoking joy, though his introduction of joy remains one-sided, as well. Reflecting the discussion of the difficulty that men have embracing polarities, both Josef and Ernst seem capable of introducing only one half of the polar pair of joy and sorrow. But in the context of the larger narrative, Ernst's speech and Josef's actions are fitting and benefit the formation of the familial community: though section three does not embrace joy and

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[128] Ibid., 92: "Das Leben und die Freude der ursprünglichen Natur, wo jene Gegensäze gar nicht vorkommen, zwischen der Erscheinung und dem Wesen, der Zeit und der Ewigkeit, ist nicht die unsrige. . . . Wir selbst fangen dagegen im Zwiespalt an, und gelangen erst zur Uebereinstimmung durch die Erlösung, die eben nichts anderes ist, als die Aufhebung jener Gegensätze."

sorrow together, Ernst's discussion of joy and Josef's heartfelt expression of joy find counterpoints in the sorrowful parts of the tales told by the women and serve to conclude a work about Christmas with the emphasis on the emotion most related to the festival. Within the larger structure of *Christmas Eve*, then, joy and sorrow are embraced together within the whole of the community's celebration.

e. Joy and Sorrow and the Romantic Emphasis on Sexualized Love

Joy and sorrow offer an emotional focus for *Bildung* that contrasts with the emphasis on love among the Jena Romantics, particularly Schlegel and Novalis. For both Schlegel and Novalis, the concrete literary models that they found for 'living poesy' developed in the idealization of a romantic love interest, so that, in Schlegel's *Lucinde*, Julius and Lucinde embody various polarities (active/passive; definite/indefinite; finite/infinite). The physical and emotional relationship of Julius and Lucinde accomplishes the embrace of polarities that Julius needs to cultivate himself fully. So too, from the first pages of *Heinrich von Ofterndingen*, Heinrich's development is propelled by his yearning for the Blue Flower that contains the image of his beloved Mathilde. Schleiermacher, himself, had also emphasized love in his *Speeches*, stating that "To intuit the world and have religion, a human being must have found humanity, and he finds it only in love and through love."[129] But, as discussed above, Schleiermacher's focus on love eschewed the strict equation of love with sexualized love. Following this trend, in *Christmas Eve* romantic love is mentioned least when

[129] *SKGA*, I.2:228: ". . . um die Welt anzuschauen und um Religion zu haben, muß der Mensch erst die Menschheit gefunden haben, und er findet sie nur in Liebe und durch Liebe." See also ibid., I.2:221-222, where the link to sexual love is as explicit as publication guidelines of the era would allow.

Schleiermacher's characters introduce the topic of love.[130] Though Schleiermacher includes references to romantic bonds, parental love and the love between friends continue to displace an emphasis on sexualized love relationships.[131]

As a replacement for the Jena emphasis on sexualized love, the joy/sorrow polarity serves as a way of approaching the experience of religious feeling, which Schleiermacher depicts in *Christmas Eve* not as any particular human emotion, but as an animating swell of piety that incorporates multiple emotions as its "effects," as he defines emotions in the *Brouillon* in their relationship to feeling. Agnes argues in section one that religious feeling is neither joy nor sorrow: "The individual, the personal, be it future or present, joy or suffering [*Freude oder Leid*], can give or take so little from a nature that moves in pious moods, just as piercing notes, which only leave behind light traces, affect the progress of the harmony."[132] Joy and sorrow participate in a religious nature

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[130] Heterosexual love is only mentioned in section one, in the context of the affianced couple, Ernst and Friederike. Ernst upholds his happiness during the festival as greater because he is about to marry. But, at the same time, he also notes that all those about to experience a special event in their lives (like Agnes, who is expecting a baby and Leonhardt, who is about to begin a period of travel) share that level of happiness. Eduard and Ernestine argue vociferously to the contrary, however, that all people can share equally in the state of joy, no matter their personal situations at present.

[131] This expansion of the meaning of love continues Schleiermacher's ethical theory of love, which posits it as a guiding principle for emotional expression, rather than as a simple emotion. The love discussed most frequently in *Christmas Eve* is parental love, as suggested by the familial focus and the overarching relational model in the piece, Mary and Jesus. For example, Agnes asks Leonhardt at one point, "And do you believe, then, that love revolves around that into which we can form [*bilden*] a child? What can we form [*bilden*]? No, love revolves around the beautiful and divine, which we believe is already in them." *DW*, 66: "Und glaubst du denn, die Liebe geht auf das, wozu wir die Kinder bilden können? Was können wir bilden? Nein, sie geht auf das Schöne und Göttliche, was wir in ihnen schon glauben." And in section one, the discussion of ardor in love is immediately shifted away from heterosexual love and to parental love: Ernst imagines he and Friederike must experience the joy of the festival most ardently, since they are basking in their engagement to marry. Ernst immediately includes Agnes, who is expecting a child, in those who experience the joy of the festival more ardently. Then Eduard and Ernestine protest, and point to the deep love that Ernestine had just expressed for her daughter Sofie as proof that one need not be in the throes of a blossoming romantic relationship to experience the heights of love. This argument would have been one particularly close to Schleiermacher's own position, as the end of his engagement to Eleanor Grunow signaled for him the end of his hopes to ever marry (though he would go on to marry the widow of his close friend, von Willich, several years later).

[132] Ibid., 65: "Das Einzelne, das Persönliche, es sei nun Zukunft oder Gegenwart, Freude oder Leid, kann einem Gemüthe, das sich in frommen Stimmungen bewegt, so wenig geben oder nehmen, wie durchgehende Noten, die nur leichte Spuren zurüklassen, den Gang der Harmonie afficiren."

that embraces each as they occur in a greater whole of experience—pious moods are not simply composed of joy or sorrow, or even both together. Embracing both joy and sorrow, as with the embrace of polarity in Jena-Romantic *Bildung*, points one to something higher.

In Schlegel's articulation of this theory in the *Athenaeum*, such movement pushes one 'beyond oneself,' as a transcendence of polarity. In contrast, Schleiermacher uses the embrace of joy and sorrow as a "broadening," which draws one into community and connects community to the realm of feeling. Through emotional polarity, *Christmas Eve* demonstrates the range of human connections that afford the inter-personal love relationships necessary for the cultivation of human nature.

5. Gender Polarity and Complementary Knowledge: 'Each Becomes a Teacher for the Other'

Assessments of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century theories of polarity cannot avoid the topic of gender. Goethe, for instance, found sexual difference a fundamental basis for polarity, and for Schelling, the highest in the series of polar encounters necessary for human formation is sexual difference.[133] In a variety of ways, the male and female dyad plays a prominent role in the theories of polarity of the period. Schleiermacher's theory of polarity, though it includes gender, is not predicated upon

[133] The centrality of male/female polarity in eighteenth-century German aesthetic theory recently has found new life in connection to the work of Luce Irigaray. Though certainly not confined to Irigaray scholarship (the notion that the male and female polarity is the most fundament polarity in Goethe's theory has long been touted within the German literary tradition, see Inta Ezergailis, *Male and Female: An Approach to Thomas Mann's Dialectic* (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), 92), recent assessments of Irigaray have tied her theory of sexual difference to Goethe and Schelling's theories of polarity, in particular. See Alison Stone's discussion of Schelling's use of sexual difference in his theory of polarity in *Luce Irigaray and the Philosophy of Sexual Difference* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 204, and Elaine Miller's focus on Goethe's notion of polarity, which then influences Schelling in "Reconsidering Irigaray's Aesthetics" in *Returning to Irigaray: feminist philosophy, politics and the Question of Unity*, ed. Marie Cimitile (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007), 104-5.

gender polarity.[134] Gender does play a major role,[135] related to the reason/religion dyad, in the conception of human formation in *Christmas Eve*. However, I have taken up the female/male pair later in this chapter in order to emphasize Schleiermacher's approach to gender in *Christmas Eve* as a thematic subset of his theory of polarity.[136] Viewed through the larger framework of polarity, gender roles in *Christmas Eve* articulate complementary ways of communicating knowledge.[137] Paralleling the dyadic activity of joy and sorrow, which acts as an additional oscillating pair within the realm of feeling,

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[134] Thus, Ursula Frost's study of *Bildung* in Schleiermacher's thinking (*Einigung des Geistigen Lebens*, 118-123) stresses his theory of polarity, but focuses on reason and religion (*Vernunft* and *Religion*) as the key dyad for understanding polarity in Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung*. For further discussion of Frost's work on *Bildung* in Schleiermacher, see chapter one.

[135] Schleiermacher discussed gender issues extensively in his work, and many studies exist of Schleiermacher's approach to gender, and to women in particular. Among these are, Julie Ellison, *Delicate Subjects: Romanticism, Gender, and the Ethics of Understanding*, who begins her study with Schleiermacher; Patricia Guenther-Gleason, *On Schleiermacher and Gender Politics* (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press, Intl., 1997), who focuses on the relationship between Schleiermacher and Schlegel in the development of Schleiermacher's thinking on gender; Richardson's study of the early development of Schleiermacher's views on women, *Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher 1768-1806: A Historical Overview*; and most recently and importantly, Elisabeth Hartlieb, *Geschlechterdifferenz im Denken Friedrich Schleiermachers*. Hartlieb considers *Christmas Eve* the "key" to Schleiermacher's thinking on gender, arguing that the relationship between the men's speeches and women's narratives provides a blueprint for understanding Schleiermacher's assessment of gender (see especially, Hartlieb, 32-40). In Patricia Guenther-Gleason's "'Christmas Eve' as a Work of Art: Implications for Interpreting Schleiermacher's Gender Ideology," in *Understanding Schleiermacher: From Translation to Interpretation, A Festschrift for Terrence Nelson Tice*, eds. Ruth Richardson and Edwina Lawler (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), 117, she provides a helpful assessment, up to 1998, of scholars who have considered gender in their interpretations of *Christmas Eve*.

[136] This position on the role of polarity argues for a broader context for readings of gender in *Christmas Eve* (and in Schleiermacher's thinking, in general). Several studies use the lens of gender to read *Christmas Eve*, including comments by earlier interpreters, such as Karl Barth, in his introduction to *Weihnachtsfeier*, 473, as well as more recent and thorough interpretations by Richardson, *Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher 1768-1806*, 132-164; Guenther-Gleason, "'Christmas Eve' as a Work of Art," 117-162; and Elisabeth Hartlieb, 22-56. I agree with much of the work of all these interpreters, which has advanced greatly contemporary understandings of *Christmas Eve* by considering the role of gender in the piece. In the context of my own project, giving preference to the thematic role of gender would narrow Schleiermacher's understanding of polarity, overly weighting male/female in the dyadic pairs I explore in this chapter.

[137] Schleiermacher intimated the importance of gender in literary depictions of human development well before he wrote *Christmas Eve*: In an 1800 letter, Schleiermacher tells his sister of his plans to pen a novel that will treat this topic directly. He asserts that she will find his reflections on Christian community "in connected order, embodied in a novel, . . . which shall contain everything that I believe I understand about men and women, and human life altogether" (*Life of Schleiermacher*, 241; *SKGA*, V.4, 374: " . . . dann sollst Du sie in ihrem ganzen Zusammenhange in einem Roman finden, den ich einmal schreiben will, und der Alles enhalten soll was ich vom Menschen und dem menschlichen Leben zu verstehen glaube.").

the dyadic activity of male and female ways of knowing presents oscillation within the realm of reason.

In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher places his observations concerning male/female complementarity in the context of gendered ways of knowing and presenting that knowledge:

> for the cognitive process, from the male side, there is a preponderance of thinking, from the female side a preponderance of higher feeling. For the presenting process, from the male side there is a preponderance of art or individual presentation, from the female side a preponderance of attire, of morality as communal presentation. (*NE*, 80)[138]

The repetition of the term "preponderance" ("*Uebergewicht*") clarifies that Schleiermacher is not simply equating females with feeling and males with reason. Rather, his observations concern which realm has greater "weight" (*Gewicht*) in male and female cognitive processes. Both feeling and reason reside inherently in all humans, which is why Sofie's parents can leave the development of her piety 'to nature,' since feeling dwells naturally within her.[139]

Schleiermacher then divides the internal cognitive *relationship* between these faculties (which has equal consequence for the presentation of knowledge) according to

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[138] *BE*, 55: "Für das Erkennen männlich Uebergewicht des Denkens, weiblich Uebergewicht des höhern Gefühls. Für das Darstellen männlich Uebergewicht der Kunst oder der individuellen Darstellung, weiblich Uebergewicht des Costüms, der Sitte als gemeinschaftliche Darstellung." Schleiermacher had expressed the same means of cultivating humanity fully in his *Soliloquies*, minus a reference to gender: He insists that he does not naturally possess artistic tendencies, though his friends do. He imagines that if he succeeds at fully cultivating himself that, by the end of his life, he will embrace the artistic tendency as well (asserting that *then* he will finally write a novel; i.e., produce art), since the perfection of human nature lies in the embrace of oppositional tendencies within it (*Soliloquies*, 19-20 and 34; *SKGA*, I.3, 11-12 and 19-20).

