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Hangyul Song

April 6, 2017
The Development of Marriage Migrant Policies in South Korea:  
a case study on policy framing development

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2017
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An abstract of  
a thesis submitted to the Faculty of Emory College of Arts and Sciences  
of Emory University in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements of the degree of  
Bachelor of Arts with Honors

Department of Political Science

2017
Abstract
The Development of Marriage Migrant Policies in South Korea: a case study on policy framing development
By Hangyul Song
This honors thesis analyzes marriage migrant policy framing development in South Korea to better understand marriage migrant policy developments process and furthermore to test the existing policy framing theories. South Korea’s rapid industrialization and urbanization led to an increasing number of rural bachelors seeking for brides abroad, hence commencing the feminized international marriage migration in South Korea. This phenomenon increased throughout the 2000’s and revealed multiple social problems arising from maltreatment of and the lack of protection for migrant population. The South Korean government responded to these issues through policies with particular frames such as multicultural families, promoting healthy family, and managing marriage brokerage market. Policy framing theories assume that these policy frames were developed through a bottom-up process and in conjunction with agenda setting. This paper tests these two assumptions by identifying and assessing the roles of actors involved in four episodes of marriage migrant policy development. Expert interviews and secondary data collection revealed that both civil society actors and state actors participated in creating frames for marriage migrant policies to a varying degree in each episode. Civil society actors mainly participated in agenda setting and issue framing while state actors framed the policy solution to the problems. The results showed that marriage migrant policy framing development was overall a more top-down process than a bottom-up process. Additionally, the analysis revealed the need to distinguish framing of the issues from framing of the solutions in order to assess the connectivity between agenda setting and framing. Lastly, a comparison between marriage migrant policy case and migrant workers’ movement case in South Korea depicted that the strength of civil society organization and the policy intention of the state can alter the actors’ role in policy framing.
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Political Science Honors Program

2017
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Rick Doner, for his thoughtful guidance through this process and his genuine interest in the topic and my academic growth. I thank the generosity of [Donor’s Name] and Emory University Political Science Department Undergraduate Research Grant for funding my research in South Korea. I also want to thank my family and friends who showed endless support and encouragement throughout the creating of this thesis. Lastly, I would like to thank all my interviewees for taking their time to share their knowledge, opinion, and experience.
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Introduction

A twenty-three-year-old Vietnamese woman living in a rural providence saw an advertisement of a South Korean international marriage agency looking for young women to marry South Korean men. She had heard of other Vietnamese women who married South Korean men through these agencies and how the women were able to send money to their families from South Korea. Although she had doubts, she learned that marrying a South Korean man provided an easier way to live and work in South Korea than to apply for the expensive work visa. She thought that her life in Korea would provide a better future for her and her family than staying in Vietnam. So she contacted the agency. The agency matched her with a South Korean who paid her and her family then would sponsor her to move to South Korea. After some online correspondence, the South Korean man came to Vietnam to meet her. Later that week, she decided to marry him and they held the ceremony in Vietnam. The agency took care of most of the paperwork and she moved to South Korea later that month.

When she got to her new home, she quickly realized that her newly wedded life would be very different than what she imagined. Her husband lived in a rundown home in a rural town, which contrasted with her expectation of a developed Korean city that she saw in TV shows. Her husband lived with his elderly mother who constantly yelled at her in Korean. To make the matters worse, her husband’s boiler repairing job barely made enough money for the family and his gambling habits made the problems worse. However, she did not know much Korean so she could not communicate with her mother-in-law and her husband. She only had few Vietnamese friends in the area so she seldom had the chance to share her frustrations. Ten weeks into the marriage, her mother-in-law began to physically assault her. Since she did not
know how the Korean legal system worked, she reached out to a migrant women’s center and was admitted into a migrant women’s shelter in the city where she stayed for a month and a half.

Later, her husband promised to move away from his mother and got a small studio apartment for them. Her time at the shelter was limited so she decided to move back in with her husband. She became pregnant soon after. However, her husband’s gambling and alcohol problems continued and he physically and verbally abused her whenever she tried to address the issue. When she was eight months pregnant, she texted her Vietnamese friend picture evidence of the abuses and admitted that she wanted to divorce him. Her friend convinced her to stay with the husband until she had the child since the divorce could jeopardize her eligibility to apply for naturalization. So she stayed and gave birth to her son. A few weeks later, she mentioned to her husband that she wanted a divorce. Her furious husband grabbed a kitchen knife stabbed her to death with 53 puncture wounds. The police found her eighteen-day-old son crying next to her murdered body. The husband was taken to the district jail but his sentence remains unknown to the public (Han, 2011).

This heart-breaking story may sound like an extraordinary outlier among the marriage migrant population. However, this story is a representation of the social issues marriage migrants experience in South Korea. A long list of marriage migrant women have been murdered by their Korean spouse, seven marriage migrant women were killed in 2014 alone. A study estimated that marriage migrant women in South Korea are 40% more likely to experience domestic violence than native-born women due to the language and cultural barrier, vulnerable citizenship status, and limited access to resources and interventions. (Byun, 2008;
Han, 2011). In addition, their unstable citizenship status in the South Korean society exposes marriage migrants to many other social problems such as discrimination, poverty, and trafficking. Many women who migrated to South Korea through a marriage have never found their Korean dream.

Mass migration of marriage migrant women began in 1990’s and rapidly increased throughout the early 2000’s. The number of marriage migrant women exceeded a quarter million people in 2016. However, policies regarding marriage migrants were limited to immigration policies so there was a gap between the social problems and government protection. In 2008, the first sets of social support policies for marriage migrants came out under the name of ‘multicultural family’ policies. The two major new multicultural family policies were the Multicultural Family Support Act (MFSA) and the Marriage Broker Business Management Act (MBBMA).

My research question is how the new social support policies, the MBBMA and the MFSA, developed when previous policies focused on immigration control. In particular, I am curious as to how the new concept of multiculturalism in MFSA and market regulation focus in the MBBMA received the most attention in making of these new policies. Furthermore, I want to understand how the term multicultural family frame became a marketing tool used to describe the marriage migrant families and the new policies that are meant to support them and supervise the marriage migration market. I approach these questions by following the development of policies responding to mass marriage migration in South Korea from early 2000s to 2017 through the lens of framing theories. Framing theories explain the first part of a policy development process where a particular social issue triggers a policy response. Therefore,
I use policy framing literature to explain how marriage migrant issues led to the development of multicultural family policies. More importantly, I use the case of marriage migrant policy development to test the predictions about the role of the actors in policy framing theories.

My analysis is organized in the following way. I first provide background on the marriage migrant phenomenon and the history of marriage migrant related policy development. The second section discusses policy framing theories, my hypothesis and my research design. Then I present my findings by expanding my case into four stages of policy framing development: Multicultural family support framing, market management framing, immigration framing, then healthy family framing. After the case analysis, I compare my case with the migrant worker movement in South Korea to further test my hypothesis. I conclude with limitations, suggestions, and future directions.

Part I: The Background on Marriage Migration in South Korea

The history of international and interracial relationships started with Korean women having involuntary relationships with foreign men. In fact, the history of international relationships taps into the less proud side of Korean history and therefore had a very negative connotation. Starting with older dynasties in the Korean peninsula, many Korean women were captured during foreign invasions and involuntarily moved to the invader’s country. As a result, the Korean society considered these dislocated women as a shameful evidence of the state’s failure and shamed and alienated the women even when they came back to Korea. Similarly, during Japanese colonization, a large amount of Korean women served as mistresses to Japanese men and later to US military men after the liberation in 1945. Throughout the history, most Koreans who provided intimate services to foreigners were women. Considering that
patriarchal Korean society traditionally consider married daughters no longer a part of her family, the Korean society further alienated the women who married foreigners and the children from interracial unions (Lee, 2008). In fact, South Korean family laws discriminated against these women by not granting Korean citizenship to the children of a Korean mother and a foreign father. Korean men could pass down the Korean citizenship to their children regardless of the mother’s nationality.

However, the gender ratio of international interracial relationship switched around 1980’s when South Korean men started to marry foreigners more than South Korean women did (Lee, 2008). This gender shift in international marriages marks the beginning of the mass feminized marriage migration phenomenon in South Korea. One of the first mass international marriages between Korean men and foreign women began with Unification Church’s mass international marriage between 950 Japanese women and Korean men in 1988 (Ahn, 2006). This event publicized mass marriage migration of foreign women without stirring up as much negative reactions from the public because this phenomenon was religious act and involved formal marriages of men. In a way, this event legitimized international marriages without the negative rhetoric used for Korean women’s international relationships. But this event does not represent the following trend in international marriages and marriage migration. Mass marriage migration of foreign women into South Korea began to expand in a non-religious context.

The gender shift in marriage migration is a consequence of South Korea’s population change from rapid urbanization, industrialization and globalization (Kim, 2009). Throughout 1960 to 1980, the accelerating industrialization in new South Korean cities required cheap,
unskilled labor from the rural areas. While many able-bodied rural men with familial responsibilities stayed with their families, many young, unmarried rural women migrated into the cities that guaranteed more economic profitability than rural areas. As a result, 40% of total urban migrants between 1966 and 1970 were young women between the age of 15 and 24, and this rate increased to 48.5% between 1971-1975, both of which show that young urban women migrated to the cities more than any other urban migrant groups (Kim, 2011). Many young urban migrant women became started their own families as city proletariats and did not return to their rural hometowns. This led to many aging bachelors in the rural areas to face shortages of eligible spouses. As urbanization and development continued, families were encouraged to have fewer children and hence nuclear families with fewer children began to replace larger traditional families. Once the rapid development began to slow down, South Korea began to face concerns of an aging society with a disproportionately small young population (Anand, 2015).

As a solution to unhappy bachelors and population shrinkage, rural municipalities with a large number of bachelors began to promote international marriages between the rural bachelors and ethnically Korean ‘Joseonjok’ women from Northern China and Mongolia (Kim, 2015).

1 Joseonjok refers to ethnic Koreans who migrated to Central Asia and Northern China during late 19th century and early 20th century. Some Joseonjok assimilated to their regional surroundings but many have kept the language and Korean cultures. Because the Joseonjok emigrated for different reasons in the history, it is a heterogeneous group. There have been a long discussion and divided opinions on Joseonjok’s relation to South Korean nationality and their immigration status into South Korea.
Rural municipalities encouraged international marriage brokers to recruit foreign brides and to process the marriage process. The demand for marriage migrants increased as domestic bride shortages deepened (Kim, 2009). Joseonjok women looked like Korean nationals and hence eased their social integration and shielded them from social rejection as foreigners. Hence, the mass marriage migration began as Joseonjok women migrated to South Korea with a specific intent to wed South Korea men in exchange of monetary and social benefits. However, the increase of ‘fake marriages’ involving Joseonjok women in addition to anti-Joseonjok sentiments building up in South Korea resulted in stricter visa restrictions for Joseonjok women in late 90’s. Stricter visa restrictions for Chinese women led marriage brokers to begin recruiting marriage migrants from Southeast Asia in the early 2000s (Kim, 2009; Byun et al, 2008). Table 1 shows how the number of Chinese marriage migrants decreases significantly in 1998 while the number of Southeast Asian women from Vietnam, the Philippines, and Thailand increases starting in 2000’s. Therefore, mass marriage migration into South Korea became a more globalized phenomenon.

