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Lobby Like a Girl:
The Strength of Women's Organized Activism

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Lobby Like a Girl:
The Strength of Women's Organized Activism

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Master of Arts, Emory University, 2019
Bachelor of Arts, Kenyon College, 2009

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Abstract

Lobby Like a Girl:
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By
Elizabeth Wiener

In three papers, this dissertation analyzes how gender-based differences in the relationships between state legislators and women's issue advocacy groups shape variation in women's political inclusion and representation. Each paper consists of an empirical study on the mechanisms through which these different relationships emerge and operate, measuring their impact on women's issue policy and policymakers.

I first demonstrate that women's advocacy groups target men and women in office differently. In developing the theory that produces this assertion, I use extensive qualitative data based on over 50 in-depth interviews with state-level women's advocacy organizations and political action committees (PACs) across the United States. I show that women's groups are more likely to target female candidates, but that tight electoral races rather than past legislative behavior predict whether an individual female candidate will receive a contribution. In contrast, legislative activism demonstrated through increases women's issue policymaking has the strongest positive effect on campaign contributions to male candidates over time.

In the second paper, I examines how different lobbying strategies affect a legislator's willingness to provide a women's issue organization access to the policymaking process, and how this willingness changes according to a legislator's gender identity. I conduct a field experiment observing legislator responsiveness to a women's advocacy group, and present strong evidence suggesting that while women are twice as likely to provide access to a women's issue group on face value, lobbying strategies signaling constituent mobilization are especially effective with men, doubling the likelihood a male legislator will respond and effectively closing gender gaps in responsiveness.

Finally, in the third paper, I shift attention to how changes in electoral support from women's groups can lead to changes in bill sponsorship by men and women in office. My findings indicate that while women in state-level office sponsor more women's issue bills as descriptive representatives overall, men are uniquely mobilized towards increased bill sponsorship when receiving increased contributions from women's political action committees.

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I dedicate this dissertation to Pippa and Harry, who changed everything.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Groups matter in politics. But how do they matter, and for whom? In exploring these questions, this dissertation considers the manner in which the "how" can in fact *depend* upon the "whom." The question of how groups matter in politics relates to what kinds of strategies a group can employ to ensure inclusion and influence in policymaking. Such strategies can vary tremendously, from "inside" or "direct" lobbying tactics that offer expertise provision and rely on legislative relationships (Austen-Smith 1993, Hall and Deardorff 2006, Grasse and Heidbreder 2011); to "outside" lobbying tactics that employ grassroots mobilization efforts to harness constituent pressure (Goldstein 1999, Kollman 1998, e.g.); to financial support and contributions donated to electoral campaigns (Fouirnaies 2018, McKay 2018, e.g.). Strategies not only vary to in their approaches, however, they also vary in their effectiveness. Lobbying strategies for achieving impact and influence might be effective for some groups more so than for others– and with some *policymakers* more so than with others. In other words, how political inclusion is accomplished can vary across multiple dimensions of "whom." For whom does the organization speak, and with whom in the policymaking process does the organization seek influence?

Taking a step back, the story of the relationship between organized interests and representation in American democracy is long and contentious. David Truman (1951) first articulated the basic assumptions and dynamics of pluralist theory, arguing that interest groups will form and become politically active when the group's shared interests are threatened in competition by another group. In this conception of "pluralist heaven," as it is often termed, marginalized groups in particular are assumed poised to form, strengthen, and engage politically within advocacy organizations, challenging governing institutions externally where

internal participation has historically excluded them. As Cigler et al. (2015, 8) explain, "central to theories of group proliferation are the pluralist notions that elements of society possess common needs and share a group identity or consciousness." For identity groups sharing experiences of systemic political, institutional, and social marginalization, the development of political group consciousness is relevant and likely (Gurin 1985, Miller et al. 1981).

Nevertheless, the extent to which "pluralist heaven" is achieved when groups historically excluded from politics seek conference with those wielding policymaking power is necessarily questioned. Interest group scholars across decades have paid careful attention to bias within systems of organized advocacy, concerned with which groups hold sway with policymakers officeholders and which groups do not (Lowi 1979, Strolovitch 2008, Weldon 2002*b*, e.g.). Just as groups matter in politics, scholars are increasingly attentive the fact that identity matters as well (Huddy 2003; 2013). Decades of research shows that group identity plays a substantial role in political behavior[1], and this extends not just to voter or constituent behavior but also to legislative behavior. Scholars agree that when it comes to the representation of groups historically excluded from politics, descriptive representation is key (Bratton and Haynie 1999, Broockman 2013, Mansbridge 1998, Phillips 1993, Williams 1998, e.g.). In terms of women's representation specifically, research across the board shows that women legislative differently on behalf of women than their male counterparts (Bratton and Haynie 1999, Reingold 2008, Swers 2002, Thomas 1994, e.g.). If women legislative differently on behalf of women, then we might expect that women in office would engage differently with women's identity groups seeking influence in politics as well. Is this the case? And if so, how do women's groups effectively interact with male legislators to promote increased women's representation?

The three essays presented here take a close examination of the relationships between women's groups and individual legislators in state-level politics, considering how an organization's gender identity and a legislator's gender identity come together to shape alternative pathways towards women's increased inclusion and representation in policymaking. The value of my research on identity politics, lobbying, and representation is stems from my examination of questions currently unanswered across each of these literatures. Specifically, I am particularly interested in conditions under which elected officials become activists for the representation of marginalized groups with whom they do *not* identify. When do men in office push women's interest policy agendas? How effective are they in doing so, and how do advocacy organizations

[1] See Huddy 2003 for full review.

and lobbyists play a role in shaping these outcomes? By shedding light on these issues, I take important steps towards determining what kinds of lobbying strategies can be most effective towards increasing substantive representation even when levels of descriptive representation remain low.

In the first essay, **"Sex, Money, and Subnational Politics: Do Women's Groups Contribute Differently to Male and Female Candidates,"**, I begin by asking the question: do women's organizations use different strategies when targeting descriptive and non-descriptive candidates? On one hand, research on lobbying shows that interest groups use campaign contributions to gain sway with influential legislators (Evans 2004, Fouirnaies 2018, Fouirnaies and Hall 2018, McKay 2018, e.g.). On the other hand, scholars also observe that groups are primarily interested ensuring their allies are elected rather than an interest in "buying" influence (Brunell 2005, Jansa and Hoyman 2018); groups contribute to candidates with whom influence need not be bought. Unpacking this strategic tension subnationally, this paper considers how groups lobbying on behalf of women chose between these two campaign finance strategies depending on whether they target descriptive and non-descriptive representatives. I model how electoral competitiveness and past legislative behavior on women's issues predict contributions by women's groups over time. How do these predictive relationships change depending on whether the women's lobby group targets male verses female legislators? Supplementing my data with a qualitative interview study of state-level women's lobbyists, I argue that women's groups are more likely to view female candidates as allies, and are thus most likely to contribute when women running for reelection face tight elections. In contrast, contributions to male candidates are instead driven by efforts to reward or incentivize legislative activism for women from less likely allies. In illuminating how relationships between women's lobbyists and legislators change depending on elements of descriptive representation, I speak to the larger question of how pathways towards substantive representation for women- and the strategic choices by groups that can maximize the likelihood of substantive outcomes- are divergent depending on the gender of the legislator.

The second essay, **"Getting a High Heel in the Door: An Experiment on Gender Gaps in Women's Organizational Lobbying"** presents a field experiment examining how women and men respond differently to women's organizational lobbying. My findings suggest that substantial gender gaps do exist; women are twice as likely to respond to a women's issue lobbyist's simple meeting request. That said, meeting requests signaling constituent mobilization have heterogeneous effects across legislator gender, doubling the

likelihood a male legislator will respond and effectively closing gender gaps in responsiveness. My results identify how women's groups can employ distinct lobbying strategies on female and male representatives to successfully gain their attention. In illuminating differing avenues toward greater inclusion for women's groups in policymaking, this paper informs how lobbying in state legislatures offers important opportunities for increased women's representation even when low levels of descriptive representation persist.

The use of experimental methods in this chapter offers a critical opportunity to overcome the endogeneity problems that often present significant obstacles to the observational study of lobbying in politics. Nevertheless, experimental methods pose their own issues, especially regarding external validity and generalizability. I address these issues in part by conducting the large-scale qualitative study presented in the previous chapter, which includes interviews of state-level women's issue lobbyists across 12 states and speaks to their objectives, strategies, and experiences in pursuing their policy agendas. Critically, the first essay as well as the final essay included in this project also incorporate longitudinal, large-n quantitative analyses to supplement the experimental results presented in the second essay. To do so, I develop an original data set measuring individual legislator bill sponsorship across women's issues, most generally and inclusively defined. The data covers individual state legislators serving in California and Ohio legislatures between 1998 and 2008.

In turn, the third essay, **"Reconsidering Gender Gaps in State Legislatures: The Effects of Women's Lobbying"**, uses this original data set to examine how changes in support from women's groups can influence changes in women's issue bill introduction by state legislators. Considerable research suggests that electing more women in U.S. state legislatures makes a difference for female constituents. That said, scholars also find that linkages between women's descriptive and substantive representation are conditional rather than absolute. While studies on the conditional linkages between women's descriptive and substantive representation have largely focused on party, district, and institutional characteristics, little is understood about the influence of women's organizations and lobbying. Similarly, where scholars often focus on female legislative behavior to identify gender gaps between descriptive and non-descriptive representatives, few scholars take interest in the conditions under which men become more active on women's issues in a legislature. This paper is concerned with both missing pieces in the literature, and investigates how lobbying by women's groups can influence male and female legislators differently. I explore how women are more likely

overall to introduce women's issue legislation regardless of whether they receive campaign contributions from women's groups. However, I also show that men in office are uniquely affected over time towards increased activity on women's issues when targeted by women's group campaign contributions, narrowing observable gender gaps while increasing women's representation overall.

Over the next couple of years, I will continue developing this dissertation project by expanding my original database, qualitative research, and comparative analyses for a book project on lobbying, legislatures, and marginalized group representation in U.S. states. One key issue that remains unresolved in the three separate papers included here relates to circuity in the causal story. More specifically, the project in its current form cannot speak to how contributions affect legislative behavior, which in turn, can affect future contribution behavior. My current approach to this issue is to lag legislative behavior is a reasonable approach, but it is nonetheless important to note that advocacy groups' expectations about future legislative behavior may also affect contributions. Addressing this issue conclusively is beyond the scope of these three individuals papers, but the coming book manuscript will devote substantial attention to disentangling this critical causal tension, and will likely draw on continued qualitative work to do so.

That having been said, the three papers presented in the chapters that follow offer a meaningful foundation for a fruitful research agenda. This dissertation project advances my exploration on how partnerships between lobbyists and legislators vary according to individual dimensions of identity, but goes deeper into questions regarding how institutional differences across state legislatures explain if and why these differences emerge. It also speaks to the critical take-away from my research: despite histories of institutionalized inequity in legislative institutions– especially with regards to interest group access and inclusion– mechanisms of lobbying and organized advocacy *can* work in favor of marginalized group representation. This dissertation offers theory, evidence, and practical insight for how lobbying in legislatures can help facilitate, rather than inhibit, increased democratic inclusion. By synthesizing and expanding upon my research in a book-length project, this considerable and relevant contribution will be more accessible to broader audiences.

Chapter 2

Sex, Money, and Subnational Politics: Do Women's Groups Contribute Differently to Male and Female Candidates?

2.1 Introduction

For many political pundits, analysts, and scholars, the story about interest group influence on policymakers is a story about money. It is a story wherein wealthy corporations govern policy outputs and under-privileged populations suffer persistent inequity. As Russell Berman, a politics writer for *The Atlantic* wrote back in March of 2016, "the problem of money in politics is so universally recognized that even Donald Trump, the ultimate capitalist, and Bernie Sanders, a self-described Democratic socialist, agree on it" (Berman 2016). Yet despite "universal" recognition, political scientists have nonetheless struggled to untangle fact from fiction within this disconcerting narrative. The empirical examination of relationships between interest group money and legislator behavior is riddled with inconsistent results. Some scholars find evidence that campaign donations have an observable impact on legislative voting behavior (Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo and Snyder Jr 2003, Fowler, Garro and Spenkuch 2020, Roscoe and Jenkins 2005, Wawro 2001, e.g.). That said, other scholars find no demonstrable evidence that campaign money influences a legislator's votes in office (Baumgartner et al. 2009, Wright 1990, e.g.). Still other scholars have instead emphasized the

importance of issue contexts and conditions, arguing that campaign contributions can be influential towards legislative votes on issues of low salience (Morton and Cameron 1992, Sorauf 1992).

When it comes to how groups themselves envision the connections between money and politics– and the resulting opportunities for influence arising therein– research suggests organized interests consider the choice of whether to make campaign contributions using two kinds of strategies. On one hand, interest groups use campaign contributions as an *access strategy* (Brunell 2005, Jansa and Hoyman 2018, 425) to gain sway or audience with influential legislators (Fouirnaies 2018, Hall and Wayman 1990, McKay 2018, e.g.). On the other hand, scholars also observe that groups are motivated by *electoral strategies,* primarily interested in ensuring their allies are elected rather than in "buying" influence (Brunell 2005, Jansa and Hoyman 2018). Groups contribute to allied candidates with whom they already hold strong ties.

However, a critical consideration of what constitutes an ally, or of how ties between candidates and organizations are forged, compels further examination. The degree to which legislators and groups are allied is often considered in terms of partisanship (Brunell 2005), or as related to positions on particular issues areas, such as free trade for labor groups (Jansa and Hoyman 2018). But can alliances also be based on experiences of social, political, or institutional marginalization? Scholars agree that groups historically excluded from politics are often best represented by elected officials who share their descriptive characteristics or salient group identities (Phillips 1998, Sapiro 1981, Williams 1998, e.g.). How does this dynamic then translate for stories about money in politics? What motivates a women's interest group to contribute to a legislative campaign, and do women's organizations use different strategies when targeting descriptive and non-descriptive candidates? How might these differing strategies reflect longer-term relationships between groups and legislators, and thus pathways towards increased representation for women?

With a subnational focus, this paper considers how groups lobbying on behalf of women chose between these two campaign finance strategies depending on shared marginalized group identity– or lack thereof. Using data on campaign contributions to Ohio and California state legislators between 2000 and 2008, I investigate how electoral competitiveness and past legislative behavior on women's issues predict contributions by women's groups over time. How do these predictive relationships change depending on whether the women's lobby group targets male verses female legislators? Drawing on in-depth interviews with state-level women's lobbyists, I argue that women's groups view female candidates as more likely allies based on

shared identity and group affinity. As such, electing more women into office represents a principle driving strategy. Women's groups therefore use electoral strategies when contributing to female candidates, and are most likely to contribute when women running for reelection face tight electoral races.

In contrast, male candidates do not have baseline ties to women's groups rooted in shared gender identity and group affinity; they are therefore not an electoral priority. Women's groups use what I term a *reverse exchange strategy* with male candidates. Access strategies based on traditional models of exchange predict that women's groups purchase legislative activism from male candidates with campaign contributions. However, reverse exchange strategies instead predict male candidates purchase campaign contributions from women's groups with legislative activism. Put differently, men in office must prove themselves allies with legislative activism on women's issues in order to *earn* campaign contributions. Campaign donations by women's groups to male candidates are therefore driven by efforts to reward legislative activism for women's interests, solidifying an alliance based on policymaking rather than on female political group consciousness. In illuminating how relationships between women's lobbyists and legislators change depending on elements of descriptive representation, I speak to the larger question of how pathways towards substantive representation for women- and the strategic choices by groups that can maximize the likelihood of substantive outcomes- are divergent depending on the gender of the legislator.

2.2 Group Strategies for Campaign Contributions

The prevailing paradigm for the role of campaign finance in influencing policymaking behavior and outcomes stems in one way or another from models of *exchange*. Exchange models for campaign finance assume that interest groups contribute to candidates for office with the hopes of purchasing a future advantage or access point to policymaking processes (Evans 2004, Fouirnaies and Hall 2018, Herrnson, Lay and Stokes 2003, McKay 2018, e.g.).The interest group is therefore assumed to be the first mover in the traditional models of exchange. As discussed above, the degree to which relationships between policymakers and interest groups work within traditional models of exchange remains unclear. A key challenge to the assertion that interest group money in politics is governed by an exchange model arises from credible commitment problems. If campaign contributions act as transactions, political action committees (PACs)[1] or

[1]PACs represent one of the largest sources of campaign money in politics.

special interest organizations donate to an elected representative's campaign in return for legislative action or behavior that cannot be expected contemporaneously. The opportunity to return on the organization's donation must arise later within the legislative institution, and only at this moment is reciprocity realized (McCarty and Rothenberg 1996). As McCarty and Rothenberg describe (1996, 874), "there is no external enforcement mechanism to insure that bargains between associations and policymakers are carried out. Although courts typically hold contracts between private parties, other means of enforcement are required for implicit contracts between groups and politicians." As a function of there being no guaranteed for delivery for legislative action "purchased" by a PAC, as discussed scholars often fail to observe any direct connection between money contributed and legislative voting behavior (Baumgartner et al. 2009, Wright 1990, e.g.).

In large part as a response to research failing to find any evidence connecting contributions by PACs to roll call voting behavior by members of Congress (Grenzke 1989, Wayman 1985, Wright 1996), Hall and Wayman (1990) introduce a groundbreaking theory asserting that PACs are primarily driven by an interest in buying legislative time and access. Research suggests that interest groups can utilize an "access strategy" for influence, making campaign contributions in order to buy audience or gain inclusion with legislators (Austen-Smith and Wright 1996, Herndon 1982, Jansa and Hoyman 2018). A strong body of empirical work shows that the use of access strategies for PACs giving can depend on factors such as incumbency (Jacobson and Carson 2019), electoral vulnerability (Ansolabehere and Snyder Jr 2000, Milyo, Primo and Groseclose 2000, Welch 1985), partisan majorities (Cox and Magar 1999, Rudolph 1999), and relevant committee membership (Fouirnaies 2018, Grier and Munger 1993, Milyo 1997). Scholars also theorize that groups use campaign contributions to purchase legislative effort (Evans 1996, Witko 2006, e.g.). In one of the most comprehensive studies evaluating these motivations to date, Barber (2016, 149) finds strong results "consistent with access-oriented giving in both cross-sectional and panel models across several decades of election cycles in both state and federal elections." Each of these studies provides evidence that PACs, most broadly defined, fit well within a traditional model of exchange by offering donations to political campaigns with the hopes it will award them some future access, credible commitment issues notwithstanding.

But when it comes to groups specifically motivated towards partisan or ideological objectives, existing research tells a slightly different story. For ideological groups, evidence suggests that *electoral strategies* driven by overlaps in ideological alignments rather than access strategies based on models of exchange shape

contribution behavior (Barber 2016, Herrnson, Panagopoulos and Bailey 2019). As Jansa and Hoyman (2018, 425) summarize, groups use electoral strategies "to affect which decision makers hold power rather than gain access to those already in power." Ideological interest groups are thus more likely than non-ideological PACs to make the active investment in representatives with whom they share values and trust (Jackson and Engel 2003, Jansa and Hoyman 2018). In fact, Jansa and Hoyman (2018, 425) also offer that "groups following an electoral strategy may augment the strategy by rewarding loyalty and punishing defection on key votes." Interestingly, while Barber (2016, 156) shows that non-ideological PACs care little about the ideological leanings of the candidates to whom they contribute, he also reveals that individual donors care a great deal- and that "ideological groups appear to split the difference between the two different motivations of PACs and individuals." These groups behave comparably to individuals contributors, who appear motivated by an interest in keeping those who share their ideological preferences in office (Barber 2016).

Where do identity groups, or women's groups specifically, fit into this theoretic debate? Answering this question is difficult for three noteworthy reasons. The first stems from the broad definitions regarding what constitute "women's issues." Identifying where the ideological or partisan boundaries of a women's issue group requires that "women's issues" in politics be clearly defined, which is challenging. How can one accurately or reliably define a subset of political issues by their connection to a group identity, or the experience of that lived identity within a larger society? Osborn (2014, 149) articulates this problem well, questioning whether one can define "a group of 'women's issues' on which women legislators, regardless of party ideology, might work together due to shared gendered interests." Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007*a*, 554) offer that "the most problematic component of theorizing the relationship between women's descriptive and substantive representation concerns establishing what constitutes, in comparative political research, women's issues."

Nonetheless, Osborn 2014 does provide a useful rubric for women's issue identification based on past research, defining women's issues as falling into one (or more) of three categories. First, scholars specify women's issues as policy issues regulating or explicating women's rights, such as those related to anti-discrimination law Wolbrecht (2000). Second, past research also defines women's issues as issues that disproportionately affect female constituencies, or as Carroll (1994, 15) states, policy areas where the "con-

sequences are likely to have more immediate and direct impact on significant larger numbers of women than of men." These issues include policy areas such as domestic violence, reproductive health, etc. (Carroll 1994, Lovenduski 2005, Reingold 2000, Swers 2002). Third, policy related to women's traditionally defined roles in the "private sphere," such as childcare, education, or other "ethic of caring" issues, are often included in definitions of women's issues (Gilligan 1992, Thomas and Welch 1991), though to varying extents.

Within this broad definition, a great number of potential "women's issues" exist– many of which, such as a women's "right to choose," are clearly "owned" by a particular party Petrocik (1996). However, other policy areas like protecting victims of domestic violence or sexual assault exist as issues that draw the concern of both parties, thus largely eluding any strong partisan or ideological connections. A lack of clarity and cohesion amongst varying "women's issues," definitions makes ideological assumptions about the groups working on "women's issue" advocacy challenging. We might expect this to be the case less so at the national level, where women's issues related to women's reproductive health, equal pay or opportunity, or sexual harassment in the workplace are both salient and partisan. But state-level legislative bodies are often tasked with considering less salient, politically charged, or ideologically divisive policy issue areas that disproportionately impact women.

This leads to the second source of uncertainty: scholars know relatively little about state-level women's issue groups and their lobbying activities– or the behavior advocacy organizations more broadly. With the exception of the few studies described above (Barber 2016, e.g), the overwhelming majority of research on interest group behavior, money in politics, and organizational influence overall focuses on national-level politics. Hojnacki et al.'s (2012) literature review on interest group scholarship demonstrates this general imbalance towards nationally organized interests, and Gray and Lowery (2001) underline the troubling disconnects between state and national-level research within the interest group subfield. What's more, even the study of women's group activity on the federal levels is limited."Identity groups" including organizations representing racial, ethnic, or religious groups; the elderly; women; or LGBT communities make up only 3.6% of organized interests in Washington (Schlozman, Brady and Verba 2018, 156). The number, nature, partisan orientation, or ideological lean of women's issue specific organizations within that 3.6% remains largely unclear. Anecdotally, we know that organizations like the National Organization for Women (NOW),

Emily's List, or the American Association of University Women (AAUW) tend to build relationships with more ideologically liberal or Democratic legislators than their conservative or Republican counterparts. That said, both NOW and the AAUW are non-partisan organizations, dedicated first and foremost to the advancement of women's rights and opportunities and to protecting women against discrimination. But their focus on national politics often moves issues of reproductive health and abortion to center stage; Emily's List, for example, declares its partisan lean explicitly by stating that their exist to "elect pro-choice Democratic women to office."[2]. It remains unclear, however, the degree to which reproductive health or access to safe and legal abortions are as prominent within the field of women's advocacy and lobbying in state-level politics, where activity on these types of issues likely exhibits substantial variation. Ultimately, with respect to state-level women's issue advocacy groups, PACs, and politically active nonprofit organizations, reliable descriptive information is limited.

Finally, the third and arguably most imperative reason for questioning how effectively existing theory applies to the lobbying motivations of women's organized interests, or the lobbying activity of organizations representing marginalized groups more generally, is shaped by the political power and relevance of marginalized group identity itself. Identity is a crucial driver of political behavior, and an extensive empirical consensus exists demonstrating that salient group identities are closely tied to significant political cohesion[3]. Activists within a women's organization, the lobbyists women's organizations employ, and their overall strategies for behavior are likely to have embraced a *politicized* group identity; in working within a political advocacy organization for women, they are likely to be connected not only by their identification as women but also by the group consciousness arising from that group membership and identification. Conceptually, political group consciousness is defined as "in-group identification politicized by a set of ideological beliefs about one's social standing, as well as a view that collective action is the best means by which the group can improve its status and realize its interests" (McClain et al. 2009, 476). Despite often being grounded in ideological beliefs, political group identity and consciousness often lead to political behavior quite different from those driven by ideological preferences alone. In fact, group identity and political group consciousness also give rise to out-group affect, distancing, and feelings of threat (Conover 1984, Gurin 1985, Jardina 2019, Miller et al. 1981). If political group consciousness affects a women's organizational

[2]This quotation can be found on the banner of their mission statement webpage, which can be accessed at https://www.emilyslist.org/pages/entry/our-mission

[3]See Huddy (2013) for a full review

lobbying strategies, or whom within a legislature they choose to build relationships and contribute to electorally, it should certainly shape increased support for candidates they believe will advance group interests (Jardina 2019, Sidanius and Pratto 2001, Tate 1993). But how might these beliefs be driven by a politician's shared marginalized identity– or lack there of? When might women's groups contribute to *male* candidates?

Even further, can we also expect shared female gender identity to build bridges between women's organizations and female candidates otherwise divided along ideological or partisan lines? Past research demonstrates nuanced relationships between gender and political party. Partisan gaps among female congressional officeholders, for instance, have grown over the past 30 years, shaped by gendered differences across party in recruitment practices and campaign contributions (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018, Thomsen and Swers 2017). Among elected female representatives, Swers (2002) finds that Democratic and Republican women diverge in their tendencies towards women's issue activism at the federal level, especially in varying contexts of partisan control. Ideologically, Osborn et al. (2019) show that female state legislators are increasingly more polarized than their male colleagues, with important implications for women's representational policymaking. Whether women's groups use ideologically driven electoral strategies or access-oriented strategies for contributions, they have a foundational interest in advancing specific policy; this applies to all groups, spanning non-ideological PACs, ideologically driven groups, identity-based advocacy organizations. For women's groups, do ties based on gender identity condition ties based on partisan or ideological preferences?

If women's group favor electoral strategies over access strategies, the potential importance of symbolic representation (Pitkin 1967) in motivating electoral priorities adds considerable weight to this last question. According to Pitkin, symbolic representation has power in its capacity to evoke meaning, confidence, or value (Pitkin 1967, 97). As Lawless (2004, 82) attests, "the symbolic importance attributed to women in positions of political leadership is routinely invoked as an explanation for the need to elect more women. regardless of whether men can represent women's substantive interests." While existing research presents conflicting findings as to the independent effects women's symbolic representation on citizen engagement and perceptions (Atkeson 2003, Lawless 2004), little is known about the importance of symbolic representation in motivating lobbying efforts by groups engaged in identity-based organizational advocacy. Certainly in terms of movement mobilization and motivating individual political action, symbolism matters. Euro-

pean new social movement theory rubrics offer that networks of groups can transform their memberships into political actors through the development of collective identity, a process that can in part depend on the development of meaningful symbols (Cohen 1985, Melucci et al. 1995, Touraine 1985). If symbolism also matters in motivating the contribution strategies of women's organizations, then electoral strategies might shape outcomes wherein women's groups support female candidates *in spite* of ideological or partisan incongruence– simply as an effort to increase descriptive and therefore symbolic representation.

These three challenges taken together make it difficult to position women's advocacy groups within existing theoretic frameworks for understanding motivating campaign contribution strategies. Information is limited on the ideological and partisan orientations of state-level women's issue groups, or even the issue areas most prominent on their political agendas. Furthermore, past research on contribution strategies by individuals, ideological groups, or non-ideological PACs cannot adequately speak to the role gendered political group consciousness plays in a woman's group use of money in politics, or their lobbying strategies more generally. Does a group's gender identity interact with their ideology or partisanship in guiding them towards electoral strategies, access strategies, or some kind of hybrid between the two as Barber (2016) finds with ideological groups? And relatedly, how does *candidate* gender condition the strategies a women's organization employs?

I utilize in-depth interviews with over 50 state-level women's advocacy groups to address these unanswered questions and inform my subsequent empirical design and analysis. Identifying grounded theory qualitative strategies as optimal, I design my study in consultation with the methodological framework outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1998) as well as by Gioia (2013). The study was approved by my university's Institutional Review Board (IRB) in October 2018, and interviews were conducted between October 2018 and August 2019.