[139] Sofie's parents insist that they do not make her perform pious activities like singing or reciting prayers, but leave the development of her religious feeling "to nature" (*DW*, 54: "Wir finden sie natürlich, und so ist auch in der That die Gesinnung ihr natürlich. Was so kommt, denken wir, kan man auch ungestört der Natur überlassen.").

gender.[140] Women's facility for synthetic oscillation provides them the means to incorporate feeling and reason more easily in their cognitive life, while men's facility for analytical activity propels their "restless striving" between oppositional elements. Women's restriction from the communal goods of academy and state, where analytical reason predominates and is cultivated,[141] results in the necessity for men to "*ausbilden*," or develop, the analytical capacities of women (depicted through common participation in the extended family unit). Through interaction in the family, women also can assist men in developing the activity of cognitive oscillation that *embraces* feeling and reason.

In *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher builds on these observations in the *Brouillon*. First, he develops the attitude of childlikeness, as we saw above, as a gender-neutral attitude that represents the role of feeling (*Gefühl*) in formation. Women incorporate that realm *more easily* because of the particular way in which they transition from childhood to adulthood; that is, women have a facility for dipolar oscillation that men find naturally difficult. Thus, in section one of *Christmas Eve* the company discusses the embrace of polarity occurring more naturally and harmoniously in women than in men as they move from childhood to adulthood. As a result, feeling predominates in women's natures, but feeling it is not a "female" realm only available to men in their interactions with women.

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[140] Schleiermacher states in the *Soliloquies* that he feels little natural facility for art; according to the *Brouillon* passage, this places his natural tendencies more in the "female" realm. Schleiermacher, himself, made his association with the feminine explicit in letters to his sister: he states in 1799 that he will "always be more closely attuned to women than to men" and then in 1804 that "If ever I play with an impossible wish it is with that of being a woman." These letters are translated and Schleiermacher's tendencies towards femininity discussed by Ruth Richardson, *Women in the Life and Thought of the Early Schleiermacher*, 38-39, in terms of his Moravian background. Richardson, ibid., 186-187, goes on to explore this issue in terms of Schleiermacher's attempts to vicariously experience motherhood through his female friends around the time he was writing *Christmas Eve*. Richardson concludes perceptively that Schleiermacher is "psychologically androgynous," and that he "learned to speak in two languages—the masculine and the feminine," which allowed him to incorporate into his writing both the male and female elements of "a common humanity" (187-188).

[141] Recall that in the *Brouillon* (chapter three), Schleiermacher describes how in two of the four goods (academy and state) reason predominates and in the other two goods (free sociality and church) feeling predominates. Women have access only to free sociality and church, where feeling is cultivated.

Men learn *how* to access this realm through their interaction with women, which provides them training in the gentle oscillation between polar elements.

Both men and women must accomplish this activity, through which individuals embrace the feeling/reason dyad internally, in order to perfect their spiritual natures. In this way, I continue to read inherent gender difference as central to Schleiermacher's thinking in *Christmas Eve*, but I remove this difference from human faculties (reason and feeling) and place it instead in humans' facilities for integrating these faculties in the course of their formation. This distinction preserves Schleiermacher's observation that men and women can achieve the same level of *Bildung*, but that they take differing paths to arrive at this shared endpoint.

a. Schleiermacher on Gender before *Christmas Eve*

Schleiermacher's published work, beginning in the *Athenaeum*, promotes the idea that women were fully capable of reaching the same level of formation (*Bildung*) as men. He pens a fragment specifically devoted to women's process of *Bildung* for the *Athenaeum*. The framing of the fragment reinforces Schleiermacher's emphasis on gender *difference*:[142] Schleiermacher doesn't write a fragment about *Bildung* for all humans; instead he addresses his remarks to women.

[142] Elisabeth Hartlieb traces Schleiermacher's consistent emphasis on gender difference in her study, *Geschlechterdifferenz im Denken Friedrich Schleiermachers*. Hartlieb sketches the variety of scholarly perspectives on gender difference in Schleiermacher (13-14), noting that some scholars de-emphasize gender difference. For example, Elisabeth Wiederanders' article, "'Laß dich gelüsten nach der Männer Bildung, Kunst, Weisheit und Ehre': Zur Emancipation der Frau bei Schleiermacher," in *Theologische Versuche* 16 (1986), 119-129, discusses the fragment on *Bildung* (even quoting in her title) as part of Schleiermacher's consistent support of women's potential. Wiederanders' perspective is optimistic concerning Schleiermacher's views of women, and she omits his emphasis on gender difference in her assessment. I follow Hartlieb, whose careful study clarifies the subtle ways in which gender difference participates in Schleiermacher's thinking, contributing to his respect for women and his hopes for women's *Bildung*.

In the first part of the fragment, he offers "ten commandments" ("*Die zehn Gebote*") that proscribe ways in which women should interact with men and children.[143] In his list of 'dos' and 'don'ts,' Schleiermacher recognizes and inscribes gender difference, advocating gender-coded roles for women (e.g., don't flirt, and don't idealize men, but love them as they are). His tenth "commandment" leaves behind the list of "shalts" and "shalt nots" and states simply: "Covet the education, art, wisdom, and honor [*Bildung, Kunst, Weisheit und Ehre*] of men."[144] This commandment creates a transition to a discussion of *Bildung* in the second half of the fragment, "The Credo." The "credo" claims *Bildung* as a realm where *gender difference* does not prevent humans from forming themselves towards a *common humanity*.

The first two creedal statements clarify this point: "I believe in immortal humanity, which was before it assumed the garment of masculinity and femininity. . . . and I believe in the power of the will and of education [*Bildung*] to make me draw near once more to the infinite, to deliver me from the chains of miseducation [*Mißbildung*], and to make me independent of the restraints of sex."[145] In these creedal statements, Schleiermacher pairs his emphasis on gender difference in the first half with a notion of a shared goal: *Bildung*. *Bildung* cultivates 'immortal humanity,' which is gender-neutral, established before the secondary addition of gender. The power of *Bildung* is that it can cultivate women "independent of the restraints of sex." This statement, because it addresses women, appears to indicate that women alone are somehow deficient and

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[143] Firchow, 74, #364; *KFSA*, I.2, 231.
[144] Ibid.: "Laß dich gelüsten nach der Männer Bildung, Kunst, Weisheit und Ehre."
[145] Firchow, 74-75, #364; *KFSA*, I.2, 231: "Ich glaube an die unendliche Menschheit, die da war, ehe sie die Hülle der Männlichkeit und der Weiblichkeit annahm. . . . und ich glaube an die Macht des Willens und der Bildung, mich dem Unendlichen wieder zu nähern, mich aus den Fesseln der Mißbildung zu erlösen, und mich von den Schranken des Geschlechts unabhängig zu machen."

'restrained' by their gender. However, as we saw above in *Christmas Eve*, when the developmental paths of men and women are discussed together, both men and women bear certain 'restraints' associated with gender (men have difficulty embracing feeling and reason as they move from childhood to adulthood).

In his *Athenaeum* fragment Schleiermacher maintains gender difference in the *process* of formation, while treating the goal of that formation as the cultivation of a common humanity. This trend continues in *Christmas Eve*: the "reciprocal recognition" between men and women aids in the spiritual development of all, with women recognizing that they *have* embraced childlikeness and adulthood, as the men aid the women's development of analytical skills, and with men recognizing that they *can* accomplish such an embrace through their reflections on the women's ability to do so as well as the women's 'stabilizing' effect on the men.[146]

The contrasting facilities of men and women for communal formation that come to the fore clarify Schleiermacher's location of family as the nexus for the four goods (sociality, academy, church, and state) employed in the pursuit of *Bildung*. Women in Schleiermacher's era had little access to the communal goods, academy and state, that work towards the development of analytical skills necessary for *Bildung*. Men, then,

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[146] As one of the female characters in Schleiermacher's *Confidential Letters on Schlegel's Lucinde* asserts, "[y]ou [men] develop us, but we [women] anchor you" (*SKGA*, I.3, 203: "Ihr bildet uns aus; aber wir befestigen Euch."). Though there are many similarities between the *Confidential Letters* and *Christmas Eve*, including the recurrence of the characters of Ernestine, Eduard, and Karoline (For commentary on this connection, see Tice, "Introduction," *CE*, 12-13), the difference between the two is highlighted when we consider the approach to formation in them: In the *Confidential Letters*, the men help the women to become "cultivated" ("*gebildet*"), while the women help the men to become "anchored" ("*befestiget*"). And within the familial arena, women demonstrate to men how to cultivate a unity of being, maintaining the attitudes of both childlikeness and adulthood as well as embracing the emotional polarities of joy and sorrow. The structural form of *Christmas Eve* bears out this observation. Whereas the gathered circle discusses the embrace of earthly and divine and childlikeness and adulthood in all three sections, they reflect upon male and female polarity in the first section only. However, sections two (women's narratives) and three (men's speeches) read as a unit and perform that reflective function, thereby continuing the conversation, at a formal level, on the necessity of embracing both male and female perspectives in one's formation.

must bring their experience of these goods into the home, so that they may aid the development of women thereby.[147]

b. Discussions of Gender in *Christmas Eve*

The company highlights the importance of sharing and embracing both male and female perspectives at the first introduction of the categories of male and female as polar expressions of human nature. This introduction occurs during the initial gift-giving, when the gathered friends discuss the predictability of the men being unable to guess the givers while the women invariably can. Ernst jokes that it is all because, as the Bible 'says,' "God hath made man upright, but women have sought out many inventions [*Künste*]" (*CE*, 30).[148] Karoline responds that, "[i]f, as it happens, your forthright simplicity is the occasion of our cunning, then set your mind at rest: the other way around, our less capacious habits may well relate similarly to the talents in which you excel" (*CE*, 30).[149] Karoline asserts that where women lack certain traits, men possess those talents, and where men lack certain traits, women have them.

Collecting all human talents together requires that men and women share their talents with one another. Here enters the importance of male and female complementarity: the complementary knowledge, or perspectives, shared between men

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[147] Schleiermacher made no argument to include women in these "public" spheres; indeed, he saw the separation as an essential part of his moral worldview. Schleiermacher's 1818 sermons on marriage, in *Predigten über den Christlichen Hausstand*, 30, flesh out this observation, noting that the job (vocation) of the husband is to negotiate the civic realm ("in der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft") and report back to his wife of the goings-on therein. See Patricia Guenther-Gleason on Schleiermacher's exclusion of women from the public sphere in "Schleiermacher's Feminist Impulses in the Context of His Later Work," in *Schleiermacher and Feminism: Sources, Evaluations, and Responses*, ed. Iain Nicol (Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 103-105. See also Richardson's multi-page note on the same in *Women*, 140-142, and my note on Schleiermacher's sermons on marriage in chapter three, under the section on Wallhausser on family and polarity.

[148] *DW*, 47: ". . . den Mann hat Gott aufrightig geschaffen, aber die Weiber suchen viel Künste."

[149] Ibid., 47-48: "Vielleicht mag wohl gar beides eben so ewig sein als nothwendig; und wenn etwa Eure ehrliche Einfalt die Bedingung unserer Schauheit ist, so beruhiget euch damit, daß vielleicht auf einer andern Seite unsere Beschränktheit sich ebenso verhält zu euren größeren Talenten."

and women helps humans of both genders fully embody the embrace of dipolarity necessary for the formation of full humanity in an individual. Despite the teasing tone prevalent in this exchange, it presents male and female polarity epistemologically.

The more analytic version of this conversation occurs after the discussion in section one of the importance of maintaining a childlike attitude, even in adulthood (see above). Ernestine bridges the conversation on childlikeness with that on male and female complementarity by noting that men have great difficulty in their transition from childhood to adulthood, which women cannot understand based on their own experience. "On the one hand, the period looks like a continuation of childhood, whose delights [joys; *Freude*] also have their own impetuous and disruptive character. On the other hand, the period takes the form of a restless striving, an indecisive, ever-changing grasping and letting go which we women are simply unable to understand" (*CE*, 54).[150] The men, she insists, go through a period of wavering between extremes, a striving that can never settle into a determinate state.