By the early to mid 2000’s, South Korea experienced a rapid increase of female marriage migrants coming into South Korea on a spouse visa. According to Table 2, the rate of international marriages increased ten times from 1990 to 2007. Additionally, table 2 shows that there were over twice as many foreign wives than foreign husbands among the international marriages, which depicts feminized trend in marriage migration. Table 1 also shows that there are about 400,000 foreign wives residing in South Korea by 2015. Population study in 2014 revealed that about 80% of foreign wives met their spouses through a marriage broker, which shows about 300,000 marriage migrants moved to South Korea through this new international
marriage market (Table 3). Furthermore, because the first wave of demand for marriage migrants came from the rural areas where many bachelors work in the farming or fishing industries, the rate of international marriages between Korean fishermen and farmer men increases to 40% between 2005 and 2008, and then decreases afterwards. However, only about 10% or less of total marriage migrants are marrying fishermen and farmers. This indicates that the marriage migration is no longer a rural phenomenon and happens across rural-urban boundaries (KOSIS, 2015).

Table 1: Nationality of Foreign Wives, 1993 – 2015; Source: KOSIS, 2016, Korean Population Statistics

|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Total                            | 3,109| 3,072| 2,963| 2,647| 9,275| 7,746| 5,370| 4,945| 6,994| 6,981| 8,238| 8,750| 9,195| 8,323| 9,139| 8,562| 8,280| 8,160| 7,925| 7,925| 8,887| 8,887| 8,887| 100.00%
| Taiwan                          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| The Philippines                |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Vietnam                        |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Cambodia                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Laos                           |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Malaysia                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Indonesia                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Thailand                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Nepal                          |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Mongolia                       |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| China                          | 2,8313 | 2,043 | 8,482 | 9,273 | 7,386 | 4,728 | 2,864 | 3,568 | 6,977 | 7,023 | 13,377 | 12,869 | 22,582 | 24,269 | 15,048 | 11,604 | 11,363 | 9,623 | 7,149 | 7,036 | 6,058 | 5,993 | 4,545 | 199,920 | 52.12%
| Japan                          | 826  | 145  | 1,412 | 2,870 | 1,078 | 747  | 912  | 819  | 703  | 690  | 854  | 829  | 883  | 1,085 | 1,290 | 1,163 | 1,140 | 1,289 | 1,125 | 1,209 | 1,213 | 1,202 | 1,095 | 1,087 | 9.37%
| Kazakhstan                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Uzbekistan                     |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Canada                         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| United States                  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Australia                      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| New Zealand                    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Kyrgyzistan                    |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Brazil                         |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
| Other or unknown               |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |

Table 2: International Marriages, 1990-2007; Source: KNSO, 2007, Population Statistics; Cited from Hyuk-Rae Kim, 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Marriages</th>
<th>International Marriage (%)</th>
<th>Foreign Wives</th>
<th>Foreign Husbands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% out of total marriages</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>% out of total marriages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>399,312</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>398,484</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>10,365</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>334,030</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>7,304</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>320,063</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10,006</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>306,573</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>11,017</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>304,932</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>19,214</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>310,944</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>25,594</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>316,375</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>31,180</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>332,752</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>30,208</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>345,597</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>29,140</td>
<td>8.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990-2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>219,290</td>
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</table>

Table 3: How Marriage Migrants met Their Spouses; Source: KOSIS, 2014, Ministry of Gender Equality and Family National Survey on Marriage Brokers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Met through a Marriage broker (%)</th>
<th>Introduced by Family and Relatives (%)</th>
<th>Introduced by Friends and Colleagues (%)</th>
<th>Introduced by neighbors (%)</th>
<th>Introduced by acquaintances (%)</th>
<th>Through a religious group (%)</th>
<th>Alone without the help of others (%)</th>
<th>Others (%)</th>
<th>don't know/ No response (%)</th>
<th>Total (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>19–24</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<td>0.7</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>30–34</td>
<td>51</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Over 35</td>
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<td>81.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<td>4.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Less than middle</td>
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<td>84.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>After college</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
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<td>Employment Status</td>
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<td>Employed</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>100</td>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yong-inam</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
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<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>92.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
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<td>70.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
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The increase of marriage migrants had some alarming social implications. First, many marriage migrants and their children reported to experiencing discrimination from families and strangers (Kim, 2006; KOSIS, 2013). Second, marriage migrant women in South Korea are especially susceptible to multitude of domestic violence because of greater power distance, language barrier, lack of knowledge on resources, and cultural barrier. Additionally, marriage migrants are more vulnerable to immigration related abuses due to their insecure citizenship status (Byun, 2008). The average rate of domestic violence against marriage migrants is 40% higher than the average rate among ethnically Korean women (Byun, 2008).

Furthermore, a national survey on marriage migrants identified that the majority of marriage migrants experienced devastating poverty (Seol et al, 2005). Many of the South Korean bachelors came from low socio-economic background. The absence of regulations on marriage brokerage and visa sponsorship encouraged financially inadequate men to sponsor marriage migrants. Because sponsoring a marriage migrant cost a lot, many bachelors became even poorer by the time marriage migrants moved (Freeman, 2011). The husband’s poverty combined with limited employment opportunities available for marriage migrants worsened their experience with poverty.

Additionally, these international marriages proved to be difficult. Many of the marriages were matched with short courtship process and each party often lacked proper information about each other. Many marriage migrants moved to South Korea with the expectation of living a more contemporary and urban life in South Korea but were faced with older, poorer, and rural men. Many men from more traditional backgrounds still lived with their parents and marriage migrant women were expected to learn from the parents-in-laws and serve them as a
caretaker. The high domestic violence rate, poverty rate, communication issues, and the mismatch of expectations led the divorce rate to increase among multicultural families (Kim, 2007). Additionally, the malpractices of marriage broker agencies led to human trafficking allegations and raised concerns for violating human rights both internationally and domestically (Byun, 2008).

The Korean government initiated numerous policy changes in order to respond to these consequential implications within the realm of immigration policy. In 1998, the Nationality Law changed to allow children with a Korean citizen parent regardless of the parent’s gender to receive Korean citizenship. Before this change, only the children with Korean father could get Korean citizenship. This change expanded the concept that people from non-ethnically homogeneous background can receive Korean citizenship. In 2002, the Ministry of Justice allowed marriage migrants on F-1 Visa, a visiting and family joining visa, to seek employment to address the issue that most of them needed employment but could not work. Regarding the issue that if a divorced foreign spouse had to leave their children and return to their country of origin unless the divorce was the Korean spouse’s responsibility. In 2002, the Ministry of Justice policy reduced documentary evidence needed to prove the responsibility of the Korean spouse. Then, in 2003, divorced foreign spouses could apply for naturalization after living in Korea for a certain period of time if the Korean spouse was dead or missing, divorced due to the spouse’s fault, or raising a child. In 2004, marriage migrants were included under the new group of immigrants who can have an easier naturalization process (gan-ye-gwi-hwa-bub), granting marriage migrants a status as denizens who have similar rights and privileges as citizens. As described in this section, government policies for marriage migrants were exclusively
immigration policies up to this point. However, these immigration policies were not enough to reduce the social issues arising among marriage migrant families.

Then after 2006, policy discussion regarding social problems of the contemporary marriage migrants changed to focus on two major areas: family support and broker business management. One of the reasons behind this change came from the increase of awareness on marriage migrants. New nation-wide researches were coming out about marriage migrants and their families as international marriages were no longer just a rural phenomenon but expanded among younger and urban population. More marriage migrants were becoming naturalized which gave them future political representation. The sheer increase in the numbers of marriage migrants and their children made multicultural families more visible, which caught the attention of civil society organizations, activists, and politicians. More importantly, marriage migration itself was an unregulated market where unregistered brokers of various capacities easily took advantage of their customers. Domestic and international organizations including the UN raised their concerns about this unregulated market (Working, 2008).

Therefore, the two ‘multicultural family policies’ were born in 2008. In June of 2008, the House of Assembly passed the Act on Regulation of Marriage Brokerage Agency, later called Marriage Broker Business Management Act (hereafter MBBMA), and Multicultural Families Support Act (hereafter MFSA) in September of 2008. These policies went under the newly made division for ‘multicultural families’ first in the Ministry of Health, Welfare, Family Affairs then

\[\text{Footnote 2}\]

This phrase ‘multicultural family’ in Korean policies refer to families that have an ethnically Korean person legally married with someone who is not ethnically Korean as
later to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (hereafter MOGEF) when the former Ministry of Gender Equality takes on the ‘family’ responsibilities³.

Since 2008, the policies went through multiple amendments. As the new MFSA expanded, the government expanded multicultural family support centers throughout the country. As the presence of the word ‘multicultural families’ increased, more people began to recognize the issues multicultural families were experiencing. The MOGEF received a large budget to run different programs at the centers and to conduct nation-wide studies on these families. More scholars and policy analysts began to study multicultural families and the impacts of these policies on their lives. The MFSA also began to pay more attention to the development of the children from multicultural households and added special assistance on child education. The MBBMA also added a lot more regulations on broker businesses and reduced the amount of marriage brokers who did not meet those regulation requirements. The MFSA and the MBBMA received a lot of attention between 2006 and 2016 throughout three different presidencies, both the conservative and the liberal governments.

The development of the MFSA and MBBMA indicates that the South Korean government responded to the social problems around marriage migrants. Many marriage migrants and their well has any dependents resulted from the union. The term Multicultural Families excludes migrant worker families and their children.

³ The Ministry of Gender Equality took over family related tasks from the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs between 2006 and 2007. This transition will be discussed further in part 3.
families have benefitted from these recent policy developments and the general Korean society seems to be more aware of different forms of families in South Korea.

However, as regulations on marriage brokers strengthened, so did the regulations on marriage migration itself. While the MBBMA monitored marriage brokers, the Ministry of Justice required that a minimum financial condition on Korean spouses to sponsor a marriage migrant. In addition, the Ministry of Justice also added a language requirement on the spousal Visa for marriage migrants coming from some large sender countries. As a result of stricter immigration requirements, the number of marriage migrants began to decrease starting in 2010 (Phee, 2016). Regardless of the decreasing number of marriage migrants, there were still a lot more marriage migrants in South Korea than ever before. As more Koreans became aware of multicultural families and policies, some also began to express the discomfort and discontent that multicultural families were receiving more support than they deserved. Anti-multiculturalism sentiments have been becoming more visible. The political and policy interest toward multicultural families began to diminish accordingly such as multicultural family support centers merging with MOGEF-sponsored healthy family centers starting in 2017.

My research question regarding the development of the needed policy is how the MBBMA and the MFSA came under the new frameworks that differed from the previous immigration policies. In particular, I am curious as to how the new concept of multiculturalism in MFSA and market regulation focus in the MBBMA received the most attention in making of these new policies. Additionally, framing of marriage migrant issues changed overtime. Figure 1 below chronologically organizes the changing frames of policies regarding marriage migrants. I question how and why the framing of the policies changed throughout the evolution of the
policies. I approach these questions with policy framing theories. Framing theories ask how social issues trigger policy development. In particular, framing theories attempt to explain how actors involved in policy development strategically use particular frames as a marketing tool to advertise a particular aspect of the social issue and to encourage a relevant policy response. Therefore, I use the framing theories to identify the role of the actors involved in the development of marriage migrant policies. By doing so, I use framing theories to better understand how marriage migrant issues led to the development of the new multicultural family policies. More importantly, I intend to use my case to test the existing predictions of policy framing theories on the role of the involved actors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before 2007</th>
<th>Frame: Immigration Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2013-2017</td>
<td>Frames: Healthy Family, Decreasing Multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 1: Changes in the framing of marriage migrant related policies*

Part II: Theory and Research Design

Policy framing first diagnoses a social issue using a particular perspective then prescribes how the policy should solve that problem (Klüver and Mahoney, 2015; Peters 2015). Framing is a well-studied concept in many disciplines such as sociology (Charles and Mackay, 2013), public administration (Lim and Seo, 2009, van Hulst and Yanow, 2014), media studies
(Druckman, 2001), cognitive psychology (Aarøe, 2011), and political science (Klüver and Mahoney, 2015, White et al, 2015). Rein and Schön (1996) introduced framing analysis as a method of policy analysis due to framing’s importance on setting the nuances and purpose of a policy change. Based on Rein and Schön, Van Hulst and Yanow (2016, 97) introduced a more dynamic theoretical approach to framing that defined framing as ‘sense-making’, ‘naming’, and ‘storytelling’ works. Framing is important in policy studies because policy framing can be a powerful tool for interest groups and policy makers to form the public’s opinion and understanding of the social problem and the policy solution (Cheng et al, 2010; D’angelo et al, 2013; Druckman, 2001).