In the section that follows, I provide a more detailed description of my methodological approach and procedures. I then outline my observational analysis and situate it in a theoretic framework for predicting gendered contribution strategies by women's issue groups.[4] My interviews lay a foundation for this paper's broadest empirical expectation: women's lobby groups contribute to male and female candidates differently. Motivated and strengthened by a gendered political group consciousness, women's groups prioritize increasing and protecting the number of women elected in office. This driving purpose is bolstered by a

[4]All names discussed in the sections that follows have been changed to protect participant anonymity.

commitment to strengthening a powerful network of female political activists, one that includes not only organizational representatives but female officeholders as well. The prioritization of increasing state-levels of descriptive representation actuates my testable expectations that women's groups use *electoral strategies* in campaign giving with female candidates, such that competitive races more so than ideology, party, or past legislative behavior on women's issues predict contributions.

When it comes to men in office, identity in-group/out-group dynamics rooted in gendered political group consciousness fosters wariness from women's groups. Male legislators and candidates are often assumed to be less likely legislative activists for women as a constituency group. Nevertheless, strategic interactions and legislative relationships between male policymakers and women's groups are often necessary and expedient- not just for women's groups but for male candidates as well. In recognition of this reality, I hypothesize that women's organizations are willing to support a male candidate *conditional* on his ability to earn trust through legislative action.

2.3 Grounded Theory Qualitative Analysis

Grounded theory methodologies create new understandings of contextually rich social relationships, offering distinct value in their "ability not only to generate theory but also to ground that theory in data" (Strauss and Corbin 1998, 9). These methods are often most productively used to gain insight into substantive areas about which little is widely understood (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Intricate data is gathered and interpreted about the experiences of individuals, their thought processes, and their strategic decision-making that is otherwise difficult to observe or extract through conventional or quantitative approaches to research. As Bitsch (2005, 77) describes, "a grounded theory project typically does not begin with a theory from which hypotheses are deducted, but with a field of study or a research question, and what is relevant to this question is allowed to emerge during the research process."

My "field of study" attends to the three outlined challenges limiting our theoretic understanding of the motivations behind strategic lobbying by state-level women's issue advocacy organizations. Who comprises the organizations, activists, and PACs advocating on behalf of women's interests in state-level legislative politics? What do they consider "women's issues" and how does gender identity relate to their policy objectives? What motivates them in their strategic choices and activism, and what drives the strategies

they feel maximize their success? Finally, how are their motivations, behaviors, legislative interactions, and strategies rooted in elements of group identity? Building upon these initial questions throughout the research process, I use what is commonly referred to as the *Gioia method* (2013) to pin down and conceptualize moving pieces within my phenomena of interest: the development and strategic incorporation of gendered political group consciousness.

2.3.1 The Qualitative Sample

Because one of the central obstacles in understanding the motivations behind women's advocacy strategies stems from the lack descriptive knowledge, my first objective was to systemically gather an inclusive and well-balanced sample of groups who champion increased representation for women's interests in policy-making. Who are state-level women's issue interest groups and what are their issues? Political scientists focused on interest group activity and influence define interest groups broadly to include any organization that seeks to influence government. As such, we might define a women's issue interest group as a group whose primary political function is to advocate for women's interests. With this generous definition in hand, however, the spectrum and number of groups is overwhelming. Without conducting a widespread survey of organizations similar to the research at the federal level conducted by Baumgartner and Leech (1998), I cannot speak descriptively with confidence about the full universe of state-level women's issue interest groups across the United States; it is far beyond the scope of this paper. Scholars estimate that there are approximately 200,000 interest groups active in American politics, leaving few constituencies unrepresented by some form of organized advocacy (Nownes 2013). It *is* within the scope of this paper, however, to report my qualitative findings based on a group sampling protocol carefully designed to be as inclusive and comprehensive as possible.

Over the course of 2018 and 2019, I interviewed fifty-six representatives from state-level women's organizations engaged in lobbying, social activism, or political advocacy (as they themselves stated and defined). The organizations each worked exclusively in state-level politics, and combined to cover the following states: Alabama, California, Florida, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Washington. I conducted in-depth interviews with subjects representing women's issue nonprofit organizations, political action committees (PACs), foundations and grant-making organiza-

tions, organizational coalitions, think-tank institutions, and organizations that conducted many or all of these functions.

Of the fifty-six interviews I conducted, thirty-one were with representatives from nonprofit organizations dedicated to women's issues, gender equity and equality, and/or women's representation in public policy. These groups were classified as 501(c)s, defined by their tax-exempt status organized under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. Many advocacy organizations are classified under Section 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) of the Internal Review Code as a function of their engagement in political advocacy and social change activism. Within my sample, 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations included think tanks, service-oriented organizations, nonprofit organizations focused on specific women's issues, and grant-making organizations. Some organizations served more than one of these functions as well. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has clear restrictions on nonprofit activities in terms of lobbying and election campaigns in order for them to be eligible for their charitable tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Restrictions described in the Treasury Regulations (501(c)(3)-1c3ii) outline the various activities that should be considered "lobbying," including the direct contact of government officials relating to bills, acts, or law-making initiatives, any efforts to influence the public on referendum, constitutional amendments, ballot initiatives, etc., or any appeals to the voting population via grassroots mobilization efforts for the purposes of influencing policy or policymaking (Lunder 2006). Any election related activities taken on by 501(c)(3)s must be non-partisan, and managers of 501(c)(3) organizations are warned that any private participation in campaign activity outside their organizational purview must be separated completely from their organizational publications, statements, or newsletters (IRS 2007). Organizational leaders do have some flexibility, however, in making specific expenditures within their budgets directed towards lobbying activities without compromising their tax-exempt status so long as they file the appropriate paperwork.[5]

The remaining twenty-five interviews were conducted with representatives from state-level women's political action committees (PACs), each of which was dedicated to increasing the number of elected representatives into state-level office who could and would be "dedicated to the enactment of policy that increases the representation of women's diverse interests and perspectives in our state" [Interview on February 15, 2019]. According to the Center on Responsive Politics[6], "an organization's PAC will collect money from

[5]This paperwork required them to make the H-election through the IRS Form 5768.

[6]https://www.opensecrets.org/527s/types.php, accessed on May 4, 2020

the group's employees or members and make contributions in the name of the PAC to candidates and political parties."

The choice to study 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations that engaged in "policy work," or "service provision" in addition to PACs dedicated to "electoral work" was intentional, not only to illuminate new phenomena and processes but also to draw comparative connections. One of my main points of interest as my data collection and analyses continued was to isolate how these two distinct types of women's organizations, electoral groups (PACs) and advocacy groups (largely non-profit organizations), were connected– if at all. It was also important to explore how such connections differed across states, or if state-level legislative institutional differences shaped different kinds of separations between these organizations. In fact, the legal separation between electoral and advocacy activities did not vary across states at all; they were strictly adhered to and respected in each of the states I studied, and defined who was and was not technically defined as a "lobbyist" (those engaged in electoral work) and simply an advocate or an activist. Critically, however, while the activities of groups and individuals were surely distinct, professional and social networks bridged these organizations together. In states big and small, from states like California and Pennsylvania with highly professionalized legislatures to states like Rhode Island and South Carolina where low levels of staff resources and compensation prevail, I found that women's organizations across both definitions engaged with each other closely and often in order to pursue a higher goal of impacting social change and achieving locally driven agendas. While organizational lobbying and advocacy activities differed in their form or legal jurisdiction, all of the fifty-six women's groups I interviewed stressed the importance of *networks and coalitions with women* as primary drivers for their successful advocacy initiatives and/or long-term political impacts.

I follow the Gioia method (2013) for my qualitative approach, which is designed to add qualitative rigor in its "systematic approach to new concept development and grounded theory articulation" (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton 2013, 32). According to this methodological framework, I began collecting my sample by instituting a protocol for *purposive sampling* in fall 2018 to build a collection of women's activist organizations, women's lobby groups, and women's political action committees working in state politics that could offer the best contribution towards understanding women's advocacy practices and strategies. To do so, I utilized the *Encyclopedia of Associations* as well as basic internet research, contacting over 40 organizations

in this initial stage of outreach alone. While I continued cold-call outreach through my own independent research, I also expanded my sample using snowballing techniques, which requested that interview subjects recommend additional organizations with whom I should connect. By the early months of 2019, I had interviewed a sufficient group of representatives from organizations to transition from *purposive sampling* to *theoretical sampling* in order to gain more insight into certain concepts and trends emergent in the data (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton 2013, Strauss and Corbin 1998). Theoretic sampling is similar to snowball sampling, but it is more targeted towards specific questions arising from analyses of past interviews. In my use of theoretic sampling, I sought to connect with individuals and groups that could confirm what the I had already found, while at the same time purposefully seeking participants who could *disprove* previous findings as well (Gioia, Corley and Hamilton 2013).

Finally, during the late spring and early summer months of 2019, I sampled some additional groups and coalitions that could help with both *literal replication*, which would predict similar results, as well as *theoretical replication* to explore results that might diverge for reasons predicted by my developing theory. I continued using my growing network of contacts to conduct outreach with more organizations, lobbyists, and veterans within state politics until my analytic results reached a point of *saturation* (Strauss and Corbin 1998), or when no new ideas or insights were arising from the data.

Because I was interested in the driving motivations, personal experiences, and strategic interests of these women's issue activists and lobbyists at the most generalizable level, I allowed my qualitative exploration to be iterative and systematic. Unlike quantitative research, data collection and analyses in grounded theory qualitative methodologies occur in alternative sequences. Analyses begin after the first interview, and are incorporated into the next interview or observation. Analysis follows each observation, and is then followed up by additional observation and analysis. A key methodological challenge in this line of research therefore lies in the tension between necessary objectivity and sensitivity. As Struass and Corbin (1998, 42) describe, "Objectivity is needed to arrive at an impartial and accurate interpretation of events. Sensitivity is required to perceive the subtle nuances and meaning in data and to recognize the connections between concepts. Both objectivity and sensitivity are necessary for making discoveries." In order to keep track of memos, maintain consistent coding techniques, and provide the foundation for simultaneous sensitive and objective analysis, I employed the RDQA Package (2016) in *R*.

While I did not administer a survey for each participating organization, activist, or lobbyist, I did take care to allow the respondent to describe and explain their organizational mission in their own words. Using RDQA, I analyzed responses and created a issue-typology to summarize the self-described areas of focus for groups included in my qualitative sample as they related to "women's issues." I present the frequency of those organizational mission types referenced by at least 10 percent of respondents in Table 2.1. In the far left column, I have listed the issue areas under which self-described missions can be categorized; the middle column shows the number of groups stating a mission falling within this issue category; and the far right column presents the percentage of total groups that included this issue in their founding organizational mission.

Table 2.1: Organizational Missions: Summarizing Women's Issue Areas

Women's Issue Area	Group Count	Group Percentage
Increasing Female Perspectives in Politics	48	85.7%
Social justice for women	16	28.6%
Violence against women	19	33.9%
Women's professional networking and advancement	10	17.9%
Reproductive health and rights	11	19.6%
Improving women's equity in opportunity	9	16.1%
Support for mothers and childcare	7	12.5%
Women and children in poverty	6	10.7%

Note: Groups could describe more than one issue area, and the percentages therefore do not add up to 100%

Of the 56 organizations I interviewed, 44 organizations listed more than central area of focus (78.6%). In fact, 48.2% of groups described three different foundational issue areas and 30.4% of groups described two distinct issue areas. Each category included covered a number of different issues connected not only conceptually but in the language used by participants to describe them as well.[7] For instance, respondents from groups focusing on issues related to violence against women represented groups devoted to issues including sex trafficking, domestic abuse, and sexual assault (among others). But additionally, respondents from these groups also consistently used language like "empowering victims," "safe spaces," and "experiences of trauma." By incorporating textual analysis of interview transcripts with traditional categorization

[7]This kind of language and textual analysis is made possible by RDQA.

of issues under broader policy areas, I am able to contextualize what "women's issues" mean to the sample of women's advocacy organizations included in my qualitative study.

One important takeaway from these descriptive statistics is that while the issue categories fall well within the definitions of women's issues outlined in the literature, they do not exhibit any strong ideological or partisan leanings. Many of the organizations participating in the interview study were "non-partisan" by definition and as a legal necessity in order to qualify for 501(c)(3) status. But organizations that, for example, worked to support women's professional advancement, advocated for increased equity in education or business, or pushed policymakers to fund better support for working mothers all promoted policy avenues that could not be cleanly identified as either liberal or conservative. Even among the 25 women's PACs interviewed, only 4 indicated a specific ideological (liberal) or partisan (Democratic) leaning. These 4 PACs were a part of a larger group of 13 PACs who explicitly limited their donation strategies to women in founding principles.

However, as is clear in Table 2.1, the predominant organizational mission across all of the groups I interviewed was to increase female perspectives in politics. At its root, this mission was oriented around the assertion that virtually every issue in American state-level politics can be considered a women's issue. Because female experiences of life and thus politics are gendered, policies at the broadest level must be considered from a gender lens to achieve equitable representation in policymaking. In the words of Olivia, a respondent from a women's interest PAC, "that there are women's issues specifically is a dated perspective, in my opinion. We want candidates that can see how all politics is women's politics. Sure, it's making the personal is political. But what is political is also personal. We want recognition that women are a constituency in all policy arenas, not just those that relate to a working vagina" (Interview on 8 February 2019). Olivia's words reveal a strong connection with a women's political group consciousness, a concept discussed in detail below.

2.3.2 Women's Political Group Consciousness

My qualitative analyses indicate that in state level politics, gendered political group consciousness gives rise to strategic priorities and propels organizational goals. These goals are rooted in the reliance and cultivation of dense networks. Women active in organized advocacy prioritize professional, social, and

emotional connections with other women– including those elected into office– to advance efforts for change. The shared experience of gender is central to building these connections and accomplishing their advocacy goals. These goals are, in turn, directed by the impellent aim of expanding and strengthening that network; for those groups engaged in electoral work, that aim translates into ensuring the proportion of women in office is steady, if not building.

Because networks of women existed on a foundation of political group consciousness based on in-group identity, women's groups had less secure ties to out-group male activists and officeholders. Political group consciousness and gender identity emulate a kind of unspoken but universal cognizance between female activists that largely does not extend to male colleagues. My findings suggest that male allies *do* exist, at times if for no other reason than by necessity, but that men are not embraced into long-term and trusted associations with women's groups until they can clearly demonstrate a respect for the importance gendered perspectives in policy issues beyond those traditionally attached to the female sex, such as reproductive rights or child care. Male colleagues and professional connections, including both those elected in office as well as sister activists working towards shared policy initiatives, must "earn their trust, or build a reputation for understanding the gender lens... I guess you're either woke or you aren't woke. Most of us want to see it before we can believe it" (Interview on 10 January 2019).

Political group consciousness developed in part out of a widespread recognition of coalitions as essential to successful advocacy. As one woman representing a state-level women's fund described, "Partnerships arise from all sorts of different relationships, but they're critical to our success in making change. It is better if we are all banding together [and] if we are serving the same ends. We want to be a beacon to our local communities, and leverage the ability to work with women all over the state in voting forums, issue forums, diving into histories and communities- we all want to connect with each other to know what other women's organizations are doing, and how we can all come together to create leadership opportunities across all the political and social arenas" (Interview on 4 February, 2019). The activities around which these partnerships arose thus spanned legislative work, community service work, and electoral work. Study participants described networks and coalitions including local women's shelters, women's business groups, advocacy organizations, and women's healthcare providers, all of whom worked together on creating policy recommendations, pushing their collectively produced reports in their state legislatures, or building "leadership

development programs for getting women elected and creating a cohort for support systems in lawmaking itself" (Interview on 5 February, 2019). Across 12 states and fifty-six interviews, respondents indicated that communication, collaboration, and social interaction across state-level women's organizations of all kinds was extensive, widespread, and consistent.

The connections between these women were political, but underneath the political motivations for social change there existed a deep and strong undercurrent of politicized women's identity, an identity that could not by definition apply to men. While political group consciousness is defined by organizations engaged in collective action to improve their social and political well-being (Gurin 1985, Miller et al. 1981), it also "involves the acceptance of the belief that fundamental differences exist between the interests of one's own group and those of the dominant group" (Miller et al. 1981, 495). These attitudes about in-group/out-group differences are central to distinctions between group membership and group identity and consciousness (Gurin 1985, Jardina 2019, Miller et al. 1981); they were also crucial to my own findings distinguishing women's political advocacy networks, both inside and outside legislative institutions, from more widely studied, non-identity related advocacy networks shaped by overlaps in political ideology. The women interviewed in the study consistently agreed that there was an unspoken but critical understanding among other *women specifically*, one that only women could fully conceptualize through lived experience of marginalization and that also engendered and animated their commitment to continued activism and advocacy, individually as well as collaboratively. As one respondent articulately captured,

> "Everything I do, everything we as a group do, manifests from a place of empowerment– of women's empowerment. We work with victims, we advocate for victims, and most of the time, one way or another, we have been victims ourselves. It *is* about policy- but the reason I am devoted to this work is women's empowerment. We as women do it together for empowerment. We listen to one another, support each other, and really only other women can fully understand." (Interview 4 February 2019)

Another representative respondent shared that, "with my closest allies in these fights, the point of connection stems from our experiences as women. A woman knows" (Interview 18 December 2018). I sought clarification regarding whether these "allies" were female elected officials or fellow lobbyists or activists. The respondent explained that her reference to allies included both "elected as well as advocates, experts, even the registered lobbyists and electoral guys. We try to be as unified and inclusive as possible with

women at all levels and spaces, in both political as well as non-political settings. We want to help unify a comprehensive voice for women."

The respondent's words echo the scholarly work of Weldon (2002*b*), as she identifies intra-group organizational interactions as primary mechanisms for building group voice. Weldon (2002*b*) proposes that group perspective can be best understood as a puzzle, wherein each individual member is a piece. As a diverse group of women come together, comparing shapes and sizes of each puzzle piece and working together to complete the puzzle, a they *collectively* create a group perspective. Therefore, such organizations or movements have a greater likelihood at articulating a group perspective on behalf of a marginalized community than any given individual who considers themselves a member of the community. The importance of networks thus arose not only in creating practical connections between professional women in their organizational roles and advocacy campaigns, but also in communicating and strengthening their group perspective as women. Another respondent described, "When we gather as a group, we help educate one another about our issues and concerns as women, and do so with the knowledge that we will trust, validate, and learn from one another. No woman will have to prove to me, or go to any exhaustive lengths to convince me, that the issues she faces are gendered issues" (Interview 13 December 2018).

I ultimately found that women's larger networks, both social as well as professional, provided an important space for women in three particular functional capacities. First and most formally, these groups were necessary to plan and coordinate lobbying agendas and strategies. Second and no less important, group meetings acted as educational spaces, helping to develop and spread awareness of the diverse set of policy priorities existing amongst groups of women with widely varying interests, preferences, perspectives, and life challenges. And finally, women's network events and gatherings, both formal and informal, served to bolster their political group consciousness, their commitment and active connection to one another, and therefore their commitment to their jobs as activists.

This last function was a necessary one, as I became increasingly aware in my research that the joys of success in activism came also with disappointments, concessions, shocking confrontations, and failures. It was in such difficult times as much as the times of celebration that networks among the women's issue lobby groups became crucial. For example, when I spoke with one respondent named Maureen in October of 2018, she had just heard news that some changes in what would soon be the final state assembly budget report had

rendered her and her colleagues' months-long efforts towards a common goal meaningless. Maureen was angry, very frustrated, but simultaneously not all that surprised. She said, "[My colleague] Jenny knew it, she told me I should expect this – Jenny is a friend, she's great, she's been working with [another state-level women's advocacy group] for years now and she knows her stuff – well, she warned me and told me I ought to prepare myself. And yet here I am, and I am livid. We'll have to pow-wow tonight. There will be wine." Maureen went on to lament, "We have been here before, and we'll be here again. We'll put on our big-girl pants and live to fight another day."

Despite its traditionally pejorative meaning, the term "big-girl" was notably common in my interviews. One respondent referred to " the big-girl brawn," (Interview 20 November 2018). Another stated that "big girls don't cry– they get angry" (Interview 4 February 2019) when describing a recent challenge with male colleagues in the social justice advocacy community. The term was often used in conjunction with the terms "fight" (as above), "strong," and "tough," but also often connected with "team," or "sister." I inferred that "big girl" was not only being reclaimed from it's original disparaging and deprecating meaning; it was embraced both as a term of empowerment that linked intimately to group. In reclaiming what it meant to be a "big girl," to be a woman in a male-dominated political world, they asserted their power as women in the collective. Ultimately, gender identity was a driving mechanism. When I told Maureen I was getting used to hearing the term "big-girl," she laughed and told me that "when we live in a world where 'boys will be boys,' big girls will get together and kick some ass" [Interview 30 October 2018].

Conclusively and most relevant to this paper, however, women's political group consciousness compelled strategies for partnerships with officeholders as well as electoral contributions. Above all, women's issue organizations– not just the PACs that do electoral work specifically, but advocacy groups, nonprofits, think-tanks and service providers alike– women's interest groups aspire to increase descriptive representation. Across each state, women's groups working both in and out of the electoral processes stated this priority clearly and emphatically. Many nonprofits and women's foundations funded groups and PACs with this specific and sole goal in mind. These grant recipients were partners, part of the state-level network. As one respondent detailed, "we consider our grantees partners. We fund grants for leadership development which gets women in office. These partners have immense and robust programs for getting women elected, campaign management training, how to run these things, and then even after you're elected– they create a

cohort so that if you're new to lawmaking, you have a support system for women" (Interview 30 November 2018). The remarks once again underlined the close-knit nature of the women's networks, even within and amongst officeholders themselves.

My interviews continued probing on this point; I wondered how partisanship, ideology, policy position overlap affected the way these networks grew. Was there accountability? Were women in the network ever punished for holding positions not endorsed by others in the organizational coalition? Laura, an elderly woman who often shocked me with her frankness, echoed many of the answers I received on this line of inquiry. She stated frankly, "of course, they can do what they want. We want them there, regardless. We empower the *woman*. Her. We want HER there, for our daughters. It is the politics of presence. The rest is for birds" (Interview 18 March 2019). It should be made clear- policy *was not* just for the "birds" when I asked other participants about Laura's comments. But Laura's underlying meaning was consistently confirmed; that women be elected and be present in office was the principal, dominant goal. As we see in Table 2.1, which presents trends among interview participants in reported organizational objectives and issue areas, attention to increasing representation of women's gendered perspective was overwhelming across participant groups. Given the role of women's political group consciousness and gender identity among these groups as well, it seems likely that increasing recognition that *all issues* can and should be examined through a gender lens is connected to the strategic prioritization of increasing the number of women in office. Women's groups might be putting a such a premium on increasing descriptive representation in order to maximize the presence of gendered political group consciousness within the legislature itself.

Drawing this connection could potentially speak to the uncertainty surrounding how groups reconcile ideological or partisan conflicts *across and within women* as a group. If what matters most is a gendered lens, or the acknowledgement that gender can shape different policy considerations that might otherwise remain unrepresented without the deliberative presence of women in power, elected officials who identify as women can accomplish this representation, independent of party and ideology. In fact, inclusion as women with varied political leanings and associations can become a powerful asset in its ability to provide a diverse perspective of women's collective identity and interest in politics.

On the other hand, gendered political group consciousness might only be possible for women embracing feminist conceptions of identity, and thus more liberal ideology. In their analysis of women's pathways to

elected office, Carroll and Sanmonbatsu (2013) find that while state level women's PACs play a substantial role in getting women elected, they also *do* appear to use ideological criteria in supporting female candidates. As a result, "these PACs contribute to gender differences in legislator ideology and to the greater representation of Democratic women in office compared with Republican women" (Carroll and Sanbonmatsu 2013, 122). In contrast to the qualitative work conducted by Carroll and Sanmonbatsu (2013) which surveyed female state legislators, my qualitative study gathered insight from the perspective of women's PACs themselves. Nevertheless, I was unable to sufficiently speak to this question, in large part because those PACs without explicit Democratic or pro-choice associations (mirroring PACs like Emily's List on the state level) were hesitant to verbally dismiss conservative or Republican women. Given the obstacles in answering this question qualitatively, I consider it empirically in my quantitative analysis later in the paper.

2.3.3 Women's Groups and Men in Office

While the women's groups in my qualitative study preferred to work with women, even across party and ideology, advocacy efforts could not be limited to the network of women in and outside of elected office. One respondent, Bethany, described perfectly: "We can't just deal with allies , we have to do more. We need the power-brokers. Sometimes they take a little more to persuade, or to listen." (Interview 11 December 2018). When Bethany spoke about allies, she was speaking about women in office- the female state legislators. She continued, "At least in [our state,] power-brokers are men. We know that often when the bills are proposed, they are at least championed by one female lawmaker. But we are still going to need some of the men in power. Unfortunately, women aren't there yet. I don't want to sound complacent; progress has been huge. But we know that there is a lot more work to be done."

Interestingly, success in working with male partners in activism as well as men in office also related directly to networking: networks and coalitions shaped reputations, which were pivotal in building the relationships necessary in legislating. For instance, in describing how her organization got started, one respondent explained,

> "It was a community based response to need at the time, because at the time there were no services in the area, no networks for support. We started an outreach and training network, and developed some community co-leadership in the area with other small groups. But in the communities we served, the voices together– voices of women's resilience and strength– grew louder. And local elected officials began to get interested. One of our state senators- a

> women, in fact– she got in contact with me and then put me in touch with another state-level organization... and things really just picked-up momentum from there. It all started with our local reputation. Of course, we have always wanted to influence state policy because we have specialized in learning what we can and cannot do within state services and infrastructures. But we didn't just start knocking on doors alone. We built a reputation, a name for ourselves, and a network came to *us*." (Interview 17 December 2018)

For male legislators specifically, the power of reputation as it translated into influence and inclusion in policymaking often came from reliability in "data driven solutions" (Interview 16 November 2018). Reputation for quality expertise, for non-biased and well-researched policy proposals, was paramount for how groups could be taken seriously with those elected in office. Developing this reputation, and the "data driven solutions" around which they were strengthened, emerged one the most fundamental strategies for influence by non-profit advocacy groups in their lobbying efforts and direct contacts with policymakers. But it was *most* relied-upon when groups targeted male legislators specifically. In fact, I found that women's issue lobbyists used expertise as a means of framing their policy asks towards more "serious" (Interview 30 January 2019) issues like finance, jobs, or the economy more generally and away from issues traditionally considered as gendered. Mindy, a savvy-advocate and former PAC manager explained that "there is a language to advocacy, there is a language that you need to adapt when you are trying to enact policy change. For men, it's more important to frame it from a prosperity lens. [We explain how] women need these things because [without them,] work productivity goes down, economic bottom lines go down. We push hard on the workforce development pieces. Removing gender, replacing it with economic issues and supporting that with membership and constituency mobilization" (Interview 26 January 2019).

That said, expertise was often insufficient to gain respect (and therefore access) from some male officeholders. In states with more professionalized legislatures, many of the women lobbyists voiced their familiarity with legislative staffers for these reasons. Samantha, for instance, made some particularly memorable comments when she described, "I do find that individual senior staffers are responsive to me, and those who know me can help foster those kinds of relationships. It is an uphill battle, I actually look really young and as a woman I have a higher barrier than my male colleagues in gaining credibility or being able to take a more aggressive position" (Interview 18 December 2018). As also referenced by Mindy above, other groups utilized membership mobilization to gain attention from male officeholders. Sharon, an coalition leader working in a far less professionalized state than Samantha, offered that she regularly will "go out

and engage our membership, and a lot of them time that can spark interest in male legislators. We train our members on how to speak to their legislators, and that is really useful in getting male allies behind us" (Interview 17 December 2018).