Eduard agrees (indeed, all of the company appear to accept these differences between men and women), adding his own explanation of this difference: "we see that in the development [*Entwikkelung*] of their spiritual nature, although it must be the same in both, men and women have their different ways—to the end that here too they may become one by sharing knowledge [through reciprocal knowledge; *durch gegenseitiges*

[150] Ibid., 70: "Es sieht aus wie eine Fortsezung ihrer Kindheit, deren Freuden auch eine heftige und zerstörende Natur zeigen; aber auch in ihrem unstäten Treiben wie ein unschlüßiges immer wechselndes Fahrenlassen und Ergreifenwollen, wovon wir nichts verstehen. Bei uns vereinigt sich beides unmerklich mit einander."

Erkennen]" (*CE*, 55).[151] Eduard argues that gender differences actually contribute to the full spiritual development of men and women.

> He then clarifies the oppositional tendencies embraced in such development:
>
> the contrast [opposition; *Gegensaz*] between the spontaneous and reflective [*Unbewußten und Besonnenen*] emerges more strongly in us [men]. And during the period of transition [to adulthood] it reveals itself in that restless striving, that passionate conflict with the world and within oneself you referred to. But within the calm, graceful nature of women comes to light the continuity and inner unity of the two [oppositional elements] (*CE*, 55).[152]

The company returns to a bit more ironic banter, but Eduard's point is allowed to stand: Men strive with difficulty to embrace internality (the realm of feeling/subjective knowledge) and externality (the world/objective knowledge. Women, however, embrace these realms with a natural ease.[153] These differences serve the purpose of mutual formation in community, however, as Schleiermacher states of the formation of religious community in the *Brouillon*: "in one's own mode of presentation, each becomes a teacher for the other" (*NE*, 131).

These conversational observations on male and female differences would have resonance for Schleiermacher's readers, as they replicate the well-known position of Wilhelm von Humboldt in his discussions of gender characteristics.[154] In her work on Romanticism, Ursula Vogel summarizes Humboldt's position:

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[151] Ibid.: "So hätten, sagte Eduard, Männer und Frauen auch in der Entwikkelung des Geistigen, das doch in beiden dasselbe sein muß, ihre abgesonderte Weise, um sich durch gegenseitiges Erkennen auch hierin zu vereinigen."

[152] Ibid.: ". . . in uns der Gegensaz des Unbewußten und des Besonnenen stärker hervortritt, und sich während des Ueberganges in jenem unruhigen Streben, jenem leidenschaftlichen Kampf mit der Welt und sich selbst offenbart. Dagegen in Eurem ruhigen und anmuthigen Wesen die Stätigkeit beider und ihre innere Einheit ans Licht tritt."

[153] The position continues to reflect Wilhelm von Humboldt's articulation of the role of sexual difference in *Bildung*.

[154] See, for example, Ursula Vogel, "Humboldt and the Romantics: Neither Hausfrau nor Citoyenne" in *Women in Western Political Philosophy: Kant to Nietzsche*, ed. Ellen Kennedy and Susan Mendus (New

> Women, Humboldt believes, are closer to the ideal of perfect humanity because their natural disposition tends towards harmony and wholeness. Whereas man, given to restless striving in the external world, invests and dissipates his energy in a multitude of fragmented pursuits, woman experiences and understands everything in relation to an *inner* centre; her mind is infinitely receptive, open to everything that is good and beautiful, yet she remains at one with herself.[155]

Schleiermacher follows this line of thought up to a point in his description of men and women, but also insists that women have reflective as well as receptive talents. Schleiermacher thereby addresses the problem that the Romantics' saw with the hierarchical understanding of men as rational, and therefore the "higher" of the two genders, but he maintains the view that women are naturally *more* intuitive and men naturally *more* reflective. In sections two and three of *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher moves from a discussion of these differences to a demonstration of them.

c. Gender Complementary Demonstrated: Women's Narratives and Men's Speeches

In the second section, Ernestine proposes that the women, in particular, now contribute to the conversation by providing narrative reflections upon particular moments in their personal development of religious feeling, using the Christmas festival as a means of topical coherence (*CE*, 56-57; *DW*, 71-72). Religious feeling serves as the impetus for the events the women narrate, but the women's cogitative reflection upon their lives provides the arena for their communal consideration. Again, the gender polarity inherent in *Christmas Eve* does not exist between the capacity to feel and the capacity to reason—

York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 110-112, as well as MacLeod, 46-52. This striving and wavering activity of the men also points back to Fichte's transcendental philosophy, which provided a theoretical basis for Schlegel's depiction of the activity of poesy (see chapter three, above).

[155] Vogel, 111.

this polarity is represented through the attitudes of childlikeness and adulthood; instead, the male/female polarity reflects polar ways of integrating these capacities.[156]

The women will use narrative, then, which Schleiermacher associates in the *Brouillon* with the integration of subjective knowing (particular/historical) and objective knowing (universal laws of human action), to reflect upon the role of religious feeling in their lives, whereas in section three the men will focus on analytical and abstract discourse. In this way, the women's memories of their personal experiences do not serve as simple expressions of feeling; narrative brings reason to bear on feeling. Thus, Friederika insists, the women's narratives can contribute to the company's *understanding* of the development of religious feeling: "with the degree of precision with which the small beautiful moments of life remain in our memory, one could demonstrate stage by stage this emergence of what is higher [the religious feeling behind the trappings of the festival]."[157] Narrative expression and reflection upon outward events, Friederika suggests, will offer a window into the stages of these women's internal development.

Supporting this observation, Ernestine ends her narrative by stating that the woman whom she described in the church with her baby has, "influenced my life and my inner being more than anyone in this world" (*CE*, 59).[158] The mode of narrative

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[156] This polarity is not unique to *Christmas Eve*: In his *Hermeneutics,* trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman, 150, Schleiermacher continues to divide human *ways* of knowing according to male and female, stating that, "[d]ivinatory knowledge is the feminine strength in knowing people and comparative knowledge, the masculine." Here, Schleiermacher labels "comparative" (analytical) knowledge as a "masculine strength," though not thereby limited to experience by males and "divinatory" (intuitive) knowledge is a "feminine strength," though not thereby limited to females.

[157] *DW*, 71: "Ja bei der Genauigkeit, mit welcher uns die kleinen schönen Momente des Lebens in der Erinnerung bleiben, könnte man stufenweise dies Hervortreten des Höheren nachweisen." I use my own translation here, so as not to use Tice's repetition of the term "joy" in his already-complicated translation of this sentence, which on my reading should point through joy (and all emotions) to religious feeling. Tice reads: ". . . one can examine the nature of our joy in small yet neither forgotten nor unrecognizable sections of our life story, to see whether this joy has undergone any number of sudden changes" (*CE*, 56).

[158] *DW*, 73: "Es war Eduards älteste Schwester, die herrliche tragische Gestalt, die mehr als irgend Jemand auf mein Leben und mein inneres Sein gewirkt hat."

expression and reflection functions as a modeling of the process of internal development, while showing how internal development occurs through external interactions in one's community.

The narratives accomplish this by interweaving modes of expression: They incorporate artistic expression through Friederika's music, which represents one mode of presenting feeling. Friederika's music occurs during the women's narratives (in the case of Ernestine's) and after (as in the case of Agnes'), seamlessly integrating the presentation of feeling in reason. The narratives also allow for philosophical discussion between narratives, in which, along with the men, the women participate in analytical evaluation of the topics broached by the narratives. The women's narratives, then, organize and demonstrate a variety of models of religiosity and of reflection upon religiosity.

The women's narratives make room for reflection and analytic discussion between narratives, which they incorporate, as with music, without disrupting the progression from tale to tale. In contrast, the men's speeches in section three remain one-sided. The men propose to thank the ladies for their narratives by each addressing in a learned fashion a subject of the ladies' choosing. The women choose "the festival, itself," and the men present analyses concerning such things as the cultural purpose of the festival (Leonhardt) and the universal nature of the festival (Ernst). The men have difficulty incorporating more than one realm at a time, moving from speech to speech, with no narrative reflection or artistic accompaniment.

The speeches recall several of the themes that have previously received attention, but within a philosophical framework. In particular, the three speakers take up the nature

of religiosity in humanity as a topic for philosophical reflection. Thus, Leonhardt ironically muses that only they, who class themselves among the "cultivated" ("*Gebildetem*"), will find narratives religiously fulfilling; however, the "uncultivated people" ("*ungebildeten Volkes*") need festivals full of action for religious fulfillment.[159] Ernst, on the other hand, associates the activities of the festival with more cerebral reflection. He views the festival activities as a means of attaining true religious self-consciousness: "It is the distinctive nature of this festival," he asserts, "that through it we should become conscious of an innermost ground out of which a new, untrammeled life emerges, and of its inexhaustible power, that in its very first germ we should already discern its finest maturity, even its highest perfection" (*CE*, 79).[160]

Eduard offers the most abstract discussion, turning away from "historical" reflections on the festival (Leonhardt) and its activities (Ernst). He takes, instead, a "mystical" approach to the festival through the Gospel of John (*CE*, 81; *DW*, 94). John's gospel, Eduard notes, discusses nothing of the circumstances of Jesus' birth, stating simply that the "Word was made flesh." According to his reading of this biblical passage, Eduard argues that, "what we celebrate is nothing other than ourselves as whole beings—that is, human nature, or whatever else you want to call it, viewed and known from the perspective of the divine . . . life's coming to know in its eternal being and in its

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[159] Ibid., 84-85. I use my own translation here to maintain the translation of "*gebildet*" as "cultivated," which implies something beyond the 'book-learning' one receives in school. Tice reads: ". . . while it might suffice for us who are well educated, . . . such would by no means be true for the great mass of uneducated folk" (*CE*, 70-71). Schleiermacher edits this passage in the 1826 version, which weaves in the theme of Christian faith (*Glaube*) to clarify what Catholic festivals fail to teach properly.

[160] Ibid., 92: ". . . dies ist die eigentliche Natur dieses Festes, daß wir uns des innersten Grundes und der unerschöpflichen Kraft des neuen ungetrübten Lebens bewußt werden, daß wir in dem ersten Keime desselben zugleich seine schönste Blüthe, seine höchste Vollendung anschauen."

ever-changing process of becoming" (*CE*, 82).[161] Eduard discusses how the company beholds in the birth of Christ their own "higher birth" as humans fully conscious of their relationship to the divine.[162] All three speeches, then, present the mode of philosophical expression directed towards the topic not simply of the festival of Christmas, but of the nature and cultivation of religiosity.

The speech format removes the company from the *experience* of religious feeling. Unlike the preceding sections, where artistic expression, narrative reflection, and philosophical analysis intermingle easily, evoking *both* religious feeling and reasoned reflection, the third section resists attempts to embrace feeling and reason together. Indeed, at the one point where it seems one of the women might contribute a personal narrative, Leonhardt interrupts and abstracts to a more generalized approach to the topic (*CE*, 80; *DW*, 93).[163] Only Josef's scolding at the end of the piece reminds them that learned discourse has carried them away from the joyful celebration of the festival through music and song. He insists, "[f]or me, all forms are too rigid, all speech-making too tedious and cold. Itself unbounded by speech, the subject of Christmas claims, indeed creates in me a speechless joy, and I cannot but laugh and exult like a child." (*CE*,

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[161] Ibid., 94-95: "Was wir sonach feiern, ist nichts anders als wir selbst, wie wir insgesammt sind, oder die menschliche Natur, oder wie ihr es sonst nennen wollt, angesehen und erkannt aus dem göttlichen Princip. . . . Was ist der Mensch an sich anders, als der Erdgeist selbst, das Erkennen der Erde in seinem ewigen Sein und in seinem immer wechselnden Werden."

[162] Ibid., 96: "Und eben so jeder von uns schaut in der Geburt Christi, seine eigene höhere Geburt an."

[163] Ernst has argued that the joy of the festival stems from the embrace of oppositions in human nature, which are most prevalent in men. Agnes states that she can explain, in her own case, why she feels just as much joy as the men during the festival, despite the fact that women have less internal oppositions to overcome: "Allein auch das kann ich mir wol zurecht legen." But at this point, Leonhardt breaks in, explaining that all women experience joy as "shared joy" (*Mitfreude*), and so of course they'll find the same joy as men in the celebration of the Christmas festival.

85)[164] Here, Josef eschews all words, and even all forms of expression, save a joyful, childlike exuberance which he wants to express, if in any form, through song (*CE*, 86).

