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Michael William Fires April 14, 2015

The Growing Divide:
Exploring Recent Political and Population Changes in the American Electorate

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Abstract

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Political Science research has long examined the connection between migration and seemingly one-sided political change. While the bulk of this research has been conducted to analyze the impact of northern migrants on the southern electorate during the Republican realignment, limited research has been conducted to determine whether migration has played a role in recent changes in presidential elections. Since the Republican victory by just five electoral votes in the 2000 presidential election, the competitive presidential landscape has shifted decisively in favor of the Democratic Party. The Democratic victories in 2008 and 2012 have easily surpassed 100 electoral votes in each contest. Scholars disagree on the role that migration has played in this new presidential landscape. This study aims to both evaluate the role played by domestic migration in recent changes in presidential elections and resolve the differing views on domestic migration's political implications. The results demonstrate that recent domestic migration has not helped one party more than the other or consistently contributed to one-sided changes in the two-party presidential vote share. Moreover, increased polarization does not appear to strongly alter this conclusion.

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Introduction: Recent Presidential Change

When Americans woke up on Wednesday November 8th, 2000, neither George W. Bush nor Al Gore could claim victory in the 54th presidential election. A full month later, the Supreme Court settled the election and awarded the victory to Bush. The final margin was five electoral votes, 266 for Gore and 271 for Bush. Eight years later, Barack Obama handily defeated John McCain by 192 electoral votes. Obama faced a tougher challenge from Mitt Romney in 2012, yet still captured the election by 126 electoral votes. What can account for this massive change in presidential election margins less than 15 years after one of the closest contests in American history?

New York Times writers Robert Gebeloff and David Leonhardt claimed that domestic migration helped the Democrats build impressive presidential margins of victory. For example, the authors argued a "Blue Diaspora" of Democratic voters into Republican states was responsible for Barack Obama's victories in Florida, Colorado, and Virginia in 2008 and 2012 (Gebeloff and Leonhardt, 2014). However, Nate Silver and Harry Enten, in their online blog FiveThirtyEight, methodically rejected the "overstated" explanation for recent Democratic success. Enten and Silver argued, "The predominant political trend of the past two decades has not been consistently better performance by the Democrats." Enten and Silver based their objection on the fact that Republicans have consistently controlled state legislatures, the House of Representatives, and that Republicans were primed to take the Senate.[1] Enten and Silver acknowledged that presidential partisanship had switched in a few states, but argued that the presidential electorate also reflected: "greater polarization …there are far fewer swing

[1] This article was written before the Republican victory in the Senate in 2014.

districts…for the most part, red states have gotten redder and blue states have gotten bluer." (Enten and Silver, 2014)

Although Enten and Silver disagreed about the scope of Gebeloff and Leonhardt's argument, all four authors agreed that substantial change had occurred in recent presidential elections. Maps 1 and 2 depict the presidential outcomes in American counties in the 2000 and 2012 elections (*See Appendix Part III, Maps*). Although it appears that the two Maps are close to identical, nearly 12 percent of all counties changed from one party to the other from 2000 to 2012 (Map 3). The Democrats won more of these counties (192) than the Republicans (175). In addition, the Democrats won Republican counties in 35 different states while the Republicans picked up Democratic counties in only 25 states. Map 4 shows these changes along with the partisanship of counties across the nation.

While throughout all levels of government the overall balance of power between the two parties may be even, changes in the landscape of Presidential elections that appear to favor the Democrats deserve explanation because of their electoral consequences. In the three states Gebeloff and Leonhardt cited (Florida, Virginia, and Colorado), the Democrats won a total of 34 counties that were Republican in 2000 while the Republicans managed to win only nine counties that were Democratic in 2000. As a result of the added counties in Florida, Virginia, and Colorado, Obama gained 49 electoral votes in 2008 and 51 in 2012. These three states alone accounted for more than 25 percent of Obama's electoral margin of victory in both 2008 and 2012.

Outside of the few states that flipped partisanship, there also appears to be growing division in many states where the winning party in 2000 has substantially increased its margin of victory. Enten and Silver pointed out that in 2012, 18 states were won by 20 or more percentage

points, 11 for the Republicans and seven for the Democrats. To put this result in perspective, in 1992, no states were won by a margin of 20 or more percentage points (Enten and Silver, 2014). This change supports the notion that at least in some areas, "red states have gotten redder and blue states have gotten bluer" (Enten and Silver, 2014). Furthermore, since 2000 24 states have experienced a change in the two party vote share that was greater than seven percentage points. Ultimately, whether a state has switched its partisanship or seen the gap between parties grow considerably, recent national political trends suggest that substantial one-sided changes have occurred that have altered the party balance since the 2000 election.

Migration

In an effort to explain the recent and seemingly "one-sided" presidential political changes referenced above, this study evaluates net-domestic migration as a contributing factor. The evaluation of migration as a factor in political change stems from the arguments put forth by Gebeloff and Leonhardt that claim recent migration aided the Democrats. In addition, preliminary research conducted in Virginia, a state that voted Republican in presidential elections for 46 years until back-to-back Democratic victories in 2008 and 2012, demonstrated that this shift from red to blue correlated well with population increases.[2] Specifically, in the six Virginia counties with the greatest population increases from 2000-2010, five went from strongly Republican in 1996 to Democratic in 2008. On average, Democrats increased their vote totals in these six counties by 162.5 percent in this span while the Republicans only experienced a 76 percent vote total increase.[3] While this study examined county population growth in only one state, it points to population change as one factor in the massive gains by the Democrats.

[2] Fires, Michael William. 2013. "Democratic Revival: How Population Shifts in Six Republican Counties Changed Virginia Politics" Paper for POLS 490 American Political Regions, Professor Merle Black.
[3] Ibid.

In a discussion of the components of population change that could have impacted Virginia politics, Qian Cai outlines the connection between migration and population increase: "population growth is the result of two factors: natural increase (more births than deaths), and net in-migration (more people moving in than moving out)." Virginia's population increase was attributed equally to both factors (Cai 2011, p. 1-2). Unlike the case with natural births, in-migration can have immediate political implications.

Net domestic migration, which includes inter- and intra-state migration and excludes cross-national immigration, could be the element of population increase that contributed to the political change in Virginia.[4] The U.S. Census Bureau defines this concept as follows: "The difference between domestic in-migration to an area and domestic out-migration from the same area during a specified time period. Domestic in- and out-migration consist of moves where both the origin and the destination are within the United States (excluding Puerto Rico)."[5] With the goal of explaining the recent one-sided changes that have transformed presidential elections in the past 15 years, this study will evaluate the partisan effects of "Net Domestic Migration."[6]

Literature Review

The relationship between migration and political changes has been explored in previous scholarship. The significant work completed by numerous researchers, summarized in the

[4] Cross-national immigration is excluded from this study because this measurement includes individuals who are not eligible to vote and therefore, cannot contribute to political changes. While it is possible that a long-term pattern of international migration could lead to delayed but eventual political effects (in the same way "Births" would), the central theory of this study is embedded in testing migration as a potential short-term mechanism of political change due to "migrants" entering a region based on pre-formed political and non-political preferences.

[5] Definition from the U.S. Census:
U.S. Census Bureau. "Population Estimates Terms and Definitions: Net Domestic Migration" Accessible at: http://www.census.gov/popest/about/terms.html (Accessed November 21, 2014)

[6] An obvious objection to the investigation of domestic migration as a cause behind the recent presidential changes across the nation is a study of migrants is unimportant and the true important issue is the demographic composition of the migrants. To resolve this belief, this study will evaluate domestic migrants as well as the percent change in different demographic groups to test whether recent changes are related strongly to migration or other demographic changes.

following sections, explains why domestic migration may be a key to explaining the recent changes in presidential elections. Migration is known to affect around six percent of the United States population each year (Molloy et al. 2011, p. 7). As a result, migration has been a main contributor to significant political change throughout American history (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001; Frendries 1989; Lyons and Durant 1980; Hood and McKee 2010; Black and Black 2002). A review of the existing scholarship reveals that migration has in the past often led to one-sided political outcomes. Furthermore, substantial scholarship concludes that different mechanisms—"homophily" and "sorting"— can cause these outcomes.

Previous literature demonstrates that in-migration is common and the reasons to migrate are varied (Molloy et al. 2011). Aside from the sheer number of individuals it can affect, in-migration can help produce significant political change in an area because migrants are not random and can be distinct from the local populations of their destinations (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2001; Gabriel and Schmitz 1995; Black and Black 1987).

Recent studies have also shown that interstate migration can affect regional politics because individuals with the financial capacity to migrate may be more likely to support one party (usually the Republicans) over another (Gimpel and Schuknect 2001). Furthermore, some scholars have argued that migrants promote political change because migrants are sometimes very different from the native populations of their destinations (Frendries 1989; Lyons and Durant 1980; Gimpel and Schuknect 2001). James Gimpel and Jason Schuknect (2001, 210) explained this impact: "Migrants may have distinct political preferences that they then import into their new neighborhoods, changing the partisan composition at those locales." John Frendries (1989, p. 211) also described how migrants can impact local politics: "Because they

are unlikely to be a perfect match of the existing electorate, in-migrants may form the basis for an alteration in the local partisan balance."

Migration and the Republican Realignment

Much of the migration research focused on the Republican realignment of whites in the South beginning in the mid-20th century. The realignment began as a slow transformation of the Southern economy coupled with a large increase in population. In Politics and Society in the South, Earl Black and Merle Black discussed the potential for political change in the South spurred by in-migration of Northern whites and a simultaneous generational realignment of native whites. These changes in the demographics in the South, Black and Black argued, could threaten the one-party domination of the Democratic region: "To the extent that white southern populations traditionally attached to the Democratic Party have been diluted by the arrival of migrating nonsouthern whites…changes to one-party politics should be anticipated" (Black and Black, 1987, p. 16).

Black and Black continued their discussion of migrating non-southern whites by noting that while they are not all "cut from the same cloth," they generally "are better educated, more prosperous, more ethnically diverse [and] they usually vote at higher rates" than native white southerners (Black and Black, 1987, p. 22). Among the other factors mentioned above, the in-migrant whites, and most importantly the traits they shared with each other, helped to slowly chip away at the Democratic South.[7]

The influx of migrant whites and the realignment of native whites transformed politics in the South. To depict this transformation, Black and Black measured the shifting partisan

[7] This idea of in-migrants sharing common traits and causing change that impacts the success of one party is a central theme that is explored later in this thesis.

tendencies of native whites and migrant whites from 1952-1984.[8] For example, in 1952, only 11 percent of native white southerners identified with the Republican Party. In contrast, 86 percent of native white southerners identified with the Democrats. By 1984, the percent of Democratic identifiers among native white southerners dropped to 45 percent and white Republican identifiers rose to 40 percent. Among migrant whites, the percent of Republican identifiers and leaning independents held steady around 44 percent from 1964 to 1984. However, Democratic identifiers among migrant whites dropped from 52 percent in 1964 to only 35 percent in 1984 (Black and Black, 1987, p. 241). In each group of whites living in the South, there was a clear move away from Democratic identification. Among native whites, there was a substantial a move towards the Republicans.

While the changes in party identification among native whites occurred throughout the region, it is important to note that Yankee migrants were by no means evenly distributed across the South. Black and Black demonstrated that northern migrants predominately chose Florida, Virginia, Texas, and Arkansas as destinations from 1950-1980. By 1980, large portions of the white populations in these states were born outside of the South, including more than 50 percent of the white population in Florida. In contrast, in Mississippi and Alabama, less than ten percent of the white populations in 1980 had been born outside of the South (Black and Black, 1987, 17-18).

In The Rise of Southern Republicans, Black and Black explained that the South's population grew at an eight percent faster rate than the rest of the nation. They also identified the civil rights movement and the expansion of the southern economy as two major factors in the transformation of the southern electorate. Black and Black cited the work of Dan Balz and

[8] Black and Black measured "Partisan Tendencies" by tabulating the amount of party identifiers and independents that lean towards a particular party in the southern electorate.

Ronald Brownstein that showed the widespread changes to the South that included "'the decline of the agrarian South and the rise of a modern economy grounded in manufacturing, defense, tourism, services, and technology.'" (Black and Black 2002, p. 5) These changes especially aided the growth of the southern Republican Party. Balz and Brownstein concluded:

> 'In concert with the economic changes, in-migration from the North and the swell of refugees from the farms to the cities and the imposition of court-ordered busing gave rise to a suburban South where one had never existed…Almost every new housing development rising in the suburban and exurban counties of the South represented another potential Republican enclave and a further nail in the Democrats' coffin.' (Black and Black, 2002, p. 5-6)

Even though Balz and Brownstein argued that much of the Republican Realignment was sparked by other factors besides migration, including the realignment of native white voters in the South, they included migration as a factor that promoted these political changes.

Harold Stanley (1988) echoed the claim that migrants were a "key force in southern partisan changes." He argued that, "without the migrants Republican identification would have been three to four points lower and Democratic identification higher" (Stanley, 1998, p. 71). Gimpel and Shucknet (2001), Frendries (1989), and Hood and McKee (2010) made similar arguments: migration was an important factor in the political changes that occurred in the South and which benefitted the Republican Party during the period studied.