In order to understand how the particular frames in the multicultural family policies developed, I looked at how theories describe the development of policy framing. When there is a public controversy that needs to be addressed by a policy, different interest groups become frame sponsors who create a frame that describes the issue at hand and propose a certain solution (Rein and Schon, 1996). Theories indicate that interest groups can vary from non-governmental organizations, the media to state actors (Charles and Mackay, 2013; Hawkins and Holden, 2013; Voltolini, 2016). Well-established framing can give non-state interest groups the political legitimacy and increase their influence on the policy development. For state actors, frames can determine who takes the responsibility for the issue and receives the funding for the program (Druckman, 2001; White et al, 2015). Additionally, a government’s policy framing reflects the government’s policy preferences both in the short and the long term (Lim and Seo, 2009). Then these different frames compete with one another through frame contestation until some are included in the policy (Boscarino, 2016). Framing is a dynamic process in which
interest groups not only have to create a rhetoric that is appealing and acceptable for the policy makers but also a wider society in which the policy with affect (Van Hulst and Yanow, 2016). Frames on a policy can be reframed overtime and the same actor can also change their frames depending on the strategic needs (Kluver and Mahoney, 2015).

According to the theories, identifying the actors involved in the development of the policy frames is the first step to understand how the multicultural family policies developed. Policy framing theories assume that both governmental and non-governmental interest groups can develop policy framing to fulfill their interest and intentions by frame contestation (Boscarino, 2016). The expectation of having a frame contestation assumes that one dominant actor does not completely control framing development and that other players can voice their different opinions. This implies that framing development would not be a top-down process monopolized by a dominant actor.

On the contrary to that assumption, policy framing studies show mixed results on whether policy framing is a top-down process, a bottom-up process, or something in between. Some studies claim that policy framing is a top-down process where the government institutions play a dominant role in constructing a frame that activates the selectively relevant feelings of the political elites, the media, and the public then promotes new policy initiatives based on the top-down framing (Entman, 2003). This seems to be the case especially in the areas such as in foreign policy, where the government has an advantageous access to information to which the civil society organizations do not have (Entman, 2003, 2004; Lim and Seo, 2009). Other studies claim that it is neither a top-down nor a bottom-up process. These studies show that civil society actors such as industry actors, unions, and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) compete with the government on the framing of a social issue (Cook et al, 2017; Hawkins and Holden, 2013). Then, some studies claim that policy framing is a bottom-up process where non-state actors (NSAs) such as NGOs and media in the civil society create and promote policy framing using different bottom-up strategies (D’Angelo, 2013; Kluver and Mahoney, 2015). Voltolini (2016) defines these NSAs as frame entrepreneurs (1504). In particular, various studies have focused on how social movements have been able to become a major NSA framing entrepreneur that impacts the development of a policy frame (Charles and Mackay, 2013).

As we can see, studies so far show that framing development can be a fluid process where sometime it is bottom up and sometimes it is bottom down. However, in the context of South Korea, framing development has been studied more as a bottom-up process occurring from social movement. Social movements in South Korea such as the democratization movement, women’s movement, and migrant worker’s movements have developed frames to construct a social identity around the issue and these frames were later reflected in the policies created as a result of the movement (Choe and Kim, 2012). For example, the Women’s movement in South Korea strategically used ‘family’ framing to bring gender issues such as domestic violence onto the mainstream agenda, which later demobilized and de-radicalized women’s rights framing in the context of public policy (Kim and Kim, 2011). Additionally, immigration advocacy interest groups have also bargained in the policy debate using ‘population’ framing as well as ‘labor’ framing while avoiding ‘human rights’ and ‘gender issue’ framing (Lee, 2009). Since marriage migrant issues share similar social issues brought up during the women’s movement or the migrant workers’ movement, I choose to test whether marriage
migrant policy framing was also developed from a bottom-up approach, potentially by civil society interest groups.

Deriving from the various studies and the similarity of the context, I draw a hypothesis that marriage migrant policy framing was a bottom-up process where multiple interest groups in the civil society competed with the state actor in framing the policy. If my findings supported this hypothesis, I would find that various civil society actors have created and contested different policy frames in making multicultural family policies. If the policy is not bottom up, the I would either see no civil society actors that create the policy frames or the state actor that controlled policy framing development.

Furthermore, even though there were several interest groups who helped starting the development of marriage migrant policies by setting the agenda, it is unclear whether those agenda setters helped framing the policies as well. This poses a question as to how agenda setting and framing are related during policy development. Agenda setting is making a social problem into a visible public problem and framing is diagnosing and prescribing the agenda using a particular perspective. Even though mass communication theorists have been disputing whether agenda setting and framing are two separate processes or whether framing is a subset of agenda setting (Reese et al., 2001), political science theorists have not extensively discussed the differences and the separation between agenda setting and framing. Policy analysis and political science theories often categorize framing as a subset or an extension of agenda setting (Peters 2015) or assume that agenda setters are also involved in policy framing. Despite the vagueness of the theories, I draw a hypothesis from policy framing theory that an interest group that sets the agenda is also involved in policy framing. If my findings support my
hypothesis, actors that set agendas for a policy also develop the policy framing. If my findings do not support my hypothesis, separate actors would set the agenda and develop policy framing.

In both hypotheses, my dependent variable is the policy framing of the marriage migrant policies in South Korea and my independent variables are the roles of civil society interest actors and state actors involved in either or both policy framing and agenda setting. I use my single case study to provide a critical test of framing theories through the observation my independent variable. I am conducting a longitudinal study on the multicultural families acts to not only analyze the emergence of the new policies but also the continued development and the change in the policies over time. I am looking back into the history of the case from 2017, and makes this a retrospective longitudinal study. A retrospective longitudinal study does not allow me to change the level of variables or conditions, but I use multiple within-case units to detect and record changes through several levels of variables. Hence, my units of analysis are episodes of policy changes over time identified in figure 1 in section 1. Testing my hypothesis across within-case units allows me to test my hypothesis multiple times on the same case with other variables held more or less constant. This is particularly important because my dependent variables are already determined and I need to be able to observe the covariation of changes in my dependent variables without the concern for intervening or preceding variables. Analyzing multiple within-case units can better detect intervening variables that may lead to a spurious relationship between the roles of the actors and policy framing development.

I conducted my research by personally interviewing field experts, and collecting newspaper articles and secondary data regarding marriage migrant policies in South Korea. I
chose to conduct interviews as a main source of my data collection because I believe that interviewing experts who have been involved in the policy framing process can reveal a more comprehensive process of policy framing development. Personal interviews can help identify covariation between the role of the actors and policy framing development as well as possible intervening variables in the study. In addition, I refrained from using quantitative methods for my research since there is no empirically tested quantitative method to measure the role of actors in policy framing development. Therefore, I used semi-structured interviews to first understand the actors involved in developing marriage migrant policies and then to figure out the roles they played in the process. When recruiting field experts as my interviewees, I first contacted civil society organizations that participated in multicultural family policy debates between 2006 and 2008. Then I contacted the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, who is in charge of running the new multicultural policies, in order to discuss their role in developing policy frames. Then, I interviewed with a regional multicultural family center, which is a government-funded center that implements the multicultural family support policies, to discuss their changed roles as the implementer of the policies. I believe that talking with a variety of actors about their roles in policy framing development of multicultural family policies allowed me test both my hypothesis on whether policy framing is a bottom up process and whether agenda setters are also involved in framing.

Then, I compare my case with migrant workers’ movement in South Korea and its policy framing process. Migrant workers’ movement brought up issues regarding maltreatment of low-skilled foreign workers and promoted policy changes by negotiating their workers’ rights with other industry and state actors. Migrant workers’ movement case is similar to marriage
migrant case in that both happened between late 1990’s throughout the 2000’s under similar state actors and involved civil society actors that exposed foreigner discrimination issues. In addition to the similarities in the context, I chose the migrant workers movement case because this case is considered to be an example of bottom-up policy framing approach. Therefore, I compare the role of the actors involved in both policy development cases to assess whether the marriage migrant case provides similar evidence of bottom-up approach or not, and what creates the variation between the cases.

Part III: Framing of Marriage Migrant Policies in South Korea


Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) directed by social activists first noticed that the marriage migrant population experienced severe and unique issues (Interview 5). Many of these NGOs were working with other migrant population, mostly migrant workers, when they realized that marriage migrants were exposed to abusive environment in their homes. My interview with the head of one of the main NGOs working with migrant women revealed that the NGO found out that the abuses marriage migrants were experiencing were often worse that the workplace abuses migrant workers were experiencing because marriage migrants were domestically bounded and had nowhere else to go while workers could at least go back to their homes at the end of the day (Interview 5). NGOs were finding out more cases of domestic abuses from the spouses as well as from parents-in-law, with whom many marriage migrants lived. Yet, marriage migrants had very limited access to shelters and help (Interview 8). Therefore, NGOs began to work with abused marriage migrants to help them find appropriate shelters, connect them to resources, and to get further assistance. One of the most visible
assistance was the creation of migrant women’s hotline. As their work with marriage migrants increased, NGOs were able to bring up the issues of marriage migrants through media outlets. Most NGOs exposed the issues through the lens of human rights abuse (Interview 4). Especially whenever there were cases of extreme human rights violation among marriage migrant communities such as multiple murder cases of marriage migrants by their spouse, NGOs publicized these issues and criticized the lack of government regulation and support for marriage migrants (Interview 5). As a result, the general public became more aware of the violence and issues marriage migrants were experiencing. Additionally, migrant women NGOs were building coalition with other women’s organizations, migrant workers organizations, and migrant organizations. During the late 1990’s into early 2000’s, the main jobs of the NGOs was to publicize social issues among marriage migrants, build advocacy networks, and to try to involve the government to address this issue formally.

During this time, civil society organizations also discussed what to call and name marriage migrants and their families. A migrant center in began to use the term ‘Kosian’ to refer to children of marriage migrants. However, migrant advocates and the migrants disliked this term due to the term’s racially discriminatory nuance. Another term ‘bi-cultural families’ were used among families in the US military bases where there were marriages between Koreans and U.S. military persons. But this term did not become widely used, perhaps due to the negative connotation these military base marriages had in the previous years. The civil society communities discussed another term “Onnuri” which means the entire world, but at the same time, a new word ‘Nurikun’ was created to refer to netizens or internet users in Korean. NGO community unfortunately abandoned this term to avoid confusion (Interview 5). Then, the
first time the term ‘multiculturalism’ appeared in the civil society groups was when some migrant worker advocacy movements used the term ‘multiculturalism’ in the context of reducing discrimination on people from non-Korean culture (Interview 4). Yet, this was not a term that was actively promoted among civil society organizations because the term came from the migrant worker movement and never made it to be popular among all migrant advocacy organizations (Interview 5). Additionally, because the term came from the point of view of all migrants, multiculturalism in social movement was a more inclusive term than what the policy later defined the term to be applied for half Korean and half foreigner family. It should be noted that there was some level of frame contestation among civil society organizations, but the contested frames did not make it to the policies due to the lack of a cohesive term upon which civil society organizations could agree and promote.