Ending the piece with Josef's call to sing serves to reinforce Schleiermacher's consistent emphasis throughout the piece on the centrality of religious feeling in community's interactions. But even Josef's call to return to singing, though it embraces feeling, continues to reflect the description of men's natures as striving forcefully to embrace oppositional tendencies. He implores that they stop discoursing altogether, refusing to make a speech, himself. In sections one and two (dominated by the activities of Sofie and the women), harmonious transitions between the modes of expression occurred almost imperceptibly. In contrast, Josef's remarks provide a jolting reminder that the company has forgotten the limits of their narrative and philosophical (reflective) approaches. He recalls them to the pious feelings of joy that mark the Christmas festival and the importance of artistic expression (singing) that helps focus these *feelings*.

Although section three remains philosophically focused until the end, resisting the incorporation of artistic and narrative ways of communicating, philosophical analysis has a crucial place in the development of the community. Just as Leonhardt worries that Sofie's attachment to religious music will cause her to become unthinkingly devoted to religious 'externals,' so too Josef worries that the company's attachment to thoughtful discourse has caused them to stray from the childlike attitude of joy—the emotion that points to the role of feeling (*Gefühl*) in their celebration. The overarching argument of the piece is that *all* perspectives contribute to the formation of the familial community and to the individuals within it. Formation in family, which allows these elements to

[164] Ibid., 97: "Alle Formen sind mir zu steif, und alles Reden zu langweilig und kalt. Der sprachlose Gegenstand verlangt oder erzeugt auch mir eine sprachlose Freude, die meinige kann wie ein Kind nur lächeln und jauchzen."

interact freely, becomes essential, since people are drawn by their natural talents to focus narrowly on one perspective. An extended family unit, composed of both men and women, keeps the process of formation balanced.

Sections two and three, then, reflect upon how gender complementarity works in familial community towards the goal of developing and perfecting one's spiritual nature. The three sections, formally, depict the cultivation of human nature in *Christmas Eve* as a reciprocal process that includes both men and women in a variety of relationships in the extended family unit. The formation of human nature cannot occur for either gender without such reciprocity. The spirituality, or piety, to which the process of formation leads, is the same for both, Eduard states. However, they take "separate ways," "so that through reciprocal recognition, they are able to unite" (*CE*, 55).[165] Though some formative activities are not *shared by* both genders, the gendered parts of formation are *reflected upon* by both males and females together as part of the process of formation.

The familial setting of *Christmas Eve* depicts the underlying emphasis on *common humanity* that is cultivated through the reciprocal sharing of difference. Schleiermacher makes this point more directly in the *Brouillon*, where he places "family character" above "gender character": Family

> becomes a complete representation of the idea of humanity. Thus, the family itself is also a complete individuality and gains a soul of its own in which those limitations are likewise suspended. This individuality is the *family character* [*Familiencharakter* as opposed to "gender characteristic," or *Geschlechtscharakter*], which is actually a pure indifference with respect to gender and bears an eternal maturity. In its manifestation there is, to be sure, either an enduring preponderance of

[165] Ibid., 70: "So hätten, sagte Eduard, Männer und Frauen auch in der Entwikkelung des Geistigen, das doch in beiden dasselbe sein muß, ihre abgesonderte Weise, um sich durch gegenseitiges Erkennen auch hierin zu vereinigen."

> masculine or feminine or their alternation in particular moments. (*NE*, 82)[166]

Invoking the term "family character" (*Familiencharakter*), Schleiermacher makes a word-play on the term "gender characteristic" (*Geschlechtscharakter*), which he discusses in surrounding lectures. Gender plays a role in the family character, but the maturity ("*Maturität*") achieved by the family has nothing to do with gender; i.e., maturity is neither a male nor female trait. In other words, *Christmas Eve* presents a complex notion of the process of human formation, which encompasses both gender-coded and non-gender-coded activities, all of which serve as means directed towards a shared end that encompasses both male and female in the perfection of a common humanity.

d. The Model of Mary and Jesus in Feminist Interpretations of *Christmas Eve*

The centrality of the model of Mary and Jesus, as I have elaborated it in the previous sections of the chapter, provides a symbolic frame for Schleiermacher's understanding of gender complementarity in *Christmas Eve*. First, the familial model of Mary and Jesus de-emphasizes the sexual aspect of male/female relationships. This shift frees the assessment of gender to focus on epistemological 'habits' exercised in the broader context of formation within the extended family unit. Second, the model of Mary and the model of Jesus, considered individually, each offer a study in the perfection of human nature, suggesting that both men and women can pursue the full formation of human nature.

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[166] *BE*, 58: ". . . die Familie eine vollständige Repräsentation der Idee der Menschheit. Daher ist sie auch selbst ein völliges Individuum und gewinnt eine eigene Seele, in welcher ebenfalls jene Beschränkungen aufgehoben sind: der *Familiencharakter*, der eigentlich reine Indifferenz des Geschlechts ist und ewige Maturität. In der Erscheinung freilich ist entweder bleibendes Uebergewicht des Männlichen oder Weiblichen oder wechselndes in einzelnen Momenten."

The figures of Mary and of Jesus have served as the basis for assertions that *Christmas Eve* presents an argument for the superiority of women. Mary and female Mary-figures, such arguments suggest, present the most advanced examples of religiosity (alongside Jesus).[167] The most striking correlative claim is that Schleiermacher portrays Jesus, as the height of religious consciousness, as a feminine figure in *Christmas Eve*—a claim that has received staunch opposition as well as strong support.[168] Reading *Christmas Eve* through the lens of Schleiermacher's polar approach to *Bildung* views the model of Mary and Jesus, both together and separately, from a perspective that suggests a balanced approach to the role of gender in *Christmas Eve*.

In the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher makes clear that polarity in *Bildung* (for both the individual and the community) depends upon the activity of oscillation. Such activity does not favor one pole or the other, but it does require a shift of direction if one pole begins to predominate. Schleiermacher notes this in his own life in the *Soliloquies*, recognizing that to form himself fully he must (by the end of his life) embrace opposing tendencies from those in his nature.[169] Schleiermacher makes the same point in *Christmas Eve*, but implicitly and at the communal level.

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[167] Katherine Faull provides a helpful overview of the issue of divine femininity in Schleiermacher in, "Schleiermacher—A Feminist? Or, How to Read Gender Inflected Theology," in *Schleiermacher and Feminism: Sources, Evaluations, and Responses*, 13-32, treating both the tendency towards divine femininity in Schleiermacher and its limits. See also her dissertation, Katherine Padilla, *The Embodiment of the Absolute: Theories of the Feminine in the Works of Schleiermacher, Schlegel, and Novalis* (Princeton University, 1988).

[168] Patricia Guenther-Gleason reviews scholarship on both sides of the issue in a note in her, "*On Schleiermacher and Gender Politics*," 330.

[169] He writes, ". . . in me self-development [*Selbstbildung* (as an internal pursuit)] and activity turned beyond the self must balance at every moment. Therefore, my progress is slow, and I shall live long before I have embraced all things equally" (*Soliloquies*, 42). *SKGA* I.3, 24: ". . . in mir Selbstbildung und Thätigkeit des Sinnes in jeglichem Momente das Gleichgewicht sich halten müßen. So schreit ich denn langsam fort, und langes Leben kann mir gewährt sein, ehe ich Alles in gleichem Grad umfaßt." In the *Speeches,* 3-6, Schleiermacher frames the nature of humanity similarly, as comprised of two opposing forces.

Schleiermacher's work in the *Brouillon* provides the explicit theoretical foundation for this point in *Christmas Eve*: In the *Brouillon*, the four goods that Schleiermacher describes in the pursuit of *Bildung* are balanced between those in which reason predominates (academy and state) and those in which feeling predominates (free sociality and church).[170] Based on this division, men and women have unique epistemological talents that make them naturally suited to shape the activities of the four goods (men in academy and state, and women in free sociality and church). Gender complementarity allows all four goods to develop fully in the formation of both men and women.

However, women are barred from participation in the academy and the state, which shifts formational tendencies, culturally, towards the male pole. The imbalance discourages full female formation, which has consequences for the formation of both men and women. In *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher uses the family, as the communal nexus where the four goods meet, to pull the tendency back towards free sociality and church. In other words, Schleiermacher depicts in *Christmas Eve* the counterbalance to larger cultural trends towards the focus in *Bildung* on academy and state.[171]

On my reading, Schleiermacher's polar approach to *Bildung* precludes the elaboration of an idea of "femininity" as the sole standard of human perfection or of women as the sole mediation point for the divine. It also clarifies the need for an emphasis on the role that women have in shaping the conception of the "divine," particularly *in a shared humanity*, as Eduard elaborates in his discussion of the embrace

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[170] Especially, *NE*, 131; *BE*, 114, but also *NE*, 133-134 and 136-137; *BE*, 116-117 and 120-121.
[171] As Schleiermacher's 1818 sermons on marriage clarify, he does not propose opening the academy and the state to women; instead, the family should function as the interactive arena in which all four goods are made available to both genders. See Schleiermacher, *Predigten*, 30.

of earthly and divine in human nature (see above).[172] Though males and females may have distinctively different talents and tendencies, in community, both genders can cultivate the tendencies of the opposite gender through mutual interaction.

e. Schleiermacher and Gender Essentialism

Schleiermacher's incorporation of women into the process of the community's formation requires essential difference. Schleiermacher's essentialism is tied to his thesis that formation is a communal process that occurs through the embrace of dipolarity. The *reciprocal* relationships between men and women in this process demand that each person must have something innately unique to give, and Schleiermacher divides these unique talents along gender lines. As a result, Schleiermacher moves women from passive essentialist roles, in which they served in Jena-Romantic novels as springboards for male *Bildung*, to active essentialist roles, in which men and women share their unique perspectives in a common process of formation.

Though this was a progressive position at the time, Schleiermacher's essentialist assumptions concerning men and women can make 21st-century readers uncomfortable. His depiction of women's natures creates idealized portraits of homebodies, who, though lacking a knack for analytical reasoning, overflow with emotionally-intuitive geniality. His depiction of men's natures categorically labels them as bumbling idiots when it

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[172] Julie Ellison observes in her work on gender in Schleiermacher that, "he seems to be trying to achieve a universally androgynous outlook by subjecting masculine critical habits to feminizing influences" (*Delicate Subjects*, 44). The role of androgyny in assessing Jena-Romantic literature has been elaborated by Sara Friedrichsmeyer, *The Androgyne in Early German Romanticism: Friedrich Schlegel, Novalis and the Metaphysics of Love* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1983). Friedrichsmeyer notes the connection of androgyny with themes of polarity and *Bildung* (see 48-58, especially); however, most interesting in the context of Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve*, Friedrichsmeyer argues that the root of the eighteenth-century interest in androgyny lies in the writings of Pietists, including Count Nicholas Ludwig von Zinzendorf (leader of the Herrnhut Brethren), who explores the issue in a positive appraisal of marriage, locating the theme in a familial setting. Schleiermacher was educated by the Brethren, who followed Zinzendorf, and his sister remained with the Brethren throughout her adult life, living in one of the "Sisterhouses."

comes to intuitive thinking (recall their absolute inability to guess a single giver of their Christmas gifts).[173]

Schleiermacher and his friends in the Jena circle—male and female—were committed to envisioning new social relationships that would recognize positive talents of women outside of rearing children and keeping house. But, as even an overly-rosy scholarly assessment of the Jena-Romantic view of women admits, "Unfortunately, the departure from the old conception of sexual roles is not as complete as we might have expected [given the progressive views of the Jena circle]. Women's special ties with the domestic world and her peculiar mental and emotional constitution have not disappeared, although they no longer bear the stigma of inferiority."[174]

Schleiermacher's sermons on marriage in 1818 continue to uphold a 'separate-but-equal' approach to male and female roles: women participate in the public sphere indirectly, through their husbands, who mediate women's access to public discourse.[175] As a result, Schleiermacher's position has also been labeled, more bluntly, "reverse sexism,"[176] because it emphasizes the positive talent of women in integrating the realm of feeling in their lives, thereby idealizing this essentialist view of women and demonizing a similarly essentialist view of men as lacking such talent.

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[173] This split of male and female continues in his *Hermeneutics*, where he asserts that "male knowledge" is "comparative" (analytical) and "female knowledge" is "divinatory" (intuitive). Many studies of gender in Schleiermacher argue that his perception of male/female polarity becomes more pronounced in his later writing. Patricia Guenther-Gleason makes this argument and refers to other studies along these lines in "Schleiermacher's Feminist Impulses," 101-105.

[174] Vogel, "Humboldt and the Romantics," in *Women in Western Political Philosophy*, 117.

[175] See my note on these sermons in chapter three, under the section on Wallhausser on polarity and family in the *Brouillon*. See as well, Schleiermacher, *Predigten über den Christlichen Hausstand*, 30-31.