In contrast to the older Republican realignment literature, M. V. Hood and S. C. McKee (2010) examined recent migration and the effects these migrants have had on Democratic success in North Carolina. In their analysis of North Carolina in the 2008 presidential election, the authors argued that in-migrants contributed to the Democratic victory in the formerly Republican state: "Due in no small part to the in-migration of residents born outside of Dixie, North Carolina and Virginia have joined Florida, the quintessential Northern transplant state, as

the newest presidential battlegrounds" (Hood and McKee 2010, p. 293).[9] Hood and McKee analyzed the changes in migrant populations after the Republican realignment and introduced the idea that present day migrants may not have the same partisan effects on politics as did migrants during the initial southern Republican realignment.

The recent migrants that Hood and McKee studied, mainly interstate migrants "born and raised" in the Northeast, have aided the Democrats. Their behavior is different from the Northern white migrants who earlier aided the growth of the Republican Party during the realignment era. However, because this article was confined to North Carolina, it failed to resolve whether this result was unique to a single state or reflected a national trend.

One shortcoming of this body of literature is that it overwhelmingly focuses on the political implications of migrants who are distinct from the native population groups. These studies do not explore the possible political consequences of migrants who are politically and ideologically similar to groups in the destination region. As a result, the realignment literature does not explore the alternative possibility of migration re-enforcing an existing partisan majority by making a Republican region more Republican and a Democratic region more Democratic.

Most importantly, this literature demonstrates that migrants moving to the same region have supported one party during one era and a different party during a subsequent era. Ultimately, while realignment scholars have demonstrated that the partisanship of migrants can influence and even help to change the politics of a region (Frendries 1989; Durant and Lyons 1980; Rice and Pepper 1997; Gimpel and Schuknect 2001, Hood and Mckee, 2010), questions

[9] In some parts of their analysis, the authors do make distinctions in the racial breakdown of the migrants. However their argument centers more on the fact that the migrants are from regions other than the South.

remain both about how recent migration has affected the success of each party across the nation and whether in-migration promotes one-sided political changes.[10]

Migration, Sorting, and Homophily:

To explain the recent trends in politics similar to those raised by Gebeloff and Leonhardt, some scholars have made strong cases that recent migration reflects a general partisan sorting in the electorate among different groups throughout the nation (Cho et al. 2009; Rodden 2010; McDonald 2011). These scholars argued that migrants are able to identify key attributes of their new neighbors. This process occurs through migrants' perception of local possessions or values that allows them to accurately identify, consciously or subconsciously, the preferences and priorities of their neighbors (Cho et al. 2009). These preferences, if similar, will encourage migrants to move into that area. Cho et al. (2009, p. 6) described this process:

> Many residents appear to be quite capable of accurately inferring the political partisanship of their neighborhood without having any discussions with their neighbors at all, but from simply looking at the residents' abodes: the type of automobile in the driveway, Christmas decorations, playground equipment in the back yard, or an American flag flying from a front porch.

Robert Preuhs (1999, p. 528-9) made a similar claim through the "consumer-voter model": Migrants make a decision to move to a destination after gauging the benefits they would gain that support both their lifestyle and political preferences. In this way, migrating voters should select areas that they believe to reflect and reinforce their personal preferences. In this process, migrants would reinforce an area's existing political homogeneity. As a result, Jonathan Rodden (2010, p. 322) wrote: "the probability that two randomly drawn individuals (or precincts) exhibit similar voting behavior is a function of the distance between their locations."

[10] MacDonald (2008, p. 894) disagrees with this argument: "partisan environments lead migrants to shift their party identifications in favor of the majority party," but eventually concludes that it is unlikely that migration to a new environment will cause a migrant to change party affiliation.

Most of these studies used a concept called *homophily* as the mechanism that drives a migrant's desire to move to a community of similar residents. Homophily is an ancient concept, included in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and Plato's *Phaedrus*, that contends human to human association is naturally homogenous (McPherson et al. 2001). Homophily's implications for community are described by McPherson et al. (2001 p. 415):

> Similarity breeds connection. This principle-the homophily principle-structures network ties of every type, including marriage, friendship, work, advice, support, information transfer, exchange, comembership, and other types of relationship. The result is that people's personal networks are homogeneous with regard to many socio-demographic, behavioral, and intrapersonal characteristics.

People associate with individuals whom they perceive to share similar values, beliefs, preferences, and attributes (DeJong 1977; McPherson et al. 2001; Cho et al. 2013). The relevance of homophily to politics is that these preferences often reflect one political party or another, aligning the migrants with people who share their partisanship (Cho et al. 2009; Rodden 2010; McDonald 2011).

This type of sorting, the sorting of lifestyle preferences that leads indirectly to partisan sorting, does not necessarily favor a particular party or occur in only one region (Cho et al. 2013). While the larger state or regional migration decisions are mostly about employment opportunities, climate, family life, taxes, and schools, the micro decisions of where to move within a chosen state and a metropolitan or suburban region are determined by smaller community factors (Clark and Ballard 1980; Cho et al. 2013).[11] This is the level in which homophily, partisan and non-partisan, becomes a factor in migration decisions and subsequent political change. As Cho, Hui and Gimpel (2013, p. 867) reflected: "Politics matters for

[11] This is not a distinction between inter- and intra-state migration. These authors merely suggest that if a move to a certain state or region is determined by a job opportunity or another non-homophily related reason, the decision of where to specifically move to in that selected state or region will then be driven by homophily.

residential choices, both directly and indirectly…If this effect persists over a long enough period of time, it could not only change the political landscape but also create new environments for the socialization of citizens."

Existing scholarship suggests that migration can have different political consequences, such as a Republican realignment or the recent shift to the Democrats in Virginia and North Carolina, and that homophily can cause migrants to choose destinations that reflect their own personal and political preferences. Exploring both bodies of literature can provide a theoretical framework that explains how recent migration can help to create the appearance of one-sided political changes across the nation.

Over the past few decades, California, due to its electoral size, has been the most important state for Democratic success in presidential elections. Population increases in Democratic demographics such as liberal whites, Hispanics, and Asians have transformed the one-time Republican state to a reliably Democratic one. While California may overshadow newer partisan shifts in states like Virginia, the population changes from 2000 to 2012 may have also contributed to the large presidential margins the Democrats have built over the Republicans.[12] Furthermore, Obama's victory in 2012 in Virginia demonstrates that 2008 may not have been a fluke due to high turnout or Obama's popularity among youth voters.[13] Migration may be a key to explaining the recent one-sided presidential gains.

[12] While the changes in Virginia have contributed to the continued success of the Democrats in presidential elections, these changes are not as meaningful as the changes in California that have made the Presidency much easier to secure for the Democrats.

[13] Including Mark Warner's narrow Senate victory in November, Democrats have won 8 of the last 9 statewide elections in Virginia (Presidential, Gubernatorial, Senatorial).

The 21st Century Political Climate

For many reasons, it may appear that the literature on the Republican realignment is insufficient to explain recent political changes. Fundamentally, the literature was focused upon explaining the changes in the post-World War II South and not 21st century America. For example, the literature consistently listed migration as one of many factors that contributed to the realignment. In today's political climate, many of these other factors that contributed to the changes during the realignment, such as the civil rights movement, the development of the suburbs, the ongoing secularization of the Democratic Party, and the rejuvenated southern economy, are no longer novel. Moreover, the realignment literature is inherently regionally focused and does not generalize to explain change across the nation.

Despite these differences, certain realignment literature outlines the crucial factors that created today's politically divided society. Black and Black, in their most recent work, Divided America, outlined the significant changes between the Republicans and Democrats from the 1950s to the present day. Black and Black argued that American politics are now "Confrontational" due to refined party ideologies. In the past, both parties had sizeable factions that disagreed on multiple issues. "For decades the Democrats had an influential conservative wing that moderated the policies pursued by national party figures…the Republicans traditionally had a moderate wing, as well as a few liberals, that restrained conservatives." (Black and Black, 2007, p. 2). This mixed ideological composition within parties promoted political moderation.

However, these intra-party ideological splits have transformed into inter-party differences. This process occurred through the realignment of conservative and liberal voters. For white Americans, especially conservatives, this realignment to the Republican Party reached

its apex during the Reagan administration that aimed to: "strengthen military, cut taxes, reduce domestic government spending, and honor traditional moral, religious, and cultural values" (Black and Black, 2007, 13). At the start of the Reagan presidency, less than 50 percent of white conservatives were Republican. However, by the end of the Reagan presidency, 68 percent of white conservatives identified as Republicans. On the other hand, liberal whites "Angered and alarmed by Reagan's rejection of their fundamental beliefs, values, and interests… responded by aligning more strongly with the Democratic Party." (Black and Black, 2007, 16)

This "white Realignment" helped diminish the moderating factions within each party. As conservative and liberal voters aligned with the Republicans and Democrats respectively, the parties achieved "ideological purity" and ultimately, created "tremendous personal, partisan, and ideological differences" between both the parties and voters of each party (Black and Black, 2007, 3). The Democratic Party has suffered most from the white realignment by losing white Christians, a group that used to support the Democrats. Beyond white voters, New Minorities and African Americans, two groups that overwhelmingly support the Democrats, have grown in size.[14] This growth has helped the Democrats counterbalance their losses among white voters.

The pervasive ideological changes within the parties and the greater ideological division among voters is often characterized in recent literature as *polarization*. Beyond Black and Black, similar research has argued that polarization, usually conceptually defined as a growing ideological and interpersonal division between Republicans and Democrats, is a reality in the current political climate of the United States (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Abramowitz 2010; Black and Black 2007; Plides 2011; Shor and McCarty 2011; Bafumi, 2012). Alan Abramowitz (2010, p.594) agreed with Black and Black that in recent decades the United States

[14] Black and Black define "New Minorities" as "Latinos, Asians, and other ethnic groups." (Black and Black, p. xiv, 2007)

has become more polarized and divided: "Over the past three decades the coalitions supporting the two major parties have become much more distinctive geographically, racially, and ideologically." In addition, Abramowitz argued that Americans agree on fewer issues, cultural divisions have become more pronounced, and Republicans and Democrats are more divided than in the past.

As a result, present day polarization fits nicely with the migration and homophily literature. If migration is governed to some extent by migrants' desires for homophily, polarization that further divides individuals and communities along lines of ideology and culture should make the preferences of others easier to discern, and partisan sorting more pronounced. In short, polarization should make it easier for migrants to detect their neighbors' viewpoints and lifestyles.

Theory: Increased Polarization, Homophily and Migration

Together, polarization, homophily, and migration might explain the recent changes observed in presidential elections. This is not to say that the preferences of natives cannot change over time as they did in the South during the Republican realignment. However, in a polarized post-realignment environment, an analysis of migration as the cause behind the recent political change could be more effective in explaining presidential changes from 2000 to 2012.

If migration can change the politics of a state or region and if migrants choose destinations with individuals who have similar political preferences, an increase in migration under these circumstances would likely contribute to an increase in partisan sorting. The likely result, if these conditions are met, would be one-sided political outcomes or changes. Furthermore, a highly polarized political environment should facilitate the mechanism of

homophily and accelerate sorting into homogenous communities. In short, polarization should make these one-sided effects more pronounced.

The theoretical connection between homophily and polarization is clear. Cho et. al. (2009, 8) stated:

> Members of particular groups choose to live near other group members in order to receive social reinforcement for their values. The prevalence of prevalent personality traits in an area is therefore reinforced by the selectivity of population movement…social influence within these locales also perpetuates a dominant value system in that place by rewarding compliant attitudes and behavior. In this manner, seemingly politically irrelevant preferences going to tastes for particular kinds of grocery and department stores, coffee shops and restaurants, and favored recreation activities (e.g., golf, camping, hunting, snow skiing), may be sufficiently related to political viewpoint that their cumulative effect on residential choice is to produce politically homogeneous neighborhoods.[15]

The preferences that dictate residential choice can be both tangible (taxes, crime rate, and economic status) and intangible like the perceived personality traits of neighbors, and a general desire to live near similar individuals, or like-minded people. Abramowitz and Saunders (2008, p. 543) argued that the divisions in societal polarization fall along "cultural," "political," "religious," and "psychological" distinctions. If, as the polarization literature states, America is more consistently divided culturally, politically, religiously, and psychologically, it makes sense that the key preferences of homophily (value systems, personality traits, and like-mindedness) would be easier for a migrant to distinguish. Therefore, it is theoretically possible that a migrant, when making residential choices on values, like-mindedness, and personality traits, would find it easier to identify neighbors who meet these preferences in a highly culturally, religiously, politically, and psychologically polarized community. Moreover, these preferences tend to be mutually reinforcing. People who share one preference likely share many other preferences. This makes sorting even easier for a migrant.

[15] While the writing seems awkward and in some places grammatically incorrect, this is quoted correctly.