While I observed that women in office are often actively engaged in statewide networks of female political activists, my qualitative results indicate that male legislators (and organizational allies as well) require different strategic attention when necessarily targeted. Mores specifically, respondents throughout my qualitative study expressed the comparative difficulties communicating with men in power that important issues often uniquely impact female citizens or constituents. This was especially pivotal when women's networks, advocacy groups, and lobbyists were working with legislators on issues *not* related to reproductive health or abortion. As discussed, because connections with women were based so foundationally on gender identity, shared gender identity translated into a shared life experience which then seemed to transcend into a deeper understanding of how almost *all* issues can be gender issues, not just issues that concern reproductive health. While this message required little explanation for female officeholders, it was not the case for their male counterparts:

> "Women know why women's issues are important. We don't need to spend time changing what our angle is or re-working our approach to defend or justify. The women have been face-to-face with this, or many of them have, or they know other women who have first hand experience. Either way- even if they haven't dealt exactly with the issues we're rallying around, that they're important is not really up for debate. They have an understanding. That's what we're thinking about when it comes to real friends [in office]... and yes, they're women." (Interview 4 December 2018)

For legislators identifying as women, who had the "understanding" based on a shared lived experience of marginalized social identity, it was not difficult to consider broader economics issues, social welfare issues, or public health issues through a gender lens. For male legislators, however, the general consensus– or maybe, the general *expectation*– was that it was difficult for them to "comprehend the magnitude of how some of the pieces of legislation they routinely consider disproportionately impact marginalized communities and women" (Interview 6 December 2018).

I emphasize *expectation* rather than consensus because despite my best efforts, I struggled to speak with organizations or activists who had extensive experiences working closely with male elected officials, or at least with any regularity. While some advocates described cordial "working relationships," the "friendships"

described openly and often as developing between women's groups and women lawmakers did not extend to men in office. Rather than alliances based on experiences, trust, and emotional connection, alliances developed between networks of women's groups and male legislators seemed to instead reflect a potentially strong but almost always transient overlap of interests. Male allies were often spoken about as if they were temporary, where as female allies were "solid," and more dependable.

One strong takeaway from the relatively limited sample of participants that could speak about their experiences lobbying and working with men in office was that this: there was a great deal more trepidation related to what best (or most productive) practices looked like in engaging with male "allies." Speaking with Lisa, a woman working within a close coalition of women's advocacy groups, grant-giving organizations, and think-tank style institutions, gave me a great sense of this. She explained,

> With men, there is a reciprocal relationship of earned trust- and I emphasize *earned*. I earn his trust, and he must also earn mine. Most of the women, I know that we're allies, because we rest on firmer ground, we have something shared. So it's like this: if it is a direct ally , a tried and true person [woman] that I know would say yes, I cut to the chase, reach out and ask them to get with me directly... I don't do that with someone I have less trust with. I approach them with more, introduce myself as an expert. I say this is what my value is, I get with some of our members who live in his district and hopefully (at my urging) have introduced themselves at some point. They need to know the value of my agenda. And then? Yes, I need to know they value me as well. To build a real bridge, I need some demonstration. (Interview 6 December 2018)

What Lisa describes (and what I heard often over the course of my interviews with PAC organizations specifically) seems to reflect an exchange-like model, rather a *reverse exchange model* for legislative interaction and campaign contributions. There is an element of quid-pro-quo in the form of trust, which can only be developed over time through action that can effectively prove longer-lasting alliance. Theoretically, such a strategy might still fall under an electoral strategy in that it is made in order to ensure an ally remains in office. But it differs considerably from the electoral strategy proposed above in its connections to dynamics of exchange. I seek to untangle these remaining questions in the section below. In addition, the discussion that follows also synthesizes the results discussed above towards a broader theoretic framework, producing testable hypotheses for the paper's remaining empirical analyses.

2.4 Theory and Hypotheses

In review, electoral strategies for campaign contributions guide groups to contribute to candidates they value as allies in order to help ensure their reelection. Such strategies are thus most likely to be pursued when allies face tight elections. In contrast, electoral competition does not influence a group's contribution when that group instead embraces access strategies for giving. Access strategies are based on models of exchange. The interest group acts as the first mover, offering electoral support in exchange for legislative access or influence.

Based on my qualitative research, I conclude that women's advocacy organizations consider their relationships and policymaking connections with state legislators carefully with a mind towards shared gender identity. Women's organizations, and more specifically women's advocacy PACs, identify the expansion and protection of women's numerical presence in office as a– if not *the*– principal objective in their efforts to increase representation for women. This strategic prioritization stems from a political group consciousness that emphasizes network. From the standpoint of political science literature, developing this network of women within a legislature would certainly represent a worthwhile investment; research across the board suggests that women legislate differently than their male colleagues on behalf of women, both individually as well as collaboratively (Bratton and Haynie 1999, Holman and Mahoney 2018, Reingold 2008, Swers 2002, e.g.). Increasing the proportion of women in office thus represents a long-term strategy to maximize the attention paid by a legislature overall to issues that disproportionately impact female constituents, as well as to increase the likelihood that traditional policy issues be considered through a critical gender lens. It can be best summarized as a function of identity-based allies, akin to a sort of sisterhood, developed through political group consciousness by women engaged in every level of state politics. In developing and strengthening a group consciousness among political activists working both inside and outside state legislative institutions, women's organizations and PACs make maintaining this powerful in-group network of female allies an uppermost priority.

Given that increasing the number of descriptively representative allies in office appears to be the dominant motivating goal of women's PACs, I predict that women's issue PACs use electoral strategies in their campaign contributions, and are more likely to contribute to *female* candidates than to male candidates. Importantly, as my qualitative research underlines, these particular alliances are grounded in shared group

identity and affinity rather than in direct political or ideological overlap. Given that the electoral strategies are thus motivated by a broader interest in increasing the proportion of women in office rather than in a specific interest in advancing a well-defined policy agenda, I also expect that electoral strategies should funnel women's issue PAC contributions to female candidates *independent* of any past legislative behavior, ideology, and partisanship. This marks a subtle but important change from past applications of electoral strategy theory, which have historically been rooted in presumed connections between candidates and legislative behavior.

However, while gaining seats in state legislatures for women is a *principal* goal, it is not the *only* goal. My qualitative work also clarified that outside the realm of registered lobbyists and PACs, women's advocacy organizations were engaged in strategies of grassroots mobilization, direct lobbying, and membership political education in the pursuit of short-term policy agendas. Staying current and active in current policymaking proposals and interests therefore does represent a substantial piece of their organizational missions as well. Naturally in pursuing these policy agendas, the importance of allies once again becomes paramount. Groups regularly use their networks of female allies to coordinate and pool resources, mobilize public support, and gain momentum in policymaking processes. In doing so, they often rely on female legislators with whom they already hold strong and dependable ties.

But while female allies in policymaking existing within networks of political activism might be more accessible and reliable, alliances with male legislators can and must exist as well. In fact, often male legislators hold positions of greatest prestige or power within a state legislature, and are thus necessary to build relationships with. Over the course of my interviews, I consistently found that the relationships successfully formed between male representatives were often considered tenuous or expedient, especially compared to those between women's groups and women in office. Such necessary and provisional alliances were most frequently negotiated to achieve shorter-term policy benchmarks or movement, and as a result often required issue re-framing to allow the organizational ask to appear *less* related to gender. In the event that alliances bridged between women's groups and "woke" male legislators emerged enduring, it was only after both sides had sufficiently attested to their dependability through action rather than cheap-talk.

As another respondent representing a women's empowerment PAC informatively related, "We are looking for female candidates, first and foremost. So if we are going to target our fundraising efforts towards a



Figure 2.1: 2x2 Table Typology Predicting Candidate Contribution by Gender and Legislative Activity on Women's Issues

male candidate, efforts that might have otherwise been channelled in support of a woman, that man better have his act together. He needs to have proven himself, and we [in the organization and larger women's network] need to be in consensus around that" (Interview 1 April 2019). It therefore seems that when women's issue PACs consider contributing to less likely allies– or male candidates for state legislative office, they too "take a little more to persuade". In order to convince a women's group that they are worthy of electoral support, men in office must earn a women's issue lobbyist's trust with legislative action. As the same respondent (Interview 1 April 2019) added to her comment above, "I'll be honest: it's rare."

Taken together, when it comes to the degree to which a women's issue PAC will target their "fundraising efforts" towards an incumbent state legislative candidate[8] it seems clear that candidates are evaluated across at least two distinct dimensions: gender identity and past legislative action on women's issues. Consider Figure 2.1, which summarizes my qualitative findings into a two-by-two table to unpack the associations between these two variables of interest.

From Figure 2.1, we can clearly see that electoral support should be extended to female candidates regardless of their past legislative behavior, and instead as a function of their gender identity. In order to pursue the

[8]I only consider incumbent candidates because past legislative behavior, or the degree to which a candidate has effectively "proven" themselves as trustworthy, or as a likely ally to women's representation, is central to my testable theory and analyses. It is possible that male (or female) challengers might have "proven" themselves in some other capacity, potentially as activists themselves, but such alternative mechanisms are difficult to consistently observe and measure. Future research might consider the conditions under which male candidates are targeted by women's issue PACs over female candidates, particularly if the woman running is Republican or publicly stated to be pro-life, but such exploration is outside the scope of the current paper.

primary goal of increasing levels of descriptive representation in state-level elected office, women's groups will target female candidates with campaign contributions even without strong backgrounds in women's issue legislative activism. In contrast, a women's organizational support for a male candidate appears contingent on past legislative activism on behalf of women. For male legislators who do not share an identity group affinity with women's issue PACs, past legislative behavior can make the difference between receiving or failing to receive campaign support from a women's group.

Still, women's issue PACs cannot simply contribute to all who fits these conditions (and thus show "Y" in the contingency table presented in Figure 2.1); resources are scarce, and decisions must be more strategic in order to maximize a group's expected utility. It is therefore also crucial to consider the influence of a candidate's electoral competitiveness as an additional variable of interest. If groups are using an electoral strategy in making campaign contributions and are limited in the amount of candidates they can choose to support, it follows that they will support the candidates they estimate could benefit most from a contribution. In other words, a women's issue PAC donating using an electoral strategy is likely to contribute to candidates they (a) want to see re-elected, but (b) they also feel face difficult races. As such, if we assume that electoral strategies are dominant, and that an outcome increasing the number of women in office as identity-based allies at least *weakly dominates* an outcome of increasing the number of policymaking allies, then we can deduce the following:

[label=()]Allies *based on either gender identity or past legislative action* will be most likely to have higher levels of contributions from a women's group The greater the electoral competition *and thus perceived threat to re-election* an ally faces, the higher levels of contributions from a women's group Increased electoral competition for candidates *not considered to be allies* should have no observable impact on campaign contributions from a women's group.

3a **Hypothesis 1:** Based on shared gender identity, women's PACs will use electoral strategies to contribute to female candidates more so than male candidates

- **Hypothesis 2:** Based on shared gender identity, women's PACs will be most likely to contribute to female candidates when candidates face high electoral competition, *independent of their past legislative activity on women's issues*
- **Hypothesis 3a:** Women's PACs will be most likely to contribute to male candidates when candidates face high electoral competition *conditional on past legislative activity on women's issues*

In the hypotheses proposed above, electoral competition plays a key role in the expected contribution behavior of women's issue PACs when groups target both female and male legislators.[9] Because electoral strategies for campaign contributions place a driving emphasis on ensuring allies are re-elected, the degree to which such allies (given they are identified as such) are facing electorally tight races is central to strategic decision-making. However, there is an alternative story to consider when predicting what motivates a women's organization in contributing to a male candidate, especially given my foundational theory that women's groups want more *women* in office first and foremost. Specifically, we might imagine that women's groups might not be working off electoral strategies, simply investing in the elections they feel maximize their *future* return on policymaking, but instead working from more of a retrospective *exchange model* for lobbying strategy; women's groups might be *rewarding* male candidates who have proven their trustworthiness, or "been on good behavior," as another respondent in my qualitative research bluntly described (Interview 11 March 2019). I was unable to objectively and confidently ascertain through my qualitative work which of these two potential stories was in fact playing a dominant role in shaping how and why women's groups donated to male candidates, in the "rare" event that they did at all. Attempting to disentangle them quantitatively is therefore of important value.

This alternative story is also of particular interest because in essence, it turns the traditional exchange models for interest group politics on their head. Traditionally, access strategies assume that the group is the first mover. But if the legislator is the first mover, and is attempting to offer something to the group as a means of exchange, access strategies are effectively reversed. The power of decision moves from the hands of the *legislator* to the hands of the *group*. In the traditional study of lobbying, such a reversed exchange model seems bizarre and unlikely. A dollar from one business group, for instance, is worth the same as a dollar from another business group; for the legislator, as a consumer of campaign contributions, it is a buyer's market. But the dynamic changes slightly when PACs are directly connected to particular identity groups, proclaiming to represent the interests of that identity group in politics for an audience of both elected officials as well as voters. In this market, where the legislator is a consumer of campaign support (and effectively, public endorsements) from a particular identity group, a dollar from a women's group is not in direct competition with a dollar from an industry group. Here, the legislator faces much more of a *seller's* market. In this alternative scenario, an endorsement and subsequent campaign contribution from a

[9] My sample of grous carefully excluded PACs that clearly stated (as Emily's List does) to *only* donate to female candidates.

women's issue PAC must be *earned*, especially if women's groups are not particularly inclined to contribute to male candidates in the first place. If this "reverse exchange model" is in fact at play, we would expect to see evidence in support of the following alternative hypothesis:

- **Hypothesis 3b:** Male candidates will receive increased campaign contributions from a women's issue group when their legislative activity on women's issues was high in the previous legislative session, *independent of electoral competition*

Because the reverse exchange model's driving mechanism, in contrast to the electoral strategy for campaign contributions, has no direct connection or reliance on electoral conditions, Hypothesis 3b is in no way conditional on electoral competitiveness in its expectations. It is thus distinct from Hypothesis 3a in a critical respect: it would suggest that the mechanisms driving a women's issue group's strategy for campaign contributions are fundamentally different based on elements of shared group identity (or lack there of).

Finally, the simplified model depicted in Figure 2.1 does not address the challenging question of how ideology and partisanship might interact with women's PAC determination to elect more female state legislators. While neither my qualitative research nor past scholarship on women's PACs can conclusively speak to this question, my more general finding that ideology and partisanship matter relatively less to than increasing levels of descriptive representation guide me in proposing one final set of hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 4:** A female candidate's individual ideology will *not* have a significant influence on campaign contributions from women's issue groups
- **Hypothesis 5:** A female candidate's political party will *not* have a significant influence on campaign contributions from women's issue group

In order to test these predictions, I utilize longitudinal regression analyses using panel data for women's issue PAC campaign contributions, women's issue bill sponsorship, and district level electoral competitiveness combined with additional data for individual legislator level controls. My data, empirical strategy, and my significant results are outlined and discussed below.

2.5 Empirical Research Design and Methodology

Because I am interested in observable demonstrations of legislative activism on women's issues, I examine the campaign contributions from women's issue organizations to support the candidacies of incumbent leg-

islators running for reelection within a state legislature. My data covers the state legislatures of Ohio and California between the 1998-2000 legislative session and the 2008 electoral cycle.[10] All analyses are conducted at the district-election year level, thus allowing for individual incumbent legislator party, ideology, and gender to vary over time.

For each district in each state and election year, I observe the real dollar amount the candidate running in that district receives in campaign contributions from one or more women's organizations. The dependent variable in the analyses that follow is therefore an aggregate measure of campaign contributions made by women's interest groups to individual candidates in the California and Ohio State legislatures. The data cover contributions made between the 2000 and 2008 electoral cycles, aggregated for each candidate and modeled on the district-election year level. For a majority (82%) of candidates included in my sample who received contributions from a women's organization in a given election cycle, the total dollar sum came from a single women's group in a single donation. Upper chamber candidates were not included in the empirical analyses. Over the five electoral cycles between 2000 and 2008, 237 candidates received campaign contributions from women's groups dedicated to issues advancing women's rights, social welfare issues, and issues related to children's rights, marking 26.7% of the total incumbent legislators running for reelection over this period. The mean amount received by an individual candidate during one election cycle was $1,429.53 in real dollars, adjusted for inflation. A density plot of the real dollar amount of an individual level contribution by women's organizations (broadly defined) per election cycle between 2000 and 2008 in CA and OH can be seen in Figure 2.2, with the dashed red line indicating the average individual contribution level.[11]

[10] One of the driving independent variables of interest in this study is obviously past legislative activity, or more specifically women's issue bill primary sponsorship. Data collection has thus far only covered these two states, but is continuing to expand for future research. Ultimately, the plan for this line of analysis is to include data from as many states as possible in order to increase generalizability as well as to make comparisons across state level institutional variation.

[11] The dependent variables included in the empirical models presented below use the real dollar amount of contributions. In order to address the distinct rightwards skew in the data, however, robustness checks are conducted with the natural log of campaign contributions as well and are included in the Appendix. Those results, while slightly different, tell a story much in line with the analyses presented below.



Figure 2.2: Distribution of Donations by Women's PACS in Nominal Dollar Amounts

I selected the organizations included in the study carefully to ensure they embrace a mission directly and specifically aimed at political advancement of women's issues. I use the nonpartisan, nonprofit National Institute on Money in Politics (NIMP) via FollowTheMoney.org and limit contributions to organizations to industry categories designated as women's organizations, social welfare organizations, and organizations dedicated to children's rights.[12] Amongst all of the industries by which FollowTheMoney.org categorizes interest group donors, these three categories best capture the spectrum of "women's issues" defined by Wolbrecht (2000) as policy that either advances women's rights, disproportionately impacts women, or falls within the traditional, "private sphere" gender roles. For those organizations designated as "women's organizations," I confirm that only organizations related to advancing women's rights; protecting female victims of domestic abuse, sexual assault, sex trafficking, sexual harassment, etc.; increasing access to women's

[12]Taken collectively, the number and levels of campaign contributions are substantially varied and sufficiently high to conduct meaningful analysis. However, taken individually industry by industry, data is more sporadic and limited across the states and years included in my study. I am thus unable to, for example, analyze the legislative activity on social welfare issues and policy issues related to the advancement of women's rights separately.

healthcare; and pro-choice initiatives are included in my sample. I therefore exclude those organizations dedicated to advancing pro-life policies, as support for anti-abortion issues is often religiously motivated, and is less likely to be driven by interest in a woman's reproductive health or role as a mother. I was also careful to confirm that organizations categorized as "social welfare organizations" and "childcare and children's rights" organizations by FollowTheMoney.org dealt singularly or primarily with issues that were either (a) substantially more consequential to women as a group than for men; or (b) traditionally concerned with women in the role of caregivers. The vast majority of such organizations advocated on behalf of victims of domestic violence and sexual assault; for increased access to affordable and quality childcare; or on behalf of abused, neglected, or impoverished children.

My first of two independent variables of interest, bill sponsorship activity on women's issues by individual state legislators, is based on a sample of 556 bills once again identified as policy that advances women's rights, that relates to issues disproportionately impacting women, and that relates to the traditional role of women as caregivers.[13] The process for identifying bills for inclusion began in the legal database LexisNexis State Capitol[14], a well-cited and reliable computer-based legal research database that includes archives of bills introduced in both chambers of each state legislature. I utilized a list of keyword search terms carefully designed by Reingold et al. (year) to return any bills related to women's issues. Searches were conducted for California and Ohio legislatures, session by session, for all legislative sessions between 1998 and 2008. Each bill returned in the search was carefully read and evaluated for its connection to the particular interests of women as defined above.[15] Not *all* bills related to health or education are included in the sample. Rather, bills that did not pertain to women's healthcare and the health or education of young

[13]While the organizational issues covered from my sample of women's PACs collected through FollowTheMoney.org cannot fully capture *all* policy areas and bill subjects included under these three broad categories, I chose *not* to exclude bills related to issues not particularly covered by FollowTheMoney.org's specific categories. I made this decision with the understanding, in part derived intuitively but also in part sourced back to my qualitative research, that organizations are paying close attention to a broad scope of legislative issues related to women, and not necessarily limited to their own specific legislative agendas, in order to assess the state of women's representation in a legislature overall. Furthermore, given my qualitative findings that networks are crucial to the values and strategies of state-level women's lobbyists, it follows that issues relevant to one group should be relevant to all groups as well.

[14]This database is no longer an available platform. In Fall of 2019, it quickly (and with little forewarning) transitioned to a new database platform, StateNet, which remains administered by LexisNexis. The protocol for bill identification and data collection with StateNet differs from the protocol for the former State Capitol. However, all data used in this analysis was collected through State Capitol.

[15]A protocol for evaluating bills and coding them based on subject is included in the Appendix.

children[16] were excluded from the sample. The sample size of 556 represents 10.6% of total bills sponsored in both states over the entire ten year period.[17]

The second independent variable of interest is electoral competition, operationalized using the margin of victory at the state-district level and based on the state electoral data compiled by Klarner (2018). Electoral competition was calculated by first taking the log of the margin of victory in order to account for a heavy rightward skew. I then transformed the measure to a negative in order to ensure the variable was increasing as electoral competition increased (and thus margin for victory decreased). My models also include estimates for the influence of candidate's individual ideological as scored by Shor and McCarty (2013) as well as candidate political party to evaluate the influence of these variables as well.

2.5.1 Analysis and Results

Given my use of panel data grouped not only across year but also across state and district, I face an important decision between utilizing a fixed-effects model and a random-effects model. According to Clark and Linzer (2015, 399), this decision should depend on "the size of the dataset (both number of units and number of observations per unit), the level of correlation between the covariate and unit effects, and the extent of within-unit variation in the independent variable relative to the dependent variable." Each of these considerations relates to the question of how a researcher should balance bias and variation in her model (Clark and Linzer 2015). The relatively small sample size and minimal number of observations per unit in my data make a fixed effects modeling strategy at high risk of having high variation, producing β estimates that diverge substantially from the true β. It also increases the standard errors of each estimated β, thus challenging a confident estimate of the relationship between my variables of interest and the campaign contributions. Finally, fixed effects models make it impossible for me to estimate time invariant variables, which for my sample includes gender, party, and often ideology.[18] Based on these considerations, I chose to use random

[16] Young children are considered those under the age of 14, or above the middle-school age range.

[17] Each bill included in the larger original database contains a number of relevant subject codes, each specified not only in terms of their policy area but also in terms of their primary targeted marginalized population or subpopulation. For instance, between 2000 and 2010, the rate of incarceration for African American women and Hispanic women was 3.9 and 2.5 times higher nationally than that of white women, respectively.These statistics were calculated using data provided by The Sencencing Project, and can be located at https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/incarcerated-women-and-girls/. As such, my data assigns bills related to the rights and protections of incarcerated women an racial/ethnic issue subject code and a civil rights subject code in addition to a prison issue code.

[18] While these variables might vary across a larger time span, within my sample of years the variation is limited if not zero.

effects estimation for each of the models presented below. That said, the risk of using a random effects model relate to the potential for bias in estimation, as unit effects might be absorbing a district level confounding variable left unspecified in the model. In order to confirm that my use of random effects estimation strategies is not introducing too much bias, I employ Hausman endogeneity tests for each model presented below. As Clark and Linzer (2015) elaborate, "the Hausman test is designed to detect violation of the random effects modeling assumption that the explanatory variables are orthogonal to the unit effects. Each of the Hausman tests produces a p-value well above .05 or .10, enabling me to feel confident that the random effects models presented below are not misspecified.[19] Formally, the full sample model I estimate is expressed as follows,

The two-way random effects model for predicting women's issue campaign contributions received by legislative district $d = 1, ..., N$ observed in election year $t = t, ..., T$ is written as:

$$y_{dt} = \beta_0 + v_{dt-1}\beta_1 + x_{dt}\beta_2 + z_d'\beta_3 + c_d + u_{dt} \text{ , where}$$

- y_{dt} is the total campaign contributions received from women's issue groups in real dollar amount by the incumbent candidate running in district *d* in year *t*,
- v_{dt-1} is the time-varying explanatory variable for women's issue bill introduction by incumbent candidate running in district *d* for year *t-1*,
- x_{dt} is the time-varying explanatory variable for electoral competition in district *d* for year *t*,
- z_d' is a vector of time-invariant explanatory variables including gender, party, and candidate ideology for candidate running in district *d*,
- c_d is an district-specific effect and u_{dt} is an idiosyncratic error term.

A first model is estimated across the entire sample of candidates, male and female. This model test Hypothesis 1, which predicts that female candidates will receive greater electoral support from women's groups than male candidates. I then run the same model sub-setting the sample for female candidates specifically. These models test Hypotheses 2, 4, and 5, all of which evaluate the relationships between women's group

[19]The results for these Hausman endogeneity tests are included int he Appendix. Additional models including those using fixed effects estimation strategies are included in the Appendix as well.

contributions to female candidates and electoral competition, candidate ideology, and political party. Finally, I run two additional models, male model A and male model B, for male candidates specifically. male model A includes an term interacting electoral competition by women's issue bill sponsorship, while male model B does not include this additional interaction term. I compare the results of these nested models to test Hypotheses 3a and 3b described above.

Table 2.2: Predicting Campaign Contributions by Women's PACs (RE)

	Dependent variable:			
	Campaign Contributions From Women's Issue Groups (Adjusted for Inflation)			
	(full sample)	(female model)	(male model A)	(male model B)
Male	-164.696^{***}			
	(50.446)			
Women's Issue	16.148	-0.782	36.914^{*}	27.075^{*}
Bill Sponsorship	(10.383)	(22.143)	(20.270)	(13.896)
Electoral Competition	21.876^{*}	117.224^{***}	-7.820	-21.476
	(12.750)	(39.875)	(11.678)	(21.819)
Candidate Ideology	-12.202	-72.699	13.035	31.059
	(26.505)	(71.334)	(23.134)	(31.155)
Democrat Candidate	-17.730	-119.888	13.350	-9.971
	(62.209)	(167.498)	(54.425)	(77.369)
Relevant	-43.703	-29.476	-32.849	-38.917
Committee Membership	(34.971)	(119.645)	(28.936)	(32.910)
Total Bills Introduced	2.023	-9.590	4.317	2.855
	(3.119)	(9.457)	(2.668)	(3.824)
Women's Bill Sponsorship *			4.594	
Electoral Competition			(4.158)	
Observations	895	237	658	658
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The results of these regression analyses are presented in Table 2.2. In addition to the independent variables of interest, I add a number of control variables for the total bills introduced by a candidate in the previous legislative term and a dummy variable accounting for the candidate's membership in a committee relevant to women's issues. This last control speaks to how interest group donors can strategically value

a legislator's power to set legislative agendas on committees relevant their organizational issues, which research shows can be a significant element driving contribution strategies (Fouirnaies 2018, McKay 2018).

The main take-away points are as follows. First, the results show strong support for Hypothesis 1, that women's groups will contribute more to female candidates than to male candidates. The full sample model estimates that men will receive substantively and significantly less in campaign donations from a women's issue group than their female counterparts running for re-election. Second, for the sample only including female candidates, women running in more competitive elections are predicted to receive a more campaign support from women's groups, a positive increase in real dollar amount that approaches the mean donation amount contributed to any individual campaign over the entire sample between 2000 and 2008.

Nonetheless, all of the remaining independent variables or controls fail to produce estimates significantly different from zero. First, past bill sponsorship on women's issues is estimated to have no significant (or positive) effect on the donation amount for female candidates at all. This thus lends support for Hypothesis 2, which predicted that electoral competitiveness would the strongest positive and *independent* influence on campaign contributions to female candidates by women's groups as a function of groups' electoral strategies for donations. Second, neither candidate ideology nor membership in the Democratic party showed a significant positive influence on amounts donated to female candidates. Therefore, the evidence presented here supports Hypotheses 4 and 5: neither a female candidate's individual ideology nor her political party significantly influence the amount of campaign contributions she receives from a women's issue group for any given year.

However, Table 2.2 tells a different story about the relationships between campaign contributions by women's issue groups and male candidates. More specifically, male model A and male model B each test Hypothesis 3a and Hypothesis 3b, respectively. As a reminder, Hypothesis 3a stated the expectation that women's organizations would be most likely to contribute to male candidates when candidates face high electoral competition *conditional* on past legislative activity on women's issues, building off the assumption that women's groups use electoral strategies when contributing to male candidates; given that the relatively low prioritization by women's groups of supporting male candidates coupled with the relatively lower likelihood a women's organization would trust a male candidate, Hypothesis 3a predicted that a women's organizational choice to use electoral strategies to support a male candidate would be dependent on the male

candidate's past legislative behavior. I therefore model this conditional influence with an interaction term in male model A, and find no support for this prediction.