[176] Herbert Richardson, 174, and Iain G. Nicol, "Moral Woman and Immoral Society: Schleiermacher on Female and Male" in *Schleiermacher and Feminism: Sources, Evaluations, and Responses*, ed. Iain Nicol (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 41.

The essentialist assumptions Schleiermacher espouses need not overshadow his point that one should not "use" others as a means for one's own formation. When one encounters other humans in one's process of formation (as one must), those persons should participate equally in the process—individual formation is, by definition for Schleiermacher, a reciprocal endeavor that must include both men and women in free association.[177] Schleiermacher's demonstration of these relationships critiques that of his friends in the Jena circle, whose literary ventures had all focused on the journey of a male protagonist. In these artistic productions, women may aid the protagonist in his developmental journey, but such women are not depicted undergoing a process of formation concurrent to the protagonist. Such is the case, for instance, for Julius in *Lucinde*, for Heinrich in *Heinrich von Ofterndingen*, and for Florentin in *Florentin* (written by Schlegel's wife, Dorothea).[178]

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[177] The scholarship on relationality, reciprocity, and community in Schleiermacher is large. Reciprocity marks Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung*, its centrality in *Christmas Eve* thus further connects the piece to Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*. One of the most recent assessments of this theme is Elizabeth Corrie's dissertation, *Individual, Communication and Community in the Work of Friedrich Schleiermacher* (Emory University, 2002). See also F. LeRon Shults' chapter, "Anthropology and Theological Method: Regulative Relationality in Schleiermacher," in his *Reforming Theological Anthropology: After the Philosophical Turn to Relationality*, 97-116. Shults, 99, provides a historiographical assessment on scholarship that reads polarity as key to understanding Schleiermacher. See also chapter one, above, on polarity in Schleiermacher.

[178] This situation remains consistent even when the women the protagonist encounters do not serve as romantic love interests. Zulima, the Muslim servant woman in *Ofterdingen*, provides a case in point. Zulima is a spoil of war, captured by a crusading knight and carried back to Europe. Heinrich meets Zulima on his way to visit his grandfather, and Zulima becomes the first artist whom the sheltered Heinrich encounters in his journey. Though Heinrich vaguely feels at this point in his journey that his calling is to be a poet, he has yet to see or hear poetry. When out for an evening walk, he encounters Zulima, who is singing and playing a lute. Zulima serves to confirm Heinrich's calling to be a poet: She immediately announces upon meeting him that he resembles her brother, the original owner of her lute, who had gone to study under a poet before she was captured. When they part, Zulima presents Heinrich with the lute (her most precious possession), passing the poetic instrument to a new owner. Though Zulima is a gifted singer and lute-player, she acts solely as a conduit for male poetic development. She can pass on the lute to Heinrich because such poetic tools belong to men and cultivate men in a process from which women remain disconnected. Zulima is never recognized as a poet in her own right, but as a messenger for the cultivation of Heinrich's poetic potential.

In comparison with the Jena-Romantic *Bildung* narratives, Schleiermacher takes a first step away from literary depictions of women as passive aids to male *Bildung*. In the end, Schleiermacher's development of a polar theory of *Bildung* drives both his essentialism and his argument for the full humanity of women. The next step towards full equality in a theory of *Bildung* would have to remove male and female from the dyadic structure of formation, or it would require shifting from dyadic polarity altogether, and creating a more encompassing realm of multiplicity-in-unity. In *Christmas Eve*, however, dipolarity remains embedded in Schleiermacher's thinking about human formation.[179]

Chapter Summary and Conclusions

Schleiermacher's approach to the male/female dyad, steeped in early-nineteenth century assumptions concerning gender, can distract contemporary readers from the root of Schleiermacher's theory of polarity. As he writes in the *Brouillon*, and as the initial divine/earthly dyad in *Christmas Eve* elaborated,

> [e]verything converges on the identity of the universal and particular [*des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen*]. . . . Ethical unity is precisely this identity. . . . Because the universal and the particular are one, community and individuality are grasped as reciprocally generated through each other, as are philosophy and religion, while art [the 'presentation of feeling'] and language [the presentation of thinking] are grasped as constantly merging into each other. (*NE*, 55)[180]

[179] This dipolar perspective would continue to inform Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, ethics, and pedagogics in the years to come, particularly in terms of the male/female dyad. See Patricia Guenther-Gleason, "Schleiermacher's Feminist Impulses," 113-122, where she discusses his later lectures on pedagogy and psychology in terms of gender polarity.

[180] *BE*, 26-27: "Es läuft alles hinaus auf die Indentität des Allgemeinen und des Besonderen. . . . Die ethische Einheit ist eben diese Identität. . . . Weil das Allgemeine und das Besondere eins ist, sind Gemeinschaft und Eigenthum, Philosophie und Religion wechselseitig durch einander hervorgebracht, Kunst, Sprache in beständigem Uebergehn ineinander begriffen."

In *Christmas Eve*, all of the depictions of 'individuality and community,' of 'philosophy and religion,' of 'art and language,' find their basis in the dyadic relation of universal and particular.

Schleiermacher's development of polarity in *Christmas Eve* clarifies his theory of *Bildung* as it had continued to evolve through his work on the *Brouillon*, where the Jena-Romantic call to "the *Bildung* of the earth" and his ethical elaboration of *Bildung* as "the highest good" had first intersected. Reading *Christmas Eve* as a narrative of polar *Bildung* identifies the underlying structure of the work, organizing the formal and thematic elements of *Christmas Eve* and articulating these elements within an integrated whole. Earthly and divine, male and female, joy and sorrow, and childlikeness and adulthood develop within the framework that rests upon the intersection of the universal/particular dyad with the reason/nature polarity that develops in connection with it.

Schleiermacher presents the extended family unit as the central social arena for the pursuit of *Bildung*. In this way, *Christmas Eve* elaborates Schleiermacher's notion of the role of family in his ethical theory as "a complete representation of the idea of humanity" (*NE*, 82).[181] Through its depiction of the extended family unit, *Christmas Eve* "de-fragments" the social elements that propelled *Meister*'s ironic undertone and historicizes the cosmic battle between finite and infinite that propelled Schlegel's use of irony. In so doing, Schleiermacher offers *Christmas Eve* as a narrative of *Bildung* that treats both the social exigencies and philosophical quandaries that marked its nineteenth-century context.

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[181] *BE*, 58: ". . . die Familie eine vollständige Repräsentation der Idee der Menschheit."

V. *Christmas Eve:* A Perspective for Understanding Nineteenth-Century *Bildung*

Introduction

Reading *Christmas Eve* as a *Bildung* narrative has elucidated its thematic and formal coherence. In this chapter, I broaden the implications of this analysis. Placed in the larger sweep of Schleiermacher's corpus, *Christmas Eve* highlights the significance of the extended family unit in his work on *Bildung*. Moving beyond Schleiermacher scholarship, *Christmas Eve* also offers a critical vantage point from which to assess the historical development of *Bildung* later in the nineteenth century. In the socio-political realm, *Christmas Eve*'s narrative of familial *Bildung* implicitly critiques the isolation and redefinition of *Bildung* within the academy and the state. In the literary realm, *Christmas Eve*'s introduction of multiple protagonists poses a challenge to the definition of *Bildung* narratives as works that follow the formation of a single person.

A. Elaborating the *Brouillon*: *Bildung* after *Christmas Eve*

Christmas Eve portrays the family as an arena for the interaction of the social "goods" of *Bildung*—a role for family that Schleiermacher introduces contemporaneously in his lectures on ethics (published as *Brouillon zur Ethik*).[1] *Christmas Eve* focuses most on the relationship of family and two of the four goods: free sociality (which pervades all the goods) and the church.[2] Schleiermacher's further work

[1] Schleiermacher's lectures on ethics, given while he was writing *Christmas Eve* (1805), portray four goods that together work for the highest good, *Bildung*. Schleiermacher names these four goods as the church, the state, the academy, and free sociality ("*freie Geselligkeit*"). He locates the nexus of these goods in the family (see chapter three). From the time of his tenure with the Jena Romantics, he upholds the centrality of social institutions in the process of *Bildung*, and both before and after the *Brouillon*, Schleiermacher addresses these arenas for *Bildung* in his writing.

[2] Depending on his circumstances and immediate goals, Schleiermacher would emphasize different arenas for *Bildung*. For instance, in his *Speeches on Religion* (1799), he addresses the role of the church in *Bildung*, particularly in response to his friends' disdain for religion. His *Soliloquies* (1800) explore the role of free sociality in *Bildung*, also in a free-flowing essay form suited to the Jena-Romantic literary context. In line with Schleiermacher's efforts on behalf of educational reform, his pedagogical lectures (throughout

on the topic of *Bildung* then shifts to the realms of the other two goods specified in the *Brouillon*: the academy and the state. By the end of his career, Schleiermacher addresses all four social goods of *Bildung* and the role of the family in the relationship of these goods. In this sense, *Christmas Eve* complements the rest of Schleiermacher's writing on *Bildung*, adding several pieces that otherwise would have remained undeveloped.

Although Schleiermacher's sermons on marriage (1818) treat the function of the family in society (see chapter four), Schleiermacher never returns, after *Christmas Eve*, to his elaboration of the *extended* family unit, nor does he return to a literary expression of *Bildung* in his later discussions of the topic. Rather than reflecting a change in his overarching theory of *Bildung*, Schleiermacher's later writing on the topic reflects changed circumstances—both for Schleiermacher personally and for Prussia.

Displaced from Halle by the invasion of Napoleon in 1806, Schleiermacher returns to a career as a professor in 1810 at the newly-founded University of Berlin. Schleiermacher embraces his role as a reformer during this period of political and social development, both through his interest in pedagogical innovation at the new university and in his efforts to initiate educational reforms in Prussia, more generally.[3] In the writing precipitated by these activities, Schleiermacher has to address bureaucratic concerns, working from the perspective of the academy and the state.

Schleiermacher's introduction to the second edition of *Christmas Eve* in 1826 refers to this new state of affairs. "Times have changed" ("*Die Zeiten sind jetzt anders als vor*") Schleiermacher notes as he begins (*CE*, 25; *DW*, 99). *Christmas Eve*, he says, reflects upon "[t]he 'great forces of destiny' then [in December, 1805] threateningly

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the 1820s) articulate the role of the academy and its relationship with the state in fostering *Bildung*. The genre with which he addresses *Bildung* has shifted with his audience (now students).

[3] See chapter one for an assessment of Schleiermacher's pedagogical writings during this period.

advancing." By 1826, these forces have "played their role, and the great battle has splintered into a thousand pieces" (*CE*, 25).[4] The Napoleonic threat is no more, and Schleiermacher's interest in solidifying Protestant identity to rally the German people has evolved.

Concerning the thematic role of religion in *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher goes on to state that the religious differences reflected in the narrative persist in some ways, but they "no longer have quite the same truth" (*CE*, 25; *DW*, 99: "*nicht mehr dieselbe Wahrheit hat*").[5] One of largest mitigating factors in an assessment of these changed circumstances is that, when Schleiermacher republishes the piece, he has at least partially settled a major issue at play in *Christmas Eve*: Schleiermacher helped to bring about the Prussian Union of Churches in 1817. Themes like the definition of church community, the helpfulness of festivals for uniting different Christian perspectives, as well as the use of music in uniting Christians, had all served to address the unification of Protestant identity.

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[4] *DW*, 99: "Das große Schicksal, welches damals drohend einherschritt, hat seine Rolle ausgespielt, und in tausend kleine hat sich der große Kampf zersplittert." More explicitly, Napoleon (a 'great force of destiny') no longer presents the unilateral French-Catholic threat against which Germans must unite; the Wars of Liberation (1813-1815) are fought and won. The "splintering" that ensues occurs on several levels: First, the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815) reinforces the fragmentation of German states. Hopes for a unified German nation remain unrealized. Second, after the wars, the reform ideals heralded by intellectuals like Schleiermacher began to conflict with the increasing conservatism of Metternich-era European political tendencies. Particularly in Prussia, tensions rise between the monarchy and advocates of reform as the monarchy reneges on promises of cooperation made during French occupation. As Leonard Krieger, *The German Idea of Freedom: History of a Political Tradition* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 216-217, describes, "the monarch recoiled so far from the spirit of Liberation that the absorption of a popular representation into the constitutional structure of the state was, despite war-time promises, ultimately rejected and the reform tradition was channeled into a non-political bureaucratic liberalism." See also Krieger, 216-272, for a detailed discussion of the post-Liberation period of German politics (1815-1830). In conjunction with this reactive tendency, German liberalism encountered an internal ideological split galvanized by the growing radicalism of a new generation of liberal reformers. Though radicalism became most pronounced after the French revolution of 1830, the activity of student groups during the 1810s and 1820s foreshadowed the movements that developed after 1830 and reached a crescendo in the revolutions of 1848-1849.