While Abramowitz discusses increasing polarization in our society over time, Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty (2011) have demonstrated that polarization varies spatially across states. Shor and McCarty ranked all fifty state legislatures in terms of levels of polarization based on survey and roll call vote data. Shor and McCarty labeled California as "by far" the most polarized state and Louisiana and Rhode Island as the least polarized.[16] They also conclude that in a majority of states, polarization in the legislatures has increased in recent years.

As a result, migrants who move to a state with higher levels of polarization, California for example, may find it easier to sort themselves into communities that share the same preferences because communities are more visibly divided. An increase in migration therefore could increase the number of residents who reflect similar partisan and non-partisan preferences. On the other hand, in areas with low levels of polarization, it may be harder for migrants, than those moving to states with higher levels of polarization, to glean the political preferences of their new communities. Under these circumstances, it may be harder for migrants moving to less polarized states to sort themselves into homogenous communities than migrants moving to more polarized states.

Testing this theory can add to the existing scholarship in the following ways: (1) it aims to explain recent changes in presidential elections, (2) it considers polarization as a key conditioning factor, (3) it is not specific to a particular region of the country or a particular party that benefits from migration and (4) it evaluates migration and sorting as mechanisms that cause further division across the nation. The significance of this project is that it has the capability of demonstrating three things: a tangible implication of increased polarization; a new, comprehensive evaluation of migration as a factor in recent one-sided presidential changes; and

[16] While California was the most polarized state legislature at the time Shor and McCarty wrote their article, in their most recent data, Colorado is the most polarized state legislature.

the potential to identify whether domestic migration benefits one party more than the other in the different political regions of the United States.

Hypotheses

Based on the theory that polarization, migration, and homophily could cause one-sided presidential change, this study submits the following hypothesis:

(1) *One-sided change in the two-party presidential vote share from 2000-2012 between Republicans and Democrats will be larger in counties with higher levels of net domestic in-migration from 2000-2012 than in counties with lower levels of net domestic migration.*

This study will measure one-sided political change as the change in the relative performance of Republican and Democratic candidates in the 2000 and 2012 presidential elections. The first hypothesis expects to observe a positive relationship between the size of net domestic migration and the total change in relative party performance in the combined vote share between Republicans and Democrats. The relative change in the two-party vote share will show if one party benefits more than the other in subsequent elections and therefore identify where one-sided change is taking place. If the change in the two-party vote share is small, or nonexistent, then by definition there has been no one-sided change in the relative performance of the two parties. Thus, the null hypothesis would be as follows:

(1-null) There is no relationship between domestic net migration and the change in the two-party vote share between the Republicans and the Democrats.

The first hypothesis would be incorrect even if there were strong negative relationship between net-domestic migration and one-sided political change. This means that if the counties with the

high levels of out-migration were the counties with the highest amount of political change, the first hypothesis would be incorrect.

The second and final hypothesis of this study involves polarization as a conditioning variable:

(2) Political regions with higher polarization scores will be the regions with the stronger relationships between migration and one-sided political change.

Ultimately, the second hypothesis expects the causal relationship between in-migration and the one-sided change in presidential elections to become stronger as areas become more polarized. As a result, the null hypothesis for the second hypothesis would be:

(2-null) There is no relationship between regional polarization values and a region's relationship between migration and one-sided political change.

Research Design

Unit of Analysis and Regional Approach:

To test these hypotheses this study will use a quantitative approach. The principal reason for selecting a quantitative approach is the availability of data across large numbers of observations. The units of analysis for this study will be counties and the justification for this selection is detailed in the following paragraphs.

This research tests in all United States counties the relationship between domestic net migration and change in the two party vote share in presidential elections.[17] There are two main reasons for selecting counties instead of congressional districts or other smaller geographic

[17] Counties are the smallest unit of analysis available where both net domestic migration figures and election returns are calculated. While there is limited migration data available at a smaller scale, for example Zip Code Tabulation Areas, there are some issues with the migration values calculated at this level. To complicate matters further, election returns from the source I have chosen, Congressional Quarterly, are not published by ZCTA's. In order to avoid an independent variable and a dependent variable that are measured in two distinct geographic regions, I decided to incorporate county-level data for each measure.

regions. First, county borders are generally unchanging, unlike congressional districts that are subject to mandated decennial redistricting. The constant boundaries make it possible to effectively study migration and political changes from year to year with some assurance that the borders of the county remain relatively the same.[18] Second, scholars of migration and homophily have called for analysis of the political implications of migration on the county level (Cho et. al. 2009). While choosing counties creates a great disparity in population size among the units of analysis, this design allows for a longitudinal study of simultaneous population and presidential political change.

While counties are a strong unit of analysis, in some cases the disparity in size may make it difficult to identify the relationship between the independent and dependent variables. For example, an extremely populous county may contain two or more distinct communities or areas that support different political parties. As a result, an increase in migration may allow both communities to grow together. Even though migrants may still sort themselves into separate communities, it would be hard to see this relationship in the relative change in party performance in presidential elections.

This study analyzes the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided presidential change by taking a regional approach. The unit of analysis will remain the county, but the actual statistical evaluation of the hypotheses will be conducted on a much larger scale after aggregating all of the counties together into five political regions. Therefore, this would diminish the likelihood of one county or one state skewing the results in comparison to a state-by-state analysis. For example, Arizona only has 15 counties and such a limited number of observations would certainly affect the statistical integrity of the study.

[18] In fact, the only boundary changes that this study encountered were in Broomfield County, Colorado. This county was created in 2001 using parts of Adams, Jefferson, and Weld counties.

While it is possible to isolate each state and test the hypotheses in every single one, this approach is unfocused and overlooks regional intricacies in the United States. Earl Black and Merle Black contend in *Divided America* that after adopting a regional approach to analyzing American political trends "politics becomes much more interesting—and easier to understand."(xi) In an effort to make the results particularly accessible, this study will first provide a national analysis and then a more focused analysis using a similar regional approach.

Black and Black split America into five regions, the Northeast, the South, the Mountain Plains, the Pacific Coast, and the Midwest. The state composition of each region is depicted in Table 1 in the appendix. Black and Black also separate the regions into Republican strongholds (the South and the Mountain Plains) and Democratic strongholds (the Northeast and the Pacific Coast). The Midwest is considered to be America's Swing Region and is not a stronghold for either party. Regions provide this study with the necessary concentration and focus needed to effectively test the hypotheses and the research questions. Moreover, analyzing the data using a regional approach provides the given method of statistical analysis with enough observations (Large N) to use multiple control variables and maintain statistical significance. To assess statistically the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided change in the two party presidential vote share, this study uses regression analysis. OLS Regression makes it possible to hold the control variables constant and examine the relationship between variables across each region. This is the appropriate technique to use in the analysis section because of the continuous nature of the dependent variable and the expected linear relationship between the independent and dependent variables.

Another form of analysis that this research incorporates is Geographic Information System (GIS) to visually display results in the different political regions. GIS makes it possible

to depict visually all of the variables and to identify spatial trends in the data. Regression analysis and correlation coefficients will help measure statistical significance, but it would limit the analysis' exploration of the spatial variation of any observed relationships. With GIS, it will be possible to identify specific parts of the nation where the observed relationships are strong or weak. This will broaden the contribution of the study and expand it beyond statistical significance.

All elements of this analysis will help establish causality and ensure falsifiability of my hypotheses. The regression analysis will show empirically whether there is a relationship between the variables before and after control variables are taken into account. GIS will help demonstrate visually whether areas with high levels of net domestic migration and one-sided changes in the two-party presidential vote share occur evenly across the nation or are clustered within certain regions.

Variables:

Dependent Variable: Amount of One-Sided Change in the Two-Party Presidential Vote Share 2000-2012

To measure the concept of "one-sided political effects", this study will calculate the relative success of political parties in presidential elections from 2000-2012 using county level presidential election data.

The Equation below demonstrates how this the dependent variable is calculated:

$$\left| \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left(\frac{\text{\#Votes DEM Presidential Candidate in 2012}}{\text{\#Total Votes Republicans and Democrats in 2012}} - \frac{\text{\#Votes DEM Presidential Candidate in 2000}}{\text{\#Total Votes Republicans and Democrats in 2000}} \right) \\ - \left(\frac{\text{\#Votes REP Presidential Candidate in 2012}}{\text{\#Total Votes Republicans and Democrats in 2012}} - \frac{\text{\#Votes REP Presidential Candidate in 2000}}{\text{\#Total Votes Republicans and Democrats in 2000}} \right) \end{array} \right\} \right|$$

To control for population variation, each step in this calculation is divided by the total votes cast for either party to convert the given value to a percentage of all votes cast for both

major parties. This calculates the relative change between the two parties as a percentage of all votes cast, effectively eliminating the problem of having one county with 100,000 voters being compared to a county with 1,000 voters. After this value is calculated, the absolute value is taken to measure the total change in the two-party vote share. This variable is depicted in Map 8.

For example, in Loudon County, Virginia, this variable would be calculated using the following steps. In 2000, the Democrats had 30,938 total votes and the total amount of votes cast for the Republicans and Democrats was 73,319. The value of votes for the Democrats divided by the total amount of votes cast for either major party is 0.4219. This value, after being multiplied by 100, is the percentage of the two-party vote that the Democrats received in 2000 (42.19). After using the same steps to calculate the percentage of the two-party vote received by the Democrats in 2012 (52.27), the 2000 value (42.19) is subtracted from the 2012 value (52.27) for a value of 10.08, the total increase in vote for the Democratic Party. This process is then repeated for the Republicans in 2000 (57.90) and 2012 (47.72) and the Republican value (-10.18) is subtracted from the Democratic value (10.08) for a total value of 20.26. This value, 20.26 percent, is the total relative change between the Republicans and the Democrats from 2000-2012 in presidential elections in Loudon County, Virginia.

If the change in this value is high, it means that one party has benefitted more than the other over the time span of the study and therefore, captures the degree in which the presidential success of each party has undergone "one-sided" political change. If the change in this value is low, or even zero, it would mean that there was limited change over the time span or that the parties grew together at a similar same rate. The first hypothesis anticipates that in counties with high levels of migration from 2000-2012, this value will be higher than the same measure in

counties with lower levels of migration. If the first hypothesis were incorrect, in areas with high levels of migration from 2000-2012, there would be little or no change in this value.

The strength of this variable is that it will not be as significantly skewed by high or low voter turnout because it examines only the relative performance of the parties, not the total amount of votes received. This variable will be measured with data from both the Congressional Quarterly Press: Voting and Elections Collection and the U.S. Census Bureau. Based on the national average across over 3000 counties, this study considers a substantively significant amount of one-sided political change to be one that is greater than ten.[19]

Another potential way to measure this concept of one-sided political change would be to analyze the relationship between the percentage changes in votes received by each party from 2000 to 2012, and to test the correlation of these values with net domestic migration. In addition, examination of the slope of the regression line between these two variables will further show if one party preforms better than the other as migration increases. These measures will be used to evaluate if one party benefits from domestic migration more than the other.

Independent Variable: Domestic Net In-Migration

The independent variable for this research will be "net domestic migration." As mentioned above, net domestic migration is the only "component" of population change which, unlike births, can have political effects in the following elections. This is crucial because although international immigration and births can have delayed effects, these individuals would have already lived in the new area for a considerable amount of time before they would be able to vote. This variable is easy to measure because county-level net domestic migration is

[19] This is determined by first calculating the national average of one-sided political change across all counties (12.13) and then the 50th percentile (9.2). Thus, substantively significant change will be change that exceeds the 50th percentile of all counties and either just below or above the mean national value.

estimated on a yearly basis by the Census and cumulative data are also available from 2000 to 2008 and 2008 to 2012.

An additional strength is that this variable distinguishes between other non-migratory population changes and immigration. If these populations had been included, they could have inflated the migration statistics and counted a significant amount of individuals who may not have been able to cause political change. This variable does not distinguish between interstate and intrastate migration. It will not count individuals who move within the same county and as a result, may underreport the amount of people who sort within large counties. If in large counties individuals are underreported, the likely outcome is that the analysis will underestimate the effects of in migration on political change. This study will compare levels of this variable across counties over time. In terms of measurement, every year the U.S. Census Bureau releases county level estimates for net domestic migration, along with other non-migratory population variables of births, deaths and immigration that will provide a full snapshot of population change in a given county.