In 2006, president Noh commissioned the committee for social inclusion to investigate the social issues arising among marriage migrants and their families. One of the reasons why the committee assessed this agenda is because President Noh made reducing discrimination as one of his main priorities during his presidency and hence addressed migrant issues. The committee conducted a nation-wide research (Table 4) and identified the seven areas of improvement (Lee, 2008). They called this the ‘Plan to socially Integrate International Marriage Migrant Women and Mixed People’ or the ‘grand plan’ to reduce discrimination against marriage migrants. Note that during this time, the research was framed as ‘social integration’ and ‘migrant women’ rather than multicultural family support. One of the interviewees who attended these meetings disclosed that the discussion focused on reducing discrimination against all immigrants and foreigners including marriage migrants and migrant workers
(Interview 5). During this time, civil society leaders discussed creating government-funded centers for migrants to help them adjust to Korea, receive information and counseling. However, the committee replaced this idea to build migrant women support centers to building seventeen marriage migrant support centers nationwide. Then the committee commissioned this project to the Korean Institute for Healthy Family. Activists and civil society organizations protested to this plan as the Korean Institute for Healthy Family had a very narrow norm for what a healthy family should be and their plan excluded other forms of migrant families (Interview 5).

What we see here is that the role of the NGOs on this issue was limited to agenda setting since they had little contestation and but its influence in the framing of the new policies. If what theories were suggesting about agenda setting and framing being conducted in a single process by the same actors, then this case goes against the theories. There can be many reasons as to why some of the bottom up framing efforts lost to the frame created by the government. First, none of the terms used among the civil society never reached an agreement to be widely used as a dominant frame referring to marriage migrants. Even beyond the term, civil society organizations have yet to create a cohesive movement calling for a policy action under a frame of their choice. In short, the government-framed intervention came before a bottom up framing tactic formed. Second, fragmentation of marriage migrant communities in terms of their physical locations and racial, national, and cultural fragmentation of the marriage migrants made it difficult for the migrants to work together to make a strong collective action that could have created a term that they could promote.
Table 4: The Major Policies of 2005 Grand Plan; Source: Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion; cited from Lee, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major policies</th>
<th>Management</th>
<th>Cooperation</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. <strong>Regulation of international marriage agencies &amp; protection of foreign wives before entry to Korea</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Control of illegal process by marriage agencies</td>
<td>MJ</td>
<td>NPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Legislation to regulate marriage agencies</td>
<td>MSH</td>
<td>MFAT/MEHRD/MGEP/NPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Regulation of trafficking in international marriages</td>
<td>MJ</td>
<td>NFA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) Standardization of marriage visa and process</td>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>MSWH/MFAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Establish national cooperation system</td>
<td>MGEP</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) Provision of information for foreign wives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <strong>Support for victims of domestic violence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Make it difficult for Korean husband to withdraw identification guarantees for his foreign wife</td>
<td>MJ</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Make it easy for foreign wives to prove their grounds for divorce</td>
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<tr>
<td>(3) Simplifying the application process for Korean citizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(4) Offering Korean citizenship or deminshion to children and their mother of unregistered international marriages abroad</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) Protection and support for victims of domestic violence</td>
<td>MGEP</td>
<td>MJ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. <strong>Support and orientation for newly arrived foreign wives</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1) Providing useful information to newly arrived foreign wives</td>
<td>MGEP</td>
<td>MJ/MGAHA/MIC/local govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Support for adaptation and settlement</td>
<td></td>
<td>MCT/MEHRD/MAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. <strong>Support for children of international marriages in schools</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Establishing multicultural education and give support to children experiencing prejudice</td>
<td>MEHRD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Offering welfare and counseling services</td>
<td>MSH</td>
<td>MEHRD</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. <strong>Providing social welfare to foreign wives</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(1) Support to meet minimum living costs &amp; health care</td>
<td>MSH</td>
<td>MGEP</td>
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<td>(2) Support for child care</td>
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<td>MGEP/MAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Providing job information</td>
<td>ML</td>
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<td>6. <strong>Raising social awareness of multicultural issues</strong></td>
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<td>(1) Publicizing governmental policies</td>
<td>MGEP/MJ</td>
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<td>(2) Promoting a pro-multicultural environment</td>
<td>MCT</td>
<td>MEHRD/MGAHA/local govt.</td>
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<td>(3) Educating civic servants on multicultural issues</td>
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<td>7. <strong>Making a comprehensive support system</strong></td>
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<td>(1) Conducting surveys of international marriage families and children</td>
<td>MGEP</td>
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<td>(3) Providing translation, counseling, education, and voluntary services</td>
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<td>(4) Build a network between central and local governments</td>
<td>MGEP</td>
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Source: Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion (2005).
MGEP: Ministry of Gender Equality and Family.
MJ: Ministry of Justice.
MSWH: Ministry of Social Welfare and Health.
MCT: Ministry of Culture & Tourism.
MEHRD: Ministry of Education & Human Resource Development.
ML: Ministry of Labor.
MGAHA: Ministry of Government Administration & Home Affairs.
MAP: Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry.
MAF: Ministry of Foreign Affairs & Trade.
MIC: Ministry of Information & Communication.
NPA: National Police Agency.
GCSC: Civil Service Commission.

If the term multicultural families in policies did not come from civil society organizations, then where did it come from? Korean sociology scholars introduced the term multiculturalism as a term well studied in immigrant receiving countries like the United States and Canada. But this term ‘multicultural family’ was a new policy term in South Korea and has a different meaning in Korea where the ethnic and cultural compositions of its residents are more
homogeneous. Even though this term was first used among South Korean migrant advocacy movements that included all migrants in South Korea, Multicultural Families in Korean policies refer to families that have an ethnically Korean person living with someone who is not ethnically Korean as well has any dependents resulted from the union (Kim, 2007). If documented migrant workers marry South Koran spouses, they are also considered as multicultural families but migrant worker families both of whose nationality are not Korean and their children are not considered as part of multicultural families (Kim, 2007). The policy definition of multiculturalism contrasted with the use of the term among civil society organizations and social movements. Hence, this term’s exclusivity towards international and interracially married families shows that the term was not crafted from a bottom-up approach, but rather from a top-down force.

The reason why this term became such an exclusive term can be found in a policy research report on MFSA in 2006 before the policy came in effect. The study says that the fundamental direction of the multicultural family policy is to integrate and support this particular population within the foreigner policy framework (Park, 2006). Paradoxically, it mentions that while multicultural families should not be considered as ‘foreigners’ but as a special type of family created within the Korean society. It also makes it clear that the multicultural family support policies should not send false signals to the international society that South Korea is further promoting the migrant workers. Therefore, the MOGEF suggests that the policy’s main purpose is to assimilate these half Korean families the later add elements of multiculturalism. This implies that the main intention of multicultural family support policies was to assimilate multicultural families. Hence, the term multicultural in South Korean policies
has a different meaning and influence compared to multiculturalism used in the U.S. and in Canada where multiculturalism tends to have the connotation of embracing the differences that can be silenced in dominantly Eurocentric communities. In the context of South Korea’s policy, marriage migrant women are categorized under limited multiculturalism tied to patriarchal and xenophobic Korean society rather than to be recognized as an active agent of multiculturalism (Oh, 2007; p 34).

I approach this movement toward multicultural family as the government’s way to transform denizens to controlled citizens. When only immigration policies previously regulated the flow of marriage migrants and international marriage market, the policies granted denizenship to marriage migrants so that marriage migrants had similar rights as citizens while maintaining a foreigner status. By using multicultural families support as the frame, the former denizens are included in these families that are recognized as South Korean families. This transforms their denizenship status to citizenship. But this transition is administered within very controlled and restricted framework where marriage migrants can become citizens when they receive support as a member of a multicultural family rather than as an individual (Interview 5). Additionally, the MFSA’s strong emphasis on integrating the families and its members into the South Korean society signals that the assimilation and hence discarding of other cultures is a condition to become a deserving citizen (Kim, 2007). Although this argument should be explored further outside of my research, I find it important to discuss the nuances of the limited multicultural family frame in regards to the conditional transformability of denizenship, which is a crucial identity for marriage migrants.
Additionally, excluding migrant worker families from multicultural family support further controls migrant worker’s access to the social services granted to denizens and citizens. Using multicultural family frame for supporting marriage migrant families seems to give the façade that the South Korean government cares about migrant issues without directly dealing with the tricky issues about migrant workers (Kim, 2009). As mentioned, this policy support does not extend to migrant worker families who struggle with being excluded from social benefits other denizens and citizens have. South Korea has been keeping unskilled short-term immigrants without the rights of a denizen (Kim, 2009). The fact that marrying with a Korean spouse is one of the only ways for a migrant worker to have an access to denizenship and citizenship is very consistent with how the South Korean policies have been excluding unskilled migrant worker from receiving denizenship or citizenship. A think tank representative revealed that one of the reasons why the multicultural family policies received so much attention as a presidential agenda is because the extending social service to marriage migrants was easier than to migrant workers since most marriage migrants were already accepted as denizens while migrant workers did not (Interview 4).

This brings up another point that multicultural family support act has another dominant framing of family support. The family support frame has been consistent from its beginning to how it has developed overtime. When we look at the beginning of the policy, the multicultural family support policies were originally submitted through the Ministry of Health and Welfare since the ministry was interested with elevating the severe poverty related issues among marriage migrant families. During this time, the Ministry of Gender Equality was transiting to become the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family and took over many family-related
functions from the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Therefore, in 2007, the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family took over the multicultural family support works. At this time, the MOGEF was still a new and small ministry and taking the family care responsibilities was their big chance to receive a large funding. When the transition happened, the MOGEF kept the family support framing (Interview 6). As a result, when the Multicultural Family Support Act was enacted in 2008, the marriage migrant family support centers nationwide were turned into multicultural family support centers. The MOGEF was created as a result of women’s movement in South Korea where women demanded more gender equality and less gender based violence. If the MOGEF were to keep its original mission, the ministry could have tried to change the framing of the policies to have more impact of women’s rights or gender equality. But this was not the case. Then what explains this consistent focus on family support policy?

When I asked a MOGEF official (Interview 6) why the new policy was named as ‘multicultural family support’ instead of ‘marriage migrant support’ or ‘marriage migrant family support’ he explained that it is because as marriage migrants had more children, the population that they needed to serve extended from individual marriage migrants to families. Many of the social problems among marriage migrant households involved and impacted the family member as well as the migrant individuals. There was a need to educate the Korean spouses and the in-laws who were sponsoring a marriage migrant. Furthermore, the mass female marriage migration phenomenon arose as a result of low marriage rates in certain regions that added to South Korea’s dangerously low birthrates. And since the low birthrates have been one of the most pressing South Korean population concerns, there was an underlying expectation that marriage migrants would help alleviate the population concern by having children with
Korean bachelors who otherwise may not have had the chance. But multiracial children and mothers in multicultural households required further assistance than a homogeneous household such as pregnancy health and postpartum support, additional language support, and childcare support. Concerns about slower language development, the lack of diversity sensitivity in schools, and discrimination against children from multicultural households increased (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2008). Therefore, the new policy needed to address the children’s issue as well as the migrant. He also added that policy already had the name of multicultural family support before it came to the MOGEF. So when MOGEF was in the transition of taking on the family support responsibilities, it automatically took the family support framed policy (Interview 6). In this sense, family support framing was necessary to deal with the arising many aspects of social problems around marriage migrants and their households.