In contrast, Hypothesis 3b instead stated that "male candidates will receive increased campaign contributions from a women's issue group when their legislative activity on women's issues was high in the previous legislative session, *independent of electoral competition*." This alternative hypothesis was rooted in a theory for campaign contribution strategy arguing that women's groups would use a kind of reverse exchange model in donating to male candidates, rewarding good behavior and thus asserting or bridging a policymaking partnership. The model labeled male model B thus tested this hypothesis by estimating the independent influence of past sponsorship of women's issue legislation. Contrarily to male model A and Hypothesis 3a, male model B shows evidence in support of Hypothesis 3b, estimating a positive and significant increase in campaign contributions by a women's issue organization for every additional bill sponsored by a male candidate in the previous legislative session. Legislative activism demonstrated through increases in women's issue policymaking has the strongest positive effect on campaign contributions to male candidates over time, and seems to earn a women's organizational support and recognition. Comparing the AIC statistics for male model A and male model B, male model B produces the smaller value for AIC indicating that it is the model without the interaction term is preferred.



Figure 2.3: Contributions Predicted by Electoral Competition

I take a closer look at the extent to which the relationships between campaign contributions by women's issue groups and candidates for state-level office differ according to gender in Figures 2.3 and 2.4. Figure 2.2 presents the changes in real dollar amounts of campaign contributions by women's issue groups predicted by the split-sample models for female candidates and male candidates (male model B). The blue line shows an unchanging trend in predicted campaign contributions for male candidates as they face increasing electoral competition. However, in stark contrast, female candidates see a rapid rise in the predicted amount of campaign contributions as electoral competition in their districts increases. Furthermore, while at extremely low levels of electoral competition there does not appear to be much of a gender gap between contributions to female and male candidates, the predicted difference between women and men running for office quickly widens such that for a majority of races, female candidates can expect higher levels of support from women's groups than their male counterparts, all else being equal. Taken together, there is strong evidence that women's groups use electoral strategies in making campaign contributions to female candidates, and are guided in this strategy based on shared gender identity.



Figure 2.4: Contributions Predicted by Past Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship

Gender gaps are also noteworthy in Figure 2.4, though the trends differ dramatically from those presented in Figure 2.3. Figure 2.4 presents the predicted contribution amounts, adjusted for inflation, as the number of women's issue bills introduced by a candidate in the preceding legislative session increases[20] (all else being equal). For female candidates, there does not appear to be a distinct trend; predicted values fluctuate around a relatively sizable predicted amount of $600 real dollars. On the other hand, male candidates show consistently and substantially lower predicted campaign contributions than female incumbents. But increases in women's issue bill sponsorship also predict a steady increase in predicted electoral support from women's groups. As reported in my qualitative study, it is clear empirically that male candidates can earn the trust and electoral support of women's groups as they are increasingly active on behalf of women's policy interests.

[20]Recall that all candidates included in the analyses are incumbent.)

2.6 Discussion

This paper combined qualitative and quantitative methodologies to explore how women's organizations and PACs use distinct strategies in targeting male and female state legislators with advocacy, lobbying, and electoral support. Over 50 in-depth interviews with women's issue advocacy groups and PACs across 12 states help inform a new theoretic framework for predicting what motivates the campaign contribution behavior of women's advocacy groups– a theoretic framework with gendered political group consciousness as its centerpiece. Women's groups are first and foremost motivated to increase levels of descriptive representation in states, and through descriptive representation achieve the larger goal of strengthening the presence of female perspectives in policymaking and politics.

My theory proposes that different models drive outreach to men in office and women in office, one based on reverse exchange models and one based on electoral strategy models respectively, each with its own empirical implications. Women's groups consider women in office as allies based on shared gender identity and thus direct campaign contributions to female candidates using electoral strategies. The same cannot be said for men, who do not share in-group affinity. Rather, men in office face an out-group identity wariness by women's issue groups, and must therefore earn campaign donations from women's organization with legislative action. I present evidence in support of each of these qualitatively grounded expectations empirically using original panel data and random effects estimation strategies for longitudinal regression analyses.

My results also lend credence to the idea that women's groups value women in office based on identity more so than on political party or ideology. It's possible that these results are biased by the overrepresentation of left-leaning or Democratic female candidates, but the empirical analyses presented here fail to show any significant influence of party or ideology on campaign contributions from women's PACs to women running for reelection. This outcome might in fact offer some support for theories highlighting the importance of symbolic representation in conjunction with descriptive representation, at least with regards to the priorities of women's organized interests. Women's interest groups emphatically report the importance of electing more women as a goal in and of itself rather than as a means to policymaking end, echoing research that assert progress in women's descriptive representation affects women's broader political engagement (Atkeson 2003, Burns, Schlozman and Verba 2001, Wittmer 2011).

Despite these promising contributions, however, a few noteworthy limitations in this research should guide its future development. Most notably, the extent to which my results are generalizable is uncertain given that they are based on a sample of two states alone. The general assemblies for California and Ohio are highly professionalized state legislatures, and it is possible that less professionalized legislative institutions shape different kinds of relationships between women's groups, gender identity, and candidates for office. Limiting the states included in the sample was a practical necessity, and this paper marks a preliminary analysis in a much broader research agenda. Future research should include data collected from a greater sample of sample of states and with an eye towards institutional variation in party composition, legislative professionalism, and levels of descriptive representation especially. Furthermore, panel data extending over a longer period of time will also enable more confident estimation of fixed effects modeling, marking another critical opportunity for more robust analysis and more generalizable conclusions.

Chapter 3

Getting a High Heel in the Door: An Experiment on State Legislator Responsiveness to Women's Issue Lobbying

3.1 Introduction

Studies of women's representation largely confine their focus to mechanisms of descriptive representation, often proposing that women are best served by elected officials with whom they share a marginalized gender identity (Phillips 1998, **?**, Williams 1998). This focus is well-merited; an impressive body of literature demonstrates that legislators are likely to take increased interest and action on behalf of constituent groups that share their descriptive characteristics (Broockman 2013, Burden 2007, Butler and Broockman 2011, Canon 1999, Carnes 2012, Grose 2005, **?**, Reingold 1992, Whitby 2000). Women in politics bring gendered life experiences to political institutions, ultimately reflecting different interests than their male counterparts (Gilligan 1992, Mansbridge 1998, **?**, **?**). Research suggests that political activity by female legislators is substantively different than male legislators otherwise similar in partisanship, seniority, and district characteristics (**??**). In state legislatures specifically, Holman and Mahoney (**?**) find that especially with the presence of a woman's caucus, increases in women's aggregate descriptive representation leads to increases in women's collaboration on women's interest legislation (even across party lines).

If descriptive representation leads to substantive representation, the current political outlook in American legislative politics looks historically hopeful for women. The 2018 election cycle brought the proportions of women serving in state legislatures to new heights. Women now make up 28.7% of all state legislators nationwide, marking a sizable increase from 25.1% in 2017.[1] In states like Nevada (50% women) and Colorado (47% women), women's numerical representation in state legislatures mirrors that in the general population, achieving a representational ideal of proportionality optimal for aggregative and deliberative democracy (1998).

Nevertheless, the impressive electoral gains for female descriptive representation in 2018 did not extend consistently across the United States. In 17 states, women make up less than 25% of legislators; this statistic fails to reach even 20% in 6 of these states. Women living in states like West Virginia (14.2% women), South Carolina (15.9% women), and Mississippi (13.8% women) face a dramatically less positive outlook if descriptive representation constitutes the only clear pathway towards substantive representation. For the numerous states in which the number of women elected into office fails to keep up with national gains, the exploration of alternative means towards the representation of women's political voice becomes vital.

Women's organized advocacy might be one way in which women's representation can be achieved in the face of low levels of descriptive representation. On the national level, organized interests influence politicians and policy through a number of strategies with varying levels of success (Baumgartner et al. 2009, Grasse and Heidbreder 2011, Kollman 1998, e.g.).[2] Strategic lobbying activities available to state-level women's advocacy organizations to gain attention from state legislators can provide an important link to women's substantive representation. However, if women's organized advocacy can be instrumental in women's representation for states with low levels of descriptive representatives, a prerequisite is that men must be responsive to women's issue groups. The field experiment presented in this paper explores this prerequisite, focusing on a group's ability to secure legislative access.

Lobbying groups can utilize different strategies for outreach depending on whom within the legislature they target for access; with less certain allies, a group can use stronger lobbying tactics to underline their potential value to a legislator. Based on the links between descriptive and substantive representation, I argue

[1] For a full breakdown of women serving in state legislatures in 2019, see the Center for American Women and Politics online at https://cawp.rutgers.edu/facts.

[2] Notably, the study of interactions between legislators and lobbyists in subnational contexts represents yet another area in need of increased scholarly attention Anzia (2019)

that female legislators will be more likely than their male counterparts to provide a women's issue group access at face value. However, I also argue that this baseline gender gap should render the effectiveness of different lobbying tactics heterogeneous across gender. If women in office are likely to be responsive to a women's group regardless, heightened lobbying tactics signaling electoral or informational benefits are unlikely to affect observable change. In contrast, I argue that male legislators should be more sensitive to the same heightened lobbying tactics, shaping an environment wherein the effectiveness of a women's issue lobbying strategy in securing legislative access depends on a legislator's gender identity.

Little is currently understood about how descriptive representation is linked to the inclusion of marginalized groups advocacy organizations in policymaking. In fact, lobbying is often studied with an eye towards its relationship with representational inequity. Thus counterintuitively, this paper identifies how lobbying in state legislatures can help facilitate, rather than inhibit, increased democratic inclusion. Women's organizational lobbying emerges as having strong potential power to effectively close observed gender gaps in legislative responsiveness, increasing opportunities for women's substantive representation overall.

3.2 Organizational Influence and Access

In order to have influence on the legislative process, an advocacy organization must have access to legislators. A lobbyist or organization's access to policy-makers is considered essential by political analysts and advocates alike (Austen-Smith 1993, Herndon 1982, Langbein 1986, Ornstein and Elder 1978, Sabato 1985, Snyder Jr 1990). Sabato notes (1985, 127), "political analysts have long agreed that access is the principal goal of most interest groups, and lobbyists have always recognized access is the key to persuasion." Organizational access thus marks a crucial gateway to further policy influence; without it, influence in policymaking is improbable. Therefore, a study of the conditions under which a legislator grants access to an advocacy organization is effectively a study of the conditions under which influence becomes possible.

While access to political decision-makers, the ability to get a "foot in the door," is fundamental to political influence, it is also unequally distributed (Dahl 1957; 1961, Garson 1974; 1978, Lowi 1979). Inequalities in access are paramount to the study of marginalized group influence in particular, as "old boys" networks shape uneven opportunities for insider and outsider groups. That said, even amongst mainstream and insider organizations, access to elected officials is not guaranteed to all groups who ask. A legislator's time is lim-

ited, fixed, and valuable. As such, legislators cannot provide access to all groups hoping to collaborate on policy or share policy preferences (Hall 1996).

It is important to note that access does not necessarily lead to significant influence on legislative decisions on policy formation. While access provides the critical opportunity to have group concerns heard, it does not guarantee that a legislator will take action on a group's insight, requests, or advice. But group access is a reflection of *inclusion* in the policymaking process, which is of paramount importance to this paper. Historically, marginalized groups have been ineffective at influencing policy that might otherwise challenge social and institutional inequality in large part as a result of barriers to access. Therefore, given that access is important, privileged, and reflective of a legislator's priorities, it is highly relevant for observation and analysis in and of itself.

3.2.1 Benefits from Providing Access

What influences an individual legislator to set aside time to hear the group's concerns? My expectations in answering this question rely on a theoretic framework similar to Hall and Deardorff's 2006 model of lobbying as a legislative subsidy. To assess the value of providing a group access, legislators estimate the benefits of time spent with that group given the costliness of their time. I characterize the potential benefits to legislators in providing an advocacy organization legislative access under three categories: electoral, informational, and intrinsic. Electoral benefits relate to how much electoral payoff a legislator can expect by working with a particular issue group. For instance, a legislator is likely to estimate attractive benefits from providing access to or partnering with a group with strong capacities to mobilize his or her constituents or to contribute to his or her campaign. Informational benefits are more broadly defined, as valuable information can take many forms.[3]. Generally speaking, however, informational benefits emerge, in Hall and Deardorff's (2006, 69) terms, as a "legislative subsidy," or an offer of any valuable information to relieve the legislator of some of their work-burden in policymaking.

Finally, benefits can also arise intrinsically, i.e. from the positive or negative feelings a legislator gets from working with or on behalf of a particular group Broockman (2013). Intrinsic benefits relate to a legislator's personal preferences and life experiences. For a marginalized group facing structural barriers to access,

[3]For a full discussion and analytic model of the different forms of valuable information interest groups and lobbyists can offer to individual legislators, see Hall and Deardorff (2006)

intrinsic benefits become a critical factor to consider, as a legislator's own experience of marginalization as a member of a particular identity group can shape their political priorities. As Burden (2007) argues, legislators use their personal preferences in making decisions on how to vote, which bills to sponsor, and how to allocate their time. While an elected official's personal preferences, ideologies, and life experiences are difficult to reliably measure, theories of descriptive representation suggest that legislators emerging from distinctive identity groups (especially those facing historic marginalization) are expected to prioritize the interests of their identity group in solidarity (Dawson 1995, Gay 2004). In fact, intrinsic motivations to represent one's marginalized identity in part form the basis for arguments underlining the *need* for descriptive representation in democracy. Phillips (1998) argues that descriptive representation allows women to give voice to preferences, issues, and interests previously overlooked in political deliberation. Importantly, great tension in the literature exists regarding any individual descriptive representative's ability to represent the diverse interests of an entire marginalized sub-population (**?**, e.g.). The link between female legislators and the prioritization of "women's issues" broadly defined must be probabilistic, as the connections between descriptive identity and legislative behavior is far from absolute. However, evidence does suggest that when the links between descriptive and substantive representation do emerge, they are motivated intrinsically (Broockman 2013, e.g.). It is therefore reasonable to consider the intrinsic, more psychological benefits an elected official might derive from providing access to a group with whom they share common life experiences or identities.

3.2.2 Benefits and Allies

Whether the benefits of working with an advocacy organization derive electorally, informationally, or intrinsically, the greater the benefits a legislator attributes to time spent with an advocacy organization, the more likely the legislator will be to accept a meeting request from that organization. For a legislator, perceived benefits must arise out of an overlap between his or her policy priorities and the group's. The resulting implication is that lobbying groups will have the most success accessing legislators with whom this overlap is clear– in other words, with legislators they understand to be allies. How a legislator perceives the benefits of working with an organization shapes the strength of potential alliances between legislator and group. While some alliances between legislator and group might be relatively strong, alliances with other

legislators might be less certain. Ultimately, an advocacy organization can use different strategic lobbying tactics to alter a legislator's perceptions of the benefits they offer, bolstering ties to less certain legislative allies and increasing their likelihood for access.[4]

For an advocacy organization representing an historically marginalized group, alliances based on intrinsic benefits are once again of particular interest. Links between descriptive and substantive representation would suggest that men and women in office are motivated differently to respond to a women's advocacy organization based on a gender group affinity (intrinsic benefits). This paper thus argues that female legislators will be more likely than their male counterparts to provide access to a women's group, all else being equal.[5] *I therefore predict that at a baseline level of responsiveness, with no additional lobbying tactics to increase legislative responsiveness used, there will be a gender gap in the likelihood a legislator will provide access to a women's organization.*

3.2.3 Strengthening Alliances with Strategic Lobbying

Legislator perceptions of intrinsic benefits, especially as they arise from elements of descriptive representation, cannot be easily manipulated by an advocacy organization: a lobbyist cannot change a legislator's experience of in-group or out-group gender identity.[6] In contrast, a legislator's perception of a group's electoral or informational benefits *are* changeable. As such, where intrinsic benefits are unavailable or where alliances are relatively weaker, an advocacy organization can use additional strategic lobbying tactics to strengthen potential alliances by emphasizing the electoral or informational benefits they can offer to a legislator. My field experiment thus manipulates an organization's use of lobbying strategies that signal electoral or informational benefits to evaluate their impact on the responsiveness of legislators- both male and female- to a women's group.

[4]This expectation speaks well to the current lobbying literature, which both theoretically proposes and empirically observes that lobbyists are most likely to target their allies in their varied strategies at influencing policy and policy-makers (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, Hall and Deardorff 2006, Schlozman and Tierney 1986).

[5]Partisanship can complicate this expectation, as some women's organizations have partisan leanings that could shape natural *electoral* allies rather than natural intrinsic allies. With this in mind, my experimental research design uses an advocacy organization dedicated to a non-partisan women's issue: supporting female victims of sex-trafficking. I also conduct regression analyses using controls for legislator party, which can be viewed in the Appendix.

[6]This assertion is, in fact, open for debate. In theory, an organization can prime a legislator's in-group intrinsic motivations, or potential affinity towards that group, with strategic language emphasizing identity. Future research might investigate the degree to which identity-priming strategies might work to links between descriptive representatives and marginalized group advocates.

Past studies of lobbying activity have identified two strategic methods to successfully achieve legislative inclusion, each of which provide either informational or electoral benefits (Burstein and Linton 2002, Grossman and Helpman 2001, Kollman 1998, e.g.). First, advocacy organizations can utilize what are commonly known as "inside strategies" for lobbying (Gais and Walker 1991, Grossman and Helpman 2001, Kollman 1998). Inside strategies refer to the provision of specialized information, or "legislative subsidies." In offering legislative subsidies, an advocacy organization can make the provision of access to their organization more likely. Empirically, the value of lobbying in terms of information and expertise provision is widely explored (Austen-Smith 1993, Austen-Smith and Wright 1996, Hansen 1991, Potters and Van Winden 1992, Rasmusen 1993, Wright 1996). Additionally, organizational surveys (Berry 1977, Heinz et al. 1993, Nownes and Freeman 1998, Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Gais and Walker 1991) confirm the validity of models asserting the informational benefits of lobbying, describing the activities undertaken by most strategic interest groups as aimed at gathering and providing expertise to lawmakers. *I thus expect that inside lobbying tactics, or meeting requests specifically signalling that an organization can offer valuable expertise, will increase legislative responsiveness to a women's advocacy organization.*

Advocacy organizations can also utilize "outside strategies" in lobbying. "Outside" lobbying strategies denote attempts to mobilize constituent or public support to affect greater legislative attention and political action (Goldstein 1999, Kollman 1998). Organizations wield valuable power to shape constituent opinion, which can in turn shape legislator behavior Grossman and Helpman (2001). Scholars observe "outside lobbying" to have noteworthy influence on the choices of elected officials Kollman (1998), and advocacy organizations large and small are often credited with pivotal roles in mobilizing public opinion campaigns to measurably shape policy outcomes across diverse issues (Skocpol et al. 1993, Soule and Olzak 2004, Weldon 2002*a*, **?**). An advocacy organization can use outside lobbying tactics to make engaging with their organization appear electorally beneficial. *I thus expect that if a women's organization uses outside lobbying tactics on a legislator when requesting access, their likelihood of seeing a response will increase. In turn, I also predict that the greatest increase in responsiveness will emerge when a women's organization utilizes both inside and outside lobbying tactics simultaneously.*

Finally, given my expectations that a gender gap *will* emerge in the baseline responsiveness to a women's organization, I argue that both inside and outside lobbying tactics are likely to have a greater impact on men

than on women. The logic here is quite straightforward: when an organization seeks access to a legislator to discuss an issue that legislator cares little about, the provision of extra incentives to pay attention to their group is worthwhile. But if the organization is seeking access to a strong ally, the investment in extra lobbying should have little effect on the already high likelihood of response. *I therefore test the prediction that inside and outside lobbying tactics will have heterogeneous effects on male and female legislators, showing a relatively strong impact on men but a limited effect on women.*

My experiment focuses on gender gaps as they relate to legislative responsiveness to a women's issue group specifically. While I argue that gender gaps in responsiveness to a women's issue group are a function of intrinsic benefits, my study cannot confidently determine if instead female legislators are more likely to respond to *all* issue groups. There are theoretic grounds for the prediction that based on their female gender identity, women in office might be more responsive to all organizations seeking access. For instance, Lazaraus and Steigerwalt's (2018) theory of gendered vulnerability would suggest women are more likely than men to prioritize activities directly related to reelection, and should therefore be more responsive to constituent organizations. Ultimately, the decision not to test for this alternative mechanism was carefully made with a mind towards ethics, as pursuing this line of inquiry would have demanded a significantly larger experimental sample. While I am clearly interested in gendered differences in legislator behavior, my motivating interest in conducting this experiment related to a *gendered issue group's* ability to gain legislative access. I speak to this point again in my concluding discussion, and at greater length in the Appendix.

The study of organizational access, especially for organizations seeking increased representation for marginalized groups, has much to gain from assessing how descriptive and non-descriptive representatives differ in their willingness to include such groups in the policymaking process. While women's organizations might face gender gaps in seeking legislative attention, they might also possess the power through strategic lobbying to *bridge* gender gaps. Such power could be pivotal in state level politics, where gains for women and women candidates often lag behind those in the national political arena. The remainder of this paper applies these motivations to a pre-registered experimental design.[7]

[7] A Pre-anaysis for this study was registered with the Open Science Framework in June of 2018.

3.3 Experimental Design

I designed and implemented an auditing experiment that sends a sample of 600 state legislators across 8 states an email containing a meeting request from a fictitious women's organization dedicated to advocating on behalf of female victims of sex trafficking. For my experimental treatments, I manipulate the text of the emails, randomly assigning legislators into four treatment groups receiving varied requests for a meeting: one group signaling constituent mobilization, one group signaling expertise collection, one group containing both signals, and a control group receiving a simple meeting request signaling neither inside nor outside lobbying activity. Legislative access was then operationalized by measuring the response rates to the meeting request, allowing me to make comparisons across treatment groups as well as across gender.

A research design utilizing randomized field experimentation is optimal to my investigation in two critical ways. First, the use of randomization in the experiment allows me to account for confounding variables such as partisanship and ideology. Second, observational inquiry into the inclusion of special interest groups in policymaking faces significant endogeneity problems. Looking retrospectively at lobbying partnerships between women's issue groups and individual legislators, it is impossible to determine if the group's lobbying tactics triggered legislator responsiveness or if the group targeted legislators whom they knew would respond. This issue of reverse causality is only heightened when considering my interest in isolating gender, a strong potential confounding variable, from the influence of lobbying tactics on access provision. Experimental analysis allows me to disentagle lobbying tactics from shared gender identity as they influence legislator responsiveness independently.

3.3.1 The Sample

My population of interest is the universe of state legislators in the United States. For ethical reasons, I select a sample of U.S. states from which to draw state legislators that is as limited in number as possible to maintain statistical power. I include elected officials from Michigan, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Wisconsin, Missouri, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and California.[8] In determining which states to include in the study, I faced certain practical obstacles in terms of timing and sample size. Numerically, I needed to strike a delicate balance in reaching the threshold of individual male and female legislators to provide

[8]For each of these states, I confirm that the state legislature publishes direct email addresses for individual legislators.

sufficient statistical power while simultaneously ensuring that the experiment extend into as few states as possible. At the same time, the experimental conditions required that each legislature be in session through the period in which the experiment would be fielded. Within these limitations, however, I carefully select states to maintain balance within the sample in terms of professionalism in the legislature, the proportion of women's serving in the legislative body, and overall partisan composition. A full discussion of state-level descriptive statistics for these three variables is presented in the Appendix.

Table 3.1: State Level Descriptive Statistics

	Partisan Balance	Gender Balance	Legislature Professionalism	Legislators in Sample
California	D (68.3%)	22.5%	2.974	53
Massachusetts	D (79.5%)	25.5%	-1.132	100
Michigan	R (60.8%)	25.0%	0.274	74
Missouri	R (72.1%)	22.3%	-0.737	90
Pennsylvania	R (62.1%)	18.6%	1.566	96
Rhode Island	D (85.5%)	31.0%	-1.064	70
South Carolina	R (63.5%)	14.1%	-0.468	52
Wisconsin	R (63.7%)	22.7%	0.017	65

Table 3.1 presents state-level descriptive statistics for these three variables. For legislative professionalism, I refer to the second dimension measurements collected by Bowen and Green (2014) with Rosenthal's (2000) conceptualization of legislative professionalism in mind. I utilize this measurement strategy in light of the potential relationships between legislative staff support and benefits to policymakers in providing access to interest groups. Differences across states in the degree to which legislatures are support-intensive and work-intensive (Bowen and Greene 2014) might shape differences in the way individual legislators value the expertise of interest groups. I include states with high levels of professionalism expecting that such states should provide for the most conservative estimates of positive effects. That said, maintaining balance within the sample is also critical towards my objective of evaluating differences in gender across various types of legislatures, including those that are more likely to prioritize interest group incorporation.

I thus also pay close attention to variation in gender compositions in my process for state selection. Scholars of the links between women's descriptive representation and substantive representation debate the importance of "critical mass" in shaping whether female representatives will emerge as activists for

women's issues rather than "token" women within an institution (Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers 2007*a*, Dahlerup 1988, Kanter 1977). I therefore take care to include states with both high and low proportions of female legislators in order to account for potential institutional differences in how women officeholders prioritize partnerships with women's issue groups. Because this paper is motivated by an interest in states with particularly low levels of women's descriptive representation, I include states like South Carolina and Pennsylvania with especially few women in office, while also including Rhode Island as a state with a relatively high proportion of female legislators. The remaining states fall around, if not slightly below, the 2018 nationwide average (25.3%). All data on state legislature gender composition was gathered using reports published by the Center for American Women and Politics (CAWP 2017).

Finally, states sampled for experimental analysis reflect the best balance in overall partisan composition possible. As shown in Table 3.1, the states included in the experiment represent both Republican and Democratic controlled legislatures, varying in terms of strength of majority party. In the aggregate sample of legislators across all eight states, 64.1% are Democrats. Past research demonstrates nuanced relationships between gender and political party. Partisan gaps among female congressional officeholders, for instance, have grown over the past 30 years, shaped by gendered differences across party in recruitment practices and campaign contributions (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018, Thomsen and Swers 2017). Among elected female representatives, Swers (2002) finds that Democratic and Republican women diverge in their tendencies towards women's issue activism at the federal level, especially in varying contexts of partisan control. Ideologically, Osborn et al. (2019) show that female state legislators are increasingly more polarized than their male colleagues, with important implications for women's representational policymaking. If Democratic and Republican women legislate differently– not just from men, but from each other– it is important to attend to potential partisan-gender differences in responses to my experimental stimuli.

However, given the partisan gaps across women officeholders overall, the number of Republican women in my sample is limited, rendering a confident examination of these partisan dynamics largely out of reach. I account for partisanship in my experimental design with my selection of states, my choice of the relatively non-partisan issue of sex trafficking, and finally with my use of block randomization by party and state in selecting the sample of male participants to mirror the sample of female legislators. Nonetheless, I do estimate a triple interaction analyses between gender, party, and treatment group in order to provide some

exploratory insight. The results of these regressions are presented in the Appendix along with a more in-depth discussion.[9]

For each of the states in the study, I include all female representatives in my sample. An equal number of male legislators are randomly selected to match the female legislators in number, state, and party.[10] I then randomly assign legislators to treatment groups across the entire sample, subsequently testing my randomization scheme for any differences across gender or party. The results of this χ^2 test were successful, producing a p value = .8934. Importantly, this experiment was approved in expedited review by my university's Institutional Review Board (IRB). Nonetheless, auditing experiments on public officials by academics must be carefully designed with attention to ethics. A full discussion of my ethical considerations and use of deception can be seen in the Appendix.

3.3.2 Experimental Stimuli and Treatment Conditions

The experimental stimulus consists of a meeting request to discuss issues of sex trafficking, with specific emphasis placed on assistance to victims of sex trafficking rather than to the policing of sex traffickers. Support for victims of sex trafficking represents an optimal choice for a "women's issue" in that it is both non-partisan and relatively non-salient.[11] If the issue had been drawing heavy attention in the media or considered "owned" by a particular party Petrocik (1996), discerning whether differences in responsiveness stemmed from experimental stimuli or from concerns of partisanship or salience would be impossible.[12] The meeting requests appeared to come from a newly-formed organization of local women dedicated to assisting

[9] All triple interaction analyses are estimated using state-fixed effects. Given the limited power of these analyses, results should not be interpreted as strong or conclusive evidence.