[5] Schleiermacher's comments concerning the need for substantial changes if he were to rewrite the piece parallel his insistence that each generation must write theology anew. The underlying truth one wishes to express remains constant, but the language and symbols that resonate with an audience shift over time.

Even with the end of the Napoleonic threat and with several major thematic issues in the work resolved, Schleiermacher still insists upon the relevancy of *Christmas Eve* for nineteenth-century readers. Despite the changing times, Schleiermacher argues that *Christmas Eve* offers a lasting "gift" to readers through its formal depiction of communal interaction. *Christmas Eve*, he states, shows how opposing views "may peacefully coexist in an ordinary living room" (*CE*, 25).[6] And in this way, he avers, the piece continues to possess "effectiveness in promoting the good."[7] The depiction of communal interaction in the extended family unit continues to present readers with a description of *how* to go about the work of *Bildung*.

Schleiermacher addresses a German audience in 1826 still negotiating social and political reforms. Though the Prussian state has begun to solidify its primacy by the 1820's, the relationships between state, church, academy, and family, as in 1806, are not set in stone. Schleiermacher's audience had not yet experienced the final social stratification of education, the mid-century revolutions and transition to an industrialized society, the unification of the German nation, or the creation of the *Kulturstaat*. Although Schleiermacher could not have foreseen these historical developments, each of these factors would weaken the role that Schleiermacher depicts for the family in *Bildung*, transferring that role to the state (and the academy and church as its subordinate arms). In 1826, however, Schleiermacher can still confidently republish his narrative depiction of familial *Bildung* as a viable exemplar for its readers.

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[6] *DW*, 99: " . . . die verschiedensten Auffassungsweisen des Christenthumes hier in einem mäßigen Zimmer nicht etwa nur friedlich neben einander sind, weil sie sich gegenseitig ingoriren, sondern wie sie sich einander freundlich stellen zur vergleichenden Betrachtung."

[7] Ibid., 100: " . . . das Güte fördernde Wirksamkeit zu finden." My translation. Tice reads: "to have its good effect" (*CE*, 26).

Christmas Eve represents an early-nineteenth century tendency toward the role of *Bildung* in German reforms that was crushed under the weight of mid-nineteenth century events Schleiermacher would not live to see. However, *Christmas Eve* does offer a means of constructing a critical narrative of the evolution of *Bildung* in the nineteenth century: As a contrasting vision of social reality, *Christmas Eve* reveals the larger parameters of nineteenth-century understandings of *Bildung* that were pared away by academic and state institutions in an attempt to situate the nexus of *Bildung* within their own domains.

B. Socio-Political Implications: Nineteenth-Century *Bildung* and *Christmas Eve*

Mendelssohn asserted in his 1784 essay (chapter one) that *Bildung* occurs only in the realm of "literary discourse" ("*Büchersprache*"),[8] but a primary application of the term in the nineteenth century developed in the realm of state-institutionalized education (German laws).[9] In the first chapter, pairing the terms *Bildung* and *Erziehung* helped to orient readers within the matrix of meanings for *Bildung* in the eighteenth century. A second pairing, *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft* (science), works similarly in the nineteenth-century context.

1. *Bildung* in the Nineteenth Century: *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft*

While *Bildung* continued, in the nineteenth-century literary sphere, to build upon the eighteenth-century connotations of the term explored in the preceding study, in the

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[8] See discussions of Mendelssohn's article in chapter one; for his reference to the literary focus of *Bildung*, see Mendelssohn, "Enlightenment," 53; "Aufklärung," 193.

[9] Articulations of the meaning of *Bildung* in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries never reached consensus, and the term continued to act in the nineteenth century as a catchword with various connotations. In his *Building a National Literature: The Case of Germany, 1830-1870*, trans. Renate Baron Franciscono (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 249, Peter Uwe Hohendahl summarizes this situation in a way that parallels my description of the eighteenth-century use of *Bildung* in chapter one: "In the mid-nineteenth century great significance was placed on the word *education* (*Bildung*). Everyone claimed to know what the concept meant. The very currency of the expression, its popularity in public discussion, and above all the way it was introduced into social conflicts made it imprecise."

social institutions of state and academy, *Bildung* was imbued in the nineteenth century with a new array of connotations. The shifting relationship between *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft* provides readers with a sense of the issues at stake.

Wissenschaft provides a less-stable conceptual counterpoint to *Bildung* than does *Erziehung*—its meaning remains as hard to capture in English as that of *Bildung*. *Wissenschaft* refers to science, but often in the broadest terms possible, and in the sense of an intellectual discipline. Thus, philosophy is "w*issenschaftlich*," or "scientific." G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), a contemporary and intellectual rival of Schleiermacher at the University of Berlin, presents a helpful example of a generally-recognized use of the two terms as well as their shifting relationship in the nineteenth century.

The young Hegel was influenced, like Schleiermacher, by the discussions of *Bildung* in the Jena milieu. During his younger years, Hegel views *Wissenschaft* (science) as an Enlightenment ideal incapable, in its narrow use of reason, of leading to *Bildung*, since *Bildung* refers to a more encompassing sense of self-cultivation and education that moves well beyond reason.[10] Thus far, Hegel's interpretation of *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft* mirrors eighteenth-century understandings of *Bildung* as formation for life, in general, and *Erziehung* as academic training. But, in his later thinking, Hegel reverses his position on *Wissenschaft*: it becomes, as a philosophical pursuit, *the* essential ingredient of *Bildung*.[11]

Hegel's mature position reflects a broader trend in the nineteenth century (often fueled by Hegelian theories), wherein the solidification of the relationship between the

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[10] Terry Pinckard's descriptions of Hegel's use of the terms *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft* in his *Hegel: A Biography* (Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) provide a helpfully clear overview of Hegel's shifting use of the terms over time. For these early uses of the terms, see Pinckard, 41-42 and 49-51.

[11] Ibid., 87-88.

two terms signals a removal of *Bildung* from practical life in the world.[12] Hegel is concerned, in particular, that government employees receive the training in *Wissenschaft* that leads to *Bildung*, and he views the university as the exclusive locus of such training.[13] Hegel thereby relegates *Bildung* to the academy and to the state, setting the stage for the the isolation of *Bildung* within these two institutions in the nineteenth-century German context.

Hegel's later position solidified after he came to the University of Berlin in 1818. By that time, the connection between state institutions and *Bildung* had grown considerably through large-scale efforts at educational reform between 1809 and 1817, both in universities and lower schools. Education reformers worked with the state to increase general literacy rates, establish colleges for training teachers, and secularize school curricula.[14]

The early-nineteenth century educational reforms created a collusive bond between state and academy and led to a re-interpretation of *Bildung* by each institution reflective of their particular goals in the nineteenth-century socio-political context. In the push towards nationhood, German state institutions located *Bildung* under their auspices, crafting the state as the harbinger of *Bildung*. Meanwhile, the academy claimed *Bildung* as well, framing *Bildung*, as we will see below, as a personal quality that indicates social status.

The following sections place *Christmas Eve* in conversation with the developing role of *Bildung* within the academy and the state in the nineteenth century. *Christmas*

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[12] For larger discussion of this relationship between *Bildung* and *Wissenschaft*, see Fritz Ringer, *Toward a Social History of Knowledge: Collected Essays* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), 193-202.
[13] Ibid., 537.
[14] The state de-secularized curricula after the 1848 revolutions, and those measures remained in place until 1872.

Eve notes the tendencies of both state and academy to shape the meaning of *Bildung* in isolation from other institutions, and it also offers the family as an alternative social arena for negotiating the participation of academy and state in the process of *Bildung*.

2. The Academy and *Christmas Eve*

After the initial period of educational reform in which Schleiermacher participated in Berlin, discrepancies developed between the theoretical objectives associated with *Bildung* and their implementation. The neo-humanist educational reforms, advocated and taught by Schleiermacher (as well as others, like Pestalozzi), focused on the cultivation of an individual's unique potential in the formation of a person to full humanity. These goals were reiterated in both academic and legislative settings. In practice, however, this process of *Bildung* was reinterpreted counter to reformers' initial intentions: A person was formed to "full humanity," but by the state and in ways useful to the state *through* a state-run educational system.[15] As Peter Uwe Hohendahl observes:

> The public talked of a theory of education exemplified by Humboldt, Schleiermacher, Johann Pestalozzi, and Adolf Diesterweg. . . . [but] [m]atters were treated one way on the level of theoretical discourse and a very different way in practice. Prussian law, for example, declared, as before, that the principles of individual education served as the standard for school regulation, whereas the administrative policy of the 1850's . . . took a completely different view. The Prussian Ministry of Education and Culture . . . made decisive efforts to control the tendencies toward social change inherent in the idealistic theory of education so that they could be integrated with the conservative principles of the postrevolutionary Prussian state.[16]

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[15] In addition to collapsing boundaries between state and academy, mid-century educational policy collapsed the boundaries between state and church. Ferdinand Stiehl articulates this latter association in his 1850 directives on elementary education: "The life of the *Volk* needs to be fundamentally reconstructed by developing its originally given, eternal realities on a foundation of Christianity, which in its ecclesiastically authorized form will permeate, develop and support family, profession, community, and state" (Translated by Renate Baron Franciscono in Hohendahl, 262). In this system, instruction would focus on the Bible and the inculcation of Christian humility (i.e., obedience to authority).

[16] Ibid., 249.

Within the academy, *Bildung* at least retained the aspect of general, rather than specialized, education at the level of the *Gymnasium* (high school) and university, but against the intention of reformers like Schleiermacher, access to these higher institutions of learning continued to restrict admission according to social class.

As part of early-nineteenth century reforms, the state instituted compulsory schooling, based on the ideal that all humans hold the capacity for *Bildung*; however, it remained almost impossible for a student from a working-class family to gain entrance to a non-vocational high school, and in consequence, to university. The university academy developed an interpretation of *Bildung* associated with this social stratification of education: *Bildung* became a social asset, held only by those with university degrees. In this way, the state declared itself the bearer of the standards of *Bildung*, and the academy declared itself the sole possessor of the qualities of *Bildung*.

Fritz Ringer has described this isolation of *Bildung* within the privileged university class.[17] He traces the fragmentation of education between the "classical" education offered by the gymnasiums and the "modernist" education offered by the "*Realschulen*." The classicist schools upheld the ideal of what we would call a "liberal arts education": a broad-based education in a variety of subjects, rather than training in subjects that will prepare a student for a particular profession. However, the nineteenth-century classicists had a stringent notion of this type of education, which rejected the teaching of even modern languages, focusing instead on subjects like ancient Greek and

[17] Fritz Ringer, in *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933* (Hanover: University Press of New England, 1969), focuses his work on the reaction of the academic class in Germany to their sense of their waning socio-political influence at the turn of the twentieth century. Ringer's discussion of the relationship between the academy and the state in this context emphasizes the way in which the academy had long accepted the role of the state in sustaining the academy. I redirect Ringer's observations in order to elaborate how, in this era, the state and academy work as parallel actors, as well as intersecting actors, in their development of the ideal of *Bildung*.

philosophy. The modernist schools, in contrast, offered more practical subjects (for example, teaching modern languages, rather than Greek) that would prepare students for professional life.

Ringer points to the solidification of these views in the 1850's, and, he states, "[b]y the 1870's and 1880's, the stiffening competition for places in the civil service and in free professions[18] had further aggravated existing antagonisms, and the conflict between classicism and modernism in secondary education had assumed the character of a class war. . . . [I]t was eminently clear by now that gymnasium cultivation was an upper-class trait."[19] The "mandarins"—the term that Ringer uses for the academic class associated with the classical notion of education—used *Bildung* as a weapon in the fight to secure their social status.

As with state articulations of *Bildung*, the academic class theoretically upheld the principles of *Bildung* that advocated a broad process of formation, while practically undermining these principles. The definitions of *Bildung* echoed those of writers like Herder and Goethe: *Bildung* is formation for *life*, not vocational training. It cultivates and harmonizes one's internal faculties through social interaction. Practically, however, *Bildung* functioned for the academic class not as a life process but as the acquisition and display of a quantifiable asset: *Bildung* became a particular knowledge-set used to distinguish oneself socially. For the academic class, such *Bildung* stood in direct contrast

[18] The "free professions" would include skilled craftsmen as well as specialists in technological fields (like mining, for example). Professions not "free" would include clerical (as in clergy), professorial, and bureaucratic positions.
[19] Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins*, 29.

with the knowledge one acquired in the "schools of useful junk" ("*Nutzlichkeitskramschulen*"), as they referred to the modernist schools.[20]

In *Christmas Eve*, the interactions of Leonhardt with the rest of the gathered company serve as a counter-argument to this approach to *Bildung*. Leonhardt, the company's academic rationalist, is the character who propels *all* of the direct references to *Bildung* in the piece (see chapter four). He seems more concerned about solidifying the parameters of *Bildung* than others in the group, and he is the only one who distinguishes the "cultivated" and the "uncultivated" as two separate groups of people (*CE*, 71; *DW*, 84). Though these latter comments are made ironically, they nonetheless reinforce a real distinction that he feels between himself and those who lack academic training.