The following example demonstrates how this variable is calculated. Loudon County, Virginia, had a value of net domestic migration from 2000-2008 of 82,758 and a value of net domestic migration from 2008-2012 of 11,563. As a result, the cumulative value in Loudon County of net domestic migrants from 2000-2012 is 94,321. To control for population variation across counties the raw value of cumulative net domestic migration of 94,321 is calculated as a percentage of the total population in Loudon County in 2000. This produces a value of 54.24 percent and means that the amount of net-migration from 2000-2012 in Loudon County, Virginia is the equivalent of a 54.24 percent increase in the total county population. Clearly in Loudon County, one of the counties explored in the analysis of Virginia, there was substantial net

domestic migration and one-sided political change from 2000-2012. Based on the national average across all counties, this study considers a substantively significant value of net domestic migration to be one that is greater than four percent of a county's population or less than negative six percent of a county's population.[20]

Conditioning Variable: Degree of Polarization

Degree of polarization in a given state's legislature will be a conditioning variable that affects the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change. To remain consistent with the other components of this study, the unit of analysis will be regions based on the average polarization ratings of all state legislatures within that region. In terms of measurement of polarization, Boris Shor and Nolan McCarty (2011) have quantified the level of polarization within different state legislatures. The authors calculated polarization, defined as the distance between party medians, by analyzing roll call votes and examining legislators responses from the National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) administered by Project Vote Smart. While the roll call vote responses accurately depict the final decision of a legislator on a particular vote, the NPAT survey asks state legislators a variety of questions on their political policy preferences, ranging from foreign policy to the environment. This method led Shor and McCarty to calculate the ideological distance between the two parties in a given legislature. Following these calculations, the authors ranked all 50 states in terms of degree of ideological polarization and argued that the polarization of state legislatures reflects polarization among a legislature's constituents and mirrors growing polarization in America.

[20] This is determined by calculating the national average (-0.16) and the interquartile range which spans from -6.2 percent to 4 percent. As a result, a substantively significant change will be one that falls below the 25th percentile or above the 75th percentile.

Methods of Control:

While there are reliable sources of data for each variable in this causal relationship, there are many potential confounding and intervening variables that will need to be controlled in this study. First, this study will analyze only presidential elections to prevent local anomalies from skewing the results. Local anomalies include such things as a local candidate running in a local election whose reputation or policy choices significantly alter a party's margin of victory. Including these elections could substantially alter the data. In addition, analyzing only presidential elections makes the candidates uniform in every county, which will reduce any abnormal variation across counties.

Economic conditions have also been incorporated in this study as a control variable. It is possible that economic conditions could affect rates of domestic migration, as many have argued individuals need financial means to migrate. As a result, using data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional Income Division, this study will control for percent change in personal income per capita from 2000-2012 (adjusted for inflation). This should be an indicator of economic strength and change across all counties in America.[21]

There are three additional control variables, calculated with data from the Surveillance, Epidemiology, and End Results Program published by the National Cancer Institute and these variables measure the percent change from 2000-2012 in the voting age population of the following demographic groups: White, Black, and Hispanic. These variables are included with the goal of countering the claim that general migration is not as relevant to study as the population changes of specific demographic groups. While it would be ideal to breakdown the

[21] The inclusion of this variable was ultimately problematic due to a shortage of data in a sizeable amount of counties. While the inclusion of this variable in some regions had minor impacts on coefficient values and r-squared values, it is impossible to tell whether these changes were due to the inclusion of the variable or the exclusion of certain counties where economic data were unavailable.

demographics of the domestic migrants, this data is unavailable on the county level. However, The U.S. Census does provide, on the county level, the voting age population for each of the aforementioned demographics. As a result, this study will measure the percent change in these populations and hold them constant in the statistical analysis of the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided change. This will make it possible to conclude if domestic migration is a factor on one-sided change independent of the changing size of specific demographic groups. Moreover, these variables will also make it possible to identify whether the growth of a particular voting age population contributes to one-sided political change more than another.

Additional Variables:

To examine whether one specific party benefits more than the other in a given region, this study also includes additional variables that will measure percent change in total votes for the Republicans and Democrats separately. In addition, in all of the scatter plots, the markers are color coded to reflect which party won the election in 2012 (Red=Republican and Blue=Democrat), with the shape, either a circle (Republican victory) or a square (Democratic victory), indicating the same.

Analysis:

The analysis of this relationship incorporates two different datasets, one with statewide data and the other with county data, with the united goal of examining across the nation the connection between domestic migration and any one-sided political change (measured by change in the relative performance of both parties in presidential elections). To accurately examine this relationship, or lack thereof, the following analysis section begins by looking at the nation as a whole and then analyzes the five political regions individually. The method of the analysis in

each region is broken up into the following parts: (1) The study of regional trends in presidential success for each party (2) The exploration of regional domestic migration (3) The summary statistics of each variable by region (4) OLS bi-variate and multi-variate regression by region to test the statistical significance of the relationship between migration and one-sided political change (5) the evaluation of the claim that one party benefits more than the other from migration. After the regional analysis is conducted to test the first hypothesis, an analysis of the second hypothesis is conducted to assess its validity.

National Analysis

Maps 5 and 6 (*See Appendix Part III, Maps*) depict on a national level the percent increase in votes for the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates from 2000-2012. The Maps are color coded with the palest shade of red indicating that a given party's percent change in votes was negative. The moderate shade of red indicates that the percent change in votes received was between zero and 40 percent and the darkest shade of red indicates a percent increase that was greater than 40. While the Republicans (Map 5) have moderate to high growth in most parts of the nation, the highest areas of growth are in Tennessee, northern Florida, Arizona and southern Nevada. Unlike the Republicans, the Democrats in Map 6, show a striking and widespread loss of votes in a huge swath from western Pennsylvania, through the entire state of West Virginia, South through Tennessee and into Southern Illinois, Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, North Texas and Oklahoma. In all of these states, the Democrats lost votes in what appears to be a majority of counties. This loss in votes for the Democrats overlaps with the region that had the highest one-party political change. This overlap suggests that the most one-sided change occurred in regions where the Democrats lost votes.

Maps 7 and 8 depict the values of the independent and dependent variables on the county level across the nation. In Map 7, the counties with the palest shade of red had more out migrants than in-migrants and as a result, a negative value for net domestic migration. The moderate red counties had a value of net domestic migration that was between zero and 15 percent of the county population in 2000 and the dark red counties had a value that was greater than 15 percent of the 2000 county population. In Map 8, counties with the palest shade of red experienced one-sided change in the two-party vote share that was less than ten percent (below the national average). The moderate-shaded counties experienced one-sided change in the two-party vote share that was between ten and 25 percent and the darkest red counties experienced one-sided change that was greater than 25 percent.

On a national scale, the most striking observation is the significant collection of counties from Oklahoma, east through Tennessee and north to West Virginia that have moderate to high levels of one-sided political change. In fact, Map 8 clearly demonstrates that this region, coined the "Jacksonian Belt" by Michael Barone, experienced more one-sided political change than any other area in the nation.[22] While there are moderate levels of migration in this part of the nation, as Map 7 depicts, there is not nearly the same intensity of migration in this region to match the amount of one-sided political change. This suggests that migration may not be the factor causing the widespread change in this part of the nation. Instead of new migrants causing the bulk of this one-sided change in the Jacksonian Belt, this change is likely the result of many native

[22] Michael Barone, a writer for the *Washington Examiner*, has written extensively about this region of the nation and defines the Jacksonian Belt as a region that extends southwest from western Pennsylvania though West Virginia and Tennessee and disperses around North Texas.

conservative voters who, unlike in the 2000 Gore campaign, have not been courted by the Obama campaigns and dislike the president's policies.[23]

Map 7 also reveals significant migration in Nevada, Arizona, western Oregon and Washington. In addition, on the east coast, Map 7 reveals substantial migration in eastern Pennsylvania through the majority of northern and western Virginia. Florida has moderate to high levels of migration throughout the entire state in the North and the South, likely contributing to the growth of both the Republican and Democratic state parties.

In terms of national statistical analysis, Figure 1 demonstrates no strong relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change (*See Appendix, National Figures*). Figure 1 is a scatterplot of every county in the Nation. Each county's position on the scatter plot is determined by the value of net domestic migration from 2000-2012 (X-Axis) and the amount of one-sided political change (Y-Axis). This scatter plot also depicts counties won by the Democrats in 2012 as blue squares and counties won by the Republicans in 2012 as red circles. If the first hypothesis were correct, there would be a positive relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided presidential change.

The correlation value of this relationship on the national level is 0.04. It is very clear that even though there is a slight positive slope to the trend line, the relationship between the two variables is not significant. A bi-variate regression confirmed this result (R-Squared 0.001) even though it did find a statistically significant relationship between net domestic migration and one-

[23] This idea also stems from the writing of Barone and discussions with Dr. Merle Black. Especially in West Virginia, there has been increased disillusion with the Democratic Party in this region of the nation over the past fifteen years. For example, many voters in West Virginia are unhappy with the Obama Administration's energy policies that appear to threaten the livelihood of many residents who rely on the mining industry for employment. This may explain the Democratic Party's failure to win a single state in West Virginia in 2012. In terms of the Gore campaign in 2000, many voters in Tennessee supported the native candidate and former senator in his unsuccessful presidential bid. The large change and simultaneous loss in votes for the Democratic Party in this region likely was related to a combination of these factors mentioned above.

sided political change (P-Value .01, Coefficient .04). This relationship on a national level is not substantively significant due to the low R-squared values and the weak coefficient. For example, this regression demonstrates that every 10 percent increase in net domestic migration results in only a 0.4 percent increase in one-sided change in party performance. A subsequent multi-variate regression (Table 2, *See Appendix II, Tables*) that held constant the changes in demographic populations found that the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided change was not statistically significant (P-value .06). Figures 2 and 3 plot the changes in the percentage of the vote for each party in states across the nation from 2000-2012.

This study conducted one final level of statistical analysis on the national level and tested the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change after separating small counties from larger ones. In "small" counties, defined as counties with a total population that is less than 11,233 (the 25th percentile of all counties in 2012), there was a statistically significant relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change (P-Value 0.00 and R-Squared 0.05). Every ten percent increase in net domestic migration results in a 1.6 percent increase in one-sided political change in "small" counties. There are nearly identical results for counties that have total populations between the 25th (11,233) and 50th (26,021) percentile. A ten percent increase in net domestic migration in these counties results in a 1.6 percent increase in one-sided political change.

This statistically significant relationship did not hold up in "semi-large" counties, defined as counties with a total population that was larger than 26,021 people and less than 67,906 people (the 75th percentile). In "large" counties, defined as counties with a total population that was greater than 67,906, there was a statistically significant relationship (P-Value 0.01) but the coefficient was much smaller and indicates that a ten percent increase in net domestic migration

would only amount in a .5 percent increase in one-sided political change. These results indicate that the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change is certainly stronger in smaller counties than larger ones.

Figure 4 (See Appendix I, National Figures), depicts the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change on a statewide level. This national figure demonstrates that at the state level, there is a slight positive relationship between the two variables. The top right quadrant, comprised of states with positive levels of net domestic migration and above average values of one-sided change, is filled predominately with states from Republican strongholds. A majority of Democratic stronghold states (depicted alone in Figure 5) appear in the left quadrants due to their negative net domestic migration values. However, the true revelation of this figure is that in Republican strongholds (depicted alone in Figure 6), the values of both variables are higher. The Midwestern states, mainly clustered in the bottom left quadrant, are depicted alone in Figure 7. A regional approach should focus the analysis further so that it will be easier to observe any relationships that could have been washed out on the national level between the independent and dependent variables.

The Northeast

Democratic presidential dominance in the Northeast from 2000 to 2012 is clear. Figures 8 and 9 (*See Appendix, Figures, Northeast*) show change in the region over the twelve-year span. The lines between each state name connect the 2000 vote share for each party to the 2012 vote share for the same party. The dotted line in each figure represents the 50% mark of the total votes cast for the Republicans and Democrats.

These figures show a commanding lead for Democrats in the former Republican stronghold. Democrats won every state in 2012 and increased their presidential margins in eight

of the eleven states. While Republicans slightly increased their share of the vote in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island, the party remained uncompetitive in each of these states. Democrats won Connecticut by 17 points, Massachusetts by 23 points, and Rhode Island by 29 points. Table 3 (*See Appendix, Tables, the Northeast*) depicts the change in the percentage of the vote for each party from 2000-2012.

Republicans were only remotely competitive in Pennsylvania and New Hampshire. The most striking example of decline in Republican competitiveness over this twelve year span was in Maine, where the Republicans went from a formidable 47.5 percent of the vote in 2000 to 42 percent in 2012. The change in Vermont was also striking where the Republicans dropped from 44.5 percent to 31.75 percent creating a one-sided change value of over 25. The lack of Republican competition in the Northeast was not surprising because it had been over 20 years since the party had won multiple states in the region. This research suggests that continuing Democratic success remains the regional outlook for presidential politics in the Northeast.

In terms of the independent variable, many Northeastern states lost more migrants than they received. Eight of the eleven states experienced more domestic out-migration than in-migration. Only Maine, Delaware and New Hampshire had positive values of net domestic migration. Notably, New York had a negative value of net domestic migration of over 1.8 million. This value was the equivalent of over nine percent of New York's 2000 population, by far the largest population loss in the Northeast.

Figure 5 shows the Northeastern states as part of a larger scatter plot for the Democratic Strongholds (the Northeast and the Pacific Coast). Each state is plotted according to values for net domestic migration and one-sided political change on a statewide level. In terms of the Northeast, only Maine has positive net domestic migration and a statewide value of one-sided

political change that is above the mean for Democratic Stronghold states. The prevailing trend in this figure is that eight of the 11 Northeastern states have one-sided change that is below the national average and six of these eight had more out-migration than in-migration. These results show that on the state level, the Northeast does not appear to confirm the first hypothesis.