[10] Statistical power computations indicate that a sample size of at least 70 women is necessary per treatment condition, thus demanding a total sample of at least 280 female legislators.

[11] The definition of "women's issues" in politics is challenging if not outright problematic. Osborn (2014, 149) articulates this problem questioning whether one can define "a group of 'women's issues' on which women legislators, regardless of party ideology, might work together due to shared gendered interests" (149). However, she does provide a useful rubric for women's issue identification based on past research, defining women's issues as falling into one (or more) of three categories. First, policy issues regulating or explicating women's rights, such as those related to anti-discrimination law Wolbrecht (2000). Second, issues that disproportionately affect female constituencies, such as domestic violence, reproductive health, etc. (**??**). Third, policy issues related to women's traditionally defined roles in the "private sphere," such as childcare, education, or other "ethic of caring" issues (Gilligan 1992, **?**). Sex trafficking thus falls under the second classification of a women's issue. The Polaris Project estimates that globally, 75% of victims of sex trafficking are female. While there is no official estimate of the number of victims in the United States, of the 8,524 individual cases reported to the National Human Trafficking Hotline in the year 2017, 7,067 were female.

[12] I assert the issue of sex trafficking to be relatively non-salient based on the fact that it is not an issue typically listed amongst those of top concern to voters (such as issues of abortion). Nor has a substantial national movement or focusing event occurred nationally to increase the prominence of the issue (such as #metoo). That said, while variation in issue salience across state as well as legislative district can be expected, I also expect the variation to be accounted for by my randomized design.

fellow-female victims of sex trafficking.[13] Each emailed meeting request contained the subject "Women Against Violence and Exploitation," in order to send a strong signal of the group's collective identity. Women Against Violence and Exploitation (WAVE) was also the name of the organization engaging in experimental outreach, and was a fictitious organization I created for the purposes of this study.[14][15] Meeting requests were delivered to each legislator on their direct email address, a method for outreach frequently utilized in each of the states included in the study.[16]

Within the text of each emailed meeting request, I independently manipulated a mobilization treatment factor and an expertise treatment factor. The randomly assigned treatments consisted of two levels, yielding four total treatment arms. The control condition for mobilization factor sent a simple meeting request to introduce the group and speak about the importance of policy supporting the victims of sex trafficking. In contrast, the mobilization condition for this factor included a reference to a working petition on the importance of sex trafficking policy. The email's language emphasized the group's success in mobilizing the legislator's constituents specifically, and stated that the petition had already been signed by a specific number of constituents residing in the most populous counties and/or cities within the legislator's district.[17] The control condition for expertise factor once again contained a simple request to meet, while the treatment condition underlined the organization's collection of expertise specific to the most populous counties legislator's district. The email text for all four treatment arms can be viewed in the Appendix.

The experimental output then observes if and how the legislative office responded to the meeting request.[18] I fielded the experiment from April 10-12, 2018. Each legislator was allotted 10 business days to respond to the meeting request. For legislators responding to the meeting request, I subsequently sent an

[13]That the organization appeared newly-formed was advantageous for my research design in that legislators could have no prior beliefs about the organization's political prominence or potential for expertise provision and constituent mobilization. This kept the validity of my treatments intact, while also creating a least-likely test scenario to best understand responsiveness to a women's group as it could differ across gender, all else held equal. Legislators are *least* likely to respond to a meeting request from a group they know nothing about, and responsiveness can be measured in terms of the group's identity and message alone rather than on prior conceptions of a value to partnership with that group.

[14]In fact, I created eight different WAVE organizations, one for each state included in the study, as the organizations were intended to be state-level and state specific rather than nationally organized.

[15]In an additional measure to maximize external validity, I created a website for each state level organization. After the signature line of each emailed meeting request, I provided a link to the fictitious organization's website (e.g. htttp://www.waveforca.org).

[16]Prior to the study, conversations with lobbyists and advocacy organizations in each of the states confirmed that scheduling requests are often communicated through email, and that legislators are attentive to their email accounts. I also confirmed with these contacts that the text of my emailed requests was standard and appropriate for my purposes.

[17]The specific number was calculated by taking 0.5% of the figure for voting population in each legislator's district. This number was non-negligible, but was also relatively low to minimize deception and to avoid arousing suspicion.

[18]A detailed description of the coding process with which I measured "responsiveness" can be found in the Appendix.

email informing them that the organization was suspending action on the project indefinitely. While these emails were sent from the fictitious organizer and only to those legislative offices that responded to the initial request, a final debriefing email was then delivered on June 22, 2018 from my personal email account.[19]

3.3.3 Experimental Results and Analysis

Across the eight state legislatures included in the study, 254 out of the 600 legislators emailed responded to the women's organization's meeting request, yielding an overall response rate across all legislators of 42.3%. Each response was carefully coded to produce different measures of legislative responsiveness. A description of my coding protocol and the various responsiveness measures can be seen in the Appendix. Following Butler and Broockman (2011) and Broockman (2013), I analyze an objective binary dependent variable for if the organization received a response from the legislative office contacted.[20]

Table 3.2: Response Rates by Gender and Treatment Group

	Control	Mobilization	Expertise	Combined	Total Sample
Overall	37.3% N = 150	54.0% N = 150	36.0% N = 150	46.0% N = 150	42.3% N = 600
Female Legislator	52.3% N = 65	53.6% N = 84	40.7% N = 76	46.6% N = 75	48.3% N = 300
Male Legislator	23.5% N = 85	53.5% N = 66	29.7% N = 74	42.6% N = 75	36.3% N = 300
Gender Differential	28.7*** **(p = .00)**	.6 **(p = 1)**	11.0 **(p = .21)**	4.0 **(p = .74)**	12.0*** **(p = .00)**

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

[19]This final debriefing concluded the experiment by extending full disclosure (as required by my University Institutional Review Board). It contained a clear and careful description of the experiment's design and purposes. Prior to sending the final debriefing email, I contacted at least three state-level organizations that do work in sex trafficking in each state, receiving approval to include that organization's name (and legislative point of contact) for reference should any legislator be interested in legislative action on the issue. This seemed critically important to maximize the long-run potential net benefits.

[20]I also collected data on whom within the office responded (legislator or staff member) and with whom the meeting would be scheduled, and found no real change in the substance or significance of the results using these alternative ordinal dependent variables.

Table 3.2 shows the rates of response broken down by treatment groups as well as by legislator gender, evaluating gender gaps across the treatment groups, the control groups, and the overall sample. Additionally, the final row in this table shows the differences across gender for each treatment group and for the total sample. Among the emails that did not signal any specific lobbying tactics, 52.3 percent of female legislators responded whereas only 23.5 percent of male legislators responded, a large and statistically significant difference of 28.7 percentage points (p = .0005). Across the entire sample, the 12 percentage point difference in response rates across women (48.3%) and men (36.3%) in office was also statistically significant, demonstrating a clear gender gap. On its face, the results support my expectation that men and women in office respond at different rates to a women's organizational meeting request assuming no additional lobbying tactics. Nonetheless, while differences are strong across the control groups and the sample at large, gender gaps are not consistent across treatment groups. Interestingly, there appears to be almost no difference in the response rates between female legislators and male legislators in the mobilization treatment group. The difference across gender within the combined treatment group is also relatively small; none of the treatment groups saw significant gender gaps in response rates.

Table 3.3: Differences in Response Rates

	Mob. Treatment - Control	Exp. Treatment - Control	Combined Treatment - Control
Overall	17.3***	-.6	8.6
	p = .00	**p = 1**	**p = .16**
Female Legislator	1.2	-11.5	-5.6
	p = 1	**p = .23**	**p = .62**
Male Legislator	29.5 ***	6.2	19.1**
	p = .00	**p = .48**	**p = .02**

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Taking a closer look at the differences in response rates across treatment and control groups, Table 3.3 shows treatment effects overall, evaluating gender gaps in treatment effects specifically. Overall, the mobilization treatment effect had a positive and significant effect on legislator responsiveness to a women's group meeting request, increasing the likelihood a legislator would respond by 17.3 percentage points. But

this overall effect might derive from the treatment's effect on male legislators specifically. Significant differences emerge across gender in observed treatment effects, providing support for my expectations that men would see greater change in responsiveness from additional lobbying tactics. While the mobilization treatment had an impressive impact on male legislators, increasing their response rate by a substantial and significant 29.5 percentage points, female legislators saw only a slight increase in the likelihood of response. Similarly, the combined treatment effects also show an overall positive effect on legislator response rate. However, whereas men saw a strong and statistically significant increase of 19.1 percentage points (p = .02) in response to the combined treatment, women in office were actually less likely to respond (though this difference also fails to reach statistical significance).

For a more thorough examination of the findings presented in Tables 3.2 and 3.3, I conduct an OLS regression analysis predicting whether the legislative office responded to the emailed meeting request sent by the fictitious women's advocacy organization. Importantly, interpretations of these analyses and those regression analyses that follow must account for the fact that I could not randomize legislator characteristics, and some confounding variables might therefore be at play. With this in mind, additional models evaluating state fixed effects and controlling for specific legislator characteristics are included in the Appendix, the results of which are all consistent with those presented below.

I estimate a baseline model (1) first which predicts effects of the experimental treatments without the inclusion of (female) gender interactions by treatment group, and then estimate a full interaction model (2), adding the interaction terms to test the hypotheses that the relationship between the experimental groups and response rates differ based on a legislator's gender.

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1(Mobilization_i) + \beta_2(Expertise_i) + \beta_3(Combined_i) + \beta_4(Female_i) + u_i. \quad (3.1)$$

$$Y_i = \beta_5 + \beta_6(Mobilization_i) + \beta_7(Expertise_i) + \beta_8(Combined_i) + \beta_9(Female_i) + \beta_{10}(Mobilization_i) * (Female_i) + \beta_{11}(Expertise_i) * (Female_i) + \beta_{12}(Combined_i) * (Female_i) + u_i \quad (3.2)$$

The regression results presented in the coefficient plot in Figure 3.1[21] strengthen the conclusions drawn from Tables 3.2 and 3.3. First, interacting the treatment groups by gender adds important nuance. The baseline model appears to underestimate the influence of gender substantially. Whereas the baseline model predicts that female legislators are 11.3 percentage points more likely to response to the women's meeting request, the interaction model predicts this positive increase at 26.5 percentage points. Employing an F-test to compare the nested models in the two regressions produces a statistically significant χ^2 statistic of 6.7891 (p = . 07). I can therefore confirm that female legislators not only respond differently to the women's advocacy group's request for access at the baseline, but to the organization's lobbying tactics as well.



Figure 3.1: Coefficient Plot with 95% Confidence Intervals, OLS Regression Analysis Predicting Legislator Responsiveness to Meeting Request by a Women's Issue Organization

The heterogeneous effects show particularly interesting results for male legislators. In the interaction model, the coefficient for male legislators receiving the meeting request signaling constituent mobilization estimated an increase in response rate by 27.1 percentage points. Looking at the negative and statistically

[21] Table B.1 in Appendix shows these results in table form as well.

significant coefficient for female legislators, the net effect of signaling constituent mobilization on women in office is estimated at virtually zero. Furthermore, the coefficient estimated for male recipients of the mobilization treatment mirrors the estimated difference between female and male legislators; lobbying tactics signaling constituent mobilization appears to close the gender gap almost entirely. Figure 3.2 underlines this point well by comparing the predicted rates of response for men and women in office in the control groups and the mobilization treatment groups. While 50.1 percent of women in the control group are predicted to respond to the women's meeting request, only 23.6 percent of men in the control group are predicted to respond. This marks a statistically significant difference of 26.5 percentage points. In contrast, men in the mobilization treatment group are predicted to respond at a rate of 50.7 percent, which exceeds the predicted rate of women in the mobilization treatment group by a statistically insignificant 0.9 percentage point.



Figure 3.2: Mobilization Treatment Effects: Comparisons Across Gender

The regression results also show that the effect of the combined treatment on men is positive and statistically significant while being entirely negated by the statistically significant negative coefficient estimated for women. In fact, the net effect of the combined treatment on female legislators is unexpectedly negative albeit small (-.037). Figure 3.3 depicts these results graphically as well. It should be noted, however, that

given the non-effects of the expertise treatment, it is likely that the constituent mobilization piece of the combined treatment drives these results.



Figure 3.3: Combined Treatment Effects: Comparisons Across Gender

Ultimately, the experimental results produce strong findings. Lobbying tactics that signal an organization's ability to provide electoral benefits to a legislator can act as additional persuasion for a legislator to provide access. Informational benefits seem to have less of an influence on access provision, at least in this context, as emphasis on expertise provision failed to trigger any strong increases in the rates of response. But significant gender gaps emerge in observed responsiveness to a women's group: when additional lobbying tactics that emphasize electoral or informational benefits are *not* employed, women's groups are likely to see more success targeting female legislators for access than male legislators. The results of this experiment suggest that by signaling electoral benefits, a women's advocacy group can effectively tighten *if not close* gender gaps in responsiveness. Whereas women in office might be more likely allies to women's organizations than men, women's organizations can use strategic lobbying tactics to shift the balance in their favor. On the other hand, my findings also suggest a ceiling effect in efforts to lobby female legislators, wherein additional lobbying tactics fail to provoke any real increase in the rate of response.

3.4 Discussion

I conducted a field experiment to explore the opportunities offered by women's advocacy for increased women's organizational inclusion in the legislative process. I argued that women in office would be more likely allies to a women's issue group than men in office, and as such more likely to respond to a women's issue group's meeting request. I also predicted that while additional lobbying tactics signaling electoral and informational benefits to a legislator would increase responsiveness, such lobbying tactics would face ceiling effects when targeting female legislators. Men, in contrast, would show substantial room for improvement in their base-level responsiveness; they would thus be influenced strongly and positively to the same organizational lobbying tactics that proved effectively inconsequential for women.

My analysis showed substantial support for these predictions, revealing interesting and conditional gender gaps in the ways men and women in office respond to women's advocacy and varying lobbying tactics by a women's group in their willingness to provide access. Women in office appear to matter for organizations advocating on a women's issue, increasing a group's potential for access and inclusion. My research lends strong support for links between descriptive and substantive representation while at the same time presenting this linkage through the previously understudied lens of lobbying and organized advocacy. In turn, I also show that by leveraging a legislator's electoral self-interest, a women's group can indeed garner attention from those in office who at first glance might be overlooked as unexpected allies. More generally, it appears from this experiment that a group's intrinsic value and electoral value can matter a great deal for lobbying efforts seeking access to legislators.

In contrast, a group's informational value did not appear to matter at all. The lack of evidence supporting my prediction that expertise provision should stimulate increased access provision is puzzling, and merits further investigation. Given that extant literature characterizes the inclusion of lobby groups in policymaking in terms of "legislative subsidies" (Hall and Deardorff 2006), why did the offer of specialized expertise not increase legislative interest? The answer might relate back to Mayhew's (1974) seminal work, such that electoral incentives are the principal driver of a legislator's behavior in this scenario as well. My results definitely indicate that for male state legislators, the "electoral connection" (Mayhew 1974) is strong; a petition with only .5% of support by registered voters more than doubled their likelihood to provide access. However, the null results might also be reflective of experimental design. The value of expertise

might relate to it's source, and it is possible that expertise provision from an unknown organization without more informative references was insufficient to provoke increased attention. Therefore, the weakness of the expertise treatment relative to the more explicit mobilization treatment is also worth consideration in these unexpected findings.

A few additional questions remain unanswered. First, these findings arise out of an examination of responsiveness to a women's group advocating on the needs of victims of sex trafficking. Sex trafficking can be defined as a women's issue in that it predominantly effects women specifically, but it is unique in comparison to other issues traditionally defined as "women's issues" such as abortion or reproduction issues (**??**, e.g.) or anti-discrimination issues (Wolbrecht 2000, e.g.) in that it cannot be easily tied to a particular ideology or political party. It remains unclear if the trends observed above with regards to gender gaps and constituent mobilization lobbying hold if the women's organization of interest is advocating on an issue more partisan, or more salient. Additional research is thus needed before these results can be broadly generalizable to lobbying efforts of all women's issue groups in U.S. states.

Second, my theory rests on the assumption that the mechanisms linking descriptive and substantive representation for women derive from instrinsic benefits. But this represents only one side of the story. In fact, scholars propose two central theories to explain the linkages between descriptive and substantive representation: the first explanation is intrinsically or personally motivated, but scholars have also often suggested that linkages between descriptive and substantive representation arise from how legislators perceive the strength of electoral support offered by in-group constituencies. If a legislator perceives a great deal of electoral potential for a given constituency group, they are likely to allocate more time to address policy issues specific to that particular constituency, and vice versa; they are likely allies to that constituency group and their policy preferences. There thus remains an underlying question as to what drives the gendered differences I observe in this experiment. Broockman's (2013) field experiment speaks elegantly to this debate in the literature, examining intrinsic verses extrinsic (i.e. political or electoral) motivations behind the links between descriptive and substantive representation amongst black politicians. His findings do support the conclusion that shared group identity shape the links between descriptive and substantive representation with regards to race. In terms of gender scholarship, compelling research also suggests that women in office often *feel compelled* to, in Pitkin's (1967), "stand in" and "act for" women as a group (Carroll 2002, **?**, **?**). As such, I

believe my assertions that the gender gaps observed here reflect intrinsic benefits of descriptive representation are well-founded. But future examination of these trends should pay more comprehensive attention to disentangling these two driving potential mechanisms.[22]

Finally, in limiting my field experiment to the examination of lobbying tactics of a women's issue group only, I leave another question unanswered regarding mechanisms and gender gaps in legislative responsiveness. That is, are women in office more responsive than their male counterparts to basic requests for access by interest groups across all issue areas? Given female legislators' greater disposition towards the prioritization of constituency services (Lazarus and Steigerwalt 2018, Richardson Jr and Freeman 1995), there is reason to expect women in office to more readily respond to group requests for meetings (or to simply pay closer attention to their legislative emails). The question as to whether the gender gaps emergent in this study relate to differences in responsiveness to women's advocacy groups or advocacy groups at large remains unclear, and merits further investigation. But importantly, this experiment was designed in order to speak to advocacy organizations seeking progress on women's representation specifically, especially in states where progress in levels of descriptive representation continues to lag. For such organizations, the source of gender gaps in legislative responsiveness to their efforts for inclusion is largely irrelevant. What matters is that these gaps have been observed to exist, and that they have also been shown to be bridgeable. Furthermore, within the study of interest groups and lobbying, very little is currently understood about how legislators respond to and engage with groups that advocate on issues that disproportionately affect women. This paper represents an effort to fill that gap in the literature.

This study and its findings have substantial implications for women's representation in the U.S. state legislatures. A great deal of important policy making impacting the everyday lives of women in the United States happens in state legislatures. Women in office matter for women, but in states like Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama where (as of 2018) women make up 14.5, 14.9, and 15 percent of the state legislature respectively (CAWP 2018), alternative mechanisms for increased representation for women are crucial. By shedding light not only on gender gaps in representation, but also on how gender gaps can be closed for overall increases substantive representation, this research can act as a beacon for women's organizations who might otherwise overlook under-explored pathways towards progress.

[22] A deeper discussion of these issues can be found in the Appendix, and is discussed in relation to results of my triple-interaction analyses.

Chapter 4

Reconsidering Gender Gaps in State Legislatures: Heterogeneous Effects of Women's Issue Lobbying

4.1 Introduction

When it comes to advancing public policy for groups historically excluded from politics, descriptive representation is key. Scholars agree that marginalized groups are best represented substantively by elected officials who share their descriptive characteristics and salient group identities (Mansbridge 1999, Lublin 1997, Lovenduski 2005, e.g.). When women in office can bring gendered life experiences to legislative institutions and policy agendas, they shape the introduction of policy positions and perspectives that would otherwise remain under-represented (Gilligan 1992, Swers 2002, Thomas 1994, Mansbridge 1998). A considerable body of research shows that women legislate differently than their male colleagues on behalf of women, and are individually as well as collaboratively more likely to sponsor and advance women's issue legislation (Dodson 2006, Holman and Mahoney 2018, Osborn 2014, Swers 2002). Scholars refer to these differences as gender gaps, where women exceed men in their representation of women. In turn, the underlying assumption is that gender gaps demonstrate the strength of links between descriptive and substantive representation (Bratton 2002, Caroll 2002, Saint-Germain 1989*a*, Swers 2005, Thomas 1994). These studies

speak to the question of how electing more women in a legislature not only increases democratic legitimacy, but increases attention to political interests of women as a group.

Nevertheless, the story of how women represent women can often be far more complicated, constrained, and uncertain. In spite of the research and theory referenced above, scholars also find that the emergence of gender gaps amongst legislators is conditional on political or institutional contexts (Dodson 2006, Osborn 2012, Swers 2002). Reingold's (2000) study of the Arizona and California state legislatures, for example, finds that gender gaps amongst Arizona legislators were larger and more varied than those observed across California legislators. Interestingly, Reingold (2000, 8) offers that these alternative trends did not arise "because the California women were slackers, but because the California men were quite active and committed to many of these issues..." Why were the California men so legislatively active for women as a group? What mechanisms facilitate substantive women's representation from non-descriptive representatives? And how, in turn, might the *absence* of gender gaps in legislative activity relate to such mechanisms?

This paper addresses these questions by examining how changes in support from women's groups can influence changes in women's issue bill sponsorship by state legislators. While studies on the linkages between women's descriptive and substantive representation have largely focused on party, district, and institutional characteristics, little is understood about the influence of women's organizations and lobbying. Similarly, where scholars often focus on differences between female and male legislative behavior, few scholars explore the mechanisms driving differences among male legislators in shaping the emergence of gender gaps. My study here is concerned with both missing pieces in the literature, and investigates how lobbying by women's groups can influence male and female legislators differently. My results reaffirm that women are more likely to sponsor women's issue legislation, and reveal that this commitment to women's representation arises independently of campaign contributions from women's groups. However, I also show that men in office are uniquely compelled towards increased activity on women's issues when targeted by women's group campaign contributions, narrowing observable gender gaps while increasing women's representation overall.

The work presented in this paper builds on my qualitative interview study conducted between Fall 2018 and Spring 2019, which uses grounded theory methodologies to investigate how women's advocacy organizations, women's political nonprofits, and women's issue political action committees (PACs) strategically

considered their lobbying activities as directed towards descriptive and non-descriptive representatives. The extensive qualitative data collected over the course of that study suggested that women's issue lobbyists *do* consider men and women in office differently in terms of legislative relationships and electoral partnerships. I found that the nature of alliances between women's groups and legislators fundamentally differed based on elements of lived experience and identity. The observed connections that developed between women's issue lobbyists and women in office were rooted in recognition of shared marginalization and women's group consciousness. Women's groups invited female legislators into dense networks of collaboration that offered systems of support in lawmaking. Female lobbyists, activists, and advocates understood female "electeds" as allies devoted to higher purposes of gender equity and equality, or broader social change. These alliances were therefore based on what political scientists would term *intrinsic motivations,* and related to the "purely psychic benefits" (Citrin and Green 1990, 6) of acting on behalf of a group's well-being (Broockman 2013, Burden 2007). In contrast, men in office were regarded with more skepticism and caution. Political advocacy targeting men in office was strategically framed to minimize emphasis on gender, and many women's issue activists thought carefully about how to shift male perspectives towards greater gender identity consciousness. Often, they approached with alternative lobbying techniques deemed unnecessary within the well-developed networks of female officeholders. This paper takes an empirical examination of these relationships, testing their implications by examining if male legislators are or are not "awakened" through electoral incentives provided by women's PACs.

4.2 Linking Descriptive and Substantive Representation

The political importance of descriptive representation is grounded in the recognition of historic, social, and institutional marginalization faced by certain groups of society in relation to others. Marginalization fosters a unique perspective, one shared and passed on across generations of historical oppression. When a group is systemically marginalized over time, it develops an identity narrative that commonly differs from the dominant group (Mansbridge 1999, 2005; Phillips 1995; Williams 1998; Young 1997). Theories asserting the need for descriptive representation argue that in order for a marginalized group to achieve representation, individual members of the group must be welcomed and empowered in decision making bodies such as a legislature; their presence greatly increases the likelihood that valid political voice will be given to the

marginalized group's unique perspective. As Kaiser (1997, 136) describes, "many feminists see increasing women's political representation, via elected office or interest group involvement, as a necessary condition for improving the status of women."

Difference is thus at the heart of this representational need: women's life experience differs from men's (Williams 1998). It is these differences that render the politics of presence central to the effective representational outcomes of deliberative democratic policymaking; difference translates into distinct insights on policy proposals and introduces new perspectives on where political intervention, action, or support is needed (Phillips 1995). Difference is therefore expected from women in office: "women are expected– by voters, activists, and researchers alike– to care more about, know more about, and do more about women's issues" (Reingold 2000, 6). Without the participation of women in legislative settings dominated by men, women's perspectives as a marginalized group might be ignored, underestimated, or simply left off the table for consideration.[1] Phillips (1995) articulates this last point especially well in terms of "overlooked interests." As Dovi (2002, 730) describes, "group representation allows historically excluded groups to get onto the political agenda their perspectives, issues, and interests that had been previously ignored."

Empirically, arguments for the value of descriptive representation in terms of agenda setting are well supported. On the state level, research has consistently shown that female legislators prioritize women's issues in setting their personal agendas. Female legislators sponsor more legislation on issues disproportionately impacting women, both in terms of social welfare policy as well as policy advancing women's rights (Bratton and Haynie 1999, Dodson and Carroll 1991, Dolan and Ford 1995, Thomas 1991). Women in Congress have also been observed as more innovative in approaching women's issues Wolbrecht (2002), and women legislators have been largely responsible for advancing women's rights policy and protection (Swers 2005, Wolbrecht 2002).

Nevertheless, in other areas of legislative behavior, the evidence of difference is mixed and inconsistent. One prominent example can once again be taken from Reingold's (2000) in-depth study of California and Arizona state legislators, which finds that "descriptive representation was, as a criterion for substantive

[1] A critical point for emphasis here, while not in the scope of this paper, is that what has historically been considered "authentic female perspective" is in reality the *white* female perspective. Since Kimberly Crenshaw 1990 first coined "intersectionality" to refer to intersections of marginalized group identities in terms of their simultaneous and interactive effects, intersectional political theory has been embraced as a research paradigm. This study does not yet incorporate intersectional analysis, as data on state legislator race and ethnicity over the period of interest remains incomplete. Future iterations of this study will pay close attention to intersectional differences as well as those based solely on gender.

representation, neither absolutely necessary nor always sufficient" (2000, 243). While Reingold (2000) does identify some key differences distinguishing female legislators as more willing to lead on women's issues and more connected with female constituents, she also finds that men are no different from women from numerous points of comparison, including policy preferences and roll call voting. One of her key take-aways in concluding her analysis is, quite simply, "that the strategy for difference is one in need of a reality check" (2000, 243).

4.2.1 Reconsidering Differences

A key aspect of this paper is therefore to offer such a check, and in the process conceptually interrogate interpretations of gender differences. To review, theories of descriptive representation suggest that without women in office, issues that predominantly impact women might remain ignored or overlooked in both individual and legislature-wide policy agendas. Electing more women into office as a strategy for increased women's representation in policymaking is thus rooted in the premises of gender difference. Empirically, this almost always translates into the analysis of sex difference in behavior for scholars of women's representation in policymaking. When sex differences are identified in policy activity on women's issues, scholars conclude the presence of women in office helps ensure that women's issues arrive and progress on the policy agenda.

On the other hand, in the event such differences are not observed, conclusions become less clear. The assumption is most often that similarities observed between women and men in office reflect the constraint of male dominated institutional norms and preferences. As Reingold (2000, 6) explains, "the standard explanation for this shortage of sex-based differentiation would be that the women did not feel free to act on behalf of, or even like, women and that doing so remained a risky, costly venture in these male-dominated political institutions." This explanation reflects the theory of critical mass, which states that just because a woman is elected into political office does not mean that she will feel comfortable and empowered giving voice to her marginalized group perspective. Due to fundamental consequences of historic marginalization, critical mass theory expects individual women in office to remain largely silent on issues of inequality in representation and institutional power when proportions of women in office are low overall[2]. As the number

[2]For a complete review and evaluation of critical mass theory as it relates to links between women's descriptive and substantive representation, see Beckwith and Cowell-Meyers (2007*b*)

of women in a legislature increases, however, a power of voice is developed where women united can stand together to challenge institutional dominance by gender and give voice to women's marginalized perspective. As Norris and Lovenduski (2001, 2-3) write,

> "[T]he nature of group interactions depend upon size. When a group remains a distinct minority within a larger society, its members will seek to adapt to its surroundings, conforming to the predominant rules of the game... But once the group reaches a certain size, critical mass theory suggests that there will be a qualitative change in the nature of group interactions, as the minority starts to assert itself and thereby transform the institutional culture, norms, and values."