The extended family unit in *Christmas Eve* incorporates Leonhardt in their interactions as one perspective. Leonhardt readily accepts this flexibility, and Schleiermacher portrays his academic arrogance as a consequence of relative youth and inexperience. Leonhardt does not get to define *Bildung* for the entire company. Indeed, at the close of *Christmas Eve*, Josef calls into question the usefulness of academic discourse to treat the Christmas festival, suggesting that music and singing are more fitting than learned discussion for the gathering. As I argued in chapter four, Schleiermacher arranges the piece so that all views, even the most contradictory (like those of Leonhardt and Josef), find a place in the communal discourse, ensuring that no view is ever negated completely.

Leonhardt's perspective, however, came to characterize the position of the university class in Germany—young and old. The university elite centralized *Bildung* in

[20] Ibid.

the academy, fueling the creation of homogenous 'extended family units' comprised of those with university degrees. In *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher depicts the extended family unit as a central arena for *Bildung*. Familial interactions encompass perspectives from church, state, and academy without relinquishing control to any particular viewpoint, or to the social institutions that these views might represent. *Christmas Eve* also presents *Bildung* as a process shared by those in different stages of life, in different professions, and of different genders. Schleiermacher reminds the reader that all people can act as participants in the process of formation to full humanity; the extended family unit portrays how this process of *Bildung* can function in modern German society.

3. The *Kulturstaat, Christmas Eve*, and Family

Schleiermacher's *Christmas Eve* stood in contrast not only to the homogenization of *Bildung* within the academy, but also to the isolation of *Bildung* within state institutions. One major means used by the state to harness *Bildung* was its embrace in the nineteenth century of the idea of a *Kulturstaat*, which equates state and culture.

Although J.G. Fichte introduced this idea of *Kulturstaat*, G.W.F. Hegel's elaboration of the concept in his political philosophy served as the basis for its use among both bourgeois reformers and socialists as an explanatory frame for nineteenth-century political policies.[21] As Wolf Lepenies describes in his study of *Kultur* in the nineteenth-century German context, the old split between culture (and, relatedly, *Bildung*) and politics "changed after the transition from a cultural to a political nationalism in the first half of the nineteenth century. Now politics was seen in Germany as the guarantor of

[21] For a compact introduction to the development of the *Kulturstaat*, see Hans Joachim Hahn, *German Thought and Culture from the Holy Roman Empire to the Present Day* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 91-127.

culture, and culture provided politics with additional legitimacy."[22] For Hegel, the *Kulturstaat* reflects his commitment to the idea that the state embodies the culture of a nation.[23] As the conception of the *Kulturstaat* develops in the mid-nineteenth century, the state serves as both the defender and disseminator, and thereby the definer, of the shared culture that unifies the German nation and shapes the identity of individual Germans. The state dictates norms for church, academy, and family, acting as the central authority for all social institutions pursuing the *Bildung* of the nation.

Schleiermacher's theory of *Bildung* in the *Brouillon* integrates the ideas of state and culture (*Kultur*) in a way that parallels Fichte and Hegel's later articulations of a *Kulturstaat*.[24] "The state," Schleiermacher writes, "rests totally on the foundation of culture and is nothing other than culture itself elevated to its highest potency" (*NE*, 61). Despite Schleiermacher's ringing endorsement of the close association of state and culture, however, his ethical theory places the reins of control in the hands of culture rather than the state. Culture propels the articulation of state; state 'rests on its foundations' and *culture* 'elevates' the *state* to 'its highest potency.' In this way, the power dynamic of state and culture theorized by Schleiermacher is the inverse of that elaborated in the mid-nineteenth idea of *Kulturstaat*.

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[22] Wolf Lepenies, *The Seduction of Culture in German History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 18.

[23] Hegel elaborates his notion of *Kulturstaat* in lectures published as *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H.B. Nisbet and ed. Allen Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 375 especially. In these lectures, Hegel's theory of the relationship of culture and state is more complex than later applications of the term by German reformers interested in articulating the power of the state in defining culture. Hegel does equate culture and state, but he also describes the role of culture as guiding the formation of the state, rather than the state guiding the definition of culture.

[24] In his elaboration of the relationship between state and culture Schleiermacher was likely drawing on the work of J.G. Herder (as did Fichte and Hegel). Herder describes the development of culture through a manifestation of the "*Geist des Volkes*" or "spirit of the people," which serves as the basis for national unity. With Herder, Schleiermacher distrusted the isolation of power in a state, however. For Herder's discussion of these issues and use of the phrase "*Geist des Volkes*" see, *Herders Sämmtliche Werke*, ed. Bernhard Suphan (Berlin: Weidmann, 1877-1913), IX, 523-532.

Schleiermacher's perspective in the *Brouillon* also diverges from nineteenth-century articulations of the *Kulturstaat*, in that it focuses on the supremacy of individuality and the limitations of the state as one of four equal goods devoted to *Bildung*. Schleiermacher explicitly combats the idea of the state's hegemony in *Bildung*, writing that, "[n]ot everything actual can be subject to its [the state's] organization; this is the error of the ancients regarding the sufficiency of the state as the highest good" (*NE*, 49). Schleiermacher continues to argue along these lines that, "in antiquity . . . cognition as well as religion were for them a completely national matter. Academy and church did not distinctly separate themselves from the state" (*NE*, 88).[25] The modern state, for Schleiermacher, must not make the mistake of the ancient state and interfere in the church or in the academy.

Academic institutions, Schleiermacher asserts, should present the embrace of universal and particular in the sphere of philosophy, while churches present the embrace of universal and particular in the sphere of feeling, and while free sociality treats the sphere of art (*NE*, 54). The state provides only one facet of the *Bildung* of the German nation. The other goods that promote *Bildung* (free sociality, academy, and church) also serve this function, according to their particular purposes. Schleiermacher's framework of goods creates a check-and-balance system that encourages the expression (and acceptance) of alternative viewpoints.

Christmas Eve explores how this unification of diverse views occurs in the *family* as the arena in which the four goods intersect. The extended family unit in *Christmas Eve* acts as a social institution that develops unity without a unilateral source of power

[25] *BE*, 65: " . . . die Alten . . . wußten . . . daß das Erkennen sowol als die Religion bei ihnen ganz national waren. Akademie und Kirche sonderten sich nicht bestimmt vom Staat."

that enforces homogeneity. In this way, despite its fictional nature and its emphasis on the relation of family and church, *Christmas Eve* describes an alternative to both eighteenth- and the nineteenth-century theories of *Bildung* that either reject the fitness of social institutions like church and state for contributing to *Bildung* or place *Bildung* wholly in the hands of the state.

Schleiermacher's definition of family pushes traditional boundaries: although the basis for his definition of family remains associated with the notion of a nuclear, patriarchal family, the extended family unit depicted in *Christmas Eve* includes friends as well. Schleiermacher's choice of the holy family (portrayed as Mary and Jesus) as his central familial model in the narrative creates a flexibility that can both retain ties to traditional family models and, simultaneously, expand the notion of family beyond relation-by-blood (see chapter four). In addition, the association of family with *Bildung* does not end with the early education of children in the home, but makes family the *perpetual* center of progress in *Bildung* for all members of society. In so doing, Schleiermacher's narrative creates a stepping stone between the eighteenth-century worries of social fragmentariness and the nineteenth-century harnessing of the state as a means for cultivating social cohesion.

The contribution of this position to social thought becomes clearer towards the end of the century: The swift industrialization of Western society, combined with the tendency of modern nation building to place the formation of citizens within the hands of state institutions, disrupted and redefined tradition roles of family in social life. *Christmas Eve* stands as a prescient critique of the collapse of family as an influential arena for the *Bildung* of individuals and communities in the nineteenth-century

Kulturstaat. It simultaneously offers a definition of family that, by expanding its boundaries beyond relation-by-blood, makes it more adaptable to nineteenth- and twentieth-century experiences of social life.

Schleiermacher also offers in *Christmas Eve* an alternative to the emphasis placed on family by nineteenth-century Catholic social thought. Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, *Rerum Novarum* (1891), provides an outline of the Catholic position. Its main focus is the effects of industrialization on the working class, and the encyclical discusses the social role of the worker's family in relation to the state in this situation. Leo defines family as "the 'society' of a man's house—a society very small, one must admit, but none the less a true society, and one older than any State."[26] He elaborates the authority of family vis-à-vis the state in terms of paternal authority (the father as head of the family). He asserts that the state should not "intrude into and exercise intimate control over the family," but, he also insists on the entitlement of families to material needs, which the state should help to provide.[27] He directs these comments to the wealthy and to state, whom he feels must safeguard both the freedom and the well-being of the family.

In the *Brouillon* and then in *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher lays the groundwork for understanding family as the nexus of social institutions, maintaining autonomy in relation to the state. In this position, his narrative and *Rerum Novarum* agree. But, in articulating *how* family functions, *Christmas Eve* creates a response to social constraints upon the family that contrasts the position of the encyclical. While *Rerum Novarum* defends the role of family through a strong appeal to the respect due to paternal authority

[26] Leo XIII, *Encyclical Letter, Rerum Novarum*, par. 12.
[27] Ibid., 14.

within the nuclear family model, *Christmas Eve* broadens the traditional notion of family and removes its narrow association with paternal authority.[28]

Consider Schleiermacher's focus on the holy family as mother and son: Jesus and Mary create a model of family that lacks a prevalent father-figure in Schleiermacher's narrative; a wholeness of familial being arises between the two. The implications of this portrayal within the narrative were discussed in chapter four, and their social relevance now becomes clear: Not only does family form the basis of one's social existence, but also one's family can function in this manner outside of the traditional family model of father-mother-children.

Schleiermacher's position as articulated in *Christmas Eve* has its own problematic implications, including the Christianization of national identity and the separation of male and female participation in *Bildung* along the line of public and private spheres. Nonetheless, the text presents a model of socio-political structuring that creates a strong role for communities that uphold individuality: *Christmas Eve* no longer depicts the striving of an individual in the midst of fragmented social structures (Goethe) or in opposition to constraining social forces (Schlegel), but *through* reciprocal interactions within the extended family unit.[29] Schleiermacher's narrative offers a portrayal of the positive function of 'extended family units' in the formation of their members to full humanity. In this way, *Christmas Eve* holds significant insight on human behavior and

[28] Schleiermacher's 1818 sermons on marriage would wrestle with paternal authority, upholding it while also attempting to secure separate-but-equal roles for wives.

[29] Schleiermacher advocates *Bildung* for both men and women, so within the social constraints of nineteenth-century Europe, family must play the central role in *Bildung*, because only through familial interaction do *all* members of society (regardless of gender or age) have access to *all* the communal goods that contribute to *Bildung*.

social relationships that challenges the structuring of the dominant models of *Bildung* that developed in the nineteenth-century German context.

C. Literary Implications: *Christmas Eve* and *Bildung* Narratives

In chapter two, I argued that *Bildung* acts as the dominating theme of the novel genre envisioned in the *Athenaeum*. *Christmas Eve*, as demonstrated in chapter four, is a *Bildung* narrative. These two observations, taken together, propel *Christmas Eve* into the scholarly milieu of the *Bildungsroman*, or novel of formation.

Christmas Eve's brevity distinguishes it from epic *Bildung* tales like *Wilhelm Meister* or *Anton Reiser*—as Ruth Richardson notes, "it is not a full-fledged *Roman* in the tradition of *Wilhelm Meister*."[30] However, the narrative is only slightly shorter than Schlegel's *Lucinde*. The most striking features of *Christmas Eve* that distinguish it from a typical *Bildungsroman* are its temporal boundaries and the location of its protagonist: the narrative focuses on one evening among friends rather than the growth-to-manhood, over a period of years, of a central protagonist.

Such distinctions, rather than excluding *Christmas Eve* from a literary discussion of *Bildung* suggest the possibility of a broader conversation that reaches beyond traditional definitions of the *Bildungsroman* genre. *Christmas Eve*, as presented in this study, helps us to understand the role of women in *Bildung* narratives, enlarges discussions of the formal demands of *Bildung* narratives, and introduces the possibility of multiple protagonists. In closing, I want to focus on the last issue mentioned: understandings of the protagonist in *Bildung* narratives.