If there is a strong relationship between domestic migration and one-sided political change, it would be reasonable to expect that most of this change has benefited the Democrats in the Northeast. Table 4 depicts the statewide values for domestic migration from 2000 to 2012 and also includes the amount of statewide one-sided change in the two party presidential vote share. These figures are important to keep in mind before examining the statistical significance of the first hypothesis. At this juncture, the Northeast demonstrates that the Democrats improved upon their 2000 performance in the presidential election at a significantly better rate than the Republicans. Moreover, in many states there has been more out-migration than in-migration over the 12-year span of this study.

Testing the First Hypothesis:

Figure 10 is a scatterplot of every county in the Northeast. Each county's position on the scatter plot is determined by the value of net domestic migration from 2000-2012 (X-Axis) and the amount of one-sided political change (Y-Axis). This scatter plot also depicts counties won by the Democrats in 2012 as blue squares and counties won by the Republicans in 2012 as red circles. If the first hypothesis proves to be correct, there would be a positive relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided presidential change.

The correlation value between the two variables in the Northeast is 0.04. While there is a slight positive relationship as depicted by the trend line, there is no strong positive relationship between the two variables in the Northeast and the counties are not closely clustered around the

trend line. Instead, the counties are generally congregated around zero on the x-axis. This pattern is interesting and unexpected. Taken at face value, it appears that the counties with the largest one-sided political changes tend to be those that experienced a limited amount of net domestic migration and no more net domestic migration than those counties with the smallest degree of one-sided change. Even though this scatter plot depicts a positive relationship, the observed relationship between the independent and dependent variables in the Northeast by no means helps to affirm the first hypothesis.

Figure 11 and Figure 12 depict the same relationship between the independent and dependent variables yet this time are sorted to show counties won by the Democrats in 2012 (Figure 11) separately from counties won by the Republicans in 2012 (Figure 12). Interestingly, victorious Democratic counties show a positive relationship between the two variables (0.21.), while counties won by the Republicans show a much weaker negative relationship (-0.05). This suggests that in the Northeast, counties won by the Democrats benefit from migration and counties won by Republicans are hindered by an increase in migration.

The summary statistics for the multiple variables in the Northeast are listed in Table 5. The first two variables listed are raw values and are uncontrolled for population. Once controlled for population variation, the average value for one-sided presidential change in counties across the Northeast was 8.78 percent of all votes cast for either party and the average value of net domestic migration from 2000-2012 was -0.4 percent of the county's population in 2000. Across the other independent variables, the trends in population growth among different demographic groups are similar to those in other regions: large percentage increases in Blacks and Hispanics (62 percent and 88 percent on average) and stagnation or loss in population on average in the White population (-2.5 percent). On average, the Democrats in the Northeast

increased their presidential vote totals by 18.4 percent and the Republicans increased their vote totals by only 10 percent between 2000 and 2012.

Regression Analysis

The first regression (Table 6) measures only the independent and dependent variables (R-Squared 0.001). The relationship between these two variables in the Northeast is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.52). In the second and final regression (Table 7), which included the additional demographic variables, there was also no statistically significant relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change (P-value of 0.60). At this juncture, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis in the Northeast region. In addition to the non-significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables, the r-squared value for the model was very low at 0.05. These results mean that the model is not a good fit to explain one-sided political change in the Northeast.

Evaluating the Claim of Migration and One Party Benefits

While the regressions demonstrated that there is no significance to the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change across the Northeast, it is also important to evaluate the claim that migration promotes electoral benefits for one party more than the other. It is possible to evaluate this claim using a correlation between domestic net migration and percent increase in votes for each party. Neither party had a significantly stronger correlation with migration than the other. In the Northeast, the Republicans had a correlation of 0.34 and the Democrats had a correlation of 0.35.

Bi-variate regressions for each party yielded similar results. The coefficient for net domestic migration and Republican percent change was 0.92 (R-Squared .11) and the same value for the Democrats was 1.06 (R-Squared .12). These coefficients are very high, and can be

interpreted as showing that a ten percent increase in net domestic migration is equal to a 9.2 percent increase in votes for Republicans and a 10.6 percent increase in votes for Democrats in the Northeast. While these numbers are high, the importance in this measure is the small difference between the values for each party. Ultimately in this region, neither party has a major advantage with recent domestic migration from 2000 to 2012.

The South

Turning to the South, the region with the most counties, Figures 13 and 14 (*See Appendix, Figures, The South*) depict the percentages of the vote between the Republicans and the Democrats that each party's presidential candidate received in 2000 and in 2012.

The figures shows there is a clear regional trend in statewide presidential success. The Republicans carried all 11 states in 2000 and nine states in 2012. The Republicans also increased their share of the vote from 2000-2012 in four states, (Arkansas, Alabama, Tennessee and Louisiana) while the Democrats increased their percentage of the vote in seven states (Virginia, Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas). Although the Democrats managed to increase their percentage of the vote in seven states, this progress was usually insufficient to win.

Democrats managed to win only two Southern states in 2012, Virginia and Florida. The Democrats overcame a nine-point deficit in 2000 to take Virginia by nearly four points in 2012. In Florida, Obama barely edged out Mitt Romney with 50.44 percent, a slight increase from Democratic performance in 2000. Table 8 (*See Appendix, Tables, The South*) depicts the presidential vote percentages for each party in 2000 and 2012.

Republicans increased their share of the two-party presidential vote in Alabama, Arkansas, Tennessee, and Louisiana. Indeed, by 2012 in Alabama, Arkansas, and Tennessee,

Mitt Romney received over 60 percent of the vote. As a result, the presidential outlook in the South is continued Republican success. Although the Democrats won two states in 2012, those contests were very close.

Net domestic migration values in the South were generally higher than in most other regions. Of the eleven Southern states, only Louisiana and Mississippi had negative net domestic migration values from 2000-2012. Florida led all Southern states by experiencing a net domestic migration increase of over 1 million from 2000-2012 (9.33 percent of the statewide population in 2000). The statewide values for migration are shown in Table 9.

Figure 6 shows the relationship of these two variables on the state level in the South as part of the larger group of Republican Strongholds (South and Mountain Plains). Out of the nine Southern states that had more in migration than out migration, four had above average values for one-sided political change. The two states that had more out-migration than in-migration were split above and below the Republican Stronghold average for one-sided change. Arkansas and Tennessee have the highest amounts of one-sided change and fairly high in-in migration values. The Republicans won these states with more than 60 percent of the vote share in 2012 suggesting that the one-sided change aided the Republicans.

Testing the First Hypothesis

Figure 15 is a scatter plot that depicts the values of domestic net migration and one-sided change for every county in the South. If the first hypothesis were correct, the scatter plot would show a strong positive relationship between the two variables and the counties would cluster around a positively sloped trend line. However, similar to the Northeast, the Southern scatter plot does not support the first hypothesis (R-Squared 0.0002). There is a similar cluster around

zero on the x-axis, meaning that the most one-sided presidential change happened in counties with values of net domestic migration closest to zero.

Figures 16 and 17 separate counties won by the Republicans from counties won by the Democrats. The relationship between domestic net migration and one-sided political change is positive (Correlation= 0.08) in Southern counties won by the Democrats. On the contrary, in counties won by the Republicans, there is a negative relationship between net domestic migration values and one-sided political change (Correlation= -0.06). While neither of these scatter plots demonstrate statistical significance, the predicted relationship appeared only in counties won by Democrats in 2012.

The summary statistics for the variables used in this analysis of the South are listed in Table 10. The first two values are the raw measures of "one-sided political change" and total net domestic migration. The mean value for the controlled dependent variable one-sided political change was 15.58 percent of all votes cast for either party. The mean value for domestic net migration from 2000-2012 is 2.17 percent of a given county's population in 2000.

The white population has a negative average percentage change in their voting age populations (-2.1 percent). Large percentage changes in the Black and Hispanic voting age populations appeared, on average, in Southern counties. The percentage of Blacks in county population increased in the average Southern county by 31.89 percent and the percentage of Hispanics increased by an average of 80 percent. On average, the Democrat increase in votes across the region on the county level was 11.9 percent while the Republicans increased their total amount of votes in presidential elections by 33.5 percent.

Regression Analysis

In the South, there is no relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change (R-Squared = 0.0002). The regression between only the independent and dependent variables (Table 11) illustrates a relationship that is not statistically significant (p-value of 0.67). An additional regression that controls for population variance and change in the various demographic populations (Table 12) also confirmed no statistical significance between domestic net migration and one-sided political change in the South (P-Value of 0.61). Table 12 depicts the full results of the second regression. In addition to the lack of a statistically significant relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change, the R-squared value is even smaller than it was in the Northeast. At this juncture, in the Southern region there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis.

Evaluating the Claim of Migration and One Party Benefits

Unlike the Northeast, migration had a strong correlation with Republican increase in votes (0.70) and a weaker correlation between migration and Democratic increase in votes (0.37). As a result, there does appear to be some evidence that, at the very least, the Republican Party in the South may do significantly better than the Democrats in counties with higher values of net domestic migration. However, similar to the Northeast, the regional analysis does not support the first hypothesis and regression analysis did not find a relationship between one-sided presidential change and migration to be significant region-wide.

Bi-variate regression analysis of this relationship yielded similar results to those in the Northeast. The relationship between net domestic migration and Republican percent increase had a coefficient of 1.46 (R-Squared 0.49) and the same measure for the Democrats was 1.20 (R-Squared 0.14). While the R-Squared values were very different (indicating that there is a more clustered relationship for the Republicans than the Democrats), a ten percent increase in net

domestic migration yields similar increases for each party, 12 percent for the Democrats and 14 percent for the Republicans. Similar to the Northeast, neither party has a large advantage as domestic migration increases.

The Midwest

The Midwest, referred to aptly as "America's Swing Region" by Black and Black in Divided America, demonstrates statewide trends in terms of presidential success and migration that stand out. Unlike the Democratic presidential dominance in the Northeast or the general Republican strength in the South, the Midwest is relatively split, with a slight edge to the Democrats. Figure 18 and Figure 19 (*See Appendix, Figures, The Midwest*) depict the presidential trends in the Midwest.

With the exceptions of Ohio and Indiana, the trends in the Midwest are that the Republican states became even more Republican in 2012 and the Democratic states became even more Democratic in 2012. Table 13 (*See Appendix, Tables, The Midwest*) lists the shares of the two-party vote that the Republicans and the Democrats received in presidential elections in the Midwest in 2000 and 2012. Democrats made presidential gains in an impressive seven states. The Democratic victory in Ohio gave the party six Midwestern states in 2012. Republicans increased their percentages of the presidential vote in three states—West Virginia, Kentucky and Missouri. All three states went Republican in both 2000 and 2012.

The Democrats clearly benefited by picking up Ohio and widening margins in every state they won in 2000. Moreover, they narrowed the gap considerably in Indiana. Even though the Republicans increased their presidential margins in the states they won in 2000, they lost Ohio, fell further behind the Democrats in Wisconsin, Iowa and Minnesota, and failed to turn any blue states red.

Net domestic migration in the Midwest (Table 14) was similar to the Northeast. The majority of Midwestern states had negative values for net domestic migration from 2000-2012. Illinois had a net domestic migration loss of over 700,000 people, a decline of 5.96 percent. Kentucky had the highest positive value for net migration with over 72,000 migrants, equivalent to 1.8 percent of its 2012 population. Only two other states, West Virginia and Missouri, had positive net values for domestic migration. With so many states having negative values for net migration, the results should be similar to the Northeast, another region with significant out-migration.

Figure 7 shows the state values for each variable in the Midwest. There is a positive relationship among the statewide values for net domestic migration and one-sided change. Only two states had positive values for net domestic migration and above regional average totals for one-sided political change. West Virginia had very high values, relative to the rest of the region, for each variable. However, West Virginia in comparison to the rest of the nation, had below average values for net domestic migration with less than 2 percent of its 2000 population. The majority of Midwestern states have below average values for one-sided change and negative values for net domestic migration. No Midwestern state had negative values of net domestic migration and above average one-sided political change values.

Testing the First Hypothesis

Figure 20 shows the weak correlation (-0.03) between net domestic migration and the amount of one-sided political change in the Midwest. The trend line is very slightly negatively sloped and it is not the strong, positive relationship that would be observed if the first hypothesis were correct. Both the Midwestern and the Northeastern scatter plots display familiar clusters of counties around zero on the x-axis. This outcome suggests that the counties with the most one-

sided presidential change are the counties where the net migration change is close to zero. This observation adds more support to the notion that either the significant one-sided change comes from residents changing their perspectives or that one-sided change occurs in areas where large amounts of people leave and are then replaced by migrants, creating a net value of zero.