In addition to MOGEF’s explanation, the family support framing could have been a result of the political environment where sustaining a healthy family has been prioritized over women and individual rights. Years of conservative governance have the history of responding to women’s issue through the frame of maintaining healthy families (Heo, 2010). The women’s movement ended up promoting healthy family frames over women’s rights frames in order to acquire more political acceptance and assistance (Kim and Kim, 2011). President Noh’s administration gave more attention to reducing discrimination, which is how social problems of marriage migrants were originally addressed with the intent to reduce discrimination. When the National Assembly began to discuss the MFSA, the Ministry of Justice and other conservatives were strongly against passing the bill for multiple reasons (Song, 2016).
Considering the initial contestation and unpopularity of the MFSA, framing the policy solution as family support could have won more agreement among the assembly voters across different party lines (Interview 6). As the new MOGEF was taking on this new and daunting task, accentuating the family support frame over migrant support or women’s support could have helped the ministry to avoid inter-ministerial conflicts and political opposition as well as give the MOGEF more legitimacy to proceed with the bill. Consequently, when Noh’s presidency was succeeded by president Lee’s conservative administration, the interest in human rights and increasing equality quickly disappeared (Interview 6). Multiple interviewees have claimed that the family support aspects of the MFSA increased while the human rights aspects decreased throughout Lee’s administration (Interview 4, 5, and 7). The political atmosphere to prefer family support over immigrant support and marriage migrant support in this case is not empirically tested at the moment. However, considering many of my expert interviews mentioned the political leaning toward the family support and healthy family framing over others, I think it is worth mentioning that the political inclination to family support could have influenced how the policy is framed as multicultural family support.

The political preference on family support could be correlated with the South Korean society’s reluctance on actively promoting individual rights before family. Many NGO working with marriage migrants have been focusing their work promoting and preserving the rights of individual migrant women. However, my interviews with the NGOs and think tanks revealed that promoting human rights is a challenging task in South Korea where the general public lacks the awareness and care on the importance of human rights (Interview 4). This seems to become more difficult when working with migrant human rights and women’s rights. One NGO worker
shared that the South Korean public tends to feel indifferent or hostile against promoting the individual rights of a foreigner and hence some right-based campaigns and arguments can be difficult to promote (Interview 8). On the contrary to the challenges with human rights rhetoric, the importance of family is deeply rooted in South Korea’s patriarchal Confucius society. Even though South Korea is a rapidly changing society, there still is a stronger emphasis on putting one’s family over an individual and the general public is more likely to accept and tolerate programs and policies geared towards keeping families healthy than right-based programs. An interviewee who works at a government funded multicultural family support center told me that their human rights programs are often framed as ‘an education program for a happy family’ to attract more attendants (Interview 1). The need to disguise human right related contents under the frame of healthy family in both activist organizations as well as in implementation depicts the public’s preference on family over individuals.

In conclusion, the birth of multicultural family support framing can be explained in three aspects: (1) framing the policy was a top-down process due to the lack of collective action among civil society organizations. This implies that strong civil society organizing may be a condition for bottom-up framing. (2) Civil society organizations were able to set the agenda but did not actively participate in framing, which shows that agenda setting and framing can be separate processes in policy making (3) The frame contestation within the government institution mattered more than the frame contestation within the civil society. The lack of space and platform for civil society actors to discuss about the policy frame is a main indicator that framing of marriage migrant policies was a government orchestrated top-down process than a bottom-up process. The analysis of the framing development revealed that there are multiple
reasons behind the top-down process. First, government seemed to have more interest in immigrant related policies within denizens and Korean families rather than to include migrant workers and other immigrants. Second, the political atmosphere and the public seemed to prefer family over individuals. Hence, multicultural family support policy and its limited definition were developed. In addition to the MFSA, the MOGEF took over another new policy, the Marriage Broker Business Management Act (MBBMA) that dealt with the business side of marriage migration.


Managing the marriage brokers was one of the first goals of the ‘Grand Plan’ in 2006 (Lee, 2008). Many of the brokerages were first commissioned and promoted by rural governments to find brides for rural bachelors. As the market for international marriages increased, so did the agents. The brokers were racking up the increasing demands and they were working abroad with local brokers to recruit potential brides (Kim, 2007). Because marriage brokers in Korea have been working without any formal registration or restriction, the international marriage brokerage thrived in a free market. But the lack of monitoring allowed for very unethical business practices such as commercial advertising for foreign brides, ‘bride guarantee’ where the brokers promised to bring someone else in case the foreign bride ran away, misinforming the clients, and abusing the migrants (Freeman, 2011; Kim, 2007). Since marriage broker businesses were illegal in the Philippines and Vietnam, the informal businesses and their actions went unreported (Kim et al, 2014). As a result of these unethical practices, the international communities began to criticize these unruly businesses and the market. UN report in 2008 pointed out the malpractices of international marriage brokers and the press in
the sender countries warned about these businesses (UN Working Group, 2008). In addition, marriage brokers were also cheating the Korean spouses who wanted to find a bride abroad and paid the hefty price for such service.

In Korea, the NGOs protested against these for-profit marriage broker businesses. From my interview with one of the main NGO leaders, I found out that the advocacy organization first called for the complete ban of international marriage brokers (Interview 5). But concerned that more problems would arise when the businesses become informal, they asked that the government regulation sort the business through a strict permit-based regulation for the marriage brokers. They linked with international organizations to bring attention to this issue and to urge the government to make regulations on this unregulated market to prevent human rights violation of marriage migrants. Later, we see that regulation of marriage broker agencies and protection of foreign wives before the arrival is the first task mentioned in the “Grand Plan”. Here we see that the civil society actors brought the government’s attention to the need to regulate marriage broker agencies using the frame of protecting marriage migrants. This supports my hypothesis that a same actor can both participate in agenda setting and framing.

Once the need for market regulation was recognized, policy makers began to create what this new policy regulation would look like. A legislator Kim Chunjin who worked at the Ministry of Health, Welfare, and Family Affairs at the time held a policy debate including advocacy based NGOs, marriage broker associations, and lawyer groups. During my interview with a NGO participant in this debate (Interview 7), I found out that this debate was similar to the multicultural family debate in the sense that the participants were mainly identifying the issues rather than to give concrete suggestions on the policy. Few other interviewees from civil
society organizations also shared this sentiment that even though the legislators were going in the direction of market regulation, lawmakers lacked consultation with other actors (Interview 5). The premise of the market regulation framing is similar between the NGOs and the government but the government’s market approach was more lenient toward marriage brokers. These remarks suggested that the policy exhibits top-down tendencies. To better understand whether the creation of MBBMA and its framing came from top down or not, I reached out the MOGEF. Since the MBBMA belong in the multicultural policy division of the MOGEF, I assumed that the ministerial actors in the MOGEF also dominated the development of the MBBMA.

Contrary to what the name ‘multicultural policy division’ may suggest, the interview revealed that the division has little to do with creating and amending the policies relating to multicultural families. It turns out that the majority of the amendments on the MBBMA has been orchestrated by individual legislators rather by the MOGEF divisional initiatives. The MOGEF official explained that this is due to South Korean government’s legislation process that favors a legislator’s amendment efforts than ministerial amendment efforts (Interview 6). He said that it is easier for a legislator to appeal for smaller amendments while ministries are expected to create a very detailed and large scale changes, which are more difficult (4). As a result, the MBBMA underwent meticulous amendments administered by individual legislators in the last decade4. Additionally, as the role of legislators vitalized over years, individual

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4 Both the MOGEF official as well as civil society leader agreed that the MBBMA has developed to become a very comprehensive and detailed piece of legislation that can regulate the international marriage brokerage market efficiently and fairly. However, both sides also expressed that the monitoring the implementation of the MBBMA proved to be the most
legislators have more incentives to make as many amendments they can since legislators are evaluated by the number of their policy development efforts rather than the quality of such efforts. The issue here is that not all individual legislators are consulting the ministry as well as other civil society interest groups, which separates activists, policy implementer, and policy developers (Interview 6). This shows that individual legislators are the dominant actor in the development of the MBBMA and its frames and limit the ministry’s influence on policy framing development.

Another evidence that developing the MBBMA was a top-down process by the legislators shows in its ‘consumer protection’ framing. The MBBMA contains a slightly different frame than the critical frame from the civil society organizations. The original purpose statement of the MBBMA frames that the policy is designed to contributing to the development of a sound marriage culture by guiding marriage brokers and by protecting the users, with the meaning of the ‘user’ extended to both the marriage migrants and the Korean spouses. This difficult part of the policy. Many of these agencies work abroad with local business partners, which makes it very difficult for South Korean law enforcement and monitoring. South Korea often lack any bilateral agreement to effectively monitor international marriage brokers, or even so corruption and many other variables hinder international monitoring. Additionally, the MOGEF experiences difficulty with internal monitoring of marriage brokers due to the difficulty in tracking, fake reporting, and regional variation in implementation (Interview 6). The lack of policy monitoring leads to variation in implementation and hence can alter desired policy outcome. More importantly in this case, many unethical and criminal marriage brokers can continue to operate and harm many people in the process.
allowed for the creation of the consumer protection frame for the Korean spouses that legitimized Korean spouses who have been negatively affected by the marriage brokers. There were marriage brokers that scammed Korean spouses and stole their money. However, the issue was that spouses that were divorced from their foreign wives or have been punished legally for abusing their wives began to form spouse consumer protection groups. (Interview 5)

Interestingly, this consumer protection frame that centered around Korean spouses expanded to the point where Korean spouses could report marriage brokers to the Korean consumer agency and to the multicultural family support hotline, which is a privilege not extended to marriage migrants abroad. Additionally, legislators appealed to the spouse constituents by referring to the MBBMA as ‘Policy to Prevent Damages from International Marriage” (Park, 2016). This framework of consumer protection takes away from the main purpose of this act, which is to regulate marriage brokers. Disproportionate emphasis on the consumer protection frame has led to a dangerous use of this frame in sympathizing and victimizing the Korean spouses with a false sense of entitlement on a marriage with a marriage migrant. For example, when a man committed suicide after his marriage migrant wife divorced him with an accuse of abuse, the media portrayed him as a victim of international marriages (Ji, 2016). This shows that legislator orchestrated ‘consumer protection’ framing of the MBBMA have been taken in by a selective group of constituents. I assume that this framing of consumer protection would have been more carefully adjusted to reduce the abuse of the frame if there were other actors involved in developing the frame.

In conclusion, individual legislators serve as the dominant actors developing the framing of the MBBMA and they have developed the consumer protection frame using a top-down
approach. In this episode of the MBBMA, the civil society advocacy groups have both introduced the issues relating to the unregulated marriage broker market and framed the solution as market management, which shows that civil society actor can function both as an agenda setter and a frame sponsor.


The Ministry of Justice (MOJ hereafter), who has been in charge of immigration policies regarding marriage migrants in the past, began to amend its immigration policies once again starting in 2011. These new policy changes in marriage migrant immigration control differed from the previous policies that carefully allowed in more marriage migrants and expanded their access to denizenship. This time, the immigration policies increased immigration requirements for marriage migrants, reducing the amount of marriage migrants coming into South Korea. But the MOJ did not advertise these new changes in the policy as directly as reducing migration. Instead, the further restrictions on marriage migration overtime share three different overarching frames that are similar to the policy frames in the MBBMA and MFSA: to prevent of marriage migrant issues, to reduce illegal marriage broker activities, and to maintain healthy families. In this section, we will discuss how the MOJ has been using these frames in the new policy amendments that resulted in the reduction of the influx of marriage migrants. My research does not test or prove whether these policies were intentionally designed to reducing marriage migration, but rather take on the position that the policy amendments do increase immigration requirements and that we see a correlative trend of reduced marriage migration into Korea. I recognize that there may be other reasons as to why less marriage migrants come to South Korea other than immigration restrictions. Additionally, I did not interview with the
MOJ and hence this section will discuss less about how these frames developed but more on how they relate to the multicultural family policy framing.