Swers (2002), on the other hand, argues institutional contexts more political in nature matter in shaping a female member of Congress's willingness to prioritize women's issues. Swers (2002) identifies clear variation in size and scope of gender gaps in legislative activity hinging on conditions such as positions of power in Congress and partisan control. Taken collectively, the uncertainty surrounding if and how women in office legislate differently than their male counterparts can naturally give rise to somewhat sobering realities, wherein increased women's representation might remain out of reach despite steady numerical gains for women in office.

I argue that this relatively pessimistic outlook can and should be more thoroughly evaluated, however. The true implications of sex similarities in legislative activity remain unclear, and are not necessarily a function of *inactivity* by women on women's issues. At their most basic definition, sex differences refer to distance between two points for comparison, and thus do not speak directly to where those points themselves exist. For illustrative purposes, we can imagine two hypothetical legislatures, Legislature A and Legislature B, wherein each individual legislator is given an average score between 0 and 10 for their level of legislative activity on women's issues. In Legislature A, the average score for female legislators is 8 and the average score for male legislators is 4. In contrast, while female legislators in Legislature B have the same average score of 8, male legislators in Legislature B have an average women's representational score of 6. If we were to simply observe sex differences in assessing women's representation, Legislature A seems to indicate stronger links between descriptive and substantive representation, but this does not tell the whole story. The legislative activity by women on women's issues in Legislature B and Legislature A both receive a score of 8, but the increased activity on women's issues by men in Legislature B can lead to invalid conclusions

if sex differences exist as the sole point of comparison. In turn, the magnitude of difference becomes less relevant if we ultimately care most about the sum level of representation. Could it not be the case that failure to discover differences between female and male officeholders reflects a *male* movement towards increased substantive representation for women, or prioritization of women's issues? If so, what might be influencing this increase, and how can we ensure that it reflects the policy needs of women as a marginalized group? Given the dramatic increases in inclusion and incorporation of women in the political institutions over the last two decades, what changes can we expect in the legislative behavior of male officeholders on behalf of women?

Emphatically, in no way does this paper deny that institutional marginalization can be present and substantial in constraining female legislators' pursuit of representational advances for women. My focus on male representational behavior on behalf of women's interests should not be interpreted as discounting the need for descriptive representation more generally. Correcting the under-representation of women and historically marginalized groups overall is of paramount importance for institutions claiming to be democratic.[3] I instead want to propose a mechanism through which men might be activated towards increased representation for women, potentially obscuring observable gender differences while at the same time "making a difference" for women in policymaking. I argue that women's issue lobbying can inform and activate men in office towards increased prioritization of women's issue legislation, narrowing observable gender gaps while increasing women's substantive representation overall.

4.3 The Influence of Lobbying on Women's Issue Prioritization

Where the advancement of women's issue policy might be less of a priority for male legislators than for female legislators, lobbying by women's groups has the power to reshape a male legislative agenda. This power is derived from the unique value women's groups can offer male legislators specifically. The discussion that follows reviews current theory on the influence of lobbying, exploring how these theories can be applied and amended when considering issues of marginalized group identity.

[3]To fully unpack the importance of increased descriptive representation is outside the scope of this paper. For a comprehensive and thorough discussion of the rationales behind the need for increased descriptive representation, see Phillips (1995) or Reingold (2000)

Despite the fact that most empirical analyses of lobbying examine the relationship between contributions from Political Action Committees (PACs) and roll call votes by legislators, eminent theories on lobbying instead contend that the greatest opportunities for influence relate more to their individual agendas rather than their voting behavior (Hall and Wayman 1990). Each of these theories directly relate to a lobbyist's potential influence with respect to his or her ability to provide value to a legislator. For example, Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (**?**, in their famous work on lobbying and foreign trade policy, conclude that a legislator's principle decision is "not how to vote but what to do with his time, how to allocate his resources, and where to put his energy" (1963, 405). Denzau and Munger (1986) take a similar approach, arguing for an exchange model wherein lobbyists trade campaign contributions for legislative effort.

More recently, Hall and Deardorff's (2006) model on lobbying as a legislative subsidy structures a lobbying organization's potential for influence as dependent on its ability to ease the burden of a legislator's substantial workload. The effort necessary for a legislator to advance policy is substantial and costly, and legislators' resources are scarce. Legislators are limited in terms of their time, expertise, and labor, and are simultaneously interested in a multitude of issues– some more so than others. When lobbyists can effectively decrease the cost of policymaking on a given issue (or increase the possible return from policymaking effort), the effect is to increase the legislator's willingness to devote attention to that policy area. What emerges is a kind of partnership, wherein a legislator increases an issue's prominence on their agenda and the lobbyist ensures it is worth their while.

A key aspect of Hall and Deardorff's (2006) model, however, is that for these partnerships to be productive, there must be overlap in the policy preferences of lobbyist and legislator. Their theory predicts that lobbyists will lobby their allies, will not lobby their enemies, and will rarely lobby "uncommitteds." They anticipate that as lobbying increases, the effort exerted by legislative allies on the policy of interest will increase, and that lobbying will increase the participation of a lobbyist's strongest allies most. This last expectation, while counterintuitive, is entirely sensible within the frames of their model: legislators and their offices are considered legislative enterprises in that they produce policy similarly to a business output, and lobbyists offer resources to these enterprises including expertise, policy language, or political capitol with fellow legislative enterprises. Hall and Deardorff (2006) are primarily interested in a lobbyist's ability to provide costly information, especially related to in-depth policy analysis, reports, or expertise. Given the

cost of such informational resources, a lobbyist should only consider working with legislative enterprises that are likely to utilize their lobbying with maximum effort.

Despite strong similarities conceptually, the theory offered in this paper differs from Hall and Deardorff (2006) in two key respects: first in terms of its consideration of campaign finance lobbying, and second in its unique focus on issues of marginalized group identity. To the first point, examining campaign contributions as a lobbying strategy rather than expertise provision or legislative support shapes alternative predictions regarding where lobbying will see the strongest impact. Whereas legislators can utilize the expertise differently to shape policy outcomes, the different ways legislators might use campaign contributions have no direct effect on the policymaking process itself. In fact, where roll call voting is concerned, there is little evidence to support the idea that money sways legislators at all (Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo and Snyder Jr 2003, Grenzke 1989, Wawro 2001, e.g.). By investing in an in-depth policy report and offering it to a legislator, a lobbyist can expect a greater return on that investment when offering it the strongest possible ally. The same cannot be said for campaign contributions, which do not necessarily carry more bang for their buck with stronger allies.

In contrast, Hall and Wayman's (1990) theory relates to campaign contributions specifically, and might offer greater insight in this regard. Rather than directly subsidizing a legislator's ability to produce policy, Hall and Wayman (1990) propose that campaign contributions are intended to *mobilize* legislators already sympathetic to a lobbyist's policy agenda. Within this framework, we can still expect lobbying in the form of campaign contributions to have the greatest effect on allies. But expectations for the relative effects on strong allies verses weak allies remains less clear.

Even further, reliance on how individual legislators are categorized as allies, enemies, or "undecideds" requires a closer examination when the policies at hand relate to identity, which marks this papers second point of divergence from Hall and Deardorff's (2006) theoretic context. Within the issue contexts considered in the research discussed above, the actions available to a legislator can be easily categorized across a continuous single dimension of either support or opposition. A central assumption is that the greater the strength of a legislator's support, the more likely they are to take action on that issue. Inaction on an issue is directly related to a relative weakness in support. But for issues of marginalized group identity and representation, the connections between legislative support and legislative action are arguably far more

complex; the central assumption stated above might not in fact hold. While studies show that gender plays a role in shaping legislative priorities such that women are most likely to advance social welfare and feminist public policies, feminist men exist; we might imagine them to be increasingly prominent as educational outreach surrounding violence against women and sexual harassment gain momentum in the public domain. However, the question as to whether male legislators in strong support of women's increased substantive representation take legislative action on those issues is complicated by perceptions of expertise and credibility, in relation to voters as well as to fellow legislators. As Swers (2002, 10) writes, "to convince other legislators of the merits of their proposals, representatives must be able to command expertise and credibility on the issue. With regard to women's issues, the expertise and credibility that congresswomen can claim through personal experience or a connection with women as a group are assets." Male representatives cannot make clear claims to these assets, and might thus refrain from placing women's issues on their policy agendas despite a potential interest in doing so. Therefore, while some men might be equal to their female colleagues in interest or support of women's issue policy, this interest does not map onto distinct categorizations of "ally" or "undecided." Rather, they exist more so as "dormant" allies, willing to take action but lacking sufficient expertise or credibility to do so.

Relationships with women's advocacy organizations represent a powerful resource for male legislators in this regard, providing both credibility as well as policy perspective. Scholars of descriptive representation have long debated this question: how can powerful individuals speak for a marginalized experience that they themselves have not lived? Speaking on the historical development of feminist politics, Phillips (1995, 9) gets to the heart of this debate as she describes,

> "... the question of who can best speak for or on behalf of another became a major source of tension, for once men were dislodged from their role of speaking for women, it seemed obvious enough that white women must also be dislodged from their role of speaking for black women, heterosexual women for lesbians, and middle-class women for those in the working class. The search for authenticity– or what Kathleen Jones sees as the dead end pursuit of that experience which will ground one's authority– then makes it difficult for anyone to represent an experience not identical to her own and, taken to this extreme, renders dialogue virtually impossible."

The discussion inevitably hinges on mechanisms for accountability, and the degree to which members of privileged groups can be trusted to represent the potentially conflicting interests of groups relatively less

privileged (Dovi 2002). Strong connections with women's organizations can act to build this accountability and credibility.

For instance, Weldon (2002*b*) provides important groundwork for the greater understanding of the representational power of women's organizations, asserting that women's movements and organizations offer an arena where women interact as women to define their priorities, and can therefore best articulate policy goals. She suggests a new conception of the link between group perspective and individual experience of marginalization, one stemming from group interaction. Weldon (2002) identifies intra-group interactions and mobilization as a primary mechanism for building a distinct group voice, offering that group perspective is a puzzle where each individual member is a piece. By coming together, comparing shapes and sizes of each puzzle piece, and working together to complete the puzzle, a marginalized group creates a group perspective (Weldon 2002, 42). Such organizations are well equipped to act as informed representatives for women's diverse policy needs; arguably, speaking for a marginalized group perspective in democratic policymaking *requires* individual legislators (male or female) to interact with the diverse marginalized group, fleshing out a more complete political perspective in order to take legislative action towards substantive representation.

If women's issue lobbyists can form such relationships with male representatives, they have the potential power to push women's issues towards greater prominence in an individual legislator's agenda where they might otherwise have been "overlooked" or avoided. Furthermore, if sustained interactions within their group's diverse membership renders women's organizations especially effective in articulating a women's group perspective, the policies put forward as a result of such partnerships should reflect representational accountability and credibility; female constituents and sister representatives might have greater trust in a male legislator's capacity to represent the distinct interests of women as a group when he has formed clear connections to politically active women's organizations giving voice to their concerns. I argue that campaign contributions by women's groups to individual male legislators "mobilize" male legislative activity towards increased women's representation; they therefore simultaneously signal the development of partnerships and connections.

The final question then left to consider is the potential effect partnerships with women's lobbyists (and the campaign contributions that signal such partnerships) might have on female legislators, and why we

expect to observe these effects differently. Given that female legislators are already more likely to prioritize women's issues independent of lobbying, the observed effects of campaign contributions from women's groups should be less visible. Women in office are already well situated to pursue such policies, and are less likely to require outside *mobilization* towards placing them on their legislative agendas. My theory's central claim is therefore that campaign contributions by women's issue groups will have the greatest observable effects on legislators *when there is room for it.* Lobbying as a tool for legislator mobilization will have the strongest visible impact on men as "dormant" allies, shifting their policymaking activity more so than female "allies" who were already likely to be active on these issues in the first place. The anticipated counterfactual is thus a pivotal element driving my expectations: lobbying shapes a change in a legislator's activity only when a legislator's activity would have been different had they never been lobbied.

4.4 Expectations, Data, and Methodology

I test the theory described above using the following hypotheses:

1. H1: Women will sponsor more bills on women's issues than men
2. H2: Campaign contributions will have no effect on female legislators' bill sponsorship
3. H3: Campaign contributions will have a positive effect on male legislators' bill sponsorship

By comparing changes in bill sponsorship on women's issues, I analyze how changes in a campaign contributions from women's issue organizations in the previous election cycle affect a legislator's active commitment to women's interest representation, and explore how these effects are or are not conditional on a legislator's gender identity. In contrast to roll call voting, bill sponsorship is costly and thus reflective of a legislator's issue priorities; it is therefore ideal for my analysis. Bill sponsorship is a consequential form of agenda setting and position-taking(Mayhew 1974, Reingold, Widner and Harmon 2019, Rocca and Gordon 2010). It also marks an important contribution to research on the effects of PAC campaign contributions, which are primarily concerned with roll call voting or activities specific to committees, and are largely confined to analyses of the U.S. Congress.

4.4.1 Data

Analysis of sponsorship activity on women's issues extends across the five legislative sessions between 2000 and 2009 in the California and Ohio General Assemblies, and is based on a sample of 1652 women's issue bills and 550 sponsors. The overall sample represents a little less than 10 percent of all bills introduced in both states over that period of time. The data collection process demanded a careful reading of all policies related to women's issues introduced in each legislative session between 2000 and 2009 for each state. I utilize LexisNexis State Capital to compile this list, a well-cited and reliable computer-based legal research database that includes archives of bills introduced in both chambers of each state legislature across the US.

All of the bills included in my data are hand-coded and carefully read to evaluate their qualification as "women's issue" policy, a process which merits deeper discussion. The definition of "women's issues" in politics is challenging if not outright problematic. Osborn (2014) speaks to this problem as whether one can define "a group of 'women's issues' on which women legislators, regardless of party ideology, might work together due to shared gendered interests" (149). She continues, however, to provide a useful rubric for women's issue identification and classification based on past research, offering that women's issues can be most clearly defined as falling into one (or more) of three categories. First, policy issues regulating or explicating women's rights, such as those related to anti-discrimination law Wolbrecht (2000). Second, issues that disproportionately affect female constituencies, such as domestic violence, reproductive health, etc.(Reingold 2000, Reingold, Widner and Harmon 2019, Swers 2002). Third and arguably most contested, policy issues related to women's traditionally defined roles in the "private sphere," such as childcare, education, or other "ethic of caring" issues like health and social welfare policy (Gilligan 1992, Swers 2002, Thomas 1994).

In alignment with a majority studies before mine, I include bills that directly target or impact women specifically. As Swers and Larson (2005, 113) describe, "the more a policy problem is viewed as directly connected to consequences for women as a group, the more likely it is that a legislator will rely on gender considerations to guide policy choices." While approaches emphasising group-salience in the study of descriptive representation are relatively consistent, scholars use differing methodologies in drawing ideological lines for bill inclusion. For the purposes of this study, I restrict women's issue bills utilizing an approach that walks a distinct, middling line between those taken by past studies of descriptive and substan-

tive representation (Bratton 2002, Bratton and Haynie 1999, Dodson and Carroll 1991, Reingold, Widner and Harmon 2019, Saint-Germain 1989*b*, Swers 2002, Wolbrecht 2002, e.g.). Similarly to more narrow coding guidelines employed by Bratton and Haynie (1999, 664), I include women's interest bills that increase women's rights, decrease discrimination against women, or improve the social, economic, or political advancement of women. For example, I include: bills to improve postpartum hospital care; bills to provide lending opportunities to female business owners; and bills to regulate childcare services.[4] Also similarly to Bratton and Haynie (1999), I exclude bills that I judge to hinder or harm the socioeconomic status or rights of women; while bills included in my sample need not be explicitly feminist, I do not include *anti-feminist* bills. This choice is rooted in my interest in lobbying efforts by women's advocacy organizations, and my assumption that such women's groups are unlikely to support policy that limits the advancement of women. This assumption is well supported by my qualitative interview work with women's interest groups working in state-level politics across the United States.[5]

However, my coding protocol is slightly *less narrow* than that utilized by Bratton and Haynie (1999) in its efforts to draw a slightly softer ideological distinction. More specifically, I am more inclusive of bills related to children's issues, thus speaking more to issues related to the "ethics of caring." Good examples include: a bill related to providing increased access to nutritional meals in early childhood educational systems, or bills related to adoption and foster-care. I include such bills with a mind towards Swers's (2005) analyses connecting bill cosponsorship in the 103rd and 104th Congresses. Her protocol is uniquely relevant to my interests in that it consults legislative reports by liberal, conservative, and bipartisan women's issue advocacy groups. Her sample includes a great number of children and family issues. In turn, because motherhood was also consistently reported among important issues of interest by women's activists in my qualitative study, I judged that while these bills did not *directly* relate to gender or women, their inclusion was nonetheless important with respect to motherhood.[6]

[4]The use of multiple subject codes in my hand-coding process was critical in my ability to filter data for inclusion. Each bill has attached to it 1-6 subject codes, and I limited bill inclusion by subsetting the larger dataset by pairing of subject codes. For instance, not all bills with the subject code for "prison" were included for analysis in this study. Rather, only bills that combined the subject code "prison" with codes such as "w$_r ights,''$ "$mother,''$ "$sex_a ssault,''$ and/or"$w_h ealth''$ $wereincludedforanalysis.$

[5]Abortion is an issue area where this is assertion is critically questionable, however. There are numerous groups that identify as women's interest groups who advocate against pro-choice initiatives that are considered anti-feminist. Because this exists as such a challenging issue for analysis, I exclude pro-life abortion groups and bills from this particular study.

[6]There were practical reasons for including these bills as well. Including bills related to children specifically enabled me to include contributions from a wider spectrum of organizations, many of which were not classified under industry category of "Women's Issues" by FollowTheMoney.org but instead under "Children's Rights" or "Health and Welfare Policy" industry categories. These



Figure 4.1: Gendered Comparisons: Median Ratios of Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship to Overall Bill Sponsorship, Legislators with Zero Increases in Women's PAC Contributions, 2000-2009

For data on campaign contributions by women's organizations for each legislator, I use the nonpartisan, nonprofit National Institute on Money in Politics (NIMP) via FollowTheMoney.org and limit contributions to "industry categories" designated as women's organizations (including those related to women's health and pro-choice initiatives but excluding those dedicated to advancing pro-life policies), health and welfare organizations, and organizations dedicated to children's rights. The contribution data is acquired at the individual organization level, and is then carefully hand-coded to exclude organizations that do not fall within the same "women's issues' coding structure applied to bills (and described above). Taken collectively, the number and levels of campaign contributions are substantially varied and sufficiently high to conduct meaningful analysis. However, taken individually industry by industry, data is more sporadic and limited across the states and years included in my study. I am thus unable to analyze the legislative activity on social welfare issues and feminist issues separately.

groups were also carefully evaluated and filtered for inclusion in the sample, as discussed below. By including these bills and thus these additional groups, I was able to expand my sample of donations for analysis.



Figure 4.2: Gendered Comparisons: Median Ratios of Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship to Overall Bill Sponsorship, Legislators with Positive Increases in Women's PAC Contributions, 2000-2009

Descriptively, Figures 4.1 and 4.2 take an initial look at the data comparing women's issue bill sponsorship by men and women, showing the mean ratio of women's issue bills sponsored to total bills introduced aggregated over all legislative sessions included in the sample. Figure 4.1 only includes legislators who saw no campaign contributions or no increase in campaign contributions in the election cycle prior, and thus compares the activity of male and female legislators who received no added "mobilization" from women's lobby groups to spur increased attention to women's issues. In contrast, Figure 4.2 compares the activity of men and women who did receive increased contributions from women's organizations. While it is impossible to make any causal inferences from these comparisons, a preliminary descriptive comparison of gender gaps is useful to take initial assessment of differences between these two groups. If campaign contributions by women's issue groups have a mobilizing effect on male legislative behavior more so than female legislative behavior, gender gaps should be larger amongst those not receiving contributions than amongst those with visible (and growing) ties to women's groups. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 do appear to reflect those predicted trends. In both groups, gender gaps emerge: women are more active in sponsoring women's issue legislation than their male counterparts. Amongst legislators receiving no increases in contributions, the mean ratio of women's issue bills to bills overall was .15 for female legislators and .07 for male legislators, marking a statistically significant and substantial difference of .08. However, the differences between male and female legislators is less substantial in Figure 4.2: the mean ratio for female legislators who saw increases in their campaign contributions from women's lobbyists was .14, only .04 greater than the mean ratio for men. This difference in difference is importantly driven predominately by male legislative behavior, which increased from a mean ratio of .07 to .10 when male legislators have received campaign contributions from women's groups.

While the gender gap presented in Figure 4.2 remains statistically significant, it is half as large as the gender gap presented in Figure 4.1, falling well in line with my theory. But critically, I cannot make any causal inferences about heterogeneous effects of campaign contributions by simply identifying variation in gender gaps across legislators who do or do not receive donations. Differences exhibited both across gender as well as with regards to women's lobby contributions might be attributed to a number of other factors. In order to evaluate the degree to which contributions influence men and women differently while also accounting for important partisan and institutional factors, I conduct a series of regression analyses, using

a Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimation strategy as well as random effects estimation to model this uniquely grouped panel data.

4.4.2 Methods

Pinpointing an empirical strategy to model this data and test my predictions offers an array of challenging alternatives. The observations in the data described above are grouped by district and legislative session, but can be grouped by state as well. With the multiple dimensions of groupings, it is highly unlikely that unit effects within a regression analysis would be equivalent across the entire sample of observations, rendering a pooling model inappropriate. The subsequent and necessary choice between a fixed effects model and a random effects model, however, is far from simple and thus made with care.

While both the fixed effects model and random effects model have advantages, I identify the random effects model over the fixed effects model as optimal in this particular analysis for reasons rooted in theory as well as practicality. The primary advantage in fixed effects estimation strategies rest in their ability to produce unbiased coefficient estimates. But there are three critical disadvantages that for my purposes outweigh the potential gains. First, there are relatively limited observations per district-year (1-3) within the data, and many variables of interest do not vary within each unit relative to the variation in bill sponsorship. As such, a fixed effect estimation of the within-unit effects of my variables of interest might diverge substantially from the true effect I wish to capture (Clark and Linzer 2015). As Clark and Linzer (2015, 7) describe, "this lack of robustness to potentially anomalous samples is what is meant by the fixed effects models having high variance."

Relatedly, because the number of observations per district is so low while the overall number of districts is considerably high, the estimation of a fixed effects model results in the loss of a troubling amount of degrees of freedom. Lastly and most consequentially, one of the most important variables of interest to my analysis– gender– shows extremely limited variation within units, or over the time period covered in the data. Therefore, in a fixed effects model, the time-invariant gender predictor would be perfectly collinear with the unit dummy variables, making estimation of its unique effect impossible. Combined, these reasons make a random effects model preferable to a fixed effects estimation strategy.

There are advantages to the random effects model as well, relating to the model's ability to constrain variance in estimates– "leading to estimates that are closer, on average, to the true value in any particular sample" (Clark and Linzer 2015, 6). Because the random effects model estimates the distribution of unit effects within a wider population, it is possible to make more generalizable predictions for units outside of the dataset (Clark and Linzer 2015). This is not possible with a fixed effects model, as the unit effects for unobserved districts or years remain unknown.[7] As such, despite the fact that my current data only include a set (or "fixed") number of years and districts, a random effects approach is more advantageous for broader, long-term inference (Clark and Linzer 2015).

However, random effects models in the context and data analyzed here do pose some drawbacks as well, arising from the bias introduced by partial pooling (Clark and Linzer 2015). Specifically, random effects estimation requires the assumption that no correlation between the influential variables of interest and the unobserved, panel-level random effects. But for some legislators, unobserved district-level characteristics might shape changes in women's issue bill sponsorship that would otherwise not be predicted by gender or campaign contributions by women's groups alone. In such districts, if above-average random effects also correspond with higher levels of campaign contributions from women's groups, then this assumption is violated.

All taken together, I choose an empirical strategy that tends towards the utilization of random effects models– but with a caveat. For each model, I run a fixed effects specification as well as a random effects specification, then employing the Hausman (1978) specification test to evaluate a null hypothesis of orthogonality for the random effects estimation. If the test produces a finding with a p-value sufficiently low, I conclude that the partial pooling in a simple random effects will result in substantially biased estimates. But rather than opting for a fixed effects model as my alternative, I utilize a Hausman-Taylor (1981) estimator. The Hausman-Taylor estimator is a kind of middle ground between the fixed effects and random effects model in that it uses instrumental variables to maintain my inclusion of time-invariant variables while at the same time allowing for some of the other explanatory variables to be correlated with the unit effects.

To best elucidate this empirical strategy, consider the following random effects model for state legislative district-level observations $i...N$ grouped by legislative session years $t = 1, ...T$,

[7] While all districts in both OH and CA are included in the sample, districts are redrawn every ten years, and those included in the current sample are not in fact the same as those that exist in these states today.

$$y_{it} = X_{1it}\beta_1 + X_{2it}\beta_2 + Z_{1i}\delta_1 + Z_{1i}\delta_1 + u_i + \epsilon_{it},$$

where

- y is the number of bills sponsored on women's issues by the state legislator representing district i in legislative session t
- X_{1it} is a vector of observations on exogenous, time-varying variables assumed to be uncorrelated with $u_i + \epsilon_{it}$,
- X_{2it} is a vector of observations on endogenous, time-varying variables assumed to be potentially correlated with $u_i + \epsilon_{it}$
- Z_{1i} is a vector of observations on exogenous, time-invariant variables assumed to be uncorrelated with $u_i + \epsilon_{it}$,
- Z_{2i} is a vector of observations on endogenous, time-time variables assumed to be potentially correlated with $u_i + \epsilon_{it}$
- u_i is the unobserved, panel-level random effect that is assumed to have a mean of zero, a finite variance σ^2_μ, and also assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) over the panels
- ϵ_{it} is the idiosyncratic error that is assumed to also have a mean of zero and finite variance σ^2_ϵ, and also assumed to be i.i.d. over all observations in the data

X_{1it} includes measurements for total campaign contributions by women's issue groups in the electoral cycle preceding legislative session t, whereas a measurement of total bills introduced in legislative session t is assumed to be potentially correlated with the random unit effect and are thus included in X_{2it}. While legislator gender is assumed to be an exogenous variable, there is very little variation across districts in incumbent legislator gender over the time period of study. I thus must include gender, a key variable of interest, within Z_{1i} as a time-invariant, exogenous estimate. Z_{2i} then includes variables like party and ideology, which are also time-invariant but assumed endogenous based on their likely correlation with unobserved individual legislator and district level characteristics.

As described, given that some of the time-variant as well as time-invariant variables in the model might be correlated with μ_i, a simple random effects estimation might not be consistent. The Hausman test confirms of this potential bias, producing a p-value sufficiently low to reject the null hypothesis stating that unit random effects are exogenous. But again, by utilizing mean-differencing to remove the μ_i before the estimation of β_1 and β_2, a fixed effects would eliminate estimates of δ_1 and δ_2 for Z_{1i} and Z_{2i}, thus making the inclusion of gender as a key variable of interest from the model impossible. In contrast, the Hausman-Taylor



Figure 4.3: Coefficient Plot with 95% Confidence Intervals and Hausman-Taylor Estimation, Predicting Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship

(1981) estimator enables me to include the largely time-invariant variable gender. I therefore estimate two models using this methodology, one baseline model and one model interacting contributions from women's organizations by candidate gender. The interaction model enables me to test my third hypothesis that male legislators will be uniquely influenced by women's issue group donations.