In the Midwest, the Republicans won most of the counties where net domestic migration accounted for 20 percent or more of the 2000 population. However, these counties do not appear to have experienced any significant levels of one-sided presidential change. Isolating the counties won by the Republicans (Figure 22), the correlation value is negative and weak (-0.05). The counties won by the Democrats have a slight positive correlation (0.03) in Figure (21) but the separation of these two categories does not yield significantly different results.

The summary statistics for the Midwest region are listed in Table 15. The average value for one-sided political change in the Midwest was just under ten percent of all votes cast for either party. The average change in net domestic migration was -0.85 percent of total population in 2000. Like the Northeast and South, the highest mean percent change values for the demographic variables were among the Black demographic (157.05 percent) and Hispanic demographic (86.51 percent). The white population percentage change value was nearly nonexistent (-1 percent). On average, the percent increase in vote share across the region was 6.2 percent for the Democrats and 15.4 percent for the Republicans.

Regression Analysis

The relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change, appears in Table 16. As in the Northeast and the South, there was no relationship between the independent and dependent variables of this study (R-Squared = 0.001). The final regression results with the control variables are listed in Table 17. Again, the p-value (0.35) was above the

desired 0.05 threshold for significance. At this point, there is not enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis in the Midwest.

Evaluating the Claim of Migration and One Party Benefits:

There was a slight edge in favor of the Republicans in terms of the correlation between domestic net migration in the Midwest and Republican change in votes (Correlation = 0.63). The correlation between Democratic change in votes and domestic migration was notably lower at 0.43. The Republicans do slightly better with migration in the Midwest, but the edge was not as high as it was for the Republicans in the South. However, bi-variate regression analysis depicts nearly identical relationships between net domestic migration and percent change in votes for each party. For every ten percent increase in net domestic migration in the Midwest, both the Democrats (R-Squared 0.19) and Republicans (R-squared 0.40) increase their vote totals by 14 percent. This indicates that migration does not favor one party significantly more than the other in the Midwest.

The Mountain Plains

The Mountain Plains has the largest number of states (13). In Figures 23 and 24 (*See Appendix, Figures, The Mountain Plains*), the presidential success of both the Republicans and Democrats in the Mountain Plains is depicted to provide good background information on the overall changes from 2000-2012.

The percentage totals for each party in the Mountain Plains can be found in Table 18 (*See Appendix, Tables, The Mountain Plains*). Starting with the Republicans, in 2000 the party nearly swept the entire region (twelve states). While this may seem like a crucial amount of states to capture for any election, most of these states have few electoral votes. The one state that the

Republicans lost to the Democrats in 2000, New Mexico, was a close election with a Democratic margin of only 0.03 percent.

By 2012, significant change in presidential competition had occurred in the Mountain Plains. Democrats won three states (Colorado, New Mexico, and Nevada) and were relatively competitive in Arizona. Most important was the Democratic victory in Colorado, the state with the second highest electoral vote total in the entire region. Democrats also increased their percentage of the vote in eight of the 13 states.

Although Republicans maintained their lead in the region, they lost three states and their vote shares plummeted in several others. Despite gaining in Arizona, Kansas, Oklahoma and Utah, the Republicans failed to maintain their 2000 margins in eight states, losing three and letting the Democrats turn a 0.03 percent victory in in New Mexico into a win of more than ten percent in 2012.

Similar to the South, the Mountain Plains states experienced positive net domestic migration. Only three states experienced negative values of domestic net migration (Table 19). Arizona led the way with a net domestic migration value of over 700,000 over the twelve-year span, equivalent to more than 14 percent of the state's 2000 population. When plotted with the South (Figure 6), all three states won by the Democrats had above average values of one-sided political change and more in-migration than out-migration. Six of the 13 total states had above average values for one-sided political change and positive net migration, the most of any region.

Testing the First Hypothesis

Figure 25 is a scatter plot of all of the counties in the Mountain Plains. A first look at the scatterplot for the Mountain Plains region demonstrates a positive relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change (Correlation = 0.13). While there is still a fair

amount of clustering around zero on the x-axis, there is generally a positive relationship around the trend line.

Separating counties won by the Republicans (Figure 26) and Democrats (Figure 27) yields a similar story for the Republicans (Correlation = 0.13). Counties won by the Democrats show little relationship with a flat fit-line (Correlation = 0.08). Notably, this is the first region where the counties won by the Republicans alone demonstrate a positive relationship between the independent and dependent variables. This is also the first region where the scatter plots for counties won by the Republicans and counties won by the Democrats both depict positive relationships between net domestic migration and one-sided political change.

Table 20 shows the summary statistics for the variables in the Mountain Plains. The average value for the dependent variable one-sided political change was around 10 percent (of votes cast by either party). The average net domestic migration value was negative at 3.5 percent (of the given county's population in 2000). Staying in line with the other regions, the percent change for the demographics was led by the Black and Hispanic demographics at a stunning 263 percent and 110 percent respectively. The White population had a negative percentage change over the 12 year span at negative 1.8 percent. The average percent increase in votes for the Democrats in the Mountain Plains was 9.1 percent, just lower than the Republican average increase in votes of 10.7 percent.

Regression Analysis

Unlike the Northeast, the South, and the Midwest, the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided presidential change is statistically significant (p-value of 0.00). The regression results for this relationship are depicted in Table 21. In a second regression that includes the additional variables, this relationship remains statistically significant (P-value of

0.008). These results can be found in Table 22. After finding this relationship it is possible to reject the null hypothesis that states there is no relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change in the Mountain Plains. The coefficient of this relationship is 0.08 and indicates that for every ten percent increase in net domestic migration in the Mountain Plains, one could expect a 0.8 percent increase in one-sided presidential change. In addition to the statistically significant relationship between the independent and dependent variables of this study, there were statistically significant relationships between change in the White population (Coefficient of -0.75) and change in the Black population (Coefficient of -0.004) with one-sided political change. The white population coefficient indicates that for every 10 percent increase in the voting-age white population, once could anticipate a 7.5 percent drop in one-sided political change.

Evaluating the Claim of Migration and One Party Benefits:

After finding a region that supports the first hypothesis, it is especially important to see if one party has benefitted more from migration than the other. Across the region, Republican change in votes was correlated with net domestic with a value of 0.73, much higher than the Democratic correlation of 0.44. However, bi-variate regression analysis demonstrates that each party benefitted similarly to an increase in domestic migration with coefficients of 1.42 for the Democrats and 1.49 for the Republicans. The only discrepancy between the two parties was in the R-Squared values where the Republicans had a value of 0.54 and the Democrats had a lower value of 0.19. This suggests that net domestic migration in the Mountain Plains can explain the variance in the Republican percent increase in votes much more than the Democratic percent increase in votes.

The Pacific Coast

The Pacific Coast is the most difficult region to test statistically because it has only five states. To make matters particularly complicated, instead of counties, Alaska is divided into electoral districts and these geographic divisions do not have migration statistics.[24] For this reason, Alaska has been left out of this study. A second problem with the Pacific Coast is a shortage of counties. For example, there are only 137 counties in the Pacific Coast while there are 1,138 in the South. Regardless this region has been included with special attention to California, Oregon and Washington, three states with a fair number of counties and significant values of net domestic migration. The statewide election figures for this region are depicted in Figures 28 and 29 (See Appendix, Figures, The Pacific Coast).

There is one prevailing trend in presidential elections across these four Pacific Coast States: Democratic dominance as in the Northeast. The percentages for each party in presidential elections are depicted in Table 23 (*See Appendix, Tables, The Pacific Coast*). Democrats won every state (except Alaska) in 2000 and they vastly improved their margins in each state in 2012. Perhaps the most impressive performance for the Democrats was their ability to turn a victory of less than a percentage point in Oregon into a near 13-point edge in 2012. The Republicans, who only won Alaska, held a 25-point margin in 2000 that shrunk to about a 15-point margin in 2012. Since Alaska will not be included in the statistical analysis of this section, the general theme in the Pacific Coast remains Democratic dominance.

Only Oregon and Washington have positive values for net domestic migration from 2000-2012 (Table 24). Alaska, California, and Hawaii had negative values. Oregon notably had a net domestic migration value of over 180,000, over 5 percent of its 2000 population.

[24] Alaska is divided into Boroughs and Census Areas. In terms of elections, Alaska is divided into electoral districts that can overlap with boroughs and Census Areas. However, the migration data was not available on these levels.

California, with a net domestic migration value of minus 1.5 million, had the most negative value of all states. Because of the large population in California however, a value of negative 1.5 million only amounted to 4.6 percent of its population in 2000. When plotted with the Northeast (Figure 5), only Oregon has above average values of one-sided change and positive net domestic migration. Three states, Hawaii, Alaska and California had more out migration than in migration and above average values for one-sided political change. This was more than any other region.

Testing the First Hypothesis

Figure 30 is the scatter plot for the Pacific Coast of net domestic migration and one-sided political change. Unlike any other region, the Pacific Coast scatter plot has a moderate relationship (and still a weak R-Squared 0.06) between net domestic migration and one-sided political change. The highest values for one-sided political change appear to occur predominately in Democratic counties that have a negative value for net domestic migration. Counties with the most one-sided change had high amounts of out-migration. Both counties won by Republicans in 2012 (Figure 32) and counties won by Democrats in 2012 (Figure 31) reflected these trends with the Democrats having a slightly stronger negative relationship.

The summary statistics for the Pacific Coast are listed in Table 25. The average value for one-sided political change was just over ten percent of all votes cast for either party. The average for net domestic migration was just under 2 percent of a given county's population in 2000. Similar to all other regions, the Black (116 percent) and Hispanic (46.8 percent) populations had high average values. In line with the rest of the nation, the white population percentage change was negative 2.4 percent. In terms of percentage increase in votes, the average gain for the Republicans across the region was 5.7 percent while the average gain for the Democrats was much higher at 32.3 percent.

Regression Analysis

The results of the first regressions between net domestic migration and one-sided political change (R-Squared = 0.06) are depicted in Table 26. Although it does not include the other control variables, the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change was statistically significant (P-value of 0.004). As expected based on the negative slope of the fit line in the scatter plot, the coefficient was negative (-0.16). When the demographic variables were factored in (Table 27), the relationship remained significant, and the coefficient remained negative. The coefficient in the Pacific Coast shows that for every ten percent increase in net domestic migration, one could expect a 1.6 percent decrease in one-sided presidential changes. All other independent variables, except domestic net migration, had relationships that were not statistically significant. While this region does show a statistically significant relationship, the negative relationship clearly clashes with my hypothesis that expected a strong, positive relationship when net domestic migration increased as a percentage of the population.

Evaluating the Claim of Migration and One Party Benefits:

While there is a statistically significant negative relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change in the Pacific Coast, it is still important to evaluate whether one party benefits more than the other as migration increases. In fact, after calculating a correlation value between migration and the Republican percent change in votes, along with the same value for the Democrats, it is clear that the Republican correlation is stronger at 0.70 than the Democrats at 0.40. This is not surprising due to the success of the Democrats in counties that have net migration values of less than zero.

Bi-variate regression analysis added to the notion that the Republicans benefit more from migration in the Pacific Coast then the Democrats. Every 10 percent increase in net domestic

migration in the Pacific Coast results in a 10 percent increase in votes for the Republicans and only a 6.4 percent increase in votes for the Democrats. The R-Squared value for the relationship between Republican percent increase (0.49) was much higher than the same value for the Democrats (0.16). This value suggests that migration can explain the variance in percent increase for the Republicans much more than migration can explain the same for the Democrats. Ultimately, migration appears to aid the Republicans in the Pacific Coast more than the Democrats.

Testing the Second Hypothesis: Polarization[25]

The second hypothesis is as follows: "States with higher polarization scores will be the states with the strongest relationship between migration and one-sided political change." To test the second hypothesis, this study calculated a regional polarization value after incorporating the state legislature polarization data from Shor and McCarty. After creating a regional average for polarization across states in different regions, it is possible to then rank each region from most polarized to least polarized. The most polarized region was the Pacific Coast, closely followed by the Mountain Plains and the Midwest. The South and the Northeast were the two least polarized regions. Based on the empirical results of the first hypothesis, the most polarized regions are the regions with the strongest relationship between one-sided political change and net domestic migration. This result is depicted in Figure 33.

While there is a clear positive relationship (R-Squared 0.85) between polarization and the strength of the correlation between net domestic migration and one-sided political change, this figure does not take into account the direction of the correlation. For example, while the

[25] Kansas, Kentucky Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada do not have Polarization Scores for 2012 and the 2008 scores were used for those states. Nebraska's polarization score is from the state senate but is included with caution as Shor and McCarty drop this state due to the non-partisan nature of its legislature.

correlation value for the Pacific Coast is 0.26 on the scatter plot in Figure 29, because Figure 29 assesses only the strength of the relationship, it does not show that the correlation value is actually negative in the Pacific Coast. Figure 34 depicts the relationship between regional polarization and the correlation value, positive or negative, between net domestic migration and one-sided political change.