In 2011, a partial amendment in the immigration law required Korean spouse sponsors to take mandatory information session to formally sponsor a marriage migrant. The MOJ stated the reason for this amendment is to maintain healthy families by preventing potential issues that can occur from fraudulent international marriages conducted by illegal activities of marriage brokers (MOJ, 2011). This amendment puts the MOJ in control of information flow regarding sponsoring marriage migrants to address the issues caused by unlawful marriage broker businesses that failed to disclose necessary information to their international marriage customers. But the additional attempt to control marriage brokers overlap with some of the responsibilities of the MBBMA in the MOGEF, which could have led to inter-ministerial conflicts. Perhaps in order to prevent such conflict, the MOJ appealed to similar fundamental ideas as the MOGEF’s multicultural family policies - maintaining healthy families, regulating the marriage brokers, and prevention of marriage migrant issues.

On the contrary to the policy amendment in 2011 that put the responsibility on the Korean spouses, an additional immigration policy amendment in 2013 adds on the immigration restriction onto the marriage migrants by using the framing of healthy families. The MOJ added that marriage migrants needed to prove their proficiency in Korean language and culture in order to qualify for the marriage migrant visa (MOJ, 2013). The problem here is that the law amendments happened without expanding Korean learning facilities in the sender countries. As a result, spouse visa applications in large sender countries like Vietnam decreased by 80% within the six months of the policy amendment while the demand for Korean language classes
increased (SBS New Media, 2014). Additionally, many marriage migrants who have already wedded their Korean spouse in their home country did not have the opportunity to take Korean classes and proficiency tests. This led to over a thousand married marriage migrants unable to qualify for their spousal entry visa, leaving many parties of international marriages frustrated and upset. An extremely frustrated Korean husband whose Vietnamese wife could not get the visa due to the lack of her language proficiency committed arson on a marriage broker agency and ended up killing the broker (Yoon, 2015), showing that marriage brokers also had to bear the cost of the immigration policy change. Even though the MOJ explains language proficiency is crucial in creating healthy marriages, the fact that the MOJ sets language proficiency as an absolute condition for healthy families seems to a patriarchal approach in defining what healthy marriages should be. Furthermore, the fact that the Korean spouses are not required to show their proficiency in the languages of the marriage migrants has a discriminatory implication and reveals the consistent focus on assimilating the marriage migrants into South Korea rather than recognizing their diversity.

There were additional changes in 2014 that further reduced marriage migration. First, the MOJ set a minimum income requirement for sponsoring spouses then the MOJ selected seven main marriage migrant sender countries by the high prevalence of divorce rate of the international marriages and added a spouse visa requirement for the marriage migrants from those seven countries to take a pre-arrival information session on international marriages (MOJ, 2014). Both the income requirement and information session attendance requirement used the frames of promoting healthier international marriages and prevention of international marriage problems, which are similar to multicultural family policies. But these immigration
requirements differ from multicultural family support in that these policies prevent potential problems by discouraging the at-risk population from participating in international marriages while multicultural family policies deal with the population that is already in South Korea.

What is interesting is that the MOJ does not refer to marriage migrant and their families as multicultural families even if the policies in the MOJ shares other frames used in multicultural family policies. The absence of multicultural family framing in immigration policies shows that the term multicultural family is a particular frame created in the context of social and family welfare and purposely disconnects from the concept of immigration. Perhaps this was meant to reduce any confusion between the MOGEF policies and the MOJ policies. But I assume that another purpose of silencing the immigrant frame in the multicultural family policies is to disassociate the immigrant identity from interfering with social welfare programs and to promote social integration of foreign individuals through the policies.

In conclusion, immigration related policies for marriage migrants returned with similar frames as multicultural family policies such as the healthy family, prevention of social issues, and monitoring marriage brokers. Using these frames, immigration policy amendments increased visa requirements for marriage migrants and their sponsoring spouses, which led to a decrease of marriage migration. What stands out the most from this episode of policy frame development is that the healthy family frame used to systematically discourage at-risk populations reflects that the state can choose to prevent international marriages of marriage migrants if these marriages have a higher chance of deriving from the government’s standard of a healthy family. This further depicts the top-down use of healthy family and prevention frames
in marriage migrant policies to justify the government’s intentions to selectively recruit marriage migrants that will create less social problems and hence maintain healthier families.


Even from the beginning, multicultural family policy framing received numbers of criticism for its focus on family rather than individuals (Kim et al, 2014). The healthy family support frame has been a consistent frame throughout a decade of alterations to the policy. However, the overemphasis on family support framing has also led to silencing of other frames, including multicultural family frame. This section will discuss how the recent development of the multicultural family policies has a top-down approach to intensify family support framing and to reduce multicultural family frame. My findings hinted to why this was the case. Family frame itself aligns better with the original policy purpose of integrating foreigners into South Korean culture. Increasing divorce rates among multicultural families, the weakening of civil society advocates through cooptation of the support system and the rise of anti-multiculturalism sentiments in South Korea can explain why the state took a top-down approach in changing of the frame.

The multiculturalism wind is slowing down in South Korea and multicultural programs are merging with other family oriented programs or getting eliminated due to the decrease in interest and funding (Interview 1,4,6). This started with South Korea’s first migrant woman legislator Jasmine Lee proposing that the migrant women’s hotline 1366 should be merged with the government’s multicultural family information and support call service called Danuri Call service. A prominent migrant women human rights advocacy NGO have created and ran the
hotline service in order to help any migrant women victims of human rights violation. The main issue with the merge was that the 1366 hotline was one of the only support system focusing on the protection of the rights and safety of migrant women while Danuri call center was a family oriented information service without any special focus on human rights protection of individuals. Danuri call center’s focus was to keep multicultural families ‘healthy’ by keeping them together and hence lacked services like legal and shelter support for the victims of gender based violence and marriage migrants seeking help regarding divorce or separation. Additionally, the 1366 hotline was meant for all migrant women and not just marriage migrants. The merging of the two under the name of Danuri call center could easily eliminate the only service for the protection of individual migrant women’s human rights and replace it with the framework of family protection. Even though this would mean a significant loss for migrant women, legislator Lee did not consult with the NGO responsible for the 1366 about the merge of the two services prior to her legislation amendment proposal (Interview 5). Enraged migrant women human rights advocates protested this amendment proposal but they only managed to keep the hotline number 1366 without stopping the merge because the House of Assembly passed Lee’s proposal. These merges signify the state’s intention to concentrate their support network on family support by diffusing the support system designed for human rights protection of individual migrant women. The state accentuated the healthy family framing while reducing the presence of migrant women and human rights frames.

Similarly, the state began to eliminate the multicultural family frame by replacing it with healthy family frame. The MOGEF made the decision to merge Healthy Family Centers with Multicultural Family Support Centers starting in 2017. The MOGEF previously commissioned the
Korean Institute for Healthy Family (KIHF hereafter) to run the multicultural family support businesses implemented in Multicultural Family Support Centers across the country. The KIHF also oversees the Healthy Family Centers whose main job is to support families experiencing issues and to enforce the state’s ideas of a ‘healthy’ family. After the merge, Multicultural Family Support Centers would keep their name but would take the jobs of Healthy Family Centers. This change was initiated and implemented within the central government without thorough consultation with regional governments or the centers (Interview 1 and 2). As a result, the Multicultural Family Support Center employee expressed her concern about the expected workload increase and the potential distractions away from her work with multicultural families (Interview 1). MOGEF official explained that the merge can extend the MOGEF’s family support to other families through utilizing the pre-existing physical presence of multicultural family centers (Interview 6). However, an NGO director suggested that this merge reflected the trend within MOGEF to reduce programs that exclusively benefit multicultural families (Interview 5).

In conclusion, the different points of views presented in the interviews suggest the merging of the two centers may be a beginning of MOGEF’s plan to diffuse multicultural family programs into other family support programs. But the question remains: why is the state accentuating the healthy family frame while reducing the multiculturalism and human rights frame?

I assume that the increase of divorce and separation rates among marriage migrant families was alarming and counterproductive to the State’s intention to use international marriages to increase younger population. Unsurprisingly, many multicultural marriages between marriage migrants and Korean spouses experience multitude of issues and many end up in separation and divorces (Seol et al, 2006). Between 2008 and 2015, there were about
8000 divorces per year between a foreign wife and a South Korean man (KOSIS, 2016). Unlike back in the 1990’s and early 2000’s, more marriage migrant women have more access to information and support and hence can file a divorce while securing their status and safety (Interview 5). However, this is concerning for the South Korean government that wants to have more ‘healthy’ families - heterosexual, married families- to raise multiple children to alleviate the shrinking population problem (Interview 6). Additionally, divorced marriage migrants as mothers of Korean citizens posed a problem in the way they wanted to control and categorized marriage migrants under the healthy family frame (Interview 5). Therefore, I assume that the state and the MOGEF are attempting reduce the amount of ‘unhealthy’ marriages by emphasizing the healthy family frame onto multicultural families.

Another reason why the government is trying to reduce multiculturalism could be from the emergence of visible anti-multiculturalism sentiments among the South Korean public. During my research on the topic of marriage migration, I frequently encountered the word ‘Damunhwa Hyumho”, which means “Hating Multiculturalism” in the media and social media (Pyun, 2016; Kwag 2017). This xenophobic term described people’s anger in having to accept foreigners as a member of society, to share social benefits and jobs with them and to fear violent crimes committed by foreigners (Prime Gyungjae, 2016). Particularly, some groups were upset that some multicultural family support program funding coming from the lottery fund was taking away the portion of the funds for other social programs like disabilities or elderly welfare that benefit South Korean citizens (Interview 6, 7). Xenophobia and negative sentiments against foreigners have always existed in South Korea where ethnic, national, and cultural homogeneity are glorified (Kim, 2007). But I felt that the development of anti-
multiculturalism was a step above the South Korean society’s general dismay against foreigners not just because people were using a strong word ‘hate’ but also because of the way people used the word ‘multiculturalism’. People used multiculturalism as a term including other migrant workers and foreigners on top of marriage migrants, which differed from the meaning of ‘multicultural family’ in South Korean policies (Interview 5). Yet, I assumed that most South Korean people first got their exposure to the term ‘multiculturalism’ from the expansion of the new multicultural family policies into the general public. Interestingly, this shows that the public learned multiculturalism as a generalized term for foreigners when the state developed this frame to indicate a selective group of migrants and to distract the concept of ‘immigrants’ away from multicultural families. But perhaps this unpopularity of multiculturalism explains why the government is trying to get rid of the frame now. While these social implications may explain the change of framing, they do not necessarily explain why the state orchestrated these changes happened in a top-down manner.

The weakening of civil society advocacy groups for individual marriage migrant helps the state to conduct these changes in a top-down manner. With the implementation of the MFSA, the MOGEF co-opted many NGOs and advocacy organizations experienced with working with marriage migrants to become government-sponsored Multicultural Family Support Centers (Interview 1, Interview 5). These centers implemented the programs determined by the MOGEF and the MFSA as government agents and hence lack autonomy compared to NGOs (Interview 1, Interview 2). As Multicultural Family Support Centers expanded across the nation, social workers have become the majority of professionals working with and for marriage migrants, which contrasts with social activists being the majority among marriage migrant related NGOs.
and advocacy groups (Interview 5). Government cooptation of NGOs and the decrease of activists working with marriage migrants led to the weakening of the civil society actors (Interview 4, 5, 8). Just as the lack of civil society collective action has allowed for the state to monopolize the development of the multicultural family policies in 2007, diminishing civil society organizations overtime allowed the state actors to easily prioritize the ‘healthy family’ frame above the ‘human rights’ and ‘individual migrant women’ frames formerly supported by NGOs.