Figure 4.3 presents the results from my first analyses in the form of coefficient plots with 95% confidence intervals, and compares the estimates from models with and without a term interacting increases in campaign contributions by gender. Because Hypothesis 3 relates specifically to male legislators rather than female legislators, I estimate the effect of male gender rather than female on the dependent variable. As alluded to above, in addition to legislator gender and increases in campaign in campaign contributions over time, the independent variables used in the regression analysis in Figure 4.3 reflect the enormous research conducted concerning what motivates legislative activity. I include a Democratic dummy variable for legislator party, as party affiliation is a consistent predictor of legislator behavior (Cox and McCubbins 2005), especially

with regards to women's issues (Bratton, Haynie and Reingold 2008, Osborn 2012, Reingold 2008). I also include a measure for individual state legislator ideology (Shor and McCarty 2013), as past research also shows that even accounting for party affiliation, ideology can have significant influence on a legislator's likelihood of sponsoring bills related to women's issues especially (Bratton 2002, Reingold 2000, Swers 2002, e.g). Regarding institutional factors, legislators who are members of committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over women's health, general health, child and family issues, welfare issues, education, justice, and civil rights issues should show greater activity on social welfare issues, feminist issues, or women's issues that relate to domestic violence and sexual assault than legislators who remain absent in these committees (Bratton and Haynie 1999, Bratton, Haynie and Reingold 2007, Reingold 2008). I thus include a dummy variable for whether each legislator is a member of one or more of committees relevant to women's issue bills, again most generally defined. Finally, I include a control for total bills introduced per legislative session in order to account for differences in legislative productivity overall, and a control for state-level fixed effects.

The results in Figure 4.3 show evidence in support of both my hypotheses. First, we see that male legislators sponsor fewer women's issue bills than female legislators, all else equal, based on the basic model coefficient estimates. The interaction model indicates that this is especially the case with male legislators who receive no increase in contributions from women's groups. However, in terms of male legislators who *do* receive increased contributions from women's groups, the results are more nuanced. Employing a Wald test to compare the nested models in the two regressions produces a statistically significant chi-squared of 7.4376 (p value = 0.006), indicating that the interaction model is in fact the "better" model, with interesting implications. The fact that the interaction model is preferred to the basic model suggests that the mechanisms shaping the influence of campaign contributions by women's groups on women's policymaking are fundamentally different for male legislators than for female legislators. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 take a closer examination across gender of the marginal effects of contributions on bill sponsorship and predicted results at varying levels of contribution amounts, respectively.

Figure 4.4 confirms that while the estimated effects of increases in campaign contributions by women's groups has no significant impact on legislators conditional on gender being *female*, the interaction term estimating the effect of increases in campaign contributions on male legislators *specifically* is both positive and



Figure 4.4: Marginal Effects of Campaign Contributions Estimated at Different Values with 90% Confidence Intervals, Comparisons Across Gender



Figure 4.5: Predicted Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship by Contribution Amount with 95% Confidence Intervals, Comparisons Across Gender

statistically significant as expected. Figure 4.5 then shows that at contribution levels exceeding $5,000, male legislators are predicted to exceed female legislators in women's issue bill sponsorship, again all else being equal. Legislator ideology is also statistically significant and negative, indicating that more liberally leaning legislators are also more active on women's issues. Given the substantively large and statistically significant estimate for total bill introduction, it appears that legislative productivity overall extends to productivity on women's issue bill sponsorship as well. Interestingly, the estimated effect of Democratic party affiliation does not emerge statistically different from zero despite the fact that Democrats are expected to be more active on both feminist and social welfare policies.[8]

To provide for robustness checks to my results, I preform split-sample analyses, modeling the data separately by legislator gender. Interestingly, a Hausmen test for endogeneity fails to reject the null hypothesis of orthogonality in both female and male legislator samples. The results presented in Figure 4.6 compare the regression results for male and female legislators estimated separately using random effects model specifications.

The results depicted in Figure 4.6 once again lend empirical support for my expectations that campaign contributions from women's groups function differently for male and female legislators. For the sample of male legislators, increases in campaign contributions show a positive and statistically significant influence on subsequent legislative activity on issues predominately impacting women or in the particular interests of women. Interestingly, aside from total legislative activity overall, contributions from women's groups appears to be the only observable influential factor in shaping women's issue bill sponsorship for male representatives. In contrast, while campaign contributions do not show any statistically significant predictive relationship to women's issue bill introduction by female legislators, party and relevant committee membership do predict increased legislative activity on women's issues. This is to be expected, of course, but presents a bit of a puzzle as to why the same predictive relationships did *not* hold for men. It's possible that men serving on relevant committees are no more interested in women's issues than are other men; they might be on those committees for different reasons entirely. What's occurring with regards to male legislators and party, however, is less clear.

[8]That said, the a substantial part of the bills included in measuring the dependent variable include bills related to violence against women, an issue which has no clear partisan ownership.



Figure 4.6: Coefficient Plot with 95% Confidence Intervals, Random Effects Model Predicting Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship, Split Sample by Gender



Figure 4.7: Coefficient Plot with 95% Confidence Intervals, Random Effects Model Predicting Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship, Split Sample by Gender and Interacting by Political Party

Therefore, in order to take a closer look at how party might be playing a role in the dynamics at hand, I estimate another series of random effects models across male and female legislators separately with an added term interacting increases in campaign contributions from women's groups by a legislator's membership in the Democratic party. If my expectations regarding men as "dormant" allies are accurate, then the unique relationship I hypothesize between male legislators and campaign contributions from women's groups should be most likely amongst male Democrats given that feminist policy and social welfare issues are observed to take a liberal lean (Crowder-Meyer and Cooperman 2018, Dodson and Carroll 1991, Swers 2002, Wolbrecht 2002, e.g.).

Figure 4.6 presents the results of these additional analyses, all of which support these expectations. For male legislators, the positive influence of campaign contributions by women's groups on women's issue bill introduction is conditional on men in office being Democrats. In addition, Democratic male legislators who are *not* receiving campaign donations are no more or less active on women's issues than Republican men in office. For female legislators, however, the story is once again quite different. The results presented in

Figure 4.6 remain largely consistent: Democratic women in office, more liberal women in office, and women in office serving on relevant committees are predicted to introduce more women's issue bills on average.

While Figure 4.6 and the discussion above consider partisanship at the individual legislator level, the influence of partisanship might also be functioning at an institutional level as well. Studies of gender and legislative activity have demonstrated that party control in legislatures and women's caucuses have significant implications for women's substantive representation (e.g. Bratton 2002; Dodson 2006; Osborn 2012; Saint-Germain 1989; Swers 2002). For instance, Swers (2002) offers a compelling theory asserting that Republican majorities constrain Republican women from pursuing women's issue interests with the intensity they otherwise might with a less powerful, minority caucus. For Swers (2002), the idea is that if the Republican party holds institutional control, the party can render taking action on women's policy issues costly to their legislative productivity or political advancement– again, given that most of these policies are considered more Democratic issues than Republican issues. Swers (2002) thus also grounds her theory in an anticipated counterfactual, unpacking expectations for what Republican women in office might otherwise do under an alternative set of circumstances. Along similar lines, this paper also hinges on a counterfactual of "dormant" legislative activity, asking the question of what a particular group of elected officials would otherwise do should they not face a given set of constraints. Therefore, in exploring the conditions under which male legislators, as "dormant" allies, might be prompted to cross a threshold between legislative inaction and action on women's issues by women's organizational lobbying, it is worth examining how majority party status influences the outcomes and relationships of interest.

What we might reasonably infer more broadly is that Republican majorities constrain progress on women's issues– and existing research does support this inference. Tolbert and Steuernagel (2001), for instance, find that Democratic majorities rather than the proportion of women in office shape the passage and implementation of state-level health policy. Osborn (2012) considers this question explicitly, and summarizes well in her description (2014, 148), "party control via legislative majority has an effect on agenda control and, therefore, an effect on whether women's issue bills are likely to get out of committee, onto the floor, and through a final vote."

I argue that when state legislatures are controlled by Republican majorities, the trends expected throughout this paper should be limited. In contrast, I expect Democratic majorities to be a most-*likely* case for the



Figure 4.8: Coefficient Plot with 95% Confidence Intervals, Random Effects Model Predicting Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship, Split Sample by State

expected dynamics discussed. If Democratic majorities loosen constraints on *any* legislators interested in advancing women's issue legislation, then for male legislators supporting feminist policy as "dormant" allies, a little financial nudge rather than an extensive lobbying effort by a women's group might be sufficient to catalyze legislative activism. For the purposes of this paper, we can make an initial assessment of these expectations by once again utilizing a comparative analysis across states, modeling the California and Ohio data separately to engage with this compelling institutional research. Over the period included in my sample, the California State Assembly held Democratic majorities while the Ohio House of Representatives was continuously under Republican control. As such, I predict that Republican constraints in Ohio should limit the positive influence of campaign contributions on women's issue bill introduction for male legislators when compared to those serving in the Democratic controlled California legislature. Again in doing so, I estimate both fixed effects models and random effects models, using Hausmen endogeneity tests to evaluate the null hypothesis of orthogonality. For both states, the tests produced p-values greater than .90, confirming the appropriate use of random effects estimation strategies.

Figure 4.7 presents results that lend support for my expectations, as well as interesting results overall. We see that in California, as expected, the hypothesized trends are relatively strong. The positive relationship between campaign contributions from women's groups and women's issue legislative activity is significant for male legislators, and not for female legislators. Male legislators who do *not* receive campaign contributions are far less likely than their female counterparts to introduce women's issue bills. Additionally, being a member of the Democratic party also has a positive influence on women's issue policy, as does being more ideologically liberal. While men in Ohio are predicted to introduce less women's issue legislation than their female counterparts, these predicted differences are not as substantial as those predicted in California. Ultimately, these results combined not only support my own predictions regarding the unique influence women's groups can have in mobilizing male legislative activity on behalf of women; they also tell a story well in line with existing research on positive relationships between Democratic party control and women's substantive representation (Burden 2007, Osborn 2012, Thomas 1991, Tolbert and Steuernagel 2001, e.g.).

4.5 Concluding Discussion and Future Research

The analyses reported in this paper provide substantial evidence in support of my theory and hypotheses. Female state legislators in California and Ohio are more active on women's issue policy, even when accounting for partisan, ideological, and institutional factors. This appears to be particularly evident in California, potentially as a function of Democratic institutional majorities.

But this is not to say that male legislators as a group *cannot* or do not have interest in taking proactive steps towards increased women's representation, or a necessarily diminished sense of commitment to doing so in representation of their female constituents when compared to their female colleagues. It is possible, however, that they feel less secure in taking strong action than women in office as a function of male gender identity. Reingold (2000, 132) raises the possibility that in their worries that female constituents might feel women in office do a better job representing women than they do, male legislators face insecurities in taking decisive policy action in pursuit of women's interests. My results are consistent with this potential underlying mechanism. This paper has argued that certain male state legislators, in particular those within the Democratic party, might need the added support of women's interest groups to overcome these potential insecurities, and act on behalf of female constituencies as their elected representatives.

That said, campaign contributions by women's lobby groups do appear to play a role in the degree to which these sex differences in legislative activity emerge. Men targeted by women's lobbying are more likely to prioritize women's issues on their legislative agenda, and increases in campaign contributions by women's groups have a fundamentally different effect on male legislators and female legislators. In fact, when campaign contributions are sufficiently high, men's legislative activism on women's issues is modeled to *exceed* that of their female counterparts, all else being equal. It would appear that *some* men in office, when strengthening partnerships with women's groups, might be mobilized to act increasingly on behalf of their female constituent's gendered interests.

This study thus marks the beginning of a line of inquiry simultaneously rich and under-explored in the current literature on women's representation. While lobbying and "special interest politics" often come with distinctly negative connotations of inequity in representation, scholars and pundits alike underestimate the role advocacy organizations might play in pushing the policymaking process towards *greater* inclusiveness for marginalized groups. Little is currently understood about role of women's lobbying in increasing substantive representation, or the noteworthy and theoretically insightful ways in which *the effectiveness* of women's lobbying itself might be shaped by elements of descriptive representation. My research and the analyses presented in this paper underline the need to fill this hole in the literature, and illuminate the importance of bridging subfields in political science to consider new and more nuanced pathways towards increased representation for marginalized groups within American legislative institutions.

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Appendix A

Appendix to Chapter 2

A.1 Robustness Checks

A.1.1 DV: Campaign Contribution in Nominal Dollar Amounts

A.1.2 DV: Logged Campaign Contributions, Adjusted for Inflation

A.1.3 Fixed Effects Models

Table A.1: Random Effects Models

	Dependent variable:			
	Campaign Contributions from Women's Issue Groups			
	(full sample)	(female model)	(male model A)	(male model B)
Male	−304.793***			
	(94.621)			
Women's Issue	29.325	−6.494	72.062*	36.254*
Bill Sponsorship	(19.471)	(40.952)	(38.775)	(21.171)
Electoral Competition	36.002	205.875***	−16.923	−6.590
	(23.913)	(73.747)	(22.342)	(20.282)
Candidate Ideology	−23.026	−130.318	22.556	23.466
	(49.711)	(131.929)	(44.264)	(44.260)
Democratic Candidate	−31.890	−221.031	27.430	−16.871
	(116.678)	(309.782)	(104.146)	(147.808)
Relevant	−87.252	−57.882	−66.107	−73.170
Committee Membership	(65.573)	(221.279)	(55.338)	(54.973)
Total Bills Introduced	5.081	−13.819	8.367	7.850
	(5.849)	(17.490)	(5.103)	(5.082)
Women's Bill Sponsorship *			8.762	
Electoral Competition			(7.952)	
Observations	895	237	658	658

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.2: Random Effects Models

	Dependent variable:			
	Natural Log of Campaign Contributions from Women's Issue Groups (Adjusted for Inflation)			
	(full sample)	(female model)	(male model A)	(male model B)
Male	−0.231*			
	(0.142)			
Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship	0.069	−0.050	0.101	0.108*
	(0.046)	(0.072)	(0.117)	(0.064)
Electoral Competition	−0.022	0.289**	−0.096	−0.098
	(0.056)	(0.130)	(0.067)	(0.061)
Candidate Ideology	0.039	−0.213	0.151	0.151
	(0.116)	(0.233)	(0.132)	(0.132)
Democratic Candidate	0.001	0.004	0.0004	0.0004
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Relevant Committee Membership	−0.005	0.089	0.017	0.019
	(0.157)	(0.391)	(0.169)	(0.168)
Total Bills Introduced	0.025*	−0.0002	0.027*	0.027*
	(0.014)	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.015)
Women's Bill Sponsorship * Electoral Competition			−0.002	
			(0.024)	
Observations	895	237	658	658
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.3: Fixed Effects Models

	Dependent variable:			
	Campaign Contributions from Women's Issue Groups (Adjusted for Inflation)			
	(full sample)	(female model)	(male model A)	(male model B)
Male	−123.402*			
	(65.754)			
Women's Issue	10.632	−29.328	43.910*	18.145
Bill Sponsorship	(12.027)	(30.743)	(25.414)	(11.067)
Electoral Competition	−14.767	35.781	−25.359	−2.400
	(24.873)	(92.141)	(22.372)	(10.600)
Candidate Ideology	5.313	−69.367	29.297	13.510
	(32.338)	(147.289)	(31.247)	(23.132)
Democratic Candidate	23.960	158.858	−6.211	8.815
	(83.362)	(365.489)	(77.545)	(54.275)
Relevant	−47.771	−72.798	−36.110	−36.554
Committee Membership	(39.416)	(192.994)	(33.113)	(28.745)
Total Bills Introduced	−1.989	−38.295**	3.013	4.045
	(4.212)	(18.433)	(3.831)	(2.657)
Women's Bill Sponsorship *			3.920	
Electoral Competition			(4.954)	
Observations	895	237	658	658
Note:				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.2 Data Collection Protocol

A.2.1 Purpose and Goals

This original data set will ultimately include measurements of state legislator bill sponsorship on women's issues between 1999-2010 in California, Ohio, Florida, Missouri, and Oregon. It relates to primary sponsorship rather than co-sponsorship. For each legislative session year, it will include the legislator's district, name, party, race, ethnicity, total bill sponsorship, women's issue bill sponsorship, feminist bill sponsorship. Ultimately, there will also be sponsorship counts per legislative session on women's issue bills broken down by more specific issues, including but not limited to social welfare issues (generally defined), intersectional issues, pro-life/pro-choice issues, and issues related to violence against women (VAW).

In order to create this larger data set, my research assistants and I collect data on each women's issue bill introduced between 1998-2010 in each of the five states included in the study. Bills are coded by specific issue, bill status, and primary sponsor. I also include a dummy variable indicating whether each women's issue bill can or cannot be considered explicitly feminist, as well as a dummy variable indicating whether or not the primary sponsor is a member of a relevant legislative committee (committees related to ANY women's issue, not just to the women's issue targeted by the bill in question).

What follows is a documentation of coding tools and protocols used for the development of this second (bill level) original data set. It was originally developed in Fall 2016, and has been under review and revision since that time. Comments, concerns, and suggestions are welcome.

A.2.2 Women's Issues Generally Defined

Defining what constitutes a "women's issue" is difficult, and often problematic outright. Women as a constituency group are diverse not only in demographic contests but in contexts of perspectives, passions, interests, and lived experiences. Scholars debate as to whether it is even possible to define "a group of 1women's issues' on which women legislators, regardless of party ideology, might work together due to shared gendered interests" (Osborn 2014, 149).

Therefore, in constructing this data set, I am as inclusive as possible, looking towards precedent in the literature to identify what legislative issues (and, in turn, pieces of sponsored bills) might be categorized as pertaining specifically to a "women's issue." I then specify for each bill a series of specific issue codes[1] to paint a clearer picture of each bill's subjectmatter. This allows me to limit future data sets to more specific issues like social welfare, abortion, or VAW. But in order to maximize the data's reach and scope, this initial stage of data collection covers women's issues in the broadest terms.

Women's issues will generally include policy areas that fall into *one or more* of three categories:

1. Women's rights issues, such as those related to anti-discrimination law (Wolbrecht 2000)

2. Issues that disproportionately affect female constituencies, such as domestic violence, reproductive health, etc. (Reingold 2000, Swers 2002)

3. Issues related to women's traditionally defined roles in the "private sphere," such as childcare, education, or other "ethic of caring" issues (Thomas 1994; Gilligan 1982)

[1] See Section 3.3 for a list of issue codes included for coding.

A.2.3 Data Collection

Identifying Bills for Inclusion

I use the database LexisNexis to identify women's issue bills, their issue subjects, their final bill status, and their primary sponsor. The following protocol describes this process:

- Go to LexisNexis State Capital Database at:
  - https://web-lexis-nexis-com.proxy.library.emory.edu/stcapuniv/?$_m = a6cc9947c8508ba38d21b48ce76637c0wc$
    $dGLbVzk-zSkVS_md5 = da72e350215dfa74b3879d00c502c04aEmoryLoginportaltotheStateCapitalda$
  - If THAT doesn't work, search for LexisNexis State Capital (with an "a" not an "o") on the Emory Library website
- Click on the link for Bills (at the top)
- Click on the link for Bill Tracking by Keyword (also at the top)
- You will then see a search form:
  - **Keyword:** use search terms for women's issues, listed below in Section XX
  - **in the:** do NOT change "Subject and Synopsis," which is the default
  - **Limit search to these states:** Highlight the state of [FL, OH, CA, OR, MO]
  - **and this session:** Highlight the EVEN NUMBER year that matches the worksheet tab year in your excel spreadsheet for bill coding
  - **and these dates:** Do NOT change "all available,"which is the default

Search Terms for Lexis Nexis

The following list was collected by Reingold et al. (2019) for the explicit purpose of identifying all possible women's issue bills by subject through LexisNexis.

- Abort!
- Abuse AND NOT drug! AND NOT elder!
- Alimony
- Birth!
- Breast
- (Child AND custody) OR (Child support)
- Child care OR childcare
- (Civil right!) OR character!
- Custodia! OR guardian! OR foster
- Day care OR daycare
- Dependent! AND care
- Discrimin!
- Divers!
- Divorce!
- Domestic Violence
- Domestic worker!
- Early child!
- Family AND NOT sympathy
- Female!
- Fertility

- Fetal OR fetus
- Gender!
- Genital!
- Harass!
- Head Start
- Marriage AND NOT same sex
- Matern!
- Midwi!
- Minor! AND consent
- Mother!
- Obstet! OR uter!
- Ovari!
- Parent!
- Patern!
- Perinatal OR prenatal OR neonatal
- Pregnan!
- Prostitut!
- Public indecency
- Rape AND drug!
- Reproduct! OR contracept!
- Sex!
- Stalk!
- Stay-at-home
- Surrog!
- Unborn
- Wom*n

Search terms should be used in LexisNexis *one at a time*. **Only Assembly bills (A.B) or House bills (H.B.) should be coded.** Once all bills have been read and coded for each search term, the coder should indicate the term's completion using the Coding Term Spreadsheet, marking a 1 under the column **Done** for the correct state, term, and year.

Additionally, before each bill is recorded in the Bill Introduction spreadsheet, it is important to use the Find function in excel to confirm that the coder has not already coded that particular bill for that year/state.

Bill Specific Issue Codes

The following list of subject codes was originally constructed in 2016 by doing a survey of past work on "women's issue" scholarship, and listing all policy areas and issues referenced or measured in both major and minor works to date. However, the list was amended and has expanded as data collection continued in the subsequent years, as new subjects were introduced when facing bills difficult to place. These specific subject codes are, in fact, meant to be *general*; they do not summarize the bill on their own. Instead, by using multiple bill specific subject codes, we get a better idea of the bill's intention while also provide for future analysis by more general subject areas.

For instance, a bill protecting the victims of domestic abuse and their families would receive the following codes: dom_abuse, child_abuse, VAW. A bill increasing/establishing regulation on the ability for sex offenders to be employed at daycare centers or elementary schools would receive the following codes: sex_assault, child_abuse, child_care, child_edu. The number of subject codes for each bill should remain under 5, with a HARD limit of six issue codes.

The list of bill specific subject codes is as follows:

- pro_l
- pro_c
- child_abuse
- child_edu
- dom_abuse
- VAW
- preg (this code is often paired with w_health, and specifies that it relates to a pregnant woman, pre-natal or post-natal care, etc.)
- child_rights
- childcare (this not only relates to daycare centers, but also for the care of children more generally)
- sex_assault
- w_health
- parent (relates to support for– or protection against– good or bad parenting, respectively)
- child_custody
- child_support
- fostercare
- child_health
- discrim
- marriage
- mother
- harass
- cyber
- w_rights
- widows
- welfare
- sex_traffick
- equal_opp
- equal_pay
- adopt
- prostit_crime
- prostit (whereas prostit_crime relates to increasing the criminal penalties for prostitution, this code is feminist in its protection of those engaged in commercial sex trade)
- paid_leave
- prison
- porn
- child_crime

Primary Sponsors

Recording the primary sponsors is actually a multi-step process. First, LexisNexis does list a single author for each bill (most often for the states included in the sample). However, it lists the sponsor in last name only (sometimes with first initial when more than one legislator has the same name). In order to ensure correct names (and smooth data merging in the future), each coder refers back to Klarner et al. (2013) candidate data to copy the full name as listed there.

In turn, LexisNexis is not always accurate in identifying primary sponsors and bill authors. With this in mind, the lead researcher reviews each completed state/year bill introduction spreadsheet in consultation with that state/year's Assembly Record, confirming that the bill listed and author specified are correct.

Relevant Committee Membership

This data is also collected by the lead researcher, who searches through the state/year specific Assembly Records to identify committees relevant to women's issues, members of those committees, and code the dummy variable in the bill introduction spreadsheet for each individual sponsor.

Appendix B

Appendix to Chapter 3

B.1 Texts of Emailed Meeting Requests

MOBILIZATION CONTROL CONDITION; EXPERTISE CONTROL CONDITION

SUBJECT: Women Against Violence and Exploitation
BODY:
Dear [LEGISLATOR NAME],

My name is [ORGANIZER NAME] and I am the Lead Organizer and Legislative Director with Women Against Violence and Exploitation (WAVE) for [STATE]. WAVE works in communities across [STATE] to promote increased protections for victims of sex trafficking in our state. We would love the opportunity to meet with you to introduce our organization and share some of the work we are doing locally.

If you cannot be available, we'd like to arrange a meeting with a legislative aid, in person or by phone from your office.

Could you be available during [DATES]? We are looking for just 30 minutes to introduce ourselves and have our concerns heard.

Looking forward to hearing from you on what time might work well and who we can expect to meet with.

Thanks in advance,

[ORGANIZER NAME]
[ORGANIZATION NAME]
[ORGANIZATION WEBSITE]

MOBILIZATION TREATMENT CONDITION; EXPERTISE CONTROL CONDITION

SUBJECT: Women Against Violence and Exploitation
BODY:
Dear [LEGISLATOR NAME],

My name is [ORGANIZER NAME] and I am the Lead Organizer and Legislative Director with Women Against Violence and Exploitation (WAVE) for [STATE]. WAVE works in communities across [STATE] to promote increased protections for victims of sex trafficking in our state. We would love the opportunity to meet with you to introduce our organization and share some of the work we are doing locally.

WAVE has been especially successful with our mobilization efforts in your district. In [DISTRICT COUNTIES] and in neighborhoods across your district, we have already gathered over [NUMBER CONSTITUTING 5% of DISTRICT REGISTERED VOTERS] hand-written signatures on a petition expressing urgent concern for the issue of sex trafficking in local communities, and we would love the opportunity to deliver our petition in person at the meeting as well.

If you cannot be available, we'd like to arrange a meeting with a legislative aid, in person or by phone from your office.

Could you be available during [DATES]? We are looking for just 30 minutes to introduce ourselves and have our concerns heard.

Looking forward to hearing from you on what time might work well and who we can expect to meet with.

Thanks in advance,

[ORGANIZER NAME]
[ORGANIZATION NAME]
[ORGANIZATION WEBSITE]

MOBILIZATION CONTROL CONDITION; EXPERTISE TREATMENT CONDITION

SUBJECT: Women Against Violence and Exploitation
BODY:
Dear [LEGISLATOR NAME],

My name is [ORGANIZER NAME] and I am the Lead Organizer and Legislative Director with Women Against Violence and Exploitation (WAVE) for [STATE]. WAVE works in communities across Rhode Island to promote increased protections for victims of sex trafficking in our state.

We work with experts in the field, and have some groundbreaking research we feel can help the constituents in [DISTRICT COUNTIES] specifically. We would love the opportunity to meet with you to introduce our organization, share some of the work we are doing locally, and discuss some of our policy research.

If you cannot be available, we'd like to arrange a meeting with a legislative aid, in person or by phone from your office.

Could you be available during [DATES]? We are looking for just 30 minutes to introduce ourselves and have our concerns heard.

Looking forward to hearing from you on what time might work well and who we can expect to meet with.

Thanks in advance,

[ORGANIZER NAME]
[ORGANIZATION NAME]
[ORGANIZATION WEBSITE]

COMBINED MOBILIZATION AND EXPERTISE TREATMENT CONDITION

SUBJECT: Women Against Violence and Exploitation
BODY:
Dear [LEGISLATOR NAME],

My name is [ORGANIZER NAME] and I am the Lead Organizer and Legislative Director with Women Against Violence and Exploitation (WAVE) for [STATE]. WAVE works in communities across Rhode Island to promote increased protections for victims of sex trafficking in our state.

We work with experts in the field, and have some groundbreaking research we feel can help the constituents in [DISTRICT COUNTIES] specifically. We would love the opportunity to meet with you to introduce our organization, share some of the work we are doing locally, and discuss some of our policy research.

WAVE has been especially successful with our mobilization efforts in your district. In [DISTRICT COUNTIES] and in neighborhoods in your district, we have already gathered over [NUMBER CONSTITUTING 5% OF DISTRICT REGISTERED VOTERS] hand-written signatures on a petition expressing urgent concern for the issue of sex trafficking in local communities, and we would love the opportunity to deliver our petition in person at the meeting as well.

If you cannot be available, we'd like to arrange a meeting with a legislative aid, in person or by phone from your office.

Could you be available during [DATES]? We are looking for just 30 minutes to introduce ourselves and have our concerns heard.

Looking forward to hearing from you on what time might work well and who we can expect to meet with.