Wilhelm Dilthey famously described the plot of a *Bildungsroman* in the following terms: "A regulated development within the life of the individual is observed, each of its

[30] Ruth Richardson, *Friedrich Schleiermacher's* Weihnachtsfeier *as "Universal Poetry,"* 599 and 604.

stages has its own intrinsic value and is at the same time the basis for a higher stage. The dissonances and conflicts of life appear as the necessary growth points through which the individual must pass on his way to maturity and harmony."[31] Dilthey touches on the theme of growth-through-polar-activity that *Christmas Eve* emphasizes. However, *Christmas Eve* stands out in this context as a narrative of *community Bildung*: the subject matter of Schleiermacher's narrative is not the formation of the life of one individual, but the lives of many individuals who together form an extended family unit.[32] The work creates a point of contrast to the plots of both eighteenth- and nineteenth-century *Bildung* narratives by depicting *multiple protagonists* engaged together in the process of *Bildung*.

Even when scholars have attempted to broaden the definition of *Bildung* literature, its association with the novel and its singular protagonist remains. Martin Swales' broadening of the genre of the *Bildungsroman* offers a prime example: though he stretches the boundaries significantly, his definition still insists upon a plot surrounding "one central figure whose experiences and whose changing self occupy a role of structural primacy within the fiction."[33] Schleiermacher's deviation from this "norm"[34] presents a fresh perspective from which to consider what makes a work a

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[31] Translated by Martin Swales in *The German Bildungsroman from Wieland to Hesse* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 3, from Wilhelm Dilthey, *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* (Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1913), 394.

[32] Schlegel even suggests in his response to the piece that it contains *too* many individuals.

[33] Martin Swales, *The German Bildungsroman from Wieland to Hesse*, 14.

[34] Some scholars question the applicability of any normative claims for *Bildung* literature. The best assessment of evolving scholarship on the *Bildungsroman* is Todd Kontje's *The German Bildungsroman: History of a National Genre.* See chapter two, in the introductory sections for Goethe's *Meister*, for further discussion of the "*Bildungsroman*" as a genre.

narrative of *Bildung*.[35] Schleiermacher offers a depiction of *Bildung*, carried forth in familial interactions between people at various stages of life.

In its nineteenth-century context, Schleiermacher's shift away from the singular male protagonist offers a detailed depiction of the ways in which he envisioned that nineteenth-century men and women could form mutually beneficial social relationships in the pursuit of *Bildung*. Ruth Richardson has already begun work in this direction by placing *Christmas Eve* within the Jena-Romantic tradition of literature and discussing the role of women in the narrative (see chapters one and four). However, I have used *Bildung* in this study to situate *Christmas Eve* in the milieu of broader eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literary trends, where *Christmas Eve* can now contribute to understandings of the historical development of literature beyond its participation in Jena-Romantic poesy.

Conclusion

In his 1826 introduction to the second edition of *Christmas Eve*, Schleiermacher emphasizes the continued value of his narrative, stating that it is "not unworthy to be offered as a Christmas gift" to future readers. He reinforces his commitment to *Bildung*, insisting that the work presents a relevant vision of how humans "with the most varied ways of understanding Christianity" can yet "peacefully coexist, . . . not by ignoring each other but by amiably engaging each other in common reflection and sharing of views" (*CE*, 25-26).

Though *Christmas Eve* focuses on differing Christian perspectives, the tale depicts a negotiation of human diversity and a celebration of individuality not limited to

[35] On my reading, *Christmas Eve* holds promise for considerations of the future of *Bildung* narratives as well, particularly in removing their association with the striving toward adulthood of a singular adolescent/young-adult protagonist.

religious viewpoints. As I explored in chapter four, Schleiermacher's observations on the relation of religion and *Bildung* in *Christmas Eve* rest within and contribute to his overarching view of human nature and to the socio-political structures to which humans, as fundamentally ethical beings, naturally incline. By interpreting *Christmas Eve* through the lens of *Bildung*, this study opens the work to new readership and research. In addition to elaborating the polar methodology and the familial dimensions of Schleiermacher's thinking on *Bildung*, *Christmas Eve* allows us to understand better the socio-political development of *Bildung* in the nineteenth century as well as the literary development of *Bildung* narratives.

Appendix A:

Christmas Eve Synopsis

Christmas Eve divides into three sections: 1) gift exchange and discussion, 2) the women's narratives, and 3) the men's speeches.

Section One: Discussion

Section one begins with a description first of the setting and then of the characters, who consist of a circle of friends gathered for Christmas Eve. Ernestine and Eduard (along with their young daughter Sofie) are hosting the company in their home. Joining them are the betrothed Ernst and Friederike, Agnes (who has brought her two children and is expecting her third child), Leonhardt, and Karoline. Another member of the circle, Josef, arrives at the end of the narrative.

Sofie is not yet old enough to make gifts for the others, but, after the gift-exchanging, she presents an elaborate model of the nativity scene, surrounded by great moments in Christian history. The guests then join together in song and move to discussion of their gifts and the festive joy they share. The conversation turns to Sofie and the role of piety in Sofie's "*Bildung*" (*CE*, 39; *DW*, 54). Leonhardt worries that Sofie's parents allow her piety too liberal expression. The topic turns more broadly, then, to the way in which art and religion should interact in a person's life, with Leonhardt arguing that they do not interact at all for him and the rest of the company asserting their essential relation.

Leonhardt then questions Sofie concerning her emotional states in order to prove her piety has the wrong impetus: He attempts in several ways to coerce her to state that she craves feelings of joy and that this desire motivates her actions. The exchange

between Leonhardt and Sofie leads the company into a discussion of the importance of maintaining childlike attitudes throughout life. The topic continues as they discuss the different experiences of men and women as they enter adulthood. Eduard asserts that men and women perfect their spiritual natures through interaction—through the exchange of "complementary knowledge" (*DW*, 70: "*gegenseitiges Erkennen*").

Section Two: The Women's Narratives

Building on the idea of men's and women's complementary knowledge, Friederike notes the role of women in maintaining the tradition of festivals, asserting that women's spiritual development might be traced through their vivid memories of such festivals. Leonhardt proposes that the women should recount some of these memories to the group, particularly concerning the Christmas festival. Ernestine agrees to go first, and Friederike takes up a position at the piano, explaining that she expresses herself better through music.

Ernestine tells of a girlhood Christmas when she goes to hear the singing at church. During the service, Ernestine eyes a mother sitting alone with her baby, gazing fixedly upon him. Ernestine views this pair as a living representation of Mary and Jesus. She is so moved, that she approaches unconsciously and asks if she can give a gift to the child. She pours out her store of sweets into the baby's lap, and the mother in turn gives Ernestine a pin so she might recognize Ernestine at a later time. Through many future interactions, the woman becomes one of the greatest influences in the development of Ernestine, and eventually her sister-in-law. Friederike then completes the narrative with further music, and Sofie joins in with a hymn by Novalis.

Agnes then begins her narrative, recalling her celebration of Christmas the previous year, when she spent Christmas helping her brother and his wife, who had just had their first child. Those gathered search for presents to give the baby for his future life. Agnes's brother, a clergyman, confides that he too has a present for the baby: he will baptize the child that night. While they present their various gifts for the baby's future, Ferdinand slips away and prepares for the baptism. They are all shocked when he returns dressed for the ceremony. He reminds him of the fittingness of their participation, for it is not simply he and the child's mother, but the entire gathered company, who hold "the power of the higher life" that should "stream out to him" (*CE*, 62; *DW*, 77).

Leonhardt interrupts, noting how this narrative is an inverse of the last: here the light streams *into* the child, whereas in the last narrative the light streamed *out from* the child Ernestine had encountered at church. Agnes agrees, and recalls how Sofie's unconscious use of lighting in her presentation of the nativity captured perfectly the reflection of light *between* child and mother.

After more music from Friedrike and singing, Karoline introduces her narrative by telling Friederike she will have to prepare to move from the current joyous themes to those of sadness, though she promises a happy ending. She, like Agnes, relates her experience of the previous Christmas, which she spent in her friend Charlotte's home. Charlotte's youngest child had been ill for several weeks. A few days before Christmas, she finally recognizes the direness of her son's illness, and makes peace with his ensuing death. The next day, the exhausted mother hands her child to Karoline to care for so that she can sleep. During this time, the child passes through a crisis and begins to recover. The mother awakens and is overcome with joy: her son is reborn, not as an angel, but

again as the child she felt she had lost. The company discusses the story in terms of its presentation of yet another Mary-figure.

At this point, the conversation is interrupted by the entrance of a band of acquaintances who are traveling about town, visiting friends. They are welcomed in with food and drink and Sofie re-lights her diorama to show the guests. The newly-arrived guests invite the circle of friends to join them as they continue on, but the party demurs and the revelers depart.

Section Three: The Men's Speeches

Ernst insists that, since they have opted to remain in conversation rather than to travel with the revelers, the men should return the favor of the ladies' narratives. Men, he states, are not gifted narrators, but that they might present speeches on the festival.

Leonhardt proposes to eulogize the festival (present its excellences and perfections) rather than commend it (represent its essential character as good). That is, he'll discuss *how* it goes about fulfilling its essential character in an excellent manner. He asserts that reading the Scriptures would present the means for celebrating the birth of Jesus only for the educated classes ("*wir Gebildetem*," *CE*, 71; *DW*, 84). The festival of Christmas, however, brings the biblical narratives to life for all Christians. He muses that Christianity in his day has less to do with the historical activities of Christ than most Christians would like to admit. In fact, events in the life of Christ, including his "supernatural birth" did not at first figure prominently in the preaching of Christianity. The festival of Christmas has brought the historical event of Christ's birth back to a place of prominence, and because it has moved beyond words (the biblical narratives) to actions, it has done so in a way that dissolves the logical tensions between the biblical

accounts of Jesus' birth. The festival has flourished primarily because of its connection with children who embrace and carry on its traditions, continuing them into their adulthood. He sees especially in the celebration the interplay of light and darkness (the star in the night) and the maintenance of mystery (through gift-giving).

Ernst says that he will address the topic, but not in an effort to refute Leonhardt. He states that Leonhardt has given a one-sided definition of a festival as a "commemoration of something," and Ernst wants to bring out the object of commemoration not as a historical event, but as an idea that excites feelings of joy. Ernst wishes to argue against those who would say that the trappings of the festival (the gifts) rather than the festival, itself, evoke the joy associated with the festival. He sets out to prove his point by demonstrating that redemption through Christ offers the source of all other joys that Christians experience. He goes on to explain that redemption is the dissolution of natural oppositions within humans. Humans need a Redeemer in whom such oppositions have never existed. The company discusses whether, by Ernst's definition, women are in need of redemption, since they naturally unite oppositions within them (like Jesus).

Eduard then begins his speech. To overcome the historical difficulties that Leonhardt introduced into understandings of the life of Jesus, Eduard focuses on the *least* historical of the gospel narratives of the birth of Christ, using John 1 as a the birth-story. As a result, the point is not where or when, but the fact that the Word of God, who both was God and was with God, was made flesh. By flesh, he explains, is meant the finite and sensible, and by the Word is meant "thinking, coming to know" (*CE*, 82; *DW*, 94: *der Gedanke, das Erkennen*). This embrace of finite and infinite helps Christians focus on

human nature, seen in its wholeness as an earthly entity coming to know itself in relation to "its eternal being" (*DW*, 95).[1] Humans, by nature, are forever in the process of raising themselves to the divine. This occurs, argues Eduard, in fellowship. Such fellowship is the Church, and all those who awaken to this type of self-consciousness enter the Church. The self-consciousness does not necessitate "science" (*CE*, 83; *DW*, 95 "*Wissenschaft*"), but, as in the case of women, can be achieved in "immediate experience" (*CE*, 83; *DW*, 95: *Empfindung*). The fellowship finds its historical beginning and its model in the self-consciousness of Jesus, and the birth of Christ then represents the "higher birth" of all self-conscious humans (humans awakened to full humanity).

At this point, Eduard announces that he will not be the last to speak, for their friend Josef had arrived. Josef replies that he has not come for learned discourse (which he guesses that Leonhardt has had a hand in introducing), but to share in the joy of the festival. He urges the company to become like children and embrace the joy of the occasion. Josef calls for Sofie to be brought to him, insisting they end their discussions so that all might sing together.

[1] I use my own translation here, because the 1826 edition that Tice uses for his translation differs substantially in this passage.

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