In conclusion, the most recent changes of the frames of multicultural family policies show that the government led initiatives emphasized the healthy family frame while reducing multicultural family and human rights frames. I claim that the reasons for this frame manipulation come from the government’s effort in trying to reduce marriage failures and the increase in anti-multiculturalism. Then, the weakening of civil society interest groups due to cooptation of NGOs and less involvement of activists made it easier for the state actors to use a top-down strategies to implement these changes.

In Section III, I discussed the development and the changes in marriage migrant policy framing by identifying the involved actors and their roles. I found out that the actors involved and the role of the actors varied among the episodes of the policy framing development. I summarize my findings in Table 5 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Episode</th>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Policy Frame</th>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Agenda Setting &amp; Framing One Actor?</th>
<th>Bottom-Up v. Top-Down?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 2007</td>
<td>Vulnerability of migrant status of marriage migrants</td>
<td>• Immigration Control</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>MOJ</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Granting Denizenship</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Top-Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural Family</td>
<td>Lack of social protection for marriage migrants</td>
<td>• Family support</td>
<td>NGOs, Think Tanks, UN, Presidential Committee</td>
<td>MOJ, MOHWFA, MOGEF</td>
<td>Yes and No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Act 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Multicultural families</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Top-Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Human rights</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage Broker Business</td>
<td>Lack of regulations among marriage broker businesses</td>
<td>• Market and business regulation</td>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Individual legislators</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Act 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Consumer protection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Top-Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-2017</td>
<td>Increase of marriage failure and anti-multiculturalism</td>
<td>• Accentuating the ‘healthy family’</td>
<td>Legislators and MOGEF</td>
<td>Legislators and MOGEF</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Decreasing Multiculturalism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Top-Down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Workers’ Movement</td>
<td>Failure to extend labor law protection to migrant workers under the</td>
<td>• Human rights</td>
<td>NGOs, migrant worker activists, migrant</td>
<td>NGOs, migrant worker union</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>system, Exclusion from other social benefits</td>
<td>• Workers’ Rights</td>
<td>worker union</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bottom-Up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
First, the actors involved and their role varied across the episodes. The role of the NGOs and civil society organizations as agenda setters and frame sponsors weakened. While civil society organizations successfully encouraged the creation of the multicultural family policies through their agenda setting, their policy framing efforts were not as successful due to the lack of collective action. This led to another powerful actor, the state, to have more influence in developing the frames for the new policies. But even within the state, different actors played a different role in framing depending on the episode. The Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, the Presidential Committee on Social Inclusion and the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs created the ‘Multicultural Family’ and ‘Family Support’ framing of Multicultural Family Support Act. Individual legislators played an important role in framing the Marriage Broker Business Management Act as business regulation and consumer protection laws. The Ministry of Justice used the frames of ‘Healthy Family, ‘Consumer Protection’, ‘Prevention of Social Issues’ while omitting the ‘multicultural family’ frame when they increased immigration restrictions for marriage migrants. Finally, the MOGEF is intensifying the ‘Healthy Family’ framing while reducing the ‘multicultural family’ frame.

Contrary to my hypothesis that an interest group does both agenda setting and framing, I found variations of involvement among different actors. NGOs and think tanks in the civil society tried both agenda setting and framing but were more successful in agenda setting than framing, which made it seem like their role was limited in agenda setting. In the case of state actors, the state played a more active role in framing than agenda setting. However, the presidential committee as well has the MOGEF also conducted extensive research on the conditions of marriage migrant women and their families, which shows that the state actors
were actively setting the agenda within the institution. Nevertheless, each actor approached agenda setting and framing differently based on the issue at hand and their relationship with other actors. These variations made me realize that the connection between agenda setting and policy framing was more fluid than just a single or a separate process. In my study, I assumed that identifying the actors would determine whether agenda setting and framing are a single process or not. But now I believe there are more factors like the comparative strength of each actor and the context of the social issue that impact their fluid relationship.

Furthermore, my findings show that most of policy framing development occurred through a top-down process contrary to expected bottom-up processes. All four of the episodes depict that the state actors had a lot more influence over developing and implementing the frames compared to civil society interest groups. The weakness of civil society collective action and the gradual weakening of the civil society interest groups seemed to be the overarching reason for the top-down development of multicultural family policy frames. This entirely top-down policy framing development differs from the theoretical expectations based on other similar cases in South Korea. In the next section, I provide a most-similar-case comparison between marriage migrant policy development and South Korean migrant worker’s movement in order to demonstrate that the differences in the role of the actors can change framing development process.

Part IV: A Case Comparison with Social Movement Policy Framing in South Korea

The migrant workers’ movement in South Korea shows how a civil society movement can frame their issue and impact government’s policy responses. I chose to compare my case with the migrant worker movement due to the similarities between the two cases. These two
cases were the first to shed light on the social issues regarding the unfair treatment of foreigners residing in South Korea. They both began to appear in public in late 90’s into the 2000s. Both issues arose as human rights violation then later changed to something different. Furthermore, the government reacted to these publicized social issues by changing the policies. On the other hand, the main difference was that the migrant workers’ issues became a social movement while marriage migrants’ issues did not. The social movement created workers’ rights frame that allowed them to negotiate with the government to make changes in their labor laws. The migrant workers’ movement demonstrates how policy framing development can come from a bottom-up approach, which contrasts with the top-down multicultural family policy development. Considering the similarities in the topic and the context of the two cases as the control, I compare the main difference between the cases to better understand the effect of civil society organization on framing development.

In the early 1990’s South Korea’s rapid industrialization and development led to shortages in the 3D (Dirty, Difficult, and Dangerous) industries in the small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). The solution to the shortage of industrial labor was to bring in cheaper labor from abroad. Therefore, the South Korean government began recruiting short term migrant workers from other parts of Asia using the Industrial Trainee System (ITS). The ITS categorized migrant workers as ‘trainees’ and not ‘workers’, which meant that they were exempt from Korea’s labor protection laws and measures. The migrant workers under the ITS system suffered from notorious work place discrimination, abuse, underpaid work, and industrial hazards without any institutionalized protection and support. Further, the trainees paid a high broker fee to migrate to work in abusive work environments that paid the lowest
wages in South Korea (Kim, Denis, 2011a). In addition to poor working conditions, the trainee status denied migrant workers other human rights such as freedom to change employers, freedom to stay in Korea longer than 3 years, freedom to practice one’s culture and religion and more (Gray, 2007). Many migrant workers chose to become undocumented workers to earn more and to work in a better place, but instead risked their status safety in Korea.

Concerned with these discriminatory conditions for migrant workers, Korean NGOs create the Migrant Workers Support Movement (MWSM) in order to first defend migrant workers’ human rights, to promote their status by initiating changes to the trainee program, and helping them integrate into Korea’s society (Kim, Denis, 2011a). Many of the pro-immigration NGOs focused on the human rights frame more than the and many of the NGOs were church-based organizations whose management centered around the clergy leadership rather than the migrant workers (Kim, Denis, 2011b). Other NGOs who wanted to make changes in the trainee system formed another movement, the Joint Committee for the Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK). Together, these activist movements expanded legal protections for migrant workers. In this process, the JCMK constructed the “workers’ right” frame in lieu of ‘protection of human right’ framing (Kim, 2012). This strategic divergence to workers’ right framing helped consolidating fragmented groups of migrant workers under one unified ‘worker’ identity. Furthermore, the workers right framing allowed the movement to expand its network beyond right-based organizations to industry actors and worker’s union. This way, the movement gained more political legitimacy as a worker’s right group. As a result, the movement achieved the abolition of the trainee program and the adoption of Employer Permit System (EPS) that entitled labor rights for migrant workers (Hasan, 2011).
Up to this point, Korean activists initiated and led these social movements, which implied that migrant workers were subjects of the movement rather than active agents. Nonetheless, NGO led social movements allowed future migrant worker activists to learn and practice different tactics of agenda setting and framing under the protection of the Korean NGOs (Kim, Denis, 2011b). As new migrant worker activists gained experience and knowledge, they grew unsatisfied with the paternal relationship with Korean NGOs. Hence, a few undocumented migrant workers created an independent migrant workers’ union, the Equality Trade Union – Migrant Branch (ETU-MB), what is later called the Migrant Trade Union (MTU) (Gray, 2007). As expected, the MTU faced challenges from the beginning. Since undocumented migrant workers founded the union, the government refused to accept its union application then deported the union founders. The government’s repression has kept the union membership low and the union’s leverage limited. Therefore, the MTU and the migrant workers’ movement have not been able to make the intended changes (Hasan, 2011). Despite the ongoing challenges, the MTU’s presence bears a symbolic significance that proactive migrant worker activists have organized the only migrant worker union that includes both documented and undocumented migrant workers. Additionally, the MTU has been recognized as an affiliate by major Korean labor organization Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (TKTU) (Gray, 2007). The MTU and the migrant workers’ movement successfully developed and promoted the worker’s right frame through creating visible and extensive networks among civil society organizations. The proactive use of framing demonstrates that well-organized civil society groups can produce the most fitting frame and influence the policy framing process from a bottom-up approach.
This differs from the marriage migrant case where the state actor dominated the policy framing process. I believe that the lack of collective action among marriage migrants account for the top-down policy development. Marriage migrants and the related NGOs did develop a network with other NGOs to protect the rights of marriage migrants, but marriage migrants were still the objects of their effort rather than an active agent (Kim, 2007). Marriage migrants had not organized together to represent themselves and to choose a frame that worked for them. Therefore, migrant women advocacy NGOs represented marriage migrants when the government began to develop multicultural family policies (Interview 5). As a result, the policy development lacked a direct representation of marriage migrants and hence the state actors could easily assert the “family support” frame that regarded marriage migrants as subjects of government welfare and integration. Perhaps the policies would have taken a different direction had there been an independent marriage migrants union that collectively voiced their demands the way migrant workers have done. Then what explains the difference in collective action between marriage migrants and migrant workers? I claim that the fragmentation of marriage migrants, the domestic nature of their issues, their denizenship eligibility, and cooptation of migrant groups challenged marriage migrant collective action compared to migrant workers.

First, while both marriage migrants and migrant workers come from diverse background, marriage migrants relatively more fragmented than migrant workers in South Korea. Migrant workers tend to live and work in concentrated industrialized towns like Ansan or they live in company’s dormitories where they meet other migrant workers (Gray, 2007). Marriage migrants, however, were scattered all across the nation and many live in rural areas isolated
from the rest of marriage migrant population especially in the early 2000s (Kim, 2009). Before the daily use of the Internet and easy access to social media, marriage migrants across the country had very limited interaction with one another and with NGOs (Interview 8). In addition to the racial, religious and cultural differences, this physical separation among marriage migrants further challenged their potential to organize.

In addition to the challenges of organizing, the lack of pre-existing legal protection for domestic violence made it harder for marriage migrants and their advocates to create an achievable movement. One of the biggest issues among marriage migrants were the high prevalence of domestic violence with and limited prevention and support for the victims (Seol et al., 2016). Therefore, the NGOs main concern was to provide better support and protect the victims (Interview 5). This is similar to how the pro-migrant NGOs helped the victims of workplace harassment and workplace injuries in the beginning of the migrant worker’s movement. However, the difference between the two is the kinds of protection available for the victims. There was already an extensive amount of labor regulations and laws that provided protection for workers. Since migrant trainees were not considered as regular workers and were excluded from these regulations, the migrant worker movement could protest to include migrant workers in the existing protection by abolishing the trainee program. But for the marriage migrants, their issues were not a matter of exclusion from the law but the absence of protective law. Under the South Korea law prior to 2010, domestic violence was not criminalized despite strong opposition by women’s organizations. Criminalizing domestic violence would have been too daunting and unrealistic task for marriage migrant groups. Civil society organizations would have more political opportunities when chose to focused on helping the victims more than
initiating a separate movement framed as marriage migrant women’s movement. This led to marriage migrants’ interactions with the NGOs to be limited to receiving help rather than learning how to organize unlike migrant workers.