Thanks in advance,

[ORGANIZER NAME]
[ORGANIZATION NAME]
[ORGANIZATION WEBSITE]

B.2 Model Included in Paper: Table Form

Table B.1: OLS Model Presented in Figure 3.1

	Dependent variable: Legislator Response	
	y1	
	(baseline Model)	(Model Interacting Treatment by Gender)
Mobilization Treatment	0.159***	0.295***
	(0.057)	(0.080)
Expertise Treatment	−0.015	0.062
	(0.056)	(0.077)
Combined Treatment	0.079	0.191**
	(0.056)	(0.077)
Female	0.111***	0.288***
	(0.040)	(0.080)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		−0.282**
		(0.113)
Female * Expertise Treatment		−0.177
		(0.113)
Female * Combined Treatment		−0.248**
		(0.113)
Constant	0.312***	0.235***
	(0.043)	(0.053)
Observations	600	600
Residual Std. Error	0.488 (df = 595)	0.486 (df = 592)
F Statistic	5.313*** (df = 4; 595)	4.120*** (df = 7; 592)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.3 Ethical Considerations and the Use of Deception

This experiment required a substantial degree of deception, and each design element was thus carefully considered with an eye towards ethics, no matter how small. Most broadly, there were two nontrivial and

necessary elements of deception were incorporated. The first was the inability to pursue informed consent. By necessity, the information provided to legislators as the subjects of this experiment was limited and experimentally manipulated. This deception was unavoidable in order to validly observe legislator behavior. If legislators were informed that the requests for meetings were a part of an auditing study, especially one seeking to identify gender gaps in responsiveness to women as a marginalized group, it would have likely changed their behavior substantially.

The second necessary element of deception was the use of a fictitious organization (and thus a fictitious organizer and meeting request). The research design was rooted in a wide variety of past auditing experiments, but paid close attention to the experiment fielded by Kalla and Broockman (2016) on the influence of campaign contributions on access provision by federal lawmakers to an advocacy organization. Kalla and Broockman (2016) partnered with an actual organization, CREDO Action, in their experimental design, and I thus initially set out to do the same. I reached out to more than 20 state-level women's issue advocacy organizations across the country to discuss what a potential partnership might look like. Eight of these initial lines of inquiry resulted in further interest, and three of those resulted in in-person meetings for more in-depth discussions of logistics. However, none of these partnerships were able to eventuate.

While my efforts ultimately failed, this initial and extensive organizational outreach underlined the widespread and substantial benefits of pursuing the study.[1] Despite declining my invitation for participation, organizations were clear in their emphatic support of my research questions and objectives. One representative came from a local advocate speaking about her own state-level lobbying efforts with a women's organization focused on sex-trafficking,

> ''I feel confident about getting with women on these programs, and we have a confidence working together. But I know there must be men out there, too, who want to be leaders for the women in their districts. This research could help, I want to know what works, and I want to have some hope about that. There is an opportunity here, I think, and what you're doing could be really important."

My initial organizational outreach also left me confident about the value of utilizing a fictitious organization as an alternative. The use of fictitious organizations minimizes the burden placed on legislators, as well

[1]This outreach also provided strong qualitative background evidence, and prompted the subsequent follow-up study exploring how gender identity and legislative alliances shape the strategic choices of women's issue lobbyists.

as the potential harm caused by the experiment and its necessary deception. In his own experiment on public officials, Putnam (1993, 73) describes his own standard in this regard by attempting a balance in treatment that is "slightly deceptive, but innocuous and highly informative." With this standard in mind, I designed an experiment that *requests* each legislator's time, but that never ultimately requires any of it. Once legislator responsiveness was recorded as the outcome variable for the study, each legislator received an email indicating that the organization was no longer be seeking the meeting. Had the study moved forward working with actual advocacy organizations, it would have resulted in a potentially high number of relatively insubstantial meetings, conducted mainly for the sake of research. Such meetings could thus be considered a waste of time for both legislator and advocacy organization, time that might have been used for work on more imminent policy-making. Finally, utilizing a fictitious organization on which legislators could have no prior beliefs came with strong methodological advantages. Prior beliefs about an organization's capacity to mobilize potential voters or about their resources and reputation in providing policy expertise in legislators would have seriously crippled the exogeneity of both treatments, rendering the experiment effectively meaningless.[2]

One consequence of the use of a fictitious organization, however, required additional attention in the final experimental design. While none of the legislative meetings with my fictitious organization could take place, the meeting request itself might have sparked legislative interest in the issue of sex trafficking that might have otherwise not arisen. Therefore, in order to ensure that any potential benefit to the victims of sex trafficking through increased legislative interest might be realized as a result of my experimental stimuli, I acquired the permission of state-level women's organizations working on issues of sex trafficking in each state to include their contact information in the study's final debriefing emails. This added measure ensured that should any legislator be interested in taking action with an organization on the issue of sex trafficking, he or she would have a clear avenue to do so. Each of the 600 debriefing emails thus included at least two state-specific organizational references and persons of contact would could be open and available to meet on issues of sex trafficking for legislators' benefit. Notably, after debriefing all 600 legislators included in the experiment, I received only four responses- all of which were positive, expressing interest in participating in future research should I be pursuing it.

[2]In order to ensure that the fictitious organization's email request appeared credible and that the organization itself appeared legitimate, a link was provided in the close of each email to an organizational website. Each website was identical aside from state-level facts and statistics about sex trafficking to ensure consistency across the experimental design.

Another noteworthy element of deception resulting from my use of a fictitious organization relates to the email texts for the mobilization condition of my experimental treatments. Within this email text, I falsely claimed that .5% of registered voters within each state legislator's constituency had signed a petition underlining concern for local issues of sex trafficking. I chose this particular percentage of registered voters after considerable conversation with interest group activists and organizational advocates in each of the states included in the study, with the intention of identifying a number that would not be considered by legislators to represent a widespread, pronounced, or overwhelming surge of constituent activity. The experimental treatment was designed to signal a group's interest in mobilization efforts rather than a groundswell of constituent behavior. I considered refraining from using any number at all, but background research with state-level lobbyists confirmed my suspicions that the *lack* of a numerical reference would detract from the experimental treatment's validity. The number of signatures referenced was estimated by me as well as by my organizational contacts as optimal for conveying my intended experimental signal while at the same limiting the level of necessary deception regarding activities within a legislative district. The debriefing emails sent to all legislators included in the study from my personal, institutional email address described this element of deception (and every element of deception more generally) in detail.

Importantly, thoughtful consideration of both non-trivial elements of deception guided me in a significant decision limiting the experimental design as it was originally conceived. My paper is careful to note that increased responsiveness of female legislators to a women's issue group might be driven by mechanisms other than intrinsic benefits; it is possible that women in office are more responsive to *all* issue groups, independent of the group's gendered issue area. My original research design spoke to this alternative mechanism, and included a non-gendered fictitious group in addition to a women's issue fictitious organization. However, this doubled the size of the experiment, and thus doubled the degree of necessary deception. Given that my interest in this line of research stems predominately from a focus on increasing opportunities for political representation of women and marginalized groups more generally, I estimated that the added value of isolating the mechanism driving gender gaps was tangential to the underlying purpose of the research: to identify if gender gaps exist in *women's issue group* responsiveness, and in turn how these gender gaps might be bridged with changes in group lobbying strategy. As such, I concluded that the ethical costs of

doubling the size of the experiment and levels of deception exceeded the benefits offered, and removed my investigation of this alternative mechanism from the research design.

In the end, all of the ethical considerations for necessary experimental deception were tantamount for IRB expedited review and approval process. Over the course of IRB review process, two main points emerged particularly important. First, it was vital to the IRB that my initial attempts to partner with a non-fictitious advocacy organization were exhaustive (which they were). These efforts ultimately spoke to the credibility of my assertion that a fictitious organization as an element of deception was, in fact, unavoidable and necessary. It was important to demonstrate that I had spent significant time and resources pursuing alternative experimental approaches.

Second, successful expedited IRB approval demanded a timely, detailed, and fully transparent debriefing process.[3] More specifically, that the debrief be clear and place prominent emphasis on all deceptive procedures related to the use of a fictitious organization was paramount to IRB approval. Given that the experimental treatments required the provision of misinformation about district level activity and policy needs–not only for the constituent mobilization condition (as discussed above) but also the expertise provision condition– it was critical to IRB approval that these measures of deception be completely outlined. It was also important that they be sufficiently justified with regards to the study's larger purpose for research. Explicit clarity was also required regarding all experimental procedures and preparations. Ultimately, there were two rounds of reviews and changes before the final debriefing language could be approved.

B.3.1 Coding Protocol for Measuring Responsiveness

To measure the outcome variable of interest, I blindly coded three different measures of legislator responsiveness for each scheduling request administered:

1. A binary measurement for if there was any response from the legislator of their office at all

[3]Originally, I had opted *against* using a debrief for participants in the study, estimating potential costs to future researchers of state politics as well as to organizations lobbying at the state level that could arise from negative legislator reactions. That said, the IRB contended that these costs were overestimated, and strongly argued that the failure to debrief legislators about the substantial measures of deception could not be ethically supported. In the end, I conceded this point. Additionally, it is worth noting once more that legislator responses to the debriefing were *not* negative, and were in fact positive overall.

2. An additional binary measurement for if the legislator or his/her office responded positively to the email request, where 0 indicates no response whatsoever OR a decline of the request and 1 signifies a response that attempted to schedule some sort of meeting

3. A ranking from 1-6 that categorizes responses, measuring interest in a meeting by ranking with whom the meeting would be scheduled

Each email was carefully read and judged as to how the response's wording indicates with whom the meeting would take place. For instance, if the response came from the legislator's scheduling staffer and stated, "I am emailing to schedule a meeting between you and Rep. X," or "Rep. X requested that I touch base with you to schedule a meeting," I coded this response as a 1 in the ranking below despite the fact that the response technically came from a staffer and not the legislator themselves.

I used these state specific specifications to code within the 1-6 outcome measure outlined below:

1. A response indicating the intention to schedule a meeting with the Member of General Assembly or State Senator (best outcome)

2. A response indicating the intention to schedule a meeting with a Upper Level Staffer

3. A response indicating the intention to schedule a meeting with a Lower Level Staffer

4. A response limited to a simple clarification question as to whether meeting should be in district or capital. This specification is coded here because while it does not express interest in a meeting explicitly, the presence of a response is a step up from an outright no to the request or a failure to respond at all. The fact that there is a response does seem to imply an interest in some kind of meeting, but there is no way to know with whom in the legislative office the meeting would take place.

5. A response indicating that no meeting would be possible

6. No response (worst outcome)

Many legislators had automatic responses set up on their email accounts. These were largely uniform in their content, emphasizing that emailing is important and that one can expect a delay in response due to the high number of emails received each day. I did not consider these replies as "responses" in the measurements

described above. In fact, I only coded responses that were directly addressed to the fictitious organizer for each state. If I received no other response outside the automatic reply, the legislator received a score of 6 in the measurement above. Further, in the first binary measurement for any response at all, I coded legislators from whom I only received the automatic reply as a 0.

In collecting data on responsiveness for later analysis, I anticipated problems in equating a non-response with a missing response; I wanted to avoid equating a legislator who did not see the organization's email request with a legislator that opened the emailed request and chose not to respond. I thus sought out a email tracking service that could collect data on if and when each email was opened (and whether the link provided at the end of each email had been clicked). Unfortunately, the tracking service failed to provide complete data: approximately 70% of the data was lost.

B.4 Robustness Checks

For additional robustness checks, Table B.1 shows the results to models adding state fixed effects to those presented in Figure 3.1 (and Table 3.4). Table B.1 does not include any individual legislator controls; the regressions in Table B.2 make this addition. Table B.1 shows that adding state fixed effects to the model does not result in any substantive changes to the results. Evaluating the difference between the nested models produces a χ^2 value of 6.8117, which is statistically significant at a 10% level with a p-value of .07815.

The controls included then added in Table B.2 reflect legislator characteristics that are expected to influence a legislator's likelihood to respond to a women's advocacy group's request on sex trafficking. I thus include a control for membership in the Democratic party, as Democrats might be more inclined to view women as strong or critical constituency group than Republicans given partisan gender gaps; a control for lower chamber membership, as legislators in the lower chambers might have less demands on their time and thus an increased likelihood to respond to the organization's meeting request; and a third control for relevant committee membership, as legislators on committees that oversee issues of sex trafficking might be more likely to respond to a group working on such an issue. Both the baseline model as well as a model interacting treatment group by gender are displayed in columns one and two. Testing the statistical difference between these two models once again yields a significant χ^2 value of 7.8516 with a p-value of .0491. These results thus fall in line with those presented in the paper, strengthening my conclusion that men and women

in office respond to the experimental treatments differently. Finally, Table B.3 then uses state level controls rather than state fixed effects, and once again produces no substantive changes from the results discussed above.

Table B.2: OLS (State Fixed Effects) Model

	Dependent variable: Legislator Response	
	y1	
	(baseline Model)	(Model Interacting Treatment by Gender)
Mobilization Treatment	0.137**	0.271***
	(0.055)	(0.078)
Expertise Treatment	−0.050	0.008
	(0.055)	(0.076)
Combined Treatment	0.061	0.151**
	(0.055)	(0.076)
Female	0.113***	0.265***
	(0.039)	(0.078)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		−0.274**
		(0.110)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		−0.135
		(0.111)
Female * Combined Treatment		−0.198*
		(0.111)
Constant	0.302***	0.236***
	(0.076)	(0.081)
Observations	600	600
Residual Std. Error	0.474 (df = 588)	0.473 (df = 585)
F Statistic	5.717*** (df = 11; 588)	4.995*** (df = 14; 585)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.3: OLS (State Fixed Effects) Model with Legislator Controls

	Dependent variable:	
	y1	
	(baseline Model)	(Model Interacting Treatment by Gender)
Mobilization Treatment	0.163***	0.299***
	(0.057)	(0.080)
Expertise Treatment	−0.016	0.062
	(0.057)	(0.078)
Combined Treatment	0.080	0.198**
	(0.056)	(0.077)
Female	0.110***	0.292***
	(0.040)	(0.080)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		−0.284**
		(0.113)
Female * Expertise Treatment		−0.179
		(0.113)
Female * Combined Treatment		−0.260**
		(0.113)
Democrat	−0.085**	−0.089**
	(0.042)	(0.042)
Relevant Committee Membership	0.028	0.023
	(0.047)	(0.047)
Lower Chamber	−0.035	−0.034
	(0.048)	(0.048)
Constant	0.385***	0.310***
	(0.066)	(0.073)
Observations	600	600
Residual Std. Error	0.487 (df = 591)	0.485 (df = 588)
F Statistic	3.325*** (df = 7; 591)	3.142*** (df = 10; 588)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B.4: OLS Model with State and Legislator Controls

	Dependent variable: Legislator Response	
	y1	
	(baseline Model)	(Model Interacting Treatment by Gender)
Mobilization Treatment	0.163***	0.297***
	(0.056)	(0.080)
Expertise Treatment	−0.015	0.060
	(0.056)	(0.077)
Combined Treatment	0.079	0.191**
	(0.056)	(0.077)
Female	0.110***	0.286***
	(0.040)	(0.080)
Female * Mobilization Treatment		−0.280**
		(0.113)
Female * Expertise Treatment		−0.174
		(0.113)
Female * Combined Treatment		−0.248**
		(0.113)
Democrat	−0.099**	−0.102**
	(0.043)	(0.043)
Relevant Committee Membership	0.035	0.029
	(0.047)	(0.047)
Lower Chamber	−0.027	−0.027
	(0.049)	(0.049)
Legislature Professionalism	0.015	0.014
	(0.017)	(0.017)
Percent Women in Legislature	0.008	0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Constant	0.210	0.154
	(0.135)	(0.137)
Observations	600	600
Residual Std. Error	0.486 (df = 590)	0.485 (df = 587)
F Statistic	3.208*** (df = 9; 590)	3.035*** (df = 12; 587)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

B.5 Gender Gaps and Partisanship in Experimental Results

Tables B.4 and B.5 evaluate partisan differences in treatment effects within male and female legislators observed independently. Table 9 interacts treatment group by legislator gender and Democratic party membership, while Table B.5 interacts treatment group by legislator gender and Republican party membership. Both Tables B.4 and B.5 are presented below.

Looking at the results interacting female gender by treatment group by Democratic party member in Table B.4, the coefficient estimated for Female refers to the difference between female Republicans vs. male Republicans in the control group. In other words, it speaks to the baseline gender differences within the Republican party. The difference is substantial, estimated at .260, and statistically significant with a p-value less than .05. The coefficient estimated for in Table B.4 for Female * Democrats compares female legislators in the control group across party, and suggests that Democratic Females are not significantly more likely to respond to the control than Republican Female legislators.

The results estimated in Table B.5 interacting female gender by treatment group by Republican party member are quite similar. The coefficient estimated for Female now refers to the difference between female Democrats and male Democrats, and is both statistically significant and substantively similar to the estimate for Female in Table B.4. And similarly to regression results presented in Table B.4, the interaction term Female * Republicans shows no significant difference between Republican and Democratic female legislators. Paying respect to the limitations of these analytic findings, these combined results do provide some evidence in support of the conclusion that partisan differences between women are not driving the trends exhibited in the broader experimental analyses.

What's more, the results presented in Tables B.4 and B.5 also lend credibility to the presumption that differences across gender can be traced back to intrinsic rather than political motivations for descriptive representatives. The experimental results show clear differences between men and women in office. However, the results cannot speak specifically to the mechanisms driving these differences. I have assumed that such gender gaps stem from intrinsic benefits offered by a women's issue group to a female legislator based on shared group identity. But scholars have also often suggested that linkages between descriptive and

Table B.5: Triple Interactions: Gender * Democrat * Treatment

	DV: Response to Women's Advocacy Organization
	Legislator Response
Mobilization Treatment	0.381***
	(0.134)
Expertise Treatment	−0.046
	(0.127)
Combined Treatment	0.233*
	(0.124)
Female	0.260**
	(0.132)
Democrat	−0.086
	(0.107)
Female * Mobilization Treatment	−0.391**
	(0.192)
Female * Expertise Treatment	0.056
	(0.188)
Female * Combined Treatment	−0.245
	(0.184)
Female * Democrat	0.052
	(0.166)
Democrat * Mobilization Treatment	−0.114
	(0.167)
Democrat * Mobilization Treatment	0.172
	(0.160)
Democrat * Combined Treatment	−0.058
	(0.158)
Female * Democrat * Mobilization Treatment	0.148
	(0.238)
Female * Democrat * Expertise Treatment	−0.367
	(0.235)
Female * Democrat * Combined Treatment	−0.019
	(0.233)
Observations	600
Residual Std. Error	0.485 (df = 584)
F Statistic	2.597*** (df = 15; 584)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

substantive representation arise from how legislators perceive the strength of electoral support offered by in-group constituencies. In his groundbreaking research on Congressional behavior, Fenno (1978) observes that members of Congress consider their districts in terms of a conglomeration of constituency groups. If

Table B.6: Triple Interactions: Gender * Republican * Treatment

	DV: Response to Women's Advocacy Organization
	Legislator Response
Mobilization Treatment	0.252***
	(0.097)
Expertise Treatment	0.068
	(0.096)
Combined Treatment	0.136
	(0.097)
Female	0.291***
	(0.099)
Republican	0.069
	(0.107)
Female * Mobilization Treatment	−0.242*
	(0.136)
Female * Expertise Treatment	−0.283**
	(0.137)
Female * Combined Treatment	−0.220
	(0.141)
Female * Republican	−0.061
	(0.162)
Republican * Mobilization Treatment	0.079
	(0.163)
Republican * Expertise Treatment	−0.162
	(0.158)
Republican * Combined Treatment	0.052
	(0.156)
Female * Republican * Mobilization Treatment	−0.117
	(0.232)
Female * Republican * Expertise Treatment	0.406*
	(0.230)
Female * Republican * Combined Treatment	0.045
	(0.230)
Observations	600
Residual Std. Error	0.472 (df = 577)
F Statistic	3.600*** (df = 22; 577)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

a legislator perceives a great deal of electoral potential for a given constituency group, they are likely to allocate more time to address policy issues specific to that particular constituency, and vice versa; they are likely allies to that constituency group and their policy preferences.

Consensus that women do objectively constitute a "constituency group" as defined by Fenno (1978) is also fairly clear in the literature. The politics of gender guide how voters consider issues, parties, and candidates (Brians 2005; Dolan 1998; Schaffner 2005; Herrnson, Lay and Stokes 2003; Paolino 1995; Plutzer and Zipp 1996). Despite being descriptively underrepresented in politics (CAWP 2015), women make up over half the voting electorate and are considered significant for understanding campaign dynamics (Schaffner 2005). Furthermore, studies show that women use their identity in deciding how to vote (Brains 2005; Dolan 1998; Paolino 1995; Plutzer and Zipp 1996).

Evidence also suggests that legislators themselves see women as a potential "constituency group," estimating their electoral support and taking action in part based on their beliefs about what women as a voting group can offer electorally. Democratic and Republican candidates alike take significant steps in campaign outreach to women voters specifically by utilizing identity-based appeals (Abdullah 2012; Anderson, Lewis, and Baird 2011; Casserly 2012; Schaffner 2005). Reingold (2000), in her study of *Women as a Constituency Group*, considers which legislators *in particular* view female constituents this way. By exploring how individual legislators perceive the electoral potential of their female constituents as a distinct constituency group, Reingold reveals who is more or less predisposed to taking action on women-specific policy concerns. She clarifies, "one does not necessarily have to perceive women as a particularly supportive constituency group to take action on their behalf, but such support certainly would provide an incentive for doing so" (2000, 114). Using interview-based evidence collected in the California and Arizona state legislatures, Reingold (2000) finds that female legislators rated women as their most supportive constituency group, where as male legislators did not. In fact, among male California legislators, women were rated as one of the *least* supportive constituency groups. Notably, districts represented by male verses female legislators were similar with respect to constituent ideology and partisanship; "the relatively strong support these female lawmakers felt they received from women cannot be 'explained away' as a coincidental reflection of district peculiarities" (2000, 119).

There thus exists a puzzling question as to what drives differences between the observed legislative activity of men and women. Identifying if a legislator's motivation is intrinsic or political is an important question because a legislator is often presented with opportunities to take action on behalf of groups which must remain unobserved; if politically rather than intrinsically motivated, a legislator is unlikely to work

for positive change for a group where there is no potential for electoral gains. Intrinsic motivations give hope that politicians will do the right thing even when nobody is watching. Furthermore, women as a marginalized group are far from homogeneous, and some subgroups within the female population- especially those facing intersectional marginalization- might not constitute large constituencies for female legislators in power. Again, if politically rather than intrinsically motivated, a female legislator is unlikely to take strong legislative action on a women's policy primarily targeting marginalized female populations outside their direct constituencies. On the other hand, intrinsic motivations for women's substantive representation would more optimistically predict pro-women's legislative activism in the same scenario. Nevertheless, this central question is as difficult to answer as it is important to answer; as Broockman (2013, 533) states well, "the role of such intrinsic motivation is challenging to empirically explore because politicians have incentives to appear intrinsically motivated even if they are not."

Ultimately, there are two potential stories at play, both of which would shed light on the gender gaps as well a the ceiling effect emerging in my central findings:

1. Men and women are motivated to respond to a women's advocacy organization based on a gender group affinity (intrinsic benefits). Women are likely to feel that affinity, leading to a higher likelihood they will respond to the women's group in their simple meeting request and also leading to the ceiling effect of added lobbying tactics. In contrast, men do not feel that affinity, and thus the additional political motivation of added lobbying tactics leads them to be more responsive.

2. Men and women are both politically motivated in the decision to respond to a women's advocacy organization. However, female legislators see women as a key electoral constituency more so than men, and are thus more likely to respond to the basic meeting request. This leads to the ceiling effect for women, where added lobbying efforts and political mobilization are unlikely to see substantial visible effect on women in office.

Partisanship offers an interesting opportunity to disentangle these stories. If electoral rather than intrinsic motivations do better to explain the gender gaps in my findings, we would expect Democratic women to be more likely to respond to the women's organization than Republican women. Based on the analysis presented in Table B.4, this is not the case. While I cannot make any firm conclusions based on these limited findings, it is noteworthy that the reported trends align well with my underlying theoretic framework,

pointing towards intrinsic rather than political mechanisms for the links between descriptive and substantive representation.

Appendix C

Appendix to Chapter 4

C.1 Fixed Effects Models

Table C.1: Full Sample Basic and Interaction Models (FE)

	Dependent variable:	
	Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship	
	(basic model)	(interaction model)
Increase in Contributions	−0.003	−0.020*
	(0.010)	(0.011)
Legislator Ideology	−0.158	−0.153
	(0.110)	(0.109)
Male	−0.958***	−1.116***
	(0.204)	(0.208)
Relevant Committee Membership	−0.011	−0.006
	(0.123)	(0.123)
Democrat	0.193	0.148
	(0.257)	(0.257)
Total Bills Introduced	0.081***	0.082***
	(0.013)	(0.013)
Increase in Contributions * Male		0.084***
		(0.026)
Observations	895	895
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.2: Split Sample by Gender (FE)

	Dependent variable:	
	Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship	
	(male legislators)	(female legislators)
Increase in Contribution	0.048**	−0.026
	(0.020)	(0.017)
Legislator Ideology	−0.044	−0.280
	(0.101)	(0.400)
Relevant Committee Membership	−0.151	1.242**
	(0.107)	(0.517)
Democrat	−0.129	0.692
	(0.249)	(0.981)
Total Bills Introduced	0.061***	0.109**
	(0.012)	(0.050)
Observations	658	237
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table C.3: Split Sample by State, Basic and Interaction Models (FE)

	Dependent variable:			
	Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship			
	CA	OH	CA	OH
	(basic)	(basic)	(interaction)	(interaction)
Increase in Contributions	−0.010	0.020	−0.028*	−0.067
	(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.098)
Male	−1.876***	−0.303**	−2.275***	−0.338**
	(0.451)	(0.126)	(0.463)	(0.132)
Legislator Ideology	−0.674*	−0.050	−0.758*	−0.052
	(0.392)	(0.057)	(0.387)	(0.057)
Relevant Committee Membership	−0.132	0.178*	−0.195	0.184*
	(0.218)	(0.094)	(0.216)	(0.094)
Democrat	0.449	0.167	0.769	0.172
	(1.463)	(0.129)	(1.446)	(0.129)
Total Bills Introduced	0.080***	0.063***	0.079***	0.062***
	(0.023)	(0.010)	(0.023)	(0.010)
Increase in Contributions * Male			0.145***	0.089
			(0.046)	(0.099)
Observations	400	495	400	495
R^2	0.109	0.128	0.136	0.130
Adjusted R^2	−0.132	−0.105	−0.101	−0.105
F Statistic	6.406*** (df = 6; 314)	9.517*** (df = 6; 390)	7.050*** (df = 7; 313)	8.271*** (df = 7; 3

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0

C.2 Random Effects Models

(NOTE: All random effects models include state and legislative session controls)

Table C.4: Full Sample, Basic and Interaction Models (RE)

	Dependent variable:	
	Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship	
	(basic model)	(interaction model)
Increase in Contribution	0.002	−0.009
	(0.009)	(0.010)
Legislator Ideology	−0.263***	−0.258***
	(0.087)	(0.087)
Male	−1.094***	−1.199***
	(0.165)	(0.170)
Relevant Committee Membership	0.041	0.032
	(0.113)	(0.113)
Democrat	0.346*	0.308
	(0.205)	(0.205)
Total Bills Introduced	0.082***	0.083***
	(0.012)	(0.012)
State (OH)	−0.116	−0.079
	(0.360)	(0.360)
Increase in Contributions * Male		0.060**
		(0.024)
Observations	895	895
Note: state clustered standard errors	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table C.5: Split Sample by Gender (RE)

	Dependent variable:	
	Women's Issue Bill Sponsorship	
	(male legislators)	(female legislators)
Increase in Contributions	0.055^{***}	-0.020
	(0.018)	(0.015)
Legislator Ideology	-0.137^{*}	-0.402^{*}
	(0.083)	(0.221)
Relevant Committee Membership	-0.104	0.736^{**}
	(0.099)	(0.362)
Democrat	-0.018	0.994^{*}
	(0.197)	(0.520)
State (OH)	-0.064	-0.956
	(0.327)	(1.070)
Total Bills Introduced	0.068^{***}	0.102^{***}
	(0.010)	(0.033)
Observations	658	237
Note: state clustered standard errors	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	