The reason why the distinction between the two graphs is important is due to the first hypothesis. The first hypothesis anticipated that there would be a clear and positive correlation between net domestic migration and one-sided political change. While there is a strong and positive correlation between the relationship between one-sided political change and the regional averages of polarization in state legislatures, strength of the relationship is not the only thing that is important to assess because the first hypothesis included direction (positive or negative relationship). In terms of strength of the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change, it is possible to reject the second null hypothesis. However, if direction is taken into account it is not possible to reject the second null hypothesis.

After breaking up all fifty states into three tiers of polarization (low, moderate, and high), the tier that had the strongest relationship between migration and one-sided change was the "moderate" tier. This analysis was conducted to supplement the testing of the second hypothesis by sorting states by polarization, not by region. While the highly polarized tier had the second strongest relationship between migration and one-sided change, this is not the result anticipated by the second hypothesis and does not add support to the notion that increased polarization leads to a stronger relationship between migration and one-sided change.

Discussion of Results and Significance:

After empirically testing the first hypothesis with regression analysis, the Mountain Plains is the only region where it is possible to reject the null hypothesis. In the Northeast, the South, and the Midwest, the relationships between net domestic migration and one-sided political change have very low r-squared values and are not significant. In these three regions it is not possible to reject the null-hypothesis. While in the Pacific Coast there is a statistically significant relationship between net-domestic migration and one-sided political change, it is a negative relationship and therefore clashes with the first hypothesis that predicted a strong positive relationship. None of the regions had r-squared values that suggested the model could explain much of the variance in one-sided political change. After testing the first hypothesis in all five regions, it is possible to draw the conclusion that net domestic migration is a factor in the degree of one-sided change in the presidential elections only in the Mountain Plains and the Pacific Coast. However, the substantive significance of this relationship is limited due to the low r-squared values and the generally weak coefficients.

The substantive significance of the results of the first hypothesis however, lies more in what it did not show statistically. The results in the Northeast, the South and the Midwest demonstrate that as large numbers of migrants move into areas, these areas do not necessarily produce strong one-sided changes in the county presidential elections. The theory that sparked the hypothesis of this study argued that migrants will be homogenous and choose where to move based on preferences that generally match their own. If this theory were correct, the one-sided political change would likely occur in regions with significant migration. However, the lack of this result in these three regions shows that while this theory is logical, in reality migrants may not select where they move based on political preferences or that other reasons not included in

this research are more important. Although two regions yielded "significant" results, the "strength" of the relationship was generally very weak. Moreover, none of the scatter plots displayed the anticipated strong and positive relationship between net-domestic migration and one-sided change.

While there were mixed results in the testing of the first hypothesis, the second hypothesis that explored polarization as a conditioning variable in the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change fared better across all regions. In order, from most polarized to least polarized, the regions rank as follows: (1) The Pacific Coast, (2) The Mountain Plains, (3) The Midwest, (4) The South, and (5) The Northeast. The Pacific Coast had the highest polarization value and the strongest correlation value (albeit negative) between net domestic migration and one-sided change in presidential elections. Moreover, the Republican Party in the Pacific Coast had a much stronger coefficient between net domestic migration and percent increase in votes, further suggesting one-sided migratory benefits in the region. The Midwest had the second highest polarization value and the strongest positive correlation between net domestic migration and one-sided political change.

Ultimately, the most polarized regions were those with the strongest correlations between net domestic migration and one-sided political change. The least polarized regions did not have statistically significant relationships between net domestic migration and one-sided political change. All five regions support the second hypothesis, leading to the conclusion that polarization by region may make the relationship between one-sided political change and net domestic migration more pronounced. However, when this was tested using tiers of polarization (Figure 34), these results did not hold up. This second measure of the influence of polarization

on the relationship between migration and one-sided political change hinders the ability to confirm the second hypothesis.

Recalling the theory in which this study was driven concerning polarization, homophily, and migration, the regional results support the idea that polarization can impact migration. The substantive significance of the second hypothesis is that this may reveal a tangible implication of polarization in our society. While this research merely showed that the relationship between migration and one-sided political change is stronger in regions that are more polarized, this result should encourage future research to further explore this observation.

Beyond the two hypotheses, this study also evaluated various claims that migrants universally aid one party or another. To explore this claim, this thesis measured the average change in votes for each party across every region and then calculated a correlation value between net domestic migration and change in votes for the Republicans and Democrats. In the Pacific Coast, The Mountain Plains, The Midwest, and the South, the Republicans gains correlated stronger with net domestic migration than Democratic gains. However, in the Northeast, the Republicans and Democrats had virtually equal values for this correlation. While this result is not a definitive test of whether one party benefits from migration more than the other, it indicates that in four of the five regions in the United States, Republican gains have a stronger positive correlation value with migration than Democrats.

Regression analysis of this relationship showed that in every region but the Pacific Coast, coefficient values were relatively even for the two parties. However, in every region except the Northeast, the Republicans had stronger R-Squared values which suggest that migration can explain variance in the Republican percent increase in total votes much better than variance in Democratic percent increase in votes.

This research also provides a regional snapshot of change across the nation from 2000-2012 in presidential elections and migration. In the Pacific Coast, the Democrats maintained their control over the region and increased their percentage of the vote in every state. The Northeast showed a similar trend. The Democratic presidential strongholds (Figure 5) have become even more Democratic from 2000 to 2012.

In the Republican strongholds (Figure 6) of the South and the Mountain Plains, the Republican Party generally improved on its 2000 results, but not nearly to the degree that the Democrats have done in their presidential strongholds from 2000-2012. For example, in the Republican Strongholds of the South and the Mountain Plains, the Democrats did not win a single state in 2000. By 2012, the Democrats carried five states, all states that had high values for net domestic migration. Moreover, in the Midwest, America's Swing Region, the Democrats picked up Ohio, a state with a negative value for net domestic migration, and held each of the Midwestern states they had won in 2000. These Democratic pickups in Republican stronghold states with high levels of net domestic migration may suggest that the Democrats fare better in Republican regions when there is substantial in-migration. In the Midwest, the Democrats may fare better in states like Ohio that experienced substantial out-migration. Ultimately, these pickups help explain why the Democrats held the presidency in 2012.

Significance of this Research

The first contribution that this research puts forth is a possible and tangible implication of polarization in our society. Migrants moving into and out of the two most polarized regions in the United States have left one-sided presidential changes in their wake. These results did not occur in the less polarized regions. Polarization, as measured by ideologies in state legislatures,

may be a factor in making it easier for migrants to identify places to move that match their political preferences.

A second contribution of this research is that it dispels the notion that recent migrants in any region are a homogenous group that universally promote one-sided political change. While this research adapts an ancient theory of homophily to explain how migrants decide where to live, the results did not confirm the theory or notion that domestic migrants will cause one-sided political change universally in all parts of the nation. While the relationship was confirmed in two regions, neither region had a particularly strong relationship or model fit (R-squared).

Third, this research contributes to the ongoing debate on migration and political implications. While there is no debate that migrants generally helped the Republican Party during the realignment in the South, this research begins to show that the conclusion—that today's domestic migrants are universally aiding the Democrats and turning red states blue in presidential elections—may be unfounded. Only in the Pacific Coast did one party (The Republicans) benefit from migration substantially more than the other. Since the Republicans remain uncompetitive across the region, the substantive significance and political implications of this finding are limited.

Fourth, the results of this study further justify taking a regional approach in American political science. The clear variation across regions in the results of this study demonstrates the intricacies and the importance of separating regions and analyzing them independently. If this study was only conducted on the national level, the intriguing negative relationship between migration and one-sided change discovered in the Pacific Coast would have been overlooked. Migration, one-sided political change, and polarization all vary spatially across the nation and across each political region. A statistical analysis only across the United States would not have

picked up on the significant relationships between net domestic migration and one-sided presidential change in the Mountain Plains or the Pacific Coast.

There are some flaws in the design of this study that limit its application. Most importantly, in the three regions where there is no relationship between migration and one-sided presidential change, the large amount of counties that are stacked around zero on the x-axis suggests that the most major one-sided political changes occur in counties with little or no net domestic migration value. Even in the Mountain Plains, the region that came closest to the result expected in the first hypothesis, there was significant clustering around zero on the X-axis.

Even in light of this, it does not necessarily mean that the theory is incorrect. Because the independent variable is a net measure, the cluster of counties around zero on the x-axis does not mean that there was no migration related change in these counties. In some counties, there could have been substantial migration related change but the in-migration and out-migration values may have canceled each other out when calculated as a net measure. In a majority of American counties, there likely was little or no migration and one-sided change. It would be useful in future scholarship to recalculate this variable so that it can distinguish counties without migration-related change from counties with substantial in- and out-migration that creates a net value of zero.

While using counties as the unit of analysis in this may have created some of the issues demonstrated above, the great disparity in population across counties helped reveal that the application of this theory may work much better in less populous geographic areas. The national analysis between counties with small, moderate and large populations demonstrated that the relationship between net domestic migration and one-side political change is much stronger and significant when counties have smaller populations.

This result is logical as larger counties likely have more than one politically homogenous community within its boundaries. For example, the largest county in this study had a total population in 2012 of nearly ten million people and the smallest county had a population of only 71. While these values represent the two extremes, it is likely that the effects of migrants who moved to communities and areas based on principals of homophily would be more pronounced in smaller counties because larger counties may have two or more politically sorted communities. Future scholarship can expand upon this research by examining the relationship between net domestic migration and one-sided political change in smaller, and less populous, geographic areas.

Another area where future study could improve would be the exploration of an alternative relationship between net-domestic migration and one-sided political change. The first hypothesis anticipated a strong and positive linear relationship between net-domestic migration and one-sided change. However, based on the results in the Pacific Coast, it is clear that this hypothesis in some regions is incorrect. As a result, a linear relationship may not be the best way to explore the relationship between these two variables. High levels of out-migration, and negative net values of domestic migration, may also produce one-sided effects. However, a linear relationship would not be able to detect this trend and as a result, another relationship (perhaps a quadratic one) should be tested.

Ultimately, while this research does provide some clarity to the ongoing debate about migration and recent political change in the United States, there are many different ways in which future scholarship can expand upon the findings in this study. Future scholarship should be conducted with a new research design to further explore the partisan implications of migration and the ongoing changes occurring in presidential elections.

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Appendix Figures

National Figures:

Figure 1



N=3108 R-Squared = 0.0019

Figure 2



Correlation=.88

Figure 3



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Figure 4 **N=50 R-Squared=0.005**



Figure 5 **N=16 R-Squared=0.04**



Figure 6 **N=24 R-Squared=0.001**



Figure 7 N=10 R-Squared=0.27



Region 1: The Northeast

Figure 8



Figure 9



Figure 10 **N=244 R-Squareed = 0.0017**



Figure 11 **N=134 R-Squared = 0.047**



Figure 12 **N=110 R-Squared=0.0032**



Region 2: The South

Figure 13



Figure 14



Figure 15 **N=1143 R-Squared=0.0002**



Figure 16 **N=904 R-Squared=0.0036**



Figure 17 **N=239 R-Squared=0.0067**



Region 3: The Midwest

Figure 18



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

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

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

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

Region 4: The Mountain Plains

Figure 23



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

Figure 25 **N=670 R-Squared=0.017**



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

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

Region 5: The Pacific Coast

Figure 28



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

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

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

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

Figure 33



Figure 34



Figure 35

Data from Fires, Michael William. 2013. "Democratic Revival: How Population Shifts in Six Republican Counties Changed Virginia Politics" Paper for POLS 490 American Political Regions, Professor Merle Black.