Nevertheless, civil society groups were more easily able to incorporate marriage migrant issues in government policies by focusing on service-oriented work that allowed for the top-down policy development. Focusing on the protection of marriage migrant women is a less threatening way to demand for their needs. Similarly, the South Korean women’s movement reframed their opposition to domestic violence from women’s right frame to preservation of family frame in order to gain more government approval and create allies (Heo, 2010). By doing so, the movement leaders entered into the government and were able to create the Ministry of Gender Equality. However, the institutionalized women’s movement leaders had to continuously incorporate the family protection frame in service-oriented programs in order to diffract opposition to their existence (Kim and Kim, 2011). Marriage migrant policies, although it did not spring from a social movement, reflects the trajectory of the women’s movement and its institutionalization through the tolerance of top-down policy approach and service-orientation. This contrasts with migrant workers’ movement where the movement chose a workers’ right frame that built a more contentious relationship with the government where the movement must express their need through a bottom-up process.

Additionally, one might still question why short-term migrant workers could organize more successfully than marriage migrants who would have more long-term benefits to be gained from organizing. The answer may be in that marriage migrants are denizens while migrant workers are foreigners. South Korean government grants denizenship to most marriage
migrants and gives them privileges and rights similar to those of citizens. Marriage migrants can also apply for naturalization later if they meet the requirements. Meanwhile, South Korean government enforces a strict short term stay regulation for (unskilled) migrant workers and exclude them of the privileges and rights granted for denizens and citizens. This short-term foreigner status implies that migrant workers’ main need was to include themselves in the existing realm of privileges and rights by creating a legitimate identity deserving of those rights such as the ‘worker’ identity. Furthermore, they needed to do this within the short amount of time they are allotted and could. However, marriage migrants have the rights as denizens and hence the discriminations they experience may be more diverse and not based on a clear collective reason. The lack of collective cause or solution makes it harder for social movement organizations to align their organizational interests and goals with those of individuals. Sociologists have named this process in which social movement uses different frames to organize and guide individuals as “frame alignment process” (Snow et al, 1986). In social movement studies, frame alignment is considered to be a necessary condition for movement participation (Snow et al, 1986). Fragmented marriage migrant civil society groups were unsuccessful during the frame alignment process and hence lacked movement participation.

In addition, cooptation of marriage migrant women’s organizing can also explain why marriage migrants are less organized than migrant workers. Marriage migrants often meet other marriage migrants by attending ‘jajomoim’, meaning self-organized groups. Despite the name, most jajomoims are organized through a local multicultural family support center or other similar NGOs. Jajomoims differ in sizes and purpose. Some groups are organized at the city level and brings in hundreds of marriage migrants from different nationalities living in the
city (Gukjenews, 2016), some others are much smaller in scale and are specific to a specific nationality (Choi, 2016). Some of the groups such as a Filipino group (Gu, 2016) seems to meet more regular than the other groups as the Cambodian group (Kim, 2016) who seem to organize the meetings for holidays. Regardless of these differences, almost groups serve as a platform to share information, connect with others and helping others adjust to South Korea. But the fact that jajomoims are often organized by government organizations and not by the women indicates that jajomoims are not true self-organized meetings but closer to government-initiated programs. There are times the multicultural centers assign a leader to the group and recruit people who would attend the meeting (Interview 8). When jajomoim are created and ran by the government, it can reduce the autonomy of marriage migrants in setting their own agenda. Additionally, considering that multicultural family support centers have more family-oriented attention, the jajomoims have more family-oriented agendas than the agendas (Interview 1), which can deter the creation of migrant women activists. These smaller and government-ran “self-organized” jajomoims are different than how migrant workers organized on their own. Considering that most jajomoims are fairly young, more time and close observation are needed to see if they become more autonomous and more of an organized political force similar to the migrant workers’ union.

To sum up the comparison between the cases of migrant workers’ movement and marriage migrant policy development, I found migrant workers were well organized to create a workers’ union and hence initiated policy changes bottom up using the ‘workers’ right’ frame. Marriage migrants were not as well organized and hence were not involved in policy framing as a collective actor. I analyzed the difference in collective action from the aspects of
fragmentation of marriage migrants, the domestic nature of marriage migrant issues, the different immigrant status, and cooptation of marriage migrant groups. However, this analysis does not take account for other variables that may affect the bottom up policy framing such as the government’s different intention behind managing the two different migrant populations. Therefore, I hope that future studies compare the cases from the perspective of the state’s needs and intentions of both the state and the civil society actors in order to expand our understanding of the state’s role in policy framing development.

Part V: Conclusion, Discussion, and Suggestions

My study on the development of the marriage migrant policy framing in South Korea produced interesting suggestions on the role of the actors in policy framing. The findings highlighted that the role of the actors changed throughout the evolution of the policies. The civil society actors first functioned as agenda setters and monitored the lack of government’s support for marriage migrants. Then, they were co-opted to implement the multicultural family support programs and hence many lost the NGO function later on. Similarly, the state actors and their roles varied across the episodes such as the MOGEF having more influence in framing the MFSA while legislators being more influential in framing the MBBMA.

Despite these variations, the findings across the episodes drew meaningful conclusion on my hypotheses. The creation of the MBBMA and MFSA demonstrated that the role of civil society actors was limited to framing the issue during agenda setting while the government actors generally dominated framing of the actual policies. Marriage migrants and the related civil society groups publicized and framed the social issues relating to violating the human rights of marriage migrants but they were not organized enough to have a strong influence on the
framing of the policy. Instead, the state actors developed the policy as a response to the agendas brought up by civil society organizations but created policy frames that best fit with the political environment, the public’s perception of the issue, and the government’s overarching intentions behind managing marriage migrant population. This finding suggests that separating agenda setting and framing only by the role of the actor is not sufficient.

There needs to be another level of analysis that distinguishes agenda setting from framing an issue and framing a solution. Policy framing consists of two parts of diagnosing the issue, and prescribing the solution. However, these two concepts are often blurred and causes confusion in analyzing policy framing. Therefore, I offer the terms ‘issue framing’ and ‘solution framing’ that differ from rhetoric and action frames of Rein and Schön (1996). Issue framing highlights certain aspects of the agenda and solution framing conceptualizes the policy solution to a highlighted problem area. The idea of issue framing is a more nuanced branding for the agenda compared to the concept of agenda setting that can lack a nuanced intention. My case suggests that agenda setting and issue framing can be a combined process while the actor’s ability to participate in solution framing are contingent upon other contextual conditions. With the distinction between issue framing and solution framing, my findings suggest that civil society organizations were both agenda setters and issue frame sponsors but they were not solution frame sponsors. Similarly, the state actors first only framed the solutions but later set the agenda, framed the issue as well as the solution.

My within-case analysis suggests that marriage migrant policy development was consistently a top down development throughout different episodes. My research identified two major reasons why the state used a top-down strategy in developing marriage migrant
policies. First is that the weakness among civil society organizations allowed the state to assert their dominant influence on policy framing. The case comparison with migrant workers’ movement highlight the contrast between the bottom-up framing of migrant worker policies and the top-down marriage migrant policies. The second reason is the state’s intention to integrate the marriage migrants in a controlled family framework rather than to highlight their individual rights and diversity. Multicultural family policies were not only designed to provide better social assistance to less privileged families but also to conduct a careful transition of denizens into the family-oriented citizenship. Therefore, my case suggests that the direction of framing development is not only contingent on the role of the actors, but also contingent on the strength of the interest group collectivization and the intentions and interests of the state actor.

I want to draw attention to the fact that both the liberal and conservative governments promoted multiculturalism. Even though the multicultural family policies were created during the liberal government, the policies were carried out during the two consecutive conservative presidencies. Nonetheless, the conservative government still promoted multiculturalism and even elected the first naturalized marriage migrant woman into the House of Assembly. How was it that the conservative government that emphasized economic growth over human rights protection become a patron of multiculturalism? The government is painfully aware of its declining population issue. Keeping multicultural families ‘healthy’ can help reduce South Korea’s declining population. Therefore, the conservative government utilized the multicultural family policies to promote population and economic growth. The tight top-down control over multicultural family policies allowed the conservative government to mold multiculturalism into
healthy family centered policies while maintaining the façade of promoting diversity and equality.

But I do not attribute the top-down policy development as a trait of only the conservative government. I predict that the liberal government would have also developed policy framing of multicultural family policies with a top-down approach. My interviews outside of Seoul revealed how detached the central government was to the providential governance and non-capital region NGOs. Most of the decisions were made in the central government without much consultation from other regional governments. All multicultural family support centers run the exact same mandated programs assigned by the central government. Beyond the party leanings, the hierarchical and centralized government structure powers the top-down decision making tendencies. Perhaps the liberal government would have provided more platforms for human rights related civil society organizations to speak up rather than family conservation or consumer protection agencies. This change in frame contestation platform for civil society organizations may change the frame of the policy, but the government would still remain the dominant actor in frame development. With current data availability, I cannot measure whether the liberal government would also endorse multiculturalism in a top-down manner or not, but I hope a future study can empirically test whether the variation in political party will make any changes or not.

I recognize that my case analysis has limitations on drawing the causal inference between the role of the actors influencing policy framing. First of all, due to the limited availability of the interviewees, I was not able to interview some core actors involved in policy development such as individual legislators, the Ministry of Justice, and the marriage broker
agency union. I believe that adding their perspective on the policy development will provide a more holistic picture of marriage migrant policy framing development. Furthermore, the absence of interviews with marriage migrants hinders my ability to draw a direct conclusion on their influence, or the lack of, on the policy framing process. This is partially due to the lack of collective marriage migrant representation. I also think that increasing the amount of within-case units can strengthen the causal inference of my study. I identified four large changes of policy framing for my research but making each policy changes as the unit of analysis would provide more precise variations that can lead to more accurate analysis.

The insightful findings and the limitations open up the potentials for further studies on the topic of marriage migrant policy development and framing development in the future. Multicultural family policies in South Korea are changing continuously and more studies should follow the pattern of their development. Especially with the steady increase of naturalized marriage migrants and their children, it would be interesting to see how the policies adapt to the changing constituents. Another direction would be to compare this case with the women’s movement in South Korea since the women’s movement also ended up in family oriented framing of policies despite its strong civil society collective action. In comparing those cases, it would be especially helpful if the study can identity the actors behind the development of the ‘healthy family’ frame. Additionally, I hope that future studies can test the effect of public opinion and media on policy framing to add to our understanding of the case and of policy framing theories.

Marriage migrant policies in the past decade have increased the amount of support for marriage migrants and their families. As the policy interest for multicultural families increased,
so did research interest on marriage migrants and their families, which created valuable knowledge, awareness, advancement on this particular population that otherwise could have been further marginalized. Despite all the positive changes, I urge to view multicultural family policies with a critical lens. The multicultural family support frame grounds varieties of issues marriage migrants and their families face into a narrow ‘family support’ solution definition and hence can exclude other important issues. The current trend shows that South Korea will continue to experience the expansion of ethnic, cultural, and racial diversification, and this transformation will keep challenging the norms previously defined by ethnically and nationally homogeneous population. Policies such as multicultural family programs will play a crucial role in how South Korea as a whole will adapt and thrive with the transforming composition of their population. Therefore, policies regarding marriage migrants and their families should expand outside of the narrow frames in order to critically assess the needs of the altering population and promote more holistic changes among migrant and domestic communities.
The interviews listed below were conducted in Seoul, Busan, and Geoje Island in South Korea. All of the interviews were conducted anonymously.

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