Appendix Part II: Tables

Table 1

Mountain Plains	***South***	***Northeast***	***Midwest***	***Pacific Coast***
Arizona	**Alabama**	Connecticut	Illinois	Alaska
Colorado	**Arkansas**	Delaware	Indiana	California
Idaho	**Florida**	Maine	Iowa	Hawaii
Kansas	**Georgia**	Maryland	Kentucky	Oregon
Montana	**Louisiana**	Massachusetts	Michigan	Washington
Nebraska	**Mississippi**	New Hampshire	Minnesota	
Nevada	**North Carolina**	New Jersey	Missouri	
New Mexico	**South Carolina**	New York	Ohio	
North Dakota	**Tennessee**	Pennsylvania	West Virginia	
Oklahoma	**Texas**	Rhode Island	Wisconsin	
South Dakota	**Virginia**	Vermont		
Utah				
Wyoming				

Table 2 Multi-variate Regression on the National Level

Independent Variables (Controlled for Population)	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
Domestic Migration as a % of Population	0.03	0.017	0.06
% Change in 18+ Black Population	-0.002	.00	0.001
% Change in 18+ White Population	-0.19	0.056	0.001
% Change in 18+ Hispanic Population	-0.003	0.002	0.134

N=3048 *R Squared= .01*

The Northeast

Table 3

State (Percent Votes)	Republicans 2000	Democrats 2000	Republicans 2012	Democrats 2012	One-Sided Change
Connecticut	40.74	59.26	41.23	58.77	.98
Delaware	43.26	56.74	40.55	59.45	5.42
Maine	47.25	52.75	42.14	57.86	10.22
Maryland	41.64	58.36	36.68	63.32	9.92
Massachusetts	35.21	64.79	38.21	61.79	6
New Hampshire	50.67	49.33	47.17	52.83	7
New Jersey	41.79	58.21	41.01	58.99	1.56
New York	36.91	63.09	35.70	64.30	2.42
Pennsylvania	47.85	52.15	47.27	52.73	1.16
Rhode Island	34.35	65.65	35.98	64.02	3.26
Vermont	44.56	55.44	31.75	68.25	25.62

Table 4

State	Domestic Migrants (2000-2012)	Domestic Migrants as % of the Population	One-Sided Change
Connecticut	-132298	-3.88	.98
Delaware	48563	6.18	5.42
Maine	27919	2.19	10.22
Maryland	-93573	-1.76	9.92
Massachusetts	-307481	-4.83	6
New Hampshire	27654	2.23	7
New Jersey	-541869	-6.43	1.56
New York	-1800332	-9.47	2.42
Pennsylvania	-83828	-0.68	1.16
Rhode Island	-54472	-5.19	3.26
Vermont	-3938	-0.65	25.62

Table 5 Summary Statistics, Variables in the Northeast

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range
One-Sided Political Change 2000-2012 *(Raw Value)*	9906.62	19025.67	5 to 151072
Total Net Domestic Migration *(Raw Value)*	-11941.21	50838.5	-464255 to 49374
Dependent Variable One-Sided Political Change As a % of Votes Cast	8.78%	7.48%	.04% to 34.05%
Independent Variable Domestic Net Migration As a % of County Population	-.40%	6.90%	-20.18% to 46.28%
% Change in Black Population	62.26%	89.30%	-23.14% to 974.74%
% Change in White Population	-2.58%	3.24%	-24.71% to 1.75%
% Change in Hispanic Population	88.67%	68.6714%	-28.36% to 667.31%

Table 6

(Controlled)	R-Squared	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
pctpopmig	0.001	.04	0.06	0.52

Table 7

Independent Variables (Controlled for Population)	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
Domestic Migration as a % of Population	.04	0.08	0.60
% Change in 18+ Black Population	0.02	.00	0.001
% Change in 18+ White Population	-.03	0.14	0.836
% Change in 18+ Hispanic Population	-0.02	.00	0.04

N=244 *R Squared= .05*

Appendix Region 2: The South

Table 8

State (Percent Votes)	**Republicans 2000**	**Democrats 2000**	**Republicans 2012**	**Democrats 2012**	**One-Sided Change**
Alabama	57.61	42.39	61.22	38.78	7.72
Arkansas	52.8	47.2	62.15	37.85	18.7
Florida	50	50	49.56	50.44	.88
Georgia	55.98	44.02	53.96	46.04	4.04
Louisiana	53.94	46.06	58.75	41.25	9.62
Mississippi	58.61	41.39	55.8	44.2	5.62
North Carolina	56.46	43.54	51.03	48.97	10.86
South Carolina	58.15	41.85	55.31	44.69	5.68
Tennessee	51.96	48.04	60.35	39.65	16.78
Texas	60.96	39.04	58.01	41.99	5.9
Virginia	54.15	45.85	48.03	51.97	12.24

Table 9

State	Domestic Migrants (2000-2012)	Domestic Migrants as % of the Population	One-Sided Change
Alabama	75068	1.69	7.72
Arkansas	74588	2.78	18.7
Florida	1497576	9.33	.88
Georgia	577986	7.03	4.04
Louisiana	-319430	-7.14	9.62
Mississippi	-40137	-1.41	5.62
North Carolina	663419	8.21	10.86
South Carolina	323080	8.03	5.68
Tennessee	291350	5.11	16.78
Texas	1002139	4.78	5.9
Virginia	181704	2.56	12.24

Table 10

Variable	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**	**Range**
One-Sided Political Change 2000-2012 (Raw Value)	4906.73	12072.87	1 to 169184
Total Net Domestic Migration (Raw Value)	3785.95	23519.82	-260045 to 206572
Dependent Variable *One-Sided Political Change As a % of Votes Cast*	15.58%	12.08%	.00% to 63.47%
Independent Variable *Domestic Net Migration As a % of County Population*	2.17%	13.37%	-60% to 88.38%
% Change in Black Population	31.89%	101.55%	-81.15% to 948.52%
% Change in White Population	-2.14%	4.64%	-42.28% to 25.14%
% Change in Hispanic Population	80%	79.48%	-75.80% to 1455.63%

Table 11

Independent Variable	**R-Squared**	**Coefficient**	**Std. Err.**	**P-Value**
pctpopmig	0.0002	-.01	0.02	0.667

Table 12

Independent Variables (Controlled for Population)	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
Domestic Migration as a % of Population	-.01	0.02	0.614
% Change in 18+ Black Population	0.01	.00	0.00
% Change in 18+ White Population	-.08	0.07	0.29
% Change in 18+ Hispanic Population	0.00	.00	0.965

N=1138 *R-Squared= .01*

Appendix Region 3: The Midwest

Table 13

State (Percent Votes)	Republicans 2000	Democrats 2000	Republicans 2012	Democrats 2012	One-Sided Change
Illinois	43.82	56.18	41.42	58.58	4.8
Indiana	58.00	42.00	55.20	44.80	5.6
Iowa	49.84	50.16	47.04	52.96	5.6
Kentucky	57.73	42.27	61.54	38.46	7.62
Michigan	47.37	52.63	45.20	54.80	4.34
Minnesota	48.71	51.29	46.06	53.94	5.3
Missouri	51.71	48.29	54.78	45.22	6.14
Ohio	51.84	48.16	48.49	51.51	6.7
West Virginia	53.24	46.76	63.67	36.33	20.86
Wisconsin	49.88	50.12	46.48	53.52	6.8

Table 14

State	Domestic Migrants (2000-2012)	Domestic Migrants as % of the Population	One-Sided Change
Illinois	-741272	-5.96	4.8
Indiana	-42105	-0.69	5.6
Iowa	-52949	-1.81	5.6
Kentucky	72767	1.80	7.62
Michigan	-566163	-5.69	4.34
Minnesota	-56875	-1.15	5.3
Missouri	9512	0.17	6.14
Ohio	-430321	-3.79	6.7
West Virginia	14824	0.82	20.86
Wisconsin	-30901	-0.58	6.8

Table 15

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range
One-Sided Political Change 2000-2012 (Raw Value)	3422.75	12916.43	0 to 246990
Total Net Domestic Migration (Raw Value)	-2029.05	29953.38	-761468 to 114423
One-Sided Political Change As a % of Votes Cast (Dependent Variable)	9.93%	10.19%	.01% to 85.20%
Domestic Net Migration As a % of County Population (Independent Variable)	-.85%	7.43%	-20.24% to 71.49%
% Change in Black Population	157.05%	341.22%	-84.44% to 7104.72%
% Change in White Population	-1.15%	1.87%	-16.34% to 20.57%
% Change in Hispanic Population	86.51%	76.69%	-43.10% to 682.41%

Table 16

Independent Variable	R-Squared	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
pctpopmig	0.001	-.04	0.04	0.316

Table 17

Independent Variables (Controlled for Population)	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
Domestic Migration as a % of Population	-.04	0.04	0.35
% Change in 18+ Black Population	0.00	.000	0.30
% Change in 18+ White Population	.06	0.18	0.72
% Change in 18+ Hispanic Population	-0.01	.004	0.004

N=913 *R-Squared= .01*

Appendix Region 4: The Mountain Plains

Table 18

Mountain Plains	Democrats 2000	Republicans 2000	Democrats 2012	Republicans 2012	One-Sided Change
Arizona	46.72	53.28	45.39	54.61	2.66
Colorado	45.51	54.49	52.75	47.25	14.48
Idaho	29.15	70.85	33.58	66.42	8.86
Kansas	39.08	60.92	38.89	61.11	.38
Montana	36.34	63.66	42.97	57.03	13.26
Nebraska	34.82	65.18	38.87	61.13	8.1
Nevada	48.14	51.86	53.41	46.59	10.54
New Mexico	50.03	49.97	55.30	44.70	10.54
North Dakota	35.27	64.73	39.88	60.12	9.22
Oklahoma	38.92	61.08	33.23	66.77	11.38
South Dakota	38.39	61.61	40.78	59.22	4.78
Utah	28.27	71.73	25.37	74.63	5.8
Wyoming	29.02	70.98	28.84	71.16	.36

Table 19

State	**Domestic Migrants (2000-2012)**	**Domestic Migrants as % of the Population**	**One-Sided Change**
Arizona	766534	14.85	2.66
Colorado	231280	5.35	14.48
Idaho	112768	8.68	8.86
Kansas	-82247	-3.05	.38
Montana	43638	4.83	13.26
Nebraska	-41503	-2.42	8.1
Nevada	380969	18.87	10.54
New Mexico	19826	1.09	10.54
North Dakota	-3721	-0.58	9.22
Oklahoma	36731	1.06	11.38
South Dakota	12049	1.59	4.78
Utah	46221	2.06	5.8
Wyoming	20369	4.12	.36

Table 20

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range
One-Sided Political Change 2000-2012 (Raw Value)	2061.49	6982.442	0 to 87438
Total Net Domestic Migration (Raw Value)	2198.25	23483.02	-42624 to 465588
(Dependent Variable) One-Sided Political Change As a % of Votes Cast	10.80%	8.68%	.02% to 54.98%
(Independent Variable) Domestic Net Migration As a % of County Population	-3.57%	10.93%	-42.48% to 68.11%
% Change in Black Population	263%	395.22%	-67.34% to 3931.62 %
% Change in White Population	-1.85%	2.51%	-19.99% to 9.27%
% Change in Hispanic Population	110.61%	169.11%	-84.68% to 2222.99%

Table 21

Independent Variable	R-Squared	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
pctpopmig	0.01	.1	0.03	0.00

Table 22

Independent Variables (Controlled for Population)	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
Domestic Migration as a % of Population	.08	0.03	0.008
% Change in 18+ Black Population	-.004	.000	0.00
% Change in 18+ White Population	-.75	0.13	0.00
% Change in 18+ Hispanic Population	.003	.002	0.238

N=617 *R-Squared= .08*

Appendix Region 5: The Pacific Coast

Table 23

State (Percent Votes)	Republicans 2000	Democrats 2000	Republicans 2012	Democrats 2012	One-Sided Change
Alaska	67.94	32.06	57.32	42.68	21.24
California	43.80	56.20	38.13	61.87	11.34
Hawaii	40.17	59.83	28.30	71.70	23.74
Oregon	49.76	50.24	43.73	56.27	12.06
Washington	47.06	52.94	42.37	57.63	9.38

Table 24

State	Domestic Migrants (2000-2012)	Domestic Migrants as % of the Population	One-Sided Change
Alaska	-11720	-1.87	21.24
California	-1482799	-4.36	11.34
Hawaii	-30519	-2.51	23.74
Oregon	183198	5.34	12.06
Washington	239795	4.06	9.38

Table 25

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Range
One-Sided Political Change 2000-2012 (Raw Value)	17523.57	50526.78	6 to 492995
Total Net Domestic Migration (Raw Value)	-7958.43	110712.9	-1141507 to 406726
Dependent Variable *One-Sided Political Change As a % of Votes Cast*	10.52%	6.48%	.13% to 27.41%
Independent Variable *Domestic Net Migration As a % of County Population*	1.99%	9.64%	-20.43% to 35.32%
% Change in Black Population	116.82%	183.63%	-35.1% to 1058.49%
% Change in White Population	-2.4%	2.83%	-12.81% to 13.17%
% Change in Hispanic Population	46.87%	25.44%	-2.1% to 163.64%

Table 26

Independent Variable	R-Squared	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
pctpopmig	0.06	-.16	0.05	0.004

Table 27

Independent Variables (Controlled for Population)	Coefficient	Std. Err.	P-Value
Domestic Migration as a % of Population	-.16	0.06	0.007
% Change in 18+ Black Population	-.003	.003	0.216
% Change in 18+ White Population	0.17	0.19	0.37
% Change in 18+ Hispanic Population	-0.02	.02	0.219

N=136 *R-Squared= .08*

Appendix Part III: Maps


Map 1
2000 Presidential Election
Legend
Republican Victory 2000
Democratic Victory 2000

Map 2

2012 Presidential Election




Map 3
Presidential Switches: 2000 to 2012
Switch Democrat to Republican
Switch Republican to Democrat


Map 4
The Nation: 2000-2012
Legend
Republican 2000 & 2012
Democrat in 2000 & 2012
Switch Democrat to Republican
Switch Republican to Democrat


Map 5
Percent Change: Republican Party 2000-2012
Legend
-56.45 - 0.0
0.0 - 39.99
39.99 - 235.16


Map 6
Democrat Percent Change:
2000-2012
Legend
-76.51 - 0.0
0.0 - 39.99
39.99 - 265.55

Map 7

Net Domestic Migration as a Percent of
County Population
2000-2012



Legend

-60.00 - 0.0
0.0 - 14.99
14.99 - 88.38

Map 8

One-Sided Change as a Percent of Votes Cast
2000-2012